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CHINESE-MIDDLE EAST RELATIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 



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George Foster SCHIECK 



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ABSTRACT {Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number^ 

China and the Middle East nave engaged in various interactions throughout the post-war 
period. This thesis looks at those interactions and postulates a purposeful intent 
underlying Chinese-Middle Eastern activity. Purposeful intent is deduced from a con- 
sideration of extant and subsequently probable Chinese and Middle Eastern foreign 
policies. Vehicles for examining these foreign policies include: aspects of applicabl 
domestic fabrics; those fabrics' perceptions of international requirements; external 
realities of the countries involved; the regional interaction itself. Economic, cul- 
tural, security and diplomatic issues are included. Likely goals and objectives of 
China and the Middle East through continued interaction are discussed. Israel and the 
other Levantine states comprise the two primary foci used to identify the Middle East 
region. China is discussed first from the period beginning with 1949 through to the 



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Claude A. Buss 



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Block 18: (cont) 

cations; Economic, Security and Diplomatic Areas; Ideology; Superpower; U.N.; 

Four Modernizations; Deng Xiaoping 

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ascendancy of Deng Xiaoping, then from the Four Modernizations and reform through 
to the present. Implications for U.S. policy regarding both China and the Middle 
East conclude the study. 



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Chinese -Middle East Relations 
and their Implications for U.S. Policy 



by 



George Foster Schieck 

Lieutenant, United 'States Navy 

B.A., West Virginia Wesleyan College, 1973 

M.A., Boston University, 1978 



Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 



MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS 

from the 

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
June 1992 



xii 






t.l 

ABSTRACT 

China and the Middle East have engaged in various interac- 
tions throughout the post-war period. This thesis looks at 
those interactions and postulates a purposeful intent underly- 
ing Chinese-Middle Eastern activity. Purposeful intent is 
deduced from a consideration of extant and subsequently 
probable Chinese and Middle Eastern foreign policies. Vehi- 
cles for examining these foreign policies include: aspects of 
applicable domestic fabrics; those fabrics' perceptions of 
international requirements; external realities of the coun- 
tries involved; the regional interaction itself. Economic, 
cultural, security and diplomatic issues are included. Likely 
goals and objectives of China and the Middle East through 
continued interaction are discussed. Israel and the other 
Levantine states comprise the two primary foci used to 
identify the Middle East region. China is discussed first 
from the period beginning with 1949 through to the ascendancy 
of Deng Xiaoping, then from the Four Modernizations and reform 
through to the present. Implications for U.S. policy regard- 
ing both China and the Middle East conclude the study. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS ' " 

