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ED^126 799 

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Ovexviews of Issues in Higher- Education:" Declining 
Test Scores, Collective B'argaininig, and State 
Planning, • . " 

Educational Policy Besearch Center for Higher 
Education- and Society, Washington,, D.t. , ^* 
,Office of the Assistant Secretary ton Education 
tDHEH) , Hashingtpn, D.C, ' * ' 
May 76 ^ . * . 

EPBC-300760026 \ " \ ^ ' ' 

86p. . 

Joseph Froomkdn Inc., .1015 Eighteenth .Street, H. S'. , 
Washington, D.Ci 20036 ^ ^ 

# ' . ' ' \ ^ 

!JF-$0.83 .HC-$a.67 Plus Postage. 

^Achievement Tests; *Coll^ctive BargainiBg; 

*. Collective Negotiation; *Educational Planning; 

♦Higlier jEducatibn; Planning Commissiojis; *]^rivate 

" ' • Colleges; *Public Schools; Besearch; *Studi5nts; 

Teacher Militancy f Onions ^ • ^ 

ABSTBACT . ^ 

Three current concerns of planners' of po^tsecondary 
isducatioB are" reviewed. "Declining test scores are attributed to an 
effort of high. schools^o "cool oft" prosjpective enrolle^s from 
enrol^'ing^in college by discouraging them- from taking academically 
demancfing programs, and impacts, especially on prestige schcfols, 
which will tend, to a-ttract an increasingly socially homogeneous and 
intellectually heteifogeneous group of students. A status report an . 
cdllective bargaining indi^jates that collective bargaining will be • 
more common in the public^ than the private* sector ; will affect the^ 
ability of public institutions to recruit an^^promote research; and 
will ultimately make it more difficult for state legislatures to 
•divert aid to private schools. The organization of §tate highei; 
education planning commissions is analyzed in terms of the effect of 
tte str^tuxe on developments in postsecondapy education. (^IHF) 



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OVERVIEWS OF ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION: 
^ reCLINING TEST SCORES, COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING, AND STATE PLAl^NING 



7 



. U S DC^AHTMENTOF HEALTH. 
EDUCATION AWELFARE 
NATIONAL INSTlTUrEOF 
4 EDUCATION 

THIS bOCUME NT HAS BEEN^HEPHO- 
DUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FRO^ 
^, 7HE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGIN. 
ATING IT 'POINTS OF V I E W OR OP I N I ON S 
STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRE- 
SENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL lNSTlTu^6.0F 
EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY 



EPRC for Higher Education and Society 

✓ ♦ 

Contract No, 300760026 



^ - May 1976 



\ 



2- 



INTRODUCTION 



/ The follo^A^irig three studies deal with currfent cpnce^s of 
planners of.postsecondarjr edugation. These short overviews Wfere 
prepared by the center^ as a contribution to'^the debate on thesejsubjects 

1. DgcMning Test Scores : Reasons and Impacts . Mchieve- 
ment test scores of college-bound students aj|e continuing to decline. '^It 
is suggested that an iriiportant contrib)iting factor to this'decline is the 
effort of high schools to ''cool off* prospective enroUees fron| enrolling 
in college by^dijscouraging thjem frorri taking- academically demanding 
programs . Nevertheless, despite less rigorous preparation,// a. high pro- 
portion of youjChs decide to attend college, v * 



e betieve, - 
o^er increas^ 



The most serious impact 'of test score declines, 
will be on tt)e self-concept^of prestige schools. Unless the 
ing financial inducements to attract high ability students, th^se institutions 
will become increasingly socially homogeneous an^ intellectjjbally hetero- 
geneous. . V , ^ ^ 



e pos t second - 
ion trend among 
momentum 
sures exerted 
ol on public, 
g economic and 



. 2. A status report^on co^ective-bargaining in 
art sector . This study concluded that although the unioniz. 
faculties slowed dowri recently, it i* likely to regain its lo 
soon. The faculties' lack of symipathy for the financial pr 
upon administrations^, >the trend to impose centralized cont 
institutions in a period of slow growth, and the deterioratiri; 
job prospects ifor faculty will encourage professors to joinjunions., -In all 
probability, collective bargaining will be'more common , ia the pubjLic fhan 
in the private sector . In the long run, unions will (1) affect the ability of 
pybilc institutions to recruit staff to pursue promii^ing research leads, 
forcing the public sector to be increasingly oriented^ to teaching, and (2) 
create powerful coalitions between elementary, secondary and college 
teachers which will makelit more difficult for state legislatures to divert 
aid to private schools V ^ ^ / j ^ 

■ ■ ^ ' ' ' \ ' ^ . ' ' 

3 ■ ' The -organization of state higher education 

missions ■ An analysis of state planning/coordination strt|Gtures was 
undertaken to upderstand the effect of different types of commissions on 
developments^ in the postsecondary sector. The study came to the con- . 
elusion that the structure of state commissions did not significantly affect 
state policy, especially as it related to the^private sector. ' States* with 
strong ^nd weak planning/coordin'S^ting organizations did not differ signifi- 
cantly in their propensity to offer scholarships to students in the private 



planning com- 



sejCtor, or in the level. 61 their awards. The deci£^i|)ns fo finance public 
and aid private higher education are essentially political decisions'.^ nf ^ 
oqe wishes to focus- increasing attention on the interact|pn between'public 
and private systems within a state, and the impact oi%ne state's public • 
system on that of neighboring states, inter -state CQop^iration must be 
encouraged between governors, their key staffs, afid interested state 
legislators. ' ' 



Joseph Froomkin 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



DECLINING TEST SCORES? REASONS AND IMPACTS 

How Much. Did'the Test Scores Decline? 
Women Are Not the Cause of Lower Scores • ■ 
^ Is the Family the Cause of Lower Test Scores;? , 
Are Less Affluent Test-Takers %e Cause? , ^' 
Is the School at Fau^t*^ -^^^ ■ ^ ■ 
The Impact of Declining Scores on Schools • 
A Time for the Reconsideration of Missions 
Footnotes • > , 

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN HIGHER EDUCATION' 
A LOOK AT THE FUTURE OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT 

. \ Introduction ' ^ ^ ^ * 

Some Reasons for the Increase of Collective Bargaining 
- " Where the Changes Have Takten Place 
, The Bargaining Agents ^ . ^ 

Imnriediate kffects of Unioftization ' ^ 

Long Rangfe Implications of Unionism 

Conclusions \ f 

Footnotes 

Appendix tables 1,2,3' 

. ■ ' - — ' 

THE ORGANIZATION OF STATE HIGHER EDUCATION 
PLANNING AND COORDINATING COMMISSIONS 

'Sotne History 

A T;jT3ol|c!i)gy of Agendies 

Agenciel9: Preferred Form§ and Operational Styles 
State f^lanning/Coordination and the Private Secto-r 
^ Form, Sliljstance and Politics 

Some Cdndlusions ^nd Suggestions ^ . ^ 
Footnotes* 





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Joseph Froomkin Inc. , ^ - • " 

" , IOI5 ElOHTEENTH STReIST. N. W., WaS H I N$T0N, D. C. 20030 j ^ 

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DECLINING.TEST SCORES: REAS'ONS AND IMPACTS . • 

" ' • / 
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; <^ . By" 
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- 6 





DEC LIN IMG. TEST SCORES-, REASONS AND IMPACTS 

/ * 

* Few recent developments have received as much attention 

in academic.circlqs and among test-oriented psychologis'ts as the con- 
tinuing decline in the test sp|re^ of potential college applicants. After 
rea-chirig a peak in 1963, thes^^lpl^: scores hav^ declined continuously^ 
and there is littlq evidence that tIteMide has ended. ^ 

\ Statisticians have concl^aed that the currfent wave of test- 
fakers is scoring genuinely lower tMn\t:,hose who took the tests some 
yoars ago, ;and that the difference m Xti&%i scores is not a statistical 



artifact-^ HoweVer, the reasons for this l(feibline have not been rigorously 
identified,' 'arid various hypotheses, none ai||ight, have been proposed to 



eiiplain the decline. 

'Thfe present paper \yill briefly surrirharize the evidence of 
the decline in test scores, review some of the hypotheses fol the decline, 
and comment^on institutional adjustments to the declining test scores. 
HOW MUCH DID THE TEST SCORES-DECLINE? - - 
Both major testing organizations, the College Entrance Exam- 
ination^ Board and the. Ameil'ican College Testing Progj^m, have recorded^ 
sigriif^ant declines in the test scores of potential college applicants . 
The scores ha\^^ dropped even more* oh the verbal portion of the test than 
on the mathematical f)ortion . The American College Testing Service,, 
which tests achievement in social studies and physical science, as wfell. 



7 



'• hasyDbserved significant declines. in social studies, ,but not in science. 
• (See Table. 1.) , \ , - , " 

• • ■ ' ' ' • 7 

During the time period for which information is availaile for 
■' , ' ' ' • ' ■ . . " .. 

both testing services, 1964/65 to 1974/75, verbal scores on thC'Scholas- ' 

tic AptitiSde Test (SAT), administered^by; tlie- College Entrance Examina.r, 

tiou Board, 'declin^bys39 points, or 0.4 of a standard deviation, while • 

'Mathematical scores declined 24 points, or roughly a quarter of a standard •« 

devi^ion. For the same ten years, the English scores rec'or4^d by ACT 

declinedrby I'l points on their ^cale, or. roughly one-fifth of ^ standard- . 

"^'deviation, and thos6 for matbematic\, by 1.5 points', again roughly one- 

^ ' fifth of a standard deviation. Combined SAT^cores fleclined by one-third - 

> of a standard deviation, .and tho^e of the ACT by one*fift4j.'^^ . • ' 

V ' ' *" 1 

No one can state with certainty the ^xterit to which the scores 
of all colieg^e-bound students declin'ed. Ifi the/first place. It is quite 
possible t^at the s/ame test-takers are_clients of both -^ganizations. The 
V CEEB test-tak@i^ numbered gome 70 per cent of all high school graduates 
who enter college in 'the. fall following graduation, and the ACX administers 
tests to .a number equaLjto 60 per cent . ' There is undoubtably some over- 
lap between the two Organizations . * . * -> " 

The attaininent of students deciding to take tests of bo$h organ^- 
izarions may be affected by the admission policies of colleges a^ univer- 
sities, or the changing preferences of students for different types of schools 
Also, rumors that test-scores are given less weight in admission, or fhat^ 

, 9 - . 



ERIC 



TABLE I 

DECLINES IN TEST SCORES OF PROSPECTIVE: 
COLLEGE STUDENTS 





* T 


SATS 




. ACT 


I ■ 




' Verbal 


Mathematics 


English 

* 


Mathematics - 


Composite 


IV 04 00 


• 473 


496 


18,7 


19.6 


19". 9 


iVOO^OO 






19 1 


■ 19.S ' 


. 20.0 ' 


l^OO o/ 


tT u/ 


49S 


18.5 


18.7 


' 19.4 


iyO/ •~Do 


AAA 


404 


18 1 


' 18.3 ' 


19*. 0 

* 


1968^69 


462 


491 V. 


18.4 


- 19.2 


' 19.4 . 


1969-70 


460./ 


488 


18.1 . 


. L9.'5 


, 19.5- 












n 


1970-71 


, 454 , 


487 


• 17.7 


18.7 


18.9 


1971-72 


450 


482 


f 

17,.-6 


18.6 


1 O O 

J.8.0 . 


1972-73 


443 


' 481 


. 47.8 


'18.8 


« 18.9 


1973-74 


440 


478 


;i7.6 


18.1 


■ 18.7 


19V4-75 


.434^ 


^ 472- 


17.3 


17,. 4 ■ 


i9.i ' 

• 










\ 

\ 





1 

Source: L. A. Munday, Declining -Admissions Test Scores , Research 
and Development Division, The American College Testing Pro- 
gram, Iowa City, Iowa- 19.76, pp. 3,5. 



