tv ISIS Motivations and Strategies CSPAN November 15, 2015 1:30pm-2:31pm EST
anybody who says anything other than italian is lying. and i'm italian. the question is, why were italians so much involved in organized crime? nobody really answers that question. you can't have reform until you have some kind of idea of what you want to reform and why, and what causes things. to have anecdotal information, and your opinion, blacks don't talk because they are afraid of police, that is maybe your experience, and that is not mine as a police officer, and that is certainly not bob's. >> arthur gets the last word here because we do have to wrap up. >> who spoke over me. what i was about to say is police complain regularly from the chief to the guy on the street that community -- high crime communities do not have sufficient cooperation from the citizens in those communities.
what i was about to say was we can disagree about the reasons. those reasons, not the only reason, one of those reasons is the fact that police in many high crime communities have abused their authority and their power. you can deny that takes place, but it is an element. and i believe that very strongly. having tod we are wrap up. i apologize to those standing at the microphones. please give a nice round of applause for these panelists. [applause] [indistinct chatter] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] "newsmakers," democratic chair raymond buckley
discuss the 2016 campaign so far. new hampshire's first in the nation primary, the issues that matter to hampshire voters, and the state's role in vetting the presidential candidates. today at 6 p.m. eastern on c-span. >> two things are very different today. first of all, we have a justice system. these trials were not held to what we would consider to be mild -- to be law. there was a lot of hearsay. no one had a defense. there were no lawyers, by the way. the courtroom is an extremely unruly place. so that is one piece of it. we don't have -- happen to believe in witchcraft. ,"nouncer: tonight on "q&a if talks aboutch
her book. >> the interesting part about the accusations, especially given the way we think of salem, is that wealthy emergence were accused of which is, sea captains were accused of which is, homeless five year old girls were accused to be witches. this is not an incident where all the victims are female. we have five male victims, including a minister here. and we don't burn witches, we hang them. there was so much encrusted in myth and so much misunderstanding here that i felt it was important to dispel. announcer: tonight at 8:00 eastern and pacific on c-span's "q&a." now, a discussion of the history, motivations, and strategies of the terror group known as isis. the international institute for strategic studies hosted the discussion tuesday before the
attacks took place in paris. this is almost an hour. >> welcome. an in-depth conversation on isis. we are here primarily to avoid any confusion about isis and iiss. i have actually been asked about that. from time to time. we have two notable guests to mark the occasion. one, jodie, who has just tablets -- published a memorable book. on the rise of isis. he is a journalist from the washington post to join the staff in 1996. he has covered national security in the middle east and currently writes about the environment, where he won the pulitzer prize, years ago, i believe.
his previous best-selling book, "the triple agent," which i will ask him about charlie, i think helped inspire this book. it is not -- i think it is in the introduction or acknowledgments. second, we have mailing -- me lly, an associatean -- me an associate professor at west point. and more importantly, she will be joining us as a senior research fellow at iiss and bahrain -- in my brain next month -- in the great -- in bah rain next month, i believe.
i'm told to warn you, her views in no way reflect anything about the military or the army. we are going to have a discussion here for about 20 minutes. and then i will turn it over to the audience for q and a. this discussion will be on the record and recorded. ask you aboutill your account. fascinatingly, it focused on a number of individuals. story of zarqawi, and his rise in jordan, his release from prison, his time in northern iraq, and ultimately his demise. of at also tells the story number of key figures who tried
, and the story of how he led the insurgency in iraq. i'm wondering if you did this, took this approach for purely narrative reasons as a journalist, or if you feel that the rise of isis is really a story about individuals and their own contingencies. in other words, could isis have been prevented if zarqawi was still in an and jordanian -- an jordanian prison, for example. >> thank you. forthanks again to iiss hosting this event and for being such a great resource to me and members of the public over the years. nice to meet nelly and then
today. and i also add to the congratulations. group comes to mind who is also isis and now has this particular program -- problem of having to explain that it is the good isis now. if you google isis these days, you won't get anywhere close to his group. i guess the starting point for me, i am, as a journalist, a story teacher -- storyteller by nature. me that hisear to importance was really underrecognized. and what he was able to create was quite unique. he moves into a spate -- space wire al qaeda was operating. it became a huge challenge problem for us.
