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AD-A042 477 


1977 J G albert* m E STONEY* M B LABERGE 







W AUG 5 1977 

VOL I, NO 3. 


Approved tot public release; 
Distribution Unlimited 




mt o7^ 

John G. /Albert, William E./stoney, j 
Walter B./LaBerge, Frank P./Ragano ■ 
^ John H./Richardson — — ■" 

Ih* Defense Svsiefns Managemeni Kevies^ is published quafferK b> ihe Defense S\ stems Management 
( ollege f lift HeUoir, \'a PuhiKalion of the Kes]cw wa«> approved b\ O-NSDt I Ma> IH. |M7^ 

Ihe sieves expressed in the Keviesx are those of authors atuJ not neeessanls those t>f the Department ol 
Intense or the Defense S\stems Management College I xpression of innovative thought is encouraged 
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copies of reprinted material should he forwarded t<i the I tlifor 

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Available in microfiche or paper copy from the National Technical Information Service. Port Royal 
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VOL I, NO 3. 


Vol. 1. No. 3. 



The purpose of the Defense S)stcms Management Review is to 
disseminate information concerning new developments and effec- 
tive actions taken relative to the management of defense systems 
programs and defense systems acquisition 

The Review is designed as a vehicle to transmit, between persons 
in positions of leadership and responsibility in the program 
management and systems acquisition communities, information 
on policies, trends, events and current thinking affecting the 
practice of program management and defense systems acquisi- 
tion The publication serves as a means for providing an histoncal 
record of significant information associated with defense systems 
acquisition/management concepts and practices 

The Review supoorts the assigned mission of the Defense Systems 
Management College, and serves as a medium for continuing the 
education and professional development of persons in the field 

Ravltw: US ISSN 0343-77r 


Defense Syatema Management Review 

Dear RcjiliT 


Volume I. Numbet of (he DSM Review is devoted 
I'rincipally to a series of articles about standardi/a- 
lion williiii the North Atlantic Treaty Organi/alion 
(NATOl.^nii articles were generated at the behest 
ol Mr. Wif) Vni I Sloney, Office of the Director of 
Deletise Research ami f ngmeering. who initialed the 
senes. Brigadier (>eneral f rank J. I’alernio guided the 
DDRAl eflort 

By a most lorliinale concurrence of circumstance we 
are able to present "A ('oncepl ofa Two-Way Street," 
by Dr Walter B LaBergc, Assistant Secretary (ieneral 
lor Defense Support. NATO. I he article by Dr. Ij- 
Berge has a delinile relation to the articles about 
slandardi/ation and is a highlight of this issue of the 

I announce with pleasure that we now have our lull 
coinpleineni ol Associate I dilors loi ihe DSM Re- 
view. (leneral Jack Cation. USAI- (Ret). Lockheed 
Aircraft Corporation. I’rofessor John W I ondahl. 
Stanford Cniversity. Mi. 1 ric Jenell. Blown A Root. 
Inc., and (ieneral Samuel C I’hillips. I S.AI (Ret). 
TRW, Inc., all have agreed to serve, along with 
Messrs. Augustine, Malloy. Sullivan and Welch iden- 
tified in Ihe last issue In Ihe ca|iacily of Associate 
I dilor these eminent praclilioners ol piogram maii- 
agenienl and systems acquisition niaiiagemeni serve 
a most important function. 

With deep regret I report Ihe loss of an imporlani 
member of Ihe Associate Ldilor team, I t Cien John 
O’Neill, USAI- (Ret). The demise of Ll (ien O'Neill 
saddened those of us who had been privileged to 
work with him and who have lost the beneni of his 
guidance and judgment. 

Lor Ihe first lime we are presenting articles prepared 
by two program managers. Brigadier Generals Frank 
Ragano. US Army and James C. Abrahamson. US 
Air Force These articles are complemented by an 
interesting article authored by an eminently qualified 
member of industry. Mr. John Richardson, Hughes 
Aircralt Company. On behalf of Ihe entire program 
management community I express gratitude and 
thanks to all distinguished contributors who have 
shared their experiences and expertise so that pro- 
gram managers and systems acquisition managers of 

At this lime I take Ihe opportunity to extend a heart- 
felt welcome to Rear Admiral Rowland (i. Freeman, 
III, USN, who has been designated as the next Com- 
mandant of the Defense Systems Management Col- 
lege. Admiral Freeman will succeed me on I July 

Major Cicncral, US Air Force 


l)efenM* SyMemt Management Keview 




TUESDAY, MAY 10, 1977 


Mr I’rcsidcnl, Mr. Secreiary (icneral, Lxcellendes, 
ami Mcmbors of the Council: 

\^e meet at an important time in the development of 
the international institutions on which our countries 

now democracies. Our Alliance is a pact for peace 
and a pact for freedom. 

The Alliance is even stronger because of solid progress 
toward Western European unification and the ex- 
panding role of the European Community in world 
affairs. The United States welcomes this develop- 
ment, and will work closely with the Community. 

Here in London last week the leaders of seven nations 
and of the Commission of the European Communities 
pledged to join others in strengthening these institu- 
tions in the economic field. 

Today and tonuirrow this Council will discuss how to 
adapt the Alliance to meet the military and political 
challenges of the 1‘180's. 

laken together, these meetings should give new im- 
petus to relations among our industrial democracies. 

■At file center of this effort mast be strong 
ties tietween Europe and North America. In 
maintaining and strengthening these ties, my 
Administration will be guided by certain 
principles. Simply stated : 

• We will continue to make the Alliance 
the heart of our foreign policy. 

• We will remain a reliable and faithful 

• We will join with you to strengthen the 
Alliance -politically, economically and 

• We will ask for and listen to the advice 
of our Allies. And we will give our views 
in return, candidly and as friends. 

This effort rests on a strong foundation The state of 
the Alliance is g<H>d. Its strategy and doctrine are 
solid. We derive added strength and new pride from 
the fact that all fitlecn of out member countries are 


In the aftermath of World War II. the political im- 
peratives were clear: to build the strength of the West 
and to deter Soviet aggression. Since then East-West 
relations have become far more complex. Managing 
them requires patience and skill. 

Our approach to East-West relations must be guided 
both by a humane vision and by a sense of history. 
Our humane vision leads us to seek broad cooperation 
with Communist states for the good of mankind. Our 
sense of history teaches us that we and the Soviet 
Union will continue to compete. Yet if we manage 
this dual relationship properly, we can hope that co- 
operation will eventually overshadow competition, 
leading to an increasingly stable relationship between 
our countries and the Soviet Union. 

The United States is now discussing with the Soviet 
Union ways to control strategic arms. By involving 
the Soviet Union in a continuing effort to reduce and 
eventually to eliminate nuclear weapons we hope not 
only to minimize the risks and costs of continuing 
arms competition but also to promote broader co- 
operation between out countries. 

The Soviet Union has nut yet accepted our proposals. 
But it has made clear that it wants an agreement. We 
will persevere in seeking an early and a genuine end to 
the arms race, througli both a freeze on moderniza- 
tion of strategic weapons and substantial reductions 
in their number. And as we pursue this goal, we will 
continue to consult with you fully-not only to keep 
you infonned but also to seek your views. 

I hope that our countries can also reach agreement 
with the Soviet Union in limiting and reducing con- 
ventional forces. The United States strongly supports 

Vol. I, No. 3. 



llie oKorls ol (In’ Alliance lo pain an accord on 
nuiuial and balanced icdiiclion ol lorces in C entral 
I iirope. riial apreenieni should be based on parity 
m torce levels throiiph overall ceilings lor the forces 
of NAK) and the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union, 
by contrast, seeks to preserve the present conven- 
tional imbalance and to national force ceil- 
ings. I hope that these obstacles can be overcome. 
.VtlllR must bed means for achieving mutual security, 
not for gaining one-sided military advantage. 

As we pursue arms control with the Soviet Union and 
the Warsaw Pact, we should also try to draw the na- 
tions of f aslern Knrope into coojieiative undertak- 
ings. Our aim is not to turn this region against the 
Soviet Union, but to enlarge the opportunities for all 
l uropean countries to work together in meeting the 
challenges of modern society. 

Next month delegates of .?5 countries will confer in 
Belgrade to plan for a meeting to review progress 
since the Helsinki Pinal Act, The United States shares 
with you a desire to make this a useful and construc- 
tive meeting. W'e support a careful review of progress 
by all countries in implementing all parts of the Final 
Act. We approach these meetings in a spirit of co- 
operation. not ol confrontation. 

America’s concern for liunian rights does not reflect 
a desire to impose oui particular political or social 
arrangements on any other country. It is. rather, an 
expression of the most deeply felt values of the 
American people. We want the world to know where 
we stand. (We entertain no illusion that the concerns 
we express and the actions we take will bring rapid 
changes in the policies of other governments. But 
neither do we believe that world opinion is without 
effect.) We will continue to express our beliefs-not 
only because we must remain true to ourselves, but 
also because we are convinced that the building of a 
better world rests on each nation’s clear expression 
of the values that have given meaning to its national 

^ In all these tasks and others facing the Al- 
liance, it is vital for us to work together-par- 
ticularly through close consultation and co- 
operation with the North Atlantic Council. 
We do not need new institutions, only to 
make better of one that has served us so 
well. To this end I pledge that the United 
States will share with the Council our views 
and intentions about the full range of issues 
affecting the Alliance. 

The Council should also examine long-range prob- 
lems, so as lo make this consultation more effective. 


A special Alliance review ol Fast -West relations, 
undertaken by the Council and drawing in national 
experts, could serve this end. .Such a review niiglit 
assess future trends in the Soviet Union, in Fastern 
Furopc and in Fast -West relations, and analyze the 
implications of these trends for the Alliance. I he 
United Slates is prepared lo make a major contribu- 
tion to this study, whose conclusions could be con- 
sidered at the May ld7S NA TO meeting. 

Defense i 

Achieving our political goals depends on a 
credible defense and deterrent. The United 
States supports the existing strategy of flex- 
ible response and forward defease. We will 
continue to provide our share of the powerful 
forces adequate to fulfill this strategy. We will 
maintain an effective strategic deterrent, we 
will keep diverse and modem theatre nuclear 
forces in Europe, and we will maintain and 
improve conventional forces based here. 

Tlie threat facing the Alliance has grown steadily in 
recent years. The Soviet Union has achieved essential 
strategic nuclear equivalence. Its theatre of nuclear 
forces have been strengthened. The Warsaw Pact's 
conventional forces in Europe emphasize an offen- 
sive posture. These forces are much stronger than 
needed for any defense purpose. Since 1065, new 
ground and air weapons have been introduced in most 
major categories: self-propelled artillery, mobile tac- 
tical missiles, mobile air defense guns, armored per- 
sonnel carriers, tactical aircraft, and tanks. The pace 
of the Pact’s buildup continues undiminished. 

Let me make it clear that our first preference 
is for early agreement with the Soviet Union 
on mutual and balanced force reductions. 

Failing to reach this agreement, our military 
strength must be maintained. 

The collective deterrent strength of our Al- 
liance is effective. But it will only remain so if 
we work to improve it. The United States is 
prepared to make a major effort to this end- 
as Vice President Mondale told you in Jan- 
uary-in the expectation that our Allies will 
do the same. 

There have been real increases in allied de- 
fense spending. But difficult economic condi- 
tions set practical limits. We need to use 
limited resources wisely, particularly in 

Defenie Systems Management Review 



strengthening conventional forces. To this 

• We must combine, coordinate, and con- 
cert our national programs more effec- 

• We must find better ways to bring new 
technology into our armed forces. 

• We must give higlier priority to increas- 
ing the readiness of these forces. 

To fulfill these goals, I hope our Defense 
Ministers, when they meet next week, will be- 
gin developing a long-term defense program 
to strengthen the Alliance's deterrence and 
defease in the 1980’s. That program should 
help us make choices and set priorities. It 
should emphasize greater Alliance coopera- 
tion to ensure that our combined resources 
are used must effectively. It should take full 
advantage of work already done within the 

But plans are not enough. We must ensure that our 
.Alliance has an adequate means for setting overall 
goals in defense, for measuring national performance 
against these goals, and for devising and carrying out 
joint programs. I propose that our Defense Ministers, 
working closely with the Secretary General, con- 
sider how best to strengthen the Alliance’s ability ac- 
tually to fulfill agreed programs. 

After an interim report to the December 1977 meet- 
ing, I hope the Defense Ministers will submit their 
program to the Spring Meeting which might be held 
at the Summit to review their recommendations. I 
also hope the Defense administrators will agree next 
week to make high priority improvements in the 
capabilities of our forces over the next year. 

As we strengthen our forces, we should also 
improve cooperation in development, pro- 
duction and procurement of Alliance de- 
fense equipment. The Alliance should not be 
weakened mUitarily by waste and overlapping. 
Nor should it be weakened politically by dis- 
putes over where to buy defense equipment. 

In each of our countries, economic and po- 
litical factors pose serious obstacles. None of 
our countries, the United States included, has 
been free from fault. We must make a major 

effort -to eliminate waste and duplication be- 
tween national programs; to provide each of 
our countrie.s an opportunity to develop, pro- 
duce and sell competitive defense equipment; 
and to maintain technological excellence in all 
Allied combat forces. To reach these goals our 
countries will need to do three things. 

First, the United States must be willing to 
promote a genuinely two-way traas-Atlantic 
trade in defense equipment. My Administra- 
tion’s decisions about the development, pro- 
duction and procurement of defense equip- 
ment will be taken with careful attention to 
the interests of all members of the Alliance. 1 
have instructed the Secretary of to 
seek increased opportunities to buy European 
defense equipment where this would mean 
more efficient use of Allied resources. I will 
work with the Congress of the United States 
to this end. 

Second, 1 hope the European allies will con- 
tinue to increase cooperation among them- 
selves in defense production. I welcome the 
initiative taken by several of your countries in 
the European Program Group. A common 
European defense production effort would 
help to aclueve economies of scale beyond the 
reach of national programs. A strengthened 
defense production base in Europe would en- 
large the opportunities for two-way trans- 
Atlantic traffic in defense equipment, while 
adding to the overall capabilities of the Al- 

Third, I hope that European and the North 
American members of the Alliance will join in 
exploring ways to improve cooperation in 
the development, production and procure- 
ment of defense equipment. This joint exam- 
ination could involve tlie European Program 
Group as it gathers .strength and cohesion. 
Some issues could be discussed in the North 
Atlantic Council. Whatever the forum, the 
United States is ready to participate in the 
way and at the pace that our allies wish. We 
are eager to join with you in trying to identify 
opportunities for joint development of new 
equipment and for increasing licensing or 
direct purchase of equipment that has already 
been developed. Together, we should look for 
ways to standardize our equipment and make 


Vol. I , No. }. 

sure it can be used by all allied forces. We 
should see if ways can be found to introduce 
into our discussions a voice that would speak 
for the common interests of the Alliance in 
offering advice about cooperation in defense 


To conclude: 

It is not enough tor us to share common purposes; 
we must also strengthen the institutions that fulfill 

those purposes. We are met today to renew our ded- 
ication to one of the most important of those insti- 
tutions. and to plan for actions that will help It to 
meet new challenges. .Some of these actions can be 
taken in the near future. Others can be developed for 
review at our meeting next year at this time. I would 
be glad to offer Washington as the site of that meet- 

The t-rench writer and aviator. Saint-Exupery, wrote 
that “the noblest task of mankind is to unite man- 
kind.” In that spirit, I am confident that we will 



VOL I, NO 3. SUMMER 1977 



Major John (i. Alheri. VS Air Torce. Comniandani 


AVI TO Ministerial Meeting 


William t. Stoney, Office of the Secretary of Defense 


Dr. Walter H. l.aBerge, Assistant Secretary General for Defense 
Support. Sforth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NA TO) 



Brigadier General Trank F. Ragano, VS Army 


John //. Rich ardso n. Hughes Aircraft Company 

Brigadier General James A. Ahrahamson. VS Air Force 


Colonel D. W. Waddell. VS Air Force 


.Major John D. Flliott. VS Army 


LtCol A. Martin Tidy, VS Army 


.Section B 1 4(a) of the Department of Defense Appropriation 
Authorization Act. !*)76 Relating to Standardization 

Vol. I. No. 3. 


The Process of Standarization 

An Overview 


William E. Stoney, Office of the Secretary of Defense 

The purpose of this discussion of the process of 
standardi/dtion is to shed some light on the process 
to guide both policy makers and system developers 
in the value of continuing the process, f urther, some 
‘‘lessons learned" are provided for those who will be 
pioneering new programs in the future. To this end 
a series of articles are presented. Advantages and dis- 
advantages of the existing process arc described. 

\ definition of standardization and interoper- 
ability and some general benefits are discussed by 
Colonel Waddell. These items and associated policy 
have recently been reinlorced and clarified by DOD 
Directive NCMBTR 2010.6, ‘‘Standardization and 
Interoperability ol Weapon Systems and equipment 
within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” 
dated II March 1077. (I encourage you to become 
familiar with this Directive, to use it as a guide, and 
to suggest improvements to it.) The article by Colonel 
Waddell also clearly highlights the advantage of 
standardization in items such as fuel, ammunition and 
high-rate consumables. 

The Roland articles are case studies including both 
the experience of the Government Project Manager 
and a senior industry Vice President. There are many 

lessons but the bottom line reflects a savings of from 
$500 to $800 million in the development phase ot 
this system. The cost savings probably will never 
make its way into the ledger, but it is there. The 
other lessons of the Roland story include those (d 
licensing and interoperability and should be taken 
into consideration if you arc embarking on similar 

The F-16 program is an ongoing, dynamic example 
of a coproduction effort of a highly complex weapon 
system. The T-16 program is one of the most impoi- 
tant and successful programs within NA K) to achieve 
the benefits of standardization The experience 
gained from overcoming significant barriers in na- 
tional industrial differences and currency exchange is 
worthy of review. 

Further, joint or lead .Service Program Offices arc 
becoming more effective as the Services cooperate in 
programs entering engineering development . 

I find there are a number of half-truths and myths 
about standardization that really didn't come out 
and get laid to rest in the articles, so I’ll lay a lew on 
the table in tins overview. 

Vol.I.No. 3. 


■'ll is ditriL'ull 10 staiulaiili/e with llic Army, Air 
[ orce, Nav>-. (Icrmans. Huplies. etc., because 

• our RKOl IKKMKNTS are dil'fcrcnt; 

• our .Sl'K II ICATIONS (especially ourSAFKTV 
SPl ( inCATlONS) arc dilYercnt; 

• our drawings are dift'ercnt; 

• our manulact tiring process is dilTerent, 

• they arc slil) changing the design, and, 

• our cultures arc different.” 

Hopefully, the information presented will assist 
you in formulating and managing your programs The 
material acquisition business is dynamic and innova- 
tive. Our job is to provide effective and affordable 
equipment to the servicemen in the field, fisc stand- 
ardization and interoperability both within the US 
and NATO to get more effectiveness for the dollar 

fare programs ot the Army 
sion areas of air warlare. 

Mr William E. Stoney is 
the Deputy Director (Tactical 
Warfare Programs) for the 
Director of Defense Research 
and Engineering. Office of the 
Secretary of Defense. Wash- 
ington, IX'. Mr Stoney is re- 
sponsible fot the tactical war- 
Navy and Air force in the mis- 
md warfare, ocean control and 

combat support Immediately prior to assumption of his 
present position (Oct 75), Mr Stoney was the Deputy Assist- 
ant Secretary for Systems Development and Technology, 
Office of the Secretary of Transportatitin. 

Mr. Stoney has had indepth expeeicnee with industry fot 
a period that exceeds 20 years. His last position in industry 
was that of Executive Advisor to the President, Microelec- 
tronic Division, Rockwell International. He served in various 
positions of great responsibility with Rockwell International 
(formerly North American Aviation Inc.) both in the US and 

A former Naval Officer. Mr. Stoney received his HSEE 
(1943) and MSEE (1947) from the University of ( alifornia, 
Berkley, where he later served as a Lecturer in Electrical 
Engineering (1946-51). He completed the UCLA Executive 
Course in 1966. 


DefenM SyMenu Minigement Review 


A Concept of a Two-Way Street 


Dr. Walter B. LaBerge 

Assistant Secretary General for Defense Support 
North Atlantic Treaty Organizations (NATO) 

The author, a former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development, 
has had the unique opportunity of seeing NATO function from inside a nation, and of see- 
ing nations function from inside NATO. He is an astute observer of the research and de- 
velopment problems that challenge the Alliance nations. In this article Dr. LaBerge presents 
a concept that he believes would make the most effective use of the collective resources of 
the natioas of Europe and the US in their common endeavor. The proposal made represents 
his private views framed by his experiences. The author is not writing for NATO in any of- 
ficial capacity.* 


There are myriad research and development 
(R&D) problems which every day challenge Alliance 
nations. Airborne Warning and Control Systems 
(AW ACS), next generation surface-to-air missiles, 
main battle tanks and air-to-air missiles all present dif- 
ferent problems and opportunities. The solution to 
these problems and other future opportunities does 
require a resolution of how to achieve a meaningful 
two-way street. I have prepared this article about 
this concept of a two-way street. 

Let me start by discussing the problem addressed 
by the concept of a two-way street. The problem of 
the Alliance today has very few historical parallels. 
The closest parallel is worth exploring because it 
focuses on what I believe to be our current NATO 

hew. if any, of you who are reading this article 
fought long ago in the campaign of 1916 at Verdun 
in Northern France. Those contestants who are still 

living recall that long deadly battle with a mixture of 
horror, and pride of valour. Few today consider an 
understanding of the Verdun campaign to be of any 
importance in this the missile age. Yet, what we are 
going througli now. though bloodless, may gain its 
closest insight from the desperate battle of Verdun. 

Most students of history say that the Battle ol 
Verdun came about in response to the military and 
political stalemate of 1914-1915, In Furope, in early 
1916, the seemingly unbreakable deadlock reached 
from Ypres in Belgium to the Marne, passed near 
Verdun and continued to the Swiss border. After 
nearly 20 months of World War I it seemed to both 
sides that a decisive, quick breakthrough was not 
possible, and that this 191 6 stalemate of forces might 
be impossible to break. So. in like manner, it may 
seem to the .Soviet planner of today, as he sees the 
stalemate of 1977 stretch from the tip of Norway 
through the length of Furo(K to the Straits ol the 
Bosphorous. This modern stalemate is also of long 
standing, and it too, is one for which it is hard to 
find a quick solution. 

•Baseil upon a presentation before the Conference on the Atlantic Community at (ieoryelown University, Washington. IK , 
14 I ebruary 1977. 

Vol. I, No. 3. 


llic solutinn in proposed and attempted by 

(■eneral I ric von l alkenkeyn, was to conduct at Ver- 
dun a campaign of unending attrition of military and 
economic resources. The objective of his campaign 
was to reduce his opponent to submission by an un- 
relenting exchange of his manpower and economic 
resources lor those ol his opponent . hor nearly a year 
(an eternity in batlle) this exchange of men and mate- 
rials look place until neither side could go on any 

Nearly a million men were blown apart from the 
2 1 St ol I ebruary I ‘>16 to the close of the battle in 
the December ol |tial year. The total losses at Verdun 
are marked at ‘t7(i.000 soldiers of both sides killed 
and wounded, and uncounted millions of tons of 
munitions expended on a front never more than 20 
miles wide and 5 miles deep. 

Maintaining the Military Balance 

The relevance of the Battle of Verdun to the sit- 
uation of today, is that where there is stalemate, 
economic and physical attri'ion may be the only 
avenues open to an adversary to change the military 
balance. It seems to me that the Soviets have chosen 
economic father than military attrition as a test of 
the strength of our military and economic systems. 
Today the Soviets and their Allies choose not battle 
but continuous threat of batlle to try to exhaust our 
resources to gain a favorable military imbalance. We 
are. whether we wish it or not. engaged in a long-term 
economic battle to maintain a military balance just as 
were I alkenkeyiTs adversaries at Verdun. 

It this assessment is true, the Alliance must plan 
tor many years ol integrated military and economic 
confrontation, liach day the strength of the Alliance 
must be great enough to deter attack, but each day it 
must also prepare (or a tomorrow and a tomorrow 
beyond that when it must be equally able to deter. 
The .Alliance must use its combined resources to buy 
the most effective military equipment, and do it in a 
way that keeps the economies of Alliance nations 
strong each day as far into the future as one can see. 
It is my thesis in this article today that the nations 
ol the Alliance are not working on this problem of 
long term military economic ciHiperation and, that 
unless they do the Alliance will have very great 

•Pri-Milcnl of I xporl'lmpnrt fethnology. Ini , Washington, 

To succeed in this long-term conflict, the nations 
of the Alliance must decide that It is truly obligatory 
to work together (which I do not believe they have 
yet decided) and then to adapt their bureaucratic 
institutions to work continuously to solve the prob- 
lems of equitable international cooperation. 

The Two-Way Street 

F'undamcntally, the concept of the two-way street 
is a concept of economic equity needed for long-term 
economic stability. Thomas A. Callaghan* coined the 
phrase “two-way street” a long time ago. Me sug- 
gested then that efficient use of our resources by all 
Alliance nations was obligatory, and that the ef- 
ficient use of resources couldn’t be accomplished 
without economic equity among the participants. 
From my recent perspective of Brussels, where I sit 
as an international public servant, I agree. To my 
mind the military-economic conflict forced upon the 
Alliance by the Soviets has already demanded eco- 
nomic equity as a condition for cixiperation for 
mutual defense. 

Today each Alliance nation must export techno- 
logical products to counter the outward flow of gold 
paid for foreign oil. This fact leads nations to want to 
improve their technology so as to increase their trade. 
No Alliance nation can plan to buy overseas without 
economic compensation. No nation wants to reduce 
the state of its science and technology by purchase of 
military technology overseas. More and more these 
considerations dominate military procurement. In- 
deed most European nations appear to believe that 
the crisis in their economic futures is as real as the 
crisis in their military future. 

The unbalanced flow of products and technology 
between America and Europe, in the view of these 
nations, cannot be allowed to continue. The Euro- 
pean members of the Alliance feel that there must be 
a “two-way street” of economic equity, and that it 
must be built very, very soon. Wliether the street is 
to have much or little traffic, they do not know, hut 
they believe that in the near future it must be eco- 
nomically balanced. What will flow back and forth 
equally over this two-way street is not at all clear 
today. It may be compensating arms procurement as 
suggested in the original version of the two-way 
street, it may be a balance of arms one way and off- 
setting commercial products the other. It may be 
only licensed drawings and technology flowing each 
way with independent production staying on each 
side of the Atlantic, or it maybe that there will not be 
a flow at all. The Alliance says the two-way street 
will be balanced, and I believe they mean it. 


DefenK Syiteins Minagement Review 

Lack of Dedication Toward Finding 
A Solution 

The pity Ii> me al this crucial time is that there 
seems to be virtually no elTort by those in charge of 
nations to fitul a long-term solution for this two-way 
street Nations are working together, but only on 
single programs of the very near future, with not too 
much success. I’eople write, people talk, people ex- 
hort ami people tire of the subject ol a two-way 
street across the Atlantic. As far as I can sec from my 
office in Brussels, the leaders of the Alliance arc not 
seriously studying how to provide the environment 
that allows the nations on each side of the ocean to 
share their efforts. 

The United .States, while vigorously advocating 
stamlardi/ation of armaments, appears to be ignor- 
ing the consequences of the fact that what they are 
suggesting is based mostly on purchase of US equip- 
ment. The flS has yet to offer any economically 
acceptable way to allow NATO the use of these 
great US research and development efforts. The US 
examples of proposed cixiperation with Kuropean 
nations occur so late in the development cycle that 
the Turopcati sources are necessarily uneconomic. 
Thus, program by program equitable offsets of tech- 
nology participation arc not possible to bring about. 

More and more the turopcan nations are finding 
that there may be no way to work equitably with the 
US. To me. an outsider, the turopean nations seem 
satisfied that there cannot he close cooperation be- 
tween Alliance partners on each side of the Atlantic 
in the development and production of armaments. 
Believing that traffic from Uuropean nations to 
American will always be small, Kurope appears to be 
heading towards a self-sufficiency in arms develop- 
ment. Turopc is becoming independent of the great 
R&l) strength in America. 

.So to me it seems that although the two-way street 
will soon become a reality, there may never be any 
traffic on it. That is not what anyone would want if 
he thouglit about it, but it is my contention, that is 
exactly what may happen. 

II allowed to happen, this consequence will result 
in a gross waste of resources. And worse, it will lead 
to different and uninteroperable equipments and to 
difficult and unnecessary logistic problems. This 
Continental research and development apartheid 
should not be allowed to happen. To prevent it 
from happerun/g, the people in charge of Ministries 
of Defense will have to make something different 
happen, and they will have to do it now. 

Options for Cooperation 

Basically, three options are possible for equitable 
transatlantic coopera'ion in defense procurement 

( 1 ) The U.S and l uropc can divide equitably pro- 
curement of their armaments, one side agree- 
ing to depend on the other side ol the At- 
lantic for a substantial part of their R&l) and 
procurement needs, or, 

(2) There can be a balance of U.S made arma- 
ments sold to I'urope and U.S purchase of 
technically advanced commercial products 
from Hurope, or, 

(.f) The flow on the two-way street can be pri- 
marily a How of ideas and drawings, with 
the result that, frequently, the same product 
will be produced both in the US and hurope 

The last option I believe can work. I do not think 
the first two options are workable no matter how 
hard we may try to make them so. In my view, op- 
tion (2), offsetting US armaments with huropean 
commercial products, requires regulation of business 
on both sides of the Atlantic beyond the realistic- 
ability of either side to implement. In cases where it 
has been tried there has been only limited success, 
hurtliermore, such an offset concept would destroy 
substantially the financial base for military technol- 
ogy development believed by huropean commercial 
industry to be crucial to their own survival 

To believe, as in option ( 1 ). that the I'S will now 
buy an equitable amount (say up to .^0 percent ) ot its 
technologically advanced armaments from l-urope 
seems today perhaps even more implaiisable. The 
current state of US technology, the US political 
pressures, and the desire for llexibility of action seem 
to make the probability of making large numbers of 
U.S purchases from hurope difficult to anticipate. 
One can cite significant cases where each buys the 
products of the other, but I don’t believe it can be 
done on the scale necessary to solve the problem of 

The concept of a two-way street based primarily 
on the exchange of technology, drawings and ideas 
has yet to be fully explored. Two aspects of such a 
two-way street need to be examined in detail, A two- 
way street of plans and technology can lead to co- 
operative programs to build the same equipment on 
both sides of the Atlantic. Conversely, it could lead 
to production of several different equipments, 
specialized to the interests of the producing nations. 

