tv Understanding the Security Threats in North Africa Panel 2 CSPAN December 27, 2017 2:22pm-3:39pm EST
speakers. thank you very much. [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> good morning, everyone, and thank you for joining us at today's panel. we are lucky to be joined by such esteemed experts on the region and in very eager to hear their thoughts on the developing
threat in the mug rob. i'm going to start by introducing everyone on the panel briefly and then asking them for some opening remarks. they are detailed biographies are in the programs before you and i'm eager to hear what they have to say so i would invite you to look at those biographies for more information and background. to my left is kim cragin, senior research fellow at the national defense university. to her left is michael ayari, senior analyst for tunisia at the international crisis group and to his left, mohammed masbah, a research fellow for the crowds and family studies at brandeis university. and an associate fellow at chatham house. i'm going to ask a panel to go in that order in just a couple of opening topic questions. i was wondering if we could start if you could talk about foreign fighter flow, the
transducing specifically what are the implications for algeria? >> thanks very much. as you see my file and the characters and fellow at the national defense university. so for those of you who are not familiar, we' part of the u.s. professional military education prram which means i have to start all my comments missing a -- i should also say that as having a portfolio for counterterrorism iwork el-haoues chili comes to sometimes i'm in southeast southeast asian sometimes in north africa. in the past two years i've been tunisia and algeria as part of this research by don't consider myself a regional expert. i think i should be taken into context. i come with a focus on four fighters and then what next in the implications for north africa. let's start with basic numbers. according to u.s. government we've all heard this, there are about 40,000 foreign fighters
who traveled to syria under back to fight against the side. turkey has higher numbers numbers are 53,000 with an additional 11,000 women and children. the reason why you see such a difference in numbers is due to a definition of what is a foreign fighter. did they make it to syria or did they get turned back in turkey? you see differences across the numbers being reported from north africa as well as a result of this. but okay. of these 40,000 official estimates from the north african countries, so to me this is tunisia, raqqa, egypt, about 7500. that in defending order to, morocco, egypt, libya and achieving academic estimates are somewhat higher academic as this go-between tan and 13,000 from these five countries. let's start with a 7500. of the 7500 foreign fighters
officially, these countries who traveled to syria and iraq only about 1600 or 22% have already returned home. these are again official numbers from those countries. comparatively speaking, , 22% ia very low number. the previous panel mention the afghan arabs and the returnees in the mid-1990s. we had as many as 70% of those from algeria return directly home. other countries it was about 80% return specifically helped the 22% so far is not too bad, but then as also the previous panel wa mentioning you have to widen your aperture and say maybe they didn't return to their home countries but to return to the region, sinai, libya. if you brought that out this about 900 900 foreign fighterso fought in sturgeon will always return to libya. about half of those are from north african countries.
there's also a significant saudi population. looking at 2000 foreign service fighters have operational experience in syria and iraq will already returned to north africa. and those five countries that i mentioned. so specifically on algeria, generally speaking as was mentioned before the foreign fighter returnees to algeria is quite low. official numbers right now coming out of algeria are around 500. the academic total, the academic is around 1100, with about 300 killed on the battlefield this year and are back and an additional 200 algerian fighters in libya. that's compared to 7000 algerians who fought in afghanistan. these are relatively speaking quite low. in fact, algeria is one of the few countries that has reversed course when it comes to the trend in foreign fighters. most of the time what you see is
consecutive conflict at first, consecutive effort of same facilitation networks. the numbers get larger and larger and larger grid . in algeria the gotten smaller and smaller and smaller because of the national tragedy or the massive conflict that took place. that's not to say algeria has not had issues with islamic state recruitment. the security services have arrested and disrupted a number of recruitment cells. i was there in may and the just arrested somebody who is actively recruiting about 300 people on facebook. they had busted the celtic it was in downtown algiers. this is what's interesting about i asked in algeria is that it doesn't seem eight uim and islamic state are competing for the same recruits. eight uim seems to be using their traditional family and social networks to recruit people while islamic state has gone online.
and sources or give a different type of recruitment and a different profile to the extent we can go with profiles of recruits and i find a really interesting. also just couple things about algeria since i've been asked to talkbout them. we heard from the previous panel, but given its historical experiences this is a country that is very, very worried about foreign fighter returnees because it was such a huge part of the civil conflict. a fatwas on the books that made it illegal to go to another conflict to travel from the 1990s. they reinforce this very quickly in 2015 and they work very quickly to shut down the networks. so i think to get her algeria to the other countries in the region is maybe a little bit of a misnomer. okay, impact. i have a timely going on my watch. i want to talk few minutes about the likely impact.
