tv U.S. House of Representatives CSPAN November 20, 2009 2:44pm-6:30pm EST
general who can pull the case from him or it can be granted to be done somewhere else. anyone higher in the chain of command -- this is in the early phase. the military themselves can choose to move it. the higher general from there could choose to send it someplace else within his court or it could be moved elsewhere even from there. >> because this is a high- profile case and with its complexity, do you think it will be some time before we get to the preliminary hearings? will it be a year? will it take longer than a normal court-martial case?
>> it kinda depends. we are really still in the beginning stages. it has only been a couple of weeks from the tragedy. we are not sure where the investigation is going to go. depending on what to the investigation comes up with, if it is very complex, it could be a to a year. he will be held in confinement during that time. the supposition is going to be, even though there's a speedy trial protections in place, his ultimate sentence is one to be something along than six months to a year. so the harm of delaying a trial will be minimize compared to some other lesser case. >> i think that it is unlikely that any significant legal
proceedings are going to happen. dr. hassan's condition happe -- happen until dr. hassan's condition stabilizes. >> i do think -- you're not talking about years before things happen in this case. his medical condition up with steny, three months to six months, these things should be taking place. >> did you say that the appeals cases eight years? >> that is the statistical average for those that have gone through the military court process. that is right.
>> between the trial process and the command review process and then the appellate process, the military system does not hurry to bring people to completion of the capital process. the collateral review process begins then. this is habeas corpus in the federal district courts. then a whole other appellate process kicks in. of course, one of the major speed bumps in the military system, unique to the military system, and is that you cannot have a capital sentence carried out to execution ofexecution wit
the approval of the president of the united states. interestingly, in the case from 1960, the case of private bennett, the last person to be executed, president eisenhower had approved his sentence and approved the execution in the late 1950's. by the time inauguration day came around in 1961, bennett was still alive. the question was presented a second time, this time to president kennedy, as to whether the execution should go forward. president kennedy obviously did
not stop it. >> recently, since that execution, the five folks that have been on death row, there has only been one that was approved. that was in 2008 by president bush. that is the great case. -- that is the gray case. it is going through the civil habeas review. that is the one that is farthest along the line. >> [unintelligible] >> one of the issues that you see is that several of these cases have been appealed. in the process, they have been appealed and overturned.
one sentence was recently committed. he had a death sentence and then he was sentenced to life without parole. there are several capital cases. five have gone to the appellate process and remain on death row. in 2004, the case was brought to trial and convicted. >> for clarification, we usually look back to 1984, when the rules were significantly change by president reagan, that is usually are starting point for counting cases. since then, there have been approximately 50 cases in which the penalty was sought.
but some of those cases -- in one case, or into cases, the individuals have been acquitted. those were cases quite resilient. the vast majority of those cases receive something other than a death penalty. only 59 of those 50 or so cases result -- only 15 or so of those cases result in a death penalty. in other cases, the appellate court overturned the death sentence. three of those are currently pending. >> in addition to being slow to
impose the death penalty as a sentence, the military justice system is slow to prove it on review. the best research on this has been done by colonel plight sullivan who has written extensively about the military death penalty. in addition, prof. gary solis did a study of the vietnam war crimes cases. the results were quite remarkable about sentences' being reduced materially as they progressed into the command review process and the appellate review process under the ucmj. draconian sentences tended to be reduced dramatically. i am not saying that that will happen here. there are a lot of steps along
the way. brian mentioned life without parole. as this case unfold, the military is greater at acronyms. you may hear lwop, which is life without parole. the only other thing that i wanted to mention renown is that, more broadly, going past the army record, the other services are not what i call bloodthirsty in terms of the administration of the death sentence. the u.s. marine corps has not had an execution since before the war between the states. it is a system that is quite slow to impose a death sentence >>. >> just the gray case alone, his
death warrant was signed by president bush last year. but it had been sitting on the president's desk for basically his entire term. it was something like seven years. just from the time they get to the president's desk to his signing it, that was an additional eight years after all of the other appeals we talk about. is a very slow process. >> [unintelligible] >> i really cannot say exactly why that is. >> some speculation has been that it is not a popular move to be the first president in a long time to issue the death sentence to a military person. certainly, that could have been it. that is speculation. president bush, as the governor
of texas, he had been pro-death penalty. but it is hard to know why he chose the one to go forward. >> president clinton did not have scruples about approving death sentences. he had also been a state governor. there was a notorious case in which he returned to arkansas to a expressly approved a death sentence under quite controversial circumstances. again, that was an eight-year presidency in which there were no military in executions. -- a military executions. >> could have sung remain at fort hood -- could house odr. hn remain at fort hood? how long are you thinking that process could take? could it be years before we see
everything finished up? do you have a guess? >> if i were to guess, this is mid november, i would say that the trial might well be over a year from now. we are familiar with something called the rocket docket. the military does not function as a rocket docket, particularly in these cases. even though that sometimes it said that the military justice system is meant to dispense lickety-split-type process, it does not function that way. >> maya understanding is that ---understanding is that he is in san antonio right now. he is not in fort hood. the expectation of where he
would be following that, he would likely be kept in pre- trial confinement. he may not go back to fort hood. he may stay in san antonio. but the ability to put him wherever is ok. there is no legal impediment as to where he goes. i do not know why they would bring him back to fort hood unless there were to have the trial there. but this creates more complications than they want by bringing him back. >> in terms of the venue question, this case has generated a lot of national and international attention already. one of the challenges is going to be finding jurors in the military justice system who are in partial and you have not prejudged the case. that happens in the civilian community as well.
the military justice system has a process for screening jurors or members. it is called for deer examination -- is called guardier examination. it is to make sure that they have not been exposed to overwhelming prejudicial publicity or that they do not come to the process with fixed views, one way or the other, that would preclude them from proper service as members of the court-martial. that is certainly going to be an issue. it is when to be a challenge where this case is held. the same is true, by the way, just to switch gears a little bit to the prosecutions that have just been moved from guantanamo to the seventh district of new york. they will need to find jurors
who are fit to sit. >> because dr. hassan is a high- ranking person in the army, the pool of jurors is much smaller. he is entitled to a jury panel of officers. there are many lessons folks and the less officers. -- there are many in list of folks and less officers. when you're dealing with the commanding general it in fort hood, the number of soldiers he has, but the number of officers is about 10% or so. the pool that you pick fofrom fr jury duty would be officers. >> .
we come from at least five of, which was the old rule, at least five for a general court- martial panel. that was used in capital cases. it has to be at least 12. you could potentially have 15 people sit on the case. that is something that is different from the civilian system. we are looking for a fairly large member pool because you have to have quite a view more than a normal court-martial. you have to have all of officers and they have to be seniors. it most likely would have to be a large army base to get the population. >> we should probably take a second to talk about the
lawyering. obviously there are trained attorneys prosecuting the case. there will be attorneys on the defense side. he has employed a retired army corporal. that is at his own expense. there will be detailed council, who are uniform lawyers, who are made eavailable to him and no expense. they have to be made available if they are reasonably available. interesting thing about this is even if you were able to afford
an attorney, you get them for free under the military justice system. that is unlike the civilian justice system, where only people who are indigent are entitled to three defense. >> is it different in civilian courts and how does it work? are there a certain number of strikes schiedathat the councilo remove members? >> it is very similar in civilian court in that regard. there is some discretion. in other words, each council will submit questions and the judge will ask the questions. some judges allow individual attorneys to ask the questions. there are challenges for cause.
i think it was one preemptory. i do not know if that is therefore capital cases, i do not think it is. it is a very similar progress -- process. it starts out with a questionnaire, like have you ever had family members involved or anyone in your family with mental health issues. then they will have more specific questions that they addressed to individual members of the panel it concerns arise -- if concerns arise. >> it is called a liberal grant rule. the military judges are under an injunction to be generous in
granting challenges for cause so that if the defense or government can come up with a plausible basis for releasing up potential court-martial member, the judge is supposed to grant it. the process is not all that dissimilar from the civilian criminal justice process and that the doctrines relating to the exclusion, for example, of racial minorities are applied. that is familiar territory in the military justice system. the military judges are alert to the potential for abuse in the exercise of challenges, and that has been a fruitful field for litigation. i'm sure that will be sought through very carefully by the
prosecution, defense, and military judge. the prosecutor is called the trial counsel, rather than prosecutor for district attorney. if you see reference to the trial counsel, that means the prosecutor. >> one thing you might want to think about is the issue of religion. i think you can expect to see discretions in that canyon it makes it clear you cannot strike someone because of their gender or race, religion is not quite as clearly resolved. i expected to be an issue in this case in terms of whether someone is either a strong christian view or muslim view, would it be inappropriate person to strike from the panel based on the views? the same is true on whether
someone believes in the death penalty. those are all questions that will be interesting and that you can expect to see. >> we should go back and take one second, we should go back and talk about the pretrial investigation. even though this plays a role comparable to a grand jury, it is different in important ways. it produces only a recommendation to the commanding officer, the convening authority. they can accept or reject. the other thing is the defense can play a very active role in article 32 investigation. they get to cross-examine witnesses, put on the unwitnessed. sometimes the accused may take
the stand. i would be skeptical if that will happen here, but we will find out. it is one of those aspects of the military justice system that is commonly pointed to as more generous than the civilian justice system. there were hands. >> you mentioned the prosecution will look very carefully to what they do for making this appeal proof. what are the concerns that you have in terms of potential appeals? >> >> michele, you can start on that. >> there are any number of pitfalls. all of the appellate issues that
could be raised in a shoplifting case, they're all of those but there are ones that would be specific, and assuming this would be at capital case, ones that are specific to capital cases. we often hear that death is different. there are very important pitfalls that this case will want to avoid, things like making sure initially that he has council who are what you would term the best qualified -- death qualified, and these are individuals that have not tried just one case. you want to make sure you have individuals assigned to this case to understand the ramifications of trying a
capital case. in the military system the convening authority has control over the purse strings when it comes to hiring expert witnesses. that is something in this case that will be particularly important because in a capital case mitigation experts, individuals who specialize in looking at the backgrounds of the accused, the defense in this case are critical to providing a fair trial and having a case that will be upheld on appeal. those are a couple of things, and i am sure that gene and brian have additional pitfalls for this type of case. >> truthfully, mitigation was changed.
he was the individual sergeant in 1995 who played in the woods and open up and shot a bunch of people, killing one and injuring 17 others. his case and the main issues dealt with the mitigation specialist in the government's refusal to provide them with a mitigation expert. that is a significant issue, because as we laid out early on one of the factors that goes into whether a death sentence can be approved is whether it mitigation factors are weighed in. you can expect that this case will focus a lot of the doctor trying to show whatever problems he has are mitigating circumstances. you can expect that. we also mentioned 80% of the cases, at the death penalty cases, had been overturned for
some reason or the other. one-third of them were from ineffective assistance of counsel. the council failing to raise its rights issues. another quarter had to do with that instructions by the judge. like it denying a request for an expert or issues like that. one of the things you will see is the defense pushing for different issues, and i think the government will want to be wary of that and make sure that air on the side of giving him additional time or resources. there is a challenge in that because the military is interested in trying cases. the recent history is that it is very difficult to get a capital case all the way through. >> there has been so much
attention to this case so far that you could almost already make up a shopping list of issues that might very well end up on the table if there is a trial. evidence may be excluded by the military judge or admitted by the military judge. those are areas that are fruitful sources of appellate litigation. obviously speedy trial is an issue we have all heard about unlawful command instance, which comes up in a variety of different ways. we have mentioned then you questions. -- mentioned venue questions.
