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00-00-1964 to 00-00-1964 


An Air Force History of Space Activities 1945-1959 









USAF Historical Division,Space Systems Division,600 Chennault 

Circle,Maxwell AFB,AL,36112-6424 







Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 






18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF 



unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) 


Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) 

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U.S.C., sections 793 end 79 * 0 , the transmission of revelation of which 
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"«**«« us mcrmataann,, 
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Covering the efforts of tbs United States from 1945 to 
September 1959 to wrestle with the unknown ratifications of space, 
this history Includes both the civilian and military activities. 

An Air three History of Space Activities presents a aore detailed 
treatment of information publisiieA in i 960 under the title of 
Threshold of Space, 1945-1959, Other aonogrsphs on this subject 
include fhs Air force in Space, 1959-1960, and (in draft) a sequel 
for flsoiTTear 1961 . 

The author of this history begins with the work of the early 
pioneers in rocketry, the first satellite feasibility studies by 
the allltary, and the relationship of the ballistic missile to the 
space vehicle. He reviews the Russian and U. 8 . space progr e s s 
between 1945 and 1957, during which efforts were made to create 
epace law and the united States chose to pursue a space-fOr-peaee 
policy. The conservative of policy ankers raised obstacle*, but 
there were apace projects, ease of then tinder the Air Force. 

After the shock of Sputnik I, the reshaping of policy resulted 
In the establishment of AHPA in the Dep ar tme n t of Defense and IASA 
as the civilian space agency. The author telle of AREA’S supreaacy 
over the military services in 1958 ; its loss of control to MSA in 
October 1958; MSA'S activities froa then until July 1959J the 
position of the Air Fores after losing out to both AHPA and MSA; 
and the Air Force's determination to cooperate with MSA, through 
research, development, and use of Its facilities. Within the DOD 
In 1959 1 authority for apace research and development was trans¬ 
ferred froa AHPA to DER&E, lnterservice tension mounted, the Air 
Force struggled to regain lost projects and objected to levy's ap¬ 
peal for a nilitary apace eaanand, and the tide turned for the Air 
Force when the Secretary of Defense decided in September to give 
to It the responsibility for the development and launching of all 
DOD space boosters and for management of Sentry, Midas, and Discov¬ 



Liaison Office 


X. The State of Rocketry, 1945-57«»..»». 

The Bnergence of Rocketry m a Science.................... 

Pioneer Thinkers........... 

The Orest Work of Peeneeusnde......... 

The Military Missile Frogrwn....... 

The Postwar Attitude toward Research end Developnent... 
Rocket-Engine Research................................. 

XX.. The Military Services Flan for Spac* 1945 - 57 ....,. 

The Russian Space Progr aa ..... 

Service Moves toward Space Projects and Policy, 1945-48... 

Resuae of 1947-57 Band Studies.....;... 

Air Force Space Projects, 19b8-57......................... 

The X-15 Research Aircraft............................. 

Bawl--Rol>o—Brass Bell—Rprards—>Syua Soar...... 

Tbs Advanced Reconnaissance Systea (ARB) or HB-117L.... 

Rypersotilc Ro v i ro o aent Teat Systea.... 

Men-ln- 8 p*oe (NIB)..... 


The First Aray-Stevy Space Project....... 

XXX. A Policy of 3paee-for-Feaee—and its Effects.......... 

The First Cbooepts of Spec* lew...... 

First Efforts to Create a Spec* lew, 1955-57.••.. 

XT. Lost Opportunitles—Vanguard and Others......... 

The President's Decision to Support a Space Pro ject....... 

Specifications for Vanguard........ 

The Unnecessary Delay....... 

Last Possibilities for a U.S. "First"......... 

V. A. Post-Sputnik Shaping of Policy..... 

At First, Rational Reactions.... 

A Modified Spaee-for-Feace Policy......................... 

A Coappoalse Space Progra a at Hone...... 

VI. Organising for the Military Space Prograa.. 

Advanced Research Projects Agency......... 

Director of Defense Research and Engineering... 

Activation of Directorate of Advanced Technology.. 

VII. Civilian Space Agencies...... 

Bearings on the President's Proposed Space Agency...,.. 

The Rational Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958.. 

Organising Spsec Agencies under PL 85 - 568 ..... 

Organisation for Space at End of 1958 ........ 

SSKSE Cv»-au.»HH 

vm. light Months of AREA Supremacy.... 

Tbs Sources of ABPA't Frt^m................. 

Vbnguard and fiplorer I................................ 


Recaaeendatlons of tbs Advisory Group oa -Special 

Capabilities...•. mm. 

Tbs U 8 AF Astronautical P r o g r— of 2k January 1958 ...... 

Loot U 8 AF Rfforts to Sava tha Astronautleal Prograai.... 

The Rule and P rogra a of ARPA in 1958 ............... 

AREA'S Operating Procadurea............................ 

The Assignment of fcrojects to ARPA.... 

ARPA'a Assigaaetft of Projects.................... 

LX. SABA'a First Pro g raa, October 1958 to July 1999' 

ARPA*a Claia to Border Projects..*... 

Tbs President's Division of Space Projects. 

RASA'e First Hina Mootba.... 

HASA-USAF Relationa..... 

X. ARPA and the Military Prograa, October 1958 to July 1999* 
The Milit a r y Space Progr a ai—Second Phase............. 

The Satellite Projects....... 

The Booster Prograai...... 

The Tracking Systaa...... 

At the Bad of June 1999 *..... 

ARPA's Changing Status in DOB*....................... 

Space Operations, October 195? to July 1999*......... 

XI. Air Force Space Policy and Supporting Action, 1957-59*.•* 
Military Reactions to tha Space-for-Feace Policy..... 
The Doetfcine of Aerospee®............................ 

The Rfcvy-Alr Force FMR Diaa gre e a ent.. 

A Time for Decision.. 

An Air Force Atteapt to Force the Issue.. 

The Bevy's Appeal for a Space Ccasnad............. 

ARPA*a Move for a Mercury Joint Teak Force........ 

McSlroy'a Decisions of l 8 Septenber 1959*.. 

9 assess* assist s zm mm* ssss 


Teatinony of Sell H. McElroy, SOD, 27 Hovamber 1957....... 104 

The Air Force Aatroneutieal Program of 24 January 1958........ 132 

Air Force Fund Statue Summary, February 1958.. 135 

KASA'e Program for FT'e 1959-60........ 151 

ABPA*a Progran............ 163 

I. THE anas CF MaOHRC, 19^5-57 

Despite astrooautieal fancies during the centuries of mythology, 
and even after the caning of respectable astronomy, it ran not until the 
latter part of the nineteenth century that there ma any understanding of 
bow to launch a man-made object into apaoe. Jules Verne was the first 
writer to pat' fictional apace travel on something of a rational basis. 

In his book Free the Earth to Moon ha employed a piece of specially de¬ 
signed artillery to project a Banned shell within grasp of lunar gravity. 
Bis approach was fundonentally correct—the use of a ballistic missile— 
but his "poverplant" imposed insuperable difficulties and provided no 
Mens for a "soft landing." 

It ia surprising that a nan of Verne's laagination did not think of 
using rockets because their behavior had been observed for generations. 
Boekets had even been turned to military ends by Sir NUllas Cosgrove, 
and they played a spectacular, though ineffectual, role in the M spoleonlc 
wars and in the Britisb-deeriean war of 1832. Naturally the military 
shoved no anthusiaiH for a weapon that did little more then frighten 
inexperienced troops. There followed a century in which the military 
were generally skeptical of any practical use of rockets. 

The Emergence of Rocketry as a Science 
Pram 1815 to 1900, rocketry was largely discarded except as a night 
onuawnt of fireworks for national holidays. Then, between 1900 and 
193<V * number of reputable scientists and engineers voiced a new faith 
in rocketry as a source of propulsion for missiles, aircraft, and even 

own country. Few western Europeans knew Russian in the early 1900'e 

and translations of Ziolkovsky's works nn not impressive. 

In 1919, Goddard, an American, praparad tala war faaoua raport bat 
one largely disregarded at the tine—"A Method of Reaching E x tr eme Alti¬ 
tudes." Be too^ Ilka Ziolkovsky, supported tais thesis mathematically, 
and he vent the Russian one batter by firing a revolver In a vacuum to 
teat the recoil and prove experimentally that Benton's third lsnr of no¬ 
tion vould be applicable to objects in space. Though he devoted nost of 
his life to the promotion of rocketry, be von fev disciples. Be remained 
almost unknown, both at hone and abroad, and took tais place in the long 
line of prophets without honor. 

In Oemany, Oberth fared scnevhat better. In 1923, uninfluenced by 
Goddard, he published his ora scientifically developed thesis on rocketry— 
The Rocket into interplanetary Space . Be included designs for rocket- 
propelled vehicles and advocated the use of liquid fuels as superior to 
the dry propellants previously employed. Alnost at once there emerged 
numerous enthusiasts at home and abroad vbo, with slight grasp of the sub¬ 
ject, took up the somewhat premature hobby of space travel. In Europe 
and America, space societies sprang into being, peopled by visionaries 
. vbo mistook themselves for space literati. 

The Great Work of Peenemuende 

The German army, in the late 1980% still trying to break its 
Versailles straight Jacket, vaS more realistic in its approach when it 
became interested in rockets as possible veapons. In the dearth of prac¬ 
tical and scientific knowledge, the soldiers of the Second Reich, though 
possessing very limited facilities, determined to develop and prove the 
vorth of rocket engines. 

Id 1930* German Military authorities selected Capt. Halter Bamberger, 
a technologist of narked ability, to develop in utaost secrecy a liquid- 
fuel rocket vith a range exceeding that of existing artillery* Bomberger, 
directly responsible to the chief of the German army, began his work at 
a small proving ground shout 20 miles from Berlin. His Organisation con¬ 
sisted Of a small staff of officers who directed a much larger number of 
civilians. Six. years later, Bomberger moved his group to Paenamusnde on 
the Baltic 8es where he established the Rocket Xxperimental 8tatlon, ded¬ 
icated to the development of radically new weapons that, if successful, 
would give Germany dominance in Europe. 1 

The near success of Feenemuende is an Impressive tribute to the com¬ 
petence of Bomberger and his staff. The experimental station grew rap¬ 
idly. At its peak it had 18,000 employees, and its area covered 80 square 
ailee. Tbs work was all-inclusive from basic reasearoh through develop- 
nant, production, training of specialised troope, and eventually supply¬ 
ing the front formations vith finished weapons. Bomberger and many of 
hie associates seam always to have been aware of tbs full potentiality 
of rockets. Thinking of developmental stages rather than of military or 
scientific ends, the Feenemuende staff envisioned a progr a m that would 
nova systematically from short-range missiles to an eventual goal of space 
vehicles* Ultimate success depended upon the realisation of adequate 
povsrplants and looked into the future for nuclear, ion, and proton 

Bomberger* • support was not lavish but sufficient to pemit swift 
progress. In 1936, ha reported the feasibility of liquid-fuel anginas, 
and six year later, 3 October 1942, he conducted the first suooessful 

launching of the A-4 missile, now generally referred to aa the V-2. It 

demonstrated a velocity of about 3 , 600 :jqph and an altitude of 55 ailea, 

far beyond the reach of air-breathing engines* The V-2 was a long way 

from the space vehicle or the satellite foreseen by Doroberger, but with 

proper priority the aiselle could have supplied the Seal g o v e maent with 


a possible ear-winning weapon* Tbs V-2 sight also have become a direct 
^hreet to the united States, for Bugen Sanger, a MSsi eaployed scientist, 
suggested that it be used as second stage of a boost-glide vehicle to be 
launched in Qeraany against Bev York City* 

Fortunately for the Allies, Hitler was long Indifferent to the accom¬ 
plishments of Feeneauende* It was not until the experience of Stalingrad 
shook his self-confidence that he turned to "secret weapons" to save hie. 

On 13 June 194b, a weak after D-day for Operation Overlord, the Germane 
fired the first of the V-l guided missiles against Sngland. The weapons 
were disturbing, but they were such less so than the V-2 rocket-propelled 
ballistic missiles that began a bonbardaent of Trance, Belgian, and Ire¬ 
land on 8 September, Bf that ties the Allied anales were well established 
on the continent and within wades would capture the eore strategically 
located missile bases, thereby, reducing the enemy threat. But Sen. Dwight 
D. Usenbower knew that six months earlier the V-l and especially the V-2 


might have endangered the Anglo-American invasion of Trance. 

The collapse of Peenamuende began soon after the launching of the 
V-2 offensive* By autumn 1944 the war was sweeping toward the Baal defeat. 
The Russians raced through eastern Germany and in January 1943 threatened 
Pe en — oen d e . In the confusion of disaster, Doroberger could not save bis 
satire group, sad a number of his employees, some with 10 years' experience, 


and A—rl—ns reacted very differently to the taste of their spoils. 

Tbs Soviet g overn — u t understood that roekete would be of pereeount lapor- 
tanee In the future and directed their naaeeat p r ogram toward nothing wore 
definite, and nothing less inclusive, then the advance—at of rocket 
—lance r e ga rdle ss of its speclfie applicability,, The result was that 
by 1956 or 1997 the Russians had a rocket engine—or possibly rocket 
engiaeS‘~*flth a thrust that could launch either nisslles laden with atomic 
warheads or heavily lnstn—mted capsules to mbit the earth or explore 
interplanetary space. The Aaericans, in contrast, had little top-level 
gulden— or support and they frags—ted their develop—nt of roeket engines 
a—ng a nuaber of projects within a e—prehsnslve hut frequently unstable 
missile progr—• The unfortunate 0 —quenoe was that in 1996 and 1997 
tbs United 8tates bad — roeket propulsion comparable to that —Joyed by 
the Soviet Union. 

The Military Mjeeile Progr— 

A aissile is "any object thrown, dropped, projected, or propelled, 

or designed to be thro—, dropped, projected, or propelled for the pur- 


pose of —king it strike e target." According to this definition, ais- 
silry is a gemus of alauy subordinate species. Insofar — the word le 
used attributively in the expression "guided nl—lie progr — "—oft— 
shortened to "aissile progr—"—it d eno t e s the davelop—it of self- 
propelled, ui—med vehicles, ar—d with warheads to be a—t against 
snsay targets and equipped for gulden— either by a preset device or 

radio CCBBMOd. 

TO sbortout through tbs as—ntles of listing "ballistic mlasll—" 

under the species of "guided missiles"--a confusing contradiction in 
terms—it ehould be sufficient to say that the postwar "missile pragma" 
case to include any wholly or partially guided missile using e turbojet, 
ramjet, or racket powerplaat or any combination of them. Whether the 
missiles were aerodynamic in structure was unimportant as far as the space 
pragma was concerned. The Important fact was that only one of the three 
forms of missile propulsion could function in areas shore the operational 
altitude of air-breathing engines. Therefore, those aiesilee designed 
for trajectories passing through and continuing shore the atmosphere had 
to be propelled by rocket engines* These rocket-propelled rehicles were 
generally referred to as "ballistic." 

A quirk of history brought together the ballistic missile program 
on the one hand and the satellite-space progr a m on the other. In 1945, 
when the armed forces, along with the rest of the world, tried to adjust 
to the new era of technology, there was still little thought, except in 
eery limited circles, of a near-future breakthrough into space.* Certainly 
in the spring and sunmer, when the remnants of Psenmsuende were, being 
absorbed by the Russians and Anerleans, them was no American space pro¬ 
gram. In the early part of 1946, both the levy and the Air Force came 
forward with satellite feasibility studies, but neither proposal reached 
the stage of research and development; and in the years between 1946 and 
199 b nothing was dona to design and produce a rocket engine for satellite 
purposes. In 1954 and 1955 the space age had as su m ed an Imminence totally 
lacking 10 yearn before. Since them was still no specially dssignsd 
satellite engine, the cervices turned realistically to what wan or soon 
would he available in the military missile pragma as it had developed 

since 194$. 

Of course only the development of rocket engines is pertinent, end 
that lies always vithin the more extensile p rogram of "guided nissilee." 

The problem then is to ferret out free a labyrinth of complexities the 
decisions that delayed or hastened the research, development, and pro¬ 
duction of "ballistic missiles" and to rslate these decisions to techno¬ 
logical difficulties and national policies. 

The Postwar Attitude toward Research end Development 

During World War II the Amy Air Farces (AAF) and the Amy Service 
Forces (ASP), particularly the Ordnance Department, each sponsored a mis¬ 
sile program. The accomplishments warn far less important then those of 
Peenamuende. Severthelees both AAF and ASF went far enough in the development 
of research and weapon carrying missiles to provide Invaluable experience in 
meeting the early poetwar demand* that eaea ae a c o nse q u e nc e of tbe demon¬ 
strated effeetiveneee of tbe V-l and Y-2. The poetwar program started 
off well but aoon ran into technological and funding difficulties. Pov¬ 
erty was especially persistent end was without rimedy for almost a decade. 
Indeed, lack of funds was one of the major reasons for the retarded develop¬ 
ment of rocket engines. 

Tbs Amsricsn shift trqm a wartime to a peacetime way of life was 
translated into an economy program for tbs military that amounted to 
austerity in some areas and to retrenchment in almost all others. In 
April 1958, in the midst of American chagrin over the Sputnik incident. 

Dr. Wernher von Braun, Director of the Development Operations Division, 

Amy Ballistic Missile Agency (AEMA), attributed Russian success to the 
Soviets' continued postwar emphasis on military nee d s, whereas tfas United 




States chose the production of consumer goods. 

Retrench—nt is particularly damaging when applied to basic research, 
where neglect, or even inconsistency of effort, can result in tine losses 
for which crash progress can offer no none than partial conpenaatlou at 
best. 8 

^ The defense research pro g r am ran into trouble as soon as World War 
II ended. The armed forces ware disturbed—they understood What the cut¬ 
back night lead to, but there was little they could do about it. An im- 
p row — en t followed the outbreak of the Korean War but did not survive the 
conflict. After January 1953, military research end develop—nt and the 
position of scientists in g ov er nment employ suffered further deterioration. 

Meanwhile, Senator Joseph McCarthy, of Wisconsin, and his like were 
in the heyday of their raapaney. Their vicious antl-lntelleetuali— coin¬ 
cided, in time only, with the more kindly jibes of Secretary of Defense 
Charles X. Wilson, bent upon defending the administration's policy of 
eeoooagr and downgrading of research and development. Accepting the suf¬ 
ficiency of existing weapons, Wilson could see small justification for a 
basic research that might contribute to unforeseeable require—fits In the 

future. The Secretary bac— a tireless spoke—an against "boondoggling 


research. One example of his frequently xpreseed opinions will show 

his point of view: 

In my own mind I think of . . . ^research and development/ like 
drilling for oil .... Tbs snart people In the oil business try 
to drill their holes for oil in a likely -plasm, so the money that is 
given to the Defense Department for research and develops—t, I like 
to see spent in an area /jjhrnnf if . . . successful ... it will be 
of some use to us. And maybe sc— other place in the nation'a budget 
could go the money for fundamental research, I don't know. I don't 
care what happens to so—of the minor other things. 


She ell—x of protests ea— late la 1955 aad early la 1996 . Trevor 

Gardner, Assistant Secretary of the Mr Tores (BU>), apoke oat strongly 

agal—t budgets Axr research —^ devalop—at* Be mii«^ tor 

the flaeal year 1957 outlay to be dou b led, to —et the challenge of 8ovlat 

technology* lie warnings igaoored, Gardner resigned to ahcar the late—ity 

of hla conviction. 

To this erltielan, Wilson invariably replied la the ea— tom. Un¬ 
doubtedly the Bueala— did have atonic boabs, 200 divisions, aad au—roue 
su b — r i m s: "80 wbatt She final thing la, la there any re a eon for than 
to go to war and If they did, would it be clear to than that they would 
—at ao nuch opposition that they would really lose." Wllaon based his 
optimise on the Air force, which be deeerlbed aa "the beat In the world." 
It would be tragic, ha sdid, If the Air for— ware second best. The Sec¬ 
retary aa* the Air far— equipped with currently available wea p on s } he 
showed little sign of seeing that without a strong aad unending p ro g ra n 
In basic research those weapons night soon beoc— obsolete and the Air 
Tores weak. 1 * 

On 8 Tefaruary 1956, alaost exactly five sooths after approving ISC'a 
latest oall for an expanded r eeearch progran, Else n how er expressed astoo- 
ishaent at the oonoezn of J—rleana baoauaa of Russian auooe—. Be was 
ears that the Gtalted States w— ahead of the Soviet Uhlan In all leportant 
aapeeta of "guided missiles.Wilson thereupon introduced a new if 
unecaptrehe—ibla th—a. Bis argoaent ran that tin— missiles ware psycho¬ 
logically aa wall — militarily significant, they should not be over- 
eaqpb—land. Shortly afterwards, Donald A. Quarles, Secretary of the Air 


Force, said, that the U.S. investment* la military research end develop* 

» ■ 

meat cere acre than adequate. 

Between 1945 end 1935 the Amy and the Air Force continued .the 
wartime goal of developing both research and weapon-carrying missiles. 
The effect of V-2 in both fields of endeavor was to give an Interest 
in rocket propulsion that previously had too often been totally absent. 
However, neither the high-altitude rocket research nor the .development 
of engines for military missiles sought the ultimate In rocket signif¬ 
icance, Bach program followed the practice of developing rocket engines 
to meet specific requirements. 

Of course in the high-altitude rocket research pr og r am there wee no 
need for an engine with a vary larga thrust. At moat, a research rooket 
was expected to propel a payload of perhaps 1,000 pounds to sn altitude 
of 200 or 2$0 miles. In the pro g r a m for military missiles, planning did 
not exeeed the concept of adjusting World War II experience to more 

•The statistics for research and development are interesting. For fis¬ 
cal years 1953, 1954, and 1955 , tbs total a ppropriations for BOO re¬ 
search and development were, respectively, $ 1.6 billion, $1.4 billion, 
and $ 1.3 billion. The difference of $300 million between 1953 end 1935 
is not great in postwar reckoning, so there semes to be only a alight 
decrease in research and development spending. But- the significance 
lies not in the loss of $300 million over a period of three years but 
that there was no increase. Percentage-vise, the RAF was asking double 
the investment in research end development during these jeers. To 
make the A m erica n effort commensurate with that of the BAF, the 1953 
ap propr i ations of $ 1.6 billion should not have decre as ed to $ 1.3 bil¬ 
lion in 1955 but should have Increased to $ 2,2 billion. 

efficient netted* of . weapon delivery. In 19^5-W tbs Amy thought of 
nlselles as an adjunct to. artillery; the Air Toroe thought of nlssiles 
latte traditional airpowtr tana of altitude, range, and velocity.. Be¬ 
cause alaost no target vu wore than 5,000 alias may and beoauae the 
Atonic Energy Caniaaiod soon undertook to bring nuclear warteade veil 
below the 10,000-pound weight of wartine bonba, practically no thought 
ni given to the davelognant of nieeilea with e greeter range or e greeter 
capacity, the greatest powerplaats envisioned did not aatoeed the requlre- 
aents of intercontinental strategic nlssiles; that these requiranents far 
exceeded the range, altitude, velocity, and capacity of the V-2 is not 
the point. It was the linltation i np oeed upon rocket-engine developeent 
by the aissile pro g r a n that did no auch, later on, to bold back the pro- 
gran for aatellltea and other apace vahLelee. 

Bigh-altitude rocket reaeeroh was conducted for the noat part at the 

Amy's White Sands Proving Ground in Bev Mexico. The White Sands exper- 

• * 

ineate, howev er , were not United to the Amy, and both the Bevy and Air 
Force participated. 

Out of the wartine nlaeile effort there had cone the WAC-Corporal 
with a narrlnini altitude of fO ailea and a payload capacity of 25 pounda. 
Its first flight oeeurred at White Sands on 26 Septmber 3$fc5« By that 
tine a few of the captured V-2'e warn reaching the United States, and 
they were entrusted to the Amy for eeanably and firing. Beoauae of 
-their greater eapaelty, the Osman nlssiles led to a waning Interest in 
KAC-Oorporal, but they also etiaulated a nore anbltlous Aray-Kavy-Air 
Force ugqper-atnosphar* research progrs n , fomulated in the late days of 
19k5« Ordnance then contracted the General Klee trio Conpany to conduct 


the V-2 experiments, and oo l6 April ig46» CB representatives, assisted 

by ecientiprts from Feeoemuende, fired a V-2 for tbo first time from Amt- 

loon soli* 

Experience with the V-2 soon showed s umber of unanticipated short¬ 
comings In the nisslle. The airframe vas clumsy and unnecessarily heavy 
because of internal structural support. The tanks used were already obso¬ 
lete by Anarican standards and ware a serious drag on the missile's pro¬ 
ficiency. Moreover, since the V-2 did not lend itself to instrumentation, 
useless ballast had frequently to be added to the payload with unpredic¬ 
table effects oo the missile's performance. An acceptable Interim solu¬ 
tion was found In Project Bumper—mating the V-2 with VAC-Corporal in a 
two stags missile—but the arrangement only emphasised the need for a 
more satisfactory replacement. Moreover, the supply of V-2's vas limited 
and this feet too mas Instrumental In persuading res ea rch authorities to 
call for a newly desipwd missile at an early date. They vented one 
approximately ae large as the V-2 but mssneble to instrumentation. In 

August 1946 the Eaval Re s e ar ch Laboratory (UL) contracted the Olson L. 


Martin Company for an Improved rocket, which wee called Viking. Alao in 
1946, with the Sivy as c ognisan t agent, Aircraft Comp any began 

developm ent of the smeller Aerobes* 

Both the Viking and Aerobes were operational by 1946, and both had 


rocket p os er p l ente. Both missiles were also dynamic amd u nd er wen t num¬ 
erous Changes to meet the standards of nsv knowledge. In addition, 


Aerobes, at the reqpsst of the Air force, vas prod u os d in a different 

version by 1955 , known as Aerobee-Bl. All three nlsslles—Viking, Aero- 

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indirectly of rocketry—the use of atonic wagons. Taaedlataly after the 
boShlng of BiroaMaa and Wagaseki in August 1945 , there vu talk of a 
aarrlage between a nuclear wa rh ead and a aieeile vehicle to create the 
"ultlaate weapon." Qen. H.H. Arnold, fin—ndlng General, AAP, expressed 
his conviction that the atonic bonb would be integrated with guided ais- 
siles, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) stated that the atonic and 
nisslle pr ogr es s should be developed in such Banner that each nade use 
of the other* This was brave talk in the glow of victory, but it carried 
little weight in the repetition of poet-Vorld War 1 efforts to "return 
to noraalcy." 

In the late days of 194? and throughout 1946, Aff put on paper a . 
ooaprSbeaslve guided Bissile study progran that inc lu ded 88 projects. 
Three of the proposed nlsalles Involved roeket propulsion—the Oonaoli- 
dated Voltes Aircraft (Cbnvair) MX-774 that called for a rocket nieelle 
with long range; the Sorth Aeerioen Aviation MX-770 supersonic surface- 
to-eurfhee, 500-eils-rengs, glide rocket Bissile; and the Republic Air¬ 
craft MX-773, 1 , 900-ails supersonic aissils that could be either rsnjet- 
• 17 

or rooket-propsllsd. Altogether, it was a program pregnant with lapor- 
taot poeelhllltles if carried through without serious interruptions. But 
serious interruptions were at hand. 

In Deesaber 1946 the afelnlstration de c re ed a outback in speeding 
for defense res e a r c h and devslopaent daring fisoal year 1947, though the 
year was already half gone. The Air force was then faced with tbs un¬ 
happy teak of deciding where its own cute should he aade. The first 
decision wee a reduction in the aiaolle research budget free #89 alllion 
to #13 Billion. The next decision was to weed out the least proalslng 

■lulls projects and keep the remaining 

. IB 

under the accepted cell* 

Since experience et White 8aads vu already showing the V-2 1ms 
satisfactory m e weapon carrier than had- been believed and the Convalr 
MX-774 studies indicated a long development period, entfanslasa for the 
rocket alsslle waned considerably. She requirement for fuel of high spe¬ 
cific impulse not then available, guidance difficulties, and unsolved 
problems of reentry indicated "a long series of costly experieents" that 
would eat deeply into the curtailed missile research and developsent funds. 
On 6 Hey 1947, Maj. Gen. Benjamin W. CMdlav, Air Materiel Command, wrote 
the commanding general of the AAF:*^ 

The Air Materiel Command and AAF miuile contractors for the 
put six Booths have been carrying on detailed studlM of the prob¬ 
able cost of developing guided missiles. From these studiM, the 
conclus io n must be drawn that the AAF program, while desirable and 
technically sound, is considerably overexpanded if we axe to carry 
on with ... /par presently reduce^budget. . . . £&*£] AAF pro- 
gran must be drastically cut. This is believed best accomplished 
by eliminating all the so-called "insurance” missiles such as sub¬ 
sonic miMllM to perform the sane mission as supersonic missilM 
being developed. Also eliminated is the 5,000-mile-range rocket 
which does not promise any tangible results in the next 8 to 10 years 
j/and the unpromising 1,500-mile rocket or ramjet missile of Republic/, 

The next month the Air Force canceled its contracts for Republic MX-773 

and Convair MX-774. 20 

By July 1947 the most important project remaining in the Air Force 
missile progr am , as far as the later apace p rogr am was concerned, wa^ the 
MX-770, which soon came to be known as Bavaho. Its development was sub¬ 
sequently conditioned by four major am e n d m en ts to the contract between 
1947 end 1950. In 1947 the plan was extended to cover three missiles— 
the original 500 -mile glide rocket missile plus a 1 , 500 -mile missile and 



a 5,000-mile missile depending upoo resists far cruising. In 1948 the 
Air force abandon ed the glide missile and rewrote the contract to provide 
for three ramjet missiles with ranges of 1,000 miles, 3,000 miles, and 
5,000 miles. In 19^9 the contract specified a 1,000-mlle and a 1 , 700 - 
mila ramjet air-launched missile and a 5 , 500 -mile missile with a type of 
launching still undetermined. In 1950, at the suggestion of Berth Ameri¬ 
can, the Havaho contract was changed again to provide for. a three-step 
development b eg in n in g with a turbojet test vehicle, a 3 , 600 HB±lr-TOCket- 

lsunched, ramjet-propelled experimental missile, and the ultimate 5 , 500 - 

mile version. 

Despite the Air force rejection of the rocket-powered glide missile 
in 1948 and the change to ramjet engines for cruising, iorth Ame r ican con¬ 
tinued the rocket development as a Havaho booster unit. The work be ca me 
an important contribution to the accumulation of experience with rocket 
engines that, along with the accomplishments of the high-altitude research 
rockets, was indispensable to the later space projects. 

In April 1946, when the Jff-770 contract was signed, Xorth American 
was without talent in rocket engines. To hasten the buildup of skill in 
this new field, the Air force turned over to the contractor two V-2 rocket 
motors transported from Oexmany. They were excellent guinea pigs that 
Borth American engineers could study and from which prepare a Chinese 
copy'brought up to the standards of American industry, from that begin¬ 
ning it should be possible to turn out a new, more efficient, and more 
powerful engine. Between 1946 and 1953, Borth American developed three 
rodent engines and designed a fourth, and a comparison of than with the 


V-2 nodal reveals the progress being aada in rocketry: 


Purpose Thrust Pounds 


German V-2 

To propel a weapon missile 


1946 at XA 

(Chlneee copy 
of. the V-2) 


(■ . 

Experimentation with a rocket 
engine brought up to the struc¬ 
ture! stenderds of American 




Designed to have e thrust of 
75,000 pounds and intended to 
servs as the powerplant of 
the glide missile 




A smaller, lighter, and more 
efficient version of the 




A combination of 2 XI1143-HA-3 1 ■ 
to boost the Kavsho 1,700-ells 




Designed as a booster for the 

5,500-mile Kavaho 


1953 (la 

design ooiy) 

It is ironical tbat the success of forth American in developing aux¬ 
iliary rocket engines for various phases of Havaho should, along with 
rochet development elsewhere, have been one of the factors l e a ding to the 
eventual cancellation of the Kavsho project. By 1957* long-range, air- 
breathing nlsslles could be regarded only as standby weapons during the 
waiting period for operational ballistic missiles. Unfortunately for 
Kavsho the Air force had another long-range, air-breathing aissile, "tfoark, 
which, though inferior In performance to Kavaho, was considerably nearer 
operational status. It was pointless to continue the development of both 
Xevaho and Snaxk. under the circumstances the Air force regretfhlly 
canceled Xavaho, mindful of the great contributioos Horth American had 

nade to the science of missiles and rocket engines* 

The 1946 policy of mtreochnent had not dinned the Anqr's interest 
in missiles, and especially rocket-propelled nissiles, as adjuncts of 
artillery. Then, after 1949, vben the Atonic Energy Caanlssicn nade proa- 
lslng reports of lightweight atonic warheads in the near future, the Amy 
initiated the Redstone ballistic nissile, which, along with several other 
nissiles of the levy and Air Force, could be used to deliver the weapon. 
Redstone, however, had a range of 175 nilas, and this weened to be 
stretching the adjunct-to-artillery theory to cower a nultltude of anbl- 
tions. 2 ^ 

The whole course of events—Rorth Aeerican Aviation progress on 
rocket engines, AEC promises for analler atonic warheads, sons favorable’ 
Rand Corporation studies on the feasibility of 1 OEM's, the lengthening 
range of the Amy's ballistic nissiles—induced the Air Force to recon¬ 
sider the advisability of a progran for long-range rocket nissiles. As 
early as 1951 the Air Force turned to Coovair and requested a cooperative 
study, to be coaqpleted within six non tbs, on a rocket glide nissile and a 
rocket ballistic nissile. There was not much doubt, as far aa Coovair 
was concerned, what the recaneendatlon would be. ' Since 1948, Coovair— 
using its own funds—had continued snail-scale work on MX-774, and the 
1991 study insisted that a ballistic nissile was feasible. The Air^Force 
accepted Coovair's judgsent and MX-774 become Atlas. Subsequently, break¬ 
throughs occurred in quick succession. Development was far advanced in 
1957, and the missile reached the production stage In 1998. 

Revival of the Air Force ICBf pro g r an was not prenature. In 1992, 

Los Alaaos was speaking oot only of small atomic warheads but of snail 

lightweight ther m onuclear (TB) warheads as well. If the latter were Mar¬ 
ried tp a long-range rocket of reasonable accuracy. It could became an 
ideal,strategic weapon. One year later the Teapot Comeittee, under Dr. 
John eon Meumann, aade a thorough study of ICBM potentialities and early 
in 195^ recommended that the program be accelerated immediately to take 
advantage of the new warheads. The Air Three reacted quickly. On 15 
July the Air Research .and Development Coueand (ARDC), as instructed by 
H e a d qua r ters U8AF, set up. the Western Development Division (HDD) at 


Inglewood, Calif., for the primary purpose of pushing the ICBK program. 
Voder Brig. Qen. Bernard A. Schrleuer, WED—which subsequently became 
known as the Air force Ball 1 Stic Missile Division (ATBND)—was responsi¬ 
ble for the management of Atlas research, development, and testing. In 
May 1955, VDD responsibility was increased to include the comparable, 
though more sophisticated. Titan. 

It was good to have the Air force ballistic missile program revived, 
and the Operation Castle thermonuclear shots in 1954 seamed to confirm the 
policy of developing rockets tailored to meet specific needs. Conse¬ 
quently, since T1 warheads promised to be email, the Air force sponsored 
correspondi n gly modest ICON'S. Though the missiles were capable of inter¬ 
continental rangs and possessed velocities great enough to achieve earth 
orbits if so desired, tbrust was far less than that which the 8ovlets 
were developing for their missile-satellite programs. 

Socket propulsion received further impetus in 1955 . In Msrch 1954, 
at tbs Fresidsat's request, the Science Advisory Cooalttec (Office of 
Defense Mobilisation) had established the Tec h nological Capabilities Panel 
(TCP) to study the threat of surprise attack. Under the chairmanship of 

Dr. James R. Killian, the panel, often referred to as the Killian Ccsmiit- 
tee,* prepared an exhaustive report and submitted it to the President on 
lfc Pebruary 1955 . Among other things, the report advocated an imeedlate 
program for intermediate-range ballistic miasilea (SOM's). The recom¬ 
mendation arouaed some enthusiasm for 'various Service proposals for 
XRBN's, and the interest heightened a fee months later when BSC recom¬ 
mended that land- and ship-baaed SOM's be considered essential to 

national security’. 

In Bovamber 1955 the Secretary of Defense approved the Jupiter IREK 
as a Joint Army-Bavy development task and authorised the Air Force to 
proceed with its own Thor IREK. The Air Force promptly added this proj¬ 
ect to the other responsibilities of WDD. The Bevy soon found that the 
Jupiter mould be unsatisfactory for shipboard use and, late in 1956, 
obtained permission to withdraw from further participation in the project 

In January 1957, the Bevy gained approval of Polaris, a solid-fuel SON 


designed especially for submarine launching. Though Polaris itself 
lacked intercontinental range, its mobility endowed the flavy for the 
first time with what amounted to strategic airpower. It gave the Bevy 
a better position from which to argue roles and missions in the approach¬ 
ing space age, but Polaris missiles were not to be diverted from IRBK 
functions to serve as boosters In satellite launchings. • 

The following table lists the performance characteristics of the 

*Othar members were J.B. Fish, J.P. Baxter, J.I. Doolittle, L.A. 
DuBrldge, L.J. Haworth, M.G. Holloway, E.H. Land, and R.C. Sprague, 

■lasl^es that proved to be Important as "lift devices" Aar satellites 
andspaee vehicle projects between 1954 and 1959 : 


. Alt or 

Ko of 









154 (A) 






36 (A) 






K* (A) 






175 (R) 






75 (R) 






1,500 (R) 







1,500 (R) 






Atlan .. 

5i500 (R) 







5,500 (R) 

2 (1 of V 
300 , 000 -lb 
thrust: 1 of 



1958 • 

60 , 000 ) 

II. THE Namur SERVICES flan for SPACE, 1945-57 

On the evening of 3 October 1942, that hletorle dear when the flret 
V-2 wee successfully launched at Peenamuende, Valter Dorn b crgcr, by then 
a major general and director of the project, called together hla chief 
aeaiatanta and said:^ 

The following polnta aagr be d e em ed of decisive significance in 
the history of technology: we have invaded space with our rocket 
and for the first time—mark this veil—we have used space as a 
bridge between two points on earth] we have proved rocket propulsion 
practicable for space travel. To land, aea, and air may now be 
added infinite empty space as an area of future intercontinental 
traffic, thereby acquiring political Importance. This third day of 
October, 1942, is the first of a new era of transportation—that of 
space travel. 

So long as the war laats, our moat urgent task can only be the 
rapid perfection of the rocket as a weapon. The development of pos¬ 
sibilities we cannot yet envisage will be a peacetime task. Then 
the first thing will be to find a safe means of landing after the 
Journey through space. 

The defeat of Germany was the and of Oornbezger's work at Peanamuende, 
but the significance of rocketry for apace travel wee not loet upon those 
who bed knowledge of the problem. 

When the Russians, went forward with their missile program in 1945 , 
they included space travel as well as missile weaponry among their hopes. 
In the United States the levy and Air force—and eventually the Army— 
became interested in space but received little encouragement from the 
higher levels of g ove r n m e n t. Without support, the serviees could do 
scarcely more then sketch a program as something to be desired. 

The Russian Space Program 

The Russians handled their program with consumsate skill. At the 
ehd of the war they mads no secret of their intentions to conduct 

experimental nlsalle work with tbe aid of the Peeneauende scientists in- 

prisoned deep In tbe Soviet Union. In addition tbe Russians gave their 

own scientists adequate support to leant whatever tbe Qexeans bad to 

teach and at tbe sane tine to go forward with their own experiments as 

rapidly as possible* Though they kept their program flexible, swiveled 

to Wet the exigencies of international politics, the Russians did not 

deviate from tbe one unalterable aim of furthering the Interests of the 

Soviet Union. Their method was scientific research In missllry, and 

their three ebief objectives were to strengthen the nation's military 

prowess, enhance propaganda, and possibly In the end to prove the matei- 

riallstle philosophy of ocmanniaa fay exhibiting life as universally in- 

dlgsnous to natter. 

As far as publicity was concerned, tbe Russian policy was "not to 
release any detail until we have experimental results'' of a broad nature, 
said one Soviet official.^ It wee not until long afterwards that Western 
authorities learned that the Soviets undertook to develop a roeket-pro- 
pelled intercontinental bomber in 19b6; that they sent rockets to alti¬ 
tudes of 100 miles with payloads of 200 pounds in 1949; that their eanlne 
passengers of atmosphere research rockets were recovered by 

1991; sod that they conducted a systematic investigation of lunar-landing 


feasibility in 1953. 

Yet no Western statesman can plead a justifiable Ignorance of the 
general nature of the Russian missile program. On 23 July 1945, Life 
published Peeneauende drawings of a large, manned space station, and 
there was every reason to suppose that tbs Russians bad acquired similar 
or perhaps more advanced drawings of tbe same concept. It was coaeo n 



knowledge that rocket-propelled aiseUes and spacecraft were two aspects 

of the sane research problaa in the thinking of German scientists in the 

Russian prison caap. In October 1949, Karl T. Compton, then chalrwan of 

the Reeeareh and Development Board, wrote Louis Johnson, Secretary of 

Defense, and quoted an unidentified aa a b er of the board as saying:^ 

Although reports tram behind the Iron Curtain are aeager, those 
which we hare indicate that the Russians are exploiting the aissile 
developments, which they inherited frow the Geraans, at high pri¬ 
ority. They would be fools not to do so, now that the United 8tates 
is so definitely eaaaitted to the atonic blits. It would be tragic 
if we were to curtail our program now and let the Russians get ahead 
of us. 

As tine went on, it became the policy of Moscow frequently to re¬ 
mind the Russian people—and the world too, if it would listen—that the 
Soviet go v e rn me n t was vigorously supporting a program to develop a space 
capability at an early date. The stream of information broadened appre¬ 
ciably in 1950—and was a flood by 199$. In 1951 there were several re¬ 
ports, emanating from g ove rn ment sources, that the Soviet Union envisioned 
a military space station and Barth satellite and that plans looked toward 

lunar landings within 10 or 15 years. This material could be found in 


many reputable Journals in the United States. 

On 27 November 1953, A.B. Besmeyanov addressed a "World Peace Con¬ 
ference 1 in Vienna. As the official representative of tha Kremlin, he 
said that with available techniques it was possible to launch a satellite 
or sand an object to tha moon. Within days Pravda published the state¬ 
ment and discussed it with a pproving interest. In 1954 the U.S.S.R. 
Academy of Sciences established the Ziolkovsky gold medal for outstandi n g 
work in interplanetary communications. In April of the next year, the 
Presidium announced the creation of tha Permanent Interdepartmental 

Commission on Interplanetary Ccmunic&tions "to coordinate and direct all 
work eooeemed with aolvlng the prohlan of nattering coaalc apace." Si¬ 
multaneously the Astronautics Section of the Central Aeroolub vaa organ¬ 
ised "to facilitate the realisation of coanlc fllghta for peaceful 
purpoaea.” Even more Indicative of a prospering apace progran were the 

appeals of Radio Moscow. Youthful volunteers were needed to help their 


country in its efforts to undertake flights to the Moon. 

Further evidence of Russian progress came in August 1955 during the 
Sixth International Astronautics! Congress at Copenhagen, sponsored by 
the International Astronautical Federation. One of the two Russian 
"observers," L.T. Sedov,' chairman of tbs Commission on Interplanetary 
Communications, declared that "it will he possible to launch an artificial 
Barth satellite within the next two years. The realisation of the Soviet 
project can be expected in the comparatively near future." Sedov cer¬ 
tainly did not speak without the knowledge and a pproval of his g o ve r nm en t, 


and his statement was tantamount to an official announcement. 

The Russians gave the world ample evidence of their space goal. In¬ 
deed the flow of information between 1951 and 1955 was a graph of Russian 
success, legible as a printed page at noon. In August 1958 tbs President 
of the United States approved an BSC statement to the offset that Soviet 
apace acccopliehnenta should long have been obvious to anyone, and a^con¬ 
gressional committee concluded that "we did not need a spy system to give 
to the technically qualified a clear forewarning of Soviet progress . 11 ^ 

It was surely a serious failure of the intelligence community if it did 
not warn the highest authorities of the looming crisis. It was an equally 
grave fault on the part of the highest authorities if they received hut 


disregarded such a warning. 

Service Moves toward Space Projects sad Policy. 1945-48 
The lack of aa American space policy, or even a rocket policy. In 
the first few years after World War II compelled the asperate services 

once aore to shift *nr thsawelves in adjusting to tbs changing order. 


Aside frae a keen interest In aisslles as a fore of artillery, the Any 
Ground Forces seeas to have had no immediate awareness of space as a 
possible area of operations. The levy and AAP/USAF felt quite differently 
about the feasibility of satellites, and they exhibited-a realistic desire 
for space projects at the time when many civilian echelons expressed dis¬ 
approval of such "impractical ideas." 

In his final war report, 12 Hoveober 1945, General Arnold disc us s ed 
the possible and probable use of new weapons in the future—projectiles, 
for instance, that night have a velocity of 3>000 alias per hour. In 
turn there would be new weapons of defense, and they would necessitate 
launching the projectiles nearer the target to give than a shorter tine 

of flight and make their detection and destruction sore difficult. Goo- 
10 . 

timing, be said: 

We must be ready to launch . . . /the projectiles/ from unex¬ 
pected directions. This can be done with true space ships, capable 
of operating outside the earth’s atmosphere. Tbs design of such a 
ship is all but practicable today; research will unquestionably 
bring it into being within the foreseeable future. ^ 

Arnold's vision did not cause wide interest at the tine, but before the 
end of the year the AAV negotiated a contract with Douglas Aircraft Com¬ 
pany for a study of intercontinental warfare and its instrumentalities. 

On 1 March 1946, Douglas in turn organised Project Rand to fulfill these 

respooeibilitiee . la this ratter Indirect mgr, therefore, it Is possible 

to think, of Band, which becameBand. Corporation oo 1 Hovember 19 W, as 

baying been es t ablis h ed to investigate seme of the poaslbllties of pens- 

tratlng space. 

By the tine of tte AAF-Douglaa contract the lavy, too, vas interested 

in space, end it moved ahead of tte AAF in foaMlising a apace prograa. 

