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Civilian Research Project 

NATO's Options for Defensive 
Cyber Against Non-State Actors 


Colonel Casimir C. Carey 
United States Army 




United States Army War College 
Class of 2013 


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Department of the Army, Department of Defense, orthe U.S. Government. 

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NATO’s Options for Defensive Cyber Against Non-State Actors 


Colonel Casimir C. Carey III 
United States Army 


Professor William C. Banks 
Syracuse University 


Ms. Karen J. Finkenbinder 

U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA 17013 


Distribution A: Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited 


Word Count: 5,965 


Overt state-to-state cyber conflicts are unlikely for the foreseeable future; states prefer to retain plausible 
deniability through surreptitious sponsorship of non-state cyber militias. International legal norms, NATO’s 
Article 5 requirements, and UN Security Council procedural issues seem to limit NATO’s options in 
responding to cyber events by non-state actors. However, there are three circumstances under which 
NATO may legally take cyber countermeasures against non-state actors: (1) when a nation-state fails to 
enforce the law against non-state actors within its borders; (2) when a cyber-disruption is tantamount to an 
economic blockade; and (3) if there is intelligence that indicates a pending cyber-attack by force, thereby 
necessitating anticipatory self-defense. The decision by NATO after 9/11 to pursue a non-state terrorist 
organization was a normative shift internationally; prior to this event, counterterrorism was widely viewed 
as a law enforcement issue. With China and Russia as permanent members of the UN Security Council, 
resolutions against countries for harboring cyber militias are unlikely. Both nations routinely tolerate—if not 
sponsor—cyber militias. NATO is the one enforcement arm with the resources to thwart the illicit militias. 


Anticipatory Self-Defense, blockade, DDOS, Tallinn Manual, Article 5, Estonia, rule of law, countermeasures 













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NATO’s Options for Defensive Cyber Against Non-State Actors 


Colonel Casimir C. Carey III 
United States Army 

Professor William C. Banks 
Syracuse University 
Project Adviser 

Ms. Karen J. Finkenbinder 
U.S. Army War College Faculty Mentor 

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the U.S. Army 
War College Fellowship. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission 
on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 
Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher 
Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of 
Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation. 

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author 
and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, 
Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 

U.S. Army War College 




NATO’s Options for Defensive Cyber Against Non-State Actors 

Report Date: 

April 2013 

Page Count: 


Word Count: 


Key Terms: 

Anticipatory Self-Defense, blockade, DDOS, Tallinn Manual, Article 
5, Estonia, rule of law, countermeasures 



Overt state-to-state cyber conflicts are unlikely for the foreseeable future; states prefer 
to retain plausible deniability through surreptitious sponsorship of non-state cyber 
militias. International legal norms, NATO’s Article 5 requirements, and UN Security 
Council procedural issues seem to limit NATO’s options in responding to cyber events 
by non-state actors. However, there are three circumstances under which NATO may 
legally take cyber countermeasures against non-state actors: (1) when a nation-state 
fails to enforce the law against non-state actors within its borders; (2) when a cyber¬ 
disruption is tantamount to an economic blockade; and (3) if there is intelligence that 
indicates a pending cyber-attack by force, thereby necessitating anticipatory self- 
defense. The decision by NATO after 9/11 to pursue a non-state terrorist organization 
was a normative shift internationally; prior to this event, counterterrorism was widely 
viewed as a law enforcement issue. With China and Russia as permanent members of 
the UN Security Council, resolutions against countries for harboring cyber militias are 
unlikely. Both nations routinely tolerate—if not sponsor—cyber militias. NATO is the 

one enforcement arm with the resources to thwart the illicit militias. 

NATO’s Options for Defensive Cyber Against Non-State Actors 

Estonia’s Minister of Defence—Jaak Aaviksoo—noted with alarm a massive 
increase in Internet queries directed against the tiny Baltic state’s government and 
commercial web servers in early May 2007. Suspecting the hand of Russia in this 
expanding Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attack, he urgently requested 
assistance from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—of which Estonia had 
been a member since 2004. To his frustration, he vented to international media that 
“NATO does not define cyber-attacks as a clear military action. This means 
that...collective self defence, will not automatically be extended to the attacked 
country.” 1 Aaviksoo’s suspicions about Kremlin sponsorship were understandable, 
given the ongoing dispute between native Estonians and ethnic Russian citizens—in 
response to the government’s decision to reposition the “Bronze Soldier” war memorial 
statue from downtown Tallinn to a suburban military cemetery. The government’s intent 
was to stop the annual conflicts that routinely occurred during the 9 May “Victory Day” 
observance of the Soviet Union’s triumph over Nazi Germany. Ethnic Russians typically 
spent the day honoring their war dead; native Estonians viewed the occasion as an 
unpleasant reminder of Soviet occupation from 1944-1991, and sardonically referred to 
the Bronze Soldier as “the Unknown Rapist.” 2 The statue’s displacement proved to be a 
tipping point that touched off riots and looting by thousands of ethnic Russian 
Estonians—leaving 800 arrested, 153 injured, and one dead. 3 Ethnic Russians 
throughout Eurasia took umbrage to the perceived insult to veterans and survivors of 
the “Great Patriotic War,” which generated conspiratorial activity on the Russian- 
language Internet forums—urging followers to disable Estonia’s Internet infrastructure. 4 
The cyber event began with “Script-kiddies”—amateurish cyber activists who copy 

programs from hacker websites—initiating demands on Estonian websites with simple 
“ping” attacks. 5 Two weeks later—just hours before “Victory Day” itself—Estonian 
government, banking, and business websites received a 200-fold increase in traffic from 
nearly a million unwittingly enslaved “botnet” computers worldwide. 6 A “bot” is a 
computer infected by malware that reprograms it to respond to an external server— 
often in a different country. 7 It was through these botnets that demands for bandwidth 
increased exponentially—from 1,000 packets 8 per day on 26 April to 2,000 packets per 
hour on 27 April to 4 million packets per second on 9 May 2007. Hundreds of targeted 
websites crashed from an inability to handle the volume of packets directed to them. 9 
Neither the European Union nor NATO could find evidence of direct collusion between 
the Russian government and the hackers who fomented the DDOS against Estonian 
governance and commerce, 10 but lost revenue and information technology expenses to 
Estonian businesses amounted to an estimated 3 million euros. 11 Estonia lost over 
1.85% of its 2007 GDP; an incident on the same scale in the United States would cost 
US citizens nearly $260 billion, 12 which is comparable to the entire Gross State Product 
of Arizona in 2007; 13 at the time, Arizona had the United States’ nineteenth-largest 
state economy. 14 From Estonia’s perspective, the crippling effect of the DDOS on its 
heavily Internet-dependent country warranted action by NATO. The argument for jus a 
bellum —“right to war”—is fairly clear in state-to-state conflicts, but in this case 
ostensibly non-state actors were responsible for disrupting a sovereign nation-state to 
the extent of crippling its economy. The North Atlantic Treaty’s Article 5 was intended to 
rally Western European countries against a Warsaw Pact border incursion during the 
Cold War; yet since NATO’s formation in 1949, the alliance has invoked Article 5 just 


