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Full text of "DTIC ADA270376: Program Manager: Journal of the Defense Systems Management College, Volume 22, Number 5, September-October 1993"

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Seprember-Ocrober 1993 



Journal of the Defense Systems Management College 

Acquisition Reform Underway at Pentagon 



Journal of the Defense Systems Management College 

Published by the 



BGen (Sel) Claude M. Bolton. |r.. USAF 

Provost and Deputy Commandant 

Edward Hirsch 

Exeeutlw Direetor 
Research and Information Division 

Or. Adelia E. Ritchie 

Director. DSMC Press 

Wilbur D. (ones. Ir. 



Managing Edilor 

Catherine M. Clark 

Associate Editor 

Esther M. Farria 

Art Director 

Greg Caruth 

Typography and Design 

Paula Croisetiere 

Program Manager (ISSN 0199-7114) is 
published bimonthly by the DEFENSE 
V^A 22060-5505. 

POSTMASTER: Send address changes 
to Program Manager. DEFENSE SYST 

For sale hy the Superintendent of Documents. 
U.S. Government Printing Office Washington. 
PC 20402 

Whenever masculine nouns or pronouns 
appear, other than with obvious reference to 
named male individuals, they have been used 
for literary purposes and are meant in their 
generic sense. 

Program Monoger 

VOL. XXII, No. 5, DSMC 116 


DOD Acquisition Reform 
Underway at Pentagon 

Catherine M. Clark 

The DSMC Alumni hear about main¬ 
taining acquisition excellence with de¬ 
clining resources. 



Reengineering Business 

Dr. fames E. Price 
Dr. Sharlett Gillard 
Dr. Mary-Blair Valentine 

What is the optimum organizational 
structure for an information system pro¬ 
gram office? Has a paradigm shift oc¬ 


DSMC/FAA Interagency 

Tony Rymiszewski 

Project "kicked off” at DSMC on luly 
26 . 1993 . 


Foreign Military Sales 
Cooperative Development 

John L. Sweeney 

A Win-Win Idea whose time has 

To subscribe, government personnel should submit written requests (using their business addresses) to the 

Manuscripts. Letters to the Editor, and other correspondence are welcome and should be addressed to the 
DSMC Press. Inquiries concerning proposed articles mav be made by phone at (70,t) 805-2892/3056 or DSN 

655-2892/3056. Septembef-Ocrober 1993 

Cover Photos: 

The DOD Acquisition Leadership-Mr. Gerald E. Keightley. Executive Director of the Defense Acquisition University, 
top left; Mrs. Colleen A. Preston, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Reform), top right; Dr. John M. Deutch, Under 
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), bottom left; and. Dr. William). Perry, Deputy Secretary of Defense, bottom 


A New Program Manager’s 
Guide to People 


Restructuring the Acquisition 


DOD Contract Performance 
Management and TQM 

Deanna ]. Bennett 

The Ben Hur theory of Program 
Management-how to fine-tune the team. 

Hermann O. Pfrengle 

The Armaments Directorate, the ac¬ 
quisition side of the German Ministry of 
Defense, has seen major adaptive orga¬ 
nizational changes since 1990. 

Joseph R. Houser 
Dr. Kenneth A. Potocki 

A look at three TQM principles; cus¬ 
tomer focus, employee involvement and 
continuous improvement. 


The Ever-Current Issues in 

Dr. Ernest A. Seglie 

Ensure that the operational effective¬ 
ness and suitability of weapons systems 
are tested adequately, evaluated objec¬ 
tively, and reported independently to 


Lean Production 

Major William B. Vance, USAF 

An initiative that stands out as a 
long-term, first-choice commitment as 
the production concept of choice in the 
program manager’s acquisition strategy. 



Keightley Explains DAU Role 


Colleen Preston On “Where We’re 



Defense Systems Acquisition 
Management Chart Updated 


Program Manager’s Notebook 
Updates Available 


From Our Readers 


DSMC Sessions Concern 

Connecting Ethics and Quality 48 

Book Review 


Keynoter Speaks on Revolutionary 



Operation Flood Relief 


DSMC Press Begins Publishii^ 


Technical Reports 


□ ’ 

DSMC Academic Environment 





DTIC Users Training 


From the Commandant 


Program Manager is a vehicle for transmitting information on policies, trends, events, and current thinking affecting program management and defense systems acquisition. . 
Statements of fact or opinion appearing in Program Manager are solely those of the authors and are not necessarily endorsed by the Department of Defense or the Defense 
Systems Management College. Unless copyrighted, articles may be reprinted. When reprinting, please credit the author and Program Manager, and forward two copies of the 
reprinted material to the DSMC Press. *** 

Program Monoger 




Underway at Pentagon 

! aintaining Acquisition Excel- 
-1 lence with Declining Re¬ 
sources,” theme of the 10th annual 
Program Managers Symposium spon¬ 
sored by the Defense Systems Man¬ 
agement College (DSMC) Alumni As¬ 
sociation, brought more than 225 
people from government and indus¬ 
try to the DSMC campus. 

Deputy Secretary of Defense Will¬ 
iam I. Perry spoke on “A New DOD 
Acquisition Strategy.” He was 
introduced by the DSMC Comman¬ 
dant, Brigadier General (Select) Claude 
M. Bolton, Jr., USAF, who invited ev¬ 
eryone to “step back and ask ques¬ 

Dr. Perry addressed elements of 
the new acquisition reform program 
in the Department of Defense (DOD). 
“Changes are taking place like a flood 
tide and DOD must not be swept away 
but, instead, take the current,” he said. 

Actions are underway to combine 
defense and industrial bases into one 
industrial acquisition reform program, 
saving tens of billions of dollars dur¬ 
ing the next five years. “It won’t be 
done overnight,” he explained. 

Several “tools” will be used, like 
industrial specifications instead of mili¬ 
tary ones, and simplified procurement 

Bener Processes 

The reorganization of DOD, under 
Defense Secretary Les Aspin, is ex- 

Catherine M. Clark 
Managing Editor 

pected to provide better processes of 
acquisition reform, environmental se¬ 
curity, advanced technology demon¬ 
stration management, logistics and eco¬ 
nomic security. 

Dr. John M. Deutch, Under Secre¬ 
tary of Defense (Acquisition and Tech¬ 
nology), formerly Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, reports to Dr. 
Perry. Dr. Deutch is charged with 
preparations for the Defense Acquisi¬ 
tion Board and daily issues concern¬ 
ing acquisition. (See Program Man¬ 
ager, July-August 1993, p. 2.) 

New Positions 

Mrs. Colleen A. Preston, who fills 
the new post. Deputy Under Secre¬ 
tary of Defense (Acquisition Reform), 
spoke on “The New OSD Acquisition 
Organization, Functions and Initia¬ 
tives.” She said “we can’t do tomorrow’s 
job with today’s system and “we must 
focus on how to reorient and 
reengineer.” She is identifying and 
implementing ways to make the ac¬ 
quisition process more efficient. (See 
story page 4.) 

Another new post. Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Economic 
Security, is charged for economic 
reinvestment, base closure and 
realignment, industrial base issues 
and international programs. Report¬ 
ing to this office will be the new 
Office of Economic Adjustment (for¬ 
merly the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense for Force Management and 

1. Mr. Gerald E. Keightley. Executive 
Director. Defense Acquisition University. 

2. Dr. lohn M. Deutch. Under Secretary of 
Defense (Acquisition and Technology). 

Progrom Manager 


Seprennber-Oaaber 1993 

Among Positions Under Agency (formerly DARPA) will report 

DUSD(A&T) to this official. 

Environmental Security handles en¬ 
vironmental issues and installations; 
Advanced Technology monitors bal¬ 
listic missile defense technology and 
the Pentagon’s seven other thrust ar¬ 
eas: and. Defense for Logistics over¬ 
sees all logistics questions. 

The Assistant to the Secretary of 
Defense for Atomic Energy will su¬ 
pervise the On-Site Inspection Agency 
and the Defense Nuclear i<^ncy. (See 
Chart, Program Manager, luly-August 
1993, pp. 28-29.) 

Defense Acquisition 

Gerald E. Keightley, Executive Di¬ 
rector of the new Defense Acquisition 
University, described its role in ac¬ 
quisition and certification; i.e., struc¬ 
ture resources, 
education and 
training and re¬ 
search and publi¬ 
cations. (See story 
this page.) 

During the July 
symposium, pan¬ 
els addressed 
the New Acquisi¬ 
tion Strategy- 
Acquisition Ex¬ 
ecutives’ Perspec¬ 
tives’: “A Report 
from the Acquisi¬ 
tion Law Review 
Panel”; and. Ac¬ 
quisition Education and 
Certification—How the Ser¬ 
vices Are Doing." 

Edward C. Robinson, 
the symposium chairman, 
succeeds Charles Tringali 
as the DSMC Alumni 

The Alumni Association 
Office is located at 7731 
Tuckerman Lane, Suite 131 
Potomac. MD 20854; 
(301)309-9125; FAX (301) 

The Director of Defense Re¬ 
search and Engineering will handle 
scientific issues, basic and applied 
research, and laboratory research 
and management: The Director of 
the Advanced Research Projects 

Photos by Richard Mattox. 

3. Mrs. Colleen A. Preston. Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense (Acquisition Reform). 

4. The Honorable William /. Perry. Deputy Secretary of 

93 10 1 27 

3 7,000 STUDLNTS 

Keightley Outlines 
DAU Role 

Robert W. Ball 

An estimated 37,000 students will 
attend one or more of 1,000 offerings 
of 50 mandatory acquisition related 
courses taught at 16 schools making 
up the Defense Acquisition Univer¬ 
sity (DAU) consortium in FY 1994. 

Gerald E. Keightley, DAU Execu¬ 
tive Director, told several hundred 
people attending the DSMC Alumni 
Association’s 10th Anniversary Sym¬ 
posium here in July that 16 Depart¬ 
ment of Defense Schools and com¬ 
mands make up the DAU consortium. 

The DAU is a result of the Defense 
Acquisition Workforce Improvement 
Act. The 16 schools will educate and 
train acquisition personnel in 12 ca¬ 
reer fields: Program Management: 
Communications/Computer Systems; 
Industrial Projierty Management; Sys¬ 
tem Planning, Research, Development 
and Engineering; Contracting; Purchas- 
ing'Procurement; Test and Evaluation 
Engineering; Quality Assurance; Manu¬ 
facturing and Production; Acquisition 
Logistics; Business, Cost Estimating 
and Financial Management, and Au¬ 

Mr. Keightley told the DSMC 
Alumni that each acquisition 
position is identified at a Level (1. II, 
Ill) and a career field. “Each level 
within a career field has mandatory 
education, training and experience 
requirements which must be met by 
people seeking certification in the 
Defense Acquisition Corps,” he said. 
Individuals may be certified in mul¬ 
tiple career fields. 

To meet Acquisition Corps require¬ 
ments. an individual must be a GM- 
(continued on page 5) 


Program Monoger 

Seprember-OCTober 1993 



I n a luncheon address to the De- 
— fense Systems Management Col¬ 
lege Alumni Association on July 9, at 
the Fort Belvoir Officers Club, Mrs. 
Colleen A. Preston, Deputy Under Sec¬ 
retary of Defense (Acquisition Reform) 
{DUSD(AR)), spoke on “where we’ll 
be going with acquisition reform." 

Mrs. Preston stated the need for 
acquisition reform is a result of a de¬ 
clining budget and changes in global 
technology. She said we will main¬ 
tain readiness but to pay for priorities 
there must be cuts in areas including 
infrastructure and production cost. A 
reduction in the acquisition workforce 
is possible, as well. 

Commercial Companies 

To “reduce costs but to ensure we 
maintain our technological superior¬ 
ity. we must be able to acquire state- 
of-the-art technology on a timely ba¬ 
sis and from commercial companies,” 
said Mrs. Preston. She stated many 
needs no longer exist. Redesign is nec- 

Esther M. Farria 
Associate Editor 

essary to reduce costs and we must 
consider adopting commercial prac¬ 
tices. Her official focus is on reorient¬ 
ing business practices. 

Mrs. Preston feels ideas for change 
will come from the acquisition com¬ 
munity. Developing integrated action 
teams with input from industry and 
others will help develop an imple¬ 
mentation plan. 

Short-term initiative "priority ac¬ 
tions" are the first steps of a compre¬ 
hensive package of acquisition reform. 
These actions include developing a 
DOD position on acquisition of com¬ 
mercial products. The ultimate goal is 
to “move away” from the DOD pro¬ 
cess now used. She advocates stream¬ 
lining procedures for developing regu¬ 
lations and sharing best practices to 
avoid duplication of effort. 

Senior Steering Group 

Mrs. Preston’s office will be the 
“focal point for restructuring and im¬ 

proving the acquisition process by di¬ 
recting the conception, development, 
adoption, implementation, and insti¬ 
tutionalization of new and innovative 
policies and processes that meet the 
principles of the new acquisition sys¬ 

The DUSD(AR) will use a Senior 
DOD Steering Group and will estab¬ 
lish a dialogue with the Congress to 
help determine how to implement the 
transition to the new acquisition sys¬ 
tem. This is not meant to replace ihe 
efforts of the offices of the Secretary 
of Defense, the military departments 
or the defense agencies to make the 
existing system function more effec¬ 
tively and continue to implement poli¬ 
cies, practices and changes to improve 
the system. These offices, departments 
and agencies will coordinate with 
DUSD(AR) to ensure changes are con¬ 
sistent with approaches pursued by 
the Acquisition Reform office. 

Legion of Merit.. .Dr. John M. Deutch, Un¬ 
der Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Tech¬ 
nology), presents the Legion of Merit to Briga¬ 
dier General (Select) Claude M. Bolton, Jr., USAF, 
DSMC Commandant. Bolton received the award 
for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the per¬ 
formance of outstanding services as Program 
Director, Advanced Cruise Missile System Pro¬ 
gram Office, Aeronautical Systems Center, and 
as Inspector General, Headquarters Air Force 
Materiel Command. 

Program Monoger 


Seprember-Oaober 1993 


1 » i 

Mr. John L. Elherton, 

Professional Staff 

member to the Senate 

Armed Services Com- 

mittee. ivas a luncheon 

speaker at the Alumni 

Association Sympo- 

Siam. His subiect tvas 

“Congress and DOD 

Acquisition - Current 



Perspective." He talked 



about the budget pro- 


• m 

cess, subcommittee as- 



signment and acquisi- 

tion reform. 





; j 

(DAU Rok continued from page 3) 

13/0-4 or higher and have a bacca¬ 
laureate degree plus 24 credits in man¬ 
agement-related courses or 24 credits 
in field plus 12 management-related 
course credits. Four years of acquisi¬ 
tion position experience are required. 
Completion of Level II training is re¬ 
quired and civilians must sign a mo¬ 
bility agreement. 

“The estimated budget for FY 94 is 
nearly $40 M more than the FY 93 
budget.” Keightley said. “The num¬ 
ber of students will jump nearly 10.000 
and the number of course offerings 
an estimated 1.100. up from 944 in 
FY 93," he said. 

The defense acquisition workforce 
is approximately 130,000. 

The DAU central office consists of 
three divisions under the President 
and Executive Director: Resource 
Management, Academic Affairs and 
University Operations. 

Resource Management is respon¬ 
sible for funding and quota allocation 
(assigns quotas and monitors regis¬ 
tration and graduation processes). 

Academic Affairs is responsible for 
the education and training. It offers 

joint, competency based, acquisition 
courses in the 12 career fields. 

University Operations include de¬ 
veloping research and publication 
capabilities in acquisition and the es¬ 
tablishment of a structure to provide 
for research and analysis of defense 
acquisition policy issues. 

The DSMC and a 1-year acquisi¬ 
tion course at the Industrial College 
of the Armed Forces (ICAF) are, by 
Title 10 mandate, part of DAU. 

The following schools are part of 
DAU when they teach mandatory 
acquisition courses: Air Force Institute 
of Technology (AFIT); Army Logistics 
Management College (ALMC): Army 
Management Engineering College 
(AMEC); Defense Contract Audit In¬ 
stitute (DCAI); Defense Logistics Civil¬ 
ian Personnel Support Office (DLACPO); 
European Command Contracting Train¬ 
ing Office (EUCOM): Information Re¬ 
sources Management College (IRMC): 
Lowry Technical Training Center; Na¬ 
val Postgraduate School (NPS): Naval 
Supply Systems Command Regional 
Contracting Centers (NAVSUP); Na¬ 
val Facilities Contracts Training Cen¬ 
ter (NFAC): Naval Warfare Assessment 
Center (NWAC); Navy Acquisition Man¬ 
agement Training Office (NAMTO), and 
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
The Navy. (ASN(RDA)). 

Process Chart 

The Defense Systems Acquisition 
Management Process Chart (DSMC 
Chart CORP: 2007 of May 1992) was 
created as an integration vehicle and 
training aid for the Acquisition Basics 
Course (now Intermediate Systems 
Acquisition Course). The chart serves 
as a roadmap of functional activities 
throughout the systems life cycle and 
is available to all DSMC course at¬ 
tendees and the acquisition commu¬ 

Response to the Chart in its first 
year of publication has been over¬ 
whelming. More than half of the DSMC 
courses have voluntarily adopted it. 
It is distributed in the AFIT Systems 
100 Course and used at the Army 
Logistics Management College, Army 
Engineer School. AFOTEC OT&E 
Course (Kirtland AFB), University of 
Maryland, Computer Science School 
(Fort Gordon), University of South¬ 
ern California, and others. 

In less than one year. 25,000 cop¬ 
ies have been distributed at customer 
request. A list has also been estab¬ 
lished identifying users. 

A recent update for reprinting re¬ 
flects minor changes: hence, the pre¬ 
vious chart remains viable. The DSMC 
Chart CORP: 2008 should be avail¬ 
able in early September 1993. 

For copies, contact: 





FT BELVOIR VA 22060-5565 

(703) 805-2376: DSN 655-2376 

Progrom Manager 


Seprember-Ocraber 1993 





“Kicked Off’ July 26 


I he Defense Systems Manage- 
-ment College (DSMC) has en¬ 
tered into am Interagency Agreement 
(lA) with the Federal Aviation Ad¬ 
ministration (FAA) to provide acqui¬ 
sition employees with program man¬ 
agement resource development. This 
project was officially “kicked off” at 
DSMC on July 26, 1993. 

During the five-year term of this 
agreement, DSMC will develop sys¬ 
tems acquisition curriculum and fa¬ 
cilitate short courses based on FAA 
case studies and lessons learned. Pro¬ 
gram management personnel in FAA 
Systems Acquisition will be instructed 
using FAA case studies and current 
Department of Transportation (DOT) 
and FAA orders and directives. 

The FAA training will be compa¬ 
rable in curriculum design and con¬ 
tent to that provided to DSMC short- 
course students. In place of the DOD 
5000 documentation series, the DOD 
coordinated and DOT approved March 
19, 1993, FAA Order 1810.1F, “Ac¬ 
quisition Policy” and corresponding 

Mr. Rymiszewskt, Professor of En¬ 
gineering Management, wrote and ne¬ 
gotiated the Integragency Agreement 
for Dr. Ben Rush, DSMC Dean of Fac¬ 
ulty. Mr. Rymiszewskt Is presently Di¬ 
rector of DSMC Corporate Planning. 

Tony Rymiszewskt 

Brigadier General (Select) Claude M. Bolton fr., USAF, Commandant, Defense Systems Man¬ 
agement College, signs an Interagency Agreement with the Federal Aviation Administration's 
John Turner, Associate Administrator for NAS Development (left), and Carolyn Blum, Associ¬ 
ate Administrator for Contracting (right). 

Progrom Monoger 


Seprember-Oaober 19<?3 

DOT/FAA documents will be empha¬ 
sized as study references used in the 
classroom and in FAA students' study 

The FAA's lohn Turner. Associate 
Administrator for NAS Development 
(AND), said at the lA signing: “We 
are pleased to formalize our associa¬ 
tion with DSMC because of its fine 
reputation in training DOD program 
management personnel...and we now 
have an opportunity to tailor this train¬ 
ing to FAA experiences and capitalize 
on lessons learned." 

Photo by Richard Mattox. 

..,DSMC is proud 
to undertake this 
Agreement effort. 
It is DSMC's first 
attempt to 
undertake a long¬ 
term reimbursable 
commitment with a 
customer outside 
of DOD, 

Frances M. Valore. Professor of Fi¬ 
nancial Management, is assigned to 
manage this effort for DSMC . Mr. 
Turner designated Jeanne D. Rush, 
former Program Manager for FAA 
Weather Processors, as the on-site 
program manager and contracting of¬ 
ficer technical representative. The 
joint project team will be colocated at 
DSMC and work under the counsel 
of Dr. Adelia E. Ritchie, Executive 
Director, DSMC Research and Infor¬ 
mation Division. 

The first course offering at DSMC 
to FAA students is planned for early 
1994 and will utilize a case-study ap¬ 
proach for the Microwave Landing 
System (MLS) and two other FAA pro¬ 

Interviews with former and current 
MLS program managers and 
multidisciplined matrix personnel are 
underway. Other FAA unique pro¬ 
gram management tasks will be mu¬ 
tually selected for development by 
DSMC upon completion of this initial 






Program Manager’s Notebook re¬ 
vised and new fact sheets have 
been published. 

If you completed and mailed 
the request form in the May- 
lune 1993 issue of Program 
Manager, your packet will be 
mailed to you. 

Government personnel may re¬ 
quest these by writing to the 
VOIR VA 22060-5565. FAX: 
(703) 805-3857. 

Nongovernment personnel may 
purchase the packet. Stock Num¬ 
ber: 008-020-01302-1, by writ¬ 
ing the Superintendent of Docu¬ 
ments, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, DC 20402. 

BGen(Sel) Claude M. Bolton, Jr.. 
DSMC Commandant, expressed his 
strong support during the lA kick-off 
meeting stating that “...DSMC is proud 
to undertake this Interagency Agree¬ 
ment effort. It is DSMC’s first at¬ 
tempt to undertake a long-term reim¬ 
bursable commitment with a customer 
outside of DOD." 

Dr. Ben Rush. DSMC Faculty Dean, 
who initiated this effort as an in-house 
research project last fall, said, "This 
is a forward looking precedent and 
opens opportunities for DSMC to of¬ 
fer multi-disciplined program manage¬ 
ment staff capabilities to other fed¬ 
eral agencies. The requirements are 
similar to our OSD customer-oriented 
systems acquisition educational 

Program Manager 


Seprember-Ocrober 1993 





Or the Ben Hur Theory 
Of Personnel Management 

w ell, they finally did it—made 

-you the manager of an ac¬ 
quisition program. Look out DOD, 
here comes the best-run program ever. 
The user will be thrilled about the 
system your program produces and 
foreign military sales customers will 
hardly be able to wait for theirs. Not 
only will the system be fielded on 
time, it will be used by the DOD Comp¬ 
troller as an ideal example of how to 
manage a program so it hits the cost 
target in the bull’s-eye. 

Wait a minute! Before you make 
plans to move into your castle in the 
air, how are you going to build it? 
Unless you’re the Clark Kent of the 
acquisition program world, your staff 
will have to make this happen. 