Through tte sonar of 19^5, Comdr. Harvey HSU, OSH, and a few associates 

in the BXectroniee Division of tte Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer), worked 

with soae of tte material salvaged from Feensauende. Hall suggested tte 

desirability of a satellite test program, and on 3 October 19^5 be vas 

aade c h a irm a n of a BuAer Committee for Evaluating the feasibility of Bpaee 
._. 12 

Bocfcetry (CV8K). HSU then opened discussions with Guggenheim Aero¬ 
nautical Laboratory of tte California Institute of Technology, Aerojet 
Engine erin g Corporation, Martin Company, lforth American Aviation, and 
Douglas. Tte tal ks led to contracts late in 19^5 and early in 19k6 with 
Guggenheim, Douglas-El Segundo, Martin, and Earth American for feasibility* 
study designs of space vehicles. 

Vlthin a matter of weeks CEFSR received several studies and cboee 
tte one from Douglas as the most suitable. Tte concept called for tte 
development of a new rocket engine, using a fuel of liquid hydrogen and 
oyygen. Tte vehicle design employed tte engine in clusters to obtain 
tte desired thrust. The members of CEPSR were convinced that they had 
at hand a project of importance but one that would require general sup¬ 
port in order to be approved by higher authorities.^ 

In March 19^6, Hall approached the AAF representatives on the joint 
AAF-teAer Aeronautical Board and broached tte subject of a possible 

Kavy-AAF experimental space project. It was Mentioned at a Meeting of 
tbe board's Research and Development Ooanittee on 9 April, and formal dis¬ 
cussions were scheduled for the next nesting on 14 May. Prospects of a 

* ib 

satisfactory understanding seened good. 

At this point Headquarters AAF becane interested in the negotiations 
fron a policy viewpoint. The Air Staff agreed that if space were exploited 
the operations would be an extension of strategic airpower. Therefore 
the AAF should be the cognisant service. To avoid a possible conpromise 
of tbe AAF position, it was eeaiential to show a competence equal to that 
of tbe Xavy. To Kaj. Gen. Curtis S. LeNay, Deputy Chief of Air Staff for 
Research and Development, fell tbe task of safeguarding the AAF position. 
On 20 April 1946 he verbally requested Douglas-Santa Monica to have Proj¬ 
ect Rand personnel prepare a satellite feasibility study for tbe AAF. 
According to Douglas, tbe study was nee ded within three weeks "to meet a 
pressing responsibility." In light of this deadline tbe company assigned 
about 50 of its ablest scientists and engineers to the task, regardless 
of other activities. 1 ^ 

The study, "Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling 

Spaceship," was written under great pressure. A first draft of 2 May 

showed inconsistencies that required overall revision, and on 12 May, 

Douglas officials band-carried tbe paper to Headquarters AAF. There were 

shortcomings that could not be corrected within the time allowed, but 

none of these faults detracted from the superior quality of the study as 


a document of historical importance. 

Replete with pertinent formulas and tables, the study proved to be 
an engineering analysis of satellite feasibility. It showed conclusively 


that la 1946 American engineers using current techniques were qualified 
to begin work on a space vehicle that could have orbited a 500 -pound 
satellite in 1951, six years before Sputnik. The first satellite would 
have orbited for 10 days or more before slowing to the velocity of re¬ 
entry, whereupon it would have been consumed by friction temperatures. 

Later versions, equipped with snail wings and guidance control, oould 
have been brought beck to Barth and landed safely* One of the more im¬ 
portant aspects of the study was its discussion of the advantages of 
liquid oxygen and alcohol fuel versus the possible use of liquid hydrogen 

and oxygen, e'subject already treated in the Douglaa-U Segundo study for 

the Ravy. 

Admittedly the utility of a satellite could not be explicitly defined 
in 1946, hut there were reasons to be optimistic. The time seemed not 
altogether different from the years immediately preceding tbs first air- 
plans flight in 1903* The Wright brothers certainly had not foreseen 
fleets of B-29*s bombing Japan or air transports circling the globe. But 
in 1946 it was possible to envision soma of tbs scientific and military 
uses which a satellite could serve, and probably this appreciation of space¬ 
ship functions was far more accurate thap the most realistic prophesies 
of airpo eer bad been at the end of the nineteenth century. It was plain, 
said the report, that a satellite, being above the atmo sphe re, could make 

■ 11 ■ 11 ■ 1 ■ . H 


The controve r sy was an old one, and in general the problem of handling 
and storing liquid hydrogen bad been regarded as offsetting the advantage 
of greater specific impulse. The Bond scientists followed the hypothesis 
that handling and storing would be solved in time. They therefore sub¬ 
mitted design analyses for the structure and performance of rockets using 
both kinds of fuel. The hydrogen-osygen-pawered rockets showed an impres¬ 
sive theoretical reduction in gross weight, and the writers urged that 
"this /fuel 7 combination should he given serious consideration in any fu¬ 
ture stoidy. (Douglas Rpt SH-II 827 , 2 May 46, p IV.) 

invaluable contributions to the study of cosale rays, gravity, estroaasgy, 
the Barth's magnetic fields, aeatber forecasting, advanced methods of 
radio cows in it cation, space medicine, and Interplanetary travel. Militar¬ 
ily a satellite could serve either as a reconnaissance craft, a guidance 
station to Increase the accuracy of weapon-bearing missiles, or a nlsalle 
itself to be brought down by remote control upon a chosen target. Finally, 
and perhapa most important of all for the Immediate future of tbs country: 
"The achievement of a satellite craft by the United States would inflame 

the imagination of mankind, and would probably produce repercussions in 


the world comparable to the explosion of tbs atoadc bomb." 

On lb May 1946 tbs Research and Development Committee of the Aero¬ 
nautical Board met as scheduled end began an interaarvica debate for which 
there could be no immediate conclusion. The Havy and AA7 feasibility 
studies were seen to be eminently practical, each in its way, and the 
discussion turned not on which project'should be accepted hut on the much 
aore difficult question of selecting a cognisant agent for military space 
activities. The AAF representatives insisted that service roles and mis¬ 
sions gave the responsibility for Intercontinental warfare to the AAF; 
that space operations would be an extension of that responsibility; and 
that by consequence the AAF was the agent of primary interest. The Havy 
argued for a Joint Havy-AAF-civllian agency. Unable to agree, the com¬ 
mittee sent the question to the Aeronautical Board where the consensus 
was that JCS would have to define roles and missions in space. The board 
then appointed a special subcommittee to its Research and Development 


Committee to coordinate space activities pending a JCS pronouncement. 

On 24 January 1947, after eight months of unrewarding discussion in 


the special subcommittee, the chief of BuAer appealed directly to the 
Joint Research and Development Board (JB1S) to create an ad hoe aatrpnau- 
tlcs panel to coordinate, evaluate, study, Justify, and allocate all 
phases of the earth satellite vehicle p rogram. This move took the ques¬ 
tion to a such higher level and opened the way for tbs first sta t a s s n t of 
defense policy on apace. The JRDB vas directly responsible to the two 

service secretaries and could largely deteraine policies of research and 


deve lop me n t that were of Joint interest to the Amy and Mavy. Under the 
chairmanship of Dr. Yaanevar Bush, the board operated through six commit¬ 
tees—electronics, guided missiles, atonic energy, medical science, geo¬ 
graphical exploration, and aeronautics. Although the committees, like 
the board itself, were under the chairmanship of distinguished civilian 
scientists, the aenbershlp was predominantly nilltary except la the sup¬ 
porting adninlstratlve offices and technical panels, which verm sometimes 

• 19 

caapased entirely of civilians. 

After JRDB received BuAer*a appeal, the AAF protested that adequate 
coordination was already being done by the Aeronautical Board'a special subcom¬ 
mittee. Three months later, to preserve its own authority, the Aeronau¬ 
tical Board requested that it be recognised officially as the agdnt to 


coordinate space projects. There wes no decision for several months. 

During that time, in Septsmber 1947, the Rational Security Act went into 

"i ■ -■■■■... ' •'* 


The Joint Research and Development Board was crested by Robert P. Patter¬ 
son and Jamas Forrestal, Secretaries of the Amy and Havy, who wanted a 
high-level agency to consider research and development policy. They de¬ 
cided to take the Joint Comlttee on lev Weapons and Bquipnant away from 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reorganise it as JRDB, and make it responsible 
to the. service secretaries. The first meeting of JREB was held on 3 July 
1946. (Minutes, 1st Mtg of JRDB, 3 Jul 46, v/statement of Bon Robert P. 


effect; AAF «u separated fr— tbe Amy to be— tbe United States Air 
Force; tbe Amy, Bevy* and Air Force were brought tog e th er within tbe 
Rational Military EstahUsb—nt under tbe Secretary of Defense; and tbe 
Joint Research and Develop—nt Board be e—a tbe Research and Deva l O p w en t 
Board (REB) with considerably no— authority and power. 

In Decenber 1947 tbe Research and Development Board rejected the 


requests —de by tbe Ravy and tbe Aeronautical Board. At tbe suggestion 

of the Air Force, REB directed its own Ooanittee on Guided Missiles (OGM) 

to assune responsibility for coordination of satellite activities because 


"an Barth Satellite le considered to be a high altitude Guided Mi—lie." 
Tbe transfer of —telllte responsibilities to tbe OGM w— not a happy aaen 
for progress. Vaneevar Bush, who continued to serve — obairnan of REB 

until 5 October 1948, discounted long-range ballistic alsallas end —tel- 


lites — "nilltary dreans." A conservative thinker and, Judging by his 
own writings, of little laagination. Bush was neverthele— highly respec¬ 
ted. Be exercised vide Influence in RIB and indeed throughout the exec¬ 
utive branch of the Government. 

•* * 

Under the cireumst—cea it is not surprising that the OonnlttM oo 

Guided Missiles showed little Interest in the Ravy and Air For— feasi¬ 
bility studies of May 1946. Oo 3 February 1948 the coaalttee sufaaltted 
the spa— question to one of its supporting agencies, the Technical Bval- 
uatlon Group (TIG), with a request for recoameodations before 31 Mamh.* 23 

TEG v— composed of five civilians—Dr. tf.A. Macl&ir, of Bell Telephone 
Laboratories, Inc., was chain—, and the other aeabers were H.G. Stever, 
F.H. Clauser, R.V. Porter, and L.J. Benders—. TEG was established by 
OGM — 10 July 1947 to nake technical analy—s of progr—s in the field 
of guided elssiles and —slst CGM in fomulatlng — integrated progr—. 
(CGM Directive, subj: For—tion of a Technical Xvaluation Group, 10 Jul 


The report. Satellite V e U.ole Program, vu reedy by 29 March 19M. 
After considering the''Saury and Air Force feasibility studies, the group 
concluded that both established the posslbllty of a satellite, but the 
Havy's proposal would necessarily be tbs sore difficult since it did not 
consider the use of existing techniques as the Air Force did. Moreover, 
since neither the Any nor tbs Air Force established a Military or scien¬ 
tific utility for a space vehicle "co—accurate vlth the presently expected 
cost, ... no satellite should be built until utility coanensurate vlth 
the coat is dearly established." Also TSG noticed that the Air Force, 
still asartlng from tbs reduced budgets of 19 W and 19 ^ 7 , vas canceling 
contracts for ballistic alssiles vhoae rocket engines night serve also 
as lift devices for satellites. To develop a special satellite rocket 
engine, as distinct fron the engines of long-range missiles, would make 

a satellite program even more of a national luxury. The report therefore 
2 k 


that the only activity directed toward satellite vehicles as such be 
a continuation of the Project RAID studies of the utility of such a 
vehicle. We believe, however, that the Xavy and U8AF should Jointly 
sponsor and participate in these studies and that they should in¬ 
clude such experimental work on auxiliary power plants, electronic 
apparatus, and the like as nay be required. 

Continuing, the report listed as desirable further studies of design and 

experimentation on stultistage rockets; test-pit development of liquid- 

hydrogen motors; very lightweight tanks end structures to the point of 

full-scale static tests; guidance for long-range missiles; and hypersonic 

and superaerodynsmie research. 

In reply to OGM the three services concurred In the TEG report by 
midsummer with the understanding that the Amy would continue research 
and development of short-range ballistic nissiles; tbs Wavy would proceed 

with the h ydrogen-oxygen rocket engine being developed by BuAer as a pos- 
elble satellite poverplaat, bat without fabricating a vehicle; and the 
Air force would follow Rand stadias on long-range rockets in order to 
determine the appropriate time to initiate development of complete vehicles. 
Ry theae concurrences, the Amy vent far toward ruling Itself oat of space, 
the levy continued to elala an interest in apace, and the Air force 
asserted its right to decide when a complete satellite vehicle should be 
developed. The COM seemed to confirm the service positions on 15 Septem¬ 
ber 1948 when it decided that Rand would continue its satellite studies, 
making them available to the Army and levy as well as the Air force, that 
each of the three Services should continue its projects pertinent to space 
as mentioned in their concurrences, and that there be no other specs 

activities for the time being. The eoamittee then declared that its 


deliberations "00 this item be considered closed.” 

The Research and Development Board was then in a position to submit 
the following stat e me n t to the Secretary of Defense, James forrestal, who 
included it in his first (1546) Report : 26 

The Barth Satellite Vehicle Progr a m, which was being carried 
out independently by each military service, was assigned to the 
Coamittee on Guided Missiles for coordination. To provide an inte¬ 
grated pr o gram with resultant elimination of duplication, the Com¬ 
mittee recommended that currant efforts in this field be limited 
to studies end component designs; well-defined areas of such 
research have been allocated to each of the three military depart¬ 

for some time prior to and immediately after the KDB decision of 
September 1948 there were space activities that received no official 
recognition, for instance, the Martin company claims to have completed 
in 1947 detailed studies of a rocket vehicle that, had it been put on a 
crash program, could have placed a 1,000-pound satellite in orbit by 1949 


or 1950. 1 Probably this report carried the Bevy«Martln contract of early 
i9fe6j to completion. If so, it caw to flower sooths too late. Martin 
complains that "nobody waa interested." Bobody could be interested at 


tbs tiae because of current negotiations under way in the Aeronautical 
Board and the Joint Beseareh and Development Board. After Septaaber 1948 
the Martin report was obsolete. 

Also in 19^7 sees eaplnyees of Amy Ordnance at Mbits Sands Proving 

Ground designed a space flight experiment that theoretically could have 

landed an object on the Moon. But the "stunt" was quickly shunted aside. 

On 24 February 1949, White Sends launched a Project Buaper missile* that 

soared to tbs surprising altitude of 250 alias. The event was only five 

soothe after the BOB decision, and Brig. Gen. Philip G. Blackaore, in 

coaaand of Mbits Sends, cautiously said in an interview that "the flight 

opens up new vistas for . . . exploration on the unknown regions of the 


atmosphere," but he did not mention space. 

The cautious avoidance of public reference to space bespoke the hes¬ 
itancy of the tiae to adalt that the space age was already something to 
take into consideration. Probably the advent of the wheel* and certainly 
the coming of the screw propeller also excited disbelief and distrust, 
but caution had not prevented conquest of tbs land, sea, and air and could 
not prevent human ventures into space. The nllltary services did not lose 
internet in space when RUB decreed caution in 1948. Indeed all three 
services had become Involved in space projects of one kind or another 
long before the critical days of 1957* The Air Force especially was in 
a favorable position to continue probing the possibility of sponsoring a 

♦See above, p 15. 




•pace program, and it took advantage of lta opportunltiea. 

The TEG report of March 19b8 vaa not all that the Air force could 
have desired, hut aa it vaa aodified by service concurrences and approved 
tor COM and BIB, it vaa far fraa unacceptable. Indeed in September 1948 the 
Air force could, scarcely look back over the apace negotiations of the pre¬ 
vious two years without gratification. The timely Band feasibility study 
in 1946 aore than balanced tbs levy's earlier effort and permitted the 

Air force to argue with evidence in asserting its data to be the service 


of primary interest in space. The rejection by RDB of the levy's request 
for aa ad hoc astronautics panel probably forestalled the establishment 
of a Joint space agency to challenge the Air force clala. Tbe RDB accept¬ 
ance of the definition of larth satellites as high-altitude guided mis¬ 
siles bolstered the Air force insistence that space veapons were strategic 
weapons. Moreover, RDB had authorised the Air force to continue spon¬ 
soring Rand apace studies, and these, eoablned with tbe pursuit of greater 
altitude, range, and speed, plus a growing knowledge of roeket potential¬ 
ities, led inevitably to speculation of what space projects could be under¬ 

Beaune of 19»7-57 Band Studies 

Band bad not waited, for BIB to give its decisions before continuing 

its work. On 1 February 19^7 it released to tbe Air force 12 new reports 

supplementing the original one, covering such subjects as building, launch?* 


ing, and orbiting of satellites. In general, the reports clarified 

Reports prepared by Band and released 1 February 19^7: 

1. BA-19021, Flight Mechanics of a Satellite Rocket. 

2. BA-19022, Aerodynamics, Gas Dynaaics, and Heat Transfer Problems 


thinking on space vehicles but did not define the utility of satellites. 

On 25 September 1947 the Chief of. Staff, USA7, directed the Air Materiel 
Command (AlC) to evaluate the reports. 

When AMC completed its evaluation of the studies in December 1947* 
progress in guided missile research by the ITavy, Air force, and others 
had reached the point where the actual design and construction of a satel¬ 
lite) vas already technically feasible, and some at AMC argued that a 
satellite project should be initiated at once. Prompt action would pro¬ 
vide the necessary components by 1952. Lt. Gen. Bernard-A. Craig, DCS/ 
Materiel at Headquarters U8AF, vas somewhat more conservative. Be rec¬ 
ognised the feasibility of satellites at the time but also that they 
were still economically too costly. This barrier, he felt sure, would 
gradually pass as technological progress brought down tbs cost of various 
components. Be therefore urged the Chief of Staff to define the Air 

Force position aa officially establishing an interest in space. This 


would guide, lower echelons that might became participants. On 15 Jan¬ 
uary 1946, Gas* Boyt S. Vandenberg, Vice Chief of Staff, signed the 


of a Satellite Socket. 

3* KA-15023, Analysis of Temperature, Pressure, end Density of the Atmos¬ 
phere Extending to E xtre m e Altitudes. 

4. HA-15024, Theoretical Characteristics of Several Liquid Propellant 


5. RA-15025, Stability end Control of a Satellite Socket. 

6. HA-15026, Structural Weight Studies of a Satellite Socket. 

7. HA-15027, Satellite Socket Powerplant. 

8. BA-15028, Communication and Observation Problems of a Satellite. 

9 . BA-15029, Study of Launching Sites for a Satellite Projectile. 

10. BA-15030, Cost Estimates for aa Experim e ntal Satellite Program. 

11. BA- 15031 , Proposed T^pe Specification for aa Experimental Satellite. 

12. BA- 15032 , Reference Papers Relating to a Satellite Study. 



following policy statement for the Air Force: 

The UBAF, eg the Service dealing primarily with air weapons— 
especially Strategic—has logical responsibility for the satellite. 

Research and Development will be pursued as rapidly as prog¬ 
ress in the guided missiles art justifies and requi r eme n ts dictate. 

To this end the problem will be continually studied with a view 
to keeping an optimum design abresst of the art, to determine the 
military worth of the vehicle—considering its utility and probable 
cost—to insure develo p me n t in critical components, if indicated, 
and to recommend initiation of the develepeent phases of the proj¬ 
ect at the proper time. 

The Vsndenberg statement followed close upon RIB's rejection of the 
levy's request for • joint astronautics panel end its refusal to recog¬ 
nise the claims of tbs Aeronautical Board as tbs permanent agency to co¬ 
ordinate space activities. The sta t ement antedated the TBO report by 
more than -bio months, however, and obviously served as the source for the 
Air Force's paper of concurrence reserving its right "to determine the. 
app ropr i ate time to initiate development of complete vehicles.”* 

During tbs next three years, Rand worked on satellite studies. The 
technique of orbiting a vehicle offered fewer theoretical difficulties 
then did determination of utility. Rot until 1950 did Rand optimistically 
forecast the feasibility of a reconnaissance satellite. The next year a 

Rand report went so far as to advocate the development of such a vehicle 


carrying a payload of television equipment. 

On the strength of Rand's 1950 forecast, set forth in a "preliminary 
report,” the Air Force gave its first space briefing to RIB, which proved 

*Tbere ia also similarity between Yandenberg's comment that the military 
worth of a vehicle must be considered in relation to its "utility and 
probable cost" end the TBO report conclusion that neither the levy nor 
the Air Force could show a military utility for a space vehicle "com¬ 
mensurate with the presently expected cost.” 

far mare sympathetic than it had been in the earlier (1947-46) diaeuasione. 
In sanctioning further USAF aetellite studies, the action of the board 
van efficiently positive to be Interpreted aa a confirmation of the Air 
Force aa SOD-eognlsant agent far apace project*. The Air Force there- 
upon broadened Band'a apace activities to include component reaearch and 


design by induetrial subcontractors. 

Another three yeara elapsed, 1991 - 54 , during which the Air Force vaa 
concerned primarily with the Korean conflict, the expand®*) of the cur¬ 
rent Military postures, and the revival of the ballistic missile program. 
At the sane tine. It preserved aa expectant interest in satellites. In 
February 1994, Band rec oas i a nd ed that the Air Force develop a scientific 
satellite as a pr e l imin a r y step to eventual utilitarian satellites, and 

in June 1999* in a supplemental report, Band again urged the Air Force 


to support a scientific satellite because: 

An artificial satellite circling the. earth for daya or weeks would 
provide information which cannot otherwise be obtained and which 
would enrich man's knowledge of the earth, the sun, and the uni¬ 
verse to really unforseeable dimensions. Bot to minimise the great 
contributions to science which the rocket program has already made. 

It may be permissible to say that It has allowed us only a glimpse 
of the unknown, showing the t r emendous possibilities which would 
lie with a continuous observation station in outer space. 

Vo one in the Air Force would or could gainsay the desirability of 
a scientific satellite. The difficulty was that Band's 1999 »tudy recom¬ 
mended a project much more expensive than hlgh-altitude research rockets 
without promising much more compensation then that already achieved at 

The 11 scientific uses of a satellite, according to Band, follow: solar 
radiation Measurements in ultraviolet end X-ray; electron density meas¬ 
urements; pressure, density, and composition measurements; cosmic ray 
measurements; albedo of the Barth; observation of meteors; measurements 
of the variation of the Barth's magnetic field; artificial seeding of the 
atmosphere; atmospheric drag measurements; goedetic measurements; and cosmic 
and solar, hi-frequency 

White Sands. It vu not easy for the Air Force to reconcile e costly 
scientific satellite vith the need to preserve national security within 
budgetary limitations. Moreover, the Air Force was reaching out toward 
space at the sane tine vith a useful reconn a i ss ance satellite as one of 
its major objectives. 

Air Force Space Projects, 19^8-57 

By the saner of 1957 the Air Force had four projects, with numerous 
subprojects, that aimed either to approach the fringe of or go into space 

with several types of aircraft, satellites, or other space vehicles. 


There was a research aircraft destined for new rocket-aerodynamic inves¬ 
tigations and a more advanced boost-glide vehicle that, rising above the 
atmos phe re, could serve as a spacecraft on reconnaissance or strategic 
bombing missions and then return to the atmosphere to complete its flight 
serodynamleally. In addition, there were plans for a reconnaissance 
satellite sufficiently versatile to fulfill several functions and a bal¬ 
listic research and test system that could include lunar landings—if 
approved. Of course, behind all the plans for wanned invasions of space 
was the belief that eventually manned spacecraft would carry human ob¬ 
servers on space missions. To mention the conquest of space without 
assuming man's presence there would have been almost as unthinkable as 
the conquest of the sea without sailors, or the conquest of continents 
without adventurers to explore the new lands. Man-in-space was sometimes 
dismissed as a "stunt," but the concept remained as the conscious or un¬ 
conscious raison d'etre of the space program, and the Air Force was al¬ 
ready speaking of a man-in-space project by 1956. Simultaneously the Air 
Force continued to support the development of more advanced rocket engines 

facta, of the space and near-space projects to which tbs Air farce was 
coonitted deserves a brief re suae to indicate tbs extent of p rogre s s nade 
between 1948 and 1957 * 

The X-15 Research Aircraft 

As early as 1942-43 there were sane in the AAF who foresaw that with¬ 
in a few years reaction propulsion in one form or another would bring air- 
power face to face with the hypothesis that no airplane could ever exceed 
the speed of sound because the velocity would pile up unpa as a b le "air 
drifts" against the wings and under surfaces of the craft. It was as 
much to test the validity of the sound-barrier theory as anything else 
that the AAF initiated the X or research aeries of aircraft.^ 

In 1944 the AAF contracted Bell Aircraft Company to build the X-l. 

It was to be a glide rocket vehicle launched front B-29's at high altitude 


and then put under its own propulsion with rocket engines of. 6,000 pounds' 
thrust, produced by Reaction Motors, Incorporated (HMI). The X-l Bade 
its first powered flight on 9 December 1946 when it achieved a speed of 
Mach 0 . 9 . Then on 14 October 1947 the X-l broke the sound barrier, with 
Capt. Charles E. Yeager as pilot. Eventually the X-l exceeded 1,000 nph, 
but by that time there was a wore advanced aircraft available. 

Learning the lessons of the X-l, Bell undertook the production of 
the X-2 and delivered it to the Air Farce in 1992. After several acci¬ 
dents and delaying misfortunes, the X-2 exceeded 2,000 nph and reached 
an altitude of 126,000 feet. Meanwhile, the Rational Advisory Oamsittee 
for Aeronautics (RACA), the Air Force, end the Ravy contracted with Bell 
for the X-15, a rocket glide research aircraft intended to pass over into 
the near provinces of space. It would be equipped with an engine 

producing 50,000 pounds of thrust, and in 1997 there were expectations 
that the plane would eventually approach speeds of 4,000 mph and achieve 
altitudes of 50 miles or more. If these capabilities could be realised, 
the X-15 would enable the Air Force to test certain aspects of the prin¬ 
ciple of boost-glide. 

Bomi—Robo—Brass Bell—gywards—Byna Soar 

The Air Force was impressed fay what it knew of Eugen Sanger's sug¬ 
gestion that the V-2 be used as second stage for a boost-glide vehicle 
that would be launched from Germany, rise above the atmosphere, and glide 
back as a very-long-range bomber against Hew York. In 1948, Rand spoke 
favorably of the idea, and some companies felt that it opened new areas 
of development. In 1952, Bell, where Dr. Dornberger was now employed, 

proposed a manned hypersonic boost-glide bomber/reconnaissance system 


that combined the Sanger concept with the more recent Rand studies. 

In 1954 the Air Force contracted Bell for a limited study of the 
boost-glide system. The conclusions were favorable, and on 12 May 1959 
the Air Force issued General Operational Requirement (GOR) 92 , which 
called for a hypersonic strategic bombardment system. The next year the 
Air Force called on Bell for a long-range boost-glide reconnaissance fees 
ibility study. Bell celled the bomber system Bomber Missile (Boal), whic 
was soon changed to Rocket Bomber (Robo). The reconnaissance study, whic 
was kept separate from Robo, received the nickname of Brass Bell. At 
' about the seme time ARDC proposed the development of a boost-glide re¬ 
search vehicle called Rywards. On 30 April 1957, Headquarters USAF di¬ 
rected ARDC to consolidate Robo, Brass Bell, and Rywards into one proj- 

e , 


During the spring sol gunner an ARDC ad hoe committee, which in¬ 
cluded representatives free XACA, Rand, and a few of the aircraft fires, 
worked on the assignment. The caasittee adopted a realistic approach of 

combining the three separate projects into a single program adjusted to 
a schedule that would permit cancellation by the Air Force with minimum 
cost should the concept pro we impractical. The overall project, termed 
Dyne Soar, was organised as follows: 

1st Flight 





Dyna Soar I Dyne Soar II 

?r Tfewnaiy 

1963 1966 


18,000 fps 18,000 fps 

390,000 ft 170,000 « 

5/000 ml 

initial Operational Capability 

Dyna Soar III 



25,000 fps 
300,000 ft 
of the globe 

The ad hoc committee completed its work on 2k August, and ARDC pre¬ 
sented the plan to the Air Staff on 17 October 1957* By that time the 
first Russian satellite bad so changed the national outlook that Bead- 

quarters UBAF directed ARDC to keep the project as described but tele- 


scope the schedule. Within weeks ARDC revamped the schedule: 

Dyna Soar I Dyna Soar II Dyna Soar III 

1st Flight 1962 1964 1965 

ioc 1967 1968 

The Advanced Reconnaissance System ( ARS) or WS-117L 

The boost-glide Brass Bell (Dyna Soar II), under the ARDC plan of 
August 1957, was assigned the theoretical range of 5/000 miles, and thus 
was not slated to be a satellite under its scheduled IOC date of 1969 . 
However out of the 1948-54 Rand studies had come reeonmendations for an 

Advanced Baconneieaeace Symem (AB 8 ) project, which the Air force 

Accepting aa valid the 1950 forecast that a reconnaissance satellite 

was feasible. General Putt, Director of Research and Development, auth¬ 
orised Band on 19 December 1950 to enlist subcontractors to study and 
design several components—a nuclear auxiliary power unit, a television 
camera, an attitude-sensing device, and other items. Band accepted this 

responsibility and called the project Nan Bole (changed to feed Bade in 

1952). In Hey 1953, Headquarters THAT approved the subcontractors' 
work and directed ARDC to take over from Band that phase of the work, 
which vas than called the Satellite Component Study.^ 

In March 195^» Band, still working on feed Book, recommended aa im¬ 
mediate high priority for a photographic reconnaissance satellite as one 


aspect of the project. Headquarters UBAf, with the a pprova l of die OSD 
Coordinating Committee on Guided Missiles, then directed ABDC in August 
195fc to proceed with development. Seven months later, 16 March 1955, 
Headquarters issued GGR 80 for a Strategic Beconnaiaaance Weapon System, 
and soon thereafter changed the name of feed Back to Pied Piper. 

for its part, ABDC want forward with the feed Beek/Pled Piper plana 
and tied the project to the Atlas missile for propulsion. At about the 
same time, ARDC announced that from October 1955 to April 1956 responsi¬ 
bility for AR 8 , or WB-U7L as it was also being called, would he shared 


See above, p 41. 

fonder the ARDC systen of numerical designation, the Satellite Component 
Study van Project RJi09-b0. In 195 k the system of numerical designation 
was changed and Project R-b09-fc0 became Project 111$. 

jointly toy Wright Air Development Center (WADC) end AFEND. After April 

1956, AFMD would be responsible for Banaging the project. 

Meanwhile ARB ran into two difficulties. First, the economy policy 

cutting research and development funds had crippled the project badly. 

The stoat valiant efforts of AFBMD, ARDC, and Headquarters USAF to win 

interest and support came to nothing. Worse, top officials within the 

offices of the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Air Force frowned 

on the project in the spring of 1955, even cutting bach on those funds 

which otherwise would have been available. Thus, two years later, in the 

answer of 1957, development officials were still trying to excite Interest 

in the project with tempting possibilities of combining ARS with Atlas 

and Titan missiles as lift devices to place payloads of 1,900 pounds in 

300-mile orbits, or 1,100-pound payloads in 600-mile orbits. At that 

date, nothing could break the opposition of 06D. The Secretary of the 

Air Force showed academic interest but warned that insistence would create 


unfavorable repercussions at high political levels. 

Hypersonic Environment Test System 

Considering that Dyna Soar and ARS could both trace back their line¬ 
age to the early years after the war, the Hypersonic Hnvirooment Test System 
(Sets) was a late comer among Air Force space interests. It had its or¬ 
igin in an ARDC proposal at 1956 that the United States should sponsor for 

scientific purposes a ballistic orbital and lunar research and test ays- 

tom. The proposal advocated three phases: first, boosting a 200-pound 
payload to an altitude of 200 miles using Aerdbee and Sergeant rockets; 


ARDC hoped to have high-level approval for the project as part of the 
contribution by the United States to the International Geophysical Year, 

scheduled tar 1 July 1957*31 Deeember 1958* 

second, boosting s 500 -pound payload to an altitude of 500 miles; and 

ihird, sending e payload into orbital flight to permit bigh- apa o d reentry 


The Air Staff received the proposal with enthusiasm and concluded 
that the project could be expanded far beyond the original concept. On 
31 July 1956, Headquarters USAF directed ARDC to revise and darvelop the 
plan into four phases that would i n clude ( 1 ) bopsting a test vehicle to 
an altitude of 300-500 miles; ( 2 ) boosting a test vehicle to an altitude 
between 1,000 and 2,000 miles; ( 3 ) combining the first two vehicles into 
m third that, using Atlas, would achieve Karth orbits and clrcualunar 
flight; and finally (4) employing a vehicle of yet higher performance to 

permit lunar landings and interplanetary missions to the vicinity of Man 

. „ 41 

and Venus. 

ARDC rewrote the plan, called it Ballistic Weapons and Development 

Supporting System (Balwards) or WS-4-54L, and submitted it to Headquarters 

USAF on 15 March 1957* The Air Staff waa gratified, hut OSAF expressed 

opposition. Richard K. Horner, Assistant Secretary (RKD) informed the 

Air Staff that the project was too radical and must be rejected "at this 

time." Headquarters USAF therefore had no choice but to Instruct ARDC 

to revise Belwards plans. Since -satellite lunar and ci s l u na r references 


were unpleasant, the third and fourth phases should be deleted. 

During the next seven months ARDC worked on the aecond revision, 
designated the Ballistic Research and last System (Brats), and submitted 
it to Headquarters USAF on 18 December. The plan was for a long-range 
development, but by the end of 1957 the temper of the administration and 
the country required something quick regardless of significance. So Brats, 

nice ARB, vm long neglected. Wban it ni rniitd 1 st* in 1958 / it van 

. 43 

redesignated Hypersonic Envlronaent Test System (BBS). 

Man-ln-Spaoe (HIS) 

In the early year* of space thinking, 19^5-57, do reeponaihle person 
believed that spacecraft would take human passengers to tbs stars. Keen 

with the siost radical ayeteM of propulsion, the journey's t&ee would he 

1 *.» * *’■'***. 

too long. Yet no one conversant with the progress of rocket propulsion 

could doubt that within a few years aen could be projected into space, 

either in satellites orbiting Earth or in spaceships traveling through 

som portions of the solar systea. The question of aan-in-spaee was, for 

the sophisticated, essentially a question of whether aan could survive in 

the space envirooaent once he got there. The success or failure of aan 

to explore and possibly to conquer space depended upon a new science— 


space medicine. 

Mo science suddenly becoass part of hunan knowledge. It evolves 
gradually as one idea eaerges froa another like biological nutations in 
successive generations. Space aedicine grew with easy transition from 
aviation aedicine. As aircraft reached farther, and farther into the 
heights above Barth, the hunan factor problems of high altitudes becnse 
the human factor problems of space. In this way, biologists, physicians, 
psychologists, and psychiatrists unwittingly began research in space med> 
lclne while handling the problems of flight in the upper atmosphere. 

The purpose of space aedicine was to leans hew the space environment 

■ v • ’ • ; 

would affect the physiological and psychological behavior of huaan beings. 
In 19b5 no one could predict the cardiov a s c u l ar and respiratory effeete 
of weightlessness; the exact danger of ambient radiation; the reaction at 


tbs human body and its perceptual and. deelalon-making functiooa to the 
high G's of, laun c hing and the vacillating G's of reentry. Hor could any¬ 
one say whether the tangible loneliness of life in a space vehicle would 
be psychologically bearable. Answers could be found only through patient 

Research in very-high-altltude environaent began in 1946 when the 
Aeroeedical Laboratory at Wright-Patterson APB and the Hatlooal Institute 
of Health decided to participate in the White Sands upper-atmosphere ex¬ 
periments. They called on Hollonan APB, H. Hex., located near White Sand*, 
for local support. Eventually, for the sake of convenience, Wright- 
Patterson established the Aeroaedical Field Laboratory at HoUcaan. By 
late 1951 overall planning for the work was a responsibility of ARDC's 
Director of Human Factors. 

The first- task of the Air Force-Institute of Health group was to find 
and aaster the techniques of sending live specimens into space and effect¬ 
ing their safe recovery. At an early date aoae of the instrumented nose 
cones that replaced the V-2 warheads bore fungus spores and fruit flies to 
detect the effects of cosmic radiation. By 1948 small animals were sent 
aloft in Aerobee capsules specially designed to control temperature and 
pressure. Many of the experiments were annulled by takeoff accidents, and 
even more were lost through faulty recovery methods. It was not until 
1951 that a monkey was successfully launched and returned, nevertheless, 

much was learned between 1946 and 1951 from electronically gathered evi- 


dance about the behavior of animals at high altitudes. 

Deep' m the great accomplishments of space medicine between 1946 end 



and 1951, the most successful projects mere frequently ridiculed by 
bevvy-beaded commentators. Tbeir criticisms mere neither a credit nor a 
help to tbe United States, but tbeir words of disapproval matched the 
national policy of economy. Space medicine lagged from 1951until late 
1957* Little was learned during those years except from the research air¬ 
craft of the Air Force and the Havy^ and from some' unobtrusive high-alti¬ 
tude balloon flights.^ 

The X-l and X-2 operations showed clearly by the early 1950's that 
it was time to think of means to sustain life in advanced models and boost- 
glide vehicles, plans which were under way. Progress was made in design¬ 
ing pressure suits, but little was done to provide a habitable cabin, a 


prerequisite for Journeys into space of more than a few hours. It was 
in connection with this necessity that the balloon flights were s»st 

Between 1952 and 1955, Holloman's Space Biology Laboratory accom¬ 
plished 78 successful ascents, numerous small animals—hamsters, mice, 
and dogs—went to altitudes of 100,000 feet or more, remained there for 
several hours, and thereby tested the lethality of cosmic radiation. 

Results convinced the scientists that the danger was less than anticipated, 
and plans began for Project High Man, the use of balloons to take human 
passengers to equal altitudes and remain there for a day or more. The 

*In 1951 the School of Aviation Medicine, Randolph APB, Tex., held the 
first major international meeting on the subject of space medicine. It 
was a symposium on "The Physics and Medicine of the Upper Atmosphere." 
Distinguished scientists came from all over the world, and tbe published 
proceedings remained the standard reference work in the field for a mm- 
ber of years. 

+The X-l, X-2, and D-588-I. 


project required larger and Bare elaborate capaulea than thoae ever used 

before. Tbe first High Mao flight occurred on 2 June 1957• Capt. Joseph 

V. Klttinger reached an altitude of 95,000 feet and floated there for 

hours, his capsule, instrumented for 25 experiments, serving aq. a space 

laboratory. The second flight, on 19 August 1957/ carried MaJ. David 

Simons to 102,000 feet, and the balloon reaialned aloft for more than 32 

hours. These experiments proved the "adjustability” of man to the space 


environment if provided vith a habitable capsule. 

By 1956 tbe progress made in space medicine, the evidence acquired 
from the balloon experiments, and the premise of AFBMD to have Atlas and 
Titan ICBM's operational within a few years began to fit together nicely. 

In February of that year, ARDC proposed that the ICBM's be modified to 
accommodate a man-inhabited capsule for orbiting, Just as the V-2 had 
been modified with nose cones for small life. Recovery was still the 
most serious difficulty. In March the Air Force approved plans for a 
Manned Ballistic Rocket Research System and stirred interest in several 
aircraft companies. In December both Avco Corporation and Martin submitted 
unsolicited proposals. Others soon followed, and hy April 1957 the Air 
Force would have contracted for a ballistic capsule study bad adequate 
funds been available. Shortly thereafter the situation changed rather 
radically, and that which had been "last" became "first" in national 
interest. Believing that the time was auspicious, ARDC proposed on\ 
November 1957 that a group directed by tbe Aeromedieal Laboratory undertake 

*Tbe Bavy had previously established Its Stratolab, but for long periods 
this project remained inactive. Also, the High Man experiments were not 
conducted by Air Force agencies alone; the Hsvy supplied the helium, and 
the Army sent two helicopters for tracking. In a limited way. High Man 
becaaie an interservice project. 

the development of * "life support capsule" as s "subsystem? son tods in 

an ICBC. The method s e ame d the quickest, slaplest, and least costly way 


of getting aan in space. 


.As space projects moved forward from speculation to feasibility 
studies, sad froa feasibility studies into research and development sta¬ 
tue, the Air Three becaae increasingly interested in aore advanced types 
of rocket engines than those current within the alssile program. In 1955, 

prophets of space spoke, for the aost part, of Viking, Aerobee, A erob ee Hi, 


Redstone, Sergeant, Jupiter, Thor, Atlas, and Titan. Ry the suaeer of 
1957, space propulsion requirements were obviously coning to exceed those 
of the alssile p rogr am . At that tine WADC could thankfully aention, in 
addition to the 12 current liquid-rocket engines of interest , or possible 
Interest to Air Three space projects, 4 other liquid-engine deve lop m en t 
and study projects already under way as well as 8 eolid-englDe projects.* 
*8ee above, pp 13-24. 

+ The following lists were presented in a SAB ad hoc oaanittee briefing on 
29 July 1957 by Earn Kotcher, Directorate of Laboratories, HADC: 

12 Available Liouid-Boekst Engines 4 Liquid Rockets in Dev A Study 


Thrust Pounds 

300,000-lb LOK-JP rocket engine 
150,000-lb IHFRA-OTMH rocket engine 


75,000-lb Hudear-rocket study 



1,000,000-lb rocket-engine study 





8 Solid Roeket-Bngine Projects 

Titan sustalner 


Thrust PouDds 




Atlas sustalner 









Q-5 booster 



Snaxk booster 




T-100D. launch 




8tate of art 






Matador booster 


2d-stage IREK 



Tbs -variety and therefore the choice of engines, either available or under 
development and that could be used for a apace program, was surprisingly 

The list, when considered in the light of Air Force contributions to 
the development of Aerobee-Hl and Havaho, is indicative of the debt that 
the Amy and Havy, and indeed the nation as well, owe to USA? pioneer ef¬ 
forts in the field. 

The First Amy-Bavy Space Project 

Almost simultaneously with the Air Force decision in. the suneer of 
195**- to proceed with Project Feed Bach, which ao soon became Pied Piper 
and by 19$$ was V8-UTL or ARS, the Amy and Havy proposed Jointly the 
development of a satellite. It was the first time the Army had come for¬ 
ward to claia a foothold in space, and it was the first attempt on the 
part of the Havy since the BOB decision of Septeaiber 1948. Undoubtedly 
the Air Force did far sore between 1948 and 1954 to promote a space pro¬ 
gram than the Amy and Havy, and by 1954 there were very respectable Air 
FOree space projects being considered. Hevertheleee, by one of the iron¬ 
ies of history, the Army-Navy proposal in 1954 was of more immediate prom¬ 
ise then anything the Air Fores could offer because it depended upon the 
use of off-the-shelf components, produced as part of the Amy's ballistic 
missile program. .a. 

wKotfcber'a list of "present" and "future" rocket engines also included both 
the Project Rover nuclear-rocket study and the 1,000,000-pound engine 
study. Both of them belonged far into the future, or so it seemed in 
1957. Project Rover was e USAF-AEC attempt to determine by 1961-62 the 
feasibility of a nuclear-rocket powerplsnt. Study on the 1,000,000-pound- 
thrust engine had only recently begun, and though its eventual Importance 
could not be questioned, especially in the dawning space- age, it was not 
imaedlately significant. 

In 195^ there was a growing Interest in "scientific satellites, ” and 
Wernher won Braun propitiously suggested tbat the Amy undertake the proj¬ 
ect. It would have been relatively sieple and Inexpensive to put together 
a vehicle from on-the-sbelf hardware of the Ordnance Department and then 
launch it with a Bedstone missile. After some consideration, Amy head¬ 
quarters decided that it would be advisable to make the project a three- 
service undertaking. The Ksvy accepted, but the Air Force was already 
too deeply interested in getting tbs reconnaissance satellite under way. 

The Army and levy together therefore worked out during 195b and the early 
part of 1995 a scheme to place a 9-pound inert slug in orbit as a scien¬ 
tific project to prove the feasibility of satellites. The B edston e mis¬ 
sile was selected as the booster with three upper stages of clustered 
Loki rockets. The project became known as Orblter, and the launching 
date was set for 1956. 52 

Thus, as early as 195*1, the Amy, Bevy, and Air Farce were all 
actively engaged in sponsoring space projects. But attempts by the aimed 
forces to explore space were disapproved by the national administration 
whose spsee-for-peace policy aimed to keep spec* free of military intrusion 


Foreign policy end technology here always been closely related. 
BoBetiaes the relstionehip has been positive ss vben g o v emnents have 
challenged technology to produce new and secret weapons in the interest 
of national prestige and security. Sometimes the relationship has been 
negative in the sense that statesmen have sought to Interdict new weapons 
or restrict the cost of armaments in the Interest of peace or eeonoey. 

To stay within the twentieth-century history of the United States, 
te ch nology of the early 1900's gave President Theodore Roosevelt the Great 
White Fleet as a "big stick" to eale the troubled areas of the Pacific 
and elsewhere. By 1914, technology had done such to bring Surope to the 
verge of war, and in Nay of that year President Woodrow Wilson tried to 
avert the caning crisis by asking for an and to tbs arms race. In 1921 
the cost of technologically aodern navies was so great that President 
Warren 0. Herding hitched American policy to a naval moratorium aa a sub¬ 
stitute for collective security. In 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
called on Aeerleen technology to supply the nation with $0,000 aircraft 
annually to curb Nasi power through intimidation or in battle. During 
hie two administrations, 194$ to 1953* President Barry S. Truman relied 
upon the te c hnology of nuclear weapons to thwart Soviet imperialism^ and 
he wee largely successful in doing so. 

By 19$$ the space age was lncootrovertlbly at hand, and President 
Bisenhower undertook a unique maneuver. For the first time in history he 
attempted to ex c lud e militant Impsrlallaa from a locale that was still 

technically inaccessible to nan. He enunciated a space-for-peace policy 
that would have excluded warcraft froa the areas in which aerodynamic 
vehicles could not operate. This policy obviously bad a profound effect 
on the course of the American space program. Whether in the long view of 
history the policy would be named vise or unwise, it constituted the intel- 
lectural aedius in which the program took shape during its early years. 

In brief, the space-for-peace policy was the frame of reference for 
many of the progr am 's critical decisions between 1955 and 1959* 

The First Concepts of Space Law 

Spaceflight is inherently international. The phrase was used in 
testimony before the Souse Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Ex¬ 
ploration in the spring of 1958, but the idea was far from novel. Long 
before Sputnik, legal scholars expressed the same thought in different 
words, but until spaceflight became theoretically possible, space was 
nationally and internationally meaningless. It was with tbs first per¬ 
ception of rocketry ae a practical means of space propulsion that space 
became a possible field of international rivalry and conflict. 1 

The international implications of spaceflight were so Obvious, indeed, 
that the V-2 rockets in 19^4 raised conjectures of possible complications 
that might arise from the future use of long-range, high-altitude missiles. 
The surmising* seemed unrealistic for the most part, however, until £.951 
when John Cobb Cooper, member of the Institute for Advanced Study, Prince¬ 
ton University, gave substance to theory la an erudite peper on "Ugh Al¬ 
titude Plight and Xational Sovereignty."^ Thereafter many creditable 
articles appeared throughout the world, and classified documents on the 
name subject began to accumulate in government files. 