once—after the 9/11 attacks upon the United States in 2001. Article 5 addresses 
collective self-defense, to which NATO’s twenty-eight signatories agree that “an armed 
attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an 
attack against them all.” 15 Lord Robertson—NATO’s Secretary General during Al 
Qaeda’s attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon—stated that the 
alliance invoked Article 5 at the time because “the attack against the United States on 
11 September was directed from abroad and shall therefore be regarded as an action 
covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.” 16 Al Qaeda’s status as a non-state 
actor evidently was not an impediment to mobilizing assistance for the United States. 
Yet in the case of Estonia, aside from providing some technical expertise and holding 
discussions among the NATO ministers, the alliance offered no response—despite 
highly sophisticated cyber capabilities in the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
France that easily could have dismantled botnets that relentlessly queried Estonian 
websites. Since the DDOS event did not cause physical damage or actual injury to 
Estonian citizens, NATO perceived itself lacking justification under international norms 
to respond with cyber in self-defense; unleashing cyber weapons to fend off attacks 
from the non-state cyber militia members would doubtlessly have been construed as an 
offensive action and breach of Russia’s sovereignty at the time. 

Under international norms, it is unlawful for NATO nations to conduct offensive 
cyber operations; except by means of an authorizing UN Security Council resolution, 
cyber actions must be under the rubric of self-defense. NATO’s Cooperative Cyber 
Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD-CoE) recently published the Tallinn Manual on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, a three-year project by an “International 


Group of Experts” in cyber technology and law. These experts determined that only “in 
the event that the use of force reaches the threshold of an armed attack is a state 
entitled to respond in self-defence” 17 with a cyber-attack by force. This is the crux of the 
problem for NATO’s cyber defense activities: cyber events rarely rise to the level of 
armed attacks by nation-states. To further complicate matters, malware is unlikely to 
surface with “Made in Russia” written into its code; sponsoring nation-states prefer to 
maintain plausible deniability, rather than face the condemnation of the international 
community with revelations of compelling evidence verifying cyber misconduct. Non¬ 
state actors will be the likely users of malware for the foreseeable future, although the 
cyber weapons they employ may very well be provided through surreptitious state 

Before the events of 9/11, nations saw attacks by non-state actors as a law 
enforcement issue. There was a normative shift, though, when the UN Security Council 
enacted increasingly restrictive sanctions on financial transactions, travel, and arms 
transfers intended by the international terrorist group Al Qaeda—regardless of its status 
as a non-state actor. One could extrapolate that cyber militias—almost always non¬ 
state actors—could be handled by the international community much like Al Qaeda, 
which still receives attacks by force nearly every week from NATO strikes. Unlike the 
physically violent actions associated with Al Qaeda, patriotic hacktivist groups sponsor 
cyber incidents with dubious characteristics as armed attacks—which puts NATO in a 
difficult legal position. Under current norms, using cyber countermeasures against non¬ 
state actors would violate the sovereignty of the states harboring them—even if they 
feign ignorance of cyber militias within their borders. The UN Charter’s Articles 39 and 


42 do, however, authorize the UN Security Council’s use of force in response to “any 
threat to the peace...or act of aggression, and shall make recommendations” to employ 
“air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace 
and security.” 18 Ideally, a UN Security Council resolution would pass—as it did in the 
case of Al Qaeda after 9/11—empowering NATO to shut down non-state cyber militias 
that disrupt or attack nation-states. 

Five of the most advanced nations in cyber operations maintain permanent seats 
on the UN Security Council—the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and 
China; all five have veto power over a potential resolution. Russia and China run 
intrusive international cyber operations on a daily basis, as described by Director of 
National Intelligence James Clapper in his 31 January 2012 statement to the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence: “Among state actors, China and Russia are of 
particular concern...entities within these countries are responsible for extensive illicit 
intrusions into US computer networks and theft of US intellectual property.” 19 Given 
China and Russia’s apparent disregard for cyber sovereignty, it is unlikely that NATO 
would get any authority to pursue cyber defensive measures from the UN Security 
Council. In September 2012 China and Russia sponsored a draft cyber resolution at 
the UN General Assembly; NATO countries declined to support the action. Although it 
proposed progressive initiatives about defining cyber norms and capacity development, 
it failed to address patriotic hackers, cyber militias, or applying the Law of Armed 
Conflict to the cyber domain. 20 Aside from self-defense against an armed attack, the 
Security Council is the only means by which offensive action may acquire international 
legitimacy. NATO has been the UN’s enforcement arm in a number of recent actions— 


such as ongoing operations against Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden, and support to 
Libyan rebels during the overthrow of Moammar Khadafi in 2011. The UN has no 
permanently assigned armed forces, so NATO’s voluntary participation is appreciated 
and respected by the international community. However, assuming a role as a cyber¬ 
security force on behalf of the UN is unlikely until the technology for attribution 
advances to the point that an attack’s origin can be ascertained with precision—and the 
intrusion’s severity is commensurate with an “armed attack.” In the meantime, NATO 
countries experience thousands of intrusive cyber probes every day; the United States 
alone has its Department of Defense (DoD) networks probed 250,000 times per hour— 
according to US Cyber Command. 21 The NATO network has about thirty “significant” 
cyber intrusions every day on its networks, routinely attempting to insert spyware into 
servers and individual computers. 22 There must be criteria established for a response 
to cyber events directed against NATO below the unambiguous armed attack level— 
acceptable under international norms and palatable to members of the alliance. 

