tv Book Discussion on The Taliban Revival CSPAN August 11, 2014 9:18pm-10:52pm EDT
>> there's no question. we have a defensive -- we have a treaty alliance with japan. >> okay. we got the question. herman? >> well, there's treaty alliance and we have made known to the leadership in beijing that we would stand behind japan. we have also urged japan not to push the issue. >> okay. other questions. the gentleman right down here in front. >> how long -- [inaudible question] [inaudible question] >> okay, okay, we got it. how long can the u.s. and europe continue to ignore militant islam? herman?
>> well, i think we have ignored it too long already. it's one of the big mistakes we make is assuming it's a single block. there are billion 600 million people in the muslim world, half in four countries, bangladesh, india, snowshower ya, -- indonesia and pakistan, and life for muslims is very defendant in each country. in the arab world, day-to-day life is different in moore morocco than saudi arabia, and even if you assume there's one percent that has very stringent interpretation of islam, that's 16 million people. a whole country, and not being engaged in the ideological and theological war with them, not dealing with elements that are reconcilable within the islamic
world is a tragedy that is going to come to bite us and it may not be as doug said an existential threat, but it's a threat where you can see casualties and hundreds of thousands through terrorist activity, and it's something we have to worry about a great, great deal. >> okay. we're out of time, but i've got a final question for the panelists that you can answer in one word. if we have one of these crisis, blowups, that the three of you have outlined is possible, do you think the obama state department and defense department is up to the task? >> in unison now. >> one, two, three, no. >> ladies and gentlemen, on that very hopeful note, thank you all for coming. next year i'll see if doug -- if mark will allow is to have two
hours, because -- >> don't forget to describe to the washington times. >> you all have to describe to the "washington times," and you have to support the american foreign policy council and the cato institute to keep all of us alive. >> and employed. >> to help you stay alive. thank you. [applause] >> all this week on c-span 2, we're featuring booktv in prime time. coming up on tuesday, books on the law and legal issues. at 8:00 p.m., sidney powell on license to lie. exposing corruption in the department of justice. and at 9:35, mike away and david fisher on u.s. marshals, inside america's most storied law enforcement agency. that's followed at 10:45 with lawrence tribe, discussing uncertain justice, the roberts court and the constitution. booktv in primetime, all this
week on c-span2. >> tuesday, a news conference on the creation of a national world war i memorial in washington, dc, a bill to authorize the memorial awaits senate action. see the event live starting at 10:00 a.m. eastern on c-span. >> c-span 2 providing live coverage the u.s. senate floor proceedings and keep public policy events, and the weekend, booktv, devoted to nonfiction books and authors. c-span2, created by the cable tv fry and throughout to you as a public service by your local cable or satellite provider. watch is in hd, like us on facebook, and follow us on twitter. >> now a look at the return of the taliban in afghanistan. has sad abbas of the national defense university talks about his book "the taliban revival:
violence and extreme jim on the pakistan frontier." this is 90 minutes. >> good morning, and welcome to the session on the resurgence of at the taliban. we are happy to welcome you this morning, and i must tell you from the very beginning that this -- with the organization in this and -- say a few words about it earlier. what this session is about is the launching of this book "the
taliban revival: violence and extremism on the pakistan frontier." this is a timely book -- i don't know because we arrive at the end of the cycle. this cycle is a cycle of intervention in afghanistan. this is definitely not the end of the conflict. we can hope it will be end of the conflict but unless we believe our own propaganda this this is not likely to be so in the months to come. since the end of 2001, a lot of people died in afghanistan, both people from the region, all of that was made to eradicate the taliban and where do we stand today? i know that the focus these days in the country is mostly about the election and what is going wrong in this election. but that what we see actually is
a resir generals of the taliban in the south and east, where nobody can be really surprised seeing they were massive organization in both places. the point is not whether this is the case. we know what is going on, or try to know what is going on. we certainly don't know everything. the question is whether that does this mean that almost 13 years of war in afghanistan, of additional war in afghanistan, has served no purpose? i mean, has the tally been been eradicated? definitely not. does it mean it was an intervention was useless? perhaps not. does it mean it was a success? definitely a different story. that is what this book is about. how did we get to the situation that we're in now. how did we get to a situation that the movement of everybody
in 2002 saw as being more or less eradicated or what was left was essentially residual. how this movement has come up again and so on, and this is what the book is about and i'm happy to say it's an tempt to bring an objective perspective on the way things are moving, looking at different angles, and this is a perspective of the book which makes it interest. the role of western policies, something we should discuss. today we tend to say, we'll live with mission accomplished, are so so we would like to believe. the roll of military in digsmaking and so on. so, for that matter, we delighted welcome the author,
hasan abbas, and let me say, for most of you, many of you at least, it doesn't need introduction, professor and chair of the department of regional and analytical studies of the national defense university college of international security affairs here in washington, dc. he is also senior adviser at the society, he previously served as a distinguished professor at columbia university, in a senior adviser at the belfair center for signs and international affairs at the canadian school of government at harvard university. well to me, what is more important is very -- many of you remember his first book, "pakistan's race" so with those words i will not stand between you and the speaker and ask him to please come up and present your book. >> thank you very much. >> thank you very much.
