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Also in this edition: 20000622 032 

Operational Logistics in NATO 

War Stoppers and DLA’s Warfighting Integration Team 
Computing Wartime Strategic Airlift Spares Requirements 
Air Force Research Laboratory Logistics Research 














Air Force Journal -Logistics 


Volume XXIV, Number 1 


Spring 2000 


AFRP 25-1 


FEATURES 

2 EAF Support Challenges—Expeditionary Airpower Part 5 

Amatzia Feinberg RAND 
Hyman L. Shulman, RAND 
Louis W. Miller, RAND 
Robert S. Tripp, RAND 

6 Running Out of Gas? Issues and Strategy 2000 

Matthew F. Pausch 

16 Logistics Crime—Knowing and Managing the Risks 

Stephen Hays Russell, PhD 


ARTICLES 

1 Operational Logistics in NATO 

Colonel Peter Schmitz, GEA 
Major John Rausch 

23 The DLA Integrated Consumable Item Support Model 

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph M. Codispoti 


DEPARTMENTS 

26 Candid Voices 

Understanding the National Security Policy-Making 
Process: Why Logisticians Should Care 
Major Vicki J. Rast 

28 Current Logistics Research 

Air Force Research Laboratory 

31 Inside Logistics 

Computing Wartime Spare Parts for Strategic Airlift 

F. Michael Slay 
Robert E. Burleson 

Senior Master Sergeant Jeffery D. Meyenburg 



General Michael E. Ryan 
Air Force Chief of Staff 


Lieutenant General Michael E. Zettler 
Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations and 
Logistics 


Colonel Richard M. Bereit 
Commander 

Air Force Logistics Management Agency 


Editor-in-chief 

Lieutenant Colonel James C. Rainey v 
Air Force Logistics Management Agency 


Editor 

Beth F. Scott 

Air Force Logistics Management Agency 


Editor 


Captain Andrew W. Hunt 
Air Force Logistics Management Agency 


The Air Force Journal of Logistics (.AFJL ), published quarterly, is the professional logistics publication of the United States Air Force. It provides an open forum for presenting 
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Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If reproduced or reprinted, the courtesy line “Originally published in the Air Force Journal of 
Logistics ," should be included. 


Operational 
Logistics in 


NATO 


Peter Schmitz 
Colonel, GEA 

Major 
John Rausch 


Logistics is traditionally an unglamorous and underappreciated activity . To 
generalise, when the battle is going well , the strategist and tactician are lionised; 
it is only when the tanks run out of gas that people go head-hunting for the 
logisticians. 

Lieutenant General William G. Pagonis, USA (Retired) 

P agonis is right. The military logistician is merely working in the 
background; supporting is his business. Ideally, he is a military 
calculator, a planner, an organiser, and a supporter with operational 
knowledge. The demands on North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
logisticians, particularly after recent significant changes in strategy and 
structure, are tremendous. NATO’s reluctant take-over of its augmented 
responsibility for logistics necessitates a pragmatic approach. Lessons learnt 
from the recent Kosovo air campaign underpin this demand. 


The fundamental changes that both 
NATO strategy and organisation have 
undergone during the course of this 
decade make demands on alliance 
logisticians that amount to a quantum 
leap. Completely new challenges, both in 
terms of quality and quantity, have 
evolved, and by comparison, the past 
looks rather tranquil. 

New Strategy 

Until the end of the 1980s, operational 
logistics in NATO was clearly 
determined by the security situation in 
Central Europe. In all strategic and 
operational aspects, military planning 
was focused on the need for repelling a 
massive attack from the East directed 
against the depth of the Central European 
region. The principal requirement, within 
the scope of forward defence, was to 
develop a sustainable military reaction 


capability that could cope with short 
warning times. This capability required a 
large number of operational units 
stationed in the potential theatre of 
operations, as well as efficient 
reinforcement and mobilisation 
mechanisms. 

The logistics preparations reflected 
this scenario: solid stockpiling required 
for actual defence operations, deliberate 
storage of equipment and critical supplies 
in the expected theatre of operations, 
proven reinforcement and mobilisation 
measures, and established logistics 
support channels to operations areas 
(called stovepipes in military terminology). 
These would have allowed operational 
readiness to be quickly stepped up to 
maximum combat power in times of crisis 
and war. Additionally, the nations 
providing troops were also responsible 
for their combat service support. At the 


time, this made sense considering the 
clear-cut allocation of geographical 
areas and the fact that logistics support 
channels were generally short. 

Before 1990, NATO operational 
logistics was focused on Central Europe 
(Figure 1). The lines of communication 
were short (with the exception of strategic 
reinforcements from the United States and 
Canada), and logistics was a national 
responsibility. 

The end of the Warsaw Pact marked a 
radical change in NATO’s strategic 
concept. Surely, national defence and 
defence of the Alliance remain paramount 
and important tasks. Elowever, the focus 
on operations in Central Europe became 
a past matter. Now any region in NATO’s 
area of responsibility (augmented even 
by the territory of the three new NATO 
partners) must be looked upon as a 
potential theatre of operations. 
Accordingly, numerous contingency 
plans need to be prepared, taking into 
account different operational options, 
force structures, and combinations of 
contributed forces by NATO partners. 

By adopting the new strategic 
concept, NATO declared its willingness 
to also accept mandates from 
international organisations (for example, 
the United Nations, Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, and 
Western Europe Union) for carrying out 
peace support operations (PSO) outside 
the Alliance territory. The term PSO 
reflects a broad spectrum, from 
humanitarian missions up to peace 

(Continued on Page 35) 


Volume XXIV, Number 1 


1 




Air Force Journal of Logistics 





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e have moved away from a containment 
strategy to one of global engagement 
with shaping and responding as the 
key words for the United States Air Force . 1 The 
increasing number of deployments launched on 
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Volume XXIV, Number 1 


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This paradigm shift presents new challenges to legacy support 
structures and the evolving Agile Combat Support (ACS) system. 
Support must spin up almost immediately to sustain operations, 
minimize airlift demands to increase deployment speed, and have 
the flexibility to respond to uncertain locations and mission 
requirements. Concurrently, cost pressures and the personnel 
implications of an expeditionary force have led the Air Force to 
reexamine the complete ACS system in order to understand how 
alternative structures, technologies, and methods affect 
capabilities. 

This article specifically examines alternative low-altitude 
navigation targeting infrared for night (LANTIRN) intermediate 
maintenance operations and explores the implications of support 
equipment investments in conjunction with various logistics 
concepts. The LANTIRN system consists of two pods (navigation 
and targeting) employed by F-16s and F-15Es. The alternative 
support structure options range from the current decentralized 
practice of deploying intermediate maintenance with the fighting 
units to a network of consolidated (or even single) support 
locations. Support equipment upgrades, policies, and capabilities 
combine with these structure options to form a rich array of 
possibilities from which the Air Force may choose the best ACS 
system to meet uncertain scenarios. 

Scenarios, Support Structures, 
and Equipment Upgrades 
Create the Trade Space 

The Air Force currently maintains LANTIRN pods using a 
decentralized logistics structure, deploying full sets of testers 
from home operating bases to forward operating locations (FOL) 
with the aircraft. Other options rely on varying levels of 
consolidation. These range from using a single Continental 
United States (CONUS) support location (CSL) to using a CSL 
in network with two to four forward support locations (FSL). This 
analysis centers on the implications of various levels of 
consolidation chosen for the LANTIRN intermediate-level 
support operations relative to operational scenarios ranging from 
peacetime to two coincident major theater wars (MTW). 

While structure decisions may focus on support locations, they 
should not do so exclusively. Adopting new procedures or 
technologies can affect how different support structures compare 
to each other in terms of capabilities and costs. While the Air 
Force does not plan on upgrading pod performance or purchasing 
additional LANTIRN pods, three investment options to upgrade 
the support equipment used to repair these pods—including zero 
investment, advanced deployment kit (ADK,) and midlife 
upgrade—were evaluated. The upgrades offer a reduced footprint 
and enhanced support equipment performance and reliability. 
The current intermediate-level LANTIRN mobility shelter set and 
proposed upgrades are shown in Figure 1. 

During the study, expected warfighter capability levels relative 
to a range of deployment and transportation times were computed 
by combining scenarios, support structures, and investments. 
Additionally, system cost implications—in terms of equipment, 
spares, and infrastructure investments, as well as transportation 
and labor expenditures—over a 15-year time horizon, the 
expected life of the program, were assessed. Analysis showed that 
the decision to centralize or decentralize LANTIRN repair 
operations hinges not on the expected system costs but on the 



Figure 1. Current and Proposed LANTIRN Support Equipment 


capability and risk levels the Air Force is willing to accommodate 
in its operational plans. 

Analysis of the Fundamental 
Factor—Time 

When weighing the implications of centralized or decentralized 
support, one must consider the deployment and inter/intratheater 
transportation times associated with each option. Whereas 
forecasting this time element for MTW scenarios is difficult, the 
expected capability levels relative to a range of both deployment 
and transportation times were assessed. Figure 2 illustrates the 
results of targeting pod analysis for a two-coincident MTW 
scenario. Only the targeting pods are shown since they are more 
mission essential and generate greater demands on the 
maintenance system. 

Given the inherent pod inventory constraint, a pod 
availability goal was set for both engaged and nonengaged 
aircraft. Availability is defined as the number of serviceable pods 
available for use on aircraft for specific missions. Since the Air 
Force currently does not have a specific availability goal for 
LANTIRN pods on aircraft, a value (80 percent) somewhat higher 
than that used for the entire aircraft fully mission-capable rate 
was chosen. 

Next, the expected pod availability for the nonengaged 
aircraft (trainers) was computed as a function of deployment or 
transportation time. Deployment time was defined as the number 


A 1 

L 

Pods 

Available 


^ (__ Engaged ACFT (378) 

Pod Availability Goal (80%) / / 

/ / 

f Nonengaged ACFT (66)1 1/ 



] During Second Major Theater War j 



_ V_ 

Decentralized 

Days to Deploy and Set Up Repair at Forward Location > 



w r 

Centralized 

One-Way Transportation Time > 



- ^ 


Figure 2. Expected Pod Availability Relative to 
Deployment or Transportation Time 


4 


Air Force Journal of Logistics 







of days it takes repair to set up functional operations at the forward 
operating location once surge missions begin, in other words, 
the number of days after flying begins when repair comes on line. 
If deployment takes longer than 7 days during the second MTW, 
there will be no pods available to fly training missions. 
Furthermore, if deployment times increase beyond this 
breakpoint, then the Air Force will risk degrading pod availability 
to the engaged aircraft. 

The centralization options introduce a different time factor 
in the analysis. Now, transportation time (defined as order and 
ship time [OST]) becomes the critical system sensitivity. Since 
equipment and some people are prepositioned near areas of 
potential conflicts, deployed units must transport unserviceable 
pods to the regional repair operation. Again, the targeting pod 
availability was computed during the second MTW as a function 
of the one-way transportation time from an FOL to a regional 
repair facility. Here, the critical breakpoint is 5 days, beyond 
which engaged aircraft capabilities may degrade. 

Structure Tradeoffs 

Strategic and Operational Risks. While centralized operations 
may be more susceptible to terrorist attacks or may be located 
too far from yet unforeseen contingencies, the decentralized 
support structure is extremely sensitive to the availability of 
deployment airlift during the early phases of large-scale missions. 
Both structures may suffer if resupply times do not meet the 
performance assumptions used to set spare parts levels. 
Operationally, a decentralized structure is very sensitive to tester 
downtime. If a single set of testers is deployed, a breakdown by 
just one will temporarily eliminate repair capabilities. In a 
consolidated structure, the greatest operational risk is OST. The 
severity of the effects of subpar performance depends upon how 
actual resupply time differs from the assumptions used to plan 
readiness spares packages and pod kits for a specific deployment 
package. 

Deployment Footprint. Among the goals of the 
Expeditionary Aerospace Force are (1) quick-hitting 
expeditionary operations and (2) deployment predictability to 
improve stability in the personal lives of Air Force personnel. 
These goals require rapid deployment of strong combat forces, 
putting a premium on reducing footprint or the amount of initial 
airlift space needed to transport operating materiel and combat 
equipment. While consolidation options may reduce the number 
of people needed in regional operations by up to 150, requiring 
smaller personnel deployments (under 60), the greatest footprint 
reduction is realized through the elimination of equipment 
movement. Conversely, decentralized support of a two-MTW 
contingency would require movement of 85 to 252 people and 
more than 180 equipment pallets, depending on upgrade 
investment. 

Organizational Issues. Although the thrust of this analysis 
focuses on the quantitative issues associated with various 
logistics structures, one cannot overlook the less tangible cross- 
organizational implications of the dipole options space. 
Decentralized support requires that individual squadron or wing 
commanders compete for valuable airlift early in the campaign. 
This includes competing not only with other LANTIRN units 
but also with other commodities. As a result, mobilization plans 
may need to be modified to prioritize deployment time lines. 


While centralized support requires minimal tactical airlift (pods 
are relatively small), commanders would have to share a global 
asset pool. This pool includes not only personnel and repair 
equipment but also tactical transport and the pods themselves. 

Support Option Advantages 
and Disadvantages 

While the centralized option requires fewer test sets and fewer 
highly skilled personnel, the annual transportation costs may be 
higher. The analysis shows that these annual costs, coupled with 
labor expenses, are virtually the same across the seven options 
analyzed. So the recurring peacetime costs and, consequently, 
present value of all costs are essentially equal, as shown in Figure 3. 


PV 

($M) 


$350 

$300 

$250 

$200 

I 

$150 

$100 

$50 

$- 




ii 


llii 


Recurring 

costs 


Investments 


2 3 4 

Option 


Figure 3. Present Value of Investment and Recurring 
Costs by Option 


Another advantage of the regional support structure is the 
drastically reduced deployment footprint. Specifically, very few 
people need to deploy to support the two MTWs. Furthermore, 
since FSLs are removed from theater operations, both the support 
equipment and people face lower risks. Although regional 
operations may become more vulnerable to attack (both 
conventional and cyber), proper preparations and 
communications design can alleviate these threats. 

Co-location of test equipment not only reduces the effects of 
single-string failures but also eliminates the need to transport 
repair equipment to support various contingencies. Since test set 
transport and setup times can be quite long and equipment 
readiness is unpredictable once it is unloaded in theater, the 
regional structure offers a much more stable support system. 
However, daily pod transportation risks increase with the 
consolidated options. Since pods must be moved off base for 
repair, the system’s sensitivity to transportation delays is 
amplified. Pods will pass through additional transportation 
channels, and more people will be involved with the loading and 
unloading process. While there is no data indicating pod 
sensitivity to transport, rough handling in the new channels may 
become an issue in the proposed regional structure. Standardized 
training procedures and tools can mitigate this potential problem. 

The analysis also shows that the decentralized structure 
requires greater support equipment investment, thus increasing 

(Continued on page 38) 


Volume XXIV, Number 1 


5 




Air Force Journal of Logistics 





















































The growth in use of contract sen/ices by the Air Force 
has become a matter of genuine concern ... focused 
particularly on what missions and jobs the Air Force has, 
plans, or should perform with military and civilian 
personnel versus what missions and jobs have been, 
can, and should be performed by contract sen/ices. 

General Curtis E. LeMay, Vice Chief of Staff 
Letter to Deputy Chiefs of Staff, 6 October 1958 

Concerns over the proper use of private sector 
contractors for military support services are 
not new. In fact, the US military has employed 
the private sector in these activities since the 
Revolutionary War. 1 Today, the Air Force 
faces major budget and personnel constraints 
and will continue to do so for the foreseeable 
future. The unwillingness of the American 
public or Congress to fund military programs 
•at the levels requested by the Services makes 
maximizing current and future funding a top 
priority. One key tool for the Air Force in this 
continuing struggle is the use of competitive 
sourcing (CS). Under CS, functions not 
considered inherently governmental or core 
are competed with the private sector. The 
intent of this process is to reduce costs and 
improve efficiency. 

Competitive Sourcing 
Concepts and Definitions 

In 1996, the Defense Science Board Task 
Force defined outsourcing as “the transfer of 
a support function traditionally performed by 
an in-house organization to an outside 
provider.” 2 This is in contrast to privatization, 
where facilities, equipment, and other 
government assets are usually transferred. 
Most of the actions taken in the support 
services arena examined herein involve 
competitive sourcing (the term used to 
describe both outsourcing and privatization) 
of existing activities or the use of the private 
sector to supplement existing military 
capabilities. According to Office of 
Management (OMB) and Budget Circular A-76 
(the federal government-wide document used 
~ as guidance on most outsourcing actions), 
only those activities considered commercial 
activities—defined as those “resulting in a 
product or service that is or could be obtained 
from a private sector source”—can be 







competed. 3 Inherently governmental functions, defined as “so 
intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance 
by federal employees (including military personnel)” are not to 
be competed with the private sector. This determination is based 
on several factors, including levels of required government 
control and oversight. 4 The Circular also delineates several 
categories of commercial activities excepted from competition, 
including national defense activities, defined as “a commercial 
activity . . . being subject to deployment in a direct military 
combat support role.” 5 Department of Defense (DoD) and Air 
Force guidance closely mirrors the OMB Circular A-76 
language. 6 

Air Force Priorities 

Air Force goals in the competitive sourcing arena are ambitious, 
place a greater focus on core activities, attempt to improve 
performance and cost effectiveness, generate savings for 
modernization, and maintain readiness. 7 CS actions have 
generally been successful in cost and personnel reduction. 
Figures from early 1999 indicate Air Force manpower savings in 
actions competed under OMB Circular A-76 during the 1990s 
averaged 36 percent. 8 Unfortunately, problems with such savings 
arise from the primary and secondary consequences of increasing 
private sector involvement in Air Force support services. These 
consequences include the risks associated with disrupting mission 
capability and activities and the inability to adequately perform 
during critical periods—initial deployment or mission 
sustainment. The number of Air Force military and civilian 
positions currently considered eligible for a public/private 
competition is, however, relatively low. According to 1995 Air 
Force data, out of a total military and civilian employee base of 
just under 600,000, about 309,000 positions were considered to 
be performing commercial activities. Of these positions, about 
49.000 were considered eligible for competition based in large 
part on national defense or deployability exemptions. 9 The Air 
Force expects to reduce its total fiscal year 1998 end strength of 
544,000 by subjecting at least 54,000 additional positions to 
competitive sourcing initiatives by fiscal year 2005. 10 

Air Force criteria for determining which functions may be 
subjected to public/private competition begins with the total 
baseline population. The Air Force then subtracts individuals in 
deployable unit type codes (UTC); all rated and medical 
personnel; certain other forward-based personnel; the 
Continental United States (CONUS) rotational pool for overseas 
presence; and other military essential, inherently governmental 
positions or those not subject to contract because of statutory 
restrictions. 11 The more detailed decision criteria cited touch on 
a key concern. The Air Force, in its efforts to meet ambitious 
outsourcing and cost-savings goals, is using criteria that do not 
always examine what effects competitive sourcing current 
functions may have in other areas and may not always be 
consistent in applying them. For example, regardless of their 
criticality to military effectiveness, individuals assigned against 
a deployable UTC are exempted, thus forming a large pool of 
untouchable positions, regardless of criticality to military 
effectiveness. The effect of competing those activities eligible 
for outsourcing on deployment effectiveness, however, is not 
addressed by a specific criterion. Evidently, these activities must 
not be considered direct combat support or otherwise militarily 
essential positions. 


This problem leads to an acknowledgment of the need for a 
clear delineation of what functions are core—those considered 
direct military combat support activities. While this question 
initially seems simple, the analysis can become complicated. 
Contractors already provide flight-line mission support for 
certain combat aircraft in theater on the flight line. Personnel 
providing support in supply, transportation, repair, and 
maintenance in country may well be considered to be providing 
services directly related to combat support, but the line is not 
clear, and the definitions become fuzzy. 12 Maintaining 
competition exemptions for all UTC-deployable functions 
presently filled by military personnel is the Air Force’s current 
position, but the continuing drive for cost containment may make 
that position untenable in the future. 

Current Status of Air Force Fuels 
and CE Support Functions 

Air Force fuels and civil engineering (CE) support functions 
provide some illustrative examples of the potential problems 
arising from CS actions. Currently, both of these functions are 
either considered for—or are already being subjected to—public/ 
private competition on an extensive scale in CONUS locations. 
Civil engineering and supply (including fuels activities) are 
approved CS processes targeted to achieve overall Air Force 
reductions cited earlier. The Air Force plans to subject more than 
7,000 civil engineering and almost 4,000 supply positions to 
competition. 13 A review of current data indicates fuels functions 
at more than ten locations, involving more than 500 positions, 
have been subjected to competition. In the Air Education and 
Training Command and Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) 
alone, more than 2,000 CE positions are currently being reviewed 
as candidates for further outsourcing. 14 In light of the imperative 
to cut costs and manpower, CS actions in the fuels and CE support 
arena are not surprising. 

Fuels activities are generally assigned to supply squadrons 
in separate fuels flights. These flights manage the requisition, 
receipt, storage, issue, quality, and accounting of all petroleum 
fuels and cryogenic products. 15 A CONUS-based or deployed 
fuels management flight generally has responsibility for fuels 
operations (control, distribution, and storage of fuels, 
propellants, and cryogenics), as well as quality control and 
inspection, accounting, training, and mobility. 16 In Air Force 
operational commands, fuels support activities generally tie 
directly into or interface on a regular basis with other key 
operational functions, including operational support, 
contracting, transportation, and CE squadrons. 

Since 1993, responsibility for managing the Air Force fuels 
infrastructure and the general provision of fuel has been divided 
between the Air Force and the Defense Logistics Agency’s (DLA) 
Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) (formerly the Defense 
Fuel Supply Center). Today, DESC is responsible for renovation 
or major maintenance, repair, and environmental expenditures 
related to fuel operations worldwide, as well as new construction. 
The Air Force is responsible for minor maintenance and fuel 
operations at existing installations and tactical fuel operations. 
In addition, DESC owns all DoD fuel until it is dispensed to mobile 
equipment, such as ships, aircraft, and ground vehicles. 17 

The fuels career field currently employs around 3,500 people, 
with the vast majority being active duty Air Force personnel. From 


8 


Air Force Journal of Logistics 



this field, the Air Force staffs its temporary overseas commitments 
(Southwest Asia, for example) and operates and maintains its 
CONUS installations. The current Air Force operations tempo has 
resulted in several hundred of these fuels specialists being in 
temporary duty status overseas on any given day. 18 In addition, 
as the Air Force moves into fully staffing the Air Expeditionary 
Force squadrons, fuels support personnel are embedded in each 
of the expeditionary units. 19 

Efforts to subject this function to significant competitive 
sourcing or privatization are ongoing. In 1998, the Department 
of Defense contracted with the Logistics Management Institute 
(LMI) to assess the potential for privatizing fuel infrastructure at 
military installations. LMI reviewed five sites in detail (including 
all three Services) and, in October 1998, provided a report with 
four alternative strategies for attracting the private sector to the 
DoD fuels arena. These strategies included accepting a private 
firm’s services on DoD assets in return for a portion of the fuel 
product {productplus tariff ), shared use, bundling of several DoD 
assets to promote privatization, and exchange of land for real 
estate. 20 All these alternatives involved private sector operation 
of the fuels support activity. The report concluded, “DoD should 
consider privatizing the fuel infrastructure at sites where it is 
financially advantageous ” 21 

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics 
tentatively endorsed this conclusion in July 1999, with 
privatization of CONUS fuels infrastructure to be pursued, where 
appropriate, on a test basis before the end of 1999. 22 During fiscal 
year 1999, the Air Force analyzed two locations for carrying out 
these privatization tests: Nellis AFB, Nevada, and Hickam AFB, 
Hawaii. Both bases, despite being identified as high-priority sites 
in the LMI study, were rejected for immediate privatization 
because of the fear of added loss of trained active duty fuels 
support personnel and construction financing issues, 
respectively. 23 

In addition to this activity, staff from the Office of the Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics proposed the transfer of 
responsibility for all CONUS, Alaska, and Hawaii fuels operations 
from the Services to DLA in fiscal year 2001. This proposal 
included the transfer of all civilian fuels and fuels-related 
employees to DLA, with all military personnel to be phased out 
of day-to-day operations over a 3-year period beginning in 2001. 
DLA would “give priority to providing the lowest cost 
operational mix of commercial and civil servant workforce based 
on economic analysis, within the constraints of civil service 
manpower billets transferred to DLA.” 24 While this initiative was 
rejected after stiff opposition from major military commands, the 
proposal was symptomatic of the level of frustration felt at senior 
DoD levels over the pace of fuels outsourcing/privatization. 25 

Most active duty CE personnel are assigned to separate CE 
groups or squadrons, with duties including fire protection, power 
production, operations, and utilities. 26 CE personnel are also 
organized by teams for deployment as part of Prime Base Engineer 
Emergency Forces (Prime BEEF) and/or RED HORSE (Rapid 
Engineer Deployable, Heavy Operations Repair Squadrons 
Engineer) teams for heavy construction. 27 In light of their 
involvement in base construction and maintenance, CE activities 
interact with most Air Force base operations when in the CONUS 
or deployed. 

