Skip to main content

Full text of "DTIC AD0513372: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: 20th Engineering Brigade, 23 July 1967 - 2 November 1968"

See other formats










Approved for public release; distribution is 
unlimited. Document partially illegible. 


Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't, agencies 
and their contractors; 

Administrative/Operational Use; 30 OCT 1968. 
Other requests shall be referred to Office of 
the Adjutant General (Army ), Washington, DC 
20310. Document partially illegible. 


AGO Itr 11 Jun 1980 ; AGO Itr 11 Jun 1980 




The Classified or limited status of this report applies 
to each page, unless otherwise marked. 

Separate page printouts MOST he marked accordingly. 


NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other 
data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a defi¬ 
nitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government 
thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and 
the fact that Uie Government may have formulated, furnished,, any 
way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not 
to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing 
the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights 
or permission to manufacture, use o.r sell any patented invention that 
may in any way be related thereto. 




CDC fiLE_CO0f AD 513 3 7 2 




Senior Officer Debriefing Report: -^Oth Engineer 
\ Brig«<ie, .■?3 July 19^7 - i November 19^8^' 


APO San Franoiseo 96491 


Dobrlefiag Report tgri 

South yiotim 


. -t 

Brlgadlor Genezil Ourtie/chaiMn \ 

Dut 7 Asaigxiaentt Conmandlng General^ 20th Qiglneor Brigade 

Zikelualre Oaieai 23 July 1967 - 2 Roreuber 1968 

Date of Reporti fpJQ0cimmm66\ (/'^■^ /. , 

1. CF!?KRAt . Beeauae the AR 1-26 dehriefliig aubjeeta (eauaetlre faotora 
of the lasurcenej, local gote ma ent atabilitj aotlona, and the BS role in 
aupport of local gOTemnent> among othera) hare boon treated hy offloora 
eainontly qualified to contribute to thoao important matters, ig^report 
uiU attcnptj^ without benoflt of the Brigade* a ataff e^qperts, to atate pos¬ 
itive, holpful coisaonta resulting Itoa pononal e:q>erionoe in the operational 
enrironaont ahared with the atalwart aoldiers of the 20th ^igineer Brigade. 


2. BACKCROPND ITTFOIfftATION . Zn order to provide perapeotive for what fol- 

iSva, the modtia oporondi of the 20th fiagineer Brigade is auBnarizedt \ 

*• Brip « »«1e« a mission vaa to provide non-diviaional engineer support 
to BS and Fjrae Vorld KUltazy Assistance* Forces in the IZI Corps Taetieal 
Zone (CTZ) (11 provinces of junries, mountains, and paddy land around Saigon) 
and the 17 Corps Taetibal Zom (17 provinces In the Mdcong Delta). Supported 
forces Ineluded the 1st, 9tb, 25th, and 101st BS Divisions, several BS separ^ 
ate brigodos and regiments, the Australian Regiments, the Thai division, ssv^ 
oral AR^ divisions, and a mlltitade of ooabat s i yport and oombat serriee 
support units. 

b. The Prl»mdo*s rosourees consisted of a small brigade headquarters, 
three small group headquarters, four combat battalions, nine oonstruotlon 
battalions, and tventy-nine separate companies and detaohmonts, including 
suoh diverse elements as land elearing teams, port oonstruetion companies, 
voU-driUing dotaefamonts, and ld||^*vo]<tag» power distribution teams. Au¬ 
thorised personnel strength varied troa about 14,250 to 15>5CO Bigineor 
soldiers. A £ev indicators of authorized materiri strong^* DTE or larger 
traetors, 274} 5 ton or larger dunqi trucks, 965} 290M wheeled tractors, 202. 

e. Thn Brlmdo^H f^mctlnn a inoludod exeeutien of directives from Tho 
Enginoor of BS Army Vietnam (BSAB7) and the CO of BS Amy Engineer Construc¬ 
tion Agenqr Vietnam (BSAEGAV) and, on its own authority, response to requests 
frrai ^ siqppor ted for ces, usually validated ty The bi^^oers of CG, ZZ Field 
Forees^ietnam (ZZFfV) or Senior Advisor (Si), ZV CTZ. These direotlves and 

©7* 07" 

4 $ 0 oaS 

/// ! 




DOD DIR 5200.10 



rcqEtostn v^r® in olx priority c.'it''*'5rlc3, ohd Brlc'do rarourcon vor® 
applir'l th''roto ccnipuloucly In tho USA!vV ordor of priority ihovn hor® (to® 
aico Tab A)t 

Priority 1. 
Priority 2. 
Priority 3. 
Priority 4. 
Priority 5. 
Priority 6. 

Conbat support 
Oporation^ mipport 
>llnlnua escontlol roquircrmt® (HER) 
Linos of corrnunication® (LOC) 

Boo® eonstruetion 

RoTolutlonazy dor^opoont topport (ROG) 


*• ‘ Under tho "nomal" ^' 

or traditior^ convontioi^ varfaro conditions for vhieh v® vor® trained ^ ' 
and for vhieh our lOS* b vor® desicnody a taotical unit usually la orientad 
to tho "Aronff tho TE3A, vith relativaly raliabl® flaidclss units and aaeur® 
supply linos and roar areas* Thor® is little comparison botveon this 
oosrontional situation and that ve faced in Yiotnwy especially drsnatlBed 
by th® Tet and subsoquont enc=y offonsivesy vhore the battlefield had a 
350-dejro® eonflcuration» vith obJootiToa throughout th® aroa, vlth no 
secure supply linos* vith no true roar area at all* and vith gorenaontal 
and nllitazy subjurisdiotlons and forcoa thoroughly eosraln^^od vith U3 
forces* This fundcnontal difforonea in conditions of "norsal" Torsus oux^ 
rent Viotsrxoco varfaro required that each coabat* stqpport* and sorfioo 
eersandor adjust hia eono^ta* oparationa* oripaization* personnel* and 
■aterlal to aeah vith tha realitias* unfsoUiar though tl^ varo* ^ 

b* Cr»n<*o pt. To tha stqpporting anglBeor* thora 1 

vore nacy profound Icplieations of those unusual eonditlona* Coabat/opora- 
tional support* nomally rosenred solely for tho taetieal unit eoaaondor* 
vas Justifiably dcaandod by f^ oosrtndors* (because etozy unit vaa at tho 
*front”)* and Bassive quantilies of faeiUtias aiding the (^orations of 
typos of units* espeoihlly for dofonso and porsonnol seourlty* vore required* 
Bocausa of the pauci'fy of Esglnoor troopa as a poreentoge of supported forces 
and of tho qualitatiTS sinilazity of "eustoaor” ncods throughout tha Bricada'a 
torrltozy* vs coneontratod our xeoouroos and nanaged antlrtiiy on an "area" 
eonoept (oinilar to that used in tha nozcal roar area) vith each of the throe 
groups ascignod a carefully doUnoatod portion of the Bzigade area of ro8po»> 
sihiUty (ilCIl)* rathor than direot or gonoral siqpport of the taotical eoszonder 
in vhieh the latter has in effect operational control of hia supporting engin* 
oors (slnllar to that used in tho nozcal forward area)* Our ooneopt may ba 
doseribed oa gonoral aupport of all USAIIY and R!!IAF in tha IZZ azui ZV Corps 
Taotieol Zonos* A mla of tfaizab arolTcd that oaoh division taotical area 
of oporatioss (TAOS) vaa usually adequately aupportod by one eoabat and on# 
construction battalion vhieh could ordlnazlly aeeoucodato the noods of both 
tho dlvloioxul and tho non-divisional troops lodged in the TAQR* Thus* in* 
stead of only the taotical troops having enginoors in direct or gonoral 
support* all of our st^portod tzoops eonatrootivaly rooolTocl this eloso 
^0 of support* Tho CBideycont of this cosmand coneopt* to vhieh Z sub- 
aexlbod AQly* enabled tho Brigade Cocr.indor to adjust his resoureas among 
groups to fulfill the raquizcaonts of all eu::1»cora on a zeaqy* rosponsive* 
flaxlhla basiB* Sly stroauoua adhoronoa to tha JJSHSV priozlly qratea (par 
2o above) end with eoneuzxent close eoozdlaation vith the s up por t ed eosasnders 




I _ ' 

VO voro f.blo to c-’sloy our r^rowrcca clTlclr \tl7 w.l at tho ccro tlno to 
cr.tlr.C/ CUT cupporwC'J cc~".nrclaro, on attcotci by tho risy cupportcd cc —'.n- 
d^ru* cc~-.tn5atlor43 (led ty thoco ftoa CG, IIFT/) now In tho ErlcaGo'o filos* 
(Tr^b B chows tho dlotxlbatlon of tho Brl^nao** of fort OTor 1$ conths* Iho of tho oiy ooncon cerpnlcno (ITor - May) and tho Tot ana cubccqucat 
offcpcivca toward our cootins our Increased oporatlonal support rcqulr-noato 
l8 ovlacnt*) UalosB tiio thoator poreontsso of orslnooro io eonoidorably 
iccxcascdy tAo aroa eoneept abould bo cnployed In noaivfnturo countorinouz^ 
goncy war* 

0 * f >>lnt5.ornhtnn ,vitH I enpbaslzod tho noeoBsitj 

for all Ehjlccor Erlc^ado ecrr'.acdoro poroonallj to Initiato and nalntaln 
frequentf InfoxratiTO coordination tdth tho conaandora they eupportod* Vo 
found that an effoetlTo pairing of ooordinatora vast' CO, IIFF7 and SA, 17 
CTZ vith CG, 20th En^jlncor Brlcado} diriaion and aoparato brigado cenandora 
with 20th Bxlgado group eoraandora} diTialonal brigade and baao inatallation 
coordinators vith 20th Brigade battalion eoz=sandors. Tho goal of euoh eo* 
ordination vaa to reach a natual appreciation of the tcqui^.snts for current 
and expoctod Ihtore projects, to iiifoiu the enatoiaor of tho extent of tho 
Brlgado's capability to cosply vith his requests, and to negotiate infoxxBal 
adjustments of oustomor prioxlties and Brigodo rosourcos applied. Tho 
Brigodo vas also aonsitlTe to its custo nero* i nformation noeds ty tailoring 
our Sf r- hiw of P<^T ^o^t to niTT* a desire, providing a apoeial 

report on Bolta projoots to SA, IV CTZ, and preparing a apoeial report on 
Bong Tan progress for OG, 9th fiiviaion. Zn order to aid the busy supported 
oommondor to prooosa his requests for the soreral Igrpes of englnoor help 
(troop eoabat or oporatioBal aopport, KGA eonstrao^m, I<0C, repnira and 
utilities, base nalntenanee) in the Boat rapid Banner, Brigade puhlishod 
^e C<r^>wdora« Guido to TVifftno^^r freon Support, which vna v«U reoeived 
(Tab C). 

d« Og?raniy^tlQ^pT <d JViul r~>nit_Ch «<n**/»>i. As noted in per 3a above, the 
unusual conditions of tho Viotnaa staUIi^ oporation eallod fbr adjustaenta 
not only in conoopts and operation hut alao in unit osgenisetion end equipcaeat. 

(1) Th e Let ue pass over quickly, but not lightly, tho nanifoet 

necossity for a eystca of alloviag tho Axey eozsandor on tho ground in a 
conbat area to state hia nooda for ohangos in T0S*a and have his noods nst 
vlttin a reasonable tlmo period. Zn October 1967, on a crash basis. Brigade 
etudied end forvardod our requests for Bodiflcation of our units' TOE's. 
Although tho requests hovo not vith substantive approval at every eoboloa, 

as of today ve have no euthorily to roqnioitioa personal, or oquipoent 
against the TOE changes. Z encourage those responsihle in tbetr oentinulag 
etfort to eooelerate the isproveaeat of the MTOE aystca. 

(2) Aviation . Zn VietnsB, the 360 dogroe hettlofield, the insecure 
enviromont, and tho detoriorated ro^ ^etca necessitated dopoadenee on 
aircraft to a dogroe aover hoforo arporioaood by englnoor units. Tho pri¬ 
ority nood for aircraft vaa for coxnand and control of Brigade units dis- 
p«rs^ throughout the ZZZ and ZV CTZ, including Pfan Qi^ Island. (See Tab D) 
This need vas accentuated by the youth and In^perienoe of our mopasy end 
platoon ooGaandore at iaedatad sites. Vo vere hsbitiiany over $Qjr short of 
eiptalBS, and ev«i those avellehle had very little ever tvo'jeero of eervioe. 