Under international law, a nation-state is responsible for any unlawful activity 
emanating from within its borders, provided that it has the capacity to exercise control 
over the whole of its territory—according to Nicholas Tsagourias, University of Glasgow, 
an international law and security scholar. 23 From the CCD-CoE’s perspective, a 
member state that suffers a cyber-incident for which another state is responsible may 
“respond to that violation of international law by resorting to proportionate responses. 
These may include, where appropriate in the circumstances, countermeasures (Rule 9) 
or the use of force in self-defence (Rule 13).” 24 Under the Tallin Manual's Rule 9, a 
NATO nation may employ “proportionate countermeasures, including cyber 


countermeasures, against the responsible State,” provided that the country does not 
take actions that constitute use of force, violate fundamental human rights, effect 
reprisals, or breach the norms of international law. 25 The use of countermeasures 
would arise when cooperation with an Internet Service Provider is not possible—or 
outright declined in the nation harboring the non-state cyber actors. Katherine Hinkle 
defines countermeasures as “temporarily lawful actions undertaken by an injured state 
in response to another state’s internationally unlawful conduct.” 26 Therefore, a state 
may take active countermeasures to bring another state into compliance with the law. 27 
Countermeasures against centrally controlled botnets may include forcibly redirecting 
bots to a different server—which instructs bots to uninstall themselves from infected 
computers. 28 The more sophisticated peer-to-peer bots, which seek other bots but have 
no central controller, can be infiltrated with fake bots that send code instructing other 
bots to shut down their own malware. 29 The key word in Hinkle’s definition is state ; the 
use of countermeasures is more complex with non-state actors. In the case of Estonia, 
the challenge of attribution presented difficulties in proving that Russia sponsored 
unlawful cyber activity, but certainly its refusal to stop the DDOS was unlawful. The 
cyber incident was well-publicized through international media; journalists repeatedly 
requested comments from Russian officials about the matter—yet the Putin government 
did nothing to stop it or even investigate the likely locations of the botnet controllers. 
After days of intermittent DDOS activity, the Estonian General Prosecutor sent a letter 
to the Russian government—requesting investigation of several suspected cyber militia 
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses in Russia. The response from his Russian counterpart 
was dismissive: “We do not co-operate because our criminal code does not recognize 


the procedure identification of IP addresses.” 30 Ultimately Estonia identified IP 
addresses associated with botnets in 175 countries. After the incident ended on 19 
May, the governments of every nation—except Russia—assisted Estonia in removing 
the malware that had enslaved unwitting computers. 31 Russia’s failure to enforce the 
rule of law implies tacit permission for cyber militias to operate with impunity; evidence 
suggests that the untouchable status of Russian patriotic hackers is more by design 
than lack of law enforcement capacity or expertise. 

There are a number of suspicious connections between the Russian government 
and one of Russia’s largest youth groups, calling itself the Nashi (“ours”)—a pro-Kremlin 
organization notorious for its association with illicit Internet activity. The Nashi were 
established in 2005, encouraged by Vladislav Surkov—President Putin’s first deputy 
chief of staff. The rapid nature by which Nashi mobilized a botnet infrastructure of over 
one million “zombie” computers suggests the hand of a sophisticated hacker 
organization cooperating with the cyber militia. In 2007, a Russian cyber-crime 
organization known as the Russian Business Network (RBN) operated the largest 
botnets in the world; one of its principle operatives was Aleksandr Boykov—formerly a 
lieutenant colonel in the Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (FSB), the KGB’s 
successor. 32 As a former director of the FSB, President Putin would have been well 
versed in its covert cyber capabilities, and Boykov’s associations with organized crime. 
RBN’s connections with law enforcement through former FSB officers ensured the 
Russian government’s security services never arrested any RBN members; therefore, 
they were emboldened to rent their “services to cyber criminals and hacker patriots.” 33 
The FSB had maintained an unsavory relationship with hackers since the early 1990s; 


Oleg Gordievsky—a former KGB colonel who defected to British MI6—declared in 1998 
that convicted Russian hackers occasionally were offered an alternative to prison: 
working for the FSB. 34 The London-based Asymmetric Threats Contingency Alliance 
(ATCA)—comprised of senior international government and private financial sector 
officials—claimed to have evidence that Moscow “rented time from trans-national 
criminal syndicates on botnets” and noted that the DDOS ended because “the attackers’ 
time on the rented servers expired, and the botnet attacks fell off abruptly.” 35 Perhaps 
ATCA’s analysis was overly circumstantial, but it raises important questions about 
accountability among nation-states. At the very least, Russia had a responsibility under 
international law to stop the DDOS being facilitated by botnet controllers located within 
its geographic borders, and prosecute the cyber criminals involved. “Rule 5” of the 
Tallinn Manual addresses the cyber responsibility of a nation-state: “A State shall not 
knowingly allow the cyber infrastructure located in its be used for acts that 
adversely and unlawfully affect other States.” 36 On the surface, it seems obvious that 
states in collusion with malicious non-state cyber actors may simply claim that they do 
not meet the knowingly test. However, the Tallinn Manual also notes that a state is in 
violation of international law if it “upon notification by another State that [a cyber¬ 
disruption] is being carried out, fails to take reasonably feasible measures to terminate 
the conduct.” 37 If the DDOS had terminated within a day or two, Moscow’s incognizance 
would be plausible—but this event was widely reported through international media, and 
continued for over three weeks. 

International law documents suggest that NATO members may come to the aid 
of one another in cyber matters. The United Nations’ Responsibility of States for 


Internationally Wrongful Acts specifies under Article 48 that states may band together to 
defend another state “if the obligation breached is owed to a group of States including 
that State and is established for the protection of a collective interest of the group.” 38 
This principle of “collective interest” identifies closely with NATO’s concept of “collective 
self-defense”; thus, legal norms should allow NATO countries to act on behalf of one 
another with cyber countermeasures against non-state actors. NATO has already 
established a precedent of collective defense against terrorism, and could extend its 
policy to cyber-terrorism as well. The Center for Strategic & International Studies’ 
(CSIS) James Lewis asserts that cyber-terrorism is “the use of computer network tools 
to shut down critical national infrastructures (such as energy, transportation, 
government operations) or to coerce or intimidate a government or civilian population.” 39 
In the case of Estonia’s DDOS in 2007, government operations were virtually shut down 
for weeks and the populace certainly was intimidated; it is therefore not unreasonable to 
deem the event “cyber-terrorism” and swing Estonia’s NATO allies into cyber action. 

