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Ms. Barbara A. Schwartz 
Department of the Army Civilian 

Colonel Stephen A. Shambach 
Project Advisor 

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the 
Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student 
academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Government. 

U.S. Army War College 


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03 MAY 2004 




Strategies for Cost Cutting Case Study of an Army and Air Force 
Petroleum Lab 





Ferdinand Samonte 





U.S. Army War College,Carlisle Barracks,Carlisle,PA,17013-5050 







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FORMAT: Strategy Research Project 

DATE: 19 March 2004 PAGES: 29 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified 

Initiatives aimed at improving efficiencies have impacted on individual mobilization 
resource areas. When reviewed in the overall context of mobilization, the cumulative second 
and third order effects on the resources have degraded mobilization efforts. This paper will 
provide a historical review of mobilization support and identify shortfalls in mobilization resource 
areas. Based on research and interviews, analysis will be provided on the cumulative impact of 
the training base, industrial base, facilities and manpower on readiness and the capability to 
support mobilization. 









Setting the Stage for Mobilization Support Planning.4 

The Military Surges.4 






The Mobilization Process.7 

The Graduated Mobilization Response.8 












The modern precess of preparing armies for war originated in the middle of the 
nineteenth century. The recruitment of volunteers to fill the ranks no longer 
sufficed. Gevernments turned to conscription, created huge ferces, and 
harnessed their natienal economies to conduct war. The word mobilization was 
first used in the 1850’s te describe the preparation of the army ef Prussia for 
deployment. The American Civil War marked the appearance in the United 
States of the draft and mass armies, along with the organizatien of productive 
reseurces to sustain them. The volunteer traditien of the minutemen was on its 
way to become little more than a sacred memory, and the logistical simplicity of 
the American Revolution was gradually falling by the wayside. The era of 
mobilization—^the reallocation of a nation’s resources fer the assembly, 
preparation, and equipping of forces for war—had arrived. 

—Frank N. Schubert 

The transitien of a nation to war requires all the resources a natien has available. Joint 
Doctrine provides fer two processes integral te mebilization. The first requires an increase in 
military readiness, the secend relies upon the ecenomy and its ability to meet both non-defense 
needs as well as continue to sustain the military.' 

The Department ef Defense (DeD) dictionary defines mobilizatien as the act of 
assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time ef war or 
other emergencies.^ While the President and National Security Ccuncil establishes natienal 
mobilization objectives. Congress exercises centrol over the mobilization process threugh 
budget appreval and fund authorization. The Secretary of Defense is responsible fer setting 
broad, basic mobilization policies, objectives and planning guidance to meet presidential 
objectives. The defense budget supperts the mobilization process fer a limited war or regional 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have detailed four tenets of mobilization, supported by twelve 
interdependent resource areas.® The tenets; objective, unity of effort, flexibility and timeliness 
are supported by “the assembly and organizatien ef resources.”'' These resources are: 
manpower, material and equipment, transportation, facilities, industrial base, training base, 
health service support, communications, host nation support, environmental impact, legal 
autherities and funding. The Joint Chiefs ef Staff have also defined mobilizatien as: 

The total of all resources available, or that can be made available, te meet 
foreseeable wartime needs. Such resources include the manpower and material 
reseurces and services required for the support of essential military, civilian, and 
survival activities, as well as the elements affecting their state of readiness, such 
as (but not limited to) the following: manning levels, state of training. 

modernization of equipment, mobilization material reserves and facilities, 
continuity of government, civil defense plans and preparedness measures, 
psychological preparedness of the people. International agreements, planning 
with Industry, dispersion, and standby legislation and controls.”® 

Initiatives aimed at improving efficiencies have impacted on individual mobilization 
resource areas. When reviewed in the overall context of mobilization, the cumulative second 
and third order effects on the resources have degraded mobilization efforts. This paper will 
provide a historical review of mobilization support and identify shortfalls In mobilization resource 
areas. Based on research and Interviews, analysis will be provided on the cumulative Impact of 
the training base, industrial base, facilities and manpower on readiness and the capability to 
support mobilization. 



The earliest mobilizations of citizen soldiers were individual volunteers; serving only for 
the duration of a specific conflict. They traveled lightly, lived in tents and in most cases, 
provided their own armaments and provisions. The Organized Reserve Corps was formed just 
prior to WWI and replaced early mobilizations supporting war activities on U.S. soil. These 
Individuals continued to mobilize as replacements for overseas units during WWI and WWII. As 
the reserve organizational structure grew, so did resource requirements. However, when the 
Selective Service System was put In place during 1917, availability and mobilization of 
manpower became secondary. ® 

During WWII, numerous support bases or facilities were developed throughout the U.S. to 
train and later deploy military personnel. Numerous enduring bases such as Fort Ord, Fort 
Devens, Fort DIx, and Fort McClellan were used as training and deployment platforms. 
Additional support Installations, such as Camp Santa Anita In California, were put into place to 
facilitate training and the manpower surge. Camp Santa Anita was a racetrack; taken over by 
the Army to conduct training.^ Once the Initial mobilization surge was completed. Camp Santa 
Anita became a racetrack again. Additional Installations such as Camp Crowder, MO; Keesler 
Field, FL; Camp Miles Standlsh, MA; Camp Fannon, TX; Jefferson Barracks, NJ; and Camp 
Hoffman, AK were temporarily developed to augment the manpower and facility requirements of 
WWII mobilization.® 



Sorting through competing Army and Navy requirements for equipment, suppiies and 
faciiities was chaiienging.® Civiiian businessmen controiied suppiy and demand since miiitary 
personnei iacked expertise and experience with procurement. This resuited in increased 
production and procurement costs, and industries realized considerabie profit. To support 
increased production demands of the war effort and sort out support priorities, the War Industry 
Board was established in 191Its purpose was to coordinate purchases and establish fill 
priorities to support ongoing military readiness. Shortened timelines for providing support 
created production and distribution backlogs for deploying personnel. 