Thoso onthuclastlc but Inoxporienced lloutonante nnd captninn nocdcd, and 
doGcrvod, tho nature nuidanco of their battalion connandors on nito. Avi¬ 
ation support was also required for roconnaiscanco of tactical airficlda, 
LOG'S, bridco sitos, land clonring areas, sources of onginoor mntorials, 
and suspected interaction areas; onernoncy resupply of rations, airr.unition, 
and critical repair parts; transportation of porsonnol, supplies, and nail 
to renoto orons. Brigado roquirenonts for aviation support to porfom 
thoso missions onoimtod to 117 aircraft days por week* At tho host, wo 
actually had available from both Brigade and IIFFV sources 48 aiircraft days 
per wook; this was only 41!^ of our roquirenonts and advorsoly offoctod nisaion 
acconplishnont. Our supported tactical connandors wore all as generous as 
possible In allocating their scarce aircraft to tho Brigade. They would 
have boon much nom effoctively supported had our aviation requlromohta been 
not. Future* TOE'S and aviation progranmlng should toko Hall account of the 
■Inilar stability' operations. 

(3) Alm.obile Canabilltv. 

(a) Although only recently organized and with less than 60^ of 
its authorized equipnont, our single airmobile oonposy proved to be a val¬ 
uable asset. Tho demands for such capabillly continued to Inearoaso. Until 
a few weeks ago It was used exeluslvoly In tho irohabllltatlon of airfields 
and fire support bases along tho Canbodlan border. In October, 1968, a fix* 
competing neod was estabUshed for Its use in preparing airfields and tem- 
porazy bases in advance engineer support of SA, IV CTZ's dry weather canpalfn 
throughout the Mekong Delta, In which roads of adequate capacity do not 
exist. Although activation of on additional oos^>aiiy does not now appear 
warranted, a means for speedy, tee^razy augmentation is necessazy. Such 
means may prove out in the pools, as currently planned. The disadvantages 

of such pools, e.g. difficulty of maintenance, lack of trained operators, 
lack of familiarity by supervisors with the capabilities and limitations 
of the equipment, covdd be overcome at low cost by selective aui^rantation 
of each of our light equipment ooiiq;>anie8. 

(b) Experience showed that plans, operations orders, and coordin¬ 
ation for our aiznoblle operations were generally lacking in one important 
regard! frequently, as the result of our inabili'ty to obtain airlift, 

our equipment was not extracted from an operational location for weeks after 
completion of the job, thus delaying both its maintenance and its use on 
other operations. Ve found it essential to pre-arrange outlift on a high 
priority basis by obtaining fizm ooimaitments before the operation from the 
supposrted tactical commander and the air transport commander. 

(4) Civilianizatlon . The advantages of the current oivUianization 
program are clear end valldi economy, training the Vietnamese toward self 
sufficiency, and continuity in units (con^are ^th Korea, where some of 
our englnoor mochanics, supply nersonnel and others have been employed in 
the some unit for over 15 years). However in tho Vietnamese environnont, 
oivUianization of engineer units on a large scale would both eountox^- 
produotive and dangerous. A nixed civilian-soldier unit would be far less 
capable of providing its own security on job sites and of contributing its 
share to base defense. It would be far less mobile, in the sense that it 
could not eaq>eot to retain its personnol integrity on a move suoh as one 
ooBstruotioa battalion reoently mode tram Long Thanh to Dong Tin. Zt would 





bo tnich loss capable of 24 fevur oporatlons such as van nozral for Brlc&do 
ooltUcrs In paving, quarrlos, and era^ horizontal and Tortical construotion* 

I cvccoot that ono vaj of rotainlng ft lo^o noaouro of unit Integrlly votdd 
bo to rostrlot olvUlanlzatlon to only ono company In each clTlllanlzod 
battalion, thus alloying tho other oompanlea to retain tholr oomplete intogrlty 
and usofulnesB* 

(5) Sn rftlfle F oitlr ""nt P«vinirr -»"nf.a« While aaxy ehangoa would be 
helpful (end cone wore In our outadttod ttTOE'e), I would etresa eereral vfaioh - 
Iziplngo on our on^noera* ability to oany out the baaie Any need to boto, 
abMt, and eonsmmloate* 

Vletnaa o^qperionea roeonflxocd that engineor eonbat battallona 
often operate in cquad* or platdon-alxe clcnonta, aeporated from axy other 
troopa, often by long diataneea. They coat be able to defend thoosolTea 
tad to oomiaieato* Booouae of ttiia typical nothod of operation the Baehlna 
guno should bo rotuxnod to the aquada* This would also Inoroaae the strength 
of dofonslvo posltiona vhon organized at platoon, ooapasy, or battalion lorel* 
One of our cosbat battallona biding a now iaolatod easq> recently found that 
its soeurl'^ position was Tory weak in aachine guns beoauae of the reduetien 
in the latest T04E to one per platoon* 

h* Both because eonstruotion battalions wore often the first into a 
now area ond beeauae they perfomed tasks nozxaally assigned to oca- 

bat battalions (suoh as sine swooping, road reeonnaisssnoe a^ intradietlon 
repair, forward airfield reuair), th^ should be augaonted with additional 
weapons (inftludinf the K>79) aod with addittonal ooaannieatioas* 

g* Engineer battalions in Vietnoa were typieally spread enrer a large 
area and often over-extezidod thoir ability to oooat^eate* The JOS/QBG 106 
prored (in one eoabat battalion) to be the answer to this problMk Brezy 
effort should be aade, beoaase of our noznally eoatterod operatien, to obtain 
a higher priority for engineer units in the issue of radios* 

e* Tailoring of Engineer Task Feroea, 

(1) Enginoer battalions played a lead role in the expansion of BS effort 
into additional areas of Vietnaa* The first U3 troops to nore into an aroa df 
the Mekong Kelta were eleaionts of an enginoer oenstruotion battalion, vhiob 
wore to prepare the aroa to serve as a base for the foUouing taetieal units* 

Far from bolng eaployed, as is noznal, in the oossaunications zone or rear areas 
of the field Azsy, the eonstruotion battalions wore the pioneering US elements* 
This also ceant that they provided thoir own natarials haul, harboznaster, 
steredozlng, and othar supply aetlvitles associated with scyply points and depots* 

(2) Our enginoer battalions fkequontly provided as nueh eonstruetion cat- 
erial for non»<mglnoor units for "salf-bolp'' eonstruotion as was used by the 
battalions theasolTos* Xn at loast one case, on engineer battalion supported 
oonstruotloa effort equivalent to three to four battalions, invUlviBg biorge and 
truck oonvoy shlpneats vfaioh aaounted to 500 to 1,000 tons of Baterials handled 




por < 117 , In addition to cn cqurd tomwc® cruohcd rock to bo off-lo’Jdrd 
and otoclqpUod* Thla "rolf-holp" olco involrcd our battalions In cddltlonol 
onrrlr.rrrlnj, eotlratln*; and wxpiloltlordrs as voU as tochnlcal acolotence 
and cpr.clollscd support, such as concroto Edrlnc snd haul, building p::d 
preparation, siirvoTlng, and utllitioa for beyond tho batt^ion*s doolcnod 

( 3 ) With those typos of aotlTltlos in pronroos within the on^lncor 
brlcado and group, a flexibility in sooting situations had to bo provided 
bqyond that furnished hy the IndiTldual battallone* The aosots, 

equipnsnt, natoriol stockpiles, skills, and even satorlals haul space or- 
ganlo to tho individual battalions and other engineer units wore thoroforo 
treated as rrlgado or group assets, to bo assigned and used toward the 
overall nission. Such operations involved dsy-to-day active eontrol. 
Heohonlcns of attaefanent, operational control, support, lateral transfer, 
and receipt • all baosM to^a to noet tha iBoodiata tadet in effoot, 
tailoring tadc foreea to naat raqwl runts at a aita or on an axtaadad projaot. 

f« Tactical Intelllgenoa. 

( 1 ) In noxcal varfara, only a snail poroentaga of engineer units la 
near enough to ths energy to bo mioh eoneomed with tlnoly taetieal into>- 
ligcnce. In the 360 degroo battlefield of Tiotnaa, all enginoor eorznndora 
v&ro noeossorily ooneomod, even thoso based in la^e canps* In addition 
to intelligenee of tha ovozall "big piotura", ty whieh tho onginoor eoa- 
rmndor oould judge how tho anosy'a likely eeursoa of aetlon eould affect 
tha anglnoors ova plena, ha reqtdred day to day intoUigenca in order to 
. size or revise the size of hia forces on lehlatod area projeets (e.g. fire 

S i)} to dotenoine 

1^ and, if so, idietber 
I tactical eosBiumder'a 
n or reaction foree 
itrangth on base aaourity 

least dally visits 
a (TOC) at all ooholons 
I dosaly with the ZII77 
TAOR in wfaioh Brigade 
'3d Infantxy Brigade, 
BeglBont* Slnilarly, 
Ig^a T0C*a* Such 
I insisted 190a in a 

taotieal operations 
naandors. Kew olssring 
nts of supported 
a Iron Trlamgla, and 
VC toitll recently 
ha peojAa with ia^ 
naiad, and in thair 
provlM* The 



pnclfication bonefltn woro ovldcntt traffic on the roads incroaoed; 
Imcincssoa and fairjj woro dovolopcd. Our basic concopt of organization • 
tho ncchanlrcd Infantry (or arziorod cavalry) - or^noor plow toon — was 
proven sound. Tho irTOE for tho land doorlns corpoiy, whon approved, will 
put our organization on an ovon sourdor footing and will also provide a 
Huch ne-'Tcd support baoo Indopondont or our two parent onjlnoor conbat 
battalions, wlilch found it nocoscazy to aufnont about 70 ooldlors to oaoh 
toaai (In addition to tho 63 on tho tern TOiC) to provldo adequate rjilnton- 
anco, supply and control, ftoa tho lessons leometi in over 130,000 aoroa 
of casoivo Jun^la eloarlns, 20th Easinoor Brlcado dy/olepod a 
f.nV o to Clra rlng (Tab E) which was puhUshod as a IIFiV roculatlon. 
This relation corvod to Insuro eultabla csiployDont pnd eisooth operation 
of tho laiul bloairlnf' toana. The esprit and eoura(;d of tho "Jungle Eatora* 
on those tearas wore phonononali the soldiers oonfoxned to the finest trai- 
ditlons of aiUtazy dodieation. EjqMtrioneo indicated that 100JC tractor 
zo^aocaont should be procrasDod et 1 to I-}* years, dependont on cutting 
conditions. Over the long ten, e doser shedd be developed which is op- 
tlnizod for tho encay hazMaaoat, high tcsq>eratores, dust, and heavy use 
always la forward gear which are eharaeteristie of land clearing operations. 

h. Ooapita tho praoticol necessity of enjoying enginoor 

troops fully on tho supported cotsaandors* roqulzmonts in accordance with 
USIRV priorities, this concentration ossontihlly on construction, in which 
our coabat engineer battalions constantly enga^, should not be allowod 
to interfere with training readinoss in the basic oonbat engineer Skills. 
Doliborate periodic trainlDg of the battalions in ninsfield clcarlag» panel 
bridging, and especially, fleet bridging, was found to be ■sndatozy in order 
to insvm a ready capatdlity to respond to the aot-iafkequaat snsrgsneiec 
in these critical coadMit engineer ftelda. 

i« Mnnegonont of Engineer Resonroos. 

(l) Tna the tine the Brigade headquarters first arrived in Vietnan, 
we reoognised the need for an infranatimi wjwitm to assist in nalrlnt de» 
dsions on reaouroe allocation and task asslgiwciitr. Such a aystna would 
idcolly have the oapafailities to aid us tot 

j|. Adjust gross distribution of tiHl^Brigade's effort to eonfora 
to priority of tbs work. 

h* Indicate and aid in edjushaent of iabalanees in the allocation 
of Brlgadd resonroos to the groiq)s by type of effort, user, and geogr^ddcal 

Measure the inpaot of new Jobs on directed construction. 

d. Provide displsya to indicate to our aajor custoaers that our 
available resources wore reesenaWy allocated to tteir projects. 

j. Provide infoxnation to Justify to 0SAI7 our requiraasnts for 
additionol resources in a tinely fashion. 

(2) The Brigade used the qystcsi described below. The work rmalninv 
in terns of nan-hours on each project was identified in four eategeriest 
constructing unit (groups and battalions), location, user, sal ijpm 

•UMtiMi .iMiMu _COHflOBITIAl 




In a like rmnor, each r.onth on a project waa Idontlflod 

tjj tho cono eatocoxloo* Tho third sot of data doTolopcd vao tho itiop 

of each conatructins unit (battalion). caplqjlne thoso throe aota of 
data tho obJoctlToa of our Banagoaont ejatoa voro rouchlj not. 

