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Full text of "DTIC AD0515469: Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division"

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AGC D/A Itr, 5 Sep 1975; AGC D/A Itr, 5 
Sep 1975 






- ACC y4 //a. 

^ 7J. 







' - •' * 

DlSTRimrriON V^^LUtlTED* 



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F.lfcopy ' '51 5469 






^Al^AilAM^rOAi tjr TO! 


ACDA-A (M) (> A|)l 71) JwE^-UT-7<7jlS21 

SlilUKCT; Operational Repo 
.•Mrborne lUvlsion 

rtJ^Lessons Learned, Headquarters. H/ lsO 




<>y ^ -yt -fL 

.» _. _ . _ _ _ , , 

Tfie' .iFtacBPa rcporl la'forw^ded loTTrevi'i^' and evaTuaTl'bn^In 
accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15. 


t(Srt Forw^ded lo“r review and evaTuaTl'bn 


1 . The Information contained In this report Is provided to Insure 
that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit 
of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training 

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation 
should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, 
ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter. 

4. The aerial flame technique discussed in paragraph 2c(l)(b) of the 
inclosed report is being evaluated by the US Army Combat Developments 
Comand, Pending final results of this evaluation, Army-wide use of 
this technique is not recommended. 


I Incl 


Commanding Generals 

US Continental Army Coimnand 
US Array Combat Developments Comraand 
US Army Materiel Comraand 

US Army War College 

US Army Command and General Staff College 
US Army Armor School 
US Army Aviation School 
US Army Chemical School 
US Army Civil Affairs School 
(Continued on page 2) 

Major ^neral, USA 
The Adjutant General 

This mate-.u-.l ^ Unlled Slates 

the nation.-.! El.-fF-of 

within . 3 ;). 

(Title IG, V. ‘ I 

the trans^ri^-i- ;i cv : > - ■ ' T,cf:aoa i» 

any nianno; 10 - 

prohibited hy 



Regraded unclassified when separated 
from classified inclosure. 




0 0 3 (d> 



niST KI HUriDN U'OISL 'll) 

US \niiy UiniilMt Survo i 1 1 aiicu Scliool 
'US Annv KlocLroiuc Warlaro School 
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tUiiof of ling ineers 

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The I’rovost Marshal General 

t'onuiianding Generals 

'JS Army Flight Tr.iining Center 
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ill Corps, ATTN: Director, Project MASSTER 
Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force, Plans & Operations 
Commandant of the Marine Corps 
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The Air University Library 
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Best Available Copy 





C)fr.4 i* o» •»*.■ < » Sirtif 

APO 96383 

AVDG-CS 15 August 1970 

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Iwcarned, 101st Airborne 
Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS 
CSFOR-65 (R2) (U) 


The inclosed Operational Report - Lessons Learned is forwarded in 
compliance with USARV Regulation 525-15 and XXIV Corps Regulation 


1 Incl 


Colonel, GS 
Chief of Staff 




8-CG, XXIV Corps, ATTN: AVII-GCT, APO 96349 
3-CG, lOlst Abn Div (Ambl) 

1-CO, Ist Bde, 101st Abn Div (Ambl) 1-ACofS, 

1-CO, 2d Bde, lOlst Abn Div (Ambl) 1-ACofS, 

1-CO, 3d Bde, lOlst Abn Div (Ambl) 10-ACofS, 

1-CO, 101st Avn Gp (Cbt) (Ambl) 1-ACofS, 

1-CO, lOlst Abn Div Arty (Ambl) 1-ACofS, 






lOlst Abn Div (Ambl) 
101st Abn Div (Ambl) 
lOlst Abn Div (Ambl) 
101st Abn Div (Ambl) 
101st Abn Div (Ambl) 


Regraded unclassified when separated 
from classified inclosure. 


Table of Content* 


1. Operations: Sipilfleant Actlrities 

a. Operations 1 

b. Training - ^ 

c. Cheaical - -- b 

d. Intelligence - -- -- - — - — _ — --- 12 

e. Rsrsonnel ---- - —--- —-- - — - 24 

f. Logistics ----— -- 26 

g. Civil Affairs ------------------- --- 28 

h. Psychological Operations-- _ _ _ . ... 52 

i. Medical ----— — - - - ---— - 54 

J. Signal- 55 

k. Engineer -- 56 

l. Angy Aviation ----------------------- 58 

a. Air Cavalry Operations ---- - --- - -------- 40 

n. Artillary-- — — - --- - — - - 40 

o. Inforaatlon -- - —- 43 

2. lessons learned: Conssander's Observations, 

Evaluations and Receutnenciations 

a. Personnel - -- -- — - -- -- —- 45 

b. Intelliganca ---------- _ ------- _ _ 4^ 

c. Operations -- 46 

d. Organisation ----- 3I 

a. Training- - 51 

f. Logistics ----------------- _ ------ 31 

g. CoBSBunications _ __ 3I 

h. Materiel 51 

i. Other ___ -------- _____ 51 

3. Oepsurtaent of the Army Survey Information 


1. Operations Narrative 

2. Organisational Structure 

3. Key Personnel Roster 

4. Field Expedient Antenna 

5. Ltr, AVDG-CS, this Hq, 16 Jun 70, subj: 

HVA Sapper Attack Against FSB Tomahavk 




juflJiat;T: Op#ratlon*l h«port - L^aaons L»*rned, JOlat Airborne :<i»lslon 
lAlrmoblle), f'eriod t-ndlnit 31 Julj JS 70 , LSrUK-65 ll'-i'j (Uj 

1. (f'J Operations: jlffn 1 fleant ActiTitlas. 

a. (0) Operations. 

llj (^ration TtlA-i jTAH couenced on 1 April 1970 and has continued 
thro^i^hout the entire period of this report. The operation was dereioped in 
close coordination and cooperation with the let Inf Dl» lAKVKj and Thus Thlen 
ProTlnce end Sector officials to continue to provide territorial security 
for the accoapilsheent of pacification and derelopsent in the populated low¬ 
lands; deny the eneay access to the populace and resources In the coastal 
areas; and to seek out and destroy eneay forces, bese areas, and cache sites. 

(a) The lat and 3 d hdea and reconnaissance assets of the division have 

been oaployed to maintain a protactlve shield beyond the periphery of the populated 
lowlands of Thus Thlen Province to prevent incursions of enei^ forces into the 
populated area, and insure a secure environment for continued pro^rtisa of the 
province pacification and developaent prograa for 1970 . The fades operated in 
close coordination with the 1 st, 3 d, and 54 th PeRts (APVN), conductin;? exten¬ 
sive patrols, surveillance, and security operations In assispied AOs to deny the 
use of these areas to the enemy. Combet operations by infantry elements were 
supported by direct and general support artillery fires, provided froo mutually 
supporting fire support bases, secured by elements of the bde and located on 
a broad front beyond the fsriphery of the lowland areas. Combined airmobile 
operatione were conducted within aaslgned AOs to eliminate enemy forces, ba-se 
areas, and cache sites, 

(b) The 2d Bde has been employed in the populated lowlands, piedmont and 
eastern edge of the canopy in coordination with the 3 d and 54 th hegts (ARVk), 
to coordinate and support the pacification and developeient program, conduct 
security operations on the edge of the canopy, and secure sustained fire support 
bases to provide direct support artillery co'/erage of the area of operations. 

The 2 d Bde coordinated and directed assistance for the ten rural districts of 
Thua Thien Province and assisted in the achievement of the elpht goals of the 
1970 Pacification and Development Plan (Reported in ORLL for period ending 30 
April 1970 ). 

(c) An Informal area coordination comnittee (ACC) was established, composed 
of the CG, let Inf Div (ARVN); Province Chief, Tfaua Thien Province; CG, lOlst 
Atai Dlv (Ambl), and the Senior Advisor CORDS, to insure that the efforts of all 
forces operating in the province are in agreement and focused toward the sane 
objectives and goals. Through this means, priorities were established for 
pacification, civic action projects, and the employmsnt of military forces 
required to upgrade the degree of security and promote pacification and develop>- 
Dent in specified areas. 

Downgraded at 5 year intervals 

lOH o: : Declassified after 12 years. 

•■•c .osuru 




^JUBJECT: Operational Heport - Leasona Leamefl, lOlat Airborne IHvlalon 
(Alnaoblle), Period Endinj; 11 July 1970, hCJ 1.3101^0*; th?) (D) 

( 2 ) The dlvialon aaauiaed operational control of I>»t B-5?, 5th 3FG (A) 

I Project Delta), on 10 May 1970 a*. 3K0B Mai Lor, YD09451P. The detachaent t/«.-pan 
Operation BAhJBEK GtADE on 15 May to conduct deep covert reconnaissance and tactic¬ 
al exploitation of Intel 1 li^enre and to Interdict enemy Infiltration and aupr-ly 
routes In the Khe 3anh Plain and Da Kron^ River Valley areas. These operations 
continued until 9 June, when the detachstent terminated ofieratlons In western 
Quanj? Trl Province and prepared for movement to Nha Trang, PVN, for stand down. 

On 25 June Det B-52, 5th SFG (A) resumed special reconnaissance operations 
In the Delta AO, until 30 June 1^0, when Operation BARBER GLADE wan terminated. 

The detachment con'ucted a total of 38 ground operations. Inserting elements 
to perform area and route reconnaissance and bomb damage assessment of air, 
artillery, and ARA strikes. The detachment accounted for 15 enemy KIA , 10 enemy 
trucks, two bulldozers, and a large amount of supplies destroyed along Route 61fc. 
Intelligence gathered by the detachment indicated that Route 616 was the main 
supply route for enemy units In Quang Trl Province and the Laotian Gal lent area. 

The detachment also concluded that there was no Indication of movement of major 
enemy units In the area of operation, although the short duration of the second 
phase of the operation (25-30 Jiina) precluded a complete and thorough coverage 
of the AO (After Action Report submitted separately by Det B-52, 5th SFG (A)). 

(3) Operation CLINCH VALlEK was initiated at 091315 July In response to 
the dlacovery of the 9th Regt, 304th NVA Division, infiltrating into South 
Vietnam. The mission of the 101st Abn Dlv (Ambl) was to provide combat support 
and combat settee support for operations by the Ist Inf Div (ARVN) in the 

KHE SANK Plateau. During the operation, elements of the 3d Bde and 3d Regt, 

1st Inf Dlv (ARVN) were employed in western Quang Trl Province to locate and 
destroy elemente of the 9th NVA Regt, discovered by armed aerial reconnaissance 
elements on 8 July (After Action Interview Report submitted separately). Artillery 
was provided by XXiV Corpe, 101st Abn Dlv (Ambl), Ist Inf Dlv (ARVN), and the 
Ist Bde, 5th Inf Dlv (Mech) to support reconnaiBsance in force operations by 
the Ist and 2d BatUlions, 3d Regt (ARVN). FRACO 25 (CLINCH VALLEI) to 0PC*lD 
2-'70 (TEXAS STAR) suspended combined operatione by the 3d Bde in the vicinity 
of fire support/operations basee (FS/OB) AIRBORNE, GOODMAN, and BRADLEY to 
located and destroy enemy rear service areas. 

(4) Operation CHISAGO PEAK/LAM SON 363, in the mountains northeast of the 
A SHAu Valley, was originally scheduled to commence on 10 July, but was post¬ 
poned with the committment of assets to Operation CLINCH VALLEY. The combined 
operation, employing elements of the let Bde and 3d Regt (ARVN), was rescheduled 
to commence on 16 July and was to be conducted in two phaSea. Tliase I (prepar¬ 
ation) provided for a program of intensive preparatory fires by artillery, 

B-52, and tactical air south of FS/OB RIPCORD, in the F3/o6 AIRBORNE/BRADLET 
GOODMAN area, to deny enemy use of the terrain and destroy cache sites and base 






SuBJtCT: Operational f'-oport - Lesnons Learned, lO'at A^rlomo OItIsIoh 
l^ir»oblle), t'oriod LcdlnK 11 July 19^0, HCS CSFOh-b^ jv’) (u] 

areas. F^rsisten'c and non-persi9*en CS nunitlons were oeploTed to deny en^any 
use of infiltration routes, for terralo restriction, and fire suppression. 

F>ui 3 e II loffensiTe) provided for the occupation of FS/OB MAURiEit on 25 
July by one US battalion, occupation by artillery on 2R an.! 29 July, and 
insertion of two battallon3 of the 3d lefft (AkVin) on 30 July, to locate and 
destroy eaieBy cache sites, lojjlstlcal facilities, and interdict routes of 
resupply and caesiiuiiication of tha 803d and 29th NVA Regioents. 

(5) FS/OB KlHlOhD »nsis opened in April 19'’0 as a key forward fire aupport 
base in the division’s sunmar offensive plan aj^sinct the 803d e.nd 29th NVA 
Hegiments. The fire supnort was occupied and secured on 11 April by 
Co C, 2d Bn (Affibl), 50^Jth Inf. Poor weathor in the division AO delayed the 
Dovement of the battalion CP and Btry B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 319th Ar*y until 16 
April. Btry C, 11th Arty (ARVN) was positioned on the firebase on 17 April 
to provide support for two bettalions of the Ist Regt IARWh). The light CF, 

Ist Regt (ARVf>) collocated on the firebase with the CP, 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th 
Inf on 18 April, to facilitate conbined operations in the area. 

la) The 2d Bn (Ainbl), 506th Inf continued security, patrol and ambush 
operations in the vicinity of?S/0B RIPCORD without significant aneay attacks, 
until 1 July 1970. The period 1-23 July was marked by increased enemy attacks 
by fire on and around the firebase and numerous ground attacks agsiiast units 
operating in the vicinity of the firebase. 

lb) In early July It became obvious that NVA forces were massing in an 
attempt to control the RIPCORD area. Elements of the 6th NVA Regt concentrated 
arottnd the FS/OB generally to the north and vest, joining the 29th and S03d NVA 
Regiments, operating east of the A SHAU Valley, south and southeast of FS/OB 
RIPCORD. With the steady increase of indirect and anti-aircraft fire, and 
enemy ground attacks in the RIPCCED area, it became apparent, by the third week 
in July, that the coat and effort required for the self-defense of the firebase, 
placed the successful accomplishment of operations in the BRAD1£1/AIRB0ERE 

area in jeopardy. 

l c) The closing of FS/OB RIPCORD would make troops available for offensive 
use against enemy supply caches and logistic Installationc to the rear of 

NVA forces massed around RIPCORD, The cache sites in the AIRBORNE/BRADCEl 
area were believed to be part of the base areas of the 803d and 29th NVA Regi¬ 
ments, The concentration of NVA forces around RIPcCRD would further facilitate 
operations in areas to the south and southeast. Therefore, the decision to 
ertract from RIR;(31D was made. 






.}UhJK(;T; (>pernMonal h«port - J.«anon3 Leamsd, JOlat AlrVorn® Division 
(Almobllo), ^’«^lo^ Kn-ilnj? 31 July 19V0, ICS CSKOI'-6S (l-^) (' ) 

(d) hlH.OhD operat.lonr. ware hli^hly successful, ceunlnf» heavy NVA car™*) t.l«^n 
and Hrawlnt; the enesiy from his cache sites. His massing of forcen around the 
firehase presented numerous tarifetK vulnerable to heavy air and artillery fire-;. 
The ?d Bn (Ambl), SOf>th Inf was extracted, anHF3/0B hlHX'KD was cloned on 
?1 July. 

(fj) <i3 Air Activities: 

(a) Durini? the reportln<t period, clone air supnort sorties were flown 

In the division area 

of operation an 

fo11 OV9 : 




Preplanned sortlen 




IsBindiate sortlen 




fiombat sky spots 








''iunshlpn (Spooky, 
•Ihadow, and Stlntjer) 




(b) Tactical air strlken expended tono of bombs and 532 tons of 

napalm durlntf the reportlnr; period. 




during the reporting 







































• Killed by artillery and killed by helicopter flares Included in KIA flpvres. 





Subject: Operational Keport - Lesions Learned, lOlst Airborne Oirislon 




31 July 

1970, HC3 CS 

iF Oh-65 (R2 

(8) Friendly losse 

3 during the 

reporting period 
















HHC/1 Bde 







HHC/2 Bde 







HHC/3 Bde 










































1 /502 











































101 Avn Gp 





















L/75 (Rgr) 







326 Engr 







501 Slg 







101 MP 





















(9) Operations narrative. See Inclosure 1. 
b. (C) Training. 

(l) The seren-day program for battalion refresher training uas initiated 
on 12 Mav 1970. This prograa provides two days for troop aovsBent (the first 
and last) and five days for the conduct of training and recreation. Conpanies 
are rotated for one-day stand downs at Eagle Beach during the five-day training 
period, allowing one day of recreational stand down and four days of training 
for each coatpany. During the reporting period, all infantry battalions 
conducted refresher training, and three battalions ccwpleted a second refresher 
training cycle. Under the previous battalion refresher training prograa. 





JUBJECT : Oparational heport - Lessons Learned, lOlst Airborne Dlrlslon 
(Airmobile), Period Knling 11 July 1970, HCS CSF0R_65 (R2) (U) 

infantry battalions conducted ten days of tialnini^ on a rotational basis. 

A separate program for recreational stjind down was conducted, allowing 
infantry battalions a three-day recreational period at Kagle Beach, on a 
rotational basis. This separate program caused the time required for a 
complete cycle of battalion refresher training to be excesslre. The system 
was not flexible enough to respond to operational requirements, causing 
sereral postponements of refresher training. The new system is more responsim'; 
to operational requirements because of its decreased length and the fusion of 
recreational and training stand downs. H allows infantry battalions to 
conduct refresher training every days. This increased frequency of 

training periods enables more effective integration of replacements, correction 
of unit tactical x^aknesses, and implementation of lessons learned. 

(2) A ranger strike operations course was organised at the Screaming 
Eagle Heplacement Training School to train the Hac Bao (Black Panthers) 
heconnaissance Company of the 1st Inf Div (AKVN) in the use of airmobile 
techniques during small unit raids a^inst selected enemy targets. The 
training program is eight days in duration, with subject areas in map reading 
and land navigation, small unit airmobile operations, patrolling, and the use 
of demolitions. The training program is concluded with a field exercise 
against a target in the division reconnaissance zone, selected from division 
intelligence sources. Instruction is conducted by SERTS cadre; a special 
cadre tium composed of one officer and four enlisted men from Company L 
(Ranger), 75th Inf; and specialised instruction presented by the 326th Engr 
Bn, the 326th Med Bn, and the G2 imagery Interpretation section. Interpreters 
are provided by the 1st Inf Div (ARVN). The cadre team from Co L (Ranger), 

75th Inf accompanies the platoon in all training, to include the field 
exercise. During the period of this report, three platoons completed the 
training, and an additional three platoons were scheduled to receive the 
training during the month of August. 

(3) The division continued its intensified training program in the pop¬ 
ulated lowlands with one dedicated battalion and a varying number of mobile 
training teams. The dedicated battalion is assigned the mission of conducting 
operations in Rni Loc District, employing 100 percent of its assets and resources 
in pacification and development and upgrading the combat effectiveness of 
territorial forces. The district has had a long record of Viet Cong Infra¬ 
structure (VCI) incidents. The battalion assists the district chief in all 
aspects of his administration, training, and operations. To acccxBpliah this 
mission, the battalion headquarters is collocated with the district head¬ 
quarters, cuid elements of the battalion conduct Joint operations with Regional 
Force, Popular Force, and Peoples Self Defense Force units, down to and includ¬ 
ing’ squad level. All operations are integrated with those of the district 
forces. In coordination with MACV mobile advisory teams (MAT) and sector 





TuBJECT: Operational Kep<jrt - Lessons Learae'l, lOlst Alrlonie 'HTlalon 
lAlnnoblle), Periol En^inf: 31 July 1970, HOG 0SfUH_6^ (I-?) (U) 

officials, W anH FT units are rotated to Phu Loc District to receive traln- 
Inij with the dedicated liattalion. On-the-job trainlnp Is provided by the 
dedicated battalion through coordination with the district chief and district 
senior advisor. Training la tailored to the specific requirements of the 
unit being trained and is conducted primarily with equipment on hand and 
aTailable to the unit being trained. In addition to the dedicated battalion, 
mobile training teans are provided by elements of the 2d Brigade to train and 
assist RF, PF, and PSDF forces throughout the lowland area. From 20 to 22 
motile training teams (MTT) were provided during the reporting period to 
assist territorial force commanders in the conduct of coobat/securlty oper¬ 
ations and training as required. The concept of employment of MTTs was 
changed on 19 May 1970 at the reouest of OVN officials. The primary role 
of the MTT had been to provide formal training. This has been changed to the 
technique of on-the-spot corrections during the conduct of operations as the 
orimary instructional vehicle. Formal classes are presented only upon request 
of and for specific instruction desired by GVN officials. Three types of 
MTTs are employed. District (subsector) teams are organised to assist the 
district staff in improving training and operational effectiveness of PF 
platoons and P3DF in the district. Three of these teams were deployed as 
of 31 July 1970. Regional Force group teams are organized to maintain liaison 
between RF group headquarters and US battalions. They assist the RF group 
cofflBiander and staff in improving the operational effectiveness of the staff 
and asaivned companies. Emphasis is placed on AfTT participation with RF 
companies on actual operations. Seven of these teams were deployed as of 
31 July 1970. Separata regional force company teams are organized to improve 
the operational effectiveness of the separate RF’ companies by assisting and 
advising the RF company cosanander in the planning and conduct of all combat/ 
security operations. Emphasis is placed on MTT participation during the con¬ 
duct of operations. Twelve separate company teams were deployed as of the 
end of this reporting period. All MTTs operate in close coordination with 
the district chief and district senior advisor to identify weaknesses and 
take corrective action in an effort to upgrade the crEoat effectiveness of 
the territorial forces. A fixed, rigid program is avoided, and ’'ormal train¬ 
ing Is tailored to correct specific weaknesses of units. It is presented on 
a level commensurate with the skills reouired b? the unit to perform its 
mission. During the three months of the reporting period, MTTs conducted 
training for one RF company group, 25 separate HF companies, 20 PF platoons, 
and 844 members of the PSDF. They also participated in seven RF group 
operations, 99 company-size operations, 109 platoon-size operations, and 203 
squad-size operations. This program of intensified training in the populated 
lowlands of the division area of operation has been extremely successful. 

It has substantially improved the capability of local forces and, more 
importantly. It has established a cadre that can continue its own development. 





ijliBJECT: Cp«ratlon«l K^port - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division 
(AlrTBobile), Period !indini» 31 July 1970, hC3 CSPOlt.65 lf<2) iO) 

( 4 ) The mist Avn Op (Cbt) lAinbl) conducted classes on pathfinder 
operations from 4 to 15 May and from 25 May to 5'June. A total of 30 
meabers of the Ist Inf Div iAkVN) received this traininK. On 22 and 23 
May, a training teas from the lOlst Airborne Division Support CcManand 
(Aabx) conducted classes on helicopter load preparation for 106 Bwmbere of 
the 4‘3th AhVN Artillery Battalion at Dong Ha. Instruction included care, 
maintenanca, and capabilities of air items and ijenoral sling load preperetion 
procedures for artillery units. The lOlst Airborne Division Artillery 

(Aabl) provided four separate teams consisting of one officer and one NbO 
to train artillery units of the Ist Inf Dlv (AHVn) in fire direction and 
firing battery procedures and techniques. Each unit received two weeks of 
training, and a total of 14 AhVN artillery batteries received this Instruction, 

(5) During the reporting period, a readiness report was formulated for 
hegional Force (RF), Popular Force (PF), and Peoples' Self Defense Force 
(PSDF) elements. Data for the "report are collected from Territorial Forces 
Evaluation System (TFES) reports, PSiDF status reports, and weakly HTT reports. 
The readiness report provides a concise and comprehensive evaluation of the 
readiness level of four major areas of development - personnel, equipment, 
training, and operational proficiency. Reports are prepared each month. The 
first two monthly reports were completed during this reporting period. Initial 
indications are that the report will provide an effective means of evaluating 
the development of territorial force units and will serve as a useful 
management tool for the deployment of divisional MTT resources, 

c. (C) Chemical. 

(1) General. The division chemical section, with operational control 
of the 20th Chemical Detachment iCBRC) and the 10th Chemical Platoon (D3), 
performed a variety of chemical missions in support of division operations 
during the reporting period. A discussion of each type mission follows. 

(a) Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) Operations. The Airborne Person¬ 
nel Detector continued to be employed as an intelligence gathering device to 
supplement and/or confirm other intelligence concerning enemy locations and 
activity. During April, all APD missions were conducted by the 2d Souadron 
(Airmobile), 17th Cavalry. Beginning in May, aisslons were performed by the 
Ist and 3d Brigades as well as by the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, A total of 
128 missions were conducted during the reporting period, APD reading indicated 
several areas where enemy activity had significantly Increased, assisting the 
ability of division units to engage the enemy during his incursions into for¬ 
ward base areas. Routes of infiltration were engaged with artillery and air 





ouBJMT: Operational Fep<)i't - Loaona L^amei, lOist Airborne Division 
(Airmobile), I'erlod bn'linR 31 Jjly 1970, i-C3 C3FU1—65 (b?) (U) 

i b] Aerial Flaiae Operatlona. Aerial flamti misalons were oon iuct.ed in 
ar»-aa bell-!ved to be booby trapptyi, to clear fields of fire around fire 
support bases, to clear and expand landing zones, and to destroy sussected 
enemy positions and cache sites, both CH47 and UHIH aircraft were used in 
flume iro[> operations. A of 52 flame missions was conducted durint' 
the period. As the weather in the division AO improved and division units 
moved deep into the canopy, several new forward fire support bases were 
constructed and several abandoned bases reoccuplad. bxtensive clearin*' 
operations were conducted around perimeters to facilitate visual observation 
and to provide fields of fire, bulk flame drops, usl’'-' eijjht to ten 55- 
(jalion drums of thickened fuel, were conducted utilizing an external sling 
load from a Clti? helicopter. In April and Mav, a total of 199*’ drums of 
thickened fuel was dropned in 240 sorties during clearing operations. The 
n/ inclpal fire supnort bases cleared were .HlbCOiiU, GhAhITE, GLADIATOj , 

• jlKKASAfl, FALCON, VEGHEL, oTl'lKr., KATHKYN , BiilCK, and SHOCK. A major flame 
project was initiated and completed for the 2d bOK Marine Brigade in an 
area 20 kilometers south of Ife Nang during the months of April and May. 

The project was conducted to assist in clearing a booby trapped area, which 
had been chosen for resettlement by Vietnamese civilians, and to provide 
technical assistance and training for the bOK forces in the development of 
their own flame program. During the operation, 870 drums of thickened 
fuel were dropped in 87 aircraft sorties. A total of 13 secondary explosions 
was observed during the drops. The division provided a CH47 helicopter and 
necessary personnel for the execution of the mission. Division chemical 
officers explained concepts of emplogment and operational techniques in 
briefings at the BOK brigade headauarters. BOK forces assisted in the 
operation by marking target areas and rigging drop nets. As a result of 
training providel by the division, BOK forces commenced their own flame drop 
program in coordination with the Ist Marine Division. During the sionth of 
Hay, three heavily booby trapped Landing zones were cleared using flame fuel. 

As a result of the six sorties conducted, 27 large secondary explosions 

(c) C3 Operations. Bulk C32 missions were conducted, using both organic 
Cb47 helicopters and Air Force high performenco aircraft on routes of infiltra¬ 
tion in the division reconnaissance zone. The drops and bombings were targeted 
to restrict heavy vehicular traffic, thus interdicting enony tactical and 
logistic advances into forward base areas. Lot.ds consisting of 55-gallon 
drums of C32, rigged with the XM925 impact fuze and burster system, were 
dropned from CH47 aircraft fron an approximate height of 40(X) feet. Bulk 
C32 missions, using BLU52 bombs, were conducted by Air Force high performance 
aircraft. These bcaobs were directed against roads leading into the northern 
A 3HAU and the DA KitONG River Valley, Tactical CS missions were conducted 





SUBJECT: Operational Keport - Lessons Learned, lOlst Airborne Division 
(Aimobre), Period Ending 31 July 19'>0, hCS CSFOK-65 (K2) (U) 

Sf^lnst suspected eneogr locations, durinp combat assaults, in supnort of 
artillery raids, lurint^ search operationa, and in support of conbined US/ 

ARVN operations. Tactical CS was employed in support of a 1st Brij^de 
artillery and air raid covorin«; three distinct target areas. UHIH helicopters 
delivered CS on all targets. Two aircraft carried ten EI 58 CS canisters, 
while a third dropped Ifa to 20 rocket tube assemblies, each containing 20 
M7A3 CS grenades. Canisters were dropped from a height of 1000 feet, while 
grenades were delivered at low level. A total of 80 canisters and ’’10 grenades 
were dropped during the operation. 

A tactical CS mission was conducted to support a search operation of the 
2d Sqdn lAmbl), 17th Cav. Four E158 CS canisters were dropp^ on tarpet areas 
along the sweep route. Weather conditions did not adversely affect the retention 
of CS in the canopy vegetation. Ho ill effects were experienced by friendly 
ground troops. 

A tactical CS mission employing 37 E 158 canisters was conducted in support 
of a combined U3/ARVN operation in the vicinity of FS/OB HENDERSON. To 
support troop insertions, winitions wore employed on enenty mortar and automatic 
weapons positions directed against the proposed landing zones. Throughout 
the operation, tactical CS was employed on nine separate occasions on suspected 
eneBy locations and during combot assaults without ill effects to friendly- 

(d) Aerial Defoliation Operations. Diesel defoliation missions ware 
conducted around fire support bases in the piedmont area, where herbicides, 
such as Agent Blue, could not bo used due to the proximity of friendly- 
crops. The diesel spray retarded the growth of the foliage and assisted in 
burning. Targets included areas adjacent to CAMP EAGLE, GAMP EVANS, and 
F3/0B BIRMINGHAM to clear fields of fire. 

Herbicide defoliation missions, using Agent Blue, to reduce foliage were 
executed against major HVA infiltration routes west of FS/OB RIPCORD. Areas 
around FS/OB BA3T0GNE and VEGHEL, and Route 547 connecting them, were sprayed 
to create and preserve fields of fire. Plans were formulated to conduct 
increased herbicide operations around permanent fire support bases with the 
approach of the dry season. 

