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AD AO 46591 



The Officer’s" 

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A Soviet View 





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SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT 


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For ulc by the Superintendent of Documents. U.S. Government Printini Oflice 
Wishiniton, D.C 20402 
Stock Number 008-070-0039^ I 



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Edited by 

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PUBLISHED UNDER / P' 

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Translated by the 
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Secretary of State Department 
Ottawa, Canada 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 


% ^ CV 5 


AMERICAN EDITOR’S COMMENT 

AUTHORSHIP 

FOREWORD 


Chapter 1. The Foundations and Principles of Soviet Military Development^ ^ . 

The Foundations of Soviet Military Development . 

The Principles of Soviet Military Development A . . . 

Social and Political Principles / • • • 

Organizational Principles i. . . . 

The Main Principles of Training and Education . . 

Chapter 2.^ The CPSU and the Soviet Armed Forces 

The Leadership of the CPSU — the Very Foundation of Soviet Military 

Development 

Political Organs, Party and Komsomol Organizations df the Soviet Armed Forces 

Party-Political Work in the Armed Forces 

On the Leading Role of the CPSU in the Armed Forcek (from resolutions of Party 
congresses and conferences, plenary meetings of the Central Committee, and 
other documents) 


Chapter 3. Marxist*Leninist Military Theory ■ 

The Theory of War and the Army . ... ^ . 

Soviet Military Science 

Soviet Military Doctrine 

Chapter 4.<^The Fundamentals of Military Psychology and Military Pedagogy. 


Military Psychology r . . . : 67 

The Mental Processes of a Person Under Military Service Conditions \ 70 

Consideration of the Mental States of Servicemen* 79 

The Mental Characteristics of the Serviceman’s Personality 80 

On the Psychological Training of Soviet Servicemen for Successful Operations in 

Modem War j 85 

Military Pedagogy .J 86 

The Theory of Training Soviet Servicemen /. 88 

The Theory of the Ideological Education of Soviet Servicemen 97 

Concerning the Pedagogical Proficiency of the Officer 104 

Chapter 5. The Armed Forces of the USSR 107 

The Structure of the Soviet Armed Forces . 109 

A High Honor and a Great Responsibility . I 119 

Dates of the Most Important Events . . . 120 

i ^ V i ) 


• Thij jeciion he>din| wm omiticd from ihe Ttbic of Conients of rhe P.uwin text (U.S. Ed ). 


V 


147 


' r f'i j? y 

Chapter 6. 

The Concern of the Communist Party for the Training and Education of Military 

Cadres 

Military Service Requirements for Officer Personnel of the Armed Forces of the 

USSR (Principal Provisions) \ 

Internal Service Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR (Extracts) 

Disciplinary Regulations of the Armed Forces ^f the USSR (Extracts) 

Awards of the Motherland , 

Higher Military Educational Institutions and Advanced Studies 

Privileges and Pensions of Officers 

Officers’ Comradely Courts of Honor . 

Chapter 7^ The Armies of the Warsaw Pact Countries^ 

The Trustworthy Shield of Socialism 

The Bulgarian People’s Army 

The Hungarian People’s Army 

The National People’s Army of the GDR 

The Polish People’s Army 

The Romanian People’s Army 

The Czechoslovak People’s Army 

Strengthening International Solidarity , 


(f 

'irhe Military Profession L . 


Chapter 8.-The Armed Forces of the Imperialist States i 

The Armed Forces of the USA , 

The Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) . 

The Armed Forces of Great Britain 

The Armed Forces of Italy 

Tlie Armed Forces of Turkey 

The Imperialist Aggressive Military Blocs 

The Main Design Specifications of Weapons and Combat Materiel 


147 

153 

156 

167 

175 

194 

200 

206 

211 

212 

215 

216 
217 

219 

220 
221 
222 

224 

225 
238 
246 
251 

253 

254 
261 


Chapter 91 Science and Military Affairs j 268 

The Contributions of Scientists (The Most^Jmportant Facts) 276 

Chapter lO.'Weapons and Military Technology^ », 280 

Chapter H.'^The Essentials of Sanitation and Hygiene * >7 v i 299 

Chapter 12 .'' General Reference Data'u^y 318 

Basic Information About the Countries of the World 318 

Principal International Organizations and Associations 322 

Astronomical and Geographical Information 327 

Physicomathematical Data 343 

Foreign Exchange Rates 356 

Reference Books on General and Special Topics 356 


vi 


AMERICAN EDITOR’S COMMENT ON THE OFFICER'S 
HANDBOOK 


The Soviet Officer's Handbook is the thirteenth volume in the “Soviet 
Military Thought’’ series, translated and published under the auspices of the 
United States Air Force. 

This compendium about the Soviet Armed Forces appeared in Moscow 
bookstores in 1971 as the fifteenth book in the Soviet “Officer’s Library.’’’ 
It is one of the most basic works in that series and had an original press- 
run of 83,CXX), which exceeds by far the pressrun of the other volumes in 
the “Officer’s Library.” As stated in the foreword, the handbook is in- 
tended to assist “officers in broadening their outlook and in resolving 
many practical problems related to the training and education of subordi- 
nates.” 

Organizational principles of the Soviet Armed Forces, including a discus- 
sion of Soviet concepts of cadre organization, centralization, and unity of 
command are covered in Chapter One. The next chapter is concerned with 
the relationship between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its 
Armed Forces, and more specifically between the Party’s Central Committee, 
the Main Political Directorate, the Ministry of Defense, and the Party organi- 
zations in military units. 

Chapter Three, “Marxist-Leninist Military Theory,” contains brief expla- 
nations of key terms in Soviet military thought. In contrast to the United 
States, where a word such as doctrine is often used ambiguously, in the Soviet 
Union such terms as doctrine, military science, military art, strategy, opera- 
tional art, and tactics have precise meanings and cannot be used interchange- 
ably. Military doctrine, for example, is the military policy of the Communist 
Party and has legal force, whereas strategy is one of the component parts of 
military art. A proper understanding of these terms is therefore essential for 
understanding Soviet military writings. 

Chapter Four is concerned with military psychology and military 
pedagogy, two subjects considered to be major fields of study for Soviet 

' The “Officer’s Library" series of books was announced by Voyenizdat, the publishing house 
of the Ministry of Defense, in December, 1964. A total of 17 books were issued in this series, 
the first appearing in 1965 and the last in 1973. 


officers and treated in greater detail in two important Soviet military works, 
Military Pedagogy and Military Psychology (Volumes Nos. 7 and 8 in the U.S. 
Air Force’s “Soviet Military Thought” series). 

“The Armed Forces of the USSR” are described in Chapter Five. All 
of the five services and their branches are discussed in turn, with a brief 
explanation of the roles and missions of each. This chapter will be partic- 
ularly useful to readers who are unfamiliar with how the organization of 
the Soviet Armed Forces differs from the American tri-service concept. 

Chapter Six, “The Military Profession,” provides information on the legal 
status of Soviet officers, both on active duty and in the reserves. It also 
includes excerpts from regulations governing the relationship between ser- 
vicemen of different ranks, the maintenance of discipline, and the award of 
decorations. 

The Armed Forces of the other Warsaw Pact states are described very 
superficially in Chapter Seven, whereas Chapter Eight presents much more 
detailed and often tendentious information on “The Armed Forces of the 
Imperialist States.” 

The next three chapters, “Science and Military Affairs,” “Weapons and 
Military Technology,” and “Essentials of Sanitation and Hygiene,” are of 
interest in describing Soviet views and in presenting what the Soviet mili- 
tary leadership considers each officer should know. The final chapter, 
“General Reference Data,” is basic information of the type found in many 
almanacs, which the reader may wish to scan because of the method of 
presentation. 

Contributors to this book include some well-known Soviet military writers. 
The editor of the work, General-Major (Reserve) S. N. Kozlov, a Candidate 
of Military Sciences, was given an award at the Frunze Prize ceremonies in 
1966 for his “outstanding military writings.” ^ General-Major Ye. F. Suli- 
mov, another contributor, is a Doctor of Philosophical Sciences and heads 
the Department of Scientific Communism at the Lenin Military-Political 
Academy.* Colonel S. A. Tyushkevich, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences and 
chief of a section of the Military History Institute of the Ministry of Defense, 
was the editor of the fifth edition (1968) of Marxism-Leninism on War and 
Army,^ which included both Generals Kozlov and Sulimov among its au- 
thors. Tyushkevich also wrote Philosophy and Military Theory, published in 
1976 not by Voyenizdat, but by the Academy of Sciences. Other authors are 
also experts in the fields they cover. 

The prominence of the contributors to this work, its inclusion in the 
“Officer’s Library” series, and its wide distribution all attest to the important 
role it is intended to play in the education of Soviet officers. Its publication 
in English as part of the U.S. Air Force’s “Soviet Military Thought” series 

’ In March 1965 (he Council of Ministers of the USSR approved the award of the "Frunze 
Prize" each year fes "excellent military or military-historical works." 

’ This book has also been published in the U.S. Air Force’s "Soviet Military Thought" series 
(No. 2). 


now makes it possible for this volume to be used as a concise reference work 
by a wide circle of American readers. 


The translation and publication o/The Officer’s Handbook does not consti- 
tute approval by any U.S. Government organization of the inferences, findings 
and conclusions contained therein. Publication is solely for the exchange and 
stimulation of ideas. 


ix 


AUTHORSHIP 


The handbook was prepared by a group of authors consisting of: Doctor 
of Philosophical Sciences, General-Major Ye. F. SuHmov (Section I); Doctor 
of Historical Sciences, Colonel S. V. Baranov and Candidate of Historical 
Sciences, Colonel Yu. N. Artamoshin (Section II); Colonel P. A. Sidorov 
(Section III); Candidate of Psychological Sciences, Lieutenant Colonel N. F. 
Fedenko and Doctor of Pedagogical Sciences, Colonel A. V. Barabansh- 
chikov (Section IV); Candidate of Military Sciences, Colonel I. S. Zheltikov, 
Engineer Colonel N. I. Bazanov, Colonels A. I. Karpov and I. A. Korotkov 
(Sections V and X); General-Lieutenant V. M. Domnikov (Section VI); 
Candidate of Military Sciences, Colonel (Retired) V. V. Mochalov (Section 
VII); General-Major I. D. Dement'yev (Section VIII); Candidate of Military 
Sciences, Colonel N. G. Sopelev and Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Colo- 
nel S. A. Tyushkevich (Section IX); Colonel of Medical Services, A. V. 
Maksimov (Section XI); Candidate of Historical Sciences, Captain 1st Rank 
(Retired) L. M. Yeremeyev (Section XII). 

Editor 

Candidate of Military Sciences 

General-Major (Reserve) S. N. KOZLOV 


X 


FOREWORD 


Command, political, engineering and technical cadre play a great role in 
the life and combat activity of the Soviet Armed Forces. Soviet officers are 
the backbone, the cohesive force of our Armed Forces. They are the agents 
of Communist Party policy in the forces, they organize and implement the 
training and education of subordinates, they reinforce order and good organi- 
zation in units and on ships. 

Under present-day conditions, which are characterized by the fundamental 
changes which have taken place in military science as a result of scientific and 
technical progress, the Communist Party is placing increased demands on 
our officer cadre. The Party considers it essential that command and all staff 
personnel should be thoroughly conversant with Marxist-Leninist theory, 
should be highly trained in military theory, and satisfy all the requirements 
of modem military theory and practice. 

In the opinion of the authors, this manual will prove of real assistance to 
military cadres in broadening their outlook on military theory and solving 
problems related to the training and education of their subordinates. It is 
intended for officers of all Services of the Armed Forces, and especially junior 
officers. 

The first sections of the book are devoted to vital military-theoretical 
problems. These set forth the foundations and principles of Soviet military 
development, and deal with questions relating to the leadership of the Armed 
Forces by the CPSU,* Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the army, 
Soviet military science and doctrine, and the principles of Soviet military 
psychology and pedagogy are examined. 

The subsequent sections deal with the Soviet Armed Forces and their 
officer corps. These are concerned with the present-day structure of Soviet 
military organization. A brief description is given of the Services and 
branches of the Armed Forces at their present stage of development. The 
reader is informed about the constant concern of the Communist Party for 
the training and education of military cadres. Excerpts from documents 
governing practical questions relating to officer service are quoted. 

A special section contains reference material on the organization of the 
Warsaw Pact, the history of its origin, the role and significance of this 

• CPSU- Communist Party of the Soviet Union [U.S. Ed.], 


xi 


organization in ensuring the security of the socialist community; and on the 
armed forces of the other member countries of the Warsaw Pact. 

The information contained in the section on “Science and Military Affairs” 
attests to the ever-increasing influence of science and scientific and technolog- 
ical progress on military affairs, the development of contemporary methods 
and means of armed combat and troop control. 

In this book, the reader will also find a variety of reference material on the 
military history of the Soviet State, from the field of the natural sciences, 
military geography, advice on basic health matters, etc. 

The spectrum of problems related to the activities of our officers is broad 
and varied and, undoubtedly, as military affairs develop further, the range 
of these problems will increase. The officer of today has to be conversant with 
such a mass of information, facts and figures, that it would be very difficult 
for him to retain it in his memory. He has to have recourse to reference 
literature. 

However, it should be borne in mind that to assemble the reference mate- 
rial needed by an officer in a book of limited size is a very difficult task. This 
handbook may not satisfy all of the reader’s requirements, since these range 
over such a broad and varied spectrum. 

The authors and publisher request the readers of this book to send their 
opinions and comments on it to Voyennoye izdatel'stvo, Moscow, K-160. 


Chapter 1. THE FOUNDATIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF 
SOVIET MILITARY DEVELOPMENT 


The activities of the Soviet State, bom of the Great October Socialist 
Revolution, are characterized by the great variety and complexity of the 
functions which it fulfills. The most important among these is that of ensur- 
ing that the country is reliably defended, i.e., the military function. This is 
fulfilled by a special organization: the Armed Forces. 

In view of the complexity of international conditions and the presence in 
the world of aggressive imperialist forces which are hostile to our system, the 
Communist Party and the Soviet government take all the steps essential for 
further strengthening the country’s defenses and increasing the fighting 
power of our Armed Forces. “Being well aware of the aggressive nature of 
imperialism, our Party considers it essential to support the peaceful policy 
of the Soviet Union with its invincible defensive might. The interests of the 
Soviet people and of world peace demand this. 

“Therefore, one of the constant concerns of the Central Committee, the 
Soviet government, and the entire nation is the strengthening of our glorious 
Armed Forces.” ‘ 

In all its activities in the field of military development the Party proceeds 
on the basis that strengthening the country’s defensive capabilities and the 
military might of the Armed Forces is one of the conditions indispensable 
for the successful accomplishment of the tasks of building communism. 

Soviet military development is based on authentic scientific foundations 
and principles, formulated and substantiated in the works of V. 1. Lenin and 
the resolutions of our Party. The CPSU has upheld them in its irreconcilable 
struggle With anti-Party elements. 

Under present-day conditions, the foundations and principles of Soviet 
military development have been evolved further in the Program of the CPSU, 
in the resolutions of the XXIII Party Congress, in Plenary Meetings of the 
Central Committee, in documents devoted to the 50th Anniversary of the 
Great October Revolution and the Armed Forces, and in the new Universal 
Military Service Law. 

' L. I. Brezhnev, 50 let veliKikh pobed sotsializma [Fifty Years of the Great Victories of 
Socialism]. Politizdat, 1967, p. S9. 


1 


A 


What is meant by Soviet military development? This concept incorporates 
everything connected with the creation and maintenance of the military 
power of our state essential for maintaining the security of the homeland. 
The military strength of the state is determined by many conditions and fac- 
tors; primarily by economic, scientific and technical, moral and political, 
and military potential (resources). All its elements are interrelated and 
interdependent. 

In evolving military policy and implementing military development, the 
CPSU and the Soviet State extend their organizational activity both into the 
social sphere, upon which the creation of its military power depends; and into 
the Armed Forces, in which this power is directly realized. 

Thus, in the broad sense of the term, military development encompasses 
the entire complex of measures by which the military policy of the Party and 
the State is effected, beginning with the organization of military production, 
the education of the population in moral-political and military affairs and the 
implementation of mobilization measures, and ending with ideological 
and organizational measures which are implemented in the Armed Forces 
themselves. 

The concept “military development” is also used in a narrower sense. It also includes measures 
directly connected with building up and strengthening the Armed Forces, namely, the organiza- 
tion of military units and formations and bringing them up to strength, their being equipped 
with materiel and weapons, the training and education of personnel, the development of mili- 
tary science, the training of cadres, and the mobilization of units and formations for combat 
readiness. 

Military development in our country conforms to the established laws of 
socialist and communist development and the political needs of the state at 
any given stage in its evolution. It is inseparable from general socialist and 
communist development. V. I. Lenin said: “The experiment in military devel- 
opment carried out by the Soviet regime cannot be looked upon as an isolated 
experiment. War includes all the forms of all the fields of development. It was 
possible for the development of our army to lead to successful results only 
because it was accomplished in the spirit of overall Soviet development, on 
the basis of class interrelationships which are manifested in the sphere of any 
development.” ^ 

Military development is a complex process of the interaction of objec- 
tive conditions and the subjective factor. On the basis of a thorough under- 
standing of the conditions and potent-al of a socialist country relating 
to the reinforcement of its defenses, "ind the elaboration and application 
of scientifically sound Ix;ninist princip'^s '' military development, the 
CPSU is able to carry out this process succ" slully. The Armed Forces, 
which were created under the wise leadership of the Party by the endeavors 
of the Soviet people and government, were always, and will always be, 
capable of the tasks of guarding the achievements of the Great October 
Revolution. 

’ V. I. Lenin, Poln, sobr, sock (Complete Collected Works], XL, 76-77. (Hereafter, cited as; 
Lenin.) 

2 




L 


THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOVIET MILITARY DEVELOPMENT 


By the foundations of Soviet military development we mean those aspects 
of the social life of our state which have a determining influence on its 
military organization. A new type of Armed Forces is being founded upon 
them and they embody the sources of its strength. 

Marxism-Leninism teaches that the Armed Forces are a special organ of 
the state, that they contain within themselves features characteristic of the 
given state, and are part of its political superstructure. The type of army and 
its basic social and political characteristics are determined by the type of state 
and, in the final analysis, by the nature of the social system and the method 
of production. 

The new type of Armed Forces corresponds to the socialist type of state; 
it differs radically in its nature, purpose and role in society from the armed 
forces of the exploiter states. 

Historically, the Soviet Armed Forces became the first form of socialist 
army. They are indissolubly linked with all aspects of the life of Soviet 
society, and are founded on the same basis. Our Armed Forces are “an exact 
copy, an exact impression of our workers’ and peasants’ nation. . . .’’ ^ They 
embody the special features of the Soviet social system, the nature of our 
state, and reflect the political tasks being resolved by the Soviet State with 
the assistance of the Armed Forces. 

Thus, the foundations of Soviet military development are: — 

— Socialist economy, primarily the sectors of heavy industry, transport, 
communications, agriculture, etc. The economic aspects of production and 
the scientific and technical resources of the state determine the quantity and 
quality of the armaments which form the material basis for the prosecution 
of war. 

Even during the period of the Russo-Japanese War, V. I. Lenin referred 
to the strengthening of the ties between the military organization of the 
country and its economic and cultural system. These objective laws are even 
more clearly manifested in the conditions created by present-day scientific 
and technical progress. The economic, scientific, and technical achievements 
of the USSR, which have astounded the whole world, made it possible to 
increase the military might of the Armed Forces to an unprecedented degree. 
The further economic growth of the country and its scientific and technical 
progress will lead to an even greater strengthening of the defensive might of 
the USSR. 

— Socialist social relationships (the social system) based on public owner- 
ship of the means of production, collective labor, comradely collaboration, 
and mutual aid. Socialism frees the working man from all forms of economic, 
political, and spiritual oppression. It gives the worker access to material 
security, to the treasures of science and culture, makes him the creator of a 
new and truly human form of life. 

’ M. V. Frunze, Izbrannyye proizvedeniya [Selected Works). Voyenizdat, 1965, p. 330. [Here- 
after, cited as; Frunze.) 




3 


Socialism is forming the new man, a man very active in work and in 
politics, a selfless defender of the new system. This is the main advantage of 
socialism over capitalism, the source of its invincibility. 

The Soviet social and governmental system is based on the firm alliance 
between the working class and peasants and on the friendship of the peo- 
ples of the USSR. The complete and final victory of socialism in our coun- 
try has resulted in the social, political, and ideological unity of Soviet 
society, which embodies the firm alliance between the working classes and 
the intelligentsia, the brotherhood of socialist nations, the unity of the 
CPSU, the Soviet government, and people. During the period of the build- 
ing of communism, the political organization of society is gaining in stabil- 
ity, strength, and unity. 

— Marxism-Leninism and its teaching on war and the army. Communist 
ideology, the ideology of the entire Soviet people, communist moral teaching, 
which motivates the behavior of our people, a high degree of political con- 
sciousness, and selfless devotion to the ideas of communism — these form the 
elements of the spiritual world of Soviet man and inspire feelings of passion- 
ate love for the socialist Motherland, a burning hatred of its enemies, and 
unshakable tenacity in the defense of the socialist homeland. 

Such, in general terms, are the economic, social-political, and ideological- 
theoretical foundations of Soviet military development. In addition, the term 
foundations of military development implies the most vital aspects of its 
essential ingredients, its most fundamental aiid definitive principles. These 
principles are so important, their consistent application so essential, that they 
acquire the significance of foundations. Thus, the Program of the CPSU 
defines Party leadership of the Armed Forces and strengthening of the role 
and influence of Party organizations in the Armed Forces as the cornerstone 
of military development. 

THE PRINCIPLES OF SOVIET MILITARY DEVELOPMENT 

Generally speaking, “principle” is understood to mean a basic point of any 
teaching or a basic requirement, an obligatory nomt governing people’s 
activities and behavior. A principle in the context of military development 
is taken to mean the obligatory requirement, the norm, from which the 
political and military leadership of the state proceeds as it creates and 
strengthens the Armed Forces. 

Correct principles are the necessary conclusions from the perceived objec- 
tive laws of the development of military affairs and the Armed Forces, from 
generalized experience of military operations, and, therefore, are of great 
importance in military development. It is impossible to put military measures 
into effect with skill and consistency without them. 

Our Party was faced with the problem of elaborating the theoretical princi- 
ples of Soviet military development when it became necessary for the young 
Soviet Republic to create an army of the state of the proletarian dictatorship 
in order to repel armed attack by internal counterrevolutionaries and the 


intervention of the imperialist countries. V. I. Lenin and the Communist 
Party evolved a classic solution to this problem; with unsurpassed mastery, 
they embodied the elaborated theoretical points in the practice of military 
development. 

The principles of Soviet military development are inseparable from the 
principles of general state and party development. 

The creation and strengthening of the Armed Forces is a complex and 
multifaceted process, which includes the production of arms and materiel, 
recruitment, the education and training of personnel, leadership of the armed 
forces, troop control and organization, the disposition of cadres, etc. Each 
of these spheres of activity is distinguished by its own essential requirements 
and principles. These are numerous and they express requirements of differ- 
ent scope. It is essential, therefore, to classify them. There are three groups 
of principles of Soviet military development: social and political, organiza- 
tional, and training and education. 

Social and Political Principles 

Principles of this kind form the sociopolitical character of the Armed 
Forces and reflect the most important aspects of its nature and purpose. In 
Soviet military development they are expressed in the political leadership of 
the Armed Forces, in the relationship between them and the people, in their 
attitude towards people of other countries, and in the nature of the relation- 
ships between servicemen within the Armed Forces. 

The principle of Party leadership. The decisive role of the supervisory, 
organizing, and educational activities of the Communist Party in Soviet 
military development is emphasized in the Program of the CPSU, in resolu- 
tions adopted at Party meetings. Plenary meetings of the Central Committee, 
and other Party documents. “The Party devotes unremitting attention to the 
enhancement of its organizing and supervisory influence over the entire life 
and activities of the Army, Air Force, and Navy and the rallying of Armed 
Forces personnel around the Communist Party and the Soviet government, 
to strengthening the unity of the Armed Forces and the people, to the 
education of military personnel in a spirit of courage, gallantry, heroism, and 
military cooperation with the armies of other socialist countries, and readi- 
ness at any moment to defend the Land of the Soviets, home of the builders 
of communism.” * 

Enhancement of the Communist Party’s role of leadership in the life and 
activities of the Armed Forces and intensification of the activeness and 
influence of Party organizations in the Armed Forces is the main social and 
political principle that has a decisive effect on military development as a 
whole. 

In socialist countries, the leadership of the entire program of building a 

* Programma Kommupisiicktskoy pariii So^tskogo Soyuza [Program of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union). Pravda Izdat., 1961, p. 112. [Hereafter cited as: Programma . . .] 


5 


new society, and strengthening the defenses and the armed forces is exercised 
by the Marxist-Leninisl parties. This feature of the political organization of 
a socialist society is no mere accident. These are the objective laws of its 
development, governed by the nature of socialist social relationships and the 
requirements of the evolution of the society and its armed defense. 

Only the Communist Party can ensure the successful fulfillment of all these 
tasks, since it is armed with Marxist-Leninist theory, is closely associated 
with the people and enjoys their unbounded confidence, is welded together 
by Party discipline, and possesses the unsurpassed qualities of inspirer and 
organizer of the masses. It is a concentration of the best representatives of 
the working class and all workers, the intellect, honor, and conscience of our 
age. 

In complete conformity with its position in the political organization of 
society, the Communist Party directs the defenses of the socialist homeland, 
the armed forces of the country, and holds this powerful political lever in its 


hands. 

The leadership and guiding activities of the CPSU in military development 
are multifaceted. Any important question in this field is resolved by the Party 
before becoming a program of activities for the state and the people. It 
formulates the state’s military and military-technical policy and develops its 
military doctrine. The Party elaborates the principles of military develop- 
ment and organizes their practical realization. It directs the training and 
disposition ol’ military personnel, supervises the activities of military institu- 
tions, and directs the life and combat activities of the troops. 

The CPSU influences every aspect of the activities of the Armed Forces 
through its ideological and organizational function. Its policies and direc- 
tives are propounded by military councils down to unit level, command- 
ers invested with unity of command, political. Party, and Komsomol 
organizations. 

The Communist Party’s most important means of influencing the life and 
activities of the forces, one of the Leninist Party’s principles of leadership of 
the Armed Forces, is well-organized and purposeful Party-political work. 

The principle of the unity of the Armed Forces and people. The most 
important feature of the Armed Forces of a socialist state is its genuine 
national character. In an exploiting society, everything is done to isolate the 
Armed Forces from the people, to set it against the people, to hide the true 
purpose of the Armed Forces from the soldiers. In a socialist society, on the 
other hand, the Armed Forces are built on the idea of closeness, one could 
almost say unification, with the people. By put ting this Leninist principle into 
practice, the Party has created a military force which is closely linked with 
the p)eople and reliaoly safeguards its interests. 

In our Soviet land, the reinforcement of military might and the Armed 
Forces has become a genuinely national matter, and the defense of the 
socialist Fatherland the sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR. Recogniz- 
ing the extreme importance of the unity of the army and the p)eople in 
strengthening the defense of the nation, the CPSU gives this matter its 


6 


unremitting attention. The Report of the CC* CPSU to the XXIII Party 
Congress emphasizes that: “It is essential to improve civil defense and mili- 
tary-patriotic work among workers, especially young people, to strengthen 
the links for providing voluntary assistance by military units and subunits to 
staffs of production organizations, training establishments, kolkhozes'^ and 
sovkhozes, J and to be more concerned about the needs of the soldiers and 
officers of the Soviet Army and their families. The entire Party and Soviet 
community are obliged to be constantly occupied with this matter.” ’ 

The further strengthening of the unity of the army and the people is greatly 
facilitated by the adoption of the measures provided for in the new Universal 
Military Service Law passed by the Third Session of the Supreme Soviet of 
the USSR in October 1967. 

The principle of internationalism. In Soviet military development this prin- 
ciple is expressed, first and foremost, in the inviolable friendship of the 
peoples of the Soviet Union. All the socialist nations and peoples of our 
country are united by a single military organization and they all have equal 
rights and duties with respect to the defense of the Motherland. Fighting men 
of different nationalities, bound by ties of firm friendship and comradeship- 
in-arms, fulfill their duty selflessly. 

Now this principle also expresses the solidarity of fraternal socialist coun- 
tries, the military cooperation of their armies, joint defense of the world 
socialist system from imperialist aggression. It has been embodied in the 
Warsaw Pact, as well as in bilateral friendship, cooperation and mutual 
assistance agreements between socialist countries. The force and effectiveness 
of socialist internationalism were clearly manifested during the defense of the 
victories of socialism in Czechoslovakia against the intrigues of internal and 
external counterrevolution. 

The principle of internationalism is manifested in the fact that our Army 
is built up and trained as an army of liberation. Armed Forces personnel are 
educated in a spirit of respect for the sovereignty of small and large nations 
and class hatred towards oppressors. This principle also provides for assist- 
ance to young national stat^ in ensuring their security against the intrigues 
of the colonial powers, and military development aid (the training of national 
cadres, the provision of arms for defense against attack from imperialists, 
etc.). 

Organizational Principles 

The nature of the organizational principles of military development dif- 
fers substantially from the nature of social and political principles. War 
requirements, the material and technical and economic resources of the 

• Central Committee [U.S. Ed.]. 

t Collective farms [U.S. Ed.]. 

t State farms [U. S. Ed.]. 

’ Materialy XXIII s'yezda KPSS [Materials of the XXIII Congress of the CPSU]. Politizdat, 
1966, p. 78. 


7 


state, military equipment and weaponry have a decisive influence on them. 

The most important principle of organizational development is the princi- 
ple of the cadre organization of the Soviet Armed Forces. This principle was 
thoroughly validated and embodied in the resolutions of the VIII and X 
Party Congresses and further developed in subsequent Party documents. 

The activities of service personnel are associated with the necessity of 
mastering weapons and military equipment and the methods and procedures 
of using them, the development of collective operations, good organization, 
discipline and training of the will. Modern warfare imposes ever increasing 
demands in this connection. This is why it is necessary to subject servicemen 
to a specific period of training and education under the actual conditions of 
life in a unit of the regular army. 

In today’s complex international situation, the existence of a regular army 
is vitally necessary to ensure the security of our country. While imperialism 
exists with its powerful regular armed forces and enormous reserves of weap- 
ons of mass destruction, our own country and fraternal socialist states are 
forced to retain their own regular armies and strengthen them by every 
possible means. 

Victory in a modem war is achieved by the efforts of all the Services and 
branches of the Armed Forces. Hence, the organizational principle of the 
continuous improvement of the organizational structure of our army and the 
harmonious development of all the Services and branches of the Armed Forces. 

The question of structure, of changing the organizational forms and ratio 
of the Services and branches of the Armed Forces is resolved by our Party 
on the basis of an assessment of the country’s internal situation, the interna- 
tional situation, and the development of methods and means of armed 
combat. 

The principle of centralism plays an exceptionally important role in Soviet 
military development. The need for strict centralization stems from the na- 
ture of the tasks which the Ar ed Forces carry out. Troop leadership and 
control must ensure purposefulness, good order and discipline, flexibility and 
rapidity of action. Without this, the successful accomplishment of combat 
missions in a war with a strong and clever enemy and the organization of 
efficient cooperation are impossible. 

Centralism in the organizational structure of the Armed Forces and the 
system of controlling them finds expression in the fact that all Armed Forces 
components with their staffs and other command and control elements are 
strictly subordinate to the central agencies of state power, to a single Supreme 
Command. Subordinate command and control elements comply strictly with 
the orders, directives and decrees of those superior to them, and are account- 
able to them for all questions relating to their activities. In military develop- 
ment this principle is provided for by the extraterritorial structure of the 
Armed Forces, by the appointment of higher officers and commanders by 
government agencies and the appropriate command, and by supervision of 
the execution of duties from the top downwards. In addition, the principle 
of centralism assumes initiative and cteativity on the part of the lowest 


8 


elements and their leaders, and reliance on subordinates’ experience and 
knowledge. 

The principle of unity of command. The Program of the CPSU defines 
unity of command as the most important principle of Soviet military develop- 
ment. Unity of command in our Armed Forces originated and developed 
normally as an expression of the objective need to ensure unity of the will 
and action of large masses of people, and good discipline and organization, 
without which the fulfillment of combat missions is impossible. This method 
of control has been proved by expeument and tested over many years of 
practical experience. “It is necessary to analyze this experiment,” said V.I. 
Lenin. “It progressed in a regular fashion, de\ eloping from fortuitous, vague 
collective decision making through collective decision making elevated into 
a system of organization which permeated the entire institution of the army, 
and now, as a general tendency, has come to unity of command, as the only 
correct way of organizing work.” ‘ 

Our Party resolved this question on the basis of social and political condi- 
tions, the distribution of class forces in the country and the maturity of the 
officer personnel. When the dictatorship of the proletariat had become firmly 
established, when the army had become more experienced and mature, and 
there were trained command personnel devoted to the people and the Moth- 
erland, the transition to unity of command was complete. 

Unity of command in the forces at unit level is now more necessary than 
ever since modem warfare is characterized by its highly dynamic quality and 
is subject to rapid situation changes, which could be followed by equally 
rapid changes in the direction and nature of the activities of the forces. Under 
these circumstances, the course of events would not leave sufficient time for 
joint decisions. Now more than ever before there is a need for commanders 
with absolute authority, whose orders would be treated as inviolable law by 
subordinates. 

Unity of command in our Armed Forces is founded on Party principles. 
This means that: 

— the commander (officer in charge) is the representative of the Party and 
the Government in the forces, the bearer of their policy, the custodian of 
Soviet laws and military regulations; 

— he is the absolute master of the forces entrusted to him, who bears full 
responsibility for all aspects of the life and activities of the subunit, unit, ship, 
formation, or establishment, for the state of the combat and political training 
of its personnel, its fighting efficiency and combat readiness; 

— the commander with sole (military and political) authority is intimately 
associated with his personnel, shows constant concern for the needs of his 
subordinates, sees that all servicemen fulfill their duties properly, and guards 
their legal rights; 

— in all his work he relies on Party organization, exploits the force of Party 

• Unin. XL 77. 


9 


influence on the troops in order to improve the standard of combat and 
political training and the strengthening of military discipline; 

— he makes wide use of the well-tried means of criticism and self-criticism, 
and the strength of the Armed Forces social and political agencies in the 
interests of enhancing the cause. 

The principle of conscious military discipline. Centuries of military history 
have shown that without firm discipline it is impossible for an army to be 
efficient in combat, and that firm discipline is the basis of an army’s fighting 
efficiency. “A military organization,” wrote M. V. Frunze, “is a specific 
organization, which demands of its members a high degree of efficiency, 
precision, executive ability, endurance, promptness in carrying out all orders, 
etc ” ’ 

The necessity of achieving unity of will and action, strict fulfillment of 
laws, regulations, and instructions, and prompt and accurate execution of 
orders determ.ines the specific form of subordination in a socialist army as 
well, but here subordination has an entirely different character from that in 
a bourgeois army, in which it is based on class domination and compulsion. 
In a socialist army it is based on the common interests of the commanders 
and their subordinates in ensuring the security of the socialist state. 

The feasibility of basing military discipline on a high degree of conscious- 
ness on the part of military personnel, of combining and fusing into a single 
entity the requirements of discipline and self-discipline, was first discovered 
in a socialist army. 

Reliance on consciousness in the reinforcement of military discipline does 
not exclude elements of compulsion where this is called for in the interests 
of ensuring the fighting efficiency and combat readiness of the forces. 

The strengthening of military discipline is a perennial problem. This is 
attributable to two factors: the fact that the forces are brought up to strength 
each year by new contingents, which have to be put into operational service, 
and the fact that the requirements for good organization and discipline are 
being constantly increased. The modem revolution in military affairs imposes 
particularly heavy demands on discipline, good organization, and order in 
the forces. 

The organizational principles also include the principle of maintaining 
constant combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces. 

The deepening of the general crisis of capitalism and the intensification of 
its contradictions increases imperialist adventurism and the danger it poses 
for the peoples of the world and for peace and social progress. This is 
convincingly demonstrated by recent events. Militant imperialism may start 
to unlea.sh a nuclear war. Therefore, Soviet military doctrine is based on the 
need to maintain constant vigilance and keep its forces in a state of permanent 
battle readiness, so that they arc able, under any conditions, to repulse an 
aggressor’s attack and deal him a crushing blow. To maintain a high state 
of constant combat readiness is the main task of the Soviet Armed Forces. 

’ Frunze, p. 459. 


10 


The Main Principles of Training and Education 

The process of training and education, the formation of high moral and 
fighting qualities of the personnel is also governed by specific principles. They 
are determined by the Soviet social and state system and the nature and 
purpose of our army; they are based on the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism, 
the teachings of military pedagogy and psychology, and the demands of 
modem warfare. 

First and foremost among these principles is the principle of the unity of 
training and education. It is a well-known fact that the success of a soldier 
in carrying out his duty depends upon both his ability and his mentality. It 
is impossible to compare one to the other: both of these aspects are intimately 
related. It is important, therefore, in teaching to educate and in educating to 
teach; and for this there are xmple opportunities. There are no forms of 
military training which precludt th^: instilling of courage and fearlessness, a 
high sense of duty to the Motherland, military pride, burning hatred of the 
enemy, or in which it is impossible to teach new knowledge in military affairs 
or to perfect practical skills. 

The duration of the period of training and education for conscripts, ac- 
cording to the new Universal Military Service Law, is limited to 2-3 years. 
At the same time, military affairs have become extremely complex, thus 
entailing all-round training and making it essential for commanders and 
political officers to place a high value on the time factor and to make constant 
efforts to improve methods of training and educating subordinates. 

The whole system of combat and political training of personnel is based 
on the principle: "teach the troops what is needed in modern warfare, ” and 
instill into servicemen those qualities which ensure that they fulfill their 
duties under the most difficult conditions of modern warfare. Therefore, 
training should be carried out under conditions as close as possible to those 
experienced in actual combat, in a spirit of active, offensive action. 

Success in forming high moral and fighting qualities is also ensured by 
conforming to the principle of consideration of the special features of the 
military collective and the individual qualities of servicemen. After all, young 
people come into the Army with different levels of general education and 
widely varying knowledge of ideology and life. The functional duties of 
soldiers and sailors and of the entire collective are by no means identical. All 
of which obliges us to approach people and collectives individually, taking 
their sjxicific nature into consideration. The use of the “average” collective 
or the “average” man as a standard cannot yield positive results, since in real 
life there are only real people. 

The teaching and educational process is not an end in itself, but a means 
of training high-principled and capable defenders of the Motherland. The 
soldier in a socialist army is animated by high ideals; the knowledge of his 
patriotic and international duty motivates all his thoughts and actions, urges 
him on tirelessly to master his military vocation, to stubbornly overcome the 
difficulties and dangers of military life, to fight the enemy to the last drop of 


11 


blood. That is why communist singleness of purpose is one of the most 
important principles in the formation of high moral and fighting qualities in 
the Soviet soldier. 


* « * 

Such, in short, are the foundations and principles of Soviet military devel- 
opment. It goes without saying that there are others besides those listed 
above. They all play an imfortant role in our military development and in 
the life and combat activities of the Armed Forces. 

The principles of military development vary under the influence of changes 
in the internal and international situation of the country and the development 
of military affairs. This makes it essential for our military cadres to make a 
thorough study of the processes associated with military development, in 
order to be able to carry out their practical activities properly. 

What to Read on This Section 

Marksizm-leninizm o voyne i armii [Marxism-Leninism on War and Army],* 
5th edition. Voyenizdat, 1968, Ch. V. 

Metodologickeskiye problemy voyennoy teorii i praktiki [Methodological 
Problems of Military Theory and Practice], 2nd edition. Voyenizdat, 1969, 
Ch. VIII, §2. 


♦ Available in English, No. 2, USAF “Soviet Military Thought" series [U.S. Ed.]. 


Chapter 2. THE CPSU AND THE SOVIET ARMED 
FORCES 


For more than half a century the history of the Soviet Armed Forces has 
been continuously associated with the name of V. I. Lenin and the activities 
of the Communist Party. Our Party is the creator; leader, and educator of 
the Armed Forces and the organizer of their historical victories over the 
enemies of the Soviet Homeland. The Soviet Armed Forces are indebted to 
its undivided leadership for their invincible might and high moral, political, 
and fighting qualities. Tlie leadership of the CPSU is the main source of the 
strength of the Soviet State and its Armed Forces. 

THE LEADERSHIP OF THE CPSU-THE VERY FOUNDATION OF SOVIET 
MILITARY DEVELOPMENT 

Leadership of the Communist Party and reinforcement of the role and 
influence of Party organizations in the Armed Forces, which is emphasized 
in the Program of the CPSU, is the basic principle of Soviet military develop- 
ment. The undivided leadership of the Armed Forces by the Party and its 
Central Committee is the objective law of their life and combat activities. 
This law is determined by the role which our Party plays in the life of Soviet 
society, as its leading and guiding force. 

After the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution the Communist 
Party became the ruling party. It took upon itself the ultimate responsibility 
for all aspects of the life and activities of the state, its safety from the 
encroachments of world imperialism, and for the building of socialism and 
communism. 

Unlike all previous social and economic formations, the assertion of social- 
ism and communism does not take the form of an upheaval, but is the result 
of the conscious, purposeful activities of the people. Activities of this kind 
can only be secured by the Ma^xist-Lcninist Party. As the political leader of 
the Soviet people, the CPSU ensures proper leadership of the masses and 
imparts to their struggle for the actiievement of their ultimate goal— commu- 
nism — an organized, systematic and scientifically sound character. 

V. I. Lenin pointed out that without a party, iron-hard and tempered in 
conflict, without a party which enjoys the confidence of the entire honest 


element in a given class, without a party capable of following the mood of 
the masses and influencing it, it would be imposc'ble to wage a successful 
struggle for socialism.' He emphasized that “the dictatorship of the proletar- 
iat is only possible through the Communist Party.” ^ 

The principal activities of the Party are the political leadership of society 
and the elaboration and solution of the radical problems of building socialism 
and communism. V. I. Lenin pointed out that the correctness of the Commu- 
nist Party’s policy determines the future of the Soviet regime. The Party’s 
policy is the vital basis of the Soviet system. Relying on Marxist-Leninist 
teaching and a knowledge of the objective laws of the development of society, 
the Communist Party elaborates and puts into effect the policy which lies at 
the basis of all spheres of the life of our state, without exception — economic, 
social, spiritual, and international relations. The Party gives to our people a 
scientifically substantiated program of action, indicates the aims of the strug- 
gle and the means of achieving them. By its titanic efforts, it ensures the 
indestructible ideological and political unity of society and tlic purposeful 
development of all the component parts of the social organism. “We have not, 
nor could there be, another political force which would be as capable of 
taking into consideration, combining, and coordinating the interests and 
needs of all the classes and social groups, all the nations and peoples, and all 
the generations of our society with such completeness and consistency as the 
Communist Party. The Party stands out as the organizing nucleus of the 
entire social system, the collective intellect of the whole Soviet people.” ’ 

Speaking about the leading role of the Party in the system of the Soviet 
State, V. I. Lenin indicated that it was called upon to be not only the people’s 
political leader, but also its tireless organizer and teacher. The Communist 
Party’s leadership of society and its relations with the masses are effected 
through an extensive coordinated system of state and public organizations — 
councils, trade unions, the Komsomol and voluntary societies. It combines 
and directs their efforts towards a common goal, activating organizational 
and ideological-educational work by its characteristic methods, developing 
by every possible means creativity, initiative, and influence among the masses 
who belong to these organizations. 

The leading role of the Communist Party in a socialist society also presup- 
poses the necessity of leadership of the Armed Forces. They are of the same 
flesh as our people and state, its armed bulwark. V. 1. Lenin demanded 
indivisible Party leadership of the entire life and activities of the Armed 
Forces. On 25 December 1918 on his initiative, the Central Committee of the 
Party adopted a program resolution “On the Policy of the Military Depart- 
ment,” in which it was stated that the policy of the Military Department, as 
in all other departments and institutions, is conducted strictly on the basis 
of genera! directives issued by the Party in the person of its Central Commit- 

' Sec Lenin, XLl, 27. 

' Unin, XLIll, 42. 

‘ Brezhnev, Delo Lenina zhivet i pobezhdayet [Unin's Work Lives and Conquers]. Poli:izdat, 
1970, p. 36. 


14 


tee and under its direct control. Our Party has always strictly fulfilled this 
Leninist requirement and continues to do so. 

How is the Communist Party’s leadership of the Armed Forces expressed? 

Firstly, by the fact that all questions relating to the defense of the socialist 
Fatherland, military development, military theory and practice are, as they 
were in the past, resolved in strict accordance with Party ideology and policy, 
on the basis of directives and instructions formulated in resolutions of con- 
gresses and plenary meetings of the Central Committee of the Party and the 
Politburo of the CC CPSU. 

The military policy of the Party, being part of the overall policy of the 
CPSU, provides for the resolution of the most important problems of military 
development. These are, first and foremost, problems relating to the strength- 
ening of the defensive potential of the country as a whole: the creation and 
development of a material and technical base for the military power of the 
state; well-organized military production; and the moral, political, and mili- 
tary training of the entire nation for the heroic defense of the Homeland. 
Ensuring the unity of the political, economic, and military leadership of the 
country, the Party strives for the most efficient utilization of the economy, 
the achievements of science and technology, and the moral and political 
forces of the state in the interests of reinforcing its defensive power. 

Secondly, the Communist Party’s leadership of the Armed Forces is ex- 
pressed in the fact that its Central Committee is directly concerned with 
questions relating to their life and activities, determines the principal trends 
and challenges of their development and takes care of the reinforcement of 
their fighting power, discipline, and solidarity. The Central Committee of the 
Party formulates guidelines for the development of the technical equipment 
of the Armed Forces, supplying the forces with aii kinds of modem weaponry 
and material; determines the optimum ratio in the development of the Ser- 
vices and branches of the Armed Forces; evolves Soviet military doctrine; 
selects and allocates executive military cadres; develops and puts into prac- 
tice the piinciples of personnel training and education; and concerns itself 
with increasing the vigilance and combat readiness of the forces. All these 
questions are resolved in conformity with the specific historical conditions 
and the requirements of military science, having regard to experience and 
practice, and combined with constant supervision of the fulfillment of the 
Party’s directives and instructions. This ensures that, before any decision is 
taken on questions relating to military development, the Central Committee 
of the Party carefully studies the state of affairs in the Armed Forces, the 
actual conditions and circumstances, and consults with executive military 
personnel. It is not uncommon for Party and Government leaders and mem- 
bers of the CC CPSU to be actually in the forces themselves, where they 
familiarize themselves with their life and training and the work of instructing 
and educating personnel. Ail this allows our Party and its Central Committee 
to resolve correctly the most complex questions of military development. 

Thirdly, the Communist Party’s leadership of the Armed Forces is man- 
ifested in the fact that there is a well-balanced system of political organs. 


15 


Party and Komsomol organizations within them. These carry out extensive 
educational and organizational work in the forces. 

The Central Committee devotes unflagging attention to questions of Party- 
political work in the Armed Forces, improving their forms and methods and 
increasing their fighting spirit and efficiency. Party and political work has the 
effect of rallying the personnel around the Party and the Soviet government, 
and mobilizes them for the fulfillment of the tasks facing the Armed Forces. 

Fourthly, the leading role of the Communist Party in the Armed Forces 
is manifested in the fact that during the trials of war the Party, by its policy 
and military-organizational activities, ensures the unity of the front and the 
rear, the transformation of the country into a single armed camp, and firm 
leadership of the forces. 

The scientific basis of the policy of the CPSU in the field of military 
development is Marxism-Leninism. In its work the Party draws on the 
objective laws of the development of human society and considers the objec- 
tive laws of war as a social phenomenon. The most progressive, Marxist- 
Leninist world outlook and a genuinely scientific method make it possible for 
the Party to penetrate deeply into the essence of war and military science, 
to study them in continuous evolution, in their relationship to the class 
struggle and the policy of the state on an international scale. 

V. I. Lenin repeatedly warned our Party and the Soviet people that while 
imperialism exists the threat of military adventure against the Land of the 
Soviets will remain. For this reason he demanded that the security of the 
Soviet Republic be gi’ en the most serious consideration and adjured the 
nation to be constantly vigilant, to strengthen the Armed Forces, to keep 
them in a permanent state of high-level combat readiness and fighting effi- 
ciency. “. . . the ruling class, the proletariat,” stated Lenin, “only if it wants 
to and will rule, must demonstrate this in its military organization.” * He 
taught that the army of a socialist state can only guarantee the safety of its 
socialist Fatherland if, in its moral and political attitude, as well as its 
organization, technical equipment and operational methods, it meets all the 
requirements of military theory and practice. 

Lenin’s theories on the armed defense of the socialist Fatherland and the 
leader’s instructions on fundamental questions of military development have 
stood the test of time and demonstrated their force and vitality. They form 
the theoretical foundation of the military policy of the Communist Party. 
These theories are clearly expressed and developed in the Program of the 
CPSU, in resolutions of Party Congresses and documents of the CC CPSU. 

“The Party,” it is stated m the Program of the CPSU, “proceeds on the 
basis that while imperialism continues to exist, the danger of wars of aggres- 
sion will remain. The CPSU considers the defense of the socialist Fatherland, 
the strengthening of the defenses of the USSR and the might of the Soviet 
Armed Forces as the sacred duty of the Party and the entire Soviet People 
and the most important function of the socialist state.” ’ 

* Lenin, XXXVIII. 139. 

’ Programma . . ., p. 110. 


16 





Guided by V. I. Lenin’s teaching on the defense of the socialist Fatherland and his recommen- 
dation that “in an age of civil war the ideal of the party of the proletariat is a belligerent party, ’’ ‘ 
the Communist Party organized and inspired the crushing defeat of the first invasion of the 
Soviet Republic by the forces of international imperialism. The Party worked out a program of 
national defense and the organization of our Armed Forces and determined the nature, purpose, 
principles and means of their development. All the most important questions relating to the 
organization and waging of the armed struggle against the interventionists and White Guards 
during the Civil War were resolved under the leadership of the Party and its leader, V. I. Lenin. 

Vital questions relating to the strengthening of the country’s defenses, the military policy and 
strategy of the Soviet State, measures for carrying out the principal strategic operations and 
providing all the necessary material and human resources were discussed, despite the difficulties 
of war, at regular Party congresses and plenary meetings of the Political and Organizational 
Bureaus of the Central Committee. In the period between the VIII and IX Party Congresses 
alone, i.e., the most difficult period of the Civil War (March 1919-April 1920), 6 plenary 
meetings of the Central Committee of the Party were held, 29 meetings of the Politburo, 19 
combined meetings of the Political and Organizational Bureaus and 1 10 meetings of the Organi- 
zational Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik). At all 
these meetings the principal and priority questions discussed were those relating to national 
defense, the conduct of the war and military development, and the adopted resolutions were put 
into effect immediately.’ The Central Committee of the Party, headed by V. 1. Lenin, was the 
war operations HQ, the organ of the collective leadership of the country’s defenses and the 
development of the Armed Forces. 

The resolutions of the VIII Party Congress were of great importance in the 
mobilization of all the country’s forces and the creation of the people’s 
regular Red Army for the crushing defeat of the interventionists and White 
Guards. The fundamentals of the Party’s military policy at this new stage in 
the development of our army were defined in V. I. Lenin’s reports and 
speeches at the congress and in the Party’s new program and a resolution on 
the military question. The congress worked out and passed program direc- 
tives on all the principal questions of Soviet military development. It con- 
solidated Lenin’s policy on the completion of the formation cf the regular 
Red Anny and determined practical measures for reinforcing its fighting 
strength. In the words of the resolution of the VIII Congress on the military 
question: “The Army must be trained, armed and organized in accordance 
with the latest developments in military science.’’ * The basic principle of 
military development — undivided Communist Party leadership of the entire 
life and activities of the Armed Forces — was established on the basis of 
congress resolutions on the military question. In this connection the congress 
outlined practical measures for the strengthening of Party leadership of the 
Army, tne consolidation of its central organization, the improvement of 
Party-political work in the forces, the training of officer cadres of proletarian 
origin, and the strict application of the class principle in the development of 
the army. 

The leading role of the Communist Party in defense of the achievements 
of the socialist revolution was also manifested in the fact that Party members 

‘ Lenin, XIV, 8. 

’ See KPSS i stroitel'stvo Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil [The CPSU and the Development of 
the Soviet Armed Forces). Voyenizdat, 1967, p. 67. 

* KPSS y rezolyutsiyakh . . . [The CPSU in Resolutions . . .], Part I, 7th ed. Gospolitizdat, 
1953, p. 435. 

17 





were in the front ranks of those fighting for the interests of the workers. More 
than half the Party membership fought selflessly in the front line during the 
Civil War. 

Having repulsed the first invasion of world imperialism, the Soviet people 
set about the task of peaceful socialist development. At the same time, the 
Communist Party did not forget about capitalist encirclement and the fact 
that the reactionary forces of imperialism had not abandoned their treacher- 
ous schemes to annihilate the Soviet system by force. The Party remembered 
V. I. Lenin’s words: “. . . Whoever forgets about the danger which constantly 
threatens us and which will continue to do so while world imperialism exists, 
— whoever forgets this, forgets our workers’ republic.” ’ 

The Communist Party devoted unremitting attention to increasing the 
country’s defense capacity. Questions of military policy and the strengthen- 
ing of the fighting power of the Armed Forces were discussed at the X, XI, 
XII, XIII, XIV and other Congresses, at Party conferences and plenary 
meetings of the Central Committee of the Party. A program for the transition 
of the army to peacetime status was outlined and the means of further 
military development were determined in resolutions of the X Congress of 
the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik). The resolutions of the congress 
emphasized the necessity of maintaining a regular army as the basis of our 
Armed Forces, the development and perfection of special technical units and 
the regeneration and reinforcement of the Navy. In order to ensure a high 
level of combat readiness and the class solidarity of the army the congress 
demanded that its proletarian content be reinforced and that the proportion 
of Party members in the army be increased. The X Congress paid special 
attention to strengthening political organizations and increasing their active 
participation in the work. In a resolution of the congress special emphasis was 
laid on the necessity “of maintaining the political system of the Red Army 
in the form that it had developed during three years of war; of improving and 
reinforcing its organization; of strengthening its ties with local Party organi- 
zations, retaining, however, the complete independence of its system.” 

At the February and April Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee of 
the Party (1924) and the XIII Congress of the Russian Communist Party 
(Bolshevik) a clear-cut program of measures was drawn up for carrying out 
military reforms in the period 1924-1928. The Party effected a fundamental 
reconstruction of the entire system of organizing, directing and bringing the 
army up to strength, training and allocating military cadres, and improved 
the system of training and educating the forces and of conducting Party- 
political work in them. 

Positive successes in strengthening the country’s defense capacity and 
increasing the fighting power of the Armed Forces were achieved as a result 
of the realization of Lenin’s plan for building socialism in the USSR. Of prime 
importance in creating the economic basis of the country’s defense capacity 

* Lenin, AT/L//. 173. 

KPSS V rezolyutsiyakh . . . [I'he CPSII in Resolutions . . .], Part I, p. 570. 


18 


was the Communist Party’s firm implementation of the general policy of 
socialist industrialization of the country. The collectivization of agriculture 
and the cultural revolution played an important role in consolidating the 
defense capacity of the USSR. Thus, the foundation of our victory over 
fascism was laid during the prewar period. 

In addition to consolidating the military and economic strength of the 
country, the Party showed great concern over increasing the moral and 
political potential of the Soviet people and educating them in the spirit of the 
great ideas of Marxism-Leninism, Soviet patriotism, and constant readiness 
for the defense of the socialist Motherland. 

In the face of the growing military threat from Nazi Germany and its allies, 
the reinforcement of the country’s defenses and the fighting power of the 
Armed Forces took priority over other matters in the Party’s activities. This 
was reflected in the resolutions of the XVIII Congress of the All-Union 
Communist Party (Bolshevik), the March Plenary Meeting of the Central 
Committee (1940), the XVIII Party Conference (February 1941) and other 
Party documents. In fulfilling these resolutions, important steps were taken 
to reorganize industry and transport, taking into account the looming mili- 
tary threat; an extensive program for the Armed Forces was drawn up and 
implemented, which provided for their reequipment, the improvement of 
their organizational structure, and their combat and political training. 

On the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, a battle of unprecedented 
magnitude developed between the shock forces of imperialism and the first 
socialist state. In these difficult years for our Motherland the Communist 
Party, under whose leadership victory was forged, displayed unsurpassed 
theoretical maturity and scientific insight. The Party worked out a program 
for the mobilization of all the country’s resources for repelling the enemy. 
The Party roused the entire Soviet people for the just cause of defending the 
socialist Fatherland and inspired our soldiers and sailors to heroic deeds. 

Concern for the strengthening of the fighting power of the Armed Forces 
was the central issue in the Party’s military organizational and political work. 
A well-balanced war economy was set up within a short period of time. The 
temporary superiority of the Nazi German army in weapons and equipment 
was overcome. The Party carried through on an unprecedented scale a pro- 
gram of measures for the war mobilization training of combat reserves and 
regulars, the reorganization and consolidation of Party-political work in the 
Armed Forces, the improvement of combat skills, and the deployment of a 
partisan movement in the enemy’s rear. The strength and endurance of our 
army, which not only withstood the enemy’s onslaught, but smashed it, were 
greatly increased by these measures, by the love they felt for their country, 
and by the concern and support of heroic workers in the rear. The Soviet 
people and their Armed Forces gained a great victory, the chief source of 
which was the Communist Party’s firm, wise leadership of the entire life of 
the country. 

“During the dark and difficult years of war, our embattled nation was led 
by the Communist Party. It organized, inspired and ideologically armed the 


Soviet people for the struggle with the enemy. The Communist Party’s best 
sons were at the forefront of the fight against fascism. The Party produced 
a remarkable galaxy of military leaders. Political officers, among whom were 
prominent Party and Government figures, carried out extensive organiza- 
tional and Party-political work in the Army. By the end of the war there were 
over three million Party members at the front. The most difficult months of 
1941 and 1942 saw the largest influx of fighting men into the Party. Our Party 
was indeed a fighting party.” “ 

From 1 July 1941 through 1 July 1946 Party organizations of the Red 
Army accepted 3,777,600 persons as candidates for membership in the All- 
Union Communist Party (Bolshevik), and 2,491,426 persons as members. 
The following table is a partial breakdown of these figures by years. 


Party carKlidates 


Party members 


During the 2nd bait of 1 94 1 1 26.625 

• 1942 1,072,088 

• 1943 1,228,359 

' 1944 896,500 

■ 1945 300,034 


49,981 

402,264 

774,837 

783,883 

399,452 


The victory of the Soviet Union in World War II was of universal impor- 
tance. It demonstrated the enormous vitality and the invincibility of the 
socialist system. The authority of the Soviet Union and its role in the solution 
of international problems increased enormously as a result of our victory over 
fascism. Favorable conditions were created for the development and victory 
of socialist revolutions in a number of European and Asian countries and the 
formation of a world system of socialism. 

In the postwar period, the Soviet people under the leadership of the Party, 
were able, within a short time, to heal the ugly wounds of the war, to rebuild 
the national economy, and to create practical prerequisites for the develop- 
ment of communism in the USSR. In view of the increasing activity among 
the aggressive forces of imperialism and their preparations for a new world 
war, the Communist Party continued to concern itself about the technical 
equipment of the Armed Forces, the improvement of their combat readiness, 
and the idealogical and political training of the personnel. The resolutions of 
recent Party congresses, and the October 1957 and subsequent plenary meet- 
ings of the CC CPSU were of great importance for strengthening the Soviet 
Armed Forces. 

A detailed analysis of the processes of development in military affairs, 
weaponry and equipment enabled the Central Committee of our Party to 
determine the general trend in the creation and development of new weap- 
onry. Thanks to the wise policy of the Central Committee of the Party on 

" 50 let Velikoy Oktyabr'skoy sotsialisticheskoy revolyutai. Tezisy TsK KPSS (Fifty Years of 
the Great October Socialist Revolution: Theses of the CC CPSU]. Politizdat, 1 967, p. 22. 

” See Vopnsy istorii KPSS (Problems of the History of the CPSU], 1965, No. 5, p. 66. 


the question of military equipment, Soviet economic, scientific and technical 
achievements, a qualitatively new material and technical base was created for 
providing the Armed Forces with up-to-date equipment and new weapons, 
primarily nuclear missiles. As a result of this, the American nuclear monop- 
oly was broken and the world socialist system obtained its own nuclear 
shield. 

The emergence of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, their wide introduction, together 
with other political, economic, scientific and technical factors, led to fundamental qualitative 
changes in all fields of military theory and practice and to a revolution in military affairs. 
Weaponry, methods of conducting military operations, troop organization, military theory, and 
the military training scheme all underwent radical qualitative changes, and methods of training 
and educating personnel were improved. As a result of this, the development of the Armed 
Forces of the USSR was raised to a new and higher level. 

In recent years, because of the aggravation of the international situation, 
the Party and the Government have passed a number of new and important 
resolutions on questions of military development aimed at further improve- 
ments in the organization of the forces and their equipment with new types 
of weapons and materiel, and improvements in the training of military per- 
sonnel and the standard of Party-political work in the forces. The third 
session of the seventh convocation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 12 
October 1967 ratified the new Universal Military Service Law. Its implemen- 
tation represents an important stage in Soviet military development, and 
provides new evidence of the Party’s concern over the strengthening of the 
country’s defenses. 

Progress in the building of communism is characterized by a further 
increase in the role and importance of the Communist Party as the leading 
and guiding force of Soviet society. These objective laws also operate in the 
military sphere. Expansion of the leading role of the CPSU in military 
development follows from the peculiarities of the international situation, the 
level of development in military affairs, the nature and special features of 
modern warfare, and other factors of fundamental importance. 

The Party’s increased role in the leadership of the Armed Forces was 
dictated, firstly, by the fact that their tasks in maintaining the security of the 
Motherland had become greater and more complex. The Party considers that 
the aggressiveness of imperialism has increased and that, as a result of this, 
there is a danger of a new world war. As was noted at the 1969 International 
Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties, the chief source of military 
danger is American imperialism in the role o^ world exploiter and gendarme, 
the sworn enemy of liberation movements. 

The ruling circles of the USA are feverishly stepping up the arms race, reinforcing aggressive 
blocks by every possible means and aggravating international tension. By implementing the 
policy of "local conflicts" and "small wars” elaborated in Washington, they try to hold on to 
their positions in dilferent parts of the globe and insolently interfere in the internal affairs of 
sovereign states. For several years now, the American imperialists have been conducting a 
shameful, murderous war against the Vietnamese people. They have unleashed bloody military 
adventures against the people of Laos and Cambodia in order to suppress the liberation move- 


21 


ment in Indochina. The American military clique directly sponsorerl and orchestrated the 
military-fascist revolution in Greece; with the covert and overt encouragement of imperialist 
circles in the USA and England, the rulers of Israel unleashed a war of conquest in the Near 
East against the United Arab Republic and other Arab countries. 

The scale of the military preparations of the imperialists of the USA and their allies can be 
judged by the fact that, beginning in 1949, the total expenditures of the member countries of 
the North Atlantic bloc for military purposes have exceeded one trillion (one thousand billion) 
dollars, the United States of America accounting for two thirds of this sum. 

The active partners of the USA in aggravating international tension and intensifying the arms 
race are its accomplices in aggressive military blocs. The aggressive North Atlantic military bloc, 
NATO, is a particularly serious threat to the peace of Europe. During the period that this bloc 
has existed the military expenditures of its member countries have reached the astronomical 
figure of almost l.S trillion dollars, i.e., more than was spent on the first and second world wars. 

Our Party counters the imperialist policy of military adventure and the 
fanning of international tensions with its Leninist foreign policy. Guided by 
the resolutions of Party congresses and plenary meetings of the CC CPSU, 
it rebuffs the aggressive activities of world reaction and, jointly with frater- 
nal socialist countries, takes the necessary steps to prevent a world nuclear 
war. One of the most important factors in resolving these problems is the 
steady growth in the military might of the Soviet Armed Forces, their read- 
iness at any moment to annihilate the aggressor, whatever weapons he may 
use. 

In the words of the Resolution of the CC CPSU on the centenary of Lenin’s 
birth: “The Party will henceforth constantly concern itself with the growth 
of the defensive capacity of the Soviet Homeland and will maintain the people 
and the Army in a state of constant readiness to repel imperialist aggression 
and defend the socialist Fatherland.” 

Secondly, the increase in the leading role of the Communist Party in the 
Armed Forces was brought about by the scientific revolution, fundamental 
changes in military affairs, and the need for Marxist-Leninist scientific fore- 
sight and the elaboration and implementation of a well-balanced policy in the 
theory’ and practice of military development. 

Thanks to the constant cone*;!!! of the Party and Government our Armed 
Forces have all the necessary means at their disposal to destroy any aggres- 
sor. But military affairs are developing rapidly. The imperialist states are 
devoting enormous efforts to gaining advantages in the military field. Thus, 
the CPSU’s correct scientific and technical policy of developing our economy 
to its fullest possible extent in order to keep the Armed Forces at the peak 
of modem military technology is now of particular importance. 

Thirdly, the enlarged role of the Communist Party in the leadership of the 
Armed Forces is determined by the increased importance of morale in mod- 
em warfare. All the history of wars shows that the more lethal the weapons 
employed, the greater the importance of the morale of the people involved 
in military operations. This applies to a far greater degree in the case of a 
possible nuclear war. The augmentation of the moral and political superiority 
of the Soviet Armed Forces over the armies of the imperialist states is now 
of paramount importance. By virtue of this, the Party plays an increasingly 


important role in the communist education of forces personnel and in their 
moral, political and psychological training. 

Fourthly, the expansion of the leading role of the CPSU in military affairs 
is dictated by the necessity of preparing the entire nation to repel imperialist 
aggression. Modem warfare obliterates the boundary between the front and 
the rear. Troops and objectives deep in the interior of the country may be 
subjected to surprise nuclear strikes. Hence, the Party is playing a larger role 
in ensuring the viability of our state in the event of war, in strengthening ^.he 
military and economic power of the USSR by every possible means, in the 
moral, political, and military training of the population, and in the organiza- 
tion of civil defense. 

Fifthly, the increase in the leading role of the CPSU in the field of military 
development is dictated by the expansion of the international obligations of 
the Soviet Armed Forces and the necessity of ensuring the close cooperation 
and unity of action of all fraternal armies. 

The conditions governing the armed defense of the socialist states have 
changed radically with the formation of the world socialist system and the 
growth of its political and economic power. Unlike the past, when only a 
single socialist state was opposed to an imperialist attack, in any future 
war imperialist aggressors will receive a rebuff from the powerful socialist 
community. 

POLITICAL ORGANS, PARTY AND KOMSOMOL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE 
SOVIET ARMED FORCES 

Party-political work is an integral part of all the organizational and ideo- 
logical activities of the Communist Party in the Armed Forces, and an 
important means of strengthening them. V. I. Lenin taught that “when 
political work is conducted with greater care among the troops . . . there is 
no laxity in the Army, its order and morale are of a higher standard and it 
wins more victories.” “ 

Political organs in the Armed Forces are the executive elements of the 
Party in the field of Party-political work. Political organs and Party organiza- 
tions are guided by the Program and Rules of the CPSU, the resolutions of 
Party congresses and conferences and the Central Committee of the CPSU, 
as well as by the Regulations for Poliiical Organs and Instructions to Organi- 
zations of the CPSU in the Soviet Armed Forces, ratified by the Central 
Committee of the Party. Political organs also base their practical work on 
orders and directives of the Minister of Defense and the Head of the Chief 
Political Directorate of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Party exercises its 
influence on all aspects of the life of the Armed Forces through political 
organs and Party organizations, and the Party members serving in them. 

During the very first days of the existence of the Soviet Armed Forces our 
Party began to set up within them a Party-political system, in which the 

” Lenin, XXXIX, 56. 


23 


institution of the military commissars occupied a prominent place. The mili- 
tary commissars not only acted as direct representatives of the Soviet regime 
in the Army, they also represented the Party’s morale, discipline, fortitude 
and courage. On 8 April 1918 the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commis- 
sars was set up to direct their activities. This fonned the foundation for the 
development of the central military-political system of our Armed Forces. 

In July 1918 the V All-Russian Congress of Soviets confirmed the institu- 
tion of the military commissar. In a resolution of the Congress it was in- 
dicated that only irreproachable revolutionaries and resolute fighters for the 
cause of the proletariat and the village poor could occupy positions as mili- 
tary commissars. As bearers of the Party’s policy, the military commissars 
organized and carried out Party-political work among the troops and exer- 
cised very strict political control of the activities of military specialists. The 
commissars directed the activities of Party cells and political sections. 

A system of political organs was set up by ihe autumn of 1918. The 
establishment of political organs was officially recognized in a resolution of 
the Central Committee of the Party on 25 October 1918. In accordance with 
this resolution, the organization of political sections attached to the revolu- 
tionary military councils of the fronts and armies was announced by the 
Revolutionary Military Council on 5 December 1918. Soon after this, politi- 
cal sections were formed in all divisions and brigades. Under Lenin’s leader- 
ship special Regulations for Political Organs were worked out. 

In order to reinforce the management of Party and political work in the 
Armed Forces, the VIII Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bol- 
shevik) decided to create a Political Section of the Revolutionary Military 
Committee of the Republic, transferring to it all the functions of the All- 
Russian Bureau of Military Commissars and placing at its head a member 
of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik), 
exercising the rights of a member of the Revolutionary Military Council. On 
the basis of this decision, the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars 
was abolished and the Political Section of the Revolutionary Military Council 
of the Republic was established in its place. The latter was soon transformed 
into the Political Directorate of the Revolutionarj' Military Council (PUR). 
Thus the formation of the Armed Forces system of political organs was 
completed. 

All the experience of the work of the military commissars and the political 
organs indicates that they played a tremendously important role in the devel- 
opment of the young Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army and the achievement 
of their historical victories over the enemies of our Homeland. M. V. Frunze, 
evaluating the activities of political organs during the Civil War, wrote: 
“Who introduced the elements of order and discipline into the ranks of our 
young Red regiments, formed amid the thunder of shell-fire? W'ho in the days 
when we suffered reverses and defeats sustained the courage and boldness of 
our fighters and infused new energy into their shaken ranks? Who organized 
the Army’s rear and established Soviet authority there, thus ensuring the 
rapid and successful advance of our armies? Who, by their persistent and 


stubborn efforts, broke the enemy’s ranks and disorganized his rear, thus 
paving the way for future successes? 

“These things were done, and done brilliantly, by the Army’s political 
organs. . . . 

“As agents of the Communist Party in the Army, the political organs acted 
as direct conveyors of the morale, energy, and enthusiasm that animated the 
Party and the confidence in victory possessed by the working class.” '* 

During the period of peaceful socialist development, by implementing the 
policy and resolutions of the Party, the political organs played an extremely 
important role in the strengthening and reequipping of the Soviet Armed 
Forces, and in the education and political training of all personnel. The 
services of the political organs in winning our historic victory in World War 
II were exceptional. As in the Civil War they acted as steadfast champions 
of the Party’s policy and influence in the Armed Forces and as political 
educators of Soviet fighting men. Together with the commanders, they led 
the work of mobilizing the forces to crush a strong and treacherous enemy. 

During the postwar period, with the appearance of new weapons and 
equipment, changes in the methods of armed conflict, and an improvement 
in the qualitative composition of the Armed Forces, improvements were 
made in the form, content and methods of Party-political work. Moral, 
political and psychological training tasks were greatly expanded and made 
much more sophisticated. New problems arose in connection with mastering 
the latest equipment, reinforcing discipline, and troop control. 

A comprehensive program for reinforcing the role and influence of politi- 
cal organs and Party organizations, improving Party-political work and the 
ideological and political education of the Armed Forces personnel is set out 
in the Program and Rules of the Party, in resolutions of the XXIII Congress 
of the CPSU and subsequent plenary meetings of the Central Committee, in 
a resolution of the CC CPSU dated 21 January 1967 “On Measures for 
Improving Party-Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces,” and in the 
message of greeting to commanders and political workers on the occasion of 
the 50th anniversary of the formation of the Political Directorate of the 
Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. 

The institution of military councils occupies an important place in the 
leadership of the forces. There are military councils in the Services, in mili- 
tary districts, fleets and several other elements of the military organism. They 
examine and resolve all fundamental questions relating to the life and activi- 
ties of the forces; they are responsible to the Central Committee, the Govern- 
ment and Minister of Defense for the constant combat readiness and fighting 
efficiency of the forces, their training and education. The resolutions of 
military councils are adopted by majority vote and put into effect by the 
orders of the respective commanders. 

leadership of Party and political work in the Armed Forces of the USSR 
is effected by the Central Committee of the CPSU through the Chief Political 

'* Frunze, p. 147. 


i T 



25 


Directorate of the Soviet Armed Forces, which exercises the rights of a section 
within the CC CPSU. 

The Bureau of the Chief Political Directorate was created in accordance 
with a resolution of the CC CPSU to ensure collectivity in resolving vital 
questions relating to Party-political work and the education of cadres of 
Party and political workers of the Armed Forces in the spirit of observing 
Leninist rules of Party life and the principles of Party leadership. Resolutions 
of the Bureau are adopted by a majority vote and put into effect by directives 
and instructions issued by the Head of the Chief Political Directorate. 

Directives on questions of Party-political work in the Armed Forces are 
issued under the signr.iures of the Minister of Defense and the Head of the 
Chief Political Directorate with the approval of the CC CPSU. Directives 
and instructions on day-to-day questions of Party-political work are issued 
by the Head of the Chief Political Directorate. 

Corresponding political directorates and political sections have been 
created to organize and direct Party and political work in all Services of the 
Armed Forces, groups of forces, military districts, air defense districts, and 
fleets. The political directorates of Services of the Armed Forces, groups of 
forces, military and air defense districts and fleets are headed by members of 
military councils — heads of the political directorates (political sections). 

Political sections of formations are established directly in units and ships 
for the supervision and organization of Party-political and educational work. 
The head of the political section is the deputy commander for political affairs 
of the formation. Political sections are also established in military training 
and scientific research establishments, the central organization of the Minis- 
try of Defense, the headquarters and directorates of districts, groups of forces 
and fleets. 

Party commissions, established under political organs are responsible for 
considering the decisions of Party organizations on questions relating to 
membership of the CPSU and cases of misdemeanors of Party and Kom- 
somol members. Party commissions are selc 'ted at appropriate Party confer- 
ences and operate under the direction of political organs. A Party commis- 
sion under the Chief Political Directorate of the Soviet Armed Forces is 
confirmed by the Central Committee of the CPSU. 

Party organizations of the Soviet Armed Forces represent a large and 
important combat force of the CPSU closely bound to its Leninist Central 
Committee. More than 80% of the personnel in the Armed Forces are Party 
or Komsomol members. This is their strength, the basis of the high level of 
political consciousness and morale of our soldiers and sailors, and the guar- 
antee that they will successfully fulfil the tasks of ensuring the security of our 
Homeland. 

Party organizations exis sd in the Red Army right from the beginning of its existence. 
Together with the young Red Army they grew rapidly and gathered strength. Whereas in 
October 1918 there were 800 Party cells in subunitf of the Army, by July 1920 there were 6,337, 
consisting of as many as 300 thousand Party members, whs in combat exhibited personal 
e.tamples of heroism, endurance and courage. 


After the victorious conclusion of the Civil War, the Central Committee of the Party and 
V. I. Lenin carefully guarded against the possibility that mass demobilization might result in 
a reduction of the numerical strength of Party members in the forces and ensured that ex- 
perienced cadres of Party workers were retained. Questions relating to Party work in the Armed 
Forces were discussed repeatedly at Party congresses and conferences and plenary meetings of 
the Central Committee. As a result, the Armed Forces Party organizations grew and gathered 
strength. 

The following table shows how the numerical strength of Party members in the Red Army 
and Navy increased during the prewar years. 


Date 

Number of cells (primary 

Party organizations) 

Party members in the 
Armed Forces 

By the end of 1921 

5,690 

73,000 

On 1 Jan., 1928 

6,001 

82,018 

On 1 Jan., 1929 

6.283 

93,830 

On 1 Jan, 1930 

6,760 

102,749 

On 1 Jan., 1931 

7,030 

133,789 

On 1 Jan., 1940 

9,468 

434,955 

On 1 Oct., 1940 

10,069 

508.450 

By June, 1941 

12,200 

560.800 


In the Great Patriotic War, the best forces of the Party were sent to the most dangerous and 
responsible sectors of the struggle. Nearly one third of the members of the Central Committee 
of our Party were at the front. Whereas during the Civil War there were 5 Party members to 
every 100 fighting men, the corresponding figures at the beginning and end of World War II 
were 13 and 25, respectively. In addition to this, there were 20 Komsomol members per 100 
fighting men. This means that almost every other soldier in our Army was either a member of 
the Party or the Komsomol. 

Party work in the forces was carried out on a massive scale. Non-Party 
fighting men were drawn into the battle with the enemy by the courage and 
irresistible impetuosity displayed by front-line Party members, thus ensuring 
victory in battles and operations. 

In the postwar period, the Armed Forces Party organizations were 
strengthened both ideologically and organizationally, their activity and 
fighting spirit increased appreciably, as did their influence on the solution 
of combat and political training tasks and the strengthening of military 
discipline. 

Fulfilling the demands of the Party Program and the resolutions of the 
XXIII Party Congress, the Party organizations of the Soviet Armed Forces 
are firmly and consistently implementing Party policy in them- all their 
activities are directed at reinforcing their fighting power, rallying military 
personnel around the Communist Party and educating them iu the spirit of 
the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, selfless devotion to the Socialist Homeland, 
the friendship of our country’s peoples, proletarian internationalism and 
burning hatred of the imperialist aggressors. They actively promote the unity 
of the Army and the people, concern themselves with the strengthening of 

•’ See KPSS i stroitel'stvo Somskikh Voontihennykh Sit [The CPSU »Jid the Development of 
the Soviet Armed Forces]. Voyenizdat, 1967, p. 226; Yu. P. Petrov, Partiynoye stroitel'HiY) v 
Sovctskoy Armii i Plate (I9IS-I96I} (Party Development in the Soviet Armed Forces (1918- 
1961)]. Voyenizdat, 1964, pp. 150. 281, 329. 



military discipline, and mobilize personnel for the exemplary fulfillment 
of combat and political training tasks, the mastering of new weapons and 
equipment, and the maintenance of a high degree of vigilance and combat 
readiness. 

Primary Party organizations in the Soviet Armed Forces are created by the 
respective political sections in regiments, individual units (battalion, com- 
pany, battery, squadron), on ships of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd class, in divisions 
of small ships, in formation headquarters, in military training establishment's 
and institutions where there are at least Party members. 

Party organizations exercising depar tiental rights for battalions, squa- 
drons, and combat operational um^ ,t ships are set up within the primary 
Party organizations with the aut „ /ation of the political section. 

In cases where there are more than 75 Party members in regiments, ships 
and departments of military academies. Party committees may be set up with 
the authorization of the political section of a strategic formation, district 
political directorate, group of forces, or fleet, the Party organizations of 
battalions, and equivalent subunits being granted the rights of a primary 
Party organization. Under these conditions, and with the permission of the 
political section. Party organizations exercising departmental rights may be 
formed in companies and equivalent subunits where there are three or more 
Party members. 

With n Party organizations of subunits, as well as within a primary Party organization, Party 
groups may be set up for companies, batteries, flights, on small ships, in platoons, aircrews, 
training sections, departments of institutions and plant workshops. The Party group organizer 
is elected at a Party group meeting, which includes three Party members, by a show of hands 
(or, wit h the permission of the Party members, by secret ballot). In Party groups which include 
less than three Party members and several candidates for Party membership, the Party group 
organizer is selected by the Party Committee (Bureau) of the unit. 

Primary Party organizations receive new members into the Party from 
among those officers, noncommissioned officers, petty officers, soldiers, sail- 
ors, workers and employees of the Soviet Armed Fot ces who are the mo t 
mature, active, and committed to the cause of Communism. Induct •'*! into 
the Party is effected on an individual basis. Candidates who have reached the 
age of 18 are accepted into the CPSU. In order to improve the qualifying 
standard of personnel being accepted into the CPSU, the XXIII Congress 
ruled that young persons up to and including the age of 23 will enter the Party 
only through the Komsomol. New Party members are accepted from among 
candidates who have passed through the probationary term established by 
the Rules of the CPSU. 

The Instructions to Organizations of the CPSU in the Soviet Armed Forces 
lay specific obligations on Party organizations, require them to use their skill 
to permeate and influence all aspects of life and activiries of subunits, units, 
ships, headquarters, military training establishments and institutions; io re- 
veal boldly, through criticism and self-criticism, shortcomings in the training 
and education of military personnel, in Party-political work, in the activities 
of Party committees (bureaus) and political organs, and in the material 


28 


security and welfare of personnel; to assist commanders in the timely adop- 
tion of measures to eliminate defects in the organization of the training 
process and service in the forces; to combat deceit, poor management, misap- 
propriation and wastefulness of state resources; and anything that is detri- 
mental to the combat readiness of military units. At Party meetings. Party 
members have the right to criticize any other Party member or candidate, 
regardless of the position he occupies. Criticism of orders and regulations 
issued by comm.anders and senior officers is not permitted. 

Party organizations reinforce unity of command in the Armed Forces. A 
commander exercising political and military authority is the champion of the 
Communist Party’s policy. Party organizations teach personnel to respect 
their commanders, and strive to ensure that each order given by a comman- 
der is carried out unquestioningly, precisely and promptly. 

Party organizations of units and subunits and all Party work in the forces 
come under the control of political organs. The deputy commander for 
political affairs together with the Party Committee (Bureau) organizes Party 
work and bears direct responsibility for its state. 

Komsomol organizations in the Soviet Armed Forces are active assistants 
of organizations of the CPSU in implementing Party policy in, and strength- 
ening their fighting power. 

Primary Komsomol organizations are created by political sections in bat- 
talions, independent companies (batteries), squadrons and equivalent subu- 
nits, in the divisions of 1st and 2nd class ships, and on submarines, as well 
as institutions, in courses or in companies of military training establishments 
and military construction detachments, when there are not less than three 
Komsomol members. 

A bureau for carrying out routine work is elected for a period of one year 
by a show of hands at a meeting of the primary Komsomol organization. A 
secretary and a deputy secretary are selected from among the members of the 
bureau at a meeting of the latter. In Komsomol organizations with less than 
10 Komsomol members, a bureau is not set up: a secretary and his deputy 
are elected. 

Within a primary Komsomol organization, Komsomol organizations exercising departmental 
rights are formed in companies, batteries and equivalent subunits. They conduct their practical 
work on the basis of tasks being solved by the subunits and primary organizations of which they 
are a part. A bureau is formed within these organizations if there are more than ten Komsomol 
members. It is elected by a show of hands for a period of one year. In a company Komsomol 
organization, Komsomol groups may be formed in platoons, crews, flights, detachments, teams, 
and also in groups detailed for work, detached duty, etc. They are formed in subunits or groups 
in which there are not less than three Komsomol members. A Komsomol group organizer is 
elected for a period of one year 

Komsomol committees are elected in regiments, on 1st and 2nd class ships, and also in 
independent units, where primary Komsomol organizations have been set up for subunits. 

The Armed Forces Komsomol organizations are guided in all their activi- 
ties by resolutions of the CPSU, the Komsomol Rules, the resolutions of 
congresses and the Central Committee of the Komsomol. Their practical 


29 


tasks are also defined in the Instructions to Komsomol Organizations in the 
Soviet Armed Forces, approved by the Komsomol Central Committee and 
the Chief Political Directorate. 

Komsomol organizations of the Armed Forces are called upon to educate 
young soldiers and sailors in the spirit of selfless dedication to the Communist 
Party and the Soviet Motherland and the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the 
heroic traditions of the revolutionary struggle and self-sacrificing labor of the 
Soviet people, t^> train steadfast, ideologically convinced fighters for the 
victory of communism, ready to give all their strength and, if need be, their 
lives as well, in the defense of the socialist Motherland. A resolution of the 
XVi Congress of the Komsomol points out that Komsomol organizations in 
the Armed Forces are called upon to strive to ensure that Komsomol mem- 
bers scrupulously fulfill Lenin’s precept — to study military affairs by actual 
procedure, to set an example in fulfilling the requirements of the oath 
and regulations and to become first-class specialists in combat and political 
training. 

Leadership of the activities of military Komsomol organizations is exer- 
cised by the Chief Political Directorate of the Soviet Armed Forces through 
the corresponding political and Party organizations and deputy commanders 
for political affairs. There are assistant heads of political sections for Kom- 
somol work in all political organizations. The most important matters relat- 
ing to Komsomol work in the Armed Forces are subject to agreement be- 
tween the Chief Political Directorate and the Komsomol Central Committee. 

PARTY-POLITICAL WORK IN THE ARMED FORCES 

Party-political work in our Armed Forces is based on the policy and 
ideology of the Communist Party, taking into account the specific tasks 
which face them at each stage of their development. It does not remain 
unchanged, but is being constantly improved. A change in the determining 
factors, including methods of anned combat, the appearance of new equip- 
ment, an improvement in the qualitative structure of the military, is accom- 
panied by development of the content, forms and methods of Party and 
political work. 

Party-political work in the Armed Forces is organized and conducted on 
the basis of definite principles, such as ideological content, scientific charac- 
ter, concreteness, purposefulness, continuity, unity of ideological and organi- 
zational activities, its conformity to the nature of modem warfare, and the 
tasks being resolved by the forces. 

There has been a big improvement in Party-political work in the forces and 
its effectiveness has been increased, thanks to the active and persistent activi- 
ties of military councils, commanders, political bodies and Party organiza- 
tions in fulfilling the requirementa of the Party Program, the resolutions of 
the XXIII Congress and plenary meetings of the CC CPSU, the resolution 
of the CC CPSU dated 21 January 1967 “On Measures for the Improvement 
of Party-Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces.” 


30 


The task of ensuring a high state of vigilance and constant combat readi- 
ness of the forces is of vital importance. This is due to the aggravation of the 
current international situation, the increased aggressiveness of imperialism, 
and the growth of the military danger for the USSR and the entire socialist 
community. 

Constant combat readiness is a vast subject. It incorporates such factors 
as the maintenance of the fighting efficiency of the forces as a whole, their 
strength, a high standard of training, their ability to wage modern warfare 
according to all the rules of military art; the moral, political and psychologi- 
cal training of personnel in conformity with the nature and special character- 
istics of modem warfare. It is, in fact, the ability of subunits, units and ships 
for immediate and decisive action when an alert is given, and the highest state 
of organizational efficiency and discipline in all the elements of the military 
organism. 

The concept of the combat readiness of the forces has now been expanded and augmented 
with new meaning. 

The so-called “seasonal” approach to combat readiness of the forces has now been consigned 
to the history books. War may now break out at any time of the year. Therefore, the forces must 
be in a constantly high and unremitting state of combat readiness. The degree of personal 
responsibility of servicemen for the combat readiness of subunits and units •’“s been increased. 
Now more than ever before, combat readiness depends upon the conscientiousness, discipline, 
and training of every soldier at the control panel of a missile complex, in the combat detail of 
a crew, etc. The importance of the time factor in ensuring combat readiness has greatly in- 
creased. All this is taken into account in the organization of Party and political work. 

Qualitative changes which have taken place in military affairs have made 
it essential for Party and political organizations to give priority to the task 
of forming a high state of political consciousness and psychological stability 
in the forces, of fostering in our soldiers a firm will for victory over a strong 
and rapacious enemy, and readiness to carry out combat orders at any cost, 
even to the point of self-sacrifice. Moral and political training entails, first and 
foremost, the instilling of profound ideological conviction and a well- 
developed sense of personal responsibility for the fulfillment of his combat 
task in each member of the forces. 

Psychological training consists in forming in personnel the psychological 
qualities needed for the successful completion of combat tasks under the 
difficult conditions of modem combat — lofty patriotic feelings, faithfulness 
to military duty, confidence in victory over the enemy, strength of will, 
courage, endurance, and discipline. 

The level of psychological stability depends largely on a sound knowledge 
of the nature of modem combat, the tactical and technical characteristics of 
weapons, and protection against them, and on the ability of personnel to 
conduct effective combat operations under any conditions. 

All educational work with Armed Forces personnel is based on a profound 
study of Lenin’s theoretical legacy, the rest lutions of Party congresses and 
plenary meetings of the CC CPSU. The achievements of our country in the 
building of communism, the revolutionary traditions of the Communist 


Party and the Soviet people and the glorious history of the Soviet State and 
its Armed Forces are publicized with force and conviction. 

The entire Marxlst-Leninist system of training officers, generals, and admi- 
rals, political work with soldiers and noncommissioned officers, political 
education, propaganda, cultural and educational work with personnel are 
devoted to this. 

In pursuing their aggressive policy, the imperialists, primarily reactionary 
circles in the USA, are striving to introduce a “war of ideas” into the socialist 
countries. They are broadening the front of ideological diversions and are 
doing everything possible to corrupt the minds of our people and undermine 
the foundations of socialism. 

Referring to the increased aggressiveness of imperialism, and the ideologi- 
cal diversions directed against the USSR and the other socialist countries, the 
XXIII Congress of the CPSU pointed out that the front of the ideological 
struggle, the ideological training of our people, is one of the most important 
sectors of the Party’s activities. This was underlined with renewed force in 
the April and July 1968 plenary meetings of the CC CPSU. They noted that 
the present stage of historical evolution is characterized by a sharp intensifi- 
cation of the ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism. The 
whole of the vast system of anticommunist propaganda is now aim.ed at 
weakening the unity of the socialist countries and the international commu- 
nist movement, breaking up the progressive forces of our times and under- 
mining socialist society from within. Under these conditions the irreconcila- 
ble struggle with hostile ideologies, the resolute unmasking of imperialist 
intrigues, the communist education of members of the CPSU and all workers, 
and the intensification of all ideological work acquire a special importance. 

Commanders, political organs and Party organizations are channelling all 
the available resources of ideological education into strengthening commu- 
nist conviction, feelings of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism, 
ideological stability and the ability to withstand any forms of bourgeois 
influence. 

Another important aspect of ideological work is the unmasking of the 
ideology of right and “left” revisionism. 

During a period when military technology is developing rapidly and being 
introduced into the forces on a large scale, it is especially important that the 
technical standards of fighting men be increased by every possible means. 
Hence, the task of developing military technical propaganda on a broad front. 

Technical universities and lecture agencies, technology evenings, technical 
proficiency schools, discussion groups, technical conferences, quizzes, special 
and popular science film shows are commonplace in the forces. Engineering 
and technical personnel of the Armed Forces, as well as soldiers and noncom- 
missioned officers with a higher specialist education, take an active part in 
military technical propaganda. 

The wide development of socialist competition and the study, generaliza- 
tion, and dissemination of advanced knowledge are important factors in 
Party and political work. 


The Communist Party firmly associates the political education of Armed 
Forces personnel with the further strengthening of military discipline, the 
importance of which has increased enormously. The very concept of disci- 
pline has become much broader than it was previously. New equipment and 
new types of weapons have brought into being the discipline of intensive 
military labor; the discipline of competent operation and constant readiness 
of combat vehicles, tools, and machinery; and the discipline of operational 
duty. New weapons have made it essential to maintain discipline of unprece- 
dented strictness in the close cooperation between both combat groups and 
individual specialist-servicemen. 

The discipline of firm control, promptness in carrying out instructions, 
irreproachable performance, and the self-discipline of servicemen have be- 
come more important. As is known, pilots and operators, sonar operators, 
drivers, and servicemen in many other specialist categories frequently and for 
long periods carry out their tasks independently. Under such conditions 
conscience and selfdiscipline are often their only forms of supervision. 

An important task of Party-political work in the forces is the further 
consolidation of unity of command. Political organs and Party organizations 
look after the education of our officer personnel, help them to master Marx- 
ist-Leninist theoi7 and the Lenin style of leadership. They are concerned with 
the training of commanders with sole military and political responsibility, 
who combine an exacting nature, determination, and an officer’s inflexible 
will with a sincere, fatherly concern for their subordinates and who con- 
stantly depend on Party organizations and the resources of the army commu- 
nity in all their activities. 

The Party seeks to ensure that all the activities of our commanders, politi- 
cal organs and Party organizations, including those engaged in Party-politi- 
cal work, are based on scientific principles in strict accordance with the tenets 
of Marxism-Leninism and on the correct exploitation of the achievements of 
science and technology. 

The successful completion of the tasks of communist development is di- 
rectly related to the standard of Party work and to the ability of Party 
organizations to convince and organize the masses. It is very important for 
political organs and Party organizations in the Armed Forces to be able to 
arrange their activities with regard to the qualitative variations, peculiarities 
and specific features of a given Service of the Armed Forces or of a specific 
branch. 

Our commanders, political organs and Party organizations have access to 
a wealth of experience in the organization of Party-political work under 
combat conditions accumulated during the Great Patriotic War. Modem 
warfare, however, imposes new and heavier demands on this aspect of mili- 
tary life. Well thought-out and skillfully presented Party-political work is of 
tremendous importance in this connection during tactical exercises. Under 
conditions most closely resembling those of actual modem warfare, possible 
variants of Party-political work are elaborated and new forms and methods 
checked out. Commanders, political organs and Party organizations have 

33 


I 


learned a great deal in this connection from such exercises as Dnepr, and 
maneuvers as Dvina. Okean and others conducted in recent years. 

* * * 

Thus, there is not one aspect in the life and activity of our Armed Forces 
which does not experience the beneficial effect of the leading role of the 
CPSU. The Communist Party and its Central Committee formulate our 
military policy, and determine the principal trends and tasks in the work of 
strengthening the country’s defenses and developing the Armed Forces. Bas- 
ing its leadership of the Armed Forces on the theoretical foundations of 
Marxism-Leninism, an assessment of the requirements of the laws of social 
development, and a detailed analysis of trends in the evolution of military 
affairs, the Party ensures the maximum effective use of moral, political, 
economic, scientific and technical potential for strengthening the defensive 
capacity of the Soviet Homeland. 

ON THE LEADING ROLE OF THE CPSU IN THE ARMED FORCES 

FROM RESOLUTIONS OF PARTY CONGRESSES AND CONFERENCES, 
PLENARY MEETINGS OF THE CENTRAL COMMIHEE, AND OTHER 
DOCUMENTS 

In view of the fact that some Party circles hold the opinion that the policy of the military 
department is the product of the personal views of individuals or an independent group — and 
statements of this kind even appear in the Party press — the Central Committee of the Russian 
Communist Party considers it necessary to state in the most categorical terms that the most 
responsible and experienced members of the Party can be in absolutely no doubt at all that the 
policy of the military department, like that of all other branches and institutions, is conducted 
strictly on the basis of general directives issued by the Party in the person of its Central 
Committee and under its direct supervision. 

(On the policy of the military department. From a resolution of the Central Committee of 
the RCP* dated 25 December 1918. KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovelskogo Soyuza [The 
CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union]. Voyenizdat, 1969, p. 35). [Note: Hereafter 
cited as: KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh . . .] 

The military training and education of the Red Army is based on the principle of class 
solidarity and socialist enlightenment. Thus, it is essential to have political commissars drawn 
from reliable and dedicated Party members alongside the military commanders and communist 
cells in each unit for the establishment of internal ideological liaison and conscious discipline. 

(From the Program of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik), adopted by the Vlll 
Congress of the RCP(b).* KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh . . . [The CPSU in resolutions . . .], Part I, 
p. 417). 

The rapid growth in the number of communist cells is the most important guarantee that the 
Army will be increasingly permeated by communist ideas and discipline. But it is precisely 
because of the tremendously important role of communist cells that commissars and all the most 
mature Party workers in the Army must take steps to ensure that unstable elements in search 

• RCP — the Russian Communist Party [U.S. Ed.]. 

* RCP(b) — Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) [U. S. Ed.]. 


of illusory rights and privileges are kept out of them. Respect for communist cells will be greater 
and more enduring, the more clearly each soldier understands and is convinced from experience 
that membership of a communist cell does not give him any special rights, but only imposes upon 
him the obligation of being an extremely selfless and courageous fighter. 

(From a resolution of the VIII Congress of the RCPG)) on the military question. KPSS v 
rezolyutsiyakh . . . [The CPSU in resolutions . . .], Part I, pp. 435-436). 

Party members serving in the Red Army must always be in the forward posts, in the most 
responsible and dangerous positions. Party members are increasing tenfold their work on the 
communist education of the Army. 