I . INTRODUCTION 1 

II. CHINA (PRO AND THE MIDDLE EAST 11 

A. GENERAL HISTORY OF INTERACTION 18 

B. CHRONOLOGY SINCE 1949 27 

III. DETERMINANTS OF PRO AND MIDDLE EAST FOREIGN 

POLICIES SINCE 1949 84 

A. PRC 86 

1 , Before Deng Xiaoping 91 

2 . Four Modernizations and Reform 12 

B. MIDDLE EAST 154 

1 . Israel 165 

2 . Other Middle East States 183 

IV. CHINESE ACTIVITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST 2 02 

A . ECONOMIC 206 

B. SECURITY 2 08 

C. DIPLOMATIC 210 

V. MIDDLE EAST ACTIVITIES IN CHINA 214 

A. ISRAEL 214 

B. OTHER MIDDLE EAST STATES 215 

VI . POLICY SUMMARIES 217 

A. DOES CHINA HAVE OR EXERCISE A "MIDDLE 

EAST POLICY" ? 219 

1 . Economic 222 

2 . Security 225 



a. Technology and Lessons Learned 

(Israel) 228 

b. Offsetting Other Non-Middle 

Eastern Powers. 229 

3. Diplomatic 238 

a. Taiwan 239 

b. Reduce Great Power Influence 240 

B. DOES ISRAEL HAVE OR EXERCISE A "CHINA 

POLICY? " 241 

1 . Economic 242 

a . New Markets 243 

b. Diversification 244 

2 . Security 245 

a. Possible R&D Assistance 246 

b. Diversification 247 

3 . Diplomatic 249 

a. Recognition 249 

b. Dilute U.S. Influence 250 

C. DO OTHER MIDDLE EAST STATES HAVE OR 

EXERCISE A "CHINA POLICY" ? 250 

1 . Economic 2 51 

a . New Market s 251 

b. Location for Investment 252 

2 . Security 253 

a. "General Store" 254 

b. Diversification 255 

3 . Diplomatic 255 



VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY. 2 57 

A . U.S. AND THE PRC 266 

1. Ideology and the "Death of Communism" 268 

2 . Superpowers? 277 

a. Kennedy, Nye, Toffler, et.ai 284 

3 . The UN and Regional Issues 290 

B. U.S. AND THE MIDDLE EAST 2 93 

1. Israel 295 

a. Arab-Israeli Dilemma 298 

b. Israeli U.S. Lobby 299 

2 . Other Middle East States 300 

a. Infrastructure and Resources 301 

b. Islam 302 

c. An Honest Broker 304 

3 . The UN and Regional Issues 305 

APPENDIX - SIGNIFICANT CALENDAR YEAR DATES FOR 

CHINA AND THE MIDDLE EAST 310 

FOOTNOTES 313 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 322 

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 339 



ACKNOWLEDGMENT 

I must include, by way of initial remarks, several rounds 
of thanks. First to the U.S. Navy for making possible thirty 
marvelous months of experiences in Monterey (including initial 
exposure to Hebrew and Mandarin) . Then to my advisors for 
allowing simultaneous work in both the Middle East and Far 
East area studies programs. Finally and most importantly, for 
the privilege of studying under Professor Buss who - among 
other things - is a scholar and splendid humanitarian. 



I . INTRODUCTION 

The nascent subject of Chinese-Middle East relations has 
been little acknowledged and even less understood, yet is not 
of inconsiderable importance. Both China and the Middle East 
figure prominently in their own respective strategic, economic 
and political spheres; the manner in which these two regions 
or spheres choose to interact - or not to interact - may well 
have larger import than our traditional regional analyses of 
these areas would indicate. As nations world-wide currently 
reexamine their roles within the rapidly evolving geopolitical 
arena of the 1990s and beyond, analyses pertaining to regional 
interaction deserve timely attention. The many readily 
apparent economic, political and/or social evolutions now 
occurring throughout Eurasia, the Middle East, and the Pacific 
(plus evolutions that are perhaps not so readily apparent) , 
lend the question of Chinese-Middle Eastern relations fresh 
and, as it will be shown, uniquely pertinent import. 

Immediate and long term implications of recent events 
throughout the Middle and Far East highlight the importance we 
ascribe to occurrences within these regions. The interaction 
of these occurrences, both directly and indirectly, generates 
and reflects considerable impact on the rest of the world. 
Our understanding (or perception) of the implications of these 
events as well as, secondarily, the events themselves combine 
to govern our formulation and prescription of policy. Some of 



the more recent and prominent of these events, a few of which 
are quite remarkable, include Khomeini's reign and legacy, 
Chinese student-led appeals for democracy and the Tienanmen 
massacre, Iraqi hostilities with Iran and Kuwait, continued 
Arab-Israeli dilemmas (illustrated as well as exacerbated by 
the Intifada) , and recent Middle East peace initiatives. This 
thesis concerns itself with the circumstances and implications 
of these and other events, viewed both regionally and inter- 
regionally, then entertains conclusions regarding Chinese and 
Middle Eastern interaction along with suggestions for the 
focus and direction of related U.S. policy. 

Inherent to the introduction within this first chapter 
are two major premises. First, that there indeed is, has been 
and will continue to be, a definite level of measurable and 
purposeful activity between China and the Middle East. 
Secondly, that despite the complex, fluid and seemingly 
disparate qualities associated with so many variables resident 
within each of the two regions, there yet remains a viable 
basis for considering the question of current and subsequent 
interaction (s) between China and the Middle East. 

Chapter II reviews the historical sweep of relations 
between China and the Middle East and concludes with an 
extensive chronology of Chinese-Middle Eastern events and 
interaction, plus other significant occurrences, since 1949. 
Although the Middle East itself may be described as an area 
from the Atlantic to the Indus and from the Sudan to the Black 



Sea, the area addressed here is located primarily within the 
fertile crescent; this abbreviated area is the hub of the 
region and more than adequate in scope for this discussion. 
Pakistan is included within the group of Middle Eastern states 
due to its ties both to China and to the Middle East. The 
year 1949 was selected as the primary point of departure 
because it collectively represents: the establishment of the 
People's Republic of China (PRO; the first full year of 
Israel's existence as a modern state; the basic time frame 
beyond which the contemporary shape of the Middle East 
coalesced. ^ 

Chapter III considers determinants of foreign policy both 
for China and for the Middle East in terms of their specific 
regions. Middle Eastern topics will be apportioned, respec- 
tively, between Israel and the other Middle Eastern states. 
An additional premise of this thesis assumes that foreign 
policies serve the national interests of their respective host 
states, which incorporates a final major premise holding that 
any study of foreign policy, especially as a cornerstone for 
looking at interaction between two or more countries or 
regions, entails a broad discussion. This discussion in- 
cludes: 1) national domestic and/or cultural fabrics; 2) 
compositions and relevancies (or legitimacy) , of state 
leadership; 3) evident policy machineiry; 4) national 
perceptions of international realities and related security 
requirements; 5) dynamics stemming from interaction within 



the international community. Salient aspects from each of 
these issues, as they relate both to China and to the Middle 
East, are requisite components in the consideration of foreign 
policy determinants. Discussion will be confined to salient 
aspects only, otherwise the subject would readily digress. 

