tv [untitled] CSPAN July 2, 2009 2:00am-2:30am EDT
remarks will be brief. perhaps not as comprehensive as ariels' introduction suggestion. i take my cue from the observations that the obama administration is trying to improve u.s.-russia relations from their worst condition since the end of the cold war. the cold war, that is something i know something about. it prompts me to ask what lessons for the management of u.s.-russian relations can we draw from the cold war experience? although the situation is different, and russia is not the soviet union. there are some applicable lessons, and i want to speak to three of them one of them is, as was the case in the cold war,
u.s. policy-making for russia should be informed by the deepest possible understanding of russia as a system, as a country, as a state, as a culture. during the cold war we devoted enormous resources to understanding the soviet union comprehensively, not just militarily. and that investment paid off. it was a substantial contributor to our successful management of cold war relations. a deep understanding of russia is a requirement for the conduct of a sensible policy today. despite the transparency, despite the much more open condition of russia as a country and a stake in the soviet union ever was, i would
submit that our understanding of russia is weaker than it should be. this is partly because it is a confusing reality. it is also varied considerably because russia does not get the attention it deserves an academic, think tank anti- government analytical circles. other priorities have taken -- and government analytical circles. other priorities have taken over the attention spans of the community. as a result, we don't have the kind of institutionalized knowledge in the consensus about the nature of our partners in this relationship that we had in the case of the soviet union. i think that is a liability, but
could and should be corrected by more investment and more attention. we don't even have a label for what kind of society or a system russia is. my favorite, which brings agreement for many but no real consensus, is byzantine financial feudalism. we know what feudalism is. it is a relationship of vertical and horizontal authorities, formal and informal, based on clan, family, personal relationships. now we know that unlike the middle ages it is not about land and peasants, it is about money. it is financial feudalism. i call a byzantine because it is
largely an governed by law, unlike western feudalism. that is my analytical offering on the nature of the russian system but conducting a policy intelligently toward that country requires a deeper understanding of it. institutional, political, economic, cultural. secondly -- the second big lesson, and i don't want to steal the thunder of my colleagues but i have to speak my mind. the priority of arms control. the u.s. and russia are the founders of the nuclear weapons era. we owe it to ourselves and to the world that we manage our relationship and this legacy with the utmost seriousness and care. i think it was a mistake for the
bush administration to downgrade arms control, which it tried in his lungs couple of years to remedy. -- which it tried in its last couple of years to remedy. and obama is right to put the arms control issue front and center. but it has to be done right. hear, the most important thing where i have some doubts is that there be a maximum transparency about courses, technology, programs and strategy and doctrine. in the cold war, u.s. intelligence supported all kinds at analytical efforts and enforced that transparency over a reluctant soviet union.
today, there is much more natural transparency because of the openness of russia, but there are areas of worrisome confusion that are troubling. for example, we have decided at russian insistence to leave tactical nuclear weapons out of the arms control dialogue or negotiations. russian doctrine makes the role of nuclear weapons in russian strategy in some ways even more important than it was for the soviet union, to make up for the
deficiencies of its forces. in that doctrine, tactical nuclear weapons, of which the russians have to let tactical nuclear weapons play a very important role. also, and while widely discussed in the 1990's and never mentioned a sense, the options were limited long-range strikes against targets. if you take these doctrines seriously, you have to ask why we have any business here talking about the dramatic reduction of nuclear forces, including constraints on the delivery systems involved
without bringing tactical nuclear weapons into the story. i have a lot less trouble with what i think russian doctrine is and what they're doing with it. but transparency is called for and then we have a question of what broader foreign policy agenda russian military policy is intended to support. russian reliance on nuclear weapons raises some interesting and worrisome scenarios. it brings them to mind when you think about the charge that russia is seeking to reestablish dominance over its neighbors. finally, there is the big democracy question. radical war, which was.
