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tv   House Judiciary Subcommittee Hearing on Online Data Privacy - Part 1  CSPAN  October 23, 2019 2:00am-2:55am EDT

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welcome everyone to the third in our series of hearings. this one on the role of data and prime fancy into competition. i recognize myself, i should state the obvious i'm, not bitter of the subcommittee, and chairs the subcommittee, the chair of the committee will be here in a few minutes. it has never been easier to share news and information that content and communicate with loved ones, all at a moments notice. given the technological recognitions it, has added to the balance of power in our economy. it's important for us to understand how this affects americans, what is causing the asymmetries of power and whether these new and growing inequalities are compatible with our democratic values. the committee's ongoing is a key part of this practice. today's hearing, we will
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examine the role that data plays and maintaining any qualities of power, and how this affects competition. as previous hearings have shown, the growing share of congress communications is now controlled by a small number of companies. these platforms are innocent, largely intermediaries, perfectly positioned throughout each communication that passed through its channels. well intermediaries have collected information on the platforms, they have an unprecedented ability to surveil users across the internet. this data collection includes information not only about the shopping habits, but also about the time that they wake up and go to sleep, the precise location of each hour of the day, and the content of the most private communications. several of these platforms amassed their revenue through digital advertising, these firms also have an incentive to connect as
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much information as possible, so that they can target consumers with precision. this can also be used by companies and more nefarious ways, distributing information based on race, gender and income, or otherwise intrude on personal privacy. i hope this will be addressed in today's hearings. first, how our digital technologies and the constant digital technologies enabled affecting competition? in digital markets, maximizing days a can provide a significant advantage, a large growing set of use allowed farms to improve existing private services to expand with a competitive edge. the most nominated companies are those that have captured the most data from as many sources as
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possible. we are the first company to establish a competitive league, winning the market, crushing any competition. in other words, competitive in digital markets are ensuring as much information as possible, as part of a long term strategy to achieve market dominance. this raises serious questions about whether it is good for society, for unrelenting data collection on which companies are looking to oust, as he pointed out. the fact that several major platforms make most of their profits by selling, items those incentives. the second question i hope will be addressed, it's how data collection increases the number of ways the dominant companies can abuse their market power. there's the collection of data enable what
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they should recognize us anti competitive, for example platforms that service intermediaries and critical insight into their business models, a dynamic that raises significant competition concerns. these issues in mind, able forward this to our witnesses today, and i now recognize this opening statement to the breaking member, former chairman of the committee. >> thank you for this. we continue our oversight in the tech industry, to date, our primary focus is on line platforms. the role that data platform play in competition in the ways in which we can better protect the privacy of consumers online data, largely concerning these platforms. data is most of the internet,
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numbers issues for all around the use of this, for example, these include allegations that, one, platforms can operate as a barrier to market buy new platforms. to, platforms hold large data bases can leverage that data to compete unfairly with third-party competitors that are dependent upon their platforms. three, the incumbent platforms can kill off competition, for data acquisition and market shares. it's my hope we can determine fact from fiction when it comes to these allegations, and i have stress beforehand i trust these laws will not exist to punish success but to foster it. congress an anti trust enforcement agencies need to be careful not to over reach, to extend or apply anti trust laws in ways that in the punishing
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success. surprising innovation and limiting consumer welfare. the supply is not the issues concerning competition for data, but also it applies to the issues concerning privacy. if you're going to address the data and consumer data privacy through legislation we might get it right. i did not say this in a vacuum. governments in the united states and europe have already begun to lay down loss to address these issues. the most prominent example being in the european union's general data protection regulation, or gdpr. following in its footsteps they have passed the california consumer privacy act, which is substantially modeled on the gdpr. testimony offered before the senate judiciary committee in march, one of our witnesses today offered a powerful indictment of the gdp our.
