tv [untitled] CSPAN July 1, 2009 10:30am-11:00am EDT
hearing what president obama has to tell us. it is a very open forum because it counts numerous experts who are graduates of that institutes. if you read one moscow newspaper, hit you can read >> -- you can read every publication. i am looking forward to a very thrilling speech telling us that the u.s. is ready to change the way the world is changing a dramatically, have because we are not used to feeling ourselves as an object of change. we are not yet ready to except that we can preheat the
initiators of change, but we want to go in line with a -- we are not ready to accept that we are the initiators of change. i would like to voice my admiration for president obama for his voice in america possibility to change in itself. you have your own problems. -- admiration for president obama for his voice in america's change in itself. thank you. >> just one follow a quick question. do you think this visit is going to influence the internal policies in russia? for example, in such areas as freedom of the press, the rule of law, and maybe russian position on the iranian issue. we have seen the horrible crackdown in tehran against the democracy movement. russia not only was mum, it did
not denounce that, russia was the host to the organization summit and provided a platform for mahmoud ahmadinejad after the suppression of the elections to speak. what are your realistic -- i understand you're hopeful you have this agenda of expectations, as you said i am a pessimist. what realistically are you expecting to change in moscow? >> honestly, i don't expect any changes, because we have lots of institutes in our country having the same names like in your country. we have lots of institutions like the court is different than the u.s., we have mass media and
press, which is not like press in the u.s. you expect anyone would denounce mahmoud ahmadinejad for bloodshed in the iranian streets. we are friends with ahmadinejad and many others you are not friends with. we have different friends. therefore, please don't pretend to be surprised. nothing new happened and all discussions with ahmadinejad at the organization summit were pre-programmed to. if it did not happen i would have been very much surprised. as for our own changes, what ever happens i am still an optimist but these changes will happen from inside and not outside. we have to produce to generate these changes ourselves because no matter how hard it is, until
we are ready for changes, nothing will happen. liberty overwhelm us back in 1990 cost -- back in the 1990's. i have always been a champion of any kind of freedom, and i have never agreed that a person can and should trade his freedom against some benefit. but let me tell you only ourselves we can change our country, and we have to go this way ourselves. no one can do it for us. >> now we will shift gears and talk about it very serious matter. . baker b -- bakeraker -- i think baker can start it off.
orr's control and missile defense, there are other issues -- arms control and missile defense, but the crux of the relationship in the areas where we can move along like arms control and areas where i feel like we are deadlocked, like missile defense, please give us your insights. >> let me answer your question first and then i will go back to the broader question. it is the case that arms control and missile defense will have a close relationship. they have been since the dawn of the nuclear age. the question is what is the direction of that relationship? is arms control going to drive the agenda to the detriment of missile defense? or can missile defense be used to be a driver to push arms
control in the right direction. the latter is the right direction because the most immediate requirement for the u.s. and russia is to adjust to the unpredictable nature of today's world compared to the dangerous and predictable environment we had during the cold war. that means a strategy that is more defensive in nature, and one that would serve russian interests as well as the united states. what many to do is adept arms control to that new reality. the best way to do that is to use missile defense. the ability of the u.s. and russia to cooperate in certain aspects of not just missile defense but broader defense and fashion and arms control agenda that facilitates that movement. otherwise, what we will do is adopt a default alternative, which would be to
multilateralize this. that would be highly destabilizing, highly risky, and ultimately invite the kinds of arms build up particularly among the new emerging nuclear aspirants that would be worrisome. where do i stand -- where do i think stands in -- where do i think things stand now on? a number of years ago proponents of missile defense were charged with moving forward with a program in a less than responsible way. the term that was used was a rush to failure. i never accepted that charge, but the term rush to failure it seems to be quite applicable for what the obama administration is
pursuing today. it has not conducted any of the fundamental reviews that are necessary for a well-rounded policy. the nuclear review is only in mid-phase. the missile defense review is not done. nevertheless, they are rushing forward with things on the arms control side that presumes that these fundamental questions of policy making have been answered. but in my judgment they have not. what is behind this russia? it is an artificial deadline -- what is behind this rush? it is artificial because the u.s. and russia have long since gone well below the thresholds of strategic nuclear weapons that were established. there is a new treaty, these so-
called strategic offensive production trading -- the so- called strategic offensive reduction training. in my judgment, the start is not nearly as important as we would have you believe. what are the fundamental risks with the administration's approach? prudent arms control ultimately rests on an agreed set of standards. when i say arms control standards, these would be applicable whether dziewit talking about conventional systems, nuclear systems -- applicable whether you were talking about conventional systems for nuclear systems. it seems like the administration is not observing these fundamental aspects of arms control.