(e) &noke Operations, ^oke operations in support of combat assaults 
were conducted by the 158th Aviation Battalion (Ambl). The XM52 Integral 
Smoke Generator was used to create smoke screens which effectively obscured 
enemy observation, limiting his capability to concentrate well aimed fire on 
assaulting troops and aircraft. 






SUBJECT; Operational Heport - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Dlrlalon 
(Ainsobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, ftC3 CSFC31-65 (R2) (Uj 

The H4A2 snoke pet was used by the 1st Brigade In eonjunetlon with 
psycholojflcal operations. A coltmn of smoke, lasting for a flwa hour period, 
was created and used as a referanee point for mmy soldiers desiring to rally. 

(2} Statistics: The following statistics pertain to cheaioal operations 
during the reporting period: 



Airborne Personnel Detector 



Flame Drop 


1,989 drums 

Tactical CS 


459 El5SfC> and 80 

M 7 A 3 grenades 

Sulk CS 


56 drums and 76 BLU 52 

Fougasse Emplacement 


131 positions 

Husch Flare Emplacement 


18 positions 

Aerial Lafollation (Herbicide) 


4,310 gallons 

Aerial CeSbllatlon (Diesel) 


550 gallons 

Protective Masks Inspected 


4,265 masks 

Bunker Seeding 


105 JEEPOs 






SlfBIFCTr Operational Report - I^aaona l 4 earned, lOlat Airborne l^iviaion 

(Airmobile), Period F.ndinK ^1 July 1970, PCS fiSFOP-f-S (I'Z) (I.) 

d. (C) Intelligence. 

(1) Knemy Situation 

(a) At the beftlnninK of the reporting period, enemy unite were located 
aa followa; 

1^ In Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue (MBTTH), local force companiea 
were operating in their traditional areas of operation - Phong Dien Special 
Action Tfnit (PD.SAU, forrrierly C113) vicinity Phong Dien (D), Quang Dien 
Special Action tfnit (QD.SAtJ, formerly Cl 14), vicinity YD4724, Cl 15 vicinity 
YDf»614, and Cl 16 vicinity YD8304. The Phu Vang Special Action Unit 
(PVSAIJ) waa unlocated. The Hue City Peconnaisaance Battalion (HCRB) waa 
located vicinity YD6514. The Phu Loc Special Action Unit (PLSAU, ' formerly 
the Phu Loc Armed Battalion) and the 4th NVA Regiment continued to operate 
in the Phu Loc mountains. The 4th NVA regiment headquarters was located 
vicinity YC9781 with the K4C Battalion vicinity ZC0195, and the K4B Battal¬ 
ion vicinity 7.C1896. The 5th NVA Regiment was deployed south and aouth- 
weat of Hue, with the headquarters vicinity YC5282: the 804th Infantry Battal¬ 
ion vicinity YC8195, the 810th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD5715, the 439th 
Infantry Battalion vicinity YC6297, the K32 Rochet Artillery Battalion vicinity 
YC7299, the Chi Thua I Sapper Battalion vicinity YC6995, and the Chi Thua 
i; .Sapper Battalion vicinity YC7290. The 6th NVA Regiment was deployed in 
the canopy south of Phong Dien (D), with the regimental headquarters vicinity 
YD3216: the 800th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD2922; the 802d Infantry Battal¬ 
ion vicinity YD2010; the 806th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD4622: the K35 
Rochet Artillery Battalion vicinity YD3620, and the K12 Sapper Battalion 
vicinity YD3423, The 29th and 803d NVA Regiments of the 324B Division were 
operating east of the A Shau Valley just south and southeast of the 6th NVA 
Regiment, The 29th NVA regiment headquarters was located vicinity YD4405, 
the 7th Infantry Battalion YD5307, the 8th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD4705, 
and the 9th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD4907. The 803d NVA regiment head- 
quartera waa located vicinity YD3415, with the let Infantry Battalion vicinity 
YD3616, and 2d Infantry Battalion vicinity YD4412, and the 3d Infantry Bat¬ 
talion vicinity YD3310, The headquarters of the 324B Division wac in Base 
Area 611 with MRTTH headquarters. The 675th NVA Artillery Regiment 
remained in Base Area 611. The llA Reconnaissance Battalion headquarters 
was located vicinity YC3298, The 7lh Front was located in the vicinity of 
former Base Area 101, with headquarters vicinity YD1931, the 808th Infantry 






SUBJtCT: Operational Report - I.eeeon* Learned, 101 et Airborne Diviaion 

(Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-66 (B2) (11) 

Battalion vicinity YD233 J, the 814th Infantry Battalion vicinity yD3737, the 
K 34 Rocket Artillery Battalion vicinity YD2636, the KlO Sapper Battalion 
vicinity YD3I33, the Kll Sapper Battalion vicinity YD2842, and the K.12 
'I'ranaportation Battalion vicinity YD1327, The 812th NVA Regiment waa 
engaged in logistic activity in support of the 7th Front, with its headquarters 
vicinity YD2025, the 4th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD2428, the 5th Infantry 
Battalion vicinity YD0023, and the 6th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD2026. 

^ In the B5 (DMZ) Front, at the beginning of the reporting period, there 
were ten units operating in the DMZ and in western Quang Tri (P). The 52d 
NVA Regiment, 320th Division remained in the northwestern corner of Quang 
Tri (P), The 246th NVA Regiment was operating in the western portion of 
the central DMZ, with headquarters vicinity XD9371, the 1st Infantry Battal¬ 
ion vicinity XD 9455 . the 2d Infantry Battalion' icinity XD8363, and the 3d 
Infantry Battalion vicinity XD9461. The headquarters of the 2?th NVA Regi¬ 
ment was located vicinity YDO 668 with the 1st Infantry Battalion vicinity 
YD0563, the 2d Infantry Battalion vicinity YD0570, and the 3d Infantry Bat¬ 
talion vicinity YD0459. The 75th Anti-Aircraft Battalion was operating 
vicinity XD9561, The 84th and 164th NVA Artillery Regiments were alter¬ 
nating fire support responsibility in the central DMZ area. The headquarters 
of the 84th NVA Artillery Regiment was located vicinity XD9874, and the 
headquarters of the 164th NVA Artillery Regiment was located vicinity YD1090, 
The 126th Naval Sapper Regiment was located vicinity YD2189. The newly 
arrived 66th NVA regiment headquarters was located vicinity yD0335, with 
the 7th Infantry Battalion vicinity XD9841, the 8th Infantry Battalion vicinity 
YD0138, and the 9th Infantry Battalion located in the Ba Long Valley. For¬ 
ward elements of the 304th Division were operating south of the Khe Sanh 
Plateau vicinity XD8438. Elements of the 27th Battalion, 31st NVA Regiment 
were operating In the Quang Tri (P) lowlands, with the battalion and regi¬ 
mental headquarters in North Vietnam, vicinity YD 1185. The 270th NVA 
Regiment remained located north of the Eastern DMZ vicinity YD 1986. The 
33d Sapper Battalion, B5 Front was operating in the vicinity of XD9939. 

(b) May 1970 

There was a significant increase in activity by NVA units in Military 
Region Tri-Thien-Hue (MRTTH) during the month. The 5th and 6th Indepen¬ 
dent Regiments were responsible for attacks by fire on Allied installations 
in the lowlands. Enemy activity and PW reports confirmed the eastward 
deployment of the 812th NVA Regiment. The mission of the 812th was to 






SliBJT C'.T Operational Heport - l.eaaona learned, lOlat Airborne Division 

(Airmobile), f^eriod Knding 51 July 1970, RClS CSFOP-F^S (1-2) /i'; 

protect rear areas and support 7th Front and 6th Pegiment incursions into 
the populated lowlands of Hai l^ang and Phong Dien Districts. A PW, t ap- 
tured on 4 May, listed as a penetration agent for MRTTH, stated that the 
. 7th Front had the rttission of reconnaissance and attack on the boundary areas 

( of Hai I.ang and Trieu Phong Districts, Quang Tri (P), in order to demon¬ 

strate the strength of the VC/NVA movement to villagers in these areas. 

7ih Front incursions into Hai Lang (D) later in the month confirmed this 
mission. A PW report on 4 May indicated that elements of the 6th Pegiment 
; had linked up with the 80 id NVA Regiment in order to coordinate rear service 

activities vicinity FS/OB RIPCORD and Co Rung. US forces operating 
vicinity FS/OB GRANITFJ and FS/OB M.AtJBEEN encountered heavy 12. 7mrn, 

I mortar, R PC, and small arms fire during the month of May. The discovery 

I of 60mm and 82mm CS mortar rounds at YD4411 {1 KM E of FS/OB 

I MAUREEN) and the use of chemical delay fused mortar rounds at FS/OB 

KATHRYN indicated that the 803d NVA Regiment received logistic priority 
along Route T7 during April and early May. 

^ DMZ activity during the month of May was characterised by attacks 
i by fi7e in the FS/OB FULLER/CAMP CARROLL area. The presence of the 

I 66th Regiment, 304th NVA Division, in the Da Krong River Valley increased 

t the enemy threat in central Quang Tri (P). The 66th Regiment launched two 

sapper attacks on Allied firebases during the month, resulting in heavy enemy 
I losses. The 66th Regiment was the target of a B52 strike early in the month, 

I resulting in 97 NVA KIA. Aerial surveillance in the 66th NVA Regiment area 

of operations indicated heavy logistic activity in the vicinity of the Laotian 

(c) June 1970 

^ In Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue, the 7th Front remained inactive 
throughout the month, possibly recovering from losses suffered in late May 
following incursions into Hai Lang (D). The 812th, 803d, and 29th NVA 
Regiments continued to occupy well established mountain base areas east of 
the Da Krong and A Shau Valleys. The mission of these units was to lure 
US and ARVN forces deep into the canopy, leaving the coastal lowlands exposed 
to infiltration by the 7th Front in southwestern Quang Tri (P) and by the 4th, 

5th, and 6th Independent Regiments in Thua Thien (P). The 81Zth NVA Regi¬ 
ment continued to provide logistic support to the 7th Front and to support 
attacks against ARVN firebases in the central canopy. The 29th NVA Regiment 

' u 






SUBJECT: Operational Report - Eeaaona Learned, lOlat Airborne Division 
(Airmobile). Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCSCSFOR-tS (R2) (U) 

shifted its area of operation west to avoid detection and destruction by Allied 
forces applying pressure from the east. The 803d NVA Regiment showed 
signs of increased offensive activity and attack preparations in the FS/OB 
Ripcord and FS/OB MAUREEN areas. The 4th NVA Regiment launched 
a coordinated attack against five allied installations in Phu Loc District on 
10 June and then returned to its normal low level of activity for the remain¬ 
der of the month. The 5th and 6th NVA Regiments increased the number of 
attacks by fire against Allied forces using 60mm and 82mm mortars and 
122 mm rockets. 

^ Enemy DMZ activity during the month of June was at is lowest level 
since prior to April 1970. Enemy forces in the central DMZ reduced their 
attacks by fire in the FS/OB FULLER/CAMP CARROLL area in order to 
resupply and reposition in preparation for future offensive actions in July 
or August. During the month, there was a significant increase in activity 
in western Quang Tri (P) and in the Laotian Salient. There were indications 
that the 9th NVA Regiment, 304th Division was infiltrating into the area to 
join the 66th NVA Regiment. On 21 June, a map overlay was captured in 
the Vietnamese Salient by the HAC BAO Company, Ist Infantry Division (ARVN), 
showing telephone lines from forward elements of the 304th Division, located 
in the Laotian Salient, to the 7th Front located to the northeast. 

(d) July 1970 

(1) In Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue, th j majority of enemy initiated 
activity was recorded in the FS/OB RIPCORD area, where elements of the 
6 th and 803d NVA Regiments had begun tc mass. On 17 July, the firebase 
received iZOmm nw>rtar fire. This was the first use of that weapon in the 
MRTTH area of operation in over 18 months. The enemy continued to inten¬ 
sify his mortar and ground attacks against US units operating vicinity FS/OB 
RIPCORD until 23 July, when the firebase was closed. There was a signifi¬ 
cant decrease in 29th NVA Regiment activity, with indications that the unit 
had withdrawn west. At the beginning of the month, elements of the 7th Front 
tried again to enter tastern Qaang Tri (P) lowlands, resulting in 135 NVA 
KIA and 17 PWs captured. Enemy units were identified as the 808th Battal¬ 
ion, 7th Front, reinforced by the lat Compan'y, K6 Battalion, 81Zth NVA 
Regiment and a signal squad from the K4 Battalion, 8I2th Regiment. Activity 
in the 4th and 5th NVA Regiment areae of operation remained at a low level, 
except for attacks by fire against Allied installations in the lowlands in early 





SUBJECT: Operational Report - Leaaone l^earned, lOlat Airborne Diviaion 

(Airmobile), FVriocl Ending 31 July 1970, PCSCSFOR-65 (FZ) UJ) 

(2) In the B5 (DMZ) F’ront, enemy initiated activity waa relatively light 
in July, although movement throughout the DMZ continued at a high level. 

The number of attacka by fire declined from 67 in June to 45 in July. Touring 
the latter part of July, in the central DMZ, the 84th and I64th Artillery 
Regimenta reaumed attacka by fire on ES/OB FULLER and C-2 Combat 
Baae. Ground contacts decreased by approxinnately 50%. The most signifi¬ 
cant contact during the month occurred in western Ouang Tri (P) on 8 July, 
when Allied forces suprised elements of the 9th NVA Regiment, 304th NVA 
Diviaion, attempting to infiltrate into SVN. Air Cavalry elements and troops, 
supported by helicopter gunahips, engaged and killed 139 NVA in the Khe 
Sanh plains and captured four PWa. The PWs stated that the 1st and 2d Bat¬ 
talions of the 9th Regiment were to control the region in the vicinity of Khe 
Sanh and south of the Ba Long Valley, They also stated that elements of the 
2d Battalion, 246th NVA Regiment were operating in western Quang Tri (P). 
The presence of the 9th and 66th Regiments, 304th NVA Division confirmed 
the enemy's determination to protect his lines of communication and base 
areas which had been established in that area. This build-up of NVA forces 
in western Quang Tri (P) also threatened Allied installations and population 
centers north and northeast of the Ba Long Valley. 

(e) At the end of the reporting period, enemy units were relocated as 

In Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue (MRTTH), Local force companies 
relocated were the Phong Dien Special Action Unit, vicinity YD3528, the 
Quang Dien Special Action Unit, vicinity YDS 122, and the Phu Vang Special 
Action Unit, vicinity YC9398. The 5th NVA regiment headquarters was 
relocated vicinity YC6382, with the 804th Infantry Battalion vicinity YC9398, 
The 6th NVA Regiment, while still deployed in the canopy south of the 
Phong Dien (D) piedmont, concentrated more around the FS/OB RIPCORD 
area. Battalions of the 6th Regiment relocated were the 800th Infantry 
Battalion vicinity YD3725, the 802d Infantry Battalion vicinity YD3018, 
the 806th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD4224, the K35 Rocket Artillery Bat¬ 
talion vicinity YD3620, and the K12 Sapper Battalion vicinity YD3423. The 
29th and 803d NVA Regiments of the 324B Division were operating east of 
the A Shau Valley just south and southeast of the 6th NVA Regiment. The 29th 
NVA regiment headquarters was located vicinity YD4306, the 7th Infantry 
Battalion vicinity YD4906, the 8th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD4807, and 
the 9th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD4208. In late July, an unidentified 
transportation battalion was reported to be operating vicinity YD2914. The 
7th Front was still located in the vicinity of former Base Area 101, after 




A vnc-cic 

SUBJECT: Operational Keport - I^saona Ijearned, lOJat Airborne Division 

(Airmobile), Period Ending July 1970, PCS CSFOPU.) 

having made several costly incursions into the lowlands during the reporting 
period. The battalions relocated in the 7th Front were the 808th Infantry 
Battalion vicinity YD3339, the 814th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD2840, the 
KIO Sapper Battalion vicinity YD3S34, the KH Sapper Battalion vicinity 
YD2546. The 812th NVA Regiment continued logistical and offensive activity 
in support of the 7th Front. The 4th Infantry Battalion was relocated vicinity 
YD2834, the 5th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD1829, and the Oth Infantry Bat¬ 
talion vicinity YD2730. The K19B (AKA 20th) Sapper Battalion, 304th NVA 
Division, under the operational control of the 812th Regiment, was located 
vicinity YD1927. 

2 In the B5 Front, at the end of the reporting period, there were eleven 
units operating in the DMZ and western Quang Tri (P) areas. The 52d NVA 
Regiment, 320th Division is no longer carried in the northwestern corner of 
Quang Tri (P); it is most likely located in North Vietnam, At the end of the 
reporting period, the 2d Infantry Battalion, 246th NVA Regiment was located 
vicinity XD7944. Forward elements of the 304th NVA Division moved farther 
south, vicinity XD9922, and were reinforced by the newly arrived 9th NVA 
Regiment. The 9th NVA regiment headquarters was located vicinity XD7738, 
with the Ist Infantry Battalion located vicinity XD7740, the 2d Infantry Battal¬ 
ion vicinity XD8236, and the 3d Infantry Battalion near the western Quang Tri 
(P) border west of Khe Sanh. The understrength 66th NVA Regiment, 304th 
Division was operating in western Quang Tri (P), with the headquarters element 
vicinity XD9533, the 7th Infantry Battalion vicinity XD8832, the 8th Infantry 
Battalion vicinity XD8930, and the 9th Infantry Battalion vicinity YD0530. 

The 270th NVA Regiment remained located north of the eastern DMZ, vicinity 
YD1986, with its 4th Battalion periodically making incusions south of the DMZ. 

(2) Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) Activities in Thua Thien (P) 

(a) The number of VC/VCI related incidents decreased slightly from 4? 
in April to 42 in May. Kidnappinge, sabotage, and rice collections remained 
at the same level as reported during April, while propaganda activity decreased 
sharply. Terrorism and assassinations increased during May. Enemy attacks 
by fire directed against ARVN and GVN installations in the lowlands increased 
to five attacks during May, compared to two in April. That activity was 
believed to have bran politically rather than militarily motivated, due to the 
numerous Vietnamese holidays in May, NVA infiltration into the lowlands 
increased from three Incursions in April to six in May. All of these incidents 
occurred in Phu Loc (D), and can be attributed to elements of the 4th and 5th 
NVA Regiments, This increase possibly means that NVA operations have been 




A V l)Cj' oo 

SUBiKCT' Operation<il Heport - I^SHOns l.earnfcd, lOlat Airborne Diviaion 
(Airmohilei, Period finding 31 July 1970, PCS CSFOR-65 (P2) 

extended into the lowlands to a‘<«iat VC/VCI forces in disrupting the GVN 
pacification and development program, VC/VCl activity in Phong Dien ilJ) 
intensified during May, with increases in terrorism, sabotage, and kidnap¬ 
ping. Further evidence confirmed the reorganization of the C113 laical 
Force Company into local guerrilla units operating throughout Phong Dien 
(D). During the month of May 1970, a total of twenty-four VCI cadre was 
eliminated by Allied operations iniThua Thien (P). Of this number, nine 
were considered significant by current MACV standards. 

(b) The number c>f VC/VCI related incidents decreased from 42 in 
May to 36 in June. Of the total incidents, involved sabotage, kidnapping, 

assassination, or terrorist activities. The'overall decrease of VC/VCI 
related incidents can be attributed |to a lull id enemy activity from 19 to 

25 June, when no incidents were reported. , Ehemy activity resumed on 

26 June and continued through the 4nd of the'n^nth. During June, the 
NVA launched a series of attacks by fire agai'iist Allied installations in 
the lowlands. The enemy employed bOmm mortars, 82mm mortars, and 
122mm rockets during these attack >. US installations shelled during 
June include CAMP EVANS (4, 8, j nd 26 June), CAMP EAGLE (twice 

cn 26 June), FS/OB LOS BANOS (10 June), and FS/OB TOMAHAWK 
(10 June). FS/OB TOMAHAWK wan the only installation in which the 
standoff attack was immediately followed by a ground assault. FS/OB 
ROY, ac ARVN installation, was alpo attacked by fire on 10 June. GVN 
installations shelled during June include the Phy Trach Bridge (26 June), 
Phong Dien (D) HQ (4 and 26 June), Phu Loc (D) HQ (10 June), and 
Nuoc Ngot Bridge (10 June). It is important to note that the majority 
of the attacks by fire occurred on 10 and 26 June, It ie possible that 
the 4th, 5th, and 6th NVA Regiments increased their offensive opera¬ 
tions in the populated areas in order to take advantage of US and ARVN 
presence in the western canopy. In Phu Vang (D), on 29 June, two 
election officials were attacked by three VC/VCI, resulting in one 
election official killed, one election official wounded, and one ARVN 
soldier killed. The Primary VCI objective was to show the populace 
what will become of those who actively participate in any activity which 
would enhance GVN control of the populace. During the month of June, 
a total of 31 VCI cadre was eliminated by GVN and Allied operations 
within Thua Thien (P). Of this number, eleven were considered signifi¬ 
cant under current MACV standards. 




Sf/R.fF.C T' Operational F'epf>rt - F<eaaona l>earned, lOlat Airborne Olviaion 

tAlrmoblJej. Period Kndlng 31 fujy 1970, PCS C.SFOP-F,S fPZ; nj) 

U ) The number of VF,/Vf,| related incidenta increased from 36 in 
('line to 18 In July. Of the t*ital incidenta, S0% involved aabotaife, Vidnappin((, 
aaaaaaination, or terrorlat incidenta. The overall increase of Vfj/Vf,! 
related activity can he attrlbtited to an increase of enemy activity in 
Phonf( Dien and I'tam Ifoa fiiatricts. An increase in rice collections was 
noted throughout the lowlands, indicating that enemy terrorist activity 
was hampered by the need for foodstuffs. VC/VCl activity in Phong 
Dien fD) showed increases in acta of terrorism, kidnappings, assassina¬ 
tions, and rice collection. 'I he noajority of terrorist Incidenta involved 
attacks hy fire on fjVrf installations and hamlets. A marked increase in 
Vfi/Vfil related incidenta was noted in the resettlement areas of northern 
/'hong Dien ffJ). These were the first significant incidents in the area 
since its founding in .January 1970. During ,/uly, enemy forces operating 
in the lowlands launched a aeries of attacks by fire against Allied, APVN, 
and fiVN installations. Allied bases shelled in July Include CAM/' /^AGI.E 
f7 July), CAM/' KVAN.S (26. 28, and 29 July). FS/OB T-BONE (22 and 
28 .July), and the VAN/f TPAM/J Training Center (5 July). Significantly, 
two of the attacks by fire on fJAM/' EVAN.S occurred during daylight 
hours. There were seven reported attacks by fire against CVN instal* 
lations during July, compared to six in .June. Attacks directed against 
l/S installations decreased from seven in June to four in July. During 
the month of July, a total of 24 VCI cadre was eliminated by GVN and 
Allied operations within Thua Thien (P). Of this number, eight were 
considered significant under MACV standards. The following table com¬ 
pares the VC/VCf incidents for May (left), June (center), and July fright) 
by district; 

fjj strict 

Fin/ F.con 



1 ntel 





/'hong Dien 









Jfuong Dien 









Ouang Dien 



0/1 /O 






/(■long Tra 









ffuong Jhiiy 









I'hu Vang 









I'hu Thu 









/'hu I/>c 









Vinh f,oc 









Nam Ifoa 
































SIJBJKCT: Operational Report - l^«aon« learned, lOlat Airborne Diviaion 

(Airmobile), Period Finding 31 July 1970, RCS CSF’OR-b5 {P2) (U) 

(1) G2 Air Operationa. 

(a) Prior to 1 May, all photo and IR miaaiona were paaaed to XXIV 
Corpa for proceaaing. The direct support concept waa introduced on 1 
May. All missions which Mohawk aircraft were capable of flying were 
assigned by the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) directly to the 131st Surveillance 
Airplane Company (SAC). This proved to be more effective and enabled 
the division to establish priorities which resulted in a more responsive 
surveillance plan. 

(b) The 01-D sorties allotted from the ZZOth Reconnaissance Airplane 
Company (RAC) were used in a new capacity. The aircraft were tasked to 
fly night surveillance around fire support bases which had received indirect 
fire during the hours of darkness. By sighting flashes and directing air- 
strikea and artillery these night surveillance missions proved to be effec¬ 
tive in reducing the intensity of enemy indirect fire, 

(4) G2 Ground Surveillance Operations. 

(a) On 1 June, the Dart 1 sensor readout station became operational. 
After a two week evaluation period, the responsibility for the readout and 
interpretation of sensors in the division reconnaissance aone passed from 
the BATCAT (EC-121) aircraft to the Dart I facility at Quang Tri Combat 
Base. Reports of sensor activations are passed immediately to the Ground 
Surveillance Section, lOlst Abn Div (Ambl) and Ist Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) 
via direct telephonic communication for quick reaction and intelligence use. 

(b) During the reporting period, the number of ground monitor sites 
increased to eleven with establishment of sites at FS/OB RIPCORD (YD34I9), 
(YD5503), and FS/OB RAKKASAN {YD4919). These additional sites reflect 
the offensive posture of ground tactical units in their operations to the south 
and west against elements of the 6th, 29th, and 803d NVA Regiments. At 
the end of the reporting period, two of these sites, FS/OB RIPCORD and 
BRICK, were closed, with relocations planned to support future operations. 

(c) During the month of June, sensor-detected activity increased in 

the division reconnaissance zone to over 100 activations per week. A high 
of 190 was reached for the period 21-27 June. The major increases in 
sensor-detected activity occurred along 01,-9, Route 6 I 6 , and Route 9222. 
Confirmation of increased enemy activity in these areas, by visual reconnais¬ 
sance, led to the employment of aerial bombardment and insertion of ground 
units. 20 





SUBJECT: Operational Report - L^asona Learned, lOlat Airborne Diviaion 

(Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSF’OR-6 ‘j (R2) I\J] 

(d) During the reporting period, the number of operational RF senaor 
strings in the division area of operation, increased from 76 to a new high 
of 147, enabling the diviaion to meet its minimum goal of one set per rifle/ 
recon platoon. Operational USD/Wla increased from 42 to 63. Forty-two 
Balanced Pressure systems (BPS) and seven Infrared Intrustion Detectors 
(IIDa) were added to the inventory for base defense of Gamp Hochmuth 
(Phu Bai Combat Base). 

(5) Counter Intelligence Section 

(a) The Cl Section, 101st Military intelligence Company, engaged in a 
variety of activities in support of its primary mission of safeguarding the 
101st Abn Div (Ambl) from enemy sabotage, espionage, and subversion, IQ 
and Cl inspections of personnel, documents, and physical security programs 
■were conducted to detect and eliminate security hazards. Technical support, 
in the form of fingerprinting, safe combination changes, recovery of lost 
combinations, and repair of security containers, was continuously provided 
both by division and supporting Cl teams, 

(b) Personnel security investigations, complaint type investigations, 
and limited investigations to insure the validity of security clearances were 
conducted in the division. Clearances for 1086 replacements were validated; 
471 SECRET clearances were granted; 3568 local files checks were conducted; 
and 431 intelligence record checks were forwarded to higher headquarters by 
the personnel security investigations (PSI) section. Additionally, 115 BI 

and NAC requests were processed. 

(c) The base camp security program was enhanced by the establishment 
of liaison with the Industrial Relations Division, Phu Bai. The intent of 

this liaison is to increase the number and effectiveness of informants. During 
the reporting period, the Cl section recruited 30 new informants. 

(6) G2 Plans/Order of Battle Section. The G2 plans/order of battle 
section continued to monitor and record the enemy situation throughout north¬ 
ern 1 Military Region, with increased emphasis in disseminating collected 
intelligence. The order of battle handbook was updated during the reporting 
period to maintain an accurate description of enemy units operating in Quang 





SUBJE'CT: Operational Report - I.esaons Learned, 101st Airborne Division 

(Airmobile). Period Ending 31 July 1970, RC5^ CSFOR-65 (R2) (U) 

Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. The division intelligence coll-ctior nlan 
was published on 1 June. The collection plan contains essential elements 
of information (EEl) needed on the enemy mission, organization and area 
of operation. Wide distribution of the plan was made to higher, adjacent, 
subordinate, and supporting organizations with an intelligence collection 

(7) Interrogation Section, 101st Military Intelligence Company. During 
the reporting period, the interrogation section, 101st Military Intelligence 
Company (Divisional) processed 13 prisoners of war (12 NVA, one VC), three 
Hoi Chanh (NVA), and 124 batches of captured enemy documents. 

(8) Weather, The Air Force weather team, 5th Weather Squadron, 
continued to provide meteorological support for the 101st Abn Div (Ambl). 

The weather team provides climatological information, weather forecasts 
for individual flights by Army aviators, current weather reports for field 
commanders, weather summaries used in the evaluation of past operations, 
and daily weather advice and interpretation for the commanding general and 
his staff, 

(a) May 1970 

^ During May, the total rainfall was normal, approximately equal to 
the mean average of 4. 0 inches. Due to the sporadic nature of precipitation 
during the month, some areas received more rain than the mean. The 
total rainfall was 4. 04 inches and occurred on 12 days, twice the normal 
frequency. Thunderstorms occurred over the mountains on 20 days Low 
cloudiness occurred on more days than normal. Ceilings below 1500 feet 
were observed on 8 days. No ceilings less than 300 feet were observed. 

No fog occurred. The average high temperature was 94°F, and the average 
low temperature was ll^T, both of which are 20F warmer than the averages 
expected for May. 

^ May afforded the first full month of good weather throughout the 
division AO. Airmobile operations were hampered on five days during 
May (14-16 and 20-21 May), and one B52 air sortie was cancelled on 13 

(b) June 1970 

' 2. During June, the total rainfall was 4. 2 inches, 1. 2 inches above the 

average. Precipitation fell on 11 days, twice the normal frequency. 