(From a message of greeting to the Red Army from the VIII Congress of the RCP(b). 
Protokoly VIII S'yezda RKP(b) [Minutes of the VIII Congress of RCP(b)]. Gospolitizdat, 1959, 
p. 443). 

The experience of the victorious struggle with Kolchak showed us where the true source of 
the military strength of proletarian power lies. Kolchak was beaten and took to flight because 
our Party at that time threw all its best forces onto the Eastern Front, having welded them into 
an iron military organization. 

(From a circular letter of the CC RCP. September 1919. KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Sil- 
akh . . ., p. 103). 

. . . For the Red Army to be truly socialist it is essential not only that it have a class 
composition, but that its personnel be clearly and properly aware of their class interests. And 
for this it is necessary for Party work to be carried out among them. 

(From a letter of the CC RCP “On Party Work in the Red Army.” KPSS o Vooruzhennykh 
Silakh . . ., p. 106). 

The conference draws the attention of the Central Committee to the need for more direct 
Central Committee leadership of the organizational and Party work of communist organizations 
in the ranks of the Red Army and Navy and non-toleration of further isolation of the life and 
work of these organizations from general Party life and work. 

(From a resolution of the IX All-Russian Conference of the RCP(b) on the organizational 
report to the Central Committee. KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh . . . [The CPSU in Resolu- 
tions . . .], Part I, p. 513). 

The Party decided, and the All-Russian Congress of Soviets unanimously affirmed, that the 
Red Army should be maintained and that its fighting efficiency be increased . . . 

But only the Party can maintain the Army. Only our considerate, solicitous, tactful, and loving 
attitude towards the Army can maintain and strengthen its fighting efficiency. 

(On the Red Army. To all organizations of the RCP(b). From a circular letter cf the CC 
RCP(b) dated 12 January 1921. KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh . . ., p. 148). 

Para. 1 1. To maintain the political system of the Red Army in the form which it developed 
during the three war years; to improve and consolidate its organization; to strengthen its ties 
with local Party organizations, maintaining, however, full independence of the system. 

(From a resolution of the X Congress of the RCP(b) on the military question (March 1921). 
KPSS V rezolyutsiyakh . . . [The CPSU in Resolutions . . .], Part I, p. 570). 

Availing itself of the current lull in the military situation, the Soviet government is now setting 
itself the task of improving and strengthening the Red Army and Navy for the purpose of 
self-defense. This places upon all our forces the obligation to apply themselves to fostering 
conscientiousness and the further strengthening of a healthy class spirit in the ranks of the Red 
Army. Bearing in mind the experience of the past, it will be necessary for this to Intensify, expand 
and give due priority to both the political education and fostering of conscious discipline and 
to the improvement of the Red Army man's lot. 

(On the strengthening of the Red Army. From a letter of the CC RCP(b) written in 1921. 
KPSS 0 Vooruzhennykh Silakh . . ., p. 155). 


35 


. . . The exercise of unity of command entails the maximum reinforcement of political work 
and the all-round consolidation of the Party's influence in military units. 

The role of political agencies, like that of Party institutions in the Army, is becoming especially 
important in this connection. 

(On unity of command in the Red Army. From a letter of the CC RCP(b) dated 6 March 1925. 

KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh .... p. 228). 

. . . The further strengthening of the Red Army as an instrument of the dictatorship of the 
working class and the eradication of bureaucratic distortions in the military system and the work 
of the command personnel can be achieved only when there is unshakable unity of the command 
and political staff and uninterrupted growth of the leading role of the All-Union Communist 
Party (Bolshevik), for which the main requirements of Party and political organs in the Army 
are skillful leadership. Party tenacity and authority. 

(On the political and moral state of the Red Army. From a resolution of the CC ACP(b)* 
dated 30 October 1928. KPSS o V-^ruzhennykh Silakh . . . , p. 252). 

Under the conditions prevailing during the present period, the Central Committee suggests that 
political organs and Party organizations and Party chiefs of the Red Army continue with great 
persistence to educate the Red Army, its officers and men in the spirit of selfless devotion to 
the Soviet regime, maximum vigilance and class irreconcilability. 

(On the officer and political personnel of the Workers* and Peasants’ Red Army. From a 
resolution of the CC ACP(b) dated 25 February 1929. KPSS o Voorozhennykh Silakh .... 
p. 259). 

52. Overall leadership of Party work in the Red Army, the Red Navy, and Air Force is effected 
by the Political Directorate of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army exercising the rights of 
the military department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bol- 
shevik). The Political Directorate of the Revolutionary Military Council exercises its leadership 
through political sections appointed by it, military commissars and Party commissions elected 
:<t appropriate Army conferences. 

Party organizations in the Red Army, Navy and Air Force operate on the basis of special 
instructions approved by the CC ACP(b). 

(On Party organizations in the Red Army. From the Rules of the ACP(b) approved by the 
XVII Party Congress. KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh . . . [The CPSU in Resolutions . . .], Part III, 
p. 242). 

The Communist Party and the Soviet government must henceforth educate Party members 
and all workers in a spirit of great vigilance, and continue untiringly to strengthen our valiant 
Armed Forces, effectively protecting the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the security of 
the socialist Homeland. 

(From the resolution of the XX Congress of the CPSU on the Report to the CC CPSU 
(February 1956), XX s'yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza. 14-25 fevralya 1956 
goda [The XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 14-25 February 1956]; 
Stenographic report, Vol 2. Gospolitizdat, 1956, p. 423). 

The complex international situation, the arms race in the principal capitalist countries, and 
the defense interests of our Homeland make it essential for commanders, political offices and 
Party organizations henceforth to improve the combat readiness of the forces, to reinforce 
discipline among the personnel, to educate them in a spirit of devotion to the Homeland and 
the Communist Party and to take an active interest in satisfying the spiritual and material needs 
of our fighting men. 

The Plenary Meeting of the CC CPSU considers that in resolving these tasks special impor- 
tance attaches to the further improvement of Party-political work among the military who are 
called upon in reinforcing the fighting power of our Armed Forces, rallying the personnel around 

• TsK VKP(b) in Russian; Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bol- 
shevik) or CC ACP(b) [U.S. Ed.]. 


36 


?- 

. » 
Jic:. 


the Communist Party and Soviet government, educating servicemen in a spirit of selfless devo- 
tion to the Soviet Homeland, friendship of the peoples of the USSR and proletarian internation- 
alism. 

(On improving Party and politicai work in the Soviet Armed Forces. From a Resoiution of 
the October ( 1957 ) Plenary Meeting of the CC CPSU. KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh . . 
p. 348). 

The basic principle of military development is leadership of the Armed Forces by the Commu- 
nist Party and enlargement of the role and influence of Party organizations in the Armed Forces. 
The Party devotes unremitting attention to increasing its organizational and guiding influence 
on the whole of the life and activities of the Army, Air Force, and Navy, rallying the Armed 
Forces personnel around the (TOmmunist Party and Soviet government, reinforcing the unity of 
the Army and the people, educating our fighting men in a spirit of courage, gallantry, heroism, 
and military cooperation with the armies of the socialist countries, and readiness at any moment 
to defend the land of the Soviets, home of the builders of Communism. 

(From the Program of the CPSU adopted at the XXII Party Congress. Progrumma Kom- 
munisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza. [Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union]. Pravda Izdat., 1961, p. 112). 

Under conditions in which the aggressive forces of imperialism are aggravating international 
tension and creating a hotbed of war, the CPSU will from now on intensify the vigilance of the 
Soviet people, reinforce the defensive power of our Homeland so that the Armed Forces of the 
USSR will always be ready to defend effectively the achievements of socialism and to give a 
shattering rebuff to any imperialist aggressor. 

(From the resolution of the XXIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 
the Report to the CC CPSU. Materialy XXIII s'yezda KPSS [Materials of the XXIII Congress 
of the CPSU]. Politizdat, 1966, p. 183). 

65. Party organizations of the Soviet Army are guided in their activities by the Program and 
Rules of the CPSU and operate on the basis of instructions approved by the Central Committee. 

Party organizations of the Soviet Army ensure that Party policy is implemented in the Armed 
Forces, rally the personnel around the Communist Party, educate our fighting men in the spirit 
of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, selfless devotion to the socialist Homeland, and actively 
promote the strengthening of the unity of the Army and the people; they are concerned with 
the reinforcement of military discipline, they mobilize the military peisonne! for the fulfillment 
of combat and political training tasks, the mastery of new weapons and equipment, irreproach- 
able performance of their military duty and fulfillment of command orders and instructions. 

(From the Rules of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Ratified by the XXII Congress, 
partial changes introduced by the XXIII Congress of the CPSU. Materialy XXIII s’yezda KPSS 
[Materials of the XXIIl Congress of the CPSU], pp. 220-221). 

To raise Party-political work in the Armed Forces of the USSR to the level of the requirements 
resulting from the resolutions of the XXIII Party Congress, taking into account the complex 
international situation, radical changes in the organization and weaponry of the forces and the 
nature of modem warfare. To improve political and organizational work among the masses of 
servicemen, concentrating mainly on further increasing the combat readiness of the Armed 
Forces. 

(On measures for improving Party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces. From a 
resoiution of the CC CPSU dated 21 January 1967 . KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh . . ., p. 416). 

The strength of the Soviet Armed Forces is in the leadership of the Communist Party, which 
works out fundamental problems related to the development and equipment of the Armed 
Forces, and fosters in our soldiers boundless devotion to the Homeland and a readiness to fulfill 
their duty of defending the achievements of socialism to the end with dignity and honor. 

(From The Message of Greeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Presidium of 
the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the fighting men 


of the heroic Armed Forces of the Soviet Union on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the 

Soviet Armed Forces. KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh .... p. 454). 

Whst to Read on This Section 

Lenin, V. I. O zashchite sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva [On the Defense of the 
Socialist Homeland]. Voyenizdat, 1968. 

KPSS 0 Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza. Dokumenty 1917-1969. 
[The CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union: Documents of the 
Period 1917-1969]. Voyenizdat, 1969. 

KPSS i stroiteVstvo Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil [The CPSU and the Devel- 
opment of the Soviet Armed Forces], 2nd edition, revised and enlarged. 
Voyenizdat, 1967. 

Partiyno-politicheskaya rabota v Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Silakh [Party- 
Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces], 2nd, revised edition. Voyeniz- 
dat, 1968. 

Petrov, Yu. P. StroiteVstvo politorganov partiynykh i komsomoVskikh or- 
ganizatsiy armii i flota (1918-1968) [The Development of the Political 
Organs of Party and Komsomol Organizations of the Armed Forces 
(1918-1968]. Voyenizdat, 1968. 

Yepishev, A. A. Nekotoryye voprosy partiyno-politicheskoy raboty [Some 
Problems of Party-Political Work]. Voyenizdat, 1970. 


Chapter 3. MARXIST-LENINIST MILITARY THEORY 


The great and glorious path followed by our people after the Great October 
Revolution has demonstrated the force and viability of Marxism-Leninism. 
Marxist-Leninist military theory has also been vindicated by history. Guided 
by the Leninist legacy of military theory and creatively developing it to 
conform to the new conditions, the CPSU has elaborated a well-balanced 
system of socialist military organization with a clearly expressed ideological 
and theoretical basis, which includes a theory of war and the army, military 
science and military doctrine. The validity of this scientific theory has been 
confirmed by the entire evolution of the Soviet State and its Armed Forces, 
and the victorious struggle of the Soviet people against imperialist aggressors. 

TKE THEORY OF WAR AND THE ARMY 

The Marxist-Leninist theory of war and the army is a component part of 
historical materialism. Its subject is the study and interpretation of the 
sociological nature of the origin, development, character and content of wars, 
and the study of war as an historical, social and political phenomenon. This 
theory discloses the natural dependence of wars and armies on political, 
economic and other social conditions, and explains their role in the historical 
process. The Marxist-Leninist theory of war and the army is not limited to 
an explanation of the past: it analyzes the problems of our own times, pro- 
vides a theoretical interpretation of the problem of war and peace, the devel- 
opment and strengthening of the armed forces of the socialist state, and 
attempts to foresee the future. This theory serves as the ideological, theoreti- 
cal and methodological foundation of Soviet military science and doctrine, 
and all our military development. 

The Marxist-Leninist theory of war and the army is our ideological 
weapon for unmasking the reactionary military ideology of imperialism, for 
the struggle against various bourgeois theories which justify wars and distort 
their political and class nature and origin in the interests of the exploiting 
classes. In exposing these pseudo-scientific theories, the Marxist-Leninist 
teaching on war and the army demonstrates convincingly that, despite exter- 
nal differences, they are all similar in one principal respect — in the final 
analysis they serve monopolistic capital and reflect the aggressive aspirations 


39 


of the exploiting classes, who try to justify their expansionist imperialistic 
policy and prove that war is a permanent and unavoidable concomitant 
phenomenon of human society. 

The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the c.rmy provides a truly 
scientific answer on the subject of its analysis, fully revealing its essential 
nature and actual content. It discloses the material and spiritual precondi- 
tions of our military victories, the superiority of socialist military organiza- 
tion over bourgeois military organization. These have their origin in the 
Communist Party’s leadership of all aspects of military development, in 
socialist economy and policy and in Marxist-Leninist ideology. The invinci- 
bility of the socialist state and its army is an objectively natural phenomenon. 
It arises from the superiority of the socialist social system over the bourgeois 
social system. 

The social revolution of the rising class, a consequence of historical neces- 
sity, is inevitably victorious over the armed violence of the reactionary 
classes. Therefore, in the final analysis, victory will always be on the side of 
the working class, since it relies on a higher social and economic organization 
and the most progressive social forces. “Violence can be used without having 
economic roots, but then it is doomed to destruction by history. But violence 
can be used when it is based on the progressive class, on the highest principles 
of socialist structure, order and organization. And then it can suffer a tempo- 
rary reverse, but it is invincible. ’’ ' 

These words of Lenin provide the scientific basis of the inevitability of our 
victory over imperialism, over any aggressor, since socialism ensures the 
highest type of modem military organization, the means of systematic mobili- 
zation and purposeful use of the largest mass of all the resources needed for 
the victorious waging of war, the highest moral and fighting qualities of the 
personnel who serve in the new type of armed forces, indestructible endur- 
ance and fortitude of the ordinary men and women in the rear and at the front 
throughout the entire war. 

The practical application of the theoretical tenets of the Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine of war and the army is an important condition of the solution of all 
the military problems confronting the Party and the State. These arguments 
contain an enormous mobilizing force. Reflecting the ideology and policy of 
the CPSU on military questions, they reveal the decisive role of the popular 
masses in the process of preparing for and waging war, in the achievement 
of military victory; they determine ways of effecting the moral and political 
mobilization of the people for war. The Party introduces ideas for the defense 
of the Fatherland into the minds of the Soviet people, thus ensuring the 
achievement of victory. Their familiarity with Marxist-Leninist teachings on 
military questions is the most important prerequisite for the invincibility of 
socialist military organization. 

On the essence of war. War is inseparably linked with the political system 


Lenin, XXXVIil, 369-370, 


out of which it grows. Politics engenders war. War is politics throughout, its 
continuation and implementation by violent means. It is impossible to un der- 
stand the essence of war without first studying its connections with the 
politics which preceded it and the political relationships which were formed 
long before the war. War does not alter fundamental relationships between 
classes, but continues and frequently accelerates the preceding policy; it does 
not abrogate, but realizes, that policy by means of armed combat. 

Thus, the nature of war is politics continued by violent means. 

The scientific definition of the concept of war, reflecting the attitude of 
progressive social forces towards it, is of profound practical significance in 
the resolution of all questions relating to war and rpilitary science. “Wars,” 
wrote Lenin, “are preeminently variegated, diverse and complex things.” ^ 
This applies, not so much to their nature as to their substance. Every war, 
being a continuation of the politics of classes and states, is essentially a class 
war. At the same time, every military conflict resulting from specific relation- 
ships (between nations, classes, etc.) occurs under different conditions, has 
its individual characteristics, and differs in its specific content from other 
wars. Therefore, the Marxist-Leninist theory of war and the army is not 
limited to an abstract affirmation of the social nature of wars in general, but 
requires that “the political content of each war be determined separately, in 
each individual case.” ’ 

Consequently, politics plays a decisive role in relation to war. In evaluating 
the nature of war, the Marxist-Leninist theory of war and the army explains 
first of all the classic character of a given war, whom it profited, the classes 
that waged it, and the historical, political, social and economic conditions 
which caused it. 

As history teaches, preparation for war is conducted in political, diplomatic, ideological, 
economic, scientific and technical, military and other respects, but certainly with politics playing 
the dtxisive role. At the same time, as we know, the nature and content of politics itself are 
determined in the final analysis by the economic laws of development. Thus, the aggressive 
policy of the imperialist states, directed at the preparation and unleashing of predatory wars of 
conquest, is determined by the basic economic law of modem capitalism, according to which 
the aim of capitalistic production undrr imperialism is the acquisition of maximum profits by 
the monopolists. To achieve this goal the imperialist bourgeoisie steps up the militarization of 
the national economy and tries to unleash wars. It is precisely the aggressive imperialist states 
that have unleashed two world wars. They are now conducting systematic and all-round pre- 
parations for world nuclear war. Imperialism was and still is the only source of military 
danger. This emphasizes with particular force the mfiortance of a correct understanding of 
the essence and nature, not only of wars in general, but particularly wars of the modem age, 
the scientific classification of these and their special features. V. I. Lenin taught that “it 
is impossible to understand a given war without first having acquired an understanding of 
the age.” * 

Types of wars. Marxism-Leninism determines types of wars according to 
their political nature and content. V. I. Lenin observed that “there are just 


' Lenin, XLIX, 369. 
' Unin, XXX. 262. 

* Unin, XLIX, 287. 


41 


and unjust wars, progressive and reactionary wars, wars of progressive and 
backward classes, wars which serve to reinforce class oppression and wars 
which serve to overthrow it.’* ’ 

The determination of the nature of a war is of decisive importance in 
planning the correct line of political conduct oi the working class and all 
workers in each specific war, since the political principle of classifying wars 
most clearly expresses the attitude of the people to a particular war: full 
support for just wars, determined action against urijust wars. 

The classification of wars by types provides a fundamental description of 
their dialectics. V. I. Lenin, recognizing the possibility that one type of war 
could turn into another for example, that a national war could become an 
imperialistic war, or that an imperialistic war might turn into a civil war, 
considered that it was “theoretically erroneous and harmful, from a practical 
point of view, not to distinguish types of wars,” ‘ since this would make it 
difficult to choose the correct attitude of the workers to any given war. This 
is what makes it so important to approach each war as a specific historic 
entity, taking into consideration the circumstances and political content of 
the war. 

Condemning imperialistic wars of conquest, Marxist-Leninists consider 
that wars to defend the achievements of peoples against imperialist aggres- 
sion, wars of national liberation, and wars of the revolutionary classes against 
the attempts of reactionary forces to hold on to, or restore their supremacy 
by the use of arms are justified and, therefore, support them. A workers’ war 
for their own social liberation, for the consolidation and development of 
socialism and communism, is the most just type of war. Thus, the term “just 
wars” is understood to mean, first of all, revolutionary wars and wars 
of liberation, since these are genuinely progressive and promote historical 
development. 

Just wars of our times include: 1) wars in defense of socialist countries 
against imperialist aggressors; 2) proletarian civil wars against the bourgeoi- 
sie; 3) national liberation wars of colonial peoples, dependent and developing 
coufjtries against imperialism; 4) wars of liberation waged by peoples of 
bourgeois countries who have become the victims of imperialist invaders and 
who are fighting for their state sovereignty. 

Unjust wars, reactionary wars of our times, are wars of conquest, which 
reflect and continue the politics of the imperialistic bourgeoisie. The imperial- 
ists are striving by means of armed force to enslave other countries, assert 
neo-colonialism, suppress the national liberation struggle, destroy the 
proletarian revolutionary movement, weaken th'- socialist camp and 
strengthen the capitalist system. The monopolists of the USA want to achieve 
world domination by military means. 

Unjust wars include: 1) counterrevolutionary wars waged by the bourgeoi- 
sie against the proletarian revolutionary movement; 2) aggressive wars of 

’ Lenin, XXXVIII. 337. 

* Lenin, XLIX, 118. 


42 


imperialist states against socialist countries; 3) imperialist wars for the resto- 
ration of the colonial system; 4) imperialist wars of conquest against peaceful 
bourgeois countries; 5) wars between imperialist states aimed at achieving a 
redistribution of spheres of influence and world domination. 

The Great October Socialist Revolution shook the capitalist world to its 
foundations. It marked the beginning of the revolutionary transition from 
capitalism to socialism throughout the world. During the past fifty years the 
world revolutionary movement has grown irresistibly, drawing in all the new 
countries and peoples. Under the conditions obtaining at the present stage 
of the crisis of capitalism, the contradictions which rend the bourgeois world 
are intensifying sharply: antagonism between labor and capital; contradic- 
tions between young national states and old colonial powers; contradictions 
between imperialist countries. The main contradiction is that which has 
developed between the opposing social systems of socialism and imperialism. 

Present-day capitalism is not only an obsolete reactionary system which retard? historical 
progress, but a dangerous aggressive force which threatens world civilization. The struggle of 
the working class and all workers against imperialism is an historical necessity. Only by taking 
this objective law into consideration is it possible to take the correct approach to the interpreta- 
tion of all the types of modem wars instigated by the imperialists. They unleash both world wars 
and local wars aimed at the suppression of liberation movements, the conquest of foreign lands 
and the enslavement of people of other countries. 

Among all the types of wars of our age, wars in defense of the socialist 
Fatherland, of course, occupy a special place. They are not only radically 
opposed to all forms of unjust wars and wars of conquest, but differ essen- 
tially from other just wars in their nature, aims, and historical significance. 
The necessity of defending the achievements of socialism is one of the com- 
mon objective laws of the transition from capitalism to socialism and com- 
munism which apply to all countries undergoing this transition under the 
conditions imposed by the existence of a world system of imperialism. 

Marxism-Leninism considers the problem of defending the socialist Fa- 
therland as a combination of the political, economic, military, moral, scien- 
tific and technical and other factors which determine the defense capacity and 
security of our own state and other socialist countries. 

In the Program of the CPSU and documents of the XXIII Party Congress 
it is emphasized that the successful solution of all questions connected with 
the defense of the socialist Fatherland is now determined by: 

— the firm, consistently peace-loving, high-principled foreign policy of the 
socialist states; 

— the comprehensive strengthening of the new type of armed forces and 
the regular socialist army; 

— the further rapid development of the material, technical and scientific 
bases of the country’s defensive capacity; 

— the strengthening of the union of the working class and the peasantry 
as the social and political basis of the country’s military strength — the consol- 
idation of the Soviet State and the improvement of socialist social relation- 
ships; 


43 


— the education of all workers in a spirit of communist ideology, social- 
ist patriotism, proletarian internationalism, and the friendship of peoples. 

As we have already stated, the principal feature of wars in defense of the 
socialist Fatherland is their absolutely just character. The principal objectives 
of a socialist state in a war imposed upon it by imperialist aggressors are: 

— the defense of socialism and communism, the most just social order in 
history; 

— the defense of the freedom and independence of the socialist nations, 
their territory and culture, and the very existence of the populations of 
socialist states; 

— to assist other socialist states and their allies to repel aggression; 

— to assist the working class and toiling masses of capitalist countries, and 
the peoples of independent countries in their struggle for liberation from 
imperialist oppression and foreign enslavement. 

These noble aims are diametrically opposed to the predatory and aggres- 
sive aims pursued by the imperialists in unjust and counterrevolutionary wars 
against socialist countries. 

During the course of a war in defense of the socialist Fatherland the 
popular masses, through experience, become even more convinced of the 
justness of its aims and tasks, the correctness of the policy of the Communist 
Party, and the scientific accuracy of the Marxist-Leninist theory of war and 
the army. This profound conviction generates a powerful upsurge of patriot- 
ism and mass heroism on the battlefields and in labor for the cause of victory 
over the enemy. The unwavering resolution of the people, Party, w’orking 
class and army of a socialist country to endure all the difficulties and trials 
of modem war, and to maintain close military alliance with fraternal coun- 
tries are guarantees of victory over any aggressor. Evidence of this is provided 
by the experience of the Soviet State’s two patriotic wars, and of the wars of 
liberation fought by other nations. 

The revolutionary and liberating nature of wars in the defense of socialist 
homelands finds expression in the fact that their victorious outcome weakens 
the position of international imperialism, results in the defeat of reactionary 
regimes in the aggressor countries, contributes to the victory of the forces of 
democracy and socialism in these countries, and leads to the separation of 
new countries from the world capitalist system. 

Such are the laws governing armed conflicts between socialist and imperialist states. This, of 
course, does not mean that wars are essential for revolution, but they do weaken the organism 
of the bourgeois system and create conditions which contribute to a still greater intensification 
of its crisis. Finally, in wars in defense of the socialist Fatherland, the national and international 
aims and tasks of the struggle for liberation are identical. By defending the fundamental interests 
of the working class and all working people of a given country, and the national interests of the 
people, a socialist state simultaneously fulfills its mission of liberation and its obligation to the 
working class and all working people of capitalist and colonial countries. 

On the nature of the army. The social nature and purpose of the army 
always reflect the nature of the social order of a given country. Marxism- 
Leninism established the absolute dependence of the character of the army 


44 


on the policy of the state and the degree of the country’s economic and 
cultural development. If a war is the realization of the policies of certain 
classes by armed force, then the army under the control of these classes is 
the principal instrument of force, the chief instrument of war. Consequently, 
a correct understanding of the nature and peculiarities of the evolution of the 
army is one of the main requirements for a deep insight into the laws govern- 
ing the conduct of war and for determining one’s attitude to a given army. 

Unlike the apologists of capitalism, who distort the nature and purpose of 
the army, Marxism-Leninism teaches that the army, as a special organization 
of armed people, created by a particular class or state for the achievement 
of its political and economic aims by force of arms, is, like war, not a 
permanent factor, but a product of antagonistic formations. The armies of 
the imperialist states are created for the defense of the exploiting system and 
the suppression of the workers, for their social and national oppression by 
the ruling classes, for the preparation and prosecution of aggressive wars, and 
the enslavement of peoples of other countries. They are instruments for 
waging wars of conquest. This is convincingly demonstrated by the first and 
second world wars and by the aggressive actions of the imperialists in the 
present age. Bourgeois armies always and in all circumstances bear the stamp 
of the ruling class and protect its interests. The apologists of the bourgeoisie 
will never succeed in proving that the army of a bourgeois state is separate 
from its politics and is indifferent in its attitude to the classes. Life itself shows 
that the bourgeois army is an instrument of the imperialist state and that it 
defends the rotting piles of capitalism. The bourgeois army is “the most 
inveterate instrument for maintaining the old order, the strongest bulwark 
of bourgeois discipline, the maintenance of capitalist domination, and the 
preservation and fostering in the workers of slavish submissiveness and 
subordination towards it.’’ ’ 

The class character of the armies of the capitalist states does not change, even when they are 
engaged in a just war of liberation. For example, the armed forces of the USA and Britain 
objectively fulfilled a mission of liberation during World War II and, therefore, enjoyed the 
support of their people. But, even then, they remained the instrument of the ruling imperialist 
circles in their endeavor to hold on to power in their own countries and accomplish their 
reactionary aims with respect to the Soviet Union and the forces of socialism and democracy 
in other countries. This became especially clear in connection with the opening of a second front 
in Europe and the postwar settlement. Under present-day conditions, the US Army reflects most 
fully the aggressive nature of imperialism. 

In order to persuade the people to go to war the imperialist forces are intensively trained in 
a spirit of anticommunism and impregnated with misanthropic ideas of racism. An inhuman 
attitude towards the peace-loving populace and a desire for personal gain are instilled in service- 
men with particular insistence. The results of such an “upbringing” were clearly manifested in 
the behavior of the American military clique in Vietnam, whose atrocities exceeded even those 
of the Hitlerites. 

Socialist armies are the exact opposite of imperialist armies. The former 
are armies of a new type. They are copies of the socialist system, an embodi- 

’ Lenin, XXXVII, 295. 


45 


ment of its characteristic features and historical advantages over the capitalist 
system. The armies of the socialist and capitalist states are separated by a gulf 
as wide as that which lies between socialism and capitalism. Socialist armies 
are truly peoples’ armies in which are realized the union of the working class 
and the peasants, the moral and political unity of the society, the friendship 
of peoples, their socialist patriotism and internationalism, the common aims 
of the socialist countries in their struggle against imperialist aggression, and 
military cooperation with fraternal armies. 

Whereas the armies of the capitalist states serve as an instrument of 
aggression and attack on other peoples, the armed forces of the USSR and 
other countries of the socialist system threaten no one and exist only for the 
purpose of ensuring the security of their states and the peaceful development 
of socialism and communism. They are the most important factor for the 
preservation of peace in the whole world. 

The Soviet Army, born of the Great October Socialist Revolution, is a 
striking example of the embodiment of these characteristics and features of 
the new type of army. The heroic course of the struggle and victory of the 
Soviet Armed Forces is an historical affirmation of the correctness of the 
Marxist- Leninist tenet that socialism is superior to capitalism and that it 
produces a higher military organization. 

With the birth of the Soviet Armed Forces, there appeared in the world’s 
historical arena a socialist army of unprecedented features and strength. Thus 
began a new phase in military history, a new and higher stage in the evolution 
of military theory and practice. 

V. I. Lenin in a comprehensive and concrete fashion related the Marxist- 
Leninist doctrine of war and the army to military science, and military affairs, 
the practice of armed combat, and the implementation of the military policy 
of the Soviet State. He imbued the tenets of this doctrine in them so compre- 
hensively and deeply that our military policy acquired an unprecedented 
scope. All this provided the Party and the people with a knowledge of the 
principles of organizing and waging war in defense of the socialist Father- 
land, and an understanding of the most important factors of victory in this 
war. 

The historical superiority of the military organization of socialism over 
that of capitalism consists primarily in the fact that the main, leading, con- 
trolling, and organizing force in a socialist army is the Marxist-Leninist 
Party. It ensures the monolithic unity of the army, controls its activities, 
unites the personnel, and mobilizes them for the fulfillment of tasks of 
strengthening the fighting power and combat readiness of the forces. 

The CPSU led and directed the scientific and technical revolution in our 
country, including also the revolution in military affairs. This was of tremen- 
dous importance in ensuring the military superiority of socialism over capi- 
talism within a short historical period, and it also had a decisive influence 
on the creative development of Marxist-Leninist military thought and the 
evolution of military science and doctrine. 

Thus, the doctrine of the army, like the doctrine of war, is a guiding 



46 


principle r action in the successful solution of modern military problems. 
The Marxist-Leninist theory of war and the army, creatively developed by 
our Party, provides a means of reliably forecasting trends in the field of 
military affairs. It scientifically determines the possible nature of wars of the 
present age, indicates the principal weapons and the means of waging such 
wars, the conditions of their course and outcome, i.e., it provides the answer 
to the question, for what sort of war should we be prepared, and what 
resources are needed to destroy an imperialist aggressor? 

The CPSU, as the controlling force of our society, derives the fundamental 
and ideological prerequisites for the elaboration of its policy in the military 
field from the Marxist-Leninist theory of war and the army. On the basis of 
this doctrine it works out a scientific approach to an explanation of the 
political content of a given war and army. Here the Party is guided by the 
Leninist principles of concreteness in determining the objective tasks and 
class goals of the warring sides in an age of crumbling capitalism and transi- 
tion to socialism. Thus is determined the political policy for the conduct of 
the working class in all types of wars and in each of them separately, primar- 
ily in revolutionary wars and wars of liberation of our own times, particularly 
wars in defense of the socialist Fatherland. 

In the just wars in defense of the socialist Fatherland during the period of 
the Civil War and the foreign military intervention, and in the Great Patriotic 
War as well, the great Leninist Party was the inspirer and organizer of our 
victory over the enemy. The Communist Party and the Soviet State achieved 
an outstanding victory because they relied on the knowledge and application 
of the objective laws of the evolution of society and the laws of modem 
warfare revealed by Marxism-Leninism. The Leninist policy of the CPSU 
was, and still is, the vital basis of the activities of our Armed Forces and the 
guarantee of their victory over any aggressor. 

The Soviet people, guided by the fundamental tenets of Marxism-Leninism 
on war and the army, have been victorious in all their wars against imperialist 
forces. This doctrine is the ideological foundation of modem military theory 
and practice. Its theses embody the incomparable experience of the political 
struggle, the military policy, and the richest experience of the armed struggle 
of the Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist Party. Our Party 
devotes considerable attention to the continuing theoretical elaboration of the 
doctrine of war and the army, to further detailed analysis and development 
of Lenin’s heritage of military theory as it applies to the tasks, conditions and 
special features of our times, having regard to the achievements of social, 
scientific and technical progress. 

SOVIET MILITARY SCIENCE 

Soviet military science is a unified system of knowledge about preparation 
for, and waging of, war in the interests of the defense of the Soviet Union 
and other socialist countries against imperialist aggression. Its functions 
include: 


— the discovery and study of objective laws of armed combat; 

— the development of methods and forms of warfare for the achievement 
of victory over the enemy on the basis of a knowledge of the above laws; 

— the elaboration of problems and method i of preparing the country’s 
territory and the Armed Forces for war, and C( mprehensive support for the 
struggle in the economic, political, moral, logistic, scientific and other 
sectors; 

— the elaboration of principles of troop organization, training, and educa- 
tion in accordance with the requirements of modern warfare; 

— the development of a method of military science as a whole, its general 
theory, the theory of military art, the military technical sciences, and its other 
parts and branches. 

Thus, by Soviet military science is meant the aggregate of diverse material 
and psychological phenomena of armed combat being studied and analyzed 
for the purpose of elaborating practical recommendations for the achieve- 
ment of victory in war. Armed combat, the chief ingredient of war, is, 
therefore, the principal research subject of contemporary Soviet military 
science. 

Soviet military science differs fundamentally from bourgeois military sci- 
ence by its class and Party nature, since it was formed by the socialist social 
and state system and serves the workers’ interests. For the first time in 
history, a military science has emerged which teaches how to utilize the 
means of armed combat in the fundamental interests of workers who have 
broken the shackles of the exploiting system. It is this which forms the 
background of the social, economic and political principles of Soviet military 
science, its Party commitment and progressive character. 

The creator of the Soviet State and its Armed Forces, V. I. Lenin, only days 
after the October victory, pointed out that “without science it is impossible 
to form a modem army. ...’’* Calling on all our personnel to utilize all the 
achievements of bourgeois military theory in the study of military science, 
he emphasized at the same time that Marxists must be able to reject its 
reactionary tendencies in interpreting particular factors and events. V. I. 
Lenin provided a thoroughly reasoned substantiation of the most general 
laws of modern armed combat, and thus laid the cornerstones of Soviet 
military science. 

In all its conclusions Soviet military science gives ample consideration to 
those advantages which a progressive socialist social and state system affords 
our Armed Forces. The high moral fiber which is characteristic of the Soviet 
people and the fightihg men of its Armed Forces has a direct influence on 
the development of Soviet military science. “. . . For the first time in the 
history of world conflict,” indicated Lenin, “elements have come into the 
army which are not characterized by bureaucratic knowledge, but which are 
guided by the ideas of fighting for the liberation of the exploited.” ’ Thanks 

• Unin, XL. 183. 

’ Lenin. XXXV. 270. 


48 


to this, Soviet military science is abie to enrich its principles and conclusions 
by new data to a much greater extent than the military science of bourgeois 
states. 

Let us take, for example, the history of the development of Soviet military art, which is the 
most important component of military science. The training by the Communist Party of new 
command cadres of the Soviet Armed Forces from among the people placed its stamp upon all 
spheres of Soviet military art. M. V. Frunze observed that, “the Red commanders introduced 
courage, initiative and resoluteness into the army . . . these characteristics of maneuverability, 
resoluteness, and offensive spirit were associated not only with the objective conditions of 
military operations, which no one denies, but with the fact that there were elements at the head 
of the Red Army imbued with the active ideology of the working class.” 

The command cadres, brought up by the Party on the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, displayed 
a profoundly creative approach to the solution of complex questions related to the organization 
of operations and battles during World War II. During this period Soviet military art discovered 
the most expedient tactical means of breaching the enemy’s deeply echeloned defense. Offensive 
operations involved a variety of powerful deep strikes which, after the enemy’s defense had been 
broken by mobile striking forces, were rapidly developed, leading either to encirclement and 
complete liquidation of large groups of enemy forces, or to their rout and pursuit in depth. 

In the postwar period, the progressive, creative nature of Soviet military 
science was manifested in its solution of the question of missiles as the 
principal means of delivering nuclear payloads to their targets, and develop- 
ment and use of nuclear missiles both on a tactical and a strategic scale. The 
Soviet Union was the first country in the world to produce an intercontinental 
ballistic missile which could reach any region or point on the globe. 

In accordance with the requirements of creative Marxism-Leninism, Soviet 
military science has waged, and still continues to wage, an irreconcilable 
struggle against all and every canon of subjectivism and voluntarism which 
inhibits the progress of military science. It spoke out resolutely against the 
generally-accepted views of bourgeois theoreticians claiming that military art 
was simply a matter of strategy and tactics, and created the theory of opera- 
tional art. 

DogmatiSi-i, which is manifest in a number of works by bourgeois military 
experts assailiug any kind of revision of “traditional” views on the fundamen- 
tal elements of military art, particularly the principals of strategy, is abso- 
lutely foreign to Soviet military science. Unlike the bourgeois interpretation 
of the principles of military art as always being immutable, regardless of the 
concrete historical conditions of the conduct of armed combat, Soviet mili- 
tary science, in conformity with the requirements of the dialectical method, 
considers that the principles of military art change as the objective conditions 
of armed combat change. Moreover, the selfsame principles, which are appar- 
ently formed in a similar manner for different historical conditions, are al- 
ways imbued with a specific content which corresponds to the new situation. 

It would, however, be a serious error to take a negative view of all the theoretical conclusions 
of bourgeois military science. Decaying capitalism still possesses certain resources. Resisting the 
victorious progress of socialism, it spares no resources for the arms race and the development 

"* Frunze, p. 92. 





49 


of military science. Bourgeois military theoreticians carefully analyze the experience of past 
wars, including the combat operations of the Soviet Armed Forces. 

The leading military experts of the western powers try to compensate for the weaknesses of 
their military organizations which stem from the defects of the capitalist system itself, in 
particular an insufficiently high level of moral potential, by stepping up the equipment of their 
armies and navies with modern weaponry and equipment and by thorough military and technical 
training of their forces. Therefore, in not overestimating bourgeois military science, it is, at the 
same time, essential not to underestimate it. The behavior of an army which is not trained to 
use all the types of weapons, all the combat resources and methods which an enemy has or may 
have, is unwise or even criminal, as Lenin pointed out. “The greatest danger in war ... is 
to underestimate the enemy and to reassure ourselves that we are stronger.” " These state- 
ments of Lenin have always been and will continue to be fundamental to Soviet military 
science. 

Historical experience teaches that the most realistic criteria of the effi- 
ciency of military science and the correctness of its conclusions are the 
ultimate results of the war. The victories of the Soviet Anned Forces over 
the enemies of our Motherland in the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War 
are convincing evidence of the advanced nature of Soviet military science. 

Modem Soviet military science includes the following principal parts and 
branches: 

— the general theory (general principles) of military science; 

— the theory of military art; 

— the theory of training and education; 

— the science of military history; 

— military administration;'^ 

— military geography; 

— military technical sciences. 

The general theory of military science. As we know, Marxism-Leninism 
considers science as a complex product of knowledge and, at the same time, 
as a process of knowledge, which is developing on the basis of the social 
practice of people. Science recognizes, firstly, demonstrated facts, knowledge 
of facts and phenomena of reality; secondly, knowledge of internal necessary 
relationships of phenomena and processes formulated as laws, arguments and 
principles; thirdly, various scientific conjectures based on a combination of 
many facts and previously discovered laws, which may be either confirmed 
and proved, or, conversely, refuted by the future development of science. 

In each science there is a general theory, conclusions and instructions 
formed on the basis of known and demonstrated facts and laws, their philo- 
sophical interpretation and ideological theoretical principles, which guide the 
development of a given science. 

These general propositions of Marxism-Leninism, which characterize sci- 
ence in general and its categories, are wholly applicable to Soviet military 
science and form the basis of its methodology. The fundamental importance 
of these propositions for Soviet military science has been confirmed by the 

" Lenin, XLI, 144. 

” More recently, this discipline has been described as the theory of the development and 
organization of the armed forces and their command and control. 


50 


entire course of its formation and development, including also its general 
theory, which analyzes and sets out the principal ideological and theoretical 
elements of military science and interrelates all its divisions, branches and 
aspects. 

The general theory of Soviet military science contains conclusions and 
principles derived from an analysis of known and proven facts, discovered 
laws, their philosophical interpretation and theoretical principles, which 
serve as the basis for the future development of military science in the light 
of the requirements of modem warfare. The purpose of general theory is to 
study contemporary armed combat as a whole, to substantiate scientifically 
the most important, fundamental tenets of military theory in conformity with 
the overall progress in science and technology and of military science, which 
is developing on this basis, and to determine the development tasks and 
tendencies which these present. General theory makes it possible to establish 
and investigate new relationships between all the parts and branches of 
military science which reflect their qualitative changes. 

One of the most characteristic processes of the present-day development of scientific knowledge 
is the rapid growth of the sciences, the widening of their scope, and their incorporation of an 
increasing number of new fields of objective reality. Another quite regular phenomenon is the 
process of differentiation of the sciences, their separation into relatively independent fields of 
individual branches of knowledge, retaining at the same time their connection with that basic 
theory from which they separated and forming with it a single system. Sciences are also 
integrating. Similar processes are observed in literally all fields of knowledge. The natural 
sciences, physics, biology and chemistry, are developing especially rapidly. The social sciences, 
in response to the practical requirements of the reorganization of society, are also being enriched. 
Military science is also undergoing a transformation, a fact which confirms the need for the 
existence of a general theory, which is of gnosiological value, since it determines the possibility 
of the future development of military science and the interpretation of its subject and content 
under new conditions. 

The development and unfolding of new branches of science takes place within the framework 
of the overall system of knowledge on the basis of common leading theories, which determine 
the direction of evolution of a given field of knowledge. It is from this point of view that there 
is a need to reveal the content of the general theory of military science. 

The general theory of Soviet military science, explaining the objective laws 
of armed combat, determines the entire system of military knowledge as a 
single structure of military science in which all its constituent branches and 
disciplines are engaged in the investigation of specific, relatively independent 
military fields (armed combat), retaining at the same time a clearly defined 
interdependence and joint subordination. It is precisely through the totality 
of interrelated and interdependent military disciplines that the general theory 
of military knowledge studies the subject which is common to them all — 
armed combat — as the only regular process. 

The rapid progress in science and technology, the intensive differentiation 
and integration of knowledge associated with it, the appearance of new 
scientific disciplines, the complication of the content of military science as a 
whole, and the enlargement of its scope emphasize the fact that there is an 
acute need to combine the conclusions and principles characteristic of differ- 

51 




ent military disciplines within the framework of a unified general theory of 
armed combat, or, in other words, within the general principles of Soviet 
military science. A general theory evolved in this way provides the basic 
arguments which serve as guides for all the components of military science. 
Forming the general theoretical basis of the entire structure of military 
science, it relates all its parts and branches to a single system. 

Questions related to the study of the objective laws of armed combat 
occupy an important place in the general theory of military science. At the 
same time, the general theory of military science proceeds from the Marxist- 
Leninist argument that there are objective laws of armed combat which do 
not depend upon human consciousness and v/ill, and that the principles of 
military science are simply the theoretical comprehension and expression of 
these objective laws. This theoretical expression of the objective laws of 
armed combat is also provided for in military science, primarily by its general 
theory, whose function it is to reveal and study them. 

In studying the nature and character of armed combat, Soviet military 
science assumes that armed combat as a whole, campaigns, operations, bat- 
tles and engagements are subject to scientific study and generalization and 
that they are not subjects in which blind impulse and chance predominate. 
Historical experience shows that the development of modes and forms of 
armed combat and the processes of waging it do not occur haphazardly, but 
regularly, and that they are subject to a specific order. These laws reflect the 
objective processes which occur in war. They have objective causes which 
arise as a result of the interaction of the various material, moral and political 
conditions and circumstances of which armed combat is composed. 

The laws may be of a general nature and affect all the spheres and fields 
of armed combat. Thus, the laws of historical materialism show that the 
development of military science depends on the social and economic condi- 
tions and the spiritual life of the society. These laws are fundamental to 
military science. At the same time, armed combat is characterized by specific 
laws which arise out of its dependence on the general and material conditions 
and results of the interaction of the various causes and circumstances inher- 
ent in armed combat itself. These laws are very important for military sci- 
ence, since it is through them that the specific features of military phenomena 
are revealed. 

Military science formulates in laws its most important principles and 
generalizations, which are the theoretical expression of the objective laws of 
armed combat. These laws express the inner, analytically established, recur- 
ring, objective, essential connections and relationships of the phenomena and 
processes of armed combat. Let us take, for example, the law which deter- 
mines the influence of politics on armed combat and its methods and forms. 
This clearly reflects these essential connections and relationships which are 
being constantly confirmed by military history. The same can be said about 
such laws as the law determining the influence of the means of armed combat 
on its course and outcome, the law determining the correlation of the forces 
of the warring sides in general, and the law determining the concentration 


52 


of superior forces and resources at the required time in a decisive direction, 
etc. 

The law determining the influence of strategy on operational art and tactics 
presents a particular contrast in its dialectics for modern conditions. For- 
merly this law found expression only in the fact that the endeavors and aims 
of tactics had to be commensurate with the dictates of strategy, which it 
served. The achievement of specific tactical results was important not in 
itself, but only to the extent that they conformed to strategy. At the same 
time, a strategic result was achieved through the accumulation of definite 
tactical and operational results which contributed and conformed to the 
overall strategic plan. A similar regular relationship applies today, but with 
one vital modification engendered by the modern development of weaponry. 
Now strategy can achieve its objectives, not only through a combination of 
tactical and operational results, but directly. 

These and other laws of armed combat, learned during the course of historical experience, 
are evidence of their major role in the formation of specific theses, principles and rules of military 
science, including the theory of military art. New theses and principles are subsequently used 
as a basis for elaborating given methods and forms of armed combat. 

The laws of armed combat are not eternal and immutable; they are transformed during the 
course of historical evolution. Confirmation of this is afforded by the above example of the 
interdependence of strategy, operational art, and tactics Military scie.nce investigates the content 
atid manifestation of given laws in the light of history and demonstrates that, concurrently with 
the more general laws inherent in armed combat, each specific age and war, like a specific 
phenomenon of social life in general, is characterized by its own objective laws. 

Nuclear missile warfare inevitably generates its own laws, substantially different from earlier 
concepts of armed combat, even as recent as those of World War 11. This applies both to the 
general characteristics of armed combat, its scale and the means of conducting warfare, and to 
the special features of conducting operations and fighting battles, attack and defense. The 
conditions and forms of cooperation, control, combat and operational support are undergoing 
qualitative changes. The significance of the time and space factor in all measurements — tactical, 
operational, and strategic — is undergoing drastic changes, a fact which is reflected primarily in 
the methods and forms of armed combat and, thus, finds expression in new objective laws of 
armed combat. 

Thus, the general theory of military science has the task of investigating 
and determining both general and specific laws of armed combat, of establish- 
ing on the basis of knowledge of objective laws the factors which determine 
the achievement of victory. In conformity with this, it selects the principal 
trend in the elaboration of general problems of military science, the nature 
of the investigation of these problems for all its components; it establishes 
their interrelationship and interdependence, and formulates its general 
principles. 

It studies in general terms the means and possibilities of armed combat, 
its conditions and special features; it examines the economic, moral and 
strictly military factors which influence the character, course and outcome 
of an armed struggle, and at the same time determines the general guidelines 
to be followed in the investigation and utilization of economic, moral and 
military potential for the purpose of achieving victory over the enemy. 

Calculation of the economic potential of the warring sides is based on 



53 


specific Marxist-Leninist principles of the determining role in armed combat 
of objective material conditions and the methods of producing material 
wealth, on the indisputable conclusion of Marxism-Leninism that in modern 
warfare, all other conditions of the struggle being equal, the political and 
economic organization of society and the level of their development are of 
decisive importance. 

By the economic potential of the country is understood the total combined 
economic resources of the state. The level of the economic potential of a given 
country always depends on the social and state system, the specific quantita- 
tive and qualitative indices of the achievements of industrial production and 
the national economy as a whole. 

The calculation of the economic potential of the Homeland and that of the 
enemy in the interests of war and the development of military science has 
many aspects. The general theory of military science is concerned primarily 
with questions relating to the dependence of present-day armed combat on 
the economic potential of states. However, unlike strategy, which examines 
specific indices of the economic potential of one’s own country and enemy 
countries as they apply to the conditions and methods of waging war, general 
theory reveals the most general objective laws in this field and formulates the 
most general principles of the utilization of material resources and the influ- 
ence of the economic factor on the course and ontcome of an armed struggle. 
It examines the interrelationship of economic potential with military and 
moral potential, and the general principles of determining the requirements 
of the armed forces for material and technical resources. 

It can be asserted that the increasing importarce of economic problems in 
military science, armed combat, and war on the whole, has created a need 
to develop a special theory of military economics within the framework of 
military science. 

The strategic leadership, relying on the fundamental principles of the 
general theory of military science as they affect these questions, takes specific 
account of the economic potential of the home country and the enemy in the 
planning, preparation and waging of a war and its campaigns. 

The determining role of objective and material conditions in the course and 
outcome of an armed conflict is paralleled by the important role played by 
the conscientiousness, good organization of and attitude towards the war of 
the popular masses, and the morale of the armed forces, i.e., by the total 
combined moral resources, or that which is implicit in the term moral poten- 
tial. Essentially, the study of phenomena in this field consists in revealing the 
objective laws which operate here and which determine the general effect of 
moral values on the fighting qualities of the armed forces, the preparation and 
conduct of military operations and armed combat as a whole, also possible 
ways, methods and forms of reinforcing and raising the morale of one's own 
forces and of undermining the morale of the enemy forces. 

Moral potential in war expresses the ability of a country, its people and 
armed forces to endure and overcome, in terms of their morale, all the 
distress and tension of war until complete victory is achieved. Much depends 


54 


on the level of a country’s moral potential: whether it will win victory in war, 
or whether it will endure defeat. This same level depends primarily on the 
attitude of the broad working masses towards the existing social and state 
system, the politics of the state, the aims of the war, the degree of patriotism 
of the popular masses, their general culture, awareness of social duty, and the 
character of their historically formed traditions. 

Soviet military science, guided by Marxism-Leninism, considers that the 
just, liberating nature of war aims unites the people and the armed forces, 
inspires them to fight heroically, and creates the most favorable conditions 
for the achievement of victory. 

However, even under the most favorable conditions, morale is not created 
by itself. The high moral potential of our country and the high morale of the 
troops who wage war depends upon the continuous systematic organizational 
and political-educational work of the Party, the various mass organizations, 
state bodies, and our military personnel. In the words of V. I. Lenin: “Only 
. . . provided there is superb organization can our moral strength be converted 
into material strength.” 

The importance of the moral and political factor is even greater under the 
conditions of modem warfare. The possible use of new weaponry, the compli- 
cation of methods and forms of combat, and the increased scale of military 
operations demand very high moral qualities, both on the part of the troops 
directly involved in combat operations and on the part of the entire popula- 
tion of the country. 

By correctly evaluating the importance of the moral and political factor 
in war and formulating general principles which express the influence of th ' 
factor on the course of an armed struggle, the general theory of military 
science assists the strategic leadership to practicably utilize the moral poten- 
tial of its country and to get to know the enemy in this connection when 
planning, preparing and waging campaigns and war as a whole. 

The Party-political work is the most important means of developing, 
strengthening and maintaining a high standard of morale, communist aware- 
ness, tenacity and discipline in the forces. It ensures the transformation of 
the moral potential of the armed forces into one of the decisive factors of 
victory. 

In addition to the analysis of problems relating to the role and importance 
of economic and moral factors, general theory is concerned with the detailed 
study of questions of war potential. By war potential is meant the military 
resources of the state, its ability to maintain fully up-to-date armed forces 
equipped with all that is needed for the successful prosecution of any war, 
including a nuclear missile war, and the achievement of victory over a power- 
ful enemy. 

The military potential of a country in this age is determined primarily by 
the firepower of its armed forces, equipped with nuclear missiles, and the 
quality and combat readiness of its armed forces. 

'* Lenin, IX. 246. 


X 

C.v * 


55 


Military potential should also take into account the degree of training and 
preparedness of the reserves and call-up contingents, as well as the availabil- 
ity of war reserves of material resources, and the time it would take to 
mobilize, concentrate and prepare them for war. Other factors taken into 
consideration include the number and quality of command personnel, both 
active service and reserve, the stage of development and general status of 
military science and technology, and several other factors associated with the 
requirements of modern warfare. 

It is of primary importance for the general theory of military science to 
take into account and elaborate all the aspects and elements of war potential 
which are directly related to the state and development of the armed forces, 
future trends in military development based on the achievements of science 
and technology, as well as existing progressive trends, the rapid development 
and assimilation of new equipment by the armed forces, and the elaboration 
of methods and forms of modern armed combat. 

Considering the ratio and interdependence of economic, moral, and mili- 
tary potential, the general theory emphasizes that the technical-economic 
and moral-political resources of a given state are undoubtedly determining 
factors as regards its war resources. These resources can be correctly evalu- 
ated only if the economic and moral potentials of the country, as well as those 
of the armed forces, are envisaged in detail. 

The study of the various factors which influence the course and outcome 
of a war occupies an important place in the general theory of military science. 
Soviet military science, in its detailed study of all the factors in the aggregate, 
examines with special care and attention strictly military factors, such as the 
technical level of all the Services of the Armed Forces and their branches, 
the military and technical background of military personnel, their opera- 
tional and tactical training, the combat training and military proficiency of 
the forces, the ability of military personnel to solve questions relating to the 
organization and conduct of war independently and constructively, knowl- 
edge of the enemy’s resources and combat methods, the ability to display 
intelligent initiative, to act in accordance with the requirements of specific 
circumstances, and to act positively and resolutely. 

In the calculation and elaboration of military factors, the general theory 
of military science proceeds from the characteristic features of present-day 
armed combat. These include the following: 

— the active participation of the entire population in wars; the mobilization 
and utilization of all the economic, moral, political and strictly military 
resources of the country in the interests of achieving victory; 

— maximum intensity of armed combat, which is waged on a high techni- 
cal level (missiles with nuclear payloads, fully motorized and mechanized 
forces, extensive use of radio-electronics and other modem technology); 

— resolutions of the aims, methods and forms of military operations and 
the conduct of war as a whole; 

— measures to combat lack of originality, sketchiness and dogmatism in 
conducting military* op)erations; continuing awareness of the influence of new 


technical means of combat upon the character of operations and warfare; a 
scientific approach to troop control, the selection of methods and forms 
of armed combat, and a rational combination of them, depending on the 
circumstances. 

One of the most important tasks of the general theory of military science 
is to examine the system of disciplines of which military science is made up 
and to determine their interrelationships, interdependence and mutual subor- 
dination. It is general theory that makes it possible to relate all the disciplines 
comprising military science into a single complex and to identify those which 
are key disciplines and which determine, by their content, all the remaining 
ones. Thus, general theory indicates that rrtilitary a ‘t occupies a key position 
in the system of disciplines which comprise military science. It reflects the 
ever-increasing role of the military technical sciences as fundamental to the 
development of the theory of military science in general, and military art in 
particular, it correctly evaluates the importance of the science of military 
history under present conditions. Although still an important factor in the 
development of military thinking and the disclosure of objective laws of the 
most consistent phenomena of armed combat, military history today, to a 
lesser degree than in the past, by virtue of the changed conditions of armed 
combat, can serve as a direct source of the development of contemporary 
military theory. 

To a much greater extent than in all the preceding eras, the level of 
industrial production, the state of, and trends in, scientific and technical 
progress serve as contemporary sources for the development of military 
theory. Historical experience, as well as the experience of contemporary 
military conflicts of a local nature, which occur in the interval between world 
wars, is also important to the extent of its value as a perpetual reference. 

General theory determines the subject of military science and establishes 
the classification of military knowledge of which it is composed. 

The theory of military art, as the most important element of Soviet military 
science, studies and elaborates actual methods and forms of armed combat. 
It represents a complex of direct military disciplines, which, like all the 
remaining branches of military science, is constantly changing and being 
creatively enriched. 

The theory of military art consists of strategy, operational art, and tactics, 
each of which represents a whole field of scientific knowledge. Strategy, 
operational art, and tactics are interrelated, interdependent and supplement 
each other. Among these, strategy plays the predominant role. 

The military art of the Services of the Armed Forces, based on a single 
military strategy, common to all of the armed forces, incorporates the opera- 
tional art and tactics of these Services of the Armed Forces. 

Strategy is a division of military art which investigates the principles of 
preparing for, and waging, war as a whole, and its campaigns. Essentially it 
is a direct instrument of politics. Politics plays a leading and guiding role in 
relation to strategy. 

Strategy is common to and unified for all branches of the country’s Ser- 

57 


vices, since war is waged, not by any one Service or branch of the Armed 
Forces, but by their combined efforts. The coordination of the actions of all 
Services of the Armed Forces in warfare is only possible within the frame- 
work of a unified military strategy. 

Like other branches of military art and military science as a whole, strategy 
has two aspects: general theoretical and applied. The subjects examined in 
the general theoretical aspect, which can be called the general theoretical 
principles of strategy, are: the principles of strategy; the theoretical principles 
of war planning; the Services of the Armed Forces as strategic categories, 
their characteristics and use in armed combat; methods and forms of armed 
combat on a strategic scale; the general principles of logistical support for the 
armed forces; the general principles of troop control on strategic scales; the 
principles of strategic preparation of the country’s territory and combat 
theaters for war. 

Applied strategy is concerned with the elaboration of specific questions 
relating to the immediate preparation for, and carrying out of, a strategic 
attack, strategic defense and other types of military operations on a strategic 
scale, and the associated logistic support, specific questions relating to the 
control of strategic groups of forces, and of the armed forces as a whole. 

Operational art is that part of military art concerned with the fundamen- 
tals of preparing and conducting operations involving operational formations 
of the armed forces on land, at sea and in the air in accordance with overall 
strategic designs and plans. 

The general theoretical side of operational art (the theoretical principles 
of operational art) is concerned with the study of the nature, principles and 
rules of preparing for, and conducting modern operations; the organization, 
qualities and potential of operational formations; methods and forms of using 
operational formations under different conditions and for different purposes; 
methods and forms of preparing and conducting different types of operations; 
the fundamentals of operational support; the fundamentals of troop control 
in operations; and the fundamentals of logistic support of forces engaged in 
operations (theory of operational rear services). 

The applied side of operational art is concerned with specific questions of 
preparing and conducting various operations (front and army operations, and 
also, on their own scale, local operations by all the Services of the Armed 
Forces). Applied operational art also elaborates in concrete form questions 
relating to operational and logistic support, as well as organizational control. 

The operational art of the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Ground Forces, the 
Navy, the Air Force and the National Air Defense Forces is concerned with 
questions of conducting operations in their respective spheres of action. 

Tactics is that part of military art which is directly concerned with the 
fundamentals of preparing for, and conducting, combat operations by subu- 
nits, units, and formations of all the branches and Services of the Armed 
Forces on land, in the air and at sea. 

Tactics is subdivided into general tactics and the tactics of Services of the 
Armed Forces. The branches and Services also have their own tactics. There 


58 


are tactics for the motorized rifle troops, the artillery, the armored troops, 
the engineers, the signal troops, the rear services, etc. 

The general theoretical side of tactics is concerned with: the characteristic 
features of modern combat operations, the principles and rules of preparing 
for and fighting modern combined arms actions, and actions involving 
branches and Services; the organization, qualities, and combat potential of 
tactical formations, units and subunits; the fundamentals of preparing, 
fighting and supporting different kinds of action. 

Applied tactics deals with specific questions of preparing and conducting 
offensive and defensive actions, and other combat actions at a tactical scale 
under various conditions, supporting such actions and controlling the forces 
involved. 

The theory of training and educating the forces (military pedagogy) is a 
component part of military science that is concerned with the development 
of scientific methods and forms of training and educating armed forces 
personnel, methods and forms of training subunits, units, and formations, 
also headquarters staff and senior officers. 

Military pedagogy is of particular importance under present-day condi- 
tions.'^ This is because the methods and forms of combat operations, the 
organization and technical equipment of the forces have become extremely 
complicated. Armed forces can be prepared for the conduct of military action 
in a future war only on a strictly scientific basis, which is the theory and 
education of troops. 

Military pedagogy covers the training and education of personnel actually 
in the forces as well as those in secondary and higher military training 
establishments. In the system of military science it is related most closely to 
military art. 

The science of military history is a component part of Soviet military 
science. Like other branches of So'^iet military science it is based on Marxist- 
Leninist methodology, which affords a genuinely scientific, dialectic-materi- 
alistic interpretation of the objective laws of military history and the develop- 
ment of military science. 

The science of military history, being closely related to general history and 
historiography, examines the history of wars, military science and, in particu- 
lar, military art, the history of armed forces, questions of military historiogra- 
phy, and the scientific description of military source material. 

The history of wars is the factual basis of military history. It is not limited 
to the chronology of military events, but incorporates both a description of 
wars as a whole and their campaigns and operations, and derives from their 
experience the conclusions and generalizations needed for military science. 

The history of military science, including the history of military art, exam- 
ines the objective laws of their development in the general process of military 
history, relying upon the most significant, typical phenomena and events, 
which disclose important aspects of the state of military science and military 
art characteristic of a given age. 

“ For more details about this see the following section. 



59 




The history of armed forces defines the objective laws of their development 
as a whole and of all branches of the forces separately. It incorporates; the 
history of the branches — the infantry, artillery, armored troops, special 
troops, etc.; the history of military units, formations and strategic formations 
— regiments, ships, divisions, corps, fleets, and armies; the history of arms 
and military equipment, military communications, rear services, etc. 

Military historiography, a part of the science of military history, studies the 
development of military historical knowledge by individual periods and 
countries, and also as problems and individual questions of military history. 

The Study of military source material is concerned with the study, classifi- 
cation and description of various historical military documents and evidence, 
materials and archives. These are used to reconstruct the history of wars, 
military science, armed forces, armaments, military equipment and military 
historiography. 

Military administration, a branch of military science, elaborates the gen- 
eral scientific principles of the structure and organization of the armed forces 
as a whole and questions relating to the organization of their component 
parts: The Services of the Armed Forces, branches, and formations, depend- 
ing on the methods and forms of armed combat and, primarily, on the 
requirements of military art. 

The chief problems with which military administration is concerned are: 
the study of questions of armed forces organization and military administra- 
tion, the fundamentals of recruitment and fulfillment of military service by 
all categories of servicemen, legal standards; the organization of the daily life 
of the forces and service routine, mobilization and demobilization of the 
army, unit administration and services, etc. 

Defining the scientific principles of troop control, military administration 
examines the following fundamental questions: forms of control (unity of 
command, collective decision making); methods of control (centralized, de- 
centralized and mixed) and their relationship; forms of subordination (direct, 
immediate and operational). 

Due to the increasing importance of control problems there has developed 
a need to isolate and develop an independent theory of troop control within 
the framework of military science. 

Military geography is the branch of military science concerned with the 
study of the present state of the political, economic, natural, and military 
characteristics of different countries, theaters of war and individual regions 
from the point of view of their influence on preparations for, and conduct of, 
military operations and war as a whole. 

Military geography consists of two principal sections: area studies, and the 
description of theaters of war. The conclusions and generalizations of mili- 
tary geography are used by all the component parts of military science. 

The system of knowledge comprising military science also incorporates a 
large group of military technical sciences, including those connected with the 
design, production and use of nuclear weapons; the military aviation sciences 
concerned with aircraft construction and the exploitation of aviation equip- 


60 


inent; the tank and motor vehicle branches concerned with the production, 
operation, and repair of armored and motor transport equipment; naval 
technical sciences related to naval shipbuilding and navigation, military com- 
munications, especially electrical engineering, radar and other military tech- 
nical sciences based on electronics; military cybernetics, etc. 

Each of these groups of military technical sciences contains a whole series 
of special branches and disciplines. Thus, for example, the artillery sciences, 
in addition to their other disciplines, include the fundamentals of the working 
principles and design of equipment, internal and external ballistics, etc. 

The military sciences also include military topography, which concerns 
itself with the fundamentals of topography and ground features for combat 
operational purposes, various methods of surveying terrain, the preparation 
of maps and plans, and the fundamentals of topographical support for forces 
in action. Military geodetic surveying is developing on an increasingly large 
scale on account of the entry of new means of armed combat into the forces’ 
inventory. 

As a result of the scientific and technical revolution, including the revolu- 
tion in military matters, there has been an upsurge of dynamism in the 
development of military science, not only because it has benefitted from the 
latest technological achievements, but on account of the introduction into the 
military field of mathematical methods of research and calculation, 
the achievements of cybernetics, bionics and other recent developments in 
modern science. 

SOVIET M. TARY DOCTRINE 

The leading role in the creative development of our military thinking, as 
in all military development, is played by the Communist Party. It is also 
clearly manifested in the elaboration and implementation of contemporary 
Soviet military doctrine. This is associated primarily with the scientific deter- 
mination and correct calculation of the characteristic features and singulari- 
ties of the present stage of world development, which have resulted in a 
radical change in the military-political and strategic positions of the USSR. 
Of cardinal importance in this connection are the following vital principles 
and conclusions concerning: the decisive role of the world socialist system in, 
and its influence on, the course of social development in the present historical 
age; imperialism as a source of aggressive wars; the nature and types of wars 
of the present age and the attitude of socialist countries towards them; the 
social-political and class nature of a possible world nuclear missile war, and 
also the factors which determine the course and outcome of a war, and the 
inevitable victory of the socialist coalition in a war against the imperialist 
bloc; the present-day functions of the socialist state and its armed forces on 
national and international scales; revolutionary changes in military matters 
based on rapid social, scientific and technical progress. 

The problem of a military doctrine proper, which would conform to the 
present-day conditions of development of the Soviet State, was resolved on 


61 


the basis of these conclusions under the leadership of the Party. And such 
a doctrine was elaborated. Its importance to our military personnel is truly 
invaluable. Studying Soviet military doctrine and being guided by its princi- 
ples in their practical work, they acquire a unified outlook on all the main 
problems of modern military matters, and are guided by mandatory princi- 
ples and rules which are unified for ever one; they see the long-term pros- 
pects of military affairs and trends in the >_ .velopment of military theory and 
practice in close unity. 

Military doctrine is a state’s system of views and instructions on the 
nature of war under specific historical conditions, the definition of the mili- 
tary tasks of the state and the armed forces and the principles of their 
development, as well as the means and forms of solving all of these tasks, 
including armed combat, which stem from the war aims and the social- 
economic and military-technical resources of the country. 

Military doctrine is elaborated and defined by the state leadership. It 
reflects the social-economic, political and historical pecularities of the state 
and the nature of its internal and external policies. Each state, in creating its 
armed forces, elaborates a definite system of views on military questions, in 
accordance with which the armed forces are developed and improved, and 
the country as a whole is prepared for war. 

The military doctrine of each state is formulated under the direct influence 
of political objectives and views on war, class relationships in the country, 
internal and external policies, and economic and military-technical potential. 
However, in the elaboration of their military doctrines, the bourgeois states 
are incapable of making an objective calculation of the social structure of 
their society and its class composition. They do not have any truly scientific 
principles; their methodology reflects their class nature; it is unsound. 

Military doctrine has two aspects: the political and the technical. The first 
is concerned with the political evaluation of the military tasks of the state. 
The second provides answers to questions arising in connection with already 
formed or conjectured special features of armed combat in modern warfare; 
it determines the military-technical tasks of the armed forces, and the means, 
methods and forms of armed combat. 


I 



Each of the bourgeois states of today has its own military doctrine, despite 
the fact that many of them have common political objectives — forcible sei- 
zure of foreign territory and the enslavement of other peoples. 

Soviet military doctrine determines the means, ways, and methods of 
ensuring the reliable defense of the Soviet Socialist State from imperialist 
aggression. It incorporates a comprehensive evaluation of the nature of future 
warfare, i.e., its social and political nature, probable methods of waging 
armed combat and the appropriate measures which need to be taken to 
prepare the armed forces, the people, and the country as a whole to inflict 
a crushing defeat upon an aggressor. 

Of all the wars which are possible in these times, the most dangerous is 
a world nuclear war, which is what the imperialist aggressors, primarily the 
USA, are preparing against the socialist community, chiefly against the 

62 




Soviet Union, as the most powerful of the socialist states. Thus, arguments 
pertaining to problems of preparing and waging universal nuclear war occupy 
the most important place in Soviet military doctrine. Along with this, the 
possibility of conducting combat operations with units and subunits and 
without nuclear weapons, i.e., by conventional weapons, is also considered. 

The principal determining feature of a nuclear war is its class and political 
content and the political objectives of the combatants. 

From the social and political content of war it follows that in connection 
with the disposition of the forces in the international arena, which is already 
taking shape, a new world war will be characterized on both sides by a clearly 
expressed class and, coupled with that, a coalitional character. In such a war, 
the aggressive imperialist bloc will be opposed by a powerful coalition of 
countries of the socialist community, welded together by their unity of pur- 
pose and community of interests in defending the achievements of socialism. 

Contemporary world war is characterized by its vast spatial scope. Armed 
combat under conditions of nuclear warfare acquires an intercontinental 
character. 

From the cardinal features of a possible world war enumerated above, it 
follows that changes in the character of modem war and the principal means 
of armed combat inevitably entail changes both in the essential nature of 
armed combat itself and in the means of waging it, which, of course, is 
considered by military doctrine in the most immediate way. 

Soviet military doctrine is, therefore, based on a calculation of the political, 
economic, scientific and technical and military factors and military scientific 
data. Its principal theses determine the main trend in military development, 
and establish a common understanding of the nature of a possible war and 
of the tasks involved in defending the state and preparing it to repel imperial- 
ist aggression. 

Soviet military doctrine expresses the views and directives of the Commu- 
nist Party and the Soviet government on all aspects of the vital activity of 
the state in wartime. 

Thus, present-day military doctrine is the political policy of the Party and 
the Soviet government in the military field. This is an expression of state 
military policy, a directive of political strategy — military strategy represent- 
ing a true union of politics and science in the interests of the defense of the 
country and the whole socialist community against imperialist aggression 
Military doctrine is called upon to ensure that all military personnel share 
identical views in the solution of present-day military tasks, making the 
maximum use of the achievements of science and technology for this purpose, 
and that there is full agreement between military theory and practice. It 
expresses the essence of military policy, has an organizing and mobilizing 
effect on the evolution of military theoretical reasoning and the practical side 
of military development. 

Our military doctrine plays an important role in the struggle against the 
reactionary military ideology of imperialism, thereby fulfilling both a na- 
tional and an international role. 


63 


. T 




Soviet military doctrine takes into consideration cooperation between the 
socialist countries in the military field and, at the same time, exerts a definite 
influence on the solution of common military problems. In this connection, 
it is necessary to emphasize that the military doctrines of the socialist states 
are united on the political side by common ideological principles, whereas on 
the technical side there are some differences between them, which reflect the 
different levels of development of the resources of these countries and other 
special features. 

Each socialist country is vitally concerned in the fight to defend the 
achievements of socialism against imperialist aggression and consolidate its 
defensive power, and each contributes its share to the common cause of 
ensuring the security of fraternal countries. 

The most powerful socialist country is the Soviet Union. Our country has 
enormous economic and military strength, it has nuclear weapons, and is a 
mighty shield standing in the way of imperialist aggression. “The revolution- 
ary achievements of our own people and those of other countries would be 
threatened,” said the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, A. 
N. Kosygin, at the XXIII Congress of the CPSU, “if they were not directly 
or indirectly shielded by the enormous military strength of the countries of 
the socialist community, primarily the Soviet Union. And if, from time to 
time, the imperialists are fearful of acting as they would like to, it is only 
because they are well aware of the risks involved.” ” 

Soviet military doctrine interacts with military science. On its military 
technical side it relies on conclusions and recommendations “selected” by 
military science. In turn, doctrine evolved on the basis of military scientific 
data has a tremendous organizing and mobilizing effect on the development 
of the Armed Forces and all military affairs, it contributes to the preparation 
of the state and the Armed Forces to repel a possible attack by an aggressor, 
and to the skillful waging of victorious armed combat. 

Military science reveals the laws inherent in armed combat and in all 
military affairs, and investigates the objective conditions and possibilities of 
waging armed combat. Military science covers a much wider range of mili- 
tary questions than does the doctrine. It examines all possible means, meth- 
ods and forms of conducting armed combat arising out of the objective 
conditions of the evolution of society and the specific historical circum- 
stances. But, of all the different questions studied by military science, the 
political leadership selects only those which contribute most to the political 
aims of war arising out of the political policy being pursued by a given state, 
and which also ensure the most successful solution of that state’s military 
tasks. 

History shows that military doctrine becomes more scientifically sound, 
objective and, therefore, more vital, the greater its reliance on the objective 
evaluations and conclusions of military science. 

” Materialy XXIII s’yezda KPSS [Materials of the XXIII Congress of the CPSU], p. 173. 


% 

JfTU 


64 


There are clear-cut differences between military science and military doctrine. Military sci- 
ence, in its development, relies on the analysis of objective laws, which are independent of human 
will, and on the practice of armed combat. Military science is the theory of military affairs. 
Doctrine, on the other hand, is based on the theoretical data of military science and the political 
principles of the state. Science analyzes and reveais objective laws: doctrine rests on the conclu- 
sions of science and directly determines the practical side of military development. 

The difference between military science and doctrine consists in the fact that doctrine, elabo- 
rated and adopted by the state, is a unified system of views and a guide to action, free of any 
kind of personal, subjective opinions and evaluations. Science, on the other hand, is character- 
ized by controversy. In the system of theories known as military science there may be several 
different points of view, diverse scientific concepts, original hypotheses which are not selected 
as doctrine for practical application and thus do not acquire the character of official state views 
on military questions. 

There is also a difference in the effective period of their principles and conclusions, the extent 
of their connection with the past and their extension into the future. Science makes a profound 
study of the past, extracting from n all that is valuable and useful for the present and the future. 
Doctrine on the other hand, is not concerned with investigating past experience of armed 
combat. Military science does this during, and for, it. Doctrine exists primarily for the present 
and the immediate future. It determines the practical tasks of military development for some 
relatively limited period. But, during the course of the evolution of warfare, new conditions and 
factors of armed combat emerge and acquire full force, as a result of which the old military 
doctrine lags behind practice and it is necessary to replace it with a new one. The duty of science, 
on the other hand, is to pave the way for practice and to foresee the course of events. 

The interrelationship and interdependence of military science and military 
doctrine is also expressed in the extent to which military science correctly 
reflects the evolution of military affairs. If military science reflects objective 
reality in a distorted fashion, employs faulty methodology, or lags behind 
practice, it will inevitably tell on the evolution of military doctrine. 

Military doctrine also interacts with strategy. Strategy as a scientific theory 
elaborates the fundamental methods and forms of armed combat on a strate- 
gic scale and, at the same time, produces ♦he military guiding principles of 
war. The theoretical arguments of strategy influence military doctrine and its 
scientific evolution. At the same time, strategy implements doctrine directly, 
and is its instrument in the elaboration of war plans and the preparation of 
the country for war. In wartime, military doctrine drops into the background 
somewhat, since, in armed combat, we are guided primarily by military- 
political and military-strategic considerations, conclusions and generaliza- 
tions which stem from the conditions of the specific situation. Consequently, 
war, armed combat, is governed by strategy, not doctrine. 

Soviet military doctrine is offensive in character. However, the offensive 
nature of our doctrine has nothing in common with the aggressiveness and 
predatory tendencies of the military doctrine of the USA and its allies, which 
reflect the criminal aims of the ruling classes of these countries. The Soviet 
Union and other countries of the socialist community do not intend to attack 
anyone at all; but, if they are attacked, they will wage the war imposed upon 
them by their enemies in the most offensive fashion in order to bring about 
the rapid defeat of those enemies. 

Soviet military doctrine assigns the decisive role in modern warfare to 
nuclear missiles. At the same time, it assumes that, in addition to nuclear 




65 




missile strikes of a strategic and operational-tactical nature, the armed forces 
will use conventional weapons. Our doctrine is based on the fact that success 
in modern armed combat is achieved not by any particular weapon or fighting 
Service, but by the united efforts of all the Services and branches of the 
Armed Forces with the Strategic Rocket Forces in the leading role. Only as 
a result of carefully organized cooperation, taking into consideration the role, 
place, and importance of each Service and branch of the Armed Forces in 
a specific situation is it possible to achieve strategic objectives in a war, and 
success in battles and operations. 

Taking into account the features of modern large-scale armed forces and 
their enormously increased fire power, Soviet military doctrine considers that 
the organization of the Services and branches of the Armed Forces should 
be fairly flexible, and conform to the most diverse conditions of warfare. 

A new and important phenomenon in modem war is the problem of the front and rear. The 
boundary between the front and the rear is being more and more obliterated and a war can now 
start simultaneously at the front and deep in the rear. Targets deep in the rear will probably 
be subjected to nuclear missile, chemical, and bacteriological attacks by the enemy’s nuclear 
missile and air forces, as well as to conventional air strikes. Airborne landings of enemy forces 
may be made in the rear, when, in some cases, large groups of enemy tank and mechanized forces 
could break through to the rear. Thus, the rear must be prepared to defend prospective targets 
against nuclear missile strikes, to repel attacks by airborne and diversionary detachments, and 
to engage enemy groups which have succeeded in breaking through. 

Civil defense, which plays a very important role in this connection, is organized in plants, 
factories, sovkhozes and kolkhozes in all large cities, towns and villages. Its main tasks are to 
provide for the defense of the population against enemy nuclear missile strikes, to neutralize the 
after-effects of a nuclear attack rapidly and efficiently, and to facilitate the uninterrupted opera- 
tion of the administrative and supply departments of production organizations, as well as to 
assist military units in repelling enemy forces which may have penetrated into the rear. 

Thus, Soviet military doctrine plays an enormous role in further strength- 
ening the defense capacity of our Motherland and that of the entire socialist 
community. Its principles have legal force; they govern all the activities of 
our military cadres. Doctrine, however, does not rule out vital organizational 
creative work. On the contrary, it provides the essential element that gives 
all the work of military cadres its purposeful character, and ensures the unity 
of their views and their endeavors to contribute to the steady increase of the 
fighting power of the Soviet State and the combat readiness of its Armed 
Forces. 

What to Read on This Section 

Marksizm-leninizm o voyne i armii [Marxism-Leninism on War and Army],* 

5th edition. Voyenizdat, 1968. 

Metodologicheskiye problemy voyennoy teorii i praktiki [Methodological 

Problems of Military Theory and Practice]. Voyenizdat, 1969, Ch.XII. 
Voyennaya strategiya [Military Strategy], 3rd edition. Voyenizdat, 1968. 
Istoriya voyennogo iskussiva [A History of Military Art]. Voyenizdat, 1966. 

* Available in English, No. 1, USAF “Soviet Military Thought” Series [U.S. Ed.]. 


r 



66 


Chapter 4. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF MILITARY 
PSYCHOLOGY AND MILITARY PEDAGOGY 




The revolution in military affairs, which has radically changed the charac- 
ter of modem warfare, has led to a requirement for higher moral and fighting 
qualities in members of the Armed Forces, and thereby complicated the task 
of teaching and training them. 

Military training has now become a very complex and dynamic process. 
There is a growing need for greater rapidity and thoroughness in the forma- 
tion of the fighting man’s character and the training of personnel of subunits, 
units, and ships in their combat, moral-political, and psychological attitudes 
toward aggressive action under conditions of modern war. All this can be 
achieved only provided the training and education of military personnel is 
organized on a scientific basis. 

In the system of sciences concerned with ascertaining the objective laws 
of training and educating Soviet servicemen, a key role is played by military 
psychology and pedagogy. 


MILITARY PSYCHOLOGY 


Military psychology is a branch of the science of psychology, which is 
concerned with the investigation of the objective laws which govern the 
formation and manifestation of the fighting man’s personality, as well as the 
psychology of the military collective under service and combat conditions, 
for the purpose of evolving practical recommendations and generalizations 
to assist officers in the training, education, and management of subordinates 
and subunits. It also plays a part in several other sectors of Armed Forces 
development, including the design and improvement of equipment and weap- 
ons in terms of the fighting man’s potential, the establishment of an optimal 
system of personnel selection according to psychological potential for partic- 
ularly complex types of combat activities, etc. 

Unlike bourgeois military psychology, which relies on idealist points of 
view and has a reactionary slant, Soviet military psychology is based on 
scientific Marxist-Leninist methodology, and the sound natural science 
teachings on the physiology of higher nervous activity propounded by the 
great Russian scientist. Academician I. P. Pavlov. In conformity with Marx- 


67 


ist-Leninist philosophy, these view matter as primary, and mind and con- 
sciousness as secondary. 

The nature of the mind as a function of the human brain consists in the 
reflection of one’s environment. Man is oriented in his environment on the 
basis of his knowledge of reality. A mind that functions properly is a 
prerequisite for man’s successful activities, since, as F. Engels said, “Every- 
thing that stimulates man to act must pass through his brain.” 

The human mind is a product of social and historical labor. The develop- 
ment of an individual’s mind also takes place under the influence of specific 
conditions and those activities with which the subject is occupied at different 
stages of his life. Military work has great educational potential. It makes a 
deep impression on the fighting man’s character. 

The world of man’s mental phenomena includes; 

— mental processes, which in turn, are subdivided into cognitive processes 
(sensations, perceptions, attention, mental representation, memory, thought, 
speech, imagination), the senses, and the will; 

— mental states, expressed as being at a normal level, in a general elevation 
or depression of a man’s spiritual powers; 

— mental qualities, including directive tendency, temperament, character, 
and ability; 

— mental formations, which are the knowledge, ability, skills, and habits 
acquired throughout the whole of one’s life. 

In every person, mental processes, qualitiefi, and states (as well as forma- 
tions) are in unison. Thus, any action or deed of a soldier is a manifestation 
of the unity of all his mental processes, qualities, and states. For example, 
during manual tracking of a target, the operator’s sense organs, i.e., his 
sensations and perceptions, his memory, thought, experience, and will, all 
function under tension. Furthermore, in this situation, the specific motives 
by which the soldier is stimulated to action, are expressed. Peculiarities in 
the temperament of servicemen, their mental state at the moment of firing, 
are also reflected in the firing results. 

To study the fighting man means to obtain specific opinions about his 
individual characteristics, mental processes, states and personality as a 
whole, on the basis of specified facts. There are various methods of studying 
the mind. 

Observation and experiment are the principal methods. Observation is the 
systematic, purposeful accumulation of facts about behavior, actions, interre- 
lationships, and statements which, when appropriately analyzed, makes it 
possible to draw conclusions about the mental peculiarities of a subordinate. 
This method includes objective external observation of the actions of an 
individual under various training, service, and combat conditions, and the 
subject’s own account of his thoughts, experiences, etc. 

Observation of behavior, activities, and deeds is the principal method of 
studying a subordinate’s mind and his individual characteristics. Success is 
achieved by him who conducts such observations puiposefully and systemati- 
cally, and who draws the correct conclusions from the accumulated facts. 


The experimental method. The purpose of a psychological experiment is 
to make accessible for external observation those inner mental processes and 
personal qualities that are not directly manifested externally. This is a funda- 
mental method in psychology, although in military science it is more difficult 
to apply to the solution of a number of problems. There are variants of this 
method: first, the laboratory, artificial experiment, for which the experi- 
menter creates the entire setting and conditions in which the subject is to be 
investigated; second, the natural experiment, an intermediate form between 
observation and experiment. 

The laboratory experimenl is conducted either by means of special technical apparatuses, or 
written tests. All the serviceman's mental processes can be determined and evaluated very 
precisely by this method. It permits certain inferences to be drawn about his temperament and 
individual abilities. Laboratory experiments are used extensively in aviation and space psychol- 
ogy in the selection of candidates for flying schools, and in training for space flights. 

In the natural experiment, it is the set of conditions under which the subject performs that 
is influenced by the experimenter, not the subject himself. Let us assume that a commander gives 
two orders, one after the other, to a soldier: to deliver food to the firing range, to deliver mail 
to the KTP.* From the soldier’s response to this situation it is possible to evaluate the peculiari- 
ties of his temperament and character. 

There are other means of investigation, which include the following. The 
study of a soldier’s mentality based on an analysis of the results of his 
activities. For example, it is frequently said of a soldier or sailor, in connec- 
tion with work performed, that he is either disciplined, or shows initiative. 
In another case, the nature of the task being carried out may provide evidence 
of the skill, abilities, and interests of a person, etc. 

Interview. This is organized in accordance v/ith a plan in conformity with 
the research tasks. A soldier’s interests, aptitudes, anxieties, difficulties and 
experiences can be studied, provided the interview is not casual, but purpose- 
ful, conducted on an individual basis in an atmosphere of mutual trust, and 
provided the results of the interview are correlated with other information. 

The questionnaire method. This is the questioning of a group of people by 
means of a prepared questionnaire. If the questionnaires are filled in anony- 
mously, this method does not provide information about the individual: the 
results, processed statistically, express average values. For example, this 
method can be used to investigate the interests of users of libraries in military 
units and aboard ships. 

These methods make it possible for an officer to ascertain the individual 
characteristics of a subordinate and to understand him. They do not require 
special laboratory conditions and they can be employed during the course of 
routine activities. 


* Russian abbreviation for, among other things, ‘tank regiment commander’ and ’technical 
control point’ [U.S. Ed.]. 


69 


THE MENTAL PROCESSES OF A PERSON UNDER MILITARY SERVICE 
CONDITIONS 

The mental processes of a serviceman are his cognitive processes, his senses 
and will. A serviceman studies and assimilates educational material and 
orients himself in a situation on the basis of his cognitive processes. Thus, 
these processes represent one of the psychological prerequisites for successful 
training and service of the personnel. They function according to known 
objective laws. A knowledge of these objective laws helps an officer to recog- 
nize the cognitive potential of his subordinates, and to take them into consid- 
eration in his practical work. 

Sensation is the initial cognitive process. Essentially, it is the reflection of 
individual properties and qualities of objects or phenomena which directly 
influence a person. The process of sensation occurs on the basis of the 
functioning of the sense organs. For example, the eye: this is an organ of 
complex structure, incorporating the lens, retina, optic nerve, and occipital 
lobes of the cortex. By means of the eye we sense color, light, form, and 
movement. Noise and sound are sensed by the ear, the aural nerve and the 
temporal regions of the cortex. The vestibular apparatus, located in the inner 
ear, is the organ by which we sense body balance. Other sense organs are 
found in the muscles, ligaments and tendons; these enable us to sense muscle 
tension and posture. 

The minimum perceptible force of a stimulus characterizes the lower 
threshold of sensation. Maximum stimulation, beyond which there is no 
sensation of any increase in the force of the imulus, is called the upper 
threshold of sensation. The minimum difference which a person can detect 
between two stimuli is called the differentiation threshold, or the difference 
threshold. 

A change of sensitivity as a result of the prolonged influence of a stimulus 
on a sense organ, or as a consequence of its absence, is called adaptation. For 
example, the eye adapts to darkness or strong light when a soldier leaves or 
enters the guardroom at night. Complete dark adaptation of the eye takes 
longer than an hour. During this time the sensitivity of the eye increases up 
to 200,000 times. Partial adaptation to a working level takes 5-7 minutes. 

The phenomenon of contrx. st in the process of sensation consists in the fact 
that weak stimuli increase sensitivity to other simultaneously acting stimuli, 
while strong stimuli diminish this sensitivity. In combat, for instance, small 
arms fire is not very noticeable against the background of an artillery bom- 
bardment. But even a single rifle shot in the forest silence seems deafening 
and makes one jump. 

The continuation of a sensation, when the action of the stimulus has ceased 
is called the after image. It lasts for a fraction of a second. For example, in 
the cinema the screen is in darkness every 3 ^^ of a second, but the viewer 
does not notice this since the after-image of the preceding frame is retained 
in his consciousness. 

Perception, This cognitive process is essentially the reflection of objects 
and phenomena as a whole, and not, simply their individual qualities, as in 


70 


the case of sensation. Perception if. characterized primarily by comprehen- 
sion. This property of perception consists in the fact that man has a tendency 
to catch significance and meaning in all that he reflects. And if it is apparent 
that meaning is not manifested in the reflected object, he will arbitrarily 
introduce meaning into it. Therefore, it sometimes happens that training 
material incorrectly presented by an officer is understood by soldiers and 
sailors in different ways. 

The integrated character of perception is expressed in the fact that the 
images being reflected in a person’s consciousness appear in a combination 
of many qualities and properties. And if a perceived familiar object influences 
a person with only some of its qualities, then, thanks to the integrated nature 
of perception, it is reflected in the consciousness in full. The integrated nature 
of perception makes it possible to recognize objects from the most insignifi- 
cant signs. Thus, an experienced pilot will recognize the specific class of an 
aircraft in flight by the characteristic sound of its engines. 

Perception is an active process. Its object is isolated in it at every instant; 
everything else reflected by the consciousness serves as its background. 

Perception depends largely on a person’s past experience, skills, moods, feelings and not only 
on those of the present moment. It also depends upon what a person expects or wishes to see 
in perceived objects. The dependence of perception on past experience and the total content of 
an individual’s mental life is called apperception. 

Mistakes may be made in the process of perception. An incorrect or distorted perception is 
called an illusion. There are various causes of illusions. These are: preconceived notions; expecta- 
tion; state of mind; lack of contrast or boundary between the perceived objects and the back- 
ground with respect to shape, volume, color, illumination. Illusions also originate in cases where 
the meaning of the perceived object is not understood, or, conversely where meaning is forcefully 
int.'oduced where none exists. 

The phenomenon of illusion is parallelled by another peculiarity of perception — constancy, 
i.e., constancy in perception. The latter is attributable to a person’s knowledge of the physical 
properties of objects, and to the fact that objects are usually perceived in association with, and 
in an environment consisting of, other familiar objects. 

There is also distinguished and so-called intentional perception which 
comes into play depending on tasks; this is associated with volitional efforts. 
A soldier, during lessons, intentionally perceives the material, visual aids or 
demonstration presented by the officer. Observation is the developed form of 
this type of perception. 

Attention is a prerequisite for the productive operation of the serviceman’s 
cognitive processes, both during training and in carrying out his duties. It is 
expressed in the preferential directive tendency of his consciousness towards 
a specific object, as a result of which it is fully reflected. Attention is charac- 
terized by a number of fundamental properties, the degree of development 
of which is proportional to its quality as a whole. 

Concentration of attention; this is the ability to concentrate on what really 
matters. A high degree of concentration depends largely on determined 
effort, interests, understanding the importance of a task, and the ability to 
carry out an assignment. Radar operators, observers, snipers, etc., must be 
capable of highly concentrated attention. 

The scope of a person’s attention is measured by the number of homoge- 


ncous objects perceived simultaneously. For example, in flying an aircraft a 
pilot must retain within his field of attention the air situation, the instrument 
readings, the controls and, at the same time, maintain radio contact with the 
ground, etc. The scope of attention is measured by the number of simultane- 
ously perceived objects per unit of time. 

Distribution of attention. This is the capability of keeping in mind several 
different objects simultaneously, or of carrying out a complex activity consist- 
ing of many simultaneous operations. 

Switching of attention is the intentional transition from one activity to 
another. The property of switching is evaluated by the time of transition from 
object to object, from one type of activity to another. 

Stability of attention is the capacity of continuing to perceive a single 
object. Stability depends on consciousness of responsibility, volitional effort, 
interest in the object, and understanding of its meaning. 

Fluctuation of attention. This is the involuntary switching of attention 
from one object to another. In complex and sophisticated forms of activity 
(for example, the apprehension of the situation on a radar screen) serious 
errors may occur as a result of such fluctuations. 

Distraction of attention is usually the result of insufficient or total lack of 
interest in an object or activity, a negligent attitude towards one’s work, or 
a lack of determined effort. This is a serious obstacle to successful training 
and service. 

Absent-mindedness is considered as the lack of attention or the conse- 
quence of its poor development. 

An idea is the image of an object (or phenomenon), which is not directly 
perceived at a given moment. It can be visual, aural, gustatory, olfactory, 
tactile, thermal, or motor. An idea may also be the result of the simultaneous 
functioning of several sense organs, in which case it is more complete and 
accurate. 

Ideas are the property of an individual. They differ in their nature in 
individual people. 1 his difference may be expressed in terms of vividness and 
rapidity in the reconstruction of ideas, depth and content, or the kind of 
thoughts that predominate in a person’s mind. The system of ideas which 
characterize a fighting m-».i comprises the substance of his spiritual world. 

Certain specific types of concepts may play an important role in the service 
life of soldiers and sailors with various trade qualifications; for example, aural 
concepts for radio operators, visual concepts for radar operators, and so on. 
The more precise and complete a serviceman’s concept of his trade qualifica- 
tions, the more successful he is in carrying out his duties. 

Memory. This cognitive proce,ss plays an exceptionally important role in 
military activities. It is precisely that soldier or sailor who has a well- 
developed memory who will assimilate training material more quickly, fully, 
and precisely, ar d who will use his experience, his learning, and the experi- 
ence of his comrades more fully in combat activity: his memory will suggest 
to him, accurately and opportunely, the necessary decision, possible variants 
of actions in analogous situation, etc. 


72 


Memory consists in memorizing, retaining and subsequently reproducing 
that which a person did, experienced, or perceived. 

Memorizing is the process of impressing on the memory that which we 
perceive, think, experience and do. It can be either intentional or uninten- 
tional. Intentional memorizing can be mechanical and meaningful. In me- 
chanical memorizing, the material is imprinted on the memory by simple 
repetition, without understanding its meaning. This type of mental process 
is employed in cases where the material being memorized has no inner 
meaning, for example, names, numerical values, addresses, etc. If, however, 
we try to assimilate meaningful material by memorizing it mechanically, it 
becomes cramming, which leads to a formal acquisition of knowledge, errors 
in reproducing it, and inability to apply it. 

Memorizing based on an understanding of the meaning of the material 
being memorized is far more productive (22 times more productive than 
mechanical memorizing). 

Retention of the memorized material is accomplished by further compre- 
hension and mastery of the material and by combatting forgetfulness. We 
know that material is not retained in the memory if it is not repeated, and 
as a consequence of excessive fatigue and emotional stress. Thus, in order to 
combat forgetfulness, it is essential to organize systematic repetitions, to 
distribute the training load properly, to alternate work according to complex- 
ity, and to rest normally. 

Reproduction is the activization of the stored material in the consciousness 
for its practical utilization. The passive form of reproduction is called recog- 
nition: an individual recognizes in what he is perceiving at the present mo- 
ment that which he perceived at some time in the past. If reproduction is 
limited to recognition, it indicates that the memorization and retention of the 
material was incomplete and superficial, that the material was poorly as- 
similated, that it was not repeated correctly and not sufficiently applied in 
practice. 

The active form of reproduction is recollection. This entails effort, stress 
and, sometimes, the use of special methods as well. Material is usually 
recollected incompletely, inaccurately and slowly. Therefore, if a serviceman 
reproduces previously studied material in the form of a recollection, it indi- 
cates either that he did not memorize it sufficiently or that he did not revise 
it. 

Finally, reproduction may also occur in the form of a memory, when the 
material is reproduced rapidly, easily, accurately and completely. 

Every person possesses memories of different kinds: motor, verbal-logical, 
emotional, and graphic. However, they are frequently developed in varying 
degrees. 

Motor memory. This is a memory for motion. It comes into play during 
training on combat equipment, driving lessons, etc. This type of memory is 
developed in a person who systematically remembers traffic routes, not by 
local features, but where and how a turn was made, where and how long he 
tsavelled, etc. 


’3 


A verbal-logical memory ensures the assimilation of the material being 
memorized, formulations, and expressions with an inner meaning, strict 
logic. This is the type of memory involved in studying regulations, mastering 
theorems, formulas, etc. 

An emotional memory preserves in our consciousness different emotions 
and the events associated with them. This is a very strong type of memory. 
Anything experienced once is remembered for a long time. 

A graphic memory. This is the kind of memory which makes it possible to 
recall a person’s face, a locality, an object, or an event. A memory of this type 
is valuable because it retains an image in detail. 

In training subordinates, it is necessary to rely on those forms of memory 
which they manifest more strongly. Those forms which are less pronounced 
should be developed. 

Memory is characterized by specific qualities: rapidity of memorizing, 
completeness of retention, duration of retention, accuracy and readiness of 
reproduction. 