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however, they are producing substantial collateral damage to consumer welfare, innovation, and the health of the digital economy. it is likely that the ccpc will have the same effects. all of these effects are avoidable. it's imperative that we identify and put into place a better means for protecting consumer privacy online. i hope our witnesses today can help us work through these important issues. before yielding back, let me put a number of statement to the record that i have received one from georgetown university, the second is a joint statement by the national cta and u.s. telecoms, a letter that has
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been sent to the chairman and myself, a letter for that choice. >> i think the chairman of the four committee for opening this. >> in june we launched a historic investigation into the state of the competition in the digital marketplace, the purpose of this investigation is to document conduct online and to examine the dominant farms are engaging, and to assess whether we are adequate to address these claims. we felt as a top to bottom review. most recently, we have had documents from the dominant platforms. on monday, tens of
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thousands of documents and we expect and review additional hearings as well. to ensure that the goals of the investigation are met. as i've said, this is essential to the constitutional responsibility to conduct the oversight enjoy they're working. we enacted the anti trust laws and congress must be responsible for determining whether the current laws or enforcement levels are keeping up with the digital markets. we have a lot of work ahead of us, but i am proud of the efforts of my colleagues, along with their dedicated staff to continue this bipartisan work together. today's hearings will advance a key online. we have published
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groundbreaking reports that focused on this issue. as the support of noted, that is at the heart of competition online. an exhaustive report concluded, and i quote, that the breadth and depth of our user data, collected by the incumbent digital platforms, advise them with a strong competitive advantage, create barriers to rivals entering and expanding in market, and allowing the incumbent digital platform to expand into adjacent markets, in quote. one of our seemed witnesses here today, suddenly reporters that large tariffs of data made tip markets in favor of a single dominant platform, killing of competition. that played an important role in the ability of start-ups to attract capital to compete with forms in this market. a panel of experts led by protector scott morton for the university of chicago reporter that investor
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as, they explained a new entrance starved of data, quantitatively speaking, relative to a tech giant, is at a competitive and they view the data deficit as uncomfortable. >> they will get locked out the market and never offer innovative, that data can be abused by platforms for purposes, they have created an innovation kill zone around dominant firms. whether it's facebook's use of an over, and the weaponization of api to block competitors, the abuse of data has serious ramifications for competition. this persons an opportunity to examine the role of privacy online, as a
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growing consensus that privacy as an important. this is critical for revenue. and a statement, we know that market consolidation allowed platform that buy escalating prices but by diminishing quality. furthermore as we've reported, misuse of data not only indicator of a lack of competition, but also since the farm dominance in the market as well. in a market that has viper competition, farms have strong incentives to respond to demands by improving the safeguards to the products, without a competition and no incentive to deliver privacy. i recently had the pleasure of
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discussing this with the harvard school business, who has written about the rise of surveillance capitalism. the point that she made that struck me was at the pattern of automating business for more clicks and better predictions is itself a market extra allergy, there is no consumer demand for this service. americans don't want to have their data mind so they can be shown another advertisement. there's no escape, because there's no alternative. people are stuck with bad options, or no options at all, which is evidence of a market failure. furthermore, companies i want to compete by offering services that deny, which enforces the market dominance of the farm. it's increasingly clear that the relationship is not either or, their mutually beneficial concepts that must be at the forefront as we continue to consider prospects of the internet to beautiful promise. before closing, i want to thank
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commissioner and chairman for their statements submitted for today's hearings. he was originally scheduled to testify between change in our schedule he cannot attend. nevertheless, i think kevin his team for their hard work against this issue. now it's my pleasure to introduce today's witnesses for today's hearing. our first witness is the honorable reheat chopra, before joining the ftc he was instrumental in working on the, and became the first student loan lawmen. he made significant inroads towards addressing the, he was nominated to serve as an ftc commission and was confirmed
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unanimously by the senate on april 26th. he received his ba from harvard university, and is in the a from university of pennsylvania. he is a professor in london since 2007. before, he served as a chief economist for three years, where he focused on competition and digital markets. he has served as a professor in the university of warm, he is also a research fellow, and received his masters and ph.d. from the london school of economics, in addition to his work as an economist, he also received his flute diploma from the musical conservatory in toronto. our
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third witness is, a professor, the chair of economic advisers during present a lot of second term. he was insistent to the president of the national security council, he serves as a non resident senior fellow, as well as an adviser for the uk government. he received his ba, and may, increase the from harvard university, as well as his masters and science from the london school of economics. finally, this is a visiting scholar, he also served as a visiting researcher at albright university as vice president in copenhagen, before her tenure, she worked at ibm, and has published multiple publications
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including four reports and served as president trump's transition team in 2016, helping to establish his federal communications commission. doctor layton received her nba from layton, her nba from rotterdam, and ph.d. from alt-right university. thank you for participating in today's hearing, and now if you will please rise out begin by swearing un. please raise your right hands. do you swear that your testimony is true and correct to the best of your knowledge, so help you god? let the record show the witnesses answers a formative, thank you. you must be in seeded. accordantly, i ask you summarize your testimony. it's a timing on the table, when it switches from green, you have one minute to conclude your testimony. commissioner chopper, you may begin.