leakage of confidential information may turn out to be an issue, would not surprise me. access to experts has been mentioned. the principal there is there has to be quality of arms between the prosecution and the defense. what you will probably see is request for experts for investigative assistance and technical advisers. are their qualifications comparable? is there a significant difference? another issue, and this has to do with the exclusionary inclusion of evidence, the claim that she was heard to say -- that he was heard to say that
the judge should exclude that. there are other aspects that might be highly controversial, for example, his religious involvement and uviews -- does that come in that aggravation or mitigation? the final thing i want to mention is what ever issues the party sprang u brings up or thes inject, if this case is ever gets to the armed forces, those judges have of practice for many years of identifying errors on
their own. they have a central legal staff and the poor over records of trial and they can identify and regulate to identify and require the parties to brief issues that they specify. they've they -- they may very well go beyond what is bubefore the court of appeals. in that respect, it has been a matter of controversy. the court has been proactive in insuring that there is meaningful civilian review and that they get a fair shake. >> [inaudible]
we are all jews to the phrase command influence. the military justice mavens are particular about this. we say unlawful command influence. they also have an effective assistance of counsel. u.c.i. comes in a variety of shapes and colors. those allegations are regularaly made, but they very rarely get anywhere.
even when a gains tax and in theory, it is quite rare that anybody gets any actual benefit at the end of the day in terms of having a conviction overturned. why is that? because our political leaders who are in charge of the defense department and the service department were not born yesterday. they are revised to be circumspect in their comments. they are typically pretty good at that. i would be surprised if anything said to date were the cause of any wrinkles in the investigative or prosecution process. what happens tomorrow, i cannot say, but so far i think they are on safe ground. >> if the military hierarchy and everyone that will serve on the
jury will report on a chain of command all the way up to the president. some high level official, whether it is a general or otherwise, comments on how he thinks the case should be handled. the issue becomes race if your superior officer -- the issue becomes a your superior officer says how the case should go, does that influence you on how you will act and decide the case? there are several other ways that this can come in at a more practical level as well. >> suppose you had a commander who said i just do not see if you put someone on report your company commander can turn around and say he is a good guy and permitted to serve out his enlistment. you cannot lawfully chill people
from coming forward. let's be very clear about one other thing, and we're doing this and bits and pieces. remember, a court-martial is dividing two stages. one is the gilts arena stage and the other is the sentencing stage. -- one is the gulilt stage and the other is the sentencing stage. one might be very short, one might be long. you do not know. but it is a two-stage process. other questions? >> on the documents issue, is their established policy on that
or is that made up as it goes by the commanding general? >> all i can say is that we pressed this in the case i was describing. and we were told that we had to proceed under the freedom of information act. i think eventually had repressed it, we might have gotten some traction with the military judge. i think the judge entered some kind of order. there was no general rule on this. i think this is a ground rule for cases that are high-profile cases that should be resolved once and for all instead of having to do in real time. real time determination of an issue like this is, as they understand, is really
unacceptable. you are on deadline for daily journalism. i think that is something that people want to be proactive on. >> [inaudible] >> different services do it differently. some of the judges are stationed out of a particular base and responsible for that base. in other state art responsible for it that part of the country or world. -- and other cases, they are
responsible for that part of the country or world. in this case i would say, and actually going back to the preliminary hearing, the article 32 hearing is not usually presided over by a judge. it is usually just a random judge advocate, but in this case i see a judge being advised to a preliminary hearing and a senior judge being assigned to this as the trial judge. i can see him in this case if it is referred to as a counsel case, there are not that many defense counsel for prosecutors who had the wherewithal and the experience to do those types of cases. there are not that many judges
who would be mindful of all the things that you guys have asked about. i foresee it being the very senior judge. >> by the way, we talk about the uniform code of military justice and the pentagon and the military and grossed. in fact, the military justice system is quite decentralized. the different branches have their own systems. three these are serviced by service arrangements. -- these are serviced by service arrangements. one difference between their military system and the civilian system is the terms of office for judges. we're all familiar with the fact that federal district judges
enjoy life tenure and their salaries reduced. those do not apply to military judges. the supreme court says the due process clause does not require a military judge to have any term of office. the bad news is that the terms they created are only three years long, which is very, very short. that is the difference. speaking personally i think that is unfortunate, and i think the military and congress should do better in terms of protecting the independence of military judges. a three-year term is something we could never tolerate in the civilian community. we will see if those concerns
about judicial independence play at a share. i am an optimist, but i do think the structure could be improved and military judges could be given longer terms of office. not by regulation but by an act of congress. >> iis not already a capital case? >> it is merely a potential capital case. >> initially the charges have been brought. there will be an article 32 appearing t hearing, where botho forward and prevent evidence and the officer will make a recommendation to the commanding general of to go forward with the charges, the specific
charges, make a recommendation that he be charged capital the or not. at that point, after that sharing is complete they will go directly to the convening authority -- after that hearing is complete, they will go directly to the convening authority. the expectation is because of a crime and the multiple counts of premeditated murder, they are setting it up for that route. that will be a step in the sequence. >> you mention congress earlier. why does that mean in terms of the trial? what are the concerns or are there no concerns, but clearly this is not going on in a
vacuum? congress, all three branches are involved in this. what does this mean? >> i do think there is a danger that congress and the pursuit of its constitutional powers may create a potential stumbling blocks in the case at hand. i am sure i am preaching to the choir, but i would hope that senator 1levin and his opposite numbers would air on the side of caution as they decide whether and how to explore some of the institutional issues that are prettpresented as they unfold.
we have had this situation come up before where moments and have come to the attention of our legislature at the same time there have been criminal proceedings. it is dangerous, and we hope for the best. i certainly would caution if there is a way to avoid public airing of these issues in a legislative forum, i certainly would hope that the senators and representatives give prayerful consideration to holding the phone and allowing the military justice system to function without having to bump into at the legislative process. >> that could be a very long wait. >> that is true. it is clear there is a tension. i know the homeland security committee held a hearing.
i understand the impulse that led them to do that. i hope the hearing is productive. it may have well galvanized the administration to do the kind of investigation that apparently is being done now as a policy matter. sometimes the legislative process can simply act as a prod to the executive branch, that is ok, but i think if it goes -- if it starts to get into public hearings in a way that could deprive the prosecution of a level playing fields, i think that would be quite unfortunate. i think people on the hill are smart enough to be alert to the danger. >> a a related issue is whether or not, based on the evidence,
whether this case could be tried not just a military court system but some kind of terrorism-related charges. i do not think that is necessarily an issue, but these of the things that could be looked at. this is another potential point of conflict. these of the different types of issues that could surface. >> we are talking about traditional product line that led to the founding of i.m.j. in 1991. we have been looking at the commission issues for the past
eight years now. some of the issues may intersect. one of them is the willingness of the bar to come forward and represent individuals who are deeply unpopular. whose content -- conduct may be viewed with dismay by the american public. it is the strength of our system that from the time john adams defendant the red coats members of the bar had been willing to come forward. civilians, but also uniformed judge advocate's to represent people whose conduct, whose apparent conduct is deeply
baffling and disturbing to the american public. i think that is the strength of our legal system. >> are there any other questions, comments? >i think i promised you and lightning discussion, and i think, we are leaving this morning's discussion with a much clearer idea of an important and complex system that is about to unfold. i want to thank all of deayou. [applause] we are adjourned. if anybody has individual questions, our panel would be willing to answer them. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2009]
>> the hearing will come to order. this morning our committee this morning our committee begins. an american soldier, nidal hasan has been charged killing 12 soldiers and one civilian in a military base in texas, on what i believe based on evidence was a terrorist attack. the purpose of this committee's investigation is to determine whether that attack would be prevented. whether the federal agencies missed signals or failed to connect dots that enabled hasan to carry out his deadly attack.
if we find such negligent or errors, we will make recommendations to ensure they don't happen again. that's our purpose. we are conducting this investigation because we believe it's our responsibility to do so could -- according to law and senate rules. we are both the homeland security committee, and over the long-term, the governmental affairs rules committee that has a special responsibility to conduct oversight, executive branch actions, particularly in this case there are questions about those actions. we know it will be difficult to fulfill our committees responsibilities. yesterday we talked to secretary gates and holder, and
asked for staff for investigation of this of the murders at fort hood. both said they reported our authority and wanted to work out an understanding in which they could cooperate, as long as our investigation did not hamper or compromise the issue of hasan. i assured them that their criminal investigation which is to bring accused to justice. our congressional investigation is to learn whether the federal government or any of his employees could have acted in a
way that would have prevented these murders from occurring. their investigation in one sense looked backwards and is punitive, and our looks forward and is preventive. i am optimistic we will work out a way for both investigations to proceed without compromising either. our staff will meet with the department of justice and defense to try to work out ground rules for both investigations without interfering with each other. i can say that our top staff has received one classified briefing on the hasan case and given access to some relevant and classified documents relating to this matter. we are off to a good
cooperative start and we will be insistant about this matter. we will issue a report and recommendations. i want to make clear this morning, that we intend to carry out this investigation with respect for the thousands of muslim americans that are serving in the american military with honor. and the millions of other patriotic law abiding muslims that live in our country. but we do no favor to all of our americans that are muslim, that a small number of their community have become violent, islamics and extremists. it seems to me here at the outset and based on what we know now, that there are three basic areas of importance.
in which our committee in this investigation will want to gather facts and draw conclusions. first, if it seems to be the case, there were colleagues of nidal hasan in the u.s. army that heard him say thing or watch him do things that raised concerns in their minds about his mental stability or extremism. the question is were those concerns conveyed up the chain of command, and were they recorded anywhere in hasan's personnel files, and did the army do anything in response to those concerns. ion did the joint terrorism task forces headed by the f.b.i. have about hasan. including transcripts of e-mails which he had with a
subject of investigation that the f.b.i. acknowledged publicly it had in its possession. the acknowledgment came last week, what judgments were made about those e-mails? were any attempts made to investigate hasan further after the e-mail traffic of the ongoing terrorist task force intercepted. and third, was the information that the joint terrorism task force had on hasan, shared with anyone in the u.s. army, the department of defense or anyone else in our government. those to me are three central questions, though by no means all the questions we will pursue painstakeingly and
answer as completely as we can, before we reach conclusions and make recommendations. this morning we are grateful to have with us, to help us consider those questions and others, a very experienced and thoughtful panel of witnesses. with experience in terrorism, counter-terrorism, law enforcement and the military. we have asked our witnesses to give us their first reactions to what we know of the murders at fort hood. and to what we know of the accused murderer, nidal hasan, based on the publicly available evidence. and i also hope they will provide their advice on what investigations should raise, on the focus of our inquiry, that is part of
i really want to thank the witnesses for being here. and i look forward to your testimony, which i am confident will get this committee's investigation of to exactly the right start. senator collins. >> think you, mr. chairman. -- thank you. let me begin by saluting you on your leadership and for your courage in proceeding with this investigation and hearings. i can think of no more important task for this committee to undertake. in investigating the september 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the commission led by tom kaine and lee hamilton discovered a vital information scattered throughout
the government that might have prevented the deaths of that terrible day if only the doctors had been connected. in the weiake of the mass murders at fort hood, we must confront a troubling question -- was this another failure to connect the dots? much has been done since 9/11/2001. we created the national counterterrorism center, additional joint terrorism task forces, infusion centers. we revised information sharing policies and promoted greater cooperation among intelligence agencies and law enforcement.