Memory is, as it were, the serviceman’s arsenal of personal experience and 
knowledge; and in this sense it is turned towards the past. The creative 
cognitive process directed towards the future is imagination. 

Imagination is the process of creating images of objects which have never 
been directly perceived and which are not being perceived at any given 
moment. It is based on the transformation and combination of ideas existing 
in a person’s mind and is intimately associated with memory and thought. 
A person’s imagination is stimulated by his needs, desires, interests, and his 
attitude towards reality. 

A well-developed imagination is essential to a fighting man. In combat, it 
helps him to understand and foresee changes in the combat situation; his 
training is facilitated if his imagination is developed, since he is able to 
visualize what his commanding officer is talking about and that which it is 
impossible to see directly. 

Imagination is of an involuntary nature when new images are formed in 
the consciousness without any effort. 1 hus, the most unusual visions of rest 
may occur in the imagination of a fatigued person. 

The intentional creation of images based on some kind of instructional 
material; texts, drawings, maps, diagrams, etc., is called reconstructive imagi- 
nation. For example, if a soldier or sailor has this type of imagination, he will 
be able to visualize more clearly an officer’s description of a modem battle. 

The process of creating images, not from a description, but by self-initia- 
tion, is called creative imagination. It frequently produces images of objects 
that do not exist in reality. This is the kind of imagination which is responsi- 
ble for the creation of new machines and works of art and which produces 
original solutions to problems in different fields of activity. A creative imagi- 
nation is an essential condition of success in the Armed Forces. It is a 
guarantee of initiative, and bold and confident action on the battlefield. 

Thought is a higher cognitive process by means of which connections and 
relationships between objects and phenomena in the surrounding world are 


reflected in man’s consciousness. Essentially, thought consists in the analysis 
and synthesis of reality, which take place in a person’s consciousness. The 
instruments of analysis and synthesis are concepts, ideas and their speech 
equivalents, words. 

A serviceman does well in combat and training activities if his mentality 
is well-developed, disciplined, and has the appropriate qualities for correctly 
reflecting the complex relationships of different situations. 

What is the nature of thought? First and foremost, it is the process of 
solving problems. Essentially, thought is the reflection in man’s conscious- 
ness of conditions, i.e., complex connections and relationships between ob- 
jects and phenomena, in which he has to act in order to achieve a certain goal. 
To resolve a problem means to find ways of acting in an existing situation 
which will ensure success. 

The solution of a combat problem includes the process of studying it, i.e., 
gaining a clear idea of the objective which must be achieved as a result of the 
impending battle; an evaluation of the situation, i.e., correlation of the idea 
of the task with the actual conditions in which one has to act; the adoption 
of the solution itself, and its practical realization. 

The success of the solution of a task depends on the correctness of the 
thought processes and the variety of forms and methods of thinking involved 
in arriving at the solution. Different ways of approaching a cognizable object 
are expressed in the thought processes. 

Psychology distinguishes the following thought processes: analysis, synthe- 
sis, comparison, abstraction, generalization, and concretization. 

Analysis consists in breaking down the whole into its constituents. For 
example, a commander, in summing up training results, considers in turn the 
actions of each subunit upon the sounding of an alert, on the march, in the 
concentration area, and in the fluidity of battle. 

Synthesis is the reverse of analysis. This is the process of reintegrating the 
constituents on the basis of revealed essential relationships. 

The process of comparison consists in comparing objects, phenomena and 
their properties, and revealing similarities or differences between them. Thus, 
we can compare the technical specifications of different types of small arms. 

Using the process of abstraction we can isolate any one aspect or property 
of an object, or a phenomenon, and this can be studied or analyzed indepen- 
dently of other properties. In studying the destructive properties of nuclear 
weapons, for example, such factors as flash, shock wave, and penetrating 
radiation are studied in succession. 

The process of generalization is simply the association of many objects or 
phenomena with respect to some sort of common characteristic. For exam- 
ple, a commander generalizes many actions of a subordinate in order to arrive 
at a conclusion about his character. 

Concretization is the reflection of many or all aspects of a particular object 
or phenomenon. The driver-mechanic of a tank, for example, is not only 
conscious of the fuel and electrical fire-extinguishing systems in general, but 
knows the layout of both systems in detail. 


75 


The process of resolving an intellectual problem may be realized in the 
form of a judgment or an inference. 

Judgment is a basic form of thought. It consists in the negation or affirma- 
tion of a fact. Thus, an observer’s report about an object he has noticed is 
a judgment. 

An inference is the formation of a new judgment from one or several 
judgments. A commander explains the task — a judgment; evaluates the situa- 
tion — another judgment; adopts a solution — a new judgment stemming from 
the preceding judgments, i.e., he makes an inference. 

Psychology recognizes the concept of methods of thinking. These methods 
pertain primarily to the process of inference. One of these is induction, which 
takes place when an inference follows from single factors, or premises, to a 
general conclusion. The process of inference using the deductive method 
occurs in the reverse order. 

Depending on the nature of the activity, thought is subdivided into visual- 
active, graphic, and abstract. 

Visual-active thought signifies thought directly involved in activity. For 
example, the actions of a submachine gunner attacking the enemy are insepa- 
rable from his thinking. It prompts him to be consistent in his movements 
and methods of fighting the enemy. 

Graphic thought arises on the basis of ideas previously apprehended by a 
person. Sometimes, this form of thinking provides the most correct solution 
to a problem. Thus, a commander is better prepared for combat if he is able 
to visualize and “run through” forthcoming actions in the light of previous 
experience. 

Abstract thought is based on concepts which are not graphically represent- 
able. 

We shall refer briefly to the characteristics of the process of communica- 
tion between people. Language is the means by which one person makes 
contact with another. The process of communication by means of language 
is accomplished in several ways. 

Oral speech is communication by means of the production of words and 
the perception of these sounds through the sense of hearing. It may take the 
form of a dialogue when there is an exchange of thoughts between two 
speakers, or a monologue. Dialogue speech has great potential as a vehicle 
for the transmission of thoughts: voice intonation and gestures make it possi- 
ble for speakers to impart emotional content to their communication. 

Monologue speech is more difficult than dialogue, primarily because the 
listeners do not react directly, as in the case of dialogue, to the thoughts being 
communicated. The speaker must catch this reaction by indications such as 
expression or lack of attention, the nature of the response, etc. 

Written language is one of the forms of communication, of which dis- 
patches, reports, code and cipher messages, etc., are examples. It is more 
difficult to convey the subject matter in written language, since it is deprived 
of any supplementary means of expression, such as facial expression, gesture, 
and context, etc., used in oral speech. A writer must use words and phrases 


76 


in such a way that they compensate for these deficiencies. It is also important 
to consider who will read the written communication and what his reaction 
to it may be. 

Language in military affairs takes different forms, such as the languages of command, propa- 
ganda, communication, etc. 

The language of command: this is the language of leadership. It has its own characteristics, 
which have their origin in the nature of combat activity: brevity, conciseness, the capacity to 
convey the maximum amount of subject m^.tter in the shortest possible time, clarity and preci- 
sion. The danger inherent in a combat situation requires that such language be energetic and 
buoyant, and that it evoke in the men to whom it is addressed confidence in their powers and 
an urge to act. It should also express the confidence of the commander himself in the correctness 
of his order. It 's delivered in military regulation style, with text-book consistency of 
phraseology. 

Propaganda language is aimed at communicating military and political information to service- 
men and convincing them of the correctness of their knowledge. Therefore, it should be explana- 
tory, convincing, graphic and charged with emotion, logical, and rigidly timed. The inclusion 
of a polemic element makes it more convincing. A commanding tone, falsehood, attempts to 
curry favor, and coarseness are not permissible in propaganda language. 

The language of communication is used in conversations, in individual work with pf-ople, as 
well as during off-duty periods. It has an individual character and permits the use of words of 
a familiar and friendly nature, freer in its choice of intonation, gestures, and facial expressions. 
The proper use of the language of communication enhances the influence of an officer on his 
men, helps him to understand them, and gain their respect for his authority. 



The important role played by the cognitive mental processes in military 
activities makes it essential to pay close attention to them. First of all, it is 
important to be able to evaluate the degree of manifestation of these processes 
in every serviceman. The resulting information provides an expedient basis 
for selecting the training methods, means, and procedures which will ensure 
the fullest assimilation of the training material by each individual. 

A commander is expected to take all the necessary steps to ensure that the 
cognitive processes of servicemen are being constantly improved. This is 
achieved by subjecting them to systematic training and including them in 
practical activities. 

Special attention should be paid to the training of the will. Modern warfare 
is of an unprecedentedly fierce, decisive, fast-moving and fluid nature. The 
enormous force of nuclear strikes, their suddenness — all this will have a great 
effect on servicemen’s minds. Under such conditions only those whose will 
is absolutely inflexible v/ill be able to cope with any task which presents itself. 

What is will? Will is the capacity of a person to control his behavior and 
mobilize his resources to overcome the difficulties standing between him and 
his objective. 

A person’s will is manifested in his acts. Conventionally, a volitional act 
is made up of several stages: understanding the objective, selection of the 
means, and planning the act, taking the decision, carrying it out, and analyz- 
ing the results. 

fo develop the will of subordinates it is necessary to train them to be 
clearly aware of the purpose of impending actions, to plan them, take a 
decision without hesitation, and relentlessly strive to carry it out. 







77 


Volitional acts may be simple or complex, prolonged or of short duration, 
performed on one’s own initiative or in fulfilling a commander’s assignment. 

Volitional acts are usually performed in response to a commander’s orders, 
commands, or instructions. A correct understanding and spontaneous ac- 
ceptance by a soldier or sailor of the task assigned to him helps him to carry 
it out with comparative ease. It is also the commander’s duty to form in his 
subordinates the proper convictions appropriate to his obligations and posi- 
tion of armed defender of the Homeland. 

In the process of forming and tempering the will, the qualities which are 
developed first include fortitude, audacity, bravery and determination. 

Sensations. Man relates to everything he sees, hears, and remembers in a 
specific way. This relationship is expressed in experiences. A person’s experi- 
ence of his relationship with the environment and other people, to himself 
and his actions is called sensation. 

Man’s feelings are an important psychological process. They affect all his 
activities and all the other mental processes. Patriotic feelings, for example, 
impel soldiers and sailors to perform heroic and noble deeds, imbue them 
with aew powers. Fear, on the othtr hand, has a depressing effect and reduces 
the fighting qualities of a soldier or sailor. 

An officer will be able to exercise his leadership of subordinates in service 
and in combat only if he finds a way of influencing their feelings, and to do 
this he must know what they experience, what disturbs them. 

Experienced feelings are divided into simple and complex. 

Simple feelings arise in connection with the satisfaction or non-satisfaction 
of a person’s material needs (e.g., hunger) and also because of the situation 
(a feeling of unrest and fear in a hazardous situation). 

Complex, or higher, feelings occur with the satisfaction or nonsatisfaction 
of a person’s spiritual needs, fulfillment or violation by him or by other people 
of accepted standards and rules. These feelings have their origin in his atti- 
tude to the Homeland, work, his duty, etc. 

Man’s higher feelings are divided into moral and political, intellectual, and 
esthetic. 

The serviceman’s moral and political feelings include: love of his Home- 
land; hatred of the enemy; internationalism; love of work; sense of collectiv- 
ism; honor; merit; and military duty. All are intimately associated with his 
world outlook, moral convictions, and views of personality. 

Intellectual feelings are experienced by a serviceman in connection with his 
training and creative activities, particularly in the solution of new nnei diffi- 
cult problems. Such feelings include: a feeling for the new, intellectual curios- 
ity, astonishment, perplexity, clarity and consistency of thought, doubt. They 
usually stimulate thought, and force the thinker to penetrate more deeply 
into the nature of objects and phenomena. 

Man’s feelings are distinguished according to their strength and duration 
as moods, affects and passions. 

Mood is the term applied to a relatively weak but prolonged emotional 
state, which envelopes a person and colors all his actions and mental pro- 


78 


cesses. The main factors which determine mood are social conditions, peo- 
ple’s lives and relationships, and world outlook. Moods may be determined 
by official events and the current situation; by news of success or failure in 
one’s service career, relationships with colleagues, the conditions of everyday 
life, etc. Moods of confidence, happiness, cheerfulness, etc., contribute to 
progress in the serviceman’s training and work, while apathy, anxiety, sor- 
row, and depression have the reverse effect, make it difficult for him to carry 
out his duties and assimilate training material. 

In his daily contacts with people, an officer should strive by personal 
example and his manner of speaking to put them in a good mood. The 
creation of a good, cheerful atmosphere is facilitated by concern for subordi- 
nates, satisfaction of their needs and requests, and respect for personal dig- 
nity. 

A short-lived and forceful emotional reaction in the form of an outburst 
is called an affect. An affect is caused by a sudden or very strong stimulus. 
It occurs most often in people who, for a long time prior to such an outburst, 
have been in a tense state. Externally, an affect is expressed in wild and 
irrational actions, gestures, exclamations or in delayed movements. After an 
affect, a person experiences depression, he is worn out and usually has a poor 
recollection of what he did and said. If there are people in a subunit prone 
to emotional experiences in the form of affects, they should be re-educated. 

Passion is a very powerful, prolonged, profound and persistent feeling 
possessing great effectiveness. Directed at socially important goals, it acts as 
a stimulus to the achievement of outstanding successes and great feats. Di- 
rected at superficial and especially egoistic goals, it impoverishes a person, 
and urges him on to commit unethical acts. 

Consideration of the Mental States of Servicemen 

By mental state is m^ant that time-limited Junctional state of the human 
mind which predetermines its work capacity, readiness to overcome work 
loads, and its potential for rapid and accurate reaction and maximal degree 
of mobilization at the required moment. A mental state expresses the tempo- 
ral characteristic of a person’s mind and is manifested in an elevation of the 
spirits or depression, a working condition, or sluggishness, etc. 

Mental states may be characterized by the depth or the superficial nature 
of their influence on the working of the mind, by positive or negative action, 
by their duration or brevity, as well as by the degree of awareness. 

The state in which a person happens to be at a given moment influences 
all his mental processes, i.e., attention, memory, reason, and speech. Under 
the influence of states, a person usually experiences certain sensations, and 
he is seen to be in a certain mood. 

Mental states, differing in content, duration, force and quality, arise from 
specific causes. An officer must always keep this fact in mind. Knowing the 
principal causes of mental states, he can control them with confidence and 
influence his subordinates appropriately. 


A person’s mental states depend on anatomical, physiological, and other 
factors. Thus, the mind of a submariner is influenced by his physical condi- 
tion, which in turn depends upon the living conditions on the submarine and 
the peculiarities of the sailors’ motor activities. The creation of optimal 
working conditions, organized rest periods, and sports activities facilitate the 
maintenance of a cheerful atmosphere among personnel. 

The mental state of soldiers and sailors also depends on emotional experi- 
ences associated with the work being carried out, on the impressions gained 
from the anticipated results of this work, etc. 

The intentional influencing of subordinates’ mental states by a commander 
through an appeal, or personal example, is extremely effective. Such external 
aspects as the commander’s voice, intonation, mood, would also, one would 
think, affect his subordinates. 

The principal factors which influence a serviceman’s mental state are a 
healthy working atmosphere, his group, and service comrades. 

The Mental Characteristics of the Serviceman’s Personality 

In the training and education process, an officer purposefully influences his 
subordinates. And since each soldier or sailor is a personality, the ability to 
understand that personality is an important prerequisite for success in educa- 
tional work. 

Man as a personality has a social nature and an essential nature. Social 
attitudes are the important elements; the total personality is revealed in these. 
Therefore, for a detailed and profound study of personality it is essential to 
consider its social nature. 

At the same time, we can speak about the biological aspect of a person, 
which is characterized primarily by the level and state of his physical devel- 
opment. True, this is not the principal element in personality, but it is 
essential to take this into consideration as well. 

Finally, personality is also characterized by the mental peculiarities of the 
individual himself. The mind comprises and determines the individuality of 
the personality. 

The characteristics of a personality depend on the social conditions of a 
person’s life. It is the social environment that influences the mental character- 
istics, and the latter influence man’s behavior, since “everything that actuates 
people must pass ♦hrough their heads. . . ' 

On the psychological side, personality is the aggregate of the mental pro- 
cesses, properties and states of an individual. The principal factors which 
determine the individual character of a person are his mental qualities, which 
include the directive tendency, temperament, character, and faculties of the 
personality. 

The directive tendency of the personality. Man’s life consists of his ac- 

' K. Mar.\ and F. Engels. Izbrannyye proizvedeniya v dvukh tomax [Selected Works in Two 
Volumes], H, 1952, 373. 


80 


tivities and his work. These are characterized by the fact that he consciously 
sets himself some sort of goals and strives for their achievement. These goals 
may be long- and short-term, important and unimportant, of personal and 
social value. The system of goals which a man sets himself and actively 
pursues, i.e., his personal singleness of purpose, expresses his directive 
tendency. 

In order to understand the directive tendency of a subordinate, an officer 
must analyze his singleness of purpose. This is facilitated by the fact that a 
person does not set himself goals haphazardly: their selection and organiza- 
tion follows a regular pattern. The stimulus for this is provided by certain 
internal forces known as motives, which, in turn, originate as a result of an 
individual’s needs and are determined by those conditions under which he 
lives and acts. 

By need is meant a person’s need of something, which, if it is not satisfied, 
causes him harm, both as a member of society and as an organism. There are 
material and spiritual needs. Inadequate or irregular satisfaction of man’s 
need of food, warmth and clothing has an adverse effect on his disposition 
and his working capacity. 

Spiritual needs are a person’s needs for correct orientation in his environ- 
ment, activity, socially significant work, other people, their acknowledgment 
and support. A person’s behavior as a conscious worker and a member of a 
group is related primarily to his spiritual needs. 

Man’s material and spiritual needs form a complex inner unity, in which 
first one, then the other set of needs can play a dominant part, constantly or 
temporarily. In educating servicemen, it is important to try to ensure that 
positive spiritual needs plaj a decisive and predominant role in their make- 
up. 

Everyone has need for something constantly. When a need makes itself felt, 
it grows strong ar impels a person to act. As such it appears in the form 
of a motive. Each motive is an intricate combination of various spiritual and 
material needs in which one or another specific need predominates. 

Motives may appear in different forms. If a person is not aware of his 
needs, he acts in accordance with their stimulating impulses. These we speak 
of as inclinations. Motives in this form appear most frequently in young 
people, who have not yet studied themselves sufficiently. 

When a person is conscious of needs which do not manifest themselves as 
a strong stimulus to action, we speak of his wishes. These are insufficiently 
strong motives. They are frequently directed at goals which a person is not 
strongly convinced he can achieve. 

A form of simple motive, volition, is also recognized. Unlike a wish, a 
volition is an active ‘motive which impels a person to act. 

Inclinations, wishes and volitions are simple motives and are largely as- 
sociated with a person’s material needs. Spiritual needs are associated w^'h 
more complex forms of motives, primarily interests. Essentially, these are 
manifested in a person’s main directive tendency towards particular objec- 
tives of his activities. The fact that a serviceman has interests is a favorable 


condition for the development of his abilities. Interests reflect primarily a 
person’s need of knowledge. 

An inclination is an expressed tendency towards participation in some kind 
of activity. It is a strong stimulus. A person with a marked inclination 
towards a particular field of activity always achieves greater successes than 
other people. 

An ideal expresses the principal direction of a person’s personal endeavors. 
It always conforms to his main personal needs, as well as to the interests of 
the g»'Oup and society. An ideal can be a person, an idea, or a deed. An ideal 
is a very strong incentive to action. Heroic acts are usually performed by 
fighting men who pursue high ideals. 

World outlook is a person’s system of views on his environment. As a rule, 
these views correspond to his personal needs and are associated in a specific 
fashion with the interests of society. If an individual’s views are not in 
harmony with the interests of society, they are unsound and will not be 
serious incentives to action. Conversely, the association of an individual’s 
views with his personal needs and the interests of society transforms these 
views into a true world outlook, the strongest and most consistent motive, 
incentive to action, and deeds. The communist world outlook organically 
combines the interests of society and all of its members. The fighting man 
who possesses a formed communist world outlook is a steady, reliable and 
thoroughly consistent man. His actions do not depend on outside influences, 
and are not subject to blind impulses. 

Such is man’s system of motives. It may vary in each individual service- 
man. The purposefulness of personality is formed according to motives. This 
means that, having ascertained the substance of a serviceman’s motives, it is 
possible to judge his directive tendency. 

The attribute of personality which characterizes each serviceman from the 
point of view of the dynamics of his mental processes is called his tempera- 
ment. Externally temperament is manifested in the strength, speed, rhythm 
and tempo of a person’s movements, in his speech, gait, facial expressions, 
manners, etc. 

The characteristics of the principal types of temperament are as follows: 

Sanguine — changeable, impressionable, reacts rapidly to circumstances, little or no inclina- 
tion towards introspection, given to accentuated facial expressions and gesticulations. A san- 
guine person carries out work assigned to him quickly. Prefers energetic work, is oppressed by 
monotony. Sociable and cheerful. 

Choleric — marked by intensity of thoughts and actions. A choleric person is unbalanced, since 
he is dominated by a state of excitement and sometimes has difficulty in restraining himself. He 
can be abrupt in his actions; is determined, rapidly grasps a situation and resolves the problem. 
He is. not inclined to hesitation; displays initiative and is sociable. 

Phlegmatic — characterized by sluggishness in actions and behavior. Usually well-balanced; 
it is rare that a phlegmatic person is not in this state. Or. being given a task, he thinks it over 
for a long time, but, having made his decision, he carries it out quietly and persistently. He is 
an efficient worker. 

Melancholic — usually engrossed in himself, reserved, unsociable. Very vulnerable, often mis- 
trustful. Sluggish; gestures and movements hesitant. 



82 


In working with people it is inadmissible to adopt preconceived notions 
about their temperaments. A person of any temperament may possess all the 
socially significant qualities of personality. Consideration of temperament is 
important insofar as it permits the correct selection of methods and ways of 
developing these qualities in an individual. 

Experience teaches that a person of choleric temperament must be kept 
under constant supervision. A blunt manner should not be used in dealing 
with him, since this may evoke an undesirable response. In addition to this, 
all instances of irregular conduct on the part of a choleric person should be 
subjected to a critical evaluation and be met with counteraction. In working 
with a sanguine person it is necessary to stimulate in him a sense of responsi- 
bility and to check the quality of his work. A phlegmatic person needs 
leadership and guidance, and he should be required to meet more exacting 
standards. A blunt manner, outbursts of temper, reticence and vagueness are 
wholly inadmissible in dealing with a melancholiac, since his is a particularly 
vulnerable temperament. 

Thus, temperament is an important quality of personality. However, it is 
not a determining quality, but a dynamic prerequisite of a more essential one 
— character. 

Character is the pivotal quality of personality which places its stamp on 
all the actions and deeds of a serviceman and expresses his specific attitude 
to reality, work, other people, and himself. 

To know the character of a subordinate is to know the most important 
thing about him, that which determines all his actions, deeds and behavior: 
the personality’s line of life, as it is called. 

Concerning the attitude of the serviceman to the outside world, we can 
speak of principled and unprincipled characters. A principled character is 
possessed by a person who has stable opinions, a stable world outlook and 
who acts in accordance with them. Conversely, an unprincipled person either 
has no opinions or convictions at all, or acts counter to them, subordinating 
himself to his feelings, outside influence, or circumstances. 

In relation to work we distinguish active and inactive characters. Active 
characters may, in turn, be purposeful or unorganized. The singleness of 
purpose of Soviet man makes his work organized, gives him social signifi- 
cance and moral value. The development of active characters goes hand in 
glove with the formation of a communist world outlook. Unorganized cha- 
racters are associated with a lack of purposefulness or the inability to subordi- 
nate their actions to plans. 

A person’s attitude to |)cople, to the collective, is formed and manifested 
in contacts with people and in joint activities. In relation to the collective, 
we distinguish reserved and sociable characters. A reserved character may 
be the result of a negative attitude or indifference to people. It can also 
originate from a profound inner concentration of personality. 

Each person also relates to himself in a specific fashion. This attitude is 
dictated by the awareness of his position in society, and his obligations to it 


83 


and to other people. Overestimation of oneself, one’s potential and needs is 
peculiar to people with an egoistic character. 

It is also important to estimate character by its strength. The chara.ters 
of people whose acts and behavior always accord with their knowledge and 
convictions are called strong characters. A person with a strong character is 
a reliable person. 

Character is also evaluated m terms of its characterist*. '^s. By traits of 
character we usually understand those stable qualities in a person by which 
his potential acts can be judged. 

We can refer to the following principal groups of character traits. First of 
all there are volitional traits. These include: vigor, independence, self-posses- 
sion, determination, firmness, and stubbornness. The reverse of these traits 
can be used in describing a weak-willed character. 

Emotional traits of character are even temper, impetuosity, passion, and 
impressionability. Their opposites are indicative of an unbalanced character. 

Intellectual traits are profound thought, quick-wittedness, and ingenuity. 

Education in the Armed Forces has the objective of imparting to service- 
men a moral character which is revealed in such character traits as commu- 
nist singleness of purpose, ideological conviction and adherence to principle, 
patriotism and internationalism, hatred for the enemies of the socialist 
Homeland, consciousness of military duty and responsibility to the people, 
collectivism, faithfulness to fighting traditions, discipline, vigilance, modesty, 
honesty, truthfulness, cheerfulness, activeness, good organization, etc. 

Abilities. An ability in psychology is understood as a specific, stable quality 
of the human mind which engenders the possibility of successful activity of 
a specific nature. The essence of this quality is not so much in the current 
level of development of a given mental process, as in the possibility of its rapid 
development. 

There are individual, special and general abilities. By individual abilities 
is meant favorable qualities of individual organs and mental processes of a 
person, irrespective of the kind of activity in question. A highly developed 
sense of sight, touch, hearing — these are individual abilities. 

When, however, we speak of the need for a high degree of development 
of individual organs and mental processes for some specific kind of activity, 
we are referring to special abilities. For example, a sniper must have keen 
eyesight, a motor mechanic needs a fine sense of touch and excellent hearing. 
However, the sniper, the motor mechanic and the explosives expert also rely 
on general abilities, for example, a good memory, attention, alertness, etc. 

The aggregate of general, special, and individual abilities inherent in a 
particular person determines his endowment, his occupational suitability. 

The degree of development of an ability or the degree of endowment may 
vary. A very high degree of endowment, which permits a man to strive for 
outstanding results in some field of activity is called talent. 

Man is born with certain inherent qualities, which are biologically deter- 
mined anatomical and physiological features of the structure of the nervous 
system and organism. These inherent qualities form the basis of abilities; the 


qualities themselves are not synonymous, since different abilities may develop 
from them. Everything depends on the conditions in which a person happens 
to find himself, or the activities in which he is involved. Abilities are, there- 
fore, social in nature, i.e., depend on social conditions. A socialist society 
provides the most favorable conditions for the development of all the best 
abilities in a person on the basis of his inherent qualities. 

It is important for an officer to be able to ascertain and evaluate correctly 
the abilities of his subordinates and to use the resulting information as the 
basis for creating conditions favorable to the comprehensive development of 
these abilities, and the formation of new ones. 

ON THE PSYCHOLOGiCAL TRAiNiNG OF SOVIET SERVICEMEN FOR 
SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS IN MODERN WAR 

In modem warfare it is essential that every serviceman be given a high level 
of moral and political training, that he possesses an excellent knowledge of 
equipment, weapons and combat operational methods, a high degree of 
physical endurance, the ability to find his bearings rapidly, to evaluate a 
situation and make the correct decision. Provided such qualities are suffi- 
ciently developed in a serviceman, a combat situation will evoke in him a 
positive reaction, positive tension and excitation, which will help him to 
summon up his strength and apply it to the fulfillment of his combat task. 

What is the mechanism of the effect on the mind of a dangerous situation, 
a mortal threat? 

The human brain is so constructed that it reacts to every unexpected 
stimulus with excitation. The excitation activates the mind. Attention is 
focused on the stimulus; this is accompanied by an emotional bracing and 
intensification of mental activity. All this is a manifestation of a positive 
working reaction, which creates a state of readiness for action. If a man is 
affected by an unusual stimulus of exceptional force, or he comes under the 
prolonged influence of a stimulus of steady force, the excitation in the cere- 
bral cortex becomes correspondingly more intense. The presence of a seat of 
intense excitation in some region of the brain or other can lead to inhibition 
in the remaining regions. Thus, a state of depression arises: a person experi- 
ences passive feelings (terror, fear), his attention is distracted, his thinking 
is paralyzed, and his actions become uncontrollable. 

The human mind may be subjected to severe tests in modern warfare. A 
nuclear explosion with its flash and noise, feelings of anxiety caused by 
anticipation of a nuclear strike, and other emotional experiences are exhaust- 
ing stimuli. All this may produce a negative effect on a soldier or a sailor and 
evoke in him a passive reaction. The schooling of servicemen’s minds to react 
positively to unexpected stimuli of exceptional force and to function posi- 
tively in a dangerous situation constitutes the muin ingredient of psychologi- 
cal training. 

The psychological training of a soldier or sailor for modem warfare means 


teaching him to act in a dangerous situation without losing his presence of 
mind. The most important way of achieving this is to place him in a danger- 
ous situation for a preparatory period and thus develop psychological stabil- 
ity. During combat training, the principle of teaching the troops that which 

1 is necessary in modem war must be strictly adhered to. Here the objective 

should be not simply to copy the external appearance of a combat situation, 
but to try to reconstruct its psychological model. 

The effectiveness of psychological training is increased when elements of 
danger and risk are introduced during the combat training process. It should 
be remembered that war and combat are permeated by danger and risk. 
Danger is an element of war. In order not to be controlled by this element, 
it is necessary to be able to endure it. The introduction of danger and elements 
of risk into combat training truly develops such an ability. Without this 
personnel would not be able to form a true concept of combat, and they 
acquire skills which can be used only in a simple, uncomplicated situation. 

Naturally, danger and an element of risk must be introduced into the 
training process within reasonable and controllable limits. There is a whole 
system of exercises, lessons, types and forms of combat training which con- 
tain elements of danger. This makes it unnecessary to introduce any special 
methods. Danger and risk are inherent in such types of training as exercises 
that involve driving combat vehicles under water; driving tanks over trenches 
containing personnel; combat firing exercises, particularly those involving 
personnel in trenches that are under fire from infantry support weapons, 
grenade throwing whilst going into the attack, etc. 

r It should always be remembered, however, that psychological prepared- 

ness for action under actual combat conditions is not achieved as a result of 
any one-time exercises: its formation continues throughout the entire service 
period, and the whole training and educational process. 

The main task of moral and psychological training is the formation in our 
fighting men of ideological conviction, unshakable confidence in the strength 
and validity of communist ideals, and education in a spirit of dedication to 
the Motherland, hatred for its enemies, and devotion to military duty. In 
content it must be directed at the instilling of heroism and courage in our 
fighting men, and readiness for self-sacrifice for the sake of the fulfillment of 
their assigned task. 

MILITARY PEDAGOGY 

Soviet military pedagogy is the science of the objective laws of communist 
education and training of fighting men, the training of personnel of subunits, 
units and ships in the skilled conduct of modern combat. It reveals the general 
pedagogical objective laws of combat and political training, forms a basis for 
the principles, methods and organizational forms of the education and train- 
ing of servicemen, develops means of uniting military collectives, their psy- 
chological training, and analyzes the activities of the commander as the 
leader and educator of his subordinates. 

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The military pedagogical sciences are defined in the methods of the various 
training subjects (tactical, firing, drill, and physical training; flight training; 
the training of subunits, units, ships, staffs, etc.). Methodics is the science of 
the objective laws of training and education applicable to a given educational 
discipline. Military pedagogy stands out as the theoretical basis for the meth- 
odics of different educational disciplines. It provides the interconnection of 
methodics and a common approach to the solution by them of pedagogical 
problems. At the same time, methodics, being based on the general argu- 
ments and conclusions of military pedagogy, develops them, thus enriching 
the initial theses of military pedagogical science as a whole. 

The basic concepts (categories) of niilitary pedagogy are training, ideologi- 
cal education and formal education. 

Training is a purposeful process, in the course of which servicemen, under 
the leadership of their commander, acquire the necessary knowledge, skills 
and abilities, and are psychologically prepared for combat. 

Ideological education is the process of the purposeful formation of a per- 
son’s character. Under the conditions obtaining in the Soviet Armed Forces, 
its purpose is the formation of communist mentality and behavior, sound 
moral and fighting qualities in servicemen, and the all-round development of 
the characters of each of them. 

Formal education is the aggregate of systematized knowledge, skills and 
abilities, views and convictions, and also the specific level of development of 
a person’s cognitive powers and practical training, reached as a result of 
teaching and educational work. Depending on the character and the directive 
tendency towards training for a specific form of socially useful activity, a 
distinction is made between general, polytechnical and professional educa- 
tion. Servicemen in military schools and academies receive a military profes- 
sional education (secondary or higher). 

Ideological education and training are inseparably linked and there is 
constant interaction between them. The former imparts ideological direction 
to training and increases its effectiveness. In turn, both formal and ideological 
educational problems are resolved during the course of training. 

Ideological education and training in the Armed Forces interacting in 
close harmony, form the military pedagogical process. This process is also 
studied by military pedagogy. Revealing its objective laws and their manifes- 
tation in the most widely varying conditions, military pedagogy evolves and 
substantiates the principles, methods, and organizational forms of teaching 
and educational work. In so doing, it indicates ways of applying the theoreti- 
cal propositions in practice, provides military cadres with the most effective 
and efficient pedagogical means and methods, and forms in them the ability 
to train and educate subordinates. 

Soviet military pedagogy is a Party science. It is based on genuinely scien- 
tific Marxist-Leninist methodology. It is concerned with the entire process 
of combat and political training of personnel in close relationship with the 
specific conditions of life and activities in the Armed Forces, and the charac- 
teristics of wars in defense of the socialist Fatherland. It analyzes pedagog- 


ical phenomena in the process of their constant change and development. 

An integral part of general pedagogy, military pedagogy is, at the same 
time, included in the system of military sciences. Military theory, in revealing 
the methods, forms, and objective laws of armed combat, the conditions and 
character of combat operations, determines what qualities a Soviet soldier 
must possess, what kind of knowledge, skills, and abilities he needs for the 
achievement of victory in modem combat. In conformity with these require- 
ments, military pedagogy is called upon to work out and substantiate the 
optimum conditions for the organization and the most effective methods of 
teaching and educational work, in both peace and war-time. Military science, 
in turn, also considers the conclusions and resources of military pedagogy. 

Military pedagogy is closely connected and interacts with general and 
military psychology, the physiology of higher nervous activity. Party political 
work, and numerous social sciences; it is also becoming more closely as- 
sociated with mathematics, cybernetics and mathematical logic. 

Research in the field of military pedagogy, which is being conducted in 
accordance with the methodological requirements of dialectical materialism, 
employs many methods. These include; observation, experiment, debate, 
survey by questionnaire, photographing, filming, television, sound recording 
and analysis of various documents. Sociological and mathematical research 
methods as well are being used on an increasing scale. 

The more complex military science becomes, the more varied the teaching 
and educational work of officers, the more imperative the need to study 
military pedagogical theory. In recent times, special attention has been de- 
voted to the development of methods and means of processing materials 
obtained in the process of investigation. 

In conformity with the new Universal Military Service Law, the period of service of privates 
and noncommissioned officers (petty officers) has been reduced; younger and more literate 
replacements are going into the Armed Fon*s. Commanders and political officers are faced with 
many new psychological and pedagogical problems in connection with this. In particular, there 
is a need for more careful selection and distribution of young servicemen by trade qualification, 
having regard to their individual peculiarities, and the need to ensure that they are put into 
service in the shortest possible time; the organization of the teaching and educational process 
must achieve a higher level of efficiency and effectiveness, maximum use being made of every 
minute of teaching time. Military psychology and pedagogy suggest ways of solving these 
problems successfully. 

The Theory of Training Soviet Servicemen 

The nature of the training process. The training of serriccmcn is a specific 
pedagogical process. It is organized and conducted in accordance with the 
policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government on the basis of 
present-day military doctrine, orders of the Minister of Defense, military 
regulations, instructions and prograrni of combat and political training. 

Its main task is to ensure a high state of constant combat readiness of units, 
ships and formations, and their ability to crush any aggressor who dares to 
disrupt the peaceful creative labor of our people. 


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The mastery of his military t’^ade and the improvement of his knowledge, 
skills, and abilities are the official duty of every serviceman and the basis of 
all his activities. The training process extends beyond the training of individ- 
ual servicemen to the coordination and unification of military collectives. 
Combat training takes place primarily in the field, at sea, in the air, at 
launching and firing positions, on airfields and tank ranges. Under simulated 
combat conditions, the personnel of subunits, units and ships acquire profi- 
ciency in the conduct of modern mobile battles and learn how to overcome 
the difficulties of field and combat conditions. 

Essentially, the training of fighting men is a social process governed by the 
Armed Forces’ requirements for well trained defenders of the Motherland, 
capable of effective action in complex modern warfare. This process consists 
of the activities of an instructor (commander, superior), and is known as 
teaching and the activities of those being instructed (subordinates) has been 
given the name of learning. In its dialectical unity teaching and learning are 
directed at the acquisition by the learners of a specific system of knowledge, 
skills and abilities. At the same time, it fosters the development of creative 
thinking, trains the will and character, and forms moral, political and fighting 
qualities, psychological stability and internal readiness for combat. 

In the training process the commander accomplishes the following tasks: 
— organizes and directs the educational work of his subordinates; 

— sets out in a systematic form the content of the training theme and 
demonstrates the most expedient methods of practical work; 

— develops in servicemen an interest in their studies and a desire to learn; 
— assists his students to study intelligently, and develop abilities and the 
capacity to acquire and improve knowledge, skill and abilities independently; 

— supervises his subordinates’ progress in acquiring proficiency in their 
military trade and evaluates their work. 

These interrelated and interdependent tasks are resolved, taking into ac- 
count the content of the training material, the degree of training and develop- 
ment of the trainees, and also the conditions in which they find themselves. 
Here the commander emerges primarily as the organizer of the activities of 
his suborou.ates. 

The acquisition of knowledge is a uniquely organized cognitive activity of 
trainees. Soviet pedagogy reveals its specific nature, resting on the Marxist- 
Leninist theory of knowledge and taking into consideration data on the 
physiology of higher nervous activity and psychology. 

Possessing knowledge, a person engages in positive activities, at the basis 
of which lies his experience, and his previous training. These activities consist 
of the apprehension of educational material, its comprehension, recollection, 
and practical application. 

The necessary skills and abilities are developed on the basis of knowledge 
in the process of purposeful exercises and practical work. The depth and 
soundness of the knowledge forming the basis of the skills and abilities also 
determine the quality of the latter. The more well-founded the knowledge. 


the more profound and reliable, then the more successfully skills and abilities 
are formed. 

Knowledge and essential skills and abilities are acquired successfully only 
when trainees have sound study motives, a positive attitude to their studies, 
self-control, and the ability to maintain constant attention. 

The objective laws and principles of training Soviet servicemen. The train- 
ing of servicemen is a regular, dialectically developing process. As in any 
social phenomenon, it reflects the basic laws of social development, uniquely 
manifests the objective laws of the perceptional activities of people, personal- 
ity formation, social psychology, physiology, cybernetics, and modelling. The 
training of servicemen has its law-governed relations v;ith various 
phenomena of public life, military affairs, and with other pedagogical pro- 
cesses (ideological education, self-education, psychological training). Finally, 
the training of servicemen has its specific pedagogical and objective laws. 
They are all dialectically interrelated and supplement, amplify, or weaken 
each other. This complicates training work, makes it varied and controver- 
sial. 

The following principles of training are derived from the objective laws 
inherent in the process of training servicemen: 

— Communist Party commitment and scientific character; 

— teaching the troops what is necessary in war; 

—consciousness and activity; 

— use of visual methods in training; 

— system and sequence in training; 

— accessibility of training; 

— sound mastery of knowledge, skills and abilities; 

— collectivism and individual approach in training. 

Soviet military pedagogy does not reduce its principles to the sum of the 
rules and methods of training. It sees in them primarily the methodological 
content which determines the general attitude and views of the trainee. In 
conjunction with this, these principles emerge as a system of basic pedagogi- 
cal requirements for the all-round training of personnel. 

What is the nature of these principles? 

Communist Party commitment and scientific character. This principle 
requires all commanders to conduct training so that their subordinates have 
a clear idea of their sacred duties as defenders of the Motherland, and 
understand the lofty meaning of military service. For this it is essential that 
knowledge and skills be formed on the basis of a profound conviction in the 
rightness of our cause, blended with personal responsibility for the defense 
of the Motherland. 

V. I. Lenin emphasized that the important thing in training is the ideologi- 
cal and political direction of teaching and consistent Party commitment in 
educational work. This presupposes that the policy of the Communist Party 
and its requirements of Armed Forces personnel will be presented in a 
striking and detailed fashion during lessons. 

Communist ideology is founded on a sound scientific basis. Hence, the 

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requirement: all knowledge which a commander imparts to his subordinates 
must be authentic, methodologically sound, and based on an evaluation of 
the objective laws of the development of military science. 

To conduct training in accordance with the principle of Communist Party 
commitment and scientific character means to be concerned about elevating 
the ideological aspect of training, to be exacting in requirements of subordi- 
nates, and to tolerate absolutely no shortcomings in combat and military 
training. 

The principle of teaching troops what is necessary in war determines the 
content of combat training and the conditions under which it is conducted. 
It imparts practical direction to the training of servicemen, ensures that 
training is related to the experience of past wars and the present-day level 
of development of military science. The significance of the requirements of 
this principle consists in our servicemen being trained in every respect for 
successful operations in modern combat. 

Soviet military doctrine and military science reveal the features and char- 
acteristic patterns of modem war. The specific actions of servicemen in 
combat are determined by military regulations and instructions. Therefore, 
one of the main requirements of this principle is: the commander must teach 
his subordinates in strict conformity with the regulations, instructions and 
orders of the Minister of Defense. 

A further requirement stemming from the principle of teaching troops 
what is necessary in war is: to pay the greatest attention to the field training 
of ground forces, the sea and air training of Navy and Air Force personnel; 
to conduct lessons directly on the equipment, in the field, at launching areas; 
to make the training conditions as close as possible to those encountered in 
actual combat; and not to tolerate oversimplification and leniency. 

Consciousness and activity. Even in the initial period of the Soviet era, V. 
I. Lenin demanded that cramming and drill be eliminated from training and 
that people be taught on the basis of their consciousness and activity. In a 
speech delivered at the III Komsomol Congress, Vladimir Il’ich said that in 
the process of training each person must engage in the most serious and 
difficult work, analyze facts and consider them critically. A person should not 
sin:ply rementber any given conclusions, but fully comprehend them. 

The principle of consciousness and activity assumes: the serviceman’s 
awareness of the tasks of the educational work; an understanding and de- 
tailed consideration of the training material; positive and resourceful actions 
of trainees during the course of lessons; correct application of acquired 
knowledge, skills and abilities in training work; self-testing and critical evalu- 
ation of the results of one’s own work. 

Consciousness and activity are developed primarily by means of a clear 
presentation of the aims of a lesson, skillful explanation of why it is necessary 
to act in a certain way and not otherwise, demanding independent solutions 
of problems, and by encouraging initiative. In many types of lessons it is 
expedient to stimulate the activities of subordinates by introducing a compet- 
itive element. 


91 



The use of visual methods in training. Many training problems are resolved 
more successfully by the use of visual methods. However, the main purpose 
of visual aids is to form in servicemen concrete and correct ideas about the 
nature of modern combat, to reveal the role of combat skill, to help them to 
understand the lay-out and operational principles of fighting equipment and 
learn how to make efficient use of weapons in combat. 

Of the different types of visual aids used in subunits, units and ships, the principal ones are: 
true or natural (combat and training weapons, combat equipment, outfits, specially equipped 
training fields, firing ranges, tank training areas, etc.); graphic aids (simulation, mock-ups, 
models, stands, miniature firing ranges, films, epidiascopes, transparency projectors, posters, 
drawings, photographs, diagrams, tables, etc.); verbal-graphic aids (striking comp-arisons, exam- 
ples, descriptions); practical demonstrations of how to carry out given operations. 

In recent years such graphic aids as films, diapositive films, color transparencies and television 
have taken the lead in this field. These have considerable advantages over other means, make 
it possible to demonstrate objects, phenomena and processes in motion, during development (for 
example, combat operations), or which cannot be observed directly (the flight of a projectile, 
metal corrosion), to show processes and phenomena in rapid or slow motion, etc. 

The use of new visual aids does not mean that we should adopt a negative attitude to those 
which have served for many years in the training process (diagrams, tables, graphs, etc.). 

System and order in training. This principle requires that the training 
material be presented in a strictly logical fashion, and that subordinates strive 
to assimilate the systems of knowledge, skills and abilities accordingly. 

K. D. Ushinskiy, the celebrated Russian pedagogue, laid down the basis 
of this principle. He wrote that only a system, a rational one, of course, which 
is derived from the very essence of objects, gives us complete power over our 
knowledge. A head filled with fragmentary, disconnected knowledge is like 
a storeroom in which everything is in disorder and in which the storekeeper 
cannot find anything; a head in which there is a system and no knowledge 
is like a store in which there are inscriptions on all the boxes, and the boxes 
are all empty. 

New material which the commander presents at a lesson must rest on, 
follow from and at the same time deepen, previously assimilated knowledge. 

To present training material systematically means to impart it in logically 
completed parts, to isolate and emphasize the principal idea around which 
different facts, examples, and illustrations are grouped, at the same time being 
concerned that all the training material is apprehended as an integrated 
whole. 

Accessibility of training. No one can consciously assimilate material on 
the strength of his previous experience and training under given concrete 
conditions without a certain degree of difficulty and then, only in a certain 
volume. Therefore, it is essential to organize the training of subordinates so 
that, by appropriately extending their mental and physical powers, they car. 
assimilate fresh knowledge more thoroughly, and acquire the necessary skills 
and abilities. 

The accessibility of training principle must not be interpreted as a require- 
ment for "easy” training. Studying without adequate stretching of the intel- 
lectual and physical powers is not only useless, but harmful, and results in 

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the servicemen’s adoption of a casual attitude towards their studies, self- 
satisfaction, and conceit. 

An officer must be fully aware of his subordinates’ level of training, their 
physical development, he must not overload their lessons with unnecessary 
details, and he must be able to talk about complex matters in clear and simple 
language and demonstrate a given action graphically. A basic rule of accessi- 
bility is to switch during training from the known to the unknown, from the 
less complex to the more complex, and from the less difficult to the more 
difficult. 

Sound mastery of knowledge, skills and abilities. Modern warfare makes 
enormous and protracted demands on servicemen’s morale and physical 
powers, and requires them to endure unprecedented difficulties and depriva- 
tions. For our fighting men to acquit themselves honorably in any ordeal, 
their knowledge, skills, and abilities must be well-founded. 

Sound mastery of knowledge is achieved by the entire training process. In 
this, an important role is played by clear and convincing narration, detailed 
explanation, demonstration of examples, and the commander’s ability to 
interest trainees and organize their practical work correctly. 

The consolidation of knowledge and the improvement of skills are out of 
the question without the active participation of the trainees themselves. It is 
essential that every soldier and sailor thoroughly understands ‘he need for 
well-founded knowledge and the reason why he should perform different 
procedures automatically. 

Systematic revision and the taking of study and lecture notes are of great 
assistance in firmly establishing knowledge and skills. 

Collectivism and the individual approach in training. Soviet soldiers and 
sailors are trained in a collective — as members of a section, detachment, 
crew, action station, etc. The solidarity and harmonious functioning of a 
collective impart a truly creative character vo training. A situation involving 
complex psychological interaction, characteristic of a real collective, arouses 
general interest and creates an atmosphere cf collective endeavor aimed at 
finding ways of fulfilling a task as efficiently as possible. 

The supervision of such a process requires an officer to have the ability to 
understand group psychology, to consider general and individual opinions 
and the moods and demands of trainees. One of the most important means 
employed for these purposes is the setting of group study problems, and the 
discussion and selection of the best solutions. 

The creation of favorable conditions for group study work depends largely 
on the officer’s ability to approach each of his subordinates individually. An 
individual approach indicates the commander’s concern that each man works 
to the full extent of his powers and potential, that he successfully assimilates 
the con;bat and political training program, and develops his abilities. 

Training is a single complete process, all aspects and elements of which are 
closely interrelated. Therefore, even the requirements of the principles of 
training need to be examined in close relationship and interdependence. 

The commander accomplishes the training of subordinates by different 


methods, chiefly oral exposition and discussion of the training material, 
demonstration, exercises, trainees’ practical activities, and independent 
work. 

Oral exposition takes the form of description, explanation and lecturing. 
Description, i.e., a brief narrative exposition of the material, is employed to 
familiarize subordinates with weapon design specifications, new facts, events, 
etc. In order to reveal the meaning of regulations, the natuie of a given 
phenomenon, process or action, the commander resorts to explanation, in the 
course of which argument plays an important part. Basic theoretical ques- 
tions are presented in the form of lectures. 

Any oral exposition made by a commander to his subordinates must 
always be convincing, well reasoned, and intimately related to the practical 
tasks of his subordinates. Success in this depends largely on his ability to 
select and use precise, authentic, and most typical facts, which help to reveal 
the essential nature of the question being studied. 

In preparing his lectures, he should carefully think out his plan, the main 
points of the subject, and their interrelationship. During presentation of the 
material, it is essential to adhere to the outlined plan, not to jump from one 
thought to another, and to complete the analysis of factual material with 
generalizations and conclusions. Brevity and clarity of exposition plus p.^eci- 
sion of expression should be aimed at in all cases. 

Discussion of the problems under study deepens, consolidates, systema- 
tizes and verifies acquired knowledge. This is conducted in the form of a 
discussion, a class-group lesson, or seminar. In preparing for a discussion, the 
commander determines and clearly formulates the training objective, and 
thinks over the subject matter, plan and questions. In order to ensure the 
success of the discussion he also prepares the subordinates for it: recommends 
literature and textbooks for study, helps them to select and analyze vital facts, 
and allocates time for independent work, etc. 

At the beginning of the discussion it is essential to reveal the significance 
of the theme, the sequence of the impending lesson, then present a question 
to the entire group and, after a slight pause (15-20 seconds), suggest that one 
of the class express his opinion. The subordinate’s reply should always be 
listened to attentively, and he should not be interrupted, even if he makes a 
mistake. 

By putting new questions to the group during the discussion, the comman- 
der directs their attention to the discovery of important aspects of the theme, 
and to relating the subject under discussion to specific problems. He tries to 
establish contact with the class and to create a cordial atmosphere during the 
lessons. After the discussion of each question, the officer briefly draws a 
general conclusion from the stated opinions. Finally, the main conclusions 
are formulated, questions are answered, and the jjerformance of the partici- 
pants evaluated. 

Demonstration. As a rule, during the course of descriptions, explanations, 
iectures, and discussions, the commander demonstrates specimens of weap- 
ons, fighting equipment and gear, demonstrates various effects and processes, 
either actually or in representation (charts, pictures, graphs, etc.). 


Embarking upon a demonstration, an officer puts concrete problems to the trainees. For 
example: “Now I shall demonstrate the specific features of this engine. Special attention should 
be paid to the function of this or that component.” Then he proceeds with the demonstration 
in slow time, interjecting brief explanations as he goes. Having satisfied himself that he has been 
understood, he continues his description or starts to demonstrate another object. 

Training in carrying out formal drill maneuvers, and handling weapons and fighting equip- 
ment is given in the form of practical demonstrations with brief explanations. Tlie essence of 
this method may be summed up in the words: “Do as I do.” Before the beginning of a 
demonstration, the officer explains the purpose of the actions in question and their practical 
significance; then he carries them out in the time laid down in the directions or instructions. The 
first demonstration is followed by a stage by stage repetition, given in slow time and accompanied 
by a brief, clear and precise explanation. 

Exercises are conscious multiple repetitions of specific actions and proce- 
dures. They are organized for the purpose of developing practical skills and 
abilities. An officer’s primary concern is to ensure that trainees learn and 
execute particular operations correctly and then, and only then, does he 
gradually increase the tempo of their work and eventually bring it up to the 
required standard. Training, which is one of the forms of exercise, is utilized 
to maintain and develop acquired skills and abilities. Training is character- 
ized by the gradual complication of operating conditions accompanied by an 
increase in the physical and moral load. 

Practical work. Military and military-technical knowledge, skills, and 
abilities are perfected and consolidated in the course of practical work — in 
tactical exercises, sea patrols, firing practices, flying, periodic servicing, in the 
repairing of equipment, etc. As a rule these are all carried out by members 
of sections, teams, crews and subunits and, therefore, play a decisive role in 
welding these groups together. 

In order that servicemen participate actively in practical work it is essentia! 
to prepare them in the appropriate way: recommend that they read rules, 
regulations, instructions and manuals, caiTy out training work, explain the 
nature of the forthcoming work, and familiarize them with safety measures. 

When the work is actually under way, the commander assigns each man 
a specific task, organizes a competition, supervises the progress of the work, 
lends assistance where necessary, summarizes the results and evaluates the 
quality of the work performed, takes timely note of independent resourceful 
actions and cites them as worthy examples. 

Independent work. Its principal forms are: work on literary sources, inde- 
pendent study of equipment, independent training, independent viewing 
and/or auditing of television and radio broadcasts. 

The most difficult type of independent work is the study of literary sources. 
The recipe for success in this work is to begin by a rapid reading of the text 
in order to gain a general idea of it. Then read the text slowly, digesting every 
phrase, each paragraph, and picking out the main points. During the second 
reading it is advisable to make an abstract of the studied material, then 
mentally reproduce it, thus consolidating the acquired kno vledge. 

The growing complexity of military science increases the importance of the 
independent training of servicemen. 

The commander supervises the work of his subordinates, in all their stud- 


ies, verifies and evaluates their knowledge, skills and abilities according to a 
four-grade system: “excellent,” “good,” “satisfactory,” and “unsatisfac- 
tory.” In all cases the evaluation must be objective and just. 

Forms of training. The quality of training depends largely on the organiza- 
tion of the military pedagogical process and the form in which it is effected. 
The forms express the organizational side of training. They provide for the 
composition and grouping of the trainees, the stnicture of the lessons (exer- 
cises), their place and duration, the role and specific nature of the instructor’s 
work. 

The forms of training, like the whole military pedagogical process, are 
being constantly improved. Their development depends upon the training 
tasks and content, the authorized organization of the forces, the specific 
nature of the combat activities and work of members of the different Services 
and arms of the Services, the overall level of development of the personnel, 
and the special characteristics of the fighting equipment. 

The practice of combat and political training involves different forms of 
training which can be arbitrarily represented under the following headings: 

— theoretical studies: lectures, seminars, class-group studies, lessons in 
laboratories and specially equipped classrooms, group exercises on maps, 
self-training, tutorials, supplementary lessons for servicemen who are making 
poor progress or who have missed lessons, etc.; 

— field training: tactical and tactical-drill training, training in launching 
and firing positions, on firing ranges, airfields, tank exercise areas, in depots 
and garages, on the parade ground, in engineering, chemical, and sports 
centers, etc.; 

— training exercises: drill, small arms, staff, physical, radio, tank gunnery, 
command post, and “Alert” training exercises, etc.; 

— live firing and rocket launches include: all single firings; firings carried 
out by detachments and crews, artillery, air and naval firing, as well as live 
rocket launches; 

— drills: tactical, tactical-sp)ecial, command and command post, as well as 
tactical drills involving live firing; 

— war games: command and command-staff games; 

— periodic servicing days. 

Apart from the forms of training common to all Services and arms of the 
Services, there are also specific forms. 

Considerable work is being done on the improvement of methods and forms of personnel 
training in connection with the reduction in the training periods of Armed Forces rank and file, 
noncommissioned and petty officers. The principal trend in these improvements is towards the 
mobilization of all the cognitive-vofjtional and physical resources of trainees, and the ir.crea.se 
of their independence and activeness in the training process. This is accomplished through the 
officer’s ability to conduct lessons and drills in a lively and interesting way, by posing compli- 
cated problems which require the trainees to extend their intellectual and physical resources and 
be capable of checking and evaluating their own work independently. G.^at possibilities of 
improving training methods and forms have been opened up by modem technical resources: 
training apparatuses, especially those with electronic and programmed attachments, electrified 
stands, monitoring devices, film projectors, electric recorders, etc. Considerable attention is 


96 


being devoted to improving forms and methods of training aimed at approximating servicemen’s 
training conditions to those of actual combat. 

In revealing the characteristic features and structure of different forms of 
training, military pedagogy emphasizes thit, intelligently combined, these 
forms permit both individual and group training, and steadily, consistently 
improve the theoretical, practical, and psychological training of all categories 
of servicemen. 

The Theory of the Ideological Education of Soviet Servicemen 

The nature of the process of the ideological education of servicemen. This 
is an exceptionally important part of an officer’s work. In accordance with 
Party and Government resolutions, the requirements of the military oath and 
military regulations, the commander forms in his subordinates a scientifically 
sound philosophy of life and ideological conviction, and educates them in the 
spirit of the principles of communist morality. Soviet servicemen are edu- 
cated in the spirit of boundless loyalty to the people and the communist 
cause; they develop the qualities of courage, audacity, heroism, and a spirit 
of comradeship in arms with the armies of socialist countries, readiness to 
give all their strength and, if need be, even their lives, for the defense of the 
socialist Motherland. 

As is evident from what we have said previously, many educational prob- 
lems are resolved during the training process — many, but by no means all. 
For this reason there is a need to carry out special educational work with 
subordinates. Ideological education is a broader and more complex process 
than training. It is the systematic and purposeful influencing of the service- 
man’s mind, senses and will, the guidance of his daily activities aimed at the 
all-round development and the formation of high moral, political and fighting 
qualities, the solidarity of military collectives, and their psychological condi- 
tioning for modem warfare. 

The commander influences his subordinates by word, personal example, 
the organization of their practical activities, and the creation of suitable 
community views in the collective. 

In the process of ideological education the commander strives to form in 
his subordinates stable personal convictions and correct behavioral habits. 

In addition to the development of inherent and positive qualities, the 
commander’s ideological education v ork also includes the re-education of 
subordinates. If a soldier has incorrect opinions and negative habits, the 
officer tries to eliminate them and form new, positive ones in their stead. 

A person is freed rhore rapidly from the survival of the past if he himself 
wants this and if he has the desire for self-improvement. That is why, in the 
process of ideological education, it is important to develop in each subordi- 
nate a desire for self-education and systematic, persistent work on himself. 

The ideological education of personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces is 
accomplished in accordance with certain principles, the most important of 


which is the communist purposefulness and Party commitment of ideological 
education. This principle expresses the natural dependence of the ideological 
education of Soviet fighting men on the policy and ideology of the Commu- 
nist Party. 

In all his practical work, an officer is obliged to conform to the resolutions 
of the CPSU on educational work, to form a clear idea of the principal aims 
of ideological education, and to be constantly concerned about raising the 
ideological level of the procedures in use. 

A very important requirement of this principle is perseverance in achieving 
the set educational aims. For example, an officer must not wash his hands 
of undisciplined soldier, on the assumption that he cannot be influenced. 
As we know, a person’s character is not formed suddenly or immediately. V. 
I. Lenin said: “Ideological education is a long and difficult process. Here it 
is imnnssihle to net hv with a decree, one has to annroach natientlv and 
skillfully 

The ideological education of servicemen during military service and mili- 
tary work. Socially useful labor and practical work play a decisive role in the 
formation of an individual’s personality and in the development of all his 
qualities. V. I. Lenin repeatedly referred to the role of labor in the communist 
education of workers, especially the young. He said: “Only by working 
together with the workers and peasants is it possible to become true commu- 
nists.’’ ^ 

Service, the combat training of Soviet servicemen, is socially useful work, 
the lofty and honorable duty of every citizen of the USSR. This labor is the 
best possible means of developing in servicemen the qualities that are essen- 
tial to an armed defender of the socialist Motherland. 

However, the educational effect of military labor depends largely on the 
commander’s fulfillment of a number of pedagogical requirements. What are 
these requirements? Firstly, it is important that soldiers, sailors, noncommis- 
sioned and petty officers understand the place and role of their service and 
their military labor in the national struggle for the building of communism. 
Secondly, the educational effect of military activities is increased if it is well 
organized, and regulation procedures are maintained during the course of 
lessons and work, if servicemen’s conduct is kept under constant supewision, 
combined with an objective evaluation of work performed. Thirdly, a vital 
factor of ideological education in the process of military labor is socialist 
competition, a desire to fulfill assumed obligations. That is why it is impor- 
tant that all the activities of soldiers, sailors, noncommissioned and p .ty 
officers should be permeated with a spirit of rivalry. Fourthly, the educatiO".al 
role of labor is increased if it is intelligently combined with recreation a.. 
cultural leisure. 

The ideological education of servicemen in and through the collective. 
Soviet society is a society of collectivists. Relationships between people in our 

' Unin. XL. 267. 

’Unin. XLl. 317. 



98 


V,>. 


country are based on friendship and comradely cooperation. Collectivism 
and comradely mutual assistance — one for all, all for one — is one of the basic 
moral precepts of the builders of communism. 

As A. S. Makarenko rightly observed, orthodox Soviet education should 
be organized by creating united, strong and influential collectives. Military 
activities, more than any other kind of activities, are of a collective nature. 
Each serviceman lives and carries out his tasks as a member of a detachment, 
team, crew, subunit, unit or ship’s complement. And it is in the collective and 
under its influence that a serviceman develops his political, military, moral 
and cultural attitudes; he also develops and consolidates such qualities as 
clear awareness of his military duty, a sense of responsibility for the assign- 
ment entrusted to him, discipline, respect for his comrades and mutual 
assistance. 


' I A A ••• # 1% A A # # A A A A M /4 ^ Wa 

A ia«w 1^1 lliwipiw SJl WUUVtfAlOtl III ttlll,* lIIIVItI|^II IIIW V^II^/IxLtVk. IWA^UllVO AllOA All^ W\/ll 1 tllUl lUWl 

constantly concerned about uniting his subordinates into a friendly close-knit family. This is 
facilitated by assigning general tasks to the personnel of the subunit, by arranging for mutual 
assistance in training, support for Party and Komsomol members, discussion of training and 
service achievements within the collective, the maintenance of the traditions of the collective, 
opposition to sham comradeship, the development of general and self-criticism, etc. The com- 
mander himself is the senior comrade, the demanding and, at the same time, solicitous supeiior 
of each subordinate. He values the honor of the collective, which he aspires to lead forward. 


The individual approach. Every serviceman is an individual personality 
with unique qualities. Thus, it is essential for a commanoor to adopt an 
individual approach in dealing with his subordinates. This means knowing 
each man’s peculiarities of character, his standard of training and other 
characteristics, and dealing with him accordingly. Without knowing his 
subordinates, a commander would not be able to organize and conduct their 
training and education with any degree of success, nor would he be able to 
lead them in battle, or even in daily life. 

In discussing the study of trainees, K. D. Ushinskiy was right when he said, 
“The teacher should try to know a person, what sort of an individual he is 
in reality, with all his weaknesses, all of his strengths, with all of his everyday, 
petty needs, and al! his great spiritual needs. Only then will he be able to draw 
out from the person’s very nature his potential for learning, and this potential 
is enormous!” * 

In order to study the individual characteristics of his subordinates, the 
commander systematically observes their conduct under different conditions, 
evaluates the result of their practical work, and talks with them. Correlating 
the information obtained by different methods, he arrives at a conclusion 
about the personal qualities of a subordinate, and on the basis of this deter- 
mines methods and procedures for conducting educational work with him. 

There is no contradiction between the adoption of an individual approach 
to people on the one hand and working with the collective and being con- 

* K. D'. Ushinskiy, Sobraniye sochineniy (Collected Works], Vol. VIII. Academy of Pedagogi- 
cal Sciences of the RSFSR, 1950, pp. 35-36. 


99 


cerned about its cohesion on the other. Moreover, the requirements of the 
individual approach principle can only be fully satisfied in a harmonious 
collective. 

The combination of impartial insistence on high standards from a service- 
man, respect for personal merit, and concern for his welfare. In summing up 
his long experience in the field of pedagogy, A. S. Makarenko said: “My basic 
principle (and I assumed that this was not only my principle, but that of all 
Soviet pedagogues) was always: demand as much as possible from a person, 
but at the same time accord him as much respect as possible.” ’ He empha- 
sized that insistence on high standards and respect for a man were two 
aspects of one and the same principle. He who does not respect a person 
cannot make great demands of him. We make demands of a person, because 
we want to elevate him, to make him more high-minded, a better person. 

Insistence on high standards from subordinates, combined with respect for 
personal merit and conccm for their wcli<ii& i> <111 initiicnauic cnaractenstic 


of our commander. This is natural. The Army could not exist without strict 
order, good organization and discipline: insistence on high standards is a 
means of organizing people, of instilling and reinforcing discipline. 

Daily insistence on high standards is apparent in the commander’s ability 
to establish the regime stipulated by military regulations and in his constant 
supervision of the activities and conduct of his subordinates. This principle, 
which applies constantly to all servicemen without exception, is incompatible 
with rudeness or belittlement of personal merit. 

Servicemen submit all their needs and inquiries to the commander, count- 
ing on his assistance and support. It is the plain duty of every officer to know 
their needs, to intercede on their behalf with the appropriate senior 
commande/s. 

Support in ideological education for the positive qualities and positive 
knowledge of a serviceman. It has already been emphasized that ideological 
education is the process of overcoming all the negative qualities of a person’s 
character and at the same time consolidating and developing his positive 
qualities. It is wrong for the attention of a teacher to be directed mainly at 
the weak points of a trainee’s conduct. This results in the whole process being 
reduced to combatting deficiencies and negative factors; the positive qualities 
of the personality are not strengthened, do not develop, and are not used as 
a basis for the formation of good moral, political and fighting qualities. 
Moreover, emphasis on only the negative side of a person’s behavior results 
in loss of faith in himself, his abilities and potential. 


Experience shows that any serviceman, along with his negative trails and his lack of under- 
standing of individual aspects of service life, has positive traits, correct views, good feelings. With 
one this may be enthusiasm for technology, with another love of sport, with a third a passion 
for reading, and so on. It is good to find this cut; to make use of it is the direct responsibility 
of the commander. 

This principle requires that fuller use be made of the positive knowledge of servicemen in 

’ A. S. Makarenko, Sock (Works), Vol. V. Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the RSFSR, 
1958, p. 229. 


100 


ideological education. The commander, who in conversations with his men tries to demonstrate 
in an interesting way the facts about positive behavior and the service achievements of outstand- 
ing performers, is acting correctly. By doing this he develops better character traits in his 
subordinates and a lofty desire for all-round improvement. 


Unity and coordination in ideological educational work. Success in ideo- 
logical educational work is directly related to the degree of coordination in 
the work of commanders. Party and Komsomol organizations. To strive for 
such coordination means to impose unified requirements on servicemen, to 
educate them through the common efforts of officers, noncommissioned and 
petty officers. Party and Komsomol organizations. 

Such is the nature of the principles of the ideological education of Soviet 
servicemen. They embody the requirements of the Communist Party, the 
military oath and regulations with respect to the maintenance, organization 
and methods of communist education in our Armed Forces. Strict observ- 


a ^***^**Wbf A^A WWAA ^bAvA^AAWAMA WWAAWAA'AA^AA KJk a'kAkAA MA AWWV/A«_r^A 


educational work in the Armed Forces. 

Finally, we shall dwell briefly on the methods of ideological education of 
Soviet servicemen. 

In order to form good moral, political and fighting qualities in servicemen, 
the commander uses such educational methods as persuasion, exercise, en- 
couragement, compulsion, and example. 

The chief method of educating Soviet servicemen is persuasion. Essentially 
this is the active influencing of the mind, senses, and will of a person for the 
purpose of helping him comprehend and understand the meaning of the ideas 
and requirements in the spirit of which he is being educated, to agree in- 
wardly with these ideas and requirements and to resolve all practical prob- 
lems in accordance with them. 

As socialism became consolidated in our country, the role of the per- 
suasion method steadily increased and that of compulsion showed a corres- 
ponding decrease. There was a particularly marked increase in the role of 
persuasion in the ideological education of people during the period of the 
full-scale buildinf; of communism. 

Persuasion involves explanation of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the 
policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, demonstration 
of the need for strict observance of the requirements of communist morality, 
the military oath and military regulations, and criticism of negative actions. 


People do not suddenly and immediately renounce their views and convictions, even though 
they may be erroneous. For example, a soldier or a sailor infected with religious prejudices does 
not as a rule rid himself of them after the first conversation. He needs time to think things over, 
to evaluate and eliminate the doubts that beset him. The commander must take this into 
consideration. His duty is to refute patiently the subordinate's incorrect views and by system- 
atically acquainting the man with scientifically sound ideas, gradually lead him to correct 
conclusions. 


Exercises. By means of this method, the commander solves principally 
such tasks as developing and inuring volitional character traits in subordi- 
nates and forming correct behavioral habits. 


I 


101 


Exercise is inse;)arably linked with persuasion. These two methods supple- 
ment each other. The commander uses persuasion to form correct views in 
his subordinates, and high-principled motivation in their daily activities, 
whereas they are reinforced by means of exercises, and at the same time 
correct behavioral habits are developed. 

The skillful use of exercise in the ideological education of subordinates 
implies the efficient organization of their daily life and activities and the 
maintenance of regulation procedure in every' respect. Acting in an organized 
fashion, consistently fulfilling all demands made of them, servicemen become 
convinced of the correctness of those ideas which the commander has in- 


stilled into them, grow accustomed to self-restraint, the ability to consciously 
subordinate their actions and intentions to the established regime, and under- 
stand the expediency and practical importance of each regulation. But for 
this it is essential that the exercises are systematic and apply to all soldiers, 

cstiinrc nnn/^nmmiccirvnAH onH nflR/'Arc iizitK/Mit 

Encouragement. This is a positive evaluation of certain activities of a 
serviceman, or his conduct as a whole. It stimulates the development of his 
character traits and behavior, provides him with the incentive to strive for 
new successes. Encouragement has an educational effect, not only on the 
individual who distinguishes himself, but also on his comrades. 

In meting out encouragement, consideration should be given not only to 
achieved successes (work results), but to the individual’s motives and the 
efforts which these involvva. Frequent encouragement for easily achieved 
successes may give rise to feelings of self-satisfacticn, vanity and conceit. 

It is sometimes expedient to encourage a soldier or sailor who has not yet 
achieved any notable distinctions in his service career or conduct, but who 
is striving to do so. In such a case, encouragement is interpreted as confidence 
in the serviceman and faith in his abilities. Such an approach frequently 
marks the beginning of a decisive change for the better in an individual’s 
character. 


An effective form of encouragement for those who achieve success in their 
training and discipline, but are under punishment, is the cancellation of the 
punishment. 

Compulsion. This method expresses a negative evaluation of a serviceman’s 
conduct and is aimed at making him feel his guilt and mend his ways; at the 
same time it is intended to prevent a possible violation of military discipline, 
both by the serviceman in question and by his comrades. Compulsion helps 
people to recognize their mistakes, eradicate bad habits and form positive 
qualities. 

V. I. Lenin said that the campaign against lack of discipline, laxity, and 
confusion, “cannot be conducted simply by propaganda and agitation, simply 
by organizing competitions, or simply by selecting organizers — compulsion 
must be used as well.’’ ‘ Here he emphasized that our policy of compulsion 
is based upon firm and unconditional persuasion. 


‘ Unin, XXXVI. 197. 



102 


Compulsion in the Armed Forces takes the form of a prohibition or 
disciplinary punishment. Persistent offenders against military discipline and 
order, as well as servicemen guilty of military or criminal offences, are tried 
by a military tribunal. 

A demand or a prohibition is not a request; it is an order. Therefore, the 
commander always expresses either of them in a categorical, unconditional 
form. Only in certain cases (where a subordinate is not well acquainted with 
service life, failure to understand certain regulations or instructions, circum- 
stantial changes), does the commander accompany a demand with brief, 
precise explanations. Demands and prohibitions issued by the commander 
must be complied with, and must be commensurate with the subordinate’s 
actual capabilities and the existing situation. 

Each punishment must be justified and in all cases must correspond to the 
degree of guilt and the gravity of the offence. In determining the form and 
e.xtent of the punishment it is essential to take into consideration the nature 
of the offence, the circumstances in which it was committed, the previous 
record of the offender, and the time he has served in the Armed Forces. In 
addition to this, the offender’s motives, character, temperament, feelings, will 
and other mental characteristics must be taken into account. 

The commander, having punished a subordinate, should ensure that the 
offender and his comrades are fully aware of the nature of the offence, its 
danger, and the justice of the punishment. 

Punishment is a very powerful means of influencing a person and it should be used carefully. 
Punishments cannot be handed out indiscriminately. Frequent punishments make people ner- 
vous and create a tense atmosphere in the subunit. It should also be borne in mind that soldiers 
and sailors who are frequently subjected to disciplinary action get used to punishments, and, 
indeed, cease to react to them. Only when all other means have been exhausted and have failed 
to yield positive results, does the commander resort unhesitatingly to punishment. 

Example. This is a specific method of education. Its effect is based on the 
tendency of people to imitate each other. This should not be understood as 
blind, mechanical copying of the actions and deeds of other people. Imitation 
entails comprehension and selectivity. Servicemen learn from people who 
serve as examples for everyone. They are especially influenced by the great 
Lenin’s example of devoted service to communism. The life and activities of 
Il'ich’s students and brothers-in-arms, the images of dispassionate revolu- 
tionaries, heroes of the two world wars, literary and film heroes provide 
examples of courage and fortitude. 

The effectiveness of all methods and means of ideological education is 
reinforced by the personal example of the commander. If an officer always 
and in all respects acts in accordance with the requirements of the military 
oath and regulations, and if his deeds are as good as his words, he enjoys 
authority among his subordinates and they imitate him. 


Concerning the Pedagogical Proficiency of the Officer 

A well-developed teaching mentality, a creative approach to the utilization 
of different methods and procedures of influencing subordinates, and profi- 
ciency in education and training are of great importance in the officer’s 
military pedagogical work. 

Pedagogical proficiency — this means to possess a knowledge of the nature 
of the military-pedagogical process, organically linked with developed skills 
and abilities in the field of teaching and educational work. Teaching skill is 
made up of numerous elements and is always manifested in combination with 
the teacher’s personal qualities. 

An important element of an officer’s complement of pedagogical skills is 
speech — the ability to use words effectively. “I am convinced,” said A. S. 
Makarenko, “that well-spoken . . . practical, forceful language is of enormous 
importance, and it may be that we still make so many mistakes in organiza- 
tional forms, because we are still often unable even to speak properly. It is 
absolutely essential to be able to speak so that your will, your culture and 
your personality are sensed in your words. This must be learned.” ’ A. S. 
Makarenko himself considered that he became a real educational expert 
when he learned how to say “come here” with 15-20 voice modulations and 
when he had learned how to produce 20 nuances by facial expression, gesture 
and voice. 

Pedagogical skill is inconceivable without developed organizational abili- 
ties. In military pedagogical work it is important for the commander to be 
able to rely on Party and Komsomol organizations, to direct the teaching and 
training activities of noncommissioned and petty officers, and to perform any 
task in a quiet, businesslike fashion. M. I. Kalinin said that all military 
personnel must be excellent organizers. 

T he skill of an officer-educator is founded on his tact, i.e., on his ability 
to maintain correct relationships with subordinates, always nd in all respects 
to display a sense of moderation, and to resolve any pedagogical problems 
without conflict. Pedagogical tact is impossible without a knowledge of the 
psychology of servicemen, without the ability to understand their feelings, 
moods, and aspirations, and without the ability to go to their assistance at 
any time. 

The fundamentals of an officer’s pedagogical skill are taught in military 
school. Abilities are developed and improved during the process of day-to- 
day work with people. The young officer is transformed into a methodologist 
and a master of training and education under the guidance and with the 
support of senior commanders and Party organizations, and by means of 
various educational measures. It should, however, be borne in mind that the 
principal means of developing pedagogical expertise is independent work. 
This takes various forms. First of all, an officer studies the classics of Marx- 

’ A. S. Makarenko, Soch. [Works], V, 242. 


104 


ism-Leninism, the resolutions of the Communist Party on training and edu- 
cation matters, military regulations and instructions, the orders and speeches 
of the Minister of Defense, the directives of the Minister of Defense and the 
Head of the Chief Political Directorate of the Soviet Armed Forces, the 
military pedagogical works of outstanding military leaders, classical works 
on pedagogy and psychology, special literature on military pedagogy and 
military psychology. 

It is impossible to become an expert in training and education without 
thoughtful preparation of each lesson, each educational procedure. Experi- 
ence shows that lesson preparation usually includes the following basic 
elements: 

— obtaining a clear understanding of the subject matter of the lessons, and 
studying the appropriate regulations, directions, instmetions, educational 
material and other sources; 

— formulation of the principal aim, and of specific training and educational 
tasks; 

— elaboration of the lesson structure, definition of basic questions relating 
to the theme, and the time needed to study each question; 

— selection of the appropriate factual material, which will be used in the 
course of the lessons; 

— selection of training methods, and personal training in carrying out 
given procedures and actions; 

— preparation of visual aids, technical facilities and other educational 
material; 

— compilation of an outline summary; 

— the training of noncommissioned and petty officers for the lesson. 

Each completed lesson or educational measure should be critically 
analyzed to establish its strong and weak aspects, and to determine the reason 
for failures, after which the officer should work independently on improving 
his ability to train and educate subordinates. Of undoubted benefit in this 
connection is self-exercise in the development of his powers of observation, 
imagination, and techniques (diction, expression, gesticulation, the ability to 
demonstrate procedures, etc.). 

Every unit and every ship has real experts in training and educational 
work. The young officer trying to improve his pedagogical skill can gain 
much by attentively studying their experience. 

* * * ' 

Such are the problems of military psychology and pedagogy. In studying 
them every officer should heed the advice of K. D. Ushinskiy: “We do not 
say to pedagogues: act in such and such a way; we say: study the laws of those 
mental phenomena which you wish to manipulate, and act in conformity with 
these lavys and the circumstances in which you wish to apply them.” ' This 

• K. D. Ushinskiy, Sobr. sock (Collected Works), VllI, 55. 


105 


means that every officer should adopt a constructive approach to the subject, 
take into consideration the specific features of the situation in which he 
works, and study his subordinates constantly. 


What to Read on This Section 

Voyennaya psikhologiya [Military Psychology]. Voyenizdat, 1968. 
Psikhologiya voinskogo kollektiva [The Psychology of the Military Collec- 
tive]. Voyenizdat, 1967. 

Sovremennyy boy i psikhologiya voina [Modern Warfare and the Psychology 
of the Fighting Man]. Voyenizdat, 1967. 

Voyennaya inzhenernaya psikhologiya [Military Engineering Psychology]. 
Voyenizdat, 1970. 

Voyennaya pedagogika [Military Pedagogy]. Voyenizdat, 1967. 

O pedagogicheskom masterstve ofitsera [On the Pedagogical Proficiency of the 




Sovremennaya burzhuaznaya voyennaya psikhologiya [Contemporary Bour- 
geois Military Psychology]. A collection of articles in translation. Voyeniz- 
dat, 1964. 


L 


Chapter 5. THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR 


The Armed Forces of the USSR have blazed a path of glory for more than 
half a century. Created by our Party under the direct leadership of V. I. 
Lenin, they have honorably fulfilled their historical mission throughout the 
entire history of their existence. Safeguarding the achievements of the Great 
October Socialist Revolution, our Armed Forces have many times engaged 
the forces of international imperialism in mortal combat and in every case 
emerged victorious. 

During the difficult years of the Civil War and the foreign military inter- 
vention, marked by economic disorganization and a shortage of weapons, the 
Red Army wiped out the well-trained and well-equipped armies of the inter- 
nal counterrevolution and the interventionist forces. Socialism won the first 
decisive battle against the forces of imperialist reaction. 

After the Civil War, the Communist Party and the Soviet government, 
implementing Lenin’s policy of industriali7.atic}: of the country and the 
socialist reconstruction of agriculture, bearing in mind the military threat 
posed by imperialism, did everything possible to strengthen the defensive 
capacity of our state. Relying on a steadily growing economic base and a 
newly created military industry, the Soviet people, led by the Communist 
Patty, transformed the Army and Navy into a formidable force within a very 
short period. The Air Force, the Navy, the armored troops and artillery, the 
Airborne Forces and the Air Defense Forces were created and equipped with 
great rapidity. The organizational structure of the Armed Forces was im- 
proved, cadres of command, political and engineering-technical personnel 
were trained. 

The Great Patriotic War was a formidable test for the Soviet State and its 
Armed Forces. Fascist Germany’s treacherous attack created unfavorable 
conditions for us at the beginning of the war. In fierce defensive engagements 
and battles, the Soviet forces courageously repulsed the onslaught of the 
shameless enemy. Moscow, Stalingrad, the Caucasus, Kursk, Leningrad, 
Eastern Ukraine, Belorussia, and Moldavia were the scenes of savage battles 
in which large groups of the forces of Hitlerite Germany and its satellites 
were destroyed. These victories were a clear expression of the growing might 
of the Soviet Armed Forces, the skill of our soldiers and airmen, and the 
generalship of our commanders. In the culminating operations of 194S, 


1 » 


107 


Fascist Germany was completely destroyed. Following this, our Armed 
Forces inflicted a decisive defeat on the Japanese Kwangtung Army, thus 
eliminating a dangerous hotbed of war in the Far East. 

The defeat of Hitlerite Germany and its allies, a defeat in which our 
country played a decisive role, was of world-wide historical importance: for 
many peoples and countries it opened the way to freedom, independence and 
social progress. 

The outstanding victories of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patri- 
otic War convincingly demonstrated the superiority of the socialist social and 
state system. Socialism created unprecedented possibilities for the political 
and economic development of our Motherland and proved to be an inex- 
haustible source of its military might. The victories of the Soviet Armed 
Forces were ensured by the monolithic unity of our people, the high state of 
morale, good organization and discipline of the troops at the front and the 
workers in the rear, and their selfless devotion to their Motherland and the 
Communist Party. 

During the past fifty years, imperialist positions have weakened considera- 
bly, but the aggressive nature of imperialism remains unchanged. The princi- 
pal force of war and aggression is American imperialism. The ruling circles 
of the USA, under the cover of talks on peace and cooperation, intensify 
military preparations against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, 
and create dangerous seats of war in different regions of the globe. Clear 
confirmation of this is provided by American aggressio n in Vietnam, continu- 
ing provocations against Cuba, and Israeli attacks on Arab countries. The 
revival of militarism and revanchism in the Federal Republic of Germany is 
a serious threat to the cause of peace and European security. 

Taking this into consideration, the Communist Party and the Soviet gov- 
ernment show continuing concern about the further reinforcement of our 
country’s defensive capacity and the strengthening of her Armed Forces. As 
a result, our Armed Forces have been transformed into a formidable and 
invincible force. 

To quote the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. 
Grechko: “Our Armed Forces stand unshakably and firmly on guard over 
the achievements of the Great October Revolution. In ideological and politi- 
cal solidarity, in moral and fighting qualities, in the training of the rank and 
file and the officer corps, in the standard of technical equipment, the Soviet 
Armed Forces are equal to the tasks ahead of them. 

Aggressors vainly entertain illusions that they can find such a combination 
of weapons and methods of using them, that would ensure victory in case of 
war. The Soviet Armed Forces are capable of waging successful warfare in 
any conditions— on the ground, in the air, at sea, day or night, both with and 
without nuclear weapons.” ' 


' Pyat'desyat let na sirazhe zavoyevaniy Velikogo Oktyabrya (Fifty Years on Guard for the 
Achievements of the Great October Revolution]. Voycnizdat, 1968, p. 25. 


108 


THE STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES 


The structure of the Soviet Armed Forces is not invariable. It has been 
changed and improved, depending on the development of the factors of 
production, the achievements of science, and technological progress. With 
the emergence of new weapons, new Services and branches of the Services 
were created, and the role and importance of the existing ones were modified. 

The Soviet Armed Forces now consist of the following Services; the Strate- 
gic Rocket Forces, the Ground Forces, the National Air Defense Forces, the 
Air Force and the Navy. Each of them has its own special fighting equipment, 
organization, make-up and supply system as well as specific methods of using 
available equipment and weaponry on a tactical, operational, or strategic 
scale. In conformity with this, every Service is intended to conduct military 
operations primarily in any given sphere — on land, at sea, in the air and 
carries out tasks under the leadership of the commander in chief of this 
Service or the immediate direction of General Headquarters. 

What are the characteristics of each of the Services of the Soviet Armed 
Forces? 

The Strategic Rocket Forces. This is the main Service. It has first rate 
fighting equipment at its disposal, ballistic missiles with powerful nuclear 
payloads, the necessary launching equipment and support facilities, and is 
capable of inflicting crushing blows on any aggrcs^'or. The supply base of the 
Rocket Forces is the superb rocket-construction industry of the USSR. 

Ballistic missiles have substantial advantages over other types of weapons. 
They are easy to disperse and camouflage at the site. They do not require 
large launch sites; they can also be mounted on mobile launchers. Such 
missiles are capable of striking objects at great distances, i.e., in practically 
any region of the globe. They can deliver nuclear payloads of enormous 
destructive force to selected targets with the utmost precision. The quality 
of our missile technology is characterized by the faultless operation of both 
the missiles themselves and all the complex mechanisms and devices involved 
in combat launches. 

The development and mass production of nuclear missiles, the establish- 
ment of the Strategic Rocket Forces as part of the Armed Forces of the Soviet 
Union, i.e., their formation into an independent Service, put at the disposal 
of the Supreme High Command a powerful means of rapidly and directly 
inflicting massed nuclear strikes on an aggres.sor, and achieving our war aims 
within the shortest possible time. 

The Strategic Rocket Forces are capable of inflicting powerful retaliatory 
strikes on an aggressor and destroying his vital installations: missile, air, and 
naval bases, airfields of his strategic air force, nuclear arsenals; they also have 
the capacity to liquidate the enemy’s concentrations of ground forces, his 
control centers and the country’s administrative and 'xonomic activities. 

In order to be able to carry out their tasks more c ficiently, the Rocket 
Forces are maintained in a constant state of combat readiness. Strategic 
missile complexes have all that is necessary to carry out their assigned tasks: 


launching systems, fully operational missiles with live payloads, highly 
skilled command and engineering personnel, and well trained combat crews. 

The potential of the Rocket Forces is determined by the number of launch- 
ers, the presence on them of ready-to-launch missiles, the power of the 
nuclear payloads, and the accuracy of the missile flight control system. It is 
necessary to take into account the fact that the damage (destruction) zone 
of a single missile also depends on the target characteristics: size, configura- 
tion, degree of protection, the nature of the terrain in its vicinity, etc. 

The destructive power of the nuclear missiles at the disposal of the Soviet 
Armed Forces is unlimited. One missile with a powerful nuclear payload 
releases more energy than all the explosives produced throughout the entire 
world during World War II. 

Colossal destruction ’s not the raison d'etre of the Rocket Forces, but the 
unavoidable result of their operations, which, in cooperation with forces of 
the other services, guarantees the achievement of complete victory over an 
aggressor. 

The Strategic Rocket Forces are the youngest and most formidable of the 
fighting Services, they form the basis of the defensive power of our country, 
and are in a constant state of combat readiness. The Soviet Union is the only 
country in the world in which they are constituted as a fighting Service. 

The Ground Forces. This, the oldest Service, is intended for military 
operations on land. For a long time, our Ground Forces, as in other armies, 
formed the basis of the Armed Forces and were the most numerous. In fact, 
they decided the outcome of wars. They also bore the main burden of the 
struggle with the enemy in the Great Patriotic War. In cooperation with the 
Air Force, the Air Defense Forces and the Navy, the Ground Forces carried 
out the most onerous combat tasks and contributed most to the enemy’s 
defeat. During the war, more than 8,000 infantrymen, artillerymen, tankmen, 
engineers, cavalrymen, and signalmen became Heroes of the Soviet Union. 

The bulk of the Ground Forces during the war was made up of rifle troops 
— the heroic and durable infantry. Both in attack and defense, the artillery 
provided the main fire power; the main strikiug and maneuvering force was 
the armored troops. 

After the war the Ground Forces underwent major changes. They are now 
armed with operational-tactical missiles, new tanks, armored personnel earn- 
ers, new conventional and rocket artillery systems, powerful anti-tank weap)- 
ons, self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, rockets, artillery, and improved control 
systems. This has greatly increased the striking power and maneuverability 
of the Ground Forces. Now, in cooperation with the other Services, they have 
the capacity to carry out missions aimed at the destruction of groups of 
enemy forces in land theaters of war much more rapidly than before. 

The present-day Ground Forces are made up of motorized infantry troops, 
tank troops, rocket troops and artillery, air defense troops, as well as special 
troops which provide support for operations of the main forces: communica- 
tions, engineering, chemical defense, radiotcchnical, motor transport, road 
construction, and other troops. 


Motorized infantry troops. Numerically, this is one of the largest branches 
of the Soviet Army. They are armed with first-rate fighting equipment- 
submachine guns, carbines, machine guns, rifles and mortars, tanks and 
anti-tank weapons, as well as rocket weapons capable of carrying nuclear 
payloads. 

A modem motorized infantry division has 16 times more tanks than a 1939 
infantry division, 37 times more armored personnel carriers and armored 
vehicles, 13 times more automatic weapons, 5 times more radio communica- 
tions facilities, all of incomparably higher quality. 

The increase in the level of technical equipment of a division has considera- 
bly enhanced its combat potential. For example, the weight of a single salvo 
of artillery and mortar fire of a division in 1939 was 1,700 kilograms, whereas 
today it is equal to 53,009 kilograms. This does not take into account nuclear 
weapons, the power of which is several hundred times greater. The available 
power ratio of a division, calculated on the basis of engine power per man, 
was 3 hp in 1939, compared with more than 30 hp today. 

The total motorization of rifle subunits, units, and formations afforded 
them mobility and maneuverability, the capacity to operate in close coopera- 
tion with tank forces, and to attack without losing contact with them. 

The availability of powerful artillery, tanks, and other mobile armored 
vehicles, and especially tactical nuclear weapons, as well as subunits and 
units of other branches have immeasurably increased the fire power and 
striking force of the motorized infantry troops, and made it possible for 
hem to conduct combat operations independently, attack, defend them- 
selves, wage encounter battles and successfully solve a variety of combat 
problems. The motorized infantry troops are the most maneuverable 
branch of the Service, always ready for combat operations in any situa- 
tion, day or night, summer and winter, in any theater of war, in any 
weather conditions. 

The tank troops. The Soviet tank troops were formed during the Civil War. 
By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War they were already a formidable 
force. Organizationally, tank units and subunits formed part of the com- 
bined-arms formations. Along with this, there were independent mechanized 
formations. During the course of the war, the availability of tanks and other 
fighting vehicles, the situation on the fronts, and the accumulation of combat 
experience in their use, led to changes in the organization of the tank troops 
as well. As early as 1942 there were independent tank and mechanized corps 
and later there were tank armies. The operational and technical potential of 
our tank troops became most apparent in offensive operations during the 
Great Patriotic War. They were equipped with remarkable fighting vehicles: 
the JS heavy tank and the T-34 medium tank, which became the basic combat 
unit of the armored and mechanized troops. The combat qualities of the latter 
were superior to those of all types of German and other foreign tanks 
throughout the entire war. 

During the post war period, the tank troops and their equipment have been 
developed further, they continue to serve as the main striking force of the 


111 


Ground Forces, and are intended for use in the main sectors for solving the 
most important problems. 

Today’s tank troops are based on heavily armored tanks with powerful 
armaments. These provide the tank subunits, units and formations with great 
striking power, a high degree of maneuverability, and greater resistance to 
the effects of nuclear weapons. The tank troops also include self-propelled 
guns, rocket weapons and artillery, as well as subunits of other branches of 
the Service, and are thus capable of solving many combat tasks indepen- 
dently. Combat operations of the tank troops are characterized by light- 
ning speed, deep penetration of the enemy’s rear, and maneuverability, as 
well as close cooperation with other branches and Services of the Armed 
Forces. 

The rocket forces and the artillery. The Ground Forces incorporate rocket 
forces armed with tactical and operational-tactical missiles. The introduction 
of these formidable weapons constituted a new qualitative jump in the en- 
hancement of the fighting power of units and formations of the Ground 
Forces. Their striking power increased immeasurably as well as the penetra- 
tion capabilities. Whereas previously, the range of artillery and other Ground 
Forces weapons was 15-25km, their rocket weapons can now hit the enemy 
at much greater ranges. Artillery and other conventional weapons could only 
inflict partial damage on the enemy forces, whereas nuclear missile strikes 
can, in a short period, completely annihilate entire subunits and units of the 
enemy, and other important objectives which form part of his groups of 
forces. 

Nuclear missiles have become the principal means of utterly defeating the 
enemy in battles and operations of the Ground Forces. 

As for the artillery, in all earlier wars it played an exceptionally important role. It acquired 
enormous importance during the Great Patriotic War. The density of artillery in offensive 
operations of the Soviet Army during 1944 and 1945 per kilometer of front reached 250-300 
guns and mortars. Devastating artillery fire made it possible to solve combat tasks successfully 
in all types of combat operations. 

Since the Great Patiotic War the fire and maneuvering potentials of Soviet artillery have 
constantly increased. Artillery and mortar units and subunits have acquired new 85mm anti- 
tank guns, 122mm, 130mm a,id 152mm guns, 240mm mortars, new rocket artillery models, as 
well as improved artillery reconnaissance systems and artillery fire control directors. Reliable 
anti-tank guns which fire hollow charge and high explosive fragmentation projectiles were 
introduced. The new artillery systems have a greater firing range and armor-piercing capability, 
a higher rate of fire and projectile efficiency, and maneuvering capabilities. At the same time, 
the design specifications of guns and mortars previously in service were improved. Artillery 
prime movers were changed, and new high-speed artillery tractors were brought into service. 

Organizationally the artillery is subdivided into organic artillery and the 
Supreme High Command Reserve. Organic artillery includes that which 
organizationally (by establishment) forms part of motorized infantry batta- 
lions, and motorized infantry, tank and airborne units and formations. The 
artillery of the Supreme High Command Reserve comprises units equipped 
with long-range guns and mortars of various calibers for firing shells and 
bombs of great destructive force. This artillery is usually earmarked for the 


112 




quantitative and qualitative reinforcement of combined arms units and for- 
mations, when carrying out combat missions. 

The Ground Forces’ artillery includes subunits, armed, not only with 
anti-tank guns, but also anti-tank guided missiles, capable of piercing the 
armor of any modern tank. They are the principal means of combatting 
enemy tanks and other armored targets, in any forms of ground forces 
combat operations. 

Artillery and artillery fire control is exercised through commanders of 
artillery (mortar) subunits and units, or commanders of artillery groups 
formed for the p)eriod of a given action. 

Even during the Great Patriotic War, extremely effective methods of con- 
ducting firing operations and cooperating with other branches of the Services 
had been developed. Now improved, they conform fully to the present-day 
standards of Soviet artillery and the character of modem warfare. 

The Air Defense Troops. As a branch their purpose is to protect the Ground 
Forces and targets in their rear from enemy air attack. The need for this 
service arose as a result of the rapid development of aerial attack weapons 
— airplanes, helicopters and combat missiles. The subunits and units respon- 
sible for the air defense of troops and targets in their rear are equipped with 
surface-to-air missile complexes, anti-aircraft artillery, as well as radiotechni- 
cal and other means of observation, detection, and identification of aerial 
targets, early warning and appropriate control facilities. 

The equipping of this branch of the Ground Forces with surface-to-air 
missile complexes enables it to deal successfully with enemy air attacks at 
low, medium, and high altitudes. 

Special Troops— engineering, chemical, signals, etc., — are included in the 
Ground Forces for the purpose of supporting the latter’s combat activities. 

The Engineering Troops are special subunits and units equipped with heavy-duty engineering 
equipment (earth-movers, bridge trains, road machinery, etc.) and are intended to provide 
combat operational support for all branches. Of the entire engineering support complex, these 
troops perform the most complex work, necessitating special training of the personnel and very 
sophisticated engineering equipment. They are subdivided into general purpose engineering 
troops (sappers) and special purpose troops (crossing assault, pontoon, road engineering, engi- 
neering construction and other subunits and units). 

The Engineering Troops have been in existence for centuries. In wars of the past they played 
an exceptionally important role; under present-day conditions their importance has increased 
still further. They are intended to prepare the lines of troop movement and maneuver routes, 
to support troop crossings of water barriers, to lay and clear minefields and explosive obstacles, 
to erect engineering obstacles and carry out demolition, to implement the most complex troop 
camouflage measures, to participate in the provision of shelters, and to deal with the conse- 
quences of the enemy’s use of nuclear weapons, etc. 

