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M. Stanton Evans 


New York 1965 

Copyright © 1965 by The Devin-Adair Company . 

All rights reserved. No portion of this 
book may be reproduced in any form without 
written permission from the publisher, 
The Devin-Adair Co., 23 East 26th Street, New York 10010, 
except by a reviewer, who may quote brief passages 
in connection with a review. 

Canadian Agent: Abelard-Schuman Canada, Ltd, Toronto 
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 65-13914 
Manufactured in the United States of America 


For Sue Ellen 


It has been only through the kind assistance of many people 
that this book has found its way into print. Although I can¬ 
not mention all of these, I should like to acknowledge the 
efforts of several who have been particularly helpful. First of 
all, for long patience, good counsel, and diligent service at 
the typewriter, my wife, Sue Ellen. For aid and comfort in 
tracking down elusive sources, Allan Ryskind, William 
Schulz, Ross Hermann, and Antoni E. Gollan. For a wide 
assortment of services including telephoning, typing, and 
keeping me relatively organized, my assistant, Miss Jo Mohr. 
And once again, for their generosity in preparing the index, 
Mr. and Mrs. Lawrence Arany. 




PART one: the establishment 

/. Is There an Establishment? 


2. Moment of Truth 


3. Operation Goldwater 

S 3 

part two: the quest for power 

/. Pragmatism and Power 

2. Americans for Democratic Action 

3. Is It Socialism? 

4. “Aid” Means Control 

5. The Planned Economy 

6 . Affluence—or Poverty? 

7. Inflation, Social Security, and Medicare 

8 . The Ultimate Scandal 

PART three: liberalism and liberty 

1. Freedom for Whom? 


2. The Law-Breakers 


3. The War Against Security 


4. Four Cases 


1. J. Robert Oppenheimer 


2. Owen Lattimore 


3. John Stewart Service 


4. William Wieland 


5. Four Other Cases 


1. Otto Otepka 


2. Michel Struelens 


3. Don B. Reynolds 


4. Mary K. Jones 











6 . The Silencers 


7. Censorship and Muzzling 


8. Managing the News 








Part One 


1 . Is There an Establishment? 

Since both its operational terms are subject to controversy, 
the title of this book needs explaining. “Liberal” and “estab¬ 
lishment” are words of indefinite extension, pliable to the 
hands of the user. The writer who employs them should say 
how he wants them understood. 

As to “Liberal,” we may for present purposes ignore 
academic disputes about similarities and distinctions between 
present bearers of the title and their precursors in the 19th 
century. Our object is to know current political tendencies, 
not the underground circuits of philosophy. For the rough 
purposes of a working vocabulary, contemporary Liberalism, 
in its domestic modulation, may be defined as belief in in¬ 
creased centralization of power in the federal government, 
and in economic “planning” aimed at the creation of a wel¬ 
fare state. In foreign affairs, Liberalism holds to the idea that 
Cold War problems can best be settled by “reasoning” with 

The Liberal Establishment 


the agents and principals of the Communist global con¬ 
spiracy, and cooperating with the “revolution of rising expec¬ 
tations” among less civilized countries. This definition tells 
us nothing about the deeper roots of Liberalism, or why it is 
what it is. It simply marks out the sector of political life 
intended when the word is used in this discussion. 

Even on this restricted plane, of course, exceptions can be 
noted. There are areas where Liberals, reversing their nor¬ 
mal stance, declare themselves against the authority of the 
federal government and assume the role of libertarian 
advocacy—principally in matters of internal security; this ex¬ 
ception, one of the most curious features of Liberal thought, 
will be examined at the proper place in our text. Still an¬ 
other species of exception concerns those individuals—like 
Senator Thomas Dodd of Connecticut—who are Liberal in 
domestic matters but do not share the prevailing Liberal 
view on questions of foreign policy. This particular class of 
exceptions cannot, however, concern us in this volume, since 
our subject is domestic rather than foreign affairs. Suffice it to 
say that, when a political figure professes both points men¬ 
tioned above, he is by our definition a Liberal. 

One philosophical aspect of Liberalism should be briefly 
noted, because we will have occasion to observe its impact 
on political matters. This is the moral relativism which char¬ 
acterizes much if not most Liberal thought, even, on certain 
occasions, when the Liberal in question formally pays alle¬ 
giance to a non-relativist creed. The highest virtue of Liberal 
orthodoxy is “tolerance”—tolerance of anything and every¬ 
thing. This universal elasticity springs from the belief that 
there are no fixed standards of right and wrong, that we can¬ 
not hold people or nations morally accountable for their acts, 
that, in fact, the idea of “moral accountability” is without 
content. This aspect of Liberal thought can be traced in ev¬ 
erything from raising children (or preventing them) to 
punishing criminals to dealing with the Soviet Union. 

Is There an Establishment? 

► 15 

When the word “Liberal” is used in this essay, then, it 
refers in the first instance to people who believe in central¬ 
ized power at home, complaisance and conciliation toward 
the Communist enemy abroad, and the notion that, in the 
working ethics of the world, everything is relative. To give 
greater substance to that conception is the purpose of this 
book; but these bare bones of meaning will tell the reader 
what is here intended by the word until our story can spell 
out its own fuller definition. 

If the word “Liberal” is in some respects troublesome, 
“establishment” is no less so. Originally, the word referred to 
the official status of Anglicanism in Great Britain as the 
“established” church—the communion recognized and sup¬ 
ported by government; from that meaning, “establishment” 
has been broadened to include the entire machinery of Brit¬ 
ish religious, civil, and cultural authority, revolving about 
the nobility, the public school system, the great universities— 
to include, that is, the effective governing class of England. 

An establishment is, then, a kind of informal junta by 
which a community is guided in all those things which mat¬ 
ter. It is defined by large areas of agreement among its mem¬ 
bers on key social and political questions, and the remarkable 
adhesion they display in action when their views are tested by 
political resistance or the friction of ideas. Whether the 
United States has an establishment of this kind, comparable 
to the English original, is a minor controversy of sorts, the 
subject of raillery between such literary antagonists as Rich¬ 
ard H. Rovere and William F. Buckley, Jr. This book holds 
that such an establishment does exist in America, that it 
labors to make the ideas of Liberalism supreme in our poli¬ 
tics, and that its members do work in concert although not 
necessarily by pre-arrangement. 

The “establishment” concept is sometimes thought to 
imply coordination and common planning, and while there is 
little doubt that some of this is going on, to suppose it an 

The Liberal Establishment 


essential feature of Establishment rule is to miss the point. 
The American Establishment is not the result of a deep-dyed 
plot, although one of its most grievous failings has been its 
negligence in dealing with those who are engaged in plots; 
it is the result instead of a cultural condition, of the fact that 
American thought in all its departments has been shot 
through with the presuppositions of Liberalism and has come 
to accept its indicated political conclusions and habits of 
mind. Establishment members are for the most part products 
of a Liberal education in the American academy, where they 
have been taught as right and natural the characteristic Lib¬ 
eral ideas of centralized power, “accommodation” of our for¬ 
eign adversaries (when they are of the left), the absence of 
fixed standards of judgment, and the conviction that anyone 
who does not profess these ideas is an ignoramus. 

Sharing such views, it is not necessary for various compo¬ 
nents of the Establishment to check signals before every 
major encounter—just as it would not be necessary for the 
opponents of Liberalism, were they in the same comfortable 
position, to consult minutely on every question in order to 
present a common front concerning it. Members of the Es¬ 
tablishment know where they stand on major issues before 
the issues come up, because the Liberal ideology supplies 
them with a whole agenda of set answers to political prob¬ 
lems. Moreover, since they are constantly engaged in the 
normal communication required to administer the affairs of a 
vast society—through government, civic institutions, aca¬ 
demic duties, foundation work, the public media—they read¬ 
ily develop a common idiom and portfolio of tactics. 

That there is an empirical thing out there which is Lib¬ 
eral, and which acts concertedly to achieve common ends in 
political life, is a fact which yields itself to the most cursory 
inspection. The reader who doubts as much can settle the 
matter for himself by comparing one week’s utterances in 
The New York Times , Newsweek magazine,* and the CBS 

Is There an Establishment? 


television network—to pick some random but obvious ex¬ 
amples. If he does so, he will find people widely separated 
by geography, corporate employment, education, and eco¬ 
nomic interest—in fact, people nominally in fierce competi¬ 
tion with each other—saying very much the same things, 
nudging the mind of the nation down the same road toward 
the same objectives. The objectives are, with exceptions so 
rare as to be negligible, Liberal—support for the United Na¬ 
tions, negotiations with the Soviet Union, a welfare proposal 
before Congress. Add to these examples a dozen other power¬ 
ful newspapers, most of the slick magazines, both remaining 
TV networks, a heavy majority of the nation's academic 
community, almost all vocal labor leaders, many clergymen, 
and most high government officials. The outline of some¬ 
thing in which a cluster of influential people are working in 
the same direction becomes easily discernible. That some¬ 
thing, whatever its own members want to call it, is herein 
described as the “Establishment.” 

Liberals are not, to be sure, the only influential people 
around. There is in a sense a “conservative" establishment 
as well. Such organizations as the Farm Bureau, the National 
Association of Manufacturers, the Chamber of Commerce 
and the American Legion represent interest and power 
groupings which frequently take up the cudgels to oppose the 
Liberal view of things. These organizations, however, are not 
as comprehensive in their ideological concern as are Liberal 
spokesmen; faithful to the interests of their members, they 
tend to restrict themselves to issues within their own particu¬ 
lar fields of competence. They do not, generally, display the 
concertedness of action which is so familiar an aspect of Lib¬ 
eral performance. Even more to the point, perhaps, they are 
transparently not in control of things where control matters 
most. In the opinion-moulding industries, in the academy, 
and in the halls of Congress, their influence is small and of 
late diminishing. 

The Liberal Establishment 


The chief point about the Liberal Establishment is that it 
is in control. It is guiding the lives and destinies of the Amer¬ 
ican people. It wields enormous, immeasurable power. In 
common prudence, it should, therefore, be subject to careful 
and continuing public scrutiny. But it is characteristic of the 
Establishment that its control embraces the instruments of 
public scrutiny. It directs and instructs popular opinion. It 
decides what subjects shall be submitted to the x-ray of media 
examination, and what groups shall run the gauntlet of pub¬ 
lic challenge to their probity. Obviously, the Establishment is 
not eager to turn that kind of attention upon its own mem¬ 
bers. Public opinion, therefore, can but rarely hold the Es¬ 
tablishment in check. More usually, its corrective potencies 
are directed against people and ideas which threaten the 
Establishment. This characteristic of the Establishment, es¬ 
sential to its strength, creates a deficiency in public discourse. 
It pushes thought exclusively in the direction desired by 
Liberalism, a situation in which thought and liberty alike 
tend to become impoverished. 

While the existence of a Liberal community acting on 
common principles and generally in charge of things is not 
hard to discover, the notion of concerted action will un¬ 
doubtedly stir protests from those designated as members of 
it. And, barring access to memoirs, correspondence, and psy¬ 
chiatrists' notebooks, there is really no way of knowing why 
Liberals in private walks of life behave so much alike and so 
often say the same things in very much the same way. For the 
most part, however, the present volume seeks to avoid this 
difficulty by focusing on a department where there can be no 
doubt as to the concertedness of the performance—to wit, the 
federal government. While government authorities make up 
only a part of any Establishment worthy of the name, it is 
government policy which forms the cutting-edge of Establish¬ 
ment enterprise, and it is the ranking personnel of govern¬ 
ment, particularly those of the executive branch, who most 

Is There an Establishment? 


clearly act together in terms of an identifiable ideology. For 
both reasons, government becomes the zone of Establishment 
activity chiefly relevant to our inquiry. 

“The Liberal Establishment” thus somewhat overstates the 
case, since we are in fact concerned primarily with the sector 
of the Establishment which, in the most literal sense, is run¬ 
ning the government. It also tends to understate matters. 
The reader will find people and policies discussed herein 
meriting a description less complimentary than “Liberal.” It 
would be unfair to real Liberals, too kind to the more-than- 
Liberal specimens, to suggest a single label can describe them 
all. In bringing up such people our purpose should be fairly 
clear: To demonstrate the receptiveness of the Establishment 
to them and their ideas. The same Liberal community which 
cannot abide the presence of Michel Struelens or Otto 
Otepka is all too ready to forgive the exotic behavior of 
Owen Lattimore or Robert Oppenheimer; it will not allow 
Gen. Curtis LeMay to criticize Communism, but will repa¬ 
triate Lee Oswald. An orthodoxy is defined by its enthusi¬ 
asms and its aversions, by what it rejects and what it allows. 
And the more-than-Liberal subjects of this book are relevant 
precisely because the Establishment has nourished and ad¬ 
vanced them and protected them when they got in trouble. 

A further complication must be recorded before we begin 
our narrative. This is the fact that, being human, Liberals do 
not always agree among themselves, and are not consistent, 
even in their inconsistencies. While there is, generally, a 
“Liberal line” on most major issues, not all Liberals adhere 
to it at any given time, nor can the same Liberals be counted 
on in every case to take the orthodox position. The Times, 
CBS, Hubert Humphrey, and J. William Fulbright are all 
Liberal. In almost all instances, these authorities will tend to 
see great issues in the same way. But not all. In matters of 
racial integration, for example, Sen. Fulbright departs from 
the Liberal orthodoxy; in matters of internal security, Sen. 

The Liberal Establishment 


Humphrey departed from it in 1954 when he sponsored the 
Communist Control Bill; the Times will occasionally depart 
from it in some editorial commentary or another. Yet where 
one advocate will drop out, the Establishment generally is 
capable of picking up another, perhaps someone who had 
himself defected on a previous occasion. Thus it is misleading 
to expect all Liberals at all times to be agreed on everything. 
The Establishment functions by the law of large numbers; it 
is not always possible to predict, to a nicety, every individual 
who will partake of the Liberal consensus; but it is possible, 
in the overview, to predict that the consensus will be there 
and to suggest its general dimensions. 

These pages, finally, should be read with the understanding 
that the full implications of the Kennedy-Johnson years are 
not yet apparent. The whole of the performance is not en¬ 
tered in the ledger, and will be seen in its entirety only in the 
perspective of time. Increments of data are created every 
week. Each day's news dispatches bring forth information 
affecting all the subjects discussed here, and often imply new 
issues or new dimensions of old ones. 

This essay does not, therefore, pretend to be exhaustive. It 
does not tell all about everything which has been going on in 
Washington for the past four years. It is, by its nature, a 
museum of curiosities. Its purpose is not to suggest that every 
official in the present administration holds to all the peculiar 
theories spelled out herein—although it would be safe to 
guess there are more men of influence who agree with them 
than otherwise. Every political regime is mixed, but every 
regime also has a dominant tone and mood, a particular 
ideological angle that sets it off and makes it distinctive. The 
men and ideas discussed here set the tone for the present 
administration; the thrust of their doctrine is occasionally 
blunted, the nature of the resulting actions sometimes con¬ 
tradictory, but there is no one among them who publicly and 

Moment of Truth 


effectively engages in counter-advocacy, and few actions if 
any which tend in the opposite direction. The reader of these 
passages will, I believe, have a true idea of the direction in 
which our present rulers are taking the once-free society of 
the United States. 

2 . Moment of Truth 

For decades Liberalism has ruled the government and opin¬ 
ions of the United States with little or no effective challenge 
to its pretensions. Only in the last ten years or so has there 
been a sustained intellectual and political effort to upset Lib¬ 
eral dominance. And only in the last half of that span has the 
resistance movement achieved proportions sizable enough to 
make the Establishment look to its defenses. 

While some degree of opposition to Liberal notions on 
domestic and foreign policy is a constant factor in our poli¬ 
tics, Liberalism’s own shaping influence in the world of ideas 
has contained and limited realization of this fact. Through¬ 
out the 1940s and 1950s, the existence of a substantial body 
of dissenters, particularly dissenters with something respon¬ 
sible to say, was heroically ignored in Establishment litera¬ 
ture. It was simply assumed, contrary to fact, that everybody 
with any sense was a Liberal, and there was an end to it. This 

Moment of Truth 


attitude, though not particularly creditable, should occasion 
no surprise. It was a natural and inevitable outgrowth of 
Liberal rule, an essential feature of Establishment prosperity. 

An orthodoxy thrives, in the last analysis, through its abil¬ 
ity to command the imagination and passive allegiance of the 
people, a politic requirement even for a monarchy and a 
pressing necessity under our own popular form of rule. Es¬ 
tablishment influence in America rests on the fact that 
Liberalism has for so long monopolized the icons and 
portents which bring a favorable response from the elector¬ 
ate; it has managed to make its own assumptions and pet 
phrases part of the conditioned thought processes of the 
country at large. To keep things this way, it is understand¬ 
ably concerned to prevent competitive ideas and symbols 
from entering the marketplace. 

In the early phase of the resistance movement, “conserva¬ 
tive” ideas, as we have come generally to call them, were not 
much referred to in intellectual circles or in the communica¬ 
tions media. It was assumed that Liberal ideas were the only 
ideas, and that suggestions to the contrary were beneath the 
trouble of refutation, were even, in some versions of the Lib¬ 
eral argument, a form of avarice or dementia. This approach 
was used for a number of reasons. First, because many Lib¬ 
erals, accustomed only to the Liberal way of viewing things 
and particularly to the Liberal technique of attributing po¬ 
litical interests to economic motives, simply believed it to be 
accurate. Second, because many of these same Liberals, hav¬ 
ing had neither inclination nor opportunity to examine 
conservatism, had no idea of what the resistance movement 
was about, and were easily convinced of a theory which sup¬ 
ported their own opinions. And third, because it would have 
been a grievous tactical mistake to give a minority view the 
publicity necessarily resulting from wide-open argument in 
the media. 

A duke, after all, does not write the London Times answer- 

The Liberal Establishment 


ing the chance remarks of a match-girl; a president of the 
United States does not employ the immense resources of his 
office to answer and publicize the effusions of some hole-in- 
corner pamphleteer. Far better to ignore the existence of 
such people altogether, thereby insuring that most of the 
citizenry never learn of their existence. Thus it is not un¬ 
common to find accepted books on political life in America— 
books, for example, regularly used in our colleges and uni¬ 
versities—based on the assumption that Liberalism is the only 
respectable form of opinion, and that conservative dissent, 
being the product of unbalanced or underprivileged minds, 
is not worth serious examination. 

Despite this wall of silence, the resistance movement has 
grown. By i960 it had assumed such proportions that it could 
not be disposed of by the policy of the averted gaze. Notwith¬ 
standing the granitic hostility of the Establishment, conserva¬ 
tism was beginning to develop its own literature, intellectual 
spokesmen, and action programs. It was even beginning to 
achieve some political results—chiefly in the election of young 
congressmen educated in conservative principles. 

With this turn of events, Establishment policy necessarily 
changed. A president does not answer a pamphleteer—unless 
the pamphleteer is getting results. From ignoring conserva¬ 
tism, the Liberal community switched over to the expose. 
The resistance movement could no longer be shriveled by 
silence; it would therefore have to be annihilated with sound. 
In consequence, the past few years have seen a veritable flood 
of books, magazine and newspaper articles, speeches and 
public statements, radio and TV programs, denouncing what 
are variously described as “ultra-conservatives,” “extremists,” 
or “the radical right.” 

This attack has borrowed heavily from the old subdomi¬ 
nant conservatives-are-crazy theme rearranged to suit the 
needs of a more immediate and less academic problem. Its 
principal feature is the charge that American liberties are 

Moment of Truth 


threatened by extremists of the right whose scarlet sins in¬ 
clude seeing Communists under the bed, despising people 
who are in want, harassing fellow citizens who disagree with 
them, and wanting to get the United States into a war with 
the Soviet Union. The sheer volume of the attack has been 
amazing, demonstrating the immense power the Establish¬ 
ment can throw into the breach when the need arises. 

While there is not space here to review the vast ocean of 
newsprint and magazine space devoted in the past few years 
to the crusade against the right, a brief rundown of certain 
books on the subject will suggest the scope of the enterprise. 
These include Men of the Far Right by Richard Dudman, 
The New Conservatism—What Went Wrong? by Peter 
Viereck, The Far Right by Roger Burlingame, The Radical 
Right, Daniel Bell, ed., Inside the John Birch Society by 
Gene Grove, The Extremists by Mark Sherwin, The Strange 
Tactics of Extremism by Harry and Bonaro Overstreet, 
Danger on the Right by Arnold Forster and Benjamin 
Epstein, They'd Rather he Right by Edward Cain, Barry 
Goldwater, Extremist of the Right, by Fred J. Cook; etc. 

Each of these books seeks to alert the nation to the menace 
of a resurgent conservatism. None of them suggests there is 
any such thing as a problem on the left side of the political 
picture; nor during the corresponding period have there 
been any comparable books from the Establishment devoted 
to the possibility of “danger on the left.” The problem, the 
American people have been told, is exclusively a problem 
involving conservatives. Considering the fact that this argu¬ 
ment, together with immense collateral pressure of the daily 
press, the mass magazines, and the TV networks, is directed 
at an audience which has for 30 years been subjected al¬ 
most exclusively to Establishment opinion, it is astounding 
the conservative movement should have survived at all. The 
nation, often uninformed about the misdoings of the people 
running the country, has been minutely and unceasingly 

The Liberal Establishment 


filled in on every failing, real or imagined, of the minority 
which seeks to challenge Liberal power. Public opinion has 
been turned, not on the people who need restraining, but on 
the forces which try, however well or ineptly, to restrain 
them. The Establishment, in short, has been demonstrating 
that it is an Establishment. 

The central features of most of these books—and of the 
corresponding articles and TV programs—are the related 
assumptions, (a) that there is nothing very much amiss with 
the way Liberalism approaches things, (b) that the problems 
we do have are the result of external forces beyond our con¬ 
trol or else of the fact that we don't have enough Liberalism, 
and (c) that people who say otherwise are either primitives 
or charlatans. To support this thesis, the Establishment has 
resorted to the time-dishonored technique of the “amalgam," 
searching out the most bizarre and misguided examples of 
anti-Liberal dissent—of the sort never wanting on any side of 
a political question—and parading these endlessly before the 
public as examples of what “conservatism" is all about. With 
only perfunctory effort being made to distinguish between 
one heretic and the next, all opponents of the Liberal ortho¬ 
doxy are dumped into the pot and stirred to a boil. 

Through it all, no effort is made to grapple with the cen¬ 
tral problems which have troubled serious conservative 
spokesmen and evoked their separate responses. These prob¬ 
lems are, first, that the Liberal orthodoxy is fashioning a 
compulsory state which can jeopardize our liberties and has 
in fact already done so; second, that Liberal foreign policy 
has led America into an easily provable series of calamities 
which have aided the Communist global enterprise in ab¬ 
sorbing half the world; and third, that Liberal orthodoxy has 
in several instances been negligent in dealing with the initia¬ 
tives of the Soviet enemy in our midst, in the corporate per¬ 
son of the Communist Party and its underground cadres. 

To extensively documented charges that these things have 

Moment of Truth 


happened and are continuing to happen, the Establishment, 
with a few honorable exceptions, makes no answer. It reso¬ 
lutely ignores the question of what kind of society we will 
have when it has finished constructing its vast network of 
controls. It offers no suggestion as to what ultimately will 
happen to America and the free world if we continue to yield 
to the demands of the Communist empire. It dismisses as 
irrelevant all demonstrations that the Communist apparat in¬ 
side the United States continues to function and to achieve 
measurable results favorable to the ambitions of our enemy. 
To all such arguments—again noting the exceptions—Liberal¬ 
ism's characteristic answer is to attack its critics as extremists 
who must be silenced. There are no real problems, the Estab¬ 
lishment appears to be saying, in its own performance, or 
even in the performance of the Communists. All problems 
which are not mandated by the nature of things are created 
by '‘extremists of the right." 

On this point various Liberal spokesmen have become so 
aroused as to demand action above and beyond the continu¬ 
ing potencies of the eternal public denunciation; they want 
the government to take steps, within its own ranks and to¬ 
ward the citizenry at large, to silence conservatives—a kind of 
action which, interestingly enough, they usually do not want 
to see taken toward Communists. The discrepancy is easily 
explained, however, since the Establishment has apparently 
convinced itself that conservatives are more dangerous than 
Communists—a species of madness which has led to the 
most disastrous consequences imaginable. 

In 1961, labor leaders Walter and Victor Reuther ap¬ 
proached the Kennedy administration with a full-scale pro¬ 
gram, replete with suggestions for Federal compulsion, to 
crack down on conservatives. The reasons behind these de¬ 
mands are most revealing. “The radical right," said Victor 
Reuther in a memorandum to Attorney General Robert 
Kennedy, “poses a far greater danger to the success of this 

The Liberal Establishment 


country in its battle against international Communism than 
does the domestic Communist movement . . . which has no 
capacity today to endanger our national security or defeat 
our national policies.” 1 

A similar warning had issued, not long before this, from 
the pen of Senator J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), chairman 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “Fundamen¬ 
tally,” said Fulbright in his own famous memorandum, “it is 
believed that the American people have little, if any, need to 
be alerted to the menace of the Cold War. Indeed, in the 
long run, it is quite possible that the principal problem of 
leadership will be, if it is not already, to restrain the desire of 
the people to hit the Communists with everything we’ve got, 
particularly if there are any more Cubas and Laos \sic ].” 2 

These exhortations had the desired effect. From 1961 for¬ 
ward, the speeches of governmental functionaries, the air¬ 
waves of radio and TV, and the headlines of the daily press 
were crammed with warnings about “the radical right”—set 
against a soothing counterpoint of assurances about the essen¬ 
tial tameness of domestic Bolshevism. 

Given this view of things, it was understandable that, when 
John Kennedy set out on a political tour in November 1963, 
infinite precautions were taken to protect him from the over¬ 
tures of “the radical right,” but not “the radical left.” In 
Dallas, Texas, federal agencies took careful measures to ascer¬ 
tain the whereabouts of right-wing agitators to forestall the 
possibility of violence. The Warren Commission report tells 
us potential trouble-makers were looked for among right¬ 
wingers who had demonstrated in Dallas a month earlier 
against Adlai Stevenson, and that federal agents armed them¬ 
selves with photographs of these people. 3 They did not take 
similar steps regarding left-wing agitators, because there 
transparently could be no danger where, in the classic for¬ 
mula, there could be no enemies. Thus no hand extended to 
disturb the brooding figure who waited among the shadows 

Moment of Truth 


on the sixth floor of the Texas Schoolbook Depository 
athwart the President's parade route. 

At 12:30 p.m., November 22, 1963, an assassin's bullet cut 
through the smiling ambiance of a Dallas motorcade and 
struck John Kennedy dead. The world paused in horrified 
disbelief. Inside of two hours, police had arrested the man 
they believed to be the murderer—a balding, defiant ex- 
Marine and sometime drifter named Lee Harvey Oswald. 
And although many commentators rushed to impute the 
crime either directly or indirectly to “the radical right" 
—that endlessly certified source of all distress—it somehow 
developed Oswald was not of the right at all. He was of the 
left. More. He was himself a critic of the right, one of those 
who had declaimed about “hate," 4 in chorus with the massed 
voices which said there could be no such as Lee Harvey 
Oswald and that if only we laid our whips to Robert Welch 
and Billy James Hargis the world would be an agreeable 

Memory does not recall an episode of equal scope in which 
men whose task it was to discern the shape of things had been 
so stunningly wrong. The moralizers of government, press 
and pulpit had exorcised a spirit of little substance and ig¬ 
nored the demon familiar at their elbow. They had fixed the 
nation's gaze upon an illusory danger on its right, and ig¬ 
nored an all too corporeal danger on its left. The Oswalds of 
the world, they had said, were not menacing, but those who 
criticized the Oswalds were menacing. They had supported 
everything which made Oswald possible, and attacked every¬ 
thing which would have made him impossible. Now they 
stood bankrupt among their prophecies, every assurance they 
had uttered wrong, every warning a miracle of irrelevance. 

“The Commission has found no evidence that the extreme 
views expressed toward President Kennedy by some right- 
wing groups centered in Dallas or any other general atmo¬ 
sphere of hate or rightwing extremism which may have ex- 

The Liberal Establishment 


isted in the city of Dallas had any connection with Oswald’s 
actions on November 22, 1963.” 5 Thus reads the report of 
the Warren Commission on the Kennedy murder. The re¬ 
port also tells us that among the factors which contributed to 
Oswald’s act were: “His avowed commitment to Marxism 
and Communism, as he understood the terms and developed 
his own interpretation of them; this was expressed by his 
antagonism toward the United States, by his defection to the 
Soviet Union, by his failure to be reconciled with life in the 
United States even after his disenchantment with the Soviet 
Union, and by his efforts, though frustrated, to go to Cuba.” 6 

It would seem likely, of course, that such conclusions 
would have occurred even to the most pedestrian intelligence 
once it was ascertained that Oswald, a Marxist, a defector to 
Moscow, and a devotee of Fidel Castro, was in fact the 
culprit. Yet here was the incredible thing: In the long weeks 
and months following the assassination, no such conclusion 
emerged from public discourse on the subject. On the con¬ 
trary, previous fantasies about “the danger on the right” were 
elaborated with even greater plangency and more fanatic 
thoroughness than before. In the very teeth of the evidence 
that the crime had been committed by one of their own, the 
forces of the left unleashed a vengeful attack in which guilt 
for the tragedy was to be pinned upon conservatives. In what 
appeared to be a siege of mass delusion, politicians, journal¬ 
ists, and even clergymen set about to sell the nation the 

1. That Liberals who said Communism is not dangerous 
but simply an exercise in “dissent,” who failed to alert the 
nation to the nature of the group of which the assassin was a 
member, whose theories of “tolerance” led to the assassin’s 
repatriation, who applauded the Supreme Court when it 
negated anti-Communist statutes passed by Congress, and 
who said those who talk about domestic Communism are 
hysterical—those who took this course were next, in any way, 

Moment of Truth 


shape or form, responsible for the actions of a Marxist 
defector to Russia and member of a pro-Communist group 
who murders the President of the United States. 

2. That conservatives who said Communism is dangerous, 
who attempted to alert the nation to the nature of the group 
in which the assassin was a member, who object to free and 
easy treatment of defectors to Communism, who opposed the 
Supreme Court’s attack on anti-Communist statutes, and who 
said the baleful energies of domestic Communism cannot be 
written off—those who took this course were responsible for 
the actions of a Marxist defector to Russia and member of a 
pro-Communist group who murders the President of the 
United States.* 

Small errors are not difficult to own. Enormous ones, par¬ 
ticularly for men caught in the imprisoning grip of ideology, 
sometimes cannot be acknowledged at all. The preceptors of 
the nation had been caught dead to rights in the most im¬ 
mense and tragic blunder of our era. They paused, baffled, 

* One Liberal spokesman did dissent from the bizarre syllogism. Dwight 
MacDonald, a free-wheeling leftist who abhors all orthodoxies including 
those of the left, took exception to a variation on the Establishment version 
of the tragedy appearing in the New Republic. A columnist identified as 
“T.R.B.” (Richard L. Strout of the Christian Science Monitor) had written 
in that journal that conservative radio and TV shows were “the kind of 
programs . . . that the brooding Oswalds of the left or right wing listen to 
and sometimes act on.” This attempt to flush Oswald’s specifically left-wing 
and anti-right wing allegiances down the memory hole was too much for 
MacDonald. “The awkward thing for Liberals about Oswald,” he wrote, “was 
that he was a crackpot leftist—it now appears that he did take an unsuccess¬ 
ful shot at General Walker . . . 

“There may be ‘brooding Oswalds’ on the right, but so far they have not 
taken action, which, as an old-fashioned believer in the Bill of Rights, I 
think is the important thing. The only Oswald we have had was on the 
left, and I think there’s enough to criticize in the broadcasting activities 
of Messrs. Hunt, Hargis, et al., without smearing them with the Dallas 
horror. That’s what we Trotskyists in the Thirties used to call ‘an amalgam,’ 
and a dirty word it was. I agree it was a great pity the assassin turned out 
to be not a lunatic Birchite, as we all assumed in that first hour of shock, 
but a lunatic ‘Marxist.’ But such was the fact. Oswald is our baby, not theirs.” 

Needless to say, MacDonald’s witness to the elementary facts of the case was 
a lonely one. The rest of the Establishment pushed forward with the satisfy¬ 
ing work of pinning the assassination on “the radical right.” 

The Liberal Establishment 


faintly sensible that something was amiss; and then the night 
closed over them once more as they fled onward. There was, 
given their mental state, no alternative. To acknowledge the 
implications of Oswald would have meant recanting, not a 
single and therefore retrievable mistake but an entire mind¬ 
set and vocabulary and store of passion; unraveling, not a 
single error, but every strand of ideology which supported 
and sustained them in their address to the happenings and 
the portents of their time. There was nothing for it but to 
press forward. Thus it was that the shock and anguish of John 
Kennedy’s death became something, if that were possible, 
still worse; not merely something stark and tragic, but some¬ 
thing obscene and formless and chilling to the touch. 

It was, in a way, the Establishment’s greatest victory. 
Numbed respect is due those who, in a moment of supreme 
crisis when their world is tumbling about them, can set to 
work with such zeal to snatch reality inside-out. The mind 
capable of blaming Oswald on “the radical right” could have 
with equal facility indicted Laocoon for the fall of Troy, 
Cicero for the treason of Catiline, or Churchill for the dis¬ 
aster of Munich. The nation capable of believing that mind 
is doomed. 

Never before had America been called upon so blatantly to 
translate grief at a President’s death into partisan energy; 
but, then, never had tastelessness and cormorant zeal been so 
perfectly mated in the citadels of orthodoxy. Liberalism had 
been called upon to review its preconceptions by the rude 
light of fact, to unite the wounded nation in its hour of pain. 
It was no contest. Prejudice triumphed over proof; the nation 
was dismissed in the rush for advantage; the heart yielded 
not compassion but a nameless horror. 

3 . Operation Goldwater 

While governmental performance will concern us most in 
the succeeding chapters, the power of the communications 
media—their ability to give the proper “cues” and to achieve 
a unified presentation for the Liberal program—can hardly 
be ignored. Liberals in government and in the media work 
closely together, and it would be difficult to say which of the 
two is more important. While we can give only passing atten¬ 
tion to this fact throughout the bulk of our narrative, it 
would be misleading if we did not in some measure show how 
crucial the communications media are to the success of the 

That the media are by and large Liberal is readily demon¬ 
strated. Each of the three television networks is heavily 
staffed with Liberals. CBS, during the 1964 campaign year, 
offered the nation such commentators as Eric Sevareid, who 

The Liberal Establishment 


writes for the Liberal Reporter, Martin Agronsky (an 
ADAer), Theodore White (former magnifier of the Chinese 
Communists), and other easily identifiable Liberals. NBC 
supplied Chet Huntley and Sander Vanocur, neither of 
whom bothers very much about concealing his Liberal in¬ 
clinations. ABC provided such luminaries as Edward P. 
Morgan, paid broadcaster of the AFL-CIO, and Howard K. 
Smith, whose idea of journalistic enterprise is to interview 
Alger Hiss on the failings of Richard Nixon. In addition, the 
networks frequently call on such Establishment favorites as 
Louis Harris, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Liberal Republi¬ 
can Meade Alcorn for “expert” commentary on political 

In the mass magazine field, two publications are generally 
considered “conservative”—the Reader's Digest and US. 
News and World Report. Both, however, feature heavy 
factual and/or non-political content, so that their conserva¬ 
tism usually consists in giving both sides a fairly even break. 
Other mass magazines for general readership tend toward 
Liberalism. Two of the most aggressively Liberal are News¬ 
week and the Saturday Evening Post . Look magazine is con¬ 
sciously and unremittingly Liberal. The Luce publications, 
Time and Life, sometimes depart from Establishment doc¬ 
trine but can be usually counted on when the chips are down. 

Among daily newspapers of national repute, two—the Chi¬ 
cago Tribune and The Wall Street Journal—are conservative. 
Almost every other paper mentioned in the usual lists of 
“good” papers is Liberal: The New York Times, Washington 
Post, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Christian Science Monitor, 
Baltimore Sun, San Francisco Chronicle, Atlanta Constitu¬ 
tion, Louisville Courier-Journal, Milwaukee Journal. There 
are papers influential in their own circulation areas which 
feature conservative editorial pages, and so offer a counter¬ 
vailing local influence against the Establishment. Almost all, 
however, are dependent for national news^ coverage on the 

Operation Goldwater 


wire services, which try hard to be fair, but are often influ¬ 
enced toward the Establishment line. 

Liberal dominance in the daily and weekly media is pro¬ 
nounced. But even this is not the entire story. Backing up 
these front-line forces in the battle for public opinion are still 
other channels of Establishment influence: 1 Oi^Uolo 

First, the academy, whence most of the opinion-moulders 
have sprung. By every assessment, college faculties are over¬ 
whelmingly Liberal, and are not reluctant to get behind Lib¬ 
eral causes in the political arena. 

Second, the upper-brow magazines, principally Harper's, 
The Atlantic, The Saturday Review, and The New Yorker— 
ultra-Liberal all. 

Third, the book publishing industry, which readily makes 
the products of Liberal thought available to the nation, but 
is sometimes bashful about bringing forth the meditations of 

Fourth, a sizable segment of the clergy, as represented in 
the National Council of the Churches of Christ in America, 
who have taken to unabashed politicking in many instances 
and who work a powerful influence in behalf of Liberalism 
even when they are not explicitly political. 

And fifth, the motion-picture industry and some television 
“drama,” which, through sympathetic treatment of Liberal 
themes, can sell the Liberal point of view while entertaining. 
On the Beach, Seven Days in May, Fail-Safe, and Dr. Strange - 
love have, for example, probably done more to disseminate 
nuclear pacifism and fear of our own military—two principal 
themes of the Establishment—than have all the speeches and 
pamphlets of the Sane Nuclear Policy Committee put to¬ 
gether. TV shows like “The Defenders,” “East Side-West 
Side,” discussion programs and the showcasing of such people 
as Gore Vidal, James Baldwin, John Henry Faulk, David 
Susskind, Steve Allen, etc., also do their bit. 

With this kind of field position in the opinion-moulding 

The Liberal Establishment 


sectors of our society, Liberalism is able to exert constant and 
ubiquitous pressure on the public to accept its version of 
events. This has happened repeatedly in matters of foreign 
policy. In China, Cuba, Laos, the Congo, and Viet Nam, the 
Liberal media sold the American people a false bill of goods 
concerning the “agrarian reformer” goals of such as Mao Tse- 
tung and Castro, and the alleged evils of Chiang Kai-shek, 
Prince Boun Oum, President Diem, and Premier Tshombe. 
These are matters, however, outside our present subject. Let 
us, therefore, select a domestic example, a category in which 
we could hardly do better than the 1964 presidential cam¬ 
paign between Barry Goldwater and Lyndon Johnson. 

The attack against Goldwater was two-fold. In its affirma¬ 
tive phase, it consisted of building up his most likely 
opposition. In its negative phase, it consisted of relentless 
hammering at Goldwater’s vulnerabilities. In both catego¬ 
ries the Establishment effort was formidable, unremitting, 
and—at last—successful. 

The build-up for Republican candidates other than Gold- 
water originally centered in Nelson Rockefeller. After Nix¬ 
on’s defeat in i960, it became an automatic assumption 
among many political commentators that Rockefeller was the 
“front-runner” for the 1964 GOP nomination. This despite 
the fact that Republican delegates to the i960 convention 
had shown no enthusiasm for Rockefeller, and the fact that 
Goldwater was better known and better liked at the grass 
roots of the party than was the New York governor. As late as 
September, 1963, The New York Times managed to wax 
effusive over a Rockefeller visit to Northwest Illinois, pro¬ 
claiming “Goldwater Area Likes Rockefeller: Reception 
Warm in Illinois Bastion of Conservatism,” and declaring the 
visit a “triumph” for Rockefeller and his wife. 1 In point of 
fact, as the local newspapers made clear, Rockefeller was boy¬ 
cotted by GOP leaders, received with ordinary civility by his 
audience, and spent most of his time talking conservatism 

Operation Goldwater ► 37 

and praising Goldwater. (In the Illinois Republican primary 
the following spring, won by Goldwater, Rockefeller got 
fewer write-in votes than did George Wallace.) 

Rockefeller was installed as “front-runner” by media say- 
so. This is a characteristic Establishment tactic—the self- 
fulfilling prophecy. By saying Rockefeller would be the 
nominee, the media convinced even Republican pros who 
didn’t like him that he would be the nominee. Thus, polls 
taken in May 1963 revealed a majority of Republican officials 
wanted Goldwater in ’64, but thought Rockefeller would get 
the nod.* 

The Goldwater movement, however, was real and growing, 
and the policy of the averted gaze became partially obsolete. 
Full-scale blitzkrieg was needed. The first occasion for this 
sort of attack presented itself when a Goldwater backer, 
Donald E. “Buz” Lukens, was elected chairman of the 600,- 
000 member Young Republican National Federation. The 
victory was portrayed in much of the Liberal press as a “take¬ 
over” of the YRs by “extremists.” Lavish attention was paid 
to statements by outgoing YR chairman Leonard Nadasdy, 
allied with the Rockefeller forces, and Rockefeller himself, to 
the effect that the Goldwater backers used “extremist” tac¬ 
tics. The fact of the matter, apparent to anyone on the 
scene, was that the truly scandalous tactics, including such 
maneuvers as switching off microphones where conservatives 
were trying to speak, were employed by Nadasdy and his 
Liberal GOP allies. 2 

The first all-out assault on Goldwater himself came with 
the murder of President Kennedy. As noted, the killing was 
made the pretext for disparagement of conservatives gen¬ 
erally and Goldwater in particular. The common theme was 
that because Kennedy’s murder was somehow traceable to the 

• See “Listening Post: A Head for Rockefeller But a Heart for Gold- 
water, M Newsweek, May 20, 1963; “Who’ll Run Against Kennedy In ’64,” 
U.S. News & World Report, May 20, 1963. 

The Liberal Establishment 


"radical right,” popular revulsion would destroy Goldwater’s 
presidential chances. "Goldwater’s house of cards,” as one 
observer quoted in the Wall Street Journal put it, "has 
tumbled.” No effort was made to commensurate this talk 
with the known facts of the assassination. 

With Goldwater and conservatism thus hopefully disposed 
of, the Establishment began to bring on its new contender for 
the Republican nomination, Pennsylvania Governor Wil¬ 
liam Scranton. Although Scranton’s experience in elective 
office was small (one term in Congress, two years as gover¬ 
nor), and although he was virtually unknown outside his 
own state, he suddenly began to appear with amazing regu¬ 
larity in the national magazines. The Scranton visage ap¬ 
peared (January 27, 1964) on the cover of Newsweek; the 
Saturday Evening Post obliged (January 18, 1964) with a 
flattering profile and mash note from Stewart Alsop; Fortune 
(February, 1964) supplied a character study depicting Scran¬ 
ton as the Galahad of Pennsylvania politics; Life (February 
28) offered a flattering puff-piece by Theodore White; 
national columnists Robert Novak and Rowland Evans, 
among others, raised a threnody about a routine Scranton 
appearance in the state of Indiana; Life did still another 
cover story, plus eight pages of pictures and text (June 26); 
Newsweek still another cover story (June 22); etc. The self- 
fulfilling prophecy was hard at work. 

Between the time of Kennedy’s assassination and the Cali¬ 
fornia primary—a stretch of almost seven months—Establish¬ 
ment magazines did numerous cover stories not only on 
Scranton, but on Rockefeller and Henry Cabot Lodge, de¬ 
pending on which of these appeared to be the leading Liberal 
contender. During this same period, they did not do a cover 
story on Goldwater * even though he led in committed dele- 

* The single exception: A wrap-up on the New Hampshire primary in 
Newsweek for March 9, 1964, splitting the cover between Goldwater and 

Operation Goldwater 


gates at every step of the way, accumulated more primary 
votes than any of his opponents, and was by early spring the 
odds-on choice as eventual Republican nominee . It was not 
until after the last Republican primary, when popular senti¬ 
ment was no longer a major factor in the nomination, that 
the magazines yielded him the publicity resulting from a 
cover story. 

Meanwhile, the Liberal media systematically downgraded 
Goldwater’s showing in the primaries. On the night of Gold- 
water’s victory in Illinois, a basset-eyed Walter Cronkite in¬ 
formed his viewers that Goldwater’s vote was “disappoint¬ 
ing”—amounting to “only” 65 per cent of the ballots. In the 
Chicago Daily News, reporter Charles Cleveland began his 
story: “Illinois voters buried Barry.” 3 On May 4, Newsweek 
complained that “despite Goldwater’s slippage at the ballot 
box and in the popularity polls,” he was garnering delegates. 
On May 18, the magazine said “the week brought fresh evi¬ 
dence of Goldwater’s unpopularity among voters,” citing a 
poll by Louis Harris and the Indiana primary. In Indiana, 
Newsweek asserted, “Goldwater managed to make even 
Harold Stassen look good. Standing in for the other contend¬ 
ers as Goldwater’s only opposition in the Indiana primary, 
Stassen piled up 39 per cent of the vote . . .” (This state¬ 
ment was flatly untrue; Stassen secured only 26 per cent of 
the Indiana vote.) Even in the wake of the California primary. 
Time alluded to the “fact” that “while others were getting 
the primary votes, Goldwater was getting the delegates . . .” 4 
(All italics added.) 

All of this would suggest that, at a minimum, Goldwater 
had secured fewer primary votes than one or another of his 
opponents. Yet the fact of the matter was that in the 1964 
primaries, Goldwater received a total popular vote of 2,147,- 
993, or 47.7 per cent of all GOP ballots cast. His closest 
competitor, Rockefeller, received 1,262,539, or 28 per cent. 
From there the list dwindled down through Henry Cabot 

The Liberal Establishment 


Lodge (7.6 per cent) and Senator Margaret Chase Smith 
(5.1 per cent), to Scranton, who amassed a grand total of 
229,528 votes (almost all of these in Pennsylvania), for 5.1 
per cent of the total. 5 

In other words, Goldwater had received almost ten times 
the popular vote garnered by his ultimate GOP opponent, 
Scranton. This hardly supported Scranton enthusiast Time 9 s 
bland assertion that “others were getting the primary votes ” 
while Goldwater by some perverse magic was getting the 
delegates. Goldwater’s backers noted that he had outstripped 
John Kennedy’s record in i960—a record depicted as a 
triumphal march by the same commentators who discounted 
Goldwater. Both men were entered in ten primaries, Gold- 
water drawing the 2 million-plus votes mentioned above, 
Kennedy some 1,775,250. In the seven states where both were 
entered, Goldwater polled 100,000 more votes than did Ken¬ 

The browbeating of Goldwater on the subject of general 
popularity and primary funk was nothing, however, com¬ 
pared to the drubbing he received for his stands on public 
issues. During the New Hampshire primary, for example, the 
Concord Monitor proclaimed in a banner headline that 
Goldwater favored repeal of Social Security, 6 a flatly untrue 
assertion. Goldwater had suggested allowing people who had 
made their own provision to contract out of the system, and 
permitting those who had religious scruples against it (such 
as the Amish farmers in whose behalf Goldwater had intro¬ 
duced a bill in Congress) to refrain from participation. Nor 
would his approach, as claimed by the opposition, “bank¬ 
rupt” the program. That job, as is pointed out in a later 
chapter, is already being handled by the Liberal regime in 
Washington. Nevertheless, Goldwater’s GOP opponents— 
principally Nelson Rockefeller—took hold of the issue and 
would not let go. Liberals in the media referred to it as 
though it were axiomatic that Goldwater wpuld destroy So¬ 
cial Security. ABC’s Howard K. Smith said blandly in one 

Operation Goldwater 


news broadcast, for example, that Goldwater's voluntary 
stance would ‘"abolish” Social Security. 

Also in New Hampshire, Goldwater raised the question of 
the accuracy of America's intercontinental ballistic missiles. 
Newsweek (January 20, 1964) “covered” this as follows: 

Pentagon officials were stunned and angry. They refuted Gold- 
water on the facts; they rated ICBM’s 70 per cent effective and 
claimed to have long since remedied a potential flaw cited by 
Goldwater—the possibility that a high altitude nuclear explosion 
would misguide a missile by erasing its electronic memory. More 
seriously still, Goldwater had called into question the very 
credibility on which the U.S. rests its strategy of peace through 
deterrence . . . 7 (Italics added.) 

The italicized portions, obviously, are not “news,” but edi¬ 
torial comment, and comment prejudiced against Goldwater. 

Shortly before the California primary, Goldwater said in a 
TV interview with Smith that tactical nuclear weapons might 
be used to defoliate jungle trails in Asia, but that he did not 
think they would be. This was given a ride in much of the 
press as Goldwater’s advocacy of such action—witness the 
headline given the story by the San Francisco Examiner: 
“Barry’s Plan to Use A-Bomb .” The same issue of that paper 
carried on its front page a column by Roscoe Drummond, 
stating Drummond's opinion that President Eisenhower had 
repudiated Goldwater. This column was headlined: “Ike 
Backs Off Barry.” 8 During this same period, segments of the 
press—notably Jack Steele of the Scripps-Howard newspapers 
—played up a Rockefeller lament that he had been subjected 
to innumerable bomb threats, suggesting “extremist” Gold- 
water backers were willing to commit violence to defeat the 
New Yorker. In a news story on this charge, Steele asserted 
that he had never seen anything as shocking in all his years of 
journalism. 9 

All of these attacks were dovetailed into the argument that 

The Liberal Establishment 


Goldwater was an “extremist” estranged from the “main¬ 
stream” of the party—the principal theme of his Liberal GOP 
opponents. Yet the statistics showed Goldwater’s conserva¬ 
tism was immeasurably nearer the consensus of the GOP than 
the Liberalism of Rockefeller or Scranton. At the end of the 
88th Congress, there were no less than 16 GOP senators with 
70-100 per cent ratings from the conservative group, Ameri¬ 
cans for Constitutional Action. At the same time, 142 of 178 
Republicans in the House had cumulative ACA ratings be¬ 
tween 70 and 100 per cent. Rockefeller ally Jacob Javits 
could claim only a 22 per cent rating—an abyss of “modera¬ 
tion” approached only by Senators Clifford Case of New 
Jersey and John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky. Goldwater’s 
rating was 98 per cent. 

As one of their chief pre-convention issues, Scranton 
people said Goldwater would drag other Republicans down 
to defeat. In November, after the elements of disaster had 
been assembled and fused, this proved all too accurate. But in 
June and July, according to the opinions of the local candi¬ 
dates themselves, it was not. Various organizations, including 
the New York Herald-Tribune, the research organization 
Congressional Quarterly, and the Capitol Hill Newspaper 
Roll Call, conducted polls among GOP nominees on the 
effect of a Goldwater candidacy, as they then foresaw it. In 
each case, by sizable majorities ranging up to two-to-one, the 
respondents said Goldwater would help them in their races . 
These answers were given only perfunctory attention in the 
national press. 

The best proof Scranton backers could muster to the con¬ 
trary was the assertion of a group calling itself “The Ripon 
Society,” consisting of ten or so academicians at Tufts, 
Harvard, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a 
paper organization without offices or a telephone. Its Direc¬ 
tor, John Saloma, had been a staffer for the. Rockefeller- 
financed magazine Advance, now defunct. In every respect, 

Operation Goldwater 


“The Ripon Society” was disqualified as a source of impartial 
information. Nevertheless, when this group said “carefully 
detailed study” revealed Goldwater would lose 49 of the 50 
states and cause the loss of five Senate and 47 House seats, its 
propaganda was given wide and respectful coverage. In a 
story for The New York Times, Earl Mazo discussed this 
handout as though it were some kind of major campaign 
breakthrough. Undisclosed by Mazo were the shadowy nature 
of the group and its ties to the Rockefeller-Scranton wing of 
the GOP. The Mazo story was picked up by papers around 
the country using The New York Times wire service. “Ari¬ 
zonan Sure Loser, GOPs Told,” read the front-page headline 
in the Atlanta Constitution . “GOP Memo Sees Disaster in 
Goldwater,” proclaimed the Nashville Tennessean in a three- 
column page-one head. “GOP Group Says Barry Might Lose 
49 States,” asserted another headline in the San Jose (Calif.) 
Mercury, under the eloquent kicker—“Slaughter.” 10 Thus 
was blatant anti-Goldwater propaganda served up to thou¬ 
sands of American voters as “news,” even as the real news on 
the same subject, but of an opposite tendency, was quietly 
played down.* 

At times the Establishment attempted a double-reverse, 
suggesting not only that Goldwater was an “extremist,” but 
that in those instances where he appeared not to be an ex¬ 
tremist he was “changing” and therefore not to be trusted. 
This point was argued by Kenneth Crawford in Newsweek 
early in the proceedings (August 19, 1963) and was given the 
full treatment in the press generally after Goldwater staged 
his August 1964 “unity” meeting with Eisenhower, Nixon, 

* Similar page-one heads appeared in other newspapers: “GOP Moderates 
Say Barry Nomination Would Be Fatal” (Seattle Post-Intelligencer); “Fear 
Loss of 49 States—Secret GOP Memo Sees Barry Defeat” (The Boston Herald; 
the memo incidentally, was hardly “secret”; it was released openly to the 
press and was obviously concocted for that very purpose). “Because Of Gold- 
water—GOP Fears Vote ‘Slaughter’ ” (Decatur, Ill., Herald); “Goldwater 
Called Disaster To GOP” (Allentown, Penna., Morning Call); “Goldwater 
Would Lose All: Ripon” (Utica, N. Y. Daily Press). 

The Liberal Establishment 


Scranton and other top Republicans at Hershey, Pennsyl¬ 
vania. At that meeting, Goldwater issued a statement saying 
he was not in favor of abolishing the UN, did not want war, 
and that he favored the Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy of 
'‘peace through strength.” The Liberal media were delirious 
at the spectacle of the “new Goldwater.” Consider the follow¬ 
ing “news” story by William McGaffin in the Chicago Daily 

The moderate views [Goldwater] expressed at a “unity” confer¬ 
ence of the Republican high command did not sound at all like 
the apostle of the conservative gospel who looked with disdain on 
all but true believers. 

It was a totally unexpected move to a new middle-of-the-road 
position and it won the all-out support of former President 
Eisenhower . . . 

But the Republican presidential candidate’s move was so out of 
character, it may have given him a new problem—one of credi¬ 
bility. Ironically, some of the same Republican critics who have 
been urging him to mend his views appeared to question, now 
that he had done so, whether they could actually believe him. 
They also asked themselves whether the sudden convert could be 
counted on to stick faithfully to the new doctrine. 11 

All of this, even if true, is in the nature of editorial com¬ 
mentary, and therefore clearly constitutes bias when it ap¬ 
pears is the news columns. But it was not true. There was 
nothing in the statement which Goldwater had not been say¬ 
ing ever since he had declared his candidacy. In New Hamp¬ 
shire, in Illinois, in Indiana, in California, he had made all of 
the same points; he had even published them in a handbook 
of his views on major questions. Yet now the repetition of 
them at Hershey, in a forum where they could not be ig¬ 
nored, was proclaimed as an alteration in his opinions. 

Perhaps the most awesome power of the national media—a 
power usually neglected in squabbles over “misquotation” 

Operation Goldwater 


—is the power to define the issues . While television and the 
magazines and the press cannot manufacture public opinion, 
they can in large part decide what public opinion will be 
about. They can zero in on certain matters to the exclusion of 
others, raise and reiterate certain questions, demand certain 
answers from one candidate while not demanding like an¬ 
swers from his opponent. This kind of influence was used 
repeatedly in the 1964 election. 

Senator Goldwater and Representative Miller, for ex¬ 
ample, were often challenged to “disavow” the Ku Klux 
Klan and the John Birch Society. Lyndon Johnson, on the 
other hand, was not challenged by the media to disavow 
Americans for Democratic Action or the Socialist Party or the 
tacit support given him by the Communists. On the eve of 
the California primary Howard K. Smith, discussing the in¬ 
fluence of the John Birch Society in that state, off-handedly 
described Goldwater as “their man.” What would have been 
the outcry if a newscaster, discussing Communist interest in 
the election, had casually referred to Lyndon Johnson as 
f( their man”? As it happened, of course, the Liberal media 
did not even discuss the Communists’ position in the election, 
much less pin them to Johnson. Similarly with Norman 
Thomas and his fellow Socialists. While Thomas campaigned 
for the Johnson-Humphrey ticket, no Liberal newsman 
called on these worthies to disavow his support. In short, the 
media effectively defined the scope of the extremist issue by 
limiting it to people backing Goldwater, and therefore de¬ 
fined it completely in Johnson’s favor. 

Another instance of the media’s power to define the issues 
occurred at Goldwater’s mid-August press conference in 
Hershey, Pennsylvania, where he raised the question of what 
weapons had been authorized in the Gulf of Tonkin episode 
in Viet Nam. The wording of the administration’s statement 
ordering U.S. counterattacks, he suggested, could be inter¬ 
preted to include the use of nuclear weapons. In this he was 

The Liberal Establishment 


quite correct. Secretary McNamara’s statement on the matter 
had said American personnel in the area were authorized to 
respond to attack with “whatever force is necessary’’ 12 —a loose 
phrase which, on its face, would include use of nuclear weap¬ 
ons. Having raised the point, however, Goldwater was con¬ 
fronted by a famous TV newsman demanding to know 
whether Goldwater was charging that nuclear weapons had 
been ordered. No, Goldwater explained, he was saying the 
wording used by the Johnson administration could be so 
construed. A furore then developed over what Goldwater 
had meant when he brought the matter up. 

The relevant point is the newsman’s driving need to dis¬ 
cover just what Goldwater meant . No such desire had been 
manifest in the case of McNamara’s original statement. No 
belligerent demands were made upon the Johnson regime to 
explain what it meant and to spell out just what had or had 
not been authorized. In the view of the Liberal media, it 
was apparently legitimate for those actually disposing of 
American lives and fortunes in a far-off corner of the globe to 
be as vague as it suited them about the kind of weapons 
employed. But it was not legitimate—indeed, it was out¬ 
rageous—for a man not in power, not disposing of those for¬ 
tunes, to bring up the subject . Having done so, he must sus¬ 
tain exhaustive cross-examination on every nuance of his 
speech and every modulation of his thought. 

The result of both episodes was to divert attention from 
Johnson’s actions to Goldwater’s words . It was, in short, to 
place the burden of explanation and clarification entirely on 
Goldwater, and to keep him on the defensive. 

A final instance of press ability to focus opinion and mag¬ 
nify certain issues to the exclusion of others appears in the 
play given various stories in Liberal papers. When New York 
Republicans Kenneth Keating and Jacob Javits refused to 
su pp°rt Goldwater, the Washington Post bannered that fact 
across a full eight columns at the top of its front page. When 

Operation Goldwater 


Democrat Strom Thurmond not only repudiated Lyndon 
Johnson but endorsed Goldwater and changed parties—a far 
more open and revolutionary step than the actions of Javits 
and Keating—that story was told in a modest secondary story 
under a two-column head. 

With the campaign under way in earnest, outright attacks 
dressed up as "news" began to fly thicker than ever. On the 
evening of September 23, the ABC "news" team "covered" 
Johnson through the usual technique of showing a film clip 
of an LBJ speech attacking Goldwater. It "covered" a Gold- 
water speech by having Edward P. Morgan, radio voice of the 
AFL-CIO, deliver a diatribe charging Goldwater with "un¬ 
supported vituperation" and speculating that Goldwater was 
becoming "desperate." Thus were both candidates given 
"equal time": Johnson was given his chance to attack Gold- 
water, and Goldwater was given his chance to be attacked by 
Edward P. Morgan. 

A favorite sport of some Liberal reporters was "crowds- 
manship," minimizing the turnout of Goldwater adherents at 
his various stops and thereby generating the self-fulfilling 
prophecy of a campaign in trouble. Exhibit A in this respect 
was Jack Steele, of "bomb threat" fame. Steele is a veteran 
Goldwater-crowd-minimizer, having played down Goldwater 
gatherings as far back as 1963,* an experience he put to 
good use in the presidential campaign. When Goldwater 

* When Goldwater spoke at a GOP $ioo-a-plate dinner at Hershey in 
October, 1963, Steele reported the Arizonan “got a cool—at times barely 
polite—reception last night.’* Steele termed the turnout “poor” and the 
response of his audience “frigid.” The AP, by way of contrast, said: “Ap¬ 
plause and cheers burst out repeatedly as he tore into the Kennedy adminis¬ 
tration . . . The applause that greeted Goldwater’s introduction turned into 
a convention-style demonstration . . . The Hershey crowd treated him like 
a candidate. Repeated rounds of applause greeted every mention of his 
name and it grew louder when he got tough with Mr. Kennedy.” The 
Philadelphia Inquirer said: “The Goldwater speech struck a responsive chord 
as his listeners interrupted him 25 times with applause . . . Goldwater, as 
he was introduced, received a two-minute standing ovation from the audi¬ 

The Liberal Establishment 


toured the South, Steele wrote, his crowds were “spotty.” In 
Atlanta, he said, Goldwater “drew a crowd which both police 
and newsmen estimated to be about one third the size of the 
150,000 who greeted Richard M. Nixon in the same city in 
the i960 campaign.” If crowds mean anything, “and they 
may not,” Steele concluded, “those Goldwater has wooed 
thus far do not seem to justify GOP hopes that he will sweep 
Dixie on November 3.” 13 

Goldwater people, angered by such statements, said the 
senator’s crowds in Atlanta totaled 250,000. Allowing for the 
opposite bias of these spokesmen, it may safely be guessed the 
figure was under this. Ben Cole of the Indianapolis Star said 
the crowd was estimated at 200,000. Luke Green, editor of 
the Atlanta Times, said Goldwater’s crowds were as large as 
or larger than Nixon’s, ranging from 150,000 up to 200,000. 
A similar verdict came from James Reston of The New York 
Times, in an article otherwise unfriendly to Goldwater. All 
of which would suggest that, whatever the actual size of 
Goldwater’s crowds in Atlanta, they were hardly “one-third” 
the size of Nixon’s, as alleged by Steele. (Georgia, of course, 
was one of the states Goldwater did carry—the first Republi¬ 
can to do so since Reconstruction.) 

While the press and TV commentators thus handled 
Goldwater on a daily basis, the weekly magazines also did 
their share. Newsweek, whose treatment of Goldwater we 
have already noted, was perhaps the most consistent in its 
unremitting opposition. Not far behind, however, was Look 
magazine, which has made sensationalized articles about the 
right-wing something of a stock in trade over the past few 
years, and which during the election season focused these 
down into attacks on Goldwater. The present writer’s files, 
which make no claim to completeness, reflect, for example, 
the following articles in Look over a two-and-a-half year 

“Who’s On the Far Right?” by Fletcher Knebel, March 13, 

Operation Goldwater 


1962; “Setback For the Far Right,” “produced” by Henry 
Ehrlich, September 25, 1962; “Rampant Right Invades 
GOP,” by T. George Harris, July 16, 1963; “Memo From a 
Dallas Citizen,” March 24, 1964, by J. M. Shea, Jr., a lament 
about the conservatism of Dallas, Texas; “Goldwater 
Speaks,” April 21, 1964, a proof-text ransacking of Gold- 
water’s utterances to find embarrassments and contradictions 
—a technique not employed by the same magazine against 
either John Kennedy or Lyndon Johnson; “Can The GOP 
Survive Goldwater?” by Richard Wilson, July 14, 1964, a 
balanced article shamefully slanted by its headline; “What Is 
a Liberal? What Is A Conservative?” by Joseph Roddy, July 
28, 1964, an article disparaging Goldwater, William F. Buck- 
ley, Jr., and Russell Kirk and elevating such people as Peter 
Viereck and Clinton Rossiter; “Memo About A Dallas Citi¬ 
zen,” by T. George Harris, August 11, 1964, a lament about 
the reaction of Dallas conservatives to Shea’s lament about 
Dallas conservatives; “Race Riots: Goldwater Boon” (sub¬ 
head: “In many states, the Goldwater position meant: No 
more Negro progress now.”), by Fletcher Knebel, September 
22, 1964; and, after the election, a special combination 
celebrative and mopping-up issue, with “Four Special Re¬ 
ports on conspiracy USA, The Frightened Far Right and 
How It Operates,” a murderer’s row of exposes featuring 
Arthur Larson and his “National Council for Civic Respon¬ 
sibility,” January 26, 1965. 

During this same span of time, my files fail to reflect any 
Look articles about The Liberal Papers, The Fair Play for 
Cuba Committee, Americans for Democratic Action, “danger 
on the left,” or the contradictions of Lyndon Johnson. 

This is not to suggest that all of what went on in the media 
with respect to Goldwater was biased; it was not. It would be 
unfair to tag all TV newscasters, newspaper reporters, or 
magazine writers with failings that should be traced and at¬ 
tributed to specific individual sources. Nor is it to suggest 

The Liberal Establishment 


the unfairness which did transpire was malevolent. Human 
beings tend to see “facts” through the lens of their own par¬ 
ticular beliefs, and to emphasize things which appeal to them. 
That is human nature, and it takes men of extraordinary 
self-possession to overcome its frailties. The fact that too 
many media people in the ’64 campaign did not overcome it, 
and that the resulting bias was heavily against Goldwater, is 
merely to say that the people involved are human beings and 
that most of those human beings are members of the Liberal 

Part Two 


1 . Pragmatism and Power 

To understand the Establishment, we must begin at the top, 
with the President of the United States. 

Before his accession to the White House, there was some 
doubt as to whether Lyndon Johnson was a “member” of the 
Establishment at all; Richard Rovere, in his humorous essay 
on the subject, placed Johnson distinctly beyond the pale— 
which, thinking back to the anti-LBJ raillery then prevalent 
in the Liberal media, is probably correct. As a drawling, 
gabardined figure from Johnson City, Texas, Johnson was 
decidely non-U in the East Coast-Ivy League world which is 
the natural habitat of the Establishment. 

All this was instantly dismissed, however, when Johnson 
became President. Today he is not only in and of the Estab¬ 
lishment, in the sense intended by this book, he is in charge 
of it. He runs the province of Establishment life with which 
we are chiefly concerned; he advances Establishment pro- 

The Liberal Establishment 


grams with agility and zeal; he is acclaimed and glorified by 
Establishment spokesmen. A former outsider, he is now so far 
“in” that he is in danger of coming out the other side. 

If we would know something about Establishment per¬ 
formance over the past four years, then, we must begin by 
knowing something about Johnson, and about his predeces¬ 
sor John Kennedy, himself an Establishment insider for many 
years before his arrival at the White House. It is useful, in 
fact, to consider Johnson and Kennedy together, for beneath 
their many obvious surface differences they were as similar as 
two distinct human beings can be. And the matters wherein 
they were alike go to the heart of Establishment belief and 

John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson were both products of 
20th-century American politics at its most technical and anti¬ 
septic level, equipped with first-rate antennae for divining 
issues, assuaging interests, and counting votes. Both were 
furnished by their times, and by their political party, with a 
bias toward the welfare state, but both managed to project, 
where it mattered, a countervailing impression of “conserva¬ 
tism.” Each was schooled in the art of convincing Liberals 
and conservatives alike that a given action was a blow for the 
ideology of the immediate listener, and that aspects of the 
action which seemed undesirable were insignificant sops to 
the opposition. Kennedy was frequently described as a 
“pragmatist”—that is, a man more interested in practical 
results than in fancy theories. The same term, with as much 
justice or more, could be applied to Johnson. As Majority 
Leader of the Senate, from 1955 through i960, he won uni¬ 
versal acclaim as the greatest political craftsman ever to hold 
that post. And it was his “pragmatism,” his ability to weld 
men of all opinions together in concentration on the practi¬ 
cal task at hand, which won him the accolade. 

By the time John Kennedy had completed a strenuous 
campaign for the presidency and had conducted the affairs of 

Pragmatism and Power 


the nation for almost three full years, the extent of his Lib¬ 
eral predisposition had become plain—as it was not plain, say, 
when he attracted conservative votes for the Democratic vice- 
presidential nomination in 1956. When Johnson succeeded 
to the Presidency in November, 1963, his “image” stood 
roughly where Kennedy’s stood in 1956—so that the effect 
was one of a “conservative” succeeding a “Liberal.” The 
truth is, however, that Johnson himself is as Liberal in his 
sympathies as was his predecessor. 

Johnson went to Congress in 1937 as an avowed New 
Dealer, elected on a platform of support for President Roose¬ 
velt’s scheme to “pack” the Supreme Court. This was at a 
time, notes one friendly reporter, when “even some of the 
most devoted New Dealers from areas far more Liberal than 
Texas were shying away from the Court plan.” 1 Johnson is a 
self-professed idolator of the late FDR, who saw to it that 
the youthful new legislator received a good committee ap¬ 
pointment upon his arrival. “He was like a daddy to me,” 
Johnson says of Roosevelt. 2 

In 1941, with Roosevelt’s blessing, Johnson was the Lib¬ 
eral candidate for the senatorial nomination from Texas. 
Despite a well-publicized laying on of hands at the White 
House portico, and despite the fact that a large field of con¬ 
servatives split the opposition vote, Johnson lost the nomina¬ 
tion to W. Lee “Pappy” O’Daniel. In 1948, however, John¬ 
son tried again, this time with the blessing of Harry Truman. 
In a hotly disputed election revolving about a mysterious 
access of “uncounted” Johnson votes six days after the polls 
had closed, Johnson was declared the winner by Liberal 
Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black. (The full story on how 
the national Establishment pulled Johnson’s electoral chest¬ 
nuts out of the fire in this episode will be recorded in a later 

Down through the years, there is nothing to indicate that 
Johnson’s New Dealism has changed appreciably. Like most 

The Liberal Establishment 


other senators from the South and Southwest, he voted 
against the Liberal line when sectional or home-state inter¬ 
ests so dictated, gas and oil votes, “civil rights/' and the Taft- 
Hartley Act constituting his major ventures into lese-majeste . 
Johnson vehemently objects to Liberal spokesmen who attack 
him for these votes, or for his down-to-earth approach to get¬ 
ting Liberal bills enacted. Robert L. Riggs notes that “John¬ 
son is frequently annoyed because he is denied the accolade 
of New Dealer ... he cherishes the thought that he is a genu¬ 
ine economic and political liberal, both by inheritance and 
by belief/’ 3 

Prior to his ascension to the presidency, these protests were 
not taken very seriously by such Liberal spokesmen as the 
Americans for Democratic Action. But examination of the 
record bears out Johnson’s complaint; he has indeed been a 
consistent Liberal, as a number of conservative observers 
have pointed out. Americans for Constitutional Action, a 
conservative organization, found Johnson’s record during his 
last term in the Senate had been “one of the most Liberal . . . 
in the Congress.” Using 90 key roll calls during this period, 
ACA found Johnson’s conservative rating was a mere 10%. 

In releasing this tabulation, ACA president Ben Moreell 
appended a statement concerning vote analyses of other 
organizations, in which Johnson was found to have cast a 
preponderance of “right” votes by Liberal standards. “Sena¬ 
tor Johnson,” Moreell said, “was highly rated over a period 
of years by both AFL-CIO (COPE) and the ADA. For ex¬ 
ample, COPE gave him a rating of 73 per cent for the period 
1 949- 1 960, based on 30 COPE ‘right’ votes and 11 ‘wrong’ 
votes. During 1959-1960 his COPE rating rose to 77 per cent. 
Senator Johnson’s cumulative ADA rating for 1949-60 was 58 
per cent, and in i960 it rose to 66 per cent. While in the 
House of Representatives, ADA rated him at 88 per cent for 
1 947-48. His cumulative House and Senate ADA score from 
i947 to i960 is 62 per cent, based on 102 ADA ‘right’ votes 
and 64 ‘wrong’ votes.” 