(3) Vo planned that thoao data vould bo rofinod in tho fbtoro to provido 
Boro noaxdnc^bl and additional Banagenont toola. Futuro rofincaonts abould 

A* Coiiqpiatorlaing effort »xp<>wd? d and p nlt_capaMlitloB in order to 
coopare thoao data hj eoo^tor in anf of its eatogoriea with voric_rc~*ainlng . 

Jl* Identiiyinf tho typos of aan-houro on a piojoet vfaieh aro oritleali 
•noh aa port oonstm^oBa oarUnovinc or Aoetriool offort. Tbaso ■SB'dioaro 
eoidd then bo oonparod as vara tho othor data. 

Dorolopiac a siBllar agrstMi fbr sritioal aquipaaBt^hPora. 

j|. XnstitiitiBC a profTBi of swand wq)haaia and traiainc to purify 
liqput iafoxBation. 

(4) Tho nood tor offootiTO aanagcaont toola to alloeato ongiBeor roaourooa 
properly will beeoao oran aoro ie^ortant in tha futura. Tho Boro onginoor 
rosoureos in Viotnaa doeroasof the Boro iaporatlTo it vUl boeoao to insure 
that thoao roaourooa ars eoanittod in tha optlncB Baiaor to aoeonplish tha 

J. Tor*nrd Plntming . Cleaolj alllod to tho proooding paragraph was 
tho Booesolty for laaginatiTO ob tlM port of all aaglBoor eoanandava* 

The oxtreadj aeasonal ellBatie roglBo in TiotB0B» eauaod Igr tho regular 
Bonaoon ehan^s, oapooiallj required earofbl planning. For axtoqilo* before 
tho vet season bogaa, va aeooleratod all* our horisontal vorlkp loavi^ tho 
Tortxoal for tho raisj aoaaon (e.g., early eonstruotion of hardatonds and 
eoneroto foundations ahd floors) | vo replfusod and ineroased tho eapaeity 
of oulTorta and orldgoa) ve atodq>iled rook and othor eoergonej LOG rep^ 
Batorials} vo obtained sood^ fortlliaerf and planting oquipnont to onoourago 
vet season growths tor erosion oentroli vo trained our loaders to tho attitude 
that oonstraotioBy oran horisontoly oan^ and vlll» bo aoeoaplishod during 
tho rains, oven if at rodueod offl^onoy (Tab F ia the 1$9tb Gmqp's oxsol* 
lent guide to vet season eonatrootion). Slidlar planniBg and axaeation paid 
off in ororoooing tha diffieultios of the anrnal dxy a o aa o n . 

4. SnpPTT ATTD, MAIKTKTTAKCE . Thoao fov ooBBiaats should first bo |daood in 
porspoetiro ty sgr opinion that, olnoo py sorfloo began In 1941» the ix^y 
has noTor boon aa v^ equipped, mppliod and supported in its aatorial naoda 
aa it was in Viotnan. 

a. Third _Fehelon A study of tho doodlini/oquipoeBt arail* 

ability osporioneo of ooabat battalions versus oonstruetion battalions lndi« 
oatod tha offootivonass of tho inelnaion of a third ooholon ualntananeo 
oapablllty at tha enginaer battalion level. Z m eemiaoed of tha soundnosa 
of this eoneopt, iddah faoilttatod reaponao to ahithUf oqqipBSBt dsaaity 





and enabled a bettor priority control of inalntonnnco assota. 

b. Por^^ r Pr, ff>i^ro n-Sf nr»^>« Td Wo woro equipped with 

many Itcna of non-otrmdard cquipaont. Thooo Included corraorclnl machlnoiy 
acquired fron luK-EHJ no woU ao non-atondord military items. Those wore 
ftrcquontly hl^h capacity items and very uooful from purely a production 
point of viow. However, non-standard oqxiipnont waa doadllnod much too 
Arequontly, and for oxtonded durations, bocauae of tho lack of repair parts. 
Exporionco provod that tho nllitaxy supply tyatem \ms unrosponaivo to re- 
qulcltlons for non-atondard ropair parts. To obtain full value fktn eoa- 
Borclal and non-standard equipment, a ^stem should be eatabliahod, and 
tested for its adequacy, to provide timely repair pa^s support for such 
equipment now existing before additional Items, suoh' as the pending LOG 
equipment bqy, are Issued to our troops. 

e. Matntonanee Aum^ntatlon . Our maintenance requirements Increased 
substantially when units wore augmented with extra mllitazy or comnorclal 
equipment, especially quarrying and crushing equlpmont. &vover, no addi¬ 
tion^ mocbonlcs wore authorized or available to maintain such equlpmont. 

The roault was a heavy extra malntonaneo burden on the unit axigmentod with 
the extra equipment. In order to allevlato a speelfle example of this 
situation, a quaxuy detachment which was authorized organic maintenance 
personnel was requested by MTOE for use at our Vung Tau quarries. There 
should be provisions for inoreasing the number of authorized malntexuuioe 
personnel when a unit Is responslbla for any significant quantl'ty of 
oommerelal equipment. 

d. lofTlstio SuTOort Locations . During ny period of command, logistical 
support elemonts significantly Improved their responsiveness In the delivery 
of materials to forward areas bqjrond the Saigon, Long Binh, and Vung Tau 
depots. More remains to be done, however. For example, a rail-served supply 
point coaqdex In the Pfau Lol area seems an Immediate need. It would save 
baok-haul, reduce the growing congestion In the Long Blnh area, and provide 
quicker sendee to all'unlts In the lot and 25th Dl^sion AOR's. 

e. Mxintortnnce . The Initial visits of the recently established Brigade 
Command Kointonanoe Kanagemont Inspection Team produced results which were 
almost uniformly unsatisfactory, convincing me that we have been guilty of 
unrealistic and defensive reporting in some cases. Z took the flnt oorreo- 
tlve steps and will recommend to sy successor that he continue our currant 
strong campaign to keep all our equipment operable. 

5 . PER.^OTPTKL AHD AirfnnSTRATION . Again for a perspective, concerning people, 
our most important acset, I believe thatt the USA has never hod a finer 
soldier than we havo In Vietnam; he Is Intelligent, resourceful, unselfish, 
Irroprosslble, courageous, and highly motivated. Nor has the United States 
ever hod a finer senior non-oenaalsslonod officer corps; It Is professional 
to tho core and proudly defends Its professionalism by self-police. Never 
has the Ihiltod States fought a war with a more professional, dedicated, and 
able groiq> of the skore sjMor officers, and bazzlng the youth and Inazpez^ 
lence which Z noted In piuni 3d(2) above, this ^ipUes with but few exceptions 
to the entire offLoer corps* 



• « 


A. of T oiiirA « Durirs ry fiftoon plun montho witli tho 

Brlcado, I vas privlloccd to sorro vlth nine group corjT.ardQro of our throe 
groups and thlrty-olght battalion coimnrdors of our thirtoon battalions. 

Tills Is too Bony, sonothlng over twloo too uiairy. I fully support and 
rocosnond adhoronco to the now policy of a standard twolro nonth corriand 
tour, with fow oxooptlons, and thoso only to provido flold oxporlcnco In 
hlghor hendquartors, rollef for ooruiandors whose Jobs havo ontaUed roro 
than a nomil ohoro of danger, or flexibility to replace an occasional 
sul>-8tandai\l porfoxnor. Should tho number of qualified In-countiy appli¬ 
cants for command become considerably larger than the number of Taeanelee 
under tho tvolTO month policy, OPO, tho agency with ftiU records and 
rosponsibillty for career managomont, could proride a list of qualified 
cocmandors for assignment In an order of merit for command, thus aiding the 
U5ARV assignment decision-maker, who has neither the flQl records nor the 
orerall long-term responsibility for effectiTe officer career management. 

b. Rotational Hitwp Avoidance . Early last fall I saw how rapidly and 
completely humps can destroy good units. The policy of requiring that 
there bo no loss larger than ISJC in any 30 days dtizlng tho second year 
In country is a sound one which should bo scrupulously followed, not only 
in bulk numbers but also in such oategorieo as koy officers and IICOs, 
moehonles, end equiiment operators. It should bo roeognized, however, that 
tho infusion solution of ^^s problem was disruptive for both gaining ond 
losing units. Each man inl\uBod was moved fkon "home” to a new unit whore 
it took some tine before he %ias produetive. i regulated replacement flow 
to eliminate the humps would reduce the prohloa by half. For excuq[^e, in 
tho ease of a battalion with a* Kay hump, a replacement iiqmt in August 
(without regard to current atrons^) coupled with a levy out of a' May DEROS 
roster of the same HOS to a non-May hump unit, would be only half as dis- 
ruptlvoi only the Individual levied eat would be affected. I|jr and large, 
extensions constitute the most effeotive and palbleas mathod of bu&q> eor- 
reotion available to the unit. Bowever,’ oare was required to avoid ereating 
a new baap in later months. 


e. Indoctrination of Teur»y EC0* s . I found that continual emphasis was 
required, most effectively through tho sergeant major channel, to instill 
eonfldonoe and an aotiva spirit of responsibilitj in our young KCO's. Liquor, 
drugs, fights, and flreazms aooidents in eai^ were ell ro&oed by such sow 
phasis. I found it essential, and therefore made it nandatozy, to have an 
KCO live in eaoh barradcs or tent, in order that he might be imediately 
responsible for the eonduot of the men. ify letter te subordinate toosMndere 
on this general aubjaot ie at Tab 0. 

d. Avards . 

(l) Recognizing that Engineer and other eonibat 8iq>port eotsanders are 
frequently conparatlvely unforoefbl in rewarding their troopa with individual 
and unit awards, the CXI*a of the Enginoer Command and Engineer Troopa naini- 
tainod an aotive program baaed on insuring adequate recognition of our 
Talorous and deservl^ englnemr soldiers. Zn fbll support of this goal, 
the 20th Brigade ewarde program was designed to be fair, oonsiatant, and 
liberal. To ooeompliah ttaie, we need three times tha XQB strength la our 




Av:it\ld ^'octlon. Prl^ado authorlij vao for tho Bronso Star and jvinlor auarda. 

(2) Proa Aucuat 1967 throuch Ootobor 1968, Bricndo coldioro rocoivcd 
4478 Individual nwarda, of which 464 woro for valor including two Dlotln- 
gulchcd Sorvlco Crocooa and 19 Silver Stal-a. Particularly r.ovir" and oary 
of adniniatration vna thn curpriao, on-tho^apot decoration of a ooldior 

in tho fiold in tho conpony of his aaaoclatoo, with tho popor work catching 
up hy noana of a form fUmlahod by tho aldo*^o-oonp to the iamodlato con* 
iDondor cortiiyicg the award of the doooration* 

(3) Although adjalniatrativoly burdenaoao, the unit award la excellent 
for unit eaprit and individual pride, and well worth the effort. Aa aids 
to the xmlta'ln Juatli^ring such aworda, in addition td the Inmodlata sorale 
boost involved thereby, Z initiated the ftequont uae of the Conmander'a Unit 
Cotaondation (BP par 200o, AR 672-5-1) prinailly for eoabat-oonneoted acti¬ 
vities, and a CG*a letter of unit oowinandetiim for sueeessfVQ. but uore anodane 
eonatruotion aetivitiea. 20th Brigade unit auerda are listed at Tab B. 


a, and Doveletr^nt Rcoulrr^ents . Two dovelopoents could 

change tho entire oharaoter of the war to the great benefit of ourselves 
and our allies. 

(1) The first and moat pervasive would enhance the soldiers abilily 
to Bove and shoot during the hours of darkness, the eneegr's usual aovement 
tine. Znage intensification seopes of the seeond or third generation would 
enable helleopter operatira and firing at ni^it| the wafer gog^ea for use 
with the soldier's steel pot would eoihle Ida to staUc and annihilate the 
en«ay who eannot see in the dark. 

(2) The second dev^opaent is a sure^ rapid aaans of nine olearing, 
both in fields and along ’bails and roads. Udle the current tests of 
destruotible rollers indicate sosw value, these devices are ousibersoae 

and are not effective against oonaand-detonated or counting Bines. Research 
should be esdiaustive end accelerated along the lines of oonqiletely inerting 
the fUse or e^qdosive, such as was under investigation tgr 1^* HazWlik at 
Z^Bglneor Research and Developaeat Laboratories early in this deoede. 