The Chemical Troops. These arc special subunits equipped with vehicles and instruments for 
I conducting radiation and chemical reconnaissance, monitoring the radioactive exposure of 
^ personnel, special processing of the troops, ground decontamination and disinfestation, and 

' carrying out other measures connected with the chemical, atomic and bacteriological defense 

) of troops and targets in the rear. 

‘ Organizationally, the Chemical Troops form part of all branches and consist of radiation and 

[ chemical reconnaissance subunits, chemical defense subunits, equipment and ground decoiitami- 
r nation and disinfestation subunits, etc. 

\ The Signals Tivops consist of subunits and units equipped with modem communication 





A 


113 


facilities; radio and radio relay, telephone and telegraph and other equipment needed to establish 
and maintain reliable communication for the purpose of troop control in all forms of combat 
activities. The Signals Troops transmit and receive orders, instructions and reports, and also 
exchanges of information between staffs and the forces. 

Communication with subordinates is organized and effected on the orders of the senior 
commander (senior staff), and coordination communications with the facilities of the respective 
forces, on instructions of the commander. To ensure uninterrupted communications, different 
systems — radio, radio relay and line communications — are used on one and the same axis. 

More stringent requirements in respect of communications reliability and the range and 
carrying capacity of radio communication lines have led in recent years to intensive development 
in long-range ultra-short Wave radio and radio relay communications. 

In some cases communication is effected by mobile means, specially appointed personnel on 
motor-cycles, in cars, helicopters, aircraft, etc. 

Motor Transportation Troops are special subunits and units, whose duty it is to transport 
troops and various kinds of equipment by motor vehicles. Subunits of the motor vehicle troops 
consist of drivers equipped with high-performance motor vehicles and other transport vehicles. 

Effective use of Motor Transportation Troops entails a developed road network, its mainte- 
nance in usable condition and a well-organized commandant service. 

Road Troops. This is a special force consisting of independent road commandant, road 
construction and bridge-building subunits which carry out tasks on the renewal, repair, con- 
struction, and utilization of roads and perform road commandant service. 

The Airborne Forces are units and formations, specially trained for making 
airborne landings in the enemy’s rear to carry out combat operations there 
in cooperation with missile units and aircraft, as well as with motor rifle and 
tank troops attacking on the front. In operations in coastal regions, the 
Airborne Forces may cooperate with the Navy. 

The Airborne Forces are uniquely organized and equipped. They are 
provided with first-rate weapons and fighting equipment: rapid fire artillery 
and rocket launchers, armored personnel carriers, anti-tank weapons and 
anti-aircraft guns, which give them the capability of successfully and rapidly 
exploiting the results of nuclear strikes and completing the enemy’s defeat 
within a short time, acting independently of and in cooperation with, other 
forces, primarily the Rocket Forces and the Air Force. 

Airborne landings were first carried out by the Red Army during the Civil War. In 1927 and 
1929 airborne landings were made in Central Asia to combat the basmachi.* 

On 2 August 1930 during Air Force exercises in the Moscow Military District, a parachute 
landing was carried out for the first time in the world in the practice of military science. 

In the fall of 1934 the first large-scale landing, involving 900 parachutists, was carried out 
during exercises in the Belorussian Military District. 

One of the largest .landings in World War II, in which over 10 thousand parachutists took, 
,/art, was carried out by Soviet airborne units in the rear of the Vyazma group of Nazi forces 
in February 1942. 

The role of the airborne forces in modem warfare has increased enor- 
mously. 

The National Air Defense Forces as a Service are responsible for carrying 
out the vital task of shielding the economic and political centers and military 
targets from possible enemy air attack. They are made up of well-trained 

• A basmach is described by the Soviets as “a member of a counterrevolutionary robber band 
in Centra! Asia during the Civil War” (U.S.Ed.J. 


units and subunits of surface-to-air missile troops, fighter aircraft, communi- 
cation, radiotechnical troops, etc., having the most modem necessary equip- 
ment. The Air Defense Forces are capable of successfully carrying out the 
task of detecting and identifying different aerial objects, determining their 
character and armament, computing their coordinates, preparing the neces- 
sary data for the weapon systems, and ensuring the destruction of these 
objects. 

The technical basis of modem air defense consists of powerful radar sta- 
tions and surface-to-air guided missile complexes designed for the destmction 
of the enemy’s air strike capabilities; all-weather supersonic fighter aircraft. 
All these resources are organized in an orderly system. The National Air 
Defense Forces can carry out their tasks both independently and in coopera- 
tion with the Air Force and air defense resources and facilities of the other 
Services. 

Modem aerial attack weapons may be used on a massive scale by the 
enemy in simultaneous attacks on large areas encompassing the theaters of 
war and deep in the country’s rear. The combat operations of the air defense 
troops can also be conducted over vast expanses. Under these conditions 
exceptional importance is attached to the cooperation of all forms of air 
defense and the clear-cut distribution between them of strike tasks in accord- 
ance with the combat potential of the forces engaged and the tactical and 
technical specifications of the weapons being used.* 

Combat operations of the Air Defense Forces on an enormous spatial scale, 
with the simultaneous involvement of large quantities of assorted weaponry 
and materiel for each air defense unit and formation, possibly may not be 
long-lasting. It is more likely that they will be extremely intensive rather than 
systematic. A state of constant combat readiness is an obligatory and essen- 
tial condition of the National Air Defense Forces. 

Modem combat aircraft flying at unprecedented speeds will be in the 
combat operational zones of any given air defense systems for a limited period 
of time. For this reason today’s air defense system with all its resources and 
facilities is in a high state of combat readiness. 

The history of the development of the Air Defense Forces dates back to World War I, when 
airplanes and dirigibles began to be used for reconnaissance and attack. 

Between the two world wars, the fire power of air defense weaponry increased and the 
performance characteristics of fighter aircraft improved. 

The development of anti-aircraft artillery saw increases in gun calibers, the muzzle velocity 
of shells, rate of fire, altitude and striking range, and improved anti-aircraft directors. 

The qualitative improvement of aircraft entailed further development of aircraft detection 
systems. Radar made its appearance in 1938; the Services began to receive experimental models 
prior to the war. Later on, during World War II, rad&r equipment came into wide use. 

The Soviet Air Defense Forces played a very important role in the Great 
Patriotic War. Many thousands of enemy aircraft were destroyed by anti- 
aircraft fire and by fighter planes in aerial battles at the front and on the 
approaches to targets in the rear; they provided reliable support in the 
combat operations of Soviet forces at the front and in the operation of the 


115 


country’s rear services. More than 80 thousand members of the Air Defense 
Forces were awarded orders and medals, 94 were honored with the title of 
Hero of the Soviet Union; 29 formations and units won the distinctive title 
of “Guards,” and 1 1 received honorary names. 

The further development of fighter aviation and especially of rocket weap- 
ons, and the use of the latter for the destruction of aerial targets, greatly 
increased the effectiveness of air defense. The increased potential of air de- 
fense resources and the task of defending our Motherland from encroach- 
ment on its air space by aggressive forces gave rise to the need to establish 
the Air Defense Forces as a Service. 

The Air Force (WS) consists of units and formations. The availability of 
aircraft with different tactical flight characteristics, designed for specific 
purposes, permits the most varied combat tasks to be undertaken by the Air 
Force. 

The size of the air forces of the most developed countries is growing very 
rapidly. In World War I they were only an auxiliary branch. In the period 
between the two world wars, the air force, together with artillery and tanks, 
became one of the main branches. During the course of World War II, 
however, as the quantity and quality of the aircraft inventory increased, the 
air force was transformed into one of the main services of the armed 
forces. 

The development of Soviet aviation began immediately after the Revolu- 
tion. On 10 November 1917 the formation of the first socialist air detachment 
was begun in Petrograd on the instructions of V. I. Lenin. The total number 
of aircraft in service at that time did not exceed 300. The industrialization 
of our country made it possible to provide the Soviet Air Force with high 
quality equipment in adequate quantities. 

The Air Force was transformed into a formidable force during the Great Patriotic War. 
During the last three years of the war, it received 40 thousand first-rate aircraft per year from 
our aircraft industry. The Air Force participated in all major opc'ations conducted by the 
Ground Forces, provided infantry and tank formations with direct support on the battlefield, 
bombed enemy communications and important targets in the enemy’s rear, destroyed his aircraft 
in aerial engagements, carried out reconnaissance missions, made airborne landings in the 
enemy’s rear, and carried out artillery spotting missions. During the war our aircraft flew 
approximately four million sorties and shot down more than 75,000 enemy aiiviau. Over 
200,000 airmen were awarded orders and medals; 2,420 were honored with the title of Hero of 
the Soviet Union. 

Modern military aircraft are jet-propelled, supersonic, missile carrying, 
all-weather machines. During recent years, their combat potential has in- 
creased enormously. By equipping them with new weapons, including nu- 
clear weapons, the fire power of each combat aircraft has been increased. A 
mission which, during World War II, would have required a whole air 
formation, can now be undertaken by a group of several aircraft. 

The speed, range, and altitude of aircraft have increased. New aircraft 
engines enable modem aircraft to reach the upper layers of the atmosphere. 


116 


LM 



These aircraft are capable of op>erating at different altitudes, thus lessening 
their chances of detection by the enemy. 

A display of the latest aircraft in 1967 included heavy supersonic missile 
carriers, VTOL aircraft, variable wing geometry aircraft and many other 
types. 

The Air Force as a Service includes long-range, tactical, and military 
transport aircraft 

Long Range Aviation is intended for action against the ei>;my’s vitally 
important strategic targest; ICBM bases, nuclear arsenals, naval bases, stra- 
tegic bomber bases, and large military industrial targets which form the 
enemy’s military potential, as well as ground forces and ships at sea. Long 
Range Aviation is equipped with modern high-speed jet-propelled bombers 
capable of operating at high altitudes and spanning intercontinental dis- 
tances. These bombers can carry nuclear and thermonuclear weapons in the 
form of aerial bombs and remotely controlled missiles of different capaci- 
ties. 

Frontal Aviation. Organizationally this is part of the forces of a front and 
is intended for joint combat operations with them and with other Services 
cooperating with them. Frontal aviation includes various types of aircraft: 
bomber, fighter, reconnaissance, spotting, liaison, etc. 

The diverse composition and varied resources of Frontal Aviation enable 
them to carry out a variety of tasks. As an integral part of a front’s strike 
forces, cooperating primarily with the Rocket Forces, they are responsible for 
the destruction of the enemy’s nuclear attack resources, the most important 
groups of his forces and reserves, airfields, command posts, targets in the rear 
and communication centers. 

Fighter aircraft protect a front’s troops, and targets in the rear area of a 
front from possible enemy air strikes and support bomber combat operations, 
reconnaissance missions, transport and other types of aviation. 

Military Transport Aviation is a branch that is intended for the transporta- 
tion and landing (dropping) of airborne assault troops, and for air lifting 
troops. It is also used for the delivery of arms, fuel, provisions and all that 
is needed to support the life and combat activities of the troops. Apart from 
specially equipped transport aircraft, this branch of the Service operates 
helicopters adapted for airborne assault landings and the delivery of materiel, 
equipment and other freight to unprepared field sites. 

The Navy of the USSR is a separate Service. One of the most important 
tasks of this Service, in the event that the imperialists unleash a war against 
the USSR and the other socialist countries, will be to inflict powerful nuclear 
missile strikes on military targets on enemy territory and to destroy atomic 
submarines and striking forces at their bases and at sea. The Navy is also 
charged with the tasks of engaging the enemy in shipping lanes for the 
purpose of disrupting his supplies, and cooperating with the Ground Forces 
in operations in maritime sectors. 

Reasoning from the military geographical position of our Motherland, the 
nature of a possible war at sea, and the interests of our State, the Soviet Union 

117 




is forced to maintain several fleets, which can carry out combat activities both 
independently and in cooperation with formations of other services. 

The Navy is one of the oldest of our fighting Services. The Soviet Navy originated in the fires 
of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the Civil War. The cruiser “Avrora” heralded 
the beginning of the new era by firing on the Winter Palace. In March 1918 the Baltic Fleet made 
its heroic Arctic voyage from Helsinki to Kronshtadt and, thus, 211 ships escaped capture by 
the German imperialists. In battles during the Civil War, our sailors heroically defended the 
achievements of the Revolution on land and at sea. In the period between the Civil War and 
the Great Patriotic War the development of the Navy proceeded swiftly. The aging Baltic and 
Black Sea fleets were reconstructed and strengthened, and the Pacific and Northern fleets were 
created anew. 

During the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Navy took part in defensive 
and offensive operations, protected the flanks of the Soviet Army from the 
sea, and was active on sea and ocean shipping lanes. The fleets and flotillas 
of the Navy carried out 114 operational and tactical assault landings of 
Ground Forces troops during the war, destroyed 79 1 enemy troop and freight 
transports and 708 warships and auxiliary vessels on shipping lanes. The 
achievements of Soviet sailors are highly valued by the Motherland. More 
than 350 thousand sailors, petty officers, officers and admirals were awarded 
orders and medals. Five hundred and thirteen of the most outstanding navy 
men were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The Northern, Red 
Banner Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific fleets were awarded the Order of the 
Red Banner in honor of the 20th Anniversary of the victory over fascist 
Germany. 

Following the end of the Great Patriotic War, the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party and the Soviet government immediately tackled the 
task of the accelerated development and renewal of the Navy. As a result, 
even during the first postwar decade, our fleet was replenished with a large 
number of new and up-to-date warships, including cruisers, destroyers, sub- 
marines, escort vessels, minesweepers, submarine hunters, and torpedo 
boats. 

The construction of new ships was parallelled by the modernization of 
prewar ships: their anti-aircraft, anti-submarine and anti-mine armament was 
increased, their reconaissance and fire systems, and other equipment, 

were improved. 

The creation of an ocean-going atomic submarine fleet armed with nuclear 
missiles marked a new qualitative jump in the development of the Armed 
Forces. 

The Navy comprises submarines armed with missiles and torpedoes, naval 
aviation, various classes of surface ships, auxiliary vessels for various pur- 
poses, coastal missile and artillery units, and marine infantry. 

Submarines and aircraft represent the main strength of oui Navy. The 
power-to-displacement ratio of a modem submarine is almost 100 times 
higher than that of a prewar submarine, its diving depth is over 5 times as 
great, and its underwater speed 3-4 times faster. 

The Navy’s main striking forces, consisting of atomic powered missile- 

118 


\ 

t . 





A 


carrying submarines and naval missile-carrying aircraft, are intended to in- 
flict nuclear strikes on major enemy targets. 

Atomic submarines are armed with long-range missiles and homing 
torpedoes with nuclear payloads, and are equipped with up-to-date observa- 
tion, target detection, and other radio-electronic gear. They are capable of 
effectively destroying at great ranges naval targets as well as targets on the 
enemy’s seaboard and deep in his rear. 

Capable of high speeds, possessing good maneuvering qualities and the 
ability to operate at great depths, atomic submarines can successfully engage 
highly mobile groups of enemy surface ships. 

Diesel submarines have not lost their importance. They can carry out 
reconnaissance patrols, destroy enemy convoys, and attack coastal targets 
with missiles. 

The naval missile-carrying air arm, which has all-weather long-range jet 
aircraft armed with missiles, is capable of inflicting strikes on large, highly 
mobile groups of enemy surface warships and convoys in remote regions of 
seas and oceans, as well as on his ports and naval bases. 

Apart from missile-carrying aircraft, the naval air arm usually includes 
ASW aircraft and helicopters equipped with modem weapons for combatting 
enemy submarines. 

Modem weapons, especially nuclear missiles capable of striking the enemy 
at great distances and with great effectiveness, have considerably increased 
the Navy’s potential, changed the forms and methods of naval warfare, and 
thus made it necessary to approach the training and education of personnel 
from a new angle. 

Equipped with the latest technology and modern weapons, the Soviet Navy 
is a formidable force which reliably guarantees the security of the sea fron- 
tiers of our Motherland. 

A HIGH HONOR AND A GREAT RESPONSIBILITY 

Dear comrades! It is a great honor to be a fighter in the mighty Army of the Soviet people 
— the builders of communism and the Army, a bulwark of peace on earth. But your responsibil- 
ity for the security and defense of the socialist Homeland is also very great. 

The interests of further strengthening the fighting power of the Soviet Armed Forces require 
persistent improvement of political and military knowledge, vigilance and combat readiness, 
mastery of fighting equipment and weapons, and high standards of organization and discipline 
on the part of all personnel. 

(From the Message of Greeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Presidium of (he 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the fighters of the 
heroic Armed Forces of the Soviet Union In connection with the 50th Anniversary of the Soviet 
Army and Navy, KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza [The CPSU on the Armed 
Forces of the Soviet Union], p. 455.) 

Soviet fighting men are conscious of their enormous responsibility for the defense of the 
Motherland and its security This responsibility is particularly great at the present time, when 
the American imperialists are intensifying military preparations against the Soviet Union and 
other socialist countries, expanding their aggres.sion in Vietnam, encouraging the Israeli invad- 
ers, and supporting the revanchist aspirations of the ruling circles of the Federal Republic of 


119 


Germany. The Communist Party and the Soviet government are dealing a decisive rebuff to the 
treacherous plans of the imperialists, and rendering all-round assistance and support to the 
peoples struggling for their freedom and independence. We applaud this Leninist policy warmly 
and wholeheartedly. 

If the imperialists dare to encroach on the Soviet Union and its sacred frontiers, they will feel 
the force of our arms. The Armed Forces are served by well-trained, educated and experienced 
officers’ cadres. The Motherland has entrusted us with first-rate weapons and equipment. We 
shall spare neither strength nor labor in order to improve our moral and fighting qualities, to 
tirelessly strengthen military discipline, good organization and order, to doggedly master our 
modem fighting equipment, and to maintain the combat readiness of subunits, units, ships, and 
formations at the highest level. Lenin’s precept — learn military science the right way — was, is, 
and will be the law of our combat service and training. 

The number of soldiers and sailors with excellent ratings in political and military training, 
the numbers of military specialists, outstanding subunits, units and ships arc increasing. We are 
proud of the high standard of our military work. But we have not yet reached the limit. We 
consider it our sacred duty to put into practice, precisely and steadfastly, the instructions of the 
Party, always to be at our posts and in a state of full combat readiness to defend the achievements 
of the Great October Revolution. 

We assure the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet of the USSR, and the Soviet government that the fighting men of the Armed Forces of 
the Great Soviet State will always be worthy sons of the Motherland and will justify the great 
confidence placed in them for the defense of the socialist state. 

(From a letter to the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 
of the USSR, and the Council of Ministers of the USSR from the soldiers, sailors, noncommis- 
sioned and petty officers, and officers in connection with the 50th Anniversary of the Soviet 
Army and Navy). 

What to Read on This Section 

y. I. Lenin i Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily [V. I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed 
Forces]. Voyenizdat, 1969. 

50 let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR [Fifty Years of the Armed Forces of the 
USSR]. Voyenizdat, 1968. 

Astashenkov, P. T. Sovetskiye raketnyye voyska [The Soviet Rocket Forces]. 
Voyenizdat, 1967. 

Sovetskaya aviatsiya i kosmonavtika [Soviet Aviation and Cosmonautics]. 
Voyenizdat, 1968. 

Voyska protivovozdushnoy oborony strany [The National Air Defense Forces]. 
Voyenizdat, 1968. 

Boyevoy put' Sovetskogo Voyenno-Morskogo Flota [The Combat Record of the 
Soviet Navy]. Voyenizdat, 1967. 

DATES OF THE MOST IMPORTANT EVENTS 
1917 

7 November (25 October) — Great October Socialist Revolution. Victory of the armed uprising 
in Petrograd. 

7-15 November (25 October-2 Noventber) — Armed uprising and establishment of the Soviet 
regime in Moscow. 


120 


t 


8 November (26 October) — Formation of the Military and Naval Committee (Military Col- 
legium of People’s Commissars from December, 1917). 

9-14 November (26 October-1 November) — Overthrow of the counterrevolutionary uprising of 
Kerenskiy and Krasnov. 

8 December (25 November) — Appeal of the Council of People’s Commissars (SNK) “To the 
entire population calling on them to struggle against the counterrevolutionary uprisings of 
General Kaledin and Ataman Dutov.” 

November — Formation of the Caspian Naval Flotilla and commencement of its combat activi- 
ties. 

December — Formation of the Chief Artillery Directorate. 

1918 

28 (15) January — Decree of the Council of People’s Commissars on the organisation of the 
Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army. 

I February (19 January) — Formation of the First Red Army Corps begun in Petrograd. 

I I February (29 January) — Decree of the Council of People’s Commissars on the organization 
of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Fleet. 

—Defeat of the counterrevolutionary advance of General Kaledin on the Don. 

12 February (30 January) — Creation of the Collegium of the People’s Commissariat for Naval 
Affairs. 

13 February (31 January) — Council of Armored Units (“Tsentrobron’ ’’) set up by order of the 
People’s Commissariat for Military Affairs (Armored Directorate from 30 August, 1918). 

19 February-27 February — Transfer of ships of the Baltic Fleet from Revel to Helsingfors. 

23 February — Day of mass mobilization of the workers for defense of the socialist Fatherland 
and of the first victories in the armed struggle against the enemies of the revolution. Celebrated 
annually as a national holiday — Day of the Soviet Armed Forces. 

3 March — Peace treaty between Soviet Russia and Germany signed at Brest. 

4 March — Adoption of a decree by the Council of People’s Commissars on the creation of a 
Supreme Military Council to direct the defense of the country, and on the organization of the 
Armed Forces. 

— Formation of the Headquarters of the Supreme Military Council to direct all military 
operations (reorganized as the Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 
Republic in September 1918). 

12 March-2 May — ^Transfer of ships of the Baltic Fleet from Helsingfors to Kronshtadt. 

8 April — Adoption of a decree by the Council of People’s Commissars on the setting up of a 
local apparatus for the raising of the Red Army — miosi', uyezd, guberniya and okrug commis- 
sariats.* 

— Creation of the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars. 

22 April — Decrees of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTslK): on the compul- 
sory military training of workers and working peasants between the ages of 18 and 40; on the 
procedure for filling posts in the Red Army (abolition of the election of officers). Approval 
of the text of the “Solemn promise on admission to the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army.” 

April-July — Formation and commencement of combat activities of the Volga and Vol'sk naval 
flotillas and the Simbirsk Naval Detachment. 

8 May — E.stablishment of the All-Russian General Staff (Vserosglavshtab), subs<^^uently 
brought under the Revo>lutionary Militai'y Council of the Republic on 6 September 1918 and 
merged with the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic 
(RVSR) to form the unified Red Army Staff on 10 February 192t. 

24 May — Creation of the Chief Directorate of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Air Force. 

29 May — Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTslK) on the changeover 
to general mobilization of workers and the poorest peasants into the Red Army. 


* Russian administrative-geographical units (U S. Ed.]. 


10 July — Adoption of a resolution by the 5th All-Russian Congress of Soviets on the building 
of a mass regular Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army. 

25 July — Commencement of the formation of the Onega Naval Flotilla (Petrozavodsk). 

30 July — Decision by a Moscow City Conference of the RCP (b) to mobilize a fifth of all the 
members of the Moscow Party organization for the Eastern Front within one week. 

July — Formation and commencement of combat activities of the Astrakhan-Caspian Naval 
Flotilla (Astrakhan). 

Beginning of August — Formation of the North Dvina Naval Flotilla (Kotlas). 

20 August — Soviet forces went over to the attack on the Tsaritsyn sector of the Southern Front. 
End of August — The Soviet Taman Army left Gelendzhik and began the legendary campaign 
to link up with the main North Caucasian forces, subsequently converted into the 1 1th Army. 
(The army joined up with the main forces at the village of Dondukovskaya on 1 3 September). 
August-November — ^Transfer of six destroyers and three minesweepers from the Baltic Sea to 
the Volga and the Caspian Sea to strengthen the flotillas operating there. 

2 September — The All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) declared the Soviet 
Republic a united military camp. Establishment of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 
Republ’c (RVSR). 

5 September — Commencement of the advance of the Red Army on the Eastern Front. 

6 September — Creation of the post of Commander-in-Chief (Glavkom) of the Armed Forces of 
the Republic by decree of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (RVSR). 

1 1 September — Creation of the Southern and Northern fronts. 

— Revolutionary military councils of the fronts and armies formed by decree of the Revolu- 
tionary Military Council of the Republic. 

September — Creation of the Field Directorate of the Red Air Force attached to the General Staff 
(transformed into ihe UQ of the Commander of the Air Force in March 1920). 

— Establishment of the post of Commander of Naval Forces of the Republic. 

October — Opening of the General Staff Academy (renamed the Red Army Military Academy 
in August 1921; the “M. V. Frunze” Military Academy since 1925). 

13 November — Resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTslK) abrogat- 
ing the Brest Treaty with Germany. 

29 November — Approval of the Internal Service Regulations by the All-Russian Central Execu- 
tive Committee (VTslK). 

30 November — Resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTslK) setting up 
the Workers’ and Peasants’ Defense Council headed by V. I. Lenin (transformed into the 
Council of Labor and Defense in April 1920). 

5 December — Approval by the Council of People’s Commissars of the Statute on the Command 
er-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Republic. 

— Order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic concerning the organization 
of political sections in the Red Army and Navy. 

8 December — Formation of the Caspian-Caucasian Front. 

10 December — Liberation of Minsk by Soviet forces. 

25 December — Resolution of the Central Committee of the Party "On the policy of the War 
Department.” 

28 December — First Field Regulations of the Red Army approved (Part 1. War of Movement). 
December — Setting up of the Soviet Naval General Staff. 

— Formation of the Central Aero-Hydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI) — the center of Soviet 
aviatiem science and technology. 

1918 — Creation, on the initiative of V. f Lcr.in. of the Nizhegorodskaya Laboratory, the start 
of the organiza.tion of scientific research in the field of radio. 

— Commencement of the organization of the air defense of Moscow, Petrograd, Kronshtadt, 
Tula and Saratov. 

— Creation of the Defense Engineering Board under the chairmanship of military engineer 
K. 1. Velichko. 

— Organization of the Higher Small-arms School under the direction of the outstanding 
specialist, N. M. Filatov. 


1919 


I January — Setting up of a commission consisting of F. E. Dzerzhinskiy and J. V. Stalin by the 
Central Committee of the RCP(b) and the Defense Council to establish the reasons for the 
surrender of Perm and to take measures to restore the situation in this region. 

3 January — Liberation of Riga by the Red Army. 

4 January — Soviet forces on the central sector of the Southern Front went over to the counter- 
attack against Krasnov’s White Cossack Army. 

— Formation of the Ukrainian front. 

6 January — Liberation of Vil'no (Vil'nyus) by the Red Army. 

22 January — Soviet forces on the Eastern Front liberate Orenburg and join up with the forces 
of Soviet Turkestan. 

30 January — Disciplinary Regulations of the Red Army confirmed by the All-Russian Central 
Executive Committee (VTslK). 

5 February — Defeat of the forces of the Central Rada and entry of the Red Army into Kiev. 

19 February — Formation of the Western Front. 

4-6 March — Commencement of the first combined campaign of the Entente against the Soviet 
Republic. 

18-23 March — 8th Congress of the RCP (b), at which the military situation was discussed. 

20-21 March — 3rd Siberian Conference of underground Bolshevik organizations of the Urals, 
Siberia and the Far East, marking a new tactic in the struggle in the rear of the enemy, held 
in Omsk. 

March — Creation of the. Dnepr Naval Flotilla. 

6 April — Liberation of Odessa from the intervening Anglo-French and White Guard forces. 

10 April — Letter from V. I. Lenin to the workers of Petrograd on assistance to the Eastern 

Front. 

I I April — Thesis of the CC RCP (b) in connection with the situation on the Eastern Front, 
written by V. I. Lenin. 

19 April — V. 1. Lenin, M. I. Kalinin and F. E. Dzerzhinskiy present at the first graduation of 
students from the General Staff Academy. Speech by V. I, Lenin at the meeting. 

22-26 April — As a result of hard fighting around the Salmysh River (north of Orenburg), the 
Red Army inflicted the first major defeat on the attacking forces of Kolchak. 

23 April — Examination of measures for the defense of the Soviet Republic by the Political 
Bureau of the CC RCP(b). 

28 April — Commencement of a counterattack by the forces of the Eastern Front against the 
White Guard armies of Kolchak. 

15-19 May — Belebey operation of the southern group oJ armies of the Eastern Front resulting 
in the defeat of Kappcl's Corps. 

22 May — Publicaiion of an appeal of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) “For the defense 
of Petrograd!.” 

13-16 June — Suppression of the counterrevolutionary uprising in the Krasrciya Gorka and 
Seraya Loshad' forts near Petrograd. 

21 June-30 August — Counterattack of the forces of the 7th and 15th Armies of the Western 
Front against the armies of Yudenich towards Narva and Pskov. 

24 June-9 August-General attack of the forces of the Eastern Front against Kolchak. 

3-4 July — Discussion by a plenary session of the CC RCP(b) of important questions arising in 
connection with the start of the second combined campaign of the Entente. 

9 July — Publication of a letter of the CC RCP(b), “Everything for the struggle with Denikin!" 
written by V. I. I^nin. 

19 July — Resolution of the CC RCP(b) on the mobilization of Party members for the front. 

10 August — Instruction by V 1. Lenin to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic 
to force the attack on the Southern Front. 

1 1 August — Order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic on the division of the 
Eastern Front into two fronts: Eastern and Turkestan. 





123 


28 August — Publication of the “Letter to the workers and peasants on victory over Kolchak,” 
written by V. I. Lenin. 

31 August — Sinking of the Ilritish destroyer “Victoria" by the Soviet submarine “Pantera" near 
Seskaran Island (Gulf of Finland). 

21 September — Examinaticn of the situation on the Southern Front by a plenary session of the 
CC RCP(b) and adoption of a resolution on its consolidation. 

24 September — Adoption of a resolution by the Defense Council on preparation for the defense 
of the Moscow region, Vitebsk, Chernigov, Voronezh, Tambov and Shatsk against the attack- 
ing forces of Denikin. 

26 September — Examination of the views of the High Command of plans for the fight against 
Denikin at a plenary ses.sion of the CC RCP(b). 

27 September — Division of the Southern Front into two independent fronts: Southern and 
Southeastern. 

9 October — Introduction of an institute of political leaders (politruki) of compa’" s, squadrons, 
batteries and equivalent subunits. 

15 October — Resolution of the CC RCP{b) on the situation at the fro’ d on measures to 
strengthen the defense of the Republic. 

20 October — Liberation of Orel by Soviet forces of the Southern Front. 

21-25 October — Decisive battles of the Red Army against the forces of Yudenich around the 
Pulkovo Heights. Enemy advance on Petrograd halted. 

26 October-21 December — Counterattack of the 7th and 15th Armies of the Western Front 
against the White Guard forces of Yudenich. 

October — Creation of the Communications Directorate of the Red Army. 

October-November — Counterattack of the forces of the Southern Front against the White 
Guard armies of Denikin. 

1 1 November — Creation of the First Cavalry Army. 

19 November 1919-9 January 1920 — General attack of the armies of the Southern and South- 
eastern Fronts against White Guard armies of Denikin. 

26 December — The forces of the Red Army on the Southeastern Front go over to general attack. 

28 December — “letter to the workers and peasants of the Ukraine on the victory over Denikin," 
written by V. 1. I^nin. 

1919 — Letter of the CC RCP(b) “On Party work in the Red Army." 

— School (or the training of air observers opened in Moscow. 

— Entry into force of the first Combat Regulations of the Red Army Artillery 
— Creation of the government Commission on Heavy Aircraft (KOMTA). 

— Publication of the draft of the Instructions on the Use of Aviation in War. 


1920 

8 January — Liberation of Rostov-on-Don by Soviet fo'^ccs of the Southern Front. 

15 January — Abolition of the Eastern Front as a result of the destruction of Kolchak's 
army. 

February-27 March — Kuban-Novorossiysk (Don-Manych) operation of the Caucasian 
ront. Capitulation of the forces of Denikin in the Novorrossiysk region. 

It) February — Khabarovsk entered by the revolutionary forces and partisans of the Maritime 
Territory (Primor’ye). 

21 February — Liberation of Archangel by troops of the 6th Soviet Army. 

February — Liberation of the Ukraine from White Guard forces completed by the Red Army. 
— First trials of Sovict-dcii’gncd training aircraf). 

1 March— Large forces of Denikin's troops defeated by the First Cavalry Army and troops of 
the 10th Army near the village of Yegorlykskaya. 

13 March — Libcrat' in of Murmansk by troops of the 6th Army. Completion of the defect of 
the intervening forces and W'hitc Guards in the Soviet north. 

19 March — Approval of the Short Field Regtilations for Private Soldiers in the Red Army. 


124 


29 March-5 April — 9th Congress of the RCF(b), at which a resolution “On transition to ti.e 
militia system" was adopted. 

7 April — Liberation of the Semirech'ye completed by Soviet forces of the Turkestan Front. 

28 April — Baku entered by armored trains of the 1 1th Soviet Army of the Caucasian Front with 
the support of the Volga-Caspian Flotilla. 

April — Creation of the Military-Political Institute, transformed in May 1925 into the Military- 
Political Academy (now the “V. I. Lenin Academy”). 

23 May — Publication of a thesis of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) “The Polish Front 
and Our Mission." 

26 May-4 July — Counterattack of Soviet forces of the Southwestern Front against the Polish 
armies in the Ukraine. 

May — Creation of the Azov and Black Sea Naval Forces. 

5 June — Polish Front breached by the First Cavalry Army. 

9-10 June — Breakthrough by the southern detachment of the Dnepr Flotilla at Tripol'ye. 

12 June — Kiev liberated from the Polish occupying forces by forces of the Southwestern Front. 

2 August — Adoption of a resolution by the Political Bureau of the CC RCP(b) making the 
Crimean sector of the Southwestern Front into the independent Southern Front. 

7 August — 3 September — Counterattack by forces on the Southwestern Front against Wrangel. 

22 August-7 September — Defeat of Wrangel’s landing force in the Kuban’ by forces of the 
Caucasian Front in collaboration with the Naval Expeditionary Division and ships of the 
Azov Flotilla. 

1 September — War Department instructed by the Politburo of the CC RCP(b) to take the 
Crimea before the beginning of winter. 

21 September — Creation of the Southern Front against Wrangel’s army. 

22-25 September — Discussion on the conclusion of p)eace with Poland and on preparation for 
the final defeat of Wrangel at the IX All-Russian Conference of the RCP(b). 

22 October — Liberation of Chita by units of the Army of National Liberation of the Far Eastern 
Republic. 

23 October — Resolution of the Council of Labor and Defense on the restoration of the Baltic 
Fleet. 

28 October — 1 November — Counterattack of the forces of the Southern Front against Wrangel 
in Northern Crimea. 

7-17 November — Perekop-Chongar operation. Completion of the defeat of Wrangel. 

12-17 November — Liberation of the Crimea. 

1 December — Report to V. 1. Lenin by thj Munitions Council on the construction of the first 
Soviet tank by the Sormovskiy Plant with the assistance of the Izhorskiy Plant and the AMO 
Plant (Moscow). 

24 December — Adoption by the Council of Labor and Defense of a resolution noting the extreme 
heroism of the men and officers of 'he Southern Front, who had defeated the White Guard 
forces of Wrangel under adverse cc^nditions, and liberated the Crimea. 

December — Setting up of the Militaiy Scientific Society administered by the General Staff 
Academy. 

1920 — Creation of the Jet-Propulsion Laboratory at the artillery range (Petrograd) (the Gas 
Dynamics Laboratory, from 1928), the staff of which worked on the development of solid-fuel 
jet motors and rocket shells. 

— Construction of a 1 2 kilowatt radio-telephone transmitter ( 1 .5 kilowatts in the United States 
at this time) with an operational radius of more than 2,(XX)km. 

— Publication of the Internal Service Regulations for Naval Vessels of the RSFR. 

1921 

12 January — Circular letter of the CC RCP(b) “On the Red Army." 

January — A commission set up by decision of the Council of Labor and Defense (STO) to 
pfcpaic a program for the development of aviation and the aircraft industry. 


125 


10 February — Formation of the Red Army Staff from the Field Staff of the Revolutionary 
Military Council of the Republic (RVSR) and the Ali-Russian General Staff. 

25 February — Tiflis (Tbilisi) entered jointly by Soviet forces of the Caucasian Front and Geor- 
gian revolutionary detachments. 

8-16 March — X Congress of the RCP(b), at which a resolution was adopted on the military 
question. 

18 March — Suppression of the counterrevolutionary Kronshtadt mutiny by units of the Red 
Army and delegates of the X Party Congress. 

25 June — Resolution of the CC RCP(b) “On the .staffing of military training establishments.” 
31 October — Instruction of the CC RCP(b) to Red Army and Navy branch organizations of the 
RCP(b) in the rear and at the front. 

1921 — Air detachments combined into naval and air force squadrons. 

— Publication of the draft, Naval Disciplinary Regulations of the RSFR. 

1922 

12 February — Final defeat of the White Guards and the Japanese forces of intervention near 
Volochayevka. 

14 February — Khabarovsk entered by the Red Army and the People’s Revolutionary Army of 
the Far Eastern Republic (DVR). 

27 March-2 April — XI Congress of the RCP(b), at which a resolution was adopted on the 
strengthening of the Red Army. 

1 April — Meeting of the military delegates to the XI Congress of the RCP(b). Discussion of the 
theses for a unified Soviet military doctrine. 

9 October — Defeat of the White Guards in the Spasskiy fortified district. 

16 October — Resolution of the V All-Russian Congress of the Communist Youth League 
(Komsomol) on the sponsorship of the Navy by the Komsomol. 

25 October — Japanese forces of intervention expelled from Vladivostok. Liberation of the Far 
East completed (except for Southern Sakhalin). 

1922 — First special design office for the development of new types of ammunition set up by 
decision of the Soviet government. 

— Construction cf the ANT-1 airplane designed by A. N. Tupolev. 

— Creation of the I-4(X) fighter plane by the Soviet designers N. N. Polikarpov, 1. P. Kostkin 
and A. A. Popov, 

— Publication of a draft of the Manual on Field Military Engineering for the Instruction of 
All branches of the Services of the Red Army. 

1923 

12 January — Decision of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic on the transfer of 
the first ten regular infantry divisions to the local militia. 

17-25 April — XII Congress of the RCP(b). 

8 August— Decree of the Central Executive Committee (TslK) and the Council cf People’s 
Commissars of the USSR on the organization of local military units and the military training 
of workers. 

1923 — Production of the 1-1 fighter plane, with a maximum speed of 26‘Ikm/hr at ground level, 
by the design team of N. N Polikarpov. 

— Self-propelled mounting for a 45mm cannon or a 60mm howitzer designed by the Soviet 
engineer P.V, Koroteyev. 

— Construction of the 750 hp 12-cylinder aircraft engine RAM (the Russian Aviation Motor) 
under the direction of A. D. Shevtsov. 

— Red Army Telegraph and Telephone Manual brought into force. 


126 


1924 


24 February — Provisional Combat Regulations of the Red Army Artillery approved. 

28 March — Order of the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Republic on reorganization 
and simplification of the central organization of the People’s Commissariat for Naval Affairs 
(Narkomvoyenmor). 

31 March-2 April- Resolution of a plenary meeting of the CC RCP(b) “On the War Depart- 
ment.” 

9 May — Provisional Red Army Garrison Duty Regulations approved. 

23-31 May — XIII Congress of the RCP(b), at which work on the reorganization of the Armed 
Forces was approved. 

9 July-24 August — Voyage of the cruiser “Avrora” and the training ship “Komsomolets” from 
Kronshtadt to Archangel and back, calling at the Swedish port of Goteborg and the Norwe- 
gian port of Bergen. The first foreign cruise of ships of the Baltic Fleet. 

12 July-19 November — Transfer of the gunboat “Vorovskiy” from Archangel to Vladivostok 
(around Europe and Asia). 

20 July-23 October — Voyage of the gunboat “Krasnyy Oktyabr'" of the Far Eastern Naval 
Flotilla from Vladivostok to Wrangel Island (Arctic Ocean) and back. 

October — First separate tank regiment formed in Moscow. 

19 November — Manual of Engineering and Technology for Line Officers of all branches of the 
Services of the Red Army approved. 

20 December — Instruction on branches of the RCP(b) in the Red Aniiy and Navy approved 
by the CC RCP(b). 

1924 — Directorate for the Investigation and Use of Military Experience and the Examination 
of Problems of Military Science established in the Red Army General Staff. 

— Flight trials of the ANT-2, the first Soviet all-metal aircraft, commenced. 

— Production of the first 100-hp M-11 Soviet aircraft engine designed by A. D. Shevtsov. 
— First anti-tank mine constructed by the military engineer D. M. Karbyshev. 

— Entry into force of the Temporary Manual on the Military Use of the Air Forces of the 
USSR (Part 1. Army Aviation). 

— The first jet engine working on an air-benzine mixture constructed by the Soviet inventor 
F. A. Tsander. 


1925 

26 January — M. V. Frunze appointed Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council and 
People’s Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR. 

6 March — Letter of guidance of the CC RCP(b) “On unity of command in the Red Army.” 

15 April — The Provisional Manual on the Defense of Centers of Population in the Rear, 
Communications Routes, Factories and Plants against Airborne and Chemical Attack, was 
put into operation. 

25 April — Graduation of the first aviation engineers from the "N. Ye. Zhukovskiy” Military Ar 
Academy. 

22 May — All-Union meeting of the Military Science Society. Report by M. V. Frunze “Our 
military construction and the tasks of the Military Science Society.” 

27 July — Regulations on work among members of the Komsomol in the Red Army and the Red 
Navy approved by the CC RCP(b), the CC of the Komsomol, and the Political Directorate 
of the Revolutionary Military Council (PUR). 

24 August — Temporary Regulations of the Red Army Armored Forces approved. 

18 September-9 October — Cruise of the destroyers “Nezamozhnik” and “Petrovskiy” in the 
Mediterranean, calling at Istanbul (Turkey) and Naples (Italy) — the first foreign cruise by 
ships of the Black Sea Fleet. 

23 September — Adoption of the Law on Compulsory Military Service in the USSR. 


127 


1 8-3 1 December — A special section “On Party Organizations in the Red Army” introduced for 
the first time into the Statutes of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) (ACP(b)). 

1925 — The ANT-3 aircraft adopted as a reconnaissance plane (R-3) for the Air Force. 

— Construction of the ANT-4 (TB-1) heavy bomber. 

— Construction of the M-15 450-hp 9-cylinder radial aircraft engine designed by A. A. 
Bessonov and A. P. Ostrovskiy. 

— Publication of the Temporary Field Regulations of the Red Army (Part 2. Division and 
Corps). 

— The Temporarj' Combat Regulations of the Red Army Artillery became operational. 

1926 

23 January — Approval of the Service Regulations for a mine division on ships of the Red Navy 
(submarines). 

March — Introduction of the Regulations on the State Provision of Specialist Officers of the Red 
Army. 

— First All-Union Congress of the Military Scientific Society. 

1 8 June — Approval of the Regulations for the Artillery Department on Vessels of the Red Navy. 
31 August-2 September — Flight of an ANT-3 aircraft piloted by M. Gromov, with Ye. Rod- 
zevich as flight mechanic, over the route Moscow-Berlin-Paris-Rome-Vienna-Warsaw-Mos- 
cow (7,000km in 34 hours flying time). 

December — Adoption of a 6-year plan for naval ship-building in the USSR (1926-1932). 

1926 — Forces supplied with the first series of Soviet-produced medium-wave and long-wave tube 
radio sets for combined forces formations and special branches. 

— Production of the M-13 V-12 aircraft engine developed by A. A. Mikulin. 

— Telegraph-Telephone Manual put into effect. (Part 2. Fixed Station Telephone Equipment). 

1927 

13 August — Implementation of the Combat Regulations of the Red Army Cavalry (Part 3. Field 
Service). 

August — Flight of the ANT-3 aircraft, with S. Shestakov as pilot and D. Fufayev as mechanic, 
on route Moscow-Tokyo-Moscow (approximately 22,000km in 153 hours flying). 

2 November — Decree of the Central Executive Commi4ee (TsIK) of the USSR awarding the 
Honorary Revolutionary Red Banner to the cniiser "Avrora” for the heroic deeds of the crew 
during the October armed uprising in Petrograd. 

1927 — Adoption of V. A. Degtyarev’s light machine giin — the first Soviet-produced automatic 
weapon. 

— A team directed by the designer N. N. Polikarpov designs the R-5 light single-engined 
bomber and reconnaissance aircraft, which takes first place in an international aviation 
competition. 

— Creation of the Soviet-produced 1-3 fighter designed by N. N. Polikarpov (speed 
280km/hr). 

— Creation of the first twin-engined, metal-hulled seaplane, the ROM- 1 (open sea reconnais- 
sance aircraft), speed 165-170kni/hr, by a team headed by the designer D. P. Grigorovich. 
— The first short-wave link, Moscow-Tashkent, opened in the Soviet Union. From this time 
radio communication in the Armed Forces went over to short-wave. 

— Implementation of the Combat Regulations of the Red Army Artillery (Part I, Book I. 
Light Artillery; Book 2. Heavy Artillery. Part 2. Principles of Combat Use). 


128 


1928 


fl 


January — Successful trials of the U-2 (Po-2) training aircraft, the best in the world, created 
under the direction of N. N. Polikarpov. 

20 February — Decision of the Central Executive Committee (TsIK) of the USSR awarding the 
Honorary Revolutionary Red Banner to the Baltic Fleet. 

3 March — The first solid-fuel rocket projectile tested in the USSR. 

30 October — Decision of the CC ACP(b) “On the political and moral state of the Red Army.” 

24 November — Publication of the Statute on commissars, commanders with unified authority, 
and deputy commanders for political affairs. 

1928 — Commencement of serial production of theTB-1 (ANT-4) twin-engined bomber designed 
by A. N. Tupolev. 

— Implementation of the Combat Regulations of the Red Army Infantry (Part 2). ^ 

i 

1929 I 

25 February — Decision of the CC ACP(b) “On the executive and political personnel of the Red I 

Army.” 

25 March — Implementation of the Combat Regulations of the Red Army Armored Forces (Part 1 

1, Book 1. Tanks). 

24 April — Implementation of the Combat Regulations of the Red Army Air Force (Book 1. 

Fighter Aviation). 

May — Design office established at the Gas Dynamics Laboratory (GDL) in Leningrad to 
develop liquid-fuel rocket motors. 

8 June — Implementation of the Manual of the Naval Navigation Branch. 

15 July — Decision of the CC ACP(b) “On the state of defense of the USSR." 

July-August — An ANT-9 piloted by M. M. Gromov completed a flight on the route Moscow- 
Berlin-Paris-Rome-London-Warsaw-Moscow (9,037km in 53 flying hours, average 
177km/hr). 

6 August — Order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR setting up the Special Far 
Eastern Army. 

23 August-1 November — Flight from Moscow-London-Keflavik-Goose Bay-New York by the 
Soviet pilots S. A. Shestakov and F. Ye. Boltov, with F. D. Fufayev as flight mechanic and 
B. V. Sterligov as navigator-radio operator, in the twin-engined ANT-4 (“Land of the Sovi- 
ets”). The flight lasted 70 days (21,242km covered in 142 hours). 

1 1 Octobcr-20 November — Chinese militarists who had provoked a conflict on the Chinese- 
Eastern Railroad defeated by troops of the Special Far Eastern Army assisted bv the Amur 
Naval Flotilla. 

22 November 1929-18 January 1930— Transfer of the battleship “Paris Commune” and the 
cruiser “Profintern” from Kronshtadt to Sevastopol (around Europe). 

November — Creation of the Red Army Motorization and Mechanization Directorate, and of 
armored vehicle and tank sections in military districts. 

— Flight by S. A. Shestakov, with B. V. Sterligov as navigator, in the ANT-4 (military version 
TB-1) from Moscow to New York across Siberia and the Pacific Ocean, 21,242km. 

1929 — Creation in the USSR of the first parachute subunits (sections) in the world, which took 
part in trial exercises and maneuvers. 

— Red Army Field Regulations (PU-29) approved by the Revolutionary Military Council of 
the USSR. 

— K. E. Tsiolkovskiy conceived the idea of producing multistage rockets capable of develop- 
ing the velocities for space flight. 

— Publication of “The Theory of Jet Engines” by Academician B. S. Stechkin — the founder 
of the modem theory of jet engines. 





— Construction of the first experimental liquid-fuel jet engine in the USSR, to the desigi> of 
F. A. Tsander. 

1930 

22 February — Implementation of the first Manual on the Use of Naval Aviation. 

27 February — Implementation of the Combat Regulations of the Red Army Naval Forces 
(BU-30). 

26 June-13 July — XVI Congress of the ACP(b), at which the need to strengthen the defensive 
capacity of the country was stressed in a resolution on the CC Report. 

August — Parachute landing with arms and munitions at an Air Force demonstration exercise 
in the Moscow Military District. 

November — Commissioning of the first “D” class submarine (“Dekabrist”) in the Baltic Fleet. 

1930 — Equipping of the Soviet Air Force with the 1-5 fighter plane. 

— Adoption of V. A. Degtyarev’s tank machine gun with G. S. Shpagin’s ball-and-socket 
mounting. 

— Red Army equipped with F. V. Tokarev’s 7.62mm semiautomatic pistol. 

— Soviet designers create a 37mm anti-tank gun with a rate of fire of up to 20 rounds a minute. 

1931 

25 January — Patronage of the Air Force of the USSR assumed by the IX Congress of the 
Komsomol. 

January — Creation in Moscow of a jet engine section of the Central Council of the Society for 
the Promotion of the Defense of the USSR, and the Aviation and Chemical Industry (Osoa- 
viakhim), subsequently to become the Central Group for the Study of Jet Propulsion and 
Rocket Flight (TsGIRD). 

5 June — Decision of the CC ACP(b) on the executive and political personnel of the Red Army. 
30 July — Decision of the CC ACP(b) on the publication of the “History of the Civil War.’’ 

1931 — Commencement of serial production of the R-5 twin-engined reconnaissance plane de- 
signed by N. N. Polikarpov (ceiling 6,500m, speed 230km/hr). 

— Soviet Air Force equipped with the TB-3 heavy bomber. 

— Commencement of the broad development of Soviet tank construction and the supply of 
new models of equipment to the forces on a mass scale. 

— Adoption of F. V. Tokarev’s quadruple-mount anti-aircraft gun. 

— Production of the prototype of the Soviet SU-14 self-propelled 152mm howitzer. 

— Red Army supplied with the 1931 model of the new 76mm anti-aircraft gun. 

— Production of the first Soviet 82mm battalion trench mortar by B.I. Shavyrin’s design office. 
— Production by Soviet designers of the first track-mounted 203mm heavy howitzer. 

— Development of a 76mm anti-aircraft gun mounted on a tank chassis (T-28 and T-26) by 
Professor Khlystalov (Artillery Academy). 

— Soviet designers produce a 120mm cannon with a firing range of approximately 20km. 
— Commencement of the use of the RV-61 ultrashort-wave radio set designed by V. A. 
Vvedenskiy. This was the first officially recorded set. 

— Combat Regulations of the Red Air Force (Book II. Reconnaissance Aviation) issued. 

1932 

21 April — Formation of the Far Fastem Naval Forces, renamed the Pacific Fleet in 1935. 

1932 — Commencement of the formation of mechanized corps in the Red Army. 

— Independent airborne brigades formed in the Soviet Union. 


— Soviet aircraft equipped with a machine gun developed by the designers B. G. Shpital'nyy 
and I. A. Komaritskiy (ShKAS), which had a higher rate of fire than foreign systems. 

— Soviet designers produced a new 45mm anti-tank gun — the most powerful anti-tank 
weapon of that time. 

— Special training of anti-aircraft gunners commenced in the Artillery Academy. 

1933 

January — Basic specifications for self-propelled artillery worked out by a special commi.ssion, 
including the designer, I. I. Ivanov, and Professor Khlystalov. 

1 March — The testing of a Soviet jet engine produced by F. A. Tsander. 

28 April — Decree of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR establishing an annual 
holiday “Air Force Day” on 18 August. 

1 June — Formation of the Northern Naval Flotilla, renamed the Northern Fleet on 1 1 May 
1937. 

30 September — Ascent of the stratospheric balloon “USSR-l” to an altitude of 19,000 meters. 
September — Commissioning of the first “Shch" class submarine (“Shchuka" series V) in the 
Pacific Fleet. 

October — Commissioning of the first “L" class submarines (“Leninets”) in the Black Sea and 
Baltic Fleets. 

November — Creation in Moscow of the Jet Propulsion Research Institute, combining the Lenin- 
grad Hydrodynamic Laboratory (in existence since 1920) and the Jet Propulsion Study 
Group. 

1933 — The Air Force equipped with the TB-4 heavy bomber. 

— Soviet Forces began to receive the 6PE and 5AK short-wave radio sets, the 71TK tank 
radio, the llAK, IISK, 13SK and other aircraft radios. 

— Testing of the RD (ANT-25) single-engined all-metal aircraft (monoplane), operational 
range 15,000km. 

— Construction of the 1-15 fighter plane by the design office headed by N. N. Polikarpov. 

1934 

26 January- 10 February — XVII Congress of the ACP(b), at which the Statutes of the ACP(b), 
including a special section “On Party organizations in the Red Army,” was adopted. 

30 January — The Soviet balloonists I. D. Usyskin, A. B. Vasenko and P. F. Fedoseyenko 
ascended to an altitude of 22,066m in the stratospheric balloon “Osoaviakhim-1,” establishing 
a world record. 

January — A Soviet rocket with a launch weight of 19kg reached an altitude of 1,500m. 

16 April — Decree of the Central Executive Committee (TsIK) of the USSR “On the establish- 
ment of a high order of merit — the title “Hero of the Soviet Union.” 

April — The majority of Chelyushkin’s expedition were taken off the ice floes in R-5 aircraft by 
the military pilots M. V. Vodop'yanov, I. V. Doronin, N. P. Kamanin, S. A. Levanevskiy, 
A. V. Lyapidevskiy, V. S. Molokov and M. M. Slepnev, For their life-saving feat, the pilots 
were the first people in the country to receive the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. 

13-18 August — First flight of a group (flight) of the AIR-6 light aircraft designed by A. S. 

Yakovlev, on the route Moscow-Irkutsk-Moscow (4,263km in 35 flying hours). 

12-1 5 September — Non-stop flight of 12,41 1km over a closed circuit by M. M. Gromov (world 
record). 

September — Commissioning of the first “M” class submarines (“Malyutka," series VI) in the 
Black Sea Fleet. 

1934 — Construction of the ANT-20 “Maksim Gor'kiy” 8-engined aircraft, the largest in the 
world. Load-carrying capacity 80 passengers, maximum speed 280km/hr, flight range 
2.000km. 


— V. A. Degtyarev’s submachine gun adopted by the Soviet Army. 

— Creation of the first original design of an armor piercing shell in the Red Army. 

— Creation of the 1-16 fighter plane (a monoplane with retractable undercarriage) by the 
designer. N. N. Polikarpov; speed 450km/hr (up to SOOkm/hr in later versions). 

— Creation of the all-duralumin SB bomber (speed 420km/hr, flight range 1,000km, bomb 
load 500kg) under the direction of the designer, A. N. Tupolev. 

— Publication of K. E. Tsiolkovskiy’s work “The Energy of the Chemical Combination of 
Matter and the selection of the Propellant Components for a Jet Engine.” 

1934— 1935 — Creation of the first liquid-fuel military rockets in the USSR, with a thrust of 100kg. 
Height of ascent 9-1 1km, flight range 12km. 

1935 

27 May — Decree of the Central Executive Committee (TsIK) and the Council of People’s 
Commissars (SNK) of the USSR concerning the intrcs'uction of the new naval ensigns, which 
are still in use. 

May — Trials of the 1-16 fighter plane designed by N. N. Polikarpov. The last modifications of 
this aircraft developed a speed of up to 525km/hr. 

1 1 July — Trials of the UT-2 (AIR-10) trainer aircraft designed by A. S. Yakovlev, which was 
in serial production between 1936 and 1946. 

22 September — Decree of the Council of People’s Commissars (SNK) of the USSR on the 
transformation of the Main Staff of the Red Army into the General Staff. 

— Decree of the Centra! Executive Committee (TsIK) and the Council of People’s Commis- 
sars (SNK) of the USSR concerning the introduction of the title of Marshal of the Soviet 
Union and military ranks for the officers of the Red Army. 

21 November — Pilot V. K. Kokkinaki reached an altitude of 14,575m in a serially produced 
fighter plane designed by N. N. Polikarpov, and exceeded the world record. 

1935 — 1,8{X) parachutists were dropped and an airborne landing of 5,700 men was made in the 
Byelorussian maneuvers. 

— Construction of the highspeed twin-engined SB bomber (monoplane) with a speed of 
400km/hr, designed by A.A. Arkhangel'skiy and his colleagues. 

— Flight test of the DB-3 twin-engined bomber, designed by S. V. Il'yushin (maximum speed 
400km/hr, bomb load 1 ,000kg, flight range 4,000km). 

— Production of a 152mm self-propelled gun in the Soviet Union. 

— Implementation of the Engineering Manual for all Red Army Services (INZh-35). 

1936 

2 July-17 October — Transfer of 2 destroyers from Kronshtadt to Vladivostok via the White 
Sea-Baltic Canal and the Northern Sea Route. 

17 July — Test pilot V. K. Kokkinaki raised a commercial payload in a TsKB-2 aircraft to an 
altitude of ri,458m, establishing a world record. 

20-22 July — The Soviet pilots, V. P. Chkalov, G. F. Baydukov and A. V. Belyakov made a 
non-stop flight in a single-engined aircraft along the route Moscow-Franz Josef Land-Sever- 
naya Zemlya-Tiksi Bay-Petropavlovsk-on-Kamchatka-Udd Island, covering 9,374km in 56 hr 
20 min. 

7 September — Pilot V. K. Kokkinaki raised a load of 2,000kg to an altitude of 1 1,005m. 

28 October — Pilot A. B. Yun-ashev, flying a heavy four-engined TsAGI-6 aircraft with a 
payload of 5,000kg, reached an altitude of 8,980m. 

1936— Acceptance by the Red Army of the first 7.62nim automatic rifle with knife bayonet (S. 
G. Simonov’s system). 

— Acceptance by the Red Army of a new 76mm divisional gun, the 1936 model (F-22), 
produced by the design office of V. G. Grabin. 


— Airborne landing of an entire division carried out during the Gorokhovets maneuvers. 
— Construction in the USSR of a two-stage rocket with aerodynamic stabilizing surfaces. 

1937 

March — Implementation of the Temporary Regulations of the Red Navy. 

27 April — Decree of the CC ACP(b) “On the creation of the USSR Committee of Defense.” 
10 May — Decree of the Central Executive Committee (TsIK) and the Council of People’s 
Commissars (SNK) of the USSR on the introduction of the institution of military commissars 
in the Red Army. 

16 May — Decree of the Central Executive Committee (TsIK) and the Council of People’s 
Commissars (SNK) of the USSR on the formation of military councils in the military districts, 
armies and fleets. 

21 May — The Soviet pilot M. V. Vodop'yanov made the first landing ever of an aircraft in the 
region of the North Pole. 

18-20 June — Flying a single-engined ANT-25 aircraft, V. P. Chkalov, G. F. Baydukov and A. 
V. Belyakov covered the route Moscow-North Pole-Vancouver (United States) flying more 
than 12,000km without landing in 63 hours and setting a world record for nonstop flight. 
12 July — Flying an ANT-25 aircraft (aii-nieta! monoplane) M. V. Gromov, A. B. YuniaSuCv 
and S. A. Danilin flew from Moscow across the North Pole to San Jacinto (California, United 
States). 

July — Military trials in the USSR of RS-82 rocket missiles fired from aircraft. 

1937 — Soviet Air Force equipped with the 1-15, I-!6 and 1-153 fighter planes and the SB and 
TB-7 bombers. 

— RS-82 rocket missiles adopted as weapons for the Soviet 1-15 and 1-16 fighter planes. 

— Red Army supplied with the 1937 model of the 152mm gun howitzer. 

— Red Army equipped with ultrashort-wave radio sets. An improved 82mm battalion mortar 
added to the armament of the Red Army. 

— Development of a design for a jet engine ’oy the Soviet scientist A. M. LyuTka. 
--Commencement of the development in the USSR of several designs of inclined-launch 
unguided rockets. 

1938 

29 July-1 1 August — Incursion of Japanese troops onto Soviet territory, and their defeat by the 
Red Army in the region of Lake Khasan. 

24-25 September — Non-stop flight of Marina Raskova, Polina Osipenko and Valentina 
Grizodubova on the Moscow-Far East route. (Women’s world record). 

8 December — Implementation of the Combat Regulations of the Red Army Infantry (Part 1). 

1938 — Red Army equipped with T-35 heavy tanks. 

— Rocket missiles (RS- 1 32) adopted as armament for Soviet high-speed bombers. 

— Adoption of the large-caliber 12.7mm heavy machine gun for use against armored vehicles 
and aircraft. V. A. Degtyarev, G. S. Shpagin and I. N. Kolesnikov contributed to its develop- 
ment. 

— The new 1938 model of the 76mm anti-aircraft gun received by the Red Army. 

— Adoption as equipment for the Red Army of a 5()mm company mortar (range 800m); a 
i07mm mountain-pack mortar (range 6,300m) and a 120mm regimental mortar (range 
5,700m). 

— Adoption of the 20mm automatic cannon of B. G. Shpital'nyy and S. V. Vladimirov as 
equipment for Soviet aircraft. 

— Adoption of the 7.62mm semiautomatic rifle with knife bayonet (F. V. Tokarev’s system). 
— Development by a team of Soviet designers of the RS- 1 32 truck-mounted multiple launcher 
for salvo firing. 


133 


— Production of the short-range BB-22 {Yak-4) bomber by the design team of A. S. Yakovlev; 
the speed of 560km/hr of this aircraft was far in excess of that of any other aircraft in the 
world. 

— Development of a 1 22mm howitzer by the design office of F. F. Petrov. 

1939 

3 January — A new text of the military oath and procedure for its administration approved by 
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. 

10-21 March — XVIII Congress of the ACP(b). 

1 6 March — Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On the length of active 
service in the Navy.” 

28 May-15 September — Military operations of Soviet-Mongolian forces to defeat the Japanese- 
Manchurian invaders in the region of Khalkhin-Gol (Mongolian People’s Republic). 

15 June-24 August — Movement of a flotiUa of minesweepers from Kronshtadt to Vladivostok 
(through the Panama Canal). 

22 June — Decree of the CC ACP(b) and the Council of People’s Commissars (SNK) of 
the USSR on the institution of Navy Day (on the last Sunday in July) as an annual holi- 
day. 

August — Soviet fighter planes equipped with rocket missiles (RS-82) used for the first time in 
operations in the region of Khalkhin-Gol. 

I September — Adoption of the Universal Military Service Law by a session of the Supreme 
Soviet of the USSR. 

1 7 September — Commencement of a campaign of liberation by the Red Army with the object 
of preventing the seizure of Western Byelorussia and the Western Ukraine by Fascist Ger- 
many. 

I I October — Decree of the Council of People’s Commissars (SNK) of the USSR on the protec- 
tion of the scy boundaries of the Soviet Union. 

October — Commissioning of the “S” class submarine, series IX-bis, by the Baltic Fleet. 

30 November 1939-12 March 1940 — Soviet-Finnish War. 

December — Commissioning of the first “K” class submarines, XIV series, by the Northern 
Fleet. 

1 939 — Complete changeover in the USSR from a mixed system in the development of the Armed 
Forces to a Regular Army. 

— Red Army equipped with the 1939 model of the 85mm anti-aircraft gun and the 1939 model 
of the 37mm automatic anti-aircraft gun. 

— Adoption of the 1939 model of the 208mm mortar (BR-5), the 1939 model of the 210mm 
gun (BR-17) and the 1939 model of the 305mm howitzer (BR-18) as equipment for the Red 
Army. 

— V. K. Kokkinaki and M. Kh. Gordiyenko made a non-stop flight from Moscow to the 
United States across the Atlantic Ocean in an aircraft designed by S. V. il'yushin (TsKB-30). 
— Construction of the light high-speed fighter plane, the Yak-1, by the design office of A. S. 
Yakovlev. 

— Construction of the high altitude fighter plane, the MiG-1, (speed 640 km/hr) by the 
designers A. I. Mikoyan and M. I. Gurevich. 

— Development of the T-32 tank by the Soviet designers M. I. Koshkin and A. A. Morozov. 
— Theoretical proof of the possibility of a fission chain reaction by the Soviet physicists Ya. 
B. Zel'dovich and Yu. B. Khariton. 

— Commencement of the supply of RUS-t air search radar to the Soviet Forces. 

— The first test in the world carried out in the USSR of a rocket powered by a jet engine 
designed by I. A. Merkulov. 


1940 


28 February — ^Thc Soviet pilot V. P. Fedorov made the world’s first flight in a rocket plane. 
March — Plenary session of the CC ACP(b) at which the results and lessons of the Soviet-Finnish 
War were examined. 

7 May — Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the establishment of 
military ranks (generals and admirals) for higher command officers of the Red Army and 
Navy. 

17 June — The Danube and Pina naval flotillas formed from the Dnepr Naval Flotilla. 

28-30 June — Liberation of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia by the Red Army. 

7 August — Formation of the Onega Naval Flotilla. 

1 2 August — Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On the strengthening 
of sole command and responsibility in the Red Army and Navy." 

2 September — Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the institution 
of the “Marshal’s Star,’’ a decoration for marshals. 

12 December — Commissioning of the cruiser “Maksim Gor'kiy” in the Baltic Fleet. 

— Implementation of the Temporary Instructions on the Conduct of Naval Operations by the 
Soviet Navy. 

December — Knowledge about the start of the Second World War and the Soviet-Finnish War 
was correlated at an All-Army conference of senior officers held in Moscow. 

1940 — Publication of draft Combat Regulations for the Red Army Infantry (Part 2). 

— Commencement of serial production of 1-26 (Yak-1) fighter planes designed by A. S. 
Yakovlev. 

— F. V. Tokarev’s automatic rifle adopted as equipment. 

— Degtyarev’s submachine gun approved for mass production. 

— Adoption of the new T-34 medium tank (designer M. I. Koshkin). 

— The first flight in an aircraft powered by a liquid-fueled rocket motor designed by L. S. 
Dushkin. 

— Construction of the new KV heavy tank by a team of designers headed by Zh. Ya. Kotin. 
— Construction of the Pe-2 dive-bomber, with a maximum speed of 540km/hr at an altitude 
of 5,(XX)m, under the direction of V. M. Petlyakov. 

— Cons ruction of the 11-2 attack aircraft by the design office of S. V. Il'yushin. 

— Commencement of the construction in the USSR of the first prototypes of a bypass turbojet, 
with thrust of 600kg, designed by A. M. Lyul'ka. 

— The designers A. 1. Mikoyan and M. I. Gurevich developed the MiG-3 high-altitude fighter 
plane powered by an engine designed by A. A. Mikulin. Serial production began in 1941. 
— Construction of the LaGG-1 fighter plane (modified LaGG-3) by the designers S. Lavoch- 
kin, V. Gorbunov and M. Gudkov. 


1941 

15-20 February — XVlll Conference of the ACP(b). 

25 February — Adoption of a decree by the CC ACP(b) and the Council of People’s Commissars 
of the USSR “On the reorganization of the Red Air Force." 

22 June — Treacherous attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union. The beginning of the 
Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people. 

— Announcement of the mobilization of reservists in 14 military districts of the USSR. 

23 June — Decree of the Council of People’s Commiss,irs (SNK) of the USSR and the CC 
ACP(b) setting up the General Headquarters of the Aimed Forces of the USSR. 

— Directive of the People’s Commissar of Defense on the formation of the Southern Front. 
23-29 June — Tank battle in the vicinity of Lutsk, Brody and Rovno. 

29 June — Publication of a directive of the Council of People’s Commissars (SNK) of the USSR 
and the CC ACP(b) to Party and Soviet organizations in regions near the front, setting out 
a program for the mobilization of all forces and resources to repulse the enemy. 

30 June — Creation of the State Defense Committee (GKO) of the USSR. 



135 


1 July — General instruction of the CC CP(b) to the Byelorussian Party, and Soviet and Kom- 
somol organizations, on the development of partisan warfare in the enemy’s rear. 

2 July — Publication of a decree of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR “On 
universal compulsory training of the population for air defense.’’ 

3 July — Radio broadcast by J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the State Defense Committee. 

5 July — Decree of the CC CP(b) of the Ukraine on the creation of partisan units and a Bolshevik 
underground organization in occupied districts. 

10 July — Decree of the GKO transforming the General Headquarters into the Headquarters of 
the Supreme Command. 

10 July-10 September — Battle of Soviet Forces for the defense of Smolensk. 

1 1 July- 19 September — Defense of Kiev. 

14 July — The first Soviet rocket battery, commanded by Captain I. A. Flerov, fired the first salvo 
on the German invaders in the Orsha rayon. * 

16 July — Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the reorganization of 
bodies concerned with political propaganda and the introduction of the institution of military 
commissars in the Red Army (this decree was extended to cover the Navy on 20 July). 

18 July — Resolution of the CC ACP(b) “On the organization of combat activities in the rear 
of the German forces. ’’ 

— Signing of an agreement between the governments of the USSR and Czechoslovakia on joint 
action against Germany and the formation of Czechoslovak fighting units in the USSR. 

30 July — The signing of a Soviet-Polish agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations, 
mutual assistance in war, and the formation of Polish military units in the USSR. 

5 August- 16 October — The heroic defense of Odessa. 

8 August — ^J. V. Stalin appointed Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the USSR. 

— First flight of aircrafl of the Baltic Fleet against military targets in Berlin. 

30 August-6 September — Defeat of German Fascist forces in the vicinity of Yel'nya. 

8 September 1941-27 January 1944 — Heroic defense of Leningrad. 

17 September — Decree of the GKO on universal compulsory military training in the USSR. 
18September — First steps in the setting up of the Soviet Guards: 100th, 127th, IS'^rdand 161st 

Infantry Divisions renamed the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Guards Divisions. 

30 September 1941-7 January 1942 — The g.'eat battle around Moscow. 

30 October 1941-4 July 1942 — The heroic defense of Sevastopol (individual subunits and groups 
fought until 9 July). 

7 November — Military parade in Red Square. 

22 November — Opening of the ice route across Lake Ladoga to Leningrad (the “Road of Life”). 
24 November — Decree of the State Defense Committee (GKO) proclaiming the Air Defense 
Forces an independent Service. 

26 November-28 December — counterattack by Soviet Forces around Tikhvin. Liberation of 
Tikhvin (9 December). 

29 November — Liberation of Rostov-on-Don by Soviet Forces. 

5 December 1941-7 January 1942 — counterattack by Soviet Forces around Moscow. 

26 December 1941-2 January 1942 — The Kerch-Feodosiya airborne landing operation. 

1941 — Creation of the first jet fighter in the world by a design team headed by V. F. Bolk- 
hovitinov. 

— Red Army supplied with 57mm self-propelled anti-tank guns. 

— Adoption of the 14.5mm anti-tank rifle (system of V. A. Degtyarev and S. G. Simonov). 
— Publication of the Red Army Field Regulations (draft). 

— Adoption by the Red Army of a new model of G. S. Shpagin’s 7.62 mm submachine gun 
(PPSh). 

— Adoption of the new TM-41 anti-tank mine with pressed metal body. 


• Soviet administrative-geographical unit [U.S. Ed.]. 


136 


1942 


4 January — Soviet parachute unit of 416 men dropped in the region of Bol'shoy Fat'yanov 
(southeast of Vyaz'ma). 

18-21 and 28 January — 652 Soviet parachutists dropped near Zhelan'ye (northwest of Yukh- 
nov). Airborne landing of a force of 1,643 men in the same region. 

January- April 1942 — General attack by Soviet Forces. The enemy is thrown back between 100 
and 350km to the west. 

On the night of 17 February — Soviet airborne landing (312 men) near Rzhev to reinforce 
surrounded troops of the 29th Army of the Kalinin Front. 

1 7-20 February — Airborne landing of the 4th Airborne Corps (6,988 men in all) to assist troops 
on the Western Front to end the encirclement of the Yukhnov grouping. 

February — First steps in the formation of the first Czechoslovak military unit in the USSR, at 
Buzuluk. 

17 March — Red Army Staff Field Service Manual approved. 

4 April — Award of the title of “Guards’ Ship” to the eight best fighting ships, including the 
“Krasnyy Krym,” the flotilla leader “Minsk,” and the minelayer “Marti.” 

— Defense boats of the Black Sea Fleet accompanying large supply ships used 82 mm rocket 
missiles (naval “Katyushas”) against enemy dive bombers. 

8-19 May — Defensive operation of troops of the Crimean Front in the Kerch Peninsula. 

10 May — First steps in the formation of the 1st Czechoslovak Brigade at Novokhopersk. 

15 May — Pilct G. Ya. Bakhchivandzhi tests the first jet aircraft in the world, designed by V. 
F. Bolkhovitinov. 

21 May — Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On the introduction of 
guards’ ranks in the Red Armed Forces.” 

30 May — Creation of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement in the USSR. 

2 June — Mountain Warfare Manual (Part 1) approved. 

7-24 July — Defensive operation of troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts in the large 
bend of the Don and in the Donets Basin. 

17 July- 18 November — Defensive period of the battle of Stalingrad. 

17 July 1942 -2 February 1943 — Battle of Stalingrad. 

25 July-31 December — Battle for the Caucasus. Defensive period. 

9 October — Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On the establishment 
of unified command and the abolition of the institution of military commissars in the Red 
Army.” (This Decree was extended to the Navy on ) 3 October.) 

9 November — Approval of the Combat Regulations of the Red Army Infantry (Parts I and 

11 ). 

19 November 1942-2 February 1943 — Counterattack by troops of th. Southwestern, Don and 
Stalingrad fronts. 

23 November — Completion of the encirclement by the Red Army of a grouping of 330, (XX) 
German Fascist troops near Stalingrad. 

November 1942-March 1943 — Attack by the Red Army in the winter campaign of 1942/43. 

1943 

1 January-4 April — Operations of Soviet Forett to liberate the North Caucasus. 

6 January — Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR instituting new insignia 
of rank, epaulets, for Red Army personnel (for Naval personnel from 15 February). 

10 January-2 February — Liquidation of the German troops surrounded near Stalingrad. 

12-18 January — Lifting of the blockade of Leningrad by troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov 

Fronts, a.ssisted by the Baltic Fleet. 

16 January — Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR instituting additional 




137 


military ranks (marshal) for the higher officers of the Air Force, Artillery, and Armored 
Troops. 

24 January-17 February — Voronezh-Kastornoye offensive by troops of the Voronezh and 
Bryansk Fronts. 

29 January-18 February — Offensive by troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts in the 
Donets Basin. 

January — Soviet Army equipped with the SlJ-76 and SU-122 self-propelled guns. 

2 February-3 March — Offensive operations of troops of the Voronezh Front and the left flank 
of the Bryansk Front towards Kursk and Ryl'sk, and towards Kharkov and Poltava. Libera- 
tion of Kharkov (16 February) and Kursk (8 February). 

19 February-3 March — Defensive operation of the Southwestern Front, south of Kharkov, v 
27 February — Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On the institution 
of the “Marshal’s Star,” a decoration for Marshal of Artillery, Marshal of Aviation and 
Marshal of Armored Troops.” 

8 March — First battle of the 1st Czechoslovak Battalion at the village of Sokolovo. 

9 May — Commencement of the formation of the 1st Polish Division fthe “Tadeusz Kosciusko” 
Division) in the USSR on the initiative of the Union of Polish Patriots. 

5 July — The start of the Battle of Kursk. 

12 July-23 August — Counterattack by Soviet Forces near Kursk. 

5 August — Liberation of Orel and Belgorod by Red Army Troops. First artillery salute in 
Moscow. Order of the Supreme High Commander awarding the battle honors “Orel” and 
“Belgorod” to the units and formations that distinguished themselves. 

21 August — Decree of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR and the CC ACP(b) 
on the organization of the Suvorov military schools. 

10 September-9 October — The Novorossiysk-Taman' offensive operation of the North Caucasus 
Front and the Black Sea Fleet. 

25-26 September — Commencement of the forcing of a crossing of the Dnepr by troops of the 
Steppe and Southwestern Fronts. 

During the night of 26 September — Airborne landing by the Red Army of 4,575 men (3rd 
Airborne Brigade) and more than 1,000 men of the 5th Brigade, who operated in the enemy’s 
rear in the areas north and south of Kanev and in the area of Cherkassy for 50 days, assisting 
the 52nd Army to force a crossing of the Dnepr. 

9 October — Decree of t'ne Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the institution of 
the military ranks of Chief Marshal of Artillery, of the Air Force, and of Armored Troops, 
and also the ranks of Marshal and Chief Marshal of Engineering Troops and Communications 
Troops. 

1-1 1 November — Kerch landing operations of the North Caucasus Front, the Black Sea Fleet, 
and the Azov Naval Flotilla. 

4-7 November — Participation by the 1st Czechoslovak Brigade as pail of the 38th Army of the 
Voronezh Front in the fighting for the liberation of Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine. 
November — First steps in the formation of the Romanian Volunteer Division (the “Tudor 
Vladimirescu” Division) in the USSR. 

24 December 1943-12 May 1944 — Operations for the liberation of the Right-Bank Ukraine and 
the Crimea 

1943 — Formation in the Soviet Army of field engineer-assault engineer teams attached to 
operational formations. 

— Soviet troop? equipped with the new 7.62mm heavy machine-gun designed by P. M. 
Goryunov, V. Ye. Voronkov and M. M. Goryunov. 

— Adoption of the new 3(X)mm high explosive rocket missile, for use against defense works 
as equipment for Soviet Forces. 

— Soviet Forces supplied with the 160mm mortar designed by 1. G. Teverovskiy. 

— The SU-152 self-propelled gun-howitzer constructed on the basis of the KV tank. 

— The SU-85 and SU-100 self-propelled guns constructed on the basis of the T-34 tank. 

— Commencement of mass production of the JS heavy tanks, developed by a design team 
headed by Zh. Ya. Kotin. 


— Red Army equipped with anti-tank weapons; the 1942 model 45inm gun and the i943 
model 57mm gun firing sub-caliber ammunition, and the 1942 model 76mm gun. 

— A. I. Sudayev’s submachine gun adopted as standard equipment for Soviet troops. 

1944 

14 January- 1 March — Offensive operation of troops of the Leningrad, Volkhov and Second 
Baltic Fronts, assisted by aircraft of the Baltic Fleet and partisans, near Leningrad and 
Novgorod. 

3-17 February — Encirclement and destruction of a large grouping of enemy forces by Soviet 
Forces in the Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy region. S 

20 March — Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR concerning the estab- 
lishment of the “Marshal’s Star” as a decoration for Marshal of Engineering Troops and 
Marshal of Communications Troops. 

2 April — Romanian territory entered by Soviet Forces. 

8 April-12 May — Crimean offensive operation of troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, the Inde- 
pendent Coastal (Primorskaya) Army and the Black Sea Fleet with tire assistance of partisans. 
Expulsion of the enemy from the Crimea. 

2 May — Formation of the 128th Independent Czechoslovak Air Force Squadron completed 
(transformed into the 1st Independent Czechoslovak Fighter Regiment in June 1944). 

9 May — Liberation of Sevastopol by troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front in cooperation with the 
Black Sea IHeet. 

10 June-9 August — Offensive operation by troops of the Leningrad and Karelian Fronts, the 
Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga and Onega Naval Flotillas. Liberation of the whole of Leningrad 
oblast'* completed. 

21 June-9 August — Svirsk-Petroza 'odsk operation on the Karelian Front. 

23 June-29 August — Byelorussian operation by troops of the 1st Baltic and the 3rd, 2nd and 
1st Byelorussian Fronts. 

25-27 June — Encirclement and destruction of a large group of the enemy in the Vitebsk region 
by troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Byelorussian Fronts. 

27-29 June — Encirclement and destruction of a group of German fascist troops at Bobruysk by 
troops of the 1st Byelorussian Front. 

3 July — Liberation of Minsk by troops of the 3rd and 1st Byelorussian Fronts. 

3--1 1 July — Encirclement and destruction of a large group of the enemy east of Minsk by troops 
of the 3rd, 2na and 1st Byelorussian Fronts. 

10 July-22 October — Offensive by Soviet Forces in the Baltic region. 

13 July — Liberation of Vilnyus by troops of the 3rd Byelorussian Front. 

13 July-29 August — The L'vov-Sandomirsk offensive by troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front. 

17 July — Troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front cross the frontiers of the USSR and enter Poland. 

18-22 July — Encirclement and destruction of a large group of the enemy west of the town of 

Brody by troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front. 

20 July — Troops of the 1st Byelorussian Front force the Western Bug and enter Poland. 

20 August-27 September — Yassy-Kishinev operation by forces of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian 
Fronts cooperating with the Black Sea Fleet and the Danube Naval Flotilla. 

24 August — Liberation of Kishinev by troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. 

24-29 August — Encircicmcnt and destruction of a large group of the enemy in the vicinity of 
Kishinev by troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts. 

8 September — Soviet Forces enter Bulgaria. 

14 Septembcr-22 October — Attack by Soviet Forces in the Baltic region by the forces of four 
fronts (3rd, 2nd and 1st Baltic Fronts and the Leningrad Front) in collaboration with the 
Baltic Fleet with the object of complete liberation of the Soviet Baltic region. 

15 September — Sofia entered by troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. 

* Soviet administrative-geographical unit {U.S. Ed.]. 


139 


22 September — Liberation of Tallin by troops of the Leningrad Front in cooperation with the 
Baltic Fleet. 

28 September-21 October — Belgrade offensive operation of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. 

6 October — Troops of the 38th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front and the 1st Czechoslovak Army 
Corps occupy the Dukla Pass and enter Slovakia. 

7 October-1 November — Petsan! 0 -Kirkenes operation of the Karelian Front and the Northern 
Fleet for the liberation of Soviet territory in the Arctic. 

13 October — Liberation of Riga by troops of the 3rd and 2nd Baltic Fronts. 

17- 18 October — Soviet troops enter Eastern Prus.sia 

20 October — Liberation of Belgrade by troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front and units of the 
People’s Liberation Army of Yugoslavia. 

21 October — Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR establishing 19 
November as an annual holiday “Artillery Day.” 

22 October — Troops of the Karelian Front reach the frontier between the USSR and Norway. 

25 October — Liberation of the Norwegian town of Kirkenes by Soviet Forces. 

29 October 1944-13 February 1945 — Budapest Operation of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts. 

31 October — Liberation of Bucharest by Soviet Forces. 

1944 — Red Army equipped with the 1944 model of the 100mm gun. — Adoption of V. A. 
Degtyarev’s modernized light machine gun. 

1945 

12 January-3 February — Vistula-Oder operation by troops of the 1st Byelorussian and the 1st 
Ukrainian Fronts assisted by armies from the left flank of the 2nd Byelorussian Front and 
the right flank of the 4th Ukrainian Front. 

12 January-28 February — Operations by troops of the 4th and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts in the 
Western Carpathians to liberate Slovakia and southern regions of Poland. 

13 January-25 April — East Prussian offensive by forces of the 3rd and 2nd Byelorussian Fronts 
and the Baltic Fleet. 

17 January — Liberation of Warsaw by troops of the 1st Byelorussian Front and the 1st Army 
of the Polish Forces. 

29 January — Troops of the 1st Byelorussian Front cross the German frontier west and northwest 
of Poznan. 

30 'anuary-9 April — Encirclement and destruction of an enemy group at Konigsberg by troops 
of the 3rd Byelorussian Front. 

1-17 February — Encirclement and destruction of a group of German Fascist troops in the region 
of Schneidermuhl (Pila) by troops of the 1st Byelorussian Front. 

3 February — Troops of the 1st Byelorussian Front begin to force the crossing of the Oder. 

13 February — Liberation of Budapest by troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts. 

15 February-6 May — Encirclement and destruction of an enemy group in the region of Breslau 
(Wroclaw) by troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front. 

5-15 March — Balaton defensive operation by troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. 

16 March-15 April — Vienna offensive operation by the 3rd and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts. 

18- 20 March — Encirclement and defeat of an enemy group in the region of Oppeln (Opole) by 
troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front. 

4 April — Liberation of Hungary from the German Fascist invaders completed by troops of the 
3rd and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts. 

13 April — Vienna occupied by troops of the 3rd and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts. 

16 April-8 May — Berlin operation of the 1st and 2nd Byelorussian Fronts and the 1st Ukrainian 
Front. 

25 April — Encirclement of Berlin completed by troops of the 1st Byelorussian and 1st Ukrainian 
Fronts. 

— Troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front reach the river Elbe in the region of Torgau, where they 
meet up with the American 1st Army. 


2 May — Troops of the 1st Byelorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts complete the defeat of the 
surrounded Berlin group and completely occupy the German capital. 

8 May — Act of unconditional capitulation of the German Armed Forces signed by representa- 
tives of the German High Command in Karlshorst (a suburb of Berlin). 

9 May — The Day of Victory over Fascist Germany. 

— Liberation of the capital of Czechoslovakia, Prague, by troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front 
supported by detachments of armed insurgents. 

24 June — Victory Parade in Moscow’s Red Square. 

8 August — Declaration of war on imperialist Japan by the Soviet Union. 

— Representatives of the USSR, the United States, Britain and France sign an agreement 
setting up the International Military Tribunal to try the main war criminals. 

9 August — Commencement of Military operations by the Soviet Armed Forces against imperial- 
ist Japan. 

9 August-2 September — Manchurian offensive operation by forces of the Transbaykal and the 
1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts, the Pacific Fleet, and the Amur Flotilla. 

11-25 August — Southern Sakhalin offensive operation of the 2nd Far Eastern Front and the 
Pacific Fleet. 

18 August-1 September — Landing on the Kuril Islands by troops of the Kamchatka Defense 
Region and the Petropavlovsk Naval Base. Liberation of the Kuril Islands. 

22 August — Liberation of Port Arthur and Talien (Dairen) by Soviet airborne troops. 

24 August — Liberation of Pyongyang by troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front. 

August — Airborne landings by the 1st Far Eastern Front in the region of Harbin (500 men), 

Girin (200 men), the Yangtze (300 men), and Pyongyang (150 men). 

— Airborne landings by the Transbaykal Front in the region north of Mukden (300 men), in 
Changchun (300 men), Mukden (300 men), Dal'niy (500 men), and Port Arthur (500 men). 

1 September — Total defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army by Soviet Forces. 

2 September — Signing of the Act of Unconditional Capitulation of Japan. End of World War 
11 . 

3 September — The Day of Victory over Japan. 

1945 — Publication of the Field Service Regulations of the Red Army (draft). 

1946 

I June — Implementation of the Disciplinary Regulations of the Soviet Armed Forces. 

I I July — Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR establishing the second 
Sunday in September as an annual holiday, “Tank Man’s Day." 

24 July — Internal Service Regulations of the Soviet Armed Forces approved. 

25 December — Start-up of the first uranium-graphite reactor constructed by 1. V. Kurchatov 
and his colleagues. 

1946 — Initial steps in the formation of the first rocket units in the Soviet Army. 

— Introduction of a company machine gun using 7.62mm rifle cartridges. 

— Commencement of trials of the Soviet MiG-9 and Yak-15 jet aircraft. 

— Construction of the MiG-9 fighter. Speed 910km/hr, altitude 13,(XX)m. 

1947 

17 January — Implementation of the Drill Manual of the Soviet Armed Forces. 

March — Statute on the political bodies of the Soviet Armed Forces approved by the Central 
Committee of the Party. 

10 June — Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR approving the texts of 
the Military Oath and the Instructions on the Procedure for Administering the Military Oath. 

24 June — G. Kondrashov catapulted from a Tu-2K aircraft; the first time this operation had 
been carried out in the USSR. 

18 October — Successful launching of the first ballistic missile in the Soviet Union. 

» 

r- 

j 


141 


1947 — Delivery of the MiG- 15, the first serially produced Soviet swept -wing jet fighter. Flight 
speed l,060km/hr, altitude up to 15,200ni. 


1948 

23 February — 30th Anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy. 

1949 

20 February — Implementation of the Garrison and Guard Duty Regulations of the Soviet 
Armed Forces. 

August — Nuclear weapon test held in the USSR. 

1949 — Ascent by Soviet geophysical rockets carrying apparatus weighing more than a ton to 
an altitude of more than 100km. 


1950 

February — A serially produced MiG-17 fighter reaches the speed of sound in level flight. 

1951 

21 August — The parachutist V. Kochetkov catapulted from the cockpit of a MiG- 15 at a speed 
of l,036km/hr. 

1 951 — Creation of the first electronic computer (MESM) in the Soviet Union under the direction 
of Academician S. A. Lebedev. 

1952 

4 

5-14 October — XIX Party Congress. 

1952 — Construction of the M2 and M3 universal mini-computers in the USSR. 

1953 

3 August — Detonation of a thermonuclear device in the Soviet Union. 

January — The staff of the Armed Forces begin to study atomic weapons and operations when 
atomic weapons are used. 

September — The first large military exercise involving the detonation of a real atomic bomb held 
in the Soviet Union. 

1954— A start was made on the elaboration of a wide variety of questions related to the conduct 
of military operations in nuclear warfare. 

1955 

3 March — Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR establishing the military 
rank of Fleet Admiral of the So\ let Union. 

25 May — Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on ratification of the 
Warsaw Defense Pact concluded between the socialist states of Central and Southeastern 
Europe on 14 May 1955. 

1955 — Trials of an "aerial cross-country vehicle" (the hovercraft principle) constructed in the 
Soviet Union under the direction of V. Kozhokhin. 

< 

ir'- 


142 


I 


1956 


14-25 February — XX Congress of the CPSU. 

November — At the request of the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers’ and Peasants’ Govern- 
ment, Soviet troops assisted the Hungarian people in crushing a counterrevolutionary upris- 
ing. 

— The testing in the USSR of the intercontinental ballistic rocket by means of which an 
artificial earth satellite was placed in orbit in October 1957. 

1957 

April — All-Army Conference of holders of proficiency badges for excellence in combat and 
political training. 

May — Armed Forces Military Scientific Conference. 

20 August — Delayed drop from an altitude of 15,388m by Meritorious Master of Sport N. 
Nikitin. 

27 August — Communique from the Soviet news agency TASS on successful trials of an intercon- 
tinental ballistic mi.ssile in the Soviet Union and on detonations of nuclear and thermonuclear 
(hydrogen) weapons. 

October — Adoption of a resolution by the October plenary session of the CC CPSU “On 
improving Party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces." 

28 October — Address of the CC CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and the Presidium 
of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to members of the Soviet Armed Forces on the occasion 
of the 40tb Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. 


1958 

i 

' 17 April — Resolution of the CC CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR “On the 

Military Councils of the Soviet Armed Forces.” 

April — New instructions to Komsomol organizations in the Soviet Armed Forces approved 
by the CC of the Komsomol and the Chief Political Directorate of the Soviet Armed 
Forces. 

October — New regulations governing political organizations in the Soviet Armed Forces ap- 
proved by the CC CPSU. 

1959 

3 January — Implementation of the Drill Manual of the Soviet Armed Forces. 

31 October — Test pilot G. K. Mosolov set up an absolute world record with a speed of 2,388 
km/hr in a serially produced MiG-21F tactical fighter. 

1 7 December — The Strategic Rocket Forces, a new Service, established by decree of the Council 
of Ministers of the USSR. 

1960 

1 May — Americaii U-2 reconnaissance plane shot down over the USSR by a Soviet rocket. 

May — All-Army Conference of the secretaries of primary party organizations. 

18 August — Resolution of the CC CPSU on alteration of the structure of Party organizations 
in the Soviet Armed Forces. 

23 August — Internal Service Regulations and Disciplinary Regulations of the Soviet Armed 
Forces approved by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. 


I 


143 


1961 


17-31 October — XXII Congress of the CPSU; adoption of the Party Program and Statutes. 

1961 — Creation in the USSR of a supersonic fighter with an assisted take-off u- 't, and with a 
very short take-off run. 

1962 

1962 — Pilot G. K. Mosolov sets up an absolute world record with a fiying speed of 2,681km/hr. 

1963 

22 August — Garrison and Guard Duty Regulations of the Soviet Armed Forces approved by 
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. 

1963 — Soviet intercontinental rockets tested for target accuracy. — Successful production in the 
Soviet Union of stable plasma of considerable density with a temperature of 40 million degrees. 

1964 

21 April — Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR approving the naval flags and 
pennants for fighting ships, the ships of border troops, auxiliary vessels and officials of the 
Ministry of Defense and the Committee of State Security (KGB). 

1965 

26 March — Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR instituting the M. V. Frunze Prize 
for Outstanding Works of Military Science. 

23 April — The launching in the Soviet Union of the first “Molniya-l” communications satellite 
providing communications between Moscow and Vladivostok for several hours. 

1965 — Creation in the Soviet Union of a new and powerful rocket by means of which the 
“Proton- 1” space laboratory was placed in Earth orbit on 16 July. Total payload (excluding 
the final carrier stage) 12.2 tons. 

— Creation of the honorary titles “Meritorious Military Pilot of the USSR” and “Meritorious 
Military Navigator of the USSR" by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. 

1966 

29 March-8 April— XXIII Congress of the CPSU. 

7 May — Decree of the CC CPSU and of the Council of Ministers of the USSR “On the present 
state as regards the work of the Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force 
and Navy Fleet (DOSAAF SSSR) and measures for its improvement.” 

21 November — First flight of the 24-scater Yak-40 jet aircraft created by a team headed by chief 
designer A. S. Yakovlev. Cruising speed 500-600km/hr, range 2,000km. 

3 December — Solemn interment in the walls of the Moscow Kremlin of the remains of the 
unknown soldier, one of the heroic defenders of Moscow. 

1966 — Creation of a new type of powerful laser by a group of scientific officers at the Institute 
of Physics, USSR Academy of Sciences, under the direction nf Academician A. M. Prokhorov. 


144 


1967 


21 January — Resolution of *he CC CPSU “On measures to improve Party-political work in the 
Soviet Armed Forces.” 

10 July — In honor of the 50th Anniversary of the R volution, the CC CPSU, the Presidium of 
the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the USSR established 300 memorial 
banners as a symbol of valor in battle for military formations, units, and ships. 

September — Dnepr, a large-scale exercise involving forces of the Byelorussian, Carpathian 
and other military districts. Military delegations from friendly armies were present at the 
exercise. 

12 October — Adoption of the Universal Military Service Law by the 3rd session of the Supreme 
Soviet of the USSR of the seventh convocation. 

2 November — Announcement in the Soviet press of the world record set up by Pilot Mikhail 
Komarov. Flying a serially produced supersonic Ye-266 fighter, designed by A. I. Miko-'an, 
he covered a 500 kilometer closed course at an average speed of 2,930kmAr. 

1968 

22 February — A warding of the Order of Lenin to the Leningrad and Moscow Military Districts 
and to the Moscow Air Defense District by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 
of the USSR; awarding of the Order of the Red Banner to the Byelorussian, Kiev, Odessa, 
North Caucasus, and Turkestan Military Districts; awarding of the Order of the October 
Revolution to the cruiser “Avrora.” 

23 February — Greetings of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the members of the heroic 
Armed Forces of the Soviet Union on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Soviet 
Armed Forces. 

21 August — Together with the troops of other fraternal armies, Soviet Forces went to the 
assistance of the Czechoslovak people in defense of the achievements of socialism against the 
threat of internal and external counterrevolution. 

1969 

17 March — Approval at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Budapest of the 
statute on the Committee of Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact States, a new statute on 
the Joint Armed Forces, Join Crimmand and other documents. 

27 May — Greetings of the CC CFSU to the political organizations, commanders and political 
workers of the Soviet Armed Fortes on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the creation 
of the Political Department of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. 

5 November — Institution of the Jubilee Medal by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 
of the USSR, and celebration of the hundredth anniversary of the birth of Lenin by the 
institution of two citations: "For Valiant Labor. In celebration of the lOOth Anniversary of 
the Birth of Lenin" and “For Military Valor. In celebration of the lOOth Anniversary of the 
Birth of Lciiin.” 

26 November — All-Army conference of junior officers in Moscow. 

1970 

March — The Dvina maneuvers, in which all branches of the Services of a number of military 
districts took part. 

22 April — Centenary of the birth of Lenin. 

April-May — Okean maneuvers of the Soviet Navy. 