SUBJECT: Operationa.1 Report - Leasons Learned, lOlet Airborne Diviiion 

(Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSF'OH-fc5 (RZ) (U) 

Thunderstorms occurred on eight days over the coastal plains and on Z2 
days over the mountains. Ceilings below 1500 feet were observed on 
three days. No ceilings of less than 300 feet were reported. Fog was 
observed on two days. The average high temperature w^s 95°F, and the 
average low temperature was 79°F, both of which are 2 F warmer than 
the average high/low for June. 

^ Airmobile operations during June were relatively unrestsicted except 
during periodic afternoon thunderstorms. Tactical air moves were cancelled 
on five days (4, 12, 13, 14, and 18 June) three of which (13, 14, and 18 June) 
were significant. 

(c) July 1970 

1 The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 2. SO inches, which 
was 0. 8 less than expected for the period. Thunderstorm activity was 
normal, with six thunderstorm days recorded over the coastal plain and 
12 days over the mountains. No ceilings of less than 1500 feet were 
recorded, and no fog days occurred in the coastal plain. Maximum tem¬ 
peratures were 4*^F higher than normal, with a mean temperature of 9^®F. 
Mean minimum temperatures remained at their seasonal average of 78 F. 
Turbulence and strong surface winds occurred for a period of 7 to 14 
days. The conditions were most pronounced over western po.rtions of the 
area of operation, where surface winds of 40 to 80 knots were recorded, 
and turbulence was of moderate to severe intensity. 

2^ Airmobile operations were unrestricted by weather during July. 

High winds hampered aerial activity on 11 July, but did not significantly 
affect operations. 

(d) Precipitation Data In Inches (Coastal Lowlands). 








0. 2 

4. 7 


20. 1 

3, 3 

0. 0 

4. 2 


21. 5 

3. 3 

0. 1 

2. 5 





SUBJECT: Oper!ition-il Report - Lessons Lehmed, lOlst Airborne Division 
(Airmobile), Period riiding 3l July :970, RCG CGfOR-65 (R2) (U; 

e. (d) Personnel. 

(i ) Chaplain. During the ri-porting period, the division provided contin¬ 
uous chnpl;‘in support to all assigned «nd attached units. A total of 
religious services was ofjnducted with an overall attendance of 65,878. Six 
of the division's 24 chapl?iias departed during the month of July, creating a 
considerable personnel problem. 

(2) Personn^'l maa'<gement. 

(a) During the reporting period, tot^l division assigned strength de¬ 
clined from 101.4% of that ’-uthorized on 1 May to 97.3% at the f-nd of July. 
Availability of ’1 series MOS personnel declined by 14%, resisting in a 
serious depletion of line company effective strength. 

(bl Prior to 1 July, the USARV roenlistment goal was pieced at a month¬ 
ly reenlistment rate of 0,5% of operative strength, counting only first term 
P-A and AUS resnlistments. As of 1 July, the goal was doubled, and all reen- 
listments counted. At this time, a prohibition was imposed on rsenlistments 
out of 11, 12 and 13 series MOS into non-combat MOS. The average monthly 
reenlistment total for the previous reporting period had been 194» May 
reenlistments totaled 205; June, 145; and July, under the new criteria, 64. 

(3) Finance. During the reporting period, the division finance office 
est'^blished the 101 st Mobile Finance Forward Team (MFFT) to provide full 
spectrum fimnce services tc personnel looeted on fire support bases. The 
team periodically visits fire support bases, permitting personnel to benefit 
from services such as parti."'1 pcyments, allotment changes, sale of treasury 
checks, collection for the savings desposit program, and acceptance of pay 
inquiries. The team is msd.* available to all commanders located beyond the 
normal service c'pabllity of the present forward finance offices, 

(4) Changes in command and staff. During the reporting period the 
following ch.'inges in cotrm-’nd and staff assignments occurred: 


MG J.J. Hennessey 


MG J.M. Wright 





BG S.B. Berry 


BG J.J. Hennessey 





COL C.E, Smith 


BG J.G. Smith 




2d Bde 

COL W.H. Root 


COL R.L. Kampe 




3d Bde 

COL B.L, Harrison 


COL W.J. Bradley 








SUBJECT: Operational Report • Lessons Learned, TOTst Airborne Division 
(Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFCau65 (R2) (U) 

Avn Gp 

LTC(P) E.P. Davis 


COL C.B. Sinclsir 


26 Jim 


COL D.E. Grange 


COL R.H. Siegrist 


25 Jun 

Oiv Arty 

COL L.E. Surut 


COL R.S. Fye 


29 Jul 


LTC C.A. Hoenstine, 

Jr. succeeded 

LTC G.D. Moore, Jr, 


2 Jim 


LTC R.J. Young 


LTC C.U. Dyke 


1 Jun 


MAJ P. Tiasterson 


LTC D .R. Pinney 


26 Jul 


MAJ H.W. Kinnison 


LTC B.B. Porter 


17 Jul 

Div Surg 

LTC R.E. Day 


COL J.F. Powers 


9 Jul 


LTC S.J. Lobodinski 


LTC R.D. Wood 


27 Kay 


LTC T. Narvaez 


LTC J.D. Martling 


30 Jun 

Fin Off 

LTC W.J. Falconer 


LTC W.J. McMahon 


U May 


LTC T.E. Minix 


LTC H.R. Thomas' 


12 May 

2-502 Inf 

LTC C.J. Shay 


LTC R.J. Young 


6 May 

1-501 Inf 

LTC T.E. Aaron 


LTC W.B. Middlemas 


8 Jim 

1-502 Inf 

LTC A.E. West 


LTC R.E. Keener 


5 May 

1-506 Inf 

LTC B.B. Porter 


LTC H.C. Holt 


17 Jul 

2-506 Inf 

LTC J.C. Bard 


LTC A.C. Lucas 


23 Jul 

3-187 Inf 

LTC I.C. Bland 


LTC H.7. Schandler 


25 Jun 

3-506 Inf 

LTC J.D. Martling 


LTC J.N. Jaggers, Jr* 


16 Jun 

2-11 Arty 

LTC R.J. Barke 


LTC J.L. Sites 


2 Jun 

2-320 FA 

LTC A.B, Davis 


LTC C.A. Hoenstine, Jr. 


27 Jfey 

101 Avn 

LTC W.N. Peachey 


LTC T.L. Meadows 


14 May 

1 58 Avn 

LTC R.J. Guard 


LTC G.N. Stenehjem 


1 Jul 





SUBJl^CT: Operational Report - Leaeons Learned, lOlst Airborne DivlElon 
(Almobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSF0R^5 (R2) (U) 

159 Avn LTC C.K, Nevton 

326 Qogr LTC C.P. Rodolph, Jr. 

succeeded LTC R.F. GLOVER 
succeeded LTC T.M. McClelland 

on 4 Jul 
on 6 Jul 

4-77 Arty LTC C.L. Nowalk 



A .P. Pollard 

5 Trans 

LTC H.l. SB»n 



J.H. Hesson 

326 Med 

LTC R.E. Day 



J.F. Powers 


(C) Logistics. 

on 27 Jm. 
on 26 Ebiy 
on 9 Jul 

(1) General. Logistic support for all division operttiona was provided 
through the DISCCM forward service support elements (FSSE), using the concept 
of area support. Throughout the period, a determined effort was made to re¬ 
duce helicopter blade time whenever possible by using vehicular transportation. 

(a) To more effectively support Operetion CLINCH VALLET (9-15 July), a 
forward refuel point was established at Mai Loc and a rearm point at Quang Tri, 
A forward element of the 3d FSSE deployed to Qusng Tri in support of two ARVN 
battalions, the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, and the 2d En (Ambl), 502d Inf for 
the duration of the operation. 

(b) In support of Operation CHISAGO PEAKAAK SON 363, the 11 refuel points 
at CAMP EVANS were expanded to 25, while an additional 11 points were estab¬ 
lished at FS/OB BIRMINGHAM. All classes of supply wore drawn from the 3d FSSE 

(c) Super contact teems continued to provide personnel and equipment 
maintenance services to units returning from operations for stand dim. The 
number of company size units supported were as follows: 


1st Bde: 

1- 327 3 

2- 327 2 

2-502 ^ 

Total 11 









2d Bde: 

1-501 , 2 

1- 502 ' S 

2- 501 _2 

Total 13 












I'b'BJtCT: Operational Report ~ Lessons Learned, IClst Airborne Divislco 
(Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCO C30Jb-65 (R2) (L) 


3d Bde: 

2- <>06 7 5 12 

1-506 2 35 

3- 187 _J 1 _4 

Total 12 9 21 

(2) DISCOM was tasked to provide civic action support In District 11, 

Hue City and to asaist Thxie Thien Province in upgrading the capabilities of 
the Sector Maintenance and Direct Support Logistic Center (SMiDSLC). At 
the end of the reporting period, five of the original 11 projects had been 
completed, and three more had been added to the task list. Approximately 
85 % of DISCCM's goal for the initial phase of the SM&DSLC project had been 
completed by the end of the reporting period, 

(3) On 1 July 1970, the 5th Transportation Battalion (Aircraft Maintenance 
and Supply) (Aobl) began work on a prescribed load list (’’LL) to support three 
UHIM aircraft scheduled to arrive in the division on or about 1 September 
197c. The PLL was completed, and all requisitioning accomplished, insiuring 
the availability of all p^.rts in advance of arrival of the aircraft. Special 
emphasis was also placed on the requisition and p^ociirement of special equip¬ 
ment needed to eocomplish the battalion mission. At the end of the reporting 
period, the current authorized stockage list (ASL) for both Company A and B 
totaled approximately 11,000 lines. On 1 June, the quick roaetion assistance 
teiflm (QRAT) provided by the 34th General Support Group arrived to assist in 
the pulling, packing, and shipping of approximately 8,000 lines of identified 
excess stock. 

(4) The 5th Trsns Bi (Acft Maint and Sup) (Ambl) provides direct support 
for repair of 424 aircraft authorized in the division. Daring the reporting 
period, 513 aircraft were repaired and released to division sviatior. units. 

Five 12th preventive maintenance periodic inspections on CH47 aircraft 
(Operation Hook) were completed during the period, requiring an average of 

16 days and 1,132 manho\irs per aircraft, 

(5) The 801st Maintenance Battslion (Ambl) technical supply continued to 
process an aversge of approximately 20,000 requests per month. Demand accom¬ 
modation fluctuated somewhat on a weekly besis, with the average for the period 
at 19 . 5 %. The beginning of the period marked a very low 455t customer satis¬ 
faction average for the month of May. At this time the technical supply 
activity still had a 39% zero balance. Intensive studies were initiated, 

and the materiel release expediter (MR£) teams were strengthened. As a result, 
receipts began to rise and have brought customer satisfaction to a 70% aver¬ 
age for the month of July. Many lines were dropped as a result of the study, 
and some 150 lines heve been shifted to the 426th Supply and Service Bat¬ 
talion (Ambl). A 100% inventory was conducted in the latter part of May and 





SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lecoons Learned, 101::t Airborne Division 
(Airmo^le), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U) 

the first woSlc-' In^j^e, which created a work backlog. When processing started 
again, there were 'sq mafty custoner issues th/it several lines went to zero 
balance, end the ptSrcentoge at zero be lance started rising. The end of this 
period finds total receipts rising again to replenish the exhausted stocka/'t. 
The impect of the inventory was felt for a few weeks, however, and the end 
result was fewer warehouse demands. The beginning of the period saw 4^>0 
warehouse demands for the month of May, compared to 17fc at the present time. 
Technical supply is presently carrying 5,118 lines which occupy approxiir,itely 
905t of available storage space. 

The battalion continued to provide contact toama for the line units and 
maintenance stand downs. The on-the-spot contact teams have continued to 
Increase materiel readiness and provide for more efficient combat units. A 
total of 511 technical assistance visits was conducted during the period. 

The country store listing was expended to reduce further the customer unit 
administrative requirements for submitting perts requests. 

g. (U) Civil Affairs. 

(1) Pacification and development activities in Thua Thien Province 
continued at an accelerated rate throughout the reporting period. The number 
of projects in progress «t the beginning of the period was 136. During the 
period, 106 new jjrojects were initiated, 102 projects were completed, and at 
the end of the period, 140 projects were in progress. All the division's 
efforts are closeljr coordinated with GVH officials at province end district 
levels. The overall effort of the division is directed toward the achieve¬ 
ment of the national objectives outlined in the Thue Thien Province Pacifi¬ 
cation and Development Flan, 1970. The ftrovince Civic Action Priority List, 
developed at the hamlet, village, and district levels and consolidated and 
approved at the province level, serves as the guideline in the selection of 
projects to be undertaken. 

(2) On 23 Jvoxe, the final refugee resettlement payment was made, there¬ 
by eliialnsting all registered refugees from the rolls in Thua Thien Province. 
The resettlement payment, which consists of 10 sheets of tin and 7,500$VH 
per family, normalizes a refugee camp, thus creating an official political 
entity. When conditions permit, the people of a normalized community have 
the option of returning to their original villages. When this is done, the 
retvimlng families receive a return-to—village (RTV) payment, which also 
consists of 10 sheets of tin and 7,500$VN per family. As of 30 June 1970, 
63,129 of the 85,114 refugees generated during and after the Tet offensive 

of 1968 had been retiirned to their native villages. There remain approximately 
22,000 people in 26 normalized camps and an additional 15,000 people scat¬ 
tered throughout the province, who are entitled to the ret\am-to-village 
payments upon retiirn to their ancestral homes. Continued division assistance 
in the program is taking the form of limited logistic and nv-terlal support 





iU’UKCT: Operational Report - Lessona Learned, lOlat Airborne Dlvialon 
CAirmobile), Period Ehding 31 July 1970, RC:; CSKOR-65 (Ri) fU) 

for related civic action projects. A total of 27 projtcta is planned, 
including 15 schools, three dispensaries, three aiai^kete, and six wells, .^or 
these projects, the province is supplying eea>ent and roofing, RF and Pf cadre 
provide the labor, and the division supplies lunber, reinforcing steel bars, 
and oftils. The Phase I Program achif-ved 136% of the Return-to-Village ProgriOi 
1.'70 goal. 

(3) In December 1969, the division support ccaamand initiated a program 

to upgrade the Sector Haintenence and Direct Support Logistics Center {SMALSLC 
of Thua Thien Province. From its new location in Hue, the SM&OSLC will 
provide Banagement, support, and services to all Rf', PF, PSDF, and RD cadre 
and their equipment in the province. Fourteen major subprojects constitute 
the Division Support Corsmand ^;ffort, with each subproject undertaken by the 
appropriate element of DISCCW. Of these, five have l«en completed, and six 
others are in progress. 

(4) During the period of this report, a total of 405 MEDCAPs was held, 
and 23,465 medical and dental patients were examined. 

(5) Major projects completed during the reporting period; 

(a) Phu Loc District. 

1 An Bang Hamlet school construction (ZD144005) 

2 Thua Luu Hamlet dispensary (ZD201012) 

J Vong Tri Hamlet school addition {ZD083008) 

(b) Phu Vang District. 

1 Phu An Villege dispensary (YD812262) 

2 Fhu Vang District dispensery repair {YD779277) 

^ Phu Ten Village dike repair (yD8l6301) 

(c) Phong Dien District. 

1 Phong Dien Hamlet Fenners' Association Bldg repair (YD528348) 

2 Pho Trach Hamlet market place (ID503424) 

2 Bo Dien Hamlet school repair (YD615298) 

^ Phong An Village office (YD611291) 

(d) Huong Dien District, 

^ Dien Loc Hamlet school repair (YD595465) ' 

2 Ke Mon Hamlet school repair (YD568464) 

2 Vlnh Xuong Hamlet school repair (YD553-473) 





SUBJECT; Operational Report - Lessons Learned, lOlat JVlrbon.' DiviBlon 
(Airmobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSF0IU65 (R2) (U) 

^ The Ety C nursery school construction (YD620456 
The Chi Tey Hamlet dispensary (YD620436) 

6 Dien My Village dispensary construction (YD6786RO) 

(e) Huong Tra District, 

1 Long Ho Truong Hamlet school furniture (yD702182) 

2 Long Khe Hamlet footbridge (YD618272) 

(f) Huong Thuy District. 

1 Huong Thuy District power line (YD819179) 

2 Tuan Hoe Hamlet health station (YD782239) 

2 Province prison farm equipment repair (YD802215) 

(g) Phu Thu District. 

1 Quang Xvyen Hamlet school construction {YD895L45) 

2 Vinh Luu Hamlet school construction (YD894215) 

2 An Luu Hamlet dispensary construction (YD945172) 

£ Loc San Hamlet school construction (YD^3236) 

(h) Hue. 

1 Phu Vinh Village school addition {YD758206) 

2 Phu Koi Hamlet latrine construction (YD775234) 

2 Phu Hoa Village reading room construction (YD769228) 

£ Hiu Hiep Hamlet street repair (YD770248) 

'i) Vinh Hai Hamlet school repair (YD080125), Vinh Loc. 

^6) During the reporting period, 102 projects were completed inclv'^ing 
17 schools, 11 dispensaries, two village headquarters, 32 wells, 20 imoriwtioD 
boards, three bridges, two dikes, and 15 others. 

(7) The division currently has 140 civic action pi ejects underway. These 
include eight schools, nine dispensaries, three administrative tniildings, 

10 markets, 14 police stations, 77 wells, one road repair, three footbridges, 
and 15 other. 

(8) Commodities issued during the reporting period; 

Cement 2,750 bags 

Tin 1,106 sheets 






31'BJECT: Operntlonftl Report - Lessons Learned, lOlst Airborne Division 

(Airmobile), Period Ending 

31 July 

1970, RCS CSF0R-t5 (R2) (1' 

Construction lumber 

29, U1 

bos rd feet 



gB11 one 

Medical supplies 






Crushed rock 





linear feet 




Ammo boxes 






Screen wire 



School kits 








Scrap wood 



Reinforcing steel bar 


linear feet 

(9) The initiel lf!nd reclamtitioc and driver training effort in Phong 
Dien District was completed during the period. Two of the four Minnecpolis- 
Moline tractors were dispi^ced to Phu Vsng District, one to Huong Thuy 
District, and one is presently being repaired. The program is now entirely 

a Vietnamese responsibility, to include the maintenance, repair and deration 
of equipment. 

(10) On 28 %y, BC Smith, ADC(O), and COL Tlian, Province Chief, attended 
the dedication ceremony cf Phong An Village Headquarters in Phong Dien District. 
In a speech delivered by the Phong An Village chief, it was noted thf:t 10 years 
ago Phong An was a scenic and prosperous area, with a well developed econoay. 

In 1%4, the village headquarters was destroyed in a wave of disruptive 
activities. In subsequent years the village headquarters was relocated twice 
and destroyed each time. Now, 100% of the local population has resettled to 
its original location, irrigation canals have b<-on constructed, and three 
schools have been repaired through the pacification program since early 1%9. 





SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, lOlst Airborne Division 
(Airmobile), Period Ehding 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (Ui 

la conclusion, the village chief pledged further development In security, 
economies, and education. 

h. (U) Psychological Operations. 

(1) Type aiki qutntity of propaganda media employed: 

(a) Total leaflets disseminated: 

Air: 23,871,000 Ground; 59,100 

(b) Total loudspeaker broadcast hoiu’s: 

Air: 645:00 Ground; 1,041:30 

(c) Total movies shown: 123 

Total hours; 333 :45 

(d) Quick reaction leaflets; 

Four missions for 290,000 leaflets 

(e) Quick reection broadcasts; 

Five missions for 17:00 hoxirs 

(f) Hoi Chanh: Eight 

(2) The 1st Inf Div (ARVN) and the lOlst Abn Div (Ambl) cooperated in 
the development of leaflets and tapes for emplojuent against the 66th NVA 
Regiment and other MVA units in the vicinity of FS/OB HENDERSON. The oper¬ 
ation involved 15 hours of aerial broadcast and the distribution of 360,000 
leaflets. Cbe NVA soldier rallied during the reporting period, 

(3) On 29 May, an earlywoid mission was conducted by the 9th Special 
Operations Sqiiadron (SCS) in support of the 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf. Several 
minor SOI compatibility problems were encountered but have since been elim¬ 
inated. It is felt that this mission constituted a milestone in the division’s 
PSYOP effort, since this was the first timt that an earlywond mission was 
conducted under the recently directed XXIV Jorps PSYOP ground communication 

(4) la an obvious effort to coimter the strong psychological impact of 
the accelerated pacification end development program in Thua Thion Province, 
the enemy increased terrorist activities in the populated lowlands during 
the latter pert of May, VC incidents ranged from destruction of 1,000 meters 
of hamlet fencing and distribution of VC propaganda leaflets to the assas¬ 
sination of the Phong Dien District Chief. As yet, the full impact of these 
incidents has not been determined. Mo appreciable change in the attitude of 





SUBJECT: Operations! Report - Leseons Learned, 101st Airborne Division 
(Airmobile), Period Hiuling 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U) 

the people toward the GVN has been detected, and it is felt that the ter¬ 
rorist activities will serve only to alienate the people further from the 

(5) During the middle of June, a photography team from the 4th PDYCP 
Group supported the division with photographic coverage of successful civic 
action projects throughout the province, taking approximately 400 slides 
which were later developed In Saigon. A slide show, code named "Operation 
Building Block", will be shovm throughout the province by the audio-visual 
teams in cooperation with Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) cadre, In 
order to stimulate populace participation in civic action projects, thus em¬ 
phasising the overall nation-building effort. 

(6) Based on recent events and intelligence reports gathered on 20 June 
in the vicinity of the Vietnamese Salient, 100,000 qtdek reaction leaflets 
were printed by the 7th PSYOP Battalion, for employment against the 66th HVA 
Regiment and dropped by the 9th SOS on 21 June, exploiting the discovery of 

a large eneigy hospital complex. In addition, the division FSTOP section con¬ 
ducted an aerial broadcast mission using tape recordings. Although concrete 
results could not be measured, it appears that quick reaction PSYOP missions 
of this nature have a detrimental effect on enemy morale due to the high 
credibility of the factual messages. 

(7) On 8 July, elements of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, on an armed 
aerial reconnaiss nee mission, in the vicinity of Khe Sanh, observed 150 to 
200 KVA in the open. In response to an immediate PSTOP mission request from 
the squadron, the division provided PSYOP support to the operation. Surrender 
or Die leaflets and safe conduct passes were dropped, and an ARVH lieutenant 
made aerial broadcasts in response to the varied ground actions. Subsequent 
airstrlkes and ground operations were exploited with Ist Inf Div (ARVN) PSYWAR 
broedoasts and quick reaction leaflets. Total KVA losses, after several days 
of operations, were very heavy. This action had a significant psychological 
impact on the KVA. 

(8) One KVA corporal rallied on 23 July in Nam Hoa District. Utilizing 
the Rfllller's Guide . 15,000 quick reaction leaflets were prepared and printed 
containing the rallier's name, rank, unit, and a statement concerning his 
excellent treatment ly the GVN. Information obtained during interrogation 
was uised to prepare a tape which was recorded by the Hoi Chanh for broadcast. 
He was later exploited by the 1st Brigade, which took him on an aerial recon¬ 
naissance over the area he had described during his interrogation to identify 
significant areas. Results of this effort were minimal as he coiild not 
associate the airborne view with familiar terrain. 

(9) A USAF aircraft flew a timely high altitude mission in support of 





SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, lOlat Airborne Division 
(Airmobile), Period Ehding 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U) 

Operation CHISAGO PEAK/LAM SON 363, dropping six million leaflets into the 
A SHAU Valley and the immediate region to the northeast. Themes for this 
sortie were Surrender or Die . Beware of B-52 Strikes , and Allied Firepower . 

i. (C) Medical. 

(l) During the reporting period, tactical deployment of companies within 
the 326th Medical Battalion (Ambl) remained the sane as in the previous 
quarter, with Company A in direct support of the Ist Brigade, Company B in 
direct support of the 2d Brigade, and Company C in direct support of the 3d 
Brigade. Headquarters and Support Company continued to provide area medical 
sunnort for fh« T-tnir at Pinrir ! 

(2) Medical Statistical Recapitulation: \ 






Total patients seen at clearing 







Total dentil patients; 






Total admissions; 






Total transferred; 















Medical diseases: 





. 1,094 



















Skin diseases 

















Foot problerjs 






Heat injuries 







Med evae missions: 







(3) Movement of the 32d Medical Depot from Phu Bai to Da Nang increased 
the order and shipping time of medical supplies from eight to 15 days. This 
delay necessitated initiation of weekly circuit supply missions by the bat- - 
talion. Due to the increased distance, any emergency supplies must be deliv« 
ered by helicopter. _ ■ ' 

(4) Company MEDCAP programs have continued, with medical companies'in 
support of toigade civil affairs programs. Each physician is scheduled for 
a minimtim of one MEDCAP per woek. 






SUBJKCT: Operational Report •- I^esMona Learned, lOlat Airborne Division 
(Airmobile), Perlo<l Endinj: )1 Juljr 1970, RCG C5;FC)Fl-F)5 (R?) {’1) 

( 5 ) The 'ilr ambuLince pl.<toon continued to perform Its mluBion of pro¬ 
viding aero-medical ev-ciiatlon sup! ovt to the 101st Abn Dlv (Ambl 1. The major 
Ity of this support originated from CAMP KAGLK. However, for moat of the 
period two UHIH air ambulances have been statlone*! at CAMP EVANG to provide 
quicker response to northern sectJona of the AO, During this reporting period 
one of the battalion's authorized twelve aircraft wan placed with division 
flight standards, leaving eleven functional aircraft with the platoon. 

(6) Mandatory training required by UGARV Regulation 350-1 la being 
actively conducted and posted to individual training records. Einphasis has 
been placed on OJT and MOS cross-training to Increase individual proficiency 
and to reduce the impact of DERCK losses and temporary absences of personnel. 
The air ambulance platoon has tdken maximum advantage of unfavorable weather 
during the period to improve individual aviator proficiency In instrument 
flight and inclement weather procedures. 

j. (C) Signal. 

( 1 ) The 501at Signal Battalion (Ambl) continued its mission to provide 
communicatlons-electronics support for the lOlst Abn Div (Ambl) throughout 
the reporting period. RATT teams continued to support the division, the three 
brigades, and DISCCM. In Operation BARBER GLADE, secure RATT was provided 
in'support of Project Delta at Mai Loc.^ Both AM and FM RWI stations con¬ 
tinued in operation, and a Jump capability wa.« provided at all times. The 
battalion responded to increased requests for 4-channel communications, 
linking brigades to battalion CPs at forward fire support bases, by instal¬ 
GLADIATCR, and MAUREEN. Four channel systems continued to be provided at 
Phu Loc District Headquarters, F3/0B BIRMINGHAM, FS/OB BA3T0GNE, CAMP EAGLE, 
CAMP EVANS, EAGLE BEACH, and FS/OB RIPCORD. Four channel systems were also 
provided at Mai Loc for Project Delta, and at FS/OBs HENDERSON, HOLCCMB and 
SHEPHERD, CAMP CARROL and Dong Ha in support of combined US/ARVTJ operations. 
Four channel systems were provided at FS/OBs TUN TAVERN and BARNETT in sup¬ 
port of ARVN operations. Operational and in?iintenance responsibility of the 
4-channel system linking FS/OB T-BONE to Hue utilizing AN/MRC68 equipment 
was transferred to the 1st Inf Div (ARVN). The battalion maintained an 
overall multi-channel reliability of 96 , 6 % diaring the reporting period. 

This can be attributed to three factors: (a) the increased responsiveness 
of the ADAO in providing helicopter support to deliver equipment to fire 
support bases when equipment failures occurred; 

(b) the decrease in maintenance problems with the multiplexer AN/TCC70 
of the AN/GRCI 63 due to familiarity gained through Its continued utilization; 

(c) authorization of the battalion to ob'taln a temporary excess of AN/ 
GRCI 63 equipment, which provided reliable backup reserves. 





i\ ^ I L. 

jL'BJEXilT: Operntlonil Report - L^osona Learned, JOlat Airborne Division 
(Airmobile), Period hiding 31 July 1970, RCS Ci:F0R-65 {R2) (U) 

(2) The battalion continuei ita policy of direct exchange of equipment 
that could not be immediately repaired. Division ‘jnits were further assisted 
by sign»il contact teams sent to field locations for on-site repairs. There 
were 921 work orders completed during the reporting period. Receipt and 
issue of additional crypto equipment relieved some of the past shortages 

and provided additional flexibility. 

(3) The division's four MARS stations completed 13,843 phone patches 
during ffey, June and July. The division MARS stations set a DSARV record 
with 5,253 Calls durint, the month of May. 

(4) The 63d Signal Battalion continued to provide cable, 12-channel 
VHF, and microwave communications support to major subordinate and higher 
unit headquarters. During Operation CLINCH VALLEY in July, contingency 
circuits from CAMP CAiiROL to CAMP EVANS and CAMP EAGLE were activated in 
support of the 3d ESrig^ de forward CP. 

(5) The battalion began a program of training selected personnel of the 
1st Inf Div (aRVN) signal battalion. To date, three officers and six enlisted 
men have received two weeks of OJT in the theory and operation of various 
equipment in the battalion. The ARVN personnel spent two weeks living and 
working with the 501st Signal Battalion. 

k. (U) Engineer. 

(1) During the reporting period, the 326tb Ehgineer Battalion (Ambl) 
continued to provide general and direct support to the division. One new 
firebase was opened and several old firelases reopened. Upgrading of the Phu 
Thu Sstuaiy Road, the Jeanne-Knight Road, and the Street Without Joy projects, 
was completed in support of tactical and civic action requirements. Rroject 
LIFESAVER was discontinued during the reporting period after the construction 
or improvement of 15 landing zones in the division AO. 