it's a great privilege and honor to be here and to see many friends and for so many of us to be able to find time. in the beginning i will also mention i'm thankful to carnegie and frederick, an old friend and his work has been guiding many of us. his courageous writings were a source of inspiration for studies. i'm also thankful to the organization in this. this is a newer organization, an advocacy group, and the one group, one different thing about this organization is that primarily pakistani-american but benefiting from the guidance of many of the scholars of south asia, and many of the other scholars and they're -- they believe in making pakistan a
progressive state and also building the u.s.-pakistan relations. so thank you very much, and i wish you best of luck in your endeavors. next 30240 minutes is to first give you a gist of the main arguments of my book, if may may call it that. and also briefly talk about my recent visit, which was kind of a book tour. i landed in -- planned to lan in pakistan for 15 days, but also had an opportunity to go to iraq , before mosul was taken. i had the opportunity to speak to the parliament to iraq and the law enforcement agency, and some of the things i heard and i just mentioned about iraq, the linkages between the pakistani taliban and this new militant terrorist group which is -- they
claim to have built a new state. it's very interesting. streets in iraq are in -- he linkage is -- i talk about the links. first and foremost, i must add, also about my background, other than me academic in the united states i have the great honor and privilege to have served as a police chief, a police officer in pakistan's tribal areas. this was between 1995 and 1997. and some of my ideas, my thoughts are based upon that, and one of the understandings with my publisher which was -- greatly helped me can the want it ited to be an economic book and some of the stories and some of the ideas from the -- so i
have many anecdotes in the book but what i want to begin with is, i happen traveled around the world, lived in men major cities around the world, about my experience having lived with the pashtuns who make up 50, 60, 70, 80% of all pakistan. i'm not a pashtun. i'm from a different ethnic group. i have not seen any other group which is as hospitable and friendly as pashtuns. at the same time, i found among the pashtuns that they -- their orientation and principle is very religious. in day-to-day affairs they are not only very pragmatic but close to secular. -- taken over by the militants.
who would beheading and killing people on the streets before we had become -- and i remember a few years all this crisis, that if you really want in pakistan -- 1970s, 19990, but if you want to hear good music, sit beside the stream, have a drink perhaps, or whatever you smoke, if you want to do that, the best place. the way it changed and radicalized was very -- this brings me to one of the major themes i reverend to the pashtuns. having seen them as hospitable and see them as secular -- and i can mention only one name, who was called by gandhi -- no pashtun leader or pakistan you leader but so close to gandhi,
the great indian leader. used to call him frontier gandhi becauses of his secular ideas. what was the biggest for me was having seen this up close, what radicalized they produce the -- are producing almost 70 to 80% of all taliban. what has gone wrong? that was in stage of that question. the second element was, in united states and the rest of the world, now very familiar with the phrase, pakistan, afghanistan, if you start picking up history books you'll find most books on history or the political arena, focusing on overall -- if there's a comparative political study are study, mostly on pakistan, and
india, of course, and other countries. you might find it very difficult to find a book which is comparing pakistan because this is the first 9/11 construct because of the security reasons, political reasons, the focus was on these two countries, and -- but there's not enough academic studies or historical treatment of the subject. i realized if i wanted to tell more about pashtuns and that's how i'm constantly pronouncing it differently because in pakistan we call it pashtun, and they are also called pashtuns. so, that is an element. to do -- 1700s, and very
different ideas and different ethnic factors and played a major role in the creation of what we know today as afghanistan. in pakistan it was of course a product of a very secular, comparative progressive movement, led by leaders -- i teach those my students and staff -- pakistani political leaders, and you would be amazed, they were from all different secular backgrounds. it would seem to you if you look at those from 1940, it will be difficult for you to comprehend how a state, who is all -- the people who came up with the idea of pakistan, how did they intend to distribute into a different direction. that to -- is a phenomenon that i tried to answer that question,
how that had taken place. so that was just to begin and explain the larger context of what you're looking at. i think that there are five major factors that i would like to mention. first and foremost, is the critical need for us to understand that different fields in which the tally ban and pakistan taliban developed and how they were groomed in some ways. what was the jess jealousy of these two organizations. today, afghan taliban, the -- all class of the old guard of the afghan taliban seem to be quite open to negotiations, and
i am not saying they have come to the left but they're looking for openings to negotiate. however, my understanding the old guard of taliban have lost control of the -- what is taking place in afghanistan today. this is the second leadership which has links with various sectarian groups as well. and those who really believed that the foreign presence in afghanistan were something that they had to identifying. they were not necessarily taliban or militants. that was their considered view and that's what they have been willing to do. that is what their tribal identity has led them to believe. that is what the historical narrative has imbedded in their mindset. those people, who are still fighting, and in my assessment
will continue to fight, are -- this is one subsect of taliban. there's the iran taliban, the pakistani, the -- are trying to negotiate into the mainstream. the biggest -- old guard of taliban trying to take control of the insurgent movement so they can direct it and potentially bring it somewhat to the community. that's briefly my assessment of afghan taliban, and they have various other groups. one group operates from the pakistan-afghanistan border and which is now on the run, some people believe because of the pakistani military operation that is happening. come to that later. i want to explain about this
division between the old guard and the new taliban. the pakistani taliban -- afghan taliban who thought -- few more words about the afghan taliban. the afghan taliban collaborated with al qaeda, and the like, but it never merged. a couple of very good studies that come out in recent years explaining there was never a merger, and had used afghan tally ban, afghan taliban for their financial needs, had used al qaeda. however in case of pakistani taliban, there was more of a merger that has taken place. the nature of the group and their publications, their media, and their -- pakistani taliban are quite active on media, on social media, afghan taliban and