145 


9 May — 25th Anniversary of the victory of the Soviet People and its Armed Forces over Fascist 
Germany. 

30 July — Socialist competition begun in the Armed Forces of the USSR as a fitting preparation 
for the XXIV Congress of the CPSU, on the initiative of the staff of the “G. I. Kotovskiy” 
Proskurov Berlin Guards Tank Regiment (Orders of Lenin, the Red Banner and Kutuzov). 



Chapter 6. THE MILITARY PROFESSION 


Accomplishing the tasks of strengthening the Armed Forces of the Soviet 
State the CPSU continues, as in the past, to pay great attention to the 
training, education and placement of military personnel. The Party proceeds 
on the basis that line, political, and technical personnel are the most impor- 
tant element, the backbone and cohesive force of the Armed Forces. They 
play the leading role in all aspects of the life and combat activities of the 
forces. 

Command cadres are conveyors of the ideology and policy of the Party and 
the State in the forces, bearers of the class spirit of the army and its fighting 
traditions. They organize the combat training and education of servicemen, 
imbue them with a love of military science, train them to be proficient in the 
use of weapons and the fundamentals of battle tactics, instill in them sound 
moral and fighting qualities and conscious military discipline, and reinforce 
order and organization in the forces. Their knowledge, experience, will, 
authority, and organizing abilities are important factors in ensuring a high 
level of fighting efficiency and combat readiness of the forces, and the achieve- 
ment of victory in battle. All this is confirmed by the rich experience of Soviet 
military development. 

THE CONCERN OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY FOR THE TRAINING AND 
EDUCATION OF MILITARY CADRES 

The task of training military cadres from among the people faced our Party 
immediately after the formation of the Red Army. The Party was convinced 
that only new officers from among the people, dedicated to the Soviet regime 
and capable of correctly understanding the Party’s general and military 
policies and steadfastly carrying them into effect, could ensure the peak 
fighting efficiency of the army of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 

“. . . The old officer corps,” said V. I. Lenin, “consisted mainly of the 
spoiled and depraved sons of capitalists, who had nothing in common with 
the simple soldier. Therefore, in building our new army, we must select 
officers from among the people. Only Red officers will have authority among 
the soldiers and be able to strengthen socialism in our army. Such an army 
will be invincible.” ‘ 


' Lenin, XXXVII, 200. 


During the first months ir. the development of the new army, the Party appointed officers from 
among Party officials and leading workers who had gained combat experience during revolution- 
ary battles in the ranks of the Red Guards and also those members of the Party who had carried 
out major work in the Red Army before the October Revolution. Revolutionary soldiers and 
sailors, as well as former non-commissioned officers, were also appointed to command positions. 

However, these measures alone were insufficient for the establishment of large military cadres. 
It was necessary to set up an extensive network of officers’ courses and military schools. The 
first Moscow revolutionary machine gun school for line officers was established on Lenin’s 
personal instructions. By 15 December 1917 all the student quotas in the school had been filled. 
On 14 February 1918 by order of the People’s Commissariat for Military Affairs the opening 
of the first thirteen officers’ courses in Moscow, Petrograd, Oranienbaum, Tver' and Kazan' was 
announced. These were courses for training line and political officers for the infantry, cavalry, 
artillery, engineering troops, machine gunnery, the communications troops, armored vehicle and 
electrotechnical units, as well as armorers, medical officers, etc. The opening of these courses 
marked the beginning of the development of the Red Army’s system of military training 
establishments. 

By the end of 1918, there were 63 military training establishments in the country, by Septem- 
ber 1919 there were 107, while in November 1920 there were as many as 153. The number of 
students in them was approximately 54,000. During this period about 40,000 Red officers took 
these courses. 

These training establishments turned out officers of middle rank. But the Army also needed 
senior and higher command officers from among the workers and peasants. To fulfill this need 
the following higher military training establishments were created in 1918 and 1919: the General 
Staff, Artillery, Military Engineering, Military Medical, and Military Economic Acade mies. In 
1919 the Petrograd Teachers’ Institute, later the Military Political Academy, opened its doors. 
At the same time, the Higher Small-arms School for Officers, the Higher Military Aviation 
Institute, the Higher Artillery School, and the Higher Military Cavalry School were opened. 

V. I. Lenin paid a great deal of attention to the training of future Red Army 
officers. On the first mass graduation of line officers in Petrograd, he sent 
them a telegram saying: “I send greetings to 400 comrade workers who today 
have completed the course for officers of the Red Army and who are entering 
its ranks as leaders . . . thousands and thousands of other workers will follow 
your example, and with such administrators and officers the victory of com- 
munism will be assured.” ^ 

November 24, 1918, was proclaimed as “Red Officers’ Day” throughout 
the country. Lenin addressed the participants in a parade in honor of this day 
from the balcony of the Mossovet* Building. In his speech, he emphasized 
that the Red Army was a completely new army, that it was called upon to 
defend the interests of the workers, and that it needed a new proletarian 
officer corps, capable of realizing the Party’s influence in the Army, and 
organizing the repulse of the enemies of the Revolution. 

Despite the fact that he was extremely preoccupied with state affairs, 
Vladimir Il'ich often put in an appearance at officers’ training centers, mili- 
tary schools, and academies, and spoke to the trainees. Many times he spoke 
to trainees on officers’ courses in the Kremlin and visited the Moscow Avia- 
tion Schoo*, officers’ heavy artillery courses, and the Military Academy of the 
Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army. 


' Lenin, XXXVII, 88. 

* Acronym for Moscow City Soviet of Workers’ Deputies [U S. Ed.). 


Questions relating to the training of military cadres were discussed at Party 
congresses. An extremely important role in this connection was played by the 
VIII Congress of the RCP(b). The “military opposition,” which demanded 
the election of officer personnel and collectivity of troop control, etc., op- 
posed the Party line on questions of military development and particularly 
the training of cadres. The congress rejected their demands for the election 
of officers and declared that it was expedient to consolidate the principle, 
already proved in practice, of the appointment of officers by the appropriate 
military bodies. As the congress indicated, the main approach to the training 
of command personnel must be through the training and education of our 
own officers from among the workers and peasants. In addition, despite the 
“military opposition,” the Party deemed it necessary to enlist military spe- 
cialists of the old army into the Red Army. 

A resolution on the military question adopted by the X Party Congress 
outlined measures for improving the training of military cadres during the 
period of agricultural reorganization after the Civil War. It was pointed out 
that there was a need to improve military training work and step up political 
instruction activities among the command officers. The congress proposed 
that measures be taken to further improve the social composition of the 
officers’ cadres, to make more regular and systematic use of Red officers in 
command positions. 

Trotskiy, who overrated the role of the old military specialists, belittled 
that of the new Red officers and opposed the nomination of the latter for 
responsible command positions, opposed these Party principles. The Party 
dealt a decisive rebuff to Trotskiy’s anti-Party views and actions. 

During the period of military reform and technical reequipment of the Army and Navy, the 
growth of the officers’ cadres continued more rapidly than before. During the 12 years from 1925 
through 1937, the military schools and colleges turned out 135,000 officers and the academies, 
approximately 13,000. Among tht command personnel the proportion of officers with technical 
and specialist training continually increased. 

The training of executive and political cadres was conducted with great intensity in the 
pre-war years, when dozens of new schools for all Services and branches of the Services were 
opened in connection with the development of the regular army. Whereas in January 1939 we 
had 14 academies and six military departments attached to civilian higher educational establish- 
ments, by the beginning of the war there were 19 academies, 10 military departments and seven 
higher naval schools. The number of students in these training establishments had increased by 
more than one and a half times during this period. 

The Communist Party carried out an enormous amount of work in the 
training of command, engineering, and political officers during the Great 
Patriotic War. During the war, the network of military training establish- 
ments was expanded and the student intake increased, and numerous officer 
retraining and refresher courses were organized. By the beginning of the third 
period of the war, cadres of command and engineering and technical officers 
were being trained by 31 higher military training establishments, 220 military 
schools, and taking more than 200 different courses for the training and 




149 


retraining of specialist officers, the annual graduation output being between 
four hundred and five hundred thousand officers. 

Nearly two million officers were trained by the entire network of military 
training establishments during the war. 

Many talented generals and officers were nominated for command posi- 
tions during the war. The remarkable organizational abilities, political matu- 
rity, and high level of military training of our command and political officers 
were vital factors in the historical victory of the Soviet State and its Armed 
Forces over the Fascist invaders. 

During the postwar period, especially in connection with the revolution in 
military affairs, further demands were made on our military cadres. As 
Engels indicated, when the waves of the technical revolution are raging 
around us, we need younger, bolder heads. Soviet officers are required to be 
experts in the handling of modem weapons and new methods and forms of 
conducting battles and operations; they must significantly broaden their 
military theoretical outlook, and improve their teaching qualifications. 

The increased role of the officer corps is expressed primarily in the fact that there has been 
a significant increase in the proportion of officers in the total number of servicemen. Whereas 
during World War I there was one officer to every 15-19 soldiers and noncommissioned officers, 
there is now one officer to every 7-1 ! other ranks in the armies of the most powerful states, while 
in the air force, rocket and other special forces the proportion is even higher. The increased role 
of officer personnel is also manifested in the fact that the most complex fighting equipment, 
various typer, of assemblies and radio-electronic equipment are, in most cases, controlled directly 
by officers v'ho are either engineers or technicians. 

Thanks to the Party’s constant concern, our Armed Forces now have 
cadres of command and specialist officers, who are wholly devoted to the 
people and the cause of communism, politically mature, highly trained in 
military technical skills and capable of expertly leading the troops, both in 
peacetime and in war. Approximately 93% of all officers, generals, and 
admirals of the Armed Forces are Party or Komsomol members. More than 
30% of the officers and, in some branches of the Services, almost 100%, have 
had a higher military or specialist education. Half of the officer personnel are 
engineers and technicians. Two-thirds of the officer personnel at regimental 
level are junior officers. 

Tasks in the further training and education of command, political and 
technical personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces, and the improvement of the 
political, working and moral qualities of military personnel are formulated 
in the Program of the CPSU and the resolutions of the XXill Party Con- 
gress. 

The Communist Party is ceaselessly preoccupied with the training and 
education of command, political, and technical cadres, recruited from the 
best representatives of the people and selflessly devoted to the cause of 
communism. The Party considers it essential that command and all staff 
officers should have a sound knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory, a high 
level of military technical training, satisfy all the requirements of modem 
military theory and practice, and reinforce military discipline. 


150 


To resolve this problem, a whole complex of measures has been put into effect; many second- 
ary militarj' training establishments have been converted into higher military training establish- 
ments; appropriate changes have been introduced into combat and political training programs, 
etc. 

The decisive element in the training of officer personnel is their ideological 
hardening, arming them with Marxist-Leninist theory. Only on the basis of 
materialist dialectics and a profound understanding of the laws of social 
development, can officer personnel correctly understand the objective laws of 
modem wars, their political and technical character and features, master all 
the forms and means of armed combat, and advance the cause of Soviet 
military science. 

The most important element in the ideological training of officers is the 
study of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and the amiy, and Party 
resolutions on questions of military development and the armed defense of 
socialism and communism. The study of Lenin’s military writings and Party 
resolutions broadens the officer’s political and military outlook, helps him to 
deepen his comprehension of the most important theoretical and practical 
problems of military development, and to resolve more successfully specific 
problems in the training and education of personnel. 

Officers of the Armed Forces are required to possess an excellent knowl- 
edge of military matters, and continuously improve their own military-tech- 
nical and scientific training. This is dictated by a true revolution in military 
matters which was brought about by progress made in science and technol- 
ogy. 

New technology and complex forms and methods of waging war necessi- 
tate new procedures and methods of training personnel. Therefore, officers 
are called upon to work continually to improve their methods, to be more 
bold in putting into practice all the new and valuable knowledge acquired in 
the process of training different categories of servicemen, and to seek ways 
of further increasing the fighting efficiency of subunits, units, and ships. 

“. . . In order to govern,” said V. I. Lenin, “one must be competent 
. . . and have some scientific education.” ’ Applied to an officer, this implies 
that he must be able to meet all the requirements of contemporary military 
theory and practice, study in detail such current problems as the nature and 
features of modem war, changes in the methods of conducting combat opera- 
tions associated with the emergence of new weapjons, ways of achieving a high 
level of combat readiness of the forces, improvement of troop control, etc. 

Continuous improvement of one’s knowledge is also necessary, because 
both technology and the people going into the Armed Forces are changing. 
The educational and cultural level of our young people increases yetir by year. 
The influx into the Army of young people with secondary and higher educa- 
tion has increased still further as a result of the introduction of the Univer- 
sal Military Service Law, passed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. It 
is a difficult matter to train and educate such people. It requires that the 


officer possess a sound technical knowledge and a broad cultural outlook. 

Modern war imposes unprecedented demands on the moral, psychological, 
and physical qualities of command officers called upon to lead troops in 
conditions which have become extremely complex. The nature of modem 
war insistently dictates an urgent need to further consolidate sole command 
responsibility, which the Party regards as the most important principle of 
military development. Sole command responsibility is the strictest centraliza- 
tion of troop control, the unconditional subordination of all servicemen to 
the will of the leader so as to ensure unity of action and coordination of effort 
in carrying out the assigned task. It provides for the full combination of the 
wide powers granted to officers with respect to subordinates, and personal 
responsibility for all aspects of the life and activities of personnel. 

“Since we are preparing our Army for decisive battle with strong and 
formidable enemies," wrote M. V. Frunze, “our units must be led by people 
possessing sufficient independence, firmness, initiative, and responsibility. We 
need officers who can keep their heads in any situation, who would be able 
to make the appropriate decision, bearing responsibility for all its conse- 
quences, and firmly carry it out.” * 

The implementation of sole command responsibility assumes the all-round 
strengthening of military discipline, regulation procedures, and organization 
in the forces. This follows from the nature and features of modern war. The 
more complex and powerful the weapons, the higher the standard of military 
discipline must be, the more precisely all orders, instructions and directives 
on the use of the equipment must be complied with, and the greater the 
degree of promptness, efficiency, and execution required of each serviceman. 

The training of subordinates to be conscientious, disciplined defenders of 
the Motherland is the most important duty of an officer. He is called upon 
to educate servicemen in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and proletarian inter- 
nationalism, conscientious fulfillment of his military duty, respect for mili- 
tary labor, and to develop in them an inner desire to adhere faithfully to the 
principles of communist morality. 

Of considerable importance in the solution of this problem is the officer’s 
c . sense of discipline and his ability to be self-critical, analyze his work and 
conduct, and thence draw the right conclusions. 

The Soviet officer is characterized by his patriotism, faithfulness to com- 
munist ideals, hatred of the enemies of the Soviet Motherland, and irreconcil- 
ability to bourgeois ideology. He is also distinguished by his Party commit- 
ment, purposefulness, steadfastness, endurance, strong will, and command 
requirements in accordance with regulations. 

Soviet officers learn the art of leadership from Lenin. Vladimir Il'ich 
demonstrated models of wise leadership of the masses, developed a certain 
style of work, the mastery of which is a vital necessity for every Soviet leader 
and every officer of the Armed Forces. 

Lenin’s style of work is understood to be the total combination of the 

* Frunze, 1965, p. 480. 


r 

H. ♦ 


152 


methods of work concerning the building of socialism and communism, and 
leadership and education of the masses. The Lenin style is a combination of 
lofty ideology, commitment to Party principles, unity of word and deed, 
communist enterprise, concreteness and purposefulness, a feeling for the new 
and a profound analysis of reality, a creative and scientific approach to work, 
reliance on the experience of the masses, and constant concern for the satis- 
faction of their needs and demands. 

The most important condition for success in the work of the officer is his 
ability to rely on the Party organization and to arrange his work in close 
cooperation with political officers. To rely on the Party organization means 
to maintain daily businesslike contact with it, to assign to Party and Kom- 
somol members specific tasks which follow from combat and political train- 
ing plans, to help them to play a leading role in training and service life, to 
direct their activities into the strengthening of conscious military discipline 
and react promptly and attentively to criticism of shortcomings in the activi- 
ties of the unit or subunit. 

The endeavors of a commander, or a superior, can be considered successful 
only when the entire mass of servicemen is closely united around him, bound 
by a common purpose and profound faith in the experience, knowledge and 
ability of their leader. T jis presupposes the close relationship of the officer 
with the soldiers or sailors, knowledge of their moods, concern for the 
satisfaction of their needs and requirements. An officer who is attentive to 
his subordinates strengthens his authority and wins their confidence. 

* « * 

At an All-Army conference of junior officers in Moscow, the Minister of 
Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko declared: 
“The officer is the main element, the principal figure in the Armed Forces. 
The Party and the Government have raised the importance of the officer to 
a high level, they have entrusted him with the training and education of 
people, granted him the right to give them orders, and lead them into battle, 
in the fulfillment of the most difficult and complex tasks.” ’ 

The officer corps of the Soviet Armed Forces is called upon to rise to every 
occasion and carry out its assigned tasks, its civil and military duty, in a 
fitting manner. 

MILITARY SERVICE REQUIREMENTS FOR OFFICER PERSONNEL OF THE 
ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR (principal provisions) 

In conformitj with the Universal Military Service Law, officers of the 
Armed Forces of the -USSR serve on the active military service list and in 
the reserve until the following maximum ages: 


’ Krasnaya zvezda [Red Star], 27 November 1969, 


Age Limits 


Military ranks 

Active 

military 

service 

category ( 
reserve 

category II 
reserve 

category III 
reserve 

Junior lieutenants, 
lieutenants and 
equivalent ranks 

40 

40 

45 

50 

Senior lieutenants, 
captains and 
equivalent ranks 

40 

45 

50 

55 

Majors and 
equivalent ranks 

4S 

45 

50 

55 

Lieutenant 
colonels and 
equivalent ranks 

45 

50 

55 

60 

Colonels and 
their equivalents 

so 

55 

— 

60 

Generals and admirals 
up to lieutenant 
general, vice- 
admiral and 
corresponding ranks 

55 

60 


65 

Colonel-generals, 
admirals and their 
corresponding ranks, army 
generals, marshals of 
branches of the Services, 
fleet admirals 

60 



65 


Women officers included in the register of those obligated to military 
service on account of their professional qualifications are put on the category 
III reserve list, irrespective of the rank conferred upon them. The maximum 
age for women officers serving in the reserve is 50 years. 

Officers who have reached the maximum age for active military service are 
subject to discharge from military service. In case of need, individuals who 
have reached the age limit may be retained on active military service for a 
period of up to five years in the manner determined by the Council of 
Ministers of the USSR. 

Officers who have not reached the maximum active military service age 
may be discharged prematurely: 

— for health reasons, in accordance with the findings of a military medical 
commission; 

— in connection with staff reductions, when there is no possibility of utiliz- 
ing their services; 

— for non-conformity to service requirements in the assessment of their 
qualifications; 

— for committing offenses which discredit the high rank of a Soviet officer; 

— for being convicted of a criminal offense. 

The officer reserve pool of the Armed Forces of the USSR is made up of: 

a) officers, generals and admirals discharged from active military duty and 
put on the reserve list; 

b) soldiers, sailors, noncommissioned and petty officers with higher or 
secondary education, who have served their period of active military duty 
and have been given officer’s rank after passing the specified examinations on 
being discharged into the reserve; 


154 


c) individuals who have undergone military training in civilian higher or 
secondary sp)ecial educational establishments and having attained officer’s 
rank after passing the specified examinations; 

d) reserve soldiers, sailors, noncommissioned and petty officers who have 
acquired higher or secondary specialist civilian education and a related train- 
ing qualification in a corresponding military profession, after achieving 
officer’s rank; 

e) reserve soldiers, sailors, noncommissioned and petty officers with at least 
grade-eight education, who have served their period of active military service 
and attained officer’s rank after undergoing a reserve officer’s course of 
instruction and passing the specified examinations. 

Reserve officers undergo training and may be called up as follows: 

a) category I reserve — annually for a period of up to three months; 

b) category II — for two training periods of up to three months each; 

c) category III — for one two-month training period. 

In addition, between these training periods, reserve officers may be called 
up for purposes of examinations for periods up to 10 days. 

The total length of the training periods during service in the reserve may 
not exceed 30 months. 

The lengths of training periods for different groups and specialist catego- 
ries of officers, generals and admirals within the limits specified by the present 
clause, are determined by the Minister of Defense of the USSR. 

In case of necessity, the Minister of Defense has the right to retain reserve 
officers, generals, and admirals on training call-ups for a period of up to two 
months in excess of the terms specified by the present law, and also to 
increase the number of reserve officer training periods, not exceeding the total 
training time specified in items a), b), and c) of the present paragraph. 

Between call-ups, category I reserve officers put in 30-60 study hours on 
officer training courses organized by garrison commanders and military com- 
missariats. Reserve officers are enrolled in these courses once in three years. 
The courses are conducted in the officer’s place of residence: for those living 
in towns — without time off from work and with partial time off from work 
for a period of up to two days during the entire course; for those living in 
the country — with time off from work. 

Reserve officers may be appointed to active military duty in peacetime to 
officers’ positions as follows: 

a) on a voluntary basis — by decree of the Minister of Defense of the USSR; 

b) by call-up for a period of two to three years for individuals up to the 
age of 30 years, the number and specialization categories being determined 
by the Council of Ministers of the USSR. 

Officers who have reached the age limit for reserve service or have been 
determined to be unqualified because of health reasons arc taken off the 
registration list for military service and retiied. 


INTERNAL SERVICE REGULATIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE 
USSR (extracts) 


Chapter 1 

Servicemen and Relationships between Them 
General Duties of Servicemen 

1. A serviceman in the Armed Forces of the USSR is a defender of his 
Motherland — the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 

A serviceman must observe the laws sacredly and be true to the 
military oath; must be disciplined, honest, just and brave, and must spare 
no resources, not even life itself, in the fulfillment of his military duty; 
he must obey his commanders implicitly and defend them in battle; and 
guard his unit’s banner as the cherished symbol that it is. 

2. A serviceman is obliged to be thoroughly conversant with, and efficiently 
and conscientiously carry out, the requirements of military regulations 
and his own duties; to make constant efforts to improve his military and 
political knowledge; to know perfectly and to take care of the weapons 
and fighting equipment entrusted to him, and also to look after military 
and state property; to display intelligent initiative; to steadfastly endure 
all the burdens and deprivations of military service; to value the com- 
radeship of fellow servicemen, to help his comrades in word and deed, 
to restrain them from unworthy acts and, without thought for his own 
life, to extricate them from danger; to be vigilant and safeguard military 
and state secrets. 

3. The serviceman should cherish the honor and military glory of the 
Armed Forces of the USSR and his own unit, and the honor of his 
military rank. 

He must fulfill his military duty to the Soviet Motherland to the end. 
Nothing, not even the threat of death, must make a serviceman of the 
Armed Forces of the Soviet Union surrender. 

If, however, a serviceman in a helpless condition as a result of a serious 
wound or shell-shock should be captured by the enemy, he must do 
everything possible to free himself and his comrades from captivity, and 
return to his own forces. 

As a prisoner of war, the serviceman must firmly uphold the honor 
and dignity of the Soviet fighting man, scrupulously maintain military 
and state secrecy, display endurance and courage, friendship and mutual 
support for his fellow prisoners, restrain them from assisting the enemy, 
contemptuously rejecting all attempts by the enemy to use him for the 
purpose of causing damage to the Armed Forces of the USSR and the 
Soviet Motherland. 


4. A serviceman must show respect to commanders and superiors, cooper- 
ate with them in maintaining order and discipline, strictly observe the 
rules of military etiquette and saluting, and always be properly, cleanly, 
and neatly dressed. 

The serviceman is obliged to report all that happens to him and all 
reprimands made to him to his immediate superior. 

5. In official matters the serviceman must approach his immediate superior; 
only with the latter’s permission may a serviceman approach the next 
highest in the chain of command. 

As a rule, the serviceman should also approach his immediate superior 
on personal niatters as well, but in case of special necessity, he may also 
appeal to a senior superior. 

In submitting complaints and requests, the serviceman is guided by the 
instructions contained in Disciplinary Regulations. 

Military Ranks 

6. Each serviceman is given a military rank in accordance with Service 
Regulations. 

7. For especially outstanding services to the Motherland in the leadership 
of all the Armed Forces of the State during wartime, the Presidium of 
the Supreme Soviet of the USSR personally confers the highest military 
rank of Genv^ralissimo of the Soviet Union. 

8. For outstanding services in leadership of the forces the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR personally confers the military rank of 
Marshal of the Soviet ^nion. 

9. For outstanding services in naval leadership the Presidium of the Su- 
preme Soviet of the USSR personally confers the military rank of Fleet 
Admiral of the Soviet Union. 


Superiors and Subordinates, Seniors and Juniors 

10. According to their official position and military rank, some servicemen 
may be superior or subordinate in relation to others. 

Superiors have the right to give orders to subordinates and they must 
ensure that these orders are carried out. Subordinates are obliged to obey 
superiors implicitly. 

1 1 . Superiors to whom servicemen are subordinate in service matters are 
direct superiors, even though only temporarily. 

The direct superior closest to the subordinate is his immediate supe- 
rior. 

12. By reason of their military rank, the following individuals on the active 
military service list are superiors: 

— Marshals of the Soviet Union, Fleet Admirals of the Soviet Union, 
chief marshals of branches of the Services and special forces — for all 
officers, noncommissioned and petty officers, soldiers, and sailors; 


157 


— army generals, marshals of branches of the Services and special 
forces, fleet admirals, generals, admirals, colonels, and captains 1st rank 
— for all junior officers, noncommissioned and petty officers, soldiers and 
sailors; 

— officers — for all noncommissioned and petty officers, soldiers, and 
sailors; 

— noncommissioned and petty officers — for soldiers and sailors in 
their own units. 

13. Servicemen who by reason of iheir official positions and military ranks 
(paras. 1 1 and 12) are not superiors or subordinates with respect to other 
servicemen, may be seniors or juniors. 

Seniority is determined by servicemen’s military ranks. 

Seniors in rank are obliged in all cases to require juniors to observe 
military discipline, public order and dress, as well as the rules of military 
conduct and saluting. 

Junior ranks must fulfill the requirements of seniors unquestioningly. 

14. Where servicemen who are working together are not subordinate to each 
other, when their service relationships have not been determined by a 
superior, the superior is the one who holds the most senior position, and 
where the positions are equivalent, the senior in rank. 

Issuing and Carrying out Orders 

15. As a rule, orders are given according to subordination. 

If, in view of extreme necessity, a superior gives a subordinate an 
order, by-passing the subordinate’s immediate superior, the subordinate 
who received the order carries it out and reports the matter to his 
immediate superior. 

16. A serviceman, on receiving an order, replies, “Yes, sir!” and then carries 
it out. 

Where it is necessary to be sure that an order given to a subordinate 
has been correctly understood, the superior demands a brief repetition 
of the order. 

The serviceman is obliged to report that he has carried out the order 
to the superior who gave it to him. 

17. If a serviceman, carrying out an order, receives a second order from 
another superior, senior in position, and this interferes with his fulfill- 
ment of the first order, he informs the superior who gave him the second 
order and, if the latter order is confirmed, the serviceman carries it out. 

The individual who gave the second order reports the facts to the 
superior who gave the first order. 

Saluting 

18. All servicemen on meeting (passing) are obliged to salute each other, 
strictly observing the rules of the Drill Regulations. 

Subordinates and juniors in rank salute first. 


158 


19. In addition, servicemen are obliged to salute: 

— the Lenin Mausoleum; 

— common graves of servicemen who died in battles for the freedom 
and independence of our Motherland; 

— the banners of military units, and also the Naval ensign on boarding 
and leaving a warship; 

— funeral processions escorted by troops. 

20. Military units and subunits in formation salute on command: 

— the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 
the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Generalis- 
simo of the Soviet Union, the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshals 
of the Soviet Union, and Fleet Admirals of the Soviet Union; 

— the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the union republic in which the 
given unit is located; 

— chief marshals, army generals and marshals of branches of the 
Services and special forces, fleet admirals, colonel-generals, admirals, 
and all direct superiors, as well as persons appointed to lead an inspec- 
tion of a unit (subunit). 

21. Military units and subunits also salute on command: 

— the Lenin Mausoleum; 

— common graves of servicemen who died in battles for the freedom 
and independence of our Motherland; 

— on meeting one another; 

— the banners of military units and, aboard ships, the Naval ensign 
when it is being hoisted or lowered; 

—funeral processions escorted by troops. 

22. When the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the 
USSR, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the 
Generalissimo of the Soviet Union, the Minister of Defense of the USSR, 
Marshals of the Soviet Union and Fleet Admirals of the Soviet Union 
are saluted by troops in formation, bands play the “Greeting March” and 
the National Anthem of the Soviet Union. 

A guard of honor is formed to meet the above-mentioned persons on 
arrival in a garrison. 

The saluting by military units of direct superiors beginning with their 
own commanders and higher, and persons appointed to carry out an 
inspection, is accompanied by bands playing the “Greeting March.” 

23. When not in formation, both during work and off-duty periods, military 
units and subunits salute on the command “Attention!” or “Stand up! 
Attention!” The command to salute is given by the senior superior 
present or the serviceman who first notices the arrival of a superior. 

On hearing this command, all present turn their heads towards the 
newly arrived superior and stand at attention, the officers with heads 
covered additionally render a hand salute. They remain in this position 
until given the order “At ease!” The senior superior present, while salut- 
ing, then reports to the newly arrived superior. No report is made to 


15S 


the latter if he is accompanied by the commander of the unit (subunit). 

24. In headquarters and institutions, saluting on command is reserved for 
direct superiors and persons appointed to carry out an inspection. 

The command “Attention!” or “Stand up! Attention!” for saluting is 
given by the first individual who notices an approaching superior. 

25. The command “Attention!” or “Stand up! Attention!” and a report are 
given only during. a superior’s first visit to a unit or subunit on a given 
day. An order to a subunit (unit) to salute a junior superior is not given 
in the presence of a senior superior, nor is a report made to him. 

The command “Attention!” or “Stand up! Attention!” is given at th' 
beginning and end of each classroom lesson. 

Servicemen who are not in formation, but present when a report is 
given, art as indicated in paragraph 23. 

The command “Attention!” or “Stand up! Attention!” before report- 
ing to a superior officer is given only if there are other servicemen 
present; if there are not, a report only is given. 

26. During the playing of the National Anthem of the Soviet Union and the 
anthems of union republics, servicemen who are in formation stand at 
attention without the appropriate command being given, while com- 
manders of subunits from platoons and higher salute. 

Servicemen not in formation when an anthem is being played come to 
attention and, if wearing a cap, salute. 

27. The order to salute is not given to military units and subunits: 

— during halts on a march as well as during tactical exercises; 

— on the firing line and at the firing position when firing is in progress; 

— on airfields when flying is in progress; 

— when carrying out housekeeping work or work for educational pur- 
poses, during special lessons and operations in workshops, garages, de- 
pots, hangars, laboratories, drawing offices, in telephone and telegraph 
exchanges and at radio stations; 

— during sports competitions and games; 

— during meals and after the sounding of “Retreat” until “Reveille”; 

— in sick quarters. 

In the cases enumerated above, the superior or senior present simply 
reports to any superior who arrives on the scene. 

On being addressed by a superior, subordinates, unless they are sick, 
stand at attention. 

Units and subunits taking part in a funeral procession do not salute. 

28. At general and ceremonial meetings, at shows, concerts, and the cinema, 
as well as at Party and Komsomol meetings and conferences, the order 
to salute is not given and no one reports to a superior. 

29. When engaged in activities when not in formation and also at meetings 
of officers, generals and admirals, the command “Comrade officers” is 
given on the arrival of superior officers. 

On this command all those present turn their heads in the direction 
of the superior and come to attention; those wearing caps will salute. 


The superior, having received the report, gives permission for the work 
or the meeting to resume with the response “Comrade officers.” 

30. The response to a superior’s or senior’s greeting (“Good day, comrades”) 
given by all servicemen, whether in or out of ranks, is: “We (I) wish you 
health’’; if the superior or senior is taking his leave (“Goodbye, com- 
rades”), the response is: “Goodbye.” 

At the end of the response, the word “comrade” is added together with 
the short form of the superior’s or senior’s military rank, leaving out 
reference to the arm of the Services or service and the words “engineer” 
or “technician.” 

31. .If a superior congratulates or thanks a serviceman in the course of duty, 
the latter replies: “I serve the Soviet Union.” 

If a superior congratulates a military unit (subunit), the response is a 
long drawn-out “Hurrah,” and if he thanks the unit (subunit), the re- 
sponse is; “We serve the Soviet Union.” 

Order of Presentation to Superiors 

32. The only person who presents himself to a senior superior on his arrival 
at a unit is the commander of the unit. Other individuals present them- 
selves only when the senior superior addresses them directly, or in case 
of special instructions. 

33. Servicemen present themselves to their immediate superiors: 

— on being appointed to a position; 

— on relinquishing a position; 

— on being promoted to the next military rank; 

— on receiving a government award; 

— on departure for, and return from, detached duty or leave. 

34. On presenting themselves to their superior, servicemen state their official 
position, rank, surname, and the reason for their appearance before the 
superior. 

35. Officers, newly appointed to a regiment, present themselves to the regi- 
mental commander, then his deputies, and on being appointed to a 
company, to the battalion commander and the company commander. 

In addition to this, the regimental commander or his deputy present 
newly appointed officers to the officers of the regiment at the next officers’ 
meeting following their arrival. 

Order of Presentation for Inspection and Verification 

36. If the serviceman who has come to inspect is of a rank equal to, or higher 
than, that of the commander of the unit, the latter presents himself to 
the former; if, on the other hand, the serviceman is of a lower rank than 
that of the commander the former presents himself to the latter. 

Before the beginning of the inspection, the commander of the unit 


161 


presents the commanders of the subunits being inspected to the inspect- 
ing officer. 

37. The inspecting officers visiting the subunits are met by the subunit com- 
manders, who report to them. 

If the rank of the inspecting officer who arrives in a subunit together 
with the unit commander is equal to or higher than that of the unit 
commander the report is made to the inspecting officer. 

If a senior superior arrives during the inspection, the commander of 
the unit (subunit) reports to him and the inspecting officer presents 
himself 

38. On the arrival of servicemen in a unit to carry out individual service 
assignments, the unit commander presents himself to the senior ranking 
member of the group only. The rest present themselves to the comman- 
der and report the purpose of their visit. 

39. All the instructions of the inspecting (verifying) officials or servicemen 
who are carrying out a senior superior’s order are transmitted through 
the unit commander. The above-named individuals are obliged to inform 
the commander of the unit (subunit) about the results of the inspection 
(verification) or the fulfillment of the assignment given to them. 

In conducting an inspection interrogation of servicemen in a unit 
(subunit), inspection officials follow the instructions in paragraph 64. 

On the Military Etiquette and Conduct of Servicemen 

40. All servicemen in addressing one another are obliged to be courteous and 
restrained. On service matters they must address each other using the 
formal form of address. 

In addressing a serviceman personally, the military rank is used with- 
out reference to the arm of the Services or service and without the words 
“engineer” or “technician.” 

Superiors and seniors, when addressing subordinates and juniors on 
service matters, use their rank and surname or simply their rank, in the 
latter case prefixing the rank with the word “comrade.” 

Subordinates and juniors, when addressing superiors and seniors on 
ser\'ice matters, use their rank prefixed with the word “comrade.” 

41. When addressing one another and giving and receiving orders when not 
in formation, servicemen must come to attention and, when wearing 
head gear, salute. 

When giving or receiving a report, the serviceman remains at the 
salute until the end of the report. If the command “Attention!” was given 
before reporting, the individual making the report drops his arm from 
the saluting position on the command “At ease!” 

42. Before addressing another serviceman in the presence of a superior or a 
senior it is necessary to request the superior’s (senior’s) permission. 

43. When a question put by a superior or senior requires an affirmative reply, 
the serviceman answers: “Yes, sir,” and when a negative response is 
called for: “No, sir.” 


t 



44. Servicemen are obliged to be constant examples of culture, modesty, and 
restraint; to observe strictly the requirements of communist morality; 
and to behave with dignity in public places and in the streets. 

Servicemen are obliged to salute any superior or senior they meet in 
public places, on trams, trollybuses, buses, the subway, suburban trains, 
etc., and, if seated and there are no unoccupied places, offer to let the 
superior or senior have his. 

If a serviceman meets a superior (senior) and it is not easy for them 
to get by each other freely, the subordinate is obliged to make way for 
the superior, and, in so doing, salute him; if it is necessary for him to pass 
ahead of the superior (senior) under such conditions, he should ask his 
permission to do so. 

When travelling by rail (water) or air transport, servicemen must 
always be in proper uniform on leaving the cars (cabins) or aircraft. 

Servicemen must be courteous to civilians, contribute to the protection 
of their honor and dignity and the maintenance of public order, as well 
as render them assistance in case of accident or natural disasters. 

45. Servicemen are forbidden to walk about with their hands in their pock- 
ets, or to sit or smoke in the presence of a superior or senior without his 
permission. Servicemen must refrain from smoking in the street or in 
places not reserved for smokers. 

46. Generals, admirals, and officers, noncommissioned and petty officers, 
soldiers and sailors on extended service are authorized to wear civilian 
clothes off duty, both away from the unit and on station, when visiting 
officers’ clubs, unit clubs, officers’ messes, sports grounds, and stadiums. 

47. The rules of military etiquette, conduct and saluting are also obligatory 
for reserve and retired officers, generals and admirals when wearing 
military uniform. Reserve and retired officers, generals and admirals 
must adhere strictly to the established rules governing the wearing of 
military uniforms. 

Chapter 2 

General Duties of Direct Superiors 

48. The commander of a unit (subunit) has absolute and sole military and 
political authority and is personally responsible to the Communist Party 
and the Soviet government for the constant combat and mobilizational 
readiness of the unit (subunit) entrusted to him. 

He is responsible for combat and political training, ideological educa- 
tion, military discipline, and moral and political state of the personnel; 
the condition of the weapons, fighting equipment and transport, and the 
provision of material, housekeeping, and medical facilities of the unit 
(subunit). 

The commander must have a comprehensive knowledge of the actual 
state of the unit (subunit) entrusted to him and take all the steps neces- 






163 


sary to ensure its combat and mobilizational readiness and provide for 
all its needs. 

49. The commander is obliged to exercise direct control of combat and 
political training, to maintain a high standard of military discipline in 
the unit (subunit) entrusted to him, to study the personnel thoroughly 
through personal contact with them, both on duty and in their daily lives, 
and to consider subordinates’ suggestions. He should know the service 
and political and moral qualities of his subordinates, continuously strive 
to improve their combat proficiency, personally involve himself in the 
day-to-day political and military education of the personnel, relying in 
his activities on Party and Komsomol organizations and exploiting their 
influence to the fullest extent for the successful fulfillment of the tasks 
which confront the unit (subunit). 

The commander is obliged to supervise the selection, placement, and 
evaluation of officers, in cooperation with his deputies and the appropri- 
ate heads of services. 

50. The commander is obliged to strive constantly *o improve his military 
and political knowledge; to know his fighting equipment and weapons; 
to supervise military scientific, rationalization, and invention work; to 
study advanced techniques in the combat and political training of troops 
and the ideological education of personnel and to pass them on to his 
subordinates in the subunit. 

51. The commander is obliged to establish and maintain firm internal order 
in his unit (subunit), promptly eliminate any noted violations of service 
routine, and resolutely bar all activities which might jeopardize the 
fighting efficiency of the unit (subunit) entrusted to him. 

Every commander (superior) must pay special attention to the rein- 
forcement of conscious discipline and the prevention of misdemeanors 
by subordinates by ascertaining and removing the underlying causes; he 
should also make every possible use of the resources of the spirit of public 
consciousness within the unit (subunit) in dealing with offenders against 
military discipline and public order. 

In case of an incident in the unit (subunit) the commander is obliged 
to report this fact promptly to his superior commander (superior). 

52. The commander must act independently within the limits of the author- 
ity granted to him, demand that subordinates precisely and promptly 
fulfil the requirements of military regulations, their official duties and 
orders (instructions), reward them for displaying intelligent initiative 
and deeds, for outstanding performances in their work, and deal firmly 
with those who are negligent. 

53. The commander is obliged to develop and maintain in his subordinates 
an awareness of the sacredness and inviolability of the military oath. He 
must instill in them high moral and fighting qualities, boundless devotion 
to the Soviet Motherland, the Communist Party, and the Soviet govern- 
ment, an honest and zealous attitude towards work, courage, endurance, 
resourcefulness, a high degree of political vigilance and readiness to fight 


164 


the enemies of our Motherland until total victory is won, sparing neither 
strength nor life itself. 

The maintenance of the unit’s traditions and the passing on of the most 
valuable experience of those who have excelled in combat and political 
training is one of the most important duties of all commanders. A Book 
of Honor is kept in every unit for this purpose. 

54. The commander must set an example in boldness and endurance, impec- 
cable conduct, strict fulfillment of laws and the military oath, the re- 
quirements of military regulations and orders (instructions). He must be 
fair to his subordinates, and refrain from rudeness and humiliation of 
their personal pride. 

55. The commander must take an active interest in raising the standard of 
physical fitness, protecting and building up the health of his subordi- 
nates; he must concern himself with their daily lives and needs, see that 
they are issued their full statutory state allowances and check the quality 
of those being received; where necessary, he must assist subordinates and 
intercede on their behalf with the superior commander (superior). 

56. In order to be able to deal with the personal needs and requests of 
servicemen on a timely basis, subunit commanders should have individ- 
ual conversations with their subordinates and, in addition to this, unit 
comanders should receive servicemen and members of their families at 
least twice a month at a specified time. 

57. The commander must ensure that the necessary safety measures are 
established for marches, exercises, live firing, special lessons or work, 
internal and guard duties, and that these measures are brought to the 
attention of subordinates in good time together with a demand that they 
be strictly adhered to. 

58. The commander must always have exact and detailed information on the 
officially listed and available personnel in the unit (subunit) entrusted to 
him, also on the existence and state of weapons, fighting equipment, 
ammunition and transport. 

59. In case of temporary absence, the commander’s duties are performed by 
a deputy. 

If a deputy is not indicated for the duration of the commander’s 
absence, and there is no official deputy, the officer with the senior posi- 
tion or rank assumes command and, having done so, reports the fact to 
the superior commander (superior). 

60. Newly appointed unit commanders assume command on the basis of 
instructions or orders of a superior commander (superior). A unit com- 
mander announces his assumption of command in an order and reports 
to his superior commander (superior). 

61. Unit commanders take over and hand over their affairs and duties in 
person in the presence of a representative of the superior commander 
(superior). 

Commissions are appointed by order of the superior commander (su- 
perior) for the purpose of taking over and handing over affairs and duties. 


These commissions verify the general state of the unit and carry out 
individual checks on the existence and condition of weapons, fighting 
equipment, ammunition, and transport and a separate check on unit 
property, all of which are documented. 

The document pertaining to the tran fer and acceptance of affairs and 
duties indicates: the officially listed and present complement of the unit, 
the political and moral state of the personnel, the unit’s state of disci- 
pline, combat and political training, and combat and mobilizational 
readiness. 

The document pertaining to the transfer and acceptance of arms, 
fighting equipment, ammunition and transport indicates: the quantity 
listed in the documents, the actual numbers, qualitative and technical 
condition of the arms, fighting equipment, ammunition, and transport, 
and the conditions under which they are kept and stored. 

The document pertaining to the transfer and acceptance of property 
indicates: the quartering and housekeeping conditions, the existence and 
state of buildings, structures, stock, and equipment; the existence, condi- 
tion, records, and manner of storing provisions, material, technical, and 
other property, both of the current allowance and of the reserve stock, 
as well as financial resources. 

The documents are signed by the accepting commander, the outgoing 
commander, and members of the commission, and then presented to the 
superior commander (superior). 

62. The transfer and acceptance of the affairs and duties of subunit com- 
manders is effected personally by theni on the basis of a unit order. 

Reports on the transfer of affairs and duties are submitted to the unit 
commander. 

The officer who assumes command submits, with his report, the docu- 
ment of acceptance of the subunit. 

This document indicates: the officially listed and present complement 
of the subunit; the political and moral state of the personnel, the state 
of discipline, combat and political training, and the state of the subunit’s 
combat readiness; the condition of the arms, fighting equipment, ammu- 
nition, transport, and property which are listed in the unit’s account 
books for the subunit and those which are available. 

The document is drawn up and signed by the officers handing over and 
taking over the position. 

63. The specified maximunt permissible period for the transference and ac- 
ceptance of the affairs and position of regimental commander is 10 days, 
that of deputy regimental commander for rear services 20 days, battalion 
and company commanders, 5 days. 

64. Newly appointed commanders of units and subunits from company 
commander and higher, on a.ssuming command, will question the ser- 
vicemen in the unit (subunit) in order to ascertain and deal with their 
complaints and requests. The time and manner of the questioning is 
announced 1-2 days beforehand. 


166 


Officers conducting such interviews must familiarize themselves with 
the unit’s complaint and request book and the decisions pertaining to 
these entries, and ensure that complaints and requests submitted during 
the questioning are entered in the book. 

Complaints made during an inspector’s interrogation are not entered 
in the complaint and request book. 

DISCIPLINARY REGULATIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR 
(extracts) 

Chapter 1 

General Considerations 

1. Military discipline is the strict and precise observance by all servicemen 
of the regime and rules embodied in laws and military regulations. 

2. Military discipline is based on the awareness by each serviceman of his 
military duty and personal responsibility for the defense of his Mother- 
land — the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. 

3. Military discipline obliges each serviceman: 

— to observe the laws strictly and to carry out precisely the require- 
ments of the military oath, military regulations, and the orders and 
instructions of superiors; 

— to steadfastly endure all the burdens and deprivations of military 
service; to spare neither blood nor life itself in carrying out his military 
duty; 

— to maintain strict military and state secrecy; 

— to be honest and just, to conscientiously study military affairs, and 
take care of military and state property in every way; 

— to show respect for superiors and seniors, strictly observe the rules 
of military etiquette and saluting; 

— to conduct himself with dignity and honor when away from his unit, 
not to commit offenses against public order, to restrain others from such 
actions, and to assist in the protection of citizens’ honor and dignity. 

4. Sound military discipline is achieved: 

— ^by instilling in servicemen high moral-political, and fighting quali- 
ties and conscious submission to superiors; 

— the maintenance of a strict regulation system in the unit (subunit, 
ship); 

— by the insistence of superiors on high standards of performance by 
subordinates, and by the skillful combination and correct application of 
persuasion and compulsion. 

5. Every superior is bound to educate his subordinates in the spirit of 
faithful fulfillment of ail the requirements of military discipline; to de- 


velop and maintain in them an awareness of military honor and duty; to 
encourage those who display intelligent initiative, keenness, and out- 
standing achievements in their work; and to deal firmly with those who 
are negligent. 

Superiors must pay special attention to the timely detection of the 
causes of subordinates’ misdeameanors, the adoption of preventive mea- 
sures, and the creation of an intolerant attitude towards violations of 
military discipline. In addition, the commander is obliged to utilize the 
resources of the spirit of public consciousness in every possible way. 

A superior must always be an example to his subordinates in the strict 
observance of laws, the military oath, military regulations, orders, in- 
structions, and standards of communist morality. 

6. The interests of the defense of the Motherland oblige superiors to be 
resolute and firm in demanding observance of military discipline and 
order, and to take action in every single case of a misdemeanor by a 
subordinate. 

A superior’s order is law to his subordinates. An order must be carried 
out unquestioningly, precisely, and promptly. 

7. In case of open insubordination or resistance on the part of a subordi- 
nate, and in order to restore order, a superior is obliged to apply all 
measures of compulsion up to arresting the offender and holding him 
legally responsible. In such a case, arms may be used only in a combat 
situation, and in peacetime only in exceptional cases in which urgency 
is of paramount importance, when the offender’s actions are clearly 
aimed at the betrayal of the Motherland, the failure of a combat assign- 
ment, or when they create a real threat to the lives of the superior, other 
servicemen, or civilians. 

The use of arms is an extreme measure and is permitted if all other 
measures taken by the superior have proved unsuccessful, or when the 
conditions of the situation do not permit other measures to be taken. 

If circumstances permit, before using arms, the superior is bound to 
warn the insubordinate serviceman of his intention. The use of the 
weapon is immediately reported by the superior to the senior officer. 

A superior who fails to take effective me -ures to restore order and 
discipline bears the responsibility for this. 

Every serviceman is bound to cooperate with his superior to restore 
military discipline and order. 

8. Only those direct superiors and superiors referred to ia chapter 1 1 may 
give award incentives or impose military punishments. 

Disciplinary punishments may be revoked by a direct superior who 
has disciplinary power at ieast equal to that of the superior who imposed 
the punishments. 

9. The disciplinary power granted to junior superiors always belongs to 
senior superiors as well. 

10. In dealing with subordinates, superiors with the rank of noncommis- 
sioned or petty officer whose positions are not referred to in the present 


Regulations exercise disciplinary power in accordance with the military 
rank stipulated in tables of organization for the position occupied: 

a) junior sergeant, sergeant, petty officer 2nd class, petty officer — 1st 
class — the authority of a squad commander; 

b) senior sergeant and chief petty officer — the authority of a — deputy 
platoon commander; 

c) petty officer and warrant officer — the authority of a company ser- 
geant — major (section petty officer). 

11. In dealing with subordinates, superiors with the ranks of officers, gener- 
als, and admirals whose positions are not referred to in the present 
Regulations, exercise disciplinary authority in accordance with the mili- 
tary rank stipulated in tables of organization for the position occupied: 

a) junior lieutenant, lieutenant, and senior lieutenant — the authority of 
a platoon (group) commander; 

b) captain and captain-lieutenant — the authority of a company com- 
mander (commander of a 4th class ship); 

c) major, lieutenant colonel, captain 3rd rank, and captain 2nd rank — 
the authority of a battalion commander (commander of a 3rd class 
ship); 

d) colonel and captain 1st rank — the authority of a regimental comman- 
der (commander of a 2nd class ship); 

e) major general and rear admiral — ^the authority of a divisional ([naval] 
brigade) commander; 

f) lieutenant general and vice-admiral — the authority of a corps com- 
mander (commander of a [naval] squadron); 

g) colonel-general and admiral — the authority of an army (flotilla) com- 
mander; 

h) marshal of a branch of the Services and special forces, army general. 
Chief Marshal, Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union and Marshal of the 
Soviet Union — the authority of a commander of a military district, 
front, fleet. 

1 2. In dealing with subordinates, deputy (assistant) commanders of subunits, 
units, ships, and formations, and chiefs of staff, exercise disciplinary 
authority one degree lower than the rights granted to their immediate 
superiors. 

On ships which have an executive officer and an assistant executive 
officer, the latter exercises disciplinary authority one degree below the 
rights granted to the executive officer. 

13. A superior who assumes the responsibilities of a position on a temporary 
basis, this being announced in an order, exercises the disciplinary author- 
ity attached to the position being temporarily filled. 

14. Battalion, company, and platoon commanders and personnel with corre- 
sponding positions, when serving as commanders of subunits or crews 
which are on temporary duty and when carrying out a task separately 
from their own unit, exercise disciplinary authority one degree higher 
than the position being occupied. 


Soldiers, sailors, noncommissioned and petty officers appointed as 
crew commanders in the above mentioned cases exercise the disciplinary 
authority of a company sergeant major (section petty officer), and those 
with the rank of petty officer and warrant officer, the authority of a 
platoon (group) commander. 

1 5. Officers commanding cadet subunits in military schools exercise discipli- 
nary authority one stage higher than the position occupied in dealing 
with subordinates. 

16. These Regulations apply to; 

a) all servicemen in the Armed Forces of the USSR; 

b) all military reservists and conscripts during training call-up periods, 
maneuvers, and other military exercises; 

c) officers, generals, and admirals on the reserve and retired lists when 
wearing military uniform. 

Chapter 2 

Incentive Awards Applicable to Soldiers, Sailors, Noncommissioned and 
Petty Officers 

1 7. The following incentive awards are applicable to soldiers, sailors, non- 
commissioned and petty officers: 

a) an expression of appreciation in the presence of the assembled ranks 
or in an order; 

b) cancellation of a previously imposed disciplinary punishment; 

c) the granting of up to 48 hours leave to soldier, sailor, noncommis- 
sioned and petty officer conscripts; 

d) the granting of a short vacation leave of up to 10 days, exclusive of 
travelling time, to soldier, sailor, noncommissioned and petty officer 
conscripts; 

e) the award of certificates, valuable gifts, or money; 

f) the award of a photograph of the serviceman taken in front of the 
unfurled banner of the unit; 

g) an announcement to the general public or the people living in the 
serviceman’s former place of employment, informing them of his 
exemplary service and awards; 

h) the award of the badge “Outstanding Serviceman”; 

i) the entry of the names of soldiers, sailors, noncommissioned and 
petty officers in the unit’s Book of Honor. 

18. In addition to the incentives enumerated in paragraph 17, students of 
military schools who complete their training course with distinction have 
their names inscribed on the Honors Board. 


170 


Chapter 3 


The Rights of Superiors to Grant Incentive Awards to Subordinate 
Soldiers, Sailors, Noncommissioned and Petty Officers 

19. A squad commander, a deputy platoon commander and a company ser- 
geant major (section petty officer) have the right: 

a) io express appreciation in front of the assembled ranks; 

b) cancel a disciplinary punishment previously imposed by them. 

20. A platoon commander (group commander) has the right: 

a) to express appreciation in front of the assembled ranks; 

b) cancel a disciplinary punishment previously imposed by him; 

c) authorize up to three special leave periods to soldier, sailor, noncom- 
missioned and petty officer conscripts, the number of days and hours 
of such leaves being established by the unit commander. 

21. A company commander (commander of a 4th class ship) and a battalion 
commander (commander of a 3rd class ship) has the right: 

a) to express appreciation in front of the assembled ranks; 

b) cancel disciplinary punishments previously imposed by them; 

c) authorize up to 48 hours leave for soldier, sailor, noncommissioned 
and petty officer conscripts; 

Commander.s (superiors) of individual units who exercise the disci- 
plinary authority of a battalion commander (commander of a 3rd 
class ship) have the right, in addition to this, to award the incentives 
indicated in paragraph 22, subparagraphs “c”, “f ”, and “h.” 

22. A regimental commander (commander of a 2nd class ship), a divisional 
commander ([naval] brigade commander), a corps commander (comman- 
der of a [naval] squadron), an army connrnander (Botiiia commander) 
have the right: 

a) to express appreciation in front of the assembled ranks or in an order; 

b) to cancel a disciplinary punishment previously imposed ’'y him; 

c) to authorize short vacation leave of up to 10 days for soldiers, sailors, 
noncommissioned and petty officer conscripts; 

d) to award certificates, valuable gifts, or money; 

e) to award a personal photograph of the serviceman taken in front of 
the unfurled banner of the unit; 

f) to inform the general public or the people living in the serviceman’s 
former place of employment about his exemplary service and awards; 

g) to award the badge “Outstanding Serviceman”; 

h) to inscribe the serviceman’s name in the Book of Honor. 

23. Commanders of military districts, fronts, and fleets, in addition to the 
rights enumerated in paragraph 22, have the right to inscribe on the 
Honors Board the names of students of military schools who complete 
their training courses with distinction. 


171 


Chapter 4 


Incentive Awards Applicable to Officers, Generals and Admirals 

24. The following incentive awards are applicable to officers, generals, and 
admiralsi 

a) an expression of appreciation, verbally or in an order; 

b) cancellation of a previously imposed disciplinary punishment; 

c) the award of certificates, valuable inscribed gifts, or money; 

d) advanced promotion to the next military rank; 

e) the award of inscribed ceremonial daggers, swords, and firearms. 

25. In higher military training establishments (courses), in addition to the 
incentives enumerated in paragraph 24, the commandants of these estab- 
lishments also have the authority to inscribe on the Board the names of 
cadets and students who graduated from their training course with gold 
medals (distinction). 

Chapter 5 

The Rights of Superiors to Award Incentives to Subordinate Officers, 
Generals, and Admirals 

26. A company commander (Commander of a 4th class ship) and a battalion 
commander (commander of a 3rd class ship) has the right: 

a) to express appreciation verbally; 

b) to cancel a disciplinary punishment previously imposed by him. 

27. A regimental commander (commander of a 2nd class ship), divisional 
commander ([naval] brigade commander), corps commander (comman- 
der of a [naval] squadron), army commander (flotilla commander), com- 
mander of a military district, front, fleet has the right. 

a) to express appreciation verbally or in an order; 

b) to cancel a disciplinary punishment previously imposed by him; 

c) to award certificates, valuable inscribed gifts, or money; 

d) to recommend advanced promotion to the next military rank. 

28. In addition to the rights granted to a commander of a military district, 
front and fleet to award incentives to all classes of servicemen of the 
Armed Forces of the USSR, Deputy Ministers of Defense of the USSR, 
the Chief of the General Staff, Commanders-in-Chief of Services and the 
Chief of the Rear of the Ministry of Defense have the right to award 
inscribed ceremonial daggers, swords, and firearms. 

29. The Minister of Defense of the USSR has the right to apply all the 
incentive measures to the fullest extent of the present Regulations to all 
classes of servicemen of the Armed Forces of the USSR. 


Chapter 6 


Punishments for Breaches of Military Discipline 

30. If a serviceman commits a breach of discipline or public order, a superior 
must, depending on the nature of the offense, remind him of his service 
obiigations, or subject him to disciplinary punishment, or refer the mat- 
ter for review by the public organizations. 

31. For the purpose of public censure of offenders of military discipline and 
public order, servicemen’s offenses may be dealt with at the discretion 
of commanders (superiors) as follows: soldiers and sailors — at meetings 
of the personnel of companies, batteries, battalions, ships and corre- 
sponding elements; noncommissioned and petty officers — at meetings of 
noncommissioned and petty officers of battali jns and comparable units; 
officers — at meetings of the officers of regiments, separate units, and 
corresponding elements. 

In addition, officers’ offenses may be dealt with by officers’ comradely 
courts of honor. The decision as to whether to transfer officers’ offenses 
for examination by a court of honor rests with the commanders (superi- 
ors) of those units and formations (institutions, establishments) in which 
the court is convened. 

32. In cases where the law on criminal responsibility for military offenses 
provides for different punishments, depending on the degree of guilt, of 
which some are handed down by the court, and others are provided for 
in the disciplinary system, the commander decides whether to send the 
case to the military investigation authorities or to limit his action to the 
imposition of a disciplinary punishment. This question and the extent of 
the disciplinary penalty are decided by the commander who, by law, 
decides whether or not to send the case to the military investigation 
authorities. 

33. A serviceman who has been disciplined for unlawful actions, subject to 
punishment by court verdict, is not exempt from committal for trial. 

34. Officers, generals and admirals should not be removed from their posts 
except in the most extreme cases which admit of no delay. 

Chapter 12 

Procedure for Imposing Disciplinary Punishments 

72. Each disciplinary punishment must correspond to the degree of guilt and 
seriousness of the offense committed. In determining the guilt and the 
disciplinary measure it is necessary to consider: the nature of the offense, 
the circumstances in which it was committed, the defendent’s former 
conduct, and his length of service and knowledge of service procedure. 

73. Arrest is one of the extreme measures and is used, as a rule, in cases 


173 


where other measures taken by a superior have proved unsuccessful. 

74. In imposing a disciplinary punishment or reminding a subordinate of his 
duties, a superior must not be hasty in determining the type and extent 
of the punishment, must not humiliate a subordinate’s personal dignity, 
or be rude. 

75. It is forbidden to impose several punishments for one and the same 
offense or to combine one punishment with another, to inflict a punish- 
ment on all the personnel of a subunit, instead of punishing the immedi- 
ate culprits; it is also forbidden to keep anyone in custody as a form of 
punishment without defining the period of custody. 

76. The strictness of the disciplinary punishment is increased: when the 
offender has committed the offense repeatedly or participated in a collec- 
tive breach of discipline and public order; when the offense was commit- 
ted while carrying out official duties; or when, as a consequence, there 
was a serious breach of order. 

77. If a superior recognizes that the disciplinary authority granted to him 
is insufficient to deal with an offense committed by a subordinate on 
account of its gravity, he requests that the offender be punished by the 
authority of a senior superior. 

78. A superior who exceeds the disciplinary authority granted to him bears 
the responsibility for this. 

79. A senior superior does not have the right to revoke or reduce a discipli- 
nary punishment imposed by a junior superior based on the severity of 
the punishment, unless the latter exceeded the authority granted to him. 

If a senior superior finds that the disciplinary punishment imposed by 
a junior superior does not correspond to the seriousness of the offense, 
he has the right to revoke it and impose a stricter one. 

80. All disciplinary punishments must be imposed within 10 days of the date 
on which the superior became aware of the offense in question and, if an 
investigation or inquiry is carried out, within 10 days of its completion. 

81. Disciplinary punishments for offenses committed by personnel while on 
guard duty cannot be imposed until after the guard has been changed. 

82. A disciplinary punishment is not imposed on an offender in a drunken 
state, nor are any kind of explanations obtained from him until he has 
recovered from the effects of intoxication, for which purpose he may, if 
necessary, be put under provisional arrest and kept in the guardhouse. 

Chapter 13 

Procedure for Carrying Out Disciplinary Punishments 

83. As a rule, a disciplinary punishment is carried out immediately and, in 
exceptional cases, no later than one month after its imposition. After that 
time, the punishment is not carried out, but entered on the serviceman’s 
record. In the latter case, a punishment is imposed on the individual 
whose fault it was that the above punishment was not carried out. 


174 


84. The performance of an imposed disciplinary punishment is not sus- 
pended on the submission of a complaint until a senior superior gives the 
order to cancel it. 

85. The imposition of disciplinary punishments is announced: to soldiers and 
sailors — personally or before the assembled ranks; to noncommissioned 
and petty officers — personally, at a noncommissioned or petty officers’ 
meeting, or before the assembled ranks of noncommissioned or petty 
officers; to officers — personally, in an instruction, at an officers’ meeting, 
or in an order. 

AWARDS OF THE MOTHERLAND 

The orders and medals of the Soviet Union, and also the highest classes 
of distinction — the titles Hero of the Soviet Union and Hero of Socialist 
Labor — are instituted as an incentive to workers, collective farmers, service- 
men and other Soviet citizens who have rendered special services in the 
matter of socialist construction and ensuring the freedom and independence 
of the Soviet State. 

The awarding of the orders and medals of the USSR is a recognition of 
the services of the person receiving the award to the country, and an incentive 
to achieve further successes for the good and the prosperity of our Mother- 
land — the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 

Under the legislation in force, orders of the USSR may be awarded both 
to individual citizens and to entire collectives — enterprises, institutions, or- 
ganizations, military formations and units. 

Those to whom orders and medals of the USSR are awarded may be 
awarded the same orders and medals again, or new ones for subsequent new 
services. 

Orders and medals of the USSR are instituted by the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Each order has its own Statute, and each medal 
a Medal Certificate ratified by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the 
USSR. 

Those to whom an order or medal of the USSR has been awarded may be 
deprived of the award only by decision of the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet of the USSR, on the basis of a court verdict, or of a misdemeanor 
committed by the person to whom the award w’as made. 

Citizens who wear orders and medals of the USSR without being entitled 
to do so commit a criminal offense. 

Highest Classes of Distinction of the USSR 

“Hero of the Soviet Union” is a title awarded for personal or collective 
services to the State connected with the performai.ee of an heroic deed. 
Instituted by Decree of the Central Executive Committee (TsIK) of the 
USSR dated 16 April 1934. 

Heroes of the Soviet Union receive the highest award of the USSR — the 


175 


Order of Lenin, a “Gold Star” medal and a Citation from the Presidium of 
the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. 

A Hero of the Soviet Union who performs a second heroic deed, no less 
heroic than that for which others who have performed a similar deed are 
awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, is awarded a second “Gold 
Star” medal, and to celebrate his neroic deeds a bronze bust of the person 
to whom the award is made is erected in the birthplace of the Hero, with a 
suitable inscription on the base.. 

For a third heroic deed similar to the deeds previously performed, a Hero 
of the Soviet Union who has been awarded two “Gold Stars” and who has 
been honored by the erection of a bust in his birthplace, is awarded a third 
“Gold Star.” 

When second and third “Gold Stars” are awarded, the Hero of the Soviet 
Union receives a Citation from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the 
USSR along with the medal. 

Under the terms of a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the 
USSR dated 6 September 1967 persons awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet 
Union have the light to the All-Union personal pension instituted by the 
award, and enjoy privileges in obtaining and in paying for living space, in 
traveling by intercity and urban transport, and in obtaining authorizations 
for sanatorium treatment; they also have the right to other privileges and 
advantages laid down by USSR legislation. 

“Hero of Socialist Labor” is a title awarded to individuals who by their 
especially outstanding activity as innovators in industry, agriculture, trans- 
port, trade, scientific discoveries and inventions have rendered exceptional 
services to the State, and have contributed to the development of the econ- 
omy, culture and science, and to the growth of the might and fame of the 
USSR. It was instituted by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 
of the USSR dated 27 December 1938. 

Heroes of Socialist Labor receive the highest award of the USSR — the 
Order of Lenin, the “Hammer and Sickle” gold medal and a Citation from 
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. 

A Hero of Socialist Labor may be awarded a second “Hammer and Sickle” 
medal for outstanding services. In this case a bronze bust, with an appropri- 
ate inscription, is erected in the birthplace of the person to whom the award 
is made. 

Heroes of Socialist Labor enjoy the same privileges and advantages as are 
laid down for Heroes of the Soviet Union. 

Orders of the USSR 

The Order of Lenin is the highest order of the USSR. It was instituted on 
6 April 1930. 

The Order of Lenin is awarded to individual citizens, collectives, institu- 
tions, enterprises and public organizations of the USSR for particular services 
in socialist development: 


a) for activity that has resulted in outstanding quantitative and qualitative 
achievements in industry, agriculture, transport, commodity circulation, and 
the procurement operations of state and cooperative institutions, enterprises 
and organizations; 

b) for particular successes in kolkhoz, sovkhoz and cooperative develop- 
ment; 

c) for outstanding path-breaking experimental managerial work; 

d) for the introduction of technical improvements of national importance 
in industrial and agricultural production, in transport and for outstanding 
inventions in these spheres; 

e) for the outstanding fulfillment of assignments of special importance to 
the state in the sphere of industry, agriculture, trade, national defense, trans- 
port and cooperation; 

f) for outstanding scientific research in the sphere of socialist development; 

g) for new urban and rural construction of outstanding artistic and social 
importance. 

The Order of Lenin is also awarded to individuals awarded the title of Hero 
of the Soviet Union or Hero of Socialist Labor. 

The Order of the October Revolution was instituted on 31 October 1967 
to celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. 

The Order of the October Revolution is awarded to citizens of the USSR, 
to enterprises, institutions, organizations and other groups of workers, mili- 
tary units and formations, as well as to republics, krays, oblasts, * and cities: 

— for active revolutionary work and for great contribution to the establish- 
ment and consolidation of the Soviet regime; 

— for outstanding services in the building of socialism and the development 
of communism; 

— for outstanding achievements in the sphere of development of the na- 
tional economy, science, and culture; 

— for special courage ai»d bravery shown in battle with the enemies of the 
Soviet State; 

— for outstanding services in strengthening the defensive capacity of the 
Soviet State; 

— for particularly fruitful governmental and social activity; 

— for active work directed toward the development and deepening of 
all-round friendly links between the peoples of the Soviet Union and other 
states, and toward the strengthening of peace between the peoples. 

The Order of “Victory” is the highest military order of the USSR. It was 
instituted on 8 November 1943. 

The Order of “Victory” is awarded to senior command personnel of the 
Soviet Army for the successful conduct of military operations on the scale 
of several fronts o: of one front, as a result of which the situation is basically 
changed in favor of the Soviet Army. 

* Soviet administrative-geographical units [U.S. Ed.]. 


177 


The names of the holders of the Order of “Victory” are to be entered on 
the Honor Board in the Great Kremlin Palace. 

The Order of the Red Banner was the first Soviet order to be created. It 
was instituted on 1 August 1924.* 

The Order of the Red Banner is awarded to serving enlisted men and 
officers of the Armed Forces and to other citizens who show particular 
bravery, self-sacrifice, and courage in direct combat and also to military units 
and groupings for particular merit in battles against the enemies of the Soviet 
Union. 

The Order of Suvorov is a military order. It was instituted on 29 July 1942 
to reward command personnel for outstanding success in the command of 
troops, for distinguished organization of combat operations, and for decisive- 
ness and persistence in carrying them out, as a result of which victory was 
achieved in battles for the Motherland in the Patriotic War. 

The Order of Suvorov has three classes. The Order of Suvorov I Class, the 
highest of them, is awarded to the commanders of fronts and armies, their 
deputies, chiefs of staff, heads of operational directorates, operational sec- 
tions, and commanders of Branches of the Services fronts and armies. The 
Order of Suvorov II Class is awarded to commanders of corps, divisions, and 
brigades, their deputies and chiefs of staff. The Order of Suvorov III Class 
is awarded to commanders of regiments and battalions, to commanders of 
regimental staffs, and also to company commanders. 

The Order of Ushakov is a military order. It was instituted on 3 March 
1944 for award to officers of the Navy for outstanding success in devis- 
ing, conducting, and ensuring active naval operations, as a result of which 
victory was achieved over a numerically superior enemy in battles for the 
Motherland. 

The Order of Ushakov has two classes. The highest class of the order is 
I Class. 

The Order of Kutuzov is a military order. It was instituted on 29 July 1942 
for award to commanders of the Soviet Army for a well-devised and con- 
ducted plan of operations for a front, an army, or a separate formation, as 
a result of which the enemy was badly defeated, while our forces retained 
their fighting capacity. 

The Order of Kutuzov has three classes. The highest class of the order is 
I Class. The Order of Kutuzov I Class is awarded to commanders of fronts 
and armies, their deputies, and chiefs of staff. The Order of Kutuzov II Class 
is awarded to commanders of corps, divisions, and brigades and chiefs of 
staff. The Order of Kutuzov III Class is awarded to commanders of regi- 
ments, battalions and companies and to regimental chiefs of staff. 

The Order of Nakhimov is a military order. It was instituted on 3 March 

* Before that time only orders of the Soviet Republics existed: the Order of the Red Banner 
(instituted on 16 September 1918) in the RSFSR, the Order of the Red Star and the Silver Star 
in the Armenian Republic, the Order of the Red Banner in the Georgian Republic, etc. The 
awarding of orders by the Republics was discontinued when the single All-Union Order of the 
Red Banner was instituted. ' 


1944 for award to naval officers for outstanding successes in devising, con- 
ducting, and ensuring naval operations as a result of which an offensive 
operation of the enemy was repulsed or active operations of the fleet were 
ensured, considerable losses were inflicted on the enemy, and our main forces 
were preserved. 

The Order of Nakhimov has two classes. The highest class of the Order 
is I Class. 

The Order of Bogdan Khmel’nitskiy was instituted on 10 October 1943 for 
award to commanders and men of the Soviet Army and Navy, to leaders of 
partisan detachments and partisans who showed particular decisiveness and 
ability in operations to defeat the enemy, and high patriotism, bravery, and 
self-sacrifice in the struggle for liberation of the Soviet land from the German 
Fascist invaders. 

The Order of Bogdan Khmel’nitskiy has three classes. The highest class 
of the Order is I Class. The Order of Bogdan Khmel’nitskiy I Class is 
awarded to commanders of fronts, fleets, armies, flotillas, their deputies, 
chiefs of staff, heads of operational directorates and sections, and command- 
ers of Branches of the Services of fronts, fleets, armies and flotillas, and 
commanders of formations of partisan detachments. The Order of Bogdan 
Khmel’nitskiy II Class is awarded to corps, divisional, brigade, and regimen- 
tal commanders and their deputies, to chiefs of staff, commanders of forma- 
tions of partisan detachments, their deputies and chiefs of staff, and com- 
manders of partisan detachments. The Order of Bogdan Khmel’nitskiy III 
Class is awarded to private soldiers, noncommissioned officers, warrant offic- 
ers and officers up to battalion commander and corresponding ranks inclu- 
sive, commanders of partisan detachments, commanders of subunits of parti- 
san detachments and partisans. 

The Order of Aleksandr Nevskiy is a military order. It was instituted on 
29 July 1942 for award to commanders in the Soviet Army who showed 
personal bravery, courage, and daring in battles for the Motherland in the 
Patriotic War and who, by ability in command, ensured the successful opera- 
tion of their units. 

The Order of Aleksandr Nevskiy is awarded to commanders of divisions 
and brigades, to commanders of regiments, battalions, companies, and pla- 
toons. 

The Order of the Patriotic War was instituted on 20 May 1942 for award 
to enlisted men and those in command positions of the Soviet Armed Forces, 
to troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and to partisan detachments 
which exhibited courage, steadfastness, and valor in battles for the Soviet 
Motherland during the Great Patriotic War, as well as to servicemen who 
by their actions promoted the success of the military operations of Soviet 
troops. 

The Order of the Patriotic War has two classes. The highest class of the 
Order is I Class. 

The Order of the Red Banner of Labor was instituted on 7 September 1928 
for award to individuals, enterprises, institutions, and groups of workers to 


179 


mark their exceptional services to the Soviet Union in the sphere of produc- 
tion, scientific activity, government or public service. 

The Order of the Red Star was instituted on 6 April 1930 for award to 
enlisted personnel and those in command positions in the Soviet Army and 
to military units and formations, collectives, institutions, enterprises, and 
public organizations who rendered outstanding service in the defense of the 
Soviet Union in time of war and of peace. 

The Order “Badge of Honor” was instituted on 25 November 1^'*'^ for 
award to individual citizens and groups of workers for high output lig 
in industry and agriculture and in transport and trade; for special achieve- 
ments in scientific research, culture, and sport; for the introduction of techni- 
cal improvements and inventions of major economic importance in all 
spheres of socialist development; and for services in increasing the fighting 
efficiency of the Soviet Army and the defense capability of the Soviet Union. 

The Order of Glory was instituted on 8 November 1943 for award to 
privates and noncommissioned officers of the Soviet Army and, in the Air 
Force, to individuals having the rank of junior lieutenant, for personal deeds 
of heroism, bravery, courage, and fearlessness by them in battles for the 
Soviet Motherland. 

The Order of Glory has three classes. The highest class of the Order is I 
Class. The Order of Glory is awarded in classes, beginning with III Class. 

Those who are awarded the Order of Glory of all three classes are pro- 
moted; privates, corporals, and sergeants to sergeant-major, sergeant-majors 
to junior lieutenants, and junior lieutenants in the Air Force to lieutenant. 

Under USSR legislation, individuals awarded the Order of Glory in all 
three classes enjoy privileges and benefits in pensions, in the allocation of, and 
payment for, living quarters, in travel by intercity and urban transport, etc. 

Medals of the USSR 

The medal “For Bravery” was instituted on 17 October 1938 for awarding 
to enlisted, command, and staff personnel of the Soviet Army, the Navy and 
Border Troops for personal courage and bravery in action against the enemies 
of the Soviet Union in a theater of war, in defense of the inviolability of the 
State boundaries, or in the struggle against saboteurs, spies, and other ene- 
mies of the Soviet State. 

The Ushakov Medal is a military medal. It was instituted on 3 March 1944 
for awarding to enlisted men, sergeants, and petty officers in the Navy for 
personal courage and bravery in action against the enemies of the Soviet 
Union in naval theaters. 

The medal “For Combat Merit” was instituted on 17 October 1938 for 
awarding to enlisted, command, and staff personnel of the Soviet Army, the 
Navy and Border Troops, and also to other citizens who, by their capable, 
enterprising, and bold acts involving risk to life in the struggle against the 
enemies of the Soviet State, have contributed to the success of operations at 
the front. 


The medal “For Distinguished Services in Defense of the National Fron- 
tiers of the USSR” was instituted on 13 July 1950 for awarding to Border 
Troops and to the civilian population for military exploits and special services 
in defense of the national frontiers of the USSR. 

The medal “For Outstanding Service in the Preservation of Public Order” 
was instituted on 1 November 1950 for awarding to personnel of the militia, 
internal security forces, and interior troops for exploits and services in the 
struggle against enemies of the Soviet State, against crime, and for the preser- 
vation of public order in the country. 

The Nakhimov Medal is a military medal. It was instituted on 3 March 
1944 for awarding to enlisted, sergeant and pettyofficer personnel in the 
Navy, and also to individuals not in the ranks of the Navy, who, by their 
capable, enterprising, and bold action involving risks to life in the struggle 
against enemies of the Soviet State in naval theaters, have contributed to the 
successful carrying out of the combat duties of ships, naval units, and sub- 
units. 

The medal “20th Anniversary of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army” 
is an anniversary medal. It was instituted on 24 January 1938 to mark the 
20th Anniversary of the Red Army and Navy for awarding to enlisted, 
command, and staff personnel: 

— who had served in the ranks of the Soviet Army and Navy for 20 years 
by 23 February 1938 and who had served their country in the Civil War in 
the ranks of the Armed Forces; 

— who had been awarded the Order of the Red Banner for distinguished 
services in battle during the Civil War. 

The medal “For Labor Valor” was instituted on 27 December 1938 for 
awarding to workers, collective farmers, employees, engineering and techni- 
cal and managerial workers, transport and construction workers, workers in 
trading and cooperative organizations, and in cultural and scientific institu- 
tions who are leading fighters for socialist development in their self-sacrific- 
ing working activity, who set brilliant examples in the use of technology and 
give high standards of labor productivity, and who promote the development 
of science, technology, and culture. 

The medal “For Distinguished Labor Service” was instituted on 27 De- 
cember 1938 for awarding to workers, collective farmers, employees, engi- 
neering and technical and managerial workers, transport and construction 
workers, workers in trading and cooperative organizations, and workers in 
cultural and scientific institutions for outstanding shock work of vita! impor- 
tance, high production figures, and services to the development of science, 
technology, and culture. 

The Anniversary Medal Celebrating the Centenary of the Birth of Vladi- 
mir Il'ich Lenin. The medal was instituted on 5 November 1969 with two 
designations; "For heroic labor. To mark the centenary of the birth of Vladi- 
mir Il'ich Lenin”, and "For military v,ilor. To mark the centenary of the birth 
of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin”, to be awarded: 

— to leading workers, collective farmers, economic specialists, workers in 


State institutions and public organizations, and scientific and cultural work- 
ers who have worked in an exemplary manner during preparation for the 
Lenin centenary; 

— to individuals who have played an active part in the struggle for the 
establishment of the Soviet regime, or in defense of the Homeland or who by 
their labor have made an appreciable contribution to the building of socialism 
in the USSR, who by their personal example and public work help the Party 
to educate the rising generation; 

— to Red Armed Forces servicemen and troops of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, to troops and bodies of the Committee of State Security administered 
by the Council of Ministers of the USSR who have achieved excellent results 
in combat and political training, and good results in the leadership of troops 
and ill sustaining their combat readiness in the course of preparation for the 
Lenin centenary. 

Members of the civilian population are awarded the Anniversary Medal 
with the inscription “For Meritorious Labor. To mark the centenary of the 
birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin”; servicemen are awarded the medal with the 
inscription “For Military Valor. To mark the centenary of the birth of 
Vladimir Il'ich Lenin”. 

The Anniversary Medal is also awarded to members of the international 
communist and workers’ movement and to other foreign progressive public 
figures. 

The medal “For Bravery in Dealing with Fires” was instituted on 31 
October 1957 for awarding to workers of the fire brigade, members of volun- 
teer fire services, military personnel and other citizens for courage, bravery, 
and self-sacrifice in dealing with fires and in their prevention. 

The medal “For Saving from Drowning” was instituted on 16 February 
1957 for awarding to lifeguards and other citizens of the USSR, and also to 
foreigners for courage, bravery and self-sacrifice in lifesaving in the water, for 
high vigilance and resourcefulness as a result of which drowning disasters 
were prevented, and also for exemplary organization of the lifeguard service. 

The medal “For a Partisan of the Patriotic War” was instituted on 2 
February 1943 for awarding to partisans of the Patriotic War who distin- 
guished themselves in the partisan struggle in the rear of the German Fascist 
aggressors. 

The medal has two classes. The I Class is the higher. 

The medal “For a Partisan of the Patriotic War” I Class is awarded to 
partisans, leaders of partisan detachments, and organizers of the partisan 
movement for special services in the organization of the partisan movement 
and for courage, heroism, and outstanding successes in the partisan struggle 
in the rear of the German Fa^xist aggressors. 

The medal “For a Partisan of the Patriotic War” II Class is awarded to 
partisans, leaders of partisan detachments, and organizers of the partisan 
movement for personal distinction in battle and in carrying out orders and 
assignments, and for active contribution to the partisan struggle against the 
German Fascist aggressors. 


The medal “For the Defense of Leningrad” was instituted on 22 December 
1942 for awarding to all servicemen and members of the civilian population 
who took a direct part in the defense of Leningrad. 

The medal “For the Defense of Moscow” was instituted on 1 May 1944 
for awarding to all servicemen and members of the civilian population who 
took a direct part in the defense of Moscow. 

The medal “For the Defense of Odessa” was instituted on 22 December 
1942 for awarding to all servicemen and members of the civilian population 
who took a direct part in the defense of Odessa. 

The medal “For the Defense of Sevastopol” was instituted on 22 December 
1942 for awarding to all servicemen and members of the civilian population 
who took a direct part in the defense of Sevastopol. 

The medal “For the Defense of Stalingrad” was instituted on 22 December 
1942 for awarding to all servicemen and members of the civilian population 
who took a direct part in the defense of Stalingrad. 

The medal “For the Defense of Kiev” was instituted on 21 June 1961 for 
awarding to all who took part in the defense of Kiev — servicemen and 
workers who played a part in the defense of Kiev in the ranks of the Home 
Guard, in the erection of defensive fortifications, by working in factories and 
plants supplying the front, and members of the Kiev underground movement 
and partisans who fought around Kiev. 

The medal “For the Defense of the Caucasus” was instituted on 1 May 
1944 for awarding to all servicemen and members of the civilian population 
who took a direct part in the defense of the Caucasus. 

The medal “For the Defense of Soviet Territory within the Arctic Circle” 
was instituted on 5 December 1944 for awarding to all military personnel and 
members of the civilian population who took a direct part in the defense of 
Soviet territory within the Arctic Circle. 

The medal “For Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War, 1941- 
1945” was instituted on 9 May 1945 to mark the victory won over Fascist 
Germany in the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945, for awarding to military 
personnel and civilians who were on active service during the war and also 
to those who contributed to victory by their work in military districts. 

The medal “20th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 
1941-1945” is an anniversary medal. It was instituted on 7 May 1965 to mark 
the 20th anniversary of the victory over Fascist Germany, for awarding to 
servicemen and civilian employees who took part in the Great Patriotic War 
in the ranks of the Armed Forces from 1941-1945, to the partisans of the 
Great Patriotic War, and to all personnel of the Armed Forces and other 
individuals awarded the medal “For Victory over Germany in the Great 
Patriotic War of 1941-1945.” 

The medal “For Victory over Japan” was instituted on 30 September 1945 
to mark the victory won over imperialist Japan, for awarding to servicemen 
and civilians who had played a direct part in operations against Japanese 
forces and in supporting these operations. 

The medal “For the Taking of Budapest” was instituted on 9 June 1945 



183 




for awarding to servicemen directly involved and to the leaders of the heroic 
storming and taking of Budapest. 

The medal “For the Taking of Konigsberg” was instituted on 9 June 1945 
for awarding to servicemen directly involved and to the leaders of the heroic 
storming and taking of Konigsberg. 

The medal “For the Taking of Vienna” was instituted on 9 June 1945 for 
awarding to servicemen directly involved and to the leaders of the heroic 
storming and taking of Vienna. 

The medal “For the Taking of Berlin” was instituted on 9 June 1945 for 
awarding to servicemen directly involved and to the leaders of the heroic 
storming and taking of Berlin. 


Ji IIV 






was instituted on 9 June 1945 


for awarding to servicemen directly involved and to the leaders of the heroic 


storming and liberation of Belgrade. 


The medal “For the Liberation of Warsaw” was instituted on 9 June 1945 


for awarding to servicemen directly mvolved and to the leaders of the heroic 
storming and liberation of Warsaw. 

The medal “For the Liberation of Prague” was instituted on 9 June 1945 
for awarding to servicemen directly involved md to the leaders of the heroic 
storming and liberation of Prague. 

The medal “For Valiant Labor in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945” 


was instituted on 6 June 1945 for awarding to workers, engineers, techni- 
cians, and office workers in industry and transport, collective farmers and 
agricultural specialists, scientific workers, technicians, artists and writers, 
workers in governmental, party, trade union, and other public organizations 
who, by their valiant and self-sacrificing labor, ensured victory over Fascist 
Germany in the Great Patriotic War. 

The medal “For the Restoration of Ferrous Metallurgy Undertakings in 
the South” was instituted on 18 May 1948 for awarding to workers, em- 
ployees, engineering and technical and managerial workers for outstanding 
work, high output figures, and services in the restoration of the ferrous 
metallurgy industry in southern districts of the USSR. 

The medal “For Restoration of the Coal Mines of the Donets Basin” was 
instituted on 10 September 1947 for awarding to workers- employees, engi- 
neering and technical and managerial workers for outstanding work, high 
output figures and services in the restoration of the coal industry of the 
Donets Basin. 

The medal “For the Cultivation of Virgin Lands” was instituted on 20 
October 1956 for awarding to individuals who distinguished themselves in 
the cultivation of virgin and fallow lands in Kazakhstan, Siberia, the Urals, 
the Volga region, and the North Caucasus. 

The medal “To Commemorate the 800th Anniversary of Moscow” was 
instituted on 20 September 1947 to mark the 800th Anniversary of the city 
of Moscowr for awarding to servicemen, workers and employees, and also to 
housewives who had taken an active part in the economic and social life of 
the city, provided that they had resided in Moscow or its suburbs for at least 
5 years. 


. 1 ’ 


184 


The mcda! “To Commemorate the 250th Anniversary of Leningrad” was 
instituted on 16 May 1957 to commemorate the 250th anniversary of the city 
of Leningrad. 

The medal “XXX Years of the Soviet Army and Navy” is an anniversary 
medai. It was instituted on 22 February 1948 to commemorate the 30th 
anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy for awarding to servicemen in the 
ranks of the Soviet Army, the Navy, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) 
and the Ministry of State Security (MGB) on 23 February 1948. 

The medal “Forty Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR” is an anniver- 
sary medal. It was instituted on 18 December 1957 to commemorate the 40th 
anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy for awarding to servicemen in the 
ranks of the Soviet Army and Navy, the forces of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs (MVD) and the Committee of State Security administered by the 
Council of Ministers of the USSR on 23 February 1958. 

The medal “Fifty Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR” is an anniver- 
sary medal. It was instituted on 26 December 1967 to mark the 50th anniver- 
sary of the Armed Forces of the USSR for awarding: 

— to servicemen who were, on 23 February 1968 in the ranks of the Soviet 
Armed Forces, the forces of the Ministry for the Preservation of Public Order 
(MOOP) of the USSR and the forces and agencies of the Committee of State 
Secruity (KGB) administered by the Council of Ministers of the USSR; 

— to generals on the reserve and retired lists, officers and reenlisted men 
with 20 calendar years of service or more; 

— to former Red Guards and servicemen who took part in operations for 
the defense of the Soviet Motherland in the ranks of the Armed Forces, as 
well as to individuals who, during their active service, were awarded orders 
of the USSPv or the medal “For Valor”, the Ushakov Medal, the meaals “For 
Services in Battle”, “For Distinguished Service in Defense of the State 
Boundary of the USSR”, the Nakhimov Medal, the medals “For Labor 
Prowess” and “For Distinguished Labor Service”. 

The medal “Fifty Years of the Soviet Militia” is an anniversary medal. It 
was instituted on 20 November 1967 to mark the 50th anniversary of the 
Soviet Militia for awarding: 

— to officers and men of the militia serving on 21 November 1967 in the 
agencies, institutions, and training establishments of the Ministry for the 
Preservation of Public Order (MOOP) of the USSR; 

— to individuals holding special ranks in the militia, transferred from 
bodies for the defense of public order to the reserve and retirement with 25 
years service or more. 

The medal may also be awarded to the officers and enlisted personnel of 
the services and subunits of the Ministry for the Preservation of Public Order 
(MOOP) of the USSR who actively assist the organs of the militia in their 
duties. 

The medal “For Exemplary Service” was instituted by order of the Minis- 
try of Defense of the USSR on 25 January 1958 for awarding to servicemen 
who have served for 10, 15, and 20 years in the Armed Forces who have good 
records and who successfully carry out their service duties. 





185 


The medal has three classes. The III Class is awarded to servicemen with 
10 years of service, II Class to those with 15 years, and I Class to those with 
20 years of service. 

The medal is awarded once a year, on 23 February, timed to coincide with 
Soviet Armed Forces Day. 


The Wearing of Orders and Medals, the Ribbons of Orders and Medals, 
and Breast Badges on Military Uniforms 

1. The wearing of orders and medals or the ribbons of orders and medals 
and military chest badges on military uniforms is compulsory. 

2. The “Gold Star” medal of the order Hero of the Soviet Union and the 
“Hammer and Sickle” of the order Hero of Socialist Labor, and also the chest 
badge “Pilot-Cosmonaut of the USSR” are worn on all types of military 
uniforms (apart from fatigue dress). 

3. The following are worn on parade dress uniform: 

the “Gold Star” medal of the order Hero of the Soviet Union and the 
“Hammer and Sickle” medal of the order Hero of Socialist Labor; 
orders and medals; 

the chest badge “Pilot-Cosmonaut of the USSR”; 
the badges for winners of the Lenin Prize and the USSR State Prize; 
the chest badges for: “Meritorious Test Pilot of the USSR,” “Meritorious 
Test Navigator of the USSR,” “Meritorious Military Pilot of the USSR” and 
“Meritorious Military Navigator of the USSR”; 
deputies’ chest badges; 
the Komsomol badge; 

the chest badge “25th Anniversary* of Victory in the Great Patriotic 
War”; 

the “Pilot-Cosmonaut” chest badge; 

the chest badges for class specialists among the officers, generals and 
admirals of the Armed Forces of the USSR; 
the submarine commander’s chest badge; 
the “Guards” badge; 

chest badges to mark graduation from military training establishments; 
badges of merit and class specialists’ badges (soldiers, sailors, noncommis- 
sioned, and petty officers); 

the “For Re-enlistment” chest badge. 

The same decorations and badges worn on the chest are worn on dress off 
duty uniform, service uniform, and field uniform, but orders and medals are 
replaced by bars bearing the ribbons of the orders and medals. 

4. It is permitted to wear the following chest insignia (badges) on all 
uniforms (apart from fatigue dress): 

— badges showing graduation from institutions of higher education; 

— “Parachute Instructor”; 


* Listed elsewhere as ''20lh Anniversary . . .” (U.S. Ed.]. 


— “Excellent Parachutist”; 

— “Parachutist”; 

— Sports badges and medals; 

— other insignia instituted by Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet of the USSR and the Union Republics, by enactments of the govern- 
ment of the USSR and the Union Republics, and by orders of the Ministry 
of Defense of the USSR. 

5. The “Gold Star” medal of the order Hero of the Soviet Union and the 
“Hammer and Sickle” medal of the order Hero of Socialist Labor are worn 
on the left side of the chest above all orders, medals, and ribbons of orders 
and medals and are fastened to the uniform by a rectangular bar covered by 
the ribbon. When two or more of the medals “Gold Star” of the order Hero 
of the Soviet Union and “Hammer and Sickle” of the order Hero of Socialist 
Labor are worn, they are fastened to the uniform in a single row. 

The “Gold Star” medal of the order Hero of the Soviet Union and the 
“Hammer and Sickle” medal of the order Hero of Socialist Labor are worn: 

to the left of the lapel on an open double-breasted coat (jacket) and dotible- 
breasted high-collared tunic, so that the upper edge of the medal bar is on 
the same level as the upper corner of the lapel; 

to the left of the lapel on an open single-breasted coat and single-breasted 
high-collared tunic so that the upper edge of the medal bar is on a level with 
the projection of the lapel; 

on a closed high-collared tunic so that the upper end of the star is on a 
level with the center of the top button; 

on flannel and uniform shirts so that the lower ends of the star are 65mm 
above the lower corner of the cutaway portion of the collar. 

6. Orders and medals worn on ribbons are positioned on the left side of 
the chest, while orders worn without ribbons are positioned on the right side 
of the chest. 

7. Orders and medals worn on the left side of the chest are attached by bars 
covered with ribbons of these orders and medals and are placed: on an open 
coat (jacket) — beginning from the bottom and continuing upward along the 
lapel; on flannel and white uniform shirts — from right to left. 

Orders and medals are arranged in the following order: 

The Order of Lenin; 

The Order of the October Revolution; 

The Order of the Red Banner; 

The Order of the Red Banner of Labor; 

The Order “Badge of Honor”; 

The Order of Glory I Class; 

The Order of Glory II Class; 

The Order of Glory III Class; 

The medal “For Valor”; 

The Ushakov Medal; 

The medal “For Services in Battle"; 


187 


The medal “For Distinguished Service in Defense of the National Frontier 
of the USSR”; 

The medal “For Outstanding Service in the Preservation of Public Order”; 
The Nakhimov Medal; 

The Anniversary medal “XX Years of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red 
Army”; 

The medal “For Labor Valor”; 

The medal “For Distinguished Labor Service”; 

The medal “For Bravery in Dealing with Fire”; 

The medal "For Saving from Drowning”; 

The medal “For a Partisan of the Patriotic War” I Class; 

The medal “For a Partisan of the Patriotic War” II Class; 

The medal “For the Defense of Leningrad”; 

The medal “For the Defense of Moscow”; 

The medal “For the Defense of Odessa”; 

The medal “For the Defense of Sevastopol”; 

The medal “For the Defense of Stalingrad”; 

The medal “For the Defense of Kiev”; 

The medal “For the Defense of the Caucasus”; 

The medal “For the Defense of Soviet Territory within the Arctic Circle”; 
The medal “For Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War of 
1941-1945”; 

The medal “The 20th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War 
of 1941-1945”; 

The medal “For Victory over Japan”; 

The medal “For the Taking of Budapest”; 

The medal “For the Taking of Konigsberg”; 

The medal “For the Taking of Vienna”; 

The medal “For the Taking of Berlin”; 

The medal “For the Liberation of Belgrade”; 

The medal “For the Liberation of Warsaw”; 

The medal “For the Liberation of Prague”; 

The medal “For Valiant Labor in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945"; 
The medal “For the Restoration of Ferrous Metallurgy Undertakings in 
the South”; 

The medal “For Restoration of the Coal Mines of the Donets Basin”; 
The medal “For the Cultivation of Virgin Lands”; 

The medal “To Commemorate the 800th Anniversary of Moscow”; 

The medal “To Commemorate the 250th Anniversary of Leningrad”; 
The anniversary medal “XXX Years of the Soviet Army and Navy”; 
The anniversary medal “40 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR”; 
The anniversary medal “50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR”; 
The anniversary medal “50 Years of the Soviet Militia”; 

The medal “For Exemplary Service” I Class; 

The medal “For Exemplary Service” II Class; 

The medal “For Exemplary Service” III Class; 


^ir 


8. Orders and medals are arranged on the same bar. Orders and medals 
that do not fit into one row are carried over to a second row placed below 
the first, and so on. 

Placing is as follows: 

on the open coat (jacket) so that the lower edge of the lapel covers two 
thirds of the first row bar. 

The bar of the second row is fastened beneath the orders and medals of 
the first row and should extend for two thirds of its width beneath the orders 
and medals of the first row, the third and subsequent rows being positioned 
in the same manner; 

on flannel and uniform shirts — in the middle so that the upper edges of the 
orders are on a level with the lower corner of the cutaway of the collar. 

Orders and medals are placed no lower than the upper buttons on a 
double-breasted coat and no lower than the second button from the top on 
a single-breasted coat. 

9. The Order of “Victory” is worn on the left side of the chest, to the left 
of the bar bearing the orders and medals. 

10. The anniversary medals “For Military Valor. To mark the centenary 
of the birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin,” and “For Heroic Labor. To mark the 
centenary of the birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin” are fastened to a rectangular 
bar and placed on items of dress uniform on the left side of the chest 15mm 
below the “Gold Star" medal of the order Hero of the Soviet Union and the 
“Hammer and Sickle” of the order Hero of Socialist Labor, and, in the 
absence of these medals, in their place. 

11. Orders worn on the right side of the chest are fastened separately and 
arranged in order of seniority in one or more rows: 

on the open coat (jacket) — beginning from the bottom and continuing 
upward along the Lpel; 

on flannel and uniform shirts — from left to right. 

