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ET ? 02 056 CS 503 358 

ZT^OR Gustainis, C~ Justin: Albone,' Kenneth 

~ TI 3 The Effects -rf Commu: ication Apprehension and 

Opportunity — o Commu: ..cats on Human Bargaining s 
/ Beiivior. 
?~ DATE Apr 0 1 

? ~-P*; Par ■■=:? -resentec =■-: :he Annual Meeting of the 

r a stern :: Jitsuricatioz Association (Pittsburgh, PA r 
«7=H 2<l-.26. r \ 

TDES prc"5 ;*F91/?C01 Plus Postage. ^ 

JESCEIPTC'v^. ^Ssxi^ty; ^Collective Bargaining; College Students; 

Comnrriiicaticn Problems;: -Comaunication- research; 
♦Cows-etiticxr:. *Cooper~ ; Interaction 
"^lat^rp-erscral Relatl-.rrsi^pj Speech com a us;., cation 
IDENH-FIr * ;. *Ccxa :ni ~ari or Apprekr ra 

ABST?::r 

l stdcy ax sniped three acts of the cc__£Ctive 
barcrain^L-r situa.tilsa that iirc.ves^ e±rzz±B: directly or iJ-irectly, 
commu.nica- texxTiLor: (1) the number ~ : opportunities zz 
comannicEr* (2V degree of cooper a trm /competitiveness shown by 

an opponent.,, and f3/) nhe der^i^e of communication apprehension 
possessed irj parties t.o the process. SerenrT^tffO college ^rudents 
participates- in he study 3«n was administered a measure of 
commcnicatxoT, ap^re^rsion rnS then asked t: play the "prisoner's 
dilemma e^xe, 11 w^icH is des^rred to measure the degree of a subject's 
cooperat^rz/cromv^titd veness- The results shewed; that a higher number 
- cf C wi umi . "T^tlc^ j betveen game participants zv,<L\ their partners was 
related -*d±n jpct-s cooperative beharior. In, addition, the findings 
revealed rj?*t.- rese?at-lly f r^r-sons ~?ho are\'arrious about communication 
with ethers :eid to ue more cooperative ifi tneir behaviors in a 
bargainor- sitnat-lra in order to avoid conflict. (FL) 



*' Reproductions supplied by EDRSare the bestthat can be made * 
* from the original document* *. * 



ERLC 



UJ5. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION 
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION 

f CENTER (ERIC) 
This document has been reproduced as 
received from the person or organization 
originating it. 
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The. Effects of Communication' Apprehension and Opportunity 
to Communicate on Human Bargaining Behavior 



* by 
J. Justin Gustainis 
and 

Kenneth Alfcone \ 



"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS 
. MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY 

J- Justin Gustainis 



Kenneth Albone 



TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES 
INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)." 



School of Speech Communication 
Bowling Green State University . 
Bowling Green, Ohio ^3^03 
(kl9) 372-2823 • 



© 1981 



Paper presented at- the annual meeting of the Eastern' 
Communication Association, Pittsburgh, Pa., April, 



The Effects of Cc-zauni cation Apprehension and J: uor^ ~±~j 
to Communi.cate on Human Bargainir-.g BehH*'i : 

The study of human bargaining behavior ha id con- 

siderable research in, recent years, much of wi lizz seen sum- 
marized in Schelling (I960),. Walton and McKeri^ I-.-t- 9 Rubin 
and Brown (1975) > Tedeschi, et al. (1973) a^d ^urzmzzi (1977) * 
A certain amount of this research has been cc: rne=d with the 
effects of various communication variables or. V-e^ini-ig behav- 
ior (Tedeschi and Rosenfeld, 1980), \ The pres'ci- sx^dy examines 
three aspects of the bargaining situation wh- \ voLv= , either 
directly or indirectly, communication behavi -is number of* 

opportunities to communicate 9 t;he degree of Ti:n/compe ti- 

tiveness shown by an opponent, and the degree o, v»mU2ii cation 
apprehension possessed by subjects 0 

