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by 0 EJ IG Letter Awareness Review
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Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6174277-Footnote-15-118-Cv-01216-OS-2018-0570-and-OS.html
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Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6174272-Footnote-10-Re-OS-FOIA-Awareness-Review-18-00799.html
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Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6174274-Footnote-12-118cv-00387-OS-2018-00089.html
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Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6174270-Footnote-8-DRAFT-Deliberative-Revised-Day-in-the.html
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Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6174273-Footnote-11-72-Hour-Awareness-Notice-Monuments.html
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Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6174275-Footnote-13-Re-ACTIVE-LITIGATION-Awareness-Review.html
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Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6174280-Footnote-21-Fwd-17-424-FOIA-Notice-Time-Sensitive.html
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Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6174278-Footnote-16-Fwd-Immediate-Awareness-Requested.html
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Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6174269-Footnote-7-Additional-Awareness-Review.html
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Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6174276-Footnote-14-FOIA-Litigation-Response.html
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Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6174271-Footnote-9-Re-LITIGATION-RECORDS-17cv01779.html
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Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6174279-Footnote-20-Additional-Awareness-Review.html
Mohan Publications || Bhakti Books
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################ Sri Katyayani Vratam Online book store చాగంటి వారు సూచించిన …. శ్రీ కాత్యాయనీ వ్రతం Author: చల్లా రామగణపతి ప్రసాద శాస్త్రి Pages : 42 https://devullu.com/books/sri-katyayani-vratam/ ############## ఈ వ్రతము వివాహము కావలసిన కన్యలకు కల్పవృక్షం వంటిది....
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Topics: KeywordsSri Katyayani Vratamu, SriKatyayaniVratamu, Katyayani Vratamu, Katyayani Vratam, Sri...
Folkscanomy: A Library of Books
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A book-in-progress about the linux kernel and its insides. The goal is simple  - to share my modest knowledge about the insides of the linux kernel and help people who are interested in linux kernel insides, and other low-level subject matter. - @0xAX Archived by Unglue.it
Topic: linux
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by 10th Judicial Circuit
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Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5687163-17-903426-D86-Final-Order.html
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by 16th Judicial District Clerk of Court
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State of LA vs. Kerry Stokes Docket #: 18-1056 Parish of Iberia Motion to Recuse Judge Lori A. Landry and Incorporated Memorandum in Support
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6536407-Motion-to-Recuse-Judge-Lori-Landry.html
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5975789-National-Security-Archive-Declaration-Renouncing.html
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5975790-National-Security-Archive-Convention-for-the.html
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5975791-National-Security-Archive-Convention-Respecting.html
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5975792-National-Security-Archive-Convention-Respecting.html
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5975793-National-Security-Archive-Convention-Relative-to.html
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5975794-National-Security-Archive-Rights-and-Duties-of.html
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5975728-National-Security-Archive-Permanent-Court-of.html
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5975729-National-Security-Archive-Permanent-Court-of.html
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5975730-National-Security-Archive-Permanent-Court-of.html
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5975731-National-Security-Archive-Permanent-Court-of.html
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5975732-National-Security-Archive-United-Nations-Reports.html
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5975733-National-Security-Archive-United-Nations-Reports.html
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5975734-National-Security-Archive-United-Nations-Reports.html
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5975735-National-Security-Archive-Permanent-Court-of.html
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by 193d Special Operations Wing
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Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6541214-2018-04080-F-Final-Reponse-Letter.html
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by 193d Special Operations Wing
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Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6544052-10-29-19-MR60117-pdf.html
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5975795-National-Security-Archive-Convention-on.html
The German scientists at Elekrostal led by Nikolaus Riehl made a contribution to the Soviet atomic project that CIA analysts believed had saved the Soviets about “six months” of work. Born in Russia, Riehl directed research at the Auer Company, which manufactured uranium metal for the Nazi atomic weapons project. According to this report, two key Soviets, Iulii Khariton and General A.P. Zaveniagin who were in Berlin after the Nazi collapse made Riehl an offer to produce uranium in a Soviet...
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6385930-National-Security-Archive-Doc-30-Central.html
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5975736-National-Security-Archive-International-Military.html
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5975737-National-Security-Archive-International-Court-of.html
The archival file that includes this scientific intelligence report provides no clues on its provenance. So far it is only available primary source in U.S. archives concerning the results of a secret U.S.-British intelligence operation: to glean information on an industrial plant in the Soviet Zone of Germany that produced large quantities of distilled calcium, an important input into the Soviet nuclear program. Apparently, MI-6 sources at the plant provided most of the intelligence and this...
