AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
CYBER SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY
CAN THE BACKDOOR BE CLOSED WITH TRUSTED DESIGN, MANUFACTURING
Stephen R. Van Etten, Maj, USAF
A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty
In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements
Advisor: Dr. Gregory F. Intoccia
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
DISTRIBUTION A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited.
The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not
reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government or the Department of Defense. In
accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the
United States government.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS.ii
Globalized Information Technology (IT) Marketplace.6
United States Government and Department of Defense (DoD)
recognition of Supply Chain Risk.9
Existing DoD and National Security Agency (NSA)
Trusted Foundry Program.12
Defense Microelectronics Activity (DEMA).13
STANDARDS DoD SHOULD FOCUS ON IN CYBER SUPPPLY CHAIN.14
Counterfeit Problem .20
Education, Training and Accountability.30
Enhanced Procurement and Testing Procedures.31
Figure 1. Integrated Device Manufacturers (IDMs) shift
to a Fabless and Foundry Model.7
Figure 2. Trusted Procurement Policy History.10
Figure 3. IT Development, Maintenance, and Service Spending.16
Figure 4. A sample of Counterfeit Parts Located on Navy P-8.23
There are significant cybersecurity challenges confronting the Department of Defense
(DoD) and other U.S. departments and agencies due to their reliance on globalized information
technology (IT) marketplace with insufficient security measures in place for a cyber supply chain
providing vital IT products destined for mission critical systems. An unsecured globalized cyber
supply chain provides amply opportunity for malicious actors to compromise, corrupt, and
introduce counterfeit cyber components destined for critical government systems designed to
protect and defend U.S. national security. The literature describes a cyber marketplace and
supply chain driven by costs, which has created numerous vulnerabilities. It also identifies U.S.
directives, policies, and techniques that have done little in securing the cyber supply chain. This
paper utilizes a problem/solution framework and focuses on some prevalent cyber supply chain
security issues a globalized IT marketplace has with counterfeit parts, malicious state and non¬
state actors and that can potentially build in backdoors that threaten cybersecurity for all.
Solutions to this complex problem will focus on mitigation efforts the DoD and other U.S.
departments and agencies can take by adding required education and training, evaluating
procurement decisions, enhancing testing procedures, and by building partnerships in order to
work trust and integrity back in its cyber supply chain.
Cyberspace is a domain that the United States relies on daily, full of growing security
concerns. Electronic devices have proliferated worldwide, creating a dependence on computers
and Internet connections. Cyberspace and the technology that enables it, has made the world
more interconnected than at any other time in history. Although this has created significant
advantages, it creates a very real vulnerability of users being targeted and subject to electronic
attack. Both nation-states and non-state actors are exploiting any vulnerability that they can find,
to steal, disrupt, threaten, compromise, or destroy information and services. These cyber attacks
can come in many forms, but the most common ones are accomplished through the use of
malware attacks using spyware, worms, Trojans and viruses. Other common attacks may come
as a result of spear phishing 1 and denial-of-service attacks 11 .
There are many cyber vulnerabilities, but the most significant one for the United States is
related to cyber technology’s design, manufacturing, and supply chain process. The growing
globalized information technology (IT) marketplace currently has very few, if any, security
measures in place to protect against the counterfeiting, tampering or corrupting of
microelectronic hardware, software, and firmware as they work their way through the cyber
supply chain. This creates a significant problem for the United States and its national defense,
given that the United States is dependent upon leading-edge microelectronic hardware, software,
and firmware that are increasingly produced outside of the United States. 1
One of the most serious concerns over cyber supply chain problems relate to “backdoors”
I Spear phishing- requests to obtain confidential information conducted over the Internet or
through email under false pretenses to fraudulently obtain passwords or personal data.
II Denial of Service attacks - attackers attempt to prevent legitimate users from accessing
information or services, typically done by flooding a network with information.
being installed in microelectronic hardware or software during code development. With so much
code necessary to write increasingly sophisticated and complex programs to accomplish an ever
growing list of important economic and social tasks. Consequently, software can be readily
modified with little or no notice, a problem that makes this cyber supply chain issues far more
challenging than conventional supply chain problems faced by the U.S. with respect to physical
products. In the cyber supply chain, backdoors can be inserted into software or IT system along
with the addition of legitimate software during its development, through the use of viruses,
worms, or other malware designed to insert a backdoor. 2 A study conducted by the International
Data Corporation in 2013 found that “at least a third of all PC software is counterfeit.” 3
Microelectronic hardware also faces similar threats, which can be even more challenging to
identify and resolve once they are installed.
The more exposure cyber components have to an unsecured supply chain, the more
exposed it is to tampering, and the more problematic it is to track for integrity, and
trustworthiness. Counterfeit, corrupted, and compromised cyber components have already been
located within Department of Defense (DoD) systems, planes, helicopters, and weapon systems
due to this unsecured globalized cyber supply chain.
Many cyber components that go into U.S. systems designed to defend the United States
against potential adversaries, who desire to target U.S. technology and systems, are produced and
procured in adversary or competitor countries such as China. The DoD has acknowledged this
growing threat by putting measures in place to increase supply chain risk management and
establish trusted suppliers for certain cyber components going into DoD systems. Unfortunately,
with the amount and type of technology layered into many of these cyber components, software,
and firmware even with these processes in place it can be nearly impossible to tell whether a
cyber component has been compromised.
There are vulnerabilities associated with the increased globalization of the IT
marketplace that present potential problems for the DoD and other U.S. government agencies.
One vulnerability this marketplace presents is ease of access. This vulnerability enables enemy
states, competitor states or non-state actors to compromise cyber IT that have potential to end up
in DoD and other U.S. systems. First, many cyber components installed in U.S. systems
designed to defend the U.S. against its competitors and adversaries who desire to target U.S.
cyber systems are produced and procured in these countries. Second, scientists have shown that
adversaries have the capability and are installing cyber backdoors in some of the worlds most
secure, ‘military grade’ microchips. 4 With the globalized IT marketplace rapidly growing, and
the increased reliance by the United States on the private sector to perform many security
functions once thought to be only the province of the federal government, the potential for
“backdoors” being built into cyber components, software, and firmware is a reality which puts
DoD and other critical U.S. cyber systems at risk. Thirdly, once these modifications or backdoors
have been built in, they can be nearly impossible to detect especially in the testing process. The
miniaturization and complexity of microelectronic hardware, software and firmware has made it
nearly impossible to detect whether a portion of the chip or software has been tampered with,
built in, or compromised. The problems created by this globalized IT marketplace are significant
and could potentially cause “exceptionally grave damage” to national security and cost the DoD
an enormous amount of time and money to fix.