Vol. I, No, J. 


bill relying on the same cooperatively shared lech- 
nology base. 

Many people believe dial standardisation of hard- 
ware is the only hope of an Mliancc husbanding its 
resources. I do not believe that at ail. roinpetition is 
the basis of our economic system. Two tanks each in 
competition bn the business of the Alliance may in 
tact be better than one. The key. I believe, is to offer 
the opportunity for cooperation across the Atlantic 
under equitable terms to the participants, and then 
to let the particular needs of the Alliance nations 
I tuning, special technical requirements, etc.) deter- 
mine whether they join in the endeavor or not. 

1 do not believe tnat nations can legislate or 
dictate s’andardi/ation. I believe that when this has 
been attempted, it has led to inefficiency and waste 
instead of efficiency and economy. In fact, most 
knowledgeable economists believe our advanced 
standard of living is based upon avoidance of a reg- 
ulated economy. 

What we. as a nation, need to do is offer the op- 
portunity for cooperation under terms of economic 
equity and then let nature take its course. 

Die cost of modern weapon development has be- 
come so expensive that large scale cooperation within 
I iiropc is already obliged. The proliferation which is 
abhorred today is the result of the situation that oc- 
curred 10 to 20 years ago when each nation could 
atlord to develop weapons independently and then 
expect to sell to the world. 

The U.S does not understand that this is no longer 
the case. The simple facts are that European nations 
will cither coo|Teratc within their own community or 
they will join their allies on the other side of the 
Atlantic. As long as neither side of the Atlantic works 
on the dilficiilt problem of how to cooperate, the 
choice IS obvious. Lurope will be forced to work in its 
ow n closed economic community in order to achieve 
the economic fairness that it feels it needs. 

ROLAND is a Ray of Hope 

The proposal I have made for a two-way street of 
technology and plans can work. The short-range air 
defense system, Roland adopted by the US from 
1 u rope is an example to prove the point. Here, m 
exchange (or equitable license fees, a European design 
has been adopted for manufacture entirely within the 
US by US industry. The US flexibility of action, 
labor base and technology have been maintained. 
Roland Is a precedent that can work again and again. 
It can work either way across the ocean as long as co- 

operation is planned for early, before competitive na- 
tional programs become entrenched. 

.Sometimes the US press has called the Roland pro- 
gram a failure. I believe it to be just opposite. Roland 
is about to become a truly outstanding success, l or 
the very first time a missile made in l urope has been 
adopted for production in the US. Soon, from any 
NATO Roland launcher, a Roland missile of US or 
T.uropean manufacture can be fired. This is the first 
time that a complete assumption of another’s design 
for full local manufacture has ever been accom- 
plished. It could be a landmark for how to cooperate 
across the Atlantic. 

If the managements of countries really wanted to 
do so, new programs of similar cooperation could be 
started. If national leaders really wanted, these new 
principles of cooperation could be widely tested. 
With either US or Hurope serving as program man- 
ager, the nation(s) on the other side of the Atlantic 
could agree to participate to ensure that its interest 
were considered and to prepare to produce for itself. 
Yet. sadly, beyond Roland today, there are too few 
programs offering such cross-Atlantic cooperation. 

Let me state, 1 believe the reason why Lurope and 
the US are beginning to go their own ways rather 
than going together is that those in charge of nations 
are not working the economic problems hard enough. 
There are not people in Alliance capitals whose jobs 
and promotions depend on solving the economic 
problems of cooperation. No one at a high level of 
government in the US or within Lurope is charged 
with putting traffic on the two-way street. No one 
will he fired if there isn’t any traffic. Bureaucracy in 
any government does not support the “two-way 

Lor example, in a Pentagon housing 25,000 
people one would be hard pressed to find one tenth 
of I percent whose main task is to find a way to 
achieve NATO effectiveness in procurement of 
armaments. Those who have been so tasked are far 
away from the centers of preliminary design and 
decisionmaking authority. 

Since Lurope no longer is certain that the US is 
willing to make a “two-way street” work, the leaders 
in the US must take the initiative. The US must sliow 
that it now wishes to develop with Luropean Allies an 
equitable basis for flow on a two-way street. The 
leaders of the United States must commit themselves 
to a basis of economic equity in dealing with Lurope 
whether it be by buying arms reciprocally from 
Europe, by offering to solve in nonmilitary procure- 
ment ways the problem of commercial offset, by 
organizing the initial efforts at major cooperative 

Defensr .SyMcma Minigrmvnl Review 



ptograins oi. by encouraging occasional competitive 
developments or as is most probable by a combina- 
tion ot all ol these means 

In like manner, the l iiropean nations must be pre- 
pared to follow suit, and be prepared to discuss how, 
when and under what terms transatlantic ciHiperation 
ts possible 

Need for Permanent Organizations 

To engage in a sustaining program tor cooperation 
requires that a nation have the administrative capa- 
bility to cooperatively plan with its allies. Permanent 
organizations are needed to think out problems, to 
lormulate plans, and to make proposals for integrated 
.•\lliancc arms development. Today neither the US nor 
the nations of I'urope have an organizational entity 
which IS committed to these tasks. To believe it will 
happen without organizational strength is to shut 
one’s eyes to reality. Both the US and the Furopean 
nations need “NATO thinking ' people in powerful 
places, need them staffed adequately, and need them 
placed in the chain of program decision. 

There are two obvious ways by which the bureauc- 
racies of the Alliance can be made to respond to the 
decisions ol their leaders to cooperate. It has always 
seemed to me peculiar that, when it comes to NATO 
matters. Presidents. Prime Ministers, Congressmen, 
Parhametilarians. Ministers of Delensc, and Chiefs of 
Siatl ot nations can call for cooperation, mutual de- 
velopment and interdependence and then subord- 
inates. almost to a man, seem to ignore the clear 
direction given. 

The actions of the Alliance, I think you will agree, 
do not follow the words of its leaders. I do not be- 
lieve this nonresponse to be malicious or intentional. 
I believe it to be the natural consequence of our con- 
temporary bureaucracies not being set up to make 
the wishes of our leaders come about . 

Virtually nothing happens in our modern bureau- 
cratic process unless there exists power centers in the 
bureaucracy that have the responsibility to furtlier 
the desired action. Contemporary experience sliows 
that lor ideas to succeed, there must be centers of 
power able to stop or to delay appropriations unless 
their special interests are catered to adequately. In 
the absence of a power center, even with high level 
urging, a bureaucracy will inevitably stall new ini- 

One example from recent US Department of De- 
fense history dramatically shows this principle to he 
true. For years and years, leaders in the IX)D and in 
the Congress decried the low reliability of US military 

equipment Much as ‘‘standardization" is today, "im- 
proved reliability" was then the popular cry. 1 he 
more people preached the less the situation changed, 
simply because there were not a high level people 
whose job satisfaction derived from the demonstra- 
tion of improved reliability” was then the populai 
cry. The more people reached the less the situation 
changed, simply because there were not at a higli level 
people whose job reduced to compensate. So, foi all 
the crying, nothing much happened to improve reli- 
ability. Then, Congress and DOD insisted on estab- 
lishment of an independent te .iiiig agency that could 
stop production until tests veiified reliability com- 
mitments. A man of ability .ind courage. Ll. (icii. 
Alfred D. Starbird, USA (Ret), was put in charge. He 
Was given a staff of 25 people, and was lequiied to 
report to the US Secretary of Defense the accept- 
ability of test programs and test results. Piograms 
were halted, tests were planned, and progiam go- 
aheads awaited test verification. 

Almost overnight, the old bureaucracy accepted 
the new bureaucracy and conformed to make room 
for it. No longer did the lobbies of schedule and 
perfonnance dominate but a coequal lobby ensured 
the interests of reliability. It worked then and it 
worked surprisingly easily. It could also work in the 
same way now to ensure national willingness to ex- 
plore international cooperation. 

The Situation in the United States 

Although what I say applies to every nation, I 
will focus on the situation in the US.Thougli the U.S 
leaders want the DOD to consider NATO in its plans 
there is no one in power within DOD whose job 
uniquely is to tnake sure that what is wanted hap- 
pens. No one in the IkS has a full time job to see that 
US designs are used by its NATO Allies or to see that 
allied designs are used by the US. Because no one 
stops a US program until commitments to NAFO use 
are demonstrated, these interests are ignored. 

The US Congress by Section 202 of its 1 077 Mili- 
tary Appropriation has been very helpful. That .Sec- 
tion requires that the .Secretary of Defense report 
whenever he undertakes any procurement action 
which is not NATO standard or interoperable How- 
ever, honest people respond to their interests as they 
see them, and even rules like this do not help unless 
there is a bureaucratic way to enforce them. 

The point that I wish to make to both my IIS and 
Furopean friends is, simply, that without enlfan- 
chised bureaucratic representation, NATO research 
and development matters will not he substantially 
considered. Well intentioned forays by public officials 
will continue to be thwarted by the bureaucracies 

Vol. I, No. 3. 


tlijl ilo not ihcnisclvcs enjoy pain by meeting NATO 

A Solution 

\h (lope o llial the Ituicpendcnl l iiropcan Program 
liroup (II P(i) can soon speak lor the I uropean na- 
trons ol the Mlianee in discussion ot trans-Atlantic 
opportunities. lire II P(i is a proper group to tbr- 
nuilate the conditions under whic/i l urope can see il 
advantageous to work with the L^S. However, as yet. 
the II P(i has not broadened its interests to include 
these discussions 

Mthoiigh III the US. International Security AITairs 
and the Director ol Delense Kesearch and linginecr- 
ing each have groups concerned with US interests in 
NAIO. they would probably admit that they neither 
have the lime, nor ihe people, to do the planning 
suggested. Nor ilo they have the power to enforce 
their plans were they to develop them. 

U'niil the inembers of the Alliance set up in their 
own Ministries ol Defense strong Slarbird-like “Of- 
lices of \.\K) .Affairs" no one should expect solving 
ol Ihe economics of the two-way street. Continued 
unwillingness of nations to set up such powerful 
olfices can onlv mean that nations do not wish the 
loss ol nexibihly that conies with commitment to 
international N A lO-wide cooperation. 

Closing Thoughts 

lx;l me ofler one last suggestion on how lo estab- 
lish a rticaninglul two-way street. Were every nalion. 
before embarking on a new armament development, 
lo apply for whal I call a "NATO (.ood Housekeep- 
ing .Seal of Interoperaliility ." we would begin sonie- 
whaf correctly Were we to start early to ensure that 
things work together today, replacements tomorrow 
might well be of one design done cooperatively. To- 
day no nation is obliged to check with anoihei on 
details of interoperability. Therefore, although we m 
NATO learn of new difficullies. we are obliged to 
wait for interoperability until "next time." lo en- 
sure rnteroperability. corrective bureaucratic proce- 
dure is required. There is now a proposition being 
examined by NATO nations to require the imparl lal 
outside interoperability review that I suggest I hope 
that this initiative can gain national support. Il it 
cannot. I will especially question the depth of the 
wishes of NATO nations for efficient use of .Mhatice 

We arc now in a Verdun-like war ol resources. Hie 
two-way street is a crucial but unthought -out concept 
that can help us in that battle. The two-way street is 
an economic problem of interdependenev which we 
must find a way to solve. How to cooperate within 
the Alliance is a bureaucratic problem, not a tech- 
nical problem. ■ i 

Dr. K. I is 

Hu’ Assistant Secretary Cicn- 
eral tor Delense Support. 
North Atlantic Iroafy Oryan- 
I'ation (N\rO). Prior to as- 
suming his present |h)sI f)r. 
laHer^’e ssas Assistant Secre- 
tary ol the Air I orce (He- 
u’arch and DevelopmenO. an app<*intmeni made by Ihe 
PresKleni of the I nited Stales. At the time ol this appoint* 
inenl he isjs |)irect»*r «>! Ihe Naval ^Veapons ( enter in ( ali- 

I roin until acieptiny his present assitnunent. Dr. 

l.aBerye was asw'cialed with the development t>l I S space 
and missile proirrams lor N ASA and the I S Armed I orces 
He has served as an en.cinecr in electronics, research and de 
velopmenl. weapons systems, and manjyemeni in positions 
ol increasing responsihiJity Dr I alierpe received his doc 
lorate in physics. 1950. Irom Ihe I'niversity ol Notre Dame 
where he received a BS (Physics) in 1947. and a BS (Naval 
Science) in 1944. 

Dr. LaBer^e, duriny World War II (Irom 1944). served 
as I vecutive OHicer and then Commander til the A MS 165 
that swept more than 2(K) mines, a number which is be- 
lieved lo exceed that id any ship ol its class in the Pacil'ic 


Defense Systems Management Review 




Brigadier General Frank P. Ragano, US Army 






Sharing Resources 

Ovci the pas.: lew years, there have been numerous 
ill taicd allempts to "slandardi/e" United Stales 
ei|uipnient with that ol our North Atlantic Treaty 
Oiyani/ation (NATO) Allies Most of these attempts 
have tailed lor a variety ol reasons. However this has 
not reduced the IIS desire lor true NATO equipment 
slandardi/ation and mterchan^eahilily . With increas- 
my cmiiliasis on commonality in recent years, inter- 
nal lonal "interoperability'' of weapons and inter- 
chanyeabihly of components have been promoted. 
Joint development programs have been initiated. 
Ibis emphasis has resulted in NATO g> vernments 
giving undivided attention to weapons standardi/a- 
tion through a sharing of the research, development, 
production, procurement, and deployment process. 

Weapons cornniorialily* among NATO Allies 
makes good sense The resources ol the US arc not 
limitless No longer can we afford the luxury of du- 
phi-aling costly research and development efforts to 
produce a multitude ol national weapons systems in 
delensc ol a common NATO threat. Sharing research 
and development efforts is one sure way to stretch 
limited NATO resources. Such sharing allows full 
counter to a joint threat. In addition, NATO partners 
en|ov cost savings inherent in increased production 
buys through the pooling of joint requirements, 
finally signillcant savings can be gained through 
joint logistics etforts by reducing operating and sup- 
port costs after the equipment is fielded. 

Coiiimonality fosters the sharing of resources, im- 
proves combat Ilexihility, and provides for quick re- 
inlorccment In support of these desirable objectives, 
the US has embarked on its first serious attempt at 

* Ihe aulhtir perceives commonaliry in a very broad conrcxl 
and uses it in lire context of both standardization and intcr- 

transferring I uropcan technology ol a coiii|rlc\ air 
defense system to the US This is the story ol the US 
Roland. . . . 


The Roland story began in the early IdtiO's with 
the cancellation of a US development effort to field 
an all-weather short-range air defense system known 
as MAUl.l R. Many of our NATO Allies were count- 
ing on the elfort to produce a system that would 
counter a recogni/ed low-altitude aii delense threat. 
Upon cancellation ol the MAUfl R program, the 
J rench and (icrmans entered into a joint develop- 
ment effort to produce a system to counter the lec- 
ogni/ed threat. Meanwhile, the US produced a clear 
weather system, known as (HAl’ARRAl,, as an in- 
terim srdution to the short-range requirements. In the 
late I'JfiO's. following a number ol I'S air delense 
studies, a growing need for an all-weather short-range 
system, was recogni/ed 

In tnid-U)70 direction from the Ofticc of the .Sec- 
retary of Defense stressed increased cooperation with 
our Allies in the area of research and development. In 
addition, emphasis began to turn towards increased 
standardization ol US equipment with the equipment 
of our f uropcan Allies. However, Department of De- 
fense jsolicy stressed the need to maintain a US pro- 
duction base for systems develojx’d through cooopei- 
ative efforts. Such a policy was clearly desirable to 
insure flexibility in foreign jsolicy matteis and to 
avoid the potential for compromise of our national 

In keeping with this policy the search lor an all- 
weather short-range system shifted to the ITiropean 
scene where three candidate systems were in various 
stages of development The British RAl’II R, btench 
CROTALK. and the l-ranco-Cierman ROl.AND, it 
was decided that these systems would he evaluated 


M it 

Vol. I. No. J. 



to dclorinino it they coiikl s.ilisly the US need. I he 
systems were evaluated and all were judged aseapabic 
ol meeting the need. 

The Proposal 

In 1‘>74 piiiposals were soheited Irom 21 sources, 
lour respondeil Hughes \ircralt Company (RO- 
1 AM)|. riulco-lord (All Weather ( IlAl’AKRAI I. 
Rockwell International (( RO IAI I ). and United Air- 
cralt (RAI’ll R HI IM)I IRl ) In January l»75, a 
contract was awarded to Hughes Aircralt Company 
lor the technology translei ol the Roland II weapon 
system to the US. 1 he system was to be known as the 
US Roland. 

The Roland ts an all-weather short-range air de- 
fense weapons system that can locate, identify, and 
destroy low-level air attackers. Roland can acquire 
targets on the move. This weapons system can engage 
targets at all aspect angles at ranges in excess of 6 
kilometers. I'.ach system consists of a fire unit, mis- 
siles, and associated support equipment, W'hilc the 
U,S Roland system will be mounted principally on 
the MU)‘) tracked vehicle, its modular design enables 
It to be employed on either wheeled or tracked ve- 
hicles as well as on trailers and at fixed ground 

The module includes a fully traversable turret 
with associated surveillance and track radars. The unit 
houses tiansrmlters. radar displays, identification 
Iriend or foe (II I ), power generation and fire control 
equipment, and environmental control units. Tach 
module IS armed with It) missiles: one on each of the 
two launcher arms, and tour in each ol the twin re- 
volving maga/mes 

I he Roland system was developed by l iiromissile, 
a consortium comprised ol Messerschniitt-Beolkow- 
Hlohm ( iiiporation. ot (lermany.and the Aerospatiale 
Uori'oratlon ol I ranee The Tiiropean program is 
under the direction ot a joint Trench-fierman pro- 
gram office Huglies Aircraft Company is the US 
Army's prime contractor tor the US Roland the 
Hoeing Aerospace ( ompany is the principal subcon- 
tractor Both American companies are licensed by 
the [ tiropeans for production of the system in the 
United States. 

The philosophy in the development of Roland in 
the US was to strive for niaxiimim standardization 
within the US Department of Defense. The stand- 
ardi/atiori requirements for Defense Supply Man- 
agement were the controlling criteria. These re- 
quirements specified (hat, to the highest degree 
practicable, items used throughout IK)D would be 

standardized. In essence, these requirements max- 
imize commonality between Roland hardware and 
other hardware items existing in, or to be introduced 
to. the US weapon inventory. Under this guidance, 
the contract was written to encourage selection ol 
equivalent US parts, assemhlies. materials, and fin- 
ishes to lacililate the establishment ol a IIS produc- 
tion base and permit maximum standardization in 
the l ederal Supply System. 

The Formal Program 

The formal program to promote interchangeability 
between the l^S and T.uropean Roland systems re- 
sulted from Congressional interest to minimize 
■■.Americanization” of the system and to ma.xiimze 
NATO standardization. This guidance provided the 
impetus towards a high level ol NATO standardiza- 
tion that resulted in extraordinary efiorts to achieve 
NATO interchangeability. 

At first there was some reluctance to delve fully 
into the area of ■'international interchangeability” 
(I-). The initial decision was made by the US to 
achieve international interchangeability only at the 
missile round level. The T.uropean expected a greater 
degree ol interchangeability. They continued to press 
to extend to the US those items which were already 
interchangeable between France and Germany. The 
interested parties made it clear that US acceptance of 
the Turopean concept of interchangeability was a 
necessary condition for continued United States/ 
l uropean cooperation on the Roland program. By 
early l‘)7(i a number of additional developments 
made a higher degree of interchangeability a more 
viable option for the I'S. These developments in- 
cluded the US decision to procure test equipment 
directly from Turope and the requirement lor an ex- 
tended joint test program using Turopean hardware 
to maintain the US program schedule. 

The Present Effort 

In March ld76, the LIS Department of the Army 
agreed to ensure that Technology Transfer T'abrica- 
tion and Test (TTF&T) hardware would be made 
interchangeable with Turopean hardware to the 
maximum extent possible. At this same time the 
Army initialed a formal program to quantify the 
benefits and penalties of maintaining interchange- 
ability during production. 

At present, the United States is pursuing a course 
of action that could ultimately result in a total num- 
ber of 55S field replaceable units (printed circuit 
boards, hydraulic components, etc.) that would be 
interchangeable with those of Turopean manufacture. 


ivrenw Syslems Mintgement Review 


One step taken to insure tliis capahility: all electrical 
connectors used in the Roland tire unit are exact 
equivalents ol the I uropean connectors and in most 
cases were purchased directly Irom huropean manu- 
lacluteis Hie American producers arc required to 
follow a slriit "huild to print ", tliereby insuring that 
components do not deviate in "lorm, fit and time- 

The Difficulties 

Ihe road to standar.h/ation through international 
itilerchangeahilily has not been witliout rougli sjrols 
as illustrated by the lollowing examples. 

Technology Transfer 

I itst. at the onset ol the program it was not clear 
that the transfer of technology would be a compli- 
cated process .As a result of that, as well as other 
complications, the contractor experienced a cost 
growth Part ol this cost growth was attributable to 
problems ol transferring drawings. Both the con- 
tractor and the (iovernment assumed that the Euro- 
peans had a drawing indenturing system equivalent 
to the I'S system. This proved to be an erroneous 
assumption. Each European subcontractor has its 
own system of numbering and annotating drawings. 
In many instances callouts on the drawings were 
relerences to a commercial catalog that had to be 
obtained and researched. Drawing changes were not 
always numbered sequentially and had to be re- 
searched to establish a change history. In addition, 
tran.slation of technical information on the drawings 
presented problems. 

Data and Documentation 

Data problems resulted from the fact that many 
items of data that the contractor expected to receive 
as part of the European documentation were not 
lurnished. Examples included: system employment 
procedures; survivability and electromagnetic com- 
patibility analyses: human factors and training data, 
detailed fabrication and test specifications; produc- 
tion planning including tooling, test equipment, and 
test setups, and environmental, reliability, and avail- 
ability test data. The gaps in system knowledge rep- 
resented by these data shortages required that the 
American contractor initiate independent engineer- 
ing analyses to produce the necessary specifications 
and documentation. 

Competition for Full Scale Production 

Since Ihe prime contractor held the exclusive 
licensing agreement with Euromissile it was not pos- 

sible to second source lull scale prodiiclion. The 
prime contraclor was in a virtual sole source position, 
much to his advantage. It took a great deal ol el fori 
to renegotiate with Euromissile to allow second 
sourcing lor compelitive procuremenl in lull scale 
production Such an arrangemeni helps to msure 
adequate compelilion with the rcsultaiil saviiigs 
and benefits. 


l.atly in the program, charges of ".Ameiicam/mg" 
the system were launched at the Project •'Iffice. Tliere 
was concern that funds were being expended on 
changes to the system to make it fit the fancy of I S 
design engineers Ihese fears were nolhiiigmore Ilian 
an enormous "soap bubble." Strict configuration 
control by the Project Office made it virtually im- 
possible to "Amcricani/c" the Roland system and a 
strict build-to-print (European) policy was enforced. 

I inally, and with considerable dismay, it was 
found that the design was not totally stabilized. Ehe 
results had significant impact on both drawing con- 
version and the fabrication process. The system was 
just entering European production when the E'S 
Army began the Technology Transfer Eahrication and 
Test program and the European contractors were 
continuing to process many, many changes. This was 
particularly true in the case of the track radai. when 
an almost complete set of new drawings was received 
after the technology transfe^j^d begun. 

These types of problems are representative ol 
those faced in the technology transfer process. The 
problems were overcome and valuable cxpeiicnce 
was gained that will helpful in future efiorts of 
this type. 

Commonality, A Reality 

The reality of international interchangeability is 
being realized in the US Roland system a reality 
brouglil about through intensive management ef- 
forts and an organization that recognizes the close 
international cooperation required to succeed in 
this type program^ 

Laisl fall (September. I‘)76) a restructured pro- 
gram was initiated that benefits from our earlier 
lessons, ("ommunication improved among the various 
Government agencies, major contractors and sup- 
pliers. All parties have learned to compromise. Some 
of Ihe normal development surveillance tasks have 
been recognized as unnecessary and have been elim- 
inated. A new and comprehensive missile-fiimg test 
program hat^cen established jointly with the Eiench 

1 1 

vm. l,No. 3. 

ami (icmian Armies. Tlic US will benefit from shar- 
ni(: tiring ranges, rising common data, and most im- 
portantly. from improved communication and co- 
(>peration witli our Allies. 

As wc entei qualification testing has been 

completed on miicli of the missile portion of the US 
Koland program. Static firings of the propulsion unit 
are well under way, and qualification testsof tlie first 
complete missile will begin in June. 

In midsummer Boeing will begin installation o( tlie 
lluglies tracking and surveillance radars, as well as 
the electro-optical sights, into the first fire unit. 
Radars and sights tor all four fire units will be fin- 
ished by October 

Also in October l')77, the first fire unit and the 
tirst test missile will be delivered to the US Army, By 
Cliristmas ol this same year .JO missiles will be ready 
for the joint test program. 

The plan is to fire the first US Roland missile dur- 
ing winter. I077.i07!s. The system is solidly engi- 
neered and will satisfy a driving requirement on the 
niidinlensity battlefield Most of the confusion, mis- 
understanding and head butting ate over. That is a 
tribute to the professionalism and dedication of de- 
tense and industry people on both sides of the At- 
lantic. They have led the way toward standardization, 
and have cut the path for others to follow. The US 
Koland will be an effective weapon system. 

Like most bold innovation. NA TO weapons stand- 
ardization tiiust go through a ditficiilt learning proc- 
ess, But standardization is vital and should be sup- 
ported and encouraged as it outgrows adolescence. 


Iti sutiimary there are a number ot itnportant les- 
sons learned that should benefit future efforts in 
technology transfer from a foreign source. 

First, it is imperative that US contractors acquire 
enough detailed data to understand the cotnplexity 
and pit tails inherent iti the technical data transler 
program. The contractors ttiust insure that proposals 
adequately address the cost and schedule tiecessary to 
complete the transaction. Second, the degree ol sys- 
tem design stability tmist be seriously assessed. At- 
tempts to transfer a design that is not stabilized will 
result in cost growth and schedule slips. Next, the 
Program Managetnent Office must be organized to 
allow continued close coordination with all (US and 
foreign) contractor and government personnel in- 
volved in the process. 

Finally the Program Manager must make Irequent 
personal visits to high-level govertmient (DOD, Min- 
ister of Defense, etc.,) and contractor (President. 
Division Manager, etc.) personnel. The Program Man- 
ager must insure that the programmatic interface is 
properly established and functioning to allow the 
technology to be transferred in an efficient and 
timely manner. 

Brigadier (icneral I- rank P. 
Kaganu is Project Manager for 
the U.S Koland. an all-weather, 
short-range air defense system. 
A graduate of Ouquesne Uni- 
versity IBST, 1950) with a 
MBA from Syracuse Univer- 
sity. Brigadier General Ragano 
attended the Command and General Staff College and the US 
Army War College Me has served as a faculty member (in the 

Dept of Management) for both the Industrial College of the 
Armed forces and the US Army War College A seasoned 
combat Officer (Vietnam-four battle campaigns 1968-69), 
Brtgadiet General Ragano has had indepth project manage- 
ment experience. In 1972 he was assigned as Protect Man- 
ager of the 2.75 Inch Rocket System. Later and immediately 
prior to his present US Koland assignment he became Project 
Manager of the CANNON Artillery W'eapons System (CAWS) 
that included the htghly successful Cannon Launched Guided 
Projecttle (CLGP). 

Dcfenae Syatenu Management Reviewi 


ROLAND, A Technology 
Transfer Program 


John H. Richardson, Hughes Aircraft Company 

lo paraphase a recent song, “we can see more clearly now." after some I 5 months of experi- 
ence in transferring the Roland weapon system technology from huropc lo the UniltHi 
States. The picture is somewhat different than that seen at the programs outset. 

I here were difficulties, ranging from licensing negotiations to parts clas.sifications. My hope 
is that by sharing our experiences we may help those who will be involved in technology 
transfer programs in the future. 


The ROLAND Technology Transfer 

( learly. itic lechnology Iranstcr has had far more 
ramilicalions than were conlcrnpiated by the con- 
tractors. While the learnitig cycle was painful at times 
m terms of program delays and cost growth, I am 
convinced that satisfactory solutions have been found. 
The benefits that will accrue to the t!S Ifom cost and 
schedule savings ap[sear to outweigh the difficulties 

Team Concept 

Let me outline the process through which Hughes 
teamed with Hie Boeing Company lo become the US 
licensee to produce the Roland system. Hughes, be- 
cause of its extensive background in air defense, was 
quite naturally interested in seeking solutions lo the 
US Army's low-altitude delense mission. When the 
Army began to accelerate its low-altitude, forward- 
area. air defense (l.flf-AAD) efiorts in I‘f7(). activ- 
ities at Huglies Aircraft began to accelerate. 

Systam Selection 

Analysis of the need for operational improvements 
lo .Short Range Air Defense (.SHOK.AD). indicated 
that an all-weather capability was required for West- 
ern Kuropcan operations because of the long periods 
of low visibility in that area. The apparent options 

were to make the current { haparral an all-wcalhoi 
system, start a new LI.S developmeni . or deploy a 
furopeun system. 