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6385904-National-Security-Archive-Doc-04-Calcium.html
CIA director Hillenkoetter reaffirmed a 1947 estimate: while it was "remotely possible" that the Soviets would test a weapon by mid-1950, the "most probable date" was mid-1953.
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6385905-National-Security-Archive-Doc-05-Document-3.html
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Probably written as an input for a yet to be identified report, this memo included estimates of output ofU 3 O 8 (triuranium octoxide), a form of yellowcake, and low-grade uranium.
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6385906-National-Security-Archive-Doc-06-Untitled.html
In this memorandum to State Department intelligence, Gordon Arneson, special assistant to the secretary of state for atomic energy matters, asked for information on possible graphite production facilities in the Soviet Union. By making this request, he demonstrated his understanding of a basic issue: that the Soviets could possibly develop an atomic reactor moderated by graphite, along the same lines as the U.S.’s Hanford, Washington plant. While suggesting some possible locations for...
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6385907-National-Security-Archive-Doc-07-Memorandum-from.html
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Apparently, a draft for a 1 January 1949 estimate of the USSR atomic energy program, this memorandum restated the findings of the July 1948 estimate about mid-1950 and mid-1953 (see document 4). It made a special point that new intelligence on Soviet uranium mining from “well-placed sources” surpassed early appraisals based on “geological theory and low-grade intelligence reports on uranium mining.” Nevertheless, the reliability of the sources had to be tested
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6385908-National-Security-Archive-Doc-08-Untitled.html
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5975796-National-Security-Archive-United-Nations-General.html
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Another draft for the 1 January 1949 estimate (not yet declassified), this memorandum cited unspecified “fragmentary” evidence on a plutonium bomb and other information furnishing a “picture of the organization of the Soviet atomic energy program and certain localities involved.” Whether such sites as Elektrostal had been identified as one of the relevant “localities” remains to be learned. According to this estimate, the Soviets had enough uranium to operate one reactor...
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6385909-National-Security-Archive-Doc-09-Untitled.html
Gordon Arneson provided Secretary of State Dean Acheson with an explanation of the intelligence information (or lack of information) that shaped the JNEIC’s recent assessment. U.S. intelligence concluded that before mid-1951 Moscow would not have enough heavy water at hand to operate a reactor for producing plutonium. As for a graphite pile reactor Arneson’s earlier efforts to collection information on Soviet graphite production had failed: “There are not even low grade rumors of Soviet...
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6385911-National-Security-Archive-Doc-11-Memorandum-for.html
A highly compressed report by the recently created Joint Nuclear Energy Intelligence Committee [JNEIC], produced only weeks before the Soviet test, reached the same basic conclusion as the earlier reports. Thus, it generally upheld the mid-1950 and mid-1953 dates, except for one modification: if the Soviets were using only "one method” for fissile material production, then mid-1951 was the earliest possible date for an atomic bomb. “One method” was probably a reference to a heavy...
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6385910-National-Security-Archive-Doc-10-Document-4.html
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5975797-National-Security-Archive-Geneva-Convention-for.html
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5975798-National-Security-Archive-Geneva-Convention-for.html
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5975799-National-Security-Archive-Geneva-Convention.html
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5975800-National-Security-Archive-Geneva-Convention.html
In this closely held memorandum, DCI Hillenkoetter notified the White House of the detection of radioactive materials in the Northern Pacific but cautioned that the intelligence community was still trying to determine whether it had found evidence of “an atomic explosion” or of some other phenomenon (volcanic activities, effluents from the Hanford production reactor, or an atomic accident in Russia). According to George Elsey’s interview with NSC Executive Secretary Sidney Souers [See...
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6385912-National-Security-Archive-Doc-12-Memorandum-from.html
Some months before the Soviet test, in April 1949, the U.S. Navy began "Project Rain Barrel" to analyze debris from nuclear weapons tests that might show up in rain water collected secretly at stations in Kodiak, Alaska, and Washington, D.C. "Rain Barrel" information described in this report was critically important to forming the scientific consensus about the nature of the Joe-1 test. [17]
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6385915-National-Security-Archive-Doc-15-Document-7-U-S.html
President Truman had been doubtful that the Soviets had tested the bomb, but on 21 September 1949, he, his aide Steven Early, and Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson saw this memorandum and the supporting documents. Air Force Chief of Staff Vandenberg had written that that "I believe an atomic bomb has been detonated over the Asiatic land mass during the period 26 August 1949 to 29 August 1949. Drawing on the findings of Tracerlab, the AFOAT-1 report concluded that an atomic bomb had been...