Opportunity to '"Gommunicata 

Tedeschi and Rosenfeld (1980) have obse that "communi- 

cations serve critical functions in bargain!-? (p. 2^6). Many 
researchers have found a direct relationship ::z :veen .the effec- 
tiveness of bargaining behavior and the extent— o which parties 
communicate with each other . (Bixens tine and Dou_.as, 196? j Ter- 
hune , 1968; Voiss^em and Sis trunks 1971; Cole, 19^2). One of the 
paradigms frequently used to examine such commur^jcation involves 
making\ communication possible only at: certain times. Such 
approaches have been described as "frequently integral parts of 
the research design used to study bargaining behavior (Rubin and 



1975% p. 116). Terhune :."£), "v. instance, utilized a 
r -person 3 0 trial prisoner's ■iUr-mms, in which the two 

r... Tnrs were able to freely comnur. ...cate .in writing) with each 
^.e? during trials , Such pairs teni-?r cc be more cooperative 
pairs who were 'not allowed sua c nimzmicationo Bixenstine 
- :Douglas (1967) found in 6-persor. .;lscner f s dilemma games \ 
-±z t when subjects were given 15-2C nrrnute verbal communication 
:7portunities during a recess in tfe game, the subjects tended 
t be more coojLrative than if not given such a chance, to com- 
m. icate. Although there is research which suggests that the 
p~ sence of communication in, a bargaining situation leads to 
120 re cooperation than does a complete absence of communication 
(^or>mis, 1959? Radlow and-Weidne^, I966) , the authors were unable 
to discover any published resear a which studied the .effects of 
various amounts of communication upon c.ooperation/compe titiveness 
in bargaining. Given* the conclusions of existing research, it is 
hypothesized that: ' 

The amount of communicatit~; is negatively related to 
convpe titiveness in bargaining 0 • ' 

„C.OQDerativeness/Com-De titivenass of Opponent 

Rubin and Brown have concluded that, in bargaining, "coopera- 
tion bege ts cooperation? and; conversely,, noncooperation bege ts 
noncooperation" (p. 270). Although there is a modest amount of 
research which would contradict this (such as that conducted by 
Gahagan "and Tedeschi, 1968 and Liridskold. and Tedeschi, 1971), the 
great majority of studies done in this area supports" the observa- 



ti 



on that, when playing against a simulated other in a bargaining 



situa-t; \ : the leval c. cooperation of su cts tend? t reflect 
the ooc^rsrz/^on evidenced, by the opponent Current ressa-rch in 
this ar=?3. : not "been plentiful — thermos": r-s cent research was 
perform^:: v the Sixties and early Seventi=~ (as in the follow- 
ing, all cf- -hich support Rubin and Brown's conclusion < Gahagan, 
Long and Hcrai, 1969? Gruder and Duslak, 1973; Lave, 196.5 and 
Wyer, 1971 1 = All of the above-mentioned research utili-sd pri- 
soner's d -rjna games similar to .the one utilized in thrls study. 
In each the games were designed for two .people , with one. 

person's sponses being artificially cooperative or noncooper^- 
tive. Iz r.any cases the responses were simulated for the subject 
participi ing in the 3*tudy. In order to provide a more recent" 
test of ~he relationship between opponents 1 cooperation and Ss 1 
cooperation, we. hypothesize thats 

' H 2 JIhe—- level of cooperation evidenced by simulated opponents 
in bargaining i s nega t ively related' to the level of comipe titiv e- 
ness shown by sublets j ) 

.Effects of communication Apprehension ■' <i "~; 