After considering all the choices, including the 
french Crolale, the British Rapier, and the VVesI 
(ieriiian-f rarico Ridand possibilities, the determina- 
tion was made by Hughes .Aircraft that the Roland, 
thoujih consiJerahly lew maiure than the other si v- 
tetm, was the most eost elleetive ehoiee. 

Our concept was that the 1 uropean system would 
be ready for true second source production in the US 
without any changes being made lo the system. This 
proved to be a rather naive point of view since there 
had lo be a few. though not many, changes made to 
meet US Army requirements 

The Team 

About this lime, Hughes and Boeing, both in- 
terested in the Roland license, determined that, work- 
ing as a team, they could optimally produce the 
Roland. As a consequence, a team agreement was 
signed establishing the roles of the two companies in 
hardware production. Huglies was established as the 
prime contractor. 

Kuromissile selected the Hughes-Boeing team as its 
US licensee for the Roland in the f all of l‘)72. A gen- 
eral agreement was signed in October l‘>72. This doc- 


Vol. I, ,No. 3. 


iiiiuMil ol atiCi'iMctit was llio basis ol llic loimal li- 
ccnso jitatucil by I uromissilc in Novetiiber IV7 ?. nic 
pailics Mopotiatinp the license ai’teeniciu attempted 
to aibieve a balanced arianpement ol llie riphls and 
obliealions imposed on each. Obviously it is more 
dillieult to neeotiale lot additional riplits alter an 
apieement has been teaebed 

Role of US Government 

At ibis jimeuire tbe role ot llie I IS (lovernment in 
license nejtotialions between American and loreign 
industrial liims deserves particular attention In spe- 
alic areas it assistance were piven to tbe imliislrial 
paiticii'ants, by tbe L 'S (iovvnunent prior to rlw start 
o) negotiations, all would benefit. Tins assistance 
woiiUl be most beneficial it it were to include: 

• liuidelmes descrihinp tbe royalty rates that 
iniplil be accejitable tor payment by tbe TS 
( iovernment undei piven circumstances. 

• Special airanpements tbe I ',S (iovernment de- 
sires to bave settled by tbe license agreement. 

• I slahbslmient ol a set ol lees and royalties con- 
sidered leasonable b\ tbe I S (iovernment. OR 

Data Rights 

Data rights provide another area that requires at- 
tention. II tbe IIS (lovertmieitl wishes to obtain 
rights in data beyond those normally provided, it 
would be well it industry were so advised. This ad- 
vice should include tbe various arrangements that 
might be acceptable to the government so the data 
rights can be priced as necessary, l or exaniide. does 
industry need to obtain a price for total unlimited 
rights and/or a price lor rights to transfer Ireely the 
data to any US industiial concern for US use only'.’ 

European Concerns 

Ibere is some concern in the I uropean commu- 
nity that US industry miglit use I uropean-generated 
data more efficiently llian lurropean industry and as 
a consequence tbe overseas industry wishes to limit as 
much as possible tbe number of US companies or in- 
dividuals to whom the data may be delivered. 

I bis desire of I uropean industry to limit data dis- 
tribution makes it imperative for the I S Department 
of Defense to notijy the US industry if DOD will 
need to hire a support eontraetor to supervise the 
performance of tbe US contractor so that arrange- 
ments can be made in tbe license agreement 

• Ascepiance ol reasonable tees and royalties 
agreed to by tbe US and foreign industrial 

• Detailed guidelines describing the conditions 
under which the US Government may he free 
to sell, deliver, ^ive away, or otherwise dispose 
of the equipment to he manufaetured under 
the anreement 

Industrial representatives ol the U.S then could re- 
quest these rights early in tbe negotiations and iden- 
tify or settle any areas of inlergovernment conflict 
before final agreement is reached. 

In the case o] Roland, mmmderstandinns in the 
areas listed did arise. Some months after the contract 
award it hecame necessary for the three governments 
to negotiate a settlement. Hie negotiations resulted in 
a memorandmn of agreement on August lb, |b7.S, 
and a memorandum of understanding on October S, 
|b7S llie industrial firms involved now are placing 
these arrangements in final form and negotiating an 
appropriate amendment to tbe license agreement. 
I be liceitse amendment then must be approved by 
the three governments, more than 15 nionibs after 
the contract award. 

Second Sourcing 

The US (iovernment normally wants the right to 
be able to obtain a second source in production. The 
license must explicitly treat w'ilb this right and with 
the point in time when this right can be exercised. 
Tbe licensor is understandably reluctant to bave his 
data package, now converted for US production, re- 
leased to other US companies without some con- 

Licensing Approaches Available 

On US Roland a license was entered into between 
US industry and l uropean industry. An alternative 
would be for tbe US Department of Defense to ne- 
gotiate for and procure a license directly from Turo- 
pean industry. Tbe military service involved could 
then conduct a competition within US industry tor 
tbe system, riiis would require that the Department 
of Delense evaluate beforeband tbe foreign systems 
to determine which one to license and hence which 
one to compete. Such an evaluation would bave to 
include an assessment of the price, reliability, re- 
producibility. mission suitability, and delivery sched- 
ules for each system but without the involvement ol 
US industry. At that stage only a very timited data 


Defense Sy.s»ems MinagemenI Review 

packjfic wiiiiKI ho jvailahlo siiioc llio oust aiul time 
roqiiiroi.1 Id huy tho dala. translalc il.aml oonvorl id I'S 
slaiularJs is oxoessivo, ospooially on sovoral sysloms. 
Ilaviiip soloclod a s\Atom. a limitod data paokajio ihon 
WDultl ho put I'lil Idi I is hid and ooniraotor soloolion. 
A ma|ot disadvantaiio In this allornallvo WDuld ho 
that llio soloolod oontraolot could claim that any 
prohloms aiiMiij; diiriiij; llio loclinoloj;y tianslor ptoc- 
OSS woro tho losull ol a doficionl data package sup 
pliod hy ilio US povornmont. I liis. oT courso. would 
ho in coniiast to tho curroni situation whoroin wo 
must solvo such prohloms with our licensor 

Revision of Regulations and Procedures 

Iho Deparlmonl ot Dolonso could perhaps lacili- 
late tho translcr ol tochnolopy in liiture ptoprams hy 
rovisinp certain ropulations and procodiiros. t or o.v- 
ample, hefore the issuance of a request .for proposal. 
DO!) should have a clear concept of what it is trying 
to accomplish in the transfer of technology. Is the US 
aitemptinp to save lime and/or nionoy ’ Are wo mov- 
inp down the "iwo way street" ol intornational sland- 
ardi/ation ’ Or hoth’’ I ho system hoinp acquired will 
have evolved in a military, cultural, and social en- 
vironment completely diUerent Irom that ol the US 
and must necessarily have sipnilicani dilTerences in 
approach to end use. maintenance, logistics, and 
parts selection 

for desirable military, eeonomic. and political 
reasons, the application of I'S military specifications 
and regulations applying to a I 'Selceeloped system 
cannot reasonahly he applied across the hoard to a 
system that was developed in a diUergnl way and 
which is already completed. 

Engineering Changes 

I here has hecn considerahle misunderstandinp 
concerning the changes made hy the US. To preserve 
interchangeahility, the US Roland has not hcen 
Americani/ed. With the exception of two changes, it 
is being produced exactly to the l tiro|>ean design. 
The two changes in the US version are substitution ol 
higher rated igniter squids in the rocket motor ol the 
missile to comply with our national safety standards 
and suhstitulion of a higher power Iransmilter to in- 
crease the power output of the track radar for 
purposes. Those who contend that we have been mak- 
ing changes for "changes sake" are just plum wrong 

Performance Tests and Design Verification 

Significant time and cost savings could be realized 
on certain performance tests and design verification 
if the US would accept the results of equivalent tests 

conducted in I mope Ideally, only limited perlorm- 
ance testing and environmental verilicalions tests 
should he conducted in the I S to amplity on loreign 
lesimp and to veiily that the technology was sulli- 
cienlly lianslerred so that US-mamilaclured hanlwaie 
perlorms as well as the I uropean-made hardware. 

Ifecause ol the extensive testing requiiemenls laid 
down hy 1)01). the curient icchnology iransler proc- 
ess lalls somewhere between a true second souice and 
a regular research, developmenl. test, and evaluation 


.Slaiidardi/alion. the type and degree, presents aii- 
othei dilemma. I he degree ol inieriiational slandard- 
i/ation desired vis-a-vis the degree o| national stand- 
ardi/ation among other US military weapon systems 
should be determined by the 1)01) Currently, these 
two types of slandardi/alion pull in opposite direc- 
tions at considerable expense in lime, money, and 

Specifications and System Capabilities 

. 1/1 area of maior onicerii is the iiossihilitv that 
1)01) may e.xpect more from a transferred foreign 
weapon system than that system is capable of provid- 
ing. file Rtdand program is a case in point 

Hie SIIOKAI) Request (or I’loposal IRIT’I con- 
tained a system specification with considerahle de- 
tailed application ol normal US lequiieiiients. I 'nited 
States industry responded by analyzing the licensed 
foreign weapon system anil indicated the areas where 
it did and did not comply with specilications. Be 
cause ol the limited tiansfei of loreign lechnologv at 
that particular time, US industry did not recogni/c 
that some of the requirements imposed on Roland 
were beyond the capability of the system without 
significant ledesign. 

This problem can be alleviated in future technol- 
ogy transfer programs if the .government will submit 
the specifications to industry well in advance of the 
Kf-T. giving industry adequate tune ti> make a de- 
tailed reviess' with tts Turopean partners. The lesull 
would be a mote complete and accuiate lespoiise to 
the Rl I’ 

Threat Assessment and System Requirements 

.Another lactoi affecting system lequlienients is 
threat assessment In many cases the l^S and loieign 
view ol the same threat is different this variance 

' V 

Vol.l,No. 3. 



cdusi’N ililloioni rci|uiri.’im'iils lo hi- placcil on ilu' 
wi’.ipon syslom. IlKTclnrc, lhro;il inlorprelalions 
slunilil Ih- cxplotoil jointly hy the US ;nul lorci(;n 
povornmcnts i\iily in the ptoeuremont process. 

Technical Data Transfer 

Tlte 1 utopeans. tor obvious reasons, are jealous 
ol their technical data atui would provide us only 
enough inlorination to allow US industry to re- 
spond to the request tor proposal. It is understand- 
able that an -ymerican company not under contract 
ssould pay only a limtted amount lor such technical 
data compared to the value ol the data package lor 
which the loreign povernments and industry have 
made a large investment. 

h sfcim that ihc US should consider providing 
su/ficicnr funds for technical data transfer as a type 
of phase zero contract to each competing contractor 
offering a foreign system. 


I he Roland problem did not cease with contract 
award. On the contrary. Hie Hughes license agree- 
ment required delivery ol all European drawings on 
niicrorilm cards within .^0 days following contract 
award. Aclually. only a few drawings were on niicro- 
tUm when the contract was let. When one considers 
that the Roland fire unit and missile have ’.‘i.OOO 
drawings plus 40.000 additional documents (com- 
pared to the original estimate of 25,000 drawings 
and 2.U000 documents) comprising tooling data, 
nianutact tiring plans, catalog sheets, and specifica- 
tions It IS understandable that the mechanics to 
accumulate, photograph, document, and transport 
tlieiii consumed nearly 4 rnontlis 

In aildition, the receipt process in the U.S, includ- 
ing customs clearance, unpacking, checking shipment 
contents, reproducing contents for translation, assign- 
ing Army part numbers lo each drawing, cataloging, 
and distributing items to project engineering activities 
re(|uired an additional month. 

Clearly, we must be more realistic in scheduling 
data Iransler on luture programs. 


Translation was of such concern in terms of quan- 
tity and quality that Hughes considered preparing a 
large technical dictionary. In the end, a translation 
contractor located near the lltiglies facilities in Cali- 
(ornia, was selected, and with good fortune. Strict 

quality control was easy lo iniplemcnl. and as trans- 
lation anoniolies were quickly led back lo the con- 
tractor. a high (juality translation product was 

Parts Conversion 

Conversion of electrical and mechanical parts 
from Turopean to US parts is another maior tech- 
nology transfer issue At present there are very 
limited I iiropean-to-HS parts conversion lists and 
without those lists it is necessary lo obtain an in- 
depth understanding of each part lo assure proper 
conversion. With more than I7,0()0 different type 
parts on Roland, this effort required significant time 
and resources since the percentage of parts for which 
an equivalent US mil-standard item existed was less 
than we expected, (>0 percent vs dO percent How- 
ever. our estimate of total parts, 66.000. almost 
matched the actual number, 68, 2.^0. 

Despite these problems, dd percent of all parts 
conversions were made during the first d ntonths of 
the program. 

I.ists of parts applicable for foreign military pro- 
grams are being developed by NATO. When these lists 
are completed the parts conversion task will be 
simplified greatly, a genuine plus for future programs. 

The parts problem does not apply to materials and 
processes. Almost all materials specified in l-.uropean 
drawings are available in the US. Too, almost all 
manufacturing processes specified in Turope have 
been derived from U.S mil-standard processes. Thus, 
conversion from Huroiiean to a corresponding U.S 
process was a direct task. 

The original objective of the Roland program was 
to have all materials and parts produced in the US. In 
the initial phase of a technology transfer program 
wherein only a few systems are being is 
expensive to pay for this objective. 

We recommend that in the future IK)D allow 
limited quantities of parts to be procured in liurope 
where none exists in the US, or where high tooling 
costs are involved. The suggestion is made that ILS 
equivalent pHirts he incorporated in the production 
phase where the tooling costs can he amortized over 
the production quantities. 

Drawing Conversion 

Another thought. There Joes not exist among 

I f< Defriiae Syslenu Manigement Review 

l uropt’an contrach>rs a Jrawm.v convcnlion standard 
•iuch js wc have in the I'S. 

In llie case ol Rolaiul there are 14 major con- 
tractors m ('urope. each with its own drawing prac- 
tices The drawing transler task requited us to acquire 
most ol the drallmg room manuals from each l.uro- 
pean suhconlractor to permit drawing conversion. In 
lutuie programs, we recommend that I'tiropean draft- 
ing room supervisors spend from 2 weeks to I month 
at the I'S contractor facilities to review the received 
drawings and documentation to enable a more rapid 
aiul elllcient conversion to US drawing practices. 

One other h'urniiean deficiency is the lack of a 
complete indentured drawing list, that is, a drawing 
tree from top assembly down to each bit and piece. 
This lack required us to generate the indentured 
drawing list to understand the interrelationship 
among all of the drawings and documents received. 

Here is the good news' Hughes sueeess/ully con- 
verted the drawings and released fir manufaeture V.f 
percent of the total technical data package 14 months 
into the program. 

Engineering Change Management 

Another issue that should be addressed on future 
programs is the proper application of engineering 
change management eontrols by the eooperating gov- 
ernments Change control must he applied uniformly 
on the Tiiropean and US manufacturers. I.ack of such 
control makes tracking o( engineering changes in a 

timely maimer by the respective industrial partners 
very difficult. 

Ihus, the I'.S (iovemment should negotiate with 
the eooperating foreign governments the overall engi- 
neering management control requirements. Ihe de- 
tailed procedures for implementing these manage- 
ment controls should he led to the industrial part- 
ners for practical resolution 

Application of the Metric System 

t inally. one element of the technology transfer 
task that was foreseen and understood was the fab- 
rication of Roland in the metric system. The prob- 
lems feared were less ve.xatious than expected and in 
tact quickly disappeared. Use of the metric system 
simply is no problem. 


These are my thoiiglits. I have indicated those ac- 
tions that I believe might be taken to improve future 
foreign technology transler progiams. and I have dis- 
cussed the actions Hughes Aircraft took eaily to 
solve difficulties. The magnitude ol ihe problems 
encounlered is relatively modest compared to the 
large savings in money and time that will be realized 
when Roland becomes o[ieratioiial Ibis Army an 
defense capability is urgently needed I am indeed 
happy that Hughes Aircrafl is having a key role in 
providing the system. I do. however, regret having 
been a contributor to a cost growth problem tor all ol 
us The hope is ihal by sharing experiences as we 
learn those who follow will he wiser 


Mr, John M. Richardson. 
I xccutive Vice Prcsidcnf. 
Hughes Aircraft ( ompany. has 
responsibility for the com- 
pany's line operating organi/a* 
tions. Mr Richardson has 
previously served as Assistant 

(rcneral Manager and Senior 
Vice President; Senior Vic-c President^ Operations, and earlier. 

as Senior Vice President and Group I\ecutivc ot the com- 
pany's Aerospace (iroup He is a member of the companv's 
pollc> hoard and management cscvutive committee In 
N^orld NVar II. Mr Richardson served as a pilot with the 
I'S Air force in the Pacific area Mr, Richardson attended 
PrincTton I’niversity. and has completed executive courses at 
UriA and Mil as well as the American Management Av 
sociation's Marketing course 

Vol.LNo. 3. 



NATO’s Military and Economic 


Brigadier General James A. Abraliamson. IJSAF 

The F-16 is a military program to develop and produce an advanced, low-cost, multipurpose 
fighter for the Unitetl States Air Force and the Air Forces of four NATO Allies- Belgium, 
Denmark, The Netherlands and Norway. Of equal importance, the F-16 Program is an eco- 
nomic program designed to strengthen the NATO Alliance through coproduction. Fhis higli 
performance aircraft is to l)e delivered from three as.sembly lines, each located in a different 
country. \ base of 4,000 IJS subcontractors and suppliers and .JO Euroiiean coproducers are 
to be employetl in the effort. These factors make the F-16 one of the most important 
efforts within NATO to achieve the benefits of standardization. 

The Consortium 

The 1 1(> consortiutn program is a partnership in 
the deepest sense ol the word. The importance of the 
ohiectives and ttic complex dynamics of the program 
can be seen from a hriel examination of the program 
history, the I K) itself, the coproduction effort and 
the depth and significance of F-lb standardization. 

fhe T K) consortium program was born on both 
sides ol the Atlantic. In the United .States, a proto- 
type demonstration program was underway to 
evaluate the application of advanced technology to a 
new generation ol lightweight, low cost, highly- 
maneuverable fighter aircraft. 1 wo aircraft com- 
panies. (ieneral Dynamics (the Yl -lb aircraft) and 
Northrop Aircraft (the YF-17 aircraft), were se- 
lected to design and build two lightweight fighter 
(I WF ) prototypes. Wlien the USAF determined that 
such a concept was feasible and functional, the LWF 
Prototype Program was accelerated and competitive 
llyofl conducted. Based on this flyoff and mission 
and cost considerations, the US decided to develop 
and produce the 1-16. Plans to implement a “full- 
scale” development program were initiated. 

At the time the USAF was pursuing its lightweight 
figliier prototype efforts, the Belgain. Danish, Nether- 
lands and Norwegian fioverniiients were evaluating 

the need to modernize their tactical air forces by re- 
placing aircraft such as the i -lOO and F-104 w.iich 
were rapidly approaching obsolescence. Far-sighted 
individuals in these Furopean nations concluded that 
the most practical method of approaching the prob- 
lem was to integrate activities such that a common 
replacement aircraft, meeting common requirements, 
could be procured for the respective Air Forces. 

A four nation consortium was constructed to pur- 
sue selection of a replacement aircraft on a multina- 
tional basis, roiisiderations of economics, balance of 
payments, technology transfer, and industrial stability 
were of major concern to the Furopean nations. In 
addition to the operational aspects of a replacement 
aircraft, it was decided that selection would also be 
based on a requirement that the aircraft would be 
coproduced within the consortium nations to offset 
aircraft and support equipment investment. 

The Furopean (jovernments selected three can- 
didate aircraft for evaluation: the French F lF 
Super-Mirage, the Swedish AJ-.^7 Viggen, and the 
winner of the US lightweight lighter competition, 
the YF-16. After an arduous series of evaluations and 
negotiations, the Furopean (jovernments selected 
the F-16. This selection was made because the F-16 
provided a combination of demonstrated capability 
and significant advancement in technology and |X't- 
formance while providing a system that was not 

Defense Systems Manigemcnl Review 

overly eoniplcx. The h'-lh offered the potential for 
lower cost, and iniproved reliability and maintenance 
capability. The selection was made (>n the basis ol 
the commitment that coproduction would take place 
m each of the four countries such that at least .‘'S 
percent of the acquisition cost of a 34H buropean 
aircraft program would be offset 

Negotiations for the F ib Multinational Fighter 
Program (MNT P) were concluded on 10 June Id75 
by the signing of a five-nation Memorandum of 
I'nderstanding that provides the basis for the current 
F-lb five-country development program. The par- 
ticipants were the United .States. Belgium, Denmark, 
Norway, and the Netherlands. 

In addition to numerous operational features and 
technological advancements, the F-16 provides inno- 
vative and unique economic features that deserve 

The F-lb program is a joint business effort to pro- 
duce the F-lb in the llnited States and in Furopc. 
As a result management of the program is complex. 
The ultimate goal of the program is to place certain 
F-lb production business in Furope to offset 100 
percent of the cost of the Furopeans’ initial buy of 
148 aircraft. I he 100 percent offset is to be com- 
pleted with the sale of 21X10 aircraft. This buy repre- 
sents about S2--1 billion, measured in 1075 dollars. 
The offset goal is to be achieved in phases based upon 
the total number of aircraft produced, e.g., 58 per- 
cent of the Furopeans' outlay is to be offset during 
the production of the first 008 F-lb aircraft (b50 US, 
.148 F.uropean) and the target of l(X) percent offset 
should occur when 2,0(X) aircraft have been produced. 

The coproduction of the F-16 consists of the fabri- 
cation and assembly of major structual components by 
both the US and Furopean industries, interchange of 
these components among the industries, and assembly 
of the F-16 in the United States and at two locations 
in Furope. Furopean industrial production will result 
in .148 aircraft rolling off the assembly lines in Bel- 
gium and the Netherlands. Norway and Denmark will 
be involved primarily with producing avionics and 
equipment subsystems. Industries in Furope will also 
support deliveries of the F-16 from the production 
line at Fort Worth, Texas. 

Aircraft and engines manufactured in Furope will 
be made to US engineering specifications. The US 
drawings will be provided to the coproducing com- 
panies. In most cases, these drawings will be con- 
verted to metric and translated to the national lan- 
guage. The drawings wdll then be used to generate 
the “factory paper" of the Furopean participants. 

i.e.. shop Instructions, blue prints, process sheets, ets . 
Inspection and acceptance will he to the original I S 
drawings and specifications in the I nglish language 
and in nonmetric measurement More than thirty 
I iiropeaii companies will be involved m this copro- 
duction program. Three experienced aircralt com- 
panies (Fokker, Fairey and .Sabca) will manutaclure 
airirame components, and assemble and delivei the 
F ib to the Air Forces ol the Furopean parlicipalmg 
(iovernments Ihe other twenty-seven plus companies 
in Furope will be involved with avionics items and 
equipment subsystems Four countries are participat- 
ing in labrication and assembly of the engine. Forty 
such items are being coproduced with some com- 
panies being involved with mote than one item. Ihe 
list reads like a "Who's Who m Furopean Business" 
All arc respected firms. 

The coproduction program is not without danger. 
The US Ail Force program management must be 
sensitive to the complexities ol doing business m 
Furope. The amount and timing ot holidays, the use 
ol overtime or multishift operations, risk-taking 
philosophy and Furopean manufacturing span times 
are some of the areas that might affect the integrity 
of schedules. For example. V^S leadtime lor F-lb 
manufacture and delivery is 24 months, while it is. 
normally, .Tb months in Furope. Certain management 
initiatives will be required on the part ol the US over 
the next 6 years, if the entire program is to be kept 
on schedule. The task is not easy. The potential pit- 
falls and complications of delivering high perform- 
ance aircraft Irom three assembly lines, each located 
in a different country, using a base of 4.000 US sub- 
contractors and suppliers and more than thirty co- 
producers in Furope, is mind-boggling. Chart .A illus- 
trates some program benefits each of which each 
carry a corollary complexity. 

Among the most difficult of the challenges is con- 
figuration management. Problems Irom "user'' iiit'uts 
have been dealt with in past programs, but the ini|iact 
of changes on the five-nation coproduction is unusu- 
ally severe. The related fields of production control, 
international contracting atid financing play an im- 
portant role in configuration decisions. A Multina- 
tional Configuration Control Board decides on the ac- 
ceptability of changes proposed by the cotitractois 
and using Air Forces. The Board is comprised of rep- 
resentatives of the five-nations. 

The benefits of coproduction, enjoyed on both 
sides of the Atlantic, constitute the overriding con- 
sideration. The increase in jobs in the greater Fort 
Worth Texas area, where the F-16 is produced by 
General Dynamics, is significant. A little less obvious 
is the great number of jobs being created throughout 
the United Slates at the subcontractor level. It is con- 

Vol. I, No. 3. 



Program Benefit 

Corollary Complexity 

T ranstei of technoloqy 
m dieas such as 
landing gear . engine 
anti assemhly line 

Requires relocation of 
ex()erienced personnel 
from five countries with 
subsequent dilution of 
corporate capabilities 

More )obs and liusiness 
through Cascade " 
effect of increased 

Careful planning and 
more lead time are 
required because of 
differences in socio 
economic systems (i e , 
overtime, shifts, wages) 

Five countries share 
cost of development 

Exchange rates, currency 
commonality, and "fair 
shares" must be estab 

Inferchangeabilitv of 

parts resulting in 
inventory reduction 
and increased support 
ability, operability , 
maintenance capability 

Increased emphasis on 
quality control and data 
transfer, requirements, 
and procedures 

Configuration inputs 
from all countries get 
into development early 

Changes result in poten- 
tial cost and time loss 

si'tvjiivelv ONliiiidifil itial 4().()(X) Americans will he 
empliiyeil in lire mamilacliire of the I -l(i when full 
prinluctliin IS achieved In I iirope, ahoul h,(X)() 
peiiple will owe then livelihood to llie F U> Miiltina- 
liottal I i)iliter I’ro^iain. 

riie lechiiKal Iranstei aspects ot the program are 
almost as important as the economic henefits. United 
States aerospace companies are working closely with 
various and diverse t iiropean industries. In some 
cases, the relation is one of peers working together 
to produce a common item. In other cases, the US 
partner m coproduction has taken the role of mentor 
and IS developing a capahihty within the t uropean 
partner that did not previously exist Krom a people- 
to-pcople standpoint, the 1-16 Multinational f ighter 
I’tograni is a tiemendous success and may he a model 
tor future international ventures t.ach day brings a 
closer mutual understanding of viewpoints among the 
people ol the five participating nations. Americans 
have been placed in l urope to work closely with 
Belgian. Danish. Dutch and Norwegian industrial or 
military people on a daily basis. Europeans have been 

sent to the United States to assist in program maiiage- 
merit . 

The tollowmg is a summalion ol some of the key 
lessons learned in the f lh coproduction program 
These lessons include considerations ol currency ex- 
change. the Buy American Act and the cultural dit- 
tererices ol the various countries 

Currency Exchange 

The coproduction effort llowing from the I l(i 
Multmalional l ighter Program has grown to encom- 
pass more than .^0 Kuropean companies and in excess 
of SO subcontractors. The mullitaceled Iransaclions 
among these fcuropean companies, the US suheon- 
Iraclors, and the f -16 primary airirame and engine 
contractors, require continuous currency transac- 
tions. The participating governments ol Norway, Den- 
mark. Belgium, the Netherlands and United States 
agreed, in the Government to Governmenl Memo- 
randum of U'riderslanding signed in June l')7.S, to the 
principle that companies participating in the program 
should be insulated from the inherent risks of open 
marked currency llucluations. Thus, all F -lb Multi- 
national Fighter Program contracts have been issued 
using the fixed exchange rates that were established 
by the five participating couiiiries. 

This unique arrangement created a complex prob- 
lem of miplenieritalion for the program office. The 
resulting procedures, which are still in the process of 
being finalized, require the combined cflorls and tal- 
ents of the Department of the Treasury, Departmeni 
of State, Fleadquarlcrs. llnited States .Air Force. 
Headquarters Air Force Systems C'oinmand. Air 
f-'orce Accounting and Finance Cenler, Ait Force 
f'otilraci Management Division and the internalioiial 
banking community. 

The resultant procedures will utilize an Ait F orce 
Accounting and Finance Center controlled currency 
clearing house which will be associated with resident 
banks in the participating countries. 

Currency forecasts will be required from all par- 
ticipating subcontractors to permit allocation of the 
appropriate mix of funds ,) the currency clearing 
house All contractors then will be required to use 
the currency clearing house for all transactions re- 
quiring currency exchange. 

Buy Am«rican Act 

The Buy American Act restricts Department of 
Defense procurement of certain non-DS products. 
Where such procurements are necessary, the procur- 


Defenic Syttenu Management Review 

iiij; .ij;oiK\ miisi tiilK siihslaiitialc the rciiiiireinoiil on 
the hasis 111 cost, jvailahilily or related laclors lhal 
|ustil\ proeiireineni ol a tion US ilem. Sueli procure- 
menis are nornially handled on a case-hy-case hasis. 
Dependinj; on the nature ol the procurenieni , aullior- 
i/ation to waive provisions of the Huy American Act 
are )trarited at lire local level for low value items or at 
the Service I leadipiarlers or 1)01) level lor larjte pro- 

( oprodiiction aspects ol the I l(i program, requir- 
mj; lhal furo(H’an industry produce hardware items 
equivalent in value to It) percent ol the procurement 
value ol the 1 S,M acciuisition ol (i.'iO aircrall, re- 
quired issuance of an exemption lo the Huy American 
Ai.1 Ihis exemption is reaccomphshed annually and 
applies lo those items procured Irom I uropcan in- 
dustry lhal count toward achievement ofthel'Soll- 
sel commitment The exemption was issued by Head- 
quarters. I'nited States Air force. Deputy Chiel of 
Staff. Systems and l.ogislics ( AI H-Ci ) with approval 
ol the Office of the .Secretary of Defense, Defense 
Securilv Assistance .-X^ieiicy (OSD/DSAA). 

conscious ol vacalion privileges. Where I'S va- 
cation periods are notmally taken at random 
and there is little or no ellect on production 
rales, furopean vacations arc more structured, 
industry oticn shuts down for specific periods 
of litiic, and production may come lo a com- 
plete hall for those periods. 

