tv Reagan Administration Middle East and Asia Policies CSPAN April 2, 2017 12:15pm-2:01pm EDT
unfoldsn, where history daily. in 1979, c-span was created as a public service america's cable television companies. it is brought to you today by your cable or satellite provider. next on american history tv, a panel of historians explores the reagan administration's relations with the middle east and asia. they discussed fears of an american decline as well as the cold war importance of these regions. the clements center for national security at austin texas posted this -- hosted this program. this program is about an hour and 45 minutes. >> thank you all for coming to the final panel of the day.
this has been a long but rich and rewarding day. ofdo have another full day panels and discussions tomorrow, which will make a full two-and-a-half day for this conference. this conference has been going on so long that barack obama was still president when we started. [laughter] >> imagine that. this conference itself is now part of history. for a final discussions today, we have to mini panels. coverp panel here will all of asia outside of russia and china. we will start with robert -- of rinceton university. comments onr some the reagan ministrations stance
toward afghanistan. we will continue the conversation with the more broad look at the region as a whole, the greater middle east from india to yemen, how the administration understood or misunderstood it. i may interject with a question or two. we will do a pivot from the middle east to east asia for our final to discussions of the day. jennifer miller of dartmouth college, no relation. dr. miller will discuss the u.s.-japan relationship. and clinton of washington will discuss the u.s.-south korea relationship. that goes without saying thanks to the organizers and sponsors that have been tremendous.
i will just dive into it. among the numerous battles an waged,ag afghanistan should be understood as a central front. you cannot claim this distinction because it received the most attention, i think sustained deliberations only happened during the second term. nor on the basis of the resources expended on it. was extensivene and unprecedented. it should be understood in terms of the expectations and hopes that reagan and other policymakers affixed to victories there. no other battlefield held the globally symbolic ramifications attached to afghanistan, nor was any other anti-communist cause outside of eastern europe nearly
as popular across the american political spectrum. the pursuit of victory limited tot diplomacy could achieve the detriment of soviets, americans, and afghanistan al ike. it appears when early on into the soviet invasion that the president policy realized -- breznev policy realized they had made a mistake. they made repeated inquiries about the possibility of talks in 1981 and 1982. although soviet officials insisted on the cessation of u.s. aid to the mujahedin and sought international recognition of the government, the most serious entreaty
of 1981 whenctober to allassador past -- day. he was struck by the communicate which offered to talk in a businesslike manner and without unnecessary polemics. he suggested that this should be taken seriously. in arecommendation farcical paperchase failed. it is a long and convoluted tale. reagan did not actually learn of any of this until december. the entirety of november passed by. afghanistan were unlikely to take wing. hade and his adversaries run out the clock.
it is unsurprising from all we know of the order interpersonal relations that afghanistan would divisionre issue of between them. this was more than a class of personalities. the soviet war and its influence animated combatants on both sides. the early reagan white house was at least as susceptible as its predecessor to the popular notion that the soviet invasion constituted a drive to the persian gulf. ev as theered brezhn long-awaited inheritor of czarist schemes to inherit a warm water port. aserstanding the invasion exactly about the soviet union's own sizable muslim opposition. he argued for limited talks on the issue, this ran into the
following year. he was opposed vigorously by the national security adviser. when the talks finally occurred in 1982, they were fruitless, and hague was out of office. the failure of u.s. the premises is unsurprising. offer you ae to thesis that there was some lost possibility at that point. the factors apparent in this phase of the afghanistan ghtflict should broader li on the reagan administration. there was a deep-seated skepticism toward negotiations with the soviet union in general and afghanistan in particular. distrusted soviet entreaties. they believed that moscow was comparatively invulnerable to the domestic cost of
counterinsurgency warfare. they fused czarist and totalitarian traits and pursued a hybrid adversary. the soviet union would therefore be able to lead along. war without facing any serious domestic opposition. this contraband much of the intelligence coming out of moscow and afghanistan where the united states maintained a quiet and the sea presence. forward as hague waned, the nsc staff succeeded in reversing -- cork junction of the administration. , which didth nsdd 32 not mention afghanistan by name but did mention containing soviet control throughout the
world. pivotal 75 which was signed by reagan in january of 1983, this was more specific. to describe external resistance to the soviet imperialism as a core national objective, and the language specific to afghanistan specify the need for keeping maximum pressure on the soviets. thesis appeared in this document. the united states moved ever closer to a broader spansion of its aid pipeline to the mujahedin, which began to happen in 1983 and 1984. it is time to talk about george schultz, who is now on scene. clark schultz and famously had a difference of opinion on nsdd25.
he disputed some elements of 75, but he did not contest the call for soviet withdrawal from afghanistan. i don't believe that schultz embraced the imperial thesis. he recalled, we did not spend a lot of time thinking about why they did what they did. they did it. explained the soviet invasion of 1985 as a manifestation of the brezhnev doctrine, which he described as what is mine is mine, and what is yours is a war grabs. he continued to engage his soviet counterpart in afghanistan, which i've been -- i find no significant talks for
the remainder of the first term. the locus of the activity moved to the u.s. -- un. the reagan administration was beginning to expand the struggle against the soviets on a number of other fronts. reagan's administration bickered about the prospect for dialogue with the soviets, it looked ahead with an ambitious campaign to condemn the invasion. throughout the 1980's, resolutions at the u.n. passed by overwhelming margin condemning the soviet invasion. only the soviet allies managed to vote in opposition. within the u.n. and national media, the united states condemned the soviet union for atrocities in afghanistan including the controversial allegation that they were employing chemical weapons.