To address these concerns, this paper will explore the following question: “With the
current globalization of an IT marketplace with few if any security measures built into its supply
chain, what steps can the DoD take to mitigate the risk of compromised, corrupted, or counterfeit
hardware, firmware and software from being installed into DoD cyber systems?” This paper
maintains that the DoD should establish a process that relies on trusted design, manufacturing,
and supply for the majority of its cyber hardware, software and firmware to minimize exposure
to the globalized IT marketplace and move closer to a more secure cyber supply chain. In other
words, DoD should establish a process where cyber components destined for its systems, travels
a trusted path established by first determining the integrity of the people and processes used to
design, generate, manufacture, and distribute cyber hardware, software and firmware. 5
This paper argues that employing a trusted design, manufacturing, and supply approach
would give the DoD more oversight to address vulnerabilities, enhance security measures, and
would address the design processes on a need-to-know basis while enhancing testing procedures
to mitigate risk. Trusted design and trusted manufacturing also would mitigate the potential for
counterfeit or corrupted cyber components from making it into DoD systems. The benefits of
trusted design and manufacturing would likely cost more, but would confidently minimize DoD
components from exposure to the unsecured globalized IT marketplace and keep production out
of adversary or competitor countries who wish to compromise DoD systems. The DoD and other
U.S. agencies reliance on trusted design and manufacturing would allow greater oversight, limit
access, control production locations, minimize the potential for tampering, and increase
accountability to deliver reliable cyber hardware, software, and firmware.
The framework for this research paper will utilize the problem/solution method. As
background, the basics of cyber attacks will be introduced. Further, the impact of the
globalization of the IT marketplace and many of the supply chain concerns will be discussed,
including the fact that this phenomena has significantly lowered computing costs and has
accelerated deployment of cyber technology. This will be followed by an overview U.S
government and DoD recognition of the problem and an introduction of the current Trusted
Supplier program. Four criteria will be established as standards in assessing possible solutions:
these will focus on cost, integrity, reliability, and traceability. An analysis of the counterfeit
problem, dangers of products coming from China and the risk backdoors pose will then follow.
The research paper will conclude with recommendations for potential solutions to the cyber
supply chain problem.
Cyber attacks are growing at an alarming rate around the world. The complexity and the
ingenuity behind these attacks, changes on a daily basis. Countries, terrorist organizations,
criminal organizations, organization insiders and individuals are all striving to strengthen their
ability or acquire the ability to carry out cyber attacks. The current arms race occurring in the
world is for cyber warfare capabilities. In comparison to land, sea, air, and space domains that
require significant investment to operate within, the cyber domain requires much less investment
to obtain similar effects. Attacks in the cyber domain are very unique compared to other
domains. They can occur in milliseconds, typically from obscured sources, and can be initiated
against integrated systems from a computer anywhere in the world without notice. 6
There are several ways these attacks are commonly carried out in the cyber domain. The
first is through direct input, typically accomplished via physical entry into a computer via a disc,
memory stick, or through data entered on an attached keyboard. 7 Another method of attack
occurs through computers connected directly to a network, which allows attackers access to other
cyber systems on that network. 8 A third form of attack is accomplished through signal attacks,
typically accomplished remotely over the Internet. 9 A fourth method of attack, often overlooked
involves the corruption of hardware, software, and firmware in the design or manufacturing
process as these items go through the cyber supply chain. 10
A few threats associated with this supply chain include: the insertion of counterfeit
components or software, the addition of malicious logic to hardware or software, relying on
untrusted, malicious or unqualified providers, and the introduction of hardware or software
containing exploitable defects. This is something that has started to gain attention over the last
decade within the DoD and other government agencies, but at this point there is no concrete plan
to address the current supply chain risk.
Globalized IT Marketplace
Several decades ago governments, militaries, universities, and companies were typically
the only ones that could afford or invest in electronics and computers. This started to change
with the invention of the personal computer in the late 1970s and the creation of the World Wide
Web around 1989. Since then, the pendulum started to swing and the electronics industry has
shifted its focus more to the general consumer. The industry demand for consumer electronics is
focused on high-volume production in a rapidly evolving market that has a short life cycle. 11 The
increased demand over the last few decades and increased costs in production associated with
each new generation of technology, has seen a technology industry once dominate in the United
States shift overseas, primarily to Asia. 12 Companies have taken their business overseas since
foreign countries provide labor at lower wages and many costs associated with production in
these countries are less. Among the top thirteen microelectronic foundries in 2015, only one,
GlobalFoundries is a U.S. based company, though even that company is foreign owned. 13
One of the key reasons for the growing global IT marketplace has to do with the costs
associated with building leading-edge microelectronics fabrication facilities, which can cost
companies several billions annually. 14 This cost, associated with the short life cycle of today’s
microelectronics industry, has seen U.S. companies’ transitioning from being integrated device
manufacturers (IDMs), and moving to a fabless company model that relies on pure-play
foundries to fabricate its products. In 2015, eleven of the thirteen leading foundries were pure-
play foundries, while only two were IDM’s. 15
This transition started in the late 1980s with the emergence of the foundry business
model. 16 This model took off in the industry and separated the design and manufacturing process
of producing microelectronics. This created fabless microelectronic companies, which allowed
companies to focus their attention and resources on design, development and marketing of its
microelectronic products. This formed and allowed pure-play foundries to focus on providing
manufacturing solutions to fabless microelectronic companies for their products. 17 This in turn
encouraged partnerships and alliances between IT companies and pure-play foundries that
provided a competitive cost advantage for both companies. With this change companies have
continued to move away from seeing a product from the beginning of research and development
all the way through testing and packaging. Instead the actual fabrication of the product is being
outsourced. This change is depicted in Figure 1 below.
IC Design House
ex & Manufacturing
IC Design & Manufacturing
Assembly & Test
Dedicated or pure-play
Figure 1 . IDM shift to the fabless and foundry business model 18
This trend in the marketplace has generated serious concerns for the DoD and other U.S.
departments and agencies, which are heavily reliant on an industry that has gone global to meet
their growing IT needs. 19 Now that most U.S. based companies are fabless or in the process of
going fabless, this transition means a measure of security has been lost. This is something the
DoD and other U.S. departments and agencies can not accept for microelectronic hardware,
software and firmware destined for the most critical U.S. systems. 20 The challenge for the DoD
is going to be its ability to influence a global arena for potential solutions to this security
concern. This will be difficult because the DoD and other U.S. departments and agencies needs
are significantly low in contrast to the general consumer market.
The other issue that this fast moving marketplace presents for the DoD is ready access to
technologies that are older or have no commercial use. The life cycle for most mi croelectronics
in the general consumer market is relatively short, driven by consumers who are looking for the
newest and greatest technology. This means there is very little need to support older
technologies, especially when factoring in the labor to fix older technology. It is typically
cheaper and more advantageous to purchase the newer technology instead of paying to fix the
old. This creates a problem for the DoD, whose needs are low-volume with unique requirements
in comparison to the general consumer market. The additional problem this creates for the DoD,
is that it generally needs support for long periods of time, with many weapon systems expected
to be sustained over periods lasting decades. 21
The growing globalized IT marketplace and continuing shift of technology development
going overseas, has a strategic significance for the United States. This is due in part to the value
the United States puts on IT and its ability to maintain a technological advantage within the DoD
and other U.S. departments and agencies. 22 For the United States and the DoD, it is critical that it
develops a plan that will be supported, is actionable and will make sure the United States
maintains its military superiority in the world.