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>> thank you. my name is robbie chopra and i served as a federal trade commissioner. oversight from congress is a pillar of sound transparent government, and i have been honored to testify many times before members of congress, including before chairman elijah cummings, who's energy and passion will be missed by so many of us. today's topic could not be more important for timely as it seems almost daily we learn a problem stemming from lack of concentration. we need to focus on four ways their companies undercut competition, concentration, conflicts of interest, contracts and capture. market power is concentrated with a few giant in so many industries, conflicts of interests allow these dominant firms to sometimes read the market in their favor, at the expend of upstart and new businesses that
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fairly compete. one-sided, take it or leave it contracts and online terms of service impose self serving regulations on consumers and small businesses. all too often, the government is to captured by those incumbents to use their power to dictate their preferred policies. in my testimony, i discuss how competition in the market is structured around data, a valuable asset with a very unique economic futures, we need to take this into account. our personal data is powering the profits and dominance of tech companies that offer basic services like email, search or photo sharing that are not truly free. fortunately, many of my colleagues around the world are also pushing forward. reports from regulators and australia, the united kingdom, the european union, are must rates for this committee and everyone
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concerned about the future of our vigil economy. in the united states, as you know, our efforts are a work in progress, and i agree that we need to take a fresh look at our policies and guidance. as we do, it's important that the federal trade commission conduct a rigorous review of quantitative market data and analysts sense of the financial incentives dragging market behavior. since during the commission, i have argued that the ftc should be using our authority under section six be of our act to get the data we need to effectively police these markets and report our findings to you and the public. when it comes to enforcement, i am more optimistic, now that scores of states, both republican and democrat are teaming up to investigate anti competitive conduct. in this moment, it is all hands on deck, and i stay in constant communication with
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that. decades ago, our state eighties played a pivotal role in ending microsoft chokehold over the future of the internet, and without that action, there would likely be no google, no facebook, and no amazon. while the ftc is a recent settlements with facebook and google's youtube included finds that made for a great headlines, they did little to fix the core problems that fueled these companies to data abuses. big fines are not big penalties for the world's biggest companies, and as we've seen time and again when a template company can pay a fine from its gains this is not a penalty, this is an incentive. as congress, federal anti trust enforcers and state attorneys all pursue their investigations we will need to pursue remedies that reduced concentration, eliminated conflicts of
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interest, or send abusive contract terms against small businesses and limit capture. for example, recent scholarship has revealed that anti trust actions that separated lines of businesses are required, for ordered more patent available for public use after competitive conduct, all elected massive innovation, small business entry and economic growth. these are useful tools in the tool box for policymakers and enforcers to consider went looking to build the remedy and prevent arm. in conclusion, while some believe that lax enforcement and absentee government at the ingredients of innovation, history teaches us it is the opposite. without a vigilant and active government promoting competition markets, sometimes that means providing corporations with benefits, like limited liability, license contracts and other opportunities, but free and fair markets won't work without meaningful consequences for
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lawbreakers. and in action as a price we cannot afford to pay. thank you. >> thank you, i now recognize doctor tommaso valletti for five minutes. >> good morning and thank you very much for inviting me. my name is tommaso valletti and i professor of economics at the imperial college in london. and i was the chief commission economist of the european commission. in that role, and let the economic analysis of several cases involving digital platforms, including google, facebook apple, microsoft and others. i would like to make four points. my first is about data. some commentators have argued that it's the new oil, others have argued that it's as common as water or air. these generations are not useful. data is key to digital platforms, and a few
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gatekeepers are in a position to control the linking up a fierce across platforms, online services, and websites. they can combine several data sets and created super profiles of individuals. this is a market for individual attention, where analysis has to be conducted, as an example. if we open all of our facebook accounts if we have one and looked at the ads popping up, you would see totally different hands. this is completely different from traditional media. unfortunately, the debate is not helped by the lack of public empirical studies in the field of economics. i know already the silicon valley part of this to say they are all like that, this would not be true, i can think of airlines, and cunning data sets that would be available in