this incensed the soviets. they told the u.s. to knock off to no avail. there was a broad and public campaign around the world directed into afghanistan. the early results disappointed the reagan white house. opposition that the vietnam war had gathered around the world as a counterpart that they were trying to reach. can stand -- comparing the afghanistan outrage left them disappointed, making them feel there was yet another double standard in the world. congress took the lead, and the reagan administration began to follow. congress knew the example of the european parliament's in 1982 to be the first of several afghanistan days.
the reagan administration responded belatedly but with some vigor. this photo was taken after a signing ceremony on march 10, 1982. reagan is embracing a young afghan refugee. he praised a nation of unsung heroes whose courageous struggles is one of the ethics of ourtime -- epics time. ofre were public observances afghanistan day in a number of u.s. cities, drawing more than just the small afghan american community. european americans were interested and turned out for the event. observation of this day the law offubsequent years -- fell in subsequent years. in moscow, this raised the cost ground to the
u.s. this was the earliest evidence that the white house received soviet intervention more as a vulnerability. efforts toesidential draw public attention to afghanistan engaged reagan's own interests and said that these. -- sympathies. he felt strongly about an issue after the next people affected by. as was the case with the pentecostals, so with the afghan refugees in that. -- he met. this is from january, 1986, when he met severely mutilated children from the war. he wrote in his diary that they mere ear babies. -- babies. to bring congress
into this. he was not acting alone. , who is, charlie wilson fairly local by the rest of united states standards, worked to expand the aid pipeline. he got an entire movie out of this. he is far from alone. james scott observed that the age of the mujahedin was the one issue that could unite congress. cks of legislators who rose opposition to aid in other parts of the third world had very little to say. liberals were happy to endorse on while opposing reagan other policy issues. this strong foundation of support was
probably too much of good thing. -- of a good thing. acrimony,e internal it seems the objectives behind the aid pipeline received little strategic discussion. it does not seem to me based on the research that a very serious sustained discussion again before 1984. that donald ford of the nsc staff, an interesting figure who died young of liver cancer in 1986, may have been the main instigator. policye, our present appears to be one in which means are seldom examined and basic against are only loosely defined. the contours of the
reagan doctrine. he wrote, the notion of afghanistan should be a mirror. afghanistan can be treated as a thesure point upon which soviets can be punished for misbehavior elsewhere in the world and on other issues. thereafter, under mcfarlane's direction, the nsc staff worked to broaden support for the afghan cause, addressing media outreach, collaboration with numerous ngos, psychological warfare, and humanitarian assistance. reagan made his famous doctrine speech in 1985, shoring up u.s. support for the rebels. the next month, he convinced reagan to further expand assistance in the country. 166 recommitted the administration to forcing a withdrawal from the country.
intriguingly, if positive the resumption of arms control talks in geneva, it is important to signal we will oppose unacceptable soviet behavior in other fields. something worth lingering on. ofultz was a firm proponent aging the mujahedin. -- aiding the mujahedin. he accepted the thesis that afghanistan constituted a pressure point upon the soviet union where it could be made to suffer in exchange for being intractable on other issues. even though the residual nsc suspicion mark earlier years, i find evidence that it persisted into the final years of the reagan administration.
a decision in 1987, in which schultz gave ground on one fundamental point on which the subunit agreed to death soviet union agreed to withdraw from afghanistan. he accepted a link between ending the aid to the mujahedin and the soviet withdrawal. reagan walked that back. the united states held to that position later on. the geneva accords of the following year were included. neither side elite event. aid side continued to their favorite afghans. congressional pressure limited the options available to reagan and schultz. reagan's afghanistan policy was under attack by both parties.
the democrats regained the senate in 1986. the majority leader accused the reagan and menstruation of trying to sell afghan rebels down the river. reagan observed of his conservative critics it is amazing how certain they can be little.y know so d--m i think they at least drive the menstruation to accelerate public diplomacy. reagan invited several mujahedin leaders. in subsequent negotiations, schultz and his equity told them that any deal on afghanistan needed to make it by congress.
separately, and perhaps most critically, and questioning reagan's support for the rebels, congress did not pose critical questions about the future of afghanistan after soviet withdrawal. i have a hard time thinking that reagan ever envisioned with drawing support from the rebels. the problem never confronted him. the soviet presence outlasted his presidency by several weeks. rebelse of the shortcomings was not fully available. countryerests in the waned. reagan's war in afghanistan although sometimes rationalized by a thesis of a russian drive to the gulf was never primarily about securing soviet withdrawal. had it represented the threat
that the early reagan team believe, they should have responded more seriously to early inquiries about the soviet withdrawal and not cared as much about two soviets left behind in who this evidence left behind. policy defined u.s. toward the conflict as a means to demonstrate to the soviet union the cost of unacceptable behavior in the world. schultz and reagan believed that a soviet withdrawal would be noticed elsewhere, particularly eastern europe. helpless in the face of the polish crackdown, the reagan administration chose to challenge the brezhnev doctrine in the minds of afghanistan. -- mountains of afghanistan. while afghan relief and aid
attracted support throughout the western world, americans felt a special sympathy. perhaps because of the lingering grievance in vietnam, but more from reagan's success in defining afghans in ways congruent to americans. sometimes deeply hostile to the west, the mujahedin enjoyed a level of american seem never remotely near it by the contras. the righteousness of their cause in pursuit of outright victory. domestic politics of the afghan dynamic withique theress trying to outdo administration. hardened by their cheapness today, the reagan -- achievements, the reagan administration were trapped by success.
provedt in afghanistan historically fleeting. after the reagan era, pursuit of victory came abandonment. indifference. the afghans could continue to fight amongst themselves, and hardly anyone cared, for a while anyway. [applause] >> thank you. great paper. we are well aware of charlie wilson. host the charlie wilson share in afghan studies. >> thank you to the organizers for creating what has been a really interesting occasion. i want to preface this talk by saying this is very early days for what is possibly going to be a project i have not decided.