Industrial mobilization planning began in the 1930’s with the nation organized under the 
President to adequately support wartime preparedness." The plan allowed the President to 
establish economic mobilization policies and provide for price controls. Through experience, the 
U.S. government realized that mobilization was a series of interrelated support processes that 
needed to occur as early as possible in advance of deploying U.S. forces. Simultaneously, the 
Army was preparing a mobilization plan to address advance support requirements of a defense 
force.^^ This plan did not address adequate troop housing and facilities for a force of 400,000 
and is considered a major shortfall. Additionally, funding was not available to support existing 
mobilization plans. 

The President realized the necessity of being able to mobilize quickly but also faced 
reelection during a period of renewed American isolationism. Oceans were considered a 
natural defenses and the U.S. public did not want a large standing Army or involved mobilization 
preparations. By 1939, the industrial mobilization plan was abandoned in favor of a limited 
preparedness policy. The President wanted to gradually increase the reach of the Navy and 
newly formed Air Corps by capitalizing on new technologies for air and naval capabilities. With 
a limited preparedness concept, the President could justify limited defense funding, still maintain 
support for internal social programs and not alienate voters. Although not the concept of the 
time, focus went to mobilization support of power projection platforms; where the force was 
trained, quickly mobilized and deployed forward. 

The end strength for the Regular Army and National Guard was increased. Intuitively, 
increased end strength required build up of additional support and training facilities in the U.S. 
Both the Navy and Air Corps provided a forward reach capability, significantly altering the value 
of the oceans in defense of the United States. Despite this, the U.S. never fully mobilized the 
economy. The federal government stayed linked to industry due to an increase in war 
production and requirements.'^ 



Setting the Stage for Mobilization Support Planning 

The protective mobilization plans of the 1940’s can be considered the primary building 
block for current mobilization support planning. The protective mobilization plan was based on 
the premise that the Army would be responsible for protecting the United States and the 
western hemisphere without support from a full scale mobilization of the industrial base.''' The 
ongoing events in Germany opened the appropriation purse strings. Protective mobilization 
allowed the Army to gradually build a homeland defense mission and expand the training base. 

The U.S. was not at war, but the interrelated pillars of mobilization; training, industrial 
base, facilities and manpower would expand. The Army took the lead in identifying mobilization 
support needs and reviewed the availability of facilities, manpower, materials, energy and all 
other resources. The industrial base was limited and did not have the ability to support 
requirements in a timely manner. During this timeframe procurement districts, arsenals and 
depots were formed in hopes of producing and assembling equipment and munitions well in 
advance of actual need.'® The Army Corps of Engineers were responsible for all military 
construction, including ordinance factories, administrative facilities and troop billets. Under 
contract, private construction companies did the actual work. Later, management of the 
factories would also be contracted. 

The Military Surges 

Mobilization planners knew that equipment and facilities should be available first. They 
were not prepared for the surge of the Army’s strength to 5.4 million. Manpower was available; 
facilities to support mobilization were not. The lag in construction of billeting, maintenance and 
repair, and supply facilities resulted in slower enlistments, delay of federalization of the National 
Guard, amendment of the draft law by lengthening the term of service and establishing interim 
rather than final recruitment goals.'® 

War agencies were regarded as strictly temporary and once the Defense program was 
replaced by the Victory program, all mobilization resource programs returned to pre-war status. 


The Korean War changed the mobilization paradigm for the U.S. Planners were tasked 
with supporting a limited war. They were faced with WWII surplus equipment, under strength 
units, service support provided by civilians and an eighteen to twenty-four month lead time for 
industry to retool to support mobilization requirements.'^ 


For manpower, the military relied upon selectees or individual replacements and 
velunteers to fill the ranks of the Natienal Guard. Selectees censisted ef inactive Reserve and 
National Guard members rather than unit members. Most of the selectees were WWII veterans 
and some were immediately assigned as trainers, while others immediately deployed to Korea 
without additional training. Personnel mobilizations were tumultuous. Additionally, individuals 
were mobilized and deployed with inadequate equipment. Reservists and active component 
personnel were released when their terms expired, leaving epen requirements for personnel 

Industrial mobilization was not a significant player initially. Mebilization planners used 
WWII surplus to meet needs. Additionally, the “roll-up and rebuild program”'® provided timely 
resupply to mobilizing and deploying forces. 

The Defense Productien Act of 8 September 1950 instituted a production program 
designed to “support and equip a 3.5 million force; replace materials and supplies; toel up and 
expand industrial capacity for higher levels of future production; and provide facilities and 
installations for the expanded armed forces.”'® Like the acts of WWII, the President was given 
the authority to establish priorities and establish an Office of Defense Mobilization. 

