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tv   Book Discussion on The Taliban Revival  CSPAN  August 12, 2014 2:06pm-3:40pm EDT

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difference isn't so great but it may end up in the same place, and that is that putin and his friends have really sort of transformed post-cold war russia into a quasi middle eastern trust state which is totally dependent on its abill to sell energy to the west because that's how they support not only their private greed but the functioning of their government. i was in a meeting with russian oil officials and one of the american officials said what would happen if the price of oil fell to $80 a barrel? and the russian said, well, that won't happen. if if it did happen, they'd have to sell off the kremlin because they'd be good for about 60 days. they need $100 and up oil just to survive because they don't have much else. they haven't developed the
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economy they could have developed if they had followed the advice of your friends who fled for catoed a an easter eda time. >> europe has become willing hostages to russia. the scenario we've all sort of talked about, what happens if the price of oil really falls? my guess is some place in the world a tanker will be sunk or a pipline will be blown up. the price of oil will spike but there will be no russian fingerprints on it. let's just do a quick couple minutes. let's focus on -- because i want to have time for q & a here, where you think the next explosion will be at on the globe? wref talked about ukraine and russia. herman? >> there's an area dealing with china that gives me great
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concern even though there's been little publicity about it. it's a doctrine of the chinese government that no u.s. sush veilance are a military ship should come within 200 miles of the coast of china, and that, of course, is contrary to freedom of the seas. we've already had a number of incidences of boat rammings, of harassment of american ships by chinese ships and the reason it's of concern is there is no give. either we give up our understanding of freedom of the sea or not, and china is not likely to change its doctrine. this creates an opportunity for something unpleasant at sea that may or may not be handled well. >> doug? >> well, i think there are a lot of possible ones.
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one is north korea. i mean, the old man who died, kim jong-il, seemed to know exactly how far to push and rile up the south koreans and america and when to stop. it's not at all clear who his son who is 31 and seems more radical -- he executed his uncle so that knows love there. you could see a war there out of mistake as opposed to intention. i think the japanese/chinese tensions over the senkaku island, both of them have been playing tough. i don't think the chinese are convinced we'd go to for for them. i think a collapse of iraq and you see isis or isil, whatever you want to call it, throwing over the border into jordan. they claim a whole territory that includes parts of the ler none, israel, jordan, turkey. if they really try to push those sorts of claims, one could see a real mess.
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the rulers are aged. they just april pointed for the first time a deputy crown priss. the family kind of breaks within in terms of brothers and who the mothers were. i think they are potentially unstable and that would be very messy if they went down. >> david? >> well, i think going back to what all of us have said about -- and the point that herman made earlier about the fanaticism of the middle east makes it less likely that the blowup is going to come with the chinese. i once wrote that taiwan has a great -- while they're in many ways situated like israel is, in a sea of enemies, that they are blessed because they have a rational enemy, and the chinese do not live in a fantasy world. they live in a world in which
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they measure very carefully what their opportunities are and what the costs are, and as long as -- it's not an accident that these things took place at a time when the world has perceived the united states as being awol. as long as they know that the world works better if they get along with folks, they will always harbor those desires but they won't do anything stupid. that can't be said for the other part of the world. the other place, the come nibss, they have now unearthed some of the correspondence that khrushchev had during the cuban missile crisis. at the height of that castro had sent a message to khrushchev that he should just go ahead and launch and if that cost them cuba, that is fine. he wrote what is this nut we've got over here? weiss willing to sacrifice his
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entire country. the middle easterners are evil and crazy. >> a couple points to fom up. i agree with you on the chinese. they're thoughtful and deliberate. >> and they're going to be around for a long time. >> but they may push this question of the 200 miles simply because they think we'll cave and that's a danger. the one big danger that's not been mentioned is that of pakistan. we talk about iran getting the bomb. pakistan already has the bomb and who can be 100% sure the fundamentalists in that country have not infiltrated the army, maybe infiltrated the units guarding the nuclear stores. the prospect of an al qaeda-type group getting control of a nuclear weapon is very unsettling. >> well, that's a cheery note to begin the q & a on. we have just a few few minutes for questions. given the shortage of time with
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questions, those of you who have a question, you can state it in 15 seconds or less, i will give you your first opportunities. then those that with a 30-second question then we'll work up to those who have minute questions and for those of you who have a four-hour statement, we'll see if we can get to that. 15-second questions. this gentleman here. >> if iran gets a nuclear bomb, do you believe it would use it against israel or some of its leaders? i'm not i'm. >> i'm not aware of any of its leaders announcing they will use nuclear weapons. they were squabbling for power. they sent other people out to do the human wave tactics. the leadership in tehran didn't show up. the skaecurity folks think it's irrational. what they believe is it would be
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hard not to act if they possessed nuclear weapons. the question is does iran want to be wiped off the map. and i haven't seen anything to suggest that but there's lots of reasons to not want that leadership to have it. the frightening thing is there is an islamic bomb already and that's pakistan. >> do you have anything to add to that? >> the real problem -- there's the problem of what they can do under a -- with a nuclear threat that's credible which gives them a great deal of freedom which is one of the reasons if they actually get it you can expect the audis to have one. we now have the saudis so fair their cooperating with israel bus they don't want these other uniticks to be armed. while they dislike us, we're a down the rod enemy. they've got plenty of other
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muslim to kill before they get around to us. >> yes, sir. right here. [ inaudible question ] my question is for noninterventionists or for those -- [ inaudible ]. >> the question is what it does. the ottoman empire was a decrepit, useless creature. the tragedy of world war i is all the old empires that got destroyed were ones that might have evolved in a more liberal direction. out of the ution empire you get the soviet union and joseph stallen. you get nazi army nay and adafl hitler. mussolini out of the one decrepit empire, you get all
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these little countries going to war and fouling apart. i would say world war i is a ka pass trophy. world war ii was the up finished business of world war i. in world war ii it was a very given creature. >> you might not have had world war ii but for world war i. and i don't think there's -- there can be any question that the u.s. involvement in world war i and the fact that the u.s., first of all, actually did end the war because we put the force in there and then got the armistice on the bases of crazy promises from woodrow wilson that the germans and everyone else accepted. and the result was nation states that aren't nations. the result was a germany that was so upset that we got nazii, communism. we got all these things as the
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result of that wr which was the single foreign entifert policy mistake. that was that war that made the 20th vent ri the bloodiest history in the history of mankind and that was in large part a result of the well intentioned fumbling progressive president and his allies who went in and mucked up everything in a way we have yet to be able to overcome. >> world war ii alone, 2.5% of the entire world died. >> but is the reason -- >> sir -- >> if i can talk about what doug -- a response to the specific question. if world war i had not taken place and the caliphate existed, it was restricted to where it was because the world -- you know, there were, in fact, bo boundaries and those boundaries had been set and suspected because they knew there was a problem if they went beyond it.