i would say this paper focuses more on the global politics aspect rather than reagan as a individual,gure, and i'm not going to be discussing at length individual members from the state department or nsc as has been the case with other papers. i am more interested in the international situation that confronted reagan at the time he came to the presidency. i am particularly interested in the importance of the idea in place of southwest asia in foreign policy. i find this interesting because of the way it amalgamated different regions of the global south i were frequently discussed in isolation. includes south and central asia, the persian gulf, and east africa and the middle east.
it is this massive region, largely united in american policymaker's minds as a place of islam. what is intriguing is that it necessary to factors that influence a wider range of countries. countries that have not been considered together as a common area. i think it is important that we consider the invasion of afghanistan and revolution of iran together and think about thishese events impacted region as a whole. i am interested in how these two andts affected afghanistan pakistan, iran, and india. the thing that is interesting about this region is that throughout reagan's presidency,
the entire region is obligated by a series of economy movements. i want to pose a couple of questions. i don't think this paper has answered, it is more posing questions. this perhaps prevented reagan and his administration from dealing with afghanistan effectively. point that i will be focusing on is this question of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of state in the region of southwest asia. iran,rd yesterday about the idea of khomeini being this terrible figure. reagan favored in iran that existed as a nationstate on the without middle east
iran. is i think this idea of southwest asia is important as a precursor to discussion in the 1990's of the class of civilizations. -- clash of civilizations. i don't want to say there is a direct correlation. i think it is important because some of the ethnic groups we see coming to the four of discussion -- fore of discussion come back after 9/11 and today with discussions of isis. the interest in southwest asia resulted from two specific concerns, containing soviet influence and preserving western oil access after the context of the energy crisis of the 1970's. less than a month after soviet troops entered afghanistan, carter declared the region now
threatened by soviet troops is a great strategic importance. thanontains more two thirds of the world's exportable oil. it brought the soviets within 300 miles of the indian ocean. this situation demands elective effort to meet the threat to security. this speech emphasized the need for cooperation with local states and the need to prevent access to the persian gulf. reagan reiterated this policy. he indicated the need to contain and rollback soviet influence and preserve u.s. alliances in southwest asia. the director pointed out that unstable governments, inefficient economies, and the persistence of traditional
creatects opportunities for soviet expansion. the scarcity of resources, oil, increasing terrorism, uncertainty of political success , and reticence on the part of western countries all contribute to the unstable international environment. he goes on, for these reasons, the 1980's will pose the greatest challenge for our survival since world war ii. the reagan and menstruation pursued- administration -- the efficacy of the u.s. central command was predicated on the continued stability of the region. u.s. concerns regarding southwest asia was integrity of the states comprising a strategic region. postcolonial nationstates that share internationally recognized
borders. u.s. strategy was to maintain the same map of southwest asia in the 1980's that existed in the 1970's. circumstances, which then inserted the potential to upset regional and global interests. as one cia analysis pointed out, the ethnic charter fee of southwest asia was such that crisis and confrontation are particularly prone to separatist activity. the more that third world thatics fracture, the more some governments will support separatist activities in other countries. the soviet invasion of afghanistan made apparent the potential for the soviet union to disrupt established political geographies of the region. the revolution in iran to a certain extent as well. discuss thetrations
potential breakdown of state lines two to soviet pressure. the director of the cia predicted soviet leadership based by resistance is likely to increase further of time he omyputes -- further auton disputes. that the state as the unit needed to be the key actor in preserving peace. reagan pursued this project. in july of 1983, reagan affirmed the necessity of maintaining the sovereignty of all nations in the region. the soviet intervention poses a direct threat to the established state system. u.s. officials agree that soviet presence meant the nation no
longer existed. the soviets point of view, the situation has become a reversible. for all practical purposes, afghanistan has been annexed. this means afghanistan served as soviethpad for intervention in southeast asia. a number of officials highlighted the belief of soviet access to the persian gulf. by expanding the defective soviet boundary into afghanistan and iran and pakistan, that would achieve. the regional relations at provided theistan critical opportunity for the u.s. to demonstrate its dedication to the territorial sovereignty of southwest asia states. the regional relations necessitated a renewed
u.s.-pakistan relationship. noted, sovietber access to pakistan would allow the naval bases along the eastern approach to the persian gulf to attack around the flank and undermine u.s. influence in the region. these aspects are well known. that is kind of this prolonged usa to pakistan in the name of response to afghanistan. u.s.-pakistan the relationship of the 1980's, far less obvious but more critical factor in the relationship was the territorial sovereignty of pakistan. us aid to do little if pakistan ceased to exist.
this emphasizes the stability and security of pakistan. the same memo that exhorted the reagan administration to pursue strong ties between u.s. and pakistan warned, that because pakistan is a critical point, it must be firmly anchored. objective is a strong, stable pakistan that is capable of resisting soviet aggression or coercion. this can only be a compost by improving pakistan's inability to defend its western border against limited soviet incursions. another strategic directive asserted that pakistani ties to the soviet goal required territorial integrity. this idea of integrity and 70 up time and again -- sovereignty appear time and again. this is probably an obvious point, but the issue is that
thismstances wilbely assertion. theirns of afghans flood homelands and settle across the border in pakistan. about theirrried implications to broader security. the department of state re-think argued that the policy towards pakistan today is to help secure independence in the face of the threat of 100,000 soviet troops across the border in afghanistan. policys critical to u.s. in defining the extent of soviet influence. the international boundary needed to delineate between afghanistan and pakistan and the various between the soviet union and southwest asia. this was not alone in concerning u.s. officials about southwest
security at large. it proved a key source of instability across southwest asia, involving not only minorities in pakistan but india and iran. localhout the 1970's, ethnic groups demanded increasing autonomy. much has been rushed by the pakistani military by 1977. issue with a massive it about pakistan in the 21st century. the big issue as well that the u.s. government highlighted was that this ethnic group lived across western pakistan and well in iran. dwelled in irian. aide --or policy
legally because it could blunt the appeal of pro-soviet separatists by giving these ethnic minorities more mistake in pakistan's future. sdd 99 discusses this threat. pakistan's southeast border with indian punjabs educators to rise economy. the rise of fundamentalism had a huge impact. this idea of terrorism really comes to the fore. criticalamentalism is during the 1980's. this is because of the widespread impact of the
movement. the prime minister was assassinated by the bodyguards, which unleashed a wave of violence across the subcontinent. this mattered within the domestic politics of india and because it aggravated into pakistan relations. justifying pursuit of nuclear weapons, indian leaders accused pakistani leaders of training camps for terrorists to cross the international border. this was a pernicious issue as the u.s. try to deal with the soviet invasion, relationship with pakistan and india. the reagan administration was convinced that the relationship needed to be improved, and they could play a critical role in doing this.