pakistani taliban. pakistani taliban are more -- they have moved far closer to al qaeda. in fact today if you ask -- many of the experts, how do we define and analyze al qaeda today? 0 you will not be able to explain the dynamics without explaining the dynamics of the pakistani taliban. that's the kind of merger that has taken place. this bring monday to the point i was earlier referring to about iraq. believe -- video0sen youtube, believe that 300 pakistani taliban and some of 0 the mill pans landed in iraq and --le milosevic -- landed in iraq and some of the -- in mosul, in parts of iraq, are in language
because they are the pakistani taliban who are operating in this area. the pakistani taliban are interestingly not homogenous in terms of the pakistani. -- who have infiltrated or joined the afghan taliban. the number in terms of the threat by the pakistani taliban, all you need to see is -- read about the major terrorist attack on the karachi airport, attack on the militarists, destroying one of the most important aircraft we have. on the air force base and in one
case, had a successfully attacked a location where pakistani believed to have kept some of it nuclear arsenal, at least the delivery system. so the opinion is, in case of pakistani taliban, their linkages of the security forces behind the scene in terms of insiders and in terms of some people who are radicalized enough, that is a much more dangerous phenomenon, and if i'm a security analyst, i would spend much more time in looking at the park tan -- pashtun y taliban. at least part of the pakistani taliban directed because the only reason that pakistan has attempted to connect with this is to -- and they smartly from their point of view moved out of the pakistan-afghanistan tribal area, which is some part -- they
moved from there into the mainstream pakistan, urban centers, chit is extremely difficult -- where it is extremely difficult to monitor them to do any surveillance. that my analysis of the pakistani taliban and afghan taliban. now coming toward -- not so very long in terms of how do we understand, based on the major series or major issues? because the brief answer to both these pakistan and afghan problems can be whether it is a problem of law enforcement or about education, about the rule of law? i think all those of are very valid ideas from a long-term perspective, but to able to understand this -- before we can attempt to study, has to go through an analysis which i
claim i have attempted and there are five point is want to mention. but before that i'll just mention a couple of anecdotes which happened. these are partly my interviews in the book and partly some of the other experiences i had. i remember the day when the pakistani former prime minister was returning to pakistan and honored to have served with her for a brief time in 1995 and 1996. in 2002, d-2070 when she was returning to new york and she said you're a police officer. what is your take about the security situation in pakistan? what should i expect when i land in pakistan? and myself, and many other security officials and friends who focus on these issues, we almost had a consensus before this and i asked her, you want
me to be blunt and direct? she said, absolutely. high likelihood you'll be assassinated, and she said immediately, instantly, i know it. i know that part. tell me something else that i need to do. and i appreciate her courage and bravery. she knew she was walking into a death trap. not only because she -- the pagesy taliban and militants were strong enough, because her assessment was -- i think she was not only absolutely right at that time but that is the new arrest -- radicalization has taken place in pakistan, unfortunately, is not only confined to the militant camps or to the -- it's into the society. still a minority, still pakistan by and large if you give them a chance, mostly work for
relatively progressive polite political party, which it's karachi or the pashtuns, the secular party, but having said that, the way that this course has changed in pakistan -- a big debate going on in institutions why this isis, the militant group that has taken over iraq, is a good idea. people are saying, at the end of the year, islamic state. so that is kind of discourse -- a major attack, if you followed that in karachi, hundreds of thousands of people, and there was the major attack. that evening, i -- about pakistan, i wrote something for jamestown foundation, a local think tank, and i wrote, who tried to kill benazir bhutto,
and i made the case probably the former head of the -- previous head of state pakistan and taliban who was killed later on. she immediately said, i think -- she wrote that -- as a memory. she sent back the text to me. i sent that article to her last night and she wrote back and said, how come your analysis is too americanized. and she wrote -- which i quoted in detail in my book, she said something to the effect, these are the radical elements within the pakistani establishment. we use the term pakistani establishment, it means security forces but by and large referring to establishment means, intelligence and military. she said there are radical elements of the jihad, tired of serving are the ones who are
probably behind it. later on i had the opportunity to ask this question to the pakistani former isi, and people criticizing a lot -- i must say i had a great experience talk canning to him at length. in 2008. and this is the isi headquarters, which is one of the most beautiful buildings. the pakistani intelligence services had quarters funds by the united states, the new building compound, it's beautiful. sitting there and when he warmed up and i asked him, general, there's something which people often say and that is kind of -- which is you ask any pakistanis
in the -- not in the book -- in the tea shop, who killed benazir bhutto. they use the slang which is used in a way that refers to intelligence. this is not -- that's the impression. so i mentioned to him, i said, do you know what people in varying populations also think? i didn't want to say i have some thinking as well, so i forget the name of the tribe. do you know these people, the pakistan people party, you -- we were sitting on a very long dinner table, and by then he was very kind and very sweet and he almost jumped in his seat and he said -- i immediately realized i should have framed it differently. what he said to me, he said, blame us for anything that you want to, but don't tell me and don't say we're stupid. we knew well that what would happen and we had warned her the
same very night. in fact later on, in a conversation, in the same building, was told that hamid karzai went to see her. the same night -- the same evening when bhutto was killed. hamid karzai told her, intelligence information that you will be assassinated on the route today, and pakistan intelligence told her the same thing. i think very honest and give the impression that my view is -- but maybe some elements from the old handers and what she said. these are the circles, if you want to understand the pakistani counterintelligence and policy, and there's almost similar kind of thinking in afghanistan. most of -- i had the honor to have many of them as my students at columbia, and i have seen them as very bright but almost
-- 99% of these -- base opened my three years of interviews -- even pashtun, they are convinced that the problem that afghanistan is facing is because pakistan supports taliban. they are absolutely convinced on this and they're very thankful for what pakistan has historically done for them. these general perceptions within pakistan is about intelligence, the role of intelligence or the role of military or about politics. the reality is somewhere hidden behind that facade and thinking. some of that at times may very well be true. so, it requires a very delicate attempt to go into some of those details, i am extremely thankful for the objective assessment.