Several personality characteristics have been shown to have 
an influence on an individual's bargaining behavior, such as risk- 
taking propensity (Dolbear and Lave, 1966? Sherman, 1967$ and 
Harnett, Cummings and Hughes, 1968), perceived locus of control 
(Rotter, 1966; Condry, 1967), authoritarianism (Hermann and 
Kogen, 1977s Smith- 1967)i and machiavellianism (O'Brien, 1970.; 
Uejio and Wrightsman, 1967, and Wahlin, 1967) . As far as a dili- 
gent search by the authors has been able to determine , however , no 



published research exists whic:. examines the rzle of communica- 
tion apprehension in bargaining behavior. Although, strictly- 
speaking, communication appre±= .\sicn may not itself be a per- 
sonality trait, it has been l:.r_^d to several personality traits, 
including several listed above ItfcCroskey, et al . , 1976). Given" 
the vast amount of literature which the study of communication 
apprehension has generated (." oCroskey, 19771 3 the authors, felt, 
this lapse to be. unusual. S..nce the typical "high communication 
apprehensive" person is like _y -co be, among other things, "a 
follower, submissive, conforming and obedient, " (McCroskey, et al., 
-P-^378), the authors hypothesized that: 

The degree of communication, apprehension reported bv an 
individual 5 is negatively related to co,. * r itiveness in bargaining. 

In addition, in order to allow for full analysis of ' the 
effect,, if any, .of. communication apprehension on bargaining, we 
posited the following research questions: 

1. Is there a significant interaction between communication - 
apprehension and the number of communications permitted in bar- 
gaining such that the relationship between communication. appre- 
hension and cooperation rill differ across the number of communi- 
cations? 

2. Is there a significant interaction between communication 
apprehension and the cooperative -competitive condition such that 
the relationship between communication apprehension and coopera- 

tion will be different in the cooperative, condition than in the 

' \ • • 

competitive condition?' ^ \ 




METHOD 

Instruments 

Qame Paradigm.! The paradigm used for the bargaining situa- 
tion in this study was the non-zero sum prisoner's dilemma game 
(Rubin and Brown, 1975).' The game consists of two players who 
choose a particular color for each trial of the game". In this 
study, the subjects individually placed against a confederate 
and each chose either red or black for each of twenty-one total 
trials. The results of each trial was revealed before the next 
trial was started. Subjects would receive points as follows: 
if both players chose black, both received one point? if both 
players chose, red, both received, negative one point; if one 
chose red and the other black, the player choosing black received 
negative two points arid the player choosing red -"received -plus two 
points. Therefore, a red choice was considered' competitive since 
points could be gained only at the expense of\the other player; 
and a black choice was considered cooperative since points could 
be gained' only with cooperation from the other player. The con- 
federate was played by 'the experimenters 0 

De-pendent Variable, The dependent variable/was 7 a measure 

of each subject's competitiveness as assessed by tl^ number of 

- x / .' • 

red choices made during the game 0 Thus choosing jl*} reds' in 21 

trials would be scored as 13. 

Communicative .Messages,, As will be explained below, ohe of 
the variables assessed was the number 0 ^communications during 
the game « It was necessary to generate appropriate messages for 



ERLC 



6 

the subjects to send to the confederate and vice versa. It was 
decided to use written messages from which the subjects could' 
make choices in order to have the maximum control over the com- 
munication between players. The authors generated eight coopera- 
tive messages and eight competitive messages and two neutral, 
messages which were then rated by five communication graduate 
students. The top- five cooperative messages and the top five 
competitive messages were selected, along with the two neutral 
ones. Appendix A gives the results of these ratings. 

• Communication Ap prehension. Communication Apprehension 
was assessed by use of the PRCA for college developed by j' 
McCroskey (1970). / 
Independent Variables 

Each of the following independent variables were used as a 
'result of the three hypotheses given earlier.. The Research ques- 
tions were asked to insure a full investigation' of the effect of 
communication apprehension in the assessment of the data collected. 

Number of C ommunications. Each subject was in one of three \ 
possible communicative conditions. The first involved no, communis 
cation between players during the prisoner's dilemma game. The v * 
second involved one communication after the ^enth trial. The 
third"~condition involved three communications after the sixth, 
eleventh, and sixteenth trials. For each communication,, /the sub- 
jects would choose one of the twelve messages discussed above 
(and found in Appendix A) to be' sent to the confederate, and then 
the confederate would' 're spond with one of the messages. In the', 
competitive condition, the confederate always .returned a competi- 

' 8 



7 

tive. message ? JLikewise in the cooperative condition the confeder 
ate always gave a cooperative message in return. 

