be an advisor to the campaign. i agreed on one condition. i did not want to get a job for myself. i went home that night and told my wife that this will be a lot of fun. there was no way barack obama would become president of the united states. with that prediction in mind as i go forward. what i would like to do is review the key judgments of the strategic review that i chaired, talk a little bit about what has happened in the interim and the president's announcement last week. . .
he inherited a disaster in afghanistan and pakistan. it began with a brilliant military success that virtually -- at virtually no cost. for seven years, the previous administration did heard about afghanistan and pakistan and did not act. -- the administration dithered. an insurgency which should have never been allowed it to grow now threatens the survival of the karzai government in afghanistan and threatens to defeat the north atlantic treaty organization's first ground operation ever.
worse than that, the disaster in afghanistan is destabilizing south and central asia on a whole. the situation the president inherited is bad and has gotten worse in the 10 months since then. we have no time machine and cannot go back and do this over. we can wish of that, but it is not realistic. what is the situation today? let me start with al qaeda. we would not have 70,000 american troops in afghanistan and 35,000 en route is not for 9/11. what is the status of al qaeda today? i will summarize what we have done to them in one sentence. like any one sentence summary, it lacks subtlety, nuance, but
if done right it gets to the point. in eight years we have succeeded in moving at their core leadership, their senior operational planners and their propagation no insurer from candy bar, afghanistan, to an unknown location -- khandahar to afghanistan. that is not to diminish the hard work of our soldiers, intelligence officers, are diplomats, our allies who are fighting. it is not to diminish the accomplishments. the fundamental fact is that all qaeda to date remains a deadly enemy for the united states of america and our allies. it is the first truly global terrorist organization in history. its reach and scope in the last eight years is almost
breathtaking when you think about from algiers to washington, from bali to madrid, is organization has struck again and again and again around the world. it has developed franchises, circuits, has acquired allies to increase its reach. it has become more than a terrorist organization and become an idea. it has created a narrative which inspires a small minority of muslims to carry out acts of mass violence. most of its attacks are indiscriminate, but it is also demonstrated to strike with great discrimination against targets like the un headquarters in baghdad and one month ago against the deputy minister of
the interior in saudi arabia. we see its reach in the united states today both direct and indirect. the afghan american arrested by the fbi in the colorado demonstrated the direct connection. what happened in fort hood it demonstrated the indirect connection of the narrative and ideology of the global islamic jihad. today the only sustained, significant pressure on the core of qaeda comes from between 30,000-60,000 feet in the air from the grounds of predators and reapers. -- from the drones. the have proven highly successful against a limited range of targets in a limited geography. and have to some extent, and it is hard to know if you are not a member of al qaeda, disrupted.
they are a tactic and not a strategy. it is like attacking one bee at a time. it is ironic. eight years after torah borrow, osama bin lawton is the voice we hear -- eight years after tora bora, bin laden is the voice we hear. he could be in the room next door as far as we know. last week, the bbc put out a report poorly sourced that he was in afghanistan in february. what was notable about the report was not how good it was but that how rare we even get
that reports about where he is. the second thing i would suggest to you about of qaeda today is that in afghanistan and pakistan it is part of a much larger syndic it of a terrorist organizations within which it is embedded. what do i mean by that? the afghan town, the pakistan talent and -- the afghan and pakistan caliban -- taliban -- a whole bunch of other groups whose eight -- whose names are interchangeable but we know are the same basic characters are a syndicate of terror. there are not a monolith. they do not have one single leader or agenda. they cooperate with each other. individuals within these movements move back and forth between organizations.
if they do not respect what we tried to impose on them. most of all, none of them in eight years had been willing to turn on al qaeda and give up its core leadership. what is remarkable when you look at it is that more than any other individual, is omar that they pledge allegiance to. he claims to be commander of the faithful. a title which, if you think about it, shows a man with a remarkable ego. "commander of the faithful"of a 1.6 billion muslims? i am very skeptical we can negotiate. i am skeptical we can negotiate with someone who has an inflated sense of his own importance. al qaeda today is embedded in a
larger syndicate of terror which is why it is so hard to go after it. within the syndicate of terror, i would suggest to you today that karzai is the single most dangerous element. they showed when you're go in mumbai. as we are learning about this, its global reach is probably also something to worry about. the nisei a few words about afghanistan. you can also summarize what we have done in afghanistan in one sentence and where we are today. we are losing the war in afghanistan, but it is not yet lost. i hope. general mcchrystal's report courtesy of bob woodward, you all have an urgent deave to
read. at the key hit the nail on the head. he got it exactly right. -- i think he hit the nail on the head. i think you should read the amex which talks about detention facilities in afghanistan in which he says we no longer control of the detention facilities in which we are keeping captured insurgents. they are defacto under the control of al qaeda and caliban. war record that takes place in those detention facilities than anywhere else in afghanistan today. -- they are under the control of al qaeda and the taliban. when you lose control of these camps you are in a deep hole. every major statistic we have it demonstrates the momentum is entirely with the taliban. bob gates reiterated that several times in his statements last week on the hill.