he did it very deliberately, even though in many ways he is probably the most least suited or least qualified person to lead a terrorist movement. he had been arrested for petty crimes as a kid. when off to fight jihad, didn't do particularly well at it. but then he threw a series of circumstances innovated some really unique ideas and ways that al qaeda rejected as being too brutal. but he had such a powerful following, such an interesting core group that he formed around thislf that it became really powerful and very strategic force in iraq. so there was an important story that needs to be told and broken down and understood. and so much more important than the isis content because without the book, there is -- without zarqawi, there is no isis. -- it isg from
something that he decided in iraq had to be done immediately as a short-term proposition. -- he was talking about that as early as 2005, 2006. importantly, he is this innovator of through sheer brutality of achieving objectives. he didn't care about his own popularity. he didn't want to be liked. he wanted to be feared and respected, and he wanted to make things happen by shaking things up. he innovated the idea of parading men before a camera and cutting their heads off. got really for the first time in 2004. i think it is really important story and one that we really need to understand now if you want to understand isis. zarqawi would not
have existed without a series of really incredible missteps by a number of outside individuals and parties, including our own government. i just wanted to try to help worlds, not people in our being saturated with this, but understand all these points that most of us are very familiar with. and the movement that followed him. nelly, usually social sciences don't like to focus on individuals. your mind, what were the main circumstances that led to the rise of isis?
ideological reactions to the u.s. invasion, opponents to the top regimes. >> first, thank you for inviting me to be part of this event and to me joby. if i may say something about so one of the things that joby tells us about his book is this bombing that was carried out initially by zarqawi's group that they tried to target an adult cinema. and the would-be bomber was too engrossed with the film that he was watching that he forgot about the mission he was supposed to carry out. he lost hisbought --
legs in the process. so i started reading it while i was on the train to work, and on that day, there were some mechanical difficulties on the train. and apparently we needed to change trains and everybody left the train except for me. i couldn't hear any of the announcements until one of the train conductor stood over me and said you really need to leave the train. >> [indiscernible] >> [laughter] by all means. i found myself really really enjoying many of these stories and aspects that i hadn't read elsewhere. y oni do want to commend job taking us back to the early is, or the group that calls itself the islamic state. since june 2014 when it was proclaimed to be, the caliphate has had so many books that has
flooded the market, and so many of them seem to begin with -- and personalities do matter. and i think what we have found zarqawi is actually a different brand of jihadism. i think for a very long time, we had been accustomed to the jihadism that was dominated by al qaeda's leadership. other personalities of bin laden. perhaps by the personalities of, shall be shaken, bourgeois jihadi's. those that shows up as a result of idealism. they were the dangerous dreamers. but we saw a kind of jihadists ideast was really about
-- ideals, about the need to die for a cause and so on. and i think with zarqawi, we are different atmosphere to it is certainly bridge law, but the thugs who decided they wanted to be jihadi's. -- jihadis. and we have seen some of those differences between al qaeda's brand of jihad is a, at least on , and based onm the narrative side, and what we are seeing today. in that respect, the book really fills an important gap. but i do want to say that there were aspects of the book that i think it doesn't -- we still have gaps in understanding the foundation of is. seriousink there was a
gap in the book from 2006 to around 2011. this is my bias here. i'm studying the leadership of what was called isi between 2006 and 2010. daddy -- hink big baghdadi is the neglected leader. and something that has been neglected about this period, particularly it was because he wanted to declare the state. the islamic state of iraq was on the him. he was the one who proclaimed it. there was also another phase i would like to know little bit more about in order for us to have a better appreciation of i.s. which is a time when you
described him of when zarqawi demoted himself. this is when it became a part of -- and this is a very important time because we saw many groups in iraq who actually joined is r.the umbrella, and kelly's group was one of many. we saw many serious divides. we saw some of the groups appealing to bin laden. what kind of disaster did you bring? why don't you dissociate yourself from these groups? from zarqawi? if there was one report -- i don't know about its authenticity -- it suggests it was al-bagdadi who was the leader.
when i read his statement, he is -- he is -- he provides almost, if you like, that the reservation -- the arise -- theorization of what he calls the beheading. unstoppable, at least in -- [indiscernible] we may say there was no state, and of course it was weak, but the hierarchy and the infrastructure of the state at least on paper, and of course all these various to said operations and various other operations that were mounted and iraq, were also a time during ab u omar's year. >> because that is your book. >> may be. [laughter]
joby, i would like to ask you about your time in jordan, seeing it as a factor in your, as i have said before, probably what helped inspire this book. you went to remote places outside of oman, including prisons. i'm wondering if you could talk a little bit about the people -- you met from the g.i. d g.i.d and their role in jordan's security establishment and how that contributed possibly -- positively or negatively to the rise of isis and the story in general. >> i think that jordan and the g.i.d. are really essential characters in the story.