. Bargaining Condition. Each subject was in one of two pos- 
sible bargaining situations 0 f The first was labeled cooperatiye 
and was one in which the confederate responded with 18 black 
choices and 3* red choices (trials 5, 9, 16) a The second was 
labeled the competitive condition and was one in which the con- 
federate responded with 18 red choices and 3 black choices 
(trials 5, 9» 16) . , j 

These first two independent variables represent a tot^l of 
six possible combinations for any particular subject to receive;, 
These six combinations were randomly put into a block- of six and 
then assigned, to the subjects in the order they participated. 

Communication Apprehension. Each subject completed the 
PRCA. This is not a true experimental variable since the sub- 
jects were not randomly assigned (and ^pould not be) to various 

levels of communication apprehension. iHowever, it is possible 

\ I ' t 

to examine the effect of this variable ! within an experimental 

approach. / 

Outline of Procedure 

Subjects , A total of 72 subjects were analyzed out 'of 7^ 

! : 

participating undergraduate students enrolled in speech courses 
at a midwestern university. Such participation is required in 
the speech courses at, this university. Two subjects were elimin 
ated from the study because the debriefing indicated that their 
color selection was made on a random basis. 

* ■ 9 . . 1 . 

ERIC l 



8 

Experiment. Each subject followed this format: first, the 
subject was asked to fill out the PRCA. Then one experimenter 
read instructions concerning the nature of playing the prisoner 1 
dilemma game. The other experimenter was in an. adjoining room 
serving as the confederate , The subject was "theili assigned to 
one of the six conditions. After answering questions concerning 
the nature of the game, the. experimenter started the game. The , 



subject had 30 seconds to c 



i 1 

hoose each color at the start of each 



trial. In conditions requiring communications, the subject was 
given up to two minutes to /choose one of the twelve ' pre -written * 
messages. The experimenter would go from room to room to report 
the choices made, for each trial, and to deliver the messages ex- 
changed between the players „ ■ A score sheet was kept by the . 
experimenter to record color choices and message choices as well 
as the score of the game . After completion of the. experiment, 
the subject was debriefed. - 1 



RESULTS 



Instrument ggj jj qhj 1 3 tYr The reliability of the .PRCA was 
assessed by use of the alpha statistic and was found to be .93. 
The reliability of the . dependent variable , . compeptitiveneoS , was 
assessed using the KR-20 statistic (an alpha statistic for ' - 
dichotomous measures) and- was found to be { 83. \ Both reliabili- 
ties were considered acceptable.. -\ " 

.Analysis of Varia nce - Results. A three Way ANOVA do sign was 
used to assess ..the results of - the experiment. The three inde- 
pendent variables served as the factors, thuL l making a 2 x 2 x 3 



design (communication apprehension was analyzed using a regres- 
sion approach utilizing one vector in the regression equation, ' 
equivalent to a two-level ■ design) . Table One gives the results 
• of the ANOVA. - These results will be discussed in terms of the 
hypotheses and research 'questions. 

Hypothesis one was (confirmed as the number of communications 
was. a significant effect! The means' are: for no communication— 
1^.58, for one communication— 13v6 ( 7 x , and for three communicaticns- 



11.96. This/ indicates that as the number of communications in- 



creases, the competitiveness of tlje responses by the subjects 
decreases. / 



Hypothesis two was confirmed as the bargaining situation was 
' / \. \ \ 

a significant Effect. The; means are: for. the competitive condi- 

x " : ■ \ ' \ 

tion— 16.06, and for the .cooperative condition— 10. 75. This in- 

' . I 

dicates that^ the subjects responded more competitively in the 
compe titive bargaining situation than in the cooperative bargain- 

■ ■ . y ..... 

ing situation,, 

Hypothesis three was not supported. • 

The first research question, an interaction between communi- 
cation apprehension and the. number \>f communications, did not 
receive any significant results,, 

The second research question, ar^ interaction between communi- 
cation apprehension and the -bar gaining situation, was significant. 