Internet anonymity will soon fade into the past; marketing firms are improving 
their attribution software models massively every year—to the point that advertising is 
reaching consumers that precisely addresses their respective product interests. 
Presumably the military cyber professionals among the NATO signatories are 
developing the same capabilities, albeit in a significantly more advanced fashion. Since 
nation-states are unlikely to leave their digital fingerprints on malware, the attribution 
focus comes down to identifying individual IP addresses—frequently disguised through 
multi-stage attacks that route through a series of unwitting computers, often in different 
countries. 40 Clever hackers purposely route their Internet traffic through IP addresses 


in NATO or well-developed neutral countries; in the United States alone, one in ten 
computers is infected with botnet malware. 41 This may necessitate standing 
agreements between member states and their Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to 
traverse international borders with attribution software, capable of tracing the paths of 
malware purveyors. IP addresses can be traced to a country of origin over 99% of the 
time, and to a particular city or region with 90-96% accuracy. 42 Even without 
discovering the name of a particular non-state actor, NATO would have adequate 
evidence to approach the country’s government in which the offending individual 
resides, and request that the unlawful breach of sovereignty cease immediately. Failure 
by the state to act implies international consent for NATO to stop the harmful Internet 

Interruptions of commerce that are tantamount to economic blockades are 
unlawful under the norms of international law unless sanctioned by the UN Security 
Council and conducted by recognized nation-states. NATO was formed following the 
Soviet Union’s ground blockade of West Berlin in 1948, which caused Western 
European nations to band together and organize the Berlin Airlift. When Yugoslavian 
President Slobodan Milosevic established a de facto economic blockade to intimidate 
Montenegro in 2000, 43 NATO threatened action that caused its cessation. 44 Estonian 
Defence Minister Jaak Aaviksoo adamantly declared that the 2007 DDOS “can 
effectively be compared to when your ports are shut to the sea,” 45 thereby creating a 
virtual economic blockade. The UN would consider a traditional naval blockade an 
armed attack. National Research Council Chief Scientist Herbert Lin has endeavored to 
update the blockade concept for the cyber domain: “In the modem era, the dependence 


of a nation’s economic relations with the outside world on the Internet may be greater 
than the dependence of national economies on maritime shipping in the mid-twentieth 
century.” 46 During the Tallinn Manuafs drafting the “Group of Experts” carefully 
considered if a cyber-blockade would equate to a blockade as a matter of law. Their 
determination was based on the intended effect, which is “to affect negatively the 
enemy’s economy. Since much of present day economic activity is conducted through 
communications via the is reasonable to apply the law of blockade to 
operations designed to block cyber communications.” 47 Living in Europe’s “most wired” 
nation, Estonian citizens were tremendously dependent upon the nation’s cyber 
infrastructure. In 2007 some 60 percent of Estonians used the Internet on a daily basis, 
and 97 percent of the bank transactions occurred online. 48 This Internet dependence is 
even greater today, worldwide. The disruptive nature of repeated DDOS events over a 
three-week period caused banks and government entities to shut off international 
access to the Internet, thereby isolating Estonia as surely as if its ports were physically 
blockaded. Businesses were unable to process transactions; the loss of three million 
euros worth of commerce was not insignificant for a nation with a population the size of 
Phoenix, Arizona. The United Nations recognizes the employment of blockades as a 
tool for enforcing sanctions upon a non-compliant nation, but they must be carried out 
by nation-states and announced prior to taking effect. Establishing a blockade without a 
UN resolution in place would be unlawful—even more so if it were executed by a non¬ 
state actor. 

Cyber events rarely occur without some degree of forewarning—perhaps not 
overtly expressed, but understood by emerging military, political, or diplomatic portents. 


Tensions between Russian nationalist sympathizers and native Estonians had been 
building for weeks before the DDOS events of 2007—which were reflected in the 
Russian-language youth group Internet chatrooms. In response to concerns about the 
Bronze Soldier’s repositioning, Nikolai Kovalyov—head of the Duma Veteran’s Affairs 
committee and formerly Putin’s immediate predecessor as director of the Russian FSB 
—visited Estonia April 30 th 2007 on a “fact finding mission” and demanded the 
immediate resignation of Estonia’s government. 49 Simultaneously, some 600 “analog” 
members of the Nashi blockaded the Estonian Embassy in Moscow and attempted to 
attack the Estonian ambassador. 50 The Russian government briefly prevented trucks 
from crossing the border from Estonia near St Petersburg, and declared that repairs to 
the state railroad system would take place on the links entering Estonia—which 
effectively shut off oil shipments. 51 Post-event analysis revealed that some of the exact 
botnets that attacked Estonia had previously been employed just weeks earlier against 
President Putin’s opposition candidate—Garry Kasparov—to prevent him from notifying 
his followers of the correct opposition rally locations. 52 According to Dennis Bilunov, 
Kasparov’s executive director of the United Civil Front party, “There is a specific 
department within the FSB...that specializes in coordinating Internet campaigns against 
those they consider a threat.” 53 Estonia’s characterization as a “threat” may have 
resonated strongly with the FSB—particularly since the organization’s former boss was 
Vladimir Putin, appointed by President Boris Yeltsin in 1998. Unlike Yeltsin—who 
purposely marginalized the FSB’s influence on the Kremlin—Putin pulled senior FSB 
officials into his oligarchical circle of friends from St Petersburg upon taking the 
presidential reins. 54 On the very day when the DDOS against Estonia reached its 


zenith, President Putin delivered a fiery speech in Moscow’s Red Square, in which he 
declared those “who are trying today to desecrate memorials to war heroes are insulting 
their own people and sowing enmity and new distrust” between the state and its 
citizens. 55 The Russian parliament even asked President Putin to sever diplomatic 
relations with Estonia, and initiate an economic blockade. 56 Each of these incidents is 
an indicator in the parlance of intelligence analysts; one can glean an estimate of a 
group’s intent with a reasonable degree of confidence—by assembling the indicators 
into an overall picture. In describing the events that led up to the DDOS incident, Hillar 
Aarelaid—director of Estonia’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT)—opined 
that “if there are fights on the street, there are going to be fights on the Internet.” 57 This 
assumption has proven correct many times in world events since Estonia’s cyber 
incident in 2007. Georgia incurred a massive DDOS attack during 2008, in conjunction 
with kinetic attacks by Russia—unsurprisingly using some botnet controller computers 
associated with the Russian Business Network. 58 The STUXNET cyber weapon 
appeared after months of international consternation about Iran’s nuclear development 
program in 2011. Understanding potential flashpoints in the physical world provides a 
clue to what may happen in the cyber domain—which presents an opportunity for 
predictive intelligence analysis. NATO may be in a position to craft an order similar to 
the United States’ classified “Presidential Directive 20,” which purportedly establishes a 
process to “ensure that U.S. citizens’ and foreign allies’ data and privacy are protected 
and international laws of war are followed.” 59 According to Washington Post reporter 
Ellen Nakashima in her article “Obama signs secret directive to help thwart 
cyberattacks,” the President has effectively authorized actions that “might include 