because this sort of foreign fighters have returned home to establish local terror cells, we had previously participated in smuggling rings and then they've helped finance of the conflicts. we are already seeing examples of this throughout north africa from the daesh, eis foreign fighter returnees. in addition you can track specific attacks that are linked to these returnees. as of october islamic state sales outside of syria and iraq conducted about 510 attacks and about one at 20 of these of these took place in north africa. ..
what are my biggest concerns cracks i will echo, my single biggest concern will happen when the present get out because most of them are only going to be imprisoned for four or five years this is for individuals on their way to syria and iraq or individuals arrested now for the attack you are talking about resources and it takes a lot of resources to monitor someone and i'm worried in for five years that the countries will decide-- these are my concerns are quite frankly i'm worried about
foreign fighters from other countries who decide to go to north africa, libya and sinai and we had talked about that i'm worried about countries that are revoking dual citizen and revoking citizenship so individuals can go home and decided go to north africa and then i'm also worried about what i refer to as regional foreign fighters, individuals who might not have gone to syria, iraq, might not go to afghanistan but they decide to travel and stay. we know there are an estimated 3000 to 8000-- 3000 to 6000 that have traveled to libya clec in conclusion i don't want to leave the impression that i think foreign fighters are the single most important thing, threats north africa, but i think even small numbers can have a significant impact. i also think they represent a unique challenge to countries as they try to imprison them, put them through the judicial system
and rehabilitate them. i think you heard that alluded to, but they are very tough to put through rehabilitation. finally, i think history has taught us no one country can manage this alone, ane especially when it comes to foreign fighters and this will require a deeper level of understa i the region. i think both are geographically, but then within countries between law enforcement other security services as well and so i think we collectively need to get this right or we will be back here in another five years talking about this exact same phenomenon. >> thank you. i think it's helpful to talk about that broad issue of foreign fighters and the areas where algeria might fit patterns of the region and where it doesn't. thank you for that. doctor come i would like to know if you could walk us through your thoughts in terms of the
rising jihadi and threats as it pertains to tunisia. >> yes, of course. as he said before tunisia is a small country in the sense that it's not the center of the growth of jihadi. it suffers from jihadi is him in libya especially so we have to keep that in mind and keep in mind the most important thing is to increase reaction and resilience of the society and institutions because lots of things can happen especially in the upcoming years i think we will have lots of mutation of jihadi seen. for the moment we don't see that in a sense that in three states into nietzsche sort of what we call revolution 2011, first between 2011 and 2013 the growth of jihadi is him. it was a attempt to unify different groups with
institution idolization of the jihadism into tunisia. in 2013 there was a first measure of regression with the groshong jihadism backed by isis and al qaeda and it was the moment where jihadism was very popular in urban area and all that stuff. from 2016 in southeast asia with the libyan tunisian border we see both isis variance and there are new regional uncertainty and i think the situation in the gulf back in the form of jihadism trick we see that an upcoming years maybe five or six for the moment in tunisia we have to step back a bit. they are like according to security forces like 250 armed jihadism.
they are in small monday and generic border. people are linked to al qaeda and isis and they are like slping sales-- sleeping cells of like maybe two or four people gathered and that might play a role of supply in case of deterioration of security situation at a regional level and there is a case is the main problem around already 1000 came back and maybe 1000 else will come back. for the moment lots of them are in jail between three and eight years the problem is after what they going to do and others are controlled. at the same time we have to step back a bit because it's not like algeria in the 80s when there was a return of afghanistan because in tunisia there's no islamist movement in the political sense where they can help them.
so, of course they played a role these people in the regional situation. tunisia is a quarter or, in fact. they went to target nigeria in a sense because there's nothing. nigeria is the big perl and they know that. some people say they want islamic caliphate in tunisia to go back to the state and all that stuff, but once we notice in tunisia to destabilize the country in a sense because tunisia is a place where they can organize ourselves. they can recruit or could they even killed tunisians except the forces of security for them to say.
tunisians have died apart from security forces, died in collateral damages and jihadists want to use tunisia to make the link between jihadists in libya and nigeria. its regional and important to gather that and understand that. first, we understand that isis in tunisia is seen as a conflict resolution force. evy people i've met were from al qaeda. isis was like manipulation of security forces and things like that. people who are like students or intellectuals, you know, all these people and not a lot in isis and it's important because in tunisia there are people are surprised sometime, intellectuals of jihadism like in the 60s.