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those sectors. if it really is paradoxical for this data economy, which is simply unprecedented amounts of data. my second point concerns the extent to which enforces such concern concerns over private laws. privacy is at the core of the economics of digital platforms and competition and shaped around it. competition takes place alongside several dimensions, only one of them is quality, choice and innovation. in fact, wind dealing with digital platforms, it is not make sense to focus on prices. the business models is to give something away for free and order tomorrow denies advertising, quality will be relevant for consumers of this. lack of competition, we need to reduce quality, a reduction in protection. my third point is
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that privacy degradation can lead to real consumer harm. data breach, identity theft, but also conservative profiling that is not done in the interests of consumers. part of the problem is that incumbents have the ability to impose terms of service that are not understood but accepted by consumers because of a lack of alternative. this is an indication of market power. what is red and obscure terms, what did they mean? think of phrases like we may share your data with trusted businesses. they see the benefits of clicking yes we cannot assess the implications of giving away their data that are banned by designed the service. this undermines the role played by consumers and by competitors. my last point my conclusion is that anti trust cases involving data and privacy can be, as an
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exploitative conduct. this is captured by the current law, another church to actions it is not. and the u.s. it is not. still it, would be wrong to ignore exploited of conduct. the data, privacy are not separable. they should be considered and any assessment of the state of competition and of market powers of online platforms. lower data protection can lead to a standard of exclusionary behavior, from dominance to privacy, this money can be used to scrutinize competitors. and can further force the data incumbent by cross linking data and create a vicious circle. these are conduct that in my opinion should be investigated. thank you for your time and i look forward to your questions.
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>> thank you, and i recognize doctor furman for five minutes. >> my name is jason furman, professor of economic policy at the harvard kennedy school. i recently chair the uk digital competition expert panel, which produced a report unlocking digital competition. one of our recommendations was that the uk established a digital market unit, and served as an unpaid adviser to the uk government as we move forward with accepting that recommendation that my panel made. today, i am testifying with my own views and ideas drawing on the report that we did. i thank you for your kind comments about it. i want to make four points in my testimony. the first is that the major digital platforms are highly concentrated and that concentration is likely to persist. it's due to a
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combination of factors, economies of scale and scope, the way that data can serve as a barrier to entry, behavioural by as he's on the part of consumers. the access to capital and brands. many of those are present and many markets but the combination of them and the extremes of all of them is unique to the digital platforms and makes it very difficult to have competition in the market. the question of whether there can be competitions for the market is a more speculative one but there's a number of reasons, including the persistence of the major platforms, and believe that the competition will be difficult, absent policy changes. my second point, which was covered is that this has cost to consumers. the services are not free, and consumers may have been
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compensated, they're paying in the form of data, losing out on quality and variety and the lack of competition stunts innovation. the question is what we should do about this. some of the reasons why you have only a few platforms it's because the benefits that consumers get from scale and scope. you want to preserve the ability to consumers to have this benefit. some of the reasons is because of unfair competition and because of what is not organic growth due to mergers that have been improved, often without any scrutiny. the key to policy is to preserve while competition is a source of innovation unless the private sector drives that innovation. to that end, my third point is that merger
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enforcement needs to be more robust in the digital sector. much of the growth we have seen has not been organic growth due to efficiency but has been acquisition. there has been no efforts, but there have been errors in allowing acquisitions to go forward that have harmed consumers. and approach should have more, so they have to technical expertise to deal with this. the merger analysis cannot focus on short run static effects, but also on potential competition, innovation, and take very seriously data as the barrier to entry. third the, increasingly high bar for blocking mergers probably needs to be addressed in a legislative manner and sums for up shifting the burden of proof. finally, my fourth point