stopping a computer attack by severing the link between an overseas server and a 
targeted domestic computer.” 60 Taking aggressive anticipatory self-defense measures 
such as these requires excellent intelligence; fortunately for NATO, intelligence 
collection is acceptable under the norms of international cyber activity. The United 
States’ National Security Agency collects continuously, as well as the United Kingdom’s 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ); UK members of parliament even 
opined that GCHQ “look to infiltrate other networks in order to gather intelligence.” 61 
Canada’s Communications Security Establishment has considerable capability, as well 
as France’s cyber warfare specialists in the General Directorate of Armament. Although 
security classifications may limit the level of detail in threat reporting shared between 
NATO nations—particularly those that became members after 1991—the use of “tear 
lines” 62 facilitates information sharing that could detect pending cyber events before they 
occur. If there were to be another DDOS like the one directed toward Estonia in 2007, 
the President could now unilaterally sever the links between botnet controllers overseas 
and the “zombie” computers in the US—as a bilateral action supporting Estonia. NATO 
signatories carry out bilateral and multilateral activities routinely, as evidenced in the 
close intelligence cooperation between the US, UK, and Canada. The botnets focused 
on Estonia had most of their “zombies” established within the US; employing a NATO 
version of the US “Presidential Directive 20” would sharply reduce the DDOS’ effect. 

Invoking the Tallinn Manuals Rule 13, using force in self-defense, would only be 
appropriate if NATO could demonstrate a need for anticipatory self-defense—which is 
permissible under Article 51 of the UN Charter, provided that it is necessary, 
discriminatory, and proportional. 63 Article 51 simply states that “[n]othing in the present 


Charter shall impair the right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack 
occurs against a Member of the United Nations.” 64 By aggregating the norms of Article 
48’s recognition of collective self-defense and Article 51, one may surmise that it is 
acceptable for NATO to collectively carry out anticipatory self-defense. However, the 
UN Charter was originally written with the assumption that anticipatory and collective 
self-defense would be a matter of states versus states; non-state actors simply were not 
an issue during the UN Charter’s drafting in the years leading up to 1949. The concept 
of anticipatory self-defense at the time was highly geographic—a state that detected 
massive forces building upon its border with another state was not compelled to wait for 
its neighbor to attack before taking countermeasures. The same principles may be 
applied with anticipatory self-defense when NATO nations detect impending cyber 
events with international security implications. For example, if NATO discovers that a 
cyber militia has embedded logic bombs into the air traffic control software at Charles 
De Gaulle Airport in Paris, and they trace the malware back to servers in Russia, NATO 
could lawfully launch cyber weapons 65 against the non-state actors if Russia refused to 
assist in the miscreants’ apprehension and prosecution. Logic bombs are capable of 
halting a computer’s operations without warning. Taking action is necessary because of 
the potentially deadly results of halting the air traffic control system during takeoffs and 
landings of many aircraft originating in NATO countries. It would be proportional to 
destroy the cyber militia’s capability to reconstitute its logic bomb assault, rather than 
conduct “kinetic” operations. State Department Senior Legal Advisor Harold Koh made 
the United States’ position very clear on this subject during his address to the 
USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference in September 2012: “A state’s national 


right of self-defense, recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter, may be triggered by 
computer network activities that amount to an armed attack or imminent threat 
thereof.” 66 Precision may be the most problematic aspect of this defensive act, since IP 
address spoofing and other techniques by hackers could misdirect NATO’s 
countermeasures against an unwitting host for the malicious attack; advances in 
attribution technology will likely mitigate this possibility. 

Determining which impending cyber threats may have international security 
implications for the alliance requires deliberation between the respective NATO 
members’ ministers, particularly since some events ultimately will not rise to the level of 
armed attacks. It is reasonable to assume, though, that countries would seek 
immediate countermeasures against cyber disruptions that would panic their citizens 
and reduce confidence in government: outages of critical utilities, transportation 
disruptions, and shutdowns of critical electronic commerce—such as securities 
exchanges. As chief scientist of the Computer Science and Telecommunications 
Board, Herbert Lin believes that “cyber attacks on the controlling information technology 
for a nation’s infrastructure that has a significant impact on the functioning of that 
infrastructure...would be an armed attack for Article 51 purposes.” 67 NATO’s most 
militarily significant members are taking a tougher stance against cyber militias. 
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta already suggested the intention to take pre-emptive, 
aggressive measures in the event of a cyber-disruption directed against the US or its 
allies, during his remarks in New York City in October 2012. 68 General Keith 
Alexander—commander of United States Cyber Command—confirmed the new cyber 
doctrine during congressional testimony in March 2013, with the announcement of 


thirteen “defend the nation” offensive cyber teams, capable of stopping pending cyber¬ 
attacks. 69 British Members of Parliament published a committee report in July 2012 that 
suggested a similar approach, specifically targeting non-state actors: “The report 
recommends the UK employs what it calls ‘active defense: Interfering with the systems 
of those trying to hack into UK networks’.” 70 British Armed Forces Minister Nick Harvey 
believes preemptive cyber strikes are a “civilized option” when faced with national 
security threats; Canadian Defence Minister Peter Gordon Mackay equates an 
anticipatory cyber strike as an “insurance policy” against aggression. 71 Germany 
established its Computer Network Operations organization in June 2012—with a 
mission to conduct offensive cyber operations—in an endeavor to counter Chinese 
intrusions and more closely mirror the cyber warfare capabilities of the United States, 
France, and Great Britain. 72 A senior German official purportedly opined—following the 
DDOS event in Estonia—that NATO’s Article 5 agreement should extend to the cyber 
domain. 73 The trouble with anticipatory self-defense against non-state actors is in 
determining intent; some intrusive malware is placed to cause damage—but it is far 
more common to encounter malware intended for persistent espionage. 