Pragmatism and Power 


Moreell pinpointed one oddity—that the ACA rating of the 
“conservative” Johnson for the period 1955-59 was lower 
than that of the “Liberal” Kennedy, a fact which Kennedy 
himself had not failed to note. “In the pre-convention cam¬ 
paigning in i960,” Moreell said, “the late President Kennedy 
and his staff used the ACA index extensively throughout the 
South to prove that, as seen through the eyes of a conservative 
organization, the then Senator Kennedy (with an 11 % ACA 
rating) was more conservative than Senator Johnson (io%).” 4 

Nor has Johnson’s Liberalism been a matter of dry statis¬ 
tics; he has frequently come to the rescue of the Liberal cause 
when it mattered most—the premier example being his 1959 
Senate action in the case of HR 3, the bill to reverse a Su¬ 
preme Court decision nullifying state sedition laws. The bill 
passed the House of Representatives by a comfortable mar¬ 
gin, and seemed likely to pass the Senate. But Johnson went 
to work with his customary zeal and almost single-handedly 
secured its defeat. He is also given credit by reporter Riggs 
for bottling up the Bricker-George effort to limit the reach of 
the presidential treaty power—a measure for which Johnson 
himself, as minority leader, had voted. 

One of Johnson’s most successful ventures in projecting 
himself as a “conservative” has been his rhetoric about 
“economy”—rhetoric dramatized by his asserted passion for 
flicking off the lights in the White House. Those who grant 
Johnson’s Liberalism on other scores have been to some ex¬ 
tent impressed by his words on this one. Yet government 
spending is the one aspect of Johnson’s career in which he has 
been most consistently Liberal. Riggs tells us: “No northern 
Liberal has preached better New Deal gospel than Lyndon 
Johnson after the new Congress assembled in January, 1959. 
No Liberal has been so effective as was Johnson in giving 
respectability to the doctrine of spending. No New Dealer 
has been a more vigorous champion of the view that the 
federal budget must not be balanced at the expense of vital 
welfare services.” 5 

The Liberal Establishment 


This partiality for spending was equally evident as John¬ 
son acceded to the White House. Even as he reaped yards of 
newsprint for his “economy” drive, Johnson was increasing 
federal expenditures. This was achieved by the expedient of 
allocating part of the new money he spent to the Kennedy 
budget for 1963-64, so that Kennedy, not Johnson, could 
posthumously take the rap for stepped up spending; request¬ 
ing “new obligational authority” empowering him to spend 
money not included in his cash budget; and pro-rating new 
expenditures so that they could be counted in budgets for 
years ahead—years, that is, after the 1964 election. Immedi¬ 
ately upon taking office, Johnson ordered a speed-up in cur¬ 
rent spending in the amount of $600 million—a step which 
somewhat negated the estimated $36,000 saved by switching 
off the lights, the net loss for the taxpayer between the two 
transactions being some $599,964,000. 

Government spending during this period was up all along 
the line. U.S. News and World Report commented that 
“during Mr. Johnson’s first three months in office the gov¬ 
ernment spent more money than in any other December- 
February period in U.S. history. All told, the budget expen¬ 
ditures in those three months under Mr. Johnson came to 
$24.3 billion. Mr. Kennedy, in his peak year of spending for 
those months, hit a total of $22.3 billion. ... So far, then, 
spending since Mr. Johnson took over has topped Mr. Ken¬ 
nedy’s record by 2 billions. It has eclipsed Mr. Eisenhower’s 
by 4.3 billions.” 6 

Johnson’s chief device for projecting his “economy” image 
was the division of requested spending authority into differ¬ 
ent departments, one department labeled “new obligational 
authority.” In this category, Johnson placed some $5.9 bil¬ 
lion for fiscal 1965, and another $4 billion thereafter. In 
other words, a total of almost $10 billion of new spending 
authority —not counted in the budget for 1964-65. By this 
manipulation, a request for $108 billion was made to look 

Pragmatism and Power 


like a request for less than $98 billion, with resulting head¬ 
lines about “economy.” Members of Congress, however, were 
not so easily misled. Rep. Clarence Cannon (D.-Mo.), 
Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, declared 
that “contrary to impressions, this budget is higher, not 
lower, than the current year . . . This budget, if adopted as 
presented, sows the seeds of increased spending in the 
future.” 7 

The object of all this new spending was spelled out by 
Johnson in a speech January 15, 1964: “We are going to try,” 
he said, “to take all of the money that we think is unneces¬ 
sarily being spent and take it from the ‘haves’ and give it to 
the ‘have nots’ that need it so much.” 8 Which is about as 
close as any recent American President has come to proclaim¬ 
ing the “redistribution of wealth.” The statement, admit¬ 
tedly, is a little confused. On the one hand, it seems to say 
only money “saved” is going to be given to the have nots— 
which is slightly different from taking money away from the 
“haves.” When we reflect, however, that there is no money 
being saved, it seems the “have nots” must in fact be serviced 
by soaking the haves. The one area in which the Johnson 
budget did cut spending was defense; yet this, as noted, does 
not cut the aggregate amount of money spent. 

In still other actions during his first few months as Presi¬ 
dent, Johnson made it clear he would continue to hew to the 
Liberal line—even though he did not neglect to burnish his 
“conservative” image simultaneously. In all fields, domestic 
and foreign, he continued the Kennedy programs with no 
noticeable alteration, while adding a few of his own for good 
measure. Whether the issue was domestic finance, internal 
security, or national defense, Johnson’s response was un¬ 
waveringly Liberal. His 1965 State of the Union address, for 
example, included suggestions for the intrusion of federal au¬ 
thority into almost every conceivable sphere of American life, 
from air pollution to mental illness. Small wonder columnist 

The Liberal Establishment 


William S. White, a warm admirer of Johnson, should state: 
“The effective and rational Liberals, such men as Senators 
Hubert Humphrey and Eugene McCarthy and Ernest Gruen- 
ing and Henry Jackson and Warren Magnuson, came to un¬ 
derstand, to support, and value Johnson as their friend and 
ultimate protector. Just so, the effective right-wingers, from 
Robert Taft's time and beyond, always knew him for what he 
was; the strongest antagonist they had, precisely because he 
knew how to make rational Liberalism work and they knew 
he did." 9 In a 1963 interview with Robert Spivack of the New 
York Herald-Tribune, Johnson confirmed White’s estimate. 
“You say I am not a Liberal,” he protested. “Let me tell you 
I am more Liberal than Eleanor Roosevelt, and I will prove 
it to you. Franklin D. Roosevelt was my hero—he gave me my 
start.” 10 As that statement indicates, the regime of Lyndon 
Johnson is in all ideological respects an extension of John 
Kennedy’s New Frontier. 

Through it all, the major resemblance, larger than any 
particular issue, continues to press itself upon our atten¬ 
tion. While this is a book about extremists, it is clear 
that neither Kennedy nor Johnson can be described by 
that word. Extremism, whatever its bad connotations, im¬ 
plies commitment, enthusiasm for some idea or objective 
outside the limits of personal advancement or comfort. It 
implies zeal in behalf of a cause, dedication to ideas, likes 
and dislikes shot through with ideological fervor. There 
was little in the Kennedy record to suggest anything of the 
sort; there is equally little in the Johnson record. Both men, 
indeed, are known to have professed abhorrence of people 
excessively moved by ideas; both were concerned to achieve 
certain things in terms of the ideology of Liberalism, but 
neither seems to have been moved or dominated by its antic 
potencies; there is more than a suspicion that, in an age 
suffused with Liberal thought, each was able to use the ener¬ 
gies of Liberal ideologues to get where he was going. Of the 

Pragmatism and Power 


two, Kennedy seems to have been more conscious in his 
pragmatism, sophisticated in his pursuit of power. Johnson’s 
approach is natural and inborn, a kind of seat-of-the-pants 
system which they would not call "pragmatism” in Muleshoe, 
Texas, but which adds up to pretty much the same thing. 

Prof. Eric Goldman of Princeton, who heads up a commit¬ 
tee of intellectuals for Johnson, has testified to the pervasive¬ 
ness of the Kennedy power mystique. "The outgoing Presi¬ 
dent [Eisenhower] believed that the Chief Executive should 
not attempt to run things too much and especially should not 
try to whiplash Congress and the nation into line,” Goldman 
says. "John Kennedy took office with whip brandished high.” 
The men around Kennedy, Goldman adds, were "students— 
and products—of the new managerial America, a managerial 
world that includes political campaigns and universities as 
well as business corporations, and they are acutely aware that 
a managerial world is one in which men and ideas are made 
or broken by subtle configurations of power.” Goldman notes 
what he calls the "new moralism” of the New Frontier- 
symbolized by the "ask not” peroration of the Kennedy 
Inaugural Address. "The new moralism is the more strik¬ 
ing,” he says admiringly, "because it is accompanied by the 
most unabashed power-consciousness that the Capital has 
ever known.” 11 

If friends and critics agree that Kennedy sought to concen¬ 
trate power in the federal government, and particularly in 
the presidency, they are equally agreed that he did so for non¬ 
doctrinaire reasons. John Owens of the Baltimore Sun de¬ 
scribed him as a "relaxed pragmatist.” Kennedy, Owens 
wrote, "is not a revolutionist. He is not even a doctrinaire. 
He is a day-by-day worker on the condition in front of 
him.” 12 That conclusion is seconded by Goldman, who 
quotes Kennedy as saying that, when issues arise, "I don’t 
have an automatic commitment.” "The Kennedy Group,” 
Goldman says, "appeared to be sure that, if the world was to 

The Liberal Establishment 


be saved, it would be saved by their becoming masters of the 
ad hoc,” 13 

America’s founders feared power because they thought it 
would endanger freedom—no matter how good or noble the 
ends for which it was created. How much more dangerous 
would they have found power sought out and husbanded by 
“masters of the ad hoc ” Unchecked by the restraint of prin¬ 
ciple or tradition, power develops its own logic and momen¬ 
tum. Unguided by superior ends, it becomes an end in itself. 
The focus of concern, in an administration absorbed purely 
in the issue of the moment, must be the accretion of power- 
on every front; those exercising the power, after all, can 
never be quite sure what particular problem they will be 
called on to set aright tomorrow. A new strike, an objection¬ 
able television program, traffic congestion in the cities, a lag 
in support for civic symphony orchestras, unfriendly articles 
in the newspapers—any or all of these might create difficulties 
requiring the use of power, or stand in the way of programs 
designed to get it. In such contingencies, a power-conscious 
administration is always better off with too much power 
rather than too little. 

Johnson’s preferences in such matters are similar to Ken¬ 
nedy’s. Indeed, the rhetoric used by Johnson’s admirers im¬ 
mediately puts us in mind of Prof. Goldman. Stewart Alsop 
makes the comparison explicit, saying: 

To say that Johnson loves power is no affront to the man. 
Kennedy loved power too. Kennedy once remarked that he 
wanted to be President “because that’s where the real power is’’. 

As soon as Johnson won that Senate post in 1955 [Alsop goes on] 
he reached out with a sure instinct for the chief levers of party 
power; the Policy Committee, the Steering Committee, the Dem¬ 
ocratic Campaign Committee and the party secretariat. He was 
chairman of the first two, and thus controlled both broad policy 
decisions and the vital committee assignments. He had a majority 
of Johnson men on the Democratic Campaign Committee, and 

Pragmatism and Power 


thus controlled campaign largess. And the whole party secretariat, 
from the now-fallen Bobby Baker on down, was devoutly loyal to 
Lyndon B. Johnson and to nobody else. 

The executive branch is, of course, wholly different from the 
legislative branch, and is even more difficult to control than the 
Senate. But anyone who saw Lyndon Johnson operating as 
majority leader will be dead certain of one thing: Johnson will 
dominate absolutely his branch of the government. He will be a 
strong President, a dominant President, master in his own house, 
for good or ill. 14 

Other journalistic testimony bears out this analysis, as does 
the remark of Adlai Stevenson, who says: “Like few political 
professionals I have known, our new President understands 
power—its uses, its sources, its limitations, and its corrup¬ 
tions.” 15 

Life magazine, which supported Johnson in the 1964 cam¬ 
paign, quoted one intimate of the President as follows: 

Now when I say Lyndon wants it all and intends to get it all, I 
mean something like this: He wants all the respect, all the admi¬ 
ration, and all the love there is. He wants all the votes there are. 
He doesn’t just want to win in 1964; he wants to win bigger than 
anybody ever did. He wants all the Texas land there is, and, by 
now, he has quite a bit of that. He wants all the money there is 
and already he has a lot of it. He not only wants to be a great 
President; he wants to be the greatest ever. He doesn’t want the 
history books to say he was as good as Lincoln; he wants them to 
say he was better. 16 

In quest of All, Johnson has been an indefatigable manip¬ 
ulator of things, issues, and people. We have noted Prof. 
Goldman’s observation that the arena of power today is a 
“managerial” one, “where men and ideas are made or broken 
by subtle configurations of power.” Johnson is, above all, 
The Manager. He is a kind of mortal Prospero, controlling 
and manipulating people and events to establish his own 

The Liberal Establishment 


mastery of the situation. Johnson's official biographer, Booth 
Mooney, says LBJ viewed his Majority Leadership in the 
Senate “as a sort of general managership." 17 His multi¬ 
faceted yet essentially vacuous appeal in the 1964 election, 
his endless massaging of every interest in society, have made 
it clear he conceives of the presidency in the same way. It is 
all one big colossal Managership. 

Like Kennedy's, Johnson's desire for power is disembodied 
from ideological objectives. Power is power, good for its own 
sake. Just what the power is supposed to do is never made 
very clear; nor, on Johnson's record, is it likely ever to be. In 
a now-famous article for The Texas Quarterly, Johnson actu¬ 
ally went a great deal farther than his predecessor in disavow¬ 
ing political philosophy. In that article, Johnson wrote: 

I am a free man, an American, A United States Senator, and a 
Democrat, in that order. 

I am also a liberal, a conservative, a Texan, a taxpayer, a 
rancher, a businessman, a consumer, a parent, a voter, and not as 
young as I used to be nor as old as I expect to be—and I am all 
these things in no fixed order. 

After thus touching every conceivable base, he goes on to 
add: “I am not able—nor even the least interested in trying— 
to define my political philosophy by the choice of a one-word 
or two-word label." And: “I bridle at the very casualness with 
which we have come to ask each other, ‘What is your political 
philosophy?' " 18 

This confession is unique in two respects. Unique, first of 
all, because it is as clear an effort to say, “I am all things to all 
men," as one is liable to find in print. And unique because it 
magnifies the absence of fixed belief and disparages those who 
have such belief or seek it in others. Here is “pragmatism" 
militant, erecting non-commitment as the first of virtues, 
proclaiming clarity and principle as vices.. Here is justifica- 

Pragmatism and Power 


tion in plenty for ideological vagueness, reversing oneself on 
the issues, playing the angles and deploying both ends against 
the middle. Under this aspect, changing one’s beliefs to suit 
different times or different constituencies is not merely 
cricket; it is a solemn duty. 

The resulting paradox became crystallized in Johnson’s 
famous dual candidacy of i960, when he ran for Vice-Presi¬ 
dent on the national ticket and for re-election to the Senate 
on the statewide Texas ticket. In that curious election year, 
Johnson stood for office on two political platforms directly 
opposed to one another. The Texas platform opposed “fed¬ 
eral encroachment” on the states, while the national platform 
called for an increase of federal powers unprecedented in 
American history. The Texas platform endorsed the state’s 
right-to-work law; the national platform called for the repeal 
of right-to-work laws. The Texas platform supported the 
depletion allowances favored by the gas and oil producers; 
the national platform pledged elimination of such “loop 
holes.” The Texas platform opposed sit-in demonstrations; 
the national platform supported them. Etc. 19 This double 
candidacy represented the culmination of Johnson’s mixed 
career as a Liberal abroad and part-time conservative at home 
and undoubtedly constitutes the ultimate achievement in 
political flexibility. 

Once elected as Vice-President, Johnson left the substance 
if not the rhetoric of conservatism behind; and since be¬ 
coming President, he has confirmed himself in Liberalism as 
emphatically as did his predecessor. There have been a few 
trappings of language and inflection to mollify conservatives; 
but the particulars of the Johnson program have been as 
Liberal as those of Kennedy’s, in some cases more so. The 
reversal has been most dramatic, of course, in the realm of 
civil rights, where Johnson has pressed hard both for cloture 
on Senate debate and for two “civil rights” bills more sweep¬ 
ing than anything since Reconstruction. This was the same 

The Liberal Establishment 


Lyndon Johnson who in 1949 declared the right of unlimited 
Senate debate to be the key principle of free government, 
and who opined that a law to compel an employer to hire a 
Negro against his will (which the 1964 civil rights bill does) 
was little better than tyranny. 20 

As the ’60 campaign suggests, Johnson’s political mastery 
and his ideological vagueness are closely related. The ability 
to appeal to differing and even overtly hostile segments of the 
political community, in series and simultaneously, helped 
make him a skillful broker between the warring factions of 
the Democratic Party. It is very likely true, as Johnson’s en¬ 
thusiasts allege, that he was the only man who could have 
successfully kept the Northern Democrats and the States’ 
Rights Southerners operating in single harness. The same 
kind of agility and suppleness helps him now. 

The resistant stuff of conviction, at the level of technical 
virtuosity, is a political handicap; it tends to build up ani¬ 
mosities among those who hold different convictions. It 
makes shifting positions difficult. These are handicaps Lyn¬ 
don Johnson has avoided. Such animosities as he has stirred 
are chiefly personal; and those which have been most vividly 
ideological—e.g v ADA’s long-nourished distaste—have proved 
ephemeral enough in the upshot. At the time of his ascend¬ 
ancy in the Senate, and today as he sits in the White House, 
there is no man living who could safely categorize his politi¬ 
cal creed—which is the way Johnson, on his own testimony, 
likes it. 

2 . Americans for Democratic Action 

To the extent that Liberalism has a doctrine and program, 
they may best be discerned in that most doctrinaire and 
programmatic of organizations, Americans for Democratic 
Action. ADA represents the pure ideological tendency of 
Liberalism in all its major phases—domestic policy, internal 
security, and foreign affairs. In its Herculean schedule of 
demands and exhortations we encounter, more clearly than 
in the indefinite profile of a Kennedy or a Johnson, the dis¬ 
tilled essence of Liberal aspiration. 

That ADA is dead amidships of the Establishment has 
been attested by friends and critics alike. Its penetration of 
the federal government under Kennedy and Johnson has 
been remarked by ADAers themselves, by ADA biographer 
Clifton Brock, by Robert Hartmann of the Los Angeles 
Times, and by James Burnham of National Review, among 
others. Under Kennedy, ADA managed to place three dozen 

The Liberal Establishment 


or so people in the high echelons of the executive branch; 
under Johnson, it secured the choicest political plum avail¬ 
able to it, nomination of its all-time favorite legislator 
Hubert Humphrey as Vice President. And under both Ken¬ 
nedy and Johnson, it has received favorable consideration for 
virtually its entire legislative program—although not always 
with the speed and certitude its ideologues would like. 

This record of success is somewhat astounding in view of 
ADA’s small and—according to Prof. Brock (as of 1962)— 
dwindling membership, depleted exchequer, lack of political 
muscle, and history of unpopularity with the voters. It is 
even more astounding in view of the fact that the men who 
made it all possible, John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, 
had voiced their distaste for ADA in no uncertain terms and 
were themselves the object of suspicion and hostility from 
the group’s dedicated planners for tomorrow. 

In a 1953 interview with Paul Healy of the Saturday Eve¬ 
ning Post , for example, Kennedy commented on people who 
charged he was not a “true Liberal.” “I’d be very happy to 
tell them I’m not a Liberal at all,” he said. “I never joined 
Americans for Democratic Action or the American Veterans 
Committee. I’m not comfortable with those people.” 1 Those 
people reciprocated by making it clear on many occasions 
that they were not very comfortable with Kennedy either. 
According to New York ADA chairman Allen Taylor (him¬ 
self a Kennedy backer), Kennedy’s Catholicism was “the 
major element in the Liberals’ doubts” about him. Taylor 
added that “many Liberals doubt that Kennedy is a real Lib¬ 
eral. Mrs. Roosevelt’s comments have had an effect.” 2 With 
the exception of Arthur Schlesinger Jr., few ADAers were for 
Kennedy with any enthusiasm. One ADA chapter in New 
Jersey said: “In our view Senator Kennedy does not measure 
up to the principles which guide ADA.” 3 

If ADAers viewed Kennedy suspiciously, they* saw Lyndon 
Johnson as a positive evil. As Majority Leader, Johnson was 

Americans for Democratic Action 


constantly under fire from ADA members in the Senate. 
ADA pilloried him in its publications and public statements, 
describing him as “a conservative, anti-civil rights, gas-and-oil 
senator/’ 4 As we have seen, this description is hardly a fair 
characterization, since Johnson had to live with a Texas con¬ 
stituency. But such considerations have small bearing on 
ADA’s demands for doctrinaire Liberalism in all things at all 

When Kennedy turned to Johnson for the vice-presidential 
post in i960, the ADA was stunned. Joseph L. Rauh, G. 
Mennen Williams and others shouted an angry “no” when 
the convention was asked to nominate the Texan by acclama¬ 
tion. 5 Rauh later said: “It may prove to be a disaster in 
November, but more important, in my opinion, is that it 
throws doubt on the sincerity of the entire party in adopting 
that wonderful platform.” 6 Even when passions had cooled 
somewhat, a vote by the national ADA board to limit en¬ 
dorsement to Kennedy, omitting Johnson, split the group 
down the middle. Only a tie-breaking ballot by chairman 
Samuel Beer carried the day for the ticket as a whole. 

Johnson disliked ADA just as much as it disliked him. 
Taking note of ADA’s opposition to his bid for the presiden¬ 
tial nomination in i960, Johnson said: “We don’t want the 
support of odd balls on the left or the right . . . ADA or 
KKK.” 7 

The fact that both Kennedy and Johnson should have 
spoken disparagingly of ADA suggests something about its 
position in the power structure of the Democratic party. For 
a decade or more, ADA’s radicalism was considered too far 
out for the American people, and therefore for Democrats 
seeking favor with the voters. Former Democratic Chairman 
Stephen Mitchell, when asked what he thought of ADA sup¬ 
port, said, “I think we can get along without it.” 8 A Massa¬ 
chusetts Democrat, Governor-to-be Foster Furculo, told an 
audience of thunderstruck ADAers: “You no longer enjoy 

The Liberal Establishment 


the confidence of the public and no candidate can do without 
it.” 9 

Others withdrawing support from ADA because of its 
radicalism have been David McDonald of the Steelworkers 
Union and the President of the Upholsterers Union. Even 
certified Liberals such as Adlai Stevenson, G. Mennen Wil¬ 
liams, and Congressman Chet Holifield have gone out of 
their way to deny connection with it. (Stevenson is listed as a 
“founder” of ADA—an allegation he denies.) 

After all the unfriendly words between Kennedy and 
Johnson on the one hand and the ADA on the other, and 
the eagerness of so many Democrats to cut free from it, it 
does not seem logical the present administration should be 
awash to the scuppers with ADA members. Yet such is in fact 
the case. Under Kennedy, prominent ADA spokesmen 
popped up all over Washington; under Johnson, Hubert 
Humphrey is Vice President, and Joe Rauh is now a favored 
guest at the White House. Rauh appeared prominently, for 
example, at White House ceremonies for the signing of the 
24th Amendment, abolishing the poll tax.* Despite the aura 
of public disfavor, then, ADA has managed to spot its mem¬ 
bers everywhere in the Democratic administration, and has 
exerted a strong shaping influence on its policies. National 
ADA chairman Samuel Beer boasted, in 1961, of “our new 
respectability, with so many of our leaders prominent in the 
New Frontier.” 10 The same John F. Kennedy who in 1953 
disavowed ADA turned about and retrieved its injured repu¬ 
tation, brushed up its radicalism, and supplied it with some 
sorely-needed prestige. The same Lyndon Johnson who in 
i960 compared ADA to the Ku Klux Klan has put it within 
field goal distance of the White House. 

* This episode was additionally curious for other reasons: There is no 
provision in the Constitution for the President to “sign" a constitutional 
amendment; and the beaming Rauh who looked on as Johnson did sign 
had actually opposed the amendment in question. Reason: As a good ADAer, 
he preferred direct congressional action without recourse*to the amendment 


Americans for Democratic Action 


Reporter Hartmann, in his series for the Los Angeles 
Times, compiled a painstaking list of ADAers, past and 
present, who had secured jobs in the Kennedy administra¬ 
tion. The best known of the group were Schlesinger, then 
special adviser to President Kennedy; Chester Bowles, a rov¬ 
ing ambassador; Ambassador “Soapy” Williams, a one-time 
ADA member despite his later disavowal; Theodore Soren¬ 
son, Kennedy’s special assistant and “alter ego”; former 
Ambassador to India J. Kenneth Galbraith; former Ambas¬ 
sador to Peru James Loeb Jr.; former Secretary of Labor, 
now Supreme Court Justice, Arthur Goldberg; former Secre¬ 
tary of Health, Education and Welfare, now Senator Abra¬ 
ham Ribicoff; Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman; 
Solicitor General Archibald Cox; Housing Administrator 
Robert Weaver; and HEW Assistant Secretary Wilbur 
Cohen. In addition to these, Hartmann lists some two dozen 
other Kennedy officials who are either current ADA members 
or alumni of the group.* 

Scanning ADA’s meager resources, Hartmann makes the 
obvious comment: “. . . when any 14-year old organization 
numbering no more than 50,000 citizens, with a budget of 

* In 1963, James Burnham updated the list as follows: “ADA's Supreme 
Court Justice is Arthur Goldberg, who was shifted to the Court from 
President Kennedy’s Cabinet. ADA graduate Abraham Ribicoff recently went 
from the Cabinet to the Senate. Ardent ADA member Orville Freeman con¬ 
tinues as Secretary of Agriculture. Senators Hubert Humphrey (who has 
served as ADA National Chairman) and Wayne Morse are on the ADA 
National Executive Committee; Joseph S. Clark, Paul Douglas, Maurine 
Neuberger, William Proxmire, Pat McNamara, Estes Kefauver and Eugene 
McCarthy are also in the ADA's senatorial bloc. ADAer J. Kenneth Galbraith 
represents the nation in New Delhi and will be followed in that post by 
Ambassador and ADAer-at-large Chester Bowles. ADAer Thomas Finletter 
is our man at NATO. (ADA founder James Loeb Jr., was Ambassador to 
Peru until retired last summer after his awkward role in Peru’s government 
overturn.) Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., another ADA founder and present 
Executive Committee member, works in the White House’s most intimate 
circle, along with ADAers Ted Sorenson and Lawrence O’Brien. As Under 
Secretaries (i.e., second in departmental command), ADAer Ivan Nestingen 
is at Health, Education and Welfare; Charles Murphy, at Agriculture; 
Henry H. Fowler, at Treasury. There were at one time no less than four 
ADA Assistant Secretaries at State (Averell Harriman, G. Mennen Williams, 
Philip H. Coombs, Carl Rowan; Harriman has since been promoted to 

The Liberal Establishment 


less than $200,000 a year, regarded as an albatross by many 
Democrats and as anathema by most Republicans, holding no 
I. O. U. from the presidential winner for his nomination— 
when any such organization can staff a new administration 
with three White House aides, three Cabinet officers, and 31 
key administrators in vital areas of finance, labor, civil rights, 
public works, power, housing, and foreign policy, it is worth 
looking into/’ 11 

ADA is indeed worth looking into, on several counts. It is a 
curiosity in American politics, a half-intellectual, half¬ 
political-action organization which does a little of everything 
in general, and, until the arrival of the Kennedy-Johnson 
regime, not much of anything in particular. It is involved, on 
a limited basis, in precinct politics; it lobbies on Capitol 
Hill; it is a fountain of statements on every subject under the 
sun, a repository for Liberal brain trusters who will gladly 
give a speech, or ghost one, on whatever topic happens to be 
at hand, and today something very like an employment serv¬ 
ice for the Liberal regime in Washington. 

ADA was founded in 1947 for the purpose of separating 
Liberal sheep from Communist and pro-Communist goats 
then crying up the Progressive Party candidacy of Henry 
Wallace. For its initiative on this score ADA should be given 
full credit, and above all should be spared charges that it is 
either “Communist” or “pro-Communist.” It is neither of 
these, and assertions that it is somehow a front for Moscow 
serve only to darken counsel by making impossible any ra- 

Under Secretary, and Rowan named Ambassador to Finland); two at Labor 
(George L. P. Weaver and Esther Peterson); and an Assistant Postmaster 
General (Frederic C. Belen). ADAer Archibald Cox is Solicitor General; 
ADAer Charles Donahue, Solicitor of the Labor Department. ADAer Frank 
McCulloch is chief of NLRB; ADAer Robert C. Weaver, of the Housing and 
Home Finance Agency; ADAer George Docking, of the Export-Import Bank. 
ADAer Howard Morgan is a commissioner of FPC; ADAer Philip Elman, of 
FTC. Eleanor Roosevelt, a member of the U.S. delegation to the United 
Nations, was ADA’s First Lady from its birth until her death. ADAer Jonathan 
Bingham is U.S. delegate to the Trusteeship Council.” * 

Americans for Democratic Action 


tional determination of what it really is. ADA itself claims to 
be “anti-Communist,” which may be a true enough designa¬ 
tion of the impulses which gave it birth, but can hardly be 
applied to its erratic record on internal security matters and 
certain foreign policy questions. A more correct description 
would be “non-Communist.” “Anti-anti-Communist” would 
be more accurate still. 

On questions of domestic policy other than internal se¬ 
curity, ADA favors putting increased power in the hands of 
the federal government. It urges the transfer of power away 
from private individuals and from the states to the authori¬ 
ties in Washington, in the interest of “democratic national 
economic planning.’’ Within the federal authority, it favors 
moving power away from Congress into the hands of the 
President, where it is less restrained by such things as com¬ 
mittee hearings, filibusters, and tedious procedure, and can 
be used quickly and without impediment. It favors, in short, 
doing away with substantive barriers to the concentration 
and exercise of political power at the national level—always 
excepting the internal security question. 

There is hardly a welfare program on record which has not 
received ADA backing, hardly a request for presidential 
power which ADA has not found good and necessary, hardly 
a problem of any description for which it has not proposed a 
federal solution. “The government,” ADA tells us, “must 
undertake to build firm foundations for enduring prosperity 
by bold long-range programs for the development of our re¬ 
sources, the rebuilding of our cities, the elimination of our 
slums, and the provision of full and equal opportunities for 
health, education, and security for all our people.” 12 In each 
of these categories and more, ADA has a multitude of federal 
schemes it wants enacted or enlarged in scope. Among its 
standard proposals are federal aid to schools at all levels, a 
stiff federal fair employment practice law, a federal “medi¬ 
care” program, price and wage controls, federal housing as- 

The Liberal Establishment 


sistance, “direct income support for farmers and a food stamp 
plan” (the Brannan plan), use of federal funds “to finance 
basic services which state and local governments provide,” on 
condition that plans be submitted which “meet certain basic 
standards” etc., etc. What ADA is after is a federally sub¬ 
sidized, federally regulated, federally administered govern¬ 
ment in which Congress yields up its powers to the executive, 
the states perform as administrative subdivisions, and the 
citizen accepts a regimen planned for him by ADA experts in 

In the contemporary meaning, the ADA program would 
achieve in America approximately what the Socialists would 
achieve in Europe. Its resemblance to the Socialist Fabian 
Society in Great Britain is not only marked but somewhat 
self-conscious. ADA critics have frequently drawn the paral¬ 
lel, but ADA enthusiasts have also acknowledged it. The 
Fabian Society set out, in the guise of reform, to introduce 
the total state to Britain by degrees; it achieved its effects not 
through mass membership or political expertise, but through 
the propagandistic energy of such intellectuals as Bernard 
Shaw, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, and Graham Wallas (who, 
for what it is worth, coined the phrase, “The Great Soci¬ 
ety”). The same considerations, as to goal and method, apply 
to ADA, with such figures as Arthur Schlesinger Jr., J. Ken¬ 
neth Galbraith and Leon Keyserling filling the roles once 
played by Shaw and Co. 

ADAers evidently do not find the comparison odious. Prof. 
Brock repeatedly points out that, at least in its “intellectual” 
modulation, ADA is a kind of American Fabian Society. The 
main difficulty with being American Fabians, in the ADA 
view, is that U. S. politics is too loose-jointed to make the 
approach effective. Prof. Brock says: “Various ADA leaders 
have advocated such a policy \i.e., functioning, like the 
Fabians, exclusively as an idea center], and much of the or¬ 
ganization’s educational and propaganda activity can be 

Americans for Democratic Action 


viewed in this light. The ADA has never committed itself to 
a clear-cut Fabian concept, however, perhaps because the 
primary vehicle of Fabian success in Britain—a centralized 
and disciplined political party—has never existed in the 
United States.” 13 

Evidently the fact that Fabianism was at all times a Social¬ 
ist technique aimed at Socialistic objectives has not been a 
factor in preventing ADA enthusiasm for it. (Interestingly 
enough, one of ADA's prime objectives has been to do away 
with the chief impediment to Fabianism cited by Brock—to 
make the Democratic party a “centralized and disciplined” 
body in the ADA image.) ADAers tend, in fact, to think well 
of European Socialists all along the line. Brock notes that a 
main cause of ADA unpopularity in the early '50s was “an 
expression of sympathy with the British Labor Government,” 
and Hartmann quotes one “Liberal Democrat with impec¬ 
cable credentials” as saying ADA is “very dominated by 
Fabian ideas.” 14 

James Burnham notes ADA's “foreign connections have 
always featured the Socialist leaders and parties of other coun¬ 
tries. The first foreign lecturer to tour this country under 
ADA auspices was Jennie Lee, a leading British Socialist, 
wife of the very leftist Aneurin Bevan.” Among foreign 
figures smiled on by ADA have been French Socialist Leon 
Blum and Italian Socialist Giuseppe Saragat. Arthur M. 
Schlesinger Jr. has placed ADA in the same spectrum as 
“the democratic socialists and leftists” of Europe. 15 

Perhaps nowhere can ADA's affinity to European Socialism 
be better glimpsed than in the writings and utterances of 
Schlesinger himself. If anyone deserves the title of “Mr. 
ADA” in the intellectual world, as Humphrey deserves it in 
the political, Schlesinger is the man. He has been an inde¬ 
fatigable source of pamphlets, articles, books, and speeches 
expounding and defending the ADA position. It was he who 
swayed many ADA members to accept Kennedy. And it was 

The Liberal Establishment 


he, in turn, who led the wholesale charge of the ADA into 
the upper ranks of the Kennedy government. 

“There seems no inherent obstacle,” Schlesinger wrote in 
1947, “to the gradual advance of socialism in the United 
States through a series of New Deals.” 16 Schlesinger, then a 
precocious professor of history at Harvard, had been asked to 
comment on the future of socialism. As the quotation sug¬ 
gests, he was quite optimistic. The long-term growth of gov¬ 
ernment control indicated to Schlesinger that the Socialist 
ideal of gradual takeover could and would be fulfilled. 

Some background is necessary. Since the days of Eduard 
Bernstein, the cause of world socialism has been divided into 
two major camps: The Communists, who believe socialism 
possible only by violent revolution; and the “social demo¬ 
crats,” who think the goal can be achieved through parlia¬ 
mentary process, i.e . 9 by legislation. Addressing himself to 
this historic debate, Schlesinger took the side of the social 

His reasoning: the Communists held that “gradualism” 
would not work because, if it ever threatened to succeed, 
capitalistic businessmen would take steps to forestall prole¬ 
tarian triumph. This expected resistance, the orthodox Com¬ 
munists reasoned, could be overcome only by violence. 
Schlesinger believed the history of the Labor government in 
England, and of the New Deal in America, proved the Com¬ 
munists in error. Instead of putting up a fight, he asserted, 
the capitalists had simply caved in. The way they humbly 
took their medicine from British and American planners— 
such as Schlesinger himself—proved they were cowards with¬ 
out the fortitude to defend themselves. 

“. . . the Marxists,” he wrote, “enormously overestimated 
the political courage and will of the capitalists. In fact, in the 
countries where capitalism really triumphed, it has yielded 
with far better grace (that is, displayed far more cowardice) 
than the Marxist schema predicted.” 17 Because businessmen 

Americans for Democratic Action 


are cowards, Schlesinger said, another depression would pro¬ 
vide the proper occasion for locking government control 
even more firmly on the economy: “. . . the New Deal greatly 
enlarged the reserves of trained personnel; the mobilization 
of industry during the war provided more experience; and 
the next depression will certainly mean a vast expansion in 
government ownership and control. The private owners will 
not only acquiesce in this. In characteristic capitalist panic, 
they will demand it.” 18 

Sometime prior to the i960 elections, Schlesinger drafted a 
semi-secret document which bore the title “The Shape of 
National Politics to Come.” Since this memorandum was 
prepared for the edification of the Democratic leadership, 
there can be little doubt that President Kennedy chose Schle¬ 
singer as his adviser with full knowledge of the opinions it 
sets forth—perhaps even because of them. 

The document makes clear that Schlesinger still thinks 
patronizingly of the business community; these are people, in 
his view, who exist to be pushed around and “disciplined” by 
the government. “The fact has to be faced,” he writes, “that 
private interests and the public interest often come into 
harsh conflict. The test will lie in willingness to take on the 
private interests whose aggressive pursuit of their own advan¬ 
tages imperils the general welfare.” 19 

Schlesinger indicates he is perfectly willing to meet this 
test. The aggressive private interests, he says, must be “disci¬ 
plined.” Moreover: “The assertion of the public interest will 
therefore mean, in particular, a determination to prevent 
special interests from absorbing the communal surplus which 
ought to be dedicated to communal, not to private, pur¬ 
poses.” 20 (For workingmen who think this might be accept¬ 
able doctrine, Schlesinger indicates his strictures are directed 
at labor unions as well as businessmen.) Here Schlesinger 
incorporates, wholesale, the prevailing economic cliche of 
i960—the dilemma of the public vs. the private sector. We 

The Liberal Establishment 


are getting plenty of consumer goods, he says (“private inter¬ 
ests”), but our public facilities are falling into “disrepair.” 
We are not spending enough on government (this at a time 
when the national budget stood at the highest point in his¬ 
tory). His answer to both problems—cracking down on “pri¬ 
vate interests” who want to spend their own money on con¬ 
sumer goods, and building up the “public sector,” or the 
amount of money available to government—is therefore ob¬ 
vious: Increase taxes. 

Of course, Schlesinger is aware that the American people 
resist paying still higher taxes; but he is hopeful they can be 
re-educated to see the error of their ways. “As yet,” he says, 
“the issue is not yet [szc] widely understood, as shown by the 
continuing complaints against taxation, public spending, etc. 
But gradually it will seem more important to enlarge services 
than to reduce taxes. Already the idea of the government as 
the enemy—the one great triumph of Republican propa¬ 
ganda in the last two decades—is beginning to give way be¬ 
fore the idea of the government as one means by which a 
community achieves its purposes.” 21 

Like certain other Liberals, Schlesinger is willing to pay 
his respects to individual freedom—particularly if the “free¬ 
dom” up for discussion is the “civil liberty” of the radical 
left. He even saluted freedom in his 1947 article, saying that 
“if socialism (i.e., the ownership by the state of all significant 
means of production) is to preserve democracy, it must be 
brought about step by step in a way which will not disrupt 
the fabric of custom, law, and mutual confidence upon which 
personal rights depend.” 22 He never makes clear, however, 
how “personal rights” can exist in an economy wherein “all 
significant means of production,” and therefore virtually all 
power over the means of subsistence, are in the hands of 

Schlesinger has further qualified his belief in individual 
freedom by remarking that “the value of the,individual can 

Americans for Democratic Action 


become abstract and sterile; arrogant forms of individualism 
sometimes discredit the basic faith in the value of the indi¬ 
vidual/’ 23 “Arrogant” forms of individualism are apparently 
the same thing as “aggressive private interests”—people who 
want to conduct their affairs in their own way, not according 
to the plan of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. Schlesinger clinches the 
point by adding that the “individualism” he prefers is that 
which “derives freely from the community.” 24 Which means, 
if it means anything, that private rights can exist only by 
leave of “the community,” i.e., government. Which means 
they are not rights at all. 

In matters of economics Schlesinger’s writings are gener¬ 
ally a superficial confection of whatever happens to be pre¬ 
valent among the Liberal intelligentsia. His memorandum to 
the Democratic leaders, as previously suggested, is in fact a 
sort of retail version of J. Kenneth Galbraith’s theories, 
devoid of Galbraith’s wit or economic expertise. 

Schlesinger seems charmingly innocent of the forces which 
make our economy run. The prosperity of America, pro¬ 
duced by the free enterprise system, he takes as sort of given- 
something which is simply there, to be chopped up and redis¬ 
tributed according to whatever plan “intellectuals” like him¬ 
self happen to devise. He takes no thought for the incentives 
which must exist for free men to create such abundance, and 
insofar as he is required to notice them he obviously thinks 
them contemptible. He says derisively, in the Galbraith 
manner: “While consumer goods pour out of our ears, while 
our cars grow longer and our kitchens shinier and gadgets 
and gimmicks overflow our closets and our attics, the public 
framework of society, on which everything else rests , is over¬ 
strained by population growth and falls into disrepair.” 
(Italics added.) 23 Any economist, no matter what his per¬ 
suasion, could tell Schlesinger that the free economy does not 
“rest” on the “public framework” of 12,000,000 government 
employees. Just the opposite is the case—public expenditures 

The Liberal Establishment 


paid for by taxes are possible only if there are industry, pro¬ 
duction, jobs and wages—from which taxes can be taken. 
Without the free economy, the “public sector” would have 
no means of support. 

Schlesinger’s imitative economics sometimes leads him into 
blatant contradiction. In his i960 memorandum, he lam¬ 
bastes our long cars and our shiny kitchens as the needless 
excrescences of a private-interest economy. Because we have 
followed the ways of free enterprise, with its bias toward con¬ 
sumer goods, we have become “the affluent society,” awash 
with gadgetry, oblivious to the plight of worthy bureaucrats. 
He thus makes it clear that “the affluent society” is entirely 
the fault of capitalistic free enterprise. 

In a later effort, however, he says precisely the opposite. In 
a 1962 piece prepared for the Saturday Evening Post, he 
writes: “The champions of the affirmative state, in their de¬ 
termination to avert Marxist revolution, had to fight con¬ 
servatism at every step along the way. Nonetheless, they 
persevered; and the twentieth century in America and Great 
Britain saw the rejection of laissez faire, the subjugation of 
the business cycle, the drowning of revolution in a torrent of 
consumer goods and the establishment of the 'affluent soci¬ 
ety.” 26 

Thus the “affluent society,” formerly characterized as the 
distasteful result of free enterprise, is now described as the 
glorious result of “the affirmative state.” Responsibility for 
affluence, in Schlesinger’s view, evidently depends upon how 
you want to evaluate it. If you want to describe it in its aspect 
of materialism and “greed,” then you pin it on conservatives; 
but if you want to invoke its great creative potencies, then 
you claim if for Liberalism. 

It is a disingenuous game Schlesinger is playing; but while 
his arguments may change with the winds, his objectives do 
not: The aggrandizement of government power,, and the re¬ 
duction of individual choice—these were the lode stars of his 

Americans for Democratic Action 


policy, in 1962 as in 1947. Nor has he been alone in that 

Among the authorities quoted approvingly by Schlesinger 
in his “Shape of National Politics” memo is fellow ADAer 
Joseph S. Clark, Democratic Senator from Pennsylvania. The 
citation is apposite, for Clark is as outspoken in his profes¬ 
sions of collectivist faith as is Schlesinger himself. Clark has 
described his point of view, for example, as follows: “A Lib¬ 
eral is here defined as one who believes in using the full force 
of government for the advancement of social, political and 
economic justice at the municipal, state, national, and inter¬ 
national levels . . .” 27 

As a member of Americans for Democratic Action, Clark is 
used to hearing the charge that his Liberal philosophy will 
lead America into a planned economy. He does not deny 
the charge. In fact, he took occasion to rise to the defense of 
his fellow Kennedyite and ADAer—and principal author of 
the i960 Democratic platform—Chester Bowles, and to con¬ 
firm the desirability of a planned economy in the United 
States. There had been some agitation to have Bowles dis¬ 
charged as Under Secretary of State, in part because of his 
radical views on domestic matters. Clark offered this reveal¬ 
ing comment: 

It is suggested that one reason why it is necessary to get rid of 
Mr. Bowles is that he is alleged to be a devotee of the planned 
economy and welfare state. If Mr. Bowles is to be indicted for 
such views it will be necessary to indict about three-fourths of the 
Senators on this side, and about one-fourth of the Senators on the 
other. If we do not get more planning into our economy and go 
forward with the welfare measures advocated by the President of 
the United States, the country will be in a far worse condition 
than it otherwise would be. I should say that the majority of the 
Senate will heartily support the well-known views of Mr. Bowles 
on domestic policy. 

Furthermore, I am confident that one reason why the Presi- 

The Liberal Establishment 


dent of the United States has made the decision to retain Mr. 
Bowles is that, by and large, the President of the United States 
himself shares those views. It is said that Mr. Bowles is unpopular 
with the conservative wing of the Democratic Party. So are 45 
other Democrats who serve in this body. I suspect their number is 
not confined to the Senate and the House of Representatives, but 
I assert also that the views of Mr. Bowles and other members of 
this body in that regard are shared also by the President of the 
United States. 28 

Clark has gone on record abundantly as to what he con¬ 
ceives a “planned economy” to be, and what he wants to do 
with the “full force of government.” In an article for the 
Atlantic, he rejoiced that American schools were training 
young people to accept a government-dominated society. “It 
is significant/' he wrote, “that what used to be called ‘history' 
is now ‘social studies.' Spiritually and economically youth is 
conditioned to respond to a Liberal program of orderly polic¬ 
ing of society by government, subject to the popular will, 
in the interests of social justice.” 29 (Italics added.) 

To get this “orderly policing,” Clark itches to do away 
with the constitutional restraints built into our system by the 
Founding Fathers. In yet another piece for the Atlantic, he 
discusses this effort of the founders to restrain tyrannical ac¬ 
tion in government. He says: “In a day when governmental 
action, if needed at all, could afford to be slow, when the 
‘tyrant' George III was fresh in men's minds, this original 
conception, favoring inaction, made good sense. Does it still 
do so? I think not.” 30 

Apparently Clark was looking the other way when modern 
tyrants like Mussolini and Hitler and Stalin were making 
George III seem benevolent by comparision. 

Like the Marxists, Clark views social and political prob¬ 
lems in terms of a “class struggle.” In a i960'speech, the 
senator made this revealing comment: “I realize that it is not 

Americans for Democratic Action 


considered quite nice to refer in America to anything like a 
'class struggle.' That is too Marxian. In America, it is consid¬ 
ered nicer to pretend that, 'What’s good for General Motors 
is good for the country.’ Yet the tax issue is at heart a class 
issue.” 31 Clark wants the federal government to step into this 
class struggle and “redistribute the wealth downward.” 32 
That is why he favors federal aid programs. 

Clark enlists himself in the campaign against private opu¬ 
lence, and shows clearly how that campaign leads on to gov¬ 
ernment control. Consider this remarkable passage: “Today 
we have no national personnel policy or plan. We do not try 
to steer our best young people into the careers where their 
brains are needed. We leave the choice to chance and the 
market place. We hope that a sense of dedication will prove 
more compelling than the dollar reward.” 33 

The result of this reliance on the market place, of course, is 
that people choose the products they want, rather than the 
products Joe Clark thinks they should want. “Does it really 
make sense,” he asks, “to siphon our ability into color televi¬ 
sion, the manufacture and sale of soft drinks, cigarettes, 
whisky and cosmetics, and the advertising of these commodi¬ 
ties? Hasn’t the time come to start thinking about how to put 
American capabilities into jobs where they can best advance 
American national interests?” 34 In other words, Americans 
are not only choosing the wrong goods, but (another way of 
saying the same thing), they are choosing the wrong jobs. 
The government should do it for them. 

Clark nostalgically recalls that “in 1942, Military Occupa¬ 
tion Specialty determined where one served 'the cause of 
freedom’.” 35 He wants something of the same sort now; 
government should pick jobs for us, then “persuade” us to 
accept its choice. Clark says: “They plan well in Russia. 
There someone decides where little Ivan is going to work. If, 
at the age of eleven, he seems unresponsive, he goes back to 
the collective farm. If he shows promise, his education is con- 

The Liberal Establishment 


tinued at state expense through technical school and the uni¬ 
versity. Education and incentives for different occupations 
are adjusted to meet the personnel needs required by the 
current Five or Seven Year Plan.” 36 

Why can’t we do the same thing here, Clark asks, using 
“persuasion” instead of compulsion? He does not elaborate 
on what forms “persuasion” strong enough to overcome the 
incentives of the market place would take; but it winds up 
sounding a great deal like the compulsion it is supposed to 
replace. He says: “How can we use both the carrot and the 
stick to get these young people trained and on their way to 
where they are needed? How can we get more and better 
teachers, scientists, priests, politicians, rabbis, ministers, and 
social workers? To get them we will have to settle for fewer 
brewers, night-club proprietors, and lobbyists.” 37 (Italics 
added.) Brewers, night-club owners and lobbyists (including 
the ADA?) please note. The ADA’s prize Senator, with a 
bland Orwellian twist, describes this program as “staffing 
freedom.” 38 

In short, the American people don’t know what they want. 
Therefore, the all-seeing Joseph Clark and his ADA brethren 
would be glad to take care of that item for them—if only our 
obsolete Constitution didn’t stand in the way! 

3 . Is It Socialism? 

It should be clear that, whatever the differences between 
pragmatic politicians of the Kennedy-Johnson mould and 
leftist theorists of the Schlesinger-Clark school, they are 
agreed on one thing: The total concentration of power in the 
federal government in Washington. The quest for domestic 
power is the number-one objective of the Establishment in 
all its categories and subdivisions. 

Numerous important questions are suggested by this fact, 
including matters of constitutionality, cost, impact on per¬ 
sonal freedom, and the like. But before we discuss such things 
we must first try to decide, in the round, what it is we are 
dealing with. Some theoretical grasp of the whole is necessary 
to set our bearings, to launch us properly upon an inspection 
of particulars. What is the reason for all this power-seeking? 
Why does the Establishment want it so badly? And where 
will we finally end up if we accede to it? 

The Liberal Establishment 


Comprehensive answers to such questions are usually 
avoided by the proponents of centralization. The critics are 
not so reticent. Spurred by the writings of such as Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr., they are ready to describe what is happening 
as “Socialism”. As sometimes used, however, the term has 
been too freely applied. Every proposal to centralize power is 
not “Socialistic,” even though it may be mistaken or harmful 
in its effects. The cry of “Socialism” has often served as a 
handy reflex to save businessmen or other conservatives the 
trouble of making a detailed criticism of the action suggested. 

In the classical sense, “Socialism” has a clear and definite 
meaning: Ownership by the state of the means of production 
and distribution. And that, for the most part, is not the kind 
of thing being sponsored by Liberalism in America today—a 
point which Liberals are eager to make. Joseph L. Rauh of 
Americans for Democratic Action, for example, says his or¬ 
ganization is not Socialist, “because we don’t believe in gov¬ 
ernment ownership of the means of production.” 1 ADA’s 
semi-official biographer, Clifton Brock, makes the same 

The Rauh answer, however—and much of the general 
argument about Socialism in America—ignores the fact that 
this definition has long since been abandoned by the Social¬ 
ists themselves. In America, in Great Britain, and in Western 
Europe, “social democracy” no longer implies extensive na¬ 
tionalization. At its most doctrinaire level, it involves nation¬ 
alization of certain basic industries. At its most effective level, 
it involves not government ownership } but government con¬ 

The change in meaning has been a psychological and polit¬ 
ical masterstroke. Control, after all, is much easier to obtain 
than ownership. It is less revolutionary in appearance, there¬ 
fore less frightening to the public. Transfer of ownership is 
sudden and total; assertion of control can be pedestrian and 
piecemeal. The first alarms people; the second pacifies them. 

Is It Socialism? 


In the end, the result is the same. As Henry George 
pointed out, formal title to a piece of property is of small 
importance if government has the right to dispose of the bene¬ 
fits it can yield. What difference does it make if a manufac¬ 
turer or a laborer or a farmer is, technically, a free agent, so 
long as government has complete disposal over all energies 
and resources? The distinction is purely legal and formal, 
and, while not without value, winds up making little sub¬ 
stantive difference to those who have transferred their rights 
to the state. 

That this is indeed the shape of contemporary Socialism 
may be established readily enough from a number of sources. 
One source indicating the full awareness of our own rulers 
concerning the true nature of our subject is a report recently 
prepared for the Central Intelligence Agency, surveying, 
among other things, the shape of internal politics in Western 
Europe. The report tells us that “leftists and younger lead¬ 
ers” in these countries have come to realize that “it was not 
necessary to nationalize industry and finance in order to 
achieve the objectives of Socialism, and that much the same 
ends could be achieved through welfare programs and 
through proper use of the mechanism of modern fiscal and 
monetary systems.” 2 

If that is the gist of Socialism in the Western world, how 
does it compare with American Liberalism? The differences, 
it would appear, are small; not that any single program is per 
se equivalent to Socialism, but rather that the effective ten¬ 
dency of Establishment policy is toward Socialist objectives. 
The Establishment, or at any rate a sizable and vocal part of 
it, wants to achieve these objectives, and consciously views 
each individual measure as a building block which will help 
construct a collectivist United States. 

In 1933, New Dealer Stuart Chase, discussing the prospects 
of national economic self-sufficiency, said: “It can only be 
undertaken when governments take power and speculative 

The Liberal Establishment 


profits away from businessmen and bankers. Vast and delicate 
problems of adjustment are entailed, which cannot be left to 
the clumsy hands of high finance. New industries must be set 
up; old industries liquidated; industrial research for substi¬ 
tute commodities encouraged on a large scale; millions of 
unemployed steered to new jobs; colossal capital shrinkage 
adjusted in some fashion; such foreign trade as remains 
rigidly budgeted by central authority/’ 3 

In 1939, Rexford G. Tugwell, one of the original theorists 
of the New Deal, put matters this way: “It seems to me that 
we are now engaged in a more or less conscious process of 
reassigning and redistributing powers and controls ... In 
certain spheres, no doubt, where enterprise is affected with a 
public interest we shall be forced to resort to an increasing 
degree of public authority to achieve the necessary control.” 4 

More recently, Liberal economist Robert Theobald— 
whose views are endorsed by a high official of the Fund for 
the Republic as “texts” for the Liberal administration in 
Washington—described the proper objectives of government 
policy as follows: “We must recognize the fact that society’s 
needs may be more important than those of a single per¬ 
son ... a strict insistence of existing rights would lead to an 
intolerable situation for all.” In the ideal future, Theobald 
adds, “Each person and each pressure group would be willing 
to concede that the interests of the community as a whole— 
once they were known—should take priority over their own 
interests.” Theobald observes that “many of the policies now 
required by the situation have been described in the past as 
socialist and communist and therefore arouse widespread 
mistrust.” He is happy to note, however, that such “doc¬ 
trinal” considerations now receive less attention than for¬ 
merly. 5 

To take a final example, consider the 1964 platform of 
Americans for Democratic Action, which quite straightfor¬ 
wardly states: “The blind forces of the market place cannot 

Is It Socialism? 


be depended upon either to achieve full employment and 
vigorous growth or to direct economic resources in accord- 
ance with national priorities. For these purposes we need 
democratic national economic planning to evaluate our re¬ 
sources and our needs and to develop an order of priorities 
for the application of resources and our needs . . .” 6 

The dominant urge, in short, is to get control —to plan, 
direct, manipulate. Control, to be sure, for the best of pur¬ 
poses—as defined by Liberals. But then Socialists, too, want 
control for the best of purposes—as defined by Socialists. The 
object is to put government in charge of everybody's destiny; 
to have economic and other decisions made, not by private 
individuals according to their own lights in the employment 
of their own energies, but by political authorities wielding 
the mace of power. 

Compare with these Liberal statements the following ut¬ 
terance by British Socialist Douglas Jay: . . the cure for 

underemployment . . . lies in the adoption of a rationalized 
employment policy. Such a policy is not necessarily Socialist; 
but it can only be adopted by a government which abandons 
laissez-faire theory, and undertakes wholeheartedly the delib¬ 
erate planning of the nation’s economic life. The redistribu¬ 
tion of resources and incomes, however, which is necessary to 
effect a better adjustment of resources to needs, must always 
be the central aim of Socialist policy.” 7 The differences be¬ 
tween Mr. Jay’s formulation of the matter and that used by 
ADA are not readily discernible. 

The power being sought by Liberals achieves its most 
potent effects by avenues which seem indirect and tortuous— 
although as the process of centralization continues this be¬ 
comes less and less the case. The fact remains that the control 
is there. Its chief instrument, chosen by the New Deal and 
wielded vigorously by Liberals ever since, is the economic 
analysis of John Maynard Keynes. 

Keynesian theory assumes government should manipulate 

The Liberal Establishment 


the economy. It views economic life, not as a series of transac¬ 
tions between private individuals, but as a vast impersonal 
“flow” of goods and services, which can and should be turned 
on and off like water from a spigot. That the multifarious 
exchanges of private individuals do add up to such a flow, 
which is to a certain extent manipulatable, is, of course, eco¬ 
nomic fact. But the converse fact that by controlling and 
manipulating the flow one also controls and manipulates mil¬ 
lions of individual human beings is also true. The essence of 
the Keynesian analysis is to regard this fact as irrelevant. 

In its leading premise that government should control the 
economic activities of its citizens, Keynesian economics in¬ 
corporates the central objective of the Socialists. In its de¬ 
tailed workings, it incorporates another Socialist objective as 
well. The avowed purpose of Keynesian fiscal and monetary 
manipulations is to transfer resources away from those who 
lend money to those who borrow it and earn it as wages. By 
pursuit of a “loose money” policy through the central bank¬ 
ing system and inflation through deficit finance, Keynesian 
government makes it unprofitable to save or to lend money at 
interest. The value of savings is eaten up by depreciation of 
the currency; the interest rate is driven down below the mar¬ 
ket rate by control of the banks. The net result is “the 
euthanasia of the rentier”—that is, expropriation of the sav¬ 
ing, money-lending class in order to assist the entrepreneur 
and the wage-earner. The goal, in short, is to “redistribute 
the wealth” through the intricate workings of money and 
credit. Moreover, the Keynesian program, through what has 
turned out to be a permanent spiral of inflation, induces 
governmental controls to deal with the rising prices that re¬ 
sult from its own profligacy. 

All of these things are essential features of American Lib¬ 
eral government today—aptly described by Swiss economist 
Wilhelm Roepke as “fiscal Socialism.” Our officials do not 
view the taxing power, for example, simply as a means of 

Is It Socialism? 


raising revenue. They view it instead as a method of deciding 
how much American citizens ought to spend. They believe 
government should take money away from private individ¬ 
uals who will spend it unwisely, and put it in the hands of 
bureaucrats, who will of course spend it wisely. They are, as 
we shall see, eager to gain other controls which result from all 
this activity—particularly the control which follows neces¬ 
sarily from the extension of subsidy. Finally, they are happy 
to employ the control implicit everywhere by mere dint of 
the fact that so much power has been accumulated; as author¬ 
ity is drained into the central government in Washington, 
alternative centers of decision are progressively enfeebled. 
When the central government misbehaves, there is no one 
influential enough to restrain it. 

Against that background, it is not surprising that British 
Socialist John Strachey should remark: “Was it not apparent 
that Keynesism has only to be pushed a little further and a 
state of things might emerge in which the nominal owners of 
the means of production, although left in full possession of 
the legal title to their property, would in reality be working 
not for themselves but for whatever hands had grasped the 
central levers of social control?’' 8 Was it not apparent, in 
short, that Keynesism comes out precisely where modern So¬ 
cialism itself has come out—securing control of the economy 
to government, leaving private citizens only the formalities of 
their free estate? 

The presumption grows that bracketing modern Liberal¬ 
ism with Socialism is not so great an injustice as Mr. Rauh 
and some of his colleagues would have us believe. Indeed, the 
similarities have become so marked that certain Liberals, and 
certain Socialists, have said as much. There has been a pro¬ 
gressive intertwining of Liberalism with American and 
European Socialism over the past few decades, to the point 
where conservative critics may be forgiven if they do not 
always know which is which. 

The Liberal Establishment 


It is fact, for example, that many contemporary spokesmen 
of the Establishment have emerged directly from the Socialist 
movement. To take only the most illustrious examples, it is 
worth noting that both Walter Lippmann, the columnist, 
and Walter Reuther, the labor leader, are alumni of the 
Intercollegiate Socialist Society, Lippmann having been head 
of the Socialist club at Harvard, Reuther at Wayne State 
University. These two men represent the quintessence of 
Establishment muscle—Lippmann as verbalizer, Reuther as 
political ramrod. That both in their college days became 
impregnated with Socialist doctrine does not tell us anything 
about their present opinions. But a survey of those opinions 
reveals their displacement from Socialist orthodoxy is 
roughly the same as that experienced by Socialism itself. Nei¬ 
ther advocates “nationalization” of industries; both advocate 
extensive government control of the economy. 

Also illustrative of our point is Hubert Humphrey, cur¬ 
rent Vice President of the United States. Humphrey is an 
advocate of almost every conceivable proposal to expand the 
scope of federal power, to substitute government control for 
the free play of private decision. He is a champion of Ameri¬ 
cans for Democratic Action and all its ideological baggage. 
Indeed, he could hardly be otherwise, having performed as 
founder, national chairman, and perennial vice chairman of 
it. On one memorable occasion, Humphrey suggested the 
fullness of his obeisance to ADA in the following words: “So 
far as the ADA is concerned, I, too, am one of its officers. I 
think it is no secret that on occasion this great organization 
has seen fit to chastise me, and perhaps properly so. Perhaps I 
did not understand why at the moment, but their judgment 
is undoubtedly better than mine.” 9 Fortunately for Hum¬ 
phrey, such self-abasement has not often been necessary, since 
ADA has seldom disagreed with his stance on issues. In 15 
years’ service in the U.S. Senate, Humphrey voted in accord¬ 
ance with ADA wishes on 191 out of 194 key roll calls, a pro- 
ADA percentage of 97 per cent. 


Is It Socialism? 


Humphrey is a close personal friend of Great Britain’s So¬ 
cialist leader Harold Wilson. According to the London Ob¬ 
server ,, Humphrey and Wilson took a 1963 jaunt together to 
a Socialist conclave in Europe. And in his 1964 campaign 
book, Humphrey spoke in genial terms of European Social¬ 
ists, pointing out that ‘‘socialism” on the continent and 
“Liberalism” in America are virtually identical 10 —the point 
which his ADA colleague, Mr. Rauh, was at pains to deny. 

Humphrey’s relationship to America’s homegrown Social¬ 
ists has been equally congenial. An openly Socialist organiza¬ 
tion, the League for Industrial Democracy (out of whose 
youth contingent, ISS, emerged Humphrey admirers Lipp- 
mann and Reuther), lists him as one of its “co-operators.” In 
1948, the year he was elected to the Senate, Humphrey ac¬ 
cepted the LID’s “Reunion of Old-Timers” award. 

In 1951, Humphrey delivered a eulogy to the Rand 
School, a self-described Socialist group controlled by the 
American Socialist Society. One of the courses offered by the 
school claimed to train people as “Socialist Party or labor 
union organizers, secretaries, writers, and speakers.” Address¬ 
ing an anniversary meeting of this blatantly Socialist organi¬ 
zation, Humphrey said: “My only regret in this heart¬ 
warming anniversary celebration is that Rand schools do not 
dot the land from New England to California.” 11 

Unsurprisingly, Humphrey won election-year accolades 
from the dean of American Socialists, Norman Thomas. In a 
1964 speech in Chicago, Thomas expressed his backing for 
Humphrey as Vice President, saying Humphrey was “the 
type of Democrat who would be a Socialist if he got to En¬ 
gland.” 12 

Humphrey’s position in our government, needless to re¬ 
mark, is of great substantive importance. Should anything 
happen to President Johnson, this friend of Socialism and 
Socialists would be in control of the immense potencies of the 
Federal executive. But Humphrey is, for the moment, even 
more important symbolically. He illustrates the whole drift 

The Liberal Establishment 


and trend of Establishment politics. The items alluded to 
above were of course well known to the leaders of the Demo¬ 
cratic Party and to the opinion-moulding members of the 
Establishment. They could not, on the record, have cared 
less. They accepted Humphrey, ADA ties, collectivist sympa¬ 
thies, and all, without public demur. That acceptance sug¬ 
gests how far down the road toward a native collectivism we 
have advanced. 

It is worth noting, for example, that Norman Thomas* 
1964 enthusiasms were not limited to the person of Hubert 
Humphrey. The Socialist leader also endorsed and cam¬ 
paigned for Lyndon Johnson, and gave enthusiastic backing 
to the Johnson domestic program. Indeed, Thomas has given 
his backing to the whole tendency of Establishment policy, 
reading it—for all the world like a member of the NAM—as 
an exercise in crypto-Socialism. 13 For that reason, Thomas 
has felt it unnecessary in recent elections to run as a Socialist 
candidate for President. 

Thomas is particularly pleased by the Johnson administra¬ 
tion’s battle against “poverty.” According to the Chicago 
Tribune Thomas has said of Johnson’s program: “I ought to 
rejoice and I do. I rub my eyes in amazement and surprise. 
His war on poverty is a Socialistic approach and may be the 
major issue of the 1964 campaign.” 14 In a subsequent letter 
to the Tribune, Thomas said the war on poverty “would 
have to go farther along Socialist lines.” 15 He did not retract 
or deny the original quote. 

In October 1964, the Liberal Establishment reciprocated 
Thomas’ esteem. A “Norman Thomas 80th Birthday Com¬ 
mittee” set about raising funds to give to Thomas to “spend 
as he wills,” as a means of supporting him and “the things for 
which he stands,” 16 and Establishment figures rushed to get 
their names on the list of sponsors. Among those lending 
their names to the fund appeal were Senators Maurine 
Neuberger, Ernest Gruening, Clifford Case, and Harrison 

Is It Socialism? 


Williams, ADA figures Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., J. Kenneth 
Galbraith and Walter Reuther, and such other representative 
Liberals as Ralph Bunche, Norman Cousins, Adolph A. 
Berle, Jr., and Martin Luther King. 

Another old Socialist overjoyed by Johnson’s war on 
poverty was Upton Sinclair. “I’ve been working on poverty 
since I was a little boy,” Sinclair said in 1964. “Johnson’s anti¬ 
poverty program is a miracle for which I’ve been working all 
my life. The President is my man. He’s going to accomplish 
the feat.” Sinclair added that “I’m as much of a Socialist as I 
have always been, but I have come to realize Socialism will 
come slowly and it won’t be labeled as such.” 17 

That the war on poverty admired by Thomas and Sinclair 
is indeed “a Socialistic approach” seems obvious enough in 
view of the fact that its major inspiration is traced to an 
avowed Socialist named Michael Harrington. Harrington is 
the author of a book called The Other America, a study 
claiming that 50 million U.S. citizens, by Harrington’s lights, 
are impoverished. By every available account, this book is the 
“bible” of the Kennedy-Johnson poverty corps. 

That the Democratic administration would call on a 
militant Socialist for counsel and advice, and premise a 
major program on the result, seems improbable, if only for 
the political risks involved. Yet such seems to be the case. 
That Harrington is a Socialist is no state secret. He calls 
himself such, has edited the Socialist weekly New America, 
and is a contributing editor of Dissent, an avowedly Socialist 
quarterly. On the other hand, there is equally little doubt 
that Harrington was the moving spirit behind the chief polit¬ 
ical brainstorm of the Liberal regime. Newsweek magazine— 
which being owned by the ADA-oriented Washington Post 
should know whereof it speaks—reports that “the late Presi¬ 
dent Kennedy asked Walter Heller, chairman of the Council 
of Economic Advisers, for a copy of Michael Harrington’s 
newly-published nontechnical report on poverty, The Other 

The Liberal Establishment 


America, and for the more scholarly analyses by economists 
like Leon Keyserling and Robert Lampman, a University of 
Wisconsin specialist on low-income families.” 18 Newsweek 
went on to say that chief poverty battler R. Sargent Shriver’s 
“brainstormers” included “Defense Department’s Adam 
Yarmolinsky and Pat Moynihan of Labor, reinforced by in¬ 
tellectuals like Harrington,” offered a quote by Harrington 
about the inadequacy of what was being planned, and threw 
in a final reference to Harrington as one who had recently 
“huddled” with Shriver. 19 Time added the intelligence that 
Harrington’s book “impressed Jack Kennedy, who used the 
Harrington phrase, 'the invisible poor’ in his speeches” and 
that “presidential economic adviser Walter Heller is thor¬ 
oughly familiar with Harrington’s thin, 191-page volume.” 20 
Finally, “poverty” spokesmen told an inquiring reporter that 
Harrington had personally been invited to Washington by 
Shriver to serve as chief idea man, and that the committee 
considered Harrington’s book the definitive work on the sub¬ 
ject. During the 1964 campaign Harrington returned the 
favor to the Johnson regime by supporting it against the 
Goldwater-Miller ticket. The New York Times —declaring 
“Many Socialists Back Johnson, Thomas Will Tour Nation 
to Support President”—reported that among prominent Soci- j 
alists backing the Johnson-Humphrey ticket were Irwin 
Suall, Thomas, and Harrington. 21 

The fact that Socialist Harrington is the chief inspiration 
of the chief domestic program of the Johnson admininistra- 
tion seems clear. And, whatever else this may or may not 
mean, it certainly leaves the Liberal regime little room for 
complaint that it is being blackguarded when some critic de¬ 
scribes its programs as “Socialistic.” 

4 . “Aid” Means Control 

If establishment politicians and ideologues seek to con¬ 
trol the economy, how do they go about it? Troops, except on 
rare occasions, do not go marching about the streets. News¬ 
papers have not been padlocked. Industry is not nationalized. 
Whence comes the power the Liberal wants to achieve? 

The answer can be phrased in many ways, but the version 
that has become most familiar to Americans is summed up in 
the two words, “federal aid.” By use of the taxing and spend¬ 
ing power, the government can effectively evade constitu¬ 
tional restrictions upon the scope of its authority. It can take 
away from individual citizens the power to dispose of their 
own resources. It can make individuals and interest groups de¬ 
pendent upon its will for their sustenance. And, finally, it can 
impose controls upon the recipients of its largess. 

Possessed of all these virtues, “federal aid” has become the 
favored technique of the Establishment. There is no need to 

The Liberal Establishment 


own an industry if it is sufficiently “aided," sufficiently de¬ 
pendent on government; it can readily be controlled in a 
pinch without any alteration in the form of ownership. 
There is no need to abolish local autonomies if in point of 
fact cities and states, dependent on federal handouts, must 
obey the federal will in all major decisions. There is no need 
for collectivized agriculture if the farmer, having accepted 
price supports, has also put on the straitjacket of acreage con¬ 
trols. Through the philosopher's stone of “aid," all aspects of 
American life can be brought under control of the govern¬ 
ment in Washington. 