(2) During the last week of Hay, engineer support was consolidated and 
connaltted to establishing a foivard line of hardened firebases in the division 
area of operation. The preponderance of engineer effort for the remainder 

of the reporting period was committed to this task. Initially four firebases 
were programmed for complete hardening. These hardening tasks committed 
A/326th Qigr to FS/OB BRICK, B/326 Jhgr to FS/OB KATdHIS, Ccnpanies B and D 
of the 27th Engr to harden FS/OB VSGHEL and to con^lete construction of an 
access road to the firebase from Route 547, and Company D of the 14th 
Ekigr Ib to harden FS/OB RAKRASAN and to complete construction of an access 
road to the firebase from FS/OB JACK, FS/OB RIPCORD was designated to be 
hardened on a selective basis. During the last two weeks of the reporting 
period, two additional firebases were designated to be hardened. FS/OB 
GLADIATOR is to be completely hardened and FS/OB MAURESl is to be hardened 





SUBJECT: Op«rational Roport - Lessons Learned, 101st Airlome DlTlsion 
(Airmobile), Period Siding 31 July 1970, RCS CSFCB-65 (R2) (U) 

(3) During the suoner season, with its sparse rainfall, helipad 
nalntenance beca-ae a prime engineer ndasion, with upgrading projects 
VECtKEL; at Phu Loe, Fhu Thu, and Nas Hoa district headquarters; and at 
various base camp helipads. Potable water was provided throxighout the 
area of operation, with purification units located at FS/OB BASTOGNE, 

FS/OB VBGHEL, Mai Loc, the Thua Luu Bridge, and CAMP EAGLE. 

(4) At the beginning of the reporting period, a new firebase (FS/OB 

SHOCK), was created out of an existing landing sone. niis firebase was 
constructed under the airmobile firebase concept of seven to 10 days 
occupation, and was closed after nine days of occupation. FS/OB KATHR7N, 
reopened during the latter part of the previous reporting period, continued 
to receive engineer support in the form of demolition and earthmoving 
work. The existing hill mass was leveled so as to support two artilleiy 
batteries. The task of hardening FS/OB BRICK encompassed the construction 
of one 20 ’x 32 ', three 10 'x 24 * and 41 8'xl2’ bunkers; installation of a 
tactical wire barrier; clearing of adequate fields of fire and preparation 
of logistic helicopter landing pads. During the hardening process, a 
system of prefabricating and airlifting bunkers to the job site was initi¬ 
ated with excellent results. The hardening process of FS/OB B^ICK was cc»> 
pieted the end of the second month of the reporting period. 

( 5 ) During the month of June two LZ cutting/bunker busting teams were 
insert^ into western Quang Trl Province in support of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 

17th Cav operations, Oaa team was Inserted into the FS/OB ROBIN area to 
cut an LZ to permit the extraction of medical supplies and documents front 
an NVA hospital site and to destroy the remaining bunkers. The second 
team was inserted near FS/OB SNAPPER to cut an LZ to extract portions 

of a rice and weapons cache. This team was also used to destroy the re¬ 
maining ordnance, rice, and bunkers. 

(6) At FS/OB VEGHEL, a project was undertaken to provide adequate 
drainage facilities for structures on the firebase, to lay wire barriers, 
and to clear fields of fire. The hardening process on FS/OB VEGHEL was 
eonq^leted bry the 27th Qigr Fh In late June. An additional requirement 

to establish a 1st Brigade forward CP, consisting of one 10'x^' TOC and 
six 8*xl2' sleeping position bunkers, was completed during the last week 
of the reporting period, 

( 7 ) Maneuver elements occupying FS/OB RIPCCRD eontinuod to receive 
engineer support throughout the entire reporting period, A refuel point 
for UELH and LOH aircraft was constructed, and buiikers were ssplaced in 
-selected positions around the firebase. Additional support included wire 
barriers, fields of fire, defensive positions, and adequate drainage facil¬ 
ities. During the latter stages of the reporting period, additional engi¬ 
neer support was conmitted to the firebase to counter increased enei^ activity. 






SUBJKCT: Operational Report - Leaaons Learned, 101st Airborne DiTlsion 
(Airmobile), Period Ei>ding 31 July 1970, hCL CSF(»-65 (R2) (U) 

(a) Ccfflpany B was tasked with improving the defensive posture of the 
firehase by continicting additional bunkers, a quad-50 position, nuaerous 
revettoents, a new log pad, and repair of damaged structures and positions, 

A new position for a ICSofia howitaer battery was built after a CH47 crashed 
and destroyed the existing battery, to include a massive ECD effort to 
deactivate and destory the damaged artillery animunition, fiogineer elements 
were extracted with the closing of the firehase on 23 July. 

(b) In support of increased enemy activity around FS/OB RIPCCSID, FS/OB 
GLADIATCE was reopened. Ckie platoon of engineers was inserted <m 19 July to 
harden the flrebase. Tasks to be accomplished included constucticn of 63 
bunkers and two log pads, clearing fields of fire and installation of 
tacticnl wire. At present 39 bunkers have been completed. 

1. (C) Army Aviation. 

(1) General. 

(a) Throughout the reporting period, the 101st Aviation Group (Combat) 
(Airmobile) provided aviation support to the division and non-divisional 
units in I Military Region, In addition to providing airlift and armed 
aerial escort support, the group augmented the aeromedical capability of 
the medical battalion and provided air traffic and pathfinder support and 
limited battlefield surveillance and target acqxiisition. 

(b) Aviation requirements were met on a daily basis to provide the 
necessary support for combat operations, logistic resupply, and pacification 
and development efforts. Aviation support was also provided for Special 
Forces Project Delta; CCN missions; the 1st Brigade, 5tb Infantry Division 
(Mechanized); and the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) in conjunction with the 
Vietnamese Air Force, 

(c) Operation LIFESAVER and its program of landing zone expansion was 
concluded on 5 June 197C, Ihiring the reporting period, LIFESAVER teams 
completed 15 LZs, thereby increasing the total number of L2s created during 
Operation LIFFSAVER to 170. All of these LZs are functional two ship LZs 
with high speed routes of approach and departure. During the reporting 
period, pathfinders controlled air traffic on as many as 14 fire support 
bases at one time. 

(2) The following are statistical data for the reporting period: 







101st Avn £ki 






ISatt-i Avn Eb 











SUBJECT: Oporatlonal Raport - Lsssods Learnad, lOlst Airborne DlrLsloo 
(Airaoblle), Period aiding 31 July 1970, RCS CSFC»U65 (R2) (U) 







159th Avn 






163d Avn Co 



_ Q. 








(3) The nuaber of aircraft receiving ground fire increased by 98 
over the last reporting period. The 101st Aviation Group experienced 187 
incidents of ground fire reported as follows! 

135 10 3 38 1 

(4) The 101st Avn Gp (Cbt) (Ambl) conducted two almoMlity classes 

for coBnanders and staff officers of the division during the repoirtlng period. 
The first class (15>16 Hay) was attended by 39 personnel. The secoiyi aimobdl^ 
ity class, conducted on 26>27 June, was attended by 31 personnel. Two patb> 
finder classes were conducted to train ARVN personnel. The first, from 4 May 
to 15 May, graduated one officer, two warrant officers, and 12 NCOs. The 
second, from 25 May to 5 Jme, graduated one officer, two warrant officers and 
n NCOS. 

(5) Air traffic activities for the period were: 

Eagle GCA Eagle Tower Td ftmHat ^ Tower 













(6) Throughout the period, the 101st Aviation Battalion (Assault Heli¬ 
copter) (Aahl) and the 158th Aviation Battalion (Assault Helicopter) (Ambl) 
alternated their ccunpanies in providing direct combat and logistic support 
to the brigades of the division. The 159th Aviation Battalion (Assault 
Support Helicopter) (Ambl) continued to provide general support to the division 
for the air movement of artillery, combat troops, and supplies. Logistic 
support was also provided to the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Meeh); the 1st Inf 
Div (ARVN); and Project Delta. The l63d A^ation Company (GS) (Ambl) continued 
to provide general support to the division, performing visual reccanaissance, 
photograp}^ missions, courier service, psychological operations support, 
airborne personnel detector missions and command and control. The company 





SLfBJcXT: Operutioiial Rep)ort - Lessona Lietimed, lOlst Airbcome DiTiflioo 
(AA.noobile), Period raiding 31 Julj 1970, RCS CSF0a.-65 {R2) (Ij) 

provided air traasportation for the division general staff. During the 
reporting period, the 53flth TVansportatiori Detachaent (Aircraft Maiatenaiice] 
(Affibl) was attached to the cuffipany and accomplished direct support maintenance 
on all company aircraft. 

m. (D) Air Cavalry Operations. The 2d Squadron (Airmobile), 17th 
Cavalry continued to perform extensive armed aerial reconnaissance throughout 
northern I Military Region in support of Allied operations. Tbe squadron 
engaged in combat as an economy of force unit, provided immediate r action 
forces for eneny contact and security of downed aircraft and surveillance and 
security operations for the division and subordinate combat elements. 

(1) The 2d Sqdn (AmLl), 17th Cav is one of the prljaary intelligence 
gathering agencies of the 101st Abo Div (Ainbl). With three air cavalry troopt, 
a ground troop and Company L (Ranger), 75th Infantry attached, the squadron 
performs extensive air and ground reconnaissance and surveillance. In the 
collection, evaluation, and dessemination of intelligence information, the 
squadron works closely with US and ARVN intelligence agencies. Close coord¬ 
ination is maintained with the division order of battle, imagery interpretation, 
ground surveillance and G-2 air sections and divisicm IW teams. Valuable 
intelligence is gained through cooperation and informal coordination with the 
Ist Inf Div (ARVH) and the Ist Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), Based <m intelligence 
indicators, the sqiuadron's combat elements are targeted against specific 

areas of interest in order to provide the commanding general with a clear 
assessment of the situation in all reaches of tbe division area of operation, 

(2) The most significant findings attributed to armed aerial reconnaissance 
hy the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav during the reporting period were in June, when 
an extensive rear service area of the 66th NVA Regt was discovered in the FS/OB 
Leatherneck area, and in July, when air cavalry elements discovered the 9tb 

}fVA Regt, 304 th NVA Division, infiltrating into SVN, 

( 3 ) Extensive employment of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav throughout the 
division AO, with particular emphasis on the division reconnaissance zone, 
resulted in 2,125 spot reports of enemy activity, eight crew served and 41 
individual weapons captured, 396 eneiny killed and five prisoners captured. 

a, (tJ) Artillery. 

(1) The 101st Airborne Division Artillery (Airmobile) provided close 
and continuous fire support to maneuver units throughout the reporting period. 
Light howitzer battalions continued to provide direct support to the infantry 
brigades, with the 2d (Ambl), 319th Arty (105) in direct support of the 
3d Brigade; the 2d Bn (Ambl), 320th Arty (105) in direct support of the 1st 
Brigade; and the Ist £ta (Ambl), 321st Arty (105) in direct support of the 2d 






SUBJSCTi Operational Report > Ltuons Learned, i01at Airborne Diviaion 
(Aimobae), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS G3fOR-65 (R2) (O) 

Battery D, 2d Bn (Aobl), 320tb lity (lO^) remined attaobed to the Ji. 

3n (iUidJl), 506th Infantry In II Mllitaiy Begion. 

Tto ai Bn (Anbl), 11th Arty (155)» the 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty, 
and A Btry (Ath), 377tb Arty raaiined in general support of the diTlnion, 

Che foaoving 106th Artillery Group units sere located in the dirieicn 
area of operatione in a general support rolei Btry A, ^ Bn (8"/l75) (SP)» 
94th Arty at 01; Btry A, Ist Bn (3“/l55) (SP), 39th Arty at PS/OB BAKKASAK; 
Btry B, Ist Bn {Q‘'/M5) (SP)i 59th Arty at PS/CB BARBARA; Btry C, Ist Bn 
(8"/l53) (SP)» 59th Arty at Caap Brans; Btry A» Ist Bn (82/l75) (SP), e5d 
Arty at PS/CB BASTOOE; Btry B, 1st Bn (82/l75) (SP), 838 Arly at IB/OB 
BIRHIHGBAH; and Btry C, Ist Bn (8"/l75) (SP), 83d Arty at m/GS 7EGHSL. 

Btry B, 2d Bn (8Vl75) (SP), 94tb Arty of the lOeth Artillery Group vas 
located at GAMP GA^C^ in Rorthem I Military Region and proYided fires in 
general support of the diviaion. 

Btry D (M42), lat Bn, 49th Arty and a section of Btry C (M55), 65th Arly 
of XX.I7 Corpe Artillery eere deployed in the division AO to provide ftres 
for base ajo& bridge secorily. 

(2) Artillery fires were eiaployed throughout the division area of 
operation to disrupt aneiay lines of cocaamication and infiltration routes. 
This uas aocoapliahed throu^jh artillery raids and fiiee in reaction to 
sensor activations, radar detections, aerial sarveillanoe, and intelligance. 
Extensive artillejy fires were ei^loyed ni^tly in the "rocket belt" areas 
on the periphery of tbs populated lovlands and in the area adjacent to 
Bilitaxy installations* 

(5) Brrou^iottt the reporxing period, ‘TS at^ AHTO artillery units oon- 
tinoed to enqplcy coordinated fires in support of oodiined operations* The 
division artillery aerial surveillacoe prograa continued to locate and ad> 
just fires on eneiy forces and to provide observation for artillery regis¬ 

(4) During the period of heavy eoeiy contact in the vicinity of IS/CB 
RIPOC^ in July, Btry B, 2d Bn (A;d)l), 3l9th Arty suffered heavy damage 
vben a CH47 aircraft crsi>bed and burned in the 105an anunitlon storage area, 
causing a major fire on the firebase. All six 105Ba howitzers of >he battery 
were destroyed. 

( 3 ) Repositioning of Artilleiy Support; 





2 Ifeiy 




3 Jby 








4 Hay 

9 hby 

10 Jby 

26 ffeiy 

10 Jvm 
14 Jun 
16 Jxu 

22 Jtm 

23 Jun 

24 Jun 

25 JTxn 

26 Jun 
6 Jul 
9 Jul 

11 Jul 
16 Jul 
18 Jul 

Operational Report - Leaaonc Learned, lolat Airborne Division 
(Ainnobilo ), Poriod Ending 51 July 1970, RCS CSroR -65 (R2) (U) 




C/ 2-320 

A/ 2-320 














Af-Vl -321 













B/ 2-320 































LOS BAi:os 






























SOBJECTi Operational fieport laaaona Laari»d, 101st Airborne DiTiBion 
(Aimobile)* Peril Slndin^ Jl July 197t)» SCS CSJOR-65 (R2) (U) 





25 Jul 




26 Jul 







27 Jul 




29 Jttl 







c. (tJ) 


(1) Public Inforwation. 

(a) Kuiuber of bometovn neus releases! 

(b) Humber of news/feature stories released to public and militaj^ 
nedia* 175 * 

(c) Ifumber of photographs released! 129. 

(d) Humber of eorrespondenta prorided support by the infonaation 
office t 91. 

(e) Coverage was also provided for 50 distinguished visitors to the 
divi^on, including Representative William 0. Ccwger (R-Ky) and General 
William C« Westmorelandf CSA. 

(2) Caumand Information* 

(a) During the reporting eriod, six issues of the division newspaperj 
^he Screaming Eagleand the spring issue of the division magazine, 
"Rendezvous with Destiny"* were published. 

(b) In support of President Hison’s proclamation of the period 24-50 
May as Drug Abuse Prevention Week* the information office instituted the 

A half-bo'or discussion program on drug abuse was broadeast over AFVH- 
TV QDiaae “Rci at 1530 hours 50 May. the program featured one medical officer, 
one legal officer, and a moderator f^om the division. 

^ A 30 second radio "spot" announcement concerning drug ahise and the 
division assiesty program was broadcast daily over AfVH-R* Qnang Tri. 

^ The "Airborne Dateline" featured drug abuse cmd the division amnesty 
program each day in the cartoon and special annoonoemant section. 





SLTR.TRICTi i'lral - I/iRf^onn lOlr.t Airtorn# DlTinion 

(Air»r>bi le), poriof) End-fM? 51 J<i3 v 107''» RCS (R2J (n) 

^ A riiflr on dm*; :ibiin<t pr“TRntlon wan attaohfl'i to th« daily bollatin 
Tr.r dintri'b'itIon and poBtinjr. 

'tSAiTV RVint Shan't 2<>-70, "TTm*; Abitna in Uw* Military", was ro;/rodue'*d 
and distr-lhatad wLtTi a ooTer l 0 tt«!r no<^iirln»: thn topic to b<s ooTexoa durinr: 
Jun* at all unit oown^ndera* calln* 






SUBJECT: Operntlonal Report - Lessons Lasmed, lOlst Airborne Diyiaion 
(Airaobile), Period Holding 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U) 

2 , Lessons Learned: Conanander's Obeervations, Evaluations and Recoovienda- 

a. (U) Personnel. None. 

b. (C) Intelligence. 

(1) Use end update of intelligence data base informtion. 

(a) Observation: A data base of intelligence infonoation on the loca¬ 
tion of eneaijr bunker complexes, cache sites, trsils, and other information 
gathered during ccmbet operations and maintained at maneuver battalion level, 
provides valuable information for units conducting patrol, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance operations. 

(b) Evaluation: Experience has shoun that when small unit comsa&ders 
and patrol leaders are thoroughly briefed on previous ene^y positions and 
activities in their area of operation, from information provided by an ac¬ 
curate and current intelligence data base, the information gathered by the 
unit and returned to intelligence personnel is aiuch more detailed and valua¬ 
ble. The data base can be kept cirrrent and will provide indications of 
eneny trends and activities in the area. The exchange of this type of infor¬ 
mation with adjacent units or units moving into the area for the first time, 
increases the overall effectiveness of operations. 

(c) Recommendation: That xmit intelligence personnel (S2) be encouraged 
to aggressively pursue a program of detailed intelligence gathering, collect¬ 
ing a data base, disseminating the data, and updating the data base frcaa de¬ 
tailed debrlefl^s. 

(2) Acoustic sensors in support of ranger teams. 

(a) Observation: Acoustic sensors can be effectively tised to extend 
the surveillance capability of ranger teams for short periods of time. 

(b) Evaluation: Following the insertion of Barger Team "Cicada" on 18 
April 70, six acoustic sensors were air delivered by personnel of the grouivd 
surveillance section, supported by the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), I7th Cav. The primary 
mission of the ranger team was to monitor sensor activity and respond with 
artillery fire. During the seven days the team monitor^ the acoustic sen¬ 
sors, it heard metallic sounds, voices, and screaming, when artillery was 
employed. Conversations hoard and translated by a Kit Carson Scout revealed 
NVA/VC plans to ambush a US unit in the area. The plan was later abandoned 
due to non-availability of automatic weapons. KVAAC were also heard mon¬ 
itoring DS radio transmissions and discussing the disposition of US forces 

in the area. 






SU6JSCT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division 
(Aimobile)i Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFai-65 (R2) (U) 

(c) Recomendation: That cosunenders consider the use of acoustic sensors 
with ranger teams for target acquisition and intelligence collection. 

c. (C) Operations. 

(1) Territorlel force operations in the jungle cenopgr. 

(a) Obsei^ation: During the Inet reporting period, a program of com¬ 
bined operations with Regional Force elements, operating in the canopy for 
short periods of time, was begun. Continued combined operations during this 
reporting period have culminated in independent RF company operations deep 
in the esnof^ for periods of up to 15 days. 

(b) Evaluation: The RF companies continue to show progress in profi¬ 
ciency and aggressiveness. Continued operations, farther from the populated 
areas, increase the responsibility and sense of urgency of the and PSDF 
forces securing the populated lowlands. 

(c) Recommendation: That continued coordination be maintained with GVH 
officials to encourage increased RF operations, in the canopy. 

(2) Sniper team employment. 

(a) Observation; A five man sniper team, employed with the PPS-5 radar, 
has shown to be a very effective method of interdicting enesy infiltration 
in the populated lowlands of Thua Thlen Province. The effective eaplpyment 
of snipers is generally limited to open, relatively level terrain of the 

(b) Evaluation: Upon initial employment of the radar/snlper teams into 
known infiltration areas, movement was frequently detected and engaiged. In¬ 
filtration through these areas was greatly diminished, and indications were 
that the routes were effectively interdicted. 

(c) Recommendation: That units be made aware of this technique of 

(3) Mechanical ambushes. 

(a) Observation: The extensive employment of mechanical ambushes during 
the reporting period has led units In the field to recommend the use of mono¬ 
filament fish line as trip wire, used PRC25 batteries as the power source, 
and clothespins for the trigger device, 

(b) Evaluation: The monofilament fish line has been procured locally 
or through individual purchase and is much preferred over trip wire. Used 





oUBJKCT: Operational Report - Lessone Learned, lOlat Airborne Division 
(Airmobile), Period &iding 31 Juiy 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U) 

PRC25 batteries are readily avaSlable and durable in all weather conditions. 
The clothespin firing device is sensitive and quickly employed in the field, 

(c) Reconmendotion: That units employing mechanical ambushes consider 
this technique of employment. 

( 4 ) Prefabricated firebase facilities. 

(a) Observation: In conjunction with the division-wide program of hard¬ 
ening fire support bases against enemy attack, facilities such as bunkers, 
latrines, showers and other structures were prefabricated or constructed in 
rear base areas, and airlifted to the firebase. 

(b) Evaluation; This procedure reduced time, effort, and aircraft blade 
time required for establishing and hardening a firebase. All tools and labor 
were readily available in rear areas, and no excess material was delivered 

to the firebase requiring bsckhoul or destruction, 

(c) Recomaend^tlon: That units establishing forward fire support bases 
consider the construction or prefabrication of facilities in rear areas, 
prior to delivery to the firebase. 

( 5 ) Local patrolling around forward firebases, 

(a) Observation; During the present division operation (TEXAS STAR), 
an active patrolling program around forward fire support bases has severely 
limited the enengr's reconnaissance capability and delayed, and some times 
prohibited, his attack on the fire support base, 

(b) Evaluation: Local patrolling around the fire support bases, from 
1000 to 1500 meters out, allows the firebase defenders to employ all defen¬ 
sive fires and enables the pintrols to locate prepositioned enei^ indirect 
fire weapons and cache sites. An eneny ground attack against FS/OB RIPGCSID 
was very likely pre-empted on 22 July, when Co A, 2d Eii (imbl), 506th Inf 
was engaged by nn estimated two company eneii^y force approxliMitely 1000 meters 
southeast of the firebese. 

(c) Recommendation; That units consider an active patrolling program 
around foi^^ard fire support bases. 

(6) Use of E-158 CS canisters. 

(a) Observation: Aircraft are extremely vulnerable to small arms and 
mortar fire while entering and leaving a landing zone during combat 
assaults, extractions, or resupply. 





SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, lOlst Airborne Division 
(Aimobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR -65 (R2) (U) 

(b) Evaluation: l^ctical CS has proven to be effective in limiting 
the enemy's ability of placing aimed fires into an L2 during these missions. 
In addition, experience has shown that it requires approximately 15-20 
minutes for the eneoty to place the first mortar round on an LZ. Employment 
of tactical CS on suspected mortar and forward observer positions, shortly 
after the initial insertion of troops, can assist in preventing effective 
mortar fire in or around the landing zone. 

(c) Recommendation: That units conducting airmobile combat and resup¬ 
ply operations consider the use of tactical CS in restricting the eneny's 
indirect fire capability. 

(7) Tactical CS against a fortified position. 

(a) Observation: The eneay's limited protective capability against riot 
control agent CS makes its useagalnst entrenched and fortified positions very 

(b) Evaluation: Ehployaent of tactical CS has caused the enei^y tc with, 
draw from his fortifications, thus increasing his vulnerability to other sup¬ 
porting fires. Qaployment of Elagainst suspected enea^ locations has 
also proved to be an effective means of reconnaissance by fire. 

(c) Recommendation: That units consider the use of tactical CS agent 
against hardened targets. 

(8) Quadrant system of control during airmobile assaults. 

(a) Observation: The use of a standard quadrant system to divide the 
ares around landing zones during combat assaults provides for better air 
traffic control and allows for continuous suppression around the landing zone* 

(b) Evaluation: It has been fovind that a system, consisting of the four 
major quadrants, NE, SE, 3il and NU, numbered one through four, respectively, 
is an excellent tool in planning for suppressive fires during crazbat 
assaults. Three quadrants are allocated a type of suppressive fire while 
the fourth is utilized for entrance and exit of the lift aircraft. The sup¬ 
pressive fires as well as airborne on call assets, i, e., tactical CS, crew 
recovery aircraft, and C&C aircraft, can be repositioned rapidly to meet a 
changing situation. 

(c) Recommendation: That the system be considered for evaluation and 
possible inclusion as airmobile doctrine by other units conducting airmobile 
combat assaults. 





G';BJF,CT: Operational Report - Leasona Learned, 101 st Airborne MtIsIoij 
(AlrMoblle), Period Rnding H July 1970, RCS CC;FaR-65 (R2) 

(9) Helicopter ground-to-air incidents during BDA. 

(e) Obaorvetlon: During conduct of bonb d’linnge assessment of B52 
strikes, aircraft hnve frequently received sa»all arms and automatic weepons 
fire end obaerved enea^r ectlvity in the strike sone. 

(b) Evaluation: The fr'^quancy of these incidents indicates that the 
enemy expects a helicopter reconnoIssence after a B52 strike and that the 
ensi^ surviving In the strike sono quickly recover to engage HS aircraft. 
Guccessful counterEi' as'ures used by the division have been to employ an air 
c'iVilry team, consisting of a OAC nircraft, two AHiG Cobras and a LOH, imme¬ 
diately after the strike. Th'- employment of tactical CS (EC158 canisters^, 
from the C&C elrereft, on suspected enemy loc tiona, has reduced the eftec- 
tlvaness of the enemy fire, 

(c) Rocommendation: That commanders consider this technique during 
the conduct of bomb d-image assessment. 

(10) Detailed studies have recently been concluded within th'. division 
in an effort to minimize friendly casualties and maximize the combat effec¬ 
tiveness of maneuver units. A study of the period 7 December 19&9 through 
9 July 1970 indicated that the majority of US casualties during the period 
w re Inflicted by enniny atVicks on night defensive positions (NDP). The 
foil owing lessons, some of them re-leamed, have been emphasized in the 

(a) Preventing the enemy from knowing the location and size of night 
defensive positions and denying him easy access into the area is extremely 
imporVint. The area selected for an NDP should bo located in rough terrain 
with thick tuidarbruah whenever possible. This will make it difficult for 
the eneny to move up to the position without being detected, and the thick 
underbrush will often prematurely detonate RPG rounds fired towaixls the 

(b) Mov'iment into the NDP should bo conducted about 15 minutes prior 
to full darkness, permitting personnel to estsblish their indlvldusl posi¬ 
tions and begin setting up their trip flares, clsymoros, warning devices, 
and mechanical ambushes while they still h’ve enough light to work safely. 

At this time, It is dark enough to prevent the enemy from observing these 
actions from a dict''nce of more than 100 meters away. 

(c) When ''steblishing individual positions, personnel should avoid dig¬ 
ging in next to trees or tree stumps. The sneny will fire his RPGs against 
trees «>nd into heavy brush areas to create air bursts in order to spray the 





ol'EU IJT: Opi'Trt tlonftl Report - Leasoiui 101st Airborne Division 

(Ai r-niobl !>■), J'eriod 31 July I9VL-'', ROD 0;;K0R-6;) (K2) (U) 

>jrea with :;hr>ipiit?l. 

yd) An NUF r.houid not L<- fstablinhei! on the side of a hill unless the 
top of the hill is reconnoit>red and out posted. In a recent operatiori, a 
Uiiit went into position on »■ small knoll below the top of a hill. The hill 
had (iien recently occupied by the NVA, and bunkers and cleared fields of fire 
had been establir.hed. When the NVA bigan an attack from this position, they 
had the advantage of cover, cle= r fields of fire, and dominant terrain. 

(e) Mechanical ambushes and trip flares should be emplaced from 100 

to 150 met'rs away from the individual positions of the NDP. When mechani¬ 
cal ambushes .'ire tripped at this dlst-nce, early warning is provided and the 
NDP*s location is not compromised, employing the meclianical ambushes 
this f^r out, friendly movement ne'.r the NDP perimeter is not significantly 

(f) At least two trip flares should be employed on the friendly side of 
the ambush. Friendly forces approaching the mechanicnl ambush from the NDP 
will be warned by tripping the flare. The flares will also provide an extra 
means of warning should the eneny succeed in bypossing the ambush, 

(g) After the recovery of e^irly warning devices and mechanical ambushes, 
squ^d patrols should be sent out on all sides of the NDP prior to the move¬ 
ment of the main body. The NVA will occupy positions as close as 20 meters 
from the NDP, apparently in order to provide themselves a sleeping position 
protected from friendly ARA, artillery, and mortar fires, and a position from 
which to reconnoiter the NDP. The squad petrols will seek out these posi¬ 
tions and spoil nny attempt by the eneiny to ambush the unit. 

(ll) Ammunition allocation forecast. 

(a) Observation; The division is required to submit a monthly forecast 
of expected ammunition expend!tiires for one month in advance. There are 
nearly 50 different types of ammunition which require forecasting and six 
different mathematical computations are required for each type. 

(b) Evaluation; Because of the myriad of mathematical computations in¬ 
volved in the ammunition forecast it was considered -n ideal type of pro¬ 
gram for the UNIVAC 1005 computer located at the division personnel center. 
The 03 section coordinated directly with personnel services branch to de¬ 
velop a computer program which would virtually eliminate the manual mathe- 

m*tical work on the forecast and reduce the chance of error considerably. 

The time required for completion of the report was reduced to approximriteiy 
one day, resulting in an overall saving of 36 man hours of work. Fiurther, 
the computer was able to print out the information and computations re- 





SUBJiiCT: Operation*! Report - Lessons Learned, lOist Airborne Division 
(Airaobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U) 

qulred in a useable forauit. 

(c) Recommendation; That units consider using the inherent capabili¬ 
ties of the RNIVaC 1005 computer to forecast ammunition requirements. 

d. (D) Org’nization. None. 

e. (U) Training. None. 

f. (D) Logistics. None. 

g. (C) Communications. Field expedient antenna. 

(a) Observation: Communicetions in the canopy between companies in 
the field and the battalion TOC are often difficult. 

(b) Units in the 3d Bde have successfully improved radio communications 
by using a field expedient antenna constructed from communications wire 

(Vfi)I). At Thb 1 is a diagram of the field expedient antenna. 

