Full text of "DTIC ADA270376: Program Manager: Journal of the Defense Systems Management College, Volume 22, Number 5, September-October 1993"

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93-23158

Seprember-Ocrober 1993

PROGRAM

MANAGER

Journal of the Defense Systems Management College

Acquisition Reform Underway at Pentagon

DTIC

PROGRAM MANAGER

Journal of the Defense Systems Management College

Published by the

DEFENSE SYSTEMS
MANAGEMENT
COLLEGE
PRESS

Commandant

BGen (Sel) Claude M. Bolton. |r.. USAF

Provost and Deputy Commandant

Edward Hirsch

Exeeutlw Direetor
Research and Information Division

Or. Adelia E. Ritchie

Director. DSMC Press

Wilbur D. (ones. Ir.

PROGRAM

MANAGER

Managing Edilor

Catherine M. Clark

Associate Editor

Esther M. Farria

Art Director

Greg Caruth

Typography and Design

Paula Croisetiere

Program Manager (ISSN 0199-7114) is
published bimonthly by the DEFENSE
SYST MGMT COLG. ATTN RDP. 9S20
BELVOIR ROAD. SUITE G38. FT BELVOIR
V^A 22060-5505.

POSTMASTER: Send address changes
to Program Manager. DEFENSE SYST
MGMT COLG. ATTN RDP. 9820 BELVOIR
ROAD. SUITE G38. FT BELVOIR VA
22060-5565.

For sale hy the Superintendent of Documents.
U.S. Government Printing Office Washington.
PC 20402

Whenever masculine nouns or pronouns
appear, other than with obvious reference to
named male individuals, they have been used
for literary purposes and are meant in their
generic sense.

Program Monoger

VOL. XXII, No. 5, DSMC 116

DOD Acquisition Reform
Underway at Pentagon

Catherine M. Clark

The DSMC Alumni hear about main¬
taining acquisition excellence with de¬
clining resources.

PARADIGM SHIFT

Reengineering Business
Organizations

Dr. fames E. Price
Dr. Sharlett Gillard
Dr. Mary-Blair Valentine

What is the optimum organizational
structure for an information system pro¬
gram office? Has a paradigm shift oc¬
curred?

DSMC/FAA Interagency
Agreement

Tony Rymiszewski

Project "kicked off” at DSMC on luly
26 . 1993 .

Foreign Military Sales
Cooperative Development

John L. Sweeney

A Win-Win Idea whose time has
come.

To subscribe, government personnel should submit written requests (using their business addresses) to the
DEFENSE SYST MGMT COLG. ATTN RDP. 9820 BELVOIR ROAD. SUITE G.38. FT BELVOIR VA
22060-5565.

Manuscripts. Letters to the Editor, and other correspondence are welcome and should be addressed to the
DSMC Press. Inquiries concerning proposed articles mav be made by phone at (70,t) 805-2892/3056 or DSN

655-2892/3056. Septembef-Ocrober 1993

Cover Photos:

The DOD Acquisition Leadership-Mr. Gerald E. Keightley. Executive Director of the Defense Acquisition University,
top left; Mrs. Colleen A. Preston, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Reform), top right; Dr. John M. Deutch, Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), bottom left; and. Dr. William). Perry, Deputy Secretary of Defense, bottom
right.

A New Program Manager’s
Guide to People

Restructuring the Acquisition
Organization

DOD Contract Performance
Management and TQM

Deanna ]. Bennett

The Ben Hur theory of Program
Management-how to fine-tune the team.

Hermann O. Pfrengle

The Armaments Directorate, the ac¬
quisition side of the German Ministry of
Defense, has seen major adaptive orga¬
nizational changes since 1990.

Joseph R. Houser
Dr. Kenneth A. Potocki

A look at three TQM principles; cus¬
tomer focus, employee involvement and
continuous improvement.

The Ever-Current Issues in
OT&E

Dr. Ernest A. Seglie

Ensure that the operational effective¬
ness and suitability of weapons systems
are tested adequately, evaluated objec¬
tively, and reported independently to
decision-makers.

Lean Production

Major William B. Vance, USAF

An initiative that stands out as a
long-term, first-choice commitment as
the production concept of choice in the
program manager’s acquisition strategy.

iWlD (QUALITY INSPBCnBD ft

ALSO:

Keightley Explains DAU Role

Colleen Preston On “Where We’re

Going”

Defense Systems Acquisition
Management Chart Updated

Program Manager’s Notebook
Updates Available

From Our Readers

DSMC Sessions Concern

Connecting Ethics and Quality 48

Book Review

Keynoter Speaks on Revolutionary

Changes

52_

Operation Flood Relief

53_

DSMC Press Begins Publishii^

&r>

Technical Reports

□ ’

DSMC Academic Environment

□

ICAF/DSMC Sign MOA

55“

DTIC Users Training

From the Commandant

56“

Program Manager is a vehicle for transmitting information on policies, trends, events, and current thinking affecting program management and defense systems acquisition. .
Statements of fact or opinion appearing in Program Manager are solely those of the authors and are not necessarily endorsed by the Department of Defense or the Defense
Systems Management College. Unless copyrighted, articles may be reprinted. When reprinting, please credit the author and Program Manager, and forward two copies of the
reprinted material to the DSMC Press. ***

Program Monoger

A NEW LOOK

DOD ACQUISITION REFORM

Underway at Pentagon

! aintaining Acquisition Excel-
-1 lence with Declining Re¬
sources,” theme of the 10th annual
Program Managers Symposium spon¬
sored by the Defense Systems Man¬
agement College (DSMC) Alumni As¬
sociation, brought more than 225
people from government and indus¬
try to the DSMC campus.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Will¬
iam I. Perry spoke on “A New DOD
Acquisition Strategy.” He was
introduced by the DSMC Comman¬
dant, Brigadier General (Select) Claude
M. Bolton, Jr., USAF, who invited ev¬
eryone to “step back and ask ques¬
tions.”

Dr. Perry addressed elements of
the new acquisition reform program
in the Department of Defense (DOD).
“Changes are taking place like a flood
tide and DOD must not be swept away
but, instead, take the current,” he said.

Actions are underway to combine
defense and industrial bases into one
industrial acquisition reform program,
saving tens of billions of dollars dur¬
ing the next five years. “It won’t be
done overnight,” he explained.

Several “tools” will be used, like
industrial specifications instead of mili¬
tary ones, and simplified procurement
procedures.

Bener Processes

The reorganization of DOD, under
Defense Secretary Les Aspin, is ex-

Catherine M. Clark
Managing Editor

pected to provide better processes of
acquisition reform, environmental se¬
curity, advanced technology demon¬
stration management, logistics and eco¬
nomic security.

Dr. John M. Deutch, Under Secre¬
tary of Defense (Acquisition and Tech¬
nology), formerly Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, reports to Dr.
Perry. Dr. Deutch is charged with
preparations for the Defense Acquisi¬
tion Board and daily issues concern¬
ing acquisition. (See Program Man¬
ager, July-August 1993, p. 2.)

New Positions

Mrs. Colleen A. Preston, who fills
the new post. Deputy Under Secre¬
tary of Defense (Acquisition Reform),
spoke on “The New OSD Acquisition
Organization, Functions and Initia¬
tives.” She said “we can’t do tomorrow’s
job with today’s system and “we must
focus on how to reorient and
reengineer.” She is identifying and
implementing ways to make the ac¬
quisition process more efficient. (See
story page 4.)

Another new post. Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Economic
Security, is charged for economic
reinvestment, base closure and
realignment, industrial base issues
and international programs. Report¬
ing to this office will be the new
Office of Economic Adjustment (for¬
merly the Office of the Secretary of
Defense for Force Management and
Personnel).

1. Mr. Gerald E. Keightley. Executive
Director. Defense Acquisition University.

2. Dr. lohn M. Deutch. Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition and Technology).

Progrom Manager

Seprennber-Oaaber 1993

Among Positions Under Agency (formerly DARPA) will report

DUSD(A&T) to this official.

Environmental Security handles en¬
vironmental issues and installations;
Advanced Technology monitors bal¬
listic missile defense technology and
the Pentagon’s seven other thrust ar¬
eas: and. Defense for Logistics over¬
sees all logistics questions.

The Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for Atomic Energy will su¬
pervise the On-Site Inspection Agency
and the Defense Nuclear i<^ncy. (See
Chart, Program Manager, luly-August
1993, pp. 28-29.)

Defense Acquisition
University

Gerald E. Keightley, Executive Di¬
rector of the new Defense Acquisition
University, described its role in ac¬
quisition and certification; i.e., struc¬
ture resources,
education and
training and re¬
search and publi¬
cations. (See story
this page.)

During the July
symposium, pan¬
els addressed
“Implementing
the New Acquisi¬
tion Strategy-
Acquisition Ex¬
ecutives’ Perspec¬
tives’: “A Report
from the Acquisi¬
tion Law Review
Panel”; and. Ac¬
quisition Education and
Certification—How the Ser¬
vices Are Doing."

Edward C. Robinson,
the symposium chairman,
succeeds Charles Tringali
as the DSMC Alumni
President.

The Alumni Association
Office is located at 7731
Tuckerman Lane, Suite 131
Potomac. MD 20854;
(301)309-9125; FAX (301)
309-0817.

The Director of Defense Re¬
search and Engineering will handle
scientific issues, basic and applied
research, and laboratory research
and management: The Director of
the Advanced Research Projects

Photos by Richard Mattox.

3. Mrs. Colleen A. Preston. Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition Reform).

4. The Honorable William /. Perry. Deputy Secretary of
Defense.

93 10 1 27

3 7,000 STUDLNTS

Keightley Outlines
DAU Role

Robert W. Ball

An estimated 37,000 students will
attend one or more of 1,000 offerings
of 50 mandatory acquisition related
courses taught at 16 schools making
up the Defense Acquisition Univer¬
sity (DAU) consortium in FY 1994.

Gerald E. Keightley, DAU Execu¬
tive Director, told several hundred
people attending the DSMC Alumni
Association’s 10th Anniversary Sym¬
posium here in July that 16 Depart¬
ment of Defense Schools and com¬
mands make up the DAU consortium.

The DAU is a result of the Defense
Acquisition Workforce Improvement
Act. The 16 schools will educate and
train acquisition personnel in 12 ca¬
reer fields: Program Management:
Communications/Computer Systems;
Industrial Projierty Management; Sys¬
tem Planning, Research, Development
and Engineering; Contracting; Purchas-
ing'Procurement; Test and Evaluation
Engineering; Quality Assurance; Manu¬
facturing and Production; Acquisition
Logistics; Business, Cost Estimating
and Financial Management, and Au¬
diting.

Mr. Keightley told the DSMC
Alumni that each acquisition
position is identified at a Level (1. II,
Ill) and a career field. “Each level
within a career field has mandatory
education, training and experience
requirements which must be met by
people seeking certification in the
Defense Acquisition Corps,” he said.
Individuals may be certified in mul¬
tiple career fields.

To meet Acquisition Corps require¬
ments. an individual must be a GM-
(continued on page 5)

Program Monoger

Seprember-OCTober 1993

WILL MAINTAIN RLADINESS

COLLEEN PRESTON EXPLAINS
‘‘WHERE WE RE GOING”

I n a luncheon address to the De-
— fense Systems Management Col¬
lege Alumni Association on July 9, at
the Fort Belvoir Officers Club, Mrs.
Colleen A. Preston, Deputy Under Sec¬
retary of Defense (Acquisition Reform)
{DUSD(AR)), spoke on “where we’ll
be going with acquisition reform."

Mrs. Preston stated the need for
acquisition reform is a result of a de¬
clining budget and changes in global
technology. She said we will main¬
tain readiness but to pay for priorities
there must be cuts in areas including
infrastructure and production cost. A
reduction in the acquisition workforce
is possible, as well.

Commercial Companies

To “reduce costs but to ensure we
maintain our technological superior¬
ity. we must be able to acquire state-
of-the-art technology on a timely ba¬
sis and from commercial companies,”
said Mrs. Preston. She stated many
needs no longer exist. Redesign is nec-

Esther M. Farria
Associate Editor

essary to reduce costs and we must
consider adopting commercial prac¬
tices. Her official focus is on reorient¬
ing business practices.

Mrs. Preston feels ideas for change
will come from the acquisition com¬
munity. Developing integrated action
teams with input from industry and
others will help develop an imple¬
mentation plan.

Short-term initiative "priority ac¬
tions" are the first steps of a compre¬
hensive package of acquisition reform.
These actions include developing a
DOD position on acquisition of com¬
mercial products. The ultimate goal is
to “move away” from the DOD pro¬
cess now used. She advocates stream¬
lining procedures for developing regu¬
lations and sharing best practices to
avoid duplication of effort.

Senior Steering Group

Mrs. Preston’s office will be the
“focal point for restructuring and im¬

proving the acquisition process by di¬
recting the conception, development,
adoption, implementation, and insti¬
tutionalization of new and innovative
policies and processes that meet the
principles of the new acquisition sys¬
tem.”

The DUSD(AR) will use a Senior
DOD Steering Group and will estab¬
lish a dialogue with the Congress to
help determine how to implement the
transition to the new acquisition sys¬
tem. This is not meant to replace ihe
efforts of the offices of the Secretary
of Defense, the military departments
or the defense agencies to make the
existing system function more effec¬
tively and continue to implement poli¬
cies, practices and changes to improve
the system. These offices, departments
and agencies will coordinate with
DUSD(AR) to ensure changes are con¬
sistent with approaches pursued by
the Acquisition Reform office.

Legion of Merit.. .Dr. John M. Deutch, Un¬
der Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Tech¬
nology), presents the Legion of Merit to Briga¬
dier General (Select) Claude M. Bolton, Jr., USAF,
DSMC Commandant. Bolton received the award
for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the per¬
formance of outstanding services as Program
Director, Advanced Cruise Missile System Pro¬
gram Office, Aeronautical Systems Center, and
as Inspector General, Headquarters Air Force
Materiel Command.

Program Monoger

Seprember-Oaober 1993

1 » i

Mr. John L. Elherton,

Professional Staff

member to the Senate

Armed Services Com-

mittee. ivas a luncheon

speaker at the Alumni

Association Sympo-

Siam. His subiect tvas

“Congress and DOD

Acquisition - Current

Perspective." He talked

■g

about the budget pro-

• m

cess, subcommittee as-

‘(MV

signment and acquisi-

tion reform.

; j

(DAU Rok continued from page 3)

13/0-4 or higher and have a bacca¬
laureate degree plus 24 credits in man¬
agement-related courses or 24 credits
in field plus 12 management-related
course credits. Four years of acquisi¬
tion position experience are required.
Completion of Level II training is re¬
quired and civilians must sign a mo¬
bility agreement.

“The estimated budget for FY 94 is
nearly $40 M more than the FY 93
budget.” Keightley said. “The num¬
ber of students will jump nearly 10.000
and the number of course offerings
an estimated 1.100. up from 944 in
FY 93," he said.

The defense acquisition workforce
is approximately 130,000.

The DAU central office consists of
three divisions under the President
and Executive Director: Resource
Management, Academic Affairs and
University Operations.

Resource Management is respon¬
sible for funding and quota allocation
(assigns quotas and monitors regis¬
tration and graduation processes).

Academic Affairs is responsible for
the education and training. It offers

joint, competency based, acquisition
courses in the 12 career fields.

University Operations include de¬
veloping research and publication
capabilities in acquisition and the es¬
tablishment of a structure to provide
for research and analysis of defense
acquisition policy issues.

The DSMC and a 1-year acquisi¬
tion course at the Industrial College
of the Armed Forces (ICAF) are, by
Title 10 mandate, part of DAU.

The following schools are part of
DAU when they teach mandatory
acquisition courses: Air Force Institute
of Technology (AFIT); Army Logistics
Management College (ALMC): Army
Management Engineering College
(AMEC); Defense Contract Audit In¬
stitute (DCAI); Defense Logistics Civil¬
ian Personnel Support Office (DLACPO);
European Command Contracting Train¬
ing Office (EUCOM): Information Re¬
sources Management College (IRMC):
Lowry Technical Training Center; Na¬
val Postgraduate School (NPS): Naval
Supply Systems Command Regional
Contracting Centers (NAVSUP); Na¬
val Facilities Contracts Training Cen¬
ter (NFAC): Naval Warfare Assessment
Center (NWAC); Navy Acquisition Man¬
agement Training Office (NAMTO), and
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
The Navy. (ASN(RDA)).

Defense
Systems
Acquisition
Management
Process Chart
Updated

The Defense Systems Acquisition
Management Process Chart (DSMC
Chart CORP: 2007 of May 1992) was
created as an integration vehicle and
training aid for the Acquisition Basics
Course (now Intermediate Systems
Acquisition Course). The chart serves
as a roadmap of functional activities
throughout the systems life cycle and
is available to all DSMC course at¬
tendees and the acquisition commu¬
nity.

Response to the Chart in its first
year of publication has been over¬
whelming. More than half of the DSMC
courses have voluntarily adopted it.
It is distributed in the AFIT Systems
100 Course and used at the Army
Logistics Management College, Army
Engineer School. AFOTEC OT&E
Course (Kirtland AFB), University of
Maryland, Computer Science School
(Fort Gordon), University of South¬
ern California, and others.

In less than one year. 25,000 cop¬
ies have been distributed at customer
request. A list has also been estab¬
lished identifying users.

A recent update for reprinting re¬
flects minor changes: hence, the pre¬
vious chart remains viable. The DSMC
Chart CORP: 2008 should be avail¬
able in early September 1993.

For copies, contact:

DEFENSE SYST MGMT COLG

ATTN OSPR

9820 BELVOIR ROAD

SUITE G38

FT BELVOIR VA 22060-5565

(703) 805-2376: DSN 655-2376

Progrom Manager

Seprember-Ocraber 1993

TRALVIMC. SIR VICKS

DSMC/FAA

INTERAGENCY

AGREEMENT:

“Kicked Off’ July 26

I he Defense Systems Manage-
-ment College (DSMC) has en¬
tered into am Interagency Agreement
(lA) with the Federal Aviation Ad¬
ministration (FAA) to provide acqui¬
sition employees with program man¬
agement resource development. This
project was officially “kicked off” at
DSMC on July 26, 1993.

During the five-year term of this
agreement, DSMC will develop sys¬
tems acquisition curriculum and fa¬
cilitate short courses based on FAA
case studies and lessons learned. Pro¬
gram management personnel in FAA
Systems Acquisition will be instructed
using FAA case studies and current
Department of Transportation (DOT)
and FAA orders and directives.

The FAA training will be compa¬
rable in curriculum design and con¬
tent to that provided to DSMC short-
course students. In place of the DOD
5000 documentation series, the DOD
coordinated and DOT approved March
19, 1993, FAA Order 1810.1F, “Ac¬
quisition Policy” and corresponding

Mr. Rymiszewskt, Professor of En¬
gineering Management, wrote and ne¬
gotiated the Integragency Agreement
for Dr. Ben Rush, DSMC Dean of Fac¬
ulty. Mr. Rymiszewskt Is presently Di¬
rector of DSMC Corporate Planning.

Tony Rymiszewskt

Brigadier General (Select) Claude M. Bolton fr., USAF, Commandant, Defense Systems Man¬
agement College, signs an Interagency Agreement with the Federal Aviation Administration's
John Turner, Associate Administrator for NAS Development (left), and Carolyn Blum, Associ¬
ate Administrator for Contracting (right).

Progrom Monoger

Seprember-Oaober 19<?3

DOT/FAA documents will be empha¬
sized as study references used in the
classroom and in FAA students' study
guides/handouts.

The FAA's lohn Turner. Associate
Administrator for NAS Development
(AND), said at the lA signing: “We
are pleased to formalize our associa¬
tion with DSMC because of its fine
reputation in training DOD program
management personnel...and we now
have an opportunity to tailor this train¬
ing to FAA experiences and capitalize
on lessons learned."

Photo by Richard Mattox.

..,DSMC is proud
to undertake this
Interagency
Agreement effort.
It is DSMC's first
attempt to
undertake a long¬
term reimbursable
commitment with a
customer outside
of DOD,

Frances M. Valore. Professor of Fi¬
nancial Management, is assigned to
manage this effort for DSMC . Mr.
Turner designated Jeanne D. Rush,
former Program Manager for FAA
Weather Processors, as the on-site
program manager and contracting of¬
ficer technical representative. The
joint project team will be colocated at
DSMC and work under the counsel
of Dr. Adelia E. Ritchie, Executive
Director, DSMC Research and Infor¬
mation Division.

The first course offering at DSMC
to FAA students is planned for early
1994 and will utilize a case-study ap¬
proach for the Microwave Landing
System (MLS) and two other FAA pro¬
grams.

Interviews with former and current
MLS program managers and
multidisciplined matrix personnel are
underway. Other FAA unique pro¬
gram management tasks will be mu¬
tually selected for development by
DSMC upon completion of this initial
task.

PROGRAM

MANAGER’S

NOTEBOOK

UPDATES

AVAILABLE

Program Manager’s Notebook re¬
vised and new fact sheets have
been published.

If you completed and mailed
the request form in the May-
lune 1993 issue of Program
Manager, your packet will be
mailed to you.

Government personnel may re¬
quest these by writing to the
DEFENSE SYST MGMT COLG,
ATTN OSPR, 9820 BELVOIR
ROAD, SUITE G38. FT BEL¬
VOIR VA 22060-5565. FAX:
(703) 805-3857.

Nongovernment personnel may
purchase the packet. Stock Num¬
ber: 008-020-01302-1, by writ¬
ing the Superintendent of Docu¬
ments, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, DC 20402.

BGen(Sel) Claude M. Bolton, Jr..
DSMC Commandant, expressed his
strong support during the lA kick-off
meeting stating that “...DSMC is proud
to undertake this Interagency Agree¬
ment effort. It is DSMC’s first at¬
tempt to undertake a long-term reim¬
bursable commitment with a customer
outside of DOD."

Dr. Ben Rush. DSMC Faculty Dean,
who initiated this effort as an in-house
research project last fall, said, "This
is a forward looking precedent and
opens opportunities for DSMC to of¬
fer multi-disciplined program manage¬
ment staff capabilities to other fed¬
eral agencies. The requirements are
similar to our OSD customer-oriented
systems acquisition educational
training."