0 



institutions have lowered standards, may discourage some student^ from 
repeating the.tests in thje hope of scoring better the second time. It has 

been est'fonated th^t perhaps as much as foilr^points of the decline in the 

* • . • »• ' • . ^ . ■ * 

SAT may- be ascribed to the smaller proportion of students taking* the 

CEEB test a second time. Also,, the decision of the University of Cali- 
fornia to drop the requirement for entering in -state freshmen to submit 
SAT scores could, have r^duosd the number of high scoring test-takers in 
the sample.^ ^ \ ;| 

Since the CEEB clients are mostly private schools, with a 
y • smattering of public schools on both coasts, and the ACT penetration is 
highest among mid-\Arestern and public schbols, changes in ca]^egef . 
attendance patterns for gifted^^students may also affect the scores recprded 
• by each of the testing services . The tendency of gifted students to attend 
in greater numbers public* institutions could have very well reduded the 
nunriber'of high-scorers for the SAT.^ Our estimates indicate that the t 
proportion of students Who earned scores exceeding 600 on the verbal part 
of the SAT test declined much'more dramatically than those earning the 
equivalent score. of 26 points on the ACT test. The^piber of test-takers, 
with these scores dropped by Roughly a third for the SAT's and only 15 
, per cent for th^ ACT population . (See Taile 2 . ) 

The real decline in scores is probably even mpre serious- 
' than that represented by published figures. Unadjusted ^T scores prob- 
V_^a6ly understate the decline by one-third. Studies undertaken by the CEEB 

■ 10- 



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5 



• • . V TABLE 2 

NUMBER OF STUDENTS WITH TEST SCORES OVER 600 VERBAL, 
OP 600 MATHEMATICS ON SAT TESTS^AND 26 ACT ON ' 
ENGLISH, MATHEMATICS AND TOTAL SCORES, 
. ^ 1971-72, .1974-75 

' (thousands). ' . • . , 



SAT , . 
Verbal Mathematics 



1971-72 
1974-75 

Per Cent 
Decline 



116 
79 

-32 



183 
157 

'-14 



ACT 

English . Mathematics 



49 
42 

-15 



205 
175 

-.15 



Total 
130 
113 



•13 



( 



Source^ Unpublished data, E^lucational Testing Service, cited In Anijegret 
Harnischfegfer and David E. Wiley, Achievenient -Scores. Debline ;" ' 
Do We Need to Worry, Chicago, December 1975 (CEMREL, Inc.)- 



r 



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ERIC 



J. 



ili^icate that the forms of. the tests administered iri more recent years • 
have been easier than those used in earlier time peiriod^^/The actual 
.decline' in verbal test scores, when adjusted for the difficulty, of the test 
form, was^ 48 and not 33 points. On the mathematical part> the corrected 
decline is 40 points, instead of 29^ The adjusted decUnes are roughly 10^ 
per cent of th^ verbal and eight per 'cent of the math" scores in 1963. 

Researcher? who have tried to fin^ evidence for a decline in 

the achievertient of high-school students to buttress their arguments that 

* ■ ■» - ' . 

-I 

the CEEB and. ACT aamplesr are repir.esentative have pointed out that: 

(1) the test scores of iQwa seniors on 4n independent -test 
' . have declined in the recent past,^ ' / - 



(2) state- wide tests in Minnesota have also. shown declines 
in the achievement of high school student?,^ 

• (3) scores on k widely-'used commercial test of achieve- ^ 

ment have al^o, recorded, declines for. high schodl ' ' ^ 
^ * students. ^ . . . . ' . ; 

There, is considerable unanimity that tRe performance of high 

'school students is declining. The developnierit is esRecia^y disturbkg 

since it cannot- be explained by changes in the prop^irtion of the age- 

eligible population that continues to high school graduation. .The prqpor- 

lion'^f age-eligihles graduating from high school has stabilized in-the 

course of tfte past five years, a period when tests declines were excep- 

tionally pr^ounced. ^ ^ ^ ^ 




•v. 



^ • ' ' women'are not the "cause of lower scores 

, Less than one -eighth of the deoline in verbal scores, and 

' ' ' ' , • ■ * - ! 

only one-tenth in the decliriean matjiema;a.(^j scores pn^the SAT teSt can 

' . ■ *" : • 0 > /• ■ " ' • ■ ' ■ : 

be dccQOnted by the increasing number of women taking the tesC. • Between 



1966/67 and 1974/75 the 'decline irr female achievement in vocabulary was 
greater than that of males.-. It can be rationalized by assuming that a 



higher proportion of females with p.dfentially low. test scores, now take , 
the test. In' mathematics, women always scored lower than men. 

A new aclfusted cdmposite scorfe which is derived^by (1) deCre- 
• menting female verbal scotes by no more than the decline of male scores, 



■ and (2) weighting the new composite score- by the jsex -Weights in the earlier 
time period fails to explai^the liot^'s s^re in/the decline in scores. 
(• .(See. Table 3. J.. ' ^ , 

. ■ ' IS the- FAMILY TH^ CAUSE- OF LOWER TEST SCOPES? V 
^.5** " Among the most speculative and. tentative explana.- * 

. tions for the^ecline in test-scores is the influence of the family. Most . «. 
psychometricians would agree that verbal ability is determined early in 
a child's life and influenca^ by family environment. 

It is often mentioned that the students witfcdeclining test- 
scores belong' to the demographic wave called the"baby-boom.J' There 
is considerable evidence that children in large fafnilies are less. verbal 

than childy^A in small families. An imagin,ativ^ psychologist has recently 

. . . ' I* • ■ ■ , • ' • * 

suggested that partW thp decline in test- scores the increasing 

. S"- 



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TABLE 3 

"MEAN SAT TEST SCORES OF MENsAND WOMEN, AND 
FOR BOTH SEXES, 1066-67 AND 1974-75 'ON^SAT 
TESTS, ACTUAL AND ADJUSTED . 



Mathefhatics 



. Verbal 
'Male l^^emalfe Total Adj usted Male Female Total Adjusted' 



1966-67 463 468 ,466 - .514 467 - 492 
1974-75 437 431. '434 '438 7 495 449 472 



.474 



1 Source: Adapted -from Sam McCanjdless, Pr9gram Service Officer CEEB/ 
^ "The Decline in Achievement" (processed), 1975. 



Adjusted Test Sdores: , Female Test Scores Estimated 440 Verbal, 449 

Mathematics, Proportions Male .543, Female .457, 



ERIC 



i . 



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9 ■ . • / 



proportion of seconcTand third children enrolling in colle'ge. It is gen-/ 
erally accepted that the verbal ability of subsec^uent children is flower 
that! that of the first-bom.^ Other observers have o^jned that children 
raised by divorced parents could have lower scores. Finally, the change* 
in child-rearing styles resulting from the ubig^uitous^ television set has 
been mentioned as a possible cause of the decline in test scores-. 

^ AH these arguments axe plausible, but tStiey are not convinc- 
ing. None explains the increase in the achievement of children in the 
eai-lier grades compared to the test scores ten or twenty years a:go, knd* 
their subsequent decline in later grades . If the potential for verbal 
achievement is forrfied in the early years', the family has to be exonerated. 

! Another attempt to explain the lower achievement in the higher 
grades involves working mothers. Their inability to supervise homework, 
etc., has" been mentioned as a possible cause of the declining test scores. 
Unfortunately, no study has proved that the achievement of children of 
working mothers is lower than mothers who sta^at hdme, once socio- 
economic status and education of parents is controlled!^ This hypothesis, . 
then, is tantalizing, but unproved. 

' ARfe^^ESS AFFLyElvJT TEST-TAKERS THE CAUS^'? 

The democratization of the postsecondary sector, which has 
made it possible for students from families with modest means to enroll 
in colleges and universities, has also been mentioned as a possible cause 
for the decline in test scores. In another study, we have mentioned that 



ERIC 



the propensity of childr^ from the lower income families to enroll iii * 
college-has increased somewhat in the course of the past five years, 
going against national trends.. ■'•^ If the mean attainment of these students 
was somewhat lower than that of test-taker&:in previous years, a hypoth- 
esis consistent with what/ we, know about the ^tainment of children raised 
in poor families , we wouid expect test-scores to declinei reflecting this 

change in self -selection. ^ * 

' ' ■ ■ *" ' . 

• Our information ab/ut the incomes of families of test-takers 
is based on a slender reed, the potential collie entrants' Swn estimates 

. «r> I. ' / 

oi their families' incomes. Jhere is considerable eviijence that such. data 
are inaccurate, but iR) better statis tit is available from any other source. 
Whatever publislkj^^ do exist indicated tfeat (•l)-^the mean incomes of 

ft 

families of ACT test-takers remained constant during the period 1970/71 
to 1974/75, and (2) duripg.that period avferage famUy income increased 
20 per cent jin current dollars . The average test-taker canrre from a 
family with 1.4 times the median income in the earlier time period, while 
four years later the family income of the average <est-taker was barely 
1.2: times the national median. 

UntiJ recently, the dncome'distribution of clients of the CEEB 
was not tabulated in a- way to make it possible to judge the. test -^takers' 
^ mean incomes . Vor the past three years, howejzjer, a more detailed tabu- 
lation of test- takers by income and earned scol^^es has become available. 
(See Table 4.) ^ ^ . - 



TABLE 4 



ANNUAL PARENTAL INCOME MEAH SAT ' 
: SCORE, BOTH TESI*S COMBINED 



1972-73 



\ 



$18,00(f andbver 

$15,000 - $17,^99. V 
$14,999. . . 
$13,499... 



$13,500 
$12,000 
$'9,000 ■ 
$6,000 



$8,999. 



Under $6,000 



$18 ,-000 and over. . 
$15,0Q6 - $17>999. 
$13,500 - $14,999. 
$12,000- $13,499. 
$9,000 - $11,999. , 
$6,000 - $8,999. . 
Under $6,000, .. . 



1973-74 



1974-75 





r Cqnt •\ - 


Score 




27 . \ ' 


• 

503 




12 . 


486 




8 


.479 




9 


471 




,20 


464 




14 


445 




10 . 


. 411 




34 


' 485 


12 


473 




. 469 


9 


464 


17 


455 


12 * 


435 


8 


403 



\ 



$30, 000 and over ,12 

$20,000 - $29,999 21 

$15,000 - $19,999 20 

16 

15 

10 

' 7 



$12,000 - $14,999; 
$9,000 - $11,999.. 
$6,000 - $8,999. . . 
Under $6,000 



494. 

479 

464 

454 

442 

422 

393 



Source: College Entrance Examination Board, cited in The Chronicle 
of Highe r Education, March 8, 1976. " ' ' 

• : t 



A re-analysis of these test 'score statistics in terms of*the 
mean incomes of families'^ in the appropriate years does not explain the . 
decline in test scores^ The test scores are plotted in relation to the 
mean incomes in each' year ip. Chart 1 . The decline in the test scores 
of a test-taker fram a family with the mean.inc6me is nine points, roughly 
the same as the published decline in test |^ores for all CEEB clients.' 

Chart 1 highlights the more drastic decli|i0 in the test scores 
of children of affluent parents, and the more modest decline in the test 
scores of children with poorer parents . The hypothesis that children of 
more affluent parents are increasingly applying to private or Eastern 
schools, schools which require SAT tests, is ndt borne out by an analysis, 
of the distribution- of test-takers by income. Roughly the same 'proportion 
of test-takers in both 1971/72 and 1973/74 originated from families with' 
incomes 1.5 times the national median. It would appear that the decline 
in the test scores.* of the children of the affluent is real. 

The different slopes of the curves in each year pre6lude any 
firm judgment about the effect of incomes on testiscores, and make It 
risky to generalize from tfle SAT experience to the ACT. .If the decline 
in scores by income group was similar for the two testing organizations, 
perhaps as much as one -quarter to one -half of the declining test scores 
of the ACT sample .spuld be accounted by the decreasing affluende of test- 
takers. HoWever, sfnce the declines, as measured ixi terms of standard 
deviation .are different for the two testing organizations, such comparisons 



have no scientific basis . Even^the most reckless comparisons fail' to 
explain the decline in test scores by the declining affluence of those jn 
the sample. 

' . IS THE SCHOOL^AT FAULT? ■ 
As neither family influences nor changes in the income dis- 
tribution can explain the declining test scores, it is reasonable to look 
at the possible.role of school influenc«s . A variety of hypotheses has 
been advanced in this connection. . - . 

' One of the most attractive was stated by Rouse, wHo hyppth- 

" ..V \ ■ . ■ ■ " 

esized.that rapidly rising enrollment after 1952 could have affected the 
quality of teaching, and caused declining test scores. If schools were - 
forced 'to hire less experiencefl, less well-educated, or Jtess verbal • . 
teachers to fill rapidly increasing vacancies, the quality of instruction, 
and hence attainment, could have declineti as a result. National statistics 
indicate that the experience of teachers did not change much from 1^65 
to 1975, after'declining somewhat between 1960 and 1965. T|ie educa- 

I 

tional attainment of teachers as measured by the percentage of .teachers 
with at least an undergraduate degree, or by the percentage of teachers 
with graduate degrees, actually increased from 1960 on. Since 1970, 
both the mean experience and education of teachers have increased, and 
(est scores have declined. •'■^ We have nfl time series measuring the 
ability of teachers , but. some recent studies have indicated that-, even in 
a period of surplus of applicants over ^obs, the recruitment of teachers 




seems to favor the graduates of less selective institutions with below 
grades. Perhaps Rouse is right in tactfully suggesting the timeliness 
of an investigation of ^ the effecti? of a decline in the caliber of'teachers 
on student tegt scores. , • , ' 

, Test scores rhay also have been affected by the cjianging pro-, 
grams of junior high and high schoals in recent jreaTs'T' These changesv 
have been documented by HaVnischfeger^and Wiley . Based on detailed, 
and unpublished, surveys of the National Cemter for Educational Statistics, 
these, two researchers have noted (1) a decline in the proportion of pupils 
taking English courses in grades 7 through 12 in tjje peripd 1970/71 and ^ 
1972/73, (2) a drop^of enijoUments in mathematics of some seven per {' 
cent, and <3) rapid growth, 1.4 to 2 . 6 per cent, of enrollment in remedial 
mathematics . The s(^me survey also indicates that (1) severi per cent 
fewer students took physical science in any given year, and {2) a decline 
in students' propensity to enroll in foreign language courses, and (3) 
virtual stability of enrollmei^t in history. 