Considering its CE support requirements, the Air Force has 
attempted, throughout the downsizing and draw down initiatives 


of the last several years, to ensure its CE deployment 
requirements are met. As noted previously, positions considered 
deployable are not currently subject to outsourcing, although 
the Air Force basically staffs its CONUS bases using both 
installation requirements and potential deployment 
requirements. 28 Only those positions considered nondeployable 
would be subjected to outsourcing competitions. Based on Air 
Force guidance regarding implementation of Defense Reform 
Initiative #20 (a DoD document providing guidance on what 
should be considered inherently governmental or otherwise 
exempt from competition), there are virtually no CE positions 
under current coding that could be competed. If contractors are 
brought into a deployed location, they are used as additional 
resources for mission sustainment, not to replace existing 
military positions. The opening of a bare base is still considered 
a job for the active duty Air Force CE component. In light of the 
pressures involved and the commercial alternatives available, 
however, this practice may not continue to be the standard. 

While efforts to keep deployable positions considered 
essential exempt from CS consideration have generally been 
effective to date, there are already stresses in the system. For 
example, the fuels career field is already approximately 130 
active duty personnel short of its desired level, based on current 
staffing levels and the number and intensity of overseas 
deployments. 29 Nevertheless, the perceived need to meet the cost 
and manpower targets cited have driven proposals to make 
deeper cuts. 30 This process could result, if pressures to cut costs 
and manpower do not ease, in reducing numbers of active duty 
personnel to a level that, even if contractors take over many 
services, may endanger mission effectiveness. 

Support Service Contractor 
Performance Questions 

Responsive support service contractor performance is a key 
requirement of the component commander, especially when 
military operations or combat begins. The criticality of such 
support goes without saying. The Air Force cannot meet mission 
requirements without timely, effective support, and the inability 
of a contractor to perform raises serious concern. For example, in 
a 1997 deployment, a fuels supply contractor promised adequate 
fuel deliveries from local sources at a base in Bahrain, where part 
of the Air Expeditionary Force was to be based. Immediately 
before deployment, the local contractor notified the Air Force it 
would only be able to supply about one-third of the required fuel. 
US embassy involvement was required to obtain the necessary 
fuel to fill the gap. 31 

Continued downsizing and outsourcing has resulted in a force 
with little additional capacity to fill in if contractors are not 
present. The DoD Inspector General found in a June 1991 audit, 
“If contractors leave their jobs during a crisis or hostile situation, 
the readiness of vital defense systems and the ability of the Armed 
Forces to perform their assigned missions would be 
jeopardized.” 32 That statement was made when 1 American in 
50 deployed to the Persian Gulf was a civilian; the Bosnian 
conflict included civilians at a rate of 1 in 10. 33 By 1998, the US 
military force commitment in Bosnia as part of the SFOR 
(stabilization force) was capped at 7,800 personnel. One study 
estimates the number of contractor personnel (both US and local 
nationals) exceeds the number of deployed military forces. 34 A 


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9 



contractor’s ability to provide surge capability is a critical factor 
in how successful a private firm’s performance will be measured. 
However, requiring a contractor to maintain a surge capacity for 
performance may be looked upon as inefficient excess capacity, 
costing the government dearly in peacetime. 35 

A March 1999 Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA) report 
addressed many of these issues. The report included findings that 
the status of contractor personnel as combatants or 
noncombatants under international law when deployed with 
military forces and the ability of the component commander to 
keep contractors performing in combat conditions were not yet 
resolved. 36 While most contractors have stayed and worked in 
previous combat and near-combat situations, there are currently 
no requirements beyond contractual terms to keep a contractor 
and its employees in the field should combat occur. 37 Recent 
analysis of this problem seems to indicate the military, in light 
of its dependence on these contractors, will have no other 
alternative than to accept and try to minimize the risk of 
contractors choosing to leave. 38 If these personnel leave in 
significant numbers, the military will not be able to handle the 
load on its own, and core warfighting abilities and military 
personnel safety will be threatened. 

A more insidious threat to US military capabilities in a 
contractor-rich, deployed environment is the potential for 
corporate blackmail. This threat could be directed against 
multinational corporations or US companies whose primary or 
subsidiary operations and personnel support DoD deployments. 
In the future, the Department of Defense could be faced with key 
contractors deciding their personnel will not deploy or will be 
withdrawn from a deployment based on threats against 
worldwide corporate interests. Corporations with multinational 
interests may decide the loss of a DoD contract is less of a business 
risk than the loss of more vital business interests or personal safety 
in other areas. A potential adversary’s ability to disrupt or delay 
the military’s ability to project and sustain forces by successfully 
threatening US corporate interests directly supporting those 
forces, may prove to be a troubling Achilles’ heel in the coming 
years. 

Contractor Personnel 
Protection Concerns 

Contractor employee force protection, particularly in light of 
increased private sector support services, is another troubling 
issue. Most support service contractors cannot provide rear area 
security and rely on the military for force protection. This leads 
to resource and mission problems for the military: 

Force protection people are a scarce commodity. Often at overseas 
locations, other support personnel augment the force protection 
personnel. The Khobar Towers after action report even 
recommended the use of other (nonforce protection) personnel to 
augment the force protection mission. As military support forces 
are privatized, the resources for augmentation of the security forces 
dwindle . .. , 39 

This problem is exacerbated by the expansion, through 
potential opponents’ weapons systems, of the battle line. For 
example, conventional weapons, such as long-range artillery and 
missiles on the Korean peninsula and in Southwest Asia, extend 
the hazard for private sector personnel to at least 53 miles behind 
the battle line. 40 


Increased private sector support services usually also result 
in an increase in the local national population hired to support 
US deployments. For example, under the initial logistics civilian 
augmentation program (LOGCAP) contract awarded to Brown 
& Root, the local national contingent at times numbered about 
13,000-14,000, with a US or expatriate contingent of about 1,700 
leading and supervising their operations. These foreign nationals 
were initially screened by checking with the local police. Those 
who passed this screening were placed under 100 percent 
surveillance by US or expatriate personnel during working 
hours. 41 If similar practices are followed on subsequent support 
contracts, persons who sympathize with actual or potential 
adversaries may be allowed into US military facilities until more 
extensive security checks are completed. This problem becomes 
more acute as the ratio of military and civilian personnel on 
deployments continues to narrow and surveillance is limited 
when US contractor personnel are restricted to specific bases or 
locals because of heightened threats. For example, after the US 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed in 1998: 

... unarmed personnel [contractors] were restricted to the bunkers 
unless escorted under arms to other locations. Contract supervision 
for 75 days was severely restricted to nonexistent. Military forces 
were also taken off the line to perform escort duties for unarmed 
DoD civilians and contractor personnel. 42 

As cited by the AFIA: 

It must be assumed that LNs [local nationals] pose a significant 
overt or covert risk to the deployed forces. As the number of 
contractor personnel increase so must the government oversight. 
Outsourcing 10 support positions does not mean that 10 more 
military forces are available to support mission requirements. The 
increases in support positions are not only QAEs [quality assurance 
evaluators] but also personnel involved in force protection 
[Emphasis supplied]. 43 

In prior conflicts, the risk incurred from one or a few local 
nationals being unsupervised or having minimum security 
checks would have been relatively low. However, today, the 
ability of one person to sow biological or chemical weapons 
through a densely populated US military encampment presents 
perhaps too high a risk. 

Cost Concerns 

A key factor in moving support functions toward public/private 
competition is the generally accepted assumption that 
competition of such processes with the private sector leads to 
substantial savings for the government. While the potential 
savings may vary between analyses, cost savings of 
approximately 30 percent are considered typical. 44 This cost¬ 
saving assumption generally focuses on the private sector’s 
ability to control wages, the need to pay for military or federal 
civilian pension and other benefits, and the multiskilled 
performance flexibility attributed to private sector employees 
(particularly when compared with often unionized federal 
civilian employees). Other sources measuring private industry 
outsourcing do not find the level of savings cited, but reductions 
of about 9 percent, with corresponding increases in capacity and 
quality, can be found. 45 

Other factors not necessarily included in this assumption of 
cost savings, however, should be taken into account. While many 
military service functions may be identified for competitive 


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Air Force Journal of Logistics 



sourcing based on the availability of the same or similar private 
sector services, the cost savings in such areas, measured in actual 
cost performance after contract award, may not be so clear. The 
downstream cost-saving question was addressed in a December 
1996 analysis of facility management costs at Naval Air Stations 
(NAS) Fallon, Nevada (contractor-provided), and Miramar, 
California (government-furnished), for fiscal years 1992 to 1996. 
Taking into account regional cost and requirements differences, 
the study found that out of nine facility management areas 
studied, only three showed significant savings from contractor 
services. One area had similar costs, and five areas were 
“significantly cheaper at NAS Miramar using in-house forces.” 46 
The study concludes: 

In summary, any blanket statement that outsourcing is cheaper is 
not always true. Careful studies are needed on a case-by-case basis 
before deciding which functions to outsource. Cost savings are 
achievable through outsourcing, but they are also achievable by 
using in-house forces. 47 

Concerns about downstream contractor costs are not limited 
to facilities contracts. The LOGCAP omnibus support services 
contract is another instance where cost data can be interpreted 
differently. The public pronouncements on the success of the 
contract are widespread and generally accepted, with savings of 
$140 million dollars being cited. 48 Other reports, however, refer 
to Army concerns that it is paying too much for these services— 
the contractor in Bosnia exceeded the first year precampaign 
planning estimate by more than $110 million—even while 
expressing satisfaction with the contractor effort. 49 Prior federal 
outsourcing contract studies indicate that, while cost savings in 
the 20-30 percent range are predicted, these savings are often 
based on initial estimates rather than long-term savings. The 
actual savings are often considerably lower or, in some cases, 
nonexistent. 50 

Another part of the total contract cost calculation must take 
into account added costs taken on by the Services (for example, 
force protection and other types of support for contractor 
personnel) when using the private sector during deployments. 
Private firms currently enjoy fairly low training costs when 
providing these services, as they often employ former military 
personnel who have the training, security clearances, and other 
attributes that allow them to quickly meet contract requirements. 
Hiring these personnel today reduces the private sector’s training 
and security clearance costs. As the Department of Defense 
continues to downsize and outsource, these costs are almost 
certain to rise. All these considerations taken together will almost 
certainly reduce actual cost savings when the Services use 
deployable contractor support services. 

Careful choices must be made and detailed market analyses 
used when determining whether a deployable function deemed 
commercial should be subject to competition, using the actual 
total costs of private sector performance (including the factors 
cited). This review should also take into account whether 
reengineered military organizations could produce similar cost 
savings, especially if statutory and regulatory barriers to such 
actions are removed. 51 

Continuing defense budget reductions may well result in a 
lower overall potential for a robust, competitive marketplace for 
certain types of military service support contractors. If this market 
does shrink and the number of contractors diminishes, the ability 


of these contractors to make acceptable market profit will 
diminish without the higher prices paid by the military. In 
combination with the emerging preference under procurement 
reform initiatives for extended contract periods, close 
cooperation between contractors and the government in drafting 
performance requirements, and the eventual reduction in the 
military’s organic ability to perform these functions, continued 
CS actions could result in the DoD substantially subsidizing the 
private sector’s ability to provide these basic services. Using 
competitive sourcing to take advantage of perceived short-/ 
medium-term cost savings may result, over the long haul, in more 
expensive contractor-provided support services. 

Active Duty Force Concerns 

The downsizing efforts of the last 10 years have cut into the 
number of people available for duty in support services and has 
contributed significantly, along with an overall increase in the 
number of deployments, to an increase in operations tempo for 
active duty support personnel. The use of outsourcing as a way 
to mitigate the effects of such downsizing and stretch the 
military’s ability to cover missions has worked to a degree, but 
limitations in the application of this solution may be coming to 
the fore. 

If the impetus for outsourcing these functions continues, the 
Air Force will have to be concerned about the loss of a trained 
pool of military personnel. Once the Air Force outsources such 
functions, there will be little opportunity to retain these skills in 
house. There is no assurance as these functions are relinquished 
that the Air Force will be able to maintain its technical 
proficiency in these areas or that contractors will retain an 
adequate knowledge base (at least without substantially 
increased training costs), especially when short-term contracts 
(less than 5-year base periods) are used. One solution to this 
problem is to simply exclude certain key functions from 
competition, as the Air Force did in excluding about 100 of the 
more than 600 CONUS utility systems under review. The Air 
Force rationalized that these facilities must be run by military 
personnel to ensure CE units are properly trained and can perform 
their duties in a deployed environment. 52 

Another concern is the need to ensure a place for deployed 
active duty personnel to come home to if base support services 
continue to be outsourced. If, for example, CS actions result in 
CONUS support operations being increasingly performed by 
contractor personnel, deployed active duty personnel in those 
functions may find their roles usurped by the private sector upon 
their return. This could result in the active duty force being 
required to be more multiskilled to cover different specialties 
not subject to contracting out—not a bad result on its face, if 
training and experience in applicable specialties can be 
maintained. The other result might be, however, that as active 
duty military personnel are increasingly relegated to military 
essential, deployable activities, these people may find 
deployments steadily increasing, with even greater negative 
impacts on force retention and morale than those experienced 
today. Such concerns dictate a corporate rethinking of the 
existing system to ensure mission demands are met. 

The Contractor Management/ 
Integration Imperative 

A key problem in this arena is the Services’ lack of comprehensive 
planning to manage and integrate private sector support 


Volume XXIV, Number 1 


11 



contractors in a deployed environment. In fact, there is no 
evidence the Services can even centrally track contractors in any 
particular deployment or even their reason for being there. In 
1991, the DoD Inspector General issued a report that included 
statements that the Department of Defense had; 

... no capability to ensure continued contractor support for 
emergency-essential services during mobilization or hostilities, no 
central oversight of contracts for emergency-essential services, no 
legal basis to compel contractors to perform, and no means to 
enforce contractual terms. 53 

The DoD’s responses to this IG report sidestepped the issue, 
stating, among other things, the need to identify “the number of 
contracts is not the important factor; the need is to make sure we 
are able to carry out our mission.” 54 This information, however, 
is vital. No component commander today can make rational 
decisions about combat or support requirements without 
knowing what contractor support can be relied upon. 

The 1999 AFIA report reveals the Air Force is still facing 
similar problems. The report summarized that overall contractor 
support was highly effective and that its implementation was 
more than adequate for noncombat operations. 55 The summary’s 
balanced tone, however, belies critical findings in potential 
wartime support. The report revealed there are no essential 
contractor service planning procedures or standardized approach 
for establishing contractor personnel oversight at deployed 
locations and current processes are reducing deployed contractor 
effectiveness. 56 The report included determinations that 
inspectors could find no consensus on who owned the support 
contractors and: 

. . . most locations did not have any idea how many contractors 
were on an installation or who the contractors were. In some 
instances , command and control of contractors was maintained 
thousands of miles away [Emphasis added]. 57 

The criticality of the contractor visibility issue arises out of 
the need to ensure essential support gets to the deployed forces 
when needed. It does not seem, however, that Air Force policies 
and doctrine truly address how contracted support will be 
deployed in a rational and planned manner. Some senior military 
personnel interviewed as part of the AFIA report believed 
civilians not included on UTCs must be excluded from 
deployments because of concerns over force protection and 
logistics support. Other Air Force units, on the other hand, are 
already pursuing placing contractor employees on their UTCs 
because of the mission-essential nature of their tasks. 58 The report 
also found: 

Once the issue of placing contractors into an [sic] UTC is resolved, 
the focus changes to moving them to the battlefield. Here, the 
TPFDD [time-phased force and deployment data] is the process 
used to accomplish this in the most time and resource effective 
manner possible. In fact, one interview mentioned that if contractors 
are not in the UTC/TPFDD, but are required on the battlefield, there 
could be massive confusion and delays caused by the military and 
the contractors competing for limited transportation resources. If 
doctrine establishes that contractors will be present on the 
battlefield, then policy needs to be developed to detail how that will 
effectively happen [Emphasis added]. 59 

While the Services are beginning to consider integrating and 
coordinating deployed contractor support, solutions seem to be 
a long way off. For example, senior military service logistics and 
supply personnel participating in an integrated joint logistics 


wargame, Focused Logistics Wargame 2010, in the summer of 
1999 found use of in-theater logistics and support contractors 
was a major issue. The October 1999 wargame results were not 
encouraging, as a key finding in the assessment of contractor 
logistics support execution was the “lack of coordination between 
the acquisition and logistics communities is creating an 
unmanageable logistics support environment on the 
battlefield.” 60 Concerns regarding this issue included: 

• Contracts were being written without adequate consideration 
for theater integration. 

• In-theater personnel faced a complicated mix of support 
arrangements. 

• The flow of contractor support and materials was not 
integrated under the theater CINC’s control. 

• The uncoordinated flow of contractor personnel into the 
theater complicated the CINC’s responsibilities for force 
protection, clothing, housing, medical, transportation, and 
legal arrangements. 61 

The participants focused on the DoD’s greater reliance on 
contractor support for these services, the segregation of the 
acquisition and logistics communities, and the lack of standards 
or requirements in the planning process as key causes of this 
problem. 62 The impact of this problem, which surfaced in every 
wargame event where extended sustainment support was 
required, included the: 

• Free flow of personnel, materiel, and equipment without 
theater CINC visibility or control. 

• Subsequent creation of multiple support mechanisms that 
complicate theater logistics coordination. 

• Lack of force protection, base operations support, and status- 
of-forces agreement/legal coordination with theater CINC 
requirements. 

• Lack of integration of contractor and DoD information 
systems. 63 

A draft joint publication, including guidance on contractors 
in the theater, addresses some of the concerns and calls for 
integration of theater support contractors directly into logistics 
plans and orders. 64 However, the draft document is silent in terms 
of how a supported theater commander would ensure movement 
and visibility of deployed contractors, coordinate their actions 
and incorporate them into TPFDD documents, move contractor 
assets and personnel into the theater, and ensure contractor 
compliance with local laws and regulations and theater-specific 
policies. In addition, the spring 1999 revision of Air Force 
Doctrine Document 2, Organization and Employment of 
Aerospace Power , makes no specific mention of contractor 
support despite detailed discussions of the logistics requirements 
in deploying air expeditionary wings. 65 

A key issue to consider when measuring a contractor’s 
effectiveness in such situations is whether the Air Force can 
integrate it into the entire deployed force. The risk of not 
including these services as actual factors in planning or exercises 
is obvious. Without practicing use of these functions or taking 
advantage of their availability in peacetime, the risk of delays 
and nonperformance in operational or wartime deployments 
increased sharply. Despite the concerns cited, the perceived 


12 


Air Force Journal of Logistics 



success of using contracted support services will almost certainly 
lead to their increased use in future deployments, with both 
positive and negative consequences. 

The LOGCAP/AFCAP Alternative 

In Bosnia I have three MACOMs: DISCOM, Signal, and 
Brown & Root . 

Brigadier General Pat Oneal (ADC[S], 1AD), Winter of 1996 66 

One potential solution to the contractor coordination problem 
in deployed operations is to turn over large parts of the support 
services process to one large firm. This concept has gained 
acceptance within the US Army under its LOGCAP, which has 
procured base operating support during every major Army 
deployment since 1992. 67 Originally intended to provide basic 
life support, engineering, and maintenance work for the Army, 
the initial contractor Brown & Root worked closely with the Army 
to expand contract coverage in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia to 
include other services such as air traffic control, all fuel storage 
and refueling operations, additional civil engineering tasks, and 
other activities. 68 The Army is pleased with the results of the 
LOGCAP and follow-on efforts putting such services in the 
private sector. This concept, however, does not come without a 
price and problems. Concerns over cost overruns (the contractor 
in Bosnia exceeded the first year precampaign planning estimate 
by $111.3M) and the increasing size of the program led Congress 
to request a General Accounting Office (GAO) review of the 
program. The 1997 GAO report found the Department of Defense 
needed to improve its contingency contracting efforts in many 
areas, including guidance, cost reporting, and monitoring. 69 

The Air Force is using a similar concept through a $450M 
contract awarded in 1997 to Readiness Management Support for 
installation support capabilities typically performed by CE and 
services personnel under the Air Force contract augmentation 
program (AFCAP). The AFCAP contract specifically tasks the 
awardee with sustainment responsibilities after at least some 
beddown tasks are completed, as well as all traditional CE 
capabilities except for crash/fire/rescue and explosive ordnance 
disposal, and all traditional services capabilities, except 
mortuary and field exchange services. 70 In addition, under an 
Army contract, the Air Force used Brown & Root for installation 
and supply support services, including base operations and 
airfield management, supply and maintenance, crash and rescue 
services, and aircraft refueling at Taszar Air Base, Hungary, 
during Operation Allied Force. 71 The appeal of using these types 
of contracts (lower troop requirements and easier contractor 
coordination) makes them an attractive alternative to extensive 
military service support infrastructure in deployed operations. 

Other Potential Management Solutions 

Another potential way to ensure a component commander 
maintains visibility, capacity, and control over deployed 
contractor support services is to restrict use of contractors to the 
locations where the deployed military supply distribution system 
begins (a theater management center or TMC) and ensure the 
component commander has control over the logistics system 
through creation of a distribution management center (DMC). 72 
The DMC commander would be the single focal point for 
distribution of supplies on the battlefield or operational area and 


would have the authority to cut through command and agency 
layers to ensure essential materiel flows to critical locations. The 
DMC would be tasked to create a workable theater supply 
distribution plan linked to the CINC’s logistics guidance and 
sustainment flow from the CONUS. 73 Integration of private sector 
firms into the logistics system would be done cautiously and in 
a limited way with the TMC’s primary focus in sending supplies 
being the supported commander. Private firms supporting units 
on the battlefield or operational area would be coordinated 
through the DMC, increasing control over distribution 
management. 

A key difficulty in implementing this approach would be 
providing powerful independence to the DMC to control 
logistics and support activities across organizational boundaries. 
Another issue would be the criteria identifying the point where 
DMC control over supply distribution from private firms would 
begin. 74 The use of omnibus deployment support contracts such 
as LOGCAP and AFCAP may be able to mitigate many of the 
concerns cited regarding the need to coordinate, harmonize, and 
integrate contractor activities, as the theater commander has one 
point of contact. The TMC/DMC concepts could also mitigate 
these problems in a different way through centralizing contractor 
control in a deployed environment. 