because of these transporter issues and ethnic conflicts, the u.s. government did not feel capable of addressing this issue. this is notable for a lot of reasons. it highlights that the border disputes compensated relations across southwest asia. so frequently we think of india as a south asian state. we think about u.s. indian relations or the u.s. pakistan relationship, but we really see how these different autonomy movements are spreading across the region and causing concern for a lot of these countries. autonomy movement had the ability to undermine national security and sovereignty and shape interregional affairs. renewed tensions between india and pakistan during the 1980's,
disputes fed into the iran-iraq war 1988. the government used their kurdish minority relations to sway kurdish resistance the opposing countries. k ethanol nationalistsurdish served as a political tool. this meant that a number of these transporter nationalist movements, located the political landscape facing the u.s. administration. these autonomy movements provided dangerous opportunities for manipulation. this is obvious from the discussions going on during the late carter administration and reagan administration. it persisted throughout the reagan administration.
soviet action in afghanistan blurred boundaries and threatened to spark chaos. one specialist highlighted this in 1986, playing to the fact that there was a communist believe that at the turn of the decade the soviets might induce the call for internal assistance, supporting the creation of a blue bulls republic of azerbaijan. he noted that while some of these fears had abated by the late 1980's, he went on to predict that if the soviet union were to become involved in southwest asia, it would be aiding these ethno -nationalist movements. ofpite the rupture u.s.-iranian relations and even
though there was a rupture in the light 1970's, the belief was maintained in the reagan administration that the diminishment of iran as a country would create a power vacuum. what is clear is that the same international boundaries that iran and afghanistan and pakistan had in the 1970's needed to persist into the bey one ofo the lastnd factors. islam. one of the really interesting factors was that analysts within the reagan administration motive this question and focused on ethno-nationalism over the question of religion. islam astalked about being the signifier of a backwards country and having not
an insignificant role to play in the region. it is worth considering the fact that reagan's government struggled to deal with these ethno-nationalist movements. also them persist. -- most of them persist. there.end >> thank you. [applause] both.nk you i want to interject one question before we finish with our final few analysts. i enjoyed the interplay of your papers. you mentioned your observation about islam and the way it was perceived. i want to ask about that. i think your suggestion was that officials in the reagan administration and intelligence community may have missed the
rise of political islam, misunderstood it, and they were so focused on the cold war, they missed that other dynamic. what do you think of that? ath of you, if they had proper understanding, whatever that is, would that have changed the reagan administration's policy toward the end game in the afghan war? so first off. >> the sentiment that i think is observed is just so powerful. it probably would have dug in in the mix.eption
maybe in conjunction with other factors may have strengthened his hand as he thought about life beyond associate withdrawal. i don't have the documents together. it looks like there were more serious and interesting productions that we thought about previously. should throw in the caveat that there were a lot of layers of separation. .ot just geographical they were going to be the ones that could tolerate being around .mericans the pakistanis were managing a lot on the ground. of the worldion where tropes have this amazingly powerful influence on the and the tryd area
for the port, which is attached to this myth about peter the great, i feel like our great grandchildren are going to be hearing about this, it just won't die, even though it was a forgery that the french put out. i guess i'm a little bit pessimistic. point -- iabout the think the point about these persistent tropes, what becomes is the overwhelming focus on the idea of the tribe as a sociopolitical organization. and the sort of assumption and tribal politics that would play out over and beyond questions of allegiance, alliance in terms of politically active groups within. extent that --n
considering the fact that the administration showed a higher degree toward the fact that the service was so fragmented and there was very little attempt by analysts or american representatives to try to promote some form of cohesion onhin this group or focus what these various political organizations were promoting, rather than just being backwards. there is never any definition or explanation about what that actually meant. there is no discussion of what political future these groups are actually promoting. less of a dominating focus on these breaks.
>> it is fairly pessimistic. it seems you are suggesting policymakers preconceived notions to come in to office with us are so powerful it is extraordinarily difficult to recognize new information and incorporated into a new forecast going forward. thank you both. other hand it over to the dr. miller, who talk about the other part of this region. reiteratedo open by that by reiterating everyone's thanks and including the everyone including the in it. paper doesn that my not place reagan as the center. interested in the question of narratives around trade in american politics, and especially narratives that claim free trade of american decline.