This is not to say direct controls, some forms of govern¬ 
ment ownership, and outright usurpation are altogether 
ruled out. But it is apparent that “aid" programs offer the 
most effective, the least painful, and politically the most 
popular way of getting the job done. Through the magic of 
“aid" the quest for power becomes a philanthropic mission, 
in which the affections and the freedom of the citizenry are 
purchased with their own money. Thus the characteristic 
Liberal response to almost any problem in our society is to 
legislate “aid." There is no phase of American life which is 
not being thoroughly “aided" by one or another agency in 
the jumble of Washington authorities, which is not in some 
way dependent upon a contract or a subsidy from govern¬ 
ment, which is not programmed for still more “aid" in the 
future, and which therefore is not effectively under the 
thumb of the federal bureaucracy. 

There are many aspects of this problem worthy of consid¬ 
eration. One is the built-in fallacy of states and localities 
shipping money to Washington, having sizable deductions 
made there as the cost of handling, bungling, and general 
overhead, and then receiving back the diminished remainder 
with thanks as “aid." Another is the false argument that fed¬ 
eral taxing resources are more competent to handle modern 
problems than are state and local resources—a contention 

“Aid n Means Control 


successfully demolished by Roger A. Freeman in his Taxes 
For the Schools . Yet another is the false hypothesis of “need’' 
worked up to justify every such proposal—whether it con¬ 
cerns medical care for the aged or funds for school construc¬ 
tion. And still another is the widespread opportunity for 
graft and corruption presented by the throwing about of such 
great sums of money, problems which have been all too evi¬ 
dent in such things as the urban renewal and farm programs. 
These matters are too vast and intricate to be examined in 
full here, although the question of need in a typical Estab¬ 
lishment enterprise, and the problem of corruption, will be 
looked into briefly in succeeding chapters. For the moment, 
the problem which concerns us is the impact of these taxing- 
and-spending programs upon American freedoms, the tech¬ 
nique by which they put the free citizen under the control of 
the ADA ideologues and the “masters of the ad hoc ” who 
populate the Liberal regime in Washington. 

Perhaps the most obvious method of control is in the exer¬ 
tion of the taxing power itself. As such as Schlesinger and 
Clark make clear, taxation is an effective means of transfer¬ 
ring the power to make decisions away from the private citi¬ 
zen and vesting it in the federal government. If the citizen 
is not allowed to keep the fruits of his labors, he will not be 
able to buy himself that mauve Cadillac or chartreuse XKE; 
instead he will have a new federally-supported civic center or 
an urban renewal project, which is of course much better for 
him. Indeed, the funds taken from the citizen for such pur¬ 
poses by government amount simply to putting him to work 
in the government’s behalf. 

Beyond this, the increasing scope of governmental activi¬ 
ties and the vast services which government therefore re¬ 
quires from one business or another, mean an increasing 
number of people who are in thrall to governmental desires. 
To consider but one example: In the steel crisis of April, 
1962, when President Kennedy sought to bend the industry’s 

The Liberal Establishment 

► 100 

pricing policies to his will, timely if rather heavy-handed use 
was made of governmental contracts with the industry. Secre¬ 
tary of Defense Robert McNamara scarcely troubled to con¬ 
ceal the threat of lost contracts if the steel companies did 
not come around to the New Frontier’s dictates. “I have 
noted,” said the secretary, “that while iron and steel prices 
have increased by 90% since 1947, the prices of nonferrous 
metals have increased by only 40%. Therefore, we are partic¬ 
ularly studying the possibility for replacement of steel by 
other materials including the potential of increased research 
and development in this area.” 1 The meaning of this state¬ 
ment could hardly have been missed: Either do what the 
President tells you, or lose your contract. Anyone familiar 
with management thinking in large corporations dealing with 
the government can testify that the same message forms 
a backdrop for every critical decision. Particularly in areas 
of public controversy, the fear of losing government con¬ 
tracts rests like a giant hand on the policy-making machinery 
of American business. 

If the mere existence of a government contract provides 
the elements of government control, it should be clear that 
the extension of a direct subsidy provides them still more 
effectively. Any business, any farmer, any community de¬ 
pendent upon government largess must obviously face the 
same considerations as those spelled out for U.S. Steel in 
1962. Action contrary to governmental desires can result in 
the loss of governmental subvention. That elementary equa¬ 
tion alone would be sufficient to introduce the element of 
control into every scheme of “federal aid.” But as it happens 
there is much more to the business of federal control than the 
knowledge that resistance may mean the loss of subsidy. For 
every scheme of “aid” necessarily involves, not simply this 
negative sanction, but a system of positive, active control, 
directing and altering the behavior of the recipient in the 
pattern of Establishment desires. Federal aid. at all times im¬ 
plies this kind of active control. 

“Aid” Means Control 


This is so for a number of reasons. Constitutionally, the 
Supreme Court has determined that the government has the 
right to control that which it subsidizes. Practically, it would 
make no sense for the government to appropriate money for 
some purpose and then take no effective steps to see the pur¬ 
pose carried out. Morally, the government has no right to 
take taxpayers dollars and to distribute them irresponsibly, 
without maintaining some influence over the way in which 
they are spent. All of these things provide quite legitimate 
and necessary bases for “control.” 

There is, moreover, another reason for control—the desire 
of the Establishment to have it. This, indeed, is the major 
reason for Establishment advocacy of “aid” programs—the 
fact that “aid” does mean control, and therefore will enable 
the federal government to remold American institutions in 
the pattern of Liberal ideology. Federal aid, as Senator Clark 
has indicated, supplies a means of breaking past the will of 
local agencies, of redistributing the wealth, of enacting uni¬ 
form national programs to supersede diverse local programs. 

It is amazing to note that Establishment aid advocates per¬ 
sist in denying that aid means control. There are few facts 
easier to ascertain, a priori or on the historical record. The 
chief reason for such control was stated some 30 years ago by 
John J. Tigert, former U.S. Commissioner of Education. 
“Reason and experience,” Tigert said, “both indicate that 
federal money cannot be expended wisely and efficiently ex¬ 
cept by exercising federal control and supervision; even then 
there is considerable waste ... If we embark upon a program 
of turning over federal money to schools without any strings 
attached, it is only a question of time until the waste, ex¬ 
travagance, and misuse of these funds will result in a reaction 
or a change. The alternative is federal control.” 2 

Congressman John Lesinski (D-Mich.), former chairman 
of the House Education and Labor Committee, put it that “it 
is impossible to draft a general federal aid bill which will not 
contain a great deal of federal control over local school sys- 

The Liberal Establishment 


terns ... I am convinced, after the hard study we have put to 
the question, that no acceptable bill preventing federal 
domination of local schools can be drawn. I reluctantly came 
to the conclusion, but I had to face the facts/’ 3 Lesinski’s 
successor as Chairman of the House Committee, Congress¬ 
man Graham Barden (D-N.C.) agreed, citing numerous ex¬ 
amples of federal interference under legislation to aid 
schools in federally-impacted areas. Even so respected a 
member of the Establishment as James Bryant Conant came 
to a similar conclusion. ‘‘To imagine that recurring appro¬ 
priations of this magnitude can be made without careful 
budgeting on the part of the administration seems to me to 
be the equivalent of imagining completely irresponsible 
government. Careful budgeting will mean, in turn, a strong 
executive agency which must have access to a mass of factual 
information about the educational situation in every state . . . 
The educational committees of the House and Senate will 
have every reason to examine into details of curricula and 
school organization, much as committees of the state legisla¬ 
tures now do from time to time.” 4 

And so, invariably, it has turned out. Federal stipends, be 
they for education or flood control, always carry with them 
federal “standards” or “guidelines” governing the way in 
which they must be spent. One community after another has 
found this out to its sorrow after becoming involved in vari¬ 
ous federal programs: 

Item . Participating in the federal government’s unem¬ 
ployment compensation program, the state of Ohio discov¬ 
ered its own money could not be used in the way it saw fit. 
Ohio employers had paid some $30 million in taxes for un¬ 
employment conpensation, of which $17 million was to be 
returned to the state. This $17 million belonged to Ohio, and 
was to be administered by an agency of the Ohio govern¬ 
ment. The federal Department of Labor, however, believed 
Ohio should adopt two procedural rules governing the dis- 

“Aid” Means Control 

► 103 

tribution of the money. It withheld the $17 million until the 
rules were complied with. 

Item. The state of Nebraska decided to accept federal 
funds for certain educational purposes, in the amount of 
$150,000. When the state Board of Education sent along to 
Washington its plans for use of the money, however, it was 
informed that “the math and science program'' would have 
to be revised “according to the guidelines sent out by the 
federal government," if the state was going to receive the 
money. As one Nebraska newspaper put it, “The federal 
department will set the terms and the state will follow 
them." 5 

Item. Various participants in even so innocuous-sounding 
an affair as the federal school lunch program have found too 
many controls for their liking. Federal guidelines concerning 
menus and the matter of who should or should not be served 
lunch at school often conflict with state and local practices. 
Result: Many schools, in Los Angeles, Phoenix, Indianapolis 
and elsewhere, have withdrawn from the program rather 
than brook federal interference with their local programs. 6 

Item. In the city of Cleveland, Ohio, federal urban re¬ 
newal authorities commanded the demolition of “structurally 
sound" buildings for such minor items as burned-out lights, 
chipped plaster, and rubbish in the basement. Federal au¬ 
thorities also ordered razing of certain buildings because they 
were not “compatible" with what the planners deemed 
proper use of the land. Housing codes to determine what is 
substandard and what is not according to federal conceptions 
are part and parcel of all urban renewal and public hous¬ 
ing programs sustained by federal money. 

Item. George Peabody College in Nashville, Tennessee, 
withdrew from participation in the National Defense Educa¬ 
tion Act because it found that, to get federal funds, it had to 
lower its academic standards regarding admissions, was not 
allowed to make its own changes in the curriculum, was pre- 

The Liberal Establishment 


vented from making changes in personnel, and was subjected 
to arbitrary conditions about when and how to recruit stu¬ 
dents for its program. 

Item. The President of the University of Louisville testi¬ 
fied unhappily that his school had eight doctoral programs, 
all in science, and all resulting from the shaping influence of 
federal funds. 

Item . When voters in California passed a referendum 
proposition repealing a state “fair housing” law, the federal 
government immediately suspended more than $100 million 
in urban renewal grants. The Housing and Home Finance 
Agency, according to the San Francisco Chronicle, said “the 
reason . . . was that federal law demands anti-discrimination 
guarantees in such projects, and this pledge could be made no 
longer because of the proposition’s passage.” 7 

Item. According to a 1962 M.I.T.-financed study, “1,665,- 
000 persons had been or were about to be required to move 
from their homes” by federal urban renewal programs. “If 
the program continues to expand, more millions will be dis¬ 
placed in the future.” These people are not consulted as to 
their wishes in the matter. They are forced to leave their 
dwellings, and usually end up in housing as bad or worse 
than what the government took away from them. 8 

Item. In March, 1965, the Federal government announced 
it was holding up “war on poverty” funds destined for the 
state of Louisiana because “it does not like some of Gov. 
John J. McKeithen’s appointments under the state’s anti¬ 
poverty program.” 9 Complaints had been lodged that two 
of the governor’s appointees were segregationists—which is 
not unlikely in view of the fact that the governor himself is 
a segregationist. It was not asserted that the men in question 
had done anything discriminatory with respect to the poverty 
program; they simply were segregationists, and that was 
enough to cause withdrawal of the funds. Federal money, in 
short, was employed as a lever to obtain conformity in a 

“Aid” Means Control 


matter of personal opinion with no connection, so far as the 
record at that time disclosed, to the purpose of the project 
in question. 

Every federal program carries with it an infra-structure of 
controls. Even land-grant colleges, often brought forward as 
examples of “aid” recipients who have not suffered from 
controls, have had their curricula angled toward “military 
science, agriculture, and the mechanic arts.” 10 Other more de¬ 
tailed controls are exerted in other programs, including fi¬ 
nancial audits, specifications for equipment and types of serv¬ 
ice, guidelines as to who is a proper participant, etc. There is 
no federal program on record which has not carried some of 
these controls, and which has not therefore influenced recipi¬ 
ents to conform to federal designs. 

Other examples, particularly in the field of urban renewal 
and housing, might be cited at length. But these will suggest 
the general tendency of the controls resulting from federal 
“aid”—controls which inevitably follow from the desire of the 
authorities in Washington to see their legislative and admin¬ 
istrative purposes fulfilled. We have cited the preponderance 
of the examples from the field of education, because it is in 
education, in training of the minds of the coming genera¬ 
tions, that control can be most effective, and should be most 
feared. It is also in education that the protestations of “no 
control” from aid advocates have been most vehement. 

The fact is that the Establishment wants control of Amer¬ 
ica’s schools, for a variety of reasons transcending administra¬ 
tive necessity. This can be demonstrated easily enough by 
noting Liberal opposition to the so-called “tax-credit” idea. 
Under the “tax-credit” plan, parents of college students and 
donors to colleges would be allowed to deduct a certain per¬ 
centage of tuition fees or gifts from their income tax. The 
result of such a program would be to ease financial hardship 
on parents and make gifts to higher education a much more 
attractive proposition. 

The Liberal Establishment 


Such a program would answer the asserted need for more 
money to higher education. Indeed, it would make more 
money available for that purpose than would an “aid” pro¬ 
gram administered in Washington, since there would be no 
outlay required for administrators, forms, office space, etc., in 
the national capital. Yet many of the same Liberals who re¬ 
peatedly stress the urgency of making money available to the 
colleges have ranged themselves against the “tax-credit” idea. 
The reason is simple: Under this proposal, there would be no 
control. The federal government would not allocate the 
money; it would not be able to determine which schools 
would get it, or for what purposes; it would not be able to lay 
down guidelines for the curriculum or oversee administra¬ 
tion; it would not be able to threaten withdrawal of funds 
from a school which did not conform to Establishment 
ideas. 11 

That control is what the Establishment is after has also 
been made clear by such as Senator Clark, in his frank state¬ 
ment that Federal “aid” programs offer an opportunity for 
reshaping the economic structure of the country, a means of 
“redistributing the wealth downward.” A like opinion has 
been sent out under the imprimatur of the National Educa¬ 
tion Association, the Establishment’s principal agent in 
prosecuting the nationalization of American schools. In an 
NEA pamphlet entitled “The Root Of the Opposition,” ex¬ 
ecutive editor John McCormally of the Hutchinson, Kansas, 
News, spelled out the Clark view at length. The real issue in 
federal-aid-to-education programs, McCormally said, con¬ 
cerns the desire of the “majority” in America to “exert most 
of its political energy” in the job of “controlling, curtailing, 
and transforming capitalism into some forms and stages of 
socialism.” Public education is an avenue for such activity, he 
goes on, but offered no great possibilities “as long as it re¬ 
mained local.” “The masses might fill the schools with their 
children; but the community leaders —its business and pro- 

“Aid” Means Control 

► 107 

fessional men—those concerned with preserving the com¬ 
munity’s wealth, controlled the schools. And they kept them 
inexpensive.” (Italics added.) 

Federal aid to education provides a means for getting 
around this difficulty, and thus the battle over federal aid is 
“a fight between the people with the wealth and the people 
with the kids . . . Once public education has been made as 
much a federal responsibility as national defense or national 
highways, more money than was ever dreamed of will be 
spent on it. More than ever of the nation’s wealth will be 
taken from those who possess it and spent on the nation’s 
children.” 12 

This statement is notable in several respects—particularly 
for its class-struggle motif and its avowal that federal aid pro¬ 
grams represent a stage on the road to Socialism. Yet the 
important point is the writer’s clear affirmation that what is 
desired is to take control of the schools away from the local 
authorities; local schools are dominated by the men of 
wealth; the federal government will put an end to this. The 
issue is first one of who shall control the schools, and there¬ 
after one of how much money shall be spent. 

The opinions of someone in Hutchinson, Kansas, would be 
only obliquely significant to the national destiny if they were 
the opinions of but a single man. But the point about Mr. 
McCormally’s creed is that it has been handsomely printed 
up and mailed out by the National Education Association, 
chief lobbyist for federal “aid” and ruling force in American 
public education. Quite obviously, the NEA agrees with Mr. 
McCormally, and it is the NEA which calls the tune in get¬ 
ting “aid” programs enacted and in administering them once 
they are on the books. 

In early 1961, The New Republic and the Washington 
Post Establishment publications with great influence in 
Washington—printed a commentary on federal “aid” affirm¬ 
ing the Clark-McCormally-NEA thesis. More money would 

The Liberal Establishment 

► 108 

be spent on education, the article said, but “the question of 
how this money should be spent, and who ultimately will be 
the school’s masters remains a topic of heated debate.” And: 
“Congress will be told of all the ways in which federal money 
could be more wisely spent, if the myopic local school boards 
or the self-seeking state legislators were not in the saddle.” 13 
Under local supervision of the schools, the article goes on, 
such know-nothings as the DAR and local clergymen can 
exert influence on the curriculum; whereas under federal 
control the “experts” (that is, the NEA panjandrums who 
mail out brochures proclaiming the virtues of Socialism) can 
take charge without fear of local pressures. 

Also in 1961, Congressman John Ashbrook (R-Ohio) un¬ 
covered an almost identical statement on “local control” 
within the ranks of the Education Office itself. In a speech on 
the floor of the House, Ashbrook disclosed: 

Carroll Hansen, Director, Publications Services, Office of Edu¬ 
cation, transmitted an unpublicized memorandum to the Com¬ 
mittee on Mission and Organization when it started its work 
which ultimately wound up in the report in question [“A Federal 
Education Agency for the Future”; see below]. In it he laid bare 
the real nemesis of the federal bureaucrats—the tradition of local 
control. On one hand he referred to this doctrine as a “valuable 
tradition” but this window dressing was brushed aside com¬ 
pletely with these prophetic words: “However, the tradition of 
local control has been used by certain groups to forestall in¬ 
creased expenditures for education; it has been used to frighten 
the Office of Education out of areas where the national interest 
is involved and where the Office does have a legitimate concern. 
The tradition of local control should no longer be permitted to 
inhibit Office of Education leadership.” 14 

These three items draw back the veil from Liberal pur¬ 
poses in promoting federal “aid”: To break down local 
autonomies, notoriously resistant to the prevailing cliches of 
the Establishment, and to homogenize Americah schools into 
a single system, administered in Washington where the Es- 

“Aid” Means Control 

► 109 

tablishment is in charge. This might well give Liberalism so 
firm a purchase on the minds of American youngsters that 
nothing could dislodge it. # 

How far have we proceeded toward this objective? Much 
further, it would appear, than most people would care to 
believe. In 1963, a House committee headed by Representa¬ 
tive Edith Green (D-Ore.) determined that the federal gov¬ 
ernment, through a gaggle of programs administered through 
seven different agencies, was already spending $1.8 billion a 
year on “aid” to education. The committee made the as¬ 
tounding discovery that more than half of America's gradu¬ 
ate students (22,000 out of 40,000) were already receiving 
federal assistance in one form or another, and estimated that 
by 1970 some three-fourths of them (60,000 out of 80,000) 
would thus be subsidized. Which means that three-quarters 
of the future intellectual class of America will be at least in 
part beholden to the federal government for its advanced 
educational work. 

In April, 1961, the U.S. Office of Education took note of 
the proliferating aid programs, found them good, but urged 
that they be consolidated, in so far as was possible, under its 
own control. Rumors about the agency's report to this effect, 
“A Federal Education Agency for the Future,” circulated 
about Washington for many weeks; the document was 
alleged to be a blueprint for federal takeover of the schools. 
In response to these charges, the education office published 
the report, saying nothing could be further from its inten- 

* When the Johnson administration finally did push a Federal-aid-to- 
education bill through, it contained many controls indeed. The control 
features, unsurprisingly, were found good by Liberal commentators. The 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch observed that the bill’s insistence on Federally- 
established “effective procedures, including provision for appropriate meas¬ 
urements of educational achievement,” authority given the U. S. Commis¬ 
sioner of Education to disseminate “to teachers and administrators significant 
information derived from education research,” and provision for appointment 
of a 12-member National Advisory Council on Education for the Disadvan¬ 
taged, “to keep the program under surveillance,” were all necessary “safe¬ 
guards,” “even though some states-righters may raise the cry of Federal 

The Liberal Establishment 


tions than a “takeover.” Assertions that the report was “a 
confidential plan to establish federal control of education,” 
said the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, are 
“completely in error both in terms of the substance of the 
report and in its publication.” 15 A reading of the report, on 
the assumption that it was not altered between its confiden¬ 
tial and public phases, confirms this defense. It seems clear 
enough that the Office of Education was not proposing a 
takeover; more accurately, it was confirming and propos¬ 
ing to reorganize a takeover which had already in large part 
occurred. To cite a characteristic passage: “The last decade 
has seen added to the historic functions of the Office ... a 
variety of new responsibilities; growing responsibilities in the 
carrying out of established federal policy; responsibility as 
the federal government’s educational auditor; and distinc¬ 
tive responsibility in the field of international education. All 
three of these functions are an outgrowth of increasingly ac¬ 
tive national concern for education. All three of these new 
major functions point to what may be identified as a fourth- 
extensive involvement in the formulation of national pol¬ 
icy.” 16 The report continues in this vein—that education is 
now one of the major responsibilities of the federal govern¬ 
ment, and that a whole new bureaucracy needs to be charted 
to oversee this responsibility, pass out the funds, and impose 
the controls. The document does not say a takeover should 
occur; it begins from the premise that the takeover is already 
a fact of life and, with a few ritualistic bows to “pluralism,” 
wants to get the whole thing organized on a sensible, busi¬ 
nesslike basis. Anyone reading this document with care must 
come to realize that federal absorption of the educational 
system is already well begun. And given the NEA-Ateu; Re¬ 
public thesis of what ought to be done once the absorption is 
completed, it is altogether possible that neither our constitu¬ 
tional system nor our free enterprise economy would survive 
the result. 

5. The Planned Economy 

As envisioned by the Founding Fathers the federal govern¬ 
ment was to perform resolutely certain tasks assigned to it by 
the Constitution, and refrain from tasks not so assigned. 
James Madison, in Federalist No. 45, gave the matter its 
classic formulation: 

The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the 
federal government are few and defined. Those which are to 
remain in the state governments are numerous and indefinite. 
The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as 
war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last 
the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The 
powers reserved to the several states will extend to all the objects 
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liber - 
ties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, im¬ 
provement, and prosperity of the state . 1 (Italics added.) 

The Liberal Establishment 


If we compare that statement to the collectivist aspirations 
of the Establishment, it is clear Liberalism seeks to turn 
Madison’s ideas inside-out. Just how close the Establishment 
has come to completing the job is hard to determine with 
precision. The higgledy-piggledy, piecemeal method of col¬ 
lectivist advance, the consistent effort of the Establishment to 
disguise what it is doing, and the contradiction and dilution 
which result from the give and take of the political system, all 
tend to confuse things. 

In general terms, however, it is obvious the program of 
inversion is well advanced, and is everywhere pressing for¬ 
ward. It would take more pages of this volume than we can 
spare to list all the areas where the federal government has 
absorbed the powers of the states and denied the liberties of 
the individual. There is no exact way of judging the full size 
and potency of Federal sprawl, but some idea of it may be 
derived from the following figures: 

1. The federal government dispenses over $125 billion 
annually by way of salaries, fees, payments for goods and serv¬ 
ice, direct subsidies, etc. This amounts to about one-quarter 
of the Gross National Product. As U.S . News observes, “tens 
of millions of Americans—it could even be a majority of 
those of voting age—are getting something directly or in¬ 
directly out of the Treasury in Washington.” 2 

2. In 1934, the national budget was $6.3 billion. In 1949, 
it was $39.4 billion. In 1956, $66.2 billion. In i960, $76.5 
billion. For the four years of the Kennedy-Johnson adminis¬ 
tration, the figures have been $81.5 billion, $87.7 billion, 
$92.6 billion and $98.4 billion. And, it should be added, 
because some expenditures are not included in the official 
budget, these figures understate the case. 

3. In 1926, the average taxpayer paid a federal income 
tax of $7. In 1962, he paid federal taxes of $860—an increase 
of better than 12,000 per cent. 

4. In 1963, American citizens paid a tax load«amounting to 

The Planned Economy 


almost one-third of their income. According to estimates by 
the Council of State Chambers of Commerce, the average cit¬ 
izen had to work 118 days merely to pay his taxes, most of 
these days in behalf of the federal government. 

5. The total assets of the federal government, as of mid- 
1 963, were valued at $315 billion, an increase of 20 per cent 
over 1958. The federal authorities, moreover, own one-third 
of all the land in the United States. 

6. Direct federal employment, military and civilian, comes 
to about five million people. Indirect federal employment, 
through federal contracts, etc., is estimated at 6.5 million. 
Another seven million or so are employed by state and local 
governments, many of them in functions related to or sub¬ 
sidized by federal programs. Total government employment, 
direct and indirect, comes to 18.5 million people, or better 
than one-fourth of the American work force. The federal 
payroll in 1963, for civilian employment only, came to $15.9 

7. The real debt of the federal government, counting trust 
fund obligations, is $1.2 trillion, according to a 1962 estimate 
prepared by Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia. 3 

The federal government, obviously, has become the domi¬ 
nant force in our society. It is our largest employer, owner of 
land, consumer of coal, electricity, and water, owner of ma¬ 
chine tools, customer for lumber, cloth, shoes, and shirts, 
owner of motor vehicles, etc. It has woven its web of subsidies 
through every quarter of our society. Subventions from the 
national treasury are extended to businessmen through the 
Small Business Administration and the Area Redevelopment 
and Urban Renewal agencies; to farmers through the Agri¬ 
culture Department; to laboring men through unemploy¬ 
ment compensation; to young people through aid to educa¬ 
tion and the Job Corps; to the elderly through Social Security 
and medicare; to city dwellers through urban renewal and 

The Liberal Establishment 

► 114 

“depressed areas” legislation; to tenants through public hous¬ 
ing, etc. 

People employed by the federal government, subsidized by 
it, or receiving contracts from it are obviously open to federal 
influence and control. But there are other methods of control 
as well. These include the previously-mentioned fiscal and 
monetary powers essential to Keynesian manipulations, and 
the negative control of taxation which deprives the citizen of 
his earned income at the whim of Washington’s economic 
numerologists. They also include a vast network of regula¬ 
tions. Federal regulators set prices of commodities from steel 
to milk. Through the Anti-Trust division of the Justice De¬ 
partment and the Federal Trade Commission they can exert 
life or death power over thousands of businesses. The gov¬ 
ernment regulates the sale of stocks and bonds, hectors the 
management of the drug industry, polices advertising, dic¬ 
tates terms for packaging and lending, sets the conditions for 
selling a pack of cigarettes. It determines how much money 
people will be paid for working and for not working. It de¬ 
cides whom a businessman shall hire and fire, and to whom 
barbecue stands and hot dog emporiums will purvey their 
services. It forbids employers to give truthful information to 
employees concerning unions, and even forbids an entrepre¬ 
neur to go out of business if he so chooses. 

Many of these controls are exercised by federal regulatory 
commissions—governing bodies responsible to the executive 
branch, but enjoying the powers of legislative, executive and 
judiciary combined. These agencies deal in “administrative 
law,” law created by the commissions, executed by them, and 
judged by them. There are now some 52 independent agen¬ 
cies extending in every direction across the American land¬ 
scape. They control almost every variety of private business, 
railroads and airlines and truckers, power companies, radio 
and television stations. They are vivid embodiment of every¬ 
thing Madison wanted to prevent. 

The Planned Economy 

► 115 

Lowell Mason, a former commissioner of the FTC, says: 
“Tyranny comes when the government agency operates 
under such a broad statutory command that it not only in¬ 
vents the means by which it carries on the duties Congress 
gave it, but can shape its methods to fit its own, rather than 
the public end.” 4 Such a point, he argues, has been reached 
in the administrative law sponsored by the Trade Commis¬ 
sion. As an example of the ad lib authority exercised by the 
FTC in the jumble of legislation available to it. Mason says: 
“As an administrator of two anti-trust laws diametrically op¬ 
posed to each other, it was not difficult for me to accuse 
everybody at a trade convention with being some kind of law¬ 
breaker. Either they were all charging everyone the same 
price, a circumstance indicating a violation of the Sherman 
Act, or they were not charging everyone the same price, a 
circumstance indicating violation of the Robinson-Patman 
Act.” 5 

In addition to the programmatic effort to put more power 
in the hands of government, there has been a drive to put 
power, within the government, into the hands of the Presi¬ 

In his message to Congress of January 11, 1962, President 
Kennedy requested standby authority to cut taxes on his own 
discretion and to launch public works programs—both sup¬ 
posedly to combat recession, both in fact unprecedented sug¬ 
gestions that Congress surrender its constitutional powers to 
the executive branch. A week later, the President requested a 
five-year authorization to cut tariffs through direct Presiden¬ 
tial negotiation with foreign countries. A fortnight later 
came the Urban Affairs plan and the Kennedy farm program 
—both of which would have given the executive branch vast 
discretionary powers over the American citizen. In March, 
Kennedy asked that many of the functions of the National 
Science Foundation be placed under his authority. In April 
he requested sweeping executive powers over the manufac- 

The Liberal Establishment 


ture and sale of drugs, as well as the power to select his own 
Federal Reserve Board Chairman. The latter proposal would 
have placed in presidential hands broad powers for political 
manipulation of the economy, through control of the redis¬ 
count rate and reserve requirements, affecting the availabil¬ 
ity of bank credit. 

The Republican Senate Policy Committee, in a statement 
issued in July 1963, estimated that “during the entire Second 
session of the 87th Congress, the President made 88 requests 
for monies, and 29 requests for Presidential powers. In the 
first six months of this session the President has made 207 
requests for monies and 70 requests for Presidential powers.” 
In October, 1964, the Policy Committee ran a similar check 
on President Johnson’s first eleven months in office, and 
found that he had made no less than 2 53 requests for money, 
110 requests for presidential powers. 6 

Thanks to the relentless initiatives of the executive and the 
increasingly revolutionary performance of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, there is today virtually no zone of public life in which 
federal officials do not claim authority. All of the acts cited 
above, of course, are violative of the division of powers sug¬ 
gested by Madison. To these are added massive waves of 
encroachment in one area after another of state authority. It 
is now maintained, for example, that the federal government 
can instruct a county within a state to provide public schools 
to its citizens; that the federal government has the right to 
superintend the integration of races in those schools; that the 
federal government has “pre-empted” the field of internal 
security legislation from the states, although the congres¬ 
sional sponsor of the federal bill in question says precisely the 
opposite. The central government has also undertaken to 
expunge prayer from public school classrooms which the 
states saw fit to leave there. And now, through the decrees of 
the Supreme Court, it even dictates to the states the composi¬ 
tion of their own several legislatures. As Professor Charles S. 


The Planned Economy 


Hyneman of Indiana University puts it, “this Court now sees 
itself as above the Constitution. It is using the Constitution 
to bring the nation to political practices which the Court 
thinks to be the ideal—and it can find in the Constitution 
words to justify its definition of the ideal.” 7 

Establishment spokesmen say this gathering incubus of 
controls is mandated by the growing complexities of the age, 
and that it does not in fact threaten freedom. As to the first 
point, such knowledgeable men as Prof. F. A. Hayek have 
conclusively shown that centralized power is less capable of 
ministering to the needs of a complex economy than is the 
self-adjusting mechanism of the free market; and, as we have 
seen, the argument from “necessity” is a diversion. The Es¬ 
tablishment seeks centralization because it wants centraliza¬ 
tion, and pursues it by methods that are not always ingenu¬ 
ous. As to the second point, we can perhaps best determine 
the impact of the Establishment program on American free¬ 
doms by getting down to specific cases. 

The Liberal regime's approach to the farm problem is an 
illuminating chapter in the annals of “democratic planning.” 
It was in a farm case, Wickard vs . Filbnrn (1942), that the 
Supreme Court laid down the maxim that government can 
control what it subsidizes; and control in all its aspects has 
been the leading characteristic of Liberal ideas on farm pol¬ 
icy. Under Agriculture Secretary Orville Freeman, Estab¬ 
lishment farm programs have included such things as dump¬ 
ing surpluses to break prices and punish recalcitrant farmers, 
strict acreage controls, a proposal to mete out jail sentences to 
dairy men failing to keep accurate records, a request that 
Freeman be allowed to buy up farm land, and blatant use of 
taxpayers’ money to propagandize for Establishment tight- 
control policies in the 1963 wheat referendum. Commenting 
on the Kennedy-Freeman 1962 farm bill embracing many of 
these coercive provisions, American Farm Bureau President 
Charles Shuman said: 

The Liberal Establishment 

► 118 

The most startling feature of the proposed legislation ... is the 
use of government stocks of wheat and feed grains to compel 
farmers to accept proposed control programs ... It is naked 
coercion to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to dump up to 
10 million tons of feed grains and 200 million bushels of wheat to 
break the market price any time farmers vote against the admin¬ 
istration’s proposed control programs . . . The . . . [administra¬ 
tion] scheme calls for supply management with tight government 
control of all farms and farmers through milk quotas, feed grain 
acreage and marketing quotas and a complicated three-price 
market control plan for wheat . . . The administration contem¬ 
plates the extension of permanent controls on production and 
marketing of all major crops and livestock. County ASC Commit¬ 
tees would have vast powers to set acreage and yield allotments as 
well as to regulate the transfer of milk allotments . . . The ad¬ 
ministration bill authorizes wholesale dumping of the surplus to 
force a favorable vote in so-called “democratic referenda .” 8 

All of this, Shuman said, was opposed to the Farm Bureau's 
belief in a free American agriculture. In 1963, American 
wheat farmers showed they agreed by voting down the 
administration’s program. 

Some of the controls employed in the agriculture program 
have been envisioned for rural land-owners everywhere. In 
his 1961 farm message, Kennedy proposed something called a 
“rural renewal program.” This would establish agencies at 
the local level called “rural renewal corporations,” with 
power to buy up farm land, consolidate it, and sell it to an¬ 
other owner. The original owner would have no option but 
to give up his land to the government. 

Nation’s Business calls attention to a 1962 Agriculture De¬ 
partment report which noted the existence of “idle land and 
unused buildings on thousands of small tracts in low-income 
rural areas.” This fact, said the report, “calls for positive as¬ 
sistance in redirecting the use and management of the re¬ 
sources involved.” 

The Planned Economy 


The answer proposed by the Agriculture experts was a 
“land classification’’ program, dividing U.S. land into eight 
categories. Depending upon the way land is classified, it 
might be used for cultivation or other purposes, with varying 
degrees of governmental restriction. If it happened to be 
placed in Class VI, VII, or VIII it could not be cultivated at 
all. In effect, under this scheme, the federal government 
would be able to dictate the use of every acre of rural land in 
the United States. 9 

Such proposals are not needed, however, to make the farm 
program deterimental to freedom. One farmer, J. Evetts 
Haley Jr. of Oklahoma, was taken to court and fined for 
raising grain on his own land and feeding it to his cattle. He 
had, the government said, overstepped his “allotment” even 
though he had accepted no subsidy, agreed to no allotment 
arrangement, did not participate in the farm program in any 
way—and even though the grain was not sold and never left 
his own property. James Weir of Arkansas actually lost his 
farm for a similar transgression. An extra fillip was given 
stories of federal control in 1964, when it was revealed the 
Agriculture Department had for years been conducting a 
“spy in the sky” program, flying over farm land and taking 
photographs to determine whether farmers were exceeding 
their allotments. 

The American business community has, if anything, been 
subjected to even more systematic harassment than have 
farmers. The most notable example was the steel case, when 
President Kennedy marshalled the entire force of the federal 
government to compel the steel industry to rescind a price 

On April 10, 1962, United States Steel and other leading 
steel companies announced a price increase of some $6 a ton 
—a 31^ per cent increase over the last previous hike in 1958, 
as compared with a net increase of about 6 per cent in costs 
during the same period. The following day, Kennedy ex- 

The Liberal Establishment 

► 120 

ploded with an angry statement in which he attacked “a tiny 
handful of steel executives whose pursuit of private power 
and profit exceeds their sense of public responsibility” and 
who assertedly showed “utter contempt for the interests of 
185 million Americans.” Other epithets in the statement in¬ 
cluded “irresponsible,” “ruthless,” “unjustifiable,” “defi¬ 
ance,” etc. In rapid succession, Kennedy threatened the steel 
men with (1) investigation by the Justice Department, (2) 
investigation by the FTC, (3) investigation by congressional 
committees, and (4) loss of contracts with the Department of 

Time magazine commented that to Kennedy, “U.S. Steel’s 
price-hike decision was a personal affront... it was . . . just as 
he was counting the credits for achieving wage-price stability 
in Election Year 1962 that Kennedy got word from Roger 
Blough. He felt he had been betrayed—and U.S. Steel became 
an enemy to be smitten at all costs. ‘U.S. Steel/ said a White 
House aide that afternoon, ‘picked the wrong President to 
doublecross. Kennedy can be a hater—and right now I don’t 
think there’s any doubt that he hates U.S. Steel.' To exact his 
revenge, Kennedy called upon all his vast powers as Presi¬ 
dent, including legal retribution, economic reprisal, public 
threats and covert pressures.” 10 

Among the last-named was a behind-the-scenes administra¬ 
tion campaign to persuade other steel companies not to go 
along with the price increase. Advances to Inland Steel Co., 
whose Board Chairman Joseph L. Block was a member of 
Kennedy’s Labor-Management Advisory Committee, proved 
successful. Inland announced it would not increase prices. 
Shortly thereafter, Bethlehem Steel, the nation’s second- 
largest producer, announced it was rescinding its price in¬ 
crease “to remain competitive.” U.S. Steel itself, only hours 
later, followed suit. 

One steel spokesman, however, was not intimidated. At the 
annual meeting of Jones & Laughlin, former Board Chair- 

The Planned Economy 

► 121 

man Ben Moreell said: “I know of no law which enables the 
President to establish . . . prices. If he did not act under the 
law, where are we headed? What does it mean when the Pres¬ 
ident orders a grand jury impanelled to hear charges against 
those who set prices he does not like; when contracts are 
awarded to punish those who thwart his will; and when the 
FBI routs innocent people out of bed at three in the morning 
to harass them with questions?” 11 

What it meant was that the President was prepared to use 
government power against those who resisted federal dicta¬ 
tion. Equally important, it showed how one act of govern¬ 
ment intervention inevitably leads to another. The pretext 
for combatting the steel price rise was to “hold the line” 
against inflation. Yet at the very time Kennedy was offering 
this argument, his own spending program in Congress was on 
its way to incurring an inflationary deficit of better than $6 
billion. Short weeks later, he would travel to Yale University 
to hold forth on the virtues of such deficits; he subsequently 
suggested still more of them by urging simultaneous tax re¬ 
ductions and spending increases. 

While the steel episode was the most flamboyant of the 
administration's onslaughts against business, it was far from 
unusual. The Liberal regime has systematically sought to get 
control over the business community, and has been making 
full use of the powers already available to it. 

Consider, for example, a 1962 bill to give the Federal 
Trade Commission virtual life-and-death powers over many 
American industries. Under its provisions, the FTC would be 
empowered to issue “cease and desist” orders under the vari¬ 
ous laws it administers—without applying to the courts. 

As to what such power would imply, the American Oil 
Company offers this illustration: “In order to retain some of 
our jobber accounts in Detroit, we had, in good faith, met 
the price a competitor offered. In 1940 the FTC charged us 
with violating the Robinson-Patman Act by this competitive 

The Liberal Establishment 

► 122 

offer, and the case started its long rounds through the federal 
courts. Finally, in 1958—more than 17 years later—the U. S. 
Supreme Court decisively ruled in our favor. The fact that 
we eventually won the case wouldn’t have done us much 
good, however, if the bill in question had been on the books. 
The FTC would have had the power to keep us from meet¬ 
ing our competitors’ prices all the while the case was drag¬ 
ging its zig-zag way through the courts.” 12 

Just how well the FTC would perform with such added 
powers may be divined from its already arbitrary conduct. 
The commission has shown every disposition to “discipline” 
“aggressive private interests” in the Schlesinger manner. Bar¬ 
ron's, a restrained and responsible voice of the business com¬ 
munity, offered this comment: “Under a reorganization plan 
upheld ... by Congress, the chairman has gained the whip 
hand over the Commission, directing its day-to-day activities, 
and . . . setting policy single-handed. He has decreed that 
whereas previously anyone could seek redress of the full 
Commission from a ruling of a trial examiner, such appeal 
now will be granted only on the motion of at least two mem¬ 
bers.” 13 

The FTC’s treatment of certain “private interests” during 
one 1962 hearing was so flagrantly unfair that it attracted 
the notice, not only of Barron’s, but of the American Civil 
Liberties Union. The FTC had adopted a policy of open 
hearings, in which “defendant” companies were required to 
divulge trade information which could be used as the basis of 
an indictment, and which could conceivably be of great value 
to competitors. One session involved the question of low- 
price milk being sold in supermarkets. The ACLU offered 
this comment: 

“There are two civil liberties aspects of this controversy 
which gravely disturb the Union and which we urge the 
Commission seriously to consider. One is the holding of an 
investigatory hearing, analagous to a grand jury investigation, 

The Planned Economy 

► 123 

in public. The second concerns the failure to allow counsel 
for companies under investigation adequate participation in 
the hearing in behalf of their clients. Both combine to create 
a breach of the safeguards embodied in the idea of due proc¬ 
ess of law, the touchstone of our democratic system which 
should be especially respected in the relationship between 
the government and the citizen.” 14 

Meanwhile, the Justice Department has been paralleling 
the FTC's work by instigating innumerable “anti-trust” suits 
against corporations suspected of monopolistic practice. In 
the year ending June 30, 1962, no less than 73 anti-trust suits 
were filed—a jump of eleven over the preceding year. If a 
company loses such a suit, the result can be disastrous and, 
even if it does not lose, the expense involved in defending 
itself against the government's tax-supported lawyers is op¬ 
pressive. The Wall Street Journal notes the losses incurred by 
the Morton Salt Company in defending itself against a price¬ 
fixing charge brought by the Justice Department. The case 
cost Morton Salt an estimated $420,000—even though it was 
acquitted. The expense of legal fees, producing records, as¬ 
signment of company personnel to the case were enormous, 
even though the company was found innocent of the charge 
brought against it. If it had simply pleaded guilty, the fine 
would have been $50,000. 

In a 1963 article, Fortune magazine noted some oddities in 
FTC thinking—oddities for which an unfortunate business¬ 
man, should he run afoul of the FTC's desires, could go to 
jail. For example, the decision that joint advertising by retail 
druggists which mentioned price would be illegal. Commis¬ 
sioner Phillip Elman, in his dissent, commented: “It seems to 
me that the Commission, charged as it is with the duty 
to promote rather than discourage competition, and to 
strengthen rather than impair the ability of small business¬ 
men to survive, should take a more positive and encouraging 
attitude toward programs of joint advertising by retailers . . . 

The Liberal Establishment 


The notion that small businessmen should be sent to jail for 
engaging in such a practice seems to me too fantastic to be 
taken seriously/’ 15 

Under the Johnson administration, proposals to expand 
federal activities—and federal controls—have continued to 
multiply. One of these is a suggestion that the U.S. Employ¬ 
ment Service, already immensely powerful, oversee hiring 
practices of private business. According to the enabling legis¬ 
lation on the subject, the result would be to make all em¬ 
ployment decisions “exclusively a public service.” 16 

Also proposed by Johnson has been an expansion of the 
considerable powers of the FTC, through a so-called “con¬ 
sumers package,” more aptly described as a package of 
governmental interference. The bill would have federal au¬ 
tarkies superintending butchers, cosmetic producers, and 
commercial advertising. It would extend federal power to var¬ 
ious commercial transactions which occur exclusively inside 
the states, rather than in interstate commerce. It would re¬ 
quire lenders to disclose actual annual rates of interest to 
borrowers. It would enable the FTC, as in the proposal dis¬ 
cussed above, to issue cease-and-desist orders to advertisers 
charged with making false claims—presuming them guilty 
until proved innocent. 17 

In the Johnson era, as in its previous history, the FTC has 
needed little encouragement to extend the hand of paternal¬ 
ism into the field of advertising. In a decision involving 
Procter & Gamble advertising, the FTC displayed its disdain 
for the intelligence of the American consumer. “The house¬ 
wife,” it said, “is easily lured from the accustomed brand by 
promotion and advertising efforts of rival manufacturers.” 18 

Nor, since Johnson has assumed office, has the executive 
branch shown any greater inclination to use its powers with 
restraint. In one of the most startling cases on record, the 
National Labor Relations Board ruled that Deering-Milliken 
Co. could not close down its facilities at Darlington, S.C., 

The Planned Economy 

► 125 

when a union was trying to organize it. 19 In another deci¬ 
sion, rendered against General Electric, the NLRB decreed it 
an unfair labor practice for GE management to convey to its 
employees concededly truthful information about the violent 
behavior of union boss James Carey, since such truthful in¬ 
formation would tend to disparage the bargaining agent in 
the eyes of its “constituents.” 20 

As for the President himself, he has been quite as willing as 
his predecessor to intervene directly in the workings of the 
economy. In the 1964 rail dispute, involving elimination of 
firemen from diesel locomotives, Johnson undertook to wheel 
and deal in all directions, promising concessions of one sort 
to both labor and management, and pressuring both sides 
toward a federally-composed agreement. The Wall Street 
Journal quoted one federal official as saying: “It wasn’t col¬ 
lective bargaining that settled the railroad dispute. It was 
compulsory Johnson.” 21 

No doubt James Madison would have been reassured to 
know that America’s government of laws rather than men, so 
painfully wrought by the Founders of 1787, would some day 
evolve into a system whose workings could be captured in the 
noble phrase, “compulsory Johnson.” 

6. Affluence—Or Poverty? 

The urge toward statism can be justified in many ways. From 
the populistic desire to “soak the rich ,, to New Deal oratory 
on the “mature economy,” those who favor increased gov¬ 
ernment power have never been at a loss for some theory to 
support their preconceived desires. The current Democratic 
administration, however, has managed to distinguish itself by 
invoking two entirely different reasons for increased govern¬ 
ment, reasons which contradict each other but which never¬ 
theless combine, in the crucible of Liberal alchemy, to pro¬ 
duce a single result. 

Under President Kennedy, the country was told it had 
been getting too fat and too lazy; such as Arthur Schlesinger, 
Jr., tirelessly decried the spread of private opulence. Such 
comfort, it was roundly suggested, was not good for the 
American soul. The right thing was for big government to 
step in and tax away the disgusting excess. Under President 

Affluence—Or Poverty? 


Johnson, the approach has been from the opposite direction. 
Instead of being too fat, we are now expiring in want. We are 
beset by “poverty,” with untold numbers of humanity, rang¬ 
ing up to 50 million, suffering from privation. The right 
thing is for government to step in and give aid to those who 
are in such distressing need. Whatever the affliction, the cor¬ 
rect answer, in the Establishment view, is always more gov¬ 
ernment control. 

These two arguments have not been rigorously divided 
between the Kennedy and Johnson years. Kennedy, during 
his campaign for the presidency, had rung some changes on 
the “poverty” theme, and the initiative toward the “war on 
poverty” was taken under his administration. And there are 
still some people around who will tell you “the private sec¬ 
tor” of the American economy is getting too big and too 
prosperous. But by and large, each President has identified 
himself with a particular approach—Kennedy with affluence, 
Johnson with poverty. 

The “affluence” argument holds that something called 
“the public sector” of the economy is impoverished, while 
something called “the private sector” is wallowing in luxury. 
The “public sector” means government; “the private sector” 
means individual persons. This was, as Schlesinger made 
clear in his i960 campaign study, Kennedy or Nixon, a 
favored theme of the late President. The historian quoted 
Kennedy as saying “the choice our nation must make” is “be¬ 
tween the public interest and private comfort” 1 —from which 
declaration it is but a few short steps to the rhetoric of “ask 
what you can do for your country.” 

This sort of argument was for many months almost a knee- 
jerk reflex of the ADA and its confreres in the Liberal Estab¬ 
lishment. Here is the way Adlai Stevenson, for example, put 
the matter: “Never before in my lifetime—not even in the 
days of Harding and Coolidge—has the mystique of privacy 
seemed to me so pervasive. The face which we present to the 

The Liberal Establishment 


world—especially through our mass circulation media—is the 
face of the individual or the family as a high consumption 
unit with minimal social links or responsibilities—father 
happily drinking his favorite beer, mother dreamily fondling 
soft garments newly rinsed in a marvel detergent, the chil¬ 
dren gaily calling from the new barbecue pit for a famous 
sauce for their steak. And, of course, a sleek new car in the 
background/’ 2 

America, Stevenson says, should have “wider purposes.” 3 

The intellectual father of “the public sector” thesis is ADA 
chieftain John Kenneth Galbraith of Harvard, former Amer¬ 
ican ambassador to India. The theory that Americans enjoy 
private splendor and public degradation was first set forward 
systematically in Galbraith’s book, The Affluent Society . 
With his characteristic taste for paradox, our angular emis¬ 
sary put the matter this way: 

The family which takes its mauve and cerise, air-conditioned, 
power-steered, and power-braked automobile out for a tour 
passes through cities that are badly paved, made hideous by lit¬ 
ter, blighted buildings, billboards, and posts for wires that long 
since should have been put underground. They pass on into a 
countryside that has been rendered largely invisible by commer¬ 
cial art . . . They picnic on exquisitely packaged food from a 
portable icebox by a polluted stream and go on to spend the 
night at a park which is a menace to public health and morals. 
Just before dozing off on an air mattress, beneath a nylon tent, 
amid the stench of decaying refuse, they may reflect vaguely on 
the curious unevenness of their blessings. 4 

The problem, Galbraith concludes, is that we have not 
properly maintained “social balance”—we have not provided 
the “public sector” with enough funds to keep up with the 
growth of the private sector. People are spending their 
money on pleasures and gadgets and extra automobiles which 
they do not need, while neglecting schools, parks, and high- 

Affluence—Or Poverty? 

► 129 

ways which they do need. As a result, “in an atmosphere of 
private opulence and public squalor, the private goods have 
full sway.” 5 Galbraith's answer is clear: government must 
increase taxes to take away from people the money they are 
spending so unwisely (on mauve Cadillacs) and spend it for 
them wisely (on better roads). 

As a number of excellent economists have pointed out, 
Galbraith's theory is not particularly new: It is, for the most 
part, a disguised version of the theories of Lord Keynes (who 
also suggested, e.g., that the problem of production had been 
“solved”). These economists also point out that the relevant 
facts contradict the “public sector” argument at almost every 
turn. During the very years when “private” services, such as 
television and the telephone and the high-powered auto¬ 
mobile, have greatly improved, the “private” sector has been 
receiving a diminishing percentage of the national patri¬ 
mony. During the same period, as “public” services, such as 
roads, schools, and the Post Office, have relatively deterio¬ 
rated in handling their assignments, the proportion going to 
“the public sector” has vastly increased. 

Galbraith's lamentations read strangely beside a survey of 
the actual magnitude of government expenditures today, and 
the vast tax burden they impose upon the people. As 
noted, the United States federal government has incurred, ac¬ 
cording to estimates for 1962, a debt of more than $1 trilion— 
an almost incomprehensible figure. Written out, the real ob¬ 
ligations of the government—meaning of the taxpayers— 
amounted to $1,242,000,000,000.00. That comes to some 
$6,642 for every man, woman and child in the United States. 
For the average family—husband, wife, and two children—it 
comes to $27,568.oo. 6 

Is a government which imposes an average per-family debt 
of more than $27,000 on its citizens too small? Is the “public 
sector” which has incurred that debt underprivileged? It is 
noteworthy that the total consumer debt in the “private sec- 

The Liberal Establishment 

► 130 

tor” was at that time only $56 billion—an average of some 
$299.50 P er capita, or $1,198 per family. It would appear that 
the people, in their private capacities, have been considerably 
less profligate than their government. 

The true state of affairs is, clearly, the reverse of Prof. 
Galbraith’s lugubrious vision. Since 1927, federal revenues 
have increased some 20 times over. While mendicant gov¬ 
ernment has been growing by leaps and bounds, the plush 
individual citizen has moved forward at a much more modest 
pace. Whereas the federal government’s income has increased 
twenty-fold since 1927, his is only four times higher. What¬ 
ever may or may not be wrong with our public services, it can 
hardly be that they have been deprived of money. 

Yet Galbraith’s thesis has achieved some popularity pre¬ 
cisely because its descriptive passages ring so true: It is quite 
accurate to charge that public services are, for the most part, 
inadequate, whereas the private market economy has enjoyed 
a fabulous splurge of productivity. Those are facts obvious 
to anyone who has ever driven a high-powered automobile 
over miserable roads, or telephoned across the continent in 
seconds because a letter mailed a week ago had not yet been 
delivered. Yet if government has been all the while absorb¬ 
ing so much of our money, and placing so heavy a tax burden 
on private citizens and business corporations, why does the 
disparity arise? 

The answer is just the opposite in its implications from 
that given by Galbraith, Schlesinger, and Stevenson. It is that 
government, by and large, is an inefficient agency. Its effort 
to administer segments of the economy from some distant 
central authority necessarily fails, for the simple reason that 
it cannot possibly anticipate all the changes and modifica¬ 
tions necessary for efficient operation. As Henry Hazlitt 
notes, the "glut” of private goods of which Mr. Galbraith 
complains is a glut which people want, and which they con¬ 
sume. But the glut of farm surpluses created^ by government 

Affluence—Or Poverty? 

► 131 

“plan” is a glut which no one wants and which is not con¬ 
sumed. It is sheer waste, caused by the inability of the author¬ 
ities in Washington to legislate supply and demand. 

Moreover, businesses operating in the private sector have 
two powerful incentives toward efficiency; they must com¬ 
pete, and they must make a profit. Modernization of plant 
and mass production to lower cost per unit of output are the 
secrets of commercial survival. In private business there is a 
premium on innovation, improved technology, and efficient 
administration; the business which did not achieve them 
would not stay in operation very long. 

In the case of government, there are no such incentives. 
The Post Office is a classic example; there is no need for it to 
make a profit, and consequently small motive for improved 
efficiency, or new techniques. Despite the introduction here 
and there of new procedures (produced by private business), 
the Post Office plods along today pretty much as it did 50 
years ago. And, since private competition with the Post Office 
has been banned by law, the postal authorities don’t have to 
worry about the customers taking their letters elsewhere. 

Add to these elementary factors the built-in inefficiency of 
the Washington bureaucracy, which spends weeks and even 
months shuffling papers before any program or any new idea 
can be put into practice, and the picture is virtually com¬ 
plete. The waste and misdirected effort of the federal gov¬ 
ernment are an appalling tale familiar to anyone who has 
studied the Washington scene with any care during the past 

In sum, the source of Mr. Galbraith’s paradox is that “the 
private sector,” with its emphasis upon competition, decen¬ 
tralization and the free allocation of resources, is properly 
equipped to produce abundance; “the public sector,” with its 
intrinsic hostility to competition, its remoteness from the 
scene of particular transactions, and its vested interest in 
things-as-they-are-with-more-of-the-same, is properly equipped 

The Liberal Establishment 

► 132 

to produce poverty. Both are doing the jobs which, in eco¬ 
nomic terms, they are bound to do. And while the increased 
transfer of funds to government may hinder the first from 
doing its job as well as it otherwise might, it cannot sub¬ 
stantially improve the performance of the second. 

The lesson of Galbraith’s complaint is thus the reverse of 
what he would have us believe: If it is demonstrated fact that 
private enterprise produces abundance, and government con¬ 
trol produces “squalor,” the best course would seem to be to 
minimize government control as much as possible. 

That answer would not satisfy Galbraith or the other 
stalwarts of the “public sector,” however, even if they ac¬ 
cepted the free market as a mechanism superior to govern¬ 
ment coercion. For their real point has nothing to do with 
technique, but with the ends chosen. People like to buy 
mauve cars; Galbraith thinks they do not need mauve cars. 
People want barbecue sets and marvel detergents; Stevenson 
thinks they do not need barbecue sets and marvel detergents. 
The issue is not how best to fulfill choice, but what the 
choice is. Under the free market, people buy for themselves 
the things they want—whether Galbraith and Stevenson 
think they need them or not. Under a system of government 
coercion, the people will take what they “need,” whether 
they want it or not. 

The ultimate issue in Mr. Galbraith’s theory, then, pre¬ 
cisely the same as in the dispute over federal “aid,” is: Who 
shall decide what the American people do with their money? 
The people themselves, buying what they want as free indi¬ 
viduals in the open market? Or Galbraith and the ADA, 
dictating to the people from their citadel of power in Wash¬ 

Just as President Kennedy set out to make war on “afflu¬ 
ence” so has President Johnson set out to make war on 
“poverty.” And in place of Galbraith, the new oracle on eco¬ 
nomic matters is said to be Socialist Michael Harrington. 

Affluence—Or Poverty? 


Quite apart from Harrington's socialism, the “poverty” 
argument needs to be considered on its own merits. When 
such consideration is given, several peculiarities begin to 
emerge—the most apparent of which is the sleight-of-hand by 
which “poverty” is defined. 

President Johnson has told us there are 35 million Ameri¬ 
cans who, by his standards, live in poverty. Yet when Johnson 
and John F. Kennedy were campaigning as the Democratic 
ticket in i960, Kennedy informed the nation that 17 million 
Americans went to bed hungry every night—using that sta¬ 
tistic as a measure of impoverishment. On the face of them, 
those figures would seem to suggest that the first four years of 
Democratic administration had more than doubled the num¬ 
ber of poor people in the United States—a point which we 
may be certain President Johnson is not anxious to make. 

The difference in figures, of course, is explained by the 
different means used to gauge the extent of poverty—all of 
which tend to dissolve at the touch of pointed inquiry. In 
Johnson’s case, the measuring-line is an income level of 
$3,000 a year. Any family whose income falls below this 
standard, Johnson says, is impoverished. 

That benchmark, however, in fact suggests the unprece¬ 
dented prosperity the United States has managed to achieve 
under the impulses of the free economy. For this “poverty” 
figure is actually higher than the average standard of living of 
the overwhelming majority of the people on earth. Edmund 
K. Faltermayer, writing in Fortune magazine, offers an inter¬ 
esting illustration: In the United States, 44% of the non¬ 
white, primarily Negro, population, conceded to be the most 
impoverished of our citizens, is below the “poverty” line 
suggested by Johnson; but in Great Britain, one of the great 
industrial and commercial nations of the world, some 75% 
of the predominantly white population falls below the John¬ 
sonian standard. 

The $3,000 standard, as almost all disputants acknowledge. 

The Liberal Establishment 

► 134 

is highly arbitrary. Some families of two or three people and 
without substantial debts may be able to get by quite well on 
that amount: larger families with big obligations might be 
pinched on $5,000 or more. 

Most to the point, Johnson’s $3,000 figure represents pov¬ 
erty by relative comparison to U.S. income figures as a whole. 
As prosperity becomes the norm in America, our notion of 
what is or is not adequate income tends to change corre¬ 
spondingly. In 1929, some 31 per cent of the people in the 
United States had family incomes under $2,000, some 39 per 
cent more had incomes between $2,000 and $4,000. In 1962, 
the respective figures were 12 per cent and 19 per cent. The 
smaller number of persons in these categories and the grow¬ 
ing number in the $5,000 and above range serve to accentu¬ 
ate the plight of those who remain below the line. The very 
fact that fewer people are poor makes it seem more intoler¬ 
able that anyone should be. 7 

As the Council of State Chambers of Commerce observes: 
“In comparison to relatively prosperous Europe, the alleged 
American poverty line of $3,000 would represent a reason¬ 
able level of well-being . . . The median family income in 
Great Britain in 1962 was equivalent to $2,900, and in most 
major European countries the median family income ranged 
from $2,700 to $3,500 in 1962. The median in Russia was 
$2,5oo.” 8 

By the relative comparisons favored by the Establishment 
there will always be “poverty” in the United States so long as 
some people make more money than others. At such time as 
the average annual income is $12,000, a family with an in¬ 
come of $10,000 will, relatively speaking, be “impoverished.” 
And there will no doubt be plenty of government proposals 
seeking to do something in their behalf. 

This is not to deny that there are in fact people—the exact 
number is difficult to determine—who are in want. Michael 
Harrington makes the point that there are plenty of people 

Affluence—Or Poverty? 


in America who, by common-sense observation rather than 
statistical juggling, are in want. Of this we may be certain. 
But the answer for these families is quite clearly not to dis¬ 
mantle the productive system which has liberated some 20% 
or more of the U.S. population from the Johnsonian version 
of “poverty” in the last generation, but to insure that the sys¬ 
tem continues to perform its beneficent work. And the in¬ 
creasing pressure of government intervention, with its 
apparatus of tax, inflation and control and with the resulting 
ominous decrease in the rate of poverty-reduction in the last 
several years, is all of an opposite tendency. The problem is 
not to be solved by demagogic outbursts to the effect that 
any and every family with less than $3,000 income annually 
must be the object of a government dole or of state schemes 
for improvement. 

It can be solved ultimately, if at all, by insuring that the 
free enterprise economy, which has allowed us the luxury of 
considering as a low income level what other nations consider 
a high one, continues to do its job. Under the rational em¬ 
ployment of energies and resources afforded by the free 
market, we can continue to spread abundance throughout 
society, so that ten years hence other socialists and other poli¬ 
ticians can have the thrill of recommending governmental 
aid to everyone who is not making $5,000 or $6,000 annu¬ 

• An interesting footnote on the “poverty” program came to light in April, 
1965, when it was learned that the agency would employ some 45 administra¬ 
tors drawing nearly $1 million a year among them in salaries, as follows: 
Director, $30,000 annually; deputy director, $28,500; three assistants to the 
director, $27,000 apiece; nine other lower-echelon functionaries, $24,500 
each and 20 more, $18,935 apiece. Obviously, the poverty warriors believe 
that, in this particular campaign against financial hardship, charity does 
indeed begin at home. 

7 . Inflation, Social Security, and Medicare 

The formula of increased governmental “aid” is, then, 
made to order for Establishment purposes, whether the stated 
pretext is to fight affluence or to fight poverty. With the at¬ 
traction of a tax cut added in, the resulting package would 
seem to be irresistible. Various interest groups are receiving 
bigger and better subventions from government; yet they are 
actually being asked to pay fewer taxes. All the wonderful 
benefits actually cost nothing—and they are good for the 
economy as well! In the alembic of Liberal ideology, all 
things become possible, including heaven on earth and the 
task of spending ourselves to eternal bliss on the Big Rock 
Candy Mountain. 

There is, however, one problem—quite apart from the 
question of centralized power. And that is the fact that as 
increased spending causes deficits, and as these deficits are 
accentuated by superimposing a tax cut, inflation is going to 

Inflation, Social Security, and Medicare ►137 

occur. The government is pumping new money into the 
economy without a corresponding increase in productivity. 
More dollars are bidding for the existing volume of produc¬ 
tion, and prices are forced upwards. There are not many 
people who perceive the responsibility of government for 
this, and the Establishment labors hard to keep it that way. 

Because the workings of inflation are piecemeal and indi¬ 
rect, and because its costs are spread over the economy at 
large, arguments against deficit finance seldom make much 
headway. The flamboyant appeal and immediacy of the di¬ 
rect subsidy, compared to the colorless, silent workings of 
inflation, make this seem a safe bargain for the Establishment 
—as it has seemed to every government which ever ruined its 
currency and its economy. So long as people are out in the 
world making money, the gradual advance of inflation will 
seem to them merely a better reason for getting still more 
money, through government subsidy if need be. They will 
have neither time nor inclination to sit down and figure out 
that it is the subsidy itself, and not U.S. Steel or General 
Motors, ’which has rotted the purchasing power of the dol¬ 

So it has worked for a generation and more. But a compli¬ 
cating factor has entered in. There are people in this world 
who are not able to keep up with the treadmill of inflation; 
as the Establishment pumps in new money, and as prices rise, 
their incomes do not rise along with them. These people 
must make do on fixed stipends, on savings or pensions or 
annuities, which do not have those comfortable “escalation” 
clauses so knowingly included in wage contracts by the 
unions whose leaders demand inflationary spending. These 
unfortunates are usually the elderly, people who have put 
away money for their later years only to find the price of 
everything has in the meantime risen enormously. The value 
of their savings has been taken from them, and they are 
barely able to meet ordinary expenses, much less extraordi- 

The Liberal Establishment 


nary ones. These people have both the time and the inclina¬ 
tion to wonder about what happened to their money. Worse 
yet, from the Establishment point of view, there are increas¬ 
ing numbers of them in our society—some 18 million and 
more now—as the life span is extended. And they can vote. 
Imagine the immense political difficulty if they came to real¬ 
ize the Establishment had robbed them, that all the “free” 
things given away to all the interest groups were actually 
paid for out of their savings, and that to sustain the political 
fortunes of Liberalism they had been thrust in their old age 
into unnecessary hardship. The results could be staggering. 

Obviously, the Establishment requires a diversion. It must 
come up with some tactic to make the inflation it has caused 
work to its own benefit. It must paint itself as the friend of all 
these old folks it has victimized, and turn emotional resent¬ 
ment against the conservatives as heartless ogres who care 
nothing about the problems of the aged. 

In pursuing this objective, the Establishment has tried a 
number of approaches. One of the most prominent has been 
noted already, in the case of the 1962 steel crisis. By cracking 
down on the steel companies, Kennedy transferred to the 
business world the blame which rightly should have been 
imputed to his own policies. This is, of course, the classic 
pattern of governments committed to inflation. As their own 
policies force prices to go up, they try to “hold the line” 
through arbitrary controls—a technique attempted, on and 
off, ever since the time of Diocletian. And while it has never 
halted inflation—which can be stopped only by curtailing the 
influx of new money into the economy—it has frequently led 
to the loss of freedom. The steel episode and the so-called 
wage-price “guidelines” of the current administration are 
merely recent examples in a long history of governmental 
diversion in a time of rising prices. 

Similarly with the Johnson program of inhibitions to 

Inflation, Social Security, and Medicare ►139 

overseas purchasing, investment, and tourism, intended to 
check America's “balance of payments" and gold outflow 
problem: The loss of gold, of course, is occasioned by the 
deterioration of the dollar through inflation, persuading 
foreign creditors they would be better off with bullion. 
While quite ready to demand “restraint" from private busi¬ 
nesses and citizens, the Johnson administration is unwilling 
to practice any restraint on its own part. In an April, 1965, 
address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Sec¬ 
retary of Commerce John T. Connor flatly rejected proposals 
to curtail government spending abroad and to adopt a “tight- 
money" policy through the Federal Reserve Board. As to the 
true source of the difficulty—deficit finance—not a word was 

Another gambit fixed on by the Kennedy-Johnson regime 
involves the Social Security program. Elderly people living 
on Social Security have seen the buying power of their bene¬ 
fits shrinking; should they discover the reason for this shrink¬ 
age, political upheaval might ensue. A scapegoat is therefore 
necessary—and what better candidate than the very conserva¬ 
tives who have for so long battled against inflation? Thus, 
in 1964, all sorts of horrible consequences for social security 
were envisioned should Barry Goldwater become President. 
No mention was made, of course, of the real dangers beset¬ 
ting the system and those dependent on it. 

To keep up with constantly rising prices caused by federal 
red ink, social security benefits and tax levies must constantly 
be increased. As a result, the program today is obligated to 
pay out an estimated $350 billion more than it has on hand 
or can expect to take in. The system is on the edge of in¬ 
solvency. Although much is made in Establishment literature 
of the social security “trust fund," usually estimated at 
around $20 billion, this is a fiction, a bookkeeping entry 
representing nothing more than an obligation on the tax¬ 
payers. There is no money in the “fund"; all social security 

The Liberal Establishment 


revenues go directly into the general fund of the United 
States, and are spent just like other tax money. Social security 
beneficiaries are paid out of this same general fund, and the 
“trust fund,” along with benefits owing to all those partici¬ 
pating in the program, must be met by still other taxes im¬ 
posed on still other Americans in generations to come. 

Even if the trust fund were real, it would hardly make a 
dent in Social Security’s insolvent condition, since obliga¬ 
tions against the system are roughly 25 times larger than the 
amount allegedly on hand. As of 1962, Social Security was 
reliably estimated to owe benefits in one category or another 
totalling some $630 billion. From those now in the system 
and still paying, an estimated $280 billion will be forthcom¬ 
ing in taxes. The difference between assets and liabilities is 
therefore around $350 billion. This huge sum must be raised 
somehow, either by vastly increasing the social security tax or 
passing it on unpaid to future generations. As C/.S. News and 
World Report summed the matter up, “this deficit, if it is 
to be paid, will have to be paid by future workers at tax 
rates now in the law. Otherwise, persons now in the pension 
system would have to pay sharply higher taxes.” 1 

Clearly, there is trouble ahead for Social Security—trouble 
spurred by the forces of inflation which have eaten away so 
much of the purchasing power of the dollar, and which will 
eat away still more if spending continues in excess of reve¬ 
nues. Ironically, as social security outlays increase, they too 
put inflationary pressure on the Treasury, so that Liberal 
efforts to adjust benefits to price rises create a kind of tread¬ 
mill effect, with OASI chasing its tail and never catching 

Still a third diversion is the “medicare” program—to pro¬ 
vide the elderly with hospital and nursing home care at gov¬ 
ernmental expense. This, the Establishment tells us now, is 
the solution to inflationary problems, and all who say other¬ 
wise are to be condemned as the enemies of the poor and 


Inflation, Social Security, and Medicare ► Ml 

“Our Blue Cross system/' declaims one medicare propo¬ 
nent, “is staggering under the load of both inflation and the 
demand, and the greatest part of the demand comes from the 
needs of the older people.” 2 Or, as President Kennedy him¬ 
self put it, medicare was needed “for those who saved or 
worked—then get hit.” 3 

As we shall see, the creative power of private enterprise has 
managed to cope with the problems of the aged in marvelous 
fashion despite the inroads of inflation. There are, neverthe¬ 
less, some elderly people in our society, whatever the num¬ 
ber, who fit the descriptive passages quoted above. Which 
makes the problem a real one. The only catch is that the 
unhappy results of government spending can hardly be cured 
by more government spending. To engage in deficit finance 
today to cure the results of yesterday's deficit can lead only 
to compounded difficulty tomorrow. The Establishment's 
approach is that of the alcoholic, who seeks to cure his hang¬ 
over with the hair of the dog that bit him. Which means he 
will be bitten still more painfully tomorrow. There can be 
no real answer to the problems of the aged who have inade¬ 
quate resources to cope with inflation except to stop the infla¬ 
tion. But this, we may be certain, the Establishment is not 
prepared to do. 

While its refusal to acknowledge its own responsibility for 
inflation is the root fallacy of the Establishment's “medicare” 
promotion, there are other fallacies as well. These include 
the arguments that by enacting the “medicare” scheme, tied 
to Social Security but financed by its own payroll tax, the 
administration has established a program which is “fiscally 
sound,” which would cause no increase in budgetary appro¬ 
priations, and which would effectively “aid the needy.” Each 
of these contentions, and particularly the last, is untrue. 

Under the medicare program, the wage base for social 
security-plus-medicare is increased from $4,800 to $5,600. 
This sounds innocuous enough, until we realize that, be¬ 
cause of the tremendous costs already imposed on the pro- 

The Liberal Establishment 

► 142 

gram, social security taxes without medicare were scheduled 
to rise to 9% per cent in 1969—meaning an annual tax of 
$444. On top of this, the administration proposal raises the 
total tax again. As noted, the social security program is al¬ 
ready hundreds of millions of dollars in the red. And insur¬ 
ance actuaries say the Kennedy-Johnson estimate on the cost 
of “medicare” is too low by half. This means the payroll tax, 
five years from now, might have to be raised still more. 

