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AD388847 


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Administrative/Operational Use; 14 NOV 1967. 
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the Adjutant General (Army), Washington, DC 
20310. 


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AD 388847 


CONFIDENTIAL 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310 

IN REPLY REFER TO 

AGAM-P (M) (5 Mar 68) FOR 0T RD-674058 8 March 1968 

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters,14th 

Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1967(u) 



SEE DISTRIBUTION 


1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance 
with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should 
be reported to ACSFOR 0T RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days 
of receipt of covering letter. 


2. Information contained In this report is provided to insure appro¬ 
priate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current 
operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material. 


BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY: 


SD D C 


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KENNETH G. WICKHAM 
Major General, USA 
The Adjutant General 


1980 


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CONFIDENTIAL 



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CG, US Army Weapons Command 

CO, 14th Combat Aviation Battalion 




CONFIDENTIAL 


DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMI 

HEADQUARTERS, 14TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION 
APQ San Francisco 96374 


AVGD-BC 14 Novesber 1967 

SUBJECTS operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 October 1967 (RCS-43 
FOR 65) 


TO: SEB DISTRIBUTION 


Section I: Significant Organizational Activitiee 
1 • (C) General 

a* The mission of the 14th GAB is to provide timely* direct 
general aviation support to the elements of the Americal Division w *id 
selected units within I Corps Tactical Zone. 

b. Major organizational changes during this quarter were: 

(1) Task Force Oregon redesignated the Americal Division 
effective 22 2400 September 1967. 

(2) The 756th Medical Detachment (-) was detached from the 
I6lat Aviation Company and attached to the 174th Aviation Company affective 
4 August 1967. 


o. Aircraft assets and their location at the close of this re¬ 
porting period are as follows: 


UNIT 

NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT 


HHD, 14th CAB 

1 U6A 

Chu Lai f RVN (BT 572 035) 

14th Sec Pit 

348th Avn Det 



534th Med Det 

71st Avn Co 

19 UH-1D, 8 UH-1C 

Chu led, RVN (BT 541 064) 

94th Slg Det 



151st TC Det 

161st Avn Co 

19 UB-1D, 8 UH-1B 

Chu Lai, RVN (BT 575 033) 

Post err PQ 


DotViigradcd at J year InLervms 
Declassified after 12 years 

S?*fOS© 

CONFIDENTIAL 

DOD DIR 5200.10 




.CONFIDENTIAL 

AVOtt.BC 14 November 1967 

SUBJECT* Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 October 1967 (RCS-CS 
FOR 65) 

UNIT NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT HEADQUARTERS LOCATION 

406th TC Dot 
449th Sig Dot 

174th Avn Co 21 UH-1D, 8 UH-1C Duo Pho, RVN (BS 812 382) 

409th TC Det 
452nd Sig Det 
756th Med Det 

176th Avn Co 19 UH-1D, 8 UH-1C Ky Ha, RVN (BT 527 116) 

411th TC Det 
454th Sig Det 

178th Avn Co 16 CH-47A, 2 0H-23G Chu Lai, RVN (BT 547 057) 

400th TO Det 

d. Transportation and Signal Detachments continue to remain 
attached to each Aviation Company to facilitate aircraft and avionics 
maintenance support. 

e. Medical support assets have been divided to afford aviation 
medical support at both Chu Lai and Duo Pho. 

f. Command 

(1) LTC Carroll C. Isaacs, OF 100 091, Armor, assumed command 
of the battalion on 7 August 1967. 

(2) Major Joe K, Bell, 04 031 035> Armor, assumed command of 
the 71st Aviation Company on 8 September 1967. 

(3) The 161st Aviation Company was commanded by Major Don¬ 
ald S. Galla, 04 031 301, Infantry. 

(4) The 174th Aviation Company was commanded by Major Thomas 
W, Wheat Jr., 04 009 596, Artillery. 

(5) The 176th Aviation Company was commanded by Major Don¬ 
ald W. Phillips, 08 425 40, Artillery. 

CONFIDENTIAL 



CONFIDENTIAL 


AVCD-BC 14 November 1967 

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 October 1967 (RCS-CS 
FOR 65) 

(6) Major John M. Kalina, 01 936 675, Infantry assumed com¬ 
mand of the 178th Aviation Company on 19 October 1967* 

2, (C) Intelligence and Counterintelligence 

a. During the period 1 August - 31 October 1967 the 14th Com¬ 
bat Aviation Battalion had 188 aircraft hit by hostile fire. This repre¬ 
sents and increase of approximately 33% over the proceeding quarter. 


b, Analysis of the hostile fire reports to determine the number 
of aircraft hit by altitude and aircraft action reveals the following: 


ALT ON GROUND T/O JUJDG 


0 12 
100 
200 
300 
400 
500 
600 
700 
800 
900 
1000 
1100 
1200 
1300 
1400 
1500 


13 16 

15 7 

9 3 

5 2 

1 3 

3 6 

0 0 

2 0 

4 0 

0 0 

2 2 

0 0 

2 0 

0 0 

0 1 

1 0 


ENRT 

9 

1 

2 

1 

2 

1 

0 

1 

1 

1 

4 

1 

0 

1 

0 

3 


TARGET ATTACK TOTAL BY ALTITUDE 


2 

1 

2 

0 

4 

10 


50 

25 

15 

10 

6 

14 

10 


4 

3 

2 

3 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 


7 

8 

3 
11 
1 
2 
1 
1 

4 


3 

CONFIDENTIAL 



! CONFIDENTIAL 


ATOD-BC 14 Novaobar 1967 

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 October 1967 (RCS-CS 


FOR 65) 

alt on ernonn) 

llSi 

UM 

BiRT 

TARGET ATTACK 

TOTAL BY ALTITUDE 

1600 

2 

0 

1 

0 

3 

1700 

0 

0 

1 

0 

3 

1800 

2 

0 

3 

0 

5 

2000 

1 

1 

4 

0 

6 

2200 

0 

0 

1 

0 

1 

2700 

0 

0 

1 

0 

1 

2900 

0 

0 

1 

0 

1 

UNKNOWN 

0 

_ 0 _ 

1 

0 

1 

12 

62 

41 

42 

31 

188 


o. Weather has had an impact on operations dinring this quarter 
particularly during the latter half of September and early October, Al¬ 
though relatively few missions have been cancelled, there have been 
frequent mission delays especially in the early morning hours. The most 
serious impact has been that lov ceilings have forced all aircraft to fly 
at lower altitudes thus increasing exposure time to enemy ground fire. 