it is not yet lost. we do not face in afghanistan nationalist uprising. what we face in afghanistan is a postulant insurgency which is confined to the ethnic community. the soviets face a national uprising. virtually the entire country was in the opposition to soviet occupation. soviet behavior reinforced that opposition. we face an insurgency which is, for the most part, confined to the postulant community. by definition, that means the majority of afghans do not favor of them. we know from reliable polling that the majority of them do not want to see a return. no one in their right mind would want to go back to living in a medieval hell that omar created
in the 1900 -- 1990's. thirdly, let me talk about pakistan. there are today the strategic prize in this part of the world as well as the most dangerous country in the world. why do i say that? all of the things that should worry americans about the future of the world in the 21st century come together in pakistan in a unique and combustible way. nuclear war and peace, proliferation of nuclear technology, terrorism, the future of islam, the future of democracy in the of the lot -- in the islamic world, the relationship between military and civil society. all of them are in that country.
the had the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world today. -- they have the fastest growing nuclear arsenal. it is the world's second largest muslim country and yet its government is teetering on the brink of collapse. pakistan is trying to make the transition from a military dictatorship to something pakistan is hoped will look like -- something pakistanis pulte looks like democracy. this is the fourth time they have tried this transition. we have to believe in the triumph of hope over experience to believe this will be successful. today's government appears to have a very limited shelf life. he may stay on as a figurehead, but power is slipping away from him every day. the alternatives are not particularly bright either.
we may see a return to sharif whose two previous times as prime minister should not fill you with confidence that pakistan will be moving in the right direction. we do not get to choose who their leaders are. when we have tried to, we have usually had brought brigitte buyer's remorse. -- we have usually had a virus remorse. they have a dynamic, confusing, and complex relationship with the syndicate of terrorism that i mentioned earlier. they either created or was the midwife for many of these organizations. it retains very close links with some of them, -- it has been a pass a supporter of omar most of the last seven years.
armen tenge threatened it with being thrown back into the stone age. -- armitage threatened. it is very hard for most western minds to put your head around. it is today very much at war with parts. this is a serious conflict. the attacks demonstrate that this war is not going particularly well with the pakistani army. if it's set -- if it spreads south, it may feel an economic deathblow to pakistan. why does pakistan have such a complex relationship? because of its obsession with india. the army believes and has believed for 60 years that asymmetric warfare is part of its tactics for defeating the indians. it has not succeeded. it has not worked.
his view remains deeply entrenched in significant parts of the officer corps and elite. in short, the state of afghanistan could not be greater. the future of al qaeda, of the nato alliance, of possibly nuclear war and peace in south asia, all of these issues are coming together. on the 27th of march, obama focused american forces in the combat zone on disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al qaeda and destroying the sanctuary along the afghanistan-pakistan border. it was clear that while there was a specific mission, to get there we had to stabilize afghanistan and pakistan.