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so that was very different from what's going on now. if the muslim world developed as it should have without all of what happened in the anointing of different royal families, it might have been a very different future. we can't go back. >> i want to get at least one or two more questions. we libertarians believe in the rule of law or the rule of clock here to stay on time. yes, ma'am. [ inaudible ]. >> i want a quick question. we don't have time for a statement. [ inaudible ].
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>> there's no question. we have a treaty alliance with japan. we would back japan. >> okay. herman, we've got the question. okay, herman. >> well, there's a treaty al alliance and we've made known to the leadership in beijing that we would stand behind japan. we've also urged japan not to push the issue. >> okay. other questions? the ja right down here in front. [ inaudible ]. >> okay, okay. we got it. >> repeat the question. >> how long can the u.s. and europe continue to ignore militant islam?
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herman? well, i think we've ignored it too long already. one of the big mistakes we make is assuming it's a single bloc. there are 100 billion 600 million people in the muslim world, half of it in four countries, bangladesh, india, indonesia, and pakistan, and life for most muslims is very different in each of those countries, even in the arab world day to day life in morocco is so different from saudi arabia. but for the fundamentalists there isn't so much difference, and even if you assume there's 1% that has a very stringent interpretation of islam, that's 16 million people. that's a whole country, and not being engaged in the ideological and theological war with them, not dealing with elements that are reconcilable within the islamic world is a tragedy
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that's going to come to bite us and may not be, as doug said, an existential threat but it's a threat where you can see casualties and hundreds of thousands through terrorist activity and it's something we have to worry about a great deal. >> okay. we're out of time, but i've got a final question for the panelists that you can answer in one word. if we have one of these crisis -- one of these blowups that three of you have outlined is possible, do you think the obama state department and defense department is up to the task? >> in unison now. >> one, two, three -- >> no! >> ladies and gentlemen, on that very hopeful note, thank you all for coming. next year i'll see if doug -- if mark will allow us to have two
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hours because -- >> and don't forget to subscribe to "the washington times." >> you got a few instructions. tough all subscribe to "the washington times" and you have to support the american foreign policy council and the cato institute to keep all of us alive -- >> and employed. >> -- to help you stay alive. thank you. coming up here on c-span3, asia society senior adviser hassan abbas. he talks about the return to power of the taliban in afghanistan. that's followed by a book tv interview with bruce herschensohn and then a look at how the founding fathers gave and took advice in their personal and public lives. over the next hour and a half, asia society senior adviser
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hassan abbas talks about the return to power of the taliban. he's now an academic and writer on middle east affairs. >> i am frederic grare the director at the carnegie endowment. we are happy to welcome you here this morning and i must tell you from the very beginning that this event is co-sponsored with the organization indus.
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so what this session is about is the launching of this book requesting the taliban revival: violence and extremism on the pakistan/afghanistan frontier." this is, indeed, a timely book or maybe not so much a timely book. i don't know because we arrive at the end of the cycle. this cycle is the cycle of western intervention in afghanistan. this is definitely not the end of the conflict. we can hope it will be the end of the conflict but unless we believe our own propaganda, this is not likely to be so in the months to come. so since the end of 2001, i mean, a lot of people have died in afghanistan, both westerners, afghan, and people from the region. billions have been spent in afghanistan. all of that to eradicate the taliban and where are we standing today? i know that the focus these days in the country is mostly about
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the election and what is going wrong in this election, but it will escape none of you that what we see actually is a resurgence of the taliban in both the south and the east. while none of us have be really surprised seeing they were massive formation in both places. but the point is not whether this is the case. we know what's going on or we try to know what's going on. we certainly don't know everything. the question is whether does this mean that almost 13 years of war in afghanistan, of eye diggsal war in afghanistan, has served no purpose? i mean, have the taliban been eradicated? definitely not. does it mean that the western intervention was useless? perhaps not. does it mean it was a success? that is definitely a different story. and this is what this book in many ways is about, how did we
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get to the situation that we are in now? how did we get to a situation that everybody in 2002 thought had been more or less eradicated or what was left of it was essentially residual? how is it that this movement has come up again and so on? and this is what the book of hassan abbas is about, and i am happy to say that this is an attempt to bring quite an objective perspective on the way things have moved looking at different angles and this is the dimensional aspect of the book which makes in my opinion its interest. so it looks in particular -- this is something that has been various discussed about, the role of western policies. again, this is something which is slightly less discussed. today we tend to say we leave with a sense of mission accomplished or so we'd like to believe. the role of the military in decision making and so on and so
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forth. so for that matter we are delighted today to welcome the author, hassan abbas, and let me say -- for most of you, many of you at least, he doesn't need an introduction. let me say he is professor and chair of the department of regional analytical studies. he is also a senior adviser at the asia society. he previously served as the distinguished professor at columbia university and a senior adviser at the sceptep center f science and international aff r affairs at the kennedy school of government at harvard university. to me what is more important, he's a very prolific writer and many of you remember his first bo book. so with those words, i will not stand between you and the speaker and ask hassan please to
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come up and present your book. >> thank you very much. thank you very much. it's a great privilege and honor to be here and to see many friends and for so many of us to be able to find time. in the beginning i will also mention i'm not only thankful to carnegie and to fredderic who is an old friend and his work has been guiding many of us. his bold and courageous writings were the source of inspiration for scholars of south asian studies. i'm also thankful to the organization indus. this is a newer organization, a think tank, and advocacy group and the one good thing and one different thing about this organization is it's primarily pakistani americans but they are benefiting from the expertise and the guidance of many of the
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scholars the south asian descent, and they are -- they believe in making pakistan a progressive state and also building the u.s./pakistan relations so thank you very much and i wish you best of luck in your endeavors. my plan next about 30 to 40 minutes is to first give you a gist of the main arguments of my book, if i may call that. and also briefly talk about my recent visit which was kind of a book tour. i planned to land in pakistan for 15 days but also had an opportunity to go to iraq two days after mosul was taken over. i had an opportunity to speak to parliamentarians to iraq and to the law enforcement agencies, and some of the things i heard and it's not that i am just mentioning about iraq, the