Facing Up to Change 

The first person you’ll have to handle 
is yourself. Who are you? You’re the 
proj am manager! Right? Whether 
you are initiating a new program or 
taking over an existing program, you 
are the precipitant of, and the person 

Deanna /. Bennett is a Program 
Manager in the U.S. Special Opera¬ 
tions Command, Research Development 
and Acquisition Center, MacDill AFB, 
Florida. She is a graduate of PMC 

Deanna J. Bennett 

who, manages an organizational 
change. Your assumption of program 
responsibility will cause unsettling ef¬ 
fects of change on workers in your 

Letting the program staff know how 
great you are won’t be enough to get 
them to work as a good team. There 
are good techniques a new program 
manager can use to help individuals 
accept and adapt to the change. These 
same processes can be a vehicle for 
you to answer key questions about 
the new people making your program 
happen, and about how you should 
manage them. 

These are reporter-type who, what, 
when, how questions. Who are these 
people? What talents do they bring to 
the program? What makes them tick 
as individuals? How can I best man¬ 
age them to solve inevitable program 
problems? When are different mana¬ 
gerial approaches called for? 

The program manager getting the 
right answers and using them prop¬ 
erly won’t have to ask the last ques¬ 
tion; Why did I ever get into this job? 

Managing Change 

Reaction to organizational change 
progresses through four phases: 

You can fine-tune the team, a la Ben Hur. 

Program AAonoger 


Seprember-Oaober 1993 

lenial, resistance, exploration and 
rommitment.' A new manager means 
jeing more than a cookie-cutter re¬ 
placement for an old one. People un¬ 
derstand that a new manager will want 
;o leave a mark on the organization: 
naking small or large changes on pro- 
redures, responsibilities, the way the 
program office interfaces with others. 

The first reaction is denial; The 
‘new guy" won’t change anything and 
:an’t. The savvy manager should 
rounter denial with personal infor¬ 
mation. what areas are being consid- 
;red for improvement, any new pro¬ 
gram direction from the Defense 
Acquisition Board (DAB) or program 
:xecutive officer, etc.- 

By understanding 
how individuals in 
the program 
perceive, judge and 
relate to the 
outside world, you 
can fine-tune the 


Once denial is overcome, resistance 
sets in. The prospect of change threat¬ 
ens feelings of competence and the 
organizational pecking order. The 
counter to resistance is to listen. Here’s 
where the program manager can begin 
double duty with a single manage¬ 
ment technique: While attacking re¬ 
sistance to change, the program man¬ 
ager can craft the form the change 
will take. The key is in how to listen 

Pinpoint Problems 

First, listen to understand the sub¬ 
stance of the concern. This may pin¬ 
point problems with the organization 
and procedures. Then you can ad¬ 
dress “what" questions. What kind 
of technical, administrative and man¬ 
agement skills does this person have? 
What do they think is not working in 
the organization (e.g., my area is fine, 
but such-and-such in someone else’s 
area is broken)? What are their per¬ 
sonal concerns? 

At the same time listen to the kinds 
of substance and concerns voiced by 
each. This will feed your assessment 
based on the Myers-Briggs Type Indi¬ 
cator.' Here’s where the “Ben-Hur 
theory” of personnel management 
comes in. Ben Hur could tell that a 
steady chariot horse should be an 
anchor on the inside, and a high- 
spirited. speedy horse on the outside.^ 
By understanding how individuals in 
the program manager organization 
perceive, judge and relate to the 
outside world, you can fine-tune the 

This helps answer the “who" ques¬ 
tions. Who is best to handle/advise 
on what type of project or situation? 
Who should be where in the organi¬ 
zation, ideally? 

It won’t be difficult in early discus¬ 
sions to identify the less socially ori¬ 
ented introvert and the outward fo¬ 
cused extrovert. These may be easy 
traits to position on the team. You 
don’t assign technology trade-off work 

Progrom Monoger 


September-Oaober 1990 

requirng extensive searching through 
journals and archival research to your 
extrovert engineer. You don’t send the 
introvert to chat with potential pro¬ 
gram cosponsors at an Air Force user’s 

Sensing and Intuition 

Perception modes can be equally 
useful to ascertain. Do the concerns 
you hear focus on practical pieces of 
the job (sensing), or where the whole 
program is going, and lack of vision 
of your predecessor (intuition)? Of 
your two financial managers/budget 
analysts, you would use the one high 
on the “sensing-end” of the scale to 
monitor the budget, and work the bud¬ 
get estimate submission and amended 

The “intuitor” is the one you would 
use for financial shortfalls to apply 
creativity in near-term reprogramming, 
and to play heavily in building your 
program objective memorandum 
(POM). Sensors and intuitors can be 
used and balanced outside the finan¬ 
cial area: the sensors to keep a steady 
hand on current work, pushing toward 
the near-term deadlines (Ben Hur’s 
inside horses): and, intuitors to iden¬ 
tify new customers, new applications, 
and new technologies for the system. 

Thinking and Feeling 

Types of judgment/decision-mak¬ 
ing are seen in individual concerns 
about your presence—^what it bodes 
for the PM office. If you hear about 
possible hurt feelings and advice about 
how best to approach certain indi- 
i/iduals, a “feeling” type is talking. It 
s wonderful to have a “feeling type” 
ivho’s dealt with and can “read” con¬ 
gressional staffers, members of the 
ZAIG and DAB, etc., to strategize 
'uture face-to-faces; and to tailor your 
nternal approach to implementing 

The “thinker,” the individual who 
juilds an iron-bar link between cause 

Sensors and intuitors 
can be used and 
balanced outside the 
financial area: the 
sensors to keep a 
steady hand on current 
work, pushing toward 
the near-term deadlines 
(Ben Hur*s inside 
horses); and, intuitors 
to identify new 
customers, new 
applications, and new 
technologies for the 


and effect, can best serve as the strat¬ 
egist of the substance of the future, 
given decisions made today. This one 
can be on source-selection boards, 
sit on contractor reviews, advise on 
technology trade-offs and work hand- 
in-hand with the “feeling” type to build 
a solid POM defense. 

Finally, where someone rates on 
the judgment/perception scale may 
help you decide who sits on the Con¬ 
figuration Control Board and is part 
of your strategic planning team (“judg¬ 
mental type"). This jjerson manages 
the stream of questions your program 
gets from The Hill; or, the shifting 
face of the POM and budget as they 
proceed through the Service, DOD 
and legislative systems (“perceiver”). 
You’ll know them from the way the 
“judger” talks about how difficult it is 
for the program to be “unsettled,” and 
wishes decisions would be made and 
“stuck to”: and, the way the perceiver 
talks about just wanting to know what’s 
going on. 

Accepting Possibilities for 

Your initial thoughts about team¬ 
ing strategy are complicated because 
each person has combinations of the 
four trait pairs. All information you 
need for a clear picture of problems 
and personalities won’t come from a 
single encounter and listening to the 
sources of resistance to change. More 
will appear when your team progresses 
beyond resistance to your presence 
and what it bodes, to the “explora¬ 
tion” stage of change—when the PM 
staff accepts and addresses the pos¬ 
sibilities from change. 

The kinds of ideas from people prob¬ 
ably will reinforce or clarify any Myers- 
Briggs type uncertainty remaining: e.g., 
suggestion about changing the for¬ 
mat of a report will be from an “S” 
type, as certainly as the suggestion 
that you drop everything and build a 
strategic plan comes from an “N.” 

Channeling the Talent 

As a new program manager, you 
have met the team and had little time 
to identify the most critical problems. 
Now, your role in the exploration pro¬ 
cess is to channel and focus the team’s 
energy, so that it does not fly off track. 
Some processes may be one-on-one, 
but meetings may aid in team build- 

Yogrom Manager 


Seprember-Oaaber 1993 

ing. Consider the what, who and how 
in structuring group attacks on prob¬ 
lems. What kind of problem? Who 
should participate in the problem 
solving process? What should that 
process be? 

Technical problems are easiest to 
start to attack. You get a small group 
of technical/functional experts to ana¬ 
lyze, identify alternatives, assess al¬ 
ternatives. and recommend solutions. 
If the people involved in the techni¬ 
cal analysis are familiar with the sys¬ 
tem and have tentative conclusions, 
it might be best to introduce (with a 
facilitator) the Kepner-Tregoe struc¬ 
tured method of problem analysis’ to 
control the tendencv' to leap intuitively 
to a logical, but not necessarily cor¬ 
rect. cause-and-effect pair. 

Hither within the group or in a re- 
view/advisor\' capacity, once you con¬ 
sider solutions you’ll ensure there is 
a “sensor■' to speak to the technical 
essence and an ‘intuitor" to see broader 
program implications of alternatives. 
Also, there tvil) be a "thinker" to deal 
with the facts, and a "feeling" type to 
be sensitive to implications of alter¬ 
natives on stake-holders. 

A Level Playing Field 

You will know your type and how 
its predispositions may cause you to 
view ultimate recommendations. With¬ 
out the range of perspectives on the 
problem, you may commit to the op¬ 
timum immediate technical solution 
in lieu of a lesser solution which is 
technically and economically prefer¬ 
able in the long run, and more politi¬ 
cally palatable/sellable. 

Some organizational problems deal¬ 
ing with internal organization, work 
flow, and morale may benefit from a 
"level playing field" across the orga¬ 
nization. If the organization is ser\'ed 
by a local area network and there is 
an internal problem requiring buy-in 
from the bottom to the top, an auto¬ 
mated brainstorming session may be 
a good way to get the most and best 

Gaining and 
maintaining team 
commitment to the 
program requires 

awareness and time. 

ideas on the table, especially if par¬ 
ticipation can be anonymous. Iden¬ 
tify a referec/manager of the inter¬ 
change, set a time-limit for the process 
(at least a few weeks so that inter¬ 
changes can fit and around other work). 

Having deftly helped your team 
through the changing of program man¬ 
agers (or establishment of a new pro¬ 
gram with you as manager), don’t stop 
short of the final step—fostering com¬ 
mitment. Gaining and maintaining 
team commitment to the program re¬ 
quires awareness and time. People 
feeling appreciated also feel they be¬ 
long to the team. The PM must be 
aware of accomplishments and con¬ 
tributions of the team and must rec¬ 
ognize them informally and formally. 

Continued Maintenance 

The program manager must work 
at organizational maintenance. Time 
must be spent continually recycling 
the organization through management- 
led reaction to the process of organi¬ 
zational change; that is. provide in¬ 
formation, listen, channel energy, and 
acknowledge accomplishments. Each 
program is continually changing; the 
net effect to the program manager to 
recognize and meet it head-on is a 
team committed to the program, and 
well-suited to carry it out. 


1. Videotape. Managing People 
Through Change, Cynthia D. Scott and 
Dennis T. laffee, produced by BARR 
Films, distributed by Video Learning 
Systems. Haverford. Pa. 

2. This is brought out in "The People 
Rollout: Key to Change" by Sally 
Cusack. Datamation. April 1, 1993, 
pp. 55-56. 

3. Introduction to Type: A Description 
of the Theor\' and Applications of the 
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Isabel 
Briggs Myers, Consulting Psycholo¬ 
gists Press. Inc.. Palo Alto, Calif. 

4. Remember the scene in Cecil B. 
DeMille’s movie Ben Hur where Ben 
Hur meets a sheik at an oasis? Watch¬ 
ing the sheik’s white Arabian chariot 
team race around a track, Ben Hur 
predicts ’’they’ll never hold the turn" 
well before they run off track. He ex¬ 
plains to the sheik that the team was 
improperly organized: The horse with 
the steadiness who should be the an¬ 
chor was on the outside, the horse 
with the spirit and speed was on the 
inside, etc. 

5. Kepner-Tregoe Problem Analysis 
(Copyright Kepner-Tregoe. Inc., 1981, 
Princeton) is a highly structured form 
of analysis that "slows down" the ana¬ 
lytical process and adds breadth to 
cause and remediation anaivsis. 

Program Monoger 


Seprember-Ocrober 1993 



The German Ministry of Defense 

basic principle of efficient 
-management holds that or¬ 
ganizational structures should be ori¬ 
ented along the mission and tasks to 
be carried out by an organization. As 
mission and tasks change, so should 
the organization’s structure. 

Fundamental changes in threat 
perception accompanied by shrink¬ 
ing defense budgets, costly German 
and European unification, and new 
defense roles within NATO and the 
West European Union (WEU) are 
among major factors contributing to 
new political, economic and military 
realities in Europe, and beyond. 

Germany's defense mission spec¬ 
trum and associated tasks are under¬ 
going shifts and changes to accomodate 
those new realities. The new military 
reality stresses streamlined rapid-re¬ 
action forces, multinational European 
rapid-deployment groups, lighter, air¬ 
mobile weapons systems and equip¬ 
ment. Consequently, the Armaments 
Directorate, which is the acquisition 
side of the German Ministry of De¬ 
fense (MOD), has seen since 1990 
major adaptive organizational changes 

Mr. Pfrengle is Liaison Representa¬ 
tive, German Liaison Office for De¬ 
fense Materiel USA/CANADA. He is a 
guest lecturer in the DSMC Multina¬ 
tional Program Management Course. 

Hermann O. Pfrengle 

Armaments Directorate 
as Restructured in 1 990 
(German Short Designations 
in Parentheses) 

which 1 will discuss in this manu¬ 

The MOD Armaments 

Following a major change in the 
German materiel acquisition process: 
i.e., the integration of the Concept 
Phase in the Preliminary Phase, the 
organization of the Armaments Di¬ 
rectorate had been restructured in 
1990, as shown in Figure 1. This first 
stage in a sweeping restructuring ef¬ 
fort created two distinct pillars of ar¬ 
maments acquisition activities: Ar¬ 
maments Technology and Armaments 

Previously, the two areas had been 
combined, but the new realities men¬ 
tioned above, specifically economic 
and budgetary constraints, necessi¬ 
tated greater transparency and con¬ 
trol above all as concerns costs. 

This restructuring at the ministe¬ 
rial level' caused certain MOD-man- 
aged projects to be shifted to the imple¬ 
menting level: i.e., to the Federal Office 
for Defense Technology and Procure¬ 
ment (BWB) on the technical-engi¬ 
neering side, and the respective Army, 
Air Force and Navy Services General 

Due to mounting budgetary con¬ 
straints which also necessitated per- 

Progrom Manager 


Seprember-Ocraber 1993 

Armaments Directorate 
as Restructured in 1992 
(German Short Designations 
in Parentheses) 

sonnel reductions in the MOD and 
throughout the German defense com¬ 
munity, the need for greater acquisi¬ 
tion control at the ministerial level 
led in 1992 to a combination of the 
Service Component Staffs R,D,T and 
F Divisions {Stabsabteilungen Vll)3 
with the Armaments Directorate’s 
Projects Division. The end result is 
the Armaments Management Division 
as shown in Figure 2. 

The Armaments Management 
Division’s staff consists of military and 
civilian personnel in a balanced mix 
of leadership, management and cen¬ 
tral functions. This is a significant 
departure from the previous principle 
of civilian control over defense acqui¬ 

sition: civilian control had been a tra¬ 
dition which had grown out of post- 
World War II concerns over too much 
military control of weapons acquisition. 

Organizational Details 

The Armaments Director now has 
two Subdivisions directly assigned to 
him: i.e., Rue Z I and Rue Z II (see 
Figure 2). Rue Z I deals with central 
armaments affairs, policy, organiza¬ 
tion, planning, matters of economics 
and business administration. Last, 
but not least, it has oversight of the 
Federal Office for Defense Technol¬ 
ogy and Procurement (BWB) on the 
implementing level.^ 

Of particular importance from a 
multinational viewpoint is the orga¬ 
nizational change in the MOD’S busi¬ 
ness of international armaments co¬ 

operation. Drawing from past experi¬ 
ence, international armaments coop¬ 
eration, which had previously resided 
at a lower level in the hierarchy, has 
now been elevated. It is directly as¬ 
signed to the Armaments Director, 
providing him also with ready sup¬ 
port in his function as the “German 
National Armaments Director” within 
the scope of NATO’s CNAD forum. 

This organizational evaluation sig¬ 
nifies the heightened importance Ger¬ 
many attaches to acquisition through 
international cooperation. Because of 
the smallness of its defense industrial 
base, which cannot sustain acquisi¬ 

tion competition in most major systems 
areas, Germany relies on international 
cooperation for such major systems, 
and will more so in the future. 

Subdivision Rue Z IPs tasks com¬ 
prise armaments matters and coop¬ 
eration within NATO, WEU, lEPG,’ 
country-specific cooperation, arms 
exports matters, and disposition of 
the former East German Armed Forces’ 
materiel. The Armaments Directorate’s 
concentration of its "foreign affairs” 
in Subdivision Rue Z II should also 
facilitate Allied contacts in such 

The Armaments Technology Divi¬ 
sion, with 4 Subdivisions and 25 Sec¬ 
tions, bears the ministerial responsi¬ 
bility for steering and controlling all 
defense research and technology ac¬ 
tivities. Within the scope of the for¬ 

mal materiel acquisition process (see 
Figure 3), this responsibility covers 
the Pre-Phase, and the approval of 
the first Milestone document, the “Tac¬ 
tical-Operational & Technical Require¬ 

The organizational structure of the 
Armaments Technology Division takes 
into account the overarching guide¬ 
lines and armaments tasks embed¬ 
ded in the “Research & Technology 
Concept.”'' and is oriented along the 
lines of technology activities extend¬ 
ing across all three Service compo¬ 
nents. It consists of the following four 

Because of the smallness of Its 
defense Industrlol bose, which 
connot sustoln ocquisitlon 
competition In most mqfor 
systems oreos, Germany relies on 
Intemotlonol cooperation for such mq|or 
systems, and will more so In the future. 


Seprember-Ocrober 1993 

Program Manager 

f The activities of Armoments 

Monogement ore guided by the 
"singie-monogement" principie; 
i.e., the organization is fully 
responsible for systems progrom 
monogement by worfc/effort, time/schedule, 
ond funds/costs. 

—IV, Weapons Employment, Effects: 
Protection Technologies. 

The Armaments Management Di¬ 
vision consists of 5 subdivisions and 
31 sections, and is responsible for 
steering and controlling the develop¬ 
ment of weapons systems. Within the 
scope of the formal materiel acquisi¬ 
tion process, this responsibility cov¬ 
ers weapons systems which are in the 
definition, development or procure¬ 
ment phases (see Figure 3) up to, and 
including, the “Final Report,”' the last 
Milestone document (at the transi¬ 
tion from the Procurement Phase to 
the In-Service Phase). 

The activities of Armaments 
Management are guided by the “single¬ 
management” principle; i.e., the 
organization is fully responsible for 
systems program management by 
work/effort, time/schedule, and funds/ 
costs. The Armaments Management 
Division consists of the following five 

—M I. Central Affairs. Policy, Budget 

—M II, Information Systems (divided 
into functional aspects) 

—^T1, Central Affairs, Policy, Planning 

—M 111, Army Systems 

—TII, Land, Air, Sea Systems 

Technologies, Platform-specific —M IV, Air Force Systems 

Technology: Evaluation of Foreign 

Defense Materiel —M V, Navy Systems. 

—T III, Intelligence/Reconnaissance, The organization of Subdivisions 

Command & Control Information M III to M V is structured along the 
Technologies lines of Service materiel responsibility. 

Preliminary Phase 
(Tactical/Operation^y Concept) 

Milestone Document 
and Technical Requirements 

Definition Phase 

Milestone Document 

Development Phase 

Milestone Document 
Fielding Report 



Milestone Document 
Final Report 

In-Service Phase 

User Service 
Staff and Rii T 





FIGURE 3. Phase 
Responsibilities (Shown 
Along Arrows) in the 
German Materiel 
Acquisition Process (as 
of 1992) 

In concluding this necessarily 
brief discussion of the German MOD’S 
restructured armaments organization, 
it should be noted that some of 
these streamlining efforts are accom¬ 
panied, of course, by pros and 

The pros stress the leaner 
organization’s mission orientation, 
greater program management control 
at the MOD level, and more flexibil¬ 
ity in adapting to the challenges of 
new tasks. The cons, largely from a 
military point of view, see a marked 
reduction of overall military influence 
in German systems acquisition. 

Procedural Changes 

A number of procedural changes 
in the acquisition process are associ¬ 
ated with the Armaments Directorate’s 
restructuring discussed above. 1 will 
address here only the most signifi¬ 
cant procedural change that may be 
of interest to the student of multina¬ 
tional program management. 

From now on, only three figures 
will be in charge of ministerial sys¬ 
tems management: 

—The system manager, located in the 
Armaments Management Division 

—The project manager, located in the 

—The system office located in the 
respective Service component’s 
general office. 

The system manager is the central 
figure in this national management 
triad. He has the overall responsibil¬ 
ity for the system’s development and 
procurement, in accordance with the 
Milestone objectives document, and 
higher-level decisions. His core tasks 
include planning, steering and con¬ 
trolling the acquisition process of his 
weapon system. To that extent, he is 
authorized to direct the BWB project 
manager, and the SeA'ice component 
system officer. 

Program Monoger 


Seprember-Oaober 1993 

As compared to the previous sys¬ 
tem management procedure, where 
the system manager was only a first 
among equals, and could make ac¬ 
quisition-related decisions only with 
the consent of the project manager 
and the system officer, the system 
manager now can yield more power. 

As concerns the acquisition-related 
MOD management directives and 
guidelines, the required updating and 
adapting has been almost completed. 
The associated implementing regula¬ 
tions and instructions are scheduled 
to be available in 1993. 


The German materiel acquisition 
process—which had originally bor¬ 
rowed essential features from the U.S. 
systems acquisition process conceived 
in the 1960s under then Defense Sec¬ 
retary Robert McNamara—had re¬ 
mained virtually unchanged during 
two decades. In line with this conti¬ 
nuity, the organization of the MOD 
Armaments Directorate had retained 
most of its original structure. 

In the face of today’s new politi¬ 
cal, economic and military realities, 
however, the changes described in 
this manuscript are important, and 
correspond with the management prin¬ 
ciple which says that the purpose of 
organizational structures is to sup¬ 
port organizational processes. These 
processes are determined by an 

organization’s mission spectrum and 
tasks; i.e., in the case of the MOD 
Armaments Directorate, the more ef¬ 
ficient acquisition of defense materiel. 

The new organizational structure 
discussed here obviously emphasizes 
the German systems acquisition’s tech¬ 
nical and economic elements more 
than the purely military ones. Never¬ 
theless, the new organizational struc¬ 
ture of the German Armaments Di¬ 
rectorate gives the military user more 
of a say in the technical-engineering 
and economic context than had been 
the case before. 

As a guest lecturer in the DSMC 
Multinational Program Management 
Course, permit me a final word on 
international cooperation. The new 
political, economic and military reali¬ 
ties appear to intensify intra- 
regional cooperation in Europe. Nev¬ 
ertheless, a closer look shows that 
cutting major weapon systems is cur¬ 
rently more the rule than the exception. 

One lesson to be drawn from this 
observation is that the acquisition of 
major systems in Europe is not nec¬ 
essarily less costly than trans-Atlan¬ 
tic cooperative acquisition. A lot de¬ 
pends, of course, on the specific kind 
of technology involved. Still, a recent 
U.S. study comes to this conclusion: 
“Germany’s procurement process is 
relatively ‘transparent’ to allied sup¬ 
pliers, including those from the United 
States....On balance, we find that U.S. 

industry has had equitable access to 
the German defense procurement 

By assigning international coop¬ 
eration directly to the Armaments di¬ 
rector, Germany also is signaling the 
heightened importance it attaches to 
acquisition among allies. If, in this 
vein, the United States would see fit 
to lessen some of its restrictions in 
technology sharing, a selective revival 
of trans-Atlantic armaments coojjera- 
tion would be quite conceivable in 
the mid-term. 

Experience shows, after all, that 
political will can be a powerful moti¬ 
vator, but sometimes needs a boost 
from economic necessity. 