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6385913-National-Security-Archive-Doc-13-Air-Force-Chief.html
This is the questions-answers document mentioned above. . Much of the text was incorporated into a confidential telegram sent to all U.S. embassies and consulates on 23 September 1949 as background information. The document conveyed great optimism that the Soviet Union had not benefitted from purloined intelligence information. But it also posited that the Soviet bomb did not make war more likely and U.S. policy was directed at policies designed to avoid war. The documents raised the...
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6385921-National-Security-Archive-Doc-21-Policy-Planning.html
This detailed report shows how U.S. analysts back-tracked the radioactive samples collected in early September to a nuclear detonation that occurred sometime between 27 and 29 August 1949.
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6385916-National-Security-Archive-Doc-16-Document-8-U-S.html
When Washington alerted the British government that an air mass containing radioactive particles was going to pass north of Scotland, London ordered special air sampling flights to collect more traces of the Soviet test. While the British had their own routine air sampling flight program, the next one was not scheduled until 14 September so important evidence could have been missed had it not been for the U.S. alert.
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6385914-National-Security-Archive-Doc-14-Document-6-U-S.html
The chronology in this draft is off (the Soviet test had not been detected on 28 August) but it includes an interesting account of how Deputy Secretary of Defense Steven Early tried to find out whether Truman knew about the early intelligence on the Soviet test. He asked if Truman knew about the “dust storm.”
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6385919-National-Security-Archive-Doc-19-George-W-Elsey.html
Souers was as close as anyone to the discussions and decisions concerning the intelligence on the Soviet test and he provided Elsey with detailed information on the considerations behind the decision to make a public announcement, including the timing of the statement. While some, such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and top civilian defense officials, wanted an early announcement to prevent a leak, as Truman had told Elsey, concern about the devaluation of the pound sterling led to some delay of...
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6385918-National-Security-Archive-Doc-18-Elsey-notes-of.html
White House staffer George Elsey had been involved in foreign policy issues, but as he wrote on the first page of this document, the intelligence on the Soviet test was so secret that he knew nothing of it until the time of the announcement. A trained historian, he wanted to know about the decision-making process and interviewed Truman and NSC executive secretary Sidney Souers to find out who knew what when, how it was decided that a statement would be made, and what problems had to be resolved...
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6385917-National-Security-Archive-Doc-17-Statement-by.html
Once senior State Department officials, including Policy Planning Staff director George F. Kennan, were read into “Vermont” intelligence, Kennan tasked several staff members to prepare a questions-and-answers document [See following item] that could be used to brief officials “in the field” after a White House announcement had been made. Here, Savage recounts how the document was prepared and what he learned about the White House decision-making on the announcement.
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6385920-National-Security-Archive-Doc-20-Memorandum-by.html
Taking into account the “Vermont” findings, the latest assessment by the JNEIC tried to put the best face on things by noting that the test confirmed previous estimates that the Soviets were working on a plutonium bomb (but not mentioning the mistaken estimates of mid-1950 and mid-1953). Nevertheless, the claim that the test occurred in Siberia suggested that acoustic and seismic data, which later indicated that the test had occurred at Semipalatinsk, had not yet been analyzed. Taking into...
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6385922-National-Security-Archive-Doc-22-Joint-Nuclear.html
Roderick Spence, who had worked at the Manhattan Project’s Metallurgical Laboratory during World War II, directed Los Alamos Laboratory's Radiochemistry Group. AFOAT-1 sent Spence a sample of the radioactive material for independent analysis. Spence's report, written up several weeks after the analytical work had occurred, concluded that the "samples supplied to us contained radioactive isotopes and that the bulk of the activity was due to fission products of fairly recent origin, their...
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6385923-National-Security-Archive-Doc-23-Document-9-R-W.html
With the U.S. nuclear monopoly, if not superiority, ending, U.S. intelligence began to look at the military implications. Air Force intelligence prepared what turned out to be an exaggerated estimate of Soviet capabilities to produce atomic weapons and deliver them to targets in the United States and the United Kingdom. The Air Force projected that the Soviets already had the capability to deliver atomic weapons to targets in the Northwest United States, using TU-4 bombers on two-way missions....