The two authors make the startling point ihat concurrently 
with the dei^line in the number of courses, taken in academic subjects, there 
has been an even steeper decline in enrollments in'^^the more vocational 
courses. These enrollments, they estimate, have declined' by some 30 
per cent.^ These developments can be. explained by either one of the \ 
following two developments: (1) the average student is taking fewer 
courses in 1972/73 than in the earlier time period, and (2) the lighter 



work load of students is due to the increasing popularity of work-studjj 
or other "reality oriented" programs . ' , . 

These developments do not cLme ass a surprisp to .anyone who 
has followed the current educational rhetoric. Affective, as contrasted 
to cognitive, development has been increasingly emphasized at the high 
school level. High school teachers and administrators try to shelter 
. their students from the bitter taste of failure in their formative years, ; 

...... - ^ • r 

andare'lfess concerned fabouit<achievement. By contrast, the personneli^^ 
in the post's econdary sector would like to attract an increasing number 
of students with high scores. There is" less rapport between these two , . 
sectors than ever Ijefore.- . , ' 

Th^re is incr€iisin^evidenc6 that the gap between what tjhe 
high schools believe**to be satisfactory attainment and what the test-giving' 
community, which reflects the values of the postsecondary establishment, 
believes are acceptable levels of knowledge is- widening. For instance, 
both the CEEB and the ACT report that the later waves of test-takers, 
who scored low on the tests, had consistently higher high school grades 
than did the earliex wave5>< who scored higher on the tests . 

The widening gap between these two sets of values can be con- 
sidered either trivial or serious depending upon one's point of view. 
Statistical analysis has indicated that test scores alone do not explain 
more than one-third of the variance of grades earned by students in col- . 
lege. When high school grades are taken into account, the contribution 



of ^cores to f)redicting grades does not ^ount to more than 10 per cent 
Qf the xjfiriance.^^ ^ ' ^ • • 

6h the other hand, if one is interested in high school standards 
and the intellectual Challenge which is offered to teen-agers, the test- ^ 
scor.e^ decline is worth pondering- It would appear that we are '.'cooling- 
o4f ' some proportion of the more giffeed students by encoura'ging them to 
pay more atj:ention to non- academic activities, while at the same time * 
having little success in raising the aqhievement o^students from poor 
families . Despite the inadequate pi/eparation, they continue to enroll' in 
cpll^ge, because they believe -that a postsecondary education is required 
to succeed in later- life. ^ ' • 

To what extent is the federal government responsible foj: this 
decline in scores? The federally -sponsored drive for innovation in curric- 
ulum at all levels of the school, undejr Title III ESEA, may well have^ 
contributed to the decline in test scores. Some years ago when the Inter- 
national Education Association published the results of its international 
assessment of mathematical achievement, it warned educators that/ . 
autonomously adminis*tered changes in curriculum^were likely to result 
in lower scores. •'^^ These warnings were aever heeded by federal policy- 
makers, who firmly believed that other,, possibly non -measurable, gains 
would maperialize from a drive to sponsor change. ^ \ 



THE IMPACT OF DECLI>M>4G SCORES ON SCHOOLS f 
- * " . * . ' ' ' 

The postseccmdary sector appears to have taken the declin- 

."ing test scores in stride. Institutions catering to freshmen with lower 

te^t scores have grown more rapidly than, those which were more selec- 

tive. In'most cases, the s elective '^sti^utions swallowed their pride 

and accepted a sufficient number of students with lower test scores to' 

fill their freshman classes! . . , - ^ 

The American College Testing Service compared the mean 

scores of entrants in a number of client institutions in 1969/70 and 197f/7 

It noted that mean scores declined least in junior colleges, and most in^ 

doctoral -granting inst\tutio;is . Golleg/s that conferred only bachelor's 

degrees saw their score decline soni^what less than those wliich awarded 

graduate degre^es below the doctorate. Despite the lower initial score^ ' 

of enrolled freshmen, ACT concluded that the retention rate through the 

V 

first term did not diffei^ significantly from one period to the other . . 

It is fairly obvious that colleges and universities are neither 
denying admission to low-scoring applicants, nor encouraging those with 
the least academic promise (as measured by test scores) to drop out. 
■i;here is, on the contrary, -some evidence that the grades earned by col- 
le^e students are higher than ev@r. It h^is been hypothesized that the 
grade inflation in colleges is due to the decline^in expected standards in - 
performance. The mood of x the high school, it has been argued, has beeh 
taking over the colleges . This decline in standards I'nay have also been/ 



triggered by the desire^o accommodate the less, gifted students, and 
thos^, in tyrn, make the entrants look good by comparison. ' . *- 

Two years ago. a self-study group of nine selective' New Eng-^ 
land and Middle-Atlantic colleges >ad already e)q)ressed some aljarm ' 
about the decline in teat jscores. BetweenrJ968 and 1972, the proportion ' 
of freshmen with verbal test scores over 700 declined by on'e-third^ and 
those with nriathematical scores over 700 dropped by 17. 1 per cent. In 
1968 >^ 84 per cent of t;h^freshmen had verbal scores over 600; by 1972^ 

this proportion had declined to 72 per cent. The proportion of freshmen 

♦ • " - ■ ■ • 

with SAT scores over 600 in mathematics declined {ess steepi^, but signif-- 

icantly, from 84 per cent in 1968 to 79 per cent^cJT the 1972 freshman 

19 ^ ' ' ' • 

cla^s.^ ^ ^ 

These declines have continued. For 32^highly selective^ col- 
leges, which reported the test scores of the middle 50 per cent of the • « 
/reshman class for both 1971 and 1974, further declines .weye observed. 
The lower range of freshman scores declined by 15 points, and the upper 
range by 28 points. Our impression is tljat these declines are understated 

because a number of institutions repprte^ the same statistics for both ^ 

I' 

years . Information from the grapevine of admission officials places 
mean score declines for most of the selective institution^ at 50 points 
for five years, or three times the rate of the average decline in scores. 
Being mostly private and expen&ive, these institutions, where the mean . 
freshman score still remains over SAT 600, are returning to their formejp 



tradition of catering to a clientele which is more hetejfogen^ouB intellect 

'• " 20 * - . 

tually and morp homogenous socially. , ^ 

.■ ' ' ' ' *' 

This fact has not escaped pit)speGtive -college applicants . . 

"v^ile'the number of test takers' whq^cored over' 600 on the SAT. YerJ)al 
portion pf the test declined by 32 per cdnt, in the pastolO years, th^ num- 
ber of applJtcanie to highly selective institutions declined by only 6 per 

Qent. Depp ite . the less attractive pool of applicants thd institutions did , 

■'*■»'• •■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ .-■ ^ ■ ., 

not reduce the number of 'acceptances . The total nuiTiber of.stude'nts 

' ' . ■ 

accepted remained Constant thro^ghofit the time period.* As in the past, 
50. per ceat of tho&e^-acceptedcturned up,' and the size of the ffeshman 
class in selective schools remained stable'in both time periods . \ 

ThVdecline in SAT scores, which has- affected ^students frpm 

. rich families, as well as students from more Modest backgrounds , is' 
changing the character of eSttte colleges?^- ftT another study, we estimated 
that* roughly half of t^e students with sdores over 600 were in elite schools 
If the study could, be repeated today, we would not be surprised if the ^ 
proportion, of gifted fr^hmen in elite institutions :were even lower. These 
schools are increasingly pricing themselves out of the market for some - 
proportion^of gifted students. ' Our guess is that these students currently 
do not take the CEEB test at all. ' 

• A TIME FOR- THE RECONSIDERATION OF MISSIONS \ 

The tentative nature of our findings rules out set conclusions 
about the decline in test scores. Others have called for more studies 

26 • ' ' 



to understand the influences and th^xauses of the decline. We shall 
limit ourselves to setting down our impressions about what might have 
happened- . 

Most likely, the clientele pf both test' services has changed. 
Probably fewer high-scoring students take both tests. Some less affluent 
gifted students are no longer applying to selective private institutions, , 

What is the policy issue? $hould we be concerned that the 
elite institutions are losing thQir intellectual c^Qhet? Or should we be 
concerned more about the type of education which the poorer gifted stu- 
det(ts are getting? We prefer to worry about the second^uestion, ^nd 
bemoan the fact that^jthere i/ no information on this gybjdct. We do know 
that an increasing nuniber of public institutions have introduced honors . 
programs for gifted students, but we knovv of no survey of their content, 

^nor of the impact of the programs on the students themselves. With 
high scoring students increasingly choosing to attend public schools, it 
would behoove federal policy-makers to investigate what arrangements ^ 
have been made in the public sector on behalf of the increasingly rare' 
gifted students - . ' • ' 

. Another issue wortft investigating further is the reason for 
the decline of academic course offering in high schools- To" what extent 
is this a function of anti-intellectualism of the ceunselling profession? 
To what extent is it due to the low caliber of teachers who were hired 

•during the recent expansion of enrollments? Why is the high school , * 



22 



increas iqgly pol'arized ,* ^ith ,the maj ority of s tudents taking fewer aca- 
dertiic courses, 'and a rpiniscule^ but growing, minority taking advanced 

courses? ', * , 

It may be appropriate to conclude with a contrdversiaLproposi- 

tion. Perhaps the high, school is anticipating the developments in our • 

soQiety, and is doing its best to discourage students from indulging in ' 

higher edu6ation which they will not be able to use iri their work. If high 

school administrators a^e right, however; the same message must also 

reach the postsecdndary sector,"* which is still trying to Jceep enroUments 

from declining, and in the process, , may be sacrificing standards/which were 

probably none-too-high in the past. 



I TP ^ 



( 



St 



2& 



I 



X ■ > 

, ' FOOTNOTES 

^i;^. A/'Munday, Declining Admissions Test Scores , The American Col- 
lege Testing ProgHnTnowi^^'Cityriowi?''^^^ 
Division, 1975), p, 1. . . 

* 

^G. L. Marco and J. Stem, Investigation of "Repeater" Hypothesis Con- 
cerning SAT Score Decline (Princeton, N.J.: ETS, 1974). ~ 

^Richard'^. Anderson, JTriyLis/Public Higher .Education and the Competi- 
tion for High Ability Students, " Journal of- Human Resources, V. 10, No. 
4 (Fall, 1975), pp. 500-511. """^ ~~r~- 

' - ' . ' *' 

^C. C. Modu and J. Stem, The Stability of tTie SAT Score Scale , College 
Entrance Examination Board Research and Development Report RDR-74- 
74, No. 3 (Princeton) New Jersey: Educational Testing Service, April, 

^ 1975). ■• • 

1^ V William Coffman, .Iowa Testing Programs, (1975). 

O. E. Swans on, /'Fashions in'Test Scores, " Student Counseling Bureau 
' Review , 25 (197'3), pp. 69-72.., \ 

^John F. Draper, Unpublished Materials, CTB/McGraw-Hill. 

^Carol Tavris, "The End of the IQ Slump," Psychology Today , Vol. 9, No. 
11 (April, 1976) pp. '69-75. 

^Wilbur Schramm, Jack Lyle and Edwin B.. Parker, Television in the Lives 
of Our Children (Stanford, Calif. : Standford University Press, 1972). - 

— ' = ■ *• ' ' . *• 

■'•^Joseph Froomkin Inc. , Recent Developments in Post-Secondary Education , 
1970-1975 (January, 197W- ~ ' '. ~ " 

^ ^ Chronicle of Higher Education , Vol. 12, No. .33 (March 15, 1976). 

■'■^Annegret Hamischfeger and Davi'd E. Wiley, Achievement Test Score 
Decline; Do We Need to Worry? , ML- Group for Policy Studies in Educa- - 
tion (Chicago: Cemrel, Inc. , December, 1975), pp. 100 ff. 

^^Laure Sharp, Who Are the New Teachers, A Look at 1971 Graduates 
(Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Social Science Research,. 1975), 



ERIC 



^^HamisciSeger and Wiley, Score Decline , pp. 83-85, 106-107. 



29 



1 ' . ■ ... - ^ . . 24 



ERIC 



^^Munday, Declining Admissions Test Scores, ip. 28. 

l^American College. Testing Program, Technical Report for the ACT 
Asstessment Program, Assessing Students. on the Way to College , V.' I 
(Fowa Citj^ Iowa:. Research and Development Division, 1973), pp. 199 ff. 

Cameron Fincher, Is the SAT Worth Its S.aljE? (Athens, Georgia: Ameri- 
can Educational Research~S[isociation^^^ 

William A. Angoff, the College Board Consumer Testing Program, A 
Tech nical .Report on Research and Development Activities Relating to 
t SrScholastic Aptitude Test and Achievement rests , (New York: (JiiKB,, 
1971), see especially unapter V. '• ' ~. ~ 

^^NevilleT. Postlethwaite, A Resume of the Surveys- of the Iptemational 
Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (I.E. A..) 
(Paris: O.E.C.D.. January^, 1974). \ ' ~ 

^^Munday, Declining Admissions Test Scores , p. 28. 