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linkages between the pakistani taliban and the new militant terrorist group which has claimed to have built a new state, it's very, very interesting. some of the slogans that have started coming up on the streets in iraq are in urdu language. the linkage with the pakistani taliban is very obvious. i'll talk briefly about some of those linkages as well. first and foremost i must add, this limited in a sense also about my background other than my academic area in the united states. i have the honor and privilege to have served as a police officer in pakistan's tribal areas between 1995 and 1997. and some of my ideas, my thoughts are based upon that, and one of the understandings with my publisher was that the press which helped me conceive
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the idea, they wanted it to be an academic book but also have some of the ideas, some of the story, some of the ideas from the field. so i have anecdotes in the book from that region as well. what i want to begin with is i have traveled around the world, lived in many major cities around the world, but my experience of having lived with the pashtuns who fmake up 70% t 80% of all taliban, my experience with living among the pashtuns was that i have not seen any of the group which is as hospitable and as friendly as pashtuns. at the same time i found among the pashtuns that they are very -- their orientation in principle is very religious, but in day-to-day affairs they are not only very pragmatic but quite secular. i had served as an assistant
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superintendent of police in 1997-1 1997-1998 in an area that was taken over by militants who were beheading and killing people on the streets before we had become aware of this phenomena elsewhere. i remember a few years before all this began that if you really want in pakistan in those days, and i'm not talking about 1970s, this is late 1990s, if you want to hear good music, sit beside the stream, have a drink perhaps as well or whatever you smoke, if you want to do that, savat was the best place. it changed and radicalized. this things me -- having seen t hospitable and having seen themes a hospitable -- one man
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was called frontier gandhi. you can't think any pakistani leader was so close to great in. they called him frontier gandhi because of his secular ideals despite being a religious man. what was the biggest enigma was having pashtuns from up close, what radicalized pashtuns to the fact that they are producing 70% to 80% of all taliban? what had gone wrong? in search of that question was i started working on my book. the second dilemma was we have in united states and in the western world we are now very familiar with the phrase halfback. however, if you start picking up the history books, you will find most books on history or even in the political arena focusing on
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overall south asia if there's a comparative political study. mostly on pakistan, bangladesh, india, of course, and nepal and sri lanka and some of the other countries. you might find it very difficult to find a book which is comparing pakistani history. this is a kind of post-9/11 construct. because of the way it was framed and focused, the focus was on these two countries. there's not enough academic study or historical treatment of the subject. i reelized if i want to tell more about pashtuns, and that's how i'm constantly pronouncing it differently because in pakistan they call it pashtuns and their side are called pashtuns. so that was the dilemma, a parallel history, and that's
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another thing i have attempted to do. first challenge was pakistan is a 60-year-old country. the nation was built in the mid 1700s. very different ideals and different ethnic factors and tribalism played a major role in the creation of what we know today of afghanistan. whereas in pakistan, it was a product of a very secular and competitively progressive movement led by all those leaders. i teach this about my students and start profiling about 15 most important pakistani political funders of pakistan. you would be amazed they were from all very different ethnic pack grounds, different sectarian background. all very, very secular. it would seem to you if you looked at those from the 1940s it will be difficult for you to complehe comprehend how a state whose own founders and the people who came
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up with the idea of pakistan, how has the country drifted into a different direction? that is a phenomena that i try to answer that question how that drift had taken place. that was just to begin and explain the larger context what the we are looking at. i think there are five major themes or factors i would like to mention. it's my findings as well. first and foremost is the particular need for us to understand the different ways in which the taliban developed. how they were groomed in some ways. what was the genesis of these two organizations. my net finding is that today among taliban, the old class or all the old guard of the taliban
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seem to be quite open to negotiations. i'd not say they have come towards the left but they have moderated quite a bit. they are looking for opportunities and openings to negotiate. the old guard have lost control of the incidents that is taking place in afghanistan today. this is a second year lap which has links with criminal groups, links with various sectarian groups as well. as well as those who really believed that the foreign presence in afghanistan was something that they had to fight. they were not necessarily taliban or militants or terrorists. that was their considered view and that's what they have been groomed to do. that is what their tribal identity has led them to
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believe. that is what their historical narrative has embedded in their mindset. those people who are still fighting and in my assessment will continue to fight or -- this is one subsector of taliban. the mean group is the pakistanis, the americans, maybe the qataris are trying to negotiate, bring into the mainstream. the biggest struggle we will see in afghanistan is that old guard of taliban trying to take control of the insurgent movement so they can direct it and potentially bring it somewhat towards the middle. that's briefly my assessment of where the taliban stands and what are the dynamics, and they have various other groups. one is a haqqani group which is now on the run some people believe because there's a major
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pakistani operation that is happening. i will come to the haqqani group later as well but i want to explain about this division between the old guard and the new taliban. the pakistani taliban -- the taliban had kind of coordinated with al qaeda and the likes but it never merged. there's a couple very good strategies that have come out in recent years explaining there was never a merger. bin laden had use d the taliban for their purposes for their financial needs, it had used al qaeda. however, in case of pakistani taliban, there was more of a merger that had taken place. the nature of the group and their bubblecations, their media
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and the pakistani taliban are active on media, on social media. pakistani taliban are for more gangerrous and lethal in my understanding than the other taliban. the main reason is they have moved far closer. if you ask me and many other experts how do we define and analyze al qaeda today, you'll not be able to explain the dynamics of al qaeda without explaining the dynamics of the pakistani taliban. that's the kind of proximity that has taken place. this mings me -- brings me to the point about iraq. there are videos on youtube. it's believed that about 300 pakistani taliban and some of the militants landed in iraq. from syria they moved into iraq.