Orders and medals are placed in the following sequence: 

Order of Suvorov I Class; 

Order of Ushakov I Class; 

Order of Kutuzov I Class; 

Ordei of Nakhimov I Class; 

Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy I Class; 

Order of Suvorov II Class; 

Order of Ushakov II Class; 

Order of Kutuzov II Class; 

Order of Nakhimov II Class; 

Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy II Class; 

Order of Suvorov III Class, 

Order of Kutuzov III Class; 

Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy III Class; 

Order of Aleksandr Nevskiy; 

Order of the Patriotic War I Class; 

Order of the Patriotic War II Class; 

Order of the Red Star. 


189 


In the placing of orders on the open ceremonial coat (jacket) the orders 
must be the same distance from the edge of the lapel as orders and medals 
worn on the left side of the chest. 

On flannel and dress uniform shirts orders must be placed 5mm apart in 
a row. Orders in the second row are placed 15-20mm below the first. When 
there are orders and medals on the left side of the chest, the centers of the 
orders in the first row on the right side of the chest must be on the same level 
as the middle of the first bar of orders and medals placed on the left side of 
the chest. 

In the absence of orders and medals on the left side of the chest, orders 
are placed on the right side of the chest so that the lower edges of the orders 
are on a level with the lower comer of the cutaway of the collar. 

12. Orders and medals of foreign powers on ribbons are worn on the left 
side of the chest beneath the lower row of orders and medals of the Soviet 
Union. Orders worn without ribbons are placed on the right side of the chest 
beneath the lower row of orders of the Soviet Union. 

13. Marshals of the Soviet Union, Fleet Admirals of the Soviet Union, 
Chief Marshals and Marshals of Service branches, and Fleet Admirals wear 
Marshal’s Stars on the tie with the ceremonial and the dress-off duty coat 
(jacket). 

14. The ribbons of orders and medals are worn on bars on the left side of 
the chest: 

— on open doable-breasted coats, jackets, and high-collared tunics ap- 
proximately 20mm below the level of the lapel buttonhole of the coat or tunic; 

— on open single-breasted coats and high-collared tunics approximately 30 
mm below the upper edge of the lapel; 

— on closed high-collared tunics (in the Navy) — 5mm above the pocket; 

— on closed high-collared tunics (in the Soviet Army) — in the middle of 
the left front on a level with the center of the second button from the top; 

— on flannel and dress uniform shirts — in the middle, so that the upper 
edge of the bar is on a level with the lower corner of the cutaway of the collar. 

15. The ribbons of orders and medals worn on bars are placed from right 
to left in the following order; 

The ribbon of the Order of Lenin; 

The ribbon of the Order of the October Revolution; 

The ribbon of the Order of the Red Banner; 

The ribbon of the Order of Suvorov I Class; 

The ribbon of the Order of Ushakov I Class; 

The ribbon of the Order of Kutuzov I Class; 

The ribbon of the Order of Nakhimov I Class; 

The ribbon of the Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy I Class; 

The ribbon of the Order of Suvorov II Class; 

The ribbon of the Order of Kutuzov 11 Class; 

The ribbon of the Order of Nakhimov II Class; 

The ribbon of the Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy II Class; 


The ribbon of the Order of Suvorov III Class; 

The ribbon of the Order of Kutuzov IH Class; 

The ribbon of the Order of Bogdan Khmel'ni^skiy III Class; 

The ribbon of the Order of Aleksandr N.’ivskiy; 

The ribbon of the Order of the Patriotic War I Class; 

The ribbon of the Order of the Patriotic War II Class; 

The ribbon of the Order of the Red Banner of Labor; 

The ribbon of the Order of the Red Star; 

The ribbon of the Order “Symbol of Honor”; 

The ribbon of the Order of Glory I Class; 

The ribbon of the Order of Glory 11 Class; 

The ribbon of the Order of Glory III Class; 

The ribbon of the medal “For Bravery”; 

The ribbon of the Ushakov Medal; 

The ribbon of the medal “For Services in Battle”; 

The ribbon of the medal “For Distinguished Services in Defense of the 
State Boundary of the USSR”; 

The ribbon of the medal “For Outstanding Service in the Preservation of 
Public Order”; 

The ribbon of the Nakhimov Medal; 

The ribbon of the anniversary medal “XX Years of the Workers’ and 
Peasants’ Red Army”; 

The ribbon of the medal “For Labor Prowess”; 

The ribbon of the medal “For Distinguished Labor Service”; 

The nbbon of the anniversary medal “For Heroic Labor (For Military 
Valor). To mark the centenary of the birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin”; 

The ribbon of the medal “For Bravery in Dealing with Fires”; 

The ribbon of the medal “For Saving from Drowning”; 

The ribbon of the medal “For a Partisan of the Patriotic War” I Class; 
The ribbon of the medal “For a Partisan of the Patriotic War” II Class; 
The ribbon of the medal “For the Defense of Leningrad”; 

The ribbon of the medal “For the Defense of Moscow”; 

The ribbon of the medal “For the Defense of Odessa”; 

The ribbon of the medal “for the DeDnse of Sevastopol”; 

The ribbon of the medal “For the Defense of Stalingrad”; 

The ribbon of the medal “For the Defense of Kiev”; 

The ribbon of (he medal “For the Defense of the Caucasus”; 

The ribbon of the medal “For the Defense of Soviet Territory within the 
Arctic Circle”; 

The ribbon of the medal “For Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic 
War, 1941-1945”; 

The ribbon of the medal “20th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patri- 
otic War of 1941-1945”; 

The ribbon of the medal “For Victory over Japan”; 

The ribbon of the medal “For the taking of Budapest”; 

The ribbon of the medal “For the taking of Konigsberg”; 


4 


191 


The ribbon of the medal “For the taking of Vienna”; 

The ribbon of the medal “For the taking of Berlin”; 

The ribbon of the medal “For the Liberation of Belgrade”; 

The ribbon of the medal “For the Liberation of Warsaw”; 

The ribbon of the medal “For the Liberation of Prague”; 

The ribbon of the medal “For Meritorious Labor in the Great Patriotic 
War of 1941-1945”; 

The ribbon of the medal “For the Restoration of Ferrous Metallurgy 
Undertakings in the South”; 

The ribbon of the medal “For Restoration of the Coal Mines of the Donets 
Basin”; 

The ribbon of the medal “For the Cultivation of Virgin Lands”; 

The ribbon of the medal “To Commemorate the SOOth Anniversary of 
Moscow”; 

The ribbon of the medal “To Commemorate the 250th Anniversary of 
Leningrad”; 

The ribbon of the anniversary medal “XXX Years of the Soviet Army and 
Navy”; 

The ribbon of the anniversary medal “40 Years of the Armed Forces of 
the USSR”; 

The ribbon of the anniversary medal “50 Years of the Armed Forces of 
the USSR”; 

The ribbon of the anniversary medal “50 Years of the Soviet Militia”; 

The ribbon of the medal “For Exemplary Service” I Class; 

The ribbon of the medal “For Exemplary Service” II Class; 

The ribbon of the medal “For Exemplary Service” III Class; 

16. The ribbons of orders and medals of foreign powers are worn on 
separate bars below the bars bearing the ribbons of orders and medals of the 
USSR. 

17. The chest badge “Pilot-Cosmonaut of the USSR,” the chest badges of 
winners of the Lenin Prize and the State Prize of the USSR, and the chest 
badges “Meritorious Test Pilot of the USSR,” “Meritorious Test Navigator 
of the USSR,” “Meritorious Military Pilot of the USSR” and “Meritorious 
Military Navigator of the USSR” arc worn on the right side of the che.st, 
below the place allocated for orders: 

— on open double-breasted coats, jackets, and high-collared tunics — so 
that the upper edge of the bar of the badges is on the same level as the upper 
comer of the lapel; 

— on open single-breasted coats and high-collared jackets — to the right of 
the lapei so that the upper edge of the bar of the badges is on a level with 
the projection of the lapel; 

— on a closed high-collared tunic — on a level with the top button. 

18. The chest badge of a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (or 
of a Union Republic) is worn on the left side of the chest: 

—on open double-breasted coats, jackets, and high-collared tunics — in the 
middle of the lapel, on a level with the buttonhole; 


192 


— on open single-breasted coats and high-co!!ared tunics — in the middle 
of the lapel, 10mm below the level of the end of the lapel; 

— on closed high-collared tunics, dress uniform shirts, and flannel shirts 
— above the orders and medals or above the bars bearing the ribbons of orders 
and medals. 

19. Military and other insigs.i^. for wearing on the chest are worn on the 
right side of the chest and placed in the following order: 

the badge “25th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War”; 
the badge “Pilot-Cosmonaut”; 

badges for military specialists among the officers, generals, and admirals 
of the Armed Forces of the USSR; 
the badge “Submarine Commander”; 
the badge “Guards”; 

badges awarded on graduation from military training establishments; 
badges for e.xemplary service; 

badges for military specialists among noncommissioned officers and en- 
listed men; 

the badge “Parachute Instructor”; 
the badge “Excellent Parachutist”; 
the badge “Parachutist”; 

the badge “For Reenlistment” and other badges listed under section 97 of 
the present Regulations. 

Badges to be worn on the chest are placed on the right side of the chest, 
from left to right, in a row: 

if orders and medals are worn — 10mm below them, and if orders and 
medals are not worn — in their place. 

Badges to be worn on the chest that do not fit into one row are carried over 
to a second row and so on. 

20. When servicemen have badges to be worn on the chest, awarded on 
graduation from two or more higher military training establishments, onlv 
one badge is worn. A badge awarded on graduation from a civilian institution 
of higher education (university, institute) may be worn along with a badge 
awarded for graduation from a higher military training establishment. This 
badge is worn to the right of the badge awarded for graduation from the 
higher military training establishment, on the same level as it. 

When there is a badge awarded for graduation from a higher military 
training establishment, a badge awarded for graduation from a secondary 
military training establi'^’iment is not worn. 

A chest badge awarded on graduation from a Suvorov military school is 
worn on the ceremonial, the dress-off duty uniform, the service uniform, and 
on the field uniform. 

A badge awarded on graduation from a Nakhimov naval school is worn 
on ceremonial, the off-duty dress uniform, and on the service uniform. 

Badges awarded on graduation from Suvorov and Nakhimov service* 
schools are worn on the right side of the chest and placed on the same level 
as badges awarded on graduation from higher or secondary military training 


193 


establishments, to the right of them, and in the absence of these badges — in 
their place. 

21. The "Komsomol” badge is worn on the left side of the chest in the 
middle, 15-20mm below the orders or order bars , and in the absence of 
orders — in their place. 

The chest badge "25th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War,” 
is worn on the right side of the chest below the orders, but above all other 
army insignia. On service and field uniforms it is permitted to wear a bar with 
the ribbon of the medal “For Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic 
War of 1941-1945” in place of the badge on the right side of the chest. The 
bar is placed 1cm above the badge for graduation from an educational estab- 
lishment. 

HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND ADVANCED 
STUDIES 

Regulations for Admission to Higher Military Educational Institutions 
(general provisions) 

The higher military educational institutions (VVUZ)* of the Armed 
Forces produce highly qualified officer personnel for the Soviet Armed 
Forces. They accept officers, servicemen on short service and extended ser- 
vice, those with a military obligation (including reserve officers), young peo- 
ple from Suvorov military schools, Nakhimov naval schools, and young 
civilians possessing high moral and political qualities, who have completed 
secondary general or technical education, whose state of health qualifies them 
for instruction in a VVUZ, * and who have successfully passed competitive 
entrance examinations. 

Officers who received short courses of military education before 1962 and 
who subsequently completed officers’ retraining and advanced courses lasting 
for at least eight months are admitted to the competitive entrance examina- 
tions for higher military educational institutions along with individuals who 
have completed the full course of military schools, if these officers satisfy all 
the other conditions for admission to such institutions. 

Individuals educated as engineers are not as a rule admitted to the engi- 
neering departments of higher military educational institutio* 3 . 

When officers who have taken courses at higher commano, aviation, and 
naval schools enter the command and command engineering de^ .rt ;ts of 
most military academies, they take entrance examinations only in then inajor 
field of specialization. Officers who have graduated from the enumerated 
higher schools with a gold medal take the examination in only one of the 

* Standing for the Russian vyssheyf voyenno-uchebnoye zavedeniye, translated as above [U.S. 
Ed.]. 


major fields of specialization and, should they obtain an excellent grade, are 
exempted from further examination. 

Candidates for entry to a VVUZ who have completed courses at secondary 
military educational institutions with a first-class ranking (“excellent”), or 
who have graduated from civilian technical institutes with a diploma with 
honors, or from secondary schools with a gold or silver medal, take the 
competitive entrance examinations only in the major field of specialization. 

individuals who have completed courses at Suvorov military schools and 
Nakhimov naval schools are accepted for higher command and higher naval 
schools respectively, without entrance examinations. Individuals who have 
completed courses at Suvorov and Nakhimov schools take competitive en- 
trance examinations for other higher military educational institutions on a 
universal basis. 

Officers who have been in command of subunits that have been rated 
“excellent” and “good” for military and political training, discipline, and 
combat readiness for the three years preceding their entry to a VVUZ are 
accepted for higher military educational institutions if they successfully pass 
entrance examinations without competition. 

Noncommissioned officers (petty officers), soldiers, and sailors who obtain 
excellent reports for military and political training throughout their service 
(but for not less than a year) are also accepted without competition. 

Individuals who have graduated from technical colleges or other equiva- 
lent civilian secondary technical educational institutions, and also individuals 
who since 1946 have graduated from secondary military, military technical 
and special (technical) military schools with a national diploma or with a 
certificate in lieu of a diploma are accepted into higher military educational 
institutions on the basis of having completed secondary education. 

Individuals enlisted as regular officers from among those called up for 2-3 
years, and also Armed Forces volunteers who have graduated from civilian 
institutions of higher education and have undertaken military training in 
them, are accepted in command academies (departments) and in the V. I. 
Lenin Military-Political Academy on an equal footing with individuals who 
have graduated from military schools, if they have at least two years’ experi- 
ence of command and political duties and satisfy the other conditions for 
entry into these educationaPnstitutions. 

The maximum age for individuals entering a VVUZ, their length of com- 
mand or of work, and also their length of service as officers or in appropriate 
posts, are established in relation to the type of military educational institution 
or its department. 

Servicemen wishing to enter higher military educational institutions (ex- 
cept for higher command, higher aviation, and higher naval schools) submit 
reports to their superior officers no later than 15 September of the year 
preceding the year of entry, in which they state their military rank, surname, 
given name and patronymic, the post held, their year and month of birth, 
their general and military education, and also the name of the VVUZ and 
department which they wish to enter. 


195 


f 


The report must be accompanied by evidence of general secondary and 
military education in the form of an appropriate document (an appropriate 
certificate or diploma) or a certified copy of such a document. 

Servicemen who, by decision of a unit commander (commandant of an 
institution) merit being sent for training are medically examined by garrison 
medical boards, after which their documents (reports, personal files, medical 
records, service records etc.) are sent to the personnel department of the 
district, group of forces, fleet, or formation. 

The selection of candidates is carried out by commissions appointed for 
this purpose on the order of commanders of military districts and air defense 
districts, groups of forces, fleets. Air Force commanders of military districts 
and fleets, commanders of formations, and the Commander of the Railway 
Troops. 

The decisions of the selection commissions, approved by those who ap- 
pointed them, are conveyed to the candidates no later than 15 December. 

Servicemen approved as candidates for training may be transferred only 
on appointment to higher posts; they are not sent on lengthy missions and, 
as a rule, are not assigned to various forms of duties on free days and 
holidays. 

Officers who are candidates for a VVUZ are freed of officers’ duties and 
have the right to use at least three free evenings a week after 1700 hours on 
working days for preparation for examinations. 

All servicemen allowed to take entrance examinations to a VVUZ are 
given a 30 day leave (in addition to their regularly entitled leave). Candidates 
who have previously taken such leave on entering a VVUZ previously are not 
given a second leave. 

Officers permitted to take entrance examinations to a VVUZ are allowed 
to take the whole of their leave entitlement in the first half year, no later than 
May. 

Servicemen are not permitted to sit for competitive entrance examinations 
to a VVUZ more than 3 times. 

Thirty-day preparatory courses are held for the servicemen candidates 
before the start of the entrance examinations on the basis of the additional 
leave granted to the candidates. As a rule the courses are organized directly 
at the VVUZ. 

The competitive entrance examinations are held by the examination boards 
of the VVUZ from 20 July through 20 August, or by visiting examination 
boards from 10 July through 10 August. 

Candidates who have received an unsatisfactory grade for one of the 
disciplines are not admitted to further examinations, and are returned to their 
former place of service. 

It is not permitted to retake examinations when an unsatisfactory grade 
has been obtained, or to retake one in order to increase a grade. 

The selection of candidates for entry to a VVUZ from among those who 
have passed entrance examinations is made by the admission boards of the 
VVUZ (visiting admission boards). 


196 


When candidates have gained an equal number of passes in the examina- 
tions, consideration is given in the first instance to the grades obtained in the 
disciplines most corresponding to the requirements of their future specializa- 
tion. 

A preferential right to admission to a VVUZ among candidates who have 
successfully passed the entrance examinations and have the same grades 
overall is enjoyed by Heroes of the Soviet Union, Heroes of Socialist Labor, 
individuals awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union, and also candi- 
dates who have obtained higher grades in the major field of specialization, 
skilled craftsmen and Class I specialists, officers with great practical experi- 
ence of service in the branch of specialization, and young civilians with a 
longer period of practical employment relative to the course offered by the 
higher military training establishment. 

Training by Correspondence of Officers in Higher Military Educational 
Institutions 

The object of training of officers by correspondence is to produce specialists 
with higher education in the system of higher military educational institu- 
tions, with minimum disturbance to the direct performance of their service 
duties by the officers. 

Training by correspondence is carried out in correspondence departments 
and sections of the VVUZ. 

Correspondence students who have satisfied all the requirements of the 
curriculum and who have defended a thesis project (paper), or passed State 
examinations receive diplomas, chest badges and gold medals in the same 
way as those who complete the residence courses in the corresponding 
VVUZ. The qualification obtained by officers in the course of training by 
correspondence is taken into consideration in their subsequent assignments 
in the service. 

Students are accepted for the correspondence training departments of a 
VVUZ in accordance with the general regulations governing admissions to 
higher military educational institutions as approved by the Ministry of De- 
fense. 

Correspondence study departments are made up in the main of officers 
serving in specialties related to the courses offered by the department con- 
cerned. There is, as a rule, no age limit on the admission of officers to 
correspondence departments. Comjjetitive entrance examinations for admis- 
sion to correspondence study departments are held at the same time as the 
entrance examinations to residence-course departments. 

Students who, for valid reasons, give up a course of study in residence- 
course departments in the second year or in later years, may, by decision of 
the commandant of the VVUZ, be admitted without entrance examination 
to corresponding courses of corresjwndence study departments teaching 


related subjects, with consideration given to the disciplines previously taken 
by these students in the residence-course department of the VVUZ. 

The study of correspondence students consists of independent work and 
study under the supervision of the teaching stalf of the VVUZ. Correspon- 
dence students engage chiefly in independent work. 

Study under the supervision of the teaching staff is carried out at study 
courses in the VYUZ and also at outlying tutorial points organized in garri- 
sons in which there are many correspondence students. 

Study courses are organized at the beginning of the first academic year 
immediately after completion of the entrance examinations and subsequently 
at the end of each academic year (the courses lasting two months). Examina- 
tions are held during the period of the study courses. A concluding and 
graduating course is held at the end of the last year of study in order to 
complete the course of study, to take examinations and tests for the final year 
of the course, and to work on, and defend, thesis projects (take State examina- 
tions). 

The concluding and graduating course lasts 4-6 months for engineering 
and technical students (depending upon the course), and 3 months for stu- 
dents taking other subjects. 

With the object of creating favorable conditions for successful study by 
officers who are correspondence students, commanders of military units 
(commandants of institutions) are made responsible for verifying that corre- 
spondence students carry out the teaching assignments of the VVUZ, for 
assisting them to have the necessary tutorial help for providing them with 
literature, for making the prescribed time available for independent study, 
etc. 

An officer who is a correspondence student has the right, in his turn: to 
be assigned to a VVUZ to attend training and concluding and graduating 
courses; to be excused from planned officers’ training, to use three full days 
a month (apart from days off) and three evenings a week after 1 600 hours 
for study, and also to receive written and oral advice from the instructors of 
the VVUZ in which he is registered. 

For his part, a VVUZ correspondence student is obliged to carry out study 
assignments, tests, and course projects conscientiously and on time and to 
take examinations and tests at the fixed time. 

Advanced Studies* 

Advanced studies (postgraduate studies) ’ at higher military educational 
and scientific research institutions of the Ministry of Defense are the form 
of training for scientific instructors and scientific specialists drawn from 
among generals, admirals, and officers with practical experience relating to 

* Ad'yunktura in ihc original (U.S. Ed.]. 

’ The term "advanced studies” is subsequently understood also to mean postgraduate studies, 
which exist in some higher military training and scientific research institutions. 


198 


the content of a selected scientific specialty who have displayed a capacity 
for teaching and scientific research. 

Advanced studies are organized with leave of absence from duty (advanced 
residence studies) and without leave of absence from duty (advanced corre- 
spondence studies). The time spent on advanced studies should not exceed 
3 years for residence studies, and 4 years for correspondence studies. 

Officers are accepted up to the age of 40 for advanced residence studies in 
all VVUZ and scientific research institutions, and up to 45 for correspon- 
dence study. 

Officers are accepted for advanced studies who have completed their higher 
education and who have had at least two years experience in practical work 
relevant to the selected scientific specialty after graduation from the VVUZ, 
and who have shown ability for scientific research and teaching. 

It is also permitted to enroll for advanced studies officers who have shown 
especially great capacity for study and a disposition for scientific rer earch and 
teaching immediately after they graduate from a higher military educational 
institution. 

Officers who wish to proceed to advanced studies submit a report to their 
superior officer. Copies of the reports are sent directly to the commandant 
of the higher military educational or scientific research institution. 

Along with the report, officers submit their scientific work, whether pub- 
lished or unpublished, descriptions of inventions with evaluations of them 
and, in their absence, scientific papers (abstracts) on the selected specialty. 

Other requirements for submission are the following; 

— an authenticated copy of a diploma of graduation from the higher educa- 
tional institution and a transcript of his study records; 

— a record of service from the last place of work; 

— a Party-political (Komsomol) reference; 

— a health certificate stating the feasibility of taking advanced studies; 

— an extract from the minutes of the council of the higher military educa- 
tional institution for officers recommended for post-graduate studies by such 
councils immediately after their graduation from a higher educational insti- 
tution; 

— a certificate of having passed the candidacy examination laid down for 
the specialty, for individuals who have passed candidacy examinations in 
whole or in part. 

Students are accepted for advanced studies between 1 April and 1 October, 
while those who have graduated from a VVUZ and are recommended for 
advanced studies in the course of the year are accepted a» times related to 
the time of graduation from a VVUZ. 

Individuals who satisfy the stated requirements and whose submitted 
scientific work or abstracts have been judged to be satisfactory are admitted 
to entrance examinations. 

Within a month of receiving documents from a candidate for admission 
to advanced studies the admissions board is obliged to inform him whether 
he is being admitted to the competitive entrance examinations or refused. 


199 


Officers who are allowed to take examinations for advanced studies with 
or without being excused from duty are given a month’s leave (apart from 
their regular leave entitlement) on full pay to prepare for and take the 
examinations. Officers, accepted for advanced studies, who have partly 
passed candidacy examinations and who are excused in this connection from 
taking some entrance examinations, are given additional leave to take the 
examinations for the remaining disciplines on a basis of 10 days for each 
examination. Those who are accepted for advanced studies without having 
to pass entrance examinations have no right to additional leave. 

Individuals who have completely passed the candidacy examinations for 
a given specialty are excused from having to take entrance examinations. 
Officers who have partly passed candidacy examinations may be excused 
from taking the corresponding entrance examinations. In this case they are 
credited with the grades of the candidacy examinations which they have 
passed. 

Individuals who have passed candidacy examinations in part, and also 
individuals who have produced scientific works and inventions, are permitted 
to take candidacy examinations instead of entrance examinations at the same 
times. 

Officers who have completely or partly passed candidacy examinations 
before commencing advanced studies may have the length of their advanced 
studies reduced by one year. 

During the time spent on advanced studies, graduate students must acquire 
thorough mastery of the selected specialty and of research and teaching 
methods and procedures, must pass candidacy examinations and prepare 
theses within the established periods. 

Correspondence students taking advanced studies are permitted four full 
free days a month (apart from regular days off) and three free evenings a week 
from 1700 hours. They are also allowed an annual additional leave of 30 days, 
not counting time spent traveling t and from the VVUZ or scientific re- 
search institute. 

Individuals who have passed candidacy examinations and who have de- 
fended or submitted a candidacy thesis within the established period during 
their graduate residence, are regarded as having completed advanced studies. 

Individuals who have passed candidacy examinations and who have de- 
fended a thesis are given a regular diploma, while individuals who have 
submitted a candidacy thesis within the stated period are given a regular 
certificate. 

PRIVILEGES AND PENSIONS OF OFFICERS 
Privileges for Officers 

What are meant by privileges for officers are various advantages arising 
from their military service or total or partial relief from certain obligations. 
They cover various aspects of the life of officers and their families. 


200 


Privileges in the sphere of labor provide that time spent on military service 
shall be included in the total length of service in qualifying for pensions and 
allowances, in admission to study, etc. 

The period of service in the Armed Forces is included in the unbroken 
length of service provided that work is begun within three months of the day 
of release from military service. 

Military service is included in the total length of work irrespective of 
whether or not the individual had a period of work before being called up 
for military service. 

For individuals who have begun to work after release from the Armed 
Forces, the time spent in military service is included in the length of trade 
union membership provided that they were members of a trade union before 
entering the Armed Forces. 

Officers released from the ranks of the Armed Forces to the reserve have 
the right to work in any sector of the economy consonant with their special 
training and work experience. Those released from the ranks of the Armed 
Forces have a preferential right to enter schools and courses to acquire new 
professions, and to employment in the enterprises and institutions of the 
Ministry of Defense. 

Officers released from military units stationed in remote localities and 
officers who have signed agreements to work in the regions of the Far North 
or in equivalent localities have the time of their uninterrupted military service 
in these localities included in their uninterrupted length of work for the 
purposes of obtaining pay increments and other benefits. 

Officers’ wives also have the right to labor benefits. Thus, when an officer’s 
wife is released from work in connection with the transfer of the husband to 
another locality she retains a record of uninterrupted work irrespective of the 
time of starting work elsewhere. Officers’ wives who graduate, from institutes 
of higher education and technical colleges have the right to be sent to work 
in the place where the husband is permanently stationed. 

The privileges regarding accommodations are that: officers and their fami- 
lies are allocated State-owned accommodations in the place of service of the 
head of the family, retain the right to accommodations, pay a reduced rent 
for an apartment, are given assistance in individual housing construction, and 
have other advantages. 

Officers keep their accommodations when they are studying, on long as- 
signments, in camp, and undergoing training if their established post is kept 
for them during their absence, and also in time of war, and during service 
in remote localities and outside the USSR. 

Members of officers’ families who go abroad to live with the head of the 
family keep their accommodations. 

Senior officers, released to the reserve or retired after serving for 25 years 
or more, retain the right to the accommodations occupied by themselves and 
their families and, should they change their place of residence, have the right 
to receive new accommodations. 

Serving officers pay for the accommodations occupied by them at a privi- 
leged rate (in accordance with the existing legislation on accommodations). 


Officers released to the reserve or retired are given assistance in the alloca- 
tion of plots of land, in the construction of individual dwelling houses, and 
in the delivery of building materials. 

Travel benefits consist of the free use of transport in the transfer of officers 
and members of their families, and also in the moving of household effects. 

All officers have the right to free travel on military travel orders for the 
journey to and from the place of leave, and also if they are given sick leave 
for a period of no less than 30 days with a change in place of residence, or 
are sent to therapeutic establishments for in-patient treatment. 

Members of officers’ families sent for in-patient treatmetit to therapeutic 
establishments and also to sanatoria, have the right to free travel on orders 
issued by military medical authorities. 

In the case of appointment to a post or transfer connected with movement 
to a new place of service, enrollment as a regular, being sent to study involv- 
ing removal from the unit manning document, being released to the reserve 
or being retired, officers and their families have the right to free travel to the 
new place of service or to the selected place of residence. 

On appointment to a post, on transfer to a new place of service, on enlisting 
as a regular, on being sent to study, and on release to the reserve, or on 
retirement, movement orders are also issued for the transportation of house- 
hold effects within the standard limits laid down for this purpose. 

Benefits in the sphere of education provide that all officers studying in 
military establishments and schools, in higher military training establish- 
ments, and also on officers’ refresher and retraining courses retain all types 
of allowances from their last post in the forces. 

Officers who are candidates for admission to a VVUZ are given unit leave 
of 30 days to prepare for and take the entrance examination. 

In addition, officers have a number of advantages in entry to educational 
institutions. 

The benefits for service in remote localities are quite varied. When serving 
in remote localities officers receive increased salaries for their posts. 

Officers serving in remote localities receive the right of transfer to other 
military districts at the end of the established period. 

They are permitted to combine regular leaves over a period of two years 
(provided that the officer should not be absent from the unit for more than 
three months). 

During the time spent by an officer in a remote locality, his family is 
assured occupation cf its living accommodations in the place of permanent 
residence. 

When reckoning the length of service for the purpose of fixing the length 
of service pension, the time spent by an officer in a remote locality is reckoned 
on a preferential basis (one and a half or two years for each year of service, 
depending on locality). 

Health service benefits ensure all officers on active military service, and 
also senior and higher officers released to the reserve or retired on grounds 
of age or illness after having served for 25 years or more (calculated on « 


preferential basis), the right to receive medical assistance for themselves and 
the members of their families and, in case of need, sanatorium and spa 
treatment through the polyclinics, sanatoria, and rest homes of the Ministry 
of Defense of the USSR. 


Pensions and Allowances 

Pensions are allotted to officers on discharge from the forces for length of 
service or on grounds of disability. 

Length of service pensions are awarded for life to officers who have served 
for 20 years or more. 

Pensions for service of between 20 and 25 years are awarded to officers 
discharged from the ranks of the Armed Forces on grounds of reduction in 
force, age, illness, or poor health, who are 40 years old by the day of discharge 
and, irrespective of age, to officers discharged directly from flying duties, 

I . J TPl. * f aL. C ^ 

suDirmniicSy uiici iiiiiicswccpcrs. inC size Oi mC pcnsicn lOr Gmccrs iCr service 
of between 20 and 25 years is fixed in relation to their age: 40% of the rate 
of pay for those who have reached the age of 50 years by the day of discharge, 
and 30% of the rate of pay for those who have not reached the age of 50 years. 

Pensions for service of 25 years or more are fixed at 50% of the rate of 
pay, with the addition of 3% of the rate for each year of service in excess 
of 25 years, but no more than 75% of the rate of pay. Officers with 25 years’ 
service, placed on the reserve list on grounds of age or illness, who have 
reached the age of 55 years on the day of release, and also officers placed on 
the retired list, are awarded a pension of 60% of the rate o^ pay plus 3% of 
the rate for each year of service, but no more than 75% of the rate of pay. 

Officers who are test pilots — 1st class and test navigators — 1st class, who 
have the honorary title "Meritorious Test Pilot of the USSR” or “Meritori- 
ous Test Navigator of the USSR,” whose service amounts to 25 years or 
more, including at least 12Vi years service in test flying, who are discharged 
directly from the duties of test pilots or test navigators, receive an increment 
to the length of service pension amounting to 10% of the pension. 

Length of service pensions may also be awarded with allowance for the 
length of labor service: 

— to officers having a total length of labor service of at least 25 calendar 
years, of which not less than half are military service — amounting to 30% 
of the rate of pay; 

— to officers having a total length of labor service of at least 30 calendar 
years, of which no less than half is military service — 40% of the rate of pay. 

The following are included in the term of service for a pension: military 
service in the Soviet Armed Forces, in forces of the Committee of State 
Security administered by the Council of Ministers of the USSR (NKGB- 
MGB), forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (NKVD-MOOP), detach- 
ments of the Red Guards, partisan detachments, units of the Home Guard 
and Labor Armies; time spent in the Red Army reserve, periods of attach- 
ment to civilian ministries and bodies, and also, under certain conditions and 


203 


at stipulated periods, service in state security agencies, agencies of the MVD 
(NKVD-MOOP), time spent on long training courses, in captivity, in encir- 
clement, and in the territory of neutral countries as internees. 

The following are calculated as preferential conditions in calculating the 
term of service for a pension; 

— six months for one month of service as a permanent member of punitive 
rifle companies and battalions and assault rifle battalions of an active army 
during the Great Patriotic War; 

— three months for one month of service in military units forming part of 
an active army, in partisan detachments and formations in a period of mili- 
tary operations, in the hero cities of Odessa, Leningrad, Sevastopol and 
Stalingrad (during stated periods), time spent continuously on treatment in 
therapeutic establishments in the case of wounds, contusions, or mutilations 
received at the front, and also as a result of illnesses at the front during the 
Great Patriotic War connected with military service; 

— two months for one month of service in combat jet and combat turbo- 
prop aircraft in aircrew posts, and also in a number of remote localities (in 
Kamchatka Oblast',* the Chukotka National Okrug,* on the Kuril Islands, 
the islands in the Bering Sea, the seaboard and islands of the Arctic Ocean, 
etc.); 

— one and a half months for one month in aircrew posts (except crew 
members of combat jet and combat turboprop aircraft); in commissioned 
submarines; on minesweepers when sweeping for mines; in the control cen- 
ters of formations of commissioned submarines and formations of mine- 
sweepers when sweeping for mines (in accordance with the special list of 
posts); as regular divers; in frontier posts, in commandants’ offices and in 
equivalent sub-units of the Border Troops, in commissioned naval frontier 
ships, small boats and vessels directly responsible for defense of the State 
boundaries of the USSR, and also in a number of remote localities (on the 
island of Sakhalin, in Murmansk, etc.). 

In all instances, except for time spent in an active army and on treatment 
occasioned by a war wound, periods of fixed term service arc reckoned in the 
term of service for a pension only on a calendar basis. 

Military officers who have become unfit for duty during military service 
and who have become disabled have the right to a disability pension irrespec- 
tive of the length of their military service. 

Disability pensions are awarded to officers accepted for discharge from 
military service by the Medical Commission for Determination of Disability 
(VTEK) as disabled persons in categories I, II and III, if the disability 
occurred during the period of military service or no later than three months 
from the day of discharge from military service, or later than this period, but 
as a result of a wound, contu.sion, mutilation, or illness that occurred during 
the period of military service or during a period spent in captivity. 

• Soviet administrative-geographical units [U.S. Ed.). 


204 


Pensions of the follo A'ing sizes (as percentages of rates of pay) are awarded, 
depending on the cause and category oi the disability: 

Category of disabiuty 

I II III 

a) To servicemen who have become 
disabled as a result of: a wound, contusion, 
or mutilation received in defense of the 
USSR or in carrying out other military 
duties; illness at the front; wounds, 
contusion, mutilation, or illness occurring 

during a period spent in captivity 75 55 40 

b) To servicemen who have become 
disabled as a result of: illness unconnected 
with being at the Front, or an accident 
unconnected with the carrying out of 
military duties, which occurred during the 
period of military service; accident or disease 
which did not occur in the period of military 
service, provided that the disability began no 
later than three months from the day of 

discharge from military service 60 45 30 

If a disability pension has been calculated from pay rates of less than 200 
rubles a month, the pension is increased by 5% of the rate of pay for five 
years’ service and, additionally, by 1 % of the rate of pay for each year of 
service in excess of five years. However, the total disability pension with 
increments for length of service may not exceed: 

— for pensioners listed under point “a” 75% of the rate of pay for a 
category I disability, 65% for a category II disability, and 45% for a category 
III disability; 

— for pensioners listed under point “b” 70% of the rate of pay for a 
category I disability, 55% for a category II disability, and 35% for a category 
III disability. 

Servicemen whose disability pension is awarded from a rate of pay of 200 
rubles or more are not given an increment for length of service. 

Pensioners whose pension is less than 1 10 rubles for a disability of category 
I and less than 90 rubles for a disability of category II have their pension 
increased by 15%, provided that the increased pension should not exceed 1 10 
rubles a month for disabled persons in category I, and 90 rubles a month for 
disabled persons in category II. 

Officers discharged from military ser .ce receive a grant amounting to 2 
months’ salary. In addition, officers dis barged from military service on 
grounds of age, sickness, reduction in force, or poor state of health, who are 
not entitled to a pension, retain the pay of their military rank for one year. 


205 


OmCERS' COMRADELY COURTS OF HONOR 


Officers’ comradely courts of honor are elected bodies of the officer corps 
of the Armed Forces. Their purpose is to maintain the dignity and honor of 
the high calling of a Soviet officer and to inculcate high moral, political and 
military qualities in officers. 

In accordance with the principles of unity of command and personal 
responsibility of a commander for the ideological education of his subordi- 
nate officers in force in the Soviet Armed Forces, courts of honor function 
under the direct leadership of commanders exercising unity of command, 
who have the exclusive right to decide questions relating to the referral of 
a misdemeanor by an officer to a court of honor. 

Officers’ comradely courts are set up: 

— in regiments, on 1st class ships and in other independent units — to 
examine misdemeanors and offenses by junior officers; 

— in divisions, naval bases and corresponding establishments — to consider 
misdemeanors and offenses by senior officers of all units of the division or 
naval base, and separately to consider misdemeanors and offenses by junior 
officers of the directorate and the individual subunits of the division, naval 
base, or corresponding establishments; 

— in directorates of districts and fleets, in military training establishments 
and military establishments, and also in chief and central directorates of the 
Ministry of Defense of the USSR — to give separate consideration to mis- 
demeanors and offenses by junior and senior officers. 

The size of officers’ courts of honor is related to the number of officers. The 
decision as to how many officers are required is taken by the commanders 
of formations, superiors of corresponding and higher ranks. The officers of 
a unit without a court of honor owing to a lack of officers participate in the 
election of the court of honor of one of the nearby units (establishments) or 
of the next higher command. These courts ot honor also examine misdemean- 
ors and offenses by the officers of the unit concerned. 

Officers’ courts of honor consist of seven or nine members elected at 
officers’ meetings. The members of officers’ courts of honor for junior officers 
are elected at a general meeting of the officers of the unit. One or two senior 
oflicers may be elected, in addition to junior officers, as members of these 
courts. 

An officers’ court of honor is elected at a meeting of senior officers in order 
to review misdemeanors by senior officers. The comu.ander (senior ranking 
officer) of the unit, formation, or establishment in which a court of honor is 
set up is not, as a rule, elected as a member of the court. 

The meeting to elect an officers’ court of honor is convened by the appro- 
priate commanding officer (senior ranking officer). When n<v'**«;sary, elections 
for a court of honor may be held at a delegate meeting upon the decision of 
the commander of a formation (or his equivalent). 

The members of the court are elected by secret ballot. Each person attend- 
ing the meeting has the right to propose and reject any caadidate. The 
question of rejection is decided by a show of hands. 


206 


The candidates who have received the greatest number of votes, but not 
less than half those taking part in the voting, are deemed to have been elected 
members of the court. 

The members of an officers’ court of honor elect a chairman of the court, 
a deputy chairman and a secretary of the court from among their own 
number by show of hands. 

An officers’ comradely court of honor is elected for a term of two years. 
The election of the court is carried out at the time laid down by the comman- 
der (senior ranking officer) of the unit, formation, or establishment, and takes 
place around the start of the training year. The composition of the elected 
court IS announced in an order by the commander (senior ranking officer) 
concerned. 

One year after election, and also on the expiration of the term of office, 
officers’ courts of honor report on their activity at meetings of officers. 

If members of a court are transferred from the unit before the expiration 
of their term of office, or if they are recalled by a meeting of officers on the 
grounds that they have not justified the trust placed in them, additional 
elections of members of the court are arranged. 

The composition of a court of honor in session is fiv ;, seven, or nine 
members. In the absence of the chairman of the court, his functions are 
carried out by the deputy chairman or by one of the members of the court. 

Should it be necessary to examine misdemeanors and offenses by com- 
manders of formations with the rank of “Colonel,” “Captain 1st Rank,” of 
regimental commanders, commanders of ist and 2nd class ships and officers 
of equivalent ranks, a five-man officers’ court of honor is set up on each 
occasion by order of the commander of the military district or fleet. In such 
instances, those appointed as members of the court are commanders of 
formations and their equivalents, in addition to the officer in direct command 
of the officer who has committed the misdemeanor. 

Officers’ comradely courts of honor examine cases: 

— relating to rr^demeanors unworthy of the rank of an officer, detrimental 
to military honor and incompatible with the principles of communist moral- 
ity; 

— relating to infringements of military discipline and public order by an 
officer; 

— relating to offenses committed by officers that may legally be referred to 
comradely courts; 

— relating to property claims by officers against each other for a sum of 
up to 100 rubles, if they agree that the case should be examined in a com- 
radely court. 

The commander (senior ranking officer) of the unit or formation in which 
the court is set up decides what cases shall be examined in an officers’ 
comradely court of honor. 

The decision to examine a case may be taken by the commander (senior 
ranking officer) on his own initiative, on the basis of a resolution from a 
meeting of officers, in connection with a submission by an injured party, or 
on the proposal of the officers’ comradely court of honor. 


The officers’ comradely court of honor examines a case within 1 5 days of 
its submission to the court. 

It is compulsory for the accused officer to attend the court session. Senior 
officers are also present at a session of the court for junior officers. Junior 
officers do not take part in sessions of the court of honor for senior officers. 

The court hears the testimony of the accused, the injured party, and 
witnesses and examines all the assembled information on the case. Officers 
present at the session, and also the injured party, may put questions, with the 
permission of the court, and speak on matters of substance relating to the case 
unde: consideration. The accused officer has the right to question witnesses 
and the injured party. 

The court reaches its decision in a separate room, in which only the 
members of the court are present. Should it be necessary to clarify additional 
information, the court has the right to renew the session or to transfer it to 
another date. 

The court arrives at its decision by a majority vote of the members of the 
court by show of hands. The decision sets out the essence of the misdemeanor 
by the officer, the judgment on it, and defines the public sanction. 

An officers’ comradely court of honor may decide to apply one of the 
following sanctions: 

— to issue a comradely warning; 

— to issue a public censure; 

— to issue a public reprimand; 

— to initiate the process for reduction in position; 

— to initiate the process for reduction in military rank by one rank; 

— to initiate the process for the dismissal of u studying officer from a higher 
training establishment; 

— to initiate the process for the discharge of an officer from the ranks of 
the Armed Forces. 

Irrespective of which of the stated social sanctions is applied, the court of 
honor may require a guilty person to compensate damage to property up to 
a limit of 100 rubles. 

The court of honor may also confine itself to an examination of a misde- 
meanor by an officer without applying the social sanctions listed above; it 
may acquit the officer if his innocence is established, but may, if necessary, 
petition for criminal proceedings againt him. 

In determining the sanction, the court of honor considers the nature of the 
misdemeanor or offense, the circumstances and the consequences of the act, 
the officer’s former conduct, and other factors which may influence the 
decision of the court. 

The substance of questions examined at meetings of courts of honor of 
senior officers, and the decisions adopted by these courts, are not com- 
municated to junior officers. It is also forbidden to take matters relating to 
the activity of comradely courts of honor outside the officer ranks. 

An appeal against a decision by an officers’ comradely court of honor may 
be submitted directly to the commander (senior ranking officer) of the unit 


in which the court is set up, within three days of rendering the decision. An 
appeal must be examined within 7 days or, should it be necessary to verify 
the appeal, within 20 days. The applicant is informed of the decision adopted 
on the appeal. 

Decisions by an officers’ comradely court of honor on the application of 
social sanctions remain in force for a year. If, during the course of this period, 
the officer is not disciplined and does not have sanctions applied to him for 
other misdemeanors or offenses, the sanction applied to him by the com- 
radely court is regarded as cancelled. 

If the officer is of exemplary behavior and has a conscientious attitude 
toward service, the comradely court of honor has the right to lift the social 
sanction applied to him, but only after a minimum of 6 months. 

Should an officer be sent to another unit, the officers’ comradely court of 
honor in the new place of service can lift the social sanction ahead of schedule 
on the same basis. 

Officers who are reduced in position and/or military rank, or who are 
removed from a training establishment, may be restored to their former rank, 
appointed to higher posts, or accepted into a training establishment for 
training after the social sanction applied to them has beer, lifted by decision 
of the court of honor, or cancelled on account of the lapse of a period of a 
year, on the same basis as officers to which these sanctions have been applied 
without a petition of the court of honor. In relation to officers discharged 
from the Armed Forces on petition by officers’ comradely courts of honor, 
the cancellation or renewal of this measure of social sanction does not entail 
their reinstatement in the ranks of the Armed Forces, and does not entail any 
change of principle in the order of discharge. 

Reserve and retired officers who were reduced in rank on petition of a court 
of honor during their active service, and who have proved themselves in 
productive and other socially beneficial labor, may be reinstated in their 
former military rank on the petition of the military commissariat by order 
of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, but not within 3 years of the 
reduction in rank. 

What To Read On This Section 

K. I. Lenin i Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily [V. I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed 
Forces]. Ch. VI. Voyenizdat, 1969. 

KPSS i stroitel'stvo Vooruzhennykh Sil [The CPSU and the Development of 
the Armed Forces]. Voyenizdat, 1967. 

50 let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR [Fifty Years of the Armed Forces of the 
USSR]. Voyenizdat, 1968. 

Zakon SSSR o vseobshchey yoinskoy obyazannosti [The Universal Military 
Service Law of the USSR]. Voyenizdat, 1967. 

Zakharov, M. V. O nauchnom podkhode k rukovodstvu voyskami [The Scien- 
tific Approach to the Command of Troops]. Voyenizdat, 1967. 


209 




Lashchenko, P. N. Stil' raboty komandira [The Commander’s Modus Ope- 
randi]. Voyenizdat, 1969. 

Kirshin, Yu. Ya. O nauchnoy organizatsii voinskogo truda [The Scientific 
Organization of Military Work]. Voyenizdat, 1970. 

Osnovy sovetskogo wyennogo zakonodatel' stva [Principles of Soviet Military 
Legislation]. Voyenizdat, 1966. 



, • ** 


Chapter 7. THE ARMIES OF THE WARSAW PACT 
COUNTRIES 


The Great October Socialist Revolution shook the capitalist world to its 
foundations when it overthrew the system of exploitation and oppression in 
our country. It indicated ways and revealed forms and methods of achieving 
the revolutionary transformation of society which acquired an international 
character. 

Now, a whole complex of European, Asian, and American countries is 
developing along the lines established by the October Revolution. The victo- 
ries of social revolution in these countries enlarged the boundanes of social- 
ism. A world socialist system has been formed. A social, economic, and 
political community of free sovereign nations has evolved, united by common 
aims and interests and close bonds of international proletarian solidarity. 
Being in the forefront of the class struggle against imperialism, for peace, and 
the social progress of mankind, the socialist community is making a decisive 
contribution to the cause of developing the world revolutionary process. 

Taking into consideration the great historical role which the world system 
of socialism plays in the destiny of mankind, our Party and government are 
doing everything they can to strengthen the might and solidarity of the great 
community of socialist states. The CPSU confidently follows a policy of 
closer political cooperation with fraternal socialist countries, the mainte- 
nance of increasingly close and regular contacts with the leaders of the 
communist parties and governments of fraternal countries, political coordi- 
nation, and the development of different forms of communication and ex- 
change between our peoples. 

In the development of relationships between the USSR and other socialist 
states, an important role is played by bilateral friendship, cooperation, and 
mutual assistance pacts. As the XXIII Congress of the CPSU emphasized, 
these agreements represent genuine charters of friendship, which embody the 
experience accumulated over many years, the maturity and warmth of rela- 
tionships between fraternal nations, and their lofty international spirit. They 
serve our common revolutionary cause well and will continue to do so. 

“Under present-day conditions, the community of socialist states is excep- 
tionally important in the strengthening of our defenses. This task has our 
constant attention. Above all, this concerns relationships with the member 


countries of the Warsaw Pact, which is a powerful instrument of political and 
defensive cooperation among the socialist countries.” ' 

The military cooperation of the socialist countries, the further strengthen- 
ing of the Warsaw Pact organization, acquires special importance in view of 
the activation of aggressive imperialist forces aimed at undermining the 
socialist system in individual countries and weakening the ideological ties 
which unite the socialist states. 

THE TRUSTWORTHY SHIELD OF SOCIALISM 

On 14 May 1955 in the city of Warsaw, a Treaty of Friendship, Coopera- 
tion, and Mutual Assistance was concluded by Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and 
Czechoslovakia. Albania, by virtue of the position taken by its leaders, has 
not participated in the work of the Warsaw Pact organization since 1963. 

The conclusion of the Warsaw Pact was forced upon us. As is known, the imperialists of the 
USA and other countries had formed themselves into the North Atlantic Bloc, NATO, as early 
as 1949. In 1954 the Paris Military Agreements were signed, on the basis of which a new 
military-political grouping emerged — the West European Alliance, and the Federal Republic of 
Germany, whose reactionary forces follow an aggressive, revanchist policy, was brought into 
NATO under US pressure in 1955. As a result of this, the threat to the security of the 
peace-loving European states increased. 

Thus, the military alliance of the fraternal nations originated as an objec- 
tively lawful act of self-defense, a measure to strengthen the defensive capac- 
ity and consolidate the resources of the European socialist states in response 
to the military preparations of the Western Powers, primarily the American 
imperialists, the formation and strengthening of aggressive military-political 
blocs, and the establishment of numerous military bases around the socialist 
countries. The alliance is a trustworthy shield for the achievements of the 
socialist countries, the powerful protector of their security and independence, 
and an important factor in the preservation of peace in Europe and the whole 
world. The CPSU and the Marxist-Lemnist parties of other fraternal socialist 
countries proceed on the basis that, while the imperialists continue to in- 
crease their military might and threaten the socialist community, the Warsaw 
Pact will be n^aintained and strengthened. 

The Warsaw Pact is a genuinely defensive organization. In the text of the 
Pact, the European socialist countries declare that they will take “the coor- 
dinated measures necessary for strengthening their defensive capacities in 
order to protect the peaceful labor of their peoples, guarantee the inviolability 
of their frontiers and territories, and ensure their defense against possible 
aggression.” 

Article 4 of the Pact states: “In case of an armed attack in Europe on one 
or several member states of the Pact by any state or group of states, each 

' L. I. Brezhnev, 50 lei velikikh pobed sotsializma [Fifty Yean, of the Great Victories of 
Socialism], p. 55. 


member state of the Pact, in exercising the right to individual or collective 
self-defense, in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations Charter, will 
render the member state or states of the Pact every assistance by whatever 
means are necessary, including the use of armed force The member states 
of the Pact will immediately hold consultations concerning the adoption of 
the joint measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and 
security.” 

In accordance with the Warsaw Pact and with the agreement of the gov- 
ernments concerned, Soviet troops are temporarily stationed on the territory 
of the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, 
the numerical strength of these troops being determined by special agree- 
ments. Relationships between Soviet troops and state bodies of fraternal 
countries are regulated by agreements on the Legal Statute of the Soviet 
Forces, and are based upon the principles of socialist internationalism, frater- 
nal mutual assistance, equality, respect for national integrity, state indepen- 
dence, sovereignty, and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. 

The highest controlling body of the Warsaw Pact organization is the 
Political Consultative Committee, which meets periodically to discuss vari- 
ous problems connected with the strengthening of the defensive capacity of 
the socialist countries, and ensuring their security. In Budapest on 17 March 
1969 at the meeting of the Committee of Defense Ministers of the Member 
States of the Warsaw Pact, the new Regulations of the Combined Armed 
Forces and Combined Command and other documents were examined in 
detail and unanimously confirmed, thus further improving the efficiency of 
the structure and the controlling agencies of the Warsaw Pact defensive 
organization. 

The Joint Armed Forces (JAF) are the common military bodies, forces, 
and resources earmarked, by agreement, for joint action and headed by the 
Commander-in-Chief. His deputy commanders-in-chief represent the armed 
forces of the allied states. There is a JAF Military Council. JAF HQ, which 
includes representatives of the armies of all Member Countries of the Pact, 
comes under the Commander-in-Chief 

The Warsaw Pact countries are in the front line of socialism, directly facing 
the imperialist states, which are hatching insane plans for liquidating the 
world system of socialism. The communist and workers’ parties and the 
governments of the socialist countries are focusing their attention on military 
development, and are constantly preoccupied with measures for increasing 
the fighting power of their armies. 

Like the Soviet Army, the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries are 
of a new type. Unlike the imperialist armies, which are pillars of the capitalist 
system and instruments of aggression, the armies of the socialist countries are 
a military organization of workers and peasants. The root source of their 
strength lies in Marxist-Leninist ideology, close and unbreakable ties with the 
people, proletarian internationalism, atid the leadership of the communist 
and workers’ parties. They are united by their knowledge of the need for joint 
defense of the national independence and revolutionary achievements of each 

213 




country and the socialist community as a whole. Practice and the experience 
of the Warsaw Pact confirm convincingly the viciousness and harmfulness of 
the anti-Leninist nationalistic thesis of the “left” revisionists which espouses: 
“reliance on one’s own resources” in the matter of defense against imperialist 
aggressors. 

During the years since the people came to power a new officer corps 
nurtured by Marxist-Leninist ideas has been created in the fraternal armies 
under the leadership of communist and workers’ parties. Line, political, and 
engineering personnel are trained in military academies and schools. As in 
the past, numerous officers pass through military educational institutions in 
the USSR, receiving a high standard of training in all branches of modern 
military affairs. The overwhelming majority of officers are Party members, 
having proven through their actions their loyalty and devotion to the people 
and the common aims of the socialist community. 

Thanks to the successful development of the national economies of the 
socialist countries, which provide the basis for their own defense industries, 
together with the continuous and unselfish assistance of the Soviet Union, the 
standard of the weapons and fighting equipment of the fraternal armies has 
improved immeasurably. These armies are equipped with sufficient modern 
weapons and resources for conducting armed combat on land, in the air, and 
at sea. They possess rocket missiles, first-rate armor. Jet aircraft, reliable air 
defense facilities, and modem warships. 

The armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries share common views on 
the nature and methods of waging modern war. Their development, technical 
equipment, organizational structure, training, and education are organized 
in accordance with the requirements of joint operations involving all the 
armed forces of the Warsaw Pact, with due regard for the extremely rich 
combat experience of the Soviet Armed Forces. 

The armies of the fraternal socialist countries are kept up to strength on 
the basis of universal military service laws. Military service is looked upon 
as a sacred obligation and an honorable duty. Each year that passes sees 
increasingly knowledgeable replacements coming into the army. As a rule, 
the period of service is 2-? y^ais i.' the Ground Forces and 3-5 years in the 
Navy. 

The armed forces of the socialist countries consist of ground forces, air 
forces (including air defense forces), navies, and border troops. 

The fraternal countries now have completely up-to-date regular armies. 
Their organization, technical equipment, and personnel training are planned 
with regard to the revolutionary changes in military affairs, and on the basis 
of the latest achievements of socialist military science. Their troops are 
trained for both nuclear and conventional warfare. 

Join! exercises and maneuvers play an important role in further strengthening the military 
cooperation of the Warsaw Pact countries and increasing the combat readiness of the allied 
armies. October Storm. Vltava, Maneuver, Rhodopes. Brotherhood-in-Arms, and many other 
exercises carried out by the armies, air defense forces, and navies in recent years, have demon- 
strated the high standard of training of ai! personnel and their ability to resolve successfully any 


214 


combat tasks, including the most complex. The constant combat readiness of the armies of the 
socialist community for victorious armed defense of the achievements of socialism and commu- 
nism has also been demonstrated by joint command post exercises, Soviet, East German, and 
Polish naval, and other exercises carried out recently. 

The ideological and political education of personnel is a major factor in 
the armies of the socialist countries. Commanders, political agencies, and 
Party organizations devote considerable effort to instilling in servicemen 
devotion to their country, faithfulness to their international duty, and con- 
stant combat readiness. Party members bind together the ranks of the forces; 
by word and personal example they inspire servicemen to fulfill their service 
duties in an exemplary fashion. Youth organizations are of great assistance 
to commanders and Party organizations in the ideological education of young 
soldiers and sailors. 

The development, organization, and training of the armies of the socialist 
states have much in common, yet each army manifests certain differences, 
which have their origin in the characteristics of these countries, their tradi- 
tions, and customs. 

THE BULGARIAN PEOPLE’S ARMY 

The fighting traditions of the Bulgarian forces originate with the glorious 
revolutionary traditions of the Bulgarian Communist Party. They were bom 
in the National Liberation Insurgent Army formed by the Bulgarian Com- 
munist Party during the armed struggle against the Nazi occupation and the 
monarchist-fascist dictatorship (1941-1944). 

On 8 September 1944 Soviet troops, fulfilling their international duty, 
crossed into Bulgarian territory, thus expediting the victory of the anti-fascist 
national uprising. The monarchist-fascist regime fell on the 9th of Septem- 
ber. The Government of the Patriotic Front, formed by the rebels under 
the leadership of the Bulgarian Communist Party, declared war on Nazi 
Germany. 

The Bulgarian People’s Army (BPA) emerged during the victorious days 
of the national revolution of 9 September 1944. In addition to the revolution- 
ary detachments and workers’ and peasants’ squads which had fought against 
the Nazi occupation forces and internal reactionaries, the army included 
reorganized units and formations of the old army. 

Duting the final stage of the war, approximately 500,000 Bulgarian troops 
took part, together with the Soviet Army, in battles against the German 
Fascist invaders in the territories of Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Austria. The 
capital of the Soviet Union, Moscow, thrice saluted the Bulgarian fighting 
man for valor and bravery displayed in the Balaton operation and other 
engagements. 

The Armed Forces of socialist Bulgaria now consist of the Ground Forces, 
the Air Force, the Air Defense Force, and the Navy. 

The General Staff and the respective chief and central directorates are 
incorporated in the Ministry of National Defense. 


Thanks to the country’s economic growth and the unselfish assistance of 
the Soviet Union, the Bulgarian National Army is equipped with first-rate 
modern weapons and fighting equipment. For example, the mechanical 
power of the motorized infantry divisions of the BPA during the period of 
popular rule has increased by a factor of 30, and that of the tank formations 
by a factor of 50. The weight of a single salvo of a motorized infantry 
formation is now six times greater than it was during World War II. Service- 
men in the BPA work night and day to achieve mastery of their new weapons 
and learn to use them with skill in the difficult conditions of a combat 
situation. The army personnel are fully aware of their great responsibility in 
guarding the freedom and independence of their own country and, together 
with the other fraternal armies, in guaranteeing the security of the entire 
socialist community. 

Citizens are called up for service in the army on reaching the age of 19. 
Volunteers who have reached the age of 18 are also accepted in units and 
formations. The period of service for privates and NCO’s in the Army, the 
Air Force, and the Air Defense Force is 2 years, and in the Navy, 3 years. 

The military ranks in the BPA are basically the same as those in the Soviet 
Armed Forces. 

Bulgarian People’s Army Day is celebrated on 23 September, in honor of 
the September armed uprising of 1923 against the monarchist-fascist dicta- 
torship when, under the leadership of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the 
first combat detachments and volunteer groups were formed. 

THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S ARMY 

In the fall of 1944, Soviet troops, carrying out a mission of liberation, 
crossed into Hungarian territory, thus promoting a new upsurge in the 
struggle of the communist-led Hungarian workers against fascism. The Pro- 
visional Hungarian Government, formed on 22 December, declared war on 
Nazi Germany. On the initiative of the Hungarian Communist Party it called 
upon the people and the soldiers to join the new Hungarian Armed Forces 
and to take up arms against the German occupation troops. 

At the beginning of 1945 several Hungarian subunits fought on the side 
of the Soviet Army against Nazi forces. During the struggle for the Hun- 
garian capital, Budapest, the Buda Volunteer Regiment fought bravely to- 
gether with Soviet units. Following the liberation of Budapest this regiment 
was incorporated in the 1st Infantry Division of the new Hungarian Army. 
Later two other divisions which were formed became part of our 3rd Ukrain- 
ian Front. 

The fighting power of the Hungarian People’s Army (HPA) increased 
from year to year. After the defeat of the counterrevolutionary rebellion in 
the fall of 1956, the Hungarian Socialist Working Party and the Revolution- 
ary Workers’ and Peasants’ Government reorganized the Army, having rein- 
forced it with command cadre dedicated to the cause of socialism. Now 
approximately 90% of the officers of the Hungarian People’s Army are the 


216 


sons of workers and peasants. The overwhelming majority of these are Party 
members. 

The Hungarian People’s Army consists of the Ground Forces, the Air 
Defense Force (which includes military aviation), units of river vessels, and 
Border Troops. During recent years the per capita technical equipment of the 
Army has increased several times. Formations of the HPA now have four 
times as many tanks as they had in 1960; the Army’s fire power has increased 
by a factor of 8. 

The army rank and file are recruited in accordance with the Home Defense 
Law passed by the State Assembly of the Hunganan People’s Republic in 
December 1960. All male citizens between the ages of 18 and 50 who are fit 
for service in the Army are liable for military duty. The term of active 
military service is up to three years. The Minister of Defense has the right 
to reduce this term. 

Personnel in the HPA are subdivided into privates (honveddk), sergeants, 
sub-officers,* officers, and generals. Regular service sub-officers* include 
junior command personnel who have expressed a wish to serve in the Army. 
The ranks of senior sergeant, sergeant-major, and chief sergeant-major have 
been established for sub-officers.* They occupy the positions of sergeant- 
majors of subunits, armorers, and sometimes platoon commanders. Officers’ 
and generals’ ranks in the HPA are similar to those in the Soviet Army. 

Officers of all branches of the Services are trained by a combined military 
training school, which accepts youths of call-up age with secondary educa- 
tion. The military academy is a higher military educational institution. 

People’s Army Day is observed on 29 September in memory of the cele- 
brated date of the national liberation struggle of the Hungarian people. (On 
29 September 1848 a revolutionary army of Hungarian honveddk led by 
Kossuth gained victory over the forces of the Austrian conquerors). 

THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S ARMY (NPA) OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC (GDR) 

The NPA of the GDR is one of the youngest armies in the socialist 
countries. The law governing its establishment was passed by the People’s 
Chamber of the German Democratic Republic on 18 January 1956. Its first 
units were formed on 1 March 1956. This day is observed in the GDR as 
National People’s Army Day. The creation of the army was necessitated by 
the fact that the inclusion of the Federal Republic of Germany in the aggres- 
sive NATO bloc freed the hands of the surviving Nazi generals, who openly 
began to recruit a West German army — the Bundeswehr. The National 
People’s Army stood on guard to protect the socialist achievements of the 
workers of the GDR. 

The appelation “national” applied to the army of the GDR underlines the 
fact that it expresses the fundamental interests of the whole German nation. 


• Podofiisery [U.S. Ed.], 


The word “people’s” indicates that it is an army of the working people, the 
army of a workers’ and peasants’ state. 

Recruitment for the Army is based on the military service law, passed on 
24 January 1962. Its command cadre consist of active members of the revolu- 
tionary movement, fighters against fascism. Ninety-five percent of the offic- 
ers, more than 50% of the NCO’s and approximately 20% of the soldiers 
of the NPA are members and candidates of the Socialist Unity Party of 
Germany. 

The National People’s Army of the GDR is prepared to repel any enemy 
attack. Its fire power has been significantly increased as a result of its equip- 
ment with operational-tactical missiles, missile launchers, self-propelled 
guns, modern computers, fire control apparatus, and communications facili- 
ties. Now the fully motorized ground forces of the NPA consist of motorized 
infantry and tank formations. The Republic’s air space is protected by the 
Air Force and the Air Defense Force, which incorporate fighter aircraft, 
radiotechnical troops, and air defense artillery units. The Air Force is 
equipped with modern all-weather supersonic fighter interceptors. The mari- 
time frontiers of the GDR are protected by the People’s Navy, which is 
equipped with modern warships and coastal artillery units. The Navy’s strik- 
ing fo:ce consists of high-speed missile and torpedo boats. It has dozens of 
rocket launchers. The frontiers of the GDR are well protected by its Border 
Troops. 

The personnel of the NPA are consistently improving their fighting skill. 
In a comparatively short time, the soldiers, NCO’s and officers of the NPA 
have succeeded in mastering many complex forms of combat training. 

The rank and file serve two years in the Army, and three years in the Air 
Force and Navy. The serviceman’s uniform is inherited from the German 
volunteers who, in 1813, fought together with Russian troops against Napo- 
leon’s army. 

The military ranks in the Army are: soldier, lance-corporal, staff corporal, 
Unteroffizier (junior sergeant), Unterfeldwebel (sergeant), Feldwebel, Ober- 
feldwebcl (sergeant major), Stabsfeldwebel (in the artillery a Feldwebel has 
the rank of Wachmeister), Unterleutnant (junior lieutenant), lieutenant, sen- 
ior lieutenant, Hauptmann (captain), major, Oberst-lcutnant* (lieutenant- 
colonel), Obezst (colonel), general-major, general-lieutenant, general-colonel, 
general of the army. 

The military ranks in the Navy are; Matrose (seaman), Obennatrose (sen- 
ior seaman), Stabsmatrose, Afaat (leading seaman), Ober-maat (petty officer), 
Meister (chief petty officer), Ober-meister (ensign), Stabs-obermeister, junior 
lieutenant, lieutenant, senior lieutenant, captain lieutenant, Korvetten-kapi- 
tan (captain 3rd rank), Fregatten-kapitdn (captain 2nd rank), Kapitdn zur 
See (captain 1st rank), Kontr-admiral, vice admiral, admiral. 


• Appears in the text, erroneously, as ober-kytenant (U.S. Ed.). 

218 


I 


THE POLISH PEOPLE’S ARMY 


On 12 October 1943 the Tadeusz Kosciuszko 1st Polish Division, formed 
on Soviet territory, engaged the Nazi invaders near the small town of Lenino, 
in the Mogilev Oblast', as part of the 33rd Army of the Soviet forces. At 
Lenino, the Polish soldiers, fighting together with Soviet troops against the 
common enemy, sealed the fraternal friendship and comradeship-in-arms of 
the Soviet and Polish peoples with their jointly spilt blood. 

The date of that historic battle — the 12th of October — is celebrated every 
year in Poland as Polish People’s Army Day. 

After the formation of the 1st Division on Soviet territory, the formation 
of other Polish units and formations (including tank, artillery, and air force) 
was begun. These formed the basis of the 1st Polish Corps, which was 
established in the USSR at the end of 1943. The 1st Polish Army was formed 
in the USSR at the beginning of 1944. On 21 July 1944 the Polish Army 
combined with the Ludow Partisan Army to form the Polish People’s Army. 
Its soldiers participated with Soviet troops in a series of combat operations 
during the final period of the war against the German Fascist invaders. 

The formation and development of the Polish People’s Army was facili- 
tated by all-round fraternal assistance from the Soviet Union. During the last 
war, the Soviet government gave the Polish Army approximately 700,000 
rifles and scb-machine guns, more than 15,000 medium machine guns, 3,5(X) 
guns, 1,000 tanks, 1,200 aircraft, more than 1 1,5(X) motor vehicles, and other 
fighting equipment. 

The armed forces of Poland now consist of the Ground Forces, the Air 
Force, the Air Defense Force, the Navy, and Internal Defense and Border 
Troops. 

Armored and mechanized divisions, provided with up-tc-date fighting 
equipment, became the main types of combined arms formations. Units were 
equipped with various types of rockets, supersonic multi-purpose aircraft, 
radars, etc. Now, for every five Polish soldiers, there is some kind of vehicle 
or complex technical equipment. The armored division of the Polish Army 
now has almost twice as many medium tanks as there were in :he whole of 
the bourgeois Polish army. 

The Polish forces are kept up to strength by the annual call-up for army 
service of citizens who have re;jchcd the age of 19 years. Two- and three-year 
terms of active military service are established by law. More than 70% of the 
officers and 35% of the NCO’s* in the Polish Army are members of the 
Polish United Workers’ Party. One in four of the officers has a higher 
education. 

The personnel of the Polish People’s Army arc subdivided into privates, 
noncommissioned officers, chorazy^ (junior officers), officers, generals, and 

• Podojitstr in Russian (U.S. Ed.). 

t Chorazy and ihc olher non-English words in ihis paragraph arc ihc Polish words for Ihcse 
ranks. The English words arc iranslalions of Ihc Russian translations of ihc Polish words [U.S. 
Ed.l. 



219 


admirals. The following military ranks have been established for privates and 
NCO’s (master-sergeants and sergeants): szeregowiec (private), starszy 
szeregowiec (lance-corporal), corporal, plutonowy, (sergeant, senior ser- 
geant), junior officers: lieutenant, senior lieutenant. Officers in the Army and 
the Air Force are given the ranks of: podporucznik (second lieutenant), 
porucznik (lieutenant), captain, major, lieutenant colonel, colonel. The mili- 
tary ranks of naval personnel are matros (seaman), mat (leading seaman), 
bosmanmat (boatswain’s mate), bosman (boatswain), starszy bosman (senior 
boatswain), chorazy flota (naval cornet), starszy chorazy Jta (senior naval 
cornet), podporucznik flota (naval second lieutenant), irucznik flota (naval 
lieutenant), kapitan flota (naval captain), komai -podporucznik (second 
lieutenant commander), komandor-porucznik enant commander), ko- 
mandor (commander). The ranks established for generals are: general 
brygadi (brigade general), general dywizi (divisional general), general broni 
(general of the army); for admirals: kontra admiral (rear admiral), wice 
admiral fvice admiral). The highest military rank is Marszalek Polski (Mar- 
shal of Poland). 

THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE’S ARMY 

On 25 October 1944 Soviet and Romanian troops completed the liberation 
of Romania from the German Fascist forces. This date is celebrated as 
Armed Forces Day in socialist Romania. 

I'he history of the formation of the Romanian People’s Army is closely 
connected with the struggle of Romanian workers under the leadership of the 
Communist Party against fascism. The victorious attack of the Soviet Army 
during the last war led to an intensification of the dissolution of the 
Romanian forces which had fought on the side of Nazi Germany. Commu- 
nist-led patriotic Romanian forces, together with military units which had 
gone over to the side of the people, carried out an armed insurrection on 23 
August 1944. Antonescu’s fascist dictatorship was overthrown and a popular 
revolution began throughout the country. The Romanian Army turned 
against Nazi Germany. 

Shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet Army, the Romanians fought the 
Nazis, throwing into the battle sixteen infantry divisions as well as a flotilla 
on the Danube River, an air corps, an air defense artillery division and other 
forces. A total of over 350,000 Ronanian officers and men fought in the war 
against Nazi Germany. The Romanian divisions advanced more than 1,000 
kilometers, freeing over 3,000 populaved points. Over 1 ,500 officers and men 
were awarded Soviet orders for heroism and bravery in the struggle with the 
fascist invaders. 

Many Romanian formations distinguished themselves in engagements 
with the Nazi forces; these included the 1st Volunteer Infantry Division 
named after the national hero Tudor Vladimirescu. This was formed on 
Soviet soil in 1943 from Romanian anti-fascist emigres and prisoners-of-war 
who had expressed a wish to take up arms against the common enemy. 


220 


The Armed Forces of the Socialist Republic of Romania consist of the 
Ground Forces, the Air Defense Force (including aviation), the Navy and 
the Border Troops. As a result of the successful development of the country’s 
heavy industry and large-scale assistance from the USSR, the Romanian 
People’s Army is provided with all that is necessary to carry out the tasks 
entrusted to it. The Army is mechanized, equipped with tanks, rocket artil- 
lery, supersonic jet aircraft, modern warships, rocket weapons, armored 
personnel carriers, and amphibious vehicles. 

The Army is kept up to strength on the basis of the military service law. 
NCO’s and the rank and file must serve a two-year term on active service. 
The personnel are improving the standards of their combat and political 
training and becoming proficient in the handling and operation of new 
fighting equipment. 

Romanian servicemen fall into the following categories: privates, non- 
commissioned officers, sub-officers,* officers, generals, and admirals. On the 
whole, the military ranks correspond to those of the Soviet Army. 

THE CZECHOSLOVAK PEOPLE’S ARMY 

The Czechoslovak People’s Army (CPA) was born during the joint strug- 
gle of the Soviet and Czechoslovak peoples against the common enemy — the 
German Fascist invaders. It was formed on the basis of partisan detachments 
which fought against the forces of the Nazi occupation and internal reaction, 
together with military formations which fought against the common enemy 
with the Soviet Army. 

The first military unit of the CPA (the 1st Czechoslovak Independent 
Battalion) was formed in February 1942 in the town of Buzuluk in the 
Orenburg Oblast', and in March 1943 Czechoslovakian soldiers under the 
command of Lieutenant Cr onel Ludvic Svoboda, forming part of the Soviet 
25th Guards Infantry Division in the region of the village of Sokolovo near 
Khar'kov, began their combat career. 

During the course of the war, the battalion grew into a brigade, and then 
into an army corps. The biggest battle in which the Czechoslovaks par- 
ticipated together with Soviet troops was the Carpathian-Dukel operation. 
Having smashed the enemy’s defenses, forward units of the Soviet Army and 
the Czechoslovak Corps reached the Dukel Pass and crossed into Czechoslo- 
vak territory on 6 October 1944. By a ruling of the Government of the 
Czechoslovak Republic in 1950, this date was proclaimed Czechoslovak 
People’s Army Day. 

The Armed Forces of the Czechoslovak Republic consist of the Army and 
the Internal and Border Troops. 

In recent years, the CPA has been transformed into a modem army, 
equipped with the latest weaponry and materiel. It includes the Ground 
Forces, the Air Force, and the Air Defense Force. The Ground Forces are 

• Podofitsery in Russian [U.S. Ed.). 


221 


of modern structure and organization, fully motorized and equipped with 
tanks, infantry, and artillery weapons. The Air Force is equipped with vari- 
ous types of jet fighters and bombers. 

The CPA is kept up to strength in accordance with the military law. 
Persons between the ages of 18 and 60 years are subject to military service, 
the call-up age being 19. NCO’s and the rank and file serve two years in the 
armed forces. 

The rank and file are divided into: vojin* (private), svobodnik (lance- 
corporal); NCO ranks are desdtnik (junior sergeant), cetar (sergeant), rotny 
(senior sergeant); sub-officers’ ranks are rotmistr, nadrotmistr, podprapor- 
scik (sub-warrant officer), (warrant officer), nadpraporscik (senior warrant 
officer). 

The following officers’ ranks are stipulated by the Officers’ Service Regula- 
tions: podporucik (junior lieutenant), porucik (lieutenant), nadporuak (sen- 
ior lieutenant), captain, major, podplukovmk (lieutenant colonel), plukovnik 
(colonel); for generals: general major (general-major), general-poruak (gen- 
eral-lieutenant), general-plukovm'k (general-colonel), armadni general (gen- 
eral of the army). 

STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY 

The armies of the fraternal socialist countries stand with the Armed Forces 
of the USSR in a united system. Their fighting cooperation is a source of 
strength and a reliable guarantee of the security of the socialist countries. It 
is necessary to maintain and strengthen this great international concentration 
of brothers-in-arms. 

(From the Message of Greeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the Council of Ministers 
of the USSR to the fighting men of the heroic Armed Forces of the Soviet 
Union in connection with the 50th Anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy. 
KPSS 0 Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza [The CPSU on the Armed 
Forces of the Soviet Union], p. 455.) 

The Soviet people, developing their national economy and increasing the 
defensive capacity of the country, consider it their international duty to do 
everything possible to strengthen the economic and military-political poten- 
tial of the world socialist community as a whole, and each of the countries 
which form it. With all its invincible might and determination to uphold the 
revolutionary achievements of peoples, our community opposes the imperial- 
ist policy of exporting counterrevolution. 

(From Tezisy Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovet- 
skogo Soyuza “K 100-letiyu so dnya rozhdeniya Vladimira Il'icha Lenina” 
[Theses of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union “On the l(K)th Anniversary of the Birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin’’], 
Pravda, 23 December 1969). 

• Vojin and the other non-English words in this and the next paragraph are the Czech words 
for these ranks (U.S. Ed.]. 


222 


What to Read on This Section 

Marksizm-leninizm o voyne i armii [Marxism-Leninism on War and Army].* 
5th edition, Ch. V. Voyenizdat, 1968. 

V. I. Lenin i Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily [V. I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed 
Forces], 2nd enlarged edition, Ch. X. Voyenizdat, 1969. 

V yedinom stroyu [In a Lfnited System]. Voyenizdat, 1965. 

Zashchita zavoyevaniy sotsializma — vysshiy internatsional'nyy dolg [The De- 
fense of the Achievements of Socialism Is the Highest International Duty]. 
Politizdat, 1968. 

Matyushkin, N. O. O sotsialisiicheskom interna tsionalizme [On Socialist In- 
ternationalism]. Voyenizdat, 1969. 

• Available in English, No. 2, USAF “Soviet Military Thought” series [U.S. Ed.]. 


223 


'Jri. 




Chapter 8. THE ARMED FORCES OF THE IMPERIALIST 
STATES 


Bourgeois armies have always been the principal means of asserting the 
economic and political domination of the capitalists, and an instrument of 
the oppression of workers within the country and the enslavement of peoples 
of other states. V. I. Lenin wrote that a permanent army in the capitalist 
countries is “an instrument of reaction, the servant of capital in the struggle 
against labor, the executioner of the people’s freedom.” ' 

According to historians, during the 400-year period from the 16th through 
the 20th centuries the armed forces of Britain have participated in 230 wars 
— predatory wars, wars of conquest. It was not for nothing that F. Engels 
named the British Army the most “brutish” in the world. “Pillage, violence, 
murder . . .,” he wrote, “have long been the established privileges, the 
acknowledged right of the British soldier.” ^ British arms have been the 
means of enslaving hundreds of millions of people. On the eve of World War 
II, the British Empire was 140 times larger in area than its parent state. 
Within this empire there lived 535,000,000 people — 11 times more than in 
the parent state. 

The entire history of the armed forces of the USA is characterized by 
robbery and coercion of other nations. From the beginning of the last century 
right down to our own times the American military clique has not ceased its 
aggressive actions against the Latin American countries — Cuba, Panama, 
Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, and others. American troops celebrated 
the capture of Hawaii and the Philippine Islands with particular cruelty and 
ferocity. “Bum and kill; there is no time to take prisoners now. The more 
you burn and kill the better. Kill everyone over ten years old.” This was the 
order given by General D. Smith, who commanded the interventionist forces 
in the Philippine Island.^. 

In the less than 200 years of their existence, the US armed forces have 
participated in 1 14 predatory wars. Today, more than a million American 
soldiers are on the territory of 33 foreign states. 

The armed forces of the USA, Britain, France, Germany, and Japan 

' Lenin, XII, 113. 

’ F. Engels, Izbrannyye voyennyye proizvedeniya [Selected Military Works]. Voyenizdat, 1956, 
p. 121. 


224 


broupht inexpiable shame upon themselves when they intervened against the 
young Soviet Republic. They landed in the North, South, and Far East of our 
country, and mounted an attack from the West. Shooting, hanging, imprison- 
ment, robbery, atrocities — all were used by the imperialist military clique in 
order to strangle the embryo socialist revolution in Russia. The American 
general. Graves, boasted with cynical frankness that his soldiers “roamed 
through the country like wild animals, robbing and killing the peaceful 
inhabitants.” 

Even now, the imperialists make extensive use of their armed forces for 
smothering national liberation movements and interfering in the internal 
affairs of other countries. This is particularly evident from the example of the 
armed intervention of the US imperialists in V'ietnam. The crimes of the 
American military clique on Vietnamese soil are reminiscent of the evil deeds 
of the fascist monsters. The shameful path of the American interventionists 
in Vietnam is marked by the murder of peace-loving inhabitants, the system- 
atic destruction of towns and villages, the destruction of schools, hospitals, 
and crops. 

At the present time, the armed forces are playing an especially important 
role in the politics of the imperialists, since they consider war to be the 
principal means of resolving the all important contradiction — the contradic- 
tion between capitalism and socialism, as well as their own internal contra- 
dictions. For this reason, the imperialists, primarily the reactionary circles 
in the USA, are directing their military power against the USSR, the world 
socialist system as a whole, and national liberation and revolutionary move- 
ments. 

What sort of armies do each of the principal imperialist states possess? 

THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USA 

In carrying out their aggressive foreign policy, the i.Tiperialists of the 
United States of America look upon the armed forces as the principal means 
of resolving international problems from a position of strength and of achiev- 
ing their set military-political objectives, which, in the final analysis, amount 
to the achievement of world domination. 

The USA has the largest and best technically equipped armed forces of all 
the capitalist countries in the world. The US Army is the foundation of the 
military might of international imperialism. 

The armed forces of the USA consist of regular armed forces and orga- 
nized reserves. There are more than 3.5 million men in the regular armed 
forces, which consist of three independent services: the Ground Forces 
(Army), the Air Force, and the Navy. 

The reserves, numbering 950,000, are considered as the basis of the mobili- 
zation deployment of the armed forces in wartime. 

The development, equipment, and training of the American armed forces 
are implemented in accordance with the requirements of US military doc- 
trine, the basis of which is the strategy of “flexible response.” This covers 


225 


preparation for any kind of war: world, local, nuclear, conventional, large, 
and small. 

Proceeding from this, the armed forces include: 

— the Strategic Attack Force, consisting of intercontinental ballistic mis- 
sile formations and units, atomic submarines armed with Polaris missiles, 
strategic bombers and reconnaissance aircraft, tanker aircraft, and support- 
ing systems; 

— the Strategic Defense Force consisting of air defense resources — surface- 
to-air missiles, interceptor aircraft, and information and control systems; 
anti-missile and space defense resources, and space detection and tracking 
systems; 

— the General Purpose Force — the Army, the Tactical Air Force, and the 
Navy (excluding atomic missile-carrying submarines); 

— Strategic Troop Transport Forces and resources, including transport 
aircraft and naval transport facilities, designed for the rapid movement of 
troops, arms, and supplies from the USA to probable theaters of operations; 

—Armed Forces Reserves — the source of replenishment of the regular 
armed forces, and the basis of their mobilization deployment. 

Higher military command and control bodies. In accordance with the 
constitution of the USA, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces is 
the President, who exercises military leadership through the National Secu- 
rity Council, the National Resources Mobilization Planning Directorate, and 
the Ministry of Defense. 

The National Security Council consists of the President (Chairman), Vice- 
President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the Chief of the 
National Resources Mobilization Planning Directorate. Sometimes it in- 
cludes other leaders of government establishments. The Central Intelligence 
Agency is subordinate to the Council. 

The National Resources Mobilization Planning Directorate is responsible 
for elaborating plans for the utilization of human and material resources in 
the event of war, implements practical measures to this end, and coordinates 
the activities of all institutions in the field of civil defense. 

The Department of Defense exercises direct control over the Armed 
Forces. The Secretary of Defense, a civilian, exercises operational control of 
the Armed Forces through the Chiefs of Staff Committee and, on other 
matters, through his assistants and the departments of the Army, Air Force, 
and Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. 

The Chiefs of Staff Committee is the working body of the Secretary of 
Defense in the administration of the Armed Forces. It is responsible for 
elaborating and implementing plans for the development and mobilization 
deployment of the Armed Forces, warfare and operations plans; it is also 
responsible for their all-round support. The Committee consists of a chair- 
man and member chiefs of staff of the Army, Air Force, and Navy. 

The working authority of the Chiefs of Staff Committee is the Combined 
Staff, headed by the Chief of Staff, the members of which are generals and 
officers of the three services, each service being represented by an equal 
number of members. 


226 


Three combined directorates, Nuclear Ammunition, Intelligence, and 
Communications, are also subordinate to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. 

The departments of the Army, Air Force, and Navy are responsible for 
recruitment and mobilization deployment, the combat training of personnel, 
logistics, scientific research in the field of organization, equipment, and com- 
bat utilization of formations, units and subunits. 

Responsibility for the operational planning and utilization of trained for- 
mations, units, and subunits of the Services is borne by unified and special 
commands, which are subordinate to the Secretary of Defense through the 
Chiefs of Staff. 

Commands made up of strategic formations, formations, and units of the 
different Services are classified as unified commands; commands composed 
of forces of one Service only are classified as specified commands. Army, Air 
Force, and Naval formations and units included in the composition of unified 
and special commands are headed by their own commanders, and are with- 
drawn from operational subordination to the departments of the Army, Air 
Force and Navy. 

Fundamental recruitment and training principles. At present there is a 
mixed system of armed forces recruitment in the USA: by enlisting volunteers 
and by flailing up reservists under the military service law. 

Those accepted as volunteers are “politically reliable” American subjects 
and foreigners of both sexes: males between the ages of 17 and 34, females 
between the ages of 18 and 34. On entering active service in regular units, 
volunteers sign contracts for a period of three to six years. 

Military service is obligatory for all male US citizens from 1814 to 26 years 
old and, for persons who have had deferments, to 35 years old. In peacetime, 
it comprises active service in the regular armed forces and the reserve. The 
total period of active service is six years, of which two are spent on active 
service in the regular armed forces, two in the first line reserve (including the 
Army or Air National Guard) and two in the second line reserve. 

The National Guard is made up of militia units, the personnel of which 
occupy the status of civilians assigned to specific units and formations. Re- 
cruitment for the National Guard is accomplished by enlisting volunteers on 
a territorial basis. There are National Guard troops in every state. These are 
intended as reinforcements for the regular forces in wartime; in peacetime 
they are used by the local authorities for suppressing revolutionary and strike 
movements. In recent years they have been used extensively in the southern 
states for the suppression of demonstrations by the Negro population. 

The main formations of the National Guard are infantry, armored, and 
mechanized divisions equipped with modem weapons. They have the same 
organization as the regular army. The equipment of these formations is kept 
in storage, in special depots and armories. In the event of war National Guard 
units become part of the regular forces. 

Army, Air Force, and Naval reserves are kept up to strength on the basis 
of a composite principle: by the enlistment of volunteers and on the basis of 
the military service law. 

Officers' training. The officer corps of the regular armed forces consists of 


regular officers and reserve officers enlisted for active service for limited 
periods. In peacetime regular officers are trained for the army by the US 
Military Academy at West Point, for the Navy by the US Naval Academy 
at Annapolis, and for the Air Force by the US Air Force Academy at 
Colorado Springs. The courses of instruction last four years. 

Some of the regular officers are selected from among the warrant officers 
(intermediate rank between officer and sergeant), sergeants, specialists, and 
privates who have graduated from officer candidate schools and passed the 
requisite examination. Besides this, officer’s rank may be conferred on per- 
sons who have completed an officer’s training course with distinction in a 
civilian higher educational establishment, and on National Guard and re- 
serve officers. 

Reserve officers are frequently enlisted for a 2-year term of service in the 
regular armed forces. Some of them may be recruited for a term of three to 
six years. 

Officers are recruited mainly from bourgeois elements, in order to ensure 
the class influence over the privates and NCO’s. As a rule, the overwhelming 
majority of the officers lend themselves to shameless anticommunist propa- 
ganda activities and try to educate their subordinates in the spirit of readiness 
to defend the interests of the ruling classes. 

The Ground Forces. The Ground Forces (Army) are considered to be one 
of the most important services which form the general purpose forces and 
they are trained for combat operations in universal nuclear and limited wars. 
In conformity with this, the main focus of attention is directed at maintaining 
a high degree of military preparedness in the forces stationed overseas, train- 
ing the strategic reserves and maintaining them in a high state of readiness 
for sea or air transfer from the continental US to the theater of operations, 
improving the organizational structure of formations and units, increasing 
their fire and striking prower, their mobility on the battlefield, and their 
capacity for resolute attack and stubborn defense. 

The numerical strength of the regular Army exceeds 1,500,000 officers and 
men. It consists of 19 divisions, including eight infantry, four mechanized, 
four armored, two airmobile and one airborne, a large number of independent 
brigades and regiments, rocket, artillery, and anti-aircraft divisions, units, 
and subunits of the Army Air Force (with over 9,500 aircraft and helicop- 
ters), logistic support, engineer and communications units, etc. 

The Army consists of branches and ser vices. Infantry, armor, and artillery 
are classified as branches. 

The services are subdivided into main and special. The main services 
include: engineer, communications, chemical, artillery engineering, intelli- 
gence and counterintelligence, quartermaster, transport, military police, and 
other services. The special services include the medical, military legal, chap- 
lain, and other services. 

The army aviation, the engineer, communications, intelligence, and coun- 
terintelligence services carry out both combat support tasks and tasks in the 
direct conduct of combat operations. 


228 


Divisions, independent brigades, and units are formed into army corps, 
field armies, and army commands, which, as a rule, are incorporated in 
unified commands of the US armed forces in zones, and are subordinate to 
the Department of the Army only on matters concerning personnel recruit- 
ment, combat training, and logistic support. 

The following come under the heading of US Army commands: the Euro- 
pean Army Command, the army commands in the Pacific Zone, Alaska, the 
South and Central American zones, and the continental US. The last-men- 
tioned command directs the mobilization planning and deployment of the 
Army, the setting up and combat training of formations and units of the 
regular Army, the National Guard, and reserves on US territory, the opera- 
tion of military schools and training centers. 

Five army military districts and the military district of Washington are 
subordinate to the Continental Army Command. 

An important place in the US Army system is occupied by the Army 
Organization and Utilization Research and Development Command. It is 
responsible for the elaboration of views on the role and tasks of the ground 
forces in different types of wars; it evolves the organizational structure of 
major field forces, formations, units, and subunits, requirements with respect 
to new types of weapons, combat materiel and equipment; it participates in 
the conduct of exercises and maneuvers in order to check the organization 
and tactics of the forces and the effectiveness of the weapons and fighting 
equipment; it also prepares and publishes field regulations and instructions. 

The Logistic Support Command carries out research and experimental 
design work on the production of new, and the improvement of existing, 
models of weapons, combat materiel, and other equipment; conducts equip- 
ment tests; organizes production, and is responsible for supplying the Army 
with weapons, combat materiel, technical facilities and equipment, and their 
storage, repair, and maintenance. 

Operational formations and major operational field forces. The highest 
major operational-strategic formation (major tactical force, according to 
American views) of ground forces in a theater of operations is the army 
group, which, depending on the situation and the tasks being solved, may 
consist of two to four field armies, independent corps, and divisions. An army 
group command is not usually concerned with administrative functions .and 
troop supply matters; these are dealt with by the theater command or special 
commands of a communications zone. 

A field army is a major operational and administrative field force which 
incorporates a staff, two to four army corps, units of the army artillery, and 
technical and administrative services. 

An army corps is a tactical formation which consists of a staff, two to four 
divisions (of which one or two are armored), one or two independent armored 
cavalry regiments, corps artillery, engineer and communications units and, 
when the corps is acting independently, logistic support units. 

The basic tactical formation of the Army is the division. At the present 
there are five types of divisions: infantry, mechanized, armored, airborne, and 


airmobile. All divisions have a unified organization and consist of two main 
elements: the divisional framework and combat battalions, the number of 
which depends upon the type of division. 

The divisional framework includes: a staff and divisional headquarters 
company; three brigade staffs and headquarters companies, an intelligence 
battalion, a communications battalion, an engineering battalion, divisional 
artillery, a rear services command and a company of military police and, in 
infantry and airborne divisions, an army aviation battalion as well. 

Depending on the task being undertaken and the conditions in the theater 
of operations, a division may have a varying number of battalions of branches 
of the services, and this determines its type. For example, an infantry division 
usually includes eight infantry and two tank battalions; a mechanized divi- 
sion, seven motorized infantry and three tank battalions; an armored divi- 
sion, six tank and five motorized infantry battalions; an airborne division, 
nine parachute battalions and a battalion of light tanks. 

The main operational-tactical principles. The main principles of combat 
operations are: 

— large-scale use of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons, which 
makes it possible to inflict damage on numerically superior enemy forces in 
short periods of time, and ensures success; 

— purposefulness of action, i.e., a determined effort to defeat the opposing 
enemy group of forces and to capture a specific target (line, region), thus 
ensuring a rapid solution of the ultimate task with the minimum expenditure 
of forces and resources; 

— surprise, which is achieved by rapidity of action, deceiving the enemy 
about the intentions of one’s own forces, the use of weapons and methods 
which the enemy does not anticipate, intelligence work, and the maintenance 
of security; 

— economy of forces and resources by utilizing the minimum quantity of 
them in secondary sectors of operation, concentration of main efforts on the 
principal (decisive) line of operation in order to ensure domination of the 
enemy for his rapid defeat; 

— maneuverability, which ensures the assumption of an advantageous po- 
sition in relation to the enemy, and makes it possible to obtain superiority 
in forces and resources in a decisive sector; 

— simplicity of planning, v, hich facilitates proper understanding and intel- 
ligent implementation of the plan and the assigned tasks and, in the final 
analysis, the successful achievement of the set objective; 

— unity of command, which ensures the unification of the efforts of all the 
forces by coordinating their actions in the fulfillment of the common task; 

— combat support, including measures to defend the troops from sudden 
enemy attack, ensure their freedont of action, and keep their plans secret from 
the enemy. 

The principal types of ground forces combat operations are considered to 
be offense and defense; parallel with these, the concentrated use of nuclear 
weapons and a high degree of troop maneuverability create conditions for 


230 


conducting a meeting engagement, which may occur in the course of an 
offensive or counterattacks (counterblows) in a defensive action. 

An offensive may be carried out against an enemy who has hastily switched 
to a defensive posture or on an enemy with a prepared defense. 

An offensive against an enemy who has hurriedly switched to the defensive 
is considered to be the most typical and frequently used form of combat 
operation. It is characterized by preparation in the shortest possible time, and 
lack of sufficient information on the disposition of enemy forces, and is 
usually carried out by troops advancing in columns without occupying initial 
areas and, at the start of a war, from their permanent deployment points or 
the regions occupied by the troops when the combat alert is given. 

An offensive against a prepared defense will be undertaken most frequently 
under conditions of close contact with the enemy. 

The principal forms of maneuver in an offensive are considered to be the 
breakthrough, the envelopment, and the outtianking maneuver. More often 
than not, the forces will combine these forms of maneuver, especially in a 
nuclear war. 

Defensive actions are undertaken for the purpose of breaking away from 
or repelling an enemy attack, holding on to an occupied position, gaining 
time, defeating attacking forces, and creating favorable conditions for a 
subsequent switch to the attack. Defense is divided into two categories: 
mobile defense and area defense. Depending on the situation, they can be 
used either independently or in combination. 

In mobile defense, the main stress is laid, not on holding the forward 
defense area, but on breaking up the main enemy grouping; for this purpose, 
a large number of troops is organized as a second echelon (reserve) and the 
minimum requisite forces and resources are deployed in the forward area. It 
is considered most expedient to conduct mobile defense on a wide front with 
forces of mechanized and armored divisions. The smallest unit capable of 
conducting a mobile defense is the brigade. 

Area defense is undertaken for the purpose of holding a specific sector of 
terrain, and is based on the maximum use of fire weapons, mainly nuclear 
weapons, the engineer organization of the terrain, and the disposition of the 
main forces and resources in the forward defense area. 

The troops defending the forward area offer maximum resistance to the 
enemy in order to direct his attack at the area most favorable to the defender, 
where the enemy could be destroyed by means of nuclear weapons and 
counterattacks by the second echelon (reserves). 

On the march, a division usually proceeds in a 20-30km zone along two, 
three, or more routes. The troops’ order of march includes reconnaissance, 
security, main body, and rear sendees (which fellow as independent columns 
behind the combat units). 

The average rate of progress; by day — tank and mixed columns — up to 
30km/hr, motorized infantry up to 40km/hr; at night — 15-20km/hr. Aver- 
age distance travelled in 24 hours — 200-280km. 

The length of the order of march of a mechanized division moving along 
two routes is 110-120km, along three routes, 6O-70km. 


231 


Width and Depth of Combat Zone for Subunits, Units and Formations on Offense and Defense 



Offense 



Defense 

Subunits, units and 
formations. 

zone 

width 

tasks' 

zone 

width 

depth of 
defense 

Motorized infantry section 

100-1 50m 


up to lOOrn 


Motorized intantry platoon 

500m 

— 

up to 750m 
1,500m 

200m 

Motorized intantry company 

up to 1,500m 

— 

1,100m 

Motorized intantry battalion 

2-3 5km 

3-4 Km 

6~8Km 

3km 

2 5km 

Mechanized (armored) brigade 

6-lCkm 

S-8km 

1 5-20km 

10-12km 

6-8km 

Mechanized division 

lS-20km 
or more 

15-20tol . 
up to 85km 

up to 25km 
or more 

30-4 0km 

Armored cavalry regiment 

up to 10km 

5c5km 
up to 20km 

10-1 2km 

6-8km 

Armored division 

20km 

pp to AOkm. 