• ProduclHin Rafes The US industry is oriented 
toward high rales of production and with little 
regard lor economic or work force stability, 
furopean industry is very conscious ol these 
laclors and works toward achieving long term 
stability in both the work force and in produc- 
tion rales, prolll.and capital investment. 

• Schedules Schedules arc directly aficcled by 
wages, taxes, worker privileges and production 
rates. Where an f-l(> aircralt can be produced 
III the US in 24 months, an f -l(> airciaft pro- 
duced in fiirope may take as many as ,fb 
months lo produce and will be more expensive. 

I xemplion ol this nature will be required lor all 
soopeialne development /acquisition programs 

through which the Dcparinient of Deicnse obtains 
mihlary hardware manulaclurcd outside the US. 



Cultural Differences 

( iiproduclion planning accomplished by US prime 
contractors ((icneral Dynamics and I’rall and Whit- 
ney Aircrall) was done on the basis ol assumptions 
ibal did not anticipate cultural diflcrenccs between 
US and I uropean industry. In fact, there is a sub- 
stantial dillerence between ways of doing business in 
the US and in f urope. 

• tiiropean Wages. Hased on a more socialistic 
society, furopean wages include higher amounts 
lor health, social security, retirement and other 
fringe benefits than do US wages. 

• European Personnel Income Taxes, f uropean 
personnel income taxes arc substantially higliei 
than US personal income taxes. These European 
taxes arc based on a more progressive rale struc- 
ture lhal results in strict adherence lo the basic 
work week Much of European industry pro- 
hibits the use of overtime, limits operations to a 
,S-<lay work week, and works only one shift per 
day to avoid forcing employees into high in- 
come tax brackets. 

• Vacalion Privileges. European society is more 

• Capital, furopean industry is under capitalized 
m comparison with US industry, fhereisalsoa 
substantial portion ol furopean industry which 
is partially or wholly government owned As a 
result, there is a cash-llow problem lhal results 
in the use ol advance lunding and/or applica- 
tion ol partial payments at the '»() or l(K) per- 
cent level rather than at the XO percent level 
which is typical in US contracts. 

• Accounting Practices and Other Procedures 

There arc also differences in accounting prac- 
tices. audit procedures, solicitation and bidding 
procedures, procurement regulations and pro- 
cedures, and contractual procedures and minor 
differences in quality control standards and 
procedures. European industry also uses the 
metric system of weights and measurements 
while US industry, though slowly changing, is 
still standardized on the inch/pound system. 

All ol the factors stated have inlliienced the way in 
which E-lb coproduction will be accomplished in 
f/urope and the manner in which program agreements 
and contracts have been negotiated and implemented. 

In all aspects where differences have been en- 
countered the governments and/or the contractors 
have been requited to negotiate a solution. The US 
cannot impose its procedures or standards on Euro- 
pean industry. The result is normally a compromise in 
which both sides must alter their normal approach or 
treatment to some degree. 

Vol. I, No. 3. 


Miillinjlioiul ajirfomcnis liavc been ncpoliatcti 
lonccmiMp application ot the Armed Services Pro- 
ciitemeiit Kegiilations (ASPRI. cost accounting 
ctandaivis, quality assuiance standards, cimtractual 
and technical audit procedures, exemption rrl na- 
tninal taxes and duties, application ot the specialty 
metals clause, liability for patent iniringements, lia- 
bilits tor ground llight damage, cutiency exchange, 
economic puce adiiistmenl , configuralion manage- 
ment. and a multitude ofothei I - 1 b program aspects 
ot multinational concern. 

1 erms and conditions ot contracts between the 
I S \l and rS industry must be passed on to I uro- 
peaii industry Negotiation of these terms and condi- 
tions was accomplished, but with considerable diffi- 
culty In many instances these negotiations were 
successtully completed only after reaching agreement 
at the (lovernment-to-fiovernment level on general 
principles or policy. 

A signilicant diflerence. related to but apart from 
the above, concerns international business experience. 
Most I uropean firms have been involved in interna- 
tional business and production for many years. 
I lilted States firms have been involved to a signil'i- 
cantly lesser degree and, at that, have dealt with 
loreign subsidiaries of the parent I'S corporation or 
have wiirked only undei a license arrangement with a 
loreign linn wh.o would manufacture a I'S developed 
product lor use by iheii (iovernnient or for sale in 
the iniernational market The I -lb prime and sub- 
contractors had little experience in international in- 
dustrial cooperation and coproduction. Initial con- 
tracts with I uropean industry suflered owing to this 
lack ol experience and the “not invented here” ap- 
proach taken in dealing with l uropean industry 
leaders, rmled Stales (lovernnicnl agencies suflered 
Iroin this same lack ol international experience the 
lack ol sensilivity to f uropean concerns and issues, 
and a tendency to deal with the hiiropean Air Forces/ 
(•overnmerils on the basis that the IJ.S way was the 
only way. Change in this attitude, which is not yet 
complete, has been a difficult proce,ss. 

A large number of Furopean business people have 
spent considerable periods of time in American lacto- 
nes receiving technical training. At the same lime, 
these (H’lsons learned about the American way of life. 
I ruled Slates pervmnel assigned to F.urope are gain- 
ing an appreciation ot the quality of life in F.urope. 
I he goal ol "bringing people together" is being 
achieved I very member ol the team must go about 
daily tasks considering the "big picture" and not any 
single, national point ol view. 

I bus. we have ilealt with the military and eco- 

nomic complexities of the F-lb Multinational Pro- 
gram a complex program that demonstrates the ne- 
cessity foi partnership management by what may he. 
perhaps, unexampled cooperation and mutual con- 
sultation The complexities of this pioneering man- 
agement process often seem staggering but the experi- 
ence to dale has been positive Progress has been keen. 
Beyond the routine debate that often characteri/ed 
NATO common efforts in the past, the F-lb multina- 
tional team is hammering out vital decisions, and im- 
plementing far-reaching actions for the benefit of all. 

At the root of this progress has been a strong, un- 
precedented spirit of cooperation and trust . Curiously, 
the bond has been strengthened by common con- 
straints among the participating nations. F.ach of the 
live nations has been strongly motivated by the 
need to moderni/.e its tactical air force by the most 
economical means and get the most for its money. 
The F-lb fulfills this need. F.ach of the countries has 
been keenly interested in standardizing those weap- 
ons systems that are frequently in concurrent use in 
neighboring Allied Forces. Here the T-lb is a giant 
step forward. All nations, in the face of shrinking de- 
fense budgets, want to recoup expenditures by shar- 
ing in (he benefits that accrue from sales. The F-lb 
provides such a solution. Although not a panacea to 
the problems of procuring economically suitable and 
credible military hardware, the F-lb carries with it an 
unusually large and varied number of attributes. 
These attributes provide high motivation to partici- 
pating nations incentives to wisrk hard at solving 
the inherent management complexities. 

The purely military benefits of NATO standardiza- 
tion and tactical modernization are so evident and 
necessary that the question of objective does not 
arise. The fundamental decision forum shifts to the 
economic and political constraints. 

As five sovereign nations go about the detailed 
analysis of tactical doctrines, mission usage, and 
resultant F'-lb equipment selection to meet particular 
requirements, it might be expected that different 
equipage and configuration will occur. This has been 
true in the past, when economic and political factors 
were applied to potential common programs. This is 
not the case with the F-lb. The five nations began 
with twenty-one country-by-country peculiar F-lb 
configuralion requirements. These requirements have 
devolved to five minor items. Because of early eco- 
noittic and political harmonization, mutual conmton 
interests rather than differences are driving the pro- 
gram. In addition to the production economics and 
o[>craling advantages of a universal F-lb. the benefit 
in having similar support equipment, training equip- 
ment. and maintenance and training philosophy can 


Defenw Syslenu Management Review 

- — ^ 

he jpplieil I hose bcnelils yield a broader market 
lot support ei|uipment and allows the r|uantity in- 
erease so necessary (or economical coproduction. 
I urther. a pooliiij! ot spates and joint usage ot depots 
provides large potential cost savings over the program 

riie ability to operate during wartime situations 
using the bases, support ei|uipmeiit, armament, 
mamienance teams, and communications ot allies 
IS a tremendous benefit of commonality. Proposed 
war plans of the live nations are beginning to reflect 
the increased flexibility that equipment commonality 

Just as the American colonies, fortified by a com- 
mon huiopean heritage, banded together to create an 
entity stronger than the sum of the parts, the I'-lb 
provides NATO with a dynamic economic, political 
and military program a program that provides tarrg- 
ible benefits to all participants in both peace and war. 
In essence, the 1-lb can be described as a major 
cornerstone expected to pul teeth in the NATO Al- 
liance and provide a better defense for all. Ihis then 
is the real value of the T-lb. 

The I - lb Air Combat lighter is a single-engine, 
lightweight, high performance aircraft. Powered by a 
25.(K)0 pound thrust ( I 1 ,3b4 kilograms! class after- 
burning lurbofan engine, this highly maneuverable 

K-16 First l,eap 

fighter excels in air-to-air combat and delivers of air- 
to-surface weapons 

The P-lb is 4X feel (14 b meters! long, lb feet 
(4.‘) meters! high, weighs approximately 22,bt)() 
pounds (I0.3.S0 kilograms! at take-off, has a combat 
radius of over 500 miles (K05 kilometers! and is 
capable of exceeding Mach 2 (twice the speed ot 

The F-lb will complement the more sophisticated 
1-15 in the air superiority role, and supplement the 
1-4, T'-l 1 1 , and A-IO in the air-to-surface role. 

Kngadier (General Janies A. 
Abratiamson is ihc I'SAI Pro- 
(irain Manager lor the 116 
Air C ombat I igliler Program, 
Wright-Patlerson At H, Ohio, 
lie IS responsible lor directing 
the live-country consortium 
ellorl to develop and pro- 
duce the I -16 fighter aircraft. 
An Mil graduate. Brigadier Oeneral Abrahamson became 

a lest pilot in 1967 and was selected as a astronaut lot the 
I'SAI Manned Orliiting l aboratory program, lie lias served 
on the National Aeronautics and Space C ouncil stall. I secu 
live Office of the President, he lias managed llic I'SM 
“Mavcnck" missile program, was ihc C ommander of the 
4950th lest Wing. WPAI H; and was Inspcitoi (icncral, \ir 
force Systems Command 

A coniinand pilot with over 3,000 Hying horns m con- 
ventional and jet lighters. Brigadier Oeneral Abrahamson has 
Hown 49 combat missions. 


.No. 3. 

Commonality — Or , 
What’s in a Word? 


Colonel I) W Waddell. USAF 

Iho Dclensc ituliislrv. ami llic inililary. m particu- 
lar. IS lUilcJ loi llic lU'iicralioii and use ol acronyms 
and hu// words In last, you arc a nobody il'youdo 
not have an acronym or bu// word ol your own. The 
Ollice ol the Ihrcilor. Defense Kesearcli and engi- 
neering (OI)DR\l I IS not an e.xception. 

file "in” word now is (’OMMONAUTY. Com- 
monality IS a handy word that can he used in mixed 
company as well as among the enlightened groups 
charged with giving it meaning. "What does it mean"'’, 
you niav ask. lhal's a lair question, hut "Who wants 
to know'"’ 

Webster delines commonality as "possession with 
another, ol a ceilaiii allribulc." IXicsn'l sound very 
military, docs if’ Ihc definition certainly is not 
menacing laiok again, though The very generality 
ot this won! IS Its claim to tame it has Hexihilily 
lanolhei bu// woid' I and may come out as 

• Commonality A ipiality which applies to 
materiel oi systems possessing like and inter- 
changeable chaiavterislics enabling each to he 
ulili/ed or operated and maintained by personnel 
trained on the others without additional specialized 
training, and or having interchangeable repair 
parts and/or components, and applying to consum- 
able items mtetchangeably equivalent without ad- 

• Compatibility Capability of two or more 
Items or components of equipment or material to 
exist or lunction m the same system or environ- 
ment without mutual interference. (NATO, 
(INTO. 1AI)B)2 

• Harmonization I the quality or state of be- 
ing III liarniony 2 . an act or instance of producing 
harnionv; a piece of harnioni/ed music. ^ I’roccss 
ot merging siniilai requirements and/or develop- 
ments into a common effort of mutual benefit.* 

*Suthoi's adapialmn ol Urriniliun and concept for use. 

"Harmoni/ation" refers to the process, oi results, 
ol adjusting differences oi inconsistencies m the 
qualitative basic military requirements ol the C .S 
and its Allies. It implies that significant features 
will be brought into line so as to make possible 
substantial gains in terms of the overall objectives 
of cooperation (e.g., enhanced utilization of re- 
sources. slandardi/ation and compatibility of 
equipments). It implies especially that compara- 
tively minor differences in "requirements" should 
not be permitted to serve as a basis for the support 
of slightly different duplicative programs and 

• Interchangeability A condition which exists 
when two or more items possess such functional 
and physical characteristics as to be equivalent in 
performance and durability, and are capable ol 
being exchanged one for the other without altera- 
tion of the items themselves or of adjoining items, 
except for adjustment, and without selection for 
fit and performance. (IX)D. NATO, ChNTO, 
lADB) The quality or state of being interchange- 
able. ^ 

• Interoperability The ability of systems, 
units, or forces to provide services to and accept 
services from other systems, units, or forces and 
to use the services so exchanged to enable them 
to operate effectively together.* 

• Standardization The process by which 
member nations achieve the closest practicable 
cooperation among forces, the most efficient use 
of research, development, and production re- 
sources; and agree to adopt on the broadest pos- 
sible basis, the use of: (I ) common or compatible 
operational, administrative, and logistic proce- 
dures; (2) common or compatible technical pro- 
cedures and criteria, (.1) common, compatible, or 
interchangeable supplies, components, weapons, or 
equipment; and (4) comnton oi compatible tac- 
tical doctrine with corresponding organizational 

Now that we have breached the line between what 


Uefeiue SyXrnu Minagcmenl Review 

you know jnd what you didn't care enough to ask 
(ahouit. you might as well string along, because there 
IS mote. Here is your chance to find out how the 
leim comnumaluy came about, what we have done 
about It lately, and what we plan to do about it 
later Ihete will be a lew words on how commonality 
tils in with our f uropean friends, too. So in the 

VMty do we have it? 

Mow did it come about? 

wo explain commonality. 

or Standardi/ation Agreements, that dclino the 
ground rules tor commonality in a variety o( weaftons/ 
systems, hflecimg the rules is another hallgamc. hut 
we arc all playing now 

The inlluencc of the US Congress is worth men 
lioning for those ot you who do not read the Wash 
ington newspapers each day. In the process ol doling 
out dollars, the Congress makes it clear that more is 
wanted for less and defense is the active model lot 
gaming. Senator Nunn. (I)-(IA) has a special interest 
in our NATO relations and has sponsored legislation* 
that emphasi/es standardi/ation 

Prior to I ‘165, Secretary of Defense McNamara 
was asking c|uestions like "Why don’t you borrow so 
and so from the (Army/Navy/ Air Force)”? The 
answers ran something likc-"But Sir, their "whatsit” 
has a "gidgcl" on it and won't fit our “gismo.” In 
I ‘>65 the Office of the Secretary of Defense de- 
creed establishment of the Defense Standardization 
Ptogram. The objective was to reduce proliferation. 

The issue came to a head shortly thereafter with 
the mlamous ?()mm incident that occurred in South- 
east Asia 

In this case, the Navy had docks full of 20mm 
high explosive incendiary ammunition and the US 
•\ir Force had none or thereabouts. Even though the 
•Air Force and Navy were "friendlies” in that little 
scrape and would have shared, ocean going bullets 
wouldn’t work in other folk’s guns. After numerous 
expressions such as . . . expletives deleted . . , , a 
special task force was formed to work out the prob- 
lem. In I‘I6‘? the Air Munition Requirements and De- 
velopment Committee (AMRAD) set up shop for a 
I -year crash effort to make sure such an episode 
would not happen again. The committee members 
did their work so well soon other areas within air 
munition were found to have similar problems. The 
committee then was extended for 1 year. By the end 
of the 2d year a name had been made for AMRAD 
and the committee was given a charter to “keep up 
the good work.” (Now everyone does not agree with 
that last phrase - especially the Service that gets a pro- 
gram cut when there is an overlap or redundancy. We 
like to think it’s good for the Department of Defense 
if we get more guns and ammunition and still have 
money to feed the troops. Read the summary on 
AMRAD at the conclusion of this article and decide 
for yourself.) 

Through mutual interest, our European Allies are 
on the bandwagon with NATO Standardization 
Groups that look at multicountry problems. The 
NATO Standardization Groups produce STANAGS. 

Vol. I.No. 3. 


What is the Problem? — What Are 
We Doing About It? 

All of you who have been around a while are 
aware of the numerous types and varieties of US 
weapons that came about through the largesse of the 
"guns and butter” era of Victiiam, However, paying 
the piper is not a fun game anymore. We have found 
that certain handy gadgets are costly to maintain and 
to operate**-not to mention, expensive to replace. 

Our job is to get new weapons and weapons sys- 
tems designed, developed, and produced. Unfortu- 
nately, it is not easily done. Look at the dollar-pie 
of any recent year and you will see that after Opera- 
tions and Maintenance (O&M) and Procurement arc 
served. Research and Development (R&D) gets a 
mighty small slice. Divvying that slice among the 
Services is no small chore as requirements dictate 

Most of you recognize that many development/ 
procurement decisions are based on iionmilitary in- 
terests. Further, things such as maintaining a strong 
technological base and a reliable industrial base may 
work to aid or complicate employment patterns 
around the country. These factors and others musi 
be taken into account. If not resolved in the Pentagon, 
the issues will come up on Capitol Hill. 

•The Nunn Amendment to P.L. 93*365 (Defense Appropri- 
ation Act of I Y 75) requires annual reports on military and 
economic costs of nonstandardization of NATO weapons 
The Culver*Nunn Amendment, P.L. 94-106 (Defensi' Ap- 
propriation Act of TY 76), requires listing of procurement 
actions on new major systems nor in eonipliancx' with the 
"sense of C’ongress" to standardize NATO weapons. The 
amendment of P.L. 94-361 (Defense Appropriation Act of 
l Y 77) cstahbshed NATO standardization as "policy of the 
United Statc% "' 

••Logistic rulc-of-ihumb: Support costs over the life of the 
system wiJJ be appro.\imately equal fo Ihc weapons acqui 
sition costs. 


What Have We Done Lately? 

,V> (litfcrcnt types of radar 

Sonte early efforts for eoiiiinonality were band-aid 
retiiedies. Other efforts had lasting effects. Among 
the lattei ate the 14 and ,A 7 aircraft used by the 
Navy Maiines and the .\ir l-orce. Too, air-scattcrable 
land mines and laser-guided munitions (L(iM) arc 
areas where consolidation of requirements and de- 
velopment efforts led to significant savings, Several 
ail hoc groups, not all as productive as the LGM 
group, have come and gone. Among the hurdles and 
pitfalls arc specification differences and interface 
problems. Often, the tail is wagging the dog. 

A current example of where good intentions go 
awry is the case of the Light Weight Lighter (LWF). 
This airplane was to have been selected from Air 
Force prototypes of the F-16 and I'- 1 7. By military 
and congressional design. Nav>’ was to follow suit and 
every effort would be made to get NATO to adopt 
the same airplane. The game plan worked great for 
the first half Air Force selected the F-IOand NATO 
hought-in in a big way. Then, the Navy chose the 
F-IK a variation of the F-17. W'ltile the Navy selec- 
tion was justified on the basis of differing military 
needs, noninilitary interests carried a lot of weight. 
(Fver tried to juggle three balls, and two rings?) 
Now we have two aircraft, two engines, two avionics 
packages, two stores management systems two 
everything' Ffforts toward commonality of systems, 
here at least, are frustrated by the fact that the Air 
Force is ahead in development and with NATO com- 
mitments. The designs arc “locked in." 

.Since it seems that “the effect on NATO" is aris 
ing more often these days, let's take a brief look at 
how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization fits into 
the juggling act. 


Although the NATO R&D dollars are approxi- 
mately equal to those of the Warsaw Pact, NATO has 
excessive duplication In fact, senior NATO Com- 
manders have estimated that proliteration and the 
corresponding lack of arms standardization depresses 
the effectiveness of Allied forces in Furope. In IflTA, 
for example, there were: 

• 4 different main battle tanks 

• 31 different antitank weapons 

• 100 different types of ships, destroyer size or 
larger, equipped with 

• S different types of surface-to-air missile 

• 40 different types of guns of 30mm or larger 

• 1 1 different types of combat aircraft in Second 
Allied Tactical Air Force. 

W'hy does this condition exist? The answers are 
interesting because they expand on the situation in 
the I'nited States. First of all, there are “national 
domestic policies" infiuenced by such things as in- 
dustrial pressures and tradition. Second, the NATO 
countries are generally unable to: 

• harmonize the different national military re- 

• obtain efficient multinational program organi- 
zation and management. 

• depend upon each other for critical develop- 
ment ; or 

• insure achievement of the legitimate economies. 

The costs of the “unables" generally fall into two 
categories-economic and military effectiveness. A 
glance at the economics reveals that in FY 75, NATO 
had a credit balance of roughly SI billion in research 
and development duplication. A “reasonable esti- 
mate" of each year’s nonstandard equipment pro- 
curement is 10 percent of the total, or approximately 
S3 billion per year. 

As for military effectiveness, the payoff is not as 
tangible, but military leaders strongly agree that lack 
of standardization significantly reduces capability, A 
general effect is inllcxibility-in some cases, forces 
would not be able to respond to a major change in 
mission. Some effects are more specific e.g.. aviation 
fuel has long been standard, but the means, and 
equipment, for rapid refueling are not. Aircraft mu- 
nitions, armaments and maintenance power units are 
different in most air forces. 

Among the seven major European nations of 
NATO, there are seven different combat aircraft, six 
different recoilless rifles, four different types of wire- 
guided and antitank weapons, and three different 
types each of mortars, rifles, and machine guns. Each 
of the seven national units in the NATO force must 
maintain its own logistics personnel and establish its 

DefenM Sytlenu Mantgemenl Review 


uwii lojiisik Mippotl I \poiisive ilupljcalioii would be 
.1 descuplivc understalement, aiul Ihesilualion is not 
auied In the nonstandard crninruinications sysicirts 
that CM si 

What Are We Doing About It? 

riiere are opportiinilies galore, to do soiticthing 
about the N.AIO situation, but support is needed 
tronr each and every nation. A big step was taken 
when last year's \.\10 ministers' guidance called 
tor greater Alliance cooperation. I be US Ciovermuent 
has both long- and short -term designs tor coping with 
llie situation. The premise lor the short run is that 
achievement ol interoperability and compatibility 
between c.Msting national weapons systems is the 
most that may be feasible now. Complete standaid- 
i/ation w ill make economic sense only in the case of 
new weapons systems, for example, the T-lband the 
Roland. In the current year. 1)01) has identified spe- 
cific areas for emphasis, that is. equipment standard- 
ization. including cominoii families of ammunitiori, 
military exercises, protected cominand facilities, re- 
location ol lorces. interoperability and consolidation 
ol comniunications (including .Airborne Warning and 
( onirol Systems), antitank training, etc. 

Initial focus tor the long term will be on the hall- 
way house ot interoperability, and eventually the 
locus will move toward competitive prototypes. 
•Aiorig the way, we will work to establish coininon 
selection procedures and production of standardized 
equipment on both sides ol the Atlantic. Other neces- 
saiy steps include sliaring of production rights to 
selected systems and the freedom to use standardized 
equipment in foreign assistance programs. 

In sum. the military, economic and political ad- 
vantages arc well worth the dependence involved. The 
Department of Defense is committed to a maximum 
cflort to harmonize US and NATO weapons reiiuirc- 
rnerits .Secretary Rumsfeld set the lone with his 
statement. "This is the time to reach out not back,”® 

Where Do We Go from Here? 

In efforts to the present, some lessons have been 
learned and some new problems have been identified. 
Oenerally speaking, there is now a wider acceptance 
ot the need to standardize weapons systems among 
the Services and m NATO or at least a recognition 
of the need to make these systems interchangeable 
to the greatest degree possible. (We are NOT pursu- 
ing the impractical goal of complete, across-the-board 

Given the multiplicity of economic, political and 

technical factors, standardization in NAIO really 
means greater interdependence by all partners ( lhal 
is a subtle way ol saying there will be new constraints 
on US efforts.) New transatlantic programs will likely 
involve licensed production. In some cases it will no 
doubt be cost cticctive for our Allies to buy complete 
systems and/or components from the US. II this be 
true, we must be prepared and willing to recipro- 
cate by adopting l-.uropean armaments when these 
armaments meet US requirements and are cost effec- 
tive. In other words, it must be a two-way street. 

For this approach to be successful, broad-based in- 
volvement and support will be required of our own 
three Services, That, in itself, is no small challenge 
since the US has its share of concerns and problems 
that must be resolved to permit efficient allocation of 
effort and resources. 

The central figures in the resolutions will be the 
Program Managers within the Services not only those 
assigned to joint, or multiservice programs. .-1// of 
you will have to deal with these concerns to some 
degree, at one time or another. How you deal with 
thetn will determine whether the concerns are valid 
or just old wives' tales. Here are a few examples, w ith 
comments . . . 

1 . COMPhTriTON. Uotnpetition gives R&D con- 
tractors incentive to design more efficient products 
and provide government a choice of weapon char- 
acteristics, hopefully over a range of prices 

C’OMMFNT The concept is fine but, olfen, we 
hang onto "options" until they become "choices" 
that are difficult to turn off with out severe in- 
dustrial and/or political penalties. Consequently, 
duplicative systems may be deployed. 

KI'IY-Select what is to you THF best svdution as 
early as possible in the development c>cle. Do not 
postpone nor delay this action. 

2. F.CONOMY OF SCALF. Fconomy of scale applies 
in the production phase (where direct cost and alloca- 
tion of overhead determine unit cost) and in the test- 
ing procedures, c.g., testing 10 of l(K)() items vs 10 of 
100. Fconomy of scale leads to the general statement 
that “more is cheaper." 

COMMFNT -The Fconomy of Scale effect is true 
in automobiles, pocket calculators, etc., hut a 
typical major weapott system quantity is itt the 
hundreds. "Minor" items of high volume (e.g., 
ammunition) may have payoff, but be careful of 
robbing Peter to pay Paul. With all work at one 

Vol. I, No. 3. 


I'l pl.iiil . I'llioi lnm\ ma\ lo.iva iiuiiisl r > . 
•Mi.l , 111 ' li'sl 

KM li.ihi.iK' o.kIi case mi ili omi moiits 

i Ml 1 I li’l Kl’OSl S'lSIlMS Imiil loquitcmciils 
111 .ill iiseis allmi a sim.'li', mull i|uii pose iinil/sysK'in 
aliil u'lliKi'i piulik'i.illmi. 

(OMMINI llii' miKcpl 111 llic 
sislem IS laliil il rei|imements are iilcMlKal. or 
ne.iily so Mme olieii. the iei|iiiiememsare similar, 
htil ilillei ill ilepiee. Iherelore. the lemieney is to 
settle lor the "hijihesl eomiium ileiiomiiialor” to 
satisly all (Sometimes ealleil "juilil platiuj;.'') 

Kl N rhalleii>:e ■‘umeason.ible'' requirements aiul 
look lor Iraile-oHs. 

4 MOiHIl ,\KI r\ Haselme deslim eoiisisls ol (he 
erealesi mimher ol eommoii eompoiietils. Other 
eomponents are altered/interehaiif>ed to salisly 
larioiis reqtiiremeiUs. (A Imildiuj! block conce|iI 
wilh '■unique'' blocks.) 

( OMMIM Olten, this is lire best way to satisfy 
user desire lor Ilexibility. I’roblcms arise when 
unique components ate not available where, 'when 
needed lor etnploymenl. 

Kl V Insure lojiistics support 

5 St ANDAKDIZAflON IS A Cl'Ki: -ALL. this 
phrase e.xpresses the beliel that a simple, readily 
aptced upon solution means the problem is solved. 

( OMMl.NT Often, the view is too narrow in that 
only a specific item is considered without full re- 
gard for etllier the variety of applications it may 
have or the tinique features of associated equip- 
ment, weapons. 

Kl.Y Analyze the problem and consider the 
"worst" case situations. 

You will llnd other examples as you go along. 
Be aware ol some of the sour notes in the harmoni/.a- 
tion scales. One of the best known scales Is Service 
Kcquirements. tripping up this scale quickly, we 

• tainguage Not always clear and precise. 

• l iming Unit/System well-defined by one .Serv- 
ice with work in progress. Other Service re 
quirenicnts. appearing later, cannot be intc- 

2 « 

gi.ilcd easily, oi, wilboiil delay and nicieased 
cost to achieve lornier requirenienis 

• l’ (not mvenied heiei Service bias 
based on established policies, "their way" ol 
doing things. 

• I’ersonal Ideas factor ol the man wilh a pen in 
Ills hand. (Own bias m ideal.s) ol whal-lo-do). 

.Anolhei popiilai scale is ibe one called I niiding. 
where we I nul . 

• fencing The I’rogram Manager has to limit 
options lo avoid undue risk 

• 1 ead Service Responsible Costs usually in- 
crease for a joint Seivice item making the 
original ftiriding inadequate. New funds come 
"out ol the Service hide" and may impact on 
other developments. 