people who believe this. there are lots of them in the other parts, volunteers it's like people said before it's like much more criminals, mercenaries and we are not dangerous because we know how to master weapons, but once there is no money there is no fight for them so we have to keep that in mind. at the same time they be a is dangerous for tunisia because as you know all of the small political groups can instrument allies. they close their eyes with movements between the jihadists and use jihadists as a tool with blackmail with tunisia and we know tunisia has two balances position between the person libya and it's difficult because it changes a lot and political access visit fit anymore libya.
if we want to sum up come i know we have to enter the details much more, but in libya the problem is not just to take natural resources. it's the tracks to legalize the money. its banking system, level of credit and all that stuff. into niche and there's of links with that with money laundering. what happened in that he-- libya , consequences and what happened in tunisia. winter-- have to understand that. at the same time tunisia is a place where there's lots of money transfers. with banks and interconnections and we have to keep that in mind just to finish-- i have time? okay. thank you. it might sound weird, but people in the fieldwork, i mean,
nigeria and tunisia fear the next five years the growth of jihadism, i think it is very weird, but there is how could i say well very powerful and libya through everybody and now these people and at the same time they are in tripoli and maybe some forces can use and make an grope like hezbollah type movement. it's what people fear because there is a penetration with lots of conversion especially in tunisia we have to remember. maybe in the next years, maybe people will say they linked to security forces and a little bit paranoid. maybe we have to see that same
polarization that we have in lebanon or what can happen in north africa and the fact of cooperating with iran in the fieldwork is a good thing, but after maybe he ran will win better than the others, so cooperation is not enough. needs political strategy of long-to eerm trything. at the end for tunisia luckily say? there's lots of ford been made by the authorities. improvement of coordination of security thanks to the national security council, but challenges remain. there is a problem of money laundering. is the heart of the war and complying institution because the problem in tunisia with political parties tended to personalize the challenge for political discussion and for july's the institution.
if there's a secession or emptiness of the presidential power and things like that dick same thing everywhere. so, lots of things anticipated now. prevention is important with lots of measures of repression. it's not enough especially in jail. urban areas, problems of corruption and political society and absence of morality of institutions. important driver of violent extremism. social regional dissemination and all of that stuff and so on, so to finish, think north africa will be new challenges and new allotment of movement. al qaeda is the main threat. at the same time may be start
research to understand the complicity of jihadism p maybe it's possible. i don't know and at the same time to know that libya is much more complicated than iraq, so take care. >> thank you. it's interesting to seem out-- how much it's shaped by what's around it and coming into it especially comparison to nigeria. i was wondering if you could tackle the same questions in morocco. what are some of the threats you see? what are things we should be thinking about that perhaps are unique to that country? >> thank you very much for this invitation. i will try to answer three questions my presentation. purse, what level of threat regarding morocco. second,. [inaudible]
finally, ce understand radicalization in morocco or chi was asked n to talk about how government and radicals, but i'm ready to answer in the q&a session, so the first question what is the current situation. morocco is safe. we might say that for the moment morocco is safe from imminent terrorist threats. morocco is the only country in north africa that was not attacked since 111, so this was a tribute to the stability of the regime as well as effectiveness of its security, services in deterring and preventing terrorist attacks in morocco, but this is not the whole picture. the situation is more complex and radicalization is on the rise. while security services try to
prevent terrorist attack, radicalization is on the rise and this is a kind of-- i will try to give up some snapshots to understand it. so as the investor says there is at least 1600 moroccans who travel to syria since 2011 and moroccan authorities claim the destruction of at least 47 terrorist cells in the last three years and 162 cents 2002. among them is around 40 something cell link. at the same time it's prevent hindrance from traveling to syria after 2015 and not to counts a lot of moroccans who have been engaged or involved in
terrorist attacks in europe as you know in madrid, 2004 and more recently in barcelona tax in the case of-- if we put this together this piece together it's difficult to assume that morocco is totally immune from terrorism, but in the same talk it's for the moment able to control and manage the situation through a different mechanism, mainly security, but also all the components in this tragedy and namely the allotment, restoration and more essentially somehow the radicalization program. i will discuss this later in the q&a question because i have some
slight different opinion on that part. lets me talk about the new generation of jihad because there's a lot of discussion about it. people ask or say or made observation that we are observing a shift within jihadism, not only morocco, but across the north african countries that this new generation is quite different from the previous one. i think, yes. there is a new generation. but, for me it's difficult to call them jihadism in the same way that we call the previous generation, not because they don't believe in jihadism or terrorism, but actually they are new and totally different from the previous one. they are different on three or four levels.