d. Units of the battalion and particularly the 174th Aviation 
Company in the Duo Fho area have contributed to the psychological warfare 
effort by dropping several hundred thousand leaflets each week and flying 
loudspeaker teams on numerous broadcasting missions. In the latter part 
of October, effort in the Due Fho area has concentrated on the "CHIEU HOI” 
program, 

3* (C) Operations and Training: 

a. Plans 

(1) Contingency plans for air and sea movement were pre¬ 
pared, 

(2) Continuous planning and coordination were accomplished 
with ground commanders in preparation for oonduct of operations outlined 
below, 

b. Operations 


4 

1 CONFIDENTIAL 


CONFIDENTIAL 


AVGD-BC 14 November 1967 

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Poriod 31 October 1967 (RCS-CS 
FOR 65) 

(1) This battalion Was engaged In combat or ooabat sup¬ 
port operations every day of the reported period* 

(2) Aviation companies of the battalion participated In the 
following major operations: 


OPERATION 

SUPPORTED UNIT 

PATHS 

Hood River 

1/101 st Abn Inf Bde 

2 Aug - 13 Aug 

Benton 

1/I01st Abn Inf Bde 

13 Aug - 29 Aug 

Raid 

1/lOlst Abn Inf Bde 

1 Sep 67 

Cook 

1/lOlst Abn Inf Bde 

4 Sep - 9 Sep 

Wheeler 

1/I01st Abn Inf Bde 

11 Sep - Pre¬ 
sent 

Wallowa 

3/lst Air Cavalry Div 

4 Oct - Pre¬ 
sent 

Prairie Eire 

5th Special Forces Group 

1 Aug - Pre¬ 
sent 


(3) In order to give the best possible combat support, units 
of the battalion were disposed as follows: 

AVIATION UNIT UNIT SUPPORTED 


71st Aviation Company Direct support to 196th Light 

Infantry Brigade 

161st Aviation Company General Support to Americal 

Division 

174th Aviation Company Direct support to 3rd Brigade 

4th Infantry Division 

176th Aviation Company Direct support to 1st Brigade 

101st Airborne Infantry Division 

178th Aviation Company Gen oral support to Amerioal 

Division. 

(4) Tho 1 /l 0181 Airborne Infantry Brigade has continued as 


5 

CONFIDENTIAL 


CONFIDENTIAL 


AVGD-BC 14 November 1967 

SUBJECT* Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 October 1967 (RCS-CS 
FOR 65) 

the primary maneuver brigade of the Americal Division, thus the numerous 
major operations involving that unit. All brigades have, however, con¬ 
ducted daily airmobile combat assaults, extractions and resupply. Assault 
missions are normally controlled by a Direct Support company reinforced 
when necessary by the 161st or another Direct Support aviation unit. 

Assaults Involving 13 or more lift ships were normally planned and con¬ 
trolled by the battalion, 

(5) On 10 August ono gunship from the 71st Aviation Company 
and one gunship from the 161st Aviation Company scrambled to the vicinity 
of BS 7578 to assist two Navy Swift Boats that were being fired on. The 
gunships made repeated runs on the enemy position until all ground fire had 
ceased. Only one enemy KBA was confirmed, however friendly forces did not 
move into the area and therefore no body count was made. (It is felt how¬ 
ever that there were many more enemy casualties), 

(6) On 13 August 1967, the Battalion coranitted 52 UH-ID's, 

13 UH-1C (gunships), and 10 CH-47*s to start Operation Benton. This massive 
operation involved moving 2 Infantry Battalions, two artillery batteries 
and support elements for a total of more that 1,500 combat troops. The 
combat assault was oonductod in a morning and afternoon phase, however 
there was no break in pace as indicated by a now Battalion high of 637 
hours flown in one day. Nine aircraft of the Battalion were hit by enemy 
ground fire, however there were no crewmember casualties, 

(7) On 14 August 1967 the 176th Aviation Company (-) with 
direct support elements deployed to the Chu Lai area to facilitate 
support of Operation Benton, The move was completed in two days without 
significant loss in capability. After completion of Operation Benton all 
elements returned to the base camp at Duo Fho, Hie move was completed on 
31 August 1967. 

(8) On 24 August 1967 the 174th Aviation Company lifted 

A Company, 2/3 5th Infantry into an LZ without artillery or gunship pre¬ 
paration, The lift was conducted at first light and apparently caught 
the enemy off guard. The ground unit killed 21, captured several small 
arms, a rocket launcher and a 60mm mortar. Aircraft did not receive fire 
going into the LZ which would further indicate complete surprise. 

(9) On 30 August 1967 the Southern perimeter of Chu Lai was 
subjected to a mertar attack. The attack lasted approximately 15 minutes 
during which time an estimated 40 rounds of 60ram and 82mm mortar shells 
foil inside the perimeter. The l6lst Aviation Company was the only 
battalion unit in the vicinity of the attack and sustained only mihor 
d amag e to the mini-port facility. Several hoses and bladders were cut by 


6 

CONFIDENTIAL 



CONFIDFNTIAL 


\ 

AVGD-BC 14 November 1967 

SUBJECT: Operational Roport for Quartorly Period 31 Ootobor 1967 (RCS-CS 
FOR 65) 

shrapnel and had to be replaced. 

(10) On 6 September 1967 the Battalion conducted a major 
assault ail .lifting elements of the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry. The 
assault forces of two (2) companies and one (l) company (-) wore in¬ 
serted into throe LZ's simultaneously. A total of 38 UH-1D*s and 2 
CH-47’3 were used as combat troop carriers. Ten gunships provided all 
preparation and suppressive fires. No artillery preparation was used to 
achieve nwnriimm surprise. The operation was extremely well executed and 
all troops were landed at H Hour, Only one aircraft reported receiving 
light sniper fire. 

(11) On 9 September 1967 the 176th Aviation Company and all 
supporting units began movement to a now location at Ky Ha in the Ghu Ini 
area. The move was completed on 15 September utilizing organic air com¬ 
bined with a road march of unit vehicles. The 176th provided continuous 
aviation support throughout the period in spite of the maintenance and 
operational problems created by such a move. 