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some of the new slogans in mow sell, in parts of -- the pakistani taliban are also interesti interestingly not homogeneous in terms of their pashtun identity. there are the sectarian groups and punjabi militants who have infiltrated or who have joined the ranks of pakistani taliban in a very big fashion. the number in terms of the threat posed by the pakistani taliban, all you need to see is -- read about the major terrorist attack on the karachi airport, major attack on pakistani military headquarters, major --
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>> at least the delivery system. so the point is in case of pakistani taliban, their linkages of law enforcement and security forces, behind the scene in terms of some insiders, in terms of some people who are radicalized enough to provide them information, that is a much more dangerous phenomena. if i'm security analyst, i would spend much more time in looking at the pakistani taliban than even the other taliban. there were attempts made to engage pakistani taliban because at least part of the reason why pakistani taliban became so lethal and reacted because the only way that pakistan attempted to work with them was through
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kinetic means. and they smartly from their point of view moved out of the tribal area which is a hub. they moved into the mainstream pakistan where it is extremely difficult to monitor them to do any surveillance. so that's the kind of nature, that's my analysis. now coming to more of academic not for very long in terms of how do we understand based on any of the major theories and any of the major issues because the brief answer to both these pakistan and afghanistan problem can be whether it is a kinetic approach you need, whether it is a broader law enforcement approach you need, or is it about education. is it about the rule of law system and i think all those are very valid ideas from a long-term perspective, but to be able to tackle this challenge or to be able to understand this before we can attempt to tackle
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has to go through advanced analysis which i claim that i have attempted and there are five points where i want to mention about those but before that i'll just mention a couple anecdotes which happened. these were partly my interviews for the book and partly some of the other experiences i had. i remember the day when benazir bhutto was returning to pakistan. i had the honor to have served with her for a brief time in 1995-'96. in 2007 when she was returning to new york and i was talking to her in new york and she just mentioned, she said you are now an academic but once upon a time, you were a police officer. what is your take about the security situation in pakistan? what should i expect? and myself, many other security
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officials and friends who focus on these issues, we almost had a consensus before this, and i asked her, i said you want me to be blunt and direct? she said absolutely. i said i think there's a very high likelihood you will be assassinated. and she said immediately, instantaneously, she said i know it. i know that part. tell me something else that i need to do until that happens, and i appreciate her courage and bravery. she knew she was walking into a death trap. not only because she talked at that time the pakistani taliban or the militants were strong enough because her assessment was and i think she was not only absolutely right at that time but that's a new reality, that radicalization, the way it has happened and taken place in pakistan, unfortunately, is not only confined to the militant camps or to the waziristan area. this has seeped in the society
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in some ways. it's still a minority, still pakistan by and large if you give them a chance, they mostly vote for relatively progressive political parties whether it is karachi, mqm or the pashtuns where they would vote in historically among the national party a secular party, but having said that the way the discourse has changed in pakistan, for instance, currently there's a debate going on on why this isis, the militants groups, why that is a good idea? people are saying at the end of the day we have an islamic state. so that kind of discourse benzene bhutto was very well aware of. the someday she landed there was a major attack. those of you who follow that remember with hundreds of thousands of people who had come to receive here and there was a major attack. that evening i'm very passionate about pakistan. i wrote something for jamestown
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foundation, the local think tank. she have an excellent publication. i wrote who tried to kill benazir bhutto. i made the case it was probably the former head of the -- previous head of the pakistani taliban who was killed in a drone strike later on. she immediately said -- she wrote back, i have still kept that blackberry with me as a memory, she sent back the text to me -- i sent that article to her that night, and she wrote back, she said, hassan, you have become to americanized. she wrote which i quote her in detail in my book. she said something to the effect, i'm paraphrasing, that these are the radical elements within the pakistani establishment. when we use the word pakistani establishment, it means security forces, it means bureaucracy as well but by and large referring to intelligence and the military. she said there are radical
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elements, those old handlers of the jihad who whether they retired or are serving are the ones who are probably behind it. later on i had the opportunity to ask this question to the pakistani former isi chief and people criticize him a lot. left the position. people have come out with a strong critique but i must say i had a great experience talking to him at length. this is 2008, and when he warmed up and this was the pakistani isi headquarters which, by the way, is one of the most luxurious buildings -- i have been to the prime minister's office and president's office and houses as well, the pakistani intelligence services headquarters funded by the states, those new building, compound, it's beautiful. you're sitting there and when he warmed unand we had a longer conversation, i asked him, i said, general, there's something
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people often say which is you ask any pakistanis in the local -- not into a bookstore, in a tea shop, but who killed benazir bhutto. they will use a slang which is used in a way which refers to the intelligence. this is not -- that's the impression. i mentioned to him, i said do you know what people in very important positions also think? i didn't want to say that i have some conspiratorial thinking as well. i said do you know what people think? that you killed benazir bhutto. we were sitting on a very long dinner table and by then he was very kind and very sweet and he kind of almost jumped in his seat and he said -- he stopped eating and i immediately realized i should have framed it differently, but what he said to me, he said blame us for anything that you want to, but
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don't tell me and don't think that we are stupid. we are as patriotic. we knew well that what would happen and we had warned her that same very night. in fact, later on in in a conversation in the same building i was told that when hamid karzai went the see her, the same night, the same evening she was killed, karzai told her, as well, we have intelligence information that there will be assassination attempt on you today. and pakistani intelligence had told her the same thing. i think the general was very honest and i don't want to give the impression my view is intelligence killed her but maybe some elements from the old handlers and those exactly what ben zar had said and before coming into the teams, these are these circles within circles if you want to understand the pakistani counterintelligence and pakistani count tercountert
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thinking. most of -- i have the honor to have many of them at my students at national defense institute, as well. i have seen them as very bright and almost -- maybe 99%, 99% of these, and this is based on my 3 years of interviews. every, they are convinced that the problems that afghanistan is facing is because pakistan supporting tap ban. they're absolutely convinced on this. and they're very thankful for what pakistan has historically done for them. but the point here is only the general perceptions within pakistan, the role of intelligence or the role of military or is it about politics? or whether in afghanistan, the reality is somewhere hidden behind that facade of conspire toirl thinking. sometimes that may very well be true. so it requires a very delicate
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attempt to go into some of those details i have attempted to -- i'm extremely thankful. fred thinks there's an objective assessment. but this brings me to the five other themes from my book and with these themes, in fact, i mean what helps us understand what has gone wrong in that region. how do we understand how this radicalization has taken place? how do we understand why taliban were able to expand in such a fashion and commit and conduct these kind of very advanced terrorist attacks. the first thing, i'm now taking it a little bit into the academic domain but i promise i'll be brief. one is regional tensions. whether it was what was happening in the region or whether all those attempts that were made from outside, united states or european countries, all those outside attempts as well as internal efforts in the last ten years in pakistan, afghanistan, looked at the issue