first is the process of rattle cassation. it became more and more faster and quicker because fast-forward jihadi which means in a short way it's like if you defend a little but the north african country as it takes time and request a lot of ingredients. this is all generation of jihadi that requires a lot of time to learn the ideology. read books, which is 1600 pages and took me three years to finish with a lot of books and listening to the audios, but this new generation actually very quickly in two, three, formats get radicalized and no one can understand how this process is enacted.
i mean, we can discuss this later, but this is the first difference is that it's very quick process of radicalization. in 2010 people who plan attack, took them six months between the first meeting and the attacks and now you can see some of normal citizens in a few weeks are radicalized and travel to syria and this is something very striking and they don't know from research perspective how we explain. again, the aspect, the former generation was more serious about ideology than the new one.
my own observation as well as some documents in last year revealed that this new recruit have limited knowledge of islam. they are really not very well educated as a matter of religion and you can see that in the-- he said 202 has been recruited from criminals. they are not really religious and have very basic knowledge of islam. very interesting dynamic is that after what was seen in morocco in 2003 there was moroccan authorities in the prison and
then this has created a kind of vacuum and a kind of ideological void because before that there was the traditional relation between the two. there was no strong organization it was a network of different groups, but they will-- they were circled around one specific community, but after that when the authorities cracked down on this community and there was a void in this area and after their release from prison they pass through a process of revision ideological revision and radicalization.
they were sidelined by this new generation. loss could ability and they are even a target of this new generation. this is something interesting and some videos online, the new young jihadi of twentysomething as infidels. it's very interesting. except, there is one or two cases, two exceptions. between all generation and the new, which is the case who has been revealed that before who was a quintana mode detainee released into syria in 2013 and succeeded eventually accept him,
i think most of the shift including those still imprisoned in the long to al qaeda, i mean, who became now old-fashioned as are in a conflict or tense relation with this new generation. can we draw a profile of this new generation. i think it's complex. i mean, they belong to different categories and also different regions from morocco, but let's say a prodigy-- a new-- it's mainly having we can say 70% of them are young male between 18
and 24 who live in marginalized area in a medium cities who have limited religious knowledge education and more importantly who work in unstable activities in that economic sector. this is very important element. most of radicals work as street vendors, seasons employer and stuff like that. for example, for the case of street vendors is conflict and sensitivity with local authorities because it's an unregulated economy sector and they have to struggle on a daily basis with the local authority and this creates frustration and it's not a surprise that he was
a street vendor and he burned himself. this category is deemed more exposed to jihadist not because it's modern religion, but because of socioeconomic fragility and this is my argument here is that we should not underestimate ideology, but also we should not think that is the primary driver for this new generation. this new generation first radicalized because it's so so real economic condition-- socioeconomic nation and then they look for an explanation or a kind of ideology's instrument wised in that gives a sense to the situation and sometimes they
are ry, jihadi are sometimes very aware of the situation. they say the situation-- i was talking with some and some essays because of the socioeconomic condition. we can't travel anymore to europe and also the situation is very hard, but more importantly because it jihadi groups actually answer to main questions that the others could not provide. of the first is the question of who we are. it's a question of identity. the answer is important question now in the arab and muslim society. it's a question of identity. it gives them a basic answer and
is under imminent threat from outside, so you have to defend. know when is defending in syria and have to do it yourself, so it's basic stuff and we need to create islamic state which is appealing, but also to answer the secd question which is actually what is my role in life jihadi groups whether we like it or not succeed to empower youth, i mean, this is what all governments in the middle east are talking in the last few years about empowering youth, but in reality it was jihadi groups that provided that, unfortunately and gives them power, wives, houses, indemnity
etc., so this together could help us to understand the recent dynamics of jihadism and in morocco also provide us with keys to understand jihadism across the region, so for political consideration here i will finish, it's necessary to understand it's not ideology that drive muslims to kill themselves, but actually it is the sociology at an early stage. the main driver is the feeling of injustice and strong
grievances that are there for a few decades and if we don't take this seriously we cannot provide long-term solutions. thank you. >> thank you. there are few connective threads i heard in your opening remarks that the numbers are not large. of the islamic state as we have come to know it in iraq and syria don't necessarily appeal to the region north does and the space to develop given the institution that is in place and yet there's a new kind of young radicalization happening. my question in the lasky doctor kraken if you you could kick us off, is it an oversimplification to say the islamic can't sort of take territory the way we think of it as in iraq and syria and if not what is the end state as these youth see it.