that was the mindset in which i was writing this paper. and my connection to fritz's paper, yesterday you talked andt's -- about extensive info foreign money. the japanese were some of the biggest buyers of u.s. debt and moved over to investing in u.s. companies and properties. most prominent being columbia pictures, the purchase of rockefeller center. i want to focus on trade rather than investment in my paper. i want to mention that japanese investment and purchase of u.s. debt is another key element. in 1981, the editorial page of the new york times published an unusual plea. please return the favor, occupy us. the author claimed that the united states needs renewal, a
new beginning in the words of president reagan. japanese leadership supported by american hard work could conn's this noble purpose. while perry saw the possibility of renewal in the japanese model, other observers saw a far more nefarious outcome. the 1980's japan had become the second-largest economy in the world. seemed poised to overtake the united states by 1990. the japanese threat, felt especially strongly in trade against a backdrop of american industrial decline, the trade grew from 16 to 60 billion. japanese cars and electronics became common aspects of american consumer and material life. what do we think about? we think about the walkman.
for many americans the specter of japanese success hung heavily. aboutrked deep fears japanese global dominance and profound concerns about the possibility of american decline. why did japan play such a americansrole in political, economic and public consciousness throughout the decade. fritz's whole paper argued that the united states had structural advantages in the economy. a key part of the story as well as political pressure, straightforward racism, powerful memories of world war ii. tonight i want to focus on another explanation. mainly the fear that japan had beaten the united states at own game. commentators repeatedly claimed that japan was
undertaking a wholesale assault on the american economy using protectionism to prevent american access to japan and government subsidies and corporate collusion. japan could do this, they claimed, because the united states had created the world in which japan was thriving. the united states said the argument -- they doggedly maintained their commitment to tradeoper ethics of free and the japanese used unsavory practices for free trade systems. equally alarming prominent observers argued that with japan's success exposing the possible weakness of america's own economic model. a wave of literature argue japan was winning precisely because it was the anti-america, because of active government planning and a group centered in individualistic mentality. stemmed from the flaws and weaknesses embedded in america, offering a chilling
portrait of america's own future. no product was more symbolic of the japanese threat than the automobile. made up 25% of american auto sales. those a dramatic jump from earlier. unemployment had reached 300,000 people. many members of the auto industry blamed japan. heads, unionmpany leaders appear to congress for legislation that would place tariffs on japanese cars. the japanese government did voluntarily adopt restraints. tragically in june 1982, a chrysler plant supervisor beat to death a 27 euros chinese-american, allegedly shouting "it's because of you we are out of work or co--- out of
work." as time magazine wrote in march 1981, detroit's problems have come to symbolize the ills of u.s. business in general. the saga of american cars in the past three years has resulted in too many industries in the past three decades as customers have been snatched away by industrious japanese competitors selling products at lower prices. it seemed evident that japan's success could only be the product of nefarious and sneaking policies that cheated that the -- cheated the global trade regime. the japanese were described as ,neaky, immature, pernicious all accusations that echo strong themes of world war ii depicteda, which often the japanese as sneaky.
and world with two began the depicted the insects. that's the pick them as insects. successo argue japan sparked intense fears because it cap doubts on the standing believe that free trade and american dominance -- in a 1985 article in a new york times magazine, the pulitzer hade when it -- winner claimed japan had risen to its dominant position -- they have devised a system of government industry partnerships that is a paradigm for directing modern industrial states for national purposes. designed for action in the new world of global commerce, the united states blueprint. he claimed this would destroy both past andtity
present. perhaps we did not win world war ii. perhaps the japanese unknown even to themselves where the winners. this claim that japan's success of because ofite american economic trade and political policy was not limited. speaking to the ways and means committee in monday's congressional hearings, congressman sam gibbons made a similar argument. staffer to check how american businesses were using a data -- using the data provided by the american commerce. but, he claimed, that office was always full of japanese. they were giving out the information we were making public and doing something with it. the racial implications of his language harkens back to world war ii. but his claim that the japanese were turning the american system against itself expressed a different fear.
in particular the cold war -- latee documents written in 1949 and 1950's, u.s. policymakers expressed a profound fear that the tele terrien enemies would use the openness and free speech of democratic politics and civil society to undermine democracy from within. 1980's the u.s. between conflict america's proclaimed commitment is free enterprise and market and trade. and japan's alledge request for reliesmarket document -- on industrial collusion and widespread cooperation. in this decade the notion was especially alarming because of reagan's own robust commitment to free enterprise.
reagan came to office in 1981. american prosperity would be achieved through deregulation. free enterprise is not only entered tries -- not only energize the economy but it is a global of american character. as he claimed, only when individuals are free to worship, only then do society becomes progressive and free. japan's meteoric ride seems to cast doubt on this ambitious agenda. subverted they structures and values of the american economy and free world. baldrige -- in a 1984 meeting, japan clearly intends to dominate by 1990 or 2000. commitmentamerica's
to smith's invisible hand of the market had done little to slow the japanese intrusion. in light of these growing fears the government adopted a policy towards japan in the middle of the decade, one that targeted japanese industrial policy. lowering trade barriers. specifically targeting japanese industrial policy. press officials identified a series of beachhead sectors, such a semi conductors, in which they are going to pressure the japanese government for stopping financial important industries such as subsidies, research support and finance planning. the administration became more aggressive in conducting formal investigations into japanese trade practices using section 301 of the 1974 trade actively heard referenced in the brazil paper. for example placing new duties
on japanese semi conductors. they are a big team from 1984 to 1988. spike the reagan administration administration's increasingly aggressive approach, japan's local economic trial seems to continue unabated. observers, a specially people in congress and outside the reagan administration, japan seems to forecast a permanent weakening of american capabilities and resolve. the matter what american policymakers did, the trade deficit only continues to rise throughout the decade. observers, this raises a far more troubling prospect. but the very structures and values that americans had lionized essential to their political, economic, and ideological system, free enterprise, low government regulation, american individualism were in fact the source of america's weakness. observers reflected positively on japanese industrial policy, japanese management.