Program Manager

Seprember-Ocrober 1993

ORCiANIZATION MAINTENANCE

ANEW

PROGRAM MANAGER S GUIDE

TO PEOPLE

Or the Ben Hur Theory
Of Personnel Management

w ell, they finally did it—made

-you the manager of an ac¬
quisition program. Look out DOD,
here comes the best-run program ever.
The user will be thrilled about the
system your program produces and
foreign military sales customers will
hardly be able to wait for theirs. Not
only will the system be fielded on
time, it will be used by the DOD Comp¬
troller as an ideal example of how to
manage a program so it hits the cost
target in the bull’s-eye.

Wait a minute! Before you make
plans to move into your castle in the
air, how are you going to build it?
Unless you’re the Clark Kent of the
acquisition program world, your staff
will have to make this happen.

Facing Up to Change

The first person you’ll have to handle
is yourself. Who are you? You’re the
proj am manager! Right? Whether
you are initiating a new program or
taking over an existing program, you
are the precipitant of, and the person

Deanna /. Bennett is a Program
Manager in the U.S. Special Opera¬
tions Command, Research Development
and Acquisition Center, MacDill AFB,
Florida. She is a graduate of PMC
93-1.

Deanna J. Bennett

who, manages an organizational
change. Your assumption of program
responsibility will cause unsettling ef¬
fects of change on workers in your
program.

Letting the program staff know how
great you are won’t be enough to get
them to work as a good team. There
are good techniques a new program
manager can use to help individuals
accept and adapt to the change. These
same processes can be a vehicle for
you to answer key questions about
the new people making your program
happen, and about how you should
manage them.

These are reporter-type who, what,
when, how questions. Who are these
people? What talents do they bring to
the program? What makes them tick
as individuals? How can I best man¬
age them to solve inevitable program
problems? When are different mana¬
gerial approaches called for?

The program manager getting the
right answers and using them prop¬
erly won’t have to ask the last ques¬
tion; Why did I ever get into this job?

Managing Change

Reaction to organizational change
progresses through four phases:

You can fine-tune the team, a la Ben Hur.

Program AAonoger

Seprember-Oaober 1993

lenial, resistance, exploration and
rommitment.' A new manager means
jeing more than a cookie-cutter re¬
placement for an old one. People un¬
derstand that a new manager will want
;o leave a mark on the organization:
naking small or large changes on pro-
redures, responsibilities, the way the
program office interfaces with others.

The first reaction is denial; The
‘new guy" won’t change anything and
:an’t. The savvy manager should
rounter denial with personal infor¬
mation. what areas are being consid-
;red for improvement, any new pro¬
gram direction from the Defense
Acquisition Board (DAB) or program
:xecutive officer, etc.-

By understanding
how individuals in
the program
manager
organization
perceive, judge and
relate to the
outside world, you
can fine-tune the

team.

Once denial is overcome, resistance
sets in. The prospect of change threat¬
ens feelings of competence and the
organizational pecking order. The
counter to resistance is to listen. Here’s
where the program manager can begin
double duty with a single manage¬
ment technique: While attacking re¬
sistance to change, the program man¬
ager can craft the form the change
will take. The key is in how to listen
twice.

Pinpoint Problems

First, listen to understand the sub¬
stance of the concern. This may pin¬
point problems with the organization
and procedures. Then you can ad¬
dress “what" questions. What kind
of technical, administrative and man¬
agement skills does this person have?
What do they think is not working in
the organization (e.g., my area is fine,
but such-and-such in someone else’s
area is broken)? What are their per¬
sonal concerns?

At the same time listen to the kinds
of substance and concerns voiced by
each. This will feed your assessment
based on the Myers-Briggs Type Indi¬
cator.' Here’s where the “Ben-Hur
theory” of personnel management
comes in. Ben Hur could tell that a
steady chariot horse should be an
anchor on the inside, and a high-
spirited. speedy horse on the outside.^
By understanding how individuals in
the program manager organization
perceive, judge and relate to the
outside world, you can fine-tune the
team.

This helps answer the “who" ques¬
tions. Who is best to handle/advise
on what type of project or situation?
Who should be where in the organi¬
zation, ideally?

It won’t be difficult in early discus¬
sions to identify the less socially ori¬
ented introvert and the outward fo¬
cused extrovert. These may be easy
traits to position on the team. You
don’t assign technology trade-off work

Progrom Monoger

September-Oaober 1990

requirng extensive searching through
journals and archival research to your
extrovert engineer. You don’t send the
introvert to chat with potential pro¬
gram cosponsors at an Air Force user’s
conference.

Sensing and Intuition

Perception modes can be equally
useful to ascertain. Do the concerns
you hear focus on practical pieces of
the job (sensing), or where the whole
program is going, and lack of vision
of your predecessor (intuition)? Of
your two financial managers/budget
analysts, you would use the one high
on the “sensing-end” of the scale to
monitor the budget, and work the bud¬
get estimate submission and amended
submission.

The “intuitor” is the one you would
use for financial shortfalls to apply
creativity in near-term reprogramming,
and to play heavily in building your
program objective memorandum
(POM). Sensors and intuitors can be
used and balanced outside the finan¬
cial area: the sensors to keep a steady
hand on current work, pushing toward
the near-term deadlines (Ben Hur’s
inside horses): and, intuitors to iden¬
tify new customers, new applications,
and new technologies for the system.

Thinking and Feeling

Types of judgment/decision-mak¬
ing are seen in individual concerns
about your presence—^what it bodes
for the PM office. If you hear about
possible hurt feelings and advice about
how best to approach certain indi-
i/iduals, a “feeling” type is talking. It
s wonderful to have a “feeling type”
ivho’s dealt with and can “read” con¬
gressional staffers, members of the
ZAIG and DAB, etc., to strategize
'uture face-to-faces; and to tailor your
nternal approach to implementing
:hanges.

The “thinker,” the individual who
juilds an iron-bar link between cause

Sensors and intuitors
can be used and
balanced outside the
financial area: the
sensors to keep a
steady hand on current
work, pushing toward
the near-term deadlines
(Ben Hur*s inside
horses); and, intuitors
to identify new
customers, new
applications, and new
technologies for the

system.

and effect, can best serve as the strat¬
egist of the substance of the future,
given decisions made today. This one
can be on source-selection boards,
sit on contractor reviews, advise on
technology trade-offs and work hand-
in-hand with the “feeling” type to build
a solid POM defense.

Finally, where someone rates on
the judgment/perception scale may
help you decide who sits on the Con¬
figuration Control Board and is part
of your strategic planning team (“judg¬
mental type"). This jjerson manages
the stream of questions your program
gets from The Hill; or, the shifting
face of the POM and budget as they
proceed through the Service, DOD
and legislative systems (“perceiver”).
You’ll know them from the way the
“judger” talks about how difficult it is
for the program to be “unsettled,” and
wishes decisions would be made and
“stuck to”: and, the way the perceiver
talks about just wanting to know what’s
going on.

Accepting Possibilities for
Change

Your initial thoughts about team¬
ing strategy are complicated because
each person has combinations of the
four trait pairs. All information you
need for a clear picture of problems
and personalities won’t come from a
single encounter and listening to the
sources of resistance to change. More
will appear when your team progresses
beyond resistance to your presence
and what it bodes, to the “explora¬
tion” stage of change—when the PM
staff accepts and addresses the pos¬
sibilities from change.

The kinds of ideas from people prob¬
ably will reinforce or clarify any Myers-
Briggs type uncertainty remaining: e.g.,
suggestion about changing the for¬
mat of a report will be from an “S”
type, as certainly as the suggestion
that you drop everything and build a
strategic plan comes from an “N.”

Channeling the Talent

As a new program manager, you
have met the team and had little time
to identify the most critical problems.
Now, your role in the exploration pro¬
cess is to channel and focus the team’s
energy, so that it does not fly off track.
Some processes may be one-on-one,
but meetings may aid in team build-

Yogrom Manager

Seprember-Oaaber 1993

ing. Consider the what, who and how
in structuring group attacks on prob¬
lems. What kind of problem? Who
should participate in the problem
solving process? What should that
process be?

Technical problems are easiest to
start to attack. You get a small group
of technical/functional experts to ana¬
lyze, identify alternatives, assess al¬
ternatives. and recommend solutions.
If the people involved in the techni¬
cal analysis are familiar with the sys¬
tem and have tentative conclusions,
it might be best to introduce (with a
facilitator) the Kepner-Tregoe struc¬
tured method of problem analysis’ to
control the tendencv' to leap intuitively
to a logical, but not necessarily cor¬
rect. cause-and-effect pair.

Hither within the group or in a re-
view/advisor\' capacity, once you con¬
sider solutions you’ll ensure there is
a “sensor■' to speak to the technical
essence and an ‘intuitor" to see broader
program implications of alternatives.
Also, there tvil) be a "thinker" to deal
with the facts, and a "feeling" type to
be sensitive to implications of alter¬
natives on stake-holders.

A Level Playing Field

You will know your type and how
its predispositions may cause you to
view ultimate recommendations. With¬
out the range of perspectives on the
problem, you may commit to the op¬
timum immediate technical solution
in lieu of a lesser solution which is
technically and economically prefer¬
able in the long run, and more politi¬
cally palatable/sellable.

Some organizational problems deal¬
ing with internal organization, work
flow, and morale may benefit from a
"level playing field" across the orga¬
nization. If the organization is ser\'ed
by a local area network and there is
an internal problem requiring buy-in
from the bottom to the top, an auto¬
mated brainstorming session may be
a good way to get the most and best

Gaining and
maintaining team
commitment to the
program requires

awareness and time.

ideas on the table, especially if par¬
ticipation can be anonymous. Iden¬
tify a referec/manager of the inter¬
change, set a time-limit for the process
(at least a few weeks so that inter¬
changes can fit and around other work).

Having deftly helped your team
through the changing of program man¬
agers (or establishment of a new pro¬
gram with you as manager), don’t stop
short of the final step—fostering com¬
mitment. Gaining and maintaining
team commitment to the program re¬
quires awareness and time. People
feeling appreciated also feel they be¬
long to the team. The PM must be
aware of accomplishments and con¬
tributions of the team and must rec¬
ognize them informally and formally.

Continued Maintenance

The program manager must work
at organizational maintenance. Time
must be spent continually recycling
the organization through management-
led reaction to the process of organi¬
zational change; that is. provide in¬
formation, listen, channel energy, and
acknowledge accomplishments. Each
program is continually changing; the
net effect to the program manager to
recognize and meet it head-on is a
team committed to the program, and
well-suited to carry it out.

Endnotes

1. Videotape. Managing People
Through Change, Cynthia D. Scott and
Dennis T. laffee, produced by BARR
Films, distributed by Video Learning
Systems. Haverford. Pa.

2. This is brought out in "The People
Rollout: Key to Change" by Sally
Cusack. Datamation. April 1, 1993,
pp. 55-56.

3. Introduction to Type: A Description
of the Theor\' and Applications of the
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Isabel
Briggs Myers, Consulting Psycholo¬
gists Press. Inc.. Palo Alto, Calif.

4. Remember the scene in Cecil B.
DeMille’s movie Ben Hur where Ben
Hur meets a sheik at an oasis? Watch¬
ing the sheik’s white Arabian chariot
team race around a track, Ben Hur
predicts ’’they’ll never hold the turn"
well before they run off track. He ex¬
plains to the sheik that the team was
improperly organized: The horse with
the steadiness who should be the an¬
chor was on the outside, the horse
with the spirit and speed was on the
inside, etc.

5. Kepner-Tregoe Problem Analysis
(Copyright Kepner-Tregoe. Inc., 1981,
Princeton) is a highly structured form
of analysis that "slows down" the ana¬
lytical process and adds breadth to
cause and remediation anaivsis.

Program Monoger

Seprember-Ocrober 1993

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

RESTRUCTURING THE
ACQUISITION
ORGANIZATION

The German Ministry of Defense

basic principle of efficient
-management holds that or¬
ganizational structures should be ori¬
ented along the mission and tasks to
be carried out by an organization. As
mission and tasks change, so should
the organization’s structure.

Fundamental changes in threat
perception accompanied by shrink¬
ing defense budgets, costly German
and European unification, and new
defense roles within NATO and the
West European Union (WEU) are
among major factors contributing to
new political, economic and military
realities in Europe, and beyond.

Germany's defense mission spec¬
trum and associated tasks are under¬
going shifts and changes to accomodate
those new realities. The new military
reality stresses streamlined rapid-re¬
action forces, multinational European
rapid-deployment groups, lighter, air¬
mobile weapons systems and equip¬
ment. Consequently, the Armaments
Directorate, which is the acquisition
side of the German Ministry of De¬
fense (MOD), has seen since 1990
major adaptive organizational changes

Mr. Pfrengle is Liaison Representa¬
tive, German Liaison Office for De¬
fense Materiel USA/CANADA. He is a
guest lecturer in the DSMC Multina¬
tional Program Management Course.

Hermann O. Pfrengle

FIGURE 1. The MOD
Armaments Directorate
as Restructured in 1 990
(German Short Designations
in Parentheses)

which 1 will discuss in this manu¬
script.

The MOD Armaments
Directorate

Following a major change in the
German materiel acquisition process:
i.e., the integration of the Concept
Phase in the Preliminary Phase, the
organization of the Armaments Di¬
rectorate had been restructured in
1990, as shown in Figure 1. This first
stage in a sweeping restructuring ef¬
fort created two distinct pillars of ar¬
maments acquisition activities: Ar¬
maments Technology and Armaments
Projects.

Previously, the two areas had been
combined, but the new realities men¬
tioned above, specifically economic
and budgetary constraints, necessi¬
tated greater transparency and con¬
trol above all as concerns costs.

This restructuring at the ministe¬
rial level' caused certain MOD-man-
aged projects to be shifted to the imple¬
menting level: i.e., to the Federal Office
for Defense Technology and Procure¬
ment (BWB) on the technical-engi¬
neering side, and the respective Army,
Air Force and Navy Services General
Offices.-

Due to mounting budgetary con¬
straints which also necessitated per-

Progrom Manager

Seprember-Ocraber 1993

FIGURE 2. The MOD
Armaments Directorate
as Restructured in 1992
(German Short Designations
in Parentheses)

sonnel reductions in the MOD and
throughout the German defense com¬
munity, the need for greater acquisi¬
tion control at the ministerial level
led in 1992 to a combination of the
Service Component Staffs R,D,T and
F Divisions {Stabsabteilungen Vll)3
with the Armaments Directorate’s
Projects Division. The end result is
the Armaments Management Division
as shown in Figure 2.

The Armaments Management
Division’s staff consists of military and
civilian personnel in a balanced mix
of leadership, management and cen¬
tral functions. This is a significant
departure from the previous principle
of civilian control over defense acqui¬

sition: civilian control had been a tra¬
dition which had grown out of post-
World War II concerns over too much
military control of weapons acquisition.

Organizational Details

The Armaments Director now has
two Subdivisions directly assigned to
him: i.e., Rue Z I and Rue Z II (see
Figure 2). Rue Z I deals with central
armaments affairs, policy, organiza¬
tion, planning, matters of economics
and business administration. Last,
but not least, it has oversight of the
Federal Office for Defense Technol¬
ogy and Procurement (BWB) on the
implementing level.^

Of particular importance from a
multinational viewpoint is the orga¬
nizational change in the MOD’S busi¬
ness of international armaments co¬

operation. Drawing from past experi¬
ence, international armaments coop¬
eration, which had previously resided
at a lower level in the hierarchy, has
now been elevated. It is directly as¬
signed to the Armaments Director,
providing him also with ready sup¬
port in his function as the “German
National Armaments Director” within
the scope of NATO’s CNAD forum.

This organizational evaluation sig¬
nifies the heightened importance Ger¬
many attaches to acquisition through
international cooperation. Because of
the smallness of its defense industrial
base, which cannot sustain acquisi¬

tion competition in most major systems
areas, Germany relies on international
cooperation for such major systems,
and will more so in the future.

Subdivision Rue Z IPs tasks com¬
prise armaments matters and coop¬
eration within NATO, WEU, lEPG,’
country-specific cooperation, arms
exports matters, and disposition of
the former East German Armed Forces’
materiel. The Armaments Directorate’s
concentration of its "foreign affairs”
in Subdivision Rue Z II should also
facilitate Allied contacts in such
matters.

The Armaments Technology Divi¬
sion, with 4 Subdivisions and 25 Sec¬
tions, bears the ministerial responsi¬
bility for steering and controlling all
defense research and technology ac¬
tivities. Within the scope of the for¬

mal materiel acquisition process (see
Figure 3), this responsibility covers
the Pre-Phase, and the approval of
the first Milestone document, the “Tac¬
tical-Operational & Technical Require¬
ments.”

The organizational structure of the
Armaments Technology Division takes
into account the overarching guide¬
lines and armaments tasks embed¬
ded in the “Research & Technology
Concept.”'' and is oriented along the
lines of technology activities extend¬
ing across all three Service compo¬
nents. It consists of the following four
subdivisions:

Because of the smallness of Its
defense Industrlol bose, which
connot sustoln ocquisitlon
competition In most mqfor
systems oreos, Germany relies on
Intemotlonol cooperation for such mq|or
systems, and will more so In the future.

Seprember-Ocrober 1993

Program Manager

f The activities of Armoments

Monogement ore guided by the
"singie-monogement" principie;
i.e., the organization is fully
responsible for systems progrom
monogement by worfc/effort, time/schedule,
ond funds/costs.

—IV, Weapons Employment, Effects:
Protection Technologies.

The Armaments Management Di¬
vision consists of 5 subdivisions and
31 sections, and is responsible for
steering and controlling the develop¬
ment of weapons systems. Within the
scope of the formal materiel acquisi¬
tion process, this responsibility cov¬
ers weapons systems which are in the
definition, development or procure¬
ment phases (see Figure 3) up to, and
including, the “Final Report,”' the last
Milestone document (at the transi¬
tion from the Procurement Phase to
the In-Service Phase).

The activities of Armaments
Management are guided by the “single¬
management” principle; i.e., the
organization is fully responsible for
systems program management by
work/effort, time/schedule, and funds/
costs. The Armaments Management
Division consists of the following five
subdivisions:

—M I. Central Affairs. Policy, Budget

—M II, Information Systems (divided
into functional aspects)

—^T1, Central Affairs, Policy, Planning

—M 111, Army Systems

—TII, Land, Air, Sea Systems

Technologies, Platform-specific —M IV, Air Force Systems

Technology: Evaluation of Foreign

Defense Materiel —M V, Navy Systems.

—T III, Intelligence/Reconnaissance, The organization of Subdivisions

Command & Control Information M III to M V is structured along the
Technologies lines of Service materiel responsibility.

Preliminary Phase
(Tactical/Operation^y Concept)

Milestone Document
TacticalOperational
and Technical Requirements

Definition Phase

Milestone Document
Military/Technical/Economic
Requirements

Development Phase

Milestone Document
Fielding Report

Procurement/Production

Phase

Milestone Document
Final Report

In-Service Phase

User Service
Staff and Rii T

RuM

.:v'

User

Service

FIGURE 3. Phase
Responsibilities (Shown
Along Arrows) in the
German Materiel
Acquisition Process (as
of 1992)

In concluding this necessarily
brief discussion of the German MOD’S
restructured armaments organization,
it should be noted that some of
these streamlining efforts are accom¬
panied, of course, by pros and
cons.

The pros stress the leaner
organization’s mission orientation,
greater program management control
at the MOD level, and more flexibil¬
ity in adapting to the challenges of
new tasks. The cons, largely from a
military point of view, see a marked
reduction of overall military influence
in German systems acquisition.

Procedural Changes

A number of procedural changes
in the acquisition process are associ¬
ated with the Armaments Directorate’s
restructuring discussed above. 1 will
address here only the most signifi¬
cant procedural change that may be
of interest to the student of multina¬
tional program management.

From now on, only three figures
will be in charge of ministerial sys¬
tems management:

—The system manager, located in the
Armaments Management Division

—The project manager, located in the
BWB

—The system office located in the
respective Service component’s
general office.

The system manager is the central
figure in this national management
triad. He has the overall responsibil¬
ity for the system’s development and
procurement, in accordance with the
Milestone objectives document, and
higher-level decisions. His core tasks
include planning, steering and con¬
trolling the acquisition process of his
weapon system. To that extent, he is
authorized to direct the BWB project
manager, and the SeA'ice component
system officer.

Program Monoger

Seprember-Oaober 1993

As compared to the previous sys¬
tem management procedure, where
the system manager was only a first
among equals, and could make ac¬
quisition-related decisions only with
the consent of the project manager
and the system officer, the system
manager now can yield more power.

As concerns the acquisition-related
MOD management directives and
guidelines, the required updating and
adapting has been almost completed.
The associated implementing regula¬
tions and instructions are scheduled
to be available in 1993.

Conclusions

The German materiel acquisition
process—which had originally bor¬
rowed essential features from the U.S.
systems acquisition process conceived
in the 1960s under then Defense Sec¬
retary Robert McNamara—had re¬
mained virtually unchanged during
two decades. In line with this conti¬
nuity, the organization of the MOD
Armaments Directorate had retained
most of its original structure.

In the face of today’s new politi¬
cal, economic and military realities,
however, the changes described in
this manuscript are important, and
correspond with the management prin¬
ciple which says that the purpose of
organizational structures is to sup¬
port organizational processes. These
processes are determined by an

organization’s mission spectrum and
tasks; i.e., in the case of the MOD
Armaments Directorate, the more ef¬
ficient acquisition of defense materiel.

The new organizational structure
discussed here obviously emphasizes
the German systems acquisition’s tech¬
nical and economic elements more
than the purely military ones. Never¬
theless, the new organizational struc¬
ture of the German Armaments Di¬
rectorate gives the military user more
of a say in the technical-engineering
and economic context than had been
the case before.

As a guest lecturer in the DSMC
Multinational Program Management
Course, permit me a final word on
international cooperation. The new
political, economic and military reali¬
ties appear to intensify intra-
regional cooperation in Europe. Nev¬
ertheless, a closer look shows that
cutting major weapon systems is cur¬
rently more the rule than the exception.

One lesson to be drawn from this
observation is that the acquisition of
major systems in Europe is not nec¬
essarily less costly than trans-Atlan¬
tic cooperative acquisition. A lot de¬
pends, of course, on the specific kind
of technology involved. Still, a recent
U.S. study comes to this conclusion:
“Germany’s procurement process is
relatively ‘transparent’ to allied sup¬
pliers, including those from the United
States....On balance, we find that U.S.

industry has had equitable access to
the German defense procurement
market.’’**

By assigning international coop¬
eration directly to the Armaments di¬
rector, Germany also is signaling the
heightened importance it attaches to
acquisition among allies. If, in this
vein, the United States would see fit
to lessen some of its restrictions in
technology sharing, a selective revival
of trans-Atlantic armaments coojjera-
tion would be quite conceivable in
the mid-term.