^^The Sloan Study Consortium, Paying for College (Hanover, New Hamp- 
shire: University Press of New England, 1974). " . ' 

%usan Y. Watts, ed.. The College Handbook (New York:^CEEB, 1975).. 
Douglas Dillenbeck and Sue Wetzel, The College Handbook (New. York: 
CEEB, 1975). 



2S 



JosEP'H Froomkin Inc. . . - 

IOI5 Eighteenth Street N. W., Washingtqn, D. C. aooae 



COLLECTIVE BARGAINING JN HIGHER EDUCATION 
A LOOK AT THE FUTURE OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT 



r 



R.J, Wolfson- 



7 



4 



INI^ROb'UCTION 

/" . « 

1- . - ^■ 

\ 

Between 1966 and 1975 faculty uriions became increasingly 

important in the bargaining over faculty salaries and working conditions. 

By late 1974 the faculties of 443 qampuses of 277 institutions had chosen 

union bargaining agents and 211 cSntracts had been signed. ^ By^ late 

1974', one of every four two-year colleges, and one of every sixteen four- 

year and graduate institutions had collective bargaining in place. About 

* - ' * ^ ..^ 

2\ per cent of all academic faculty members In the United States were 

organjzedin that year. 

At present, collective bargaining is not the prevalent form 

^f relationship between faculty and administration in institutions of . 

higher learning as a whole, nor in any subgroup defined by such charac- 

teristics as: geography, salary levels, academic standing, size, degree- 

.granting range (i.e., full-scale graduate institutions, institutions granting 

only a few doctorates, four-year institutions, two-year institutions), and 

control (public;- private nondenominational, denominational). Thus far, 

collective bargaining has made almost no inroads at all into the top-ranking 

univers[ities,: public or private, nor the top-ranking four-year colleges 

(which are all private institutions) Not one of the great public or private' 

universities or colleges is to be found among the ranks of institutions ^ 

with certified collective bargaining agents for their faculties . (See Appen-: 

dix.) With the exception of Boston University^ no private, large, dobtoral 



26 



granting universities with lesser research commitment have attempted 
faculty collective bargaining. Only public campuses or systems (SUNY, 
Rutgers,' Wayne State, The University of Cincinnati , The University of , 
Hawaii- and The University of Washington ) or publicly supported in a 
very substantial way (Temple) have elected bargaining agents. 

The process of certification of higher education faculties for 
collective bargaining has been going on fairly steadily gince 1966 (cf. 
Table I and Appendix). By late 1974 i^lie broad aspects of the situation _ 



ERIC 



were fairly clfear . As parbarino points out: 

. 1 . 'Collective bargaining. Is primarily a feature of^ubliC 
higher education. Although only two-^Jiirds of all full , 
time higher. education faculty are in public institutions, ' 
90% of all thos,^ who are organized are in public institu- • 
tions. . Only 2% of all pr'ivate institutions are organized 

as contrasted with 20% of public institutions . 4 

• i',' ■ ■ * * 

2. Since more than five-^phs (in 1969) of all faculty, were 
'^in four-year and grad&e institutions, it is in that sector 

that the future of faculty bargaining -lies. 5 ^ 

3, Organized faculty are concentrated in a few states*: New 
York, Pennsylvania, Michigan and New Jersey. One- 
third of all orgaaizSd institutions and^one-half of all 
organized faculty menjberg are in New York.^ 

Between 1972 and 1974 both the number pf institutions orga- 
nized and the numbers of faculties covered by agreements appears to 
have slowed down. In.the course of the current year, a number of agree- 

> 

ments, notably the union gains at the University of Ge*)rgia and the . 
University of Florida, have given the impression that the unionization 
movement was picking up again:. • ^ ^ ^ 

,33 ' • . 



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The^extent t6 which unionization will spread or slow down in 

the next few years depends to a large „extent on the action taken by state 

legislatures . (Currently, eleven state legislatures are considering the 

exemption of university teachers from provisions of public employment 

bills which outlaw upions . A recent survey of the status of these bills 

indicated that littletmovemepi in legislative process was anticipated during 

this pre-election year, but that the likelihood of the passage of these bills 

7 

was not foreclosed in the future. ... 

i . , ■ 

' We believe that these bills are not' likely to has^e smooth sail- 
ing in those states where a ^'flagship" institution has special affection of 
the legislature. The pressure for homogenous treatment of all institutions' 
covered by a contract does not escape the understanding of most state 
legislators. Iii states like Alabama, Nebraska or Ohio, the danger of 
weakening the support and the special relationship of the State University 
, to the legislature may*effectively block the passage bf such measures. ^_ 
. ^orpe Reasons for the Increase of Collective Bargaining 

Why, after decades of dLsdain for the notion of collective bar- 
gaining, have college and university faculties tended to favor this new 
roode of dealing with administrations? Ladd and Lipset^ offer four reasons 
for -this change. . . ' 

^, T\}e economic reason . With slower growth in enroll - 
' > ments^nd reduction in resources going to institutions', 
w.ith rising outpu/of PhDs, p^bbably due in significant 
degree to a tendency on the part of young people to try 
'» to avoid the problems of^he "real" world, there, is 



ERIC 



29 



increasing competition for a shrinking number of faculty 
positions. These threats 60 the faculty are riot always 
understood by them./ ) 

2. The- structural reason . The development ^ in the public 

sector, of statewide systems administered from the center, 
. ha"s been a phenomenon of the 60s and 70s. This i;ias led 
to the incj-easing bureaucratization of the institutions 
within these systems, and the removal of the decision- 
making locus from the individual campus, to a consider- 
able degree. Thus, there has been a significant. reduction 
^ in faculty prerogatives in governance. 

3.. The legal reason . Beginning in the early 60s there has 

been a proliferation of state laws enabling public employees - 
to engage in collective bargaining. 

4. The ideological reason . Events of the 60s (the aViti-wan ' 
movement and the student movement generally) led to an. 
increased involvement of students in governance of insti- 
tutions. Unionism is seen as a response, essentially 
conservative, of self-protection by faculty menibers. 

^These pressures, in both public and private sectors, ^mpel . 

faculty members in many institutions to seek relief, illusory or nor, in 

collective bargaining: tha collectivization' of public institutions intc^ 

systems , with the consequent removal of control over many budgetary 

functions fo central offices;^ the perceived need to protect faculty interests 

in the budget against the inroads of well-organized groups of support and 
« 

maintenance workers, and against the resistance of organized stude^ 
groups to increases in tuition levels (particularly at private institutions). > 
Finatiy, especialjly in private institutions, there is the belief that col- 
lective Jjargaining offers the best basis (for establishing legal standing 
for Che faculty at institutions which treat its- faculty as emplayees rajther 

. * . ■ ' - • r . ■ .0 

36 



ERIC 



than "the university." '-^ 

' • Collective l»rgainihg ^as gained the most acceptance in the , - 
pubUc sector for the structural and legal reasons given above. It 
gained popularity iirst in the two-year and J,eeser four.-year colleges 
for the economic reasons. Moreover, the "coUeglalify" between the 
faculty and administration there was much more illusory. . 

Where the Changes Have Taken Place , . , 

I In recent y^rs riiovqs toward collective bargaining have 
been made at second-rank universities, where more of the perquisites 
of the classic scholarly life (modjerate teaching loads, sonie degree of ^ 
faculty involvement in govemancL, commitment ^o research, some de- 
gree of collegiality between faculty and administration) arh to .be found - 
than in the public foirr-year and j:wo-year colleges, in the nriost. recently 
emerging uniy4;sities or in the ^m^llest and least selective private four- 
year colleges. Thus, election campaigns have been mounted by advocates 
of collective bargaining at Fordham, Syracuse; Boston Universij:y, New 
• York University, Temple, Rutgers,. Wayn^ State an^ rtttsburgh. Of these 
elections, collective bargaining lost at Fordham, Syracuse and New York 
University, while the issue remains in doubt at Pittsburgh. But the mat- 
ter has not come up seriously at institutions which are separable from 
large systems, which are financially in fairly good condition, where 
faculty feel that their role in institutional governance is not seriously in 
jeopardy, whej^'faculty feel some significant serts^ Qf collegiality with . 

O 1^ 



•administration. One anomalous case, 'anomalous^ot because, it Is not . 

■ " ' ■ * • - * \ I 

consistent with this discussion of reasons, but because an'.elfection was 

I 

held at all, is that of Michigan State. By the logic of the foregoing dis- 
cussion, there should hav^LheenJiisi/fticient pressure to warrant the 
holding of an election. However, one was held. And collective bargain- 
ing was roundly defeated- 

Tight budgets tend to downgrade the perceived qualit^ of 
institutions, at least in the qyes of the faculty. Since therejs little 
prospect fo£/a rapid growth in fun^s allocated to highehr education^ the 

• atmosphere which contributes to the growth of unionism is /likely to be 
reinforced on a number of .campuses. Experienced observers of collec- 
tive bargaining, such as Garbarino, Ladd and Lipset, and Crossland, 
are agreed that collective bargaining will, in all likelihpod, continue to 
spread in higher education institutions . 

n The Bargaining Agents ' ^ 

Most of the. collective bargaining ^ente- in higher education 
institutions are affiliates of the American Association of University ^ 
Prgfegsors (AAUP), the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) or the 

^^^tional Education Association .<NEA). tjenerally the three orgai^rtfations 
have '^divided their successesi^along type-of-institution lines (cf. Table II). 
With some exceptions 1) AAUP has done best with foQr-year and graduate 
institutions which have a tradition of broad offerings or liberal arts^ 
orientation going back more than ten or fifteen years; 2) AFT has done 



32 



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best with two-year colleges; 3) NEA has ^ signed up teacher -training in- * 
f 

stitutions which have traditionally been a part of the education establish- 
ment. In other words, AAUP has been most successful in institutions * 

' C 11 ' . ' o ' 

at which traditionally it had a members^hip base;^ AFT has gener;ally 
brganized institutions which are ^verned locally, ^d NBA insMtu- 
tions traditionally training teachers; . , • p 

^ Immediate Effects of UQionifeation^ ' , 

Is there any basis for concluding that collective bargaining 
has materially a'ffected working conditions? At present jthere is little 
evidence to support-firm conditions; one study^2 vvhich examined salary 
and promotions demonstrates the difficulty of pinpoihting clearcut results. 



This is a statistical analysis of two groups of in^^ti'tutions with collective 

bargaining contracts. The first group consists of forty-three institutions 

with collectFve bargaining contracts effective during tlife 'academic, years 

1970-71 to 1974-75 inclusive. The second subset is eight schoors with' 

initial contracts' prior to 1970-71 . On the basis of this analysis the authorg 

come to a oumber of tentative Qonclusions . First of all, tliey suggest 

The analysis would appear to indicate th^t initiation of^ , 
' • collective bargaining has brought gains to upper level 
fapulty via, more rapid growth in compensation and 
salaries, but hot to lower rank^facuity in terms of either , 
more rapid salary increaseLor increaaed^pfomb^ions 
However, this apparent greater increase in compensation 
and salary for full and associate professors requires 
^ further analysis because the data indicate that a set of 
, seven Pennsylvania schopls account for mu^h of these 
gains. ^ , ' . 



40 




-A 



Thisr^ IS little e\H4en(j%<jfaiiv. general gains in faculty ^ 

compensation, salary, or protiftotiong attributablejio 
collective bargaining contr^^Cts , 



resi)ect to the impact of particular organizations engaged* in dol- 

ff ■ 

leqtive bargaining, the authors say. > 



It would apipear that AAUP has been successful in increas- 
ing, for at least some faculty ranks, the £ompensation 
and salary levels abovp national trends^including schools 
which do not have collective bargaining/. There is no 
evidence that AAUP has increased promotion into upper 
ranks at a rate different from the national average. . . 
Faculty conpensationr salary and promotion gains at AFT- 
represented schools have noi^ differed significantly from 
the national 'average' - . '. . ../the nine institutions in the 
•sample represented by NEA7 made sizable, and statistically 
• significant, average gains relative to the national trenjis 
in faculty compensatioi§a'nd salary for the assistant profes- 
sor through full professor categories. They did not, how- 
ever, show differential promotion growth from the nationwide 
movement. . .These results for NEA are primarUy attribut- , 
able to a single contract which covers seven of the nine 
institutions in this category. . .^/Of the fifteen institutions 
wfeich are represented by a cBn^ined NEA-^FT junit7it 
appears that such combined. . ./institutions/ show primarily 

' negative mean growth rates and" definite relative decreases 

.in salal-y'aiia compensation sincQ collective bargaining was - . 

.• initiated . ' 

, , With respect to the Pennsylvania contract referred to above, 

.the authors point out that prior to the initiation of collective bargaining 

the faculty at the institutions were "pa/d considerably tess than either 

' the regional or national average sala'ny and compensatioh in each rank.' 