20km 

30km 


or more 

up to lOOkm 

or more 

or more 

Army corps 

(Mechanized division— 2, 

Armored division— 1. 

Armored cavalry regiment— 1) 

40-50km 

80-1 OOkm 

50-80km 

up to 70-80km 


* Depth of tasks from the front line: numerator— most immediate task, denominator— following task. 


The Air Force. The US Air Force is subdivided into the regular Air Force 
and the organized reserves (the National Guard and the Air Force Reserve). 
The main air commands, which are the major operational field forces of the 
US Air Force are; Strategic Air Command (SAC), Tactical Air Command 
(TAC), Aerospace Defense Command (ASDC), Military Airlift Command 
(MAC) and the USAF commands in the European, Pacific, \Iaskan, and 
South American zones. 

Theie are over 900,000 officers and men in the Air Force. The Air Force 
has 1,054 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM’s), approximately 14,000 
aircraft and helicopters, as well as a large quantity of anti-aircraft missiles. 
In addition to these, 2,700 serviceable aircraft and helicopters are kept in 
storage. 

The Strategic Air Command (SAC) was formed in 1946 and is the largest 
higher air formation in the Air Force. It combines the strategic aviation and 
missile resources of the Air Force, and is intended to carry out independent 
aerospace operations by inflicting nuclear strikes on the entire complex of 
targets which represent an enemy’s military power and military-economic 
potential, in order to weaken the enemy’s will to resist and continue the war. 

SAC consists of three air armies (2nd, 8th and 15th) and independent 
formations and units which are stationed in the continental US. The air 
armies differ in their composition and organization. Normally, an air army 
consists of five or six divisions, which are the main formations of strategic 
aviation, and ICBM’s. In terms of organization and composition, the divi- 
sions are subdivided into aerospace and aviation. An aerospace division 
consists of a staff and three or four wings (missile, aerospace, aviation — heavy 
bomber, medium bomber, or reconnaissance), as well as logistic support 
subunits. 

An aviation division consists of from two to four wings (aerospace, heavy 
bombardment and refueling) as well as logistic support subunits. 


A missile v ing of Minutemen ICBM’s consists of a staff', three or four 
missile squadrons (a squadron consists of five detachments, each with 10 
launchers), a combat support group, and mobile technical maintenance 
subunits. 

A missile wing of Titan 2 ICBM’s consists of a staff, two missile squadrons 
(a squadron consists of nine detachments per launcher), a combat support 
group and mobile technical maintenance subunits. 

An aerospace wing consists of one or two squadrons of heavy bombers and 
one or two tanker squadrons. 

A heavy bomber wing consists of one or two squadrons of heavy bombers 
and one or two tanker squadrons. 

A medium bomber wing consists of three squadrons of medium bombers 
and one or two tanker squadrons. 

A SAC air reconnaissance wing consists of two or three reconnaissance 
squadrons. 

A tanker wing consists of two or three tanker squadrons. All the aerospace 
and aviation wings have headquarters, airfield maintenance groups and logis- 
tic support subunits. 

SAC has a total of one thousand Minuteman ICBM’s, fifty-four Titan 2 
ICBM’s, over five hundred strategic heavy bombers and approximately 
eighty medium strategic bombers. 

The Tactical Air Command (TAC) was formed in 1946. Unlike the tactical 
air commands in probable theaters of operation, TAC was charged with the 
following specific tasks: the equipment and training of units and subunits 
intended for the reinforcement of USAF tactical groupings deployed in over- 
seas theaters of operations; the creation of mobile air strike formations and 
provision of the means of transferring them to theaters of operations for use 
in cooperation with the Army and the Navy, both in a limited and in a general 
nuclear war; verification of the effectiveness of the tactical air weapons sys- 
tems and elaboration and verification of views on the use of the Tactical Air 
Force; support of the Continental Air Defense Command; conducting exer- 
cises independently and as part of the Strike Command. 

The Tactical Air Command includes tactical fighter, reconnaissance, and 
airborne transport aviation which is formed into air armies, air divisions, 
wings, and squadrons, operational training wings, an air diversion wing, a 
tactical air intelligence center, as well as air base support wings and groups. 

TAC is operationally subordinate to the Strike Command; it consists of 
three air armiefi, special and maintenance units. The basic formation of the 
Tactical Air Force is the tactical air army, which may have several aviation 
wings formed into air divisions. 

A TAC air division consists of a headquarters, three tactical fighter wings, 
an air reconnaissance wing and logistic support subunits. 

An airborne transport division consists of a headquarters, two or three 
airborne transport wings, and logistic support subunits. 

A tactical fighter wing consists of a headquarters and three tactical fighter 


233 


squadrons, each of which includes four flights, an air base support group, and 
technical maintenance subunits. Each wing has appr'ycimately 3,500 officers 
and men and up to 75 tactical fighter aircraft. 

The Aerospace Defense (ASD) Command is responsible for the planning 
and operational direction of ail the air defense, antimissile, and space defense 
forces and resources (including those of the Army and the Navy) of the 
continental USA. The Command consists of regions, all the resources of 
which are formed into air divisions. Approximately 20 National Guard 
fighter-interceptor squadrons are also assigned to the ASD Command. 

The Miiitary Airlift Command (MAC) provides for the requirements of all 
branches of the United States armed forces for air transportation to overseas 
theaters of operations. MAC is made up of two air transport armies, four 
indei>endcnt wings and special services (rescue, meterological and carto- 
graphic). 

The MAC fleet numbers approximately 1,000 aircraft of different types, 
including over 400 heavy transports. In addition to these, MAC is assigned 
approximately 230 Reserve and National Guard transports and over 350 
transports of the Civil Air Reserve. 

The Navy. The political leadership of the USA regards the Navy as one 
of the principal means of unleashing and waging wai against the USSR and 
other socialist states, and suppressing national liberation movements in 
Asian, African, and Latin American countries. For this purpose the USA has 
created, and maintains in a state of constant combat readiness, the largest 
navy in the capitalist world; it is charged with the following principal tasks: 

— to inflict nuclear strikes on the most important coastal and remote 
targets, industrial and administrative centers of the enemy, and to destroy his 
naval forces at sea and in their bases; 

— to blockade sea areas and straits in order to deny enemy ships, especially 
submarines, access to the open sea (ocean); 

— to carry out seaborne assaults on a strategic and tactical scale; 

— to cooperate with the ground forces by supporting them from the sea, 
by carrying out seaborne landings, and by transporting troops and various 
kinds of supplies; 

— to defend sea and ocean lines of communication; 

— to defend the territory of the USA, especially against missile strikes by 
enemy submarines. 

The US Navy has approximately 1,680 ships and vessels, 8,880 aircraft and 
helicopters and four divisions of Marines with reinforcement and mainte- 
nance units. There are approximately 1,050,000 officers and men in the Navy, 
including about 300,000 Marines. 

The composition of the main types of vessels is as follows: 

Atomic missile-carrying submarines — 41 
Strike aircraft carriers (one atomic) — 16 
Antisubmarine carriers — 9 
Assault helicopter carriers — 9 
Guided missile cruisers (one atomic) — 1 1 


Atomic torpedo-carrying submarines — 39 

Guided missile frigates and destroyers (two atomic) — 55 

Cruisers — 25 

Frigates and destroyers — 333 

Submarines — 127 

Escort vessels (including 5 guided missile) — 265 

Assault ships and vessels — 246 

Minesweepers — 180 

Auxiliary vessels — 370. 

!rs both peacetime and wartime, the Navy has two parallel organizational 
structures: administrative and operational. The administrative organization 
provides for the administrative structure of the Navy in two main fleets by 
branches of the service, the organization of the permanent basing and registry 
of vessels, the combat training of homogeneous forces, personnel recruit- 
ment, the logistic support of ships and units. The administrative control of 
the Navy is the responsibility of the Chief of Naval Staff. 

The operational organization provides for the organizational structure of 
the Navy as part of the combined commands of the US Armed Forces, the 
deployment of the Navy in the principal theate/s, the training of the hetero- 
geneous forces and the control of the Navy in the carrying out of its missions 
in peacetime and wartime. The operational control of the Navy is the respon- 
sibility of the Chiefs of Staff. 

The US Navy, in accordance with its administrative organization, is 
formed into two main fleets (the Atlantic and the Pacific) and five naval 
districts. 

The Atlantic and Pacific fleets have basically similar organizational struc- 
tures. 

The Atlantic Fleet (the headquarters of which is located at the main naval 
base, Norfolk) in terms of administrative organization incorporates homoge- 
neous forces of the fleet: air, cruiser and minelaying, submarine, minesweep- 
ing, amphibious. Marine Corps, and maintenance; as well as the Experimen- 
tal and Training Commands. 

Naval Air includes seven strike carriers, five antisubmarine carriers and 
approximately 2,000 naval aircraft and helicopters. The strike and anti- 
submarine carriers are formed into divisions (two or three to a division), the 
carrier-borne aircraft into air strike wings (one wing to eacli strike carrier) 
and air groups (one to each antisubmarine earner). Naval air also includes 
formations and units of base aircraft. 

The Cruiser and Minelaying Force consists of flotillas which may contain 
one to three missile cruisers and two to four squadrons (each squadron 
consisting of two or three divisions of three to five destroyers). The total 
number of vessels in the cruiser and minelaying force exceeds 150, including 
six guided missile cruisers. 

The Submarine Force includes atomic missile-carrying, atomic torpedo- 
carrying, and diesel-electric submarines. The atomic missile-carrying subma- 


fines are formed into the 14th, 16th, 18th and 20th squadrons (consisting of 
seven to nine vessels each). 

Conventional and atomic torpedo-carrying submarines are formed into 
flotillas consisting of two or three squadrons (of two or three divisions with 
four to six vessels in each). 

The Minesweeping Force consists of several squadrons of minesweepers of 
three to five divisions each (with four to six minesweeper-destroyers or 
coastal minesweepers per division). 

The Amphibious Force includes two amphibious groups containing six 
amphibious squadrons (of seven to twelve assault vessels and transports 
each). 

The Fleet Marine Force consists of ground forces (the 2nd Marine Divi- 
sion, reinforcement and maintenance units) and aircraft (the 2nd Wing, 
which has up to 400 aircraft and helicopters). 

The Fleet Maintenance Force includes four squadrons, which are forma- 
tions of the mobile logistics support force at sea, as well as shore establish- 
ments and units for repairing weapons and equipment, freight transportation, 
etc. The maintenance force contains more than 250 auxiliary vessels. 

In terms of operational organization, the homogeneous forces of the Atlan- 
tic Fleet provide units for the operational formations in the Atlantic zone, 
the Central and South American, European and Mediterranean zones. 

The main operational formations are the 2nd and 6th Fleets. The 2nd Fleet 
does not have a fixed composition; its principal bases are, Norfolk, Newport, 
Mayport and Charleston (USA). It is intended for action in the Northeastern 
Atlantic, and comprises the basis of the NATO Atlantic Strike Fleet. The 6th 
Fleet operates in the Mediterranean and serves as the basis of the NATO 
Striking Force in the Southern European theater of operations. It normally 
consists of two strike carriers, one or two cruisers, more than 15 destroyers, 
two to four submarines, a division of minesweepers, an, amphibious squadron 
(of six to eight assault vessels) with a battalion of Marines and several 
auxiliary vessels. 

The Pacific Fleet (the headquarters of which is located in Pearl Harbor 
Naval Base). The following are administratively subordinate to the Com- 
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet: 

Naval Air, which includes nine strike carriers, four antisubmarine carriers, 
and over 2,500 combat aircraft and helicopters. The shore servicing of these 
forces in the Pacific theater is provided for by ten fleet air bases, three naval 
bases, two fleet auxiliary and one rear base. The strike carriers are formed 
into divisions (one to three in each) and the antisubmarine carriers are 
formed iiito antisubmarine groups. 

The Cruiser and Minelaying Force, consisting of more than 170 warships, 
including seven missile cruisers, which are formed into flotillas, squadrons 
and divisions. 

The Submarine Force, which is combined into two flotillas of submarines 
based at San Diego and Pearl Harbor. Atomic submarines armed with Polaris 
missiles (seven vessels in all) form the 1 5th Squadron, which is based at Apra 
(Guam). 


236 


t 


The Minesweeping Force, combined into a flotilla consisting of squadrons 
and divisions, which include a total of more than 40 minesweeping destroy- 
ers, coastal and harbor minesweepers. 

The Amphibious Force, consisting of two amphibious groups with three 
amphibious squadrons in each (and 10-11 assault vessels in a squadron). 

The Marines, including three Marine divisions (1st, 3rd, and 5th), rein- 
forcement units (a tank battalion, three batteries of 203.2mm howitzers, three 
batteries of 155mm guns, three SAM divisions of Hawks, etc.) and mainte- 
nance units, as well as the 1st and 3rd Marine Air Wings. 

The Maintenance Forces, including over 100 auxiliary vessels. 

The main operational formations of the Pacific Fleet are the 1st and 7th 
Operational Fleets. 

The 1st Fleet, its headquarters and forces, organized as operational forma- 
tions, groups, and detachments, are engaged in the training of ships and units 
of the Pacific Fleet for action as part of the forward dispositions in the Far 
East and Southeast Asia. Its operational zone takes in the central and eastern 
part of the Pacific Ocean, including the Aleutian and Hawaiian islands and 
the western seaboard of the USA. 

The 7th Fleet is the forward striking force of the USA in the Western 
Pacific. It consists of strike carrier formations (five strike carriers) with 400 
aircraft; anti-submarine carriers, destroyers, escort vessels, amphibious and 
minesweeping ships and vessels, marine divisions, and other forces. 

In all, the 7th Fleet has approximately 170 fighting ships and over 800 
aircraft and helicopters. Three strike carriers (250-300 combat aircraft) and 
approximately 70 screening vessels, amphibious and minesweeping forces, as 
well as over two divisions of marines, are directly engaged in aggressive 
military operations against the Vietnamese people. 

The Unified Commands of the US Armed Forces in zones include major 
field forces, formations, and units of different services and are the highest 
major operational-strategic forces. The commander-in-chief of a unified com- 
mand is directly subordinate to the Secretary of Defense through the Chiefs 
of Staff Committee, and is responsible for combat readiness, the elaboration 
of operational plans, and the utilization of the armed forces assigned to him. 
The unified commands include the Armed Forces Commands in the Euro- 
pean, Pacific, Atlantic and Alaskan zones, the Aerospace Defense Command 
and the Strike Command. 

The Armed Forces Command in the European Zone is the largest grouping 
of American armed forces. Its zone of responsibility extends over the whole 
of Western Europe and adjacent seas (including the Mediterranean), North 
Africa, the Near and Middle East. 

The Command consists of the Army Command (the 5th and 7th Army 
Corps, the South European Tactical Group, reinforcement and logistic sup- 
port units); the Air Force Command (the 3rd and 17th Air Armies, an air 
defense division, an air transport division, independent units and logistic 
support elements), and the Naval Command, the basis of which is the 6th 
Operational Fleet. 

The Armed Force Command in the Pacific Zone controls a vast expanse 


237 


of territory in the Far East (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Okinawa), 
Southeast Asia (South Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines) and other 
Pacific regions. The Command consists of the Air Force Command (the 5th, 
7th, and 13th Air Armies, an airborne transport division and an air division 
transferred to the operational control of SAC), the Naval Command (a 
formation of strategic atomic missile-carrying submarine forces, the 1st and 
7th Operational Fleets, ASW forces, naval operational formations in South 
Vietnam, Japan, South Korea and other regions), the Army Commands in 
South Korea, South Vietnam and Japan. 

The Strike Command incorporates all the combat-ready formations and 
units of the Army and the Tactical Air Force in the continental USA ear- 
marked for the reinforcement of existing, and the deployment of new, group- 
ings in overseas theaters of operations. 

The Armed Forces Commands in the Alaskan, Central and South Ameri- 
can zones incorporate independent units and subunits of the Air Force, the 
Army and the Navy. 

THE ARMED FORCES OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (FRG) 

The reactionary forces of West Germany, encouraged by imperialistic 
circles in the USA and other western countries, ignoring the lessons of two 
world wars, have, from the very beginning of the existence of the FRG, 
adopted a policy of militarizing the country and preparing it for a new 
revanchist war. This is confirmed by the restoration of the domination of 
monopolies and banks. West Germany’s entry into the aggressive NATO 
bloc and the formation of the Bundeswehr, the restoration of the country’s 
military-economic potential (the supplies and technology base of the West 
German military machine), the rehabilitation of Nazi war criminals, an- 
ticommunist and anti-Soviet propaganda and subversive activity, revanchist 
propaganda, and demands to reexamine the results of World War II, aspira- 
tions to acquire nuclear weapons, the passing of extraordinary laws aimed at 
the further militarization of the country, and a number of other measures. 

Resting on the military strategy of the NATO bloc, the West German 
militarists are making increasing efforts to exert a decisive influence on the 
elaboration of fundamental elements of this strategy and, in the final analysis, 
to adapt it to the revanchist aims of West German imperialism. While ac- 
knowledging the fundamental arguments of the American strategy of “flexi- 
ble response,” the West German military command considers that certain of 
these arguments applicable to Europe, and especially to the FRG, should be 
changed. In its opinion, nuclear weapons should be used at the very beginning 
of a conflict, since West Germany, as part of the NATO zone, is only a 
strategic battle area deprived of depth, especially as a result of the withdrawal 
of France from NATO and, therefore, does not permit either loss of space 
or weakening of its military potential. In this connection, it is reckoned that 
the FRG together with its NATO allies, must be in a constant state of 
readiness to wage: 


— a general ’■■.clear war, which from the very beginning will be of a 
coalitional nature, waged on a global scale with massive, unlimited use of 
nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction directed at the entire 
complex of the military might and the military-economic potential of a 
probable enemy; 

— a general nuclear war arising as a result of the expansion of the scale of 
a limited armed conflict; 

— armed conflicts in the course of which conventional weapons only, or 
both conventional and tactical nuclear weapons, are used. 

Proceeding from the strategic position of West Germany, the political 
leadership came to the conclusion that in the event of war, the main ground 
and air battles would develop primarily on German territory. Therefore, it 
put forward to the NATO leadership the so-called “front lines” concept, 
which was approved in September 1963. According to this concept, it is 
proposed to deploy, in peacetime, the main groupings of NATO forces im- 
mediately on the frontiers of the socialist bloc countries. The military com- 
mand of the FRG, in contrast with the views of the US leadership, not only 
does not admit of a possible withdrawal of NATO forces from the border 
area, but emphasizes the need for the front-line groupings of these forces to 
develop offensive actions from the very start of a war, and to carry the ground 
combat operations onto the territories of the Warsaw Fact countries. 

To realize the “front lines” concept, a unique nuclear barrier in the form 
of a nuclear mine belt was created along the eastern boundary of the FRG. 
Relying on this, the NATO forces will be able to organize the dispositions 
of their forces for attack in decisive sectors and, in the event of failure, 
conduct successful defensive actions. 

In the opinion of the Bundeswehr Command, the nature of modern war 
and the decisive role of its initial operations necessitate the maintenance of 
forces in peacetime which would be able to carry out the missions of the first 
phase and, possibly, the entire initial period of a war without substantial 
reinforcement. 

The West German militarists consider that a dominant position in Western 
Europe in peacetime and the achievement of military-strategic objectives in 
the event of war, can only be achieved from a position of strength and for 
this it is essential to create powerful armed forces which surpass the armies 
of West Germany’s NATO allies. The Bundeswehr is one of the largest 
armies of the capitalist states of Europe. Its numerical strength, excluding the 
Border Troops, has reached approximately 460,000 including: 284,000 in the 
Army (approximately 63% of the total number of personnel), 98,000 in the 
Air Force (21 %), 34,000 in the Navy (7%), and over 40,000 in the Territorial 
Defense Forces (9%). 

The higher military control bodies. In peacetime, the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Armed Forces is the Minister of Defense, a civilian post held by a 
member of the governing party. In wartime, the post is held by the Federal 
Chancellor (the head of the Government). The right to declare war and a 
state of mobilization (a so-cailed “state of defense”) belongs to the Lower 


239 


Chamber of Parliament (the Bundestag), subject to subsequent confirmation 
by the President, and in individual cases requiring an immediate decision, this 
right is exercised by the President, but with the cons'^nt of the Federal 
Chancellor. Actually, these reservations and the ext rar.rd' nary laws passed 
in May and June 1968 eliminate the West German Parliament from discus- 
sion of the question of declaration of war. 

The higher military control bodies are the Defense Council and the Minis- 
try of Defense. 

The Defense Council is a higher consultative body under the Federal 
Chancellor. It elaborates and takes decisions on all important questions of 
military policy and the development of the Armed Forces. Included in the 
composition of the Council are the Chancellor (Chairman), Vice-Chancellor 
and the ministers of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, Finance, 
Eiconomic Affairs, and the Minister for Scientific Research Problems, who is 
mainly concerned with atomic issues. 

The Minister of Defense exercises control of the Armed Forces through 
chief directorates, directorates, and departments of the Ministry. The follow- 
ing are subordinate to him; the Deputy Minister of Defense (Secretary of 
State), three chief directorates (Military Issues, Weapons and Materiel, and 
Military Administrative), two directorates (Personnel, and Budgetary and 
Financial), three departments (Planning, Organization, Press and Informa- 
tion), and the Chancellery. The Chief Directorate of Military Issues, in fact, 
fulfills the functions of a general staff and is headed by the Inspector General 
of the Armed Forces, who has under his command the Inspectors (Com- 
manders) of the Army, the Air Force and the Navy, the Territorial Troops, 
the Medical Troops, and the Armed Forces Combat Training Directorate. 

The Higher Military Council under the Inspector General is the consulta- 
tive and coordinating body for matters relating to the control of the Armed 
Forces, plans for their development, combat training, and other questions 
common to all the Armed Forces. The members of the Higher Military 
Council are the Inspector General (Chairman), the inspectors of the Services 
and the Territorial Troops, and the Head of the Chief Directorate of Weap- 
ons and Materiel. 

The main principles of recruitment and service. The FRG operates a mixed 
system of recruitment for the Armed Forces: on the basis of the call-up of 
reservists under the terms of the Universal Military Service Law passed in 
July 1956 and by voluntary enlistment. According to the Universal Military 
Service Law, in peacetime all males from 18 to 45 years of age are called up 
for military service, NCO’s and officers up to and including 60 years of age. 
In wartime, all males up to 60 years of age are considered to be reservists. 

Armed Forces personnel are divided into three categories: regular service- 
men who have chosen the military profession as a career, volunteers, and 
persons who are serving their obligatory term in accordance with the Univer- 
sal Military Service Law. 

Regular servicemen remain in the .\rmed Forces until they reach the age 
of 60, after which they are discharged and put o»> the reserve list for a period 


of 5 years. Volunteers are soldiers and NCO’s who, after completion of their 
period of active service, remain in the Armed Forces for a further 3-1 5 years, 
and officers on contract service. The first contract, which is for a minimum 
of 3 years, can be extended for a period of up to 15 years. After this, 
volunteers may be discharged into the reserve oi remain in the regular forces. 

Males who have reached the age of 18 years are called up for military 
service. There are two call-ups a year: from 1 April through 30 June and from 
1 September through 15 December. The first three months of service are 
usually devoted to basic training; the remainder of the term is served in units 
and subunits, training in the specialized fields of the various branches of the 
services. 

NCO’s are recruited from volunteers and servicemen who have expressed 
a wish to remain in the Armed Forces. NCO’s are eligible for selection up 
to the age of 23 years. Candidates are given 16 or more months of training 
in special schools for NCO’s. During this period they are obliged to serve one 
year in units and subunits on a general basis. 

The officer corps is recruited from cadres of the former Hitler Wehrmacht 
and from among short service and re-enlisted soldiers and NCO’s. Officer 
candidates are enlisted from persons between the ages of 17 and 25 years. 
Their period of training lasts 38 months. Military ranks are conferred accord- 
ing to the post occupied, length of service, and education. 

After being discharged from the Armed Forces, privates are enrolled in 
educational assemblies lasting for up to 9 months, and reserve NCO’s and 
officers up to 18 months. 

Short-term servicemen account for only 50% of the personnel in the Army, 
less in the Air Force, and almost none in the Navy. 

The Armed Forces of the FRG consist of regulars, who form part of the 
Combined NATO Forces, and Territorial Defense Forces, which are at the 
disposal of the National Command. 

The regular Armed Forces, which represent the main source of the coun- 
try’s military strength, are made up of three independent services: the Army, 
the Air Force, and the ^-’avy. 

The Army is considered to be the most important of the services and 
accounts for 63% of the total numerical strength of the Armed Forces. 

The Army is headed by the Inspector (Commander), who has under his 
command: army corps, independent units, and military training establish- 
ments for officers and NCO’s. 

The Army consists of 12 divisions (seven motorized, three tank, a moun- 
tain infantry and an airborne division, four battalions of Sergeant guided 
missiles, as well as independent artillery, engineer and communications units, 
etc., which form three army corps — the highest army commands. 

An army corps includes two or three motorized infantry, one tank division, 
as well as independent corps units and subunits: a battalion of Sergeant 
guided missiles (four installations), a mixed artillery battalion (twelve 155mm 
and six 203.2mm guns), an artillery instrument reconnaissance battalion, a 


sapper battalion, an ABC (atomic, biological, and chemical) defense battal- 
ion, a transport regiment, and an army air battalion. 

The motorized infantry division is the main Army formation, capable of 
conducting combat operations both with and without nuclear weapons. It has 
up-to-date weapons and fighting equipment and is fully motorized. The 
division consists of a staff and a headquarters company, two motorized and 
one tank brigade, an artillery regiment, an air defense artillery battalion, 
reconnaissance, sapper, army air, communications, medical, and two reserve 
battalions; ABC, military police, ordnance, repair, and quartermaster com- 
panies. The division has more than 200 medium and 28 light tanks, six 
Honest John ballistic missile installations, twelve 175mm self-propelled guns, 
six 203.2mm and 36 155mm self-propelled howitzers and approximately 30 
helicopters. 

The tank division is considered to be the main tactical formation of the 
Tank Force, the best adapted for conducting military operations in a nuclear 
war. It has two tank and one motorized infantry brigade; the other elements 
of the division are similar in organi7.ation, composition, and equipment to a 
motorized infantry division. The division is equipped with approximately 300 
tanks, and it has the same quantity of artillery and helicopters as a motorized 
infantry division, as well as approximately 650 armored personnel carriers 
and 3,000 motor vehicles of various types. The numerical strength of the 
division is 16,750 officers and men. 

The Mountain Infantry Division is considered as the tactical formation of 
the Army intended for conducting combat operations in mountainous ter- 
rain. It consists of: a staff, a headquarters company, two mountain infantry 
and one motorized infantry brigade, an artillei 7 regiment, an air defense 
artillery battalion, reconnaissance, sapper, communications, and medical 
battalions; transport, pack animal transportation, ordnance, repair, military 
police, and ABC companies. The numerical strength of this division is 1 7,500 
officers and men; its equipment consists of approximately 200 tanks, fiaur 
Honest John ballistic missile launchers, four 203.2mm howitzers, twelve 
155mm howitzers, 36 105mm howitzers, 86 mortars, 70 40mm double-bar- 
reled anti-aircraft guns, approximately 60 90mm self-propelled anti-tank 
guns, up to 500 armored personnel carriers, and approximately 3,000 motor 
vehicles. 

The airborne division is considered to be the highest formation of the 
Bundeswehr Airborne Forces, and is intended mainly for conducting military 
operations in the enemy’s rear and only in isolated cases for carrying out the 
usual combat tasks of a motorized infantry division. The division consists of: 
a staff and a headquarters company, two parachute brigades, an artillery 
regiment; sapper, communications, and supply battalions; reconnaissance, 
military police, and ABC companies; an army air squadron. There are ap- 
proximately 11,000 men in the division. 

The main types of ground forces combat operations are considered to be 
offense and defense, which can be conducted by major field forces, forma- 
tions, and units simultaneously or successively. 


242 


Width and Depth of Combat Zone of Subunits, Units, and Formations on Offense and Defense 



Offense 



Defense 

Subunits, units and 
formations 

zone 

width 

misstonV 

zone 

width 

depth of 
defense 

Ntoonred infantry sectien 

! 00-1 50m 


30-1 OOm 


Motorized infantry platoon 

200-300m 

_ 

250-400m 

150m 

Tank platoon 

250m 

1.5-2kni 

up to 400m 

15C-200m 

Motonzed tnfantry company 

700-900m 

.1-1 5km 

2-3k.'n 

1.5km 

approx. 1km 

Tank company 

500-7 50m 

2km 

4km 

l-1.5km 

400-600m 

Mctonzed infantry battaliwi 

1.5-2km 

2-3km 

6-8km 

2-3km 

2km 

Tank battalion 

1-1. 5km 

2^ta 

(i-Skm 

2-3km 

2km 

Motorized infantry brigade 

&-12km 

fcfikitl 

16-20km 

8-1 2km 

12k.m 

Tank brigade 

fr-lOkm 

5^km 

lfr-2()km 

8- 12km 

12km 

Motorized infantry division 

up to 25-30km 

L6-20km 

30-40km 

2S-30km 

50km 

Tank division 

up to 30km 

16-20km 

30-4bkm 

20-25km 

30-40km 

Army corps (2 mot divs, 

1 tk div) 

50-60km 

up to 35km 
up to 8bkm 

80km 
or more 

60-80km 


• Numerator— the most immediate task, denominator— the following task (from the front line). 


The offensive is the chief form of combat action envisaged for the purpose 
of defeating an enemy and taking important lines and objectives which pro- 
vide favorable conditions for the development of combat operations. An 
offensive must combine movement, fire, and a thrust in a selected direction. 
It can be undertaken without preparation, i.e., without stopping the action 
in progress, when the advantage in forces and combat readiness do not lie 
with the enemy, or when it is necessary to exploit the element of surprise, 
and with systematic preparation when the enemy has the advantage in com- 
bat readiness, forces, and weapons and has succeeded in creating a prepared 
defense. The basic forms of maneuver on the offensive are considered to be 
the frontal attack and the outflanking maneuver from one or two directions. 

There are two forms of defense — static and mobile. Static defense is orga- 
nized in advance in order to hold specific areas (lines) of terrain for the 
purpose of wearing down and halting an advance by a superior enemy. If 
there is no immediate contact with the enemy in front of the defense line, a 
security zone 20-40km deep is created. Mobile defense is employed after an 
unsuccessful encounter battle, when repelling a counterattack (counter- 
strike.s) of superior enemy forces, or following unsuccessful actions in a static 
defense operation. Troops engaged in mobile defense can conduct holding 
actions, temporarily hold defense positions, carry out a withdrawal, or mount 
an attack with a limited objective. 

The most important condition for success in conducting warfare is consid- 
ered to be the use of nuclear weapons. 

The Air Force. In the plans of the West German command, the Air Force 
is assigned the role of the Bundeswehr’s main striking force. The Inspector 
(Commander) exercises control of this force through the Air Force Head- 
quarters. 


rhe highest major operational field forces are the “North” and “South” 
commands, which form the 2nd and 4th NATO Tactical Air Command 
Formations, respectively. 

The Air Command consists of three air divisions: Combat, Air Defense, 
and Rear Support. The Combat Division consists of two or three F-104G 
fighter-bomber squadrons, two G.91 light combat squadrons, an RF-104G 
reconnaissance squadron, and a Pershing guided missile squadron (two batta- 
lions each with four launchers). The Air Defense division has a fighter 
squadron of air defense F-104G aircraft, three battalions of Nike surface-to- 
air guided missiles (each with 36 launchers), four or five battalions of Hawk 
surface-to-air guided missiles (each with 24 launchers), radar units, and 
others. 

The Rear Support Division combines four or five communications units, 
two or three supply regiments, an engineer battalion, and two or three 
training regiments. 

The wing is the basic tactical unit of the Air Force, which carries out 
combat tasks independently or as part of a formation. F-104G wings have 
two squadrons (each containing 18 aircraft) and two groups: a technical 
group (in which there are 14 reserve aircraft) and an airfield maintenance 
group. Light combat wings of G.91 aircraft consist of two wings: one fighter- 
bomber and one reconnaissance, each containing 18 aircraft. 

The Air Force also incorporates the Air Transport Command, which is 
directly subordinate to the main staff of Air Force. It includes three air 
transport wings of Noratlas and Transall aircraft (two squadrons in each). 

The Air Force has a total of 600 combat and over 1 10 transport aircraft, 
Pershing missile launchers, 216 Nike surface-to-air missile launchers and the 
same number of Hawk installations. 

In developing the Air Force, the main attention is directed towards main- 
taining it at an up-to-date technical standard by equipping it in a timely 
manner with the latest types of aircraft and missiles, as well as by training 
the requisite number of flying and technical personnel. 

In the view of the West German Command, the main combat efforts of the 
Air Force should be concentrated on carrying out the following tasks: achiev- 
ing and maintaining air superiority, attacking the enemy’s communications 
and bases, providing direct air support for the Army and the air defense of 
the territory. 

The Navy consists of the Fleet, the Fleet Air Arm, and the Marine Corps 
and includes more than 200 fighting vessels (including: 22 destroyers, escort 
and other similar vessels, 10 submarines, 74 minesweepers, 40 torpedo boats 
and 26 assault vessels), approximately 80 auxiliary vessels, over 200 aircraft 
and helicopters of various types, and a battalion of marines. 

The ships and aircraft (helicopters) are formed into 23 squadrons, includ- 
ing three destroyer squadrons, one squadron of escort vessels, four squadrons 
of torpedo boats, six squadrons of minesweepers, one squadron of minelayers, 
one squadron of assault vessels, one submarine squadron, and four squadrons 
of naval aircraft. 


244 


The squadrons are formed into five flotillas (destroyers, submarines, tor- 
pedo boats, the minesweeping force, and supply ships), the Naval Air Com- 
mand, and an amphibious group. 

The Navy is headed by the Inspector (Commander) of the National Navy, 
who exercises operational control of the Fleet through the Commander-in- 
Chief of the Fleet (who is the Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic Fleet), and 
resolves questions relating to development, personnel training, and logistic 
support for the Navy through the Naval Directorate. The Commander-in- 
Chief of the North Sea Fleet is subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Baltic Fleet. 

Taking into account the geographical position of the FRG and the impor- 
tance of the Baltic Straits for NATO, the leadership of the Bundeswehr 
considers that the main task of the West German Navy, in case of a war, 
should be to deny the socialist countries access to the North Sea, and, 
consequently, an outlet to the Atlantic for their navies. This task must be 
solved jointly with the Danish Fleet and with the close cooperation of air and 
ground forces operating in the zone of the Baltic Straits and with the support 
of American and British carrier strike forces. Additionally, the West German 
Navy is responsible for assisting its own forces engaged in maritime opera- 
tions with supporting fire, by providing transportation for troops and 
materiel and by carrying out landing operations in coastal regions and de- 
ception operations for the purpose of distracting and misleading enemy 
forces. 

Approximately 75% of the naval forces belong to the Baltic Fleet and are 
based at the naval bases of Kiel, Flensburg, Olpenitz, and Neustadt. The 
remaining combat forces of the Navy are incorporated in the North Sea Fleet, 
based at Wilhelmshaven, Cuxhaven, and Emden-Borkum to secure sea com- 
munications in the approaches to West German North Sea ports. 

The Territorial Troops. Beginning in 1963, and especially intensively since 
1965, the West German Command has been speeding up the formation of the 
so-called Territorial Troops, which are under national command, calculating 
thereby to use them as the basis for the deployment of a multimillion-man 
army in the event of war, on the model of Fascist Germany. 

The Territorial Troops do not constitute one of the Services. They are 
called upon to ensure the freedom of action of NATO forces by protecting 
important military and non-military targets on West German territory, re- 
pelling airborne landings and diversionary groups, protecting and restoring 
essential communications, erecting and maintaining engineering structures, 
providing personnel, transportation facilities, engineering supplies, and com- 
munications facilities for the regular forces, organizing civil defense, jointly 
with the local civil authorities, and ensuring the uninterrupted operation of 
industry, transport, communications, etc. 

The Territorial Troops are headed by the Inspector (Commander-in- 
ChieOi who is directly subordinate to the Inspector-General of the Bunde- 
swehr. The main headquarters is established under him, and at NATO 


245 


Headquarters in the North European theater of operations, the Northern and 
Central Army Groups, there are Bundeswehr representatives who coordinate 
the activities of the Territorial Troops with those of the NATO forces. 

The Commander-in-Chicf and staft of the Territorial Troops have six 
military districts under their command: 


Military districts 

Territorial boundaries 

Location of district HQ 

1st Military District 

Schlesurig-Holstein and the city of Hamburg 

Kiel 

2nd Military District 

Lower Saxony and the city of Bremen 

Hannover 

3rd Military District 

North Bhine-Westphalia 

Dusseldorf 

4th Military District 

Hessen, Rhmeland-Pfaly, Saarland 

Mainz 

jih Military District 

Badim-Wurltemburg 

Stuttgart 

6th Military District 

Bav.'ria 

Munich 


Each military district is divided into military provinces (in all there are 29 
territorial provinces), and the provinces are subdivided into two or three 
territorial regions. In peacetime the Territorial Troops consist solely of exec- 
utive bodies and a small number of units and subunits for conducting the 
combat training of reservists, and servicing equipment. The bulk of the forces 
are maintained in the form of skeleton units and subunits of the Territorial 
Reserve, and will be deployed only in the event of war. 

Since 1966 the Territorial Troops system has included the so-called “Home 
Defense Force" (“Heimatschutz”), consisting of infantry battalions, guard 
companies, and military police platoons. The personnel in this force are 
drawn from servicemen who have completed their period of compulsory 
military service in the Bundeswehr, privates up to the age of 45 years, officers 
up to the age of 60. 

In May 1968 the West German Command decided to incorporate the 
Territorial Troops in the Army, which should simplify the system of leader- 
ship, facilitate the mobilization deployment of the troops, improve coopera- 
tion both within the Bundeswehr and with NATO forces, as well as reduce 
the cost of their maintenance. 

THE ARMED FORCES OF GREAT BRITAIN 

Great Britain, at one time a great colonial sea power, has lost her former 
independence and has been forced to follow in the wake of the politics and 
strategy of the USA and NATO. Such a state of affairs came about as a result 
of Great Britain’s loss of her colonies and influence on the Commonwealth 
countries and, consequently, the loss of military bases, human, and material 
resources. This in turn led to a weakening of the country’s economic position 
and a reduction in its military potential. The most important factor influenc- 
ing Britain’s present-day policies is the incompatibility between her military 
obligations to NATO, CENTO, and SEATO and her comparatively limited 
economic and financial resources. 

British strategy is based on the use of both nuclear strike forces in a general 


246 


war and conventional armed forces in various parts of the world: Europe, the 
Near and Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa. 

The recent change in the principles of the “East of Suez” military policy 
provides evidence that Great Britain cannot maintain large-scale armed 
forces on foreign soil. Her present military policy provides for the mainte- 
nance of minimal forces overseas, and at home a strong, mobile strategic 
reserve and a specific quantity of air and sea transport facilities, capable of 
ferrying reserves to any part of the globe in the shortest possible time, as well 
as airlifting supplies for troops in combat areas. 

The establishment of numerically small, but highly mobile armed forces, 
capable of conducting military operations both with and without nuclear 
weapons, conforms to this basic trend in Britain’s military development. 

The higher military control bodies. According to the constitution, the 
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces is the King (at present, the 
Queen); however, in fact, the responsibility for preparing the country for war 
rests with the Prime Minister, who heads the Cabinet, to which vhe Defense 
Committee and the Minister of Defense are subordinate. 

The Defense Committee evolves the general principles of military policy 
and determines the main line to be followed in preparing the country for war 
and developing the Armed Forces, and coordinates the related activities of 
ministers and departments. The Defense Committee consists of the Prime 
Minister (Chairman) and the ministers of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Home 
Affairs, Finance, Labor, and National Service; other ministers and repre- 
sentatives of the High Command may also be invited to attend meetings of 
the Committee. 

The Ministry of Defense, headed by ^ civilian who is a Member of Parlia- 
ment belonging to the governing party, exercises direct control over the 
development of the Armed Forces, military scientific work, and military 
production; elaborates the fundamentals of the country’s military policy; and, 
following their approval by the Defense Committee, undertakes the appropri- 
ate practical measures. 

The Minister of Defense exercises operational control of the Armed Forces 
through the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee fulfills the function of Chief of the Defense Staff, being the Chief 
Military Adviser of the Minister of Defense. The Committee is made up of 
the Chief of the General Staff (the Army Staff), the Air Force Chief of Staff, 
and the Chief of Naval Staff. 

Major questions concerning leadership of the Armed Forces are resolved 
by the Defense Council formed under the Minister of Defense. The members 
of the Defense Council are the Minister of Defense, the Chief of the Defense 
Staff, the Deputy Minister for Administration and Armament, the Chiefs of 
Staff of the Services, the Parliamentary Deputy Ministers of Defense for the 
Services, the Permanent Deputy Minister of Defense, and the Chief Scientific 
Adviser to the Minister of Defense. 

A'^my, Navy, and Air Force Councils, attached to the Defense Council, 


are responsible for the training and logistic support of their respective 
services. 

Recruitment for the Armed Forces is by voluntary enlistment for periods 
from 6 to 22 years. The draft was abolished in 1961. Personnel enlisted for 
service in the Regular Army have the right after a six-year period of service 
(after six, nine years, etc.) to withdraw from active military service, and in 
this case, after six years of service, personnel are placed on the reserve list 
for six years; after nine years, on the reserve list for three years. After the 
expiration of their contract, servicemen may extend it to 22 years and then 
for another five years. 

NCO’s are recruited from the mc>t capable privates who have served in 
the Army for at least six months. There are junior and senior NCO’s: corpo- 
ral (bombardier in the Artillery), junior sergeant, sergeant, and staff sergeant 
are junior NCO ranks; warrant officer 1st and 2nd classes are senior NCO 
ranks. 

Regular Army officers are tiained at Sandhurst Military College (the 
training period lasts two years) and are partially supplemented by NCO’s and 
graduates of higher civilian educational institutions. 

Naval officers are drawn mainly from graduates of Dartmouth Naval 
College and partially from naval petty officers and the ranks of the Navy. 

During the course of their term of service. Army, Air Force, and Naval 
officers take refresher and retraining courses lasting from six to ten months. 
The main higher military training establishments of the Armed Forces are 
the Army, Royal Air Force, and Naval Staff Colleges, the Combined Staff 
College, and the Imperial Defense College. 

The Army consists of the regular Army and reserves. The numerical 
strength of the former (including colonial troops, enlisted volunteers from the 
populations of colonies and dependent countries) is 210,000 officers and men. 
The main grouping of British Forces is located in West Germany (the British 
Army of the Rhine, consisting of three divisions, independent reinforcement, 
combat, and logistic support units numbering 50,000 men) and, in the UK, 
the Strategic Command, which incorporates all the formations and units of 
the Army with a total numerical strength of over 100,000 officers and men. 

Army units and subunits are also stationed in the Middle East (the Persian 
Gulf area), the Far East (Hong Kong). Southeast Asia (Singapore, Malaysia), 
and other regions. 

The army reserves are subdivided into the Regular Army Reserve and the 
Officers’ Reserve. The Regular Army Reserve is the principal one in the 
ground forces, including the Army Volunteer Reserve (warrant officers and 
other ranks placed on the reserve list after completing their service contract) 
and the Army Emergency Reserve (personnel who have completed a period 
of service in the Royal Artillery, the Royal Engineers, the Royal Corps of 
Signals, etc., and been placed on the reserve list), as well as civilian specialist 
volunteers enlisted for two, three, or four year terms. 

The Regular Army Reserve of Officers consists of regular officers and 
generals serving in the reserve. 


248 


The Army consists of branches of the Services (Infantry, Royal Artillery, 
Royal Engineers,* and the Royal Army Corps of Signals) and services (Royal 
Army Supply Corps, Royal Army Ordnance Corps, Royal Electrical and 
Mechanical Engineers, Royal Army Medical Corps, Intelligence Corps,* 
Physical Training Corps, Corps of Chaplains, Corps of Military Police, etc.). 

The highest operational-strategic formation of the Army in a theater of 
operations is considered to be the army group, which consists of two or three 
corps, independent formations, and reserve units of the main command, as 
well as logistic support units and subunits. 

A corps does not have a permanent organizational structure: it may con- 
tain up to three divisions, two or three armored vehicle reconnaissance 
regiments, artillery units, rear units and services; organic corps units (an 
artillery survey regiment, a communications regiment and engineer regi- 
ments formed into an engineer group). 

A division is a tactical formation of variable composition. Depending on 
the situation and the assigned task, it can have two to four infantry or 
armored brigades, a missile-howitzer regiment, an air defense artillery regi- 
ment, and other units and subunits. 

The infantry brigade is the main combined forces tactical formation. This 
consists of a headquarters, three infantry battalions, a tank regiment, a field 
artillery regiment, a field engineer squadron, a communications squadron, an 
intelligence platoon, an army air reconnaissance detachment, a platoon of 
military police, and rear services subunits. An infantry brigade has a total of 
more than 5,000 officers and men, 54 tanks, approximately 30 armored 
reconnaissance vehicles, 18 105mm howitzers, 24 120mm recoilless guns, six 
army aircraft and helicopters, approximately 750 motor vehicles, and other 
equipment. 

The armored brigade is the main tactical formation of armored troops. It 
consists of a headquarters, three tank regiments, an infantry battalion, a 
medium self-propelled artillery regiment, a squadron of armored personnel 
carriers, and other subunits (as in an infantry brigade). The total number of 
officers and men in an armored brigade exceeds 5,000; it has 162 tanks, 65 
reconnaissance vehicles, 18 155mm self-propelled howitzers, approximately 
100 armored personnel carriers, and up to 740 motor vehicles. 

The parachute brigade has basically the same organization as the infantry 
brigade, but no tank regiment, and parachute battalions instead of infantry 
battalions. 

Attack is considered the main form of combat operation. The width of the 
attack r.ontage and combat task depth depend on the situation, the relation- 
ship of the forces, the assigned task and the nature of the terrain. A division, 
operating in the direction of main thrust of a corps has an attack frontage 
of 20km or more, a brigade, six to ten km. The immediate task of a division 

* Sapernaya sluzhba — the Russian equivalent of the British "Royal Sappers and Miners,” 
now the “Royal Engineers," was included in the Russian text after “Intelligence Corps” [U.S. 
Ed.]. 


is usually put at a depth of up to 15km; the next one, 30-40km. The depth 
of the immediate task, of a brigade is put at six to eight km and the next task 
up to 15km. 

Troops go over to the defensive temporarily for the purpose of holding 
terrain, wearing down the enemy, inflicting losses, and gaining time to pre- 
pare a fresh attack. Defense must be active and stable. division in defense 
occupies a frontage of 25-30km and a depth of 25km. The defense zone of 
a division consists of a forward defense area security zone (10-20km in depth 
where there is no contact with the enemy), battle outpost positions (l-3km 
from the front line) and a main defense area, in which two positions are 
established for first echelon brigades and one for a second echelon brigade. 

An infantry brigade defends a zone with a 10-15km front and up to 10km 
in depth. 

The Royal Air Force. In 1967 the military-political leadership of Great 
Britain re-examined the former organizational structure of the Royal Air 
Force and adopted a new one. In accordance with this, three main commands 
were created; the Strike Command, the Air Support Command, and the Air 
Training Command. 

The Strike Command (headquarters at High Wycombe) consists of a 
combination of Bomber and Fighter Commands. Initially its composition is 
planned to consist of two air groups; the Bomber Group and the Fighter 
Group. The following are the main tasks of the Command; to carry out 
independent and joint (with the US Air Force SAC) strategic air operations; 
carry out missions in the interests of NATO, CENTO, and SEATO armed 
forces; and protect the most important military targets, industrial, adminis- 
trative, and political centers of the country from air attack. It is proposed 
that, initially the Command should consist of three wings (of three squadrons 
each) of Vulcan B.2 and Victor B.2 medium strategic bombers, one wing of 
Victor tankers, a squadron of reconnaissance aircraft, and five squadrons of 
tactical fighters. 

The Air Support Command is a major operations' field force, the functions 
of which are to airlift troops to overseas theaters of operations, to support 
the regrouping and supply of troops from the air within theaters of opera- 
tions, as well as landing operations. It is planned that the Command should 
have approximately ten squadrons of heavy VC 10, Belfast, Britannia, Comet 
C.4 and Hercules C.MkI aircraft, three squadrons of Argosy and Andover 
medium military transports, three squadrons of transport helicopters, two 
squadrons of ground attack aircraft. Phantom and Harrier tactical fighters, 
etc. 

The Air Training Command is to be based on the Flight Training Com- 
mand and the Technical Training Command. 

Other commands include: Coastal Command, which it is planned to incor- 
oorate in the Strike Command; Signals Command; and Logistic Support 
Command. 

In addition, there are RAF commands in theaters of operations; these are 
intended for participation in combat operations involving the NATO, 


CENTO, and SEATO blocs, supporting the deployment of British troops in 
overseas theaters of operations, air defense, protection of air, sea, and ground 
communications, and other tasks. 

RAF commands in theaters of operations do not have a standard organiza- 
tion or perm.anent composition. These commands include: 

— the RAF in West Germany: four squadrons of Canberra B.8 light bomb- 
ers, two squadrons of tactical reconnaissance aircraft, and two air defense 
fighter squadrons; 

— the RAF in the Near East (Cyprus): a wing of Canberra light bombers, 
two squadrons of tactical reconnaissance aircraft, and one air defense fighter 
squadron; 

— the RAF in the Middle East (the Persian Gulf area): two squadrons of 
ground attack aircraft, two squadrons of transport aircraft, a squadron of 
helicopters and a squadron of coastal patrol aircraft; 

— the RAF in the Far East: a squadron of light bombers, two air defense 
squadrons, a tactical reconnaissance squadron, a squadron of ground attack 
aircraft, and three squadrons of transport aircraft. 

The Royal Navy. The Royal Navy comprises a force of over 280 ships, 
including five strike carriers, two assault helicopter carriers, three cruisers, 
six guided missile destroyers, over 80 destroyers and escort vessels, 43 subma- 
rines (including three atomic), and other vessels. It has 160 reserve vessels 
and 36 under construction. 

The main operational formations of the Navy are the Western and Far 
Eastern fleets. 

THE ARMED FORCES OF ITALY 

With her entry into the aggressive NATO bloc in 1949, Italy became 
involved in the arms race and began to follow a policy of close cooperation 
with the countries of this bloc; control of the main structure of its armed 
forces was handed over to NATO. 

The total numerical strength of the Italian Armed Forces is approximate!) 
500,000 officers and men, including 270,000 in the Army, 60,000 in the Air 
Force, 40,000 in the Navy, 80,000 in the military police force (Carabinieri), 
and 40,000 Border Troops. The country has over 800,000 trained reservists. 

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces is the President of the 
Republic. The Minister of Defense exercises direct control of the Armed 
Forces. 

The Armed Forces are kept up to strength in conformity with the Univer- 
sal Military Service Law. Males between the ages of 18 and 55 years are 
subject to military service. The period of service is 15 months in the Army 
and the Air Force and 24 months in the Navy. 

For military administration purposes Italy is divided into six military, 
three air, and six naval districts. The main Italian army grouping is in the 
northern and northeastern regions of the country. Units of the United States 
Army, Air Force, and Navy are also stationed in Italy. 


251 


The Army. The highest main tactical field force of the Army is the army 
corps, which usually consists of one armored and two infantry divisions* (or 
three infantry divisions, or three or four alpine brigades), an armored cavalry 
regiment, one or two heavy artillery regiments, one or two army aviation 
detachments, and corps combat and logistic support units. 

The Army consists of seven divisions (two armored and five infantry), 
twelve brigades (one armored cavalry, four infantry, five alpine, one para- 
chute and one missile), as well as a large number of reinforcements and 
logistic support units. 

An armored division consists of a staff and a headquarters company, two 
tank brigades equipped with M47 and M60 tanks, a motorized infantry 
brigade (with Ml 13 armored personnel carriers), an artillery brigade; recon- 
naissance, engineer, and communications battalions; and maintenance subu- 
nits. A tank brigade has two tank battalions (of over 100 tanks) and a 
motorized infantry battalion; reconnaissance, sapper and communications 
companies; and support subunits. A motorized infantry brigade differs from 
a tank brigade in that it has one tank and two motorized infantry battalions. 

An infantry division consists of a staff, a headquarters company, two 
infantry and one infantry-tank regiment, a field artillery regiment; reconnais- 
sance, engineer and communication battalions; an air detachment and main- 
tenance subunits. A division has over 16,000 officers and men, approximately 
130 light and medium tanks, over 100 armored personnel carriers and ar- 
mored vehicles, 72 I05mm and 155mm guns. 

An independent infantry brigade consists of a staff and a headquarters 
company, an infantry regiment (of two or three battalions), a tank battalion, 
a division of field artillery, a communications company, an engineer com- 
pany, a flight of army aircraft, and maintenance subunits. 

An alpine brigade consists of a staff and a headquarters company, an alpine 
regiment (of three or four battalions), a regiment of mountain artillery (three 
or four batteries) and communications, engineer, and mechanized companies, 
a flight of army aircraft, and maintenance subunits. 

The organization of a parachute brigade is similar to that of an infantry 
brigade, the only difference being that it has no tank battalion, while a 
parachute regiment may have two or three parachute battalions. 

A missile brigade is the main nuclear support formation of the Italian 
Army. It contains three divisions of Honest John ballistic missiles, two 
divisions of 203.2mm howitzers, an infantry battalion (for outpost tasks), and 
control and logistic support subunits. 

The units and subunits of the Italian Army are equipped mainly with 
weapons and fighting equipment of foreign design (American, French, etc.). 

The Air Force has about 450 aircraft. The main tactical subunit of the Air 
Force is the squadron (16-25 aircraft). Three squadrons form an air brigade. 
The Air Force comprises: two fighter-bomber brigades, two fighter brigades, 
a reconnaissance brigade, a brigade of Nike-Ajax and Nike-Hercules surface- 

* The word “divisions" was inserted by Ihe franslalor [U.S. Ed.]. 


252 


to-air guided missiles, as well as several independent squadrons of combat 
and auxiliary aircraft, logistic support units and subunits. 

The Italian Air Force is equipped mainly with American F-84s, F-86s, and 
F-104s. Italian Fiat G.91s are used as fighter-bombers and reconnaissance 
aircraft. 

The Navy consists of the Fleet, Coastal Aviation and the Marine Corps. 
The Fleet has over 200 combat and auxiliary vessels, including two guided 
missile cruisers (“Giuseppe Garibaldi” and “Vittorio Veneta”), two guided 
missile frigates, 10 submarines, two guided missile destroyers, four destroy- 
ers, 36 escort vessels, and a large number of other vessels. 

The Naval Air arm has three air groups of patrol aircraft (40) (which 
organizationally form part of the Air Force, but which are subordinate to the 
Navy in matters of employment), as well as about 50 helicopters. 

The Marines include independent sabotage and reconnaissance groups. 

The principal naval bases are Taranto, Spezia, Naples, Ancona, Brindisi, 
Messina, and Cagliari. 

THE ARMED FORCES OF TURKEY 

Together with Greece, Turkey, occupying a favorable military-strategic 
position, forms NATO’s southeastern flank — the springboard for the deploy- 
ment of this aggressive bloc’s armed forces directly on the frontiers of the 
Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries. 

According to the Turkish constitution, the Supreme Commander of the 
Armed Forces is the P^'sident. He is also the Chairman of the National 
Security Council, which includes the Prime Minister, his deputies, the Chief 
of the General Staff and the ministers of Foreign Affairs, National Defense, 
Finance, Industry, Transport, Public Works, as well as the Deputy Chief of 
the General Staff, commanders-in-chief of the Services, and the General 
Secretary of the Committee of National Security. The Council determines the 
government’s military policy, exercises general supervision of the develop- 
ment of the Armed Forces, and determines measures for preparing the coun- 
try for war and for the mobilization of the country’s resources for military 
purposes. 

The Chief of the General Staff exercises direct control of the Armed Forces 
through the General Staff and the commanders-in-chief of the Services. 

The Armed Forces consist of the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy. 
Their overall numerical strength is 480,000 officers and men. 

The Army forms the basis of the Armed Forces and numbers approxi- 
mately 400,000 men. The Army’s combat forces comprise 17 divisions (13 
infantry, one armored, and three training), 1 1 independent brigades (four 
armored and seven military police), up to 10 independent infantry, armored 
cavalry, cavalry, and frontier regiments, and other independent support, 
combat, and logistic support units. The formations, independent units, and 
subunits are organized into six army corps, which form three field armies: 
the 1st Field Anny deployed in Western Turkey, the 3rd Field Army in the 


eastern regions (Eastern Anatolia), and the 2nd Field Army in the soutnern 
and central regions of the country. 

An army corps includes two or three divisions, one or two brigades, 
independent infantry, armored cavalry, tank, artillery, and engineer units and 
subunits, as well as logistic support units. 

The infantry division, based on the former structure of the American 
pentomic division, is the principal tactical formation of the Turkish Army. 
It consists of: a staff and a headquarters company, five combat groups, 
divisional artillery (direct support — three divisions of 105mm and 155mm 
towed howitzers and two divisions of 105mm and 155mm self-propelled 
howitzers; general support — a missile howitzer division), tank, reconnais- 
sance, engineer, and communication battalions, an army aviation company, 
and an army aviation repair group, as well as a rear division (medical, 
transport, and ordnance battalions; HQ, quartermaster, and administrative 
companies). A division contains a total of approximately 13,750 officers and 
men, 123 tanks, 60 105-1 55mm guns, four 203.2mm howitzers, and two 
Honest John ballistic missile launchers. 

The Air Force, for organizational purposes, is formed into two air armies 
(forces). These consist of air defense fighter-bomber and fighter units and 
Nike surface-to-air guided missile divisions, reconnaissance and transport 
units (subunits), and auxiliary aviation (communication, training, medical). 
The Turkish Air Force has approximately 450 aircraft (more than half of 
which are combat aircraft) of American manufacture: F-84, F-86 (various 
modifications), F-lOO, F-104, F-5, C-47, and C-130. 

The basic subunit of the Air Force is the squadron (18-25 aircraft, depend- 
ing on the types). 

The Navy has over 100 vessels of different types, provided by the US and 
British fleets, and includes nine destroyers and ten submarines. The total 
number of officers and men in the Navy is approximately 37,000. 

The highest organizational unit of the Navy is the flotilla, which incorpo- 
rates groups of destroyers, ASW vessels, submarines, minesweepers, mine- 
laying and net-laying vessels, as well as detachments of auxiliary vessels. 

The principal naval bases are: Izmir, Gelcuk, Iskenderim, Mersin, and 
Trabzon. 

THE IMPERIALIST AGGRESSIVE MILITARY BLOCS 
THE NORTH ATLANTIC BLOC 

The North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) is the largest aggressive military- 
political bloc among all the military blocs created by the imperialist powers 
after World War II. This bloc was established on the initiative of the USA. 
The objectives of the USA in forming this bloc were, firstly, to unite the 
countries of Western Europe into a military-political alliance for the prepara- 
tion and unleashing of an aggressive war against the Soviet Union and other 


254 


countries which had embarked on the socialist path of development; se- 
condly, to prevent the survival of the independent grouping of capitalist 
states in Western Europe, in the form of the West European Alliance, (Great 
Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg), which had been 
created by that time and was capable of competing with the USA; to 
strengthen its influence on the solution of European problems; and, by means 
of the NATO bloc, to exploit the human and material resources of capitalist 
Europe in its aggressive aims. 

The North Atlantic Pact was signed on 4 April 1949 by the representatives 
of twelve countries: the USA, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Nether- 
lands, Luxembourg, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Italy and Portu- 
gal. In February 1952 Greece and Turkey were brought into NATO and, in 
May 1955, West Germ.any, 

Thus, NATO combined 15 of the most developed capitalist countries of 
Western Europe and North America, with a territorial area of approximately 
22,000,000 square kilometers and a population of over 510,000,000, possess- 
ing enormous military-economic potential. 

Special features of the North Atlantic bloc are its permanently functioning 
combined political and military bodies, whose sphere of activities embraces 
both the political and the military, and military-economic fields, and the 
existence of large-scale combined armed forces with their respective organs 
of control and theaters of operations, prepared in an Operational sense ac- 
cording to a common plan. 

The numerical strength of the combined armed forces of the NATO bloc 
exceeds 6,500,000 men: in 1967 the direct military expenditures alone of these 
countries amounted to approximately 100 billion dollars, exceeding by sev- 
eral times the corresponding expenditures for the early 1950’s. 

The highest political body of the North Atlantic bloc is the NA TO Council. 
It meets twice a year (in April-May and in December) at the foreign ministers 
or heads of government level, with the participation of the ministers of 
Defense, Economics, Finance, etc., depending on the nature of the questions 
under discussion. Questions usually debated at NATO Council meetings are 
those relating to the international situation, the political activities of the bloc; 
reports of working bodies on the military-political problems of the bloc are 
also read at these meetings. In the period between NATO Council sessions, 
permanent representatives with ambassador’s rank hold periodic meetings. 
This is called the Permanent Council. 

The working body of the Council is the International Staff Secretariat, 
headed by the Secretary General and located in Brussels, Belgium. 

Following France’s withdrawal from the military organization of the bloc 
and non-participation in the discussion of military problems in the NATO 
Council, the NATO leadership established the so-called Military Planning 
Committee, which, in fact, is the same NATO Council without the participa- 
tion of French representatives. The Military Committee and the Nuclear 
Defense Committee are subordinate to it. 

The Military Committee is the chief executive military body of the NATO 


Council and the highest body of the strategic leadership of the bloc’s armed 
forces. Plenary meetings are usually held twice a year (ahead of the NATO 
Council sessions) and are attended by the chiefs of general staffs. 

The Permanent Military Committee (subordinate to the Military Commit- 
tee), within the limits of the authority granted to it, exercises leadership of 
the bloc’s military activities in the period between sessions of the Military 
Committee. It consists of representatives of the general staffs of member 
countries (except France) and is located in Brussels. 

The Permanent Military Committee, as the highest working military body 
of NATO, is responsible for the strategic leadership of the combined armed 
forces through the Supreme and Chief Commands of the respective zones. 

The Nuclear Defense Committee, formed in 1966, is made up of the 
defense ministers of twelve countries (France, Iceland, and Luxembourg 
refused to participate in this organization). The working body of the Commit- 
tee is the Nuclear Planning Group, consisting of the four permanent mem- 
bers (the USA, Great Britain, the FRG, and Italy) and three non-permanent 
members elected in turn from among the other member countries of the 
Committee for a term of 18 months. The Nuclear Defense Committee and 
the Nuclear Planning Group are occupied with all aspects of nuclear policy 
and the use of nuclear weapons by NATO. 

The area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty takes in the territory of the 
member countries and the Atlantic Ocean north of the Northern Tropics. 
Militarily it is subdivided into four zones: the zones of the two Supreme 
Commands (Europe and the Atlantic), the Channel Command, and the 
US-Canadian Regional Strategic Group. 

The Zone of the NATO Supreme Command in Europe embraces the 
territory of the European member states (except Portugal and France, the 
latter occupying a special position) and the Mediterranean Sea. The position 
of Supreme Commander of the NATO Combined Forces is occupied by an 
American general. In peacetime the Supreme Commander is responsible for 
the organization, equipment, and training of the forces subordinate to him, 
he elaborates operational plans for the utilization of the armed forces, sub- 
mits recommendations to higher authorities, and supervises measures for the 
operational organization of the territories and the logistic support of the 
forces; in wartime he directs the combat operations of the forces in accord- 
ance with approved plans. The commanders-in-chief in the North European, 
Central European, and South European theaters of operations and NATO 
mobile forces are subordinate to the Supreme Commander. 

The North European theater of operations includes the territories of Nor- 
way, Denmark, the West German State of Schleswig-Holstein, and the Baltic 
coastal waters and straits zone. 

The Central European theater of operations includes the territory and 
coastal waters of the FRG (except the State of Schleswig-Holstein), Belgium, 
the Netherlands, and Luxemburg, and is most important in terms of its 
military-strategic position, the composition of the armed forces deployed 
within it, and the operational equipment of the territory. Two army groups 

256 


f 


and two combined tactical air commands, consisting of 23 divisions and 
approximately 2,500 combat aircraft, respectively, are deployed in this 
theater. 

The Northern Army Group consists of four army corps: West German 
(four divisions), British (three divisions and a Canadian brigade), Dutch (two 
divisions), and Belgium (two divisions). 

The Central Army Group includes the 5th and 7th US Army Corps (five 
divisions and reinforcement units) and two West German army corps (seven 
divisions). The 1st French Field Army, consisting of two divisions and sup- 
port units, is stationed in the Army Group Zone. 

The 2nd Combined Tactical Air Command, which cooperates with the 
Northern Army Group, includes formations and units of the British, West 
German, Belgium and Dutch air forces totalling approximately l,r00 
aircraft. 

The 4th Combined Tactical Air Command, which cooperates with the 
Central Army Group, includes major field forces and formations of the US, 
Canadian and West German air forces, totalling over 1,500 combat aircraft. 

There are no combined naval forces in the theater. 

The South European theater of operations embraces the territories of Italy, 
Greece, and Turkey, and the Mediterranean Sea. The characteristic features 
of the theater are its great extent (from the Resia Pass on the northern 
frontier of Italy, through Greece to the eastern frontier of Turkey — a distance 
of over 3,000km); the isolation of its land areas by the Adriatic, Ionian, and 
Aegean seas and the Sea of Marmora, the Bosphorus Straits and Dardanelles, 
which hinders the operational cooperation of the ground forces and obliges 
the NATO Command to plan and conduct operations in independent regions 
of the theater — Italy, Greece, and Western and Eastern Turkey. 

Deployed within the theater are two combined army commands (in the 
south, on Italian territory, and in the southeast, on Greek and Turkish 
territory), combined air forces consisting of two Combined Tactical Air 
Commands (5 CTAC on Italian territory, including Italian and American air 
force units, and 6 CTAC on Greek and Turkish territory, including Greek, 
Turkish, and American Turkish-based air force units). 

The Combined Navy in this theater of operations consists of the US 6th 
Fleet (the naval striking force in the theater) and British, Italian, Greek, and 
Turkish naval ships. 

The Zone of the NATO Atlantic Supreme Command takes in the Atlantic 
Ocean and adjacent seas from the Northern Tropics to the Arctic and from 
the coastal waters of Europe and Northwest Africa to the coast of the North 
American continent and the territory of Portugal. The Supreme Commander, 
an American admiral, and his headquarters are based in Norfolk (USA). The 
NATO Atlantic forces are based on naval elements, which come under the 
control of the respective NATO commanders only for the duration of exer- 
cises and maneuvers, and in the event of war. 

The following are subordinate to the Supreme Commander in the Atlantic 
Zone: the chief command in the Eastern Atlantic with its headquarters in 


257 


Northwood (Great Britain), in the Western Atlantic with its headquarters in 
Norfolk (USA), in the Iberian sector of the Atlantic with its headquarters 
at San Pedro de Penaferrim (Portugal), as well as the NATO Atlantic Strike 
Fleet Command with its shore-based headquarters in New York. 

The Zone of NATO’s Channel High Command is the responsibility of a 
committee of British, Belgian, and Dutch representatives. The Commander- 
in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces, with headquarters in Portsmouth 
(Great Britain) is subordinate to it. The main task of this command is to 
ensure the safety of the shipping lanes in the English Channel with the forces 
allocated by the member countries of the Committee. 

The US-Canadian Regional Strategic Group is concerned with the elabora- 
tion of plans for joint operations of US and Canadian armed forces on the 
territories of these countries. 

THE CENTRAL TREATY 0RGAN!ZATI0N-CENT0 

This military bloc was established in 1955 as the result of a conspiracy of 
the Western imperialist states. (Until 1959, i.e., until Iraq’s withdrawal, it 
was called the Bagdad Pact.) Membei countries are Great Britain, Turkey, 
Pakistan, and Iran. Although not legally a member of CENTO, the USA, in 
fact, directs its activities. In March 1959 the USA concluded bilateral mili- 
tary agreements with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, under the terms of which 
the Americans acquired the right to introduce their own troops into these 
territories under the pretext of “guaranteeing their security,” but, in fact, to 
suppress anti-imperialist and democratic movements. 

In creating CENTO, the USA and Great Britain were governed mainly by 
their strategic and military-economic interests in the Near and Middle East. 
They took into consideration the proximity of the bloc’s eastern member 
countries to the frontiers of the Soviet Union — an advantageous springboard 
for preparing and unleashing a war against the USSR — the presence of 
enormous oil reserves and the large-scale extraction of oil, needed to satisfy 
the requirements of the NATO member countries, and the important human 
resources of the eastern countries of CENTO. Finally, they set themselves 
the goal of using the CENTO bloc as an instrument to counter the growing 
national liberation movement of the peoples in this region. 

The highest executive body of this bloc is the CENTO Council, which 
meets once a year (usually in April) at the foreign ministers and sometimes 
heads of government level, with the participation of other officials concerned 
with the questions discussed by the Council. 

Leadership of the bloc between sessions of the Council is exercised by the 
Council of Representatives of the member countries. The representatives 
carry ambassadorial rank. The Council usually meets twice a month under 
the chairmanship of the Secretary General of CENTO. 

The following are subordinate to the Council: the Military Committee, the 
Committee on Combating (so-called) Subversive Activities, the Economic 
Committee, the Liaison Committee, the Budgetary and Administrative Com- 


258 


mittee, the Economic Control Group, several subcommittees, and the Gen- 
eral Secretariat — the working body of the CENTO Council. 

The Military Committee is the highest military body of the bloc. It elabo- 
rates and submits to the Council recommendations and suggestions relating 
to the development, training, and plans for the utilization of the armed forces; 
it determines the themes and programs of joint exercises and maneuvers, 
directs the activities of subordinate bodies in charge of strategic planning, and 
organizes cooperation with the NATO bloc on military matters. The Com- 
mittee members are the chiefs of general staffs or supreme commanders of 
the armed forces of the CENTO countries, as well as a representative of the 
US Department of Defense. 

Between sessions of the Committee the Permanent Group of Representa- 
tives, which is subordinate to the Committee, is responsible for military 
matters. The Group is composed of representatives of the military depart- 
ments of the USA, Great Britain, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. The working 
body of this Group is the Combined Military Planning Staff. Since 1960 this 
Staff has been headed by an American general. 

The Committee on “Combating Subversive Activities” organizes and car- 
ries out, within the framework of CENTO, anticommunist activities and 
directs the subversive activities of imperialist agents in Near and Middle 
Eastern countries. 

The Economic Committee is concerned with matters relating to the mili- 
tarization of the economics of the eastern countries of CENTO and is respon- 
sible for the elaboration and implementation of plans for the construction of 
airfields, roads, naval bases and ports, communication links, and other items 
of military significance. 


The Numerical Strength and Combat Composition of the Armed Forces of the Eastern Countries 

of CENTO 



Turkey 

Iran 

Pakistan 

Total 

Total numerical stre^gt^ ol the regular 

480 

180 

280 

940 

armed lorces. thousands ot men, 
including. 

Army 

400 

16t 

250 

814 

Air Force 

43 

10 

20 

73 

Navy 

37 

6 

10 

53 

Numerical strength ol irregular 

20 

26 

45 

90 

lorces 

Combat composition 

Divisions 

17 

8 

10 

35 

Independent brigades (groups) 

It 

1 

— 

12 

Squadrons ol combat aircralt, 

23 

7 

12 

42 

including; 

light bombers 

— 

— 

3 

3 

tactical lighters 

12 

v. 

6 

18 

lighter-interceptors 

8 

6 

2 

16 

reconnaissance iircralt 

3 

1 

1 


Total number ol combat aircralt 

312 

166 

200 

678 

fighting shipi. 

82 

37 

21 

no 

including: 

light cruisers 

— 


1 

1 

destroyers 

8 

— 

5 

13 

submarines 

10 

— 

1 

11 

other vessels 

64 

37 

14 

115 

Auxiliary vessels 

26 

2 

6 

34 


1 


259 


The CENTO bloc does not have a unified command and combined armed 
forces. However, the training of national armed forces and the elaboration 
of plans for their utilization in war are in the hands of the bloc’s controlling 
bodies, the leading role in which is shared by the US and British representa- 
tives. 

THE SOUTHEAST TREATY ORGANIZATION (SEATO) 

This military bloc was formed in 1954. Its member countries are the USA, 
Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines 
and Pakistan. The bloc was created for the purpose of combating national 
liberation movements in the countries of Southeast Asia and preparing for 
war against the socialist countries. The area covered by the Treaty is the 
southwestern part of the Pacific Ocean south of latitude 2r30' N. Its head- 
quarters is in Bangkok (Thailand). 

The highest controlling body of SEATO is the Council, consisting of the 
ministers of Foreign Affairs and War, and representatives of other ministries. 
The Council meets once a year. The Committee of Military Advisers and the 
Council of Representatives are subordinate to the SEATO Council. 

The Committee of Military Advisers consists of military leaders of the bloc 
member countries. The Military Planning Directorate — a permanent body 
which represents the embryo of the future unified command of the bloc’s 
armed forces — has been formed under the Committee. The work of the 
military advisers is directed by American generals and admirals. 

Permanent machinery for conducting the current work of SEATO has 
been set up, with the Secretary General at its head. 

There is no central military command and the armed forces are under 
national leadership. Support for the bloc members is provided by the US 7th 
Fleet based in Taiwan and the Philippines, and elements of the US Air Force 
based on the islands of Guam and Okinawa and in South Vietnam and 
Thailand. 


The Numerical Strength of the Armed Forces of the Asiatic Member Countries of SEATO 


Country 

Popu'stion 
(ii. millions) 

Army 
(in Ihous ) 

Navy 

(m thous.) 

Air 

Force 
(in thous ) 

Total 
numerical 
strength ol 
armed forces 
(in thous ) 

Australis 

12 0 

<34 

161 

205 

80 

Nsw Zeslind 

27 

56 

29 

43 

128 

Ptulippinss 

32,5 

17 

55 

6 

30 

Thiiiand 

32S 

85 

21.5 

20 

126 3 


The air forces of the SEATO countries are equipped mainly with fighters, 
bombers, and transports. The largest of these air forces is the Australian, 
which includes four fighter squadrons equipped with Australian Sabres 
(F-86), two squadrons of Canberra bombers, two squadrons of Neptune sea 


260 


reconnaissance aircraft, two transport squadrons, two squadrons of Iroquois 
helicopters, one squadron of Bloodhound Mkl surface-to-air missiles — a 
total of 220 combat aircraft. 

The New Zealand Air Force has 37 combat aircraft, the Philippine Air 
Force 64, and the Thai Air Force 125. 


The Navies of the Asiatic Member Countries of SEATO 


Country 

Light 

aircratt 

carriers 

Destroyers 

Frigates 

Mine- 

sweepers 

Mine- 

layers 


Other 

vessels 

Australia 

1 

6 

_ 

6 

_ 


22 

New Zealand 

_ 


4 

4 

— 


12 

Philippines* 

— 

— 

— 

2 

— 


36 

Thailand* 

— 


5 

5 



26 


* The Philippine Navy has 12 escort patrol vessels. si« assault vessels, si« subtnarine hunters, and 1 8 patrol boats. 

• The Thai Navy has nine submarine hunters. 18 patrol boats and eight assault vessels. 


THE MAIN DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS OF WEAPONS AND CDMBAT MATERIEL 
The Main Design Specifications of Surface-to-Surface Missiles 


Missile 

Range, 

Launch 

Length, 

Max. 

Warhead 

Type o( 

Remarks 


km 

weieht. 

m 

body 

yield. 

control 




tons 


diameter, 

millions 

system 






m. 

o( tons 







Strategic missiles 



Minutetnan lA 

10,130 

31 

169 

1.8 

1.5 

Sellcontainedi 

Three-stage solid-luel 



33 




inertial 

missile launched Irom 
underground silo. 

Minuteman 2 

11,265 

182 

1.8 

2.0 


Minuteman 1 was brought 
into operational use in 

1962, Minuteman 2 in 1966 



Titan 2 

over 11,000 

1496 

314 

3.05 

10-18 

• 

Two-stage missile with 








liquid-fuel engines, 
launched from under- 








ground silo. In operational 
use since 1963. 

Polaris A2 

2,800 

14.5 

94 

1.37 

0.5 

• 

Two-stage solid-(uel 








missile carried by atomic 

Polaris A3 

4.630 

15 8 

95 

1 37 

10 


submannes (16 per vessel); 
launched (rom underwater 
position. Accepted (or 
operational use by the Navy: 

Polaris A2 in 1962, Polans 

A3 in 1964 





TKtkal missiles 



Pershing 

185-740 

4 5 

10 5 

1.0 

up to 0 5 

SeKcorrlained 

Two-stage solid-luel 







inertial 

missile, launched (rom 
mobile launchers. Supplied 








to the US Afrtty ((rom 1964) 
and the West German Air 








Force. Launch-ready time 

30 mrn. 

Sergeant 

50-140 

4 5 

10 5 

08 

. 

SeW-contained 

One-stage solid-luel missile 







inertial 

(or use with mobile launcher 
Qn*r3t,nnal in the US Army (since 
1962) and the West German Army. 

.i4ace GGM-138 

2.100 

82 

134 

14 


• 

A cruise missile with jet proput- 


siofl cruise engine and solid- 
fuel launching booster. Maximum 
(tight velocity 1.000 hm/hr, (light 
altitude 0 3-12hm. Launched from 
mobile launcher or underground 
shelter Warhead: nuclear or 
conventional Introduced Into the 
US Air Forte in <989 


1 


261 



THE MAIN DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS OF WEAPONS AND COMBAT MATERIEL-Continued 
The Main Design Specifications of Surface-to-Surface Missiles 


Missile 

Range, 

Launch 

Length, Max 

Warhead 

Tvpe of 

Remarks 


km 

weight. 

m body 

yield, 

control 




tons 

diameter. 

millions 

system 





m 

of tons 




Honest John 10 3-40 2,1 7,9 0.76 ' Solid fuel nnissile for use with 

mobile launcher, mounted on the 
chassis of a o-ton trucR. War- 
head: nuclear or conventional. 
Operational in the armies of the 
USA and other NATO countries. 

Lance 70 1.5 6.1 0,56 - Proposed as a replacement for 

the existing Hones* John and 
Little John ballistic missiles. 


The Main Design Specifications of Aircraft 





Flight characteristics 

Main armament 


Aircraft designation 
and name (country) 

No, 

in 

crew 

Take-off 
wt.. tons 

Max. speed, 
km/hr 

Service 

ceiling, 

m 

Range, 

km 

Rocket (no., 
type, caliber, 
mm) 

Machine-gun 
and cannon 
(no.,caliber, 
mm) 

Maximum bomb 
load, kg 





strategic bombers 



B-52G,H, Strato- 
fortress (USA) 

6 

200-230 

1,000- 

1,050 

17,000 

16,000- 

19,000 

2 Hound Dog 
guided miss- 
iles 

4 X 20mm cannon 
4x 12 7mm 
machine guns 

10,000 

B-5BA Hustler 
(USA) 

3 

BO 

2,000- 

2,200 

20,000 

7,000 


lx 20mm cannon 

Nuclear weapon 
in pod 

B-47 Stratoiet 
(USA) 

3 

ICO 

960 

14,000 

10,000 

1 Rascal guided 
missile 

1 X 20mm cannon 

10,000 

FB-lll (USA, under- 
going tests) 

2 

31 

M2.5 

Approx 

iB,000 

Over 

6.100 


7 X SRAMs 

17,000 (nuclear 
or convention- 
s') 

Vulcan B,2 
(Britain) 

5 

90 

l.lOO- 

1,200 

1B,000 

Over 

9,000 

1 Blue Steel 
guided missile 


9,600 

Victor B 2 
(Britain) 

Mirage IVA 
(France) 

5 

2 

B(7-100 

30 

1,100- 

1,200 

2,000- 

2,400 

Over 1 1 ,000 1 Blue Steel 

1B,000 guided missile 

4,000 IAS- 30 guided 
missile 

TKtkal fighters and bombers 


16,000 

Nuclear bomb 
60,000 tons* 

F-lOO Super Sabre 
(USA) 

1 

17-lB 

i,3or- 

1,400 

17,000 

3,300 

24 X 127mm unguided 
missiles 

4 X Sidewinder or 
2xBullpup guided 
missiles 

4 X 20mm 

Over 3,000 

F-101 AandC 
Voodoo (USA) 

1 

22 

1,900- 

2,000 

1B,000- 

20,000 

4,500 

Unguided missiles 
and Falcon guided 
missiles 

4 X 20mm 

Nuclear anri 
conventional 
bombs 

F-104C Starfighter 
(USA) 

1 

10-12 

2,250 

2O,C-.0 

3,000 

2 X Sidewinder or 
Bullpup guided 
missilest 

lx 20mm 

1,350 

F-105 Thunderchief 
(USA.) 

t 

20 

2,000- 

2,200 

15,LOO 

4,000 

190 x70mm unguided 
missiles or 

4 X Sidewinder or 

2 X Bullpup guided 
missiles 

lx 20mm 

Over 4,600 

F-4C Phantom 2 
(USA) 

2 

23-25 

2,500 

24,000 

4,500 

Bx Sidewinder and 
Sparrow Of 

2 X Bullpup 
guided missiles 


5,500 

F-5A (USA) 

1 

21 

1,600 

15,250 

Over 

3,000 

4 X guided 
missiles 

2 X 20mm 


F-lilA{USA) 

Mirage HIE 
(France) 

2 

I 

35-37 

M2 5 

1,900 

24.000 

25.000 

5,000 

2,500 

Several SRAMs 

2 X 30mm 
cannon 

Up to 9,000 

Vautof IIB 

2 


1,100 

15,000 

4,000 

4 X guided 
missiles. Of 
20Bx6Bmm 
unguided 
missiles 

2x30mm 

cannon 

Tactical bomber 


262 


The Main Design Specifications of Aircraft— Continued 





Flight characteristics 

Main armament 

Aircraft designation 

No. 

Takeoff 

Max. speed. 

Service 

Range, 

Rocket (no. Machine-gun Maximum bomb 

and name (country) 

in 

wt.. tons 

km/hr 

ceiling. 

km 

type, caliber, and cannon load, kg 

:rew 



m 


mm) (no., caliber. 







mm) 

Canberra (Britain) 

2-3 

20-22 

940-1,000 

IB, 000 

4,500- 

NordAS.30 4 X 20mm 3,600 





4,B00 

guided missile 

Hunter (Britain) 

1 

10.7 

1,160 

16,000 

3,000 

74x50.Bmm 4 x 30mm 900 






unguided 

missiles 





Strategic and tactical recoi.naissance aircraft 

RB.57F (USA) 

1-2 

21,000 

1,300 

30,000 

B,000 

Strategic reconnaissance aircraft; designed for high-altitude 






photo, radiation, and electronic reconnaissance and 
weather reconnaissance. 


SR.71 (USA) 

2 


3,200 

30,000 

B,000 

Strategic reconnaissance aircraft 

U-2 (USA) 

1 

B.OOO 

BOO 

24,000 

B,000 

Strategic reconnaissance aircraft 

Canberra PR. 9 

2 

20,000 

1,025 

Approx. 

6,400- 

Tactical reconnaissance aircraft 

(Britain) 




20,000 

7,200 


hunter FR. 1 0 

1 

10,700 

1,160 

16,000 

3,000 

Tactice' reconnaissance aircraft 

(Britain) 






Victor B.2 

5 

9,300 

1,100- 

16,700 

Approx. 

Strategic reconnaissance aircraft 

(Britain) 



1,200 


10,000 

Mirage IIIR 

1 


1,900- 

15,000 

2,500 

Tactical reconnaissance aircraft 

(France) 




2,400 







Interceptor fighters 

F-IOIB Voodoo 

2 

22 

1,900 

IB, 000 

4,500 

All-weather interceptor fighter; 6 X Falcon guided missiles 

(USA) 






or 2 X Genie unguided missiles with nuclear charges. 

F-102A Delta 

1 

11.3 

1,500 

15,000 

l.&OO 

All-weather interceptor fighter; 6xFalcon guided missiles 

Dagger (USA) 






and 24 X 70mm unguided missiles. 

F-106A.B Delta 

1 

16 

2,250 

Up to 

Up to 

All-weather interceptor fighter, 4 x Super Falcon guided 

Dart (USA) 




20,000 

3,000 

missiles and 1 x Genie unguided missile with a 
nuclear charge. 

Javelin 

2 

15 

1,100 

17,000 

2,500 

AxFirestreak guided missiles (or 148x50.Bmm 

(Britain) 

Lightning F.2 

1 

16 

2,400 

20,000 


unguided missiles) and 2 x 30mm cannons 

2xFirestreak guided missiles and 2 x 30mm cannons. 

(Britain) 






Mystere IVA 

1 


1,120 

16,500 

2,300 

Day fighter; 2xguided missiles and 55x6Bmm unguided 

(France) 






missiles, 900kg of bombs. 

Super Mystere IVB 

1 


1,190 

17,000 

1,B00 

Day fighter; 2xguided missiles or 32 x unguided 

(France) 






68mm unguided missiles, 900kg of bombs 





Military 

transport aircraft 

C-141A Starlifter 

5 

144 

920 

15,000 

10,000 

Load: 154 soldiers with personal weapons, or 129 

(USA) 






parachutists, or 10 loaded shock-absorbing platforms 
each weighing 3,600kg, or 2 light tanks, or a 

Minuteman ICBM in a container. Max mum payload 







42,000kg 

C-SA Galaxy 

5 

350 

920 

10,700 

Up to 

Load: 350 soldiers with weapons or up to 120 tons 

(USA) 





10,000 

of freight. 

C-130 Hercules 

4 

62 

5B0 

10,000- 

5,000 

toad: 92 persons or 21,000kg. 

(USA) 




12,000 


C-133 Cargomaster 
(USA) 

4-E 

1 130 

650 

9,000 

BOOO 

Load: 2BB persons or 52,000kg. 

C-135 Stratolifter 
(USA) 

6 

i25 

1,000 

15,000 

7,500 

Load: 150 persons or 40,000kg, 





Tanker aircraft 


KC-135A Stratotanker 


125 

1,000 

15,000 

10,000 

Fuel reserve transferred to aircraft in flight. 

(USA) 






up to 40 tons. 

Victor B.Kl 

5 

BO-lOO 

1 1,100- 

'.B,000 

11,000 

Fuel reserve transferred to aircraft in flight. 




1,200 



24 tons. 


• Possibly “a nuclear bomb with a warhead yieW ol 60,000 tons" [U S. Ed.), 
t Could be read as "2 Sidewinder guided missiles or a Bullpup guided missile'' (US. Ed,]. 



263 



Main Design Specifications of Air-to-Ground Guided Missiles 


Dimensions, m 


Name and 
designation of 
missile (country) 

Length 

Wing-span 

Max 

diameter 

Launch 
weight, kg 

Range, 

km 

Type of control 
system 

Remarks 

Hound Dog 
(USA) 

Approx. 13 

0.72 

3.7 

4,500 

1,100 

Inertial 

Carried by B-52G, H strategic 
bombers (2 per aircraft); 
max. spe^ Mach 2; nuclear 
warhead. 

Bullpup 

(USA) 

3.35-A U 

0.3-045 

0.8-1.2 

26O-B10 

9-11 

Radio command 

Carried by tactical fighters and 
naval aircraft Conventional 
warhead; modification "0" 
nuclear warhead. 

Blue Steel 
(Britain) 

Approx. 

107 

1.28 

Approx. 4 

Approx. 

7,000 

320 

Inertial 

Carried by Vulcgp B.2 and 

Victor 8.2 strategic bombers 
(one per aircraft). Flight 
velocity Mach 1.6; nuclear 
warhead. 

Quail 

(USA) 

39 

Height 

1.0 

16 

500 

Up to 

400 

Self-contained, 

programmed 

An electronic countermeasures 
missile car;ied by B-52G,H 
strategic bombers. 

AS-30 

(France) 

39 

0.34 

1.0 

510 

Up to 1 1 

Radio command 

Carried by Mirage III, Canberra 
and Etendar aircraft 
Conventional warhead. 


Main Design Specifications of Surface-to-Air Missiles 

Name and 
designation of 
missile (country) 

Max. 

range, km 

Launch 
weight, kg 

Length, m 

Max. body 
diameter, m 

Max. 
velocity, 
Mach No, 

Type of control 
system 

Remarks 

Nike-Hercules 

(USA) 

130 

4,700 

12.7 

O.B (2nd 
stage) 

M>3 

Radio command 
with radar 
tracking of 
target and 
missile 

Two-stage solid-fusi missile for 
use against supersonic 
targets flying at altitudes of 
up to 30km. Nuclear 
warhead. Introduced in 

1958 

Nike-Ajax 

(USA) 

40 

1,100 

10.3 

0,3 (2nd 
stage) 

M2,3 

ditto 

Two-stage missile; second 
stage powered by liquid 
propellant engine. 
Fragmentation-high explosive 
warhead Operational in the 
Army since 1963. Launch 
complexes: fixud and mobile. 

Hawk 

(USA) 

35 

590 

5 

0.36 

M 2,5 

Semi-active radar 
homing 

Single-stage solid-fuel missile 
for use against supersonic 
targets at low and medium 
altitudes (up to 15km). 
Launched from a mobile 
triple ramp launcher. 
Conventional warhead. 
Operational in the Army 
since 1959. 

Bomarc 

(USA) 

700 

7,280 

13.7 

09 

M2.8 

Combined (radio 
and active 
homing head) 

Missile with two ramjet engines 
and a solid-propellant 
booster. Intended for use 
against supersonic aerial 
targets at altitudes of up to 
30km. Nuclear warhead. 

Thunderbird 

(Britain) 

46 

1,900 

6.4 

0,53 

• 

Semi-active radar 
homing 

Designed for use against 
supersonic aerial targets at 
altitudes of up to 20km. 
Operational in the Army 
since 1960. Mobile 
launcher. Fragmentation-high 
explosive warhead. 

Masurca 

(France) 

40 

1,850 

86 

0,4 

M2.5 

Combination 

Two-stage solid-fuel missile for 
use against aerial targets at 
altitudes of up to 25km. 
Conventional warhead. 


264 



Main Design Specifications of Armored Equipment 


Name 

(countiy) 

No. in 
crew 

Combat 

weight, 

tons 

Thickness 
of armor, 
mm 

Max. 

speed, 

km/hr 

Fuel 

distance, 

km 

Engine 

capacity, 

hp 

Armament (number, 
caliber, mm) 

Remarks 

Walker Bulldog 
M41A3 light 
tank 
(USA) 

4 

23 

3B/32 

65 

240 

525 

1X76. 2mm gun 
lx 7.62mm machine gun 
Ix 12.7mm anti-aircraft 
machine gun 

Army equipped with this 
tank since 1953; 
improved in 195B. 

Patton M4B 
medium 
tank 
(USA) 

4 

46 

17B/100 

45 

310 

B50 

lx 90mm gun 

1 x 7.62mm machine gun 
lx 12.7mm anti-aircraft 
machine gun 

Introduced in 1953; 
modified model 
introduced in 1956. 

Sheridan light 
tank 
(USA) 

4 

16 

Bullet- 

proof 

armor 

65 

4B0 

350 

lx 155mm gun 
lx 7.62mm machine gun 
lx 12.7mm anti-aircraft 
gun 

Shillelagh missile 

Designed for 
reconnaissance, 
combat outpost, tank 
destruction. 

Amphibious tank— 
spe^ in water 6.2 
km/hr. The missile, 
weighing 20kg, has 
an infrared or radar 
guidance system. 

M60A1 

medium 

tank 

(USA) 

4 

46.3 

17B/100 

4B 

400 

750 

lx 105mm gun 

1 X 7.62mm machine gun 
lx 12.7mm anti-aircraft 
machine gun 

Main combat tank of 
the US Army. Has a 
vertical and 
horizontal 

stabilization system. 
Modernized model 
introduced in 1962. 

M103 heavy 
tank 
(USA) 

5 

54.4 

130/127 

34 

160 

BIO 

lx 120mm gun 

1 X 12.7mm anti-aircraft 
machine gun 

lx 7.62mm machine gun 


Centurion 

MklX and 

4 

50 

150/75 

34 

19CV-200 

640-650 

1 X 105mm gun 

1 X 7.62mm machine gun 

Introduced 

195B-1960. Has a 


MkX 

medium 

tank 

(Britain) 


gun stabilization 
system in two 
planes. It can ford 
water obstacles or 
navigate afloat (with 
special equipment). 


Chieftain tank 

A 

46 

• 

35 320 

700 

lx 120mm gun 

Introduced in 1963. 

(Britain) 






2x7.62mm machine gun 

Has a gun 






lxl2.7mm anti-aircraft 

stabilization system 


machine gun 


in two planes. A 
frame type flotation 
device is used for 
negotiating water 


Leopard 
medium 
tank (FRG) 

4 39 . 70 560 

620 

1 X 105mm gun 
lx 7.62mm machine gun 
lx 12.7mm anti-aircraft 
machine gun 

Introduced in 1963. 

With special 
equipment can ford 
water obstacles up to 

4m deep 

Turenne 
AMX-51 
light tank 
(Fraxe) 

3 14.5 up to 40 65 400 

270 

lx 75mm gun 
lx 7.5mm machine gun 

Introduced in 1951. 
Reequipped with a 

105mm gun. Has 
equipment for 
launching the SS- 1 1 
anti-tank guided 
missile (4 missiles) 

AMX-63 

medium 

tank 

(Fraxe) 

4 32.5 - 65 480 

720 

1 1 ..... 

1 A i Vr^HIlIl gun 

lx 7.62mm machine gun 
lx 12.7mm anti-aircraft 
machine gun 

IntroduCeu in 1963. 

With special 
equipment can ford 
water obstacles up to 

4m deep 

Main Design Specifications of Armored Personnel Carriers and Armored Cars 

Name 

(tombat Seating Max. Fuel 

weight, (incl. speed, distance, 

ions crew) km/hr km 

Armament (number, 
caliber, mm) 

Remarks 


Armored 

personnel carriers 



MU3 amphibious 
vehicle (UW) 


Ml 14 amphibious 
vehicle (USA) 


1C 


64 


64 


320 


400 


lx 12.7mm machine 
gun 


1 X 12.7mm machine 
gun 


A reconnaissance vehicle, a ssif-prooelled 
flamethrower, a mobile adv.anced HQ, and a 
transporter tor the Pershing guided missile 
and the Mauler anti-aircraft guided missile, 
etc. have been developed from the Ml 13. 

Used as a reconnaissaxe and a staff vehicle. 


265 


Main Design Specifications of Armored Personnel Carriers and Armored Cars— Continued 



Combat 

Seating 

Max 

Fuel 

Armament (number, 


Name 

weight. 

(incl. 

speed, 

distance. 

caliber, mm) 

Remarks 


tons 

crew) 

km/hr 

km 








lx 7, 62mm machine 







gun 


FV432 (Britain) 

14 

14 

48 

450 

lx 7.62mm machine 

Can be fitted out to navigate water barriers. 






gun 

Amphibious, 

Saracen wheeled 

10 

12 

70 


2x7.62m,tr. machine 

Different types of vehicles have been 

vehicle (Britain) 





guns 

develop^ on the chassis of the armored 
personnel carrier 

AMX Vn-56 

14 

14 

65 

340 

lx 12.7mm machine 


(France) 





gun 


VTT-PC (France) 

13,5 

7 

60 

350 

lx 7.5mm machine 

It is planned to equip mechanized and tank 






gun 

regiments with these armored personnel 
carriers 

SPW (FRG) 

146 

8 

51 

270 

lx 20mm gun 

Motorized infantry squads are equipped with 






lx 7,62mm machine 

these. 






gun 


SPIA (FRG) 

8.2 

5 

58 

350 

lx 20mm gun 

Reconnaissance sub-units are equipped with 







these. 

Main Design Specifications of Armored Personnel Carriers and Armored Cars 


Combat 


Max. 

Fuel 

Armament (number, 


Name 

weight. 

(incl 

speed, 

distance. 

caliber, mm) 

Remarks 


tons 

crew) 

km /hr 

km 








Armored cars 


Ferret Mk 2 

4 3 

2 

72 

300 

lx 7.62mm machine 

Armed with Vigilant anti-tank guided missile. 