1. Comparatively speaking, the min¬ 
isterial level would include most of 
the U.S. DOD, plus Component Staff 
acquisition functions; German Com¬ 
ponent Staffs are integrated in the 

2. Changes on the implementing level 
will be discussed in a future article. 

3. Roughly equivalent to the U.S. 
Service Components’ Deputy Chief 
of Staff Offices for RDT&E, plus some 
Materiel Commamd functions. 

4. See Endnote 2. 

5. lEPG = Independent European 
Program Group, a forum to intensify 
cooperation among European coun¬ 

6. This “Research & Technology Con¬ 
cept” is tied in with other German 
governmental technology perspectives 
beyond the defense sector. 

7. Partly equivalent to the U.S. SAR. 

8. C. M. Aquino. "Germany’s De¬ 
fense Market,” Logistics Management 
Institute, Bethesda. Md., August 1992, 
p. xii. 

H|||H In the face of today's new 

political, economic ond militaiy 
reolities, however, the chonges 
described in this manuscript ore 
importont, ond correspond with the 
monogement principle which soys thot the 
purpose of orgonizotionol structures is to 
support orgonizotionol processes. 

Progrom Monoger 


Seprember-Oaober 1993 



Three Principles 

[ n approach Is presented for 

-1 the continued application of 

total quality management (TQM) prin¬ 
ciples to the Department of Defense 
(DOD) contract performance manage¬ 
ment process. The cost and schedule 
management subprocess of DOD con¬ 
tract performance management is ad¬ 
dressed with respect to the TCiM prin¬ 
ciples—customer focus, employee 
involvement and continuous process 

The DOD management and con¬ 
tractors have achieved success using 
TQM to improve cost and schedule 
management. This paper will advo¬ 
cate continued use of TQM and will 
present concepts on how TQM can 
further improve DOD cost and sched¬ 
ule management. 

Introduction and Background 

The DOD contract cost and sched¬ 
ule management process is defined 
by DoD Instruction 5000.2 Cost/Sched¬ 
ule Control Systems Criteria (C/SCSC). 
This DOD Instruction defines the data 

Mr. Houser is a consultant with IBM Federal Systems Company. He was the industry leader for the DOD/NSIA TQM 
study on cost/schedule management. He is Chairman of the Board and past President of Performance Management 
Association (PMA), and is past Chairman of NSIA's Management Systems Subcommittee. 

Dr. Potocki is Associate Department Head of the Technical Services Department at The Johns Hopkins University 
Applied Physics Laboratory. He has been a program manager for DOD and NASA programs at the Applied Physics 
Laboratory, and he teaches TQM at the G.W.C. Whiting School of Engineering. 

Progrom AAonoger 


Seprember-Ocrober 1993 

requirements for the contractors’ cost/ 
schedule management process. It is 
structured to jiermit contractors to use 
existing systems to the maximum ex¬ 
tent possible with the intent of using 
the same data for DOD reporting that 
the contractor uses for managing cost 
and schedule performance. 

Figure 1 illustrates the DOD cost/ 
schedule management process. The 
contractors' cost/schedule manage¬ 
ment process is depicted within the 
dashed-line box. The data from this 
process is used for DOD performance 
reports generated by the contractor 
and used by DOD to conduct perfor¬ 
mance reviews on the contract as de- 

Figure 1. DOD C/SCSC Cost/Schedule Management 

paper demonstrates how TQM 
can continue to improve the effec¬ 

tiveness and efficiency of the C/SCSC 

Customer Focus 

The quality of a process can be 
determined by the results it achieves 
and customer satisfaction. A process 
has external customers who purchase 
products and services and internal 
customers who require output from 
an entity within the process. For ex¬ 
ample. within a contractor’s cost/sched¬ 
ule management process, a cost esti¬ 
mator requires a contract schedule 
from the scheduling department in 
order to develop an estimated cost for 
the contract. The cost estimator is an 
internal customer of the scheduling 

I. M. luran provides a customer- 
focused definition of quality as fit¬ 
ness for use. Customers have needs, 
and they determine the usefulness and 
satisfaction level derived from services 
and products. A key ingredient to the 
successful application of TQM is a 
customer focus by process owners who 
are constantly striving to maximize 
customer satisfaction levels. 

picted by the blocks referenced with ®. Contract performance reviews by 

an ®. DOD and contractors use the same Figure 2 illustrates customer in¬ 

cost and schedule performance data, volvement defining requirements at 
Corrective actions and redirection the front end of the process and the 

result from both the contractors’ and Using the same process to satisfy customer feedback on satisfaction lev- 
DOD’s performance reviews as de- two different customer groups, DOD els with the service or product at the 
picted in the block referenced with a and industry, is a complex task. This end of the process. The customer is 

Progrom Monoger 


Seprember-Oaober 1993 

Table 1. DOD Cost/Schedule Customers 

DOD Customers 

Contractor Customers 

OUSD{A) Executives 

Contractor Program Managers 

DOD Program Managers 


Systems Acquisition Executives 


Program Executive Officers 

Financial Managers 

Program Budget Analysts 


Cost Estimators 


Defense Contract Auditors 
Program Office Analyst 

Production Managers 

the most important participant to de¬ 
fine requirements, wants and needs 
to determine the usefulness and sat¬ 
isfaction levels with the product or 

DOD Cost/Schedule 

The DOD contract cost/schedule 
control process is a shared manage¬ 
ment approach by DOD and defense 
contractors to manage major systems 
programs as illustrated in Figure 1. 
The DOD and contractors have a 
shared ownership of the cost/sched¬ 
ule management process and a joint 
responsibility to ensure the process 
meets the needs of both DOD and 
the contractor, including external and 
internal customers. 

This shared responsibility and pro¬ 
cess ownership is a major challenge 
to the successful application of a cus¬ 
tomer focus to TQM. A large team 
effort involving all the participants in 
this shared process is required to im¬ 
prove the process. Some of the many 
customers of this process for govern¬ 
ment and contractors are illustrated 
in Table 1. 

Management functions from DOD 
and industry have different goals and 
objectives, but they each desire to 
embrace TQM. The A. D. Little sur¬ 
vey on C/SCSC’ found different cus¬ 
tomer needs. The survey stated the 

following: “Because the various us¬ 
ers of C/SCSC (Cost/Schedule Con¬ 
trol Systems Criteria) have somewhat 
different needs and perceptions, some 
of the controversies surrounding 
C/SCSC may not be as amenable to 
resolution as others.” 

The DOD/NSIA (National Secu¬ 
rity Industrial Association) TQM study 
on Cost and Schedule Management' 
consisted of 250 interviews with the 
customer groups as identified in Table 
1. Both of the referenced studies iden¬ 
tified a broad and diverse population 
of customers with varied needs and 
requirements with relatively equal rank¬ 
ing in importance. 

The DOD/NSIA study found a 
higher satisfaction level with the cost 
of C/S (cost and schedule) manage¬ 
ment. Contractors expressed a lower 
satisfaction level related to duplica¬ 
tion of some elements of C/S manage¬ 
ment. This process with shared re¬ 
sponsibilities and conflicting needs 
between customers requires a well- 
coordinated effort to achieve customer 
satisfaction for all users in the DOD 
cost/schedule management process. 


It is common TQM practice to evalu¬ 
ate customer needs and importance. 
Many past efforts have focused on 
internal customers. More recently, 
efforts to implement TQM concepts 

in the IX)D cost/schedule process have 
rightfully identified program manage¬ 
ment as a key external customer whose 
needs have not been adequately sat¬ 
isfied by this process. 

Many of the recommendations from 
the TCiM report of DOD Cost/Sched¬ 
ule Management recognized the im¬ 
portance of program management as 
an external customer. Program man¬ 
agement is responsible for program 
success and is accountable for man¬ 
aging programs on schedule and within 
cost targets. This report suggests that 
DOD and contractor TQM initiatives 
in cost/schedule management should 
emphasize an increased customer fo¬ 
cus on program management. 

Program management should have 
a strong voice in defining requirements, 
and their satisfaction should be a driv¬ 
ing force behind most improvement 
activities. While it is appropriate to 
increase efforts to improve the satis¬ 
faction levels of program management, 
it should not de-emphasize the im¬ 
portance of the internal customers. 
The challenge of a customer-focused 
TC)M program is to continually strive 
to improve the satisfaction level for 
external and internal customers. 

Tom Peters, in his book Thriving 
on Chaos,^ stresses the importance of 
a strong customer focus to improve 
organizational p)erformance. Peters 
recommends a Customer Information 
System (CIS) consisting of formal 
market research and surveys to 
quantify customer needs and satis¬ 

It also includes informal customer 
telephone calls, customer meetings 
and correspondence. Both DOD and 
industry leaders in cost/schedule man¬ 
agement (and C/SCSC) can take de¬ 
monstrable actions to listen to all cus¬ 
tomers, measure customer satisfaction 
and team together to use this infor¬ 
mation to improve the process. 

Program management is a key ex¬ 
ternal customer whose satisfaction level 

Progrom Monoger 


Seprember-Oaober 1993 

FIGURE 2. Customer Process Participation 



with DOD cost/schedule management 
has been low; it is appropriate to fo¬ 
cus process improvement efforts to 
improve their satisfaction level. 

Employee Involvement 

Improving and increasing the value 
of products and services is a common 
objective found in the various ap¬ 
proaches to TQM. While TQM lead¬ 
ers have somewhat different ap¬ 
proaches, they have common 
ingredients. Quality leaders such as 
W. Edwards Deming, Joseph M. luran, 
Kaoru Ishikawa and Philip B. Crosby 
stress the importance of work-force 
employee involvement to improve the 
value of products and services. Their 
views are summarized as follows:^ 

Deming - Quality is everybody’s job 

- Organization-wide partici¬ 

furan - Problems and opportunities 
need to be identified and 
solved through task teams 

- Company-wide participation 
Ishikawa- An atmosphere of mutual 

trust and respect is neces¬ 
sary for full employee in¬ 

- Quality control should be a 
company-wide effort 

Crosby - Encourage employees to 
communicate obstacles to 

- To ensure success, develop 
team leadership skills and 
encourage interdepartmen¬ 
tal collaboration 

- Form quality improvement 

DOD Cost/Schedule 

Leaders in DOD contract cost/ 
schedule management have recognized 
the need to address work-force em¬ 
ployee involvement. The A. D. Little 
survey on C/SCSC stated: “We con¬ 
cluded that recommending the insur¬ 
ance of directives or even more guid¬ 
ance would probably not help the (C/ 
SCSC) situation....Instead of more 

guidance, we concluded that we would 
recommend attacking the problem(s) 
at its source. The sources are (a) the 
inadequate understanding of many 
industry and government personnel 
on what C/SCSC can be expected to 
accomplish and (b) the inadequately 
qualified C/SCSC DOD practitioners.” 

The A. D. Little study recommended 
work-force employee involvement ac¬ 
tions involving persons within DOD 
and industry who implement and op¬ 
erate DOD cost^schedule management 

The DOD/NSIA TQM report on 
DOD Cost/Schedule Management Pro¬ 
cess made 18 recommendations. The 
DOD and NSIA formed integrated work 
groups from DOD and industry with 
representation from all involved dis¬ 
ciplines and functions to identify and 

solve problems. These work-force 
employee groups have taken corrective 
action on 17 of 18 recommendations. 

The DOD has taken additional ac¬ 
tions to encourage work-force employee 
involvement, such as issuing guid¬ 
ance to encourage industry use of 
nonfunctional work teams from DOD 
and industry to manage contracts. The 
DOD executives have lectured at con¬ 
ferences and visited contractors to 
communicate their views supporting 
work-force employee involvement 


Significant developments from the 
TQM approach are new management 
and organizational theories related to 
work-force employee involvement. 
These include employee empower- 

FIGURE 3. IBM Rochester Quality Journey 





Mkt Driven 








Dev Cycle 



Mfg Cycle 











Cost of Quality 





Program Manager 


Seprember-Oaober 1993 

FIGURE 4. DOD/Industry TQM Activities 

• TQM study complete 

• DOD C/SCSC , 2rd NafI C/S 

streamlined 5 items Conference 

• 1 St Nat'l C/SCSC • qod C/SCSC 
streamlined 3 items 

•TQM study 


Guide Revised 

• Air Force C/SCSC 


»Air Force and Army 
streamlined cost 


•TQM study 
•2nd Nat’l C/SCSC 


streamlined 4 items 
•4th NafI C/SCSC 

ment, removing functional barriers, 
and multifunctional work groups. 
These work groups are commonly 
called work teams and DOD often 
refers to them as Integrated Product 
Teams (IPTs). 

Contractors and DOD are support¬ 
ing multifunctional work groups in an 
effort to improve organizational co¬ 
operation and increase effectiveness 
and efficiency. Dennis C. Kinlaw, 
author of Developing Superior Work 
Teams, emphasizes the importance 
of work-force employee involvement 
to achieve superior results from orga¬ 
nizations. He states. “In the many 
years that I have consulted with orga¬ 
nizations. I have heard all sorts of 
complaints from all kinds of jobhold¬ 
ers. But there is one complaint I have 
never heard—people have never said 
to me that there was too much team¬ 
work in their organization.”'' 

The DOD organizations, govern¬ 
ment and industry, are restructuring 
in response to the significant 
reduction in DOD budgets. As part 
of this restructuring, many organiza¬ 
tions are moving toward employee 
empowerment and removing functional 

These organizations are reducing 
middle management, headquarters 
operations and support staffs; form¬ 
ing integrated product teams: imple¬ 
menting concurrent engineering and 
self-directed work teams; and revis¬ 
ing compensation plans to reward team 

The DOD and industry leaders in 
cost/schedule management can review 
what they are doing to proactively 
promote employee empowerment and 
break down functional barriers. Con¬ 
tracts and organizations can be en¬ 
couraged to use multifunctional work 
groups to solve problems in their cost/ 
schedule process. Contracts and or¬ 
ganizations successfully empowering 
employees and removing functional 
barriers can be recognized and ad¬ 

Those involved with DOD cost/ 
schedule management, government 
and industry, can take the initiative 
to become leaders in work-force em¬ 
ployee involvement by looking for 
opportunities to promote multifunc¬ 
tional work groups to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the 
C/S process. 

Continuous Process 

Developing world-class processes 
and obtaining results from applying 
TQM requires time. The quality jour¬ 
ney for the IBM Rochester Plant (win¬ 
ner of the 1990 Malcolm Baldrige 
National Quality Award) with approxi¬ 
mately 10,000 employees, spans sev¬ 
eral years with carefully develop^ed 
initiatives as illustrated in Figure 3. 

In continuous improvement, each 
organization or process is unique, and 
each quality journey will have to be 
customized to its unique environment. 
As illustrated in Figure 3 the quality 
journey is a series of phases with each 
phase expanding and stretching the 
organization’s goals to achieve world- 
class results. 

DOD Cost/Schedule 

The quality journey for DOD con¬ 
tract cost/schedule management cov¬ 
ers many years. In 1967, DOD im¬ 

proved the process by changing from 
a regulatory specification approach 
to a process based on criteria which 
permitted contractors to maximize their 
use of existing internal control sys¬ 
tem. During the mid-’70s there were 
many task forces established to im¬ 
prove DOD contract cost/schedule 

During the mid-’80s. DOD and in¬ 
dustry. through NSIA. initiated a TQM 
partnership to improve the DOD cost/ 
schedule management process for 
contractors and DOD, as illustrated 
in Figure 4. 

There have been several carefully 
planned activities and initiatives which 
have resulted in process improvements. 
The quality journey continues and, 
as of this writing, DOD is updating its 
training and educational material to 
reflect the changes from this TQM 
activity. In addition, the DOD loint 
Implementation Guide (IIG) for DOD 
cost/schedule (C/SCSC) is being up¬ 
dated to reflect the same changes. 


Achieving and maintaining a “world- 
class process" and obtaining a high 
level of customer satisfaction is a con¬ 
tinual effort. The principle of con¬ 
tinuous improvement complements 
and animates the principles of cus¬ 
tomer focus and employee involve¬ 

Progrom Manager 


Seprember-Oaober 1993 

Customer focus identifies the 
issues, employee involvement pro¬ 
duces solutions and implements 
changes, and the improved process 
provides the benefit to DOD and in¬ 
dustry. It gets the job done well at a 
more competitive cost. Most DOD 
and defense-related industry organi¬ 
zations are going through significant 
change with the reduction of DOD 

These organizations are downsizing 
and/or consolidating, and many are 
expected to “do more with less.” In 
this changing environment, DOD and 
contractors will have to improve their 
organizations and processes to main¬ 
tain and improve existing performance 

With these changes. DOD and 
contractor organizations are seeking 
improved cost/schedule management 
practices to improve organizational 
and contractual f)erformance measure¬ 

The DOD contract cost/schedule 
management and the TQM partner¬ 
ship between DOD and industry has 
achieved admirable results, but a 
world-class process requires continu¬ 
ous improvement with expanded per¬ 
formance goals. 


Achieving sustainable DOD cost/ 
schedule management process im¬ 
provements has been a priority for 
DOD and industry for a significant 

period of time. The importance of 
achieving sustainable improvements 
is greater in the current environment 
of downsizing and consolidation for 
both DOD and contractors. 

According to a U. S. Government 
Accounting Office (GAO)^ study, 20 
firms with TQM programs that scored 
high on the Malcolm Baldrige Na¬ 
tional Quality Award have high orga¬ 
nizational performance. As illustrated 
in Figure 5. the GAO study found the 
majority of the measurable perfor¬ 
mance results in the four areas stud¬ 
ied to be positive. 

The DOD cost/schedule manage¬ 
ment process has benefited from past 
TQM activities. The DOD stated that 
as a result of TQM and other im¬ 
provement activities* “Contract esti¬ 
mates at completion (EACs) reported 
to us by our program managers in 
quarterly management summary re¬ 
ports, are now significantly more re¬ 
alistic than they used to be." The 
NSIA President said as a result of 
changes that DOD and industry have 
jointly implemented,” “Cross indus¬ 
try savings are difficult to quantify 
but initial projections could reach over 
a billion dollars per year.” 

This paper focused on the TQM 
principles; Customer Focus, Employee 
Involvement, and Continuous Im¬ 
provement. Government leaders in 
DOD cost/schedule mana^ment have 
and can continue to achieve improved 
results by the continued application 
of TQM. 


1. DOD cost/schedule management is 
defined by DOD Instruction 5000.2, Cost/ 
Schedule Control Systems Criteria (C/ 

2. Survey Relating to the Implementation 
of Cost/Schedule Control Systems, A.D. 
Little. Program Systems Management Com¬ 
pany, dated 12/5/83 and 8/15/84. 

3. TQM Report for Program Management 
on the Cost^chedule Management Pro¬ 
cess, DOD and NSIA (National Security 
Industrial Association) dated 5/17/91. 

4. Thriving on Chaos, Tom Peters, Alfred 
A. Knoff, New York, 1987. 

5. Quality Tree, The Maryland Center for 
Quality and Productivity College of Busi¬ 
ness and Management, University of Mary¬ 

6. Developing Superior Work Teams, Build¬ 
ing Quality and the Competitive Edge, Den¬ 
nis C. Kinlaw, Lexington Books. 

7. How the Baldrige Award Really Works, 
David A. Garvin, Harvard Business Re¬ 
view, November-December 1991. 

8. Office of the Under Secretary of De¬ 
fense (Acquisition), Deputy Director for 
Performance Management, memorandum 
to NASA Administrator, dated March 12, 

9. National Security Industrial Associa¬ 
tion memorandum to Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), dated 
luly 1992. 

FIGURE 5. GAO Study on TQM 

Positive 75% 

Positive 90.8% 

Positive 90.8% 

Positive 85% 


Neg 17.3% 

No Ctig 6.2% 
Neg 3.1% 

No Chg21.4% 

Neg 15.0% 

Neg 3.6% 

Progrom Manager 


September-Oaober 1993 



Impact On Information System 
Program Management 

James E. Price, Ph.D. 

Sharlett Gillard, Ed.D. 

Mary-Blair Valentine, DPA 

I nformation systems development 
— has evolved through various 
stages of organizational reengineering. 
Since specific hierarchial structures 
are tailored to accomplish unique busi¬ 
ness objectives, this incremental shift 
has resulted in myriad organizational 
structures. The unanswered ques¬ 
tion is: What is the optimum organi¬ 
zational structure for an information 
system program office? 

This paper suggests that a para¬ 
digm shift has occurred. Program man¬ 
agers have moved from yesterday's 
matrix organizational structure to one 
more appropriately described as a tri¬ 
dimensional organization. The term 
tri-dimensional organization depicts 
the width, depth, and height of pro¬ 
gram manager responsibilities in the 
program office, within the parent or- 

Dr. Price is a Professor of Informa¬ 
tion Systems Management in the Inte¬ 
grative Program Management Depart¬ 
ment, Defense Systems Management 
College. Dr. Gillard is a Professor of 
Information Systems Management at 
the University of Southern Indiana. Dr. 
Valentine is the Army Materiel Com¬ 
mand Health Promotion Coordinator 
and the Army Communities of Excel¬ 
lence Program Manager. 

ganization, and at the point where 
they interact with external organiza¬ 

Its use is intended to depict the 
width of the flat matrix organization, 
depth of the parent organization, and 
height of the multiorganizational hi¬ 
erarchy in which program managers 
function. The concept of the tri-di- 
mensional organization was developjed 
to shift the paradigm of matrix man¬ 
agement from one focusing solely on 
internal workings of the program of¬ 
fice to one addressing the impact of 
the external environment on the or¬ 

Organizational Environment 

In the early days of information 
system development, the technical 
community generally played the key 
leadership role. Since organizations 
typically followed functional or de¬ 
partmental lines of authority, a data 
processing (DP) or electronic DP de¬ 
partment housed the “computer gu¬ 
rus,” and were depicted on organiza¬ 
tional charts as a staff line to the 
accounting department or a vice-presi¬ 

Though the title “program man¬ 
ager” emerged later, the DP or EDP 

department manager functioned as an 
information system program manager 
(PM), charged with oversight and lead¬ 
ership of technically oriented person¬ 
nel. Subordinates were assigned per¬ 
manently to the department and 
answered only to one manager. Novice 
user groups provided little input (usu¬ 
ally only user requirements) and 
learned to be satisfied with the sys¬ 
tem produced. 

Such organizational structure gave 
rise to centralized authority for the 
DP department manager; i.e., pro¬ 
gram manager. In a centralized envi¬ 
ronment, the PM was charged with 
all communication between the in¬ 
formation system developers and in¬ 
dividuals outside the department-user- 
groups, peer managers, senior 
executives, and external entities like 
vendors, special-interest groups, the 
legal environment, etc. The knowl¬ 
edge, skills, proficiency, interpersonal 
abilities, and communication compe¬ 
tence of the PM were paramount fac¬ 
tors in the success or failure of the 

The paradigm shift occurred when 
user groups became computer liter¬ 
ate, resulting in a maturization in the 
art of information systems develop¬ 
ment. Matrix organizations is a term 

Program Monoger 


Seprember-Oaober 1993 

used to describe the multidimensional 
organization that resulted when pro¬ 
gram teams were superimposed on 
existing organizational structures. A 
graphic depiction of a matrix organi¬ 
zational structure is provided in Fig¬ 
ure 1. Observe that program man¬ 
agement operations are positioned 
along the vertical axis, and the func¬ 
tional, technical, and support depart¬ 
ments along the horizontal axis. 

