After the Gulf War ended, military publications throughout the U.S. heralded this effort as proof that General Abram's Total Force concept worked. But for the 335th Signal Command (RC) in Georgia, those trumpets blew a sour note. The 335th was one of three major subordinate reserve commands not mobilized by the Third Army, as it created new units out of whole cloth. What is the role of the Reserve Components (RC) in general and signal corps units in particular? What has the relationship between the Active Components (AC) and RC been? What should it be? What kind of historical baggage does the Signal Corps carry onto the modern battlefield? This paper looks at these issues, creating an historical perspective for both the RC and the Signal Corps, then uses the RC signal Corps in the form of the 335th Signal Command to illustrate problems which apply across the RC spectrum. Finally, the paper focuses in on recommendations and new policies now being exposed to unite RC and AC signal units. These programs find universal application throughout the Reserve Community and will be necessary to revitalize the Total Force concept which was mortally wounded on the burning sands of Kuwait.