The Office of Defense Mebilization controlled appropriations for defense procurement and 
industrial mobilization as well as providing for research and development. Even though WWII 
arsenals and other factories were used extensively to support mobilization; requirements and 
scheduling were never synchronized. There were numerous resource shortages in ammunitien 
and clothing during the Korean War. By the time the Kerean War ended, the U.S. had tripled 
the size ef the military and quadrupled the defense budget. 

The U.S learned that a limited war weuld require quick worldwide deployment of troops in 
a combat-ready state ef training. The requirement for a substantial training base was 


The impact of mobilization efforts on politics is nothing new. Te this point, we have seen 
the range of politics; isolationist policies, reluctance te mobilize the econemy for preparedness, 
gevernment suppert of privately owned industries and lags in meeting mebilization support 
requirements. However, once the President made the decisien to commit resources to 
mobilization, the natien respended. 

The impact of mobilization on politics was never more evident than during Vietnam. U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam spanned three presidential administrations, yet the national strategy did 


not improve the readiness posture by mobilizing the nation. Subsequent U.S. national support 
was never realized. Reserve mobilization was minimal and limited to approximately 35,000 
personnel. Politically, the President attempted to conduct the war so that it would have little 
noticeable impact on everyday life in the U.S. The bottom line; there was no mobilization base 
support effort conducted during Vietnam. Looking at the definition of the mobilization base, 
mobilization requires among other things, the “psychological preparedness of the people.”^" 

One of the reasons the population of the United States was disaffected with Vietnam was 
because there was no preparedness. And without the support of the mobilization base, the 
nation would not continue to sustain the war effort. 



In the wake of budget deficits due in part from large military buildups to win the Cold War, 
the nation called for a large drawdown of military forces by cutting Defense appropriations.^' 
With the drawdown, the nation also looked for the “peace dividend”. Once again the active 
component was downsized, with an increase to the Reserves. Overall, the U.S. was cautious in 
re-evaluating national security requirements and its defense posture. Defense through 
mobilization had been the prevailing doctrine and post Cold War proved no differently. The 
Total Force policy was adopted in 1973 with hopes of integrating both active and Reserves in 
the war planning process. The Total Force policy linked Reserve Component mobilization 
requirements with individual service components'^ and provides a cost effective means to 
maintain a trained and balanced force for the security of the nation. A standing active force is 
very expensive and historically, the U.S. does not maintain a large standing Army. The Total 
Force Policy shifts missions from the active to the Reserve Component.A key factor of the 
Total Force Policy would be to ensure that trained Reserves would be ready when required in 
any future deployment of U.S. forces. 

National security interests of the U.S. are met by the ability to rapidly mobilize, deploy, 
and employ reserve component personnel. The Total Force Policy was designed to facilitate 
this.^'' However, the Total Force Policy does not necessarily reflect the proper mix of Reserve 
and active component requirements. The ongoing recommendation is to review the force 
structure to ensure the proper mix of skills to support mobilization and contingency 



The Mobilization Process 

Unlike WWII, the U.S. no longer needs a large, heavy Industrial base to support a full 
mobilization. With a focus on supporting regional contingencies, the Industrial base was 
beginning to feel the effects of declining resources. Simple economics proved that to be 
successful and support mobilization efforts, businesses need to have the ability to be 
responsive and provide a product or service smarter, quicker and cheaper. 

In a 1990 address to Congress, then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stated that the 
Department of Defense was concerned with the erosion of the U.S. Industrial base. Three Items 
were cited: a decline in the total number of defense suppliers; accelerating penetration of 
foreign goods into U.S. markets; and a growing dependency on foreign sources for vital 
components and subassemblies, and decreasing returns of fixed assets, declining capital 
Investments and lagging productivity In key defense sectors.^® However, during Operation 
Desert Storm (ODS), industry planning kept pace with military planning due to the availability of 
strategic stockpiles of supplies and equipment left over from Cold War preparations. The 
stockpiles allowed the U.S. to successfully support and conduct a short duration conflict. One of 
the unanswered questions is whether the U.S. could have sustained a protracted conflict after 
stockpiles were depleted. 

The national military strategy calls for the military to meet future challenges with a smaller 
force and with that in mind, the military needed to evolve from a heavy forward presence to a 
light, CONUS based easily deployable force.^® This significantly increased the reliance on the 
Reserve Components and the availability of power projection platforms to quickly support 
mobilization. The Total Force Policy was beginning to have an impact; DoD, at least, 
considered active, guard and Reserve personnel as one integrated force. Reserve and National 
Guard units were visible members of their communities and performed numerous humanitarian 
and disaster relief mission throughout the world, augmented active forces and provided skills 
otherwise not available. 

The DoD remained cautious in the use of Reserves and in 1988, recognized that the Air 
Force, Navy, Coast Guard and Marines would be able to accommodate mobilization of their 
Reserve forces. The Reserve forces in these services had been trained and integrated with 
their active counterparts. The Army did not provide training and integration of the Reserves and 
National Guard as required by the Total Force Policy. As a result, the Army would require major 
expansion of the training base to increase capability. Also recognizing that mobilization efforts 


needed to be phased, both the graduated mobilization response (GMR) and the time-phased 
force and deployment data (TPFDD) plan, developed in 1982^® were being implemented. 
Phasing was designed to enhance readiness by providing the mobilization base with the 
opportunity to synchronize planning and capabilities with requirements. Phasing was also 
designed to prevent a surge that would overwhelm the mobilization base, depleting available 
resources. Additionally, phasing caused further refinement of the Total Force Policy, providing 
manpower to be mobilized and employed as a unit, rather than individual fillers which had 
proved to be an unsuccessful practice during the Korean War.^® 

The Graduated Mobilization Response 

A direct correlation between graduated mobilization response (GMR) and the increased 
demand for support facilities and training is built into the process. Military installations are 
integral to the mobilization base. As the level of GMR increases, requirements for training, 
facilities and manpower increase. This shows the interdependence between manpower 
mobilization, readiness of the sustaining and training base, and ability of the economy to 
respond and plan to use capabilities. 