(12) On 12 September the Battalion committed 36 UH-ID’s, 6 
CH-47*s, 10 gunships, 2 wreckers and 1 smoke ship to support the 2d day of 
Operation Wheeler, Two battalions of infantry and two artillery batterios 
from the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division were airlifted into mul¬ 
tiple landing zones. The first LZ was mined and in spite of a heavy prep 
by TAG Air using Daisy Cutters, and both 105 and 155 Artillery, a. mine was 
detonated while the 5th "V" of 3 was on the ground. Several casualties 
were sustained as a result of the first detonation and more were sustained 
when a 2d mine was exploded by crewmen and infantry men hastening to assist 
the already injured. Automatic weapons firo was intense throughout the 
day. A total of nine aircraft were damaged during the first lift and 

had to bo replaced. The immediate response by all companies to provide 
additional aircraft to perform the 2d lift is particularly praiseworthy. 
Battalion statistics for the day include 1,626 troops, 21 6 tons of cargo 
and 317 hours flown, A total of 3 aircraft wore damaged by mines and 
10 hit by ground fire. 

(13) On 23 Soptorabor the Battalion conducted its first 
"People Sniffer" mission utilizing 2 UH-ID's and two gunships for secur¬ 
ity, Since that time this type mission has been conducted more and more 
frequently with varying results. Details of this type mission are dis¬ 
cussed in Part II of this roport, 

(14) On 29 September 1967, this battalion was called upon 
to provide gunship closo air support, roaction force lift ships, and 
flareships to units of the 101st Airborne Division who wore engaged in 
heavy fight-W. During the first encounter 2 UH-ID’s ware shot down 
while attempting to porfona fatidical avdcua^ionc. Subsequently a < - 

7 

CONFIDENTIAL ! 





CONFIDENTIAL [ 


AVOMC 14 November 1967 

SUBJECT* Operational Report for Qucrtorly Period 31 Octobor 1967 (RCS-CS 
FOR 65) 

gunahip providing oovor was downed and 3 more aircraft wore shot down 
while inserting a lift force into the immediate area. An aircraft 
operating in the area were subjected to continuous heavy automatic 
weapons fire* Tactical air and gunahip support were provided until 
darkness and weather proven tod further assistance. Since the area was 
still insocuro and recovery Was impossible those aircraft still on the 
ground ware destroyed in place* In final tabulation for the day, the 
battalion had 22 aircraft hit, 3 UH-ID’s and 1 UH-1B destroyed, 8 pilots 
wounded and 1 crew chief frilled in action. This was the worst day ever 
suffered by the battalion* 

(15) On 8 October 1967 a tropical storm passed near the Chu 
Lai area \riijh hoavy rain and high winds. Nearly all operations were eon- 
cellod for that day* 

(16) Throughout this quarter, units of the 14th Battalion 
have been called upon to perform many typos of missions, day and night 
In good weather and bad* In all oasos the challenge was met In an out¬ 
standing manner and many kudos received from supported ground units. 

(17) During the quarter the 14th Aviation Battalion accom¬ 
plished the following: 



AUGUST 

SEPTEMBER.- 

OCTOBER 

TOTAL 

Hours 

11,617 

10,825 

10,894 

33,336 

Troops 

61,496 

61,410 

63,530 

186,436 

Cargo Tons 

7,323 

8,281 

9,492 

25,096 

Sorties 

46,097 

43,284 

44,507 

133,888 

Med Evncs 

129 

117 

139 

385 

VC KBA (Conf) 

97 

81 

65 

243 

Structures Destroyed 

363 

399 

549 

1,311 

Sampans Destroyed 


7 

25 

32 

Ammunition Expended: 
7.62m 1 

,005,260 

1,440,365 

1,150,903 

3,596,528 

40m 

18,075 

21,299 

26,355 

65,729 

2,75” rockets 

7,306 

9,728 

7,404 

24,438 


8 


CONFIDENTIAL 



CONFIDENTIAL L 


AVGD-BC 14 Norenber 1967 

SUBJECTS Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 October 1967 (RCS-CS 
FOR 65) 

Companies flew a total of 838 hours at night performing insertions, 
extractions, medical evacuation, resupply and armed helioopter missions* 

The 178th Assault Support Helicopter Company evacuated 34 UH-ID's, 

2 UIMB's, 2 UB-IC's, 9 OH-23*8, 1 OH-13 and 1 0-1 during this three 
month period* 

c* Training 

(1) The battalion prepared a program of instruction to be 
presented to the 198th light Infantry Brigade and its subordinate units as 
a part of that Brigade's in country orientation and training in the plan¬ 
ning for ami utilization of available aviation support. Instruction was 
presented on the 21st, 24th, 25th and 27th of October* Training subjects 
included battalion levol lift planning, small unit lift planning, re¬ 
supply operations with tho UH-1D, gun ship employment and CH-47 utilisation 
and planning j 


(2) All units conducted protective mask training requiring 
all air crew, members to perform in flight duties while veering their 
individual protective mask* A minimum of 30 minutes flying time and two 
approaches are to be completed each month. 

(3) A mobile training team from the 178th Aviation Com¬ 
pany visited numerous ground units of the America 1 Division to assist 
using units in planning for and utilising the CB-47. Particular emphasis 
was placed on rigging techniques for external loads* 

(4) All UH-1 companies conducted "Firefly* training to 
Insure that sufficient personnel were trained to provide this capability 
within each unit* 

(5) All units conducted familiarisation firing of individual 
and crew served weapons* 

(6) The battalion continued to utilize jjjaxiraum quotas for 
AAMTAP courses* Because of a shortage of maintenance officers, several 
Warrant Officer quotas were also requested* 

(7) Training of replacement crew members continued to re¬ 
quire an extensive Q2TT program for gunners and crew chief and a closely 
coordinated standardization program for new aviators* 

(8) During tlds reporting period the 174th Aviation Com¬ 
pany has conducted training classes for the NCO Academy of the 3rd Brigade 
4th Infantry Division* Tho classes were pivon on the optimum utilization 


i 


9 . 