One appropriate interpretation of this\ result is that the corre- 
lation between communication apprehension and competitiveness 
(D.V. ) differs between the two bargaining situations . Table Two 
gives these correlations'. One immediate! observation is that the 



10 





Table 


One 






/ 


Analysis of Variance 


Results 






/ 


SS 


df 


.• MS 


F 


P 


1 

No / elf Communi- 
cations 


86.643 


2 


43=321 


3.45 


<.05 


Bargaining Situa- 
tion \ 


496.760 


1 


496.760 ' 


39.60 . 


< • 001 


Communication \ 
Apprehension 


3.414 


1 


3.414 • 
/37.712 


.27 


n.s." 


No. of Comm. x 
Barg. Sit. 


75.425 


2 


; 01 


n. s . 


No. of Comm. x 
o omm . App . 




0 

2 


5.719 ' 


.46 


n.s. 


Barg.: Sit. x ' 
Coram. App. , . 


55. 334 


1 


55.334 


4.4l 


^1.05 


Three Way Inter- 
action 

1 , ■* 


.91.394 


2 


45.6?7 


3.64 


^•05 




f .2^ « OX J) 




12.544 






Total 


1573.319 


71 








\ ' , 
\ . ' 


Table 


Two 


\ . ■ 

. - \. 
\ 

\ 


\ 

\ 

\ 





Correlations of Comi^uni cation App::, tension with V 
Competitiveness in Each Bargaining Situation 

/. Cooperative Situation Competitive Situation 

Correlations 0 05 -.18 



11 • 

correlation is positive in the cooperative situation but nega- 
tive in the competitive situation. However, no conceptual inter- 
pretation should be made without first investigating the signi- 
ficant three-way interaction. 

i 

The three-way interaction would seem to present some inter- 
pretational problems, as higher interactions tend to do. One 
appropriate way to view the interaction is* to look at the corre- 
lations between communication apprehension and competitiveness 
(D.V.) for all six cells representing the combination of the 
three communications levels 7 and two bargaining situations. Table 
Three gives, these correlations. ..It can be readily seen that the 

- • Table Three , • \' 

Correlations/of Communication Apprehension with Competitiveness- 
.in Each ^Bargaining Situation Within Each of the No* o'f 
■Communication Conditions V. - 

: ... Cooperative Situation ' Competitive Situation 

0 Communications ' -.26; -OS" 

.1, Communication ■ • -»^2 > -.0^ 

3 Communications ! \, .65 > : -.28 U N=12 

r' ' ■ " : \ . " ' v • ' ' ." " ■ ■: 

interaction occurred because of * the cooperative- three communica- 
tions cell having the only^os4^ve (and largest) • correlation; 
as all other cells ha^e negative correlations:.' Also, this fact 
clearly points out . the reason, for ^ the significant two-way inter- 



corre 



lations 



action,., as the appropriate average of the 

bargaining situation" would give the results in .Table Two.* Theret- 
ofore , . the two-way interaction has ''no conceptual meaning, but the* 
three-way interaction can be conceptuall y int erpreted. 



13 



• 12 
The negative correlations in five of the six cells of the 
three-way interaction can be interpreted as follows: the more 
communication apprehension a subject reports, the less competi- . 
tive he responds in the prisoner's dilemma game * —This supports 

the third hypothesis. The positive correlation in the coopera- 

• / /■ 

tive-three communications.^ cell indicates that the more communica- 
tion apprehension a subject reports , the more competitive he plays 
the game. Thus the results' indicate either the- one cell has a 
meaningful nonintuitive interpretation; or* if it is to be viewed 
as 'a sampling error, then the other five cells would indicate the 
true nature of the effect of communication apprehension, which 
is that^the higher' 1 coMiiuni cation apprehension a subject has lead's 
to lower competitive behavior in bargaining situations. 