(3) See also per 3g for another RfiD need. 

b. Plann l nt? for Pence . Z an awaro that soao planning for peace is 
underway, and Z proffer the following to help. Certain troop units and 
advisors will roaaln when the bulk of BS forces are withdrawn. To con¬ 
serve B5 resources and engineer capabilities, the locations of the pemanent 
bases for these people sh^d be detezeined now and the eonstruotien there 
should be TOUdnlzed for long lt;*e and low operating cost. Sinilarly, our 
current efforts in LOC, probably the greatest engineer, contribution to pac¬ 
ification and eeonoaie developoont, should continue to be oriented to those 
najor roads which will be Bost productive during peacetiae. Canals and 
ai^elds should be developed in the seae patten. Revolutionazy develop- 
Bent mxpport activities should be evra sore sttengly enphasised, especially 
in those areas aost likaly to beooae eoonoBio eenters after the war. 




Priorities shoiild bo ostabllahcd in tho noar futuro so that tho construction 
of roads, nodical faellitios, vator troatncnt plants, pouor dictrlbution 
sjstcns, and educational facilities in thoso areas recoiro an cnphasls second 
only to oporatlonnl requirenonts* Ehnlneor naclilnory cul table for lot or uso 
clTillan construction conpanies should bo introduced now into tho rdlitaiy 
lystcn. Cormorclal Itoras such as our Euclid dunp trucks, Catorplllnr D-9 
dozors, and Inconln;; LOG equipnont b^f could bo maintained by clTillan con¬ 
tractors with much ooro oaso than TOE itemo of equipment bocauao repair parts 
aro conorally STallable throucb coccnoreial channols. Surplus comorclal 
equipnont on hand when peace is declared should bo made arallable for purohsss 
by Viotnonoso eontraetors* Surplus niUtaxy equipment which cannot be fea¬ 
sibly returned to the United States should bo used tq oq^p ARVIY enclneor 
units with never and better eonstruetlon equipsiont. Installations which 
are wacatod by United States foroes should be tumod orer to ARVN forces 
for their use or utilised as elTHlaa reltigee and rehabilitation eenten. 

Va should omfer at an esrly data with tba Goromnont of the Republie of 
Tietaaa to enable then to plea for the use of fsollities vfaieh we would 
Taeate. US troop units ah^d inoraasa our afforts to hire and train 
Viotnanoso skilled voxicors and laborers vheroror posolbla, as well as 
Vlotaanoso foremen and supervisors. Prlae areas of interest should bo 
prefab yards, quorxylns and crasher operations, asphalt production,. eoxv- 
erota batch plants, Tortieal construction projects, road naintenanea and 
psTlng operations, praoast conoreta yards, oonerata blodc jdanta, notor 
pool naintenanea, and svqpply aotiwitiaa. ^ _ 

7. C0!"TATID POLICY . On# of wy goals was to aid the fhrthar davelopment 
of the splendid officers who commanded our groupe by strictly employing 
tl|p honored oommsnd systea of telling them what to do but not how to do 
it. Resoureeftal self relianoe was demonstratod by aaoh, aspeeially under 
the conditions of Tat and subsequent eommunist offonsivts, when groups 
ond battalions ross to tha difficult oeeaslon rssultiag from our almost 
total inability to comzainleata and nor# about. I did attempt to guide 
them toward what I call "the totality of eoesaand*^ insuring that they ap¬ 
plied tbemsolTes not oi&y to the payoff item, operations, but also in a 
eonsoious way and with an approiniate investoont of their personal tine 
to the eontrlbutlng personal, norale, supply, malatenanee, etc., factors 
vfaieh must bs suaosssftQly aeoomplished and balanced if ths psyoff is to 
be achieved. This they did. Ibother of oy personal beliefs, vhieh Z 
found to voxk voU in Vlstaan, is what I o«Ql *the sanctity of eomaand”. 

This policy demands a constantly open door and personal, "eyeball” oontaot 
studiously encouragod by the s^or coanandar with tha junieri it broolea 
no interposition botweon tha two commanders by say tlam^ of sitbsr ooa- 
nander's staff, inoludlxig even the Oopu’^ or Chief of Staff. Total res¬ 
ponsibility residss sol^ in ths oodaaandsrs in ths chain of eemnand} the 
eoBcaand ohsnnsl mist bs osrefUUy pressrvsdf eaqy to uss^ firs# of Intorfe^ 
enoo and, of oourse, naver bgr-passsd. 




8. m^T, CoEnand of US oltisons in a vtsr sono io tho hichost prlYllono 
tho eountiy con ontruat to a profoaaionol aoldlor. Vj oossnandorB and I 
havo otrlvon to bo found doaorving of that truat. I am proud of tho aeeom- 
pllahnonta of the aoldlers of the 20th ^iglnoor Brigade. I am proud to haTe 
boon one of Idica in their rtmSjp T^9pon»iy, reaouroeful, reliable aiq>port 
to the ns Armor ia Vietnam. 



Brigadier Geoeralt USA 





A* 20th EbgliM«r Brigade Ragulatioa 415-15 

B. Oiatributioii of Brlgado Effort 

C, Coaaasdor'o Quldo to fttgln—r ftoop Support 

D. Uaporsal of Brlgado Baaourooa 

E, CoBuodar*a Oulda to land Q.aorl]^ 

Mmiao on - vd HQ DA 

0, Indoctrination of Touag Wnnoflaalonart Qffloara 
E. Balt itMrda 

20 th Rot' U15-I5 

DER/ivTHENT OP mfi IJtff 
APO S-'.n Francisco 96}»91 

RXUL.'»nO;j 5 Scptcribcr 1968 

N'JhBaR ia5-i5 


Crvictoriv-s, Priorities, and Control of Zopincor iiffort 

1. PURPOSE : To establish categories and priorities of cn;dnccr support 
and to pr<-scribc proccd'irar. for allocation of engineer effort and 

2. SCOPS t The provislona of this rC;.ulation are applicable to tho 
Bripadu Headquarters and all subordinate units of the 20th Engineer 


3. ^JCCmESi 

a. To insure rapid and effective response to missions and requests 
for cn.'incer effort throughout the Brigade's ijrea of Responsibilitj^'* 

b* To insure proper allocation of cnf4>necr effort and resources to 
assigned tasks on tho basis of ostablishod priorities* 

U* Ci4Ti:AXRIB8 t Tho catogo>^ts of engineer effort are explained below 
in order of priority. 

a* Co^'bat Support ! (Priority 1). Engincwr operations in support of 
tactical operations in progress to assist maneuver der-ients, 
support elements and combat service si^port clerients* This type tnission 
is nonially of short duration; requires ninitnal, if any, en(ine«.rinr; 
do&if;n; and is such'that tlic success of a tactical operation would be 
Jeopar^ted if tho task is not accomplishod expeditious]^'* Inncdlato 
response is the critical oloment in combat support missions• 

b* Operational Support : (Priority 2)* Ur.gently required engineer 
support of corb'.t forces, combat support forces or combat service 
support forces clearly related to current or impendint; tactical 
operations* This type mission is such that the prim'-ry operational 
or support mission will be serious!;’ and iMX-diatc!;- handicapped if 
the task is not .accomplished uq^ditiousl;'* Tasks directly related 
to base crj.ip defense may also oc accoi^>lished as operational support* 
Operational support t>\sk8 normally require onl;’ ltt<iitcd en.lncv.xlnc 
design rnd arc accorq>li8hed b^* troop labor* ^.s in eoiibat support 
missions, prompt response is .a critical element of operational support 
nLssions, olt^iourh tine should rioncrally bo cuffieicot to poxisit conttiaxid 
ruviow of tho roquiroaont* 

7Ab 4 

c. l iinjjiiLii Ssr;cntinl Rcquircracnts t (Priority 3)« Iicriuiror..-nts, 

which, when j.'uirillcd, r.llow .m inco-Tiinr, unit to occupj' its nai hone 
station. ’'dniMvri EsGcnti.*'.! Roquirewontc consist of concrete for 

neGsh"JJ.c, r.rr.dinr And stnbilizinf' for tcnt-'.'.c, stabilized 
p.'irlcLn*’'; .''re.-.s for LquipnH,'nt nnd ^vLrcrr.ft, ininiim.: open storr.' i. ".rens, 
rjci dr''inr.;'.e, field showers nnd bum-out Ictrinos, access nnd main 
area roads, nnd nirernft revetments. 

d. lanes of Coriniunic-ntion ; (Priority U). The LOG i’rogrrn is the 
deliberate restoration to RXV Standards nnd maintenance of national 
and interprovincinl hit,lTwr!iS, other provincial routes., and rnilroads 
which arc* required for the support of tactical opefations. It is an 
integrated pro;-;raii» involving the combined efforts of Ministry of Public 
Works (iiRJ), Vietnam National Railroad Sjntcn (VHRS), U.S. Agency for 
International Dovcloptivent (US/JD), .orny ilopublic of Vietnam (ARVII), 
Haval Forces, Vietnam (NAVPORV), llilitarj' Assistance Conraand, Vietnam 
(ItACV), and U.S. Army* Vietnam (US/iRV). The general objectives or tho 
deliberate LOG Restoration Program in RVN arc r.K)lic 2 tion of en-,lneer 
troop end contractor effort to accomplish the f(blowings 

(1) Facilitato.JLar^iO ccalo oporations by restoring main supply 
routes (iiSl). 

(2) Provide heavy traffic KSR around ports, depot conqpluxes and 
major installations. 

(3) By-pass metropolitan areas. 

(U) Rostoro local routes to sustain military traffic. 

(5) Reduce dependence on air LOG'S, thersby freeing aircraft for 
direct support of tacUeal operrtions. 

e. Base Gonstruction t (Priority 5)» Brso construction is provided 
for under two programs t ifilltary Gonstructlm .unny (MC/i) and minor 
construction. :iCA for tho RVIJ is provided for in US/JW Regulation Ul!>-1 
and is tho prin'ry vohlcle for base construe ion. Minor constructiovi 
includes those projects for alteration, convrslon, or construction of 
real property facilities using Otili. funds, dnor construction projects 
arc normally' accoiaplished hi>' tiie Installatioi iinglnccr usin'; resources 
under his control. Those pmjccts beyond th: capability of the 
Installation iSnr^neor m y be accomplished ly engineer troop Labor. 

f. Revolutionary Povclopnent Support : (Priority 6). Coordinated 
military and civil actions dusit^nud to lib\.rato xoe people Viet 
Cong control, restore public security, initiate political, social and 
economic dcvelopriune, extend cffcctivo Qovemment of Vietnam (GVU) 
authority nod vln tho uiUing support of tho ViotnamoM pooplc. 

20th Her- 

5. i"^oi:RouiL:s : 

.^. Coi-br-.t Svpport ; Jomall;' requested fio;.i th^ nearest engineer 
\init. II tl'.w requested comb-'.t support is beyond the cnpi''.bilities or 
.".uthority of the emtinecr unit rccoi\'inr, the recuent it will iiiaedintcl^' 
be rcferx'ed to the next hi her headquarters for •'.ssiotance. 

b. Oporaticnol Support : Nomallj'' requested through corimond channels 
to n Field Force, cqiiivnlcnt C(»«.nnds, or Headquarters, US/iRVi It nay 
be requested •'t lower levels of coiriond if ur.-ency so dictates. Field 
Force and equivalent corviands will request operational support directly 
fron this- headquarters. /JJ. requests for op^ support will be 
reviewed and validated by this headquarters. 

c. Hioimuin Essential Rg^uirenents (Iffia) : Requests will be forwarded 
to this h'-odquartors for validation and issuance of a directive for 

d. Lines of Coroiunications t LOG nvointcna.ncc and restoration arc 
novemed bj LOG directives issued this headquarters. 

(1) General roajd directives ((HU}*s) issued to each croup provide 
authority'’ for nointcnanco of specified or assicned routes in each qroup's 
AOR, directed b^' this headquarters, that can bo supported by O&lLi funds. 

There is a $200,000 DA restriction on individual projects char>ioablo under 
Om. to the OlD's. 