for example, japan is number one, lessons for america. the japanese succeeded because agreement and consensus, rather than individual brilliance and charismatic leadership. we have supported egoism and self interests and damaged groups with comment interests. both are essentially arguing america is weak because of individualism. the unitedrs cited states commitment to the free market as the cause. in his 1982 book miracle by design, the real reasons behind lowers economic success, taxes and competition were listed as the source. and claims that reagan offered a
vision in which "prosperity will come if we just give entrepreneurial free enterprise. he bemoaned that the true capitalism professes a adam smith will do the job. judging from the current state of the american economy, adams hand seems to have a case of arthritis. a former reagan administration official had gone on church to japan in the first half of the decade. book, trading places, how we are giving our future to japan and how to reclaim it, he offered a sobering assessment on american failures. american individualism had given away every epic of himself. own purposeca's
that paved the way for japanese success. strong belief the that the issue is neither japan nor japanese relationship to you -- relationship. our problems are only symptomatically larger fight. our inability to compete with japan springs from the same as the decaygard of our central cities, the permeation of our society and rugs and the decline of our educational system. they argued the intense anxiety over japan's economic success during the 1980's did not stem from the economic impact, political pressure, or the use of historical frameworks. equally important is what japan's rise said about america itself, that america was being
taken advantage of. that it had lost the resolve or willingness or ability to truly compete. that it had the wrong values. that even capitalism itself were on trial. because of america's own institutional and ideological business, because of america's own lack of resolve. if reiterating languages and ideas and anxieties that deeply shaped the united states conceptualism of communist threats throughout the cold war. they depicted japan's rise as potent evidence of america's divide -- america's demise. >> thank you dr. miller.
policy toward south korea. my paper revisits the troop withdrawal plan and eventually reversed and fully canceled by ragan. the paper traces the process whereby the plan was devised, implemented, delayed, and fully stopped. mainly concern over instability and elsewhere. to maintain aed position and credibility in the international system and east asia more specifically, restructuring of the u.s. rok alliance command architecture, which increased south korea responsibility. so in some level they started the process.
reagan who reinforce these patterns, several of which outlived the cold war. i will start by going over some of these basic patterns. i'm going to bombard you with a lot of information. i have highlighted aspects that are worth focusing on. before and get to the patterns, these patterns in the u.s. south korean relationship are rooted in the foundation of -- and the period began with the landing of the twee fourth core in september of 1945 and ended with the u.s. defense treaty. these patterns developed and were solidified during this period and emerged from several consecutive and interconnected roles.
creator, liberator, savior and ultimate protector. more fully institutionalized them for central elements in the relationship. the first pattern on the international level is the u.s. commitment to south korea is a most derivative of larger interests. the second pattern is that the u.s. is the higher guarantor of external sovereignty. the american desire to maintain -- this includes the operational control. u.s. reticence take on the commitment.
commitment,s that seemingly the security of japan. as was more intangible questions of credibility and prestige. the events to disrupt the events in greater involvement during the korean war. >> can everyone hear me. >> lummis pattern on the domestic level. carter's -- more than anything was base his desire to avoid another vietnam and also the base relationships with u.s. allies, not so much,
but on the credential and on these internal human rights records. he rapidly began his policy several days after entering office. i think it was january 26. the order was another -- wasn't whether or not cheap should be withdrawn but how you should do it. it was implemented quickly by mid-1977. wereof the major elements laid out. number four, necessary to the -- drawal as the u.s. forces gradually withdrew.
this required congressional approval. crucial leverage over the future plan, the future development and execution of the plan. to be an establishment of a more combined and command structure. because itportant would replace the u.n. command where the u.s. would help that would hold much more unilateral control and a much more equal uncooperative relationship. it appears they are uploading my slides. the format is incomplete to some a. met in immediate widespread -- with immediate widespread opposition. assistant secretary richard holbrook said at the time it was
very much a case of rather than people fighting or a battle for the mind of the president, it was a battle against the mind of the president. it was a full on rebellion. opposed toctors were not only how the plan was being implemented but really to the larger implementations -- larger implications of the plan itself. on a larger and international level, the japan problem, which is to say the real and perceived effects of japan's security and own future actions, the u.s. would be foregoing credibility with the leadership and on a larger system. were distinct fears about removing the so-called tripwire. whereas president nixon's withdrawal had loosened the tripwire.
moving south of seoul. this is where he was more that he was removing the tripwire. related to this was concern over the u.s. losing relative control over south korean actions. this was stated by many people , whichic and private spoke explicitly to this. domestic level, the explicit linkage of the withdrawal of human rights abuses that only undermines -- there were several important developments. the first was the plan because of intense congressional opposition. its first delay and alteration. secondly in november of the year, the csc was established.
also it increased south korea's own operational and command responsibilities. this served to bolster economic -- and would force the administration to begin a new internal review of the troop withdrawal prophecy. this is a crucial period in the process. this was the final delay of the withdrawal plan. and what is remarkable is -- national not security adviser's announcement of carter's decision, he
announces the delay of the plan. 1979 was known as the year of multiple crises, both global and local. shaw,was the fall of the the iranian revolution, crisis and the global energy market, and the soviet invasion of back and a stem. not only did it take up a significant amount of attention but it influenced how u.s. officials would view of vents in south korea. the year was marked by economic turmoil kept off by the assassination of the head of the korean central intelligence agency. in the wake of the assassination, you as were explicitly concerned about chaos. and he expressly stated nobody wants another loss of a key
regional ally. queue in an internal which the u.s. was displeased with an express their disapproval over the breaking of the command. they said theye would not attempt to roll back or challenge the move. in 1980 there were large protests, the objection of martial law, and a brutal and tragic track down. at this time in both public and private, and there are new -- , this alsocuments included giving the south koreans approval to use the armed forces several units from the 20th south korean division to use them in the final
crackdown, but the u.s. to not have command over the special forces troops. carter remains very cool but maintains basic economic military relations with south korea because of the concern over larger instabilities. carter losing the election became a lame duck president. this was somewhat akin to the negotiations of the iranian hostages as well. them, but theon negotiations were actually taken up by the incoming reagan administration, particularly richard allen. theyended up happening is no longer execute a very important early visit to the white house.