zarqawi was a jordanian. at the same time, as i understand him, his real influence as a jihadi was out of the country. it is not part of the jordanian movement per se. was influenced more by his -- his experience in afghanistan, and then coming back to jordan years later and helping start a prisonat all ended up in part because of these lovely attempted bombings that they could never pull off. he didn't have a single successful attack ever. the one that filled the most famously was just described by nelly. but what was important and what comes out of this story is really jordan's role -- it is interesting -- they recognized they had a serious problem, they sought as early as the early
1990's with these afghan fighters coming back to the country looking for things to do, being radicalized, and getting into trouble. pretty sophisticated containment operation began at that time. it was pretty good it had to deal -- pretty new. it was sort of a homegrown terrorist problem that they were having to deal with, it's quite brutally at times. there was a combination they did very well. they had extremely good penetration, which i think is easier to do in a small country. but i have always been impressed hashe fact that the g.i.d. a pretty good grasp of everything that is going on and they control the potential troublemakers. fortress has -- the nickname for it used to be the fingernail factory. they have become a little bit more -- a little less rough
around the edges. but they do what they need to do, including keeping people in prison for quite a long period of time. the ideological partners was a guy who was a kuwaiti born palestinian who had sort of the philosophy that started this movement. and after he was released, zarqawi and office elements were eventually released in a general amnesty in 1999, but the jordanians saw him as a threat and they kept him essentially imprison for the rest of, you know, until actually just a few months ago. when he lets them out was putting out messages that they supported. criticizing zarqawi, for example. they have been pretty good at controlling some of these groups. it is not just the jordanian population they are dealing with, but a huge number of
outsiders. and not just any refugee camps, but all the cities. and then you also have the problem of having isis on two sides of the border in iraq and syria. has amplifiedem in the last couple of years. they are continuing complaining to me when asked the to them about just how, you know, not just a resource problem, but they feel disadvantaged and shortchanged on every front. and they are fighting a challenge that is really unique in the region and their absolutely essential to keeping prices from spreading further -- keeping isis from spreading further. elementsort of a tragic to what is happening to the country. acted upon by outside forces in a way that has been disastrous economically. >> from your time in jordan, did you pick up any certain blowback
among the population about the treatment of prisoners? or does it affect the radicalization? >> well, one mistake that was made -- and i think the jordanians would it be knowledge this -- would acknowledge this, back in the 1990's, they kept the jihadists to gather. and this was a tactical decision because these hard-core guys were affecting the regulars, the ordinary criminals. so they chose to put them all together, and the book opens up with the scene of these 50 radicals all present together in this gel that -- all prisons to -- all prisoned together in this jail that had been abandoned. it is obviously hard to get a true version of what happened, but essentially it helped drive these guys together, it helped to create a more radical clic
than had existed before that. and not came back to hot the jordanians -- haunt the jordanians many times over. it is part of their efforts today, they are very good at not to penetration, but good human intelligence. talking to ordinary officers, the equivalent of almost more fbi then cia, dealing with families of young men who were camp ando the jihadist working with parents, working with siblings and making many, many houses. a real street level care and attention being paid to potential problems that were coming up. i think that is what makes them remarkably, if you look at the region, stable compared to their neighbors. nelly, going back to isis today, can you help us situate
them in the spectrum of islamist groups and talk a little bit more about the difference with al qaeda and how that evolved? > sure. time mentor of saarc normally iarqawi, prefer to call them jihadis. the islamists are those i consider to be groups who use islam as part of their political agenda, but they are willing to conduct elections. they are part of the political process. are those whos reject the political process altogether. on the jihadi spectrum, i think we counter the group that came , reallyisis, or i.s.
through the lens of the king. he is the person, or the ideologue, whose writings provided the foundations of that brand of secretary is an -- secretary and is a -- secretarianism. one of his early books that became quite popular amongst his followers is "the religion of abraham." in it, he really provides the deceit for that kind of secreta rianism that zarqawi would really run with. zarqawieen said that and others abused his writings, but they didn't really.