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is that even with all of that merger enforcement will not be sufficient to deal with the horses that have already left the bar. anti trust groups can help but it can be slow, can have a hard time addressing behavioral remedies and that is why i proposed in the uk, and i think what makes sense in the united states, the establishment of a digital market unit. i'm optimistic about whether it's an existing body like the ftc, the important thing is to functions. a code of conduct that was backed up by enforcement authorities, the second function would be systems with open standards and data mobility, which would enable more entry and competition, and the third function will be a greater degree of data openness. with
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this approach, we could avoid some of the more extreme market disruptive steps. i'm sure consumers get all the benefits a fair competition but, also enable new entrance to compete, and through the market and even deliver further benefits above and beyond what we have seen today. thank you. >> thank you, i recognize daughter layton for five minutes. >> good morning and thank you. chairman adler, chairman cicilline and ranking member, i'm honored to join these panel members and contribute to this important conversation. i want to recognize and thank the committee staffers to prepare for preparing for this hearing. this testimony represents my own views. as professor tommaso valletti lays out, we know nothing about privacy. the qualification of harm and how many violations regulations would deter. without these key
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points of women situation, it's ill-advised to build a regime that pursues that regulators are in the no. the best numbers i have come from --, who estimates there are a few violations per year, a small number given the size of the economy. given the good policy informations available, regulatory advocates look for other arguments to justify their preferred approach, such as competition. many well-intentioned policies are promoted on this premise that they will level the playing field. we must look at the actual effects, not just the theory and argumentation. however compelling it may be. my testimony introduces an engineering concept of control points, just as a linchpin keeps a wheel from sliding off an access, harnessing a controlled point is a powerful way to govern a system. commissioner chopra suggested there's a royalty controlling
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our system, but there's also a commissioner's loyalty controlling our politics. the reality is that regulation false markets access. there's no surprise that anti trust authorities around the world and across the u.s. are looking at our politics. this may make nationality by using the bully pulpit of the state. fortunately, congress can tamper the self interested actors so that no one state can dictate the commercial terms of our national economy. i'm extremely grateful that this congress is considering updating the privacy framework for the digital age. we can learn a lot from the european union, which has had a two decade natural experiment and regulating the tech economy. the long term trends and outcomes are clear, by looking at the european commission scoreboard and the euro stats surveys. while large enterprises, small and long,
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they have a hard time growing. they don't invest in information technology, and they transact little across borders. after 18 months, we can see that the largest advertising platforms, whether fledgling rivals have lost ground. they propose a set of six costs. only the largest players can afford the requirements of, fees audits impact assessments, software updates and so on. last in half of all companies can comply with these regulations that cost 3 million dollars perform. consumers are no better off, there at the lowest point since 2006. and contrast, the united states welcomed 40,000 new internet start ups last year alone. we have been fortunate to have a single market from our, founding and a tradition of bottom-up roles that were
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based upon real world harm. with its 77 regulations on enterprise, they have 22 more obligations in the gdpr. a preliminary cost benefit analysis prepared by the california department of justice suggests that cost exceeds benefits by a factor of 14. it notes 70 billion dollars and start up and running costs for compliance. these costs go to privacy lawyers and consultants. the consumer benefits are estimated generally at it we are five billion dollars. it's hard to see what is progressive about giving a windfall to the privacy bar at the expense of consumers and small businesses. these are companies plus 500 employees or less, they make up 99% of the california businesses. these other companies that will bear the brunt of regulations, which are dreamed up by the regulatory royalty and emir month. take appeal to justify this regulation on human rights is part of an attempt to avoid the fourth discussion about the costs. in closing, there the
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right way and a wrong way to do privacy protection. gdp are the wrong way. good regulation should cause little to implement, a little to understand, i appreciate this committee is considering alternatives. we and strengthen the largest players. i'm optimistic because the market we are talking about is a third of our national economy, the other percentage is where our opportunities are. that is where the data revolution has not come and where we have the opportunities to grow, where we can transform legging industries in health and transportation. so the important part is if we want these new companies to emerge, and we want to emerge the status quo we have to make sure we don't kill it and the great aware regulations that stop the innovator at the gate.