Even barring this eventuality, in fiscal 1971-72 the wage 
base will be jumped another $ 1,000 to $6,600, which means 
the total tax bill will be $580.00. By 1973, the combined ef¬ 
fect of this boost plus the ascending tax rate will be an annual 
social security levy of $633. The reason for postponement of 
this whopping tax increase is clear: To give the impression 
that the program costs only “a few cents” a month in its 
early stage. Once the scheme is established and the political 
benefits have been reaped —then will come the skyrocketing 
tax boost. 

These arrangements hardly suggest that the program is 
“fiscally sound.” Indeed, they open up a vista of endless defi¬ 
cits, and of endless tax increases to keep up with them. That 
prospect contrasts strangely with the safe-as-Gibraltar ap¬ 
proach employed by “medicare” advocates. A pamphlet 
passed out at a labor union rally on “medicare,” for example, 
claims the program will bring blessed relief to young couples 
who have hitherto been helping their parents in time of 
need. “Few of us,” says the leaflet, “can afford the increasing 
cost of raising and educating our children properly, and at 
the same time carry the full burden of costly medical care for 
our parents. We must not jeopardize the future of our chil¬ 
dren by draining the family budget to meet these medical 
expenses.” 4 But what could jeopardize the future of today's 
children more effectively than pyramiding debts in the social 
security-medicare system, sinking the value of the dollar still 
further, and mandating vast tax increases for the years ahead? 

Inflation, Social Security, and Medicare ►143 

Under the already-projected increases in the social security 
system, the average young couple today will soon be paying 
more social security tax than income tax. Extend the same 
curve for another generation, and imagine the legacy be¬ 
queathed to the children of this young couple, who will have 
to pay taxes to support twice as many aged folks as there are 
today, who will have the corresponding burden of galloping 
federal expenditures for other subsidies, and who will be paid 
in a dollar that, if they are lucky, will be worth perhaps one- 
fifth of its value in 1939. 

Part of the “medicare” publicity includes a suggestion that 
young couples, in addition to evading responsibility for their 
parents, will “build benefits” for themselves through the 
program. The leaflet quoted above goes on to say that the 
program will work toward “building health insurance pro¬ 
tection upon our retirement at 65.” 5 The idea is diligently 
put forward that the proposal is some kind of insurance, 
which will return benefits in proportion to payments. This 
too is untrue. Money paid in for “medicare” today will not 
be saved, or invested, or set aside. It will be spent immedi¬ 
ately. Future “benefits” accruing to today’s young couples 
will be paid for—not by their “premiums” which will have 
long since been spent—but by still other taxes paid by their 
children. That is, if the program has not by then been repu¬ 
diated altogether. The net result can only be a huge loss for 
those now entering the program; as things stood in 1959, sans 
medicare, those entering social security will pay out, at a 
minimum, $1.69 for every dollar they receive—by the OASI’s 
own estimate. 6 No one coming under social security today 
can hope to get back as much as he pays in; the program is 
already too far in the red. 

So much for the argument that the medicare idea is “fis¬ 
cally sound” or that it will require no increase in budgetary 
appropriations. What of the argument—the real issue at stake 
—that “medicare” will effectively aid the needy? The indica- 

The Liberal Establishment 


tions, at every level, are precisely of the opposite tendency. 
To begin with, there is the fact that the social security levy is 
a “regressive” tax—harder on the poor than on the well-to-do. 
It is a fixed tax on the lowest income bracket, allowing no 
exemptions or deductions. This means that a man who actu¬ 
ally earns $5,600 a year would pay the same absolute amount 
(not merely the same percentage) as does a man making 
$100,000 a year. More ironic yet, the man making $5,600 a 
year may well pay that tax to provide benefits to a retired, 
well-to-do man who has no need of them. 

Moreover, the evidence is plentiful that the “medicare” 
scheme would extend coverage to those who for the most part 
don't need it, while withholding coverage from those who do. 
It would enroll everyone on Social Security, even though the 
vast majority have private health insurance coverage, but 
would omit, after 1967, those people on public welfare rolls 
who are not eligible for Social Security. This anomaly shows 
quite clearly that the purpose of the legislation is not so 
much to help anyone as it is to secure votes for the political 
candidates of the Establishment. 

Without the emotional fervor instilled into the elderly in 
favor of quick passage, it is quite possible the occasion for 
“medicare” would have disappeared altogether, so rapid has 
been the spread of private health insurance programs. It was 
not so long ago that health insurance for the elderly was in 
short supply. In 1953, only 26 per cent of the aged had pri¬ 
vate hospital insurance. By 1962 that figure had more than 
doubled; by 1969, it is expected to reach 75 per cent of the 
aged population. 

As for the “long-range” need, this is even more chimerical. 
As of December 31, 1961—at the height of the original 
“medicare” agitation—75 per cent of the civilian population 
was covered by private health insurance. This figure will 
reach 90 per cent by 1970. 7 

While future need is not pressing in the aggregate, neither 

Inflation, Social Security, and Medicare 

► 145 

is present need accurately reflected in the bare statistics of 
private health coverage. A number of the aged, after all, pre¬ 
fer to pay medical bills out of current liquidity, rather than 
to carry the administrative costs of insurance. Despite the 
inroads of government-spawned inflation, many are able to 
pay their bills who are not counted in the private-insurance 
figures. Thus, a 1957 survey by the National Opinion 
Research Corporation found only 9.6 per cent of those inter¬ 
viewed unable to pay a medical bill of $5oo. 8 And an exten¬ 
sive i960 survey by James Wiggins and Helmut Schoek re¬ 
veals the vast majority of the aged say they need no medical 
aid and don’t want any. Canvassing some 1,492 people aged 
65 and over, Schoek and Wiggins found 92 per cent had no 
medical needs which were not being taken care of. Moreover, 
among the remaining 8 per cent, financial barriers to proper 
medical care “were the least important ones.” 9 The sociolo¬ 
gists observe that frequently the fear of risk or trouble, or the 
advice of family or friends, deterred the respondents from 
having operations, or obtaining artificial aids. “Only 5 per 
cent of all respondents in our sample had spent over $100 for 
themselves or their spouses in the month preceding the inter¬ 
view . . . Only 1 per cent in our sample reported medical 
expenses in excess of $500.” 10 Additionally, 64 per cent of 
the respondents said they had private health insurance. 
Those who did not were asked how they would take care of 
emergency medical expenses of $1,000 or more. Forty-two 
per cent of those without private coverage said they would 
pay cash; 11 per cent would borrow on their homes; and 15 
per cent would draw on the cash value of insurance or sell 
stocks and bonds. 

These findings were confirmed by the observations of Rep¬ 
resentative Thomas Curtis of Missouri. “No age group is 
likely to have as favorable a liquid asset position as the aged,” 
Curtis said, “seventy-four per cent of whom now own liquid 
assets of one form or another . . . according to the OASI, 

The Liberal Establishment 


almost three of every four beneficiary couples own their own 
home, most of them free of mortgage. And the median equity 
in non-farm homes for the homeowner is $8,360 . . . Only 
4 per cent of the aged live in the homes of relatives/’ 11 

It becomes apparent that there will soon be virtually com¬ 
plete coverage of the aged population through private health 
insurance; that many persons not so covered can pay their 
medical bills; that there is in consequence no widespread 
national “need” for medicare; and that the real problem con¬ 
cerns somewhere between 5 and 10 per cent of the aged 
population—many of whom, not being covered by Social Se¬ 
curity, will not be helped after 1967 by the “medicare” pro¬ 

That there are some people who do need assistance, even 
though they are a small percentage of the population and 
even though the number is getting smaller with the widening 
coverage of private medical insurance, seems clear enough. 
And certainly a humane society should want to see these 
people do not suffer in privation in their declining years. 
Under the circumstances, a sensible program would seem to 
be one which is (a) temporary, to take care of need as long as 
it lasts; (b) voluntary—so that only those who need assistance 
will participate; and (c) selective—to reach that segment of 
the population now unable to meet its medical expenses. Yet 
the Establishment program is none of these things. In order 
to treat the problem of perhaps one million people, the pro¬ 
gram would blanket into its compulsory workings some 140 
million people. It would extend “aid” to 90 per cent of the 
aged who do not need it, while giving no aid to many of the 
10 per cent who do need it. Instead of a temporary program, 
the Establishment gives us a permanent program to extend 
indefinitely into the future, irrespective of need; instead of a 
voluntary program the Establishment gives us a compulsory 
program, blanketing in everyone whether he needs assistance 
or not; instead of a selective program, the Establishment 

Inflation, Social Security, and Medicare 


gives us a nonselective program which amalgamates the med¬ 
ical services of everyone, and misses the fraction of the popu¬ 
lation which stands most in need of assistance. 

This is truly, as Representative Curtis says, “like a salvo of 
grapeshot fired at a smoke-shrouded target.” 12 As a medical 
program it makes no sense at all. As a means of increasing 
taxes surreptitiously, of gaining another zone of control, and 
of banging the drums for votes, it makes a great deal of sense 

8 . The Ultimate Scandal 

The biggest bombshell of the 1964 presidential campaign 
was the discovery, October 14, that Walter Jenkins, a veteran 
aide to Lyndon Johnson, had been arrested in the basement 
of the Washington, D.C., YMCA on a charge of “indecent 
gestures.” 1 

Rumors that some such revelation was in the offing had 
swept Washington for the preceding two days. When the 
news broke, Jenkins was spirited away to George Washington 
University Hospital, assertedly “suffering from fatigue and 
exhaustion,” his resignation was obtained by a presidential 
emissary, and the nation was staggered by the magnitude of 
the scandal. The furore was redoubled when it was learned 
that Jenkins had been arrested on a similar morals charge, 
July, 1959, listed on the police blotter as “disorderly conduct 
(pervert).” Despite this previous offense, in ■ a category 
widely recognized as susceptible to blackmail, Jenkins had 

The Ultimate Scandal 


enjoyed a high-level security clearance and, as Johnson's chief 
aide, handled confidential information coming to the Presi¬ 
dent's office. 

When it became known that several reporters were on to 
the Jenkins case, important White House advisers attempted 
to have the story killed. Two close friends of President John¬ 
son, Clark Clifford and Abe Fortas, visited the editors of all 
three Washington newspapers and asked them to suppress the 
story, on the grounds that it “would have a terrible effect not 
only on Jenkins but on his family as well." 2 All three papers 
reportedly agreed, but to no avail. Someone leaked the mat¬ 
ter to United Press International. Within a matter of hours, 
the story was out. 

Concerning the personal shortcomings of the unfortunate 
Mr. Jenkins, nothing need be said. But concerning the way 
the case was handled from 1959 forward, a great deal needs to 
be said indeed. In the first place, the fact that Jenkins en¬ 
joyed a top-level clearance for five years after his first arrest 
is itself a security scandal of major proportions. That he 
should have had access to major secrets in the White House is 
shocking, as is the fact that presidential advisers should have 
attempted to prevent the public from finding out about the 

Jenkins was a key figure in Johnson's sprawling political 
and financial empire. He had been an LBJ confidant since 
1939, and was a stockholder and treasurer of the LBJ Co., 
owner of the Johnson TV station. Jenkins has a son named 
Lyndon; the official biography of Johnson, by Booth 
Mooney, is dedicated “to Walter Jenkins." 3 James Reston 
says Jenkins was LBJ's “official confidant, the last man to 
leave the White House in the evening . . ." It is apparent 
that Jenkins was closely intertwined with Johnson’s affairs, 
private, financial, and political. 

Jenkins figured prominently in another embarrassment to 
the Johnson regime, the Bobby Baker case. According to 

The Liberal Establishment 

► 150 

witness Don B. Reynolds, Jenkins was the go-between in a 
transaction whereby a stereo set was given to then-Senator 
Johnson and an effort was made to have Reynolds buy tele¬ 
vision advertising time on Johnson's TV station. Jenkins was 
thus an important figure in the chief scandal to which Re¬ 
publicans had been referring throughout the presidential 
campaign, and now became the center of still another sensa¬ 
tion in his own right. 

Greed, negligence, and personal failings have no ideologi¬ 
cal home. They may be found in any quarter of the political 
world. Democratic or Republican, Liberal or Conservative. 
It is not therefore surprising that the Kennedy-Johnson ad¬ 
ministration should have had a scandal or two on its hands, 
and the mere fact of scandal has no bearing on the subject of 
this book. There are, however, aspects of these scandals in¬ 
timately related to our theme, concerning the nature of big 
government and the abuses attendant upon it. It is big gov¬ 
ernment which has made these malfeasances possible, and 
which has allowed responsible officials to conceal what is hap¬ 
pening from the American people. 

The common theme of the embarrassments afflicting this 
administration is the mutually-sustaining potency of political 
influence on the one hand and financial influence on the 
other. It is a kind of reciprocity which has from the begin¬ 
ning marked the rise to national prominence of Lyndon 

Johnson ascended to the U.S. Senate in a cloud of contro¬ 
versy in 1948, following a Democratic run-off in Texas in 
which he defeated Gov. Coke Stevenson. The victory was 
made possible by a “revised" tally sent in six days late from 
Jim Wells County, bossed by the famous “duke of Duval," 
George Parr. Johnson forces asserted that a ballot box in 
Alice, Texas, precinct 13, had by some oversight not been 
canvassed. When it was counted, the tally turned out to be 
202 to 1 in favor of Johnson, a margin sufficient to give him 
the election. The matter was contested through the Texas 

The Ultimate Scandal 


State Central Committee, where Johnson forces triumphed 
by one vote, and at the state convention, where Stevenson 
supporters were barred from the floor altogether. Then it 
went to the courts. After a see-saw battle, the matter came 
before Federal Judge T. Whitfield Davidson on September 
21, 1948. U.S. News and World Report, in a wrap-up on this 
battle, says: 

On that day, the Stevenson forces brought in their witnesses 
from Jim Wells County. One housewife, said by Stevenson inves¬ 
tigators to have been listed as voter No. 842, testified she had not 
voted. So did a man allegedly listed as voter No. 911. Other 
witnesses maintained that only 600 ballots had been issued for 
precinct 13, while 1,028 persons were reported as having voted. 4 

Johnson lawyers questioned the truthfulness of one Steven¬ 
son witness, demanded that Stevenson pluralities in other 
counties be looked into, and challenged the jurisdiction of 
the court. Judge Davidson, however, ruled in favor of Steven¬ 
son and ordered an investigation into the Jim Wells vote and 
the vote in one other county. Johnson forces led by John 
Connally tried appeals to the Texas Supreme Court (de¬ 
nied) and to the Fifth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals (ac¬ 
cepted, but at a hearing date too late to get Johnson on the 
ballot). U.S . News adds: 

In the meantime, new mysteries were developing. Judge 
Davidson’s commissioner, W. R. Smith, found many of the wit¬ 
nesses he sought in Jim Wells County were vacationing in 
Mexico—and he was unable to locate a copy of the voting list. A 
precinct 13 official said that two copies of the list had been stolen. 

The only remaining copy of the list was said to be in a ballot 
box. One box, said to be from precinct 13, was opened, but it 
contained no list. Another box was to be opened the following 
day. 5 

The Liberal Establishment 


Johnson’s attorneys, meanwhile, flew to Washington to ap¬ 
peal to Associate Justice Hugo Black of the Supreme Court, 
who ruled that the federal courts had no business deciding 
elections, and thus overturned Davidson’s decision. “Justice 
Black’s order,” concludes U.S. News, “arrived just in time 
to prevent the other ballot box in precinct 13 from being 
opened—and that investigation ground to a halt.” Black’s rul¬ 
ing turned the tide, and when the Supreme Court as a whole 
sustained his decision, Johnson was assured of becoming a 
United States senator. 

As Johnson’s political prosperity bloomed, so did his fam¬ 
ily’s business fortunes. In the very year that he went to the 
Senate, the Federal Communications Commission was study¬ 
ing allocation of channels to the then-burgeoning television 
industry. In 1952, when Johnson held a seat on the Senate 
Commerce Committee which oversees FCC doings and had in 
addition become Democratic whip, the FCC decided that 
Austin, Texas, should have only one TV channel, and that 
channel was awarded to the radio station then owned by Mrs. 
Lyndon Johnson. 

The Wall Street Journal notes: “After deciding one station 
would handle all standard television in Austin, FCC had no 
difficulty choosing who should have it. The agency an- j 

nounced on April 14, 1952, its formal verdict that Austin 
would get Channel 7; Mrs. Johnson’s company had filed for 
exactly that channel one month earlier, and had already 
nailed down network affiliation.” 6 The effect of these deci¬ 
sions was to make Austin a one TV station town, with that 
station owned by the wife of Senator Johnson. The Journal 
notes that the FCC had allotted three channels to the city of 
Corpus Christi to the south of Austin, which is about half the 
size of the state capital. As a result of this turn of events, the 
Johnsons now own a property valued at around $7 million. 

The Journal's somewhat tongue-in-cheek account of this 
story suggests a presentation of the Johnson business saga 
entitled “How to Put $17,500 into Broadcasting and Come 

The Ultimate Scandal 

► 153 

Out With Multimillions” ($17,500 was the price Mrs. John¬ 
son paid for the original radio station in 1943), for which 
one of the suggested subtitles is, “A Long Run of Luck With 
Government Rulings Helps Lots.” 7 

The Journal notes the numerous men who have worked 
both in a political capacity for the new President and in a 
business capacity for his wife. These include John Connally, 
“Jake” Pickle (recently elected to Congress) and J. C. 
Kellam, who had served with the National Youth Adminis¬ 
tration when LBJ was its Texas director. Also included was 
Walter Jenkins, who served both as Johnson’s administrative 
assistant and as treasurer of the corporation which ran the 
TV station. “Like two young oaks springing up side by side,” 
the Journal comments, “the LBJ careers in government and 
business grew mightily—their trunks rising parallel and 
branches intertwining . . . The statesman husband at no time 
held stock in the wife’s enterprise. Yet the rising family for¬ 
tune not only freed him to pursue politics but financed hand¬ 
some hospitality in surroundings appropriate to increasingly 
lofty office . . .” 8 

As for the help which politics might have given to business, 
the Journal says: “Unlike most businesses, a broadcasting en¬ 
terprise can exist and expand only with government ap¬ 
proval. From the very beginning and repeatedly thereafter, 
the fate of the Johnson family fortune has inevitably hung 
not only upon business acumen but also upon favorable rul¬ 
ings by the Federal Communications Commission. Yet FCC 
public records show not a single intervention by Representa¬ 
tive, Senator, Vice President, or President Johnson in quest 
of a favor for his wife’s company. 

“Quite apparently, there was no need for it. Mrs. Johnson 
was able to present the FCC with a record of solid business 
success, whenever that was relevant to government decisions. 
When it was not relevant, she was—as one official of the 
agency remarks—consistently ‘lucky.’ The practical effect- 
disregarding intent—of a long series of FCC rulings has been 

The Liberal Establishment 


to create the Johnson local TV broadcasting monopoly, ex¬ 
pand its sphere, and defend it against incursions.” 9 The arti¬ 
cle goes on to detail how the FCC, by some rather strange 
logic, prevented a competitive channel from being beamed 
into Austin, instead allocating the channel to Corpus Christi 
—which at the time already had two TV stations in operation. 

The Johnson TV station, in addition to being testimony to 
Lady Bird’s “luck,” was to figure prominently in the saga of 
Robert G. (Bobby) Baker. Baker, a native of Pickens, S.C., 
made $19,000 a year as secretary to the Democratic majority 
of the Senate. A former page on Capitol Hill, Baker became 
secretary in 1955 by appointment of Lyndon Johnson. From 
this position of seeming obscurity but great leverage, Baker 
built himself a financial empire. When the controversy sur¬ 
rounding him broke in the fall of 1963, he had a net worth, 
by his own estimate, of better than $2 million. He held stock 
in banks, insurance companies, supermarkets, a motel and 
restaurant, and a pipeline manufacturing company. He 
owned real estate which he valued at half-a-million dollars. 
He owned a $125,000 home in an exclusive section of Wash¬ 
ington, and a townhouse near the Capitol which cost $28,000. 
Resident in the latter was his secretary, former Tennessee 
beauty queen Carol Tyler, whom he listed as his cousin. 

How did a young man from Pickens, S.C., parlay a $19,000 
a year salary into such opulence? That was the question 
Senate investigators set out to answer in October, 1963, when 
they heard testimony from Ralph Hill, a vending machine 
operator who had filed a civil suit complaining Baker had 
caused termination of Hill’s services as a supplier to a defense 
contractor. Baker denied the charges. When the Senate com¬ 
mittee moved to question him in the matter, however, Baker 
resigned. Appearing later before the Committee, Baker took 
refuge in the Fifth Amendment respecting some 125 ques¬ 
tions about his activities. 

Baker, clearly, was a bright young maq who saw the 

The Ultimate Scandal 


labyrinth of governmental pressures there to be used if one 
knew how. The Wall Street Journal commented that “the 
record of the Senate Rules Committee’s investigation so far 
suggests that this young wheeler-dealer, the eyes and ears of 
the Senate’s Democratic leaders, was cut in on profitable 
business deals not necessarily because he would or could 
wield his influence but simply because that influence existed. 
For example, a vice-president of the two-year-old District of 
Columbia National Bank recommended a $125,000 loan to 
Mr. Baker to buy a house without security, in part because 
Mr. Baker was ‘a gentleman of innumerable friendships and 
connections.’ ” 10 Certain witnesses testified that Baker, in 
addition to radiating an aura of good connections, was on 
occasion doing something with them. In a story about Baker’s 
appearance before the committee, Time magazine summa¬ 
rized some of the relevant testimony: 

Last September, Ralph Hill, president of Capitol Vending Co., 
filed a $300,000 damage suit against Baker, Ernest C. Tucker, 
Baker's Washington law office associate, and Fred Black, Jr., a 
Baker buddy who, like Baker, is a big Serv-U stockholder ... In 
the suit, Hill charged that Baker negotiated to get Capitol's 
machines into Melpar (an aerospace subcontractor), then de¬ 
manded a monthly kickback. Hill said he paid Baker $5,600 over 
16 months. He also charged that when Baker wanted Hill to sell 
out to Serv-U and he refused, Baker talked Melpar into dropping 
its Capitol contract . . . 

Hill's suit further contended that Baker told North American 
lobbyist Black he could help North American get government 
contracts through his Senate post. This, Hill claimed, led Black 
to assist Serv-U in getting North American's business. North 
American President John L. Atwood told the committee that 
Serv-U vending machines did $2,500,000 worth of business an¬ 
nually in North American installations . . . u 

The Liberal Establishment 

► 156 

More sensational testimony yet was to come from insur¬ 
ance agent Reynolds, who succeeded in pointing the develop¬ 
ing scandal straight toward the White House. For one thing, 
Reynolds testified that Fred Black, Jr., had given Baker some 
$10,000 in i960 “to get our man elected.” Baker later told 
him, Reynolds said, that the money was for Lyndon Johnson. 
And Reynolds’ biggest expose concerned that Johnson televi¬ 
sion station in Austin. Reynolds, in whose insurance office 
Baker was a silent partner, testified that Baker had been in¬ 
strumental in a transaction whereby Reynolds gave Lyndon 
Johnson a stereo phonograph valued at $585. This was as- 
sertedly a token of thanks for two large insurance policies 
taken out on Johnson’s life by the TV station, written by 
Reynolds. Also, Reynolds testified, Johnson administrative 
assistant and TV station executive Walter Jenkins had sug¬ 
gested that Reynolds buy $1,200 worth of advertising time on 
the station. Jenkins denied this in a sworn affidavit to the 
committee. Reynolds further said that, having no use for TV 
advertising in Austin, Texas, he attempted to subcontract 
part of it to one Albert G. Young, president of the Mid- 
Atlantic Stainless Steel Company. For his part, President 
Johnson dismissed the whole matter by saying the stereo set 
was a gift from “the Baker family.” 

While the Democratic-controlled Rules Committee seemed 
satisfied with the Jenkins and Johnson explanations, Iowa’s 
outspoken Rep. H. R. Gross was not. “While the President 
has given some explanation of the stereo set,” Gross told the 
House of Representatives, “he has said absolutely nothing 
about the $1,200 gift of cash money that Don Reynolds says 
he was pressured into contributing to the LBJ Company 
radio and television firm. There is no doubt that Don Rey¬ 
nolds paid the money to the LBJ Company for he has the 
checks to prove it. There is little doubt that someone had to 
suggest this arrangement, for it is most unlikely that a Mary¬ 
land insurance man would throw $1,200 down the drain by 

The Ultimate Scandal 

► 157 

advertising on a station 1,500 miles away.” 12 (Obviously, 
Representative Gross was not familiar with Lady Bird John¬ 
son’s extraordinary “luck.”) 

“If the LBJ Company employees were shaking down this 
insurance man in this questionable way without his knowl¬ 
edge,” Gross went on, “the President should say so publicly 
and condemn them. If President Johnson knew about it, then 
he owes the public an explanation of this transaction.” 13 

Gross also had some harsh words for the Senate Rules 
Committee, which did not seem anxious to turn up informa¬ 
tion embarrassing to a Democratic President. Gross noted 
that Jenkins had not been called to appear before the Com¬ 
mittee, nor had Albert Young, who allegedly could corrobo¬ 
rate Reynolds’ story about the TV time sale: 

The testimony of Mr. Young is the testimony the Senate com¬ 
mittee should be seeking if it really wants to find out who is 
telling the truth in this affair. Also, there is an obligation to call 
Mr. Jenkins to testify in person, and to be questioned on the 
details of this whole affair. Mr. Jenkins was an employee of the 
Senate when these matters transpired, and the fact that he is now 
the No. 1 assistant to President Johnson should not be a barrier 
to calling him for questioning under oath. Sherman Adams ap¬ 
peared and testified before a House committee on dealings with 
Bernard Goldfine and the vicuna coat gift. There is no reason 
why Walter Jenkins should not testify . . . 14 


Mr. Reynolds states that he had a conversation with Jenkins in 
which Mr. Jenkins produced a letter from a Mr. Huff Baines, of 
Texas, who indicated that he would buy advertising on the LBJ 
Company station if he wrote the Lyndon Johnson insurance. 
Reynolds states he did not buy the advertising on a voluntary 
basis, but only after being called by Jenkins and told to buy it. 
Certainly Mr. Walter Jenkins should remember this, if it hap¬ 
pened. 15 

The Liberal Establishment 


Gross concluded with this salvo at Johnson himself: 

Apparently President Johnson intends to try to shut off all 
questioning on the subject of his dealings with Bobby Baker. I 
do not believe that the inadquate statements he made last week 
before running away from reporters should end it. In fact, his 
conduct and statements to this point raise more questions than 
they answer. 

There was no word of criticism of Bobby Baker in the state¬ 
ment made by Johnson, so we can probably assume that he still 
has the same warm admiration for Mr. Baker that he had when 
they were gift-giving pals back in 1959. If we are wrong he should 
tell us. 

The President explained the expensive stereo set as a gift from 
the Baker family, and indicated it was merely one of many gifts 
that passed back and forth between him and his bosom friend, 
Bobby Baker. I would like to hear more about these tokens of 
affection that were passing back and forth between the then 
majority leader and Bobby Baker. It could be most pertinent. Up 
to this point there has been no demonstration of the government 
relationships that gave Baker his power to land highly lucrative 
vending machine contracts in the aerospace and defense indus¬ 
tries. He must have had powerful friends who were active and 
influential in defense and aerospace contract matters. 16 

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the testimony of 
insurance agent Reynolds was making things hot not only for 
Bobby Baker, but for Baker’s former employer, President 
Johnson. From that fact, the scandal took on a new dimen¬ 
sion. Information was “leaked” from the White House to 
various newspapermen, seeking to discredit Reynolds. The 
information was said by The New York Times to have come 
from the FBI and military intelligence agencies, and to have 
been based on records compiled during Reynolds’ military 
service. In some ways, this was the most sensational aspect of 
an already-sensational case, but since it carries implications of 
entirely other issues we shall leave it to be 4 examined more 
fully in the next phase of our discussion. 


The Ultimate Scandal 


Similar to the Baker scandal, but even larger in scope, was 
the Billie Sol Estes case. Estes was a shrewd young man who 
knew how to cultivate political connections and make them 
pay off. He found the federal government’s farm program 
waiting for him, and in its interstices discovered an agile 
wheeler-dealer could go a long way on very little indeed. 
Within the framework provided by the government, he con¬ 
structed a fantastic empire valued in the tens of millions of 

Simply put, Estes’ operation consisted of three parts: (1) 
Deals whereby he sold cotton acreage to farmers who in turn 
leased the land back to him, allowing him to plant ever- 
increasing quantities of cotton, collecting handsome govern¬ 
ment subsidies for his burgeoning surplus; (2) Further deals 
with farmers to supply them, at below-cost prices, with 
anhydrous ammonia fertilizer which increased the yield of 
their land for both cotton and grain sorghums used as cattle 
feed; (3) Still other deals by which farmers agreed to store 
their surplus grain in Estes storage bins and warehouses. 
Billie Sol lost money on the fertilizer, but made it back on 
cotton allotments and storage fees. It was a marvelous piece 
of work, showing much thought by a mind suited to the 

In all three of its phases, the Estes enterprise was made 
possible by the government’s system of price supports and 
acreage allotments. His own working capital came in the first 
place from the subsidies he received for his cotton; the desire 
of the farmers for ever-increasing quantities of fertilizer came 
from the twin facts that the government would pay them for 
all the cotton they could grow and that they were limited in 
the number of acres they could plant and so had to increase 
yield per acre; and with the booming surpluses that resulted, 
the business of storing excess crops, which was for Billie Sol 
the ultimate pay-off, became a subdivision of high finance. 

Along the way, Estes worked in some side aspects which are 
also of interest, such as borrowing millions of dollars on the 

The Liberal Establishment 


collateral of fertilizer tanks which weren’t there. But most 
decisive of all, whenever his incredible empire showed signs 
of toppling, he had been able to get some notable coopera¬ 
tion out of Washington. 

With the advent of the New Frontier, Estes’ political con¬ 
nections had improved immeasurably. He had been an 
ardent supporter of Adlai Stevenson in 1956 (having come 
up with the striking campaign idea of training an entire flock 
of parakeets to fly across the country chirping “I like Adlai”), 
and a strong supporter of the Kennedy-Johnson ticket in 
i960. Washington Post reporter Julius Duscha notes that 
“from December i960 to January 1962, a period of only thir¬ 
teen months, Estes contributed a total of $12,300 to the na¬ 
tional Democratic Party alone. In January 1962 he wrote out 
a check for $5,000 for fifty tickets at $100 each for the Ken¬ 
nedy Inaugural anniversary dinner in Washington’s National 
Guard Armory. Among his guests at the dinner were Texas 
Senator Ralph Yarborough, members of the Senator’s staff, 
and employees in the office of Vice President Lyndon John¬ 
son.” 17 

In late 1961, when his empire began to crumble around 
the edges, Estes had occasion to call upon his political con¬ 
nections for assistance. And as various trains of investigation 
were pursued, it became apparent these connections were ex¬ 
tensive indeed. Among those who made inquiries at Agri¬ 
culture when the going got rough were Vice President John¬ 
son, Senator Yarborough, Congressman Jim “Slick” Ruther¬ 
ford (both Yarborough and Rutherford being recipients of 
substantial campaign donations from Estes), Congressman 
Carl Albert of Oklahoma, and Congressman Bob Poage of 
Texas. Within the Agriculture Department itself, Estes ap¬ 
proached Under Secretary Charles Murphy, who had been 
appointed by President Kennedy early in his administration 
with, as Duscha notes, “the strong political backing of Vice 
President Lyndon B. Johnson.” 18 It was Murphy who had to 

The Ultimate Scandal 


pass upon Estes* sale-lease arrangements with farmers in 
order to increase his cotton allotments, which, the evidence 
indicated, were simply devices allowing him to buy the al¬ 
lotments outright. In October, 1961, it was reported that De¬ 
partment investigators were well on their way to declaring 
the allotment deals illegal; and Estes flew to Washington to 
raise cane and stress his political connections to several mem¬ 
bers of the Department. 

One official to whom he talked, Wilson Tucker, told Sen¬ 
ate investigators that Estes “made some very general state¬ 
ment concerning the use of his personal airplane in helping 
in behalf of the Kennedy-Johnson campaign,” 19 underlined 
the power of his associations and threatened to make trouble 
for the administration. Although fiddling with a great many 
documents, Tucker said, Estes failed to show the contents of 
most of them. “He did permit me to glance quickly at one 
letter which I believe was from the National Democratic 
headquarters in Washington, and at the bottom of the letter 
was a pen note stating something like this: 'Check mailed . . . 
day,* and from a quick glance I believe it was $1,000 but may 
have been $10,000 or some other amount. I was not given 
time to really see what was written.” 20 

Tucker referred Estes to another official, Emery E. (Red) 
Jacobs, formerly active in the Liberal Farmers Union and 
an associate of the late Senator Robert Kerr, Democrat of 
Oklahoma. A week after Estes’ conversation with Jacobs, the 
two met in Dallas and went on the famous shopping spree in 
which Jacobs bought $1,311 worth of expensive clothes at 
Neiman-Marcus—clothes which, according to Jacobs, he had 
paid for in cash out of his own pocket. When testimony about 
this episode came out the following spring. Secretary of Agri¬ 
culture Freeman requested Jacobs’ resignation. 

In late December, 1961, Under Secretary Murphy handed 
down a ruling that Estes’ cotton allotments should be can¬ 
celled. But, as Duscha notes, on the same day “he decided to 

The Liberal Establishment 

► 162 

reappoint Estes to the Cotton Advisory Committee, despite 
an adverse recommendation from the Department’s person¬ 
nel office.” 21 Estes called on Rutherford and Yarborough to 
salvage the allotments, and on January 6, 1962, the two legis¬ 
lators and their generous constituent met in Murphy’s office 
to discuss matters again. Murphy decided to give Estes an¬ 
other chance to prove the legality of the allotment transac¬ 
tions. The Department dispatched still other investigators to 
Texas to check the allotments out again, one of whom testi¬ 
fied that Jacobs had asked him “to send me a report contain¬ 
ing every justification that you can find to permit the reten¬ 
tion of these allotments,” and said that Under Secretary 
Murphy would be “amicable, agreeable or even desirous of 
permitting the retention of these allotments.” 22 Both Jacobs 
and Murphy denied these allegations. 

Other Agriculture officials who went on shopping trips 
with Estes were Assistant Secretary James T. Ralph and his 
administrative assistant William E. Morris. Morris had for¬ 
merly been an aide to GOP Congressman H. Carl Andersen, 
who sold Estes some stock in a mining company, and had 
introduced Estes to the Minnesota legislator. Estes had 
bought Morris a $100 hat at Neiman-Marcus. Although a 
clerk testified that Ralph had been fitted for a suit of clothes, 
there was no evidence introduced that Estes had bought him 
anything. The FBI did discover, however, that Ralph had 
used Estes’ credit card to make personal telephone calls, a 
finding which was followed by Ralph’s being asked to resign 
from the department. At Christmas, 1961, Estes sent $100 
money orders to both Morris and Ralph. The two men told 
House investigators they had sent these gifts to the Demo¬ 
cratic National Committee as campaign contributions. In 
April 1962, Morris was asked to resign. Yet another to feel 
the warmth of Estes’ friendship was Assistant Secretary of 
Labor Jerry T. Holleman, former President, of the Texas 
AFL-CIO. When it was discovered that, Estes had sent 

The Ultimate Scandal 


Holleman $ 1,000, the Labor Department official was also 
asked to resign. 

As it developed, all of Estes' connections could not forestall 
the inevitable. He fell from grace, as did almost all those 
associated with him. Appointed officials were fired, and the 
voters dealt with some of the elected ones. Democrat Ruther¬ 
ford and Republican Andersen, both having to seek re- 
election that same year, were summarily dumped from office. 
While it lasted, however, Estes showed he knew how to make 
his weight felt. Duscha notes: “Through January, February 
and March the case dragged on, with no effort by the Agri¬ 
culture Department to bring it to a close. Ever since Estes 
had brought to bear on Under Secretary Murphy the influ¬ 
ence of his political friends in Texas, the Department had 
slowed down its efforts to terminate the case and penalize 
him.” 23 

The exact extent of Lyndon Johnson's association with 
Estes is something of a mystery. As Duscha notes, one of 
Johnson’s aides called Murphy at the height of the Estes crisis 
to ask about the “status of the case.” In late i960, Johnson 
had written Estes a “Dear Billie” letter, signed “Lyndon,” 
which read as follows: “It was certainly good to hear from 
you. As you can imagine, I have been receiving thousands of 
letters and telegrams in the last few weeks and I haven’t been 
able to answer them as soon as I would like to have. I do want 
you to know, however, that I have put your suggestion in the 
hands of the people who will make the final decision on this 
matter and I hope the outcome is favorable. I’ll let you know 
if there is anything else that can be done.” 24 A spokesman 
for Johnson, Charles Boatner, confirmed that this letter re¬ 
ferred to William P. Mattox, who had been recommended by 
Estes for appointment to a position in the Kennedy-Johnson 
Agriculture Department, and who was to figure in a bizarre 
mystery which will be considered in a subsequent chapter of 
this essay. The day prior to Johnson’s letter, another LBJ 

The Liberal Establishment 


subaltern, Clifton Carter, had written Estes, referring to his 
“fine letter about Bill Mattox,” and saying “I’ll see that it 
gets in the proper hands.” 25 

Mattox was subsequently named Vice Chairman of the 
County Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Com¬ 
mittee in Reeves County, Texas, where Estes lives. In May 
1962, Mattox was suspended from his job and in June was 
dismissed altogether. He was charged with having flown to 
Washington, on official business, at Estes’ expense. 

There is much more to the Estes case than this—the mys¬ 
terious death of an Agriculture official who was investigating 
the legality of Estes’ cotton allotments; proved subornations 
to lower Agriculture officials in Texas; and other odds and 
ends. But the major scandal transcends all these particulars. 

What emerges most clearly from the Estes and Baker epi¬ 
sodes is the fact that the federal Establishment in Washington 
is made to order for smart operators in search of ready for¬ 
tunes. The leverage of governmental power was used by 
knowledgeable individuals to make a fast buck; in the Estes 
ease, in particular, the resulting affluence, or appearance of it, 
was used to shore up political connections, woo officials, and 
keep the machinery running. On top of this, the resultant 
power combinations, in the Baker, Estes, and Jenkins scan¬ 
dals alike, have made it possible for government officials to 
impede the development of public information concerning 
the scandals, and to put pressure on those who would blow 
the whistle on their operations. 

The complex of malfeasances wrapped up in these scan¬ 
dals, in short, was made possible by the very labyrinth of big 
government Liberals have sought to create as an answer to all 
our ills. The individuals involved would have been what they 
were, no doubt, under other circumstances as well; but it was 
the fact that massive, complicated, and far-reaching govern¬ 
mental programs existed, each involving billions of dollars of 
taxpayers’ money to be dispensed in the right way by those 

The Ultimate Scandal 

► 165 

who knew the ropes, which lay at the bottom of the matter. 

This, in the final analysis, is the real scandal—the network 
of payrolls, contracts, subsidies, controls, pressures, and out¬ 
right coercion which is the federal government today. The 
sprawling bureaucracy of the welfare state, in addition to its 
other demerits, is increasingly demonstrated to be an El 
Dorado for con men and those who would shield them from 
public scrutiny. 

Part Three 


1 . Freedom for Whom? 

Our object has been to demonstrate the drift of the Estab¬ 
lishment toward the total state, an enterprise in which the 
desires of pragmatic politicians and collectivist ideologues are 
perfectly united. The society Liberalism seeks for us is a 
society covered by a vast network of subsidies, controls, and 
regulations, through which the government wields indefinite 
authority over a race of obedient pensioners. 

The natural question which arises when we view such a 
system is: What happens to freedom? America’s founders 
tried to create a union of decentralized and limited powers in 
order to defend the liberty of the citizen. By turning the 
system inside out, doesn’t Liberalism put freedom in jeop¬ 
ardy? To a certain extent, that question has already been 
answered in the affirmative. We have suggested some of the 
results of Liberal policy, in which farmers and businessmen 
have lost the freedom to dispose of their property as they see 

The Liberal Establishment 


fit, etc. In the interstices, we have seen the growth of venality 
sealed off from censure and correction, itself a species of en¬ 
croachment as it plunders the citizen for the purposes of pri¬ 
vate greed. 

All of this would seem to suggest Liberalism’s disregard for 
the American design has led precisely to the result the found¬ 
ers apprehended: The progressive decay of liberty. To the 
mind of a Madison, an Adams, or even a Hamilton, the 
present scope of federal interference in what were once pri¬ 
vate matters would have seemed inconceivable; it far exceeds, 
in fact, the brand of interference practiced by the 18th- 
century king and Parliament against whom these men re¬ 
belled. The Liberal Establishment has abandoned the ideals 
of freedom for which the United States is supposed to stand. 
Equally to the point, it has abandoned the reputed meaning 
of Liberalism itself—which has to do with the liberty of the 

Establishment spokesmen, however, deny these conclu¬ 
sions. They still employ, on given occasions, the rhetoric of 
personal freedom, and still regard themselves as defenders of 
individual liberty. It is the conservative, they charge, who 
threatens freedom and the Liberal who is truly concerned to 
protect it. As may be expected in the assertion of so paradoxi¬ 
cal a position, the argument is a little complicated. Its main 
elements, however, seem to include the following: 

1. Living in the 20th century, we are on a higher plateau 
of understanding than were the Founding Fathers. We are 
educated and sensitive enough to preserve human liberty 
without the restraints and impediments to effective govern¬ 
ment built into the American system to begin with. 

2. Part of our improved understanding includes the per¬ 
ception that “freedom” has a new and broader meaning; it 
now signifies freedom from want, hunger and fear. Only by 
use of the concentrated powers of government can these free¬ 
doms be conferred. 

Freedom for Whom? 


3. What were once conceived as freedoms, particularly the 
ability to dispose of one’s own property, are not freedoms at 
all. These things must yield to the new conception of free¬ 
dom mentioned in point No. 2. 

4. Of the old liberties desired by the Founding Fathers, 
one vestige remains. This is freedom of religion, speech, 
press, the right to dissent, to be afforded due process, to par¬ 
ticipate in political decision-making. These are “preferred 
rights,” 1 and Liberal allegiance to them is testimony that the 
Establishment is still libertarian. 

5. Because these particular rights are covered by the First 
Amendment to the Constitution, Liberals say that amend¬ 
ment is sacred. It, and other parts of the Bill of Rights which 
touch on similar matters, must be preserved inviolate. No 
incursion upon its guarantees is permissible. 

6. With respect to First Amendment rights, the Liberal 
triumphantly concludes, the conservative is the true offender. 
He is always trying to silence dissenters, put heretics in jail, 
impose his views on others. It is the Liberal who stands up for 
heresy, protects honest men in government from conservative 
witch-hunts, etc. 

We must pass over the aspect of this argument which at¬ 
tempts so abruptly to change the meaning of “freedom”; the 
Liberal wants to make the word mean exemption from the 
compulsions of circumstance, rather than from the caprice of 
tyrants. And while that point is an interesting one, it is of a 
philosophical turn which cannot be encompassed in the 
present volume. To most people, to the men who wrote the 
American Constitution and to ranked generations of Western 
society, “freedom” has meant the absence of arbitrary human 
restraint exercised outside the known and regular guidelines 
of the law. And, in fact, that is precisely what it means to 
Liberals themselves when they talk about “preferred rights” 
and “civil liberties” and protection of the First Amendment. 

It is apparent that Liberalism’s fealty to freedom in this 

The Liberal Establishment 


sense stands or falls on the question of “preferred rights/' 
The right of dissent, of free speech and a free press, is the key 
point, and the First Amendment is the central text. The Lib¬ 
eral attitude toward these things assertedly proves, despite 
everything we have set down in the preceding section, that 
Liberalism is devoted to freedom, is not going to impose a 
despotism on America. It is possible, Establishment spokes¬ 
men would have us believe, to take away a man’s right to 
dispose of his property, but leave him inviolate in the expres¬ 
sion of his opinions. So long as that latter freedom remains, 
everything will be all right. The citizen can always speak out 
against anything he doesn't like and have it changed. 

But how does the citizen retain this latter freedom if power 
has become centralized beyond the point of effective re¬ 
straint, and if he is dependent on the whim of government 
for his livelihood? In these circumstances, his freedom obvi¬ 
ously depends on the willingness of government to let him 
enjoy it. Let that willingness contract, let it be withdrawn 
from those departments of society government finds displeas¬ 
ing, and “parchment barriers," as Madison called them, can 
do little. And, even in those areas where government still 
smiles upon free speech, it can hardly be characterized as a 
“right," since it exists only by sufferance of the authorities. 
In a subsequent chapter, we shall examine some cases in 
which precisely this kind of contraction has occurred. 

Liberalism has its priorities reversed. Once the citizen's 
right to dispose of his energies and resources is sufficiently 
diminished, the job of eliminating “preferred rights" be¬ 
comes a mopping-up operation, to be pursued according to 
the leisure and inclination of the ruler. “Preferred rights" 
themselves will not be able to do much about it. If property 
rights are kept intact, however, and if the central government 
is hedged about by alternative centers of decision, then the 
rights of free speech, free press, and so forth will be un¬ 
dergirded by something more than theory. A man secure in 

Freedom for Whom? 


his home, in the enjoyment of earnings gained in employ¬ 
ment of his choice, has a place to stand; he has a base from 
which to enter the give and take of political disagreement. A 
newspaper which buys its newsprint and machinery in the 
open market, choosing among competitive suppliers, is rela¬ 
tively immune from government coercion. But a man who 
owes his dwelling and his daily bread to government, a news¬ 
paper which gets its machinery and newsprint from the state, 
may both be silenced in a moment by withdrawal of the 
material elements of life and enterprise. 

The Liberal view on “preferred rights” is equally contra¬ 
dictory on constitutional grounds. The Establishment has 
told us the Constitution is outmoded, that we cannot be 
guided by the sentiments of the 18th century, and that con¬ 
stitutional restraints must be judged by the needs of the 
moment. If all this is so, whence comes the deification of the 
First Amendment? How does it happen that this portion of 
the Constitution alone is to be interpreted strictly, minimiz¬ 
ing the reach of governmental power, while the rest of it is 
interpreted loosely, maximizing that power? Liberal juris¬ 
prudence on these two contradictory points is merely the ra¬ 
tionalization of pre-conceived ideas, with relevance neither 
to consistency nor to the canons of law and reason. 

These are some of the theoretical objections which might 
be elaborated against the Liberal’s argument that he favors 
“dissent” even while dismantling restraints upon the abuse of 
power; and in a theoretical work, still other objections might 
be cited. For our present purpose, however, it will do to 
examine Liberalism’s claims on an empirical basis. 

Establishment subsidiaries like the American Civil Liber¬ 
ties Union, Americans for Democratic Action, and the Fund 
For the Republic never tire of proclaiming the sacredness of 
“civil liberties,” or warning the nation about the danger 
presented to these liberties by the minions of the American 
right wing. It is in the name of “civil liberties” that the 

The Liberal Establishment 

► 174 

Establishment, for example, opposes prayer in the public 
schools, demands improved treatment of accused and con¬ 
victed criminals, berates law enforcement agencies for “bru¬ 
tality,” insists that Communist “dissenters” not be put in jail 
or barred from speaking on American college campuses, cru¬ 
sades against security procedures in government, etc. 

Abstractly put, the goals of this activity seem unexcep¬ 
tionable—however at variance they may be with the Liberal 
performance in other areas, or however shaky the theoretical 
ground supporting them. Surely it is desirable that dissenters 
not be persecuted for disagreeing with the majority, that the 
First Amendment be preserved intact, that blameless men 
should not be hounded from government. No one who be¬ 
lieves in the objectives of the American Constitution could 
favor such things, although we might legitimately ask why 
the Establishment, in view of its overall performance, doesn’t 
favor them. Certain questions, however, insistently suggest 

First of all, are the issues to which the Establishment has 
affixed itself really the way we have been describing them? 
Are Liberals, in expunging prayer from the schools, merely 
defending the Constitution? Or are they up to something 
else? In their seemingly endless war with the House Commit¬ 
tee on Un-American Activities, anti-Communist legislation 
and government loyalty programs, are they championing the 
right of dissent? Or are they defending something other than 
dissent? In resisting efforts to oust alleged “security risks” 
from government, are they standing up for individual free¬ 
dom from persecution? Or are they doing something alto¬ 
gether different? 

Secondly, does the Establishment really believe what it says 
about “preferred rights” and “dissent” and the rest of it, or 
does it only talk of these things when the matter up for dis¬ 
cussion is congenial to Establishment ideas? Does it adhere 
to its expansive theories when the dissenter in question turns 

Freedom for Whom? 

► 175 

out to be a right-winger, or the good man in government is 
opposing Liberal programs, or when the exercise of preferred 
rights and due process is inconvenient to Establishment pur¬ 
poses? Is Liberalism really willing to countenance dissent 
against itself? 

To complete and clarify the issues raised in the first section 
of this essay, we must suggest some answers to these questions. 
We must determine what it is that the Establishment is, char¬ 
acteristically, protecting when it talks of “dissent,” and, con¬ 
versely, the way it acts when it is confronted by something 
that really is dissent—that is, dissent against Liberalism. 
When we have done so, we will be in a better position to 
judge whether Liberalism’s drive toward the total state can 
be limited to matters of “property rights,” as the Establish¬ 
ment tells us it will be, or whether it will at last bring all 
our freedoms down in an impartial ruin. 

2 . 7 he Law-Breakers 

Everyone but the most frenetic anarchist will concede that 
government has some function in society. Advocates of the 
purest laissez-faire acknowledge the need for the traffic- 
policeman state, maintaining an arena of order, insuring 
equal administration of the rules of the game. Without 
peace, without the suppression of crime and violence, there 
could be no liberty. Every man would be prey to the whim of 
his neighbor. Society would disintegrate into the war of each 
against each. 

That is only common sense, as well as the studied observa¬ 
tion of political sages from Aristotle to Locke to Blackstone. 
As the Supreme Court put it 100 years ago: “The great ob¬ 
ject and duty of government is the protection of the lives, 
liberty, and property of the people composing it, whether 
abroad or at home, and any government failing in the ac¬ 
complishment of that object, or the performance of that duty, 
is not worth preserving.” 1 

The Law-Breakers 


This general proposition was well understood by the men 
who built the American nation, and was the principal reason 
for their meeting in Philadelphia to construct a Federal 
Union. It was precisely to insure the maintenance of peace, to 
preserve order among the states, and to obtain equal adminis¬ 
tration of laws constitutionally enjoined upon it that our 
central government came into being. 

It is therefore curious to note that, while government 
today is taking on functions never remotely envisioned for it 
by America’s founders—from setting the price of milk to su¬ 
perintending our cultural pursuits—it seems increasingly 
unable to handle the most elementary tasks of civil authority. 
Even as Liberal ideologues propose to legislate us into 
utopia, they are incapable of preventing the rampant increase 
of crime, growing contempt for the law and those who en¬ 
force it, and the disintegration of the moral and legal codes 
which permit our society to function in an orderly manner. 

When Senator Goldwater brought up this subject during 
the 1964 campaign, he was charged with everything from 
racism to irrelevance to violation of his own principles. By 
what right did Goldwater raise the matter of crime in a pres¬ 
idential election? Was he suggesting prevention of crime was 
a Federal, rather than a state or local responsibility? How did 
this fit with his states’ rights position? The paradox suggested 
by these questions, as it happens, might better be turned on 
the questioners themselves. Since they want the Federal Gov¬ 
ernment to intervene in every zone of American life, why 
don't they want the Federal Government to do something 
about crime and violence? Whence their constitutional ob¬ 
jections on this, of all points? Why have government do ev¬ 
erything it is not supposed to do, but refrain from doing the 
things some government must do if society is to survive? 

The answer, of course, is two-fold: First, the Liberals do 
want the Federal Government to engage in police action in 
those cases where their own sense of outrage is piqued, e.g., 
racial violence against “civil rights” enthusiasts in the South. 

The Liberal Establishment 


They do not, however, want such action where their sense 
of outrage is, at best, subdued, e.g., racial violence by “civil 
rights” enthusiasts in the North. Second, the true need of 
the situation is not for the Federal government to pre-empt 
local police functions, but for the government and the 
Liberal Establishment generally to stop doing things which 
lend encouragement to the forces of moral and legal disinte¬ 

The issue of law and order has a relevance to the Liberal- 
conservative face-off so profound that its dimensions can 
hardly be explored in the superficial exchanges which do 
service as political debate in America. The question goes 
deep, to contrasting views of man and his nature, and of the 
ethical universe in which man has his being. It has to do with 
the pulverization of values and standards, with the idea that 
man is a product of material forces devoid of responsibilities, 
with disregard for the known and fixed guidelines of the law 
and the Constitution, and with the idea that discipline and 
achievement are of less concern than social homogenization 
and the gospel of adjustment. 

These are the final issues between Liberalism and conserv¬ 
atism. They involve the whole agenda of bland and permis¬ 
sive nostrums aimed at elasticizing moral standards, pulling 
down values, and obliterating distinctions. For a genera¬ 
tion and more, the main thrust of Liberal policy has been to 
drain from the American consciousness its last few vestiges of 
piety. The Liberal view of things is, characteristically, that re¬ 
ligious truth is at best a kind of convenient superstition, that 
the world as we know it is the product of physical stress and 
material impulse, that the best policy is not what is right, but 
what works. It says values are not fixed or certain, but “rela¬ 
tive,” that in matters of public policy we must be guided, not 
by the strictures of the Constitution, but by the necessity of 
the moment. Materialism and agnosticism derived from 
Freud and Marx and Darwin; annihilation of value derived 

The Law-Breakers 


from Nietzsche and James and Dewey. These are the root 
precepts of Liberal philosophy. 

In the academy, where Liberal thought is imparted in its 
most concentrated form, this “relativism” has had some strik¬ 
ing results. In Changing Values in College, Philip Jacob tells 
us the typical result of higher education in America today is 
to induce rejection of “moral taboos” and “skepticism of the 
supernatural as a determining force in human affairs.” Under 
the pressure of society at large and of his college environ¬ 
ment, the student is nudged toward a “Liberal attitude,” re¬ 
fusing to “let fixed moral standards or ingrained prejudice 
govern his relations with other people .” 2 Other surveys of 
college youth confirm this. In the late 1950s, two sociologists 
at Queens College, New York, questioned 225 students about 
the celebrated Charles Van Doren TV quiz scandal case. Most 
of the students considered Van Doren, not as a culprit, but as 
a “tragic hero.” Eighty-six per cent were sympathetic to him. 
Twenty-six per cent found nothing wrong with his behavior. 

Similar results outside the academy were indicated by stud¬ 
ies of soldiers who broke under the pressures of Communist 
brainwashing in Korea. The typical brainwashee, said Major 
William Mayer, the Army psychiatrist who examined return¬ 
ing prisoners, “was an individual who based his sense of se¬ 
curity and often of superiority on transient, materialistic 
values, and was a man who, if deprived of material sources of 
support, would prove to be insecure, easily manipulated and 
controlled, lacking in real loyalties and convictions.” 3 

It is acknowledged by most observers that our society is 
suffering from ethical impoverishment; that frivolity and 
vulgarization have tended to displace spiritual and moral 
precepts which once informed our national consciousness. 
Waxing materialism and skepticism have gone hand in hand 
with a crime rate that has been increasing at better than five 
times the increase in the rate of population growth. We are 

The Liberal Establishment 


beset by an accelerating secularization, a corresponding de¬ 
cline of moral energy. 

It is somehow appropriate that the Establishment, survey¬ 
ing this scene, should decide that now is precisely the time to 
extirpate religious observance from the education of Ameri¬ 
can youth. In the name of “civil liberties,” the Establishment 
has brought its program of secularization to a triumphant 
climax. In the Supreme Court prayer decisions, saying we 
must construe the First Amendment to the Constitution with 
elaborate punctilio so that not even a hint of arbitrary power 
may endanger our liberties, we find in its concentrated es¬ 
sence the kind of “freedom” the Establishment would confer 
upon us. Not, to be sure, the freedom of the farmer to plow 
his ground and reap his produce, or the freedom of the 
worker to seek employment unhindered, or the freedom of 
the businessman to stay out of jail. But the freedom, instead, 
of the atheist not to hear the Lord’s Prayer recited by believ¬ 
ing Christians; the freedom of children to be compelled to 
spend the intellectually active hours of their formative years 
in schools devoid of religious sentiment. That, all too exactly, 
is the notion of freedom which animates the Establishment. 

It is, in a word, freedom from religious authority, the 
variety of freedom sought by the materialist, the pragmatist, 
the relativist. It is this the Establishment is after and not, as 
some Liberal spokesmen would have us believe, strict ob¬ 
servance of the Constitution. On this point, we should be 
absolutely clear. The Liberal resort to strict construction is a 
pretext, a device for getting at the real objective. 

This is so for at least three reasons. First, America’s Found¬ 
ing Fathers did not intend, when they enacted the First 
Amendment, to banish religious observances sponsored by 
the states. Their sanctions were imposed against the Com 
gress, and they were aimed, not at mere religious ceremonial, 
but against erection of an established church. Thus, even 
were strict construction of the First Amendment the real 

The Law-Breakers 


point, the Liberal position would be open to serious argu¬ 

Second, as noted, the Liberals themselves are inveterate 
advocates of—not strict construction—but loose construction. 
Their characteristic plea is for an interpretation of the Con¬ 
stitution which will increase the scope of governmental au¬ 
thority. Strict construction is reserved by the Establishment 
for those special cases in which it takes a particular interest. 
It is a device, not a principle, and when it is invoked it is 
generally to serve some larger ideological interest. 

Third, it is clear that constitutionality cannot be the point. 
This was shown conclusively when opponents of the Court 
decision attempted to launch a constitutional amendment 
which would make prayer in the classrooms of America al¬ 
lowable on the option of local authorities. The Establish¬ 
ment rose up en masse against this proposal. Yet opposition 
to the amendment could not have been constitutional, since 
the amendment process is itself the final and incontestable 
arbiter of what is constitutional. The objection was against 
prayer in the classroom, constitutional or not. The objection 
was to religious observance. 

If Establishment performance on this specific point were 
not sufficient, the Supreme Court has also set an instructive 
example of disregard for the fundamental purpose of the law 
when the law stands in the way of Liberal aspirations. It is a 
fact known to all students of our Constitution that our cen¬ 
tral government was to be one of limited powers. The Su- 

* The Liberal rejoinder on this point is that, by way of the 14th Amend¬ 
ment, the whole of the Bill of Rights is “incorporated” into the Constitu¬ 
tion’s restraints upon the states. This was the assertion of Justice Hugo Black 
in the 1962 prayer case. That position, however, is refuted by a long series 
of Supreme Court decisions dating back to Reconstruction. As the late 
Justice Felix Frankfurter put it, “the notion that the 14th Amendment was 
a covert way of imposing upon the states all the rules which it seemed impor¬ 
tant to 18th-century statesmen to write into the Federal amendments was 
rejected by judges who were themselves witnesses of the process by which the 
14th Amendment became part of the Constitution.” (Adamson v. California, 


The Liberal Establishment 


preme Court, after much Liberal hectoring and change of 
personalities, has employed certain ambiguities of phrase 
within the document—principally the general welfare and 
commerce clauses—to reverse that intention. Whereas the 
Constitution as a whole was meant to be an investiture of 
limited power, phrases within it are interpreted as grants of 
unlimited power. In short, the phrases are employed as pre¬ 
texts to avert the purpose of the law, the supreme law which 
is supposed to bind the government itself. 

In justification of this course, various Liberal sages, includ¬ 
ing several on the Supreme Court, have favored us with 
specimens of opportunistic reasoning. It was a Supreme 
Court Justice who imparted the noble datum that one cannot 
eat the Constitution. It was another Justice who opined that 
his own preference for champagne over dishwater was irrele¬ 
vant to the topsy turvy of the cosmos. It was a Supreme Court 
Justice who told us that, when the law does not conform to 
present necessity, we must twist the law to suit our circum¬ 
stances. Even so Liberal a commentator as Kenneth Burke 
professes “demoralization” as the Court subjects the Constitu¬ 
tion to “casuistic stretching” to “supply new legal fictions to 
encompass new material arising since the Constitution was 
framed.” 4 

All this, the Liberal will rejoin, is necessary—else how 
could we survive under the complexities of the present age? 
It is not our purpose to enter that argument here. The point 
is that such “casuistic stretching” of the law, such obvious 
twisting of the Constitution this way and that, bespeaks a 
system in which will and desire take precedence over the text 
of law. 

Nor does corrosion by example end there. In a preceding 
chapter we have canvassed the ascendant corruption of the 
present regime in Washington. We have seen flagrant dis¬ 
regard for morality and timely bending of the law for pur¬ 
poses of private gain. Direct violations of the law have been 

The Law-Breakers 

► 183 

committed, moreover, in an effort to conceal these misdoings 
from the American public. In the Baker case, for example, 
the administration "leaked” confidential information to re¬ 
porters in an attempt to discredit a key witness. "In several 
instances,” reported Cabell Phillips of The New York Times, 
"individual newsmen and news executives have been read 
excerpts from what purported to be reports by either Air 
Force intelligence or the Federal Bureau of Investigation.” 5 
Such use of confidential material is contrary to law. In an¬ 
other episode involving a witness hostile to the Kennedy ad¬ 
ministration, government officials appeared before a congres¬ 
sional committee and gave false testimony, later retracted 
when the facts threatened to come out. 

Other flagrant violations of the law have occurred in the 
field of foreign affairs and defense policy. For years. Congress 
mandated expenditure of appropriated funds for develop¬ 
ment of the B70 bomber. Because it did not agree with the 
Congressional will in this case, the administration refused to 
use the money as directed, in violation of the rightful au¬ 
thority of the legislature. 

Similar disregard for the intent of Congress and therefore 
for the law has been manifested in the matter of allied trade 
with Communist nations. The executive branch has repeat¬ 
edly failed to comply with Congressional efforts to prevent 
trade and aid to Communist nations. The Battle Act, the 
Johnson Act, and Public Law 87-128 forbid trade with 
Communist countries, aid to nations in default of their debts 
or to nations which are trading with Communist countries. 
Specific laws and riders to foreign aid bills have been passed 
mandating cutback of aid to Yugoslavia and Poland, and a 
cutoff of aid to nations trading with Communist Cuba. Every 
one of these prohibitions has been flouted by the executive 
branch or evaded by verbal subterfuge. The wheat deal with 
the Soviet Union, for example, was in violation of the Latta 
amendment to the 1961 agriculture act, which forbids sale of 

The Liberal Establishment 


subsidized farm commodities to Communist countries. Presi¬ 
dent Johnson’s response to a congressional mandate to cut off 
aid to countries trading with Cuba was to lop off a few thou¬ 
sand dollars in meaningless aid to France and Britain, leaving 
major aid recipients funneling goods to Castro untouched. 

The executive branch has added insult to injury by refus¬ 
ing to tell the legislature what it is or isn’t doing in such 
cases. In matters pertaining to censorship of military offi¬ 
cers, trading with the enemy, administration of the foreign 
aid program, and others, it has claimed "executive privilege” 
and thrown dust in the eyes of congressional investigators. 

The lesson is clear enough: If you don*t agree with the law, 
ignore it . Figure out some expedient for getting around it. 
Or, failing that, simply say the law is "wrong” and violate it. 
The latter course was chosen by Democratic senatorial aspi¬ 
rant Pierre Salinger and the Democratic hierarchy of Cali¬ 
fornia in 1964. Salinger was not a resident of California when 
he decided to run for the Senate there. When incumbent 
Clair Engle died, Democratic Governor Edmund G. "Pat” 
Brown moved to appoint Salinger to the vacant seat. Cali¬ 
fornia law, however, requires that a Senate appointee must 
be an "elector” of the state, meaning someone qualified to 
vote there. Although Salinger was not so qualified, Brown 
appointed him anyway. State Attorney General Stanley Mosk 
ratified the choice (as did the Democrats of the United States 
Senate), asserting that the state law which would have barred 
Salinger was "invalid.” In an exchange reported by the San 
Francisco Chronicle, Mosk made a most interesting assertion: 
"Asked by a reporter whether it was unusual for an attorney 
general to testify that the laws of his state were invalid, 
Mosk said: ‘We have on occasion confessed error.’ ” 6 

It was with this sort of precept and example that Senator 
Goldwater concerned himself during the ’64 campaign —not 
with suggestions that the Federal government take over the 
functions of the states and localities. Indeed, one of his main 

The Law-Breakers 

► 185 

points was precisely that the Federal government, through 
the Supreme Court, had been stripping local authorities of 
their rightful and necessary powers to handle law enforce¬ 
ment, and that this trend needed reversing. 

Perhaps the most famous Supreme Court decree in this 
field was the 1957 Mallory case, in which a convicted rapist, 
Andrew Mallory, under sentence of death, was turned loose 
by the high court on the grounds that the police had waited 
too long (over night) to bring Mallory before a magistrate. 
Three years later, Mallory was arrested once more on a rape 
charge, of which he was acquitted, and was convicted of as¬ 
sault and burglary and sentenced to a prison term of 10 to 20 

During his presidential campaign, Goldwater called atten¬ 
tion to some other less well-known but equally important 

Three years ago five members of the Supreme Court decided 
that state courts must follow Federal rules of evidence whether 
they wanted to or not. Specifically, no evidence could be used if 
police investigators made some mistake, any mistake, in gathering 
the evidence. This rule must hold even if it means an obviously 
guilty defendant will go free ... In an earlier case, the Supreme 
Court ordered that a criminal conviction should be reversed, no 
matter how guilty the defendant, if it were shown that some 
technical violation of constitutional rights occurred anywhere in 
the course of investigation and trial . . . 

The trend has now reached its logical end. Five justices of our 
Supreme Court have held that a voluntary confession made by a 
state prisoner was inadmissible because his lawyer was not 
present when it was made. This was held despite the fact that the 
prisoner admittedly knew of his right to remain silent. . . . There 
was no question in these cases that confessions were extorted or 
untrue. Such confessions have long, and rightly, been invalid. 
This is a new rule. It seems to say that a criminal defendant must 
be given a sporting chance to go free, even though nobody 

The Liberal Establishment 


doubts in the slightest that he is guilty. No wonder our law 
enforcement officers have been demoralized and rendered ineffec¬ 
tive in their job. 7 

If the example set by Liberal government and the aid and 
comfort rendered by the Supreme Court were not enough, 
Establishment spokesmen have repeatedly spoken out in ex¬ 
tenuation of demonstrators engaged in “civil disobedience/' 
mass marches, and outright race riots. It was only when the 
fear of a “white backlash" caused some second thoughts that 
Liberal spokesmen backed away from these expressions of 
support and extenuation. Consider, for example, the 1963 
statement made on national television by President Kennedy 
as he discussed the integration of the University of Alabama 
and the introduction of what was to become the “Civil 
Rights" act of 1964. 

“The old code of equity law under which we live," he said, 
“commands for every wrong a remedy, but in too many 
communities, in too many parts of the country, wrongs are 
inflicted on Negro citizens for which there are no remedies at 
law. Unless the Congress acts, their only remedy is in the 
street .” 8 (Italics added.) 

Any “civil rights" demonstrator listening to that statement 
could only conclude (1) that until Congress acted, he was 
justified in seeking his “remedy in the street," and (2) that 
should Congress fail to act, he would be entitled to indulge 
the “remedy" with even greater force and frequency. In a 
word, the technique of marching and mass demonstrations 
blending into outright violence was being ratified by the 
highest conceivable authority, the nation’s chief magistrate 
himself. Kennedy in effect was using such activity as a club 
over the head of Congress, telling them that if the bill were 
not enacted, riots would ensue. In the succeeding year, citi¬ 
zens in New York City, Rochester and Philadelphia were to 
see a great deal of this “remedy," and were, perhaps to be 

The Law-Breakers 

► 187 

forgiven if they did not understand it to be mandated by the 
old code of equity law. 

Kennedy’s statement was reinforced by similar utterances 
from others high in the Liberal administration. In a 1964 
address at Colby College, U.N. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson 
told his student audience that, “In the great struggle to ad¬ 
vance civil and human rights . . . even a jail sentence is no 
longer a dishonor but a proud achievement.” 9 In a less 
flamboyant statement, then-Senator Hubert Humphrey said 
that while “civil rights” demonstrations might be “tech¬ 
nically” in violation of state laws, “that was not the point”: 
“When Negroes have full rights and full protection of the 
law . . . then the demonstrations, technically legal or not, 
will cease.” 10 This cavalier attitude toward “technical” 
legality seems a little odd, since it is on the basis of far more 
“technical” points that the courts have been turning loose 
criminals upon the nation. Evidently technical violations of 
the law are of less concern to the Establishment than tech¬ 
nical errors in procedure by those trying to enforce it. 

All of these things, and several others which space does not 
allow us to mention, are part of the Federal Government’s 
general apparatus of support and example for those who 
would evade the law, take it in their own hands, or violate it 
openly when they find its strictures inconvenient. But none 
of them is quite so direct, or so blatant, as the new concept of 
federal-aid-to-civil-disobedience unveiled by a report of the 
New York State Senate. 

The New York legislators had cause, during the closing 
months of 1964, to look into an organization called “Mobili¬ 
zation for Youth,” a social and political agitation group oper¬ 
ating in New York City. MFY garnered a few fleeting head¬ 
lines in 1964 when its workings were examined by the New 
York Daily News. The paper charged that MFY, sustained by 
taxpayers’ money at the local and national levels, was infil¬ 
trated by Communists and other agents of the far left. The 

The Liberal Establishment 


issue failed to catch fire, however, because national media 
were too busy alerting the nation to the menace of “extrem¬ 
ists” on the right. It was therefore necessary to wait for the 
New York Senate report to get the full story. 

In essence, the report discloses that MFY was indeed heav¬ 
ily infiltrated by the ultra left, and had an identified member 
of the Communist Party on its governing board. The com¬ 
mittee took testimony indicating that the Communists con¬ 
sidered MFY a major target for penetration, and instructed 
their operatives to seek positions in it. 

More to the point of the “law and order” issue, the com¬ 
mittee confirmed what had been reported earlier, that MFY 
was deeply involved in promoting the celebrated New York 
“rent strike,” in which tenants of apartment buildings re¬ 
fused to pay their rent until landlords met their demands for 
repairs and improvements. MFY also encouraged school boy¬ 
cotts and was engaged in other “civil rights” protest activ¬ 

Among MFY’s projects was a so-called “Adventure Corps,” 
complacently described in a federal report as a “para¬ 
military” group, in which youngsters would drill in imitation 
of military maneuvers. One Liberal social worker voiced 
shock at the corps’ “focus on military drill, including uni¬ 
forms and rifles, and a general kind of Bundist rigidity.” 11 

In addition, the New York News disclosed that MFY had 
paid for and printed a handbill advertising a “mass rent 
strike rally,” which was distributed at the scene of “civil 
rights” agitation in New York City in 1964. The leaflet, 
according to the News, had been ordered by MFY employee 
Ezra Birnbaum, and told residents of the lower East Side that 
“Harlem tenants organized rent strikes and are getting 
results—we can do the same.” 12 The New York Senate com¬ 
mittee discovered a memorandum by Birnbaum, however, 
indicating the motive of the “rent strike” drive was some¬ 
thing other than improved living conditions for tenants. The 

The Law-Breakers 


memo advocated action to “organize tenants as a political 
force,” and said, “we will no longer work with individual 
tenant complaints unless the tenant is prepared to help or¬ 
ganize his building.” 13 

All of this activity, lending encouragement to the forces of 
civil disorder, has been subsidized by the Kennedy-Johnson 
Administration, to the tune of more than $6 million of tax¬ 
payers’ money. Moreover, it was subsequently learned that 
the Johnson regime had hired former MFY Director George 
Brager, who says MFY’s “soundness has been affirmed” and 
who characterizes charges concerning infiltration of the 
group as “a collection of rumors,” 14 to work in connection 
with the “war on poverty.” 