* 

CONFIDENTIAL 



< CONFIDENTIAL 


AVGD-BC 14 November 1967 

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 October 1967 (RCS-CS 
FOR 65) 

of aircraft to include UH~1D f s and gunships in support of ground units* 
The classes received much praise, and consequently they wero presented to 
elements of the 198th light Infantry Brigade during the last week of 
October, 


4* (C) Logistics 


a* General: During the reporting period all areas of logistical 
Support were adequate except vehicular support* Vehicle ports and lubri¬ 
cants are in short supply causing some equipment to become deadlined and 
the situation has not improved* 

b. Class I - No significant events or problems. 

c. Class n and IV: No significant problems encountered during 
the quarter. On 15 September 1967 cargo sling equipment was obtained from 
the 221 st depot and reissued to units of the 196th light Infantry Bri¬ 
gade and lOjst Airborne in support logistical projects. Also during the 
quarter 4 each trucks, forklift were obtained through personal liaison 
from Cam Ranh Depot for all units except 71st Aviation Company. 

d. Class III: 

(l) 1-13 August 1967 : Operation Hood River - The permanent 

JP4 refuel area at Quang Ngai with seven (7) permanent points were 
utilised using one (1) 350 GPM and four (4) 10.000 gallon bladders from 
the Karines in support of large lifts. Six (6) POL tankers from Chu Iai 
were sent over the road to provide increased refuel capabilities. Add¬ 
itional hoses were added to the tankers so that refueling could be accom¬ 
pli shod with engines running, 

(2) IZ^-15 August 1967 : A coordinated move by the 176th 

Assault Helicopter Company from Due Pho to Chu Lai was completed util¬ 
izing the units organic transportation, The base camp remained at Due 
Pho and temporary facilities wero arranged for the unit at MG 36 area, 

Ky Ha, 


(3) 15 August 1967 : Operation Benton - Refueling facilities 
at Quang Ngii relocated at Tam Ky on 14 - 15 August 1967, Four (4) 

10,000 gallon bladders were hapd receipted from the Marines and moved to 
Tam Ky, Tho Marines already had six (6) JP4 refuel points in operation 
and they were used. In addition to the seven (7) refuel points operated 
by the Marines and tho 6even (7) refuel points setup by the 14th Battalion 
eight (?; POL tankers were used at the site to support the initial inser¬ 
tion of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division in that encounter. 


10 

< CONFIDENTIAL 



CONFIDENTIAL 


AVCHW3C 14 November 1967 

SUBJECT* Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 October 1967 (RCS-CS 
FOR 65) 

(4) 30-31 August 1967 * 176th Aviation Company during 
this period was spaced back to Duo Pho using organic air and surface 
transportation. One (1) 1ST supported the move to Chu Lai and one (l) 

1ST supported the move back to Duo Pho, to support the 1st Brigade, 

101st Airborne Division who went into an AO Vest of Quang Ngal, The 
Tam Ky JP4 refuel capability minus the Marine JF4 permanent refuel 
point was reestablished as Quang Ngai and this facility plus Gallager 
Beach facility wan utilized to support the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne 
Division until on or about 9 September 1967. 

(5) 31 August 1967 s Operation Raid - The JP4 refuel point 
at Quang Ngai was propositioned at Ha Thanh in support of this oper¬ 
ation. An eight (8) point refueling area utilizing 100 GPM pumps suj>- 
plying 30,000 gallons of JF4 from 500 gallon bladders. Gunship amm¬ 
unition was also prapositionod by air at Ha Thanh. 

(6) 9 Sept e mber 19671 The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne 
Division was lifted from Quang Ngai to Chu Lai in preparation for 
Operation Wheeler. JP4 refuel facilities from Quang Ngai was once 
again relocated to Tam Ky during the period 9-12. September 1967 

to support Operation Wheeler. The operation began 13 September 
1967 and 23 JP4 refuel points to include the Marines permanent points. 
Army Support Command points and POL Tankers from the 14th Aviation 
Battalion were setup to provide mi.n1.mum turn around time for a two 
battalion insertion. In addition a JP4 refuel point was setup at Tien 
Phouc and Gallager Be^oh facilities were closed, A separate rearm 
point was set up on the Tam Ky sod strip that would allow 4 guns to 
rearm at any given time, 

e. Class V - No significant events or problem. 

f. Base Development: 

(1) Chu Iai area: A request for construction of a chapel 
for the 14th Aviation Battalion was submitted on 8 September 1967 and 
was finally returned on 14 October 1967 disapproved. Sheet tin was 
ordered and received from depot during tho quarter for all units except 
the 176th to cover remaining administrative buildings, existing struc¬ 
tures and enlisted billets. 

(2) The aircraft revetment program for all units except 
the 176th Aviation Company was completed on 1 September 1967. Amer- 
ical Division, eocenpted the 176th from this requirement, due to in¬ 
stability of unit. 

(3) During the 1st of October a drainage problem was 

11 


CONFIDENTIAL 


CONFIDENTIAL 



AVGD-BC 14 November 1967 

SUBJECT* Operational Roport for Quarterly Period 31 October 1967 (RCS-CS 
FOR 65) 

encountered in the 161st Aviation Company moss hall. This problem 
occurred during a seasonal storm and was eliminated without any 

AsmdvtjrtiflfflirjLL to jjpioscBgatAl. 

(4) Duo Pm area: Dio 174th Aviation Company completed 
construction of a now mail hall and have moved from tents with dirt 
floors to tents with wooden floors* The new tents have been constructed 
with steel plates atop the frames end the plates then covered with sand¬ 
bags* This type construction affords considerable protection from in¬ 
coming mortar rounds* 

g. Maint e-ncnr^ 

(1) The flow of vehicle repair parts during this period 
has ftlewed to a marked degrees Doadlino rates continue to increase 
despite major efforts in the vehicle maintenance field* The 188th 
Maintenance Battalion has reported that despite efforts to expedite 
repair parts from depot, fringe items and some PLL items simply do not 
appear to be available* Even "Red Ball" requisitions frequently fail 
to obtain parts within a thirty day period. 

(2) The rapid turnover of qualified maintenance personnel 
has been significant during this quarter. Input has been largely com¬ 
posed of inexperienced, though school-trained, specialists* Some senior 
NCO f s that have been received have had no maintenance experience other 
than schooling. Two very significant areas in which extreme shortages 
sadist are motor maintenance and armament repairmen* Minor personnel 
shortages and low skill levels are evident in all maintenance MQS fields* 

(3) During a period of exceptionally rainy weather in 
October the lack of hangar space hindered maintenance efforts* No 
hangar facilities exist for CH-47 airoraft and it is anticipated that 
the problem will intensify in the upcoming monsoon season. 