One partial solution to concerns over contractor performance 
would be to ensure that all contractors and their employees 
would be subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice in a 
combat zone. The feasibility and complexity of imposing such 
a requirement is beyond the scope of this article. If implemented, 
this could raise confidence in contractor performance in deployed 
environments, even if it limited the number of contractors willing 
to operate in these theaters. A related initiative would be to 
mandate, via contract, employment of a certain percentage of Air 
National Guard or Air Force Reserve personnel in key positions. 
This concept could prove highly effective in meeting the need 
for responsive deployment of both military and contractor 
personnel. Depending on the contingency, key personnel with 
necessary skills would already be in theater, either called to 
active duty or employed by the appropriate private sector 
contractors. 

An alternative to contractor performance would be to allocate 
a significant percentage of initial deployment support service 
activities to the National Guard or the Reserve. If properly 
managed and resourced, this could eliminate many of the 
concerns regarding active duty force overdeployment and 
whether such active duty forces would have positions at CONUS 
bases should these be subjected to competitive sourcing. The 
functions placed under National Guard and Reserve 
responsibility would only be called upon as needed for 
deployments. Use of this concept could, in large measure, offset 
many of the concerns cited regarding use of contractors, 
including force protection, cost overruns, and failure to perform 
once the battle line moved close to support elements. 

One concern with this concept involves the ability of such 
National Guard or Reserve support service activities to deploy 
in a timely manner in short-notice contingencies. Such concerns 
might call for the retention of certain levels of specialties in a 
rapid reaction, active duty support force. National Guard and 
Reserve forces could follow soon to continue this activity once 
deployed and either continue performance in a sustainment mode 
or turn the activity over to the private sector. Another concern 


Volume XXIV, Number 1 


13 




regarding this concept would be the ability of and need for such 
National Guard or Reserve activities to maintain proper levels 
of training and expertise to act quickly and effectively in a 
deployed environment and still meet Air Force cost and budget 
reduction targets without putting undue additional strain on the 
Guard and Reserve. This could be accomplished as long as the 
Air Force, using the Total Force concept, made the appropriate 
commitment to training, equipping, and employing these forces. 

A second alternative that could be pursued would involve the 
transfer of responsibility and overall control to the service with 
the predominant need for the required support services involved 
in a joint deployed environment. If, for example, a deployment 
depended primarily on fixed-wing aircraft deployment, the Air 
Force would take the lead on providing support services. An 
Army detachment would take primary responsibility in a 
deployment if rotary-wing aircraft were the primary focus. This 
concept could lead to further cost and personnel-saving 
opportunities through reengineering of support service activities. 
However, the initial cost of coordinating these activities would 
likely be high and the interservice obstacles formidable. 

In determining whether contracted support services are 
effective, the ability of the force commander to have visibility 
and control over and the ability to integrate these private sector 
providers in an area of operations is absolutely vital. This 
capability must become second nature, rather than using 
contractors on a trust-me basis. To make this concept work for 
the Air Force, these ideas will have to become robust, 
thoughtfully considered concepts taking into account both the 
problems and the advantages of using the private sector in certain 
key areas. Methods to encourage the maturation of this concept 
should include: 

• Enhancing partnering arrangements through special 
contracting rules and developing and implementing standard 
acquisition policies and requirements for such support 
services. 

• Clearly determining which functions must be performed by 
military personnel and which can be contracted out. 

• Developing integrated information systems between 
deployed contractors and participating Air Force units. 

• Integrating LOGCAP or similar constructs in logistics 
planning. 

• Involving outsourced support services in theater-level 
exercises, with senior representatives from current 
deployment-ready firms already under contract attending. 

• Expanding Air Force, joint, and interagency workshops and 
wargames/exercises to feature use of LOGCAP or similar 
constructs for essential support services. 75 

Only after such steps are taken will use of an omnibus support 
contractor or a number of support contractors be truly integrated 
into the Air Force’s deployable logistics infrastructure, 
inefficiencies reduced, and synergies exploited. 

Core Functions Reassessed 

While these potential solutions are essential for easing the 
pressure from ongoing competitive sourcing in Air Force support 
services, the most important changes to be made are at a more 
basic level. Changes must be made when determining whether 
support service activities are core or otherwise not subject to 


competitive sourcing competitions. The Air Force and its 
appropriate activities must continue to reassess the decision 
criteria regarding which support service activities will remain 
core are made, such as the current Air Force policy to exclude 
deployable positions from competition. The Air Force and the 
other Services have ostensibly used contractors to supplement 
their personnel in deployment actions, in essence, determining 
these tasks are not core in terms of having to be performed by 
military personnel. In fact, reviews of programs such as LOGCAP 
demonstrate the Services are, in fact, using contractor support to 
replace military personnel. 

CS proponents often look to the private sector for justification 
to contract out parts of the DoD mission considered noncore, 
basing the analysis on the business concept of keeping in house 
only those functions or processes that provide the customer value 
and the corporation a competitive advantage. A key issue, 
however, is, while private companies develop specific core 
competencies (McDonald’s in fast food delivery, Microsoft in 
consumer and business software, and so forth), these 
competencies are integrated , complex systems , not discrete 
functions. Core competencies can, in fact, be defined as those 
processes giving the firm a competitive advantage, built and 
sustained through a few highly focused mixtures of skills, 
technologies, process design, and concentrated corporate 
culture. 76 Core competencies are surely not just discrete 
functions that can be performed separately by other companies. 

The private sector has acknowledged this and keeps those 
functions in house that directly impact their ability to provide 
the consumer their preeminent product. The federal government 
and the Department of Defense, however, generally use the OMB 
Circular A-76 analytical model of reviewing discrete functions 
and whether the private sector can perform them, with only 
limited exceptions. In many cases, for simple tasks and those not 
directly affecting national security, this approach is valid. 
However, in cases where commercial tasks directly impact the 
deployed warfighter, whether on the battle line or behind, and 
where private sector performance of such tasks raises serious cost, 
security, or performance concerns, the Air Force must reassess 
whether such functions should be considered core —not just 
focus on location or deployability but on the secondary/ 
downstream effects on deployment effectiveness of using the 
private sector to perform these functions. 

The following criteria should be central to any such 
reassessment: 

• A consideration of the type of services required when 
deployed overseas, anticipated length of deployments for this 
support service specialty, and likelihood this specialty will 
be in combat conditions during deployment. 

• An assessment on what level of risk a private sector employee 
would subject other civilian and military personnel to if used 
in a combat support situation. 

• An analysis of the effect of using various mixes of public and 
private sector assets and personnel to flexibly and effectively 
deploy Air Force assets. This should consider the effect of 
using contractors both in deployed forces and at CONUS 
bases. 

• A review of the perceived need for each support specialty in 
likely deployments (two major regional conflicts versus 
humanitarian operations and so forth). 


14 


Air Force Journal of Logistics 




Adopting these recommendations and analytical criteria 
should ensure the Air Force receives maximum performance from 
its deployable forces (active duty, National Guard/Reserve, and 
federal civilians), as well as contractor personnel, at a reduced 
cost, without adding unnecessarily to force protection, contractor 
management/integration, or active duty deployment stress 
problems. 

Recommendations and Conclusions 

The benefits of contractor support are well known and numerous. 
Cost reduction, fewer military resources devoted to nonmilitary 
tasks, and synergies with private industry are just a few. While 
the Air Force will, for the foreseeable future, continue to pursue 
competitive sourcing as a key tool in meeting budget and 
personnel constraints and finding new moneys to modernize 
weapon systems, careful consideration needs to be taken in 
establishing criteria for such actions and analyzing where these 
activities may go too far. This concern becomes critical when 
discussing the actual or potential competitive sourcing of support 
services involved in expeditionary or other deployments. The 
ability of a component commander to track private sector 
contractors, utilize their capabilities in theater and integrate them 
effectively with the deployed force, and ensure essential support 
in combat and near-combat situations is absolutely vital to 
successful employment of Air Force units and contractors 
overseas. 

In balancing these fundamental considerations, it is no longer 
enough to review commercial activities in a functional manner, 
focusing on whether there is a private sector market available to 
provide the service. The Air Force must also examine the 
downstream/secondary costs of moving these services into the 
private sector, including additional Air Force assets in contractor 
oversight and force protection, retention of active duty forces as 
potential deployments increase, and risks to the active duty force 
should key contractors or their personnel fail to perform as 
required. 

Support service personnel today are closer to potential battle 
lines than ever before and are often the first or among the first to 
deploy. In low-intensity conflicts with a sympathetic security 
environment, such as humanitarian relief operations or 
peacekeeping after a political settlement is reached, extensive 
deployed contractor support services may entail few risks. In 
higher intensity conflicts, where security becomes a greater 
concern and the need for timely and effective performance 
becomes even greater, the risk of using contractor services also 
rises. 

This discussion leads to a number of options for the Air Force 
as it faces pressure for increased competitive sourcing. The Air 
Force may determine the risk of continuing competitive sourcing 
these support services is too great and eliminate these positions 
from further consideration. In light of the continuing pressure to 
reduce costs and personnel and with the existence of commercial 
sources for these functions (LOGCAP, AFCAP, and so forth), 
acceptance of this alternative seems unlikely. Another alternative 
is to employ one or a number of the alternatives in this analysis 
to try to balance risk and cost savings. Finally, the Air Force can 
decide to continue to march forward with existing competitive 
sourcing practices and assume remaining military personnel can 
handle the increased burden of fewer resources and greater 


responsibilities involved with increased deployed contracted 
support. 

Based on current trends, the Air Force will likely continue in 
its present course, hoping that informal arrangements and 
evolutionary change in the employment of deployable contractor 
supply support will cover its needs and eventually reduce stress 
on the active duty force. This approach may well prove 
unsuccessful. Even if the potential solutions provided herein— 
including use of omnibus private sector contractors for virtually 
all deployed support services, coordination of deployed support 
contractors through a distribution management center, greater 
utilization of Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve personnel 
for such deployable functions (separate from or in conjunction 
with the private sector or the other Services), and use of more 
joint supply services—are fully utilized, they will satisfy only 
part of the equation. The Air Force must also reassess its criteria 
for determining which processes and functions will be subject 
to competitive sourcing and make this decision based on the 
overall effect on the Air Force in deployment actions. This 
reassessment could eventually lead to a determination that the 
problems associated with this type of competitive sourcing 
outweigh its benefits, ultimately leading to a halt in this process. 
Performing this assessment sooner, rather than later, is imperative, 
as the future budget implications of reduced cost savings must 
be acknowledged and the loss of trained Air Force personnel for 
these functions, once private firms take over performance, is 
almost always permanent. 

In the end, all this comes down to a risk analysis. The Air Force 
is balancing the need to reduce costs with the need to ensure 
timely, effective, and dependable support services in deployment 
actions. A detailed assessment of fundamental support service 
needs during deployments—balancing the benefits (potentially 
reduced costs and fewer Air Force personnel involved overseas) 
of private sector support with its risks (increased force protection 
and contractor oversight costs, potential lack of control, and 
integration over vital support services)—is essential if the Air 
Force is to protect its personnel, continue to perform at a high 
level of excellence, and meet budget and manpower targets. 

The stakes are high. The failure of these deployed contractors 
to perform adequately, in combination with the increased strain 
upon a smaller number of military members, can increase the 
chances of mission failure and that US military and civilian 
personnel will become casualties. These concerns must be 
addressed. Only once this is resolved can the Air Force truly find 
the right mix between the public and private sector in its most 
important role, supporting the national security strategy around 
the world. 

Notes 

1. Maj Michael Stollenwerk, USA, LOGCAP: Can Battlefield 
Privatization and Outsourcing Create Tactical Synergy? Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army 
Command and General Staff College, 16 December 199S, 6. 

2. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition and Technology, Report of the Defense Science Board 
Task Force on Outsourcing and Privatization, Washington, DC, April 
1996, 6a. 

3. Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-76, Revised 
Supplemental Handbook, Performance of Commercial Activities , March 
1996, 35. 

(Continued on page 39) 


Volume XXIV, Number 1 


15 




16 


Air Force Journal of Logistics 
















L ogistics managers devote substantial skill and effort in 
designing efficient and responsive logistics systems. 
Sometimes, however, external shocks or changing 
circumstances require the best of logistics systems to be modified 
or to respond and adapt in unexpected ways. Such is the situation 
today in domestic and global logistics networks that must deal 
with the burgeoning problem of logistics crime. 

Consider these recent events that are symptomatic of the 
growing problem of logistics crime both abroad and 
domestically: 

• Masked robbers brandishing pistols burst into an Irvine, 
California, distribution center, tie up warehouse employees, 
shoot to death an escaping dock worker, and use the firm’s 
own truck to load up and make off with more than $12M in 
memory chips and circuit boards. 

• A senior buyer for a nationally prominent firm is charged in 
Kentucky with accepting bribes from at least two of the firm’s 
major suppliers over a period of years. Contracts in the 
millions of dollars are involved. 

• More than $600K worth of Macintosh computers are stolen 
from a parked C. R. England trailer in one of Colorado’s largest 
cargo thefts ever. 

• Armed pirates in a small motorboat board a 20,000-ton 
container ship in a safe anchorage area outside the harbor at 
Rio de Janeiro at midnight. The night watchman is 
apprehended at gunpoint. A second boat approaches them, 
and more armed pirates climb aboard. The crew is subdued at 
gunpoint, and the captain is confronted and required to open 
two safes and to reveal the vessel’s stowage plan. A third boat 
comes alongside the ship, and massive amounts of high-value 
cargo, cash, and the crew’s valuables are taken. 

• Armed bandits in Mexico, posing as highway police, 
commandeer a trailer loaded with $300K worth of merchandise 
from the United States. The rig is later found (empty). 

• In Dade County, Florida, a driver shows up at the freight 
forwarder and picks up a trailer full of fashion merchandise. 
The crime is discovered when the real driver shows up 30 
minutes later. 

• Last fall at the port of Los Angeles where intermodal 
containers were strewn about awaiting transport, in the early 
morning hours, thieves cut a security fence and stole the 
contents of ten containers, bringing the number of stolen or 
pilfered containers at that port for the year to more than 400. 
• On 1-880 north of San Jose, California, a van with no license 
plates pulls alongside an 18-wheeler that just left a computer 
supplier and tries to get the driver to pull over. When the driver 
ignores the attempt, the van’s occupants open the side door 
and brandish assault rifles. The truck driver instinctively 
swerves toward the van in an attempt to drive them off the 
road. The van brakes and scrambles away. 

This article addresses the nature, prevalence, and impact of 
logistics-related crimes on supply chain players and action 
logistics managers can take to control their exposure to logistics 
crime. Emphasis is on cargo theft, which is pandemic with 
invasion robberies, piracy, and hijacking. 

The Nature of Logistics Crime 

In today’s environment logistics-related crimes can and do occur 
at any point in the supply chain. The harsh reality is that all points 
and all players are potential targets for this kind of crime. 


17 





Table 1 categorizes logistics crime from the manufacturer or 
shipper’s perspective. Two major categories of crime, onsite and 
offsite, exist. Onsite crimes occur at the manufacturer, depot, or 
distribution facility. Offsite crimes occur at a third-party 
operation, typically when components or products are either in 
a carrier’s transportation equipment or facility or in a public 
warehouse. 


1 Onsite Crimes 

Offsite Crimes 1 

insider* 

Outsider* 

Insider* 

Outsider* 

Pilferage 

Theft 

Fraud 

Bribery 

Invasion robbery 
Burglary 

Pilferage 

Fraud 

Cargo theft on station 

Invasion robbery 

Burglary 

Thief driver 

Document fraud 

Phantom ships 

Cargo theft off station 
Document fraud 
Trailer/container theft 
Hijacking 

Piracy 

Note: Crimes ancillary to logistics include drug smuggling, money laundering, and transportation of 
illegal aliens. 

‘Insider/outsider categories relate to perpetrators. Any category of logistics crime may involve insider 
information. 


Table 1. Categories of Logistics Crime 


Onsite and offsite crimes can be further stratified into two 
subcategories: insider and outsider crime. Insider crimes are 
those that are committed by employees of either the firm or a 
third-party logistics services provider. Outsider crimes, although 
often facilitated by insider information, are committed by people 
external to the legitimate logistics network. Within each of these 
subcategories, the following types of crime can be identified. 

• Pilferage. The stealing of incidental quantities of materials 
or merchandise or theft of part of the contents of a shipping 
package is pilferage. 

• Theft. The term theft is used when whole cases, pallet loads, 
or containers of items are stolen. Whereas pilfered items are 
typically taken for the thief’s own use, the spoils of theft are 
generally sold for profit. Theft can be committed by insiders 
hiding in a facility until after hours (breakouts, unauthorized 
entry after hours, or tampering with inventory records. Theft 
by outsiders is defined as burglary or robbery. 

• Fraud. Deceit for economic gain is fraud. Fraud is generally 
the use of some form of false identification that causes an 
element within the logistics network to give up or relinquish 
control of an item. In logistics, this crime is typically document 
fraud for authorization to release a trailer or container or 
fraudulent bills of lading designed to direct legitimate cargo 
to an alternative location for illegal sale. 1 

• Bribery. Giving money or substantial gifts with the intent to 
influence a recipient’s actions constitutes bribery. The 
payer’s intent is to gain quid pro quo from the recipient. The 
line between gratuities from suppliers, carriers, and third-party 
logistics providers and bribes is hazy and is defined by the 
magnitude of the exchange and the intent and response. 

• Cargo Theft. The illegal appropriation of merchandise or 
materials that are being staged for movement or that are in 
transit defines cargo theft. Common forms of cargo theft 
include invasion robberies; drivers with false identities 
arriving to take in tow a loaded trailer; fraudulent 
documentation; hijacking of trucks; theft of parked rigs, 
trailers, or containers; piracy in port or on the high seas; and 
cargo acquisition by phantom ships. Phantom ships, operated 


by a syndicate, are general cargo vessels with repainted 

markings, false crew credentials, and fake registrations. 

The Prevalence of Logistics Crime 

Although logisticians are sensing an alarming increase in 
logistics-related crimes, hard data are hard to come by. This is 
the case for three reasons. 

First, reporting systems for collecting logistics-related crime 
statistics are limited. For example, no mechanisms exist for 
aggregating data on procurement bribery, pilferage, or contract 
fraud. 

Second, law enforcement officials have no unique category 
for reporting logistics crimes . 2 Theft of an 18-wheeler full of furs, 
for example, is recorded as vehicular theft, not cargo theft. After- 
hours theft of pallet loads of cellular phones from a manufacturer’s 
warehouse is reported as a burglary. If the crime occurs during 
operating hours and the perpetrators use guns, a robbery is 
recorded, not a logistics crime. 

Third, a propensity exists for under-reporting logistics-related 
crimes for reasons of insurance, publicity, and nuisance. 3 Some 
acts of piracy go unreported to protect the liner company from 
increased insurance premiums. Trucking companies do not 
always report trailer or container theft for fear of adverse publicity. 
Some victims of logistics crimes in the corporate world view the 
reporting and subsequent investigations as a further loss with 
little likelihood of a positive resolution. The crimes go 
unreported. 4 Nonetheless, statistical data on piracy and domestic 
cargo theft are becoming more available. 

Piracy 

Table 2 portrays summary facts on piracy. Note that reported acts 
have increased more than threefold since 1994. 5 The highest risk 
area for piracy is Southeast Asia, although Somalia and Brazil 
have had significant problems in their coastal waters with 
marauders boarding ships to plunder cargo. 6 Geographically, the 
problem is so severe in Somalia that ships have been advised to 
stay at least 50 nautical miles away from that country’s coast. 7 

More acts of piracy occur in the South China Sea and in the 
Strait of Malacca than anywhere else in the world. 8 The South 
China Sea is dotted with many uninhabited islands on which 
pirates can hide before and after their attacks. In the Malacca 
Straits, there are stretches where passages are so narrow and the 
water so shallow that precise navigation is required. Because of 
this, slow moving ships are often easy targets for the pirates. Once 
on board, they can commandeer the entire ship or make off with 
selected items. 

Both small groups of thieves and highly organized bands of 
pirates, armed with modem high-tech weapons, commit acts of 
piracy and intelligence concerning what the ships are carrying. 9 


Reported 

Occurrences 

Piracy by Reqion 

Piracy by Country 

1999—285 

1. Southeast Asia 

1. Indonesia 

1998—264 

2. Africa 

2. Thailand 

1997—229 

3. Central & South America 

3. Philippines 

1996—205 


4. Somalia 

1995—127 


5. Brazil 

1994— 90 


6. Nigeria 



7 . Guatemala 



8. Ecuador 


Table 2. Facts on International Piracy 


18 


Air Force Journal of Logistics 





Piracy is also turning increasingly violent. In 1998, 51 crewmen 
were killed, 30 injured, and more than 400 were taken hostage. 10 
In just one incident of piracy in 1999, 23 Chinese seamen were 
murdered. 11 The situation has become so threatening that the 
International Chamber of Commerce is now posting a weekly 
Internet report for ship operators warning of piracy attacks, their 
locations, and tactics. 12 

According to the International Maritime Bureau, in addition 
to the traditional form of piracy where malefactors board the 
vessels, an average of 20 phantom ship attacks occur each year. 
So-called phantom vessels sail under carefully faked documents 
and are used to steal upwards of $200M in cargo every year from 
East Asian docks. Most of these phantom ships are operated by 
groups of Chinese working out of Hong Kong, Taipei, Bangkok, 
and Singapore who target bulk cargoes that have a ready 
market—metals, minerals, timber. 13 

Cargo Theft 

The predominant type of logistics crime today is cargo theft on 
land. This is estimated to be a thriving $ 10B activity in the United 
States. 14 For comparison purposes, $10B is 3.1 percent of the 
nation’s annual surface transportation freight bill. Hijackings, 
burglarized trailers, container theft at ports, bank robbery style 
invasions of distribution centers, and other forms of cargo theft 
are growing at such alarming rates that firms, industry 
associations, and law enforcement joint task forces are launching 
a major counterattack. 15 

Several factors contribute to the recent escalation of cargo 
theft: 

• The pervasive use of containers in domestic and international 
logistics has encouraged cargo theft because of the increased 
profit potential. 16 Simply put, stealing a container is a much 
more efficient form of theft than going after individual cartons 
or loaded pallets. Oftentimes, sophisticated criminals target 
containers with merchandise valued in the millions. For 
example, one 40-foot container full of expensive perfumes or 
electronics can be worth upwards of $16M. 

• The huge increase in international trade has increased both 
the opportunity for cargo theft and created ready markets 
abroad where the loot can be sold for a fraction of its true value. 
The theft of cargo for export is rampant at our nation’s 
seaports. 

• Computers have made it much easier for insiders and hackers 
to gain access to shipment information that can be shared with 
accomplices and used to create fraudulent documentation. 

• Cargo theft is a low-risk activity. These crimes receive little 
public attention, and until recently, authorities had not put a 
high priority on cargo theft. Since cargo crimes often involve 
multiple jurisdictions, police agencies have not known how 
to investigate cargo theft. Additionally, sentencing guidelines 
for those convicted of this kind of crime are weak. 17 

• The electronic revolution has generated small-size, high- 
value merchandise that is portable with a ready market. 
Thieves are increasingly targeting this value-dense cargo. 

• The profit potential of high-value cargo with a ready market has 
been discovered by both organized and multinational 
criminal elements. 18 

• Drug traffickers have expanded their operations into cargo 
theft. The theft of computer chips and electronics has proven 


to be just as lucrative as the drug trade and is far less risky. 
For example, an ounce of cocaine and a Pentium chip can each 
be fenced on a street comer for about $600. 19 Obviously, it is 
far safer to be stopped with a Pentium chip than with cocaine. 
Thieves can drive down the road with computers and not worry 
about transporting something illegal. 