United States Government and DoD Recognition of Cyber Supply Chain Risk
Supply chain risk is defined as: “The risk that an adversary may sabotage, maliciously
introduce unwanted function, or otherwise subvert the design, integrity, manufacturing,
production, distribution, installation, operation, or maintenance of a covered system so as to
surveil, deny, disrupt, or otherwise degrade the function, use, or operation of such system.” 23 The
cyber supply chain security problem has been known for decades and initiatives have been under
development for just as long, with the intent to secure it from the growing risks associated with
the globalization of the IT marketplace. Despite such awareness and efforts, the supply chain
threat has continued to grow. This major cyber threat is so significant that it now has the
capability of affecting the development and operations of critical IT systems on whicht the DoD
and other U.S. departments and agencies rely on. 24 The microelectronic hardware risk has been
acknowledged as a serious problem for quite some time within the U.S. government; since the
U.S. national defense and critical security systems are dependent on the microelectronics
installed in these systems. 25 Since the early 2000s, there have been a number of initiatives to
address the concern but none that have truly reduced the threat.
In 2002 the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) was released
requiring federal agencies to ensure their information technology systems incorporated
appropriate information security safeguards. 26 The following year, in recognition of the DoD’s
reliance on leading edge microelectronics hardware and the increase in its production being sent
overseas, the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) published the Defense Trusted IC
Strategy in 2003. 27 This established a series of initiatives that both the DoD and the National
Security Agency (NSA) needed to move forward with to ensure that U.S. defense and security
communities would have continued access to state of the art microelectronics required to meet
the operational needs for mission critical and mission essential systems. 28 Figure 2 shows a
history of trusted procurement policies since 2003.
I nt err m Trus te d
Addresses DoD concerns
that systems that rely on advanced
liC's for critical capabilities may be
vuInerabfee orcompromised if not
produced in a trusted manner.
DO D I 52-00.39
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t SCRMJ to Improve
the integrity of
components used in
FY2012 Natl Def Auth Act
Section si a -Outlines new
industry lead role in
averting counterfeits in
defence supply chain
Duncan Hunter FY2G09
DEPSECDEF Authorization EM 11
Initiated Trusted Dependable^ continuous long-term
Foundry Program access and trust for all mission critical
semiconductors_increase use of
Trusted Foundry Services tsec. 2 545
like Skelton FY2011
R ed uction of su p p ly c h a in risk m
the acquisition of national
security systems (sec,a 15]!
Figure 2. Trusted Procurement Policy History. 29
In response to Defense Trusted IC Strategy the DoD and NSA created the Trusted
Foundry Program with the goal of reducing the risk associated with a globalized IT marketplace
relying on foreign manufactures. This program was designed to give the DoD and NSA the
ability to track their microelectronics from end to end through a trusted domestic supply chain in
a secure environment designed to ensure hardware assurance and integrity.
In 2004, the Bush administration issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12
(HSPD-12). HSPD-12 focused on individuals who worked in the cyber security supply chain.
The goal was to identify individuals who might engage in fraud, tampering, counterfeiting and
terrorist exploitation in order to gain access to the federal workforce and to critical infrastructure
facilities. 30 In January of 2008, the Bush administration put together the Comprehensive National
Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI), which included National Security Presidential Directive 54 and
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 24. These took at a multi-pronged approach to identify
emerging cyber threats, looked to close gaps in current and future cyber vulnerabilities, and
proactively respond to entities that desired to steal or manipulate secure federal systems. 31 In
2009 the Obama administration directed a Cybersecurity Policy Review that built on the CNCI.
Within the CNCI was Initiative #11 which focused on developing a multi-pronged approach for
global supply chain risk management.
The trend of cyber supply chain security concerns continues, as well as efforts to address
them. In 2010, Section 806 of the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) authorized
the DoD to consider the supply chain risk of a contractor, determine the risk that they may pose
due to the lack of supply chain security, and if necessary exclude them from consideration. 32 By
2011 the Senate Armed Services Committee investigation of counterfeit electronic parts in
military aircraft and weapons led to Section 818 of the 2012 NDAA which imposes many new
supply chain obligations upon contractors of the DoD. 33 Also in 2012, the DoD issued
instruction 5200.44, which looks to control the quality, configuration, and security software,
firmware, hardware, and systems throughout their lifecycles. 34 In addition this instruction
employs protections that manage risk in the supply chain for components or subcomponent
products and services identifiable as having a DoD end-use. 35
In 2013, the Obama administration issued a new Cybersecurity Executive Order (EO) in
response to the growing cyber threat to critical infrastructure. This Cybersecurity EO directed
agencies to take specific actions to secure their critical infrastructure from physical and cyber
threats. 36 One topic the Cybersecurity EO did not mention however, the growing problem
associated with supply chain security risk, though it did acknowledge the need to include
security standards in the acquisition planning and contract administration process. 37 It also called
for detailed steps to harmonize and make consistent existing procurement requirements related to
cyber security. 38
From a cyber supply chain point of view, there seems to be wide recognition of a
significant problem, evident by some of the initiatives, directives, acts or orders listed above.
Yet, very little progress has been made in addressing and establishing actual solutions for the
cyber supply chain security problems. Through all of this, efforts to defend against signal attacks
seems to be the focus, while a compromised cyber supply chain delivering compromised
hardware and software present an equally dangerous problem. 39 With this in mind, a
Government Accountabilities Office (GAO) report found that the trusted supplier program is a
primary risk reduction program for acquiring microelectronics for mission critical DoD
Existing DoD and NS A Trusted Foundry Program
The Trusted Foundry Program (TFP) was established in 2004 as a joint DoD and NSA
program. This program was designed to ensure that both communities would have ready access
to trusted leading-edge microelectronics for mission critical national defense systems provided
by domestic sources. 41 This program started by partnering with IBM, a U.S. based company.
IBM was able and willing to provide trusted leading-edge microelectronics through the design,
fabrication, manufacturing, packaging and testing process. 42 This partnership worked well but a
single domestic supplier could not satisfy the entire DoD needs and the program was expanded
to include other firms offering mature technologies that became the trusted supplier program
managed by the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) within the DoD. 43
In 2006, the DMEA was authorized to develop an accreditation process designed with the
intent to engage other U.S. based microelectronic suppliers and bring them into the trusted
supplier program. 44 As of April 2016 the program, according the DMEA website has 71 trusted
suppliers including 22 with trusted fabrication process capabilities. Unfortunately, none of these
suppliers provide the leading-edge capabilities of IBM that meet DoD needs, so the use of these
suppliers has been minimal. 45 Unfortunately for the DoD, in July 2015, IBM’s microelectronics
fabrication business - the DoD’s sole supplier of leading-edge technologies was transferred to
GlobalFoundries, a U.S. based, but foreign owned entity. 46 In October 2015, a GAO report
indicated there was uncertainty about whether the DoD would continue to have access to the
trusted leading-edge technologies provided by IBM. 47
Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA)
The DMEA was created to assist the U.S. Air Force with the emerging growth and
necessity of microelectronics in weapon systems. The unit has evolved over the years under
different agency heads. Today, DMEA reports to the Director for Defense Research and
Engineering. It is an organization within the DoD with the unique mission of providing
microelectronic components and assembly for DoD legacy systems. Legacy systems are older
DoD systems that the current microelectronics industry cannot support with regular parts.