that is a much broader mission. the reviews i gave to the president which he endorsed had 20 major recommendations and 180 sub-recommendations and i will not go into them. i want to stress this point. this is resource intensive. this is going to come with a big cost. to send one american soldier to afghanistan for one year costs $1 million. if you think this cost is it to scale, forget it. to send 30,000 that will cost more than $30 million. it does not get cheaper sending more troops. the non-military side is expensive as well. this legislation triples assistance to afghanistan to
more than $1.50 billion per year. wow, that is a lot of money. now they are saying, big deal, we spend that much on a general motors in 30 minutes. over 15 years that is $15 billion and it will make them the largest single suppository of american economic assistance in the world outside of afghanistan and iraq. what happened in the eight months from march 27th until his speech last week at west point? there are two things. first, on the military side, we had an unprecedented event, or virtually unprecedented, strategically because of the calls upon the commander to come up with an operational plan for a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy in
southern and eastern afghanistan. for reasons that i do not know, mckiernan was judged to be the wrong man for the job. he was fired by secretary gates. that was a big thing. the last time we fired a battlefield commander during wartime was 1951. the issue then was whether or not to use nuclear weapons against communist china. i do not know what general mckiernan did. we lost two months of his time and we had to take three months to get general mcchrystal comfortable on the ground and to get his recommendations. instead of an operational plan getting delivered in may and was in august. in the interim, the military situation deteriorated sharply. from the president's standpoint
support for the war in the democratic party and on the hill dropped through the floor. what had been a good war one year ago was now just like every other war, a bad one. skepticism about the war had become widespread among the president's supporters. the second thing that happened was on the political side. the expectation in march was that we would be able to work with the then afghan government and the international community to produce something that would look like a legitimate and credible presidential election. instead, we had a fiasco followed by a disaster. no one can pretend that this afghan presidential election was legitimate or credible. in the first round, karzai
supporters produced 1 million fraudulent ballots. that is a lot even by the standards of a florida or illinois. [laughter] this is cheating on a global scale. he got caught and he got away with it. i am not sure how diligent man the government looks through the eyes of the afghans, but it looks illegitimate through the eyes of americans and our european and non-european partners. this administration has to bear some of the responsibility for this. it did not happen on the bush's watch. behavior towards the election was like the famous of the art in the headlights. you could see the problem coming, but we seemed mesmerized until it was run over. again, we do not have a time machine and cannot go back and fix this.
we have to work with president karzai. we may find, and in retrospect, that this was the fatal blow. we do not know that yet, and i think we can yet turn this around. mrs. clinton now has her date for the next three years. she will be managing mr. karzai. she needs to avoid demonizing, temper tantrums, and try to bring out the best in karzai. where are we going from here? let me offer you three observations. first, this is a bold gamble. what the president is to has embarked upon today has no guarantee of success. there are all kinds of things that may fail. trying to build an afghan army and police force may be a lot
harder, and i suggest will be a lot harder, and we think. trying to reverse the taliban and momentum will be difficult. for sure, casualties are going to go up. domestic dissent, here and and other nato countries, over this war is winding a stronger and harder. there are several potential game changers that could change everything, literally in a matter of minutes. another 9/11 attack inside the united states does not have to bring down two of the largest buildings in the world to be significant that comes out of pakistan will be a game changer. the president of the united states will not simply be able to call up and say do something about this.
another mumbai attacked coming out of pakistan will also be a game changer. the indian government's capacity to absorb mass casualty attacks, i suspect, has been reached. they will not send someone to islamabad the next time. the second thing i would say is that, as hard as it is, it is the best of the bad options and have today. we really only had two other options. one was to cut and run. we can define that in a lot of different ways, downsize the mission, readjust the mission, but all of them come down to cutting and running in one way or another. i think the president wisely ruled that out from the beginning.
if we are defeated in afghanistan by the taliban it will be a global game changer. the global reverberations of that in the islamic world will be enormous and no more so than in pakistan. thirdly, this issue is now going to consume this presidency which is why it took them 92 days to come to a conclusion because they do not like the answer. this will be the issue, the foreign policy issue, that the congress of the united states is judged upon less than one year from now. other issues may outweigh it, the economy, but this will be the foreign policy issue that people look to. it is going to need to be
explained to the american people again and again, why they are sending their sons and daughters to the other side of the planet to fight a war which has been going on longer than any war in american history. it is going to have to explain how we intend to win the war and how we hope to be able to get out of it. that will mean political energy, capital, and the most precious thing in any white house, the time of the president that will have to be devoted to this issue. warsh consume presidencies. this war stands on the verge of consuming this presidency. the last thing i will say, one final note, the good news in all of this, i generally believe we will note in july, august 2011 whether this strategy works. why do i say that? by then we will have had the additional forces for six
months, for more than one year, and we will have a found out whether we can break the momentum of the taliban and will find out how pakistan reacted to all of this. we will have found out whether we can build an afghan national security force. we will not have achieved victory. the and will not be in sight, but we will at least know whether we have a strategy that has a promise of success. if it does, i would suggest to you that there will be very, very few american soldiers coming home in the summer of 2011. if it does not work then we will face the very, very difficult decision of owning a to that and deciding where we go next. i sure hope he does not call me that day. thank you for your attention.