The GMR provides for five levels of mobilization: 

Presidential selected reserve call-up (SRC). Title 10, United States Code (USC) 
673(b), authorizes the President to involuntarily call up 200,000 members (all 
services) of the selected reserves as individuals or units for 180 days, with an 
extension of up to 180 days. This PSRC authority does not require the President 
to declare a national emergency; it does require a report to the U.S. Congress 
within 24 hours. 

Partial mobilization. Title 10, USC 673(a), authorizes the mobilization of 
1,000,000 ready reserve (all services) members for up to 24 months using a 
Presidential executive order upon proclamation of a national emergency. 
Congress may declare a state of national emergency and subsequent reserve 
mobilization under Title 10, USC 672(d). The congressional declaration does not 
limit the number of reservists mobilized or the length of tour unless specified in 
the resolution. 

Total mobilization. This is an extension of full mobilization. It activates and 
organizes additional units beyond the current approved force structure. Total 
mobilization brings the industrial mobilization base up to full capacity to provide 
additional resources, equipment, and production facilities needed to support the 
armed forces of the nation. 

Selective mobilization. This is used primarily for domestic emergencies or 
natural disasters. It is authorized under Title 10, USC 3500,8500,331,332, and 
333. The President or Congress, through proclamation or special action, 
authorizes and expansion of the active duty force with National Guard or Reserve 


units to protect life, federal property, and functions, or to prevent the disruption of 
federal activities?'’ 

The GMR supported the national military strategy but did not provide a plan for a rapid 
partial mobilization. The GMR was still geared for total war, where full mobilization was 
expected. Until Operations Desert Shield and Storm (ODS), it had been nearly twenty years 
since the U.S relied on the Reserve Components. Short of a global conflict, it was generally 
assumed that Reservists would not be called to active duty. Subsequently, training of 
Reservists was not a high priority. Approximately 245,000 Reserve Component personnel were 
mobilized during ODS. Initially, in August 1990, 25,000 selected Reserve unit members and 
Individual Military Augmentees were called to active duty for a period of 90 days under the 
200,000 call up authority, later extended not to exceed 270 days. They provided combat 
support and combat service support functions, primarily on CONUS based installations as well 
as augmenting air and sea port facilities. The call-up was phased over the next several months, 
culminating in January 1991 with Presidential authorization fora Partial Mobilization. The 
Secretary of Defense was authorized to call up to 1,000,000 Reservists for a period of two 

As a result, critical enablers, such as port operations and supply personnel were identified 
for later mobilization on the TPFDD and not included in the 90 day call up authority. 

Additionally, the TPFDD did not include individuals, only units with a unit identification code. To 
avoid further delays, the TPFDD had to be manually adjusted, moving units forward to 
accommodate critical manpower shortfalls.^’ 


Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm demonstrated the ability of the U.S. to quickly 
mobilize and deploy Reserve forces and equipment. Approximately 106,000 of the 245,000 
mobilized reservists served in Southwest Asia during ODS. The remainder performed support 
functions for both the training and sustaining bases. Upon mobilization, premobilization training 
was identified as a readiness detractor. Specifically, training was at issue for three Army 
National Guard (ARNG) combat brigades.®^ During peacetime, the ARNG did not train to 
combat proficiency. Contributors to the shortfall in training included a lack of maneuver and 
training space, inadequate equipment, lack of dedicated trainers and state economic constraints 
to fit all training in available drills and annual training periods. This had an adverse impact on 
the mobilization and readiness process. The brigades never deployed due to the amount of 
time required for post-mobilization training.^" 


This had high visibility and concern within Congress and along with realignment of the 
force structure, was considered in the 1993 Bottoms-Up Review conducted by DoD.®'* There 
were inequities in training and equipment distribution between the active and Reserve 
Components. The resulting enhanced readiness brigades were expected to receive priority for 
training and resources. In order to enhance training and decrease mobilization to deployment 
processing time, the General Accounting Office made several recommendations to the Sec of 
the Army. These Included sharing of available training equipment between active and Reserve 
units; increase the training base to provide instruction on equipment used by units to which 
reservist were assigned; and ensure that Reserve commanders are adequately trained.^® Later, 
It was determined that the mobilization base would be required to provide training and 
maneuver sites, training personnel, opposing forces and installation support.®® 

Other problems occurred with Infrastructure support. Mobilization plans and the TPFDD 
called for mobilization support units to be called at full mobilization. For the Army, this was the 
United States Army Reserve (USAR) Garrison unit. Additionally, USAR Garrison units only 
supported larger installations. Four USAR Garrisons were activated to support OSD.®’’ The 
reserve structure to support further activation and mobilization was not available under GMR, 
the 200,000 call-up for ODS 

The USAR Garrison unit operates military Installations when the active component 
deploys. Deployments left a shortfall In medical, logistical, force protection, asset accountability 
and administrative support for mobilization stations throughout the U.S.,®® subsequently, 
additional mobilization stations were not augmented with USAR Garrisons, protracting 
mobilization processing and training time. 