They continue, though, that "these salary gains werq accompanied by . . 

16 ' 

apparently slower J:han normaJL^romotions at these schools." 

. The authors then analyze two instances of iastitutions covered 



.15 



41 



35 



• \ 

by cx)llective bargaining which pay subist;antially higher than average sal- 
aries, the U. S. Merchant Marine Academy and the City University of 
New York. These were among the very first colleges to elect bargain- ^ 
ing agents and to begin the collective bargaining process. The bargaining 
agfent for these campuses is NEA and AFT jointly and the result of 
collective bargaining, according to the authors, is 



Compensation and salary at the CuNY campuses and at 
the Merchant Marine Academy were considerably and- ^ • . 
significantly higher than both the natipnal and regional 
average salaries for all ranks in the academic year 
1970-71. . . However, . ...during the past four years, 
CUNY-MMA have shown a negafive mean net growth rate 
iOLf acuity compensation and salary^ ThatTs", faculty 
compensation, on a national average, hasf grown from 
1% to 2^ per year faster than the compensation at CUNY- 
MMA. ^Similarly, on a national cqfnparis on, the faculty 
salaries have averaged from 1% to 1.6% higher rates of 
growth per year than those at th^se schools. . . We can 
conclude that, at least over the period for which our data 
h^ds, CUNY-MMA campuses do not show any positive a 
gains aq;sociated with collective bargaining; in fact, we 
note exactly the opposite result. . . In no sense. . .do the 
data indicate that these institutions have gained from - • 

collective bargaining^during the period 1970-71 to 1974-75. 



And finally. 



The major findings of this study can be succinctly stated 
as follows: we can find no evidence Of any general gains 
i n salary, compensation, or promotions attributable to 
the adoption of collective bargaining by college and univer - 
sity faculty . If anything, the evidence suggests that those 
campuses adopting collective bargainirig have not done as 
well as the non-collective bargaining schools . Positive 
collective b'krgain ing gains were observed primarily for 
those campuses represented by AAUP and for the single 
group of Pennsylvania colleges Represented by NEA. These 
gains were more than offset by the generally negative im- 
pact on campuses represented by either AFT or combined 
A FT- NEA bargaining agents. 18 ^ 



■36 . 

The authors are at pains to pbinf out that these results can only be treated 
as tentative dfle to the small sample with which they have been forced to^ 
operate, ^ecfedver, the only considerations with which the authors Have 
been able to deal have been faculty salary, compensation and promotion ^ 
rates . They quite clearly point out 'that they have been unable to spefcify,. 
precisely enough for purposes of statistical analysis, such matters as 
faculty power, collegiality, morale, or involvement in governance of the ^ 
in-stitutioii/ It seems quite clear that for man/ faculty bodies at many 
institutions^hese corisideratidns are of almost as much importance as 
^ salary and \dXe o^ promotion . \^ 

Recent developments in Pennsylvania arid New Jersey illus'- 
trate that unionized faculties are willing to. give up, on occasion, 
compensation increments in order to assure job security. In mid-i976, 
njnion representatives representing the higher education sector scaled 

down their mon^m-y demands in order to save 280 faculty positions, 

' ' 19 

which otherwise would have been eliminated the following year. 

^ Long Range Implicatiorls of Unionism 

«• 

Assuming that faculty unionization continues to spread, what 
.sorts of consequences can be expected? We have already seen indications 
that the effect ©^salaries, compensation and'promotion is difficult to 
evaluate. And it will be even more so as the numbers of instftutions , 
ODvered by collective bargaining increases and it becomes more and 
more difficult'to establish a "clean" norm of change unaffected directly 



J 



ERIC 



4 



0! 



by collective bargaining for compajrison purposes. 

But what of other aspects of the working"'«ituation of academic 
faculty? And what is the likely effect on the role of administrators, Ijoth 
local and systemwide? How are these events likely^ to affect the character 
of institutions? Are there likely to be differential effects depending on 
which organizations are selected as bargaining agent? Acid<finally, hqw.* 
differently will the public and private sectors be affected? 

1. Wher>e will collective bargaVning be accepted? 

If past trends are portents of the future, unionization will 

take place much- more in the public sector than in the private- There 

will probably be few, if any, faculCy unions at the very best of the private 
20 

universities . Indeed, faculties q\ sojne of the elite four-year private 

21 

colleges, as well, will probably nc^t choose to be represented by bargain 
ing agents • . * ^ 

2 . Tendencies toward centralization ^n the public sector. 

In the public sector unionization is likely to spread, in line 
with past trends . And as the process moves forward there will be a 
general tendency on the part of stat,e governments to try to simplify the' 
task of bargaining by minimizing the nunnber of contracts negotiated. 
The pattern followed in New York and Hawaii is likely to be replicated 
in many "other places . - 

In New York this pattern has resulted in the inclusion of all 

*• ■ ^ ■ ' • 

•ft 

SUNY units, four-year colleges. University Centers, Medical Schools . 



44 



and special eolleges, being ^overed by one agent, and by one contract. 
Moreover, all professional personnel,- faculty and .others, in the system, 
have been covered by the same contract. The result has been that while 
the state's negotiations have been simplified, the contract has been far 
less satisfactory t6 the faculty than might otherwise have been the case. 

In these instances, the/price of simplifying administration 
is to place significant policy decisions regarding salary levels, tenure, 
the jocation of programs, libraries and such facilities as computers and . 
laboratories, at a center where budgetary powers are concentrated. Such 
centralization is often forced by state legislatures in their attempt to 
control costs through prescribing hours, class size, and content. 

3. Restrjffcted role for public>sector campus administrators . 

Should this trend gather steam, the greatest losers are likely 
to be the local (i.e. , inc^^idual campus) administrators. They will lose 
their authority to originate policy. Their major task will consist of im- 
■ piementing policies worked out at the center between the bargainmg and 
grievance committees, on the one hand, and the central administration's . 
negotiators on the other. • 

4. Effects on Governance Arrangements . 

What will happen to the faculty's role in institutional gover- 
nance? Faculty unionization will, in general, not regult in a reduction 
of that role althqugh its form may change slightly. Tho^e private insti- 
, tutions which are O^anized will have been the ones at which faculty's 



role in governance was in jeopardy anyway .1^^ In the public sector there 
will be some removal of governance'activities Jp central points but it is 
not unlikely that those central points will be close physically and func- 
tionally to the flagship campuses of the public systems. And it is precisely 
here that faculty's role in governance was strong before. There may 
have to 'be more doffing of the hat to faculty from lesser campuses by 
those of the flagship campu$es, but governance will still be a strong 
faculty prerogative there. - 

Faculty senates (those comprised of faculty members only) 
.will find the scope of their concerns narrowed. One study23 suggests 
that the union will come more and more to be the-primary arena in which 
the faculty deal with etbnomic issues while the Senate will be concerned 
with academic affg^irs . 

Senates yhich represent broader constituencies (faculty, 

administration, students, staff, etc.) could find their powers less diluted 

than the faculty senates will. They may continue, to roughly the extent 

they were before, to be involved in economic issuQs. Faculty would be 

having to deal with these matters in a tricky way, since in the Senate 

» • 

they will have to be careful not to get their more complex governance 
roles tangled up. They will have to engage in a bit more\)rchegtration 
than in the case where either there is a faculty senate, or where there 
is no union, 

On^alance, the organization of the faculty by a union will 



40 



not reduce faculty's roles in. governance which it wishes to ke^p. It will 
probably make it more difficult for an individual unit in a system of 
campuses to mold its programs and wof^k load. Moreover^ it wiU surely 
tend to reduce the extent to which collegiality can develop or flourish 
(if it has been flourishing) between faculty and administration. And the . 
resulting greater bureaucratization will tend to give rise to new power 
groups whose primary function will be the conduct of union business . 
5. Tenure . ' ^ 

* / - 

Traditionally, academic tenure in American colleges and • 



universities has been associated with a series' of statements drafted, by 
AAUP and ACE and endorsed by a'number*of professional and; academic 
organizations-.^^ In this tradition academic tenure is viewed as a mesons 
of protecting the freedom of expression of the academic faculty. Propo- 
nents of this view have never justified tenure as a means of maintaining 
claims on jobs, but rather as a way of ensuring that unpopular intellectual 
J positions could honestly be taken and defended v^ithout fear of retaliation 

by dismissal. Ip this conception of tenure, it has been held from early 
on that tenure should not be easily conferred. The usual position has 
been^at tenure should conferred only in exceptional cases much b^- 
, fore completion of seven years of full-time"teaching but that it should be. • 

granted in most cases upon completion of seven years . The only exceptions , 
to th6 9even-year maximum rule countenanced by these statements of . 
^j^lrcy would occur if a new appointment at a new -.institution were to begin 



ERIC 



within sUch a short time of completldn of seven years of full time teach- 
ing as to allow nearly no time for a probationary period to pass . In such 
a case there is provision for limited fractional counting of the prior 
experience. - ^ . 

It is clear that thijs policy was formulated with as much con- 
*cern for the maintenance of academic quality as it was for the protection 
of faculty members. This approach to the tenure of teacheris in their 
positions is to be distinguished from that which characterizes civil 
servants, especially teachers in the public elementary and high schpols. , 

It has been common for many years for tenure in such institutions to be 

ii 

gained after three years or fewer as a regular full-time teacher. And 
consistent with their exi5erience. in these pre-college institutions, NEA 
and AFT were heard, in recent years' jj|^st before the financial difficulties^ 
made themselves felt, to urge that tenure in colleges also come after 
completion of the thjrd year. This could come only at the cost of ai chance 
really to establish the potential scholarly quality of the candidate, in the 
ov-erwhelrtiing proportion of cas^. 

It is worth noting in parsing that in the British higher educa- 
tion sys^m tenure comes with the first reappointment, that is, after one 
year. And the cost of this practice (which has led to a situation in which 
about 94 per cent of all academic faculty in Great Britain have tenure) 
has caused some strain as enrollments turned down. 

The tenute system, as it ha^; been for decades, is under \ 



48 



attack from three other quarters . Younger, untenured faculty see tenure 
as a barrier which not all of them can cross . They are vociferous in ' 
their attacks on the tenure system, and on AAUP, which many see as 
devoted to the maintenance of tenure and little else. Administrators 
with tight budgets have been discussing the establishment of tenure quotas 
(which AAUP strongly resists) or the-outright abolition of the system. 
There have been proposals^^ by administrators that tenure be replaced , 
by a systerif of renewable -term contracts. 'Thus far, this sort of proposal 
has not caught on. - . ' ' 

Thus^ the tenure issue turns out to be a source of friction 
between unteni/red and tenured faculty and adnfinistrators, and between 
tenured faculty and students as well ks between AAyP and NEA-AFT. A 
union contract, in many instances, can be perceived by the existing 
faculty as a way to increase job security in ^ese uncertain times. 
6. Spfecial Issues in the Private Sector . . ' . 

In the private sector the situation is different. Two of the ' 
major pressures for unionism aire there absent. There is no aggrega- 
tion.process at work in the private sector. Consequently, the facult^ jls 
less likely to feel its channels to administrators blocked, and feel increas 
ingly powe:^less . Nor is private faculty pressure likely^ cause state 
resources to be channeled to these institutions. To the Contrary, there 
is a constant awareness of institutional poverty whit;h is frequently driven 
home by appeals to faculty, who may well be underpaid relative to their 

• ■- 49.. 



43 



publicljr^mployed brethren, to contribute to the institutional fund drive. 
The privatQ institutions are, for the most ^rt,^loodless s/ones . * 

Faculty unions at private institutions are a response to two 
kinds of pressures. First, they are seen by faculty^ members as^a cbunter 
weight to the well-organized budgetary claims of unionized support and 
niaintenance staff. Second, they are a desperate defense against per- 
ceived author itarianism^-of administrators. A? a few cases of the Bloom-- 
field College or Boston University variety develop and tie the institutions 
up in conflict and lawsuit, administrations of private institutions may 
find it advisable to Wiprove their linkages to the faculty. 

An int(^^ting oce^urrence in the private sector haa^beei? the 
attempt, successful in some instances,^ of professional schools whose 
faculty command significantly higher salaries than do most faculty mem- 
bers, to separate themselves in'the^argaining pi4)cess from their 
colleague^i the rest of the university. The usual pattern is for these 
units to petition the Nl^RB for th4 chance to claim separate bargaining 
unit status.' Frequently, once this is achieved they do not go into col^c- 
tive bargaining. Rather,' they continue in their individualistic mode. But 
what th^y have achieved is to avoid being forced to bargain in the same 
unit as theil: less favored colleagues. ' *^ * 

7. Two Scenarios^ m ^ , . . , 

Suppose for th^jriomentfthat the s^enari^ develops along 
these lines, then: .a large nur^er of public and relatively few private' 



institutioAs ajie unionized. In the unionized sector decision -making 

regarding budgets, workload, appointment, promotion, tenure, salaries*, 

etc. are. controlled by negotiation between unions and central negotiate 

ing authoVities, What is likely to happen to the quality of public* institutions? 