[applause] >> we have plenty of people raising their hands. does anyone have a question? all right. you are the man. why don't you let him? sorry. >> thank you for the top. i would like to ask a question. if we use the cut and run strategy, do you recommend any psychological tactics to make the enemy feel defeated? we can still do a cut and run as long as we are covering this with proper psychological tactics that can it -- that can
give them a feeling of defeat. >> nothing springs to mind immediately as to how we can turn a retreat into a victory. there are various levels of cut and run. we do not have to completely give of. we can say we are afghan-izing the war quickly. we can hope the government we leave survives. after all, the communist government in afghanistan al lived the soviet union, barely. it's not a parallel, we want to spend a lot of time thinking about it. i do not think there is a downsizing the mission
alternatives. if we go to appear counter- terrorism, it will not work. as an intelligence professional who spent a great deal of time trying to persuade people to commit treason, they will not do it if they do not think you're going to be around to give them the check when they come back from their mission. it does not work that way. >> this morning, ambassador benjamin gave an end -- gave an interesting talk. during the course of the 15 minutes he failed to use three words that you used in the first five minutes which were global islamic jihad. to what level was this broader ideological struggle, how this resonates within the current ministration? it seemed to be a hesitancy or push back on looking at the problem through that lens. >> on like dan, i have the
liberty of saying whatever i want to say. -- been unlike da -- unlike dan. the simplest answer is that i think this administration understands that this is a battle of ideas and the narratives. it has to come up with a counter-narrative to the narrative of the global islamist jihad. -- it is more less created over the last decade or so. the best proof of that is the president's speech in cairo. that speech in some ways it was addressed exactly to them. what is the narrative of the global islamist jihad? the short version is the united states is now a crusading power that is trying to impose its will on the moslem world by
dividing the world up into smaller states which it can manipulate -- bids will on leave muslim world. what does barack obama say in cairo? what is his opening line? bin"we are not and imperialists colonial power. we are revolutionary state. we were born against an empire." it was a great speech. i do not think anyone disputes that. the problem is going to be following that up. the count -- the counter- narrative has to be punctuated with real things. they have proceeded to do that in some places and they are struggling in others. in the battlefield of the narratives, the israeli-arab of battlefield, they are having a difficult time. they do not have partners.
that makes moving forward very hard. i believe i am convinced that they understand the central role of the war of ideology. >> i am studying at the university of maryland. are really enjoyed your speech. i wanted to make a comment. about my country afghanistan, you talk about the elections rate i was there during the elections and was working directly on the elections. we were seeing how things were
being arranged on the forefront. everybody was watching that. nobody was -- and we could see that this was a -- this would be the consequence of the election. it is not a big deal in the eyes of afghanistan because it was the second election in the history of our country. we are used to it. they're working the kinks out. right now, we have to obviously find a way to work with the president. the best thing we can do is to push our president to bring the right people in the door. secondly, with regards to the engagement of the united states in afghanistan, i should say that we obviously know that
people talk about eight years of engagement in afghanistan, but i am telling you that it has not been eight years of the engagement. it has been one year and a few months of engagement beginning in 2002-2003 when they went to iraq. since then, we were seeing that all the problems, all of the issues that were taking us into failure and getting us closer to the taliban, we were just watching. i hope -- i wanted to put -- >> can you ask a question please? do you have a question? >> i just wanted to finish my
statement by saying that we have the chance to succeed in afghanistan because we have the will of our people on our side. thank you very much. >> to comment briefly, i agree with what you said. karzai's problem is more here than there. i agree with everything you said about the impact of the war on iraq and this venture in afghanistan. do you have a question over here? with the microphone, please. >> i am a journalist. you contrasted the situation in afghanistan with the situation facing the russians, soviets before.
i hate to ask this question,ñr but he begged it with the comparison. the comparison that is often made is the situation obama is facing is what we faced with vietnam. you know the question. >> the ghost of a vietnam haunts this administration and walks to the halls every day. it walks to the corridors of the united states congress constantly. afghanistan in 2009 is not vietnam in 1965 or even 1961. it is a very different situation. we were attacked. the most successful foreign attack on the united states of america, bar none, was the attack on our capital in 1814 which was carried out from
afghanistan. those who did that are plotting to day a repeat performance. in 2006, on the anniversary of september 11th, the plan a repeat performance that would have been more chilling and devastating than what happened in 2001 which would have been to blow up eight jumbo jet flying across to the united states and canada. had that succeeded, more people would have died on september 11th. the international airline systems would have gone out of business. no one in their right mind would have a phone anywhere again. that is the viet cong were. as bad as they work, they had no designs to attack the united
states. the specter of the north vietnamese attack in seattle was entirely created by the johnson administration and had no basis in fact. secondly, we are not in afghanistan as a colonial imperial power. there is not an american in america who wants to colonnade and control afghanistan. to the contrary, we would like to get away as quickly as we can. the situation in vietnam, the u.s. was there with very little legitimacy and was perceived as the vp colonial -- of the french. let's deal with the situation we have a, not with analogies to other places. i understand the question. in terms of domestic politics there is a great parallel. the president finds himself in a terrible situation.