-- for optical war, which was out strategic power -- throughout the cold war, it was about strategic power. ronald reagan was the one who got it right, but did not find any conflict between pushing the strategic and security issues of realism along with the values of human rights and democracy. i saw this up close and personal. effectively done. the most important -- i saw all this up close and personal very effectively done. it was not that he change the minds of gorbachev on the substance. the most important thing is he convinced them he was serious about that. this was an important part of
obama's mission for moscow. he has to stand tall on debate democracy questions, not just individual freedom, freedom of the press, organized political opposition, but the rule of law , an honest and effective limited state. these are things that russians want, and they need to hear from the president of the united states that he is a tribute and defender of those values. hopefully, president obama will find both private and public occasions in moscow, to establish himself as such. >> thank you very much. of course, some will say that may be president obama does not believe in a small compact market, but that is their opinion. i will go to irina yasina for a
broad view from russia. what does russia civil society expect from this visit? what does it expect from the interactions between the leaders of russia, and i say plural because to exclude prime minister putin is from our own peril. whether somebody likes it or not putin his still the leading politician in russia. you may agree or disagree. do you think that the anti- americanisms that is so prevalent in the russian state television channels is something that benefits the russian people? go ahead. 10 minutes. >> thank you. let me start by the end of your
question. first of all, it is pleasant to see you again. your as handsome as you used to be. let me comment on what you said about putin being the leading politician. the events around wto exception showed to us to is the boss in russian politics. ina politics, and that is why i apologize for this example. -- i am in politics. s to anti-americanism on russian television, there is no tangible benefit you can touch and feel from it. but the russian mentality is made this way. we are looking for enemies to blame for all of our problems. that is easy. you gave a very good playing
card for our authorities because you should have been more careful. then we would that be facing that kind of crisis carry it is easy to blame everybody, especially the americans. everybody is to blame except the russians cannot because they don't like to look into the mirror and ask themselves am i to blame? this sounds simple but it is very serious and sad. now let's talk about the expectations of the russian civil society for president obama's visit. there are no expectations at all. it is not just because our civil society is such is very scattered, it is not united. it does not have any evidence -- does not have any evidence he --
this we see a black man becoming a u.s. president. that is a challenge, but this and all -- this also shows weekend change something. -- this also shows a week can change something. he -- it shows we can change something. the egyptian speech of president obama is something many people remember, and i remember it because it was not so long ago. it was an historic speech where he demonstrated that the u.s. is he ready to change in itself, because you have no one to demand that others change unless you are ready for the change themselves. he first change yourself and ask the others then if you change yourself. i hope during his visit to russia president obama also say
a moving speech, but on the topics which are closer and known to russians who are free from totalitarian sticproblems t long ago, we know that and we have done a lot of errors kopach hit -- we have made a lot of errors, but we are ready to start changing. whenever that president obama will make a speech -- we know that president obama will make a speech. [unintelligible] and we very much look forward to hearing what president obama has to tell us. it is a very open forum because it counts numerous experts who
are graduates of that institutes. if you read one moscow newspaper, hit you can read >> -- you can read every publication. i am looking forward to a very thrilling speech telling us that the u.s. is ready to change the way the world is changing a dramatically, have because we are not used to feeling ourselves as an object of change. we are not yet ready to except that we can preheat the initiators of change, but we want to go in line with a -- we are not ready to accept that we are the initiators of change. i would like to voice my admiration for president obama for his voice in america
possibility to change in itself. you have your own problems. -- admiration for president obama for his voice in america's change in itself. thank you. >> just one follow a quick question. do you think this visit is going to influence the internal policies in russia? for example, in such areas as freedom of the press, the rule of law, and maybe russian position on the iranian issue. we have seen the horrible crackdown in tehran against the democracy movement. russia not only was mum, it did not denounce that, russia was the host to the organization summit and provided a platform for mahmoud ahmadinejad after the suppression of the elections
to speak. what are your realistic -- i understand you're hopeful you have this agenda of expectations, as you said i am a pessimist. what realistically are you expecting to change in moscow? >> honestly, i don't expect any changes, because we have lots of institutes in our country having the same names like in your country. we have lots of institutions like the court is different than the u.s., we have mass media and press, which is not like press in the u.s. you expect anyone would denounce mahmoud ahmadinejad for bloodshed in the iranian