The answer^ this question depends heavily on the ability of unions to 

negotiate successfully for wages, job tenure and seniority and not neglect 

tradit'iortal academic conceptions. At present, all the indications are that 

faculties perceive significant differences among the three major faculty 

organizations with respect fo these matters, and that their success to 

27 

balance these considerations simultaneously is limited; 

* The convenience of dealing with a jingle bargaining agent may 
place research institutions in the same bargaining unit with lesser insti- 
tutions, as Jiappened in Hawaii. The faculty of research camplises are 
then outnumbered by those of lesser institutions* - Trade union •<:onceptions 

IT 

of tenure, seniority and bargaining procedure^ may come to dominate. 

* • <? 

This did happen at Hawaii when, in the first electijon, AFT beca>^e the 

t 

bargaining agent. But the membership there became so cjisenchanted • 

/ ' C ' 

with AFT's performance that it Was turned out and replaced by a local 

>,. "■ ■ 

coali^n of AAUP arid NEA. «No such overturn occurred in SUNY and 
CUNY; there has been a watering-down of procedures there dQe to the 
merging of each of t(he entire systems into one bargaining unit. If this 
were to happen iaa significant number of cases, the private sector might 
become the repositorir of research capability. One might then find two 



9 

'45 



different classes of university faculty developing: those witl) institutional 
commitment and those with dijscipline commitment. In such a case, ye 
might expect a drift of the, second sort of faculty toward private institu- 
j tions, and a consequent drfit of the better graduate students toward those 
institutions as well. Thus, the public sector faculty would become 
bureaucratlzed while the private university sector faculty would tend to 
remain essentially individualized. 

An alternative scenario ^ould envision the private sector be- 
coming substantially unionized (a less likely outcome, in my view). In 
this case the distinction between the two sectors would be less clear. If 
the private sectar is organized by an organization like A A UP, which has 
a greater commitment to traditional academic values than do AFT or NEA, 
the private sector would be in general more supportive of traditional 
notions of tenure, promotion, salary determination and collegial deter- 
mination /Of academic issues. ^ V ^ . 

Administrators in private institutions which have been orga- 
. nized can expect to find themselves in a different position than their 

counte^rparts.on unorganized private campuses or than those in the public 
' sector. They should retain much of the authority of the administrators 
^of unorganized campuses. Indeed, in some ways their jobs should'be 
much more enjoyable. They ought to be much more able to deal with 
pressures from conservative boards of trustees pressing them to be tough, 
^ pointing out the extent to which the bargaining situation limits this. 

52 



ERLC 



L 



And they might be able to devote themselves much more to a new form 
of,collegialism, that which could devel^op over the bargaining table when 
both parties to the bargain are concerned to preserve as much of tradi- 

tional academic attitudes and procedures as possible.' . ; 

, * ■ •■ ■ . ' ■ • • 

, "pinally, if enrollments do turn down, the concerns of unionized 

faculties to protect jobs of their members are likely to strengthen their 
coalition with members of the same or similar unions representing 
teachers^at the elementary and secondary school level. Given the pre- 
ponderance of public sector faculty among the organized, it is quit^ possi- 
ble that a strong and politically powerful coalition will develop with unin- 
tended consequerf?:es . The pressure of unionized public sector teache/s 
to protect their interest could very easily block legislation to aid th^ 
private sector in a given state-. If the size of the pie for higher education 
is fixed, the likelihood that more of it is to go to the public sector iis 
increased when strong pressure groups, represented by unions, put 
collective pressure on the legislature. , 
8. T he Future of the Three Organizations . 

What of the future of the three major uni9nizing organizations 
active in the higher education sector? Croasland °vspeculates that, the 
three will, within a decade or two, merge into one giant hyphenated ' 
organization. In order for this fusion to occur, the significant difference 
between their missions, and in their commitments, would have to be 
worked out. There have been gestures,, largely on the part of NEA, 



'toward each of/the other two organirzations / • . . • 

' AAUP has, consistently rebuffed NEA and the AFT-NEA merger " 

in New York has just broken up. AAUP is Very st/ongly committed to 
the continuation of its^role as conscience of the academic world through 
its development and promulgation of policies dealing with tenure, appoint- 
ment, promotion, academic freedom, maintenance of salary standards. 
AAUP has, and will continue to haye, an important portioruetf its men)ber- 

''ship among 'the unorganized in the elite private university and college 
sector for whom the maintenance of its traditional role is important. 
Therefore, it is unlikely, except in pittic.ular circumstances where local 
temporary alliances make sfenge (such as the NEA-AAUP hookup in Hawaii), 
that AAUP will merge. . • . 

Merger between AFT and NEA may perhaps occiir. But the 
recent history in New York suggests that such a merger is unlikely to take 
place soon. There are widely perched fundamental ideological differ- 
ences between the two^^ in which AFT is seen as liberal to radic'^ and 
as a militant labor organization. NEA, on the other hand, is ideologically 
much more conservative, has ti^ to the educatiorjist establishment and 
is less militant. The two organizations serve different publics with differ- 
ent needs just as AAUP serves'a still different public with yet different 

« * 

needs . The advantages of merger are getting fewer and fewer as the 

organization process spreads, 

— i 

In those states where there exists either a series of disparate' 



agglomerations of public educational institutions (e.g. , California with 

" - . « ■ ' ' . , ' ' . 

a university, a state college system and a system of community* colleges) 

or in those states where a flagship institution (e.g.-, Alabama, Nebraska* 
or Ohio) holds the particular affections of the state legislature, the, con- 
sequences of unionism- are likely to be looked with disfavor by legislatures. 
It is precisely in those sta:tes that. reluctance about authorizing public 
employee bargaining will be felt most. . 

Conclusions ' 

Summing up, then: collective bargaining is in higher^educa- 
tion to stay. It is very likely to cover much of public higher education, 
much less likely to succeed in covering the private sector. It will result, 

in significant bureaucratization of those institutions where it succeeds. 

* 

There will result, especially on public campuses, . significant reduction 
in the prerogatives^o/ local Campus administrators. It rtiay simplify and 
enrich the roles of .administrators on private campuses. It may lead to a 
two-level higher education World, On one*level (the private sector) there 
Would. be much more adherence to traditional individualistic academic 
values and ways of doing Business . On the other leJi^l (the public sector) 
there would be .morie reliance on collective techniques atrd probably a loss 
for faculty interested in research. This split-level structure would prob- 
ably result in a reduction of the traffic of faculty members between the 
two sectors and in some degree contribute to the intellectual stultification 
especially of the public sector . / 




49 



f 




If the prognosis of this review are accepted/the trends' to 
collective bargaining will Just reinforce existing trends: (1) faculties . 
will get older, and (2) there will be less emphasis on research. As 
enrollments stabilize or declin^ th^se trends were likely to manifest 
themselves under any cirbumstances . ^ 

Collective bar^ining agreements may either improve thfe 
caliber of teaching or cause it to worsen. If a ,uniofl contract niakes 
faculty more secure, they may pa^rmore attention to teaching; if in- 
creased security decreases incentives for outstandirig performance, 
course content and presentation will deteriorate* There is no evidence 
to bolster either hypothesis. Hence, federal action on collective bar- 
gaining, difficult to envisage under existing labor relations legislation ^ 
and states' rights to regulate bargaining with public ernj^loyees, is not 
a matter of urgency. \ ^ 

A more immediate t:oncern is the targeting of research to 
maintain the quality of feculties. Recent trends to de-emphasize funda- 
mental r^^arch ^ay have to be reconsidered. With turnover of faculty 
declining, federal investment in scholarly research is likely to have 
loiag-lasting effects and pay off jji better posts econ'dary programs . This 
is the issue which needs immediate attention. * - 



56 



ERIC ' ^ ; 



> . FOOTNOTES 

^National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Educa- 
tion, Schedule of Institutions with Bargaining Agents and Contracts ,. 
September 1, 1975, p. 1. ^ [ " 

^AAUP has been certified by the NLRBas collective bargaining agent* 
for the Boston University faculty, but the Boston University adminxsti'a- 
tion is contesting this certification in the courts so no. bargaining has 
yet taken place / ^ ; _ 

^Although AAUP has been designated its collective bargaining agent by 
the faculty at this institution in aU election held there, the State of Wash- 
ington has not yet recognized the designation* 

4cf, J. W. Garbarino (with the association of B. Aussiek;er.), Faculty 
/Bargaining, Carnegie Commission on Higher Eciucation and The Forf^ 
^ Foundation, McGraw-Hill, 1975, pp. 57-59. 



^Ibid., p. 60. . 
^Ebid., pp. 60-61.' 

7" Election -Year Politic? Hits Public-College Bargaining, '' Chronicle o f 
Higher Education , March 22, 1976, p. 1. 

" ^ ■ ■ * ' 

^E. C. Ladd, Jr > , and S/ M>. Lipset, Prpfessors, Unions an^^American . 
Higher Education , Carnegie Commission on Higher Education and The 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, 
D. C, 1973, p. 4. 

^See the third paper in this collection. - 

l^Fred E. Crossland, *'Will the Academy Survive Unionization?'* Change , 
Febrtta^y 1976, pp. 38-42. 

^^Cf. Tabl^ II. - V ' • 

19 ' ^ 

William W, Brown and Courtenay C. Stone, ''An Empirical Analysis 

of the Impact of Collective Bargaining on Faculty Salary, Compensation, 
and Protnotions* in Higher Education," Department of Economics, Cali- 
fornia State University, Northridge, California, Febrtiary 197^, 

13ll)id., pp. 16-17. ^. * 



51 



^ %id. ,-pp. 19-20. r ' ... 

•ISftjid., p. 20. 
l^rbid., p. 21. 

17ibid:, pp. 22-23. ' ■ . 

^^ Ibid. , p. 25. X 

— — . ■ y 

^^"2 States' Layoffs Averted," Chronicle of Higher Education , March 29, 
1976, p. 11. 

^^Including, almost certainly, the Universities of Chicago, Pennsylvania, 
and Rochester; Yale, Har?^ard, Princeton, Stanford, Columbia, Carnegie- 
Mellon, Cornell, Brown, Johns Hopkins, Northwestern, Washington, Duke, 
Rice, Vanderbilt qitid Dartmouth Universities; and MIT and Cal Tech. 

Such as Amherst, Williams, Ob^rlin, letc. 

^^Cf "Collegi^lity by Contract, " Chronicle of Higher Education , Marcl> 
10, 1976, p. 5. - 

^^Stanford Project on Academic Governancis, reported in Faculty Collective 
Bargaining, A Chronicle of Higher Education Ha-pdbook , Editorial Projects 
• for Education, Washington, D. C, 1976^ rf./68-70. 

. 24Esnecially the.statements-of 1915, 1925 and 1940. For details of these 
statements and the history, see Louis Joughin, Academic Freedom and 
Tenur6, A Handbook of the American Association of University Professors, 
University of Wis.consin Press, Madison, Wisconsin, 1969, Chaps. Ill and 

IV. ■ • ' ' ; • 

^Spor example, by the presidents of Bloomfield, Bennington and Union - 
Colleges. 

^^For example, .the Law Schools at Syracuse and Fordham and the Medical 
School a|^^ittsburgh . > • 

27^-,^ "Thg^ Ladd-Lipset Survey, " Chronicle of Higher Education , February 
9, 17, 23, 1976. * 

Fred E. Cross land, op^_cit. 



29 



ERIC 



Ladd and Lipset, Chroaicles , loc. cit. 



^ • - -58 



■r 



52 



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u 

a 

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o 

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CL. CL. 



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^ ^ 2h i3 1^ ^ 

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62 



Joseph Froomkin Inc. 

lOiS EiOHTEENTH Street. N. W.^ Washington. D. C. 20036 



ORGANIZATION OF STATE HIGHER EDUCATION 
PLANNING AND COORDINATING COMMISSIONS 



/ 



By • 
George Basich 



63 



THEORGANIZATION OF 3TATE HIGHER EDUCATION , 
PLANNING AND COORDINATING COMMISSIONS 

In the course of the past few years, after a period of rapid 
growth, the American postsecondary sector has experienced a slow-down 
in the rate of increase of enrollments^. The more w^ddly disseminated 
projections of enrollment for the remainder of the 197()'s and the early 
1980's predict even slower growth or no growth at all in the wdrk loads ^ 
of postsecondary education institutions. 

This break with past trends will place additional strain on 
state planning/coordinating bodies, as some public sector campuses 
remain stable and others lose enrollments. An even more politically 
painful development will be the need, in the long run, to examine the role 
of the public sector vis-a-vis the private sector. Some states may also 
have to evaluate the impact ^f their policies for public institutions on the 
public sector of neighboring states. * ^ * 

Keeping these n ew iss u^ in mind, we decided to review the 
organization of the state commissions that are charged with the planning 
and coordination of higher education systems, hoping to throw some 
light upon their ability to deal with these problems. We have reviewed 
recent trends in the organization of state planning agencies^ summarized 

7 

some evaluations of their scope and effectiveness, performed some statis 
tical analyses to highlight the possible effect of organization upon the. 



propensity of states to support the private gector >(this^ support consists 

• ' ■ ^ .' • 

mostly of scholarships for students who attend, private schools), and 
summarized t^ views of knowledgeable observers -about the policy- 
making process at the state level. We have tried to .answer the follow- - 
ing question: Should the federal government encourage the strength^ing 
of organizations at the stats' level, or should it rely on other arrange- 
ments to build. a desirable consensus during aperiod,of stability? 