• Service Unique feature Delays occur because 
of trying to "sell" the bighcst detioimnator 
The Service requiring unique leatures may base 
I unding troubles also, 

• Service Marketeering High powered sales pitches 
(wbite-ss.ish) and out-ol-chaiinels effoiis back- 

Other scales lacking harmony mcliide I'ocr Com- 
wunications (between developer, contractor, and 
user); Comha! / inironim nijl Dittcrciwcs (land, sea, 
air). Di)crriiiul Dijten'uvs: and. InJiisiriiil Moliva- 
lions (interfaces, "soniethmg different," pricing 

The notes on these scales as practiced at presetit 
are often dissonant, the challenge to Program Man- 
agers is to attain rctiditioti. in tune. 


The job of a I’rograttt Manager is never easy and 
it is less easy in those cases where there are multiple 
customers. The success or failure of statidardi/ation 
in joint programs depends on the people involved. 
The most important person is the Program Manager 
That 's you! 

• You are the man in charge so, be in charge. 

• You are the man-with-the-plan. so develop atid 
follow a good plan. 

Defense Syslem.s Management Review 

• '(iiu have ciisUiiiicrs llial imisl be salisHoil 
eimimuiikjte with Iliem, lisleii lo llieiii. 

• ^(>11 [ia\e bosses who can help you. even pro- 
leei voii siippoil ihein, keep them inrorTiied. 

• Non ate sjoveminenl's represenlative with in- 
dtisirv work with industry, keep the jtood 
kill ol industry. 

I here ate many hats that the I’tojiratn Manatier 
must weat and it’s sometimes ditfieult to wear them 
well. As stated by Abraliatn Lincoln. “You can't 
('lease all ol the |'eo['le all ol the lime.’' 

Just remember the objective we want to stand- 
ardi/e. but not lor the sake ol standardi/ation Lhe 
real objective is lo enhance combat readiness, (iivc 
the Iroi'i's what they neeil to do the job when the 
lime comes! 


Air Munitions Requirements and 
Development (AMRAD) Committee 

lhe Air .Munitions Recjiiirenients and Develop- 
ment ( AMRAD) ( ommillee was established in Idbd 
bv Dt John hosier, then Director oh Delense Re- 
search and I iiftineeririp ( DDRAI ); 

to effect . inter-Service coordination . . . 
(and) whose purpose will be to recommend 
joint use requirements and to advise me 
IDDR&E) on matters of standardization.” 

Representation is Ironi each ol the four military Serv- 
ices The Chairman, originally designated from the 
DDRAI stall, serves for a d-year ['eriod. This posi- 
tion assignment is now rotated among the Services. 
Over lime, (he Committee has established a close 
winking relationship with the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary ol Delense ( l&l.) 

Die fommiltee has effectively resolved incom- 
patibility issues associated with 20mm ammunition, 
genet il purpose bomb fuzes and 2.75-inch rocket 
motors and fuzes .At the prescribed I -year review in 
June l‘)70. then Deputy Secretary of Defense Pack- 
ard lormalized and amplified the Committee’s opera- 
tion to 

advise and assist in ensuring wihere prac- 
tical. a congruence of requirements and design 
standardization of air munitions and related 
components to fill the needs of more than one 

lhe previous "f barter’' became a •‘Terms ol Refer- 
ence"* document. The Terms of Reference delin- 

*Ihe 1972 revision ol Itie terms ol Relerenee detined re- 
lated iiiunitions as those 

developed (or air-to-ground (applicable) in the 
ground-to-ground and/or ground to-au role.” 

eated the mission, scope, organization, policy, func- 
tions. authority, responsibilities and administration 

riiesc formalities were supplemented, in April 
DI7I. by a Joint .Service Agreement wherein the 
Service agreed lo utilize the Committee and (he es- 
tablished procedures to liarnioni/c .Service quali- 
tative requirements and characteristics for air and 
related munitions. 

Each Service agreed to submit a Requirements/ 
Objective document no later than d months after 
starting advanced development, fhe AMRAD com- 
mittee nominates appropriate Requirements, /Objec- 
tives lor joint use and requests comments/recom- 
mendalions from the Services to establish their 
interests in standardization. Based on these com- 
ments and recommendations AMRAD recommends 
a standardization category, subject lo approval by 
the Director of Defense Research and Engineering 
(DDR&E ). Eor joint programs, a lead Service is des- 
ignated to coordinate the effort and include funds 
in their budget to develop the item. (Service-unique 
features are funded by the Service requiring such 
features.) The lead Service is also res('onsible for 
prei'aring a Joint Service Operational Requirement 
and, later, a Joint Development Plan These docu- 
ments serve as the Service ’’contracts'' lo accomplish 
the tasks necessary lo provide the specined munition/ 
weapon system. 

Problems occur frequently in development and ad- 
ditional guidance becomes necessary. Occasionally, 
guidance is requested. The AMRAD (ommillee has 

A recent nnidil'ication expands the AMR.AD area of interest 
to all nonnuclear munitions. I inal coordination will au- 
thorize a new name Armaments/Munitions Requirements 
and Development Committee Fhe acronym A.VtR.AD will be 
relai cd. 

2 ‘) 

Vol- I. No. 3. 

.i^liu’ iM seveial ptojiiams iii ordci lo kocp llic 
pm>;i.ims iiiiiMiii: clloclivoly. AsMsIaiice, i-spcv.ially 
misolKilcd, is 1,'asy lo mismlcrpii't as iliteclion. ami. 
on ocijasion. llic distiiKiion may nol bo loo clear. 
Siicb misiniorpiotallon is one ol the buill in lia/ aids 
lor advisory groups. I be .\MK \I) commilloe prelors 
lo view Ibis as a cballengo and llic oppoiuinily lo 
oslablish .sidid lolalions ol iiriilual liusi willi I’ro- 
glam Ollicos so ibal a candid. Iroc inloicliangc ol 
inroimalion will occur 

iK'spilo llic lormal piocodurcs and llic .Services’ 
public posilion in lavor ol' commonalily/slandardi/a- 

lioii. .AMKM) wiirk is lai lioni being roiilme I a._b 
Service umleislaiulably prclers lo do llieii own work. 
Nol uiicommonly . lire AMK.M) cajoles and pleads lo 
oblam agreenieni on joiiil lequiiemenls lliroiigli re- 
evalualion. Irade-olls. cic. Occasionally. DDR&I may 
e.xert direct inlluence as a “coiiil ol lasl fcsorl.’’ Ilie 
objeclive. in all inslaiices. is lo gel llie job done wbile 
obtaining the most useliil miimlion/syslem at least 
cost to ibe I 'S laxpayei . 

I very dollar saved ibioiigb reduced duplication is 
available lor anotber program ibai migbl nol oibei- 
wise have been lunded. 

AMRAD reviews Joint Service Oper 
ationsi Requirement and publishes 

endorsed by Service Secretaries 
Joint Development Plan is prepared. 

Joint Development Plan is forwarded 
to Director of Defense Research 
and Engineering (AMRAD). 

•/r AMRAD dftwrminm thg Rtquir9m»nts/Obiectiv9 « nor a 
candidate for /oint daaatoprnant or doat not hava joint ap 
plication a SR « fonaardad to tha proponant Saryica. Othar 
Sarvica staffing is not rapuirad. 

^This avaiuation is daaignad to ravaai potantial foint Sarvica 
usa and is not mtandad for ona Sarvica to pass ludgmant on 
tha validity of a raquiramant of anothar Sarvica. 

fiff tha Standardisation catagory is dataimmad to ha a Joint 
Ranuiramant, or Joint Sarvica Usaabla, a Datarmination and 
Racommandations will ha sant to tha Sarvicas outlining tha 
raquiramant for a Joint Sarvica Oparational Raquiramant. if 
othar than tha standardisation catagory daacribad. a Joint 
Sarvica Oparational Raquiramant is not raquirad and a 
Standardisation/Racommandation will be forwarded to the 

Figure I . Air Munitions Requirements Documentation Cycle 

Defense .Systems Management Review 

. » 


Cited References 

1. l>opi nt "Slandarili/ation and fnlor<»pcrabi(it> of V\ca|x»n Systcim and ( quipmeni vuihin (he N<fr(l» AdanOf 

I rcal\ ( )rgam/alion (\ \ H »)." 1)01) l)iri‘(. ti\e 20l0.h. ASIXISA). ^^a^hln^it(»n. IK . Mar 77. 

2. ' l>K tionar\ Mildarv ami Avwrciafcd Icrnis,** .!( \S I. Ihc Joinl ( Inch <>l Slal'I. V>asIiinglNi). IK 

20XH . 1 Vp 74. 

ixvhsu t s Ihml \< »t ».(».&(. Mernam ( o.. Publishers, Sprin^lield, M A I *)7 I . unabridged. 

4. Di'pi of Defense. ’Marmoni/afion of OualKadve Kequiremenfs (dr Defense I quipmenf of (he I ni(ed .S(a(es and Its 
Mhes." 1)01) DireOive 4100.4. DDR&I . Washinglon. IX .27 Sep f>4. 

5. . “Kationali/ation Sfandardi/afion Miihin NAK)," a refx»rl to (he ( f>ngress by Donald Kumsfeld. 2d Report. 

Jan 7b. 

RAl ) Ills previous .issign 
Air War College 

( \)lonel D W added IS as- 
signed to Headquarters. CSAl 
as the Air 1 orec member of 
the Air Munitions Require* 
nents and Development 
( AMR ADi ( ommillee. Otfiee 
of the Director ol Dek’tise Re 
search and 1 ngineering (Ol)|)» 
nt Was that of laciiltv member. 

1 arlier assignments ol Colonel Waddell include service as 
a 1 -H6( flight instructor and as an acjdcmic/tlu’iu instructor 
in undergraduate pilot training He was an I 105 pilot in 
Si A. where he spent almost 6 years as a pnstmer m S»>rth 
\ letnam. 

( efUmei Waddell holds a li 1 ,1 liom (leorgia lech and 
all MHA tr<>m the I nivervitv ot Southern ( alifornu. He is 
a graduate ot Squadron Officer School and ilie Air 
( ollcge 

Vol.I.No. 3. 

The Impact on US Security 


Major John I). Elliott, US Army 

The aim of this article is to report on the significance of new initiatives for the NA TO Al- 
liance and assess how they may impact on American national security, l irst, it is essential to 
understand the NATO definition of standardization and its supporting principles. Second, a 
review of some of the criticisms and solutions directed at the NATO mechanisms for achiev- 
ing International Military Standardization is offered as a reference point for evaluating the 
importance of the new US initiatives. 


International military standardization (IMS) has 
been a persistent concern among NATO member 
nations since 1940 because of the advantages it 
contributes to overall military effectiveness and 
cost savings in research development and engineer- 
ing (RD&h). Initially, with American amiament 
left over from World War II the Alliance achieved 
a high degree ol equipment standardization. Progress 
in national research and development after the 
Korean ('onllict. as well as other factors such as 
economic nationalism, changed this. In the fifties 
and sixties some progress was made on IMS, as the 
development of the NATO Air Defense (iround 
Environment (NAIXiE), and adoption of tlie Nike, 
Hawk, and Starfigliter weapons systems clearly 
demonstrate. In view of the magnitude of the overall 
advantages IMS holds for NATO, these achievements 
are slight, althougli they are positive expressions of 
resolving a difficult problem. The achievements also 
temper the charge by critics that only “lip service” 
has been paid to IMS in the past. Recent initiatives 
by the United States indicate that a breakthrougli 
has been made that will greatly improve the future 
progress of IMS. 

What Is International Military 
Standardization i' 

As defined by the NATO Glossary, standardization 

The process by which membei nations achieve the 
closest practical cooperation among lorces, the 
most efficient use of research, development and 
inixJijction resources, attd agree to adopt on the 
broadest possible basis the use of: 

a. Common or compatible operational, adminis- 
trative and logistic procedures. 

b. Common or compatible technical procedures 
and criteria. 

c. Common, compatible or interchatigeable sup- 
plies, cotnpottents, weapotis. or equipment 

d. Commoti or crmipatible tactical doctrine with 
corresponding organizational compatibility.* 

Ttiis definition sets the boundaries for IMS but more 
understanding is derived tiom consideraiion of the 
three principles IMS is designed to achieve in N.A JO. 
These arc interchangeahility. mtcroperuhililw and 
compatihilUy and generally mean * 

Interchangeability a condition which exists when 
two or more items can be exchanged lor each 
other between NATO armed forces. 
Interoperability the ability of systems, units or 
lorces to provide services and to accept services 
from other NATO armed forces. 

Compatibility the capability of two or more 
items or components of equipment to exist or 
function in the same system with other NATO 
armed forces. 

•l or complelf definition sec ,V.-1 /W (iVoisurv. eoinpatibilily, 
p. 2-62; interchangeability, p. 21 39; and inlero|)erability, 
p. 2-141 


Defense Systenu Management Review 

I Ik’M‘ I'lllk ipll's .IK' ,1 s.llll'llt k'.IIIIK'ul IMS « llll. ll 
slii'iilil lonlnlnilc Iua.ikI llic ou'ii I'loailci .liiii ol 
"uiuin.ili/.ilii'n " IliK ii'ini li.i', Ih'i’ii ik'l'moil .is ".my 
.KtiiMi «1 ik1i m.iki’s moic ollisk'til m I'lIcctiU' use ol 
llu' K'VIIIKOS ik'VoU'il ilk' Alll.llkk' lo ik'li'liso." Il 
lollosss ik.ii IMS IS .1 ko\ doMK'iil ol kilioiKili/alioii, 

AsComplisliMk'Ml ol Ilk' piiikiplcs slalc'il ioi|Uires 
imiliial icso.ikIi, ik'vdofink'nl .iiul s'nt;iik'ci iiij; olloi Is 
ts'sullmi: III iiiaU'ik'l anil noiiiii.iu-ik'l (c )!.. laclkal 
iltkliitk'l st.iikI.iKli/.ilioii |)i Makolm Cuin.'. ssliilc 
Dik'cIoi ol Dok'iiso I<oso.ikIi ami 1 iifiiiicciing 
iDDR.Sl I, III a rcporl* lo ContJK'ss oaily in I‘l7k 
lisieil two okji'ciivos lot I'.S cooperalivo RD&I 

I I I Kiklikini; llic shi'rirall. in ical tciins. holweon 
Ilk' I S KIkVl proj;iain ami llial oi llic .Soviets by 
inakiny yicatcr use oi ilic RDiitl ol out Allies, ami 
(’i likieasini; N.AIO military iotee eiiecliveness 
lliioui;li ineicaseil eominon oi interoperable liaril- 
vsaie ami the resiillanl eilieieneies in procurenieni , 
irainniji. lojusties, manpower ami operational 

lliese ohieelives will be aeconiplislieil lliroufib llie 
meekanisms ioi asliievniE IMS m N.AIO. 

Mechanisms for Achieving IMS 
in NATO 

loilay. a primary meehanism working lo aeeom- 
plisli IMS in NAIO is lire ( onlcreiiec of National 
.Arniaments Direelors (('NAD), ol which lire Director, 
DDR&l IS the I'S representative. Interestingly, the 
( NAD IS pail of the civilian side of the NATO or- 
gani/alional striiclure. See figure 1. By reporting 
diteclly lo the North Atlantic Council, the (NAD 
has a direct access channel to forward the results of 
Its forum activilies in which il strives "to make co- 
operation as easy and advantageous as possible" by 
exchanging inlormalion on o|>erational concepts, 
~ equipmeni programs, and technical and logistical 

mailers ^ (iroups comprising the CNAl) forum are 
shown at 1 igure .. 

The Military Agency lor Standardi/.alion ( MAS) is 
the Military Conimillcc's |)rimary agency for initiat- 
ing IMS proposals in conlormance with policy formu- 
lated by the Military Committee. The Military Coni- 
millee reports to the North Atlantic Council. 


I *llcreinallcr rclcrrej lo as the Currie Reporl 

Die I I RtM.ROI I'* ami 1 INABI K* .iie iwo 
olhei iiiajoi mechanisms oig.mi/ed In ilic I iiiopc.m 
meniheis ol NAfO loslei IMS wilhin llie M 
haiice Neilhei I I R( )( ,R()CI’ iioi MN Mil I have 
repiesenlalion lioni all the NA I D coimliies. set ilu n 
deliberations have consislenily taken a .mept 
able to most nienibei nations for cs.miple. M R( ) 
(iROCl’s I uropean I’logram (ooup (I l’(,| has made 
several tangible contribut ions to N \ I ( ) mliasiiik line 
lumls, cooperated in all.miiiig li.iimne ami loeisiks 
objeelives, coll.iboialed on ei|uipnienl developmeiiis, 
and assisted in long iange planning 

(he ITN'ABI.I, contains the core countries ol the 
1TIR()(|R()IIP with the sigiiilicant addition ol I i.mce 
Unlike I I ROdROUl’. il is not allihaled diieciK 
with NATO, but organi/es its own acliviiies Die ob- 
jectives of MNABl I . like those ol I UR()(.R()l I’, 
stress greater cooperation and collahoialioii with the 
atm ol achieving more total IMS within the Allanlk 

Both organi/ations continue loeonlribute lowaids 
achieving NAIO basic aims'' by providing speed ic 
opportunities to ensure a stronger and more cohesive 
Luropean contribution lo the common defense. How- 
ever, l INABhi definitely offers the best chance lot 
long Icim success in IMS because both I ranee and the 
primary common market countries are lepresented. II 
the TUROdROUl’ objectives ate met. as outlined at 
the l ebiuary l‘>7(i meeting in Rome, a highei degiee 
of I'uiopean integration in both the imhlaiy and m 
dusirial spheres will be one of its nalmal pioducls. 
Accomplishment of the objectives of all IMS mech- 
anisms will be enhanced. 

Operation of IMS niechanisms has not been com- 
pletely free of error or condemnation. 

The Problem of IMS: 

Simply stated the boundaries of the piohlem of 
IMS are established by political and economic condi- 
tions. As noted, early NATO military standaidi/ation 

•The I UROdROliP was fuumled in 1 968 when die I reikh 
military forces were withdrawn from NATO command ( ui- 
renl members are Helgium, Denmark, Ciermany, (.ireeee, 
Italy. I usembourg, Nelherlands, Norway, lurkey. and the 
landed Kingdom I or addilional inlormalion see "The I uio- 
groiip," NAK) Inlormalion Service, Hrussek, Kelgiuni. |d7.S. 
••IINABI'l preceded the lormalion of I flRtKiROlT by 
several years and current members are 1 ranee. Italy , Nelhei- 
lands. Germany. Helgium and the United Kingdom. I or ad- 
ditional information see Michael J. Woodcock. "NATO 
Slandardiaation." Militarv Keiiew, Oct 1975, pp 42, 4ft 

Vol. I, No. 3. 


I i 

1 ( 
■--J! ' 

Civil Committees 

• Defense Review 

• Nuclear Defense Affairs- 
Planning Group 

• Infrastructure 

• Economic Affairs 

• Budget 

• Conference of National 
Armaments Directors (CNAD) 

• Communications 

• Challenges of Modern Society 

Military Committee 

International Military Staff 


Supreme Allied Commander, Europe - 
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic - 
Canada-US Regional Planning Group 
Allied Commander in Chief, Channel — - 

Figure l.Thc Nalo Organization 


Defense Systems Msnigement Review 

— - r 

aijcomplislu’il bv a I'Hilititally slmtip I S shep- 
hcidinp a NAIO Mrati-py o( masMvc retaliadoii I co 
iii'imc coiulilions were not a eonsliaint Sueli is not 
now the case Imlas, tlie extensive and expensive 
liiiplication ot N \IO arinanients is reco^ni/ed as a 
serious weakness ot the Alliance * I)i (lardincr 1 . 
Iijcker. lornier Assistant Secretary C.eneral ol NATO 
lor Delense Support writing in \,l /'O /scncu 7 / V76;, 
rioleil that iii s()ile ol some notable success N A I () has 
been "deslandardi/ing in many ways in the past 
several years, so that the variety ol weapons in the 
inventories ol the Alliance has been steadily increas- 
ing \ review ol Table I Irom Dr C urrie's report 
illusirales the current duplication ol equipnicnl types 
among maior NAIO Allies The situation described 
bv Dr I IK ker has not yet changed. 

( oniparisons like these do not carry the weight ot 
remarks bv Cieneral Cioodpasier. lormer Supreme 
Allied C ommander 1 urope. who when recently re- 
viewing vmie ot the laults ol NATO strategy con- 

Uuk ol siandaidi/alion. past resistance to welding 
an lorces into true cenirali/ed ciunmands wtiti 
common sv stems lot then employment, absence 
ol an "area logistics system' to enable ground 
lorces to be used with adequate Ireedom ol action, 
disinleresi and opposition towards proposals lor 
..ommon proctnemenl programs all this takes a 
loll ol etiecliveness which I have estimated as at 
least ?() percent, and lor some lorces .‘>0 percent or 
more There is much that could he remedied, at 
lower eoM, bv adding inilialive and more energetic 

(icnerjl Johannes Sleinholl, lormer niairman ol 
the Military C'ommillee. lakes a position similar to 
(leneral (loodpasler 's in his recent book, h'oliin ireiht 
i/rc \ -1 TO ' I Where is ,V,-I TO l)rilting'’l. ^ He is partic- 
ularly critical about the absence ot slandardi/ation 
in the ACT Mobile t orcel.AMTl * Like Cioodpasler 
and others, he also has good things to say and lauds 
NAIHil . Nike. Hawk, and Slarlighicr programs while 
welcoming new initiatives In his view, NATO will 
have to become more serious about TM.S, if it is to 
remain a viable Alliance ’ 

Thomas C allagtian's critique expressed in his T'S, 
huropean /-eoiiornn Cooperation in Ui/itar}' anJ 
( till Teehnolngv remains the most informative be- 

*lhis vlaienirni is made in ennsiderjlion nl Ihr cireumsianec 
lhal vlandaidi/jliiin ol mititarv hardware and laetical doc- 
Irine would dcliasl trom some of ihe nexihilily possible 
ihrough divcrsiry fhe* advantages ul siandardi/atkin out- 
weigh Hesihility m this inslanee 


irupliiation of |-<juipmenl lypes Among 
Mafot NATO Al 1 11 S 
.Source: Currie Report, p VTII-13 



II [ IT 



O ,c I U; ^ 3 o ^ 

X - 3 £ y ? P § r? 

s o I 

- I-' 

to 15 =13' .Ol 

n, wins (U m 3 *- > IT) 

II -J I- I- I- I- O O < < 

United j I 

Kingdo m ! x x x x x x j x x x x 

France I x I x”" x x x x ix x x x x 

France Tx x x x x x 

Ge rmany ; x x x x x x 


Italy XXX X 

Canada | x 

cause It IS the most analytical. Neither Cloodpaster 
nor Steinhoff argue that they based their percent- 
ages of lost effectiveness on any existing data base 
other than their professional expertise.* But C'alla- 
glian has produced a well researched study employing 
modern techniques of quantitative analysis. The 
study results reinforce the professional judgment 
of both Cloodpaster and Steinhoff. More impor- 
tantly. Callaghan addresses IMS on a much broader 
Iront by including data on what IMS does and does 
not do to national delense budgets. Tor example, he 
reveals that US Turopean defense budgets have gone 
from SIS..T billion per year to SI1S4 billion per 
year over the past .15 yeais.'° Callaghan estimates 
that duplication costs now exceed SIC) billion per 
year, not to mention the limitations m military 
effectiveness caused by the recurring failure of IMS 
principles, i.c.. interchangeability, interoperability, 
and compatibility. 

Callaghan bases his criticism on the factvirs that 

•Aelually such a study using oiwralions rescateh/systems 
analysis icehniques appears desirable, even long overdue, l or 
a eoniplctc review of the NATO and American. Hriiish. 
Canadian. Australian military standardiaallon progiains see 
Delos A. MsCoole .Military SlanJarJization Its Oppor- 
tunities anil Alternatives for the L'.S. Army, CIS Army War 
College, Carlisle Harracks, PA, 1975. 

Defense Systems Management Review 

llie liiKitRlarios <il llic prohlcm mfiilioned 
eudiei llu'sc taclnrs led to the duplications ( now 
costing billions ol dollais) that actually weaken the 
NAIO conventional delense poslute 

boi ( allaghan. 

NAIO's coiiventional loices are (I) i|ualilativcly 
very uneven, some weak and some stronj:.(2l in- 
terioi to the Warsaw Pact m i)uaiility and diversity ; 
and ( unable lopistically to support one an- 
olhei * * 

lo overcome these and other deficiencies he recom- 
mended I S mitiatives that wimld develop: 

(l| A North Atlantic common delense market, 

(2) Cooperation in civil technology, and 

(.?) Open povernnient procurement 

( allaghaii’s recommendations have not met with 
complete acceptance. The lormation of a North 
Atlantic common defense market, the establishment 
of a lunctional orgatii/ation within NATO (like Cal- 
laghan's I uro|x’an Delense I’rocurement Agency), 
and utili/ation of a "two-way street” approach to 
military KD&I and subsequent sales, would make 
total IMS possible, 

( ertaiiily, IMS is not a panacea to solve all NATO 
problems, but laitli in it as a dilution to many of its 
materiel problems is not misplaced, Callagfian's 
recommendations, over the long-term, should go a 
long way toward paying the “costs of standardi/a- 
tion '■ Kenneth Booth described these problems in 
the K I 'SI Journal as 

• Different replacement cycles of different na- 
tional armies, 

• Desire of national governments and industries 
to maintain employment and keep in the fore- 
front of technical developments, 

• Diflcrent tactical preferences of national armies 
(related to their having different battles in 

• Typical military preference for their own na- 
tional equipment, 

• ( act that joint production is not always a suc- 

• ( act that the need to compromise vimctimes 
produces military camels rather than thorougli- 
bred warhorses 

(he capstone lor this point id view, (or Booth, is 
"the great unspoken motivation that NATO will not 
always be there, 

Decisionmakers in the T'.S are well aware o( the 
problems and are striving for new solutions. This is 
readily apparent when one considers recent public 
laws designed to cope with the problems ot IMS 
These “new initiatives" were begun to ensure greater 
and more thorougli progress, 

US Initiatives to Achieve IMS 

The flS initiatives designed to achieve greater IMS 
accelerated during the past 2 years. Noteworthy is the 
fact that much of the weight behind overcoming 
inertia for developing a “strategy for standardization “ 
has come from the Congress, A growing defense 
budget and a sincere desire to improve the NATO 
defense capability have been essential elements of 
concern to a Congress that feels IMS can both reduce 
the budget and strengthen NATO, 

In 075 the Culver-Nunn amendment totheDOD 
Appropriation Authorization Act (PLd3-365)i^ pro- 
vided a firm indication of the sense of Congress on 
IMS, This Amendment required the Secretary ol 
Defense to assess the current status of standardiza- 
tion and report the results achieved both to the Con- 
gress and to NATO on a semiannual basis, A primary 
(eature of the assessment is an evaluation of the costs 
and loss of weapons and equipment. The backbone of 
the report, now submitted annually, consists of 

( 1 ) a list of possible actions (dr standardization, 

(2) an evaluation of the relative priorities and ef- 
fect, Initial reports have been well received by 
the Congress, 

(iepartment of Defense Appropriation Authoriza- 
tion Act, l‘)77, PL ‘)4-.(61 was signed by President 
f-'ord on July 14, 1476, This law provides the best 
insurance policy for IM.S yet issued by any NATO 
country. By this action the US became the leader in 
developing a “strategy for standardization," (Aiblic 
laiw ‘)4-.361 amends the I ‘>76 Act, making it US 
policy that equipment procured for US armed forces 
stationed in Kurope be standardized or at least inter- 
operable with that of other NATO members,*® De- 
tails of such procurements will be reported lo the 

Vol. l,No, J. 

_ # 

Congress by llie Scctelarv ol Delcnse lo ensure com- 
pliancc with this Moreover, the Secretary ol 
Defense is now specifically aulliori/eil to buy other 
than I S equipment to implement the policy I’ublic 
law '14-.fbl stales m unequivocal language that it is 
the sense ol Congress that '■weapons systems being 
developed for employment in the NATO theater shall 
conjonr} it> a (('I'tmon WM'O nyuircmcnl '^^ 
(Italics added) 

Accordingly, the Secretary ol Detensc, working 
with members of the .Alliance, will identify areas for 
cooperative arrangements and negotiate specific 
agreements to accomplish the objectives to the maxi- 
mum extent possible. 

Lastly, the Congress advises it has accepted the 
"Two-Way Street" concept of operation advocated in 
tlie Callaghan Report, The Congress is encouraging 
the fcuropean governments to accelerate efforts to 
foster IMS.'® 

At this point, "things are good and getting better” 
as far as IMS policy is concerned. With adoption of 
the Allied Tactical Publication (ATP) 33 in 1976, 
which establishes basic air warfare doctrine for 
NATO, we are witnessing considerable improvement 
in the harmonization of NATO tactical doctrine. 
Agreement on ATP 35 on land warfare will soon fol- 
low. But what does this do for American national 
security? What advantages, and what liabilities does 
this new emphasis on military siandardi/ation con- 
vey'’ This IS a subject on which there is even less 
agreement than there is agreement on the need for 

What Impact Will IMS Have On 
American National Security? 

Independence has been a key feature of American 
national security policy since Washington's farwell 
advice to avoid entangling foreign alliances. Yet, both 
the advice and the feature of independence have dem- 
onstrated unique malleability over the nation’s his- 
tory. When required, military technology has been 
bought, borrowed, and traded to meet national re- 
quirements and, in this century, a considerable 
amount of military equipment has been provided 
friendly nations. Much of this exchange occurred 
through the leftd-lease program of World War II and 
the grant programs of the fifties and early sixties. 
More recently, the United States has been trying to 
"sell its way to standardization" in the NATO Al- 
liance. Considering the quantity of weapons systems 
acquired by NATO member nations on a “pay as 
you go basis,” the US has not done badly, particu- 
larly over the past 10 years. Why is this now likely 
to change? 