■ \ * 

: DISCUSSION I,- 

t \ ' * '" 

This section is divided into two parts, the first which: will 
discuss, the re v sults of the hypotheses and ..research questions, and 
the second' will discuss future research in the 'area of bargaining. 
Interpretation of Results / The first two hypotheses were 

/important because of their value in determining the validity of 
the , srtudy ' as a bargaining situation. Research has indicated that 
both the number of communications and the "type jof bargaining 

"situation are important variables in bargaining. This study found 
such results in the first two hypotheses, arid also confirmed the 9 
direction in which the .variables were, predicted to occur. That 
is, 'the "higher number of communications was "related with more * 
cpoperative 'behavior? and the cooperative situation had more <■ 



V , 13 

\ 

cooperative behavior than the competitive situation.. Any study 
which purports to relate ^.communication variables to other salient 
variables in a bargaining situation (as th^s one does) must, 
demonstrate to some degree that a bargaining situation existed. 
The results of this study iri^ terms of communication apprehension 
can now be appropriately discussed pertinent to a bargaining - 
situation. 

The third hypothesis suggested that there would be a rela- 
tionship between communication apprehension and competitiveness^ 
such that the person reporting higher cdipunrcation apprehension 
would respond more cooperatively in the bargaining situation. 
Initially "this* hypothesis had to ,be unsupported based upon- the 
analysis of variance results. However, upon analysis of the 
interaction effect (research questions) it was fourid that dom- 
muriication apprehension had a significant interaction effept with 
the other .variables of the study. Post hoc analysis revealed 
that the subjects in/cne ■ of the possible six cells 'relating the. 
nunber 1 of comnuni cat ions to the' type of bargaining situation 
responded differently in competitiveness in relation tp communi-V; 
cation apprehension than the other five cells.' The five cells 
supported the third hypothesis, thus- supporting the intuitive 
'notion that persons who are anxious over' communication With others- 
would tend to want to be , more cooperative in their ..behaviors in a 
.bargaining situation to possibly avoid conflict- or anticipated 
f^iiuire^ommuni cations. The interpretation of 'the .-sixth cell be- 
♦comes troublesome ,* because it suggests just the opposite, that • 
people with anxiety to communications would increase their 



1* 

competitive behaviors . Two possible reasons can be given for 
this result. The first is. that perhaps duetto tho size of the 
sample (n=12 per cell) the results are due to some sort of 
sampling error or subject bias. If this is the case, then the 
authors argue that the other five cells are representative of 
the population and support >the third hypothesise The second 
reason is that .the effect is real, and that an' interaction can 
be conceptually valid 'in relating communication apprehension \o . 
other variables in a bargaining situation. ; The results, in this 
case, would suggest there^ is' at least one bargaining situation 
(in this study, 'the - situation was ria cooperative situation with 
three- opportunities for. coramurii cation ): in which a more communica- 
tive apprehensive .person-* would tend to be mora competitive/. This 
result would be important in ' that it maty^ suggest that certain 
, bargaining situations' may be useful in helping; a more anxious 
■communicator -to become 'more competitive „ - Whether to : be - more com- ' : 
petitive is desirable or not is no.t the concern, of this study... 
.That there are kinds , of ' situations which may help! anxious- com- v 
municat'ors to want to communicate • in a more anxious- free gitua- 

" * ' - ; ■ - ' c \i ' ' 

tion. is important, and should "perhaps be pursue d» v ' N 

" ' v\ ■ ; ■ \ . • . \ . * ■ . ■ * r » - 

Future -Research. Rubin and Brown (1975) have a very good 
collection of many of the. salient variables which affecj/ various 
bargaining- situations. , Most of these variables can, be Seen as •. 
personality variables or situational variables. but not/ necessarily 
as communication variables. Questions may be asked, such as: What 
is the nature of the relationship^ between participants in a bar- 
gaining situation which allow these salient variables to be. known 