(4) Despite many combat damaged aircraft during this 
period, maintenance reaction has been excellent. Aircraft repair 
parts continued to flow well but transportation difficulties from Saigon 
Sometimes delayed shipments of EDP parts fox several days, 

(5) Aircraft availability during this quarter was as 


follows: 

UH-1D 

UH-1B/C (Armed) 

C&4Z 

August 

85* 

81* 

73* 


4b 

12 




CONFIDENTIAL 




CONFIDENTIAL 


AVGD-BC 14 November 1967 

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quartorly Period 31 October 1967 (RCS-CS 
FOR 65) 



m=in 

HH-1B/C (Armed) 


September 

85* 

80* 

66% 

October 

82* 

80* 

75% 

quarter was 

(6) Aircraft mission ready, availability during 
as follows: 


item. 

UH-1B/C (Armed) 

CH-A7 

August 

77* 

61* 

58% 

September 

m 

67* 

55% 

October 

m 

64* 

59% 


5 , (C) Civil Affairs: 

a* During this period unit! of the Battalion have continued 
to hniil many tons of rice and salt from field locations to storage 
areas from which it is later distributed to refugees throughout the 
Americal AO, 

b. Hundreds of refugees have been moved from major contact 
Areas to refugee centers, 

c. Battalion units, particularly the 174th Aviation Company in 
the Due Pho area, have donated soap and candy to orphanages and, when 
possible, building materials and tools to assist in the construction 

of refugee centers, 

d. Battalion doctors participated in the MEDCAP program in 
conjunction with Amarical Division ground units. This program has be¬ 
come particularly active during recent weeks, 

6. (C) Personnel 

a. The following is an analysis of the battalion strength 
for the quarter. 


AUTHORIZED 
1 Aug 67 1,659 


CONSOLIDATED BATTALION STRENGTH 

ASSIGNED OVER/SKORI 

1,278 -381 


13 




iNFIPENTIAL 



- CONFIDENTIAL 


AVGD-BC 14 November 1967 

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 October 1967 (RCS-CS 
FOR 65) 


CONSOLIDATED BATTALION STRENGTH 


AUTHORIZED 


ASSIGNED 

OVER/SHORT 

31 Oct 67 1,659 


1,130 

-529 


The following is a breakdown of the authorized and assignod rated 
and non-ratod personnel during the quarter. 



RATED 



NON-RATED 



AUTH 



AUTH 

ACT 


OFF 

WO 

OFF 

WO 

OFF 

WO 

OFF WO 

1 Aug 67 

92 

241 

96 

183 

4 

4 

6 4 

31 Oct 67 92 

241 

72 

192 

4 

4 

7 3 

b. The following is a listing of critical MOS shortages 
that have eodsted as of 31 October 1967. 

MOS 





AUTHORIZED 


ACTUAL 

35K 





19 


13 

35M 





4 


2 

36K 





14 


8 

45J 





16 


7 

63C 





24 


22 

67A 





74 


21 

68A 





16 


3 

68B 





31 


26 

68D. 





>0 


'4 

68G 





30 


26 

7. 

(c) 

Other 






14 


CONFIDENTIAL 





' CONFIDENTIAL , 


AVGD-BC 14 November 1967 

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 October 1967 (RCS-CS 
FOR 65) 

a. Aviation Safety 

(1) During the period of this report the battalion ex¬ 
perienced nine (9) major Army Aircraft accidents involving helicopters. 
Four (4) of the accidents were a result of pilot error, one (l) re¬ 
sulted from adverse weather and three (3) due to engine failure. 

(2) One (1) of the eight (8) helicopters suffered re¬ 
pairable damage and seven (7) were total losses. 

(3) One (l) fatality occurred as a result of aircraft 

accidents. 

(4) For the raporting period the battalion flow 33,336 
hours compared to 29,268 hours for the previous quarter. This rep¬ 
resents a deviation of + 13.8$. An accident rate of 23.8 per 100,000 
flying hours was accrued compared to 30.2 for the previously reported 
period, a deviation of - 23.7/6. 


Section II Commander^ Observations and Recommendations Part I, Ob¬ 
servations (Lessons Learned). 

1 • (C) Personnel 1J 

Item : Shortage of CH-47 aviators. 

Discussion : She 178th has been operating with as few as 55% 
of assigned aviators and at present has only about 7156 assigned. 

Observation As of September 196? there are 14 CH-47 com¬ 
panies assigned to USARV. To maintain a 90% strength level would . 
require a minimum of 476 replacements each year not including staff 
officer requirements at the various levels of command. Present pilot 
output from transition courses is not adequate and does not consider 
the authorized grade stricture of the TO&E. 

2. (C) Operations 

s*- 

a. Item : Misutilization of CH-47 helicopters. 

Discussion i Units continue to request and. receive CH-47 
aircraft to support lift requirements that could be accomplished by. 
fixed wing aircraft or be moved all or part of the way by road convoy. 
In addition too much cargo is still being carried internally when in 


CONFIDENTIAL 




CONFIDENTIAL 


AVGD-BC 14 November 1967 

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 October 1967 (HCS-CS 
FOR 65) 

cases it vould be feasible to rig for external lift. 

Observation : Better utilisation of the CH-47 could be 
achieved by emphasis on advanoe planning. Too often it appears that 
units request CH-47 support because it is more convenient and requires 
less effort than obtaining other modes of transport. Sling equipment 
is generally available and aviation personnel are ready and willing 
to assist ground units in learning external rigging techniques. 

b. Item : People sniffer missions. 

Discussion: The "people sniffer" mission is a new concept 
that was first tried on 23 September. The purpose of this mission is 
to detect the presence of personnel on the ground regardless of oover 
or concealment. Through a chemical process, airborne equipment senses 
ammonia present in the area and provides a reading to the observer. 

Since orientals give off a relatively high ammonia odor, the machine 
will normally register a positive reading even for a very few persons. 

The "sniffer" ship reports all concentrations by calling "Hot Spot". 

A second UH-1D flying chase at altitude records the spot for later 
reference. Two gunships fly cover and render suppressive fire as re¬ 
quired. 