The Turopcans have not been dormant in science 
and technology. Since 1967 when Trench military 
forces withdrew from NATO, the big three Kuropcan 
Powers West (.ermany, the United Kingdom, and 
Trance have vastly expanded the size, capability, 
and output of their respective RD&T communities. 
In doing so, they have increasingly found them- 
selves in direct sales competition with major arms 
producers in the Soviet Union and the United Stales. 
That notwithstanding, armament developments have 
been so successful for these Turopean nations that 
they now field some military equipment superior to 
that produced in either the United States or the 
-Soviet Union. Certainly, this did not come as a sur- 
prise. given the long history of Turopean successes in 
weaponry. The surprise is contained in the element of 
strong competition within the Turopean success. 

Turopean technological competition should not be 
confu.sed with a 1970 version of "I.e Defi l.uropeen." 
Rathci, it should be judged more as admission that 
Turope has completely recovered its former place in 
the competitive market place of western nations. This 
success of the Turopeans in military RD&T provides a 
competitor to the defense policies of independence 
that have been standard for the Anglo-Saxon nations 
belonging to NATO. The alternative policy offered 
by this brisk competition is one of cooperation, but it 
can result in a degree of imerdepenjence not accept- 
able to some nations. Both Canada and the United 
Kingdom recognized the advantages of cooperative,' 
collaborative RD&T after the Korean contlict and 
have modified their defense policies accordingly. The 
United Kingdom and Canada have an intensive, if 
relatively brief, history of collaborative RD&T with 
other nations to develop the military equipments 
and weapons systems needed to match their roles 
in world affairs. The United Slates has viewed in- 
terdependence less favorably than any of the Alliance 
members, with the exception of Trance. 

This drift towards greater interdependence carries 
with it a perception of possible detrimental impact 
on American national security. Traditionally, the 
United States, despite the availability of excellent 
Turopean and some Asian military equipment, has 
held to a long-term policy of producing its own. Ad- 
vantages of this are obvious considering the world- 
wide military requirements that the United States 
has had to meet since 1941 to live up to its interna- 
tional political obligations. Since I SI 2 there has 
been a constant theme of independence (if not mili- 
tary autarky) in at least the manufacturing of mili- 
tary equipments and weapons systems. In both 
world wars, considerable use was made of Trench and 
British equipment, but Americans moved on to their 
own as soon as possible. 


DefrnM Systems Minagement Review 

Since l‘>45 very little ‘‘foreign” military equip- 
ment has been purchased by the Lhiited States. Mili 
tarv sales has been a one-way street in which the US 
sold materiel as well as licensing and coproduction 
agreements rather than buying.*® This tradition (or 
arrangement) was broken with the purchase of the 
brench-Cierman Roland air defense system (to pro- 
duce a modified US version based on foreign develop- 
ments) in January l‘*75. Today, negotiations arc 
considerably more extensive with the recent com- 
petition between the American XM-I and Uerman 
U’opard II tanks representing the best example. In 
the summer of l‘)7h it looked as though the decision 
had been made: the Americans (as expected by the 
I uropeans) had ruled the American tank the winner. 
Mr Rumsfeld, then Secretary of Defense, ruled other- 
wise (perhaps to the amazement of the turopeans) 
and declared that a decision would he made after 
further comparative testing and evaluation. 
Moreover. Mr. Rumsfeld emphasized the requirement 
tor collaborative efforts of any possible future pro- 
duction to maximize the interoperability, inter- 
changeability, and compatibility of NATO military 
equipment standardization. At that stage, it was not 
unlait to predict the acceptance of a hybrid tank in- 
corporating the best features of both designs. This 
would have produced a NATO tank in the true sense 
of that term, 

Unlortunately, decisions have since been made 
that preempt fielding a ‘‘NATO tank,” Chrysler was 
awarded the contract for the XM-1 in November, 
I ‘>76. Selection of a main tank gun has been delayed 
by the US until December l‘>77, and in mid-January 
l‘>77 both the US and (Jermany announced that each 
would produce its own tank for its’ forces. Work on 
interoiierability will continue, but the dramatic 
breakthrougli that would have vastly expanded the 
potentialities ol NATO military standardization has 
been contained. Apparently, acceptance of the Ger- 
man tank design would have resulted in a degree of 
interdependence not acceptable to the United States. 
The Germans, by all appearances, were more willing 
to accept these circumstances. In spite of setbacks, 
the decisions made must he welcomed because they 
will ultimately advance the overall objectives of 
standardization and enable greater interoperability 
than ever possible in the past, tven this conditional 
success sliould provide the basis for substantial de- 
cisions in the future that will result in standardized 
weapons systems for NATO ground forces. Such de- 
cisions are not new to NATO airforces, who have 
been narrowing the overall number of aircraft and in 
l‘)75, selected the American built P-16 as their 
standard fighter. However, these decisions are new 
(or ground forces who, with a variety of equipment, 
resemble Coxey’s Army more than modern military 
forces capable of successfully combating the Warsaw 

Pact divisions. Other weapons systems will follow the 
Roland II and the MRC'A fighter and will be manu- 
factured within the NA K) member nations. The par- 
ticipants will share in the production profits as well as 
the RD&P costs. This is an important point because 
according to Major General Richard Bowman. Di- 
rector, t uropean and NATO AUairs (OASD/ISA). 
production costs will usually he higher than single- 
source production. Knsuing military effectiveness 
of NATO will more than offset this cost. 

Willingness to coopciate in military RD&P ob- 
viously does not lead to interdependence within a 
short period of lime. Indeed, considering the size and 
industrial capabilities of some of the national units 
involved, it may never result in very far reaching in- 
terdependence. Broader exchanges of military tech- 
nology expressed in end products does not automat- 
ically result in the subordination syndrome that has 
been complained about on both sides of the Atlantic 
and in the northern hemisphere of this continent. In 
fact, a decision will soon be required on which 
method the American or the Puropean is best lor 
the accomplishment of NATO military standardiza- 
tion. Americans favor an ‘‘interdependence" in which 
RD&P costs are borne by one country with the 
finished product purchased by the others.^® Piiro- 
peans prefer ‘‘interdependence” in which RD&I 
costs arc distributed by bilateral or multilateral 
agreements with the finished products purchased by 
the developers and the other countries. The use ol 
both these methods will continue with the probable 
emergence of the Puropean view for the tgehno- 
logically more advanced weapons systems because ol 
considerations such as cost and early agreement on 
coproduction and licensing. National RD&P may be 
expected to continue at all cost levels until the 
policies and NATO military requirements arc stand- 

During the near (5 year) and midiange (5 to 10 
year) time frames military interdependence attrib- 
utable to IMS will be limited. Only in the long- 
range (10 to 20 year) time frame can this projection 
of interdependence be extended to full reach Pven 
then it is unlikely that interdependence resulting 
from collaborative RD&J: would pose any serious 
constraints on American national security. Taking 
the recent US initiatives on NATO military stand- 
ardization as a point of departure, a brief review of 
what could likely be accomplished within the three 
time frames mentioned above is outlined here. 

In the near range time frame, duplication of ef- 
forts and the associated expense in resources will 
decline as the immediate payoffs in NATO forces 
effectiveness are realized from the standardization of 
items listed by Dr. Currie "as ammunition, bomb 

racks, comiminicallons, piucodiircs, Iraininp, ami 
logistics siippott."^^* In the midrange tune Iranie, 
where the real advantages and cost savings are, greater 
progress can he expected on the Airborne Warning 
and Control .System (AW ACS), atnmutrition ol all 
dimensions, the liiture main battle tank, ground 
based air defense systems, assault guns, reconnais- 
sance helicopters, and V/STOL aircraft, rocket mine- 
laying equipment, electronic wartare (and compatible 
IH systems) atitisurtace ship missiles, and the NAK) 
I’atrol llydroloil ( I’llM ) New weapons and 

equipments that are now being conceptuali/ed by the 
NAIO research and development community will 
contrihute significantly to the benefits reserved to 
the long-range time Irame Immediate preparation of 
a NATO orerj// operational eoncepi, similar to the 
AHCA Aft-V.S Operational Concept.^^ to guide re- 
seatch and development of tactics, equipment, and 
logistics for NATO armed forces during the long- 
range time frame is an essential requirement for suc- 
cessful I.M.S in the (uture. Constructive planning now 
will further ofiset any potential liabilities of RD&h 
interdependence that might emerge in coming dec- 

Not suiprisingly . some of the new items of equip- 
ment listed for the near and midrange time frames 
will he produced by NATO member nations and “not 
invented here." This situation will increase the degree 
ol RD&I interdependence that is viewed skeptically 
by some members ol the U.S defense community. 
These members arc concerned with potential strategic 
hahililics slcmming (rom greater defense inlcrdcpend- 
cnce with NATO I uro[>e. The liabilities arc related 
primarily to the growing economic exchanges be- 
tween key NATO I iitopean nations, especially West 
(lermany, with the .Soviet Union. The opposing U.S 
defense community members fear that tying US 
deicnse RD&I too closely to N ATO I iiro|H’ runs the 
risk ol the US losing control over Us own Rl)&|- 
process in the long-range tune frame. That notwith- 
standing, collaborative RD&f offers an expansive op- 
portunity lor cross-pollinalioii o( American-l uropean 
ideas. The resulting improvemenl ol the overall 
NATO deicnse posture makes the narrow margin o( 
risk invidvcd worth taking. 

example, indicates that Roland II production in the 
United States will eventually total about Sl.O bil- 
hon The expanding science and technology 

base in NATO I urope makes it impossible (or the 
United States to contitiue “selling its way to staiidard- 
i/ation." Moteovet, growing RD&l costs make it im- 
possible for I uropearis to go it alone on highly ex- 
pensive weapons systems that utili/c the “latest” 
technology Adoption ol the two-way street policy is 
a viable approach to achieving the principles of IMS 
while vastly stretigthening the conventional combat 
power o( NATO over the coming decades. T here is no 
doubt that all NATO member nations will benefit 
troiii this recent US policy decision, especially NATO 

Implementation of new LiS legislation clearly com- 
menced when Mr. Rumsfeld postponed the choice be- 
tween competing American tank designs. Ocneral 
Motors and Chrysler were sent back to design major 
components for competition with a list developed by 
Mr. Rumsfeld and the Oernian Minister of Defense. 
Mr. Georg laiher.^*’ This precedent will pave the way 
(or other coproduction and licensing agreeiiients, as 
directed by the Congress in I’l. ‘)4-.T()l. The action 
will ultimately produce a new main battle tank em- 
phasi/itig the NATO principles of IMS, More impor- 
tantly. it demonstrates flS faith in IMS and serves as 
an example for other NATO Allies who may soon be 
involved in collaborative RD&l- . 

Concluding Remarks 

(ieneral Steinholf, in his book U'oliiti Treibt Die 
\ATO'^ referred to standardi/ation as a "magical” 
word. A multitude of persotis have been in favor of 
standardi/ation in the past and want to see how in- 
teroperability, interchangeability, and compatibility 
will work when combined in NATO armed (orces. In 
the opinion of this writer, the belief in standardi/.a- 
tion worked (or years because NATO sulTcred under 
the illusion that it was working. This illusion has been 
dispelled by the recognition of the fact that standard- 
i/ation. to actually work, requires "interdependence" 
among NATO member nations. 

economic considerations are a preeminent factor 
in all considerations of expanding collaborative 
RD&T and the resultant military slandardi/.ation. 
Virtually any sampling of cost-benefit analysis puts 
the US ahead financially, regardless of which methods 
of collaborative RDAI are employed. Callaghan, for 

“Interdependence" does not mean subordination 
of US national security policy to control by other na- 
tions in the NATO Alliance or elsewhere. Moreover, 
existing data indicates that it will not adversely affect 
America's RD&T base or economic structure. Interde. 
pendence does mean: 

*Of courK near term suhili/ation may incrc.ise some one- 
time costs for retrofit, redesign and mechani/od interlaces, 

♦.See reference f.t for comments on Allied funding of the 
1-16 and AWACS for additional examples of how the US will 

Defense Systems Minigement Review 

• NAK) can slructiitc its common requirements, 
to respoiul to Booth’s critique, hy setting up 
stmilar equipment replacement cycles; 

• iJelense employment can become more stable in 
the absence ot nuctiiatmg ilemaml . 

• the sharing ot RD&h costs and cross pollination 
ol Ametican-l uropean ideas will help in meet- 
ing the objectives outlined by Dr ('urric, 

• tactical pretcrences can become NATOoriented; 

• each member nation can adopt the best equip- 
ments and weapons systems; 

• joint production can result in more siicccsslul 
thoroughbred warhorscs like the Multi-Role 
Combat Aircraft (MRCA);and 

• NATO vvill remain as a more viable Alliance 

Most importantly, it will now be possible to develop 
a coordinated long-range operational concept lor 
guiding research and development leading towards 
total International Military Standardization among 
NATO member nations. Reinforced by harniorii/a- 
tion of tactical doctrine, communications, logistics, 
and other elements of rationalization, the maturation 
of I.MS policy evinced by recent US initiatives will 
have positive impact on American national security. 


1 . North .Atlantic Treaty Organization, .V/t TO Clossary of Terms and liefiniiions for Military I 'se iTnylish and Trench). 
Brussels. Belgium, Apr 76, pp 2-240. 

2. Malcolm R. Currie, "The Department of Defense Program of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, I V 1977,” 
Director of Research and Engineering. Department of Defense, Report to the Congress of the Cnited .States 
(94th Cong., 2d sess.), 3 Eeh 76, p, Vlll-I . 

3. NATO Information Service, V/l TfZ Earrj end E/gurer. Brussels, Belgium, 1977, pp 131.132. 

4. Georg Eehcr, "Principles I nderlying German Defense Policy,” ,V/1 TO Review. 24(2): 8-1 1 (1976). 

5. (iardiner L. Tucker, "Standardization and the Joint Defense," A'/l TO Review. 23(1 ): 1 1 (1975). 

6. Andrew (ioodpaster, "NATO Strategy and Requirements 1975-1985,” Survival. XVII(5): 212 (1975). 

7. Johannes Steinhoff. Mihin Treihl die .V.4 TO’’, Hoffman und Campe, Hamburg, Germany, 1976. 

8. /6id,,pp.248,249. 

9. Ihid . p 255. 

10. Thomas A. Callaghan, Jr., t '.S./Turopean Cooperation in Military and Civil Technology. Monograph, Center for Stra- 
tegic Studies, Washington, IX', 1975, rev ed, p 10. 

12. /6id . plOH. 

13. Ken Booth, “Security Makes Strange Bedfellows: NATO's Problems from a Minimalist Perspective,” Journal of the 
Royal Cnited Services Institute for Defense Studies, Dec 75, p 8. 

14. US Congress, (93d Cong., 2d sess.). Department of Defense Appropriation .Authorization Act. /975, Public Taw 
9J J6S. H. Rept. 14592, US (kivl Printing Office, Wuhington, DC, 1974. 

15. (93d Cong., 2d sea.). Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act. IV77. Public Ijtw V4J6I . 

H. Rept. 12438, US Govt Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1976. 

16. /bid.. SEC. 802. Section 814(a)(1). 

*7. . SK . 80J.(a). 

IN. /ftK/.. SK .803.U). 

19. l»addis Smith. Hruain's ( Uwdestine Suhfnarines. Aichon Books, New York, 1975. 

20. “lank Contest Seen I>ecidetl in Advance: (Germans U>sers.’* Hahimore hveninjf Sun. Baltimore. MI), 15 Mar 76, p 2. 

2 1 . Drew Middleton, “Army Tests I wo Tanks as Rivals to (icrman Entry," Ven York Times, New York, 18 Mar 76, p 20. 

22. John W. I inney, “1 .S. and Bonn Reach lank Compromise, ** New York Times, New York. 5 Aug 76, p 1 . 

23. John I . Lucas, “The Air Combat Lighter: Progress for Standardization, " VI TO Heview, 23(6): 3-6 (1975). 

24. Richard C. Bowman, “NAIO Standardization for Improved Combat Capability,” Commanders Diges/, 19(19); 3 

25. Henry 1. Simmons, “NATO Equipment Standardization and Rationality -US Opinions and Proposals,** /nrernflf/om?/ 
Defense Keview, 8(2): 156-157 (1975). 

26. “NATO Equipment Standardisation- A (German View," International Defense Review, 9(4): 563-568 (1976). 

27. C urrie, 0/7. (7t., p Vlll-3. 

28. IhHi 

29. Simmons, 0/7. cit.. pp 156-57. 

30. Jt>hn O. LUiott, “Ciuide for Military .Standardization: ABCA Armies’ Operational Concept, 1986-95," Research 
anti Des'elftpment. l7(May-Jun|: 10-11 (1976). 

3 1 . Richard Pipes (ed), Soviet Strategy in turope. Crane, Russak and Company, Inc.. New- York, 1976, Pt III, PP 21 1 *304. 

32. Callaghan. 0/7. cit.. p 52. 

33. H<7wman.o/7. ctt.. pp 6,7. 

34. L. Clifton Berry, Jr., “House Panel Slams XM-I Delay," Armed Forces Journal. 1 14(1 ): 8 (1976). 

Majoi John 1). I Iliutt. US 
Army, is assigned to the Stra- 
tegic Planning (iroup. Joint 
I orce.s and Strategy Direc- 
torate. US Army C'oncx'pts 
Analysis Agency. He serves on 
the US delegation to NATO’s 
Tactical and logistical Con- 
cepts Panel (PANI I XD and the American. British. Cana- 
dian. and Austraban (ABC A) Ou<idripartite Working Ciroup 

on C'ombat Development (C)W(i/CT)). He received his Hj\. 
degree from the University of Maryland and the degree of 
M.A. from Boston Universily. Major Elliott is currently a 
docuiral student in political scicna' at the Cieorge Wash- 
ington University. 

Majoi I lliott has been designated a NATO 1 cilow for the 
academic year 1977-78. The purpose of this Research Ecllow- 
ship is to promote study and research leading to publication 
on aspects relevant to the North Atlantic Alliance. 

l>fenae Systems Management Review 


An Alternative Approach 


A. Martin Lidy, Lt Col, USA 

Among N ATO’s ailments is the vast diversity of equipment with which its forces are armed- 
an impairment from which forces of the Soviet Bloc do not suffer. The results include in- 
creased equipment acquisition and maintenance costs, difficulties in logistics support, and 
restrictions on the ability of NATO forces to operate in concert. Numerous efforts to 
alleviate this situation have floundered. This author submits a solution lies in standardiza- 

Part I 



The .Vurtli Allanik I realy Organization (NATO) 
is a political and military Alliance of fifteen sov- 
erign nations. The organization was established in 
l‘»49 to halt the westward expansion of the Soviet 
Union on the Luropcan continent. Torined around 
the residual World War 11 occupation forces of the 
western nations, the NATO military establishment 
has grown to a total peacetime strength of more than 
5 million men the combined annual defense ex- 
penditure approaches $140 billion. ^ 

Worldwide economic conditions and rising defense 
costs have served to create political initiatives within 
the Alliance to manage the burden of defense within 
resource limits. Member nations realize that if ade- 
quate forces are to be maintained, NATO forces must 
be truly integrated. The imperative actions are to 
specialize the defense efforts among the participating 
nations, standardize NATO weapons systems, and in- 
crease the interoperability of forces. The increasing 
costs must he curbed while military effectiveness is 
achieved. In his address to the North Atlantic Council 
(Brussels. May 1975), Gerald ford, then President of 
the United States, noted; 

A generation after its creation, the alli- 
ance wastes vast sums each year, sacrificing 
military effectiveness. W’e have simply not 
done enough to standardize our weajxms. 

We must correct this. We must also agree 
atnong ourselves on a sensible division of 
weapons development programs and produc- 
tion responsibilities. .And we must do more 
to enhance our mutual capacity to support 
each other both in battle and logistically.^ 

In July 1975. the Secretary of Defense established 
a DOD Steering Group and a series of working panels. 
The purpose was to draw together the various on- 
going DOD actions relating to rationalization and 


Terms as used by the IXJD Steering Group are de- 
fined below. 

KaiionaUzaiion.- Any action that makes more ef- 
ficient use of the defense resources of NATO and 
NATO nationals without changing the total 
planned defense funding of the member states. 

Specialization. -The special conditions within 

Vol. I, No. 3. 


\AI() wherein :i inemhcr or group of metriher 
ndtioiis most suited hy virtue of tcchiheal skills, 
loe.itioii. or other tangible assets can perform a 
speeitie task, or significant portion thereof, for 

St dtulardizal ion. -W\c process by which member 
nations achieve the closest practicable cooperation 
among torces. the most efficient use of research, 
development, and production resources, and agree 
to adopt on the broadest basis the use of: 

a. fommon or compatible operational, ad- 
mimslrative and logistical procedures. 

b. Common or compatible technical pro- 
cedures and criteria. 

c. Common, compatible, or interchangeable 
supplies, components, weapons, or equipment. 

d. Common or compatible tactical doctrine 
with corresponding organization compatibility. 

Inieroperahle .- \\ie ability of systems to provide 
services to or accept services from other systems 
and to use the services so exchanged to enable 
them to operate eltectively together. 


I he Luropean nations, owing to the devastation 
vsrought hy World War II, had limited economic 
means with which to equip and field armed forces 
during the infancy of NATO. In May, I ‘>50, the 
N.AK) Defense Committee, recognizing the huge 
cost associated with defense, recommended 

progressive increase in defense forces 
based on the creation of balanced collective 
torces rather than balanced national 

In general, these urgings went unheeded. The United 
States was providing a major ixirtion of the arma- 
ments for the forces, first through military assistance 
programs and later by direct foreign military sales. 
I he US actions did provide NATO military forces 
with standardized equipment equipment that was 
lor the most part interiqrcrable. To insure against 
the possibility that the United States might be re- 
quired to underwiiie a major portion of the Allied 
delense ellort as it had during World War II, NATO 
doctrine established that logistics was a national re- 


In mid and late I’l.'iO, the l uropcan industrial base 
had recovered sulficiently to permit the joint devel- 
opment and production of exclusively l iiropean 
major items of equipment. The first multinational 
venture was the I IAI (<.‘>l tactical aircraft program. 
Initiated in l‘).S4, this program eventually resulted in 
the delivery of more than bOO aircraft .* 

Ijtc in l'>5b. the United States suggested greater 
coordination in weapons development and produc- 
tion to minimize US cost Information about US de- 
velopments became more readily available ' I he 
first Ihiited States weapons systems selected by 
NATO for joint development were the HAWK air 
defense missile and the SlDl W'lNDf R air-to-air 
missile.® This success was followed by other joint 
projects, each approached on an ad hoc basis The 
1-104 STARI Kiini R and the lU'Il.l’UP missile 
are examples of early NATO standardization through 
joint weapons production. 

The attention of the United States, during the 
1960s, was directed towards Southeast Asia. Hie US 
was then expending sums comparable to about SO 
percent of the entire NATO military K&l) budget. 
United States forces were being developed for and 
deployed to combat operations in the jungles and 
rice paddies ol Asia, not the plains and mountains 
ol luropc. While the l uropeans continued joint 
programs, it was with only limited US interest and 
participation. The previous degree of standardization 
achieved through single source development and 
joint development was eroded by individual na- 
tional priorities, requirements, and capabilities and 
by an inability to adjust these items to an agreed in- 
ternational schedule fir development. Dr U.ardiner 
L. Tucker, then the Assistant Secretary Ueneral of 
NAK) for Support, was critical of the variety of 
weapons used by the .Allied Uonimand Turope 
Mobile Force* (AMF) 

With seven nations contributing, there are 
seven different types of combat aircraft in 
the air arm; there are six different types of 
recoilless rifies; four different types of wire- 
guided antitank weapons; three different 
types each of mortars, rifles and machine 
guns. This force is prepared to deploy to a 
number of different critical areas in lime of 
crisis, and obviously cannot preposition its 
own supplies in each of these possible areas. 
Because their weapons and supplies are so 

*Thc AMF is a joint air-ground cornhat force composed of a 
reinforced light infantry ballahon and supportuig tactical 
aircraft. The force is for use by NATO aulhorilies in crisis 
situations on NAFO flanks lo demonstrate Atliance 

Defense .Systems Management Review 

lilvotso. each ol tlie seven national units in 
this torce must maintain its own logistics 
personnel aiul establish its own support. Ik'- 
cause the weapons anil supplies of .AMI- 
units ate not standardi/eil with those ol the 
host countries into which they are prepared 
to deploy, they cannot plan initially to draw 
on host country supplies and replenish them 
in due course, they must bring their lull sup- 
plies with them uh 

Belore his retirement. (leneral (loodpaster, the 
Supreme -Mlied Commander l uro|X' (SACrUR), put 
a price tag on the cost ol NAIO-wide nonslatidard- 
i/Jtion when he noted that it reduced NAK) combat 
etlectiveness hy .k) to 50 percent. The United 
States Congress was quick to respotid, and Ihiblic 
Ijw ').5-5(i 5 directs the Secretary ol Deletise 

• to undertake a specific assessment of the 
costs and the possible loss of nonnuclear com- 
bat effectiveness of the military forces of the 
North .-Atlantic Treaty Organization countries 
caused by lailure to standardize weapons sys- 
tems. ammunition, fuel, and other military 
impediments tor land, air. and naval forces. 

• to develop a list of standardization actions in 
order ol relative priority that could improve 
the overall North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
nonnuclear delense capability or save resources 
tor the Alliance as a whole; and 

• to bring before appropriate North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization bodies the results of these 
assessments and evaluations in order that the 
suggested actions and recommendations may 
become an integral part of the overall North 
.Atlantic I reaty Organization development of 
force goals and review of force goals.* * 

With the high level interest of the l-xecutive and 
1-egislativc branches of government once agaiti 
aroused, the United States Department of Defense 
must seek options to achieve a truly NATO-wide in- 
tegrated and standardized force. The military force 
must be capable of providing peacetime deterrence, 
and must assure an effective wartime capability. 

Part II 

NATO Materiel Acquisition Process 

riie NATO can be viewed as consisting of three 
major components. These components are the na- 
tional participants in the Alliance and the civil and 
militar/ authorities of the Alliance bureaucracy itself. 
Within NA K). the North Atlantic Council (NAC) is 
the highest authority, I'he NAC is chaired by tlie 
Secretary General and is comprised of heads of gov- 
ernment and ministers of member countries, hach 
nation maintains a permanent representative, an 
ambassador and supporting staff at NATO Head- 
quarters. Brussels. Two times each year, ministerial 
or heads of government level sessions are held. 
Agendas arc developed by the permanent repre- 

The day-to-day activities of the NAC arc con- 
ducted by various committees. Activities range in 
diversity from the Military Budget Committee to 
the Committee on the Challenges of Modern So- 
ciety. W'ith regard to materiel acquisition the Con- 
ference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) 
is the most important committee. 

The CNAD (in l‘)f>6) evolved from what had 
been the Armaments Committee. The CNAD, was 
established because 

• neither the Armaments Committee nor any 
other NATO organization has been able to de- 
velop a comprehensive system for regular and 
systematic exchange of information between 
member nations on either existing or future 
national systems, whether unilateral or multi- 
lateral, and 

• machinery did not exist lor balancing national 
industrial and economic interests over the 
whole range of NATO cooperation in research, 
development, and production >2 

Today, the CNAD serves as an Alliance materiel 
acquisition information exchange body, not as a pro- 
curement decisionmaking authority . The CNAD 

“. . . not only encourages and assists the 
countries to join together in equipment and 
research projects, but also provides means 
tor exchanges of information on operational 
concepts, national equipment programs and 
appropriate technical and logistical matters 
where cooperation can bencTit NATO and 

Vol. I.No. J. 


the nations, even if no partienlai project as 
such is likely to inateriali/e It further en- 
coiiraites discussions on lonper-lerin research 
activities with a view to providing guidance 
on the possibility ol meeting luture military 
neeils through the application of advanced 
techiudogy or new scientific discoveries.”*^ 

The ( NAD carries out these actions on a daily 
basis through: a research group, three service main 
groups and the I riservice (iroup on .Air Defense 
and about 140 subgroups and information exchange 
panels.*'* Most members ol the armaments groups, 
the Delense Research (iroup and the subordinate 
groups are experts Irom N.ATO capitols. Rased on 
agendas developed by the national representatives 
(N.ADKI I’S). the armaments directors meet, gen- 
erally twice each year, to discuss materiel develop- 
ment and production requirements for NAIO lorces. 
The discussion is centered about the political, eco- 
nomic. and technical aspects. Too. the directors 
provide advice and guidance to the NAC on matters 
connected with equipping and logislically support- 
ing NAIO forces. 

In dune I'XtK. the ( SAD established the SATO 
Industrial .-\dvisory (iroup (NIA(i) to support its 
work. Die objectives ol this group of industrialists, 
designated to represent each national industry, are 

• to provide a forum lor Iree exchange of views 
on the various industrial aspects of NAIO 

• to losier a deeper leeling of inicrnaiional in- 
volvement in research, development and pro- 

• to seek closer c(H)|ieration among the indus- 
tries ol member countries, and 

• to encourage timely and efficient exchanges of 
information between member governments and 
Ihier defense industries.*** 

NATO Civil Authorities 


lo implement NAC policy decisions the political 
structure ol the NATO bureaucracy is represented by 
the NATO International Stall (IS) and is directed by 
the .Secretary (letieral. Ol lire four Assistant .Secretary 
(•enerals on the IS, the Assistani Secretary (ieneral 
lor Delense Supfrorl is the person most concerned 
with NAIO materiel acquisition. His duties and re- 

sponsibilities. Ill .nldition to heading the Delense Sup- 
port Division and participating as the working chair- 
man ol the ( NAD, include 

• the proniolioti of the most efficient use ol the 
resources of the Alliance for the equipment and 
support id its lorces This task especially in- 

• the encouragenieni of cooperation between 
nations in research, development and pro- 
duction and standardi/ation ol weapons and 
equipment and their supply and mainte- 
nance within the Iramework of the defense 
plans of the Alliance. 