you just go back and read his writings and you know that he is hisone who reneged on words, but they didn't use them. and that to get into too much technicalities about this, but the main difference -- and this is the difference that was very clear to bin laden when they first met saarc hourly back in 1999 -- zarqawi back in 1999, they didn't want to have anything to do with him. i do want to get too technical, but these are the kind of social contracts of the jihadis, or in that case, the global contract. it is the notion of with whom you want to associate, in terms of believers. and it is from with whom you want to disassociate. whereas al qaeda and bin laden, they wanted to focus and emphasize the values of bringing
people together. turn, concerned about the people you need to disassociate. precisely because they did not share your believes and they didn't really -- they reject the shiites and the way the ought to reject them and so on. and for those who actually emphasized that aspect, this this association on the basis of beliefs -- disassociation on the basis of beliefs, they were forced to resort to that 20 muslim declares to be unbelievers. mainstream muslims, including bin laden -- and he wouldn't be mentioned -- but even people like bin laden were very, very careful and they were not utilize it. mainstream muslims would tell theonly got decides
believer's intentions because you can only use it against those only god knows it. whereas our car we -- zarqawi knew better. he thought they wanted to cleanse and purify the faith from those believes they disapproved of. on the ideological spectrum, this is where we see the roots of that sectarian ideology emerging. out of his writings. zarqawi becomes the arm that advances it. we see his disciples, one of the people who was fighting along zarqawi. he died in iraq. he was furious with zarqawi,
howard dare you send him to the battlefield. -- how dare you sent him to the battlefield. from that respect, we see a clear difference between the strategically oriented to hotties -- jihadis and those who were sectarian, who were prepared to sacrifice strategic objectives to appear if i be the tension was always probable. -- to purify the faith. the tension was always palpable. they said they had refused to to teach his book in the training camps. that is why zarqawi did not want
to join al qaeda. later on, bin laden and others were more pragmatic. they brought him in when he became more mellow bowl. the issues, it is not that the regime only used him. he was also using the machine. also, abusing the jihadis who followed his views. it seems, if you look at the trajectory in and out of prison, it is one where he was willing to make concessions. soon thereafter, we see him being released from prison. >> you want to add anything? i will ask one more question to joby. you described in depth in the book, i think quite well, about the military advance and
development of these cells under general mcchrystal. they were highly mobile. they included special forces. together with intelligence analysis and resources. being a breakthrough against the insurgency provoked by al qaeda in iraq. with that in mind, do you see anything we can learn from isis now? and other words, is the air war that has been going on for more than one year unwinnable without that kind of action on the ground? certainly 40 special operators
in syria are not enough. do you see that trend heading in any direction because of general mcchrystal's success? or was that apples and oranges? joby: the united states developed a pretty good operational strategy against zarqawi's movement to read it took them three years to get it up and running, through trial and error. boneheaded mistakes. what brought the movement on its heels was two things. the anbar awakening, which coincided with improved tactics. intelligence/special operations group that ran out of
mcchrystal's operation. what was successful about it was they moved from bombing at a distance or large troop operations to high tempo intelligence capture and kill, and then kill capture. going after al qaeda every night. i talked to the guys involved in the program, tough guys that you are glad are on our side. they would have breakfast for dinner and go out at night. hit safe houses, three or four times a night, night after night. as soon as they hit one, they
would collect intelligence and go after another immediately. high tempo, never giving the enemy a chance to regroup or regather. they were effective at taking out second or third tier commanders and eventually killing zarqawi. a couple of problems. one, we had full control over iraq. of the airspace. cooperative government with significant resources.
the effect was relatively small groups could make a big difference, ultimately, in the defeat of zarqawi. i remember sitting with intelligence folks in 2008 who are convinced al qaeda had been defeated. that didn't happen. they became isis. you see the groups of special operations into the theater. there is some indication they hope to reprise that successful formula using friendly forces like kurds but hopefully with advisers, instructors, that can help locate that experiment. -- replicate that experiment. whether they can do that in syria without full control over
her space and the kind of intelligence network we had is a good question. benjamin: nelly, you are trying to answer that. ample time for q&a. please identify your self and keep your question as short as possible. the gentleman in the front. the microphone will come to you. >> thank you for your discussion. i want to preface my question with a cynical observation. with the current condition of the u.s. political process, if it were in existence in 1941, we would be speaking japanese and german. since september 11, two administrations have made strategic errors that range from catastrophic to ludicrous. mr. bush failed to ask and answer the what next question. how do you account for that? is this in our dna? are the problems to tough, or is the political process to difficult -- too difficult? joe b: that is a million-dollar question. all i can offer is, it is instructive to look at the strategic side. the failures that happen again and again, often because we did not ask the question, what comes next or did not have the
strategic vision to see what was around the corner, i think in the case of the obama administration, they were caught by the arab spring movement that nobody knew what to do with. seeing our allies toppled. it seemed in our interest to side with the demonstrators. we were hopeful something good would come out of it.