Experience shows, after all, that
political will can be a powerful moti¬
vator, but sometimes needs a boost
from economic necessity.

Endnotes

1. Comparatively speaking, the min¬
isterial level would include most of
the U.S. DOD, plus Component Staff
acquisition functions; German Com¬
ponent Staffs are integrated in the
MOD.

2. Changes on the implementing level
will be discussed in a future article.

3. Roughly equivalent to the U.S.
Service Components’ Deputy Chief
of Staff Offices for RDT&E, plus some
Materiel Commamd functions.

4. See Endnote 2.

5. lEPG = Independent European
Program Group, a forum to intensify
cooperation among European coun¬
tries.

6. This “Research & Technology Con¬
cept” is tied in with other German
governmental technology perspectives
beyond the defense sector.

7. Partly equivalent to the U.S. SAR.

8. C. M. Aquino. "Germany’s De¬
fense Market,” Logistics Management
Institute, Bethesda. Md., August 1992,
p. xii.

H|||H In the face of today's new

political, economic ond militaiy
reolities, however, the chonges
described in this manuscript ore
importont, ond correspond with the
monogement principle which soys thot the
purpose of orgonizotionol structures is to
support orgonizotionol processes.

Progrom Monoger

Seprember-Oaober 1993

Tlif; QUAIJTV fOLIRiVI Y

DOD CONTRACT
PERFORMANCE
MANAGEMENT AND TQM

Three Principles

[ n approach Is presented for

-1 the continued application of

total quality management (TQM) prin¬
ciples to the Department of Defense
(DOD) contract performance manage¬
ment process. The cost and schedule
management subprocess of DOD con¬
tract performance management is ad¬
dressed with respect to the TCiM prin¬
ciples—customer focus, employee
involvement and continuous process
improvement.

The DOD management and con¬
tractors have achieved success using
TQM to improve cost and schedule
management. This paper will advo¬
cate continued use of TQM and will
present concepts on how TQM can
further improve DOD cost and sched¬
ule management.

Introduction and Background

The DOD contract cost and sched¬
ule management process is defined
by DoD Instruction 5000.2 Cost/Sched¬
ule Control Systems Criteria (C/SCSC).
This DOD Instruction defines the data

Mr. Houser is a consultant with IBM Federal Systems Company. He was the industry leader for the DOD/NSIA TQM
study on cost/schedule management. He is Chairman of the Board and past President of Performance Management
Association (PMA), and is past Chairman of NSIA's Management Systems Subcommittee.

Dr. Potocki is Associate Department Head of the Technical Services Department at The Johns Hopkins University
Applied Physics Laboratory. He has been a program manager for DOD and NASA programs at the Applied Physics
Laboratory, and he teaches TQM at the G.W.C. Whiting School of Engineering.

Progrom AAonoger

Seprember-Ocrober 1993

requirements for the contractors’ cost/
schedule management process. It is
structured to jiermit contractors to use
existing systems to the maximum ex¬
tent possible with the intent of using
the same data for DOD reporting that
the contractor uses for managing cost
and schedule performance.

Figure 1 illustrates the DOD cost/
schedule management process. The
contractors' cost/schedule manage¬
ment process is depicted within the
dashed-line box. The data from this
process is used for DOD performance
reports generated by the contractor
and used by DOD to conduct perfor¬
mance reviews on the contract as de-

Figure 1. DOD C/SCSC Cost/Schedule Management
Process

paper demonstrates how TQM
can continue to improve the effec¬

tiveness and efficiency of the C/SCSC
process.

Customer Focus

The quality of a process can be
determined by the results it achieves
and customer satisfaction. A process
has external customers who purchase
products and services and internal
customers who require output from
an entity within the process. For ex¬
ample. within a contractor’s cost/sched¬
ule management process, a cost esti¬
mator requires a contract schedule
from the scheduling department in
order to develop an estimated cost for
the contract. The cost estimator is an
internal customer of the scheduling
department.

I. M. luran provides a customer-
focused definition of quality as fit¬
ness for use. Customers have needs,
and they determine the usefulness and
satisfaction level derived from services
and products. A key ingredient to the
successful application of TQM is a
customer focus by process owners who
are constantly striving to maximize
customer satisfaction levels.

picted by the blocks referenced with ®. Contract performance reviews by

an ®. DOD and contractors use the same Figure 2 illustrates customer in¬

cost and schedule performance data, volvement defining requirements at
Corrective actions and redirection the front end of the process and the

result from both the contractors’ and Using the same process to satisfy customer feedback on satisfaction lev-
DOD’s performance reviews as de- two different customer groups, DOD els with the service or product at the
picted in the block referenced with a and industry, is a complex task. This end of the process. The customer is

Progrom Monoger

Seprember-Oaober 1993

Table 1. DOD Cost/Schedule Customers

DOD Customers

Contractor Customers

OUSD{A) Executives

Contractor Program Managers

DOD Program Managers

Executives

Systems Acquisition Executives

Accountants

Program Executive Officers

Financial Managers

Program Budget Analysts

Estimators/Pricers

Cost Estimators

Engineers

Defense Contract Auditors
Program Office Analyst

Production Managers

the most important participant to de¬
fine requirements, wants and needs
to determine the usefulness and sat¬
isfaction levels with the product or
service.

DOD Cost/Schedule
Management'

The DOD contract cost/schedule
control process is a shared manage¬
ment approach by DOD and defense
contractors to manage major systems
programs as illustrated in Figure 1.
The DOD and contractors have a
shared ownership of the cost/sched¬
ule management process and a joint
responsibility to ensure the process
meets the needs of both DOD and
the contractor, including external and
internal customers.

This shared responsibility and pro¬
cess ownership is a major challenge
to the successful application of a cus¬
tomer focus to TQM. A large team
effort involving all the participants in
this shared process is required to im¬
prove the process. Some of the many
customers of this process for govern¬
ment and contractors are illustrated
in Table 1.

Management functions from DOD
and industry have different goals and
objectives, but they each desire to
embrace TQM. The A. D. Little sur¬
vey on C/SCSC’ found different cus¬
tomer needs. The survey stated the

following: “Because the various us¬
ers of C/SCSC (Cost/Schedule Con¬
trol Systems Criteria) have somewhat
different needs and perceptions, some
of the controversies surrounding
C/SCSC may not be as amenable to
resolution as others.”

The DOD/NSIA (National Secu¬
rity Industrial Association) TQM study
on Cost and Schedule Management'
consisted of 250 interviews with the
customer groups as identified in Table
1. Both of the referenced studies iden¬
tified a broad and diverse population
of customers with varied needs and
requirements with relatively equal rank¬
ing in importance.

The DOD/NSIA study found a
higher satisfaction level with the cost
of C/S (cost and schedule) manage¬
ment. Contractors expressed a lower
satisfaction level related to duplica¬
tion of some elements of C/S manage¬
ment. This process with shared re¬
sponsibilities and conflicting needs
between customers requires a well-
coordinated effort to achieve customer
satisfaction for all users in the DOD
cost/schedule management process.

Observations

It is common TQM practice to evalu¬
ate customer needs and importance.
Many past efforts have focused on
internal customers. More recently,
efforts to implement TQM concepts

in the IX)D cost/schedule process have
rightfully identified program manage¬
ment as a key external customer whose
needs have not been adequately sat¬
isfied by this process.

Many of the recommendations from
the TCiM report of DOD Cost/Sched¬
ule Management recognized the im¬
portance of program management as
an external customer. Program man¬
agement is responsible for program
success and is accountable for man¬
aging programs on schedule and within
cost targets. This report suggests that
DOD and contractor TQM initiatives
in cost/schedule management should
emphasize an increased customer fo¬
cus on program management.

Program management should have
a strong voice in defining requirements,
and their satisfaction should be a driv¬
ing force behind most improvement
activities. While it is appropriate to
increase efforts to improve the satis¬
faction levels of program management,
it should not de-emphasize the im¬
portance of the internal customers.
The challenge of a customer-focused
TC)M program is to continually strive
to improve the satisfaction level for
external and internal customers.

Tom Peters, in his book Thriving
on Chaos,^ stresses the importance of
a strong customer focus to improve
organizational p)erformance. Peters
recommends a Customer Information
System (CIS) consisting of formal
market research and surveys to
quantify customer needs and satis¬
faction.

It also includes informal customer
telephone calls, customer meetings
and correspondence. Both DOD and
industry leaders in cost/schedule man¬
agement (and C/SCSC) can take de¬
monstrable actions to listen to all cus¬
tomers, measure customer satisfaction
and team together to use this infor¬
mation to improve the process.

Program management is a key ex¬
ternal customer whose satisfaction level

Progrom Monoger

Seprember-Oaober 1993

FIGURE 2. Customer Process Participation

Process

Activities

with DOD cost/schedule management
has been low; it is appropriate to fo¬
cus process improvement efforts to
improve their satisfaction level.

Employee Involvement

Improving and increasing the value
of products and services is a common
objective found in the various ap¬
proaches to TQM. While TQM lead¬
ers have somewhat different ap¬
proaches, they have common
ingredients. Quality leaders such as
W. Edwards Deming, Joseph M. luran,
Kaoru Ishikawa and Philip B. Crosby
stress the importance of work-force
employee involvement to improve the
value of products and services. Their
views are summarized as follows:^

Deming - Quality is everybody’s job

- Organization-wide partici¬
pation

furan - Problems and opportunities
need to be identified and
solved through task teams

- Company-wide participation
Ishikawa- An atmosphere of mutual

trust and respect is neces¬
sary for full employee in¬
volvement

- Quality control should be a
company-wide effort

Crosby - Encourage employees to
communicate obstacles to
management

- To ensure success, develop
team leadership skills and
encourage interdepartmen¬
tal collaboration

- Form quality improvement
teams.

DOD Cost/Schedule
Management

Leaders in DOD contract cost/
schedule management have recognized
the need to address work-force em¬
ployee involvement. The A. D. Little
survey on C/SCSC stated: “We con¬
cluded that recommending the insur¬
ance of directives or even more guid¬
ance would probably not help the (C/
SCSC) situation....Instead of more

guidance, we concluded that we would
recommend attacking the problem(s)
at its source. The sources are (a) the
inadequate understanding of many
industry and government personnel
on what C/SCSC can be expected to
accomplish and (b) the inadequately
qualified C/SCSC DOD practitioners.”

The A. D. Little study recommended
work-force employee involvement ac¬
tions involving persons within DOD
and industry who implement and op¬
erate DOD cost^schedule management
systems.

The DOD/NSIA TQM report on
DOD Cost/Schedule Management Pro¬
cess made 18 recommendations. The
DOD and NSIA formed integrated work
groups from DOD and industry with
representation from all involved dis¬
ciplines and functions to identify and

solve problems. These work-force
employee groups have taken corrective
action on 17 of 18 recommendations.

The DOD has taken additional ac¬
tions to encourage work-force employee
involvement, such as issuing guid¬
ance to encourage industry use of
nonfunctional work teams from DOD
and industry to manage contracts. The
DOD executives have lectured at con¬
ferences and visited contractors to
communicate their views supporting
work-force employee involvement
concepts.

Observations

Significant developments from the
TQM approach are new management
and organizational theories related to
work-force employee involvement.
These include employee empower-

FIGURE 3. IBM Rochester Quality Journey

1990-95

1988

1981

1984

Mkt Driven

Process

Strategy

Process

Mgmt

Employee

Product

Mgmt

Dev Cycle

Empowerment

Focus

Mfg Cycle

Time

Critical

Zero

Time

Customer

Success

Defects

Process

Integration

Factors

Cost of Quality

Efficiency

Benchmarks

Vision

Goals

Program Manager

Seprember-Oaober 1993

FIGURE 4. DOD/Industry TQM Activities

• TQM study complete

• DOD C/SCSC , 2rd NafI C/S

streamlined 5 items Conference

• 1 St Nat'l C/SCSC • qod C/SCSC
streamlined 3 items

Conference
•TQM study
initiated

1989

• DQD C/SCSC
Guide Revised

• Air Force C/SCSC
Workshop

1988

»Air Force and Army
streamlined cost
reporting

oooM

1990
•TQM study
conducted
•2nd Nat’l C/SCSC
Conference

1992

• DOD C/SCSC
streamlined 4 items
•4th NafI C/SCSC
Conference

ment, removing functional barriers,
and multifunctional work groups.
These work groups are commonly
called work teams and DOD often
refers to them as Integrated Product
Teams (IPTs).

Contractors and DOD are support¬
ing multifunctional work groups in an
effort to improve organizational co¬
operation and increase effectiveness
and efficiency. Dennis C. Kinlaw,
author of Developing Superior Work
Teams, emphasizes the importance
of work-force employee involvement
to achieve superior results from orga¬
nizations. He states. “In the many
years that I have consulted with orga¬
nizations. I have heard all sorts of
complaints from all kinds of jobhold¬
ers. But there is one complaint I have
never heard—people have never said
to me that there was too much team¬
work in their organization.”''

The DOD organizations, govern¬
ment and industry, are restructuring
in response to the significant
reduction in DOD budgets. As part
of this restructuring, many organiza¬
tions are moving toward employee
empowerment and removing functional
barriers.

These organizations are reducing
middle management, headquarters
operations and support staffs; form¬
ing integrated product teams: imple¬
menting concurrent engineering and
self-directed work teams; and revis¬
ing compensation plans to reward team
performance.

The DOD and industry leaders in
cost/schedule management can review
what they are doing to proactively
promote employee empowerment and
break down functional barriers. Con¬
tracts and organizations can be en¬
couraged to use multifunctional work
groups to solve problems in their cost/
schedule process. Contracts and or¬
ganizations successfully empowering
employees and removing functional
barriers can be recognized and ad¬
vertised.

Those involved with DOD cost/
schedule management, government
and industry, can take the initiative
to become leaders in work-force em¬
ployee involvement by looking for
opportunities to promote multifunc¬
tional work groups to improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of the
C/S process.

Continuous Process
Improvement

Developing world-class processes
and obtaining results from applying
TQM requires time. The quality jour¬
ney for the IBM Rochester Plant (win¬
ner of the 1990 Malcolm Baldrige
National Quality Award) with approxi¬
mately 10,000 employees, spans sev¬
eral years with carefully develop^ed
initiatives as illustrated in Figure 3.

In continuous improvement, each
organization or process is unique, and
each quality journey will have to be
customized to its unique environment.
As illustrated in Figure 3 the quality
journey is a series of phases with each
phase expanding and stretching the
organization’s goals to achieve world-
class results.

DOD Cost/Schedule
Management

The quality journey for DOD con¬
tract cost/schedule management cov¬
ers many years. In 1967, DOD im¬

proved the process by changing from
a regulatory specification approach
to a process based on criteria which
permitted contractors to maximize their
use of existing internal control sys¬
tem. During the mid-’70s there were
many task forces established to im¬
prove DOD contract cost/schedule
management.

During the mid-’80s. DOD and in¬
dustry. through NSIA. initiated a TQM
partnership to improve the DOD cost/
schedule management process for
contractors and DOD, as illustrated
in Figure 4.

There have been several carefully
planned activities and initiatives which
have resulted in process improvements.
The quality journey continues and,
as of this writing, DOD is updating its
training and educational material to
reflect the changes from this TQM
activity. In addition, the DOD loint
Implementation Guide (IIG) for DOD
cost/schedule (C/SCSC) is being up¬
dated to reflect the same changes.

Observations

Achieving and maintaining a “world-
class process" and obtaining a high
level of customer satisfaction is a con¬
tinual effort. The principle of con¬
tinuous improvement complements
and animates the principles of cus¬
tomer focus and employee involve¬
ment.

Progrom Manager

Seprember-Oaober 1993

Customer focus identifies the
issues, employee involvement pro¬
duces solutions and implements
changes, and the improved process
provides the benefit to DOD and in¬
dustry. It gets the job done well at a
more competitive cost. Most DOD
and defense-related industry organi¬
zations are going through significant
change with the reduction of DOD
budgets.

These organizations are downsizing
and/or consolidating, and many are
expected to “do more with less.” In
this changing environment, DOD and
contractors will have to improve their
organizations and processes to main¬
tain and improve existing performance
levels.

With these changes. DOD and
contractor organizations are seeking
improved cost/schedule management
practices to improve organizational
and contractual f)erformance measure¬
ments.

The DOD contract cost/schedule
management and the TQM partner¬
ship between DOD and industry has
achieved admirable results, but a
world-class process requires continu¬
ous improvement with expanded per¬
formance goals.

Summary

Achieving sustainable DOD cost/
schedule management process im¬
provements has been a priority for
DOD and industry for a significant

period of time. The importance of
achieving sustainable improvements
is greater in the current environment
of downsizing and consolidation for
both DOD and contractors.

According to a U. S. Government
Accounting Office (GAO)^ study, 20
firms with TQM programs that scored
high on the Malcolm Baldrige Na¬
tional Quality Award have high orga¬
nizational performance. As illustrated
in Figure 5. the GAO study found the
majority of the measurable perfor¬
mance results in the four areas stud¬
ied to be positive.

The DOD cost/schedule manage¬
ment process has benefited from past
TQM activities. The DOD stated that
as a result of TQM and other im¬
provement activities* “Contract esti¬
mates at completion (EACs) reported
to us by our program managers in
quarterly management summary re¬
ports, are now significantly more re¬
alistic than they used to be." The
NSIA President said as a result of
changes that DOD and industry have
jointly implemented,” “Cross indus¬
try savings are difficult to quantify
but initial projections could reach over
a billion dollars per year.”

This paper focused on the TQM
principles; Customer Focus, Employee
Involvement, and Continuous Im¬
provement. Government leaders in
DOD cost/schedule mana^ment have
and can continue to achieve improved
results by the continued application
of TQM.

Endnotes

1. DOD cost/schedule management is
defined by DOD Instruction 5000.2, Cost/
Schedule Control Systems Criteria (C/
SCSC).

2. Survey Relating to the Implementation
of Cost/Schedule Control Systems, A.D.
Little. Program Systems Management Com¬
pany, dated 12/5/83 and 8/15/84.

3. TQM Report for Program Management
on the Cost^chedule Management Pro¬
cess, DOD and NSIA (National Security
Industrial Association) dated 5/17/91.

4. Thriving on Chaos, Tom Peters, Alfred
A. Knoff, New York, 1987.

5. Quality Tree, The Maryland Center for
Quality and Productivity College of Busi¬
ness and Management, University of Mary¬
land.

6. Developing Superior Work Teams, Build¬
ing Quality and the Competitive Edge, Den¬
nis C. Kinlaw, Lexington Books.

7. How the Baldrige Award Really Works,
David A. Garvin, Harvard Business Re¬
view, November-December 1991.

8. Office of the Under Secretary of De¬
fense (Acquisition), Deputy Director for
Performance Management, memorandum
to NASA Administrator, dated March 12,
1993.

9. National Security Industrial Associa¬
tion memorandum to Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), dated
luly 1992.

FIGURE 5. GAO Study on TQM

Employee
Relations
Positive 75%

Operational
Procedures
Positive 90.8%

Customer
Satisfaction
Positive 90.8%

Financial
Performance
Positive 85%

NoChg7.7%

Neg 17.3%

No Ctig 6.2%
Neg 3.1%

No Chg21.4%

Neg 15.0%

Neg 3.6%

Progrom Manager

September-Oaober 1993

PROGRAM OFFICE PARADIGM SHIFT

REENGINEERING
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS

Impact On Information System
Program Management

James E. Price, Ph.D.

Sharlett Gillard, Ed.D.

Mary-Blair Valentine, DPA

I nformation systems development
— has evolved through various
stages of organizational reengineering.
Since specific hierarchial structures
are tailored to accomplish unique busi¬
ness objectives, this incremental shift
has resulted in myriad organizational
structures. The unanswered ques¬
tion is: What is the optimum organi¬
zational structure for an information
system program office?

This paper suggests that a para¬
digm shift has occurred. Program man¬
agers have moved from yesterday's
matrix organizational structure to one
more appropriately described as a tri¬
dimensional organization. The term
tri-dimensional organization depicts
the width, depth, and height of pro¬
gram manager responsibilities in the
program office, within the parent or-

Dr. Price is a Professor of Informa¬
tion Systems Management in the Inte¬
grative Program Management Depart¬
ment, Defense Systems Management
College. Dr. Gillard is a Professor of
Information Systems Management at
the University of Southern Indiana. Dr.
Valentine is the Army Materiel Com¬
mand Health Promotion Coordinator
and the Army Communities of Excel¬
lence Program Manager.

ganization, and at the point where
they interact with external organiza¬
tions.

Its use is intended to depict the
width of the flat matrix organization,
depth of the parent organization, and
height of the multiorganizational hi¬
erarchy in which program managers
function. The concept of the tri-di-
mensional organization was developjed
to shift the paradigm of matrix man¬
agement from one focusing solely on
internal workings of the program of¬
fice to one addressing the impact of
the external environment on the or¬
ganization.

Organizational Environment

In the early days of information
system development, the technical
community generally played the key
leadership role. Since organizations
typically followed functional or de¬
partmental lines of authority, a data
processing (DP) or electronic DP de¬
partment housed the “computer gu¬
rus,” and were depicted on organiza¬
tional charts as a staff line to the
accounting department or a vice-presi¬
dent.

Though the title “program man¬
ager” emerged later, the DP or EDP

department manager functioned as an
information system program manager
(PM), charged with oversight and lead¬
ership of technically oriented person¬
nel. Subordinates were assigned per¬
manently to the department and
answered only to one manager. Novice
user groups provided little input (usu¬
ally only user requirements) and
learned to be satisfied with the sys¬
tem produced.

Such organizational structure gave
rise to centralized authority for the
DP department manager; i.e., pro¬
gram manager. In a centralized envi¬
ronment, the PM was charged with
all communication between the in¬
formation system developers and in¬
dividuals outside the department-user-
groups, peer managers, senior
executives, and external entities like
vendors, special-interest groups, the
legal environment, etc. The knowl¬
edge, skills, proficiency, interpersonal
abilities, and communication compe¬
tence of the PM were paramount fac¬
tors in the success or failure of the
system.