Observation : For best results one UH-1D with the sniffer 
equipment must fly at low level and one UH-1D must be at altitude to 
observe and record exact locations of hot spots. The low level air¬ 
craft is necessarily exposed to hostile fire, however exposure can be 
minimizadTjy a well planned area reconnaissance. Care should be taken 
to insure that the aircraft does not pass over an area or terrain 
feature more than once. When several hot spots have boen located in 
a particular area there is no need to oontinue looking for more. 

Close coordination between the "sniffer" and chase is required to 
insure the reconnaissance is flown according to plan. Emergency pro¬ 
cedures in the event hostile fire is received must be emphasized. 

o« Item : "Firefly" Operations 

Discussion : Some units have requested "Firefly" missions 
in mountainous terrain. The majority of these missions have been 
unsuccessful. 

Observation: Firefly missions are intended for and are 
most successful over flat terrain with waterway systems. Use in the 
mountains is impractical because the lights have insufficient range, 
navigation is difficult, increased engagement range results in low 
target destruction capability, ta r g o t density is low, 

16 

CONFIDENTIAL 




CONFIDENTIAL 


AVGO.BC 14 November 196? 

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period SI October 1967 (RCS-CS 
FOR 65) 

and aircraft are unable to maneuver adequately. The results do not 
justify the hazards and special problems encountered. 

d. . Item : Air delivered ordnance for Landing Zone preparation. 

Discussion : The experience of subordinate elements of 
this headquarters indicated that the use of high explosive bombs with 
extension fuses, (Daisy Gutters) has given the best results on landing 
zones that are suspected of being mined, booby-trapped or rigged with \ 
helicopter traps. If approach and departure routes can be predeter¬ 
mined, it is also desirable to prepare these and the likely trouble 
spots with Daisy Cutters. The use of heavy ordnance on ridgeline 
landing zones is also desirable. The cratering effeot of 500 pound 
bombs (or heavier) makes an ideal touchdown point for helicopters and 
eliminates hazards of boobytraps and mines. If the landing zone is 
suspected or known to have reinforced bunkers in or near it, the use 
of delayed fuse bombs can be very effective. The delay feature allows 
the bomb to bury itself from 10 - 20 feet in the soft earth prior to 
detonating. This normally has a devastating effect on underground 
tunnels and bunkers, collapsing most of them. The use of napalm has 
good effects on bunkers and built-up areas but should be used with 
discretion on areas that ore dry and covered with heavy grass or fol¬ 
iage. If used in these areas it must be used very early in the prep¬ 
aration. This will allow time for any fires to burn out prior to 
troop insertion. The use of Cluster Bomb Units (CBO) during landing 
zone preparation should be avoided. Although it is effective ordnance 
against personnel and other targets, there are often unexplodod boob- 
lets lett on the ground, which the enemy quickly converts into booby- 
traps for use against our forces. 

Observation : Numerous types of air delivered ordnance is 
available for XZ preparation, . Choice of a particular type (e) 
ordnance must be determined for each LZ, 

< . 

e. Item : Selection of staging areas. 

Discussion : Selection of the staging area for a oombat 
assault can directly affect the ability of a unit to reinforce an . 
Initial element that is subjected to immediate- enemy contact. The 
lift force must complete a turn-around to the FZ before additional 
troops can be brought In to reinforce. 

Observation : Staging areas must be selected as olose to 
the assault objective as possible. Turn around time in excess of 1 
hour may be tactically unsound. 


17 

; CONFIDENTIAL 




CONFIDENTIAL 


AVGD.BC 14 November 1967 

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 October 1967 ^RGS-CS 
FOR 65) 

f• Item: Coordination between rigging and evacuation crews 
when recovering downed aircraft. 

Discussion : On several occasions a maintenance crew has 
responded to a call to evaluate and rig a downed aircraft for aerial 
recovery by CH-47 and than have had to wait in excess of an hour for 
the CH-47. In all cases radio contact was maintained with an air bo mo 
coordinator to keep him informed of the progress of the rigging crew. 

Observation : 3he exposure of a rigging crew and aircraft 
for, excessive time in a known hostile environment is a needless risk. 
Positive coordination should be made between the rigging crew and the 
crew of the evacuation aircraft or through a third party to insure that 
the evacuation aircraft con closely follow the rigging team into the 
recovery site. 


g. Item : Inspection of rigging on disabled aircraft prior 
to evacuation by CH-^47. 

Discussion : During this reporting period two UH-1 ’s 
were dropped because of improper rigging or unserviceable sling equip¬ 
ment. 


Observation : When the situation permits the pilot should 
personally inspect the disabled aircraft. Hie controls must be locked, 
rotor blados tied down, rigging equipment serviceable and properly fas¬ 
tened, and two doughnuts used. 

h. Item : Debris in the pick-up zone. 

Discussion : Discarded packing and crating material strewn 
about the PZ creates a hazard to both the people working in the area 
and to the helicopter. Winds generated by a CH-47 reach gale force and 
objects carelessly placed become deadly missiles. Tor papor, steel 
bands, etc have been injeBted into aircraft engines necessitating a 
costly engine change. Flying debris has also caused damage to rotor 
blades. 


Observation: Police of piok-up zones requires continuous 
command emphasis to preclude injury to personnel and unnoccessary air¬ 
craft maintenance. 

i. Item: Investigation of ground to air hostile firo by 
ground units. 

Discussion : Ground tc air hostile fire could be ovidonce 

18 . 

CONFIDENTIAL 



CONFIDENTIAL 


AVGIM3C 14 November 1967 

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 October 1967 (RCS-CS 
FOR 65) 

of a large concentration of enemy troops* On at least one occasion, 
investigation of such on incident resulted in a VC Company being com¬ 
pletely wiped out* 

Observation : Ground to air fire incidents should be Inves¬ 
tigated whenever possible* 

j. Item : Hazards to flight* 

Discussion : Aircraft flying through some tactical AO's 
ore required to contact each firing battery on on Individual basis to 
ascertain hazards* At times this necessitates changing frequencies 
as many as five times in a relatively short period of time. Excessive 
time spent tuning radios adds to the hazards by detracting from the 
pilots capability to watch for other aircraft. 

Observation : An artillery advisory service with centralized 
control within well defined geographical areas would bo of great 
benefit* The system presently in use in the III Corps area is a good 
example. 


k* Item s Mined LZ's. 