the results have been significant. terrorist plots, both at home and abroad, have been ported. -- ahve been thrawrted. the recent arrest demonstrates the tremendous benefits of information sharing, as well as federal, state, and local law enforcement. the shootings at 4 foot may indicate that communication failures and poor judgment calls can't defeat the system is intended to church that vital information is shared to protect our country and its citizens. this case also raises questions about whether or not restricted rules have a chilling affect on
the legitimate in dissemination of information, making it too difficult to connect the dots that would have allowed a clear picture of the threat to re- emerge. will explore with our expert witnesses today. our ongoing investigation will also seek answers to questions specific to the fort hood case. for example, how did our intelligence community and law enforcement agencies handle intercepted communications between major hasan and a radical cleric, that was a known al-qaeda associate. did they contact anyone in major hasan's command to relay concerns. did they seek to interview
major hasan himself? when major hasan began to question the oath he had taken to support and defend the constitution of the united states, did anyone in his military chain of command intervene? when major hasan in his presentation of walter reed in 2007 recommended that the department of defense allow quote muslim soldiers the option of being released as conscientious objectors to increase moral and decrease adverse events end quote, did his colleagues view this statement as a red flag? were numerous warning signs ignored because the army faces a severe shortage of
psychiatrists and because the army was concerned as the chief of staff put it, about a backlash against muslim soldiers. these are all troubling questions that we will seek to answer. for nearly four years this committee has been investigating the threat of home-grown terrorism. we have explored radicalization in our prisons and how the internet can act as a terrorist training camp. we have warned that individuals within the united states can be inspired by al-qaeda's violent idealogy, to execute attacks even if they do not receive direct orders to do so. and we have learned of the difficulty of detecting lone wolf terrorists.
to prevent future home-grown terrorist attacks, we must better understand why law enforcement, intelligence agencies and our military personnel system may have failed in this case. major hasan's attack targeted innocent civilians and soldiers regardless of their religious faith. the patriotic soldiers and citizens of all faiths who were injured and killed, not on a foreign battleground, but rather on what should have been safe and secure american territory deserve a thorough investigation. with so many questions still swirling around this heinous attack, it's important for our nation to understand what
happened so that we may work to prevent future incidents. we owe that to our troops, to their families and communities, and to all the american people. >> thank you very much, senator collins for that excellent opening statement. and now go to the witnesses and begin with retired general of the army, and former chief of staff, and we are delighted to have you here as a decorated american soldier, and a relevant experience that general keane will testify to, at fort brag when a soldier with white extremist views was involved in the murder of an african-american couple. that experience informs his view of this incident, and we
welcome his reflections on that and the broader view of extremism in the military, and how we hope that the army has handled this situation. general keane, it's a greater honor for you to be here. >> thank you, i truly appreciate you inviting me to testify this morning on a subject of national importance that directly affects the american people, and equally important our soldiers and their families. how pagemu÷ painful and ironic that our soldiers were gunned down at fort hood. as we are rapidly become aware. the preliminary reports suggest that major hasan himself is an extremist, and as he cried out
the refrain. and it appears that likely major hasan's targets and radical beliefs are directly related as we chose to kill those who were "destination -- destined to fight. we welcome the agencies of government and this congress are conducting to determine who was major hasan, what were the patterns of his behavior and attitude, what did he know about what appears to be his extremist beliefs. what did we know about what appears to be his extremist beliefs, how did we share that information and what actions did we take or fail to result as a result. and most definitely, what must we do to prevent such incidents in the future. the department of defense has a long standing policy of
intolerance, for organizations and practices and activities that are discriminatory or extremist in nature. this policy was updated in 1996 for extremist act ivities and again in 1996 after two army soldiers committed two murders at fort brag, north carolina, resulting in a death of two african-americans and with a subsequent revision in 1996. in fact the army issued a pamphlet entitled extremist activities as a result of that incident. i took command in fort brag weeks after that incident occurred, and there was much we learned. first and foremost we were
tolerating racially skin heads in our units in fort brag. when extremism occurs in a unit, there is a natural tendency to withdraw, and as such it can polarize a unit and affect its moral to perform at a high standard. what we found at fort brag is that our policies were not clear in identifying what extremist behavior was. in this case tattoos, specific dress and racial rhetoric and nazi symbols, etc. as a result racial extremists were allowed to exist in our units, 21 soldiers were removed
from the service for exhibiting this behavior, but unfortunately after the murders were committed. two soldiers were tried and convicted for these murders. the army determined that we need to update our policy and educate army soldiers and leaders on the patterns of behavior and those policies that require soldiers and leaders to identify such behavior and report it. so that commanders can take appropriate action. commanders options are numerous from counseling, efficiency reporting, ucmj actions and involuntary separation. our commanders then and now, have full authority by army policy to quote prohibit military personnel from engaging in or participating in
activities that the commander determines will adversely affect good order and discipline, end quote. i expect strongly after we conduct these investigations, we will find that our policies will need revision again to account for the specific behavior and attitudes by radical islamics. it should not be lack of courage for a soldier to identify a fellow soldier who is exhibiting extremist behavior. it should be an obligation. and as such commanders need the guidelines of what this behavior is and use the tools to rehabilitate the soldiers if
possible or to take legal or separation action. because jehagist are linked to security operations that affect the united states, it's important that we share information about such individuals. what is in the media these last days about major hasan and his behavior, is determined to be true is very disturbing. such allegations as justifying internet bombing on the internet, warning about adverse events if muslims were not allowed to leave military service. immediately seeking counsel from anwar al-awlaki with well known ties to al-qaeda.
finally, with the fbi sharing what it knew about hasan. while these patterns are preliminary and will be confirmed by the investigations that are conducted, it is very similar to what we experienced in the late 1990's where we worked long curly -- where we work wrongfully tolerating extremist in the organization that put them at odds with the character of the army. let me conclude by saying that the incident and his behavior is not about muslims and their religion, who are part of the fabric of american life, nor is
it about the 10,000 muslims in the military that quite frankly are not seen as muslims, but as soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. their contribution, commitment, and sacrifice is not only appreciated, it is honored. this is fundamentally about teapot misheard -- jihadists extremism. i was in the pentagon on 9/11 and felt up close the horror of the extremism as the army lost more soldiers and civilians that day than any day in the last eight years of war. i know our soldiers and families are stunned by this strategy because their friends and loved ones were killed simply because
of who they are and what they stand for. they were committed to defend this nation against the very extremism that killed them. this is the most transformational issue i have dealt with in my military service and continues to be set today. in my judgment it is the most significant threat to the security of the american people that i have faced in my lifetime. we are a society that despises -- that aspires to tolerant and admirers diversity, a at the same time, we must know what a threat looks like coppe, and wet know what to do about it. tahnhank you. . .
>> thank you for the stirring statement. we are honored to have a grand townsend with us, former assistant to the president for homeland security and counter- terrorism. we are really grateful to have you here to put this case into the context of your experience in the field of counter- in the field of counter- terr please, proceed. >> thank you. it is really a privilege for me to be here today. after more than 20 years in the government, most as a prosecutor, the one thing i think we know for sure is that things always look clearer of looking back. -- then when you are in the heat of battle. as you well understand, i caution the american people to remember that imperfect knowledge in the heat of the
battle and investigation often results in less than perfect judgments and knowledge. i applaud the effort of the -- i ask that we find the effort to keep to these actions. i have conducted many such reviews in my time in government. probably the most well-known was the katrina lessons learned. in the wake of a national strategy, wally typically look for single point of failure, the failures tend to be systemic weaknesses and failures. the importance of your work and i define these so we can fix them. -- and identifying these so we can fix them. when we look at this incident, without knowing all of the facts, we come away with many questions.
i break them down into three distinct areas. first, a collection, law- enforcement, and the investigation -- and third, the military. let me start with collection. wally must rely on public report, -- while we must rely on a public report, lawfully intercepted investigations -- the intelligence community identified less than two dozen communications pulled from this unrelated investigation that had more than 20,000 communications. i'm a say to you that that is an extraordinary accomplishment on behalf of the fbi and when not have occurred prior to 9/11. suggest a more capable fbi determined to protect us.
that is to be commended. i look at the law enforcement investigations. to evaluate that, and it is difficult without understanding several things first, the content of the communications. they remain classified in the ongoing investigation. second, when the investigators looked at the communications, what did they look at them against? what information did they have access to at the time they evaluated the communications? third, once they had the information and made a judgment whether we agree or not, what did they do to share that information with individuals who could have taken action outside of a law enforcement context? let me start with content. while i cannot speak to the specific content of his communications, here is what we
do now from the 9/11 commission report. he was in san diego. at that same moscow word to of the 9/11 hijackers. in 2001, he went to the mosque in northern virginia. it is the same mosque with the same two hijackers from 9/11. his phone number is discovered in an apartment he has been the sick -- apartment. he has been the subject of investigation in 2002. he is well known to the international counter-terrorism community.
the defense criminal investigative service was a part of that review. they looked at major hassan's person now file. what was in that file? were they there? were they considered? based on the judgment that was made on it, it raises some question of whether not that information made it into the personnel file that the jttf had access to. if it was not there, we must ask ourselves why. what information was shared?
i can tell you from my experience, it will dictate what rules apply in terms of information sharing. there are two sets of rules that apply. this seems to be complicated. if the information in this communications were pursuant to the foreign intelligence surveillance, it typically. cannot recall thinking back on a time when the court did not grant such permission. that is a legal restriction on the sharing. the second set of rules is a memorandum of understanding that the fbi is into.
it is not to be shared with their home agencies without the permission of the jttf. that process can be gotten. there is not a reason not to have it. did the dod as for that to be shared? -- asked for that to be shared? we need to know the answer. there is something that offends me as suggesting it was on the part of the department of defense. if they felt they did not have the authority, another federal agency could whether it lives on personnel or other reasons.
in the end, why was major hassan -- in the wake of the review, did they interviewed him? if they did not lead him to be a threat, then why did they go and interview him? if you did not want to interview him, why did you interview his colleagues where the information that was not in the file it discovered? there are three typical responses to those questions. first is the protection of sources. they would not want to reveal where they got this. i would suggest to the committee that there are ways around that concern to mass the method by which you did that collection. second, i worry about a sense of
political correctness. we very much respect and rely on the vast majority of law- abiding muslims. we have done tremendous cultural training and said the federal government law enforcement agencies -- inside the federal government law enforcement agencies. there is the fbi domestic and asian opera -- domestic investigation operational guidelines. they are updated annually. it has been suggested they would not have interviewed him because they are discouraged.
when we did get the military, we must look at this important aspect. we have to know whether or not if there is a method by which the derogatory information made its way into a major hasan's personnel file. even if the military got the information's, they have the process and procedures in place to assure that it not fall through the cracks. the mets have adequate resources and training with in the military -- they must have adequate resources and training with in the military to address this issue. they need resources to root out the potential criminal, spies, and terrorists.
it is important that we assure ourselves and we address these issues, because it is at the core of our obligation to protect our service members and their families. we ask much of them. we owe them an honest look. it is easy to offer questions and opinions will we are unburdened by the fact. i'm not here to second-guess the public servant who investigated this case but to offer how we might improve the system and better protect our men and women in uniform. >> i really appreciate the spirit and content of your testimony, which i think will be both informative and helpful as we go forward. thank you for bringing your experience. -- the next witness is with the intelligence division of new york city's police department.