all the critics of the war are daut pelosi democrats from cambridge and new york city. the supporters are sarah palin republic and. the people he has to convince are his natural constituency. palin is just looking for a chance to say he is covering it up. the politics in this are terrible. yes? >> you mention that we do not know and there have been no credible reports. there have been reports over a
number of years that he has not stayed in above iran what is going back and forth. there were reports in the 2004 and photographic evidence. the had seen him there in january 2009. how do you analyze those reports? >> i want to be absolutely explicit. the last time we had a solid piece of information about where osama bin lawn was was eight years ago. -- osama bin laden was 8 years ago. he said it has been a few years. senate -- gates has been my boss in more organizations than i can remember. it has been eight years, mr. gates, since we have had any idea. has he been in iraq?
i do not rule it out. al qaeda has been able to operate in iran on more than one occasion. we do not know what the government relationship was. i would suggest to you that if the iranians want to give us trouble in the world in the next few years, one of the simplest ways for them to do it is to just allow a higher degree of al qaeda operational activity in their territory. since we have no baseline as to what they allow, more of it coming would be hard to judge in its significance. if the relationship between al qaeda and ron, it is a black hole. -- between al qaeda and iran. >> have a question about the
syndicate of terrorist organizations including the caliban. there was not a single afghan on the plans for 9/11, as far as i know. -- on the planes. omar sending out information and is allowing [unintelligible] he is sending out messages. this -- he says we are not threatening everyone. why do not -- why do not give them a chance? >> there are several questions buried in that one question. first ago, those chosen by a osama bin laden chosen carefully.
it was deliberate. he brilliantly realized that by putting 15 saudis on the airplanes he was going to create a problem. it was a brilliant piece of tactical strategy. apparently he could not find enough people who could fly who were capable of doing that. omar and the taliban, i do not believe that is what he is saying. we are prepared to let you leave, more or less gracefully. the emirate of afghanistan will be created and we will talk to our fellow afghans about what the situation will be. to the contrary, he says karzai is a trader and deserves a traders' response.
-- and he is a day traitor and deserves a traitors response. i believe parts of the taliban maybe but -- may be prepared to break. they will not do it now. no one in their right man is going to break because you will be dead tomorrow morning and so will your family. if the momentum is shifted, we can offer security and protection to people who break from the caliban then we begin to see fissures within the movement. if we do something simple like paying soldiers up more money at the taliban days we might also find that many people did many people will switch over.
that is part of what i mean that we will know in 18 months. by then we will see whether the villagers are likely to develop in the taliban. we will see whether the resources we have brains record in who might otherwise go to the taliban. i think we will know that within that definite period of time. i am very skeptical of the notion the [unintelligible] is interested with negotiations with the united states. if they are, prove it to us. >> we have time for two more questions. >> i am with the bin "american conservative" magazines. we were against the war in iraq. what about an exit strategy that was promoted that america
as a democracy you is not able to fight a guerrilla war. we should really be moving into a defensive strategy, which we could do well. as a democracy, we cannot with all the conflicting issues have a coherent policy for settlements on the west bank. we cannot stop it. >> the short answer to your question is we tried a defensive policy between 1998 when they declared war on us and september 11th, 2001. we ended up with september 11th, 2001. i sat in the situation room in the white house when we launched cruise missiles.
that is a very difficult strategy to carry out because we have to be lucky in foiling every single plot. they have to be lucky once or twice to have a devastating effect on us. we may get their -- there. if it is not working in 18 months, we need to be honest and rigorous and say it is not working. then we may have to go to that strategy. i would rather try to find out whether there is a better alternative to the one you are suggesting. >> i appreciate your remarks. i am a former intelligence
officer. here is the deal. five years ago, congress rejected 402-2 resolution. we are not willing to have our sons and daughters, friends and neighbors bear the burden physically. the speaker has said there will be non. we are not willing to embrace paying for this thing financially. what does that say about our level of commitment? if we take this at face value which is we have to find a way to mitigate this great. this threat, i do not think we can eliminate it. politicians on both sides of the aisle are saying if the threat can be made to permanently go way, it is not happening.