15 

and/or have an effect upon that situation? This question may be 
best answered by looking at communication variables. This study 
looks at one such variable , which is the anxiety a person may 
have in communicating in particular Y^ays in the situation. This x 
study indicates that by looking at such variables, then the nature 
of the bargaining situation may become more apparent, and hence 
the effects of the salient variables as mentioned by Rubin and 
Brown (1975) can be assessed more adequately. It is posited that 
perhaps the communication variables can be viewed as mediating 
variables' between the personality variables and the .behaviors dis- 
played within a bargaining situation.. This study suggests that 
the behavior .displayed by persons in a 'bargaining situation can. 
differ in differing bargaining situations "as the effect., of a 
commuhi cation variable -^communication' apprehension. It" is sug-. 
gested that, further research -utilizing communication -variables' 'in 
bargaining situations may produce fruitful results for those 
scholars who have,- an interest in the effects arid behaviors present 
in bargaining situations. For example, the personality variables 
discussed 'by' Rubin 1 ' and Brown (1075) could be evaluated in bargain- 
ing situations along with a mediating communication variable such 
as seif-dis closure . ..Certainly the degree and type of self- 
disclosures, made in a bargaining situation^would affect the way in 
which perceived personality- .'variables afxec't human bargaining be- 
havior.. However, rese's^rch in bargaining does not address this 
affect, but singly relates" a set Qf personality variables- with 
outcomes in bargaining situations 0 By investigating communication 
variables, such as self-disclosure and communication apprehension, 



--. 16 

an interactive process analysis c- made of bargaining situa- 
tions which would add to existing knowledge which relate per- 
, sonality variables to outcome variables in bargaining situations. 



9 

ERIC 



18- 



/ . i ... 

] 

17 

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\ , ■ ■ - 1 \ 
Cole, S. G. Conflict and Cooperation in Potentially In- 
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Condry, J. C. , Jr. The Effects of Situational Power andXper 
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■ Druckman, D." (1977) Negotiations : ' Social-Psychologic al 
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< < 'Gahagen, J. P. and Tedeschi, J. T. . Strategy and- the Credi- ' 
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Conflict Resolution . 1968, 12, 224-23^. ; ■ * ~ . 

■'. Gruder,, C. L. and Duslak,' - R. • J. Elicitation of, Cooperation ' 
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.Game. Journal of Conflict Resolution . ,197?. 17,162-174. 1 

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/ 



/ 



20 

APPENDIX A 
Rating ojf Messages 

Message . , Rating * 

1. I think I can do better if I do this. .by myself • 2.4 

2. The way I see this game, it's everyone for himself. .1.0** 

- 3. I'll 'give a little if you give a little. 6,2** 

4. We're only going to get somewhere with this game 

if we get together. '7.0** 

5» v We can both earn points if we v agree to "make the 

right choices. , • . ■ : *■ 6.4*? 

' 6. Gan't help you. Sprry. ~. 2.0** 

iX .7. If we'^both play blacky we' .both win.- What do you .say?- 5 6^4** 

8 0 -> I'm. in. this for myself i ^ ,* ; ■ 

. 9« I see no point Irf cooperating. p 

10. ..Let's help each other. ^. ■ - ; ,J ' \, ' ' - . v * 

-11. I think, we should both try to.; reach an agreement 
on choice of "colors. >■ 




,12.. I'agree With you-, / / ■ - * r*\ 

13* I will not giVe you any guarantees about my choices. ' 2.6 / 

1 14. Competition is' what this game is all about. ' j . 1.2^* ° 

.15 • 'No message to send.v *. A ' . 4.0*** 

16. "'No message in reply. ,v \ 3^*** 

'1.7 • We should reach some sort ,of agreement on our '.' '•" '•/;' 
„ choices.- , • , .. ' ,. 5. if- 

1 18, I disagree with you. • " V .3, 0 • 

Mean rating with 1 ■= mos/t competitive^ and" 7= most ^cooperative . 

Messages selecte'd. for. .use in.- the game . ' . ■ !':. * 

• ' r , » . r . l V:. 

•Messages authors intended to ' include , and did; -Ratings were- 
taken to verify- their neutrality, • II \ ". 



ERIC 



22. , - . //