he has testified before the committee before about a seminal report that he co-authored for the nypd. the nypd has a remarkable look at a focus on home from terrorism. we are very grateful that you have returned to the committee and we welcome your testimony at this time. >> in october of 2007, i testified before this committee about the findings of a recent study titled along " radicalization in the west, a
homegrown threat." this threat has not materialized in the night states. for the past comments, we did for the past 12 months, they have uncovered a cost -- in the past 12 months, they have past 12 months, they have uncovered these arrests, along with intelligence operations indicate that radicalization is taking place in the nine states. one year ago, november, 2008, the department of homeland security and the fbi issued a warning related to an al qaeda- linked terrorist plot on the long island commuter network. the origins of the pot related back directly to a new yorker who traveled to pakistan to seek
out an opportunity to participate in violent jihad. april, 2009, before their joint arrest, four men at sot explosives outside of a jewish synagogue in riverdale in an attempt to terror -- carry out a terrorist attack. these men were radicalized in the united states. july, 2009, several men were arrested in north carolina, possessing weapons and several thousand rounds of ammunition and had plans to attack the marine base at quantico virginia. the seven men were inspired by al qaeda and radicalized in the united states. this past september, age 24, a man was arrested with an al qaeda-blank conspiracy to attack locations in new york with hydrogen-peroxide based explosives. it is called one of the most serious since 9/11.
he lived in the united stated during his formative years before departing for pakistan. later that same september, a 21- year-old from new york's was indicted for conspiracy to commit murder abroad in support for foreign terrorism. he was arrested in kosovo. he wanted to take up arms against perceived enemies of islam, meaning american troops. he was also radicalized in the united states. there are more. in boston, a 26-year old in graduate of a massachusetts college of pharmacy was arrested last month. he was charged with conspiring to attack civilians at a shopping mall in the night state as well as to members of the executive branch of the federal government. he was radicalized in the united states.
at least 15 men have radicalized in minneapolis. they have left the united states to fight in somalia. they joined a terrorist group associated with al qaeda based in somalia. our fear is what happens when they return tb united states -- to the united states. this pass september, -- this past of timbeseptember, an offie building was targeted. in springfield, at a federal building was targeted. finally, there was a recent arrest of two chicagoans would direct links to a group that was responsible for the november
2008 mumbai terrorist attacks. they seem to be plotting against targets. they appear to have been radicalized in the united states. given the evidence, one must conclude the radicalization of violence is occurring in the united states. given what seems to be a pattern of individuals, the nypd has invested a substantial effort in order to assess the quantity of a process that warrants the radicalization traject tree -- trajectory. it is consistent with the model from the 2007 nypd report that suggested four phases. driving this process is the proliferation of al qaeda
ideology intertwined with real political grievances in a war against islam and provides justification to young men with an remarkable background to pursue violent extremists and. -- extremism. phase one, pre-radicalization. it is the point of origin for individuals before they progress. based on the cases, individuals are vulnerable to ratification and tend to be male muslims between the age of 15 and 35 from varied backgrounds. cigna begin proportions come from middle-class backgrounds. -- significant proportions come from middle-class backgrounds. the vast majority of individuals do not start out as religiously observant or knowledgeable.
phase two, but dedication. it is the phase where individuals begin to explore the more literal interpretation of islam, gradually gravitating away from their old identity and beginning to explore ideology. the trigger for the religion is a catalyst of crisis. it challenges the individuals beliefs and forces them to reconsider their previous outlook and world view. phase three, indoctrination. it is the phase where individuals intensified the believe, adopt the extremist ideology, and concludes without question that they must further the case. that action is violence.
it justifies, legitimizes, and encourages violence against anything un-islamic including the west and its allies. the signatures associated with this phase including becoming an active participant in the group, becoming increasingly isolated from one's life. gradually coming individuals begin to isolate themselves from secular society. they believe the world is divided between believers and infidels, everyone else. phase four, do have is asian -- jidahization. this is where they participate in jihad and dedicate themselves as warriors. they will seek to travel abroad to participate in the film of a jihad in afghanistan, pakistan, somalia, or iraq.
frequently, group members participate in outdoor out of his campaign, paint ball, with the purpose of bonding. potential targets are chosen, surveillance begins. the group when agonizes -- weaponizes the components. additional research has highlighted new findings. the most important is that the internet has become a more viable venue. this was highlighted by a 2008 report from this committee. "the use of the internet by al qaeda and other violent extremist groups has expanded the threat to our homeland.
no longer is it just from abroad. the threat is from within." in 2007, we discussed the concept of the spiritual sanctuary, an individual who provides religious justification for violence and extremism. now have a new catalyst, the virtual spiritual sanctuary. what he is not the only onetheal-awlaki is an example of this concept. he had the ability to translate literature that promoted violent jihad in english.
not only al-awlaki been in a plot against fort dix in new jersey, his tapes were played for all of those who attended the toronto training camps in the winter of 2005. they plotted to explode 3 tons of ammonium nitrate in the fall of 2006. in recent years, u.s. authorities have been courted -- uncovered significant numbers of individuals who are intent on committing violent jihadist in the united states or abroad. radicalization is taking place in the united states today. in the past year, there have been six cases and to come and sit of traveling abroad, i carry
out violence -- who, instead of traveling abroad, decided to play out violence there. the al qaeda threat to the u.s. homeland is no longer limited to the al qaeda core. it is decentralized and consist of three primary elements, al qaeda corp., al qaeda allies, and others who began to target the west -- most recently, it has no operational relationship with al qaeda. it consists of individuals rather allies -- radicalized in the west. thank you. >> thank you. i have two quick comments. the testimony that you gave a summary of the various homegrown terrorist plots that have been
formed in stopped in the last year reminds us that, though we are in an unconditional war with the extremists who attacked as on 9/11, it has increasingly come within our borders. it started here officially, even though it was coming at this before, 9/11. this pattern of homegrown radicalization is a very sick man in the front. -- is a very disturbing front of most of these plots -- front. most of these plots have been stopped. i'm going to ask you to relate this schematic framework that you have of the phases of
radicalization be somewhat been know about hasan from sources. our next witness is the former deputy to the assistant. he comes to us today as senior adviser at the center for strategic and international studies. thank you for being here. >> thank you. plessy the for the opportunity -- thank you for the operation to ea -- opportunity to testify today. i ask that this be entered in the record. >> so ordered. >> my testimony addresses the implications of the fort hood attacked, including the terrorist threat to our military. the challenges of dealing with
the lone wolf insider threat and the increasing problems of radicalization. the horrific event at fort hood was shocking not only -- because it occurred in our own country on a major military base and an army officers whose job was to care for them and lobbying. it has raised questions about why such an event happened and whether authorities could have prevented such an attack and the national security implications of this incident moving forward. unlike any event since 9/11, it has filled discussion about violent extremist ideology in our midst. it is premature to answer these questions completely or make judgments without more information about the events and the alleged perpetrator. there may have been a failure to connect the dots or a failure
to adopt a late what the document. there may have been a mixture of motives or factors that play in the alleged perpetrators mind. what makes it a case to appears to a been harder, is that major hasan allegedly acted alone and may have used medical research to hide his own medical turmoil. this and then follows a line of attacks against military personnel in separate instances, including a murder at a recruitment center in little rock, an act of fratricide in little rock, and one in kuwait. @@@@@@@ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whether we are facing a new wave
driven by some of radicalized actors. the fbi, in concert with other authorities recently disrupted a series of serious plots and arrested potential terrorists and new york, north carolina, texas, and illinois. some of these were homegrown, while at least two of them appear to have a serious international connections. some of them like the foiled plot at quantico and the failed attack to shoot down a plane and the failed attack at fort dix in 2000 were aimed directly at the military at home. even with all of these events are occurring, i think we must be careful not to draw final conclusions about how the fort hood attacked fits into these series of arrests and incidents and whether there is a recognizable pattern that ties this event to all the others. i think it is important to recognize the constant threat to our military from terrorist
attacks. from the attacks at the marine barracks in beirut, the destruction of khobar towers in saudi arabia, the attack on the uss cole in 2000, terrorists have purposely targeted u.s. military installations here and abroad. military bases provide the most visible and legitimate target that help them justify their actions by tying their tax directly to proceed attacks on muslims by the u.s. military. the attacks on our military will continue. they will grow more likely over time. the military presence abroad will remain a visible target for enemies. at home, violent radicals will see the military as an of this -- obvious and legitimate target.
the problem in this case of ford could seems not to have come from the outside but from within. based on publicly available information, seems likely that the perpetrator acted alone. unlike a lone wolf, he used his privilege role as an insider, officer, dr., to attack the military and murder his fellow searchers. the lone wolf is the most challenging and difficult for the law and forcing communities. the more a terrorist is interacting capabilities, the more likely that the plot can be prevented. the u.s. government foreign partners have uncovered a variety of cell since 9/11 and prevented numerous attacks. if there is no expression of violent tendencies, it is difficult not only for authorities, but four friends,
colleagues, in neighborhoods to determine that a violent threat is looming. law enforcement is limited in the ability to follow up without indications of directly suspicious or criminal behavior. they do in one murder at the -- the murder in little rock was a reminder of this. it may be that we will not see a smoking gun that revealed his true motivations and signaled an intent to resort to violence by other violent -- violence. there will likely be clues that will appear to point to a pack of violence. a key question is whether those points were seen and evaluate it properly. the most troubling revealed
today involves suspicious communications between major hasan andal-awlaki. he is a cleric with ties to the 9/11 hijackers. al-awlaki is well known to the u.s. government. what may have made these communications more difficult to diagnose is that the alleged perpetrators own doubts and complex about serving in the military may have been masked by the own medical research about the mind of muslims searchers. the threat of an american lone wolf crews to be the most of the full problem for u.s. law enforcement. even more so when they are acting from the inside.
there has become a heightened debate posed by the extremism. the west is at war with islam and the muslims must unite to fight the united states in defense of fellow muslims has widespread appeal. this is a simple narrative that helps explain world events and local grievances. it is widely believed in many corridors of the world. it acts as a siren song for troubled individuals. al qaeda takes full advantage of this ideology. bin laden has a gimmick crafted message is attractive to american audiences -- have directly crafted messages attractive to american audiences.
though this is inherently violent, it is not illegal to believe in or the spouse is. many views throughout the world, given our first amendment protection, cannot be considered illegal. causality [unintelligible] advocacy of violence is not prosecutable under u.s. law. there are many radical laws like -- people like al-awlaki he incited violence under u.s. law. the u.s. has largely been immune from the larger economic problems of muslin citizen integration and the intended problems of radicalization. much of this can be contributed to the integration into society as americans and to the common
ideals of the american dream. the danger of this ideology is that more individuals will fall prey to radicalization. this is why i think american citizens and the muslims have a special responsibility not to play into the hands of the violent extremists and their ideology. there cannot be a divide in our society. reaction to the horrors of fort hood has been measured and civil. muslim americans have a special responsibility. regardless of the motivations of the perpetrator, said the attack at fort hood is an important time for muslim americans to stand up against this ideology that is so deadly and destructive. this involves more than just condemnation but an active participation in the debate about how to isolate and displace the allure of this
fall's ideology, especially in the united states. i applaud the executive director of the muslim public affairs council has issued a call to a fellow muslim americans. the call the fort hood attacked a defining moment for muslim americans. he concluded the following. we as muslim americans are the answer to this frightening phenomenon. we own our own destiny. it is fundamentally intertwined with our nation's destiny. terrorism will be defeated with our work on the front line, not on the battlefield but in our mosques and community centers. we are acting on the guiding principles of islam and america. i think it is our leaders who must rise up to face down the ideology that is aimed to show division in our society.
i think it'll be critical to ensure that information was shared and evaluate it properly. i think it will be important to preserve the necessary tools to law enforcement in the intelligence committee that will allow them to uncover data points related to extremist terrorism. i think the two provisions will include the roving wiretap provision and business record authority -- should be renewed. it may prevented the effective use of these techniques by law enforcement the de i think congress -- enforcement. i think congress should fully support and implement it.
the demonstration should look at existing laws to determine whether more aggressive use would be appropriate against those providing a logical support to loan will terrorists in violent extremists. >> is easily. if you can come to a -- excuse me. if you can please come to a close. the number of committee members here. we want to get into the questions. but let me conclude with a couple of the key questions that i think not only build on the questions that have been raised, the point to forward-looking domitian's. -- informations. it affected the ability to see the collective body of the information about h informationasan. are there -- about a major hasan. should they be reviewed?