International law does not address spying—largely because every country does it 
and none wants to cease collecting intelligence. Col Gary Brown and Maj Keira Poellet 
assert in “The Customary International Law of Cyberspace” that since “cyber activities 
are frequently akin to espionage...most cyber activities can also occur without violating 
territorial sovereignty.” 74 Applying the “espionage template” to this international legal 
question suggests that because states recognize spying occurs routinely, they simply 
cannot do anything about malicious cyber events; the two are presumably too difficult to 


distinguish. However, non-state actors like cyber militias or patriotic hackers ostensibly 
do not have an affiliation with nation-states; therefore, the argument that they may be 
engaging in digital reconnaissance would not be valid. Only state governments have 
legitimate intelligence collection requirements and recognized organizations for that 
purpose. Col Brown observes, too, that cyber espionage has garnered a degree of 
public condemnation that may distinguish it from physical espionage and its lack of 
associated interest within international law. 75 

NATO’s taking cyber countermeasures is not without its potential problems. 
Myriam Dunn Cavelty asserts in “Cyber Allies: Strengths and weaknesses of NATO’s 
cyberdefense posture” that attribution of cyber-attacks on member states—linked to 
Article 5 collective self-defense decisions—is excessively vexatious for the alliance. 

She anticipates that attribution collection software would be too intrusive on people’s 
privacy, causing an unwelcome increase in regulation for the private sector in all twenty- 
eight countries. Cavelty believes NATO should focus strictly on cyber-security problems 
affecting NATO’s internal military networks, and address cyber threats to member states 
through Article 4 procedures—meaning members “will ‘consult together’ in the case of 
cyberattacks, but are not duty bound to aid each other as described in Article 5 of the 
Treaty.” 76 In congressional testimony during the July 2010 hearing on “Planning for the 
Future of Cyber Attack,” the Council on Foreign Relations’ Robert K. Knake noted that 
the way in which states respond when confronted with the presence of illicit cyber 
activity inside their borders indicates their level of commitment to international norms of 
cyber sovereignty. Furthermore, Knake asserts that states refusing to cooperate in 
removing cyber threats should expect consequences for their inaction. 77 Therefore, if 


NATO were to associate a non-state actor’s IP address with the preparation of illicit 
cyber weapons, it would be permissible as an anticipatory self-defense measure to 
target the IP address with cyber countermeasures that could prevent the attack’s 
initiation and protect the sovereignty of the NATO signatory involved. There is no 
requirement under international law that nations must “take the first punch” before 
responding to threats. This self-defense measure could occur after Article 4 
consultations as a bilateral or multi-lateral arrangement between NATO members, or 
through the Article 5 process. Some NATO nations may have reservations about 
employing cyber countermeasures under Article 5 procedures, which can be addressed 
through national caveats. NATO countries have been in Afghanistan for over a decade 
under an Article 5 collective defense authorization, yet nearly all have national caveats 
that limit some aspects of their respective forces’ operations. German forces were not 
allowed to patrol at night, and their government limited the Bundeswehr to movements 
by armored vehicles only. 78 Although this caused tension with fellow NATO countries at 
times, Germany had the right to declare its own force protection measures. The same 
is true of cyber force protection—individual nations may set their respective rules of 
cyber engagement, even if NATO invokes Article 5. 

Cyber has joined air, land, sea, and space as a fifth operational domain of 
modern warfare. 79 Since there has not been a thorough overhaul of international law 
since the highly kinetic 1940s, its application to cyber operations is clumsy and 
inconsistent. In summary, there are three scenarios in which cyber countermeasures 
would be appropriate: (1) when a nation-state fails to enforce the rule of law against 
non-state actors employing cyber disruptions against other states from within its 


borders; (2) when a cyber-disruption is tantamount to an economic blockade; and (3) if 
there is intelligence that indicates a pending cyber-attack by force, thereby necessitating 
anticipatory self-defense. NATO cannot sit on its collective hands if its members incur 
another cyber incident on the scale of the DDOS in Estonia during 2007. Since the UN 
is so hamstrung by procedural issues, NATO must hold nations accountable for failing 
to address cyber militia activity within their borders. If the harboring nations fail to act, 
NATO should take measures to cease the illicit activity; there are no other alliances 
capable of enforcing the international norms of cyber activity. Creating cyber events so 
severe that they generate an economic blockade is an unlawful use of force, whether 
the origin is a state or non-state actor. Data from February 2013 published by the 
Allianz fur Cyber-Sicherheit (Cyber Security Alliance) determined that—among the top 
fifteen cyber-attacking countries—the Russian Federation is geographically the IP 
address location for 32% of the world’s cyber-intrusions. Russia and Ukraine combined 
account for 40% of all cyber-intrusions. 80 China is widely vilified as the most egregious 
violator of cyber sovereignty, yet the Allianz found only 15% of cyber-intrusions 
originated from China. 81 With the scale of cyber threat emanating from Eastern Europe, 
NATO must take preemptive countermeasures if it recognizes an imminent cyber-attack 
against a member state, provided that it is identified by thorough intelligence analysis. 
Perhaps if Minister of Defence Jaak Aaviksoo could return to May 2007, he would 
approach his NATO allies with an argument that belatedly occurred to him as the DDOS 
on Estonia was winding down: “Considering the scale of damage and the way these 
cyber-attacks have been organised, we can compare them to terrorist activities.” 82 


NATO has been fighting terrorism for twelve years; defeating cyber-terrorism by non¬ 
state actors is simply an extension of current policy. 


1 Ian Traynor, “Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia,” The Guardian 
Online, May 16, 2007, 
(accessed February 7, 2013) 

2 Kertu Ruus, “Cyber War I: Estonia Attacked from Russia,” European Affairs Online, vol 9, 
issue 1-2 (Winter/Spring 2008), linked from The European Institute Online, 

from-russia.html (accessed January 22, 2013) 

3 Nerijus Adomaitis, “Estonia calm after Red Army site riots, Russia angry,” Reuters Online, 
April 28, 2007, 
idUSL2873034620070428 (accessed January 22, 2013) 

4 Joshua Davis, “Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe,” August 21, 2007, 
Wired Magazine Online, Issue 15.09, 
09/ff estonia?currentPaqe=all (accessed January 22, 2013) 

5 Ibid. 

6 Ibid. 

7 Kara Flook, “Russia and the Cyber Threat,” May 13, 2009, AEI Critical Threats Online, 
American Enterprise Institute, 
(accessed February 7, 2013) 

8 A “packet” is a unit of data routed between an origin and a destination on the Internet. 

See Margaret Rouse’s definition in SearchNetworking, (accessed February 12, 2013) 