>> let me first start by saying i'm not going to be the person to say the numbers are not large. their exit quite large. you already have more than that even at the lowest numbers from north africa to syria and iraq so i don't think the numbers are low. of the issue of it is an oversimplification to say they will not take territory i think is actually true. going back to all of the ideologues we were saying that no one reads. i mean, i think there's an element that they don't have to take an entire country and just have to control some territory. this is a concern for libya is okay maybe they won't be up north, but will be down south and if they could control a little bit of territory is that sufficient in the border region area.
if they control a little bit of territory in the sinai and threaten cairo which is basically what they're doing now, is that sufficient and i think it's not as big as what they did in those old and rock out, but i think is it sufficient and a concern yes and is it sufficient for us to hold territory and not rebuild, absolutely, so that's how i would answer that. >> does that examine state remember what we saw in iraq and syria and do we seen adoption of tactics or adjusted for a particular region? is that a way to think about things we are watching going forward? >> this is the problem with these groups, so not to go too far out but let's take yemen, pre-major crisis. you had the -- them trying to say let's not beat up the tribe to maintain our state haven. so,-- but they could not bring
themselves to do it. they still use these oppressive measures on the local population , so i think that will be the key until they hold remote territory where maybe there a major population centers for a little bit as rebuilding in the maybe y might see some things like rocca, but it's not because it's not a major population territory like mosel. right now they won't be able to do that, but that doesn't mean they won't be able to do it in five or eight years which is i think the big concerns. >> i would be remiss if i did not ask about implications of libya on tanisha and i'm curious if you cancel or give us the sense in terms of what are some of the dynamics that use the imminently threatening tunisia and what you think we should be thinking about long-term given that border? >> you mean the problem of
deterioration between the libyan situation? >> that's right. >> of course. in a sense, the main problem with economic because we know that the border population is thanks to smuggling in that step in the borders have been cloned and there is lots of misery at the moment. of its very difficult, so the first thing. after, there's a possibility of migration of poor libyans in tunisia because if they are rich there's no problem in society can takehem. if they don't have money maybe immigrations may be a probl and there is the problem of controlling the border because it's difficult. you can close it, so people can enter. it's the main thing and after the fact is that if there is not an improvement at the same time
of external intelligence in libya and tunisia it's difficult to trust the formation that comes from libya. if the situation grows harsher and harsher between the camps they will be less credible. it's a direct threat. >> is there a tipping point you are looking at in terms of when the dynamics in libya may fundamentally change the situation tunisia because from my estimation i could be wrong. we have not seen that yet. are the metrics you are looking at specifically that fundamentally change the balance? >> >> it might. it might because it's regional and even the jihadi themselves and tunisia have different personalities. it's regional when they speak of
caliphate. tunisia, it's nothing for them, but it's lots of these people wait the signal. they say they wait the signal and the signal is regional crisis, not just national one. institutions are to be stabilized and strengthened, but in a good manner. >> the journalist in me would be remiss if i did not ask about jihadi because it appeals to my journalistic sensibilities. i couldn't help but think as you spoke, given how quickly they become radicalized, are they equally able to be on radicalized as quickly. it seems to me it's much harder to bring back if you will. is there a potential with
someone who has radicalized in a few months in terms of how the international community, how local government brings it back. is it enough to bring economic development or a sense of protection to an radicalized someone given how quickly they radicalized begin with? >> yeah, i think in many cases with radicalization story, our prison so you see some of them actually travel to syria went and fought after a few months they return back in prefer to surround themselves to authorities and spend that prison sentence and stan dai. there are people who have no ideological component. they went to syria because of psychology appear because of
that thing a lot of syria, so when they went and saw the conflict among the different jihadi groups etc. so they decided to return and in that case there are a few works to be done. adjusted to work on some psychological counseling to advise to reintegrate into society afterward, i don't know how many of them are in this case. this is a very easy job for this category of people who have been on anarly stage. they saw on tv what' going on and then simply they decided to go with three or four of their friends, but the question is how to deal with hardline or people who started to come be-- me convince. i think it's complex and here authorities need to develop a
kind of filter or vetting system to see the different categories of jihadists who are ideologically involved or indoctrinated by a deep level. then there will definitely need an ideological dialogue. i disagree maybe with the current approach that they only want to have dialogue coming to discuss only with those who voluntary went to participate in the program. actually, you need to have with everybody including the hardline jihadi and then try to enter in a rigorous discussion among scholars between the radical and moderate and then try to
convince them. know is not easy. i know it's not for sure it wl have consequens, b the dialogue is a important component because, i mean, part of the problem of radicalization is the absence of dialogue, i mean, if they had their family and communities they wouldn't go even in the beginning, but actually it reveals a bigger problem that has to do with the set-- changes of social values etc., but speaking on the it's a variety of profiles and difficult to come up with one or two categories-- we have-- he said each case on its own, but there should be a policy, a comprehensive and inclusive policy that deals with all of the different categories.