The proponents of space law then turned back to the history of marltla* 
lor for precedent and analogy. They pointed out that the law of the aea 
evolved with the rise of nationalise. The age of discovery and the 
SpaniBh-Portuguese-Sngliah rivalries of aspire led first to unilateral 
claims to the sea, or to the large areas of the sea, as part of national 
domains. later the claims lapsed when the increasing number of strong 
nations prohibited enforcement. Free this situation csste the doctrine 
of the freedom of the seas, and this in turn was slightly modified by the 
seaward extension at sovereignty within the range of coastal defense, or 
as Justified by other considerations. The principle was crystalised by 
the latter part of the eighteenth century in the "three-mile limit," and 
it generally persisted thereafter deepite occasional attempts to extend 
the distance. It was not unr e asonable to hope that International agree¬ 
ments would recognise same specific distance above the earth as analogous 

to the three-mile limit, beyond which there would be freedom of space com- 


parable to freedom of the seas. 

Along with these discussions many writers recognised that sooner or 
later there would be the question of legality to space claims as there had 
been to territorial claims in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
From the time of Colunbus and his immediate successors it was customary 
for explorers to witness the colonial cl aims of their monarchs by leaving 
upon the shores of new lands figures of the crown and cross as emblems of 
sovereignty and state religion. The claims were further strengthened by 
taking back to tbe homeland small quantities of soil and a few branches 
of vegetation. A yet stronger claim came with the establishment of colo¬ 
nial settlements, and in the twentieth century tbe Permanent Court of 


International Justice decreed in the Hbrweglaa-Danish dispute over Green¬ 
land that there mist be also "the exercise ... of sovereign authority." 
Similar methods of imposing ownership on celestial bodies would probably 
follow landings on the noon and planets,* and, indicative of the spirit 
of the twentieth century, several writers assumed that the first earth 
visitors to astral realms would leave scientific Instruments as symbols 
of national claims. 

Such was the thinking among the experts in international law on the 
subject of spaceflight between 1950 and 1955. The fact that reputable 
scholars were becoming concerned with the problem was noted in the Depart¬ 
ment of State, and this doubtless convinced same authorities that the 
time bad come to give official thought to the international significance 
of space. 

First Efforts to Create aSeaceLaw, lggfrH 
Looking back with the wisdom of hindsight, it is easy to see that the 
years 1954 and 1955 were critical in the history of the world. It was 
then that apt only were decisions made cm man's first ventures into space 
but Soviet and American space policies were determined that directly af¬ 
fected the formulation of space law. 

The compelling force behind the earliest space project sponsored by 

the American government was the plan of scientists to hold the International 


-"There were suggestions that a happier alternative would be for inter¬ 
national law first to provide that, Ilka Antartlea, celestial bodies 
would be subject to no one sovereign authority. 

*When Lunik II reached the moon on 13-14 September 1959 it pleat e d on the 
lunar surface metal pennants inscribed with tbs name and coat of arms of 
the Soviet Union. However, the Russians made no colonial claims to the 
moon at that time. 

Geophysical Year (IGY). There was a long but .thin history behind the 
scientific program. The scheme was hi outgrowth, or perhaps an expansion, 
of previous International Polar Years of which the first had occurred on 
1 August 1802 to 1 September 1883, when 48 nations in the vicinity of the 
Arctic Circle studied sim u ltaneously and reported on various phenomena. 

The results were interesting and encouraging, and a second International 
Polar Year was undertaken during 1932-33, commemorating the fiftieth anni¬ 
versary of the first. A third international endeavor was slated for the 
end of the next half century, 19B2-83, but such great scientific strides 
vere taken between 1933 and 1953 that scientists were unwilling to wait 
for another JO years. In the Bidet of preparatory conferences, the con¬ 
cept was broadened to became an International Geophysical Year, and the 
tine agreed upon was 1 July 1957 to 31 December 1958. 

In October 1954 a special eassittee of the International Council of 
Scientific Onions (CSAGl) met in Borne. Here an almost crucial decision 

was aade to include among the IGY activities the launching of small satel- 


lites for scientific purposes. The determination of IGY scientists to 

explore space nay have come as a shock to some officials in Washington, 

because it meant that the issue of the international significance of 

space could no longer be ignored. The united States and the Soviet Union 

were clearly the only nations capable both financially and technologically 

to support the original experiment. Undoubtedly the Russians would gladly 


offer their cooperation to IGY authorities, and the United States could 
scarcely afford to do otherwise. 

On 15 April 1955 the Soviets announced the establishment of its 
Special Commission for Interplanetary Communications. The meaning of the 

■ova vu plain. 8inc* tbe commission mi given the responsibility of 

designing and producing "m remote control laboratory to circle the Karth 

aa a satellite, tbs.Russian statement vac tantamount to an annouoccaant 

of a aatallite program, and a boaat that the word was already far advanced. 

Conc u rrently, outatandli* Russian acientista spake confidently of tbe 

Soviet program. Military rockets would be hameaeed to place a aatellite 

in orbit. Later, other aatellitea would circle tbe moon, and tbeae in 

turn would be fallowed by radlo-aoundlng apaccahipa and eventually by 

manned vehicles. The Soviet program was adalxably bold, and lta reawrk- 
able success in tbs next few years was impressive evidence of straight 
thinking in Moscow. 

S imu ltaneously an A me ri can program, taking shape in high-level de¬ 
liberations in Washington, was being delineated with clrcwspection. Since 
a satellite circling the earth aust unavoidably pass over foreign terri¬ 
tories, it was necessary, thought tbs President and the Secretary of 8tate, 
to ingress upon the world that American apace vehicles wars peaceful. In 
February 195$ tbs President received assurance from hie top scientific 
advisers that no satellite as then conceived could be aaployed as an of¬ 
fensive weapon. If the vehicle released a bomb it would not fall upon 
the territory below, but would continue circling tbs earth in the wake of 
the satellite.^ Bara was a clear distinction between aircraft of high 
altitude and satellites. It followed that, as a aatter of defense, the 
sovereignty of a nation should extend upward through the area navigable 
by aeronautical craft, but above that height the area should be accepted . 
as free of national boundaries because it was not ananable to offensive 
weapon systems. If tbs point could be universally accepted in 1995, it 



might serve a* the basic canon in an International law prohibiting combat 
above the atmosphere regardless of future technological progress in space 

The next question confronting the President mas the kind of propul* 

sion to be used by the satellite. The Russians had stated that they would 

employ military missiles to orbit their satellites, and the President 

wanted to put that decision in contrast With American aims by rejecting 

the uas of military missiles to penetrate speee. Be Bought the advice of. 

hie highest political advisers, and in Nay 1955 they a gre e d that the Amer¬ 

lean satellite should be orbited by nonmilitary rocket engines. Heltfaer 
President Eisenhower nor his advisers feared the delay their idealism would 
impose upoo the American satellite project by requiring the development of 
a spaelal "civilian" booster. 

The President could have announced the satellite project at once but 
apparently refrained for diplomatic reasons. In May end June he wee pre¬ 
paring for a "summit meeting" in Geneva, scheduled for 18-19 July. It 
was there he presented his "open skies" proposal to the Russians. His 
move began s persistent effort on this pert of the united States to tie in 

space exploration with disarmament and the creation of an international 


law that would keep space altogether free of nilitary rivalries. - 

The Russians showed little enthusiasm for the President's proposal. 
The exchange of military blueprints was not likely to appeal to a nation 
as imperialistic as tbs Soviet Union. Equally annoying, no doubt, was 
the Implication that they modify their frequently asserted claim to abso¬ 
lute sovereignty in the airspace above their homeland. On this point they 

remained ad—nt until success with their apace p rog rae uda it advante- 


genus for them to argue differently. 

The President vms doubtless disappointed by tbe Russian rejection of 
bis Inspection proposal. It meant also that be could not use tbe A m er ic an 
satellite in immediate negotiations vitb Moscow for tbe recognition of tbe 
freedom of speee. Tbe tine bad cone, regardless of Nosoov, to announce 
publicly that tbe United States would launch a series of snail satellites 
entirely peaceful in nature, as one of tbe contributions tbe nation would 
ask* to IGY. On 29 July 195$, one week after, tbe President's return from 
tbe Geneva conference, an official statement can* fron tbe White Bouse 
that the United States was indeed undertaking a Satellite project for 
scientific purposes. And, to prove tbe good intentions of tbs United 
States, tbe satellite would be launched by e specially developed noomil- 
itaxy rocket engine.^ 

So it was tba public laarnsd of tha first government-sponsored scien¬ 
tific satellite. On 1 August 1955* Riklta Khrushchev took advantage of a 
reception at tbs Swiss legation in Moscow to express his willingness, and 

the willingness of his nation, to "support" the American space effort if 


the Interests of humanity could thereby be served. These ware fine 
words, but Russo-American cooperation In space projects was more easily 
envisioned than achieved. 

In the autumn and late winter of 1955-56 the united States conducted 
a meteorological study that entailed the lofting of balloons, from many 
locations, including some in West Germany end Turkey. When tbe balloons 
passed over Soviet territory tbe Russians protested vigorously. They 
claimed that tbe bidden purpose of tbe balloons, as well as the open-skies 


proposal, was to obtain photographs needed to aake naps of Russia. The 

United States denied Intentions of espionage, but on 7 February 1956 the 

Department at State decreed that no more balloons Should be released. 

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles said that he acted as a setter "of 

decent friendly relations." Be added, almost as a warning, that the aost 

reason a bl e interpretation of international lav made the ownership of air- 


space and outer space "a disputable question." 

The balloon incident showed that high-altitude flights were fraught 
with international complications, and there was no reason to suppose that 
the Russians would be aore kindly disposed toward satellite overflights 
of their territory, no natter how peaceful the iMtellites night be. More¬ 
over, the President's advisers were no longer as sure as they had been in 
February 1955 that space and space vehicles were without military signif¬ 
icance. The President was cognisant of these changing ideas and became 
even aore devoted to a space-for-peace formula. In his 8tete of the Union 
message on 10 January 1957, he expressed a willingness to accept an inter¬ 
national agreaasnt to control reliably "the development of missiles and 
satellites." Again, he linked together his space-for-peace with his hopes 
for dlyiraiawnt. 1 ^ 

Four days later, Henry Cabot Lodge, the American ambassador to the 

United Rations (UH), presented a more detailed version of the saae plan 

w ■ 

td the General Assembly. Tbs Russians made no direct reply. But in 
March and April, Soviet representatives argued for the prohibition of 
nuclear weapons, and they interpreted the term to Include rockets of any 
range if equipped with nuclear warheads. In this way the Soviets made 
space control dependent upon the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Such 

a prohibition, in Western opinion, was' already unenfor ce able however be¬ 
cause the Russians bad rejected Elsenhower's doctrine of the open skies 


and all other forns of effective Inspection. 

On 25 July 1957, Harold Stassen, the President 1 s Special Assistant 
for Disanuawnt and the Jaericaa representative on the Usaxaaaeat Sub- 
coanittee of the UR General Assaably, reiterated the need to establish 
control over experimentation with Objects traveling through outer-space— 
this aeant apparently both ballistic alsslles and satellites. Be warned 
that the situation was perilously close to that of 19^5-46 when, follow¬ 
ing the Hlroehiaa-Hegesalr 1, boablags, the rejection of the Baruch control 
plan had led to an international reee for atonic weapons. Stassen hoped 
the sane nictate would not he nade in the developeent at space vehicles, 
which involved an equal, and perhaps an even greater, *»«g»** for nanklnd. 
Be proposed a technical coanittee of the world's ealnent scientists to 
devise an inspection and detection systen that would guarantee the peace¬ 
ful uses of space.^ 

Space politics in the United Rations did not go beyond that point 
prior to Sputnik, but it had gone far enough to show the positions of the 
United States and the Soviet Uhloa. 


Long before 1954 it vu common knowledge that aeronautics, thet. 
science of creating and operating aircraft, was United by a celling. 
Air-breathing engines would not operate shore an altitude of approximately 
140,000 feet. It was equally well known that rocket engines had no such 
ceiling. Rockets developed a momentum that depended entirely on Newton's 
third law of notion and were independent of the atmosphere as an oxidiser 
for combustion, thereby renoving all limits to the altitudes attainable. 
Finally, there was no law of physics to restrict either the rocket's 
thrust or payload capacity. The rocket could be used to deliver warheads 
against earthbound enemies or to propel vehicles into the depths of the 
solar system and beyond. If Peenemuende and White Sands bad any meaning 
it was that astronautics—the science of designing, manufacturing, and 
launching of spacecraft—was Inevitable. If the Kavy and Air Force fea¬ 
sibility studies of 1946, and all the subsequent plan^ bad any meaning, 
it vas that the techniques of astronautics were rapidly being Mastered. 
These facts were abundantly clear when the Army and Navy proposed Project 
Orbiter in 1954. 

Nevertheless there were seme who, even if they saw the inevitability 


of space travel, could not see its importance. On 19 November 1954, Von 
Braun warned that the possessor of the first space station would be in a 
poaltion to rule Earth. The next day Secretary of Defense Wilson was 
asked in a news conference if he agreed with Von Braun. "Bo," said Wilson, 
"I would rather keep my feet on the ground, figuratively speaking as well 

as physically speaking. I don't know that anyone knows bow yon would rule 
tte world with a apace station, it is a little dreaay, I think." Two 
weeks later Wilson was reminded that the Russians might orbit a satellite 
before the Anericans. ”1 wouldn't care if they did," he replied. 1 

The President's Decision to Support a Space Project 

Even as Secretary Wilson argued that space was a paradise for dree*- 

* v ' 

ing scientists, the situation was changing. It was in March 195b that 
the President, to guard against a second Pearl Harbor, created the Tech¬ 
nological Capabilities Panel under the cbalreanahip of Dr. Janes R. 


Killian. In its report, submitted to the President on lb February 199$, 

the panel dealt with many subjects, among them the importance of space 


vehicles in the near future as instruments of intelligence. 

The Killian Committee had a thorough understanding of the technical 
difficulties and possibilities of exploring space. The report pointed 
out that large surveillance satellites would have to await the develop¬ 
ment of ICBK rocket engines, for nothing else at the time could supply 
the required booster thrust. On the other hand, email satellites weighing 
5 to 25 pounds could be orbited by Redstone engines, which would soon be 
available in quantity. The total coat would be moderate. In what was 
doubtless a reference to Orbiter, the report stated optimistically that 
a "project of this kind has been proposed by the Department of Defeqfm, 
and may al re ady be underway.” In its concluding remarks on the subject, 
the panel declared: "The new prestige that the world will accord the 
nation first to launch on artificial earth satellite would better go to 

♦See shove, pp 22-23 

the U.S. than to the USSR.” 

On 11 March 1955 the Assistant Secretary of Defense (RU>) transmitted 
the Killian Report to the service secretaries. He requested a JCB posi¬ 
tion on the report that he could forward to the Rational Security Council, 
already engaged in determining the kind of satellite program the United 
States should support. The services were gratified that the panel iue 
dorsad the concept of a reconnaissance satellite. It seemed to sanction 
the Air Force Feed Back and the Axmy-Ravy Orbiter plans and indicated 

that these projects had "a general alignment favored by the country*a 


highest scientific talent". 

It vas while the Joint Strategic Hans Committee (JSPC) studied the 
panel's report that the levy, on 23 March 1955* officially requested OSD 
approval of Project Orbiter. The administration was just then in the 
midst of formulating its apace policy, which was already being premised 
on the spece-for-peace thesis. The Secretary of Defense, acting in light 
of the current trend, promptly quashed the levy's proposal. On 28 March 
be esqpressed his disapproval of Orbiter, and bis directive to the three 
aerviee secretaries was so phrased as seemingly to include Feed Back as 

Because of important policy questions Involved, these depart¬ 
mental programs must be carefully considered and fully coordinated. 
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Development) is 
assigned responsibility for such coordination. Further funds n(ll 
not be committed for work in this area without his prior a p proval. 

Wilson's mem o r a ndum was discouraging, but it did not deter the JCS 

on 18 April 1955* in its comments on the panel report, from asserting a 

military need for a surveillance satellite. The Joint Chiefs added that 

to be useful the satellite would have to be much larger than the one being 

considered by the Government.** Presumably tbs Secretary of Defense smt 
the JC8 comments, or at least an abstract of them, to the national Secur¬ 
ity Council, still engaged in satellite deliberations. 

The JCS opinions, however, were of little influence. On 26 Nay 1955, 
HSC expressed its confidence in a space-for-peacs policy. Though acknow¬ 
ledging the necessity of a space project, the council ignored the JCS re¬ 
quirement for a surveillance vehicle. It called for the development of 
a satellite divorced from military significance and lifted into orbit by 
a noomilitary booster. Thus, HSC determined the nature of America's first 
•pace venture and cast aside the Orbiter project.^ 

The President approved the policy statement on 27 Nay. Following a 
delay of two months, while futile negotiations were under way with the 
Russians over open skies, the White House announced on 29 July 1955 that 
the United States would launch a series of small, purely scientific satel¬ 
lites in the course of IGY. The military, for the sake of efficiency, 
would have only managerial authority in contracting with industry for the 
design and production of the satellite components. 

Specifications for Vanguard 

In a sense the White House announ c eme nt was premature. Although the 
May policy statement settled the type of satellite to be developed, the 
means of propulsion and the managerial agency within the Department yof 
Defense remained unsettled. Discussions, under the direction of Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Quarles, were proceeding among the three military 
services and various important committees, but decisions were still 


la view of the responsibility assigned to hla by Wilson's directive 
of 28 March, Quarles had turned at once to the Coordinating Committee 
on General Seleoees for advice end guidance, stating that the project 
would be a triserviee effort but tied to IGY cnasiltannta. Be also spec¬ 
ified that the satellite itself would be unclassified, although the 


•eens of delivery could be classified. 

The coonlttee submitted its report on k May 199$* It expressed con¬ 
fidence in the feasibility of the satellite, urged continuation of the 
study, and suggested that each of the three services prepare satellite 
proposals within the broad outline already determined. At once Quarles 
directed each of the three services to submit plans and soon thereafter 
created the eight-man, all-civilian ad hoe Advisory Group on Special Cap¬ 
abilities—sometimes called the Stewart Committee for its chairman. Dr. 

* 8 

Homer J. Stewart—to consider and evaluate them. 

Three weeks before the White Bouse announcement of 29 July the three 
services submitted their separate' plans. The Army brought back Orbiter 
with only minor modification. The Bevy too urged Orbiter but, fearful of 
ite rejection because it called for the uee of a military missile as booster, 
suggested a backup plan based upon the use of Viking, the test vehicle 
produced several years before for upper-atmosphere research. The Viking 
was free of military connotations, and its thrust promised to lift a 
sphere 20 inches in diameter end weighing 20 pounds into an orbit with 
a perigee of 150 to 200 miles. 

*Otber members of the group were: Drs. C.C. Furnas, R.R. KcKath, C.C. 
Laurltsen, John B. Rosser, Richard W. Porter, Joseph Kaplan and G.H. 

Clement; Athelstand F. Spllbause as alternate; and Paul 8. Smith and 
Joseph C. Meyers as secretaries. 

The Air Force faced a dilemma. Although vitally interested in the 
exploration of apace, it could do only one of two things, neither of 
vhieh teemed likely of acceptance: propose the use of Atlas or the de¬ 
velopment of a oev nomilltary rocket engine, either of vhieh would almost 
certainly interfere with the general progress of the ICBM program. In 
the end the Air Force submitted plans for Project World Series and urged 
employment of Atlas aa the booster. The Air Force was thus practically 
ruled out of responsibility for the nation's first space program by cir¬ 
cumstances and the Administration's prejudice against the use of a mill- 

tary missile. 

The characteristics of the three service proposals can be briefly 


summarized in tabular form: 

2d stage 
3d stage 
4th stage 
Thrust at sea 

Beady date 






78,000 lbs 

$18 million 
Late 19$7 




27,000 lbs 

$20 million 
Mid 1997 

Air Force 



v * 


330,000 lbs 

$l6 million 
Early 1998 

On 4 August 1999 the ad hoc advisory group sent its report to Quarles. 
There was a reasonable assurance that the United States could put a small, 
scientific satellite in orbit during IGY. Admittedly, Atlas would give 
the greatest performance margin and permit the largest payload. Bowever, 
the group also thought that the Air Force plans would interfere with the 
ICEK pr ogram, and this involved "points of national policy outside the 
competence of the group." As between the Army and Havy plans, the group 
voted five to two in favor of Viking. Bern again the edvleebility of 

employing nllltary boosters influenced the decision. The use of Bedstone 
would create problem of security and, since Bedstone facilities and nan- . 
power were Halted, night prove disadvantageous both to the missile and 
satellite program. Also, free a technical viewpoint. Viking required 
only two additional stages whereas Bedstone required three. The minority 
favored Qrbitor because Bedstone was larger than Viking, had fewer develop¬ 
ment problem, was already entering flight-testing, and therefore would 


have the benefit of aany tests before the tine of satellite-launching. 

With this report in hand, Quarles sought the advice of the Research 
and Developeent Policy Council, composed of the three service assistant 
secretaries (BM>) and high-ranking development officers of the Army, Navy, 
and Air Force. Quarles was chairman. The council concurred in the rec- 
oaaendations of the advisory group, thought not unanimously. Army rep¬ 
resentatives insisted that Orblter was the better plan since it depended 
upon the proved coaqpooents of Bedstone and was more likely to succeed than 
Viking. On 15 August the Army warned the Secretary of Defense that, be¬ 
cause of time-consuming development requirements, the Viking plan might 

enable, the. Soviets to launch the first satellite, an event of incalculable 


effect on American prestige. 

OSD chose to Ignore the Army's warning and on 9 September 1955 approve 

the Viking plan, soon to be known as Vanguard. OSD also instructed the 

Army and Air Fence to cooperate with the Navy, under whom m a n a gem e n t the 

project would be developed. Actually, the Navy served as project manager 

with authority to contract with industry for the necessary coeqpaoents. 

Simultaneously, OSD warned the three services on 19 September that they 


could not develop any other satellite of their own. 

Approval of the Viking plan meant that the prise contract went to 

Martin, who had first designed and produced the research vehicle. Another 

contract went to General Electric to modify the Aerobee-Hi 1 a 20,000* 

pound-thrust Hermes engine into a 27,000-pound-thrust first stage for 

Vanguard. Aerojet was to adapt the Aerobee main engine into a Vanguard 

second stage. Either the Grand Central Rocket or the Alleghany Ballistics 


Laboratory would design the third stage. 

The Unnecessary Delay 

Rocket authorities considered the Vanguard concept to be technically 

exc e ll en t. Had it been approved two or three years sooner, it would have 

sufficed to meet the temporary national needa. Undertaken as it was late 

in 195 ?, the competitive element of the United States forging ahead of 

the Soviet Union's space program made Vanguard a riaky venture. To be 

successful, "something bad to be done within 2 years that bad never been 


done before in 2 years." Even so. Vanguard might have come through on 

schedule had it not bogged dawn in prejudice. The Department of Defense 

did not consider Vanguard a project of "first importance" and allowed 


only a "dribbling release" of requisite funds. 

There was protest, within the Department of Defense and elsewhere, 
but It did not overcome the dominating indifference. In mid-August 1955, 
Quarles replaced Harold Talbot as Secretary of the Air Force, and he 
brought to his new office the same caution that characterised his work 
as Assistant Secretary of Defense (BAD). On 22 November, Clifford C. 
Furnas, chancellor of the University of Buffalo, succeeded Quarles as 
Assistant Secretary of Defense. He was a scientist of repute and had 
served on the Stewart Committee. He was therefore highly qualified by 


training and experience to appreciate the requirements of Vanguard. There 
vas hope that he might succeed in breaking through the vail of indifference. 
He failed, and resigned in protest. He later blamed Wilson for the "fi¬ 
nancial congestion" that held back Vanguard in spite of warning that 
Russia would succeed in putting the first satellite in orbit. Furnas 

said that Wilson adopted a "so vfaat" attitude toward the program and 


sidetracked Vanguard funds when they vere most needed. 

Lover military echelons, and interested civilians too, became alarmed 

by the program's slowdown. True, the Vanguard first stage vas ready for 

firing on 8 December 1956, and in the next five months there vere six 

other firings, ail of them successful. In every case, however, the 

second and third stages vere dummies. This vas a; serious matter because 

the success of Vanguard vas dependent on all three stages. The situation 

became more grave because of the mounting evidence that the Russians 

vere preparing to launch their satellite at an early date. In June 1957, 

F.J. Hrieger of Rand predicted the first Soviet satellite would be launched 

in the late summer or early autumn, suggesting 17 September as a probable 


date because it would mark the centenary of Ziolkovsky 1 s birth. 

During these same critical days there vas such high-level h *ge~ >in e 
over the cost of Vanguard. The original Havy estimate had been $15 to 
$20 million. The total rose steadily, and in January 1957 the Bureau of 
the Budget estimated that it would be $ 83.6 million. Arrangements ha& 
been made to fund $ 70 . million, vhich left $ 13*6 million still to be pro¬ 
vided. In April 1957 the Bureau of the Budget reeatimated the cost, 


raising it to $110 million, which left $40 million to he funded. 

There were sharp arguments within the Government on the advisability 
of continuing the project. The Bureau of the Budget and the Rational 

Science Foundation were reluctant to invest more money. The Vanguard 
proponents argued that the program could obtain information of importance 
for missiles, especially on micrometeorlc matter; that the scientific 
casmunity of the world would be shocked by such a retreat; and that can¬ 
cellation would vitally affect the prestige of the United States. The 
President turned to the Rational Security Council for advice. At its 
meeting of 10 May 1957 the Council gave Vanguard a reprieve. The proj¬ 
ect could continue but without further elaboration. Indeed, if possible, 


the coat should be cut. 

last Possibilities for a P.S . " first" 

The summr of 1997 was a period of anxiety for those who understood 

the situation and dreaded the consequences of a Soviet "first” in space. 

Until 4 October they hoped that either Washington would approve an Army 

project somewhat akin to Orblter or that the Air Force's controversial 

Project Far Side would succeed. Neither hope was realized. 

Aeong the experts of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA), same 

felt that the slowdown in Vanguard night persuade 060 to reconsider the 

rejected. Orblter plan, in part at least. The 1994 proposal to develop 


a satellite project along with Redstone had the touch of reality. After 
the selection of the Viking in 1999, ABMA continued its regular experi¬ 
ments, and these included the further development of the Jupiter-C. This 


was a multistage missile based on the Bedstone but intended as a test 


vehicle for the Jupiter program. 

'■Work on the preliminary designs for Redstone started in 1990. Progress 
was rapid after approval in the spring of 1951, but the first Bedstone 
operational unit as a field weapon system was not ready until May 1998. 




The Army attempted several tlaes to obtain permission to use the 

Jupiter-0 as a means of orbiting a satellite but in Hay 1996 was expressly 


forbidden by OSD to do so. At least the Secretary of Defense did not 


forbid continuation of thnPupiter-C, and it was fired for the first tine 

on 20 September 1956 as a three-stage vehicle with the Redstone as the 

first stage. It lifted an 64-pound payload to an altitude of 660 miles 

over a range of 3,300 miles. Van Braun and his associates realised at 


once that had the 84-pound payload been replaced by a fourth stage it 

could have gone into orbit. The date of 20 September 1956 therefore 

marked the existence of an American capability to place a satellite in 


orbit, but the Government did not take advantage of Its own resources. 

The uneasiness of the Army Increased in the summer of 1997 when the 
Russians announced their development of long-range missiles, threatened 
to use them in the Sues crisis, and in August demonstrated their possession 
of an intercontinental ballistic missile. It was evident that the Soviets 
had reached the frontier of outer space and were preparing to launch a 
satellite. The tragedy of the situation, as seen by the Army and its mis¬ 
sile team at AINA, was later summarised by Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, then 
Deputy Chief of the Office of Research and Development: "We had the 

scientists and the industrial facilities to keep ahead of the Russians. 


The failure was in decision-making." 

Though outwardly the Administration showed no change of heart, &ere 
were runors of uneasiness at high levels. Reports of this concern came 
through to military field agencies and to same interested civilians. One 
periodical expressed its belief as late as July that something would be 

"This is what was later done for the first Explorer satellite. 



done to permit tbs ABM team to show Its competence: 

Suloglsed and advertised ad nsuseua as mankind's graateat adven- 
tare there la still no assurance that any of tbs VAKJUARD launchings 
attempted will be successful during tbs 18 Booths of the IGY. It's 
the nature of tbs still-young state of the rocket art. 

Seen if YAHQUARD la ready by spring it still nay not be first. 

Reports point to a Russian try within 10 weeks. And to tbs south, 
the ffcmff BiooUe teas fit Huntsville/ everybody tries to ignore 
nay beat even that date. 

Thus, until almost the last ninute there was expectation that the Adminis¬ 
tration would call on the Jupiter-C to outmaneuver the Russians. But 
days passed, and tbs word that could have given Aneriea primacy in space 
did not pass from Washington to Huntsville. 

There was yet one more opportunity for tbs United Stntee to achieve 
a spectacular though not a satellite success before the Soviets could cap¬ 
ture the imagination of the world with Sputnik. Project Far Side was the 
Air Force version of a concept that slowly evolved fraa proposals made 

in 1951 by Dr. 8 . Fred Singer, of the University of Maryland, for further 


research in the upper atmosphere. By 195 k, Singer was tailing about a 

minimus orbital unmanned satellite of earth (Mouse) project, which expended the 

upper-atetosphere research free instrumented high-altitude rockets to 

satellites. Tbs idea won the interest of Col. William 6 . Davis, Air Force 

Office of Scientific Research (AP06R), ARDC, whose enthusiasm equaled his 


great determination. 

During the next two years there were widening discussions of Mouse. 

Then, in 1956 , Davis and Morton Alperin, also of AFOSR, attended the an¬ 
nuel international aatronautieal conference in Rome. They beard the Rus¬ 
sian representative speak of the Soviet plans for a satellite, and, knowing 
that Vanguard moved slowly, came to the conclusion that Mouse, if properly 

supported. Bight serve as an American balance to tbs coming Russian suc¬ 
cess. With further thought, Davis drew up a modified version ofMouse. 

It called for the firing of six rockets in an upper-atmosphere research 

project Intended to gather at an altitude of 4,000 miles information of 
„ * 

vital interest to the Air Force." To overcame the drag of the lower 

atmosphere the rockets would be fired from balloons at an altitude of 

100,000 feet. 

For a number of reasons, Far Side became controversial. If properly 
supported, it would require perhaps as much as 7 percent of ARDC's lim¬ 
ited research funds for fiscal year 1957. There was also the question 
of Jurisdiction. Since Far Side, if approved, would be a geophysical 
experiment, it rightfully belonged to tbs Air Force Cambridge Research 
Center (AFCRC) rather than AFOSR, but Davis questioned the depth of AFCRC 
interest in the project. He therefore faced* a dilemma. He could either 
abandon the project or proceed so quietly—some would say "furtively" ~ 
ttaat opposition would fade in the ignorance of what was being done. He 

chose the second approach, and until 15 March 1957, Lt. Gen. Thomas S. 


Power, commander of ARDC, was not briefed on the subject. 

Ry that time so much had gone into the project that, as Davis had 
foreseen, lt was difficult to withdraw. Despite charges of subterfuge,^ 

*The information gathered would pertain to magnetic fields, cosmic rays, 
and the propagation of radio signals in extrsme altitudes. 

*For instance, coordination was not always open. The project was only 
listed in AFOSR in July 56 as "Status of Research Proposals," but in Sep¬ 
tember was listed as "accepted." When challenged on this point, Davis 
said coordination was normal for an "unsolicited exploration research pro¬ 
posal." (Ltra, B/Gen H.F. Gregory, COKAF06R to M/Gen V.K. Morgan, CCMAFCRC 
5 Apr 57, S Morgan to Gregory, 17 Apr 57; ltr. Col W.O. Davis to COMARPC, 

25 Oct 57, subj: Coordination of Project Far Bide. 

mismanagement, and "utter misdirection of basic research funds," ARDC 

requested tbe Air Staff to appeal to the Secretary of the Air Force and 

through hla to the Department of State, the Department of the Interior, 


and the Atonic Energy Ccunission to permit teats at Enivetok. Fends- 


aion vas granted in June 1957* 

The first shot vaa fired at the end of September. It vaa a failure. 
The balloon, carrying the rocket to be launched by radio, vent up a few 
thousand feet and then suddenly fell into the sea. The Second atteapt, 
on 4 October, vas a near success. The balloon rose to 90,000 feet and 
then began a slow descent. When it vas down to 70,000 feet the crew made 
a last-minute attempt to save the day and fired the rocket. Though it 
became entangled with the collapsing balloon, the rocket vas traced to 


an altitude of 370 miles. After that the instrument vas silent. 

* * . * * # 

The next morning, newspapers around the world bannerllned the Im¬ 
pound Russian Sputnik, the first aanasds satellite in history. 

♦Actually Tar Side survived only because of the contractor, Aeronutronic, 
Inc., which duplicated the money allocated by tbe Air Force. In June 1957 
six balloons vers delivered by Aeronutronic free which the rockets could 
be fired, and the crew moved oversees for testing. At the earns time Davis 
was relieved of his duties at AF0BR and vas succeeded by Col. Eugene LaVier. 
Despite the high qualifications of Colonel LaVier, this shift reportedly 
Injured the morale of Far Side personnel. 

^In the third teat, on 6 October, a abort in tbe. firing mechanise triggered 
the rocket, which could not be traced. In the fourth atteapt, the 'balloon 
froze at 56,000 feat and shattered. The fifth attempt was on 19 October. 
The rocket vaa fired at 96 ,500 feet but vaa damaged in passing through 
the balloon and sent back few signals. The sixth and last shot vas on 22 
October. Its signals were heard for eight minutes, which meant that the 
rocket penetrated between 2,500 and 4,000 miles into space. Brig. Gen. H.F. 
Gregory pointed out in justification of Far Side that, despite all the 
criticisms that could be made, had the operation succeeded, it would have 
offered a spectacular success to which tbe Administration, the Department 
of Defense, tbe Air Force-, and tbe American people would have been glad 
to point on the unhappy mornUMMg^|a|aber 1957 * 


Sputnik narked a nagnlfleant and hiatorle advance in science. As 
such, it deserved the congratulations that the President of the United 
States gave the Soviet government on 9 October 1997. Bo American would 
have felt other than kind envy had the first satellite been orbited by a 
friendly power. But coming as it did from Communist Russia, dedicated to 
the "burial" of free nan, the triumph created dismay everywhere outside 
the iron curtain. As a congressional committee phrased it: "We face the 
terrifying prospect that nuclear attack upon the United States can be 
directed from Soviet bases." In addition, there was the new challenge 
to America's preeminence in the world of technology, the loss of inter¬ 
national prestige, and the fact that Buasia had staked out for herself 
primacy in space. 1 

In contrast with an early tendency toward "hysteria"—for so the 
first American reaction baa been described—the shock and surprise of 
Sputnik had some beneficent effects. The American "smug senae of superi¬ 
ority was shattered,” and out of the national humiliation came a more calm 
realisation that, among other things, there had to be a reexamination of 
foreign and domestic policies on questions of space projects, defense 
organisation, strategy, and the desirability of a civilinn-sclentlf^p 
space program that would far exceed the little ambitions of Vanguard. 
Again quoting a congressional ecmmittee, there was widespread admission 
that America's misfortune was attributable only to indifference in the 


past on the part both of the people and the Government: 

Soviet Russia's ability to develop atomic end hydrogen weapons 
so soon after the United States did, should have been earning enough 
to galvanise our national efforts. Our Intelligence of Soviet mis¬ 
sile experiments should have hoisted higher the red flag of danger. 

But until the American people read about, and could see for themselves 
if they cared to look, a luminous metal ball revolving in the heavens, 
Russian progress in science and production was serious discounted. 

Hov the American people must respond to the fact that we have 
a great and powe r ful rival in the most complicated technical end in¬ 
dustrial fields. They must respond, not In panic, not in diffuse 
and wasteful motion, but in a calm and purposeful dedication to the 
task of building up the nation's strength. Our country must be strong 
and unexcelled in the weapons of war; it must use that strength in 
the difficult, hut unremitting, search for peace. 

Once the chagrin of Sputnik had somewhat subsided, the press demanded 
and the Gove rn m en t attempted a Judicious appraisal of the situation. In 
the area of foreign affairs, the President decided upon, and Congress ap¬ 
proved, a reassertion of the pre-Sputnik space-for-peece policy, hut qual¬ 
ified to accommodate a very restricted ailltary program and a very ambitious 
civilian-scientific program. So the United States came to sponsor a three¬ 
fold space policy—international, military, and scientific. The three-fold 
policy itself underwent considerable change between October 1957 and the 
end of 1959 # hut always space-for-peece earns first, and to that end the 
military progr am remained subordinate to the civilian. 

At First, Emotional Reactions 

Throughout the American press and seemingly throughout the foreign 


press as well, the first reaction to Sputnik was expressed in sharp crit¬ 
ic Isa of the Administration. Editorials in the United States especially 

condemned "the partial measures, hit or miss planning and confused organ- 


ization that have marked our . . . work in this field." 

Opinion on Capitol Hill vu caustic in general, and the unfavorable 
comments were not Halted to representatives of one party. Senator 
Syoington warned that the position of the Tree World would toon become 
Intolerable unless strong remedies were introduced by the Administration 
without delay. Senator Henry M. Jackson regarded Sputnik as a "devasta¬ 
ting blow to the prestige of the United States." Senator Styles Bridges 
said it was time for Americans "to be lees concerned with ... the 
height of the tail fin on the new ear and to he more prepared to ehed 
blood, sweat, and tears if this country and the free world are to survive." 

At the level of the White House and the Cabinet there was a tendency, 
*aid Bewsweek, for officials "to hide behind the pretense of being undis¬ 
turbed." Presidential Assistant Sherman Adams spoke of the accomplishment 
as "outerspoee basketball"; James Hagerty, presidential press secretary, 
said Sputnik was unimportant because it had not caught tbs President una¬ 
wares; aooo-to-be-retired Secretary of Defense Wilson said the Russians 
bad performed a "neat scientific trick." On 9 October 1957 a White House 
press release announced cryptically that the United States would not en¬ 
gage in a apace race—and that the Vanguard schedule would not be acceler¬ 
ated; The statement was fat with unconcern. Yet again, on 3 Hovember, 
the 1,120-pound Sputnik II, complete with dog, was casually dismissed by 
Hagerty as being "no surprise to the President." 


The press generally interpreted the Sputnik bellttlanent policy as 
a sign of nervousness, and the interpretation was not altogether without 
supporting evidence. Between 8 and 15 October the President and his ad¬ 
visers held numerous conferences "looking toward a re-evaluation of the 
missile program" —a comment that, perpetuated the confusion in many alnde 

of missiles with satellites, lo late October there was a mistaken report 
that the third shot of Par Side had penetrated 4,000 elles into space. 
Without waiting for -verification, the Department of Defense embarrassingly 
hailed the "achievement" as proof of a vigorous p rogram in research and 
development. The press could also note that after Sputnik H the President 
called further conferences on the subject of the missile program.. 

Despite the President's assertion that the Vanguard schedule would 
not be accelerated, there were signs of acceleration. The Vanguard sched¬ 
ule had called for several teat vehicle shots before attempting to fire 
a genuine satellite vehicle. The first test vehicle shot wee scheduled 
for early December 1957* and by Hoveaber the Administration fastened upon 
this event and inflated it to portend the. actual launching of a satellite— 
an undertaking for which URL lacked the opportunity for adequate technical 
preparation. Of course, on 6 December the shot failed to orbit and the 
United States was again humiliated unnecessarily. 

By the end of the year the nation was beginning to accept the unpleas- 

% . 

ant fact that the space pr ogra m had lagged too long to catch up with the 
Russians in the near future. The President was more reassuring than he 
had ever been before when, on 9 January 1958, in the course of his State 
of the Union message, he said quite simply that "most of us did not an¬ 
ticipate the intensity of the psychological Impact upon the world o^ the 
launching of the first satellite.” 

Meanwhile, between the appearance of Sputnik I on 4 October 1957 sod 
the President'e message to Congress on 9 January 1956, much thought had 
been given to tbs space policy that the United States would pursue in the 

The flight* of Sputnik around the earth brought into sharp focus the 
earlier academic question of sovereignty in space and its violation by 
space vehicles. There was still no line of demarcation of areas to be 
closed or open to international traffic, whether military or civilian- 

With perfect aplomb, the Russians protested after 4 October 1957 that 
no one could aeeuee them of violating the rights of other nations by the 
satellite moving overhead. Sputnik had not passed over any foreign terri¬ 
tory; it was simply that foreign nations passed under the orbit of Sputnik. 
Along with this casuistry, the Russians unofficially proposed in periodi¬ 
cals that an international agreement should limit sovereignty to an altitude 
of 12 miles, or at most l 8 .^ The Americans were less precise In their com¬ 
ments. Tor instance. Von Braun said there were no exact division lines in 
nature. The question of sovereignty would have to be settled by arbitrary 
decisions, and he suggested, for no particular reason, that an altitude of 
100 miles could be accepted as the division between national sovereignty in 
altitude and the free space from which military vehicles might be prohibited. 

f ■ 

Be added that 300 miles or 1,000 miles would be equally acceptable. Rear 
Adm. Hyman G. Rlekover, Assistant Chief of Bureau of Ships for Ifuclear Pro- 


pulsion, USB, was more military in hie approach. Be said: 

The dividing line between military and civilian usee fat spatXf 
could arbitrarily be set at the . . . maxima permissible altitude 
for a missile of 12,500 miles .... The distance of 12,500 miles 
is the m a ximu m distance a missile would be required to travel. The 
earth being 25,000 miles in clrciafexence, 12,500 miles is the maxi¬ 
mum distance between any two points on earth.* 

‘The statement was reasonable in 1957*58* hut by i 960 it appeared that anti¬ 
missile defenses might make it necessary for the attacking missile to he sent 
toward its target the long way round, a distance that could far exceed 12,500 

He added that delineation would reserve for each nation an area "analogous 
to the 3-mil* limit for international waters." Such a boundary for national 
rights would not only insure ample altitude for IBM's and ICM's but 
would be high enough to permit the employment of some military satellites 
as well. 

. Both Von Braun and Riekover deserved and received the highest respect, 
but neither of them spoke for the U. 8 . Government. The President, of 
course, was the arbiter of policy, and in reaching his decisions, he was 
guided by his immediate advisers, especially by Secretary of State Dulles 
and by leaders of Congress. 

During all the months of pre-Sputnik effort to define and support 
a epsoe-for-peuce policy, the Government had not coamitted Itself on de¬ 
tails of space law or limits of sovereignty. The President, between 1955 
sod 1957 , did nothing more officially than seek an international agree¬ 
ment, through the United Rations, to limit the exploration of space to 
peaceful purposes and to tie this in if possible with a move toward dis¬ 
armament. Consequently, in October 1957 the President was free to continue 
negotiations for a space law without being hamstrung by previous coamit- 
ments.. However, since the United States did not lamedietely protest the 
flight of Sputnik above American territory, this silence could be inter¬ 
preted as a tacit admission that all space was free for scientific explo- 

9 ML ■ 

ration since the Russians claimed that function for Sputnik. . 

The position of the President and the Secretary of State during the 
last few weeks of 1957 and far into 1958 seems to have been that for the 
immediate future the United States should do no more than continue the 
effort to negotiate agreements to keep space for peaceful purposes and to 
countenance a space program at hone demonstrating the nation's peaceful 

intention*. At the same tine, since circumstances demanded some fore of 

military pr og r am , the President could Justify it as necessary pending the 

realisation of international control. In doing so, he could appeal to 

the charter of the United Nations, to which the Russians had subscribed, 

for legal Justification. Article 51 of the charter recognised the right 

of a nation to defend itself against attack from any direction, a provision 


as applicable to space as it was to land, sea, aind air. 

The President received support in maintaining such a position from 
Congress even at the time when both bouses were attempting to insure an 
adequate space program for the Department of Defence. Throughout the 
first six or seven months of 1956, many senators and representatives ex¬ 
pressed individually their approval of the Chief Executive's space-for- 
peace policy. In June the Senate and House passed a concurrent resolution 
"that the United. States should strive through the United Hations" to reach 
an International agreement "to banish the use of outerspaee for military 
purposes, provide for Joint explorations of outerspaee, end establish 
methods to settle disputes which may arise." The resolution had the sup¬ 
port of both the Department of State and the Department of Defense and 

seemed to express a complete a g reement between the executive and legisla- 


tive branches of the Government. 

After the exchange of American and Russian views in the General Assem¬ 
bly in January and April 1957 and Harold Stas sen's statement before tSe 


Disarmament Subcommittee of the General Assembly in July, the United 
Nations took no further action on space for several months. Then, shaken 
from their lethargy by Sputnik on 4 October, 20 nations Joined with the 

*See above, pp 66 - 67 . 

United Staten on 11 October In bringing before the General As neatly a 
draft diaamanent resolution that nailed for the peaceful uses of space. 
Without attempting definitions, the resolution Implied that "outerspace" 
meant the region above and beyond the farthest altitude at vfaich the 
atmosphere could hinder the orbiting of satellites. Also, the silence 
of the sponsoring nations on the subject of their sovereignty, like the 
silence of the united States, could be Interpreted as a concession that 
space beyond the ateosptaere was free. 

In another one of the long intervals of patient waiting engendered 
by the vast machinery of the United nations, the Russian and American 
positions were made clear in a direct correspondence between President 
Eisenhower and Hicolai A. Bulganin, nominal Prime. Minister of the 8oviet 
Union. On 11 December 1957, Bulganin proposed a suamlt meeting on dis¬ 
armament. On 13 January 1953 the President replied, urging again that 
disarmament begin by limiting the use of space to peaceful purposes. 
Elsenhower warned that both the United States and the Soviet Union were 
"using outerspace" for testing missiles designed for military purposes. 

Be thereby admitted that HUM'S and ICBM's followed trajectories that 
made them space weapons. This renewed tie-in of space vehicles with mis¬ 
siles opened the way for Bulganin to reply on 3 February that ah agreement 
to use space only for peaceful purposes could be reached without difficulty 

if the Western powers would baa fission and fusion weapons altogether and 

12 . 

liquidate foreign bases. So the argument was back where it had been 12 
manthe before. 

On 25 March 1958 the new Soviet ambassador to the United Rations, 
Valerian A. Zorin, supported by the solid bloc of Conmunist state represen¬ 
tatives, requested the General Assembly to i n cl u de on its agenda an item 

to prohibit the use of "cosmic space" for military purpoeee and. to cell 
for the withdrawal of all troopa fraa bases bald, in foreign countriaa. 