SOME HISTORY ' 
Until late in the 19th Century, state posts econdary institutions 
were governed by separate boards of trustees, just as were their private 
counterparts . Legislatures authorized new institutions on an ad hoc 
basis, often in response to pressures of different religious or booster 

groups-. . \ , 

' In the last two decades of the 19th Century, the rapid expan- 
sion of normal teacher training schools and of agricultural and mechanical 
colleges sparked a movement for more integrated control of the public , 
sector of higher education. State governing boards for higher education 
were establi^ed, particularly 4n less affluent states, to coordinate the 
administration of the several campuses and to^ut some order in institu- 
tional relations ?o the state government. There^ere about a dozen such 
• statewide governing boards at the end of World ;War I, .16 by 1949, and 
today, after a net gain of three adherents since the mid-60's, 20 states 
have single or consolidated statewide governing boards,' sometimes only 



;f , ' '58 . ^ 

for four-year colleges And universities, and less often for all public in- 
stitutions. 

Other states retained separate boards for their principal 
universities which co-existed with statewide boards for other systems, 
e.g., the teacher's colleges, which eventually were upgraded to four- 
year institutions. Separate boards were established for vocational techni 
cal schools and for junior colleges. Especially following the post-World 
War II>expansion in enrollments, these same state^ began to adopt some 
form of statewide planning and coordinating organization, for the most 
part advisory in character, which often did not include all the^public 
institutions in Jhe state. 

Today, with the exception of two small states which have no 
coordinating agencies and rely on individual board arrangements, 28 



ERIC 



States without statewide'go/erning boaids have opted for a variety of 
higher education planning and coordinating organizations witn varying 
jurisdiction and authority. As a general rule, over the last decade, these 
coordinating organizations have tended to expand their coverage of the 
postsecondary sector, and to assume increasing authority to bolster their ' 
original purely advisory roles . 

' r A TYPOLOGY OF AGENCIES 
The increasing complexity and variety of state higher educa- 
tioa/planning arrangements did not escape the attention of policy scientists. 
Thus, Berdahl tried to describe developments in thi^ field and evaluate 

x 

DO 



. f.' 59 



ERIC 



* / * ■ i. 

the performance "of these boards I In order. to simplify the discussion, ' 
we have adopted his classification of state higher education planning/ 
coordinating arrangements. These may be summarized as follows: 

(1) No structure . •Individual institutions- have their own governing ' 
boards; no formal organization exists to coordina/e their activities. 
There UerB 28 such states in 1949, 11 as late as 1964, and two in 

,^975. 

(2) Voluntary . A consortium of institutions, generally in the public 
sector/ is established without any statutory authority. Seven states 

had such arrangements in 1959, and only one in 1974. 

' . a ■ ■ '.. . 

. (3) Institutional membership, advisory . Boards with representatives 

of either a majority of public 'institutions or of all public institutions, 

but only advisory powers, are of purely historical interest. There \ 

were three such boards in 1964, one in 1973, none in 1974. 

(4) Broad membership, advisory . Boards.that also have only advisory 
powers, but presumably more influence,' since the majority of mem- ' 
bers were appointed to represent the public interest, gained acceptance 
in the 1960's . The num|3er of such boards peaked at 12 in 1973 . ^ 
Subsequently, three of the 12 became quasi regulafory (see below), 
and one ^tate adopted the broad membership, advisory structure. 

(5) Broad membership-, quasi regulatory . Boards with a majority 

of members representing the public, and with some regulatory author- 
v» ity, are becoming increasingly popular . These boards do not replace 



60 



the individual institution's governing boards, but have broader author- 

W ' \ , 

ity than advisory boards. They recommend, and are sometimes ^ 

capable of imposing, growtji targets, program scope, and resource 

V. ' - , ' 

allocatipn ceilings,' at least for the public sector. , 

« ^ * . 

(6) Statewide governing boards . These boards liave substantial 

direct pow^r to administer, plan and allocate resources among 

campuses in the public sector only. Ther^are twenty states with 



V 



suqh boards"^K)day. 



The state organizations by type appear in Table i. 
^ AtC^r Berdahl published his survey. Congress enacted the 

Higher Education Act of 1972, which, in part, authorized states to estab- 
lish or designate existing agencies as so-called 1202 commissions for 



statewide planning of all postsecandary education resources . These com- 
missions were supposed to fill gaps in existing higher education planning , 
and to integrate into the plantiing process increas/ingly important occu- 
pationally oriented training programs . The new organizations., it was , 
hq^edT^^uld force states to rethink their policy for all education beyond 
the high school. v ^* * . * 

* By March of 1975, 46 states had established 1202 commissions 

Thirty of these commissions were attached to existing state higher eduta- 

4 

tion planning/coordinating agencies. Nine new oommissions w^^re estab- 
lished oil^^e of statewide governing boards; two in the states with no 
structure; and another in the state with the voluntary agency. Current 



TABLE 1 



CLASSIFICATIONS OR STATEWIDE PLANNING/COOEDINATING 
- ' STRUCTURES, 1964 AND 1973 



» Cl assifications 

State . vm ~ vm 

Alabama * 1 . 4 

Alaska \ 6 / 6 

Arizona 6 - 6 . 

Arkansas 4 • 4 

California 3 3 

Colorado ^ ^ ^ 2 _ 5 

Connecticut 1 5 

Delaware 1 ' » 1 

^Florida 6^ * 6 

Georgia * ^ 6 6 

Hawaii^ 6 6 

Idaho ' ^ 6 , . 

Illinois • 5 " ^ 75 

Indiana 2 ^ 4 

Lowa \ 6 . "6 

Kansas ^ 6 ^ 6 

''Kentucky . 3 ^ 4 

Louisiana 1 / / * 5 

-Maine - ' " 1 6 

Maryland , 4 ' '4 

Massachusetts 1 5 

Michigan ^ • 4 ^ 4 

Minnesota - / ^ " 2 >^ 4 

Mississippi ^ 6 ^ 6 

Missouri _ ^ 4 4>^ 

Montafla x . ^ 6 6 

Nebraska . ^ 1 , ^ 2 

Nevada ; 6 ' 6 ' 

N%w Hampshire 6 * 6 

New Jersey , ^ 1 " . 5 

New Mexico ^ ' ' 5 5 

New York ^ 5 5 

North Carolina 5 * ^ / 

North Dakota . 6 ^ 6 

Ohio ^ 5 , 5 



62^ 



TABLE 1 (Cont'd) 



, CLASS#ICATIONS OF STATEWIDE PLANNING/COORDINATING 

STRUCTURES, 1964 AND 1973 



Sl^ 



ate 



Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 
South Dakota 
Tennessee 
Texas 

Utah . ^ 

Vermont 

Virginia 

Washington 

West Virginia 

Wisconsin 

Wyoming 



5 
6 
4 
6 
4 
6 
1 
5 
4 
1 
4 
2 
1 
3 



Classifications 



1973 

5 
6 
5 

4 
6 
5 
5 

6 . 
1 
4 
4 

6 
4 



/ 



Legend: . 1 - No structure 

2 - Voluntary agency ' \ I 

„ 3' - Advisory board with a majority of n^emberjS representing 
institutions 

. 4,- Advisory boards with a majority of members representing 
the public interest \) ^ ^ 

'5 - Quasir regulatory boards with a majority of members Repre- 
senting the public interest 
^ 6 - Single ot consolidated governing boards yvithout local or sub- 
sidiary system govemitig bodies • 



Source: 1964: .Robert 0. Berdahl, Statewide Coordination of Higher Edu- 
cation (Wp-shington, D. C: American ^Council on Education, 

^ T^rry, pp. 34-35. 

^ 1973:, Nancy M. Berve, '^Survey of the^Structure of State Coordi- 

patLng or Governing Boards and Public Institutional and 
^ Multicampus Governing Boards of Posts econdary Education- - 
as of January 1, 1975/* 'Higher Education in the States 
(Denver: Education Commission ot tne states, Vol. 4^ 
/ y' . No. 10, 1975), pp. 297-352. 



opposition, centered in vocational education circles- -but not shared by 

» 

their occupationally- oriented -program brethren at the community and 

four-year college levels --reflects a strong preference for tyin'g,the 

statewide planning process tor existing vocational education program 

2 

administrators and agencies. ' . 

It would be difficult for most states to implement the recom- 
mendations for cut-backs of programs or facilities, if these were advanced 
by 1202* commissions . The power of the planning/advisory bodies in 
many states -is limited to the pdblic sector, and in 1969 only three states 
exercised the power to charter institutions to grant licenses or degrees, 
and tw6 more had authority to approve program changes and degrees 
after the charter had been granted. It is unlikely that evfen these states 
could curb "surplus" institutions, as long as they were pjroviding an 
acceptable service. . In other states, the planning/coordinating agency 
has little authority to regulate existing programs of public institutions , 
and can, at best, administer mild wjrist-slaps to colleges and universities 
which are expanding unnecessary, or undesirable, programs. 

AGENCIES: PREFERRED FORMS AND OPERATIONAL STYLES 

The Berdahl study purposely eschewed any effort to measure 
outcomes of the .different , types of agencies. Accprding to Berdahl, more 
important than form is the agency's reputation for "fairness" in the. 
exercise of/ts assigned functions', and especially its ability to mediate 
between the state and the institutions . . ■» 



Of the many functions performed by a state coordinating 
agQncy, e.g. /planning, budget review, program approval, capital outlay 
review, or federal aid administration, Berdahl's study focused on the 
first three. He believes the agency needs strong planning and program 
approval powers and capability, to control nqt only the size, but also 
the character of iitstitutions. While he counsel* strong agencjr^udget 
review and recommending authority, however, he is not ^ure that the . • 
agency should displace, still less duplicate, the executive budget process 
for higher education. His preference, sometimes hedged by reference 
to local circumstances, is for the quasi-regulatory form. He feels that 

governing boards gjr^often mired in administrative concerns and have ^ 

, . /■ 

nofe focused enough on long-range planning, oi^ dealt with the overall 
problems of schools that are not part of the board. He also believes 
that institutional autonomy in administrative matters is very important, 
and this remains essentially'^intact even under quasi -regulatory agencies. 

The quasi-i^egulgitory agency is- probably better suited to an 
expanding postsecondary sector than to one which is stable or declining. 
In the steady-state envirSnment, institutions are likely to break ranks 
and expand, vfolating the recommendations of the board. This has a.lready 
happened in Alabama, where two units of the state system carried out 
expan'Sioh plans in contravqj^tion to thOi agency's recommendations. 

Unanimity is lacking about the ideal form of a state higher 
education agency. The Carnegie Commission for Higher Education, 

r 



which was headed by the ex-chancellor of a major state university, recom- 
mended agencies with-advisory powers only.^ However, most knowledger^ 
able observers, including Folger and Godwin, cleanly prefer the stronger 

qiiasi- regulatory form. These two authors stress the need to improve 

• ■ ' ■ ■ f ' 

Aboel# the technology of planning and it^_exercise. 

Our literature review impressed us with the narrowness of ' 
the concerns of most state agencies, regardless of form. While one finds 
evidence of an occasional serious study of the role of the private sector, 
the literature'is devoid of a detailed, orderly analysis -of the impact of ^ 
the public sector's plans and policies on private institutipns . An even 

• more glaring oi^ission is th.e lack of studies of the increasing propensity 

of students to^opt for occupational training and the effect oMiis new trend 

• ■ ' 5 

on the role of conventional postsecondary institutions. 

». 

* Berdahl, in his sfudy, notes that planning/coordinating bodies 
gave lip service but little serious consideratiMl to private higher educa- 
tion. The proprietary vocational sector is not mentioned at all by Berdahl, 
Folger, or other writers on postsecondary planning. It does not appear, 

4*t ■ - • 

from our survey, that most agencies coordinated their platts'with those - 
of private institutions, except in the case of the facilities construction 
programs, which were financed mostly by the federal government, and . 
perhaps the design of scholarship programs . If the planning bodies made 
long-range evaluations of the roles of both sectors, this fact has not been 
featured^ in recent literature-. 



66 



STATE PLANNING/COORDINATION AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
o . ' The dearth of factual information about. the way state planning/ 

coordinating agencies deal with the problems of the private sector moti- 
vated us to attempt to measure the relationship between different types 
of organization and certain developments of the past 10 years . We de- » 
eided to ask the following questions: (1) Did the form of the organiza- 
tion of the planning/coordinating procesg in the past, say in 19S4^ affect 
the growth of the pubkc and. private sectors? (2) Was the relative growth 
of these two sectors influential in determining the ^organization of the , 
ag-encies today? (3^) To what extent does the organization of the planning/ 
coordination process affect the state's ability to introduce scholarship, 
programs? i^) Are state scholarship programs which favor the private 
sector more^ likely to be inti^duced where one type of agency, rather than 
another, prevails?" v ' * * 

Organization in 1964^ and the role of the private sector. 