when our going to start talking honestly with each other and the american people about that fact? -- when are we going to start talking? we're going to have to pay for them. thank you. >> it is a very good and difficult question which goes beyond my area of expertise. as i said, this is going to be a resource intense battle. that has all kinds of implications for other things we want to do. i do not know whether the situation in iraq is going to get worse next year as many expect it will, but i think if we draw down the u.s. forces in iraq, it will be compelled by the situation in afghanistan. we will not have the option of doing both at once.
one great line that has been exposed in the last decade is this -- the united states military can fight two medium- sized conflicts at the same time. we cannot do that. if you are involved in one, do not start another one. it has implications in other places. the notion that the united states today could use military force against iran while it is bogged down in afghanistan and is trying to get out of iraq is lunacy. we could not afford to do that. we simply could not. that has implications for the future of iran's nuclear development policy. the president is going to take the military option off of the table. -- president is not going to take the option off of the
table. mr. president, if you want to do that it is your nickel, but here is my racket -- my resignation. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you, bruce. [applause] >> he will be available to sign copies of his book. he will remain outside. clocks while embedded in afghanistan, free-lance video journalist observing how the use unmanned aerial vehicles, or drums. >> the two drawn units in afghanistan, one handles the north and one handles the south. at the south is the busier of the two. these numbers are classified, but i would guess 100 drones.
the predators look like a model airplanes about the size of a small compact car. there reapers look the same that are about twice as big. they look like fighter jets more than model airplanes. you can hang bonds on these. they carried different sensors like cameras, radars, etc. they can stay in the air and a long time. it depends on what you are carrying but it is not impossible for one of these to orbit for one full day just spoke it -- soaking up data and taking pictures of terrain. you can think of them as manned aircraft except that the man in the aircraft is on the ground talking to the ground troops. they actually use a track
program that looks like an instant messenger to do a lot of the communications with those receiving the reports. they are fairly precise as far as these things go. they did not carry large weapons. it is a far cry from a b-1 bomber. this is about 1/4 size of a the reaper. it is very efficient for what it does which is to stay airborne for a long period of time. it has a small engine in the bag. it can carry two missiles at two pounds each. typically we do not even supply the missiles because we need fuel. we would rather have the time in
the sky to help support the troops if they are out on convoy or on a strategic missile in the queue for the big bad guys here -- a strategic mission of looking for the big bad guys. the picture is not as nice as of the reaper but it is the exact same mission. >> of the units in afghanistan do not handle many attacks. the operations and the operators sit in these trailers. most of those people are in las vegas. their work at the air force base in nevada. the guys in afghanistan launch and recover them. they are responsible for operations in small areas
usually around the air base. it is like a 24 hour operation. the air for skies and contractors are constantly dragging these out to the air strip in watching them from control trailers with a remote control. they pass them off to the guys in las vegas. they fly around and return the drowns -- drones to the guys in control. they will look for roadside bombs, any activity. >> they took a pilot out of the cockpit and put in a satellite dish. they are always looking for the control.
the missions can be so long, over one day sometimes, that a regular person could not do it. it also allows us to do the majority of the work back in the united states and there is no need to deploy. you can also ship of the crew for four era -- four hours. having that kind of flexibility allows you to do that. >> they have video cameras and high fidelity radar that takes these really impressive snapshots of terrain. in the morning you take one snapshot. you come back in the evening and take another and compare. if you see differences like this corner has been disturbed, then
you might have spotted a roadside bomb. they will bury it when you are not looking, but if you have the pictures to compare it is called change detection. they revisit areas and take radar snapshots. they sent in the ground teams to investigate. this is the reaper. how are they different? >> it is the same design and they scaled it up. a bigger wings, more powerful engine. we get to carry more. instead of carrying two missiles we can carry four and two 500 pound bombs. they were able to put a larger telescopes for better optics. it has much better sense our
capability. because there is a bigger engine it can go higher, faster, and it is tough to get the credit for over 100 miles per hour. if you need to respond and get a contact on the ground, we can push the reaper up to 200 miles per hour. >> you are also using this to spot roadside bombs? >> correct. the radar of here on the nose is another sensor that is on here. it uses radio waves and you get a nice image of the ground. we fly the same path over and over and are trying to help keep the roads clear. >> he was indicted with the air force. -- above