In matrix organizational structures, 
department managers share control 
of their subordinates with the pro¬ 
gram manager. Program managers 
are responsible for schedules, bud¬ 
gets, assessing alternatives, and lead¬ 
ing the program to successful comple¬ 
tion. Managers of the functional, 
technical and support departments 
provide personnel and technical as¬ 
sistance to the program manager. 
Perhaps Sammet and Green sum it 
up best by stating that the PM "... is 
responsible for "what” and “when." 
and the...department managers...are 
responsible for the ‘how’."‘ 

Subordinate Status 

In a matrix organization PMs over¬ 
see two types of subordinate groups. 


Perhaps Sammet 
and Green sum it 
up best by stating 
that the PM "... is 
responsible for 
*whaV and *when, * 

the, ..department 
managers.. .are 
responsible for the 


Figure I ; Matrix Organizational Structures 

One group includes program team 
members f)ermanently assigned to the 
program and solely under the PM’s 
authority. The second group consists 
of matrix support personnel, or sub¬ 
ject-matter experts from the 
organization’s functional departments, 
who are temporarily attached to the 
program team but remain assigned to 
their parent department. They are re¬ 
sponsible to both their department 
supervisor and the PM. 

Gibby introduced the term “shared 
authority” to describe this unique, co¬ 
existent relationship that persists be¬ 
tween PMs and managers of support¬ 
ing departments.’ 

Measureinent Criteria 

In early matrix organizational en¬ 
vironments, program managers were 
appointed to head the automation ef¬ 
fort. Initially, these managers were 
technicians. The results they pro¬ 
duced were inconsistent. Some sys¬ 
tems were purported to “work well” 
while others were “unsuccessful.” Both 
terms were quickly recognized as rela¬ 

Over time a generally agreed upon 
measure became this; The design, 
development and fielding of an infor¬ 
mation system is deemed “success¬ 
ful” when the information system sat¬ 
isfies the user requirements, is 
produced within budget, and is com¬ 
pleted on time. Although the order of 
priority is sometimes changed, these 
three criteria have become universally 
accepted by developers of informa¬ 
tion systems.’ 

The paradigm shift from techni¬ 
cian-led systems development to ma¬ 
trix-oriented program teams solved 
many early problems associated with 
producing an information system that 
met user requirements. Matrix orga¬ 
nizations tend to focus on the end 
product. This rather myopic view can 
produce a technically effective infor¬ 
mation system; however, technically 
effective information systems are not 

Progrom Manager 


Seprember-Octaber 1993 

FIGURE 2. Tri-dimensional Organizational 

automatically accepted by oversight 
agencies, corporate organizations, 
competitors, user-communities, and 

Hence, that initial paradigm shift 
did not solve problems associated with 
designing, developing, and fielding an 
effective information system. 

Tri-dimensional Structure 

Program managers operate in a tri¬ 
dimensional organizational structure 
to promote sound management and 
efficient use of its resources. The pro¬ 
gram office consists of the program 
team; the inter-organization comprises 
the parent organization, user com¬ 
munity, and contractor(s): and, the 
inter-organization is made up of ex¬ 
ternal organizations having a vested 
interest, or oversight authofity, in the 
program office. This tri-dimensional 
organization concept is depicted in 
Figure 2. 

At each level, or ring, program man¬ 
agers and their teams have specific 
interests. At the first level, program 
office, the program manager is charged 
with day-to-day leadership. The PM 
interacts with system developers and 
personnel dispersed throughout the 
organization. Primary concerns are 
issues related to matrix organizational 
structures and lines of authority. 

Hence, at the first level in the tri¬ 
dimensional organization structure, 
program managers are encumbered 
with an ambiguous leadership role. 
Their day-to-day focus is on team build¬ 
ing; developing and maintaining rela¬ 
tionships with functional, technical 
and support department managers; 
and the profusion of technical details 
associated with designing, develop¬ 
ing and fielding an information system. 

Level Two 

As program managers move into 
the intra-organizational ring, level two 
in the tri-dimensional organization 
structure, they begin to interact with 

other departments in their organiza¬ 
tion, the user community, and sup¬ 
porting contractors. The PM focus 
shifts between managing contractor 
support, meeting customer require¬ 
ments, and establishing how the pro¬ 
gram office "fits” with the rest of the 

In contrast to the first level where 
the program manager has some de¬ 
gree of autonomy, the second level 
exposes the PM to competition for 
finite resources within the parent or¬ 
ganization. Concerns include surviv¬ 
ability of the information systems pro¬ 
gram, professional credibility, and 
peer-group acceptance. 

Generally, the immediate program 
team might be relatively small. How¬ 
ever, at the second level when repre¬ 
sentatives from the user community 
are considered, the team grows con¬ 
siderably. Indeed, it is not unusual 
for the team to number in the hun¬ 

dreds. The size of the team and the 
level of complexity involved is diffi¬ 
cult to imagine. 

For example, when contractors join 
the team to accomplish technical 
functions associated with designing 
and developing an information sys¬ 
tem. the numbers become astronomi¬ 
cal. Consider this; One programmer 
can be expected to write, test, and 
debug 2,000 lines of computer code 
in one year.^ 

Thus, the number of programmers 
involved becomes mind-boggling, con¬ 
sidering that many information sys¬ 
tems contain several million lines of 
computer code. To further complicate 
the issure, the code is often produced 
by programmers working in geographi¬ 
cally dispersed groups. One recent 
author [Marsh, p. 63] likened it to 
publishing a 37-chapter novel, with a 
different person writing each chapter, 
from a different country. 

Program Manager 


Seprember-Ocrober 1993 

Inter-Organization Level 

Finally, program managers operat¬ 
ing at the inter-organizational level, 
or third ring, highlight strategic is¬ 
sues. Examples include external over¬ 
sight and how the program office op¬ 
erates in the inter-organizational 
environment. In addition, they iden¬ 
tify stakeholders, secure sponsors, and 
build relationships with constituents. 
The focus is on how the organization 
(rather than the program office) "fits" 
into the global community. 

Robert Block [1983]’ would likely 
refer to this level as the political com¬ 
ponent, or that group of people out¬ 
side the information system-building 
community (levels one and two) who 
make problem-solving decisions that 
can make or break an information 
systems initiative. Indeed, Block con¬ 
cludes that the political component is 
the major contributor of program fail¬ 
ure. Hence, successful program man¬ 
agers learn how to interact with the 
oversight community represented in 
Figure 2 as the inter-organizational 

To accomplish this program man¬ 
agers identify stakeholders, identify 
and secure sponsors/advocates, and 
build relationships with constituents. 
Some authors characterize this level 
of program manager as “Mr. Outside,” 
because they are concerned witl i fight¬ 
ing resource allocation battles in head¬ 
quarters, preparing justifications for 
fiscal authorizations, testifying, and 
monitoring the execution of programs. 

The difficulty is that program man¬ 
agers must be all things to all people 
at all times. Specifically, program 
managers and teams must effectively 
manage all ‘hree levels in the tri¬ 
dimensional organizational structure 
simultaneously. This is quite a task 
for one person. 


The paradigm shift from functional 
organization structures to matrix or- 

Lines of authority 
have been 
team members find 
responsible to 
supervisors and 
supervisors find 
directing activities 
of subordinates 
having dual 

ganizations has precipitated alterations 
in traditional management perceptions. 
As program team members are pro¬ 
cured from functional areas, opera¬ 
tions of those areas are exposed to 
greater scrutiny. Information integra¬ 
tion from a variety of departments 
has generated a previously unrivaled 
degree of interdependency. 

Power/authority relationships have 
shifted and, indeed, remain in flux as 
PM team members change from pro¬ 
gram to program. Lines of authority 
have been redrawn—program team 
members find themselves responsible 
to multiple supervisors and supervi¬ 

sors find themselves directing activi¬ 
ties of subordinates having dual alle¬ 

Thus, numerous management vari¬ 
ables are undergoing metamorphosis. 
As with previous paradigm shifts, the 
tri-dimensional structure offers solu¬ 
tions to existing problems and oppor¬ 
tunity to meet new challenges. 


1. Sammet and Green, Defense Ac¬ 
quisition Management. 1990. p. 108. 
(Boca Raton: Florida, Atlantic Uni¬ 
versity Press, 1990). 

2. Gibby, Lowell Bruce. “Project 
Management Authority in Matrix Or¬ 
ganizations," Ph.D. dissertation. Uni¬ 
versity of California. Los Angeles, 1974, 
p. 14. 

3. Atkinson, Rick and Barton Gellman, 
“Navy Fires Three Working on Top 
let: Lagging Schedule. Cost of A-12 
Cited,” The Washington Post. Decem¬ 
ber 5, 1990, pp. 1 and 19; Bobrowski, 
Paul M.. “Project Management Con¬ 
trol Problems: An Information Sys¬ 
tems Focus.” Project Management [our- 
nal. (1989), p. 11; Kerzner, Harold, 
“In Search of Excellence in Project 
Management,” Journal of Systems 
Management; (February 1987), p. 31; 
Moir. lames, “Project Methodology, 
Organization, and Structure." Journal 
of Jnformation Management, p. 38; 
Pinto. leffrey K. and Dennis P. Slevin. 
“Critical Success Factors in Effective 
Project Implementation," ed. Cleland, 
David I. and King, William R., Project 
Management Handbook. (New York; 
Van Nostrand Reinhold. 2nd ed. 
1988), pp. 481-2; Thayer, Richard H. 
Arthur ^ Pyster, and Robert C. Wood, 
“Major Issues in Software Engineer¬ 
ing Project Management," IEEE Trans¬ 
actions on Software Engineering. Vol. 
SE7 No. 4. duly 1981), p. 333. 

4. Marsh. Alton. "Pentagon Up Against 
a Software Wall," Government Execu- 
tive. Vol. 22. No. b. (May 1990), p. 

5. Block, Robert. The Politics of Projects. 
(New York: Yourdon Press, 1983). 

p. 6. 

Program Monoger 


Seprember-Ocrober 1993 

Mr. Sweeney is a graduate of DSMC's 
PMC 93-1. Before that he was Pro¬ 
gram Manager for the E-2C Hawkeye 
program. He is assigned to NAVAIR, 
Survivability and Production. 

From a program manager s stand¬ 
point, foreign involvement in his sys¬ 
tem places a significant burden on 
the management of the program, with 
little obvious direct return. All par¬ 

ties are reluctant to share technolo¬ 
gies. The contractors are reticent to 
become involved with competing con¬ 
tractors. The reduced cost associated 
with shared development and pro- 


s resources devoted to de- 

-- fense procurement contract 

and technology become more ad¬ 
vanced (more expensive), affordabil¬ 
ity becomes more of a driving factor 
in our capability to maintain the best 
equipment in the hands of the oper¬ 
ating forces. Moreover, the technol¬ 
ogy and manufacturing base of our 
allies often approaches, and occasion¬ 
ally surpasses, ours. With similar 
economic and defense requirements, 
they too are faced with the "guns or 
butter” trade-off. Far too often we 
individually attack the same problems 
and end up with similar, redundant 
solutions. By approaching them co¬ 
operatively. we could save money and, 
more importantly, likely achieve a 
better solution through the synergism 
of our combined technological talents. 

The argument sounds reasonable 
and is the basis for Senator Sam Nunn's 
many cooperative development ini¬ 
tiatives; and the proscription in 5000.2 
to seek a cooperative development 
before a unique one. The coopera¬ 
tive approach is rarely pursued. 

John L. Sweeney 



A Better Solution 

Program Manager 


September-Ocrober 1990 

diiction, to be sure, lessens the bur¬ 
den on the ta.xpiiyer but generally is 
not returned to the program. Thus, 
funds available to the program are 
reduced. Added complications of split 
constituencies, unique customer re¬ 
quirements and political overtones 
often dilute resources available to the 
program. Many programs have found 
that, despite these limitations, there 
are benefits to be had. 


To illustrate this idea. I would like 
to recount the successes of the Naw’s 
K-2C Hawkeye. In addition to 

ter. The experience gained by living 
through operations in a unique envi¬ 
ronment and culture allowed us to 
understand the strengths and limita¬ 
tions of our system better, and to tai¬ 
lor our support systems better. But 
most of all, by applying ourselves to¬ 
gether. cooperatively, we have con¬ 
tinued the improvement of the 

The ^^2C Hawkeye is the world’s 
foremost Airborne Harly Warning sys¬ 
tem. It is the central iictor in virtually 
all the Navy’s Carrier Battle Group 
operations providing not only early 
warning, but all command and con- 

r,-2C Haivkcyc 

supporting the "national good" by 
aiding our allies in their defense ef¬ 
forts, the perspectives gained by ac¬ 
commodating another view allowed 
us to structure our own program bet- 

trol functions: from strike guidance 
and support, to search and rescue. 
The Hawkeye is the eyes of the Fleet. 
Its system combines multisensor de¬ 
tection information into a highly inte¬ 

grated tactical picture which is then 
provided back to the battle group. 

The system has grown during the 
years to keep abreast of the threat 
and the changing operational envi¬ 
ronment through a program of con¬ 
tinuous product improvement. The 
F-2C has undergone five major system 
upgrades resulting in the present sys¬ 
tem. currently undergoing initial op¬ 
erational test and evaluation (lOTSfK). 
Fach iteration increased the Hawkeye’s 
capability, diversity and utility. 

In addition to the Ll.S. Navy, the 
Hawkeye is used by several of our 
allies; Israel. lapan. Kgypt. Singapore 
and, soon to be. Taiwan. It sees 
worldwide service operating in a di¬ 
versity of environments and cultures. 
Fach of these brings their nuance; 
their unique circumstances. Notwith¬ 
standing, all users are part of the 
Hawkeye family with common needs 
and problems. The members of the 
family have been able to continue 
growth and solve problems which 
would have been more difficult, or 
impossible, to resolve on an individual 

State of the Art 

To illustrate this point. I would 
like to cite a few of our successes. 
When Fgypt bought the Hawkeye, 
the LISN Interrogation Friend or Foe 
(IFF) was basically the original sys¬ 
tem; 20 years old and technologically 
outgrown. Fgypt needed a unique 
IFF that would function with both 
Fgyptian and U.S. formats. Fgv'pt 
funded the development of this sys¬ 
tem as part of its F-2C procurement. 
Here, Fgypt’s need and funds were 
applied with U.S. effort and the 
Hawkeye program gained. We built 
the system and the fallout technology 
allowed the USN to develop a state- 
of-the-art system for USN aircraft. 

To regress a little, as mentioned, 
the Hawkeye is the product of an 
iterative development program. As 
the radar and the computer were im- 

Progrom Monoger 


September-Oaober 1993 

E-2C Multimission Capability 




y Xf- 

Tanker Vectoring 

Air Defense 

Airborne Early Warning 

• Radar 

• Passive 

./^ateHi^nk & Voice 
yy communications 

Passive Detection System 

Air Space 

proved, the display system became a 
choke point. Our fleet, supported by 
the test and evaluation community, 
cried the need for a better display; 
but the resources just weren’t there. 
Egypt, too, wanted the maximum ca¬ 
pability for its system. By sharing the 
development, we found we could af¬ 
ford a new advanced technology dis¬ 
play. This led us to the next step, a 
cooperative effort wherein a joint need 
and joint funding resulted in the de¬ 
velopment of a new display for the 

Integration of the new display into 
the aircraft required development of 
a new tactical software program for 
the aircraft. The tactical program tells 
the central computer how to recog¬ 
nize, evaluate, and combine inputs 
from the sensor systems: and how to 
display these to the operator. This 
last function is performed by the dis¬ 
play subprogram. The multiple new 
features of the new display (including 

color) virtually ensured that multiple 
early changes were going to be re¬ 
quired to optimize the output. Ini¬ 
tially. Egypt and the United States 
were going to update their own pro¬ 
grams; however, the expense of such 
a course again became an impedi¬ 
ment. Moreover, it was recognized 
that while there were differences in 
tactical programs, the display should 
be almost identical. 

We decided to seek a common so¬ 
lution and share not only funding, 
but other resources required. The 
development program was undertaken 
as a Nunn Amendment Cooperative 
Development Program. This is not 
an FMS program. Each participant 
funds his effort out of national funds. 
Each has his strengths to contribute: 
Egypt had a sophisticated software 
facility and trained programmers: the 
USN had years of operational experi¬ 
ence with the E-2C and programmers 
with an intimate knowledge of the E- 
2 tactical program. 

The deal was struck to combine 
these resources and develop a com¬ 
mon display subprogram. Egypt will 
benefit by more fully using its soft¬ 
ware lab, by gaining experience with 
the tactical program, and by reducing 
cost. In fact, we both benefited not 
only from reduced costs, but from 
shared ideas, development of an in¬ 
teroperable system, and development 
of professional ties between our re¬ 
spective software support activities. 

A Central Unit 

The Hawkeye also has benefited 
from application of technology devel¬ 
oped independently by our allies. The 
navigation system needed updating. 
The Global Positioning System (GPS) 
and joint Tactical Information Data 
System (JTIDS) were being added to 
the aircraft. A new. smart, navigation 
display was required but development 
of a new system would have been 
expensive, in terms of money and time. 

Progronn Manager 


Seprember-Ocrober 1993 

• E-2A Introduced in 1961 (59 A/C) 

• E-2B Introduced in 1969 (CILOP) 

• E-2C Introduced in 1971 (Increase UE) P^l 









UDP Group I 



UDP Group II 

Auto Detect/ 



Manual Detect/ 


Addition of Basic 
Auto Detect/Track 


Compatibility with 
Trac-A Antenna 

Improved Surface 
Detection and 

Four-Fold Increase 
in Computer Track 
Capacity (HSP) 

Improved Auto 
Capability in All 
processing and 
triple pulse rept 

Limited ECCM 

Improved ECCM 

Improved ECCM 

Further ECCM 




•Addition of 
sidelobe canceller 
loops to suppress 
threat jamming 

• Addition of narrow 
band filter to 
improve operation 
in EMI environment 

•Add'l sidelobe 
canceller loops 

•Delta on sum 
technique reduces 
main beam jammer 

•Improved operation 
in EMI environment 

•Add'l improved 
narrow band 
cancellers to 
improve operation 
in EMI 


•Auto channel 
monitoring and 

Extended Radar 
Radar Range 

Addition of Auto 
Detect/Track in 
Heavy EMI 

Improved IFF 

• Improved sidelobe 

• Performance 
assessment of 
threat detection 
(Multi-ring test 

Fortunately. Canadian Marconi had 
developed a beautiful system, the 
Multifunctional Control Display Unit 
(MFCDU) that promised to combine 
various displays into a central unit. 
This system was evaluated as a 
Foreign Weapons Evaluation program 
and found to fulfill that promise. 
The system is now going into the 

While not development, exactly, 
we have shared resources in another 
area that promises significant mutual 
benefit; and the release of resources 
to other efforts. The follow-on logis¬ 
tic and technical support required to 

sustain day-to-day operations is be¬ 
ing accomplished under unique con¬ 
tractor efforts for the individual op¬ 
erators. Not only is this inefficient 
with six individuals each waiting to 
be called on each problem; but they 
aren’t talking together and the collec¬ 
tive wisdom is not being fully devel¬ 
oped. We are copying the Air Force 
here and developing an E-2C Con¬ 
solidated Support Program wherein 
one integrated support structure will 
provide for the sustaining needs of all 

Shared Efforts 

Similar benefits, to a greater or lesser 

extent, have been gained through our 
other cooperative partners. Coopera¬ 
tive efforts work. The Navy has ben¬ 
efited; our other users have benefited. 
Today, the Hawkeye faces a future 
shaped by budget restrictions, higher 
costs and completing requirements. In 
that environment, we are committed 
to the belief that only through shared 
coopjerative efforts, through fully capi¬ 
talizing on technological strengths of 
our allies, can we affordably meet needs 
of the future. 

Coopjerative development is a win- 
win idea whose time has come. Rec¬ 
ognition of the potential it offers can 
add a new dimension in support of 
virtually any program. 

Progrom Manager 


Seprember-Ocfober 1993 




Dr. Ernest A. Seglie 

FIGURE I. DOTAE Agenda Items 

i *>*>o 



Modeling & 

Big Ten 

How Much 
Testing Is 

ber of 1992. the National Research 
Council sponsored a 2-day workshop 
of academic and Defense Department 
workers on statistical issues in de¬ 
fense analysis and testing, and the 
issue was: “How much testing is 

I «>«> > 

New Acquisition 



Early Operational 

Follow-on OT 

i «>*> I 

The Big Ten 



Data Sharing 

Test Resources 

Building Suitable 

Philosophy of End- 
to-End & Baseline 

I n early 1990, about six months 
after Clif Duncan became Direc¬ 
tor of Operational Test and Evalua¬ 
tion (OT&E),' we were talking infor¬ 
mally in his office. He said he had 
concluded that being DOT&E was an 
old man’s job; that one did not make 
friends if one did this job forthrightly; 
and that the pressures to worry about 
a career after this job might consciously 
or unconsciously inhibit a younger 
person who had to worry about sup¬ 
porting a family and subsequent em¬ 

The reason, of course, is that op¬ 
erational testing too often brings home 
the bad news that a system is not all 
that it was hoped to be. During his 
tenure as DOT&E, Dr. Duncan con¬ 
sciously and consistently worked to 
change and improve weapons devel¬ 
opment so that the systems turned 
out as they were hoped to be. 

One forum for him to push change 
was the Operational Test Agency (OTA) 
Commanders’ Conference held every 
six months. At this conference of the 
OTAs, he could bring up items that 
would improve how OT&E served the 
acquisition of good systems. He also 
could highlight areas of concern. 

Still Current Issues 

Figure 1 lists the DOT&E agenda 
items during 1990, 1991 and 1992 

Dr. Seglie is Science Advisor, Op¬ 
erational Test and Evaluation, Office 
of the Secretary of Defense. 

conferences. These items were the 
current issues during those years. I 
believe that they are more. They will 
always be the current issues. Five 
years from now they will be the cur¬ 
rent issues, even if the buzz words 
used to describe them are different. 

Even if there is no longer a sepa¬ 
rate office of DOT&E. those who must 
make the big decisions on weapons 
systems will need OT&E information, 
and these will be the issues that will 
concern them. In other words, I be¬ 
lieve they are close to being a com¬ 
plete set of ever-current OT&E issues. 

Proof of this is that they are now 
beginning to repeat themselves. For 
example, in 1990 “How much testing 
is enough?” was an issue. In Septem- 

In late 1993 or early 1994, the In¬ 
ternational Test and Evaluation As¬ 
sociation and the Military Operations 
Research Society will cosponsor a sym¬ 
posium with the title "How Much Test¬ 
ing Is Enough?” The issue will not go 
away: we will only get better at ad¬ 
dressing it. 

The same thing is true with con¬ 
tractor involvement. There were 
changes to the law in 1989 and in 
1992. There are proposed changes to 

Progrom Manager 


Sepfember-Oaober 1993 

the law again this year. These issues 
just keep coming up. I propose to go 
through them, starting with the most 
recent. Each year had an overarching 
theme: 1992 was the year of response 
to the new world order: 1991 con¬ 
tained the nitty-gritty changes; and 
1990 was the first blush. 