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>> thank you, i will proceed under the five role and i recognize mr. nadler for five minutes. >> thank you. professor valletti, the largest tech platforms have acquired accompanies globally without any chance from anti-trust enforcers. is there any evidence to suggest this exemption was a mistake? >> this is my personal opinion. >> please use your microphone. >> sorry. there has been anti trust immunity in the tech sector for far too long, google facebook had, very few happen that it. you will notify some mergers if they're above a certain threshold and the threshold is dictated on the turnover of companies in the past three years, but also
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pharmaceutical companies have turnover are not yet there. you don't have the two to intervene. yes, i do think we have severely under enforced in the area, which means not necessarily those markets were bad. but we should have investigated them for. sure >> i ask you the same question. >> what with our world look like if google had not bought youtube? or amazon had not bought -- many of these acquisitions that many believed could grow on their own to be their own big giant. i agree that under enforcement can really kill innovation and kill entry because when it's harder and harder to break in, that suggest that for small business, and bad for all of us. >> thank you. professor valletti, was it anti-trust in be doing to ensure dominant platforms are not following up
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but initial competitors? >> the simple answer is run open cases and investigate. the point is, i already know there is a response, that entrepreneurs want to be bought, this is an exit strategy they want to capture on their own invasion. dominic company should not be allowed to buy those. they cannot be bought by those. the chairman before mentioned it, spyware that facebook was using to buy some rivals, so there's a lot of things that we can. do >> you also argue that the dominant platform tries to see policy to intrench and dominance. explain how that works. >> there are different ways. one way could be for instance a
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company which is dominant and does not have alternatives, that's why it's dominant, because you cannot find alternatives. this dominant company and you need to service will, ask you to sign up for whatever. you don't know where your data is going in jail know what will happen with your data. we did are going to be used to monetize something else, if it's something genetic, even you're offspring. money is going to be made from this high protected advertising. once you've managed it you can do lots to prevent it. >> why do you think that privacy is an appropriate factor to consider under competition law? >> the notion of competition is multifaceted. since consumers care about privacy that's one of the major things that they have to give. healthy privacy
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to individuals. >> your view is beta big data creating barriers to break into markets. >> big data is creating entry barriers and if you try to guess what the next industry is going to be, we've had success in from ibm to microsoft to google and etc, next is likely to be ai and machine learning and the company's best voice to take advantage of that out the larger incumbents now. >> the larger because if the data? >> yes. that's what's needed for this next stage in the economy. >> that may lead to my next question which is why is it is still a barrier to entry even though it's not rivalries? >> it's not unravel roads but there are companies that keep that data and keep that data to themselves. they have economies of scale. this thing to do watch a large amount of data
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that are even much more then you can do with a medium or a small amount of data. a lot of that as a function of public policy choices that we have made about what data is and is not open to. >> -- a new entrants would have to assemble its own data starting from scratch? >> yes. >> we are going to have the gentleman from colorado recognized for five minutes in the region with the intelligent of the witnesses and come back immediately after. mr. buck? >> i want to thank you for holding this hearing, i appreciate this. doctor layton a couple of quick questions. i'm going to go really basic. if i'm sitting in from my desktop and i want to go to the u.s. house of representatives website, or type in something
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on my browser, he was house up top of the area i click on it and a resolve or, a resolve or takes me to the website that i'm looking for. my understanding is that we've had a change in that to add inscription to the area. can you explain why the change was necessary and where we're going with that? >> the issue that you are talking about is the protocol, a new standard being proposed by google and mozilla. let me from this issue. i've discussed it in my testimony but i think it's a great example of where we have a challenge with our privacy regulation between the person's right to privacy and the public's right to know. we've seen from gdpr and other
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things like this that a number of viable resources that we've had on the internet for law enforcement, for copyright protections from public information, they have been masks and clouded because of techniques taken on by regulation. in this case where, you look at what's called the doh, in an effort to protect the privacy, is changing the architecture of the internet, which piece to be very distributed and modular. a number of parties would perform this redirect ask that you talk about -- >> what is the number of parties? >> we talked about tens of thousands. whether they want to block militias content, and law enforcement uses this to find criminals and so on. this would all be subsumed into the information that the parties would use would be. lost the reason is done because google
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and mozilla want to be able to get marketing data in that process, and pull that control point, as i described, into their own network, would normally would it would reside outside. this is just a coating tweak that can upset the entire balance we have built up today over all these decades. >> we no longer have tens of thousands of providers in this particular area? >> it would eliminate the industry overnight. despite one major coating tweak. it's quite staggering how much a simple click like that, or not nicholas to, put a coating tweak can change it. there's some users who may like it, who they want to -- have all my whole experience to being google, fair enough, but -- they >> have that choice? now >> they have the default now. yes. you can choose safe search, you can choose the difference settings. but what we are making worse off are all the law enforcement, parents, families who are trying to set up permission to protect their own privacy and their own preferences.