• Additionally, organized crime in the United States has joined 
with drug traffickers based in Latin America, Southeast Asia, 
and Eastern Europe to trade computer parts for drugs. These 
consortiums receive cocaine shipments from abroad, pay for 
them with stolen high-tech cargo, and ship the loot abroad 
where it is sold as legitimate cargo. According to cargo crime 
experts, the fact that microprocessors have become the drug 
criminals’ currency of choice is the single biggest contributor 
to the escalation of cargo theft in the United States. 20 

Table 3 identifies the cargoes and areas most victimized by 
thieves. Clearly, high-value products are disproportionately 
targeted, particularly computer chips and electronics. 21 


Predominant Items 
Targeted bv Thieves 

High Cargo Crime 

Areas Domestically 

High Cargo Crime 
Reqlons Abroad 

1. Computer chips 

1. Los Angeles/Long Beach area of 

1. Russia 

2. Electronics (for example, 
computers, cell phones, 

Southern California 

2. New York City/New Jersey 

2. Eastern Europe 

televisions) 

3. Furs, sports & designer 

3. Miami & South Florida 

3. South Africa 

apparel 

4. Other highly targeted cargoes: 

4. San Jose & the 1-5 Corridor to 

4. Brazil 

tires, tobacco, liquor, 
perfume, jewelry & gems 

Los Angeles 

5. Memphis 

6. Chicago 

5, Mexico 


Table 3. Targets of Cargo Theft 


At present, Los Angeles/Long Beach is considered the cargo 
crime capital of the United States. Southern California, New York 
City/New Jersey, and the Miami area are collectively known as 
the Bermuda Triangle of cargo crime because of the prevalence 
of container thefts at ports and intermodal terminals, thefts at 
distribution centers, stolen trailers, and truck hijackings. 22 

The situation has become so acute that some underwriters in 
London have recently withdrawn from insuring certain goods 
(computers, stereos, televisions, and designer jeans, for example) 
that move through these three cargo centers. 23 

In southern California, 1-5 is a major crime corridor. Gangs 
of illegal immigrants from Columbia, Ecuador, and Peru (known 
to authorities as the South American Connection) rent trucks in 
Los Angeles, drive up to Silicon Valley in northern California 
to perpetrate robberies at high-tech distribution centers, and 
return to Los Angeles to export the loot or fence it locally. 24 Other 
criminals case distribution centers in the San Jose area to observe 
motor freight shipping patterns. They then hijack the trucks 
loaded with electronics and bring the contraband down 1-5 where 
it can be exported from ports. 25 

Outside the Bermuda Crime Triangle, Memphis and Chicago 
are also high crime areas because they are major distribution 
nodes in several logistics networks. 

Internationally, Russia is the country most vexed with cargo 
theft. 26 Cargo crimes in both Russia and Eastern Europe inhibit 
supply chain connections with the West because reliable 
distribution networks in country are difficult to establish and 
keep secure. Other major international cargo crime areas include 
South Africa, Brazil, and Mexico. The escalation in lawlessness 


Volume XXIV, Number 1 


19 





in South Africa, where 5,773 truck hijackings alone were reported 
in 1998, has caused major disruptions in distribution networks. 27 

Kodak reports losing $1M a year in cargo theft in Brazil, where 
the biggest problem is the hijacking of trucks. 28 Other companies 
report similar problems in Mexico. 29 In fact, one US manufacturer 
has lost so many shipments of running shoes to highway bandits 
in Mexico that the firm now puts sneakers for the left foot in one 
trailer and those for the right foot in a separate rig. Another major 
manufacturer doing business in Mexico allows for two hijackings 
per month in its operating budget. 30 

Table 4 summarizes a number of salient cargo theft 
characteristics. 


! $10 billion per year direct cost 1 

Insiders help orchestrate up to 85% of cargo thefts.* 

15% exclusively 
outsiders. 

60% of crimes occur during transit.** 

40% of cargo crimes occur in 
warehouses or transfer 
facilities. 

85% of in-transit cargo theft involves motor carriers. 

Other 

modes. 

Organized crime involved in 40% of thefts. 

Small local gangs or individual criminals commit 
60% of cargo crimes. 

‘Authoritative estimates on the involvement of insiders in cargo theft vary between 50% & 85%. 

"For high-tech cargo, 70% of theft occurs in transit. New security measures at electronics distribution 
facilities nationwide have reduced the proportion of crimes occurring onsite 


Table 4. Domestic Cargo Theft Profile 


Insurance investigators and law enforcement agencies believe 
more than half of all cargo thefts involve employees or ex¬ 
employees. 31 When the definition of insiders is expanded to 
include contractors and business partners, some estimates of the 
proportion of thefts orchestrated by those in positions of trust 
are as high as 85 percent. 32 

Prior to 1997, more than 50 percent of all cargo theft occurred 
at distribution or transfer terminals. However, an increase in on- 
station vigilance and new security measures in the last few years 
has led to a shifting of cargo theft to in-transit crimes. In-transit 
crimes now account for 60 percent of all cargo theft. 33 

Of the cargo crime occurring during transit, 85 percent of the 
losses involve motor carriers, followed by maritime, rail, and air. 34 

The FBTs Cargo Crime Task Force estimates that 40 percent 
of cargo thefts are carried out as an organized criminal conspiracy 
with the collusion of port workers, truck drivers, freight 
forwarders, dispatchers, and warehouse employees. 35 

The Impact of Logistics Crime 

Logistics crimes impact both the emotional and physical security 
of the people involved in the supply chain or logistics networks, 
disrupt reliability in logistics services, increase insurance and 
transport rates, cause financial loss, contribute to higher prices, 
and have an economic cost on society. 36 The national shortage 
in truck drivers has been compounded by drivers leaving this 
field of employment out of fear of being hijacked. The 
International Maritime Bureau reports on the emotional toll 
piracy is taking on crew members at sea where attacks by modem 
Bluebeards are turning more violent. 37 Warehouses have become 
dangerous places to work with recurring instances of employees 
being maced, knifed, shot, and pistol-whipped. 38 

Today’s supply chains are designed for high efficiency with 
lean inventories. Inventories for continuous replenishment are 
largely in quasi warehouses on wheels or rails, afloat, or aloft. 
This pull-type logistics system makes cargo theft highly 
disruptive with plant shutdowns and customer service failures 
often being the end result. 


In economic terms, logistics crimes in all their dimensions 
have an obvious impact. Pilferage increases costs. Bribery distorts 
and suboptimizes a firm’s resource allocation decisions. Theft 
in the electronics industry is estimated to add $150 to the price 
of a personal computer. 39 Stolen products may reappear on the 
market at a low price and compete with goods that have moved 
through legitimate channels. Insurers are increasing deductibles 
(in many cases from $50K to $500K per incident), raising 
premiums, and in some cases, refusing to insure certain cargoes 
in specific transportation lanes. 

In terms of cost to society, the RAND Corporation determined 
cargo theft has multiple costs. In addition to the direct loss 
associated with the crime, indirect costs of reporting and internal 
investigations, enhanced security measures, police 
investigations, lost and displaced sales, reduced profits to the 
transportation industry, and increased prices to consumers can 
be a sixfold factor. 40 

The dollar magnitude of pilferage is difficult to assess. Risk 
management experts report that pilferage is pervasive, operating 
as a cancerous growth and, for most firms, a larger problem than 
theft. John Case, a leading security management consultant, 
states that as a national average for industrial and retail firms, 
three out of ten employees pilfer and the cost of pilferage far 
exceeds the cost of theft. 41 

Collective Approaches to the Problem 

Government and law enforcement agencies, industry 
associations, and professional groups are taking concerted actions 
to deal with the crisis in logistics crime. These include the 
following actions. 

• The National Association of Purchasing Management has 
formulated guidelines and training materials to deal with 
gratuities and the potential for bribery in procurement. 
Logistics management consultants have also developed new 
expertise in crime prevention and have substantially 
increased their services in the areas of loss prevention 
strategies, physical facility design for security, and new crime 
deterrent technologies. 

• Twenty-five high-technology companies have banded 
together to organize the Technology Asset Protection 
Association to issue security guidelines on international 
cargo handling and strategies for evaluating security 
procedures of carriers. 42 

• The American Trucking Association, a strong voice for 
elevating the status of cargo theft to a federal crime, recently 
established a national cargo theft information and prevention 
service. This capability allows trucking firms and law 
enforcement officials use a secure Internet to share details on 
cargo crimes. 43 

• The Western States Cargo Theft Association, a law 
enforcement and industry partnership dedicated to 
eradication of cargo theft and hijacking in California, now 
communicates information on criminal methods and 
appropriate defensive strategies. Their Internet site posts hefty 
rewards for tips leading to the recovery of specific heists. 44 

• The National Cargo Security Council was formed in 1997 as 
a coalition of transportation providers and government 
agencies for developing best practices to foil cargo crime. 45 


20 


Air Force Journal of Logistics 




• In early 1999, President Clinton set up the Interagency 
Commission on Crime and Security at US seaports. This 
commission—involving senior officials from Treasury, 
Justice, and Transportation—has already recommended stiffer 
penalties to deter cargo theft at port cities and may recommend 
mandatory licensing of all dock workers. 46 

• On 9 January 1999, Senator Thomas A. Daschle (D-South 
Dakota) introduced Senate Bill 9 (Subtitle H, Deterring Cargo 
Theft). This pending legislation, cosponsored by 17 Senators, 
expands the definition of cargo crime under federal 
jurisdiction, increases federal sentencing guidelines for cargo 
theft, and establishes a national database on cargo theft. The 
bill will also require the Attorney General to submit an annual 
report to Congress, evaluating law enforcement activity 
relating to the investigation and prosecution of cargo theft. 47 

Suggestions for Logistics Managers 

Examining an organization’s exposure to logistics-related crimes 
suggests that managers must deal with the prospects of onsite 
crimes committed by both insiders and outsiders. In addition, 
managers must control their risks incident to offsite crimes when 
their products are in the custody of a third party or being 
transported by private fleet. 

Written and Communicated Policies and Procedures 

Managing an operation’s exposure to logistics crime begins 
by developing clear policies and a loss prevention plan. The 
process requires engaging and coordinating with logistics 
partners (contracted operations and transportation companies, 
for example) and may require the retention of a loss prevention 
consultant. 48 

A firm must articulate to its employees and partners its 
expectations concerning honesty and its policies and procedures 
relating to crime prevention. Further, it must communicate to all 
trusted agents the impact that logistics crime can have on their 
common well being. 

A loss prevention plan will incorporate written policies and 
procedures and directives for physical security measures, 
employee screening, document and communications security, 
evaluation of transportation providers, driver identification and 
control, and employee and work management. 

Loss prevention campaigns with prominently displayed 
posters and tips bulletins—coupled with recurring training 
sessions to communicate corporate policies on accepting 
gratuities, no-exception accountability records, safeguarding the 
confidentiality of documents and computer records, controlled 
access, need-to-know communication restrictions, reporting 
suspicious behavior, challenging unknown individuals, and 
using an anonymous tip line—form the basis of an internalized 
loss prevention plan. Employees must understand the 
organization’s top-to-bottom commitment to high ethical 
standards and loss prevention. 

Physical Security 

The ultimate in physical security begins with a building 
design that divides the facility into cells protected by locked doors 
that can only be opened by electronic code. 49 Such a 
system, coupled with controlled access from the outside and 
electronic tracking of all movement of people and inventory 
within, makes invasion robberies, thefts, breakouts, and pilferage 
almost impossible. 


The full range of physical security measures includes fences, 
security guards who do random and double-back patrolling, 
ample interior and exterior lighting, closed-circuit television 
cameras, a uniform identification and sign-in system, employee 
parking lots away from inventory storage areas and outside fences, 
intrusive detection alarms (infrared, acoustic, or mechanical), 
good housekeeping, separation of shipping and receiving areas, 
and all dock doors closed when not actively receiving. Other 
measures include limiting the number of exits employees can 
use and rotating security guard assignments to discourage 
fraternization with employees who may turn out to be dishonest. 

Employee Screening 

The majority of logistics crimes can be traced to insiders, 
including reconnaissance done by temporary employees, 
suppliers, customers, and contractors. 50 As a result, a 
comprehensive loss prevention plan must involve criminal and 
credit checks on new employees, independent contractors, and 
other insiders. Such screenings require careful adherence to law. 51 

Document and Communications Security 

Firms should insist on no-exception accountability. No cargo 
should move without a document (or a computer record with bar 
code and scanner tracking), even if it is being shifted within the 
warehouse itself. Bills of lading and packing lists must be 
controlled. Employee access to electronic data interchange (EDI). 
(Dishonest employees use access codes belonging to coworkers 
to trace shipments for a robbery or to deliberately misdirect a 
shipment to set up a theft.) Limit discussions on inventories and 
shipments to a need-to-know basis. Drivers must be cautioned 
not to talk about the loads they carry, both on the CB and at truck 
stops. Thieves must not be guided to the merchandise with labels; 
nondescriptive packaging must be used and logos removed from 
containers. 

Evaluation of Transportation Providers 

Because the majority of cargo theft occurs offsite, the 
evaluation of security practices of the transportation providers 
and freight forwarders is crucial. 52 Security conscious third 
parties will incorporate such practices as: 

• Employee background checks. 

• Instructing drivers to be mum on cargoes and routes. 

• Parking the rear of the truck against a wall or never leaving a 
truck unattended. 

• Advanced locking mechanisms on the rear of cargo trucks, 
including alarmed devices, controlled access to and within 
freight terminals, transponders, and the Global Positioning 
Satellite system for multimodal and worldwide tracking of 
freight. 

• Use of secure containers with heavy duty barrier seals that are 
drill and pick resistant. 

• EDI transmittal of documentation to limit ability to change 
bills of lading and so on. 53 

One of the best ways to assess the security practices of a carrier 
is to insist on seeing evidence that the carrier’s insurance 
company has audited and approved the plan. 

With respect to carrier liability and insurance, shippers must 
understand limitations to which they may be subjected. For 
example, a carrier may limit its liability to $250K per trailer or 


Volume XXIV, Number 1 


21 


container even though the value of the contents far exceeds this 
amount. Insurance is typically not available for motor freight into 
Mexico. 

With the high levels of cargo theft today, insurance companies 
have substantially raised the deductibles carriers must pay 
(particularly for high-value cargo). 54 Shippers need to evaluate 
the financial posture of prospective carriers to ensure carriers can 
meet these hefty deductibles. It is particularly important to assess 
the financial position of carriers who are self-insured. 

For international shipments, shippers must be alert to the fact 
that carriers are being denied insurance protection for some high- 
risk ports (south Florida, for example). 55 For ocean freight 
(particularly freight moving through areas of high piracy), the 
shipper must confirm the freight is protected by an all risks 
policy. 

Driver Identification and Control 

Firms should demand photo identification and authorizing 
documentation from all outside drivers. Providing a driver 
waiting room or establishing a line in the warehouse that drivers 
are not allowed to cross is also prudent. 

Employee and Work Management 

Security consultants report that compensation levels directly 
affect theft rates, since employees view pilferage as a tax-free 
bonus for being underpaid. 56 Mangers must not only promote a 
sense of mission efficiency and cost objectives among 
employees but also ensure that pay is equitable. 

Managers must also design work assignments in procurement, 
warehousing, and shipping to ensure separation of duties. 
Additionally, buyers, traffic managers, inventory managers, and 
other key players should occasionally be rotated to other duty 
areas or positions. Separation and rotation of duties reduces the 
ability of one individual to perpetrate a logistics crime. 

Employees must be trained in the need-to-know 
communications philosophy on the job and instructed in not 
talking about their company’s affairs and procedures in public. 57 

Employers should provide a problem-solving forum or an 
employee assistance program for associates with financial 
difficulties, substance abuse problems, or even mental health 
difficulties. Such a program can defuse the propensity for insiders 
to perpetrate logistics crimes. 58 

Finally, employees must be made formally accountable for 
losses. This is best done through training and by having each 
employee sign a form that states clearly all company policies 
relating to honesty and integrity, including causes for dismissal. 

Conclusion 

Logistics managers need to become aware of the growing risks 
of becoming a victim of logistics crime. These crimes can occur 
onsite (bribery, pilferage, and records tampering) or offsite 
(container theft, robbery, and hijackings). Further, most logistics- 
related crimes of both categories involve insiders. 

The most burgeoning problems are cargo theft (domestically 
and internationally) and piracy on the high seas. In dollar 
magnitude of loss, however, the most significant problem may 
be pilferage. Perhaps the most pernicious problem is bribery of 
decision makers because this crime can go undetected for long 
periods and distorts critical resource allocation decisions. 

The trends in cargo crime are particularly serious: escalating 
rates, growing involvement of drug traffickers and organized 

22 


crime, increasing violence, and more sophisticated executions 
involving insiders and fraud tied to the computerization of 
freight handling. 

The FBI recently reported, “The theft of cargo has become so 
widespread that it constitutes a serious threat to the flow of 
commerce in the United States.” 59 

The growth in logistics crime in the last decade has gone from 
random and insignificant to a serious problem that is increasing 
costs to logistics players, consumers, and society at large. 

Efficiency in supplier choice and reliable inbound deliveries 
and efficiency and reliability in outbound distribution are at the 
heart of modem economic activity. Logistics crimes not only are 
expensive but also dismpt the reliability and efficiency that form 
the backbone of modern logistics networks. 

Leading-edge logistics managers of today must modify their 
practices and introduce new controls to reduce the risk of being 
victimized by logistics crimes. 

Notes 

L J °hn Publicover, Jr, Intermodal Cargo Transportation: Industry Best 
Security Practices, PB 99-152761, Volpe National Transportation 
Systems Center, US Department of Transportation, 1999, 61. 

2. “Cargo Theft: America’s Most Hidden Crime,” Traffic World 13 April 
1998, 11 

3. Tim Minahan, “How Sound is Your Cargo Security Plan?” Purchasing 
Magazine , 22 May 1998, 22-26. 

4. John P. Mello, Jr, “Stop, Thief!” CFO Magazine , October 1997 29- 
30. 

5. Robert Mottley, “Is Your Cargo Insured from Pirates?” American 
Shipper , January 1996, 67. 

6. International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against 
Ships Report for 1999 , London, January 2000, ii. 

7. “China is urged to Crack Down on Piracy,” American Shipper, 
November 1998, 73. 

8. Ibid. 73. 

9. “We’re beginning to see more ships being attacked on the basis of the 
types of cargo that they are carrying. Somehow they are acquiring 
information from industry sources.” Thomas J. Timlen of the Baltic 
and International Maritime Council in Denmark, an organization that 
tracks worldwide piracy statistics, as quoted in “Piracy Modem Style,” 
American Shipper , March 1997, 72. 

10. US Government, International Trade Data System, “Topic of the Week 
Series: Maritime Piracy,” (NDC2), Springfield, Virginia, 1999. 

11. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for 1999. 

12. “Reports of Piracy Attacks and Warnings” [Online] Available: 
www.icc-ccs.org. 

13. Marine Watch Institute, “Phantom ships: Piracy’s Newest Twist in Asia,” 
news brief, Point Reyes Station, California, 1996. 

14. Technology Asset Protection Association “Facts and Stats” [Online] 
Available: http://tapa3.org/facts.htm and “Cargo’s Bad Boys: Whatcha 
Gonna Do?” Inbound Logistics, Vol. 19, No. 7, July 1999, 84. 

15. Toby B.^ Gooley, “Hands Off! Organized Gangs of Thieves Want Your 
Freight,” Logistics Management and Distribution Report, 1 February 
1999, 7-9. 

16. When first introduced, containers greatly reduced pilferage and theft 
because containers secured freight. However, in recent years, criminals 
with the right equipment see a lucrative new target, and new and more 
sophisticated patterns of theft have developed. See Intermodal Cargo 
Transportation: Industry Best Security Practices, 68. 

17. “Hands Off! Organized Gangs of Thieves Want Your Freight,” 9. 

18. “Highway Robbery,” Silicon Valley News, 14 February 1999. 

19. “How Sound is Your Cargo Security Plan?” 22, and “Stop Thief'” 
30. 

20. “Facts and Stats.” 

21. Canadian Board of Marine Underwriters, Report of the Loss Prevention 
Committee, 1998, Mississauga, Ontario, 3. 

22. “South Florida Becoming ‘Casablanca’ for Cargo Theft,” Naples Daily 
News, 3 January 1998. 


(Continued on page 40) 

Air Force Journal of Logistics 



Proactive Support to the Warfighter 


Lieutenant Colonel 
Joseph M. Codispoti 


The DLA 
Integrated 
Consumable 
Item Support 
Model 

A s the nation’s logistics combat support agency, the Defense Logistics 
Agency (DLA) is charged with the primary role of providing supplies and 
services to America’s military forces around the globe. As a provider of supplies, 
DLA manages more than 4 million consumable items—more than 90 percent of the 
consumable items in the Department of Defense. 1 Traditionally thought of as a nuts- 
and-bolts supplier of low-cost, low-impact items, under the Consumable Item Transfer 
(CIT) program, DLA has inherited the management of thousands of consumable items 
from the Services. As a result of CIT, DLA now manages many more high-impact, 
show stopper items that directly support warfighting. 


Although DLA defines itself as a combat 
support organization, it spends 
comparatively little energy defining the 
combat requirements it could be 
expected to support during 
contingencies. A perusal of the Agency’s 
strategic plan indicates a clear orientation 
toward peacetime support, not the 
expected wartime needs. The plan 
addresses a need to comprehend 
customer requirements and produce 
integrated combat logistics solutions, but 
combat support is absent from the 
Agency’s specific goals and objectives. 
However, DLA is not completely to blame 
for its peacetime orientation. The 
Services typically do not identify 
credible wartime requirements to DLA 
and do not appropriately identify which 
DLA items are critical to the operation of 
combat essential systems. 2 Nevertheless, 
DLA is not well postured to project and 


potentially meet the Services’ wartime 
requirements. 

ICIS Tasking 
and Objective 

The Integrated Consumable Item Support 
(ICIS) model is DLA’s effort to help the 
Agency take a proactive approach to 
warfighter support. 3 In December 1993, 
former DLA Director Vice Admiral 
Edward Straw voiced concern about 
DLA’s inability to determine how well it 
could support large-scale contingency 
operations. The Desert Shield/Desert 
Storm experience left him concerned 
about how much longer DLA could have 
supported a medium- to high-level 
operations tempo. Of particular concern 
was the mandate to slash the inventories 
DLA had relied upon during the Gulf 
War. How long could DLA support future 


wars with significantly reduced 
inventories? Admiral Straw’s concern led 
to the formation of a task group to 
develop a tool to answer the following 
questions: 

• What are my war stopper items? 

• What weapon systems will be affected 

by lack of these war stopper items? 

• When will I run out of stock? 

• What investment decisions should I 

make today to better support 

tomorrow’s contingencies? 

The task group (eventually named the 
Warfighting Integration Team and 
hereafter referred to as the ICIS team) set 
out to develop a tool to meet the 
director’s tasking. The objective was to 
“continuously assess DLA’s ability to 
meet Service consumable item support 
requirements during major theater war 
and other high demand scenarios.” The 
final product would be DLA’s ICIS 
model. 4 

The first two challenges in the 
director’s tasking were to identify DLA’s 
war stopper items, hereafter referred to as 
critical items, and determine the weapon 
system application. The ICIS team 
defined critical items as items whose 
failure would render a combat essential 
system not mission capable (NMC) or 
partially mission capable (PMC). 5 
Combat essential systems, identified by 
the Services, are major end items used by 
combat arms, combat support, or combat 
service support personnel in the theater 
of war. War stopper items could thus 
range from power supplies on F-16 
aircraft to filters on water purification 
units. 