in fact he was the first foreign emissary to visit the white house. it was after reagan's inauguration he would do so. reagan is a study in stark contrast with carter. this is not a revelation in both domestic and foreign policies. this was immediate the evident when he came into office. whereas carter had attempted to draw down the u.s. commitment to south korea and perfect -- and rights, reagan for his part viewed it in a way that cannot be disaggregated from others. he also views carter's pressure as counterproductive at best and dangerous at worst.
the incoming team was keenly aware of the difference and examining the briefing books and internal memos, it was very clear they had this in mind. it was very clear from a memo it sent aoader words powerful message. president carter's message to asia was his intention to reduce troop strength. this was borne out in a summit on february 2, 1981. stronglyt only reaffirmed basic patterns but he strengthened them. on the international level reagan was specific about it was
a source of reassurance to japan in the context of an anti-soviet policy, the peninsulas again seen as a key strategic note in a larger context. south korean and sultry and used thistself language to alexander haig who readily agreed in the eternal meetings. first and foremost carter exquisitely canceled any further troop withdrawals. sizes fact increase the the 43,000. the president then considered the reagan administration exerted relative control. this was giving up the north korean nuclear weapons program
and to deeply institutionalize the combined forces command structure. the level of domestic politics the reagan demonstration is keenly aware of the role this would play. tons of abilities to legitimize his relationship is no one could. and reagan himself would agree to criticisms of south korea unlike his predecessor in private. stressed the focus should be on human rights abuses and iron curtains, not on american allies. beyond the inadequacies in its carter's policy was opposed and fail because of the uncertainty opposed in basic patterns i have laid out. aagan was firm to attempt policy in particular. rather than being a holy original approach, his was a more vigorous reaffirmation if in a new context.
these are very poor because they are highly contextual. and despite differing conditions within the larger international system. thank you very much. >> thank you. dr. miller, listening to your iner about american anxiety japan, i'm relieved we no longer have to worry about the rising of oez ship. >> i wasn't thinking about that at all. >> i would like to ask about china. it seems that a looming essence in both of the discussions. i would like to ask both of you what about china. is there anything you can offer us about the relationship between united states and china
have is that bilateral relationship affect the relationship? >> hit dress it somewhat in the paper. i mention time carter's thinking being influenced by earlier developments. the most exclusive for the nixon doctrine. and a key element of south korea relationship with the u.s. being derivative and assumed by larger interests is once the u.s. perception of these larger this was laidfts, out in the 70's with these withdrawals. the south koreans themselves
responded with a great deal of concern to these issues. this is still relevant today. like't know if you would me to speak to that directly but i can pass off to dr. miller. enough in they trade discussions, china comes up very little, which is surprising in and of itself. it shows reagan administration policy makers are focusing on japan is the economic concern in this region. japan is a big market that america is being denied access to, first because of trade barriers and then this focuses on more industrial and internal economic practices in japan. -- way industries
a regional dynamics -- one is the fear that japan is allowed of subvert to sort the proper practices of free trade. if they don't stamp this out, other countries will look to japan and they too can sort of use these liberal practices. that is interesting inverse to the or -- into the earlier area of the cold war. the other place were more regional concerns come into play is along with this criticism of japan and subverting the free
aade system is something that bash that is a constant theme, which is this belief that japan had taken advantage of america's they are notd playing their proper role, they are not expanding their military. reagan administration talks about pulling back from some of their commitment and gives japan a much larger commitment. that is more thinking about china. they are still figuring out what that is going to mean. that is where the question of china comes into play a little more. and this criticism that japan doesn't do enough for its own defense is a new story. the american occupation officials write that in 1946.
article nine says japan will never have a military. the u.s. is rebuilding the japanese military and constantly pressuring the japanese to do more. that is a narrative deeply related to china in terms of the impact of the chinese revolution and the korean war. this idea that the japanese aren't just freeloaders on trade, but also freeloaders on defense. >> thank you. we have 15 or 20 minutes before question from the audience. please state your name and affiliation. >> harrington faculty fellow here. thank you for a fantastic panel. i want to ask it question to jennifer, whose paper was terrific. with the interconnection between what is going on in east asia
and in the middle east and southwest asia, one of the other things i also think is being isplained about at this time the unites states is essentially responsible for the sea lanes. i'm wondering if you could say something about that, the importance of oil politics. i'm sure we will talk about it again tomorrow with the middle east. if there is any immolation to japan at how americans are perceiving that. >> that question is one of the issues that comes up early in this question about how far reagan administration officials want to push japan to be responsible for its own defense. that japanhis idea is going to be responsible for much more of that defense and they have been responsible for in the past. the japanese government, especially prime and mr. , it is said they are
open to that idea, but they don't quite play out the way the administration has been hoping. in this to mastic fear of automobiles, which comes out of fear of oil politics. one reason they are selling so well is because they have better gas mileage. at least in what i read, and i should emphasize this is my first four way into the topic, so my reading was not exhaustive. it isn't necessarily drawing those connections as directly but in terms of the specific they are very much seeing the manifestations of that in this question about automobile, which is so prominent in the first half of the decade as the primary example of the japanese threat.