this brings me to the other -- from my book and with these two in fact -- i mean, what helps us understand what has gone wrong and how can we understand how this radicalization has taken place, how do we understand why taliban were able to expand in such a fashion, and to make -- conduct these kind of very advanced terrorist attacks. the first thing -- i'm now taking a little bet into the academic domain but i will be brief. one is regional tensions. whether what is happening in the region or all those attempts made from outside, the united states or countries, all those outside attempts and determined effort pakistan and afghanistan, looked at the issue in a way it is just isolated issue, or maybe the pakistani policy. the reality is, that a large
part of this is a proxy war between intelligence agencies. pakistan, india, some of it -- india, for example, the security and intelligence organization in afghanistan, may see -- very important member of that organization were actually seen given -- some of them had been kgb, german viewpoint about pakistani, extremely redick laws because they view of history of pakistan and afghanistan through the lens of jihad. i heave season a very political view in that organization. so when they get an opportunity -- and we know many have come out how that support has taken place. in the context talking about the regional issues. based in walks, at least in
very, very recently in pakistan in the tribal area, from 2001 onwards. a hero of the jihad, and a very good book come out by the people who worked on the -- command you to lead if your interested but haffani network is an organization, military intelligence, always framed as good taliban. the security and media projected it. which means there were some groups groups which were terrorist in their organization, which is not political groups, but they had never attacked pakistan, despite the number of suicide bombings in pages and deaths across pakistan, there are some groups which never directly attacked pakistan. so those are frame at good taliban.
haqqani was one of them. they're the same -- because of the expansion of the indian infrastructure in afghanistan. some right, some wrong. they don't want the situation to be worse than the 1990s, with this ethnic war and pakistan was using some of the cash -- kashmiri militants. it's purely based on the political perspective. however, pakistan wanted to counter that in the last ten years. the muslim -- interesting thing to me is -- for the first many years during the war on terror, no one -- or maybe it was done at some level -- i can't use the word no one -- no one in meetings between in the head of
state of pakistan and the ute, the issue of tall began never came -- taliban never came up or mentioned in passing and that's a very important issue for the americans to look into. why from 2001 to 2006, when this resurgence of taliban started happening, why we just -- they are hoyt. they're not history. they were operating. they were expanding, they were thinking, and haqqai groups -- the pressure on haqqani groups, on pakistan, to eliminate haqqani groups started in 2006-2007. however, in the context of the regional tensions, pakistan supported haqqani network. and i'm extremely thankful to the pakistani military officers, some who i have been honored to have my students. i cannot talk about that in my official domain and reminds me
of something important which i should have mentioned in the beginning, that all that i'm saying, these are my personal opinions not linked to my job. haqqani group -- i heard in pakistan -- this is people that i -- who were working with me -- i realized haqqani -- i talked with in the military groups, and one case the pakistani general told me, when i asked him, you led the operation and he was the only one who allowed know mention his name and explain what happened in 2009, and i asked him, why you -- and he said to me, we have lost hundreds and thousands of army officers, and he questioned me, he said do you thick can face my soldier if i tell him that the people that are killing the
pakistani army in this area in the daytime, that at nighttime they're having parties with? i said i wouldn't be able to face my soldiers. so he said in 2009 he had no difference whatsoever on which of the group he was to save and which are not to be saved. however, from other people realized there's a difference between the military operations, commanded and controlled by the pakistani military, and the pakistani intelligence. the way the pakistani intelligence operated was not in secret or not in coordination with or not even in cooperation with themanstream pakistani army and that's the point also which tells us -- gives us some insight into this issue. so he haqqani group, they are people in pakistan who are not only sympathetic with -- actually scared of haqqani.
many instances of -- not military, paramilitary force, one of the generals who commanded the force said to me, -- i'm fine with time dnr said to me, in many cases, the frontier kept him -- remained inside the fort. they were told they -- they were given specific information the haqqani operatives were on the other side. ...
for many palestinians pakistan army is as much an enemy as the americans or the indians and in one case a lot of the first cases were palestinians were arrested some of the terrorists and they were interrogating th them. the time for the monthly prayers that muslims perform there was a call for prayers. he said to the commanding officer where's this coming from?
are you muslim? of course we are muslim. it's a pakistani army. oh i thought it was fighting in indian army. again there are many such instances so there's this regional lack of preparation. in many cases the earlier attempts made by pakistan they have not given any proper briefings in the area so i am now coming to these two points and i will go to the second plane. the first one is regional tensions and palast and as a great credit -- etc.. i think the tribal belt at least as a graveyard of ignorance. you can forget about americans on the other side or the international forces for pakistani military and intelligence. the second reference is to the nexus between crime and terror which is critical to understand. a new phenomenon buzzword and a sense or new -- you need to be a
pakistani taliban and to get as much money as you can through kidnappings and etc. is to grow a beard of course longer the one the one i have and you know two or three verses. you have headgear and uke can use green, yellow or black depending on your inclination and you are a religious scholar. you can give a fatwa and be a religious person. this is a new phenomenon have the opportunity to travel in a bus between two major cities in pakistan. right in the middle they have this of course video screen they were showing an indian movie and the person sitting next to me had his own tape recorder in which there was a sermon of some religious scholar. which is by the way very bigoted and narrow-minded. he started, and now you could
clearly see that at least 15 of us couldn't watch the movie that was there. no one walked up to this person including myself in fact to say can you lower the voice because we knew exactly what he was doing. it was his mission for us not to watch that movie and for that matter an american movie but to listen to the sermon that he wanted us to hear. the difference i have seen in my lifetime and in the last 15 years have been a little bit out of touch the pakistan where i had lived in 2000 before i came to the usa remember people would walk up to someone and challen challenge. that is a big change that has happened in society and many of these criminal elements. very few know that mimi -- maybe a criminal will be challenged by
the religious mullah will not be a challenge because they can say you have committed blasphemy. you are from such and such sect or out of islam. that phenomena i think has taken root and which is something very important which the major source of funding for pakistani taliban in islamabad. i asked a christian a week ago eight pakistani policeman would have thought, they are doing about in islamabad about crime and fighting and whether they are getting funds for the police. he said sir the two most law enforcement in islamabad both cars were stolen from outside their houses. if the police chief of the
cities and one was in syria and this was the commissioner and the other was a chief of police. it was 15 or 20 years that happened and they said we have no clue what happened. so to expect pakistani civilian infrastructures capable of handling it seems the case in afghanistan by the way. in pakistan there are agencies. so behind that façade also are many criminal organizations that are operating. this suits them in a big way. the same in afghanistan. in one case i was told that in one area we realize there were five girls schools it was not the taliban. he was a member of the
construction company. a girls school everyone will say taliban has reconstructed. the religious angle is not there or the debtor phenomenon is linked to all these issues in a significant fashion but all the factors the most important one is also a big fashion. it in karachi for example they were able to unearth a training school that is not a suicide bombing training school. in karachi this was meant to teach you how to rob a bank to the seniormost police officer who was able to unearth that was killed in karachi. that is a very critical issue for us to look at.