1992: The New World Order 

During 1992 the world was reeling 
from the dramatic changes in the world 
order. The Defense Department was 
attempting to respond. Everyone 
wanted to know how the changes 
would affect Department business. 
With the change of administrations 
in 1993, that question is still relevant. 
The OT&E must understand each new 
acquisition strategy that the Depart¬ 
ment adopts so that OT&E can sup¬ 
ply relevant information in a timely 

The New Acquisition Strategy 

One of the consistent themes in all 
the discussions of new acquisition strat¬ 
egies is that we will produce less, but 
know more about the systems we pro¬ 
duce. In the lanuary 1992 Report to 
the President and Congress. Defense 
Secretary Dick Cheney said; 

With the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, we no longer face a glo¬ 
bal adversary able to ueld large 
quantities of increasingly ad¬ 
vanced weapons. As a result, 
we can afford to take more time 
before we move new weapons 
systems to production. We can 
concentrate on research and 
development, operational test¬ 
ing, and the upgrade of existing 
systems, to ensure we maintain 
the technological edge we re¬ 

When Mr. Les Aspin became De¬ 
fense Secretary, we sought evidence 
of what he had thought about opera¬ 
tional testing prior to becoming Sec¬ 
retary. In February 1992, then Rep¬ 
resentative Aspin talked about a 

The Honorable Les Aspin 
Secretary of Defense 

comprehensive resource strategy. It 
had four parts: 

—Selective Upgrading 
—Selective Low-Rate Procurements 
—Rollover Plus 
—Silver Bullet Procurements. 

He discussed each in turn, but let 
me quote him on rollover plus: 

...But our current system for de¬ 
veloping and fielding advanced 
systems is also no longer sus¬ 
tainable. We don’t have the 
relentlessly modernizing threat 
to counter and we don’t have 
the money to do it, anyway. The 
replacement is ‘rollover- 
plus’....First. there’s the rollover 
part of the system. Here, we 
would continue to prototype new 
systems and components but not 
put them into production until 
stringent criteria are met. Those 
criteria are A) that the technol¬ 
ogy works. B) that it was re¬ 
quired by development of the 
threat, or C) represented a break¬ 
through that would alter battle¬ 
field operations. 

Second, there’s the manufactur¬ 
ing technology and operational 
testing. They are the new ac¬ 
tive ingredients in ’rollover- 

plus’ would require the re¬ 
sultant prototype to be ‘produc¬ 
tion-representative.’ and would 
thoroughly test prototypes of 
promising technologies and sys¬ 
tems in an operational context. 

Let me explain. Traditionally, 
prototypes have been developed 
to provide a range of informa¬ 
tion: to resolve technical ques¬ 
tions about new technologies, 
provide insights into a system’s 
appearance and spatial layout, 
and to test sub-component in¬ 
tegration into a system. ‘Tradi¬ 
tional’ prototypes, therefore, have 
been developed primarily to 
understand technical performance 
issues. Although the resolution 
of technical performance issues 
is a key of any prototyping strat¬ 
egy. our ’prototyping-plus’ strat¬ 
egy incorporates two additional 
objectives: manufacturing 
producibility and the resolution 
of operational performance issues. 

1 conclude from these remarks that 
while the need for production is going 
down, the need for information is go¬ 
ing up. Any future acquisition strat¬ 
egy, when considered honestly, will 
have to make testing address opera¬ 
tional issues about the system under 
consideration. The new acquisition 
strategies require information earlier, 
and in spite of the possibility that the 
system may not be produced. 

The first point is, then, that the 
Department needs good information 
early, and cannot afford to have things 
go all the way to OT before finding 
the faults. The test-fix-test again may 
be too expensive. The alternative is 
to try to get it right the first time: to 
keep everyone’s eye on the goal from 
the very beginning. That is what the 
next two thrusts are about. 

Linkage: COEA-DT-OT 

At Milestone I the program has to 
present a Cost and Operational Effec¬ 
tiveness Analysis (COEA) to the 

Program Monoger 


Seprember-Oaober 1993 

FIGURE 2. The Big Ten 



Evaluations...are too 

There is too little 
“stress" on equipment 
and personnel. 

Report to Congress 
are incomplete and 

Oi-site (^jservatkms 
by steiff am infrecpient. 

Problems and limitations 
of OT are rrat reported. 

DOT&E reports are 
[rubber stamp] of 

Service test reports. 

Testir^ us^ “^iden 

Inadequate resources 
are provided. 

Testir^ is not realistic 
and objective. 

Difference between 

OT and DT is blurred. 

Defense Acquisition Board. At the 
same time, the proijram presents an 
Operational Requirements Document 
(ORD). The weakness of the ORDs is 
legendary. However, the COEA often 
presents a clearer picture of what the 
sponsor wants the system to do. 

The COEA puts the system in a 
scenario; de\’elops measures of effec¬ 
tiveness and suitability: analyzes simu¬ 
lated battle results; and provides jus¬ 
tification of the expenditure of the 
billions of dollars that the new pro¬ 
gram costs. At the same time, the 
Test and Evaluation Master Plan 
(TEMP) is first submitted. 

In the past, these documents have 
had little to do with each other. Most 
testers have never seen a COEA. At 
least one Service fought hard to pre¬ 
vent any linkage between these docu¬ 
ments. They looked at the COEA as a 
box to check to satisfy OSD, and not 
as a management document that jus¬ 
tified the route chosen. 

The USD(A), PASfE, and DOTSfE 
looked on the situation rather differ¬ 
ently. The current guidance is that 
the same measures of effectiveness 
(MOEs) and criteria will be used to 
measure the progress of the program 
from the COEA through development 
to operational testing. Enforcing con¬ 
sistency ensures that ev'eryone has 
their eye on the same goal. There is a 
second way of doing this, discussed 
in the next section. 

Early Operational Assessments 

When DOT&E looked for reasons 
why systems have trouble in OT. he 
found there is often a breakdown in 
communication during development. 
The user defines the need: the devel¬ 
oper is tempted to say, "Thank you. 
I'll get something that meets this need. 
Now step out of my way." The user 
disappears for the next 14 years dur¬ 
ing system development. 

The children of the original user 
then get this thing to test. The proof 

of the disconnect: after 14 years of 
development, the user redefines the 
requirement weeks before the final 
production decision; sometimes re¬ 
quirements are completely disavowed. 

One way to avoid such surprises is 
to examine the system from the op¬ 
erational point of view throughout 
development. This is the role of early 
operational assessments. 

Some of us believe that good de¬ 
velopmental testers know what the 
problems are. Many DTers have said 
as much to me. Many of them also 
have personally complained to me 
that while they know the problems, 
they are not listened to very sympa¬ 
thetically, and they are not free to 
make the problems visible: Their test 
reports belong to the program office 
(funding for the developmental tests 
comes from the program manager). 

To give visibility to system features 
important to effectiveness and suit¬ 
ability, the Director has established 
the policy that the DOT&E must ap¬ 

prove. in writing, plans for operational 
assessments that support the com¬ 
mitment of funds. 

Follow-on OT 

Recall that many of the reports the 
Director signed had negative conclu¬ 
sions or caveats; for example, the re¬ 
port would say that "The system is 
effective and suitable, except for reli¬ 
ability.” When that occurred, the Di¬ 
rector often reported that the Service 
would not field the system until a fix 
has been proved in Follow-on Opera¬ 
tional Testing (FOT&E). 

Part of the reason to put such 
assurances in the report to Congress 
was to help guarantee that the 
tests actually occurred. This has 
been a successful, albeit expensive, 

On the other hand, we had not 
been diligent in reporting the results 
of that F'OT&E to Congress. We will 
in the future explicitly report to Con¬ 
gress on the outcome of such FOT&E. 

Progronn Manager 


Seprennber-Ocrober 1993 

Remember that the motivation for all 
these actions is to keep visible the 
goal: to give our country effective and 
suitable systems that increase our 
military capability. 

1991: The Nitty-Gritty 

The Big Ten 

The Director made a list of criti¬ 
cisms and complaints of those involved 
in OT&E. This list, and the commit¬ 
ment to address the criticism, was 
part of the Director’s confirmation 
hearings. (Figure 2). 

With such a visible and high-level 
commitment, this office has diligently 
worked to improve OT&E in all these 
areas. Many of the criticisms are in¬ 
terrelated. The lack of on-site obser¬ 
vation, the rubber-stamp observation, 
the problem not repwrted, and the 
optimistic assessments all required this 
office to assume more responsibility 
for its evaluations. This it has done. 

Independent Evaluations 

The best way to address the criti¬ 
cism that the DOT&E just rubber- 
stamped the Service test agency re¬ 
ports was to take responsibility for 
doing a report based on our own analy¬ 
sis. The DOT&E began to do that. 
This also addresses the criticism that 
the reports were too optimistic; the 
reports are now truly DOT&E’s. 

What has happened, and I expect 
will happen more often in the future, 
is that the Director will develop an 
independent evaluation plan. This 
will be available to the Services and 
will be the basis of the Director’s de¬ 
termination of the adequacy of the 
TEMP and operational test plans. 

After the test, the independent evalu¬ 
ation plan will be the basis of the 
DOT&E evaluation. The “basis of 
evaluation” means that at least those 
items included in the plan will be 
considered. It never means factors 
discovered during the test will be 

If you don't plan to 
test a piece, there is 
little incentive to 
give that piece the 
same attention as 
something vou are 
going to test. The 
result is clear. The 
country eventually 
pays for it. 

Data Sharing 

To do the analysis and evaluation 
independent of the Service requires 
that DOT&E have access to the data 
in a timely manner. The law guaran¬ 
tees that DOT&E have access to all 
data that DOT&E determines is nec¬ 
essary to do the evaluation. In some 
cases we plug directly into the com¬ 
puters as data enters the database. 

Test Resources 

The inadequacies of resources were 
also part of the Big Ten. The only 
time to deal with this without major 
disruption is early; i.e., before the pro¬ 
gram is a program or when the acqui¬ 
sition strategy is being formulated. 
Document this in the Test and Evalu¬ 
ation Master Plan. 

Building Suitable Systems 

Another effort to get good systems 
was a study to identify systemic prob¬ 
lem areas. The Director’s job is de¬ 
ceptively simple concerning acquisi¬ 
tion programs. Before a system can 
go to full-rate production, the Direc¬ 
tor must send a report to the Secre¬ 
tary and the Congress stating that the 
test was adequate and that the test 
confirms that the system actually tested 

is effective and suitable. Weakness 
in suitability is the biggest systemic 
problem. Suitability includes reliability, 
availability and maintainability. (Fig¬ 
ure 3). 

The reports to Congress often said 
the systems were effective without 
caveat; they rarely said suitable with¬ 
out caveat. They said for example, 
“Suitable, except for reliability,” or 
“marginally suitable,” or “potentially 

The DOT&E explored the causes 
of this in a study he commissioned by 
the Logistics Management Institute. 
The study compared the field experi¬ 
ence to the OT results and concluded 
that OT found most of the significant 
problems in the tested items. 

What they also found was that sig¬ 
nificant problems often existed in the 
items not tested; for example, the lo¬ 
gistic support system. This is a good 
rule to remember: If you don’t plan to 
test a piece, there is little incentive to 
give that piece the same attention as 
something you are going to test. The 
result is clear. The country eventu¬ 
ally pays for it. 

The study’s other major critique of 
OT was that it often did not have 
enough test hours to get a full appre¬ 
ciation of the reliability problems. One 
program especially singled out was 
the AH-64. The test did not have 
enough hours for even one aircraft to 
get to phase maintenance. 

Their recommendations were: 

—Devote more attention and 
technical effort to suitability 

—Improve responses to problems 

—Use data and insights from all 
phases and technical 

—Ensure that critical items of 
peculiar support equipment 
are identified, included in test 
plans, and made available for 

Progrom Monoger 


Seprember-Oaober 1993 

FIGURE 3. Suitability is defined in the 5000 

fit The degree to which a system can be placed 
satisfactorily in field use with consideration given 
to availability, compatibility, transportability, 
interoperability, wartime usage rates, maintain¬ 
ability, safety, human factors, manpower support- 
ability, logistics supportability, natural environmen¬ 
tal effects and impacts, documentation and train¬ 
ing requirements. 5 5 

Most of the life-cycle cost of sys¬ 
tems comes from suitability concerns: 
spare parts, logistics support, etc. 
Decision-makers’ interest will increase 
as budgets go down. 

Philosophy of End-to-End 
And Baseline Testing 

If you want to know how the office 
of DOraK would approach a prob¬ 
lem, consider that we will always want 
to know what the system adds to the 
militarv’ capability of the countrv'. This 
may be confusing to developmental 
testers. The developmental testers 
look at contract specification compli¬ 
ance, and the subject of military use 
is over the horizon. 

But of the five reasons for doing 
DT enumerated in 5000.2. only one 
has to do with specification compli¬ 
ance. The others are to inform about 
operational limitations, technological 
limitations and risk, cost-performance 
trade-offs, and readiness for opera¬ 
tional test and evaluation. 

When operational testers look at a 
system from the point of view of their 
militar\'capability, they use the mea¬ 
sure of mission accomplishment. 

An e.xample may help here. Say a 
new surface-to-surface missile is be¬ 
ing developed whose navigation is so 
good it can come very close to wher- 
e\’er you aim it. As a result, its war¬ 
head need not be so big. 

When the operational testers look 
for mission accomplishment, they ask: 
What is the targeting system? Is the 
targeting system accurate enough to 
support the missile? Said the other 
way round, is the missile supportable 
with current intelligence assets? You 
might not think that is an appropriate 
question, but it is a design question 
of importance. 

If the target location is not very 
accurate, then designing for high-place¬ 
ment accuracy is not worth much 
money. The small warhead may be a 

mistake. These are design questions 
to be considered at the ver\' start of 
the program. Remember that OT looks 
at the full mission, end-to-end (Fig¬ 
ure 4). Since DTers have not done 
that kind of thing. OTers will reduce 
the risk of surprise by trying to pick 
up such disconnects in their early 
operational assessments. 

The second aspect of the testing 
philosophy that DOT&E has pursued 
is baseline testing; that is. include the 
current way of doing the mission in 
the test. There are two reasons for 
doing this. 

First, this calibrates the lest. The 
only way to really answer the criti¬ 
cism that the tests were too easy and 
results were optimistic is to test the 
way we would do the mission today. 

If the test scenario and threat rep¬ 
resented is too easy, even the old way 
of doing the mission would look good. 
Including a baseline is a calibration 
that compares the test to the expecta¬ 
tions examined in the COKA. By di¬ 
rection. the C0F;A includes the cur¬ 
rent way of doing the mission. 

The second reason for doing a 
baseline is that systems often fail to 

meet the stated requirements. The 
question around the DAB table is then: 
"Is it still worth buying?" When that 
question comes up the answer is al¬ 
ways “It is so much better that the 
current system." When asked if the 
test confirms this, the DOT&F an¬ 
swer should be "Yes, we tested the 
old system and the new system, and 
the new one is x times as good.” 

We cannot say that if we have not 
tested the old way. We don’t know if 
the new system is better than the old. 
The purpose of testing is to gain infor¬ 

If the information most often de¬ 
sired is how much better the new sys¬ 
tem is than the old. then the tester 
should plan to get that information. 
(Don’t be put off by those who say 
that is not the requirement; that is the 
question most often asked when sys¬ 
tems fail requirements.) 

1990: First Blush 

The Big Ten 

The "BigTen" were first mentioned 
in OTA meetings in 1990. As you can 
see. they come up repeatedly. Most 
members of the DOT&F office carry a 
copy around with them. 

Program Manager 


Seprember-Ocrober 1990 

FIGURE 4. Operational Effectiveness 

66 The overall degree of mission accomplish¬ 
ment of a system when used by representative 
personnel in the environment planned or expected 
(e.g., natural, electronic, threat etc.) for opera¬ 
tional employment of the system considering or¬ 
ganization, doctrine, tactics, survivability, vulner¬ 
ability, and threat (including countermeasures, 
initial nuclear weapons effects, nuclear, biological, 
and chemical contamination (NBCC) threats).9 9 

Contractor Involvement 

The law addresses contractor in¬ 
volvement in two ways. First, no per¬ 
son employed by the contractor for 
the system being tested may be in¬ 
volved in the conduct of the opera¬ 
tional test and evaluation required to 
support going beyond low-rate initial 
production. The limitation does not 
apply to the extent that the Secretary 
of Defense plans for persons employed 
by the contractor to be involved in 
the operations, maintenance, and sup¬ 
port of the system being tested when 
the system is deployed in combat. 

If you want a way to think about 
this, it is the following. After develop¬ 
ment. and after the low-rate initial 
production, the question is: “Is the 
go\'ernment ready to accept this into 
America’s arsenal?” 

The answer is “No” if the military 
is not ready to accept it, or needs 
contractor support to operate or main¬ 
tain it (in ways not planned for during 

The second prohibition is that a 
contractor who has participated in (or 

is participating in) the development, 
pr'' lOn or testing of a system for a 
military department or defense agency 
ar for another contractor of the De¬ 
partment of Defense) may not be in¬ 
volved (in any way) in the establish¬ 
ment of criteria for data collection, 
performance assessment, or evalua¬ 
tion activities for the operational test 
and evaluation. 

(An additional paragraph in this 
section of the law was added in 1992: 
“The limitation In subparagraph (A) 
(above) does not apply to a contrac¬ 
tor that has participated in such de¬ 
velopment, production, or testing solely 
as a representative of the Federal Gov¬ 
ernment.” The meaning of this sub- 
paragraph is unclear, and the Gen¬ 
eral Counsel has advised us that it 
does not change anything because 
contractors do not act as representa¬ 
tives of the government.) 

How Much Testing Is Enough? 

Before the Department of Defense 
buys a major item, the law requires a 
field test of the equipment. While the 
law specifies that the test will be a 
field test, it provides no guidance on 

what is adequate; i.e., how much field 
testing is enough? 

The DOT&E must determine the 
adequacy of the test as well as the 
number of low-rate initial production 
items needed for an operational test. 
With new acquisition strategies being 
formulated, more time available, and 
all defense activities under budgetary 
pressure, it is desirable to have a sense 
of how much is enough. 

There are two aspects to the 
“enough” question: an engineering/ 
operational aspect, and a statistical 
aspect. Say the system must be 
tested under three different climatic 
conditions because the equipment 
is expected to work in the desert, in 
the jungle, and in temperate 

Say also that soldiers require that 
the system be tested in two different 
ways because it will be used in two 
very different ways: to do reconnais¬ 
sance, and to direct artillery fire. In 
such cases, then, the system should 
be tested in a number of different 

How many different scenarios to 
test is a difficult engineering (and op¬ 
erational) question: Should the effec¬ 
tiveness and suitability be confirmed 
in each scenario, or in a representa¬ 
tive sample of scenarios, or in the 
most difficult scenarios? There is even 
a question of how many forces to 
represent in each scenario, a ques¬ 
tion that plays an important role in 
determining the cost of the test. These 
are engineering and operational judg¬ 
ments that modeling and simulation 
can clarify. 

For even a single scenario, the num¬ 
ber of field trials must be determined. 
Assume initially that one scenario is 
sufficient: that there is very clear defi¬ 
nition of what the measure of effec¬ 
tiveness is (for example, the probabil¬ 
ity of destroying a target with a single 
weapon); and that the passing value 
for the measure is known. 

Program Manager 


Seprember-Oaober 1993 

FIGURE 5. Task Force Report 

Do not employ simulations to prove or dis¬ 
prove things, but instead exploit thieir ability to 
isolate high sensitivity areas. Simulation has an 
important role In providing sensitivity analyses, 
and as a method of focusing on system engineer¬ 
ing issues early through operational tests. 5 5 

Report of the 
Defense Science Board Task Force on 
Improving Test and Evaluation Effectiveness 

December 1989 

To dctermino the sample size, more 
information must be specified. Usu¬ 
ally this information could be speci¬ 
fied by stating the confidence level 
desired for the estimation of the pa¬ 
rameter (the alpha and beta risks). 
But who specifies this confidence level? 
Not the law. Usually not the user, 
who doesn't think about such things. 
But what confidence level should be 

I believe that is often a business 
ciecision. Let me give you some ex¬ 
amples to consider. The first example 
demonstrates that a small test is not 
always a better test, even from a busi¬ 
ness perspective, because small tests 
increase the chance that a good sys¬ 
tem will fail. 

Risky Tests 

Consider a hypothetical test plan 
for a smart artillerv' round. Almost a 
billion dollars have been spent on 
research and development. If the 
rounds are bought the total cost may 
be S4 or S5 billion, and the ultimate 
cost of a round is somewhere between 
S11.000 and S25.000 per round. The 
test has only a small number of rounds 
because of "funding constraints." 

As a result, the proposed test cre¬ 
ates a risk that we reject a "good" 
system with a probability of 0.35 to 
0.45. On the face of it. this does not 
appear to be a smart test. The ques¬ 
tion is: "Is there a rational way to 
argue such issues?" 

I believe that good management 
and smart business demand that we 
look explicitly at these questions in 
the future. 

Minimizing Current Cost by 
Using Reliability Growth 

The munitions example above il¬ 
lustrates how the desire to reduce the 
apparent current cost of the program 
can influence test design. The next 
example concerns an attempt to save 

missiles for the wartime stockpile rather 
than use them up in testing. 

In this example, the total buy of 
missiles is about 1.000. The test pro¬ 
gram launches only 10 to 15 missiles 
because of a desire to save missiles 
for the stockpile. One of the com¬ 
plexities of testing in the real world is 
that the configuration (design) tested 
is sometimes changed in the middle 
of the test because the early part of 
the test reveals a specific failure mode. 
This is often the case when early reli¬ 
ability is poor. The change is designed 
to remo\'e the failure mode discov¬ 

Thus, it is asserted that the reli¬ 
ability "grows" as more testing oc¬ 
curs. (This is a misnomer: the reli¬ 
ability improves as the design gets 
better.) Reliability growth cuiwes are 
produced that predict the reliability 
as a function of the number (or hours) 
of test firings. The proposal is made 
to begin to trace the reliability growth 
and to project it out to its asymptotic 

When the asymptotic value meets 
the user's reliability criteria, the pro¬ 
posal continues, we should stop op¬ 

erational testing. Kxperience with other 
systems led to the belief that 10-15 
missiles would be sufficient to project 
such asymptotic behavior. 

The proposal is in error in a num¬ 
ber of ways. First, if one were to stop 
testing, one would miss the chance to 
find and fix additional faults. The 
reliability would not grow. 

Second, it is probably not appro¬ 
priate to use a projected value of reli¬ 
ability to answer the requirement of 
the law that the test confirm the ef¬ 
fectiveness and suitability of the sys¬ 
tem for combat. Remember that 
DOT&H reports the as-tested values. 

Finally (and this is the critical ques¬ 
tion). it is fair to ask whether the 
number of missiles in the stockpile 
should be maximized, or the number 
of reliable missiles in the stockpile 
should be maximized. This addresses 
the criteria used in the proposed test. 
The proposed test assumed some 
knowledge of the reliability growth 
parameter. Using this number, the 
test size could be calculated which 
would maximize the number of reli¬ 
able missiles in the remaining stock¬ 

Progrom Monoger 


Seprember-Ocrober 1993 

Such an approach asserts that the 
test should stop when the expected 
increase in reliability (as a result of 
the next test firing) as applied to the 
remaining missiles increases the total 
number of reliable missiles in the re¬ 
maining stockpile by less than one. 
In the case in point, applying typical 
growth parameters, the number of test 
missiles might be on the order of 100. 

Such a proposal also raises the 
question of how much testing should 
be done to confirm the assumptions 
by which the statistician will analyze 
the data: in this case, the assump¬ 
tions made in the reliability growth 
model. This question often is ignored 
when applying statistical models or 

Some confirmation is needed that 
the assumptions are appropriate. What 
is the penalty for not testing the as¬ 
sumptions? What tests should as¬ 
sumptions pass before they are ac¬ 

Modeling and Simulation 

In tests, large sample size com¬ 
pensates for the expected random vari¬ 
ability of results from trial-to-trial. 
Models and simulations can help plan 
tests by directly addressing the vari¬ 
ability (Figure 5). 