>> i just want to ask everyone on the panel a last question. we heard about. we heard about the islamic state, al qaeda, entranced by-- daesh, hezbollah, financing, money laundering, youth radicalization and i'm curious for the audience if you could give us a sense, the primary threat as you see it, foreign fighters included the primary threat to the region if you were think about it can you give us a sense and maybe i will ask you to start us off in terms of how do you see the threat, how you measure threats cracks when we are thinking about it, is there one that dominates one of the other? >> what again? >> if you were to bring threats? >> rattled ovation, we talked that youth, various groups
making their way in and i'm curious what is the one you are watching first and foremost? >> they are different in nature, but i think in employment and social agility is the most important issue that we need to address and then it's the question of good governance because if you don't have these two elements good governance and social equality that it will spread all different kinds of problems not only radicalization, but criminology, illegal immigration and all different kinds of problems, so i think the two main challenges for the next 10 years in north african countries is in employment for young people and good--
[inaudible] >> in the two words it may be i think i collect inclusivity. the most important thing in the region. we have lots of corruption regulation and lots of people are discriminated inside the countries and cannot access business. it's the first thing of frustration. it's the economy. lack of inclusivity. third, the fact that regional power in libya is very dangerous. >> you can come up with a lot of social and local political issues, but as a national security profession list if i were responsib for that in
those countries i outside of my own country i would be worried about the dynamics in libya sinai. i don't did you can diss aggregate sinai. inside my country i would be worried about the prison population because the d radicalization program is decent and so as you have people coming out of prison and a normal criminals in prison being interacted with the jihadi that are there i just think that's what i would be worried about. >> i would like to open it up to questions. >> bill lawrence. george washington university. excellent panel. i really enjoyed it and obviously you can't cover everything in a panel but i wanted to point out two things
and get your reaction. i mean, your argument about jihadi-- what was it, fast food jihadi is almost argued against by three or four other things you said about that incubation of grievance and so i would argue that, i mean, recently 6 different reasons people join isis, but most deep anecdotal and other research shows that humiliation triggers are often anything in those humiliations can happen much younger than three months before which got me to the point about the structural argument coming the structural problems and structural responses are important, but 99% of structurally socioeconomically
youth don't become terrorists, so what is the issue with the less than 1%? there are many many aspects to this that have to be addressed. i will name one, neighborhood intervention. most neighbor-- terrorists come from the same neighborhood. four or five into rocco. >> if i hear you correctly there are socioeconomic problems route the region and yet such relatively few numbers go to become jihadi, so what is the distinction? >> it gets down to maybe i will make this my last point that it's individual level profiling an individual level intervention and i agree with everything said on that level, but it's really complicated stuff, but you have
to get into the triggering mechanism and often those are in that three-month period. it goes back deeper so eight sort of psychological side of this and if i could add one more point this whole cult deprogramming literature. you know, their tech needs to indoctrinate people. >> do you think it's something that's almost individual in terms of approach and if so how do they go about it if that is the case claimant to understand radicalization, there are three liars or three layers. of the first is the structure level, economic, political environment and also the political opportunity. after 911 the security vacuum in the different countries provided
and also some goverent turn a blind eye on people that wanted to travel a certain points in the second level is ideology. it's important to understand the radicalization because it's the software. the hardware's the fracture, but the software is the ideology. it's important to understand it, but not the main driver. the main driver, the third level actually-- on an broader level the academics try to-- either the structural level. islamization, a long debate, but actually they don't give much importance to the agency, to why those specific people among millions of muslims across the
