Following the Cold War, the Services sought to redefine themselves in the face of a future operating environment devoid of a singular threat. As this era unfolded the term expeditionary came to the forefront of each service culture and has increasingly dominated discussions over the past decade. The core competencies, capabilities, and conditions that should underpin expeditionary operations are not common across the services and are not codified by DoD policy, joint doctrine, or joint training standards. Today, the expeditionary moniker is used universally, albeit with varying definitions and associated training tasks, conditions, and standards developed by each service. The essential element of being joint is the ability to speak a common language and this is not the case with expeditionary operations. This creates interoperability and capability gaps that could be exploited and generates expectations and assumptions in the planning process that may not exist otherwise. This paper will demonstrate that only by establishing and implementing joint expeditionary doctrine and training standards will the joint force be effective in the current operating environment and meet the challenges of the future operating environment. Analyzing the American military expeditionary tradition shapes modern thoughts on the subject. Analyzing the way each service used the last decade to transform can help determine what the joint force needs to be successful in the future operating environment.