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in a way that's just isolated issue relative to the tribal belt or the pakistani and afghan policy. the reality is that a large part of this is linked a proxy war of the intelligence agencies. pakistan, india, some of the intelligence agencies, as well. now the afghan intelligence is coming out, as well. might be surprised to know that india's, for example, the security and intelligence organization of afghanistan, many senior members and very important members of that organization were actually trained during the russian times. some of them had worked with kgb. they had general viewpoint about pakistan is extremely critical because they viewed the history of pakistan-afghanistan through the lens of the afghan jihad and they -- these -- i have seen that very critical view in that organization so when they get an opportunity and we know of many effect that is have come out, how that support has taken place. this means we also in the
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context of talking about the regional issues. this is enough an afghan group, based in pakistan or at least very, very recently in pakistan in the tribal area. from 2001 onwards. a hero of the afghan jihad. some -- given some of his history, there's a very good book by cdc west point coming out by the people who worked there on the group which i recommend you to read if you're interested but the group is one which is an after gan orientation which for the pakistani military intelligence was always framed as good taliban. or at least that's how the security analysts and media projected it, which means there were some groups terrorist in the orientation. which were not groups and never attacked pakistan. despite suicide attacks and attacks in pakistan, there are
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some groups which never directly attacked pakistan and framed as good taliban. hakini group is one of them. while tall began, also, because they were pursuing some of the pakistani interests in afghanistan because of the expansion of the indian infrastructure in afghanistan and india's has its own reasons. some right, some wrong. they don't want the situation to revert to the 1990s where there was in ethnic war and pakistan was using some of the afghan area for training militants in the area and india has their own interests. they've wanted to invest more in afghanistan not out of love for afghan but it's built based on the security perspective. however pakistan wanted to counter that in the last ten years. most interesting thing to me also is which i found out in during my studies, this research, for the first many years during the war on terror,
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no one or maybe it was done at some level, i can't use the word, no one. in most meetings between the head of state of pakistan and united states, the issue of taliban never came up. or it would be mentioned in the passing. and that's a very important issue for the american intelligence to look into. why from 2001 to 2006 when the resurgence of taliban started happening, why we thought them out of spent force. they're history. they were not history. they were operating. they were expanding. they were thinking and the group if they were even pressured, many pakistan would have let it go earlier. the pressure on the group on pakistan basically to eliminate the group started actually in 2006 or 2007. however, coming to still remaining in the context of the regional tensions, pakistan supporting the group. i have found out in various interviews and i'm extremely thankful to the pakistani
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military aufrtss, some of them i had the honor of students. i cannot talk about that part in my official domain and this reminds me of something important i should have mentioned right in the beginning that all that i'm saying is as regards is my personal opinion and not linked to my job which is a government job. but hakani group i heard in pakistan, this is now not people that i -- who were working with me. i have realized that hakani group, there was no sympathy for the hakani group i thought was there in some of the military groups. in one case, pakistani general when i asked him, general, you led the operation and he was actually the only one who allowed me to mention his name and explain all what happened in 2009. when i asked him, why you never went against hakani group. he said to me, hassan, we have lost hundreds and thousands of army officers and he questioned
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me. he said, do you think i can face my soldier if i tell him that the people that are killing the pakistan army in the area and daytime that at nighttime we are having party with them? he said, i'll not be able to face my soldiers so that -- he said he never -- i trust that general very much. he said in 2009, he said he had no briefing whatsoever on which are the groups he's to save and xh are the groups not to be saved. however, from other people i came to realize there's a difference between the military operations commanded, controlled by the pakistani military and the pakistani intelligence. the way the pakistani intelligence operated was not in sync with or not in coordination or not even in cooperation with the mainstream pakistan army and that's a point also which tells us, shows us, gives us some insights into this issue so the hakani group are also feeling that at times they were people in pakistan who were not only
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sympathetic or friendly, not that they were sympathetic or friendly to hakani group but scared of them. there were many instances of frontier code. this is not military. this is a paramilitary force. one of the generals that commanded this force in an interview said to me, i'm fine with time? the general said to me that in many cases the frontier corps kept themselves hidden or remained inside different forts. they were told, they were given specific force the operators are moving on the other side. neither they had the weapons, nor they had the capability, nor the training to take on them. because for pakistan, the counter insurgency is new thing. the first unit that landed in that yaer in 2004 learned for the first time and this is -- also a major at that time and now pakistani intelligence told me, he said when we landed there
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and realized that in the tribal pushtun province, they respond to. however, in parts of the tribal areas, people cannot speak in urdu and military was seen as an outside force. they no one to communicate with those people in that area. for many pashtuns pakistan army is as much an army for them as the americans or the indians are. actually, in one case, when one -- the first cases were pakistani military arrested some of the terrorists, and they were interrogating them, that was a sign of sunset and the time for the prayers, one of the five prayers that muslims perform, there was this call for prayers. and this terrorist said to that commanding officer, he said, where's the voice coming from? are you muslim? he said, of course, we are
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muslim. the pakistan army. they said, oh, i thought i'm fighting indian army. this is, again, there are many such instances. so there's this regional power play but total lack of preparation, also. in many cases, the earlier attempts made by pakistan, they were not given any proper briefings of which are the tribes in which areas so i'm now clubbing the two points. first is regional tensions and this people of afghanistan as a graveyard and et cetera. i think the tribal belt in pakistan at least is a graveyard of ignorance where even forget about the americans on the other side, international forces. for even pakistani military and intelligence, it was a new word. the second reference is to the nexus between crime and terror which is very critical to understand. a new phenomenon buzzword in a sense or a new craze was alm you
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actually need to do to be a pakistani taliban to get as much money as you can through kidnappings, et cetera, grow a beard, of course, longer than the one i have and you need to know two or three verses and that's -- you have a head gear. you can pink green or white or black depending on the inclination and you are already religious scholar and give an fitfa and claim to be religious person and people will know. this is new in pakistan. would avoid challenging you. very recently i had the opportunity to travel in a bus between two major cities in pakistan and right in the middle, there was -- they had this, of course, a video screen showing an indian movie and a person sitting next to me had his own tape recorder in which there's a recorded sermon of a scholar and very bigoted and narrow minded and now very clearly see that at least 15 of
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us couldn't watch that movie that was there. no one walked up to this person including myself, frankly, i must admit, to say, can you lower the voice? because we knew exactly what he was doing. it was his mission for us not to watch that indian movie or for that matter american movie but to listen to the sermon he wanted us to hear. the difference as i have seen in my lifetime, been in the u.s. for 15 years and a little bit of touch you can see and visit pakistan regularly and the pakistan i left in year 2000 coming to the u.s., i remember people would generally really walk up to someone and challenge. that's another change that's happened in society which is -- and many of these criminal elements now, very well know that maybe a criminal will be attacked and challenged but a person who's claiming to be a religious authority, or even a mere ri law jous mullah will not