Those above several elements include, or might be 
collectively referred to as, the comparatively recent disci- 
pline of Political Culture.^ I do not mean to serve as 
apologist for this new discipline, nor to consider the various 
ways, quantitative or otherwise, in which Political Culture 
might eventually acquire sufficient stature so as to incorpo- 
rate predictive capabilities. Rather I intend to entertain 
what seems to me an intuitive, seat-of -the-pants procedure: 
namely, if you want to know what the other guy is thinking or 
planning, then you have to know what is important to that 
person or group. This must be done, as far as is feasible, 
from his/her/their own perspective. Culture, state machinery, 
and all the rest, are certainly ingredients for uncovering 
priorities of any one person or group, especially within a 
governmental or foreign policy framework. The world is not 
yet small enough, despite explosions of mobility and access to 
information, to nullify the idiosyncracies of domestic fabrics 
that are distinctive formulative ingredients of thought 
processes and also of knee jerk reactions. Indeed, even 
language, its phonetics, vocabulary, syntax and written form, 
may well have a profound place (both formative and symptom- 



atic) , in the process of shaping thoughts, ideas, and hence 
priorities . 

Domestic and regional topics are considered with an eye 
to their explicatory assistance for cross-regional interac- 
tion. China will be considered in two periods, the first 
being from 1949 to the arrival of Deng Xiaoping' s leadership 
and then subsequently through to the present. Possible policy 
directions and impacts of recent economic and political 
changes within China will be included. For the Middle East, 
Israel's formation and execution of foreign policy will be 
considered, followed by a look at the policy development, 
priorities and dilemmas of the other primary Middle Eastern 
states. National and/or demographic variations among these 
Middle Eastern states will be taken into account. As with the 
discussion on China, impacts of growth plus other current and 
projected events within the Middle East will be considered 
when postulating probable directions of national and regional 
concerns in that region. 

The international scope and practical levels of Chinese- 
Middle East interaction itself are addressed in Chapters IV 
and V. Actual and likely activities of China in the Middle 
East, as well as Middle Eastern activities vis-a-vis China, 
will be considered. Economic, cultural, security and diplo- 
matic issues encompass the areas to be addressed. 

Chapter VI recaps the central implications and discusses 
the central conclusions of whether or not meaningful and long 



term policies of interaction exist between China and the 
Middle East (or the Middle East and China) , plus their likely 
continued evolution. Against a backdrop of historical 
interaction and concomitant consideration of Chinese-Middle 
Eastern national fabrics and regional interaction since 1949, 
considerable support is provided for showing purposeful intent 
within Chinese-Middle Eastern relations. By way of contrast, 
it will be noted that occasional third party political 
analysis, from examining selected issues only (e.g. politics, 
or economics, or arms sales), regards interaction between 
China and the Middle East, or portions thereof, as sporadic at 
best and/or opportunistic at worst. I submit, however, that 
such attempts at analysis are too narrow and very misleading. 
Similarly, and related to the long term and purposeful 
Chinese-Middle Eastern interactions here postulated, a no less 
important conclusion states that the gain or benefit derived 
from these purposeful policies and interactions (compared to 
interactions between the Middle East and powers other than 
China) , has far exceeded the relatively limited scale of 
operational endeavor upon which, so far, these policies have 
been conducted. That is, the Chinese (and perhaps also the 
Middle Easterners), have indeed received a big bang for their 
buck and may well have planned it that way. One additional 
conclusion maintains that conditions of Chinese-Middle Eastern 
relations may indeed serve as a general bellwether for Chinese 
international relations and intentions as a whole. 



Implications for U.S. policy stemming from the above will 
be considered in Chapter VII, pertaining both to China and to 
the Middle East. Aspects of these closing comments include: 
1) the place of ideology; 2) what it means to be a superpower 
(including perceptions of national decline and/or evolution) ; 
3) the role of an honest broker for the Middle East; 4) 
effects of the internecine dilemmas within the Middle East 
itself; 5) China's increasing role within Asian and world 
affairs; and 6) corresponding impacts of China and the Middle 
East on U.S. domestic politics. 

An appendix containing notable dates for both China and 
the Middle East - important birthdays, anniversaries of 
significant events, holidays and cultural landmarks - has been 
included. The unique forces at work in these regions quite 
frequently are associated with or catalyzed by, to the extent 
of being explained or characterized by, calendar reference 
points . 