Discussion : On 12 September 1967 a minod LZ was encoun¬ 
tered while conducting a combat assault during Operation Wheeler, In 
spite of a heavy prep by TAC Air .using Daisy Cutters and both 105mm 
and 155mm Artillery, a mine was exploded while the 5th "V" of 3 was 
on the ground. Crewmembers of other aircraft and infantry troops 
rushed to the aid of the injured and set off a second mine* The result 
was confusion and congestion in the LZ and caused a delay of the follow- 
on flights. In addition several personnel became unnecessary casualties. 

Observation : Detonation of one mino in an LZ is evidence 
that others are present. All aircraft must unload and depart the LZ as 
rapidly as possible to permit a continuation of the mission. Injured 
personnel can be treated by personnel already on the ground and evac¬ 
uated by dustoff or other aircraft when possible, without interfering with 
the mission. 

1. Item : UH-1 Utilization; 

Discussion : Although the situation has greatly improved 
during this reporting period, it is still found that when aircraft re¬ 
port for a mission such as resupply, they are often poorly used. In 
some instances resupply aircraft have been utilized for missions which 
should have been accomplished by the Command and Control aircraft. Also 

19 

CONFIDENTIAL 



_ 





CONFIDENTIAL 1 


AVGD-BC 14 November 1967 

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 Ootober 1967 (RCS-GS 
FOR 65) 

an several oeoasions resupply aircraft have taken several separate 
small loads to different locations which could have been combined into 
a larger load. 

Observation i Aircraft Commanders should be quick to assist 
supported units in the matters of aircraft utilization, advisory on the 
possible uses of the aircraft, consolidating loads and generally "ed¬ 
ucating" the ground units. 

3. (C) Training and Organization 

Item : Division Aviation Officer 

Discussion : As stated in FM 1-15, dated February 1967, the 
Commander of the Division Aviation Battalion is assigned the additional 
duty of Division Aviation Officer, In this capacity he is responsible 
for advising the Division Commander and staff on the technical asp¬ 
ects of aviation and the employment of elements of the battalion. He 
maintains liaison with aviation representatives and staff officers of 
higher and lower headquarters and with adjacent units. He prepares the 
aviation training program for the division and provides technical super¬ 
vision of aviation training within the division. He further superb- 
vises the tactical employment of aviation elements assigned or attached 
to the division. Normally, the Assistant Division Aviation Officer is 
located at the Division Tactical Operations Center (DTOC) and is the 
principle representative of and responsible to the Division Aviation 
Officer on the division special staff. In addition he is usually res¬ 
ponsible for supervising the Army Aviation Element (AAE) of the DTOC for 
the Division Aviation Officer. The above dootrino, both time tested 
and battle worn, continues to be an effective solution In Vietnam today. 

Observation : This Battalion submitted a formal request to 
the Commending General, Americal Division, that the Division be organ¬ 
ized with the Commandihg Officer, 14th Aviation Battalion as the Div¬ 
ision Aviation Officer independent of all aviation units. This decision 
was based on the uniqueness of the newly formed Americal Division 
which includes two formerly separate brigades with organic aviation 
sections. A Division Artillery Aviation Section is also attached to the 
divisioh. Although the 14th CAB provides the bulk of the aviation sup¬ 
port to the division and there is no Divisional Aviation Battalion 
per se, it was deemed essential to have a Division Aviation Officer 
not a part of any unit, who was solely a special staff officer. 

This also was to free the Aviation Battalion Commander of those strictly 
administrative duties performed by the DAO, The Battalion then asked 
for permission to provide a Liaison Officer to the Division to effect 
coordination for all activities pertaining to the assets of the 14th 

20 

CONFIDENTIAL 


y 



CONFIDENTIAL 1 

AVGD-BC 

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 
FOR 65) 

Aviation Battalion and any other 17th Aviation Group 
the Division, This proposal was aocepted and at the 
liaison officer and two members of the Amy Aviation 
provided, 

4* (U) Intelligence: None, 

5, (C) Logistics 

a. Item : Fuel contamination by monsoon flooding. 

Discussion : After a recent exceptionally heavy rain, some 
bladder type fueling points located in areas with poor drainage, were 
found to be seriously contaminated by water. This discovery was made 
after quite a number of aircraft had been fueled from the contaminated 
bladders. 


14 November 1967 
Ootobor 1967 (RCS-CS 


elements supporting 
present time a 
Element are being 


Observation : Fuel bladders should be located In areas 
with adequate drainage. During the monsoon season and especially after 
an unusually heavy rain, fuel samples should be taken from all bladders 
and inspected for water prior to refueling any aircraft* 

b. Item: Fuel Identification 

Discussion : On at least one occasion recently a UH-1 air¬ 
craft refueled at a field site from a 5,000 gallon bladder which did 
not contain JP4, An investigation revealed that the bladder contained 
115-145 aviation fuel for piston engine aircraft operating in the area. 
It was not marked in any manner and was located in the proximity to 
other bladders which did oontain JP4, 

Observation : All fuel bladders and/or their associated 
nozzles should be clearly marked as to type fuel. Though it is the 
responsibility of personnel refueling aircraft to visually check all 
fuel before placing it in the fuel tank, such markings would serve os 
an additional precaution, 

c. Item : Unserviceable rigging equipment and improperly 
rigged loads. 


Discussion : This item.continues to be a problem area 
within many of the units supported by the 178th Assault Support Hel¬ 
icopter Company. During the reporting period fivo (5) external loads 
were lost as a result of faulty rigging equipment and one (l) because 
it was improperly rigged. 


21 

CONFIDENTIAL 




CONFIDENTIAL L 

AVG&-BC 14 November 1967 

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 October 1967 (RCS-CS 
FOR 65) 

Observation : User units are not properly maintaining the 
rigging equipment designed for externally carried loads. This equip¬ 
ment requires proper care, cleaning and, above all, frequent inspections. 
Oil soakod, frayed or friction burned slings should not be used when 
air transporting supplies. The art of rigging, although not complicated 
is best accomplished when a few basic principles are adhered to. Tech¬ 
nical assistance can be obtained by requesting liaison visits or by moans 
of a mobile training team which is available. 


Part II, Recommendations: 

1. (U) Personnel: None. 