(c) Recommendation; That units consider the of this simple, field 
expedient antenna to improve radio communication in the field. 

h. (U) Materiel, None. 

i. (C) Other. 

(1) Civic action assistsnoe by RD cadre. 

(a) Observation: The success of civic action projects will invariably 
depend upon the leadership of the local Vietnamese officials, Although the 
majority of elected officials is very capable, there will always be some who 
are relatively ineffective. RD cadre are generally well trained, strong 
leaders, knowledgeable in civic acti«j ectivlties. 

tb) Evaluation: RD cadre can provide valuable advice in the coordin.tion 
of civic action projects and mry be able to encourage completion of slow- 
moTing projects, 

(c) Recommendotion; That personnel involved in civic action employ the 
assistance that can be provided by local RD cadre. 

(2) NVA Sapper Attack igainst FSB Tcaabawk. See Inclosure 5. 

3. Department of the Army Survey Informtion. None. 





AVII-CCT (15 August 1970) 1st Ind 

SUBJECT; Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Air¬ 
mobile), Period Ending 31 July 1970, Rf:S CSFOR-65 (R2) (U) 

DA, HQ, XXIV Corps, APO San Francisco 96349 


TO; Commanding General, USARV, APO San Francisco 96375 1 tXP 

1. (U) The ORLL for 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) has been reviewed 
by this headquarters in accordance with AR 525-15. 

2. (C) This headquarters concurs with the report as written with the fol¬ 
lowing comments. 

a. Reference the item concerning quadrant system of control during air¬ 
mobile assaults, page 48, paragraph 2c(8). Using a standard reference system 
for all airmobile operations will assist in training of personnel and control 
of units. The information stated is not sufficient for adequate evaluation. 
However, additional information concerning techniques and control, to include 
examples and charts, will be provided by the 101st Airborne Division (Airmo¬ 
bile) as soon as possible. Recommend either this system or a clock system of 
similar nature be evaluated and considered for possible inclusion in airmo¬ 
bile doctrine. 

b. Reference the item concerning helicopter ground-to-air incidents dur¬ 
ing BDA, page 49, paragraph 2c(9). Assessment of BDA must be rapid and com¬ 
plete. However, all methods of assessment must be varied to insure the enemy 
does not compromise the procedure of BDA used. Recommend this procedure be 
evaluated and considered for Inclusion in BDA techniques. 


I ' ' 

CqptBW. AGC 
Auitlonl Adjutunl Genanil 

52 , 


AVUAT-OPS (15 Aur 70) 2.1 Iiid 

SUBJECT: Ciperat tonal Report-I.essons I. earned, 101st Airborne 

I'tvisloii (Airmobile), Period Kncling 31 July 1970, KCS (.SFOK-65 
(R2) (II) 

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, Al’O San Tranclsco 96375 

TO: Cnnmiaiiilet in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, 

APO 96 '8 

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned 
for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970 from Headquarters, 101st 
Airborne Division (Alrnidblle) and concurs with comments of indorsing 


Cu>* W Stfivens Jr 
(’npfcnn, ACiC 
AesisUnt AtOufant General 

Cy fum; 

XXIV Corps 

lOlst Airborne Dlv 


62 . 

i:poP-ur (15 Auk 3«i imJ (u) 

SUBJKCT: Opi‘rat I ona 1 Ropt>rt l.t*ust»ns Learned uf H(), 101st 

Airborne Division (Airmobile), for Period Undlng 
Jl July 1970, RCS CSKOK-65 (P2) 

HQ, US Army, Pacific, ^PO San Kranclsco 96558 2 ft MAR '971 

TO; Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department 
of the Army, Washington, 0. C. 20310 

This headquarters concurs In subject report as indorsed. 


Asst AG 




Incloaure 1 (Oparutiona H^rmtive) to Ops rati oal Rsport - I^saaoM UsarosU, 
lOlst Alr;.>irnB Division (Airnobils), JMriod Kndine )1 July 1^70, RCti iSFOFt -o 
(R2) C. ) 

terniinatad at dusk. A aueep ressaled NVA 1£IA, two Ri'C lauocbaxBt one 
AJC-47> one ^t-60 oacMnegun, one M'79 grenade launcher and one HTC 23 radio, 
aat. Twenty-six Uu ware wounded in the action. 

At 292140 , vicinity 71)458190 (PS/OB (2USITB), Co A, 2d Bn (Ambl), 301st 
Inf revised an enemy ground attack supported by mortar and HPG fire. With 
flaresiups, usjAF AC-119 "stinger" aircraft, AHA and tube artillery support¬ 
ing the company, the eneny was repulsed and a first light sweep revealed 16 
F7A iCiA and one PV captured. The company suffered seven killed, seven 
wounded, and one missing in action. 

Qa 50 April, PS/OB CRAhlTE received five separate mortar attacks result¬ 
ing in 54 BS VIA. ARA and tube artillery were employed on suspected enemy 
positions as air cavalry elements and ground foroea searched for enemy 
mortar positions. 

On 1 toy, enemy indirect fire attacks c»ntinued on PS/OB GRaSITE and 
GLADIATCR. A total of eleven attacks were directed at the fire bases as 
US ground units aided by counter-mortar radar and aerial reconaa5.ssanoe 
aircfaft continued to search for enemy mortar positions* 

On 2 Hhy, sixty-four 33 £^lon drums of napala were dropped in the 
vicinity of 7s/OB HENDERSON to improve fields of fJra, The 2d Bn, .34th 
ARVK Regt made heavy contact south of the firebase resulting in 18 eneiiy iCLA. 
Snecy mortar attacks continued against fS/OB GSANITB* Air strikes a^inst 
enemy mortar positions resulted in three N?A KIA, three secondary fires, 
four bunkers destroyed and one secondary explosion. 

The search for eneny mortar positions in the vicinity PS/OB EIPCOHD 
and GEAHHE continued on 5 May, with heavy artillery support ftom PS/OB 
JACK. At 050330, CAMP EA(3£ received seventeen 122 iie rockets causing li^t 
damage to aircraft and ammunition supply points. Eleven US were wounded 
in the attackr 

At 031130 , vicinity 10)511063 the 1st Pit, Co C, 2d Bn (Aabl), 502d Inf, 
while conducting patrol activities, received ^G and sibJ.1 arms fire from 
an eneny force at 40 meters. The eleiaent returned organic weapons fire and 
employed ARA, tube artillery and air strikes on the enemy positions. A 
s^ieep of the contact area revealed 27 NTA KEA, US casualties were one KIA 
and 13 VIA. 

On 4 and 5 Ifey, a heavy artillery battery again moved to vicinity 
PS/OB Jack ani was employed against suspected eneny fortar positions in the 
canopy vicinity PS/OB QRANITE. The battery returned to CAMP EVANS each 

On 3 Va.7t contacts hy units of the 1st Bde, south of the TISTEE PORKS 
area of the SONG BO River resulted in 18 NVA KTA . US casnaltles were 




loclosure 1 (Opemti ria Namtlve) to Oper.iti<rwI - l^asunn Lo.irriB'j, 

lOlat Airborne Division (Airmobile), inriod CridinK 31 July I'i'h't HCJ 
(HI’) (U) 

(1) 29 April - 5 toy l'»70. 

(a) On 30 April, the diviaxun comnsnced operations with the ^4th AHTi: 
Re^rinunt in the area south of Pl/OB lENDKRtJON. The let Bn, 54th AKVN HoRt 
assaulted into the AO south of tlie Fti/OB on 50 April followed by the 2d 
Bn which assaulted to FS/OB TON TAVERN on 1 May. Both battalions conduct¬ 
ed operations in coordination with the 3<i Bri^wie. On 30 April, Co D, Ist 
Bn (Ambl), 50 l 3 t Inf assaulted to iS/OB lENDERSON and provided security for 
tliB insertion of Btry B(-), 2d Bn(Ambl), 11th Arty and Btry B, 12th Arty 
(AHVN)* The ooupany passed to the operational control of the 3d Bds. 

Also on 30 April, the lat Bn (Anbl), 50l8t Inf terminated operations 
south of CAM? EVANS and moved by air to ES/OB KATHRYN to comnenoe reconnais¬ 
sance in force operations to locate and destroy eneny anti-aircraft weapons 
and base camps in the area. The battalion (-) passed to the operational 
control of the 1st Bde. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 5^th Inf passed OPOON to the 
1st Bde at 1600 hairs and continued operations southwest of PS/OB Bl)Ll£T. 
Fcxir US and one AHVN battalion were now conducting operations against 
elements of the 29th HVA Regt in the mountains, vicinity the SONG BO River. 

The 2d Bde continued to provide support for pacification and develop- 
oent prograas in the lowland areas and assumed responsibility for the 
piedmont area of PHCWG DIEN District south of CAMP EVANS. Mobile training 
teams continued to improve the combat proficiency of RP and PP units and 
to teach PSOF Aindamsntals of defense. 

The 3d Bde continued reconnaissance in force operations with two US 
battalions in operational coordination with the Ist^ 2d and 4tb Bn, Ist 
ARVN Regt south of PS/OB RIPCORD and PATTON. On 1 toy, the 2d Bn, 54th 
ARVN Re^ oored by air to LA VANG. The 3d Bn(-) moved >y air to PS/OB 
O'REILLY to provide security for the firebase and to conduct patrol and 
ambush operations northwest of FS/OB RIPCORD. On 5 toy, Co D, Ist Bn, 
(Ambl), 501st Inf was relieved a,t PS/CB. HENDBRSuN by Co A and the Recon 
Platoon. DCO then moved by air from the firebase and returned to control 
of the parent unit at PB/ob BASTOOE. Co A, 21 Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, with 
the Reconnaissauice Platoon, moved hy air to PS/OB HENDERSON to provide 
security for the PS/OB. 

(b) Significant Activities. At 291400, vicinity YD505077, the 2d Pit, 
Co B, 2d Bn (Anbl), 502d Inf received mortar and heavy amaj.1 arms fire from 
an eneiiy force located in bunkers at a distance of 10 meters. The platoon 
employed organic weapons, tube artillery and ARA and was reinforced by the 
remairvler of the company. Company C and the reconnaissance platoon. As 
the US elements maneuverea against the enemy force, supported by air strikes 
ARA and tube artillery, the enemy fled to a secoid bunker complex at 1515 
hairs. At 1549 hours the enemy fled to a third bunker complex. The contact 

Inclosure 1 



Inclo'n.iT't* ’ 11 ofTj w ' to Oinfi'-Ionil F.e;»rt — , 

I'.ilut Ai!'b«>rn>.! ’■;vini<jri ruk ui U ), Ktvlinf; 51 J'*ly i'CXj 

ut-) (li) 

Mix KIA irvl V.'lA. 

At U‘;100i.', vicinity YD4'*.J(>4 (4 KM NW of Ps/uii TUU TAVciftN) t^ie Irt bn, 
t>4th iVHV?» Re^rt en;'i^‘d in eatiinitcd two enenyr platoons in bunkers 50 '^'Ctt rs 
from tlicir I'osition. The enemy returned sioal 1 arms fire and witWrew. AHA 
w:i3 employed and a sweep ."evealed 28 NVA KLA. ARVH casualties vere five KI--. 
and 2b WLV. 

(2) 6 - 12 my 1M70. 

(a) On 6 May, the Bn 54th ARVN Begt assaulted into an LZ northvest 

of PS/OB TUN TAVERN (vicinity PS/OB MINK) and joined the lat and 2d Bn, 54th 

•vHV^i Re>?t conduction operations a,gainst eleuents of the 66th NVA Re(^ in the 
area. On 7 May, ti»e 2d Bn, 54th ARVN Regt was extracted and moved by air to 
CAKi> GARRlL and trien by vehicle to DONG IIA. 

In reaction to heavy enemy activity in the PS/OB HENDERSON area on 6 my, 

Co 3, 5d Bn (Ambl), 107th Inf ar»i Co D, 1st Bn (Ambl), 5Clst Inf passed to 

the operational control of the 2d Bn (Ambl), 50lBt Inf and assaulted into the 
area north of FS/OB HENDERSON on 7 May to locate eneny units. A Jd Bde con¬ 
trol eleaent directed operations from the firebaae. Companies C and D, 2d 
3n (Ambl), 501st Inf passed to the operational control of the 31 Bn (Ambl), 
506th Inf and continued operations south of IS/OB RIPCORD. 

Co C, 3d Bn (Ambl), 107th Inf and Co D, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf returned 
to parent unit control on 0 May and the 3d .«ie terminated operations in the 
re/OB HENDERSON area as the 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf returned to CAMP EVANS. 

The 2d Bn, 2d AP.VN Regt passed OPCON to the 54th ARVN Regt to provide security 

On 9 May, the 2d Bn(-) (Ambl), 501st Inf redeployed in the division AO 
vicinity FS/CB GLADIATOR and CSIANITE with Go C and D returning to battalion 
control. Co A remained at CAMP EVANS to aupnent security and reequip. 

On 10 May, the Ist Bn, let ARVN Regt terminated operations with the 3d 
Bde vicinity Ps/OB RIPCORD and moved to Li VANG to provide security in the 
area. The 3d Bde continued operations with two US and one ARVN battalion 
in the mountains south of FS/OB RIPOORD and PATTON. 

Also on 10 May, the division assumed OPCON of Detachment B-52, 5th 
Special Forces Group (a). Two companies and elements of the headquarters 
moved by air from NHA TRANG to CiUANG TRI and then by vehicle to MAI LOG, 

The detachment began preparations for insertion of reconnaissance teams into 
the division AO on 15 May. 

On 11 May, the 5d Bn, 54th ARVH Regt terminated operations with the 1st 
Bde vicinity the SONG BO River and moved by air to PS/OB ANZIO. 

On 12 toy, the 2d Bn (Ambl), 50 l 2 t Inf moved to PHU BAI COIBAT BSE to 
conduct battalj n refresher training and returned to operational control if 
the 3i Bde. The Ist Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf returno<l to OPCON of iho 3d Bde and 
continued operations against aleinej|it^^of the fiOJ NVA, Kept. 'I'lio I'P of the 



Inclooure 1 (Oi«-‘nitit>nfli K-irratiTB) tn Ojeratlnnal Report - LBosona I/»amod, 
lOlat Airburno Division (Aiiniobile), period KndinK July 1970* RCJ CoFDR-69 

(R:’) (u) 

5d Bn, 5d ARVN He^t moved by air to FS/OH KATHRYN to prepare for aso.oat of 
elements of the Iviitalion into area south of the firebase on 15 Hay in 
OPCOCRD with the Ist Bde. 

Throu^out the period 6-11 May, A Btry (8-in), Ist Bn 591h Arty con— 
tjjwad daily moves from CAMP KVAH3 to the ar-a south of FS/OB JACK to deliver 
heavy artillery on suspected enemy mortar locations in the vicinity of F3/0B 
GLADIATOR and OUNITC. Ths battery returned to CAM^ EVANS each ni^Jit, 

(b) Significant Activities. At 060505, FS/OB HENDERSON received RPC, 
small arms fire, satchel char^^s, recoilless rifle and mortar fire followed 
by a will organized and coordinated ground attack by the 8th Bn, 66th NVA 
Regt, Fires, started when the ffVA employed flame throwers against the fire 
base, aaused approximately 1000 rounds of 155®® artillery ammunition to 
explode. Defending forces supported by ARA, t\ibe artillery and gunships 
accounted for 29 NVA killed. The eneoy withdrew at 0720, Co B, M. Bn (Ambl), 
50l3t Tnf moved by air to reinforce Co A, 2d Bn (Ambl), 501*1 Inf, and to 
conduct a daylight sweep. Friendly elements received Incoming mortar fire 
sporadically throu^out the day. Artillery, ARA, gunships, and air strikes 
were employed against enengr mortar positions. The 2d Bn, 2d ARVN Regt 
assaulted south of PS/OB lENDBRSON to locate and destroy the remainder of the 
enen^ force, A number of friendly casualties were caused by the exploding 
155®n artillery ammunition. Thirty-two D3 «re killed in action, 55 wounded, 
and two missing in action, ARVN casualties were 19 KIA and 45 VCLA. 

On 7 Fby, FS/OB HENDERSON continued to receive sporadic mortar and recoil 
less fire throughout the day, resulting in four US and three ARVN VIA. 

At 070450, 10429122, (FS/CB MAUREEN) the 2d Pit, Co D, Ist Bn (Ambl), 
5C)6th Inf received 60nim mortar fire, small anas and satchel charges from an 
estimated ensny company. The platoon returned fire while a flareship and 
ARA were employed. Elements of the company moving to reinforce the platoon 
received small arms fire from an eneny force at 20 meters. The element re¬ 
turned small arms fire aul the enemy fled, ARA, gunships air strikes 
were employed on suspected eneny locations at 0700, 6UmB mortar fire was 
received by the company at 0800 and again at I50O, Six US were kill ed in 
action and 12 wounded. A sweep revealed four NVA KIA. 

On 7 and 8 Jby, the Ist Bn, 5d^h '>J17N Regt continued to engage eneny 
forces in the PS/OB TON TAVERN area accounting for 56 RVA EIA, At O8O9OO, 
vicinity 1D043560, the battalion discovered 50 graves containing 97 eneny 
bodies apparently killed by AP air strikes during the previous wek. 

At 091050, vicinity 1D495954, Co A, 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf received small 
arms and RPC fire and fragmentation grenades from an estimated 12 - 15 eneny 
in bunkers. The company returned fire and withdrew as artillery, ARA, gun¬ 
ships, and air strikes were employed, A 8»«ep of the area revealed 18 NVA 
KIA. US casualties were one KIA and 12 VIA. 

The period 10-12 Maty was narked by light contact in the division AO, 
Eighteen eneny were killed hy snail arms--ABA- .tuba. art111ar\c« sunahina- 
and air strikes. 




Inclosiire 1 (Cporation^i NunmtiW) to Uturut* ooai H«part - lje»uoB« 

lOiat Airborne Divuion (Airnobile), Period Batin#: }i Jitly 1970, RCS CS?LH-(t^ 

(S2) (0) 

(5) u - 20 my iqyo 

(a) Uq IJ Kii', the 5d bn, VI HafC. (-iKVlO Boved by air froa CAM" ini. 
to re/CB VTiGIftlL to jotrs the 1st Bde c ^nductia^ offp&aive operations ajipiinot 
elements of the 2dth hVA Hej^t in the aountains aouthseat of HOB. The three 
AbV7; CJ parlies eonbat assaulted froa K/OB VBGifiL with Ccapanlea A and 3, 

1st Ba (limbi), 301st Inf, into two landing zones south of the HAU lA RiTer, 

The aHVN oo::piinle3 conducted patrols to the ooutb and two DS coBipanies 
conducted {u-tro.s north towaid the river. 

Incleaent weather postponed the planned insertion of reconnalasanoe 
teaias of Oet 352, 5th dPG (A) on 15 May. Two teams were inserted into the 
Vietnanasc Salient vicinity XIi92?285 and XD381240 on 16 May. 

On 18 my, in response to intelligence indicating a possible eneiiQr 
attack against P.iO BAl Comb.t Base and the BONG HA Training Center in oele- 
bration of the birthday of HO CrU lEHH, Companies B and C, 2d 3n (Aabl), 

50l8t Inf passed to the operational control of Pf5J BAl Baise Defense. Co A 
passed OPCCR to the Ist Bn (Aabl), 50Si Inf to screen south of PHU BAl. 

The division observed a cease fire and all offensive operations terainated 
with units asairriing a defensive posture from 181200 to 191200 May. 

On 19 my, the 4th Bn, Ist Regt (ahVN) extracted from the J'i Bde AO and 
moved by air to LA VAKG to refit and provide secsirity in the area, leaving 
the 2d and 3d battalions conducting operations in coordination with the 5d 
Bde soutn of IS/OB RIPCORD. 

Also on 19 May, the 2d Bn (Asibl), pOlst Inf completed battalion refresher 
training and prepared for redeployment into the division AO. Company C 
assaulted from FHH 3AI Combat Base to FS/OB BRICK and prepared to receive 
artillery. On 20 JRy, the remainder of the battalion moved by air to PS/OB 
BRICX to comnenoe search operations in the TA TRACH River Tally, and passed 
to the operational Control of the 1st Bde. 

Cm 20 toy, the planned extraction of the Ist Bn (Ambl), 50lBt Inf from 
vicinity IB/03 KATHRYN to PHD BAl Combat Base to conduct battalion refresher 
tTaining «s postponed due to inclement weather. 

The 21 Bde continued tu operate in tdie piedmont and to deploy Mobile 
Training Teauas to .ncrease the capabilities of teritorlal forces. 

(b) Significant Activities. At 160428, vieinity TD487065, Co A, 2d 3n 
(Aabl), 5021 Inf recaived RPG fire from an enemy location north of their 
night defensive position. Seven minutes later the company receives. RPG, 
automatic weapons and smll anoe fire from the enemy east and west of the 
position. The company returned organic weapons and vabe artillery fire. 

A DSaF flareship was employed to provide illumir^tion. At 0521 hours fne 
Hecon Pit engaged enemy movement at YD490068. A fiirst ii^t sweep of both 
contact areas by the Recon Pit revealed five MVA KXA, two AK-47o and one RPG 
launcher oa.rf'jred* US losses w^r^^our JuTl—amd ^ ..iMundad.. .. 



iQclotiviro 1 (Ope Hirr^tivc) to Uperatiuiiao. Heport - LoBsona l^arrvfi, 

lulat iirbome DiviJion (Airaiobi le), i^eriod Knditv? 51 July 1970, RCii 
(R2) (!;) 

At 160690, Ticinity YD91 82 56, tdiile a>ippcortiQg the insertion of Reoon 
Teas 5, B52, 9th SFG(a), an AHIG froa 3try C, dtl Bn (Aerial Arty), 7,th 
Arty (Afflbi), received 25om mchine gun fire. Directed by the DHlH comatind 
and control aircraft, the Cotira engaged the area killing 39 eneciy ar«i destroy¬ 
ing two 2^ ton trucks. The lat Pit, 2^ Co, Slat Abn Rgr Bn (ARVN SF) 
inserted near the target area to c-induct father assessasnt of the AKA fires. 
The element s^e oontact with an aatimated 30 ece^y, killing three and sus¬ 
taining one IS arsi one AiVN tflA. The pLitoon was unable to reach the target 
Area and vas extracted fruo a hot landing lone it 1820 hours by Co B, 19Pth 
Aen Ba (AH; (Anbl). 

At 171039, fD4173<t8, a C!i-4? from Jc. P., 159th Avn Br. (aSH) (Ambl) re¬ 
ceived ground fire, crashed and burned The aircraft was a total lost and 
five 03 were killed. 

' At 181849, 4. OHlH aircraft from Co C, 158th Avn Bn (AH) (Arbi) was re¬ 
ported missing with four crew members and two passengers aboard. The Aerial 
Rifle Platoon, Troop B, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th CaT was inserted at '£0555258 on 
19 Mxy to conduct a search for the aircraft. The platoon was unsucosssfol in 
loeatlAg the aircraft and tas extracted prior to darkness. One cember of the 
missing aircraft crev, who had walked from the crash site to a snail landing 
zone, was extracted at I914OO hours by a OEIH from Co A, lOlst kn Bn (AH) 
(Aaibl) ce a mission for the Signal Bn (Aahl). The injured crew member 

stated the aircraft ms hit by ground fire, atten^ted to make a fccroed land¬ 
ing on a landing aoxM, crashed and rolled down a hill into a canopy covered 
area. Se had no knowledge of the exact location of the aircraft or other 
crew members. 

On 19 (by, id>s ^ Co, 81st Abn Rgr Bn (AR'VH) was inserted vicinity XD 
907254 'to conduct assessment of the ABA attack conducted 00 I6 ttiy. The 
cca^any ^^togcapbed two destroyed 2^-9 'ton type vehicles euid was extracted 
on 20 Itay. Sporadic contact with the ene^r resolted in I5 ARVR VIA during 
the ope rati cm. 

At 201155, vicinity ID496069i the Recon Pit and Co A, Si Bn (Asbl), 5^21 
Inf xeoeived intansu small arms and RPG fire from three sides at 19 meters. 

The element returned fire, employed ARA ^3d naneuvered against the enemy. 
Contact terminated at 1250 hours as the enemy fled leaving one KIA. US cas- 
ulaties were t hr e e KIA and nine VIA. 

The 2i Bn (Asbl), 501st Inf completed refresher training on 19 hay and 
redeployed in vhe AO on 20 Hay. The Bn conducted a comibat assault vicinity 
FSB BRICE to conduct search operations in the TA IHACH River '7alley and passed 
to the operational control of the 1st Bde. 

Throu^out the period 15-20 Hay elements of the 2d and 51 Battalions, 

I -LO 




Lnclooure 1 (C’i*5ratiijii;i N.imitsve) to OiAsratJunal Itaport - LeBaoDB Ijeamed, 
U'lat Airlxrnjt; Uiti^ioh (AiriBi>bil«), Hsri(xi Kndlng July ■J970* RCS C15POR-65 
(HJ) (U) 

lat Ra^t (AKVK) mule viifiLiii t with tlie eiiei^y vicinity FSB RA.RHiRX resulting 
in 6^ NVA KU nod 11 ARVN WIA. 

(4) ^tly - 1 Jurxi 1')70 

(a) On L'1 M\y, th«- lat Bn (Ambl), 901at Inf moved by air from FS/CB 
KATBRI® to ?Hy BAI Coniiat Bane and began preparation for battalion refresher 
training. Tlie b^ittalion passed from the operational control of the lat Bde 
to OiWN of the Pd Bde. The 5d Bde assumed responsibility for the portion 
of the THIKiS K)HKS area of the SOHG BO River vacated by the extraction of 
the lat Bn (Ambl), Inf as Co B« 1at Bn (imbl), Inf ttiVBd by air 

from raA'B liAKKAiiA;; to flj/OB KATURni to provide seourity for the fire base and 
conduct local patrolling. Tlie 1at Bde continued combined operations southwest 
of HUE with t1>o .d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf and the 3d Bn, 3^ Regt (AHVN) oonductlng 
operations a^riinot elements of two battalions of the 29th NVA Regt in the 
vicinity of PS/Ofl VKCaKL. 

On 24 Miy, Companies A and D, l8t Bn (Ambl), ^Olet Inf moved by air to 
KB KATHRYN and jusoed to the operational control of the let Bn (Ambl), 506th 
Inf to conduct patrol operations north and south of the firehose. This move¬ 
ment was mde in reaction to increased enemy activity in the area. 

Also on 24 May, the lot Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf teralnatad operations vicinity 
FS/OB BASTCQi'E and i.iovod south to FS/OB VEGllEL to assume control of area tanffi 
to conduct operations in coordination with the yi. Bn, yi. Begt (ARVN), The 
2d Bn (Ambl), 5021 Inf terminated operations in the vicinity of FSB VEC3SL 
and mcved north to FS/OB BASTOQIE, assuming control of area Uniform. 

On 26 May, the 31 Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) terminated operations in eoordina> 
tion with the 3d Bde, vicinity FU/CB O'REILLY and BARBARA, and moved by air to 
LA VANG to conduct stand down. Tho 4th Bn, >1 Regt (ARTH) moved by air from 
LA VANG to vicinity YD2453» east of FS/CB BARBARA, to oonduot reconnaissance 
in force operations in the area. 

On 27 Fh.y, Companies A and D, 1at Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf were released from 
OPCON of the 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf and returned by air to FS/CB BIRMINGHAM 
and control of the parent unit. The 1st Bn (Ambl), ^Olst Inf terminated 
battalion refresher training auid assumed control of area Vftxiskey from the 
1st Bn (Ambl), 50^ Inf. The lat Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf moved to PHD BAT Cois- 
bat Bass to prepare for battalion refresher training to begin on 28 Fhy. 

The 2d Bde continued operations in the piedmont in the northern fringes 
of the cainopy of THUA THIEN Province and conducted extensive patrol and ni£^t 
ambush operations in coordination with territorial forces to deny the eneagr 
access to the population in the coastal lowlands. 

The division continued to employ extensive ground and aerial sensor devices 




IncloBuie 1 (Operations Narrativie) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 
101st Airborne Division (Ainaobile), Period finding 51 July 1970, RC3 CSPCE-^ 
(82) (U) 

to locate and aomtor ^neioy moveaent and continued to engage suspected eneiiQr 
locations with artillery fires and TISAP aircraft, Det B52, 5th SPG(a) con¬ 
tinued Operation BARIER GLADS maintaining recoonaieaanoe aM roadrunwr teams 
in the diviaioa area of operation. 

(b) Significant Activities. On 21 Miy, two 0H$A helicoptera froa the 
ai Sqln (Aj^I), 17th Cav received ground fire at 1}55 boura, vicinity YC 
495859) and at 1625 hours, vicinity XD781248, crashed and huxned. Both air¬ 
craft were total loaaes and three crew meabare were wounded in action. 

At 230940, vicinity YD499069, Co A, M Bn (Aabl), 502d Inf discovered 
twenty 4*x5'x4* hunters containing bodies of twelve KVA killed by artillery, 
small arms and helicopter fixe. 

At 251655, vicinity XD912271, a UH1H from Co B, 158th Avn Bn (aH) (Ambl), 
while conducting visual reconnaissance In support of Operation BARBER CSADE, 
received ground fixe, crashed and burned. Six DS and two ARVK were killed 
in action, including the comaanding officer, Det B52, 5th S9 G{a), 

At 25I8OO, and again at 2000 hours, at fSB KATHRYR, Co A, 1st Bn (Anbl), 
306tb Inf was attacked by fixe with 60m and 82aB mortar fire impacting in¬ 
side the perimeter. Two to three 82in mortar rounds, received during the 
2000 hour attack, contained agent CS. ARA and tube artillery was employed 
SFgainst suspected enemy locations. Results of the two attacks were three 
US KIA and 25 WIi. 