There is one last assumption, in addition to those 
utilized above by the thesis, within which the entire thesis 
is located, as in a venue. Namely that there is an ongoing 
generic need for reexamining traditional concepts and methods 
of measurement whereby conclusions are formed regarding 
domestic and international proclivities of other states or 
regions. Such reexaminations are requisite, due to the many 
faceted nature associated with any examination of foreign 
policy, and especially now for all concerned with the contin- 



ued emergence (or perhaps, simplistically, the "realignment"), 
of China and the rest of Asia through to and including the 
Middle East (not to mention Europe and the former Soviet 
Union) . It is these overall reexaminations that help to give 
shape to our recognition and understanding of Chinese-Middle 
Eastern relations. Post war conceptions such as "bipolarity " , 
plus the traditional nation-state system as derived from the 
European model (which dominated thinking for centuries) , 
simply no longer apply, if they ever did; this, in turn, 
effects our perceptions (or new reality, if you will), of 
current regional interaction. Ferreting out, or making sense 
of, another count2:y's or region's perceptions and policies so 
as to better address our own is only as valid as the concepts 
and measuring devices employed throughout the process. If 
attempts to understand others' perceptions and policies 
utilize weak or brittle conceptual tools, then incorporation 
of subsequent conclusions and directions into our own policies 
based on those attempts will serve primarily to generate or 
even perpetuate the possibility of out-of-sync relations as 
well as the likelihood of bad policy. 

This thesis began at a time when the Berlin Wall still 
appeared secure in its divisiveness . I was confident of 
finding long term undercurrents of Chinese-Middle Eastern 
interaction, and wondered then how to best postulate what I 
took to be their inevitable growth and impact. Since 1989, 
the world has rapidly shelved long-held traditional assump- 

8 



tions not only in Berlin and Europe, but also in Moscow, 
Beijing, Baghdad and most recently in Arab-Israeli capitals. 
Concomitantly, Chinese-Middle Eastern interaction has steadily 
emerged into public view and requires, now, not so much a 
postulation of its existence but rather a characterization of 
its tenor and scope. Also, since undertaking this project, 
and via assignments throughout the Pacific Rim, Persian Gulf, 
and Arabia, it became increasingly apparent to me, somewhat 
unexpectedly, just how much information, both relevant to this 
topic and available within the public domain, is already "out 
there" waiting to be culled into informative narratives. This 
material, in the aggregate, is voluminous and found (sometimes 
piecemeal), in scores of private and public collections 
throughout these and other regions. Furthermore, as China 
grows more accessible, despite setbacks, to pursuit by 
outsiders of indigenous sources, the scope of available 
material increases exponentially. Information regarding the 
Middle East is, in similar fashion, substantial and growing: 
this is an indication not only of increased activity in that 
region but also of our interest in it. Most of the material 
employed in this initial study utilizes secondary sources and 
is but a fraction of the whole. My occasional access to 
primary sources indicates their tantalizing potential and the 
intriguing nature (as it seems to me), of this subject. I 
have tried to keep all material proportionately representative 



and to weave historical perspective through the political and 
social analysis. 

Continued development of this subject must include, at 
the very least, liberal use of primary source material gleaned 
from national and regional capitals, industrial sectors, 
agriculture, banking and finance, academia, the military, 
technical development, telecommunications, diplomatic inter- 
change, and personal voices within all of the above named 
sectors and also from within the countries to be considered. 
Despite the introductory nature of this current project, I 
remain absolutely convinced of the direction and general 
veracity of its conclusions. 



10 



II. CHINA (PRO AND THE MIDDLE EAST 

Since the Hellespont is a traditional dividing line 
between Occident and Orient, portions of the Middle East 
(certainly Iran and Pakistan, perhaps also Iraq and Syria) , 
may be said to be parts of Asia. Other portions of the Middle 
East are said to be African (Egypt, Libya, the Sudan), while 
still others are said to bridge continents (Arabian Peninsula, 
Israel, Jordan, Kuwait). Regardless of the geographic rubric 
under which the Middle East is placed, it is important, first, 
to regard both the Middle East and China not as immutably 
fixed locations under this or that label, but rather primarily 
as centers of fluid activity depicted within national parame- 
ters . 

Common perceptions of China picture it as a timeless and 
immutable monolith (full of Asian mysteries, to be sure, but 
monolithic nonetheless), between the Pacific and Hindu Kush, 
yet the borders of China have migrated rather frequently and 
extensively over the centuries. This historical flexibility 
continues into the present. Xinjiang's incorporation within 
the PRC, as an example, is by no means as historically 
inevitable as is that of the provinces closer to the coast. 
Since 1949, Chinese interests in Tibet plus border consulta- 
tions and confrontations with Pakistan and India, respective- 
ly, are additional illustrations of the mutable dimensions of 
the PRC. Other changes preceding and during World War II 

11 



resulted in the readjustment of China's border in the Mongo- 
lian and Manchurian sectors. Negotiations already completed 
and others pending or anticipated regarding Macao, Hong Kong 
and Taiwan, will further adjust China's national configuration 
(and add to her diverse national character as well) . Novel 
developments in the Spratlys already promise both actual and 
perceptual readjustment of China's southeastern frontiers. 
Still other regions, such as Outer Mongolia, the Maritime 
Provinces, Korean Peninsula, Ryukyu Islands and portions of 
Southeast Asia, were at various times integral elements of 
China . 