often, it is hard to see what is next because we cannot see what is around the corner. they were suddenly faced with this where they could not see what was behind the next corner. we were pretty hopeful that we could see what would come out behind it, but in every case it has been a disaster. how we can get ahead of it? that is a tough one. i remembered talking to senior folks here. they were convinced it was going to fall. of course we are going to have a stable government in this critical place and it did not begin to happen. even with all the iranians and americans and everyone there, where does this end? we can't -- we don't know where it is going.
we cannot come up with good answers on how to solve it. >> thank you john craig from the center for american progress. joby, you said at the end that the centers for zarqawi transitioned into isis. i want to ask a question about why zarqawi. both men and joby described the disbandment of the iraqi military is tragic mistakes, but in fact they were in of the neocon agenda. i think they were very deliberate policies pursued by the administration at the time. these ideological views, very much see the value of isis as a weapon for going after the shiite government in baghdad and
our calorie, an unknown jihadist figure in 2000 2003 to the connection. the cia was pretty convinced at the time that's our kelly had no connection to saddam hussein. -- that zarqawi had no connection to saddam hussein. that became part of the justification for the invasion. >> in iraq priority 2003, most people, whether they believed it or not, it was part of the kind of ticket you needed to get into university or to do things. so, it had tremendous influence on those who did not like saddam but who had to be part of the party. that is why the new regime lost many talents who could have been part of the new government. they were excluded. because they were just baptist. -- bathist. many of them are fighting and forming groups, it natural to fight a long with his zarqawi. once they started getting to know him better, we find there was an enormous divide between his zarqawi and the former bathists and others.
it was one of obama's first statements. he called on the bathists to join. particularly those in the military, he called on them to join the islamic state of a rock is so long as they could have actually, some basic knowledge of koranic verses and so on. he is the one who did the outreach. he reached out to the kurds in his public statements. >> it is clear that early outreach by czar callery did amazing things early on. the first big attack in 2003
against the u.n. compound, the jordanian embassy, the major shiite facilities, were all using improvised bombs made from iraqi aircraft munitions. there was help providing equipment, intelligence. here is a guy able to have intelligence that worked pretty quickly. to plan coordinated attacks and have powerful, locally produced munitions to attack. which points to participation and attack from well-placed iraqi sources. [indiscernible] >> in the recent years we have seen the increasing islamic activity and afghanistan and other areas outside the region. what evidence did you see of the basic isil, are they providing an example or is there money, leadership advisors? do you see evidence of a greater link than just being a and
example? joby: i have been convinced it is mostly by inspiration and example. sometimes they communicate with their own propaganda and speak to each other through their own facebook postings and tweets and things like that, evening and encouragement from the sibling organizations throughout the region.
it will be interesting to see what happens. because, if that turns out to be an isis-produced bomb, the question is, is that something a local isis affiliate would together or was it something that was directed and somehow equipment, supplies, no-how came from central isis? i do not know the answer but it will be telling to see the answer and the extent to which centralizes has command responsibility to some of these organizations. i think right now you see the beheadings and placing flytrap afghanistan a couple days ago, in libya, you see echoing going on but it is not impossible to roll out logistics. >> let us take three questions from the back. >> ken meyer.
the prevailing opinion among the syrians and iraqis is that the united states is behind the islamic state. the u.s. treasury decided to look into how the islamic state received those hundreds of toyotas that used in the takeover of northern iraq? what do you think they're going to find? >> in the corner? >> sorry. >> british embassy. it strikes me, when dealing with an adversarial or enemy the idea of giving them credibility is dangerous. by calling them the islamic state or isis whiffed on that.
have we reached the point of no return and how they are branded and how that gives them the credibility they desire? >> far corner? >> hello. sorry. thank you for being here. i wanted to ask if you could talk a little bit about recruitment. jihadist recruitment. how isis has influenced al qaeda's ability to recruit jihadists and how their recruitment processes have changed as a result. >> nelly, i will ask you to start with the question.