(2) Deliberate LOO restoration, construction of bridcos, and 
reconstruction of destiroyed brid cs oire ^^ovemed by individual LOO 
projects issued by this hoadqvuurtcrs. These projects arc OScIu funded, 
or if new construction they ore NCi. funded, and will not be ncconplished 
\aidor the provisions of the QRD's. 


u. Base Construction t I'rojocts that are funded under HC/i and 
accoriplishcd b;- troops will be directed by US/^.V through this headquarters. 
Project approval, cstablishnont of construction priorities and determination 
of whether troop or contract labor will bo utilized for construction will 
be accaapUshe'd by the USJJlV Sn<;lnccr. This di.tcriAinatlon is based on 
availability of funds and troop effort, .\pproved ninor construction projects 
that do not exceed $10,000 in funded costs may be accepted and directed by 
this headquarters. ;J1 requests for minor construction utilizlnt' brigade 
troops will be referred to this headquarters for validation and diroction 
under the bri^jado's .qonorol construction directive. 

f. Revolutionary* Development Support (HDS) » ilUS projects pro;romnod 
arc foniarded throu^ Dl^W^ oi! il ¥Y^ to H^, USt'iRV, ATTW; AVH(ffi, for 
approval. Validated projects will be directed Ir/ US^'i^VV throui^h this 
headquarters. Civic action projects roquirins sdniiaal support may contlnuo 
to be undurteken by Ensincor Group tsiits without referral to this head¬ 
quarters provided that they do not interfere with other progr e wu o d roquiro- 
nents and they aro eoardinatod idth tho Frovliieo end District Senior Advisors. 



• • 

6. AUTHailTY: 

a. The Coi.naiidinr’ General, 20th jinr^nocr Bri,-,".dc, reserves the 
followin', authority for all construction by Bri^^adc troops: 

(1) Validation and directive authority for operational support 

(2) Approval and directive authority for all. !C3a construction. 

(3) directive authority for all minor construction projects in 
support of District/Inst-allation En^dnccr. 

b* Approval and dlrcctivo authority for combat support missions is 
hereby delo' ated to the Caenivandinf; Officer, 3Uth, 79th and l59th 
Groups* This authority may be sub-dclc^atud to the lovol neccssarj' to 
instiro imr>iediatc response to tactical roquirer^icnts* 

c* Rccucsts for cn.'^nccr support over which CO, 20th Ensincor 
Bricadc has rcscr/ed authority will be c:q>oditiously forwarded to this 
headquarters, ATT?*: AVBI-CHOPS, for review, validation and issuance of 
directivcis, as appropriate* 

d. Uiurosolvod requests for on^dnoor support, whether for category, 
priority or validity will be referred to this headquarters, ATTN: 
AVBI-GHCX^ for detonaination* 


a* iUl reports required by current regulations remain in effect* 

b* A cop^* of each combat si^^rt directive issued by ■*'ny Bri'cado 
unit will bo forwerdod to this headquarters, .'.TIN: AV3I*0S for 

8* PglflUtTATIOW t This regulation is effective upon receipt* 


A* USAilV Rc^id^tlon 220-10* 
b* USARV Ro -Illation lil$-l* 
c* Regulation ii20-U* 

d. 20th 13 Rcsulation 


FOR T.IZ ca;iiin)Bi: 


RICHARD £. Ti:nXR () 

/ksslstcnt Adjutant 

J. R. Bl 
Kojor, AGO 

6 i>lua 

$ - ni CTZ, ATTNi Encr 
5 - S^4j IV CTZ, ATT^t Engr 
5 - OQj Snslnoor Tro^ 

5 - CG, USAfiC/iV, AIlNt AVCD-BCM 


• • 


26 October 1968 

This cuidc, prepared lor all of our supported unit commanders, 
our ’'ciistoners" and prospective custor.iers, is intended to assist 
you in reouesting engineer support by explaining the resources 
of the 20th Engineer Brigade, the categories and priorities of 
U engineer support, and the procedures for obtaining our 

This giiidc is arranged into areas explaining specific items on 
t^'pes of support and their priorities and general information 
vhich ex]^4nds on procedures for requesting the various tj'pes of 
engineer support and action for construction or maintenance of 

We hope that this guide vdll prove useful to you in the 
accGinpliehfflent of our coimnon mission here in Vietnam. We of 
the 20th Engineer Brigade look forward to working with you to 
that end. 


DC, UoA 



Item Pane 


A. Combat "upport 2 

B. Operational mcport 2 

C. *4ER * 2 

D. LOG 3 

E. Ease Construction 4 

F. Re-'olutlonary De’-elopment •■support . 5 

II. niRECTP^S 5 

III. BOD and EOC 6 


V. .mi'^RY 7 

References (Inclosure l) 8 

Organizational Chart (Inclostire 2) 9 

HER Request (Inclosure 3) 10 



I. CATPr.ORJE.:; of U AR^ rJi:GIT^J:R ;.UPP0RT - - The categories of enfTineer 
support, priorities and procedures for requesting support are listed 

A. Combat Support (Priority t) 

1. Definition: Mreently required engineer support of tactical 
operations in progress to assist maneuver elements, combat support 
elements, and combat ser'dee support elements. This tyipe of mission 
is normally of short duration; requires minimal, if any, engineering 
design; and is such that the success of a tactical operation vrould be 
jeopardized if the tasks were not accomplished expeditiously. Irmediate 
response is the critical element in combat support missions. 

2. Tj^ical Piission: Land clearing, tactical bridge emplacement, 
hasty heliports/airfields, demolitions, and emergency road repair. 

3. Procedures: Combat support is normally requested through the 
chain of command to II FFOTCEV or SA, I'' Corps. In emergencies, it 
can be reouested directly from the nearest engineer unit of the 

B. Operational Support (Priority 2) 

1. Definition: Engineer support of combat forces, combat support 
forces, or combat service support forces clearly related to current or 
impending tactical operations. This type mission is such that the 
primarv operational or support mission will be seriously and 
inwediately handicapped if the task is not accomplished oqjcditiously. 
Tasks directly related to base camp defense may also be accomplished 
as operational support. Operational support tasks, normally require 
only limited engineering design and are accomplished by troop labor. 

As in combat missions, prompt response in a critierJ. element of 
operotional support missions, although time should generally be 
sufficient to permit corraand redew of the requirement. 

2. Typical Idssions: Iridge protective de'dces, fire support 
bases, renwte airfield maintenance and upgrade, repair of LOG 
interdictions and revetments for critical facilities. 

3. Procedures: Operational support is requested in writing 
through command channels to HQ U' AUV; HQ>II Field Force rnd the 
Senior Ad^dsor, IV Corps who make requests for operational support 
directly to the 20th Engineer Brigade, 

C. Ilinimum Essential Requirements (Priority 3) 

1. Definition: Requirements, which, when fulfilled, allow an 
Incoming or relocating unit to occupy its new hone station. Hininum 


rtronliil Reqiiircmcntp (hLR) consist of concrete slabs for ir.csshalls, 
rrarlinr: -'nd stabilizing of areas for tentage, stabilized parking areas 
for rqiiipncnt and aircraft, niinimnm open storage areas, area drainage, 
field shovfors aixl burn-out latrines and access and main area roads. 
Aircraft re^'etments for incoming aircraft will be constructed in 
conjunction with 


2. Typical I.issions: liER construction for all incoming or 
relocating units from di'dsion to detachment size. 

€ . • 

3. Proccdiircs: Requests for lER will be forwarded in accordance 
with U AR'^ Reg 415-1 by the incoming or relocating unit, or the unit's 
sponsor, through its parent brigade level or equivalent headquarters 
(to preclude unnecessary construction should the unit location change 
at the last minute), to the 20th "jJngineer Brigade for issuance of a 
directive for construction. See inclosure 3 for the information to bo 
included in your IKR request. 

a. lER facilities must be constructed on land controlled by 
the US Oovernment. If this is not the case the requesting unit must 
apply for real estate in accordance t.'ith U'-ARV Regulation 405-1. 

b. If a user desires to upgrade liHR facilities, the required 
information must be submitted on a DA Form 2701 to the local 
Installation engineer per U^'ARV Regulation 420-4 or on a DA Form 1391 
through command channels per U.'iARV Regulation 415-1 • 

c. Requests for support which exceed the criteria of HER as 
defined in U ARV Reg 415-1 cannot be recoraplished by 20th iingineer 
Brigade units unless so directed by UoARV. 


d. Adequate lead time is essential to quick response and 
timely completion of lER. Units should submit request for JSR at 
least 45 days in advance, if possible, to allow the engineers 
sufficient time to plan, schedule, and coordinate the construction. 

e. Request should be marked with appropriate security 

D. Lines of ConBiunica.tion (priority 4) 

1. Definition; The LOG Program is the deliberate restoration 
to It/\CV standards and mintentmee of national and interprovincial 
highways, other provincial routes, and railroads which are required 
for the support of tactical, operations. The objecti^'es of the 
deliberate I/XJ Restoration I’rogram in RVN are to; 

1 . P'acilitate large scale operations by restoring main 
supply routes (li R). 


b. Pro-'idc a traffic k U around ports, depot complexes 

nnd major installations. 

c. By-pass metropolitan areas. 

d. Uestore local routes to sustain military traffic. 

^ e. Reduce dependence on air LOG'S, thereby freeing aircraft 

for direct support of tactical operations. 

* «* 

2. Typical Lission: Construction of the ‘aigon Bypass to include 
the Phu Cuong Bridge. 

3. Procedures: A FY Program is do'^eloped by 20th Engineer Brigade 
using priorities established by IL\CV. 

a. LOG liaintenance will be performed \dion it is determined 
that the maintenance is beyond the capabilities of PPy (Minister of 
Public Works) or the tactical commander (U'^/AR'/N) in whoso TAG® the 
road is located. 

b. liaintenance of access roads and cantonment roads is the 
responsibility of the post engineer and will be accomplished by the 
local PAifE organization. The 20th Engineer Brigade does not have the 
responsibility or authority to maintain these roads, unless the effort 
required is beyond the capability of PA«E, 

3. Base Construction (Priority 5) 

1. Definition: Base Development efforts in 'Vietnam are justified, 
approved and funded under a modified MCA Program. This is a formal 
system requiring advance programming, detailed justifications, review 
bv local Base Planning Boards, and issuance of specific construction 
directi’^es to accomplish distinct work items. To supplement the MCA 
system, the Minor Construction Program is a’'ailable to construct those 
urgently required items planned under the same criteria as above. 

These projects are O&MA funded and ma.^' not exceed 025»OOO funded costs 
in ’Vietnam. 

2. Typical Missions: Maintenance hangers, water towers, ser^dee 
clubs, port facilities, POL storage, power distribution systems, 
logistical depots, signal facilities and medical facilities, 

3. Procedures: 


(l) Requirements should be defined in terns of specific 
scope for each category of work, UbARV Regulation 415**1 and AR 415**15 



provide guidance for completing the DD Form 1391» Mlitrjy Construction 
Line Item Data. 

(2) In coordination 'dth the Dasc Development Officer, 
the 1391 form is prepared using criteri.*' contained in 1.ACDC Construction 
bulletin 415-2-10 and the ;tandards of construction in n'./iRV 

Peculation 415-1. The DD Tonn 1391 is submitted to the local L-ase 
De^'clopment Doard for approval. Following this action, the request is 
submitted through connand channels to UAARV for approval and funding 

( 3 ) Base Development Boards detemlne priorities of 
construction at each installation once directives have been issued 
to engineer troops or contractor. 


( 1 ) Urgently reouired facilities may be constructed under 
the procedures of U ..''JIV Regulation 420-4. The item must, however, be 
on the Base Development Plsji or added to it by board action. 

( 2 ) In coordination with the Real Property Maintenance 

Facility Manager (installation Engineer), a DA Form 2701 is prepared 
stating the requirement and urgency for this construction. Based upon 
the Base Development Board's priority and the availability of funds, 
the item will be constructed by U (PA&E or a troop utility 

detachment) or the 20th ’^inginoer Brigade, 

F. Re^^olutionary Develoment moport (Priority 6) 

1. Definition: (Coordinated military and civic actions designed 
to liberate the 'Fietn?meso people from Viet Cong control, restore 
public security, initiate political, social and economic devcloprert, 
extend effoctive Govemnont of Vietnam (GVN) authority, rnd vrin the 
willing support of the Vietnamese people, 

2. Typical Missions: Construction of cn earth-filled dam, market 
places, teachers homes, maternity dispons.-rys, schools and warehouses. 

3 . Procedures: Prograror.od RDB Projects are fowarded through 
DFPCORDG of II FFV to Uf.AR'f for apnrovnl. Validatetl reouests ire 
directed through channels to tho 20th .Ingineer Brigade. Civic action 
support '.ay bo underteJeen by any engineer unit providing they have 
effort a'\*>.liable. Assistance for civic action may be requested from 
t'fte nearest engineer unit and will be undertaken onl}' on an "as 
available" basis. Cdnce ci'dc action is not a funded program, all 
materials \ised must be either donated or obtained from salvage. 