Similarly, the Middle East has only recently acquired its 
current cartographic guise. Its contemporary national 
boundaries, created for the most part by third parties with 
vested colonial interests, not infrequently serve as fictional 
(and also frictional), lines between tribal or other more 
primary and stronger allegiances. These nominal boundaries 
have been subject to fairly constant flows of redefinition and 
alteration resulting from a plethora of Middle Eastern 
sources. These alterations, within the time period we are 
considering, are not as likely to occur primarily as functions 
of outlying provincial relations to a strong or weak regional 
center - as has been the case, historically, with China. 
Rather, ongoing conflicts or tensions (Hashemite-Saudi, 
Shi ' ite-Sunni , Iraqi-Iranian, Iraqi-Syrian, Iraqi-Kuwaiti, 
Progressive-Conservative, Iraqi & Iranian & Turkish vs. 

12 



Kurdish, Persian-Arabic, Arab-Israeli and Palestinian, Pan- 
Arabian vs. Nationalist, Secular Zionist vs. Judaic Orthodox, 
Ashkenazic-Sephardic, Sabra-Immigrant , etc, ) , render the 
Middle East susceptible to a kaleidoscopic host of pressures 
from several directions, often simultaneously. The extensive 
integration of contemporary Middle Eastern economics into 
global markets further extends these pressures onto a wider 
audience. Whether belligerent or beneficent, major or minor, 
these pressures often generate de facto and de jure alter- 
ations of national landscapes and/or priorities within the 
region. 

China and the Middle East are also fluid in a demographic 
sense. Chinese culture has touched every corner of the globe 
and Middle Eastern influence has been legendary in scope. 
"China Towns" exist within most major cities worldwide and the 
range of peoples who consider the Middle East as home, 
ancestrally and/or religiously, are too numerous to count. 
Demographic influences also move in the opposite direction as 
well. Significant inputs of ideas and, again, people (most 
recently dating from the previous century) , have penetrated 
China, now and again, along trade routes and from the coast 
inland. Moreover, Chinese students, scores of thousands of 
them, have lately been pursuing academic or practical prepara- 
tion abroad, beginning with an influx to Japan prior to 
hostilities during the late Qing and early Republican years, 
then largely to Europe and now, after a temporary hiatus of 

13 



enforced isolation, predominantly to the United States. This 
youthful and/or professional peregrination provides another 
very rich source of ideas and experiences for the mainland; 
this influx of ideas is not unrelated (indeed, it is very much 
related) , to events of current concern to Chinese political 
leadership. Israel in the Middle East (in the sense of a 
Jewish homeland) , is a nation comprised during the last 100 
years almost entirely of immigrants, while the Arab countries 
have historically - albeit cyclically - always felt the 
movement of other peoples (merchants, soldiers, clerics, 
etc.), into and through their precincts. Most if not all of 
the Arab states, especially along the Persian Gulf, now act as 
hosts to vast numbers of foreign workers as well as experienc- 
ing unprecedented transient movements of their own peoples 
through non-Arabic and non-Islamic cultures. An outgrowth of 
this new mobility are expatriate and immigrant Arab communi- 
ties appearing throughout Europe and North America. In all of 
these other Middle Eastern countries, various new requirements 
and adjustments related to societal management, education, 
political participation, economics, values, immediate informa- 
tion processing, plus increasingly transitory population 
movements have contributed greatly to cross pollination of 
peoples and ideas. Such movement and avenues of access, taken 
largely for granted in the U.S., Europe and even now (almost) 
in Japan are, for China and much of the Middle East, more 
threatening than not to current established conservative 

14 



hierarchies although again not historically uncommon (espe- 
cially along traditional trade routes, coastal areas and 
population centers). For demographic and national reasons, 
then, both China and the Middle East are very fluid in 
character. 

Still, there remains a fixed timelessness to both 
regions. China has never truly been conquered, even by the 
Mongols or Manchurians, for China's Chineseness has always 
assimilated the would be usurper. China's propensity for 
focusing on itself as an inland power through the centuries 
contributes to maintenance of this "Chineseness". For 
example, the Chinese name for "China" means Middle Kingdom 
around which all other countries are located. Mongol and 
Manchurian invaders both quickly recognized the practicality 
and need for utilizing extant administrative machinery to 
control populations much larger than their own (entrenched and 
extensive bureaucracy is one of China's many inventions). 
Transitions, for the new arrivals, from political management 
into adopting cultural practices and eventual absorption into 
the Chinese domestic fabric became variants of when and not 
if. During the relatively recent so-called colonial era, 
China was never entirely under territorial control by European 
or other powers, much less cultural domination. The Unequal 
Treaties, plus China's general impotence from the late Qing 
years through to the first portion of this century, were acute 



15 



embarrassments and indicative of severe political difficul- 
ties, but not the stuff of complete domination by an outsider. 