does this mean that the obama administration cannot arrive at a treaty with russia? no, that is not one i mean by failure. i mean one that does not serve the interests of the united states or internationally. let's go through some of these standards. he should not enter into a negotiation you are on willing to walk away from. -- you should not enter in a negotiation you are not willing to walk away from. that is not of pulling that standard in terms of having a firm idea of when your partner is asking too much and you will not go there. if you don't establish that foundation, then any agreement becomes acceptable to the negotiator. that arms control not become an end in itself. this sort of nonsensical allusion to the reset -button
means this becomes a litmus test about the health of the greater u.s.-russia relationship. that is not an appropriate to do arms control. the third standard is that the process should not dominate substance. i see a lack of a bottom line standard or approach or coal for the administration's arms control policy. it is about the process of how it appears to the russians and to the broader world community in terms of how things are going. we should see treaties on narrowly defined subject matters, but it seems like the obama administration is looking to deal with a whole variety of
issues with the exception of tactical nuclear. whether it be a missile defense or linkages to nato expansion, whether it be linkages about the nature of the russian relationship with iran. it does not seem very well focused he should see a treaty that reduces the likelihood of conflicts, but what i see here is the administration moving in that default option of multilateralism mutual goal our ability. does that reduce the -- i don't think so. so that worries me. will the treaty be adequately verifiable? maybe. that depends on exactly how is that they want to account for any reductions they are seeking. that is an open question.
will the treaty be enforceable? that is up to the u.s. as to if it will probably enforce this tree. i find it questionable -- if it will probably enforce this treaty. i find is questionable if the obama is administration is doing anything. i am not sure that the russians are at all in compliance with those only politically and not legally binding agreements. so the final one is william negotiate treaties on the basis that to anything that violates -- that violates your obligation to your allies. it seems to me that the obama
administration is coming close to the line of throwing two important nato allies over board in order to achieve this so- called reset with the u.s.- russian relations. what is it that i think the of ministration should be focused on? fundamentally, we need to move in a direction of what we call a protect and defend it strategy. we talk about that in a background about establishing an arms control policy that is a tool in achieving this new approach that will be defensive. but what we need to do is the following. we need to not worry about the start deadline. i think the u.s. and russia can continue to make progress as we have been doing in recent years
on reducing the number of nuclear warheads under the treaty. there is one issue that the treaty is currently dependent on a not truly compatible transparency and verification regime. the one thing i do think that should be in the near term negotiations is drafting a protocol to the moscow treaty that provides for this transparency measures, specifically against the accounting standard that is associated with that particular treaty which is on his deployed warheads. the third thing they need to do is limit formal linkages. the idea that the u.s. will get into negotiations that will have a formal linkages regarding the
question of iran, they will not serve the process very well. we should defer negotiations with regard to the plane warheads that would go below the moscow treaty level. we got into 2012 that the moscow treaty will be in force, said that gives us plenty of time to negotiate a more fundamentally sound treaty. the most important aspect is to try to get the u.s. and russia, and ultimately in the broader international arena, arms control standards in place that try to posture all countries verses ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons and so forth in ways that are more fundamentally defensive in terms of their fulfillment. i would like to ultimately move
in that direction. let me say as i come back to this question i opened up with as regard to the russian failure is that the house of representatives surprisingly in recent days adopted unanimously an amendment to the defense authorization bill that says that the administration may not use any funds to implement a treaty with russia that would not be adequately verifiable. it would not put any limitations on missile defense systems or conventional weapons. and basically president obama would have to certify that. finally, they said you would have to certify he would take steps to improve the safety and security of the u.s. nuclear force, indeed modernize its strategic nuclear weapons infrastructure. if that is not a shot across the
mouth at the obama administration i don't know what is, because it was adopted without dissent. >> on this optimistic note, we are going back to moscow. can we have a full screen? are you ready? ok, yes. do we have moscow? yes. no audio. >> i would like to deal with the problem of arms control from the russian viewpoint. corms control was crucial -- arms control was a crucial issue here during the cold war years. in fact, it was an efficient mechanism for decreasing the
risk of nuclear war or establishing rules for iraq initially assured destruction -- establishing rules for mutual leak a shortage -- mutually assured destruction. i believe this linkage has did not disappear with the cold war. what we see now is an attempt to use the arms control process as a kind of prime mover to solve other issues and bilateral contacts. fritz ermath mentioned that russia is not the soviet union. unfortunately, many people in the russian elite and decision makers believe that russia is the soviet union because it has