the third one is the whole issue of these two words -- the frontier state of course is this tribal belt farm where they are able to -- there's no international border. legally there is. of course the united nations also identified that but it was projected as a frontier of different tribes invited around. they are able to control and stop it's impossible. two other things because after all i want you to read my book and find out what the other things are and i will just conclude by two ideas. my book is to help students and readers understand the new answers which are embedded there but i made an attempt in the end to say what in my view can
resolve these issues? how to set the whole thing right other than these issues of education which are extremely important but long term. in my view there are two particular things we need to do particularly with taliban. one is and this is what i've written a lot about is this investment in the civilian law enforcement. it's neither happening in pakistan. it's great to have printed 60 security forces in afghanistan but the police in afghanistan are really the police. investment in police would have let the support of civilian law enforcement infrastructure which is linked to the rule of law and the rule of law is linked to democracy. you make a choice when you give a country and military -- and many make an investment in
training. in afghanistan one of my students who is still there and she is brave enough to go to school in afghanistan and i much mention her. she was the first woman told me about how great is the inspiration she is getting. she said i went back because many are now opting to be lawyers in afghanistan. in the last three years, the last year for sure among the students who pass through the system training to become a judge there were eight or nine of them. i'm not trying to say the taliban are coming back. a lot has happened that has to happen in a much more coordinated fashion. civilian infrastructure both in
afghanistan and pakistan and believe me it's going to mean much cheaper than the other projects. last and not the least point i think politicalization has taken root in afghanistan pakistan. without it you are not going to find it out. sectarianism has gone into not only south asia but the middle east. the way sectarianism has become so divisive it is one factor which is causing militarism and extremism. in my book i will explain the tradition of the sufis and the mistakes. you would be amazed to see from the tribal -- i had an opportunity to go to this place in the tribal area in china as well which changes the dynamic
which is way different historically based on the mystics and still sufis who are very open. i think the teachings of those great mystics mistakes in south asia who can provide a bridge for the shias and sunnis and all the other to come together because unless he can treat religious -- you will not be able to get to this phenomena with law enforcement. thank you very much for your patience. [applause] >> thank you very much hassan for your illustration. there's a serious temptation to stay in pakistan but i'm going to push you again and go back to the first question which is at the risk of connection political and military connections in the
pakistani government there are differences between the two. i heard a completely different story. he said well in fact those two have no operational connection whatsoever. he can move from one thing to the other and this is probably a reality. i'm just basically calling to doubt that when we look at the region and we try to look at the consequence of a 12 year war when we look at what could be done and the potential solution what can we say about this? the whole idea of something which is a series of localize localized -- based on the
appearance of something larger but at the same time you mentioned things that can go beyond that. can you give us your take on the difference between what it's like to leave it or not. >> i think to begin with and beat it with the idea of the taliban which inspired the pakistanis to think about a group such as taliban. in terms of ideas, in terms of the very phenomena and the dynamic it was the taliban who came first and that's a different story how were they created and what was the role of the pakistani and how much of that was indigenous which is also the case that it was primarily a phenomenon. later on the pakistanis were inspired and it took them quite a while. in 2001 when the whole operation after the terrorist attacks the
way the international campaign in that region began at that time "the new york times" and "washington post" or any of the newspapers tried to find the word pakistani taliban. the first time the group came to me was in 2007. like basil masoud and so many others who were saying we have affiliation with the taliban. if not at the operational level at least at the ideological level. within the islamic context it comes from within the muslim sunni sect but it has become so diluted -- there was this anti-cloning him -- colonial activism movement which in the indian part is very progressive but they are middle-of-the-road. they are clearly against extremism but the pakistani who
found a home mostly in the past in areas they are also inspired by the same phenomenon. the commonality between both the taliban is one inspirational and secondly in terms of the subset because this is what the book did in the theological framework that they had. now we come to operation. there were a few instances. i will give you one example. there was the one pakistani officer who would go and meet the family. he was the senior intelligence officer who was the one who trained mullah omar. he seen as the godfather of mullah omar. pp played a very important role
in jihad. he started wearing a big turbine and he was having a life. he was sent a few years ago by the pakistani military. he had complete -- by and large pakistan kept a good relationship with the taliban. that the insurgents on the ground necessarily that the old guard which moved to pakistan so the pakistani military said two imam we need your help. go and talk to the pakistani taliban and tell them we have evidence we are getting funding from india. the taliban arrange that messa message. the pakistani taliban got ahold of the imam. unfortunately the preview of this beheading is on youtube.