The United States countered on 2 September by requesting international 
cooperation in space to parallel progress in dlsaraaaeat. This sparring 
was simply a repetition of old arguments. The Soviets wanted to use space 
as a means of eliminating American military bases in Europe; the Americans 
wanted to bold the bases pending an effective international control of 
space exploration . 13 

On 17 September the General Assembly compromised by placing the 

Russian and American proposals under the single heading of "Questions of 

the Peaceful Use of Space" and submitting them to its First Coanlttee 

(Political and Security) for consideration. Debate began 12 Xovamber 


1958 and moved back and forth along the well-trodden aigasenta. 

Meanwhile the administration in Washington had determined upon new 
tactics. On 18 September, Secretary Dulles addressed the General Assembly 
and urged the p r om p t creation of an Id hoc committee to speed a gr eem ent 
on the creation of a permanent agency;. Ambassador Lodge repeated the re¬ 
quest in tbs First Committee on 13 November, and 19 other nations supported 
the proposal. At the same time, possibly to appease the Russian delegates. 
Ambassador Lodge rephra ae d the American policy on apace and disamsment by 
urging that the study of space should proceed regardless at any other ques¬ 
tions. He hoped that agreement on the peaceful use of space night reduce 


international tensions and the need for armament. 

*Tbe 19 nations were Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Guatemala, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Bepal, Motherlands, Mew Zealand, 
Sweden, Turkey, the Union of South Africa, the united w-tn g anm , and Venezuela. 



The Russians showed no sign of cooperation, and the President decided 
to demonstrate the solidarity of Aeerlean opinion in backing the Adminis¬ 
tration. Be turned to the joint congressional resolution of the previous 
June and requested Iyndon B. Johnson, majority leader of the Senate, to 

support the Administration's space-for-peace policy by addressing the' 


General Assembly and affirming the nation's unity on the subject. Speak¬ 
ing in Hew York on 17 Hoveaber, Johnson said that the Congress of the United 
States had requested the President to appeal to the Uhited Rations for in¬ 
ternational cooperation in space. Be assured the General Asseably that 
there were no differences "within our. Government, between our parties, or 
anong our people" on the need to keep space for peaceful exploration. Be 
urged that there be no differences anong the Si UR members. Be concluded: 1 ^ 

Today, outerspace is free. It is unscarred by conflict. Ho 
nation bolds concession there. It must ranain this way. We of the 
United States do not acknowledge that there are landlords of outer- 
space who can presume to bargain with the nations of the earth on 
the price of access to this new domain. We aust not—and need not— 
corrupt this great opportunity by bringing to it the very antagonisms 
which we nay, by courage overcame end leave behind forever through 
a joint adventure into this new realm. 

The address was effective, and the Russians indicated a willingness 
to cooperate with the Americans in preparing a joint resolution without 
reference to the military bases. Direct conversations between Lodge and 
Zorin raised hopes of settlement* On 2k Hoveaber, however. Lodge announced 
that though there was agreement on the need for an ed hoc committee^ there 
was disagreement on membership. The Soviets stood for an U-member com¬ 
mittee to include Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, and the U.8.S.R. The 
Americans argued for representation in accordance with interest in space; 
the Russians argued for a proportional representation by bloc. The First 
Comlttee sanctioned an 18-member plan, and the General Assembly approved 

the decision on 13 December. The Cseohs, Poles, and Russians, joined by 

the representatives of ladle and the united drab Republic, per* 

tldpete because the Rumani sne were excluded, and the lfl member coeedttee 

thus becane a 13 member committee in actuality.* It began work In the 

spacing of 1959 «»d sufcnitted a report on 2 6 June that solemnised the usual. 

platitudes and urged the creation of an autonaeous organisation to deal 


vlth space problems. 

The lbth General Assembly convened in September 1959 and began con- 
slderatiob of the report. Christian Herter, Secretary of State since 22 
April, addressed the Assembly much as Dulles bad done a year before and 
asked the Russians to cooperate: Kuznetsov, again the ranking Soviet 
representative, responded favorably and proposed creation of the Committee 
on the Peaceful Usee of Outerepece as a permanent agency. On 12 Decanter 
the Assembly established this committee vlth representatives from 2b 

19 * 

states .* 77 

♦Argentina, Australia, Belglus, Brasil, Canada, Prance, Iran, Italy, 

Japan, Mexico, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 

^The committee also emphasised the coordination of radio frequencies for 
tracking, ooomuoicatlons, and research purposes as the "first technical 
area in which immediate international action was required, suggesting the 
International Telecommunlcatioo Union (ITU), a m agency, as a means of 
ha ndlin g the problem. The ITU, vlth representation from 00 nations, met 
at Geneva in August-December 1959, but little vae done. The United States 
also focused attention on the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and 
urged that it study the use of meteorological satellites. As a consequence, 
WMO established a special panel in 1959 , with the United States as a 
member, (Souse Bearings before the Cfcite on Science A Astronautics, 86 th 
Cong, 2d Sees, Re view of the Sgsge Program, pp 28-32.) 

^Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgian, Brasil, Bulgaria, Can¬ 
ada. Czechoslovakia, Prance, Hungary, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, 
Mexico, Poland, Rumania, Sweden, the Soviet Union, the United Arab Re¬ 
public, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 



Ho one could say bow long tbs Russians would cooperate with the com¬ 
mittee they bad been instrumental in setting up. 

A Space Program at tom 
Moved as they were by tbs horrors of a possible space war, the Pres¬ 
ident and bis foreign policy advisers clung tenaciously to the space-for- 
peace policy. The Chief Executive did not coaproaise this position until 
after Sputnik when he regretfully conceded the need far a Military space 
pyograa—but one of small dimensions. Be still hoped to focus world at¬ 
tention on Aserlca's Interest in peace by emphasising the civilian-scientific 
program for the exploration of space. Sputnik compelled a compromised 
apace policy at home, but the extent of the compromise was made clear 
only in the chronology of events. 

The statement of 9 October 1997 that the United States would not 
engage in a space race was not reassuring to the military. Then an o t her 
month peeaed before there was any indication froa the White Bouse what 

the national policy would be. Sputnik II on 3 Hovember occasioned another 

• ‘ 

outcry of protest froa the press, and four days later. President Eisenhower 
addressed the nation by television. Me intent was admittedly to reassure 
the uneasy public on tbs advanced status of American weapons, particularly 
missiles, and he announced tbs appointment of Dr. James B. Killian, pres¬ 
ident of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to he Special Assist¬ 
ant to the President for Science and Technology. Killian would be aided 


by the Science Advisory Committee. 

The appointment of Killian ,at this time appeared to recognize the 
inevitability of a military space program. The President confirmed this 
idea on 5 February 1958 in a preee conference when be said the Department 


of Defense would "continue" to control military space projects even after 

. 21 

the establishment of a civilian space agency. At the sane tine, the 
President's Science Advisory Committee ms working on the first compre¬ 
hensive statement of U.S. interests in space. Simul t ane o usly, the 
Department of Defense assumed that a military program ms certain 
' and planned accordingly. 

On 2 6 March 195fl tbe adviaory committee released a policy paper. It 
listed three rea s on a why space should be explored: to acquire scientific 
knowledge, further national prestige* and guarantee American military 
strength. This was the first top-level indication of what policy would 
prevail. On 2 April the President committed himself officially. Be. asked 
Congress for a civilian agency, the Rational Aeronautics and Space Admin¬ 
istration (RASA^ to conduct all space activities except those primarily 

associated with military requirements. Ths Presidential message was con- 


fixmatlon of a two-fold space program—one civilian and one military. 

Congress debated the nature of RASA for several soothe and did not 
peas the Rational Aeronautics and Space Act of 195® until midsummer. Ths 
President approved it, PI> 85 - 568 , 00 29 July, and the dual space program 
became statutory. 

Meiunrhlle, the Secretary of Defense initiated a move to make the mil¬ 
itary more sure of their space responsibilities. In March 195®, be sug¬ 
gested that HSC's Planning Board consider the advisability of RSC issuing 
a national security policy on space. At once the board set up the Ad Roc 
Subcommittee on Space, which requested and received comments and assistance 
from the Rational Science Foundation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
three services, and other agencies throughout the Government. The product 


was the Preliminery U.S. policy on Spec#, wn conveniently known an BBC 


5&L4/1, wbich the President a p proved on 18 August 1958 . 

The document set forth more explicitly than hitherto the purpose sad 
principles of the civilian and .military progress,. JBC recognised .that 
space had m i l i tary significance, hut was nore. concerned with the political 
lepLleatlons. It..was politically dangerous £qrJE}ussle to rawin' perman- . 
ently superior to the United States in astronautics, and the penetration 
of space pads it nore necessary than ewer to work* toward international- . 
control and.cooperation.. in.conclusion; the council.advocated a six-point 
policy: continue the ICY experiments; recognise thet, interest of the United 
Rations in space; propose s series of bilateral srrsngeasnts with other 
nations, i nclu d in g Russia, to regulate current activities in specs; invite 
all nations to participate on a reciprocal basis in U. 8 . scientific proj¬ 
ects; propose other project# for Multilateral participation; and assist 
other nations of the Free World in their specs projects. 

It is important to note the council's insistence upon international 
cooperation in space, with the emphasis on. reciprocal development of space 
science by the United States and other nations. All American contributions 
to these activities would cobs within the responsibility of KASA, and, in 
a very limited but very real sense Indeed, RASA was certain to be an ad¬ 
junct of the.Department of State. 

By the late euamer of 1958 , there were three documents that, taken 
together, expressed the Administration's space policy—the report of the 
President'a Science Advisory Conmlttee on 26 Kerch, the Rational Aeronau¬ 
tics sod Space Act of 29 July, and BBC's Preliminary U.S. Policy on Space 
of 18 August, lech affirmed that there must be a military space program. 

but the overall tone was that the military program should be kept as asall 
as possible. 

A fourth important document appeared in March 1959~*thefirst Opera* 
tions Flan of BSC’s Operations Coordinating Board. (OCB). The pepef was 
intended to guide and Implement .the national program. It recommended 
a four-point action to include analysis, incident by incident, of inter* 
national legal issues as they developed; negotiation of international 
agreements for a complete record of satellite orbits and frequencies; 
formulation of agreements with other nations as required for the peac eful 
use of apace; and preparation of world opinion psychologically and polit¬ 
ically for tbs possible launching of American reconnaissance satellites. 

In its general approach, the OCB Operations Plan indicated a alight change 
of thinking, at least within tbs confines of BBC, that meant modification 
of the space-for-peace policy along lines a little more favorable to the 

By the time the OCB plan was finished, there bed been aany Important 
changes in the situation sines August 1958 whan tbs President bed approved 
the preliminary policy statement. Both the military and scientific space 
programs bad gained significant new data on the space environme nt , the 
organisation of the civilian and military space programs had been completed, 
and the international situation demanded core than aver that the United 
States regain its lost prestige. Under the clrcumstaneee, the SBC feljfc 
that the policy statement required a "complete review" and, with the 
President's approval, entrusted the work to an ad hoc committee of the 
Bational Aeronautics and Space Council (lASC), which the Specs Aet of 

„ a6 

1998 had brought into existence. 

The ad hoe committee began its work in July, using as reference the 

earlier-noted executive and legislative measures and then, In August 
1959* ISC's Rational Security Poliey or BBC 5906/1. This policy statement 
affirmed the necessity from a national security viewpoint of a space pro¬ 
gram that could support the scientific, military, and political alms of 

the United States. 

In Sovamber 1959* IASC tranmnltted the report of its ad hoc ccamlttee 
to BBC. The report urged a national space policy that would: 

Carry out energetically a program for the exploration and use 
of outerepece by the United States, based upon a sound scientific and 
technological progress, designed: (a) to achieve that enhancement 
of scientific knowledge, military strength, economic capabilities, 
and political position which may be derived through the advantageous 
application of space technology and through approprlmta international 
cooperation In related matters, and (b) to obtain the advantages 
which came from successful achievements In space. 

In addition, the report declared that civil, scientific, and military 
space projects had important implications for national security, and it 
regretted that the Soviet's spectacular "firsts"—which by then included 
the orbiting of a Sputnik with canine passenger, an interplanetary probe, 
and a lunar impact—had raised Russian international prestige even above 
the level attained In October 1957* Though the full military significance 
of space could not then be defined, it was apparent that space vehicles 
would have to be employed to enforce whatever international agr e em en ts 
might eventually be reached to prevent a space war, and until then re¬ 
connaissance satellites could be a Safeguard against another Pearl Harbor 


The recommendations served HASC and BSC in their task of revising 
the policy on space. The paper, BBC 5918/1,.was completed 12 January 
i 960 and signed by the President on 26 January. It represented no great 
change from all that had came before. It admitted the importance of space 

but kept the emphasis on the civilian program. Tbs Administration re- 
—<"■* consistent in downgrading tbs military space effort froa March 
1955 , vlth the initiation of Vanguard, through the first reactions to 
Sputnik, and acroas the mouths of 1958 and 1959* The moat Important 
change had come in March 1998 when the President's Science Advisory 
fn—ittnn admitted need for a military program, but after that the em¬ 
phasis tarried on the sane low plateau. 

There was, however, a marked difference between expressions of na¬ 
tional policy and the actual implementation of that policy. Once a mil¬ 
itary spaee program became pexmissable, it gained a momentum from its 
own projects that did not completely respond to the brakes of policy. 

As a result, the status of the military program mas far more advanced 
in the summer and autumn of 1959 than the words of the Rational Security 
Council papers could Indicate. 

The success of the military projects was all the more remarkable 
because the progr am , as a whole, became entangled In the web of organis¬ 
ing inside and outside the Department of Defense. 


The month between Sputnik I and Sputnik II, k October to 3 Sbvember 
1957 * wee filled with criticism of the ibwrlean missile-space programs. 

The two were almost Identical In the public mind, and In truth, space 
projects were and would be for acme time almost conpletely dependent 
upon missile organisations and components. It was a critical hour in the 
nation's history, and the demand for action was not to be Ignored. Time 
and again the question was raised as to why the missile-space programs 
had failed to meet the crisis and bow the programs could be wltallsed to 
carry forward the burden of catching up with Russia. 

There was a tendency among some to attribute the failure to inter- 

service rivalry or "service bickerings." The President on more than ooe 

occasion publicly declared that interservloe rivalry aust atop, and bit 

coament was so placed in context as to imply that this was the evil of 

tbs day.* Some periodicals took up the cry to designate a "Pentagon boas" 

c apabl e of e n d in g "service bickerings" and put the nation ahead of tbs 


8 ovlet Unioo in technology. 

A contrary viewpoint held that the failure to win first plmoe in 
space was not due to. "service bickerings" but to national policy. There 
was no vigorous Anerlean space progra e in 1957 because of a preference 

♦In bis television addxeas to the nation on 7 Rovaeber 1957 tbs President 
said, " Inter-serviee competition shall not be allowed to ^hiexmZ . . . our 
scientific and development program." Again, in his State of the Union . 
message to Congress on 9 January 1958 he said: "I am not attempting today 
to pass judeasat on tbs charge of harmful service rivalries. But one thing 
is sure. Whatever they are, America wants than stopped." 

for economy, aa insistence that space projects must offer returns com¬ 
mensurate with cost, and a determination to keep the military out of space 
for the eake of foreign relations. The decisions were made ower a period 
of 12 years, 1945 to 1957, by the Research and Develo p me n t Board, the 
Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the White Bouse, 
national policy said "no” both to Bevy and Air Force apace mebltions in 
1946-48, rejected Project arbiter in 1955, dulled the Vanguard effort for 
two critical years, and refused pemlssioo far-AEKA to launch a satellite. 

There was also widespread objection to the appointment of any wore 
bosses. In 1957 asay voices cried out In Congress, In the ea rned forces, 
and among interested dtisens to simplify rather than elaborate the mis¬ 
sile organisational setup to which the specs pro g ra m was certain to be 

tied for sons time. The need was not for more "csars" with overlapping • 


domains and authorities, but for right decisions. Missile organisation 
charts showed "bureau on top of bureau, committee on top of committee, 
office 00 top of office . . . jjEoJ the average unsophisticated, or even 

sophisticated person, it looked like the most complicated Jigsaw pussle 
that ever was Invented. ” The question then, in 1957, was whether the or¬ 
ganisation was to be more simple or more complex, whether the csars were 


to be overthrown or perpetuated. 

Serious efforts were mads to escape from the labyrinth. On 17 October, 
General Putt, DCS/Development at Headquarters U 8 AF, acting on orders Tram 
higher authority, directed Lt. Gen. Samuel X. Anderson, the comma n d er of 
ARDC, to assemble aa ad hoe committee to consider ways by which the Air 
Force could assist in countering world reactions to Sputnik I. The com¬ 
mittee was composed of members of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board 
( 8 AB) and the aircraft industry, plus a snail group of ARDC personnel as 



technical advisers. Tbs canittee net 21-22 October under the chalraan- 

■hip of Sr. Edward Teller. The two-day discussion produced en impressive 

report that exhibited no shyness of the truth. In. tbe technological war 

between the United States and the Soviet Union, tbe farmer bad slipped 

behind because of complacency and swollen bureaucracy. *To date, our 

administrative and eanSgament practices have not pereltted either the 

responsible civilian or Armed Service agencies to establish a stable yet 

imaginative RU> program." Tbs caaalttee's two racaaaendations were 

strongly phrased: 

1. Consolidate tbe organisation and simplify the management 
for the development and operation of balllatlc micella and apace 
flight prograaa froa tbe Office of the Secretary of Defense on down, 
including tbe efforts of all services. 

2. Put the ballistic alsslle and space flight progress on a 
maximum effort basis in all its aspects, without reservation as to 
time, dollars, or people used. Most important of all, provide a re¬ 
alistic assurance that the entire program baa tbe priority of govern- 
aental and national interest required by tbe threat. 

Tba Teller Report, which bore the signatures of sane very distinguished 
■dentists and leading authorities* on nlssllea and satellites, was cir¬ 
culated on 28 October among high levels of the Deportment of Defense. By 
coincidence, Trevor Gardner's article, "But He Are Still Lagging," appeared 
in Life one week later, on k Bomber. Gardner, too, argued for a simpli¬ 
fied organisational arrangement to meet nlaeile-epace prograa requirements 
and for ample funds to support research and development. Since Gardner's 

*LLat of members of the Teller Coonittee: Edward Teller, E.J. Barlow, 

J. Bearer, K.J* Bossert, G.H. Clement, E.B. Doll, W.R. Dornberger, K. 
Ehrlcke, C. Taulders, C.L. Forrest, D.T. Griggs, M.D. Hunter, J. Isenberger, 
T.G. Lanphi e r, F. O'Green, V.F. Parker, L.D. Ridenour, R.J. Sandstrom, 

M. Sherman, W.M. Slth, E. Spraits, E.A. Stelnhoff, G.8. Triable, G.E. 

Valley, T.F. Valkowics, R.H. Hldaer, R.G. Wilson. Also attending were 

representatives of KADC, AFCRC, AFBND, and AF06R. 


forebodings bad already been tragically Justified, be ms not a person 

vbose advice should have been Ignored. On 7 November, within three days 

of Gardner's article, tbe Secruity Resources Panel of ODK, under the chair- 


aanshlp of H. Rowan Gaither, submitted its report. Deterrence and Survival 
in -am Buclear Age, which went to BBC and therefore came within the Prea~ 
Ident's advisory circles. Along with the Rockefeller report. International 
Security—the Military Aspect, which appeared In January 1956, the Gaither 
report was part of a rising tide of criticism of the Government's overly 
complex and Inadequately budgeted programs. 

In the midst of this criticism and debate tbe President announced on 
7 November his selection of Dr. Killian as his scientific adviser. Insofar 
as his appointment indicated some fora of a military space program, the 
services were pleased. Insofar as the appointment night Indicate making 
tbe missile-space program more and more complex, tbe military were uneasy. 
At the same time the Secretary of Defense, acting on the assumption that 
there would be a military space program, showed dearly that he too was 
thinking of adding to the number of military missile-space agencies. By 
the end of 1957 it was evident that the age of the esare had not paaeed. 

Advanced Research Projects Agency 

On 7 August 1957, President Elsenhower announced the resignation of 
Wilson and the nomination of Weil H. McElroy as Secretary of Defense. To¬ 
ward the end of September, McElroy came to the Pentagon to familiarise him¬ 
self with the Job be would occupy on 9 October. Thereafter he visited acme 
of the major military installations, and on 4-5 October he was guest of the 

•Gaither was former president of the Ford Foundation. His committee be¬ 
gan its study in April 1957 , but before it was completed he became ill 
and was succeeded by two co-chairmen—Robert C. Sprague and William C. 

Army Ballistic Missile Agency in Huntsville, Ala. Along vlth MaJ. Gen. 

John B. Nadaria, cr—finding general of ABIA, and Yon Braun, McUroy vas 
— ong tbs first to learn of Sputnik I. Ho one could have bad a aore dra- 
aatio Induction to high office. (See testimony, p 104.) 

Almost lamedlately McElroy found Mnself in tbe aidst of a reorgan- 
isation that could not always be clearly understood. Obedient to Presi¬ 
dential direction, tbe Secretary of Defense abolished his Office of Special 
Assistant for Guided Missiles and created in its place the Office of 
Director of Guided Missiles to "direct all activities in the Department 
of Defense relating to research, developeent, engineering, production, 
and procu r eae n t of guided missiles.." William Holaday, who had been tbe 
Special Assistant for Guided Missiles, headed the new office, apparently 
clothed, at the President's behest, with the authority of tbe Secretary- 
of Defense in the field of guided aisslles. Presuaably bis duty was to 
override .service rivalries. At once, however, the Secretary of Defense 
said that Holaday could not direct tbe work of tbe services in tbe field 
of guided missiles, and there were seas questions on Capitol Hill on how 
Holaday could be a director if he could not direct. Holaday hlaaelf was 
vague about bis authority and did not know what his relationship was to 
Dr. Killian, the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology. 
Mcllroy stated that he too vas uncertain what authority Dr. Killian 

Though tbe post-Sputnlk domains of authority were thus far from 
Sharply drawn, McElroy proceeded to plan for yet another osar within DOD 
whose duly would be to unify the space projects scattered among tbe three 
services. He first spoke of this newly conceived "special projects" agency 

Testimony of Hell H. MdRlrqy, 

• ™ Vgc£B5«? 

Senator Syaington: I know that you caeM Into the Dapartaent fat 
Defense, Mr. McElroy, just about the tine that the Ruealana 
l au n c bed SputnlkJ .... Vera you auzprlaed when they launched 
the sputnik! 

Secretary McELroy: I vaa very such surprised. In fact, 1 wea 
dean at Huntsville, Ala., having Juat spent the day awatnlng 
Juplters, and I an uni Italy to forget the tine that X heard about 
the flret Sputnik. It certainly launched ae Into a Job hare on 
certain vlnga. So that would be clear to ae aa long aa I live. 

Senator Syaington: Do you raeaeber tint soae people did not 
eeea to be particularly suxprlaedf 

Secretary MttBlroy: I do, and I auppoaa If I bad been privy to 
the Intelligence knowledge that had been around, in the co—unity, 
I would not have been so surprised, either. But I was very auch 

Senator Syaington: Veil, I was surprised soae people were not 
surprised; because when defense authorities ease before our Slab* 
coueittee on Appropriations last Angust, and naked for aoney, 
they said~I want to be sure I state it correctly--that this 
aoney was asked for so we would "launch the first artificial 

(Senate Hearings before the Preparedness Investigating Subcate, 
85 th Cong, let it 2d Sees, Inquiry into Satellite end Missile 1 
Program, p 250 .) 


vben be a ppeared before a congressional or—Ittee on 20 B o— ibe r 1957• 

Be said then that be would pass tbe agency at a lewel above that of the 
three services so that it could control interservloa rivalry. The director 
would tbao be responsible for all Military research aod davelopwnt efforts 
"in tbe satellite and space research field 1 * and for antiball 1 Stic missiles.*’ 
' Hben McKLroy sought tbe opinion of tbe Joint Chiefs of Staff, be 
found opposition. The service chiefs did not want tbe agency to have 
devdopaent and contractual authority, because they felt such an arrange- 
cent would h —p er the transition of sgrsta— frou developnent to operational 
status. Tbe need vaa for an office with authority to wake policy deci¬ 
sions. The services were quite capable of —naging their research and 
developeent if they could but be authorised to pro ceed with the work. 

Tbe Joint Chiefs submitted these views to the Secretary on 25 Bov—her 

■ 7 

McXlroy overruled the JCS objections and continued his plans for 
the Advanced Research Projects Agency (AKPA), as it had then ec— to be 

called. The Secretary received full support free the President, who asked 

Congress to give ARPA a budget but one that would be largely spent through 


the technical end procurenent agencies of the Amy, Bevy, end Air force. 

McXlroy wanted to act as quickly as possible. Tbe Rational Security 

Act a—ndnents of 1949 bed vested tbe Secretary of Defense with authority 

to transfer, reassign, abolish, or consolidate nonconbatant functions 

after notifying Congress. On the advice of his General Counsel, McXlroy 

assvaned he thereby had the authority to establish AREA, hut the Senate 

and Bouse did not agree to this interpretation. Without any desire to 


hinder the Secretary, they questioned his right to set up AREA. In 

delineate the authority areae of his office and of the offices of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Besearch and engineering) and the DOD 
Director of Guided Missiles, under Paul D. Foote and Bola&ay, respectively. 
Johnson, Foote, and Holed ay recognised that the relationship of their 
agencies had to be one of close Interdependence to permit a constant ex¬ 
change of lnfoznatloo in their respective fields. Howev er, the relation¬ 
ship bet w een ARPA and the Director of Guided Missiles was nade closer by 
the fact that aany of the vehicles and caepooents employed by guided mis¬ 
siles and space vehicles were identical. On the other head, both agencies 

would be dependent for further pxbgress on the products in the broader 
fields of research under the authority of the Assistant Secretary (HUB).' U 

Johnson organised ARPA in three divisions—Financial Management, Pol¬ 
icy and Programs, and Technical Operations. Be obtained a large part of 
his staff by a contractual arrangement with the Institute for Defense 
Analysis (IDA), which provided a unit of AO persons headed fay Dr. Herbert 
F. York. She latter was already well known for bis thermonuclear work at 
Livermore Laboratory, and in ARPA ha served a« Johnson's chief selentiet. 
By May 19§6, ARPA was an operating organisation, and its chief weakness 
was the . lack of experience on the part of IDA p ersonnel with military 
methods of procedure. 

Director of Defense Research and Engineering 
At the same time that plane were being nade for ARPA, the President 
’ end the Secretary of Defense were preparing to reorganise the Department 

♦IDA was created in 1955 in contract between G6D and Massachusetts Insti¬ 
tute of Technology to supply qualified personnel for the Weapons Systems 
Evaluation Group. MIX initiated the work and invited five other univer¬ 
sities to participate. Ford Foundation granted $500,000 for working 

of Defense ia a way certain to influence the space program. In his State 
of the Union message of 9 January 1958, Els e nhower, referring to inter- 
service rivalry, said sane weapons did not fit Into any existing service 
pattern and gave rise to "jurisdictional dispute." He felt that the sit¬ 
uation demanded important changes in the organisation of the Department 

of Defense and stated he would later send specific reco—cndatioaa to 


Three aonths afterwards, on 3 April, the President suhaitted his re¬ 
quest. He said that "separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever” 
and that peacetime activity of the military forces should be coupletely 
unified. He wanted the authority of the Secretary of Defense to be "dear 
and direct" in respect to the dsvelopuant at new weapons. Therefore, one 
of his Important points was the elimination of the Office of Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering). and in its place the estab- 

llsheent of a Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DORNS), with 


three major functions: 

first, to be the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense an 
scientific and technical natters; second, to supervise all research 
and engineering activities in the Department of Defense, including 
those of the Advanced Beaeareh Projects Agency and of the Office of 
the Director of Guided Missiles; and third, to direct research and 
engineering. activities that require centralised management. 

The President apparently intended the Director of Defense Beaeareh and 

Engineering to outrank the ARPA director as well as the Director of Guided 


After due deliberation Congress enacted Public Law 85 - 599 , Depart¬ 
ment of Defense Reorganisation Act of 1958. Among its provisions was the 
establishment of a Director of Defease Research and Engineering to be 
appointed by the President and taking precedence within the Department of 

Defense after the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and the three 
service aecreteriea. Be would be the principal adviser to SOD oo scien¬ 
tific and technical natters; supervise all research and engineering activ¬ 
ities in DOD; and direct, control, assign, or reassign the research and 
engineering activities deseed by the Secretary of Defense to require cen¬ 
tralised ne ne g — en t. The President a pprove d the act on 6 August 1958 and 


on 24 Decenber appointed Dr. York as the first director of the nev agency. 

Activation of Directorate of Advanced Technology 
Prior to Sputnik I Air Toroe space activities bad been handled, in 
the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff/Developeent, with Brig. Gen. 

Boner A. Bousbay, Deputy Director of Research and Developnent, responsible 
for the overall coordination of those projects that pertained to apace. 

On 22 loveeber 1957, two days after MdELrcy pu b licly spoke of hie 
pla n e for ARPA in congressional hearings. Col. V.Y. Addnei, Assistant 
Director of the Office of Legislative Liaison, urged the Air force "to 
Junp the gun on the problen of astronautics by appointing either a Director 
or Assistant Chief of Staff for Astronautics." In view of the growing 
opposition within Headquarters USAf to the creation of additional assist¬ 
ant chiefs of staff, there was little probability of placing an agency 
at that level. Conceivably, it could have been located In the Office of 
the Assistant Chief of Staff for Guided Missiles, where there was already 
sane capability for the work.. She Chief of Staff decided, however, to 
place the agency under the DC 8 /DevelopMat, and on 10 Deeaeber, General 

Putt announced the establishaent of the Directorate of Astronautics, to 


be headed by General Boushey. 

OSD reacted unfavorably. Hoi ad ay publicly stated that the Mr force 
"wanted to grab the limelight and establish a position." tbs Secretary 
of Defense expressed his opposition to the use of tbs tern "astronautics," 
which seae e d to hia an Air force bid for papular support. Strong pres¬ 
sure on Headquarters USAf from above, verbal rather than written,, aade It 
advisable on 13 December for Putt to cancel his directive of 10 December. 1 ^ 

Ha ad quarters OSAF, keenly aware of the need to centralise its apace 

activities in soae one agency, regarded the cancellation of 13 Deeaabar 

as aerely a postponement. The prospects of getting OSD approval, h ow e v e r, 

was admittedly slight for the next few months, and an interim measure 

was needed. Since space vehicles were dependent on ballistic missiles. 

H e ad q ua r ters adopted the temporary solution on k Kerch 1<£8 of authorising 

the Assistant Chief of Staff for Guided Missiles to coordinate USAf space 


At about the seme time the DCS/Developaent suggested the advisability 
of requesting OSD approval of an Afr force space agenay. The Office of 
the Chief of Staff was not averse but foresaw a long delay. Tbers were 
weeks of negot iat ion between the Air force, OSD, and AHPA. An Air force 
space directorate, it was argued by the Air Staff, was ne e ded to serve as 
liaison with AHPA, and it would be equally n ee ded as a msans of contact 
with the civilian .space agency then being provided by Congress. Flans 
were carefully drawn, and on 22 July, after Congress had passed the 
■pace act. Secretary Douglas formally requested pera lea i oo to activate 
the directorate. Two days later Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles 
gave his approval. Sven then, the term "astronautics" was considered 
impolitic for the military. On 29 July, General White issued General 
Order hh, stating that "the verbal order of the Chief of Steff 

establishing tbs Directorate of Advanced Technology, Deputy Chief of Staff, 

Development, effective 15 July 1959, Is confirmed* 

There ess no directorate charter at the time, but the DCB/DeveXopment 


suaaarlsed the purpose of the agency In a 29 July memorandum: 

To supervise at the Air Staff level the formulation of the Air force 
Advanced Technological Program} provide technical information and 
advice to the Air Staff on the process of developments; maintain 
coordination with AREA, the Departments of the Amy and Savy and 
other interested government agencies; and maintain liaison with 
civilian educational institutions, industry, and representativee 
of foreign governments engaged in research and development activ¬ 

The amee a emo randu a named General Bonafaey an director aqd provided him 
vith a email staff. Boushey promptly organised hie directorate under 
four aeeistente—for Boost Glide Systees, Space Projects and Systems 
Studies, Manned Military Specs Systems, and Unmanned Military Space Sys- 

Doubtleas Headquarters USAP hoped to make the D ir e c torate of Advanced 
Technology the oontrol point for all Air Pares space projects* However, 
since the space projects were dependent upon missiles, ths space pragma 
necessarily involved ARM), whose mala point of contact with Headquarters 
vas through the Assistant Chief of Staff for Guided Missiles. Under the 
circumstances it was imprudent to sever ell ties between the guided mis¬ 
sile office and the space pro g r am , and a reassignment of authority between 
the Assistant Chief of Staff for Guided Missiles sad the Directorate of 
Advanced Technology vas inevitable. On 6 April 1959 the Chief of Staff 
rescinded the directive of 4 March 1958 and delegated responsibility for 
coordinating and monitoring all Air force space activities within the Air 
Staff to the Directorate of Advanced Technology. However, the Assistant 
Chief of Staff for Guided Missiles continued to retain responsibility for 

coordinating tbs requirements for ballistic missile resources needed in 
support of the space projects, including boosters and test facilities. 
On 13 April a Headquarters office instruction defined the relationship 
between the Directorate of Advanced Technology and other offices of the 
Air Staff, ABPA, and IASA. 20 


Both houses of Congress were deeply disturbed by Sputnik I and Sputnik 
II. The Russians appeared veil on the way toward an ICBM-atanic -var cap^— 
ability that would permit direct attack on American cities and industry. 
Equally disconcerting, from the viewpoint of the cold war strategy, was 
the detrimental impact the Russian successea undeniably had on the pres¬ 
tige of the United States. Moreover, the United States was far behind the 
Soviets in planning and conducting space activities—an important factor 
in such areas as international law, foreign relations, and hitherto uni¬ 
magined weaponry of offense and defense, as well aa a compelling appeal 
to imagination through projects of such universal usefulness as meteorology 
and navigation. In the yet vaster areas of pure science, space operations 
seemed destined to be of incalculable importance to the whole human race 
and its social structure. 

Senators and representatives did not content themselves with expres¬ 
sions of astonishment, dismay, or incurable optimism. The situation was 
serious, and Congress prepared for serious action. On 27 November 1957 
the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on 
Armed Services opened an investigation of the American missile and space 
programs. On 6 February 1958 the Senate established a Special Committee 
on Space and Astronautics. The Bouse followed suit, establishing on 5 
March its own Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration. 
Meanwhile, both the Senate and House came to the assistance of the Depart¬ 
ment of Defense by cooperating with Secretary McElroy in establishing 

ARPA. This DOD agency assured the nation that there would be a military- 
space program. Ho one could say at the time how much the program would 
be curtailed by the civilian-scientific program still being debated in 
White House and congressional circles.^ 

By March 1958 , Congress was conversant with several alternative pro¬ 
posals for the organization of space agencies by the executive branch, as 
well as several ways in which the legislative branch could keep itself 
informed. The congressional committees felt that the President had a 
wide choice. He could entrust the entire space program to one of the 
following: the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, a 
new commission modeled on ABC, a department of science, or a coordinated 
effort by the National Academy of Science and the National Science Founda¬ 
tion. In exercising its own watchdog prerogatives, Congress could choose 
between creating a new Joint committee on space, adding space responsibil¬ 
ities to the Joint Conmlttee on Atomic Energy, or placing .the existent 


Senate.and House space committees on a permanent basis. 

Congress had not gone beyond this point when the President's Science 


Advisory Committee Issued its statement of 26 March 1958 . The paper 
showed that the military space program was certain to be continued. It 
showed also that an extensive civilian-scientific program would be undertaken 
and that Congress would be called upon to establish by law a civilian space 
agency, or a complex of space agencies. The situation then moved rapidly 
toward its climax. 

Hearings 00 the President's Proposed Space Agency 
On 2 April 1958 the President forwarded to Congress his reconmendation 
"that aeronautical and space science activities sponsored by the United 
*See above, p 94 . 

States be conducted under the direction of a civilian agency, except for 
those projects primarily associated with military require men ts." Be urged 
Congress to create a Rational Aeronautics and Space Agency into vhlch the 
Rational Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (XACA) would be absorbed as a 
nucleus. In this way RASA would continue the aeronautical research func¬ 
tions of NACA and expend into the space area. The new agency would be 
headed by a director appointed by the President with the consent of the 
Senate. President Eisenhower reguested the creation also of a national 

aeronautics and space board to advise him, with representation from inter- 


ested government agencies including the military. He added: 

It is contemplated that the Department of Defense will continue 
to be responsible for space activities peculiar to or primarily 
associated with military weapons systems or military operations. 
Responsibility for other pro g r a ms is to be assumed by the new agency. 

The President clearly called for a space program that was split 
between civilian-scientific interests and the military. It was then up 
to Congress to approve the.President's policy in such a way as to Insure 
the security of the nation in space. 'This point, indeed, became the crux 
of the long and interesting hearings conducted by the Senate and House 
space committees. Congress could not forget that space exploration was 
possible in 1958 because of missile developments. Also, In 1958 the mil¬ 
itary controlled most of the personnel trained for research in space pro¬ 
pulsion and vehicles as well as the materials needed for the future pro¬ 
gram. For Congress, the most obvious and Imaediate problem was to deter¬ 
mine as exactly as possible the relationship between the civilian and 

military programs. 

During April and May & procession of distinguished witnesses moved 
before the congressional space committees. At first the consensus wee 

that HACA, with a few changes in its charter, would become XASA. The 
scientists sanctioned such an arrangement. Fran their point of view a 
civilian-scientific program was essential because Use nonmilitary aspects 
of space exploration were too important to be entrusted to a purely mili¬ 
tary program* Only a civilian-scientific program eould insure a techni¬ 
cally sound approach. Yet the scientists were also of one accord that 
military interests should be safeguarded, and they spoke specifically of 
reconnaissance and communication satellites. These witnesses were confi¬ 
dent that military applications would follow automatically from a scientific 


The military and their representatives were in general agreement with 

the civilian scientists, but they interjected a few cautious reservations. 

Spokesmen for the Department of Defense approved the establishment of XASA 

and spoke of it as being an extension of HACA into space. However, all 

of them spoke out against excluding the Department of Defense from basic 

research for service missions. This precaution would entail avoidance of 

a rigid definition of weapon programs. Conceding that the nonmilitary 

aspects of the national space program should be under civilian direction, 

the point was made time and again that nothing should be done to prevent 

the. Department of Defense from anticipating "reasonable requirements" and 

proceeding vith the work immediately. The military theme was simply that 


there -should be two programs and they should be closely coordinated. 

The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 
Congress enacted on 16 July the national Aeronautics and Space Act 
of 1958* In an introductory declaration of policy and purpose. Congress 
affirmed that the space activities of the United States were devoted to 

peaceful ends and that responsibility for conducting this work was vested 
in a civilian agency. The authority of the agency was then qualified by 
important exceptions. Activities primarily associated with weapon system 
developments, military operations, or the defense of the United States— 
including the necessary research and development—"shall be the responsi¬ 
bility of, and shall be directed by, the Department of Defense." The act 

authorized the President to determine which agency, civilian or military, 


should have responsibility for specific projects. 

The Space Act provided for three new agencies. Two of then were 

wholly civilian—the National Aeronautics and Space Council (HASC) and 

the Rational Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The third agency, 

the Civilian-Military Liaison Committee (C-MLC), was, as its name implied, 

hybrid. The respective purpose of these agencies was to assist and advise 

the President in space matters, to direct the civilian-scientific apace 

program, and to tie together the civilian and military program in "a two- 


way street of information and decision making." 

The council consisted of the President, Secretary of State, Secretary 
of Defense, Administrator of NASA, Chairman of AEC, and four additional 
members appointed by the President—one from within and three from outside 
the Government. NASC would assist the President to survey aeronautical 
and space activities and "provide for effective cooperation between the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of De¬ 

NASA , 4 headed by a presidentlally appointed administrator, received 
authority to plan, direct, and conduct aeronautical and space activities; 
arrange for participation in space activities by the scientific community; 

and provide for the widest practicable dissemination of acquired informa¬ 
tion. RASA was thus unmistakably an operational agency and would require 
operating facilities as soon as activated. The need was met by absorbing 
KACA, its personnel, and facilities. The act directed all other govern¬ 
ment departments and agencies to cooperate as required by NASA "in making 
their services, equipment, personnel, and facilities available." The act 
also stated that KASA, under the guidance of the President, could engage 

in a program of international cooperation, a provision that gave a foreign 

• 10 

policy tie-in with the Department of State. 

The Civilian-Military Liaison Committee would consist of a chairman 
appointed by the President and a membership of unspecified number but 
equally divided between representatives from KASA and DOD. The military 
representatives in turn would be equally divided between OSD and each of 
the three services. "The Administration ^SiASA7 and the Department of De¬ 
fense, through the Liaison Committee, shall advise and consult with each 
other on all matters within their respective jurisdictions relating to 
aeronautical and space activities and shall keep each other fully and cur¬ 
rently informed with respect to such activities." In case of unresolved 

disagreement between the Administrator of KASA and the Secretary of Defense, 


either of them could refer the matter to the President for decision. 

The train of witnesses from the Department of Defense bad ably im¬ 
pressed on Congress the necessity of conducting research and development 
for its own space projects. Congress in turn went to seme length to in- 


sure DOD*s freedom in this field, as explained in the Conference Report: 

The Congress recognizes that the development of aeronautics and space 
capabilities is important both to peaceful purposes and to the de¬ 
fense of the United States and for the preservation of peace every¬ 
where. It is the intent of Congress that the necessary freedom to 


carry on research, development, and exploration be afforded both a 
civilian agency and the Defense Establishment to Insure the full 
development of these peaceful and defense uses without unnecessary 
delay, to exclude the possibility that one agency would be able to 
preempt a field of activity so as to preclude the other agency from 
moving along related lines of development necessary to the full ac¬ 
complishment of its duties assigned under this act. At the same 
time, such freedom to pursue activities should be so conducted ah 
to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort and expenditure. This 
can be accomplished by providing for full cooperation between the 
civilian agency and the Department of Defense. It is clearly rec¬ 
ognised that, activities which are peculiar to or primarily associa¬ 
ted with weapons systems or military operations or to the defense 
of the United States (including the research and development neces¬ 
sary to make effective provision for the defense of the United States) 
shall be under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense. How¬ 
ever, because there is a gray area between civilian and military 
interests,' and unavoidable overlapping, it is necessary that machinery 
be provided at the highest level of Government to make determinations 
of responsibility and Jurisdiction. 

This act makes such provision by providing that the President, 
assisted by an Advisory Council, shall make the actual determinations 
in the assignment of new programs and projects. The act also pro¬ 
vides that the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration and the Secretary of Defense can seek solutions to 
questions of jurisdiction either directly or through a Civilian-Mil¬ 
itary Liaison Committee to hold to a minimum the questions referred 
to the President and the Council. 

Organising Space Agencies under PL 85-368 
The President approved the Space Act on 29 July 1958. Under its 
terms it would become effective on a convenient date within the succeeding 
90 days, nils allowed the President and his advisers 13 weeks, until 26 
October, in which to appoint the members of the space council and the top 
NASA officials. Since C-MLC was a liaison committee between the Depart¬ 
ment of Defense and NASA, the appointment of its chairman could await the 
actual activation of NASA. 

On 6 August 1958 the President selected Dr. T. Keith Glenaao, presi¬ 
dent of Case Institute of Technology, Cleveland, Ohio, and Dr. Hugh L. 
Dryden, Director of MCA, as the administrator and deputy administrator 


of NASA. On k September the President choae Villiam A.M. Burden as the 
fifth government member of the space council. At the sane time the Pres¬ 
ident appointed Dre* Janes E* Doolittle, Alan T. Waterman, and Detler W. 

Bronk as the nongovernment members. On 31 October the President reassigned 
William Holaday from Director of Guided Missiles to chairmanship of C-MLC. 

The Space Act did not specify how NASA was to be organised other than 
to provide for an administrator and a deputy administrator. Glenman there¬ 
fore had a free hand in setting up the agency, and he acted with dispatch. 

He organised NASA into three divisions—Space and Plight Development, 
Aeronautical and Space Research, and Business Administration. On 1 Oc¬ 
tober 195*9, Glennan announced that NASA vas prepared to discharge its 


Of the three agencies established by the Space Act, the Civilian- 
Military Liaison Committee was the least wen defined,, and it become the 
moat difficult to organise. Since Congress did not fix the membership, it 
vaa up to Glennan and McKlroy to make the arrangement. After several con¬ 
ferences there was an agreement that the committee would be composed of 
four representatives from NASA, one from OSD (AKPA), and one each from 

the Army, Navy, and Air Force. These eight, along with the chairman, gave 

14 > 

the committee nine members. 

On 12 September, McElroy asked the three services to recommend their 
C-MLC representatives and alternates. The Air Force bad already given 
much thought to this, being deeply concerned by the fact tbat NASA would 
absorb XACA along with much of the space program originally conceived by 
the Air Force and still considered essential to its mission. Thus some 
Air Staff officials felt that an Air Force general officer should be chairman 

of C-MLC since the Air Force had a predominant role in both aeronautics 

and space. The suggestion was not received enthusiastically, and on 31 

October, with Holaday's selection as chairman, the Department of Defense 


announced its committee representatives. 

A much more difficult question concerned the scope of C-MLC'a func- 

tions. The Space Act had been vague on this point, and it vas generally 

agreed that a charter or similar paper vas necessary. The Joint Chiefs 

Vere uneasy least the military be unable to convey their viewpoint to 

the civilian agency, and therein they doubtless reflected the anxiety Cf • 


the three services as veil. Negotiations begun in September, resulted 
in a first draft circulated among the services during the first veefc in 
October. Tbs Army, NSvy, and Air Force all vanted a more convincing guar¬ 
antee of future cooperation between NASA and DOD. In addition, the Air 


Force still argued for a USAF general officer as chairman. 

A series of high-level conferences ensued Involving the service sec¬ 
retaries and the Director of ARPA. Out of these conferences came a com¬ 
promise draft that reconciled the HASA-DOD viewpoints. The charter stated 
that C-MLC would provide a channel for the exchange of information and ad¬ 
vice between NASA and DOD, encourage further NASA-DOD contact at appropri¬ 
ate levels, recommend courses of action in the event of differences between 
NASA and DOD, and perform other duties as assigned by NASA or DOD. The 

committee would meet once each month and report its conclusions to NASA 

and DOD. 