The paradigm shift occurred when
user groups became computer liter¬
ate, resulting in a maturization in the
art of information systems develop¬
ment. Matrix organizations is a term

Program Monoger

Seprember-Oaober 1993

used to describe the multidimensional
organization that resulted when pro¬
gram teams were superimposed on
existing organizational structures. A
graphic depiction of a matrix organi¬
zational structure is provided in Fig¬
ure 1. Observe that program man¬
agement operations are positioned
along the vertical axis, and the func¬
tional, technical, and support depart¬
ments along the horizontal axis.

In matrix organizational structures,
department managers share control
of their subordinates with the pro¬
gram manager. Program managers
are responsible for schedules, bud¬
gets, assessing alternatives, and lead¬
ing the program to successful comple¬
tion. Managers of the functional,
technical and support departments
provide personnel and technical as¬
sistance to the program manager.
Perhaps Sammet and Green sum it
up best by stating that the PM "... is
responsible for "what” and “when."
and the...department managers...are
responsible for the ‘how’."‘

Subordinate Status

In a matrix organization PMs over¬
see two types of subordinate groups.

PARADIGM SHIFT

Perhaps Sammet
and Green sum it
up best by stating
that the PM "... is
responsible for
*whaV and *when, *
and

the, ..department
managers.. .are
responsible for the

^how^**

Figure I ; Matrix Organizational Structures

One group includes program team
members f)ermanently assigned to the
program and solely under the PM’s
authority. The second group consists
of matrix support personnel, or sub¬
ject-matter experts from the
organization’s functional departments,
who are temporarily attached to the
program team but remain assigned to
their parent department. They are re¬
sponsible to both their department
supervisor and the PM.

Gibby introduced the term “shared
authority” to describe this unique, co¬
existent relationship that persists be¬
tween PMs and managers of support¬
ing departments.’

Measureinent Criteria

In early matrix organizational en¬
vironments, program managers were
appointed to head the automation ef¬
fort. Initially, these managers were
technicians. The results they pro¬
duced were inconsistent. Some sys¬
tems were purported to “work well”
while others were “unsuccessful.” Both
terms were quickly recognized as rela¬
tive.

Over time a generally agreed upon
measure became this; The design,
development and fielding of an infor¬
mation system is deemed “success¬
ful” when the information system sat¬
isfies the user requirements, is
produced within budget, and is com¬
pleted on time. Although the order of
priority is sometimes changed, these
three criteria have become universally
accepted by developers of informa¬
tion systems.’

The paradigm shift from techni¬
cian-led systems development to ma¬
trix-oriented program teams solved
many early problems associated with
producing an information system that
met user requirements. Matrix orga¬
nizations tend to focus on the end
product. This rather myopic view can
produce a technically effective infor¬
mation system; however, technically
effective information systems are not

Progrom Manager

Seprember-Octaber 1993

FIGURE 2. Tri-dimensional Organizational

automatically accepted by oversight
agencies, corporate organizations,
competitors, user-communities, and
customers.

Hence, that initial paradigm shift
did not solve problems associated with
designing, developing, and fielding an
effective information system.

Tri-dimensional Structure

Program managers operate in a tri¬
dimensional organizational structure
to promote sound management and
efficient use of its resources. The pro¬
gram office consists of the program
team; the inter-organization comprises
the parent organization, user com¬
munity, and contractor(s): and, the
inter-organization is made up of ex¬
ternal organizations having a vested
interest, or oversight authofity, in the
program office. This tri-dimensional
organization concept is depicted in
Figure 2.

At each level, or ring, program man¬
agers and their teams have specific
interests. At the first level, program
office, the program manager is charged
with day-to-day leadership. The PM
interacts with system developers and
personnel dispersed throughout the
organization. Primary concerns are
issues related to matrix organizational
structures and lines of authority.

Hence, at the first level in the tri¬
dimensional organization structure,
program managers are encumbered
with an ambiguous leadership role.
Their day-to-day focus is on team build¬
ing; developing and maintaining rela¬
tionships with functional, technical
and support department managers;
and the profusion of technical details
associated with designing, develop¬
ing and fielding an information system.

Level Two

As program managers move into
the intra-organizational ring, level two
in the tri-dimensional organization
structure, they begin to interact with

other departments in their organiza¬
tion, the user community, and sup¬
porting contractors. The PM focus
shifts between managing contractor
support, meeting customer require¬
ments, and establishing how the pro¬
gram office "fits” with the rest of the
organization.

In contrast to the first level where
the program manager has some de¬
gree of autonomy, the second level
exposes the PM to competition for
finite resources within the parent or¬
ganization. Concerns include surviv¬
ability of the information systems pro¬
gram, professional credibility, and
peer-group acceptance.

Generally, the immediate program
team might be relatively small. How¬
ever, at the second level when repre¬
sentatives from the user community
are considered, the team grows con¬
siderably. Indeed, it is not unusual
for the team to number in the hun¬

dreds. The size of the team and the
level of complexity involved is diffi¬
cult to imagine.

For example, when contractors join
the team to accomplish technical
functions associated with designing
and developing an information sys¬
tem. the numbers become astronomi¬
cal. Consider this; One programmer
can be expected to write, test, and
debug 2,000 lines of computer code
in one year.^

Thus, the number of programmers
involved becomes mind-boggling, con¬
sidering that many information sys¬
tems contain several million lines of
computer code. To further complicate
the issure, the code is often produced
by programmers working in geographi¬
cally dispersed groups. One recent
author [Marsh, p. 63] likened it to
publishing a 37-chapter novel, with a
different person writing each chapter,
from a different country.

Program Manager

Seprember-Ocrober 1993

Inter-Organization Level

Finally, program managers operat¬
ing at the inter-organizational level,
or third ring, highlight strategic is¬
sues. Examples include external over¬
sight and how the program office op¬
erates in the inter-organizational
environment. In addition, they iden¬
tify stakeholders, secure sponsors, and
build relationships with constituents.
The focus is on how the organization
(rather than the program office) "fits"
into the global community.

Robert Block [1983]’ would likely
refer to this level as the political com¬
ponent, or that group of people out¬
side the information system-building
community (levels one and two) who
make problem-solving decisions that
can make or break an information
systems initiative. Indeed, Block con¬
cludes that the political component is
the major contributor of program fail¬
ure. Hence, successful program man¬
agers learn how to interact with the
oversight community represented in
Figure 2 as the inter-organizational
level.

To accomplish this program man¬
agers identify stakeholders, identify
and secure sponsors/advocates, and
build relationships with constituents.
Some authors characterize this level
of program manager as “Mr. Outside,”
because they are concerned witl i fight¬
ing resource allocation battles in head¬
quarters, preparing justifications for
fiscal authorizations, testifying, and
monitoring the execution of programs.

The difficulty is that program man¬
agers must be all things to all people
at all times. Specifically, program
managers and teams must effectively
manage all ‘hree levels in the tri¬
dimensional organizational structure
simultaneously. This is quite a task
for one person.

Summary

The paradigm shift from functional
organization structures to matrix or-

Lines of authority
have been
redrawn—program
team members find
themselves
responsible to
multiple
supervisors and
supervisors find
themselves
directing activities
of subordinates
having dual
allegiance.

ganizations has precipitated alterations
in traditional management perceptions.
As program team members are pro¬
cured from functional areas, opera¬
tions of those areas are exposed to
greater scrutiny. Information integra¬
tion from a variety of departments
has generated a previously unrivaled
degree of interdependency.

Power/authority relationships have
shifted and, indeed, remain in flux as
PM team members change from pro¬
gram to program. Lines of authority
have been redrawn—program team
members find themselves responsible
to multiple supervisors and supervi¬

sors find themselves directing activi¬
ties of subordinates having dual alle¬
giance.

Thus, numerous management vari¬
ables are undergoing metamorphosis.
As with previous paradigm shifts, the
tri-dimensional structure offers solu¬
tions to existing problems and oppor¬
tunity to meet new challenges.

Endnotes

1. Sammet and Green, Defense Ac¬
quisition Management. 1990. p. 108.
(Boca Raton: Florida, Atlantic Uni¬
versity Press, 1990).

2. Gibby, Lowell Bruce. “Project
Management Authority in Matrix Or¬
ganizations," Ph.D. dissertation. Uni¬
versity of California. Los Angeles, 1974,
p. 14.

3. Atkinson, Rick and Barton Gellman,
“Navy Fires Three Working on Top
let: Lagging Schedule. Cost of A-12
Cited,” The Washington Post. Decem¬
ber 5, 1990, pp. 1 and 19; Bobrowski,
Paul M.. “Project Management Con¬
trol Problems: An Information Sys¬
tems Focus.” Project Management [our-
nal. (1989), p. 11; Kerzner, Harold,
“In Search of Excellence in Project
Management,” Journal of Systems
Management; (February 1987), p. 31;
Moir. lames, “Project Methodology,
Organization, and Structure." Journal
of Jnformation Management, p. 38;
Pinto. leffrey K. and Dennis P. Slevin.
“Critical Success Factors in Effective
Project Implementation," ed. Cleland,
David I. and King, William R., Project
Management Handbook. (New York;
Van Nostrand Reinhold. 2nd ed.
1988), pp. 481-2; Thayer, Richard H.
Arthur ^ Pyster, and Robert C. Wood,
“Major Issues in Software Engineer¬
ing Project Management," IEEE Trans¬
actions on Software Engineering. Vol.
SE7 No. 4. duly 1981), p. 333.

4. Marsh. Alton. "Pentagon Up Against
a Software Wall," Government Execu-
tive. Vol. 22. No. b. (May 1990), p.
63.

5. Block, Robert. The Politics of Projects.
(New York: Yourdon Press, 1983).

p. 6.

Program Monoger

Seprember-Ocrober 1993

Mr. Sweeney is a graduate of DSMC's
PMC 93-1. Before that he was Pro¬
gram Manager for the E-2C Hawkeye
program. He is assigned to NAVAIR,
Survivability and Production.

From a program manager s stand¬
point, foreign involvement in his sys¬
tem places a significant burden on
the management of the program, with
little obvious direct return. All par¬

ties are reluctant to share technolo¬
gies. The contractors are reticent to
become involved with competing con¬
tractors. The reduced cost associated
with shared development and pro-

s resources devoted to de-

-- fense procurement contract

and technology become more ad¬
vanced (more expensive), affordabil¬
ity becomes more of a driving factor
in our capability to maintain the best
equipment in the hands of the oper¬
ating forces. Moreover, the technol¬
ogy and manufacturing base of our
allies often approaches, and occasion¬
ally surpasses, ours. With similar
economic and defense requirements,
they too are faced with the "guns or
butter” trade-off. Far too often we
individually attack the same problems
and end up with similar, redundant
solutions. By approaching them co¬
operatively. we could save money and,
more importantly, likely achieve a
better solution through the synergism
of our combined technological talents.

The argument sounds reasonable
and is the basis for Senator Sam Nunn's
many cooperative development ini¬
tiatives; and the proscription in 5000.2
to seek a cooperative development
before a unique one. The coopera¬
tive approach is rarely pursued.

John L. Sweeney

A WIN-WIN IDEA

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES
COOPERATIVE
DEVELOPMENT

A Better Solution

Program Manager

September-Ocrober 1990

diiction, to be sure, lessens the bur¬
den on the ta.xpiiyer but generally is
not returned to the program. Thus,
funds available to the program are
reduced. Added complications of split
constituencies, unique customer re¬
quirements and political overtones
often dilute resources available to the
program. Many programs have found
that, despite these limitations, there
are benefits to be had.

Success

To illustrate this idea. I would like
to recount the successes of the Naw’s
K-2C Hawkeye. In addition to

ter. The experience gained by living
through operations in a unique envi¬
ronment and culture allowed us to
understand the strengths and limita¬
tions of our system better, and to tai¬
lor our support systems better. But
most of all, by applying ourselves to¬
gether. cooperatively, we have con¬
tinued the improvement of the
Hawkeye.

The ^^2C Hawkeye is the world’s
foremost Airborne Harly Warning sys¬
tem. It is the central iictor in virtually
all the Navy’s Carrier Battle Group
operations providing not only early
warning, but all command and con-

r,-2C Haivkcyc

supporting the "national good" by
aiding our allies in their defense ef¬
forts, the perspectives gained by ac¬
commodating another view allowed
us to structure our own program bet-

trol functions: from strike guidance
and support, to search and rescue.
The Hawkeye is the eyes of the Fleet.
Its system combines multisensor de¬
tection information into a highly inte¬

grated tactical picture which is then
provided back to the battle group.

The system has grown during the
years to keep abreast of the threat
and the changing operational envi¬
ronment through a program of con¬
tinuous product improvement. The
F-2C has undergone five major system
upgrades resulting in the present sys¬
tem. currently undergoing initial op¬
erational test and evaluation (lOTSfK).
Fach iteration increased the Hawkeye’s
capability, diversity and utility.

In addition to the Ll.S. Navy, the
Hawkeye is used by several of our
allies; Israel. lapan. Kgypt. Singapore
and, soon to be. Taiwan. It sees
worldwide service operating in a di¬
versity of environments and cultures.
Fach of these brings their nuance;
their unique circumstances. Notwith¬
standing, all users are part of the
Hawkeye family with common needs
and problems. The members of the
family have been able to continue
growth and solve problems which
would have been more difficult, or
impossible, to resolve on an individual
basis.

State of the Art

To illustrate this point. I would
like to cite a few of our successes.
When Fgypt bought the Hawkeye,
the LISN Interrogation Friend or Foe
(IFF) was basically the original sys¬
tem; 20 years old and technologically
outgrown. Fgypt needed a unique
IFF that would function with both
Fgyptian and U.S. formats. Fgv'pt
funded the development of this sys¬
tem as part of its F-2C procurement.
Here, Fgypt’s need and funds were
applied with U.S. effort and the
Hawkeye program gained. We built
the system and the fallout technology
allowed the USN to develop a state-
of-the-art system for USN aircraft.

To regress a little, as mentioned,
the Hawkeye is the product of an
iterative development program. As
the radar and the computer were im-

Progrom Monoger

September-Oaober 1993

E-2C Multimission Capability

Intercept

Control

y Xf-

Tanker Vectoring

Air Defense
Network

Airborne Early Warning

• Radar

• Passive
•IFF

./^ateHi^nk & Voice
yy communications

Passive Detection System

Air Space
Management

proved, the display system became a
choke point. Our fleet, supported by
the test and evaluation community,
cried the need for a better display;
but the resources just weren’t there.
Egypt, too, wanted the maximum ca¬
pability for its system. By sharing the
development, we found we could af¬
ford a new advanced technology dis¬
play. This led us to the next step, a
cooperative effort wherein a joint need
and joint funding resulted in the de¬
velopment of a new display for the
Hawkeye.

Integration of the new display into
the aircraft required development of
a new tactical software program for
the aircraft. The tactical program tells
the central computer how to recog¬
nize, evaluate, and combine inputs
from the sensor systems: and how to
display these to the operator. This
last function is performed by the dis¬
play subprogram. The multiple new
features of the new display (including

color) virtually ensured that multiple
early changes were going to be re¬
quired to optimize the output. Ini¬
tially. Egypt and the United States
were going to update their own pro¬
grams; however, the expense of such
a course again became an impedi¬
ment. Moreover, it was recognized
that while there were differences in
tactical programs, the display should
be almost identical.

We decided to seek a common so¬
lution and share not only funding,
but other resources required. The
development program was undertaken
as a Nunn Amendment Cooperative
Development Program. This is not
an FMS program. Each participant
funds his effort out of national funds.
Each has his strengths to contribute:
Egypt had a sophisticated software
facility and trained programmers: the
USN had years of operational experi¬
ence with the E-2C and programmers
with an intimate knowledge of the E-
2 tactical program.

The deal was struck to combine
these resources and develop a com¬
mon display subprogram. Egypt will
benefit by more fully using its soft¬
ware lab, by gaining experience with
the tactical program, and by reducing
cost. In fact, we both benefited not
only from reduced costs, but from
shared ideas, development of an in¬
teroperable system, and development
of professional ties between our re¬
spective software support activities.

A Central Unit

The Hawkeye also has benefited
from application of technology devel¬
oped independently by our allies. The
navigation system needed updating.
The Global Positioning System (GPS)
and joint Tactical Information Data
System (JTIDS) were being added to
the aircraft. A new. smart, navigation
display was required but development
of a new system would have been
expensive, in terms of money and time.

Progronn Manager

Seprember-Ocrober 1993

• E-2A Introduced in 1961 (59 A/C)

• E-2B Introduced in 1969 (CILOP)

• E-2C Introduced in 1971 (Increase UE) P^l

1971

APS-120

1978

APS-125

1984

APS-138

1988

APS-139

UDP Group I

1990

APS-145

UDP Group II

Auto Detect/

Track

Overwater

Manual Detect/
Track

Overland

Addition of Basic
Auto Detect/Track
Capability

Overland

Compatibility with
Trac-A Antenna

Improved Surface
Surveillance
Detection and
Tracking

Four-Fold Increase
in Computer Track
Capacity (HSP)

Improved Auto
Detect/Tracking
Capability in All
Environments
(Environmental
processing and
triple pulse rept
frequency)

Limited ECCM

Improved ECCM

Further ECCM
Improvements

Automatically

Optimize

System

•Addition of
sidelobe canceller
loops to suppress
threat jamming

• Addition of narrow
band filter to
improve operation
in EMI environment

•Add'l sidelobe
canceller loops

•Delta on sum
technique reduces
main beam jammer
impact

•Improved operation
in EMI environment

•Add'l improved
narrow band
cancellers to
improve operation
in EMI

environments

•Auto channel
monitoring and
selection

Extended Radar
Radar Range

Addition of Auto
Detect/Track in
Heavy EMI

Improved IFF

• Improved sidelobe
cancellation

• Performance
assessment of
threat detection
(Multi-ring test
targets)

Fortunately. Canadian Marconi had
developed a beautiful system, the
Multifunctional Control Display Unit
(MFCDU) that promised to combine
various displays into a central unit.
This system was evaluated as a
Foreign Weapons Evaluation program
and found to fulfill that promise.
The system is now going into the
Hawkeye.

While not development, exactly,
we have shared resources in another
area that promises significant mutual
benefit; and the release of resources
to other efforts. The follow-on logis¬
tic and technical support required to

sustain day-to-day operations is be¬
ing accomplished under unique con¬
tractor efforts for the individual op¬
erators. Not only is this inefficient
with six individuals each waiting to
be called on each problem; but they
aren’t talking together and the collec¬
tive wisdom is not being fully devel¬
oped. We are copying the Air Force
here and developing an E-2C Con¬
solidated Support Program wherein
one integrated support structure will
provide for the sustaining needs of all
users.

Shared Efforts

Similar benefits, to a greater or lesser

extent, have been gained through our
other cooperative partners. Coopera¬
tive efforts work. The Navy has ben¬
efited; our other users have benefited.
Today, the Hawkeye faces a future
shaped by budget restrictions, higher
costs and completing requirements. In
that environment, we are committed
to the belief that only through shared
coopjerative efforts, through fully capi¬
talizing on technological strengths of
our allies, can we affordably meet needs
of the future.

Coopjerative development is a win-
win idea whose time has come. Rec¬
ognition of the potential it offers can
add a new dimension in support of
virtually any program.

Progrom Manager

Seprember-Ocfober 1993

HOW MUCH Tl STING?

THE EVER-CURRENT ISSUES

IN OT&E

Dr. Ernest A. Seglie

FIGURE I. DOTAE Agenda Items

i *>*>o

Contractor

Involvement

Modeling &
Simulation

Big Ten

How Much
Testing Is
Enough?

ber of 1992. the National Research
Council sponsored a 2-day workshop
of academic and Defense Department
workers on statistical issues in de¬
fense analysis and testing, and the
issue was: “How much testing is
enough?"

I «>«> >

New Acquisition
Strategy

Linkage:

COEA-DTOT

Early Operational
Assessments

Follow-on OT

i «>*> I

The Big Ten

Independent

Evaluations

Data Sharing

Test Resources

Building Suitable
Systems

Philosophy of End-
to-End & Baseline

I n early 1990, about six months
after Clif Duncan became Direc¬
tor of Operational Test and Evalua¬
tion (OT&E),' we were talking infor¬
mally in his office. He said he had
concluded that being DOT&E was an
old man’s job; that one did not make
friends if one did this job forthrightly;
and that the pressures to worry about
a career after this job might consciously
or unconsciously inhibit a younger
person who had to worry about sup¬
porting a family and subsequent em¬
ployment.

The reason, of course, is that op¬
erational testing too often brings home
the bad news that a system is not all
that it was hoped to be. During his
tenure as DOT&E, Dr. Duncan con¬
sciously and consistently worked to
change and improve weapons devel¬
opment so that the systems turned
out as they were hoped to be.

One forum for him to push change
was the Operational Test Agency (OTA)
Commanders’ Conference held every
six months. At this conference of the
OTAs, he could bring up items that
would improve how OT&E served the
acquisition of good systems. He also
could highlight areas of concern.

Still Current Issues

Figure 1 lists the DOT&E agenda
items during 1990, 1991 and 1992

Dr. Seglie is Science Advisor, Op¬
erational Test and Evaluation, Office
of the Secretary of Defense.

conferences. These items were the
current issues during those years. I
believe that they are more. They will
always be the current issues. Five
years from now they will be the cur¬
rent issues, even if the buzz words
used to describe them are different.

Even if there is no longer a sepa¬
rate office of DOT&E. those who must
make the big decisions on weapons
systems will need OT&E information,
and these will be the issues that will
concern them. In other words, I be¬
lieve they are close to being a com¬
plete set of ever-current OT&E issues.

Proof of this is that they are now
beginning to repeat themselves. For
example, in 1990 “How much testing
is enough?” was an issue. In Septem-

In late 1993 or early 1994, the In¬
ternational Test and Evaluation As¬
sociation and the Military Operations
Research Society will cosponsor a sym¬
posium with the title "How Much Test¬
ing Is Enough?” The issue will not go
away: we will only get better at ad¬
dressing it.

The same thing is true with con¬
tractor involvement. There were
changes to the law in 1989 and in
1992. There are proposed changes to

Progrom Manager

Sepfember-Oaober 1993

the law again this year. These issues
just keep coming up. I propose to go
through them, starting with the most
recent. Each year had an overarching
theme: 1992 was the year of response
to the new world order: 1991 con¬
tained the nitty-gritty changes; and
1990 was the first blush.

1992: The New World Order

During 1992 the world was reeling
from the dramatic changes in the world
order. The Defense Department was
attempting to respond. Everyone
wanted to know how the changes
would affect Department business.
With the change of administrations
in 1993, that question is still relevant.
The OT&E must understand each new
acquisition strategy that the Depart¬
ment adopts so that OT&E can sup¬
ply relevant information in a timely
way.