9 Jason Richards, “Denial-of-Service: The Estonian Cyberwar and Its Implications for U.S. 
National Security,” 2009, International Affairs Review, 
(accessed February 12, 2013) 

10 Stephen Herzog, “Revisiting the Estonian Cyber Attacks: Digital Threats and 
Multinational Responses,” Journal of Strategic Security Online, Vol IV (2011), No 2: 53 
http://scholarcommons.usf.edU/iss/vol4/iss2/4/ (accessed January 22, 2013) 

11 Toomas Lepik, “Setting the scene: Lessons Learned,” February 13, 2008, Estonian 
Informatics Centre, linked from Europe’s Information Society Thematic Portal: Workshop on 
learning from large scale attacks on the Internet - Policy Implications,” societv/policv/nis/strateqy/activities/ciip/larqe scale/index 

m (accessed January 22, 2013) 


12 Calculated with Estonian GDP at $21.279 billion and US GDP of $13.811 trillion. See 
geohive Global Economy, qdpl .aspx (accessed February 

13 Transcribed from Arizona’s 2007 Gross State Product (GSP) of $259.2 billion. See US 
Government Revenue, January 9, 2013, state revenue 2007bZ0a (accessed January 
9, 2013) 

14 “Arizona GDP Size and Rank,” January 26, 2010, EconoPost Online, (accessed March 1,2013) 

15 “The North Atlantic Treaty,” April 4, 1949, linked from North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Home Page at “e-Library” to “Official Texts,” texts 17120.htm (accessed December 11,2012) 

16 George Robertson, “Statement by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson,” October 2, 
2001, linked from NATO Speeches, 
(accessed February 3, 2013) 

17 Michael N. Schmitt, et al, The Tallinn Manual On the International Law Applicable to 
Cyber Warfare Online'. 54, linked from NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence 
at “Publications,” (accessed February 12, 2013) 

18 “Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and 
Acts of Aggression,” Charter of the United Nations Online, 

http://www.un.orq/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml (accessed February 22, 2013) 

19 James R. Clapper, “Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat 
Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence,” January 31, 2012, www.dni.qov/index.php/newsroom/testimonies (accessed 
December 11,2012) 

20 Jason Healey, “Breakthrough or Just Broken? China and Russia’s UNGA Proposal on 
Cyber Norms,” New At!anticist Online, September 21,2012, atlanticist/breakthrouqh-or-iust-broken-china-and-russias-unqa- 

proposal-cyber-norms (accessed February 12, 2013) 

21 James G. Stavridis and Elton C Parker, “Sailing the Cyber Sea,” Joint Force Quarterly 
Online, vol 65 (April 2012): 63, (accessed 
December 11,2012) 

22 Matthias Gebauer, “NATO Faced with Rising Flood of Cyberattacks,” Der Spiegel Online, 
April 26, 2012, 
numbers-of-cvberattacks-a-829908.html (accessed December 13, 2012) 

23 Nicholas Tsagourias, “Cyber attacks, self-defence, and the problem of attribution,” 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Vol 17, No 2 (2012): 240, 
http://icsl.oxfordiournals.Org/content/17/2/229.short (accessed January 18, 2013) 



Ibid, 35. 

25 Ibid, 41. 

26 Katherine C. Hinkle, “Countermeasures in the Cyber Context: One More Thing to Worry 
About,” The Yale Journal of International Law Online, Vol 37 (Fall 2011): 12, 

thinq-to-worry-about (accessed January 31,2013) 

27 Oona Hathaway, “The Law of Cyber-Attack,” California Law Review, Vol 100 (2012): 857, 
linked from the Social Science Research Network, id=2134932 (accessed March 1,2013) 

28 Felix Leder, Tillmann Werner, and Peter Martini, “Proactive Botnet Countermeasures: An 
Offensive Approach,” from The Virtual Battlefield: Perspectives on Cyber Warfare, 2009, linked 
from NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence 2009 Conference Proceedings, (accessed March 19, 2013) 

30 Steve Mansfield-Devine, “Estonia: what doesn’t kill you makes you stronger,” Network 
Security, Vol 2012, Issue 7 (July 2012): 15, (accessed February 7, 2013) 

31 Ibid, 15. 

32 Kara Flook, “Russia and the Cyber Threat.” (accessed February 8, 2013) 

33 Alexander Klimburg, “Mobilising Cyber Power,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol 
53, Issue 1 (2011): 49-50 , linked from Taylor & Francis Online, 

http://www.tandfonline.eom/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2011.555595 (accessed January 24, 

34 Kara Flook, “Russia and the Cyber Threat.” (accessed February 8, 2013) 

35 lain Thomson, “Russia ‘hired botnets’ for Estonia cyber war,” May 31, 2007,, (accessed 
January 24, 2013) 

36 Michael N. Schmitt, Tallinn Manual, 33. 

37 Ibid, 34. 

38 International Law Commission, “Responsibility of States for Internationally wrongful acts,” 
2001, (accessed January 18, 2013) 

39 James A. Lewis, “Assessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism, Cyber War and Other Cyber 
Threats,” December 2002: 1, Center for Strategic & International Studies, risks of cvberterror.pdf (accessed February 22, 


40 David D. Clark and Susan Landau, “Untangling Attribution,” Harvard National Security 
Journal , vol 2, issue 2 (2011): 334, in HeinOnline (accessed December 12, 2012) 

41 Grant Gross, “White House Launches Coordinated Effort to Battle Botnets,” May 30, 

2012, PC World Online, house launches coordinated effort to battle bot 

nets.html (accessed March 1,2013) 

42 David D. Clark and Susan Landau, “Untangling Attribution,” 340. 

43 Carlotta Gall, “Montenegrin Says Belgrade Is Using Its Army to Oust Him,” The New York 
Times Online , March 28, 2000, 
belqrade-is-usinq-its-army-to-oust-him.html (accessed March 18, 2013) 

44 “Robertson warns Milosevic on Montenegro,” NATO Newspages Online , September 27, 
2000, (accessed March 18, 2013) 

45 Mark Landler and John Markoff, “Digital Fears Emerge After Data Siege in Estonia,” May 
29, 2007, The New York Times Online, r=0 

(accessed February 22, 2013) 

46 Herbert S. Lin, “Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force,” Journal of National 
Security Law & Policy Online, Vol 4, No 63 (2010): 81, from HeinOnline, 
http://heinonline.orq/HOL/Paqe?handle=hein.iournals/inatselp4&div=9&q sent=1 &collection=iou 

rnals (accessed February 22, 2013) 