For example, a missile disperses 
sub munitions over a large area to 
attack convoys or assembly areas: the 
plan asserts that only 10 missiles can 
be fired, and therefore no statistically 
valid conclusions can be drawn. These 
10 shots are for demonstration only. 
When asked why no valid conclu¬ 
sions could be drawn, the answer is 
the variability of results from such a 
small sample size. 

If the criterion against which the 
missile is judged is the number of 
vehicles stopped in the convoy, then 
the variability of that number from 
missile firing to missile firing may be 
a complex thing. A mathematical 
model of the system demonstrated 

that the “small” sample gave results 
clustered rather closely. 

Thus, the variability that would re¬ 
quire a larger sample size may not be 
there, and the small sample size may 
be adequate. 

Between models and testing, the 
best relation may be one of 
complementarity. The model can help 
formulate hypotheses, which can then 
be tested directly. Smart use of the 
model might lead to better tests. Usu¬ 
ally, the variability of the outcome 
from trial-to-trial is important infor¬ 
mation that the model could supply 
to test planners. 

Not all models calculate correctly 
the variability that occurs on repeated 
runs. Insisting that models attempt 
to capture the variability may lead to 
better and more useful models. Again, 
the variability of results from trial-to- 
trial and from mission-to-mission 
should affect not only the size of the 
test, but how the military would plan 
to use the system. 

For example, highly effective sur- 
face-to-air missiles might be fired ac¬ 
cording to a doctrine of shoot—look 


1. In 1983, the Congress established, 
within the DOD, a Director of Opera¬ 
tional Test and Evaluation. The Di¬ 
rector is the principal advisor to the 
Secretary of Defense on operational 
test and evaluation within the De¬ 
partment and shall prescribe policies 
and procedures of the conduct of op¬ 
erational test and evaluation. Title 10 
of the U.S. Code defines operational 
test and evaluation. It means (within 
that section): (i) the field test, under 
realistic combat conditions of any item 
of (or key component oO weapons, 
equipment, or munitions for use in 
purpose of determining the 
effectivemess and suitability of the 
weapons, equipment, or minitions for 
use in combat by typical military us- 

(to see if it hit)—shoot. A less-effec¬ 
tive missile might fire according to a 
shoot-shoot-look doctrine. 


This review of specific issues and 
actions during the last few years can 
serve as a guide so that you should 
always know where the OT&E person 
is coming from: 

—Military capability and mission 
level testing, not “black box” 

—Get in early to make problems 
visible at a time when they can 
be fixed 

—Keep the user in the loop 

—Do independent analysis and 

If there is a core value within the 
OT&E community concerning acqui¬ 
sition it is the following: Ensure that 
the operational effectiveness and suit¬ 
ability of weapons systems are tested 
adequately, evaluated objectively, and 
reported independently to acquisition 

If the system works right, even 
younger persons can become DOT&E. 

ers: and (ii) the evaluation of the re¬ 
sults of such test. 

Title 10 requires that a major defense 
acquisition program may not proceed 
beyond low-rate initial production until 
initial operational test and evalua¬ 
tion of the program is completed. 
Further, it requires that the Director 
shall analyze the results of the opera¬ 
tional test and evaluation conducted 
for each major defense acquisition 
program and prepare a report stating 
the opinion of the Director as (A) 
whether test and evaluation performed 
were adequate: and, (B) whether the 
results of such test and evaluation 
confirm that the items or components 
actually tested are effective and suit¬ 
able for combat. 

Program Monoger 


Sepfember-Ocrober 1993 



A Focus for Defense Procurement Success 

Major William B. Vance, USAF 

bout the defense budget, I 
- raise a hope and a cau¬ 
tion. As we restructure our mili¬ 
tary' forces to meet the new threats 
of the post-CoId War world, it is 
true that we can responsibly re¬ 
duce our defense budget. Now, 
we may all doubt what that range 
of reductions is, but let me say 
that as long as 1 am president, I 
will do everything I can to make 
sure that the men and women 
who serve under the American 
flag will remain the best-trained, 
the best-prepared, the best- 
equipped fighting force in the 
world, and everyone of you should 
make that solemn pledge. 

counters and initiate new offensive 
programs. The resultant arms race 
was a classic war of attrition, yet one 
most decisively fought on an uncon¬ 
ventional battlefield—the balance 

Outcome of the Cold War has pre¬ 
sented the United States with a pre¬ 
dictable set of circumstances: (1) sole 
military-superpower status, (2) free¬ 
dom to downsize the military due to 
the smaller size of any foreseeable 

-President Bill Clinton 
State of the Union Address 
February 17, 1993' 

Collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 
gave the world visual confirmation of 
a hidden suspicion. The United States 
had just won the Cold War by spend¬ 
ing the Soviet Union into virtual bank¬ 
ruptcy. American weapons acquisi¬ 
tion decisions, particularly those made 
in the post-Vietnam era, had forced 
the U.S.S.R. to develop defensive 

Major Vance, a June graduate of 
the Marine Corps Command and Staff 
College, is assigned to the Office of the 
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisi¬ 
tion, Directorate for Electronics and 
Special Programs, Pentagon. He is an 
F-16 test pilot with 2,500 hours in 
more than 45 aircraft types. 

Progronn Manager 


Seprember-Ocraber 1993 

adversary as compared to the former 
Soviet Union, and (3) ability and need 
to contribute the resultant excess de¬ 
fense dollars toward servicing the na¬ 
tional debt. 

Our national leadership must 
use these new circumstances as a 
baseline for future strategy decisions. 
Indeed, the National Security 
Strategy of the United States acknowl¬ 
edges the realities of these circum¬ 
stances in its introduction to Section 
V, the Defense Agenda for the 1990s, 
which “...will guide our deliberate 
reductions to no more than the 
forces we need to defend our inter¬ 
ests and meet our global responsibili¬ 

Weapon systems... 
will still need to be 

Quollty people will 
still need to be 

In contrast, money 
will still need to be 

Uncomfortable Dilemma 

Unfortunately, this reduced spend¬ 
ing level for personnel and weapon 
systems suggests a very uncomfort¬ 
able dilemma. We now have the best 
military force the United States has 
ever fielded, both in the quality of 
troops and equipment. 

However, the passage of time and 
the nature of man and, consequently, 
man’s propensity toward conflict, still 
remain unchanged. Weapon systems, 
provided by a robust defense indus¬ 
trial base, will still need to be fielded. 
Quality people will still need to be 
trained. In contrast, money will still 
need to be saved. The national debt 
and the now ambiguous threat man¬ 
date satisfaction of each of these needs, 
even though they are in conflict. 

The resultant, rapidly increasing 
competition for scarce resources, 
caused by both defense structure re¬ 
ductions and budget reductions, could 
diminish our ability to act decisively 
as a world leader, and even render us 
unable to defend our national inter¬ 
ests or execute our international re¬ 

Factors Invalidating the 
Historical Approach 

The United States is witnessing the 
need for a dramatic shift in military 
thinking. Contemporary military strat¬ 
egies must be based on the need for 
defending our national interests in an 
increasingly complicated politico-mili¬ 
tary environment rather than for de¬ 
fending against a Cold War super¬ 
power threat. The inherent reductions 
in force structure required by this shift 
in thinking mandate fewer but neces¬ 
sarily smarter weapon systems. 

To that end, the Department of 
Defense (DOD) has described a new 
acquisition strategy that no longer rou¬ 
tinely requires conceptual or devel¬ 
opmental systems or technologies to 
pass into the production phase. Em¬ 
phasis will be placed on developing 

Program Monoger 


September-Oaober 1993 

A Few Definitions Are Appropriate 
for Terms Used in this Paper 

Acquisition Strategy: A program 
manager's written plan to satisfy the 
mission need. This paper also refers 
to acquisition strategy as DOD’s overall 
approach to defense procurement.* 

Acquisition Program: A formal pro¬ 
gram that may result in the acquisi¬ 
tion of new defense procurement. Es¬ 
tablishment of an acquisition program 
occurs at Milestone I, or Concept Dem¬ 
onstration Approval, and requires com¬ 
petitive prototyping, a step beyond 
Advanced Technology Demonstrations 
used during concept exploration.^ 

Production Concept: That part of a 
program manager's acquisition strat¬ 
egy that defines the rate and quantity 
of item production. 

Production Approval: Milestone III of 
the Defense Acquisition Process.® 

technologies and production-level 
manufacturing techniques for future 
use. More emphasis will be placed 
on technology insertion and improve¬ 
ment of current systems, rather than 
on initiating new starts.' 

Further, to save money in the short 
term, many acquisition programs have 
been postponed, stretched into future 
years, or canceled outright. 

Although this strategy is in compli¬ 
ance with the policy of saving dollars 
while still attempting to provide needed 
capability, at what cost to the nation 
and our future defense industrial ca¬ 
pability is DOD following this strategy? 


One of the pillars of our National 
Security Strategy is reconstitution, 
using our defense technology and the 
U.S. defense industrial base as the 
means.' Although funding levels for 
science and technology remain stable 
for now, our acquisition strategies of 
necessity require a large reduction in 
production dollars." If production is 

allowed to decrease to insufficiently 
profitable levels, contractors may elect 
to cease operations. Their technical 
bases, processes and equipment may 
be lost forever. General Dynamics, 
for example, (prior to the sale of its 
fighter production line to Lockheed) 
required a minimum economic pro¬ 
duction run of four or five F-16s 

Granted, processes may be docu¬ 
mented and manufacturing equipment 
mothballed; however, highly skilled 
and focused teams—such as Lock¬ 
heed’s Advanced Development Com¬ 
pany, the "Skunk Works"—should 
they disband from lack of profits, may 
be impossible to reassemble should 
the nation's military require reconsti¬ 
tution. Our reliance on technology as 
a force multiplier, and ultimately as a 
battlefield lifesaver. renders the loss 
of the defense industry’s brainpower, 
complicated technical processes, and 
its highly trained workers strategically 

Weapons Platforms 

The reduction in absolute num¬ 
bers of weapons platforms is a fact in 
this new era. Civilian and military 
decision-makers at every level must 
exercise careful judgment to decide 
how much reduction is too much, 
and then prevent it. in a statement 
some critics might call uncharacteris¬ 
tic. Air Force doctrine, though gener¬ 
ally praising and usually depending 
extensively on high technology, spe¬ 
cifically acknowledges the fact that 
numbers do matter: 

Advanced technology is crucially 
important to aerospace forces, 
but numbers arc a!'"> important. 

A small, technically sophisticated 
force could be overwhelmed by 
a huge but unsophisticated 
force—that is. at some point 
quantity can overwhelm qual¬ 

The direct result of a policy that 
would reduce actual numbers of op¬ 

erationally assigned systems faster than 
reducing manpower would be a de¬ 
crease in the amount of hands-on train¬ 
ing available to the war fighters. Out- 
year DOD budgets acknowledge this 
shortfall and propose large increases 
in training and simulation dollars for 
all the Services as an attempt to com¬ 
pensate. '' Nevertheless, from my view¬ 
point as an operator, there is nothing 
as good as the genuine article to train 
for the fog of war. 

Gutted Budgets 

Post-Cold War budget reductions 
have truly put the defense establish¬ 
ment on the defensive in an effort to 
avoid another hollow-force era. 
America is proficient at fielding high- 
technology. and usable, stalwart weap¬ 
ons. The fall of the Berlin Wall, fol¬ 
lowed by the military’s decisive Desert 
Storm performance, attests to the wis¬ 
dom of our previous approach to de¬ 
fense procurement. Now, facing gut¬ 
ted budgets. DOD is constrained by 
decreasing manpower levels and weap¬ 
ons platforms, and the consequent 
erosion of the nation’s defense indus¬ 
trial base. 

Although some sectors of the de¬ 
fense industry have begun to consoli¬ 
date in an attempt to alleviate this 
erosion, this is not widely the case in 
the aircraft manufacturing sector. 
Aviation Week and Space Technolog}’ 
relates a recent market study released 
by Booz-Allen & Flamilton that im¬ 
plies “the result is too many firms 
chasing too few programs. The study 
predicted that a ’hurricane’ of con¬ 
solidation and restructuring is in the 
wind."'- Several defense contractors, 
for example, are "...marked for ex¬ 
tinction as fighter builders...” if the 
multiservice A/F-X aircraft program is 

The Acquisition Dilemma: 

Tough Answers to Simple Questions 

Solutions are available, however, 
that provide varying degrees of relief. 
They also require varying degrees of 

Progrom Monoger 


Seprember-Oaober 1990 

commitment and an honest evalua¬ 
tion of which readiness characteris¬ 
tics the combatant commanders con¬ 
sider important for the future defense 
of our country’s national interests. 
Certainly, the Services’ budget in¬ 
creases for simulation will provide 
operators artificial experience. 

Artificial experience is described 
by Ted Gold, Hicks & Associates, Inc., 
and Rich Wagner, Karman Corpora¬ 
tion, in Long Shadows and Virtual 
Swords: Managing Defense Resources 
in the Changing Security Environment, 
lune 1990. It is essentially that expe¬ 
rience gained through simulation rather 
than by training on operational equip¬ 

What policies or circumstances will 
dictate how much simulation is too 
much? Further, technology insertion 
as a tenet of the new acquisition 
strategy will provide interim capabil¬ 
ity improvements. What happens 
when the receiving system’s 
preplanned product improvement re¬ 
serve is miniaturized, integrated and 
filled to its physical or economically 
feasible capacity, and there is no room 
left for improvement? 

Three Questions 

In addition, we can emphasize 
fieldable prototypes or execute acqui¬ 
sition programs through engineering 
and manufacturing development, in¬ 
tentionally delaying the Milestone III 
production decision. Technologies 
could then be shelved, awaiting need. 
What happens to the defense con¬ 
tractor, tied contractually to the his¬ 
torical acquisition approach, when his 
profit generator, full-rate production, 
is removed? 

justification for our future defense 
posture and, therefore, justification 
for a predominant acquisition strategy, 
lies in the obvious answer to three 
questions. First, is it practical to regain 
and maintain a robust defense indus¬ 
trial base to enable the reconstitution 
pillar of our National Strategy? 

Training strategies 
ore composed of 
thiee moin inputs: 
money, time on 
equipment, and 
time on 

is nothing os good 
os the genuine 
Qiticle to troin for 
the fog of wor. 

Second, is it necessary to provide 
fully mission-capable training levels 
to our war fighters, rather than some 
ill-defined, skills-maintenance train¬ 
ing level? 

Finally, is it important to have 
actual equipment available to pro¬ 
vide not only realistic training but 
also quick-reaction, force-projection 
capability? Analysis of this three- 
part problem when viewed against a 
defense budget free fall reveals two 
approaches to possible solutions— 
adjustments to our training strategies 
and adjustments to our acquisition 

Solution: Training Strategies 

Training strategies are composed 
of three main inputs: money, time on 
equipment, and time on simulators. 
Declining budgets combined with fewer 
weapons platforms result in reduced 
hands-on training time in operational 
systems. The clear solution to the 

resultant decline in operator proficiency 
is an increased emphasis on simula¬ 
tion. State-of-the-art simulators pro¬ 
vide safety (cats should have as many 
lives as I’ve used up in the F-16 simu¬ 
lator), supierior visual and auditory 
fidelity, six degrees-of-freedom mo¬ 
tion, long-distance interface with other 
simulators for mock-combat scenarios 
against live opponents or even an¬ 
other computer, and greatly reduced 
operating costs compared to an hour 
of flying time or MlAl tank gunnery. 

The DOD concurs: ’’...The Penta¬ 
gon has targeted training efficiency 
as a major concern of the post-Cold 
War era....Playing a big part in the 
Pentagon’s acquisition strategy are cost 
effective off-the-shelf part task train¬ 
ers, maintenance trainers and mis¬ 
sion rehearsal systems.”'^ 

The National Training Systems 
Association in Arlington, Virginia, 
published a marketing research re¬ 
port that predicts steady growth dur¬ 
ing the next decade for worldwide 
military training and simulation bud¬ 
gets, already estimated at $3 to $3.5 
billion annually.’’ Granted, an in¬ 
creased emphasis on training via simu¬ 
lation is beneficial; but simulators do 
not project combat power, nor do they 
execute national policy. 


Increasing the emphasis on our 
training strategy via simulation as a 
solution does improve readiness to a 
degree, but it is incomplete. Every 
hour spent in simulation is one less 
hour spent in the actual system. 

There is a trade-off between 
simulator training and hardware train¬ 
ing: The {jerformance of a few Na¬ 
tional Guard units in Operation Desert 
Storm clearly indicated that in many 
cases there is not enough training time 
available to keep units ready for the 
complex weapons and tactics of 
modern warfare.'" If only training 
and simulation are emphasized, the 
declining trend in the ability of our 

Program Manager 


Seprember-Ocrober 1993 

defense industrial base to build 
combat hardware efficiently is not re¬ 

Obviously, actual aircraft or tanks 
are not added to the inventory to re¬ 
place phased-out or unusable articles. 
Training and simulation are not the 
complete answer. Again, from an 
operator’s viewpoint, there is nothing 
as good as the genuine article to train 
for the fog of war. 

Solution: Acquisition 

Rethinking acquisition strategies 
promises a more complete solution 
than a change in our training strate¬ 
gies. As specified in DOD Instruction 
5000.2, Part 3, the production and 
deployment phase (Phase III) of a 
DOD acquisition program has his¬ 
torically supplied the country with 
aircraft, tanl«, and other military hard¬ 
ware.'" Now, although reductions in 
force structure mandate fewer but 
smarter weapon systems, technologi¬ 
cal developments continue at ever- 
increasing rates: consequently, this 
historical approach must change on 
a broad scale. 

The DOD new acquisition strategy 
addresses this need by no longer rou¬ 
tinely expecting conceptual or devel¬ 
opmental systems or technologies to 
pass into Phase III. Emphasis may 
be placed as appropriate on develop¬ 
ing specific technologies and produc¬ 
tion-level manufacturing techniques 
for future use, putting this technology 
“on the shelf” or “in the pipeline” 
until an emerging threat mandates 

This new acquisition strategy con¬ 
sists of numerous elements but the 
general trend is toward an approach 
that, by design, leans heavily on re¬ 
search, development, test and evalu¬ 
ation rather than on production. In 
short, this approach aclmowlec^s both 
its current and future financial envi¬ 
ronments. Concerning that financial 
environment. Phase III by design has 

provided contractors with most of their 
profits, as DOD contracts historically 
do not provide for significant profits 
during earlier phases of the acquisi¬ 
tion process. 

AIA Takes Exception 

Consequently, the Aerospace In¬ 
dustries Association (AIA) takes ex¬ 
ception to this new DOD approach: 

The AIA has taken issue with the 
Defense Dept, plan to perform 
research and development and 
then put a design “on the shelf” 
and defer production. LeRoy }. 
Haugh, vice president of procure¬ 
ment and financial services at 
AIA, said the shelf life of technol¬ 
ogy is not very long, and it may 
not be possible to keep a design 
on hold unless there is at least 
some limited production to dem¬ 
onstrate feasibility. Under the 
current payment schemes for re¬ 
search and development, most 
companies would have trouble 
making any profit at all, he main¬ 

Former Defense Secretary Dick 
Cheney addressed this common aero¬ 
space industry concern at a press con¬ 
ference in January 1992. He specifi¬ 
cally said that not only do we intend 
to develop selected technologies into 
weapon systems, but that we intend 
to develop the manufacturing processes 
to build those systems. He said the 
Defense Department fully intends to 
procure such items in sufficient quan¬ 
tity that users can acquire operational 
experience with the systems as well 
as develop appropriate doctrine. “We 
are not talking about just building 
one or two items and putting them on 
the shelf,” he summarized.'’' 

The construction of fieldable pro¬ 
totypes is a production concept that 
takes advanced technologies a step 
further than a spot on the shelf. This 
approach places Advanced Technol¬ 
ogy Demonstrators (ATDs), normally 
one-of-a-kind items used to assess 

program risk during the Concept Ex¬ 
ploration Phase, into the hands of 
operators for evaluation in realistic 
ofjerational environments. This is a 
superb idea for systems not intended 
for procurement in large numbers; in 
fact, at this stage of the acquisition 
process, an acquisition program does 
not exist—no production concept has 
been formalized. 


Consequently, we must realize that 
these ATDs are immature, develop¬ 
mental systems: Maintenance and 
operation must be accomplished by 
experienced personnel. A familiar 
example of the fieldable prototype 
concept in action is the Joint Surveil¬ 
lance and Target Attack Radar Sys¬ 
tem (JSTARS) used effectively in Op¬ 
eration Desert Storm. Unfortunately, 
with results similar to an approach 
that just changes our training strat¬ 
egy, a plan that depends on building 
fieldable prototypes to keep assem¬ 
bly lines open and profits flowing is 
not the answer. 

According to General Lawrence 
Skantze. USAF (Ret.), former Com¬ 
mander of Air Force Systems Com¬ 
mand (now Air Force Materiel Com¬ 
mand), Congress will “need to be 
convinced of the credibility of the ATD 
project before it is even funded or put 
through the pre-Milestone I [Concept 
Exploration] process.”^® The uncer¬ 
tainty of extending a fieldable proto¬ 
type into a reasonable production run 
invalidates the idea of using ATDs to 
train personnel and provide opera¬ 
tionally significant numbers of actual 

Clearly, further development of 
ATDs or shelving technologies at Mile¬ 
stone III are not the ideal production 
concepts to solve the dilemma of de¬ 
clining numbers of actual hardware, 
deteriorating operator proficiency, and 
a decaying defense industrial base. 
Although Defense Secretary Les Aspin 
has articulated a four-point program 
to enhance the defense industrial base. 

Program AAonoger 


beprember-Ocrober 1993 

maintenance of that industrial base 
is only part of the requirement. 

Acquisition Concepts 

In a 12 February ’92 address to the 
American Defense Preparedness As¬ 
sociation, and later in his confirmation 
hearings for Defense Secretary, Mr. 
Aspin listed four acquisition concepts 
which would enhance the defense in¬ 
dustrial base: “selective upgrading; 
selective low-rate procurements: 
rollover plus, which is continued re¬ 
search and development of critical 
technologies: and silver-bullet procure¬ 
ments, or purchases of highly capable 
systems with advanced technologies.’’- ‘ 

A more all-encompassing acquisi¬ 
tion strategy might provide perhaps 
the best overall solution to this three- 
part problem. Low-rate initial pro¬ 
duction, recently dubbed lean pro¬ 
duction by senior Air Force officials, 
may enable the necessary synergistic 
effect of sufficient numbers of plat¬ 
forms: a capable defense industrial 
base: and proficient, combat-ready 
operators. Lean production is a pro¬ 
duction concept that supplies small 
numbers of actual operational plat¬ 
forms at an efficient and profitable 

A summary of the concept clearly 
identifies the advantage: 

Lean production recognizes that 
in order to have a true opera¬ 
tional capability, the system must 
go beyond the prototyping phase 
and on into an operational envi¬ 
ronment. Essentially, this con¬ 
cept says you cannot put tech¬ 
nology on the shelf and expect to 
produce it. [Itl implies that the 
forces in the field must have pro¬ 
duction items to train with in 
order to achieve combat readi¬ 

Benefits for the War Fighters 

It would appear that the war fight¬ 
ers favor this approach. Lean pro- 

General Mike Loh. USAF 

All future weapon 
systems will be 
subject to [italics 
added] low rate 
production, and 
the Air Force must 
work with industry 
from the beginning 
to develop 'smart, 
strategies’ that 
enable companies 
to avoid 
overhead costs. 
-February 4r 1990 

duction, as a routinely selected pro¬ 
duction concept rather than as a Band- 
Aid for a budget crunch, would gov¬ 
ern the procurement of a system from 
the earliest stages of its acquisition 
cycle. The war fighters would know 

that they would be buying the best 
available technology. 