On the other hand, and contrary to this experience of 
China, Middle Eastern states have for the most part seldom if 
ever been free of a conqueror's domination, yet their region 
also retains a timeless mystique; Levantine and Arabian 
uniqueness, coupled with the attraction of Jerusalem and 
Mecca, have been magnets that no conqueror could ever truly 
control or overcome. Whether politically beholden to Rome, 
Constantinople, London or Paris, the practicalities of Middle 
Eastern sovereignty and economic management have not altered 
the continued primary focus of all concerned with intangibles 
forever resident in phrases such as "via dolorosa", "the hajj" 
or "next year in Jerusalem" . 

Portions of the Middle East have, however, escaped 
colonization: much of Arabia (comparable in size to the U.S. 
east of the Mississippi), never felt the sway of anything more 
sedentary than Bedouin nomads, adding to that region's 
mystique and timelessness . Another unusual Middle East 
circumstance, mentioned here if for no other reason than to 
highlight little known aspects of Arab history and to abrogate 
stereotypical perceptions, is the Sultanate of Oman; though 
once saddled with foreign occupiers (Portuguese from 1508 to 
1650, Persians from 1741 to 1744), and host to a resident 
British consul since 1800, Oman has had an unbroken and 
extended history, mercantile and sedentary, more-or-less its 

16 



own for centuries, encompassing far flung extraterritorial 
acquisitions such as Zanzibar (separated in 1856), and Gwadar 
(sold to Pakistan in 1958) . Regardless, then, of whether the 
Middle Eastern states were colonized, or atypically, as in the 
case of Oman, themselves colonizers, or neither of the two 
(Arabia) , the respective sacred tenets of Christian, Moslem 
and Jew, as well as other traditions, have given the region a 
unique aspect, rife with variations, all its own. 



17 



A. GENERAL HISTORY OF INTERACTION 

Given these combined fluid as well as timeless character- 
istics of China and the Middle East, plus their continental 
proximity, it is not surprising to learn of their historical 
contact through the ages. Although this contact was limited 
in scope by the formidable natural barriers inherent to both 
regions (the Himalayas in the south and other mountain ranges 
and deserts spanning the remainder of China's frontiers, plus 
an effectively inaccessible interior to all but the coastal 
areas of Arabia) , there was definite and measured human 
traffic between China and regions contiguous to it. The 
famous overland Silk Road is the most prominent example of 
this two way flow of people and goods; along it travelled 
ancient commerce to and from China and Central Asia, the 
Middle East, and beyond. Maritime routes supplemented the 
Silk Road. Occasional Chinese fleets, most notably the Ming 
dynasty voyages, journeyed from the South China Sea to Arabian 
waters to advance commercial interests and the tribute system, 
but these expeditions suffered the fates of political contro- 
versy; rulers of China have continuously debated the merits of 
maritime power (a debate which still continues).^ Seafarers 
from the Persian Gulf also supplemented Silk Road commercial 
flows. Arab traders regularly carried goods between Africa, 
India and China and back to Arabia. Excavations near Salalah 
in Oman are now uncovering an ancient trade center at least as 
grand as Pompeii, which is possibly the fabled city of Ubar 

18 



(from The Arabian Nights) and/or Iram (from the Koran), with 
artifacts that span millenia from Rome, Greece, China, Egypt 
and Syria. Once in Arabia, whether in present day Oman, 
Shatt-al-Arab, or somewhere in between, caravans then carried 
these sea-borne goods to the Mediterranean. This latter 
nautical and caravan link thrived until the 16th century with 
the arrival of colonialism; Arab societies then fell inland 
and an attendant growth of coastal piracy occurred. In 1853 
a treaty of maritime truce amongst various Gulf Sheikdoms, 
giving rise to the term "Trucial States", roughly terminated 
the 200-300 year decline of nautical trade in the Persian Gulf 
area. Subsequent contemporary transport of petroleum, the 
goods attendant to its capital generation, and also the Suez 
Canal on the other side of Arabia, have been leading factors 
for the resurgence of nautical trade in the region. 