At 240600, vicinity YD075394 ( 2 KMSW of PSB HBNDBRSOH), the 4th Bn, 

54th Regt (ARVH) xeoeived RPG aztd small arms fire from an estimated enei^ 
company surrounding their night defensive position. The element returned 
organic weapons ti^re and employed ABA and tube artillery, A sweep of the 
contact area rerreaJed 45 H7A KIA, ARVK casualties were four KIA and I6 VIA, 

At 261010, in reaction to a contact by elements of Co C, B1 Bn (Ashl), 
506th Ihf which resulted in two US VIA, a UH1H Madevac helicopter from Co C, 
326th H»d Bn (Anhl), while lowering the jungle penetxator at TD3262Q6, 
received one RPG round in the Ihel oell, crashed and burned. All four crew 
memioers were killed in action. 

At 271048, vicinity YD456124, the Recon Pit, let Bn (A*l), 506l4i Inf, 
^ile conducting patrol activities near FSB MAUBffilT, received RPG and small 
arms fixe from an eneny force at 35 meters. The element returned organic 
weapons fire and tube artillery. The enemy brote contact and fled. ARA was 
requested and arrived on station at 1105 hours and a pink team arrived at 
1143» One KVA was killed by AHA fire. At 1008 hours the platoon engaged 
two enenQT with small arms fixe at 73 nBters, An ene^y force returned RPG, 
autontic weapons and small arms fixe. ARA aiil gonehips arrived on station 





Inclosure 1 (Operations NairatiTe) to Operational Report - l>eBBonB leazned, 
lOlBt Airborne DiTision (llraobile). Period Ending 31 July 1970, ECS CSTOR-^^ 
(R2) (TJ) 

and laaediately engaged asTeral eneay. Contact tamlDated at 1919 hours. 

A swep of the area reTSaled six lITA killed by halioopter fixe, six by AKA. 
fixe aind seven by stnall ams fire. INd US eeze wounded in action. 

At 280130, PS/CB O'REILLY, the Ist and 2d Companies, lat Bn, let Sect 
(ARVK) xeceiv^ mortar fire followed by a ground attadc employing SPG and 
saeJI arms fire. Eleoenta on the firebaae returned orgwiio weapons fire aad 
tube artillery. A flareehip and ARA were requeetsd and on station at 0139 
and 0203 hours respectively, fiie enemy was repulsed before daylight and a 
first light sweep revealed 77 HYA KIA, two FW, 29 Ai&>47's, eif^t RPC launchers, 
three Soviet LPO flame throwers amd two (^com radios, ftr ee ARVK were killed 
and 13 wounded in the action. 

At 281930, vicinity YD5ai309, the PH}HG DIES District Chief was killed 
»diile driving to his hone when he was attacked by 7iet Cong employing B-40 
rocke ts. 

During the period 29 May to 1 June, 13 eneqy were klllad in sporadic activ¬ 
ities throu^out the division AO. Seven ware killed by helicopter fire, four 
by small ams fire, two by tactical air strikes and two by artillery fire. An 
additional five NTA KIA were discovered in graves. 

(5) 2-9 June 1970 

(a) This period was marked by an increase In enemy contact with ARVK 
units and light contact with unite of the division. ARVK and territorial 
force units accounted for 232 HTA and 20 TC killed In action. Thirty-seven 
enemy were killed in li^t contact with units of the division during the 

On 2 June, the division provided aviation assets in support of tbs 2d Bn, 
34th Regt (aRW) in the sucoesslhl defense of TS/OB TDK TAYERN a^iinst a deter¬ 
mined attack by elements of the 66th HYA Re^ ^icb had moved from the BA 
LCSG Yalley area. Troops A and B, 2d Sqin (Aubl), 17th Cav provided contin- 
xLous air cover in the area during the period of contact. 

At 021233, tlm ai Bde passed OFCOK of the Ist Bn (Ad>l), 301st Inf to 
tile 3d Bde and assumed operational control of the let Bn (Arhl), 306th Inf 
vdiich moved by air from PS/OB EATHRYH to CAMP SYAHS to assume the mission of 
Division Ready Force and prepare for battalion refresher training. The l8t 
Bn (Ambl), 30lBt Inf moved oy air from PS/OB BIRMIHG31AM and ABSHAL to FS/OB 
KATHRIH aM assumed responsibility for area Sierra. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 302d 
Inf redeployed in the AO vicinity FS/OB BIRMINGEAM to provide seoirity for the 
firebaae and conduct patrol and ambush operations in the area. 

Cn 3 June, division aviation assets supported the iasertian of the 3d 





Incloaui^ 1 (Openitiono NarratiTe) to Operational He port - IjeauonB LsaTncd, 
lOlat A.irbonje Division (Airmobile), Period Kudina -M July 1970, RC3 CSPOR-^5 
(RJ) (U) 

Bn, 1st Regt (aRVN ) and tlio extraction of the Al Bn, 54th Retft (iHVM) in 
tht‘ IIIN 'I^AViRi: area. 'lio M Bn, lut H«»'t (ARVll) insaBd to the operational 

control of the 54tb Regl (aHVN). The lat Bn, let Regt (ARVH) noTad by air 
from bS/OB BAitJAHA and O'RKILLY to U VAlid. Tiie ai Bn, lat Regd, (ARVll) re¬ 
mained in the bti/CP BARBAblA - O'RKILl.Y area Jind aasuimd the eecurity minsion 
for bti/OB 0 'HK:.oLY. 

At 060000, the Vi Bde assumed OPCuN of the 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf from 
the ai Bde as the battalion completed refresher training and moved by air 
from CAPO? EVAKS to FS/OB RIPCORD and GEiAfllTC to provide security for tha fire- 
baaes and conduct operations in airea Quebec* The 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf 
terminated operations vicinity FS/OD RIPCORD and moved by air to CAl'lP EVANS 
to prepare for refresher training and assumed the mission of Division Ready 

Also on 8 June, the lat Bn, lat Regt (ARVN) nx»ved by air from LA VAMG 
to FS/OB OniEILLY to provide seesurity for tiie fire base and conduct local 
operations in the vicinity of the firebauie. The 2d Bn, lat Regt (aRVN) 
moved by air from PS/OB O'REELLY to LA VANG to provide security in tha area 
and stand dovn. 

On 9 June, Dat B52, 5th SFC(a} extracted all teams from the division 
area of operation and conducted stand doun at MAI LOG* During the period 
16 >&y - 9 Juna tte detachment accounted for 50 enemy klllod in action uhile 
sustaining seven US KIA, eight US VIA, 4 ARVN KIA and 56 ARVN VIA* 

(b) Significant Activities* At 020450, PS/OB TUN TAVERN, the 2d Bn, 54th 
Regt (ARVN) received an attack from all sides of the fixebaee by the 9th Bn, 
66th HVA Regt employing 82niB mortar, 75™» recoilless rifle, RPG amd small 
arms fire* Elements on the firebaae returned organic veapons fixe and employed 
flaxeships, ABA, tube artillery and air strikes* The enengr penetrated the 
perimeter and was able to occupy bunkers on the east side of the fixebaee* 

The aitoation was static at 0645 hours* At 0950 hours a renewed assault was 
made on the firebaae from the north anxl northwest but was Immadiately le- 
pulsed. The eneicy was driven from the fixebase by 1115 hours alUiou^ it 
continued to receive 75™ recoilless rifle and 62am mortar fixe sporadically 
throughout the day* 

A sweep of the contact area revealed 61 NYA KIA and one FV* Three US 
from tha 501st Sig Bn (Aahl}, in support of the 1st Bn, 54'tti Regt (ARVN) were 
casualties* Two were lulled and one was wounded in action* ARVN casualties 
were 50 KIA and 119 VIA* Two US and one Australian advisor were wounded in 

At 031455, vicinity YD022354 (l KM V of PSB LANGIEY), the l8t Bn, 54th 
Regt (ARVN) discovered 20 NVA killed by air force and two bunkers with over¬ 
head cover destroyed by air strikes* 



1 ^ 



Incloaiira 1 (Cparationa Narrative) to Operational Report - Iveaaons Learned, 
lOlat Aarbomo Divialon (jLirnobile), I’eriod Ending }1 July 1970, RCS COPtR -65 
(R2) (U) 

At 041500 , ▼iclnity Rj/OB WN TAWRIl (YD050520), tto Jd. Bn, Int Reprt (Aim;)f 
in a seeep conducted near the lirehoae, dlicovored 45 NVA killed by air 
strikse within the nrarioua 72 hours. At I 64 O houre the battalion enpa^ied 
an enengr f^ roe with organic MJapona fire, killirv; 10 NVA while auataining 
tw) KIA. On the following day, alenentB of the battalion killed four Bore 
NVA that had attacked with 82nm aortar and email arns fire one kilometer 
eoutheaat of Pl/OB TUN TAVERN. 

At 060550 * the 3d Co, 3d Bn, lat Regt (aRVN) engaged an eatinated two 
eneinjr companies with sbeiII arms fire at a range of I 50 BBtora at ■©043531 • 

Tube artillery and ARA were employed and a sweep lerealed 11 NVA KIA. At 
1410 hours, vicinity 'YD055543* elements of the 1st Bn, 54th Regt (ARVN) 
discovered the bodies of 12 NVA KIA. 

Cn a June, elements of the division discovered the bodies of seven NVA 
killed by artillery and air atrikes in previews contacts cind accounted for 
11 more NVA ITTA on 9 June as contact with enei^y elements In the division AO 
remained light. 

( 6 ) 10 - 16 June 1970 

(a) On 10 June, elements of the K4C Bn, 4th NVA Ragt launched attacks 
by fiije a^inat units of the 2d Bde occupying PS/OB LOS BANOS, PHU LOG District 
Headquarters and NUOC HOOT Bridge. A sijiultamousi ground and mortar attack 
was directed at PS/OB TuMdHAWK. As part of the reaction to this contact the 
division provided aviation ausets to the HOC BAD Company and territorial 
forces for movement and assualt into fHU LOC District to regain contact with 
the eneiy after their withdrawal* 

Also on 10 JiuiS, Det B52, ^Hh, SPG(A) moved by vehicle to CJDANG TRI and 
prepared for movement to NHA TRAHG for stand dow). 

Poor weather conditions on 12, 13 suid 14 June caused postponement of 
several tacticskl mofves by air and the cancellation of 18 sorties of tactical 
air support. Improved weather conditions on 15 Jiine permitted the division 
to continue extensive armed aerial reconnaissanoe in the division AO and to 
accomplish the repositioning of several units. 

At 150900 , the 1st Bn (Auhl), 501st Inf moved by air from PS/OB KATHRYN 
and peisaed from the operational, control of the 3<i Bde to OFCON of the 2d 
Bde. “Uie battalion assumed responsibility for security of PS/CB RAKKASAN and 
Initiated patrol and ambush operations in area Romeo to prevent infiltration 
of NVA and guerilla forces Into the populated lowlands. 

The Ist Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf noved by air from the vicinity of PS/OB 
RIPCORD to vicinity PS/CB KATHRYN to assuns responsibility for area Siena. 




IncloBuiv 1 (0;«rjtioDa Narrative) to Operatiuiiai Report - i>aaaoQ3 learned, 
10l3t Aj-rborne Division (Airmobile), rtriod finding July 1970» RCS CSPOR-^9 
(R2) (0) 

and conduct operations to locate anl destroy elements of tha SOJd H7A Regt. 

The ad Bn (Ambl), ‘X'bth Inf completed battalion refrmsher training and 
redeployed in the AO moving by air from CAMP £VANS to PS/C® RIPCORD to assuBS 
roeponsibllity for area ^^bec. The battalion provided security for the 
firebuse and initiated ceconnaissanoe in force operations In the area. 

The Ist Bn, }d Regt (aRVR), operating in coordination with the let Bn 
(AM}l)y 327th Inf, conducted a combat assault on 15 June into the area north¬ 
east of FSB (ECHGIa, vicinity fD4406, and be^m reconnaiaeanoe in foroe ope^ 
ations to the south on two axes. 

(b) Significant Activities. At IOOI 4 O, the 4th KVA Regt began four 
separate attacks on OS units located in PIC LOC District. Co D(-), 2d Bn 
(Ambl), 527 th Inf at PS/OB TOMIHA'^, received a ground attack supported by 
02bbi mortar, FPG and small arms fire by the 7 IB Sapper Contpany. Tube artil¬ 
lery, aRA, Slim mortars, fougasse and or^uiic weapons were employed a^inat 
the enaaor. Contact was broken at 0218 hours, although sporadic mortar fir* 
continued until 0550 hours. Rone of the eneny, estimated to be 70 in atrength, 
penetrated the periaater. Twenty-eight NVA were killed and three prisonerB 
were captured. One US was killed and two were veunded in action. 

At 100144 , FHtI LOC District Headquarters and the coaaand post, 21 Bn 
(Aabl), 327 th Inf received two HPG rouiids, one 122nim rocket and 20 - 25 82niB 
mortar rounds resulting in eight OS WIA, including two US MACT adviBotB and 
one 0S)C. 

Between the hours of O150 and 0445* Co B(-), 21 Bn (Aabl) 327th Inf, 
at PS/OB LOS BANOS received approxinately twelve BZm mortar rounds, most 
of which iji^cted outside the perimeter. One US was wounded in action. 

At 100158 , mobile training team number 10, located vicinity HUOC HOOT 
Bridge (ZDI 520 IO), received 13 mortar rotmds, followed by three lore at 
0540 hoars. The element employed 81mm mortar fire on suspected enemy 

At 100520 , the 1st Co, 4tfa Bn, 54th Regt (ARVH), at PS/CB ROY, received 
10 — 20 82mm mortar rounds. Counter mortar fires were eoployed, no casualties 
were sustained. 

The period 11 - 14 June was marked by light activity in the division AO. 

Two US were killed in action as the division accounted for 19 B7A KIA, 

Tvelve NVA bodies were discovered KIA from earlier contacts. The bodies 
Kre found in graves or hidden from view in heavily vegetated areas. Gun- 
ships from the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav accounted for three NVA KIA, TTSAP 
air strikes killed two NVA, and ground action resulted in two NVA KIA. 

7 ^ 


75 - 


Inclosore 1 (OpsratloDS Sarratira) to Operational Eeport - liBssons Ijaamad, 
lOlat iirboriJB DiTiaion (JLiraiDbila 1, Pariod Ending 51 July 1970, RCS CSFCR-6> 

(82) (0) 

At 150945t gunshipe from Trp k, 2d Sqdn (Ajfcl) 17th Car engaged an eneay 
foroe ▼iclnitv XD869569. At 1054 hours the Aerial Rine Platoon, Trp A» 

2d Sqdn (Aafcl), 17th Cav «aa inserted to a^^ep the contact aiea and conflrBed 
t«lTB HVA killed by helicopter. The pl itoon en^^ed one eneay at yj aetere 
at 1215 hcurs resulting in one N7A KIA. 

On 16 June, in area Oscar, vicinity CEORCIA, the let 8c, 3<i 8egt 
(ARVN) aede contact with eneny forces employing ataall arme, BPG and bOam 
mortar fire at O945, 105O and 1450 hours. The let and 2d Companies employed 
small arms and artillery fire resulting in three KTA killed by artillery 
and eight KVA killed by small arms. One A8VN was killed and 20 wounded in 
the contacts. 

(7) 17 - 25 June 1970 

(a) On 17 June, at XD898316, eleoenta of Trp A, 2d Sqdn (Anbl), 17th Car, 
while ccnductlng risoal reconnaissance in the FSB l^THEHKECK area, obeerved 
10 HTA in the open, 15O - 200 log reinforced bunkers, 15 pup tenta, two burning 
camp fixes, numeinus leaxv-tos, 10 latrines and a network of trails leading 
Into the area* 

Sxtansive visual reconnaiseanoe by elements of the 2d Sq^ (Amhl), 17tfa 
Car tfarou^out the day on 18 June revealed heavy eneigr activity and a large 
number of additional bunkers in the FSB I£ATHBBK£C£ area* Tbe area was engaged 
by gunshipe, artinexy and air strikes throu^out the afternoon. There were 
two incidents of ground to air fire in the area. 

On 19 June, elements of the 2d Sqdn (Anhl), 17th C«v, while conducting 
bomb damage assessment of air force tactical air strikes, located an evacuated 
600 aan hospital complex west of FSB I2ATHERNSCK. Trp B, 2d Sq^ (Ambl), I7tb 
Cav was inserted into the area and discovered medical supplies, rioe, grenades 
and misoellaneous equipment. 

On 21 June, Trp D and the Reconcaissanoe Company (HOC BAO), 1st Inf QiT 
(AHVK) conducted a combined assault into the FSB ]£ATB&BNECK > ROBIH area 
to seek out and destroy enemy bunkers and cache sites. Continaous air cover 
was provided by the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17tii Cav. 

Also on 21 June, the 1st Bn (Ambl), 50l3t Inf redeployed in the AO, pas~ 
sing to the operational control of the 1st Bde and morlng by air to FSB BASTOGR* 
Co A secured the fire base idille Companies B, C and D initiated search and 
attack patrols in the vicinity of the fireb^e. 

The 2d Bn (Ambl), 5021 Inf moved by vehicle from vicinity FSB BASTOCJB 
to CAKP BAGI£ and prepared for battalion refresher training and assumed the 
mlseicD of Division Ready Force. 




lnc’.oBur« 1 (cperationu Narrative) to Operational Report - lasBons learned, 

'Olet iarborne DiV:^ion (A-innobile^, r^eriod Knding July 1970, RCS CSFDR-6?) 


On 22 June, a taak force under conLrol of the id Bds, operating in coordin¬ 
ation with the ^th Bn, M Regt (AHVN), oonsieting of Co a, 2d Bn (Anfcl), 50?d 
Inf, Co B, 1st Bn (Anfcl), Inf, the HOC BAO Company, and eXementG of the 

2d Sqdn (iahl), I7th Cay, conducted operations to further exploit enemy base 
areas and cache sites in the vicinity of FSB LfiATHEfflECK and SIEPHSRD* Co A, 

31 3n (Anfcl), 5^31 Inf and Co B, Ist Bn (Ambl), Inf passed from opera¬ 

tional control of the Ist Bde to OPCCH of the id Bde and assaulted into PSB 
3'EPHfiHD» Elenenta of the 2d Bn (Ambl), 11th Arty were moved by air to PSB 
SifiPIEHD and SARii; to provide artillery support to the task, force. 

On 25 June, Det B52, 5th 3PG(A) returned to Mfcl LOG and. prepared to resume 
Operation 5A.RBER GIAIKo 

On 24 June, the 5th Bn, 3d Regt (ARVK) terminated operations in coordination 
with the 3d Bde in the FSB IfiATHERNECK area and returned to DOUG HA. 

On 25 June, the 5d Bde Task Force was withdr .a from the northwestern por¬ 
tion of the division AO. Co A, 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf and Co Bt 1st Bn (Asbl), 
50l3t Inf returned to parent unit control; the HOC BAO Co returned to HDE and 
was released to the control of the Ist Inf Div (ABVN); Btry A(-)» 2d Bn (Aafcl), 
11th Arty moved by air to FSB RIPCOHD; and the 2d Sqdn (Aafcl), 17th Cav resumed 
normal operations. Btry C(-), 2d Bn (xmbl), 11th Arty remain^ at PSB SAHCE 
and psrepared to redeploy in the 2i Bde AO, 

Alco on 25 June^ Det B52. 5th 3 PG(a) resumed Operation BAREBR G3Jd£ with 
insertion of the 2i Pit, 44th Hanger Co into the vicinity of XD8544. 

(b) Significant Activities. At 170340| vicinity 1D441066 (Area Oscar)1 
the li^t CP, ai and 3d Companies, Ist En, 3d Regt (AEVU), operating in coordin¬ 
ation with the Ist Bn (Aid}l), 327th Inf, engaged an estimated enemy platoon 
near their ni^t defensive pjosition. Or^nic weapons^ tube artillery, ARA, 
and a flareship were employed and resulted in 52 HVA OA. ABW casualties 
i«re four with minor wounds. 

On 18 June, In the Tietnamese Salient (XD883I), gonshipe, ASA, and air 
strikes wre employed resulting in 26 HVA KIA. Weather precluded the insertion 
of Trp D, ad Sqdn (Aimbl), 17th Cav into the area to conduct patrol and snr- 
veillanoe operations. 

The weather cleared permitting insertion of Troop D on the 19th and a re¬ 
cently evacuated hospitaH complex was discovered* Hine enem^ were killed in 
the Vietnamese Salient. 

The insertion of Trp D and the ARP, Trp B, ad Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav and 
the HDC BAO Co into the vicinity of PSB KOBIH on 21 June to perform bomb damage 
assessment and to exploit B52 strikes, resulted in discovery of 62 bunkers, 

50 tons of rioe, medical supplies, six NVA killed by air force, a shirt idei^ 





Ircloaure 1; 'nu Nar',*t ^ vt- '■ t>. rat. oriai Kcpcrt - L^ .uorio Ujanwa , 

lOlst A-ir-borne Div’Eion ; A; ranni it*;, t-r >■ s cxi i^rm .j.p. '.1 Juiy .70, ii'.’O 

(H.>) (0) 

tifying eleuenta ot tin- ;tb Un, obt>. N'VA Retfl, anri capture of two FVo* t'hrae 
US ier« vtounded in .ict:oii vi»tn the AHp, Trp B, 31 S'yin (Aiabi,', lyth OaY recfiViri 
uinail amfei fir* and frujoatjiiUitian trrenodea fr .is S - ‘j aneaty at '5 Betera, Ttw 
element returned fxie liut the enemy witluiree and a sweep roYealeu no enemy 

‘The 3d 3de ooiabuied task force, innerted ii-to t.’ip Y-cinity Pih I>lAT;ijiKc.Cjl 
on 72 June, located and destroyed enemy untailationa and food stuffs u l.l 
they were extrixcted on 75 June, Totals for trie ;«riod 17 - 25 June in t/.e 
area v»re 6‘^ NVA KIA* two PW, 52 tons of rioe, three tone o*" salt, 10 r-isen 
of mlacellaneoufl foodatuffa, three individual and one crow servsd weapon 
captured, 19|500 A.K-47 rounds, 4,dt>J l.'.Vmra rounds, 312' RpG rounda, 40 75iw 
recoilless rifle rounds, and 15 IPTwo rockets. k total of 283 banters were 

At 22160c, vicinity ’01722«i, (lj i£K W of FSB JSROJt), tlie 2id Co, Ist Bn, 
l3t Regt (aRTN) discovered a training amea consisting of a rifle range, 50 
huta with underground bunkers, and .m aamunition bunker contiining 10,00/0 
AK—47 rcunda, 200 RPC rounds and 41' RVA uaiforme with no aitrkings. 

At 231045, vicinity 18425^, (2 KM SW of FSB JiHD>e), the lot Bn, Ist Begt 

(AHVN) engaged an estimated two enemy platoons witli organic weapons, gunshlps 

and tube artillery. The enemy returned smll arms fire and fled. A sweep of 
the contact area revaaled 47 R7A KlA anti a larcje eneny base camp ressulting 
in 10 IWG, 11 CSWCf 156t450 AK-47 rounds, 30,000 12,7®“ machinegin rounds, 

780 RKJ rounds, 50 anti-tank minee, I6C bunkers, t'wo aniaal cages and two 
PW cages. The area west and south of FSB JEROME in a known rear service area 

supporting the 812th NVA Regt and the Tth Front. Four aRVH were wounded in 


At 241450, vicinity YD217252, the 1st Bn, 2d Regt (aRVTI) diacovered graves 
containing 43 NVA killed by an air force B52 strtkE approximately 1O days 

(8) 26 June - 7 July 197O 

(a) The division continued to provide aviation assets to the 1st Inf Div 
(ARVN) and the Ist Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mecb) throughout this period. Assets 
wire ^ao provided to Det B52, 5th S?G(a), until the termination of Operation 
BARBER OLATK on 30 June. There were a total of 117 incidents of aircraft 
receiving ground fire. One aircraft was shot down by 12,Tam aachinegun fire 
and crashed. Nineteen other aircraft were rendered non-flyable. 

The division continued extensive employment of ground sensor devices to 
locate and monitor enemy movement and engage suspected enaqy locations with 
artillery and narins, navy and U3AP aircraft. During the period a total of 




Inclo*ur« 1 (Oiperitionj Narr-ntive) to Operation.*] h* - Leeponu Learned, 

lOlut iirb me OiviBion (Airaiobile), Poriod Endinti . July 197C, RCS 
(R2) (U) 

J25 activation* were recordea aui 5oo^ r-.Au»la of auisd caliber artillery 
aJ«ttucitioK %(er0 ‘‘ired in re ictivui. 

The divieioo continued to ooreiuct operations to locate and destroy omBy 
forces, staging ariaa and linen of coiaunicatioo, and to prevent enemy infil¬ 
tration into the piipilated lowlands and disruption of elections held on 28 June. 

Ctt) 2b June, division aviation assets were provided for t.'s assault of the 

/ 4th 3n, ^th Regt (IRTR) into the area vicinity PSb BRICK* The battalion CP 

collocated with the CP, 2d Bn (ijiibl), ^1at Inf to facilitate coordinated 
operations a^Llnst elesEnta of the 29th RVA RegLiaent ■*n area Xray. 

On 28 June, an artillery raid was conducted fro* PSB BIJL2£ by Btry B, let 
Bn, SJd Arty- preplanned targets along route 548» vicinity REltD2Z70!IS 
were en^gad. 

On 29 June, the 2d Bn (Aj^I), 503d. Inf completed battalion refresher 
training at CAKP BAG1£ and redeployed by vekicle to the vicinity of PSB BASTOGME* 
The battalion assaaed responsibility for area Onlfom, secnrity of the f.irebaae, 
and initiated search and attack, patrols in the vicinity of th» firebase. The 

1at Bn (Amhl), 50lat Inf laoved fro* PSB BASTOQJE to PUD LOC District, passed 

to the operational control of the 2d Bde, and assuasd rssponaibility for area, 
Zulu and security of FSB LOS BANOS and TOMAHAWK. The ad Bn (Aabl), 527th Inf 
moved by air and vehicle fro* PHD LOC District to CAMP SAGlfi and began prepar¬ 
ation for battalion refresher training. 'Kie battalion also aaeoned tbe axssic.n 
of Division Heady Force. 

On 30 JuiMt Det B32f 5th SPC(a) terminated Op^/ratior BABSR GLADS and 
ore pared to move by air to NHA TRAHC. 

The period 1-7 July sav a narliBd increase in eneaqr activity in the 5d 
Bde area of operation as elements of the B0}d and 6tb NTA BegLoents conducted 
daily attacks by fire on FSB RlPCCSiS. Mare than 16C rounds of 60as> and 82ui 
■crtar and 7^m recoilless rifle fire were directed at the firebsae during the 
first seven days of July, resulting In 21 US VIA. In the vicinity of tbe 
firebase ITS unite en^ged in 25 enemy and eignt friendly initiated contacts, 
resulting in 30 NTA KIA, nine IWC, and two CSVC. DS casualties vexe 18 killed 
and 104 wounded. 

On 1 July, tbe Aero-riQe Platoon, Trp C, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), I7tb Cav was in¬ 
serted west of PSB RIPCORD in reaction to the eneny attacks 1^ fire on the 
firebase. When the platoon reoelved fire on tbe landing Eone, Trp D, 2i Sqdn 
(Anhl), 17th Cav was Inserted to reinforce tbe aRP. These elements passed to 
operational control of the 2d Bn (Ambl), ^6th Inf until they were extracted 
on 2 July, returning to peirent unit control at 1810 hours. 

Also on 1 July, the 1st Bde passed operational oontiol of tbe 2d Bn (Aidil}, 



Incljsure 1 (Uiarationu Narrative) to 0;eration»I Report - Lasnone Lsameci, 
lOlat ilrborna Division (iiranbile), period Ending 31 July 1^70, RCS SSK>?-Ct» 

(R2) (tl) 

501at Inf to the 2ii Bde and reBponaibility for PS/OB ERICK ajid area Xr-j.y tc the 
4th Bn, ^th Regt (IJlVli). The 2d Bn (Jusbl), let Inf Boved by air from vicin¬ 
ity PS/UB BRICK to RH! BM Coabat Baaa to prejaie for mownerit to OlMP EVij;s 
and redeployaent. 

On 2 July, the 2d Bn (Ajabl), ^‘ist Inf pnaeed to the operatitmal control 
of the 3d Bde and aosaitlted into landing ^onee south and southvest of PS/OB 
RIPCORD. The battalion OF collocated on the firebase with the CP, 2d Bn (Ajxbl), 
506tb Inf, 

On ^ July, three battalions were repositioned in suj^rt of the battalion 
refresher training pro^raia. The let Bn (^b 4>1), 50l8t ?jif teminated operations 
in P33 IOC District and moeed to wicinity PB/CB TE®H1 and peeued OPCCSf to lat 
Bde. IS*!! lat Bn (Uii)!), 327th Inf terminated operations vicinity FS/CB 7EC2EL 
and MB4. to CaJIP BlGIii, closing at 1312 hours, and began preparation for refresher 
trairing. The battalion aasomed the Bission of DRJ at 060? hours. The 2d Bn 
(aAI), 327th Inf completed refresher training and returned to PHD LOG Dis¬ 
trict and reasBumed responsibility for area Zulu. 

On 5 and 6 July, Troops C and D, Sqdn (imibl), 17th Car moved to Qnacg 
Tri, joining Troop A, to facilitate the concentration of ainoobile cavalry 
elenEnta in the nortl^st portion of the division AO. This movement was in 
reaction to intelligence concerning infiltration of the 9ih Regt, 304th 
NVA Division into South Vietnam. 

On 6 July, additional artillery (three 155nn howitaers) from Btry A., 2i 
Bn (ixsbl), 11th Arty were moved from FS/OB RAKKASAH to IS/CB RIPCOHD in support 
of operatiais in Ihat area. Six 105 b®» howiteers f\f Btry B, 21 Bn (Aohl), 

3l9th Arty and six 1551011 howitzers of Btry A, 2i Bn (Aafcl), lltb Arty were 
located on the firebase at that time, 

Cto 7 July, the Ist Bn, 3*1 Regt (ARVN) terminated operations vicinity PS/CB 
VBGBEL and ®®GIA. and lanred by air and vehicle to CAMP SALLY to begin le- 
frsshar training for future operations. 