DEMA provides long term support with a cradle to grave, total life cycle support management
DEMA works closely with companies through the Program Protection Plan process to
anticipate and make plans for parts obsolescence in mission critical systems. 48 This means
participating suppliers must notify and give DEMA a two-year notice before they intend to stop
production of any critical microelectronics. 49 The DEMA as mentioned above also manages the
Trusted Supplier Program, which at this point in time is the most reliable and trusted way to
mitigate risk when acquiring microelectronics for mission critical systems. 50 To become a trusted
supplier the DEMA manages an accreditation program that mandates qualified suppliers follow a
set of very stringent manufacturing and security obligations to receive and maintain an
accreditation. 51 This program may be the best example of how the DoD can ensure
microelectronics destined for mission critical systems are not exposed to tampering and will
perform as intended when needed. Unfortunately, this program is too small in its current design
to address the demand for new manufacturing needs of the DoD as a whole.
STANDARDS DoD SHOULD FOCUS ON IN CYBER SUPPPLY CHAIN
Cyber security remains an area of emphasis for the DoD and other U.S. departments and
agencies this is clear with the funds dedicated to support it in recent budgets, but is it enough?
Government wide spending on Information Technology (IT) has seen a steady increase
over the past 5 years from $75.4 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2011 to around $81.5 billion in FY
2016, right around an 8 percent increase. 52 The DoD’s 38 percent share, $31 billion, is
significantly higher than any other government agency. 53 This represents a decrease in IT
spending decrease from around $35 billion in 2011 to $31 billion today. 54 With the reliance the
DoD has on IT and the microelectronics that go into mission critical systems, the DoD needs to
be increasing spending, not decreasing it in order to defend against sophisticated cyber attacks
that continue to grow.
The question is how does the DoD efficiently spend its money, encourage productivity,
influence security measures, and maintain effective competition within its cyber supply chain?
To properly spend its money DoD must establish strong relationships with the private sector and
work closely with them to address these concerns. Efforts and funding should focus on better
education, communication of requirements, expectations and clear guidelines for the
procurement of IT and microelectronic components within the acquisition community. If the
DoD and other U.S. departments and agencies do not shift more focus to securing the cyber
supply chain they are going to likely spend more through the life cycle of IT and microelectronic
components going into its systems. This cyber supply chain shift will likely result in higher
acquisition costs up front, but should control and reduce costs for systems and products during
their life cycle.
DoD IT spending is currently categorized into three areas; development, maintenance and
service spending. For the DoD to improve and work towards a more secure cyber supply chain,
DoD must put more focus in the area of development, which accounts for only 23 percent of the
current IT spending, (see Figure 3). 55 Development Modernization Enhancement (DME)
expenses are intended to; “substantively improve capability or performance, implement
legislative or regulatory requirements; or meet an agency leadership request.” 56 The capital costs
that are included as a part of DME, “include hardware, software development and acquisition
costs, commercial off -the-shelf acquisition costs, government labor costs for planning,
development, acquisition, system integration, and direct project management and overhead
support.” 57 Figure 2 above outlines, the trusted procurement policies and initiatives in place
since the early 2000s, but the DoD and other U.S. departments and agencies cyber supply chains
have not seen much positive change and have ultimately fallen short of meeting these policies. If
the budget cannot be increased, funds should be shifted to DME from Operations and
Maintenance (O&M) spending which accounts for 66.5 percent of IT spending in order to
address these policies and focus on securing the cyber supply chain. 58 A secured and trusted
cyber supply chain would likely see costs of O&M reduced with more reliable and trusted
microelectronic hardware, software and firmware coming out of the cyber supply chain.
Figure 3. IT Development, Maintenance, and Service Spending 59
While the globalization of the IT marketplace has added diversity, innovation,
competition and lowered prices within the IT industry, it has seen a reduction in security. This
has opened the opportunity for malicious actors to corrupt cyber supply chains by inserting
counterfeit or malicious IT goods into the DoD and other U.S. departments and agencies cyber
supply chains. Over the last decade a world economic crisis and budget cuts in the public and
private sectors have resulted in budget cuts in manufacturing and security validation associated
with the fabrication of IT products. 60 When talking costs, it is typically the determining factor
that influences the final choice for most buyers, especially government agencies who typically go
with the low bid. 61 This is a bad practice to continue in the current globalized IT marketplace. If
a product is priced significantly less than other competing products, this should bring up red
flags, and questions should be asked before proceeding with the lower priced item such as: “How
was it produced? Where is it from? Which software programming language was used to
implement it? What vulnerabilities might I be accepting when I by the cheaper product?” 62 The
DoD and other U.S. departments and agencies must change its mindset and rethink the low cost
approach when it comes to products coming out of the globalized IT marketplace. The DoD and
other U.S. departments and agencies must understand that a more secure cyber supply chain
comes with increased costs and more funds must be allocated to improve assurances that
microelectronic hardware, software and firmware being put into U.S. systems will be
uncompromised and can be trusted.
Integrity in IT is critical to the success of DoD systems and the mission critical weapon
systems that rely on it. It is crucial that the microelectronic hardware, software and firmware
come from the cyber supply chain have integrity. Currently, there is little integrity in the cyber
supply chain and very few actionable measures have been taken by the DoD and other U.S.
departments and agencies to make improvements. DoD should expect integrity from beginning
to end in the acquisition process of its microelectronic hardware, software and firmware. This
includes expecting a high degree of integrity from the people, systems, equipment and the
logistical process that moves a product between them all.
One of the biggest and most challenging threats may be the insider threat, which is why
holding personnel to high integrity standards and verifying that integrity is so important.
Integrity of personnel is important, there should be background checks and processes in place for
continuous evaluation of personnel involved at all levels of the cyber supply chain. This process
should be similar to the security clearance process and access control that the DoD and other
U.S. departments and agencies use for access to information and facilities. There must be a well-
established chain of custody that identifies personnel handling products from beginning to the
end of the cyber supply chain process. Personnel throughout the cyber supply chain should only
have access rights to critical information that applies to tasks needed to complete or accomplish
their assigned duties. There needs to be integrity among DoD contractors and personnel working
in the acquisition process and trust that they will follow policy, do their research, and use
companies that have trusted processes in place. Ultimately, if personnel at all levels know they
are being watched, held accountable and are held to a high level of integrity, a significant amount
of risk will be mitigated. This reduces the likelihood of products being compromised as they
move through the cyber supply chain.
Integrity does not end with the personnel involved in the cyber supply chain, it must also
exist in the design, systems and equipment that create a product from research and development
(R&D), to design, through fabrication, testing and packaging of a product. Security measures
must be in place that makes the cost and time required to compromise products too high for an
attacker. If the costs and effort needed are greater than the benefit to conduct an attack, malicious
actors are less likely to carry out an attack. To do this security must be built into the product.