• the organi/ation of exchanges of inlorma- 
tion which may lead to such equi|)inent 

• the study of logistic problems including the 
operation of the NATO Pipeline System, the 
NATO Maintenance and Supply Orgam/a- 
tion. etc. 

• techriical and financial supervision of the 
NATO Infrastructure program. 

• participation in the process of defense reviews 
on matters within the responsibility and com- 
petence of the Division.*® 


The NATO Maintenance and Supply Organi/ation 
(NAMSO), is an operating agency subordinate to the 
NATO Assistant Secretary (ieneral for Defense Sup- 
port. The mission of NAMSO is e,s.sentially that of 
facilitating the supply of spare parts and providing 
maintenance and repair lacilities necessary for the 
support of certain weapons systems in NATO nation 
inventories. The major activities of the organi/ation 
have been to stock parts and maintain l uropean 
based oveihaul facilities for equipment manufactured 
by the United States and used by non-US NATO 
forces. TTie NAMSO can and does serve as a broker 
for other weapons common to two or more nations. 
Surprisingly, although the United States was instru- 
mental in establishing NAMSO il does not participate 
in nor use Ibis agency lo any great extent.*^ 

NATO Military Authorities 


The Military Committee is the highest military 
authority in NATO. Military Commanders of the 


Defense System.s Management Review 




Alliance are suhordinale to tins hody. Orpani/ation 
of the Military Commillec is shown in l ipurc 1 . Hie 
NAC has charged the Military ('oininittee with 

• the peaceinne task ol recoiiimendiiip those 
measures necessary for the common delense of 
NAK) area. 

• providing military advice and counsel to the 
\ A( . 

• coordinating the requests and recommenda- 
tions of the major NATO commanders 

• providing the direction necessary to implement 
approved NATO plans and policyT® 

In addition to the three major commands and a 
regional planning group, the Military Commitiee is 
responsible lor two agencies that are involved with 
the materiel acquisition process. I'hesc agencies are 
the Military .Agency for .Slandardi/aiion (MAS) and 
the .Advisory (iroup for Aerospace Research and l)e 
vclopment (,A(iARI)|. 


I he Chiels ot .SlafI ot the member nations ac- 
tually constitute the Military Committee but each 
nation maintains a permanent military representative 

with supporting staff to elleci national pailicipalion. 
The Military Committee is liirther supported m its 
day-lo-tlay activities by an International Military 


I he M.A.S w as organi/ed in I ’>5 1 as the priiuii'jl 
activity within N.AIO to insure that the mihlar> 
forces oiK’rale together in the most ellective matiiici 
However, the MAS. as an entirely military agency, has 
had little to do with standardi/alion ot armaments 
which is the responsibility ol the CNAI). A leview ol 
Table 1 suggests, with the exception ol the an panels, 
most current efforts of the MAS are concerned with 
standardi/alion of procedures rather ihan siandard- 
i/alion ol military e(|uipinent . 


The ,A(»AKI) was formed in I' 1 he pui|’ose 
was to bring together member nation experts m aeio- 
space science and technology. To accomplish its 
broad chartei of exchanging scientitic and technical 
data, encouraging cooperation, and lecommendmg 
effective ways for member nations lo use research 
and development capabililies for the common good. 
A(i.ARI) relies on panels, consultani ami exchange 
programs, and technical studies requested by or 
througli the N.-\TO Military Committee. 

Figure 1. The NATO Military Authority 

SAIti !•<<« arrt NMM 

Wrvttei tUmmU fclpywi (HtT| p t<M 

Vol.I.No. 3. 



The Formal Acquisition Process 

111 Its oaiK sijfici, the ( Nad suuplil to loslor in- «.oopci.ition hy coiisulermt: .mil ilisciissiiij; 
ni;i|oi Items ol ei|iiipiiient then iiiuler lievelopiiieiil 
or m proiliielioii This const rained tlic frecdoni ol 
choice loi ( N AD workint: members and 

■■ restricted occasions when nations were 
willing to commit resources to joint cooper- 
ative cl torts ' 

As the oft-lhe-shell items were exhausted, the work- 
ing groups were lorced to consider liilurc needs, 
riien It was toimd that \ A lO-wide specific guidance 
upon which .ici|insilioii plans could he developed did 
not exisi Hs D>nx, the CN.-M) directed the Main 
(iioups to make systematic reviews of all luliire 
ei|inpmeiil needs Miis action was only partially 

As a result ol the pendulum swing away Ironi the 
earls proceduie ol lormal N.A I O equipment require- 

ments being developed by the iiiajoi N'AIO ( oni 
mandeis (a procedure that tailed to achieve common 
N AT O systems), the rhiti ( N Al) Charlei went to the 
other extreme and did not lequiie a lormal iiipiil 
Ironi the NAIO military aiilhorilics on equipment 
rei|unenienls Instead, the stress was on providing an 
atmosphere to encom.ige voluntary cooperation by 
the nations It only two nations were interested m 
a coopeialive ei|Uii'menl elloil. ihis was considered 
to be an improvement over llie failure ol the earlier 


Ihc Military Commillee was given the role ol pro- 
viding the military aiiihorilies interlace to the ( NAD 
Dnique among NAK) ('omimllecs. the ( NAD con- 
tains a member designated by the Military (dmmil 
tec. To provide a direct route lor the expression ol 
views by the major NAK) commanders. Ihc Military 
(■omniillcc in l') 7 l directed that 

• the Military Commanders will provide the 




Table I. Militars' Agency fur Standardisation Working Panels 

Naval Panels 

Maritime Tactical Data Cards 
Helicopter Operations from 
Ships other than A/C Carriers 
Replenishment at Sea 
Amphibious Warfare 
Nava) Fuels and Lubricants 
Mine Warfare 

Technical Publications 
Tactical Publications 
Exercise Evaluation 
Naval Medical 

Army Panels 

Army Fuels and Lubricants 
Combat Clothing & Equipment 
Materials Handling 
General Medical 
NBC Medical 

Movements and Transport 
Rail Movements and Transport 
Land Force Airmobility 
Camouflage and Concealment 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
Combat Engineering 
Ammunition Interchangeability 
Artillery Procedures 
Land Force Operational 

NBC Operational Procedures 
Intelligence Procerfures 
Land Force Tactical Doctrine 
Land Force Logistics 

Air Panels 

Air T raffic Control 
A/C Instruments and Aircrew 

Interservice Laser Interoperability 
Air Electrical 
Search and Rescue 
Flight Safety 

Electromagnetic Compatibility 
Maps and Charts 
Lasar Panel on Safe Exposure 

Photo Equipment and Material 
Photo Recce Interpretation 
Air Transport 
Air Armament 
NATO Tactical Air Doctrine 
A/C Gaseous Systems 
Airfield Marking and Lighting 
Aircraft Standard Parts 
Aviation Fuels and Lubricants 
POL Handling Equipment 
Aircraft Cross Servicing 
Interservice Tactical Air Opera- 
tional Procedures 

Source: Ronald E. Wakeford, “NATO Standardization Concepts,” SSC-TN-.f9l6-|, Stanford Research Institute. 
June 7.S, p 97. 


Defense Systems Management Keview 

( \ \|) with jfirooil Mililiiry (oiMmillcc mlel- 

yti'llicr. Ihc JepemJcnl groups, or siihgroups. operate 
utulct appropriate tiiaiti groups atid comiiicl detailed 
weapons studies in support ol' the ( 



• the Milltaiv ( Uniinaiiders ssill express opinions 
and u\omniendalions on lonit-lerni. hroad op- 
eiaiional eoncepts related to equipment re- 
qiiireiiienls. jiiil 

• tin Militarv ( iinimanders will participate as ac- 
tiscK as possible at meetings o( the ( NAD and 
Its suhoidmjte groups 

• SA( I I'K ami SA( I ANT will support the work 
ol the ( N M) hy providing the use ol the lacili- 
iies ot the SMAI’I lechnical ('enter and SA( - 
lAMCIN to the extent possible. The same 
thing was directed with respect to A(IARU and 
the other Military Commillee agencies.^ 

I he linkage ol the military requirements and op- 
eialional concepts ol the military commanders with 
the mam groups ol the C’NAI) provided the mech- 
anism to anticqiate rutuie requirements Starting 
equipment discussions helore nations become com- 
mitted to a specitie course ol action should provide a 
better basis upon which to reach agreernertt. Since 
1070, the CNAI) working groups have evolved into 
loiums m search ol cases in which NATO luture col- 
laboration on weapons development and production 
can he achieved The working groups hold 3 to 4-day 
sessions involving military, scientific, and technical 
experts two or three times each year. Draft positions 
on weapon systems are coordinated with national 
authorities, formal recommendations ate presented 
to the ( NAD for consideration. 


Based on specific recommendations of working 
groups, the (NAD may elevate a major weapotts 
system to the status of a “NATO Project." Current 
NATO Projects are listed in Table 2. Once a system 
receives this designation, the developing nation(s) 
work collectively to produce the system. Other 
nations with interest in the system can arrange for 
purchase. In the case ol Ihc more complex NATO 
Multi-Role Combat Atrcrali Project (MRCA), an 
intergovcrnmenal body was established to manage 
the project.** The elevated status provides interna- 
tional recognition to what would otherwise be merely 
bilateral or multilateral activities. An appropriate 
NATO Steering Committee is established to monitor 
and assist participants and report the project status 
to the CNAI). 

The formal NATO materiel acquisition organiza- 
tion brings the three organizational components to- 

Vol. I. No. J. 

Operating Alternatives to the NATO Process 

The CNAI) is rather unwieldy because ol its size 
and the diverse interest of its members. Because ot 
this, three smaller subgroups with common miercsts 
in materiel acquisition have been created to supple- 
ment the efforts ol the CN AI) The subgroups arc 
l•.(JRO(jR()|IP, the four Power Oroiip and the In- 
dependent furopeari Program (iroup lie.. IT.'RO- 
(iROLlP members and francel. 

In ld()b, Belgium, Denmark, fhe federal Republic 
of Germany. Greece, Italy, l.uxembourg, the Nether- 
lands. Norway, Turkey, and the United Kingdom 
formed the hUROGROLT' as an instrument ol co- 
operation. consultation, and coordination within the 
formal NATO organization The specilic puiposes ol 
Ihc f.UR()(. ROUP arc 

• to achieve, by collaboration, elleclivc use ol 
their financial resources and greater elTiciency 
in their national defense ettorls. 

• to facilitate, by multilateral improvement pro- 
grams, Ihc US lorce presence in I urope po- 
litically, psychologically, and materially, and 

• to consult with each other on matters relating 
to security and dclensc. and above all. develop 
common equipment, tiaining, and logistic con- 

The fURO(iR()UP, even without french partici- 
pation. has produced results in expanded cooperation. 
The I uropean Defense Improvement Program ti- 

TABLE 2,Currenl NATO Weapons Systems Projects 
Source: “NATO Factsand Figiu’es," NATO 
Information Services, Brussels. Belgium, 
OctTl.p 133 

NATO JAGUAR Tactical and framing Aircraft 

NATO SEASPARROW Point Defense Ship Missile 

NATO Azores Fixed Acoustical Range 

NATO AN-USD 501 Surveillance System 

NATO FH-70 Towed Howitzer 

NATO Acoustic Communication with Submarines 

NATO PUMA, GAZELLE, and LYNX Helicopters 

NATO Multi Role Combat Aircraft 

NATO ZENOE Locating Radar 

NATO Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (TrackedI 


-■-J* 2- 


njiKCil jn cvlonsivo sheltei I'mpriiin lot aircrull In 
I iiro[io. riio I I ROdKOl'l’ nalions incroascil dc- 
liTisc expenditures hy perecntdruni l‘)7(Mo d)7.^) 
in monetary terms I he I 'lilted States Inercasc was 
one percent 1 he I I R( HI ROUP success In promot- 
ing; weapons standardl/atloii is apparent trom a re- 
Slew ot the list ol NATO projects. Most ol the proj- 
ects are based on I uropean development and are ol 
1 uropean ori>:m. The TURtKiROUT’ elTorts demon- 
strate that the I uropeatis have the will to identily 
ami develop areas of coojicratioit and are capable of 
doing many things tor Kuropean defense on a totally 
i uropean basis. 

The second formal subgroup, (the .Armament Di- 
rectors of the US. I.IK. I ranee and the I RU) was 
established to provide less formal body to har- 
moni/e the national materiel development programs 
of the main producing countries of the Alliance. TTiis. 
the I'our Power Uiroiip, is comprised ot the chiefs ol 
defense research and development of I'rance, the 
federal Republic of (lermany. the United Kingdom, 
and the United Stales I he l-oui Power (iroup meets 
every b nionihs I ach national project Is reviewed 
b\ phase ol development Projects are e.xamined with 
a view toward cancelling duplicative national planned 
programs in favor ol a common solution. Since 
these tour coiiniries expend about dH percent of the 
combined N.-\I() dclensc research and development 
funds, the l our Power review process encompasses 
virtually all major NATO weapons developnienis. 

A significant problem facing the four Power 
(iroup is harmoni/ation ol the national phases of 
materiel development. The United Slates acquisition 
process is based on four distinct phases. Control of 
major systems is exercised through reviews by the 
l) .Systems -Acquisition Review Council 

(l)SAR( ) and Secielary of Defense approval (be- 
tween each phase) Other memhers of the four 
Power (iroup use from three to seven phases ol de- 
velopnienl .See I able .T llecausc ol a paucity ol 
available data, it was not possible to determine what 
national materiel acquisition control is exercised 
within the four Power (iroup countries. 

Apparent Problems within the Existing 

Despite urgings ol the Defense Committee to 
create balanced collective forces rather than balanced 
national forces, only now is NAT O beginning to con- 
sider rationah/alion and speciali/ation of its defense 
forces. 77ie A'/1 TO Joclnnc mawlaiin that lotfiuic 
suppan is a nalional rcspnnsihihlv. With a vast or- 
gani/ation devoted to eqiiipmenl technology and 
development exchanges. NAT O equipment standard- 
i/ation has achieved only a niodicum of success. The 
NATO forces maintain a plethora ot costly weapon 
systems less standardized and less interoperable than 
economic common sense should allow. Many critics 
of the process have addressed the problem ot stand- 
ardization. The resultant observations suggest three 
major problem areas within the N ATO orgam/ational 


.Since NATO is an Alliance of sovereign nations, 
all decisionmaking is based on joint consultation 
fach member nation then is tree to take whatever 
course of action it deems api'ropriate. There is no 
supranational authority vested with the [lower to 
compel a nation to take a specific action. As a re- 
sult, the ( NAD is merely a body that encourages 

TABLE 3. Four Power Group Materiel Acquisition Phases 

United States^' 


Federal Republic of 

United Kingdom 


Conceptual study 

Lead phase 
Concept phase 

Feasibility study 
Project definition 


Feasibili'y study 

Definition phase 

Full scale development 

Exploratory development 
Completion of drawings 
and manufacture of 

Development phase 

Full development 

Production and di ployment Mass production 

Procurement ohase 
Service phase 


tlefense Syilrmii Management Review 

ami assists cuopeiatioii lluoiijih iiitoriiiatioii cs- 
chanijcs and discussions ol nalional dcvciopincnl 
pn ipranis 

I vliT I’orl. a lornicr VAIO Assislani Socrolarv 
(.cncral lot Deicnso Suppoii, has sungeslcd lhal ihc 
piotsictn lacniL’ NAIO is 

" liovs lo hridcc the >;ap that exists be- 
tween the vast amount ol orjiani/ed inlornta- 
tion dcvelo|X'd at the inlorination exctianpe 
level and the decisionniakinj; process at the 
national level 

I he t’\AI) as a bouy does not possess authority to 
make materiel acquisition decisions for nations. Ihe 
( NAD may assist in cooperative efforts once the 
nations have decided on a course of action. The 
( N.AI) consists ol national representatives who are 
supposed to have authority to make weapons acqui- 
sition decisions lor the respective nalional defense 
esl ahlishments The acliial decisioninakin); process 
apparently lias not been successful because the sup- 
porlm>; apparatus (main proups, subgroups, and 
panels), have been unable lo assimilate the huge 
quantities ol technical inlornialion and to present 
the decisionmakers with clear, concise, and rational 
sets ol choices from whi.n decisions can be made. 
Tlie f our I’ower (iroup iias been less than successful 
since IIS stalTs arc nationally oriented New programs 
arc considered only in various pliascs of research and 
development, the (iroup does not seem to coordinate 
at procurement thresholds. 


Ihe ( NAD supporting organi/alions are part-lime 
working groups consisting ol national representatives 
and selected members of the international and mili- 
tary stalTs. l acer^^ has suggested tlial the existing 
organi/alion does not allow for agreement on com- 
mon requirements niucli less a system to meet the 
need, (ertainly, Ihe national representatives to the 
various ( NAD groups tend 'o be strong advocates of 
national programs. A 15-nian working group meeting 
only periodically and subjected to strong national 
biases is not the best forum in which to agree upon 
.'omnion military requirements or to make dilTicult 
choices lor Ihe Alliance as an entity. Because of 
this deficiency Ihe ( NAD replaced Ihe old Arma- 
ments (■ommittce. The NATO weapons acquisition 
process is much like a 15-man lil'ehoal cast adrift 
without a rudder. Navigation depends upon coordina- 
tion ol the oars. Unless the oars are coordinated, 
especially the strongest ones, the course will he 
chaotic l acer believes the liUR()(.R(UiP, provided 

It secures I reiich participation, can serve as a com- 
pensating alternative to the dominance and to the 
rather miprediclable I'liiled .Stales parlicipalion m 
we.ipons standard i/al ion. 

l acer observed lhal there is no body at the inter- 
nalional level with responsibility lot harmoni/ing 
nalional equipment re|)lacement plans. While the 
( NAD working bodies do have Military (ommittee 
represcnlalioti. there is little agreement on which 
weapons to select There is less agreeinent on what 
the Alliance-wide priority lot introduction should 
be. Instead, when a weapon is selected lor multina- 
tional use. each nation deals with the producer di- 
rectly. The producer then establishes a production 
and delivery schedule generally on a first come first 
served basis without regard to Alliance priorities. 
Additionally, there is no coherent international plan- 
ning for Alliance-wide mixes ol weapons. Neither 
arc international plans developed to extend the use- 
ful hie of (dder systems. Rather than promoting 
•nanagemeni by weapons laniily, NAIO exchanges 
infomiation on an ad hoc and rather random project 
by-project fasis. 


The NATO does not have a standing procurement 
activjty to support an Alliance purchase of common 
weapon systems. I'or large projects such as the 
MRCA, multinational consortiums are established 
Because there is no inlcinational management, na- 
tional weapons procurements usually arc negotiated 
directly with national or international manufacturers 
and without regard lo production economies of scale 
or Alliance priorities. Most countries procure Irom 
one or more foreign manufacliirers. Hence the finan- 
cial drain lhal each project imposes on the national 
balance of payments becomes increasingly important 
as system costs increase. Many times the balance of 
payments becomes the controlling lactor determin- 
ing the si/e of the procurement and the timing ol 
Ihc expenditure. 

James^^ called for a central direction to procure- 
ment and common funding of procurement at least 
on a modest scale. He recommended that a Turopean 
Procurement Agency be established so that Ihe pro- 
curement accounts of Lurotrean nations could be 
adequately balanced internally and balanced with 
those of the United .States. Callaghan^^ supports Ihe 
central procurement concept but suggests that na- 
lional accounts should not be balanced on a project 
or annual basis. He cites the United Stales ('anadian 
Developmenl/Produclion Sharing Program with a 
record of 34 years of bilateral success. Callaghan ob- 
serves that wide variances between these two nations 

Vol. I, No. 3. 



tuvc iK'Curred but that a long term balance has beeti 

Ibe Western 1 uropean I'nion (WI U) study 
was critical ol the duplication ol 12 ministries ol de- 
tense lor each ol the l uropeatt members ol NATO. 
Reason tully 'lO percent ol the defense spending of 
these member countries is NAT(f related. The study 
went further than the James solution. A recommen- 
dation was that all 12 defense establishments merge 
to achieve greater elTiciency and effectiveness with- 
out increasing the overall cost of defense. Such 
merger would centrali/e f uropean defense procure- 
ment in a single authority.^® Kecogni/ing the prac- 
tical limitations ol this recommendation the WF.U 
study committee suggested, as an alternative, that 
each nation remodel its defense organization to be 
more compatible with that of its neighbor. In this 
way rationalization and specialization of the turo- 
pean defense effort can be achieved over the longer 

In the area ol weapons procurement, the WFU 
study cointnitiee further recommended that the 
twelve countries agree to ten weapons projects that 
would vome into service within the next decade, 
bach weapon would he assigned to a specific country 
for research and development but all nations would 
agree to buy the ten systems (with no alternatives 
permitted) when the production stage was reached. 
Offered would be a package deal of weapons research, 
development and procurement. Because of techno- 
logical constraints, there ate few NATO nations that 

can unilaterally develop and produce an entire mod- 
ern weapons system. Wliile subcontracting or licens- 
ing might be alternatives, rallaghan cautions that 
such measures probably will be cosily. Me cited the 
British 1-4 PHANTOM licensing experience that re- 
sulted in twice the cost for about halfof the number 
of aircraft aircralt that the British could have pur- 
chased directly from the Ihiitcd States. 

To bring all metnhers of the Alliance into sharing 
the developtnetii o( a new weapons system, total life 
cycle procurement must be considered. Spares, am- 
munition, repair facilities, or training ranges to main- 
tain readiness may he the only contribution that 
some nations can offer to help offset the cost ot pur- 
chases. If only the acquisition costs arc considered, 
most countries will incur deficit balances. If life cycle 
costs arc accounted for on a weapons family basis, 
then all nations probably can provide at least some 
portion of the total requirement. A central NATO 
procurem.ent agency would permit nations 

• to take advantage of long-term production runs, 

• to schedule deployments based on Alliance- 
wide priorities. 

• to share the cost burden for new weapons pro- 
curement, and 

• to maintain relatively balanced defense ac- 

Part III 

An Alternative Approach to Achieve NATO Standardization 

Problem Overview 

The NATO materiel acquisition process that now 
exists has evolved from various formal organizational 
iterations, and even informal parallel alternatives de- 
veloped within the formal framework. While the Four 
Power (iroup and CNAl) now provide possible 
mechanisms for elfective management, the missing 
catalyst comtnon to every attempt to make the 
process a viable one appears to be the lack of cen- 
tralized responsibility and authority. Instead, NATO 
continues to rely on committees to manage the 
Alliance materiel selection process. 

If the problem of weapons standardization is as 
important as the military and political leaders em- 

phasize. NATO can no longer afford to rely solely 
on information exchange panels, committee meet- 
ings, or armaments symposia in the hopes that these 
will result in the best recommendations for the 
Alliance. Weapons acquisition is a complex and 
costly business- a business requiring strong profes- 
sional leadership supported by military and tech- 
nical expertise. Such leadership and support is neces- 
sary so that specific technical requirements can be 
established, alternative plans evaluated, and sound 
recommendations for action formulated. The au- 
thority and responsibility for these tasks must be 
vested in individuals if timely and credible results 
are to be obtained. 

The lack of a NATO Procurement Agency works 


Defense Systems MaiugemenI Review 

I(> itu’ dis.nlvjnl.ij!cs nt tlic Alliance. II a NATO Pro- 
curement Agency were established lor materiel ac- 
Huisition and support, the .Alliance would be in a 
position to reap the benefits ot 

• longer production runs, 

• equitable production distribution among all 
nationsol the ,Alhance, and 

• Alliance-wide standardi/ation. 

I he weapons systems would be purchased by nations 
lor their lorces, through the international agency. 
The procurement agency would serve the collective 
ellorl ot the Alliance rather than purchasing com- 
monly owned equipment lor the Alliance, 

First Steps 

As a positive first step toward achieving improved 
weapons standardi/ation within NATO, I recommend 
the establishment of a permanent staff of Weapons 
I'amily Managers (WFM) and a NATO Procurement 
Agency (NPA). I suggest both the WFM and NPA be 
part of the Alliance organi/ation structure, subordi- 
nate to the NATO Assistant Secretary General for 
Defense Support, (the senior person within NATO re- 
sponsible for efficient use of Alliance resources in 
equipping and supporting its forces). 

Weapons Family Managers 

Tor two decades, the (iroject manager concept has 
been an important innovation for management of 
complex tasks involving numerous governmental and 
industrial entities. The Weapons Family Manager ap- 
proach would be based broadly on the Program Man- 
agement concei>t. A WFM would be designated for 
each family ot weapons or equipment, based on 
logical groupings by military role and technical per- 
lormancc characteristics. A list of ground force WFM 
is contained in Table 4. 

The typical WFM Office probably would consist 
of 25 to 40 military and civilian personnel who have 
had previous national or international weapons ac- 
quisitions experience. Tlie specific responsibilities of 
the WFM would he to 

• serve as the NATO interface with: the military 
users, the NATO intelligence activities, national 
weapons acquisition agencies, and the NATO 
Procurement Agency. 

• establish the NATO (unctional baseline tech- 
nical requirements for all weapon systems 
within their family, 

• assess the existing NATO weapons inventories 
and future plans for commonality, munitions, 
spares, etc. 

• assess new weapons candidates currently in 
conceptual or validation phases of development. 

• accept that the Four Power Ciroup has even less 
official recognition in NATO than the FURO- 
(iROLiP, and is looked on with askance by 
some nations and some elements of the Inter- 
national Staff. 

• develop and recommend to the entire ('NAD an 
Alliance-wide plan for their family of weapons 
based on considerations of total life cycle costs 
and system effectiveness that 

• introduce new weapons by military priority. 

TABLE 4, Ground Force Weapons Family Managers 



Artillery, mortars, multi- 
ple rocket launchers, etc. 

Tanks, reconnaissance ve- 
hicles, personnel carriers, 

Antitank missiles and 
rockets, auxiliary or man- 
carried weapons 40mm 
or less. 

Air defense guns and mis- 
siles, radars, etc. 

Flelicopters, light fixed 
wing, etc. 

All communications sys- 
tems used by ground 

Special purpose equip- 
ment used in engineer- 
ing, chemical, mainte- 
nance, etc. 


Indirect fire systems 

Combat vehicles 

Antitank and smal 

Air defense 


Communications systems 

Support equipment 

Vol. I, No. 3. 

• estuhijsh high-low mixes where appropriate, 

• extend the useru) life of older .systems when 

• serve as the single NATO point o( contact tor 
inloritraticm concerning their family ot weapons, 

•Assume the Tour Power (iroup nations produce 
about dg percent of the Alliance R&I) effort. Partic- 
ularly all new major weapons systems in the concep- 
tual. validation, or full scale development phases will 
be in development in one or more of these nations. 
The .senior positions within the WFM Office should 
have military representation from each of the four 
nations, probably at the Hag rank to facilitate coordi- 
nation with national and international authorities 
and. to bring together the knowledge of the various 
individual national weapons management processes. 
One possible method of assigning responsibility for 
senior personnel is indicated in Figure 2. Assignments 
could be made on a rotational basis. For continuity 
normal tenure should be for a minimum of 4 years. 
Other members of the WFM Office would be con- 
cerned with engineering, integrated logistics support, 
configuration management, planning, procurement 
and production. These [xrsitions would be tailored to 
meet the specific needs of each WFM Office and 
could be filled by any nation of the Alliance. In this 
manner, the WFM could serve to develop national 
expertise in materiel acquisition. As staff members 
returned to their own nation agencies they would 
take with them the expertise gained. 

Deputy for 
Concept and 



Weapons Family 

Deputy for 
Full Scale De 
velopment and 




Deputy for 






*Senior Four Power Group Member 

Figure 2. The Weapons Family Manager Office 

The WFM would operate as an integrator of inter- 
national military requirements with the researchers 
and developers of various national ministeries of de- 
fense. The WFM must examine the military need 

within his area of concern, and consider choices to 
meet it. Discussions with the military force structure 
and logistics planners about current and future plans 
would provide essential understanding and the basis 
upon which to develop a harmoni/cd NATO-wide 
moderni/ation plan within the family of weapons 
that each WFM manages. By drawing on the func- 
tional expertise of the NATO Maintenance and Sup- 
ply Agency, the NATO Procurement Agency, when 
necessary the Infrastructure rornmittces, and per- 
haps an AFCFNT Support Command, as recom- 
mended by Komer,3® the WFM Office can formulate 
an effective, efficient, and comprehensive plan for the 
Alliance to equip and support its forces. Ihe WFM 
Offices could replace the Armaments Groups of the 
CNAD and bridge the gap that now exists between 
the vast amounts of information and the national 

Once the technical baseline requirements were 
established for the weapons family, the WFM would 
examine the specific options available to meet the 
need. Based on analyses and technically supported 
by AGARD, Ihe SFIAPE Technical Center and SAC- 
LANTCEN, the WFM would make recommendations 
to the Four Power Group, The WFM would recom- 
mend the selected weapon system for NATO full- 
scale development. Under certain circumstances, and 
if costs permit, it might be desirable to continue with 
two prototypes during full scale development and 
operational testing before selecting the final candi- 
date. A simple majority vote of the Four Power 
Group Armaments Directors would constitute the 
NATO systems acquisition position for the full scale 
development phase. In the event of a split vote, the 
Assistant Secretary General for Defense Support 
would cast the deciding vote. The decision would 
not compel the nation or nations that were not 
selected to cancel their programs. Program develop- 
ment could continue-but with the understanding 
that a nonstandard system, with limited potential 
for NATO sales, was being developed. A rational ap- 
proach for these nations to follow would he to pool 
research and development funds to strengthen the 
selected effort and eliminate expensive duplication. 