the pakistani taliban cap timbro for year, the head of him and despite the best efforts you would think the pakistani military would save one of their legends. there was another case son-in-law chief of staff was kidnapped by pakistani military. i was told this in very -- they tried their level best to talk to the pakistani taliban. the pakistani taliban never listen. what i'm saying is you are right in some ways there's that difference however what we have come to know very recently is when the pakistani military moved into the north area they unearthed a training center of suicide bombers. on the face of it maybe there was a disconnect in terms of issues but because of the human inspiration in the commonality
in the framework they were at the end of the day it was bound to happen that they would come together. my view is if and when the u.s. forces and the international forces will move completely out of afghanistan you will see a coming together of pakistani and taliban. the reason being in this is the secularist and intelligence, that they can have some level of friendship but the vanguard of all of taliban. the pakistani taliban somehow they will come and fight. they were using the same areas similar logistics. people were jumping from one group to the other so i agree sometime in the last few years pakistani taliban were disconnected operating at different levels but they are bound to come together more so especially when u.s. forces and
the pakistani operation will finish because the regional integration and ideological framework will bring them together. >> i'm sure there are questions. please introduce yourself and then state your question. >> i am ralph hyder from washington d.c.. thank you for a very illuminating talk. it was very enlightening. my question is who is financing the taliban is where's the money coming from? >> for the pakistani taliban and the afghan taliban there are different answers. we have so many studies that amount of the money is coming from opium trade you have different members of the international forces name different people. if you talk to the british you will get a different answer. the tragedy is from the american
perspective our whole campaign in afghanistan was haphazard, was very good intentions but i think those who planned it planted in a different fashion. because they were never given a timeline. no one went after the faction in afghanistan and in a strong fashion. it was strong efforts are in there. the net result of the opium producers knew that the only way they could succeed and function is to continue to take a 50% cut to taliban. on the ground the insurgents fighting them in the old guard. they are getting a major chunk of their money from opium. i think there's no doubt. secondly and there are details on the declassified on wikileaks
or leaked information i have some restriction to talk about but what i can briefly mention is there is a lot of evidence that there was a lot of funding from the gulf area. there are many sources. this was in the "washington post" as well. when the money is coming for some of the arab countries for the afghan taliban what it really means and they realize in fact there was a lot of money first being generated in kabul by the political class, sense of the gulf and then coming back in a legal fashion in the shape of investments or something else. a lot of that i think was benefiting the afghan taliban as well. the answer who funds the pakistani taliban is different. they get most of their money and this is what pakistani police officer said to me, kidnapping for ransom, bank robbers from
karachi and in south punjab. the political economy of religious politicalization has taken a life of its own. you can go start a small -- pakistan is one of the few countries you need no license, no registration of any sort if you want to build a mosque of any sort. the point is this political economy also gives this funding to the phenomena so the problem of taliban fighting in pakistan is -- when i discussed this with the pakistani military who i must add has been very open to me when i was doing this research and i asked him the same question because i was making the case to them you are always using the kinetic approach and you have no law enforcement backing to cut these financial links which are linked
to criminal areas. they mentioned we have evidence that the indians are funding. where is the evidence? "the new york times" -- we have ever asked them to show evidence. why does only pakistan which is asked to show evidence of involvement? i said i would like to know what is the nature of that evidence? they found indian money in currency there which again anyone can keep any currency that they want. the point is right or wrong or what is the extent legally for another for another day that pakistani intelligence is generally some of the members that i met, they think there are some funding from india for some of those militant groups. i personally say having written
a little bit about intelligence organizations we can never be certain. i don't of any intelligence agency in the world who is known for really doing any spiritual work. in this case i met many people who are convinced. senior members of the government i had the opportunity to discuss and this is in pakistan. one of the major answers to this question is none of them are funded and is stunned as i was and is much as i would like to argue for us it's important to understand that there are people in pakistan educated people who are generally convinced whether this denial, whether it is diversion or whether it's genuine i have no way to have that empirical evidence in front of you. there are people who are convinced that this is some american intelligence, at least
one segment. implication of this thinking is very serious. those people will blame everything on outside forces and will not do anything which they can do to tackle this extremism. that is why mention that. it's not the majority who thinks like that. the reality is somewhere between all that but if i had to guess i would say kidnapping for ransom and bank robberies and those religious centers linked to unfortunately countries which are also a major source of funding for pakistan. >> mark schneider international crisis group. thank you very much for the discussion and i look forward to reading the book. as you know crisis group as well as shared group to share that to share the view that that strengthening law enforcement within pakistan as well as
afghanistan is fundamental. we also have seen the work that has begun and i appreciate your assessment through the kerry-lugar bergman funding for civilian law enforcement pakistan. has it been enough? has it done the right kinds of things and you didn't take it to the next step to your call for rule of law to when will we see the five top moving fully under the regular rule of law in pakistan under the constitution so civilian law enforcement would extend into that area? and finally one area where i have some questions. you indicated a separation between isi and the pakistan army in terms of operations. as you know the leadership of
the isi comes out of the army structure and moves back into the army usually at some point. i say most of our own assessments would be that they are not separate interest these -- entities are separate policies but in fact a single policy and the support for the haqqani group or example comes out of that single policy. one example might be and perhaps even explain we haven't seen very much in the way of haqqani victims in the current drive in north waziristan. >> thank you very much for all the work that crisis group is doing and your work on civilian law enforcement reform and reform of the pakistani civil service and your thesis on pakistani mergers. i think crisis group has done a great job by producing those extensive academic solid