streets. we are friends with ahmadinejad and many others you are not friends with. we have different friends. therefore, please don't pretend to be surprised. nothing new happened and all discussions with ahmadinejad at the organization summit were pre-programmed to. if it did not happen i would have been very much surprised. as for our own changes, what ever happens i am still an optimist but these changes will happen from inside and not outside. we have to produce to generate these changes ourselves because no matter how hard it is, until we are ready for changes, nothing will happen. liberty overwhelm us back in 1990 cost -- back in the 1990's. i have always been a champion of any kind of freedom, and i have
never agreed that a person can and should trade his freedom against some benefit. but let me tell you only ourselves we can change our country, and we have to go this way ourselves. no one can do it for us. >> now we will shift gears and talk about it very serious matter. . baker b -- bakeraker -- i think baker can start it off. orr's control and missile defense, there are other issues -- arms control and missile defense, but the crux of the relationship in the areas where we can move along like arms control and areas where i feel
like we are deadlocked, like missile defense, please give us your insights. >> let me answer your question first and then i will go back to the broader question. it is the case that arms control and missile defense will have a close relationship. they have been since the dawn of the nuclear age. the question is what is the direction of that relationship? is arms control going to drive the agenda to the detriment of missile defense? or can missile defense be used to be a driver to push arms control in the right direction. the latter is the right direction because the most immediate requirement for the u.s. and russia is to adjust to the unpredictable nature of today's world compared to the dangerous and predictable environment we had during the cold war. that means a strategy that is
more defensive in nature, and one that would serve russian interests as well as the united states. what many to do is adept arms control to that new reality. the best way to do that is to use missile defense. the ability of the u.s. and russia to cooperate in certain aspects of not just missile defense but broader defense and fashion and arms control agenda that facilitates that movement. otherwise, what we will do is adopt a default alternative, which would be to multilateralize this. that would be highly destabilizing, highly risky, and ultimately invite the kinds of arms build up particularly among the new emerging nuclear
aspirants that would be worrisome. where do i stand -- where do i think stands in -- where do i think things stand now on? a number of years ago proponents of missile defense were charged with moving forward with a program in a less than responsible way. the term that was used was a rush to failure. i never accepted that charge, but the term rush to failure it seems to be quite applicable for what the obama administration is pursuing today. it has not conducted any of the fundamental reviews that are necessary for a well-rounded policy. the nuclear review is only in mid-phase.
the missile defense review is not done. nevertheless, they are rushing forward with things on the arms control side that presumes that these fundamental questions of policy making have been answered. but in my judgment they have not. what is behind this russia? it is an artificial deadline -- what is behind this rush? it is artificial because the u.s. and russia have long since gone well below the thresholds of strategic nuclear weapons that were established. there is a new treaty, these so- called strategic offensive production trading -- the so- called strategic offensive reduction training. in my judgment, the start is not
nearly as important as we would have you believe. what are the fundamental risks with the administration's approach? prudent arms control ultimately rests on an agreed set of standards. when i say arms control standards, these would be applicable whether dziewit talking about conventional systems, nuclear systems -- applicable whether you were talking about conventional systems for nuclear systems. it seems like the administration is not observing these fundamental aspects of arms control. does this mean that the obama administration cannot arrive at a treaty with russia? no, that is not one i mean by failure. i mean one that does not serve the interests of the united states or internationally. let's go through some of these
standards. he should not enter into a negotiation you are on willing to walk away from. -- you should not enter in a negotiation you are not willing to walk away from. that is not of pulling that standard in terms of having a firm idea of when your partner is asking too much and you will not go there. if you don't establish that foundation, then any agreement becomes acceptable to the negotiator. that arms control not become an end in itself. this sort of nonsensical allusion to the reset -button means this becomes a litmus test about the health of the greater u.s.-russia relationship. that is not an appropriate to do arms control.
the third standard is that the process should not dominate substance. i see a lack of a bottom line standard or approach or coal for the administration's arms control policy. it is about the process of how it appears to the russians and to the broader world community in terms of how things are going. we should see treaties on narrowly defined subject matters, but it seems like the obama administration is looking to deal with a whole variety of issues with the exception of tactical nuclear. whether it be a missile defense or linkages to nato expansion, whether it be linkages about the nature of the russian relationship with iran.