(b) Significant Activities* On the morning of 26 Jons, CAIB SACSf was 
twice attacked by fire. At 0009 hours approxlmtely ten d2mi mortar rounds 
impacted in ids area of the 21 Bn (Ambl), 320th Arty and the 4th Bn (Aerial 
Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl), One US was killed and ei^t wounded during the 
attack. Two UHIH helicopters and one sealut were damaged, and one mainten¬ 
ance tent was destroyed. At 0247 hours seven l22aQ rockets impacted in 
areas of Co B, 159th Avn Bn (ASS) (Ambl>, 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty 
(Ambl), 265th HHD, 801st MaLnt Bn (Ambl), Div Arty, and G Sector of tte CAIC 
BACIE perimeter. Results \Kre four US VOA; one AH1G helioopter and one 5/4 
ton 1^7 truck destroyed; one CH-47, one AH1G, two 2^ ton M55 trucks, two 3/4 
ton >57 trucks and two Ml51 jeeps, damaged. Aerial rocket artillery, tube 
artillery and mortar fire was employed on suspected enemy locations. Aerial 





Incloaure 1 (OparAtiona NarraU»«) to Operutxuit&i Report - Lessons Lsaroud, 
lOlst Aarbome Division (Ainsubile), period Ending July 1970« RCS CjP0R-6i 
(R^) (0) 

reconnadasunoe of tbs rocket belt and suspected eoeay firing positions revened 
one NTA KIA, 

At 26023‘Jt Vicinity 7D442118, the Ist Pit, Co B, Ist Bn (AKbl), 306th inf 
received RPG and aaall arae ftie in their ni^t defensive position. The pla¬ 
toon retumed snail area fire and employed ARA and a fleireshlp. A first 
swep of the contact area revealed six K7A KlA, two AK-47Bt two &PC launchere, 
two RPC rounde, and 23 i pound satchel charges. 0B oasnaltisa were four EIA 
and eight VflA. 

Light and sporadic contact in the division area of operation during the 
period 26 - 30 June resulted in eight NVA KIA and one US killed and eleven 

On 1 July, at CT^Oe hcure, on PS/CB RIPCORD, the CP and Co D, ai Bn (Anhl), 
506th Inf received five 32 bbb mortar rounds and small arms fire from the aouth- 
eaet. At 0830, the firebase received 13 rounds of 629mi mortar fire which 
impacted inside the perimeter. At 1343 hours, the eneqy employed l6 73imB 
recoUleas rifle rounds, 6—8 impacting Inside the fire base perimeter. At 
1912 hours, four roonds of 82iai murteir fire landed on the firebase* Artillery, 
air struts and or^mc mortar fixe were ei^loyed on suspected enesy locations 
throughout the day. Fifteen US received minor wounds daring the day, all from 
Btry B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 519th Arty, located on the highest point of the firebase. 
Most of the casoalties occurred as the battery was employing counter-battery 

At 011043 hours, approximately 15CX) maters soathsast of JS/OB RIPCORD, 

Co B, ^ Bn (Aidil), 366tb Inf received fire from 73 asters west of their posi¬ 
tion, The element returned organic weapons fixe and a pink team was employed. 

A swep of ths area after contact revealed one BVA KIA, Two US were wounded. 

At 2225 bo\ira the company received 8-10 RPG rounds and small arms fire from 
100 nsters south of their position. Elements retun^d fixe and tbs enemy 
wittidxev. There were no friendly casualties or damage. 

Also on 1 July, Regional and Popular force units joined by ARTS infantry 
and araored elements, and the SJC BAO Company, waged a l6-hour battle near 
^pang Trl with main force enemy units, resulting in 133 enemy killed and 1? 
captured, G7K forces suffered 12 KIA. 

At 020546 July, vicinity ID557172 (Hill 902), the CP and Ist and 2d Pita, 

Co C, 2d Bn (Ambl), 306th Icf received RPG, satchel charges and aaall arms fire 
In their night defensive position. An estinated semper coipany, in a well 
organized and executed attack, were successftil in penetrating the perimeter 
and occupying positions inside the HDP. The eneBy sappers and elements of Co C 
exchanged satchel chargr^s and fragmentation grenades in a fierce battle until 
the enesy within the perinetsr were killed, and the reaEkinder withdrew at aiw 

1 - 1 ^ 




Incloaore 1 (Ojierationa Narratiw ) to Oparational 8 *port - IiaBBoaa Learned, 

10 l 3 t iarbome DlTiOion (Air*)hiie), Period finding 51 J'^lj 1970, ECS CSPOB -65 

(R2) (tr) 

proxlJietBljr 0420 Lours. The cooqjeny cnaeander ms killed in the initial ex¬ 
change or fire. The coa{»ny aedic ijmsdiatler organised the defense of the 
position until relieved lator by the artillery fureard obeerver. Sporadic 
contact sod aaortar fire oontinu^ tintil epproxi&tsly 0350 hours. Results 
of the action mie I 5 NYl fill, seven (JS fill, six US VU and ooe US Mil. 

On 3 July, between the hours of 1415 sod 1520, in the Ticinity of JCD9744, 
seven kiloaeters northseat of the Kl£ SlHB airstrip, aircraft fros Trp 1 , 2d 
S^dn (fiadil), 17tb Cav, condgetipg araed aerial reoonnalseance, engaged approx- 
iastely 14 ene^y, killing tuelve. The IBP, Trp 1, 2i Sq^ (labl), 17th Car 
ws inserted at JQ> 79 Q 445 , engaged tuo eoe^y in bunkers resulting in tun STl 
fill, one US Ell, and two US and ooe Kit Carson scout wounded. The platoon 
was extracted at 1820 hours. 

It 040950 , vicinity TD372170, an individual from Co C, 21 Bn (libl), 501st 
Inf, ehile the conpany tc.3 conducting a search and attack operation soatb- 
aaat of PS/OB RIPCORD, detonated a booby trap consisting of five 82m aortar 
rounds, placed along the trail and daisy chained. Three rounds were placed 
on the ri^t aide of the trail and two on the left. ?lve US were killed and 
five wounded. 

On 4 July, PS/CB RIPCORD was attacked by fire for the fourth day in a row. 

1 total of nine attacks were directed at firebsae, three consiatlag of 
62ias and 60mB aortar CS rounds. Three US were wounded. 

It 050010, vicinity ID377159* Co C, 2d Bn (labl), 501st Ihf, ^dille in their 
ni^t defensive position aoutbe^t of ^/(£ RIFOORD, engaged three eneay with 
bbbU aras fixe 20 maters to the vest of their position. The eoeiy returned 
small arms fire and satchel charges, and appeared to flee. It OO 5 O hours the 
ooaqpeny was attacked with satchel chargee and returned ovffuoLe weapons fixe* 

The ens^y a^in vitMrev and ARl and a flaxeship were employed. 1 sweep under 
illuirrination revealed no enesy casualties. Three US were wounded. 

It 0^5 hours, the coBqany received 8-10 RPG rounds and smeQl arms fire, 
a^in from the west* This tine a smep revealed five KVl Klfi, five lK-47a, 
twenty«i^t i-pound satchel charges and two KTTl gas Bisks. One US mn killed 
and 14 were evacuated for wands. 

It 05i240, vicinity lD356l6l, three kilometers south uf FS/OB RIPCOHD, Co 1 , 
2d Bn (imbl), 506th Inf en^ged 8-10 eneny with sail axos ajxi artillery fire, 
killing five HTfi. Two US were wounded ly RPG fire. 

Cm 6 July, eneny contact in the FS/CB h4URS£3i area by elements of the 1st 
Bn (fimbi), 506tb Inf resulted in three NTA KIA, and 20 US Wifi. At 1750 hours, 
three kiiossters eouthweet of FS/CB RiPCCEiD, t5 US were wounded in Co A, 2 e 1 Bn 
(Aatal), 501 st Inf, by snail anas fire and fragmentation grenades from an esti¬ 
mated enemy company on all sides of the friendly position. 





Inclosure 1 (Cporationa NatTMtxve) to Cperntionikl Raport - Iiaasons lisarned, 
lOlat AJ-rborne Divi^iion (Airmobile), Pariod Ending 51 Jniy '970, RCS CSPOft— 65 
(R2) (0) 

At O 6155 O, vicinity TD745455, a ranger team from Co I. (Racgar), 75th Inf 
sada cc^tact vith an estimtad enemy company 50 ■etara north and vest of thair 
position, Qr;$inic weapons, ARA and a pink, team were amployad, resulting in 
13 HYA KIA, Six rangerm ware wounded. 

At 070940 , vicinity, '0534194, waat of FS/CB RIPCORD, while assaulting on 
Hill 1000, Co Q, ^ Bd (Ambl), 501st Inf reoeivad small arms fire and satchel 
charges from an eneny foroa located in budoBrs, 50 BBtem frcm their position, 
Ths company employed or^nic weapons fire, tube artillery, ABA* and air 
strlkBB on the enemy positions. Contact was broloan at approzisatsly I 50 O 
hours as the company moved off the bill, having suffered three KIA and 19 
VIA, Siz RVA ware killed in the action* 

Other enemy contact in the vicinity of PS/OB RIPCORD, on 7 «Jbly» hy elements 
of the 21 Bn (Ambl), 506 th Inf and tha 2i Bn (Aabl), 50l8t Inf, resulted in 
one US KIA and 28 VIA. 

(9) 8-16 July 1970 

(a) la reaction to intelligence information indicating the possibility 
of infiltration by the 9tb RegiioeDt, 5C4th KYA Bivislcc into South Vietnam, 
to relnfoToe ard replace the weakened 66tb HYA ResLnsnt, xeconnaifisanae and 
survelllanoe efforts in the nuithwestem portion of the division AO were 
^tensified, Bxtansi-re efforts to interdict tha infiltration of the 9th Regt 
culminated at approzlmtely 11 50 hours on 8 July, as a pink team, from Trp A, 

2i Sqdn (A4*>1), iTth Cav observed 150 - 200 ensay in the open, vicinity XD3256, 
The axes was engaged 'by oachiriegun and rocket firs from the pink team and a 
oooaand and control aircraft accompanying the team. Additional gonshlp and 
AHA support was requested, and, within 50 minutes, wms on station engaging 
the eoeuy. At 1558 hours, Trp D, 2i Sqdn (Aahl), 17 th Cav was Inserted Into 
the contact area to make a ground sweep and capture a prisoner. The troop 
made contact with the enemy and was extracted at 1758 hours, having captured 
three priaonere and a large number of sne^y documents, which identified the 
9th H7A Regt. Pink teams, and sections of ARA from tito 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 
77 th Arty (Aid)l), providing relief on station, continued to engage the eneoy 
throughout the day, resulting in 159 enemy killed. 

In reaction to this activity. Operation CLINCH YALISY, employing elements 
of the 5d Bda and tha 5d Regt (ARVN), vos initlatsd at 091515 hours. Btry 3, 

2d Bn (Anbl), 11th Arty was airlifted from FS/OB YSCaSL to FS/CB SARCS. Tha 2d 
Bn (Amhl), 50^ Inf moved hy air from IS/CB BIRMlHaHAM to Mil LOG and conducted 
an aixnol^le assai it into FS/(B SHEPHERD to provide security for Btxy A, 4fith 
Arty (aRYH). The battalion paaeed from operational control of the Ist Me 
to operational control of tne 5d Bde. Co B secured the fixebase while corn* 
paniSB A, C and D conducted eeourity operations in the Tlcinlty of the firebass 
The Ist Bn (Ambl), 506 th Inf passed from operational control of the 5d Bde to 





IncloBure 1 (Operationa NarratiTB) to uperational Report - Lessons Learned, 

101 st Airborne Dirision (Airaoblle), Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSK)R-65 
(R2) (0) 

area was engaged by gunshipe and ARA, rcaolting in 50 enesy killed* Air to 
ground contact continued tbrou^out tbe day. At 12^0 hours, ten ocis enesiy 
were killed by gannhipe in the vicinity of XD826565. Trp D, 2d Sqdn (Anbl), 

17 Cut was inserted at this location, at 1538 hours and oaptuxed three 
prisoners. While ooUecting eneoy equipoent, weapons end doouasnta for extrao* 
tion, and sweeping tbe contact area, the troop was engaged by an eatioated bat¬ 
talia sias ensisy force. Daring tbe engageasnt, 24 RTA wsre killed and Trp 
D suffbied air KIA and five WIA before being extracted at 1750 hours. Aircraft 
Bcxsening the ground troop continusd to engage eneqr in the area. At 1900 
houre, vicinity XD825563f aircraft from Trp A obeerrsd and engaged an active 
12.7mm machinegun position, destroying the weapon, one RPG launcher, one radio 
and four rucksacks lying in the vicinity. At 1745 hours, a eoasand and control 
aircraft, flown by the CO, 21 Sqdn (Asbl), 17th Car, landed and extracted one 
wounded KVA iV. The final contact of the day occurred at 1919 hwxrs, idien 
aircraft from HHF, 23 Sqdn (Ambl), I7th Cav observed 10 - 15 eneiqy near an 
active 12.7mm machinegun position. The aoaa was engaged with MSO ttaehinegon 
fixe and AH1G gunshipe, resulting in tha destruction of tbe weapon and 10 
eneqy killed. 

Also on 8 July, vicinity JB/CB BIPOORD» the ene^r a^in rsfusad to be dis¬ 
lodged from Hill 1000. Companies C and D, 21 Bn (Ambl), 506 1h Zhf wsra en^tged 
with small arms and automatic weapons fixe Iqr an eneagr in well fortified ban¬ 
kers, at 1050 hours* Intensive fixe from at lea^t thxse mtoally supporting 
bunkars, pinned the companies down* One bunker was neutralized with K}? LAV 
fire, but the other two could not be destroyed* Contact was terminatad at 
approximately 1300 hours as the companies again moved off tbe hill. US cas¬ 
ualties wexe two killed and f wounded. 

At 091615 hours, vicinity XD 826365 , aircraft from Trp A» 2i Sqjdr. (Ambl), 
17 th Oav observed ten KVA bodies killed during the previous ni|dit by heavy 
artillery employed from CAMP CARROL by Btry Bt 8tb Bn, 4th Arty. Cavalry air- 
oxaft killed two other' sneiiy in the KHS SAHH Hateau aoea during the day. 

On 10 July, beginning at 073^ hours, FS/OB RIRCORD was attacked by fire on 
eig^t separate occasions during tha day. The enemr employed 60 Mb and 82mm 
mortar and xecoilless rifle fire, resulting in two US KIA and 17 US VIA. 

Also on 10 July, aircxaft from Troops A and B, 2d Sqdn (Aabl), 17th Cav 
killed 26 KVA in scattered air to ground contact in support of Operation 

On 11 July, Troops A and B killed 14 KVA in support of ARVK ground forces 
in ths CLIKCH VALlEY AO, and the 1st Bn, 3d Regt (ARVK) killed five eneqy 
while sweeping in the vicinity of XD823^1* 

At 110900 hours, vicinity XD853362, the Ist Bn, 3d Regt (ARVK) discovered 
thirty enemy bodies killed by helicopter, and, between tbe hours of I 845 and 




lacloBure 1 (Operataona Narrative) to Operational Report - ItaBSons Learned, 
lOlat ilirbome Division (Airmobile), iarlod Ending }1 July 1970| HCS CSPtH -65 
(R2) (U) 

tie let Bde, aM Btovad by air from FS/OB KATilRYW to PS/CB BAbTOOTK, asaiuning 
reaponsibility for the firebase. 

On 10 July, the Ist and 2d Battalions, }d Regt (AJ3VN) assaulted Lnto FS/OB 
SBIPIER and SHTTH, respectively, to begin reconoalaaanoe in force operations. 

The 3d Regt light CP moved by air to FS/CB SHEPHERD. The 3d Bde tactical CP 
moved to CAMP CARROL auid maintained dose coordination with the 3^ Regt (iRYNj. 

On 11 JvLly, division aviation assets were provided to support the assaoilt 
of a platoon of the HAC BAO Company, with four members cf Co L (Han^r), 73tb 
Inf, into the CLINCH VALIEY area. The assault and sabaequent patrolling oper¬ 
ations culminated an extensive training program conducted by the Scieaalng 
Eagle Replacement Training School (SSRTS). 

The 1st Bn (Ambl), 327tb Inf completed refresher training and moved by 
vehicle and air, from CAJ1P EACa£, to PS/OB THCHCL and KATHR7I. The 1st Bn (/J*)!), 
301st Inf moved from FS/OB VEGBBL to PHD BAI Coot>at Base, ussuaed the mission 
of DRF, and prepared for refresher training. 

The 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved from FS/CB RIPCORD and vicinity, to GAJ1P 
EVANS, to refit and prepare for redeployment a^iinst elements of the 805d FVA 
Regt, vicinity FS/CB RIPCORD. On 12 July, the battalion assaulted into the 
vicinity of YD 3319 und YD 31 I 8 and be^n attacks to the south and east. 

Operation CLINCH VALLEY was terminated at 151802 July, as the let and 3d 
Bn, 3d Regt (aRVN) extracted from PS/OB SNAPPER and SMETH to vicinity MAI LOC 
and then movi^ by air to CAMP SALLY* The 3d Bn (Axhl), 5021 Inf moved by air 
from FS/OB SHSPISRD to CAMP EAGIE, returned to operational control of the Ist 
Bde, and prepared for redeployment. 

Results of Operation CLINCH VAUBY (Period 091315 to 151802 July) sere 
226 NVA KIA (186 by US, 38 by ARVN), 15 IWC (ARVN), and U CStfC (3 by US, 

11 by ARVN). There were no Allied casualties reported during the operation. 

Elements of the 803d and 6 th NVA Regiments continued to conduct stand-off 
attacks against FS/CB HIPCOHD during the period 8 — I 6 July. The enemy employ¬ 
ment of 6 O 111 D and 82am mortar and 75>aii reocilless rifle fixe, on 10 July, re¬ 
sulted in two US killed and 1? wounded, on the firebase. Ground action around 
the firebase, vicinity Hills 1000 and 805, resulted In ten US KIA, 52 US VIA, 
and 12 NVA KIA* 

Between the hours of 1000 aixl I 6 OO, on I 6 July, the USS SDSON fired 224 
five inch rounds at bunkers and caves in the mountains north of PBU LOC Dis¬ 
trict, sealing four eaves, and causing two secondary explosions. 

(b) Significant Activities* At 081130 hoars, vicinity XD 826363 , aircraft 
from Tzp A, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), l7th Cav observed 150 - 200 NVA In the open. Tfae 




locloauw 1 (Operationa Narratl-re) to Operational Report - LesBonB laamod, 
lOlet JLirbome Division (Airaobile), i»riod Rndlng 51 July 1970, RC5 C3PC8-65 
(R2) (0) 

1920, disoovered 100 eoeay killed by air strikes within the past 56 hours. 

At 122222 hours, vicinity ■0562188 (Hill 8O5), Co D, 3d Bn (iJiihl), 501st 
Inf, while in their night defensive position, teoeived 50 to 40 RPG rounds and 
saall aras fire, froa an eneay force, 250 astsre to the northeast, The company 
returned orennic weapons fire, and ARA, air strikes and a flaxeship weie 
eaployed. Sixteen ITS were trounded. 

At 121555 hours, vicinity XD840559 (oos kiloastar north of FS/OB SHAjpSR), 
the 3<1 Co, 1st Bn, 3d Regt (ARW) engaged an aBtiaatad 40 ens^r with or^^ic 
weapons fire. A sweep revealed 30 H7A KIA, one RfD mohinegon, four BPG 
launchers, six AK-47e, one 60 sd aortar, coi^lete, 100 xockaacks, 33 Cblcoa 
gxenadaa, 60 RPG and 120 60 bbi aortar rounds, 60 Chiooa jpus aaaks, and 15 pcunds 
of docunsnte. 

Also on 12 July, vicinity 1S173240, ^ kilometeTs ecuthweet of 7S/CB JEROME, 
the 3d Co, 3d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVH;, disoovei^d the bodies of 65 FfA killed by 
air strikes within the last 3-4 days. 

On 13 July, Qeneral WilliaiB C. Ubotaoreland visited the division. 

At 140203 hours, vicinity fD362168, Co D, 2d Bn (Asbl), 50l8t Inf, while 
in their defensive position on Hill 805, again received RPG and smll 

arm fixe from an eneqy force, 20 meters northwest of their poeitioa. The 
element returned or^ic weapons fixe and employed M53 *3C eali'ber fixe (Quad 
50) from fS/OB RIFCEHD, and eimm mortar fixe, air strikes, and ABA, Contact 
texminated at 0307 hours and a first light check of the area revealed five HTA 
KIA, Tbs company suffered six KIA and nine VIA, At 2255 hours, the coa^pany 
received small arms fire and RPG fixe and satchel charges, and at OI 59 houre, 
leoelved thirty^-seven 82mm mortar rounds, ii^aeting around their SSF, OrgHlio 
weapons, ARA, tube artillery and mortar fixe wm employed against the enaay. 

One ITS was killed in the action. A first li^t sweep revealed noBBxaus blood 

On 14 July, Companies A and B and the Becon Sit, 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, 
in yet another attempt to eject the enemy from Hill 1000, was engaged 'by RPC, 
small arms and aortar fire, resulting in one US KIA and 2D VIA, Organic 
weapons, ABA, tube artillery and air strikes wsze eaployed a^lnst ene^y po8l> 
tions azHl well fortified bunkers on the hill* Partial sweeps of the area 
revealed five N7A OA, Elements withdrew to the vicinity of 1D325189, where, 
at 1715 hours, they received 82am aortar fixe vithout casoalties. Artillery 
was enjoyed on the suspected eneny location. 

Operation CLIHCE 7ALUST was terminated at 151802 Jtily. 

At 16I815 hours, vicinity 1D360186 (Hill 805), Co D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th 
Inf disoo'VBred two NTA killed by artillery within the last 24 hours, 




IncIoBure 1 (Oi»rationa NitrrativB) to Operational Report - Laasons L(?arned, 
lOlst Airbome Division (Airaoblie), Period Eodinfc 51 July 1970, RCS C3P0H-^9 
(R2) (0) 

(10) 17 - 25 July 1970 

(a) On 17 July, PS/OB RIPCORD roceivod sporadic nortar fire throu^cAit the 
day with lljfht and casualties on the firebose. The enemy employnd llXlan 

■ortars for the first tiiuB since the firebase was opened in April 1970. The 
planned extraction of the Bn (Ambl), Inf was postponed due to hii^ 

winds in the RIPCORD area. 

The ad Bn (Anbl), 5021 Inf moTOd by air to LZ AHS (vicinity JS/OB VSCHSL), 
staged, and conduot^ an assault into three landing zones south of 75/C£ BLAZS. 
The battalion initiated search and attack operations in the lEHIiESSEE 

Cn 18 July, the 2d Bn (Ambl), 50l3t Inf aoved by air from PS/OB RIPCORD to 
GAM? ETARS and then by vehicle to PHD BAI Combat Base to begin preparation for 
refresher trainins and assiuned the mission of DRP. 

At 181330» a CH-47 in logistical auK»rt of 5S/(B RIPCORD, was shot down by 
enemy ground fire and crashed in the IO^bb arnmnition storage area, causing 
a major fire and extensive damage on the firebase. All six lO^mn howitzers 
of Btay B. 21 Bn (Ambl), 319th Arty were destroyed. In reaction, the 1st Bn 
(ABbl) (-), 50l8t Inf passed to operational control of the 3d Bds, and 
assaulted into PS/CB GLADIATOR to secure the firebase fur insertion of Btry 
B, 21 Bn (Aobl), 320tb Arty. This move was rade to insure adequate artillery 
coverage for the RIPCORD area. 

On 19 July, PS/CB RIPCORD continued to receive sporadic mortar fire, caaising 
li^t oasualtiee but not Interfbring with damage repair and clean up opara> 
tions on the firebase. 

Also on 19 July, the 4th Bn, 54iR Ragt (arVH) terminated operations in 
area Xray and moved by air from PS/CB BRICK to PS/OB ROY and AKZIO. 

On 21 July, the 2i Bn (Ambl), 5031 Inf terminated operations in search of 
elements of Hie 29th RVA Regiment, in, the vicinity cf'li.rlNESSEE and extracted by 
air to CAMP SAGI£ to refit and prepare for fixture operations to support insexv 
tion of AUisd forces into the P^/CB AIRBORME-BRADI£T area. 

On 22 July, the 1st Bis passed reswnaibility for PB/OB BASTOOE axxd Area 
Dniform to 21 Bds. Oo A, Ist Bn (Anbl), 502d Inf moved by vehicle from 
PS/OB BIRMINGHAM to PS/OB BASTOGBE and assuaed security of the firebase, Co B, 
1st Bn (Ambl), 502i Inf moved by vehicle from PS/CB AH3SSAL to vicinity YD64O9 
and be^u3 patrol and surveillance operations in the vicinity of PB/CB BASTOGNE. 

Becaxise of the enemy buildup of forces euid the increased tempo of eneay 
attacks in the Fs/OB RIPCORD area, it became apparent that the cost and effort 
required for the self-defense of RIPCORD placed the accomplishiDent of future 




Incloflura 1 (OparAtiona NArratiw) to Operatione-l Report - iiosaons teamed, 
lOlst Airbomo Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 51 July 1970, RC?5 C.lPOH-b^ 
(R2) (D) 

operationa in the eneaty's rear supply and semoe anas, vicinity of BRADLEY 
and AIRBORIE, in jeopardy. 

On 25 July, the 5d Bde directed the extraction of the 2i Bn (Arhl), yi6th 
Inf froB IS/OB SIPOORD, €uid vicinity. Extraction fron the firebaee began at 
0545 hours and was coapleted, daapibe heavy indirect and 12.7*i maciiinegun 
fixe, at 1214 hours* Co D, 2d Bn (Aabl), 506th Inf vas inserted vicinity 
YD 565178 to assist the extraction of Co A, ai Bn (AJdBl), 506th Inf. Extrac¬ 
tion of Companies A and D be^m at 1505 hours and uae conpletsd without 
dasage or oasualtias at 1401 hours. Seventy-four USA?, mrine and navy tac¬ 
tical air sorties and continuous ARA. and tube artillery fires were eiaployed 
in support of the extraction. The battalion moved to CAMP EVA5S to conduct 
stand down and bs^in preparation for refresher training. 

(b) Significant Activities* FS/CB RIPCORD received six attacks by fire 
from eneoty forces employing bOioii, BPbb, and 120bbi mortars on 17 July, begin¬ 
ning at 0704 hoxirs. The last attack was at 1745 hours* Artillery and tacti¬ 
cal air support was employed on stispected enes^ locations thron^iout the day. 
Results were 14 DS WIA and one kit Carson scout VIA. 

At I 8 I 55 O, a CH-47 aircraft from Co A, 159th Avn Bn (aBH) (Ambl), »rrying 
a sling load of 105 ™ howitaer aaounition to FS/CB RIPCO®, received 12*7 bb 
machine gun fixe tdiile on approach to the flzebane* The ad.rcraft crashed into 
the 105Bm aasninition storage point, causing a major fire. Extensive danage 
was caused in Btiy 3, 2d Bn (AJabl), 519 th Arty, as well aa the bunkers and 
TOC cm the southern portion of the firebaae. Five howltaern from the battery 
vteie destroyed amd one damaged. An AK/MP(14A coonter-aortsr radar, two 106aB 
xenoilleas rifles, and an 45/(310-165 7HF radio set were also destroyed. The 
fi.ebase continued to receive sporadic enemy mortar firs throughout the day, 
resulting in one TJ5 KIA and four US VIA. The crash of the helicopter resulted 
ir one cxbv Bsbsr killed and five crew members wounded* In spite of the fire, 
and F'nUoding 105 mD ammunition on the firebaae, the perimeter remained intact, 
and 1^ late aifteotoon the fires were brottgdit under control and clean up opera- 
tiona began on the firebaae* To assist in defending the flrebase, artillery 
fixes were inczeaaed from FS/OB BARBARA, O'RBILLT and RAggASAS until Btry B, 

^ Bn (Ambl), 520tk Arty was ladd and ready to fixe from FS/CB (RADIATOR at 
1857 houTB* 

FS/(X RIF(X}RD continued to receive sporadic mortar fire on the flrebase 
throu^iont the period 19 - 22 July. A total of 54 stand-off attacks were con¬ 
ducted by tlm eneiQr during these four days resulting in aeven US KIA and 55 
US VIA* All but five wounded required evacuation. A total of 51 tactical 
air strikes were directed into the RIPCORD area between 19 and 22 July. 

Cta 20 July, contact by Co D, let Bn (Ambl), 506 th Ihf and Co A, 2d Bn 
(Asbl), 506 th Inf, east and south of Hill 8 O 5 , vicinity FS/CB RIPCORD, resulted 
in six NYA KIA. Ifcavy contact at 1750 hours ^ the 1st Pit, Co D, Ist Bo 





Ixjcloaure 1 (0;ier»ti inu N\rT«tlT«; to Operiti'jnal Report - liBSBoaB Laamed, 
lOlst DiYiuion (Airaubile), trrlod Rndin>r 51 July 1970, RjCS 
( 0 ) 

'Aubl ), 9c^th Ixif with Jti) enenor f roe enployuif; Suna nortar and aoall am 
fire, Ticlnity tD576lt!9i reuulted in iour KIA and fire US WXl. Contact 
tenainated at 18?0 hovire. 

it ^10712 hour'll vicinity 0376192, three klloueterfl east of Pi/c® HlrXrO, 

Cj D| let Bn (Xtabl), ‘>-6th Inf, wtiile preparing to leave their night defenoive 
ponition, received approzioately eighty 82 bb aortar rounds and arasll anas 
fire froB an ene^y force a.] around their position, is the coapany returned 
fire with or^^ic weapons \iiri euployed tube artillery and ARi a^lnat tne 
eneBQr, Co D, En (ijabij, t^obth Inf air annaulted froa vicinity YD330240, 
to an L2 north of the contact area. The conpany attacted to the south to 
reinforce Co D, let Be (imbl), ^06tb Inf, light contact with the enemy 

enr'jute, suffering four WIi, capituning a 12.7nB aachinegui, and discovering 
.. Ltrge bunicnr complex at '0572198. Co C, 21 Bn (imbl), 5^th Inf was inserted 
t/j destroy the bunker cjirplex. 