3 . The War Against Security 

Liberal concern for “civil liberties” is manifested chiefly in 
cases involving the internal security of the United States. In 
the Establishment view, efforts to rebuke and control the 
Communist conspiracy within the United States amount to 
attacks on “free speech,” and safeguards against security and 
loyalty risks in the American government are little better 
than a medieval inquisition. 

The Smith Act, the Internal Security Act of 1950, the At¬ 
torney General’s list of subversive organizations, the House 
Committee on Un-American Activities, the Senate Internal 
Security Subcommittee, and the FBI—all have felt the lash of 
Establishment disdain. Loyalty oaths, passport regulations, 
and anti-propaganda ordinances are particularly anathema. 
In the Establishment view, true “civil liberties” demand that 
profession of Communist opinion be looked upon as a matter 
of political dissent, and that efforts to deprive someone of 

The War Against Security 


governmental employment on security grounds be treated as 
a criminal proceeding in which the full weight of proof is on 
the “prosecution.” Unfortunately, neither of these presuppo¬ 
sitions fits the facts. 

Participation in the Communist global enterprise is some¬ 
thing more than “dissent,” or an exercise in free speech. 
Communists are not troublesome because of their opinions, 
because of things they say . They are troublesome because 
they are the agents of a hostile foreign power trying to de¬ 
stroy the United States. They are a fifth column whose alle¬ 
giance in the struggle for world survival is with the enemy—a 
fifth column trained to use any and every means, including 
violence, which serves the cause of the Bolshevik conspiracy. 
Sanctions against them therefore concern, not their speech, 
but their systemic commitment to the enemy. Such sanctions 
are not a domestic problem so much as a problem of national 
defense. Our government's mandate to deal with them is part 
of its mandate to protect American citizens from a foreign 
adversary—the most elementary of its functions, without 
which there could be no United States and no freedom for its 

The Establishment view of security measures in govern¬ 
ment is equally misleading. There is, after all, no such thing 
as a right to a government job. The Liberal argument is 
equivalent to saying the government—that is, the individu¬ 
als who constitute the government—should be sealed off 
from surveillance by the citizenry. The government does not 
have rights; the people who work for government, in that 

• Some Liberals have clearly recognized this point. Vide Prof. Sidney Hook, 
in Heresy Yes—Conspiracy No: “It is Communism as an international move¬ 
ment whose capital is Moscow which is the enemy of American democracy; 
and the American Communist Party, no matter what its size or influence 
(which is not entirely inconsiderable), is an integral part of that movement 
... It is not the speech of members of the Communist Party which makes 
them dangerous but their organizational ties, for this in effect makes them a 
para-military fifth column of a powerful state, ready to strike whenever their 
foreign masters give the word.” 

The Liberal Establishment 

► 192 

specific capacity, have privileges extended to them by the 
citizen, revocable under terms the citizen chooses to establish 
for his own protection. The question of continued govern¬ 
ment employment, therefore, is not commensurable with 
prosecution for a crime. The burden of proof is not on a 
“prosecution,” seeking to put a man in jail, and doubts are 
not to be resolved in favor of the “accused,” who is to be 
presumed “innocent” until proved otherwise. It is the indi¬ 
vidual citizen who has rights over against the members of the 
government, and who in particular has a right to be certain 
public servants who are “risks” of one sort or another in the 
Cold War are not employed in the government. Where there 
are reasonable doubts, these doubts should be resolved, not in 
favor of the public servant, but in favor of the citizen's right 
to have the best possible representation in government and to 
be secure against foreign enemies. 

Both these points are fairly well settled in the laws of our 
nation.* Yet the Establishment continues to view Commu¬ 
nism as a question of “free speech” and internal security in 
government as a field in which “rights” are all on the side of 
the public servant. The result has been a long and systematic 
campaign against every form of internal security measure 
seeking to protect the nation from Communism or from 
those whose background makes them, as government em¬ 
ployees, unacceptable as “risks.” 

The Supreme Court under Earl Warren has been the most 
powerful instrument of the Establishment program in this 
field. The Warren Court has laid level internal security 
statutes and regulations in almost every sector of American 
life. It has struck down state sedition laws (the Nelson case), 
emasculated the Smith Act (the Yates case), hampered Con¬ 
gressional investigating committees (the Watkins case), 
forced opening of security files to Communist defendants 

* Justice Holmes, a Liberal’s Liberal, put it that “th^ petitioner may have 
a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to 
be a policeman.” 

The War Against Security 


(Jencks case), upset executive department security proce¬ 
dures (Service case), and hindered efforts to prevent Com¬ 
munist entrance to and exit from the country (Kent case). 
The Court has erased from the books almost every sanction 
the United States has against the internal activities of the 

The Court’s method has not always been ingenuous. The 
Nelson case striking down the sedition law of the state of 
Pennsylvania, for example, was based on the notion that the 
Federal government, by passage of the Smith Act, had pre¬ 
empted the internal security field; the states didn’t need to 
handle internal subversion because Federal authorities, oper¬ 
ating under the Smith Act, would do it for them. Yet one 
year later, the same Supreme Court virtually cancelled out 
the Smith Act, eliminating the very law whose pre-emptive 
potencies supposedly made state action unnecessary. 

On those occasions where the Court has after much tedium 
affirmed the constitutionality of an anti-Communist measure, 
other zones of the Establishment have stepped in to do the 
work of nullification. In October, 1961, after 10 years of 
litigation, the Court upheld a requirement of the Internal 
Security Act of 1950 that the Communist Party of the United 
States register as a “Communist-action” group. This ruling 
made it unlawful to issue passports to members of the Com¬ 
munist Party. The restriction was immediately done away 
with by a State Department order that anyone whose passport 
was challenged had the right to confront witnesses testifying 
to his Communist affiliation and to see the evidence upon 
which the denial was based. The effect of such action would 
be to dry up sources of information about the Party and to 
disclose information security officials had about its activities. 
Since security officers are reluctant to “blow” their informa¬ 
tion sources, “the real effect of the regulations,” as the 
Internal Security subcommittee put it, “was to assure the is¬ 
suance of passports to many, if not most. Communist appli¬ 
cants.” 1 

The Liberal Establishment 

► 194 

Establishment lenience toward internal Communism, and 
its desire to rid the nation of effective internal security mea¬ 
sures, may be discerned in the related matters of Lee Harvey 
Oswald and the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, of which 
Oswald was a member. In both instances, the readiness of the 
Establishment to confer freedom of movement upon those 
deeply compromised with America’s Communist adversaries 
played an important role. 

The web of circumstance tying Oswald to the international 
Communist conspiracy is convincing. According to his own 
statement, he took to Communism at the age of 15, when 
someone gave him a pamphlet defending Communist spies 
Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. His interest aroused, he turned 
to Karl Marx’s Das Kapital and began slipping by degrees 
into the fringes of the far left. He wound up by going to 
Russia, renouncing his American citizenship, taking a Rus¬ 
sian wife, and declaring: “I affirm that my allegiance is to the 
Soviet Socialist Republic.” 2 According to a 1959 interview 
with Aline Mosby of United Press International, Oswald was 
convinced capitalism and the American free enterprise sys¬ 
tem were finished. “Capitalism has passed its peak,” he said. 
“Capitalism will disappear as feudalism disappeared.” 3 In 
1962, after supposedly putting in service as a factory worker 
at Minsk, and improving his marksmanship as a member of a 
“rifle club,” Oswald returned to America. He was allowed 
repatriation by State Department authorities, reportedly on 
the technical grounds that his citizenship, though renounced 
by him, had not been formally revoked. The U.S. embassy 
also lent him $435.71 to pay his travel expenses. 

All of this, it was subsequently revealed, took place over 
the vehement protest of J. W. Holland, an immigration offi¬ 
cial who opposed granting Oswald a visa, saying “a substan¬ 
tial amount of derogatory security information” had been 
developed concerning him, and that Oswald’s profession of a 
change of heart was “not sufficient to relieye doubts which 
have arisen regarding his loyalty to the U.S.” Here, then, was 

The War Against Security 


a committed Marxist, a defector to Moscow who had re¬ 
nounced his citizenship, received special training from the 
Communists including training in marksmanship, who was 
married to the niece of an MVD agent, and whose record 
excited suspicion on the part of a responsible State Depart¬ 
ment officer. Yet when Oswald asked repatriation to America, 
U.S. officials in Moscow not only decided in his favor, but 
financed his return. 

Moreover, according to Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott, 
Oswald obtained another passport to go to Russia five months 
before he assassinated President Kennedy. “This was done/' 
say the reporters, “without the customary ‘name check’ re¬ 
quired for persons known to be Communists or to have 
Communist associations. . . . [His] incriminatory State De¬ 
partment file apparently was completely ignored in giving 
Oswald a passport to Russia the day after he asked for it.” 4 

The passport issue pops up again in the matter of the Fair 
Play for Cuba Committee, with which Oswald became in¬ 
volved on his return to America. Oswald’s Fair Play member¬ 
ship card was issued May 28, 1963. In the summer of 1963 he 
participated in a pro-Castro demonstration in New Orleans, 
and was booked by police there after a scuffle with anti-Castro 
Cubans. On August 21, he appeared on a New Orleans radio 
program and defended the Castro dictatorship. In their in¬ 
vestigation of Oswald’s apartment, Dallas police found let¬ 
ters to him from a man in New York City, on stationery of 
the Communist Party USA, offering advice on how to con¬ 
duct himself in Dallas. One instructed him on how to set up a 
Fair Play for Cuba chapter. The FBI also learned Oswald had 
been receiving mailings in Dallas from the “Fair Play” group 
under the name “A. Hidell.”* 

* For some reason the Warren Commission gave only perfunctory attention 
to Oswald’s left-wing connections. It correctly noted, as indicated in chapter 
2, part I, that Oswald was not influenced in any way by right-wing activity, 
and that he was influenced by left-wing activity. Yet in its discussion of or¬ 
ganizations which might have had some bearing on the Kennedy assassina¬ 
tion, the report devotes some seven pages of text, in The New York Times 

The Liberal Establishment 


The Fair Play for Cuba Committee had long been under 
investigation by committees of Congress and by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. Jay Sourwine, chief counsel for the 
Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, has said: “We have 
sworn testimony on the record that the Fair Play for Cuba 
Committee was initiated with the assistance of money which 
came from Castro in Cuba. This is Communist money. The 
committee has evidence that some of the persons active in 
the Fair Play for Cuba Committee itself are Communists. 
The committee has information that old line Communists, all 
across the country, are helping [FPCC] in its demonstrations 
and organization.” 5 

In its annual report for fiscal year 1961, the FBI said: “The 
Fair Play for Cuba Committee is one of the main outlets in 
this country for pro-Castro propaganda . . . The Bureau dur¬ 
ing the 1961 fiscal year determined that certain funds used by 
the committee to pay for a newspaper advertisement had 
come from a Cuban official assigned to the United Nations, a 
fact later admitted by a committee member in testimony be¬ 
fore a congressional committee. FBI investigations have also 

edition (pp. 271-78), including a full-page reproduction of an ad critical of 
Kennedy placed in the Dallas Morning News, to right-wingers, explaining at 
length the formation of the conservative group which placed the ad, the in¬ 
dividuals composing it, and the identity and background of another rightist 
spokesman who printed up an anti-Kennedy leaflet. None of this, by the re¬ 
port’s own statement, had the slightest connection with Oswald. By way of 
contrast, the report devotes only 2V2 pages (269-271) to the Fair Play For 
Cuba Committee, limiting its discussion to the bare essentials of Oswald’s 
own involvement with it. No mention is made of the people composing the 
Fair Play For Cuba Committee, the extensive investigations of it by congres¬ 
sional committees and the FBI, or its certified status as a Castro-subsidized 
front. Why the inordinate attention to the right-wing agitators in no way 
connected with Oswald, and the total lack of attention to left-wingers who 
were connected with him? In similar vein, reporters Allen and Scott disclose 
that the Warren Commission refused to accept for its public report a letter 
from Congressman John Pillion (R-N.Y.) spelling out alleged connections 
of Oswald with the Soviet secret police, and claiming that the record showed 
Oswald's “entire Communist background and training had conditioned him 
to kill.” (Indianapolis News, Sept. 24, 1964) 

The War Against Security 


shown that the Fair Play for Cuba Committee has been 
heavily infiltrated by the Communist Party and Socialist 
Workers Party, and these parties have actually organized 
some chapters of the committee/’ 6 

Further light was cast on FPCC in the spring of 1963 by 
the Senate Internal Security subcommittee. The Senate body 
released the testimony of Vincent Theodore Lee, Fair Play 
national executive secretary who signed Oswald’s member¬ 
ship card. Lee’s testimony is marked by consistent resort to 
the Fifth Amendment—the plea that one cannot be forced to 
answer a question if a truthful reply would be incriminating, 
or would lead through a chain of other questions to some¬ 
thing incriminating. Lee invoked the Fifth with respect to 
where and when he was born, where he went to school, 
whether he was a member of the American Civil Liberties 
Union, etc. He also refused to answer all of the following 
questions: “During your lifetime have you ever received 
compensation from the Communist Party USA?” “When did 
you last receive money from the Communist Party USA?” 
“Are you presently a member of the Communist Party of the 
United States?” “Are you presently a member of the Com¬ 
munist Party of Cuba?” “Are you the same V. T. Lee who in 
the capacity as head of the Florida unit of the FPCC attended 
a national conference of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in 
New York City in July 1961?” 7 In each of these instances, 
Lee replied: “I respectfully decline to answer that question, 
invoking my privileges under the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution.” 8 

Among Lee’s predecessors at FPCC was Robert Taber, a 
former CBS newsman. According to Senator Thomas Dodd, 
Taber has a criminal record, “which includes a conviction for 
armed assault and kidnapping,” 9 left the United States with 
$19,000 in committee funds, went to Cuba where he “cov¬ 
ered” the Bay of Pigs invasion for the Castro press, and 
served, by his own account, in the Cuban militia. According 

The Liberal Establishment 


to the Cuban Communist magazine, Bohemia, Dodd noted, 
Taber in fact worked with the Red secret police. Taber 
next travelled to Prague, Czechoslovakia, using a Cuban pass¬ 
port because his American passport had expired. In March, 
1962, despite all this, Taber walked into the American con¬ 
sulate in Hamburg, Germany, and had his American passport 
renewed, as Dodd says, “without any difficulty.”* 10 

The Fair Play for Cuba Committee began with an assist 
from several big-name Liberals and was turned into a “civil 
liberties” folk hero of sorts when one of these, critic Kenneth 
Tynan, was called to testify before the Senate Committee. 
Dodd commented on the peculiar receptivity of the Estab¬ 
lishment toward the organization: 

The Fair Play for Cuba Committee has been the chief public 
relations instrument of the Castro network in the United States. 
It has succeeded in befuddling and deceiving many thousands of 
Americans who are certainly not Communists, and it has enjoyed 
an inexplicable vogue on some of our campuses. 

It is a commentary on our society that the Fair Play for Cuba 
Committee has been able to retain a substantial non-Communist 
following despite the demonstrated facts that Castro agents 
played an important role in its organization, and that it received 
secret funds from the Castro government. 

To me this suggests the existence of a stubborn and unreason¬ 
ing innocence on the part of some of our non-Communist Lib¬ 
erals. But despite the widespread tendency to cling to illusions, I 

* Reviewing the record of this former CBS newsman, Dodd concluded: “It 
is something to ponder that a man like Taber would worm his way into a 
top position on the CBS staff, get himself assigned as CBS correspondent in 
Cuba in the period preceding the Castro takeover, and then have his totally 
pro-Castro presentations purveyed to the American public by one of our 
two great television networks. 

“It is my earnest hope that the story of Robert Taber, as here presented, 
can do something to persuade our news media that their correspondents 
cannot be selected on the sole basis of their ability as newspapermen or 
cameramen or commentators—that it is their duty to the American public 
to conduct a somewhat closer check into character and basic loyalties than 
was conducted in the case of Robert Taber.” 

The War Against Security 


believe that the Fair Play for Cuba Committee would have gone 
out of business a long time ago if the American press had made it 
a point of duty to expose it to the public. 11 

Despite the information unearthed by Dodd, by the FBI, 
and by Congressional committees, Attorney General Robert 
Kennedy did not put the FPCC on his list of subversive or¬ 
ganizations. The given reason: Thanks to inhibitions im¬ 
posed by the Supreme Court, no organization has been 
placed on the Attorney General's list since 1955. 

Oswald and the Fair Play for Cuba Committee are only the 
most prominent beneficiaries of the Establishment notion 
that “dissent" covers a multitude of leftist sins. And the elas- 
ticizing of passport regulations is only one among many steps 
taken by the present administration to dismantle the coun¬ 
try’s interna] security system. The Senate Internal Security 
subcommittee, inquiring into the passport matter, also dis¬ 
covered the Kennedy State Department had taken steps to 
dismantle and/or emasculate that agency’s office of Security. 
Among these steps were abolition of the office of Physical 
Security, reduction in the number of Security employees, and 
demotion of top security expert Otto Otepka. These moves 
were defended in the name of “economy," although addi¬ 
tional personnel had to be brought in to take over the con¬ 
tinuing workload of the department, and although new offi¬ 
cials were appointed to handle, among other things, the 
duties formerly discharged by Otepka. And although, it 
might be added, the same administration seeking “economy" 
in the Security office was running the U.S. Federal budget to 
record heights by expanded spending elsewhere in govern¬ 

In November, 1961, Otepka testified that the New Fron¬ 
tier had abolished some 20 out of 123 jobs in the Washington 
security office. 12 Additionally, he said, the Kennedy State 
Department had resorted to the practice of waiving security 

The Liberal Establishment 


clearance when an employee was first hired, then backdating 
his clearance once it got around to checking up on him. 
“Evidence in our record/' said the Internal Security Sub¬ 
committee, “makes it clear . . . that some offices in the De¬ 
partment, apparently without the Secretary having full per¬ 
sonal knowledge of the merits of each case, have resorted to 
the indiscriminate use of waiver provisions. In many in¬ 
stances employees were known to be working in sensitive 
areas and had access to classified defense information before 
they had any specific security clearance from responsible per¬ 
sons in the Department." The subcommittee found that, 
under waiver procedures, no fewer than 616 people were 
hired between January 23, 1961, and May 17, 1962, “to work 
on classified material if necessary." 13 

With respect to episodes in which the Department had 
been “waiving the pre-appointment investigative require¬ 
ment," 14 Otepka testified: 

Sourwine. It must be true that there are many people working in 
the State Department with access to classified material who have 
not been investigated. 

Otepka. That is correct . 15 

# # # 

Sourwine. I asked you . . . whether you ever knew of anyone at 
the Assistant Secretary level or higher who was appointed under 
a waiver. 

Otepka. There have been some waivers at the Assistant Secretary 
level . 16 

# # * 

Sourwine. The committee has been advised, Mr. Otepka, by 
another officer of the department who communicated with a 
member of the committee, that you recently informed Mr. 
Boswell [William O. Boswell, Director of Security, Otepka’s im¬ 
mediate superior] respecting the antedating of security clear¬ 
ances. Can you tell us how many cases of that nature there were 
in the information you gave Mr. Boswell? 

The War Against Security 


Otepka. I identified in that memorandum something like 30 

# # # 

Sourwine. Now, you distinguished a while ago between the 
waiver procedure in the case of officers in the department and the 
waiver procedure in other cases. In the case of employees other 
than officers, what is the difference in the waiver procedure? 
Otepka. The Department of State, because of the competition it 
has encountered from private industry and other government 
agencies for the services of qualified clerks, has found it necessary 
to waive the full-scale investigations required for clerical person¬ 
nel, GS-4 and below, in order to secure these people immediate 

Sourwine. So all these, GS-4 and below, are appointed with 
blanket waiver? 

Otepka. Yes, sir . 17 

Under President Johnson, the program of security de¬ 
mobilization continued. In September, 1964, it was revealed 
the Johnson State Department had ordered the destruction by 
burning of security records in local offices around the coun¬ 
try. This step was justified in the name of “efficiency,” al¬ 
though local agents testified it would hinder them in their 
work and although it had the effect of centralizing control of 
security completely in the hands of those who had set out to 
dismantle the Washington security office. 18 

Among these various cases, the Otepka demotion was par¬ 
ticularly significant. As Deputy Director, Otepka was one of 
the crack security team brought into State by the late Scott 
McLeod, who had headed the office under John Foster 
Dulles. Otepka’s post-Dulles superiors put into his care two 
special security cases—John Stewart Service and William 
Wieland. With Otepka handling these complex matters 
above and beyond his regular duties, his superiors argued he 
was not in fact performing the functions of a “Deputy Direc¬ 
tor,” one of them alleging this as a “phony” job description 

The Liberal Establishment 


for Otepka’s position. 19 Otepka was therefore demoted to the 
post of chief of evaluations division. Since higher-ups ignored 
Otepka’s evaluation on both Service and Wieland, the only 
result emerging from all this was to get Otepka demoted. 

The Kennedy State Department next proceeded to “reor¬ 
ganize” things so that personnel were transferred away from 
Otepka’s office and into another division. Otepka was then 
assigned out of the Security office altogether, his superiors 
feeling a tour with the National War College would enable 
him to have his “vistas broadened.” 20 

The Senate Internal Security subcommittee felt Otepka’s 
problem might have been that he was a stickler for security 
regulations.* 21 Reviewing his record, the senators said: 

“The conduct of Mr. Otto Otepka in the Wieland case and 
other cases, and his insistence upon what he considered good 
security has, without fault on his part, brought harm to his 
career in the State Department. . .” 22 

Yet another step in the Liberal campaign to maximize 
“civil liberties” was the New Frontier’s 1961 action suspend¬ 
ing an “intercept” program aimed at propaganda from Iron 
Curtain countries. Under both Truman and Eisenhower, ad¬ 
dressees in America were asked if they wanted to receive Red 
mail from abroad; the vast majority said “no.” Under the 
Kennedy order, however, the mail was delivered automati¬ 
cally and, under international postal agreements, delivered 

* The committee reached these conclusions: “. . . Boswell’s plans, with the 
assistance of his new executive officer, were designed not to eliminate unes¬ 
sential operations, but as events seem to bear out, were directed at individuals 
so that Boswell could reorganize and entrench the entire security organiza¬ 
tion under Foreign Service control . . . Boswell and others in the Department 
were quick to defend cutbacks in the domestic operations of the Office of 
Security to the extent of 25 positions (almost all persons cut were veteran 
civil service employees) while increasing the number of security officer 
positions at posts abroad, all under the Foreign Service . . . Boswell further 
sought to justify the domestic cuts on grounds of decreased workloads. The 
fact is that not only have workloads not decreased but all of the abolished 
domestic positions have been restored in order to enable the Department to 
handle increases in investigative caseloads . . . The reduction in force in the 
Office of Security was not followed by any drop in the workload . . .” 


The War Against Security 


free. Congressman Glenn Cunningham (R-Neb.) subse¬ 
quently introduced a rider to a postal bill to cut off this free 
delivery of Red mail, adopted by the House with only two 
dissenting votes. Questioned about this action Kennedy said 
the free mail agreement was a “reciprocal matter,” accruing 
to the benefit of the United States: “I think in the last twelve 
months ending March 31, 1961, we sent a total of 16 million 
pounds of mail of all types to the Iron Curtain countries, and 
a lot of it went to friends and relatives in Iron Curtain coun¬ 
tries, and food packages and all the rest, and we were only 
receiving 2.3 million pounds.” 23 

That statement did not do credit to the President’s 
vaunted memory for detail. According to the Post Office De¬ 
partment, 2.5 million pounds of mail, not 16 million, were 
sent from America to Iron Curtain countries that year, and 
1.6 million pounds, not 2.3 million, were received from those 
countries. Even that tabulation, however, was grossly mis¬ 
leading. For much Communist mail entering the country was 
not tabulated at all. As Cunningham put it: 

Customs Bureau inspection units were located at only three 
ports; they were and are woefully undermanned; they did not 
attempt to stop material going to colleges, schools, libraries, 
newspapers, government offices, foreign embassies, consulates, etc. 
Thus a great amount of the material was never subject to any 
action by the Customs Bureau. The fact remains, however, that 
of those persons who were asked by the Customs Bureau if they 
wanted material addressed to them, fewer than 10% replied 
affirmatively. 24 

Cunningham’s amendment sought to exclude Communist 
propaganda from the convention under which international 
mail is delivered free of charge within the recipient country. 
The amendment did not affect our participation in the postal 
union per se, nor did it alter the present status of first-class 
mail delivery. “It would require inspection,” Cunningham 

The Liberal Establishment 


said, “just as mail is now inspected (including suspect first- 
class mail) for obscene and pornographic matter, material 
which advocates the violent overthrow of the government, 
and material involving mail fraud. Nothing in the amend¬ 
ment will upset the present law which requires a search war¬ 
rant before first-class mail may be opened without the ad¬ 
dressee’s permission.”* 25 

The fundamental point—despite the cries of “censorship” 
thrown up by the Kennedy regime and its supporters—was 
the character of the Communist challenge: There can be no 
such thing as a “reciprocal” agreement with the Communists, 
because the Communists honor such agreements only in the 
breach. It is impossible, after all, to mail anti-Communist lit¬ 
erature into Communist countries, and have it delivered— 
first class, second class, free or prepaid. Magazines and news¬ 
papers from the Free World are barred from Soviet-domi¬ 
nated countries; broadcasts into Communist countries are 
jammed as a matter of course. In view of all this, it can hardly 
be argued that the United States is under reciprocal obliga¬ 
tion to deliver Communist propaganda, free of charge, into 
American homes. 

While executive department security regulations have 
been worked over at length, the Establishment has not neg¬ 
lected its long-term war against the House Committee on Un- 
American Activities. Among those spearheading this drive is 
Americans for Democratic Action, which from its inception 
has been hostile to the House Committee. In 1950, the ADA 
platform said: “While we recognize the right of Congress to 
conduct investigations, the House Committee on Un-Ameri- 

* Congress passed Cunningham’s amendment over executive protests. 
Cunningham subsequently charged the administration was getting around 
the law, saying: “You have certainly not carried out this law, and you are 
looking for loopholes.” (House Postal Operations subcommittee hearings, 
June 20, 1963). In 1964, a panel of three Federal judges in California decreed 
the Cunningham amendment was unconstitutional in a case brought by the 
American Civil Liberties Union. 

The War Against Security 


can Activities has proved itself a threat to freedom of political 
opinion. We therefore call for its abolition.” 26 For several 
years thereafter, when anti-anti-Communism became unpop¬ 
ular, ADA dropped this plank from its platform. In 1964, 
however—and this is a measure of Establishment progress in 
recent years—the group cast off its reticence and plumped once 
more for abolition, throwing in the Senate Internal Security 
subcommittee and the Attorney General’s list for good mea¬ 
sure. In its platform recommendations to the 1964 Democratic 
convention—the same convention which nominated ADA pan¬ 
jandrum Humphrey for Vice President—ADA urged adop¬ 
tion of the language, “First and foremost, we pledge the abo¬ 
lition of the House Un-American Activities Committee.” It 
also called for emasculation of the Smith Act and the Internal 
Security Act of 1950, and “abolition of the Attorney Gen¬ 
eral’s list of subversive organizations.” 27 In its own 1964 
platform ADA said: “We urge that the Un-American Activi¬ 
ties Committee of the House of Representatives be discon¬ 
tinued ... We urge the abolition of the Attorney General’s 
list of subversive organizations.” 28 

The abolition fight in the House of Representatives has 
been led by ADAer James Roosevelt, D-Calif., a key legisla¬ 
tive lieutenant of both Kennedy and Johnson and editor of 
the controversial foreign policy volume. The Liberal Papers . 
Roosevelt was among the defenders of the students who 
rioted in May, i960, against the House Committee in San 
Francisco, and a critic of the committee’s film, Operation 
Abolition, which depicted that episode. The institutionalized 
fury which erupted over Operation Abolition> with editorials 
springing up in Liberal newspapers from Coast to Coast and 
Liberal spokesman fulminating from lectern and pulpit, was 
a good example of Establishment mobilization in times of 
crisis. The film depicted the House Committee in a good 
light, and the students, agitated by Communists, in a bad 
one. It was therefore necessary that the film be discredited. 

The Liberal Establishment 


and to this end Establishment spokesmen went heartily to 
work, trumpeting alleged inaccuracies of narrative and film 
sequence. In point of fact, the bulk of the “distortions” al¬ 
leged by HUAC’s critics were misrepresentations by the 
left. 29 

Operation Abolition was based, for the most part, on a 
report prepared by FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover, entitled 
“Communist Target—Youth.” Critics of the film therefore 
had to undertake an attack on Hoover as well, a task from 
which they did not shrink. Hoover has been even more trou¬ 
blesome to enemies of internal security than has HUAC, be¬ 
cause of the high and universal esteem in which his country¬ 
men hold him. That esteem, however, has made him difficult 
to attack, and the job of “getting” him has been conducted 
mostly under the rose. In late 1964, however, the attack on 
the FBI came increasingly to the surface. One of Hoover’s 
most vocal critics, Fred J. Cook, assumed national promi¬ 
nence and prestige by having one of his books, an attack on 
Barry Goldwater, distributed by the Democratic National 
Committee. This despite the fact that Cook had been dis¬ 
charged from his job at The New York World Telegram and 
Sun for participating in a hoax “bribe” story to build reader- 
ship for an article series he had co-authored with another 
reporter. 30 * While Cook’s anti-Goldwater volume was being 
dispensed by the Democratic Party, his anti-Hoover volume 
was prominently displayed in bookstores across the country. 

Simultaneously with the appearance of Cook’s opus on the 
FBI, the Warren Commission released its report containing 
criticism of Hoover’s agency, and militant “civil rights” lead¬ 
ers stepped up their complaints about alleged FBI inaction 
in the South. When Hoover responded by countercriticizing 
the Warren report and calling Martin Luther King “the 

* Cook said he had told his city desk of the alleged bribe offer, which the 
paper denied. The other reporter, Eugene Gleason, subsequently said he had 
told Cook of the “offer,” and Cook repeated the charge believing it to be true. 

The War Against Security 


most notorious liar in the country/' the long knives flashed in 
earnest. Almost immediately, the ADA-oriented magazine, 
Newsweek, came up with a cover story saying Hoover was in 
hot water at the White House, and describing President 
Johnson as a “disenchanted [Hoover] fan" “who had decided 
. . . that he must find a new chief of the FBI/’ Newsweek 
added that “the search is on for a replacement." Relations be¬ 
tween Hoover and former Attorney General Robert Ken¬ 
nedy had been tense, the magazine said, quoting one Justice 
Department spokesman as follows: “When we had problems 
with the FBI, Bob would tell us, 'Take it easy, take it easy,' 
and you got the impression that after January 1, 1965, 
Hoover wouldn’t be around any more. They’d make him an 
ambassador or something somewhere." On this point, News¬ 
week said: “Yet President Kennedy had no intention of tak¬ 
ing such a step until after the election of 1964; indeed, with 
an eye to the campaign, he took to inviting Hoover to the 
White House for luncheon a deux .” 31 

This story drew a quick denial from the White House, at 
least with respect to the intentions of President Johnson, and 
a blistering retort from the FBI. Newsweek' s close connec¬ 
tions with the Democratic regime make it apparent, however, 
that its account represented, at a minimum, the views and 
wishes of someone high up in authority in Washington. 

Interestingly, the attack on the FBI was picked up by 
Americans for Democratic Action itself, which charged the 
agency was “not wholeheartedly determined to enforce the 
civil rights laws," and “not able to do the job," urging that its 
functions in this regard be turned over to some other depart¬ 
ment of government. ADA’s Joseph L. Rauh appeared before 
the New York Civil Liberties Union and charged FBI Di¬ 
rector Hoover was hostile to civil rights, a supporter of 
states’ rights, and “the wrong man for the job.’’ 32 

The net impact of these actions is clear enough. In the 
name of “civil liberties," the Establishment seeks to strike 

The Liberal Establishment 


down all legislation inhibiting domestic Communist activity, 
refuses to take action against the pro-Communist Fair Play 
for Cuba Committee, fights against security regulations 
which would prevent the free movement in and out of the 
country by such as Oswald and Taber, opens the floodgates to 
tax-subsidized delivery of Communist propaganda, disman¬ 
tles necessary precautions against security risks in the Amer¬ 
ican government, crusades against anti-Communist investi¬ 
gating committees and the FBI. 

If the Establishment succeeds in its program, as it very 
nearly has, there will not be a single law, executive regula¬ 
tion, congressional or other agency left standing to impede 
the work of the Communist enterprise in America. 

Granted that, in each of these categories, all possible pre¬ 
cautions should be taken to prevent abuse of power, unfair¬ 
ness to individuals, neglect of appropriate forms of due pro¬ 
cess. To guard against such things is a legitimate, indeed a 
mandatory, concern of those who want to maintain “civil 
liberties.” But the sweep and thoroughness of the Establish¬ 
ment attack makes it clear the object is not simply to rid the 
security program of abuses; it is to rid the country of the 
security program. It is to have the nation stop defending 
itself against the Communist apparatus. It is, in short, to 
relinquish an important aspect of the most essential task of 
government—to protect American citizens against the initia¬ 
tives of a powerful and determined enemy. 

4 . Four Cases 

That establishment representations about “civil liber¬ 
ties” often disguise neglect of fundamental security require¬ 
ments may be more clearly demonstrated by examining some 
individual cases. This section will explore the background of 
people who have been beneficiaries of Establishment protec¬ 
tion against charges of security default. Each has been power¬ 
fully sustained by the Liberal apparatus in one or more of its 
departments—the media, government agencies, individuals 
high in government, the Supreme Court, the President him¬ 
self. Each has been depicted as a martyr to witch-hunters, and 
therefore as an example of Establishment zeal in protecting 
“civil liberties.” Each to this day enjoys the esteem of Estab¬ 
lishment spokesmen, is honored and/or consulted in Wash¬ 
ington, has friends highly placed there, can gain access to 
Establishment media, etc. A little exploration in each case 
will tell us whether this fact bespeaks allegiance to freedom 
or neglect of duty. 

The Liberal Establishment 


1. /. Robert Oppenheimer 

Easily the most illustrious of these four figures is Dr. J. 
Robert Oppenheimer, pioneer in the atomic bomb project 
during World War II, favorite of such Liberal spokesmen as 
the Alsop brothers, and universally revered in Establishment 
circles as a combination scientist, sage, and prose-poet. Sym¬ 
bolic of Oppenheimer’s exalted standing is the fact that Pres¬ 
ident Johnson, soon after assuming his high office, bestowed 
on the physicist the Enrico Fermi award, carrying a stipend 
of $50,000, taxpayer’s money. 

Presentation of the award was made a grand occasion at the 
White House, with innumerable officials, family members 
and newsmen on hand to record the event for posterity. Op¬ 
penheimer, after a gracious speech by the President, stepped 
forward to receive his bauble. He opined that it was a sign of 
great character and courage that the United States govern¬ 
ment should be making this award to him. The reference was 
an ironic one in view of the fact that Oppenheimer, whose 
clearance to handle secret data was suspended by the Atomic 
Energy Commission in 1954, is still officially categorized as a 
“security risk” on the grounds of “character.” That the 
American government should bestow so cherished an honor 
upon a man under this shadow of reprobation is indeed an 
unusual reversal suggesting extraordinary qualities in the 
government capable of it. 

The Washington Post declared that the award’s “greatest 
significance lies, perhaps, in the altered climate of American 
opinion which it denotes . . . The America which honors 
Robert Oppenheimer seems a great deal healthier than the 
America which dishonored him a decade ago.” 1 Similar 
comment was forthcoming from The New York Times. From 
these remarks, one would gather that Oppenheimer was an 
American Dreyfus, the innocent victim of willful men in 
government. For the sake of a balanced record, it would be 

Four Cases 


well that the American people know the other side of the 
story about the man who so recently pocketed $50,000 of 
their money. 

Dr. Oppenheimer’s “security risk” status was conferred 
upon him by a three-man panel headed by Gordon Gray. 
The Gray Board compiled a 992-page record in which it 
heard testimony both pro and con from a galaxy of witnesses, 
and, addressing itself directly to Oppenheimer, came to the 
following conclusions: 

“It was reported that in 1940 you were listed as a sponsor 
of the Friends of the Chinese People, an organization which 
was characterized in 1944 by the House Committee on Un- 
American Activities as a Communist-front organization. 

“The Board concludes that this allegation is true . . . 

“It was further reported that in 1938 you were a member 
of the Western Council of the Consumers Union. The Con¬ 
sumers Union was cited in 1944 by the House Committee on 
Un-American Activities as a Communist front headed by the 
Communist Arthur Kallet. 

“The Board concludes that this allegation is true .. . 

“It was further reported that you stated in 1943 that you 
were not a Communist, but had probably belonged to every 
Communist front organization on the west coast and had 
signed many petitions in which Communists were inter¬ 

“The Board concludes that this statement was made by Dr. 
Oppenheimer, and the Board had before it considerable evi¬ 
dence indicating Dr. Oppenheimer’s membership in, and as¬ 
sociation with. Communist-front organizations and activities 
on the west coast. . . 

“It was reported that in 1943 and previously you were 
intimately associated with Dr. Jean Tatlock, a member of the 
Communist Party in San Francisco, and that Dr. Tatlock was 
partially responsible for your association with Communist 
front groups. 

The Liberal Establishment 


“The Board concludes that this allegation is true .. . 

“It was reported that your wife, Katherine Puening Op- 
penheimer, was formerly the wife of Joseph Dallet, a member 
of the Communist Party, who was killed in Spain in 1937 
fighting for the Spanish Republican Army. 

“The Board concludes that this allegation is true .. . 

“It was further reported that during the period of her asso¬ 
ciation with Joseph Dallet, your wife became a member of 
the Communist Party ... 

“The Board concludes that this allegation is true .. . 

“It was reported that your brother Frank Friedman Op- 
penheimer became a member of the Communist Party in 
1936 and has served as a party organizer and as educational 
director of the professional section of the Communist Party 
in Los Angeles County. 

“The Board concludes that this allegation is true . . . 

“It was further reported that your brother's wife, Jackie 
Oppenheimer, was a member of the Communist Party in 


“The Board concludes that this allegation is true ... 

“It was reported that you have associated with members 
and officials of the Communist Party, including Isaac Folkoff, 
Steven Nelson, Rudy Lambert, Kenneth May, Jack Manley, 
and Thomas Addis. 

“The Board concludes that this allegation is substantially 
true." (Oppenheimer admitted associations with Folkoff, 
Nelson, Lambert, May, and Addis, and that he knew the first 
four were Communists and that Addis “was either a Com¬ 
munist or close to one." The Board found no evidence con¬ 
cerning association with Manley.) 2 

The Board in addition found Oppenheimer had made con¬ 
tributions to the Communist Party, that a number of Com¬ 
munist functionaries described him as a Communist, that he 
had secured jobs in the atomic energy project for Commu¬ 
nists Giovanni Rossi Lomanitz and David Hawkins, that he 

Four Cases 


failed to report to authorities an approach by his friend 
Haakon Chevalier soliciting information about the A-bomb 
project, and that his friendly association with Chevalier con¬ 
tinued long after this effort was made: 

The Board concludes on the basis of testimony and other in¬ 
formation before it that Dr. Oppenheimer made periodic con¬ 
tributions through Communist Party functionaries to the Com¬ 
munist Party in San Francisco area in amounts aggregating not 
less than $500 nor more than $1,000 a year during a period of 
approximately four years ending in April 1942. As of April, 1942, 
Dr. Oppenheimer had been for several months participating in 
government atomic energy research activities . . . 

The Board concludes that Dr. Oppenheimer was responsible 
for the employment on the atom bomb project of Giovanni Rossi 
Lomanitz at Berkeley and David Hawkins at Los Alamos. 

The Board concludes that Dr. Oppenheimer asked for the 
transfer of David Bohm to Los Alamos, although Bohm was 
closely associated with the Communist Party. In his answer, Dr. 
Oppenheimer admitted that while at Berkeley he had assigned 
David Bohm to a problem of basic science having a bearing on 
atomic research . . . 3 

Thus it develops that: 

1. Oppenheimer gave up to $1,000 annually to the 
Communist Party for a period of four years, overlapping 
both the Hitler-Stalin pact and the commencement of Op- 
penheimer’s participation in the atomic energy project. 

2. Responsible officials in the Communist Party in the San 
Francisco area said Oppenheimer was a Communist. 

3. Oppenheimer’s wife had been a Communist, and had 
been married to a Communist prior to her marriage to 

4. Oppenheimer’s “intimate friend,” Jean Tatlock, was a 

5. Oppenheimer’s brother, Frank, was a Communist. 

The Liberal Establishment 


6. Frank's wife, Oppenheimer’s sister-in-law, was a Com¬ 

7. Oppenheimer’s close friend, Haakon Chevalier, was a 
Communist fellow traveler. 

8. Steve Nelson, a well-known Communist, was a frequent 
guest in Oppenheimer’s home. 

9. Oppenheimer lied either to a military intelligence 
agent, or to the Gray Board itself, about an attempt by 
Chevalier to obtain information about the atomic bomb. 

In addition, the Gray Board arrived at these conclusions: 

1. ‘‘We find that Dr. Oppenheimer’s continuing conduct 
and associations have reflected a serious disregard for the 
requirements of the security system. 

2. “We have found a susceptibility to influence which 
could have serious implications for the security interests of 
the country. 

3. “We find his conduct in the hydrogen-bomb program 
sufficiently disturbing as to raise a doubt as to whether his 
future participation, if characterized by the same attitudes in 
a government program relating to the national defense, 
would be clearly consistent with the best interests of security. 

4. “We have regretfully concluded that Dr. Oppenheimer 
has been less than candid in several instances in his testimony 
before this Board.” 4 

The report containing these conclusions was signed by 
Gray and by Thomas Morgan. Dr. Ward V. Evans, the third 
member of the Board, filed a minority report, urging that 
Oppenheimer’s clearance be reinstated. Evans denied none of 
the findings of his colleagues, but argued that: “Most of this 
derogatory information was in the hands of the Commission 
when Dr. Oppenheimer was cleared in 1947. They appar¬ 
ently were aware of his associations and his left-wing policies; 
yet they cleared him. They took a chance on him because of 
his special talents and he continued to do a good job.” Dr. 
Evans added that “there is not the slightest vestige of infer- 

Four Cases 


mation before this Board that would indicate that Dr. Op- 
penheimer is not a loyal citizen of his country. He hates 
Russia. He had communistic friends, it is true. He still has 
some. However, the evidence indicates that he has fewer of 
them than he had in 1947.” 5 Therefore, Dr. Evans asked, 
why not clear him now if he was cleared in 1947, and if no 
one doubts his loyalty? 

The obvious answer, of course, is that commission of egre¬ 
gious error in 1947 constitutes no reason for repeating that 
same error in 1954 or 1964; that even “some” “communistic” 
friends are too many for a man who has access to the most 
terrible and most precious secrets his country possesses; and 
that the issue is not subjective loyalty, but the objective 
standards which render a man a security risk. And if those 
conditions ever existed in the case of anyone, they surely 
existed in the case of Robert Oppenheimer. 

The full Atomic Energy Commission, passing on the Gray 
Board’s report, accepted the majority conclusion and rejected 
Dr. Evans’ extenuations. Indeed, the AEC statement on Op¬ 
penheimer was more vehement than the Gray Board’s. Com¬ 
missioners Lewis Strauss, Eugene Zuckert, and Joseph Camp¬ 
bell offered the following observations on the case: 

“We find Dr. Oppenheimer is not entitled to the con¬ 
tinued confidence of the government and of this commission 
because of the proof of fundamental defects in his 'character’ 
. . . The record shows that Dr. Oppenheimer has consistently 
placed himself outside the rules which govern others. He has 
falsified in matters wherein he was charged with grave re¬ 
sponsibilities in the national interest.. .” 6 

And: “The work of military intelligence, the FBI, and the 
AEC—all, at one time or another, have felt the effect of his 
falsehoods, evasions, and misrepresentations. Dr. Oppen- 
heimer’s willful disregard for the obligations of security is 
evidenced by his obstruction of inquiries of security offi¬ 
cials . . ” 7 

The Liberal Establishment 


And: “We find that his associations with persons known by 
him to be Communists have extended far beyond the toler¬ 
able limits of prudence and self-restraint . . . These associa¬ 
tions have lasted too long to be justified as merely the inter¬ 
mittent and accidental revival of earlier friendships.” 8 

More vehement still was a fourth commissioner, Thomas 
E. Murray, who said in a concurring opinion: 

“Dr. Oppenheimer occupied a position of paramount im¬ 
portance: his relationship to the security interests of the 
United States was the most intimate possible one. It was rea¬ 
sonable to expect that he would manifest the measure of co¬ 
operation appropriate to his responsibilities. He did not do 
so. It was reasonable to expect that he would be particularly 
scrupulous in his fidelity to security regulations. These regu¬ 
lations are the special test of the loyalty of the American 
citizen who serves his government in the sensitive area of the 
Atomic Energy program. Dr. Oppenheimer did not meet this 
decisive test. He was disloyal.” 9 

The fifth commissioner, Dr. Henry DeWolf Smyth, dis¬ 
sented. Like Dr. Evans, he did not deny any of the findings 
of fact reached by the Gray Board; but he minimized their 
importance, stressing that Oppenheimer’s associations with 
Communists were random and infrequent, that it had never 
been discovered that he had divulged secrets, and that his 
potential contributions to the atomic energy program far 
outweighed possible dangers from his shaky security back¬ 

In short, the mass of evidence about Oppenheimer’s associ¬ 
ations and curiosities of judgment was not denied even by 
his most ardent defenders. It was simply dismissed, on the 
theory that the government ought to take some gambles in 
order to secure the services of so talented a man. But this 
stance is directly contrary to the received measure for loyalty- 
security cases, which is that a reasonable doubt about security 
must be resolved in favor of the citizen, not the government 

Four Cases 


employee. An employee of the government is an agent of the 
people, and must fulfill the contractual obligations they 
through their representatives establish. They, the citizens, 
have a right, over against the government and its employees, 
to be certain that no “gambles” are taken with their security 
in the struggle against an enemy which all government em¬ 
ployees are pledged to combat. To say Oppenheimer despite 
his record has a “right” to government employment is to say 
the citizens of the United States do not have a right to be 
assured of the integrity of their government. 

Oppenheimer defenders Joseph and Stewart Alsop, also 
acknowledging the matter set forward above, take a different 
tack. Oppenheimer was wronged, they say, because his several 
critics in the security process took different grounds for op¬ 
posing him: One, early on, alleging he was “ a Soviet agent,” 
the Gray Board faulting him for opposition to the Hydrogen 
bomb, and the Atomic Energy Commission finding against 
him for “defects of character.” Taking only the Gray Board 
and Commission allegations, it is difficult to see why the fact 
that different sets of people found different sets of reasons for 
revoking Oppenheimer’s security clearance should be a dis¬ 
abling objection. It is not out of the ordinary for a case, going 
from one tribunal to the next, to be concluded with a similar 
verdict on different grounds. Supreme Court justices within 
the same tribunal, in fact, do the same kind of thing all the 
time. Even more to the point, the inconsistencies alleged by 
the Alsops, even if we grant them full force, hardly constitute 
an exoneration of Oppenheimer. His record, acknowledged 
by all, is still there. 

Finally, it should be noted that the Establishment argu¬ 
ment about Oppenheimer’s great talents is disingenuous; for 
exactly the same supposition—that the “rights” are all on the 
side of the suspected employee—is routinely invoked by Lib¬ 
erals in loyalty-security cases where no question of scientific 
or other genius is involved. 

The Liberal Establishment 


2. Owen Lattimore 

Second only to Oppenheimer in Establishment “civil lib¬ 
erties” mythology is Asiatic scholar Owen Lattimore, for¬ 
merly of Johns Hopkins University, now of the University of 
Leeds in England. Twice during the early 1950s Lattimore 
occupied the “civil liberties” spotlight: Once when he was 
attacked by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (R-Wis.), and 
again when he was indicted for perjury, and acquitted, in 
connection with his testimony before the Senate Internal Se¬ 
curity subcommittee. On both occasions, in the interval be¬ 
tween them, and in the years succeeding, Lattimore has been 
a high favorite of Liberals in government and in the 

He is published in Establishment journals; has important 
friends who have served in high capacities with both Ken¬ 
nedy and Johnson; and as late as 1961 was reportedly con¬ 
sulted on Asian matters by the government. In that year, 
Lattimore popped up in Ulan Bator, capital of the sparsely 
populated Soviet satrapy of Outer Mongolia. His visit coin¬ 
cided with a deal being worked up by our government to 
have Outer Mongolia admitted to the United Nations, and 
amid rumors that the Kennedy regime was going to extend 
recognition to the Mongolian government. 

Because Lattimore’s field of specialization encompasses 
Outer Mongolia, and because he had long been on record as 
an advocate of U.S. recognition, some spokesmen, like Sena¬ 
tor Thomas Dodd, thought it a curious coincidence that “at 
the very moment when there was a big drive on to persuade 
the State Department to grant recognition to Outer Mon¬ 
golia, Owen Lattimore should arrive there as a VIP visitor.” 1 

It is reasonable to conclude that Lattimore was in Mon¬ 
golia, if not at the direction, at least with the cooperation, of 
the Kennedy State Department. Fulton Lewis, Jr. reported: 
“Lattimore’s visit is shrouded in secrecy. Travelling on two 

Four Cases 


grants, Lattimore’s ostensible purpose was to study Mon¬ 
golian 'progress/ State Department officials admit they knew 
of Lattimore’s visit, but deny that he was dispatched on offi¬ 
cial business. They say that they will consult with the Balti¬ 
more professor upon his return/’ 2 

This same Owen Lattimore, curiously enough, had been 
publicly disparaged by John Kennedy in 1949, and by the 
Senate Internal Security subcommittee in a 1951 report on 
the Communist-infiltrated Institute of Pacific Relations 
which devoted an explicit and highly unflattering section to 
him. He was, the report said, "one of the most influential 
public figures in the Institute of Pacific Relations. His role 
within the IPR was of the highest importance.” 3 The sub¬ 
committee thought Lattimore important for other reasons as 
well. "Throughout the hearings,” it said, "Owen Lattimore’s 
connections and associations with the Communist interna¬ 
tional organization have been shown to be so pronounced, 
and his misrepresentations before the subcommittee have 
been so frequent, that the committee has elected to devote a 
short section to him as a personality.” 4 

Lattimore’s connections also extended into the U.S. gov¬ 
ernment. From 1942 to 1944, he was Deputy Director of the 
Office of War Information in Charge of Pacific Operations. 
He accompanied Vice President Henry Wallace on his official 
visit to China and Siberia in 1944. He was a close friend of 
John Carter Vincent, Director of Far Eastern Affairs for the 
State Department, and also of Lauchlin Currie, President 
Roosevelt’s executive assistant in charge of Far Eastern mat¬ 
ters. In 1942, Lattimore gave the address where he could be 
reached four days a week as "Lauchlin Currie’s office, room 
228, State Department Building.” 5 

In the post-war years, Lattimore became one of a coterie 
of writers dedicated to brushing up the "image” of the Chi¬ 
nese Communists. As an old China hand, he cranked out 
numerous articles and books promoting the line that the 

The Liberal Establishment 


Communist Party of China was a “peasant’s party” compar¬ 
ing favorably with the evil Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-shek. 

The Senate subcommittee remarked that “the literary out¬ 
put of Owen Lattimore may be an index of his influence 
upon public opinion in the United States. The Library of 
Congress lists 11 of his books and over 40 articles. By his 
acclaim of certain books and his criticism of others, Latti¬ 
more, as a book reviewer, was in a position to exercise further 
influence on the success of books on the Far East.” 6 The 
fashion in which Lattimore wielded this influence is instruc¬ 
tive. In The China Story, Freda Utley devotes a chapter to 
Lattimore and his writings. Miss Utley’s expertise on China 
is at least as great as Lattimore’s and her credentials to assess 
Communism considerably better. Lattimore’s views on the 
virtue of Chiang Kai-shek, she notes, altered radically in the 
post-war years—as did the Communist line: 

The one subject on which Owen Lattimore has shown no 
tendency to “shift” his views, at least since 1937, is the Soviet 
Union, which is consistently represented in his writings as peace- 
loving, progressive, powerful, and as having given the Russian 
workers and peasants such a happy life that they are envied by 
all their neighbors. 

The drift of his first short popular book, Solution in Asia 
(1945) was indicated on its jacket, which stated: “He shows that 
all the Asiatic peoples are more interested in actual democratic 
practices, such as the ones they see in action across the Russian 
border, than they are in the fine theories of Anglo-Saxon democ¬ 
racies which come coupled with ruthless imperialism.” 

And inside the covers we read, in Lattimore’s own words, that 
“In Asia the Soviet Union has a major power of attraction, 
backed by a history of development and body of precedents . . . 
To all of these peoples . . . the Russians and the Soviet Union 
have a great power of attraction. In their eyes—rather doubtfully 
in the eyes of the older generation, more and more clearly in the 
eyes of the younger generation—the Soviet Union stands for 

Four Cases 


strategic security, economic prosperity, technological progress, 
miraculous medicine, free education, equality of opportunity, 
and democracy: a powerful combination.” 

It is hardly surprising that the Communist New Masses called 
Solution in Asia a “must book not only for our San Francisco 
delegates but for every one of us.” 7 

Lattimore, of course, did not say he thought all those won¬ 
derful things about the Soviet Union. It was just the natives 
of Asia, interviewed by him, who thought those things. He 
was simply presenting their opinions, which happened to co¬ 
incide with the Communist Party line. Other aspects of his 
career, however, will not yield so easily to facile extenuation. 
There is, for example, the Senate subcommittee’s discussion 
of Lattimore, which tells us that: 

The former editor of the Daily Worker, Louis Budenz, testified 
to five episodes which he experienced within the Politburo of the 
Communist Party that involved Lattimore as a full participant 
in the Soviet conspiracy. The episodes took place between 1937 
and 1945, during which period Budenz was a high official in the 
Communist Party . . . 

A brigadier general in the Soviet military intelligence and 
one-time assistant to General Berzin, who was the head of Soviet 
intelligence during the 1930s, testified to a conversation that he 
had with General Berzin in 1935 wherein he was told that Lat¬ 
timore was one of “our men” . . . The general, Alexander 
Barmine, was told this again in 1937 by General Krivitsky who 
had been head of the Western European intelligence for the 
Soviets . . . 

On the basis of these facts and others, including (but without 
limitation) Lattimore’s editing of Pacific Affairs ; his recom¬ 
mendations on policy to the State Department, coinciding as they 
do with Lawrence Rosinger's . . .; his falsifications about his close 
association with Lauchlin Currie . . .; his conference with the 
Soviet agent, Rogoff . . . and the Soviet embassy official Gokhman 
. .. ; and his subservience to Soviet officials in Moscow in 1936 . . . 

The Liberal Establishment 


the subcommittee can come to no other conclusion but that Lat- 
timore was for some time, beginning in the middle 1930s, a con¬ 
scious, articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy. 8 

The 1961 pressure for recognition of Outer Mongolia and 
Lattimore’s simultaneous journey there assume additional 
interest when we reflect that one of Lattimore’s specialties, 
during the period the committee inspected, was urging rec¬ 
ognition of Outer Mongolia. The committee report says: 

A former counseler to the Soviet foreign office . . . testified he 
was present at a meeting in the Soviet Foreign Office in 1936 or 
1937 when a board of Commissars presided over by Litvinov 
passed a formal resolution putting Lattimore in charge of a cam¬ 
paign to represent Outer Mongolia to the democratic world as a 
country entitled to membership in the League of Nations . . . 9 

The report also says: 

The record shows that Owen Lattimore contended many times 
that Outer Mongolia was a free and independent country . . . Yet 
the record shows conclusively that Lattimore knew in 1936 Outer 
Mongolia was Soviet-controlled, and that he repeatedly sought 
from Soviet authorities permission to visit it . . . 10 

It would seem Senator Dodd was justified in raising the 
question: Was Lattimore’s 1961 visit to Outer Mongolia—at 
the very time the Kennedy State Department was negotiating 
the U.N. “dear'—merely a coincidence? 

Among other items of interest about Lattimore included 
in the subcommittee report: 

Lattimore was not able to explain to the subcommittee why he 
conferred for several hours, during the Hitler-Stalin and Russo- 
Japanese alliances, on the subject of his approaching assignment 
as President Roosevelt’s adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, with the 

Four Cases 


then Ambassador for the Soviet Union, Constantine Oumansky 
. . . Here again, Lattimore told untruths about significant facts. 
He testified there had been a great deal of publicity about his 
appointment; and yet it was shown conclusively that there was 
no announcement in the press until 11 days after the conversa¬ 
tion . . . and there were indications that the Chinese embassy did 
not know of it until more than a week later. 11 


The evidence shows conclusively that Lattimore knew Fred¬ 
erick V. Field to be a Communist; that he collaborated with 
Field after he possessed this knowledge; and that he did not tell 
the truth before the subcommittee about this association with 
Field. 12 

Lattimore, the subcommittee concluded, 

.. . testified falsely before the subcommittee with reference to at 
least five separate matters that were relevant to the inquiry and 
substantial in import. 13 

On the technical point that “pro-Communism” was too 
difficult to prove, Lattimore escaped conviction for perjury. 
For the rest of it, the substantive conclusions of the commit¬ 
tee stand. 

Despite this heavily-documented record, Lattimore was 
most emphatically not abandoned by the Establishment. On 
the contrary, he was acclaimed, in the words of William F. 
Buckley, Jr., as “the first lady among American witches.” He 
continued to hold down his teaching post at Johns Hopkins, 
continued to publish articles in some of the best magazines 
(The Atlantic made its pages available for a run-down of his 
latest excursion to Mongolia), and continued to enjoy the 
cooperation and favor of the American government. 

A sign of Lattimore’s durable purchase on Establishment 

The Liberal Establishment 


favor appeared in Newsweek magazine early in September, 
1962. Since its purchase by the Washington Post, News¬ 
week has become a reliable indicator of sentiment in the 
ADA sector of the prevailing regime, and a journal in 
high sympathy with the beliefs and actions of the Democratic 
administration. It was therefore intriguing to note that, in a 
feature on Communist China, the magazine should see fit to 
devote part of its "Where Are They Now?” department to 
Lattimore. Reviewing Lattimore’s status as an "expert” on 
the Orient, and noting that he was still active as a lecturer on 
Asiatic history, Newsweek went on blandly to assert that "his 
biggest headlines came in 1950, when Senator Joseph R. Mc¬ 
Carthy branded him ‘pro-Red.’ (He later was completely 
cleared by a federal court.) ” 14 Thus did Newsweek add its 
mite to Lattimore’s rehabilitation. 

From what has gone before, it is evident that Lattimore has 
been "completely cleared” of nothing by the Federal Courts; 
the perjury charges against him—which, incidentally, had 
nothing to do with Senator McCarthy—were dropped on 
technical grounds. As to the substantive justice of the "pro- 
Red” charge, the findings of the Senate Internal Security 
subcommittee (unmentioned by Newsweek ) hardly give rise 
to the blithe assertions of this Establishment publication. In¬ 
deed, the subcommittee’s charge that Lattimore was "a con¬ 
scious, articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy” is if 
anything stronger than the imputation of which, in News- 
week's version, Lattimore was assertedly cleared. (Some 
weeks later, Newsweek rendered similar and more elaborate 
service to a Lattimore confrere, Edgar Snow, who was also the 
subject of critical testimony in the subcommittee’s hearings.) 

Apart from his Mongolian trip, his article in the Atlantic, 
and the friendly notice in Newsweek, there are additional 
hints that Lattimore stands well with the current administra¬ 
tion. In fact, several of his friends have occupied positions of 
influence in it. 

Four Cases 


Among these have been the late Edward R. Murrow, of 
CBS and USIA, and White House confidant Abe Fortas, both 
of whom receive bouquets in Lattimore’s book Ordeal by 
Slander. Fortas is a close associate of President Johnson, an al¬ 
most daily visitor in the White House, who acknowledges that 
he has received “certain assignments” from the President. 
Among these, as noted in a previous chapter, was the job of 
attempting to hush up the Walter Jenkins case, with all of its 
own damaging implications for internal security. Here is 
what Lattimore says of this Johnson intimate, who served as 
his attorney during the Tydings hearings and the Senate sub¬ 
committee investigations: “The story would have been differ¬ 
ent, and more tragic, if it had not been for the law firm of 
Arnold, Fortas, and Porter; and particularly for Abe Fortas, 
who after weeks of exhausting work on the ‘case' still had 
wisdom and patience left to give me counsel on the book.” 15 

3. John Stewart Service 

Among the many spokesmen in and out of government 
who adopted the Lattimore line on Chiang Kai-shek and the 
Chinese Communists was a Foreign Service officer named 
John Stewart Service, also attacked by McCarthy and also 
made the object of long and effective solicitude as an Estab¬ 
lishment “civil liberties” hero. Service was the beneficiary of 
Establishment protection in no less than four separate cate¬ 
gories: When McCarthy named him as a security risk, he was 
accorded the full treatment in sympathetic Liberal media 
and pictured as a hard-working diplomat hounded by fa¬ 
natics. When his case was processed by security authorities in 
the State Department, he was given the benefit of every pos¬ 
sible doubt and cleared innumerable times. When the Civil 
Service Loyalty Review Board “uncleared” him and he was 
discharged, the Supreme Court stepped in to order his rein¬ 
statement. And, finally when he returned to the State De- 

The Liberal Establishment 


partment, he was given an important assignment despite a 
skeptical report as to his '‘suitability” by security evaluations 
officer Otepka. 

Service was sent to China in the 1940s, where he served as a 
diplomatic adviser to Gen. Joseph Stilwell and Gen. Albert 
Wedemeyer. In this capacity, he kept up a running fire of 
criticism against America's ally Chiang Kai-shek, contrasting 
his “Kuomintang” regime unfavorably with that of the Chi¬ 
nese Communists. The following quotations, taken from 
Service's memoranda during this period, suggest how far he 
was willing to go in such advocacy: 

We need not fear the collapse of Kuomintang government . . . 
any new government under any other than the present reac¬ 
tionary control will be more cooperative and better able to 
mobilize the country . . . The example of a democratic, non- 
imperialistic China will be much better counter-propaganda 
than the present regime . .. The key to stability must be a strong, 
unified China. This can be accomplished only on a democratic 
foundation . . . Chiang’s main supports are the most chauvinist 
elements in the country . . . We need feel no ties of gratitude to 
Chiang; ... we cannot hope to deal successfully with Chiang 
without being hard-boiled; secondly, we cannot hope to solve 
China’s problems without consideration of the opposition forces. 
Communist, Provincial, and Liberal . . . We should not be 
swayed by pleas of the danger of China’s collapse . . . There may 
be a period of some confusion, but the eventual gains of the 
Kuomintang’s collapse will more than make up for this . . - 1 


The Generalissimo [Chiang Kai-shek] shows a . . . loss of real¬ 
istic flexibility and a hardening of narrowly conservative views. 
His growing megalomania and his unfortunate attempts to be a 
sage as well as a leader . . . have forfeited the respect of many 
intellectuals. Criticism of his dictatorship is becoming outspoken. 

. . . On the internal political front the desire of the Kuomintang 

Four Cases 


leaders to perpetuate their own power overrides all other consid¬ 
erations. The result is the enthronement of reaction . . . On the 
economic front the Kuomintang is unwilling to take any effective 
steps to check inflation which would injure the landlord-capital¬ 
ist class. It is directly responsible for the increase of official cor¬ 
ruption ... It fails to carry out effective mobilization of resources 


While Service presented Chiang in this way, his view of the 
Communists was all hearts and flowers: 

With [a] great popular base, the Communists cannot be elimi¬ 
nated. Kuomintang attempts to do so by force must mean a 
complete denial of democracy. This will strengthen the ties of 
the Communists with the people. A Communist victory will be 
inevitable . . . From the basic fact the Communists have built up 
popular support of a magnitude and depth which makes their 
elimination impossible, we must draw the conclusion that the 
Communists will have a certain and important share in China’s 
future ... I suggest the future conclusion that unless the 
Kuomintang goes as far as the Communists in political and eco¬ 
nomic reform, and otherwise proves itself able to contest this 
leadership of the people (none of which it yet shows signs of 
being willing or able to do), the Communists will be the domi¬ 
nant force in China within a comparatively few years . 3 

These missives, written by a diplomat accredited to a war¬ 
time ally, openly sought to undermine that ally in a period of 
crisis. Moreover, according to those who have reason to know, 
the particulars were blatantly incorrect. Wedemeyer, for ex¬ 
ample, testified it was not Chiang, but the Communists, who 
were ineffective in the struggle with Japan. 

Service also pressed the thesis that the Chinese Commu¬ 
nists were “independent” of Moscow. In one report he said: 
“Any orientation which the Chinese Communists may once 
have had toward the Soviet Union seems to be a thing of the 

The Liberal Establishment 


past. The Communists have been working to make their 
thinking and propaganda realistically Chinese, and they are 
giving out democratic policies and they expect the United 
States to approve and sympathetically support it—they believe 
the U.S. rather than the Soviet Union will be the only coun¬ 
try able to give economic assistance.” 4 A copy of this particu¬ 
lar report was seized by the FBI in 1945, from the offices of a 
magazine called Amerasia . Editor of this IPR-associated pub¬ 
lication was a man named Philip Jaffe—identified under oath 
as a Soviet agent. The magazine was a cover for a vast traffic 
in government documents, and the exposure of it launched 
in 1945 showed that John Stewart Service did not confine 
himself to composing memoranda. 

On June 7, 1945, the FBI arrested Service, Jaffe and four 
others for alleged violation of the Espionage Act. The other 
four were Emmanuel Larsen, also of the State Department; 
Lieut. Andrew Roth, liaison officer between Naval Intelli¬ 
gence and the State Department; Kate Louise Mitchell, an 
editor of Amerasia; and journalist Mark Gayn. Freda Utley 
sums up the case as follows: 

The FBI revealed that it had found a hundred files in the 
Amerasia offices, containing top secret and highly confidential 
papers stolen from the State Department, from the War and 
Navy Departments, the OSS and the OWI. It also found a large 
photocopying department, which could not possibly have been 
required by Amerasia for publishing purposes, and was almost 
certainly used for the photostatting of stolen papers for transmis¬ 
sion to Moscow. The secret papers found in Amerasia s offices 
concerned such subjects as the Navy’s schedule and targets for 
the bombing of Japan; the disposition of the Japanese fleet; a 
detailed report showing the complete disposition and strength of 
the units of the Chinese Nationalist armies, with their exact 
locations and the names of their commanders. 5 

The FBI confiscated hundreds of stolen documents— 
documents which, according to OSS agent Frank Bielaski, 

Four Cases 


bore the stamp that possession of them was a violation of the 
Espionage Act. 

For several months before the arrests, the FBI had been 
shadowing the principals in the case, including Service. It 
noted meetings among them, and recorded conversations be¬ 
tween them. On April 19, 1945, Service held the first of sev¬ 
eral meetings with Jaffe. According to FBI agent Myron 
Gurnea, Service took along to that encounter a classified re¬ 
port he had prepared for the State Department. Jaffe found 
the report interesting, according to Service, and asked to see 
still others. Service, “after some hesitation/’ consented. On 
April 20, the two men met at Jaffe’s room at the Statler Hotel 
in Washington, where Service turned over copies of his re¬ 
ports on China. The FBI, which had planted a microphone 
in the room, recorded a Service-Jaffe conversation about mili¬ 
tary and political matters in China. At one point Service said: 
“Well, what I said about the military plans is, of course, very 
secret.” On another occasion, Jaffe asked Service if United 
States forces would land in China. Service answered: “I don’t 
think it has been decided. I can tell you in a couple of weeks 
when Stilwell gets back.” 6 

Two days after the arrests, the FBI was told to hold its fire 
until conclusion of the United Nations conference in San 
Francisco. Disclosure of the Amerasia thefts, it was said, 
would offend the Soviet government. Simultaneously, a bitter 
campaign was launched against the Justice Department for 
pressing the case. One Liberal spokesman proclaimed that 
Service’s arrest “brought some exceedingly powerful people 
within the Government to his defense.” 7 The matter was 
hushed up, and the prosecution allowed the defense that 
Amerasia 's possession of secret documents was merely a case 
of “journalistic zeal.” Service was not indicted, and Jaffe and 
Emmanuel Larsen escaped with fines. 

When the Civil Service Loyalty Review Board declared 
Service a “loyalty risk” in 1951, however, it hinged its deci¬ 
sion on the Amerasia matter, in particular on what it viewed 

The Liberal Establishment 


as Service's indiscretions with Jaffe. The Board canvassed 
some 18 documents which Service conceded “were or may 
have been lent by him to Jaffe"—one week after he had re¬ 
turned to the United States from China. The Board made 
this comment: 

“From our examination of these reports, it appears to us 
that they were for the most part such as a newspaper reporter 
on the spot might transmit to his newspaper. Some of them, 
however, appear to us to be of a nature which no discreet 
person would disseminate without express authority, and 
some of them were dated within four to six weeks of the time 
they were lent to Jaffe, and the originals had not been in the 
hands of the State Department for more than a week." 8 

Concerning Service's conversations with Jaffe, the Board 

We have no knowledge of what information Service may have 
imparted to Jaffe and others orally during these meetings in New 
York, or during the evening parties he went to with Jaffe and 
others in Washington on April 19th and 20th and May 8th and 
29th. These indicate that there was some conviviality, and that 
Service talked very freely, discussing, among other things, troop 
dispositions and military plans which he said he had seen and 
which he said were Very secret.' 

This intimacy of talk appears to have continued unabated, 
though from the first Service felt that Jaffe was unduly inquisi¬ 
tive and evidently suspected that Jaffe might be a Communist, 
having after the meeting of April 20th asked Lieutenant Roth 
whether Jaffe was a Communist, to which Roth replied that he 
did not believe Jaffe was a Communist but that he was extremely 
sympathetic. 9 

Service's loquacity and open-handedness with Jaffe about 
“very secret" matters contrasted strangely with his behavior 
toward a non-Communist writer. Brooks Atkinson, who said 
Service never showed him classified material. Atkinson, 

Four Cases 


moreover, was a close personal friend of Service, whereas 
Jaffe and Service had never met before April 19, the day 
before Service started turning over documents. 