With the concurrence of the Air Force 
Materiel Command (AFMC) Studies and 


Volume XXIV, Number 1 


23 




Analysis Office (AFMC/XP-AO), the ICIS 
team used the following criteria to 
identify Air Force critical items: 

Mission Item Essentiality Code (MIEC) 

(3 d position) = E or F 
Level of Indenture (LOI) = 1 or 2 
Source, Maintainability, Recoverability 

Code (SMR) (2 d position) = O 

Using these criteria, the team captured 
items that would cause an NMC or PMC 
condition (MIEC criteria) and be 
removed and replaced by the warfighter 
on the flight line (LOI/SMR criteria). 
These are the same criteria used by 
AFMC to determine items most likely to 
have an immediate impact on combat 
operations. 6 

The applications, programs, and 
indentures (API) file, managed by the 
AFMC Item Management Division 
(AFMC/LGI), contains the set of 
component items for Air Force aircraft 
and engines. Equipment specialists in the 
air logistics center system management 
shops maintain the database for their 
respective aircraft and engines. The ICIS 
team receives the API annually, applies 
the critical item criteria, and produces a 
filtered list of Air Force critical items, by 
weapon system, for use in ICIS analyses. 7 
This process builds the database to 
answer the first two questions in the 
tasking—what are my critical items and 
to what weapon systems do they apply? 
The ICIS team completes the joint force 
critical item set by using Service 
databases to pick out items and weapon 
system applications. The important 
aspect of the critical item identification 
process is that DLA is using Service data 
and an approved methodology. 

To answer the third question—when 
will I run out of stock?—The ICIS team 
modified DLA’s sourcing model to create 
the new general sourcing model (GSM). 
The GSM basically compares expected 
demand to DLA inventory and projects 
how well DLA might be expected to 
support the combat operation. 8 

The fourth question in the tasking was 
overcome by events when funding for 
war reserve stock for DLA-managed 
materiel was transferred from DLA to the 
Services. The director’s intent was to 
determine how much readiness could be 
gained with increases in war reserve 
funding. Armed with ICIS assessment 
results, the director could better defend 
requests for increased war reserve funding 


from Congress. Although the original 
intent of the director’s tasking is no 
longer valid, DLA can still use ICIS to 
identify potential sustainment problems 
and initiate proactive investment 
measures; for example, surge clauses, 
direct vendor delivery capabilities, or as 
a last resort, increased inventory. 

Assessment Process 

The ICIS assessment process can be 
divided into three basic parts: input, 
sourcing, and output. 

Input. The basic building block for the 
ICIS assessment is a flow of forces and 
equipment to a theater of operations. The 
time-phased force and deployment data 
(TPFDD) is the primary force flow data 
source in ICIS. For Air Force units, the 
TPFDD will identify the type of unit, 
number/type of aircraft, number of troops 
deploying, deployment location, and 
required delivery date at the deployment 
location. Gleaning this data from the 
TPFDD, ICIS can determine, for example, 
that 72 F-16C/D aircraft and 1,500 Air 
Force troops are deploying to Kwangju 
Air Base on D-plus-3-day. 9 

The next piece of critical input data is 
the planned operating tempo 
(OPTEMPO) for weapon systems. The Air 
Force data source is the Readiness Spares 
Package (RSP) Authorization Document, 
also known as the War Mobilization 
Plan-5 , or WMP-5. This document 
provides planned sortie rates/durations 
for each combat aircraft identified in war 
plans. It is used by the supply community 
to build RSPs and used in ICIS to 
determine projected flying hours for 
deployed aircraft. Suppose the WMP-5 
OPTEMPO for F-16 aircraft is 2.5 sorties 
per day with an average sortie duration 
of 2 hours. ICIS would apply these rates 
to all F-16 aircraft deployed to the 
theater. In our example, the F-16s at 
Kwangju would be flying 360 hours per 
day (2.5 sorties x 2 hours/sortie x 72 
aircraft). 10 

The next bit of information would be 
the critical item set and failure factors for 
those critical items. As described 
previously, the Air Force critical item set 
is extracted from AFMC’s API file. The 
failure factors are derived by comparing 
the annual demand for the item with the 
flying hour profile for the weapon 
system. The annual demand is extracted 
from DLA’s requisition history file and 


the annual flying hour profile is extracted 
from the programs portion of the API file. 
If the Air Force requisitioned 50 Type A 
circuit cards for the F-16 during 1998 and 
the F-16 fleet flew 10,000 hours in 1998, 
the failure factor for Type A circuit cards 
would be 50/10,000, or .005 per flying 
hour. Continuing our example, the F-16s 
at Kwangju would demand 1.8 (360 x 
.005) circuit cards per day. ICIS would 
calculate demand for Type A circuit 
cards (and all other F-16 items) for the 
entire F-16 fleet in theater and pass the 
expected daily demand to the assessment 
process. The model will repeat this 
process, for all item/weapon system 
combinations, each day of the scenario. 11 

Sourcing. The daily demand per item 
is segmented by weapon system and 
Service. For example, if a DLA item is 
common and critical to F-15 and F/A-18 
aircraft, ICIS will project separate 
demand streams for Air Force F-15C/D 
and F-15E, Navy F/A-18C, and Marine 
Corps F/A-18D aircraft. Sourcing is 
accomplished by comparing demands to 
inventory (actual and projected due-in), 
and demands are either filled or placed 
on back order. Using this basic process, 
ICIS assesses how well DLA could be 
expected to support joint force 
requirements for the given operational 
scenario. 12 

Output. ICIS produces three basic 
types of output: metrics, a problem item 
list, and an operational availability (A o ) 
model interface file. The first of three 
metrics is fill rate, which is the percentage 
of demands filled during the assessment. 
If the expected demand for an item is 
10,000 and DLA fills 9,000 demands, the 
fill rate is 90 percent (9,000/10,000). The 
second metric is average number of back 
orders, which depicts the potential hurt 
for an item. An item with a very high 
average number of back orders has the 
potential to impact a significant number 
of combat essential weapon systems. The 
final metric is projected response time 
(PRT), which measures the time from the 
date of demand until the item is received 
in the theater. The higher the PRT, the 
longer it takes, on average, for DLA to 
satisfy demand. As noted earlier, ICIS 
creates separate demand streams for each 
item/service/weapon system combination. 
As a result, ICIS creates separate sets of 
metrics for each combination. 13 

The second output is the problem item 
list. This feature uses the same three 


24 


Air Force Journal of Logistics 



metrics but allows the user to specify 
problem item criteria to produce a 
prioritized list of potential problem 
items. For example, the user could set 
parameters to request items with a fill rate 
less than 70 percent and PRT greater than 
100 days. The user then sorts by PRT to 
list items starting with the highest PRT 
of record on down to a PRT of 100 days. 
The problem item list provides 
logisticians a tool to sort through the 
thousands of items and focus on the most 
critical few. 14 

The third output is an interface file for 

the A models, such as the Air Force’s 

0 

aircraft sustainability model (ASM). 15 
The ICIS Team met with AFMC/XP-AO 
and LGI to collaborate on ASM-ICIS 
input. The first test file was passed to 
AFMC in late summer for evaluation. 
AFMC is gleaning fill rate and PRT for 
Air Force critical items and fusing the 
expected back order information for 
DLA-managed items with non-DLA 
managed items, mainly Air Force- 
managed recoverable items. The ASM 
will then produce a composite hurt list 
that shows the items with the potential for 
causing the greatest number of holes in 
combat essential aircraft. The ASM-ICIS 
collaboration will mark the first time a 
Service will have considered the impact 
of DLA-managed items on A o . The ICIS 
team is pursuing similar collaborative 
efforts with the Army and Navy; the 
Marine Corps has no A o model. 

Commodities 

ICIS currently assesses all DLA-managed 
commodity types, except Class VIII 
(Medical). The Kwangju F-16 example 
illustrated the combat critical Class IX 
(Repair Parts) commodity assessment. 
ICIS also assesses Class I (Subsistence); 
Class II (Clothing and Textiles); Class 
IIIB (Bulk Fuel); Class HIP (Packaged 
Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants [POL]); 
Class IV (Construction); and noncombat 
critical repair parts, which includes 
support for intermediate and depot 
maintenance. Subsistence assessments 
consider the unique production and 
distribution capabilities with a warn and 
highly preplanned industrial base. Bulk 
Fuel assessments, which are beyond the 
scope of this article, use a unique 
sourcing routine tailored to this very 
specialized commodity. 16 The remainder 
of this article focuses on the commodities 


(excluding fuel) that directly affect the A o 
of combat essential weapon systems and 
equipment—namely, repair parts and 
packaged POL. 

Air Force Data 
Limitations 

The ICIS model exposes holes in the Air 
Force logistics data arsenal. Deficiencies 
vary by commodity type but are most 
acute in the critical repair parts realm. The 
following is a summary of deficiencies 
for repair parts and packaged POL. 

Packaged POL. The Army is the only 
Service adequately tracking packaged 
POL consumption. Given the criticality 
of oils, lubricants, hydraulic fluids, and 
other packaged POL products, the Air 
Force needs a master packaged POL 
database. For lack of data, ICIS uses 
peacetime consumption to project Air 
Force wartime demand. 17 The aircraft 
maintenance, transportation, and civil 
engineering communities could identify 
the types of packaged POL required for 
deployed aircraft/vehicle types, as well 
as facilities and support equipment, and 
develop consumption factors based on 
flying or operating hours. They should 
also account for fluid change 
requirements supporting planned 
maintenance and/or prescribed by 
technical orders. The end result would be 
consumption factors, based on actual 
operations, for use in projecting combat 
requirements. Today’s factors, based on 
pounds per person per day, are squishy at 
best for assessment purposes and perhaps 
only marginally useful for projecting 
nonunit cargo lift requirements. 
Additionally, many of these items are 
environmentally hazardous. A better 
educated requirements projection may 
help reduce the stocks initially deployed, 
as overseas disposal can be costly and 
politically sensitive. 

Repair Parts. This commodity 
represents the most critical subset of 
DLA-managed items. While the Air Force 
maintains a configuration database in the 
API file, data robustness varies 
dramatically by weapon system. For 
example, the ICIS-filtered critical item set 
for the F-16 includes around 200 items, 
while the C-130 critical item file includes 
around 4,000 items. 18 While some 
disparity can be attributed to the size and 
complexity of the weapon system, a great 
deal is actually attributed to the 


comparative energies of the equipment 
specialists who populate the API. 
Representatives in the F-16 System 
Management Division admitted that API 
management was an extremely low 
priority for their equipment specialists. 
When the paucity of F-16 data was 
elevated to General George T. Babbitt, 
then Director of DLA, his handwritten 
note to the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Logistics sparked intensive effort in 
AFMC to populate the API. 

As noted, Air Force failure factors in 
ICIS are derived from peacetime demand 
and peacetime flying hour programs. A 
more precise failure factor could be 
gleaned from base-level issues, provided 
maintenance technicians properly 
annotate the SRD on issue requests. 19 
The current ICIS methodology is 
sufficient but does not use the best 
available data. 

Perhaps the largest omission in the 
critical repair parts area is the total lack 
of data for systems other than aircraft and 
aircraft engines. AFMC has no API 
equivalent for vehicles, support 
equipment, communications equipment, 
materiel-handling equipment, or other 
deployable equipment items. Even if 
such a database existed, the Air Force does 
not clearly or consistently document in 
the TPFDD the numbers and types of 
equipment deploying to the theater. By 
contrast, the Army assigns a line item 
number (LIN) to every piece of unique 
equipment introduced to the inventory. 
Army planners identify specific pieces of 
equipment by inserting the LIN and the 
quantity deploying in the Level 4 detail 
of the TPFDD. The Air Force could use 
the SRD for the same purpose, 
identifying the type of equipment by 
SRD and quantity deployed in Level 4 
detail. Currently, ICIS must be 
programmed to read a free text field to 
determine the deploying weapon 
system—a process hampered by the 
unique annotations of each planner 
populating the TPFDD database. 20 By 
identifying deploying equipment in the 
TPFDD, identifying critical component 
parts, and tracking repair part failure 
factors for equipment other than aircraft, 
the Air Force could alleviate a hole in its 
wartime repair parts data. 

The intermediate/depot repair part 
portion of ICIS currently projects 

(Continued on page 41) 


Volume XXIV, Number 1 


25 





Understanding the National Security Policy-Making Process: 
Why Logisticians Should Care 

Major Vicki J. Rast 


This article highlights research findings from interviews with 135 
US Government policy makers and briefly accents the importance 
of understanding the national security policy-making process 
for logisticians. 

Policy Outcomes: Interagency Conflict 
Leads to War Termination 

The nature of the gap between diplomacy and warfighting 
ensures the interagency national security process develops 
policy to bring about war termination in the form of a cease-fire. 
However, it fails to achieve conflict termination in the form of a 
sustainable peace. This policy outcome is the result of 
interagency conflict that occurs because of defects in leadership, 
the absence of strategic vision, dissimilar organization cultures, 
disparate world views (for example, political ideologies and 
philosophies regarding the use of force), and the absence of an 
integrated interagency planning mechanism to conduct ongoing 
crisis analysis and option generation. Together, these factors 
impede the effective development of crisis analysis, end-state 
vision, termination criteria, and termination strategy. 

While it seems obvious to the observer, crisis analysis remains 
the most crucial aspect of policy development but presents the 
greatest opportunity for analytical dysfunction. Because decision 
makers lack strategic vision and focus on tactical-level issues, 
policy tends to address distinct parts of the conflict system (that 
is, the nodes—Bosnia) but not the problems engulfing the 
system as a whole (for example, the Balkans). Further, because 
the interagency process lacks an integrated planning mechanism 
and decision makers exclude issue-specific experts from crisis 
analysis processes, decision makers fail to address the underlying 
causes and conditions of conflict, promoting instead a temporaiy 
solution to the immediate crisis in the form of a cease-fire. The 
effects of interagency conflict on clearly visualizing the end state 
exacerbate this problem further. 

The ways in which decision makers frame crises hold great 
import for the development of the desired end state. By extension, 
this analysis frames the end-state vision. The nature of the crisis 
determines goals regarding the post-intervention environment. 
Again, the tactical focus employed by the decision makers causes 
them to frame the end state largely in terms of containing the 


conflict to prevent spillover. This tactical focus likewise negates 
the decision maker’s ability to clearly see the integration of the 
diplomatic, economic, military, and social instruments of power 
in a fashion that brings about long-term systemic change. Such 
a perspective promotes the development of conflict termination 
criteria that establish goals in terms of simply ending the 
fighting. 

The focus on inducing or forcing a cease-fire prevents decision 
makers from recognizing the relationship between termination 
criteria and the political objectives that shape end-state vision. 
Consequently, the clarity of a cease-fire (in terms of organized 
hostilities) overshadows the development of other less assessable 
termination criteria (for example, elections as a political 
criterion). In conjunction with self-limited crisis analysis and the 
absence of the desired end state, overreliance on a cease-fire as a 
verifiable criterion prompts decision makers to frame the 
remaining termination criteria in ways that fail to induce 
necessary systemic change but may bring about temporary 
improvements in a tactical sense. By extension, these factors act 
in concert to produce an intervention and termination strategy 
that employs courses of action aimed at ending the physical 
violence. However, they stop short of achieving positive 
systemic change toward sustainable peace. 

If you don't know where you want to go, any road will take 
you there . The truthfulness of this axiom applies in its entirety 
to termination strategy development. Even though decision 
makers may agree that something should be done, their inability 
to define the destination ensures that termination strategy 
development becomes an exercise in driving without a map 
(termination criteria) toward an unspecified location (end state) 
as a product of an incomplete conception of what needs to be 
done (crisis analysis). The inability to articulate those three 
elements of conflict termination policy produces an environment 
wherein development of the fourth (termination strategy) defaults 
to the lowest common denominator—the use of force to induce 
a cease-fire through creating a damaging stalemate. In the final 
analysis, the absence of an integrated interagency planning 
mechanism can only produce a strategy aimed at creating this 
temporary cease-fire (war termination) but not sustainable 
conflict termination. As the cases of the Persian Gulf and Bosnia 
illustrate, the application of force cannot end conflict for the 


26 


Air Force Journal of Logistics 




long term. Domestic politics magnify this problem, as the 
American public remains unwilling to accept casualties. Further, 
the perceived need to demonize the enemy to mobilize public 
support prompts decision makers to develop strategies that 
promote conflict escalation through the application of 
overwhelming force so they can sustain domestic (and 
international) support for their actions. Coupled with the need 
to save face, this dynamic ensures decision makers become more 
psychologically entrapped as they frame prior expenditures of 
blood and treasure as investments toward future success. 

In the final analysis, these boundaries synergistically constrain 
the decision maker’s capacity to consider alternative courses of 
action, making the use of force to bring about a cease-fire the 
most implementable option, irrespective of both short- and long¬ 
term consequences of that strategy. 

But I’m a Logistics Officer... 

Many of you in this particular audience are probably asking, 
“What is a maintenance/logistics officer doing thinking about 
these types of national security problems?” My response to this 
query is straightforward. Every person in uniform, as well as 
anyone else who has influence in the security policy process, 
needs to be thinking about national security, projections for 
future military intervention in particular. While I currently play 
a special role in educating mid-career officers through their 
intermediate service school experience, each of us has a duty to 
understand the roles that we as logisticians, commanders, and 
warfighters play in achieving national objectives and 
maintaining national security. This duty demands that we 
educate our comrades in arms regarding airpower’s unique role 
in achieving objectives and maintaining security. 

In the post-Cold War disorder, this understanding requires that 
we effectively articulate our roles to superiors and subordinates 
alike—both uniformed and civilian—and that we critically 
analyze the ways in which airpower can best achieve these 
objectives. At the squadron level, such communication requires 
that we internalize airpower’s contributions toward achieving 
the vision for the desired end state (during both peacetime and 
wartime). We must persuasively communicate that vision to our 
first- and second-term aircraft crew chiefs, supply technicians, 
logistics planners, and mechanics, as well as our lieutenants and 
captains. Our ability to retain and attract qualified people 
correlates directly with our individual ability to demonstrate that 
what we do every day directly affects national security. Young 
people today want to know they can make a difference. Because 
our career fields constitute the vast majority of Air Force 
personnel, our ability as logisticians to articulate that influence 
is a direct reflection of our individual leadership, leadership that 
affects retention rates in critical specialties. Without a broader 
understanding of the national security process and the role the 
Air Force plays (see, for instance, former Air Force Secretary 
Sheila E. Widnall’s “Air Force Contributions on National 
Security Strategy”), we fail to convince our people that what they 
do makes a difference, a perilous failure on our part! Our 
leadership and understanding play a crucial role above the unit 
level as well. 


At the strategic level, our lack of understanding of the 
national security policy-making process hampers our ability to 
articulate the role airpower uniquely plays in the pursuit of 
national interests and core objectives. A multidimensional 
problem too complex to elaborate herein, this weakness impacts 
our ability to fund the programs the Air Force foresees as future 
requirements while simultaneously limiting innovative thinking 
within the interagency, joint, and combined arenas. Reflect for a 
moment: what roles do you as a logistician play in this process? 

The problem for many of us is that we begin thinking about 
these role-specific issues far too late in our careers (senior 0-4 or 
0-5 level). By this time, our professional experiences have shaped 
our analytical techniques, promoting the adoption of the we *ve 
always done it that way mentality or, worse yet, prompting 
nonrated officers to have no opinion at all on these matters. 

Consequently, our capacity to develop alternative airpower 
employment ideas tends to mirror prior experience, focusing 
almost exclusively on bombing, airlift, and maintaining air 
superiority. Unarguably critical competencies, we have to ask if 
they represent the only ways in which airpower can contribute 
to maintaining national security. Hence, once assigned to key 
staff positions on the Air Staff, Joint Staff, or commander in chiefs 
staff—contrary to popular opinion, rated officers do not make 
these decisions in isolation—logisticians unnecessarily suffer 
steep learning curves to enhance critical analysis skills while 
honing their abilities to influence decision-making processes. 
As professionals in the application of armed violence, we need 
to develop our understanding of policy process dynamics before 
serving in these critical assignments. Granted, some lessons can 
be reinforced only through personal experience. However, 
enhancing our understanding of the policy process early in our 
careers ensures we enter these positions with our eyes and minds 
wide open. If, indeed, we are learning through our mistakes, at 
what cost does this learning occur? Who pays the interim and, 
perhaps, long-term price for our learning curvesl This point bears 
repeating. It is our responsibility as professional officers to 
develop an understanding of policy process dynamics before we 
begin to serve in positions that affect national policy, acquisition, 
and research and development of new weapons systems in 
particular. 

In the end, our ability to comprehend and articulate the role 
logisticians play in the national security process affects our 
nation’s capacity to employ airpower effectively and efficiently. 
Whether serving at the unit level (being primarily responsible 
for sortie generation) or at the command and staff level 
(envisaging and controlling the tactical, operational, and 
strategic employment of air assets), logisticians must be able to 
think innovatively about the use of airpower. Only then can we 
maximize our specialty’s unique contribution as we help leaders 
understand the role airpower plays in securing national 
objectives, while simultaneously convincing airmen of all ranks 
that their dedication and effort contribute directly to sustaining 
the security and prosperity of our nation. 

Major Rast is on faculty at the Air Command and Staff 
College. An aircraft maintenance officer , she has experience 
with F-16 deployments during Operations Desert Shield, Desert 
Storm , and Southern Watch. 


Volume XXIV, Number 1 


27 





Air Force Research Laboratory 

Deployment and Sustainment 
Research and Development 

The Air Force Research Laboratory Deployment and Sustainment 
Division (AFRL/HES) conducts research to improve Air Force 
logistics functions at the retail and wholesale levels and protect 
Air Force personnel in potentially toxic environments at 
deployed locations. Applications cover a broad spectrum of field, 
depot, and space operations with customers throughout the Air 
Force, Department of Defense, other government agencies, 
academic institutions, and US industry. 

To obtain more information about the following ongoing 
research projects, contact the program managers listed below or 
visit the Deployment and Sustainment Division’s home page at 
www.he.afrl.af.mil/hes/index.htm 

ABDAR Technology 

Objective. Enhance Air Force aircraft battle damage assessment 
and repair (ABDAR) by providing battle damage assessors, 
technicians, and engineers with quick and easy access to 
assessment and repair information. 

Approach. A contracted research effort with four major phases 
began in August fiscal year 1995. In Phase I, a requirements 
analysis was performed to identify information required by 
assessors and engineers to assess damaged aircraft. In Phase II, 
the design effort focused on providing ABDAR information to 
the user through a portable maintenance aid (PMA). The PMA 
will contain all the information required, including assessment 
and repair logic, technical orders, parts information, wiring 
diagrams, schematics, and troubleshooting data. A graphical user 
interface will allow the user to easily access and comprehend 
ABDAR information. The Phase III effort involved implementing 
the software design, authoring technical data, and integrating 
the system. Data for a specific test-bed aircraft were developed 
for presentation on the PMA. Finally, in Phase IV, system 
enhancements were made and a field test was conducted to 
evaluate system effectiveness and user acceptance. 

Payoff. Fast and accurate battle damage assessment and repair 
will lead to improved combat effectiveness, by reducing the time 


to get damaged aircraft back to mission capable status. Less 
experienced users will have better access to ABDAR information, 
reducing the reliance on highly trained assessors. Minimizing 
the amount of paper technical data and supporting information 
presently required will enhance deployment capabilities. 

First Lieutenant Steve Grace, AFRL/HESR, DSN 785-8422, 
Comm (937) 255-8422, steven.grace@he.wpafb.af.mil 

Monocular Display Devices and 
Alternative Computer Control Devices to 
Aircraft Maintenance 

Objective. Assess promising new monocular display and 
alternative computer input technologies for the presentation and 
retrieval of maintenance technical information for flight-line and 
depot maintenance. 

