This monograph explores the nature of interagency leadership and policy fulfillment during a stability operation without an antecedent combat phase, specifically the Greek Civil War, 1947- 1949. Employing John Lovell's Imaginary Ideal Machine for Making Policy as a theoretical construct, this research establishes three hypotheses. First, in such an operation, the US military element must answer directly to the Department of State to remain integrated within the interagency. Written directives from national through operational-level leadership clear fuzzy lines of authority in the interagency. Second, an articulated line of authority with a commensurate budget is an effective tool to provide unity of effort, a forcing mechanism for cooperation, and an indicator of lead federal agency status. Finally, key players in the interagency must receive prior interagency experience as well as post-assignment incentives to be effective. In this case study, all members received a reward for good work, but causality between good interagency integration and perceived benefits was suspect.