The Review Board concluded: "We are not required to 
find Service guilty of disloyalty, and we do not do so, but for 
an experienced and trusted representative of our State De¬ 
partment to so far forget his duty to his trust as his conduct 
with Jaffe so clearly indicates, forces us with regret to con¬ 
clude that there is reasonable doubt as to his loyalty/' 10 The 
Board handed down its order: "The employee, John Stewart 
Service, should be forthwith removed from the rolls of the 
Department of State/' 11 

When the Supreme Court declared the Secretary of State 
had acted summarily in discharging Service and ordered his 
reinstatement, evaluations chief Otto Otepka was called upon 
to examine the case. His conclusions, less harsh than those of 
the 1951 review board, were nevertheless skeptical about 

My recommendation was that insofar as the security standards 
and principles were concerned, that I found that Mr. Service was 
not disloyal, that he was not a Communist, but that there were 
other factors relating to his judgment and conduct which I felt 
must be considered under the regulations pertaining to the per¬ 
formance and conduct of members of the Foreign Service of the 
United States. 12 

Otepka’s reservations, however, were ignored by his State 
Department superiors: 

In my analysis and conclusions on the case, I made a specific 
recommendation as to security and suitability. That recommen¬ 
dation was reviewed by the then Director of the Office of Security 
who concurred with one of my recommendations and disagreed 
with the other . . . The case then, following in the normal course, 
channel of review, next went to the administrator of the Bureau 

The Liberal Establishment 


of Security and Consular Affairs. He in turn disagreed with all of 
us and he made a recommendation to the Deputy Under Secre¬ 
tary for Administration . . . who cleared Mr. Service on all 
counts. 13 

Otepka also revealed that, although the State Department 
had announced Service would be given a “nonsensitive” job, 
nothing of the sort had happened. “All positions in the De¬ 
partment of State,” Otepka said, “are sensitive unless they are 
specifically designated as nonsensitive by the administrator of 
the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. I never saw 
the designation as nonsensitive of the position occupied by 
Mr. Service.” 14 

Service in point of fact was placed in the Office of Operat¬ 
ing Facilities, where he handled “all matters attendant to the 
travel of Department personnel to and from abroad.” 15 At 
the time of Otepka’s testimony, Service was employed as U.S. 
consul general in Liverpool, England, a highly responsible 
post he occupied until his resignation in August, 1962. 

4. William Wieland 

Our final case from the annals of Establishment “civil lib¬ 
erties” enthusiasm is less celebrated than those we have been 
discussing, but a man of distinction nonetheless. He is Wil¬ 
liam Wieland, a State Department official who, by testimony 
of several U.S. ambassadors and by the findings of a congres¬ 
sional committee, played a crucial role in suppressing infor¬ 
mation about Fidel Castro’s ties to Communism, materially 
assisted Castro’s drive to power, falsified questionnaires re¬ 
quired of him for State Department employment, and who— 
despite all this—received a nationally televised ad lib security 
“clearance” from the President of the United States. 

The “clearance” occurred at a January 1962 press con- 

Four Cases 


ference, when a reporter named Sarah McLendon asked Pres¬ 
ident Kennedy about Wieland and another State Department 
employee, both of whom she characterized as “security risks.” 
Obviously angered, Kennedy expressed his confidence in the 
two men. Of Wieland he said: “I am familiar with Mr. 
Wieland and I am also familiar with his duties at the present 
time.” Wieland, the President averred, could carry out his 
State Department duties “without detriment to the interests 
of the United States, and I hope without detriment to [his] 
character by your question.” 1 State Department spokesmen 
followed up by declaring Wieland had been checked and 
cleared. Thus was Miss McLendon rebuked and another vic¬ 
tory chalked up for the cause of “civil liberties.” 

It developed, however, that Wieland had in fact not been 
cleared, and that steps to nail down his clearance were insti¬ 
tuted, by an odd coincidence, the day after Kennedy's asser¬ 
tions. It also developed that, in hearings before the Senate 
Internal Security subcommittee, no less than four United 
States ambassadors had voiced doubts about Wieland, three 
of them documenting his activities in behalf of Castro. In 
October 1962, the subcommittee issued a report lacing to¬ 
gether the numerous threads of Wieland’s curious career, 
citing it as “a case history which illustrates most of what is 
wrong with the State Department from a security stand¬ 
point.” 2 

The Wieland saga is indeed a bizarre case history of the 
things which are permitted within the Liberal Establishment 
in the name of “civil liberties.” It is a history best begun by 
consulting the testimony of the Hon. Robert C. Hill, former 
American Ambassador to Mexico, as he is questioned by Sen¬ 
ate Internal Security subcommittee counsel Jay G. Sourwine: 

Sourwine. Are you acquainted with Mr. William Wieland? 

Hill. I have met him. 

Sourwine. Who is Mr. Wieland? 

The Liberal Establishment 


Hill. William Wieland, at the time I was Ambassador of the 
United States to Mexico, could be properly classified as my 
superior because he was in charge of the Cuban-Mexican affairs. 
It is interesting to note that during the period of time I was 
Ambassador of the United States in Mexico, I heard from Mr. 
Wieland only twice by telephone and once or twice through the 
mail. He did come to Mexico on several occasions, accompanying 
Dr. Milton Eisenhower, who was there often as a guest of the 
Mexican Government. 

Sourwine. What has been your experience with Mr. Wieland? 
Hill. It is most unsatisfactory. 

Sourwine. What do you mean by that? 

Hill. Well, I did not regard him a competent officer or a 
man who could be trusted. I was warned by members of the 
Foreign Service about Mr. Wieland; that he was an opportunist 
and a dilettante and that I should be very careful in my dealings 
with him. 3 

Hill, who was in Mexico from 1957 to 1961, related his 
difficulties in getting through to President Eisenhower the 
seriousness of the Cuban situation. By going through Milton 
Eisenhower, Hill thought, he might be able to sound the 

Sourwine. Surely you had some way of getting this information 
from the State Department other than through Dr. Eisenhower. 
Hill. We had the normal, diplomatic channels and we utilized 
those channels. 

Sourwine. With what result? 

Hill. We had no positive results. It concerned us greatly. 4 

Hill got his briefing with Milton Eisenhower in August 
1959, but found himself battling William Wieland to put his 
point across. “When the briefing started,” he testified, “it was 
opposed by Mr. Wieland because he gave the impression that 
we were misrepresenting the situation in Cuba.” 5 Hill had 
asked along his counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs, 

Four Cases 


Raymond Leddy, to give the facts about Castro. But, he 

. . . soon after we took off from Mexico City I spoke to the 
doctor and I said: would it be possible for us to utilize the time 
between Mexico City and Mazatlan to give him our point of view 
regarding the problem of Communism in Cuba. He said, “fine.” 
Then we sat down together. It was a C-47 airplane that had a 
divan in the middle and bucket seats along the side. The doctor 
was seated on the divan with Mr. Leddy so he could personally 
view some of the documents. Mr. Wieland was seated on the 
divan. Mr. Leddy started to give his report based on his judg¬ 
ment and based on his experience . . . Each time Mr. Leddy 
would say, “This is Communist dominated” or “This man is a 
Communist” he was met with Mr. Wieland saying, “It is not 

In the middle of what turned out to be quite a long discussion. 
Colonel Glawe, who was the air attach^, came back and joined 
in the discussion and became involved in supporting Mr. Leddy’s 
point of view. Each time that communism was mentioned and its 
control of the situation in Cuba, it was discounted by Mr. 

Mr. Leddy had an intelligence report for the month of June 
1959 which supported many of Mr. Leddy’s contentions. It was 
obvious to me that Mr. Wieland had not read the report, al¬ 
though he was directly responsible for the area. But when Mr. 
Leddy attempted to project the actual documents into the pic¬ 
ture, an argument ensued, not a serious one, but I mean men 
disagreeing on the issues. 6 

“In every instance where we tried to present Communist 
infiltration in the government of Castro.” Hill concluded, “it 
was met with a rebuff by Mr. Wieland.” 7 

William D. Pawley, former ambassador to Peru and Brazil, 
and an American businessman with considerable acquaint¬ 
ance in Cuba, provides another chapter in the Wieland case 

The Liberal Establishment 


“I had a man with me,” Pawley testified before the Senate 
subcommittee, in September i960, “by the name of Wie- 

Sourwine. You say “with” you, where was that? 

Pawley. He served with me as press attache in Rio when I was 
Ambassador there . . . His activity there was of a nature that was 
displeasing to me, being conscious of this communist problem 
probably more than most Americans as early as that, just having 
come from Asia, and it was of sufficient worry, although there was 
nothing specific that I could put my hands on—it was conversa¬ 
tions that I would hear him have with other members of the press 
in press conferences and things of that kind—to give me a 
squirmy feeling regarding his activities, and I made it known to 
various officials from time to time—it has been a long time ago, so 
to say to whom would be difficult for me right now—that I didn't 
believe that Wieland was particularly useful to the U.S. Gov¬ 

I later found out, I lost track of him for years, that he had 
taken a Foreign Service examination and had come along in the 
Foreign Service, and I then came in touch with him when he 
became the area officer over Cuba, Haiti, and Santo Domingo 
and he has been there for several years. 

Senator Keating. You mean he is in the Department here? 
Pawley. He is in the Department. 

Keating. But under the Latin American desk. 

Pawley. He is a junior to the Assistant Secretary. 

Sourwine. He presently heads the desk for the Caribbean and 

Pawley. He is more than the desk officer. He is area officer for 
the Caribbean, including Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican 

Concerned about Wieland, Pawley attempted to set his 
misgivings before State Department officials, including an 
Ambassador Mallory, a deputy in charge of Latin American 

Four Cases 

►23 7 

In this discussion I said, “I would like to do something that I 
know you people don’t particularly like but I think it is impor¬ 
tant that I do it. I have great misgivings of the wiseness to have 
had and to continue to have William Wieland in a critical post. 
His close association with Herbert Matthews of the New York 
Times and the activities having to do with this whole Cuban 
episode in which he is in charge, and has a great deal to do with 
the policies that come out, this man should not be there, and he 
should not have been there for a long time.” Mallory said this to 
me—this can be corroborated by Senator George Smathers who 
was present—he said, ”1 am sorry that I am having this pressure 
put on me regarding Wieland because I might have changed him 
to some other post; but now with this pressure, I will not change 
him.” And I said to Mallory, “I don’t understand that. I am a 
former U.S. Government official, I worked in this Department for 
5/4 years. I was trying to be useful by pointing out something that 
I think is of value to the Department, and you put it on the basis 
that I am bringing pressure. It just doesn’t make sense.” . . . The 
man is still there, and I understand he was even invited to partic¬ 
ipate in the foreign ministers’ conferences which have just taken 
place. I am not positive of that but I have heard that he went. 8 

Ambassadors Arthur Gardner and Earl E. T. Smith, whose 
successive terms as American envoy to Cuba spanned the pe¬ 
riod of Castro's ascendancy, supplied still other aspects of the 
Wieland story. 

Gardner, who was in Havana from 1953 through 1957, said 
Wieland served for a short time in the Embassy there. “I 
think he was in the economics section,” Gardner said. “But I 
am not certain. But I mean—I can tell you—I was very glad 
to see him go.” 9 Smith, who was sent to replace Gardner be¬ 
cause the latter was too “biased” against Castro, expanded on 
Wieland’s merits and his attitudes on American policy in 

Sourwine. Is it true, sir, that you were instructed to get a briefing 
on your new job as Ambassador to Cuba from Herbert Matthews 
of the New York Timesf 

The Liberal Establishment 


Smith. Yes; that is correct. 

Sourwine. Who gave you these instructions? 

Smith. William Wieland, Director of the Caribbean Division 
and Mexico. At that time he was Director of the Caribbean Divi¬ 
sion, Central American Affairs. 

Sourwine. Did you, sir, in fact see Matthews? 

Smith. Yes; I did. 

Sourwine. And did he brief you on the Cuban situation? 

Smith. Yes; he did. 

Sourwine. Could you give us the highlights of what he told 
you?. . . 

Smith. We talked for 2% hours on the Cuban situation, a com¬ 
plete review of his feelings regarding Cuba, Batista, Castro, the 
situation in Cuba, and what he thought would happen. 
Sourwine. What did he think would happen? 

Smith. He did not believe that the Batista government could 
last, and that the fall of the Batista government would come 
relatively soon. 

Sourwine. Specifically what did he say about Castro? 

Smith. In February 1957 Herbert L. Matthews wrote three arti¬ 
cles on Fidel Castro, which appeared on the front pages of the 
New York Times, in which he eulogized Fidel Castro and por¬ 
trayed him as a political Robin Hood, and I would say that he 
repeated those views to me in our conversation. 10 

The connection between Matthews and Wieland, Smith 
alleged, was close. “I would say that Mr. Wieland and all 
those who had anything to do with Cuba had a close connec¬ 
tion with Herbert Matthews. I will go further than that. I 
will say that when I was Ambassador, that I was thoroughly 
aware of this, and sometimes made the remark in my own 
Embassy that Mr. Matthews was more familiar with the State 
Department thinking regarding Cuba than I was.” 11 

Concerning the effect of the Matthews-Wieland outlook 
on Cuba, Smith further stated: 

The fact that the United States was no longer supporting 
Batista had a devastating psychological effect upon the armed 

Four Cases 


forces and upon the leaders of the labor movement. This went a 
long way toward bringing about his downfall. 

On the other hand, our actions in the United States were 
responsible for the rise to power of Castro. Until certain portions 
of the American press began to write derogatory articles against 
the Batista government, the Castro revolution never got off first 
base. 12 

He concluded with the blunt statement: “Without the 
United States, Castro would not be in power today.” 13 

Smith later disclosed, in his book, The Fourth Floor, that 
“in early January 1958, Wieland visited the American Em¬ 
bassy in Havana and showed us a paper he had written, which 
depicted the economy of Cuba as crumbling and recom¬ 
mended that the United States apply pressure on the gov¬ 
ernment of Cuba to hasten its downfall.” 1 * (Italics added). 

Supporting testimony was given by Ambassador Gardner, 
who said Batista’s troops “got so discouraged by the position 
we had taken about not giving them arms and so on that they 
just didn’t want to fight.” 15 Ambassador Hill confirmed 
Smith’s judgment as to the reasons for Castro’s rise. “Indi¬ 
viduals in the State Department,” he said, “and individuals 
in the New York Times put Castro in power.” 16 
Ambassador Smith was asked to pinpoint the matter. 

Senator Eastland. Who were the individuals in the State De¬ 
partment . . . that were slanting the news that way; that were 
telling falsehoods; that were pro-Castro? 

Smith. There were quite a few, Senator. 

Eastland. Who were they? 

Smith. I repeat again, do I have to mention names? 

Eastland. Yes. We have reasons, Mr. Smith. 

Smith. Yes, sir. You see my point, I do not want to get people in 
trouble either. 

Eastland. Well, I know that. 

Smith. Because I do not believe that they are dangerous. 
Eastland. I am not certain about that. 

The Liberal Establishment 


Smith. All right, sir. 

Eastland. We have sources of information. 

Smith. Yes. I believe Wieland, William Wieland, and that is as 
far as I would like to go in the State Department. 17 

Ambassador Hill's testimony on the Eisenhower confer¬ 
ence summed it up this way: 

Hill. Colonel Glawe [air attach^ at U.S. embassy in Mexico] 
referred to Mr. Wieland as either a damn fool or a Commu¬ 
nist . . . 

The Chairman. The man said Wieland was either a damn fool 
or a Communist? 

Hill. Yes, sir; that was said in the temper of the moment. I don't 
believe Wieland is a Communist. 

Senator Keating. You didn’t comment on the other part of the 

Hill. Do you think it is necessary, Senator ? 18 

And Ambassador Pawley, to round out the picture, put it 
this way: 

Sourwine. I think this question should be asked for the record: 
Have you any reason to believe that William Wieland is a Com¬ 

Pawley. No, I don’t have any reason to believe that. I only know 
that many of these men, that get involved in this type of thing 
over the years that I have had any connection with, are serving 
the cause of our enemies, that is all. 

Sourwine. You think he is doing this wittingly, intentionally? 
Pawley. I have got to say that he is either one of the stupidest 
men living or he is doing it intentionally . 19 

Still further testimony about Wieland was given by se¬ 
curity officer Otto Otepka, who had reviewed the case for the 
security office. “I felt and I specified each instance,” Otepka 
said, “that I thought there were questions, serious questions 

Four Cases 


of the man’s integrity, and I felt that such questions since 
they had did not relate to the issue as to whether or not he 
was disloyal, was a Communist or subversive, the question of 
integrity should be reviewed and adjudicated under the For¬ 
eign Service regulations of the Department of State.” 20 

Concerning statements by Wieland before the subcommit¬ 
tee, Otepka added that ‘‘we prepared an analysis bringing out 
various matters where there were disparities between the tes¬ 
timony of Mr. Wieland and the testimony of others we 
thought were credible, and we raised the question specifically 
as to which of those were to be believed.” 

Sourwine. Are you telling us in your judgment Mr. Wieland 

Otepka. I think Mr. Wieland lied; yes sir. 

Sourwine. And you said so in plain language in the report you 
sent up there? 

Otepka. I did not use the term ‘lie’ but certainly the inference 
was plain. There were such words as ‘misrepresentations’ and 
'false statements.’ 

Sourwine. Your judgment was that Mr. Wieland lied to this 

Otepka. I identified those instances where I thought he did not 
tell this committee the truth. 21 

On October 16, 1962, the subcommittee released its report 
dealing with Wieland, tying together the testimony of the 
four ambassadors, of Wieland himself, and of various other 
witnesses. It came to these conclusions about Wieland: 

“He was appointed without any security check. 

“(His appointment actually was effective before he even 
filled out any form of an application). 

“He falsified his job application by omission. 

“When he later filled out an expanded personal history 
form, he falsified that by direct misstatement. 

The Liberal Establishment 


“Mr. Wieland had a hand in shaping our policy with re¬ 
spect to Cuba both before and after Castro’s takeover. 

“He held a position which by definition made him one of 
the State Department’s experts in Latin American affairs, and 
Cuban affairs particularly. One of the things the Department 
paid him for was his expertise—his own judgment based on 
his own experience. 

“Yet he never told his superiors officially or wrote in any 
Department paper, down to the very day when Fidel Castro 
stood before the world as a self-proclaimed Marxist, what he 
told his friends privately as early as 1958, or earlier, that 
Castro ‘is a Communist,’ and '‘is surrounded by Commies 
{and) . . . subject to Communist influences / ” 22 (Italics 

Moreover, the subcommittee said, Wieland had access to 
considerable information concerning Castro’s connections 
with Moscow: “To Mr. Wieland’s desk came, over a period of 
years, great quantities of solid intelligence respecting the 
Communist nature and connections of the Castro movement, 
of Castro himself and his principal lieutenants. The commit¬ 
tee was unable to document a single instance in which Mr. 
Wieland passed any of this material up to his superiors or 
mentioned it as credible in any report or policy paper.” 23 

On the contrary: “Mr. Wieland became an active apologist 
for Fidel Castro, even to the extent of openly contradicting 
intelligence officers who were attempting to brief Dr. Milton 
Eisenhower . . . respecting Communism in the Castro re¬ 
gime.” 24 

Wieland’s performance before the subcommittee was 
marked by an almost total lapse of memory. He maintained 
he had no way of knowing Castro was a Communist, or even 
Communist-dominated, until it was too late. Confronted by 
particulars which contradicted this story, his most character¬ 
istic response was: “I don’t recall.” He could not remember 
the discussion in the airplane in which, according to testi- 

Four Cases 


mony from several witnesses, he openly contradicted intelli¬ 
gence reports showing Castro’s ties to the Kremlin. He 
refused, however, to challenge adverse testimony on this 

Senator Keating. . . . Your recollection seems to be hazy on this 
subject. Do you challenge the statements of all three of these 
witnesses in substance, that they said you must be either a Com¬ 
munist or a fool? 

Wieland. Sir, if three witnesses say such a remark was made, I 
don't challenge it, no. I don't recall. 25 

Despite Wieland’s loss of memory, the subcommittee was 
able to establish certain things as follows: 

1. Wieland was in Bogota, Columbia, during the Com¬ 
munist-inspired riots of 1948. “. . . he admitted that before 
July of 1949 he knew that Castro had been active in the 
Bogota uprising . . .” 26 But “when Wieland was examined 
about whether he filed any reports with the State Depart¬ 
ment concerning Castro’s participation in the Bogotazo, he 
again had memory trouble.” 27 

2. Wieland knew, according to his own testimony, that 
Raul Castro, Fidel’s brother, had attended a Communist 
Congress in Prague, Czechoslovakia. 28 

3. Wieland knew of “Che” Guevara’s activity in the Castro 
movement, and said: “. . . that he was a Communist was 
certainly our conclusion.” 29 

4. Wieland told Samuel Shaffer of Newsweek, sometime in 
late 1957 or early 1958—according to Shaffer’s uncontradicted 
testimony—that “Fidel Castro, who many of you newspaper¬ 
men are romanticizing, is surrounded by Commies ... I don’t 
know whether he is himself a Communist, but I am certain 
that he is subject to Communist influences.” 30 

5. Wieland told his friends, Mr. and Mrs. Frank Becerra, in 
i 957 > according to Becerra’s uncontradicted testimony: 

The Liberal Establishment 


“Fidel Castro is a Communist. Fidel Castro will be the 
ruination of Cuba if he gets into power. Fidel Castro was 
one of the leaders of the famous Bogota uprising in Bogota 
in 1948 at the time when Gaitan was assassinated.” 31 

6. U.S. Ambassadors in Latin America repeatedly warned 
that Castro was in league with the Communists, if not actu¬ 
ally a Communist himself. The subcommittee says: “Such 
information would certainly be required reading for Mr. 
Wieland as the Director of the Office of Middle American 
Affairs and later as the Director of the Office of Caribbean- 
Mexican Affairs.” 32 

7. Wieland was informed by other means—including re¬ 
ports of the Central Intelligence Agency, the FBI, and au¬ 
thoritative sources within Cuba—regarding Communist ac¬ 
tivities in Cuba, and Fidel Castro’s role in those activities. 

Wieland did not deny having seen the reports from the 
ambassadors, the CIA or the FBI, nor did he deny that vari¬ 
ous Cubans and others had personally warned him of Castro’s 
Communist associations: 

Sourwine. You must know those FBI reports were consistent in 
referring to Castro as a Communist and his regime and his 
movement as a Communist regime and a Communist movement? 
That is true, is it not? 

Wieland. I don't recall them, sir, specifically 33 

Despite the wealth of evidence that Wieland knew Castro 
was tied in with Communists, and despite his own statement 
that Castro “was a greater threat to Cuba itself, as well as the 
United States, than the government of Batista,” the subcom¬ 
mittee found, as noted, that Wieland “became an active 
apologist for Fidel Castro.” He did not inform his superiors 
of Castro’s connections, and he took an active part in forming 
policy decisions which brought about the downfall of Batista 
and put Castro in control of Cuba. 

Four Cases 


And that is the story of William Wieland—a man sheltered 
by the Establishment notion of “civil liberties,” of whom 
President Kennedy approvingly remarked: “I am familiar 
with Mr. Wieland and I am also familiar with his duties at 
the present time.” 

5 . Four Other Cases 

When establishment spokesmen talk about “civil liber¬ 
ties/’ they do not always refer to legitimate cases of dissent 
and individual freedom; conversely, when authentic cases of 
“dissent” arise, Establishment spokesmen are sometimes si¬ 
lent about civil liberties. 

One such episode arises out of matter discussed in the 
preceding chapter. It involves State Department security offi¬ 
cial Otto Otepka, who played a role in both the Service and 
Wieland cases, and testified before a Senate committee about 
the dismantling of the State Department security force and 
the practice of “waiving” and then backdating security clear¬ 

1. Otto Otepka . 

With Otto Otepka, we reach a sort of continental divide 
for students of the Establishment mentality. It is acknowl- 

Four Other Cases 


edged by all sides of the dispute that Otepka was a true ex¬ 
pert in his field, a diligent worker, careful in his evaluations 
and scrupulous in his concern to maintain proper security 
standards. The Senate subcommittee concluded Otepka’s 
only misdemeanor was his interest in good security precau¬ 
tions, and that for these reasons he was demoted and sub¬ 
jected to unusual harassments. Otepka did not fit in with the 
Liberal notion of “civil liberties” in government, which 
meant he did not believe security checks should be taken 
lightly or that people with dubious backgrounds should be 
given positions of trust. It therefore followed, in the logic of 
the Establishment, that Otepka himself could and should be 
deprived of his “civil liberties.” 

Otepka’s insistence on security precautions did not endear 
him to the officials of the State Department. Reporters 
Robert Allen and Paul Scott disclose, for example, that 
Otepka tangled with Assistant Secretary of State Harlan 
Cleveland and other officials of the Kennedy administration. 
Cleveland allegedly had appointed certain people of ques¬ 
tionable security status to an advisory committee on staffing 
of Americans in international organizations. According to 
Allen and Scott, Otepka protested to his State Department 
superiors. “When the State Department's daisy chain tipped 
off Cleveland that he was being watched,” say the reporters, 
“he retaliated swiftly by having John F. Reilly, Deputy As¬ 
sistant Secretary for Security, place Otepka under surveil¬ 
lance. This was quietly arranged through the office of Attor¬ 
ney General Robert Kennedy, a personal friend of Reilly.” 1 

Also objectionable to State Department chieftains were 
Otepka’s assertions about security “waivers” and emergency 
clearances. Called to testify about these charges. Department 
officials denied everything. Otepka countered by producing 
documents in corroboration of his statements, initialed by 
the same men who claimed to know nothing about the mat¬ 
ter. His rebuttal, according to subcommittee members, was 
“ironclad.” 2 

The Liberal Establishment 


Having thus proved his veracity, Otepka was put on notice 
of dismissal. Department officials could not accuse him of 
deception, since they were caught dead to rights in a decep¬ 
tion of their own. So they charged him with a violation of 
security. He had allegedly breached security regulations by 
producing the documents before the Senate subcommittee! 
This was the supreme stroke of irony, coming as it did from 
men who had been steadily pulling apart all security precau¬ 
tions, and aimed as it was at the man who had struggled to 
maintain some semblance of order in clearing people for sen¬ 
sitive positions. 

New Frontier harassment of Otepka, then, included demo¬ 
tion and displacement from his office, reduction in the staff 
assigned to him, a suggestion that he “broaden his vistas” by 
leaving the Department for the National War College, and 
an outright effort at dismissal because he gave truthful evi¬ 
dence of security delinquency to properly authorized mem¬ 
bers of Congress. As his discussions with the Senators devel¬ 
oped, other methods were employed as well. One of these was 
the ransacking of his “burn bag,” a depository for papers 
which are no longer wanted and which should be destroyed, 
to discover what kind of information he was passing along to 
the senators. Another was an effort to tap his telephone. 

Not content with this performance, three New Frontiers¬ 
men also testified falsely about the program of harassment. In 
July and August 1963, the Senate subcommittee called before 
it State Department officers Elmer Dewey Hill, David I. 
Belisle, and John F. Reilly, and questioned them about the 
bugging of Otepka’s telephone: 

Sourwine. Do you know of any single instance in which the 
Department has ever listened in on the telephone of any em¬ 
ployee? I am talking about his office telephone—the telephone 
that does not belong to him; it belongs to the State Depart¬ 
ment ... 

Hill. I cannot recall such an instance. 

Four Other Cases 


Sourwine. Do you know of any instance where a listening device 
has been placed in an employee’s office? 

Hill. Not to my knowledge. 

# # # 

Sourwine. Specifically, did you ever have anything to do with 
tapping the telephone of Mr. Otepka, the Chief of the Division 
of Evaluations in the Office of Security? 

Hill. No, sir. 

Sourwine. Did you ever have anything to do with placing a 
listening device in Mr. Otepka’s office? 

Hill. No, sir. 

Sourwine. Did you have any knowledge of it, if it was done? 

Hill. No, sir . 3 

Subsequently, the subcommittee made known it had inde¬ 
pendent evidence that just such steps had been taken to bug 
Otepka’s telephone. Hill suddenly found occasion to “clar¬ 
ify” his testimony. On March 18, 1963, he wrote the sub¬ 
committee, “Mr. John F. Reilly, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Security, asked me to explore the possibility of arranging 
some way to eavesdrop on conversations taking place in Mr. 
Otepka’s office. Mr. Reilly explained to me that he would 
only consider such a technique if other investigative methods 
failed . .. 

<( That evening Mr . Schneider and 1 altered the existing 
wiring in the telephone in Mr . Otepka’s office . We then es¬ 
tablished a circuit from Mr. Otepka’s office to the Division of 
Technical Services Laboratory by making additional con¬ 
nections in the existing telephone wiring system . . .” 4 (Em¬ 
phasis added.) 

In short, Hill’s “clarification” was an admission that he had 
lied under oath. 

The subcommittee had put similar questions to Belisle, 
counsel Sourwine asking: “Do you have any information 
with respect to the tapping of the telephone of Mr. Otto 
Otepka, the Chief of the Division of Evaluations of the De¬ 
partment of State?” 

The Liberal Establishment 


Belisle. No sir. 

Sourwine. Do you know whether this was done? 

Belisle. No, I do not. 

Sourwine. Did you have anything to do with the placing of a 
listening device in Mr. Otepka’s office? 

Belisle. I did not, sir. 

Sourwine. Do you know if this was done? 

Belisle. I do not. 5 

On November 6, 1963, Belisle decided he would like to 
“amplify” his testimony. He disclosed that Reilly had men¬ 
tioned these events to him, but “only after the events oc¬ 
curred.” He added that “at the time the events took place, I 
was in Costa Rica in connection with the visit of the Presi¬ 
dent and the Secretary to that country. I had, therefore, no 
first-hand information concerning these events, and it was for 
this reason that I answered Mr. Sourwine’s questions as I 
did.” 6 Like Hill's clarification, Belisle’s “amplification” is 
simply an admission of falsehood. For Sourwine had not 
asked him whether he had “first-hand” information, but 
merely whether or not he “knew whether this was done ” 
Belisle knew it had been done; he testified he did not. 

Finally, the subcommittee also questioned Reilly, who had 
taken over the State Department security office: 

Sourwine. Have you ever engaged in or ordered the bugging or 
tapping or otherwise compromising telephones or private conver¬ 
sations in the office of any employee of the State Department? 
Reilly. No, sir. 

Sourwine. Specifically in the case of Mr. Otepka you did not do 

Reilly. That is correct, sir. 

Sourwine. Did you tell Mr. Jerome Schneider to install an elec¬ 
trical device to compromise Mr. Otepka’s telephone? 

Reilly. No, sir. 

Sourwine. So that audible conversations in his office could be 
heard whether or not that phone was on the hool^? 

Four Other Cases 


Reilly. No, sir. 

Sourwine. Did you know this had been done? 

Reilly. No, sir . 7 

Thus Reilly’s testimony in August, 1963. On November 6, 
he too, decided he would like to “amplify” his remarks with a 
letter to the subcommittee: 

On March 13, 1963, I discussed with Mr. David I. Belisle, my 
special assistant, a variety of investigating techniques which 
might be used to determine whether my suspicions [about 
Otepka] were accurate. As a result of these discussions, I con¬ 
cluded that the best technique would be to recover and examine 
Mr. Otepka’s classified trash from his burn bag. On March 14, 
Mr. Otepka’s burn bag was recovered, but an examination of its 
contents revealed nothing of significance. 

On March 18, while Mr. Belisle was in Costa Rica in connec¬ 
tion with the visit to that country by the President and the 
Secretary, I asked Mr. Elmer D. Hill, Chief of the Division of 
Technical Services, to undertake a survey of the feasibility of 
intercepting conversations in Mr. Otepka’s office. I made it clear 
to Mr. Hill that I was not authorizing the actual interception 
of any conversations. Rather, I desired to know whether this 
technique could be used without undue risk or detection in the 
event that subsequent examination of Mr. Otepka’s bags con¬ 
tinued to reveal nothing of significance. 

On March 19, Mr. Hill told me that he and Mr. Clarence J. 
Schneider had discussed the means by which conversations in Mr. 
Otepka’s office might be intercepted and had conducted a feasi¬ 
bility survey by connecting spare telephone wire from the tele¬ 
phone in Mr. Otepka’s office to the Division of Technical Services 
Laboratory. Mr. Hill told me that the system attempted had not 
proven successful when he and Mr. Schneider had tested it and 
that they were uncertain whether it could be made to work. 8 

Subsequently, Reilly said, he found the information he was 
looking for—that Otepka was giving information to Sourwine 

The Liberal Establishment 


—in Otepka’s burn bag, so that further experiments with 
phone-tapping were unnecessary. He then ordered the device 
removed. “No conversations/’ he added, “were intercepted as 
a result of the events described above.” And: “Other than 
these events, I know of nothing which could have given rise 
to the belief that Mr. Otepka’s office was being ‘bugged’ or 
that his telephone was being ‘tapped’.” 9 In other words, 
Reilly could not think of anything which would give rise to 
the suspicion that Otepka’s office had been bugged or that his 
phone had been tapped unless it was this effort to bug his 
office and tap his phone! 

Despite Reilly’s puzzlement, the fact of the matter is, in his 
case as in Hill’s and Belisle’s, his “amplification” is an admis¬ 
sion that he had testified falsely. Sourwine did not ask him 
whether he had succeeded in “intercepting” conversations, 
whether he had left a listening device in the office for more 
than two days, or whether he was prepared to use the device 
as a first rather than a last resort. He asked Reilly, instead: 
“Have you ever engaged in or ordered the bugging or tap¬ 
ping or otherwise compromising telephones or private con¬ 
versations in the office of any employee of the State Depart¬ 
ment?” To which Reilly flatly replied: “No, sir.” Sourwine 
asked: “Specifically in the case of Mr. Otepka you did not do 
so?” To which Reilly flatly replied: “That is correct, sir.” 

Reilly had ordered Hill to set about the business of “com¬ 
promising” Otepka’s telephone; Reilly testified that he had 
not done so. 

Summarizing the events ranging from the Wieland case to 
the Otepka case, then, we get the following: 

1. State Department official William Wieland covering up 
for Castro, helping steer the U.S. into diplomatic calamity. 

2. New Frontier officials including President Kennedy 
himself covering up for Wieland. 

3. State Department officials manipulating’ the record to 

Four Other Cases 


justify retroactively Kennedy’s impromptu “clearance” for 
Wieland at his January 24, 1962 press conference. 

4. State Department efforts to dismantle the security appa¬ 
ratus of that agency, and to cover up for their own laxness 
in hiring employees, both high and low, without proper 
clearance procedures. 

5. State Department reprisals against Otto Otepka for hav¬ 
ing told the truth about these matters. 

6. State Department denial of the true facts about security 
laxness in rebuttal to Otepka’s testimony. 

7. State Department reprisals against Otepka for producing 
documentation that their testimony was untrue. 

8. State Department harassment of Opteka in general, in¬ 
cluding demotion, reduction of his staff, and bugging of his 

9. State Department falsehoods to cover up tapping Otep¬ 
ka’s telephone. 

At no point along the way, needless to remark, did Estab¬ 
lishment spokesmen for “dissent” step forward in Otepka’s 

2. Michel Struelens 

A further test of Establishment fealty to the “preferred 
right” of free speech occurred in the fall of 1961, as the Ken¬ 
nedy State Department wrestled with the Gordian knot of 
the Congo. 

Our State Department at that time was pledged to all-out 
support of a United Nations campaign to reunite the Congo 
by forcibly bringing the “secessionist” province of Katanga 
back into the fold. Because the Katanga action had involved 
aggression by U.N. and central Congolese forces, and 
because Katanga was an anti-Communist state while the cen¬ 
tral government ranged in its affections from “neutralist” to 
pro-Soviet, this policy was a controversial one, a topic of hot 

The Liberal Establishment 


dispute in the press and in the halls of Congress. Signs 
abounded that the American people were growing restive. 

The Katangese government of Moise Tshombe at that 
time maintained in New York an information officer, a Bel¬ 
gian named Michel Struelens. Like all public relations offi¬ 
cers of all governments, Struelens attempted to get a favor¬ 
able hearing for the Katanga side of things, and supplied 
information to congressmen and members of the press. Since 
almost all news coming out of the Congo was then being 
tunneled through official U.N. sources, Struelens was often 
the only opposition spokesman who had some first-hand facts 
at his command. That this single focus of resistance should 
actually be operating on American soil, contributing to 
dissent against its policies, was apparently intolerable to the 
State Department. It therefore launched a free-swinging 
campaign to discredit Struelens and all those in the United 
States who protested Establishment policy. 

State Department spokesmen and sympathetic voices in the 
press began attacking Struelens as an evil figure buying fav¬ 
orable publicity, hinting broadly that opponents of official 
policy were somehow improperly influenced by him. Steps 
were also instituted to have Struelens removed from the 

In the fall of 1961 Struelens was called into the U.S. Immi¬ 
gration office in New York City, where the official in charge 
wrote on his passport that his American visa, by order of the 
Secretary of State, had been invalidated. Certain members of 
Congress did not look favorably upon this action. Nor, to its 
credit, did the sometimes oblivious American Civil Liberties 
Union. At the request of Senator Thomas Dodd, the Internal 
Security subcommittee investigated the matter, and discov¬ 
ered that the effort to oust Struelens was, pure and simple, 
an attempt to silence opposition to official policies. 

This conclusion was not nailed down, of course, without a 
great deal of backing and filling by the State Department, 

Four Other Cases 


which managed to think up a half-dozen reasons, other than 
the real one, for ousting Struelens. The committee’s patient 
inquiry, however, established these contrived explanations to 
be without exception misleading. Some of the matters on 
which, the subcommittee concluded, the Department had 
been lax with the truth: 

1. When he was called before the Subcommittee, Struelens 
testified he had been on extremely cordial terms with the 
State Department up through August 1961, having as a mat¬ 
ter of fact in that month gone on a secret mission to the 
Congo at State Department request. State Department offi¬ 
cials flatly denied this, but under cross-examination backed 
down. The subcommittee found Struelens was telling the 
truth, and the State Department was not. 

2. When Struelens was called to come down to the immi¬ 
gration office, he was not told his visa was to be cancelled. He 
was told, instead, that immigration officials wanted only to 
“look at” his passport. 1 

3. The State Department said Struelens had exceeded the 
proper scope of his visa. The Subcommittee found the issuing 
officer had himself written on the visa the functions Struelens 
was to perform in America, and these were precisely the 
functions he did perform. 

4. The State Department said Struelens’ ejection from 
America was mandated by the U.N. action in the Congo. 
“The resolutions of the United Nations security council have 
called for the termination of his services.” 2 The committee 
found this to be completely false. 

5. The State Department retreated to another position: 
that it had itself made a technical error in issuing Sruelens 
the wrong kind of visa, and for this reason had to withdraw 
it. Questioned by the committee. Under Secretary George 
McGhee acknowledged that even this was a subterfuge, 
enabling “us to protect ourselves against his efforts ... to 
undermine our policies.” 3 

The Liberal Establishment 


6. Assistant Secretaries of State G. Mennen Williams and 
Carl T. Rowan delivered speeches on the same day—Decem¬ 
ber 27, 1961—attacking what Williams called the "well- 
financed propaganda machine” 4 of Katanga; Rowan said 
Struelens had been "spreading around at least $140,000 over 
the last year.” 5 Newsweek, obviously acting on "leaked” 
information, had earlier charged Struelens had spent $140,- 
000 in six months. 6 Drew Pearson, with typical restraint, re¬ 
fined this to $100,000 in one month. 7 

The truth: Struelens had spent $40,000 in i960, including 
the cost of setting up his office; and $100,000 in 1961—not all 
of which had been expended when Rowan made his speech. 
These sums, the Subcommittee proceedings revealed, were 
considerably smaller than those most foreign information 
offices spend, and proportionately less than the amount spent 
by the public relations firm of the Central Congolese Gov¬ 
ernment. Although this latter agency failed to register as a 
foreign agent until public protest was made, Rowan had 
nothing critical to say about it. 

7. Assistant Secretary Williams caused the issuance of a 
statement accusing Struelens of involvement in an effort to 
"bribe” the Government of Costa Rica into recognizing 
Katanga. This charge was denied by Costa Rican officials, 
and no evidence was ever produced to support it. 

8. The Subcommittee states: "The evidence in hand 
strongly indicates that sources in the Department of State at 
different times circulated the story that certain speeches de¬ 
livered on the floors of Congress dealing with the Congo had 
been written in whole or in part by Mr. Struelens.” 8 That 
charge was printed by Drew Pearson on the same day as the 
Rowan and Williams speeches, and two days later by a re¬ 
porter for the Washingto?i Post. The Subcommittee found it 
to be totally unsupported. 

Of particular interest in this episode was the performance 
of Carl T. Rowan, presently head of USIA, then Deputy 

Four Other Cases 

►25 7 

Assistant Secretary of State. Since Rowan had functioned as 
the Administration’s chief hatchetman against Struelens, the 
subcommittee found occasion to question him at length. De¬ 
livering his December 27 speech in Philadelphia, Rowan had 
declared that “there has been a clever big money campaign to 
convince Americans that they ought to support the Katanga 
secession.” He went on to add: 

Heading up this campaign is a former Belgian civil servant, 
Michel Struelens, who operates out of some rather plush quarters 
in New York. 

By spreading around at least $140,000 over the last year, Mr. 
Struelens has gotten some extremely vocal help in dispensing a 
string of myths and a stream of misinformation about Katanga 
and the Congo . . . 

It is an extremely revealing thing to look at the sources of 
support for Tshombe and his policy of secession. 

In the United States we have a conglomeration of arch¬ 
conservatives; People who oppose the income tax; avowed de¬ 
fenders of racial segregation; opponents of fluoridation of water; 
those who want to destroy the Supreme Court, largely because of 
its ruling on school segregation and so forth. 9 

This speech was coordinated with Williams’ parallel ad¬ 
dress in Detroit, charging sympathy for Katanga had been 
“cultivated widely in Europe and even here in the United 
States by a well-financed propaganda machine speaking for 
Mr. Tshombe and against the U.N.” 10 Also on the same day, 
columnist Pearson unleashed a bitter attack against Sen. 
Thomas Dodd (D-Conn.), charging Dodd was in cahoots 
with the Katangese because he had dared to criticize the U.S.- 
financed aggression there. While all this was going on, the 
U.N. was driving in for the kill in Katanga, and the U.S. 
State Department was laying its plans to oust Struelens from 
the country. 

Under questioning by Senator Dodd and committee coun- 

The Liberal Establishment 


sel Jay Sourwine, Rowan was unable to back up the sweeping 
generalizations contained in his speech. 

Sourwine. What information did you have about the amount 
of money spent by Mr. Struelens over the year preceding your 

Rowan. I had information as to the figures that he had filed with 
the Justice Department . . . 

Sourwine. Is it not a fact that those figures showed that the total 
amount made available to him for a period of a year and 3 
months was $140,000; $40,000 for the first quarter, including the 
expense of setting up the office, and $100,000 for the year 1961; 
and that all of this money had not yet been expended at the time 
you made your speech? 

Rowan. I do not know specifically what those figures showed, but 
I had information that led me to believe that that was an ac¬ 
curate statement . . . 

# # # 

Senator Dodd. Let us see if we cannot get at the heart of this. 
This man has made a report which he is required to file with the 
Department of Justice under law. You say you have no informa¬ 
tion that it is not accurate. Your speech cites a figure which, on 
the face of it, if the report filed by Struelens is accurate, is inac¬ 
curate ... My question is: How do you reconcile these things? . . . 
Rowan. I am saying that the information provided to me as to 
what Mr. Struelens had spent indicated that over the last year he 
had spent $140,000. 

Dodd. Was this information other than his official report to the 
Department of Justice? 

Rowan. I did not personally go to the Department of Justice to 
take the information out of the files. 

Dodd. I understand. You saw the report, though, you said? 
Rowan. Not the report specifically before that speech, no. 

Dodd. It would seem to me that this is a serious matter. You are a 
high official of this government. You charge a man with having 
spent more money than he reported and is required to report 
under the law. It seems to me that a high official who made a 

Four Other Cases 


misstatement of that kind ought to correct it, if it is not accurate. 
Rowan. If it is not accurate. 

Dodd. That is right. Do you have information that $140,000 was 
spent that year? 

Rowan. If I find that the statement is not accurate, I will correct 
it to the point of accuracy. 

Dodd. I think you should give this committee right now any 
information that you have indicating that such a sum of money 
was spent by Struelens over that year, any information of any 
kind from any quarter. 

Rowan. I do not have the specific figures information, sir. 11 

Rowan was further questioned about the assertion that the 
backers of Tshombe in America were political kooks and ex¬ 

Sourwine. Did you mean in this speech to have reference to 
Senator Dodd, of Connecticut? 

Rowan. I was not referring to Senator Dodd, of Connecticut, 

Sourwine. Were you aware that Senator Dodd had made a num¬ 
ber of speeches supporting Tshombe? 

Rowan. I was aware that Senator Dodd had made some speeches 
supporting Tshombe. 

Sourwine. Did you think that Senator Dodd would fit into any of 
your oratorical pigeonholes? . . . Do you consider Senator Dodd 
an arch conservative? 

Rowan. Let me say that, as I indicated, I was referring to the 
signers of the Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters ad, and there are 
signers of that ad who fall into that category. 

Dodd. Of course, you recognize, Mr. Secretary, that in the public 
mind it was not the ad in the New York Times . I am quite 
certain you would agree it was, I think, pretty largely the men 
who spoke in Congress who were in the public mind, the indi¬ 
viduals who had been speaking up for, to put it that way, 
Tshombe in Katanga. 

I do not know of anyone, though, who has advocated the aboli- 

The Liberal Establishment 


tion of the income tax. I am sure I have not. I am sure Senator 
Keating has not. I do not believe Senator Yarborough has. I do 
not believe Senator Russell has. I just do not believe that. 
Rowan. Let me reiterate that I was not referring to members of 

Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, perhaps I can capsule this, and let 
me ask a question that may be a little long. I will ask permission 
to put in the record at this point various items, newspaper clip¬ 
pings and so on, which show that a number of individuals have 
in recent periods of time been on Tshombe’s side. These include 
the editors of Life, the editors of the New York Herald Tribune, 
Richard Nixon, Senator Dodd, Senator Yarborough, Senator 
Lausche, Herbert Hoover, Arthur Krock, Billy Graham, William 
S. White, editors of the Los Angeles Times, Max Lerner, editors 
of the Scripps-Howard newspapers, Bishop N. S. Booth, Metho¬ 
dist Bishop of Katanga, Paul Henri Spaak, Madame Suzanne 
Labin, Maurice Schumann, and other members of the French 
Socialist Party who signed a telegram to protest to President 
Kennedy, Prime Minister Macmillan, President DeGaulle, Max 
Ascoli, and the Reporter magazine, and the editors of the Detroit 
Free Press . . . Do you consider any of these individuals as in¬ 
cluded in the categories, the items of the category that you 
listed here, as the sources of support for Tshombe and his policy 
of secession? 

Rowan. I do not recall all the names you read, but I think in 
fairness I ought to reiterate that I did make the distinction be¬ 
tween those who were critical of our policies, those who even 
supported Tshombe to some extent, and those who were propa¬ 
gandizing in behalf of secession and spreading myths and mis¬ 
information. 12 

The subcommittee found Rowan had in fact made no such 

Mr. Rowan’s ex post facto explanation of the intent of his 
speech is difficult to reconcile with the actual text. Nowhere in 
his speech did he draw a distinction between* those who were 

Four Other Cases 


critical of our policy, those who supported Tshombe to some 
extent, and those who, for different reasons, were propagandizing 
in behalf of secession and spreading myths and misinformation. 
On the contrary, the clear and only impression conveyed by Mr. 
Rowan's words was (1) that those supporting Tshombe were, 
ipso facto , supporters of secession, and (2) that overwhelmingly 
this support came from bigoted and extremist groups in the 
United States. While Mr. Rowan argued that he was referring 
primarily to the signers of the New York Times advertisement, 
nowhere in his speech did he mention the New York Times 
advertisement or place any such limit on the scope of his accusa¬ 
tions. 13 

The Subcommittee came to the following conclusions con¬ 
cerning the Rowan charges: 

Mr. Williams and Mr. Rowan told the committee they had not 
meant to imply that Mr. Struelens had spent the money of the 
Katanga Information Service in an improper way, or that Mem¬ 
bers of Congress and newspaper columnists who had expressed 
misgivings about the U.N. Congo operation were improperly in¬ 
fluenced by Mr. Struelens. 

Mr. Rowan offered no evidence to back his charge that support 
for President Tshombe came primarily from an amalgam of 
political extremists, including those who opposed the income tax 
and those who opposed the fluoridation of water. Mr. Rowan was 
not prepared to place any one in any of his several extremist 

Although spokesmen implied that the State Department was in 
possession of information indicating that Mr. Struelens had in 
some way been involved in an attempt to arrange recognition of 
Katanga by Costa Rica through the bribery of certain Costa 
Rican officials, the State Department failed to present any such 
evidence to the subcommittee, nor was any found elsewhere. 14 

Concerning the Rowan allegation that “by spreading 
around at least $140,000 over the last year, Mr. Struelens has 

The Liberal Establishment 


gotten some extremely vocal help, etc.,” the subcommittee 
found (1) that the allegation was factually incorrect, (2) 
that the spending by Struelens was modest compared with 
other government information agencies, (3) that the impli¬ 
cation of suborned sympathy was false. Said the subcommit¬ 
tee report: 

In his periodic statements to the Department of Justice as a 
registered foreign agent, Mr. Struelens reported expenditures of 
$140,000 over a period of one year and three months. Of this 
amount, $40,000 was for the first quarter, including the expense 
of setting up the office, and $100,000 was expended over the 
course of 1961. No evidence was found to cast doubt on these 
figures. In comparison with the expenditures of other govern¬ 
ments for information purposes in this country, the expenditures 
of the Katanga Information Service seem quite modest. 15 

The episode would seem to suggest that Liberal Carl 
Rowan, being singularly free with the use of blanket charges 
he cannot sustain, is hardly the man to head so pivotal an 
agency as the USIA. It also suggests another dimension of 
Establishment sincerity in its professed allegiance to dis¬ 

3. Don B. Reynolds 

Among the various embarrassments which have troubled 
Lyndon Johnson during his tenure as Vice President and 
President, none has been more persistent than the Bobby 
Baker case. And in that case, no single individual has been 
more bothersome to Johnson and Baker alike than Don B. 
Reynolds, the Maryland insurance man who once performed 
as Baker’s partner, gave an expensive stereo set to Johnson 
via Baker, and at last told all to Senator John Williams of 
Delaware and the Senate Rules Committee. 

In early 1964, the Rules Committee, after a good deal of 
public pressure, prepared to release Reynolds’ testimony con- 

Four Other Cases 


cerning the bizarre matter of the stereo set and asserted pres¬ 
sure placed on him, through Walter Jenkins, to buy advertis¬ 
ing time on Johnson’s TV station in Austin. Disclosure of 
such matters, as Johnson went about the business of consoli¬ 
dating himself in the esteem of the public, was not favored at 
the White House. Nor was Reynolds’ testimony rendered 
more acceptable by the fact that he produced in evidence the 
cancelled checks with which he had paid for the stereo and 
the advertising, plus the shipment order from the Magnavox 
Company in Fort Wayne, Indiana. 

As the Washington Star reported, “the Rules Committee 
juggled this hot potato for eight days, trying to decide 
whether to shelve the testimony, release it, or call Mr. Reyn¬ 
olds to testify at a public hearing.” 1 When the painful deci¬ 
sion was at last made to release it, steps were taken at the 
White House to smear and discredit Reynolds with various 
members of the press. This sample of police state tactics 
shocked many of the journalists involved, including, to their 
credit, a number of Liberals. 

The most complete story of what took place was told by 
reporter Cabell Phillips of The New York Times, whose ac¬ 
count is worth quoting at length. 

Persons within and close to the Johnson administration, [Phil¬ 
lips wrote] have attempted to use secret government documents 
to impugn the testimony of a witness in the Robert G. Baker 
case . . . 

Some reporters and editors concerned with the Baker investi¬ 
gation have been advised by persons in the White House that 
Mr. Reynolds is an unreliable witness. 

In several instances, individual newsmen and news executives 
have been read excerpts from what purported to be reports by 
either Air Force intelligence or the Federal Bureau of Investiga¬ 
tion. These reports purportedly contained derogatory informa¬ 
tion on Mr. Reynolds* background and his reputation for 
veracity . . . 

The Times has established that direct approaches were made 

The Liberal Establishment 


by persons in the White House to at least two publications in an 
effort to have them alter or suppress articles based on the Reyn¬ 
olds testimony. In the case of a third publication, a White House 
aide volunteered that Reynolds was not to be believed . . . 2 

When the Reynolds testimony was about to break, Phillips 
continued, two reporters took their articles on the subject to 
the assistant White House press secretary, Andrew Hatcher. 
In at least one instance, Hatcher disappeared with the re¬ 
porter’s copy for about 20 minutes, returning with the mes¬ 
sage that there would be no comment: 

Later that afternoon, however, the reporter’s editor received 
a telephone call from a well-known aide to President Johnson. 

The aide told the editor that the story was inaccurate in cer¬ 
tain details concerning Mr. Johnson’s understanding about the 
source of the gift. He suggested, according to the editor, that the 
paper might want to kill the article outright, or at least postpone 
publication until the next week, when the facts could be checked 
against the official transcript. 3 

The editor in question did make a few changes in the 
article, but printed it the next day. A check of the transcript, 
he said, showed that his reporter’s copy had been accurate. 

In another instance, according to Phillips, a reporter called 
a friend at the White House for comment on Reynolds’ tes¬ 
timony. He was assertedly told: “You ought to see this fel¬ 
low’s record. You can’t believe a word he says.” 4 

Phillips reported still another episode: 

In a third instance . . . the publisher of a national news maga¬ 
zine was called by long-distance telephone by someone described 
to the Times as “an important White House personage, but not 
the President.” There was more than one telephone call in this 
instance, in which the caller “warned” the publisher that any 
article based on Reynolds’ testimony would prpbably be inaccu- 

Four Other Cases 


rate. Excerpts allegedly from the FBI file were read to the pub¬ 
lisher to substantiate the “warning.” 

The fact that the White House was in possession of FBI or 
other intelligence reports on Mr. Reynolds was known to a num¬ 
ber of reporters. 5 

One newsman who employed the data on Reynolds accord¬ 
ing to White House desires was Drew Pearson, who wrote 
two articles, purportedly based on FBI information, concern¬ 
ing Reynolds’ service in the Air Force. They characterized 
Reynolds as a man “who has brought reckless charges in the 
past against people who have crossed him,” and accused the 
witness of having engaged in black market and other im¬ 
proper activities. 6 The FBI denied having made such infor¬ 
mation available to Pearson, as did the White House. Pearson 
himself said “the White House seemed flabbergasted when I 
told them about Reynolds’ amazing record.” 7 Reporter Phil¬ 
lips of The Times noted, however, that Pearson’s charges 
“paralleled in many details information made available to 
other reporters and editors.” 8 

Reaction to this move by the Johnson administration was 
heated. Republican Senator Hugh Scott addressed a letter to 
FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover and to Defense Secretary Robert 
McNamara, urging an inquiry into the whys and wherefores 
of the “leak.” Scott pointed out that the material referred to 
had not been made available to the Rules Committee—a 
point on which he was supported by committee counsel 
Lennox P. McLlendon. McLlendon, who had asked the FBI 
and the Pentagon for background documents on Reynolds, 
related: “I was informed that the reason they were not avail¬ 
able was that they were ‘classified.’ ” 9 Others criticizing the 
procedure were Rep. H. R. Gross of Iowa and Rep. Kath¬ 
erine St. George of New York. 

Nor was the critical commentary limited to Republicans. 
While there was no massive outcry from the Liberal guard- 

The Liberal Establishment 


ians of our freedoms, certain members of the press spoke 
strong words of dispraise. Arthur Krock of The New York 
Times commented: 

The Democratic committeemen have said nothing on these 
matters in public. But if they are not troubled by the anonymous 
release for publication of personal dossiers, gathered by powerful 
executive agencies from informants whose identity and assertions 
are concealed from the subject, and consigned to government 
archives under a seal of secrecy, they should be. 

And they should also be troubled by the criterion implied in 
this instance for the choice of the secret documents to be released 
to the press—the discrediting of persons who have acquired a 
public audience for statements impairing the confidence of the 
people in the ethical standards of their government . . . 

When the method employed [to discredit a witness] is the 
anonymous handout of this nature to the press, the constitu¬ 
tional rights of persons are violated . . . These include perhaps 
millions of citizens who should be concerned about this particu¬ 
lar example, because the government has on file allegations 
about them of which they are as ignorant as of their sources. 10 

Andrew Tully fired off a similar criticism in a column 
appearing in the Chicago American: 

As a free American citizen, I am scared by the Johnson admin¬ 
istration’s attempt to smear a witness in the Bobby Baker case 
thru the apparent use of material in confidential FBI and mili¬ 
tary files. . . . 

To the citizens this situation should be far more frightening 
than any nightmare featuring Nikita Khrushchev fondling a 
nuclear bomb. 

It says, in simple and ugly language, that no one is safe from 
the machinations of his own government. It says that secret po¬ 
lice dossiers on Americans may be used against any man or 
woman who dares to stir up trouble for the political party in 

Four Other Cases 


. . . the shameful aspect of this tawdry mess is the effect it may 
have on other witnesses to be called before the committee. Few 
human beings lack a skeleton in the closets of their past, and a 
witness would not be inclined to testify freely and honestly if he 
knew that some public official was lurking in the wings ready to 
use the government’s “secret” file against him. 

A file on a citizen’s past is a security necessity when a citizen 
is, or has been, employed by the government, as Reynolds was in 
the air force and diplomatic service. But much of the material in 
such files is raw, unverified stuff, made up of gossip, rumors and 
the like. 

This muck leaked to the press about Reynolds may or may not 
be true. That, however, is irrelevant. The point is that the law 
says it may not be used in this shabby fashion. And that is what 
is so frightening. 11 

Questioned about the matter by CBS newsman Roger 
Mudd, Reynolds himself offered some interesting commen¬ 

Mudd: Mr. Reynolds, is there any doubt in your mind that the 
“leak” to Drew Pearson about your character file was made with 
White House help? 

Reynolds: I am sure it was coordinated through White House 
efforts and was made available either directly through the White 
House or through subterfuge of White House efforts. There is no 
one else that it could hurt. 

Mudd: Who would Drew Pearson be trying to protect? 

Reynolds: I would assume in the natural order of things, num¬ 
ber one, that Bobby Baker has already had his problem. So he is 
not trying to protect Bobby. I would assume he is trying to 
protect Mr. Jenkins, the President of the United States, and 
many, or at least several, other people who are intimately associ¬ 
ated with this particular group. 12 

In the Reynolds case, then, we see the coercive effects of 
big government at work in ever-widening circles. First power 

The Liberal Establishment 


and money are consolidated by the welfare state in Wash¬ 
ington; then a “wheeler dealer” moves in to make his fortune 
from the resulting entanglement of influence, pressure, con¬ 
tracts, etc.; then, when these improprieties are threatened 
with exposure, intimidation and abuse of confidential infor¬ 
mation are called into play to silence those who would pro¬ 
test or inform the public. What starts out as an allegedly 
innocuous invasion of “property rights” winds its way, with 
little difficulty, to abuse of personal rights as well. 

4. Mary K . Jones 

Demotion and harassment of a loyal government em¬ 
ployee, furbelowed with wiretapping and an exercise in 
perjury; a government effort to smear and discredit a legally- 
accredited spokesman for another country who disagrees with 
official policy; and an effort to silence an unfriendly witness 
by the abuse of confidential information. Now we come to an 
even more complex and frightening case, in which hostility 
to dissent has by degrees brought certain Establishment 
members to outright denial of due process, including the 
right of habeas corpus . 

As the Bobby Baker case produced its attack on the right of 
dissent, so did the Billie Sol Estes scandal. One of the great 
mysteries of the Estes case involved an Agriculture Depart¬ 
ment employee named Henry Marshall, the cotton expert 
who was found shot to death in East Texas in June, 1961. 
Marshall had assertedly opposed the Estes arrangement to 
buy up cotton allotments, claiming it was illegal. In the 
midst of the Estes controversy, however, this important wit¬ 
ness was found dead. From that mysterious death flowed a 
whole series of other enigmas, concluding with an outright 
attack on the most elementary “civil liberties” of a little- 
known file clerk in the Agriculture Department office in 

Four Other Cases 


Marshall was important to the Estes case because he had 
allegedly rendered an opinion against Estes’ Rube Goldberg 
plan for gaining cotton allotments and told Estes as much, 
which would mean Estes and the Agriculture Department 
knew more than a year before action was taken that the 
scheme was illegal. With Marshall dead, however, nothing 
could be proved. As Secretary of Agriculture Freeman put it, 
nobody knew what had happened “because the key figure in 
this was the man who unfortunately is not alive.” 1 

Freeman’s reference to Marshall and his key role in the 
Estes case caused a number of people, including a grand jury 
in Robertson County, Texas, and the Texas Rangers to take 
renewed interest in the case. In May, 1962, Marshall’s body 
was exhumed and a belated autopsy performed by a group of 
examiners headed by Houston pathologist Joseph A. Jach- 
imczyk. “For reasons that no one seemed to be able to ex¬ 
plain adequately,” writes Julius Duscha, “there had been no 
autopsy at the time of Marshall’s death eleven months earlier 
. . . The pathologist concluded that the cause of Marshall’s 
death could have been suicide but more likely was homi¬ 
cide.” 2 The grand jury could come to no conclusion. The 
Texas Rangers, however, decided Marshall’s death was mur¬ 
der. The Rangers’ report said carbon monoxide was found in 
Marshall’s lungs, that his hands were bruised, that he had 
received “a serious brain injury and cut over his left eye,” 3 
that there was blood on the sides and rear of his pickup truck, 
and that a dent in the right side of the truck “was caused by 
some type of instrument other than a human hand or head,” 
indicating the possibility of a struggle. 

Most conclusive of all was the fact that Marshall was shot 
five times through the stomach with a bolt-action rifle. To 
shoot oneself in the stomach even once with a rifle, holding it 
away from the body and pushing the trigger outward, would 
be difficult. But to shoot oneself five times in this manner, 
repeatedly lowering the rifle to pump the bolt, is impossible. 

The Liberal Establishment 


Moreover, the Rangers found three of the bullet wounds 
were such as to render Marshall incapable of further action, 
and that he had died quickly of internal hemmorhaging. The 
Rangers could find no motive for suicide, and determined 
that Marshall's behavior immediately before his death was 
not suicidal. 

“This investigation has resulted," said the Rangers, “in 
our conclusion that Mr. Marshall's death could not have been 
the result of suicide; therefore, this Department's continuing 
investigation will be based on the theory that he was mur¬ 
dered." 4 That conclusion drew the assent of Senator John 
McClellan of Arkansas, as it will of anyone who considers the 
wild improbability of a suicide being committed in such a 
manner. It would appear, then, that the one man who could 
throw light on Estes’ cotton allotment deal was murdered— 
the man whose death, according to Secretary Freeman, meant 
“nobody knows" the full story on Estes. 

But one of Freeman's subordinates, a man named Battle 
Hales, thought the problem could be unravelled. Hales 
claimed to have in his files material establishing that another 
man, Taylor Allen, had been present at the meeting between 
Marshall and Estes' attorney, knew Marshall had said the 
allotment transfers were illegal, and could therefore dissolve 
the cloud of uncertainty to which Freeman alluded. As Sena¬ 
tor John Williams put it: 

[Hales] said that with his files he could prove that Mr. Mar¬ 
shall, deceased, had rendered an opinion that their plan to trans¬ 
fer cotton acreage in West Texas was illegal. Mr. Hales had also 
claimed that the manner in which the Department was letting 
Mr. Estes handle acreage allotments was wrong. He said there 
were also reports in the file concerning this recommendation of 
another important witness, Mr. Taylor Allen, which would sup¬ 
port his charges. 5 

Four Other Cases 


It would appear from this that the distraught Secretary 
Freeman had deliverance close at hand. With such a fund of 
information in his files, Battle Hales should have been the 
Agriculture Department’s man of the hour. For some reason, 
however, the Department did not see it that way. Its officials 
did not seem to care for his criticisms of the way the Estes 
case was handled; nor were they much impressed by his offer 
of data establishing that what Estes had been doing, with 
Department permission, had long been certified as illegal. 
Hales succeeded, in fact, in drawing official displeasure, not 
toward Estes, but toward himself. Senator Williams said: 

Suggestions had been made that there were circumstances in 
the Estes case which warranted its referral to the Department of 
Justice. Instead, Mr. Hales, on April 19, [1962] was intensively 
questioned by the FBI. 

The following day, April 20, when Mr. Hales returned to his 
office he found a guard at the door, and he was barred from 
entering. He was told that he had been relieved of his previous 
duties and transferred to another job involving the Department’s 
food stockpiling activities in connection with the civil defense 
programs. He was allowed to take his personal effects from his 
office but was told that his files must remain. Allegedly the com¬ 
binations on his files were all changed to make sure that he did 
not have access to any of the information which had been com¬ 
piled during his examination of the Estes case. 

After Mr. Hales had been removed from his office and side¬ 
tracked to an insignificant position his secretary was placed 
under suspicion, and the harassment began. 6 

The treatment accorded Hales was in some ways similar to 
that accorded Otepka. Much worse things were to follow, 
however, for Hales’ secretary, Mary Kimbrough Jones. Sena¬ 
tor Williams continued: 

Apparently she remained too loyal to her former boss and tried 
to protect his files from being pigeonholed or destroyed, with the 

The Liberal Establishment 


result that she became very unpopular with other Department 

Allegedly, she was ordered from the office and when she ob¬ 
jected she was bodily removed and detained in an adjoining 

Dr. Lee K. Buchanan, the Chief of the Health Division of the 
Agriculture Personnel Office, was called in, and without any 
effort to consult Miss Jones’ personal physician concerning com¬ 
mitment to a mental institution he arbitrarily ordered this lady 
carried to a mental institution. 7 

This was April 25, 1962. Miss Jones was taken to District 
General Hospital, where she was kept under mental observa¬ 
tion for 12 days. On May 7, pursuant to a court order for an 
examination to determine whether she was sane, Miss Jones 
was released as being of sound mind. In the meantime, how¬ 
ever, she had been held a virtual prisoner for almost two 
weeks, without protection from the safeguards of the law. “I 
was amazed to find/’ said Williams, “that if a man while on 
the streets of Washington, D.C., murders someone, the officer 
who arrests him takes him to the police station where he must 
first be officially booked; and he is given an opportunity to 
call his lawyer. But this girl who had committed no crime was 
given no such opportunity. The police officer, and I have 
here his statement, confirms that not only did they not call 
any of the family of this girl, but they made no effort to call 
any of them. They merely loaded her in the patrol wagon and 
sent her off.” 8 

No doctor signed anything before Miss Jones was com¬ 
mitted; and the police officer called in by the Agriculture 
Department had never before been in charge of a mental 
case. The officer testified that Miss Jones was not violent, but 
that she repeatedly walked over to a window—a possible indi¬ 
cation she was getting ready to kill herself. It developed, 
however: (1) The room was on the first floor, (2) the win- 

Four Other Cases 


dow was closed: (3) Miss Jones made no effort to open it. 
Moreover, this occurred after she had been forcibly carried 
from an office, detained in another room, and told she was 
going to be submitted to psychiatric examination. The fact 
that she was sane was at last established by medical authority. 

What was behind this strange assault on the rights of Miss 
Jones? Why was it important, first of all, that Battle Hales be 
separated from his files? Why important that Miss Jones be 
separated from them? And why, finally, important that Miss 
Jones be subjected to the discrediting experience of deten¬ 
tion as a possible mental case for 12 days? 

According to an interview with Jack Steele of the Scripps- 
Howard newspapers, Taylor Allen subsequently confirmed 
everything Hales had said about Estes, Marshall and the 
Agriculture Department. Allen disclosed “that the Depart¬ 
ment has known for more than a year that Billie Sol Estes was 
warned in advance that his plan to transfer cotton allotments 
to West Texas was illegal . . . Mr. Allen said the warning was 
given by the late Henry Marshall, the department’s cotton 
expert in Texas, at a meeting in Mr. Marshall’s office at Col¬ 
lege Station, Texas, on January 17, 1961. 

“He said Mr. Marshall gave the warning to John Denni¬ 
son, attorney for Mr. Estes, and W. F. (Bill) Mattox, vice 
chairman of the Reeves County (Pecos) Stabilization Com¬ 
mittee, which later approved many of the allotment transfers 
for Mr. Estes. 

“Mr. Allen recalled that Mr. Marshall had told Messrs. 
Dennison and Mattox emphatically that the proposal of Mr. 
Estes to transfer allotments was illegal.” 9 

Allen added, according to Steele, that he had given this 
information to a Department investigator more than a year 
previously. Thus, on this testimony, it would appear Battle 
Hales’ contention was right, Secretary Freeman’s supposition 

We now have this sequence of events: Estes’ attorney and 

The Liberal Establishment 


Agriculture official Mattox—the latter appointed at Estes* 
behest and with the intercession of LBJ aide Clifton Carter- 
are told by Henry Marshall that the proposed allotment 
scheme is illegal. Estes goes ahead with it anyway, and Mattox 
gives his approval. When trouble begins to brew over the 
matter, Marshall is found dead, shot five times in the stomach 
with a bolt-action rifle. The Texas Rangers conclude that 
more likely than not he was murdered. Secretary of Agricul¬ 
ture Freeman, questioned about the allotments, says unfor¬ 
tunately “nobody knows” what went on down there in Texas 
because Marshall is no longer around to tell the story. Agri¬ 
culture official Battle Hales, however, says somebody does 
know and he, Hales, has the proof in his files. Hales is subse¬ 
quently questioned, finds a guard at the door to his office and 
is barred from entering, is transferred and told to leave his 
files behind. When, apparently, Hales* secretary, Mary K. 
Jones, tries to protect the files, she is bodily removed from 
the office and committed to a mental institution for 12 days 
without judicial process. 

As Senator Williams concluded: “Should those files now 
fail to produce what Mr. Hales had alleged, who will ever 
know whether or not they have been stripped? Certainly 
these files were not confiscated for nothing. If Miss Jones is 
discredited as a witness, it could prove convenient to some¬ 
one.” 10 

By way of postscript, it should be noted that the Estab¬ 
lishment did not rise up in outrage at the assault committed 
on the civil liberties of either Mr. Hales or Miss Jones. Or, 
for that matter, on the civil liberties of Mr. Marshall. 

In sum, the cycle of the Baker-Reynolds case is repeated: 
From welfare state bonanza to swindle to crackdown on per¬ 
sonal liberties. Only this time the assault on personal liberties 
was not merely an attempt to discredit—as distasteful as such 
an attempt can be—but actual incarceration, without due 
process, without habeas corpus, without counsel. In this case, 

Four Other Cases 


that is, we see the full mechanics of the police state exposed 
and functioning with totalitarian purpose. 

Nor is the case of Miss Jones the only example of such a 
startling assault on legal safeguards. An equally flagrant ex¬ 
ample occurred in the case of former Maj. Gen. Edwin A. 
Walker, whose criticisms of administration policy in several 
fields and membership in the John Birch Society have made 
him a favored target for Establishment spokesmen. Walker 
appeared at the University of Mississippi in the fall of 1962, 
when Federal troops were effecting the enrollment of Negro 
student James Meredith. During a night of student demon¬ 
strations, bottle throwing, and use of tear gas bombs by the 
troops. Walker was on the scene. He was accused of inciting 
the students to riot, but was exonerated by a grand jury 
and won a sizable libel judgment against those who had so 
accused him. Before his case ever got to a court room, how¬ 
ever, he was subjected to one of the most fantastic ordeals 
ever visited on an American citizen. 