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6385924-National-Security-Archive-Doc-24-Document-10.html
During this hearing of the Joint Committee of Atomic Energy (JCAE), a defensive Director of Central Intelligence Roscoe Hillenkoetter argued that "our estimate was not too far off in the first place" because it was an "error of a few months" (p. 5) and that "I don't think we were taken by surprise." (p. 46). Nevertheless, a fuller picture emerged when Chairman Sen. Brian McMahon (D-Conn) read from the Joint Nuclear Energy Intelligence Committee’s 1949 report (see...
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6385925-National-Security-Archive-Doc-25-Document-12.html
A brief analysis of the Soviet test in this CIA publication found that the Soviets had gained a political advantage. Despite the test, it did not fundamentally change the U.S.’s military-security position; the “superior US stockpile” remained a “significant” advantage. To identify a prospective military threat, it would be necessary to “determine the time at which the rising curve of a Soviet stockpile will reach a point at which it can be considered operationally effective.” The...
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6385926-National-Security-Archive-Doc-26-Central.html
To deal with the strategic issues raised by the Soviet bomb, the CIA produced a long analysis, focusing not only on Soviet nuclear capabilities but also on Moscow's intentions and the extent to which a nuclear weapons capability increased the risk of U.S.-Soviet conflict. The analysts reached the general conclusion that they saw “no firm basis for an assumption that the USSR presently intends deliberately to use military force to attain a Communist world or further to expand Soviet territory...
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6385927-National-Security-Archive-Doc-27-Estimate-of-the.html
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5975801-National-Security-Archive-Convention-for-the.html
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The Students Following the Line of the Imam always maintained that a major concern was that the United States would try to foment another coup d'etat similar to the one against Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq in 1953. A debate has sprung up in recent times about whether the CIA and British intelligence in fact played a role in the ultimate overthrow. This cable from the American ambassador in Baghdad, where the Shah had flown after the first coup attempt failed, appears to give irrefutable...
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6536623-National-Security-Archive-Doc-01-U-S-Embassy.html
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5975802-National-Security-Archive-Convention-for-the.html
During a discussion with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on the peaceful uses of atomic energy, Philip Farley mentioned that the U.S., the Soviet Union, and other countries had been discussing the importance of controls over nuclear reactor operations and Washington and Moscow’s “common interest in seeing that other countries did not obtain nuclear weapons.” That same day, Farley met with Harold Knapp of the Atomic Energy Commission who, like Farley’s boss, Gerard C. Smith, had...
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6199557-National-Security-Archive-Doc-1-Memorandum-for.html
State Department official William Sebald reported that the Defense Department wanted to introduce nuclear-capable Honest John missiles and 280 mm artillery to U.S. forces in South Korea, arguing that it would be permissible under a "liberal interpretation of paragraph 13(d) of the Korean Armistice Agreement," which constrained either side from introducing "new weapons into Korea, other than piece-for-piece replacement of equipment." For others at State, the deployments would...
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6549586-National-Security-Archive-Doc-01.html
Assistant Secretary Walter Robertson restated Sebald's concerns in the previous document, but allowed that "if it is determined that the security of the United States is imperiled by a failure to introduce these items, that is another matter." Moreover, State Department lawyer Herman Phleger indicated that he did "not maintain that we are forever bound by an armistice agreement when its terms become outmoded and impossible to live with, and where the other side bas already...
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6549587-National-Security-Archive-Doc-02-Assistant.html
Deputy Secretary of Defense Reuben Robertson began this discussion by arguing that the United States needed to cut back on military spending in Korea and that the introduction of nuclear-capable systems would help. The proposed cuts would be accomplished by "reducing the size" of South Korean military forces. Furthermore, the North Koreans had been violating the armistice by "throwing out of balance" the comparative effectiveness of forces in the North and the South. State...
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6549588-National-Security-Archive-Doc-03-Record-of.html
Assistant Secretary Francis Wilcox reported to U.N. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge that the State Department continued to object to the Pentagon's nuclear deployment plan because of its "far reaching implications not only for the Armistice Agreement but also our relations with our allies in the UNC and our general position both in the UN and the Far East." During the interagency discussions of the National Security Council’s directive to update a statement of policy on South Korea...
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6549589-National-Security-Archive-Doc-04-Assistant.html
With Dulles scheduled to visit the Pentagon, Assistant Secretary Robertson wanted him to keep in mind that the Joint Chiefs had yet to provide evidence of North Korean/Communist armistice violations and that as recently as the previous summer the United States had made assurances that "it would continue to abide by [the Armistice's] terms." According to Robertson, it "would be disastrous to our position with our Allies and in the United Nations if we were to proceed and equip our...
Source: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6549590-National-Security-Archive-Doc-05-Mr-Robertson-to.html