The WFM would closely tnonitor the program 
during full scale development, and provide NATO 
assistance if required. The WFM would arrange for 
NATO observation or participation in operational 
testing to insure that the system meets international 
requirements. In this period, the WFM would con- 
tinue to refine its acquisition, deployment, and sup- 
port plans with the national ministeries of defense 
and the NATO functional agencies. When the full 
scale development phase was completed, the plans 
could be consolidated and presented to the CNAD 
for concurrence. Once approved by the'CNAD, the 



Derenie Systemi Minagemenl Review 


Wf M plan would become the NATO common po- 
sition tor the production, deployment, and service 
phase tor the system. 

NATO Procurement Agency 

The NATO Procurement Agency would be a per- 
manent tunclional activity to serve as a focal point 
for all international weapons procurement within the 
.Alliance. Pstablishment of this Agency would elim- 
inate the need to establish consortiums on an ad hoc 
basis The success of the NATO Infrastructure Pro- 
gram in handling commonly funded projects for the 
NAIKil . NICS, and other efforts is a precedent that 
might be followed by the NPA. 

I he NPA would establish contact with national de- 
fense industries througli the NATO Industrial Ad- 
visory firoup of the C'NAD. The major function of 
the NPA would be to support the Weapons Kamily 
Managers and the NATO Maintenance and Supply 
Agency. The NPA would provide contracting and 
procurement support especially during the produc- 
tion and service phase of the system life. Further, 
the NPS would develop work breakouts across all 
member nations within national capabilities for the 
system and its support. To achieve national coopera- 
tion in standardization all nations must share a piece 
of the action. Costs, schedules, and technical per- 
lormance will be paramount considerations, but the 
NP.A must also take into account the international 
balance ol payments status and the diversification of 
the production base All these factors were evaluated 
in the Kuropean selection of the F-16. One of the 
most signitlcant selling points was 

". work equivalent to 40 percent of the 
value of the aircraft ordered in Kuropc is to 
be undertaken there. 

The NPA would be the functional agency to accom- 
plish the breakout for the Alliance equipment pro- 
curement requirements. 

The NPA must monitor and keep track of the in- 
ternational balance of defense procurement accounts, 
a politically sensitive activity. Callaghan's suggestion 
that national accounts should not be forced to be 
balanced on a project or annual basis should he 
heeded. Variances will exist, but management con- 
trol should work toward equitable resolution. Be- 
cause of the high level political interest that will be 
associated wdth the procurement activity, the NPA 
should develop and recommend to the Council of 
Ministers a formula (for the NPA to follow) and the 
range of variances that will be tolerated. Once ap- 
proved by the Council, the status of the national ac- 

counts would be reported annually at the Spring 
ministerial session so that the amount, the trends and 
the management actions to be *aken are known to the 
political leaders of the member nations. 

Cost vs Benefit of the Alternative 

There is no doubt that the alternative proposed 
here will result in a larger NATO bureaucracy. The 
additional manning might range from two to lour 
thousand full-time staff members, depending on the 
final organization of the NATO Procurement Agency 
and the number of Weapons Family Managers des- 
ignated. Assuming an average annual direct and in- 
direct cost of S50, ()()() per staff member for salary, 
travel, and overhead expenses, the cost to member 
nations might be as high as S-00 million each year 
if savings cannot be realized by eliminating the CNAl) 
Main Ciroup and other panels. Some spaces may be 
transferred from the International Staff, SIIAPF., or 
the Technical Centers of the major commands. Col- 
location of activities with national agencies might 
reduce costs further. 

As noted earlier the penalty for nonstandardiza- 
tion has been estimated at a .^0 to 50 percent reduc- 
tion in combat effectiveness. Another estimate is 
that the Alliance wastes more than SIO billion of its 
precious defense resources each year in duplicative 
research, development, production, and logistical 
efforts. If these cost estimates are approximately 
correct, the alternative would break-even if only a 
two percent reduction in nonstandardization were 
achieved. At this breakeven point a concomi'ant no 
additional cost improvement in combat effectiveness 
of about one percent would be expected. 

Analysis at this level cannot prove the optimality 
of any alternative approach. The potential for sig- 
nificant direct savings, at a token cost, clearly does 
exist. For these costs, the subjective probability 
assessment that the alternative will fail would have to 
be greater than ‘)H percent for the expected value of 
the efforts lo be negative. The United .States DSAKC 
system, supported by the project management con- 
cept provides a working analogy that has demon- 
strated the feasibility of the approach at the national 
level. To expect as effective a system at the interna- 
tional level of operation is not realistic. Nevertheless, 
high-level political interest in achieving defense econ- 
omics will certainly insure that any atiernpt to 
achieve greater standardization will have less than a 
98 percent chance of failure, I feel that the benefits 
that might accrue would far outweigh the cost risks 
associated with the alternative. 

Vol. I, No. 3. 


Decision Points and Dimensions 

I hc Weapons I ainily Manager concept can provide 
the catalyst essential lor centralized inanageinent ol 
materiel acquisition lot NATO. By translating inili- 
laty requircinenis into teclinical baselines, examining 
options and making choices, the WI'M can make the 
Alliance weapons acquisition process iunclion as the 
military and political leaders have indicated that it 
must. By imposing two lormal decisions points tor 
NATO projects, the hour Bower (iroup approval be- 
tore entering lull scale development (l)SAK(' II 
equivalent) and the ( NAD approval prior to produc- 
tion and deployment (l)SAR( III ), the responsibility 

lot decisionmaking becomes more clearly delined. 
The lormal decisions then become the documented 
NAK) course ol action. The mechanism loi elli- 
cienlly equipping and support NAK) lorces would he 
established on a permanent rather than an ad hoc 

The N.A IO Brocurement Agency would add a per- 
inanenl dimension to the centralized management id 
international procurement. As the riumbei ol mm 
moil procurement projects increase, it should be pos 
sible to balance national accounts while providing 
all member nations participation in equipping and 
supporting the entire Alliance forces. 

Part IV 

Summary, Recommendations and Conclusions 


In this article actions are reviewed that have estab- 
lished the need lor the Department of Defense to de- 
velop and unplenieni policies to make NATO stand- 
ardization a reality. The summary of past NATO co- 
operation in the areas of standardization is intended 
as prologue. 

Within the franiework ol the NATO organization 
model, specifically, the franiework and elements of 
the materiel acquisition submodel, national partici- 
pants and civil and military staffs do interact for the 
purpose of achieving cooperation in research, de- 
velopment, and production of standard weapons and 
equipment. The organizational model that now exists 
has evolved over lime. The model remains unwieldy. 
This has been recognized, and two subgroups (the 
K)R(KiR()llB and the lour Bower (iroup) have 
been established to facilitate the materiel acquisition 
and standardization process. 

The FTJRfKiRODB. predominantly liiiropean but 
excluding Brancc. has been uniquely successful during 
its short existence by increasing the Kuropean con- 
tribution to the NATO defense and by fostering 
strong I uiopcan cooperation toward achieving weap- 
ons standardization during development and produc- 
tion. The Tour Power Group, consisting of the Fed- 
eral Republic ot (icrniany, France, the United King- 
dom, and the United Slates, contributes about ‘)H per- 
cent of the total NATO military research and de- 
velopment effort This group meets semiannually 
with the primary purpose of eliminating research and 
development duplication. 

To date NAK) attempts to achieve standardiza- 
tion have been less successful than national delense 
budgets and common sense dictate. Many have criti- 
cized the NATO materiel acquisition and standard- 
ization system. For purposes of analysis, these criti- 
cisms have been grouped into three categories 
decisionmaking, management, aiid centralized pro- 

An alternative to the armaments groups of the 
Council of National Arniamcnis Directors (CNAU) 
has been offered in this article as a remedy to the 
problem of management. The alternative is based on 
the concept of project managemcni and establishes 
Weapons l amily Managers for weapons of like func- 
tion and performance. Specific management re- 
sponsibilities for the WFM have been defined and 
discussed. The discussion is intended to surface the 
complexity of the nianagemeni activities that to 
date have been the responsibility of coniniiltees. 

The suggestion that a centralized NATO Brocure- 
ment Agency be established is supported. Such 
agency would facilitate the standardization process 
by insuring 

• that each nation participate in the process, 

• that national defense accounts arc monitored 
and managed toward achieving a more equit- 
able balance over the long term, and 

• that the advantages of longer production runs 
and diversification arc achieved. 


Defense Systems Management Review 


It the niana>:iMm’iit ami proairomi'iit as[Kvl> ol the 
piohk'ins ate leetilieil, the deeisiomitakmj; aiilhorilv 
ve\teil in the t om I’owet (itoup ami the ( \AD ean 
be useil to iletine and establish the necessary thresh- 
olds lor \AI() materiel acqiiisilioii decisions and 
ultiriiale standardi/alion. 


Willioiil the leadership and direct participation of 
the I'liited States, any propram to achieve NATO 
standardi/ation scill be less than optimal I ive signifi- 
cant problem areas have been identified explicitly or 
implicitly in this paper t hese aieas recpiired liirthcr 
examination, tndeptli examination should result in 
IK)|) implementing policy decisions and plans for 
action. Ttiese areas ate discussed in order of ini- 


I’ast perlormance ol the I'nited States in the area 
ol foreign Military Sales with NATC) Allies has re- 
sulted III an overwlielming market dominance to US 
advantage Ihis domittaiice must be tempered if the 
Allies are to be expected to cooperate with rather 
than compete against the United States for a fair 
share. A time-phase formula for balancing defense 
accounts that is equitahle and acceptable to all iiieni- 
ber nations must he derived. This formula and the 
variance thresholds that will be tolerated can then be 
employed by a centrali/ed NAK) Procuremeiit 
Agency to support its management task. 


Members of the US Department ol Delense must 
better understand the materiel acquisition processes 
ol the NATO member nations in particular the 
processes of the four Power (irotip nations if the 
IX)I) IS to lead effectively and participate in any suc- 
cesslul NAIO standardi/ation effort. A detailed 

' study ol the (iermati. I retich and British materiel 

acquisition systems should be undertaken inimedi- 
ately, and those ol the other nations as soon as pos- 
sible. The results of these efforts should he developed 
lor incorporation in a course on international mate- 
riel acquisition that can be made available to all mem- 
ber nations ol NATO. 


' (ienerally, the o|ierations and maintenance costs 

J associated with a weapon system during its lifetime 


1 Vol. l,No. 3. 


dominate the acquisition cost ol the system. I ven il 
NAIO can achieve some modicum of success m the 
area of acquiring standard weapons, without an in- 
ternational level and scope of planning for integrated 
logistical support ol the system, cost savings will be 
token. The United .States must take the lead, as it 
did during the formative years of NATO, to establish 
a policy of international planning in the area ol 
logistical support or in the organi/ation of a common 
approach analogous to the NAK) Infrastructure 


t rance has remained apart from NATO since Presi- 
dent l)e fiaulle limited direct military participaiion in 
the Alliance. Trance has also remained outside the 
fUKOUROUP. The LInited .States must decide what 
military participation it would expect Irom Trance 
for supporting a wider and stronger role for Trance in 
the NATO materiel acquisition process. Kie potential 
economic advantages of a system organized around 
the Weapons Taniily Manager concept certainly 
should be used as leverage to encourage more Trench 
military participation within the Alliance. 


Wtiile ground forces have been used to illustrate 
the concept, the Weapons family Managers for other 
services should he defined, developed and incorporated 
into a comprehensive plan for NATO implementa- 
tion. The same concept might he adopted in other 
support areas such as the Infrastructure Progiam and 
common services for the Alliance. 


I he alternative proposed would increase the NATO 
bureaucracy by perhaps as many as two to four 
thousand permanent staff members. This cost may be 
viewed by some as excessive. If this alternative is only 
.SO percent more efficient than the existing system, it 
would add the equivalent ol 15 to 25 percent more 
combat forces to the 5 million men under arms with a 
negligible increase in the SI 40 billion now spent each 
year on defense. 


Organization to achieve NATO standardization is 
feasible, necessary, and long overdue, .Suitable courses 
of action arc reasonably clear. A Weapons family 
Manager concept and a NATO Procurement .Agency 
should be initiated promptly. 



Cited References 

1 . Dept of Defense. " I rends in the NATO Countries' Defense Programs,” f)ASD (PA&P), Washington, IX', Jun 75, p J. 

2. Ronald C. Wakeford. "NATO Standard iration Concepts,” SSC-TN-39I6-I, Stanford Research Institute, Palo Alto, 
CA. Jun 75, p 5. 

}. James R. Schlesingei, "NATO Ratkmali/ation and Standardization,” Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Washington, 
fX'. 24 Jul 75,p I. 

4. Thomas A. Callaghan. “t'S/Kuropean hconomic f /operation in Military and Civil Technology,” Kx-lm Tech Inc., 
ArUnglon, V A, Aug 74, p 1 3. 

5. "Division of Responsibilities in Wartime Between the NA'fO Commanders and Major and Subordinate Allied Com- 
manders.” NATO Military Committee Memorandum MC 36/2, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 25 l eb 60, p 27. 

6. NATO Information Services. ‘‘NATO pacts and Figures.” Brussels, Belgium, Oct 7 1 , p 127. 

7. Wakeford. o/>. c/r .p 53. 

H. NATO Information Services, op. cir,, p 128. 

9. Oardiner L. Tucker, “.Standardization and the Joint Defense,” A'/l TO Review, Jan 75, p 6. 

10. Aakeford, op. fir , p 89. 

1 1 . Dept of Defense, “A Report to the Congress on the Standardization of Military Pz)uipment in NATO and Other Re- 
lated Actions (I ),” purusant to Public Law 93-365, Washington, DC, 30 Apt 75, p I. 

1 2. Wakeford. op. cir.. p 55. 

13. .NATO Information Services, op. crV.. p 132. 

14. ”C<x)peration in Research, Development, and Production of Military Equipment: Study of NBMR Procedure." North 
Atlantic Council Report C-M(66)33(2d Rev)(l ), North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Brussels, Belgium, 8 Jan 69. 

15. NATO Information Services, op. cir.. p 134. 

16. fbnl . pl9l. 

17. (allaghan, op. cir.. P. 30. 

18. NATO Information Services, op. cif.. p 196. 

19. Wakeford. op. cir . p 58. 

20. IhKl.. p 60. 

2 1 . NATO Information Services, op. cir.. p 1 33. 

22. "Cooperation in Research, Development, and Production of Military Ixjuipment: Study of NBMR Procedure," rrp. 
cir.. p 14. 

23. Ministry of Defense, “rhe Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and Development of the Federal Armed 
Forces,” While Paper 1973-74, Federal Republic of (iermany, Bonn. Jin 74. 

24. Callaghan, op. cir.. p 64. 

25. /bid , p. 67. 


' . i 

IXTensc Systems Management Review 

26. Oepi. of Oefen.«. **A Report to (he Congress on (he Standardization of Military Flquipment in NATO and Other 
KeUled Actif>ns (1).” pursuant to Public [.aw 93-365, Washington, IX', 30 Apr 75, p 41 . 

27. , DOD Directive 5000.1 , “Acquisition of Major Defense Systems," Washington, DC, I 3 Jul 71, pp 2. 3. 

2H. “hour h)wer l)ecisH>n .Schedule," hour Power (»roup Memorandum, Brussels, Belgium, Dec 74, p 1 2. 

29. Ministry of Defense, op. cif. . p 1 85 . 

X). “hour Power IXcuain Schedule,” op. at., p 1 1. 

31. Wakeford, op. cit., p 62. 

32. Roger f acer. “The Allunce and huropc Part 111: Weapons Procurement in hurope -Capabilities and Chances." I Je/- 
phi Paprr \o /0/i. IntematHinaJ Institute for Stragetic Studies, London, Jan 75. 

33. Robert kh<»des James. “Standardization and Common Production of Weapons and tquipment in NATO," Interna- 
(lonal Institute for Strategic Studies, london, Oct 67. 

VI. (aJIagban.op at 

35. fhid pp 50.51. 

36. Wckeford, op ci/ . p69. 

37. Callaghan. op rir..p45. 

38 K. Komer, el al. “Rationalizing NATO's Defense Posture (C)," Rand Corporation, Washington, IX', heb 75. 

39. “hour hiwer Decision Schedule," op. rir. p 17. 

40. Wakeford. op cl/., pp 25-32. 

Additional References 

Buchin, AUiUu, fhr Impluaiiom of a ^uropran Sysiem [or Defense I'echnolofy, (nternacional Institute for Strategic 
Sludiei, |j>nd<m, IVA7. 

(alman. John, turopean ( ooperalion in Defense lechnology [he Political Aspects. International Institute f<ir Slrctegic 
Stwlics, Ij.nclon, l*Jf>7. 

( eniral IntrlUgenec Agency. -Soviet Spending for Defense: A Dollar Cost Companson of Soviet and I S Defense Activities, 
SR IK 74 7, Washington. DC . Dec 74. 

C'ufTie. Malcum R„ “The Program of Research and Development Test and Kvaluatnin K'Y 1976," Dept of Defense, Wash- 
ington, DC'. 26 peh 75. 

Dept of Defense, “Tofce Planning Data Base fl')," Office of the Assistant Secretary of (PAJH-). .NATO J orcc 
Action Memorandum Number 3, Washington, IX', 21 Dec 74. 

, "The Deciunn ('iHirdmaling l*aper (IX'P) and Che Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC)." 

DtJD Instruction 5000.2,Washington, IX . 21 Jan 75. 

“XM-198 155mm Towed Howilrer (I ),” PM No. 24, Office of Director of Defense Research and Kngineering 

(ODDRK) Memorandum, Washington, IX*. 2 Jul 75, (Rev Coordinalion IXaft). 

Komer, Robert W„ "Treating NATO’s Self-Inflicted Wound," foreign Policy, ?<l J>; (Winter 1973-74). 

Robinson, LTG Wallace II. Jr., “Reducing Acquiaitinn and Osvnership Coats with DIDS and Staidardization," Defense 
Management Journal, 11(3); (1975). 

Schlciinger, James R., Dept of Defense. "Annual Department of Defense Report, I'Y 1976," Washington, DC, 5 Feb 75, 

Vol. I, No. 3. 

5 ‘) 

'The Ihiemma of Deiiining Defense l>i>Uars and Increasing Weapons Systems Costs,” Commanders Digest, 18(3): (1975). 

I S ( ongrcs.s. Senate (ommitlec on Armed Services, “Authorizing Appropriations for Kijscal Year 1 976 and July-Seplem' 
her 1976 Transition Period for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty , Selected Reserve, 
and Civilian Personnel Strengths and for Other Purposes,” S. Kept., CS Govt Printing Office, Washington. IX , 19 May 


\ aiulevanter, K( . T . Jr., “Common funding in NATO,” RM 5282'PR, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, ( A, Jun 67. 

LtC'olA Marlin Lidy. USA, 
IS a military assistant. Office 
of the Under Secretary of the 
Army (OR) from 1975-76 he 
served as Spcctai Assistant to 
the Project Manager for OR 
and Chief. Washington field 
Olfice. Advanced Attack Heli* 
w>ptcr Progr.iin. I rom 19T1-75 l.tC ol Lidy was senior ground 
!«'rce .injl>si (OSI> PAAI ). I urope Div In this capacity he 
w,»\ a memher ot the I S delegation to the Mutual and 
M.ilanccil I orce Rcdiuium Conference. Vienna, and OSD 

representative. NAIO Militar> Committee study group on 
Conventional force Balance. An Infantry Officer, f fC'ol 
Lidy served two tours in SI A (1966-67. 1970-71). In 1966 
he received the MS Industrial Tnginecring (OR) from the 
Georgia Institute of lechnologv. He is j graduate of the 
US Army C'ommand and Staff C ollege (1970) and the US 
Military Academy. BS I ngineering (1959) Ihis article is 
based on an Individual Study Pa)x*r (Detense Documentation 
C enter No. AD A02656I) that earned designation as a C om- 
mandants Distinguished Study p.n*r to his graduation from 
the DSMC' Program Management C ourse 75-2. 


Defense Systems Management Review 


Standardization Policy of United States 

Section 814(a) of the Department of Defense 
Appropriation Authorization Act, 1976 Relating to Standardization 


Si'clion H|4(.i) 111 the Dop.iilmcnl nl Dcicnsc Ap- 
pr(>['rijliiin Aiilhnri/.ilioii Act. I‘>7<i Still. .‘'44), 
IS jincmicii as lollows 

(a) I I I It t\ the f)(ilt( y <>/ the I ttiicj States that 
equipment prneure<l Jor the use u] persnnnel of the 
Arnwii limes nj the IhiteJ States statiuneil in 
I urope utiiler the terms oj \nrth Atlantic I'reaty 
should he standardized or at least interoperable with 
equtpment of other members of the \orth Atlantic 
Ireatv < Iryaiiization In carryinp mil such policy the 
Sccrclary ol Dcicnsc shall, lo the niaxiimint Iciisihlc 
cxicni. Initialc aiul carry out proctircmcnl procedures 
thal provide lor ihe aapiisil ion ol eqiiipnienl which 
IS slandardi/ed oi inleroperahic with equipment ol 
other niemhers ol the North Atlantic Treaty ()rj>an- 
i/aliori whenever such c<)uipincnt is to he used by 
personnel ol the Armed I orces ol the United Slates 
slalioncd in l iirope undet the terms ol Ihe North 
Allanlic Treaty Such procedures shall also take into 
consnlcralion the cost. Iiinclions. quahly. and avail- 
ability ol the etpiipment to be procured In any case 
in which ec(ui()nienl aulhori/cd lo be procured under 
title I ol this Act is ulih/ed lor the purpose ol' carry- 
inj: oul the lorettoing policy, the Secretary of Deicnse 
shall report lo Uoncress the lull details ol the nature 
and substance ol any and all apreements entered into 
by the United Stales with any other member or mem- 
bers ol Ihe North Allanlic Treaty Orpani/ation pro- 
vidinp Tor the acc|uisiiion ol ecpiipinent mamitaclurcd 
outside Ihe I 'nilcd Stales in exchange lor, or as a part 
ol. any other agreement by such member or members 
to acciuite e<iuipmcnl maiuilactured in the United 
Slates. Such report shall be made by. the Secretary 
within .10 days ol the dale ol enactment of this Act, 

(2) Whenever the .Secretary of Defense de- 
icrmmes that it is rieces.sary in order to carry out Ihe 
policy expressed in paragraph ( I ) of this subsection, 
to procure ec|uipmenl manufactured outside the 
United .States, he is authori/ed lo determine, for the 
purposes ol section 2 or title III of the Act of March 
3, 1033 (47 .Slat, 1.S20.4I ILS.C. I0a|. [Buy Amer- 

ican Act) that the acquisition of such equipment 
manufactured in the United States is inconsistent 
ss'ith the publie interest. 

(3) In any case in which the Secretary of De- 
fense initiates procurement action on a nese ma/or 
system which is not standard or interoperable with 
equipment of other members of the Morth Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, he shall report that fact to the 
Congress in the annual report required under sec- 
tion 302(c) of I’ublic 1-aw ‘)3-3(iS. as amended, in- 
cluding a description of the system to be procured 
and the reasons for thal choice. 


(a) It is Ihe sense of Congress that weapons sys- 
tems being developed wholly or primarily for em- 
ployment in the North Atlantic Treaty Organi/ation 
thealer shall conform to a common North Allanlic 
Treaty Organi/ation requirement in order lo pro- 
ceed toward joint doctrine and planning and to fa- 
ciliiaie maximum feasible standardi/aiion and inter- 
operability of equipment. A common North Allanlic 
Treaty Organi/ation requirement shall be under- 
stood lo include a common definition of the military 
threat to the North Allanlic Treaty Organi/ation 
countries. The .Secretary of Defense shall, in the re- 
ports required by section 302(c) of I’ublic Ijw 
03-3(>5. as amended, identify those programs in re- 
search and development for United .Slates forces in 
I'. urope and the common North Allanlic Treaty Or- 
gani/ation requirements which such programs sup- 
port. In the absence of such common requirement, 
the Secretary shall include a discussion of the aettons 
taken within Ihe North Atlantic Alliance in pursuit 
of a common reqiiircmcnl. The Secretary of Defense 
shall also report on efforts to establish a regidar pro- 
cedure and mechanism within 'he North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization for determining common mili- 
tary requirements. 

(b) It is the sense of the Congress that progress 
toward the realization of the objectives of standard- 
ization and interoperability would be enhanced by 

Vol.I.No. J. 

fxi’anJcJ inier Mlu'J priHuranvni of anm ami 
cquipnieiil wilhin the Notlh AiIjmIk I ro;ily Oi 
>:dm/aliiin h is turihcr f/w sfiisc <>/ //ic Coiifpcss 
thill fxpuiiiUil iiutr AllifJ proi imnicni ssouU he 
tauhtatcd h\ grrutir n'liam c on lu cnsina unit co- 
priiiluition aitrccnunts .iiuuni; the sij:iKil>itics of 
fill' Nurili Mlaiilic Ircalv It is llio ( onf:ri.'ss’ con- 
sulcroil |ud>:iiu-nl ifial mkIi at;rociiiorils. il properly 
eonsinuleil so as lo preserve ihe ellieiencies assoei- 
aled with eeonoimes ol stale, eoulil iiol only min- 
iim/e poleiitial eeoriomu hanlsliip to parltes lo 
sueh aiireenienls ImiI .ilso increase Ihe snrvivahilily . 
in lime ol war. ol the AlliaiKe's ariiiainenis pro- 
(Inction base bv dispeisin;; iiiannlaclnrinf; lacililiev. 
Accordingly, the Setrelarv ol Delense, in coniiinc- 
lion vviili appropriate represenlalives ol other mem- 
bers ol the Alhaiite. shall attempt lo Ihe mavimum 
evleni leasihle ( 1 1 lo ideniily areas lor such co- 
operative arraiifiemenls and 1 21 to nepoliale such 

apreements pursuant lo these ends. The .Secretary ol 
Delense shall include in Ihe report lo the (dntiress 
recpiired by section .?()2(c) ol I’liblic 1-iw ‘>.VU)5, as 
amended, a discussion of the specific assessments 
made iiiidei the above piovisions and the results 
achieved with the North Atlantic 1 reaty Orttani/a- 
lion allies 

(c) Il is the sense of llte Congress that slanilard- 
i/alion of weapons and eipnpmenl within the North 
Atlantic Alliance on the ba.sis ol a "two-nay street " 
eoncept of eoopvration in defense proeiirenient be- 
tween Turope and North America could only work 
in a realistic sense if the f.uropean nations operated 
on a united and eolleetive basis. Acci'rdingly . the 
Congress encourages the governments of l:urope 
lo accelerate their present efforts to achieve f.uro- 
pean artnanienis eoUahoration among all l.uropean 
members of the Alliance 


Manuscripts will be considered lor publication in the Defense Systems Manage- 
ment Review. Tlie following topics arc of particular interest to the Review reader- 

• Views of professionals on current and pertinent defense systems ac(|uisition 
and program management 

• Problems confronting Program and Systems Acquisition Managers 

• Analysis of approaches to problem solution 

• Past experiences of responsible authorities 

• Defense systems management perspectives <)f the US Congress, the military 
services, industry, the media, a«</ multinational programs. 

To share your knowledge and expertise contact the Managing Lditor, Delense Sys- 
tems .Management Review, Defense Systems Management Ct)llcgc, Fort IJelvoir. 
VA 22060 



Ilio Hiinorjhic Norman R. Augustine 
Vice I’residenl tor Technical Operations 
Marlin Marietta Aerospace 

(•cneral Jack J . Cation. CSAh ( Ret) 
V'ice (’resilient. Operations 
locklieed Aircraft Corporation 

I’rotessor John W. Fondahl 
Stanford University 

Mr. Eric Jenelt 
Vice Rresidenl 
Industrial Civil Division 
Drown & Root. Inc. 

Mr. John M . Malloy 

Vice President, Administration 

Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical 

General Samuel ('.Phillips. USAE (Ret) 
Vice President and General Manager 
TRW Energy Production Group 

The Honorable Leonard Sullivan, Jr. 

Mr. John J. Welch, Jr. 

Senior Vice President 
Vought Corporation 


Defenw SyMems Mimgemcnl Review 


DEFKiNSK SYSTEMS mana(;ement <:oeit:(;e 

Major General John G. Albert, USAF 

Colonel John B, Hanby, Jr., USA 
Deputy Commandant 

Mr. Thomas F. Keegan, Jr. 

Director, Department of Plans and Programs 


Commander D. P. Kirchner, USN 
Chief, Publications Division 

Ms. Avondale L. Stephenson 
Managing Editor 

Professor David D. Acker 
Contributing Editor 

Brigadier General Frank Palermo 
Contributing Editor 

Mr. Robert Ball 
Senior Editor 

Mrs. Margaret E. Abernathy 
Mrs. Jeanette Tippie 
Editorial Assistants 

Mr. Donald K. Greene 
Graphics Supervision 

( OKKI ( I IONS Vt.l 1, No, 

I’a>!c I I Irsi line in atlido dcscriplioii lio\ sliould read " I celinolofneal elianpc prowlli 
rate in technology applications and. the . . 

Page ( oluinn 2. paragraph 2. sentence 2 coinmencing on line 2 shoiiUI read "Iliis 
includes indorsement and support ol the protessional staffers ol the .Armed 
Services and Appropriations ('ommittees ol hoih the Mouse ot Representatives 
and the .Senate.” 

I’age.s't; Column 2. paragraph 2. line I, should read "Ihe Tact that committee stalls 
do have access . . ' 

Page 4.V Pootnole, should read. “Icist public address. April 11, IKCS.” The c|Uolalion 
relerenced should read. “Important principles may. and must, be inne.sible.” 

P.ige Headline, should read: “Dl lT.NSI SYSTI ,MS MANAGPMTNT RTVIl W" 

Defense Systems Management Review