The New Acquisition Strategy

One of the consistent themes in all
the discussions of new acquisition strat¬
egies is that we will produce less, but
know more about the systems we pro¬
duce. In the lanuary 1992 Report to
the President and Congress. Defense
Secretary Dick Cheney said;

With the collapse of the Soviet
Union, we no longer face a glo¬
bal adversary able to ueld large
quantities of increasingly ad¬
vanced weapons. As a result,
we can afford to take more time
before we move new weapons
systems to production. We can
concentrate on research and
development, operational test¬
ing, and the upgrade of existing
systems, to ensure we maintain
the technological edge we re¬
quire.

When Mr. Les Aspin became De¬
fense Secretary, we sought evidence
of what he had thought about opera¬
tional testing prior to becoming Sec¬
retary. In February 1992, then Rep¬
resentative Aspin talked about a

The Honorable Les Aspin
Secretary of Defense

comprehensive resource strategy. It
had four parts:

—Selective Upgrading
—Selective Low-Rate Procurements
—Rollover Plus
—Silver Bullet Procurements.

He discussed each in turn, but let
me quote him on rollover plus:

...But our current system for de¬
veloping and fielding advanced
systems is also no longer sus¬
tainable. We don’t have the
relentlessly modernizing threat
to counter and we don’t have
the money to do it, anyway. The
replacement is ‘rollover-
plus’....First. there’s the rollover
part of the system. Here, we
would continue to prototype new
systems and components but not
put them into production until
stringent criteria are met. Those
criteria are A) that the technol¬
ogy works. B) that it was re¬
quired by development of the
threat, or C) represented a break¬
through that would alter battle¬
field operations.

Second, there’s the manufactur¬
ing technology and operational
testing. They are the new ac¬
tive ingredients in ’rollover-

plus’...it would require the re¬
sultant prototype to be ‘produc¬
tion-representative.’ and would
thoroughly test prototypes of
promising technologies and sys¬
tems in an operational context.

Let me explain. Traditionally,
prototypes have been developed
to provide a range of informa¬
tion: to resolve technical ques¬
tions about new technologies,
provide insights into a system’s
appearance and spatial layout,
and to test sub-component in¬
tegration into a system. ‘Tradi¬
tional’ prototypes, therefore, have
been developed primarily to
understand technical performance
issues. Although the resolution
of technical performance issues
is a key of any prototyping strat¬
egy. our ’prototyping-plus’ strat¬
egy incorporates two additional
objectives: manufacturing
producibility and the resolution
of operational performance issues.

1 conclude from these remarks that
while the need for production is going
down, the need for information is go¬
ing up. Any future acquisition strat¬
egy, when considered honestly, will
have to make testing address opera¬
tional issues about the system under
consideration. The new acquisition
strategies require information earlier,
and in spite of the possibility that the
system may not be produced.

The first point is, then, that the
Department needs good information
early, and cannot afford to have things
go all the way to OT before finding
the faults. The test-fix-test again may
be too expensive. The alternative is
to try to get it right the first time: to
keep everyone’s eye on the goal from
the very beginning. That is what the
next two thrusts are about.

Linkage: COEA-DT-OT

At Milestone I the program has to
present a Cost and Operational Effec¬
tiveness Analysis (COEA) to the

Program Monoger

Seprember-Oaober 1993

FIGURE 2. The Big Ten

I-IV

VI-X

Evaluations...are too
optimistic.

There is too little
“stress" on equipment
and personnel.

Report to Congress
are incomplete and
inaccurate.

Oi-site (^jservatkms
by steiff am infrecpient.

Problems and limitations
of OT are rrat reported.

DOT&E reports are
[rubber stamp] of

Service test reports.

Testir^ us^ “^iden
crews.*

Inadequate resources
are provided.

Testir^ is not realistic
and objective.

Difference between

OT and DT is blurred.

Defense Acquisition Board. At the
same time, the proijram presents an
Operational Requirements Document
(ORD). The weakness of the ORDs is
legendary. However, the COEA often
presents a clearer picture of what the
sponsor wants the system to do.

The COEA puts the system in a
scenario; de\’elops measures of effec¬
tiveness and suitability: analyzes simu¬
lated battle results; and provides jus¬
tification of the expenditure of the
billions of dollars that the new pro¬
gram costs. At the same time, the
Test and Evaluation Master Plan
(TEMP) is first submitted.

In the past, these documents have
had little to do with each other. Most
testers have never seen a COEA. At
least one Service fought hard to pre¬
vent any linkage between these docu¬
ments. They looked at the COEA as a
box to check to satisfy OSD, and not
as a management document that jus¬
tified the route chosen.

The USD(A), PASfE, and DOTSfE
looked on the situation rather differ¬
ently. The current guidance is that
the same measures of effectiveness
(MOEs) and criteria will be used to
measure the progress of the program
from the COEA through development
to operational testing. Enforcing con¬
sistency ensures that ev'eryone has
their eye on the same goal. There is a
second way of doing this, discussed
in the next section.

Early Operational Assessments

When DOT&E looked for reasons
why systems have trouble in OT. he
found there is often a breakdown in
communication during development.
The user defines the need: the devel¬
oper is tempted to say, "Thank you.
I'll get something that meets this need.
Now step out of my way." The user
disappears for the next 14 years dur¬
ing system development.

The children of the original user
then get this thing to test. The proof

of the disconnect: after 14 years of
development, the user redefines the
requirement weeks before the final
production decision; sometimes re¬
quirements are completely disavowed.

One way to avoid such surprises is
to examine the system from the op¬
erational point of view throughout
development. This is the role of early
operational assessments.

Some of us believe that good de¬
velopmental testers know what the
problems are. Many DTers have said
as much to me. Many of them also
have personally complained to me
that while they know the problems,
they are not listened to very sympa¬
thetically, and they are not free to
make the problems visible: Their test
reports belong to the program office
(funding for the developmental tests
comes from the program manager).

To give visibility to system features
important to effectiveness and suit¬
ability, the Director has established
the policy that the DOT&E must ap¬

prove. in writing, plans for operational
assessments that support the com¬
mitment of funds.

Follow-on OT

Recall that many of the reports the
Director signed had negative conclu¬
sions or caveats; for example, the re¬
port would say that "The system is
effective and suitable, except for reli¬
ability.” When that occurred, the Di¬
rector often reported that the Service
would not field the system until a fix
has been proved in Follow-on Opera¬
tional Testing (FOT&E).

Part of the reason to put such
assurances in the report to Congress
was to help guarantee that the
tests actually occurred. This has
been a successful, albeit expensive,
strategy.

On the other hand, we had not
been diligent in reporting the results
of that F'OT&E to Congress. We will
in the future explicitly report to Con¬
gress on the outcome of such FOT&E.

Progronn Manager

Seprennber-Ocrober 1993

Remember that the motivation for all
these actions is to keep visible the
goal: to give our country effective and
suitable systems that increase our
military capability.

1991: The Nitty-Gritty

The Big Ten

The Director made a list of criti¬
cisms and complaints of those involved
in OT&E. This list, and the commit¬
ment to address the criticism, was
part of the Director’s confirmation
hearings. (Figure 2).

With such a visible and high-level
commitment, this office has diligently
worked to improve OT&E in all these
areas. Many of the criticisms are in¬
terrelated. The lack of on-site obser¬
vation, the rubber-stamp observation,
the problem not repwrted, and the
optimistic assessments all required this
office to assume more responsibility
for its evaluations. This it has done.

Independent Evaluations

The best way to address the criti¬
cism that the DOT&E just rubber-
stamped the Service test agency re¬
ports was to take responsibility for
doing a report based on our own analy¬
sis. The DOT&E began to do that.
This also addresses the criticism that
the reports were too optimistic; the
reports are now truly DOT&E’s.

What has happened, and I expect
will happen more often in the future,
is that the Director will develop an
independent evaluation plan. This
will be available to the Services and
will be the basis of the Director’s de¬
termination of the adequacy of the
TEMP and operational test plans.

After the test, the independent evalu¬
ation plan will be the basis of the
DOT&E evaluation. The “basis of
evaluation” means that at least those
items included in the plan will be
considered. It never means factors
discovered during the test will be
ignored.

If you don't plan to
test a piece, there is
little incentive to
give that piece the
same attention as
something vou are
going to test. The
result is clear. The
country eventually
pays for it.

Data Sharing

To do the analysis and evaluation
independent of the Service requires
that DOT&E have access to the data
in a timely manner. The law guaran¬
tees that DOT&E have access to all
data that DOT&E determines is nec¬
essary to do the evaluation. In some
cases we plug directly into the com¬
puters as data enters the database.

Test Resources

The inadequacies of resources were
also part of the Big Ten. The only
time to deal with this without major
disruption is early; i.e., before the pro¬
gram is a program or when the acqui¬
sition strategy is being formulated.
Document this in the Test and Evalu¬
ation Master Plan.

Building Suitable Systems

Another effort to get good systems
was a study to identify systemic prob¬
lem areas. The Director’s job is de¬
ceptively simple concerning acquisi¬
tion programs. Before a system can
go to full-rate production, the Direc¬
tor must send a report to the Secre¬
tary and the Congress stating that the
test was adequate and that the test
confirms that the system actually tested

is effective and suitable. Weakness
in suitability is the biggest systemic
problem. Suitability includes reliability,
availability and maintainability. (Fig¬
ure 3).

The reports to Congress often said
the systems were effective without
caveat; they rarely said suitable with¬
out caveat. They said for example,
“Suitable, except for reliability,” or
“marginally suitable,” or “potentially
suitable.”

The DOT&E explored the causes
of this in a study he commissioned by
the Logistics Management Institute.
The study compared the field experi¬
ence to the OT results and concluded
that OT found most of the significant
problems in the tested items.

What they also found was that sig¬
nificant problems often existed in the
items not tested; for example, the lo¬
gistic support system. This is a good
rule to remember: If you don’t plan to
test a piece, there is little incentive to
give that piece the same attention as
something you are going to test. The
result is clear. The country eventu¬
ally pays for it.

The study’s other major critique of
OT was that it often did not have
enough test hours to get a full appre¬
ciation of the reliability problems. One
program especially singled out was
the AH-64. The test did not have
enough hours for even one aircraft to
get to phase maintenance.

Their recommendations were:

—Devote more attention and
technical effort to suitability

—Improve responses to problems
detected

—Use data and insights from all
phases and technical
disciplines

—Ensure that critical items of
peculiar support equipment
are identified, included in test
plans, and made available for
OT.

Progrom Monoger

Seprember-Oaober 1993

FIGURE 3. Suitability is defined in the 5000
Series

fit The degree to which a system can be placed
satisfactorily in field use with consideration given
to availability, compatibility, transportability,
interoperability, wartime usage rates, maintain¬
ability, safety, human factors, manpower support-
ability, logistics supportability, natural environmen¬
tal effects and impacts, documentation and train¬
ing requirements. 5 5

Most of the life-cycle cost of sys¬
tems comes from suitability concerns:
spare parts, logistics support, etc.
Decision-makers’ interest will increase
as budgets go down.

Philosophy of End-to-End
And Baseline Testing

If you want to know how the office
of DOraK would approach a prob¬
lem, consider that we will always want
to know what the system adds to the
militarv’ capability of the countrv'. This
may be confusing to developmental
testers. The developmental testers
look at contract specification compli¬
ance, and the subject of military use
is over the horizon.

But of the five reasons for doing
DT enumerated in 5000.2. only one
has to do with specification compli¬
ance. The others are to inform about
operational limitations, technological
limitations and risk, cost-performance
trade-offs, and readiness for opera¬
tional test and evaluation.

When operational testers look at a
system from the point of view of their
militar\'capability, they use the mea¬
sure of mission accomplishment.

An e.xample may help here. Say a
new surface-to-surface missile is be¬
ing developed whose navigation is so
good it can come very close to wher-
e\’er you aim it. As a result, its war¬
head need not be so big.

When the operational testers look
for mission accomplishment, they ask:
What is the targeting system? Is the
targeting system accurate enough to
support the missile? Said the other
way round, is the missile supportable
with current intelligence assets? You
might not think that is an appropriate
question, but it is a design question
of importance.

If the target location is not very
accurate, then designing for high-place¬
ment accuracy is not worth much
money. The small warhead may be a

mistake. These are design questions
to be considered at the ver\' start of
the program. Remember that OT looks
at the full mission, end-to-end (Fig¬
ure 4). Since DTers have not done
that kind of thing. OTers will reduce
the risk of surprise by trying to pick
up such disconnects in their early
operational assessments.

The second aspect of the testing
philosophy that DOT&E has pursued
is baseline testing; that is. include the
current way of doing the mission in
the test. There are two reasons for
doing this.

First, this calibrates the lest. The
only way to really answer the criti¬
cism that the tests were too easy and
results were optimistic is to test the
way we would do the mission today.

If the test scenario and threat rep¬
resented is too easy, even the old way
of doing the mission would look good.
Including a baseline is a calibration
that compares the test to the expecta¬
tions examined in the COKA. By di¬
rection. the C0F;A includes the cur¬
rent way of doing the mission.

The second reason for doing a
baseline is that systems often fail to

meet the stated requirements. The
question around the DAB table is then:
"Is it still worth buying?" When that
question comes up the answer is al¬
ways “It is so much better that the
current system." When asked if the
test confirms this, the DOT&F an¬
swer should be "Yes, we tested the
old system and the new system, and
the new one is x times as good.”

We cannot say that if we have not
tested the old way. We don’t know if
the new system is better than the old.
The purpose of testing is to gain infor¬
mation.

If the information most often de¬
sired is how much better the new sys¬
tem is than the old. then the tester
should plan to get that information.
(Don’t be put off by those who say
that is not the requirement; that is the
question most often asked when sys¬
tems fail requirements.)

1990: First Blush

The Big Ten

The "BigTen" were first mentioned
in OTA meetings in 1990. As you can
see. they come up repeatedly. Most
members of the DOT&F office carry a
copy around with them.

Program Manager

Seprember-Ocrober 1990

FIGURE 4. Operational Effectiveness

66 The overall degree of mission accomplish¬
ment of a system when used by representative
personnel in the environment planned or expected
(e.g., natural, electronic, threat etc.) for opera¬
tional employment of the system considering or¬
ganization, doctrine, tactics, survivability, vulner¬
ability, and threat (including countermeasures,
initial nuclear weapons effects, nuclear, biological,
and chemical contamination (NBCC) threats).9 9

Contractor Involvement

The law addresses contractor in¬
volvement in two ways. First, no per¬
son employed by the contractor for
the system being tested may be in¬
volved in the conduct of the opera¬
tional test and evaluation required to
support going beyond low-rate initial
production. The limitation does not
apply to the extent that the Secretary
of Defense plans for persons employed
by the contractor to be involved in
the operations, maintenance, and sup¬
port of the system being tested when
the system is deployed in combat.

If you want a way to think about
this, it is the following. After develop¬
ment. and after the low-rate initial
production, the question is: “Is the
go\'ernment ready to accept this into
America’s arsenal?”

The answer is “No” if the military
is not ready to accept it, or needs
contractor support to operate or main¬
tain it (in ways not planned for during
combat).

The second prohibition is that a
contractor who has participated in (or

is participating in) the development,
pr'' lOn or testing of a system for a
military department or defense agency
ar for another contractor of the De¬
partment of Defense) may not be in¬
volved (in any way) in the establish¬
ment of criteria for data collection,
performance assessment, or evalua¬
tion activities for the operational test
and evaluation.

(An additional paragraph in this
section of the law was added in 1992:
“The limitation In subparagraph (A)
(above) does not apply to a contrac¬
tor that has participated in such de¬
velopment, production, or testing solely
as a representative of the Federal Gov¬
ernment.” The meaning of this sub-
paragraph is unclear, and the Gen¬
eral Counsel has advised us that it
does not change anything because
contractors do not act as representa¬
tives of the government.)

How Much Testing Is Enough?

Before the Department of Defense
buys a major item, the law requires a
field test of the equipment. While the
law specifies that the test will be a
field test, it provides no guidance on

what is adequate; i.e., how much field
testing is enough?

The DOT&E must determine the
adequacy of the test as well as the
number of low-rate initial production
items needed for an operational test.
With new acquisition strategies being
formulated, more time available, and
all defense activities under budgetary
pressure, it is desirable to have a sense
of how much is enough.

There are two aspects to the
“enough” question: an engineering/
operational aspect, and a statistical
aspect. Say the system must be
tested under three different climatic
conditions because the equipment
is expected to work in the desert, in
the jungle, and in temperate
climates.

Say also that soldiers require that
the system be tested in two different
ways because it will be used in two
very different ways: to do reconnais¬
sance, and to direct artillery fire. In
such cases, then, the system should
be tested in a number of different
scenarios.

How many different scenarios to
test is a difficult engineering (and op¬
erational) question: Should the effec¬
tiveness and suitability be confirmed
in each scenario, or in a representa¬
tive sample of scenarios, or in the
most difficult scenarios? There is even
a question of how many forces to
represent in each scenario, a ques¬
tion that plays an important role in
determining the cost of the test. These
are engineering and operational judg¬
ments that modeling and simulation
can clarify.

For even a single scenario, the num¬
ber of field trials must be determined.
Assume initially that one scenario is
sufficient: that there is very clear defi¬
nition of what the measure of effec¬
tiveness is (for example, the probabil¬
ity of destroying a target with a single
weapon); and that the passing value
for the measure is known.

Program Manager

Seprember-Oaober 1993

FIGURE 5. Task Force Report

Do not employ simulations to prove or dis¬
prove things, but instead exploit thieir ability to
isolate high sensitivity areas. Simulation has an
important role In providing sensitivity analyses,
and as a method of focusing on system engineer¬
ing issues early through operational tests. 5 5

Report of the
Defense Science Board Task Force on
Improving Test and Evaluation Effectiveness

December 1989

To dctermino the sample size, more
information must be specified. Usu¬
ally this information could be speci¬
fied by stating the confidence level
desired for the estimation of the pa¬
rameter (the alpha and beta risks).
But who specifies this confidence level?
Not the law. Usually not the user,
who doesn't think about such things.
But what confidence level should be
used?

I believe that is often a business
ciecision. Let me give you some ex¬
amples to consider. The first example
demonstrates that a small test is not
always a better test, even from a busi¬
ness perspective, because small tests
increase the chance that a good sys¬
tem will fail.

Risky Tests

Consider a hypothetical test plan
for a smart artillerv' round. Almost a
billion dollars have been spent on
research and development. If the
rounds are bought the total cost may
be S4 or S5 billion, and the ultimate
cost of a round is somewhere between
S11.000 and S25.000 per round. The
test has only a small number of rounds
because of "funding constraints."

As a result, the proposed test cre¬
ates a risk that we reject a "good"
system with a probability of 0.35 to
0.45. On the face of it. this does not
appear to be a smart test. The ques¬
tion is: "Is there a rational way to
argue such issues?"

I believe that good management
and smart business demand that we
look explicitly at these questions in
the future.

Minimizing Current Cost by
Using Reliability Growth
Theory

The munitions example above il¬
lustrates how the desire to reduce the
apparent current cost of the program
can influence test design. The next
example concerns an attempt to save

missiles for the wartime stockpile rather
than use them up in testing.

In this example, the total buy of
missiles is about 1.000. The test pro¬
gram launches only 10 to 15 missiles
because of a desire to save missiles
for the stockpile. One of the com¬
plexities of testing in the real world is
that the configuration (design) tested
is sometimes changed in the middle
of the test because the early part of
the test reveals a specific failure mode.
This is often the case when early reli¬
ability is poor. The change is designed
to remo\'e the failure mode discov¬
ered.

Thus, it is asserted that the reli¬
ability "grows" as more testing oc¬
curs. (This is a misnomer: the reli¬
ability improves as the design gets
better.) Reliability growth cuiwes are
produced that predict the reliability
as a function of the number (or hours)
of test firings. The proposal is made
to begin to trace the reliability growth
and to project it out to its asymptotic
value.

When the asymptotic value meets
the user's reliability criteria, the pro¬
posal continues, we should stop op¬

erational testing. Kxperience with other
systems led to the belief that 10-15
missiles would be sufficient to project
such asymptotic behavior.

The proposal is in error in a num¬
ber of ways. First, if one were to stop
testing, one would miss the chance to
find and fix additional faults. The
reliability would not grow.

Second, it is probably not appro¬
priate to use a projected value of reli¬
ability to answer the requirement of
the law that the test confirm the ef¬
fectiveness and suitability of the sys¬
tem for combat. Remember that
DOT&H reports the as-tested values.

Finally (and this is the critical ques¬
tion). it is fair to ask whether the
number of missiles in the stockpile
should be maximized, or the number
of reliable missiles in the stockpile
should be maximized. This addresses
the criteria used in the proposed test.
The proposed test assumed some
knowledge of the reliability growth
parameter. Using this number, the
test size could be calculated which
would maximize the number of reli¬
able missiles in the remaining stock¬
pile.

Progrom Monoger

Seprember-Ocrober 1993

Such an approach asserts that the
test should stop when the expected
increase in reliability (as a result of
the next test firing) as applied to the
remaining missiles increases the total
number of reliable missiles in the re¬
maining stockpile by less than one.
In the case in point, applying typical
growth parameters, the number of test
missiles might be on the order of 100.

Such a proposal also raises the
question of how much testing should
be done to confirm the assumptions
by which the statistician will analyze
the data: in this case, the assump¬
tions made in the reliability growth
model. This question often is ignored
when applying statistical models or
theories.

Some confirmation is needed that
the assumptions are appropriate. What
is the penalty for not testing the as¬
sumptions? What tests should as¬
sumptions pass before they are ac¬
cepted?

Modeling and Simulation

In tests, large sample size com¬
pensates for the expected random vari¬
ability of results from trial-to-trial.
Models and simulations can help plan
tests by directly addressing the vari¬
ability (Figure 5).

For example, a missile disperses
sub munitions over a large area to
attack convoys or assembly areas: the
plan asserts that only 10 missiles can
be fired, and therefore no statistically
valid conclusions can be drawn. These
10 shots are for demonstration only.
When asked why no valid conclu¬
sions could be drawn, the answer is
the variability of results from such a
small sample size.

If the criterion against which the
missile is judged is the number of
vehicles stopped in the convoy, then
the variability of that number from
missile firing to missile firing may be
a complex thing. A mathematical
model of the system demonstrated

that the “small” sample gave results
clustered rather closely.