globe choose to join jihadism and the third level that's important is that individual. it's also should not be neglected because people have their own-- there are millions of people who have been marginalized and, humiliated. on the same condition in the same family and sometimes you seek one joint in the neck and it's important to look at the specific individual choices into the agency and how people try to justify their choices and sometimes it's not really-- it's not a linear channel that you can say. for example, well educated should not be affected. in a fair astonishing way we can
answer in a surprise, moroccan professor of philosophy who was known for his posts on facebook against islamist and all kinds of religious ideologies, last week he traveled last month to join daesh. it was against all the expectation of people because, i mean, you don't know, but this was a case that you can say only poor-- there are other examples, but the patrn is tha, the age of 25 male living in cities on the shantytown are more exposed to this ideology. >> just want to take 20 seconds
to answer. i put my academic hat on and was -- what you're basically sane are there are no control groups. we have these people joining, but we don't know why people don't join at about five years ago i did a series of studies on why individuals don't become terrorists, which is your control group factor and we did a first and we did surveys and focus groups and individual interviews and the palestinian west bank, so no barriers to becoming a terrorist in the palestinian west bank. there is someone who knows someone and we looked at why people don't join here: we did in yemen finished at the yemen study in 2015. we looked at why people are not joining and participating in violence in yemen. if you google my name and there are only ones out there that answer the control group. the fast food jihadi i just want
to say don't want to underplay because it's rapid and not a genuine radicalizatio ion'think that is true. i tnk the earlier panel tal thel media and the internet and how the role it's playing in radicalization is important. it's not the only explanation for the quick increase of radicalization, but it's a huge part and an example i use when i talk about this is my daughter who has a facetime relationship with people and she will play games with people on facetime for two hours and it's a very real relationship and she views them as someone who is in her life like someone who has a physical relationship in her life and so as individuals develop relationships through social media online we don't see it as much because it's not face-to-face and it's hard to intervene from a security relationship, but this is a real relationship that helped radicalize people and so i don't
want to diminish that because it's very very hard to deal with from a policy perspective. >> if you will just wait for the microphone. thank you. >> one of the distinguishing features and the importance and a lot of government people and academics are beginning to equate modern islam with sufism. is a you are feeling that sufism is playing a role as a barrier to the radicalization of the youth or society in general? i was just in morocco and they were talking about 2 million moroccans out of employment and out of school, which is a huge category from which to recruits
their jihadi's, but is sufism significant as a barrier to the attraction of extreme-- extremism and islam? >> >> maybe, yes in fact it's been used-- sufism has been used by nigerians during the '90s and morocco against jihadi is some. the problems in the factor of promoting sufism is successful and not seen by the population to close from the state and at the same time the state must have enough credibility. they need to know it doesn't work and people know that's these people are presented from the state and things like that, but it can be done. i won't say d radicalization.
it depends on the way sufism is in the country and depends on the balance and things like that yes, it might work. in tunisia there are some debate about that, about reactivating the sufism. just maybe to have something about the radicalization. the way we frame the problem of radicalization, i think, is in favor-- [inaudible] >> there are differences. it's very minor, the best way to deal radicalize people and means people can think to speak with jihadi because they have doctrine-- common doctrinal base, but at the end it's more complicated and i think the best way of what we say in
radicalization and radicalizing is to refer to people in this country with the possibility to have stemic ideas and to express them peacefully and if we know that we can radicalize everything. in the end there will be utopian things like that. >> two related questions. he recent study showed state-sponsored established islamic organization was effective against radicalization and i wondered if there's a comment on that.