are there common warning signs in the fort hood tried key that can be used to prevent future attacks? are there realistic expectations about preventing a lone wolf attacks? are there relevant laws and authorities in o geac in front of such a threat? how much preventing goes beyond the throttle government? -- federal government? how do we strike the balance? should there be a more formal mechanism for enlisting muslim americans to empower them to take on violent ideology and allow federal and tribal authorities the ability to more actively address the concerns? with that, i will be happy to answer any questions. >> thank you for the helpful testimony our last -- testimony.
our last witness is brian jenkins. he was involved in the study of terrorism before most people focus on the concept. -- and a long time before we ended up in a war. he was last before the committee in january, testifying on the mumbai attacks of last met november -- last november. >> thank you. thank you for inviting me to talk about this event. this was given to me in memory of those who were killed on 9/11. i am wearing it out of respect for those who were killed and wounded at fort hood. when i testified before this committee last the january in
mumbai, you may recall that in response to the question could a mumbai style attack have been in the united states -- i said, it could. the difference lies in the scale of events. the recruiting and training of 10 suicide attackers was beyond anything that we had seen in any of the conspiracies and covered thus far since 9/11. we had seen lone gunman, shooters who motivated -- who were motivated by political cause and run aamok. there were attackers armed with a readily available weapons. i mention that now because the threat we face is not so much
one of organizations penetrating the united states as it is the spread of ideology and models of behavior pitta that is what we behavior pitta that is what we are talking about it is noteworthy that the only terrorist attackers to succeed in harming anyone in the united states and 9/11 network blown gunmen. at a glance, major nidal hasan's rampage at fort hood looks a lot like what used to be called going postal, a deepening sense of personal grievance, culminating in a homicidal rampage directed against co- workers, in this case fellow soldiers. fotr hasan, going jihad reflects the channeling of personality problems into a deadly
fanaticism. we must wait, really, for a thorough inquiry to fully understand his motives, preparation, objectives. but on the basis of what has been reported in the news media, we clearly have a troubled man who engaged himself with extremist ideology is through the internet that resonated with and reinforced his own anger, leaving him at some point to a decision to kill. the markers on his path to the november 5 events correspond with those of many laid out in previous studies of radicalization, notably the excellent study by the new york police department. it some of the posts are missing, it is because of the correspondents like al-awlaki.
his journey may have been largely an interior one. i mentioned signposts. there seem to have been some that prompts the question, could it have been prevented? i am going to join the other members of the panel here and say that it is premature for me on the basis of what we know now to make that judgment. experience has taught me to be exceptionally cautious in this domain. seen through a rear view mirror, a lot of these seem tantalizing if only we have been able to connect the dots. sometimes the over estimate what is notable, especially in the realm of human behavior. we are not good at predicting
human violence. we do not have an extra for a man's soul. -- x-ray for a man's soul. this is an issue of self fragile position -- self radicalization. mutt derives from -- much to rise from groups. it lies at the edge of our knowledge. it implies the capabilities of psychology and radicalization very. it to be useful to explore what we should be looking for.
the nature of the conflicts we confront today creates exceptional challenges to member of our armed forces. it is showing up in a form of breakdowns, suicide, and sometimes homicide's but a this is by no mind -- stood rigid, size. this by no means is uses his axe. -- acts. the number of attacks is growing each year since 9/11, in the
kind and quality of these actions. some analysts say al qaeda is following a strategy of leader- less resistance at as a consequence of the relentless pursuit. leader-less resistance envisions an army of autonomous terrorist operatives united in a common cause, not connected organizationally. it is difficult to destroy a leaderless enterprise, but leaderless resistance is ultimately a strategy of weakness and says we have greatly reduced al qaeda's operations. outside of pakistan and afghanistan, its leaders do little other than exhort others to violence. what it does offer is the opportunity for terrorist leaders to assert ownership of
just about every homicidal maniac on the planet. it is not surprising that the internet group was quick to praise the fort hood slayings as another deal had success. since 9/11, authorities in new york have uncovered nearly 30 plot attacks in the net is days. it would have resulted in a successful terrorist attacks. i do remind you that very little separates the ambitions of terrorist wannabes from deadly terrorist assaults. the essential ingredient is intense. that is what we are talking about. it remains an asset -- intelligence information remains important.
we have had eight plots discover this year. this is much harder than previous years. there appears to become an inspiration. there is no organizational ordination between events. this is individual actions -- these are individual actions. six of the plot since 9/11 have been directed against american soldiers are military facilities. it is more legitimate than attacking civilians. the majority of the plot were aimed simply at causing mass civilian casualties', especially
in public transportation been used. what does this tell us about the radicalization in america? we have to be careful about over reaction. we have about 100 individuals that were arrested for terrorism related crimes. almost all of them were recruited locally. it does show that radicalization and recruitment to terrorism is occurring in the united states and is a security concern. it has yielded very few recruits. the velocity of significant tax -- a tax [unintelligible] they are unsympathetic to jihadist appeals. what authorities are going to
confront our tiny conspiracies or the actions of individuals which are always going to be hard to predict in a free society. but thank you very much. excellent background. aslan context. you are right. the number of muslim americans involved in this plot are quite small. a small number of people can do terrible harm. it is important to put the small number into context of the larger muslim american community, which is not any part of this. we will have a seven minute rounds of questions with members of the committee. there was some commentary that this was an unstable person, a person punish us.
this was not a jihadist act or a terrorist attack, some like to say. the comment on that on your prepared testimony. i want to draw you out on a. my conclusion is that the existence of mental stress does not mean that the act carried out is not jihadist for terrorists. >> these are not small chili -- mutually exclusive categories. we have individuals who are terrorists who were attracted to these extremist ideology is because of their own -- ideology's because of their own personal discontent. terrorism does not attract the well adjusted. >> absolutely.
>> what happens is you do have individuals who are angry at something. it resonates and reinforces and channels them down a path toward a particular action. if we find that there are many aspects for his personality that are troublesome, that is not as good his act from being properly labeled, an act of terrorism. but -- >> in this case we have
to view it in the context of what it means to be in the united states military. i wonder if he can help us understand that a bit, particularly in light of the concerns that those who have an -- those who have expressed about concerns about being politically correct. this is a soldier had a right to say what everyone to say without consequences? >> absolutely not. free speech is an integral part of the right of americans, but in the united states military, the mission comes first. to be able to form that mission you need collegian and good order.
-- cohesion and good order. they can be council and rehabilitated for it. if there is an unwillingness to change our commitment to be believed, we separate it. all of this is short of any criminal behavior. a military unit cannot function and perform its mission under considerable stress. this speech aggravates other members of the team. it polarizes the unit.
it differentiates people in the unit. it forces them to take sides. regardless of their sensibilities, the order and morale of the unit takes priority over the sensibilities. that is the reality of the military and its mission and what the american people are holding as accountable for. >> what is the responsibility of an individual's shoulder -- individual soldier who hears an individual soldier express political views he deems extremist? at fort bragg there were white supremacist views. what we are worried here in our islamic views. what is the chain of command for
a soldier? >> the members of the team have an obligation to identify to the chain of command any of this type of extreme is behavior, that was clearly one of the problems that we had at fort bragg, inside of our units. it is being tolerated by the soldiers and the immediate chain of command, to a certain degree. it is not clear in my mind that we have in the military today and in the army units clear, specific guidelines as to what is jihadist, extremist behavior. how do you identify this behavior? how does it manifest itself? that is one of the things that this investigation will determine, as i said in my remarks, and i believe the department of defense will have the issue very specific guidelines, as we had to do
after the racially motivated murders and skinhead extremism we had it in the midst of the 1990's. >> we will definitely pursue that, and that may be a recommendation, but to the best of your knowledge, existing army policy about extremism is general preventing extremist activity, or more focused based on the fort bragg case with white supremacist activity? >> the army pamphlet that was published in 2000, entitled "extremist activities," was driven by the fort bragg incident and deals with racial extremism. that is its focus. . there is a much broader focus than that. i think the pamphlet was designed to give the commanders in the chain of command some specific enough to do with this
problem given the particular incident. what we are dealing with here what we are dealing with here now is jihadist extremist particularly and i would suggest. . . >> it would suggest that those kind of guidelines in the returns -- in terms of dealing with that as a specific case, that behavior, that rhetoric are not in the hands of our commanders. >> if our investigation finds that that is true, and i think it is, that is an area for correction particularly in light of the record other witnesses have testified to in the ways jihadists are being self- radicalized to attack the american military on basis, not
just a broad but here at home. my time is up. it thank you. senator collins 3 >> in general, let me pick out -- senator collins. >> general, let me pick up where he left off. i commend you for taking strong action after the racially motivated murder at fort bragg. as i read it through this pamphlet, however, the types of conduct prohibited in the policy manual really do not apply in the case of major hasan. would you agree with that? >> i absolutely agree. as pamphlets are in the hierarchy of information provided to the leaders in our units, it only deals with something very specific as a result of a particular action.
under the umbrella of a general policy, that is what it is designed to do. we do not have anything like that dealing with the hasan said it, his behavior, his attitude and what should be the actions that died leaders -- that guide our leaders and soldiers. >> be prohibited activities listed in this manual are geared towards organized activities. they really do not apply to the lone wolf conduct that we saw. i agree with the chairman that this is an area we need to pursue. mr. townshend, there has been discussion this morning thisms. townsend, there has been discussion about his first amendment rights. i want to pursue this issue with you. both the foreign intelligence
surveillance act and the attorney general's guidelines for him but collection based solely, and that is the important word, solely on activities protected by the first amendment. these restrictions were adopted to prevent abuses that happened in the past where federal intelligence law enforcement agencies targeted individuals based solely on their political activities. no one wants to see that. i am concerned, however, by reports that our federal budget that our federal counter insurgency agents have backed off from further inquiries into hasan's activities based on concerns about his first amendment rights. do it the restrictions in the
attorney general guidelines in any way prohibit investigations if there are other reasons to do so? in other words, to give you a specific, wouldn't the fact that major hasan had been in repeated contact with a radical extremist islamic cleric who is a known associate of terrorists be a reason to pursue an investigation? >> senator collins, i agree with you completely. to the extent that there would have been concerned of infringing on his right to free speech or his freedom to practice his religion, and there were other factors to which you could point beyond that having nothing to do with religion or speech that could have caused concern. while it is not public, the
content of those communications, certainly this communications -- and now we are hearing from his colleagues any combination of those factors, as long as it is not based solely on the exercise of his constitutional freedom could inform further investigation by the fbi. >> so, if we are being told that one reason this was not aggressively pursued was concerned that it would violate the restrictions or the attorney general's guidelines, you would disagree with that decision based on what you know? >> based on what i know now, yes. frankly, senator, this is why i mentioned the concern about political correctness. we have to ensure that our investigators feel sufficiently backed up, if you will, to follow the facts wherever they
lead them. if the lead them to an investigation of a senior member of the uniformed military who happens to be a muslim doctor, that is where it leads them. they have to feel confident they can pursue the facts wherever they take them against whoever the target may be. >> the other very important point made in your testimony was whether the members of the j.t.t.f. are prohibited from sharing information without permission of the fbi not only can they ask permission but presumably the fbi could direct a referral to the farming or the dcis. is that correct? >> the best way to explain this to people is by example. imagine if you had intercept not of a federal crime and, perhaps rape or child abuse. suppose you had that information
coming over the wiretap and the local police officer did not say, can i share this? presumably, lord willing, somebody paid attention and would say this needs to be share with local authorities to either prosecuting crimes or to protect a child, in my example. absolutely my view of this is all members of the j.t.t.f. obligation when they see information. certainly if it passes you, just because it is not your jurisdiction or york agency, it does not really view of the fundamental obligation to follow this up. >> thank you. >> i want to say very briefly, in connecticut we had a case just as you described and related to terrorism where a local official was being investigated for corruption. wiretaps except the fact that he was involved in sexual abuse of
children. it went right to the attorney general at that time to determine whether he should be arrested for those acts of abusing children. of course, the correct judgment was made which was that the corruption investigation was forgotten and he was arrested, and as far as i know still in jail, for those crimes. as is our custom on this committee, we call on order of arrival. senator? >> to our witnesses, thank you very much for joining us today. and for the time that you have invested in preparing for more testimony responding. this has been both eliminating and constructive. i want to return to testimony that you gave us.