*Tbe military representatives were Roy V. Johnson, OSD; MaJ. Oen. 
Dick, Army; Vice Adm. R.B. Pirie, Navy; and MaJ. Oen. R.P. Swofford, Air 
Force. The NASA representatives, announced on 17 November 1958, were 
Hugh L. Dryden, Abe Silverstein, Homer J. Stewart, and Ira H. Abbott. 


The Armed Force* Policy Council (AFPC) approved these terms of ref¬ 
erence on 22 October, end this action, in. the opinion of the Director of 


ARPA, vas equivalent to ratification by DOD* 

The AFPC approval of the C-MLC charter, and even the appointment of 
Holaday as chairman, did not completely clarify the position of the com¬ 
mittee in the overall structure of space organisations. It vas Impossible 
to predict how the responsibilities of the committee would develop, and 
during the formative period the Air Force needed a particularly sensitive 
channel of contact -to permit prompt action. Lt. Oen. Roscoe C. Wilson, 
DCS/Developaent since March 1998, appointed a member of bis staff to mon¬ 
itor C-MLC activities for the USAF member of the committee. He, in turn, 
was supported by a designated officer from each of three directorates of 
DCS/Development: Advanced Technology, Requirements, and Research and 
Development. 20 

Though much thought went into the organization of C-MLC and into the 

selection of its members, between November 1958 and July 1959 the agency 

functioned only as an atrophy. So unimportant were its contributions to 


the space program that its history can be largely ignored. 

Organization for Space at End of 1958 
In October 1957 the cry had been for a simplification of the miasile- 
space complex within the Department of Defense. A year later the missile 

*The first C-MLC charter was a compromise and did not allow the committee 
the scope of activity undoubtedly intended by the Space. Act. From the 
beginning lt was largely ignored both by DOD and NASA, with most of the im¬ 
portant issues' being settled directly by the Secretary of Defense and the 
Administrator, NASA. As a consequence the minutes of C-MLC' s first eight 
meetings, beginning 25 November 1958 and continuing through 18 June 1959* 
exhibit a poverty' of activity, and even after the beginning of fiscal year 
1980 , when a new charter-went into effect, there was little improvement. 

* f M 

complex had not been simplified, the military space complex had been elab¬ 
orated, and in addition there vas the newly created civilian complex. 

Since the military were obligated to provide NASA with much of its logis¬ 
tic support, it was not always a simple matter to drew sharp lines between 
the clvlllan and military space-missile organisations; it was even lees 
simple to draw sharp lines between the civilian and military space pro¬ 
grams. The areas of overlap were very large and gray. The confusion in¬ 
evitably resulting from the overlays of agencies and projects became 
greater as the international situation kept alive the question of whether 
space was primarily a civilian responsibility to be useifor peaceful pur¬ 
poses or primarily a military responsibility to provide national defense. 
Under the circumstances there were endless opportunities for disagreements 
and rivalries that at any time might delay projects of vital interest to 
the United States. In the latter part of 1958 the situation was far from 
ideal, and it did not appreciably improve during the first six months of 




Wbeo McElroy activated ARPA on 7 February 1956, be intended it to be 
either & "special task force" within tbe Department of Defense or possibly 
a "fourth service" to direct and control the research and development 
phase of the military space program. For at least a year it seemed that 
ARPA might Indeed continue indefinitely to function as a fourth service, 
and during the first eight months of the period, February through Septem¬ 
ber, it had a yet greater role, for it served as the civilian space agency 


as well. The President himself confirmed this temporary overall authority. 

The Sources of ARPA’s Program 

In the hectic days after Sputnik, civilian authorities had not only 
to determine high policy—questions of space-for-peace, of a single or 
dual space program, of space agency organization—but also the kind of 
projects to receive immediate emphasis. There were sane who felt that 
neither Vanguard nor the Army-sponsored Jupiter-C proposal had any inher¬ 
ent value except as a "spectacular first," and Sputnik had robbed them of 
that. In the future the United States should forsake any project that 
smacked of "second best" and concentrate on another "spectacular first" 
as the only way to surpass Sputnik. Others argued that the United States 

*In a memo to McElroy on 2k March the President approved tbe assignment 
of scientific and military space projects to ARPA, as tbe Secretary had 
set forth in a memo of 19 March. The President said: "I do so with the 
understanding that when and if a civilian space agency is created, these 
projects will be subject to review to determine which would be under the 
cognizance of the Department of Defense and which under the cognizance 
of the new agency." 


. 125 

needed psychologically to get into space at once, even though American 

satellites could not equal for the time being the success of the Russians. 


The latter argument prevailed. 

Vanguard and Explorer I 

When reports of Sputnik first reached Redstone Arsenal, General Medaris 
and Dr. Von Braun, thought at once that their hitherto rejected Jupiter-C 
project might now be acceptable. They immediately briefed their guest, 

SOD Designate MeKLroy, and assured him the Army could place a satellite 
in orbit within 60 to 90 days. On 7 October, Wilbur M. Brucker, Secretary 
of the Army, recommended that the Secretary of .Defense approve an Army 


program to launch a satellite within 120 days at a cost of $12.7 million. 
This proposal was on McElroy's desk when he became Secretary of Defense 
on 9 October. 

The new Secretary, assuming that a military satellite would be tol¬ 
erated under the changing circumstances, asked Brucker to restudy the pro¬ 
posal and, at the seme time, suggest ways of assisting Vanguard. The 
Army promptly discussed its project with Holaday, who was already review¬ 
ing plans to accelerate the Vanguard schedule in an indirect way. The 
Navy had planned to launch a Vanguard test vehicle (TV-3) late in 1957# 
but without intending to orbit it. After Sputnik the date was set for 
6 December, the objective of the launching was changed to achieve orbit, 
and the test vehicle was advertised as a satellite. In view of these 
Vanguard plans, Holaday urged that the Jupiter-C not be launched until 
after 6 December. McElroy agreed, but on 8 November be authorised the 

Army to proceed, knowing that the Jupiter-C could not be launched before 


the Vanguard. 



On 3 Hovwnber 1957 the Rueelons successfully orbited Sputnik II, the 

satellite weighing 1,120 pounds. One month later, 6 December, the Savy 

attempted to orbit the Vanguard test vehicle with its 3.25-pound payload. 

There was a mechanical failure in the propulsion system, and Vanguard 

burst Into flames two seconds after launching. There was some criticism 

of the decision to turn a test vehicle launching into a satellite launch- 


lag: "We pushed Vanguard too hard, and the project became a mess." 

Meanwhile, the Army vent forward with its Jupiter-C project, now des¬ 
ignated Explorer. It was being planned as a "scientific satellite,” and 
objections no longer were there to using a military missile, the Redstone, 
as a booster* launching occurred 31 January 195®, and a cylindrical satel¬ 
lite weighing 30.8 pounds with a perigee of 217 miles, an apogee of 1,093 
miles, and an estimated life of 7 to 10 years was successfully orbited. 

The shot took place only 84 days after McElroy's authorization. The chief 
value of Explorer I lies in its irrefutable confirmation that the United 
States could have launched a satellite before the Soviet Union If the 
Army had received permission to make the try. 

Explorer I was a great boon to Army prestige. In this connection it 
is interesting to note that the Army had the same advantage, in miniature, 
over the Navy and the Air Force that the Soviet Union had. over the United 
States. The Army had an available missile with sufficient thrust to serve 
as booster in lifting a small satellite into orbit. Flans for Project 
Orb iter were based on that simple fact, and it was this same simple fact 
that led McElroy to give AEMA responsibility for the first successful 
American satellite. This did not imply that the Army had a carefully 
thought-Cut space program but rather that the Army met a national crisis 



in one field by using e weapon developed for another field as an emergency 

system of propulsion. Secretary Brucker said much this 
timony before a congressional committee at a later date:' 

thing in tes> 

The Army developed its broad capabilities, which are now being 
used in space projects, as an inevitable result of its progressive 
work and outstanding success in the field of military missiles* The 
Army is gratified that as a result of this developed capability it 
can lend substantial support and assistance to the vital national 
space progr a m. 

Air Force Requests for POD Approval 

The Air Force was quite aware that McKlroy’s interest in Explorer 
could bods ill for U8AF interests. On 29 October 1957, while OSD was 
still examining the Army's proposal, representatives of the Air Staff 
briefed the Secretary of Defense on the background and current status of 
the Advanced Reconnaissance Satellite (ARS) or WS-HTL, pointing out that 
with a small Increase in funds for fiscal year 1959 the satellite could 
be orbited in i960. During the first -two weeks of November the Air Force 
submitted suggestions to the Armed Forces Policy Council and to the Sec* 
retary of Defense that a Thor-boosted recoverable photographic satellite 
be launched in March 1959, that 12 Navabo boosters be utilised in various 
combinations to orbit satellites with payloads varying from 7? to 2,000 
pounds, and 'that payloads of 26 to 270 pounds be sent to the moon within 
the next 8 to 12 months. On 12 November 1957, Secretary of the Air Force 
Douglas requested the Secretary of Defense to assign to the Air Force re¬ 
sponsibility for all military satellites including, of course, WS-117L 

which was to be accelerated. There was no answer to the Air Force papers 


prior to the launching of Explorer I. 

Recommendations of the Advisory Group on Special Capabilities 

On 6 September 1957, Hbladay had written a memorandum to Dr* Stewart, 

chairman of the Advisory Group on Special Capabilities, evaluators and 


selectors of the IGY satellite: 

You and the members of your group constitute a unique body of 
experience In satellite systems and tbs actual problems of their 
development, having studied the possibilities before the announce* 
sent of the scientific satellite program, and having monitored its 
progress from the beginning. You also considered the larger, longer 
range possibilities such as WS-117L early in 1956 and made certain 
recommendations on it to the Department of Defense which for a num¬ 
ber of reasons could not be implemented at that time. 

I feel that it may be timely to ask the group to help me by 
preparing for the time when it will ultimately be necessary to decide 
on a number of questions on military applications of satellite tech¬ 
niques. The feasibility and timing of such applications seem to de¬ 
pend mainly upon the capabilities of rocket systems, their availabil¬ 
ity, and, of course, upon the outcome of Project Vanguard, our first 
venture in this field. 

I should now therefore like to ask the Advisory Group on Special 
Capabilities to look again into the satellite plans and programs of 
the military departments and submit your conclusions on the techni¬ 
cal capabilities based on the best available facts at this time . . . . 
As to timing, I shall be.grateful if you could submit your main con¬ 
clusions by March 1958. 

The group held a meeting on 3 October, and the next day its leisurely ap¬ 
proach was disrupted by Sputnik. Holaday requested that the group "expe¬ 
dite its study in every possible way," and on 11 October the group asked 

each of the three military services to submit recommendations as soon as 



The services replied in December with what may be called their first 
official programs. They agreed that the Russian success should be coun¬ 
tered by a U.S. national program that Integrated scientific and military 
elements "to avoid a dilution of effort," and they all looked toward man¬ 
ned space vehicles as the chief goal for the future. Otherwise each 
service thought along the lines of its own traditions. The Army and Navy, 

*See above, p 72* 

being surface-minded, wanted the apace program designed to support land 
forces and fleets. The Air Force, on the contrary, thought of space as 
an extension of the operational area of airpover. 

The Army's immediate interest covered reconnaissance, meteorology, 
mapping, geodesy, and navigation. Beyond this there should be deeper 
probes into the solar system. In a three-year program, the Army suggested 
l6 Jupiter launchings that would provide a 20-pound reconnaissance satellite 
by mid-1958, a 15-pound lunar shot by September 1958, a 120-pound lunar 
shot with photography by January 1959, end a 50- to 100-pound lunar impact 
8 cmetime in 1959* Stretching out another dozen years to 1971, the Army 
spoke of manned carriers propelled by Titan-like boosters with sundry com¬ 
binations of high-speed stages. The estimated cost was $14 billion. The 
Army was strong in its opposition to a single-service military program, 
though advocating a unified program to meet the legitimate needs of all 
three services. The Army also opposed recognition of space operations as 


an extension of strategic air activity. 

The Navy stressed small satellites, not exceeding 300 pounds, to meet 
immediate military requirements for communications, navigation, meteorology, 
and reconnaissance. They could be launched either by improved Vanguards 
or Thors in a schedule of 50 vehicles through 1961 . Snail, 10-pound satel¬ 
lites could also be advantageously launched from flying aircraft. The 
long-term program included manned vehicles of the X-15 type, five lunar 
shots, and eventually 1,500-pound satellites using Titan-Vanguard combi¬ 
nations for propulsion. The cost was considerably but vaguely more than 

. 10 
$212 million. 

The Air Force suggested a short-term Thor-boosted 300-pound recoverable 



photographic satellita by 1959* A long-term program, baaed on Atlas and 
Titan missiles in connection vith WS-117L, included missions for photog¬ 
raphy, ferret detection, infrared surveillance of aircraft and ICBM's, 
and eventually visual surveillance with television. With program accel¬ 
eration, a WS-H7L 2,000-pound satellite on a 300-mile orbit would be 
possible by 1959* The great advantage of WS-117L vas that it had been 

under study since 1946 and under development since 1956; The weakness of 


the Air Force paper was its lack of cost estimates. 

The advisory group recognized valid military, scientific, and, even¬ 
tually, commercial needs for satellites and believed that the objectives 
of the overall program would have to Include manned spaceflight drawn from 
the X-15 experience. The group urged both an immediate short-range as 
veil as a long-range program that would reach toward the genuinely spec¬ 
tacular. There were four major recommendations. First, plan for a strong 

program of large satellites and manned flight. Second, take Immediate 


action to use the available potentialities of Vanguard and Jupiter-C to 
launch very small satellites/ as well as the Jupiter and Thor IRBM's to 
launch 300- to 400-pound satellites by 1959* This recommendation called 
for a Thor-H7L interim program while anticipating the Atlas-117L. Third, 
WS-117L should be continued and given both military and nonmilitary appli¬ 
cation.^ The fourth recommendation urged that the scientific parts of the 

♦Already Jupiter-C waa being called Juno I, a Redstone booster vith three 
clusters of Sergeants. JunoU was a Jupiter booster with three clusters 
of Sergeants, and Juno III vas a Jupiter booster with three clusters of 
Vanguard Stage 3- 

*In evaluating WS-117L the group noted the limited support given the proj¬ 
ect to date and emphasized the feasibility of using both the Thor- and 
Atlas-boosted combinations for such nonmilitary and military purposes as 
pure scientific exploration, communications, weather forecasting, etc., in 
addition to the planned reconnaissance and surveillance tasks. 


national program should be carefully related and "mutually reinforced." 

The USAF Aatronautlcal Program of 24 January 1958 

Anticipating the Stewart Committee's report by several days, Hbladay 
requested the Air Force—and presumably the Army and Navy too—on 7 Jan¬ 
uary 1958 to suggest ways.of expediting the space effort. Holaday spec- 

clfically stated that the purpose of the paper was to assist the Director 


of ARPA during the coming period of his indoctrination. The Directorate 
of Research and Development prepared a summary statement on the Air Force 
aatronautlcal development program, listing 5 systems and 21 subsystems to 
carry out 6 types of missions "essential to the maintenance of our national 
position and prestige." (See Table, p 132.) Two areas were mentioned as 
being of interest to both the military and scientific programs—space re¬ 
search and manned flight. Four other areas—reconnaissance, weapon deliv¬ 
ery, data transmission, and countermeasures--were considered of military 
interest only. The program covered a period of 10 years, and the cost 
was estimated as an additional $61 million for fiscal year 1958 and $1.2 
billion for fiscal year 1959. Assistant Secretary Horner forwarded the 

proposal on 25 January and requested Holaday to approve it and grant the 

. . 14 

required resources. 

There was an unfortunate misunderstanding within Air Force circles 
about the purpose of Holaday's request. DCS/Development and the Director 
of Research and Development thought the program should remain in and be 
carried out by the Air Force. Homer, too, seemed to have made the same 
assumption, else his request that Hbladay approve the program and grant 
the requisite funds was scarcely comprehensible. Holaday, on the other 
hand, used the paper as he said be would—to assist Johnson during his 




The Air Force 













I. 609 Ballistic 


Space research 

Test & Be¬ 

2. Aerial survey and 


lated Systems 

target locating system 


11. 447 Manned 

3. X-15 

Space research 

Supersonic Re¬ 

• 4. Advanced hypersonic 

Manned space 


search System 

research aircraft 




IQ. 464 Dyna Soar 

5. Manned capsule test 

Manned specs flight 

6. Conceptual test 

Manned space flight 



7* Boost glide tactical 

Weapon delivery 



8. Boost glide interceptor 




9. Satellite interceptor 



10. Global reconnaissance 


ll. Global bomber 


IV. 117 Satellite 

12. ABS A photo capsule 



recoverable data 



13. 24-hr reconnaissance 




14. Global surveillance 


space research 

15. Manned strategic 

Weapon delivery; 



l6. Strategic communica¬ 

tions station 

Data transmission 

V. 499 Ia w 

17. Manned variable tra¬ 

Manned space flight; 


jectory a. test 

Space research 

18. Nuclear rocket test 

Space research 

19. Ion propulsion test 

Space research 

20. Lunar transport 

Manned space flight; 


Space research 

21. Manned lunar base 

Weapon delivery; 









indoctrination. Holaday therefore made so reply to Horner, which was 
keenly disappointing to General Putt and his staff. There were sane who 

felt that the program had been pigeonholed to die—to be "overtakenby 

.. 15 

events," as was said occasionally of later Air Force proposals. 

Last USAF Efforts to Save the Astronautical Program 

By the end of January it was plain that McElroy would activate AKPA 
within a few days. It was also plain that ARPA would take over the mili¬ 
tary space research and development program unless McElroy could first be 
persuaded to reconsider the. move. The Air Force then made three last at¬ 
tempts to limit ARPA's authority. 

On 1 February 1958, Douglas harked back to his memorandum of 12 No¬ 
vember—still unanswered—in which he had asked that the Air Force have 
responsibility for WS-117L satellites. Row, more than two months later, 
he again addressed the Secretary of Defense, requesting that the latter 

approve a draft paper containing the following paragraph and return it to 


the Air Force as a directive: 

In connection with the proposed establishment of ABPA, of which 
you are aware, I desire that the foregoing project for a military re¬ 
connaissance satellite, as accelerated in the proposal submitted to 
me under date of November 12, 1957* be continued by.the Air Force. 
However, no significant changes should be made in the program as so 
approved without the specific approval of ABPA. Pending the defin¬ 
itive establishment of ABPA the Director of Guided Missiles will have 
directional authority in respect to the program. 

Again there was no reply, and on 7 February McElroy activated ARPA. 

For several weeks Johnson was too busy setting his new bouse in order 
to exercise authority over the services. In this moment of respite, Doug¬ 
las felt there was still the possibility of saving the integrity of the 
Air Force program. Once more, on lk February, he approached McElroy and 
requested authorization for the Air Force to undertake five projects 

closely related to, but more detailed than, the Tbor-WS-117I< proposals of 

the previous November and December. These included I CBM nose-cone testing 

using a Thor-Vanguard combination; a Thor-Hustler television satellite, to 

be launched in September 1958* primarily for weather forecasting; a Thor- 

Vanguerd satellite, with a first-flight date of July 1958, to carry out 

reentry experiments; a Thor-Hustler scientific satellite to be launched 

initially in October 1958; and a Thor-Vanguard launching for the purpose 


of hitting the moon. 

A week passed with no acknowledgment from the Secretary of Defense, 
and on 21 February the Air Force made another try to save WS-117L for it¬ 
self. This time Horner requested the Secretary of Defense to designate 
the Air Force as executive agent for VS-117L since its development plan 
was already being readied. Indeed, a contract with Lockheed was being 
supported from Air Force resources during fiscal year 1958. Provision for 
the contract had been included in the original fiscal year 1959 budget, 
but in the course of formulation the funds had been deleted in favor of 

AKPA. Berner hoped these funds would be returned to the Air Force, with 


authority to proceed. 

When McElroy replied on 24 February, he ignored Douglas' requests of 
1 and 14 February. However, the Secretary of Defense approved the acceler¬ 
ation of HS-117L, but under the direction of ARPA. Also, he requested that 


a fund status summary of Air Force space projects be submitted to ARPA. 

The Air Force knew that development responsibility over USAF space projects 
had passed to ARPA. Of course Headquarters USAF prepared the financial 
statement and submitted it next day. (See summary, p 135•) 

Air Force Fund Statue Summary 
February 195# 

Projects Under Way 

FY 1956 




FY 1958 

FY 1959 

BRATS study (not yet approved 
by OSD) 





X-15 study 





Dyna Soar 





ARS (FY 1959 funds in ARPA 





Lunar base studies 





Technical development (including 90.00 
1-million-lb-thruBt rocket, 
human factors engineering, 
electronic techniques, & 
atmospheric physics) 




Basic research (propulsion, 
materials, geophysics, etc.) 




Tes t & instrumentation 




Center operations 



Projects submitted 06D for 

Television satellites 
Recoverable satellites 
Scientific satellites 

Moon impact 






—Requested in the ARPA 1959 budget and not included in totals. 

(Memo, B/Gen H.A. Boushey to C/S USAF, 26 Feb 56, 
subj: Status of USAF Astronautics Program, v/incl. 
Data Sheets.) 


The Buie and Program of ARPA in 1958 

McElroy had ample opportunity in his first months in office to become 
familiar with what the services had to offer and vhat they desired for the 
Still nebulous space program. Before ARPA was activated, in February 1958 
the Secretary experienced the disappointment of the Vanguard attempt on 6 
December and another Vanguard failure on 5 February. On the other hand, 
he was doubtless encouraged by the success of Explorer I on 31 January 
and by plans for the continuation of that project. He had learned from 
briefings, memorandums, conferences, and reports the potential capabili¬ 
ties of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in space activities, and he had also 
the recommendations of the Stewart Committee to guide him in selecting 
projects for assignment to ARPA. 

ARPA's Operating Procedures 

Johnson's approach to the services was not altogether a happy choice. 
Although ARPA was established ostensibly to direct the research and devel¬ 
opment phase of military space projects, the activating DOD Directive No. 
5105.15, of 7 February 1958 , was couched in general terms: "The agency 
shall be responsible for the direction or performance of such advanced 
projects in the field of research and development as the Secretary of De¬ 
fense shall, from time to time, designate by individual category.” More 
specifically, the agency was authorized to direct the assigned projects, 
whatever they might be, by contractual arrangements with both government 
and. nongovernment agencies. Also, ARPA was authorized to acquire or con¬ 
struct facilities as necessary. The Secretary of Defense thus remained 
in a position to control the growth and responsibilities of ARPA by either 
limiting the agency's responsibility to individually assigned projects or 


granting an overall authorization for vide areas. The services of course 
could do nothing but follow a "wait, and see" policy while AHPA's true sig¬ 
nificance slowly unfolded. 

There was one thing, however, of which both ARPA and the services 
could be sure—in the specific areas of Its eventual assignments, whatever 
they might be, ARPA would possess an authority superior to that of the Army, 
Havy, or Air Force. For more than a month, Johnson did very little to 
show what operating procedures he would employ. Then on 27 March 1958 
he sent nearly identical memorandums of basic policy to each of the serv¬ 
ice secretaries. Though authorised to, he would not in the near 
future construct or acquire facilities, but he asserted his right to take 
over service laboratories whenever be should deem it advisable. After 
ARPA received project assignments from the Secretary of Defense, he would 
reassign them among the services or perhaps outside the services—which¬ 
ever might be conducive to greater efficiency. In pursuit of ARPA objec¬ 
tives^ Johnson stated that he was free to deal directly with field agen¬ 
cies, completely bypassing service and command headquarters. He listed 
the Army Ballistic Missile Agency, the Air Force Ballistic Missiles Divis¬ 
ion, other centers of the Air Research and Development Command, and the 
Haval Ordnance Test Station (ROTS) at Inyokern, Calif., to vhieh he would 

issue directives from time to time "for technical and administrative 



The services did not relish Johnson's decision to act independently. 
There was no question of his authority, hut there was a question of the 
wisdom of his decisions. To have a service project assigned to ARPA and 
then have it splintered into components for reassignment among service or 


outside agencies might lead to Increased efficiency In the development of 
some parts, but It seemed unlikely that the project as a whole would ben¬ 
efit from dismemberment. Moreover, his policy of suspending established 
methods of communication could lead to confusion, and it seemed to be at 
least a partial transfer of Indispensable field units from the control of 
service headquarters to a fourth service. It was rather widely assumed 
that this disregard for normal channels of conmuoication came from Johnson's 
IDA advisers who were "inexperienced with military methods of procedure." 

There is always another side of the coin. Johnson had great author¬ 
ity, but with it came corresponding difficulties. Though he could indeed 
act independently as if chief of a fourth and superior service, his posi¬ 
tion vithin the Department of Defense made it necessary for him to act as 
arbitrator in service differences over space. It is also right to mention 
that Johnson did not get the idea of out-of-channel communications from 

his IDA advisers but from Secretary of the Army Brucker, who suggested 


it as a "time-saving" device. 

The out-of-channel communications did not work well. It nevertheless 

required most of 1958 for ARPA to concede and make amends. In-the end, 

AREA decided first to deal directly with ARDC rather than AFBMD and, some- 


what later, to recognize the rights of Headquarters USAF. 

The Assignment of Projects to ARPA 

Two months elapsed before any projects were actually assigned to ARPA, 
but Johnson did not wait that long to assert his authority in the area of 
space research and development. 

McElroy's memorandum to the Secretary of the Air Force on Zk February 
1958 stated definitely that VS-117L would be placed under ARPA. Four days 


later, Johnson gave evidence of his right to speak for the Secretary of 
Defense in natters pertaining to space. Expressing Ms own interest in 
USAF's long-term claims to manned space flight and WS-117L, Johnson said 
the Air Force should concentrate on these two fields even to the detri¬ 
ment of lower-priority projects. Hie wanted WS-117L accelerated but re¬ 
jected the Interim Thor-boosted version in favor of the Atlas version 


and requested a clarification of the whole Air Force program. 

Accordingly, Air Staff representatives briefed Johnson on 19 March 
1938. The briefing covered unmanned systems, Dyna Soar, lunar base, 
and manned satellites as a substitute for manned hypersonic research sys¬ 
tem. Explanations of WS-117L were limited to the Atlas version, and MIS 
was 8till kept to the employment of a manned capsule in preference to con¬ 
centration on Dyna Soar. Only the capsule method was considered capable 


of putting a man in space ahead of the Russians. 

That same day, Johnson asked SOD-Presidential approval of three space 
projects selected by ARPA. Project No. 1, to be assigned to ABMA, called 
for launchings--in August, November, and December 1958 and January 1959— 
of a high-visibility "propaganda" satellite, an escape guidance experiment, 
an IGY satellite, and a cloud-cover experiment. Project NO. 2, to be 
assigned to AFBMD, consisted of three lunar probes using a Thor booster, 
part of Vanguard as second stage, and a solid rocket as third stage. Proj¬ 
ect NO. 3, to be assigned to HOTS, was the development and operation of a 


mechanical ground-scanning system for the lunar probes. 

McElroy sanctioned the projects vitMn hours and forwarded Johnson's 
request to the White House. Five days later, the President signified hie 
approval but carefully made the point that only for the time being ARPA 

vas acting as the national apace agency. Upon the activation of a.civilian 

agency, be warned, there would be a reevaluation and redistribution of pro j 

ecta. On 27 March 1956, Johnson was thus in a position to issue ARPA 

Orders (AO's) Nos. 1, 2, and 3 to AEMA, AFBMD, and NOTS to undertake the 

development of the space vehicles, the lunar probes, and the scanning 


The buildup of the national space program began with AO's 1, 2, and 

3. Other projects passed to ARPA in quick succession. On 4 April, Argus, 

the high-altitude atomic effects tests scheduled for the South Atlantic 

area in the near future, became an ARPA responsibility though not technl- 


cally part of the space program. On 1 May another transfer was made by 
an OSD directive that stated: 

. . . all satellites and other outer space vehicle programs to be 
conducted by the Department of Defense, Including the VANGUARD series, 
are hereby reassigned from the Director, Guided Missiles, to the Di¬ 
rector, Advanced Research Projects Agency. The VANGUARD reassignment 
specifically includes responsibility for preparation of the monthly 
reports to the President on the progress in the International Geo¬ 
physical Year Satellite programs. 

The Director, Guided Missiles, will continue to be responsible 
for support of the above programs by necessary rocketry, launching 
and other range facilities, and the like. 

By the time that Vanguard became an ARPA project there was obvious 
need of a systematic way to record the transfers. On 17 May 1956 the 
Department of Defense issued Directive No. 3200.5, which repeated the 
February definition of ARPA's authority and also served as the basic paper 
to which all future transfers to ARPA would be recorded as inclosures. 

AO's 1, 2, and 3 remained separate, but the Argus and Vanguard transfers 
automatically became Inclosures 1 and 2. Between then and October 1958 
numerous other assignments were made, including WS-117L on 30 June. The 

assignments covered the whole spectrum of "space-related" projects from 

propellants to engines, electronic vehicles, tracking, defense against 

* . 

ballistic missiles, and satellites and space probes. 

By the first of July it was possible to place ARPA's projects into- 
three,broad areas: ballistic missile defense, chemical propellant re¬ 
search, and military space, the last for the time being including some 
projects destined for the civilian space agency. The frontiers of ARPA 
had been drawn. 

ARPA's Assignment of Projects 

The. distribution of projects among the services began with AO's 1, 

2, and 3* The system of formalizing the assignments vas satisfactory and' 
underwent no change. Between 19 March and 1 October 1958, ARPA issued 22 
AO'% which in turn were subject to numerous amendments from time to time. 

It was soon evident that Johnson was. following through on his announced 
policy of assigning, and even splintering, projects among the services 
and other agencies as be saw fit. The Air force, in a last attempt to 
preserve the integrity of its program, decided upon a new tactic. Rather 
than appeal uselessly to the Secretary of Defense, an appeal should be made 

"Projects transferred to ARPA, and the dates: 

1. Argus (nuclear explosions in exosphere over South Atlantic) 4 Apr 58 

2. All DOD approved satellite and outer space programs (with 

Vanguard) 1 May 58 

3< High-performance solid propellants 7 Jim 58 

4. Minitrack doppler fence 20 Jun 58 

3. USA and USAF ballistic missile defense projects except 

Nike Zeus and SMEWS 20 Jun 58 

6. Studies of effects of space weapons employment on 

military electronic systems $0 Jun 38 

7* Nuclear-bomb-propelled space vehicle 20 Jun 58 

8. Superthrust rockets 20 Jun 58 

9. WS-117L 30 Jun 58 

to Johnson to assign the Air Force a revised USAF integrated program in- 


stead of its dismembered parts. In April, Headquarters had a plan con¬ 
sisting of four projects—an accelerated WS-117L Advanced Reconnaissance 
Satellite, to be operational by March i960; a man-in-space capsule; a man¬ 
ned lunar base for intelligence observations of Earth and outer space; 
and the continued development of the 300,000- to 400,000-pound rocket 
engine begun in 1954, the 1,000,000-pound single-chamber engine begun 
.in 1957, end the AEC-USAF-sponsored nuclear-boob -propelled vehicle. Maj. 

Gen. Jacob E. Smart, Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, forwarded the proposed 


plan to Horner for transmission to Johnson. The memorandum remained 
unsigned on Horner's desk until mid-June. By that time it had been "over¬ 
taken by events" and was returned to General Smart. 

In the meantime, ARPA's breakdown of programs and projects, and their 
reassignment, continued. The Air Force received back from ARPA, on a con¬ 
tractual basis with ARDC and APEMD, studies of satellite defense, effects 
of space weapons on electronics, and the feasibility of nudear-bomb- 
propelled space vehicles. In addition, the Air Force also received assign¬ 
ments for research in high-energy fuels, the development of W8-117L and 
Project Score. The latter was a propaganda stunt to send a complete Atlas 
vehicle into orbit, equipped to broadcast a recorded Christmas message to 
"the world"’ from the President. 

The Air Force was pleased to have these assignments even as contracts 
between ARPA and ARDC or ARPA and AFEMD. Nevertheless, the Air Force was 
seriously disturbed by ARPA's persistent splintering of projects into com¬ 
ponents, as for instance separating the three lunar shots from the develop¬ 
ment of a mechanical system to track them. The Air Force felt a keen 

sense of loss in giving up to tbs Army the projects for the cloud-cover 

satellite and the new 1.5 million-pound clustered engines. By midsummer 

the. identity of the well-thought-out Air Force space program had been lost, 

the projects either assigned hack to ARDC or AFBMD under ARPA management 

or scattered among other agencies. Indeed when the Directorate of Advanced 

Technology came into being on 15 July 1958, the director, General Boushey, 

had little to direct other than seven studies in a space study program de- 


vised since January: 

Humber Date of Origin Objective 

1. SR 178 . 12 Feb 58 . Global surveillance system to determine design 

of manned reconnaissance satellite system. 

2. SR l8l 10 Jul 58 Strategic orbital system to determine concept 

for military operations in Earth orbital space. 

3. SR 182 25 Jul 56 Strategic interplanetary system to determine 

military usage research for vehicle and test. 

4. SR 183 4 Apr 58 Lunar observatory as approach to manned obser- 

, . vatory on the moon. > . 

5. SR l84 24 Apr 58 24-hour reconnaissance satellite for continuous 

surveillance of preselected areas on Earth. 

6. SR187 1 May 58 Satellite interceptor System to combat hostile 

satellites with early detection and elimination. 

7. SR 192 29 Aug 58 Strategic lunar system to determine feasibility’ 

of using the moon for military purposes. 

There was another matter resulting from the distribution of projects 
that caused concern in Headquarters USAF by the late spring of 1958. The 
successful orbiting of Explorer I on 31 January—followed on 17 March by 
the successful orbiting of Vanguard I—placed the Air Force in an unfavor¬ 
able position. The two satellites were most gratifying as accomplish¬ 
ments, but they left the Air Force as the only service that had not demon- 

’• T - ‘ r 

atrated an ability to launch a satellite despite the claim to preeminence 
in space. Headquarters feared the situation would become "even more em¬ 
barrassing" in the next few months. The only promise of an early success, 
after ARPA began distribution, was in the three lunar shots specified in 

AO No. 2 


In April and May, Headquarters USA? thought of the lunar shots opti¬ 
mistically. There seemed a likely chance of success for either the first 

or second try. In that event, the third shot, as an unnecessary duplica- 


tion, could probably be placed under WS-117L as a biological experiment... 
Unfortunately, that is not the way the lunar probes turned out. The first 
shot, on 17 August 1958, reached an altitude of only 40,000 to 70,000 
feet. Before the second and third shots could be fired, the project pas¬ 
sed from ARPA to NASA, which, like ARPA, operated in this instance through 
AFBMD. The second shot, on 11 October, reached an altitude of 70,700 
miles, and the third shot, on 8 November, went only to <#>3 miles. 

The year 1938, whether during the period of ARPA's supremacy or 
after the division of the program with NASA, was not turning out well 
for the Air Force. Not until 18 December did Air Force competence prove 
itself in space endeavors, for it was then that the Atlas missile of Proj¬ 
ect Score went into orbit. 



























Daring the first half of 1958 the services lost managerial control 
of their space projects—but only to ARPA. At the same time it was evi¬ 
dent that the activation of NASA, set for the early autumn, would bring 
a day of reckoning, a day for the division of the national program between 
ARPA and the new civilian agency. 

The question that remained undecided during crucial weeks was where 
to draw the dividing line between the military and civil programs. There 
were large areas of overlapping Interests, projects which were of impor¬ 
tance both for strategic and for scientific reasons. It would be a sim¬ 
ple matter, of course, to make arbitrary decisions, to say which projects 
were to be kept within the military program and which were to be trans¬ 
ferred to civilian control. But arbitrary distinctions between military 
and civilian programs might not be wise from the viewpoint of national 
interest. The nature of World War II and the international situation 
that existed after the war blurred the lines between civilian and military 
activities. Astronautics, whether civilian or military, whether aimed at 
preparedness or peaceful purposes, would make important contributions to 

human welfare, to the political prestige of the United States, and to the 


defensive and offensive strength of the nation. 

The Space Act of 1958 provided both for military and civilian space 
programs and for cooperation and coordination between the space agencies. 
The aim was to avoid undue duplication. The danger was in assignment of, 
borderline projects to civilian management. Despite the best intentions 

to cooperate, the civilian agency would be motivated by scientific objec¬ 
tives devoid of tbe urgency required by defense. Under the circumstances 
it seemed better to keep the border projects under military control or,--"-.' 
failing this, to tolerate sane duplication rather than hold back the mil¬ 
itary use of vehicles for which there was no pressing need among civilians. 

ARPA'b Claim to . Boarder Projects 

From the President's message to Congress on 2 April I95Q it.was clear 
that MCA would become the nucleus of MSA, end there would be a wide 
overlap of civilian and military interests. With ARPA already serving 
as the national space agency, it was expedient for Johnson, Director of 
ARPA, and Dryden, Director of MCA, to establish "a "jurisdictional com¬ 
mittee" to determine as far as possible tbe ARPA and MSA areas of opera¬ 
tions. Negotiations were in progress before tbe end of April. Johnson 
made a strong effort to keep military losses to the minimum. As pro 
tempore head of the national space program, he organized ARPA's existing 
projects into four categories. Category I, Defense vs ICBM's, covered the 
entire field except Nlke-Zeus and EMEUS. By their very nature, there was 
no chance of Category I projects being transferred to NASA. Category II, 
Military Reconnaissance Satellites, was little more than the Air Force 
WS-117L program, and that too was certain to remain under DOD control. 
Category III, Military Developments for and Applications of Space Tech¬ 
nology, was "a collection of smaller items, ” which became the real bone 
of contention between ARPA and NACA (MSA). Ab Dr. York said before a 
congressional committee on 23 April, "On our first go-round, and for our 
own part, we /in ARPAj list all these Category III project!^ as being 


military developments." Category IV, indisputably destined for NASA, 
included the four satellite experiments of AO No. 1 being designed by 
the Army; the three lunar probes of AO No. 2 entrusted to AFHMD and their 
payloads being developed by NOTS; Project Vanguard; and the Explorer ser¬ 
ies for cosmic ray, solar, and astronomical measures as veil as. meteor- 


ological and biological research. 

By the first week in May, ARPA and NACA agreed that the initial pro¬ 
gram for NASA would contain three principal areas of Interest: use of 
unmanned space vehicles instrumented to collect scientific information; 
development of science, technology, and equipment required for manned 

space flight; and research and development of components and techniques 


needed to increase the national capability in space technology. 

Throughout the remainkar of the spring and veil into the summer of 
1958; ARPA continued to hope and work for a strong military program. The 
basic philosophy was that the United States could not permit, either from 
a national or military standpoint, a foreign power to control space. 

This condition overruled the argument that the military should attempt 
no space exploration until it was possible to determine specific military 
usefulness. As ARPA spokesmen pointed out, "A strong military research 
and development program that will lead to manned and unmanned space or¬ 
biting weapon systems and space flight vehicles to permit military 

-"Category III included man-in-space; Operation Argus (the high-altitude 
tests of atomic detonation effects held in the South Atlantic in the 
autumn of 1958); satellite tracking and monitoring systeoe (which had 
come to the fore in early spring discussions of celestial traffic control); 
satellite communications relay, meteorological reporting, and navigational 
aid systems; bomb-powered rockets; and solid propellants. These were 
projects of mutual scientific and military interest, and the services 
hoped to keep them in DOD. 

operation In space can be the key to future national survival." 

ABPA believed that military space missions mould fall into four 
types: defensive missions to defend the United States from IGBM's, IRBM's, 
and. satellite, weapon carriers; offensive missions for purposes of deter¬ 
rence or .strategic weapon delivery; information missions for surveillance, 

conmtunicatlon> .weather observation, and space traffic control; and apace 


bases for logistic purposes. 

The President's Division of Space Projects 
Actually the military, were fighting a lost cause. Under the Space 
Act of 1958. the Preeldent had authority to determine which agency should 
be responsible for specific projects. His policy of epace-fpr-peace made 
him reluctant to grant the military any space activity that could be con¬ 
sidered of scientific Interest, and when be signed the Space Act on 29 
July, he made it clear that borderline projects would go to NASA.^ 

Two months later, on 1 October, when hr. Glennan activated the civil¬ 
ian agency, the President confirmed this decision in Executive Order 
IO783. Be thereby transferred to RASA responsibility for: 

(a) The United States scientific satellite project (Project 

(b) Specific projects of the Advanced Research Projects Agency 
Odd of .the Department of the Air force which relate to space activ¬ 
ities (including lunar probes, scientific satellites, and super- 
thrust boosters) within the Sdbpe $f the functions devolving upon 

the national Aeronautics and Space Administration under the .provisions 
of the Rational Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, and which shall 
be more particularly described In one or more supplementary Executive 
orders hereafter Issued. 

Kith the exception of Project Vanguard,, however, the specific proj¬ 
ects entrusted to RASA were not defined since the "one or more supplemen¬ 
tary Executive orders" were never issued. The omission enabled RASA to 

claim practically any ARFA or USAF project remotely connected with astro¬ 
nautics provided the President did not disapprove. In October 1958, ARPA 
lost control of Category IV, as had been expected, and also a large part 
of Category III—which may also have been expected but was certainly con¬ 
trary to military hopes. Still worse, it appeared probable that the 
remainder of Category III might also pass to NASA in the near future. 

Along with its sweeping responsibility for space projects, NASA ac¬ 
quired extensive but scattered facilities. With the absorption of NACA, 
it acquired the three research centers at Langley APB, Va.; Cleveland, 

Ohio; and Moffett Field, Calif. In addition there was Wallops Island, 

Va., and several other field offices. Within a matter of weeks the Pres¬ 
ident also transferred to NASA most of the Army's Interest in the Jet Pro¬ 
pulsion Laboratory under the California Institute of Technology. At the 
same time, that is within the first two or three months of its existence, 
NASA made at least two vain attempts to get part of the Army Ballistic 
Missile Agency at Huntsville, but the President's reputed reply of "not 

at this time" only postponed the answer ARPA feared would be affirmative 


sooner or later. 

NASA's First Nine Months 

NASA's responsibility was to organize a space program considerably 
broader than that required by ARFA or the three services. In undertaking 
the work, Or. Glennan, himself an outstanding scientist, had the assistance 

^Actually, little of the original ARPA "space" program remained in the 
agency with the exception of WS-117L. But new projects were being dis¬ 
cussed, and some were soon approved and placed under ARPA's authority, 
so that by the end of October the agency could boast an 11-project program. 

of Dr. Dryden and the very competent former KACA staff. They were well 
versed in current space technology, and many of them, had served on a spe¬ 
cial NACA coomittee that anticipated NASA's early needs by preparing a 
report, submitted to Glennan on 28 October 1958, to guide his first, efforts. 
Entitled "Recommendations to NASA for a National Civil Space Program," the 
report emphasised the role that the physical and life sciences would play 
in the exploitation of space and pointed out the importance of manned 
space flight. It called for close coordination with "civil and military 
agencies" in related work, but, since NASA's program would be largely one 

of scientific'interest, there was nowhere in the report that sense!of ur- 


gency felt within the armed forces. 

Before the end of 1958, Glennan approved a NASA program for fiscal 
years 1959-60. (See program, p 151.) Among other things, it called for 
numerous space science and advanced technology projects, the latter with 
emphasis on the development of boosters and vehicles. In operations, the 
program would mean launching many sounding rockets, 35 satellites, 7 lunar 
probes, and 3 interplanetary probes before July i960. It was an ambitious 

The space science program was very broad. It covered seven great 
areas of research: the atmosphere of the earth, moon> planets, and sun; 
the ionosphere; energetic particles; the electric and magnetic fields; 
the gravitational fields; astronomy; and biosciences. 

Of course a program that reached so far into scientific investiga¬ 
tion was necessarily one of unceasing flux. Details of 1 projects, and 
entire projects, varied from month to month, almost from day to day. By 
the spring of 1959 the program in general content was about what it had 

NASA*a Program for PY's 1959-60 

1. Supporting activities 

a, JFL funding-nondirected programs 

b. University contracts and grants—long-term nonspecific 


2. Space science program 

a. Sounding rockets, numerous launchings 

b. 35.satellites 

c. 7 lunar probes 

d. 3 interplanetary probes 

3* Application program 

a. Meteorological satellite in connection vith other 


b. Communication satellite, to be at first a large balloon 

or reflective type 

c. 24-hour satellite to be developed with ARPA 

d. Navigational satellite but details very indefinite 

4. Advanced technology program 

a. Vehicle technology 

b. Boosters—recoverable 

c. Propulsion 

d. Man-in-space (MIS) 

e. Human factors 

f. Scout 

5. Ground support 

a. Tracking 

b. Launchings 

c. Guidance. 

d. Structures. 

been in October, but the project* were more daring. XASA witnesses in 

congressional hearings spoke of lunar impacts, lunar orbitings* and soft 

lunar landings as well as manned space flight, all by the end of 1961. 

In addition, there would be deeper and deeper probes into space and tbs 

development of meteorological, communication, and astronomical observatory 

satellites. Experience was soon to prove, however, that optimism outran 


If the space science program was to earn the aura of reality, it had 
to be based upon the possession, or at least the prospects, of adequate 
boosters and vehicles. Invested with authority by the Space Act of 1996 
to call for cooperation from any federal agency, Glennan cast aside com¬ 
pletely the old taboo against the use of military rockets for the peace¬ 
ful exploitation of space. Be informed the President that military rockets 

would be used when needed and called upon 000 to supply him with requisite 


information, services, equipment, facilities, and personnel. Since nei¬ 
ther the President nor the Secretary of Defense offered objection to Glen- 
nan's action, it was evident that military rockets could then be used for 
scientific projects without travail of conscience. 

The rockets immediately available to RASA were, however, of limited 
usefulness. Vanguard seemed still unreliable and, along with the more 
reliabxe Jupiter-C, offered small payload capacity. The combinations of 
Jupiter and Jupiter-C as well as Thor-Able were equally hampered by tech¬ 
nical shortcomings that prevented high-altitude orbiting. At the end of 
the year HASA turned to Thor-Hustler (later redesignated Agena), a combi¬ 
nation of Thor and Bell Aircraft's Bustler engine. It was the most power¬ 
ful and most welcome member of HASA's first group of vehicles, but it could 

not meet all of tbs requirements of an expanding program. 