Thus, the variability that would re¬
quire a larger sample size may not be
there, and the small sample size may
be adequate.

Between models and testing, the
best relation may be one of
complementarity. The model can help
formulate hypotheses, which can then
be tested directly. Smart use of the
model might lead to better tests. Usu¬
ally, the variability of the outcome
from trial-to-trial is important infor¬
mation that the model could supply
to test planners.

Not all models calculate correctly
the variability that occurs on repeated
runs. Insisting that models attempt
to capture the variability may lead to
better and more useful models. Again,
the variability of results from trial-to-
trial and from mission-to-mission
should affect not only the size of the
test, but how the military would plan
to use the system.

For example, highly effective sur-
face-to-air missiles might be fired ac¬
cording to a doctrine of shoot—look

Endnotes

1. In 1983, the Congress established,
within the DOD, a Director of Opera¬
tional Test and Evaluation. The Di¬
rector is the principal advisor to the
Secretary of Defense on operational
test and evaluation within the De¬
partment and shall prescribe policies
and procedures of the conduct of op¬
erational test and evaluation. Title 10
of the U.S. Code defines operational
test and evaluation. It means (within
that section): (i) the field test, under
realistic combat conditions of any item
of (or key component oO weapons,
equipment, or munitions for use in
purpose of determining the
effectivemess and suitability of the
weapons, equipment, or minitions for
use in combat by typical military us-

(to see if it hit)—shoot. A less-effec¬
tive missile might fire according to a
shoot-shoot-look doctrine.

Conclusion

This review of specific issues and
actions during the last few years can
serve as a guide so that you should
always know where the OT&E person
is coming from:

—Military capability and mission
level testing, not “black box”
testing

—Get in early to make problems
visible at a time when they can
be fixed

—Keep the user in the loop

—Do independent analysis and
reporting.

If there is a core value within the
OT&E community concerning acqui¬
sition it is the following: Ensure that
the operational effectiveness and suit¬
ability of weapons systems are tested
adequately, evaluated objectively, and
reported independently to acquisition
decision-makers.

If the system works right, even
younger persons can become DOT&E.

ers: and (ii) the evaluation of the re¬
sults of such test.

Title 10 requires that a major defense
acquisition program may not proceed
beyond low-rate initial production until
initial operational test and evalua¬
tion of the program is completed.
Further, it requires that the Director
shall analyze the results of the opera¬
tional test and evaluation conducted
for each major defense acquisition
program and prepare a report stating
the opinion of the Director as (A)
whether test and evaluation performed
were adequate: and, (B) whether the
results of such test and evaluation
confirm that the items or components
actually tested are effective and suit¬
able for combat.

Program Monoger

Sepfember-Ocrober 1993

RESTRUCTURING

LEAN PRODUCTION

A Focus for Defense Procurement Success

Major William B. Vance, USAF

bout the defense budget, I
- raise a hope and a cau¬
tion. As we restructure our mili¬
tary' forces to meet the new threats
of the post-CoId War world, it is
true that we can responsibly re¬
duce our defense budget. Now,
we may all doubt what that range
of reductions is, but let me say
that as long as 1 am president, I
will do everything I can to make
sure that the men and women
who serve under the American
flag will remain the best-trained,
the best-prepared, the best-
equipped fighting force in the
world, and everyone of you should
make that solemn pledge.

counters and initiate new offensive
programs. The resultant arms race
was a classic war of attrition, yet one
most decisively fought on an uncon¬
ventional battlefield—the balance
sheet.

Outcome of the Cold War has pre¬
sented the United States with a pre¬
dictable set of circumstances: (1) sole
military-superpower status, (2) free¬
dom to downsize the military due to
the smaller size of any foreseeable

-President Bill Clinton
State of the Union Address
February 17, 1993'

Collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989
gave the world visual confirmation of
a hidden suspicion. The United States
had just won the Cold War by spend¬
ing the Soviet Union into virtual bank¬
ruptcy. American weapons acquisi¬
tion decisions, particularly those made
in the post-Vietnam era, had forced
the U.S.S.R. to develop defensive

Major Vance, a June graduate of
the Marine Corps Command and Staff
College, is assigned to the Office of the
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisi¬
tion, Directorate for Electronics and
Special Programs, Pentagon. He is an
F-16 test pilot with 2,500 hours in
more than 45 aircraft types.

Progronn Manager

Seprember-Ocraber 1993

adversary as compared to the former
Soviet Union, and (3) ability and need
to contribute the resultant excess de¬
fense dollars toward servicing the na¬
tional debt.

Our national leadership must
use these new circumstances as a
baseline for future strategy decisions.
Indeed, the National Security
Strategy of the United States acknowl¬
edges the realities of these circum¬
stances in its introduction to Section
V, the Defense Agenda for the 1990s,
which “...will guide our deliberate
reductions to no more than the
forces we need to defend our inter¬
ests and meet our global responsibili¬
ties.

Weapon systems...
will still need to be
fielded.

Quollty people will
still need to be
trained.

In contrast, money
will still need to be
soved.

Uncomfortable Dilemma

Unfortunately, this reduced spend¬
ing level for personnel and weapon
systems suggests a very uncomfort¬
able dilemma. We now have the best
military force the United States has
ever fielded, both in the quality of
troops and equipment.

However, the passage of time and
the nature of man and, consequently,
man’s propensity toward conflict, still
remain unchanged. Weapon systems,
provided by a robust defense indus¬
trial base, will still need to be fielded.
Quality people will still need to be
trained. In contrast, money will still
need to be saved. The national debt
and the now ambiguous threat man¬
date satisfaction of each of these needs,
even though they are in conflict.

The resultant, rapidly increasing
competition for scarce resources,
caused by both defense structure re¬
ductions and budget reductions, could
diminish our ability to act decisively
as a world leader, and even render us
unable to defend our national inter¬
ests or execute our international re¬
sponsibilities.

Factors Invalidating the
Historical Approach

The United States is witnessing the
need for a dramatic shift in military
thinking. Contemporary military strat¬
egies must be based on the need for
defending our national interests in an
increasingly complicated politico-mili¬
tary environment rather than for de¬
fending against a Cold War super¬
power threat. The inherent reductions
in force structure required by this shift
in thinking mandate fewer but neces¬
sarily smarter weapon systems.

To that end, the Department of
Defense (DOD) has described a new
acquisition strategy that no longer rou¬
tinely requires conceptual or devel¬
opmental systems or technologies to
pass into the production phase. Em¬
phasis will be placed on developing

Program Monoger

September-Oaober 1993

A Few Definitions Are Appropriate
for Terms Used in this Paper

Acquisition Strategy: A program
manager's written plan to satisfy the
mission need. This paper also refers
to acquisition strategy as DOD’s overall
approach to defense procurement.*

Acquisition Program: A formal pro¬
gram that may result in the acquisi¬
tion of new defense procurement. Es¬
tablishment of an acquisition program
occurs at Milestone I, or Concept Dem¬
onstration Approval, and requires com¬
petitive prototyping, a step beyond
Advanced Technology Demonstrations
used during concept exploration.^

Production Concept: That part of a
program manager's acquisition strat¬
egy that defines the rate and quantity
of item production.

Production Approval: Milestone III of
the Defense Acquisition Process.®

technologies and production-level
manufacturing techniques for future
use. More emphasis will be placed
on technology insertion and improve¬
ment of current systems, rather than
on initiating new starts.'

Further, to save money in the short
term, many acquisition programs have
been postponed, stretched into future
years, or canceled outright.

Although this strategy is in compli¬
ance with the policy of saving dollars
while still attempting to provide needed
capability, at what cost to the nation
and our future defense industrial ca¬
pability is DOD following this strategy?

Reconstitution

One of the pillars of our National
Security Strategy is reconstitution,
using our defense technology and the
U.S. defense industrial base as the
means.' Although funding levels for
science and technology remain stable
for now, our acquisition strategies of
necessity require a large reduction in
production dollars." If production is

allowed to decrease to insufficiently
profitable levels, contractors may elect
to cease operations. Their technical
bases, processes and equipment may
be lost forever. General Dynamics,
for example, (prior to the sale of its
fighter production line to Lockheed)
required a minimum economic pro¬
duction run of four or five F-16s
monthly."

Granted, processes may be docu¬
mented and manufacturing equipment
mothballed; however, highly skilled
and focused teams—such as Lock¬
heed’s Advanced Development Com¬
pany, the "Skunk Works"—should
they disband from lack of profits, may
be impossible to reassemble should
the nation's military require reconsti¬
tution. Our reliance on technology as
a force multiplier, and ultimately as a
battlefield lifesaver. renders the loss
of the defense industry’s brainpower,
complicated technical processes, and
its highly trained workers strategically
unacceptable.

Weapons Platforms

The reduction in absolute num¬
bers of weapons platforms is a fact in
this new era. Civilian and military
decision-makers at every level must
exercise careful judgment to decide
how much reduction is too much,
and then prevent it. in a statement
some critics might call uncharacteris¬
tic. Air Force doctrine, though gener¬
ally praising and usually depending
extensively on high technology, spe¬
cifically acknowledges the fact that
numbers do matter:

Advanced technology is crucially
important to aerospace forces,
but numbers arc a!'"> important.

A small, technically sophisticated
force could be overwhelmed by
a huge but unsophisticated
force—that is. at some point
quantity can overwhelm qual¬
ity.'*’

The direct result of a policy that
would reduce actual numbers of op¬

erationally assigned systems faster than
reducing manpower would be a de¬
crease in the amount of hands-on train¬
ing available to the war fighters. Out-
year DOD budgets acknowledge this
shortfall and propose large increases
in training and simulation dollars for
all the Services as an attempt to com¬
pensate. '' Nevertheless, from my view¬
point as an operator, there is nothing
as good as the genuine article to train
for the fog of war.

Gutted Budgets

Post-Cold War budget reductions
have truly put the defense establish¬
ment on the defensive in an effort to
avoid another hollow-force era.
America is proficient at fielding high-
technology. and usable, stalwart weap¬
ons. The fall of the Berlin Wall, fol¬
lowed by the military’s decisive Desert
Storm performance, attests to the wis¬
dom of our previous approach to de¬
fense procurement. Now, facing gut¬
ted budgets. DOD is constrained by
decreasing manpower levels and weap¬
ons platforms, and the consequent
erosion of the nation’s defense indus¬
trial base.

Although some sectors of the de¬
fense industry have begun to consoli¬
date in an attempt to alleviate this
erosion, this is not widely the case in
the aircraft manufacturing sector.
Aviation Week and Space Technolog}’
relates a recent market study released
by Booz-Allen & Flamilton that im¬
plies “the result is too many firms
chasing too few programs. The study
predicted that a ’hurricane’ of con¬
solidation and restructuring is in the
wind."'- Several defense contractors,
for example, are "...marked for ex¬
tinction as fighter builders...” if the
multiservice A/F-X aircraft program is
terminated.''

The Acquisition Dilemma:

Tough Answers to Simple Questions

Solutions are available, however,
that provide varying degrees of relief.
They also require varying degrees of

Progrom Monoger

Seprember-Oaober 1990

commitment and an honest evalua¬
tion of which readiness characteris¬
tics the combatant commanders con¬
sider important for the future defense
of our country’s national interests.
Certainly, the Services’ budget in¬
creases for simulation will provide
operators artificial experience.

Artificial experience is described
by Ted Gold, Hicks & Associates, Inc.,
and Rich Wagner, Karman Corpora¬
tion, in Long Shadows and Virtual
Swords: Managing Defense Resources
in the Changing Security Environment,
lune 1990. It is essentially that expe¬
rience gained through simulation rather
than by training on operational equip¬
ment.

What policies or circumstances will
dictate how much simulation is too
much? Further, technology insertion
as a tenet of the new acquisition
strategy will provide interim capabil¬
ity improvements. What happens
when the receiving system’s
preplanned product improvement re¬
serve is miniaturized, integrated and
filled to its physical or economically
feasible capacity, and there is no room
left for improvement?

Three Questions

In addition, we can emphasize
fieldable prototypes or execute acqui¬
sition programs through engineering
and manufacturing development, in¬
tentionally delaying the Milestone III
production decision. Technologies
could then be shelved, awaiting need.
What happens to the defense con¬
tractor, tied contractually to the his¬
torical acquisition approach, when his
profit generator, full-rate production,
is removed?

justification for our future defense
posture and, therefore, justification
for a predominant acquisition strategy,
lies in the obvious answer to three
questions. First, is it practical to regain
and maintain a robust defense indus¬
trial base to enable the reconstitution
pillar of our National Strategy?

Training strategies
ore composed of
thiee moin inputs:
money, time on
equipment, and
time on

simuiotois....There
is nothing os good
os the genuine
Qiticle to troin for
the fog of wor.

Second, is it necessary to provide
fully mission-capable training levels
to our war fighters, rather than some
ill-defined, skills-maintenance train¬
ing level?

Finally, is it important to have
actual equipment available to pro¬
vide not only realistic training but
also quick-reaction, force-projection
capability? Analysis of this three-
part problem when viewed against a
defense budget free fall reveals two
approaches to possible solutions—
adjustments to our training strategies
and adjustments to our acquisition
strategies.

Solution: Training Strategies

Training strategies are composed
of three main inputs: money, time on
equipment, and time on simulators.
Declining budgets combined with fewer
weapons platforms result in reduced
hands-on training time in operational
systems. The clear solution to the

resultant decline in operator proficiency
is an increased emphasis on simula¬
tion. State-of-the-art simulators pro¬
vide safety (cats should have as many
lives as I’ve used up in the F-16 simu¬
lator), supierior visual and auditory
fidelity, six degrees-of-freedom mo¬
tion, long-distance interface with other
simulators for mock-combat scenarios
against live opponents or even an¬
other computer, and greatly reduced
operating costs compared to an hour
of flying time or MlAl tank gunnery.

The DOD concurs: ’’...The Penta¬
gon has targeted training efficiency
as a major concern of the post-Cold
War era....Playing a big part in the
Pentagon’s acquisition strategy are cost
effective off-the-shelf part task train¬
ers, maintenance trainers and mis¬
sion rehearsal systems.”'^

The National Training Systems
Association in Arlington, Virginia,
published a marketing research re¬
port that predicts steady growth dur¬
ing the next decade for worldwide
military training and simulation bud¬
gets, already estimated at $3 to $3.5
billion annually.’’ Granted, an in¬
creased emphasis on training via simu¬
lation is beneficial; but simulators do
not project combat power, nor do they
execute national policy.

Trade-off

Increasing the emphasis on our
training strategy via simulation as a
solution does improve readiness to a
degree, but it is incomplete. Every
hour spent in simulation is one less
hour spent in the actual system.

There is a trade-off between
simulator training and hardware train¬
ing: The {jerformance of a few Na¬
tional Guard units in Operation Desert
Storm clearly indicated that in many
cases there is not enough training time
available to keep units ready for the
complex weapons and tactics of
modern warfare.'" If only training
and simulation are emphasized, the
declining trend in the ability of our

Program Manager

Seprember-Ocrober 1993

defense industrial base to build
combat hardware efficiently is not re¬
versed.

Obviously, actual aircraft or tanks
are not added to the inventory to re¬
place phased-out or unusable articles.
Training and simulation are not the
complete answer. Again, from an
operator’s viewpoint, there is nothing
as good as the genuine article to train
for the fog of war.

Solution: Acquisition
Strategies

Rethinking acquisition strategies
promises a more complete solution
than a change in our training strate¬
gies. As specified in DOD Instruction
5000.2, Part 3, the production and
deployment phase (Phase III) of a
DOD acquisition program has his¬
torically supplied the country with
aircraft, tanl«, and other military hard¬
ware.'" Now, although reductions in
force structure mandate fewer but
smarter weapon systems, technologi¬
cal developments continue at ever-
increasing rates: consequently, this
historical approach must change on
a broad scale.

The DOD new acquisition strategy
addresses this need by no longer rou¬
tinely expecting conceptual or devel¬
opmental systems or technologies to
pass into Phase III. Emphasis may
be placed as appropriate on develop¬
ing specific technologies and produc¬
tion-level manufacturing techniques
for future use, putting this technology
“on the shelf” or “in the pipeline”
until an emerging threat mandates
production.

This new acquisition strategy con¬
sists of numerous elements but the
general trend is toward an approach
that, by design, leans heavily on re¬
search, development, test and evalu¬
ation rather than on production. In
short, this approach aclmowlec^s both
its current and future financial envi¬
ronments. Concerning that financial
environment. Phase III by design has

provided contractors with most of their
profits, as DOD contracts historically
do not provide for significant profits
during earlier phases of the acquisi¬
tion process.

AIA Takes Exception

Consequently, the Aerospace In¬
dustries Association (AIA) takes ex¬
ception to this new DOD approach:

The AIA has taken issue with the
Defense Dept, plan to perform
research and development and
then put a design “on the shelf”
and defer production. LeRoy }.
Haugh, vice president of procure¬
ment and financial services at
AIA, said the shelf life of technol¬
ogy is not very long, and it may
not be possible to keep a design
on hold unless there is at least
some limited production to dem¬
onstrate feasibility. Under the
current payment schemes for re¬
search and development, most
companies would have trouble
making any profit at all, he main¬
tained.'^

Former Defense Secretary Dick
Cheney addressed this common aero¬
space industry concern at a press con¬
ference in January 1992. He specifi¬
cally said that not only do we intend
to develop selected technologies into
weapon systems, but that we intend
to develop the manufacturing processes
to build those systems. He said the
Defense Department fully intends to
procure such items in sufficient quan¬
tity that users can acquire operational
experience with the systems as well
as develop appropriate doctrine. “We
are not talking about just building
one or two items and putting them on
the shelf,” he summarized.'’'

The construction of fieldable pro¬
totypes is a production concept that
takes advanced technologies a step
further than a spot on the shelf. This
approach places Advanced Technol¬
ogy Demonstrators (ATDs), normally
one-of-a-kind items used to assess

program risk during the Concept Ex¬
ploration Phase, into the hands of
operators for evaluation in realistic
ofjerational environments. This is a
superb idea for systems not intended
for procurement in large numbers; in
fact, at this stage of the acquisition
process, an acquisition program does
not exist—no production concept has
been formalized.

JSTARS

Consequently, we must realize that
these ATDs are immature, develop¬
mental systems: Maintenance and
operation must be accomplished by
experienced personnel. A familiar
example of the fieldable prototype
concept in action is the Joint Surveil¬
lance and Target Attack Radar Sys¬
tem (JSTARS) used effectively in Op¬
eration Desert Storm. Unfortunately,
with results similar to an approach
that just changes our training strat¬
egy, a plan that depends on building
fieldable prototypes to keep assem¬
bly lines open and profits flowing is
not the answer.

According to General Lawrence
Skantze. USAF (Ret.), former Com¬
mander of Air Force Systems Com¬
mand (now Air Force Materiel Com¬
mand), Congress will “need to be
convinced of the credibility of the ATD
project before it is even funded or put
through the pre-Milestone I [Concept
Exploration] process.”^® The uncer¬
tainty of extending a fieldable proto¬
type into a reasonable production run
invalidates the idea of using ATDs to
train personnel and provide opera¬
tionally significant numbers of actual
hardware.

Clearly, further development of
ATDs or shelving technologies at Mile¬
stone III are not the ideal production
concepts to solve the dilemma of de¬
clining numbers of actual hardware,
deteriorating operator proficiency, and
a decaying defense industrial base.
Although Defense Secretary Les Aspin
has articulated a four-point program
to enhance the defense industrial base.

Program AAonoger

beprember-Ocrober 1993

maintenance of that industrial base
is only part of the requirement.

Acquisition Concepts

In a 12 February ’92 address to the
American Defense Preparedness As¬
sociation, and later in his confirmation
hearings for Defense Secretary, Mr.
Aspin listed four acquisition concepts
which would enhance the defense in¬
dustrial base: “selective upgrading;
selective low-rate procurements:
rollover plus, which is continued re¬
search and development of critical
technologies: and silver-bullet procure¬
ments, or purchases of highly capable
systems with advanced technologies.’’- ‘

A more all-encompassing acquisi¬
tion strategy might provide perhaps
the best overall solution to this three-
part problem. Low-rate initial pro¬
duction, recently dubbed lean pro¬
duction by senior Air Force officials,
may enable the necessary synergistic
effect of sufficient numbers of plat¬
forms: a capable defense industrial
base: and proficient, combat-ready
operators. Lean production is a pro¬
duction concept that supplies small
numbers of actual operational plat¬
forms at an efficient and profitable
pace.

A summary of the concept clearly
identifies the advantage:

Lean production recognizes that
in order to have a true opera¬
tional capability, the system must
go beyond the prototyping phase
and on into an operational envi¬
ronment. Essentially, this con¬
cept says you cannot put tech¬
nology on the shelf and expect to
produce it. [Itl implies that the
forces in the field must have pro¬
duction items to train with in
order to achieve combat readi¬
ness.--

Benefits for the War Fighters

It would appear that the war fight¬
ers favor this approach. Lean pro-

General Mike Loh. USAF

All future weapon
systems will be
subject to [italics
added] low rate
production, and
the Air Force must
work with industry
from the beginning
to develop 'smart,
realistic
production
strategies’ that
enable companies
to avoid
debilitating
overhead costs.
-February 4r 1990

duction, as a routinely selected pro¬
duction concept rather than as a Band-
Aid for a budget crunch, would gov¬
ern the procurement of a system from
the earliest stages of its acquisition
cycle. The war fighters would know

that they would be buying the best
available technology.

They would be buying fully devel¬
oped support equipment and techni¬
cal data. They would be buying an
optimized manufacturing process.
Most importantly, they would be buy¬
ing sufficient numbers of platforms
on which to train to mission-ready
proficiency levels and to take to com¬
bat should the need arise. In short,
lean production as a part of the total
acquisition strategy buys real capa¬
bility.

Moreover, the process is inherently
stable, a feature much desired by both
a volatile, politically motivated con¬
gressional process and the defense
industrial complex. Conceptually,
when a request for proposal is issued
with a reasonable assurance that lean
production will be the production con¬
cept, the contractor will be assured
his efforts will produce a state-of-the-
art product in sufficient quantities to
provide a profit level that will justify
the bid.

Aggressive Steps

Our defense industries are so frag¬
ile at this point in our history that
aggressive steps must be taken to en¬
sure the undiminished effectiveness
of this national asset. Because this
situation is critical, future acquisition
programs may be driven more by needs
of the defense industrial base rather
than by operational needs.