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>> do we have any idea how many of these providers there will be in the future? will it just be three or four, or will be once again -- >> you can imagine, you can have a kind of world where google consumes the internet test because of the way the things are coated. more things could be in encrypted. 70% of the internet is encrypted today because consumers want to have more privacy. but prior to encryption, large platforms can look at today that is there. they're able to use that to get the marketing information. so i don't have the number of how many dennis resolve are bailable today but there will be fewer. it's one of the services offered by a number of other parties out there. >> mr. chopra, thoughts on that? >> i think raising some important questions about who gets to decide this. when we just have one or two browsers that dominate the market and can make a coating tweaks,
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maybe for self serving purposes, that's something we have to be weary of. conflicts of interest with this level of market power have to be top of mind because it's not just about our economy. like doctor layton said, it raises questions about how to protect children? how do we enforce our laws? to me, i think these kinds of regulations should be decided by congress, not a company with a conflict of interest. >> thank you for your time. and i yield back. >> the chair recognizes the gentleman from georgia, who is anxious to ask questions before the break. >> thank you. thank you to the witnesses for being here today. especially mr. valletti, a long journey. thank you. many big tech companies have touted their data portability as the reason they can't be anti competitive, but few if any, are impenetrable. professor
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furman,? >> they can operate on multiple systems simultaneously. >> would you agree that one of them promote more competition than the other? >> yes. i think the technical details about how, we use the word systems with open standards and data mobility, ways to do that that enable switching and multiple homing and other ways that force traceability to do that. >> how can interrupt ability promote competition? >> it enables abilities to have more choices, switch more entrance to come in and that you've accumulated. >> what would look like to have a social media platform to be
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truly into rubble. >> one it's an email (interpreter). if the email had been invented by a single company, it would have had its own protocols and you can only email people with the same email system. you cannot worry about whether there on the same email system, that's a true form of interoperability that enables more choice. >> commissioner chopra, one could argue that privacy violations and other monopolistic behavior is incentivized by the ad based model. more data accompany as, the more data that accompany has the more company data can collapse and the more dominant again become. can you speak to some of the compounding
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problems with the ad base model? >> one of the objects and i had to the ftc settlement with facebook for the companies early and repeated violations of a law enforcement order was their desire to maintain their dominance by collecting more and more data, because guess what? it gets more valuable as you get more. i talk about this in my testimony. we need to start thinking not just about privacy rules, but what's the reason why companies invade our privacy? one of those reasons is the behavioural advertising model, which is not an ad that we all get, but one that is targeted at one person, and it's often manipulative. we have to think about how these businesses are incentivizing structures if we want to get to the root cause of massive surveillance in our economy today.
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>> thank you. mister chairman, in the interest of time, i yield back so that my other colleagues will have an opportunity >> i think. you i represent mr. book before we recess. >> i have two questions about centralizing, and the second from 20 different advocacy groups. >> objection. the committee will stand a recess and come back into after. i think the witnesses for their intelligence.


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