47 Michael N. Schmitt, Tallinn Manual, 162. 

48 Stephen Herzog, “Revisiting the Estonian Cyber Attacks,” 51. 

49 Victor Yasmann, “Russia: Monument Dispute with Estonia Gets Dirty,” May 4, 2007, 

Radio Free Europe: Radio Liberty Online, 
(accessed February 8, 2013) 

50 Rene Vark, “The Siege of the Estonian Embassy in Moscow: Protection of a Diplomatic 
Mission and Its Staff in the Receiving State,” Juridica International Online, Vol XV (2008), (accessed February 8, 2013) 

51 Steven Lee Myers, Tensions Worsen Between Russia and Estonia,” The New York 
Times Online, May 2, 2007, 
estonia.4.5537016.html? r=0 (accessed February 11,2013) 

52 Joshua Davis, “Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe,” (accessed 
February 11,2013) 

53 Ibid. 


54 “The making of a neo-KGB state: Political power in Russia now lies with the FSB, the 
KGB’s successor,” August 23, 2007, The Economist Online, (accessed February 18, 2013) 

55 Adrian Blomfield, “Putin criticizes Estonia over war memorial,” May 10, 2007, The 
Telegraph Online, 
over-war-memorial.html (accessed February 12, 2013) 

56 Ibid. 

57 Mark Landler and John Markoff, “Digital Fears Emerge After Data Siege in Estonia.” 

58 John Markoff, “Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks,” The New York Times Online, August 
12, 2008, http://www.nytimes.eom/2008/08/13/technoloqy/l 3cyber.html? r=0 (accessed March 
17, 2013) 

59 Ellen Nakashima, “Obama signs secret directive to help thwart cyberattacks,” 

Washington Post Online, November 14, 2012, - 
14/world/35505871 1 networks-cvberattacks-defense (accessed December 13, 2012) 

61 Steve Evans, “UK should strike first in cyber war, MPs say,” Computer Business Review, 
linked from “Security News,” July 18, 2012, 
first-in-cvber-war-mps-sav-180712 (accessed March 17, 2013) 

62 “Tear lines” are simply “watered down” intelligence. They convey threats in general 
terms without specifying the sources and methods employed to collect the intelligence. 

63 Stephen Dycus, et al, Aspen Casebook Series, National Security Law, 5 th ed. (New York: 
Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2011), 350. 

64 United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” December 10, 2012, linked from United 
Nations Homepage at “Documents,” http://www.un.orq/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml 
(accessed December 17, 2012) 

65 A “cyber weapon” is defined as any “cyber device, materiel, instrument, mechanism, 
equipment, or software used, designed, or intended to be used to conduct a cyber-attack. See 
Michael N. Schmitt’s “International Law in Cyberspace: The Koh Speech and Tallinn Manual 
juxtaposed,” Harvard International Law Journal, vol 54 (December 2012), (accessed December 18, 2012) 

66 Plarold Hongju Koh, “International Law in Cyberspace,” linked from Harvard International 
Law Journal Online, vol 54 (December 2012), (accessed December 
18, 2012) 

67 Herbert S. Lin, “Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force,” 74. 

68 Phil Stewart, “U.S. defense chief says pre-emptive action possible over cyber threat,” 
Reuters Online, October 11, 2012, linked from “Top News,” 


 (accessed December 14, 
2012 ) 

69 Richard Lardner, “Pentagon forming cyber teams to prevent attacks,” Washington Times 
Online , March 12, 2013, 
cvber-teams-to-prevent-attacks/?oaqe=all (accessed March 18, 2013) 

70 Steve Evans, “UK should strike first in cyber war, MPs say.” 

71 Agence France Press, “Cyber strikes a ‘civilized’ option: Britain,” Inquirer Technology, 
June 3, 2012, linked from “Headlines,” htto:// 
civilized-option-britain (accessed December 17, 2012) 

72 Jorge Benitez, “Germany reveals offensive cyberwarfare capability,” NATO Source, June, 
8, 2012, linked from The Atlantic Council, 
offensive-cyberwarfare-capability (accessed December 17, 2012) 

73 James A. Lewis, “The ‘Korean’ Cyber Attacks and their Implications for Cyber Conflict,” 
October 2009: 3, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Korean Cyber Attacks and Their Implications for Cvb 

er Conflict.pdf (accessed February 22, 2013) 

74 Gary Brown and Keira Poellet, “The Customary International Law of Cyberspace,” 
Strategic Studies Quarterly, Fall 2012: 134, 
(accessed February 18, 2013) 

75 J. Nicholas Hoover, “Cyber Warfare Still Poses Legal Questions,” InformationWeek 
Government Online, September 19, 2012, 

question/240007560 (accessed March 17, 2013) 

76 Myriam Dunn Cavelty, “Cyber Allies: Strengths and weaknesses of NATO’s cyberdefense 
posture,” Internationale Poiitik, vol 12/3 (February 1,2012): 13, in Social Science Research 
Network (accessed December 12, 2012) 

77 Robert K. Knake, “Untangling Attribution: Moving to Accountability in Cyberspace,” from 
the Congressional Hearing on Planning for the Future of Cyber Attack, July 15, 2010, in 
“Publications,” under “Testimony,” 
movinq-accountabilitv-cyberspace/p22630 (accessed December 12, 2012) 

78 John Nagl and Richard Weitz, “Counterinsurgency and the Future of NATO,” Chicago 
Council Transatlantic Paper Series No 1, October 2010:11, 
(accessed March 17, 2013) 

79 Mark Clayton, “Pentagon unveils its new cyberstrategy. Well, some of it, anyway,” The 
Christian Science Monitor Online, July 14, 2011, 

Well-some-of-it-anyway (accessed February 18, 2013) 


80 In February 2013 Deutsche Telekom and the Allianz fur Cyber-Sicherheit detected 7,407, 
348 cyber-attacks from the top 15 source nations. Russia accounted for 2,402,722 and Ukraine 
originated 566,531. See Allianz fur Cyber-Sicherheit’s “Overview of current cyber attacks 
(logged by 97 sensors), (accessed March 19, 2013) 

81 Ibid. The Allianz reported 1,075,248 intrusions between Taiwan Province and China. 

82 “Estonia urges firm EU, NATO response to new form of warfare: cyber-attacks,” The 
Sydney Morning Herald Online, May 16, 2007, 

of-warfarecyberattacks/2007/05/16/1178995207414.html (accessed February 18, 2013)