II. DlRECTI"Er. : 

A. Upon receipt of a prciject directive for b.ase construction, 


operationnl support, or a request for KTl, the 20th Tncineer Dric^de 
vn.ll in turn send a vfritten flirectivo to the appropriate enpincer 
proup thereby assipninp the task for construction. An infomation 
copy of this directi’-c will be sent to the customer. 

B. \/hen the constinicting unit receives its directive, it will 
contact the user or requestor to determine details of the project, 
work out siting arrangements, and indicate to the user the estimated 
schedule of construction. This liasion will remain in effect until 
the project-, is complete and is accepted by the user*. 

III. BOD and ::DC 

A. Beneficial Occupancy Date (BOD) is the estimated date on which 
the using unit vrlll be able to occupy the facility, if they so desire, 
prior to the actual cor^letion date. In determining the BOD, 
coordination ’^ill be effected betv/een the user and the constructing 
unit to ensure a complete understanding by both pfirties as to what 
facilities or comoonents must be eoirpleted prior to the DOD, The 
user should understand that use of the facility prior to actual 
completion (BCD) normally causes the actual completion date to be 
extended somewhat due to congested working conditions and other 
construction ''ariables. 

B. Estimated Date of Con^letion (EDO) is the estimated date on 
which the facility will be entirely completed and turned over to the 
user. A joint inspection will be conducted with representatives from 
the constructing unit and user. 


I’', ns .ouncEc of the aoiy :ch!GiMECR brigade 


A. The 20th Engineer Brigade is a major comnand of UBARV responsible 
for U3 non-divisional engineer support in the III and IV CTZ, an area of 
over 25>000 square miles. The Brigade's strength is approximately 1A»500 
military personnel and 5»000 civilians. To accomplish our mViSions 

are organized into 3 engineer groups, the 34th, 79th and 159 tli, each 
ha^dn»; 4 to 5 engineer combat or construction battalions. In addition, 
numerous separate companies are assigned to each group to provide b:xkup 
in special constriction equipment and skills, panel and float bridf.lng, 
and hauling capabilities. Small detachments, which very from 2 to >0 men, 
arc organic to each group to furnish well drilling, ccncrotc production, 
power distribution, rock crushing, and asphalt production services. An 
orgar.i/.ational chart for the 20th Engineer Brigade is shovai as inclosure 2. 

B. A combat engineer battalion is composed of approxinatel}' BOO 
officers and men organized Into a headquarters ond headquarters company 
and U line companies. The organisation, H03 structure, and TOC equipment 
enable the combat battalion to provide all types of combat engineer 
support. Construction projects are also undertaken by eoribat engineer 



hittfilionn, but unless f'c unit is aticnentcd by additionrJ. hcav»r 
oquircTH^nt or construction personnel their capabilities are limited in 
this area. Three of the four combat engineer battalions in the 20th 
ongineer Brigade have either a light equipment or construction support 
compare attached, 

C, An engineer construction battalion is larger (about 900 men) 
than a combat battalion and is organized into a headquarters and 
headouarters compai\y» an equipment and mintenance company, and three 
(3) construction companies. The organization, MOf) structure and 
equiment give this battalion a balanced capability for horizontal 
(earthvfork) and vertical (building) construction to include plumbing 
and electrical work. Construction battalions are also called upon and 
ha''e the capability to provide conibat support to tactical units in an 
emergency. This normally requires an auj^ntation of additional radios, 
nine detectors, weapons and other specialized equipment. 

D. Organizations supported by the 20th Engineer Brigade include all 
FI4L\F and combat, combat support and eotibat service support units 
within the III and IV Corps Tactical Zone. 


A. In the past many misunderstandings have evolved, especially in 
base construction tasks, when the construction unit stops work and moves 
to another project. In most cases the stoppage or delay is due to 
higher priority missions being assigned which take pxu»cedence over 
base construction. The constructing unit will contact the user in each 
case to insure that he understands the reason for the delav, 

B, The 20th Engineer Brigade sincerely hopes that this informational 
guide will assist our custcmiers in understanding our organization, 
priorities, types of work, and the coordination necosoar'y to insuro that 
a usable facility is conqsleted or that a support mission is pr >rerly 
aeconu'^lished. If at any time questions arise the customer shoild 
imr^iatel^' contact the nearest engineer unit. They will satxify ^xjur 
question if they are involved, or will contact hi|^r headquarters to 
^t an answer. 

3 Incl 

1 - References 

2 - Organioational Chart 

3 - ISSR Request 



a. .'.R 415 - 15 , COMSTRUCTION , MCA Pro/^ran Oevelopnent, dated 22 March 1962. 

b. AR 415-2i1, CONoTRUCTIOW . Departnent of the Army Facility Clasces and 
Construction Categories, dated 17 October 1967. 

c. KACV Directive 405-1, RS/iL Ef;TATE « Acquisition, Allocation, Reporting 
and Disposal of Real i^tate within the Republic of ’’^ietnan by US liilitary 
Forces, dated 3 November 1966. 

d. li;.CV Construction Bulletin 415-2-10, CRITERIA FOR lilLIT.ARY COir.TRUCTICTl , 
dated 14 December 1966. 

e. U ARV Regulation 405-1, RSAL S^VTATE . Acquisition, Utilization, 
Recording, Reporting and Disposal of Real Estate, dated 13 liay 1968. 

f. U'iARV Regulation 405-3, R!:)AL ESTATE . Base De'-elomentAicster Planning, 
dated 20 Ha" 1968. 

g. U ..iR’' Regulation 415-1, CO!<tTRUCTION ^ Standards, Procedures and 
Control of Construction R^sour^ies, dated 4 April 1968. 

h. USARV Regulation 420-^4, REPAIRS AND UTILITIES . Minor Construction - 
Approval Authority, Pi^gramoing and Review of R&U Ihrojeets (Revised 
edition in printing) 

1. Users Manual For Customers of the U*«S* Amy Tlngineor Construction 
Agency Vietnam, undated. 


Incl 1 


APO 96m 

jUD«r%CT: Request for lER JU]:^rt for 

rmil: H(^ 

Prirade or Dqul^^alent Le^'e! Parent Unit • * 


TO: HQ ^ 

20th Engineer Brigade 
.VTTN: /Omi-CCft 
APO 96491 

1. References: 

a. /is applicable. 

b. U.iARV Regulation 415-1. 

c. UO.VRV Regulation 220-10, 

d. U-ARV Messaget A'llGD-PO 68208, subject: Base Camp Consolidation 
dated 5 "eptember 1968. 

e. U'jAR^' Letter, XvHEN-MO, subject: Engineer Effort and Resources, 
dated 21 August 1968, 

2. AUTHWrry: HO. directing isove, message cite, letter, etc. 


a. irER supnort is required a t . 

b. Site vns approved b’’' XXX Case De^relopraont Planning Poard o n 

e. i\rea has (not) been previously occupied b:* a unit. 

d. If land is not presently controlled by the US Gor’emnent a request 
for real estate uas sub^tted to_on _. 

Incl 3 


(Office S.'-nbol) 

fjUBJSC'i: Hequest for If-iR Support fo r ' 

4. SCOP" OF WORK REQUIHED; (Include as appropriate) 

* a. Concrete slabs fo r n esshalls. 

b. Field abov»er3 and burn-out Latrines fo r p ersonnel. 

c. Parking hardstands fo r v ehicles an d aircraft 

(To include number and type of aircraft revetnents required) 

d. Open storage area.* 

* .« 

e. Access and main area roads.* 

f. Grading and stabilization necessary' to accoimodate the erection 

o f t ents. 

g. General descriptive statement as to the condition of the sits^ 
i.e., wooded, sandy, poorly drained etc. if available. 


a. KTA of unit and desired occupancy data (if different). 

b. Contact officer (name, unit telephone number of person whon 
constructing unit is to contact for specific information and coordination) 

c. Other clarifying or amplifying information. 




*Only if required 

Request should carry an appropriate classification if applicable 

Incl 3 (cent) 


59TM E^4GK GP 










DianriTMiirrr cf tik apj-iy 

APO San Francisco 96491 


1* Purpose: This publication is provided to assist the tactical 

conn '-Ticlor in the planning and conduct ..of land clearing operations assigned 

to his un^t. 

2. The 20'fii EKGIiiKER BRIGADE has two organic land clearing ic ins (the 

LCT auJ the S6th LiTT) whicli arc available to sup*X)rt II FIELD FORCE 
VjETM.iM aiyi its CFCON units. The loans aro not self supiiorting md mist 
be auginciitcd with comiii'nd, control, administr'.tive, supply, and maintenance 
personnel and ciiuipnent. Each land clearing team consists of 30 each DTE 
dozers with Rome Plow blades. 

3. During the period 1 August 1967 thru 5 August 1968, 2OTH ELGIKEER 
BRIf-ADE land clearing units have cleared more than 120,000 acres of jungle 
in the III CCRI5 TACTICAL ZOi’lE. This experience and the resulting lessons 
learned, after action reports, and association with tictical unit o.-ir-minders 
h'.ve resulted in this printing of the Comivkinders Guide to Land Clec*’ir.g. 

4. Any corv.ionts or recommendtitlons regarding the contents of this l.'.nd^ ;ulde are welcome and should be addressed to iha luacrsigncd, 




1. The Lind clearing t.ean io orgainzed under MICE 5-36E and augmented 
by additional pernonnel and equipment* The team nviy bo attached to a combat 
onglnrer conp:my (minus) or a land clearing task force (LCTF) may bo 
formed for clearjng missions with the land clearing tom ns its 
nucleus* The following is a typical orgatdsationi 

a* Headquarters section! CO, XO, Ist Sgt, Supply SOT, Rear Elomont 
KCO, Company Clerk, Supply Clerk and two medics* 

b* Commui^oiitions section! One communications SQT and three radio 

c* Miintcnsnco section: One warrant officer, ono motor SGT, three 
maintcnanco team leaders, two contact truck operators, two woldors, two 
fuel tank ot)orators, five ordnance mechanics, eighteen engineer 
mcchanias and two parts clerks* 

d* Land clearing section: One section loader, a lieutenant, one section 
SGT, three cutting toam leaders, three assistant cutting team leaders, and 
sixty dozer operators divided into three teams of twenty operators each* 

2* The LCT? leaves a rear detachment in its base camp consisting of the 
XO, Supply SGT, rear Eleisent IfCO, Company Clerk, Sup;^ Clerk and Barts 

3* The teams organisation is shown in Figure #1* 

4* i«’orml equipment density of the LCTF is as follows: 


DTE Tr-ictor 

30 oa (normally with 6 oa bull 
blades and 24 roos plows)* 


Low-beds v/tractor 

10 ea 


Disc Harrow 

9 ea 


Air eexaprossor, 250 ofis 

4 ea 


M548 Traci: 

7 ea 


2-^ ton fuel tanker 

2 ea 


•i" ton truck 

1 ea 


3/4 ton contact truck 

3 ea 


3/4 ton cargo truck 

1 ea 

5* Required equipment not authorised the LCTF, but necessary for 
effective operetlMio is aai follows! 



a. Arc, with radio 

b. Wrecker, 5 ton 

c, An-Ptc 25 radio 

d, mi 

c, VTR 

1 ea 
1 ca 
8 ca 

1 ea (2 hoxirs / day minimum) 

1 ca (On an no needed biois only 
for equipment recovery «ind mainten¬ 

6. The LCTF operates best as an entity. The land clearinc element 
should not bo sub divided into more than 3 separate teams of 8 to 10 
dOBcrs each. The LCTF should never be split up between 2 or more land 
clearing operations, but must bo employed together. Otherwise, maintenance, 
co-nmind, and control augumentations cannot provide the necessary support. 

If clearing teams ore employed at widely' separated cutting sites on the 
same o^-tcration, additional maintenance support must be obtained for that 
part of the te-'.m separated from the coin b^y. This support should include 
as a minimum: 

a. Lifting capability such as a wreciwr, VTR, or 3 ton crane. 

b. Contact truck or its equivalent. 

c. Additional air or ground transport to insure command and control and 
a steady flow of repair parts. 


1« Rcnponsibilitlos: 

a. The -tactir'il commander l»as overall rcs’Hjnoibility for I'ukI clearing 
operations. He is assigned the mission, a»id the 20rH EHGIHEER BRIGiVDE 
land clearing tiask force is placed in direct support for the duration of 
the operation. The following are the normal res'xmsibilitics of the 
tactica l corwiandcrx 

(1) In coordination with the CO, LCTF, designation of the area 
to be cut ©anil day. Care will be taken that tho nj*cn- is not too largo so 
that the plows c-m complete their work by 1600 hours. This \dll permit 
timely return to base camp and oaintenance. 