research-based applications and thank you very much as someone who is interested in southeastern studies. on the kerry lugar bill and if i may add the last sentence in my book is that the best thing in my assessment that the united states has done for pakistan or in pakistan in the last six decades is the most extensive expansion of the fulbright program. the state department and usaid deserves full credit for that. it has taken a long time for the policy shift to have taken place but it has taken place. it will take many years for us to see because a new generation of pakistani scholars is being produced in pakistan and i have some friends from the state department sitting here who can remind me but i think it's hundreds of graduates from fulbright who have graduated or
will graduate in the next couple of years. pakistan is the largest receiver of fulbright scholarships. that is a great thing however police and law enforcement, it has happened frankly quite late and there is not much that has been done. unlike in the military to military relationship where the organizations are the set principles and clear demarcation of responsibilities we engage with military. when it comes to policing would be surprised united states there's no single office which can coordinate any law enforcement. ins and state department are very small. i really hope they get more funding in the state department. we have done a few things in
latin america in the 1970s which kept the u.s. away from us but i think and this is an idea which i want to write in my next book seeing them as a new model for intervention. if you have to intervene in a failed state what is the first thing you will do? support the civilian law enforcement at the structure. the difference between karachi is and i'm crossing a certain limit i get a 220-dollar ticket. in karachi or elsewhere you cannot do that. ultimately it comes down to law enforcement. and the rule of law systems. thank you very much for those points and thank you for reminding me about that question. i should've mentioned one of my major findings is an one of the ways we can tackle the situation is by expanding pakistan into
the tribal area. currently it's partly eponymous. no pakistani courts are pakistani police in the area unless you cooperate in the pakistani tribal belt into mainstream pakistan. this will continue to go back to terrorism. on the last point on the differences between military intelligence it's a difficult question and in terms of the orientation is easy to see the pakistani mainstream military. i think now they are very well coordinated and they are very well focused. this is primarily in the book but what i have found out recently is there is clarity of thinking. in fact when i asked him this was mentioned about the haqqani group they said we will squeeze them but what i heard yesterday
there's a tweak on twitter those of you who follow twitter a leading passion politician and i wish i could have quoted exactly what he said the something to effect that the suicide bombing that happened yesterday that left five people dead this is conducted by those people who have been pushed out of pakistan. some of the people believe that pakistan is intentionally pushing out the haqqani group so they are in afghanistan and there are others who think they have done it and finally they are recognized that we had to push out to push out of economy. a group from that area but unlike pakistani taliban where there is one drone strike that happened yesterday and it's my personal guess our estimate but it was well directed and well
coordinated. pakistan taliban when it comes to a connie group they are not directing them to a new century. previously okay we are conducting a operation in south waziristan. this time around at my assessment in a connie group is pushed out. they're not killed and they are not targeted. the pakistani military is now based on my understanding is a bit late in the game but fully recognize the issue. it's difficult to find out what the isi is thinking. i will not go in that area. i really honestly hope the isi has revised this.
there are contractors and i don't know what the mindset is there but the military i think it's now pretty clear on this. >> i promise to be brief. i am sorry i'm a professor and trained to give long answers. >> i'm so grateful for such a benefiting insightful -- of many layers. thank you very much. you mentioned about benazir bhutto's assassination i think some questions, some of the questions remain to be debated. who was behind president kennedy's killing? who killed benazir bhutto? it's one of those cases where we
remain to debate it. you have mentioned at the end the recommendation that you ga gave. on enforcement enhancements and -- and sharif double the salaries and a -- were doubled. my question to you is based on your recommendation on religious pluralism and law enforcement, my question is in most of the cases in pakistan the prime ministers became prime minister after an accident. if you become prime minister and if you are asked to make the recommendation of the prime minister pragmatically what a something specifically the three
or four steps you will do to bring this kind of terrorism and instability to a close? thank you. >> thank you very much. you are right it is an issue but the reason i would really like pakistan to thoroughly investigate and figure out who killed benazir bhutto because in the absence of a very clear answer it continues to become more popular and is those who are behind the killings think they can continue to kill and get away with it. we have seen in the recent past many of the politicians were killed. people of the national party the pashtun in that area, many of the leaders, there was a very well-known member of the pakistani parliament a christian
leader who was a member of the cabinet also in the case of benazir bhutto we don't know who killed her. he was killed by his own guard. he said he were supporting a hindu girl who had committed blasphemy and the tragedy is some i must say this that it was the government of punjab. there was not a single imam the day that he was killed he was ready to stand and lead the prayers for her. including the officially paid imam who had been fired. the imam was still the official imam so there's that fear and that's why it's important but your point is well taken. in case of sharif raising the salaries is only one part of the problem. the real issue is your
transformation as an institution in terms terms of current six and investment in new technologies in terms of many modern states there are these cameras on the highways and other places because you can -- is not meant to stop terrorism. the modern policing concepts are not particularly focused on stopping terrorism. they are focused on investigating terrorist might happens. pakistan has not invested in that in any case. that is a choice pakistan has to make and with respect from my friend from pakistan air force, don't take it personally. pakistan wants modern police stations. for the price of one f-16 you can build 30 new stations. it's not only about salary but about a policy choice and they
also have a choice in this regard. the last question and i think most likely the best chance that i have is to be able to at some stage -- i love my job as an academic and i would love to be a professor but there's no chance i will ever become a prime minister but if i got a chance to advise i think first and foremost and one of my pakistani friends i mention it right pakistani officer who is here in the u.s. scholarship a couple of years ago he had mentioned in his experience working in the prime minister's offices. all the problems can be resolved if you get an honest and efficient and competent prime minister. some of the things are very basic. for instance and first and foremost for me is rooting out
corruption and i can only happen if you instill a form of accountability. this will not happen overnight but as soon as the north major case of corruption which there is no -- unfortunately in the political arena they go after them in a strong fashion. i would be the first thing. the second thing which i mentioned keeping pakistan's religious identity but taking pakistan -- making this post famous speech he said would be good to her mosque or a church or a temple state has nothing to do with it. this was in 1947. he was not this one small intellectual in some corner thinking about his dream. no he was the most popular leader that pakistan has produced. people love him and he was able to create a whole country. his ideas are based on pakistan.