Tests need to be built into the beginning and end of each process before it moves through the
supply chain to make sure a product is clean and acting appropriately before additional layers are
added. These processes and security measures should be revisited and evaluated to make sure
holes are identified and those security gaps are closed. The DoD and other U.S. departments and
agencies must work closely with the private sector to promote and improve the integrity of the
personnel, systems and processes that make up the cyber supply chain. Integrity built into these
areas of the cyber supply chain will mitigate risk for DoD and other U.S. departments and
agencies, while increase the trust of products coming out of it.
Reliability is extremely important when it comes to the microelectronic hardware,
software and firmware going into DoD and other U.S. departments and agencies U.S. cyber
systems. If the IT purchased is unreliable, it can compromise missions, threaten national security,
critical infrastructure and endanger the health and safety of personnel or bystanders. The DoD
continues to invest in more technologically advanced IT systems and weaponry but if it is not
reliable, the mission will fail. The DoD and other U.S. departments and agencies have a heavy
reliance on advanced technology, reliability in this technology is key to them achieving national
security objectives and a critical component to ensuring the U.S. military remains the most
technologically advanced and superior fighting force in the world. Until, the DoD and other U.S.
departments and agencies can establish in partnership with the public and private sectors a more
secure cyber supply chain it must question and test everything coming out of it.
Being able to trace parts is crucial to containing suspected or confirmed, compromised,
corrupted, or counterfeit microelectronic hardware, software and firmware in DoD and other
U.S. departments and agencies systems. There is no 100 percent guaranteed method to prevent
attacks coming in through the DoD and other U.S. departments and agencies cyber supply chain.
So in the event of an attack, when it is suspected or confirmed, compromised, corrupted, or
counterfeit microelectronic hardware, software or firmware are identified as the cause, there
needs to be a quick way to locate and quarantine other similar items received from the same
supplier. To accomplish this microelectronic hardware, software or firmware should have
markings capable of being tracked in a database to quickly identify their location in order to
remove them and eliminate future attacks or failures.
To track down and establish the origin of these compromised, corrupted, or counterfeit
microelectronic hardware, software or firmware located in DoD and other U.S. departments and
agencies systems products should have unique identifiers that allow track back through the cyber
supply chain to potentially identify were the microelectronic hardware, software or firmware was
compromised, corrupted, or counterfeited in the cyber supply chain process. Working with the
supplier and keeping them informed of a potential security breaches would help them close
potential security gaps in their cyber supply chain. This would also allow the DoD and other U.S.
departments and agencies to reassess future use of these suppliers and report the breech for
further investigation by law enforcement. Traceability in all areas of the cyber supply chain
would be the ideal situation, but at a minimum there should be a way to track parts once they are
installed or enter into DoD control.
The biggest problem produced by the globalized IT marketplace may be the large number
of counterfeit IT products that continue to inundate the cyber supply chain. Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) defines counterfeit electronic parts as:
“.. .an unlawful or unauthorized reproduction, substitution, or alteration that has been knowingly
mismarked, misidentified, or otherwise misrepresented to be an authentic, unmodified electronic
part from the original manufacturer, or a source with the express written authority of the original
manufacturer or current design activity, including an authorized aftermarket manufacturer.
Unlawful or unauthorized substitution includes used electronic parts represented as new, or the
false identification of grade, serial number, lot number, date code, or performance
characteristics.” 63 These counterfeit parts do not discriminate and are finding their way into all
levels of the cyber supply chain, those of private and public companies, the DoD and other U.S.
departments and agencies. The more concerning part is that no one truly has a grasp on the
impacts that these counterfeit parts have had the customers that have them installed in systems.
Louis P. Feuchtbaum a former Naval officer and former attorney who represented large IT
companies in dealing with counterfeit electronics and procurement fraud states the economic and
safety issues involved with it are “indefinable and undeniable because they could be so grave.” 64
This counterfeit threat is a growing problem for not only the U.S. government but for
U.S. business. This threat is costing millions of dollars a year in lost time, labor, and failing
equipment. Over the past decade, there are a number of incidents where U.S. law enforcement
has seized millions of dollars in counterfeit parts and or stopped the sale of them in sting
operations. For example, federal authorities seized more than $143 million in counterfeit Cisco
hardware and labels over a five-year period. 65 In 2008, a Saudi citizen attempted to sell
counterfeit Cisco 100 gigabit interface converters bought in China to the DoD as genuine Cisco
equipment. 66 Over a three-year period starting in 2007 U.S. authorities seized more than 5.6
million bogus semiconductors, with over 50 of these shipments falsely market as military or
aerospace grade devises.” 67 In 2011, “two people were convicted of selling as many as 59,000
counterfeit microelectronic circuits from China to the U.S. military, defense contractors, and
others for use in U.S. warships, airplanes, missiles, and missile defense systems.” 68 In 2012, the
FBI seized $76 million in counterfeit routers destined for U.S. government networks 69 . Then in
2014, an American contractor admitted to conspiring to traffic counterfeit semiconductors as
new when they were actually refurbished and remarked to a U.S. Navy submarine base. 70 These
are just a few of the many counterfeit seizures over the past few years. The bigger concern is
how many of these shipments or sales are making it through the system and being installed into
mission critical systems designed to protect and defend U.S. national security and creating a
significant cyber security problem.
For the DoD, there have been a number of counterfeit parts that have made it through the
cyber supply chain and been found in mission critical systems. A Senate report in 2012, “found
1,800 cases of counterfeit electronics parts involving over one million suspected parts,”
suspected of being in our cyber supply chain exposing some significant holes. 71 One of these
cases identified 84,000 suspected counterfeit parts made it into the DoD supply chain from one
supplier, where some of these parts made it into Traffic Alert Collision Avoidance Systems
(TCAS) meant for installation in C5-AMP, C-12, and Global Hawk airframes. 72 Counterfeit
parts have been located in Air Force aircraft made by Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and others to
include the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) having 7 incidents of counterfeit parts be located in
its own systems. 73 According to the MDA they also “found 800 fake parts on one missile
interceptor system, at a cost of over $2 million dollars to replace them.” 74 Figure 4 below shows
a real versus counterfeit part located on a Navy P-8. There are too many of these reports and
they, unfortunately, continue to grow. Even worse is there are significant amounts of counterfeit
incidents that don’t even get reported and even more cases that haven’t even been identified.
The DoD must start to build trust into its cyber supply chain and move quickly to mitigate the
risk that counterfeit parts have on national defense, cyber security and more importantly the
danger they present to military personnel.
Figure 4. A sample of counterfeit parts located on Navy P-8. (http://www.electronics-
To resolve this problem, where does one start, the acquisitions process, the contractor, the
supplier or the manufacturer considering there are problems at all levels. Section 818 of the fiscal
year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (FY 2012 NDAA) deals with the counterfeit issue
tied to electronic parts and sets forth statues that require systems and procedures be put in place
by large DoD contractors to detect and avoid counterfeit electronic parts. A recent proposed rule
change by the DoD in late 2015 holds the same detect and avoid expectations and expanding the
rule to small business, commercial and commercial off the shelf (COTS) suppliers. This is a
great step in the right direction and should have occurred with its original release. In fact, there is
a reason to believe the vulnerability of counterfeit parts is increased the further you go down the
supply chain to smaller companies because they typically have fewer resources, procedures or
capabilities to test, inspect and defend against counterfeits. 75 Regardless of the company size or
who the counterfeit product is supplied by, the risk it poses to the DoD and critical mission
systems is the same. These rules are coming at the right time, but will only be effective if they
One thing is clear counterfeits are a big concern as when it comes to cyber security,
which threatens the reliability of computer networks and systems that the U.S. government relies
heavily on. The other major concern is the risk of these inferior counterfeit parts being on
mission critical weapon systems that the DoD depend on to protect and defend the United States.