Without a semblance of due process, the Federal govern¬ 
ment arrested Walker and spirited him out of the state to a 
Federal prison for psychiatric prisoners in Springfield, Mis¬ 
souri. He was denied right to bail, having been shipped out 
of Mississippi before he was able to make bond. And he was 
subjected to a court order submitting him to psychiatric tests, 
in a proceeding where he was not represented by counsel. 
Walker's confinement and psychiatric examination were or¬ 
dered on the basis of a memorandum by a government psy¬ 
chiatrist who had never seen Walker, who had not examined 
the details of the case, who was 1,000 miles away, and who 
based his opinion of Walker's mental balance on ‘‘news re¬ 
ports." 11 

Walker was, in short, a political prisoner, subjected to 
treatment similar to that meted out in totalitarian countries. 
Here was a denial of “civil liberties" with a vengeance. Yet 
once more the Establishment, with the exception of the 

The Liberal Establishment 


American Civil Liberties Union—sensitive enough to the 
norms of freedom not to overlook so flagrant a dereliction 
—was mute; as indeed it had to be, since this trampling upon 
constitutional rights was being executed by the Establish¬ 
ment itself. 

6 . The Silencers 

It may be argued that the cases discussed in the preceding 
chapter are not typical; that while Liberals are sometimes out 
of patience with dissent, they are after all human and there¬ 
fore prone to make a mistake now and then. Perhaps we have 
focused on exceptional episodes, exaggerating the danger to 
“preferred rights” resulting from the Establishment quest for 

Such speculation, even if true, would not answer the ques¬ 
tions raised by the Liberal performance. That Establish- 
mentarians are human beings and do make mistakes, or 
sometimes get carried away with their own sense of mission to 
the point of imposing it on others, is precisely the issue. 
All human beings. Liberal or conservative or in between, are 
susceptible to this particular failing. That is why no group of 
human beings should be given unchecked power over their 

The Liberal Establishment 


There is evidence, additionally, that Liberal hostility to 
dissent is not a sometime thing. Increasingly over the past 
few years the Establishment’s urge to silence whole classes of 
people who disagree with Liberal policy has become pain¬ 
fully apparent. In this respect, too, the Establishment com¬ 
mits the very sins it is fond of imputing to conservatives. 

It is sometimes charged against “right-wing extremists,” for 
example, that they use bullying tactics to silence political 
opponents; “blacklisting” methods to put the Indian sign on 
people who disagree with them; the techniques of censorship 
and social pressure to silence opposition; “guilt by associa¬ 
tion” to smear people who won’t accept their views on politi¬ 
cal questions; etc. In point of fact, all these methods and 
others have been employed by various prominent Liberals, 
including some high in the councils of our government. 

This chapter discusses some of these matters. Its purpose is 
not to suggest that all Liberals use all the methods described 
herein, or that all conservatives are blameless with respect to 
all of them. Political malfeasance is seldom limited to a single 
side of any dispute. Our purpose is to bring to the surface an 
aspect of the record seldom mentioned in the Liberal media— 
the fact that a systematic and coordinated effort has been 
launched by a number of Liberals to silence conservatives, 
employing both public and private means of coercion. 

One of the most startling episodes in this category occurred 
in the fall of 1962, in this writer’s home city of Indianapolis, 
Indiana. As the congressional elections of that year ap¬ 
proached, the New Frontier found itself in political difficulty. 
A great hue and cry had gone up around the nation concern¬ 
ing the intrusion of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Throughout 
August, September, and October, the Kennedy regime had 
stoutly denied that any such thing was taking place. But the 
unrest was growing rapidly, and President Kennedy launched 
into the campaign to shore up Democratic chances and to 
take a few soundings. The soundings had not’ been good. In 

The Silencers 


Cincinnati, Kennedy had been greeted by conservative dis¬ 
sidents demanding action in Cuba. The resulting newspaper 
photographs, showing pickets holding signs which bore the 
legend “Less Profile, More Courage,” and other like senti¬ 
ments, had not been beneficial to the New Frontier image. 
And, as Kennedy prepared to move on to Indianapolis, it 
was learned that members of the conservative youth group, 
Young Americans for Freedom, planned a similar demonstra¬ 
tion there. Steps were taken to prevent such an unfortunate 

Kennedy arrived at Indianapolis Municipal Airport Octo¬ 
ber 13, and delivered a speech lambasting Republicans as 
warmongers and praising Democrats as the embodiment of 
virtue. The high ethical tone of the meeting, however, may 
have been lost on the YAF members in the audience, fully 
absorbed as they were in the business of being beaten up. 
Their planned demonstration, as things turned out, never 
did get off the ground. The students relate that as soon as 
they hoisted their signs, they were set upon by a squadron of 
bravoes who ripped the placards from their hands and tore 
them to pieces. The goons also gave a number of the students 
a thorough working-over. 

One picketer was knocked down, kicked in the head and 
pummeled in the kidneys. Another, beaten around the head, 
had his teeth knocked loose and his mouth split open. A 22- 
year-old girl was set upon by three men who wrenched the 
poster from her hand and injured her arm. 

The YAF members say they identified their assailants by 
two common features 1) they were wearing straw hats adver¬ 
tising the candidacy of Indiana Democrat Birch Bayh for the 
Senate; 2) many of them wore AFL-CIO or other union 

The students also charge that state and city police officers, 
both under Democratic jurisdiction, saw several of the beat¬ 
ings and took little or no action. They say they called on 

The Liberal Establishment 


police to arrest their attackers, or at least to take their names, 
but to no avail. Police did intervene to break up some of the 
scuffles when called upon, but made no arrests. Officers inter¬ 
viewed afterward said they could not tell who had started 
the violence. 

Eric Johnson, a student of Purdue University extension in 
Indianapolis, said: “I was standing there holding a sign. I felt 
someone grab my arm and pull it down. I turned around and 
was hit in the jaw. I caught a rain of punches in the throat 
and face. About six to eight men were really letting me have 
it. They were all big, and were all wearing those Birch Bayh 

“They knocked my teeth loose and split open my chin. I 
was bleeding from the mouth pretty freely and spitting 
blood. I got loose and went over to an officer standing nearby. 
'You saw what happened,’ I said. 'What are you going to do 
about it?’ He just ignored me.’’ 1 

Doug Whitehead, a student at the medical center, gave this 
statement: “I was the first to put a sign up. Six guys came up 
and surrounded me. One of them said. Tut the sign down.’ 
When I refused, they started shoving. I still held on to the 
sign. My glasses fell, and when I bent over to get them they 
hit me and knocked me down. They pummeled me when I 
was on the ground. They ripped my sweater up the back and 
broke my watch.” 

A young man named Ken Jester said he received a wicked 
clout in the jaw. A medical student, Peter Horn, witnessed 
this attack and tried to step between Jester and his assailants. 
Horn told the story as follows: “The same group of men who 
had attacked Doug Whitehead moved in on us again . . . one 
of them grabbed Jester around the neck while another hit 
him in the face. I told them to let the kid go. They were 
killing him. They threw him aside and turned to me. 

“I ducked and they knocked me to the ground. One of 
them kicked me in the head. One of them went to work on 
my back just over the kidneys.” 

The Silencers ^281 


The goons apparently drew no lines as to what was permis¬ 
sible and what was not. When it came to silencing conserva¬ 
tive opposition to the President, anything went—including 
the roughing up of women. Miss Linda Liddy, a volunteer 
secretary for Indiana Young Americans for Freedom, said she 
was holding a sign when “three big men, all wearing Birch 
Bayh hats” came up to her. “One grabbed my arm. The other 
two tore the paper off the sign. When it was all over, I no¬ 
ticed that my arm was scratched and bruised.” 

Rudy Kachmann, a graduate of the I.U. medical school, 
asked a policeman to arrest the men attacking Whitehead. 
“The officer told me to keep quiet,” Kachmann says. “He said 
I was making too much noise.” Kachmann also witnessed 
the attack on Horn. “Two civil defense policemen were 
standing there,” he says. “I asked them to help and they iust 
backed off.” 

Virtually identical testimony comes from Geoffrey Ham¬ 
mond, then a student at Butler University in Indianapolis, 
and Richard Allen, who attended Indiana University, India¬ 
napolis Extension. Allen says that when three men tore a sign 
away from a young girl of about 18, he tried to stop them and 
reported the episode to a civil defense policeman “who was 
standing about 10 or 15 feet away watching the whole thing. 
I wanted to be on record as having turned this information 
in. He turned and walked away.” 

There is more to this story, but the preceding conveys the 
general idea. Needless to say, by the time President Kennedy 
got into his speech, opposition signs demanding action 
against Castro had disappeared from the crowd as if by magic. 
The President was free to hold forth on the virtues of his 
party without annoyance. Nine days later, Kennedy appeared 
on a national TV hookup to announce that he had ordered a 
blockade of Cuba. 

It is not to be inferred from the foregoing that the Estab¬ 
lishment routinely resorts to violence to silence its opposi¬ 
tion. There is no proof that the national labor-Democratic 

The Liberal Establishment 


axis knew of what its local cohorts were doing, and good rea¬ 
son to suspect that if it had known it might have disapproved. 
Such methods, after all, tend to be counterproductive—as 
suggested by the fact that the roughing-up of the YAF dem¬ 
onstrators attracted even more unfavorable publicity than 
would have a few photographs of anti-Kennedy pickets. 
There are better ways of squelching dissent, and the Estab¬ 
lishment knows what they are. 

In the opening section of this volume, we referred to a 
document called “the Reuther Memorandum.” The Reuther 
brothers, as noted, were highly concerned about what they 
called “the radical right,” and wanted some measures taken 
to silence it. Asked to specify ways and means, they submitted 
the memorandum, spelling out their views at length in a fairly 
complete blueprint for throttling conservative and anti- 
Communist sentiment of every description. In some respects 
the Reuther memo resembled that other famous document of 
1961, the Fulbright Memorandum. Much of it is devoted to 
the “danger” of anti-Communist military men, the inadvisa¬ 
bility of military sponsorship of anti-Communist speakers, a 
suggestion for a full-scale purge of the military by Secretary 
of Defense McNamara, a hint that a military coup might be 
in the offing, etc. Also, the Reuther memo contains the inter¬ 
esting thesis that anti-Communists are “unappeasable” but 
that Communists are not; that domestic anti-Communists are 
more dangerous than domestic Communists; and that the 
“radical right” <( must never be permitted to become so 
strong ” 2 as to endanger Liberal programs. (Italics added.) 

The Reuther Memorandum makes quite clear that it 
wants the “radical right” silenced by coercive governmental 
action. Among its suggestions: 

1. Hearings to determine whether “radical right” organi¬ 
zations should be put on the Attorney General's list of sub¬ 
versive groups. (The memo makes clear it thinks they should 

The Silencers 


2. A broad hint that if the FBI ‘‘has not yet infiltrated'' 
these organizations, it should. 

3. Harassment of these organizations by looking into their 
tax status, and ditto for companies which sustain with adver¬ 
tising such things as telecasts of Fred Schwarz anti-Commu- 
nist meetings. 

4. Use of the FCC to neutralize conservative and anti- 
Communist programs on radio and TV. In particular, the 
FCC “might consider examining the extent of the practice 
of giving free time to the radical right and could take mea¬ 
sures to encourage stations to assign comparable time for an 
opposing point of view on a free basis." 3 

5. A sustained effort to make officials who “exaggerate the 
domestic Communist menace" “fall into line" 4 with the 
Reuther view that there is no such menace. J. Edgar Hoover 
is singled out as one of those who, not to put too fine a 
point on it, is to be silenced. 

6. A parallel effort by “private agencies" to “expose the 
radical right." 5 

This “hard line" against conservatives and anti-Commu- 
nists was subsequently adopted by the administration. To 
date, there have been no public efforts to put “radical right" 
groups on the Attorney General's list, and it is not known 
whether the FBI has been ordered to infiltrate such organiza¬ 
tions. But the rest of the program is in full swing. The 
muzzling of the military is standard operating procedure; 
official insistence that the danger is not Communism but 
anti-Communism is by now routine; the Federal Commu¬ 
nications Commission is hard at work to choke off conserva¬ 
tive spokesmen; tax-exemptions are being looked into; and 
“private agencies" have moved into action to help in the 
“exposure." The last point is one of particular interest, in¬ 
volving as it does a further elaboration of the Reuther con¬ 
ception of silencing those who disagree with Reuther. 

Shortly after the Reuther Memorandum was submitted, 
the Establishment came up with a rather complete agenda for 

The Liberal Establishment 


muzzling conservatives by exposing them as minions of 
“hate." Wherever conservative spokesmen might pop up, 
whatever their standing or their scholarship, they were to be 
described as the familiars of anti-Semites, blackhearted tor¬ 
mentors of school teachers, and devotees of the anonymous 
phone call. 

Supplying ammunition for the “exposure" was an organi¬ 
zation called “Group Research, Inc.," headquartered in 
Washington. GRI had assembled a magpie-like collection of 
data about “right wingers," a category which it conceived as 
including everything from the anti-Semitic absurdities of 
Common Sense to the lofty cerebrations of Ludwig Von 
Mises. GRFs function was to send out fact sheets on these 
“right wing" individuals and organizations, to be filed and 
kept in instant readiness against outcroppings of conserva¬ 
tism. The contents traced obscure and frequently remote 
connections among the various right-wingers, linking the in¬ 
dividual concerned by a chain of associations to the most 
disreputable “extremists" available. 

GRI makes every effort to be factual, and seldom includes 
its own evaluations in its reports. The general bias is mainly 
evident in the over-all scheme, in the occasional use of in¬ 
flammatory language (“reactionary," “extremist," etc.) and 
the inclusion of such things as a statement by a group of 
ministers flaying Dr. Fred Schwarz and excoriating such dan¬ 
gerous characters as former Representative Walter Judd (R.- 
Minn.) and Senator Thomas Dodd. 

Principal consumers of GRFs output are the publications 
of the labor unions. The AFL-CIO’s Committee on Political 
Education seems to be particularly fond of them. In March 
1963, COPE sent out a memorandum to union leaders 
around the country, urging the use of GRI materials. The 
real object of the “right-wing," COPE said, is “determined 
anti-labor activity and an all-out drive against social welfare 
legislation." 6 Combating this menace in cooperation with 

The Silencers 


other Liberal groups, “unions can find a common ground 
which will help counteract right-wing activities and build 
support on labor questions. ,,7 GRI materials, COPE believes, 
provide a means of doing this. 

“When you hear that a right-wing speaker is coming to 
town/’ says the memo, “check him out immediately in the 
GRI Directory and alert friendly groups . . . Armed with the 
facts about extremist groups, labor union members can take 
some leadership in combatting them, either by heading them 
off before they really get started or by limiting the damage 
they do and helping to dry them up,” 8 (Italics added.) 

Following this noble statement, COPE offered a passage 
eloquent with “democratic” tolerance: 

“Preventive action is best, of course, but it is not easy. The 
idea is to alert democratic groups to the possibility of trouble 
and meet with their representatives. 

“Ordinarily it is best not to pass resolutions or take a vote. 
But there is sometimes an advantage in arranging a meeting 
at which community leaders actually sign a warning state¬ 
ment, for release to the press, in advance of a right-wing 
meeting, exposing its nature and intent.” 9 

What, we may well wonder, has happened to “freedom of 
expression”? How does Liberal concern for the “free market 
place of ideas” jibe with “heading off” and “drying up” con¬ 
servative speakers before they get a chance to say their piece? 
Equally intriguing is the warning against passing resolutions 
and taking a vote. Why do these stalwarts of democracy ob¬ 
ject to the democratic procedure of voting? Could it be they 
fear the spirit of dissent in their own ranks? 

GRLs material was also made use of by the more explicitly 
political branch of the Establishment. In short order, its re¬ 
searches began popping up in speeches by New Frontiersmen 
on Capitol Hill—a fact which jibes strangely with the stated 
purposes of the organization. GRI is incorporated as a non¬ 
profit, educational organization. Its statement of purpose says 

The Liberal Establishment 


“the objects of the corporation are exclusively educational 
and no other.” Yet the record shows GRI immediately be¬ 
came involved in a political campaign of guilt-by-association, 
far less “educational” than many of the conservative pro¬ 
grams it tars with the brush of “extremism.” 

For example, the first verifiable airing of GRFs researches 
was a speech delivered October, 1962, by Liberal Senator 
Gale McGee (D-Wyo.), in criticism of the Washington news¬ 
letter Human Events and the conservative Americans for 
Constitutional Action. McGee’s dissertation followed, point 
by point, the “research” previously turned out by GRI. In 
some places, the wording was virtually identical. 

In July 1962, GRI produced a “special report” on Ameri¬ 
cans for Constitutional Action. The report says: “ACA’s first 
organizer appears to have been John Underhill of Washing¬ 
ton, D. C. Soon after the opening of the Washington Office, 
Kenneth Ingwalson, who had been on the staff of the Ameri¬ 
can Farm Bureau Federation, became Executive Director of 
ACA. He served until early 1961 and then became assistant 
publisher of Human Events, which collaborates with ACA. 
He was replaced as executive director of ACA by Charles A. 
McManus, who had been with the ACA staff since 1959.” 10 

McGee’s version was almost a carbon copy, as follows: 
“The first paid organizer appears to have been a John Un¬ 
derhill of Washington, D. C. However, soon after the open¬ 
ing of the office here, Kenneth W. Ingwalson took over as 
executive director. Mr. Ingwalson, as has been noted earlier, 
had been on the staff of the American Farm Bureau Federa¬ 
tion, where he was director of their special education pro¬ 
gram. He served with ACA until last year, and as I have 
mentioned, is now at Human Events. Mr. Ingwalson has 
been replaced as ACA’s executive director by Charles A. 
McManus, Jr., who has been with the organization since 
1959 -” 11 

McGee’s fidelity to the GRI material produced one error 

The Silencers 


which gave the game away even more obviously. GRI listed, 
as a contributor to ACA, one “Harold Rousburg,” of India¬ 
napolis, Indiana. McGee also listed, as a contributor to ACA, 
one “Harold Rousburg/' of Indianapolis, Indiana. In point 
of fact, the gentleman's name is Ransbnrg. He is a prominent 
businessman in Indianapolis, and a quite open and active 
leader of conservative causes there. 

Another exponent of GRI material was Congressman 
Ronald Brooks Cameron (D-Calif.), who took to the floor of 
the House in May 1963 to renew the attack on ACA. 
Cameron described ACA as a “political leech” which was 
“doing the devil's work in American politics.” 12 Having thus 
established his own moderation, Cameron proceeded to par¬ 
rot the GRI material for the benefit of his House colleagues. 
Like McGee, he lapsed into the phraseology of GRI, on occa¬ 
sion neglecting to put the matter in his own words. 

Following Cameron, New Frontiersman John Brademas of 
Indiana joined the attack, reading into the record material 
on ACA finances which bore an amazing resemblance to the 
findings of GRI. In none of these instances, going back to 
Senator McGee, was credit given to the “exclusively educa¬ 
tional” services of Group Research, Inc. 

During the 1964 presidential campaign, GRI itself found 
time in its educational program to publish a 31-page dossier 
on the background of people supporting Barry Goldwater for 
President, making sure to include everyone who could be 
remotely connected with the John Birch Society and drag¬ 
ging into the discussion such people as Minuteman Robert 
DePugh, anti-Semite Gerald L.K. Smith, and the head of the 
Ku Klux Klan. Exactly what “educational” purpose this 
served was not made clear. Its political purpose, however, was 
obvious, particularly since it was brought out at the height of 
the presidential campaign (October 12, 1964). 

In September, 1964, two other onslaughts were launched 
against conservatives, also under allegedly nonpolitical aus- 

The Liberal Establishment 


pices. The first of these was the “National Council for 
Civic Responsibility,” headed by former Eisenhower official 
and premier “modern” Republican Arthur Larson. The 
group exhibited a high degree of interlock with GRI, setting 
about to establish the same kind of “web of subversion” on 
the part of conservatives, leading back eventually to the John 
Birch Society, that is a favorite of Group Research. GRI itself 
acknowledged as much in its report for September 30, 1964, 
giving Larson’s organization a handsome send-off and not 
failing to note, along the way, that Larson had “announced 
he would vote this year for Lyndon Johnson.” 13 (Ah, educa¬ 
tion.) GRI also revealed that “Larson said his organization 
will use the factual material prepared regularly by Group 
Research, Inc.” 14 

The second enterprise was a book called Danger on The 
Right, by Arnold Forster and Benjamin Epstein, which fol¬ 
lows the same pattern employed by GRI and set forward by 
Larson as the operating plan for his group: Establish the 
John Birch Society as the supreme menace in American life, 
then tie every conservative in sight to Birchism. Group Re¬ 
search also hailed the appearance of this volume, describing it 
as “a documented but hard-hitting description of who’s who 
and what’s what in the real right wing, including its financ¬ 
ing.” 15 The book was sponsored, interestingly enough, by 
the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, which is usually 
associated in the public mind with the job of combatting anti- 
Semitism. The two authors are officials of this organization. 
Since there isn’t much organized anti-Semitism in the United 
States, however, the authors say they decided to attack the 
non-anti-Semitic right wing instead. 

Because ADL is a “nonpolitical” organization, question 
arose as to the propriety of rushing into print a book of such 
marked political implications barely a month before election 
day. ADL chairman Dore Schary blithely dismissed this ques¬ 
tion by saying: “The coincidence that the candidate nomi- 

The Silencers 


nated [by the Republicans] has the unpleasant support of the 
radical right is a problem for the GOP, not us.” 16 Schary 
added that “withholding publication” might have given the 
impression that ADL was supporting Goldwater, and “rather 
than let this happen, we went ahead” 17 —a non sequitur 
matched only by ADL’s reasoning that since there was no 
anti-Semitism to combat, it would combat those who weren’t 

The ADL book was published October 9. The Group Re¬ 
search rundown on Goldwater, published only three days 
later, contains quotes from the ADL book, woven into a text 
intended to be detrimental to Goldwater. Thus a study 
prepared by a tax-exempt organization (ADL) was used by 
an “educational” organization (GRI) for the express purpose 
of discrediting a presidential candidate in the very thick of 
an election campaign. And, as flagrant as was this mutilation 
of assertedly non-political privileges, the best—in the doings 
of the National Council for Civic Responsibility—was yet to 
come. While Liberals were piously denouncing “the right” 
for alleged political use of tax-exempt funds, the National 
Council for Civic Responsibility was employing some $60,000 
received from the Democratic National Committee, funneled 
to it through a tax-exempt organization called the Public 
Affairs Institute. Reporter Jack Anderson detailed this fan¬ 
tastic maneuver as follows: “The National Council for Civic 
Responsibility was formed on too short notice to obtain a 
tax exemption. So the Democrats quietly arranged with the 
Public Affairs Institute, a tax-exempt foundation, to take it 
over. This permitted the council to solicit tax-deductible con¬ 
tributions. The biggest donation, however, was a fat $50,000 
check from the Democratic National Committee’s 'book 
fund.’ Later, the Democrats handed over another $10,000 in 
cash.” 18 And the burden of the ADL book is that right¬ 
wingers are illicitly using tax-exempt money for political 

The Liberal Establishment 


One of the chief side effects of using tax-exempt funds for 
the political purpose of attacking conservatives (for using tax- 
exempt funds for political purposes) is clearly to stop the flow 
of money to the right, as recommended in the Reuther 
memorandum. Columnist Ralph de Toledano observes: 
“The ADL book will be used by Liberal-left-labor groups to 
attack corporations and foundations which have, to a tiny 
extent, attempted to counterbalance the overwhelming Lib¬ 
eralism of America’s tax-exempt spending. Except for the 
trickle of funds going to the handful of conservative founda¬ 
tions, a conservative scholar would find it impossible to find 
anyone to subsidize his research in the social, political, and 
economic sciences.” 19 That precisely this result has been 
achieved may be confirmed by talking to fund-raisers for al¬ 
most any conservative group. 

In addition, the Establishment has moved to take away tax- 
exemption from various conservative groups, another of the 
chief objectives spelled out in the Reuther memorandum. 
GRI and its political spokesmen in Congress have made 
much over the tax-exempt money which has found its way 
into conservative hands. The ADL book recites at length the 
names and financial dossiers of groups which have committed 
the offense of funneling money to conservatives who in one 
way or another resemble or “parallel” the John Birch So¬ 
ciety. As noted, Rep. John Brademas (D-Ind.), in his House 
speech following Representative Cameron’s recitation of 
GRI prose, focused at loving length on the finances of Amer¬ 
icans for Constitutional Action. Six days later, Senator 
Maurine Neuberger (D-Ore.) delivered a speech driving the 
point home. Mrs. Neuberger listed the usual agenda of right- 
wing organizations, focusing on those which held tax-exempt 
status. “It is painfully clear,” she said, “that the tax service 
has simply not done the job Congress gave it. To rout out the 
propagandists from the bona fide educators.” 20 

This campaign bore its first fruit in November, 1964, when 

The Silencers 


the Internal Revenue Service informed one of GRI's favorite 
subjects, Billy James Hargis, that his “Christian Crusade” 
organization was in danger of losing its tax-exemption. Much 
of what Hargis writes and says is clearly political in its over¬ 
tones, but no more so than the work of the Liberal groups 
we have been discussing. How is it that Hargis is to have his 
tax-exempt status revoked but these groups are not? The 
powers of the Internal Revenue Service, obviously, are to be 
used for political objectives, to cut down conservative dissent 
and allow full rein to the Liberal orthodoxy, whose tax- 
exempt political spokesmen are “bona fide educators.” 

The Establishment next took on H. L. Hunt's radio pro¬ 
gram, “Life Lines,” one of the pet targets of GRI and 
COPE. The Internal Revenue Service decreed the program 
was not educational and, therefore, not entitled to a tax- 
exemption. Also attacked were Circuit Riders, Inc., and the 
American Enterprise Institute, a highly esteemed research 
organization in Washington, some of whose officials had 
taken leave of absence to work in the 1964 campaign for 
Senator Goldwater. Meanwhile, nothing at all was being 
done about the activities of Public Affairs Institute, replete 
with $60,000 on an illegal maneuver direct from Lyndon 
Johnson's own Democratic National Committee. No action 
by Hunt or AEI or anyone else on the conservative side re¬ 
motely approached the action of the Public Affairs-NCCR 
group; yet official crackdown was launched against the con¬ 
servatives, not the Liberals. 

The official alibi for this bold assault on conservative dis¬ 
sent is an IRS statement that “We've done a good job of 
weeding out the left-wing organizations, now we're going to 
clean up on the right-wing organizations.'' 21 The NCCR ex¬ 
ample suggests the “good job” of cleaning up is “good” for 
the left exclusively. Nor is this episode the only one that 
comes to mind. As William F. Buckley Jr. notes, “the Ameri¬ 
can Committee for the United Nations . . . pleads for the 

The Liberal Establishment 


admission of Red China on tax-exempt dough, even while 
the Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Red 
China is denied tax-deductibility.” 22 

Yet another aspect of the Reuther program which has re¬ 
ceived full backing from the Liberal administration is the 
throttling of conservatives on radio and television. For the 
past two years, GRI’s chief customer, the AFL-CIO’s Com¬ 
mittee on Political Education, has been flailing away at this 
subject, demanding that something be done about such right- 
wing figures on the airways as Dan Smoot, Dean Clarence 
Manion, and Hargis. Obedient to Reuther’s wishes, the Fed¬ 
eral Communications has set about, in the guise of “fairness,” 
to make things uncomfortable for these people and for sta¬ 
tions using their broadcasts. These same “fairness” strictures, 
however, do not apply to, exempli gratia, the AFL-CIO’s own 
paid broadcaster, Edward P. Morgan, who also appears on 
national television as a network commentator. 

Also faithfully executed were Reuther’s demands that anti- 
Communist spokesmen in the military be silenced. In this 
category, the Kennedy administration embarked on one of 
the most extensive programs of outright censorship in the 
annals of American government. Both the FCC crackdown 
and the muzzling of the military deserve fuller development 
on their own merits, and will be examined further. 

Add to this calculated program of extinguishing conserva¬ 
tive voices the immense potencies of the Liberal media—the 
books, the newspapers, the magazine articles, the TV shows, 
discussed previously—and it becomes apparent the Estab¬ 
lishment campaign to silence its opposition is formidable 

7 . Censorship and Muzzling 

If there is any absolute in the moral universe of the Estab¬ 
lishment, it surely must be the axiom that “censorship” is 
evil. Contemporary Liberalism abounds with First Amend- 
mentarians who have with Jefferson sworn on the altar of 
God eternal hostility to the slightest incursion on free expres¬ 
sion. This enthusiasm extends even unto the Communist 
Party. Everybody should have a right to his opinion and the 
unhindered statement thereof, say the civil liberties advo¬ 
cates, no matter how heretical or revolutionary. 

Liberal doctrine on this score does not hold true, however, 
for dissenters on the right. To censor Communist propa¬ 
ganda or salacious literature is verboten. But to censor the 
anti -Communist remarks of American military men, that is 
an entirely different matter. 

That Liberals do like censorship when they are wielding 
the blue pencils first came to light in the summer of 1961, 

The Liberal Establishment 


when Senator Strom Thurmond (D-S.C.) discovered State 
Department functionaries were systematically crossing out 
anti-Communist remarks from the speeches of military offi¬ 
cers, including some of the most respected members of the 
armed services. Among the phrases State and Defense De¬ 
partment censors blue-pencilled from speeches by such high- 
ranking officers as Lt. Gen. Arthur Trudeau, Adm. Arleigh 
Burke, and Gen. Curtis LeMay were the following: 

“The Communist strategy is one of subversion and armed 
revolution supported from outside the target nation.” 

“If the Communists attack.” (Changed to: “If an attack on 
our country or its allies occurs.”) 

“He (Khrushchev) has been known to take off a shoe and 
bang that on the table.” 

“I for one do not believe that the Soviets have relented in 
the slightest in their determination to dominate the world 
and to destroy our way of life.” 

“As we engage the Communists.” (Changed to “As we 
strive for real peace.”) 

... to meet the critical challenges of Communism.” 
(Changed to “the critical challenges of the day.”) 

“ . .. the poisonous fumes of world Communism.” 

“ . . . Communists.” (Changed to “Sino-Soviet bloc,” sev¬ 
eral times.) 

“The Communist challenge.” (Changed to “the chal¬ 
lenge.”) 1 

And so forth. Senator Thurmond placed 170 different ex¬ 
amples of this kind of censorship in the Congressional 
Record, reflecting the Establishment’s unwillingness to have 
the simplest facts about Communism recited by official 
sources. Gen. Trudeau, for example, had proposed to say that 
either we can face up to the cold war and “remain the 
champion,” or else go down in “ignominious defeat.” The 
State Department censor challenged this, commenting: “This 

Censorship and Muzzling 


section might well be tempered since it largely rules out any 
chance of an evolution of the Soviet system.” 2 

The pattern of deletions was consistent. The censors' 
efforts were aimed at: 

(1) Preventing identification of the Communists by 
name, if at all possible; references to the “Sino-Soviet bloc” 
were preferred; or, better still, indefinite mention of “other 
powers”; or “an adversary”; or, best of all, avoidance of hos¬ 
tile thoughts altogether. 

(2) Toning down references to “conflict” or “cold war” 
or “warfare.” 

(3) Eliminating references to Khrushchev personally and, 
in at least one instance, to Castro. 

(4) Silencing suggestions that the Communists do not 
operate in good faith. 

(5) Avoiding references to the ability of the United States 
to strike the Soviet Union militarily. 

(6) Most characteristically, eliminating references to the 
idea of “victory” over Communism or the Soviet Union. 

In this last category, Brig. Gen. John W. White proposed 
to say, in a speech in Columbus, Ohio: “Victory on each of 
the battlefields of the world is essential to the survival of 
freedom.” The State Department inverted this to read “de¬ 
feat of Communist aggression,” commenting: “The word vic¬ 
tory has a militaristic and aggressive ring less suited than the 
substituted phrase for describing our national objectives. It 
also implies an 'all-or-nothing' approach leaving no room for 
accommodation.’ ' 3 

The events leading to these disclosures began in the spring 
of 1961, when Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker was cashiered 
from his command of the Army's 24th Division in Germany 
for alleged involvement in “politics.” It soon became clear 
that the attack on Walker was simply a pretext for a much 
larger crackdown. Reporter Cabell Phillips of The New York 
Times disclosed that “high officials at the Pentagon have said 

The Liberal Establishment 


that they hope this example will have a restraining effect on 
other military men . . . ” 4 * 

In the midst of the Walker controversy, Senator Thur¬ 
mond unearthed a veritable manifesto of appeasement which 
had been put out under the signature of Senator J. William 
Fulbright (D-Ark.), which seemed to be controlling in the 
administration’s attitude toward anti-Communist pronounce¬ 
ments by the military. (“Shortly after the receipt of the 
Fulbright Memorandum” Phillips said, “and a subsequent 
conference between the Senator and Defense Secretary Mc¬ 
Namara, a directive was issued reinforcing the authority of 
the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs to provide ‘policy 
guidance [for] . . . the conduct of any information programs 
directed in whole or in part to the general public / ” 5 ) The 
Memorandum lashed out at military participation in anti- 
Communist seminars, and attempted to prove that the nation 
was somehow in danger of a military take-over. 

This note, curiously enough, had been sounded July 16, by 
Gus Hall, General Secretary of the American Communist 
Party, in an article urging all-out war on “the radical right.” 
Hall particularly berated the military for staging and partic¬ 
ipating in anti-Red seminars, saying such enterprises “cannot 

* On the merits of the case against Walker based on allegations by a 
sensationalist tabloid called Overseas Weekly, Maj. Gen. Thomas A. Lane 
(ret.) makes this comment: “On complaint of persons deserving no credence 
whatsoever (General Walker later received a judgment against the publish¬ 
ers of Overseas Weekly in a German court for defamation), an officer of 
thirty years of distinguished service who had received the continuing appro¬ 
bation of his military supervisors in this period, was removed from command 
before the charges had even been investigated . . . The action was apparently 
motivated only by political considerations. The object was to make an ex¬ 
ample of a trenchant anti-Communist whom the presidential advisors con¬ 
sidered ‘extremist/ They disregarded the fact that General Walker was 
carrying out the order of his superiors and acting pursuant to National 
Security Council directives which had never been rescinded." 

With respect to Walker’s so-called “Pro-Blue" program for his troops in 
Germany, allegedly “political" in nature, Senator John Tower (R-Tex.) 
placed in the Congressional Record for August 30, 1961, the text of this 
program. It is an effort to instill moral and patriotic values, and to teach 
some of the basic facts about Communism. 

Censorship and Muzzling 


help but create our own Trench Generals,* who feel at home 
in fascist circles, and are ready to lend themselves to their 
objectives.** 6 

The Fulbright statement, leaked to Phillips July 20, made 
the identical point: “Perhaps it is far-fetched to call forth the 
revolt of the French generals as an example of the ultimate 
danger; nevertheless, military officers, French or American, 
have some common characteristics arising from their profes¬ 
sion and there are numerous military ‘fingers on the trigger* 
throughout the world.** 7 

On August 2, Senator Thurmond succeeded in getting a 
copy of the Memorandum, and inserted it in the Congres¬ 
sional Record, forcing Fulbright himself to follow suit. The 
Establishment, which had hitherto behaved as if the issue did 
not exist, suddenly unleashed its counter-arguments. The 
Memorandum, it was asserted, was simply intended to keep 
the military “out of politics’* and to crack down on “extrem¬ 
ists” appearing at the seminars. As Senator Karl Mundt ob¬ 
served, however, Fulbright had had no objection when the 
military sought to enter “politics** by another door—when, 
e.g., Lt. Gen. James Gavin and others indicted the perform¬ 
ance of the Eisenhower Administration. At that time, Ful¬ 
bright commented: “Their Commander-in-Chief complains 
that ‘too many generals have all sorts of ideas.* Yet mankind 
moves on ideas. Men with ideas are the makers and shakers of 
the world. The larger their number serving the country, the 
more fruitful and vigorous the country.” 8 And Fulbright 
added: “I have read many of the statements made by some of 
our great generals . . . and they have persuaded me that they 
are correct.” 9 In short, it was all right for generals to speak 
out on issues so long as what they said agreed with the views 
of J. W. Fulbright.* 

* In the 1963 debate over the nuclear test ban treaty, Fulbright reversed 
his field yet once more. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had said the treaty had 
"military disadvantages,” but "political advantages.” Their views on the 

The Liberal Establishment 


Further, the argument that the dispute had nothing to do 
with Communism per se, but only with keeping the military 
“out of politics,” was thoroughly refuted by the systematic 
censorship of anti-Communist phrases. It is obviously not a 
matter of politics for a military man to say Communists are 
Communists. Yet, under State Department blue pencils, 
these were the phrases removed from speeches. What does the 
phrase, “Communist conspiracy directed toward absolute 
domination of the world,” 10 have to do with politics? Or 
“the Communist challenge”? or “the critical challenges of 

The muzzling effort, clearly, was directed at removing 
material offensive to the Communists in Moscow, but hardly 
offensive to any American, whatever his politics. Accordingly, 
the Kennedy officials fell back to a second line of defense. 
The phrases had been deleted, said Under Secretary of State 
George Ball, during periods of international stress, when “re¬ 
lations between the United States and the Communist bloc 
were in a particularly sensitive and critical state.” 11 The idea 
was that the Kennedy regime did not want military men say¬ 
ing things which would, in these delicate intervals, offend the 
Communists. This alibi was also exploded by Thurmond. 
The Senator's insertions in the Congressional Record showed 
censorship of material unfriendly to the Communists took 
place continuously—not during isolated episodes. 

Thurmond said: 

The censored actions which are now in the record demonstrate 
clearly that the ‘sensitive negotiations’ reason will not suffice to 
justify the deletions. Two specific examples have been given as 
instances of sensitive negotiations. The first concerned the release 
of the RB-47 Fliers. Those fliers were released on January 25, 
1961, and indeed, were back in Washington on January 27, 1961. 

political gain from the treaty, Fulbright said, should be ^convincing to any 
senator. Senator Thurmond was not long in recalling Fulbright's 1961 aver¬ 
sion to military ventures in “political” questions. 

Censorship and Muzzling 


The other sensitive negotiation which has been cited was the 
Vienna conference between the President and Khrushchev which 
commenced on June 4, 1961. 12 

Yet numerous deletions were made from speeches after the 
release of the fliers, and well before Kennedy departed for 
Vienna. Hostile references to Khrushchev were crossed out of 
military remarks on February 14, March 18, April 12, April 
20, April 21, and May 11. Moreover, similar deletions were 
made after Kennedy returned from Vienna, in July and 
August of 1961. Thurmond commented: “ ... it is apparent 
that the censors used the sensitive negotiations when possible 
to explain the deletion or change of statements on the subject 
of Communism and the cold war. They deleted the same type 
of materials, however, with a high degree of consistency when 
they had no pretense of the existence of any sensitive negotia¬ 
tions. ,,1S 

That the censorship was aimed, not at protecting “sensitive 
negotiations,” but simply at a general policy of conciliating 
the Communists—and cracking down on our own military 
men to do it—was made clear by the various comments of the 
State Department, as relayed to the Senate by Under Secre¬ 
tary Ball. For example, in deleting a reference to 
Khrushchev's shoe-pounding at the U.N., the Department 
commented: “It was the policy of the United States not to 
conduct personel attacks against high-ranking foreign offi¬ 
cials ” 14 Reference to Khrushchev's “we will bury you” state¬ 
ment was removed from one speech on this pretext: “The 
State Department reviewer suggested omitting this quotation 
since Khrushchev had explained that if he made this remark, 
what it referred to was the inevitability of the triumph of 
Communism, not the military destruction of the United 
States.” 15 Thus, on the strength of Khrushchev's “explana¬ 
tion”, which explains nothing, a United States military officer 
was muzzled. 

Other comments: “References to a policy of liberation of 

The Liberal Establishment 


the satellite nations of Eastern Europe were considered in¬ 
advisable.” 16 And: “Statements by a military officer could 
have been used to cast doubt on the sincerity and good faith 
of the President's expressed desire to try to seek an accom¬ 
modation with the Soviet Union.” 17 

The Fulbright Memorandum had played variations on the 
same theme, saying: “In the long run, it is quite possible that 
the principal problem of leadership will be, if it is not al¬ 
ready, to restrain the desire of the people to hit the Commu¬ 
nists with everything we've got, particularly if there are more 
Cubas and Laos (ric).” 18 And: “Fundamentally, it is be¬ 
lieved that the American people have little, if any, need to be 
alerted to the menace of the cold war.” 19 Rather, it says, the 
people must be educated to the “true nature” of the cold war 
—an education, presumably, aimed at keeping them from 
wanting to “hit the Communists with everything we've got.” 
Military leaders, of course, cannot understand this kind of 
thing, and for that reason have to be silenced. As Fulbright's 
Memo put it: “There is little in the education, training or 
experience of most military officers to equip them with the 
balance of judgment necessary to put their own ultimate 
solutions into proper perspective in the President's total 
strategy for the nuclear age.” 20 In other words, men trained 
to believe in victory are not “equipped” to understand ap¬ 

As Thurmond pressed on, the Establishment came up with 
yet another version of what it was doing. By keeping the 
military “out of politics,” the argument ran, the New Fron¬ 
tier was simply abiding by the precepts of the American Con¬ 
stitution, which vests control over military affairs in the 
hands of civilian officials. The real issue, the Establishment 
decided, was “civilian control” and whether we were, by 
gadfry, going to have constitutional government in this coun¬ 
try, or military usurpation—like in France! 

All very well. Let us always be careful, in dealing with the 

Censorship and Muzzling 


military as with other matters, to abide by the letter and 
spirit of the Constitution. But what in fact does the Constitu¬ 
tion say on this subject? It indeed specifies that control over 
the military shall be vested in civilians—and it even designates 
the civilians who are to be in charge, namely, those who sit 
in the United States Congress. The Congress is entrusted with 
various responsibilities concerning the military, including 
the responsibility “to make rules for the government and 
regulation of the land and naval forces,” and “to make all 
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
execution the foregoing powers.” 21 

Yet when these civilians thus entrusted with the superin¬ 
tendence of the military attempted to look into the matter of 
censorship and muzzling, the advocates of constitutional 
civilian control would have none of it. Called before the Sen¬ 
ate Armed Services Committee and asked to reveal who had 
been erasing anti-Communism from the rhetoric of America’s 
military leaders, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara re¬ 
fused, claiming “executive privilege.” He and President 
Kennedy had determined that the body of civilians who have 
constitutional mandate in these matters should be denied 
such information. 

All of which served effectively to underline the hypocrisy 
of the “civilian control” argument. The censorship had noth¬ 
ing to do with civil vs. military prerogatives: It had every¬ 
thing to do with hard vs. soft policies on the issue of Com¬ 
munism, and the desire of the Establishment to silence those 
who disagreed with its own particular views. Thus two acts of 
suppression were committed: Officers were muzzled, and in¬ 
formation was denied to Congress concerning responsibility 
for the muzzling. And, needless to add, Establishment civil 
libertarians uttered no audible word of protest. 

8 . Managing the News 

When the government of a once-free society begins to take 
on authoritarian airs, there is no better corrective than the 
truth. If the voters are fully and regularly informed of what 
is going on, they can take steps to put things right at the next 
election. For those who would consolidate total power, there¬ 
fore, it is essential to control the circuits of information. 
This brings us to that final stronghold of “civil liberties,” 
freedom of the press. 

The independent press is a boon of liberty which, the Es¬ 
tablishment says, should be inviolate. Yet the imperatives of 
the Liberal program, leading to the several malfeasances we 
have examined, draw Liberalism inexorably toward control 
of the press as well. Unfriendly articles in the newspapers, 
exposes on television, radio facilities available to the opposi¬ 
tion-all these could stir up resentment, and trouble. They 
therefore must be brought under Establishment jurisdiction. 

Managing the News 


In some part, this problem is taken care of by the fact that 
many segments of the media are already suffused with Lib¬ 
eralism, so that only perfunctory attention is paid to Liberal 
misdoings in government and a great deal of attention is paid 
to conservative misdoings outside of government. As in the 
case of the Kennedy assassination and the 1964 presidential 
campaign, the predispositions of the media tend to help the 
governmental Establishment along. The effort of Johnson 
aides Clifford and Fortas to kill the Jenkins story is indica¬ 
tive of Establishment temper in such matters; and the appar¬ 
ent willingness of certain editors to go along with the sup¬ 
pression is indicative of how successful the Establishment can 
sometimes be. Would the same editors attempt to suppress a 
story of such magnitude if it concerned Goldwater rather 
than Johnson? 

A similar willingness to suppress one side of the record was 
evident in the “equal time” controversy during the cam¬ 
paign, when Johnson appeared on television to “explain” 
leadership changes in the Soviet Union and the detonation of 
an atomic device inside Red China. When Goldwater applied 
for equal time, the Federal Communications Commission 
turned him down. The three television networks also de¬ 
clined Goldwater’s request, although they had made time 
available to Adlai Stevenson, who had also been turned 
down by the FCC in a parallel situation in 1956. Again, the 
desire of the Establishment to cut off opposition views was 
apparent, as was the willingness of some of the media, in this 
case all three national TV networks, to go along with that 

There are nevertheless many newsmen and electronic 
journalists more interested in reporting the facts than in 
ideological apple-polishing. When a big story comes along, 
such newsmen, whatever their politics, are eager to convey it 
to the public. The governmental Establishment, not content 
with the more than even break it consistently gets from the 

The Liberal Establishment 


media, finds this unacceptable. It therefore sets about to sup¬ 
press stories, disguise facts, and browbeat unfriendly news¬ 

During the i960 campaign, John Kennedy declaimed: . . 
I want to be a President who has the confidence of the people 
and who takes the people into his confidence; who lets them 
know what he is doing and where we are going, who is for his 
program and who is against.” 1 That statement suggested that 
the new President, when he took office, would follow an open- 
handed policy toward the reporters who supply the people 
with their information. 

It soon became apparent, however, that “freedom of infor¬ 
mation” in the Kennedy conception was subject to variable 
meanings. As beneficiary of an excellent press, the New Fron¬ 
tier glowed its approval; but let an unfriendly article appear 
and reporters were given a dressing-down comparable to that 
accorded Roger Blough. The new Liberal regime, it devel¬ 
oped, was not much interested in supplying information to 
the press impartially; it saw the press instead as an instru¬ 
ment with which to shape its “image,” ventilate its opinions, 
and advance its programs. 

To this end, the administration deployed the tandem in¬ 
centives of carrot-and-stick. Reporters considered “friendly” 
were petted and supplied with propitious “leaks.” Un¬ 
friendly or merely indifferent reporters were denied infor¬ 
mation and bawled out for their indiscretions. Additionally, 
the Kennedy regime concealed information from the press 
generally, and sought to shape stories—particularly those in 
specialized publications dealing with the armed services—to 
fit its policies. 

In 1963, the Freedom of Information Committee of the 
American Society of newspaper editors severely criticized the 
New Frontier's news policy. Among the items singled out 
were “information from official sources that distorted the 
true picture of the Cuban crisis,” and “a clamp-down in the 

Managing the News 


Pentagon and the State Department on access to news 
sources.” 2 The committee also took note of a dispute “as to 
whether a government press spokesman has an inherent right 
to deceive the people if he feels that it would be in the inter¬ 
est of national security”; and scored “ 'executive privilege’ as 
exercised by the Kennedy administration to withhold infor¬ 
mation from Congress and the people.” 3 

The report added that “administration press spokesmen 
have been forceful in their denials that the public has been 
denied legitimate information because of 'news manage¬ 
ment.’ They have been less successful in refuting hard evi¬ 
dence that some of their information was purposely distorted 
for purposes of propaganda deception.” 4 And: “The Ken¬ 
nedy administration, as with past administrations, continued 
to exercise a policy of executive privilege to suppress infor¬ 
mation.” 5 Examples cited in this connection were the hearings 
on military muzzling, and the appearance of State Depart¬ 
ment Policy Planning chief W. W. Rostow in connection 
with his thesis that Moscow is “mellowing.” 

ASNE official Lee Hills of the Knight newspapers and 
Freedom of Information chairman John Colburn submitted 
this statement to the Government Information Subcommit¬ 
tee of the House of Representatives: “Today the press and 
the people throughout the country are most concerned by the 
statements of the Defense Department spokesman that in 
times of crisis . . . news will be used as a weapon of propa¬ 
ganda warfare; that it’s also an inherent right of the govern¬ 
ment to lie if necessary under threat of nuclear attack. This is 
a philosophy of totalitarianism, utterly foreign to our Ameri¬ 
can precepts. Congress, through this committee, must deter¬ 
mine whether this is to be a continuing policy.” 6 

The “utterly foreign” philosophy referred to had been 
formulated by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public 
Affairs Arthur Sylvester. The New York Times, under the 
headline “U.S. Aide Defends Lying to Nation,” reported 

The Liberal Establishment 


Sylvester had told the New York Chapter of Sigma Delta Chi, 
in the Times 9 paraphrase, that “when a nation's security is 
threatened, as that of the United States was during the recent 
Cuban crisis, that nation’s leaders are justified in telling lies 
to its people.” 7 The direct Sylvester quote, as recorded by the 
Associated Press, was: “It is basic throughout history, that it 
is the government’s right, and therefore the people’s right, 
inherent if necessary, to lie to save itself. This seems to me 
basic.” 8 

As the ASNE commentary suggests, criticism of Kennedy 
news policies was widely expressed in journalistic circles. In a 
poll of Washington correspondents conducted by Newsweek 
magazine, 29 respondents said the New Frontier “worked 
harder” at news management than did the Eisenhower re¬ 
gime, compared to 3 who held the reverse opinion. And on 
the basis of “fairness and competence,” 28 respondents said 
Ike’s press chief James Hagerty rated over Pierre Salinger, 
compared to 7 who thought Salinger the better of the two. 9 
Two New York Times correspondents were particularly crit¬ 
ical of the Kennedy press technique. Arthur Krock of that 
newspaper wrote: 

“1. A news management policy not only exists, but, in the 
form of direct and deliberate action, has been enforced more 
cynically and boldly than by any previous administration in a 
period when the United States was not in a war or without 
visible means of regression from the verge of war. 

“2. In the form of indirect but equally deliberate action, 
the policy has been much more effective than direct action in 
coloring the several facets of public information, because it 
has been employed with subtlety and imagination for which 
there is no historic parallel known to me.” 10 

The Times 9 military analyst, Hanson Baldwin, issued a 
similar complaint, charging “FBI agents have been employed 
in at least half a dozen separate instances in the past two years 
in investigations of the sources of news stories.” 11 

Managing the News 


The magazine Aviation Week commented, concerning 
news in its own particular field: “Review of information for 
security has become almost a one-man affair in the Pentagon. 
Even relatively minor questions must now go to the office of 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public affairs Arthur Syl¬ 
vester for a ruling. Speeches are confined largely to non-con- 
troversial material, with little or no reference to the Com¬ 
munist threat permitted.” 12 

Reporter Fletcher Knebel, writing in Look magazine, said 
“the Washington press corps has taken almost as many lumps 
in 19 months of Kennedy rule as during the three previous 
administrations put together.” 13 The three previous admin¬ 
istrations—Eisenhower, Truman, and Roosevelt—dated back 
30 years, to 1933. Knebel supported his assertion with the 
following examples: 

Kennedy personally has called down at least six Washington 
correspondents either for their writings or for their publications. 

Three Kennedy Administration officials have threatened to sue 

Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy has reproved at least 
four newspapermen for stories he disliked. 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation questioned six news¬ 
papermen in connection with stories concerning policies of the 
Kennedy administration. 

Pentagon security officials quizzed three correspondents. 

The White House cancelled 22 subscriptions to the New York 
Herald Tribune . 

White House Special Counsel Theodore C. Sorenson has 
reprimanded some newspapermen. 

Administration officials, reporters charge, put 'the freeze' on 
some reporters who had offended them. 

White House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger has rebuked about 
a dozen reporters for their stories. 

White House aide Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., a Pulitzer Prize his¬ 
torian, called one columnist 'an idiot.' 

The Liberal Establishment 


Even the Kennedy women have gotten into the act. Ethel 
Kennedy, wife of the Attorney General, and Mrs. Jean Smith, 
sister of the President, braced one correspondent for his story 
about dunkings in the Bob Kennedy pool. 14 

Robert Spivack, a Liberal writer for the New York Herald 
Tribune, commented on the celebrated move to cancel that 
newspaper, along with certain other aspects of Kennedy press 
treatment. "The summary firing of competent Jack Romagna 
as chief White House stenographer/' Spivack said, "after 21 
years of faithful service to Presidents Roosevelt, Truman and 
Eisenhower seemed a brutal action. [Romagna was fired after 
noting on a presidential statement that it had been dictated 
from the White House swimming pool.] 

"The President’s decision to cancel not only his own sub¬ 
scription to the New York Herald Tribune, but 21 other 
subscriptions, could only leave the impression that he is now 
deciding the reading habits of his associates. 

"There is a joke making the rounds in Washington these 
days. ‘President Kennedy,’ it goes, ‘firmly believes in the 
right to dissent. In fact, he will tell you what you can dissent 
about.’. . .” 15 

Spivack also commented on the administration’s tech¬ 
niques of persuasion: "Unfortunately, when a President 
honors some reporters with his presence, or with a story, they 
fall all over themselves. They even assume their assignment is 
henceforth to defend the man’s every action and to protect 
him from hostile questions. This leads, as it has in the Ken¬ 
nedy administration, to an unhealthy relationship. Thus 
many newspapermen did not protest the midnight calls from 
G-men to reporters who were covering a phase of the big 
steel story. The President compounded that blunder by try¬ 
ing to laugh it off .. . 

"Although there were heated discussions by newsmen in 
the outer hall [at Kennedy’s latest news conference] about 

Managing the News 


the Romagna and Herald Tribune episodes, when they came 
into the conference auditorium not one of the regulars asked 
a question about either. Whether it was the presence of the 
cameras, or the experience of previous complaints from the 
White House, or the grim look on Mr. Kennedy’s face, they 
blew the big stories.” 16 

Thus “the stick”—intended to make Washington reporters 
think twice before writing dispatches which displeased the 
President or those around him. 

There was also the carrot, which consisted, among other 
things, of endless wooing of the press, pats on the back for 
“objective” stories, exclusives to the favorites. These tactics 
were designed to get a congenial play for the stories the New 
Frontier wanted used. An example was the “briefing” held 
by Presidential aides Sorenson and Lawrence O'Brien in Sep¬ 
tember, 1961. Unfavorable reporters were not invited, since 
the object was to float a background story telling how success¬ 
ful Kennedy had been in getting legislation through his first 
session of Congress. Sorenson and O’Brien produced a mem¬ 
orandum stating the President’s achievements, which asserted 
that Kennedy had been three times as effective as had Roose¬ 
velt during his first 100 days—a result arrived at by hailing 
the passage of the most routine and unnoticed bills as “victo¬ 

Similar tactics have been charged to President Johnson. 
Many newsmen complain that the Johnson technique of hold¬ 
ing impromptu press conferences, or peripatetic ones on the 
White House lawn, severely limits access to the news. This 
procedure, they say, enables Johnson to cut off questions he 
doesn’t like, to deal only with those reporters he favors, and 
to shape press coverage along lines congenial to his wishes. 
U.S. News notes the charge that White House news tends 
“to be fed out to a few privileged individuals” and that “the 
President uses his influence to curtail the flow of news . . . 
except on terms set by the White House.” One correspon- 

The Liberal Establishment 


dent is quoted as saying: “The censorship in Washington is 
serious. There is more under Johnson than under any other 
Democratic President to my knowledge. He has clamped 
down on everybody in government. ,,17 

Yet another aspect of the New Frontier press technique 
was revealed when certain memoranda passed around among 
the official family were made public. An assistant to Secretary 
of the Interior Stewart Udall, for example, issued a memo 
saying: “It was mandatory that the White House be given 48 
hours notice before contracts were announced/' Concerning 
one $39 million project, for example, “considerable mileage 
could have been made by giving the White House a chance 
before the week-end of notifying interested members of Con¬ 
gress." 18 

Kennedy aide O'Brien voiced the same sentiment, com¬ 
ing at the matter from the other direction, in a “Memoran¬ 
dum to all Cabinet Officials and Agency Heads": “Despite 
frequent requests, the procedure for notifying members of 
Congress of projects and favorable action of the administra¬ 
tion has not been functioning smoothly. It is not in the best 
interest of legislative harmony to have Republican Senators 
announce projects directly affecting districts with sitting 
Democratic Congressmen." 19 

The richest of all such ukases, however, was fired off by one 
Herbert W. Klotz, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Com¬ 
merce. Quoth Klotz: 

“At a White House meeting of Cabinet assistants, we have 
been advised again that speeches of Cabinet and sub-cabinet 
officers do not contain sufficient reference to the President 
and his personal interest in, and compassion with, the prob¬ 
lems which face the nation. Liberal quotations from his 
speeches, past or present, should be used ... It is also to be 
kept in mind that, in making announcements of local proj¬ 
ects, the President should be given credit line * in the lead 
paragraph." 20 

When confronted by the “news management" charge, the 

Managing the News 


Establishment responds that its actions were dictated by con¬ 
cern for the national security. Acts of censorship and of out¬ 
right falsification occurred, however, in many areas having 
nothing to do with security matters. A few examples: 

1. When a government investigator named Jerry Jackis was 
assigned to look into the administration of the foreign aid 
program in Cambodia, he came up with a highly unfavorable 
report. He subsequently was fired, and when he sought access 
to his own personnel records to prove he had been unfairly 
dismissed, that privilege was denied him. 

2. Immediately prior to the 1962 elections. Secretary of 
Labor Willard Wirtz announced that “over 4,500,000 more 
Americans have jobs than when this administration took 
office in January 1961”—a statement obviously beneficial to 
the New Frontier in the impending contest at the polls. After 
the election, however, it was revealed that Wirtz’s assertion 
did not take into account the normal increase of jobs be¬ 
tween January and October, thus exaggerating the number 
of “jobs created” by about three million. 21 

3. The Democratic administration has refused to disclose 
the details of what happened in the disastrous 1961 invasion 
at Cuba’s Bay of Pigs. An official report on this subject has yet 
to be released. The truth about the death of American pilots 
involved in the action has come forth piecemeal, from sources 
other than the administration. The New Frontiersmen tried 
to gloss over the fact that air support was planned for the 
invasion and then pulled back by presidential order. 

4. In the TFX controversy, as US. News and World Re¬ 
port put it, “favorable information was ‘pushed/ unfavorable 
facts were hidden. At one point, some of the Pentagon’s lofti¬ 
est officials were asked to agree to take lie-detector tests to 
find out who had given a reporter a nonsecret document that 
officials wanted to suppress.” 22 

5. In the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, a whole series of 
actions were taken to misrepresent the situation to the Amer¬ 
ican people. Chief among these was the repeated statement 

The Liberal Establishment 


that no missile build-up was taking place in Cuba, a line that 
continued even after the date when—by the New Frontier's 
own admission—there was a photographic proof of what was 
going on, not to mention the mountain of intelligence data 
that had been piled up in the preceding weeks and months. 
After the “crisis” was officially presumed over, the adminis¬ 
tration floated a story that it had not come up with its 
photographic information sooner because Hurricane Ella 
had prevented aerial surveillance of Cuba between October 
3 and October 14. Yet in fact this particular storm did not 
assume hurricane proportions until October 15.* 

The performance of the Kennedy administration in the 
realm of “news management,” by common testimony, sur¬ 
passed anything seen in Washington before. With the advent 
of President Johnson, however, it was apparent the new pres¬ 
ident would not lose the title by default. High-pressure 
efforts to control the shape of the news in all its aspects were 
still very much the order of the day. One of Johnson's first 
acts in office, for example, was to get under control the devel¬ 
oping controversy about the Kennedy assassination. When it 
became apparent the evidence implicated Lee Harvey Os- 

* Writing in The New York Herald Tribune, David Wise summed up the 
administration’s total effort at news management in the missile crisis: 

1. Misinformation was deliberately given out by the White House and 
Pentagon during the week of October 14 to protect the government's crisis 
planning. Instead, in many cases, information might simply have been with¬ 
held for a few days. 

2. A broad, 12-point list of forbidden subjects was promulgated by the 
Pentagon to guide its officials, and the White House simultaneously asked 
publishers to exercise restraint along the same lines . . . 

3. The Big Brother rule (a requirement that no official could give an 
interview unless a third person were present) was imposed at the Pentagon, 
and a modified Big Brother rule was issued at the State Department. Al¬ 
though differing in detail, they were designed to reveal reporters’ news 
sources. The fear among the press corps is that this will inhibit officials 
from talking to them. 

4. Petty curbs were instituted by Presidential press secretary Pierre Sal¬ 
inger, restricting photographers and newsmen from waiting at the west 
entrance to the White House and to photograph and interview officials as 
they enter and leave the nation’s important public building. 

5. The Pentagon’s press chief expounded the theory that news stemming 
from government actions was part of the ‘weaponry’ of the cold war. 

Managing the News 


wald, and that Oswald was associated with the far-left Fair 
Play for Cuba Committee, the Senate Internal Security sub¬ 
committee evinced some interest in the matter. This com¬ 
mittee, as we have noted, has conducted extensive hearings 
on the Fair Play group, uncovering the fact that Fair Play 
had been financed by the Castro government. It is, moreover, 
staffed by some of the most knowledgeable anti-Communists 
in the nation. 

Johnson moved quickly to avert such an investigation by 
setting up a special commission under Chief Justice Earl 
Warren, himself an ultra-Liberal who had been in the front 
rank of those attempting to pin the Kennedy murder on 
“hate” groups, by which he meant conservatives. It was 
openly acknowledged that among the main purposes of estab¬ 
lishing the Warren inquiry was to pre-empt the Internal Se¬ 
curity subcommittee. The New York Times reported that 
“one purpose of the presidential inquiry is to head off com¬ 
peting investigations by House and Senate Committees and 
give the public a single report that would command the na¬ 
tion's full confidence.” 23 (Italics added.) 

Two other examples manifested themselves in the early 
weeks of 1964—both freighted with political dynamite. One 
concerned the Bobby Baker case, discussed in the preceding 
section; the other concerned Senator Barry Goldwater’s 
charge that America's ICBMs were not sufficiently depend¬ 
able for the nation to stake its survival on them alone. 

In the first case, reporter Jay G. Hayden of the North 
American Newspaper Alliance wrote: “New allegations de¬ 
rogatory to Baker have been cropping up ever since October, 
1963, but delayed release until last week of the official tran¬ 
script of testimony by Don B. Reynolds, a Washington in¬ 
surance broker. All Senate proceedings in the matter have 
been kept strictly out of sight. Three Republicans on the 
Senate Committee on Rules, Carl Curtis of Nebraska, John 
Cooper of Kentucky and Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, again 
and again have moved for normal official publicity, but six 

The Liberal Establishment 


Democrats just as adamantly said ‘no/ . . . After portions of 
the Reynolds testimony had leaked out, however, the Dem¬ 
ocratic wall of secrecy cracked. The full Reynolds transcript 
was released and it was announced that the committee would 
now reveal in open session all that it has been able to uncover 
concerning Baker’s operations.” 24 Subsequent to this, as we 
have seen, strenuous efforts were made to discredit Reynolds. 

In the second case, columnists Robert S. Allen and Paul 
Scott reported Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was 
holding the lid on evidence that would vindicate Senator 
Goldwater’s stand. Testimony by Gens. Curtis LeMay and 
Thomas Power backed up Goldwater’s criticism. But, said 
the reporters: “While testifying several months ago, their 
comments are still under lock and key. Sen. John Stennis (D- 
Miss.) chairman of the Preparedness subcommittee, has sev¬ 
eral times sought Pentagon approval to publish Power’s tes¬ 
timony. Defense Secretary McNamara has refused.” 25 

One other aspect of news management persisting from 
the New Frontier to the Johnson administration is that allo¬ 
cated to the Federal Communications Commission. In July of 
1963, the FCC issued an order instructing radio and TV 
broadcasters that, in effect, conservative presentations were 
not to be allowed on the airways without rebuttals being 
solicited in advance from Liberals. No similar provisions 
were suggested for rebuttals to the Liberalism that is stand¬ 
ard fare on the national networks. The net effect of this order 
has been to harass the few conservative commentators who 
have access to microphone or camera. 

The FCC informed its licensees that “when a controversial 
program involves a personal attack upon an individual or 
organization, the licensee must transmit the text of the 
broadcast to the person or group attacked, wherever located, 
either prior to or at the time of the broadcast, with a specific 
offer of his station’s facilities for an adequate response.” 26 

The FCC evinced a rather specialized view*as to what was 

Managing the News 


“controversial” and what was not. In deciding whether ma¬ 
terial was “fair,” the commission said, it would examine sub¬ 
stance rather than “label or form”: “It is immaterial whether 
a particular program or viewpoint is presented under the 
label of ‘Americanism,’ ‘anti-Communism,’ or ‘states rights/ 
or whether it is a paid announcement, official speech, edito¬ 
rial or religious broadcast.” 27 This pronouncement just 
happened to coincide with organized labor’s drive to muffle 
conservative voices on the airways. As the Reuther memoran¬ 
dum had put it, the FCC could, and did, “take measures to 
encourage stations to assign comparable time for an opposing 
point of view on a free basis.” 28 

Results were not long in coming. Dean Clarence Manion, 
whose program of interviews and commentary appears on 
some 300 stations, discloses that numerous license-holders 
have felt it necessary to cancel his show because of the FCC 
order. “One such station,” Manion said, “declined to air our 
October 27 broadcast, but felt perfectly safe in substituting a 
recording by Dr. Walt W. Rostow, the chief planning officer 
of the American State Department,” 29 author of the notion 
that we can get along with the Communists because they 
are mellowing. 

When Manion aired a criticism of the 1963 nuclear-test 
ban treaty, advocates of the agreement demanded free time 
for rebuttal on all stations carrying his show. Given the fact 
that the same Liberal politicians responsible for pushing the 
treaty were also responsible for the issuance of broadcast li¬ 
censes, a number of stations understandably complied with 
this expensive request. The obvious alternative to such ha¬ 
rassment is to drop the Manion program altogether. 

Washington correspondent Ralph de Toledano reports 
other instances of the doctrine being employed to silence 
conservatives. “In one of Ohio’s small towns,” he notes, “an 
independent station dropped one of its commentators be¬ 
cause, it was alleged, the FCC did not approve of his Ameri- 

The Liberal Establishment 


canism message. The station also told him that according to 
FCC regulations, every time he made any statement which 
might antagonize an individual or a group, copies of it had to 
be sent to all concerned and free time granted to them for 
rebuttal. In Kentucky, the GOP candidate lost by 13,150 
votes in the 1963 gubernatorial election. The influential 
trade publication. Broadcasting , noted how the FCC directly 
affected the outcome of that contest and loaded it in favor of 
the Democratic hopeful. The FCC, in the guise of 'fairness/ 
ordered that every radio station had to notify the Democrats 
if it ran a paid political announcement. The Democrats were 
then empowered to demand and get equal time free. The 
result: Radio stations refused to accept GOP spot announce¬ 
ments on the ground that it was giving away two spots for 
one.” 30 

Broadcasting magazine asked of this episode: "If the GOP 
had achieved planned radio exposure, could it have overcome 
the 13,000 vote advantage of Democrat Breathitt?” 31 There 
is no way of knowing that, of course, but it is obvious enough 
that in so exceedingly close an election, failure to achieve 
such necessary exposure as this could all too easily be the 
margin of difference. Broadcasting concluded: "The FCC, 
under its present leadership, is acting more like an arm of the 
. . . administration than like the arm of Congress that it and 
other independent agencies were originally created to be.” 32 * 

This program was of course initiated under the Kennedy 
administration; but the FCC under Johnson continues to 

* The readiness of many Liberals to employ the FCC’s potencies to their 
own advantage was further illustrated early in 1965, when Rev. Carl Mclntire, 
a favorite target of the COPE-GRI axis, moved to buy a small-town radio 
station in Pennsylvania. Organized Liberalism was up in arms. Time re¬ 
ported (February 12, 1965): “More than 40 organizations—including the 
Greater Philadelphia Council of Churches, the NAACP, the Philadelphia 
chapter of the Jewish Anti-Defamation League, and the Roman Catholic 
weekly Commonweal —asked the FCC to ban the sale . . .” Among dissenting 
voices were Time itself, which described the Liberals’ protest as “a classic 
failure to be tolerant toward people or ideas they oppose,” the Minneapolis 
Star, and Christian Century. All honor to these. 

Managing the News 


elaborate upon and defend it. A letter signed by Ben F. 
Waple, Secretary of the FCC, offers this defense of the "fair¬ 
ness” policy: "From time to time, licensees of the Commission 
and others have urged, in effect, that programs treating with 
‘anti-Communism,’ ‘pro-Americanism’ or religion should not 
be governed by any obligation of fairness since the opponents 
of the views expressed on such programs must by definition 
be ‘pro-Communist’, ‘anti-American’ or atheistic. We know 
of no significant controversy in this country concerning the 
merits of the Communist form of government, the American 
form of government, or religion. However, the programs in 
question often do express vigorous viewpoints on the United 
Nations Organization, the wisdom of foreign aid, how best 
to combat Communism and a host of other genuinely contro¬ 
versial issues.” 33 

All very well—but this explanation does not tell us why 
"states’ rights” was so helpfully included in the original di¬ 
rective instructing licensees to look beyond label and form. 
Has anyone been contending that "states’ rights” is not a 
controversial subject, exempt from the "fairness” doctrine? It 
seems doubtful. Which means the FCC’s inclusion of this 
example in its original order was not an effort to set people 
straight who thought their views were non-controversial, but 
an effort instead to pinpoint for broadcasters the kind of con¬ 
troversial things, namely conservative things, which should 
be pounced upon and subjected to harassment. 

The bias of the FCC position becomes apparent when we 
note that it faults "anti-Communist” and "Americanism” 
programs for attacking the United Nations and foreign aid— 
"genuinely controversial issues.” But why not select for equal 
disapprobation those programs which take the Liberal posi¬ 
tion on such issues? Are these subject to free rebuttal also? 
He who thinks the answer is yes has not fathomed the nature 
of the Liberal Establishment. 


Our major theme has been the decline of freedom. We have 
attempted to set forward, as briefly as possible, the precondi¬ 
tions of liberty and the proper functions of government in 
seeking to preserve it. And we have noticed, in a journalistic 
way, the odd contortions by which Liberalism has managed 
to get its order of priorities in this respect reversed. 

The first and obvious function of government, in its do¬ 
mestic aspect, is to suppress acts of crime and violence, to 
insure that its citizens are able to go about their daily affairs 
without being knocked in the head or traduced to foreign 
enemies. Under the Liberal stewardship, this function of 
government has been increasingly defaulted. As suggested in 
chapters 2 and 3, Part II, the Establishment is either un¬ 
able or unwilling to address itself resolutely to the problems 
of crime and internal security, preferring to consign such 
matters to the category of ‘'civil liberties”—meaning these are 



areas in which the ordinary citizen is no longer entitled to 
the protective services of government. 

In other categories which are not part of the chief and most 
elementary functions of government, or else doubtfully in¬ 
cluded in that rank, Liberalism is eager to accumulate power 
and to extend its sway, without limitation or constitutional 
restraint. It will not suppress a Lee Harvey Oswald or an 
Andrew Mallory, but will enthusiastically control American 
farmers and businessmen, lock up a Mary K. Jones or perse¬ 
cute an Otto Otepka. In areas where the exercise of power is 
needful to the existence of society, the Liberal blushes and 
rejects the crown; but in areas where power is illicit or of 
doubtful paternity, he seeks it out and wields it with zest. He 
would have government do almost nothing it is supposed to 
do, and every thing it is not. 