pakistan is very far away from us ideals. they can do small things for which they can take pakistan backwards. some of those issues are related to policy issues. others will be linked to education ensuring that your next book to ensure review all of the curriculum and take out some of those words and some of the bigotry which is part of the pakistani textbook. the second thing would be after accountability an and corruption would be education reforms and the third thing i think would be a larger issue which is a peace process for india. i am convinced and i think pakistani leadership is convinced you will not be able to get rid of pakistani groups or some other radicalization and less pakistan and india make an amicable sustainable peace process. there are signs of that.
think it's a pakistani security establishment which also has to be convinced. not only the pakistani leadership i think india has to play a role to make such a transition happen. without these few things i don't see a bright light before pakistan. >> i am president of eight in dose and i have two short questions. number one is the taliban have regrouped and thank you for a very excellent analysis of the situation. i find it a bit paradoxical they have taken large territories but their posture is significantly different to what it was in 2001 and secondly the elections were pretty well-conducted and well
attended. there was no disruption our activities from taliban. so i find it a little hard to believe. my second question is the military action in progress. do you think it's going to continue for long" will be the long-term outcome of back? do you see the possibility of isolating pakistani taliban from other taliban? >> thank you very much. you are absolutely right. in case of the taliban or afghanistan's political situation we have a crisis there but the crisis is different from what we had talked about and disrupting the whole election process. there is a lot about the resilience of the people and
some of the very good things that happened benefiting from the u.s. effort. major mistakes like supporting warlords and so many others on the part of united states frankly but at the same time there's a new middle class that's going up in afghanistan. that has a new stake in afghanistan's future. i think we owe it to the international community and especially that states which funded it by and large however the case for instance there are 30,000 reporting stations. elections were not conducted in several because taliban did not allow that to happen. there are pictures of them and long white beards in caps with bandages on their fingers because all those who voted, their fingers were cut. you have to see i think the hindu newspaper where the
picture has come. luckily abdullah abdullah and some of the others as well they are joined in terms, join together as the future of afghanistan and the future of afghanistan. on the opposition side mullah omar had said they are against democracy and against elections. in this case there was a lot of work as well as american intelligence. there was a lot of support which kept some of the taliban away. i was talking to one of the gentlemen who is doing research on this who is actually sitting here and reminded if you look at all the incident data the number of acts and afghanistan by the taliban has not declined.
what happened in kabul recently and others in recent days but the overall percentagewise those have not declined. we will have a successful election but we will see how -- have to see where this goes. i think credit should go to secretary kerry and others who were able to bring -- to abdullah and connie telling them that they have to reconcile and figure out how they will bring a national unity government. it will not be weeks, it will be days that you see taliban conducting more attacks. even if there is a reconciliation among the political bigwigs in afghanistan and in south and east infrastructure is -- in the case
of pakistani taliban and the problem is much larger. i think there's a huge impact of -- conducted in may of 2013. all of the progressive voting parties couldn't -- so the pakistani taliban in some ways a more devastating impact than the taliban and afghan. for that i mentioned there were no solutions. >> one last question. >> thank you so much hassan abbas. i teach at the department of -- and i'm currently a visitor at carnegie. i have two questions. one about your recommendation as a solution for the radicalization. last i remember there was a long discussion on the musharraf -- and a lot of time on talk on
building pakistan there were efforts to spread this tradition. i'm not really sure what exactly are the concrete steps that states can take to change the outlook in the nomenclature within society because when you talk about spreading tradition and there are delegated efforts there's an amount of persistence to that. a progressive society probably is sometimes a national consequence of other steps you have taken and he mentioned education reforms and all that stuff. [inaudible] second is a historic anomaly. you talk about afghan taliban and pakistan's zone of comfort
as opposed to the pakistani taliban. i'm still wondering what exactly was the reaction of taliban on pakistan's decision to site where the united states post 11 -- post-9/11? if they felt that kind of betrayal than i would assume that their reaction should have been, there should have been some sort of position within them and wouldn't that create attention against the state of pakistan? >> both very good questions. they felt there was a betrayal and i mentioned that is in chapter 3 or four and you are right. this is obvious from the book who has written a book with the taliban. he was ambassador to pakistan a close friend of pakistan. you can read the book and see the distaste he has for pakistan
because he thinks the pakistanis -- there are simply no doubt about it. that is why have some doubts about the nomenclature. but still we know for a fact from various studies that the majority of taliban either had moved to pakistan with their families. recently there was a mullah who was killed who was the taliban leader who was killed most likely by pakistani taliban because military intelligence is now pushing them. that is the commitment they have given to the united states. however in the initial years they ignored the option to come to pakistan from their point of view. in afghanistan they would have been killed. pakistan gave him space and it's my guess and estimate without any direct source in this case, i think maybe now 100 afghan
taliban leaders are around that number came to pakistan and brought their families. at that time they talk to pakistan that pakistan should have stood by them but despite that they save them from being bombed. intelligence organizations, think there's a lot of manipulation. afghan taliban or pakistani forces helped them. in their operations against the northern alliance that there was this control, this manipulation and some were still sympathetic to pakistan. whenever they needed the old guards help to go after pakistani taliban they didn't help them much so they responded by not coming out of the pakistani taliban.