In i964, the states that had no planning structure, and those 
with either citizen -domind:tqd advisory or quasi-regulatory board's, had 
the highest proportions of private enrollment? (See Table 2.) In the 
following decade, it was precisely these states which mosf expanded their 
public sectors. Despite high public enrollment growth rates, the share 
of the private sector in these states did not decrease more than in states 
with other coordinating structures . It would appear that it was not the 

74'- 



67 



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structure of the planning/coordinating organizations, but the states' in- 
ternal politics and the financial capacity of the priV|^ sector to e^and 
which affected the growth and distribution of enrollment. 
Organization in 1973 .apd thcfole of the private sector . 

The distribution of state planning/coordinating organizations 
in 1973 tells a somewhat different story about trends in both public and 
private sector enrollments. (See Table 3.) In general,- states with rapid 
growth in public enrollments moved to organizations with more authority. 
The effect of rapid public-sector growth on private-sector growth is still 
unclear; the proportionate' declines of the j^rivate share of total enroll- 
ment were very similar in states with^high and low growth. Strangely 
, enough, the largest proportional losses in the private share occurred 
in states with th5 broader advisory group. ^ 
S ome general comments on structure . 

A total of 37 states currently have either quasi-regulatory 
boards or state governing boards Another ten have advisory boards 
dominated by citizen members. The following pattern seems to have . 
been established: (1) States in which private enrollments are proportion- 
ately higher are more likely to have quasi-regulatory boards. (2) States 

V 

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boards or statewide governing' boards . 
Scholarship aid and the, private sector. 

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- 77 



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of the state's concern with opeiling up opportunities to participate in higher 
education for children whose mmilies are somewhat better off than those 
eligible for federal aid, distributed some $475 million in^scholarship aid. 
for the year 1974-75. Probably twOrfrfths of that aid^ was 'restricted to 
graduate students and special programs, and three-fifths was^ channeled / 
to undergraduate students. Nearly 60 per cent of the total scholarship 
• funds vvere distributed to students attending schools in the private sector. 

It is remarkable that the incidence of state scholarship pro- • ^ 
grams is lowest in states with state-wide governing boards . Only 13 out 
of 20 states with governing boards had such programs in operation by 
1974-75, as contrasted to 25 of the remaining 30 states. All seven of 
the holdouts in the group have had statewide governing boards for at least 
10 years . 

The percentage of the scholarship funds going to students 
attending private institutions did not differ significantly in states with 
either of the three most popular forms of organization of planning /coor- 
dinating bodies . What did differ was the dollar amount allocated per ^ 
enrollee in the state, and the amount of dollars available per student 
enrolled in private education. Compared to states with other types of . 
6rganization, states with quasi -regulatory boards, the very states withy* 
the highest proportion of students in private institutions, allocated more 
money both per private school enrollee and per private student recipient. 

The states with more money per private enrailee also disbursed 

ERIC * 



72 



scholarships to a higher proportion of students enrolled in the private 
sector. As can be seen from Table 3, these programs spread the money 
more widely by keeping the average award at no higher, and sometimes 
at a lower amount per recipient, than inr states with smaller and more 
restrictive programs . 

FORM, SUBSTANCE AND POLITICS . ^ ^ 

When states are classified into groups with similar organi- 
zations for th^ planning/coordination of higher education, the lack of 
'difference in outcomes, either with :fespect to enrollment trends, or 
shares of the private sector, or scholarship policy, raises the interest- 
ing question of whether these organizati\ais play an important role in ^ 
determining policy at the state level. 

One of the more, successful directors of a state system, John 

D. Millet, who headed the Ohio Board of Regents, would certainly answer 

7 

this question in the negative. In his valedictory lectures, h^ stated:' 

There was never any doubt in my mind. . .that the really 
important decisions affecting higher education in Ohio ^ 
were made by the Governor and the General Assembly. 
The Board of Regents had final authority to. decideHonly 
certain particular questions. . . ^ 

The really important planning decisions were not made , 
by the Board of Regents; they were made by the chief 
executive and the legislature, with the further partici- 
pation of the'judiciary on two occasions. And I want to add 
that this process is the way by which I think planning deci- 
sions must be made in our kind of society^d in our kind 
of government. ^ 

Millet further defines policy planning, which is usually ^ 

80'' 



ERIC 



73 . ( 



performed by the legislature, executive and judicial branches, as^ 

the resolution of major issues entailing value judgements, 
major issues of social goals. . .Policy planning is also" 
concerned with how to obtairv the economic resources with 
which to pursue the desired goals. . . 

Intiis experience, program planning, the job left to the Board . 

of Regents, "is more conce^pied with the details of action, once policy 

decisions have been made. " . . 

The limited role which planning/coordinating agencies can 

play under thes^ ground rules has been widely recognized. F,or instance, 

V 

9 

Warren G. Hill saw their problem as follows: 

Central agencies arid their staffs have found themselves 
torn between the conviction that they should be institutional 
proponents and the realization that their statutory obliga- 
tions require objectivity and a close relationship to governors 
and the legislative bodies . In how many instances do states 
have plans to adjust to stabilized or declining enrollment 
that minimize disruption and unreasonable "straight line" 
cuts in support? How many of 'states have established 
priorities that cut across constituent unit lirtes, that is, 
. whereby the needs of all the facilities in a state system 
• are placed in rank 6r3er rather than on a campus or single- 
system basis? . , ^ 

Despite their limited influence, the state planning/coordinat- 
ing councils have had some positive effect upon procedural matters. It 
cannot be denied that they have, on occasion, rationalized the distribu- 
tion of resources throughout the state system and promoted more efficient 
pooling arrangements between the private and public sectors. Whenever 
they have had impressive statistical programs, the way they pres^ted 
information to the executive branch and the legislature undoubtedly affected 



A 

. 74 



the substance of policy decisions . ; ^ ' . 

Nevertheless, as John^ Folger has pointe^ out,, the technology • 

■ ^' . -i', ' ■ • . ' \* 

of planning leaves mucfi to be desired. Enrollment projections change • 

from "year to year. There is no cleaif -understanding of the role of higher* 
education in meeting the demands of the labor market. Folger doubts 
that the planning/coordinating agencies, or for that matter anyone else, 
can do a definitive job of anticipating the optimum size and composition 
oyjie postsecondar]^systerri in a given state. The more sophisticated 
presentations, which take multiple alternatives into^account, are not 
readily accepted by action -oriented groups such as governors and the ^ 
state legislatures . / > 

The federal policy -planner must face the danger that there 
is a seduqtive ease in communicating with organizations which are ifi 
place, organizations which, in a non-political world, could do the job. 
'There is a temptation to make these essentially undemocratic organiza- 
tions more representative and encourage them to include or consult more 
of the providefs'of postsecondary education (the 1202 strategy). While 
it Is possible that the claimants of resources for higher education .can , 
be gathered in a council, however, it is less likely that they will reach 
a consensus, and the policy makers who hold the.purse strings are likely 
to make their deci's ion in an ad hoc manner. • . ^ 

A Carpegie Commission on Higher Education survey of legis- 
10 



/ 



lators concluded: 



I 



ERIC 



82 . 



The impression conveyed. by legislatM-s and state execu- 
tive officials as they, anticipated the fiWre was one of men 
^ . beleaguered by the pressures of office .^^w of them 

seemed»able to take a long, view that was wh^eheartedly 
optimistic . Most, of them were more aware dfs^ossihle 
' difficulties in meeting the challenges to higher eSuQE^n 
than of alternativiss in coping with the expected needs>«^ 
' Most of them seemed cognizant of the fact that the future 
' depends on the present. For all of them, higher education 

was~ of necessity only one item on the agenda of public 
^ » policy making. And because it was only one. item compet- ■ 
" ' irig with many others, few of these^stite officials were ' ; 
'willing to be programmatic. ' ■ 

■ V ^ME CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS ^ 

* TJhre apparent consensus that the allocation of resources to 

the postsecondary sector is predominantly a political process, and the 

■J ^ . . . ' 

much more tentative conclusion that its allocation within the public*system 
can, perhaps, be affected by state planning/ccJordinating bodies, still 
leave's two questioriB unanswered: . (1) Which activitie|^ may need to be 
, encouraged to allocate resources In a period of declining enrollments, ' 
and (2) how to protect the private sector in a period of rapidly rising 

prices? ' . . ^ ^ • ■ 

We do not believe that the state planning/coordinating Sbdies 
are likely to be strong-enougti in most states to champion programs that 
would solve these problems. It would be unfair to Castigate an organ i- . 

,zation for not looking around the comer, or for not addressing qtte^ions 

■ • . . . ■ 

which max not be' politically meaningful in the context in which it operates 

This was aot our purpose. On the contrary, we attempted to evaluate 
. .... \ . ^ 

■ the . potential^ role of these organ izatiot^Ths innovating or providing 

■ ■ ■ , . " ' . • ' ' ■ . 

80 ■ 



1 



initiatives ill a moment 'of crisis . ' ' 

The planning and the implementation of the spectacular growth 
of the public sector took place in a political context which was shaped 
largely l)y. governors. Governors and their staffs were the mainsprijig' 
of successful expansion programs in higher education. The names Vf ' . 
Sanford in North Carolina, Rhodes in Ohio, Kemer in Illinois, Brown in 
California, and Rockefellef in New York are closely associated with the , 
establishment of master plans for the expansion of postsecondary educa- 
tion/ ' 0. . *^ 

We would like to suggest that the time is ripe to interest 
governors, and possibly legislative leaders, fn alternate policies which 
would be suitable to a no-growth environment. High on this new agehda . 
is the need to refocus state higher education master plans to' deal more 
effectively with the private sector, and to initiate coordination among 
states, in pricing colliege services and in pooling resources- 

State plannirig/cootdinating commissions would not be fexfcluded 
from thisa^)rocess . On the contrary, their r61es woulc? probably b.e 



strengthened. No politifcal figure likes to make difficult ^nd unpopular 
decisions.. The options will have to be worked up by members of state ^ 
commissions in order to reduce the o^i^^^he hard chojbes. 
' . With busy governors ^nd legislators increasingly harried by 

money problems, information and expert advice from &tate agen<iies will 
be in greater demand . Vifhether it 'will be available will depend on tm 



• ■ 77 ' * . • 

• • * ■ 

. V . > . ■ . * ■ 

tf^ ■ 

V - • ' ' . * • 

initiative of the governors in demanding, or^aUowing their state agency 
staffs to -examine, ways of shrinking the public sector. 

As an immediate initiative, we would propose a series of 
regional conferences for governors or k-ey aides, where some of the 

♦ 

issues raised, in this paper wouldlje discussed. This activity is well in 
the tradition of the Office of Education, which has been sponsoring an 
information program for Congressional staffs, and ought to allocate 
somfe money to broadening the outlook of key personnel in areas \^here 
the most important decisions in postsecondary education are being made 

• ^ ' • • ^ ^ji - . 



■85 



78 



FOOTNOTES 

•'•Robert O. Berdahl, Statewide Coordination of Higher Education (Wash- 
ington, D. C : American Council on Education, 1971) • 

^T. Harry McKinney, ^'Administration of the Section 1203 Comprehensivd^ 
Statewide Pianning Grants Program" (Report for the Office of Planning, 
Budgeting, and Evaluation in the Office of Education, U, S- Department 
of Health, Edupation and Welfare) November, 1975, pp, 20, 30-63 passim. 

'^Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, The Capitol and the Campus: 
State Responsibility for Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill, " 
April 197].). ~ ■ J 

"^John K. Folger, 'Three Questions about Statewide Planning," and Winfred 
L. Godwin, ''Regional Dimensions, of Planning^d Coordination," in 
iFormulating Policy in Postsecondary Education , ed . by John F • Hughes 
and Olive Mills (Washington, D. C: American Council on Education, 
19>75), pp. 230-246. , j ^ 

5 ' 

Our view is conveniently demonstrated by omissions in the volume, Form- 
ulating Policy in Postsecondary Education, cited in the previousmaragraph 




^Toward a More Effective Federal/State Partnership Related to^rivate 
Higher Education (pre^red for the U. S. Office of Education, U, S, 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare by the staff of the Educa- 
tion Commission of the States) October 31, 1975. Figures derived from 
data on pp. 33-35. - 

^John p. Millett, Politics and Higher Education, -1974 (University, Ala.: 
University of Alabama Press, 1974), pp. 61-62. (Note the parts of this 
quote ^re now in rever^je order of appearance. ) 

^Ibid., p. 57. 

^Warren G. Hill, *To Keep from Being King, " in Formulating Policy in 
Postsecondary Education (Washington^ D. C. : American Counfcil on 
Education, 1975), pp. 247.-248. ' 

^^Heinz Eulau and Harold Quinley, State Officials and Higher Education 
(New York: McGrawrHill, 1970), p. 185. '