(2) IVovlsion of adequate aircraft support to tho LCTF commander 
to insure cutting of accurate well defined areas, thus reducing unnecessary 
effort. A nininum of two hours is naedod when the initial trace of a 

new cut is being nadc. Additional air time shoiild be provided ditring the 
morning for iadequato control of the cutting. Ono half hour of air tlmo 
should also be provided around 1600 hours each day to estimate the acreage 
cut during tho day -.nd rocon of the next days cut. 

(3) Provision of >’idoquato security for the cutting teams and tho 
fiw'.intenanco personnel in base eamps, during movement, and during cutting. 

(4) iDOurlng that at least two hours of daylight is allocated for 
nMntcn’nce at tho end of each day, 

b. The commanding officer of tho LCTF is rosponslblo fori 


(1) Coordinating the selection of a cutting area with the scniKxr 
tactical comrrndcr* , 

(2) Organizing tho cutting of tl^o area designated b7 tho senior 
tacticr.1 conuandcr in accordance with the security and cutting procoduros 
outlined in this guide, 

(3) Insuring that adequate security is provided for the land clearing 
element. If at anj' time there is in his opinion inadequate socurity, he 

has tho responsibility to withdraw tho plows to a secure area and 
im.acdi'.toly notify tho comnandor of tho tactical unit in chnrgo of tho 

(4) Insuring that proper operating procedures arc foUowod hy tho 
land clearing elements• 

(5) Providing technical advice ajid assistance to tho tactical 
commander, particularly as to tho c'.pability of the task force to cut under 
tho existing torr:'.in, trsOfficabillty, weather, and security conditions. 

2* Sccurltyx 

a. Security of a land clearing task force Is most Important to the 
success of a land clearing operation. Tho VC rocogniso tho effect tho 


::::c:no. "^ s 07. 3U' rm-s vco;-ii.-i<v .oci 

Ho-ric olow ’> r. on 1;?: o^j« *aGio)'3 - -a willing to cr. hia ''icn ■wir:')U,';;h 

c.r.r:. •;, ’ttcnipta tf) ('ca.'.'li' or cIcatrcQ'’ Lavl ( .V .iion;, cqulpmont, Th-;/' 
forf^ naat *>e ar'rcas’vo, alert, ifT recvsnai* c ‘t .'11 t?.Mrr.» "CIi-’.il.’.o'' will do 
all I>o c-w to dinini^it an operatin'-, erq-teci Hy biiow3c' • iP.xlty 1 r r.lic.un ’\v tho 
ccciu’ity clcnKsntri* 

b. Adequate necurity Tor Lxrgo area cuttinc oixjrations c-m lo iro-vrrdod only 
It n»ch .niacci :: J’r.iitr;* -"id. •'r-'aor lu'kitc, ;JoiT,r.l apcrj*lty -'roccc'uroa arc outlined 

(1) Tlie size of tlio security force uacd to acctu’c tbc I-P'1 clr.'.ri -’3 team 
will also Lr ^overne:! b’ the t-'.ctica.l sitivition. iJorriviHj'^ •■ji ar..v:;':d c- v.'.lry 
t3;*oop reinCorced ty a t.'.nlc platoon will be .isrigned the -niaaipi^ 

(2) A socpi'o area \;ill be cstjbliahtt I'Kii uiat^I, ‘■.ij ~ .i- each cutt 
arta. lor use as a m••intei'uncc u'.se* 

(3) The security olemsnt coinnuiVicr should defer .•■ • on Mitting 
procccivrcf.. to the cutti;;^ tenaa co'uaiiv'er, exce;5t 5n enses n' t*' . ical '--rGency* 

c* j ifantry foot trooi^s nwy be used .(S scciurity whe". tlie L'.'v’ clo'ring team 
is cata^^eu in stri ^ cuttiiv,. If, tliere iuist be a sufficioitiy larte force 
to out^xjst o.-.xi S' cure tlie perimeter of the entire area being cut^ However, 
mechanized i:ifrntry is TMferrect because of its nfinewrerability and .-.dditional 
firepower which is a stro^ig -.’oterrent to the VC. 

d. Tips for tbo toctical comm'.nderi 

(1) Artillery preparation of the cutting area prior to tlie beg?Ji .'ing 
of cutting is adv:.8P.rlo. 

(.'0 Haras'i g fire, I'irecird at ajpht rnto t)ir , rc-i to be cut the neirt 
di.y, effectively din courages ambushes, mine parties, etc, 

(3) Amiush octrois and reconnaissance Iv fire wi-Tl effectively discover 
ix)cl:et3 of enemy resistance aivl roscoiutige sniper vux? RFC att'clcs, 

(4) Security cleine its .and. rorae plows Bhoinld never use the s me route 
to a:id i>om th'^ ci’.t, ; u order to coxmter enemj' rai.aang activities, 

(5) Plows should never move bctw:>en tlao cut and. tlic b se e mp without 
pro:xjr security escort, 

(6) Tlie .lost t'ffrctivc .-letliod lor movin;, to the cut is to have the entire 
colui.Tn led ly a ta.n!: followed b-y a bull blid.c, vho l.nll bltide c..’n clc. r a path 
for tl>c plows AFC's ar.d wi71 .also deto'^te . -ay rai.::e8 encountered, 


(7) Plow 0 ;W.".t 0',*8 <aitl iikiintcnance laersoniael ha* •; the •/ . I -'ctermi-iition 
as to the scrv;.© of thijij* f!i'oh:ne8. The operators u.- -.v rt .iding 
oxalcrs 'to laovo to a secure area if tlicir tr ctor overhe-its or it: .crt,. .Tenclng 
raoch.inic.-’l difr*.,.cxilty. 

Sj.GTlO • lit - QF^IUYIO/^S (cont?.nue tl) 

(G) An ?j.t:ioV.i.liKc:o plow nct-nr. trou‘Ic; thr security should 
inmora.-.tHly . ;i'est:. .'tc. The '■‘low operators will stop -Uicir nlows only 
if they h?.vc cx^ricaccd rvech-.LUccl difficulties -th t preveat thc: r 
no'/iii;; to n secure area, tlicy are in con-tict with the euoiny, or they 
h;?vc discovered n dud row)d, ‘ ooLy 'trap or enemy mine, 

(9) iXKv rovr.v's ohoiUd. be nv^r’ced in'.vx^i^.tclj' ly tlic security 
eleiiveats to prevent other plows aid vehicles from runnijig over thci!', 

(10) Plows should never be moved at night. 

(11) I’o security veheile should ever be closer tlun /O ict'"*; :o 
a plovi wliile cutting or moving. This will preclude accidental iu.vj ;.- to 
personnel and vehicles should the tractor or ploir blEuie detonate an 

nine or looby trap or should a large tree fall in the direction of other 
vnliiclc E. Perso nel chould never move aroimd on the ground near ploi/s 
when they cuttin;;. 

(12) Once a base cuap has been, it should be ocaipiotl 
ii'ined.'.atcly. U'.occupi.nd b'.so camps have in the trist been mined prior to the 
arrival of the occupying forces. 

(13) comii'jvl and control of the land operation 
can be accompli-shcd ody if the tactioil conm-ivler irovidoe the LCTP 
platoon l<y?der An AFC with radio. 

(14) Holico-»ter li'wviing tones should Ihj cle.'red by the ICIF every 
300 meters, 


(15) Areas should not be windrowed unless absolutely necessary, 

such AS route clearing or Cor 12's. An urea requires 2 to 3 times tlic effort 
A'ld timo when wmlrovr.- iig is ■'nvolved tlvui cleiring vi.thout w: ndrov: ng. 

All w: ndroving shodd be occoapli shed with hull blades rather than rooe 

3* C»itt:'ng procetlva-os: 

a, ’Syneo of ci’t* Jungle cic.-ring is nora' .'iccomplishrd uti.ll ung 
oiie of tliree tochniA’Ucs. 

(1) lloci: cutti ’g: This trehniqur is utilized when c,loar; ug large 
areas of j'Uig.le, An ^rna of approKimxtcl:* 300 .7cres is dtosen ar/ 
org'.nizod . .nto throe sections of aanraximately 100 acres c\ich and 
aosrg.’cd to each of the throe wttiJig The le.'d ploi; of c-'cli teaia 

first clears *i tr.icc aroiuid tho ;\rea to be ci’t» Jungle is cleared lij' the 
plows a'-d oocuri'is' rlcncat moving in a countor-cloc’v:'.ce di.rectdon. Cutting 
can . 0.80 I o .'ccoanliched when the seoivi'^' vehicles arc nested .-roiu;*’. tlio 
psrinstor of tho cut. When the cut is nearly uomi>loted, tiio "le-'cL" p?.ow 


SZu^mi III - oreiL;TIOMS (continuod) 

of cuch to;n will be pulled fro.:i the cut to bepin r. new tmcc. Ap])roxi'!P.tcly 
four tr-'’-ctorG \/ill be, left to coiiplctc tho cut, while the other cix move 
to tho now nrc”.* Block cutting is illuntmtod in Figure 2» 

(2) Striu cutting; Thin technique is used when cutting nlong I'oads 
••’.nd tr ils or *lu:n clcnring landing zpnes or surveillance lanes • If tho 
l-'.nc is wide enough (200 meters or greater)* A technique similar to 
block cutting m.y bo used on an elongated rectangle, crossing the tr;.il 
when required although care shoiQd be taken to insure that drainage 
ditched and rord shoulders are not damaged in tho process. In narrower 
cuts, one tc'jn cutting abreast is the most efficient method of clearing* 

(3) Clearing fields of fire; This technique is utilised in clearing 
bL'.se camps and fields of fire* Tho team starts at tho camps center and 
cuts outward moving in a counterwcloclwiso direction to the otter 
extremities of the IDP* Tho windrows should extend radially outward from 
the enter of tho liDP* Clearing flolds of fire is illustrated in Figure 3* 

b* Cultivated rubber; The normal technique used to cut cultivated 
rubber utilized an anchor chain, towed by two dozers with a third "cluisc” 
dozer following behind as illustrated in Figure 4> The chain uproots 2 or 
more rows of trocs, (depondiivg on size) on each pass* The chase dozer 
follows nt the apex of tho chain and clears the chain should it got hung 
up on a stump or extremely large tree* Chains cannot bo well utilised in 
light imdorgrowth as tliey will only push down the light undergrowth leaving 
it to spring back up* 

e* Acreage estimates; Tho following nro acreage estimates for a clearing 
te^ua of 25 tractors for various type cuts, under optiuun coMitiesM of 
security and level, dry terrain, excluding, windrowing* 

(1) Block cutting; 



Light Jungle 
MedAm J\mgle 
Heavy Jungle 

(2) Strip cutting 

250 acrcs/day 
200 acres/day 
150 scros/day 

(a) Light Jungle 

(b) Medium Junglo 

(c) Heavy Jxingle 

(3) Cultivated rubber: 

200 acres/day 
150 acrcs/day 
100 acros/dny 

50 acros/day/tonm of 9 plows 

d* Large trees are often left standing as they preside less cover to 
tlie enemy in a vortical position* Cutting ]mrge trees with rorao jdows is 
also inefficient because of tho extra s|d.itting effort required* 

4* Organization of tho cutting area* 

a* Initial novo out to tho designated cutting area will be accomplished 
with the seoirity element in tho lead* Nomolly an initial preparation by 
fire of tiu> cuttlr^ aroa is conducted* 


r.l-.>rriON III - OIEIUTIOHS (continued) 

b# On .irriv.'.l in th' cutting aren, a secure area will iMrk(li"tely 
be estrbl.lRlicd Tor the use of disabled or overheating plows. An air 
coriprcssor, water trailer and a contact vehicle will norn'lly be placed 
in tlic si-cure area, 

c, Iinn<jdi.-.tcly after arriving at the cutting :^roa, the scciu'ity clcracrrb 
and the cutting team, led bj' a previously designated "lead plow", will 

nove oxit to begin cutting an initial trace around the area. This initial 
cut \d.ll bo controlled only by the pLitoon leader of the cutting platoon 
fron an .-.ircraft, 


d. The CO of the security force and CO of the LCTF will plan and 
coordinate the cut so as to have an area big enough to Icecp one tcan 
busy one day, yet sraall enough so that no uncut islands will be left 

in the area at the end of the day. Such uncut islands are open invitations 
to the cneny for nines or anbushes the nox+. day, 

c. In the event a cut v;lll be finished early, the CO of the LCTF 
will notify tlie tactical corif.v.nder a nininuiu of one hour before cocf lotion 
to insure that an aircraft is made available to the platoon loader for 
starting a new cut, 

f. All cutting should be coiiq)leted at 1600 hours to allow time for 
mintcnancc of the plows at the base c^jnp, A raininuri of two hours of 
daylight TOintonanco is required, 

g, Rotvirn to the base camp will bo accor-pllshed in the sane narjaer 
as the nove out, with security leading. The rotujm will be node by a 
different route from the one taken to the cut* 

h, A plow will be halted when it begins to overheat. Under no cir- 
cunstaaiccs will the tempdrature gages be allowed to register in tho black 
range nv -rked on the face of tho gaxigo, 

i. Base camps and HDP's will bo sited so that plows will be required 
to do a mdiilnun of walking. Under no elrciunstances will plows be required 
to wall: riorc a distance of four Idlo-netcrs from tiie cut to the base 
caop. All walking a'’st be done in first gear,. Floi’s c nnot nove faster 
th’n three miles oer henu*, 