he is giving speeches about the automobile industry in the first half of the decade. he is seeking to solve these problems in the auto industry. there are those defense elements in this question of can they get the japanese to spanish the defense of the territorial water surrounding japan? there is this other sections that manifests itself domestically. >> i have a question for elizabeth and rob. is thing i took away sometimes configurations facilitate policy
motivations. you mentioned southwest asia. mind another spatial configuration, which is neutrality. how much does afghanistan's neutrality factor into american policy thinking does it appear at all in any sort of documents you have reviewed? >> what is striking in soviet dialogue about afghanistan has and then a chapter resumes under scholz much later, they agree on the end they are trying to reach. they agree on an independent not aligned afghanistan.
but what meeting you attach to nonalignment can very. they don't want to see the model replicated in afghanistan. it winds up being a lone star for both governments. there are some intriguing discussions of an austrian style arrangement for afghanistan. gorbachev talked about it in finland, which is an enact analogy. up until 73, where afghanistan was very quiet in the realm of foreign policy in the french to its neighbor. -- foreign policy and french to its and differential
neighbor. a slight issue calling afghanistan a neutral country. if you look at its especially than the relationship between its foreign and regional policy, the afghan government was not neutral. when you arrived at the question of foreign aid and development, and where money can come from, that certainly affects his politics. i think that in an of itself demonstrates that. i don't think afghanistan is a neutral space. of that is applied to it rather than necessarily being a cause.
>> behind you. >> brian gibson. this is towards elizabeth. the kurds, which are very close and dear to my own research. i thought it was very interesting when you are talking about the soviet strategy to try to break up iran. this with the azerbaijan republic. from that perspective there is by the the precedent set soviets to actually try to achieve this. the american strategy of trying to keep everything together and not interfere with autonomy or , which of course they were in the 1960's when they fought against the iraqi government, when i am interested
in -- i actually want to read your paper. it may be worthwhile to draw that out as kind of a starting point. if you do decide to make this into a bigger project. thanks. >> any response? >> i think that sounds great. our university of texas. a comment to follow-up on paul's question and a question for , i don't veryrob much about the reagan administration relations with china in the 80's. we know that vice president bush was going over it a couple of times. kissinger and his firm had a lot of context. i think given we know much more
from the first bush administration -- we don't know so much, at least i don't know for my casual reading, i think that may be useful. ferguson may have more on his second volume. a lot of that stuff is proprietary properly -- proprietary probably. would be interested in hearing more of that context. the question for elizabeth and rob is in the reagan administration, especially early on, gorbachev was thinking how do we get out of this? had we save face? -- theyrevent this from are looking for ways to get out. ande is some talk negotiations with the u.n. as an
intermediary. can you say a little bit more about that? how viable was that? is this kind of a side slack to those who are -- who want an answer and are placating the soviets? >> historically the u.n. deserves a fair amount of credit. and really this irrepressible architects of the very flawed side of treaties, he had to keep going back and forth because the government would not let extend recognition to its neighbor and he also had to keep tabs on opinions in washington and moscow. the book out of afghanistan cowritten between him and selig harrison is interesting.
they have element i found myself doubting as we got into the documents. particularly with the reagan administration. they said the u.n. functioned in the absence of serious superpower diplomacy. washington and moscow found other things to talk about productively. and also soviet petite hit critical mass with gorbachev himself. chronicled when they decided time was up. it was a helpful part of the overall solution but by itself insufficient. brief point.e one i think this idea of finland is problematic. a lot of times when we talk about a soviet invasion we talk about the u.s., the u.n., we
don't talk about the afghan regime itself. the afghan communist government was in place and one of the critical factors that would have prevented this idea of finland theging is they recognize durham lined as an international boundary between afghanistan and pakistan. and what finally led to the soviet withdrawal led to this issue. this is obviously important today. it geneva the way the --ords -- the geneva accords it meant that conflict was regardless of what was decided at the u.n. or the way that the u.s. or soviets tried to influence discussion. >> i think there at least secondhand evidence that the offers were trying to this as a carrot to afghanistan
in the middle of the decade. finally you can have some border dispute resolved. and offer thatrm was and how durable i leave to you to research. >> i'm going to come over to the side of the room. jennifer, thanks for your great paper and the panel in general. very interesting stuff. one kind of suggestion and an interesting way to look at it. reagan the administration's attitude towards the dollar is as important as their attitude toward japan. the dollar appreciates something like 40% to 86.
this is precisely why japanese products can flood the market. and their defense of this action is this is the magic of free markets doing its job's. this is precisely what free enterprise and an international movement of goods and globalization is about. just including a few thoughts on the dollar could be very interesting. a voice that as of today you could look to include is president donald trump. i think the first political and in manyhe took ways the origin of his worldview in precise terms as you laid it out, as the deterioration of the
, it goes back to precisely -- japan has been replaced by china and mexico. he is taking out ads in the new york times and 80's about these types of issues and make america response, the a politics responding to these developments. that is certainly what i was thinking about. one thing i was curious about this idea that other countries are taking advantage of the united states come from? this is one of my first forays into exploring that. what is also important to think in using this as part of his public persona in the 80's was only one of many. a common trope of
advertising, especially car advertising in the 80's, the japanese were taken over. a car advertisement for pontiac, for new york pontiac dealers, that warned americans they should buy american cars because of the keep buying japanese cars they will be soon visiting the big christmas tree at hero heat her center. i think we recognize this is a big origin story. i think it is worth exploring that. are really common statements in the 1980's to hear this excoriation of japan as a country seeking to dominate and undermine the united states. and that the narrative trump tapped into with this idea that other countries are taking advantage of us and your leaders
don't have the guts to stop it have a real precursor in this moment. >> i realize we have several other questions. i would like to end this punctually. for another day in continuing this discussion of ronald reagan and global politics in the 1980's. panelists and participants like last night, we would love .or you to join us at dinner there will be a shuttle to pick you up in 20 minutes. with that please join me in thanking our panel. [applause] [chatter] >> you are watching american history tv