In January 1959# RASA listed three vehicles in a near-future second 
group and seven basic engines to be developed for tbs long-term program. 
Tbs second group Included a modification of Thor-Able vlth guidance to 
become Thor-Delta and two Atlas combinations, one of which, Atlas-Bustler, 
would lift a 3,000-pound payload. The seven basic engines included two 
modifications—one a Vanguard and tbs other a 6,000-pound storable-fuel 
JFL engine—and five new ones. The latter ranged in thrusts from the 
15,000-pound Pratt & Whitney to the 1.5 million-pound single-chamber 

NASA devised various combinations of the seven engines to provide 
four basic vehicles—Vega, Centaur, Saturn, and Nova. Saturn, being de¬ 
veloped by ARPA-AEMA, would have a cluster of eight 188,000-pound engines 
with a total thrust of 1.5 million pounds, and Nova would have a cluster 

of four 1.5 million-pound single engines with a total thrust of 6 million 


Both the plans for the second group and for the seven basic engines 

were very impressive and constituted "a great leap forward"—at least on 

paper—provided, of course, that delays could be avoided on the way. NASA 

believed that between the fall of 1959 end the winter of 1961 it would be 

possible to increase orbital payloads from 300 pounds at altitudes of 300 

miles to 800 pounds at 22,000 miles. The payload for the long-range pros- 


pects was estimated to be 8,000 pounds at 300 miles. 

As part of the overall propulsion program, NASA included more futur¬ 
istic projects. A number of nonchemical systems were based on nuclear 
and electric engines; the latter included both ion and plasma rockets. 

But no matter hour promising they might be, the application of results 


would be part of eery long-term objectives. 

In April 1959* Dr. Glenn an stated that NASA scientists were "hard at 
work on problems connected with all our major military missiles—problems 

concerned with warhead stability, stage separation, and high energy fuels, 


to name a few. It is no exaggeration to say that just about every U.8. 


aircraft and missile had benefitted Importantly from RASA research." 
Certainly the NASA program did help the military, but not as an unmixed 
blessing. NASA adopted a program with fine scientific objectives, but 
the instruments with which the program was to be put into effect were 
largely military projects transferred to NASA authority. NASA's space 
vehicles, whether already available or under development, were originated 
by the military, sometimes in cooperation with NACA. NASA's research work 
in fuels, and in nonchemical engines was a continuation of research begun 
by the military. NASA's man-in-space or Mercury project was originally 
an Air Force dream. Once these projects passed from military to civilian 
control, even though their development continued and under efficient man¬ 
agement, the emphasis shifted. They had one significance for the military, 
another for NASA,. and there was a tendency to alow down in just those as¬ 
pects of the program in which defense was most interested. 

The exploitation of space is costly. If the United States could not 
afford to support twp programs so that neither would interfere with the 
other, there were some who felt that national security demanded the sur¬ 
vival of military projects, even If that meant elimination of civilian 

RASA-08AF Relations 

The creation of ARPA and RASA affected the Air Force unfavorably, since 
Its future night veil depend upon a space role. To have the space program 
taken over by ARPA vas a serious blow, and to have the progr a m again divided 
with RASA vas yet more disturbing. Entirely outside the Department of De¬ 
fense, the leaders of the civilian agency thought neither in terms nor 

interests of the military but pursued space flight and space exploration 


as ends in themselves. Yet national defense vas at stake. 

Favored by the President as an expression of space-for-peace, RASA 
could often impose its vill upon the Department of Defense and the mili¬ 
tary services. Furthermore, the Bureau of the Budget vas the voice of the 
President in matters of government finance, and in seme ways became the 
final arbiter in matters of space. It distributed its benedictions among 
space projects and between the two space programs in accordance with the 


White House philosophy of economy and preference for the civilian agency. 

The Air Force hoped for cordial relations with RASA as a matter both 
of national and service Interest, perpetuating if possible the excellent 
cooperation that had always existed between itself and HACA. The space 
agency seemed destined to play the major role in the American program for 
years to come, and the future of the Air Force lay in space. Cooperation 
could be beneficial to both. The Air Force could assist RASA vith sup¬ 
porting facilities and experienced personnel, and RASA could assist the 
Air Force in projects of mutual interest. 

There were of course occasions of misunderstanding, but the Air Force 
kept its goal of cooperation. This policy vas brought out clearly in 
connection with the long-delayed WS-609 B alllstic Missile Test System 

(BKTS). Id the suraoer of 1958 tba Directorate of Research and Develop¬ 
ment suggested a joint U8AP-NACA effort for the project, and the subse¬ 
quent negotiations between the two agencies culminated In a USAF-NASA 
Memorandum of Understanding on 31 October, It provided for USAF-NASA 
cooperation In the development of a solid-rocket test vehicle that the 

Mr Force soon redesignated as the hy p e rsonic Environment That System 


(HET8) and RASA called Scout. 

The Air Force hoped that the cooperation shown by NASA in connection 
with BETS-Scout would prevail generally, but unfortunately there were 
other signs of strain. In addition to NASA's no-urgency attitude and non¬ 
military security precautions, there were two major sources of irritation— 
NASA's interrupt!ve demands on USAF facilities and resources used for bal¬ 
listic missiles and NASA's tendency to assume proprietary rights In the 


lunar system of the USAF space study program. 

NASA's first contact with the Air Force came shortly after the agen¬ 
cy's activation and was essentially in matters of logistics. Although 
the space agency inherited the facilities of NACA, these were inadequate 
to the vastly expanded requirements of the space projects. NASA there¬ 
upon proceeded to contract missile industry and civilian research centers 
and to take over facilities owned by or contracted to other government 

By January 1959* NASA bad acquired the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, had 
tried to take over ABMA, and was writing contracts with Rocketdyne and 
the Space Technology Laboratories. Simultaneously, NASA received space 
projects previously assigned by ARPA to AFEMD. The transfer automatically 
broadened NASA's grip, with acme disruption of the USAF ballistic missile 
program. The question for the Mr Force, and for ARPA too, was how to 

share the missile-boosters with NASA and bow to determine tbs NASA-service 
demands on missile industry and test facilities without serious impairment 
of the military weapon system pro g ram* As early as January 1959 the NASA- 
ARPA requirements for Atlas boosters generated major problems in schedul¬ 
ing. Also the launching of NASA space vehicles threatened to overtax the 


Air Force facilities at Patrick and Vandenberg. 

Thus at the beginning of the new year, NASA's enthusiasm, plus its 
failure to appreciate military requirements, imposed strains on relations 
with the Air Force. To ease the situation. Headquarters USAF at the be¬ 
hest of AFBKD sought a NASA-U8AF agreement to apportion the demands being 
made on USAF resources for ballistic missile research, development, pro¬ 
duction, and testing facilities. In turn, HASA professed fear that such 
an agreement would interfere with the civilian space progr am and preferred 
to negotiate at the level of the Secretary of Defenae. At the end of fis¬ 
cal year 1959 there was still no NASA-USAF agreement on these vital ques¬ 
tions, and the military program felt the disadvantage of having a lower 


priority than that of the civilian program. 

In the weeks following ARPA's activation, when service projects were 
being transferred to that agency by 06D decree, the Air Force began a 
space sthdy program. Its inspiration was a desire by Air Force leaders 
to avoid in the age of space exploration the blind spot that bad led to 
the lapse of the I CBM program between 1947 and 1954. The need was to 
look as far as possible into the future of space exploration and keep an 
integrated concept of possible operations ahead of current requirements. 
The means chosen to effect this aim was a relatively program. 

• 23 

already sponsored by ARDC, vlth industry. 

Inmediately after Sputnik, Headquarters U8AF authorised ARDC to under¬ 

take a study of military space applications and of the research and de¬ 
velopment to attain and support the requisite ays tears. The conclusion 
vas that there were three basic areas of permanent importance--Earth 
satellites, lunar control, and interplanetary exploration. In the next 
few months, February-August 1958, the ABDC-lndustry effort produced seven 
series of study requirements (SR's), six of which were organised as sub- 

2 ^ 

studies under three strategic systems: 

Strategic Orbital 

SR l8l, Strategic, 
10 Jul 58 

Strategic Lunar Strategic Interplanetary 

System System 

SR 192, Strategic 
Lunar System, 

29 Aug 58 

SR 182, Strategic 
25 JU1 58 

SR 178, Global Sur¬ 

12 Feb 58 

SR ld3. Lunar 
4 Apr 58 

SR l£7. Satellite 
Interceptor System, 
1 May 58 

The seventh series, the 24-hour reconnaissance satellite studies, SR 184, 
1958, vas regarded as a possible support system—along with the photographic 
satellite of WS-117L, the meteorological satellite, man-in-epace, end Dyna 

*The program was conducted on both a voluntary and funded basis. ARDC 
from time to time released to industry general descriptions of an area 
of probable future operational significance. Industry in turn undertook 
studies to determine the kind of weapons likely to be required, consider¬ 
ing technical feasibility, operational concept, facilities, manpower, 
training, methods of development, production schedules, and overall cost 
estimates. The studies were then evaluated by ARDC, the School of Avia¬ 
tion Medicine, would-be interested commands, Rand, Headquarters U8AF, 
and HACA. It vas a complicated process, but the end results had been 


Soar—for tba strategic orbital syetom. 

Tbe idea of a lunar base, which vaa carefully evaluated in SR 1^2 and 
SR 183, bad already aroused strong interest in some UBAF circles, and a 
lunar base had been listed as one of tbe five main divisions of tbe Air 
Force proposed astronautical program submitted to the Director of Guided... 
Missiles on 25 January 1958. It vas defended by General Boushey, Deputy 


Director of Research and Development, in congressional hearings during 
April, whan be claimed that tbe moon could be used as a launching site 
for deeper penetration of space, as a supply base for earth satellites, 
as an astronomical and meteorological observatory, and as a means of world¬ 
wide surveillance that could be a deterrence to aggression. From time to 
time other spokesman said essentially tbe same thing and warned that it 

might well became a matter of urgency to claim tbe moon by landing there 

25 ' .-V 

ahead of the Russians. 

The suggestion that a lunar base was militarily significant was chal¬ 
lenged, but its scientific value could never once be denied. Naturally 
the strategic lunar system (SR 192) and lunar observatory studies (SR 183) 
excited Interest among the NASA representatives at a RASA-USAF conference 
on 13 November 1958. NASA asked that it be kept apprised of tbe progress 
made by the whole space study program, particularly in the fields of over¬ 
lapping Interests. NASA wanted especially to know of tbe strategic lunar 

system status and, in return for this Air Force information, offered full 


In succeeding months, tbe strategic lunar system began to seem feas¬ 
ible with a logical extension of current techniques. In tbe spring of 
1959 there was speculation that a manned lunar landing and return might 

be possible by 1967, and. s permanent lunar base by 1969. Tbe estimated 

cost vas fixed at $8 billion and an annual operating cost after establish- 


sent of tbe base of approximately $600 million. 

In accordance with tbe agreement of November 1958, NASA vas kept In¬ 
formed of progress but seemed less and less inclined to reciprocate. Grad¬ 
ually a background of unhappy incidents in NA8A-USAF relations built up. 

In March 1959* ARDC invited NASA to participate in contractor midpoint 
briefings on SR 183* The response was markedly unenthusiastic, and only 
one NASA representative attended. Early in April* NASA created a Lunar 
Exploration Group. Tbe Army and Navy had representatives on the group 
but not the Air Force. A short time afterwards, on 17 April, to the sur¬ 
prise of the Air Force, NASA announced plans for long-range scientific ex- 


ploratloe of the moon. It vas at this same time that NASA representatives 
vere speaking confidently of lunar orbitings and landings in their state¬ 
ments before congressional committees. 

A fev days later, at a scheduled Headquarters ARDC briefing by two 
contractors working on the strategic lunar system studies, NASA represen¬ 
tatives "Injected" the remark that the lunar area vas "exclusively NASA 
property." This far-from-cooperative attitude by NASA in the lunar field 
became more noticeable as weeks passed, and It cane to cover much wider 
areas. Although during the summer of 1959 NASA agreed to participate with 
ARDC in briefing the Department of State on space activities and programs, 
NASA soon reneged. The stated explanation vas that NASA must avoid the 
impression of compromising its devotion to space-for-peace by seeming to 


associate its program with the military. There vere suggestions, how¬ 
ever, that the Air Force's insistence upon urgency for the overall program 

vu very Irritating to NASA officials vho, adjusting plans to budgets in 

tbs 1958-59 period, could not conceive of a lunar base except as a 20-year 


Whatever tbe explanation, the trend in KASA-USAF relatione that de¬ 
veloped over the space study progr a m was discouraging. The man-ln-space 
project had already been transferred to NASA, and it looked as though NASA 
would also take over the lunar exploration and base projects as well, with 
not so much as acknowledgement of Indebtedness. 

Headquarters USAF, however, made no compromise in its effort to better 
relations as a long-term objective. In the spring of i960 it was Air Force 
policy, and of course ARDC policy as well, to adhere to full cooperation 
with NASA even "at the rlak of our own programs. NASA must have the max¬ 
imum posalble aceeas to ARDC'a objectives and alma in projects of mutual 



The loss of Category IV and most of Category III projects, gave ARPA's 
program the lean look of starvation. (See program, p 163.) One glance and 
every bone in tbe skeleton was visible, but the shrinkage did not alter the 
agency's position within the Department of Defense. In October 1958 the 
agency still operated under tbe original DOD directive of 7 February—whose 
number had been changed to 3200.5 on 17 May. If ARPA was criticised, some¬ 
times with the audible hope that it might be abort lived. Secretary McElroy's 
reply was always tbe same: AREA was a permanent addition. 

In tbe course of the next eight or nine months the overall situation 
changed. ARPA's program suffered a few more losses to RASA but generally 
held its own, moved toward maturity in some projects, and gained several 
new projects. Tbe criticism of ARPA became more and more outspoken in 
military circles, but the agency was also stoutly derendM^ and these opin¬ 
ions were personal rather than official statements on the part of the Serv¬ 
ices. At the same time the position of ARPA shifted and slipped lower in 
tbe DOD organizational structure. 














Tbe Military Space Program—Second Phase 
After the division of projects with NASA, ARPA still did work in the 
ballistic missile defense area, which in one instance overlapped the space 
program, and in the space program itself the agency continued active in 
research and development for various satellites—six in late 1958 and early 
1959* Also, ARPA was instrumental in preparing tbe way for an effective track¬ 
ing system, and supported booster developments as long as permitted to do so. 





after Transfers 

In Sumner 

8 before HABA vaa 

1. Missile defense except Nike-Zeus 
and SHEWS 

1. Missile defense except Hike- 
Zeus and SMEWS 

2. Military reconnaissance satellite 2. Military reconnaissance satellite 
VS-117L WS-117L (being reorganised into 

2.1 advanced reconnaissance three separate projects within 

satellite ARPA) 

2.2 photo capsule 

2.3 24-br recpnnaissance 

2.4 Banned strategic station 

2.5 strategic communication satellite 

2.6 global surveillance 

3> Military developments for the ap- 3* Certain to be lost to XASA except 
plication of space technology for 3*5 satellite tracking and 

3.1 man-ln-spaee 3*6.3 navigational satellite 

3.2 special engines 

3-3 special components 

3 . 3 .1 chemical batteries 
3 * 3*2 nuclear reactor . 

3 . 3.3 solar batteries 
3*3*4 telemetry (etc.) 

3*4 Project Argus 

3.5 satellite tracking (Space Track) 

3*6 practical application of satellites 

3 . 6.1 communications satellite 

3.6.2 meteorological satellite 
3 * 6.3 navigational satellite 

3.7 bomb-powered rocket 

3.8 solid propellants 

It-. Other advanced research projects. 4. Certain to be lost to NASA 

4.1 ABMA/JFL program 

4.1.1 HACA balloon for density 

4.1.2 ABNA scientific satellite 

4.1.3 Army lunar probe 

4.1.4 Army lunar probe 

4.2 Three USAT lunar probes (one fired) 

4.3 NRL gadget program to photograph 
back side of moon 

4.4 Follow-on program, a continuation of 
the IGY work in 

4.4.1 cosmic measurements 

4.4.2 astronomical measurements 

4.4.3 solar research 
4.4.4. biological research 

The Satellite Projects 

Three of the six satellite types being sponsored by ARPA come from 
WS-117L. On 10 September 1958, Johnson redefined the Advanced Reconnaissance 
System and brake it down into separate projects with different designations. 
Previously the system designation had been changed from Pled Pipe! to Sentry, 
and now Johnson kept his name for the true reconnaissance satellite that employed 
visual (photographic) and ferret (electromagnetic) methods of observation. 

He stripped away a series of experiments that bad clustered around Sentry 
and gathered them together as the function of another satellite. Discoverer. 

This project was designed for vehicle and subsystem tests, biomedical 
flights, and the mastery of recovery techniques. The Infrared subsystem 
of ARS then was redesignated as the Missile Defense &Lam Satellite (Midas). 

Its function was to detect ICBM's at practically the Instant of their 
launching and thereby appreciably advance the time of warning. All three 
projects were assigned to ARDC-AFBMD with the usual contractual arrange¬ 
ment. These three satellites would depend initially upon Thor boosters 


but eventually the operational versions would employ Atlas. 

A satellite strategic communication station had also been one of the 

subsystems of WS-UTL, but it was not until July 1958 that ARPA acted to 

support the idea and Instructed ARDC to prepare the plan. By that time 

the Army and Navy too had submitted their communication satellite requlre- 


ments, and a strong trlservlce interest was vested in the outcome. 

The ARDC abbreviated development plan was completed on 26 August. 

It called for a worldwide communication system consisting of several satel¬ 
lites in polar orbit and, later, four on equatorial orbit which, at alti¬ 
tudes of 22,000 nautical miles, would equal the angular velocity of the 

earth and appear stationary. The prInary purpose of the system vas to 

alert the United States in a crisis of imminent hostilities, provide' SAC 

sufficient warning to mount a retaliatory strike force, and enable SAC to 

exercise command and control over the strike force once, it was airborne. 

The Air Staff approved ARDC'a plan and submitted it to AREA on 30 Septem- 

her 1958 . 

After cautious' consideration Johnson approved the plan on 22 October 
but splintered the project, assigning vehicle development to ARDC and pay- 
load to the Army Signal Corps. Here, as in almost no other instance, the 
splintering became a major issue because Air force Interest in a communi¬ 
cation satellite was widely different from that of the Army and Havy. 

These two services wanted the equatorial satellite to improve the trunking 
system for the transmission of critical Intelligence information to and 
from Europe, the Middle East, and far East. Such an aid to communication 
would provide the Army and Havy with the best insurance of command and con¬ 
trol for oversea weapons and forces. Since an equatorial, stationary sa¬ 
tellite, orbiting at 22,000 miles, vas certainly far beyond the capabilities 


of the United States in 1998 , the Army and Navy wanted interim repeater 

satellites orbiting the equator at 2,000 miles. The Air force had little 

interest in any equatorial satellite, and none in a repeater, for this 

satellite could cover only that territory between 79 ° S and 79 ° * latitude. 

The Air force wanted a polar satellite that would cover areas of the world 


where SAC forces were flying. 

The Air Force protested strongly to Johnson against his decision, and 

*The repeater principle had been used in Project Score, launched 18 De¬ 
cember 1998. 


he conceded the need for an Army-Air Force working group to insure that 
the Signal Corps designed a communication package meeting the needs of 
all three services. In the discussions that followed the Army and Navy 
were in mutual support, and agreement with the Air Force was difficult. 

The negotiations continued for weeks, with no settlement in sight. Johnson 
broke the deadlock by stating on 6 March 1959 that SAC's need for a polar 
satellite should be met at the earliest practicable date, fils decision 
resulted in an ARPA-sponsored communication satellite program consisting 
of three major systems: the SAC polar satellite termed Steer that would 
have its first test flight in 15 months, using an Atlas-Agena vehicle; an 
interim delay-repeater satellite designated Courier; and a 24-hour global 
communication satellite named Decree, to be developed sometime in the 

In the midst of these discussions, the long-dormant suggestion of a 
navigation satellite rose to the level of AREA approval. Both the Navy 
and the Air Force expressed an interest in such a project when making their 
recommendations to the Stewart Committee in December 1957-Januaxy 1958. But 
the Air Force did not include it in its' 25 January proposal, and the project 
was generally regarded as one primarily supported by the Navy. The purpose 
of the navigation satellite was to insure an instantaneous all-weather 
system for determining the position of any point on the globe by passive 
means. The receiving station, on ship or shore, or in the air, would 
listen for a radio signal from the satellite as it came over the horizon. 

The satellite would relay to the receiving station the signal for the 
Doppler shift, the synchronous time, and the orbital parameters in effect. 
The information would be sufficient to permit locating the circle of 


position vithin 0.4 mile. The project had the name Transit. It vas es¬ 
sentially simple, and In expectation of miniaturization, ARPA was thinking 
at the end of fiscal year 1959 of employing it operationally as a piggy¬ 
back payload on some prime satellite mission. During the research and 

development stage, management vas split between AFBMD and the Navy's Bureau 


of Ordnance. 

The sixth satellite project was the elaborated version of the cloud 

cover experiment assigned to ASMA by AO 1, on 19 March 1958. In succeeding 

months it bad been designated the Television Infra-Red Observing Station 

(Tiros) and was being developed to observe weather conditions in target 

areas, refueling zones, landing fields, and ocean operating areas. It 

would be for all intents an extension of weather aircraft operations. Its 

payload would consist of television cameras and photocells for infrared 

detection. As the project expanded, the Army Signal Corps and the Air 

Force Cambridge Research Center had been admitted to participation. It 

was a promising project, but in January 1959 Johnson informed JCS it would 


be transferred to NASA. 

In briefing JCS, Johnson dipped somewhat into the future. He spoke 
of a possible satellite for electronic countermeasures, of a space surveil¬ 
lance platform, and of a maneuverable recovery space vehicle (MRS V). The 
latter would insure a means of attack, defense, and escape, and the ARPA 
director expressed his confidence that in the end man-ln-space would be 
possible. In this connection he referred to the loss of the man-ln-space 
project to NASA but pointedly remarked that the Air Force's boost-glide 
Dyna Soar would surpass the capabilities of Mercury. Here, indeed, was 
potentially a manned space vehicle that could maneuver in and out of orbit. 



remaining under sufficient pilot control to operate from and return to 


predetermined fixed military bases. 

It ess gratifying to have Johnson's recognition of Dyna Soar, but 
to some USAS' officials his remarks could have presaged its loss either 
to ARPA or to NASA. ARPA saw the need of a manned maneuverable spacecraft 
and could take over Dyna Soar for development if the Air Force advanced 
its orbital ^capability. At the same time, NASA claimed to be the agency 
for manned spaceflight and could demand the transfer of Dyna Soar if ARPA 


took it as a manned space vehicle. As one Air Force officer said: 

The Air Force 'has been successful in retaining control of Dyna 
Soar by asserting that it has less than an orbital flight capability. 
This procedure has thus far succeeded in thwarting ARPA's overtures 
to take over the program. The Director of ARPA has stated-that the 
Dyna Sour program is the best approach toward the goal of manned 
space vehicles having a military capability. It is anticipated that 
ARPA will develop some type of a man-ln-space program patterned after 
the Dyna Soar program. At the present time, ARPA is conducting inves¬ 
tigative studies on advanced vehicle characteristics which would be 
applicable to such a program. 

As a safeguard, the Air Force continued for some time to emphasize the 

suborbltal rather than the orbital characteristics of Dyna Soar while going 

forward with its development as rapidly as weak funding and strong opposi- 


tlon within OSD permitted. 

*At the time that Johnson briefed JCS, January 1999, Dyna Soar seemed to 
be moving forward rapidly. On 29 November 1997; DD 9k authorized ARDC 
to proceed with Dyna Soar, and on 16 June 1998 the command announced the 
selection of Boeing and Martin as dual contractors for the early design 
phase. In April 1999; Boeing and Martin submitted designs, and SAB lent 
full support. Gradually, opposition in OSD seemed also to be dwindling. 
The Air Force felt more certain of its claims to Dyna Soar and by the 
late autumn of 1999 vas speaking without constraint of the boost-glide 
vehicle as possibly meeting USAF space requirements. (Draft memo by 
D/AT, to be sent by SAP to SOD, 23 Oct 99; subj: Required Action on Dyna 

The Booster Program 

As the need for larger satellites became more pressing, the need for 

more powerful boosters became more and more apparent. In the first six 

months of 1959, ARPA still had two major propulsion development projects 

under way—Saturn and Centaur. Saturn was the new name given to Juno V, 

the 1.5 million-pound booster consisting of a cluster of eight engines. 

It bad begun with in-house studies by ABMA in April 1957; and on 15 August 

1958, AO 14-59 directed the Army Ordnance and Missile Command (AQMC) to 

develop the booster. On 19 May 1959; ARPA announced the selection of the 

upper stages for the Saturn vehicle—a two-engine Titan for second stage 

and a Centaur as third stage. The Titan would contribute a thrust of 

367,000 pounds, and Centaur would add 30,000 pounds. Before the end of 

fiscal year 1959; there were prospects of using Saturn to launch USAF 


strategic surveillance satellites. 

Centaur promised great versatility and in 1959 was also being mentioned 
as the third stage for Atlas or Titan in launching communication and sev¬ 
eral other kinds of satellites. Its wide usefulness made Centaur applicable 
to the civilian space program as well as the military, and in February there 
were rumors—well substantiated—that NASA planned to take over Centaur 
development at the end of fiscal year 1959* After a long series of nego¬ 
tiations between ABPA and NASA, the former agreed in April to transfer the 
engine to NASA on 1 July. The shift was a blow to the military who be¬ 
lieved the civilian agency would place the project on a slower schedule 
than that advocated by ARPA and delay its availability for the military 
projects. Several segments within the Depaihnent of Defense continued to 
argue against the decision, but to no avail. The transfer was effected on 
schedule. 12 

The Tracking System 

The satellite tracking and surveillance system ires the most compli¬ 
cated of ARPA's projects in 1958 and 1959* The Air Force originated work 
on the system in the unhappy days after Sputnik I and II, when it became 
evident that the launching and flight of friendly rad hostile space ob¬ 
jects required same, form of monitoring. From the viewpoint of national 

security, it was essential to detect, identify, and if possible, determine 


the purpose of any satellite. 

For want of better equipment, the Air Force turned to radar facilities 
being developed to detect ICBM's. On 5 October 1957 the Millstone Hill 
radar at tfestford, Mass., prototype of stations to be used in the Ballistic 
Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), became operational. Because it suc¬ 
cessfully tracked Sputnik, the station was believed the best available 
means of tracking satellites rad, along with facilities in Trinidad, became 
the foundation in the slow buildup of a satellite tracking system. 

On 3 December 1937, Headquarters USAF gave primary responsibility to 
AHDC for coordinating satellite data from radio, radar, optical, and pho¬ 
tographic coverage. ARDC, in turn, would transfer the data to the Naval 
Research Laboratory (NHL) and the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory. 
This arrangement was the first move toward creating national procedures 
for tracking space vehicles. Plans progressed rapidly rad in January 1936, 

Project Space Track got under way with ARDC's establishment of a filter 


center at Air Force Cambridge Research Center. Shortly afterwards, six 
other ARDC centers received contributory assignments. By early April 1936 
the project was moving along smoothly. This success, rad the growing 
space program under ARPA, increased the complexities rad requirements of 

the project. The emerging plane for boost-glide vehicles and for recon¬ 
naissance, communication, navigation, weather, and scientific satellites, 
as well as hopes for lunar and interplanetary probes, meant a rapid in¬ 
crease in celestial traffic. On 19 June 1996, Headquarters USAF Issued 
GGR 170, Satellite Defense System, setting forth operational requirements 
for a tracking and control system. 

Meanwhile, the original Air Force-sponsored project was being expanded 

by higher authority into a more comprehensive program. On 18 January 1958, 

Holaday, who was still the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 

for Guided Missiles, directed the Secretary of the Navy to work for the 

integration of all DOD tracking and surveillance agencies into a national 

capability.^ Technically, the chief problem was that of dealing with the 

"dark" or nonradiating bodies. In attempted solutions, NRL set up a triservice 

committee which advised OSD that ARPA should establish a "surveillance 

fence” across the United States. This could be done by utilizing Army and 

Navy Doploc and Minitrack detection facilities already in existence or under 

development between San Diego, Calif., and Ft. Stewart, Ga. On 20June 1958, 

ARPA directed the Army and Navy to combine their facilities into a fence 


along the southern border of the country. 

The establishment of the fence created yet another problem—the need 

to have an organization to operate the system. The Army and Navy wanted 

a new triservice agency; the Air Force wanted responsibility assigned to 

, ' 17 

the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD). Discussion continued 

through the summer, and since agreement proved impossible, ARPA established 
the Space Surveillance Task Force. It was composed of representatives 
from the entire intelligence community. Its purpose was to study the 

problem from the viewpoint of Intelligence requirements aa modified by 

available techniques. The task force recognised the capabilities of the 

Air Force intelligence agency, the USAF Space Track project, and the filter 

center and pointed out that the Air Force had already solved the problem 

within its own service framework. The next step was to place the work on 

a national basis. 

At this point, the President signed the Space Act of 1958* No one 
knew what NASA's attitude would be toward surveillance. The Air Force 
hoped for cooperation, but Dr. Glennan promptly asked AHPA to transfer the 
entire responsibility for developing the detection and tracking unit. 


Johnson refused on the ground that military interests would be injured. 

On 9 November 1998, Johnson informed ARDC that the time bad come for 
an interim control system. Johnson felt that the logical place was the 
Air Force Cambridge Research Center and directed ARDC to develop the re¬ 
quired control units. The data readout facilities of NRL and the Army's 

Ballistic Research Laboratory (HRL) at Aberdeen, Md., would be made avail- 

able as necessary. Johnson's decision in a sense acknowledged the great 
progress mhde between 18 January and 5 November 1958 by DOD to create a na¬ 
tional space surveillance program, and his choice of the Cambridge center 
as the site for the Interim system pleased the Air Force. It did not 
please the Army, Navy, or NASA. 

Before the end of the month, ARDC set up a steering committee to work 
vlth representatives from ARPA, USAF, NRL, and BRL. At the meetings, the 
Army and Navy representatives were openly critical of Johnson's approach. 
Out of patience with tedious objectives, Johnson directed ARDC, on 19 De¬ 
cember, to proceed with the program, and on 13 January 1959 issued ARPA's 

System Development Flan for Space Track, it called for an Interim Space 
Surveillance System (ISSS) to be operational by March i960, consisting of 
a worldwide net of sensors feeding Information to the Cambridge control cen¬ 
ter for data processing. Later, a formal National Space Surveillance Sys- 

, x 21 

tem (HSSS) could be worked out. 

Meanwhile, following the NASA, request of October 1996 for complete 
control of detection and tracking, negotiations had been under way to devise 
a method whereby the requirements of the civilian sgency and the military 
could be met. A D0D-NA8A agreement was signed on 10 January 1959, recog¬ 
nizing the differences between the civilian and military needs. NASA was 
primarily interested in Information on flights pertaining to research and 
development; ARPA was primarily Interested in operational flights that 
would be of significance for the intelligence community. It was therefore 
agreed that NASA and AREA would both operate detection and tracking sta¬ 
tions with complete exchange of information. NASA assumed responsibility 
for a three-station net, with stations in California, Australia, and South 
Africa, and some Mini track stations for polar and Mercury flights. The 
Department of Defense was then left with responsibility for detection and track¬ 
ing from..the Atlantic,.Pacific, and White Sands missile ranges, the east-west 
Minitrack fence, and two additional stations—one in Japan and one in Spain. 

Management of the national system was entrusted to an ARPA-NASA tech¬ 
nical committee organized without service representatives. Moreover, the 
committee worked directly with ARDC and Cambridge, bypassing Headquarters 
USAF. The situation was far from satisfactory as far as the Air Force was 
concerned. Nevertheless, great progress had been made toward an effective 
NSSS in which the Army and Navy were responsible for creating a more 

effective method of detecting and tracking noncooperating satellites and 


the Air Force provided additional sensors and the control center. 

At the End of June 1959 

On 17 March 1959* OSD canceled DOD Directive 3200*5 under vhich ARPA 
had operated since 17 May 1953, and Issued a nev DOD Directive 5IO5.15. 
Though it revived the number of the original directive of 7 February 195®, 
it actually "wiped the slate clean" of the many changes of the past year. 

It effected a redefinition of ARPA's program in a series of descriptive 
lnclosures, which grew to more than a dozen between March and July 1959* 
Under the new directive, ARPA continued to operate in three areas, 
though two of them were somewhat broadened beyond what they had been. 
Missile defense was now termed defense against "extra atmosphere offen¬ 
sive vehicles," to Include both space vehicles and ballistic missiles; 
and propellant chemistry seem now in close alliance with vehicle materials. 
The area of the military space prograp remained the same, but within it 
there was considerable shift in projects. 

The titles of the projects assigned to ARPA under the new directive 
reflected the progress being made in the space program and its related 
fields. Project Defender covered the activities of ARPA in devising meth¬ 
ods of defense against hostile missiles, satellites, and other space ve¬ 
hicles. Project Principle and Project Fontus pertained to propellant 
chemistry and vehicle materials. 

In the space prograp Itself, there were 10 projects. Discoverer, 


Midas, and Sentry were elements of the old WS-117L ARS, now separated as 
the test experiment, infrared detection, and reconnaissance satellites 

♦Sentry was to be redesignated as Samos in August 1959 

respectively; Kotus end Transit were the communication end navigation sa¬ 
tellites; Sheppard was the space surveillance project; and Suzano was a 
more recently approved space platform or orbital base from which to launch 
advanced space missions. OSD bad also approved a space electronic counter¬ 
measure project dubbed Somnium; added a requirement for Tribe, a series 
of vehicles for special military space missions; and established Project 
Longsight, a series of space studies and system analyses to supply DOD on 
^..continuous basis with suggestions of projects that should be initiated 
to satisfy future military requirements. There was a strong similarity 
between the stated purpose of Project Longs ight and ARDC's space study pro¬ 

ARPA'g Changing Status in DOD 

For months in 1958, ARPA held a unique and powerful position in the 
Department of Defense. The director was the voice of the Secretary of 
Defense in matters of space research and development. Sometimes called a 
"fourth service" or a DOD "task force," the agency had seemed—to JCS and 
the services—more like an arm of OK) reaching down into the operational 
level of the military services. 

The Army, Havy, and Air Force felt from the beginning that ARPA should 
not be permanent, but as time passed it was evident that ARPA was doing an 
excellent Job, and the opposition of the Army and Havy waned. They still 
agreed with the Air Force in late 1958 and early 1959 that ARPA should go, 
but they did not agree it should go soon. Havy spokesmen, for instance, 
said that the Havy was not in the space vehicle business and was interested 
much more in payloads, "in what goes into space,” than in bow the payloads 
would get there. The Implication was that the Havy was no longer disturbed 


by ARPA as a fourth service since the agency had not attempted to inter- 


fere with matters pertaining strictly to the sea. 

The Air Force, on the other hand, was very much in the space vehicle 
business since its missiles were being used as boosters for so many satel¬ 
lite and space probe launchings. General Schriever was glad to acknowledge 
the good work done by ARPA but voiced sharp criticism of its disregard of 
tested concepts of management, its practice of splintering projects 
among the, and its failure to recognise the urgency of defin¬ 
ing a military posture in space. In January 1959# Schriever did not hesi¬ 
tate to say that ARPA should be phased out at the end of fiscal year 1999. 
The elimination of ARPA would leave DEBAR to become the space policy agency 
and permit the services to do their own research and development as they 

had done for land, sea, and air requirements in accordance with definite 


mission assignments. 

After Dr. Herbert F. York's appointment as the first Director of De- 


fense Research and Engineering on 24 December 1996, there was confusion 
as to whether Johnson outranked York or York outranked Johnson. The sit¬ 
uation elicited same amused but unfavorable comment in congressional taear- 

■ 29 


The question was not settled until 17 March 1959, when DOD Directive 
9109.19 enumerated ARPA projects and vent on to say that they were "subject 
to the supervision and coordination of the Director of Defense Research 
and Engineering in the same manner as those of the military departments 
and will be conducted in accordance with the priorities established by the 

♦See above, p 109. 

Secretary of Defense." The directive thus slipped a nev echelon between 
the Secretary of Defense and ARPA. 

In May 1959, York explained the arrangement in the course of testi¬ 
mony before a congressional camittee. He said there were four basic, oper¬ 
ating agencies in the Department of Defense—the Army, Navy, Air Force, and 
ARPA—doing research and development either by in-bouse work or by contract 

with outside agencies. DDRUS would supervise and coordinate all research 


and development, including that assigned to ARPA. 

The changes brought about by the establishment of DDR&E were far 
short of what the extreme critics of ARPA would have liked. But, whether 
they meant a deliberate change in the attitude of OSD toward ARPA or not, 
they certainly deprived the agency's director of seme of the authority 
given him in February 1958. He was no longer the voice of the Secretary 
of Defense in matters of space research and development. That authority 
was now vested in York. 

Space Operations, October 1957 to July 1959 
In the first 20 months of space operations, the Russians made four 
successful launchings. They admitted no failures. The Americans on the 
other band attempted 26 launchings—21 earth satellites, 3 lunar probes, 
and 2 interplanetary probes. Eight satellites entered orbit and 13 failed; 
the three lunar probes failed, not exceeding 70,000 feet, 71,000 miles, 
and 1,000 miles, respectively. One of the interplanetary probes reached 
an altitude of 63,582 miles, and the other went into orbit around the sun. 

This record put the Americans far ahead of the Russians if numbers 
alone counted. However, there were other factors to be considered. The 
Russians payload began with l8Z pounds for Sputnik I and increased in 

Sputnik U to 1,120 pounds. Furthermore, the Russian launchings led to 
important "firsts"—first to send a satellite In orbit around the earth; 
first to send animal life In orbit around the earth; first to have an in¬ 
terplanetary probe place a satellite around the sun. The American weakness 
was lack of thrust to send up large payloads, and the United States started 

with a payload of 3*5 pounds and increased the weight eventually to a max- 

ifflum of 372 pounds. 

The Russian triumphs had great psychological-political significance. 

Dr. Glennan admitted as much when he said in September 1939 that Americans 

still "play second fiddle In this space bulslness.” The President and the 

National Security Council expressed the same view officially and explicitly, 

but not publicly, when they acknowledged in January i 960 that the Russian 

"firsts” resulted in "substantial and enduring gains in the Soviet pres- 


Nevertheless, thanks to the ingenuity and devotion of NASA, ARPA, Army, 
Navy, Air Force, and industrial scientists, the Americans made noteworthy 
contributions to space science through the use of miniaturized instruments. 
These were made specially to compensate for the nation's lack in rocket- 
engine thrust power. The eight orbited satellites were distributed among 
four projects—2 Vanguards, 3 Explorers, 1 Score, and 2 Discoverers. 

Vanguard alone had received official approval before Sputnik and was 
intended to serve solely as a scientific contribution to IGY. Explorer 
was hastily conceived, primarily as a countermeasure to the Russian Sput¬ 
nik success. Incidentally, it too served to gather IGY scientific infor¬ 
mation though it depended for propulsion upon the use of a military missile 
as the lift device. Project Score was the Christmas greetings satellite 

successfully launched on l8 December 1938. 

Of the four projects. Discoverer was the first true military satellite. 
Painstakingly prepared by AFBMD after being separated fay ARPA from WS-117L, 
it vas Instrumented to aid in the development of other military satellites. 

It had six main test objectives: airframe and guidance subsystems, stab¬ 
ilization equipment, means of controlling the internal environment, re¬ 
action of mice and small primates to weightlessness, adequacy of capsule 
recovery techniques, and proficiency of ground support equipment and 

, 2 9 


Discoverer I and Discoverer II were successfully launched on 28 Feb¬ 
ruary and 13 April 1939* Discoverer II created a small international in¬ 
cident of rivalry. Intrigue, and theft. The satellite was the first to 
contain a recovery capsule, equipped with a retro-rocket ejection mechan¬ 
ism. It vas intended to permit recovery after a few passes around the 
earth, and the recovery task force, consisting of nine C-119's, four RC-121's, 
and three destroyers, was operating off Hawaii. Several attempts to trigger 
the capsule failed. Not until the next day, during its seventeenth pass, 
vas the capsule ejected—and this was automatic. It came down reputedly 
in a fjord northwest of Longyear City in the Spitsbergen Islands. The 
islands were Norwegian, but under a provision of the 1920 Treaty of Paris, 
all signatory nations, including Russia, had the right to exploit mineral 
deposits there. Numerous Soviet mines existed in the region and the island 
vas inhabited by Russians in 1959- The capsule, therefore, fell almost in 
Soviet laps. It vas not surprising that neither the Americans nor the Nor¬ 
wegians could find the capsule, but they saw evidence that the Russians 
had found and shipped the prize home to their own space scientists. The 



April Issue of Current Intelligence Digest published the following com¬ 
ments on the Incident: 

A search party was Immediately organized and the search continued 
through 22 April with negative results. During the search in the 
Spitsbergen area, a helicopter crew observed footprints in the snow 
and evidence of a heavy object being dragged through the snow into 
the entrance of a Soviet mine. The Air Attache in Oslo, Norway, re¬ 
ported that discussions with Colonel Tatum, Air Rescue Commander, 
and Lt Colonel Metbeson, AFEMD, revealed that Russian indigenous 
personnel did retrieve the capsule on 15 April. The USAIRA, Oslo, 
also reported that several days later, a Russian ice breaker was 
sighted entering and departing Longyear City, Spitsbergen. 










Perhaps the most disturbing thing about Sputnik was the paradox of 
Its undeniable Importance and Its imprecise significance. There was uni¬ 
versal pride In the satellite and an Intuitive understanding that history 
was in labor vlth one of its great crises. Change vas imminent, but with¬ 
out clairvoyance of what the change would be, the world strained with 

anxiety for the future—and with nostalgia for the comfortable ways of 


In the conflict between the opponents and proponents of a military 
space program, no one denied that a scientific program was essential be¬ 
cause little was known about space; but for that same reason many denied 
the need for a military program. To this argument the military replied 
that despite existing ignorance of what space warfare would be, space, as 
an area of operations, would eventually shatter the old-time concept of 
land, sea, and air missions. In time, space weapons would erase existing 
lines of responsibility. The United States must develop a military spaqe 
competency parallel with scientific knowledge or one day find Itself help¬ 
less under a devastating blow. The question was whether the nation should 
seek merely the scientific exploration of space or both the exploration 
and control of space. The military were careful to point out that capa¬ 
bility to control space did not necessarily mean the abusive exercise of 

that control. 

In the late months of 1957 and early 1958; the military frankly 

admitted they could speak less fluently of space warfare than of Infantry 
maneuvers, of naval blockades, or of strategic bombing. They lacked the 
experience. "There is a lot of scientific data that we can get from ex¬ 
ploration of space," said General Schriever in April 1958 , but it is "im¬ 
possible, I would say now, for any man to predict exactly how important 

space will be for military purposes, looking into the future, 20, 30 , or 

3- ^ 

40 years." In December 1959, an Air Force position paper commented: 

Scientific and engineering contributions to the solution of 
military problems have revolutionized warfare. The invention of 
gunpowder, the steam engine, the submarine,, the airplane, the tank, 
radar, nuclear weapons and the ballistic missile, to name only a 
few examples, have had profound effect on military strategy and 
the balance of power between nations. 

The latest contribution and perhaps the greatest technological 
change of all, is man's first step into space. It can be clearly 
foreseen that military space systems will alter current military 
concepts and strategies, even though the exact nature of their use 
and effect cannot be delineated over the long range. Recognizing 
that the military potential of space is of such significance that 
within this century it may well determine the future history of 
the world, the military must exploit this potential in the national 

If the military did not succeed in the two years since October 1957 
in reaching a clear conception of space warfare, it was not for-want of 
trying. The effort was persistent, but the objective was too big to be 
seen without perspective. Army, Navy, Air Force, and JCS analysts attempted 
time and again to foresee the role of the military in space but ended always 
with nothing more than a laborious listing of satellite projects under de¬ 
velopment. A list of ship classes could not explain naval strategy or 
tactics, or the significance of sea power, and lists of possible space 
vehicles did not explain space strategy or tactics, or the significance 

of space power. The best that could be done was to speak of the "military 
^ „5 

uses of space." 

The inability of Btrategiats and tacticians to prepare handbooks on 
apace warfare in no way detracted from the obviously great military sig¬ 
nificance of apace. The Army, Wavy, and Air Force knew that somehow, and 
in some way, space would became the transcendent factor in preserving peace 
or, failing that, in winning the war. That knowledge was the important 
thing, and the DOS apace projects were as much exploratory for military 
ends as the scientific projects were exploratory for scientific ends. 

In the first two years of their exploratory efforts the military were 

keenly aware of the need to reconcile their requirements with a national 

space policy that leaned aore favorably toward the civilian-scientific 

program. The services bad also to fortify their separate positions with 

doctrine and with attempts to obtain assigned roles and missions. The 

prospects of space were limitless, and the services vied among themselves 


for dominance. 

Military Reactions to the Space-for-Peace Policy 

After January 1948, when General Vandenberg asserted that responsibil¬ 
ity for satellites logically belonged to the Air Force, there was no fur¬ 
ther policy statement on space prior to Sputnik. In the confusion that 
followed Sputnik, the Air Force felt the need of a new statement, especially 
as a talking paper for its representatives appearing before congressional 
committees. The task of preparation fell to the Office of the Deputy Chief 
of Staff /Development. 

(to 6 December 1957* DCS/Development forwarded to the Chief of Staff, USAF, 
a policy statement that affirmed the loyalty of the Air Force to national 
objectives and asserted that the control of space was essential to national 
security. Continuing, the paper declared that the Air Force was the logical 


agency to achieve this military power because there could be "no division, ^ 


per eg, between air and apace; only one indivisible field of operations 


above the surface of the Barth," 

In referring to Air Force support of national objectives and the 
desire to exploit the military advantages of space, the policy statement 
fingered an unpleasant dichotomy from which the military could not escape t 

during the next two years. The national objective was expressed in the 


President's space-for-peace policy, so phrased in pre-Sputnik days as to 

exclude the military from those regions beyond the aerodynamic capabilities 

of airpower. Bhd this same principle been part of the freedom of the seas, 
the navies of the world would have been excluded from the oceans beyond the 
three-mile limit. Hone denied the ideal of space-for-peace but the resul¬ 
tant restrictions did not jibe with the obligations of the military for 
the security of the United States. From the beginning to the end, the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force were united in expressing their acceptance of 
Bpace-for-peace as the national objective, but until international arrange¬ 
ments could guarantee that all nations would follow the same ideal, an 

American capability to control space was essential to the liberty of free 

, 8 


♦Even before Sputnik the Air Force vas aware that space had serious impli¬ 
cation for airpower. In the spring of 1957 the Air Force General Counsel 
undertook a study of "air space” and "outer space” definitions, the 
legality of satellites in transterritorial flight, and the legal compli¬ 
cations of space defense. Of equal Interest were the less cosmic subjects 
of interservice rivalry, military budgets, and possible changes in the 
structure of the Air Force. The General Counsel moved slowly, however, 
and in March 1958 was still weighing the advantages of various alternative 
policies before reconmendlng an official position. (Memo, Col R.L. Johnson. 
Dev Div, D/R&D to D/Plans, 15 May 57, subj: Future of Satellite Operations.) 