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challenged because they have said you have committed blasphemy or you are from such and such sect or out of islam. that phenomenon i think has taken root and which is something very, very important with which no military of the world can tackle. and this crime and terrorism nexus, the funding is either kidnappings in the area, even islamabad. i asked this question just a week ago to a pakistani police chief who was a colleague once 15 years ago. what about -- they're doing about -- in islamabad area, crime fighting. getting more funds, police. he said, sir, the two senior most law enforcement officers in islamabad within the last week both of them, cars stolen from outside their houses. if the police chief of the cities, this is one was in
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civilian and assistant commissioner and the other was a chief of police, and it was 15, 20 days before that had happened. and they said, we have no clue what had happened. so, for to expect that pakistani civilian infrastructure is capable of handling and the same is the case in afghanistan, by the way. even more intense. pakistan, these days, traditional law enforcement agencies. in afghanistan, everything is very new. so in the guard of this terror, behind that facade, also are many criminal organizations that are operating with full force. i think that this suits them in a big way. same in afghanistan. in one case i was told that actually the u.s. forces realized that in one area, they realized that there were these five girl schools, bombed repeatedly and came to know later on it was not the afghan taliban. it was a member of a
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construction company because this meant business for him. you bomb a girl's school. everyone will say, taliban have done that. it means someone has to reconstruct it. his was the biggest company in the area. i'm not saying religious age sl not there or terror angle is linked in a significant fashion but the crime being the most important one is also at play in a big fashion. in karachi. i have hardly five minutes i think. in karachi, for example, they were able to unearth a training school which is not -- suicide bombing training school which is also terrible phenomenon in the waziristan area. this is meant the teach you how to rob a bank and the senior most police officer who was able to unearth that was killed in a major terrorist attack in karachi. so that i'm referring -- that's very, very critical issue for us to look at. the third one is the whole issue
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of -- i've clubled these two words, frontier state and a -- the frontier state, of course, the tribal belt from where they were able to create a hub both for afghan taliban and pakistani th taliban. there's no international border. yes, legally there is. of course united nations also identified that but historically projected as a frontier and different tribes divide along that line. and they operate in a different fashion to we think that we will be able to control and stop, it's impossible. i'll leave two other themes because after all i want you to read my book and find out what the other themes are and conclude my two ideas. my purpose was to help my students to understand these layers of themes and the nuances which are embedded there. but i have taken -- i've made an attempt in the end to say what in my view can resolve these
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issues. how to set the whole thing right. and other than the issues of rule of law and education, which are very critical, extremely important but long term. in my view, in short term, there are two critical things that we have to do. both in pakistan and afghanistan, particulafghanistan to tackle taliban. one is what i have written a lot about is civilian law enforcement infrastructure. which neither happened in afghanistan. it is great for 360,000 security forces in afghanistan. but how many of those are in police are whether the police in afghanistan is really police? i think it is a paramilitary force. investment in police would have left -- led to support of the civilian law enforcement infrastructure. which is linked to rule of law and rule of law is linked to democracy. you make a very clear choice when you invest in giving a country a military equipment and when you make an investment in training a judge.
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in afghanistan, it had worked out. one of my students who's still there and brave enough to opt to go for another tour in afghanistan and i must mention her. she was the first one who told me about how great is the kind of inspiration she is getting and said i'm going back because many afghan women are now opting to become judges and lawyers in afghanistan. and in the last three years i think consecutively, last year for sure, among the top 15 students who passed through the criminal justice system training to become a judge, out of the top 15, there were i think 8 or 9 are women and that's a consistent pattern. so, i'm not trying to say that afghan taliban are coming back in terms of revival. a lot has happened but this has to happen in a much more coordinated fashion. coordination in infrastructure, both in afghanistan and pakistan and believe me, it is going to be much cheaper than the other
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projects that we have conducted. and last and but not the least point, i think that the radicalization has taken root in both pakistan and afghanistan. without religious pluralism, you are not going to find a way out. the very sectarianism has seeped into not only south asia and the
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the teachings to provide a bridge for the shias and sunnis and all the other groups to come together because unless you have -- you can teach radicalization, you cannot teach it. thank you very much for your patience. [ applause ] >> thank you very much. hassan, a speech not just of an overview but an east asian and moved from pakistan to afghanistan and a stay of pakistan and going to push you again in that direction by asking you the first question which is, the risk of connection political and military connection between the afghan and pakistani government and you
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have explained this at the very beginning that we have differences between the two. now pakistan, recently, i heard the saying, of course, but also heard a completely different story from the -- saying, well, in fact, you know, those two have no cooperation and connection whatsoever. you need to move from one side to the other, this is probably a reality but a danger really is not there. and i'm not -- i'm just basically quoting people. so, you know, when we look at the region, when we try to look at the consequences of 12 years of war, when we look at what would be done and we look at the potential evolution, what can we say about this? well, what is your take on this question because they say what is beyond is the whole idea of spillover effect, of explosion of risk or something which is a series of localized -- my own inclination would be the second, this type of appearance of
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something larger but at the same time i recognize there are -- such as when you mentioned at the end, sectarianism and could go beyond that. so, can you give us your take on this and what is likely to lead us or not? >> i think to begin with, indeed, it was the idea of afghan taliban which inspired the pakistanis to think about a group such as taliban. so the -- in terms of ideas, in terms of the very phenomenon and the dynamic, it was the afghan taliban who came first and that's a different story how were they created, when's the role of the pakistani intelligence and how much is indigenous and it was an afghan phenomenon. later on, the pakistanis were inspired. actually, took them quite a while. in 2001, when the whole operation -- after the sad terrorist attacks, the way the
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international campaign in that region began, at that time, try doing this. "the new york times" or "the washington post" or any of the newspaper and try to find the word pakistani taliban. you will not find it. the first the group came into being is 2007. they continued to operate like so many others as militants who were always saying that we have affiliation with afghan taliban. if not at an operational level, at least at an ideological level because the root of both the talibans within the islamic context comes from the school of thought within the muslim sunni sect. but it is become so different that the source or the home of the urban -- still in india. the name of a city. there was a muslim activism movement which now in the indian part is a lot -- very progressive and middle of the road and very clearly against extremism and militant sy and
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those that who found a home mostly in the areas, they are phenomenon. they're the ones who are funded in the afghan jihadi, as well. the commonality between the sides of taliban is one inspirational. read, that's the kind of frame work they have. now we come to the third level of operational. whether they're both think they're actually -- they were very few instances of where they're linked. i'll give you one example. there was this one pakistani officer and i had an opportunity to go and meet their family and known as colonel imam who was the very senior pakistani intelligence officer and trained o o oma. trained in special forces in north carolina in u.s. he played a very important role in afghan jihad. he was sent because he started