They would be buying fully devel¬ 
oped support equipment and techni¬ 
cal data. They would be buying an 
optimized manufacturing process. 
Most importantly, they would be buy¬ 
ing sufficient numbers of platforms 
on which to train to mission-ready 
proficiency levels and to take to com¬ 
bat should the need arise. In short, 
lean production as a part of the total 
acquisition strategy buys real capa¬ 

Moreover, the process is inherently 
stable, a feature much desired by both 
a volatile, politically motivated con¬ 
gressional process and the defense 
industrial complex. Conceptually, 
when a request for proposal is issued 
with a reasonable assurance that lean 
production will be the production con¬ 
cept, the contractor will be assured 
his efforts will produce a state-of-the- 
art product in sufficient quantities to 
provide a profit level that will justify 
the bid. 

Aggressive Steps 

Our defense industries are so frag¬ 
ile at this point in our history that 
aggressive steps must be taken to en¬ 
sure the undiminished effectiveness 
of this national asset. Because this 
situation is critical, future acquisition 
programs may be driven more by needs 
of the defense industrial base rather 
than by operational needs. 

General Mike Loh, Commander of 
the Air Combat Command, addressed 
a group of more than 800 industry 
and Service representatives at a 
February 4, 1993, Air Force Associa¬ 
tion Symposium with a forceful, pre¬ 
cedent-setting speech. He said the 
Air Force intends to increase support 
to the defense industry by continuing 
upgrades to existing systems; by 
identifying new systems for low-rate 
production; and by enabling prime 
contractors and sulxontractors to de¬ 
velop advanced ojjerational prototypes 

Progrom Monoger 


September-Oaober 1993 

and their manufacturing processes as 
candidates for future production sys¬ 

Specifically, according to General 
Loh, “All future weapon systems will 
be subject to [italics added! low rate 
production, and the Air Force must 
work with industry from the begin¬ 
ning to develop ‘smart, realistic pro¬ 
duction strategies’ that enable com¬ 
panies to avoid debilitating overhead 
costs. The war fighters are on board 
with the lean-production concept. 

Lean Production: 

A Vision for Success 

A suitable vision of the way a lean 
production program of the future 
should look in action is the formerly 
classified, award-winning program run 
by the Skunk Works—the F-117A 
Stealth Fighter. 

Two test pilots from the Have Blue 
flight test program were awarded the 
Iven C. Kinchloe Award at the 1989 
Society of Experimental Test Pilots 
Symposium. Each year, the award is 
presented in recognition of outstand¬ 
ing accomplishments in the conduct 
of flight test activities. The award 
was presented to Lt Col Ken Dyson, 
USAF (Ret.), Chief Test Pilot for 
Rockwell International: and William 
C. Park, Jr., then Director of Flight 
Operations, Advanced Development 
Projects at Lockheed. Both men pre¬ 
viously were ineligible for consider¬ 
ation for this award due to the classi¬ 
fication of their project. They were 
the only pilots to fly the radical proof- 
of-concept aircraft that pioneered cur¬ 
rent stealth technology and, later, de¬ 
velopment and production of the 
F-117A.^^ The F-117A Stealth Fighter 
program won the internationally rec¬ 
ognized Collier Trophy. 

In 1976, work began on the Have 
Blue prototype, and in late 1978 
Lockheed received the full-scale de¬ 
velopment contract. In just more than 
a decade, the Skunk Works would 
supply the country with 59 Stealth 

A suitQbl« vision of 
Iho woy o ioon 
program of the 
future should look 
in action is the ... 
progrom run by 
the Skunk Woiks- 
the F-117A Steolth 

Fighters. The program moved from 
design go-ahead to first flight in 31 
months and initial operational capa¬ 
bility (IOC) in 60 months. 

Since the F-117A was essentially a 
concurrent development, production 
and deployment program, test pilots 
conducted flight tests while operators 
trained in the aircraft and developed 
tactics. The Skunk Works’ Richard 
Silz said essential testing was 
completed by IOC in October 1983, 
but for several years after that flight 
test continued to fill in missing data. 
According to Silz, “While this approach 
to testing worked and is probably 
in the best traditions of the Skunk 
Works, flight test is just this year fin¬ 
ishing the final reports on the last of 
the original test plans written over 
ten years ago.’’^* 

Textbook Example 

Although not a “lean-production” 
program in the contemporary sense 
of the word, this silver-bullet procure¬ 
ment is a textbook example of the 
way an acquisition strategy should 

be executed using this production con¬ 
cept. Though few procurements will 
have the various benefits of classi¬ 
fied, or “black” program management 
oversight, ail program managers can 
learn from experiences of the Skunk 
Works’ team and incorporate those 
lean-production lessons into their 
acquisition strategies. A need was 
determined, a technology was devel¬ 
oped, prototypjes were built and tested 
to reduce program risk, and 59 plat¬ 
forms and their attendant support 
equipment and technical data were 
procured during the program’s pro¬ 
duction run. 

During this production run, an op¬ 
erational squadron achieved IOC and 
refined its combat tactics. An ongo¬ 
ing flight test program continued to 
supply operators with valuable data 
and product improvements. At a unit 
flyaway cost of under $43 million, the 
company produced a superb product 
at a fair price. Any future acquisition 
program using the Stealth Fighter 
paradigm will be complying with the 
intent and spirit of the lean-produc¬ 
tion concept. Though previous suc¬ 
cess is no guarantee of future perfor¬ 
mance, imitation is the sincerest form 
of flattery. 


General Loh said all future weapwn 
systems will be “subject to” low-rate 
production. Rather than having fu¬ 
ture acquisition programs subject only 
to lean production, by actually adopting 
lean production as a first-choice pro¬ 
duction concept on multiple-item pro¬ 
grams (as opposed to limited-item pro¬ 
grams like aircraft carriers or satellites), 
the acquisition community would be 
able to keep contractor teams together 
and keep assembly lines at least warm. 

The genuine article would be avail¬ 
able for operator training and opera¬ 
tional test and evaluation. Combat¬ 
ant commanders would accumulate 
actual numbers of combat platforms 
in sufficient quantity to employ them 
operationally, but for a longer time 

Program Manager 


Seprember-October 1993 

than provided by full-rate production 

The threat is surely ambiguous. The 
threat is decidedly volatile. The Middle 
East, the Balkans, and India are de¬ 
fined by centuries-old religious, ra¬ 
cial and ethnic conflict; North Korea 
may field atomic weapons this year 
and may implode before the end of 
the century: South America leads the 
world in drug production and distri¬ 

Our streets are filled with some 
of the most violent crime in the civi¬ 
lized world. At the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the dissolution of the War¬ 
saw Pact. America rejoiced at the re¬ 
alization of the Cold War victory. 
Communism was declared bankrupt 
and the Soviet Union disintegrated 
into a confused collection of 15 
independent states, some of which 
discovered they were custodians of 
large conventional and nuclear 


The media hailed President Boris 
Yeltsin as a visionary capable of bring¬ 
ing the new confederation out of its 
problems and into the light of democ¬ 
racy. The window of opportunity to 
assist democratic reform in the former 
Soviet Union may close as various 
countries assess and consolidate hold¬ 
ings and define strategic goals. 

Recent observations indicate some 
of these states are beginning defense 
industries with remnants of the ex- 
Soviet Union’s defense industrial com¬ 
plex. An intelligence community study 
indicates that Russia. Ukraine, Geor¬ 
gia. Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan are 
producing major weapon systems and 
other military hardware.-'’ Mr. Yeltsin 
probably faces a tenuous political 

America cannot sit on the side¬ 
lines and watch the world go by. hop¬ 
ing no threat will emerge that might 
disrupt our defense conversion: 

W« must 

ore stoles 
thot...relish our 
copobilHy to 
respond onytime, 
onywhere, to ony 

[Secretary of State, Mr. Warren] 
Christopher warned that if Rus¬ 
sia were to fall into anarchy or 
return to despotism the U.S. would 
pay a “frightening”price. “Noth¬ 
ing less is involved than the pos¬ 
sibility of a renewed nuclear threat; 
higher defense budgets; spread¬ 
ing instability; and a devastat¬ 
ing setback for the world-wide 
democratic movement...."-' 

Many actors in the world commu¬ 
nity are not sympathetic with our de¬ 
sire to reduce our military forces or 
resolve our economic problems. 

To Crisis 

Clearly, as we monitor threats 
throughout the world, we must as a 
nation remember there are states that 
opportunistically relish our impend¬ 
ing diminished capability to respond 
anytime, anywhere, to any crisis. Until 
recently not an issue, our Cold War 
and conflict-tested military power may 
soon be compromised; with that, our 
most important national interests may 
be indefensible and our treaty obliga¬ 
tions unmeetable. 

Facing drastic budget cuts and a 
new threat environment, DOD must 
lean forward in joint fashion, acknowl¬ 
edging a deteriorating defense indus¬ 
trial base, haphazard decreases in 
weap)ons platforms, and the p)otential 
for reduced combat capability as a 
result of insufficient training. Defense 
Secretary Aspin. during confirmation 
hearings, said the DOD acquisition 
system is “increasingly complex and 
adversarial.” He intends to stream¬ 
line and simplify the process while 
protecting it from new abuses.’" 

In an interview with the Air Force 
Times that same week, then Defense 
Secretary Cheney, pointing out that 
$1 billion was set aside this year for 
defense conversion, said, “There is a 
new tendency in Congress to spond 
money on what are essentially do¬ 
mestic programs and call it defense."-’' 

Lean Production 

Given an appropriate program, the 
first production concept the program 
manager should consider when writ¬ 
ing acquisition strategy should be lean 
production. Its application could solve 
many contemptorary defense procure¬ 
ment problems. A lean-production 
decision would simplify the acquisi¬ 
tion process for defense procurement 
programs, guard against abuses, and 
focus defense dollars on defense pro¬ 

It would enable more hands-on 
training on opierational systems; sup¬ 
ply adequate numbers of opjerational 
systems: and provide sufficient busi¬ 
ness volume and incentive to main¬ 
tain a viable defense industrial base. 
Each attribute is a critical and neces¬ 
sary component of any future acqui¬ 
sition strategy. 

By directly addressing these issues, 
a broad application of the lean-pro¬ 
duction concept would contribute syn- 
eigistically to the strategic. op)erational, 
and tactical levels of our preparation 
for war. If the acquisition community 
is to become p»art of the solution and 

Program Monoger 


Seprember-Ocrober 1990 

assist the President in assuring U.S. 
forces remain the best trained, pre¬ 
pared. and equipped fightir '■re in 
the world, we must acknowledge mul¬ 
tipolar threats to U.S. interests and 
focus defense procurement efforts to 
protect these interests. 

To solve many of our most pres¬ 
sing contemporary defense procure¬ 
ment issues, one initiative stands out— 
a long-term, first-choice commitment 
to lean production as the production 
concept of choice in the program 
manager’s acquisition strategy. 

EDITOR’S NOTE: Views herein are 
solely those of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect those of the Depart¬ 
ment of Defense or the Defense Sys¬ 
tems Management College. 


1. “Word for Word.” Defense News, 
February 1993, p. 14. 

2. The White House. National Secu¬ 
rity Strategy of the United States, Au¬ 
gust 1991. 

3. Cochrane, Charles B. “DoD’s New 
Acquisition Approach: Myth or Real¬ 
ity?” Program Manager, July-August 
1992, pp. 38-46. 

4. United States Air Force. Head¬ 
quarters Air Force Materiel Command. 
"Acquisition Plans/Strategy Panels.” 
Intermediate Systems Acquisition Man¬ 
agement - SAS006, Volume I. Brooks 
AFB, Texas: Systems Acquisition 
School, October 1991. 

5. Department of Defense. Department 
of Defense Instruction 5000.2, “De¬ 
fense Acquisition Management Poli¬ 
cies and Procedures,” February 1991. 

6. Ibid. 

7. The White House, pp. 30-31. 

8. Holzer, Robert, and George Leopold. 

“Technology Programs Elude DoD 
Budget Ax.” Defense News. February 
1993, p. 18. 

9. Bickers, Charles. “U.S. Fight for 
Survival.” /one’s Defence Weekly. Sep¬ 
tember 12. 1992, pp. 34-35. 

10. United States Air Force. Head¬ 
quarters U.S. Air Force. Basic Aero¬ 
space Doctrine of the United States Air 
Force, Air Force Manual 1-1, Vol. II., 
Washington D.C., March 1992. 

11. Griffin, Louisa. “Simulation and 
Training: A Well-Protected Piece of 
the DoD Budget Pie.” Defense Elec¬ 
tronics, April 1992, pp. 45-49. 

12. Morrocco, John D. “Lockheed 
Buys Shares in Future.” Avratron Week 
and Space Technology, December 1992, 

pp. 20-21. 

13. Bickers, pp. 34-35. 

14. Lesser, Roger. “Pentagon Targets 
Training as Critical Asset.” Defense 
Electronics, November 1992, p. 29. 

15. Griffin, p. 45. 

16. Willis, Grant. “A New Genera¬ 
tion of Warriors." Navy Times, March 
18,1991, p. 12. 

17. DOD Instruction 5000.2, pp. 3- 

18. Hughes, David. “Use of Consult¬ 
ants Grows as Industry Restructures.” 
Aviation Week and Space Technology, 
January 4,1993, pp. 58-60. 

19. Cochrane, p. 40. 

20. Skantze, Lawrence. “Restore Sense 
to Acquisition.” Defense News. No¬ 
vember 1992, p. 15. 

21. Silverberg, David. “Clinton Takes 
First Steps to Guide New Procure¬ 
ment Policy." Defense News. Febru¬ 
ary 1993, p. 42. 

22. Cochrane, p. 40. 

23. Opall, Barbara. “Loh: Industrial 
Base to Guide AF Weapon Plans.” 
Defense News. February 1993, p. 6. 

24. Lynch, David J. “How the Skunk 
Works Fielded Stealth.” Air Force 
Magazine, November 1992, pp. 22- 

25. Thirty-Third Symposium Proceed¬ 
ings. Lancaster, California: The Soci¬ 
ety of Experimental Test Pilots, 1989. 

26. “What’s News - World-Wide.” 
The Wall Street Journal, March 4,1993, 
Section A., p. 1. 

27. Ignatius, Adi, and Carla Anne 
Robbins. “Russian Crisis Eases as 
Court Considers Issues.” The Wall 
Street Journal, March 23,1993, Sec¬ 
tion A., p. 8. 

28. Ricks, Thomas E. “Aspin Side¬ 
steps Questions at Hearing on His 
Nomination to be Defense Chief,” The 
Wall Street Journal, January 8,1993, 
Section B, p. 6A. 

29. Wolffe, Jim. “Concern Voiced 
That Drawdown Could Worsen.” Air 
Force Times, January 11, 1993, p. 3. 

Other References 

Dunlap, Charles J., Jr., “The Origins 
of the American Military Coup of 2012,” 
Parameters, XXII, Winter 1992-93, pp. 

Gold. Ted, Hicks 8f Associates, Inc., 
and Richard Wagner, Kaman Corpo¬ 
ration. “Long Shadows and Virtual 
Swords: Managing Defense Resources 
in the Changing Security Environ¬ 
ment,” June 1990, as descrilsed in 
Cochrane. Charles B. “DoD’s New 
Acquisition Approach: Myth or Real¬ 
ity?” Program Manager, July-August 
1992, p. 39. 

Payne, K.B., Linda H. Vlahos, and 
Willis A. Stanley. "Evolving Russian 
Views on Defense: An Opportunity 
for Cooperation.” Strategic Review, XXI, 
Winter 1993, pp. 61-72. 

Progrom Monoger 


Sepromber-Ocfober 1993 


T he luly-August 1993 Program Manager had an 
article entitled “The Work Breakdown Structure (WBS)— 
It’s Much More Than a Cost Reporting Structure." The 
article proposed an engineering WBS approach, combining 
product and process features. The subject is timely because 
M1L-STD-881B, “Work Breakdown Structures for Defense 
Material Items." was signed on March 25, 1993. 

1 agree that the WBS is very important to an engineering 
community that is not aware of the role it should play in 
WBS development. I do not agree with the article’s pro¬ 
posed WBS redefinition, however, and fear that its publica¬ 
tion just as MIL-STD-881B is being distributed will add to 
the confusion. Despite many good points, the article mis¬ 
represents the WBS, and advocates inappropriate use of the 
flawed draft M1L-STD-499B, “Systems Engineering.” MIL- 
STD-881B is official Department of Defense WBS policy, 
and was published only after careful consideration of the 
points raised in the article. 

Your readers should refer to MIL-STD-881B, especially 
the User Guide at Appendix I, to understand how to prepare 
and use a WBS. My purpose here is not to repeat that 
excellent guidance, but to clarify a few points raised by the 

First, the draft MIL-STD-499B. the basis for the article, 
was not approved because it contained many problems. For 
example, it would have required all contractors to use as 
their organizational structure multidisciplinary teams. This 
excessively rigid requirement will be corrected in the next 
draft by instead requiring “multidisciplinary teamwork," without 
specifying how a contractor must organize. The draft also 
confused the WBS concept by mixing “product” and "pro¬ 
cess” inappropriately. Unfortunately, the unapproved draft 
499B is already being improperly invoked on some con¬ 

Second, the reference to the MIL-STD-881 WBS prima¬ 
rily as a cost reporting structure is incorrect. I understand 
why it may be viewed in that way, given its historical asso¬ 
ciation with the Contractor Cost Data Reporting (CCDR) 
Plan. In reality, proper program WBS development is very 
important early in the acquisition process (long before CCDR 
reporting starts) in order to properly identify summary level 
products consisting of hardware, software, services, data, 
and facilities. This did not occur in the F-22 case cited in the 
article, and it was impractical to correct the WBS retroac¬ 

tively. This problem is avoidable by performing proper up¬ 
front planning. The F-22 WBS could have been developed 
in compliance with M1L-STD-881A without compromising 
the integrated management approach. 

Finally, the article quotes out of context a briefing made 
by the Air Force support contractor for MIL-STD-881 B. I 
have heard his briefing, and can vouch for his understand¬ 
ing of WBS policy. In fact, the contract includes a task to 
develop WBS training materials that will be used in ail 
appropriate Defense acquisition courses. 

For an excellent discussion of WBS development and 
use, your readers should read the article in the March-April 
1991 Program Manager entitled “The ‘Hither and Yawn 
(Yon)’ of Statement of Work Preparation.” It pointed out 
“The WBS format was never intended to be enforced verba¬ 
tim. but used as a starting point for future tailoring by 
program managers. Rigid task procedures and too much 
data are issues needing to be resolved within the SPO before 
solicitation release or contract 
award. The key point is that the Send Letters to- 
WBS does not drive our require- DEFENSE SYST MGMT COLG 
ments. We do. It merely pro- aTTN RDP 
vides the framework. ” 1 agree 9320 beLVOIR ROAD 
with this view. WBS policy was SUITE G38 
never the issue; improper (usu- pj- beLVOIR VA 22060-5565 
ally excessively rigid) WBS imple- 
mentation was. 

In addition to the User Guide, MIL-STD-881 B has guid¬ 
ance for software-intensive applications and for contractors 
that use integrated product team organizations. Should 
M1L-STD-499B ultimately be approved, its requirement will 
be compatible with thc.e in MIL-STD-881 B. 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this article. 
I trust these clarifications will be helpful to Program Man¬ 
ager readers, and will support the author’s desire to have 
engineers stay in the room when the topic of WBS comes up. 

Gene H. Porter 
Director, Acquisition 
Program Integration 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
13 August 1993 

(The writer is referring to Dr. Jerry Lake’s article.) 

TTianks for the July-August Program Manager. The article 
X on early military aviation is excellent—well-written and 

TTianks so much for Program Manager, it contains a lot of 

X interesting articles. Best of all was the piece. “Spruce, 

nicely illustrated. You tell an important, complex story that 

Dojje and Fordism.” I enjoyed reading it and passed it along 

is little known or appreciated in historical or management 

to my staff. 


Mr. Jacob Neufeld 

Harold W. Nelson, USA 


Chief, US Army Center of Military History 
Washington, D.C. 

Center for Air Force History 

Progrom Atonoger 


Seprember-October 1993 



Connecting Ethics and Quality 

s. Judith Light, a certified 

-management consultant horn 

Colorado Springs, Colo., facilitated 
several group discussions at DSMC 
on “Connecting Ethics AND Qual¬ 
ity.” Using quotes, lecturette, exer¬ 
cises and dialogue, the groups ex¬ 
plored the relationships between 
people and systems. Ms. Light started 
the recent sessions with the following 
quote by Margaret Wheatley in the 
book. Leadership arxd the New Science: 

This world of relationships is 
rich and complex. Gregory 
Bateson (1980) speaks of “the 
jjattem that connects,” and uiges 
that we stop teaching facts— 
the things of knowledge—and 
focus, instead, on relationships 
as the basis of all definitions. 
With relationships, we give up 
predictability for potentials. 
Several years ago I read that 
elementary particles were 
“bundles of potentiality.” I have 
begun to think of all of us this 
way, for surely we are as unde- 
finable, unanalyzable, and 
bundled with potential as any¬ 
thing in the universe. None of 
us exists indejTendent of our re¬ 
lationships with others. Differ¬ 
ent settings and people evoke 

Dr. Hall is a Special Assistant to the 
DSMC Commandant for Quality. She 
also is an instructor in the Principles of 
Management Department and works 
on curriculum integration. 

Dr. Mary-fo Hall 

some qualities from us and leave 
others dormant. In each of these 
relationships, we are different, 
new in some way. 

Ms. Light suggested that as an out¬ 
growth of the session that everyone 
leave and look at others as “bundles 
of potentiality.” She stressed that ethics 
is about asking the right questions 
not about having the right answers. 



One of the exercises was to define 
ethics pictorially. Some of the groups 
had one picture: other groups had 
individual pictures. One particular 
definition was a house with a box on 
the inside. On the inside of the box 
was a question mark. The originator 
of the definition stated that ethics starts 
with self and at an early age. How¬ 

ever, as we grow, we get boxed in to 
certain paradigms, roles and rules. 

Another person defined ethics as 
brain (head) plus heart. 

Still another group collectively de¬ 
picted ethics as a teeter-totter. On 
one end was management and all the 
resources. On the other end, were all 
workers. Under one end sharp tacks 
were pointing upward, and under the 
other side were many PAC-MEN ready 
to gobble anyone that falls. 

The group talked about trust, in¬ 
tegrity and fairness that play into the 
balance that affects the teeter-totter. 

After the discussion, it was agreed 
that ethics is the ground rules by which 
we live and by which people operate 
within the organization. Ethics deals 
with the fundamental human relation- 

Pro^om AAonoger 


September-Ocrober 1993 

ships, including one’s relationship with 
oneself and one’s relationship to the 
organizational system. 

In the discussion, the word “re¬ 
vere” was used rather than respect. 
“Revere" is nonjudgmental. Another 
concept in ethics that is nonjudgmental 
is that of “allowing" one to be differ¬ 
ent rather than the concept of “toler¬ 
ating differences.” 