in addition to the islamist-isis branding, talk about perhaps who in the islamic world community has some credibility about condemning, and kobe writes about the efforts to get various clerics to speak up against them, but how is that working? where is that going? i will ask joby and general about the u.s.-iraqi contribution to the rise of isis which i think stems more from the fact that they have taken over a lot of basis and equipment that are from the iraqi army. we thought they were better trained and motivated then and turns out to be. so, let's start with you.
nelly: that let me start with this question about what we call them in the issue on that ability. i think, one issue to do with naming and using religion, i think when we analyze groups like is and so on, it is important to understand how religion matters and, more importantly, when it does not matter. this is lacking in the analysis. because sometimes we see religion as paying a medium for a position. something different than theological issues. this is where theology and the efforts to bring in the clerics and give us a three-hour lecture on the islamic tradition and so
on is not going to appeal to the young person who is not to motivated simply because of spiritual reasons, but because they really want to do something. this really talks about the recruitment part. because here, -- you know, i think -- we need to work out really what is behind that to recruitment strategy and to understand the phenomenon. my colleagues are doing a broad study of out foreign fighters, looking at a very large database on open source and hopefully that will give us, at some
point, some meaningful answers about why people join and so on. roughly, we are seeing, for my own perspective, we are seeing a different kind of people who are joining is. theology does not seem to be critical. many young people are converting to join is. and i ask, isn't islam? is it a ticket to become becoming jihadi rather than jihadi teeing a ticket to become muslim? this is very important and cannot be stressed enough. we cannot call it, you say, what do we call them? it is not up to us. i think the groups, the islamic states, is best described by al qaeda when they announce it. al qaeda called it, the group that called itself the islamic state. that is a group that is not in and of itself a state. this is a more accurate description. i am cynical about isis, isil. they all contain the islamic state.
it does not do it. i would rather call them, the group that calls itself the islamic state. it is not a state in the sense it is not seeking a seat at the united stations, nor does it want it, nor is it going to have a seat on the united nations. so, i think, you know, it is on some of these things we need to knowledge how groups define themselves. we cannot decide how they define themselves. when we study them, we have to of knowledge that hard. at the same time, we have to stress the other aspects as well. >> before you leave the army, you can create a new acronym that they are quite successful at. joby, final words? joby: you can forgive people in
the region for having conspiracy theories, including the notion that isis is somehow u.s.-funded or backed in some way. i am always amazed at some pervasive -- at how pervasive some of these theories are. there are educated people, people who follow the news, who are convinced that isis is a creation of iran. others who think the united states is backing isis in some way. it is a pickup argument. it is remarkable that western equipment, in this case, japanese trucks,, all of this left behind by american contractors who imported these toyota trucks. it turns out the security contractors who ran the bases, did the food preparation, did all this legit -- just --
logistical stuff, did not take it with them. there was a huge parking lot left. isis liberated them and took them for themselves. you have old divisions worth a of humvees, jeeps, tanks, you name it. it is probably the best armed, best equipped terrorist organization the world has ever seen. we had this money because we wanted so much as a country about giving arms to syrian rebels, because god for bid of some of those would fall into the hand of isis, instead, what they did was they raided our own former bases in iraq and took the things for themselves. >> any other burning questions? last one. >> thank you for this discussion. i am alex him and is. i work for the voice of america. my question is about the foreign actors. those who came from the west to join isis. my question is whether or not you have any information on the possible connection between isis and radical organizations in the west. maybe some rightist or other medical organizations. nelly: i do not know about this. i mean, in terms of trying to suggest they are infiltrating is from the far right, i think, ideologically that would be
very, very difficult unless they are trying to penetrate is, i do not see how there could be any kind of ideological sympathy between far-right groups in the west and i.s. i cannot see any sympathies. >> we will leave it at that. i think this has been a productive discussion and i have closing recommendations. buy jobi's book and follow nelly on various social media. [applause]
[captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015] >> today, our road to the white house coverage continues with the democratic presidential debate. we will hear from martin o'malley, hillary clinton, and bernie sanders. the debate cosponsored by cbs moines register, and twitter. you can see it at 4:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. >> now, john kerry talking about u.s. policy in syria and the outgoing campaign against isis to from the u.s. institute of
peace, this is 45 minutes. [applause] >> good afternoon and welcome. i'm the president of the united states institute of peace. today's event comes at a critical moment in the syrian conflict. this has become an open sore in the middle east and it threatens global security. world is gripped with the arrival of refugees in europe, highlighting there are 60 million people displaced by a global conflict. 12 million of those are syrian and estimates suggest a quarter of a million syrian have been killed in the civil war today are