J, Plows si'tould not work too close to one anoth- r, Moxinun cutting 
is achieved when one plow is not hindered tanothor : lower cutting 

k. Plows sliould not be operated in 3rd gear, as cxcossivo speed causes 
vibrations which danago cab assomblies* 

1* Plow blades are "floated" (le, kept .as close to the ground as 
possible) when cutting. This leaves a nininun of stump and also dotomtes 
rdiios Y;ith the blcodo instead of tho track* 

m. Plows will net bo used ns recovery vehicles* A VTR will be 
provided by the tactical connander for this purpose* 



rp.cnail TTT , QlTT^\TTOm fcontium^) 

5« Orc'i^nzation of base defensive positions* 

n* Tho LCTF requires a circular area of 200 meters minimum dlarioter 
for its base camp, A hnrd, dry imintoivuico nroa should bo included, 
\rticncvcr possible* 

b* The following procefuros should be followed in constructing a 
night defensive oosition or base canqp. 

(1) Under no circunstances will other cutting‘begin before cutting 
for tho base canp rirca is cooqfilGte* 


(2) Fields of fire around tho base can^ will bo cut by the LCTF 
under the direction of the tactical conoonder* 

(3) Under no circumstances will rone plow blades be used to dig 
in vehicles and dig bunkers* The blade* is designed exclusively to cut 
trods and brush* Dozors with bull blndes ore part of a LCTF and are 
available for tills worV* 

(4) The LCTF iraqulros tlireo bull blades to prepare its area* Bull 
blades can then bo nado available to the tactical co'amandor to assist 

tho supporting combat engineer unit in preparing the NDP* 

(5) Base camp construction should stop for naintonnneo of dozers 
at 1630 hours* 

(6) Under no circunstoncos will dozers bo worked after the hours 
of darlcnoss, unless tlie tactical situating and condition of the doionses 
of the craiqi dictator othbrviee*, 


(7) No dozers will be left behind for base caiop construction once 
tho base caap is occupied and cutting begins* Any futher base cam'> 
construction is tho responsibility of tho supporting combat engineer unit* 



SECTION IV - M; ifrr: i?lAllCE 

1, T1 10 LGTF will imlirt'.in r.ll mchincn acsigncd to the unit, 

2. TJiiitl Eciiolon Contact Team; A third echelon contact team directed 

b;; a conior engineer i.xichanic will occompiny the LCTF to the field. This 
team ;'illbc • with a 2-'r ton truck and n 3/4 ton contact truck. The 

tc’.ra will have c complete cot of tools end all portable test instrunents 
necessary for third echelon maintenance. The tcvan will be responsible for: 

a. Performing all possible third echelon maintenance in the field in 
as tincly a iiftnncr as possible, 

b. Coordinating the ordering and delivery of 'll third cholon 
repair parts to the field location, 

c. Coordi:vxting with the CO of the LCTF and third echelon laxir 
elements on tiio decision ot evc.cmto mchlc^'o to the third echelon rcjar 

d. If oquiprioiit is to bo evacuated to direct support naintcnanco 
located in a rear base camp, the LCTF will subiait a CkV Form 2407 to 
that shop. In general, if lift capability is not available or cstinatod 
work cxcocds 72 hours, the tractor will be evacuated to a base carq[> 

3» Procedures, 

a. Each dr y one tractor from each team will be held in the naint¬ 
cnanco .\rca. These machines will have all first and second echelon 
naintomnee performed, all fluid changes nfccossary and lubrications, 
belly pans cloancd out, radiator flushed, and all required periodic 
naintonance chocks perfofned, 

b. E<\ch evening a nininun of two hours of d-ylight maintenance 
will be perforrand. During this time, all first echelon rrintcnance will 
bo performed, to include sharpening of each blade, 

c. Maintenance problems not resolvable at organisational or DSU 
level will Innodlr.toly bo brought to the attention of tho Group Maint- 
cnanco Officer, 

4* Stand down 

For every 60 days of opor itlon. a n nimum of 10 days of strnd 
down is required, exclusive of travel 

b. Stand downs should be conducted at tho homo station baso camp of tne 

c. Prior to st>and down the naintcnanco officer should determine, 
as near as pc^siblc, what rep'.ir parts \dll be required to successfully 
co.nplcto the maintenance portion of ilio st^ind down in the allotted flriic. 

SECTIO N IV ^ ailNTEruillCK (continued) 

Subject repair p-.rts list should bo turned over to the Grouii MRE not less 
tli?.n 7 d’.ys prior to down. The ?1RE should .Insure that s.11 jwssiblc 
efforts are expended to expexUte receipt of needed repair parts. 

d. The LCTF iiuintenance officer will insure the.t an odquatc site 
for n .intcnrncc rop^.irs and needed equipinont is availiiblo to accomplish 
all repairs. 



1* The LCTF cle’x:nda on the tactical coocr.ndero security elei-ients for lo{;istioal 
support while in the field. This loRistical support will include; 

a. Meals and riessing facilities to include meals served in insulated 
food containers or late meals served after all maintenance has been 
porforned on dosers. 

b. Miniimim daily POL and water requirements rret 

(1) Potable water 

e *• 

(2) rionpotablo wntor 

(3) Diesel fuel 

(4) Gasoline 

400 gallons 
400 gallons 
2000 gallons 
60 gallons 

c. Ice and Sundry packs. Quantities sufficient for the n\imbcr of 
men in the field and comparable to that allowed for tlie field units 
of soctirity elements afe required. 

d. Air transportati<»i. When the LCTF is moving from on extremely 
muddy NDP, the following equipment should bo airlifted to preclude 

(1) Contact trucl» 

(2) Are welders 

(3) Water trailers 

(4) Lubricator * 

(5) Extra blades^ nabe^ C framos, otc. 

e. Other logistical support. Bubrioatlng oil, groase, spare parts, 
and other small items will bo provided by the LCIF's parent u^t. 

f. Amnunltim resupply will be drawn from the supportinf security element. 


!• Tlio LCTF liac the organic Cipabiility to monitor only two radio note; 
the Lf.TF net and one other net designated hy the tactical corirv'.ndcr. 

2, During cuttijig operations, each cutting tern will use the net of the 
scttirity decent \/orking with then, 

3, D.nectioa of the cutting teams will take priority over all traffic 
on tlie net, e:xept in tlie event of a t^^etical eraergency, 

4* Tl'iC LCTF *will mintain communications on its ncsi(fncd nets twenty- 
foul* hoiurs a day, 

5* Reports will be submitted only to the tactical coom'-ndcr and the 
S-3 of the parent unit of tho LCTF, Other agencies dosirin^ information 
.will obtain it from tliese sources. 




7 Deccrabnr 1967 

SUBJECT: Indoctrination of loung Noncomdscioned Officers 

1. Throughout our Army's histoiy, particularly in times of conflicts, 
many young men have been promoted to levels of responsibility seemingly out 
cf Iteeping with the experience and maturity that is desirable in military 
leaders. Among the senior officers of our Army today are some who were 
eomrndors of companies and battalions at tender ages during World War II. 

We know that yoving men can meet the challenges of leadership and bring to 
the task exceptional strengths found oaly in youth. It is obvious that 
there is no Justification for faulting tray's young NCO's on their youth 
alone. There is, however, a necessity to recogidze the challenge to our 
ovm Jeadership to accelerate the acquisition of Judgment, maturity, and 
understanding by these young NCO's. 

Z. Ky immediate concern is with an apparent tendency of some of our 
young NCO's to shed their role as military loaders with the sounding of 
retreat. Insufficient leadership by NCO's in many incidents involving the 
lower grades, and actual !XX) involvement in incidents discreditable to 
themselves and the Army, point up the ne’ed for corrective action. 

3. Army leaders are rmsponsiblo 24 hours of each day for everyone 
janior t) them. In too many instances this has been forgotten. I am sure 
that the NCO's are aware of this rosponsibiJ.ity and the authority that 
accompanies it, so I wonder why they do not act when action is needed. Are 
our young NCO's confident we will back their exercise of leadership off-duty? 

Do policies encourage the exercise of such leadership? Or do NCO's believe 
that an attempt to deter an off-duty soldier headed for trouble will result 
in a Monday morning quarterback review of Judgment or be met with indifference? 
Do nur young NCO's thoroughly understand the necessity of setting an example? 
Setting a good exanqile is a fundamental trait of the good leader. Do we 
encourage and insist upon it? 

7 Dcccnbcr 1962 


SUBJi^CTi'; Indoctrinati-'n f Y^ung Hone imirri '-ncd Officcrr 

/,. A roviev; of the guidance and ."o^lcics Ihat bti-ir f'n l.hir nubjccL r.!i Kid bo 
nndc at each Icvc' of c’raord. \lo need nn rg^,i*c::rivo , iMgroai t' irrtil^ » 
2/-hf;nr ccncc of rcrponsibiliiy Ir vr A'CC*:-. etrerrinf;; 

a. The necessity of example as a trait and nark of fitness for leadership. 

b. The lcadcrrhi]> responsibilities of NCO's on-duty or off-duty, on-po-t or 
off-s^ost, in uniform or in mufti, and to subordinates o'f their wn and of other 

c. A leadership climate tliat encourages an )X!0 to take charge and to guide 
soldiers awny from impending trouble. 

$. I enjoin you to continue to develop and use effective means to assure eom- 
plete xinderstanding of the obligations that aceompany rank and to encourage 
!:C0's to act '..'hen action is indicated day or night, on-duty or off-duty. CILITMAII 
Brigadier General, USA 


22 October 1968 


20th Enrlnoor Brlrade 

IIHC, 20th Engineer Brigade 

HHC, 20th Engineer Brigade (lat Oak Leaf Cluster) 

34th Enrineer Group 

69th Engineer Battalion (VALOROUS UNIT CITATION) 

HHC, 34th Engineer Group 

79th ^incor Group 

HHC, 79 th Engineer Group 
66th Engineer Compani/ 

100th Engineer Company 
362d Engineer Company 
588th I^lneer Battalion 
I68th En^neer Battalion 
554th Engineer Battalion 
500th Engineer Company 

I68th Engineer Battalion (let Oak Leaf Cluster) 

HHC, 79th Engineer Group (1st Oak Leaf Cluster) 
34th Engineer (Battalion 

p 66th &igineer Company (1st Oak Leaf Cluster) 

1S9th ^plnoer Croun 

HHC, 159th Engineer Group 

46th Engineer Battalion (3d Oak Leaf Cluster) 

^d Ehgineer Battalion 

I69th Engineer Battalion (1st Oak Leaf Cluster) 
103d Engineer Company 
92d Engineer Battalion 

62d Engineer Battalion (lat Oak Leaf Cluster) 
I69th Engineer Battalion (2d Oak Leaf Cluster) 


IaI i) 


• OfVI«INAT1M« ACTtVirv ( C tiyw n aiNMr> 

HQ DA, OAC^OR, Washington, D.C. 20310 

jaa. REPORT (CCURITV CL* tsi P 1C A TIO^' 



Senior Officer Debriefing Report of BG Curtis Chapman, CG, 20th Engr Bde 

«• OeacRIRTI VK MOTK* (7yp» •! NRart am^ JRclualM 

Sr. Officer Debriefing Rept; CG, 20th Engr Bde. 23 July 1967 to 2 November 1968 

«• AUTMOmtl (Fhmt MM, aNM# Mftola to*! ibmw> 

BG Curtis Chapman 


30 October 







7 A. NO. OF NCFt 



lAI* fpeH} 

t mtmhtff mrni mmr 

DA, OACSFOR, Washington, D.C. 20310 


ily tUitificaUoii