For many scores of centuries, commerce along these well 
defined trade routes continued to be the primary and perhaps 
only link between China and the territories beyond her western 
frontier (the Middle East, Russian Principalities and Europe) , 
The only near successful attempt to unite these two areas 
politically was the work of Genghis Khan and his sons. They 
pushed their Mongolian empire from the seacoast of northern 
China almost as far as the Danube, as well as south around the 
Himalayas to the Persian Gulf and the vicinity of Baghdad. 
They reached Asia Minor and had a large window on the Mediter- 
ranean, nearly enveloping the Black Sea in the process and 

19 



stopping just short of bursting into Europe/ All other 
empires, before and since, remained centered either on the 
Mediterranean, on Persia, on South Asia, on Central Asia, or 
on China itself; never again was one political entity to span 
both China and portions of the Middle East. Even Arab 
national expansion and the resultant Ottoman Empire did not 
exceed, politically, the Indus or Caucasus. Subsequent 
Islamic religious expansion did, however, continue centrifu- 
gally into Africa, Southern Europe, Astrakhan, further into 
Central Asia, South Asia, Indonesia and beyond, providing 
significant and lasting cultural bridges. 

Distinguishing between Islamic religious growth and its 
political boundaries is not an easy task; difficulties with 
this distinction are related to Islam's initial 7th century 
theocratic rush of expansion and its traditional predilection 
for governing in both civil and religious affairs wherever it 
resides.^ This historical Islamic preference, whenever 
possible, for the mosque as the preferred seat of government, 
in addition to clerical or moral authority, effectively 
removes the distinction between secular and sacred venues and 
is a primary reason for the muddied distinction between 
Islamic political - and religious - growth or cohesiveness . 
Thus political, as well as cultural, connections might be seen 
among contiguous Islamic settlements, regardless of the 
timing, purpose or sponsorship of their growth, and the 
presence (if any) of adjacent or intersecting "national" 

20 



boundaries, etc. But in terms of concurrent, singular, and 
genuine political unification spanning both traditional China 
and the Middle East, only the great Genghis Khan - a central 
force from the Asian Steppes - has so far been able to bring 
this about, and then for only a very brief period. 

I want again to reemphasize the fluid national and 
demographic activity historically inherent within China, 
especially when considering her expansive interior spaces and 
the various peoples resident there. This human and historical 
diversity is not unimportant, even though now comprising, in 
the sense of population, a mere percentage of China's vast 
masses. Hard references to steady commerce of goods and ideas 
between China and the Mediterranean region via the Silk Road 
date from as early as Ptolemy and, even earlier, from the Han 
Dynasty. The periodic overland east-to-west migrations by 
peoples of the Steppes began at least by 500 A.D.; Attila, 
Genghis Khan and Tamerlane are only a few of the many who 
contested for power throughout this broad region. Arabs, 
Mongols, Tibetans, Chinese and others regularly seesawed 
through Kashi (Kashgar) and/or adjoining areas. Buddhism and 
Islam traversed the Silk Road through Central Asia. Chinese 
suzerainty extended, on occasion, around the Pamirs and into 
Kabul. Kashi and Urumqi are, culturally, as much or more of 
a home to Pakistanis from the south or former Siberian nomads 
to the north as they are now, almost, to Han Chinese from the 
east. Traditional China doesn't even begin to begin until 

21 



Jiayuguan, where the Great Wall has its terminus in Gansu 
province at the eastern fringe of the Taklimakan Desert. This 
interplay of peoples and rivalries surrounding the routes of 
Silk Road commerce had perhaps its grandest manifestation 
during the 19th century's Great Game when Russia, Britain and 
China all jockeyed for strategic position within Central Asia. 
Current PRC-sponsored Chinese migrations into Xinjiang now 
find hureaucratized Kan peoples living rather uneasily side- 
by-side v;ith the free spirited Uygurs, Kirgiz, Kazakhs, and 
others. Xaticnal identities throughout central Asia, from 
Jiayuguan uo Kashi (in China) and again as far on the other 
side of !:he FRC-CIS border to the Caspian Sea (in the former 
So"Lez 'Jnicni , parallel many of the flavors and complexities 
of nationalism and other concerns found in the contemporary 
Middle East:. That "hese central Asian complexities are 
them.selves physically adjacent to the Middle East does little 
to inhibit their volatility. Current activity - a reawakening 
or resurgence of nationalistic and Islam.ic interests through- 
out central Asia - is having an increasingly significant 
irrpact on Chinese and Middle Eastern (and Russian) decisions 
made in capital cities thousands of miles distant from each 
other. Consideration of this resurgent activity will reappear 
throughout these pages. 