(Britain) 





gun 


AML 245 

4,5 

3 

100 

600 

lx 60mm mortar 

Introduced into the forces in 1961 

(France) 





2 X 7.5mm machine 



guns 


Main Design Specifications of Self-Propelled Artillery 


Name (country) 

No in 
crew 

Combat 

weight 

tons 

Max. 

firing 

range, 

km 

Max 
speed, 
km /hr 

Fuel 

km 

Eng. 

hp 

Angle of lire 

Vert. horiz. 

Remarks 

M108 105mm 
howitzer 

5 

172 

14 

65 

240 

340 

-10‘ 

-f75- 

360' 

Introduced in 1962. 

Rotating turret. 

(USA) 

M109 155mm 
howitzer 
(USA) 

5 

18.7 

18.4 

50 

400 

420 

-5* 

-f75- 

360' 

Introduced in 1963 

Can (ire atomic 
shells weighing less 
than 1kg, 

M107 175mm gun 
(USA) 

5 

279 

32 

55 

700 

420 

65' 

60’ 

Introduced in 1962. 

Corps artillery of the 

USA, the FRG and 
other countries is 
equipped with this 
gun. 

M55 203,2mm 
howitzer (USA) 

6 

43 

17 

48 

250 

810 

-5' 

-f65' 

60' 

Introduced in 1954. 

MHO 20J,2mm 

5 

26.1 

17 

55 

720 

420 

65' 

60’ 

Introduced in 1962, 

howitzer (USA) 

Abbot 105mm gun 
(Britain) 

4 

13 5 

18.5 

47 

450 

220 

Rotating 

turret 


Introduced in 1963, 
adapted for 
navigating water 
barriers afloat 

105mm howitzer 
(France) 

5 

16 

14 

60 

400 

270 

-5’ 

-f69- 

40’ 

Introduced in 1952; 
mounted on the 
chassis of the 

AMX-51 tank. 

1 55mm howitzer 
(France) 

7 

17 

20-25 

60 

400 

270 

O' 

+ 67' 

50' 


Jagdpanzer 90mm 
anti-tank gun (FRG) 

4 

23 

1.5 

80 

580 

500 

-7' 

-H5’ 


Hull hermetically 
sealed and fitted 
with a filtration unit 
Effective range 
when firing at tanks 
1,500m, 


266 



Design Specifications of Guided Anti-tank Missiles 


Name (country) 

Range, m 

Total weight 
of weapon, 
incl. 

launchers, 

kg 

Launch 
weight, kg 

Weight of 
missile 
head, kg 

Length, m 

Body 

diameter, 

mm 

Flight 

velocity, 

m/sec 

Armor 

penetrating 

capability, 

mm 

Moskito 

360-2400 

2B 

11.5 

4 

1.1 

120 

100 

600 

(Switzerland) 

Kobra (FRG) 

400-1600 

10 

10 

2.7 

095 

100 

85 

500 

Entac (France) 

400-2000 

17 

12 

3.9 

083 

140 

85 

450 

SS- 1 1 (France) 

500-3000 

30 

28 5 

81 

1.2 

160 

140 

600 

Vigilant (Britain) 

230-1600 

20 

12 

3.5 

1.06 

110 

150 

600 

Malkara (Britain) 

600-3200 

97 

97 

27 

2.0 

200 

150 

500 

Milan 

25-2000 

11 

11 

• 

075 

103 

180 

• 

(FRG-France) 

Hot (FRG-France) 

75-4000 

25 

25 

• 

1.24 

136 

280 

• 

Shillelagh (USA) 

500-2000 

• 

20 

6.2 

1.09 

152 

150 

500 

Swingfire 

2000 

• 

• 

7 

09 

127 

190 

500 

(Britain) 

MAW (USA) 

1000 

• 

• 

6 7 

0 72 

120 

• 

• 

TOW (USA) 

3000 

72 

72 

3.8 

1 14 

140 

300 

• 


What to Read on This Section 

Marksizm-leninism o voyne iarmii [Marxism-Leninism on War and Army],* 
5th edition, Ch. IV. Voyenizdat, 1968. 

Belashchenko, T. K., Rzheshevskiy, O. A. Armiya SShA kak ona yest’ [The 
US A: ny as It Really Is]. Voyenizdat, 1968. 

Belashchenko, T. K. et al., Komu sluzhit ofitserskiy korpus SShA? [Whom 
Does the US Officer Corps Serve?]. Voyenizdat, 1966. 

Volkov, N. V., Makarov, L. P., Udarnaya sila NATO v Yevrope [NATO’s 
Striking Force in Europe]. Voyenizdat, 1967. 

Organizatsiya i vooruzheniye armiy i flotov kapitalisticheskikh gosudarstv 
[The Organization and Armament of the Armed Forces of the Capitalist 
States]., 2nd enlarged edition. Voyenizdat, 1968. 

* Available in English, No. 2. USAF “Soviet Military Thought” series [U.S. Ed.]. 


Chapter 9. SCIENCE AND MILITARY AFFAIRS 


Science is the most important element of intellectual culture, the highest 
form of human knowledge. A system of developing knowledge, science is 
based on facts of reality; it provides an explanation of their origin and 
development, the means of gaining an insight into objective laws of the real 
world, and methods of making conscious and purposeful use of them. 

The main function of science is to serve the interests of mankind, to achieve happiness and 
justice on earth, to save us from all that is harmful in the elemental forces of nature and society. 
Thanks to science, we have been able to eliminate certain diseases in man, others we have learned 
to combat successfully; our living conditions have been improved. Science has enabled us to 
harness natural forces; this has considerably lightened man's work, and made it possible for a 
smaller number of people to carry out a much greater volume of work. It has made us stronger 
and wiser. 

The natural sciences have always been associated with the development of 
the productive resources of society; they have served the interests of develop- 
ing production and moved it forward. 

The social sciences have been used by various social forces to change social 
relationships, and superstructural phenomena;* they have contributed to the 
practical activities of the class struggle. 

In our own times science has penetrated deeply into the life of society: into 
the material output, social attitudes, and spiritual lives of people. It promotes 
progress and, in the final analysis, emerges as its powerful accelerator. 

A comprehensive analysis of the role of science in the present age is given 
in the Program of the CPSU, resolutions of the XXII and XXIII Party 
Congresses, and in subsequent documents of the Central Committee. Empha- 
sizing the world historical role of science, the Party reveals the fundamental 
roles of scienc? in the capitalist and socialist systems and gives special atten- 
tion to the elucidation of the increasing role of science in the building of the 
communist society. 

As result of the constant concen) of the Communist Party, science has 
advanced at an unprecedented rate in our country. Confirmation of this is 
provided by the numerous discoveries of Soviet scientists in many branches 

* Nadstmyechnyye yavleniya, ‘superslruclure’ in Marxis* philosophy refers to the political, 
legal, religious, arlislic, and philosophic views of society and the political, legal and other 
institutions corresponding to them (U.S. Ed.]. 


268 


of human knowledge, including the social sciences, mathematics, physics, the 
space sciences, radioelectronics, technology, etc. There are over 900,000 
scientists in the USSR: one quarter of all the scientists in the world. 

In our country science is becoming more and more a direct productive 
force. It participates actively in the process of material production and in 
social life. Science has achieved significant new results in the past five-year 
plan. In conformity with the XXIII Party Congress Directives, both basic 
theoretical research and applied science have been developed. Special atten- 
tion has been given to the elaboration of theoretical problems in power 
engineering, the development of new structural, building, and other materi- 
als, and production automation and control. 

The role of the social sciences is becoming increasingly important. Taking 
this into consideration, the CPSU CC in August 19b7 adopted a special 
resolution “On measures for the further development of the social sciences 
and increasing their role in the building of communism.” In this resolution 
the Central Committee clearly defined the tasks of scientific research in all 
the most important branches of the social sciences, and emphasized the need 
to devote special attention to Marxist-Leninist methodology, a class-Party 
and specifically historical approach to social phenomena. 

A characteristic feature of modern science is its growing influence on 
military affairs. This does not, of course, mean that military affairs are any 
less dependent on economic conditions, politics, and other aspects of social 
life. On the contrary, the qualitatively new role of science in relation to 
military affairs strengthens this dependency and lends it special importance. 
The special role of science in relation to military affairs is expressed in the 
most concentrated form in those revolutionary changes which took place in 
it after World War II, and which continue to develop at a more profound 
level. The military power wielded by states today and, particularly, tomorrow 
will be determined mainly by the level of scientific development and the 
extent to which it penetrates the field of military affairs. 

Scientific-technical progress in the imperialist countries is being utilized increasingly for 
military purposes. The US Department of Defense has seized the predominant role in Amer- 
ican science. Three quarters of the engineers and scientists in the USA are working on mili- 
tary and space projects. Eighty per cent of all federal funds allocated for scientific research 
is absorb'd by the Pentagon’s military and space programs, i.e., about 15 billion dollars per 
year. 

The main reason why science and military science are so closely interrelated in the imperialist 
countries is the antagonistic nature of capitalism, which is based on private ownership. The 
imperialist states strive to use their economic and political strength and the achievements of 
science as instruments to exploit and oppress their own people and those of other countries, 
particularly backward countries. It is precisely because of this that military expenditures are 
continu.ally increasing and scientific potential is being squandered to the detriment of historical 
progress. If the money spent by the NATO countries in one month on military requirements 
were to be diverted to peaceful purposes, it would be possible to irrigate the whole of the Sahara 
Desert . 

Humanity suffers greatly on account of the imperialists’ policy of aggression and wars. Each 
year the world spends approximately 120 billion dollars for military purposes, which is roughly 
equal to the total annual income of all the poorly developed countries of the world, which have 


269 


a total population of 1.5 billion people. The efforts of almost 90% of today’s scientists are 
concentrated on problems connected in one way or another with military affairs. 

In the socialist countries, science serves constructive purposes, but the 
imperialist policy of continuing the arms race and building up tension 
throughout the world forces the socialist countries, who are not interested 
in war, to utilize the achievements of science to consolidate their own defen- 
sive capacity and increase the fighting power of their armed forces. 

Being associated with military problems, science predetermines the devel- 
opment of the military affairs in a variety of ways. The greatest scientific 
discoveries are, in a way, turning points in the development of military affairs. 
This has already been demonstrated by World War II, a time of important 
scientific discoveries and inventions in which new fields of research were 
opened up. During this war, Soviet scientists and desi gners developed many 
new models of tanks, aircraft, nuclear weapons, and other means of armed 
combat, which outperformed those of the German Fascist forces. 

The 20th century is the century of the great scientific and technical revolu- 
tion. Scientific potential, together with economic, moral-political and strictly 
military potential, constitutes the basis of a country’s military power. A high 
degree of development in science and technology is the main prerequisite for 
military technical supremacy and the achievement of victory over the enemy. 

In the age of missiles and the atom, to lag behind in the utilization of 
scientific and technical achievements in the interests of military science could 
lead to irretrievable consequences. 

The influence of science on military affairs is manifested primarily in the 
field of military equipment and weapons. A change in the standard and 
quantity of military equipment is accompanied by a change in the structure 
of the armed forces, the ratio of the Services and the branches of the Services, 
the nature of armed combat, the methods and forms of waging war, troop 
control, and the training and education of personnel. 

One of the main indications of the penetration of the military field by 
science is the continuous and spasmodic growth of the power available per 
man in the armed forces, the saturation of the armed forces with increasingly 
sophisticated means of communication, control, and automation. This has 
considerably increased the combat potential of formations, units, and ships. 

The following figures will give an indication of the increase of the power available per man 
in the Soviet Armed Forces. Whereas in 1939 the power-weight ratio of an infantry division was 
3 hp per man, the corresponding figure for a motorized infantry division today exceeds 30 hp 
per man. 

The power available per man in the Navy has increased even more strikingly. A modern 
submarine has almost 100 times more power available per man than a prewar submarine. 

The development of military affairs on the basis of scientific and technolog- 
ical achievements in all the countries of significant military potential is 
characterized by an enormous increase in the efficiency of weapons, and their 
effective range, in very short intervals of time, and the capacity to move 
troops and all their equipment with much greater speed. In other words. 


science has provided the means of substantially increasing all the components 
of the armed forces’ fighting power. 

The most important role in the radical transformations which have taken 
place in military affairs have been played by modern industries based on 
science and technology, such as power engineering, metallurgy, electronics, 
machine-building and instrument making, the chemical industry, etc. The 
achievements of mathematics, physics, chemistry and cybernetics form the 
military-technical basis of modern military affairs. These sciences have pro- 
vided the theoretical foundations for the production and utilization of the 
latest weapons and their delivery. Nuclear charges of different yields are the 
progeny of modern science and technology. They can be delivered in minutes 
to any point on the globe for the destruction of a wide variety of targets. 

Modern science has also brought about changes in conventional weapons and in all the 
equipment of the Services and branches of the Services. As a consequence the mobility of the 
troopK and their capacity to cover great distances, concentrate and disperse, etc., has increased 
enormously. The motorization of the forces has increased their speed of movement almost 
tenfold. The development of aviation and the use of helicopters make it possible to airlift entire 
formations and their equipment over great distances in the shortest possible time. Troops are 
now equipped with up-to-date communications and control facilities, night viewers, and can 
rapidly switch from one type of action to another, etc. 

The Navy and the Air Force are equipped with the most up-to-date and sophisticated equip- 
ment. Aircraft and ships are equipped with most modern radar systems. According to American 
scientists, radar equipment accounts for 20% and 30%, respectively, of the cost of modern 
submarines and aircraft. The submarines of today’s navies are a synthesis of the data of many 
sciences — astronavigation and nuclear physics, metallurgy and electronics, hydraulics and aero- 
dynamics, radio engineering and chemistry. 

Information published in the foreign press points to the conclusion that 
future research work associated with military science is being channeled into 
attempts to discover new materials, sources of energy, and means of automa- 
tion. 

Now, as never before, there is a need for super-strong materials. And 
science is providing the answers to this extremely difficult problem. Titanium 
alloys which possess a high degree of strength and heat resistance have 
recently been produced. They are widely used in missile engineering and 
astronautics. But the principal method of obtaining super-strong materials, 
as foreign scientists emphasize, is to produce materials of monocrystalline 
structure, in which all the molecules of the metal are combined into one 
crystal, whereby the strength of the metal is increased many hundreds of 
times. The development of mass production technology makes it possible to 
produce combat equipment of greater strength and lightness — aircraft, mis- 
siles of all types, surface vessels and submarines, etc. 

At the same time, work is being carried out in the field of metal ceramics and intermetallic 
compriunds. Metal ceramics, which are alloys of different materials (ceramic powder and metal 
or metal alloys) possess great tensile strength at high temperatures. Chemical compounds of 
metals, known as intermetallic compounds (titanium borides and nitrides, etc.) do not require 
alloying, have a high fusing temperature, and are very resistant to chemical action. 


Space vehicle flights have shown that construction materials must meet 
new and higher standards. Besides being strong and light-weight, they must 
possess heat stability — withstand the heat of the sun and the cold of interstel- 
lar space, shield the crew from radiation and cosmic rays. 

The achievement of supersonic speeds in aviation was accompanied by 
dangerous overheating of the airframe and engine structures in the head-on 
flow of air masses. The aircraft surface is subject to heating measured in 
hundreds of degrees centigrade. The elimination of temperature barriers (at 
M^2.7) has become a problem. At speeds in the region of M = 2.7, the 
mechanical properties of titanium alloys and stainless steel deteriorate criti- 
cally and the reliability of the structural members cannot be fully guaranteed. 
The achievement of greater speeds in the atmosphere (close to the earth) and 
in space flights depends on chemical research on macromolecular compounds 
of great strength and lightness. The strength of polymers is provided by the 
gigantic size of their molecules, which are millions of times larger than those 
observed in nature. The first representatives of such materials (organic plas- 
tics) have been produced; these can withstand temperatures of several thou- 
sand degrees. They are exceptionally resistant to mechanical action and 
heavy pressures. In the future, such materials will be widely used in all 
military equipment. 

Semiconductors, AC rectifiers, detectors, amplifiers, radio-frequency oscil- 
lators, thermoelectric generators, thermoelements for measuring circuits, 
current and voltage stabilizers, etc., occupy an important place in military 
technology. The use of semiconductors greatly reduces the size and weight 
of radioelectronic equipment, but increases its strength and reliability. 

Nuclear energy continues to be utilized intensively both in the form of 
munitions with different yields and for different purposes, and in the form 
of fundamentally new engines and sources of electrical power. Surface vessels 
and submarines which utilize the thermal energy of nuclear reaction have 
now been built. 

The use of thermonuclear energy will be even more advantageous in the 
construction and operation of very high power propulsion plants which will 
run for a long time without fuel replenishment. Since thermonuclear reaction 
involves the utilization of the hydrogen isotope deuterium, which occurs in 
heavy water, the solution of the problem of isolating heavy water from light 
water and obtaining deuterium will provide man with vast, practically inex- 
haustible reserves of raw material for nuclear reaction and the production of 
cheap electrical power. In addition to this, thermonuclear reactors are practi- 
cally harmless and, therefore, do not require heavy lead and concrete shields. 
If it should prove possible to produce compact electric gene.ators, they can 
be used to power missiles, aircraft, ships and other military and non-military 
equipment. 

Promising sources of energy are thermopile-junctio. ? of different elements heated by bom- 
bardment with beta rays. Radioactive isotopes may be used as sources of electron flow. In this 
way it is possible to produce compact sources with a very high capacity, which would operate 
for long periods without any kind of recharging or replenishment with isotopes. Some day 


thermopiles will make it possible to run transport facilities on electric motors. This would greatly 
simplify the design of transport equipment. 

In the opinion of foreign scientists, the development of science may pro- 
duce many fundamentally new means of delivery, such as ion rockets. The 
operating principle of this rocket will obviously involve a proton accelerator, 
which will eject protons through a nozzle at a very high velocity, thus 
creating a jet thrust. Similar in principle to the ion rocket is the plasma 
rocket. Many possible new types of engines are already known to science and 
the problem of constructing them will undoubtedly be resolved. 

The most important area in which science influences military affairs is the 
management and control of troops by means of automation. Here science also 
expresses itself in a decisive fashion. After revolutionizing weapons and the 
means of their delivery, it also transformed the means of their control and 
made it possible to automate them. 

Many of the procedures of controlling modern military equipment take 
infinitesimally small intervals of time, during which it would be impossible 
for a human to make a decision and carry out different operations at the 
required speed. Automation of control makes it possible to remove the limita- 
tions imposed by human capabilities. 

The use of nuclear weapons and other modern technology, and the in- 
creased maneuverability of the forces, may change a situation rapidly and 
suddenly, and thus increase the volume of information. The main deficiency 
of earlier control systems was the low productivity of staffs when receiving, 
processing, and transmitting information. Automation of control eliminates 
the disparity which had formed between combat potential and the means and 
methods of control. 

A very important contribution to the solution of this complex problem was 
made by cybernetics — the science of controlling complex dynamic systems 
and processes. It is coiicerned with developing processes from the point of 
view of control principles, and makes wide use of the methods of the exact 
sciences. 

The most common principle of cybernetics is that control as a process always occurs in a 
closed circuit in which there are controlled and controlling elements linked together by direct 
and feedback coupling. Control is effected by means of control signals, and verification of the 
I’ctions of the object in response to the control signals is accomplished by the transmission of 
feedback signals. This principle applies to all the processes of controlling mechanisms in equip- 
ment, weapons in combat, and troops in operations. 

Electronic computers are used for the reception, storage, and processing 
of information. They carry out these operations in accordance with a pro- 
grrm, which is worked out specially for each control process. The basis of 
the program is the algorithm, a systematic mathematical procedure for the 
solution of a problem. Each complex process can be represented in the form 
of elementary operations, which arc carried out in a specific sequence in 
accordance with strictly defined rules. Even the most complex processes can 
be converted into a sequence of elementary operations and rules leading to 


the required solution with the specific current parameters of the situation. 

An important role in the development of military affairs is played by the 
special military technical disciplines: the artillery, military engineering, mili- 
tary aviation and naval sciences. These sciences are concerned with the study, 
design, production, testing, combat application, and comprehensive evalua- 
tion ol' military equipment. Their task is to make a detailed study of the 
requirements of military art and the quality of military equipment. 

A discipline which has been pushed to the forefront by the military- 
technical revoluLion is operations research, which makes it possible for a 
commander to obtain a quantitative basis for the creation and utilization of 
forces and resources in c battle or an operation in order to reach a decision. 
The methods of this science, which are based on the theory of probability, 
mathematical statistics, queuing theory, the theory of games, linear and 
dynamic programming, and statistical test methods, make it possible to 
determine quantitatively: whether utilization of the available resources to 
achieve a given objective will ensure the maximum effect; which dominant 
factors influence the achievement of the desired results with the minimum 
expenditure of time and effort; and hew a change in the situation will affect 
the achievement of the most economical and rapid solution of the overall 
task. All this makes it possible to determine the best methods of conducting 
combat operations, and means of developing and acquiring greater mastery 
of equipment. 

In its turn, the theory of probability, the mathematical science concerned v,'th the study of 
regularities in mass random phenomena, affords the means of obtaining a quantitative basis for 
estimating the objective possibilities that a given event will occur. By using a numerical measure 
of the degree of probability that an event will occur it is possible to arrive at a more precise 
solution, or to foresee the possible outcome of events which recur on a large scale. Probability 
theory forms the basis of all the other mathematical methods used in military affairs. 

Linear programming is a mathematical theory which makes it possible to reduce the solution 
of planning problems and troop and equipment control to a sequence of automatically executed 
operations in accordance with incoming information. This theory provides the solution of 
arbitrary extremal problems in which the quality index is linearly related to the control parame- 
ters, and the limits are linear equations or inequalities. 

In the field of military affairs every situation which ar.ses in the course of combat operations 
is one of conflict. The interests and activities of the warring sides are diametrically opposite; their 
interaction is accomy/anied by a vast number of related factors which complicate any analysis 
of an evolving situation. Situations of conflict, in which the interests of two or more sides are 
involved, are studied by methods u.scd in game theory, the mathematical theory of conflict 
situations. 

Queuing theory is widely used for evaluating the carrying capacity and quality of different 
control systems and facilities, for example, the effectiveness of air defense as a whole, and the 
firepower of individual types of weapons. 

In complex cases, when a given event is accompanied by numerous constantly varying factors, 
the most convenient method of calculation is the statistical test method. For examysie, it would 
be extremely difficult to use analytical methods to study the repulse of a massive enemy air 
attack. In this case, foreign specialists set up a model of the operational-tactical formation of 
the enemy aircraft in the air and the disposition of ait defense forces repelling this attack. 
Successively, at set intervals of time, the dynamies of the action are played through and 


274 


calculations are made for each game episode (the episode is played through). The complex 
process is broken down into individual episodes. The position of the opposing sides is determined 
for each episode and studied. As a result, it is possible to establish a picture of the course of 
combat actions and their possible results. 

In addition to these theories, modeling is also used extensively. Of course, 
it has been used before. For example, during World War II, far away from 
the front, before an attack, a model of the enemy’s defenses was constructed 
and methods of breaching them were worked out. Nowadays modeling plays 
a much more important role as a result of changes in combat operations and 
troop control methods. Modeling is now quite different in many respects. 

In addition to training, games, and exercises, military science now makes 
use of mathematical modeling. It is useful for determining the effectiveness 
of models of weapons, in training and improving the qualifications of person- 
nel, and working out the best methods of conducting military operations. 

Thus, having constructed a model of a battle, using mathematical methods where necessary 
and possible, the development and outcome of impending operations can be gauged. The more 
battles are modeled, and the more accurately and objectively qualitative and quantitative factors 
are evaluated, the more clearly apparent become ways of achieving success, or the defects in its 
preparation and organization. The ultimate result of modeling is the determination of the 
optimum conditions which would afford the highest probability of success. 

An important factor in combat organization is the situation forecast. This 
is based on foresight. Forecasting provides the answers to questions concern- 
ing the forces and resources needed to achieve a desired result at given stages 
of combat operations, how certain processes (events) will develop under 
specified conditions. The results of target damage (destruction), the place 
(region) of the location of moving targets based on previously received data, 
radiation and meteorological conditions, etc., are forecast. 

As a typical example of a forecasting task, we could take the compilation 
of a forecast of the radiation conditions in a combat area where a nuclear 
weapon has been used. All commanders should be able to prepare such a 
forecast, since subunits and units frequendy have to operate at great distances 
from each other, and their higher headquarters cannot always ensure that 
they have a forecast of the radiation situation. A well thought out and 
substantiated forecast makes it possible to determine the optimum route and 
direction of approach, and the probable contamination level. 

The most important channel through which science influences military 
affairs is the military-technical training of servicemen. This training requires 
mastering of weapons and equipment, increasing the fighting efficiency of the 
troops, and ensuring their constant combat readiness. 

Science calls for a new attitude towards the fighting spirit of the troops, their 
morale and fighting qualities, and their psychological training. Here it is not 
permissible to underestimate the fighting equipment and overestimate the 
morale and fighting qualities of servicemen, or vice versa. 

Military-technical qualifications and high morale and fighting qualities do 
not evolve by themselves, but develop in the process of training and education 
based on profound ideological conviction, an understanding of the nature of 


modern armed combat, a knowledge of the enemy’s equipment and military 
art, and methods of using new weapons. 

Only physically fit servicemen, prepared for the trials of dynamically 
developing actions can act quickly, decisively and boldly in modern combat. 
Here an exceptionally important role is played by oiology and medicine, and 
by specialists in these fields. 

The training of servicemen is accomplished by various methi., in every- 
day service routine, in combat exercises, marches, flying, in the classroom 
and on the firing range, in other words their entire service life. Commanders 
are required to be skilled in the organization of service life, the training and 
education process, and troop control, in the light of the knowledge afforded 
by all the sciences. 

In its most general form, scientific military management can be described 
as the techniques involved in achieving, in the best possible way, the most 
effective use of combat, technical, moral, and political potential of the troops 
to ensure the successful fulfillment of tasks assigned to them. To achieve this 
it is essential that every officer should possess thorough knowledge and have 
a solid military training. Knowledge and ability are the principal conditions 
for success in troop control. Whereas knowledge is expressed in a profound 
understanding of military matters and the objective laws to which they are 
subordinate, ability means the effective utilization of this knowledge and the 
correct placement of personnel, having regard to their level of training, 
knowledge, and skills. By ability is meant an officer’s capacity in a combat 
situation to take into account a multitude of facts and data, make calcula- 
tions, analyze the sum total of this information, and select the optimum 
solution of the given combat mission. 

In modem war it is always essential for an officer to know his assignment 
and understand the plan of his superior officer, to be able to appreciate the 
situation from every angle, to calculate and correlate facts and data, and to 
plan the objectives, the forces and resources, the methods of operation, and 
the missions of his subordinates. A commander has the right to use his 
initiative and to take risks. These will always be justified if they are based on 
scientific calculation and foresight. 

The philosophical training of officer personnel is of prime importance in 
acquiring scientific methods of controlling subordinates. Familiarity with 
Marxist-Leninist philosophy not only broadens the general outlook, but helps 
officers to recognize trends in the development of military affairs, and facili- 
tates the successful solution of practical problems of enhancing the combat 
readiness of the forces. 

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF SCIENTISTS (the most important facts) 

The material-technical basis of military affairs has been decisively in- 
fluenced by many of the most important discoveries in the fields of physics, 
aerodynamics and rocket dynamics, electronics, cybernetics, chemistry, biol- 
ogy, and other sciences. Below are given the most important facts about 
scientific discoveries. 


276 


# The formulation of Einstein’s theory of relativity (partial in 1905 and 
general in 1916) and, on the basis of this, the derivation of the mass-energy 
equation (E = mc^). 

# The origin (1924-1926) and development of quantum mechanics, 
which led to the discovery of the internal energy of a body — nuclear energy. 
The founders of this science were Max Planck (Germany) and E. Rutherford 
(Britain), its creators Louis de Broglie (France), Niels Bohr (Denmark), W. 
Heisenberg (Germany), and others. The most important contribution to the 
future development of problems in this science were the husband and wife 
team Joliot-Curie (France), the Soviet scientists A. Ioffe, P. Kapitsa, L. 
Landau and others. 

# In 1939 the German scientists Hahn and Strassman discovered the 
phenomenon of the splitting of the uranium atom. 

# In 1940 the Soviet scientist V. A. Fabrikant expressed the idea of the 
possibility of amplifying light and radio waves. In the 1950s, the Soviet Nobel 
Prize recipients P. G. Basov and A. M. Prokhorov and the Americans C. 
Towns and A. Shavlov created quantum generators and amplifiers (lasers). 

# In 1956 the Soviet Academician, I. V. Kurchatov published a paper on 
the theory of thermonuclear reaction. 

# In recent years, Soviet and foreign scientists have provided a theoretical 
solution for fundamentally new physical methods for the direct conversion 
of thermal energy into electrical energy in static systems, which do not have 
any moving parts (thermoelectric, thermoelectronic, and ferroelectric 
systems). 

* * * 

# The discoveries of the Russian scientists S. A. Chaplygin and N. Ye. 
Zhukovskiy were of great importance in the field of aerodynamics and rocket 
dynamics. In 1902 Academician S. A. Chaplygin established fundamental 
relationships for the movement of gases at high subsonic and supersonic 
speeds, and the “father of Russian aviation,” Professor N. Ye. Zhukovskiy, 
elaborated the principles of aircraft dynamics. 

# Between 1897 and 1904 the Russian scientist L V. Meshcherskiy elabo- 
rated the mathematical theory of the movement of a point of variable mass. 
Meshcherskiy’s works formed the basis of jet technology. 

# At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, 
the great Russian scientist K. E. Tsiolkovskiy developed the rocket system 
and the basic formulas of rocket dynamics. 

# In the 1920s and the years immediately following, theoretical and 
practical work in the field of rocket engineering was carried on under the 
leadership of the Soviet scientists. Engineer F. A. Tsander and Academician 
S. P. Korolev. 

# The work of the Soviet Academician B S. Stechkin, The Theory of the 
Air-Breathing Jet Engine,* was published in 1929. Abroad German scien- 
tists, including G. Obert, were working on the theory of jet engines. 

# Teoriya vozdushnogo reakthnogo dvigatelya [U.S. Ed.]. 


277 


# During World War II (1941-1945) Academician S. A. Khristianovich 
elaborated a theoretical solution of the objective laws that govern variations 
in the aerodynamic characteristics of an aircraft wing during transition to 
high speed flight. Academician N. Ye. Kochin worked out a practical solu- 
tion to problems of the “round wing theory.” Corresponding Member of the 
Academy of Sciences of the USSR N. G. Chetayev proposed a method of 
calculating the stability of an aircraft in motion on the ground. 

A groun of scientists, headed by Academician M. V. Keldysh, worked out 
the mathematical theory of flutter. 

♦ ♦ * 

# During the 19th century Russian and foreign scientists elaborated the 
principles of the theory of the electromagnetic field and the laws of radio 
wave propagation (M. Faraday, J. Maxwell, H. Hertz, A. S. Popov, 
K. Bjerknes and G. Marconi). 

# In 1895 the Russian scientist A. S. Popov invented the radio. In 1897 
Popov became the first man to accomplish wireless communication at a 
distance. 

# In the 1930’s Soviet and foreign scientists elaborated the theoretical 
principles of radar, which is used extensively in military affairs. 

The theoretical works of Soviet Academicians L. I. Mandel'shtam, N. D. 
Papaleksi, V. A. Fok, B. A. Vvedenskiy and other scientists were used in the 
development of various radiotech nical instruments used by the armed forces. 

* ♦ * 

# During World War II N. Wiener (USA) founded the science of cyber- 
netics. In the postwar years great contributions have been made to the 
development of this science by the foreigr scientists K. Shannon and J. 
Newman, Soviet Academicians A. N. Kolmogorov and A. I. Berg, and 
others. 

Technical cybernetics and the theory and application of electronic ma- 
chines have been developed further in recent years. 

* * * 

# In the field of chemistry an important place is '"cupied by the theory 
of chain reactions, elaborated in the 1930s by the Soviet Nobel Prize recipient 
N. N. Semenov. 

# Research work carried out under the direction cf I. I. Kitaygorodskiy 
resulted .n the creation in 1942-1943 of armored glass ("BS"),* which is 25 
times stronger than normal glass. 

# Later discoveries by Soviet and foreign scientists in the field of mac- 
romolecular compounds led to the creation of new substances of exceptional 
purity, new materials able to withstand the effects of extreme temperatures, 
new corrosion-resisting and insulating materials, coatings, special alloys and 
a variety of structural plastic materials. New materials have been produced 

# Russian abbreviation for bronesleklo ‘armored glass’ [U.S. Ed.] 


278 



I 

f 

I 


I 


I 


with predetermined properties not possessed by natural substances — glass- 
fiber reinforced plastics, synthetic mica, asbestos, resins, ceramics, etc. 

* * * 

# Theoretical research in the field of biology, primarily the study of 
viruses and bacteria, and the discovery by Soviet and foreign scientists of 
antibiotics contribute to the protection of the population and the armed 
forces from epidemic diseases, and minimize the number of unfavorable 
after-effects of serious wounds. 

Biology provides theoretical answers to problems connected with the de- 
velopment of means of protection against weapons of mass destruction. 

What to Read on This Section 

Marksizm-leninizm o voyne i armii [Marxism-Leninism on War and Army].* 
5th edition, Ch. VI-VII. Voyenizdat, 1968. 

Pokrovskiy, G. I. Nauka i tekhnika v sovremennykh voynakh [Science and 
Technology in Modern Wars]. Voyenizdat, 1959. 

Matematika v boyu [Mathematics in Combat]. Voyenizdat, 1964. 

Fizika v boyu [Physics in Combat]. Voyenizdat, 1967. 

* Available in English, No. 2, USAF “Soviel Military Thought” series [U.S. Ed.). 



Chapter 10. WEAPONS AND MILITARY TECHNOLOGY 


The scientific-technicai revolution has had an enormous iniiuencc on the 


development of war material. What are the characteristic features of weapons 
and military technology at the present time? 

Nuclear weapons. By nuclear weapons we ordinarily mean special explo- 
sive devices (charges), based on the use of intranuclear energy released during 
the chain reaction of the fission of heavy nuclei or the thermonuclear reaction 
of the synthesis of light nuclei (thermonuclear weapons). 

There are three types of nuclear weapons: 

a) Weapons commonly called nuclear. The energy released by the explo- 
sion of a nuclear weapon is caused by the chain reaction of the fission of nuclei 
of uranium-235, plutonium-239 or uranium-233. The charge, made of nu- 
clear explosive (fissile) material, usually consists of several parts, the mass of 
each of which is less than the critical mass. The combination of the parts of 
the charge, i.e., the achievement of a super-critical ' mass is effected by a 
special device and the detonation of a conventional explosive. To increase the 
output coefficient of the fissile material, the charge is surrounded by neutron 
reflectors. 

b) Weapons commonly known as thermonuclear. The energy released by 
the explosion of a thermonuclear weapon is mainly (up to 80-90%) the result 
of thermonuclear reaction. The principal components of a weapon of this 
type are the nuclear and thermonuclear charges. The fuel elements in a 
thermonuclear charge may be a mixture of deuterium and tritium or deute- 
rium and lithium. The release of energy during the explosion of such weapons 
occurs as the result of two successive reactions: the explosion of the nuclear 
charge (the reaction of the fission of heavy nuclei) and the subsequent helium 
fusion reaction. 

c) Thermonuclear weapons. In such weapons the explosion occurs as the 
result of three nuclear reactions: the detonation of the nuclear charge, which 
serves as a primer; the development of thermonuclear reactions of the fusion 
of light elements; the fission of nuclei of heavy elements, usually uranium- 
238, in the form of a shell covering the entire charge. Most of the energy is 
released as a result of the fission of uranium-238 nuclei by neutrons released 
during thermonuclear fusion reaction. 


* The critical mass is the minimum amount of uranium-235 or plutonium-239 required to 
sustain a chain reaction. 




Nuclear weapons were first used by the United States of America in the 
final phase of World War II in August 1945 for the destruction of the cities 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On each of these cities the Americans dropped 
one quite primitive nuclear aerial bomb. The cities were destroyed and the 
total number of killed and wounded exceeded half a million. 

After the war, the most industrially developed countries rapidly perfected 
nuclear weapons, which became the principal means of striking an enemy. 
They have been introduced into all services of the armed forces and are used 
as warheads in strategic, operational-tactical, and tactical rockets, as well as 
aeriai bombs, artillery shells and mines, ground-to-air guided missiles and 
anti-missile missiles, airborne missiles, naval torpedoes, depth charges and 
special mines. 

Nuclear ammunition may be exploded in the atmosphere, in water, in the 
ground, and in outer space. Hence, nuclear explosions are classified as aerial, 
surface, underground, above-water and under-water. An extremely high tem- 
perature of several million degrees is created at the site of a nuclear explosion. 
A blinding flash changes into a fire-ball; the explosion produces a powerful 
shock wave and an enormous quantity of thermal energy (luminous radia- 
tion) is radiated into the environment. A nuclear explosion is accompanied 
by a stream of gamma rays and neutrons, which possess great penetrating 
force. Thus, the damage factors of a nuclear explosion are the following: the 
shock wave, the flash, penetrating radiation, and ground contamination. 

The yield of nuclear charges depends on their design, the quantity, and 
quality of the given nuclear fuel, and is expressed as its TNT equivalent, i.e., 
the quantity of TNT that would be required to produce an explosion equal 
in released energy to the yield of the given nuclear charge. 

The diversity of potential targets and the specifications of the nuclear 
deiivery systems made it essential to have charges of different yields, from 
several tons to several tens of millions of tons of TNT. Low-yield nuclear 
charges are intended mainly for destroying various targets in battle. Their 
delivery systems may be tactical guided and unguided missiles, artillery shells 
and mines, gruund-lu-air guided missiles, and naval torpedoes; they can also 
be used as depth charges. Medium yield nuclear charges of the order of 
several tens of thousands of tons (tens of kilotons) are designed to hit strategi- 
cally important and distant targets. They can be delivered by operational- 
tactical rockets, aircraft, and naval torpedoes and can be used as mines. High 
yield nuclear charges of several millions of tons (megatons) are generally 
intended for the destruction of important strategic targets deep in the 
enemy’s rear, and can be delivered by strategic missiles, aircraft, and other 
means. 

Missile* technology. The development of missile technology has led to its 
widespread application in military affairs. 

In terms of launching location and target characteristics missiles are cus- 
tomarily classified as follows; "ground-to-ground,” when the launcher and 

* In Russian, "raketa" is both rocket and missile. In US terminology, a missile is guided, a 
rocket is not [U.S. Ed.]. 

281 






the target are on the ground; “ground-to-air,” when the launcher is on the 
ground and the target is in the air; “air-to-air,” when launched from any 
aircraft at targets in the air; “air-to-ground,” when launched from aircraft 
at targets on the ground; “surface-to-surface” (for the Navy). 

Missile technology is directly concerned with missiles and launchers. Mis- 
siles consist of rocket engines, on-board control systems and a warhead or 
telemetery equipment. The launching installation may include a launcher, 
transporter-erector and launcher vehicles and assemblies, fueling, monitoring 
and measurement systems, guidance and control instruments. 

The power of modern rocket engines makes it possible to deliver payloads 
of enormous destructive force to any point on the globe. 

A part of the armament of the services and branches of the Services, 
missiles have already at the present stage of development become one of the 
principal means of waging war. 

According to their design features, types of fuel and trajectories, missiles 
aie customarily classified as single-stage, multi-stage, ballistic and cruise, 
liquid- and solid-fueled, guided and unguided. 

In terms of the aim and nature of the mission to be completed, missiles are 
classified as strategic, operational-tactical, tactical, anti-aircraft, naval, and 
airborne. 

As a rule, strategic missiles are guided and multi-stage. They can have 
liquid- or solid-fuel engines capable of sustaining flight for several thousand 
kilometers and delivering nuclear payloads to selected targets. Medium- 
range strategic missiles can be one- or two-stage. Strategic missiles have 
warheads with yields of from several hundreds of kilotons to several tens of 
megatons. 

The range of a missile is the principal factor that determines the targets 
against which it is used. 

Strategic missiles are capable of spanning vast distances; their range is 
practically unlimited. Strategic missiles (MRBMs and ICBMs) can be 
launched from mobile or fixed launch installations. 

Operational-tactical missiles are guided ballistic missiles with ranges of 
several tens to many hundreds of kilometers. 

The engine of a ballistic missile is usually powered by a bi-propellant fuel 
(combustible and oxidizer). The oxidizer makes it possible for the engine to 
operate outside the dense layers of the earth’s atmosphere, where there is 
little or no oxygen to maintain combustion and create sufficient thrust. 

Most “ground-to-ground” guided missiles are launched vertically. On 
leaving the launcher, the control system in the rocket begins to function and 
the missile is guided onto its combat course. During this stage, the engine 
continues to operate and the missile goes into the ascending arm of its 
trajectory. When it reaches a predetermined speed, the engine automatically 
shuts off, and the missile completes its flight as a conventional artillery shell 
on a ballistic trajectory. 

The cruise missile, which has an aerodynamic configuration similar to that 


of an airplane, is often called a flying bomb. It is usually powered by an 
air-breathing jet engine. 

Operational-tactical ballistic missiles have mobile launchers and can be 
used against the enemy’s nuclear attack facilities: missile installations on 
airfields, nuclear weapon stockpiles, command posts, groupings of forces, etc. 

Tactical missiles, with ranges of several tens of kilometers, are designed to 
provide direct support for ground forces on the battlefield. They can be used 
for strikes against nuclear attack facilities in the combat formations of the 
enemy forces; the destruction of artillery, missile, and mortar batteries, per- 
sonnel and firing positions in strong points and in assembly areas; reserves 
and command posts; disruption of the operation of the enemy’s rear units, 
and the repulse of enemy counterattacks during an offensive. There are both 
guided and unguided tactical missiles. In order to increase their accuracy, 
missiles of this type are equipped with on-board control systems. Tactical 
missiles are launched from mobile launchers, which can move with the 
troops. 

Anti-tank guided missiles are also classified as tactical missiles. Their main 
purpose is the destruction of tanks and other armored targets. 

Air defense missiles are the most effective means of air defense. Remote 
control systems or combined remote control (first stage) and homing (last 
stage of flight) systems are used to guide the missiles to their targets. Air 
defense missiles are capable of hitting targets at any altitudes in any meteoro- 
logical conditions, day or night; with nuclear warheads they can destroy 
entire groups of aircraft flying in formation. 

Airborne missiles are carried by certain types of aircraft for attacking 
surface (sea) or airborne targets. Bombers are usually armed with guided 
cruise missiles, the range of which, after being launched from an aircraft, can 
be reckoned in hundreds of kilometers. This permits aircraft to attack targets 
from long distances, without entering the enemy's air defense zones. Short- 
range, low dispersion air-launched missiles are carried by aircraft for attack- 
ing small targets, such as ships, bridges, launch sites, etc. 

Small guided and unguided airborne missiles are carried by fighter aircraft 
for attacking airborne targets: aircraft, helicopters, balloons, and dirigibles. 

Tanks. These are tracked fighting machines with armored protection and 
fire power; their mobility, turning, and cross-country capabilities give them 
a high degree of maneuverability. The first experimental tank was built in 
Russia in May 1915, but tanks were originally developed in Britain and 
France. Now they are standard equipment for the armored (tank) forces of 
many of the world’s armies. 

According to a universally accepted system of classification, tanks are 
usually subdivided into three categories; light, medium, and heavy. Light 
tanks (weighing up to 20 tons) are designed for reconnaissance work and, in 
some cases, for example, in fording water obstacles, they are used in direct 
support of infantry (motorized infantry) subunits. Medium tanks (up to 40 
tons) are generally used as elements of units and formations for the solution 
of independent tasks. Sometimes medium tanks may be attached to infantry 


283 


(motorized infantry) units and subunits for direct support in an attack, or for 
reinforcement in a defensive action. They are designed to destroy the enemy’s 
weapons, his tanks, self-propelled artillery and personnel. Heavy tanks 
(weighing over 40 tons) are generally used as elements of units for accom- 
plishing independent tasks, mainly engaging enemy tanks and anti-tank 
weapons. In individual cases, they can be used to destroy or neutralize his 
defensive structures. 

The development of anti-tank weapons during World War II, and particu- 
larly since the war, has necessitated an increase in the thickness of the 
armored protection and improvements in the shape of the tank body. Tanks 
can travel across country and negotiate various obstacles. Most types of tanks 
are equipped with guns having calibers that range from 75 to 120mm. The 
armor-piercing shells fired by these guns have a high degree of penetration 
ability. In addition, tanks are armed with different types of machine guns, 
including air defense machine guns for use against low-flying aircraft and 
other airborne targets. 

Effective firepower is ensured by the traversing turrets, guns, electric 
drives, and sophisticated sighting devices, including infra-red equipment, 
which are incorporated in modern tank designs. 

In addition to the main types of tanks, some armies are equipped with 
reconnaissance, amphibious, and airborne assault tanks. 

Because of their design characteristics, tanks, more than any other fighting 
vehicles, are suitable for action in nuclear warfare, a fact which determines 
their future development. 

Artillery. Artillery includes different types of weapons and equipment: 
guns, howitzers, mortars, trench moilars, combat rocket launchers, artillery 
ammunition, and artillery reconnaissance, observation and fire control 
systems. 

The design and specifications of artillery systems depend upon the purpose 
for which they are intended and the tasks to be completed. 

As a rule, guns are rifled and, compared to howitzers and mortars, have 
longer barrels (usually 30-60 calibers), a much greater muzzle velocity ^500 
m/sec or more), range, and armor penetrating capability. The trajectory of 
a gun shell is flatter than that of howitzer and mortar shells. Gun bores vary 
from 20mm to over 400mm. Guns are standard equipment for artillery 
subunits, troop artillery, coastal artillery, anti-tank, and air defense units, 
tanks, self-propelled artillery, and naval ships, as well as aircraft. 

Howitzers, like guns, are rifled. They are used both by units and formations 
of organic field artillery and the artillery of the Supreme High Command 
Reserve. Howitzer calibers start at 100mm. The distinguishing characteris- 
tics of this type of weapon are that it has a much shorter barrel than the 
cannon (15-30 calibers), a lower muzzle velocity (300-500 m/sec), a shorter 
firing range and, therefore, an inferior armor-piercing capability. The ho- 
witzer is better adapted than the gun for firing at greater angles of elevation 
(up to 63*), i.e., it has a steep trajectory, which is essential for destro.ing 


284 


targets protected by shelters, or situated on the far side of steep ridges, in 
forests and built-up areas, etc. 

Mortars are the least widely used of all artillery ordnance. They have short 
rifled barrels (barrel lengths do not exceed 16 calibers and muzzle velocities 
vary between 150 and 300 m/sec). They are designed to deliver high angle 
fire at hidden targets. 

Trench mortars are smooth bore artillery pieces without a recoil system. 
They have been in widespread use in many of the world’s armies since the 
eve of, and particularly during, World War II. Trench mortars are designed 
for striking enemy personnel and weapons located both in the open and in 
dug-outs, trenches, and various kinds of shelters. 

Trench mortars have a number of advantages over rifled guns, in particu- 
lar; simplicity of design and maintenance, lightness and, therefore, greater 
battlefield maneuverability; their high trajectory and greater angles of fall of 
the shells are essential for the destruction of targets protected by cover. 
Drawbacks of the trench mortar are its inability to fire projectiles on flat 
trajectories, its comparatively short range, and the impossibility of delivering 
direct fire against tanks. 

Rocket launchers are, as a rule, multi-loading, mounted on the chassis of 
cross-country trucks, tracked cross-country vehicles, or tanks, and are de- 
signed for launching unguided missiles. A rocket launcher usually consists 
of moving parts, guide rails, aiming mechanisms (elevation and traverse), and 
electrical equipment. The number of guide rails determines the weight of a 
rocket salvo fired by the launcher. In World War II, the range of rocket 
artillery varied between 4 and 10km. A high density of fire, and thus in- 
creased effectiveness, is achieved by subunits employing salvo fire. 

Possible targets against which rocket launchers may be used include artil- 
lery and mortar batteries, enemy nuclear attack resources, and personnel, 
both in the open and under cover, etc. 

Artillery ammunition is the aggregate of elements necessary to fire artillery 
(mortar) rounds (to deliver fire). Artillery (mortar) rounds are stored and 
issued to units as complete rounds. A complete round consists of a shell and 
a charge; the shell consists of the body, the explosive and the fuse; the charge 
consists of the cartridge, the propellant charge, and the primer. 

The diversity of targets on the battlefield necessitates a vast array of 
different types of shells. One type of gun may fire the following shells, which 
differ in their purpose ani effect: fragmentation, high-explosive-fragmenta- 
tion, high-explosive, armor-piercing, concrete-piercing, shrapnel, incendiary, 
illuminating, smoke, propaganda, etc. 

The effect of shells on a target depends on the fuse setting, which provides 
for either instantaneous or delayed detonation. Shells designed for use against 
armored and concrete targets have base fuses, i.e., the fuses are located in the 
bottom part of the shell body; other types of shells have nose fuses. 

Powder charges, depending on the caliber of the gun, are either fixed or 
variable. Fixed powder charges are usually us.“d in ammunition for guns of 
up to 100mm caliber. In this case, all the elements of the artillery round are 


285 


grouped together; the charge is located in the shell-case. Taken together, 
these are usually referred to as a fixed round (fixed ammunition). Variable 
charges are, as a rule, used in guns of calibers in excess of 100mm which have 
separate loading. Variable charges consist of several pre-prepared and accu- 
rately w'eighed charge increments. This permits the size of the charge to be 
varied so as to influence the muzzle velocity of the shell, the nature of its 
trajectory and range. 

The accounting and supply unit used when issuing ammunition and plan- 
ning artillery fire mission is the unit of fire. The number of artillery (mortar) 
rounds in a unit of fire depends on the caliber of the gun (mortar). A unit 
of fire for each type and caliber of gun contains shells for different purposes 
in a certain proportion. 

A mortar round consists of a shell, the main propellant charge and charge 
increments; the shell consists of the body and stabilizer housing, the bursting 
charge, and fuse. A mortar round for certain breech-loading mortars consists 
of a shell case, into which the powder charge is placed; the charge is ignited 
by a screwed-in primer. 

Rocket shells (unguided missiles) used in field rocket artillery fall into a 
special category of artillery ammunition. The distinguishing feature of this 
type of shell is that it has a motor whicn, as a rule, burns solid fuel. The motor 
has a combustion chamber and a jet nozzle through which gases are ejected, 
thus ereating the thrust which propels the missile. The rocket fuel is usually 
ignited by means of a squib, set off by the electrieal power supply system of 
the launcher. 

Artillery power is firepower, while firepower lies in artillery ammunition. 
Shell bodies are designed to cause damage to targets and usually incorporate 
an explosive, the amount of which determines the explosive force. 

Observation and fire control instruments. Binoculars, battery comman- 
der’s telescopes, directors, reconnaissance theodolites, range finders, all kinds 
of acoustic and radar equipment, computers, and automatic power genera- 
tors for laying are uied for battlefield observation, target reconnaissance, the 
preparation of firing data, and fire control. 

The principal artillery fire control devices are the mechanized artillery 
board and coordinator, the azimuth scale and range rule; in air defense 
gunnery, the air defense fire director; in naval and coastal artillery, fire 
directors with computers and electrically powered drives for automatic gun 
laying, similar to those used in the air defense fire director. 

Small arms. Pistols; machine pistols (submachine guns); rifles; carbines; 
light, heavy, and large-caliber machine guns. The main purpose of small arms 
is to kill enemy personnel in close combat. Small arms calibers range from 
6 to 20mm. 

Their rapidity of fire, adequate effective range, reliability of operation, 
maneuverability, convenience and simplicity of operation, their relatively 
straightforward design, which permits large-scale manufacture, have made it 
possible to introduce them into all the Services and branches of the Services. 

Depending on their weight, design and purpose, a distinction is made 


between individual and team small-arm weapons. Individual weapons (offic- 
ers’ and soldiers’ personal weapons) include: pistols, submachine guns, rifles, 
and carbines. Team weapons — various types of machine guns — are usually 
operated by several men. 

According to the degree of automation of the operations connected with 
reloading and firing, small arms arc divided into non-automatic (single-shot 
and magazine), and semi-automatic, and automatic. 

Individual (personal) weapons are used as a means of killing enemy person- 
nel at distances up to 600ni. Light machine guns are used against groups and 
important single targets up to 800m away. Heavy machine guns are used to 
deliver massive fire for the suppression and destruction of group targets and 
weapons at ranges up to and in excess of 1,000m. Large-caliber machine guns 
are usually used against exposed and lightly armored ground targets at ranges 
of up to 3,000ni, and airborne targets at altitudes of up to 2,000m. 

Tanks and aircraft are equipped with special tank and aircraft machine 
guns. 

The development of small arms has followed a long and difficult path — 
from smooth-bore, round-shot, muzzle loaded flintlocks to powerful modern 
automatic weapons. 

Aviation. The technical basis of modern military aviation consists of air- 
craft and helicopters, plus ground equipment at airfields, command posts and 
repair depots, and electronic aids. 

The aircraft resources of the present-day air forces of the developed nations 
consist, as a rule, of reconnaissance aircraft, fighter bombers, bombers, 
fighters, and transports. 

Reconnaissance aircraft are designed to carry out tactical, operational, and 
strategic reconnaissance missions. Each of these categories of reconnaissance 
IS carried out by aircraft of a specific type with dilferent specifications and 
equipment. Aerial cameras, radio communications, and radio navigation aids 
are standard equipment for reconnaissance aircraft. 

Fighter bombers are supersonic jet aircraft, the armament of which con- 
sists of cannons, unguided and guided missiles, and bombs in various combi- 
nations. They carry either conventional or nuclear weapons and can be used 
for the destruction of aerial targets. 

Depending on their role and design, bombers are classified as tactical or 
long-range (strategic). They carry conventional and nuclear missiles and 
bombs for attacking ground targets. 

The modern bomber is an all-metal cantilever monoplane pow-ered by two 
or more jet engines. Navigational and operational accuracy are ensured by 
means of radio navigation systems, optical and radar sights, and computers. 

Fighters are designed for the destruction of aerodynamic flying targets — 
enemy aircraft, cruise missiles, and helicopters. Fighters are the fastest type 
of aircraft, capable of operating at all altitudes and in the stratosphere. 
Modern fighters are usually armed with air-to-air guided missiles and carry 
a crew of one or two. 

Military transport aircraft are specially equipped for airborne assault land- 


287 


ings, and ferrying troops and supplies (ammunition, arms, provisions, etc.). 
They are usually long range aircraft with a high load carrying capacity. 

Helicopters are machines which fly by means of rotors. They take off and 
land vertically, without runways, and are able to hover at a given altitude 
over a given precise point on land or water. They are designed for assault 
landings and freight transportation and can also be used for artillery recon- 
naissance and spotting. In Vietnam, the US Army Command uses helicopters 
to engage ground targets. 

Engineer equipment is used in all the Services and principal branches of 
the Services. The increased power of modern weapons of destruction and the 
introduction of diverse fighting equipment have resulted in increased de- 
mands for large volumes of military engineering work and its accomplish- 
ment within the shortest possible time in support of troop combat operations. 
This is made possible only by the extensive use of a mass of high-performance 
machinery and every conceivable form of mechanization. 

Engineer equipment includes: mines; engineer reconnaissance, mine, and 
obstacle clearance resources; ferrying facilities, and special engineer vehicles. 

Mines consist t f anti-tank and anti-personnel mines with contact and 
proximity fuses. The armed forces of countries which possess nuclear weap- 
ons can also use nuclear land mines. Minefields can be laid by hand or special 
minelaying vehicles. 

Engineer reconnaissance and mine and obstacle clearance equipment in- 
cludes mine detectors and probes, detonating cables and jet engines for 
uncovering them, bangalore torpedoes, and special armored mineclearing 
vehicles. 

Ferrying equipment consists of assault and reconnaissance boats, 
footbridges, ferries, pontoon and bridging packs, sectional bridges, bridge- 
building vehicles and assemblies, self-propelled landing craft, and other 
equipment. 

Bulldozers, graders, skimmers, trench diggers, loaders, and other engineer- 
ing equipment are used for preparing attack areas for an offensive, supporting 
troop maneuvers, creating static deployment areas, including static areas for 
the Rocket Forces, and equipping airfields and sites for the Air Defense 
Forces, as well as naval bases. 

Transport facilities. Armed forces are supported by all the modern forms 
of transportation; rail, motor vehicle, air, river, and marine, as well as 
pipelines. 

Transport has always played an important role in military affairs. Nowa- 
days, armed forces could not exist without it. 

Motor vehicle and air transport have now become especially important. 

Air defense and anti-missile defense resources. A sophisticated complex 
of various means of detecting, identifying, tracking, and destroying enemy 
aircraft and missiles protects the population, industrial centers, groupings of 
forces, and other objectives. 

The principal means of detection, identification, and tracking is radar. In 
order to detect an object (for example, an aircraft or a missile) in space, a 


radar station must generate electromagnetic energy, direct it at the target, 
and then receive and record the signal reflected from it. 

The most important characteristics of a radar station, upon which its 
detection range depends, are pulse power, receiver sensitivity, and directivity 
of the antenna. The greater the value of each of these characteristics, the 
greater the detection range. 

The increased speed of the means of delivering an aerial attack has led to 
the need to increase the distance at which they can be detected. Thus, during 
recent years, the pulse power of radar stations has constantly increased. 
Whe^'eas that of the first radar stations did not exceed 100-200kw, the 
outputs of modern long range stations is sometimes higher than 1,000- 
2.,000kw. 


Radar and other electronic equipment now in use can detect aerospace 
targets at any time of the year, day or night, at great distances, identify them 
and determine their exact position, thus providing target indications for the 
air defense missile complexes and fighter aircraft. 

Special radar stations, capable of detecting small-sized objects at great 
distances are required to counter ballistic missiles. For example, the Ameri- 
cans have already built radar stations capable of detecting approaching mis- 
siles at distances of several thousand kilometers. The use of complex elec- 
tronic computers in the radar system makes it possible, not only to detect a 
flying object, but to determine its coordinates and calculate its flight trajec- 
tory instantaneously. The USA is developing radar equipment with even 
greater detection ranges. 

Modem fighter interceptors can attain very high speeds in both vertical 
and level flight, have long range operational capabilities, and are equipped 
with powerful cannons and rockets, electronic navigation equipment, and 
automated guidance systems, which make it possible to detect and destroy 
aerial targets beyond visual range, day or night, and in difficult meteorologi- 
cal conditions. They are a reliable means of combating all types of aircraft, 
cruise missiles, and other targets at any altitude in the earth’s atmosphere, 
whether flying at subsonic or supersonic speeds. The most important advan- 
tages of fighter interceptors are their maneuverability, the fact that they can 
be rapidly relocated at bases where they are most needed, and the fact that 
they can be used repeatedly. 

Air defense artillery is still an effective means of air defense, especially 
against low-level a "ial attack. The development of aviation and the as- 
sociated dcvelopiticiit of air defense artillery led to a need for guns of different 
calibers, and air defense fire directors. 

The most important combat qualities of air defense artillery are that it can 
open fire rapidly and maintain a prolonged delivery of fire, destroy targets 
at different altitudes in any weather conditions, and at any time of the year, 
day or night, and fire at visually unobserved and untracked targets (barrage 
fire). The use of radar permits more effective use to be made of air defense 
artillery, especially in poor visibility. 


289 



Air defense artillery is a maneuverable air defense weapon, which can be 
used for the protection of both military and non-military targets. 

Depending on their purpose and design specifications, air defense guns are 
classified as follows: 2(>-60mm — small caliber; 6(>-100mm — medium caliber; 
and above 100mm — large caliber. 

To increase their rate of fire, small caliber air defense guns are generally 
designed for use with fixed ammunition and automatic loading and firing 
systems, while medium and large caliber guns have semi-automatic loading 
systems. To increase the effectiveness of fire, some armies use two-, three-, 
and four-barreled guns on a single mounting (gun carriage). 

The basic air defense artillery subunit is the battery, consisting of four to 
eight guns. 

Depending on the combat conditions and the nature of the target, air 
defense artillery employs one of two principal methods of firing: with and 
without air defense artillery fire detectors. The former is the chief method of 
aerial target firing, and involves the use of data provided by gun-laying radar, 
gun-laying radar and range finder, or, in some cases, range finder alone. 
Firing without an air defense artillery director is used for barrage firing at 
aircraft or other aerial targets and for visual firing at aerial and ground 
targets. It can also be used for firing at ground targets from covered firing 
positions. 

Ground-to-air guided missiles are the most reliable means of air defense. 
They are capable of destroying any modern aircraft or other airborne target, 
whether flying at subsonic or supersonic speed, at any altitude. 

The main features of ground-to-air guided missiles are their great ceilings, 
accuracy and strike reliability. According to foreign sources, the probability 
of a target (modern aircraft) being hit by one missile is reckoned to be more 
than 65%. Different types of ground-to-air guided missiles are used against 
airborne targets at different altitudes and at different distances from the 
defended objects. 

The use of ground-to-air guided missiles in combination with air defense 
artillery and fighter aircraft ensures a reliable air defense system. 

Military radioelectronics. This is the name given to a whole complex of 
independent branches of science and technology, which have developed dur- 
ing recent years in all the armies of the world on the basis of radio engineering 
and electronics. These include all forms of electrical communication, radar, 
radio navigation, radio-telecontrol, radiometeorology, television and photo- 
grammetry, hydroacoustics, infrared, electron'; computer, vacuum tube, 
semiconductor, and other branches of techno.O'ty. 

Radioelectronics is now of decisive important : i “ilitary affairs. It is 
difficult to imagine the possibility of conducting mode. . military operations 
and combat actions without the extensive use of radio-electronic equipment. 
The application of radioelectronics in military affairs has led to a major 
c'.iange in troop control methods, improvements to the combat qualities of 
existing types of arms and fighting equipment, and the creation of new types 
of arms with combat qualities that have brought about a revolution in mili- 


290 


tary affairs. Radioelectronics made it possible to develop guided missiles for 
various purposes. And finally, the ultra-powerful weapons of our modern 
world, based on utilizing the energy of the atomic nucleus, would never have 
developed without the resources and methods of radioelectronics. 

Radioelectronics has been applied in military affairs mainly in the develop- 
ment of communications, intelligence, and troop and weapon control facili- 
ties. 

It is true to say that an army’s “nervous system” is its communications 
network. In modern warfare, in which combat operations may spread over 
vast areas and involve highly mobile troops and equipment, radio communi- 
cations have become especially important. Radio is now the main form of 
communication in the armed forces. Every combat airplane, tank, rocket 
launcher, ground forces, subunit, and warship must have radio communica- 
tions equipment. 

If an army’s communications represent its nervous system, reconnaissance 
can be considered as its eyes and ears. The timely detection of an enemy plays 
a decisive role in the outcome of combat operations and armed conflict as a 
whole. Military reconnaissance involves the use of a variety of technical 
facilities, widely differing in design, potential, and methods of application. 
These include radioelectronic resources: radar stations, radio interception 
and direction finding, television, hydroacoustic apparatus, infrared viewers, 
radiation monitoring instruments, etc. 

Radar observation and reconnaissance facilities are used to detect various 
military objects. The operating principles of this type of equipment, which 
is used on a very large scale in air defense and aviation, have already been 
referred to. 

Hydroacoustic apparatus is widely used in the Navy to detect submarines 
and accomplish a number of other combat tasks. It can be included under 
the heading of radioelectronics, although it utilizes sound waves, not radio 
waves. The devices for generating, receiving, amplifying and transforming 
sound waves are similar to those used in radio, and are based on electronic 
circuits. 

There are active and passive hydroacoustic systems. Active systems (sonar) 
operate on the same principle as radar, but use sound waves and their 
reflection for illuminating objects in the water. Passive systems (hydro- 
phones) operate on the principle of the conversion of mechanical vibrations 
of water particles into sound vibrations. Such vibrations are produced by a 
ship’s propellers, hull, etc. 

Radio reconnaissance has been used by all the armies of the world almost 
from the moment they first acquired radio. Intelligence is picked up by 
listening in to (intercepting) the enemy’s radio communications and radio 
direction finding signals, i.e., by determining the direction from which the 
radio waves of enemy transmissions originate. Like any other form of radio 
reconnaissance, this is extremely effective and can be carried out in absolute 
secrecy, since it involves only the reception of enemy radio transmissions. 

Military television is used in foreign armies, air forces, and navies for 


intelligence purposes and also for monitoring and observation in various 
forms of controlled fire. It permits observation of areas (objects, installations, 
assemblies, equipment) where direct contact is not possible, for example, on 
account of a high level of radiation, total destruction, landslides, floods, fires 
and so on. This also applies to areas in enemy territory. The effectiveness and 
clarity of the resulting intelligence information is one of the most significam 
aspects of television. 

Infrared night vision devices are used for visual reconnaissance, observa- 
tion and identification in darkness. These take the form of night sights on 
various types of v.'eapons, and night driving equipment. These devices are 
based on the principle of converting invisible infrared radiation, used for 
“illumination,” into a visible image. 

Special radioelectronic equipment, which functions fully automatically, 
without interference in its operation and without human intervention, occu- 
pies an important place in military affairs. This category of equipment in- 
cludes various radiation monitoring and measuring devices, which form the 
basis of sensors of every possible type of information; for example, sensors 
for the determ.ination and transmission of data on levels of ground radiation 
and chemical contamination, the state of the weather, etc. 

In modern warfare, seconds make the difference between success and 
failure. This is where mechanization and automation come to man’s aid. The 
wide use of mechanization and automation in different military fields has 
been made possible solely as a result of the rapid progress in radioelectronics. 
Among the sophisticated automatic devices available today an important 
place is occupied by the electronic computer. It is used for the automation 
of G'fferent calculations, weapon control, and can “think out” solutions to 
operational-tactical problems, etc. 

According to the foreign press, electronic computers are used in the guid- 
ance systems of anti-missile and air defense weapons, in missile and artillery 
systems on naval vessels, and in ground and airborne aviation systems. These 
can compute every conceivable kind of calculation to assist a commander in 
reaching the optimal decision. 

The extensive use of radioelectronic equipment by modern armies posed 
a new problem — that of paralyzing the enemy’s radioelectronic equipment, 
thereby depriving him of stability, flexibility, and uninterrupted control of his 
forces and weapons. 

The aggregate of measures employed to accomplish these objectives is 
often referred to in the foreign press as the war in the ether, or radio warfare; 
and the elements of radio warfare are considered to be radio reconnaissance, 
electronic counter-measures (ECM), and electronic counter-counter-meas- 
iirp<j r>r defense. 

Means of communication. Military communications are designed for the 
transmission of signals, commands, orders, instructions, reports, and various 
situation data required for troop control in the process of preparing for and 
carrying out combat operations. 

Radio is the most effective and reliable means of communication in modern 


warfare. Its chief virtue is that it permits communication with mobile objects 
(ships, aircraft, tanks, etc.). The first models of radio stations were con- 
structed by our compatriot, A. S. Popov, at the end of the last century. 

Radio facilities have different electromagnetic radiation frequency ranges 
(wavelengths). The radio wave spectrum is divided into four bands. 


Band 

Wave length, m 

Wave band, mhz 

Use 

Long-wave 

30,000-3,000 

0 01-01 

Radio communication 

Medium-wave 

3,000-200 

0.1-1 5 

• • 

Short-wave 

Uttrashort'wave; 

20* 1-10 

1.5-30 


meter 

10-1 

30-300 

Radio communication and 
radio 

decimeters 

1-01 

300-3,000 

relay links. 

centimeters 

01-0.01 

3,000-30,000 

television 


Radio communications equipment is designated long-, medium-, short-, or 
ultrashort-wave in accordance with the above table. 

Long-wave radio stations are effective over long distances, their range 
being little affected by seasonal variations, or the time of the day, phases of 
solar activity, or ionospheric disturbances. However, much of the energy of 
electromagnetic waves in the long-wave band is absorbed during reflection 
from the ionosphere, and for this reason it is necessary to use high-power 
transmitters and very large antennas. The band width of long-wave radio 
stations is very small, and thus they are used mainly for telegraphy. Long 
waves are of smaller amplitude than waves in the other bands; they are 
absorbed by sea water and can penetrate to a great depth. In the foreign press, 
it is noted that this property is utilized in the Navy for communication with 
submarines. 

The operating range of medium-wave radio stations is shorter, and de- 
pends largely on the time of the day (the range of the most powerful transmit- 
ters reaches 4,000-5,(XX)km at night time and is far less during daylight 
hours). Their range is affected little by ionospheric disturbances and for this 
reason they are the principal means of communication in high latitudes. The 
number of operating frequencies in this band is also limited. Stations operat- 
ing on medium-wave frequencies use both speech and telegraphy. 

The remarkable fact that radio waves in the short-wave band are reflected 
from the upper layers of the ionosphere without appreciable loss of energy 
makes it possible to use them for communication over very great distances. 
However, the communication range of the surface (ground) wave generated 
by short-wave radio stations is limited to several dozen kilometers. 

Short-wave radio is used on practically all command links and in all 
branches of the Services. It is used for telephone, telegraph, phototelegraph 
and data link communications. Simultaneous working on two or three chan- 
nels is possible. 

Ground forces ultrashort-wave (USW) radio stations operate on frequen- 


293 


cies in the metric band. Aircraft USW communications are carried on fre- 
quencies in part of the decimetric band. This is explained by the fact that 
metric waves possess, in some degree, the property of diffraction (i.e., the 
property of bending around irregularities in the earth’s surface) and their 
propagation range is somewhat greater than line-of-sight range. Decimetric 
and centimetric waves do not have this property. Owing to the fact that 
ultrashort waves are not reflected from the ionosphere, but penetrate right 
through it, USW radio stations operate on the surface wave only. Their range 
of operation, which varies from several kilometers to several tens of kilome- 
ters, is virtually unaffected by seasonal factors or the time of the day. The 
large band width of the USW band makes it possible for a radio link to 
include apparatuses for the transmission of all kinds of information, includ- 
ing television, as well as the capacity for simultaneous operation on several 
channels. 

According to foreign sources, radio stations of this type are widely used 
for control in the lower tactical elements of the ground forces and fighter 
aviation. They are carried by motor vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and 
aircraft. Some sets are portable and weigh only a few kilograms. 

The modern radio communications equipment of a tactical element is 
characterized by a high degree of operational reliability, simplicity of mainte- 
nance, and rapidity of netting. The frequency stability of radio emissions 
makes it unnecessary to adjust such equipment during operation. 

Radio relay was first used as a means of troop control during World War 
II. The operating principles and design of radio relay facilities incorporate 
a number of the positive features of both radio and line communications. If 
we say that radio communication has been established between two points, 
we imply that there is a radio station at both of these points through which 
information is exchanged and that the range of operation is determined by 
the type of radio equipment employed. If, on the other hand, we are talking 
about radio relay, we have in mind a whole chain of stations, two of which 
are located at control points (terminal stations), and one or several between 
them (intermediate stations). The operating range of such a radio relay 
system depends mainly upon the number of intermediate stations. 

Each terminal station has a radio transmitter and a receiver. Transmission 
and reception are on different frequencies, thus ensuring that the transmitter 
does not interfere with the receiver. Each intermediate station has a similar 
set-up, which makes it possible for signals received from neighboring stations 
to be retransmitted in either direction. A similar retransmission scheme is 
used in line telegraphy by means of a relay. Hence the term radio relay link 
for a complex of terminal and intermediate radio stations. 

Radio relay stations operate in the metric, decimetric and centimetric 
segments of the ultrashort-wave band. This permits the use of very small 
antennas, capable of transmitting electromagnetic energy in a narrow beam, 
thus eliminating the wasteful expenditure of energy and requiring hundreds 
of times less radiating power for a given operating range than is necessary 
with non-directional antennas. Therefore, the output of transmitters of radio 


relay stations is comparatively low (from several watts to several dozen 
watts). The range of communication between neighboring stations of a ra- 
dio relay link is 40-50km, depending on the terrain and the height of the 
antennas. 

By using multiplexing equipment, several telephone and telegraph chan- 
nels can be received on a radio relay system (as in line communications). The 
more channels a radio relay system has, the more complex its equipment. 
Radio relay stations are either low-capacity or multichannel. The former are 
capable of receiving no more than four channels; the latter have the capacity 
for a large number of channels. There are both mobile and fixed radio relay 
stations. 

Under present-day conditions, radio relay, together with radio communi- 
cations, is the most important means of troop control. 

In recent years, it has been found possible to increase considerably the 
range of USW communication without intermediate stations, 

Apart from their many advantages, radio and radio relay communications 
have one serious disadvantage; they can be intercepted by the enemy. There- 
fore, in utilizing these forms of communication, it is essential to ensure the 
absolute security of the messages and transmissions. 

Under present-day conditions, line communications have lost their former 
importance and have been replaced by more mobile forms of communication. 
However, because of the known merits of this form of communication it will 
still be used under various conditions in a combat situation. 

Line communications have made great strides since World War II. Over- 
head lines have been replaced by cables. Field cable lines, depending on their 
purpose and the type of cable used, are divided into two main categories; light 
and heavy. 

Light cable lines are used in tactical elements. They can be single- or 
two-core cables and can carry telephonic and telegraphic communications 
over distances of several dozen kilometers. Simultaneous telephone and tele- 
graph operation is also possible. Mechanized laying of light cable lines has 
considerably speeded up the establishment of communication by this means. 
Motor vehicles, helicopters, etc., are used for this purpose. 

Heavy field cable lines are used for communications on major links. These 
consist of four-core cables, each core being covered by rubber insulation, all 
enclosed in a single Jacket of semiconducting rubber, which, in addition to 
providing mechanical protection, acts as a screen. The laying of this type of 
cable, either on the surface or at a specific depth below the surface, has also 
been mechanized. Heavy cable lines can carry several telephone conversa- 
tions and telegraphic transmissions. Modern amplifying equipment ensures 
communications over distances of several hundred kilometers. 

All the forms of communication enumerated above are combined into a 
single system through communication centers, which are established at con- 
trol points. 

The terminal elements of these systems may be telephone, telegraph, tele- 
printer, and phototelegraph equipment, different signaling devices, as well as 


units for recording data link information where electronic computers are 
used at control points. 

Mobile means of communication, which play a very important role in 
troop control in modern warfare, include cross-country vehicles, armored 
personnel carriers, helicopters and aircraft, and in some cases, fighting vehi- 
cles as well. The principal advantage of these is that they can deliver not only 
actual graphic and textual documents, but different types of small-sized 
secret equipment as well. 

Communications facilities permit the rapid exchange of various kinds of 
information between command elements. However, in order to increase the 
operational efficiency of troop control it is essential that this information be 
processed and converted very quickly into a form that will facilitate a rapid 
and accurate appreciation of the situation and the adoption of a well-founded 
solution. To this end, headquarters and other command elements are pro- 
vided with technical facilities, such as equipment for information documenta- 
tion and presentation, duplication of textual and graphic documents, and 
various types of calculators, etc. 

Naval materiel. Navy materiel is extremely diverse. It includes the entire 
fleet — different classes of surface vessels and submarines, plus naval aircraft. 

Until the advent of nuclear weapons, naval fighting power was based on 
surface vessels. Now it is based on atomic submarines armed with nuclear 
ballistic missiles, and naval aviation. According to the foreign press, the 
endurance of American atomic-powered missile-carrying submarines is prac- 
tically unlimited. They can carry up to 16 ballistic missiles with ranges of 
2,000-4,(XX)km. In the opinion of foreign exp)erts, the nuclear missiles carried 
by these vessels can be used against large-scale military-industrial and ad- 
ministrative and political centers, strategic missile launch sites, air and naval 
bases, large groups of forces, and other important strategic targets. The 
displacement of American a*omic-powered missile-carrying submarines is 
upwards of 3,000 tons, theii ubmerged speed, 25-30 knots. 

Naval missile-carrying aircraft can also inflict powerful strikes on enemy 
naval and coastal targets. 

Naval aircraft can be based either at coastal airfields or on aircraft carriers. 
An aircraft carrier is essentially a floating aerodrome, which has all that is 
necessary for the landing, accommodation, repair, and servicing of combat 
aircraft. Aircraft carriers are the largest in size and displacement of all naval 
surface vessels. According to the foreign press, their tonnage varies between 
42 and 76 thousand tons. Their speed is between 33 and 35 knots and they 
have comparatively powerful defensive armaments, usually consisting of 
twelve to fourteen dual-purpose 120- 127mm guns, thirty to fifty 20-40mm 
antiaircraft guns, or several surface-to-air guided missile launchers. The main 
combat component on an aircraft carrier is its complement of aircraft, the 
purpose of which is to attack shipping and coastal targets. The number of 
aircraft on a carrier, depending on the vessel’s displacement and the types 
of aircraft (bombers, fighters), may be as high as 140. 

Foreign navies (mainly the US Navy) have, in recent years, developed in 
two clearly defined directions: naval strike forces (submarines, aircraft and 


296 


aircraft carriers) and anti submarine warfare (ASW) forces. Therefore, in 
addition to heavy (strike) carriers, there are light and special ASW carriers. 
They are of smaller displacements and somewhat different weapons comple- 
ments, dictated by their purpose: surveillance of the enemy and the anti- 
submarine defense of fighting ships and convoys on the shipping lanes. 

Submarines armed with conventional or nuclear torpedoes may be used as 
ASW weapons. Submarines can inflict strikes on enemy shipping and recon- 
noiter his naval forces. 

Despite the rapid development of the submarine fleet, surface warships 
have not lost their importance. 

Surface vessels used in World War 11 included: battleships, cruisers, de- 
stroyers, escort vessels, minesweepers, torpedo boats, landing craft, depot 
ships, and several others. Different classes (types) of ships are described in 
terms of their dimensions, displacement, armor protection, speed, cruising 
range, and armament. 

Battleships were used to shell enemy ships and destroy them at sea. They 
were also used to demolish large coastal installations. The displacement of 
these vessels was as high as 60 thousand tons, their speed 30-35 knots, and 
cruising range 10-15 thousand miles. They were equipped with six to twelve 
powerful guns of 356-406mm, in two-, three-, or four-gun armored turret.s. 

In addition, the battleships were equipped with dual-purpose 127-1 52mm 
guns mounted in self-contained turrets for defense against aircraft and small 
craft; battleships also have numerous small-caliber air defense guns. 

Heavy cruisers, like battleships, are designed to destroy surface vessels at 
sea and bombard coastal targets. According to foreign sources, the displace- 
ment of heavy cruisers varies between 18 and 34 thousand tons and their 
armament consists of six to nine 203-305mm guns, eight to twelve dual- 
purpose guns up to 127mm in caliber, and several dozen small-caliber air 
defense guns. 

Since the war, battleships and heavy cruisers of some countries have been 
equipped with surface-to-air guided missile launchers and helicopters. 

The displacement of light cruisers varies between six and eighteen thou- 
sand tons. These warships are armed with nine to twelve 152mm guns, eight 
to twelve 102-1 27mm dual-purpose guns, 35-50 small-caliber air defense 
guns, several surface-to-air guided missile launchers, four to six torpedo 
tubes, and carry one to three helicopters. Their speeds vary between 32 and 
38 knots. The main purpose of light cruisers is the destruction of the enemy’s 
light naval forces and the disruption of sea communications. 

Battleships are no longer being built by any nation and the number of ships 
of this class in service is decreasing all the time. Other, more up-to-date, 
forms of naval technology are being developed. 

Special ships for the air defense of formations of vessels and convoys at sea 
began to make their appearance in the navies of the world in the post-war 
period. The displacement of these ships varies between five and eight thou- 
sand tons, their armament consists of eight to twelve 127- 130mm dual- 
purpose gums, small-caliber (20-40mm) air defense guns and surface-to-air 
missiles; their speeds vary from 30-34 knots. 


Radar patrol vessels are designed for long-range aircraft detection, have 
a displacement of two to three and a half thousand tons, are armed with four 
to six 120- 127mm dual-purpose guns, eight to twelve 40mm guns and depth 
charges, they can reach 30-35 knots. 

Destroyers are designed to carry out torpedo attacks on enemy ships, to 
protect naval squadrons and convoys of merchant ships from aircraft, sub- 
marine, and torpedo-boat attacks. The displacement of this class of warship 
varies between one and a half and three and a half thousand tons; their 
armament usually consists of four to six 120-127mm dual-purpose guns, 
eight to ten 40mm air defense guns, surface-to-air guided missiles, five to ten 
533mm torpedo tubes, and depth charges. 

Escort vessels fulfill the same functions as destroyers. Their displacement 
is less (one to three thousand tons) and they carry correspondingly fewer 
weapons. 

ASW vessels, even small ones, are designed to detect and destroy enemy 
submarines and carry out patrols. These vessels have displacements of up to 
2,700 tons; their armament consists of two to six dual-purpose guns, the 
calibers of which vary from 76 to 127mm, four to twelve small-caliber air 
defense guns, torpedo tubes and depth charges, and their speeds range from 
14-35 knots. 

Minelayers have similar specifications. Their purpose is to lay mines in the 
paths of enemy naval forces. 

The smallest naval surface ships, both in size and displacement, are tor- 
pedo boats, the role of which is to carry out torpedo attacks on enemy ships. 
The distinctive feature of torpedo boats is their speed (up to 42 knots); their 
main armament consists of torpedoes. 

Naval technology has developed rapidly in recent years, and naval fire 
power has increased considerably. The technically highly developed mari- 
time nations are forging ahead with the re-equipment of all classes of surface 
vessels. Increasingly, ships are being equipped with various types of missiles 
instead of the classical rifled guns. There is a tendency amongst a number of 
the most aggressive imperialist countries (members of N.ATO) to equip cer- 
tain merchant ships with Polaris nuclear missiles and include them in their 
navies as “chameleon” ships to carry out nuclear strikes in the event of war. 

What to Read on This Section 

Organizatsiya i vooruzheniye armiy i flotov kapitalisticheskikh gosudarstv 
[The Organization and Arms of the Armed Forces of the Capitalist States], 
2nd. enlarged edition. Voyenizdat, 1968. 

Mikhaylov, V. A., Naumenko, I. A. Yadernaya fizika i yadernoye oruzhiye 
[Nuclear Physics and Nuclear Weapons]. Voyenizdat, 1966. 

Yadernoye oruzhiye [Nuclear Weapons]. Voyenizdat, 1968. 

Barchenkov, S. A. Radioelektronika obuchayet, upravlyayet i kontroliruyet 
[Radioclectronics Teaches, Controls, and Monitors]. Voyenizdat, 1966. 


298 


Chapter 11. THE ESSENTIALS OF SANITATION AND 
HYGIENE 


The Communist Party and the Soviet Government, in their constant con- 
cern for the well-being of the Armed Forces, do everything possible to ensure 
that Soviet servicemen are strong, healthy and hardy — which is perfectly 
understandable, since the fighting efficiency and combat readiness of the 
Forces depend largely on the state of health and physical fitness of the officers 
and men. Under present-day conditions, at a time when the development of 
military technology has reached an unprecedented level, ever-increasing de- 
mands are being imposed on the human body. This is why questions concern- 
ing the protection of servicemen’s health have a direct bearing on the official 
duties of all command personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces. 

The Internal Service Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR oblige 
all officers to concern themselves with the protection of the health of their 
subordinates. In order to carry out their obligations in this respect, all officers 
must be familiar with disease prevention measures, the rules governing hy- 
giene, daily life and service, nutrition and rest, and the physiology and 
hygiene of military work. 

As we know, the duties of a subunit commander include the arrangement 
of training for personnel on individual topics of the military medical training 
program. Therefore, they should also know how to organize first aid on the 
battlefield, and the rules and scope of self and mutual assistance in case of 
combat injury and accidents. 

* * * 

The physical condition of servicemen is recorded and assessed on the basis 
of data obtained from a number of checks, including: daily medical inspec- 
tions of personnel: physical and medical examination of conscripted service- 
men; medical examination of soldiers, sailors, noncommissioned and petty 
officers. Aii these measures are undertaken in close contact with subunit 
commanders and representatives of the medical service. 

Internal Service Regulations emphasize that it is very important for sub- 
unit commanders to be present at medical examinations made for the purpose 
of investigating the physical condition of personnel. These officers provide the 
medical officer with information based on observations of the physical 


299 


i 

r- 


capabilities of their subordinates, and the medical officer informs them of the 
measures which need to be taken to improve the physical condition of sol- 
diers, sailors, noncommissioned and petty officers. 

The medical inspection plan is approved by the unit commander and the 
examination results are reported to him. The number of servicemen examined 
is given, together with detailed information about their condition. Reports 
on personnel who require regular medical examinations, therapy, preventive 
treatment, special combat and physical training, work, rest, or food routines 
are submitted separately. The report should also include the results of thera- 
peutic and preventive measures taken by the medical service in connection 
with examination data, and additional measures which require the comman- 
der’s approval. 

The outpatient clinic. If a serviceman becomes ill he must report the fact 
to his immediate superior at once and, with his permission, go for assistance 
to the regimental medical aid station, which is the center for all therapeutic 
and preventive work in the forces. The unit medical aid station consists of 
an outpatient clinic, an infirmary and a pharmacy. The medical assistance 
provided by the outpatient clinic of a medical aid station is limited to the 
treatment of diseases which do not require the attention of a doctor, complex 
investigations or special equipment. Vaccinations and medical inspections 
can also be carried out in outpatient clinics. Outpatients must be seen by a 
medical officer. The time of attendance at the clinic is set out in unit orders. 
Soldiers and noncommissioned officers proceed to the medical aid station in 
the charge of a senior with the medical inspection and sick book. After 
personnel on sick call have been examined and attended to, and the appropri- 
ate entries recorded in the medical books, they return to the company. It is 
the duty of the subunit commander to organize the appropriate health im- 
provement measures for soldiers and noncommissioned officers for whom the 
unit medical officer has given instructions for treatment. 

The commander of a unit or subunit should be aware of the number of 
servicemen on the sick list and the nature of their illnesses. He authorizes 
individual servicemen to be excused from duty owing to sickness on the 
recommendation of the medical officer. A medical officer may recommend 
that a serviceman be partially or fully excused from training or duty for a 
period not exceeding three days. If necessary, a further period of relief from 
duties may be granted. 

Medical treatment in quarters. An officer living in a garrison, or temporar- 
ily quartered there during leave or on temporary duty assignment, receives 
medical treatment in his quarters from the unit medical aid station, the 
garrison hospital or a hospital polyclinic department (polyclinic). He is 
treated in quarters in an emergency, in the event that he is unable to visit a 
medical aid center, or has to remain in bed in his quarters and hospital 
treatment is not essential. 

Officers of a unit which has no medical officer receive medical treatment 
in their quarters from the medical station of the unit to which the garrison 
commander has assigned this responsibility. Authorization for treatment in 


quarters is given by the medical officer of the unit (polyclinic) on the basis 
of a medical examination, taking into account the relevant conditions of the 
officer’s quarters. If an officer being treated in his quarters happens to be on 
leave or temporary duty, the unit medical officer reports this to the garrison 
medical officer, who in turn informs the town military commandant. 

Patients receive medication and dressings from the unit medical aid station 
(hospital). 

Hospital treatment. If a patient cannot be treated as an outpatient, he is 
hospitalized, i.e., he is put into ai. infirmary for hospital treatment. Patients 
who require hospital treatment for a period not in excess of five to seven days, 
do not need nursing, special diet, or complex tests, are accommodated in the 
sick bav of the unit’s medical aid .station. 

A serviceman may be sent for hospital treatment outside his unit by order 
of the commander, on the recommendation of the medical officer. In urgent 
cases, he can be sent to a civilian hospital, if specialized tieatment is indicated 
and such treatment cannot be given at the nearest military hospital. 

The procedure for this and the list of documents which a serviceman 
requires in units are laid down in Internal Service Regulations. 

Servicemen who become ill on leave, while on temporary duty or traveling, 
are sent to a hospital or other medical institute by military commandants or 
commissariats. In this case, they present their travel or leave orders, as well 
as their identification document. 

In sending a serviceman to the hospital on account of a functional disorder 
of the nervous system (neurasthenia, hysteria, etc.), the commander of a 
subunit should submit a formal description, indicating the peculiarities of the 
patient’s behavior. This should be accompanied by his medical record; and 
in the case of epileptics and persons suffering from enuresis, documents 
signed by the senior medical officer of the unit and the subunit commander 
describing the observed symptoms. 

Sanatorium-health resort treatment and organized rest. The hospital and 
health facilities available to servicemen include sanatorium-health resort 
treatment and organized rest. The therapeutic and preventive treatment 
given in sanatoria include: physiotherapy, remedial physical culture, dieting, 
sanatorium treatment, terrain cure (controlled walking). Depending on the 
available therapeutic factors, sanatoria are classified as climatic, balneologi- 
cal, fangotherapeutic, etc., and, according to field of specialization, as 
nervous disorders, somatic, gastrointestinal, cardiological, tubercular, 
osteotubercular, etc. 

Sanatorium-health resort treatment for officers and members of their fami- 
lies is covered by Order No. 20 of the Minister of War of the USSR dated 
1952, and by "Indications and Coun erindications for Admission to Sana- 
toria and Rest Homes of the Minisi»> of Defense of the USSR.” 

Patients are selected for admission to sanatoria by sanatorium selection 
commissions attached to military units, formations, institutions and garri- 
sons, on the basis of clinical examination data and the established indications 
and counterindications for admission to sanatoria. In addition to medical 




officv^rs, these commissions include headquarters and Party organization rep- 
resentatives. 

The following are eligible for sanatorium treatment and organized rest in 
sanatoria and rest homes of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR: 

— officers of the Soviet Armed Forces and members of their families; 

— officers seconded in the prescribed order for work in civilian ministries 
and departments while remaining regular officers of the Soviet Armed 
Forces, members of their families (also extended to officers assigned to civil- 
ian ministries and departments for the military training of students of higher 
educational establishments); 

— extended service and conscripted soldiers, sailors and noncommissioned 
and petty officers; conscripted personnel are admitted as exceptions, where 
there are special medical indications (considered separately in each individ- 
ual case), to central sanatoria with the permission of the Head of the Military 
Medical Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, at the request of the Head 
of the Military Medical Department of a military district, and to military 
district sanatoria with the latter’s permission. 

The right to sanatorium treatment for the members of an officer’s family 
is limited to his wife and the children whose names are entered on his service 
record as dependents. Children from 5 to 13 years of age inclusive are sent 
to children’s sanatoria only, and children from 14 years of age and older are 
sent to sanatoria and rest homes for adults. The members of families of 
extended service noncommissioned and petty officers receive sanatorium 
treatment only if there are special medical indications and with the per- 
mission of the Head of the Centrai Military Medical Directorate in each 
individual case. 

Payment for treatment and organized rest in sanatoria and rest homes run 
by the Ministry of Defense of the USSR is made in accordance with the 
existing regulations. Thus, on arrival at the sanatorium, officers pay 25% of 
the cost of their travel warrant, accommodation and treatment; members of 
their families pay 50%, and Ministry of Defense employees, 30%. Con- 
scripted soldiers, noncommissioned and petty officers use the services of 
sanatoria and rest homes free of charge, but they are required lO present a 
food certificate. 

A completed sanatorium form (orders), together with medical documents 
(medical book) can be issued to an officer and members of his family by the 
head of the medical service of the unit or establishment, on the recommenda- 
tion of the Sanatorium Selection Commission, only with the permission of 
the unit commander. 

Not all officers are in need of sanatorium treatment. Personnel whose 
health is almost normal may spend their leave for recuperative purposes in 
other health improvement establishments run by the Ministry of Defense. 
Some of the military district sanatoria have guest houses where a warrant 
entitles an officer to accommodation in a room for two to four persons and 
three meals a day (without treatment, therapeutic procedures, e'c.). The 
maximum length of a stay in such guest houses is 24 days. 


302 


Physically fit officers may be granted active recreational leave in tourist 
camps under military district and central administration. Tourist camps are 
located on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus, on the south coast of the 
Crimea, in the Carpathians, the Baltic, near Leningrad, and other places. 
They provide accommodation in buildings or tents and are set up for a 20-day 
vacation. During the summer, officers may obtain warrants for the Ministry 
of Defense swimming camp w'ith a 21 -day boat excursion along the Volga 
River from Moscow to Astrakhan and back. 

On the prevention of certain illnesses. Gastrointestinal, respiratory, and 
circulatory complaints, hypertension and arteriosclerosis, neuropsychic dis- 
order, are included among the most common diseases. Prophylactic measures 
aimed at their prevention are of great importance in the maintenance of the 
serviceman’s health. 

Gastrointestinal complaints (acute and chronic gastritis, chronic colitis, 
ulcers) occur mainly as a result of nutritional defects, especially the consump- 
tion of inferior food, which occurs most frequently during the summer. The 
consumption of excessive amounts of alcohol also contributes to illnesses. 

The aggravation of chronic gastrointestinal complaints is usually caused 
by irregular eating habits, overeating, eating too quickly, living cold, dry food 
for a prolonged period, insufficient mastication of food on account of dental 
defects, the consumption of very hot or very cold food, spicy dishes, etc. 

Preventive measures against these illnesses include the maintenance of 
exemplary sanitary conditions in the area occupied by the unit, the procure- 
ment and proper storage of good quality food products, and proper food 
preparation. Of great importance for medical personnel are the early diagno- 
sis of these diseases, particularly among new recruits, continuing observation 
of servicemen found to be suffering from any of these disorders, strict adher- 
ence to the daily work schedule and feeding regimen, and timely hospitaliza- 
tion of patients who cannot be treated in the unit. 

Of the resp^ atory diseases, the most dangerous is pulmonary tuberculosis. 
Tuberculosis may be brought into the army by young recruits. For this 
reason, special requirements are imposed on medical selection commissions 
in connection with the examination of recruits. 

Early recognition of tuberculosis is ensured by regular medical and X-ray 
examinations of the servicemen. 

Of great importance in the prevention of tuberculosis are- toughening 
exercises, physical training and sports, health instruction given by officers of 
the Medical Service; strict observance of the regulations on barrack-room 
hygiene and attention to personal hygiene. 

Commanders at all levels should pay particular attention to the recommen- 
dations of representatives of the Medical Service concerning the need for a 
careful check on the health of servicemen working under unfavorable condi- 
tions, in the presence of sharp temperature fluctuations, dust, inadequate 
ventilation, toxic substances; as well as on servicemen who, having con- 
tracted tuberculosis, may become a hazard to those around them (kitchen, 
dining hall and warehouse staff, etc.). 


303 


There may be servicemen who, while not suffering from tuberculosis, may 
be predisposed to it. These are people who are physically weak, with pro- 
nounced anemia and a weakly developed rib cage, people who have suffered 
with exudative pleurisy, chronic catarrh of the upper respiratory tract, pro- 
longed elevation of temperature up to 37.2-37.8°, and individuals who 
progressively lose weight. It is expedient for subunit commanders to establish 
a strictly individual physical load for such people on the advice of the unit 
medical officer. 

Servicemen suffering from active pulmonary tuberculosis are treated in 
specialized hospitals and subsequently undergo a period of convalescence in 
specialized sanatoria. The treatment of such patients in sanatoria is free 
under Soviet law. 

In the prevention of cardiovascular ailments, particular attention is paid 
to prophylactic measures against the occurrence of rheumatism, hyperten- 
sion and atherosclerosis. 

Rheumatism begins most frequently in childhood or adolescence: in 75% 
of the cases before the age of 15, in 15% between the ages of 15 and 25, and 
in 10% after the age of 25. Rheumatism develops very often after angina 
(within 10-15 days) or acute inflamation of the epipharynx and upper respi- 
ratory tracts. Of critical importance in the genesis of the disease is the 
condition of the body and its susceptibility to streptococci. Cooling of the 
body (cold, dampness) also has a great influence on the development of the 
disease. The greatest incidence occurs during the fall and winter (from Octo- 
ber through April). 

Prophylaxis of rheumatism includes the active treatment of acute and 
chronic affections of the throat, upper respiratory tract, nasal accessory sinus, 
and teeth. In order to reduce the incidence of these disorders it is essential 
to subject personnel to systematic toughening exercises. 

The main symptom of hypertensive disease is elevated arterial blood pres- 
sure; the chief causes are deep disturbances of the regulation of the vascular 
tone brought about by changes in the nervous system, endocrine glands, and 
kidneys. Hypertensive disease is a neurogenic disorder attributable to 
traumatism and stress of the higher nervous activity. 

The all-round physical training of servicemen is very important in the 
prevention of hypertensive disease. An inactive way of life predisposes a 
person to it. Other reasons for its development are: nervous overstrain, 
mental trauma; situations associated with prolonged or frequently recurring 
alarm, fear, lack of self-confidence; excessive consumption of meat and fat. 

The earlier hypertensiori is detected, the easier it is to treat. People suffer- 
ing from it should be aware of the great harm that can be caused by smoking, 
overindulgence in alcoholic drinks, insufficient rest, negative emotions, and 
physical overexertion. 

The most common blood disorder is anemia. I