Nor is the paradox alleviated by quibbles about “preferred 
rights,” the special sanctity of the First Amendment, or the 
negligible importance of property. For we have seen that 
Liberalism manages to violate, not only the long-received 
standards of liberty familiar to the West, but its own specially- 
contrived standards as well. Whether freedom means un¬ 
fettered use of all faculties and energies, or merely of partic¬ 
ular faculties designated by the left, modern Liberalism in its 
pursuit of power has managed to violate it. Property rights, 
free speech, due process, rights of conscience, the free press- 
all have fallen impartially before the advance of Liberal 
power. There is no conjugation of liberty—always excepting 
the liberty of criminals to roam the streets and of security 
risks to consume the taxpayer’s substance—which has not 

The reasons for these strange contradictions cannot be can¬ 
vassed in a book like this one, which seeks to set down an 
unexamined side of the record rather than to speculate upon 
the motives behind it; indeed, the contrast between the two 
sides of the Liberal performance, and the contradictions 

The Liberal Establishment 


within the major subdivisions of it, are more suited to psy¬ 
chological analysis than to political speculation. Why Lib¬ 
erals behave as they do is the topic for another and larger 
volume; our object has been merely to establish that, con¬ 
trary to their own verbal testament. Liberals do behave in a 
fashion detrimental to liberty. 

While the twistings and turnings of Liberalism in its 
Procrustean bed of “civil liberties” are cause for puzzlement, 
its ultimate hostility to freedom is not. Given the basic com¬ 
mitment to power, it is not only possible but necessary that 
Liberalism, after all is said and done, should be harmful to 
liberty. If men have learned anything over two millennia of 
political enterprise, it is that freedom depends upon effective 
restraints on the exercise of power. The chief business of 
America’s founders was to build such restraints into our con¬ 
stitutional system; the chief business of Liberalism has been 
to remove them. The Founders believed government was the 
servant of the people, and to that end created a system in 
which power, through various stratagems, was limited . Lib¬ 
eralism means to give us, and in large part has already done 
so, a system in which government is not servant but master, 
and power is in effect unlimited . As we have noticed in the 
“pragmatic” performance of the Kennedy-Johnson politi¬ 
cians, and the “planned economy” notions of the ADA, Pro¬ 
fessor Schlesinger, et al v Liberalism seeks to transport us to a 
realm where government has unhindered power to direct 
every aspect of our lives; these gentlemen want to create an 
American brand of collectivism in which power, far from 
being diffused and restrained, is compact and convenient for 
their own political uses. 

That objective is incompatible with freedom. If govern¬ 
ment in fact should possess such power, then liberty of any 
sort can survive only at the sufferance and pleasure of the 
authorities. To avert that plain conclusion, to obscure its 
relevance, Liberalism has devised all the various exceptions 



and special definitions about higher and lower liberties and 
the rest of it that we have had occasion to notice. But even 
the special freedoms admired of Liberalism must eventually 
fall victim to its potencies. If consolidated power is released 
from the check of alternative centers of decision, there is no 
logical reason that free speech should be more exempt from 
its decrees than the right to dispose of one’s property. And so, 
in fact, it has turned out. 

Nor should it be supposed that the inversion of our consti¬ 
tutional system has been accidental. The unhappy truth of 
the matter is that, even as the Founders wanted limited gov¬ 
ernment to preserve freedom, so Liberals want unlimited gov¬ 
ernment to destroy freedom. Not, of course, with malicious 
intent; but because freedom, which implies diversity and the 
play of individual judgment, is hostile to the uniformities 
desired of pragmatists and planners. President Kennedy be¬ 
lieved he had worked out a satisfactory arrangement concern¬ 
ing steel prices and wages in 1962, and was infuriated when 
the steel industry, in that election year, failed to agree. Sud¬ 
denly, the massive potencies of the Federal establishment, 
unhindered by constitutional restraint, were thrown into the 
balance, and along with the resulting incursion on the rights 
of stockholders and management to run a private business 
FBI agents were found routing newspapermen out of bed at 
3 a.m. to demand what they knew of the matter. The farm 
program begins with controls imposed on farmers concerning 
the use of their land, proceeds through the various declen¬ 
sions of power to the creation of a Billie Sol Estes to the 
outright denial of due process to a Mary K. Jones. Where 
property rights have fallen, the demise of other rights has not 
been far behind. 

Liberals, quite naturally, will deny any necessary relation 
between these various acts; will argue that Liberalism’s fun¬ 
damental commitments, contrary to our assertion, are to 
freedom; and that the matters we have cited are mere aber- 

The Liberal Establishment 


rations—exceptions to Liberalism’s great rule of libertarian 
fervor. And, to support their argument, will note the labors 
of individuals and organizations—not merely in behalf of 
criminals and security risks—but in behalf of minority groups, 
as in the “civil rights” struggle, and even, in certain isolated 
instances, in behalf of some right-wing as well as left-wing 
dissenters. In several of its particulars, the rebuttal is true 
enough; but in its interpretation of them we think it is pos¬ 
sible to show the Liberal view mistaken. 

It is apparent, first of all, that the intervention of certain 
Liberals, notably the American Civil Liberties Union, in 
behalf of right-wing dissenters substantiates the case we 
have been making about the present tendencies of the Estab¬ 
lishment. If Liberalism at large were not persecuting these 
dissenters, there would be no call for the ACLU to look into 
the matter. For its honesty in believing free speech should be 
extended to conservatives as well as Liberals, the ACLU de¬ 
serves a good deal of credit. But for making such intervention 
necessary, and for making it vivid by contrast to the general 
drift of Establishment performance. Liberalism in general 
deserves no credit at all. 

While the ACLU position in the Struelens, Walker, FTC 
and other cases does honor to that organization’s sentiments, 
moreover, it is less consistent with the logic of power than the 
more authoritarian performance of its Liberal colleagues. For 
while the ousting of a Struelens or jailing of a Walker vio¬ 
lates Liberalism’s stated views on free speech, these actions 
are all too consistent with Liberalism’s basic premises about 
government. Such things are not a perversion of Liberal 
philosophy but necessary and natural products of it. Liberal¬ 
ism becomes increasingly hostile to freedom in all categories 
—including the particular categories favored by the ACLU— 
because the Liberal system, as such, is hostile to freedom. 

So long as Liberalism continues to aggregate power in the 
interest of a “planned society,” and continue5 to erode the 



institutional barriers against the abuse of power, the logic 
of authoritarianism will continue to do its work. Intractable 
individuals will forever not be knowing what is really good 
for them—as the ADA or Prof. Schlesinger or Prof. Galbraith, 
by their own testimony, do know—and will forever be going 
off on inconvenient tangents. Their freedom will therefore 
have to be diminished. In the first instance, this will involve 
the power to dispose of energies and resources—that is, the 
much-despised property rights. Since such matters as printed 
or spoken dissent, political opposition, and even religious 
sentiment can, however, also be troublesome, balking the 
plan or stirring resistance to it, these freedoms will draw the 
hostile notice of the authorities soon enough in their turn. 

Thus it is not really astonishing that, under the Liberal 
stewardship, we should observe such things as managed news, 
harassment of dissenters, wiretapping, censorship, and denial 
of due process—in short, the whole apparatus of control ap¬ 
plied to freedom of speech and conscience. The Liberal view 
of government, in its master plan, has created a sufficient 
motive for such things; in its consolidation of power, has sup¬ 
plied a convenient instrument; and in its destruction of con¬ 
stitutional restraints, has removed the impediment to doing 
them. Nothing remains to prevent the deed but the Liberal 
conscience itself, and this, as the ACLU’s protests make clear, 
is becoming increasingly negligent of its own distinctions. 

Clearly, the elevation of certain well-regarded liberties 
from the general decline of all liberties is not the rule, but 
the exception. The institutions favored by Liberalism are 
uniformly aimed toward despotism. They amount to unlim¬ 
ited, centralized power, preferably concentrated in the execu¬ 
tive, to be used without let or hindrance wherever the wield- 
ers of it find such action to their taste. The ease with which 
such power can fulfil the ends of despotism is apparent; let 
the users merely decide to be despotic, and there is no re- 

The Liberal Establishment 


straint, no constitutional barrier, no alternative center of 
power, which can be interposed against them. 

Consider Liberalism’s previously-noted enthusiasm for 
“civil rights.” Even if we discount the obvious inconsistencies 
of the Liberal view and the political motives behind it, the 
central fallacy remains. The expanded freedoms Liberalism 
would confer on Negro citizens—like those they would extend 
to various left-wing dissidents—cannot be logically derived 
from the Liberal ethos of “planning,” majoritarianism, and 
disdain for the Constitution. They are the effulgence, not of 
institutional settlement, but of personal caprice. Because 
Liberals, for various reasons, happen to want more freedom 
for B’hais or Vegetarians or Negroes in the South, they gra¬ 
ciously confer such freedom, even as they are contracting 
other freedoms elsewhere (and even as, in the matter of 
“civil rights,” they are dismantling the general design of free 
institutions). The liberty in question is not what the Consti¬ 
tution makes necessary, but what the all-powerful govern¬ 
ment condescends to grant. In previous cases, we have been 
told liberties affirmed by the Constitution must be ignored; 
in this one we are told a liberty affirmed by the Constitution 
must at all cost be vindicated. Obviously, it is Liberal dis¬ 
cretion, not constitutional text, which rules. The people at 
large, and even the beneficiaries of Liberal discretion, receive 
their portion of regimentation or liberty, not by right, but 
at the pleasure of government, exactly as do the neglected 
subjects and petted favorites of an absolute monarch. 

Like those court favorites, the chosen few of the present 
hour may think the arrangement a good one, until such 
time as the whim of the rulers changes, or the rulers them¬ 
selves are changed. At that moment, there will be nothing to 
prevent all the powers assertedly gathered in behalf of these 
groups from being turned against them. Their supposedly 
augmented freedom will then join that of the nation at large 
In a common ruin. 



The evanescence of liberty in collectivist systems is a com¬ 
mon feature of modern history. Hardly an “ism” has made its 
mark in the 20th century without promising someone greater 
“freedom”—always, of course, at the expense of someone else's 
freedom and the general system. Invariably, too, the particu¬ 
lar freedom to be exalted above the rest has been destroyed 
with the freedoms it was supposed to replace. That is the 
inevitable result of power released from the bondage of con¬ 
stitutional or customary restraint; coercive arrangements 
made for one occasion, like those “temporary” government 
buildings which were so long a staple of the Washington 
landscape, often outlive that occasion to be used for other 
purposes. Power loosed from constitutional limits to serve 
some particular group may end up disserving that group be¬ 
cause in the last analysis it disserves everyone who would be 

In an earlier chapter, we asserted that the regimentation 
desired by Liberalism bears a strong resemblance to Social¬ 
ism. So much is attested not only by some of the Establish¬ 
ment's more unguarded spokesmen, and by the obvious 
similarity of objective and technique, but by the Socialists 
themselves. In certain essential respects, however, the com¬ 
parison breaks down. In its deeper implications, in the 
randomness of its “pragmatism,” its yen for ad hoc power, 
and its exaltation of a single ruler as the embodiment of the 
nation, Liberalism differs from socialism. Social democracy 
in Britain and on the Continent is more consistent, more 
structured, and more rational than Liberalism in America. 
It does not tend toward paeans in behalf of power or the 
species of Bonapartism that has attached itself to the Ameri¬ 
can presidency. 

In this respect, Liberalism does not resemble socialism so 
much as it does that “revolution without a doctrine,” Na¬ 
zism, and its Mediterranean in-law obsessed with the majesty 
of power for power's sake. Indeed, despite the obvious influ- 

The Liberal Establishment 


ence of the Fabians, the borrowings from European Socialism 
and Marxism, and the acclaim of Norman Thomas, an excel¬ 
lent case can be made for the position that Liberalism is a 
genteel American version, not of Socialism, but of fascism. 
That, too, however, is the topic for yet another book. Enough 
has been said in this one, we think, to suggest that, whatever 
collectivist “ism” is most closely aligned with it, Liberalism is 
a creed profoundly hostile to American freedom. 



Chapter 2: Moment of Truth 

1. “The Radical Right In America Today,” identified as “the Reuther 

Memorandum” by Andrew F. Oehlmann, executive assistant to the 
Attorney General, in letter to John Wesley Rhoads of Philadelphia, 
July 11, 1963. 

2. “The Fulbright Memorandum,” placed in the Congressional Record 

for August 2, 1961, by Senator J. William Fulbright, D.-Ark., and 
Senator J. Strom Thurmond, D.-S. C. 

3. “Report of the Warren Commission on the Assassination of Presi¬ 

dent Kennedy,” New York Times edition, McGraw-Hill, 1964, p. 49. 

4. Interview with UPI reporter Aline Mosby, quoted in The New York 

Times, November 25, 1963. Oswald's statement: “People hate be¬ 
cause they're told to hate, like school kids. It's the fashion to hate 
people in the United States.” Those words might have been taken 
from any number of Liberal commentaries attempting to pin re¬ 
sponsibility for non-hater Oswald's actions on American con¬ 

5. Warren Report, op. cit., p. 391 

6. Ibid., p. 43 

Chapter 3: Operation Goldwater 

1. The New York Times, September 9, 1963. 

2. For a fuller discussion of this dispute, see my article, “Goldwater, 

Rockefeller, and the Young Republicans,” National Review, 

The Liberal Establishment 


August 13, 1963. 

3. Chicago Daily News, April 15, 1964 

4. Time , June 12, 1964, p. 34 

5. These figures are from U.S. News and World Report, June 15, 1964, 

P . 36 

6. Concord, N.H. Monitor, January 7, 1964 

7. Newsweek, January 20, 1964, p. 21 

8. San Francisco Examiner, May 25, 1964 

9. Indianapolis Times, June 1, 1964 

10. These headlines are photographically reproduced in a brochure en¬ 
titled, “On The Nation's Front Pages,” published by The New York 
Times News Service. 

11. Chicago Daily News, August 13, 1964 

12. Ibid. 

13. Indianapolis Times, September 16, 1964 



Chapter 1: Pragmatism And Power 

1. Robert L. Riggs, Candidates i960, Basic Books, Inc., p. 309 

2. Joseph Alsop, Reader's Digest, February, 1964, p. 60 

3. Op. cit., pp. 309-10. 

4. ACA News Release, March 6, 1964 

5. Op. cit., p. 308 

6. U.S. News and World Report, April 13, 1964 

7. Quoted in Omaha World-Herald editorial, “More New Spending,” 

January 27, 1964 

8. Congressional Record, February 6, 1964 

9. The Professional, Houghton-Mifflin, 1964, pp. 59-60 

10. New York Herald-Tribune, December 1, 1963 

11. Let Us Begin, Simon & Schuster, 1961, pp. 9, 15 

12. Baltimore Sun, March 2, 1961 

13. Op. cit., p. 16 

14. Reader's Digest, February, 1964, p. 60 

15. Introduction to A Time For Action, Pocket Books, Inc., 1964, p. 12 

16. Life, August 14, 1964, p. 26 

17. The Lyndon Johnson Story, Avon Books, 1964, p. 117 

18. A Time For Action, op. cit., pp. 15-16 

19. Victory Lasky, JFK: The Man and The Myth, Macmillan, 1963, p. 


20. See Fulton Lewis Jr. column. King Features, July 1, 1964 




Chapter 2: Americans For Democratic Action 

1. James McGregor Burns, John Kennedy: A Political Profile, Avon 

Books, 1961, p. 135 

2. Clifton Brock, Americans For Democratic Action, Public Affairs Press, 

1962, pp. 185-86 

3. Ibid., p. 187 

4. Ibid., p. 179 

5. Lasky, op. cit., p. 408 

6. Lyle Wilson, UPI dispatch, Indianapolis News, November 30, 1963 

7. Brock, op. cit., p. 178 

8. Ibid., p. 148 

9. Quoted in “Americans For Democratic Action,” Study by the Staff of 

the Senate Republican Policy Committee, April, 1958; p. 88 

10. Quoted by Robert F. Hartmann in series of articles for the Los 
Angeles Times, reprinted in the Congressional Record, September 
14, 1961 

11. Ibid. 

12. Quoted by James Burnham in National Review, May 7, 1963 

13. Brock, op. cit., p. 83 

14. Ibid., p. 144; Hartmann, op. cit. 

15. Burnham, op. cit. 

16. “The Future of Socialism: The Perspective Now,” Partisan Review, 
May-June, 1947, p. 231 

17. Ibid. 

18. Ibid. 

19. “The Shape of National Politics To Come,” a Memorandum by 
Arthur Schlesinger Jr. (mimeographed), p. 8 

20. Ibid., p. 10 

21. Ibid. 

22. Partisan Review, op. cit., pp. 230-31 

23. The Vital Center, Houghton-Mifflin, 1949 and 1962, p. 248 

24. Ibid. 

25. Schlesinger, “The Shape of National Politics To Come,” op. cit., p. 


26. The Saturday Evening Post, May 19, 1962 

27. “Can the Liberals Rally?” Atlantic Monthly, July, 1953 

28. Quoted by Senator Homer Capehart, R-Ind., in TV broadcast of 
August 18, 1961 

29. Clark, “Can the Liberals Rally?” op. cit. 

30. Atlantic Monthly, March, 1962 

31. Speech delivered at George Washington University, March 28, i960 

32. Ibid. 

33. “Staffing Freedom,” reprint from the National Civil Service League. 

34. Ibid. 

35. Ibid. 

The Liberal Establishment 


36. Ibid. 

37. Ibid. 

38. Ibid. 

Chapter 3: Is It Socialism? 

1. Quoted in Congressional Quarterly, September 18, 1964, inserted in 

Congressional Record, September 28, 1964, by Senator George 
McGovern, D-S. D. 

2. ‘‘Trends in the World Situation/' Memorandum prepared for the 

Board of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency by 
Willard Matthias, June 9, 1964; p. 18 

3. Quoted by John T. Flynn, As We Go Marching, Doubleday, 1944, p. 


4. Quoted by Raoul E. Desvernine, Democratic Despotism, Dodd-Mead, 

* 93 6 > PP- 9 8 ~99 

5. Robert Theobald, The Challenge of Abundance, Mentor, 1962, pp. 

108, 109, 116-17 

6. Congressional Quarterly, op. cit. 

7. The Socialist Case, Faber 8c Faber, London, 1947, p. 183 

8. Quoted by Phillip M. Crane, The Democrat's Dilemma, Regnery, 

Chicago, 1964, p. 121 

9. The Cause Is Mankind, Praeger, 1964, p. 16 

10. Congressional Record, June 20, 1957 

11. Crane, op. cit., p. 201 

12. Chicago Tribune, May 30, 1964 

13. See Chicago Tribune, October 2, 1964 

14. Chicago Tribune, May 30, 1964 

15. Chicago Tribune, June 9, 1964 

16. Fund-raising letter of the Norman Thomas 80th Birthday Com¬ 
mittee, 1182 Broadway, New York, October, 1964 

17. Washington Post, October 18, 1964 

18. Newsweek, February 17, 1964 

19. Ibid. 

20. Time, February 7, 1964 

21. The New York Times, October 11, 1964 

Chapter 4: “Aid” Means Control 

1. Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, April 13, 1962. 

Transcript released by DOD. 

2. Quoted by Ernest L. Wilkinson in Federal Aid to Education, Brigham 

Young University, Provo, Utah, p. 2 

3. Ibid., pp. 2, 3 

4. Ibid., p. 3 

5. The Norfolk, Neb. Daily News, January 13, 1958 

6. Antoni E. Gollan, two articles on the school lunch program, Indian - 



apolis News, August 30 and September 30, 1963 

7. San Francisco Chronicle, November 11, 1964 

8. Martin Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer, MIT Press, 1964, p. 221 

9. The New York Times, March 5, 1965 

10. George C. S. Benson and John M. Payne, National Aid to Higher 
Education, American Enterprise Association, 1958, p. 11 

11. For examples of Liberal opposition to the tax-credit idea see Wash¬ 
ington Post, February 5, 1964, write-up of Senate debate on the sub¬ 
ject; Fred M. Hechinger in New York Times, May 26, 1963; NEA 
statement, January 7, 1964. 

12. The Root of the Opposition, NEA pamphlet, undated. 

13. New Republic, January 9, 1961 

14. Congressional Record, July 18, 1961 

15. HEW release, July 5, 1961 

16. A Federal Education Agency for the Future, HEW publication, 
April, 1961, p. 6 

Chapter y. The Planned Economy 

1. The Federalist Papers, Modern Library, p. 303 

2. U.S. News and World Report, September 28, 1964 

3. For facts and figures on the extent of Federal sprawl, see “Govern¬ 

ment in Business,” National Industrial Conference Board, 1964; 
“Big Government,” by Rep. Richard Poff, R-Va., Small Business 
Bulletin, July-August, i960; “How Big is Big Government?” Wash¬ 
ington World, August 7, 1962; “Government Salaries on the Rise,” 
News Front, November 1964; “The Ever-Lengthening Shadow,” 
New England Letter of the First National Bank of Boston, August 
29, 1952; “End of the Road in Sight For States?” U.S. News and 
World Report, March 29, 1965 

4. The Language of Dissent, World Publishing Co., 1959, p. 35 

5. Ibid., p. 27 

6. Statements of Senate Republican Policy Committee, July, 1963 and 

October, 1964 

7. U.S. News and World Report, January 18, 1965 

8. Farm Bureau News, March 16, 1962 

9. Nation's Business, April, 1962 

10. Time, April 20, 1962 

11. Speech by Admiral Moreell, July 13, 1962 

12. Torch & Oval, American Oil Co. magazine, March, 1962 

13. Barron's, March 19, 1962 

14. ACLU letter to Paul Rand Dixon, FTC Chairman, April 20, 1962 

15. Fortune, August, 1963 

16. Quoted by Rep. Frank Bow, R-Ohio, in Reader's Digest, October, 


17. As Arthur Krock of The Neto York Times noted, the government is 
fortunate its strictures about representing things honestly to the 

The Liberal Establishment 


public do not apply to itself. Referring to an FTC order compelling 
a shaving cream company to desist from assertedly misleading ad¬ 
vertising, Krock said: “If government were subject to the principle 
asserted . . . for industry’s selling practices, it would have been the 
leading defendant in the Colgate case.” Indianapolis News, April 

9 . 1965 

18. Quoted in Omaha World-Herald editorial, “Too Dumb To Shop,” 
February 12, 1964 

19. See Arthur Krock column, Indianapolis News, December 11, 1964 

20. Employee Relations News, published by the General Electric Co., 
December 21, 1964 

21. Wall Street Journal, May 7, 1964 

Chapter 6: Affluence—or Poverty? 

1. Kennedy Or Nixon? Macmillan, i960, p. 37 

2. The National Purpose, Holt, i960, pp. 26-27 

3. Ibid., p. 27 

4. The Affluent Society, Houghton-Mifflin, 1958, p. 253 

5. Ibid., p. 257 

6. Washington World, August 7, 1962 

7. Fortune, March, 1964. For further figures on the relative affluence of 

America’s impoverished, see U.S. News and World Report, January 
20, 1964 

8. “Federal Spending Facts,’’ statement of Council of State Chambers of 

Commerce, Bulletin No. 214, July 6, 1964 

Chapter 7 : Inflation, Social Security, And Medicare 

1. U.S. News and World Report, July 2, 1962 

2. Dr. George A. Silver on AFL-CIO TV program, “Briefing Session,’’ 

quoted in “Legislative Analysis,’’ bulletin of American Enterprise 
Association, May 1, 1962, p. 14 

3. UPI dispatch, May 21, 1962 

4. “Each Family Has Three Responsibilities,’’ pamphlet distributed at 

Indianapolis medicare rally, May 20, 1962 

5. Ibid. 

6. Paper presented at meeting of the Society of Actuaries by Ray M. 

Peterson, November, 1959 

7. “Legislative Analysis’’ bulletin, op. cit., p. 19 

8. “Medical Care for the Aged,” Human Events, May 12, i960 

9. “A Profile of the Aging: USA,” paper presented to the Fifth Congress 

of the International Association of Gerontology, August 11, i960 

10. Ibid. 

11. “Medical Care for the Aged,” op. cit. 

12. Ibid. 



Chapter 8: The Ultimate Scandal 

1. New York Times, October 15, 1964 

2. Quoted by William Schulz in Indianapolis News, October 26, 1964 

3. The Lyndon Johnson Story, “the complete authorized and illustrated 

biography by Booth Mooney,” Avon Books, 1964 

4. U.S. News and World Report, April 6, 1964 

5. Ibid. 

6. The Wall Street Journal, March 23, 1964 

7. Ibid. 

8. Ibid. 

9. Ibid. 

10. The Wall Street Journal, February 25, 1964 

11. Time, March 6, 1964 

12. Congressional Record, January 27, 1964 

13. Ibid. 

14. Ibid. 

15. Ibid. 

16. Ibid. 

17. Taxpayer's Hay ride, Little-Brown & Co., 1964, pp. 20-21 

18. Ibid., p. 171 

19. Ibid., p. 165 

20. Ibid., p. 166 

21. Ibid., p. 169 

22. Ibid., p. 172 

23. Ibid., p. 177 

24. Letter from Johnson to Estes, December 28, i960, photographically 
reproduced in Human Events, February 29, 1964 

25. Human Events, February 29, 1964 


Chapter 1: Freedom For Whom? 

1. The doctrine of “preferred freedoms” as applied to First Amendment 
rights was first set forward by Justice Harlan Fiske Stone in his 
dissent in United States v. Butler (1936). For a general outline of 
the position see Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Supreme Court From 
Taft to Warren, Norton, 1964, pp. 134 et seq. 

Chapter 2: The Law Breakers 

1. Durand v. Hollins, 4 Blatch. 451 (i860) 

The Liberal Establishment ►334 

2. Changing Values In College, by Philip E. Jacob, Harper & Row, 1957, 

pp. 41, 52 

3. See my Revolt on the Campus, Regnery, 1961, p. 238 

4. Attitudes Toward History, Beacon Press, 1959, p. 134 

5. The New York Times, February 8, 1964 

6. San Francisco Chronicle, August 11, 1964 

7. Campaign address in St. Petersburg, Fla., September 15, 1964 

8. The Burden And The Glory, addresses by President Kennedy, Allan 

Nevins, ed.. Harper & Row, 1964, p. 183 

9. Quoted in St. Louis Post-Dispatch editorial, reprinted in The Indiana¬ 

polis Star, September 20, 1964. The Post-Dispatch explained 
Stevenson’s statement as “facetious irony” and berated Goldwater 
for quoting it—a curious defense in view of the all-out Liberal 
attack on Goldwater for assertedly failing to represent himself 

10. The Cause Is Mankind, op. cit., p. 20 

11. “Counter-Attack on Delinquency—The Program of the Federal 
Government to Develop Rational Answers to a Growing Crisis,” 
prepared by the President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency 
and Youth Crime, June, 1964, p. 30; Fulton Lewis Jr., Indianapolis 
News, January G, 1965 

12. Handbill issued by “Integrated Workers,” 227 East 3rd St., New 
York. See New York Daily News, August 21, 1964, and December 
30, 1964 

13. Quoted by Fulton Lewis Jr., Indianapolis News, January 6, 1965 

14. The New York Times, December 30, 1964 

Chapter 3 : The War Against Security 

1. State Department Security, Report of the Senate Internal Security 

subcommittee (hereinafter referred to as SISS), October 12, 1962, p. 

2. The New York Times, November 25, 1963 

3. Ibid. 

4. Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott, Indianapolis News, January 13, 1965, 

and Hall syndicate, February 7, 1964 

5. “Fair Play For Cuba Committee,” SISS hearings, October 23, 1961, p. 


6. “Castro’s Network in the United States,” SISS hearings, February 14, 

1963, p. 14 

7. Ibid., pp. 7, 9, 11, 12, 17, 18 

8. Ibid. 

9. Statement by Senator Dodd, July 3, 1963 

10. Ibid. 

11. Ibid. 

12. State Department Security, op. cit., p. 115 

13. “State Department Security”, SISS hearings, p. 27 



14. Ibid., p. 20 

15. Ibid., p. 19 

16. Ibid., p. 21 

17. Ibid., pp. 22, 27 

18. Chicago Tribune, September 25, 1964 

19. “State Department Security,” op. cit., p. 204 

20. Ibid., p. 225 

21. State Department Security, op. cit., p. 9 

22. Ibid., p. 17 

23. Wall Street Journal, January 25, 1962 

24. Letter to the author, February 12, 1962 

25. Ibid. 

26. Americans For Democratic Action, op. cit., p. 142 

27. “Proposal For a Democratic Party Platform,” published by ADA, 
1964, pp. 15-16 

28. Congressional Record, September 28, 1964 

29. For a fuller discussion of this episode see my article in The Com¬ 
mittee and Its Critics, Wm. F. Buckley Jr., ed., Putnam, 1962, “The 
San Francisco Riots.” 

30. See Robert A. Poteete, “Two Reporters Fired In Slum Bribe Story,” 
New York Herald-Tribune, November 25, 1959; also Ross Hermann, 
“Anti-Goldwater ‘Cook Book’ Could Backfire,” Indianapolis News, 
October 29, 1964 

31. Newsweek, December 7, 1964 

32. Quoted by Senator Thomas Dodd (D-Conn.), statement of February 
25* * 9 6 5 

Chapter 4: Four Cases 


1. Quoted by Fulton Lewis, Jr., in Exclusive, April 10, 1963 

2. In The Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer, Texts of Principal Docu¬ 

ments and Letters of Personnel Security Board, General Manager, 
Commissioners of United States Atomic Energy Commission; Wash¬ 
ington, D. C., May 27, 1954, through June 29, 1954; pp. 3-6 

3. Ibid., pp. 7-8 

4. Ibid., p. 21 

5. Ibid., p. 22 

6. Ibid., pp. 51-52 

7. Ibid., p. 53 

8. Ibid., p. 51 

9. Ibid., p. 63 


1. Quoted by Fulton Lewis Jr., in Exclusive, August 30, 1961 

2. Ibid. 

3. Institute of Pacific Relations, Report of the Committee on the 

The Liberal Establishment 


Judiciary, 1952, p. 215 

4. Ibid., pp. 214, 215 

5. Ibid., p. 216 

6. Ibid., p. 215 

7. Freda Utley, The China Story, Regnery, 1951, pp. 200, 201 

8. Op. cit., p. 218 

9. Ibid., p. 217 

10. Ibid., p. 216 

11. Ibid., p. 217 

12. Ibid., p. 216 

13. Ibid., p. 224 

14. Newsweek, September 3, 1962 

15. Ordeal By Slander, Little Brown, 1950, p. viii 


I. IPR hearings, pp. 786-87 
2r Ibid., p. 809 

3. Ibid., p. 811 

4. Utley, op. cit., p. 116 

5. Ibid., pp. 158-59 

6. Ralph de Toledano, Spies, Dupes, and Diplomats, Little-Brown, 1952, 

pp. 149-50 

7. Utley, op. cit., p. 161 

8. IPR hearings, p. 4847 

9. Ibid., p. 4848 

10. Ibid., p. 4849 

II. Ibid., p. 4838 

12. “State Department Security,” SISS hearings, p. 198 

13. Ibid., pp. 197-98 

14. Ibid., p. 197 

15. Ibid. 


1. UPI dispatch, Indianapolis News, January 25, 1962 

2. State Department Security, SISS report, p. 2 

3. “Communist Threat to the U.S. Through the Caribbean,” SISS 

hearings, Part 12, June 12, 1961, p. 795 

4. Ibid., p. 796 

5. Ibid., p. 797 

6. Ibid., pp. 797-98 

7. Ibid., p. 798 

8. “Communist Threat to U.S.,” etc. Part 10, September 2 and 8, i960, 

pp. 736-38 

9. “Communist Threat to U.S.” etc.. Part 9, August 27 and 30, i960, p. 


10. Ibid., pp. 682-83 

11. Ibid., p. 685 



12. Ibid., p. 694 

13. Ibid., p. 699 

14. The Fourth Floor, Random House, 1962, p. 58 

15. Op. cit., p. 673 

16. “Communist Threat to U.S.,” etc., Part 12, op. cit., p. 821 

17. “Communist Threat to U.S.,” etc., Part 9, op. cit., p. 697 

18. “Communist Threat to U.S.,” etc., Part 12, op. cit., p. 798 

19. “Communist Threat to U.S.,” etc., Part 10, op. cit., p. 746 

20. “State Department Security,” SISS hearings, op. cit., p. 184 

21. Ibid. 

22. State Department Security, SISS report, op. cit., p. 3 

23. Ibid. 

24. Ibid. 

25. Ibid., p. 127 

26. Ibid., p. 118 

27. Ibid., p. 119 

28. Ibid., p. 149 

29. Ibid., p. 151 

30. Ibid., pp. 143, 152 

31. Ibid., p. 145 

32. Ibid., p. 106 

33. Ibid., p. 114 

Chapter y. Four Other Cases 


1. Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott, Indianapolis News, October 3, 1963 

2. Chicago Tribune, October 8, 1963 

3. “Resolution and Pertinent Data Relative to Security in the Depart¬ 

ment of State,” SISS publication, November 9, 1963, p. 3 

4. Ibid., p. 5 

5. Ibid., p. 7 

6. Ibid., p. 8 

7. Ibid., p. 9 

8. Ibid., p. 11 

9. Ibid., p. 12 


1. Visa Procedures of Department of State — The Struelens Case , SISS 

report, August 6, 1962, p. 17 

2. Ibid., p. 33 

3. Ibid., p. 26 

4. Ibid., p. 40 

5. Ibid. 

6. Ibid., p. 17 

7. Ibid., p. 53. Full text of column appears in “Visa Procedures of De¬ 

partment of State,” SISS hearings, 1962, pp. 558-59 

The Liberal Establishment 


8. Ibid., p. 50 

9. Ibid., p. 40 

10. Ibid. 

11. Ibid., pp. 43, 44 

12. Ibid., pp. 48, 49 

13. Ibid., p. 50 

14. Ibid., p. 71 

15. Ibid. 


1. John Barron in the Washington Star, quoted in Republican Con¬ 

gressional Committee newsletter, February 14, 1964 

2. The New York Times, February 8, 1964 

3. Ibid. 

4. Ibid. 

5. Ibid. 

6. Ibid. 

7. Ibid. 

8. Ibid. 

9. Chicago Suri’Times, February 14, 1964 

10. Indianapolis Neras, February 18, 1964 

11. Chicago's American, February 14, 1964 

12. CBS Evening News, February 10, 1964 


1. Quoted by Senator John Williams, R-Del., in Congressional Record, 

May 17, 1962 

2. Taxpayer's Hayride, op. cit., p. 149 

3. Ibid. 

4. Ibid., pp. 150-51 

5. Congressional Record, May 17, 1962 

6. Congressional Record, May 14, 1962 

7. Ibid. 

8. Congressional Record, May 17, 1962 

9. Ibid. 

10. Ibid. 

11. Statement by Congressman Bruce Alger, R-Texas, October 3, 1962; 
statement by Robert Morris, October 12, 1962 

Chapter 6: The Silencers 

1. All of the students' quotations are from interviews with the author. 

They were printed in The Indianapolis News for October 16, 1962. 
Other similar statements, along with eye-witness testimony, were 
printed in other newspapers of the city at the time. 

2. “The Radical Right In America Today," op. cit., p. 5. For sequence 

on Reuther brothers’ transactions with Robert Kennedy, see The 

Notes ►339 

Far Right, by Bernard Eisman and Donald Janson, McGraw-Hill, 


3. “The Radical Right In America Today,” p. 9 

4. Ibid., pp. 10, 11 

5. Ibid., p. 5 

6. “Combatting Right-Wing Activity In Your Community,” COPE 

memorandum to state and local union leaders, March, 1963. For 
further discussion, see Richard Wilson, “Keeping Tabs on The 
Conservatives,” Philadelphia Bulletin, November 19, 1963 

7. Ibid. 

8. Ibid. 

9. Ibid. 

10. Group Research Report, published by Group Research, Inc., 1404 
New York Ave., NW, Washington, D.C., July 20, 1962 

11. Congressional Record, October 4, 1962 

12. Congressional Record, May 20, 1963 

13. Group Research Report, September 30, 1964 

14. Ibid. 

15. Ibid. 

16. Santa Barbara (Calif.) News-Press, September 25, 1964 

17. Ibid. 

18. New York Post, March 3, 1965 

19. Manchester (N.H.) Union-Leader, October 8, 1964 

20. Congressional Record, June 10, 1963 

21. Quoted by William F. Buckley, Jr., in The Indianapolis Star, April 
7, 1965. For background on Circuit Riders and AEI cases, see “Cir¬ 
cuit Riders Challenge Tax-Exempt Status of Others,” Cincinnati 
Enquirer, April 21, 1965, and “Institute Quizzed on Political Tie,” 
Washington Post, April 15, 1965. 

22. Ibid. 

Chapter 7 : Censorship and Muzzling 

1. Congressional Record, February 19, 1962 

2. Ibid. 

3. Washington Evening Star, May 27, 1962 

4. New York Times, July 17, 1961 

5. Ibid. 

6. “For People’s Unity Against Big Business And War Danger—The 

Ultra Right, Kennedy, And Role of the Progressives,” The Worker, 
July 16, 1961 

7. “Fulbright Memorandum,” op. cit. 

8. Quoted by Senator Karl Mundt, R-S.D., Congressional Record, 

August 17, 1961 

9. Ibid. 

10. Congressional Record, February 19, 1962 

11. Letter from Ball to Chairman John Stennis, D-Miss., of Senate 

The Liberal Establishment ^340 

Armed Services Committee, Washington Evening Star, May 27, 1962 

12. Congressional Record, February 19, 1962 

13. Ibid. 

14. “Military Cold War Education And Speech Review Policies,” hear¬ 
ings before Preparedness Subcommittee of Senate Armed Services 
Committee, Part 7, June 1962, p. 3298 

15. Ibid., p. 3306 

16. Ibid., p. 3307 

17. Ibid., p. 3322 

18. “Fulbright Memorandum,” op. cit. 

19. Ibid. 

20. Ibid. 

21. Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8 

Chapter 8: Managing The News 

1. The Speeches of Senator John F. Kennedy, Report of Subcommittee 

on Communications, Senate Commerce Committee; speech made in 
New York, November 5, i960; p. 90 

2. Report of the Freedom of Information Committee, American Society 

of Newspaper Editors, John H. Colburn, Chairman; Problems of 
Journalism, ASNE proceedings, 1963, p. 225 

3. Ibid. 

4. Ibid., p. 226 

5. Ibid. 

6. Ibid., p. 233 

7. New York Times, December 7, 1962 

8. Associated Press dispatch, December 7, 1962; a tape-recorded trans¬ 

cription of this statement is printed in Problems of Journalism, op. 
cit., p. 226 

9. Newsweek, April 8, 1963 

10. Fortune, March, 1963 

11. The Atlantic, April, 1963 

12. Aviation Week, quoted in Battle Line, publication of the Republi¬ 
can National Committee, April 22, 1961 

13. Look, August 28, 1962 

14. Ibid. 

15. Indianapolis News, June 22, 1962 

16. Ibid. 

17. U. S. News and World Report, March 22, 1965 

18. Baltimore Sun, May 3, 1961 

19. Battle Line, May 7, 1961 

20. Battle Line, April 26, 1961 

21. U.S. News and World Report, April 15, 1963 

22. Ibid. 

23. New York Times, November 30, 1963 

Notes ►341 

24. NANA dispatch by Jay G. Hayden, Indianapolis News, January 29, 


25. Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott, Indianapolis News, January 22, 


26. Federal Communications Commission, FCC-63-734, 38372, Public 
Notice-B, July 26, 1963 

27. Ibid. 

28. “The Radical Right in America Today/’ op. cit., p. 9 

29. Manion Forum broadcast, November 24, 1963 

30. Quoted by Ralph de Toledano, Indianapolis News, January 23, 1964 

31. Ibid. 

32. Ibid. 

33. Letter from Ben F. Waple, Secretary, Federal Communications Com¬ 
mission, to Louis Ruthenburg, Evansville, Indiana, December 9, 



Adams, John, 170 

Adams, Sherman, 157 

Adamson v. California , 1947, 181 n 

Addis, Thomas, 212 

Advance , 43 

“Adventure Corps,” 188 
A fluent Society, The, 128 
Agriculture Department, 117-119, 
160-164, 269-274 
Agronsky, Martin, 34 
Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters, 259 
Alabama, University of, 186 
Albert, Rep. Carl, 160 
Alcorn, Meade, 34 
Allen, Richard, 281 
Allen, Robert S., 195, 247, 314 
Allen, Steve, 35 
Allen, Taylor, 270, 273 
Alsop, Joseph, 38, 210, 217 
Alsop, Stewart, 38, 210, 217 
Amerasia, 228-230 
ABC-TV, 34, 47 

American Civil Liberties Union, 122, 
173, 254, 276, 322 

American Committee for the United 
Nations, 291 

American Enterprise Institute, 291 
AFL-CIO, 279-281 

AFL-CIO (COPE), 56, 284-285, 291, 
292, 3i6n 

American Legion, 17 
American Oil Co., 121 
American Socialist Society, 92 

American Society of Newspaper Edi¬ 
tors, 139, 304-306 

American Veterans Committee, 68 
Americans for Constitutional Action, 
42, 56'57* 286-287, 290 
Americans for Democratic Action, 45, 
49, 56, 60, 86-89, 92, 173* 320, 323; 
government penetration, 67-84; 
“public sector,” and, 127-128; se¬ 
curity, and, 204-207 
Andersen, Rep. H. Carl, 162, 163 
Anderson, Jack, 289 
Arnold, Fortas, and Porter, 225 
Ascoli, Max, 260 
Ashbrook, Rep. John, 108 
Associated Press, 306 
Atkinson, Brooks, 230-231 
Atlanta Constitution, 34, 43 
Atlanta Times, 48 
Atlantic, The, 35, 82, 223, 224 
Atomic Energy Commission, 210-217 
Atwood, John L., 155 
Aviation Week, 307 

Baines, Huff, 157 

Baker, Bobby, 149, 154-159, 164, 183 
262-3, 266, 268, 274, 313-3H 
Baldwin, Hanson, 306 
Baldwin, James, 35 
Ball, George, 298, 299 
Baltimore Sun, 34 
Barden, Rep. Graham, 102 
Barmine, Alexander, 221 

The Liberal Establishment 


Barron's, 122 

Barry Goldwater, Extremist of the 
Right, 25 

Batista, Fulgencio, 228-239, 244 

Battle Act, The, 183 

Bayh, Sen. Birch, 279-282 

Becerra, Frank, 243 

Beer, Samuel, 69, 70 

Belen, Frederick C., 72 n 

Belisle, David I., 248-252 

Bell, Daniel, 25 

Berle, Adolph A., Jr., 95 

Bernstein, Edward, 76 

Berzin, General, 221 

Bethlehem Steel, 120 

Bevan, Aneurin, 75 

Bielaski, Frank, 228 

Bingham, Jonathan, 72 n 

Birch, John, Society, 45, 275, 287-288, 


Bimbaum, Ezra, 188 

Black, Fred, Jr., 155-156 

Black, Justice Hugo, 55, 152, 18m 

Block, Joseph L., 120 

Blough, Roger, 120, 304 

Blum, Leon, 75 

B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League, 

Boatner, Charles, 163 

Bohemia, 198 

Bohm, David, 213 

Booth, Bishop N. S., 260 

Boswell, William O., 200, 202n 

Boun Oum, Prince, 36 

Bowles, Chester, 71, 81-82 

Brademas, Rep. John, 287, 290 

Brager, George, 189 

Broadcasting, 316 

Brock, Clifton, 67, 68, 74-75, 86 

Brown, Gov. Edmund G. “Pat,” 184 

Buchanan, James, 7 m 

Buchanan, Lee K., 272 

Buckley, William F., Jr., 15, 49, 223, 


Budenz, Louis, 221 
Bunche, Ralph, 95 
Burke, Adm. Arleigh, 294 
Burke, Kenneth, 182 
Burlingame, Roger, 25 

Burnham, James, 67, 75 
Byrd, Sen. Harry, 113 

Cain, Edward, 25 

Cameron, Rep. Ronald Brooks, 287, 

Campbell, Joseph, 215 
Cannon, Rep. Clarence, 59 
Capitol Vending Co., 155 
Carey, James, 125 
Carter, Clifton, 164, 274 
Case, Sen. Clifford, 42, 94 
Castro, Fidel, 30, 36, 232-244, 252, 
281, 295, 313 
Castro, Raul, 243 

Censorship, 278, 292, 293-301, 302-316, 

Central Intelligence Agency, 87, 244 
Chamber of Commerce, U.S., 17 
Changing Values in College, 178 
Chase, Stuart, 87 
Chevalier, Haakon, 213, 214 
Chiang Kai-shek, 36, 220, 222, 225-227 
Chicago American, 266 
Chicago Daily News, 39, 44 
Chicago Tribune, 34, 94 
China, 36, 219-220, 224, 225-230 
China Story, The, 220 
Christian Century, 31 6n 
Christian Crusade, 291 
Christian Science Monitor, 3 in, 34 
Circuit Riders, Inc., 291 
“Civil liberties,” 171-174, 180, 190- 
191,207-208,302, 318-319, 321-324; 
“cases,” 209, 210, 218, 225, 232, 246- 
247, 262, 268, 274-275 
“Civil Rights” act, 1964, 186-187 
Civil Service Loyalty Review Board, 

“Civilian control,” 300-301 
Clark, Joseph S., 7 in, 81-84, 85, 99, 
101, 106 

Cleveland, Charles, 39 
Cleveland, Harlan, 247 
Clifford, Clark, 149, 303 
Cohen, Wilbur, 71 
Colburn, John F., 305 
Colby College, 187 
Cole, Ben, 48 
CBS-TV, 16, 19, 33, 267 



Commonweal, 31671 
‘‘Communist Target-Youth,” 206 
Conant, James Bryant, 102 
Concord (N.H.), Monitor, 40 
Congo, 36, 253-257 
Congressional Quarterly, 42 
Congressional Record, 294, 29671, 297- 

Connally, John, 151, 153 
Connor, John T., 139 
Consumers Union, Western Council 
of the, 211 

Cook, Fred J., 25, 206 
Coombs, Philip H., 7171 
Cooper, Sen. John Sherman, 42, 313 
Cousins, Norman, 95 
Cox, Archibald, 71, 7271 
Crawford, Kenneth, 43 
Cronkite, Walter, 39 
Cuba, 28, 36, 183-184, 197-198, 232- 
244, 278-281, 300, 304, 311-313 
Cunningham, Rep. Glenn, 203, 204 
Currie, Lauchlin, 219, 221 
Curtis, Sen. Carl, 313 
Curtis, Rep. Thomas, 145-147 

Daily Worker, 221 

Dallet, Joseph, 212 

Danger on the Right, 25, 288-290 

Davidson, Judge T. Whitfield, 151- 


Deering-Milliken Co., 124 
‘‘Defenders, The,” 35 
Defense Department, 294, 305, 307, 
31271, 314 

DeGaulle, President Charles, 260 
Democratic Party, 66, 316; National 
Committee, 162, 206, 289, 291 
Dennison, John, 273 
DePugh, Robert, 287 
De Toledano, Ralph, 290, 315 
Detroit Free Press, 260 
Diem, Ngo Dinh, 36 
Dissent, 95 

“Dissent,” 173-174, 191, 246, 262, 268, 
277-278, 308, 322-323 
District of Columbia National Bank, 

Docking, George, 7271 
“Dr. Strangelove,” 35 

Dodd, Sen. Thomas, 14, 197-198, 199, 
218, 222, 254, 257-259, 260, 284 
Donahue, Charles, 7271 
Douglas, Sen. Paul, 7 in 
Dreyfus, Alfred, 210 
Drummond, Roscoe, 41 
Dudman, Richard, 25 
Dulles, John Foster, 201 
Duscha, Julius, 160-161, 163, 269 

“East Side-West Side,” 35 
Eastland, Sen. James O., 239-240 
Education Office, U.S., 108-110 
Ehrlich, Henry, 49 
Eisenhower, President Dwight, 41, 43- 
44, 58, 202, 234, 297, 306-308 
Eisenhower, Milton, 234, 242 
Elman, Philip, 7271, 123 
Employment Service, U.S., 124 
Engle, Clair, 184 
Epstein, Benjamin, 25, 288-290 
Espionage Act, 229 
Estes, Billie Sol, 159-165, 268-274, 321 
Evans, Rowland, 38 
Evans, Ward V., 214-217 
“Extremists,” 24-25, 37, 42-43, 278, 284 
Extremists, The, 25 

Fabianism, 74-75, 326 
Fail-Safe, 35 

Fair Play for Cuba Committee, 49, 
194-199, 313 

Faltermayer, Edmund K., 133 
Far Right, The, 25 
Farm Bureau, 17, 117-118 
Farmers Union, 161 
Faulk, John Henry, 35 
“Federal aid,” 97-109, 136 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 158, 
161, 183, 190, 195-196, 199, 206-208, 
215, 228-229, 244, 263, 265, 266, 
271, 283, 306, 307, 321 
Federal Communications Commission, 
152-154, 283, 292, 303, 314-317 
“Federal Education Agency for the 
Future, A,” 108-110 
Federal Reserve Board, 116, 139 
Federal Trade Commission, 114-115, 
121-124, 322 

Fermi, Enrico, award, 210 

The Liberal Establishment 


Field, Frederick V., 223 
Finletter, Thomas K., 7in 
Folkoff, Isaac, 212 
Forster, Arnold, 25, 288-290 
Fortas, Abe, 149, 225, 303 
Fortune, 38, 123, 133 
Fourth Floor, The, 239 
Fowler, Henry H., 7171 
Frankfurter, Justice Felix, 18m 
“Free Speech,” 172, 190-192, 253, 285, 
293, 3*9> 32i 

Freeman, Orville, 71, 117, 161, 269- 
271, 273-274 
Freeman, Roger A., 99 
Friends of the Chinese People, 211 
Fulbright, J. William, 19-20, 27 
“Fulbright Memorandum,” 282, 296- 
297, 300 

Fund for the Republic, 87, 173 
Furcolo, Gov. Foster, 69 

Galbraith, J. Kenneth, 71, 74, 79, 95, 
128-132, 323 

Gardner, Ambassador Arthur, 237, 239 
Gavin, Lt. Gen. James, 297 
Gayn, Mark, 228 
General Electric, 125 
General Motors, 137 
George, Henry, 87 
Gleason, Eugene, 206 
Glawe, Colonel, 235, 240 
Gokhman, Soviet official, 221 
Goldberg, Justice Arthur, 71 
Goldfine, Bernard, 157 
Goldwater, Barry, 25, 206, 303; ADA- 
GRI, and, 287, 289, 291; crime, and, 
177; ICBM, and, 41, 313-314; presi¬ 
dential campaign, 36-50; Social Se¬ 
curity, and, 40-41, 139; states rights, 
and, 177, 184-185 
Graham, Billy, 260 
Gray, Gordon, Board, 211-217 
Green, Edith, 109 
Green, Luke, 48 
Gross, Rep. H. R., 156-157, 265 
“Group Research, Inc.,” 284-292, 31611 
Grone, Gene, 25 
Gruening, Ernest, 60, 94 
Gurnea, Myron, 229 

Hagerty, James, 306 

Hales, Battle, 270-271, 273-274 
Haley, J. Evetts, Jr., 119 
Hall, Gus, 296 
Hamilton, Alexander, 170 
Hammond, Geoffrey, 281 
Hanson, Carrol, 108 
Hargis, Billy James, 29, 291, 292 
Harper's, 35 
Harriman, Averell, 7 in 
Harrington, Michael, 95-96, 132-135 
Harris, Louis, 34, 39 
Harris, T. George, 49 
Hartmann, Robert, 67, 71 
Hatcher, Andrew, 264 
Hawkins, David, 212-213 
Hayden, Jay G., 314 
Hayek, F. A., 117 
Hazlitt, Henry, 130 
Healy, Paul, 68 
Heller, Walter, 95-96 
Hill, Elmer Dewey, 248-249, 251-252 
Hill, Ralph, 154-155 
Hill, Robert C., 233-234, 239-240 
Hills, Lee, 305 
Holifield, Rep. Chet, 70 
Holland, J. W., 194 
Holleman, Jerry T., 162 
Hook, Sidney, 19 m 
Hoover, Herbert, 260 
Hoover, J. Edgar, 206-207, 265 
Horn, Peter, 280, 281 
House Committee on Un-American 
Activities, 174-190, 204-206, 211 
House Government Information Sub¬ 
committee, 305 

Housing and Home Finance Agency, 

Human Events, 286 
Humphrey, Vice-President Hubert, 
ADA, and, 68, 70, 71/1, 75, 92-94; 
Johnson, and, 60; “Liberal line,” 
and, 19-20; race riots, and, 187; 
Socialist support, 45 
Hunt, H. L., 291 
Huntley, Chet, 34 
Hutchison, Kansas, News, 106-107 
Hyneman, Charles S., 117 

Immigration, U.S., office, 254-255 
Indianapolis Star, 48 
Information Agency, U.S., 256, 262 



Ingwalson, Kenneth W., 286 
Inside the John Birch Society, 25 
Institute of Pacific Relations, 219, 228 
Intercollegiate Socialist Society, 92, 93 
Internal Security Act, 190, 205 

Jachimczyk, Joseph A., 269 
Jackis, Jerry, 311 
Jackson, Sen. Henry, 60 
Jacob, Philip, 179 
Jacobs, Emery E. (Red), 161 
Jaffe, Philip, 228-231 
Javits, Sen. Jacob, 42, 46-47 
Jay, Douglas, 89 
Jencks, Clinton, case, 193 
Jenkins, Walter, 148-150, 153, 156- 
157, 164, 225, 263, 267, 303 
Jester, Ken, 280 
Job Corps, 113 

Johns Hopkins University, 218, 233 
Johnson, Eric, 280 

Johnson, President Lyndon B., 36, 45- 
47, 49; ADA, and, 67-72, 93; Baker, 
Estes, Jenkins scandals, 148-164, 183, 
262, 266, 267; foreign aid, and, 184; 
labor-management, and, 124-125; 
Lattimore, and, 225; poverty, and, 
94-96, 132-135, 189; power, rise to, 
53-66; powers, and, 116; press, and, 
309-310, 312, 314, 316; Reynolds, 
and, 262-264; security, and, 201, 207; 
Socialist support, 94; taxes, and, 127 
Johnson, Mrs. Lyndon B., 152-153, 157 
Johnson Act, 183 
Jones, Mary K., 268-276, 319, 321 
Jones & Laughlin Steel, 120-121 
Judd, Rep. Walter, 284 
Justice Department, 114, 123, 229, 258, 
262, 271 

Kachmann, Rudy, 281 
Kallet, Arthur, 211 
Katanga, 253-262 

Keating, Sen. Kenneth, 46-47, 236, 240, 
243, 260 

Kefauver, Sen. Estes, 7m 
Kellam, J. C., 153 
Kennedy, Ethel, 307 
Kennedy, President John F., 40, 47 n, 
115; ADA, and, 67-72, 75, 81; afflu¬ 
ence, and, 132; appeasement, and, 

300-301; “Civil Rights” act, 186-187; 
Cuba, and, 278-281, 304-306, 311- 
312; inflation, and, 138-139; Indi¬ 
anapolis visit, 279-281; Johnson, L. 
B., and, 54-55; Lattimore, and, 218- 
219, 222; mail, Red, and, 202-204; 
“medicare,” and, 139-141; murder 
of, 28-32, 37-38, 303, 312; poverty, 
and, 96, 99-100, 119-121; powers, 
and, 115-116; press, and, 303-313, 
316-317; scandals, 150; security, 
and, 199-200, 204, 207; steel crisis, 
1962, 138, 308, 321; taxes, and, 126- 
127; Vienna, conf., 299-301; Wie- 
land, and, 232-233, 245, 251, 252-253 
Kennedy, Sen. Robert, 27, 199, 207, 
247, 307, 308 

Kennedy-Johnson regime, 20, 72, 95, 
112, 127, 139-142; 150, 163-164, 189, 
199-200, 202, 218, 292, 298, 304- 
3°9» 316-317 

Kent, Rockwell, case, 193 

Kerr, Sen. Robert, 161 

Keynes, John Maynard, 89-91, 114, 129 

Keyserling, Leon, 74, 96 

Khrushchev, Nikita, 294-295, 299 

King, Martin Luther, 95, 206-207 

Kirk, Russell, 49 

Klotz, Herbert W., 310 

Knebel, Fletcher, 48-49, 307 

Krivitsky, General, 221 

Krock, Arthur, 260, 265, 306 

Ku Klux Klan, 45, 69, 70, 287 

Labin, Madame Suzanne, 260 

Lambert, Rudy, 212 

Lampman, Robert, 96 

Lane, Maj. Gen. Thomas A., 296n 

Laos, 28, 36, 300 

Larsen, Emmanuel, 228, 229 

Larson, Arthur, 49, 288 

Lattimore, Owen, 19, 218-225 

Lausche, Sen. Frank, 260 

League of Industrial Democracy, 93 

Leddy, Raymond, 235 

Lee, Jennie, 75 

Lee, Vincent Theodore, 197 

LeMay, Gen. Curtis, 19, 294, 314 

Lerner, Max, 260 

Lesinski, John, 101-102 

Lewis, Fulton, Jr., 218 

The Liberal Establishment 


Liberal Papers, The, 49, 205 

Liddy, Linda, 281 

Life, 34, 38, 260 

“Life Lines,” 291 

Lippmann, Walter, 92, 93 

Litvinoff, Maxim, 222 

Lodge, Henry Cabot, 38, 40 

Loeb, James, Jr., 71 

Lomanitz, Giovanni Rossi, 212-213 

Look, 34, 48, 49, 307 

Los Angeles Times, 67, 71, 260 

Louisville Courier-Journal, 34 

Luce, Henry, 34 

Lukens, Donald E. “Buz,” 37 

McCarthy, Sen. Eugene, 60, 7 177 
McCarthy, Sen. Joseph R., 218, 224 
McClellan, Sen. John, 270 
McCormally, John, 106-107 
McCullock, Frank, 72 n 
McDonald, David, 70 
MacDonald, Dwight, 3177 
McGaffin, William, 44 
McGee, Sen. Gale, 286-287 
McGhee, George, 255 
Mclntire, Rev. Carl, 31671 
McKeithen, Gov. John J., 104 
McLendon, Lennox P., 265 
McLendon, Sarah, 233 
McLeod, Scott, 201 
McManus, Charles A., 286 
Macmillan, Harold, 260 
McNamara, Sen. Pat, 7171 
McNamara, Sec. Robert, 46, 100, 265, 
282, 296, 300, 314 

Madison, James, 111-114, 11 6, 125, 
170, 172 

Magnavox Company, 263 
Magnuson, Sen. Warren, 60 
Mallory, Ambassador, 236-237 
Mallory, Andrew", 185, 319 
Manion, Clarence, 292, 315 
Manley, Jack, 212 
Mao Tse-tung, 36 
Marshall, Henry, 268-270, 273-274 
Marx, Karl, 194 
Mason, Lowell, 115 
Matthews, Herbert L., 237-238 
Mattox, W. F. (Bill), 163-164, 273-274 
May, Kenneth, 212 

Mayer, Major William, 179 

Mazo, Earl, 43 

“Medicare,” 140-147 

Men of the Far Right, 25 

Meredith, James, 275 

Mid-Atlantic Stainless Steel Co., 156 

Miller, Rep. William, 45 

Milwaukee Journal, 34 

Minneapolis Star, 31677 

Mississippi, University of, 275 

Mitchell, Kate Louise, 228 

Mitchell, Stephen, 69 

“Mobilization for Youth,” 187-189 

Mooney, Booth, 64, 149 

Moreell, Adm. Ben, 56-57, 121 

Morgan, Edward P., 34, 47, 292 

Morgan, Howard, 7277 

Morgan, Thomas, 214 

Morris, William E., 162 

Morse, Sen. Wayne, 7177 

Morton Salt Co., 123 

Mosby, Aline, 194 

Mosk, Stanley, 184 

Moynihan, Pat, 96 

Mudd, Roger, 267 

Mundt, Sen. Karl, 297 

Murphy, Charles, 7177, 160-163 

Murray, Thomas E., 216 

Murrow, Edward R., 225 

Nadasdy, Leonard, 37 

Nashville Tennessean, 43 
National Advisory Council on Educa¬ 
tion for the Disadvantaged, 10977 
NAACP, 31677 

National Association of Manufac¬ 
turers, 17 
NBC-TV, 34 

National Council for Civic Responsi¬ 
bility, 288-289, 291 

National Council of Churches of 
Christ in America, 35 
National Education Association, 106- 

National Labor Relations Board, 124- 


National Opinion Research Corp., 145 
National Review, 67 
National Science Foundation, 115 
National War College, 202, 248 



National Youth Administration, 153 
Nation's Business, 118 
Nelson, Steve, 192-193, 212, 214 
Nestigen, Ivan, 7in 
Neuberger, Sen. Maureen, 7 in, 94, 

New America, 95 
New Conservatism—What Went 
Wrong?, The, 25 

New Deal, 55-57, 76-77, 87-89, 126 
New Frontier, 60, 160, 199, 202, 248, 
252, 278-279, 285, 300, 304, 306, 
309-312, 214 
New Masses, 221 
New Republic, 3 in, 107 
New York Civil Liberties Union, 207 
New York Daily News, 187-188 
New York Herald Tribune, 42, 60, 
260, 307, 308-309, 312W 
New York Times, The, 16, 19-20, 34, 
36, 43, 48, 96, 158, 183, 210, 237-239, 
259, 260, 263-266, 295-297, 305-306, 

New York World Telegram and Sun, 


New Yorker, The, 35 
Newsweek, 16, 34, 38, 39, 41, 44, 48, 
95-96, 207, 224, 306 
Nixon, Richard, 36, 43, 48, 260 
Novak, Robert, 38 

North American Newspaper Alliance, 

O’Brien, Lawrence, 7 m, 309, 310 
O’Daniel, W. Lee “Pappy/" 55 
On the Beach, 35 
Operation Abolition, 205-206 
Oppenheimer, Frank F., 212 
Oppenheimer, J. Robert, 19, 210-215, 
217, 218 

Oppenheimer, Jackie, 212, 214 
Oppenheimer, Katherine P., 212, 213 
Ordeal by Slander, 225 
Oswald, Lee Harvey, 29-32, 92, 194- 
198, 199, 208, 312-313, 319 
Otepka, Otto, 19, 199-202, 226, 231- 
232, 241-242, 246-253, 271, 319 
Other America, The, 95 
Outer Mongolia, 218-219, 222, 224 

Overseas Weekly, 296 n 
Overstreet, Harry and Bonaro, 25 

Pacific Affairs, 221 
Parr, George, 150 
Pawley, William D., 235-236, 240 
Peabody, George, College, 103 
Pearson, Drew, 256, 257, 265, 267 
Peterson, Esther, 72 n 
Philadelphia Inquirer, 47 n 
Phillips, Cabell, 183, 263-265, 295-297 
Pickle, “Jake,” 153 
Poage, Rep. Bob, 160 
“Poverty,” 94-96, 104, 126-135, 136, 

Power, Gen. Thomas, 314 
“Pragmatism,” 54, 64, 320, 325 
“Preferred rights,” 171-174, 253, 277, 

Procter & Gamble, 124 
Progressive Party, 72 
“Property rights,” 172-175, 268, 319- 

Proxmire, Sen. William, 7in 
Public Affairs Institute, 289-291 
“Public sector,” 127-129 

Radical Right, The, 25 
Radical right, the, 24-25, 38, 283 
Ralph, James T., 162 
Rand School, 93 
Ransburg, Harold, 287 
Rauh, Joseph L., 69, 70, 86, 91-93, 207 
Reader’s Digest, 34 
Reilly, John F., 247-252 
Reporter, 34, 260 
Reston, James, 48, 149 
Reuther, Victor, 27 
Reuther, Walter, 27, 92, 93, 95 
“Reuther Memorandum/" 282-284, 
292 , 3 J 5 

Reynolds, Don B., 150, 156-158, 262- 
268, 274, 313-314 
Ribicoff, Sen. Abraham, 71 
Riggs, Robert L., 56-57 
Ripon Society, The, 42-43 
Robinson-Patman Act, 115, 121 
Rockefeller, Gov. Nelson, 36-44 
Roddy, Joseph, 49 
Roepke, Wiehelm, 90 

The Liberal Establishment 


Rogoff, Soviet Agent, 221 
Roll Call, 42 
Romagna, Jack, 308-309 
Roosevelt, Eleanor, 60, 68, 7271 
Roosevelt, President F. D., 55, 60, 
Roosevelt, Rep. James, 205 
Rosenberg, Julius and Ethel, 194 
Rosinger, Lawrence K., 221 
Rossiter, Clinton, 49 
Rostow, Walt W., 305, 315 
Roth, Lieut. Andrew, 228, 230 
Rovere, Richard H., 15, 53 
Rowan, Carl T., 7 in, 256-262 
Russell, Sen. Richard, 260 
Rutherford, Rep. Jim “Slick,” 160, 
162, 163 

St. George, Rep. Katherine, 265 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 34, 10972 
Salinger, Pierre, 184, 307, 31271 
Saloma, John, 42 
San Francisco Chronicle, 34, 184 
San Francisco Examiner, 41 
San Jose (Calif.) Mercury, 43 
Sane Nuclear Policy Committee, 34 
Saragat, Giuseppe, 75 
Saturday Evening Post, 34, 38, 68, 80 
Saturday Review, The, 35 
Schary, Dore, 288-289 
Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr., 34, 95, 99, 
122, 126-127, 130, 307, 320, 323; 
ADA, and, 68-71, 74-81, 85-86 
Schneider, Clarence J., 249, 251 
Schaek, Helmut, 145 
Schuman, Charles, 117-118 
Schumann, Maurice, 260 
Schwartz, Fred, 283, 284 
Scott, Sen. Hugh, 265, 313 
Scott, Paul, 195, 247, 314 
Scranton, Gov. William, 38-40, 42-44 
Security and Consular Affairs, Bureau 
of, 232 

Senate Armed Services Committee, 

Senate Internal Security Subcommit* 
tee, 190, 197-200, 205, 218-219, 224, 
233-243, 248-253, 254-262, 313 
Senate Rules Committee, 156, 262-3, 
265, 267, 313-314 

Service, John Stewart, 201-202, 225- 
232, 246 

Sevareid, Eric, 33-34 
Seven Days in May, 35 
Shaw, Bernard, 74 
Shea, J. M., Jr., 49 
Sherwin, Mark, 25 
Shriver, R. Sargent, 96 
Sigma Delta Chi, 309 
Sinclair, Upton, 95 
“Sino-Soviet bloc,” 295 
Small Business Administration, 113 
Smith, Ambassador Earl E. T., 237- 

Smith, Gerald L. K., 287 
Smith, Howard K., 34, 41, 45 
Smith, Mrs. Jean, 308 
Smith, Sen. Margaret Chase, 40 
Smith, W. R., 151 
Smith Act, 190, 192-193, 205 
Smoot, Dan, 292 
Smyth, Henry DeWolf, 216 
Snow, Edgar, 224 

Social Security, 40-41, 113, 139-147 
Socialism, 74-76, 325-326 
Solution in Asia, 220-221 
Sorensen, Theodore C., 71, 307, 309 
Sourwine, Jay, G., 200-201, 233-244, 
248-252, 258-260 

Soviet Union, 183, 220-223, 227-229, 

Spaak, Paul Henri, 260 
Spivack, Robert, 60, 308 
Stassen, Harold, 39 
State Department, 199-203, 218-219, 
221-222, 225-226, 228-233, 236-238, 
241-244, 246-252, 253-262, 294-295, 
298-299, 305, 315 
Steele, Jack, 41, 47-48, 273 
Stennis, Sen. John, 314 
Stevenson, Adlai, 28, 70, 128, 130, 
132, 160, 187, 303 
Stevenson, Gov. Coke, 150-151 
Stilwell, Gen. Joseph, 226, 229 
Strachey, John, 91 

Strange Tactics of Extremism, The, 


Strauss, Adm. Lewis, 215 
Strout, Richard, L., 3in 
Struelens, Michel, 19, 253-262, 322 
Suall, Irwin, 96 



Subversive organization, 190, 199, 205, 
210, 282-283 

Supreme Court, U.S., 116-117, 122, 
181-182, 185-186, 192-193, 199, 217, 

Susskind, David, 35 
Sylvester, Arthur, 305-307 

Taber, Robert, 197-198, 208 
Taft, Sen. Robert A., 60 
Tatlock, Jean, 211, 213 
Taxes for the Schools, 99 
Taylor, Allen, 68 
Texas Quarterly, The, 64 
TFX controversy, 311 
Theobald, Robert, 88 
They’d Rather Be Right, 25 
Thomas, Norman, 45, 93-95, 96, 326 
Thurmond, Sen. Strom, 47, 294, 296- 
298, 300 

Tigert, John J., 101 
Time, 34, 39, 96, 120, 316/1 
Tower, Sen. John, 296/1 
Trudeau, Lt. Gen. Arthur, 294 
Truman, President Harry, 55, 202, 

Tshombe, Premier Moise, 36, 254, 
257, 259-261 
Tucker, Ernest C., 155 
Tucker, Wilson, 161 
Tugwell, Rexford G., 88 
Tully, Andrew, 266 
Tyler, Carol, 154 
Tynan, Kenneth, 198 

Udall, Stewart, 310 
Underhill, John, 286 
United Nations, 218, 222, 229, 253- 
255» 257, 299, 317 
United Press International, 149, 193 
US. News and World Report, 34, 37 n, 
58, 112, 140, 151, 309, 311 
United States Steel, 119-120, 137 
Utley, Freda, 220, 228 

Van Doren, Charles, 179 
Vanocur, Sander, 34 
Vidal, Gore, 35 
Viereck, Peter, 25, 49 
Viet Nam, 36, 45 

Vincent, John Carter, 219 
Von Mises, Ludwig, 284 

Walker, Maj. Gen. Edwin A., 275, 
295-296, 322 

Wall Street Journal, The, 34, 38, 
123, 125, 152-153, 155 
Wallace, Gov. George, 37 
Wallace, Henry, 72, 219 
Wallas, Graham, 74 
War Information, office of, 228 
Warren, Chief Justice Earl, 192, 313 
Warren Commission, 28-30, 206, 313 
Washington Post, 34, 46, 95, 107, 160, 
210, 224, 256 
Washington Star, 263 
Watkins case, 192 
Wayne State University, 92 
Weaver, George L. P., 72 
Weaver, Robert C., 71, 72 n 
Webb, Sidney and Beatrice, 74 
Wedemeyer, Gen. Albert, 226, 227 
Weir, James, 119 
Welch, Robert, 29 
White, Brig, Gen. John W., 295 
White, Theodore, 33, 38 
White, William S., 60, 260 
Whitehead, Doug, 280, 281 
Wickard, Filbum, 117 
Wieland, William, 201-202, 232-245, 
246, 252-253 
Wiggins, James, 145 
Williams, G. Mennen, 69, 70, 71, 256- 
257, 261 

Williams, Sen. Harrison, 95 
Williams, Sen. John, 262, 270-271, 274 
Wilson, Harold, 93 
Wilson, Richard, 49 
Wirtz, Willard, 311 
Wise, David, 312/1 

Yarborough, Ralph, 160, 162, 260 
Yarmolinsky, Adam, 96 
Yates case, 192 
Young, Albert G., 156-157 
Young Americans for Freedom, 279- 

Young Republican National Federa¬ 
tion, 37 

Zuckert, Eugene, 215