These counterfeits carry the capability of being corrupted with backdoors and are typically made
of made of inferior products likely to fail. The vulnerabilities introduced by counterfeit parts
could lead to mission failure and even worse could compromise the safety and lives of U.S.
troops. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) did some investigating of the prevalence
of counterfeit parts in DoD platforms. In one effort the GAO created a fictitious organization that
purchased military-grade electronic parts and in one case, 7 of 13 parts they purchased and tested
were suspected to be counterfeit. 76 That means nearly 54 percent of parts sold to the GAO as
military-grade parts, were suspected of being counterfeit. These counterfeit parts coming in
through the cyber supply chain present a clear threat to cyber and national security. Measures
must be taken to identify and remove these counterfeits from the supply chain and eliminated the
potential of hardware and software attacks that compromise cybersecurity, or the failure of these
parts that could comprise the safety and lives of U.S. troops.
When looking at the major issues associated with the globalization of the IT marketplace
that feeds the DoD and other U.S. departments and agencies cyber supply chain, a common
theme that continues to be present in nearly every article, investigation or report, is China. The
People’s Republic of China (PRC) is commonly a suspected source of cyber security threats and
cyber supply chain risk. 77 There are many cybersecurity experts who have identified teams of
hackers responsible for the theft of U.S. data; they have connected these attacks to the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) of China and non-military groups sponsored by the Chinese
government. 78 When looking at cyber supply chain risk, Chinese manufacturers account for one-
fifth of the global IT marketplace and are also known to be a dominant source of supplying
counterfeit electronic parts into the global cyber supply chain. 79 As a leader in cyber theft,
manufacturing and as a leading source of counterfeit electronics in the cyber supply chain, China
and the cyber products originating from their country are a threat to U.S. cybersecurity.
When looking at manufacturing, China is home to leading pure-play foundries producing
microelectronic hardware, software, and firmware, which should draw concern for the DoD and
other U.S. departments and agencies. This is concerning due to the control PRC has over
companies within its borders and the influence they could or already have had in exploiting
cyber vulnerabilities to further economic espionage or military exploitation. 80 Over the past
decade millions of cyber attacks on U.S. entities, including the DoD have been traced back to
China. There appears to be little doubt that China is stealing government and military secrets
through hacking and by introducing corrupted and counterfeit electronic parts into the U.S.
government cyber supply chain. 81 For this reason, U.S. intelligence officials believe IT products
originating from China pose a significant threat to U.S. national security. 82 NSA has even
intervened in purchases by U.S. companies and steered them away from purchasing from
Chinese companies if they wanted “to continue its lucrative business with the U.S.
government.” 83 This is troubling, since a large amount of cyber components being produced in
China are going into DoD mission critical systems. Especially, when China is actively making
strategic moves and building up its military with the intent to push the United States and its
influence out of the Pacific.
Potentially, the most pressing concern with China is the large amount of counterfeit
electronic parts that it floods into the cyber supply chain. China not only continues to be a
leading source of counterfeit and pirated goods found entering the United States, they are also a
leading source of counterfeit IT products. 84 An investigation by Senate Armed Services
Committee determined “China is the dominant source for counterfeit electronic parts that are
infiltrating the defense supply chain.” 85 China is believed to account for close to 60 percent of
the counterfeit electronics produced in the world 86 This statistic is not likely to change due to the
rampant government corruption and little to no interest in stopping the counterfeiting, especially
since they are sold openly in China’s public market. “China continues to turn a blind eye to the
rights of intellectual property (IP) holders and instead provides a host country to a billion-dollar
black market industry for the creation of counterfeit electronics.” 87 The Senate Armed Services
Committee investigation also found that more than 70 percent of 100 suspected counterfeit parts
located in the DoD supply chain were traced back to China. This percentage is troubling and the
practice of acquiring microelectronic hardware and software for mission-critical systems coming
out of China should be evaluated and heavily questioned.
Backdoors being built into microelectronic hardware and software destined for DoD and
other U.S. departments and agencies systems are a major threat and risk that comes with a
globalized IT marketplace and cyber supply chain. These backdoors can be introduced in a
number of ways, introduced by malicious insiders during the design process, added during
fabrication at a foundry, or built into counterfeit components being sold as the real thing to name
just a few. These backdoors can be designed to do a number of things, give an attacker control of
a device, leak information, act as a gateway for access to other systems connected to the device,
shut a device down or damage it permanently. Unlike traditional signal attacks, where the
malicious actor must find a way into a system or device, with the backdoor, an attacker’s path of
attack is already built into the functionality of microelectronic hardware or software code before
or during its fabrication. These typically remain dormant until triggered, which can launch a
cyber attack designed to intercept classified intelligence, compromise critical infrastructure
capabilities while undermining DoD ability to successfully complete its mission. 88 Building trust
back into the U.S. government and DoD cyber supply chain would mitigate the risk of these
backdoors being built in and adding another cyber security vulnerability to defend against.
When these backdoors or counterfeits are identified, the impact and fix can vary
depending on whether the backdoor is built into the microelectronic hardware or software. If it is
identified as a hardware attack, first you must locate and identify which piece of hardware is
compromised or counterfeit, which can be very difficult due to a large number of hardware
components most mission critical systems have. The second problem with compromised
hardware is it cannot be altered or patched; it must be physically removed and replaced with a
new hardware. 89 Then similar hardware devices must be located, tested and replaced in other
systems containing the same device. Now when software is identified as having malicious code
or of being counterfeit, the software can be updated, rewritten, or replaced. Hardware or
software, the globalized cyber supply chain gives U.S. adversaries the ability to insert malicious
backdoors that can have catastrophic effects capable of disabling or impairing critical DoD
systems and weapons. 90 Currently, the capabilities for detecting these backdoors are limited and
attackers seem to stay one step ahead in developing new evasion techniques, meaning current
capabilities can identify every kind of backdoor. 91 Preventing these backdoors is crucial and
trusted design and manufacturing would drastically reduce the risk of them being maliciously
installed in the design and manufacturing process where they are built in.
There are a number of suggestions to help protect against backdoors, they offer additional
levels of security and monitoring but they also have the ability to present or create additional
problems. With a potential of compromised chips slipping through the testing process, many
articles on the topic suggest that there should be an additional level of security built into the
microelectronic hardware. This can be accomplished by adding additional circuitry to the
hardware designed to monitor the behavior of it and identify unusual activity indicative of an
attack if attacked it would isolate any malicious activity, and notify other devices containing
similar circuits. 92 Some other suggestions include a similar approach but have a self-destruct
feature built into the hardware. These are great ideas in principle and having the defense built
into hardware or software that doesn’t require human intervention to stop an attack sounds
intriguing. But, is adding more complexity to an already complex device or system is wise, this
tends to add the potential for more exploitable flaws. There is potential that the additional
circuitry could identify normal activity as an attack or falsely identify an attack and disable the
system or device unnecessarily. In many cases, simplicity may be a better approach. While there
are potential benefits to built-in hardware and software security, there may be just as many
shortcomings that could cause effects similar to the attacks that the protection mechanisms are
trying to prevent.