Adding to the shortfall of USAR Garrison, there was no increase in the civilian end 
strength during ODS. While performing concurrent deployment of active component personnel 
and mobilizing Reserve and National Guard units, civilians were expected to continue to 
perform day to day base sustaining activities. DoD civilians performed many of the support 
functions previously accomplished by military personnel. Logistics operations such as 
equipment and preventive building maintenance were neglected In order to support mobilization. 
This had a cascading effect on replacement parts and equipment required for ODS. The civilian 
personnel system was not responsive to the surge in mobilization requirements. 

The industrial base also redefined surge capabilities during ODS. To provide products, 
goods and services quicker and cheaper, the Industrial base did not expand military production 
as It had in the past. The focus was on logistics support services using existing facilities and 
equipment to accelerate production, maintenance, and repair of Items.®® Primarily, industry 


limited production expansion to produce consumables and small items. Because of the 
strategic reserve stock, the speed at which the country was able to mobilize resources for war, 
without expanding, became a key factor in the success of ODS. Equally impressive was the 
capability of the mobilization base to provide superior technology in terms of weapons 
modernization and equipment 

Over a half million passengers, 3.7 million tons of dry cargo and 6.1 million tons of 
petroleum products were shipped to the theater of operations.''" Getting personnel and supplies 
to southwest Asia required an integrated and synchronized effort between all facets of the 
mobilization base. The President activated the Civilian and Reserve Air Fleet for the first time. 
Port capabilities were increased and there were instances where the U.S. government upgraded 
commercial runways to accommodate the surge in air traffic. 

The nation had five months to prepare for war and relied heavily on high stock levels from 
the mobilization base as well as prepositioned equipment.'" The high stock levels were a result 
of the Cold War defense budgets, where resources provided for an adequate build up. The 
stock levels also provided the industrial base with the time needed to accelerate production. 
However, if ODS had been protracted, stock levels might not have sustained U.S. forces. A 
recommendation would be to have the U.S. continue to examine stock levels to ensure 
adequate stocks are available while the industrial base gears up to support operations. 

There are numerous examples where the mobilization base accelerated both production 
and delivery on its own initiative, providing just in time supplies and equipment. In other 
situations, the Defense Logistics Agency increased the number of vendors capable of providing 
required items and effectively used available resources to meet mobilization needs, without 
invoking the Defense Production Act. The Defense Production Act allows the President to direct 
industry to expand capabilities to meet the requirements of sustaining war efforts. 


The U.S. mobilization base has continued to down size. Technology has led to better 
inventory systems and cost savings. Just in time delivery methods replaced large warehouses 
and centralized distribution systems. Outsourcing replaced local businesses. Defense 
contracts, once plentiful and easily obtained now face highly competitive rules and constrained 
resources. A significant downside should be noted: ODS depleted the strategic reserve built up 
from the Cold War. Working together, industry and DoD sought to improve manufacturing 
technologies, providing emphasis on the capability to reconstitute the forces. There are 
concerns that without a major threat to the U.S., defense budgets will continue to shrink and the 


strength posture of the U.S. will be diminished. Modernization, mobiiization and transformation 
are geared to support iong-term security requirements. Additionai resource requirements are 
iinked to modernization and transformation. New weapons piatforms require additionai 
maneuver space and training time for both the active and Reserve Components. Despite new 
requirements, a number of ongoing initiatives have a negative impact on manpower and training 

The DoD is chaiienged with being abie to reconstitute production rates to support regionai 
confiicts. Recommendations inciude defense partnering with industry. This is one way to 
continue to retain the industriai base, innovative DoD ieaders have encouraged cross training 
programs within private industries. This has enabied industries to be prepared to meet nationai 
defense surge production requirements.''^ 



Base realignment and ciosure (BRAG) actions began in 1988 continued through 1995. 
During the period, DoD underwent a series of four base ciosure studies. Both the Air Force and 
Army were impacted. Instaiiations and bases were transferred or soid to state and iocai 
redeveiopment firms, turned over to other Federai agencies, or restructured in whoie or part to 
be Reserve enciaves. On Reserve enciaves, DoD reduced its infrastructure of biiieting and 
administrative space by fifty seven percent, identified haif a miilion acres of unneeded training 
acres and further reduced avaiiabie training acres from 394,430 to 351,386, an eieven percent 

The eieven percent loss in training space needs to be factored in with increase range and 
maneuver space requirements for new equipment and usabie maneuver or training space 
avaiiabie on active instaiiations. Urban encroachment, environmentai restrictions, access and 
avaiiabiiity, water sites and even shape of the instaiiation have impacted on the avaiiabiiity of 
training and maneuver space.'*'' Fort Hood couid be used as an exampie, oniy eighteen percent 
of the required maneuver space is avaiiabie for use due to the fact that the instaiiation is buiit up 
and overcrowded.'*® 

The next BRAG round is scheduied for 2005. If the trend continues, six of the ten major 
Reserve enclaves, currently used as mobilization stations, wiii ciose. Minimum essentiai 
training area wili be maintained, with no additionai personnei support to meet premobiiization 
training requirements, in many cases, the Reserve Gomponents accepted unimproved training 
areas, with littie or no funding for improvement.'*® Lack of adequate maneuver space forces 


units to train outside of doctrinai requirements and increase the use of workarounds to minimize 
the ioss of space. Reserve units wili receive iower priorities when competing for training space. 