In seeking to adjust their loyalty to the President's somewhat ex¬ 
treme position and their obligations to safeguard the defense of the United 
States, the Military did not criticise the space-for-peece policy but 
sought rather to determine for themselves bow effective international 
space lew was likely to be, how it would curtail their own activities, 
and how far they should go In presenting a case for military space proj¬ 

In March 1958 the three services took advantage of their invitation 
to assist the national Security Council In Its preparation of the Prelim¬ 
inary united States Policy on Space (H9C 581 A/ 1 ). They expressed their 
views and were at one In supporting the Ideal of space-for-peace. They 
were also at one In warning against emasculating the military program. 
After Its HSC recommendations, the Air Force undertook a second study, 
for Air Force eyes only, on the feasibility of an International law for 
Space and its effects on the military space program. The task required 
five months to complete, and DCS/Plana hnd Progr a ms drew upon the advice 
of all Interested Headquarters agencies as well as the Air University and 


Band Corporation. 

On 22 August 1958 the Air Force "Study on Sovereignty over Outer- 
Space" was completed, and by 8 October it was distributed among Headquar¬ 
ters offices with the recommendation that it serve as the basis for de¬ 
veloping future studies by the Air Staff when called upon for comments or 
actions related to an International law for space. It was Air Force doc¬ 
trine, under this paper, that the Government should avoid committing Itself 
on any current issue. Time was needed to evaluate the totally new condi¬ 
tions being created by the space age. It seemed particularly unfortunate 



for the Department of State to assume, as it vas assuming, that silence 
on space claims In relation to specific events, such as Sputnik's transit, 
implied a general waiver of claims. Effective international control of 
space conceivably could come in the future, hut it vas a goal not a reality. 
In supporting the President's policy, the military should urge and assist 
in obtaining international cooperation in projects not pertinent to national 
security, thereby contributing to the eventual attainment of the national 
objective. At the same time the Mr Force should seek approval of an ade¬ 
quate program of research and development and vork toward the formulation 
of projects to meet the scientific, commercial, and military needs of the 
United States. The military goal must always be the prevention of Soviet 
dominance in space. 10 

The passing months brought no variation in themes. The Government 

continued to speak of space-for-peace, to negotiate in the United Nations 

for acceptance of the policy, to find powerful support for the idea in 

Congress and among the people generally. The military continued to face 

the dilemma with the same uneasiness. On 2 May 1959 the Chief of Naval 


Operations vrote to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

I have noted recent statements by members of Congress, and of 
the Executive Department, vith a generally favorable and public re¬ 
action on "the peaceful use of outer space." I view vith concern 
the adverse effects on national security of an unrealistic or restric¬ 
tive international agreement to use outer space solely for peaceful 
purposes. The U.S. Military Services have responsibilities which 
require the use of outer space for research, development, and oper¬ 
ation of weapons systems. Until an enforceable and positive guar¬ 
antee of control in the use of space can be made, this will remain so. 

The Joint Chiefs on 22 May forwarded an elaboration of these views to 
the Secretary of Defense. It would be, they said, a most serious matter 
to restrict the services in their use of space before an enforceable inter¬ 
national control came into being. The current and future capabilities- 

of the armed forces should not be hampered by premature agreements to keep 

space for peace, and the JCS hoped that Its opinions would be considered 


before the United States committed Itself to definite agreements. Seven 

months later. In December 1959, the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, 


Maj. Gen. Richard M. Montgomery, said essentially the seme thing: 

The President's announced policy is /that/ the exploration of 
space and, therefore, this country's space programs, will be used 
only for peaceful purposes, and for the good of mankind. Falling 
that, however, the Air Force believes that there Is a great poten¬ 
tial in apace from a military standpoint, and that this potential 
must be developed. 

The Doctrine of Aerospace 

The service chiefs were not always in unanimous agreement on questions 

of space. Hothing divided them more sharply than the USAF claim that the 

continuum of air and space gave the Air Force the responsibility, under 

accepted roles and missions, to become the service of primary Interest 

in space. This had been the argument, implicitly at least, in Vandenberg's 

statement of January 1948. It was repeated in the policy statement of 6 

December 1957* And again, in March 1958, the Chief of Staff, USAF, General 

White, wrote: 

For all practical purposes air and space merge, form a continuous 
and indivisible field of operations. Just as in the past, when our 
capability to control the air permitted our freedom of movement in 
the land and seas beneath, so, in the future, will the capability to 
control space permit our freedom of movement on the surface of the 
earth and through the atmosphere. 

Though numerous Air Force officers repeated the same thought in pub¬ 
lic statements, in articles, and in classified papers during the succeeding 
months, the doctrine of air-space continuum was not propagated systematically. 
By the time 1956 was well advanced, ARPA and NASA acquisitions and 
actions had virtually wrecked the proposed USAF astronautics program of 

25 January, and the Air Staff felt It van essential to undertake a counter* 
offensive to regain If possible some portions at least of its program. 

There was need to reassert the doctrine of air-space continuum and define 
it In terns that lent emphasis to the concept. The movement came to a 
climax In the last days of 1958 vben the Air Staff vas preparing a talking 
paper for the Chief of Staff In his scheduled appearances before congres¬ 
sional committees. This meant redoing the policy paper of 6 December 1957 
with emphasis on vhat the Air Force had contributed to both the military 
and scientific space programs during 1958 , a reassertlon of the air-space 
continuum doctrine, and a restatement of Air Force claims to overall re¬ 
sponsibility for the development and control of space vehicles, granting 
recognition of limited Army and Navy needs. The policy statement vas com¬ 
pleted on 30 January 1959 and vas consonant vith the accepted roles and 
missions for operations on land and sea and in the air. It spoke of the 
air-space continuum as "aerospace"—a tens used for same time within a few 

Air Staff offices—and defined the term in such manner as to justify Air 


Force claims as the service of primary interest there. 

On 3 February 195 S> General White appeared before the House Committee 

on Science and Astronautics. He expressed the desire of the Air Force to 

promote the peaceful use of space for the benefit of mankind as sought by 

the President. Fending effective measure o that end, however. White 

declared that the right of the Free World to explore space depended upon 


a "strong and capable deterrent aerospace force." He added: 

The Air Force has operated throughout its relatively short history 
in the sensible atmosphere around the earth. Recent developments have 
allowed us to extend our operations further away from the earth, ap¬ 
proaching the environment popularly referred to as space. Since there 
is no dividing line, no natural barrier separating these two areas, 
there can be no operational boundry between them. Thus air and space 
comprise a single continuous operational field in which the Air Force 
must continue to function. The area is aerospace. 


General White thus brought to the fore the old doctrine of air-space 

The significance of the definition was not missed, and the reaction 

was less than unanimously enthusiastic. Tbs criticism that rose within 

the committee overflowed and spread far beyond the limits of the room. 

The next day Representative Daniel J. Flood of Pennsylvania, in hearings 

before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, allowed 

himself the pleasure of sarcasm. He epitomised the feelings of many Air 


Force critics, both civilian and military in the following dialogue: 

Rep. Daniel Flood: 

Boys, the Air Force has come up with a new phrase, "aerospace". 
That is a beauty. Even Wlnchell could not think that one up. That 
means everybody is out of space and the air except the Air Force, in 
case you don't know it. Has the Air Force, without consulting any¬ 
body, taken the Wavy out of the air and space? ... /The Air Force 
has/ now staked out a claim to "aerospace". That is their pigeon- 
space and air. Do you know about it /Sir. Gates/? . . . You Navy 
people had better get into tills space thing, because I have been 
around here for a long time, and I have seen this happen in other 
areas. You had better get back into space or you "aint" going to 
be in space. 

Thomas S. Gates, Secretary of the Wavy: 

We have a little thing called Vanguard which is doing pretty well. 
Rep. Daniel Flood: 

I know, I agree With you. But the honeymoon is over for the Air 
Force. There will not be many aircraft around when the sons of the 
flyboya go to the Air Academy. They have to have something to stay 
in business. You had better get into there, or you won't be around. 

General White did not retract the claim of the Air Force to aerospace. 

The criticism at least accustomed all ears to the sound of the word, and 

it made known the position of the Air Staff. The discussion continued 

through the remainder of 1959 hut gradually the consents lost sharpness. 

In its final form, officially approved and incorporated in AFM 1-2, 

December 1959* the definition stated: 

The aerospace Is an operationally indivisible medium consisting 
of the total expanse beyond the earth’s surface. The forces of the 
Air force comprise a family of operating systems—air systems, ballis¬ 
tic missiles, and space vehicle systems. These are the fundamental 
aerospace forces of the nation. 

Logically the doctrine of aerospace expressed the thought that alrpower and 

space power are the same thing and should be vested in a single service which, 

whatever its official title, would be the aerospace force. Space vehicles 

would be another category of vehicles for employment in the regions above 

the surface of the earth to help deter war or, failing that, to help win 

the war. 

The Air Staff felt that the doctrine of aerospace epitomised USA? space 
policy, completely adjusted to the accepted theory of roles and missions. 

But a doctrinal pronouncement did not automatically correct the situation. 
Historically and logically the Air Force claims could be Justified, and 
they could even be made to fit the Air Force needs and capabilities as pro¬ 
jected into the 1960-70 decade—though prophecy was dangerous in an age of 
technological change. Nevertheless) the unhappy fact remained that in the 
first part of 1959 the Air Force still bad no space program in being that 


could Justify claims to space leadership. 

The task confronting the Air Staff was to devise same way of persuading 
OSD to assign space missions and projects to the Air Force to fill the vac¬ 
uum created in 1958 by the losses to ARPA and NASA. There were two possible 
approaches: to request a redefinition of service roles and missions not 
yet updated to meet the demands of the space age or to pursue a slower 

*At the end of 1958 the functional responsibility of the Air Force derived 
from three documents: the 1948 Key Vest functions paper, DOD Directive 5100.1 
of 16 Mar 1954, and its revision of 31 Dec 1958. The Key West Agreement was 
prepared without thought of the space age, and no changes bad been introduced. 
Nor were there provisions in 5100.1 to meet the current technological, develop¬ 
ments or the new political-military situation. (Ltr, Gen T.S. Power to Gen 
T.D. White, 9 Feb 59.) 


course but accelerate development of specific aerospace hardware with the 

approval of ARPA and NASA. To request clarification of missions without 

possessing the hardware might provide the Army and Navy- an excellent oppor- 


tunity for refutation to the permanent detriment of Air Force claims. 

Headquarters USAF chose to move slowly, and General LeMay, Vice Chief, ex- 


plained this approach in a letter of 17 March 1959 to General Power at SAC< 

Specifically, we intend to accelerate the development of aero¬ 
space hardware and intensify our efforts to obtain early official 
sanction from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and 
the Secretary of Defense for the Air Force to pursue these develop¬ 
ment projects .... While recognising Army and Navy interest in 
aerospace projects, we would seek to limit their participation to a 
coordinating role. Furthermore, we axe making every effort to place 
qualified Air Force representatives in key positions of Influence 
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and other governmental 
organisations concerned with space activities* 

The Navy-Air Force FMR Disag re e me nt 
In 1957 and the early part of 1958 the Army seemed to have better 
space claims than the Navy. There was the undisputed fact that the Army 
could have put a satellite in orbit before Vanguard; and there were the 
impressive Explorer orbitings on 31 January, 26 March, and 26 July 1958 . 
Slowly the tide turned. There was the launching of Vanguard I on 17 March 
1958 and the USAF success in placing the Project Score satellite (Atlas 
missile) in orbit on 16 December 1958. Thus, the Air Force and Navy both 
shewed a competence to equal that of the Army before the beginning of 1959. 
If it bad not been for the Saturn booster project, the Army would have had 
an insignificant apace role for the future. Even with Saturn, the trend 
was toward a Navy-Air Force race. 

In the spring of 1959 the Chief of Naval Operations established an 
ad hoc committee under Rear Adm. Thomas F. Connolly to determine the 


Navy’s astronautics policy. Three Booths later, CflO approved the Connolly 
report. It called for a comprehensive program to enhance the "roles and 
missions presently assigned to the Navy" and cited the Pacific Missile 
Benge (PMR) as a major contribution by the Navy to the national space pro¬ 
gram. At once CNO established in his office the Astronautics Operations 
Division (0p?5U) and the Astronautics Development Division (Op-76). At 

the seme time the Navy assumed a more aggressive attitude in the long- 


standing dispute with the Air Force over PMR-Vandenberg AFB relations. 

The Pacific Missile Range and Vandenberg vere in juxtaposition because 

both vere carved from an 86,000-acre strip of California coastland, formerly 

the Army's damp Cooke. In 1956 the Air Force obtained 67,000 acres of the 

northern part of the tract as a training-operational area for ballistic 

missiles. It vas named Cooke AFB until redesignated for Vandenberg in 

October 1958, and. it vas placed' under tbs administrative and operational 

control of AFEMD's 1st Missile Division (later reassigned to SAC). Before 

the end of 1957 the Air Force vas constructing Thor and Atlas pads at 

Vandenberg that could be used either for training or operational purposes. 

As soon as a military space program seemed probable, it vas evident that 

Vandenberg offered special advantages for launching polar-orbiting satel- 


lites, since the boosters would pass over no land north of Antartica. 

Meanwhile the Navy obtained permission from OSD in December 1957 to 

combine the remaining southern part of Camp Cooke, totaling 19,000 acres, 

with the Naval Missile Test Center, which had been operating at Point Mugu, 

90 miles, to the south, since 1946. The Navy would develop its new possession, 

the Pacific Missile Range, as. a national facility and companion to the At- 


lantic and White Sands missile ranges. 


Sine* PMR would serve all agencies needing its special facilities, 
the Navy and Air Force were certain to overlap in operational activities 
and interests. To forestall misunderstandings, Ada. Arleigh Burke, Chief 
of Ravel Operations, and General Vhite, Chief of Staff, USAF, began nego¬ 
tiating early in 1958 for an agreement, which they signed 5 March. It pro¬ 
vided for coordination in fixing radio frequencies, firing schedules, and 
the avoidance of undesirable duplication. Range safety remained with the 
Havy or the Air Force depending upon the responsibility for tracking spe¬ 
cific missiles, but this provision was in contradiction with the navy's 

proprietary authority for flight preparation of missiles, control through 


flight and impact, and operation of the range safety equipment. 

The agreement was of little benefit. The Navy formally opened the 
Pacific Missile Range in June 1958, and at once Navy-Air Force misunder¬ 
standings began. Tbs trouble started at the operational levels of PMR 
and the 1st Missile Division. Small questions, such'as basing a Havy drone 
aircraft on Vandenberg, were followed by accusations and counteraccusations 
of Improper coordination and lack of cooperation. Other contentions in¬ 
volved the means of insuring safety for Southern Pacific Railway trains 
passing through PMR-Vandenberg territories during missile-satellite launch¬ 
ings, the authority to reimburse the railway company for necessary inter¬ 
ruption of its schedules, and the right of PMR to negotiate a unilateral 

agreement with the railway regardless of objections either by the 1st Mis- 


sile Division, SAC, or Headquarters USAF. 

A much more serious misunderstanding arose in February 1959 when ARPA 
directed the Air Force to launch Discoverer satellites on 26 February, 13 
April, 3 June, and 25 June into polar orbits from Thor pads at Vandenberg. 

Tbs Discoverer trajectories passed over PMR territory. Each time for the 
sake of safety, the Navy evacuated BJR, where work was proceeding on 
two Atlas pads for the Samos and Midas projects, and the entire village 
of Surf, located between MR and Vandenberg AFB. The Navy also halted 
Southern Pacific trains. The cost of these evacuations and delayed work, 
which lasted for several hours or several daya depending on the countdown, 
ran into considerable sums, and of course proved most annoying to the ci¬ 
vilians affected. The Air Force felt that the evacuations were unnecessary 
since it considered the odds to be 200,000 to 1 against fatalities. The 
Navy's rebuttal was that the odds were only 20,000 to 1. The real point 

at issue was responsibility for safety, a question complicated by the 

. 27 

contradiction implicit in the Burke-White agreement of March 195«* 

For the Air Force the significance of the PMR controversy Involved 
not only the control of important facilities on the west coast but also 

strategy, roles and missions, and the future, functions of the Navy and Air 

26 a 29 

Force in space. On 13 December 1958, General Power wrote General White: 

The Navy appears to be using custodianship of the Pacific Mis¬ 
sile Range to develop an ambitious space program centering on this 
range. The implications of Navy planning are not significant on the 
surface but could be devastating. The precedent for the control of 
space could be well established, yet easily disguised with the devel¬ 
opment of world-wide launch, tracking and control facilities. The 
agency controlling space facilities will control the space missions. 

Power cited two documents in support of his contention. A special OSD 

committee report of 18 August 1956 recommended transfer of the southern 

part of Vandenberg to PMR, and an Aerojet Corporation report, prepared 

under contract with PMR, recommended expansion of the range to Include six 

major divisions: Polar Orbit Range, Equatorial Orbit Range, Intercontinental 

Range, Intermediate Range, Anti-Missile Range, and Extended Sea and Inland Range 

General Power's views seemed not without Justification when Admiral 

Burke said in January 1959 that the Navy with 060 concurrence had projected 
a 15 -year expansion plan for the PMR complex at an estimated total coat of 
$4 billion. She plan called for six separate firing ranges—Sea Seat, XREM, ICBM, 
Polar Orbit, Equatorial Orbit, and Anti-Missile-Missile. ^ The OSD-Navy 
plan vas practically an unqualified adoption of Aerojet's recommendation. 

To USAF officers at Vandenberg and at MR, It appeared that the Navy 

vas consistently trying to establish control over Vandenberg. This vas 

brought out in numerous proposals that followed in rather rapid sequence— 

requests for the physical transfer of Vandenberg missile assembly buildings 

to PMR, the move to acquire temporarily the use of 400 acres from Vanden- 

berg's area, the use of Vandenberg airstrips by PMR aircraft. The conten- 


tions went on into the spring. 

With each week It became more and more evident that the Burke-White 
paper of March 1958 vas no longer applicable to a rapidly changing situa¬ 
tion. The Navy then prepared a proposed triservice-NABA agreement. The 
Air Force rejected it because its provisions threatened control of Vanden¬ 
berg operations that "impugned directly on the future of the Strategic Air 
Command in space." Negotiations continued, however, at the chief of staff 
level. Before a satisfactory arrangement vas reached, the dispute at fMR 
and Vandenberg became yet more unpleasant in connection with the "Discoverer 
crisis" in August 1959* Discoverers I and II were successfully launched 
on 28 February and 13 April 1959* tut Discoverer in and IV, launched 3 
and 25 June, both failed to orbit. The Air Force wanted to move the exit 
azimuth for future Discoverer launchings eastward to take advantage of the 
earth's rotation. PMR's comander claimed that the shift vould endanger 
civilian life and property} the Air Force replied that the chance vas 1 to 

1,000,000. The question still remained unsettled when Admiral Burke and 

General White signed the new Navy-USAF "Agreement for Coordinated Pease- 

time Operation of the Pacific Missile Range" on 22 September. The agree- 


ment represented a compromise in the Navy's favor, but the understanding 


bad already been "overtaken by events” that sere favorable to the Air Force. 

A Time for Decision 

During the spring and early summer of 1959; interservice tension 
mounted. The criticism of the doctrine of aerospace, the FMR dispute, and 
the expressed desire of the Air Force to regain managerial control of re¬ 
search and development for its space projects were indicative of the prev¬ 
alent restlessness. Moreover, it was time for changes in priority of 
projects. Some of those accorded highest national priority for research 
and development in January 1958 —Thor, Jupiter, Juplter-C, and Vanguard— 
could be removed from the list in March 1959 as having passed beyond that 
stage. On the other band, Midas , 1 Discoverer, and Sentry had advanced to 
the place where they should be accorded highest priority status. Soon the 

Secretary of Defense would have to make assignments of operational control 


for these satellites. Clearly a time for decision was at hand." 

#The agreement listed three major responsibilities of the Navy—range 
Bafety criteria, including approval of safety plans, procedures, and 
equipment for all missiles, satellites, and space vehicles launched at 
PMR; coordination to prevent duplication of range facilities and equip¬ 
ment; and the provision, maintenance, and operation of all common-use 
facilities, including ground instrumentation and the equipment required 
by Joint tenancy agreements. Air Force rights were protected by the agree¬ 
ment to reserve for the service sponsoring the flight the control of flight 
preparation, the launching devices, and the missiles, satellites, and 
space vehicles themselves while in flight until the Impact of missile or 
until the last-stage burnout of satellites and space vehicles. 

An Air Force Attempt to Force the Iseue 

Although the Chief of Staff decided in the late Vinter of 1958 not 

to request a redefinition of service roles and missions, the decision 

did not preclude the request for operational assignments as satellite 

projects approached the end of development. Since it had been assumed 

that the Sentry reconnaissance satellite would eventually be placed under 

USAF operational control, the Under Secretary of the Air Force Informally 

asked the Secretary of Defense on 26 February 1959 to approve the transfer 

at once. The Secretary of Defense agreed to consider the transfer if an 

official recommendation were made. By 1? April 1959 the under Secretary 

of the Air Force had a recommendation from the Air Staff that the transfer 


of Sentry from ARPA to USAF be effected 1 July. 

The request for operational control of Sentry was extended to cover 

Midas too, and Headquarters USAF was optimistic. The field agencies, ARDC 

and AFSMD, apparently were not aware of what was happening, and on 18 May, 

General Schrlever, ARDC’s commander, wrote identical letters to Generals 


Gerhart and Wilson containing the following paragraph: 

It is important that we get all or part of the space mission 
assigned to the Air Force as soon as possible including operational 
as veil as development aspects. The Air Force is expending a great 
deal 9 f time on space efforts much of which could be made more pro¬ 
ductive if the military space mission were clearly assigned. We could 
then pursue both our development and operational space efforts more 
aggressively. Moreover, such an assignment would do much to reduce 
the extensive and detailed ."assistance" we have been getting from the 
Department of Defense, and place us in a better position relative to 
the Rational Aeronautics and Space Administration. It would permit 
us to plan and integrate our resources more effectively. It would 
also do much to clear the air between the Services and reduce the 
reactive efforts that take up so much of our time and keep us con¬ 
stantly off balance. 

The two deputy chiefs of staff, in their reply to General Schrlever, 
did little more than hint at the situation developing in the Pentagon. 


Two weeks later, when Schriever attended a briefing there, he learned of 
the effort the Air Force had made to recover some of its lost projects. 

He learned also of a new position paper, completed 4 June, derived from 
the doctrine of aerospace. It stated that the Air Force would seek manage¬ 
ment responsibility for the research and development projects vital to 
space dominancy, request recognition as the executive agent of the Depart¬ 
ment of Defense for coordination and integration of research and develop-* 

ment facilities and resources, and ask assignment of space systems to SAC 


and NORAD when operational, 

The Navy's Appeal for a Space Command 

The Army and Navy were aware, of course, of the Air Force move to 

obtain assignment from the Secretary of Defense of Sentry and Midas, and 

there was every reason to believe that, in view of McElroy' s statement in 

the Anted Forces Policy Council meeting, on 2 6 February, he would reach a 

decision in the near future regarding the disposition of the two projects* 

On 22 April 1959* Admiral Burke suggested to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

that the indivisibility of space and "the prospective magnitude of astronau- 

tical operations" required the establishment of a general military space 

agency. It would be under the direction of JCS and responsive "to the 

operational requirements of ARPA and NASA." Burke argued that the national 

interests would be served if "all facilities and functions" applicable to 

space vehicles and satellite operations, "Including those of the three na- 


tional missile ranges, " were coordinated under a single command. 

The proposal ran counter to Air Force thinking that satellites should 
be operated by the service of primary interest, and it struck sharply 
against the doctrine of aerospace. The Chief of Naval Operations knew 


that his recommendations would be opposed by the Air Force, but he also 
knew that they would be approved by the Army and that he could count on 
the old Army-Navy advantage of 2 to 1 in JCS recommendations. Burke was 

therefore scarcely surprised when Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Chief of Staff, USA, 


gave full concurrence. The admiral must also have expected General White's 

objection to such a command taking over the "functions" of military space 

operations. White argued that the responsibility should go to the unified 

and specified commands. The Joint Chiefs referred the question to the 


Joint Staff with a request for recommendations by 15 June. 

ABPA's Move for a Mercury Joint Task Force 

On 25 May, while the Joint Staff still considered the Navy's proposal. 

Dr. Glennan requested DOD assistance in the tracking and cosmunlcatlon pro- 


gram for Mercury man-in-space flights. The Secretary of Defense handed 
the question to a six-member ARPA-DDR&E-NASA committee that promptly turned 
to the Navy's proposal for a Joint military space command and the objec¬ 
tions of the Air Force to such an organization. There was thus a direct 
if unintentional connection between the Navy's proposal and ARPA's sugges¬ 
tion, after the Joint committee completed its deliberations, for a Mercury 
Joint task force. The Air Force concurred with ARPA but assumed that the 
task force would remain under ARPA, not JCS. The Air Force recommended 
that, since the needed facilities were part of the Atlantic Missile Range, 


the AMR commander should also serve as task force commander. 

On 30 June the Department of Defense Informed Glennan that the mili¬ 
tary would support Mercury with a task force and appointed Johnson, in 
cooperation with Glennan to work out an initial plan. In a meeting of the 
ARPA, Army, Navy, and Air Force ad hoc group, all but the USAF representatives 


advocated a task force under JCS that could also serve as the nucleus of 
the space command proposed by the Navy. Despite Air Force protests, the 
ad hoc group requested ARPA to prepare a paper with this recommendation 
for service concurrence and presentation to the Armed Forces Policy Coun¬ 
cil for approval. The proponents of the task force held their point and 
went so far as to draft and redraft a DOD directive to that effect even 

after NASA signified a preference for a much simpler "coordination group" 


under AMR's commander. 

Suddenly the situation changed. As a result of NASA's recommendation 
and some personal intervention at the OSD-OSAF level, on 24 July the ARPA 
ad hoc group released a draft directive much nearer USAF desires. It des¬ 
ignated Lt. Gen. Donald N. Yates, the AMR commander, as DOD representative 
for Mercury support and made him responsible to the Secretary of Defense. 

His additional duties included the preparation of plans to support the 
operation; direction and control of assigned DOD facilities, forces, and as- 


sets; and the furtherance of DOD specific missions to aid the project. 

Meanwhile, the Secretary of Defense had shown something less than 
enthusiasm for a joint space command. 

McElroy'a Decisions of 18 September 1959 

In the midst of discussions concerning USAF's transfer request, Burke's 
joint-command proposal and NASA's Mercury support requirements, MCElroy on 
29 May 1999 asked JCS to recommend assignment of operational'responsibility 
for Sentry, Midas, Transit, and the Interim satellite detection system. 
McElroy asked that a reply be "expedited," but on 24 July the Joint Chiefs 
informed him that they could not reach agreement, and the question then 
came to lodge on his desk. After another three weeks, McElroy took a new 

approach. He personally briefed the Joint Chiefs on 13 August, to inform 

them of his "thinking." He deemed the scheduled satellite launchings up 

through 1963 too few to justify a joint military astronautics command "at 

the present time." He vas also inclined to make the Air Force responsible 

for all DOD boosters, with payloads divided among the three services. He 


asked the Joint Chiefs for their "comments." 

The result vas the some—the Joint Chiefs could not agree. McElroy 
then made the decision on his own. On 18 September the Secretary of De¬ 
fense informed JCS that there would be no joint military space command; 
that the Air Force was responsible for launching DOD's space boosters; 
that the Air Force would have management responsibility for Sentry (Samos) 

and Midas; and that the Army and Navy would have similar responsibility 


for Courier and Transit respectively. 

Two years after Sputnik the tide seemed to have turned in favor of 
the Air Force, though the Secretary of Defense had not yet given the serv¬ 
ices managerial control of their research and development projects. There 
vas reason neither for optimism or depression, for none could ssy what would 
be next. In the world of defense, as in the world of everything else, the 
"last" decision is never final. 

* * * * * 

The progress made by the American space program during the first two 
years after Sputnik could have been considered remarkable under different 
circumstances. There vas, however, a disturbing pattern in overall events. 
For every cluster of small American accomplishments there vas, with- out 
fuss or furor, a surpassing Russian achievement. There vas unpublicized 
discontent within the National Security Council as evidenced by its policy 

statement of January i 960 . There was criticism, too, on Capitol Hill, 
and among columnists and Journalists. An example was the editorial that 
appeared in Time on 19 January 1959, Just 17 days after the Russians launched 
their Lunik I on an interplanetary probe that sent "the first man-made planet 
circling the Sun with an estimated life of millions of years." Continuing, 
Time commented: 

Just when U.S. space achievements were beginning to make up for 
Sputnik Jolts to the U.S. pride and prestige, the Russians sent their 
Lunik soaring far beyond where any man-made object had ever penetrated 
before. Once again the world marveled at U.S.S.R. 's technological 
prowess. Pressing an immediate question: Why is the U.S. still lag¬ 
ging in a race that may decide whether freedom has any future? 

The answer to the question was not simple. 

The basic element in the lag was the long period after World War II 
when civilian authorities failed to comprehend that the life of the nation 
could depend on an endlessly progressive technology. In the view of the 


House Select Coonittee on Astronautics and Space Exploration: 

In the space field, in fact, the military people have generally 
shown far more foresight than the civilians, far more concern for 
applied science although still slow to appreciate the values of basic 
research. If the United States military mind was slow to grasp the 
worth of scientific discovery in the years leading into World War II, 
Just the opposite has been true of the postwar decade. It is no ac¬ 
cident, for example, that *0 percent of the physics doctorates in 
the United States since World War II were at least partially subsi¬ 
dized by the Office of Naval Research. Similar accomplishments could 
be quoted for the Army and Air Force. In fact, the military often 
had to hide valuable research work done under its aegis from the 
vengeful eyes of civilian budget experts. If the sputniks caught 
the United States by surprise, it was not for lack of warning 
from our military scientists. 

It was this scientific conservatism at policy-making levels of the 
Government that gave the Soviets their head start in developing high- 
thrust rocket engines to serve with equal ease either an ICBM or a space 
program. Once handicapped by the Soviet time lead, there were technological 

factors that made American recovery seem slow indeed. Each new engine, 

for instance, required countless manhours for Its design, development, 

construction, and testing. There was no easy ratio between chamber dimen* 

sions and thrust. General Wilson, DCS/Development, phrased it nicely when 

he said: "Propulsion is the key to space use. Up to the present we have 

not learned bow to scale up a missile propulsion system to Increase its 

thrust. Thus, each program must be undertaken as a separate and distinct 


development effort." 

Among the nontechnical factors of delay, none was more important than 
the lack of a stimulating, and unifying national objective. Other than a 
space-for-peace policy, the cry was seldom for anything more than the dull 
motif of "catching up with Russia." An exception was voiced by Represen¬ 
tative James G. Fulton, of Pennsylvania, in discussions with Livingston T. 

Merchant, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Representative 


want to ask about the space program/^ the administration is 
entering into. Are they simply trying to catch tip to Russia in some 
fields or are they trying to keep ahead in others, or are we really 
going to have a program that I am for, of leapfrogging Russia? Would 
it be possible for us to have a space program that leapfrogged Russia 
and moved ahead our own targets more or less independently of her prop¬ 
aganda? Why don't we do that? Why don't we set targets ahead 3 to 5 
years, far-reaching and far-seeking constructive targets, and then 
go ahead and reach them instead of looking to see how Russia is run¬ 
ning and then run down that street? 

To these penetrating questions the representative of the State Department 
replied: "I think it is a very constructive approach, sir." 

The space-for-peace policy itself, though widely supported as an ideal, 
was sometimes criticized sharply because it divided the American space pro¬ 
gram into two unsynchronized parts—one that sought to move with the tempo 
of military necessity and one that would progress with the philosophic calm 


of pure science. Again to quote Time, many of the Administration's "scien¬ 
tific brains ... proved to be nay-sayers and quibblers, among other things 
stirring up a futile. Irrelevant dispute over whether space is a civilian 
or a military realm." Time regretted that the President's high-minded 
policy of space-for-peace did not stand up before the argument that great 
military advantages would be won by the nation first to make space its own 

These advantages seemed still irrefutable at the end of 1959, even 
though the military could not yet envision space tactics and strategy as 
clearly as Brig. Gen. William L. Mitchell foresaw the tactics and strategy 
of airpover when he bombed and sank the Ostfriesland off the Virginia shores 
in 1921. True, Mitchell had behind him experiences of World War I. The 

weakness of the military in 1959 lay in their inability to speak in more 


definite terms than the "uses of space" and categories of offensive and 
defensive space weapons. Yet nothing could refute the argument that space, 
by its very immensity, was certain eventually to Introduce new concepts of 
warfare and weaponry. -• 

He who comes second best in the space race will have no second chance 
to win. 


Notes to pages 4-17 



1. Presentation to Air Council by W.E. Dornberger, 7 Dec 57, History of 

2. W.D. Dornberger, V-2, James Cleugh & Geoffrey Halliday, trails (New 
York, 1954), EP lS3E7. 

3. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York, 1948), pp 258-60. 

4. Dornberger, Hist of Peenemuode. 

5. Statement by V. von Braun, ABMA, in House Hearings before the Select 
Cknte on Astronautics & Space Exploration, 85 th Cong, 2d Sess, (Here¬ 
inafter cited as McCormack Cmte), Astronautics and Space Exploration, 

pp 19 - 20 . ~ 

6 . The United States Air Force Dictionary (Air University Press, 1956). 

7 . Von Braun before McCormack Cmte, p 17* ?. 

8 . Brochure, SAC Space Concepts, 13 Aug 59; Fred Whipple, "Interview," 
Missiles and Rockets, Mar 57 . 

9 . Press Conf with Charles E. Wilson, SOD, NY Times, 13 May 53* 

10. Press Conf with Wilson, NY Times, 7 Jun 55 • • 

11. J.H. Douglas, NY Times, 26 Apr 53; address by Sen Stuart Symington, 
Congressional Record, 23 Jun 53; Gen T.D. White, VC/S USAF, NY Times, 
21May 55; L/Gen D. L. Putt, DCS/D, USAF, NY Times, 14 Jun 55; HI®, 

6 & 12 Nov 55. 

12. NSC Action 915, 24 Sep 53, & 1433, -8 Sep 55. 

13. Trevor Gardner, NY Times, 12 Aug & 9 Dec 55* 

14. Wilson, BY Times, 7 Oct & 23 Nov 53 . 

15. NY Times, 9 Neb 56 . 

16. F.J. Malina, "Is the Sky the Limit?" Army Ordnance, Jul-Aug 46; H.E. 
Newell, Jr, High Altitude Rocket Research (New York, 1953), P 13* 

17* The Development of the Navaho Missile by J.A. Neal, WADC Hist Br, 

Jan 55 , p 1; ltr, M/Gen B.W. Chidlaw, Dep CG/Engineering, AMC to CG 


Notes to pages 18-28 

AAF, 6 May 47, subj: AAF GM Program, Doc 73 in AMC History of the 
Development of Guided Missiles, 1946-1950, by M.R* Self. 

18. Self, pp 42-43. 

19. Ltr by Chldlav, 6 May 47. 

20. Memo, B/Gen T.S. Power, Dep AC/AS -3 to CG AAF, 16 Jun 37 , subj: Oper¬ 
ational Rqrmts (Priorities) for GM's, 1947-1937, in Self, Doc 76 . 

21. Neal, pp 1-13. 

22. Ibid., pp 4, 28-31. 

23. C.H. Donnelly, The United States Guided Missile Program, prep for 
Preparedness Investigating Subcmte of Senate Cmte on Armed Services, 
86 th Cong, 1st Seas (Washington, 1959), PP 62 - 69 . 

24. Ltr, T. Gardner to Levis Strauss, 14 Jul 34, ARDC GO 42, 13 Jul 34 , 
subj: Reorgn of Hq ARDC & Orgn of WDD. 

25. Rpt of Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP) of the Science Advisory 
Qnte, Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack (Washington, l4 Feb 35), 
passim . 

26. Donnelly, pp 81-82. 


1. Dornberger, V-2, pp 16-17* 

2. Ltr, Col L.A. Hall, D/Warning & Threat Assessments, AC/l to M/Gen G.W. 
Martin, D/Plans, lo Dec 59, subj: Organization, Planning, & Control 
of the Soviet Space Prog; interview, Mae Link, Max Rosenberg, & Lee 
Bowen with B/Gen D.D. Fllckinger, 25 May 61. 

3 . Staff Rpt, House Select Cmte on Astro & Space Exploration, Astronau¬ 
tics and its Applications (Washington, 1958 ) (Hereinafter cited as 
Staff Rpt), p 223. 

4. NSC 36l4/l, U.S. Policy on Outer Space, Anx A, The Soviet Space System 
18 Aug 50 . 

3. Memo, K.T. Compton, Cfamn/RDB to SOD, 31 Oct 59, subj: Progress Rpt 
Study of GM Frog. 

12 Oct 51. 

7. NSC 5814/1, Anx A; Staff Rpt, pp 217-37; House Rpt 1758, Select Cmte 
on Astro & Space Exploration, 83 th Cong, 2d Sees, The National Space 

6 . 

Wash Evening Star, 7 Sep 31; NT Times, 4 Oct 31; 
Thereports multiplied during”The next 12 months. 

4 Oct 51; Wash Post. 

Notes to pages 26-36 


Program, App 3 , passim; A.T. Zacbringer, "Soviet Astronautics," Mis¬ 
siles & Rockets, Feb 57 . . 

8 . Staff Rpt, p 221» 

9 . NSC 5814/1; H Rpt 1758, p 31. 

10 . "General Arnold's Third Report,” The War Reports of General of the 
Army George £. Mars>>*v», General of the Army H.H. Arnold, and Fleet 
Admiral Ernest J. King (Philadelphia A New York7 1947), P 553* 

11. Ltr, R.C. lens, Jr, D/Planning. DCS/P&O, WARD to Col C.D. Gasser, SAB, 

7 Apr 60, AF Space Frog, Atch 4; Douglas Aircraft Co Contract W- 33 -O 38 . 
ae-l4l05; B/Oen B.B. Schriever, Briefing at Pentagon on ARDC, 24 Jan 54 

12. E.M. 'Same, Aeronautics and Astronautics (Washington, 1961 ), p 6 l. 

13* Rpt of Technical Evaluation Gp Satellite Vehicle Program (GM 13/70), 

29 Mar 48 (Hereinafter cited as TEG Rpt); Capt C.W. Styer, Jr, USN, 

6 Camdr R.F. Freltsg, USN, "The Navy in the Space Age," U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings, Mar 60 . 

14. Memo, Ch/BuAer to JRBB, 24 Jan 47, subj: Earth Satellite Vehicle, Incls 

15. Rand RA-15000, First Quarterly Report, Jhn 46, pp 6-17. 

16 . Ibid .; Douglas Rpt SM-11827, Preliminary Design of An Experimental 
World Circling Spaceship, 2 May 46. 

17. Douglas Rpt SM-11827, pp 2, 9-16. 

18. Memo, R/Adm L.C. Stevens, Chnn/R&D Cmte, Aeronautical Bd to Aero Bd, 

15 May « 6 , subj: Case No. 244—High Altitude Earth Satellite; Aero Bd 
Minutes, 29 May 46. 

19. Memo, Ch/BuAer to JRDB, 24 Jan 46; JRDB Rules of Orgn and Procedure, 

7 Oct 46. 

20. JRDB Minutes of 6 th Mtg, 6 Mar 47, v/atch AAF Position Papers; memo, 
L/Gen H.S. Vandenberg, 'Senior Army Member of Aero Bd to JRDB, 13 Jun 
47, subj: Satellite Agency. 

21. JRDB Minutes of 6 thMtg; memo, RDB to Aero Bd, 9 Jan 48, subj: Earth 
Satellite Vehicle. 

22. Vannevar Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men (New York, 1949)* pp 84-86. 

23. CGM Minutes, 3 Feb 48, Item 10; ltr, F.L. Hbvde, Chmn/CGM to W.A. 
McNair, Ctmn/TEG, 6 Feb 48. 

24. TEG Rpt. 

206 P*6 e8 37-**SW 

25. Ltr, M/0ea H.B. Saylor, Cb/RAD Dlv, Ord Dept to Secy/CGM, 26 Jul 48, 
subj: Comments on TEG Rpt; ltr, R/Ada D.V. Gallery, ACHO (GK) to Secy/ 
COM, 8 Jul 48; ltr, M/Gen F.O. Carroll, USAF Member/CGM to Cbmn/CGM, 

27 Jul 48, subj: Satellite Vehicle Prog; COM Minutes, 15 Sap 48, Item 

12 . 

26. First Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1948, App C, Rpt of the Exec 
Secy/HUB, p 129. 

27. W.B. Bergen, Pres/Kartin Co, quoted In Denver Post, 25 Sep 59 . 

28. H.A. Zahl, Research D/Anqy Signal Corps, quoted In Wash Evening 
Star, 28 Oct 58 ; Account of Incident In HY Tribune, 18 (Jet bO. 

29. Ltr, B/Gen A.R. Cranford, Ch/Engr Dlv, AMC to DCS/M, Hq U 8 AF, 8 Dee 
47, subj: Project Rand Satellite Vehicle; aeao, L/Oen H.A. Craig, 

DCS/k to VC/S, 12 Jan 48, subj: Earth Satellite Vehicle. 

30 . Rand R-217, Utility of a Satellite Vehicle for Reconnaissance (Project 

Feed Back), Apr 51« ~ . 

31. Memo, Col J.A. Dunning, Off of D/Plans to D/Plans, 28 Oct 57, subj: 
USAF Satellite Prog. 

32. Rand Rb- 1194, Scientific Uses for a Satellite Vehicle, 12 Feb 54; Rand 
Rm-1500, Scientific Use of an Artificial Satellite, B Jun 55 . 

33. Hist, AFFXC, Jan-Jun 58 , pp 164-82. 

34. Rand R-217. 

35* BAR Project Card, ARDC to Hq USAF, 10 Oct 57, subj: Abbreviated System 

36 . Memo, Col D.L. Kime, Off of D/Dev Plang to D/RAD, 18 Hov 57 , subj: 
Comments on Ahbr System Dev nan; M/R by Col B.H. Ferrer, 4 Hov 57 , 
subj: Boost Glide Concept; D/RAD Dev Directive (DD) 94 , 25 Hov 57, 
subj: I&personlc Strategic Weapon System. 

37. RCA-Rand RM-999, Progress Report (Project Feed Back), 1 Jan 53 . 

36 . Rand R-262, Project Feed Back Summary Report, Vols I A II, 1 Mar 54. 

39 . Hq ARDC Briefing to SAB Ad Hoc Cate on Advanced Weapons Tech A 
Environment, Space Technology, 29 Jul 57, PP 17*21. 

40. Hq ARDC Ityper-Environment Test System Dev Plan, 18 May 59, P 1*1* 

41. Ibid . 

42. Memo, d/RAD to R.E. Homer, ASAF (RAD), 13 May 57, subj: BALWARDS 
Vehicles; memo, Hq USAF to Hq ARDC, 15 May 57 , subj: BALKABD 6 . 


Notes to pages 50-62. 209 

43. Memo, Hq USAF to Hq ARDC, 3 Feb 58, subj: BRATS; Hq ARDC Hyper-Environ¬ 
ment Test System Supporting Plan, 13 Mar 59. 

44. J.S. Hanrahan & David Buabnell, Space and Biology (Nev York, i960), 

PP 3-1^. 

45. B/Gen D.D. Flickinger, D/Human Factors, Hq ARDC, "Human Factor Prob¬ 
lems In Space Flight," in Space Technology, an ARDC presentation to 
SAB, 29 Jul 57, PP 57-67. 

46. AFMDC, History of Research in Space and Biodynamics, 1946-1958, PP 1-28. 

47. Off of Asst/Bioastronautics, Hq ARDC, Capability & Rqrmts for Manned 
Space Ops, 15 Dec 60. 

48. Flickinger; memo, Gen T.S. Power, CINCSAC to C/S USAF, 13 Aug 58, subj: 
SAC Space Policy. 

49. Hist, AFMDC, Jul-Dec 57, pp 29-52. 

50. Memo, Col J.L. Martin, Dep D/AT to Off/LL, 10 Nov 59, subj: Project 
Mercury, v/atch 1, Outline of History of USAF Man-in-Space; Hq ARDC, 
Bioastronautics Capability & Rqrmts for Manned Space Ops, 15 Dec 60, 

PP 4-5. 

51. Ezra Kotcber, Off of D/Labs, VADC, "Vehicle Design,” in Space Technol¬ 
ogy (presentation), pp 25-36. 

52. Statement by R/Adm J.T. Hayward, ACNO (RAD) before McCormack Onto, 

P 275. 


1. H Rpt 1756, 85th Cong, 2d Sees, p 19. 

2. J.C. Cooper, "High Altitude Flight and National Sovereignty," Inter¬ 
national Law Quarterly Review, Spring 58. 

3. Sir A.D. McNair, The Lav of the Air (London, 1953), App, pp 295-328; 
Col. M.B. Schofield, USAF,""’’Control of Outer Space," Air University 
Quarterly Review, Spring 58. 

4. Space Law, a symposium prep at request of Sen L.B. Johnson, Chmn/Senate 
Sp Cmte on Space A Astronautics, 85th Cong, 2d Sees, 31 Dec 58, passim ; 
Sir Geoffrey Butler & Simon Mac Coley, The Development of International 
Law (London, 1958), pp 40-58. 

5* Oscar Schacter, "Who Owns the Universe?" in Space Law, HP 8-17. 

6 . Wenner Buedeler, The International Geophysical Year (UNESCO, 1957), 

pp 14-26, 48-49. 


Notes to pages 62-72 

7. Joseph Kaplan, The IGY Rocket and Satellite Program (Washington, 

I960), p 13. 

8. 'NY Times, 16 Apr 55. 

9. W.B. Hester, "Some Political Implications of Space Plight," Journal 

of the British Interplanetary Society, Hoy-Dec 55* ” 

10. TCP Rpt Meeting the Threat, pp 146-47. 

11. NSC 5520, 26 May 55* 

12. R.V. Young, "The Aerial Inspection Plan and Air Sovereignty," George 
Washington Lair Review, Apr 56. 

13. MaJ H.J. Neumann, USAF, "The Legal Status of Outer Space and the Soviet 
Union," in Space Lear, pp 495-503. Neumann cited A. Kielov and S. 