Approach. A series of experimental studies is being 
conducted to evaluate the devices for supporting various 
maintenance tasks. Initial efforts focused upon evaluating 
monocular display devices (MDD) and alternative computer 
control devices (ACCD) in a variety of environments. Efforts are 
focusing upon testing a variety of newly developed MDD and 
ACCD technologies. MDD devices include occluding and see- 
through displays. ACCDs include state-of-the-art speech-based 
controls and electromyographic (EMG) controls. EMG devices 
use electrical signals accompanying muscle contractions to input 
user commands. Seven studies and numerous usability 
evaluations conducted since 1991 have demonstrated significant 
improvements in performance of technicians using MDDs under 
a variety of conditions and for a variety of tasks. Initial ACCD 
studies using speech recognition technology have shown 
significant benefits to the technology but have also identified 
problems encountered due to noise. Studies are planned for using 
advanced speech recognition and special microphones placed 
in the ear. This work is being conducted as a joint effort with the 
AFRL Crew Systems Interface Division. 

Payoff. The payoffs to the Air Force will include improved 
maintenance performance, reduced maintenance down time, and 
reduced maintenance costs. 

Barbara Masquelier, AFRL/HESR, DSN 986-7005, Comm 
(937) 656-7005, barbara.masquelier@he.wpafb.af.mil 

Deployable Waste Management System 

Objective. Develop and evaluate a deployable waste 
management system to support bare-base operations. The system 
will process the primary types of waste produced during deployed 
operations, including municipal solid waste, medical waste, 
petroleum, fuels, waste water, and air emissions. 

Approach. The initial step will be to characterize (identify) 
materials that must be processed at typical deployed operations 
sites. Characterization of waste streams is necessary in order to 
ensure that the system will handle all materials encountered 
throughout a deployment. Concurrently, innovative 
technologies will be evaluated for application in the system. The 
technologies include revolutionary new processes as well as 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) systems. The most promising 
technologies for processing each type of waste will be identified. 
Also, opportunities to minimize waste at the source will be 
investigated. Preliminary system designs will be developed for 
evaluation of the most promising technologies and waste 
reduction techniques. Analytical models of the designs will be 
tested to evaluate the processing of waste streams expected from 



28 


Air Force Journal of Logistics 




a bare base. The analysis results will be used to determine which 
design will be fabricated for testing. After completion of the 
system, performance testing will be conducted involving 
individual component tests as well as total system tests. 
Following individual component testing, the system will be 
assembled to evaluate overall performance. Initial tests will be 
conducted in the laboratory, followed by tests in the field. 

Payoff. This effort will demonstrate the feasibility of a DMWS 
that provides cost-effective processing and neutralization of 
waste products produced during bare-base operations. Proper 
management of the waste materials will provide a safer, healthier 
environment for Air Force personnel, reduce the amount of 
cleanup required at the completion of the operations, and reduce 
environmental damage, promoting better relations with the host 
nation. 

Jill Ritter, DSN 986-4391, Comm (937) 656-4391, 
jill.ritter@he.wpafb.af.mil 

Logistics Control and Information Support 

Objective. To provide logistics personnel at all echelons within 
the wing-level complex proactive access to real-time, accurate 
information needed for decision support, and more effective 
utilization of logistics resources. 

Approach. The Logistics Control and Information Support 
(LOCIS) program is researching and developing technologies for 
an enhanced command and control capability for wing-level 
logistics personnel. LOCIS will provide easy access to logistics 
information to support proactive problem identification and 
resolution. LOCIS technologies will automatically collect and 
synthesize information required for key logistics decisions. The 
most important pieces of information will be retrieved from 
existing maintenance, supply, munitions, and fuels information 
systems. Using advanced information technologies, LOCIS 
technologies will automatically supplement this information 
with data from legacy information systems to provide immediate, 
useful information to logistics decision makers. In addition, 
LOCIS will use automated data collection technologies to 
supplement existing data with real-time data. LOCIS 
technologies will provide logistics decision makers with a look¬ 
ahead simulation capability to identify problems in the planning/ 
replanning process. 

Payoff. LOCIS will provide logistics personnel the 
information and tools needed to better perform their duties. 
Through the use of real time, accurate information, and the 
application of advanced decision aids, logistics personnel will 
be more effective in the day-to-day use of their assets and in short- 
notice deployment operations. 

Barbara Masquelier, AFRL/HESR, DSN 986-7005, Comm 
(937) 656-7005, barbara.masquelier® he.wpafb.af.mil 

Logistics Contingency Assessment Tool 

Objective. To demonstrate new technologies and processes to 
improve the deployment planning process, reduce deployment 
footprint, reduce deployment response times, and use deployment 
resources more efficiently and effectively. 

Approach. The logistics contingency assessment tool 
(LOGCAT) is a vision for improved wing-level deployment 
planning and replanning. Currently, the LOGCAT vision 
comprises four integrated initiatives, survey tool for employment 
planning (STEP); unit type code cevelopment, tailoring, and 
optimization (UTC-DTO); beddown capability assessment tool 


(BCAT); and logistics analysis to improve deployability (LOG- 
AID). STEP will use advanced integration of computer hardware 
and software to automate the collection, storage, and retrieval of 
deployment site survey information. STEP consists of three major 
subsystems: a suite of computerized/multimedia site survey data 
collection tools, deployment site knowledge database, and 
graphical and collaborative user interface for retrieving 
information from the deployment knowledge database. 
Transition of the STEP to the Standard Systems Group (SSG) for 
operational implementation was completed IN fiscal year 1998. 
UTC-DTO uses advanced software to automatically develop 
UTCs, automatically tailor UTCs based on individual 
deployment scenarios, and optimize the packing of UTC 
equipment onto 463L cargo pallets. BCAT uses advanced 
database design to compare deployment site force beddown 
capabilities against deploying force requirements and produce 
a list of resource shortfalls. Transition of the BCAT to the SSG 
for operational implementation was completed in fiscal year 
1998. LOG-AID is analyzing the deployment process firsthand 
to define requirements, identify additional opportunities, and 
improve deployment-planning processes. Where appropriate, 
additional planning tools and processes will be developed and 
integrated with the BCAT, STEP, and UTC-DTO tools to form a 
demonstration deployment planning system. The deployment 
planning demonstration system was evaluated in a field test at 
Mountain Home AFB in September 1999. Current efforts are 
focused on assisting the transition of the technology for 
operational use. 

Payoff. Improved wing-level deployment planning and 
execution will increase Air Force combat capability. Reducing 
the mobility footprint will reduce requirements for scarce airlift 
assets, enabling deployment of additional combat capability. 
Reducing deployment response time will increase the deterrent 
effect of our military forces on distant enemies and allow policy 
makers to respond more quickly to aggressive actions should 
deterrence fail. More efficient and effective use of mobility 
resources will allow the Air Force to maximize its power 
projection capabilities. 

Captain Adrian Crowley, AFRL/HESR, DSN 986-4558, 

Comm (937) 656-4558, adrian.crowley@he.wpafb.af.mil 

Logistics Research Requirements Survey 

Objective. The primary objective of this effort was to determine 
the feasibility of using a Web-based survey instrument to identify 
needed research in the logistics and maintenance environments. 
The ultimate goal is to develop a methodology to help identify 
research opportunities that directly support the expeditionary 
airpower and mobility capabilities. 

Approach. The basic approach was to select a specific area of 
logistics to test the proposed survey methodology, develop 
survey questions relevant to that area, collect responses from 
personnel in the field via the Internet, and analyze the data 
collected to evaluate the methodology and identify specific 
research requirements. Supply was selected as the specific area 
of study because of its focused and defined boundaries. Once it 
was determined that supply would be the chosen area, the survey 
team conducted field interviews with a wide variety of supply 
personnel to determine key themes and concepts to be addressed. 
Questions were developed, a COTS survey tool selected, and 
questions were created and validated with follow-up interviews. 
The survey was then made available over the Internet for supply 
personnel to input their responses. The availability of the survey 


Volume XXIV, Number 1 


29 



was announced to supply personnel via the supply management 
chain. The response from the field was very positive, and a large 
amount of data was collected. The final report is presently being 
prepared. 

Payoff. The laboratory will be able to respond more quickly 
and accurately to current research needs in the areas of 
maintenance and logistics. Technologies to reduce costs and 
increase operational capabilities will be made available to the 
warfighter. 

Cheryl Batchelor, AFRL/HESR, DSN 986-4392,Comm 
(937) 656-4392, cheryl.batchelor@he.wpafb.af.mil 

Predictive Failures and 
Advanced Diagnostics 

Objective. The objective of this effort is to develop technology 
to reduce aircraft down time by enhancing the capability of 
maintainers to identify the causes of system failures through 
better diagnostics and, where possible, the imminent system 
failures (failure prognostics) so that repairs can be made before 
an actual failure occurs. 

Approach. Research the various areas that make up the 
diagnostics and prognostics process and focus on the 
improvements that offer the best return on investment. Initial 
efforts will involve an analysis of the diagnostic process, 
identification of those variables presently used to diagnose 
faults, identifying other variables for which data may be available 
(such as built-in test sensor data), and identification of historical 
information (such as failure rates and component failure histories 
for specific aircraft/components and for fleet aircraft/ 
components). These data sources will then be used to develop 
advanced diagnostic algorithms. The algorithms will employ 
state-of-the art pattern recognition techniques, data-mining 
applications, intelligent agents, and self-adapting artificial 
intelligence techniques. The algorithms will then be tested using 
an aircraft subsystem as a test bed. In Phase II, the diagnostic 
algorithms will be extended and adapted to predict system/ 
component failures. This capability will be based upon 
recognition of patterns of system behavior that typically occur 
just before a component fails, plus other factors such as time 
between failure. 

Payoff. This effort will yield advanced capabilities in two 
areas: diagnostics and prognostics. The diagnostics capability 
will significantly increase the accuracy with which technicians 
are able to diagnose the causes of system failures, thereby 
restoring the aircraft to operational status sooner and reducing 
the consumption of spare parts. The prognostic capability will 
make it possible to replace about-to-fail parts before they fail, 
reducing system failures, in-flight aborts, and aircraft accidents. 
It will provide for more effective provisioning and placement of 
parts, ensuring that the right part is in the right place at the right 
time. It will provide a critical capability for Agile Combat 
Support and will be an enabling technology for the Air 
Expeditionary Force scenario. 

Paul Faas, AFRL/HESR, DSN 986-4390, Comm (937) 
656-4290, paul.faas@he.wpafb.af.mil 

Cognitive Process Modeling 

Objective. Develop and demonstrate advanced modeling and 
simulation techniques that can easily generate high-fidelity 
computer models of human behavior as well as state-of-the-art 
intelligent agents for use in synthetic environments, distributed 
simulations, and information systems. 


Approach. The maturation of intelligent agent technology 
has created the opportunity to apply such technology to the 
modeling and simulation of human and organizational behavior 
and the development of advanced human-computer interfaces. 
In the area of modeling human behavior, the Research 
Laboratory is applying intelligent agent modeling techniques 
to the development of advanced command and control echelons, 
technical controllers, and human performance organizational 
models. The development of such models will increase the 
realism of joint synthetic battlespace exercises while reducing 
their cost. In addition, these types of models will allow the 
simulation of information operations. One of the major goals of 
the effort is to provide users with a flexible scenario generation 
capability that will enable them to easily adapt available models 
to a wide variety of exercises with minimal effort. 

In the area of human computer interfaces, intelligent agents 
are applied to the creation of interfaces that use agents to 
selectively monitor and react to state changes in the world. When 
user-specified conditions are met, the agents become active and 
perform actions on behalf of the user. New capabilities being 
developed include standard user-interface profiles (by position), 
the ability for a user to request customized information (from 
disparate data systems), and look-ahead and what scenario 
planning tools. While the target demonstration is Air Mobility 
Command’s Tanker Airlift Control Center, the technology 
developed in this effort will be applicable to a wide range of 
logistics applications. It is intended that users with no 
programming experience will be able to program the intelligent 
agents, thus allowing users to decide what information they wish 
to track and how they want the intelligent agents to respond to 
changes in the world. The goal is to make the tasking of agents 
no more difficult than using a spreadsheet. In addition, the agents 
will operate over computer networks, thus allowing users to 
monitor and retrieve information at remote locations 

Payoff. With the Air Force and the Department of Defense 
relying more on modeling and simulation technology for a 
variety of applications—including acquisition, testing, training, 
wargaming, mission rehearsal, and operational representation of 
the battlespace—the development of advanced intelligent agent 
technology will satisfy critical technological voids in these 
simulations by providing realistic representations of human 
cognition as well as advanced agent technology to enhance the 
effective utilization of military information systems. 

Dr Michael J. Young, AFRL/HESS, DSN 785-8229, Comm 
(937) 255-8229, michael.young@he.wpafb.af.mil 

Modular Aircraft Support System 

Objective. Design, build, and demonstrate proof-of-concept 
aerospace ground equipment (AGE) that supply electricity, 
cooling air, nitrogen, hydraulic, and related utilities for aircraft 
maintenance in modular, multifunction carts. Increase the 
affordability and reduce the airlift required to deploy AGE 
through modular designs with advanced concepts and 
technologies. 

Approach. The Modular Aircraft Support System (MASS) 
program is supported through an integrated product team (IPT) 
with members from the Air Force support equipment community 
and laboratories. The IPT will jointly develop requirements, 
provide customer input, coordinate research and development 
(R&D) efforts, and support technology transition. Phase I 

(Continued on page 41) 


30 


Air Force Journal of Logistics 




EXPLORING THE HEART OF LOGISTICS 


Computing Wartime Spare Parts for Strategic Airlift 

F. Michael Slay, Robert E. Burleson, 

Senior Master Sergeant Jeffery D. Meyenburg 


US warfighting doctrine calls for small, mobile forces that can 
be quickly inserted into regions far outside the borders of the 
Continental United States. The mission of the Air Mobility 
Command (AMC) strategic airlift forces is to support these 
deployments. 

To meet these taskings, these aircraft must be able to operate 
worldwide with very high mission capable rates. Down time due 
to parts and maintenance must be kept to a minimum because 
every plane is needed. However, experience indicates that 
wartime spares support, as presently computed, is inadequate for 
the task. 

A new approach to the modeling of AMC’s wartime spare parts 
requirements has been developed that greatly reduces wartime 
not mission capable rates with only a 6 percent increase in the 
total investment in wartime spares. Furthermore, it can easily be 
implemented in the existing Air Force computation system with 
some appropriate parameter changes. 

AMC Operations 


and F-16), a squadron can usually substitute a working aircraft 
for a not mission capable (NMC) aircraft with little or no impact 
on the mission. However, the dispersed nature of strategic airlift 
operations limits the availability of substitute aircraft. Moreover, 
when an airlifter becomes NMC en route, it is typically loaded 
with cargo. Even when a substitute is available, fixing the aircraft 
is usually faster, cheaper, and easier than flying the substitute to 
the location and reloading the entire cargo. Thus, returning 
broken aircraft to service quickly is essential to efficient airlift 
operations. 

For this reason, AMC prepositions people, parts, and tools at 
various strategic locations. These forward supply locations (FSL) 
put maintenance and supply elements closer to where they are 
actually needed. Each FSL supports the activity in a region, such 
as Europe or the Far East. A stateside primary supply point (PSP), 
located at an MOB, supports each FSL. The MOBs are supported 
by the five air logistics center depots. 

The Problem 


The nature of strategic airlift operations forces the Air Mobility 
Command to have a unique logistics structure. While other aircraft 
normally operate from their home base or out of a deployed 
location with deployed maintenance, airlifters must fly 
everywhere. A fighter or bomber sortie typically launches from 
and returns to the same location. An airlifter normally flies a 
route, typically originating at a main operating base (MOB), 
either on the East or West Coast, continuing on to various pickup 
and delivery locations around the world, and returning to the 
MOB (Figure 1). 

Unfortunately, since airlifters fly everywhere, they also break 
everywhere. When they break, it is essential that they be returned 
to service quickly. In tactical air operations (for example, F-15 



To support wartime operations, the Air Force computes, for each 
strategic airlift aircraft type (C-5, C-17, and C-141), two kinds of 
wartime readiness spares packages (RSP), an in-place readiness 
spares package (IRSP) for each MOB, and a mobility readiness 
spares package (MRSP) to support en route and deployed 
location operations. RSPs provide the additional spares needed 
to support the higher tempo of wartime operations. They are 
critical to AMC’s ability to keep its strategic airlifters operating 
with a minimum of down time because of parts shortages. RSPs 
are computed based on a planned level of activity (as reflected 
in a specific warplan) along with estimates of failures, repair and 
resupply times, allowable number of not mission capable supply 
(NMCS) aircraft, and so on. Currently, the RSPs are built using 
the aircraft sustainability model (ASM), which was designed to 
compute requirements for aircraft in a tactical environment (for 
example, for fighters that take off and lands at the same base). 

The RSPs for a particular aircraft type, such as a C-5, are 
computed by splitting the fleet in two, with half of the fleet en 
route and the rest divided among the MOBs. Typically, there are 
two MOBs, each getting a quarter of the total fleet. The en route 
half is modeled as if all the aircraft are at a single base. While 
this provides for ease and tractability in the computation, it is 
not accurate. 


Volume XXIV, Number 1 


31 





The inaccuracy derives from two oversimplifications: all the 
en route aircraft are co-located, allowing for cannibalization, and 
their demands are all at one place, yielding economy-of-scale 
effects in supply. While both affect MRSP composition, co¬ 
locating the aircraft is more significant. Because the aircraft are 
actually widely dispersed, en route cannibalization is rarely 
possible. Even when it is, the priority of returning all the aircraft 
to service weighs against cannibalization. Thus, the en route parts 
computation should assume no cannibalization (a model option 
never before used by the Air Force). This profoundly affects the 
computed mix of spare parts. The impact of having all the 
demands at one location is similar, if less dramatic. For a low- 
demand item, a single spare at the one location can eliminate 
virtually all back orders. However, if demands for the item are 
dispersed throughout the globe, a single spare will rarely be close 
at hand. Only having a spare at each location would preclude 
virtually all back orders. 

There are other problems. The current computation ignores 
the relationship between forward stocks and the spares at the 
MOBs. It assumes that half the fleet is en route (though all co¬ 
located) while the other half is divided up among the MOBs. The 
current computation uses reasonable estimates of the resupply 
times for each location, but there are no connections. Each spares 
package is computed independently. 

In reality, all the aircraft fly to all the locations, and these 
locations do not operate independently. The forward locations 
are resupplied by the PSPs/MOBs. The FSLs are resupplied from 
PSP stock at the MOB, and the MOB repair shop handles both 
locally generated repairs and those from FSLs. Thus, all demands 
ultimately flow through the MOBs. By ignoring this rear echelon 
role, the current computation grossly understates the demands 
on the MOBs. 

Obviously, a better method is needed—one that models AMC 
operations and logistics with greater accuracy. 

Approach 

The system must compute both MRSPs and IRSPs. While the 
IRSP computation is, by itself, straightforward and needs no 
fundamental revision, the relationship between the IRSPs and 
the MRSPs needs to be included. The MRSPs should reflect the 
PSP support, and the IRSPs should reflect the demands from the 
FSLs. 

Theoretically, all the MRSPs and IRSPs could be computed 
together by one grand multi-echelon, multi-indenture model. 
Unfortunately, no such model exists, and even if one did, it would 
be difficult to put it into the Air Force requirements system. The 
requirements model already embedded in the Weapon Systems 
Management Information System/Requirements/Execution 
Availability Logistics Model (WSMIS/REALM)—the aircraft 
sustainability model—must be used. 1 

The ASM is an optimization model, computing the minimum 
cost inventory to yield a given number of aircraft mission capable 
(MC) on a given day. It is a dynamic, multi-echelon, multi¬ 
indenture inventory model, but the multi-echelon computations 
it is designed to handle are not nearly as complex as the AMC 
environment. Typically, the ASM is only run for a single site. 

Fortunately, it is possible to use a collection of single-site ASM 
runs (one for each location) to approximate a true multi-echelon 
computation. The key is correctly accounting for the relationship 


between the locations and properly portraying the multi-echelon 
tradeoff of spares between the forward kits (MRSPs) and the kits 
at the MOBs (IRSPs). 

Research was conducted concerning the behavior of multi¬ 
echelon tradeoffs using the ASM and the Logistics Management 
Institute (LMI) aircraft availability model—the current Air Force 
standard for computing peacetime reparable spares requirements. 
The models rarely put safety stock at the rear echelon, stocking 
only enough parts there to fill the pipelines. Furthermore, the 
exceptions were all special cases involving programmed depot 
maintenance—a situation in which the rear echelon safety stock 
is needed to support local operations, not the forward echelon. 

This is a striking result and a breakthrough in how to model 
the AMC case. The safety stock level at the rear echelon to 
support forward locations can simply be set to zero. 

Thus, the IRSP computation is straightforward. The ASM is 
run to a target number of aircraft MC using the correct demands 
(including those from FSLs). Because the safety stock to support 
the forward locations is zero, the IRSP stocks are initialized to 
the pipeline quantity. The ASM can still buy safety stock to 
support local operations (to reach the MC target). For IRSP 
computations, cannibalization is allowed, since aircraft in 
maintenance at the MOBs are actually co-located. 

The IRSP computation assumes that the PSP responds 
immediately to demands from the forward locations. This 
assumption provides the key to the MRSP computation—the 
resupply time to the forward locations should not include any 
supply delays. That is, the order and ship time (OST) from the 
PSP to the FSL should be used as the resupply time for the MRSP 
computation. 

Thus, the MRSP computation is also straightforward— 
standard ASM runs (with the appropriate parameters) can be used. 
Note that for the MRSP computation, cannibalization is turned 
off since, as explained earlier, cannibalization en route is rare. 
Figure 2 shows the connections between the various RSPs. 

It is possible to compute MRSPs and IRSPs individually (using 
existing Air Force requirements systems) and yet have them 
effectively linked. The MRSP computation would assume 
support from the IRSPs; the IRSPs would be computed to provide 
that support. 

If the model is to reflect AMC operations and logistics 
accurately, many details must be resolved. What are the resupply 
times? If the en route aircraft are not all at a single location, at 
how many locations are they? (That is, how many MRSPs should 
we compute?) How much activity will occur at each location? 
These and other issues are treated in detail in LMI Report 
AF801R1. 2 Highlights from the report follow. 



32 


Air Force Journal of Logistics 





Resupply Times 

What resupply time would be most appropriate for use in 
computing MRSPs and IRSPs for strategic airlifters? Specifically, 
what should the OST be from depot to PSP? From PSP to FSL? 
To answer these questions, current AMC resupply times were 
analyzed. In general, peacetime pipeline performance is not a 
very good predictor of wartime performance, because in war, most 
units will deploy to an overseas location and rely on logistics 
support structures and pipelines not used in peacetime. However, 
AMC is unusual in that, for the most part, it will use the same 
logistics support structures/pipelines in war that it uses in peace 
(though wartime will be more intensive), making it reasonable 
to utilize peacetime pipeline performance as a measure of 
expected wartime support. 

More than 57,000 OST transactions (December through 
August 1997) were analyzed for all of AMC’s MOBs and FSLs 
to compute average resupply times from the depots to the MOBs 
and from the MOBs to the FSLs. These times were computed with 
and without depot delay and with and without a cap on upper 
end outliers. Capping outliers prevents a significant upward 
skewing in the average times. 

For the purposes of the AMC IRSP computation, an 8-day 
resupply time (depot to MOB) (not counting delays) was used. 
An additional 2-day depot delay was recommended. Though this 
is less than the reparable item pipeline data analysis tool average, 
it is an achievable standard. 