It is recommended that DoD review the possibiiity of using the two miliion acres avaiiabie 
at White Sands Missiie Range for additionai maneuver space. Additionally, recommend that 
BRAG work closely with the ongoing Joint Land Use Study Program to resolve encroachment 
issues that will continue to degrade the training base. 

Additionally, the Army closed several depots and supporting organizations while the Air 
Force privatized two of its five depots as a result of BRAG. By law, fifty percent of depot work 
must be done at government facilities otherwise all depots would have been considered for 
BRAG scrutiny.'*^ With increased reliance on the commercial industrial base for repair and 
overhaul of major end items, responsiveness and surge capabilities are currently under review 
by the General Accounting Office. 

The next BRAG round will consider the remaining depots with the possibility of transferring 
all depot operations to the private sector. Mobilization surge capabilities are negatively 
impacted by the decline in the number of suppliers and declining capital investments.''® Rather 
than depend on lagging response time from the industrial base, the Army is considering turning 
two arsenals into federal corporations that could manufacture commercial products as well as 
manufacture needed munitions to reconstitute depleted stockpiles.''® This imitative should be 

The DoD declared a war on wood throughout the military. Older, WWII facilities were 
demolished. All military installations, including the Reserve enclaves, were required to reduce 
the square footage of available facilities. For example. Fort Indiantown Gap demolished 349 
facilities since 1998.®° Once a building has been destroyed, like-type facilities are not 
reconstructed. This leads to a shortfall of billeting, training and administrative space needed to 
support mobilizing and deploying forces.®' Rather than building new facilities, contracting and 
acquisition processes should be reformed to facilitate a quick turn around of leasing off post 
facilities to support mobilization surges. 


In the 30 September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Sec Def discusses 
“first to fight” forces as being trained and ready; at the cost of degrading the readiness of other 
units.®® Readiness, as defined in the QDR, includes readiness of carrier air wings, strategic 
transport capabilities, non-divisional and Reserve Gomponent units and the aging infrastructure 
and instrumentation of U.S. training ranges.®® The infrastructure of the mobilization base also 


includes military and civilian piers, runways, and hangars supporting U.S. combat forces; the 
buildings where DoD personnel work; military housing and barracks; and training space.®'* 
Sustainment of facilities on military installations had fallen significantly behind the industrial 
base, adding to readiness concerns. In 1998, the services were directed to dispose of over 80 
million square feet of unneeded and unserviceable facilities; of that, the Army’s goal by the end 
of fiscal year 2003 was to demolish 53.2 million square feet.®® 

The capability of the mobilization base and the aging infrastructure was next tested after 
the events of 11 September 2001. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) followed by Operation 
Iraqi Freedom placed constant pressure on the mobilization base. Adding to mobilization 
stressors, the Army continued to demolish and dispose of unserviceable facilities throughout the 
mobilization process. As of 27 January 2004,193,804 National Guard and Reservist members 
have been mobilized from within DoD.®® In contrast to ODS, Garrison Support Units (GSUs); 
formerly USAR Garrison units; were mobilized early in the process. The GSUs are assigned to 
Army Power Projection Platforms and larger mobilization stations across the U.S. as depicted in 
Figure 1 .®^ Other services did not require a surge in support capabilities. With the exception of 
the Army; all other services are structured to train, mobilize and deploy reserve component 
members almost immediately. 

Each GSU has a different structure, designed to meet the needs of the installation it 
supports. As in ODS, GSUs were not assigned to smaller installations. Once again the TPFDD 
was manually adjusted to meet the needs of the Combatant Commander; as a result both the 
larger and smaller installations identified problems with the mobilization surge. Facilities 
available during ODS mobilization had been demolished as a result of the war on wood. 

Billeting facilities, dinning areas and administrative space were at a premium. In many cases, 
active component forces had not deployed. Manpower requirements within the GSU also 
surfaced as problematic. The right skill sets were not available and in many cases, there was a 
grade mismatch. 

The deployment timelines conflicted with mobilization timelines and facilities were not 
vacated for follow on mobilization use.®® The TPFDD had not been adjusted to meet the needs 
of partial mobilization to support regional conflicts. 



The installation support structure went through several transitions in the period between 
ODS and the mobilizations for OEF and OIF. Commercial activities studies were conducted. In 
many cases, the commercial industrial base was contracted to perform day to day logistic and 
public works functions. When the original statements of work were written for commercial 
activities studies, workload data was based on prior year activities. Advanced planning for 
mobilization support activities was not included in the cost comparisons.®® Where installations 
kept support functions with DoD civilians, mobilization resource activities were cut to a 
minimum. Maintenance shops were closed and facilities converted to other uses. Even with the 
GSUs, installations had difficulty handling the large scale mobilization.®® 

The support provided by GSUs falls into three categories: Installation support where day 
to day business is conducted; Force Protection with individuals providing access to installations; 
and, mobilization support for activities directly tied to mobilization and deployment. All GSUs 
were activated to support OEF and OIF. Subsequently, these Reservists will leave active duty 
in June 2004, leaving a shortfall in resource support services. HQDA will be developing a 
contract to provide mobilization support for the next rotation into OEF and OIF.®^ 