Co 0, 2d Bn (iid)!}, 906tb Inf linked up with Co B, Ist Bn (iadil), 906th 

Inf at 1225 heura as sporadic mortar fire continued to Impoot In the area un¬ 
til 1613 hours, iir atrikeE and a pink tasjn supported the contact as Co D, 

1st Bn (iobi), 306th Inf suffered five KIA and 51 Vli, and accounted for si^t 

N7i iOi. 

it 0840 hours, a UHIH helicopter from Co C, 526tb M»d Bn (imbl), while 
attempting to extract casualties from Co B, Ist Bn (imbl), 306th Inf area of 
contact, was hit in the tail boom by an RPG round, while in the pick>'up zone, 
and rendered non«flyable« it 0947 hours, anotbsr oedevac aircraft from Co C, 

526th fted Bn (imbl) was hit by small anas fixe in the sams pidc-up zone, re¬ 
sulting in one crew member killed and one wounded. TUm aircraft xetuzned to 
Gi>!P EAG1£ where it found to be non-flyable. i third aircraft, from Co A, 
136th ivn Bo (ah), was hit by small arms fire at 163B hours, while attempting 
to extract elements of Co B, 1st Bo (iflhl), 306th Inf. The aircraft crashed 
"ind caught fire on the ?2. Six other aircraft received ground fire in the 
RIP'XRD area d'lring the day with three being hit by nachlnegun and small arms 
fire, all returned to Ci>iP ETiBS and one was found to be non-flyable. 

it approximately 1700 hours, CompanieB C and B, 2d Bn (imbl), 506th Inf 
and Co B, 1st Bn (imbl), 306th Inf were extracted from a plck-op zone at 
0572198 and returned to CAMP EVANS to refit and prepare for future insertion 
into the RIPCORB area. 

At 221500 hours, vicinity ID555187* 1.5 kilomsters southeast of FS/OB RIPCORD, 
Co A, 21 Bn (imbl), 306tit Inf received rifle grenades, mortar and small arms from a large enemy force attacking from the north, east and southeast. 

Tube artillery, ABA and tactical air support were employed against the eneiQr. 
Contact was maintained until dark when the company oonsolidated their position 
and formed a defensive perimeter. Because of the close proximity of the 
entlmatcd three-company size encigy force, extraction of the wmn^d was not 





Inclosure 1 (Oper-^tlunu Rarrati'f'B) tt> Opamtlomi Report - Lesaoo* L^arnwi, 

101«t Airborne Olviaiun (Airairhila) , 

( 82 ; (a) 

attamptad iurlivr the )t)at of 

ooapony ware not serious* Those idio 
fortable aa possible until ttvy were 
IVelre 03 «ere killed durl/if: the day 

During the night of 22 - 2} July 
• aployed in the RDOOHD area against 

ieriod Kndim 51 July 1970, RCS CSP.H-6‘, 

the fifty-ooe (eraonoel wnindad In tne 
bad Bore aerloue wounds were aBde as ooaw- 
extraoted on tha ■oming of the 25d. 
and the coopeny acoounted for 61 RVA klA* 

BKwlve artillery and air striicea were 
lonuwn and aispected ena^y locations. 

More than 2200 rounds of oiixed caliber Artillery aaninition were fired in 
support of the extraction of the 2d Bn (Ajdjl), 906th Inf on 25 Jnly* Fourtoe:. 
CH-47 aircraft were employed coBBaanciag at 0545 hoara to e xtract 22 sorties, 
which included six 155sn howltwra, two H -405 dozers, ooauni cation a a'julp- 
aent, and one M55 (Quad 50 ) sachiaegun. The CH-47 extraction operation 
proceeded ssKsothly until 0740 hours, wdien one CH-47 was shot down on the fire- 
baae by 12*7nai taachiaagun fire. The aircraft was forced to land amidst the 
105en bowitzars ^ich had been destroyed on 18 July, and thus prevented the 
extraction of the artillery pieces and two 106nn rcooHles.t rifles. The CH-47 
received a direct hit ly an eneiy mortar .round, causing the aircraft to bum 
and explode. Sight additional CH-47 aircraft received hits during the extrac¬ 
tion, foiir were later determined non-flyable. Co B, 21 Bn (iabl), 506 th Inf 
began extraction at 0745 hours by UhlH but was delayed until 0935 hours by heavy 
eneigy 60nn and 82mm mortar fire. The extraction tojb ccoducted by infiltrating 
one BHIK aircraft into the firebase at a tlse. 

During the extraction, PS/CB RIPCORD was under continuous eaesy mortar 
fire, with severed hundred roiuxia impacting throughout the fixebaae, Air, 
artillery, and ARA destroyed several enecy mortar and mchinegun positions. In 
addition, numerous eneny, driven into the open by CS were killed by DS fire¬ 

( 11 ) 24-51 July 1970 

(a) With the extraction of DSunits from the PS/OB RIPOOHD area, the division 
began an extensive artillery and aerial bombardment plan directed against 
the NVA forces massed in tha area. Daring the period 240600 to 5 IO 6 OO July, 
over 10,000 rounds of mixed caliber artillery, 155 forward air controlled mis¬ 
sions - for 226 sorties - 168 drama of persistent agent CS, and 150 barrels 
of thickened fuel were directed a^lnst known and suepeeted enesy locations. 

On 24 July, the 21 Bn (Ambl), 50lBt Inf completed refresher training at 
PHU BAI Combat Base and moved by vehicle to CAMP BVABS to prspaie for ibtura 
operations in the vicinity of K/CB RAKKASAS. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf 
be(^ battalion refresher training at CAMP STARS. 

On 25 July, the 2d Bde passed reaponsibiJity for FS/CB RAKKASAN to the 3d 
Bde ais division farces repositioned to increase security of the populated low¬ 
lands eind supj'ort operations in the enemy's rear service support areais, in 





Inclosare 1 v^nerutivat; Nitrrativi:} to OiST-vtional neport - Leajoru Learnad, 

O'v .ii'in (AirM'bile), Period Kml mg 31 July 1970* RCS C3PtjR-^3 

(?’) (’J) 

the iBountauis norU»:\3t i-f the \ 'Jhau Valley. 

Operation C'IISA'jO ^^1A1£/IAM SON 563 be^pm at 25070 O July, aa eleaents of cne 
l3t Me, in .porational coori ination with the 5<i Re>?t, lat Inf Div (ABVlf), 
aasiultad into the oinratLOfWl area at 0800 hours, The M Bn (labl), ^02d 
Inf asrailted into the ?1i/0B MMTRSSN area, aeized and Mcured the firebase, 
ani be# 5 in eearch opemtione to the uest* Coapany D received fire on their 
LZ at ’C)405119» lithe artillery, AiU and tactical CS, dropped from TJHIH air- 
craft, auppTBsaed the en#>my fire. There were no US casualtlea during the 

The 1st Bn (Ai;;bl), Inf passed reaponaibility for FS/OB BASTCaiE to 

the 3d Bn (Ambl), 187tli Inf and companies A and B iiasaulted. into landing aones 
south of re/OB BIHKIIfGhAK and ARSENAL to conduct search and attanlc patrols, 

Co C, 1st Bn (Ambl), 30lst Inf movea by air to PS/C® HAiOCASAH and assasaed 
the nia sinn of firebase security. 

On 26 July, the CP and Co C, 2d Bn (Anbl), 50l3't Inf moved by air to FS/OB 
RAaKASAN closing at I 619 hours. Co C assuaed mission of security for '-ne 
fire bass. 

On 28 July, the light CP, 3d Refft (AKTO) and Btiy A (155), l^th Arty (ABVN) 
moved by air to FS/OB HAUHEEN in support of Operation CKISAQO ffiAK/LAK SON 363, 

On 29 Jiily, Btry C, 2d Bn (Anbl), 320tb Arty repositioned, by air, from 
PS/OB BASTOCaffi to PS/OB MATOEEN to provide additional artillery support for 
Operation CHISAGO SEAK/LAM SON 365» The battery uas replaced on FS/CB BAS- 
TO'aC by Btry B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 519th Arty from GAMP EVANS. 

On 30 July, division aviation assets, coordinated through the 1st Bda, 
supported the assault by the Ist and 2d Battalions, 5d Bogt (abVN) into tba 
CHI^GO TEAK/LAH SON 563 area of operation to locate and destroy eneay forces, 
cache sites, and staging areas. Extensive preparation of the landing zones 
by tactical air, AHA and tube artillery from both US and AR7N batteries sup¬ 
ported the insertion, Li^t ground to air fire was received during the insertion 
of the 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN), >4iich was completed at 0659 hours, with no 
Allied casualties. The 1st Bn was inserted at 1010 hours without incident. 

On 51 July, the Ist Bde passed operational control of the Ist Bn (Antol), 

506 th Inf to the ai Bde and assumed operational control of the 2d Bn (Ambl), 

506 th Inf. Tte 1st Bn (Ambl), 506 th Inf moved by air from FS/OB KATHRIK to 
CAMP EVANS, began preparation for battalion refresher training end $UBsamed 
the mission of DRP. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 506 th Dif moved by air from CAMP EVANS 
to 5B/03 X^.THRI®, assumed the misBion of securing the firebaae, and begpjQ 
search and attack operations in the vicinity of the firebaae. 




Inclo3ure l (Operations Harrative) to Operational Report - latiouiiu l/B*riiod, 
lOlat Airborne Division (Aircwbile), i'eriod Ending 51 July 1970, Rui CS?0R-6i; 
(R2) (0) 

(b) Significant Activitiea. On 24 July, vicinity 1(1)245205 {5f l.iloiaeter« 
nortJjeast of PS/OB THDHDER), tha ad Bn, let Regt t'aRVR) discovered 54 ITU 
bodies iciiled by axr etrikaa approxiasitely tvo ueeks earlier. Alao found were 
21 individual and fivs crew aerred weapons, inclivling two RK) Buchineguns. 

At 26U26 hours, vicinity 1(0415150, the 3d Pit, Co A, 2d Bn (Aai)!), 5 ad 
Inf en^ged 3-4 eneoy in bunhers, at 35 asters, with aoEill anue, nxirtar fire 
and ABA, resulting in the first three eneoy killed during Opsiatioa CHISAGO 
iSAl^LAM 30H 565» Sine 15'v10*x4* bunkers with 5' overhead cover were des¬ 

At 281827 hours, GAMP EV&RS received four 122 jbb rocists injeicting near 
the BEBS hall of the I58th Avn Bn (AH) (Anbl). ABA, tube artillery and a white 
team were employed on a suspected enemy location. The 3d Bde aecurity platoon 
was inserted in the vicinity of 1 (D 450525 and discovered four 122 iaii rocKcte 
in launching tranches. Results of the attack were one DS KIA and 13 HS VIA. 

At 290905 hours, CAMP STARS received another three 122iBn rocsets, impacting 
in the vicinity of Btry C, 4th Bn ^Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl), Co C, 158th 
Avn Bn (ah) (Arbi), and the 2i Bn (Anibl), 506 th Inf. Ho casualtiee or damage 
were caused. 

The 2d Bn, 3^ Regt (aRW) uade contact with the eneny almost imaediately 
after insertion, vicinity 7D558C)97» on JO July. The Ist Co reoeived skblII 
arms fixe from an enemy force lOO meters to the north at oei 6 hours. The 
element retoznad organic weapons fire and employed ARA and a pink team. A 
B\«ep resulted in the capture of a 12-7ia» ■achinegun. At 1020 hours, vicinity 
7D348103, the battalion en^Lged an eatimatsd enemy platoon with Biia.ll arms 
fire at 50 nBters. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew to the 
ncorth. An air strike was employed. A sweep of the area revealed 11 HTA KIA 
and resulted in one RH) machinegun captured. At 1515 hours the 1st Co killed 
an KTA at 70359097, and, at 150 O hours, killed four more HTA. 

On 31 July, the 1st Co, 2i Bn, 5‘i Regt (ARTN) discovered 17 eneny budies 
killed by air strikes approximately three days earlier, at 7D357115, 







Incloaure J UV^milzatlonal 3tructur«) to Oporationai Hoport - L«s 3 ona Learned, 
lOlat Alrborna Division (Airoobilo), Period Kndln#^ w^uly 1970, hCS C3F0R_65 
(R2) lU) 

Ujv (Aabi) 

101 at A viation Group (Cbt) (A|ibl) 

HHC, 1st Bde 

Ist Bn lAmhl), 1i>7th lnl‘ 

1st Bn (Ambl), SOlst Inf 
2d Bn (Anbl), 502d Inf 
42d Inf Pit (Set r\rT) 

2d Brigade. lOlat Aba Piv (Anbl) 

HHC, 2d Bde 

2d Bn (Ambl), 127th Inf 
3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf 
lat Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf 
47th Inf Pit (Set Dog) 

3d Brigade. IQlsb Abn Dlv (Ambl) 

KHC, 3d Bde 

2d Bn (Ambl), SOist Inf 
lat Bsi (Ambl), 506th Inf 
2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf 
58th Inf Pit (Set Dog) 

HHB, lOlat Abn Div Arty (Ambl) 

2d Bn (Ambl), 11th Arty 

2d Bn (Ambl), 319th Arty 

2d Bn (Ambl), 320th Arty 

1st Bn (Ambl), 321st Arty 

4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl) 

Btry A (Avn), 377th Arty (Ambl) 

266th FA Det (Suj-veillance Radar) 

HHC, 101 at Avn Op (Cbt) (Ambl) 
lOlat Avn Eb (AH) (Ambl) 

158th Avn Bn (AH) (Ambl) 

159th Avn Bn (ASH) (Ambl) 

163d Avn Co (OS) (Ambl) 

359th Avn Det (Div) 

HHC and Band, 101st Abn DISCOH (Ambl) 
5th Trans Bn (Aeft Mnt & Spt) (Ambl) 
326th Med Bb (Ambl) 

426th ses bn (Ambl) 

801st Maint Bn (Ambl) 

101st Admin (’o (Ambl) 

Screaming Eagle Beplacemsnt Training 
School (SERTS) 

IQIst Atn Div (Ambl) Troons 

HHC, lOlst Abn Div (Ambl) 

3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf 
2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17tb Car 
326th Oig Eh (Ambl) 

50l8t Sig En (Ambl) 

101 St MP Co (Ambl) 

265th Badio ^search Co 
10th Cml m (DS) 

20th Cml Det (C^ Center) 

22d Mil Hist Det 

25th PI Det (Field Service) 

34th PI Det (Field Service) 

101 St MI Co (Dlv) 

557th Inf Pit (Cbt Tracker) 

20th TASS (USAF) 



Incloaure (Key Hersonnol Hoatar) to Operationaj haport - . 

rSlir^irbome Division (Ainnoblla), P«riod Ending 31 July 1970, htS CSF0h-fe5 

iR2) (U) 


kViC iCi) 

ADC (S) 

Cof 3 

CO, l3t Bde 
CO, 2d Hde 
CC, 3d Bvia 
Cd, lOlst Am Gp 
ACofS, G1 
ACofS, G2 
ACofS, G3 
ACofS, G4 
ACofS, G5 
CheaiicAl Off 
Dtv Surg 

Fin Off 



CO, 1st Bn Umbl), 327th Inf 

CO, 2d Bn (Ambi), 327th Inf 

CO, 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf 

CO, Ist Bn (.Ainbl), 501st Inf 

CO, 2d Ba (Ambi), SOlst Inf 

CO, 1st Bn (Amblj, 502d Inf 

CO, 1st Bn ^Atnbl), 506th Inf 

CO, 2d Bn lAmbl), 506th Inf 

CO, 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf 

CO, 3d Bn (Ambi), 506th Inf 

CO, 2d Bn (Ambi), 11th Arty 

CO, 2d Bn (Ambi), 319th Arty 

CO, 2d Bn CAmbi), 320th Arty 

CO, 4th Bn (Aerial ArtyJ, 77th Arty (Ambl) 

CO, Ist Bn (Ambi), 32l8t Arty 

CO, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav 

CO, lOlst Avn Bn (Aslt Hel) (Ambl) 

CO, 158th Avn Bn (Aslt Hel) (Ambl) 

CO, 159th Avn Bn (Aslt Sup Hel) (Ambl) 

CO, 326th SngT Bn (Ambl) 

CO, 326th Med Bn (Ambl) 

CO, 5th Trans Bn (Ambi) 

CO, 426th 3&S Bn (Ambi) 

CO, Foist Maint Bn (Ambl) 


MG John J. Hennessey 

BG Sidney B. Barry 

COL (P) 01 in E. Saith 

COL Hugh A. MacDoneld 

COL John D. White 

COL Walter H. hoot 

COL Benjamin L. Harrison 

LTC (P) Edviard P. Oivis 

COL David E. Grange 

COL Lee E. Surut 

LTC Charles A. Hoenstlne, Jr. 

LTC Lavere W. Bindrup 

LTC Roy J. Young 

MAJ Peter Masterson 

MAJ Harlen W. Kinnison 

LTC james R. Klugh 

LTC Robert E. Day 

LTC Stanley J. Lobodinski 

LTC Thomas Narvaez 

LTC Carl W, Welbom 

LTC Walter J. Falconer 

LTC Clifford E. Keys, Jr. 

LTC Thomas £. Minix 

LTC Donald A. Yoder 

LTC Edward F. Pickett 

LTC Charles J. Shay 

LTC Thomas E. Aaron 

LTC Otis W. Livin'ston, Jr. 

LTC Arvid E. West, Jr. 

LTC Bobby B. Porter 
LTC John C. Bard 
LTC Ivan C. Bland 
LTC John E. Martling 
LTC Robert J. Burke 
LTC William A. Walker 
LTC Alvah B. Davis, Jr. 

LTC Charles L. Nowalk 
LTC Arch A. Ely, Jr. 

LTC Robert F. Molinelli 
LTC William H. Peachey 
LTC Robert J. Guard 
LTC George F, Nevton 
LTC Carl P. Rodolph, Jr. 

LTC Robert E. Day 
LTC harold I. Small 
LTC Ronald N. Bowman 
LTC James F. Dunn 

Ifi c l'jau re 3 



hiolo-M:''.- 4 rStpOiiici't, AistOiina) to Opor;;al heport - Lyr'.rjoi;^ l,*;aTnfed, 

lOliJt Au'oor!'.' Diviaion (Aii-irobile) r-riod ;i July 1.70, KC.: C!;i'T)R-6'^ 

c:.') CO 


TO PRC 25-j 










th«j Chief tif Sidit 

APO 96383 

AVDG-CS 16 June 1970 

SUBJECT; NVA Sapper Attack Against FSB Tomahawk (U) 


1. (C) At 100140 June 1970, FSB Tomahawk (ZD81i255) was attacked by 
the 3let (7lB) Sapper Company, 4th NVA Regiment. The company had an 
estimated strength of 70. The enemy launched a three •pronged assault, 
with the main attack directed at the northwestern portion of the firebase, 
where one bunker (Bunker #7) protects the perimeter and covers a high 
speed avenue of approach to the three 155mm howitzers (See sketch at 
inclosure 1). Supporting attacks on the northern and southeastern sidee 
of the firebase were directed at the 155mm howitzer position and company 
command post. The assault came without warning and was not preceded 
by preparatory indirect (RPC/mortar) fires. RPGs were employed as 
part of the sapper attack. Diversionary stand-off attacks were made, how¬ 
ever, against Phu Loc District Headquarters {ZD097007), Nuoc Ngot Bridge 
(ZDI53010), FSB Los Banos (AT183134), and FSB Roy (ZD805871). 

2. (C) Results of the action against FSB Tomahawk were; 
















AVDG-CS 16 June 1970 

SUBJECT; NVA Sspper AtUck Agataat FSB Tomahawk (U) 

a. Soldier was killed hy a falling 81mm mortar illumination canister. 

b. Ten AK-47»; two 9mm pistols. 

c. Nine RPG-Z. 

d. One POW died at the 9Sth Evacuation Hospital. 

1. (U) The successful defense of FSB Tomahawk is attributed to the pro> 

per application of the fundamentals of defense. If one basic principle 
could be isolated as the single most important factor, it would be the 
aggressive leadership of the battalion commander and the company com¬ 
mander. Strong command and control actions assured a high alert status 
on the part of the troopers manning perimeter fighting positions. Inclo¬ 
sure 2 is a resiime of significant observations which reinforce lessons 
learned from previous sapper attacks against other firebases. 



a 8 Colonel, GS 

Chief of SUff 







OBSERVATION : The battalion and company commander had contin- 
ually stressed the importance of soldiers manning fighting 
positions being awake and alert. The company commander, "King 
of the Hill," had instructed the platoon leader responsible 
for perimeter defense to have either himself, his platoon ser¬ 
geant, or a squad leader continually walking the perimeter and 
checking the alertness of the soldiers during the hours of dark¬ 
ness. lofhile checking the perimeter, the platoon sergeant de¬ 
tected movement in the protective wire. He killed one sapper 
with M16 fire as the sapper attack was initiated. 

LESSON LEARNED : To successfully lefend a firebase against a 
determined sapper attack, the attack must be detected and de¬ 
feated before the sapper penetrates the inner belt of protective 

OBSERVATION : The communications wire (WD-1) connecting the 
fighting positions with the company and platoon command posts 
had been laid on top of the ground and was cut by the initial 
volley of RPG fire. Communications throughout the attack were 
maintained by AN/PRC-25 and AN/PRT-88 radios. 

LESSON LEARNED ; a. Communications wire must be buried six 
to twelve inches. 

b. To insure adequate communications throughout the 
attack, dual (telephune and radio) communications must be 
available at each bunker/fighting position. 

OBSERVATIO N: Ammunition storage. 

a'i SuTficient small arms ammunition was stored at each 
fighting position to defend against a determined sapper attack. 
For this reason, ammunition resupply was not required during 
the action. 

b. Bulk small arms and 90mm ammunition as well as hand 
grenades and LAWs were stored in two widely separated ammunition 
dumps. Both storage areas were well protected; one below ground 
level, but without overhead cover, and the other, although above 
ground level, covered by sandbags. During the first phase of 
the attack, the underground storage area exploded, but caused 

no casualties. 

c. The ammunition dump which was below ground level was 
located, at hand grenade range, between the line of bunkers 



102 - 

and Che Inner belt of protective wire. Although Indications are that the 
anmunilclon explosion resulted from a well placed NVA satchel charge, it is 
possible that it was caused by a hand grenade thrown from a US fighting 
posit Ion. 

LESSON LEARNED : a. Sufficient ammunition must be stored at primary, alternate, 
and supplementary fighting positions to defeat a determined sapper attack. 

b. Bulk anununltlon storage areas will be a target during a sapper attack. 

c. Bulk ammunition must be protected and stored at a minimum of two lo¬ 
cations . 

d. Amrounltton storage areas should not be located between the line of 
fighting positions and the protective wire. 

OBSERVATION ; The attacking force had been In a staging area reconnoitering 
FSB Tomahawk and preparing for the attack for a period of seven days. On 

the last two days (8 and 9 June) prior to the attack, one NVA soldier hid in 

shoulder high grass 400 to 500 meters from the perimeter and observed the 
position for 48 hours. At 092200 June, he determined the time was right 

for attack. He moved to a rally point and led the attacking force to the 


LESSON LEARNED : a. Normally, the sapper will spend several days reconnoiter¬ 
ing a flrebase prior to attack. 

b. Fields of fire and observation must be cleared well beyond the limit 
of protective wire. 

OBSERVATION ; The staging area used by the sappers was within a short walking 
distance of the flrebase. The unit had not patrolled the area for a period 
In excess of nine days. 

LESSONS LEARNED ; When occupying a flrebase, the unit must continually, but 
in random patterns, patrol to a range of 3000 meters (82mm mortar range) 
around the position. 

OBSERVATION ; During the period 31 May through 8 June, the defensive targets 
were fired between 2300 and 0200 hours. On 9 June, the "King of the Hill" 
decided to vary the pattern and conduct the firing from 0200 to 0400 hours. 
When the attack began, the artillery forward observer was preparing to ad¬ 
just the flrebase defensive targets. 

LESSON LEARNED : Detailed planning Is required to vary time and type of activ¬ 
ity to avoid establishing set patterns of defense. 



OBSERVATION: [hiring tht sapper? withdrawal, the? aoved through 

an area apprcxiiately SOO aeters froa the perimeter which had 
been seeded with trip flares. »fhen the flares were activated, 
the area was engaged with cannon artillery to block ene'sv escape 

LESSON LLARS'ED : Trip flares placed well forward of the perioeter 
JT likely avenues of approach or escape will provide early warn 
ing of attack or indicate routes of withdrawal. 

OBSERVATION: An anti-sapoer fence, consisting of chain link 

fencing Tour feet high and buried one to six inches, had been 
olaced around the firebase. Esaaination following the attack 
revealed that the sappers had been unable to cut the fence. 

All breaks in the wire were caused by e.tplosions. 

LESSON LEARNED : Protective wire, prnperlv ewolaced, is an 
effective harrier to sapper wovesent. 

OBSERVATIQN : Upon initiation of the attack, the "King of the 

Hill" ordered his artillery forward observer outside the con- 
aand bunker to adjust defensive targets and AR.A. He also in¬ 
structed the platoon leader to wove to the noint of contact to 
survey the situation and to submit an accurate SITREP. 

LESSON LEARNED : Aggressive leadership is required to insure 
that proper action is taken by subordinates. 

OBSERVATION : Due to a personnel shortage, LP/QPs and anbushes 
were not eaployed outside the perimeter. The "King of the Hill" 
stated that his defensive plans included emolovyient of an LP'OP 
on the approach route used by the NVA. However, oersonnel 
shortages required him to employ all available personnel on the 

LESSON LE-AR-NED : kfhen determining personnel requirements for 
firebase defense, sufficient allowance should be made to man 
the perimeter and to employ early warning LP/OPs and ambushes. 

OBSERVATION : During the week preceding the altark, the "Kine 

of the Hill" conducted walk-through rehearsals of the defensive 
plan to include the assembly and movement of the reaction force. 
At the initiation of the attack, the reaction force was assembled 
and later moved to the point of the main attack. 

LESSON LE-AR^TD : Frequent and planned rehearsals of the fire- 
base defensive plan, to include the assembly and employment of 
the reaction force, insures proper and timely resoonse bv defen¬ 
sive forces. 

OBSERVATION : The "King of the Hill" had directed that oersonncl 

c 2^5^- y ■/ 



/ 04 - 

on ((uard occupy fiKhting positions rather than positions within 
or on top of sleepinR bunkers. 

LT SSON LF.ARNt'D : Guard personnel are less vulnerable to RPC and 
sapper attack 'when manning fifthtind positions rather than posi¬ 
tions on top or inside sleeping bunkers. Additionally, more 
effective fire can be delivered aj^ainst the attacking sapper. 

O HSKRVATION : The C-150 flareship could not, for an undetermined 

reason, cojnmiip. i rate directly with the '*Kin«t of the Hill." In¬ 
structions '■-.r "h t'; ketbal ! * were relayed from the "Kin^ of the 
il-’l" throuf.h the battalion command post to the C-130. This is 
an acceptable, but less desirable, arranjjement. 

LESSO N LFARNHI Ir The "Kine of the Hill" should communicate di¬ 
rect 1 y ^7rtTr~al 1 supporting aircraft. 

OB SERVATION’ : By a study of intelligence reports and enemy ac¬ 

tivity occurring one year ago, the battalion commander deter¬ 
mined that FSB Tomahawk was attacked on 19 June 1969. He ad¬ 
vised the "King of the Hill" that NVA sapper attacks against 
firebases are sometimes repetitive from year to year and that 
due to a lack of flexibility in planning, NVA operations fol¬ 
low definite patterns. 

LESSON LEARNED : Commanders should study one year old intel¬ 
ligence reports and enemy activity. 

OBSER VATION : The platoon responsible for defense of the fire- 
base had been there for nine days and had rehearsed the firebase 
lefensive plan three times during that period. 

LES.SON LEAPN EP: With proper leadership and frequent walkthrough 
rehearsals, the assurance of a successful defense increases the 
longer the unit stays on the firebase. 

OBSERVATION : On 1 .June 1970, the 2d Bn (Ambl) . 327th Inf 
received an agent report indicating the NVA would attack Lang 
Co Bridge on 9 or 10 June. The report also stated that the NVA 
would be wearing ARVN uniforms. One NVA sapper was observed 
wearing a US helmet and long trousers. 

LESSON LEARN EH: Intelligence information should be passed to 
the lowest ecKelon possible (the individual soldier) consistent 
with security restrictions. 

OBSERVATION : Seven fougasse wires and several trip flares 

positioned outside the inner belt of protective wire had been 
cut or tied off. 



LESSON LEARNED ': Fougasse wires should be buried when possible, 
and trip flares and trip flare wires should be camouflaged. 

OBSERVATION : The N'VA were using an M60 machine gun during the 


LESSON LEARNE D: Abandoned US weapons, ammunition, and equip- 
ment will be retrieved by the VC/NVA and used against US or 
ARVN units. 

UBSERVATIO.N : A helicopter flareship mid the FAC monitored a 

radio transmission, the flareship on a FM and the FAC on a UHF 
frequency, that the sender was observing mortar flashes and N'VA 
soldiers moving north across QLl in the vicinity of FSB Roy. 

The originator and recip,.ent of the transmission cannot be de¬ 
termined. However, the battalion commander did not receive the 

LF.SSON LEARNED : All intelligence information must be passed to 
the ground commander so that he can employ available resources 
to counter the attack or to seal enemy routes of withdrawal. 

OBSERVATION : The battalion commander requested ARA, helicopter 

flareships, and "Basketball" at 0141 hours. ARA arrived on 
station at 0225 hours, the helicopter flareship at 0220 hours, 
and "Basketball" at 0320 hours. 

LESSON LiiARNED : Arrival time for ARA and the helicopter flare- 
ships should not have exceeded strip alert time (two minutes) 
plus flight time (approximately 15 minutes from Camp Eagle). 



DD .1473