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wearing a big turban. he was having a retired life. he was sent a few years ago by the pakistani intelligence and military to please go and talk to the pakistani tall been and complete cover from the afghan taliban. those afghan taliban with good relation of pakistan and by and large they kept a good relationship. the old guard. not the insurgents on the ground necessarily. the old guard and moved to pakistan. so the pakistani military and intelligence said to the colonel, we need your help. go and talk to the pakistani taliban and tell them that we have evidence that they're getting funding from india. so, we don't want -- and the afghan taliban arranged that message. they owed a lot to the colonel. the pakistani taliban got hold of the colonel and unfortunately his -- the video of his beheading is on youtube. the pakistani taliban kept him for over a year i think beheaded
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him and despite the best efforts of afghan taliban, you think the pakistani military never talked to save one of the sons of their soil? one of their legends? there was another case, son-in-law of pakistan's joint chief of staff was kidnapped. pakistani military and i was told this in various interviews. they tried the level best to tell the afghan taliban, please go and talk to the pakistani taliban. we need the people back. the pakistani taliban never listened. what i'm saying is, yes, you are right. in some ways there's that difference. however, what we have come to know very recently is that when the pakistani moved into the north area, they have unearthed a school of suicide bombers so on the face of it maybe they were disconnect in terms of operational issues but because of the commonality and
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ideological framework, they were at the end of the day, it was bound to happen to come together. and my view is that if -- if and when the u.s. forces will, international forces will go completely out of afghanistan, you will see a coming together of pakistani and afghan taliban. the reason being and this is i think the failure of the pakistani and of the security analysts and intelligence, that they always thought that they can have some level of friendship of the old guard and old taliban and pakistani taliban and afghan taliban somehow they will come and fight. that was wrong. it was -- they were using the same areas, similar logistics. people were jumping from one group to the other. so, i agree that in sometime the last few years, afghan and pakistani taliban disconnected and they're bound to come together more so, especially when the u.s. forces from that side will go away and when the
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pakistani operation in north waziristan will stop and bring them together. >> okay. let's -- please, i'm sure there are lots of questions. please introduce yourself and keep your question brief. sir? >> i'm washington, d.c. thank you for very illuminating talk. it's very enlightening. my question is, who's financing the taliban? where's the money coming from? >> for the pakistani taliban and afghan taliban, there are different answer. for the afghan taliban, we have so many study it is major chunk of the money is coming from odium. you hear different members of the international forces blame different people. if you talk to the british, you get a different officer. the american officers on the ground, you get a different answer. from the american perspective, our whole campaign in
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afghanistan was haphazard, was very well meaning with all the good intentions, a lot of taxpayers money, yours and my money but i think those that planned it planned it in a defective fashion and because they were never given a time line. no one went after the opium production in afghanistan in a strong fashion. it was very small efforts here and there. the net result, opium producers knew the only way to succeed and function is to continue to get the stand 20% or 30%, god knows maybe 50% cut to taliban. in case of taliban, they have on the ground, divided between the old guard in pakistan. the afghan insurgents in afghanistan are getting a major chunk of their money from opium. i think no doubt. secondly, there's some declassified materials, not declassified. wikileaks information and i have some restrictions to talk about
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it but what i can briefly mention is there's a lot of evidence, senior most officials of the u.s. government seen quoted there's funding from the gulf area to this. there are many sources in closed doors meeting and in "washington post," as well. so there's -- and when they probe further, that when the money is coming from gulf for some of the arab countries for the afghan taliban, what it means is in fact, a lot of money first being generated in kabul by the politician, political elite class as a kickback sent to gulf and then coming back in a legal fashion in the shape of investments or something else but a lot of that i think benefiting the afghan taliban, as well. the answer who funds the pakistani taliban is slightly different. they get most of their money and this is what the pakistani police officers said to me is through -- for kidnapping for ransom. bank robbery that is are there in karachi and south punjab
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where the political economy of religious radicalization has taken a life of its own. you can go start a small mosque in the corner. i think pakistan is a few countries you need no license, no registration of any sort if you want to build a mosque or a religious center of any sort. of course, it has to be islamic. try doing -- building a synagogue somewhere. the point is, this political economy of radicalization, also then gives the funding to this phenomenon. so the problem of taliban funding in pakistan is far more serious. when i discuss this with the pakistani military, who i must add has been very open to me when i was doing this research, and i asked them the same question. because i was making case to them, you are always going through kinetic approach. you have no law enforcement backing to tackle these -- to cut the financial links which are linked to the criminal areas an they mentioned, no, we have
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evidence that indian's also funding it. i said i would like to take it on the face value. where's the evidence? they said you mention about hakani group. "new york times," everyone says about other sources. we have never asked them to show the evidence. why does only pakistan asked to show evidence of indian involvement. i said, okay, still, i would like to know what's the nature of that evidence. and their argument is found indian money in some indian currency there which, again, is not always strong argue. . anyone can keep any currency you want. the point is that whether right or wrong or what's the extent, leave that aside. that's a long debate for another day. pakistani intelligence is generally i think convinced and at least some of the members that i met, they think that there's some funding from india, for some of those militant groups. and i would personally say having read and written about a little bit of intelligence organizations, you can never be
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certain. i don't know of any intelligence agency in the world which is known for real -- doing any spiritual or humanitarian work. intelligence agencies responsibilities are very different. but in this case, i have met many people who are convinced, actually senior members of government i had the opportunity to discuss and that's, of course, conspire torial and you get the mayor answer, one of the answers to the question is, not funded. of course, as stunned as i was and as much that i would like to argue for us it is important to understand that there are people in pakistan, educated people who are generally convinced whether it is denial, whether it is diversion or whether it is genuine, i have no way to have that empirical evidence in front of you, but there are people who are convinced that this is some american intelligence agency funding pakistani taliban or at
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least a segment of it and the center is serious because then those people will think, blame everything on outside forces and will not do, not do anything on which they can do to tackle this extremism and religious militancy. so that's why i mention that. that's not majority who thinks like that but that's also a factor. the reality is somewhere in between all that. if i have to guess, i would say it's kidnapping for ransom. it is bank rob ris, it's the religious centers which are also major source of funding for pakistani taliban. >> all right. >> mark schneider, international crisis group. as you know, thank you very much
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to when will we see the fattah moving fully under the regular law enforcement -- rule of law in pakistan under the constitution so that civilian law enforcement will extend into that area? and finally, one area where i have some questions. you indicated a separation between isi and the pakistan army in terms of operations. as you know, the leadership of the isi comes out of the army
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structure and moves back into the army at usually some point. and i say most of our own assessments would be that they're not separate entities or separate policies but, in fact, a single policy. and the support for the kahani group, for example, comes out of that single policy. one example might be perhaps you can explain why we haven't seen very much in the way of hakani victims in the current drive in north waziristan. >> thank you very much. first of -- all the work that crisis group is doing and their work on civilian law enforcement reform and on reform of the pakistani civil service and your pieces on pakistani -- i think crisis group has done a great job producing the extensive academic or solid research-based