As a result of ongoing demolition of facilities, billeting space was severely limited. With 
the active component still on many installations and facilities unavailable on others, mobilized 
and deploying Reservists were billeted in open facility areas such as post gyms or tents. On 
smaller installations with limited space or no facilities, hotels and motels were contracted to 
provide off post billeting. The Installation Management Agency for the Army is currently 


developing and staffing “Billeting Standards for Mobilizing Soldiers”. Once finalized, the 
standards will be used throughout the Army and will provide a tiered priority system for 


Mobilization is a key element in the National Security Strategy of the U.S. Success in war 
depends on the nation and its capability to integrate the training and industrial base with facility 
and manpower availability. 

There are a number of challenges facing the nation. Declining resources have had a 
direct impact on the readiness of mobilization. The U.S. must continuously replace strategic 
stockpiles while meeting the requirement of ongoing activities. And it must be accomplished 
quickly to respond to ongoing activities. The U.S. was fortunate during ODS and other short 
duration conflicts. Stockpiles were in place and the reconstitution process was not challenged. 
Unless there is coordination between DoD and the industrial base, there will be shortfalls in 
meeting defense requirements. Shortening the cycle time will require forward thinking. The 
initiative to convert two arsenals into federal corporations may become the benchmark for the 
future of the industrial base in support of DoD. The arsenals would manufacture needed 
munitions to reconstitute depleted stockpiles, meet surge requirements and manufacture 
commercial products during peacetime. It is logical to assume that these activities would be 
partnership ventures, very similar to management of Corps of Engineers factories during WWII. 

Infrastructure support for facilities and the training base was critical throughout the 
mobilization history of the U.S. During WWII, facilities were developed to provide for training 
and mobilization of military personnel. The cycle time from training to deployment was reduced 
by developing additional training bases to temporarily augment existing bases to meet surge 
requirements. As in the case of Camp Santa Anita, once personnel were trained, the base 
became a racetrack again. During the Korean Conflict and ODS, the U.S. had the benefit of 
existing bases and infrastructure and successfully sustained a rapid build up of personnel to 
participate in a regional conflict. 

The Total Force Policy was never fully implemented by the Army. Subsequently, Reserve 
personnel did not receive parity for training and equipment. Lack of infrastructure support in 
terms of the training base had a detrimental impact on readiness and deployment. The training 
base is now focused on providing training for enhanced brigades. The infrastructure can 
support training for one brigade, and allow for shorter cycle time from mobilization to 
deployment.®® By exploring the availability of additional maneuver and training space such as 


the two million acres at White Sands Missile Range, DoD can increase the number of units who 
can train and be ready to deploy when needed. 

Numerous facilities were builtto support WWII mobilizations; however 80 million square 
feet of facilities have been demolished since 1998. There are billeting shortages, due to 
ongoing demolition and overlapping deployments. Bases have closed, adding to the shortfall in 
training and maneuver space. There is a shortfall in the synchronization between the GMR and 
the TPFDD. The TPFDD was manually adjusted for ODS and OIF. The Total Force Policy 
should align with the GMR and TPFDD. The force mix should be reviewed and realigned if 

The nation depends on the adequacy of the mobilization base to meet future needs. To 
have a trained and ready reserve force to meet mobilization needs, the U.S. needs to provide 
adequate facilities and training, and ensure the industrial base is ready. Mobilization resources 
are interdependent. Manpower, training, and facilities will result in a trained and ready force to 
support the national security strategy. 

WORD COUNT = 6,419 




'Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Doctrine Encyciopedia (Washington, D.C.iU.S. Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, 17 December 2003), 524. 

^Joint Chiefs of Staff, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub 1-02; 
avaiiabie from <www.dtic.mii/doctrine/jei/doddict/data/m/03450.htmi>; Internet; accessed 7 
December 2003. 

^Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning, Joint Pub 4-05 (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 22 June 1995), li-1. 

'•ibid, iV-1. 

®Joint Chiefs of Staff, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub 1-02; 
avaiiabie from <www.dtic.mii/doctrine/jei/doddict/data/m/03451 .htmi>; Internet; accessed 7 
December 2003. 

®Frank N. Schubert, Mobilization in World War II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of 
Miiitary History), 3; avaiiabie from <>; 
Internet; accessed 23 January 2004. 

'"“WWII Stories,” 1942; avaiiabie from < 
curated_story.jsp?exd=561 >; internet; accessed 10 February 2004. 

®ibid. Numerous memoirs from the “Band of Brothers” series are avaiiabie at the same web 
site, some simiiar experiences; many different mobiiization and basic training sites throughout 
the U.S. 

"Schubert, 3. 


"Ibid, 6. 

'"Ibid, 8. 

'"“Management Aids,” 26 January 1994; avaiiabie from <http://acused.adu.gen/WW2 
Timeiin/.htmi>; Internet; accessed 26 Jan 04. 

'^'Schubert, 11. 

'"Center for Military History, History and Military Mobilization in the U.S. Army: 1977-1945, 
CMH Pub 104-10, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center for Miiitary History, 1989), 476. 

'"Shubert, 17. 