second of all, in morocco how does it fit into the daesh al qaeda relationship? >> actually, the question whether the-- this kind of discussion that includes sophism and i can say yes and no at the same time. on a broader level, yes. moderate ideas within society if you do it with changing-- radicals actually does not radicalized in the mosque or in areas where this kind of
discourse is a spread. actually they are radicalized outside areas and especially i agree that it's a very important vehicle. it's the videoconferencing of it and i totally agree that facetime in all of this new media has accelerated the process of radicalization. if we want to defend the fast food jihadi we have to understand how facilitates the contacts and in many cases of people who travel to syria was through the internet, but actually they didn't just take the decision to go, but it would actually-- contact with their peers, friends, family and then
they facilitated the process of traveling, but it's it turns into the question of whether it's the state-sponsored is affected. i think they can work on the level. [inaudible] >> as a tool to fight radicalization. [inaudible] >> political opposition. it's a opposition group we mig say. it might be an to radical idea
because they agree with daesh ideology, but from the state's point of view they are a challenge for the kings authority as a commander of the faithful. .. marilyn shapley with mercy corps. i was wondering if you could talk a little bit more about the impact of migration on the public been to places like tunisia or whether you might have future security issues including
radicalization, thank you. >> yeah, i mean, i think if i was the previous question on what am i worried about? i was given more than twoor three, that would definitely be on my list . i focused on north africa, but i think if you brought it in geographically, the issue of what i talked about regional foreign fighters, that's taking place around there. especially as you go into countries which have -- it was mentioned previously the border with libya was difficult but if you go down to molly, it gets much worse. as you go further south, the issue of regional foreign fighters becomes more difficult and the issue of monitoring, affecting, information sharing, all the things we said was hard with north africa become exponentially more hard as you go south. >> anything you wanted to
add? okay. >> thank you. i'm an independent researcher and consultant. my question is to the doctor about returning foreign fighters. in tunisia we have in algeria, a small cell that pledges allegiance to isis in addition to absorb these foreign fighters and in libya there's no shortage of groups to absorb those foreign fighters. do you see any group playing that role and morocco, for example. any group that can absorb these foreign fighters and pose a threat to morocco? that's the first question and a quick question to doctor
cragin, you said attacks related to foreign fighters, can you break down these attacks? as far as we know there are not in morocco. less than five in algeria and less than 20 in tunisia i'm assuming the majority are in libya unless you have another breakdown . thank you. >> actually, the question of tunisia has attracted less public debate in morocco than in tunisia because actually they dropped their government in that level but to assess the, how it has been dealt with it's pretty interesting. there is now 250 moroccans who returned and most of them have been put in or all of them have been jailed. for between 2 to 10 years and that's just the change of terrorism laws that included provisions on people who traveled to syria or outside.
many people actually are hesitant to return but there is something that we should take into consideration that after the crackdown on daesh in syriaand iraq, there were a lot of workers who want to return . but they can't return because of the difficult security situation in syria. they are afraid to be killed by daesh or other militants too. we don't know yet whether they have, whether they want to return or not but there are some people who are in between neither fighters nor returning but the situation i think has not been addressed how to deal with those people who want to surrender themselves but they cannot do that . this is in debate, the subject.
i don't know but there are manyeturning'swho return because they worked at. [inaudible] and they prefer to surrender themselves to the moroccan embassy in turkey and then they return to work. but there are some people who really are planning to do something. we don't know. we don't knowthe current rate of recidivism . after they leave the prison, so it's very difficult to answer. >> doctor cragin. >> i had a book about the country and i don't have it here so if you send me an
email unhappy to give it to you. my data includes attacks and plots and then the plots become difficult because some countries will arrest somebody because they were exchanging emails with somebody else but there's no real plot there for me an explosive device has to have been built. there has to have been real action taken towards a plot. in my head, the bulk are libya and egypt so your instinct is correct but that's what i have in my head. yes. >> i've been trying for a long time to get a question in. >> i'm from the center for the study for democracy. lookingat the region in general , and the different political systems that govern these places. you have monarchy, confusion with parliamentary systems. we have had the presence of military and their influence on the government in algeria and the democratic system in
tunisia. i don't know what to call libya. is there influence on the presence of the terrorist groups orradicalization in the region ? is there any one of these systems that have been more effective in dealing with whether it's meeting with the presence or the production prevention of radicalization? >> there the influence of the political system on radicalization? terrorism you mean, anti-terrorism. of course there is. we see it through egypt of cc for example, we see the difference. it depends on the context. but there is directinfluence. in fact, in libya there is no political center . the central bank, of course it keeps latitude to
terrist grps.tunisia, i will see democracy, is much more that we call a consensual democracy. it's the domestication of islam. that's an influence. if tunisia had been a polarization between. [inaudible], what we call the secular or the international. not the syrian war but lots of people might have died so i think it's a good choice to do that. and in algeria and all the others, they have their own capacities and they do the problem for you and the problem is the rapidity of their regimes. >> i'm afraid we've run out
of time but i want to thank our panelists for not only delving into the nuance of some of the very complicated issues . before the mode but allowing us to deal with the broad themes that we should be thinking about not only as we think about the region but also what supplies you specific so i hope you will join me in thinking our panelists for a very illuminating conversation. >>. [inaudible conversation]