Clearly, the current globalized IT marketplace presents a significant threat with few if
any security measures currently built into the current cyber supply chain. The threat of
counterfeits, countries like China and the potential of backdoors being built into cyber
components has been acknowledged, but little been done to completely address it. The DoD and
other U.S. departments and agencies must and can take steps to mitigate the risk of
compromised, corrupted, or counterfeit hardware, firmware and software from being installed
into mission critical cyber systems. By integrating trusted design, manufacturing, and supply
practices while acquiring microelectronic hardware, software, and firmware, the overall risk to
cybersecurity would be reduced. While there are a number of issues to address with the cyber
supply chain, recommendations in this paper will focus on education, training, and accountability
- enhance procurement and testing practices - and building partnerships to mitigate the risk
associated with a globalized cyber supply chain and improve U.S. cyber security.
The benefits that the DoD and other U.S. departments and agencies reap with a
globalized IT marketplace are at conflict with the security risks and unsecured cyber supply
chain that it provides. While there may never be a 100 percent solution to securing the cyber
supply chain, there are multiple approaches that must be taken to mitigate the risk associated
with its globalization. Efforts must be taken to re-establish a level of trust and integrity in the
cyber supply chain that is beneficial for the U.S. government and for those in the private and
public sectors within its borders and those abroad. While there are a number areas that need to be
addressed in regard to the globalized IT marketplace, there are a few things that will be helpful in
mitigating the risk associated with the cyber supply chain. The DoD and other U.S. departments
and agencies must start by focusing on internal practices and procedures before it starts to move
out and resolve the cyber security issues created by the globalized cyber supply chain.
Education, Training, and Accountability
Without making or adding any additional policies, rules or initiatives designed to mitigate
the security risks associated with the globalized IT marketplace, the DoD and other U.S.
departments and agencies would see a rapid reduction in risk by doing a few simply things. It
starts with educating, training and holding those affiliated with the procurement of
microelectronic hardware, software and firmware accountable for following practices and rules
already in place. There are sufficient risk management practices and resources in place, that if
followed would reduce threats associated with the globalized supply chain but they must be
practiced and implemented consistently at all levels to be successful.
For education and training, the DoD and other U.S. departments and agencies must have
a clear understand of the threat posed by a globalized IT marketplace. There must be a concerted
effort to educate personnel, contractors, and suppliers on the dangers present in a globalized
cyber supply chain. There seems to be a lack of understanding in regard to the true threat faced
by the DoD and other U.S. departments and agencies when looking at the cyber supply chain.
The more education and heightened awareness at all levels will raise recognition of the risk,
encourage more sharing of information and lead to enhanced practices designed to increase cyber
security in the supply chain. Training must make people aware of the organizations, resources,
and tools available to them and that they will be expected to utilize. These include things like the
trusted supplier program and databases that list risky suppliers which people should check before
ordering and procuring cyber parts. Increased education and training programs are a must for the
DoD and other U.S. departments and agencies and would go a long way in raising awareness and
increase the cybersecurity associated with U.S. procurement practices.
Enhanced Procurement and Testing Practices
Until the DoD and other U.S. departments and agencies feel there has been enough done
to increase security and trust is built back in the cyber supply chain, purchases from high-risk
suppliers and from fabrication facilities located in certain parts of the world should not be
permitted. This means every effort should be made to eliminate the purchase of microelectronic
hardware, software and firmware coming out of China or other countries that pose a similar
cybersecurity risk. This will not be an easy task, but should be a requirement. Every effort should
be made to make purchases from the original component manufacturer (OCM) and trusted
suppliers of the OCM. Procurement from small business suppliers who are significantly removed
from the OCM should be re-evaluated with the increased risk and potential they have of
introducing corrupted, compromised or counterfeit parts into mission critical systems. The DoD
and other U.S. departments and agencies must be willing to accept the additional costs that will
likely be associated with this approach. While this may increase costs with the procurement of
cyber components, decreasing the introduction of corrupted, compromised or counterfeit parts
into the U.S. government should reduce the cost associated with cyber security and the life cycle
costs tied to mission-critical systems.
Until the IT industry as a whole starts to address the security issues associated with the
current cyber supply chain the DoD and other U.S. departments and agencies must work
diligently to drastically improve its ability to test and validate microelectronic hardware and
software being placed into its mission critical systems. Testing must move beyond simply testing
that microelectronic hardware, software, and firmware is functioning as intended. While this is
important, testing procedures and techniques must look for potential flaws or backdoors that may
have been introduced during the design or fabrication of a product. Forensic testing must be
improved to identify and catch counterfeits coming through the cyber supply chain. This will
help prevent them from being installed into DoD and other U.S. department and agency systems.
While the DoD and other U.S. departments and agencies should expect suppliers and contractors
to accomplish this, there are obvious holes and deficiencies in current testing procedures and
practices from one supplier to the next. The DoD should invest in research and development
teams who are focused on identifying corrupted, compromised or counterfeited microelectronic
hardware, software and firmware coming through the global cyber supply chain. If the DoD
wants to limit and mitigate the risk of these components from getting into its mission critical
systems it needs to take more ownership and limit its reliance on suppliers and contractors to
accomplish it for them.
The DoD and other U.S. departments and agencies will not be successful in moving
towards a more secure cyber supply chain without working closely with the private and public
sector to resolve the growing issue that threatens everyone and costs billions of dollars in
damages ever year. The DoD and other U.S. departments and agencies must engage with U.S. IT
companies and find ways to bring fabrication facilities back to the States. They must work
closely with companies and suppliers to instill the value, importance and benefit a trusted cyber
supply chain brings by establishing acceptable security practices that are financially beneficial
for all. The U.S. government as a whole must work closely with allies and partners around the
world and make a concentrated effort to change practices in the IT industry globally; the U.S.
cannot do it alone. These partnerships must be viewed as beneficial for the global IT marketplace
and the benefit of all who are a part of it, while it is critical to the cyber security of the U.S., they
must benefit everyone and not just the United States if real change is going to take place.
1 Defined Business Solutions, LLC. “Cyber Defense Hardware Vulnerabilities.” (April 12, 2011)
2 Michael I. Morrison, “The Acquisition Supply Chain and the Security of Government
Information Technology Purchases.” Public Contract Law Journal (March 12, 2013) 4.
3 John F. Gantz et al., “The Dangerous World of Counterfeit and Pirated Software, International
Date Corporation White Paper,” (March 2013) 2.
4 John Reed. “Proof That Military Chips From China Are Infected?” defensetech.org (30 May
5 GAO. “Trusted Defense Microelectronics, Future Access and Capabilities Are Uncertain,”
GAO-16-185T (October 2015) 1.