'^Dr. Robert W. Coakiey, Highlights of Mobilization, The Korean War, 2-3.7 AF.C, 

(Historicai Manuscripts Coiiection, U.S. Army Center for Miiitary History) 4. 




^“Joint Chiefs of Staff, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub 1-02; 
avaiiabie from <www.dtic.mii/doctrine/jei/doddict/data/m/03451 .htmi>; Internet; accessed 7 
December 2003. 

^'COL Ronaid P. Daie, Mobilization for Operation Desert Shield/Storm: Lessons Learned, 
Strategy Research Project (Cariisie Barracks: U.S. Army War Coiiege, 8 Aprii 1991) 

^^Generai Accounting Office, Army Training: Management Initiatives Needed to Enhance 
Reservists’ Training (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Generai Accounting Office, 1989) 5. 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning, Joint Pub 4-05 (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 22 June 1995), viii. 

""Ibid, 13. 

"®Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and Congress, 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1990). 

"^Department of the Army, Division Operations, Fieid Manuai 71-100 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Department of the Army, 28 August 1996) D-1. 

""Department of Defense, Mobilization Master Pian, DoD 3020.36-P (Washington, D.C.: 

U.S. Department of Defense, 1988) 15. 

""Daie, 10. 

""Department of Defense, “Totai Force Poiicy Report to the Congress,” suppiementai 
presented to Congress, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1991), 472. 

"“Department of the Army, Division Operations, D-1 and D-2. 

"'Pete Peterson, Mob Pianner, G1, FORSCOM, personai interview by author 22 December 
2003 at Fort McPherson, GA. 

""RAND, Postmobilization Training Resource Requirements: Army National Guard Heavy 
Enhanced Brigades (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), 80. 

""Generai Accounting Office, Reserve Forces: Aspects of the Army’s Equipping Strategy 
Hamper Reserve Readiness (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Generai Accounting Office, February 
1993), 10. 

""Department of Defense, “FY 1998 Reserve Component inactivation’s Ciosed Out Under 
Bottom Up Review (BUR),” 26 November 1997; avaiiabie from 

<http://www.defenselink.mii/reieases/1997/b11261997_bt635-97.htmi>; Internet; accessed 18 
February 2004. 

""General Accounting Office, Army Training: Management Initiatives Needs to Enhance 
Reservists’ Training, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1989), 22. 


^®RAND, Time and Resources Required for Postmobiiization Training of AC/ARNG 
Integrated Heavy Divisions (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998), 10-11. 

^^John Seitz, U.S. Army Reserve in Operation Desert Storm. Installation Operations: The 
Role ofUSAR Garrisons (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, August 1994), 5. 

^®Frank M. Hudgins, Activation/Partial Mobilization of U.S. Army Reserves and Associated 
Personnel Management System Problems {Car\\s\e Barracks: U.S. Army War Coiiege, March 
1992) 18. 

^®John T. Correii, “The Industriai Base at War,” Air Force Magazine Online December 1991 
Oournai on-iine]; avaiiabiefrom < 
/1291 industriai.asp>; Internet; accessed 26 January 2004. 

'“’“U.S. Transportation Command: A Short History,”; available from 
<>; Internet; accessed 13 December 2003. 


'“’Robert Molino, “History of the Defense Logistics Agency,”; available from 
<>; Internet; accessed 29 January 2004. 

'“’General Accounting Office, Military Base Closures: Better Planning Needed for Future 
Reserve Enclaves, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003), 11-16. 

'’'‘“Land Requirement Assessment from The Installation-Level Perspective,”; available from 
<>; accessed 10 March 2004. 


''^General Accounting Office, Military Base Closures: Better Planning Needed for Future 
Reserve Enclaves, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003), 23. 

''^George Cahlink, “Erasing Bases,” October 2003 Oournai on-line]; available 
from <http:www.govexec.eom/features/1003/1003s2.htm>; accessed 9 December 2003. 

'“’Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and Congress, 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1990). 


^‘’General Accounting Office, Military Base Closures: Better Planning Needed for Future 
Reserve Enclaves, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003), 11. 

Pete Peterson, Mob Planner, G1, FORSCOM, personal interview by author 22 December 
2003 at Fort McPherson, GA. 

“Donald H. Rumsfeld, Ouadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: The 
Pentagon, September 2001), 8. 



®"lbid, 10. 

^'Department of Defense, “Defense Reform Initiative Decision #36 - Disposai/Demoiition of 
Excess Structures,” 5 May 1998; avaiiabie from <http://www.defenseiink.mii/dodreform/ 
drids/drid36.htmi>. Internet; accessed 22 February 2004. 

"DoD News release, “National Guard and Reserve Mobilization as of January 28, 2004,”; 
available from <>; Internet; accessed 29 January 2004 

'^Alfred Jones, COL, DCS, G-3 First Army, telephonic interview by author, 10 January 
2002 . 


"Based on authors experience in developing Statements of Work for A-76 studies and 
subsequent government bidding on Most Efficient Organization. Review of Fort McPherson, 
Fort Gordon and Fort Drum A-76 studies in 2000 revealed that mobilization support was not 
considered for the study. 



'^Dumlao, Ernie, Operations and Mobilization Planner, Operations and Mobilization Branch, 
FIQIMA, telephonic interview by author, 5 January 2004. 

"RAND, Time and Resources Required for Postmobiiization Training of AC/ARNG 
Integrated Fleavy Divisions, 12. 



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