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publications so thank you very much as someone who's interested in south asian studies. on the bill, i think it was a great idea. one of the best ideas. as i may add, the last sentence in my book is that the best thing in my assessment that united states has done for pakistan or in pakistan in the last six decades is actually the recent but the most extensive expansion of the fulbright program. the number of scholars and state department, they deserve full credit for that. it has taken a long time for this policy shift to have taken place but it has taken place. it will take many years for us to see because a new generation of pakistani scholars is being produced pakistan. i have some friends from state department if they can remind me and i think already hundreds of graduates of fulbright and will graduate next coming couple of
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years. it's -- i think after only pakistan is the biggest recipient or maybe largest recipient of fulbright scholarships. this is a product of the idea and that's the great thing. however, in case of police and law enforcement, it has happened, frankly, quite late and there is not much that is being done. because unlike in the military relationship where the department of defense there are set principles and very clear demarcation of responsibilities, who will engage with the military of a partner nation? when it comes to police, you'll be surprised in the united states there's no single office that can coordinate any law enforcement partnership. i really hope there will be more funding to go towards inin. there's a history of we have done in latin america in 1960s
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and '70s and kept u.s. away from this. this is an idea that i want to write my next book of law enforcement partnerships as a new model for intervention. not that i support international interventions but if you have to intervene in a failed state, what is the first thing you have to do? always support the civilian law enforcement infrastructure. the difference between the roads in karachi and for that matter in virginia is that here where i am crossing a certain limit, i gate $200, $300 ticket and then extremely careful next 6 months. in karachi or elsewhere, you cannot do that ultimately it comes down to law enforcement. and the rule of law systems so thank you very much for that those points. in fattah, thank you for reminding me about that question. i should have mentioned one of my major findings also is and one of the ways of which to tackle the situation is by expanding the rate of pakistan into the tribal area. currently it is partly
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autonomous. no pakistani courts or police in that area unless you incorporate the pakistani tribal belt into mainstream pakistan, again, this will continue to go back to become a hub of terrorism. on the last point, on the differences between military intelligence, it's a difficult question. and in terms of the rendition, it's easy to see the rendition in pakistani mainstream military because you know the profiles of the top generals. i think now they are very well coordinated and very well focused. this is not primarily in the book but what i have found out recently is there's clarity of thinking as regards operation in north waziristan. in fact, when i asked a general, and this is mentioned about the hakani group, they say we will coerce them, we will squeeze them, we will go after them. but what i heard yesterday,
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there's a tweet, on twitter, a leading pakistani politician, he said, i wish i could have quoted exactly but he said something to the effect of the suicide bombing attack that happened yesterday, 45 people dead, that this is conducted by those people who have been pushed out of pakistan. now, some of the people believing there's americans also believe who believe in conspiracy theories and believe pakistan is pushing out hakani group to be in afghanistan and create, make the life hell. there are others who think they have done it, finally recognized to push out hakani from the area and unlike pakistani taliban and pakistan is helping u.s. coordinate and direct drone strikes, one happened yesterday. this is -- i think this is personal my guess and estimate and well directed, very coordinated.
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pakistan is going against pakistani taliban very strongly but coming to hakani group, at least they're not directing them to a new sanctuary. previously, south waziristan, okay, we are conducting an operation. you better go to -- they were told go into the north waziristan. this time around in my assessment, the hakani group is really pushed out. not killed or targeted but not provided sanctuary. the pakistani military i think is now based on my understanding is now a bit late in the game but they fully recognize the issue. it is very difficult to find out what the isis is thinking. i will not go in that area. i really and earnestly hope that isi realized this. i would like to believe that's taken place because you are right. the top general in isi reports to the army chief but then lower level operators and then there
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are old handlers and then contractors and i don't know what is the mindset there. but the military leadership i think is now pretty clear on this issue. i promise to be brief and answer them. i'm sorry. i'm a professor. i'm trained to give long answer. >> thank you very much. i'm so grateful, hassan, for such a penetrating and many layers. very educative. thank you very much. an observation and a question. you mentioned bhutto's assassination. i think some of the question would remain being debated. who was behind president kennedy's killing. who brought down the plane. it's one of those cases which will continue to remain to be debated.
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you have mentioned at the end the recommendation that you gave. the religious pluralism and law enforcement enhancements and reinforcements. this, he doubled the salaries and doubled the forces in punjab and the crime also doubled in punjab in the same way. my question to you is, based on your recommendation for religious purlism and this law enforcement enhancement, my question is, that in most of the cases in pakistan, the prime ministers became prime ministers through an accident. if you become prime minister through an accident or if you are asked to make a recommendation pragmatically, what is something specifically those three or four steps and
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you will do to bring this kind of terrorism and instability to a closure? thank you. >> thank you very much. you're right about that. the issues. but the reason i would really like pakistan to thoroughly investigate and figure out who killed them because in the absence of a very clear answer, the conspiracy theories continue to be more popular and then those who are behind the killings continue to think they can kill and get away with it. and we have seen that in the recent past many of the politicians were killed, people of the national party, the party in that area, members of the pakistan people's party, many of the leaders, there was a very well-known member of the parliament, a christian lead who was a member of the
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parliament -- a member of the cabinet, also, were killed. in case of bhutto, we don't know who killed her. the governor of pakistan, who was killed by his own guard because he said you have committed blasphemy supporting a hindu girl who committed blasphe blasphemy. and the fact that the tragedy is and i must say this, that he was a governor of punjab. there was not a single imam that day when he was killed ready to stand and lead the prayers for him. including the officially paid imam who should have been fired. that imam was not fired. that imam is still the official imam of the mosque of the governor's house and there's that fear. the point is very well taken. in case of sharif, raising the salaries is only takes care of one part of the problem. the real issue is, your transformation as an institution in terms of forkus on forensics,
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investment in new technologies, in terms of -- there's a reason why there are many modern states the cameras on the highways and other places because you can just after the event, those are not meant to stop terrorism. the modern policing concepts are not particularly focused on stopping terrorism. they're focused on investigating terrorism when it happens. pakistan is not invested that in any case and that's a choice pakistan has made, frankly, whether they want and with due respect to my friend from the air force, pakistan and don't take it personally, whether pakistan wants f-16s or pakistan wants modern police stations. you can rather than -- price of one f-16, you build 30 new modern pli stations and not only about salary but a policy choice and those that provide pakistan with the weapons, they have a
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choice. i think most likely the best chance i will have is to be able at some stage advise the prime minister. i love my job as an academic and love to be a professor and writer so there's no chance that i'll ever become a prom bime minister but if i get a chance to advise and i quote a pakistani friend who served in high positions and i'll actually record him because i'm mentioning him, very bright pakistani foreign service officer who was here on a u.s. scholarship a couple of years ago, went back. he had mentioned in his experience working in the prime minister's office that pakistan's 50% of all the problems can be resolved if you get an honest and an efficient and a competent prime minister. because some of the things are very, very basic. for instance, and that's my idea, the first and foremost will be rooting out corruption. and that can only happen if you instill a form of


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