For the MRSP computation (MOB to FSL), a resupply time of 
10 days is recommended. To this figure, no delay time is added, 
because the MOB is assumed to fill all orders. While this 
assumption is not always accurate, the MOB NMCS figures 
cannot be computed without it. Using this assumption does not 
introduce significant error because the IRSP stock was initialized 
to the pipeline. Furthermore, when the MOB does not fill a 
forward requisition, en route NMCS aircraft will need to be 
increased while decreasing NMCS aircraft at a MOB. Since the 
MOB would not make this trade unless it is reasonable to do so, 
this will make the model slightly conservative. 

Number of Locations 

The current computation builds an IRSP for each MOB and a 
single MRSP to support all en route operations. The MRSP is 
then segmented into smaller packages for actual use in various 
theaters. The new computation builds an IRSP for each MOB and 
a collection of MRSPs. Currently, three MRSPs are built for the 
C-17 and five each for the C-5 and the C-141. These numbers are 
a function of the fleet sizes and will change as the C-17 fleet grows 
and the C-141 inventory shrinks. Since there are far more than 
five segments, these MRSPs must be further segmented. This part 
of the process has not changed. 

Activity Levels 

The USAF War and Mobilization Plan , Volume 5 (WMP-5 ) 3 
defines a worldwide level of activity for each mission design 
operated by AMC. The current RSP computation in WSMIS/ 
REALM splits this activity between the IRSPs and the MRSP, 
with half of the planes and activity allocated to the IRSPs and 
half allocated to the MRSP. 

The new method replaces the current procedure with a more 
accurate division of aircraft and activity based on AMC’s detailed 


analysis of various multiple regional conflict scenarios. For the 
scenarios, the airlift flow model, a simulation of wartime airlift 
operations, was run repeatedly by the AMC Studies and Analysis 
Flight. The results were averaged to produce regional activity 
levels applicable to the various RSPs, and the total activity was 
prorated accordingly. Since a majority of the activity is en route, 
the MRSP now receives more than half of the total. 

However, this proration was not generated simply on the basis 
of the flying hours from the Air Force manual. Rather, using the 
results from our earlier demand forecasting research, the total 
activity should be prorated on the basis of a combination of 
sorties and flying hours. 4 For airlifters, failures are 75 percent 
sortie driven and 25 percent flying-hour driven. The activity is 
prorated among the RSPs accordingly. 

Thus, with the MRSPs getting more than half the total aircraft 
and flying hours, one would expect the IRSPs to get less than 
half, but there is another twist. Since the MOBs support the en 
route operations, the demands at a MOB include the demands 
generated by the local activity at the MOB plus all the demands 
that flow from the en route locations it supports. Thus, instead of 
getting less than half the total aircraft and flying hours, the IRSPs 
are computed as if they get all of the aircraft and flying hours. 

This sounds like double counting, but it is not wrong. In any 
multi-echelon system, demands at a retail location can echo up 
through the supply chain, causing repeated demands at higher 
echelons. It is correct to count all those demands at all the 
locations. 

Conclusions 

To assess the impact of the new methodology, C-5, C-17, and C- 
141 RSPs were computed using both the old and new methods 
and the September 1998 D087 buy kit data. The new method 
increases the cost of the kits slightly and increases their range 
and depth significantly. The total RSP requirement rises from 
$530.1M to $560.7M, a 5.8 percent increase. To determine the 
cost impact on Air Force buy-and-repair requirements, changes 
in the RSP requirements were inserted into the central secondary 
item stratification. The new computation yields $10.4M in new 
buys and $8.6M in additional repairs. 

To compare the resulting parts mixes, AMC analyzed the 
changes in the total MRSP requirement for those NSNs that caused 
mission incapable, awaiting parts incidents in 1998. An NSN with 
enough MRSP spares to put one unit in each segment is called 
sufficient. Insufficiency in a mission incapable causing NSN is a 
matter for concern, since segments without this part are a potential 
source of serious delays. The new computation yields 
significantly increased levels, specifically in many of those 
mission incapable-causing NSNs that are insufficient. Most of 
the insufficient NSNs become sufficient in the new computation. 
Conversely, only a handful of sufficient NSNs become 
insufficient. 

To estimate the impact of the new RSP on readiness, the old 
and new kits were assessed using the new method. The new RSP, 
computed to reach a direct support objectives with the new 
method, achieves the target number of aircraft MC, while the old 
RSP yields a catastrophic number of NMCS aircraft (more than 
five times the allowed number in all cases). Clearly, AMC could 
not continue to operate as planned under these conditions. 
Heroic measures—expedited resupply, en route cannibalization, 


Volume XXIV, Number 1 


33 




and en route line replaceable unit repair—would be necessary 
to even approach the planned number of sorties. 

Thus, the new AMC RSP computation method yields 
significant improvement in readiness at minimal cost. The Air 
Force is currently in the process of implementing the new method 
in the Weapon Systems Management Information System/ 
Requirements/Execution Availability Logistics Model 
requirements computation. 

Notes 

1. F. M. Slay, et al, Optimizing Spares Support: The Aircraft Sustainability 
Model , Logistics Management Institute Report AF501MR1, October 
1996. 

2. F. M. Slay and R. E. Burleson, Computing Strategic Airlift Reparable 
Spares Packages , Logistics Management Institute Report AF801R1, 
May 1999. 

3. Department of the Air Force, USAF War and Mobilization Plan, Volume 
5 (WMP-5), Basic Planning Factors and Data , Washington DC, HQ 
USAF/XOXOW, March 1993. 

4. F. M. Slay, et al, “Predicting Demand For Wartime Spares,” Air Force 
Journal of Logistics, Spring 1996, and F. M. Slay and C. C. Sherbrooke, 
“Predicting Wartime Demand for Aircraft Spares,” Logistics 
Management Institute Report AF501MR2, April 1997. 

F. Michael Slay and Robert E. Burleson are research fellows 
at LMI, and Senior Master Sergeant Jeffery D. Meyenburg is the 
superintendent of Weapon Systems Requirements in the Logistics 
Directorate , Supply Division, Headquarters Air Mobility 
Command . / |j★/ 


Air Force Journal of Logistics 
Editorial Advisory Board 

General John W. Handy 
Geneneral Bryce Poe II (Retired) 

Lieutenant General Charles H. Coolidge, Jr 

Lieutenant General Stewart E. Cranston (Retired) 

Lieutenant General John M. Nowak (Retired) 

Lieutenant General George Rhodes (Retired) 

Lieutenant General Michael E. Zettler 

Major General Dennis G. Haines 

Major General Robert P. Bongiovi 

Major General Ernest O. Robbins 

Brigadier General Terry L. Gabreski 

Brigadier General Quentin L. Peterson 

Brigadier General Stanley A. Sieg 

Brigadier General Billy K. Stewart 

Brigadier General Donald J. Wetekam 

Colonel William R. Beechel 

Colonel Richard M. Bereit 

Colonel Rodney J. Berlin 

Colonel Clarence T. Lowry (Retired) 

Colonel Albert Smith, Jr (Retired) 

Mr Timothy A. Beyland 
Professor I. B. Holley, Jr 
Ms Susan A. O’Neal 
Professor Jerome G. Peppers 


Most Significant Article Award 



Lieutenant Colonel David K.Underwood 
Captain John E. Bell 


The Editorial Advisory Board 
selected “AEF Munitions 
Availability”—written by Lieutenant 
Colonel David K. Underwood and 
Captain John E. Bell—as the most 
significant article to appear in 
Volume XXIII, No. 4. Lieutenant 
Colonel Underwood was a student 
at the Air War College when this 
article was written. Captain Bell is 
a project manager in the 
Maintenance Division of the Air 
Force Logistics Management 
Agency. 


Errata 

Table 1 in Colonel William Stringer’s letter to the editor as 
it appeared in the Air Force Journal of Logistics, Vol. XXIII, 
No. 4, page 1, was incorrect. The table to the right contains 
the correct information for series D and E data. 


Series 

F-15 

F-16 

C-5 

A 

3,910 

3,727 

6,548 

B 

3,940 

3,536 

2,668 

C 

3,159 

13,435 

2,528 

D 

2,931 

13,045 


E 

2,090 




Table 1. NSNs with F-15/F-16 Application Data 


34 


Air Force Journal of Logistics 







(Continued from page 1) 



Figure 1. Before 1990, NATO operational logistics was 
focused on Central Europe. The lines of communication 
were short (with the exception of strategic reinforce¬ 
ments from the United States and Canada), and logistics 
was a national responsibility. 

enforcement operations. It is important to know these types of 
operations can even involve the participation of non-NATO 
armed forces. A recent example was the conflict in the Balkans. 

There is consensus amongst NATO nations that PSOs will be 
the type of operation that will become the most likely in the 
future. 

Peace Dividend and 
Restructuring of Forces 

The national concepts of operation of the NATO partners also 
reflect the new situation. In addition to national defence in the 
strictest sense of the word, the projection of military power to 
operational theatres in and beyond the Alliance’s territory is of 
crucial importance. All NATO member countries by now consider 
operations in a multinational context as the rule. All things 
considered, the new disposition of security risks made it possible, 
even in light of the broader spectrum of responsibilities, to reduce 
and restructure drastically the military potential of all NATO 
member countries. This produced the expected peace dividend. 
The number of soldiers on active duty decreased by about 45 
percent. The remaining forces were restructured to form combat- 
capable, fully manned, and fully equipped mobile reaction forces. 
These forces form the backbone for a direct military involvement 
option in crisis areas in near real time. Furthermore, increased 
skeletonisation of units takes into account the need for extended 
mobilisation periods to prepare for national or collective defence 
operations. 

Logistics Implications of the 
New Strategic Concept 

Logistically speaking, this means defence procurement planners 
must ensure the continuous adaptation of operational equipment 
to the changing responsibilities. Lighter and more mobile is the 
current motto. In view of the dramatic cuts in the equipment 


budgets (they have been halved since 1990), this goal can only 
be reached in the long term. The new strategic concept, however, 
also means reducing or mothballing major equipment, massive 
reductions in supplies, a decrease in the logistics capabilities of 
operational units, as well as a concentration and consolidation 
of logistics services in service centres, to include, if need be, even 
outsourcing of logistics tasks. Logisticians are required to support 
the routine peacetime operations of the armed forces across the 
whole spectrum of military missions, thus ensuring NATO’s 
reaction forces can deploy for possible action without buildup. 
They also must prepare to support a practically unlimited number 
of operational options. These include the provision, as required 
by the situations, of suitable command and management 
structures and the capability for multinational cooperation or, 
preferably, integration. 

In short, the future requirements that logisticians will have to 
meet have undergone fundamental changes. Practical experience 
gained by the nations in the course of a variety of NATO and 
coalition operations outside the alliance area during the 1990s, 
culminating in the Kosovo air campaign, clearly demonstrated 
the decisive importance of efficient and flexible, if not 
customised, logistics to successful operations. 

The inclusion of peace support operations in NATO’s 
spectrum of responsibilities makes logistics planning and combat 
service support considerably more difficult. Collective defence 
operations on NATO territory can be made the subject of 
contingency plans since the theatre of operations, concept of 
operations, assets, and nations involved, as well as the command 
and control structures, are known. Unlike measures regarding 
mobilisation, buildup, deployment, and sustainability with 
respect to a specific area of operations that planners are able to 
manage to a large extent, the conditions of peace support 
operations are fundamentally different. Key operational and 
logistics factors—such as mission, area of employment, and 
nations involved (defined by political leaders)—only become 
known on short notice. Bringing up reinforcements from the 
home country, which become available only after mobilisation, 
is not possible. Some nations, as a rule, reserve these 
reinforcements exclusively for national and collective defence. 

In NATO, national and collective defence planning covers the 
entire Alliance territory (Figure 2). Peace support operations, 
even outside NATO territory, come on top. Additionally, the 
composition of a multinational formation is not necessarily 
determined by military needs or economic criteria. The desire of 
a nation to participate in an operation may also be interpreted as 
a political signal. A country simply wants to show its colours. 
As a result, elements—no matter the degree of smallness or 
military practicality—are assigned to a task force. The 
participation of 30 or more nations in one operation is not 
unusual, and all of them require logistical support. 

Consequently, it is obvious that the old principle in which 
the logistics support of units operating as a single element of a 
multinational formation is a strictly national responsibility no 
longer makes sense. Logistics is in the process of becoming 
increasingly a coordinating, collective, and organisational 
management task for NATO. 

Complex Planning Process 

The mission, operational requirements, and composition of a task 
force, as well as the availability and efficiency of civilian 


Volume XXIV, Number 1 


35 







Figure 2. In NATO, national and collective defence 
planning covers the entire Alliance territory. Peace 
support operations, even outside NATO territory, come 
on top. 

economic structures in the operations area, form the detailed basis 
for logistics planning. The overall multinational formation 
logistics support requirements are assessed against the 
background of the participating nations’ logistics capabilities. 
A multitude of questions need to be answered. 

• Which logistics services must be provided through military 
channels and which services can be provided by commercial 
contractors? 

• Which services and supplies can be obtained locally through 
consolidated contracting (for example, accommodation, food, 
transport services, fuel, telecommunications)? 

• How can the flow of necessary materiel from the homeland to 
the area of operations be optimised? How can the local 
distribution of materiel be organised efficiently? 

• Which nations can provide logistics support for others? 

On the whole, predicting the likely consumption of materiel 
in an operational area is a challenging and risky task. Relevant 
determining factors include intended operational intensity, as 
well as climatic and infrastructure conditions. The electronic 
equipment mean time between failure in extremely cold areas is 
completely different from that in hot and humid zones. Transports 
operated on unimproved surfaces are subject to considerably 
greater wear and tear than on smooth blacktop roads. Prognostic 
errors not only will entail expensive corrective action but also 
may carry operational risks. As a result, the necessary process of 
conceiving and preparing logistics plans should lead to a 
customised multinational command and control structure that 
ensures optimal logistics management of a campaign. 

Transport as a Key Factor 

The Alliance’s new strategic concept assigns a critical role to 
transport as a power projection enabler. Strategic and theatre 
operational mobility is the overriding concern. Consequently, 
rapid deployment and redeployment of combat forces and 
ensuring their tactical mobility and combat readiness in the 
theatre of operations are important tasks. To compare and 
illustrate the importance of speed, during the first 30 days of 


Operation Desert Shield, the United States deployed 38,000 
troops and approximately 150,000 short tons of equipment to 
the theatre of operations. 

NATO’s need for transport services is enormous. For example, 
one armoured division comprises approximately 15,000 troops 
and some 7,500 vehicles. The sole transport of vehicles and other 
major equipment requires about 30 medium-sized roll-on/roll¬ 
off ships, or when deploying a German Air Force ECR TORNADO 
squadron, approximately 1,000 tons of a wide variety of 
equipment and supplies have to be moved along with the unit. 
Depending on the situation, as many as 800 troops may be 
affected by the deployment. 

The distances to be covered are also impressive. A NATO 
operation carried out in southeastern Turkey requires 
reinforcements from Central Europe to fly 3,000 kilometres 
(1,864 miles). The UN forces dispatched to Somalia had to travel 
more than 7,000 kilometres (4,350 miles). Additionally, it should 
be noted that, due to the very quantity of materiel to be 
transported, in both cases, the considerably longer and also more 
time-consuming transport by sea was the rule. To make the 
comparison, the sea route from Rotterdam to Turkey is about 
3,300 nautical miles and the route from Rotterdam to Mogadiscio 
approximately 9,500 nautical miles. The available military 
transports that can cover operational demands of that size are 
absolutely not sufficient. NATO urgently needs to tackle that 
problem. 

Reliable Logistics Support 
in the Area of Operations 

There are two important aspects to operational area logistics 
support. The first is the units stationed in the area of operations 
need accommodation, messing, medical support, postal services, 
waste removal services, and so forth. The second, on the other 
hand, is materiel readiness and operational mobility or, to put it 
into simple terms, the fighting capability of these units in their 
area of employment. It must be guaranteed. This capability hinges 
on reliable logistics support in the area. The logistical 
prerequisite is an uninterrupted flow of materiel and supplies (fuel 
included) over long distances and maintained, as the case may 
be, in a threat environment and despite an inadequate or only 
rudimentary transport infrastructure. The other main logistics 
requirements are the creation of local repair facilities. 

Military logisticians, particularly those of European NATO 
nations, are now faced with tasks they are not accustomed to; for 
example, the organisation and management of large-scale 
transhipment activities at seaports or airports, creation of a cold- 
storage system for food supplies, and extensive purification of 
water in an operational area, as soldiers operating in torrid zones 
need at least 6 litres (1.6 gallons) of water per day. Improvement 
of the local transport infrastructure in areas where deemed 
necessary has never been an unusual task for engineer troops or 
civilian contractors. This requirement will not go away. It 
includes the expansion and utilisation of existing airbases and 
seaports, all vital to success. 

Experience has shown that logisticians of different nations 
operating in the same area compete for services and supplies on 
the local market. Whenever such a market exists, prices go up. 
Glaring examples of astronomical price hikes are fresh food 
supplies, accommodation, transport services and equipment, as 
well as a variety of other services. Container prices in Saudi 


36 


Air Force Journal of Logistics 





Arabia, for example, increased by a factor of 30 in the Gulf War. 
After these painful experiences, most are in agreement to 
consolidate all procurement actions henceforth. 

To illustrate the magnitude of the task, an operational 
formation of 10,000 troops drawn from a wide variety of air force 
units needs 30 tons of food and 170 tons of ground petroleum 
products per day. Ammunition, spare parts, and other supplies 
come on top of this requirement. 

Should each nation participating in a multinational task force 
maintain its own stovepipes to the employment area and establish 
its own command and control elements and logistics facilities, 
the resulting teeth-to-tail ratio—the ratio of operational 
formations to support troops in the area of operations—would 
be totally disproportionate and at the expense of operational and 
tactical capabilities. The overall formation size would be out of 
proportion to the operational mission. Mobility and flexibility 
would be degraded to the point of mutual obstruction. Finally, 
the large number of logistics facilities would constitute an 
unnecessary risk. Security forces that could be used for other tasks 
would have to be set aside to protect these facilities, or the people 
operating a facility would have to organise their own protection 
at the expense of efficient support. 

Also, the economic aspect is remarkable. The Nordic-Polish 
Brigade (consisting of troops from the Scandinavian countries 
and Poland), which operated in Kosovo, organised a common 
logistics support organisation for its forces. The result was a 40 
percent increase in efficiency. 

In view of the lack of standardised equipment and/or other 
national particularities (for example, different standards of 
medical support), national stovepipes to an operations area are 
inevitable. However, it is imperative for operational reasons that 
these differences are reduced to a minimum, and it is just as 
advisable for economic reasons. There are many areas in which 
logistics tasks can be carried out in a theatre of operations as a 
consolidated and/or collective effort. 

Limitations and Outsourcing 

No nation is able to maintain logistics troops that can support 
the full range of possible operational challenges. This is neither 
practical nor affordable. The role of commercial contractors is, 
therefore, becoming increasingly important to the operational 
support of all NATO nations’ armed forces. 

The criterion for having military logistics capabilities in place 
is linked to the necessity for operational reasons. Military 
logistics must be limited to the core functions that are uniquely 
indispensable to military operations and, as a matter of principle, 
cannot be provided by the private sector. We call it the 
operational minimum. It should cover the direct support of units 
in the theatre of operations, as well as the maintenance and battle 
damage repair of weapon systems in operation. It also should 
apply to the provision of transport services and materiel handling 
in the event the existing transport infrastructure is inadequate or 
the services are needed in a threat environment. On the other 
hand, the transport to safe ports in neighbouring regions by 
commercial carriers gives absolutely no cause for concern and is 
even vital, considering the limited military resources. 

The constant need for reducing operating expenses has caused 
all NATO nations to reexamine the predefined operational 
minimum for in-place military logistics capabilities and to weigh 
private sector outsourcing possibilities. The ideas and plans 


under discussion are downright spectacular. In the United 
Kingdom, scenarios are currently under consideration that 
recommend the civilianisation of in-flight refueling capabilities. 
The United Kingdom is also considering leasing C-17 strategic 
air transports, which would be made available for both civilian 
and military use. 

The practical implementation of demanding strategic and 
operational plans is unthinkable without having extensive 
recourse to powerful private sector companies. Considering the 
scope of support required and the timeframe envisaged, it is of 
overriding importance in this context that transport regularly 
provides striking examples. It would have been impossible to 
conduct the Gulf War the way it was done, without making 
comprehensive use of civil resources to provide a broad spectrum 
of logistics support. 

Third-party logistics provides on-call operational support of 
a predefined scope through the contracting of commercial 
companies to the military. It appears to be a growing business. 
The US company Brown & Root Services Corporation, for 
example, supports US Army units deployed to Bosnia. A detailed 
cost analysis carried out by US authorities clearly shows the 
greater cost-effectiveness of this service support in comparison 
with corresponding military services. Differences in service 
quality have not been noted. 

The US Army’s basis for this kind of support is a worldwide 
contract that provides for the on-call beddown and support of 
up to 20,000 troops in five field camps at different locations. An 
extension of the support packages under the contract is optional. 
The spectrum ranges from general logistics support, such as 
providing food and transport, to engineering services, operation 
of communication facilities, and medical support. Even highly 
specialised management functions in the operations area no 
longer have to be performed by the military. NATO also has tested 
this concept with local contracts in support of intelligence forces 
being managed by the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency. 

NATO and Logistics 

This short glance at logistics planning, transport, theatre 
logistics support, and existing limitations should underline a 
necessity for NATO’s enhanced involvement in multinational 
logistics issues. There is absolutely no point to, on the one hand, 
from the operations side, significantly improve interoperability 
and integration of forces and, on the other hand, ignore logistics 
aspects. One thing seems to be quite clear, Who else, other than 
the Alliance itself, could take over responsibility for the planning 
and execution of logistics support to multinational operations? 

What did NATO do about that in the last decade? Under the 
proviso of the new strategy, in principle, all NATO nations 
approved revised Principles and Policies for Logistics (MC 319/ 
1). The fundamental statement here is that nations and respective 
NATO commanders do have a common responsibility for 
logistics. It reflects a complete turnaround in the understanding 
of logistics, which in the past was a purely national responsibility. 

Consequently, NATO produced a number of basic documents 
on multinational logistics. Amongst them is the Allied Joint 
Logistic Doctrine (AJP4), which functions as a general practical 
guideline for logistics management within NATO. The 
Multinational Joint Logistics Centre-Concept focuses primarily 
on the broad variety of logistics coordination functions in a PSO 


Volume XXIV, Number 1 


37 


operation. Additionally, there are logistics doctrines for land, 
naval, and air forces. 

Despite the fact that a lot of work has been done on the concept 
and doctrinal side, their practical impact is not impressive. The 
newly defined common responsibility for logistics in day-to-day 
business remains vague. The authority of a NATO commander to 
establish requirements or conduct inspections could hardly be 
looked upon as an increase of real authority. 

The commander of a NATO force, although formally endowed 
with rights regarding logistics—but only in a very limited way 
(to put it politely)—is enabled to assess the status of logistical 
readiness of the forces and their capability to support and sustain 
operations. There is no effective information flow between nations 
and NATO headquarters in existence that provides NATO with 
adequate logistics data. A sound organisational concept 
allocating the different NATO command levels defined and clearly 
delineated responsibilities, tasks, and tools for logistics 
management is not in existence. 

In case of operations kicked off on short notice, NATO’s 
logisticians—together with their colleagues from troop 
contributing nations— reinvent the wheel when establishing a 
mission-tailored logistics C2 structure. This seems to be necessary 
in the absence of reliable logistics C2 structures and procedures, 
preplanned manning rosters, and multinational logistics 
procedures. In this situation, troop-contributing nations try to 
remain on the safe side, establish their own solution, and accept 
the aforementioned disadvantages of too many stovepipes in a 
theatre of operations. 

In their scepticism, the nations are right. NATO’s ability to take 
over responsibility for logistics is still far from ideal. 