Krylov, "State Sovereignty in Air Space,” International Affairs (Moscow), 
Mar 56. 

14. NY Times, 30 Jul 55. 

15. Facts on File, 28 Jul-3 Aug 55, p 255* 

16. NY Times, 8 Feb 56. 

17. J.C. Cooper, "Legal Problems of Upper Space," Proceeding s of American 
Society of International Law, 50th Annual Meeting, 25 -w Aug 56; NY 
Times, 11 Jan 57* 

18. NY Times, 15 Jan 57; Yearbook of the United Nations, 1956 (New York, 

i95TJ7pp 100 - 101 . 

19. H Doc 372, 84th Cong, 2d Sess, Rpt of President to Cong for 1957, U.S. 

Participation in the United Nations, pp 14-15* ~ 


1. Press Coat with Wilson, NY Times, 21 Nov & 17 Dec 54.. 

2. TCP Rpt Meeting the Threat, pp 146-47. 

3. Draft memo, SAF to SOD, 11 Apr 55, subj: TCP Rpt- 

4. Memo, C.E. Wilson to Secys Army, Navy, It AF, 26 Mar 55, subj: Earth 

5. Memo, JCS to SOD, 18 Apr 55, subj: TCP Rpt, JCS 1899/200. 

6. NSC 5520, 26 May 55. 

Notes to pages 72-78 


7. Memo, D.A. Quarles, ASOD (RAD) to Coordinating Cmte on Gen Sciences, 

30 Mar 55 , subj: Scientific Satellite; M/R, A.E. Lombard, Scientific 
Adviser, D/RAD, 5 Apr 55, subj: Scientific Satellite. 

8 . Memo, R.V. Cairns, Cfamn/Coord Cmte on Gen Sciences to ASOD (RAD), 4 
May 55* subj: Scientific Satellite Prog in the DOD; nano, D.A. Quarles, 
to SAP, 17 May 55* subj: Scientific Satellite; Rpt of Ad Hoc Advisory 
Gp on Sp Capabilities, 4 Aug 55* App F. 

9 . Memo, Col Joseph W. Williams, Dep Aaat/Dev Frog to M/Gen H.C. Donnelly, 
Sp Asst to C/S, 18 Mar 58 , subj: Project World Series; Rpt of Ad Hoc 
Advay Gp. 

10. Rpt of Ad Hoc Advay Gp. 

11. Ibid . 

12. Paper prep by DOD for House Select Cmte on Astro & Space Exploration, 
89 th Cong, 2d Sesa (McCormack Cmte), pp 155-56; L/Gen J.M. Gavin (Rtd), 
War and Peace in the Space Age (Rev York, 1958 ), pp 14-15. 

13. Memo, R.B. Robertson, Jr, Actg Dep SOD to Secya/Anay, Navy, AF, 9 Sep 
55* subj: Tech Prog for NSC 5520; memo, J.B. McCandery, Dep ASOD 
(RAD) to ASAF (RAD), 19 Sep 55 , subj: AF Scientific Satellites; State¬ 
ment by R/Adm J.T. Hayward, ACHO (RAD) before McCormack Cmte. 

14. "Project Vanguard," Missiles and Rockets, Jul 57 . 

15 . Statement by W. von Braun before McCormack Onto, p 63 . 

16. C.C. Furnas, ASOD (RAD), quoted in NY Times, l 6 Oct 57* 

17. C.C. Furnas, quoted in Facta on File, 10-16 Oct 57* P 331* 

18. Rand RM-1922, A Casebook on Soviet Astronautics, Pt II, 21 Jun 57, 
passim; A3TIA Eoc AD 133035, "Soviet gpace flight Activities," a 
discussion of the Rand apace flight program, presented to AFSAB by 
F.J. Krleger, 29 Jul 59* 

19 . Memtf, P.F. Bundage, D/BOB to the President, 30 Apr 57* subj: Project 

20. Ibid .; memo, J.S. Lay, Jr, Exec Secy/NSC to members of NSC, 3 May 57 , 
subj: U.S. Scientific Satellite Prog; memo, C.E. Wilson to JCS A 
Secys/Army, Navy, AF, 17 May 57, subj: U.S. Scientific Satellite Prog. 

21. Von Braun before McCormack Cate, pp 33-34, 66 . 

22. Statement by Gen Gavin before McCormack Gate. 

23. Von Braun before McCormack Cmte, pp 18-19, 34 . 







26 . 





2 . 




6 . 


8 . 

9 * 

Notes to pages 78-88. 

Garin before McCormack Cate, pp 164-85. 

"Project Vanguard," Missiles and Rockets. Jul 57. 

S.F. Singer, "Synoptic Rocket Observations in tbs Upper Atmosphere," 
Nature. 20 Jun 53. 

Memo, Col V.O. Davis, APOSR to Col D.D. Flickinger, 30 Jul $k, subj: 
Pro g ram Mouse. 

Memo, Col Davis to 7.M. Field, D/Ru>, 12 Jul 57, subj: Par Side Project 

Memo, Col B.H. Holman, ARDC to M/Gen M.C. Dealer, 20 Mar 57, subj: 
Project Far Side. 

Ltr, B/Oen A.D. Starbird, ABC to AFOSR, 17 Apr 57; ltr, U-Secy, Dept/ 
Interior to SAP, 21 Jun 57. 

Aerozratronics System Pub C-100, 16 Sep 57, subj: Conduct of Par Side 
Phase II Bxpers. 


K Rpt 1371, 90th Rpt by Cmte on Govt Ops, 85th Cong, 2d Sess, U.S. 
Military Aid and Supply Programs in Western Europe, p 31. 

Ibid.; H Rpt 1121, 11th Rpt by Cmte on Govt Ope, 86th Cong, 1st Sess., 
Organisation and Management of Missile Programs, pp 1-2. 

Astronautics, Nov 57* This comment vas typical and could be supported 
by references to numerous Journals rad periodicals. 

Pacts on Pile. 10-16 Oct 57. 

These and other comments may be found in NY Times, Wash Post, Pacts 
on Pile, etc., for period 5 Oct-7 Dec 57. 

G. Zadorogbnyl, "The Artificial Satellite rad International Lair," 
Bovctakaia Rosalia, 17 Oct 57, trras by A.M. Jones, in Space Lam, 
pp 5Qh-6. 

Von Braun before McCormack Cmte. 

Statement by R/Adm Byoan G. Riekaver before McCormack Cate, p 26l. 

Statement by Loftus Becker, Legal Adviser, Dept/State, before McCormack 
cate, pp 1269-75. 

Dept/State Bulletin, 9 Jun 58. 


Notes to pages 88-97- 


11. H Rpt 1769 , 85 th Cong, Exploration of Outer Space, passim; 8 Rpt 1728 , 
85 th Cong, Peaceful Exploration of Space, passim . 

12. NY Times. 11 Dee 57, 11 Jan & 3 Feb 58 . 

13. Yearbook of the United Nations. 1958 (New York, 1959), pp 19-22. 

14. Ibid . 

15.. H Doc 104, 85 th Cong, 2d Sees, Rpt of President to Cong for 1958, 

U.S. Participation In the United Nations . 

16. Ibid . 

17. NY Times, 18 Nov 58 . 

18. H Doc 104, 85 th Cong; Dept/State study, "Major Elements of United States 
International Consultative and Cooperative Activities In the yield of 
Outer Space," In H Hearings before Cate on Science & Astronautics, 

86 th Cong, 2d Seas, Review of the Space Program, pp 28-32; Yearbook 
of the United Nations, 1959~ TNew York, 60), pp 24-28. 

19. Dept/State, "Major Elements ... of Activities In Outer Space. ” 

20. NY Times, 8 Nov 57. 

21. Ibid., 6 Feb 58 . 

22. Ibid .. 13 Jan A 3 Apr 58 ; memo, JCS to SOD, 25 Nov 57, subj: DOD Bp 
Projects Agency; Rpt of President's Science Adv Gate, Introduction 
to Outer Space. 26 Mar 58 . 

23 . Memo, M/Gen J.B. Cary, D/Plans to C/S USAF, 26 Jun 58 , subj: U.S. 

Policy on Outer Space; memo. Col R.P. Worden, Off of D/Plans to Gen 
Cary, D/Plans, 19 Jun 58 , subj: National Policy on Space; NSC 58l4/l, 
Preliminary U.S. Policy on Space, 18 Aug 58 . 

24. NSC 58l4/l. 

25. OCB Operation Flan for Outer Space, 18 Mar 59* 

26. Memo, Col R.R. Rowland, Off of D/Plans to D/AT et al., 27 Aug 59, 
subj: U.S. Policy on Outer Space, NSC 58l4/l. 

27. NSC 5901 / 1 , A National Security Policy, 5 Aug 57* 

28. Memo, L/Col I.N. Kohrman, Off of D/Plans to C/S USAF, 18 Nov 59, 
subj: Final Draft of U.S. Policy on Outer Space. 


Notes to pages 99-110• 


1. Newsweek, 18 Nov 57. 

2. Trevor Gardner, "But We Are Still Lagging," Life, k Nov 57. 

3. Statement by Edwin L. Weial, Ch Counsel/DOD, in S Hearings before 
Preparedness Investigating Subcmte of Cmte on Armed Services, 85 th 
Cong, 1st and 2d Sess (hereinafter cited as Johnson Subcmte), Inquiry 
Into Satellite and Missile Programs, p 220. 

k . Rpt of Teller Ad Hoc Cmte, Hq ARDC, 28 Oct 57* 

5 . DOS Dir 5105.10, 15 Nov 57; Statements of Neil McElroy & W.M. Holaday 
before Johnson Subcmte, pp 211-14, 346-49; H Rpt 1121, as cited in V, 
n 2, p 17. 

6 . Statement by Neil McElroy, in H Hearings before DOD Subcmte on Appro¬ 
priations, 85 th Cong, 1st Sess (hereinafter cited as Mahon Subcmte), 
The Ballistic Missile Program, p 7 . 

7. Memo, JCS to SOD, 25 Nov 57 , subj: DOD Sp Projects Agency. 

8 . Memo, SOD to JCS, 6 Dec 57* subj: DOD Sp Projects Agency; S Doc 298 , 
85 th Cong, 2d Sess, Comm from the President, "Proposed Additional 
Authority for the Department of Defense,” 7 Jan 58 ; McElroy before 
Mahon Subcmte, p 7. 

9. H Rpt 1121, pp 132-35. 

10. DOD Dir 5105*15* 7 Feb 58 , subj: ARPA. 

11. Memo, P.D. Foote, W.M. Holaday, & R.W. Johnson to SOD, 7 Apr 58 . 

12. NY Times, 10 Jan 58 . 

13. Ibid ., 4 Apr 58 . 

14. FL 85 - 599 , DOD Reorganization Act of 1958, appr 6 Aug 58 ; memo, M/Gen 
H.C. Donnelly, Aast DCS/P&P to DCS/PfcP, 4 Aug 58 , subj: DOD Keorgn, 
v/2 Incls; Facte on File, 16-24 Dec 58 . 

15. Memo, Col V.Y. Adduci, Off/LL to VC/S, 22 Nov 57; memo, L/Gen D.L. 
Putt* DCS/D to M/Gen J.E. Smart, Asst VC/S, 10 Dec 57* subj: Estfamt 
of a Dir of Astronautics. 

16. NY Times, l4 Dec 57* verbal info from Off of C/S thru Col J.L. Martin, 
D7AT to Lee Bowen, 27 Jul 60; memo, Putt to All Dire et al., 13 Dec 
57* subj: Cancellation of the Memo of 10 Dec 57. 

17. Memo, Asst VC/S to Air Staff, 4 Mar 58 , subj: Space Projects Involving 

Notes to pages 111-118 


18 . Memo, M/Geo J.S. Mills, Asst DCS/D to Gen Smart, 12 Mar $8, subj: A 
Dir of Advanced Weapons; .memo, B/Gen R.H. Warren, Mil Asst/SOD to 
SAP, 22 Jul $8, subj: Dir of Advanced Technology; DAF GO w, 29 Jul 
98 , subj: Bstbmt of AFDAT. 

19 . Memo, L/Gen R.C. Wilson, DCS/D to All Dirs et al., 29 Jul 98 , subj: 
Estbmt of AFDAT. 

20. Memo, B/Gen H.A. Bousbey, D/AT to C/S 08AF, 8 Dec 98 , subj: Functions 
of AFDAT; memo, M/Gen C.M. HcCorkle, Asst C/S (CM) to Asst YC/S, 13 
Jan 99, subj: Function of AFDAT; memo. Smart to Deps et al., 6 Apr 
59* subj: Respons for Space Projects; BOI 21-14, 13 Apr 99* 


1. Memo, Ellene Galloway to Rep J.W. McCormack, 7 Mar 99, subj: Problems 
of Cong in Formulating Outer Space Leg, in H Hearings before McCormack 

2. Ibid . 

3. NY Times. 3 Apr 98 . 

4. H Rpt 1758, 89 th Cong, 2d Bess, The National Space Program . 

9. Statements before McCormack Qnte, by H.L. Dryden, D/NACA, p 403; C.C. 
Furnas, Chancellor, U. of Buffalo, pp 735-73; Lee DuBrldge, Pres, 

Calif Institute of Tech, pp 778-79; W.H. Pickering, D/JPL, p 804; 

J.A. Van Allen, States Univ, Iowa, pp 864-69; V.S. Dornberger, Tech 
Asst to Pres, Bell Aircraft Corp, pp 1085-94. 

6 . Statements before McCormack Cmte by M/Gen John B. Medaris, AGMC, p 167 ; 
R/Adm Rjrman G. Rlckover, AC/BuShlps for Nuclear Propulsion, pp 222, 
230-31; R/Adm John T. Hayward, ACNO (BAD), p 276 ; L/Gen Donald L. Putt, 
DCS/D, HSAF, pp 99-134; M/Gen Bernard A. Schriever, COMAFEMD, pp 647-97 
E.F. York, Ch Scientist/ARPA, p 47; J.D. Doolittle, Cbmn/NACA, p 928 ; 
R/Adm W.F. Raborn, D/Sp Projects, DSN, pp 889-909* Dee also ltr, D.A. 
Quarles, Dep SOD to M.H. Sterns, D/BOB, 1 Apr 98 . 

7 . PL 89 - 968 , The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 , appr 29 
Jul 58 . 

8 . H Rpt 1758. 

9. PL 85 - 568 . 

10. Ibid. 

11. Ibid. 



12 . 




16 . 
17 . 

18 . 


20 . 

1 . 

2 . 



Notes to pages 118-127. 

H Rpt 2166, National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 Conf Rpt, 15 
Jul 58 , p 16 . 

NASA Release, 1 Oct 58 . 

Memo, McElroy to Secys/Army, Nary, AF, 12 Sep 58 , subj: The Civilian- 
Military Liaison Cate. 

Ibid .; M/R by M/Gen M.C. Dealer, D/R&D, 23 Jul 58 ; memo. Dealer to 
Asst DCS/D, Sep 58 , subj: DOD-RASA Orgn & Relationship; memo, Quarles 
to Sseys/Army, Navy, AF, 31 Oct 58 , subj: C-MLC. 

Memo, JCS to SOD, 22 Oct 58 , subj: C-MLC, JCS 2263 / 17 . 

Memo, Secy/Army to D/ARPA, nd; memo, Secy/Navy to D/ARPA, nd; ASSS 
by B/Gen H.A. Bousbey, Dep D/R&D, 8 Oct 58 ; memo, M/Gen R.P. Swofford, 
Asst DCS/D to Ada Asst/OSAF, 8 Oct 58 ; ASSS, L/Gen R.C. Wilson, DCS/D 
to All Din et al., 14 Oct 58 , all same subj: Terms of Ref for C-MLC. 

Memo, J.H. Douglas, SAF to c/S OSAF. l 6 Oct 58 , subj: Terms of Ref 
for C-MLC; memo, Swofford to SAF, 24 Oct 58 , subj: Initial Mtg of 
DOD Nominees to C-MLC; JCS 2283 / 18 , Terms of Reference of C-MLC. 

M/R by Maj H.C. Howard, 23 Oct $8, subj: C-MLC. 

Memo, Wilson to D/AT et al., 29 Oct 58 , subj: USAF Adm C-MLC Channels. 


Interview, Joseph Angell, Max Rosenberg, & Lee Bowen with L/Gen D.L. 
Yates, 7 Mar 6 l. 

H Rpt 1121, 86 th Cong, 1st Sess, Organisation and Management of Mis¬ 
sile Programs, p 131 . 

Ibid .. pp 131-32. 

Yates interview. 

5. Statement by W.M. Brucker, Secy/Amy, in H Hearings before Cmte on 

Science & Astronautics, 86 th Cong, 1st Seas, Missile Development and 
Space Sciences, p 200. “ . ... 

6 . Astronautics Briefing to Armed Forces Policy Council by M/Gen J.S. 
Mills, Asst DCS/D, 5 Nov 57; memo, M/Gen R.P. Swofford, Jr, D/R&D 
to R.E. Horner, ASAF (R&D), 22 Nov 57, subj: Proposed DOD Dir of Sp 
Projects; memo, Horner to SAF, Attn: Sp Asst/Armed Forces Policy Coun¬ 
cil, 12 Nov 57* subj: Outer Space Vehicles; memo, William Weltzen, 

Off of ASAF (R&D) to Horner, 18 Dec 57, subj: Astronautic Planning; 
memo. J.H. Douglas. SAF to N ell McE l roy, SOD. 12 No v 57; subj; Respona- 
for Mil Satellites. 

Notes to pages 128-139 


7« Memo, tf.A. Holaday, Sp Asst/SOD (GiM) to Chmn/Advs Gp on Sp Capabil¬ 
ities, 6 Sep 57, subj: Satellite Frogs. 

8 . Memo, Exec Secy/Advsy Gp on Sp Cpbllties to ASAF (BAD), 11 Oct 57, 
subj: WS-117L. 

9. Memo, J.H. Stevart, Cbmn/Adm Gp on Sp Cpbllties to Holaday, 15 Jan 
58 , subj: Satellite Plans of the Mil Depts, v/incl, p 20; Col R.C. 
Richardson, Asst/Long Range Objectives, DCS/P&P to M/Gen H.C. Donnelly, 
Asst DCS/FUP, 14 May 58 , subj: BSC Policy on Outer Space. 

10. Memo, Stevart to Holaday, 15 Jan 5 8 , incl, pp 20-21. 

11. Ibid ., p 21. 

12. Ibid ., pp 3-12. 

13* Memo, Holaday to SAP, 7 Jan 58 , Bubj: Satellite Program. 

14. Memo, Horner to Holaday, 25 Jan 58 , subj: Air Force Astro Dev Prog. 

15. Verbal ccnments by William Weitzen, Off of ASAF (RfcD) to Lee Boven, 

12 Aug 60; tale con Lee Boven vith B/Gen H.A. Bousbey, Comdr/Amold 
Engr Dev Center, 25 Aug 60. 

16. Memo, Douglas to SOD, 1 Feb 58 , subj: Recon Satellites, v/incl, draft 
memo, SOD to SAP, subj: Prog for Mil Recon Satellite (VS-117L). 

17. Memo, Douglas to SOD, 14 Feb 58 , subj: Tbor & WS-U7L Prog. 

18. Memo, Homer to SOD, 21 Feb 58 . 

19. Memo, McElroy to SAP, 24 Feb 58 , subj: AF WS-117L Frog. 

20. Memos, R.W. Johnson, D/ARPA to Secys/Army, Navy, & AF, 27 Mar 58 . 

21. Statement by Neil McElroy in H Hearings before DOD Subcmte on Appn, 
85 th Cong, 1st Sess, The Ballistic Missile Program, p 7; DOD Dir 
5105.15, 24 Mar 58 , subj: ARPA; memo, the President to SOD, 7 Feb 
58 , subj: Approval of Adv Space Projects; memo, Johnson to Secy/Aray, 
27 Mar 58 . 

22. AO 2, Amnd 4, 29 Sep 58; AO 9, Amnd 5, 29 Sep 58 , & Amnd 6 , 11 Dec 58 . 

23. Memo, Johnson to SAF, 28 Feb 58 , subj: Recon Satellites & Manned Space 

24. Memo, B/Gen H.A. Bousbey, Dep D/R&D to M/Gen J.S. Mills, Asst DCS/D, 

18 Mar 58 , subj: Suggested Remarks for Col Oder at Presentation to 
Roy W. Johnson, 1000, on 19 Mar 58 ; memo. Mills to VC/S USAF, 20 Mar 
58 , subj: Man in Space Prog; memos,M.A. McIntyre, OSAF to D/ARPA, 

Votes to Sages 139-149. 

19 Mar 96 , subjs: AP Kan In Space Prog & W8-U7L. 

29* Memo, Johnson to SOD, 19 Mar 58 , subj: Proposed ARPA Projects, v/3 
incls, ARPA Projects 1, 2, A 3* 

26. Nano, MeELroy to the President, 19 Mar 58 , subj: ARPA's Proposed 
Projects; memo, the President to SOD, 2b Mar 58 ; AO's 1, 2, A 3, 

27 Mar 58 . 

27. Memo, D.A. Quarles, Dep SOD to D/ARPA, 4 Apr 38 , subj; Argus. 

28. Memo, Quarles to D/ARPA, 1 May 38 , subj: Satellite Frogs, Including 
the Vanguard Series. 

29 . Memo, L/Gen D.L. Putt, DCS/D to C/S USAP, 3 Apr 38 , subj: Recon 

30 . Memo, Boushey to M/Qen J.E. Smart, Asst VC/S USAP, 2 Apr 38 , subj: 
USAP Astro Prog, v/incl. Proposed Memo, Horner to D/ARPA, same subj. 

31. Memo, L/Col P.J. Dillon, Jr to Col Leon Booth, Sp Asst/DCS/D, 10 Sep 
38 , subj: Air Staff Orientation; AO's 10-14 A 17-19, 25 Jul-29 Aug 38 . 

32. Ltr, Gen C.E. LaMay, VC/S USAP to L/Gen S.E. Anderson, GOMARDC, 9 
MSy 58. 


1. Ltr, Gen T.S. Power, CBfGSAC to C/S USAP, 13 Aug 38 , subj: SAC Space 

2. Statement by H.P. York, Ch Sdentlst/ARPA, in I Hearings before Sub- 
cmte of Qnte on Appn, 85 th Cong, 2d Seas, Department of Defense Ap¬ 
propriations. pp 295-319. 

3. Statement by H.L. DrycLen, D/NACA, submitted to the McCormack Qnte, 
pp 949-50. 

4. R.S. Cesaro A Robertson Youngqulst, "Strategic Space—Key to Rational 
Survival," Statement at 5 th Annual ARDC Science A Engineering Sympo¬ 
sium, Hq ARDC, 22 Jul 58 . 

5. AO 28-59, 29 Sep 58 . 

6 . AO 2-58, Aand 5, 6 Oct 58 ; AO 12-59, Amnd 1, 6 Oct 38 , AO 10-59, 

Amnd 7, 13 Apr 5?i AO 17-59, Amnd 5 , 13 Apr 59* 

7. M/R by Maj Paul L. Chell, Analysis Dlv, HQ ARDC, 24 Apr 59, subj: 
ABMA; Exec Orders IO 783 A 10793, 1 Oct A 3 Dec 38 ; Statement by T.K. 
Glennan, A/NASA, in S Hearings before RASA Auth Subcmte of Qnte on ' 
Aero A Space Science, 86th Cong, 1st Seas, (hereinafter cited as 

Notes to pages 150-158. 219 

Stennis Cmte), NASA Authorisation for fiscal Year I960, Pt 1, 
Scientific and Technical Presentations, pp 6-7. 

8. Rpt., NACA Sp Cmte on Space Tech, 28 Oct 58 , subj: Recommendations 
to NASA for a National Space Program, passim . 

9 . Stennis Cmte, Pt 2, Program Detail for fiscal Year i 960 , passim . 

10. Ltr, D.A. Quarles, Actg SOD to Glennan, 10 Dec 58 ; memo, Quarles to 
Secys/Axmy, Navy, & AP, 10 Dec 58 , subj: Prelim Study of the Status 
of the Large Socket Progs, v/Atch 1; NASA Rpt to the President, 27 
Jan 59 , subj: A National Space Vehicle Prog. 

11. NASA Rpt tp the President, 27 Jan 59* 


12. Stennis Cute, Pt 1, passim . 

13. RASA Presentation to C-MLC, 15 May 59, subj: National Space Sciences 

14. Statements by W.E. Moeckel & J.B. Childs before Stennis Cmte, Pt 1, 
pp 36-40, 48-54. 

15. Glennan before Stennis Cmte, Pt 1, p 6 . 

16. Memo, Col J.L. Martin, D/AT, to M/Gen R.P. Strafford, 5 Jan 59 , subj: 
Presentation for Comdrs Conf; ltr, H.P. York, DER&E to C.P. Ducander, 
Ch Counsel/N Cmte on Science & Astro, 30 Dec 59* 

17* Martin to Svofford, 5 Jan 59 . 

18. M/R by L/C K.G. Lundell, 4 Jun 58 , subj: System 609 A BMTSj ltr, Dryden 
to Boushey, 11 Jul 58 ; Memo of Understanding, 31 Oct 58 , subj: Coop 
between NASA & the Air Force in the Dev of a Solid-Rocket Test Vehicle 
ltr, L/Col J.R. Ryan, Astro Div, Hq ARDC to DCS/D, Hq USAF, 18 Dec 58 , 
subj: System 609 A. 

19* Stennis Cmte, Pt 2, pp 743-48; memo, Col G.B. Knight, USAF to M/Gen 
V.P. Fisher, subj: Testimony by NASA Witnesses, 21 May 59 . 

20. Hist AMC's Ballistic Missile Center, Jan-Jun 59 , I, pp I /sic 7 , 46-52. 

21. Ibid .; memo, Schriever to C/S USAF, 2 Feb 59, subj: NASA/AF Operating 

22. Hist, AMC's Ballistic Missile Center, Jan-Jun 59, I, pp I, 48-52. 

23. Chief of Staff's Policy Book, i 960 , USAF and Related Space Activities, 
Item. 129, Tab E. 

24. ARDC Presentation of a Plan for an Advanced, Integrated Space Study 
Program, 30 Jun 58 . Three of the study series had not been released 



Hotes to pages 156 - 166 . 

at this time, but they were sufficiently far advanced for ARDC rep¬ 
resentatives to speek of then with a knowledge of their content. 

25. Statement by Bousbey before McCormack Cmte, p 525; SAC.brochure, 13 
Aug 59> subj; SAC Space Concepts. 

26. Memo, Col <E.K. Kiessling, Hq ARDC to L/Gen S.E. Anderson CQMARDC, 

17 Nov 58 , subj: Space Study Program; note, Maj P.L. Chell, Analysis 
Div, Hq ARDC to Col E.K. Kiessling, Hq ARDC, 11 Dec 56 , subj: Space 
Study Prog vs RASA. The NASA programs for fiscal years 1959-60 vere 
outlined and attached to Chell's so-called "card." 

27. ASSS by B/Gen D.E. Hevton, Hq ARDC, 16 Feb 60, subj: Discussion of 
A7 Study Prog with NASA, Tab A, Abstract; Maj Chell, Introduction 
at AF-EASA Interchange of Info on Lunar Subjs, 16 Jun 60. 

28. NASA Release 59-116, 17 Apr 59. 

29. Memo, Maj Chell to Col O.J. Poage, Ch/Mlaslon Analysis Off, ARDC, 

17 Dec 59* 

30. M/R by Chell, 13 May 60, subj: Info Interchange with NASA (SR 183 , 
Lunar Observatory Studies). 

31. Ltr Oen T.D. White, C/S USAF to L/Gen R.C. Wilson, DCS/D, 14 Apr 60; 
ltr. Col N.C. Appold, Sp Asst for ARPA-NASA, Hq ARDC to Col R.D. 
Curtin, AFBMD, 29 Apr 60. 


1. Memo, Johnson .to CGKAFBMD, 10 Sep 56 , subj: Redef of WS-117L; ARPA, 
Space Technology Program Review. 9-15 Sep 59 (hereinafter cited as 
ARPA Program Review) I. 201-6; Johnson Briefing for JCS, 10 Jan 59, 

subj: ARPA's Program (hereinafter cited as ARPA Progr a m, 10 Jan 59 ); 

Sup to Hq USAF Daily Staff Digest, 6 Mar 59- 

2.. Ltr, Boushey to C0MARDC, 11 Jul 56 , aubj: Comm A Navigation Satellites. 

3 . Ltr, Hq ARDC to D/AT, 10 Sep 56 , subj: Abbr System Dev Plan 470L; 

memo, Horner to D/ARPA, 30 Sep 56 . 

4. Memo, Johnson to Horner, 22 Oct 58 , subj: Strat Comm System; ltr, 
Scbriever to DCS/D, 3 Dec 56 , subj: Mgt of Comm Satellite Prog; ARPA 
Program Review, II, 251-53) memo, M/Gen James Ferguson, D/Rqxvts to 
Col J.E. Kelsey, 8 Feb 59 , subj: ARPA Rqrmts Panel Mtg; M/R by Maj 
H.C. Howard of D/AX, 10 Feb 59/ subj: Coma Satellite; memo, Gen C.E. 
LeMay, VC/S to Deps et al., 6 Mar 59> subj: AF Position on Comm 
Satellite Prog. 

5. M/R by Maj Howard, 17 Dec 58 , subj: Comm Satellite; ltr, Swofford to 
COMARDC, 24 Dec 58 , subj: Joint Azmy-AF Comm Satellite Dev Prog; 




Rotes to pages 167-172. 


memo, Johnson, to CCMARDC, 6 Mar 59, subj: Satellite Cobb Id Polar 
Regions for SAC; AO 54-59, Aand 1, 22 May 59 . 

6 . ARPA Program, 10 Jan 59; ARPA Program Review, I, 153-57. 

7. Mono, R/Adn J.E. dark, ARPA to OOKARDC, 7 Jan 59, subj: Launching 
and Data Readout Planning for Cloud Cover Exper; ARPA Program, 10 
Jao 59* 

8 . ARPA Program, 10 Jao 59 . 

9 . Memo, Col R.H. EUie, Off of D/Plans, DCS/PKP to Dep D/Plans, 20 Jan 
59, subj: Man-in-Space Prog. 

10. M/R by L/Col B.I. Ferrer, 4 Nov 57, subj: Boost-Glide Concept; DCS/D 
DD94, 25 Nov 57, subj: Hypersonic Strat Weapon System; M/R by Col 
Ferrer, Off of D/AT, 6 Oct 58 , subj: Dynasoar Mtg with Mr. Homer on 
2 Oct 53; nemo, Johnson to SOD, 7 Nov 53, subj: Eyna Soar; nemo. Col 
J.R. Pinion, Exec, DCS/D to All Dire et al., 7 Nov 58 , aubj: Dyna Soar. 

11. ARPA Program, 10 Jan 59; ARPA Prograa Review, I, 21-87; memo, R/Adm 
J.E. Clark, Actg D/ARPA to SAP (R&DJ7 i£jun 59, subj: Saturn Booster 
for AF Space Progs; 

12. Statement by L/Gen 8 .S. Anderson, COKARDC, quoted without ref in 
DOD Staff Study, 5 Nay 59, subj: Rees against Transfer of Centaur 

to RASA; ltr, York to Glennan, 18 May 59; AO 19-59, Amnd 5, 30 Jun 59 . 

13. Ltr, Capt J.G. Lang, U 8 N, Actg DC 8 /I, NORAD to AFCIN, 4 Jan 53, subj: 
Space Track. 

14. ARPA System Dev Plan for Space Track (a resume), 13 Jan 59 . 

15. M/R by L/Col V.D. Pritchard, Ch, Test Instrua Div, Hq ARDC, 2 Sep 58 , 
subj: Satellite Tracking & Surveillance. 

16. AO 7-58 fc 8 - 58 , 20 Jun 58 . 

17. Memo, L/Gen R.H. Lynn, VCOKADC to Gen E.E. Partride, CINCNORAD, 6 
Oct 58 , subj: Mgt of Interim Satellite Detection and Tracking System, 
v/ind. Background Info. 

18. Memo, M/Gen H.E. Watson, AFCIN to D/AT, 25 Aug 58 , subj: Space Vehicle 
Surveillance Prog. 

19. Memo, Col J.L. Martin of D/AT to NASA, 22 Oct 58 , subj: Tracking of 
(NASA's) Inflatable Satellite; ltr, Johnson to Glennan, 5 Nov 53. 

20. Memo, Johnson to CQMARDC, 5 Roy 58 , subj: Satellite Detection and 
Surveillance System Dev. 



Notes to pages 173 -l 8 k. 

21. M/ft by MajH.C. Howard of D/AT, 21 NOv 58 , subjs Space Surveillance; 
AO 50-59, 19 Dec 58 ; ARPA System Dev Plan for Space Track, 13 Jaa 59 . 

22. Memo, Bousbey to Chmn/Air Def Panel Weapons Bd, 30 Apr 59, aubj: 

Space Surveillance. 

23 . Statements by L/Oen A.O. Trudeau, Ch, RAD, USA; V/Adm J.T. Hayward, 
ACNO (RAD); A M/Gen B.A. Schrlever, CGMAPBMD, in S Hearings before 
Subemte on Govt Orgn for Space Activities of Cote on Aero & Space 

* Sciences, 86 th Cong, 1st Sees, Investigation of Governmental Organ¬ 
isation for Space Activities, pp 236, e82, 315, A ki. 6 -rf. 

2k. Naso, M/Gen H.T. Wbeleaa, D/Plans to C/S USAF, 15 Jan 59, subj: ARPA 
Frogs; memo, L/Gen Wilson, DCS/D to L/Gen J.K. Gerhart, DCS/PAP, 12 
Jaa 59 , subj: AP Mission in Space. 

25 . S Hearings, Investigation . . . Space Activities, p 137* 

26 . Ibid ., pp 558 - 59 . 

27. Hanson Baldwin, "Neglected Factor in the Space Race,” Nf Times, 17 
Jan 60; James HSgerty, Jr, "Q.S. Program Has Gone Far in 28 Months," 
Washington Poet. 22 May 60; Clarke Nevlon, "We Can Catch the Russians 
in Spaced* Missiles A Rockets, lk Dec 59 . 

28. NSC 5818 , 26 Jan 59, subj: U.S. Policy on Space. 

29. NASA, United States and Russian Satellites. Lunar Probes and Space 
Probear^.957-1959; AFBMD, Summary of Air Force Ballistic Missile 
Division Activities in Space, Jun 60. 


1. Bouse Rpt 1758, 85 th Cong, 2d Sess, The National 8 pace Program . 

2. Statement by Gen Putt before McCormack Oate, p 123* 

3 . Statement by Gen Schrlever before McCormack Cmte, p 6 k 8 . 

k. D/AT, Proposed Military Position on Space, Dec 59 . 

5 . Nemo, Horner to D/ARPA, 10 Nov 58 , subj: AF Statement of Mil Uses of 
Space; WSEG Rpt 39, Mil Applications of Artificial Earth Satellites, 
submitted 13 Jun and considered by JC 8 lk Jul 59 . The references 
could be continued indefinitely. 

6 . SAC brochure, SAC's Space Concepts, 13 Aug 59* 

7 . Memo, Bousbey to Sp Asst to C/S USAF, 6 Dec 57, aubj: Missile Hearing, 
v/lnd 1 , policy. 

Notes to pages 18^-191. 


8 . Putt before McCormack Cmte, pp 100-101. 

9. Memo, B/Gen G.V. Martin, Dep D/Plans to Col R.A. Yudkin, War Plana 
Div, 3 Mar 59/ v/inclj memo, M/Gen H.C. Donnelly, Aset DCS/F&P to 
D/Plana, 21 Mar 58, subj: Prep of a USAF Position on Sovereignty 
Over Outer Space; Putt before McCormack Qnte, pp 99-136; memo, B/Gen 
N.F. Parrish, Aaet/Coordlnation to D/Dev Prog at al., 9 May 58 , subj: 
Mil Questionnaire; memo, L/Col J.B. Barney, Policy Dlv, D/Plans to 
D/Ops et al., 12 Jun 58 , subj: Policy Paper on Sovereignly Over Outer 
Space, v/incl; memo, Col S.G. Fisher, Asst Dep D/Plans for Policy to 
Asst/LR Objectives, 22 Aug 58 , subj: Trane of Study on Sovereignty 
Over Outer Space. 

10. Memo, Fisher to Asst/LR Objectives, 22 Aug 58 ; memo. Col B.S. Abbey, 
Policy Div to DCS/D et al., 8 Oct 58 , subj: Study on Sovereignty Over 
Outer Space. 

11. Memo, CUD to Cbmn/JCS, 2 May 59 , subj: U.S. Mil Policy on Outer Space. 

12. Memo, Cbmn/jCS to SOD, 22 May 59 , subj: U.S. Mil Policy on Outer 

13. Memo, M/Gen R.M. Montgomery, Asst VC/S USA? to M/Gen C.H. Donnelly, 
Asst DCS/PfcP, 16 Dec 59/ subj: Draft Statement on AF Policy with 
Regard to Space. 

lh. Gen T.D. White, C/S USAF, "Air and Space Indivisible," Air Force, 

Mar 58. 

15. Memo, B/Gen G.W. Martin, Dep D/Plans to L/Gen J.K* Gerhart, DCS/F&P, 

13 Jan 59 , subj: USAF Respons in Aerospace; ltr, Gerhart to L/Gen 
Eamet O'Donnell, Jr, DCS/Pers, 15 Jan 59; memo. Col R.E. Richardson, 
Asst/lR Objectives to M/Gen H.T. Wheless, D/Plans, 25 Nov 58 , subj: 

AF Leadership in Space; USAF in Space, A Policy Statement, 30 Jan 59 . 

1 6 . Statement by Gen White in H Bearings before Cmte on Science & Astro, 
86 th Cong, 1st Sess, Missile Development and Space Sciences , pp 73-7^* 

17* H Hearings before Subcmte of Cmte on Appn, 86 th Cong, 1st Sess, POD 
Appropriations for i 960 . Pt 1, Policy Statements, pp 57^-80. 

18. Memo, Col R.H. Ellis, Asst Dep D/Plans for WP to Dep D/Plans for 
Policy, 26 Mar 59, subj: Def of Aerospace; memo. Col S.G. Fisher, 

Asst Dep D/Plans for Policy to DCS/P&P, 20 Mar 59/ same subj. 

19. Memo, Wheless. to Gerhart, 17 Jan 59 , subj: Aerospace Power and Na¬ 
tional Security, 1960 - 70 . 

20. Memo, Boushey to Gerhart, 7 Jan 59 , subj: AF Mission in Space; memo, 
Wheless to DCS/D, 5 Feb 59 , subj: AF Objectives in Space. 

21. Ltr, LeMay to Power, CINCSAC, 17 Mar 59* 



Hotes to pages 192-196. 

22. Capt C.W. 8 tyer, UHN, & Comdr R.F. Freitag, TJ 8 N, "Tbs Navy in the 
Space Age," U. 8 . Naval Institute Proceedings. Mar 60. 

23. Boyd Hill, "Tbs Inglewood Coaqplex: Brawn and Heart of the AF Ballistic 
Missiles," AMC Worldwide. Apr 39; Hist, 1st Missile Div, Jan-Jun 39 , 

Vol I. 

24. Styer A Freltag. 

23 . U 8 N-USAF Agreement for Coordinated Peacetime Operation of tbs Pacific 
Missile Range, 3 Mar 36 . 

26. Hist, 1st Missile Dlv, I, 126-32. 

27. Ibid . 

28. Ltr, Col O.S. Curtis, 8 enlor AF Bep at PMR to Col G.S. Brown, Exec 
Off, 1st Missile Dlv, 13 May 39 . 

29* Ltr, Power to White, 13 Dec 36 . 

30. Signed Statement by Adm Arleigh A. Burke, CHO, 29 Jan 39, Inserted 
In H Hearings, POD Appropriations for I960. Pt 1, Policy Statements, 

PP 736-39. 

31. Hist, 1st Missile Dlv, I, 126-32. 

32. Ibid ., pp 120-29, 136-40. 

33* Memo, B/Gen J.F. Whisenand, USAF, to Cbnn/jCS, 16 Peb 39, subj: Pri¬ 
orities for BM & Sat Progs, v/App, draft memo, SOD to Pres, same subj; 
memo, Donald A. Quarles, Actg SOD to HASC, 26 Mar 39, subj: Priorities 
for Sat Progs; Note by the Secys, Action on JCS 2012/133, J-3 2012/133/1, 
19 Mar 39, subj: WS-U7L Infrared Sat Prog; memo, Martin, Actg D/Plans 
to C/S USAF, 13 Apr 39, subj: Priorities for Bt & Sat Prog; memo, JCS 
to SOD, 12 May 39 , subj: Priorities for Space Frogs; memo, Wheless to 
C/S USAF, 12 May 39 , same subj; memo, McElroy to Secys/Axmy, Navy, 

AF, 27 Apr 39, subj: Top Nat Priorities Frogs. 

34. ASSS, Col R.H. Ellis, Asst Dep D/Plans for WP to DCS/PAP, 17 Apr 39, 
subj: Status of WS-117L; memo, Donnelly to VC/S, 17 Apr 39, subj: 

Status of WS-117L. 

33 . Ltrs, Schrlever to Gerhart & Wilson, 18 May 39 . 

36 . Memo, Col Butcher to Dep D/Plans, 11 Jun 39 , subj: Coord of Sat A 
Space Vehicle Ops; ASSS, Wheless to DCS/D, 9 Jun 59, subj: Reply to 
Gen Schrlever. 

37. Memo, Adm Burke to JCS, 22 Apr 39, subj: Coord of Sat A Space Vehicle 
Ops, v/Encl, draft memo, JCS to SOD, same subj. 


Notes to pages 199*203. 

36 . Memo, C/S USAF to JCS, 12 May 39 . aubj: Coord of Sat & Space Vehicle 
Ops; memo* Hheless to C/S USAF, lb May 59 , subj: Navy Proposal for a 
Single Mil Agency for Coord of Sat & Space Vehicle Ops. 

39. Ltr, Glennan to McElroy, 25 May 59 . 

bO. Memo, Boushey to Swofford, 1 Jan 59 , subj: Global Tracking; Col Otto 
Haney, Off D/Dev Plang, b Jun 59, aubj: Conments on Ltr of Dr. Glennan 
to SOD. 

bl. M/R by Col John Martin, 17 Jul 59, subj: Proposed Orgn for Support 
of Project Mercury. 

b2. Draft DOD Dir, 2b Jul 59 , subj: Asgmt of Respons for DOD Support of 
Project Mercury. 

b3. Memos, McElroy to JCS, 29 May 59 , subjs: Asgmt of Operational Respons 
for an Interim Sat Early Warning System; Asgmt of Respons for an 
Interim Sat Navigation System; Asgmt of Operational Respons for Phase 
I of a Sat Recon System; Asgmt of Operational Respons for an Interim 
Sat Detection System. See also memo, JCS to SOD, 2b Jul 59, subj: 
Coord of Sat & Space Vehicle Ops; M/R by B/Gen G.W. Martin, 13 Aug 59* 

bb. Memo, McElroy to JCS, 18 Sep 59 , subj: Coord of Sat & Space Vehicle 

b5. H Rpt 1758 , 85 th Cong, p 8 . 

b 6 . Statement by Wilson In H Hearings before Qnte on Science & Astro, 

86 th Cong, 2d Sess, Review of the Space Program, p b 8 l. 

kj. Statements by Fulton & Merchant in Review of the Space Program, p 11. 




















































Army Ballistic Missile Agency 
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations 

Atomic Energy Cosmission 

Air Force Ballistic Missile Division 

Air Force Cambridge Research Center 

Air Force Flight Test Center 

Air Force Missile Development Center 

Air Force Office of Scientific Research 

Armed Forces Policy Council 

Air Materiel Command 


ARPA Order 

Army Ordnance Missile Command 
Air Research and Development Command 
Advanced Research Projects Agency 
Advanced Reconnaissance System 
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 
Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Air Staff Summary Sheet 

Ballistic Weapons and Development Supporting System 
Ballistic Missiles 

Ballistic Missile Early Warning System 
Ballistic Missile Test System 
Bomber Missile 

Ballistic Research and Test System 
Ballistic Research Laboratory 
Bureau of Aeronautics (Navy) 

Committee for Evaluating the Feasibility of Space 

Committee on Guided Missiles 
Civilian-Military Liaison Committee 
Directorate of Advanced Technology 
Development Directive 

Director of Defense Research and Engineering 


feet per second 

Guided Missiles 

General Operational Requirement 
Hypersonic Environment Test System 
Institute for Defense Analysis 
International Geophysical Year 
Initial Operational Capability 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
Joint Research and Development Board 
Joint Strategic Plans Committee 






Minimum Orbital Unmanned Satellite of Earth 


Memo for Record 


National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 


National Aeronautics and Space Administration 


National Aeronautics and Space Council 


National Intelligence Estimate 


North American Air Defense Command 


Naval Ordnance Test Station 


Naval Research Laboratory 


National Security Council 


Operations Coordinating Board 


Office of Defense Mobilisation 


Office, Secretary of the Air Force 


Office, Secretary of Defense 




Pacific Missile Range 


Plans and Operations 


Plans and Programs 


Program; Programming 


Research and Development Board 


Rocket Bomber 


Scientific Advisory Board 




Secretary of Defense 


Study Requirement 


Technological Capabilities Panel 


Technical Evaluation Group 


Television Infra-Red Observing Station 




Wright Air Development Center 


Wright Air Development Division 


Western Development Division 


War Plans 


Weapons Systems Evaluation Group 



1. SAF-OS 

2. SAF-US 

3. SAF-RD 

4. SAF-AA 

5. SAF-LL 
6 - 7 . SAF-OI -1 

8 . SAF-SS 


10. AFADA 

11. AFBSA 

12. AFCQA 

13. AFCVC 

14. AFDAS 

15. AFESS 

16. AFIIS 

17. AFJAC 

18. AFMSG 

19. AFRIN 

20. AFQAP 

21. AFODC 

22. AFQRQ 

23. AFPDC 

24. AFRDC 

25. AFRDP 

26. AFRDD 

27. AFRRP 

28. AFRST 

29. AFSDC 

30. AFSPD 

31. AFXDC 

32. AFXOP 

33. AFXPD 

53. OAR 
5^. FACAF 
55-57. SAC 
58-60. TAG 
6l. USAFA 
62 - 63 . USAFE 


65 - 66 . ASI 
67-71. ASI (HAF) 
72-76. ASI (HA) 
77-100. AFCBO (Stock) 


34-35. ADC 

36. AFCS 

37. AFLC 
38-44. AFSC 

45. ATC 

46. AU 

47. AFAFC 

48. AAC 


50. CONAC 


52. MATS