near the end of your testimony, i did not catch it. i tried to find in your statement, but something to the effect that we, the muslim americans, are the defining answer. do you remember that? go back and revisit that comment. >> this comment comes from the executive director of a group called the muslim public affairs council. an important group. it is based in southern california. as i describe it, he called it a defining moment for american muslims which was to -- what i
found incredibly important, and this is based on my experience both in the treasury and white engaging with muslim leaders and american members for some time on issues of terrorism. the realization and articulation about the importance of the battlefield and the frontlines in the mosques, community centers, and the associations -- it is an incredible statement. it is important that muslim americans have to take ownership of the ideological battle happening within islam itself. they have to find ways of isolating those that are radical -- radicalizing our youth. >> out of all the comments, that one jump off the page at me. we are a legislative committee. we're not the fbi. we're not the justice
department. we are a legislative committee. i think is pretty good advice, and some things that we might want to do legislatively. in terms of what the muslim community in this country -- what responsibilities they have and what they can do to help the rest of us make sure that this doesn't happen again. we heard one piece of advice, and i won the other witnesses to respond. >> my reaction to that is certainly one of encouragement. i praise them for making those remarks. in a larger context of what we are dealing with in terms of the challenge inside as long between the radicals adn teh traditi -- and the traditionalists, it is hard to see defeating radical islam itself without the willing
cooperation of the moderates to reject it. we're going to kill a lot of these radical islamists over the next years as we have over the last eight years. as we all know, the fact of the matter is, killing them will not defeat this movement. this movement will have to be defeated by muslims to reject it. >> most, as you know, most muslim americans are patriotic, law abiding citizens. very few of them speak publicly, and i will explain why. many cooperate quietly with federal law enforcement, and we won't be successful without the continuing. that is to be commended. oftentimes, moderate muslims are reluctant to speak out because the radicals label them. they are called un-islamic.
it is both discouraging to them and frightening to moderate muslims. it intimidates them from speaking out. that is the environment they lived in. lived in. there a that have the courage to speak publicly, but we don't want to discourage them from privately and quietly cooperating with local officials. >> the question in terms of the ways to combat extremism and what role does the muslim community play, we are informed by our discussions with intelligence officials in the u.k., denmark, and the netherlands that have had to deal with this problem. their responses right along the same lines that at the end of the day, it will be@@@@@'&g
>> i would just under score what ms. townsend said. it is important for muslims to speak out publicly, but also there is evidence of a great deal of quiet activity going on within the community. we are talking about people attempting to ensure that their own family members, friends, colleagues, do not go down a self-destructive path. there is a great deal of pressure in the community against this type of activity. >> the other question i want to ask, we are not the fbi, the justice department, or any of those things. several levy suggested things we should be doing legislatively to reduce the likelihood of this thing happening again in our country. just go back and reemphasize those things for us please, anyone.
made legislative recommendations, reemphasize them. >> i would say that we need to be making sure that law- enforcement agencies have the legal authority to be able to domestic -- investigate domestically. it has been described as the -- as a very difficult problem. it becomes incredibly important for authorities to have the legal backing, proceedings, and resources. to the extent that there are additional pressures to try to ferret out these types of actors and events, do they have the resources to cover these types of events, to follow up on the kinds of communications, leads that may exist where there may be thousands of communications? that is a critical question
moving forward in addition to others. >> one has got to do with my pet issue, the information sharing in the rules. sometimes we make them too cumbersome, and it is just discouraging. the rules become so cumbersome that they are discouraging people not to do it. and the fbi's own internal guidelines. it may be that it is discouraging people to do what they really needed to do. the u.s. military did not get the information that they could have acted within their system. we have to look at whether or not the u.s. military, if they had got the information, that
they identify and deal with these things affectively. >> good questions and very constructive answers. >> thank you for holding a hearing. you believe that the attack on for a good -- on fort hood -- [unintelligible] >> i do, based on the preliminary reports. what he was screaming at the time of the act and his behavior and attitude prior to that, just based on that, investigations will confirm what his motivations are. what is in front of us right now? >> when we look at basic english dictionary definition of terror, it is hard to imagine that this was not an act of terror.
what remains to be seen is that this is an individual or a few as part of some larger conspiracy. i do believe that he is an entity. >> we're not going to prejudge their findings. >> ask your opinion, not your findings. if you don't want to voice your opinion, that is fine with me. >> it looks like an act of terror to me. for the technical definition, the question of political motivation behind the attack is going to be central in determining whether or not you can legally classified it, but it looks like an act of terror to me. >> terrorism is defined in the quality of the act. the act itself meets the qualities of an act of terror. under a legal definition, in terms of a lark, major -- in
therms of the law, major hassan is charged with 13 counts of murder. we have them -- we have him on an ordinary crime. >> let me briefly review what we do know. he had communications with an american imam. the fbi had some knowledge of this and reviewed communications. the content was consistent with research being conducted by a the major in his position -- and his position as a secretary -- psychiatrist. he had communications with other extremists and advocated suicide bombing.
possibly an individual riposte on the web site that favorably compared the american sotho jumping on a grenade to save the lives of his fellow soldiers to suicide bombers. extremist activities that -- he antagonized students and faculty by espousing what they perceive to be history mr. exotic views -- extremist islamic views. there the medical presentation to former students where he said that we love that more than we love life. fighting to establish an islamic state to please god. it was condoned by is on -- islam. obviously, this is speculation. the military is most sensitive than any organization to any taint, allegation, or impression
of being discriminatory. which is appropriate. you think that political correctness may have played some role in the fact that these talks were not connected. >> absolutely. i think a factor here is his position as an officer in his position as a psychiatrist. it contributed because of the special category that someone who is operating as a clinician every day. it is an individual activity versus a group activity that provides more supervision. but there are many people associating with him.
i think we're going to find a very clearly that we do not have specific guidelines in dealing with extremism. in terms of the obligations of the members of the military to identify and report, what actions to take, and what constitutes extremism itself. you take some of the burden away by having the guidelines. when you have the guidelines, you're clearly saying to the institution that this is important to us. we're not going to tolerate this kind of behavior. immediately, trying to curb the behavior through counseling and rehabilitation. >> i have spoken to military officers who have stated that they, at least until now, have had a significant reluctance to pursue what might be indications
because of this political correctness environment. have you heard the same? >> i know it exists, no doubt about it. what i am trying to say is that the delay to deal with it -- it should not have to be an act of moral courage on behalf of a soldier to have to report behavior that we should not be tolerated inside of a military organization. the way to make that an obligation is to provide very specific guidelines to the chain of command as to what the duties are in regards to this issue. that doesn't take this issue off the table because the institution is speaking clearly in terms of what expectations are and what it will tolerate and not tolerate. >> and perhaps bearing on the side of caution -- air on the side of caution -- erring on the
side of caution. >> we have investigated lots of time and effort in a post 9/11 world to make sure that people understand that we are going to provide people first amendment protections and their freedom of religion. because this was a senior member of the uniformed military, there is a reluctance to proceed. this was an area that the committee should and ought to investigate and uncover in terms of our law enforcement system that we can't allow them to be reluctant to follow the facts just because they are afraid that they are going to be criticized for not being politically correct. >> in the nypd, if we had a concern like that, it would be afforded up the chain of command as well as the department of internal affairs for investigation. >> given my experience that the
fbi, i do not think there would have been as a to political correctness with respect to the ethnicity or religious beliefs of the individual. this is based on what i know. the fact that he was a medical doctor and his status in the military, that he did research with respect to conflicts in the minds of muslim soldiers might have affected the judgment of the fbi, but less the question of his ethnicity or his beliefs. >> if they believe that those kinds of the males that they detected were part of research that advocates extreme muslim activity, i would like to find out what kind of research is going on and. frankly, i have never heard of such research. i am kind of skeptical about
your answer. >> i don't think religion is a basis for being stigmatized, but is not a shield for legitimate inquiry. it should not have inhibited and appropriate inquiry. let me underscore a point by the general. my military experience is in combat units. actions and attitudes like this would be picked up much faster than in the individual professional activity of a psychiatrist, even though in military service. >> i thank you, i think the witnesses. -- thank the witnesses. >> after the massacre, i received a phone call from a high-ranking officer in the
army. we have great respect for diversity of religion, but it should not be a cover for bad behavior. this officer said to me that if the army and the rest of the services make clear that islamic extremist activiteies are not tolerated -- without that, this officer said to me, i worry that the non muslim soldiers are going to have hesitation to have what we have to have in combat, which is blind trust in one another. it is a really important point so far as we focus on the extremists. we will be doing a favor to
everybody else in that particular group, and helping military cohesion. >> i think this hearing has been important for a lot of different reasons, and some of the issues the articulated are definitely some of them. this whole idea of political correctness, whether it is due correctness, whether it is due to an officer or when you talked about referring up the chain of command, what if the
and go to times square in new york. contacts with imam -- are the silos still in place? is there information not being shared? >> tremendous progress has been made. when it came to the jttf, as an indication that we have made a lot of progress. it is not clear to me that the information that was going to be sort of the personnel system ever made its way to the personnel file. if that is the case, that means that when the had the communications and looked at the record of the personnel file, if there was no derogatory information, they are at a disadvantage. we have to fix that system if
there was information inside the military. we need to make its way to a format. >> you have brought some of the most important testimony today as far as fixing this going forward. it sounds like this obviously should have been in place. it is simple as far as their policies and procedures. going forward, if these policies and procedures are in place, it takes pressure off. maybe they are obligated to report. let's say the of somebody who is a muslim that feels -- should i report this or not? will i be stigmatized? i agree. it protect them. that is very important.
i want to go back to something that you said is a little bit disturbing. when he said that they feel -- say they uri moderate muslim out there. and they feel like they would be stigmatized. they would be kind of set apart. getting back to what he said as far as thebligation of the muslim-american kennedy, they have an obligation to separate those that are radical so that somebody that as moderate feels like they can come out and condemn. that would seem to me to be the overarching obligation of the muslim american community. it would be to not let the radicals control the community. you are actually disloyal to the
muslim brotherhood out there. >> you and i don't disagree. >> i am simply telling you that based on my experience, this is a continuing challenge for the law enforcement community that is to encourage moderate muslims to speak out. i suppose my only suggestion is that we ought to take some part, some reassurance and the fact that there are patriotic law- abiding muslim americans that are not speaking out publicly but do it they can to stigmatize those that have radical beliefs and bring them to the attention of local law enforcement. for that, we are very grateful. >> i think all of you have had some excellent testimony today and have given others in the military some further direction to go as well. we need to redo some of the tools, obviously for law enforcement.