2. (0) Operations: 

Reference: Section II, Part I, paragraph 2a. 

Recommendations: That all units carefully consider the var¬ 

ious modes available to accomplish a transportation requirement and 
seloct the mode that is best suited to that requirement. The 178th 
Assault Support Helicopter Company has organized a mobile training 
team for the specific purpose of assisting ground units in load planning 
and rigging techniques. All units should make regular use of this 
team to insure the best utilization of CH-47 aircraft. 

3* (U) Training and Organization: None. 

4* (U) Intelligence: None. 

5. (C) Logistics: 

Reference: Section II, Part I, paragraph 5c. 

Recommendation: That all units establish inspection and 
storage criteria for rigging equipment to insure availability and 
serviceability. Technical assistance nay bo obtained from aviation 
personnel of the 178th Assault Sy^portyHelicopter^JcjMjjany. 

/ 



•CARROLL v. 
LTC, Armor 
Commanding 


CONFIDENTIAL 




f 


CONHDEMIUL 

AVDF-GC (18 Nov 67) 1st Ind 

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (KCS-CSFOR-65)(U) 

Da, Hq, America! Division, aPO San Francisco 96374 4 

Tut Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO San 
Francisco 96375 

1. (U) Forwarded herewith is subject report of the 14th Combat 
Aviation Battalion. 

2. (C) The following comments are considered pertinant to the 
referenced paragraph of the basic communication. 

a. Reference: Section I, para l.a.(1), pg 1. This head¬ 
quarters was activated as HHC, Americal Division effective 25 Sep¬ 
tember 1967. 


b. Reference: Section II, part 1, para 2.j., pg 20. A 
centralized system of artillery advisories for aircraft is now in 
effect. 

3* (U) This headquarters concurs with the observations and 
comments contained in subject report. 


FOR THE COMMANDER: 



r- --.Z- l.r 

’UTO KAWABAfiX 
C~?t. ACC 

hir ' 1 Mutant CeneraT 


CONFIDENTIAL 


DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS 
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS 
DOD DIR 5200.10 




CONFIDENTIAL 


AVHGC-UST (14 Nov 67) 2d Ind (C) 

SUBJECT* Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 
(RCS-CS FOR 65) 

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARKY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 26 JAN1968 

TO* Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT. 

APO 96558 

1* (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons 

Learned for the Quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 from Headquarters, 

14th Combat Aviation Battalion (AX2A) as indorsed, 

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow* 

a. Reference item concerning personnel, critical MOS shortages, 
page 14, paragraph 6b: Concur. The shortage of MDS's is command wide; 
therefore, the 14th Combat Aviation Battalion has their proportionate share 
of these MOS shortages. The 1st Aviation Brigade is over strength in MOS 
35M. That headquarters has been directed to reassign two MOS 35M personnel 
to the 14th Combat Aviation Battalion. 

b. Reference item concerning personnel CH-47 aviators, page 15, 
paragraph 1* Concur. The redistribution of CH-47 aviators by the 17th Avi¬ 
ation Group duri ng early November provided a more equitable distribution of 
available aviator assets. In the near future, the Falcon Group will be act¬ 
ivated; one of its subordinate uni ts will be the 14th Combat Aviation Battalion. 
The activation of this group is expected to enhance aviator personnel replace¬ 
ment support in the I CTZ. 

c. Reference item concerning hazards to flight, page 19, paragraph 
j; and 2d Indorsement: Concur. HQ MACV is presently vorkipg on a directive 
to establish Artillery warning control centers in Vietnam. The III Corps 
system is being used as a model. 

d. Reference item concerning unserviceable rigging eauipment, page 
21, paragraph 5c: Concur. The supporting aviation unit provides technical 
assistance to the supported unit. This includes assistance in preparing the 
load for rigging, assuring that the load is properly rigged and inspection 
of the load prior to pickup by the helicopter. Elimination of sling load ac¬ 
cidents can best be accomplished by the supporting unit through an aggressive 
liaison program to the supported units. 


Downgraded at S year Intervals 
25 Declassified after 12 years 
DOD DIR 5200.10 


CONBDfcN'NM. 

AVHGC-DST (14 Nov 67) 2d Ind (C) 

SUBJECT* Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 
(RCS-CS FOR 65) 

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting 

unit through channels. 

FOR THE COMMANDER* 

C. S. NARATSUKASA 
Captain, A3C 

Assistant Adjutant General 


Copy Furnished* 

HQ, 14th CAB 
HQ, Americal Wv 



1 ~ 



GP0P-DT(14 Nov 67) 3d Ind (U) 

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period 
Ending 31 Oct 67 from Hq, 14th Combat Avn Bn 
(UIC: WAX2AA) (RCS CSFOR-65) 

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 2 7 FEB 1968 

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff For Force Development, 
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310 

This headquarters has evaluated subject report 
and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report 
as indorsed. 

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF: 




K. F. OSBOURN 
MAJ, AGO 
Asst AG 


27 



DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA ■ R & D 

(SecurUy cItmulticnUon of tltlo, body of mbttrmct nnrf Imicxlnt) nnttotntlon munt be or *[ v ^^ w ^ ,r,n dfP ^vvrolt^rport^l^cJ^ij^JJJod^ 


1 ORIGIN A TINO A C Tl VI TV (Corpoff author) 


OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310 


U«. REPORT 1ECURIT 

Confidential 


V CL AISIFIC A TION 


ib. CROUP 


-4 


J. REPORT TITLE 


Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 14th Combat Aviation Battalion 


4. descriptive NOTE* (Typm ot report end Inclusive deles) 

Experiences of un it encaged in count erinsurgency operations. 1 Aug - 31 Oct 1967 

*. authorisi (First neme, middle Inlllul, leel name) 


CO, 14th Combat Aviation Battalion 


« REPORT OATE 

7m. TOTAL NO. OR PAGES 

Tb. NO. or REF* 

14 November 1967 

28 


•a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO. 

•«. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER'S! 

be PROJECT NO. 

N /A 

674058 


•t. OTHER REPORT NOISI (Any other numbers that may be assigned 
this report) 

d. 

-a,--- 



to. distribution »tatiment 


II. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 

N/A 


IS. ABSTRACT 


12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY 

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310 




DD 


"“..1473 


UNCI ASSIFIED 


♦ v I ’1 .**•*;« 11