Facing increased Combatant Commander (CCDR) demand for tanker support and dwindling post-war funding, Air Mobility Command (AMC) requested a solution. It received deployment credit approval for active duty aircrews flying three particular must-do missions. Normally these missions do not count as deployments. Resultantly, active duty workload measurement, deployment-to-dwell (D2D), increased reserve requirements. Reserve forces did not concur with AMC s original request. Now they face increased mobilization needs without receiving credit for flying those same missions. This inequity undercuts USAF readiness for three reasons. DoD budget officials warn of no post-war peace dividend. The need for cocost-effectiveeserve forces has risen. Retaining quality citizen airmen suffers from an uneven active-reserve set of rules. AMC s volunteer incentives are diluted by its one-size-fits-all aspect. A part of the reserves never reach the incentives mobility reduction. Leaders should repair the workload inequity and inaccurate measurements. Only improving adopted fighter D2D methods for KC-135s will meet CCDR requirements.