maybe make some of the tweaks that you have to make things a little less cumbersome. i thank all the witnesses for testimony today. >> there are obviously lessons here that relate to this particular case. the behavior of employees of the army and the department of justice. there are broader implications for society, particularly in these lone wolf cases. hear, people say things that are extreme -- respecting first amendment rights, you have to begin to reach out and see if you to stop somebody before they do something very harmful. >> there is already a great deal in the public record about silence that raises concerns about the adequacy of our law enforcement.
about whether the military acted on information that was the only available to it, but commented upon the department of defense records. the senate arms services committee thinks that the matter will focus on the military, and in the connections of jttf to the military. the investigation is going to be carried out in a way that is consistent with the essential need to avoid jeopardize in the criminal investigation. i think the committee here has been careful. i want to commend the committee and the witnesses that have been careful not to say something to avoid saying anything that could jeopardize this investigation
and the prosecution. it is essential that we both investigate, correct where it is necessary. and also that we prosecute without running into the defense that there has been a prejudgment by people that have commanded some kind of authority, or that there is anyone else in law enforcement. ms. townsend, your testimony seems to be on point when you talk about the jttf being incumbered by some of its procedures. the memorandum of agreement looks like a contract between small type in small print between itself and the department of defense, is 16 pages long. it took three months for three
people sign the agreement. the way it was characterized in april before a house committee by the l.a. county sheriff was that a local task force officer may not share information with his or her home agency without demonstrating the specific need and right to know. that is not factual. but that is with the sheriff believed. i believe there is too much of that feeling of restriction as to the reaching out potential for information there is also -- information. there is also the problem of the follow-up, either into other
agencies' records, but perhaps within jttf itself, when subsequent information comes to its bid -- attention. can you quickly tell us whether or not that you know that a jttf that gets information in the first year has the ability and does when it gets information, connected to the information? can you give us a real quick answer? >> of the possibility exists -- the possibility exists. you have the look on an individual basis.
the need for investigations, the fact that these investigations and the need for actions should not impugn the contributions of the military and our society. you have all said that. the diversity of our nation's military and of our nation as a whole has been a great strength. it is one of our most effective weapons against the fanatics of any religion, though as a whole different beliefs. you included a statement that is a very significant " in terms of the possibility of the muslim
community. as a counter narrative, there is no more powerful weapon that the promise and reality to be integrated as all other immigrants in american society. i want you to comment oa statement of rev. pat robertson the recently asserted the following. that is long is not a religion, but a violent political system bent on the overthrow the governments of the world and world domination. and as to whether or not a statement such as that by a well-known american cerlic makes -- cleric makes it more difficult for moderate muslims to make the argument, and indeed whether that kind of statement
really helps the enemy radicalize people that would commit terrorist acts against us. you have a reaction to that? >> i will stand by what i said, which is the division of our society would be detrimental in the worst manifestation of the effect of this ideology. as long as one of the great religions of the world, and at the end of the day, it will be muslim americans that help us defeat this violent brand of it. >> i think it is important that it be contested and opposed. for a major religious leader in this country to label as long -- islam as a whole as a
violent organization plays into the hands of the extremists and gives them the propaganda tool that they look for. and i wonder if you believe that that is the case. >> i do not believe that it is helpful. i think it plays into the i think it plays into the ve of the west and the u.s. being against islam. islam. >> does >> i think it is an outrageous, irresponsible statement by a religious leader. it is full of discrimination. it is offensive to muslims in general, and it no doubt in flames this situation and make no contribution to what we are trying to achieve, and that is a stable situation. does anybody else want to comment? >> i agree completely with general keane. it is ignorant. it lacks the basis of knowledge.
there is a very small extreme wing of islam, but there are extreme wings of other religions which are found to be deeply offensive to the vast majority of the leaders of those religions, just as fundamental extremism is to islam. the vast majority of people, muslim or not, should take great offense at this statement. >> thank you very much for raising that last question. i agree that not only was an outrageous, but it hurts our efforts to succeed in this conflict. the other senators who came earlier it had to leave. i think senator collins and i will do one more quick round. i wanted to ask you some hypothetical said.
if the new york police department was doing a court order surveillance of somebody in this city, who was known to be involved in islamist extremist activities, and as part of that surveillance came across a member of the nypd communicating with that individual, what would the reaction -- let's assume first that the communications were of a religious nature, not particularly inflammatory, but still communicating with an individual known as an extremist, what with the reaction of the department be?
insight as to what the purpose of this interaction is. obviously, any type of interaction between a member of the service and individuals that are being investigated across the board would be something of concern and would give senior level attention. >> the simple communication with somebody that had a record of being involved in association with terrorism would raise concerns or raise this up to a higher level within the nypd? >> the issues are the pedigree of the individual at the conduct of communication -- content of communication. >> in other words, say an officer in the nypd was found communicating with the subject of an investigation and was raising -- expressing extremist
views and perhaps suggesting the justification for violent actions in pursuit of extremist views, i presume it would raise alarm bells. i think the process would be -- >> i think the process would be to move up the chain of command to bring it to the appropriate level of attention. >> i presume that you would watch that person more carefully or take more aggressive action. >> i think that we would need to understand what that means in context. we looked at the radicalization process and found that an isolated interaction -- does it fit into a larger continuum? >> you have developed the four phases of radicalization, and to
the extent you're able based on the public record, i wanted to ask you if you would apply that framework to what you know about hassan. >> ethic mr. jenkins made a good point that when you're dealing with a lone wolf and individual actor, to some degree, they are at the margins of process that others have looked at. our study looked at groups of individuals. we have looked at some preliminary information out there. it is suggested that we went through some type of radicalization process. the key questions asked, look at his behaviors and see how those correlate to some of the indicators that we have identified in the model.
>> somebody operating over the internet, incidentally, someone like the man we have been talking about operates a public web site with quite open expressions to extremist behavior. you don't have to have a court of writ -- a court authorized surveillance of his e-mail's. there are a lot of others like this to conclude that this guy is at war. i wanted to ask you that from what you know, the fbi acknowledges e-mail's between major hassan and a subject of investigation. >> based on his pedigree, going
back to 9/11, looking at what he has done more recently in terms of his website, he is clearly an individual of concern. i think the next question we would ask is what is the nature of the relationship between him and another individual? the spiritual sanction moves somebody down that pathway. that is really the key question eventually. did he move that person down the pathway by encouraging him to move from self identification to indoctrination? i think that is a key issue. >> and i think the fact that we will have to go into these females -- e-mails. there has been some description, and i see that is based on fact, part of the doctor's
research with a subject to the investigation. the choice of this recipient of the mails says a lot about what he was looking for. there is a lot of muslim imams and authorities that he might of communicated with as part of research. doesn't it say something about him? he may have been looking for spiritual sanctioning of what he is accused of ultimately doing. >> i agree wholeheartedly with that view. who you reach out to for theological and doctrinal questions gives an indication as to what message we're looking for. >> a final question, there is a
question in his testimony about whether the u.s. military is doing enough to protect its bases in the context of clear appeals by jihadist leaders to protect their information. most of them are not successful, but general, you have any response? is there more that we should be doing to protect the security of bases, even in the u.s. from terrorist attack? >> i think that we dramatically change security post 9/11 for obvious reasons. i am confident that the military goes through continuous reviews to make sure that is as rigorous
as it should be. the incident is so dramatically different because it comes from within as opposed to without. it is more up to the members of that organization with an -- within than it is to guard at the gate, dealing with protection issues. and certainly, the other thing that goes hand in glove with this is the cooperation with law-enforcement agencies and intelligence services in terms of stopping these incidents before they actually take place. that is crucial. it has prevented most of these incidents from taking place. it is the tremendous work that law enforcement is doing in cooperation with other agencies.
if we can continue to improve the process, i will add to it as well. >> mr. jenkins, we hope that one of the results of our investigation will be a new pamphlet on extremist activities that incorporates the lessons of this case. it's still begs the question of what should the military do when it identifies a soldier who is embracing radical views, extremist views. do the good work of the nypd about the four stages of radicalization, it is possible that intervention at an early stage could make a difference and could lead to something
short of discharging the individual from those services. in 2007 when he testified before congress about the hottest radicalization and recruitment, you talked about the possibility of counter messaging. i would like to ask you whether you see opportunities for the army to intervene at stage 1 of the radicalization process to try to help members of our military get back on track. >> i think it is important when we look at this in the context of military service, to be quite honest with you, what i was in the military, i did not know, nor did i care, what your religion was of the members of my unit. i dealt with them as individuals.
what it said about their preferences for method of burial with something that did not concern me. it is entirely appropriate when an individual is displaying behavior that is inappropriate within the context of a military unit or is behaving in a way that is contrary to morrell -- morale, that there be an appropriate intervention. and in many cases, in a combat unit, that will be picked up fairly quickly and there will be that appropriate intervention. i think what we have to do is empower individuals and not be shy about it. that understandable concerns about free speech and civil liberties -- there is clearly
manifest behavior that is inappropriate, wrong, contrary, and so on. in many cases, i think there is intervention. we know about radicalization only from those terrorists that have made it all the way through a terrorist act or an arrest. we don't have information about those that drop out along the way. there are a lot that to drop out along the way, or are counseled along the way. would be interesting would be to know that in the case of major hassan, he has been subjected to extraordinary scrutiny because of this event. there are literally thousands of reporters that pick up every statement that he made. that, right now, is chronologically flat. what we like to see in order to compare it to what we know -- in
a sense, construct a chronology. when was communicating with this imam? what were his actions over time, so that we can see a trajectory. at that point, we can identify where there might have been a useful intervention. useful intervention. >> let me just end my comments today by going back to the 9/11 commission's report. it does appear to me that we did have -- it is too early to say for sure, but that we did have a failure to share critical information, a failure to ask questions to initiate an investigation, or at least an inquiry or an interview, and that the resultss were tragic,
horrible consequences, a terrorist attack. the 9/11 commission reminds us, and i want to read from the report, in the 9/11 story, for example, we see samples of information that could be accessed like and distributed nsa information that would have helped to identify one of the terrorists in january of 2000, but someone had to ask for it. in that case, no one did. . . o ask. in that case, no one did. the information is distributed, but in a compartmentalized fashion. or the information is available, someone asks, but it cannot be shared. what all these stories have in what all these stories have in t it demonstrates the need to know before sharing.