6 Defined Business Solutions, LLC. “Cyber Defense Hardware Vulnerabilities,” 3.
8 Ibid, 4.
11 GAO. “Trusted Defense Microelectronics,” 1.
13 IC Insights. Major 2015 Foundries (Pure-Play and IDM), accessed 8/2/2016,
14 GAO. “Trusted Defense Microelectronics,” 1.
15 IC Insights. Major 2015 Foundries (Pure-Play and IDM), accessed 8/2/2016,
16 Samar K. Saha, “Emerging Business Trends in the Microelectronics Industry.” Open Journal
of Business and Management, 4, (2016) 106.
19 Morrison. “The Acquisition Supply Chain,” 5.
20 J. Nicholas Hoover, “Secure the Cyber Supply Chain.” Information Week. (November 9,
21 GAO. “Trusted Defense Microelectronics,” 2.
22 Ibid, 3.
23 Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 2011. Section 806. (Jan 7, 2011)
24 Jarrellann Filsinger et al., “Chain Risk Management Awareness.” Armed Forces
Communication and Electronics Association Supply Cyber Committee, (February 2012) 9.
25 Defined Business Solutions, LLC. “Cyber Defense Hardware Vulnerabilities,” 4.
26 Jeffery Chiow, Robert Metzger. “Cyber, Supply Chain and Information Security: New
Developments & The Big Picture,” Rogers Joseph O’Donnell. (February 2013) 4.
29 Trusted Foundry, “Be Safe. Be Sure. Be Trusted.” Accessed 7/23/2016.
http ://www. trustedfoundrypro gram, or g
30 Morrison. “The Acquisition Supply Chain,” 15.
31 John Rollins, Anna C. Henning, “Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative: Legal
Authorities and Policy Considerations.” Congressional Research Service. (March 10, 2009)
32 Chiow, Cyber, “Supply Chain and Information Security,” 2.
34 DoD Instruction 5200.44, “Protection of Mission Critical Functions to Achieve Trusted
Systems and Networks (TSN).” (November 5, 2012)
36 Chiow, “Cyber, Supply Chain and Information Security,” 5.
37 Morrison. “The Acquisition Supply Chain,” 10.
39 Defined Business Solutions, LLC. “Cyber Defense Hardware Vulnerabilities,” 5.
40 GAO. Trusted Defense Microelectronics, 4.
41 Defined Business Solutions, LLC. “Cyber Defense Hardware Vulnerabilities,” 5.
42 GAO. Trusted Defense Microelectronics, 2.
43 Defined Business Solutions, LLC.’’Cyber Defense Hardware Vulnerabilities,” 5.
44 GAO. “Trusted Defense Microelectronics,” 2.
45 Ibid, 4.
46 Ibid, 1.
48 Chiow, Cyber, “Supply Chain and Information Security,” 3.
50 GAO. “Trusted Defense Microelectronics,” 4.
52 ITDashboard.gov, “IT Spending FY 2011-2017-Government wide.” accessed 8/3/2016,
55 ITDashboard.gov, “Development, Maintenance, and Services Spending,” accessed 8/3/2016,
https ://itdashboard. gov/
60 Pierluigi Paganini, “Hardware Attacks, backdoors and electronic component qualification.”
INFOSEC Institute. (October 13, 2013)
62 Jarrellann Filsinger et al., “Chain Risk Management Awareness.” Armed Forces
Communication and Electronics Association Supply Cyber Committee. (February 2012) 7.
63 Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement and Procedures, Guidance, and
Information. Subpart 2002.1-Definitions, Revised August 2, 2016.
64 Michael B Kelly, “Counterfeit Chinese Microchips Are Getting So Good They Can’t Be
Identified,” Business Insider. (June 16, 2012)
65 Filsinger et al., “Chain Risk Management Awareness.” 2.
68 Davis Inserra and Stephen P. Bucci Ph.D., “Cyber Supply Chain Security: A Crucial Step
Toward U.S. Security, Prosperity, and Freedom in Cyberspace,” Backgrounder No. 2880,
(March 6, 2014)
69 David Goldman, “Fake tech gear has infiltrated the U.S. government,” The Cybercrime
Economy. (November 8, 2012)
70 Don Sawyer, “Counterfeit threat taking malicious turn? Military Embedded Systems.” October
71 Press release. “Senate Armed Services Committee Release Report on Counterfeit Electronic
Parts,” U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services. (May 21, 2012) 1.
72 Ibid, 2.
73 Amber Corrin, “Counterfeit electronics in supply chain put contractors on the hook,” The
Business of Federal Technology, November 8, 2011.
76 Corrin, “Counterfeit electronics in supply chain.”
77 Morrison. “The Acquisition Supply Chain,” 6.
80 Inserra, “Cyber Supply Chain Security,” 6.
81 Kelly, “Counterfeit Chinese Microchips.”
82 Morrison. “The Acquisition Supply Chain,” 6.
84 Goldman, “Fake tech gear.”
85 Press release. “Senate Armed Services Committee.”
87 John McHale, “Counterfeit IC threat evolves with spread of clone parts,” Military Embedded
Systems. (July 21, 2015)
88 Sawyer, “Counterfeit threat taking malicious turn?”
89 Inserra, “Cyber Supply Chain Security,” 4.
90 Ibid, 5.
91 Paganini, “Hardware Attacks, backdoors,” Detection.
92 John D. Villasenor, “Ensuring Hardware Cyber security. Issues in Technology Innovation,”
Brookings. Issue 9. (May 2011)
Chiow, Jeffery, Robert Metzger. Cyber, Supply Chain and Information Security: New
Developments & The Big Picture, Rogers Joseph O’Donnell. February 2013.
Corrin, Amber. Counterfeit electronics in supply chain put contractors on the hook, The
Business of Federal Technology, November 8, 2011.
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement and Procedures, Guidance, and
Information. Subpart 2002.1-Definitions, Revised August 2, 2016.
Defined Business Solutions, LLC. Cyber Defense Hardware Vulnerabilities, April 12, 2011.
DoD Instruction 5200.44, Protection of Mission Critical Functions to Achieve Trusted Systems
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Filsinger, Jarrellann, Barbara Fast, Daniel G. Wolf, James F.X. Payne and Mary Anderson.
Chain Risk Management Awareness. Armed Forces Communication and Electronics
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Date Corporation White Paper, March 2013.
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November 8, 2012. http://monev.cnn.com/2012/ll/08/technologv/securitv/counterfeit-
Government Accountability Office, Trusted Defense Microelectronics, Future Access and
Capabilities Are Uncertain, GAO-16-185T, October 2015.
Hoover, J. Nicholas, Secure the Cyber Supply Chain. Information Week, November 2009.
Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 2011. Section 806, Jan 7, 2011.
ITDashboard.gov, IT Spending FY 2011-2017-Government wide, accessed 8/3/2016
Inserra, Davis, and, Stephen P. Bucci Ph.D. Cyber Supply Chain Security: A Crucial Step
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McHale, John. Counterfeit IC threat evolves with spread of clone parts, Military Embedded
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Morrison, Michael I. The Acquisition Supply Chain and the Security of Government
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