Way Ahead 

After having developed logistics concepts and doctrines, the time 
has now come to transfer them into practice. It needs to be said 
that there are plenty of ongoing projects on logistics planning, 
information systems, and procedures that definitely will, in the 
long run, improve multinational logistics led by NATO. However, 
ongoing activities, as in many multinational organisations, 


proceed slowly and cumbersomely. Moreover, the necessity to 
seek consensus amongst NATO nations is, unfortunately, very 
often used simply as an excuse for bad management. 

NATO’s Defence Capability Initiative (DCI), set up after the 
Washington Summit 1999, deals with several logistics points. 
The objective of DCI is to improve NATO’s military capabilities 
and be more deployable, sustainable, survivable, and effective. 
In this context, logistics plays an important role. 

Vision Needed 

Nevertheless, NATO’s understanding of multinational logistics 
remains a collection of single logistics items. There is no over¬ 
arching vision of a future integrated logistics management system 
covering all functional areas of logistics and allocating specific 
responsibilities to each level of command, preparing to meet 
operational requirements in peacetime, crises, and war. In short, 
NATO still lacks sufficient logistics management! 

Hopefully, DCI’s outcome for logistics issues will finally: 

• Establish a sound logistics structure with appropriate 
authority. 

• Crest an effective, efficient controlling system, including a 
viable assessment tools. 

• Foster a professional management system with clear-cut, 
achievable objectives for short, mid, and long term. 

In fact, there is still a lot of practical work to be done. Until 
NATO has a reliable and efficient logistics organisation at its 
disposal, then and only then can NATO commanders be provided 
the warm feeling that their forces are logistically reliable and 
sustainable. 

Colonel Peter Schmitz is the Chief Logistics Division , 
Headquarters German Air Force Command in Cologne, 
Germany, and Major John Rausch is Chief Movements Section 
and senior US logistician at HQAIRNORTH (NATO) A4 Division 
at Ramstein Air Base , Germany. /JF7 


(Continued from page 5) 

the financial risks to the Air Force. However, the present value 
analysis indicates that, in the long term, recurring costs outweigh 
investment costs, making the financial difference between the 
seven options negligible. 

Most important, the consolidated intermediate repair structure 
will require new organizational processes. Unit commanders will 
have to relinquish some of their control over LANTIRN pods. 
They will also have to communicate very closely with the support 
centers and other bases serviced by the same regional facility. 
Performance metrics and incentive systems may also need to 
change to support a system focused on customer (warfighter) 
satisfaction, on-time delivery, and quality workmanship. 

Conclusions 

Analyses show that—given today’s planning scenarios and 
deployment and transportation processes—the Air Force must 
invest in support equipment upgrades regardless of support 


structure. Furthermore, centralized support exclusively from 
CONUS facilities may reduce warfighter capabilities due to 
extended pipelines. Thus, it can be asserted that in assessing 
centralized repair alternatives, the Air Force should only consider 
networked FSL and CSL structures. 

While the FSL structure introduces new risks to the Air Force, 
it also offers some distinct advantages over the current system. 
The most viable structure the analyses identified would use two 
FSLs and one CONUS facility. Figure 4 shows a notional 
implementation of such a structure with five prepositioned sets 
in each region and the peacetime manning indicated in the white 
bubbles. 

This system requires that pods be shipped from FOLs to the 
centralized repair facilities. While this analysis was based on 
Defense Planning Guidance flying program expectations, other 
mission profiles (like Operation Noble Anvil) may change the 
resource requirements. However, since the options analysis 
focused on relative differences, the overall strategic outcomes 
would not change. 


38 


Air Force Journal of Logistics 




Figure 4. Notional Beddown of Equipment and People 
for a Regional Repair Structure 


Based on the analysis, the Air Force should invest in the ADK 
upgrade and conduct a proof-of-concept experiment of the 
regional repair option. However, a centralized system will be 


sensitive to transportation times and may suffer from poor cross- 
organizational cooperation and communication. Viable 
locations to conduct this test include Aviano AB, Italy; Royal 
Air Force Lakenheath, United Kingdom; or another US Air Forces 
in Europe installation. This test offers an opportunity to assess 
transportation system capabilities (and shortfalls) in an 
international environment and with more stringent operating 
tempos than within the United States. 

Notes 

1. Gen Michael E. Ryan, “Air Expeditionary Forces,” DoD Press Briefing, 
August 4, 1998. 

2. _, “Aerospace Expeditionary Force: Better Use of Aerospace 

Power for the 21st Century,” Briefing, Washington, DC: AQ, USAF, 1998. 

Amatzi Feinberg, Hyman L. Shulman, Louis W. Miller, and 
Robert S. Tripp are senior analysts at RAND. m 


(Continued from page 15) 

4. OMB, Circular No. A-76, 3. 

5. OMB, Circular No. A-76, 3, 36 

6. Department of Defense Directive 4100.15, Commercial Activities 
Program , 10 March 1989; Department of Defense Instruction 4100.33, 
Commercial Activities Program Procedures, 1 July 1992; and Air Force 
Pamphlet 26-12, Guidelines for Implementing the Air Force 
Commercial Activities Program, 25 September 1992, 7. 

7. Lt Col Mark Hester, “Competitive Sourcing and Privatization,” Deputy 
Air Force Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs Briefing, 30 November 
1999, 13. 

8. Hester, 16, and DoD Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force, 

1 . 

9. Hester, 12, and Edward G. Keating, Frank Camm, and Christopher 
Hanks, “Sourcing Decisions for Air Force Support Services—Current 
and Historical Patterns,” Documented Briefing, Santa Barbara, 
California: RAND Corporation, October 1996, 5-8. 

10. Hester, 18, 35, 37. 

11. Ibid., 24. 

12. Lt Col Stephen E. Newbold, USAF, “Competitive Sourcing and 
Privatization: An Essential USAF Strategy,” Air Force Journal of 
Logistics, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, Spring 1999, 32. 

13. Hester, 28-29. 

14. E-mail, Maj Kimberly Daeger, USAF, AF/XPMS, to Maj Gregory A. 
Cummings, USAF, HQ AFCESA/CEXR, 15 November 1999, and 
“Total Force Civil Engineer Blue-Suit Wartime Requirements,” 
Briefing, January 1999, 15 November 1999, 23, 45, 47. 

15. Booz, Allen, and Hamilton, Inc., Organizational Options for Air Force 
Base-Level Fuels, September 1996, 8. 

16. Booz, Allen, and Hamilton, 9-11. 

17. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics, draft memorandum, 
subject: Transfer of Responsibility for US Fuels Operations, 26 May 
1999. 

18. SMSgt Thomas Gillenwater, 609 ASUS/LGSF, Shaw AFB, interviewed 
by author, 4 November 1999. 

19. Draft Message, HQ ACC/LGS, “HQ ACC Comments Concerning 
ODUSD(L) Staff Initiative to Privatize All Fuel Operations in CONUS 
(Including Alaska and Hawaii),” 28 May 1999. 

20. David R. Gallay, et al., Assessment of the Potential for Privatizing Fuel 
Infrastructure at Military Installations, McLean, Virginia: Logistics 
Management Institute, Report LG805R1, October 1998, 1-3 - 1-4. 

21. Gallay, iii. 

22. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (A&T)/L/SCI, “Privatizing 
Fuels Infrastructure at Military Installations,” Talking Paper, 20 July 
1999. 

23. John Lavin, Senior Fuels Analyst/Fuels Flight Team Chief, AF/ILSP, 
interviewed by author, 15 November 1999. 

24. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics, draft memorandum. 


25. Lavin interview. 

26. Cummings, 19. 

27. Cummings, 8-14. 

28. Department of Defense, Defense Reform Initiative Directive #20 
Implementation Package, 10 June 1998, 22-25, 40-42. 64-66. 

29. Lavin interview. 

30. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (A&T)/L/SCI, Talking 
Paper.. 

31. 366th Supply Squadron, “AEF V,” Briefing, Shaikh Isa AB, Bahrain, 
28 August-9 November 1997, 9. 

32. Department of Defense Inspector General, Civilian Contractor Overseas 
Support During Hostilities, Audit Report No. 91-105, 26 June 1991, 
1-30. 

33. Kathryn Mclntire Peters, “Civilians at War,” Government Executive, 
July 1996, 24. 

34. Air Force Inspection Agency, Eagle Look Inspection Report, 
Contractor Support and Essential Services (CSES) During Wartime 
and Operational Contingencies , PN 8-504, Kirtland AFB, New 
Mexico, 22 March 1999, 52. 

35. Frank Camm, Expanding Private Production of Defense Services, 
RAND Report MR-734-CRMAF, Santa Monica, California: RAND 
Corporation, 1996, 17-18. 

36. AHA Report, 18-19. 

37. Lt Col Blair A. Ross and Lt Col Terrance J. Spoon, USA, Potential 
Combat Risks from Outsourcing of Selected Sustainment Functions, 
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: US Army War College, 1998, 34; 
Col Steven J. Zamparelli, “Contractors on the Battlefield: What Have 
We Signed Up For?” Air Force Journal of Logistics, Vol. XXIII, No 
3, Fall 1999, 12. 

38. Zamparelli, 13. 

39. Zamparelli, 16. 

40. Ross and Spoon, 11-12. 

41. David M. Capouya, Project Manager, Houston Support Group, Brown 
& Root Services, “Brown & Root Services,” briefing, 15 November 
1999. 

42. AFIA Report, 53. 

43. AFIA Report, 52. 

44. DoD Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force, 7. 

45. “Outsourcing Did You Know? The Outsourcing Institute’s Trend 
Report,” The Outsourcing Institute, 30 January 1996. 

46. Lt Christopher J. Luz, USN, Outsourcing Facilities Management: A 
Comparative Analysis Between the Private Sector and Department of 
the Navy, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, December 
1996,71. 

47. Luz, 72. 

48. Darlene E. Stafford and James M. Jondrow, A Survey of Privatization and 
Outsourcing Initiatives, Alexandria, Virginia: Center for Naval 
Analysis, December 1996, 5, 27. 


Volume XXIV, Number 1 


39 






49. Camm, 17, and Stollenwerk, 22-23. 

50. Comptroller General of the United States, Future Years Defense 
Program: Funding Increase and Planned Savings in Fiscal Year 2000 
Program Are at Risk, NSIAD-00-11, Washington DC: General 
Accounting Office, November 1999, 33; Comptroller General of the 
United States, DoD Competitive Sourcing: Questions About Goals, 
Pace; and Risks of Key Reform Initiative , NSIAD-99-46, Washington 
DC: General Accounting Office, February 1999, 4; and Lt Comdr 
Jon M. Watson, USCG, Reasons for OMB Circular A-76 Contract Cost 
Increases for US Coast Guard Activities and Perceptions of the USCG 
A-76 Program, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 
December 1991, 59. 

51. Comptroller General of the United States, Best Management Practices: 
Reengineering the Air Force's Logistics System Can Yield Substantial 
Savings, NSIAD-96-5, Washington DC: General Accounting Office, 
February 1996, 3-7. 

52. Hester, 6. 

53. DoDIG, Audit Report No. 91-105,3. 

54. Zamparelli, 13. 

55. AFIA Report, Executive Summary, 1. 

56. AFIA Report, 7-11. 

57. AFIA Report, 55-57. 

58. AFIA Report, 33. 

59. Ibid. 

60. “Focused Logistics Wargame 2010—Executive Session,” Briefing/ 
Executive Summary, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 
22 October 1999, 35. 

61. Ibid. 

62. “Focused Logistics Wargame 2010,” 37. 


63. “Focused Logistics Wargame—2010,” 38. 

64. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Logistics Support for 
Joint Operations (Draft Joint Publication 4.0), Chap. V, undated, 2-3. 

65. United States Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document 2, Organization 
and Employment of Aerospace Power, Version 5, Spring 1999 
Revision. 

66. Stollenwerk, 17. 

67. Stollenwerk, 17-23. 

68. Capouya, 12. 

69. Stollenwerk, 22-23. 

70. Sue Alexander, “AFCAP and the New Multiplication,” The Civil 
Engineer, Vol. 55, No. 2, Summer 1997, 26, 29. 

71. Capouya, 16-26. 

72. Maj Susan A. Davidson, USA, “Where is the Battle Line for Supply 
Contractors?” Air Force Journal of Logistics, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, 
Summer 1999, 10. 

73. Davidson, 10-11. 

74. Davidson, 40. 

75. Ross and Spoon and US Army Audit Agency, Contractor Support for the 
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program: Operation Joint Endeavor, 
Alexandria, Virginia, 23 December 1996, 43-44. 

76. Peter G.W. Keen and Ellen M. Knapp, Every Manager's Guide to 
Business Processes , Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Business School Press, 1995, 74-78. 


Mathew Pausch is a career civil servant. At the time of writing, 
he was a student at the Air War College. IJ\*/ 


(Continued from page 22) 

23. Patrick Barco, “Fraud, Hijacking and Theft of Valuables,” Canadian 
Board of Marine Underwriters, company point paper, 1997, 1. 

24. “Call It I-Way Robbery,” Business Week, 14 April 1997, 57. 

25. “Highway Robbery.” 

26. “How Sound Is Your Cargo Security Plan?” 26. 

27. South Africa, Fleetwatch Magazine, November/December 1999, 5. 

28. “Security,” Transportation Consumer Protection Council [Online] 
Available: www.transportlaw.com. 

29. The proliferation of armed robbery of cargo in Mexico has prompted 
many trucking firms going into Mexico to outfit their trucks with armor. 
One armor installation firm alone reports armoring 500 rigs operating 
in Mexico. “Cargo Theft in the News” [Online] 7 September 1999 
Available: www.trucking.org/cc/councils/tlpsc/newsbriefs/index.html. 

30. Jennifer Arend, “Mexican Hijackers Get $10 Billion Haul from U.S.,” 
Washington Times, 9 July 1999. 

31. “How Sound is Your Cargo Security Plan?” 23, and Hands Off! 
Organized Gangs of Thieves Want Your Freight,” 9. 

32. Greg Gillespie, “Crime and High Tech Growing Hand in Hand,” 
Spectrum, February 1998, 14; “Cargo Theft: America’s Most Hidden 
Crime,” 11; and Intermodal Cargo Transportation: Industry Best 
Security Practices, 74. 

33. James N. Dertouzos, Eric Larson, Patricia Ebener, The Economic Costs 
and Implications of High-Technology Hardware Theft, Santa Monica: 
The RAND Corporation, 1999, 14, and “Cargo’s Bad Boys: Whatcha 
Gonna Do?” 84. 

34. Intermodal Cargo Transportation Industry Best Security Practices, 75. 

35. “Cargo’s Bad Boys: Whatcha Gonna Do?” 85, and an indication of 
the pervasiveness of suspect participation in logistics supply chains is 
the fact that recent surveys indicate that up to half of the Port of Miami’s 
dock workers have prior felony records. See news report posting in 
American Shipper, October, 1999, 91. 

36. For a comprehensive discussion on the impact of cargo crimes, see 
Intermodal Cargo Transportation Industry Best Security Practices. 

37. “Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Report for 1999.” 

38. Cindy H. Muroff, “How Dangerous Is your Warehouse?” Warehousing 
Management, February 1996, 17-18. 

39. “Security Lacking at U.S. Seaports,” American Shipper, October 1999, 
91. 

40. The Economic Costs and Implications of High-Technology Hardware 
Theft, 52. 


41. John Case, CPP, “How to Identify Dishonesty within Your Business,” 
John Case and Associates, Del Mar, California [Online] Available: 
www.employeetheft.com. 

42. “How Sound Is Your Cargo Security Plan?” 26. 

43. Ibid. 

44. [Online] Available: www.wscta.com. 

45. “How Sound Is Your Cargo Security Plan?” 26. 

46. “Security Lacking at U.S. Seaports,” 91. 

47. “Hands Off! Organized Gangs of Thieves Want Your Freight,” 8. 

48. The National Cargo Security Council (NCSC) offers training and 
forums and assists public and private groups with logistics crime 
prevention initiatives. They also publish Guidelines for Cargo Security 
and Loss Control, which provides detailed descriptions on how to 
develop a loss control program. The NCSC can be contacted at (703) 
821-7725 or [Online] Available: www.cargosecurity.com. 

49. As a further extension of the ultimate in physical security, the Wyle 
Laboratories distribution center in Phoenix, Arizona, is designed not 
only as a locked cell but also to look like a regular office building and 
not a distribution center. 

50. “Stop, Thief!” 30. 

51. The Guide to Background Investigations, published by National 
Employment Screening Services (800-247-8713), can help managers 
work through the legal labyrinth of background checks. 

52. The Technology Asset Protection Association has issued guidelines to 
help shippers identify carriers with up-to-date procedures to protect 
against cargo theft. These guidelines are available to members only. 
[Online] Available: www.tapa3.org. 

53. The importance of background checks is illustrated by this incident. 
A Midwest trucking company unknowingly hired a dispatcher who 
had been convicted of seven felonies. The company was experiencing 
a string of hijackings that ceased after the dispatcher was terminated. 
Newsletter on Cargo Theft, Western Overseas Corporation, 1855 
Coronado Avenue, Long Beach, California, July 1998. 

54. Report of the Loss Prevention Committee, 5. 

55. “South Florida Becoming ‘Casablanca’ for Cargo Theft.” 

56. Jack Deal, “In-house Theft, Pilferage, and Embezzlement” [Online] 
Available: www.dealconsuIting.com/management/theft.html. The Deal 
Consulting Group in Santa Cruz, California has an extensive practice 
in the area of industrial loss prevention. 

57. “Loose Lips Sink Ships,” The Globe and Mail, Toronto, Canada, 2 
June 1998. 

58. Donna Fenn, “Workplace Theft: Preventing Employee Pilferage,” Inc. 
Magazine, 1 February 1995, 31-32. 


40 


Air Force Journal of Logistics 




59. National Cargo Security Council, “Introduction,” Guidelines for Cargo 
Security Loss and Control , 2000, i. 

Stephen Hays Rusell (Lt Col, USAF, Retired) is associate 
professor of Logistics Management, Goddard School of Business 


and Economics, Weber State University, Ogden, Utah . He is a 
graduate of the Air Force Institute of Technology School of 
Systems and Logistics (MS, 1974) and Arizona State University 
(PhD, 1978). 


(Continued from page 25) 

historical demand to the future. 21 For ICIS to be a useful tool for 
the Air Force, it must interface with a depot workload planning 
tool like the reparability forecast model (RFM). The RFM uses a 
bill of materiel to forecast repair parts requirements to support a 
6-month workload. The next logical step would be linking the 
expected wartime reparable item failures from the ASM with the 
workload planning tool in the RFM. This would, in turn, feed 
projected wartime depot surge requirements for repair parts to 
ICIS. 

The ICIS model is clearly a step in the right direction by DLA 
in its attempt to take a more proactive role in supporting the 
warfighter. But like any model or simulation, the utility of the 
output is critically linked to the quality of the input data. For 
example, the Air Force recently considered ICIS output as an 
input to the annual other war reserve materiel computation for 
repair parts. It is also testing the linkage between ICIS and the 
ASM, with initial results due in the near future. While these 
collaborations promise significantly better sustainment 
assessment capabilities, data deficiencies will limit their 
effectiveness. Aircraft parts projections will be understated (due 
to API holes), and parts projections for nonaircraft systems will 
be ignored. Depot maintenance parts assessments also promise 
significant new assessment capabilities, but the effectiveness will 
be limited until the Air Force links the ASM, RFM, and ICIS. 
While the Air Force may not have the resources in the near term 
to address all the data deficiencies identified, it would be wise 
to address them in due time, beginning with repair parts 
deficiencies. A more robust Air Force input to the ICIS model 
would help DLA proactively manage its wartime sustainment for 
Air Force combat essential systems and equipment. 

Notes 

1. “What Is DLA?” [Online] Available: http://www.dla.mil/ 
about_dla.htm. 

2. DLA maintains an enormous Weapon System Support Program 
(WSSP) database. The WSSP was established to identify weapon system 
and combat equipment-related repair parts and define the criticality 
of the part to the operation of the end item. Using the WSSP DLA 
inventory, managers would be better able to target limited stock fund 


dollars to the most combat critical repair parts. In reality the WSSP is 
not adequately maintained by the Services. As a result, it is a bloated 
and diluted file and of questionable use to the inventory managers. 
Combat essential item lists obtained by the ICIS team directly from 
the Services contained far fewer items. 

3. “ICIS Briefing” [Online] Available http://www.icis.hq.dla.mil. 

4. Ibid, and “Executive Summary” [Online] Available: http:// 
www.icis.hq.dla.mil. 

5. “Executive Summary ” 

6. “Air Force Data Cache Processing” [Online] Available: http:// 
www.icis.hq.dla.mil. 

7. Ibid. 

8 . “ICIS Briefing” and “Executive Summary.” 

9. Ibid. 

10. “ICIS Briefing,” “Executive Summary,” and “Air Force Data Cache 
Processing.” 

11. Ibid. 

12. “Executive Summary.” 

13. “ICIS Briefing” and “Executive Summary.” 

14. Ibid. 

15. “Executive Summary.” 

16. “ICIS Briefing” and “Executive Summary.” 

17. “Component Maintenance Support Module” [Online] Available: http:// 
www.icis.hq.dla.mil. 

18. “API Summary File,” spreadsheet, Warfighting Integration Team, 
Headquarters Defense Logistics Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 1998. 

19. The SRD is a data element on base-level issue requests used to document 
the applicable weapon system/equipment application. A maintainer 
replacing a part on a B-52H aircraft annotates the SRD for the B-52H 
on the issue request for all parts pertaining to the B-52H. SRDs, which 
are assigned and maintained by HQ AFMC, were established to track 
parts consumption and operations and maintenance costs for aircraft 
and equipment. 

20. For example, one planner may annotate the deployment of 12 A-10 
aircraft as 72 AJOA-10A, while another annotates the same deployments 
as A-10/0A-10(1). Programs like ICIS, which try to determine the 
weapon systems and quantities deploying, must be programmed to 
anticipate all possible ways a planner might annotate the TPFDD. In 
reality, ICIS occasionally drops deployment lines and identifies them 
separately on an exception list in the fuels assessment. 

21. “Component Maintenance Support Module.” 

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph M. Codispoti is a career supply 
officer. He is currently Chief Warfighter Team, Headquarters, 
Air Force Supply/Fuels Policy and Procedures Division. At the 
time of writing, he was a student at the Air War College. Iiykj 


(Continued from page 30) 

included a series of MASS design studies emphasizing 
technology assessment, cost/affordability analysis, and the 
reliability/maintainability analysis of AGE. This early research 
resulted in a large knowledge base of existing problems and 
preliminary specifications for MASS machines. Phase II will bring 
this concept through an R&D cycle, culminating in the creation 
of a MASS prototype unit and field test/demonstrations in fiscal 
year 2000 

Payoff. Introduction of modular support equipment will 
reduce the deployment footprint in a direct, objective way. 


Making support equipment smaller, multifunction, and modular 
allows for reduced numbers of ground support equipment items 
while maintaining flexibility. Maintenance modularity allows 
for reduced down time for repairs, increasing availability. At the 
same time, MASS machines will be more reliable and 
maintainable than current support equipment, resulting in 
reduced MASS ownership costs in manpower, spares, and 
training. Cost savings should span from initial acquisition 
through disposal. 

Matthew Tracy, AFRL/HESS, DSN 785-8360, Comm (937) 
255-8360, matthew.tracy@he.wpafb.af.mil 


Volume XXIV, Number 1 


41 





Air Force Jourhl^ Logistics 



Coming in Future Issues 

• Contracting Out—A Cost-Effective Multiplier 

• Supply Downsizing 




Available Soon) 


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Now, the Air Force Logistics Management JP 
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Historical Perspective. This 
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