that approach assumes it is possible to know in advance who will need to use the information. the point is, information must be shared with those that have the ability to understand the full context and take action. . . there are warning signs and red flags all over. if you look and his contacts with the radical imam without revealing what those specific emails said, just the fact that he was seeking advice and communicating with a known terrorist, when you start the together of the pieces of information it reminds me very
much of the silo of information is available throughout the government and the different agencies prior to the attack in our country on 9/11. that we have not allowed new silos to build up, that the jttf's which have been tremendous and had a lot of success is due not inadvertently become another silo or information cannot be shared without jumping through too many hoops. that is our challenge as we learn more through our investigation to identify legal barriers, administrative impediments that may have blocked the sharing of information in this case, and to identify it in our military
whether we need better systems to encourage the recording, as the general put it so well, that it no longer is a moral act of courage, but rather an obligation to report disturbing information. that is what our investigation is aimed at. i want to thank the chairman for initiating this very important investigation and to express my appreciation to all of you today for your fourth right, candid, an expert testimony. thank you. >> thank you, senator collins. as always is a pleasure to work with you. we are going to conduct this investigation in the same thorough and bipartisan way we have everything we have done together on this committee, including some controversial and
sensitive investigations into federal government behavior regarding prior to 9/11 and also during hurricane katrina. i think he stated well all we have accomplished today. i cannot think the five of the witnesses enough for your testimony. i cannot imagine a better way to inform our investigation. you have brought your considerable experience and expertise to the table. you have helped us begin to understand how to best approach this. you have made some specific suggestions, not just about questions to pursue in our investigation, but about reforms to initiate as a result of what we already know about dr. hasan and the murders that occurred at fort hood. i would like to take the liberty of keeping in touch with you as
this investigation goes on. i would invite you not to hesitate to initiate to us -- we will continue the investigation and i hope we can work in a cooperative way now we have begun relations with the executive branch. it will now inevitably take a less public turned, with a lot of interviews and reviews of documents and will reconvene in a public session when and if we think it is appropriate and constructive to do so, and ultimately to issue a report and recommendations. it has been a real service not just to the committee but to homeland security for the people of our country. the record will stay open for 15 days for additional statements and questions. the hearing is adjourned. [captioning performed by national captioning institute]
>> coming on c-span, the senate republicans on the health-care bill. after that is the state department briefing. after that is a treasury department nomination. coming this thanksgiving on c- span, three nights of c-span original documentaries on the icon icons of the three branches of the american government. beginning thursday night, the supreme court is home to america's highest court and reveals the building in exquisite detail to the as a supreme court justices. friday at 8:00 p.m. eastern, inside the white house,
america's most famous home. our visit shows the grand public places as well as those rarely seen spaces. saturday at 8:00 p.m. eastern, the history, art, and architecture of the capital which is one of america's most symbolic structures. three memorable lines thursday, friday, and saturday all at 8:00 p.m. eastern. earlier today, senate republicans spoke about the democratic leadership's health care bill. debate began this morning. the first procedural vote is scheduled for tomorrow night at 8:00 p.m. eastern. 60 votes are required to move forward. their comments lasted 25 minutes. >> shall we let him make a dramatic entrance? good morning everyone. we are here today to talk about
this massive 2,074 page bill that you see here in this chair. it is not dramatically different from the bills we have seen before. we know what the core of the bill is. between four and billion dollars and five her billion dollars in taxes and higher insurance premiums for 80% of americans. -- $00 billion and $500 billion. there has been gimmickery. i am hard-pressed to see how they can do this with a straight face. they say that this will cost between $800,000,000,000.- 1918718098 dollars.
cbo will tell you that if you look -- $800 billion a and $900 billion. this is a massive expansion of the federal government. the gimmick they employ is to delay the kick in of the benefits. if you are looking for an analogy it will be like asking you to make a mortgage payment for four years before moving in. with that, let me turn to another senator. >> in those more conservative states, opposition runs even greater than two to one against this plan. in view of that, it would be our hope that are more moderate colleagues on the democratic
side would respect the wishes of their constituents rather than do the bidding of. reid. -- bidding of harry reid. this will impact all americans, and we believe in very negative ways. our hope is that the views of the american people will be respected. >> yesterday the california board of regents raised tuition 32% for students in california. there is a lot of finger- pointing going on about whose fault that is and they are mostly pointing at each other. the figures should be pointed directly at washington d.c. because for the last 30 years medicaid spending has grown at a rate of 7% to nine% a year -- 9%
a year. medicaid is one more hidden tax in this bill. the bill like the other democratic bills expands medicaid and sends a big part of the bill, $25 billion, to the states, the state of tennessee, which will seriously damage higher education or cause the imposition of a new state income tax or both. >> in the words of yogi berra, this is deja vu all over again. tax increases, medicare cuts, and premium increases for the american people. i think what is striking about this proposal in that it was marketed as being different and going to drop costs down, according to cbo increases
caused by hundred and $60 billion. they say it may reduce the deficit over 10 years, but as it has already been pointed out, the implementation is the late on this. they assume savings from the class act which the chairman of the senate budget committee has described as a ponzi scheme, something that bernie madoff would be proud of. this would also take another two added $50 billion to address. all the pronouncements about deficit and cost control are not going to be found in this piece of legislation. as it has been mentioned, the american people understand that and that is why they're winning in so heavily against this and why we need to defeat this. >> the leader has mentioned the use of gimmicks and a lack of transparency.
[unintelligible] we're going to the motion to proceed tomorrow, that there will be a bait and switch going on. what we're voting on is three pages. that is the product that the leader will shift to after that. about 20.5 pounds. when we get our thanksgiving turkey, that is about the same size. one of the real dangers, i think, that we're talking about with this health care proposal that the democrats have put before us is the concern about rationing of our health care. we are seeing this play out a little bit this week in the news with the recommendations that came out from the preventative services tax force. also there have been recommendations about when women should receive mammograms. the real concern and the focus
here is that we come in this legislation, give to the secretary of health and social services a great deal of control, authority, and also two medical counts is that are not elected or appointed to allow them to make medical decisions about whether or not our procedures will be covered. this is kind of a peek under the curtain, if you will, of what we can anticipate with a government run program. >> let's see. the bill has a public option in it, a government takeover of health care. it raises insurance premiums for those people who have insurance. it raises taxes on small businesses and individuals, middle-class americans, and cuts about $500 million in medicare
benefits. that is a program already scheduled to be insolvent in 2017. you might ask the question, why might anyone take the position that you could vote tomorrow night at 8:00 p.m. to get on this bill, as bad as it is, and what expectations do you have that you will ever be able to change anything in the bill? as you know, it takes 60 votes basically to get closer to have the debate. then the debate will be to get 51. no senator who votes for closure on the motion to proceed tomorrow can, i think, with a straight face contend that they have not embraced the bad policy contained in this bill. higher premiums, higher taxes for the middle class and small businesses, medicare cuts. there is nothing here to like. i think what we need to do is kill this bill and have it to a common sense bipartisan bill
building on the step-by-step reforms we all know are important in order to do what is in the best interest of the american people. >> i sat to the markup on the health education labor bill where virtually nothing was taken from republican ideas and what was which change without consulting a single senator. i was part of the group of six that ended with phony deadlines, tight time lines that kept us from getting the job done. this is so immense to change all of health care for all of america in effect 100% of the people. you cannot do that even in 2000 pages. no one can understand a 2000 page bill, especially if it is filled with the directives for the secretary of health and human services to fill in the details.
my wife and i owned three shoe stores. i know that if you're selling someone issue and there are complaining, you probably better show them something else. august shows us that people are complaining about this bill. letters come emails, telephone calls, and town hall meetings show us that this is not the issue they wanted to buy. this is the issue for someone else. -- this is not the shoe for someone else. they're going to have to pay for it. >> i would like to have you take a look at the church -- chart which is taxes. we went to great depths during the month of october -- i mean, the month of march, to point out the democrats' budget. it will triple the national debt. this bill adds to that and is
not accounted for. it spends too much, texas to much, and obviously in adds to the dead. -- taxes too much. you spend this $2.60 trillion adding to the dead, even with all those taxes, it will be more debt. there is $500 billion of new taxes in here. it creates too much debt because even with all the new taxes spending still exceeds the taxes. over here, you have taxes raised on a majority of middle-class taxpayers contrary to the fact, and this is two-thirds of taxpayers, contrary to what the president promised. small businesses are going to pay higher taxes. it is going to bring more drought to hiring with these
higher payroll taxes, penalties, and fees. seniors are going to pay higher taxes. on -- to top this all off, we're opening the door to this legislation to the irs being more intrusive with taxpayers to the point of a new insurance credits, new taxes, and this will create more havoc for america. >> we will take your questions. >> i the question. the recommendations that came out this week that women should get your mammograms and screenings, do you think that the obama administration had any influence over those or any link or was this independent? >> i will not speculate on that. recommendations like this from a
task force, a panel, that has been put together by the administration that those recommendations will be used by the insurance companies as they make a determination as to what they're going to cover. as a woman, i want to be able to consult with my doctor based on my family history to know when i should be getting a mammogram. we will figure out when that is appropriate but we will follow the guidelines that we look to. it is the insurance companies who are saying, sorry, you are over 50 and it is now every other year as opposed to what my coverage was before, that causes me a great deal of concern. >> anyone else? >> center collins, there is some unfinished business in congress that needs to be addressed before dan york. -- senator collins --
[unintelligible] there is a list of a five or six items. was this leveraged to pressure the democrats to forestall this as a must pass? >> why are we trying to do this, pass this 2000 page bill, that has -- that as senators have indicated american people oppose when we ought to be addressing the matters that are clearly needed and urgent? but the items out there for the rest of the year period provisions to the patriot act. we have not finished the appropriations bill. the majority wants to extend the debt ceiling. i probably left something out, but you get the drift. your question raises the issue
of why we're not doing the things that we need to do instead of spending time passing a bill that the american people are literally crying out, please do not do this. i have perfect strangers coming up to me at the airport from other states asking me to stop this thing. you might say that is just an anecdotal observations, but we have poll numbers on top of this with unanimous expression from public opinion polls say not to pass this bill. yes, you raised the issue. that is what we should be doing. it will take from now to christmas to all of those issues and measures we should be dealing with. instead we are trying to do something the american people do not want with a manufacturer deadline. how many manufactured deadlines have we had? first, it was going to be before the august recess. then it was going to be by the first of october. then it was going to be by
thanksgiving. now it is going to be by christmas. how many deadlines will that come up with to try and convince us to do something the american people are saying with loud voices they do not want done? [unintelligible] >> the guidelines about breast cancer and cervical cancer, do you see this as a rationing of care? >> we have had discussion about rationing. one of the members of our congress has talked about it a lot is senator kyle. would you like to make some observations? >> this is how rationing starts. that is the point. i do not think you'll find the word rationing anywhere in the bill, but we can point to five or six specific provisions which creates an opportunity for rationing. as -- as costs insulate and money is insufficient,
inevitably, as it has in other systems, rationing will result, the lay of care, denial of care. at first it is guidelines that the insurance companies, as she said, adopt those guidelines with respect to coverage decisions. incidently this has a specific language in it as a comparative effectiveness research will be used for coverage determinations. that is just one of the ways in which rationing could occur here. there's a great country-western song out by brad paisley called "welcome to the future." it reminds me of this song. this is what we need to expect in the future. [unintelligible] >> how would you address that issue? >> others may want to address this as well. the fundamental point is,
fortunately in america having insurance is not the only thing that affects your ability to get health care. nobody believes, however, that people that are insured get the best or most efficient care. especially with regard to preventative screenings for the things we're talking about here, that is not they do in the emergency rooms. insuring people is an important part of this debate. the republican ideas for dealing with the people who are uninsured is to try and target the solutions to the specific problems rather than change the entire health-care system in order to provide coverage. i will not go into all of the provisions because they have been recited ad nauseam. you have the ability to negotiate with the insurance companies to get the kind of coverage at a reduced cost that is the best for everyone.
my last point. the question of mandated coverage is very large in this bill. you have to make sure that you cannot provide everything for everyone as a mandate and therefore drive up the premiums which is what the cbo says will happen in this legislation. he need to enable people to buy the injuries that is best for their needs and their families the. >> to follow him, i think we recognize for the women, the lower income women, there are some good solid programs, certainly in my state, where we do reaching out and provide free mammograms for them. we also provide circles -- several screenings. we do have safety nets in place. -- cervical screenings. if you are employed in have a little bit of insurance coverage there to help you that now we
are operating under these recommendations, these guidelines, that are suggesting that you do not need that first mammogram until you are 50-years old, what happens to the woman who has insurance and is 40- years old, has a family history. the doctor says you should be getting that mammogram but it is not going to be covered by your insurance because we have started that russian, that first that. the woman decides she is not going to hit the mammogram because of cost. -- we have started and the rationing. it is a situation where these, whether it is the secretary of health and human services or the advisory panels that make these decisions and terminations as to your particular health care and
make that directive, it is the government telling you until you are 50, we do not think you need it. if you do, you pay for it on your own. in addition to the things that they said, -- >> in addition, i think we know the costs are at the end of life with chronic diseases. the disturbing things that we're