The group also discussed quality, 
change, competition, and the ethics 
of caring and worth. The session ended 

The place to begin to change 

the world is first in one’s own 

heart and head and hands and 

then work out from there. 

—Robert Pirsig 
Zen and the Art of Motorcycle 

Ideas for encouraging further indi¬ 
vidual exploration recommended by 
Ms. Light include: 

Driving Fear Out of the Workplace, 
Kathleen Ryan and Daniel F. 

Quality of Else, Lloyd Dobyns and 
Clare Crawford-Mason 

Caring: An Alternative Approach 
to Ethics and Moral Education, Nel 

The Tao of Leadership, John Heider 

Small Decencies: Reflections and 
Meditations on Being Human at Work, 
John Cowan 

The Worth Ethic, Kate Ludeman 

The Hard Problems of Management: 
Gaining the Ethics Edge, Mark Pastin 

Leadership and the New Science, 
Margaret Wheatley 

“TQM from the Trenches: The Role 
of the Individual,” Rolf Clark, Pro¬ 
gram Manager, March/April 1992 



Affirmative Action (AA) - A policy followed closely by the 
Federal Civil Service that requires agencies to take positive steps 
to insure equal opportunity in employment, development, ad¬ 
vancement, and treatment of all employees and applicants for 
employment regardless of race, color, sex, religion, national origin, 
or physical or mental handicap. Affirmative action also requires 
that specific actions be directed at the special problems and 
unique concerns in assuring equal employment opportunity for 
minorities, women and other disadvantaged groups. 

Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) - Federal policy to 
provide equal employment opportunity for all; to prohibit dis¬ 
crimination on the ground of age, race, color, religion, sex, na¬ 
tional origin, or physical or mental handicap; and to promote the 
full realization of employees’ potential through a continuing affir¬ 
mative action program in each executive department and agency. 

Glass Ceiling - Artificial barriers, based on biases in attitudes 
or in the organization, that prevent qualified individuals from 
advancing upward into management. 

Mentor - An advisor who helps those with less experience to 
understand processes. 

Process Action Team (PAT) - A team chartered to work on an 
improvement process as part of the TQM effort. 

Sexual Harassment - Unwelcome sexual advances, requests 
for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual 
nature when: 

(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or 
implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s employment; 

(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual 
is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such 
individual; or 

(3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of substantially 
interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an 
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. 

Upward Mobility Program (UMP) - Systematic career devel¬ 
opment requiring competitive selection in positions that provide 
experience and training leading to future assignments in other, 
more responsible positions. 

Program Monoger 


Seprember-Oaober 1993 


Who's Bashing Whom? 

Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries 

by Dr. Laura D’Andrea Tyson, Institute for International Economics Washington, D.C. 
November, 1992, 324 pps.. Paperback, $25.00. (ISBN 0-88132-106-0). 

There are no easy answers to the 
high stakes trade issues being played 
out on the economic world stage. The 
highly visible and politically appealing 
bashing of lapanese cars and VCRs is 
certainly part of that game, but it is 
merely a nudge on the economic front 
of slowing imports to, and increasing 
exports from, the United States. 

Referring to the book’s title. “Who's 
Bashing Whom,” the author says that 
“ some degree everybody’s bashing 
everybody," when it comes to high tech¬ 
nology trade. Nevertheless, after read¬ 
ing the fine print. I’m inclined to think 
she believes that the United States is 
indeed the “bashee,” not the other way 
around. Plus, she makes a strong, well- 
documented case to support her argu¬ 
ment that we should be on the giving 
end for a change. 

When Dr. Tyson wrote her book, 
she worked for the prestigious Institute 
for International Economics. In the 
meantime, she has been confirmed to 
be Chairperson of President Clinton’s 
Council of Economic Advisers. She cer¬ 
tainly is in a key position to turn some 
of her ideas into policy. This makes the 
book even more important for our trad¬ 
ing partners, especially Japan, to read. 

Dr. Tyson’s problem is really with 
the Japanese. She takes a quick swipe 
at Europe early in her book, citing our 
clashes with Europe concerning ques¬ 
tions of market access: overt trade bar¬ 
riers. like tariffs and preferential gov¬ 
ernment procurement; and, the touchy 
subject of subsidies. 

The general European idea seems 
clear enough however; The competi¬ 
tive opportunities afforded to foreign 
companies in the European market 

should be matched by comparable for¬ 
eign opportunities for European com¬ 
panies. This reciprocity principle ap¬ 
pears to be emerging in U.S. trade policy 
so, for now, things appear on a 
noncollision course with our European 

No, Japan is definitely the problem. 
The author argues that the problem boils 
down to one of market access. Barriers 
to market access in Japan resist simple 
remedies because they are rooted in 
unique structural features of Japanese 
capitalism. She cites the case of Motorola 
attempting to make inroads into the Japa¬ 
nese cellular phone market. 

Impediments occurred despite the 
fact the Japanese admitted in public 
that the Motorola cellular phone was a 
smaller and better mobile phone than 
Japanese models. Only through threats 
of trade retaliation by the U.S. Trade 
Representative in 1989 was Motorola 
able to establish a foothold in Japan’s 
cellular phone market. This whole pro¬ 
cess took about 10 years and gave time 
for Motorola’s Japanese competitors to 
start catching up. 

This brings us to the thrust of the 
book—what to do. Should Japanese 
firms be accorded national treatment 
in the American market when Ameri¬ 
can firms are not accorded such 
treatment in the Japanese market? Dr. 
Tyson’s prescription for curing trade im¬ 
balances are what she calls “cautious 

She recommends that the nation’s 
(U.S.) trade laws be used to deter or 
compensate for foreign practices not 
adequately regulated by existing multi¬ 
lateral rules. While Dr. Tyson makes a 
case that cautious activism is not the 

same as protectionism, she does admit 
that a certain amount of arm-twisting 
and forceful unilateralism may be nec¬ 
essary. Hardly the free-market nice guy 

One important point Dr. Tyson pre¬ 
sents is her philosophy for the future. 
She sees declining military research and 
development (R&D) and a need for in¬ 
creased government nonmilitary R&D, 
particularly in high-tech applications like 
biotechnology, semiconductor manufac¬ 
turing, robotics, artificial intelligence, 
and high-definition displays. 

She sees a growing overlap between 
technologies and materials with both 
civilian and military applications, and 
the continued globalization of high-tech¬ 
nology markets. 

From what we are seeing in the di¬ 
rection of the Clinton Department of 
Defense, what she envisioned in this 
book in November 1992 is right on track 
with what is happening in late 1993. 

This is a well-timed and informative 
book. The only criticism is that it some¬ 
times uses a lot of economic technical 
jargon to make a point. Because of the 
technical and complex nature of the 
material discussed, I guess that comes 
with the territory. 

That being said, this book is defi¬ 
nitely necessary reading for our trade 
representatives and our trading part¬ 
ners, particularly Japan. It is a strong 
shot across the bow for any of those 
partners who think they can continue 
to bash America. William W. 
Bahnmeier, DSMC 95 Program 
Manager, and Professor of Principles 
of Program Management. 

Progrom Monoger 


Seprember-CDcober 1993 



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Help Us Keep You on Our Subscription List! 


Keynoter Speaks On 



Joan Sable 

Mr. James McDivilt, keynoter, and BGen (Set) Claude M. Bolton, Jr., USAF, DSMC 


! I he Defense Systems Manage- 

I-ment College (DSMC) and the 

National Contract Management As¬ 
sociation (NCMA), Washington, D.C. 
Chapter, co-hosted the 1993 Acquisi¬ 
tion Research Symposium at the Holi¬ 
day Inn Crowne Plaza in Rockville, 
Maryland. Close to 200 acquisition 
personnel attended this 2 1/2-day 

Mr. Calvin Brown, DSMC, and Ms. 
Donna Ireton, NCMA, co-chaired the 
conference assisted by program co¬ 
chairs, Ms. loan Sable, DSMC, and 
Mr. Patrick Sullivan, NCMA. 

BGen (Sel) Claude M. Bolton, Jr., 
DSMC Commandant, gave the open¬ 
ing remarks and introduced the key¬ 
note speaker, Mr. James McDivitt, 
Senior Vice President, Government 
Operations & International, Rockwell 

Mr. McDivitt spoke of defining our 
own future. He said “the future be¬ 
gins now...we need to worry about 
decisions made today for they will 
affect our future. The defense depart¬ 
ment and we in industry are in the 
midst of revolutionary changes. It is 
during times of revolution that some 
of the biggest mistakes are made.... 

Ms. Sable was program co-chair for 
the Symposium and is a Technical In¬ 
formation Specialist in the Research 
and Information Division at DSMC. 

Most of these decisions appear to be 
made based upon short-term conse¬ 
quences - like the impact on a local 
community of closing a depot, or the 
difficulty of laying off federal workers- 
with very little consideration to the 
long-term consequences.” 

Other plenary speakers at the June 
Symposium included: Mr. Thomas J. 
Dolan, Jr., Holder of DSMC’s 
Acquisition Law Chair: Mr. Steven K. 
Conver, Vice President, Operations 
Integration, Martin Marietta 
Corporation; and Ms. Deborah L. 
Wince-Smith, Senior Fellow, Council 
on Competitiveness (former Assistant 
Secretary of Commerce for Technol¬ 
ogy Policy). 

The second day’s morning session 
included a Joint Logistics Command¬ 
ers Panel comprising Rear Admiral 
Robert G. Harrison, USN; Mr. Darold 
L. Griffin, AMC; Rear Admiral Leonard 
Vincent (USN), DLA, DCMC; Mr. 
Ronald D. Elliott, USMC; and Colo¬ 
nel Harry H. Heimple, USAF. BGen 
(Sel) Bolton moderated this discus¬ 
sion. Each panelist addressed acqui¬ 
sition initiatives of the present and 
plans for the future in their respective 
commands. At the conclusion, pan¬ 
elists answered questions from the 

The program concluded with these 
two panel discussions: “The Interna¬ 
tional Aspects of Acquisition." 

Progrom AAonoger 


September-Oaober 1993 

Photo by Richard Mattox. 

ioinl iogistii:< ComnwiKkr Panel Manhers (left la ri^ht): Cal //urn’ II. Ildmpic. LIS.M': Mr. ParalJ /.. Griffin: Mr. RanakI P. I'JItal: R.\PM 
I.eanarJ \ 'iikxiU. USX. 

modemtod bv Mr. lohn S. Autry, 
K.xccutivo \'icc President. Susun 
Dnvis International o’ Public Affairs 
Group: and. "The Industrial Base- 
Progress or Poverty?" moderated by 
Mr. Patrick D. Sullivan. Assistant \'ice 
President. Procurement & Finance, 
Aerospace Industries Association of 

Industrial and International 
Panel Members 

•Members of the international panel 
included: Mr. Shii^co .Matsutomi. First 
.Secretar\' Fconomic Section, Fhnbassy 
of lapan: .Mr. Galen I. Ho. \'ice Presi¬ 
dent and General .Manaoer, .Merlin 
Programme. IB.M-Aerospace Systems: 
.Mr. Gerhard 1. I.ohan. Head of Trade 
Section. Delegation of the Commis¬ 
sion of the Furopean Communities: 
and .Ms. Laura Beth Sherman. Assis¬ 
tant General Counsel. LI.S. Trade Rep- 

•Members of the industrial base 
panel included: .Ms. Fllen Brown. 
Professional Staff .Member. Commit¬ 
tee on .Armed Services. Ll.S. 1 louse of 

Representatives: Mr. Richard C. 
Barnard, Assistant Vice President. 
Army Times Publishing Company and 
Kxecuti\'e FAIitor. Defense News. Space 
News. Commercial Aviation News: Mr. 
.Vicholas M. Torelli. Ir.. Former Deputv 
Assistant Secretar\' of Defense for Pro¬ 
duction Resources: and Dr. lames 
Blackwell. Assistant Director. Science 
Applications International Corpora¬ 
tion Strategic Assessment Center. 

Acker Award 

Si,\ty-two papers were selected for 
publication in the symposium book 
of Proceedinas. Thirtv-lwo of these 


were selected for presentation during 
symposium break-out sessions. This 
\olume of papers is available upon 
written request to L'/S.MC. ATT.\': OS- 
PR. Fort Belvoir, \'A 22000-5420. 

.Acker Skill in Communication 
/\r\'ard recipients for outstanding papers 
were: LISAF .MajorCiregon.’A. Garrett. 
.Arrnv I.TC Alan S. Gilbreth. L''r. Will¬ 
iam I. Hooker. .Mr. .Martin 1. 
Kestenbaum, and Dr. Ronald I.. 

Progrom Monoger 



Volunteers from the Defense Sys¬ 
tems Management College (DSMC), 
including students, are raising 
money for flood victims in Ham¬ 
burg, Iowa. The College also is 
adopting the family of a DSMC 

Food donated by local merchants 
and DSMC employees netted 
SI.800 at a cookout. A bake sale 
netted S555. A white elephant sale 
was held in late August. The Col¬ 
lege is working with the Red Cross 
and the ludge Ad\ocate General, 
according to the DSMC personnel 

Heaxw rains and flooding from the 
Missouri and Nishnabotna rix'crs 
sent five feet oi water through the 
Southwest Iowa town, forcing 
evacuation of 250 people. 

Septennber-Ocrober 1993 


he DSMC Press has begun pub¬ 
lishing a new type of docu¬ 
ment called DSMC Technical Reports 
(TRs). The first, TR 1-93, Acquiring 
Defense Systems, by the late David D. 
Acker, will arrive from the printer in 

The TRs are manuscripts written 
in-house by DSMC faculty and staff 
or others in the defense acquisition 
community such as faculty of the De¬ 
fense Acquisition University member 
schools or Pentagon staff. The TRs 
are categorized as information out¬ 
side of books, guidebooks, mono¬ 
graphs, magazine articles or course 
materials. Examples include studies, 
position or issue papers, status re¬ 
ports, summaries of legislation or regu- 
latior s, doctoral dissertations, and 
evaluations and critiques. 

Publication of TRs expands DSMC’s 
research and information dissemina¬ 
tion mission into a wider customer 

service base, and provides increased 
opportunities for acquisition profes¬ 
sionals to publish. 

Printing is limited to several hun¬ 
dred copies, most of which are dis¬ 
tributed to the DSMC library, other 
Department of Defense and govern¬ 
ment libraries, selected university li¬ 
braries, and the Defense Technical 
Information Center (DTIC) and the 
National Technical Information Ser¬ 
vice (NTIS). Multiple copies can be 
obtained from DTIC and NTIS. 

Other manuscripts selected as TRs 
are: Dr. Robert Warren’s University 
of Southern California doctoral dis¬ 
sertation, “The Impact of the 
Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisi¬ 
tion) on Defense Science and Tech¬ 
nology: An Organizational Culture 
Study”; and C. B. Cochrane’s “Sum¬ 
mary and Assessment - Acquisition 
Policy Implications: National Defense 
Authorization Act for FY-1993, and 

Department of Defense Appropriations 
Act for FY-1993.” 

Interested authors can submit 
manuscripts for consideration to: 





FT BELVOIR VA 22060-5565 

703-805-3056; DSN 655-3056 

The Policy and Authors’ Guide¬ 
lines are on this page. Because of the 
special nature of the work by Acker, 
former DSMC archivist and historian, 
an exception has been made to the 
ix)licy regarding a standard cover and 
no illustrations. 

With the possible exception of the 
Acker TR, the DSMC Press has no 
plans to market TRs through the U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 

Wilbur Jones 


—TR manuscript topics shall relate to defense acquisi¬ 

—Authors must submit manuscripts to the Director, DSMC 
Press, for publication consideration. No prearrange¬ 
ments are required. Following necessary peer review, 
the decision to publish is the Director’s. 

—Authors are responsible for internal staffing and ap¬ 
proval, accuracy, completeness and editing. The Press 
staff provides counsel regarding structure and compo¬ 

—Authors accepted for publication should provide the 
DSMC Press with a hard copy of the manuscript, 
preferably single-spaced, and a labeled IBM diskette 
with the manuscript in WordPerfect Version 5.1. 

—No word or page limit is required, but authors must aim 
for no more than 50 single-spaced pages. 

—Illustrations, except for charts to support text, are not 
recommended. Foldouts are prohibited. 

—The DSMC Visual Arts Department (OS-VA) provides a 
standard black-and-white cover without illustrations 
showing the title, author, TR number and DSMC logo 
and similar title page. 

—The TRs are printed by the DSMC Printing and Dupli¬ 
cating Services Department (OS-PR) in a run of 200 
copies (head-to-head), on an as-received basis de¬ 
pending on workload. 

-External distribution by OS-PR includes DOD and other 
government libraries, selected university libraries and 
other repositories, the Defense Technical Information 
Center, National Technical Information Service, and 
limited on-demand requests. 

—Authors may register and own the copyright to material 
prepared on their own time. 

—Exceptions to this policy will be on a case basis. 

Program Monoger 


Seprember-Oaober 1990 



419 Graduated in June 

Lt Col Matt 

I ; he Program Management 
_! Course graduated 419 success¬ 
ful students from PMC 93-1 on June 
11, 1993. Two “firsts” occurred for 
this graduation: The first husband 
and wife team in the PMC class gradu¬ 
ated together; Major Toni Arnold. 
USAF, and Mr. Mike Niggel, SAIC 
Corp. The first “legacy” student also 
graduated in this class: Mr. Bob Steele, 
who received his diploma from his 
father, Mr. Bill Steele, a graduate of 
PMC 77-2. 

During the remainder of June and 
early July, the division was busily pre¬ 
paring to receive the new class. CAPT 
Steve Kupka, USN, the Executive Di¬ 
rector of the Program Management 
Education Division for the last 2 years, 
retired July 30 and moved to Bound 
Brook, New Jersey. 

After a short respite, we welcomed 
421 students (a new record) for PMC 
93-2, which began July 26. Not to be 

LtCol Gillis is the PMC Course Di¬ 
rector at DSMC. 

Gillis, USAF 

outdone as “firsts” by the last class, 
CAFT Kate Paige, USN, is the first 
section leader whose spouse was a 
section leader in an earlier PMC class. 

After a harrowing but short experi¬ 
ence with the PMC Pre-Test, the class 
is off and running and reading. Some 
details on the class composition follow: 

—Average Age, 41 years 

—Average Acquisition Experience, 10 


—Average Rank, (for military) 

—Average Grade (for civilians), 

PMC 93-2 is 48 percent civilians 
and 52 percent military. In addition 
to the usual DOD students, we have 
2 Coast Guard students, 14 Industry 
students, and 1 Allied exchange stu¬ 
dent from Turkey. 

This class offers a diverse and ex¬ 
perienced background. We look for¬ 
ward to a great experience in learning 
the intricacies of Defense Department 
Acquisition Management. 


The Defense Technical Information Center located at Cameron 
Station, Va., will sponsor its annual Users Training Conference 
November 1-4, 1993. It will be at the Stouffer Concourse Hotel. 
Arlington. Va., and features the theme. “Information and Technol¬ 
ogy Teamed for Success.” For further information, contact Ms. 
Patti Miller, (703) 274-3848. 



On June 23, 1993, an unprec¬ 
edented memorandum of agree¬ 
ment (MOA) was signed between 
the Industrial College of the 
Armed Forces (ICAF) and the 
Defense Systems Management 
College (DSMC). The ICAF 
sponsors the DOD designated 
&nior Acquisition Management 
Course (Level III) and DSMC 
sponsors the Program Manage¬ 
ment Course (Level II)—both 
under the auspices of the De¬ 
fense Acquisition University con¬ 

The purpose of the MOA is to 
promote improved communica¬ 
tions, cooperation and under¬ 
standing between ICAF and 
DSMC as a means of improving 
their respective educational cur¬ 
ricula and enhancing the execu¬ 
tion of their respective College 

Specific facets of the MOA pro¬ 
vide for periodic meetings and 
exchange of materials to pro¬ 
mote understanding of each 
other’s curricula, educational 
methods, and research endeav¬ 
ors. The ICAF and DSMC will 
continue to utilize selected fac¬ 
ulty to serve as guest lecturers/ 
instructors in each other’s re¬ 
spective courses of instruction. 

The MOA also provides for 
regular exchange of qualified 
faculty to serve as students in 
ICAF and DSMC respective 
courses of instruction. As a first 
step toward this goal, DSMC fac¬ 
ulty member Paul Mcllvaine will 
be a student of ICAF’s upcom¬ 
ing Senior Acquisition Manage¬ 
ment Course. 

Program Monoger 


Seprember-Ocrober 1993 


Changes at DSMC 

I n my first chat with you, I indicated many 
— changes and challenges were ahead for all 
of us in the acquisition business. Well, during 
the last four months, many changes have taken 
place and indicate an interesting future. 

As you may have noticed in the July-August 
1993 Program Manager magazine, a quick scan 
of the table of contents tells the story. Articles 
indicating change included “Dr. Deutch Restruc¬ 
tures Defense Acquisition Organization, Acqui¬ 
sition Law Panel Reports to Congress, and Help¬ 
ing Our Customers.” Each of these articles 
described changes which either directly or indi¬ 
rectly have significantly impacted the Defense 
Systems Management College (DSMC). 

I won't repeat these articles but I encourage 
you to read them if you have not already. 

I would, however, like to highlight changes 
and activities DSMC has experienced since I 
last spoke to you. 

First, as indicated in the July-August Program 
Manager magazine, DSMC and DAU (Defense 
Acquisition University) now reside organizationally 
under the newly formed Deputy Under Secre¬ 
tary of Defense for Acquisition Reform. Mrs. 
Colleen Preston has been confirmed as the Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense to head the new 
Acquisition Reform Office. Mrs. Preston is well 
acquainted with DSMC and acquisition. 

She spoke to several of our DSMC classes in 
the past and, while working in the House of 
Representatives as general counsel, she was a 
key in drafting the Defense Acquisition Work¬ 
force Improvement Act. She was deeply in¬ 
volved with the Section 800 Panel review and 
has hit the ground running in the acquisition 
reform office. We are extremely pleased and 
fortunate to be working for Mrs. Preston and 
look forward to working with her and the Reform 
Office staff. 

Other changes at DSMC include an initiative 
to review our flagship acquisition course, PMC 
(Program Management Course). This review is 
called DSMC 95 and is essentially a bottoms-up 
review. We start by talking with our customers 
and stakeholders to see whether or not we are 
teaching what is required. Once we have estab¬ 
lished this requirement in terms of desired com¬ 
petencies, we will review and change our PMC 
curriculum as required. The final step will be to 
ensure the DSMC organizational structure sup¬ 
ports this curriculum and, in turn, our customers. 

Some customer inputs received thus far in¬ 
clude reducing course length dramatically, in¬ 
creasing course topic integration, incorporating 
integrated product team concepts, strengthening^ 
incorporating software management, establish¬ 
ing PMC prerequisites, increasing multinational 
emphasis, incorporating commercial practices 
topics, incorporating acquisition reform initia¬ 
tives, etc. 

As you can see, we have a number of topics to 
consider. We will be talking to many of you in 
the weeks ahead on how to improve PMC and 
how to ensure PMC is totally responsive to field 
requirements. I encourage you to drop me a line 
if you have anything you’d like us to consider as 
we improve our PMC. 

There are many other changes I’d like to dis¬ 
cuss with you but time does not permit. We will 
do our best to keep you abreast through this and 
future issues of Program Manager magazine. Until 

—BGen (Sel) Claude M. Bolton, ]r., USAF 

Progrom Monoger 


September-Oaober 1993