inherited its nuclear weapons, its security council, it has inherited a large part of its territory and its political elites and political mentality. if we look at the russian political mentality, it still remains very much motivated by the cold war stereotypes. i would say that the [unintelligible] what is good for america is that for russia and vice versa is still very much there in russia decisionmaking. and the approaches towards forms control and many other issues are very strongly motivated by this zero sum game. if we look at the forthcoming negotiations on arms control, including the issue of strategic
nuclear weapons reductions and the issue related to the abatement of the ballistic missile defense in europe, we see that there is a certain contradiction in side of this. i'm. does russia really need the reductions -- a certain contradiction on this side of the paradigm. because if we take the weakness of russian economy, at the political weakness of the russian regime, we see the nuclear potential still remains the core of russian political influence in the world. antique -- and russia is recognized as a global
superpower. in fact, if russia reduces its nuclear weapons, it will be a clear signal that russia becomes a week at least in the eyes of the russian decision makers kerik the second reason why russia does not want dramatic cuts in nuclear weapons is that the lord levels of nuclear potential would become -- the lower levels of nuclear potential would become -- to obtain nuclear weapons, because when nuclear potentials are lower with countries to have them, it means that the role of such countries as iran, north korea, with their smaller nuclear potentials, will grow. they will play a more significant role in international affairs tahn they plate before -- than they played
before. if i believe nuclear reductions will make the political environment of the world more dangerous. so while russia is ready to negotiate a new treaty with the u.s. and reduce its nuclear weapons, my answer is very clear. russia wants to prevent the deployment of ballistic missile defenses in eastern europe by all means. it is the key issue in the russian arms control agenda and it has very serious motivation which has little to do with national security concerns, but which has very deep political motivation. russia is not afraid of american ballistic missile defense in poland or czech republic. no one believes here it is a threat to russia, but the russian elite cannot reconcile
the idea that the u.s. can deploy it modern weapons close to russian borders in the nation's sick which two decades ago -- in the nations which two decades ago or a part of the [unintelligible] as you may have noticed in remounts, putin and medvedev, here they were doing everything to encourage this linkage between its strategic nuclear katz and the issue of ballistic when -- strategic nuclear cutrs and ballistic missiles. it is clear that it has a political explanation. russia wants to show that the u.s. and nato cannot deploy the weapons in europe without russian consent and without russian agreement. russia wants to show they are
politically influential and they have a serious impact in europe and their relations with the u.s. that it can prevent any kind of military deployment close to its borders. this will be the core of the obama-mad that if discussions, and it certainly will be a serious test -- the core of obama-medvedev discussions. whether it is a global ballistic missile defense or not. i would mention that the russian attitudes towards obama are not so straightforward s irina yasina has mentioned. many people see obama's charisma, they enjoy his openness, but many people doubt whether he is really
experienced, whether this charisma is translated into american leadership and protecting american national interests in inappropriate ways. whether his his speech in egypt or other places, it actually increases his personal popularity but many believed it does not solve the american leadership -- they don't believe it serves american leadership. there is a strong temptation in moscow to test obama in a way that nikita khrushchev tested john kennedy in 1961. you remember the berlin crisis and the cuban crisis. the military exercises which are now going on near the georgian border, which is a clear demonstration of russian forces
and an attempt to intimidate, it is also a kind of test for obama because i believe it is creating a certain background, a certain environment for the forthcoming negotiations, including those on the ballistic missile defenses and arms control. recently, couldn't -- putin said the countries should be judged by their potential rather than their intentions, but unfortunately he thought it was bismarck. >> actually it was [unintelligible] >> i believe if we look at the arms control problem we should not forget that russia is the only country which can destroy america and america remains the only country which can destroy russia. this mutual destruction remains
on the agenda. we cannot deal without it and we cannot forget about this legacy of the cold war. i believe fritz ermath remembers an interesting experience of the 1980's went american competitive strategy brought to lead an interesting phenomenon in russian military buildup. -- brought to life in interesting phenomenon. the soviet union actually started a kind of dual approach in response to single military program. russia simultaneously developed offensive and defensive programs. this was such a severe burden for russia economy that it has undermined the soviet union and has accelerated its collapse.
unfortunately, he what we see of the russian leadership is following the same light. we see the intense not only to increase his strategic nuclear potential, but also the attempt to increase potential weapons and build up strategic missile defenses. it is a way -- i believe the american message of the forthcoming negotiations with moscow should be clear that arms control should be a two-way street. it should prevent not only the present threat but it should also prevent the fourth coming of france -- prevent the forthcoming threats. we should understand the threats for russia are not coming from the u.s. but the new actress -- but the noon act