General Mike Loh, Commander of
the Air Combat Command, addressed
a group of more than 800 industry
and Service representatives at a
February 4, 1993, Air Force Associa¬
tion Symposium with a forceful, pre¬
cedent-setting speech. He said the
Air Force intends to increase support
to the defense industry by continuing
upgrades to existing systems; by
identifying new systems for low-rate
production; and by enabling prime
contractors and sulxontractors to de¬
velop advanced ojjerational prototypes

Progrom Monoger

September-Oaober 1993

and their manufacturing processes as
candidates for future production sys¬
tems.

Specifically, according to General
Loh, “All future weapon systems will
be subject to [italics added! low rate
production, and the Air Force must
work with industry from the begin¬
ning to develop ‘smart, realistic pro¬
duction strategies’ that enable com¬
panies to avoid debilitating overhead
costs. The war fighters are on board
with the lean-production concept.

Lean Production:

A Vision for Success

A suitable vision of the way a lean
production program of the future
should look in action is the formerly
classified, award-winning program run
by the Skunk Works—the F-117A
Stealth Fighter.

Two test pilots from the Have Blue
flight test program were awarded the
Iven C. Kinchloe Award at the 1989
Society of Experimental Test Pilots
Symposium. Each year, the award is
presented in recognition of outstand¬
ing accomplishments in the conduct
of flight test activities. The award
was presented to Lt Col Ken Dyson,
USAF (Ret.), Chief Test Pilot for
Rockwell International: and William
C. Park, Jr., then Director of Flight
Operations, Advanced Development
Projects at Lockheed. Both men pre¬
viously were ineligible for consider¬
ation for this award due to the classi¬
fication of their project. They were
the only pilots to fly the radical proof-
of-concept aircraft that pioneered cur¬
rent stealth technology and, later, de¬
velopment and production of the
F-117A.^^ The F-117A Stealth Fighter
program won the internationally rec¬
ognized Collier Trophy.

In 1976, work began on the Have
Blue prototype, and in late 1978
Lockheed received the full-scale de¬
velopment contract. In just more than
a decade, the Skunk Works would
supply the country with 59 Stealth

A suitQbl« vision of
Iho woy o ioon
production
program of the
future should look
in action is the ...
Qword-winning
progrom run by
the Skunk Woiks-
the F-117A Steolth
Fighter.

Fighters. The program moved from
design go-ahead to first flight in 31
months and initial operational capa¬
bility (IOC) in 60 months.

Since the F-117A was essentially a
concurrent development, production
and deployment program, test pilots
conducted flight tests while operators
trained in the aircraft and developed
tactics. The Skunk Works’ Richard
Silz said essential testing was
completed by IOC in October 1983,
but for several years after that flight
test continued to fill in missing data.
According to Silz, “While this approach
to testing worked and is probably
in the best traditions of the Skunk
Works, flight test is just this year fin¬
ishing the final reports on the last of
the original test plans written over
ten years ago.’’^*

Textbook Example

Although not a “lean-production”
program in the contemporary sense
of the word, this silver-bullet procure¬
ment is a textbook example of the
way an acquisition strategy should

be executed using this production con¬
cept. Though few procurements will
have the various benefits of classi¬
fied, or “black” program management
oversight, ail program managers can
learn from experiences of the Skunk
Works’ team and incorporate those
lean-production lessons into their
acquisition strategies. A need was
determined, a technology was devel¬
oped, prototypjes were built and tested
to reduce program risk, and 59 plat¬
forms and their attendant support
equipment and technical data were
procured during the program’s pro¬
duction run.

During this production run, an op¬
erational squadron achieved IOC and
refined its combat tactics. An ongo¬
ing flight test program continued to
supply operators with valuable data
and product improvements. At a unit
flyaway cost of under $43 million, the
company produced a superb product
at a fair price. Any future acquisition
program using the Stealth Fighter
paradigm will be complying with the
intent and spirit of the lean-produc¬
tion concept. Though previous suc¬
cess is no guarantee of future perfor¬
mance, imitation is the sincerest form
of flattery.

Conclusions

General Loh said all future weapwn
systems will be “subject to” low-rate
production. Rather than having fu¬
ture acquisition programs subject only
to lean production, by actually adopting
lean production as a first-choice pro¬
duction concept on multiple-item pro¬
grams (as opposed to limited-item pro¬
grams like aircraft carriers or satellites),
the acquisition community would be
able to keep contractor teams together
and keep assembly lines at least warm.

The genuine article would be avail¬
able for operator training and opera¬
tional test and evaluation. Combat¬
ant commanders would accumulate
actual numbers of combat platforms
in sufficient quantity to employ them
operationally, but for a longer time

Program Manager

Seprember-October 1993

than provided by full-rate production
decisions.

The threat is surely ambiguous. The
threat is decidedly volatile. The Middle
East, the Balkans, and India are de¬
fined by centuries-old religious, ra¬
cial and ethnic conflict; North Korea
may field atomic weapons this year
and may implode before the end of
the century: South America leads the
world in drug production and distri¬
bution.

Our streets are filled with some
of the most violent crime in the civi¬
lized world. At the fall of the Berlin
Wall and the dissolution of the War¬
saw Pact. America rejoiced at the re¬
alization of the Cold War victory.
Communism was declared bankrupt
and the Soviet Union disintegrated
into a confused collection of 15
independent states, some of which
discovered they were custodians of
large conventional and nuclear
arsenals.

Russia

The media hailed President Boris
Yeltsin as a visionary capable of bring¬
ing the new confederation out of its
problems and into the light of democ¬
racy. The window of opportunity to
assist democratic reform in the former
Soviet Union may close as various
countries assess and consolidate hold¬
ings and define strategic goals.

Recent observations indicate some
of these states are beginning defense
industries with remnants of the ex-
Soviet Union’s defense industrial com¬
plex. An intelligence community study
indicates that Russia. Ukraine, Geor¬
gia. Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan are
producing major weapon systems and
other military hardware.-'’ Mr. Yeltsin
probably faces a tenuous political
future.

America cannot sit on the side¬
lines and watch the world go by. hop¬
ing no threat will emerge that might
disrupt our defense conversion:

W« must

r»nn«mber...th#f«
ore stoles
thot...relish our
impending
diminished
copobilHy to
respond onytime,
onywhere, to ony
crisis.

[Secretary of State, Mr. Warren]
Christopher warned that if Rus¬
sia were to fall into anarchy or
return to despotism the U.S. would
pay a “frightening”price. “Noth¬
ing less is involved than the pos¬
sibility of a renewed nuclear threat;
higher defense budgets; spread¬
ing instability; and a devastat¬
ing setback for the world-wide
democratic movement...."-'

Many actors in the world commu¬
nity are not sympathetic with our de¬
sire to reduce our military forces or
resolve our economic problems.

Responding
To Crisis

Clearly, as we monitor threats
throughout the world, we must as a
nation remember there are states that
opportunistically relish our impend¬
ing diminished capability to respond
anytime, anywhere, to any crisis. Until
recently not an issue, our Cold War
and conflict-tested military power may
soon be compromised; with that, our
most important national interests may
be indefensible and our treaty obliga¬
tions unmeetable.

Facing drastic budget cuts and a
new threat environment, DOD must
lean forward in joint fashion, acknowl¬
edging a deteriorating defense indus¬
trial base, haphazard decreases in
weap)ons platforms, and the p)otential
for reduced combat capability as a
result of insufficient training. Defense
Secretary Aspin. during confirmation
hearings, said the DOD acquisition
system is “increasingly complex and
adversarial.” He intends to stream¬
line and simplify the process while
protecting it from new abuses.’"

In an interview with the Air Force
Times that same week, then Defense
Secretary Cheney, pointing out that
$1 billion was set aside this year for
defense conversion, said, “There is a
new tendency in Congress to spond
money on what are essentially do¬
mestic programs and call it defense."-’'

Lean Production

Given an appropriate program, the
first production concept the program
manager should consider when writ¬
ing acquisition strategy should be lean
production. Its application could solve
many contemptorary defense procure¬
ment problems. A lean-production
decision would simplify the acquisi¬
tion process for defense procurement
programs, guard against abuses, and
focus defense dollars on defense pro¬
grams.

It would enable more hands-on
training on opierational systems; sup¬
ply adequate numbers of opjerational
systems: and provide sufficient busi¬
ness volume and incentive to main¬
tain a viable defense industrial base.
Each attribute is a critical and neces¬
sary component of any future acqui¬
sition strategy.

By directly addressing these issues,
a broad application of the lean-pro¬
duction concept would contribute syn-
eigistically to the strategic. op)erational,
and tactical levels of our preparation
for war. If the acquisition community
is to become p»art of the solution and

Program Monoger

Seprember-Ocrober 1990

assist the President in assuring U.S.
forces remain the best trained, pre¬
pared. and equipped fightir '■re in
the world, we must acknowledge mul¬
tipolar threats to U.S. interests and
focus defense procurement efforts to
protect these interests.

To solve many of our most pres¬
sing contemporary defense procure¬
ment issues, one initiative stands out—
a long-term, first-choice commitment
to lean production as the production
concept of choice in the program
manager’s acquisition strategy.

EDITOR’S NOTE: Views herein are
solely those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect those of the Depart¬
ment of Defense or the Defense Sys¬
tems Management College.

Endnotes

1. “Word for Word.” Defense News,
February 1993, p. 14.

2. The White House. National Secu¬
rity Strategy of the United States, Au¬
gust 1991.

3. Cochrane, Charles B. “DoD’s New
Acquisition Approach: Myth or Real¬
ity?” Program Manager, July-August
1992, pp. 38-46.

4. United States Air Force. Head¬
quarters Air Force Materiel Command.
"Acquisition Plans/Strategy Panels.”
Intermediate Systems Acquisition Man¬
agement - SAS006, Volume I. Brooks
AFB, Texas: Systems Acquisition
School, October 1991.

5. Department of Defense. Department
of Defense Instruction 5000.2, “De¬
fense Acquisition Management Poli¬
cies and Procedures,” February 1991.

6. Ibid.

7. The White House, pp. 30-31.

8. Holzer, Robert, and George Leopold.

“Technology Programs Elude DoD
Budget Ax.” Defense News. February
1993, p. 18.

9. Bickers, Charles. “U.S. Fight for
Survival.” /one’s Defence Weekly. Sep¬
tember 12. 1992, pp. 34-35.

10. United States Air Force. Head¬
quarters U.S. Air Force. Basic Aero¬
space Doctrine of the United States Air
Force, Air Force Manual 1-1, Vol. II.,
Washington D.C., March 1992.

11. Griffin, Louisa. “Simulation and
Training: A Well-Protected Piece of
the DoD Budget Pie.” Defense Elec¬
tronics, April 1992, pp. 45-49.

12. Morrocco, John D. “Lockheed
Buys Shares in Future.” Avratron Week
and Space Technology, December 1992,

pp. 20-21.

13. Bickers, pp. 34-35.

14. Lesser, Roger. “Pentagon Targets
Training as Critical Asset.” Defense
Electronics, November 1992, p. 29.

15. Griffin, p. 45.

16. Willis, Grant. “A New Genera¬
tion of Warriors." Navy Times, March
18,1991, p. 12.

17. DOD Instruction 5000.2, pp. 3-
23.

18. Hughes, David. “Use of Consult¬
ants Grows as Industry Restructures.”
Aviation Week and Space Technology,
January 4,1993, pp. 58-60.

19. Cochrane, p. 40.

20. Skantze, Lawrence. “Restore Sense
to Acquisition.” Defense News. No¬
vember 1992, p. 15.

21. Silverberg, David. “Clinton Takes
First Steps to Guide New Procure¬
ment Policy." Defense News. Febru¬
ary 1993, p. 42.

22. Cochrane, p. 40.

23. Opall, Barbara. “Loh: Industrial
Base to Guide AF Weapon Plans.”
Defense News. February 1993, p. 6.

24. Lynch, David J. “How the Skunk
Works Fielded Stealth.” Air Force
Magazine, November 1992, pp. 22-
28.

25. Thirty-Third Symposium Proceed¬
ings. Lancaster, California: The Soci¬
ety of Experimental Test Pilots, 1989.

26. “What’s News - World-Wide.”
The Wall Street Journal, March 4,1993,
Section A., p. 1.

27. Ignatius, Adi, and Carla Anne
Robbins. “Russian Crisis Eases as
Court Considers Issues.” The Wall
Street Journal, March 23,1993, Sec¬
tion A., p. 8.

28. Ricks, Thomas E. “Aspin Side¬
steps Questions at Hearing on His
Nomination to be Defense Chief,” The
Wall Street Journal, January 8,1993,
Section B, p. 6A.

29. Wolffe, Jim. “Concern Voiced
That Drawdown Could Worsen.” Air
Force Times, January 11, 1993, p. 3.

Other References

Dunlap, Charles J., Jr., “The Origins
of the American Military Coup of 2012,”
Parameters, XXII, Winter 1992-93, pp.
19-20.

Gold. Ted, Hicks 8f Associates, Inc.,
and Richard Wagner, Kaman Corpo¬
ration. “Long Shadows and Virtual
Swords: Managing Defense Resources
in the Changing Security Environ¬
ment,” June 1990, as descrilsed in
Cochrane. Charles B. “DoD’s New
Acquisition Approach: Myth or Real¬
ity?” Program Manager, July-August
1992, p. 39.

Payne, K.B., Linda H. Vlahos, and
Willis A. Stanley. "Evolving Russian
Views on Defense: An Opportunity
for Cooperation.” Strategic Review, XXI,
Winter 1993, pp. 61-72.

Progrom Monoger

Sepromber-Ocfober 1993

ROM

T he luly-August 1993 Program Manager had an
article entitled “The Work Breakdown Structure (WBS)—
It’s Much More Than a Cost Reporting Structure." The
article proposed an engineering WBS approach, combining
product and process features. The subject is timely because
M1L-STD-881B, “Work Breakdown Structures for Defense
Material Items." was signed on March 25, 1993.

1 agree that the WBS is very important to an engineering
community that is not aware of the role it should play in
WBS development. I do not agree with the article’s pro¬
posed WBS redefinition, however, and fear that its publica¬
tion just as MIL-STD-881B is being distributed will add to
the confusion. Despite many good points, the article mis¬
represents the WBS, and advocates inappropriate use of the
flawed draft M1L-STD-499B, “Systems Engineering.” MIL-
STD-881B is official Department of Defense WBS policy,
and was published only after careful consideration of the
points raised in the article.

Your readers should refer to MIL-STD-881B, especially
the User Guide at Appendix I, to understand how to prepare
and use a WBS. My purpose here is not to repeat that
excellent guidance, but to clarify a few points raised by the
article.

First, the draft MIL-STD-499B. the basis for the article,
was not approved because it contained many problems. For
example, it would have required all contractors to use as
their organizational structure multidisciplinary teams. This
excessively rigid requirement will be corrected in the next
draft by instead requiring “multidisciplinary teamwork," without
specifying how a contractor must organize. The draft also
confused the WBS concept by mixing “product” and "pro¬
cess” inappropriately. Unfortunately, the unapproved draft
499B is already being improperly invoked on some con¬
tracts.

Second, the reference to the MIL-STD-881 WBS prima¬
rily as a cost reporting structure is incorrect. I understand
why it may be viewed in that way, given its historical asso¬
ciation with the Contractor Cost Data Reporting (CCDR)
Plan. In reality, proper program WBS development is very
important early in the acquisition process (long before CCDR
reporting starts) in order to properly identify summary level
products consisting of hardware, software, services, data,
and facilities. This did not occur in the F-22 case cited in the
article, and it was impractical to correct the WBS retroac¬

tively. This problem is avoidable by performing proper up¬
front planning. The F-22 WBS could have been developed
in compliance with M1L-STD-881A without compromising
the integrated management approach.

Finally, the article quotes out of context a briefing made
by the Air Force support contractor for MIL-STD-881 B. I
have heard his briefing, and can vouch for his understand¬
ing of WBS policy. In fact, the contract includes a task to
develop WBS training materials that will be used in ail
appropriate Defense acquisition courses.

For an excellent discussion of WBS development and
use, your readers should read the article in the March-April
1991 Program Manager entitled “The ‘Hither and Yawn
(Yon)’ of Statement of Work Preparation.” It pointed out
“The WBS format was never intended to be enforced verba¬
tim. but used as a starting point for future tailoring by
program managers. Rigid task procedures and too much
data are issues needing to be resolved within the SPO before
solicitation release or contract
award. The key point is that the Send Letters to-
WBS does not drive our require- DEFENSE SYST MGMT COLG
ments. We do. It merely pro- aTTN RDP
vides the framework. ” 1 agree 9320 beLVOIR ROAD
with this view. WBS policy was SUITE G38
never the issue; improper (usu- pj- beLVOIR VA 22060-5565
ally excessively rigid) WBS imple-
mentation was.

In addition to the User Guide, MIL-STD-881 B has guid¬
ance for software-intensive applications and for contractors
that use integrated product team organizations. Should
M1L-STD-499B ultimately be approved, its requirement will
be compatible with thc.e in MIL-STD-881 B.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this article.
I trust these clarifications will be helpful to Program Man¬
ager readers, and will support the author’s desire to have
engineers stay in the room when the topic of WBS comes up.

Gene H. Porter
Director, Acquisition
Program Integration

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
13 August 1993

(The writer is referring to Dr. Jerry Lake’s article.)

TTianks for the July-August Program Manager. The article
X on early military aviation is excellent—well-written and

TTianks so much for Program Manager, it contains a lot of

X interesting articles. Best of all was the piece. “Spruce,

nicely illustrated. You tell an important, complex story that

Dojje and Fordism.” I enjoyed reading it and passed it along

is little known or appreciated in historical or management

to my staff.

circles.

Mr. Jacob Neufeld

Harold W. Nelson, USA

Director

Chief, US Army Center of Military History
Washington, D.C.

Center for Air Force History

Progrom Atonoger

Seprember-October 1993

KI I ATIDXSHIPS

DSMC SESSIONS

Connecting Ethics and Quality

s. Judith Light, a certified

-management consultant horn

Colorado Springs, Colo., facilitated
several group discussions at DSMC
on “Connecting Ethics AND Qual¬
ity.” Using quotes, lecturette, exer¬
cises and dialogue, the groups ex¬
plored the relationships between
people and systems. Ms. Light started
the recent sessions with the following
quote by Margaret Wheatley in the
book. Leadership arxd the New Science:

This world of relationships is
rich and complex. Gregory
Bateson (1980) speaks of “the
jjattem that connects,” and uiges
that we stop teaching facts—
the things of knowledge—and
focus, instead, on relationships
as the basis of all definitions.
With relationships, we give up
predictability for potentials.
Several years ago I read that
elementary particles were
“bundles of potentiality.” I have
begun to think of all of us this
way, for surely we are as unde-
finable, unanalyzable, and
bundled with potential as any¬
thing in the universe. None of
us exists indejTendent of our re¬
lationships with others. Differ¬
ent settings and people evoke

Dr. Hall is a Special Assistant to the
DSMC Commandant for Quality. She
also is an instructor in the Principles of
Management Department and works
on curriculum integration.

Dr. Mary-fo Hall

some qualities from us and leave
others dormant. In each of these
relationships, we are different,
new in some way.

Ms. Light suggested that as an out¬
growth of the session that everyone
leave and look at others as “bundles
of potentiality.” She stressed that ethics
is about asking the right questions
not about having the right answers.

Group

Participation

One of the exercises was to define
ethics pictorially. Some of the groups
had one picture: other groups had
individual pictures. One particular
definition was a house with a box on
the inside. On the inside of the box
was a question mark. The originator
of the definition stated that ethics starts
with self and at an early age. How¬

ever, as we grow, we get boxed in to
certain paradigms, roles and rules.

Another person defined ethics as
brain (head) plus heart.

Still another group collectively de¬
picted ethics as a teeter-totter. On
one end was management and all the
resources. On the other end, were all
workers. Under one end sharp tacks
were pointing upward, and under the
other side were many PAC-MEN ready
to gobble anyone that falls.

The group talked about trust, in¬
tegrity and fairness that play into the
balance that affects the teeter-totter.

After the discussion, it was agreed
that ethics is the ground rules by which
we live and by which people operate
within the organization. Ethics deals
with the fundamental human relation-

Pro^om AAonoger

September-Ocrober 1993

ships, including one’s relationship with
oneself and one’s relationship to the
organizational system.

In the discussion, the word “re¬
vere” was used rather than respect.
“Revere" is nonjudgmental. Another
concept in ethics that is nonjudgmental
is that of “allowing" one to be differ¬
ent rather than the concept of “toler¬
ating differences.”

The group also discussed quality,
change, competition, and the ethics
of caring and worth. The session ended
with:

The place to begin to change

the world is first in one’s own

heart and head and hands and

then work out from there.

—Robert Pirsig
Zen and the Art of Motorcycle
Maintenance

Ideas for encouraging further indi¬
vidual exploration recommended by
Ms. Light include:

Driving Fear Out of the Workplace,
Kathleen Ryan and Daniel F.
Oestereich

Quality of Else, Lloyd Dobyns and
Clare Crawford-Mason

Caring: An Alternative Approach
to Ethics and Moral Education, Nel
Noddings

The Tao of Leadership, John Heider

Small Decencies: Reflections and
Meditations on Being Human at Work,
John Cowan

The Worth Ethic, Kate Ludeman

The Hard Problems of Management:
Gaining the Ethics Edge, Mark Pastin

Leadership and the New Science,
Margaret Wheatley

“TQM from the Trenches: The Role
of the Individual,” Rolf Clark, Pro¬
gram Manager, March/April 1992

OPERATIONAL

DEFINITIONS

Affirmative Action (AA) - A policy followed closely by the
Federal Civil Service that requires agencies to take positive steps
to insure equal opportunity in employment, development, ad¬
vancement, and treatment of all employees and applicants for
employment regardless of race, color, sex, religion, national origin,
or physical or mental handicap. Affirmative action also requires
that specific actions be directed at the special problems and
unique concerns in assuring equal employment opportunity for
minorities, women and other disadvantaged groups.

Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) - Federal policy to
provide equal employment opportunity for all; to prohibit dis¬
crimination on the ground of age, race, color, religion, sex, na¬
tional origin, or physical or mental handicap; and to promote the
full realization of employees’ potential through a continuing affir¬
mative action program in each executive department and agency.

Glass Ceiling - Artificial barriers, based on biases in attitudes
or in the organization, that prevent qualified individuals from
advancing upward into management.

Mentor - An advisor who helps those with less experience to
understand processes.

Process Action Team (PAT) - A team chartered to work on an
improvement process as part of the TQM effort.

Sexual Harassment - Unwelcome sexual advances, requests
for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature when:

(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or
implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s employment;

(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual
is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such
individual; or

(3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of substantially
interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.

Upward Mobility Program (UMP) - Systematic career devel¬
opment requiring competitive selection in positions that provide
experience and training leading to future assignments in other,
more responsible positions.

Program Monoger

Seprember-Oaober 1993

BOOK REVIEW

Who's Bashing Whom?

Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries

by Dr. Laura D’Andrea Tyson, Institute for International Economics Washington, D.C.
November, 1992, 324 pps.. Paperback, $25.00. (ISBN 0-88132-106-0).

There are no easy answers to the
high stakes trade issues being played
out on the economic world stage. The
highly visible and politically appealing
bashing of lapanese cars and VCRs is
certainly part of that game, but it is
merely a nudge on the economic front
of slowing imports to, and increasing
exports from, the United States.

Referring to the book’s title. “Who's
Bashing Whom,” the author says that
“...to some degree everybody’s bashing
everybody," when it comes to high tech¬
nology trade. Nevertheless, after read¬
ing the fine print. I’m inclined to think
she believes that the United States is
indeed the “bashee,” not the other way
around. Plus, she makes a strong, well-
documented case to support her argu¬
ment that we should be on the giving
end for a change.

When Dr. Tyson wrote her book,
she worked for the prestigious Institute
for International Economics. In the
meantime, she has been confirmed to
be Chairperson of President Clinton’s
Council of Economic Advisers. She cer¬
tainly is in a key position to turn some
of her ideas into policy. This makes the
book even more important for our trad¬
ing partners, especially Japan, to read.

Dr. Tyson’s problem is really with
the Japanese. She takes a quick swipe
at Europe early in her book, citing our
clashes with Europe concerning ques¬
tions of market access: overt trade bar¬
riers. like tariffs and preferential gov¬
ernment procurement; and, the touchy
subject of subsidies.

The general European idea seems
clear enough however; The competi¬
tive opportunities afforded to foreign
companies in the European market

should be matched by comparable for¬
eign opportunities for European com¬
panies. This reciprocity principle ap¬
pears to be emerging in U.S. trade policy
so, for now, things appear on a
noncollision course with our European
friends.

No, Japan is definitely the problem.
The author argues that the problem boils
down to one of market access. Barriers
to market access in Japan resist simple
remedies because they are rooted in
unique structural features of Japanese
capitalism. She cites the case of Motorola
attempting to make inroads into the Japa¬
nese cellular phone market.

Impediments occurred despite the
fact the Japanese admitted in public
that the Motorola cellular phone was a
smaller and better mobile phone than
Japanese models. Only through threats
of trade retaliation by the U.S. Trade
Representative in 1989 was Motorola
able to establish a foothold in Japan’s
cellular phone market. This whole pro¬
cess took about 10 years and gave time
for Motorola’s Japanese competitors to
start catching up.

This brings us to the thrust of the
book—what to do. Should Japanese
firms be accorded national treatment
in the American market when Ameri¬
can firms are not accorded such
treatment in the Japanese market? Dr.
Tyson’s prescription for curing trade im¬
balances are what she calls “cautious
activism.”

She recommends that the nation’s
(U.S.) trade laws be used to deter or
compensate for foreign practices not
adequately regulated by existing multi¬
lateral rules. While Dr. Tyson makes a
case that cautious activism is not the

same as protectionism, she does admit
that a certain amount of arm-twisting
and forceful unilateralism may be nec¬
essary. Hardly the free-market nice guy
(person).

One important point Dr. Tyson pre¬
sents is her philosophy for the future.
She sees declining military research and
development (R&D) and a need for in¬
creased government nonmilitary R&D,
particularly in high-tech applications like
biotechnology, semiconductor manufac¬
turing, robotics, artificial intelligence,
and high-definition displays.

She sees a growing overlap between
technologies and materials with both
civilian and military applications, and
the continued globalization of high-tech¬
nology markets.

From what we are seeing in the di¬
rection of the Clinton Department of
Defense, what she envisioned in this
book in November 1992 is right on track
with what is happening in late 1993.

This is a well-timed and informative
book. The only criticism is that it some¬
times uses a lot of economic technical
jargon to make a point. Because of the
technical and complex nature of the
material discussed, I guess that comes
with the territory.

That being said, this book is defi¬
nitely necessary reading for our trade
representatives and our trading part¬
ners, particularly Japan. It is a strong
shot across the bow for any of those
partners who think they can continue
to bash America. William W.
Bahnmeier, DSMC 95 Program
Manager, and Professor of Principles
of Program Management.

Progrom Monoger

Seprember-CDcober 1993

ATTENTION PENTAGON
SUBSCRIBERS
OF

PROGRAM MANAGER MAGAZINE

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dji Jii/vvl l''OP addrc^" I'orki.u c>.'!n:\itiblc wiili
Li>lN jddiv^^inc "land.iid^. The main pur-
pv"e I-- U' >.jiialii'' PiH'' lar i-'iwe-sinc mail on
LIM’S .inlomaled L\juipmont aaid aaiMuiv pv'-
teniial pv"-i,p^o ^li^eoaiiN. riio PcM’* adv.liO'"
iormai will evvapri'-o u;’ to i'i\ c line-' tv' ineUide
the toe of a "ireet name in the "IV'liwr; Ad¬
dle"'- I me."

I'enta.eon addre"" ehanpe" were ei’ieetne
’d lane P’".'. .\i'ter .'! Peeemher 1all
!h'i )o J,he "iandaai I'entaei'n

iormai w ill he reuirned to the initialing orpani-
:mtion,

.\" we po to piv"" with till" i""Ue. we are
aware oi onlv the"e ehanpe". r''ther PrtP
aeti'.me" ma'' be aiieeted nltimatelw Reader"
"hoLild eon"ult their local repnlativ'n" and in
lorm r.’r'p.'i;.'?! .Mimitpe.' it the'.' are atfeeted.

lo eontinue on tlie /’’op.-u’.-n .\/i;.’\,-pe.' "ub
"eription Iwt after ’ i IV'eember. "end addiV""
ehanpe" tv':

nrn \sf; syst .\k.mt coi (■

ATT\ nSMC I’KRSS
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SLUTK C.T.S

n l’>riA'OIK \'A 22000 5365

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ACQUISITION KI SEARCH SYMPOSIUM

Keynoter Speaks On

REVOLUTIONARY

CHANGES

Joan Sable

Mr. James McDivilt, keynoter, and BGen (Set) Claude M. Bolton, Jr., USAF, DSMC
Commandant.

! I he Defense Systems Manage-

I-ment College (DSMC) and the

National Contract Management As¬
sociation (NCMA), Washington, D.C.
Chapter, co-hosted the 1993 Acquisi¬
tion Research Symposium at the Holi¬
day Inn Crowne Plaza in Rockville,
Maryland. Close to 200 acquisition
personnel attended this 2 1/2-day
event.

Mr. Calvin Brown, DSMC, and Ms.
Donna Ireton, NCMA, co-chaired the
conference assisted by program co¬
chairs, Ms. loan Sable, DSMC, and
Mr. Patrick Sullivan, NCMA.

BGen (Sel) Claude M. Bolton, Jr.,
DSMC Commandant, gave the open¬
ing remarks and introduced the key¬
note speaker, Mr. James McDivitt,
Senior Vice President, Government
Operations & International, Rockwell
International.

Mr. McDivitt spoke of defining our
own future. He said “the future be¬
gins now...we need to worry about
decisions made today for they will
affect our future. The defense depart¬
ment and we in industry are in the
midst of revolutionary changes. It is
during times of revolution that some
of the biggest mistakes are made....

Ms. Sable was program co-chair for
the Symposium and is a Technical In¬
formation Specialist in the Research
and Information Division at DSMC.

Most of these decisions appear to be
made based upon short-term conse¬
quences - like the impact on a local
community of closing a depot, or the
difficulty of laying off federal workers-
with very little consideration to the
long-term consequences.”

Other plenary speakers at the June
Symposium included: Mr. Thomas J.
Dolan, Jr., Holder of DSMC’s
Acquisition Law Chair: Mr. Steven K.
Conver, Vice President, Operations
Integration, Martin Marietta
Corporation; and Ms. Deborah L.
Wince-Smith, Senior Fellow, Council
on Competitiveness (former Assistant
Secretary of Commerce for Technol¬
ogy Policy).

The second day’s morning session
included a Joint Logistics Command¬
ers Panel comprising Rear Admiral
Robert G. Harrison, USN; Mr. Darold
L. Griffin, AMC; Rear Admiral Leonard
Vincent (USN), DLA, DCMC; Mr.
Ronald D. Elliott, USMC; and Colo¬
nel Harry H. Heimple, USAF. BGen
(Sel) Bolton moderated this discus¬
sion. Each panelist addressed acqui¬
sition initiatives of the present and
plans for the future in their respective
commands. At the conclusion, pan¬
elists answered questions from the
audience.

The program concluded with these
two panel discussions: “The Interna¬
tional Aspects of Acquisition."

Progrom AAonoger

September-Oaober 1993

Photo by Richard Mattox.

ioinl iogistii:< ComnwiKkr Panel Manhers (left la ri^ht): Cal //urn’ II. Ildmpic. LIS.M': Mr. ParalJ /.. Griffin: Mr. RanakI P. I'JItal: R.\PM
I.eanarJ \ 'iikxiU. USX.

modemtod bv Mr. lohn S. Autry,
K.xccutivo \'icc President. Susun
Dnvis International o’ Public Affairs
Group: and. "The Industrial Base-
Progress or Poverty?" moderated by
Mr. Patrick D. Sullivan. Assistant \'ice
President. Procurement & Finance,
Aerospace Industries Association of
America.

Industrial and International
Panel Members

•Members of the international panel
included: Mr. Shii^co .Matsutomi. First
.Secretar\' Fconomic Section, Fhnbassy
of lapan: .Mr. Galen I. Ho. \'ice Presi¬
dent and General .Manaoer, .Merlin
Programme. IB.M-Aerospace Systems:
.Mr. Gerhard 1. I.ohan. Head of Trade
Section. Delegation of the Commis¬
sion of the Furopean Communities:
and .Ms. Laura Beth Sherman. Assis¬
tant General Counsel. LI.S. Trade Rep-
resentatiw.

•Members of the industrial base
panel included: .Ms. Fllen Brown.
Professional Staff .Member. Commit¬
tee on .Armed Services. Ll.S. 1 louse of

Representatives: Mr. Richard C.
Barnard, Assistant Vice President.
Army Times Publishing Company and
Kxecuti\'e FAIitor. Defense News. Space
News. Commercial Aviation News: Mr.
.Vicholas M. Torelli. Ir.. Former Deputv
Assistant Secretar\' of Defense for Pro¬
duction Resources: and Dr. lames
Blackwell. Assistant Director. Science
Applications International Corpora¬
tion Strategic Assessment Center.

Acker Award

Si,\ty-two papers were selected for
publication in the symposium book
of Proceedinas. Thirtv-lwo of these

were selected for presentation during
symposium break-out sessions. This
\olume of papers is available upon
written request to L'/S.MC. ATT.\': OS-
PR. Fort Belvoir, \'A 22000-5420.

.Acker Skill in Communication
/\r\'ard recipients for outstanding papers
were: LISAF .MajorCiregon.’A. Garrett.
.Arrnv I.TC Alan S. Gilbreth. L''r. Will¬
iam I. Hooker. .Mr. .Martin 1.
Kestenbaum, and Dr. Ronald I..
Straight.

Progrom Monoger

OPERATION
FLOOD RELIEF

Volunteers from the Defense Sys¬
tems Management College (DSMC),
including students, are raising
money for flood victims in Ham¬
burg, Iowa. The College also is
adopting the family of a DSMC
soldier.

Food donated by local merchants
and DSMC employees netted
SI.800 at a cookout. A bake sale
netted S555. A white elephant sale
was held in late August. The Col¬
lege is working with the Red Cross
and the ludge Ad\ocate General,
according to the DSMC personnel
office.

Heaxw rains and flooding from the
Missouri and Nishnabotna rix'crs
sent five feet oi water through the
Southwest Iowa town, forcing
evacuation of 250 people.

Septennber-Ocrober 1993

DSMC PRESS BEGINS PUBLISHING
TECHNICAL REPORTS

he DSMC Press has begun pub¬
lishing a new type of docu¬
ment called DSMC Technical Reports
(TRs). The first, TR 1-93, Acquiring
Defense Systems, by the late David D.
Acker, will arrive from the printer in
September.

The TRs are manuscripts written
in-house by DSMC faculty and staff
or others in the defense acquisition
community such as faculty of the De¬
fense Acquisition University member
schools or Pentagon staff. The TRs
are categorized as information out¬
side of books, guidebooks, mono¬
graphs, magazine articles or course
materials. Examples include studies,
position or issue papers, status re¬
ports, summaries of legislation or regu-
latior s, doctoral dissertations, and
evaluations and critiques.

Publication of TRs expands DSMC’s
research and information dissemina¬
tion mission into a wider customer

service base, and provides increased
opportunities for acquisition profes¬
sionals to publish.

Printing is limited to several hun¬
dred copies, most of which are dis¬
tributed to the DSMC library, other
Department of Defense and govern¬
ment libraries, selected university li¬
braries, and the Defense Technical
Information Center (DTIC) and the
National Technical Information Ser¬
vice (NTIS). Multiple copies can be
obtained from DTIC and NTIS.

Other manuscripts selected as TRs
are: Dr. Robert Warren’s University
of Southern California doctoral dis¬
sertation, “The Impact of the
Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisi¬
tion) on Defense Science and Tech¬
nology: An Organizational Culture
Study”; and C. B. Cochrane’s “Sum¬
mary and Assessment - Acquisition
Policy Implications: National Defense
Authorization Act for FY-1993, and

Department of Defense Appropriations
Act for FY-1993.”

Interested authors can submit
manuscripts for consideration to:

DEFENSE SYST MGMT COLG

ATTN RDP ESTHER FARRIA

9820 BELVOIR ROAD

SUITE G38

FT BELVOIR VA 22060-5565

703-805-3056; DSN 655-3056

The Policy and Authors’ Guide¬
lines are on this page. Because of the
special nature of the work by Acker,
former DSMC archivist and historian,
an exception has been made to the
ix)licy regarding a standard cover and
no illustrations.

With the possible exception of the
Acker TR, the DSMC Press has no
plans to market TRs through the U.S.
Government Printing Office.

Wilbur Jones

POLICY AND AUTHORS’ GUIDELINES

—TR manuscript topics shall relate to defense acquisi¬
tion.

—Authors must submit manuscripts to the Director, DSMC
Press, for publication consideration. No prearrange¬
ments are required. Following necessary peer review,
the decision to publish is the Director’s.

—Authors are responsible for internal staffing and ap¬
proval, accuracy, completeness and editing. The Press
staff provides counsel regarding structure and compo¬
sition.

—Authors accepted for publication should provide the
DSMC Press with a hard copy of the manuscript,
preferably single-spaced, and a labeled IBM diskette
with the manuscript in WordPerfect Version 5.1.

—No word or page limit is required, but authors must aim
for no more than 50 single-spaced pages.

—Illustrations, except for charts to support text, are not
recommended. Foldouts are prohibited.

—The DSMC Visual Arts Department (OS-VA) provides a
standard black-and-white cover without illustrations
showing the title, author, TR number and DSMC logo
and similar title page.

—The TRs are printed by the DSMC Printing and Dupli¬
cating Services Department (OS-PR) in a run of 200
copies (head-to-head), on an as-received basis de¬
pending on workload.

-External distribution by OS-PR includes DOD and other
government libraries, selected university libraries and
other repositories, the Defense Technical Information
Center, National Technical Information Service, and
limited on-demand requests.

—Authors may register and own the copyright to material
prepared on their own time.

—Exceptions to this policy will be on a case basis.

Program Monoger

Seprember-Oaober 1990

DSMC ACADEMIC ENVIRONMENT

PMC HIGHLIGHTS

419 Graduated in June

Lt Col Matt

I ; he Program Management
_! Course graduated 419 success¬
ful students from PMC 93-1 on June
11, 1993. Two “firsts” occurred for
this graduation: The first husband
and wife team in the PMC class gradu¬
ated together; Major Toni Arnold.
USAF, and Mr. Mike Niggel, SAIC
Corp. The first “legacy” student also
graduated in this class: Mr. Bob Steele,
who received his diploma from his
father, Mr. Bill Steele, a graduate of
PMC 77-2.

During the remainder of June and
early July, the division was busily pre¬
paring to receive the new class. CAPT
Steve Kupka, USN, the Executive Di¬
rector of the Program Management
Education Division for the last 2 years,
retired July 30 and moved to Bound
Brook, New Jersey.

After a short respite, we welcomed
421 students (a new record) for PMC
93-2, which began July 26. Not to be

LtCol Gillis is the PMC Course Di¬
rector at DSMC.

Gillis, USAF

outdone as “firsts” by the last class,
CAFT Kate Paige, USN, is the first
section leader whose spouse was a
section leader in an earlier PMC class.

After a harrowing but short experi¬
ence with the PMC Pre-Test, the class
is off and running and reading. Some
details on the class composition follow:

—Average Age, 41 years

—Average Acquisition Experience, 10

years

—Average Rank, (for military)
0-5

—Average Grade (for civilians),
GM-14.

PMC 93-2 is 48 percent civilians
and 52 percent military. In addition
to the usual DOD students, we have
2 Coast Guard students, 14 Industry
students, and 1 Allied exchange stu¬
dent from Turkey.

This class offers a diverse and ex¬
perienced background. We look for¬
ward to a great experience in learning
the intricacies of Defense Department
Acquisition Management.

DTIC USERS TRAINING

The Defense Technical Information Center located at Cameron
Station, Va., will sponsor its annual Users Training Conference
November 1-4, 1993. It will be at the Stouffer Concourse Hotel.
Arlington. Va., and features the theme. “Information and Technol¬
ogy Teamed for Success.” For further information, contact Ms.
Patti Miller, (703) 274-3848.

ICAF AND DSMC
SIGN

MEMORANDUM
OF AGREEMENT

On June 23, 1993, an unprec¬
edented memorandum of agree¬
ment (MOA) was signed between
the Industrial College of the
Armed Forces (ICAF) and the
Defense Systems Management
College (DSMC). The ICAF
sponsors the DOD designated
&nior Acquisition Management
Course (Level III) and DSMC
sponsors the Program Manage¬
ment Course (Level II)—both
under the auspices of the De¬
fense Acquisition University con¬
sortium.

The purpose of the MOA is to
promote improved communica¬
tions, cooperation and under¬
standing between ICAF and
DSMC as a means of improving
their respective educational cur¬
ricula and enhancing the execu¬
tion of their respective College
missions.

Specific facets of the MOA pro¬
vide for periodic meetings and
exchange of materials to pro¬
mote understanding of each
other’s curricula, educational
methods, and research endeav¬
ors. The ICAF and DSMC will
continue to utilize selected fac¬
ulty to serve as guest lecturers/
instructors in each other’s re¬
spective courses of instruction.

The MOA also provides for
regular exchange of qualified
faculty to serve as students in
ICAF and DSMC respective
courses of instruction. As a first
step toward this goal, DSMC fac¬
ulty member Paul Mcllvaine will
be a student of ICAF’s upcom¬
ing Senior Acquisition Manage¬
ment Course.

Program Monoger

Seprember-Ocrober 1993

FROM THE COMMANDANT

Changes at DSMC

I n my first chat with you, I indicated many
— changes and challenges were ahead for all
of us in the acquisition business. Well, during
the last four months, many changes have taken
place and indicate an interesting future.

As you may have noticed in the July-August
1993 Program Manager magazine, a quick scan
of the table of contents tells the story. Articles
indicating change included “Dr. Deutch Restruc¬
tures Defense Acquisition Organization, Acqui¬
sition Law Panel Reports to Congress, and Help¬
ing Our Customers.” Each of these articles
described changes which either directly or indi¬
rectly have significantly impacted the Defense
Systems Management College (DSMC).

I won't repeat these articles but I encourage
you to read them if you have not already.

I would, however, like to highlight changes
and activities DSMC has experienced since I
last spoke to you.

First, as indicated in the July-August Program
Manager magazine, DSMC and DAU (Defense
Acquisition University) now reside organizationally
under the newly formed Deputy Under Secre¬
tary of Defense for Acquisition Reform. Mrs.
Colleen Preston has been confirmed as the Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense to head the new
Acquisition Reform Office. Mrs. Preston is well
acquainted with DSMC and acquisition.

She spoke to several of our DSMC classes in
the past and, while working in the House of
Representatives as general counsel, she was a
key in drafting the Defense Acquisition Work¬
force Improvement Act. She was deeply in¬
volved with the Section 800 Panel review and
has hit the ground running in the acquisition
reform office. We are extremely pleased and
fortunate to be working for Mrs. Preston and
look forward to working with her and the Reform
Office staff.

Other changes at DSMC include an initiative
to review our flagship acquisition course, PMC
(Program Management Course). This review is
called DSMC 95 and is essentially a bottoms-up
review. We start by talking with our customers
and stakeholders to see whether or not we are
teaching what is required. Once we have estab¬
lished this requirement in terms of desired com¬
petencies, we will review and change our PMC
curriculum as required. The final step will be to
ensure the DSMC organizational structure sup¬
ports this curriculum and, in turn, our customers.

Some customer inputs received thus far in¬
clude reducing course length dramatically, in¬
creasing course topic integration, incorporating
integrated product team concepts, strengthening^
incorporating software management, establish¬
ing PMC prerequisites, increasing multinational
emphasis, incorporating commercial practices
topics, incorporating acquisition reform initia¬
tives, etc.

As you can see, we have a number of topics to
consider. We will be talking to many of you in
the weeks ahead on how to improve PMC and
how to ensure PMC is totally responsive to field
requirements. I encourage you to drop me a line
if you have anything you’d like us to consider as
we improve our PMC.

There are many other changes I’d like to dis¬
cuss with you but time does not permit. We will
do our best to keep you abreast through this and
future issues of Program Manager magazine. Until
then....

—BGen (Sel) Claude M. Bolton, ]r., USAF

Progrom Monoger

September-Oaober 1993