When commerce with China was taken up by the maritime 
interests of industrializing Europe and, subsequently, 
America, commercial flows along the old overland Silk Road 

22 



became superceded in volume and dominated by direct sea routes 
largely bypassing the Middle East. (Sea routes between Arabia 
and China had existed for centuries, but as competitive 
alternatives rather than as monopolistic requirements). 
During this period the Qing dynasty was the last to rule 
Imperial China; forms of colonialism and mercantilism proceed- 
ed to infiltrate interaction between China and the rest of the 
world. The Middle East had, by this time, passed from the 
arabian and Islamic Umayyad Dynasty to eventual Ottoman rule. 
It was not until this century's two World Wars that the 
general demise of colonialism then present within Asia and 
elsewhere occurred, along with the fatal weakening of the 
Ottoman Empire; Wilsonian self-determination plus the frame- 
work of the United Nations were causal influences as well as 
symptomatic indicators of colonialism's closure. China and 
the Middle East were now basically, after a fashion, on their 
own again. 

Because of the heated internal Chinese dispute over the 
direction and directors-to-be of mainland China after the 
Qing, the People's Republic (FRC) was not proclaimed until 
late 1949. During the protracted three-way conflict in China 
involving the Communists, Nationalists and Japanese, Mao 
Zedong closely observed the Second World War's progress beyond 
China with an eye to its effect on China's own security; he 
concluded, as had apparently many Chinese rulers before him, 
that the Middle East played a pivotal strategic role as far as 

23 



the ultimate safety of China was concerned/ If the Germans 
(or in later decades the Soviets or Americans), should gain 
uncontested domination over the Middle East, then China's own 
security would become that much more tenuous. For if Germany 
gained control of the Levant in the 1940s, that would have 
isolated South Asia from the global conflict then in progress, 
thus weakening Europe and providing largely unobstructed 
avenues for Axis coordination against China from the west, 
south and east. These observations of Mao were later to 
expand into his Intermediate Zone theory and the Three Worlds 
doctrine .'' 

Meanwhile, rule was established in Moscow by the Russian 
Communists in 1917 and Egypt, after attempts by Saudi Arabia 
and Yemen, became the first Arab state to establish continuous 
relations with the USSR in 1943. Other occurrences within 
this formative period included creation of the UN and Israel, 
which were among the Second World War's more prominent 
byproducts. (The War acted, among other things, as catalyst 
for generation of a forum for nascent ideas of world govern- 
ment, which in turn supported Zionism's drive for a state of 
Israel. Disclosures of the holocaust provided further impetus 
for the formation of Israel) . Even the PRC may be said to be, 
indirectly, a byproduct of the postwar era; the struggles 
which led to the PRC ' s formation had been in progress, 
roughly, since the turn of the centuiry and held to their own 
timetable, although concluding (at least for the time being) , 

24 



in 1949. Israel then became the first Levantine country to 
extend recognition to the PRC in 1950, with Pakistan, also in 
1950, being the first Islamic country to recognize the PRC. 
Although China and Israel did not then quite manage to 
normalize relations, other countries in the Middle East did 
succeed in establishing bilateral relations with China. There 
has subsequently been a steadily increasing involvement of 
China with the Middle East, and vice versa, since 1949. 

Before jumping into post-1949 developments, it is 
instructive to note that despite the fluid (as well as the 
timeless), qualities of China and the Middle East, plus their 
relative geographic proximity, China is one of the very few 
countries where Middle Eastern demographic or cultural 
influence is relatively sparse. References are made to 
communities of Arabs and other traders along the Silk Road and 
coastal areas where commercial activity entered and departed 
China. ^ These settlements, however, either became absorbed 
outright by the Chinese through the centuries, or assimilated 
as in the case of the north central Hui minority, or otherwise 
drifted away, failing to exert sufficient presence to ensure 
their distinctive survival. Islam itself penetrated central 
Asia and became prominent in China's outlying provinces (which 
were not always part of China) , although its direct impact on 
China as a whole has been slight; at present China's popula- 
tion is only 4% Muslim and Buddhist (with perhaps only a few 
hundred Jews, if any) .^ China is learning, however, of the 

25 



potential public relations value intrinsic to its (relations 
with its) minority peoples and of having over 20 million 
Muslims resident within her borders. China must also deal 
with the fact, now unpleasant to Beijing, that much of her 
outlying territory, though sparsely populated, has been 
populated almost entirely with Islamic minorities . ^° 

Likewise with Christianity: Christian impact within China 
remains comparatively mild, but shows signs of recent (since 
the 1700s) growth. Official PRC tolerance for approved 
religious observances within the last decade has afforded a 
respite for Chinese Christians and other religious groups, 
though only to a limited and as yet sporadic extent via 
officially sanctioned churches, both Protestant and Catholic. 
Initial Chinese restrictions against Christian proselytizing 
began from the mid-18th century and were instituted for 
primarily political reasons (catalyzed, paradoxically, by 
Rome's reaction to Jesuit practices at China's Imperial 
court) . These sanctions grew to cultural proportions, 
becoming periodically quite severe against all missionary 
activities, especially during the formative years of the PRC. 
Recent events in Poland and Romania sufficiently roused 
contemporary Chinese leadership to renew sanctions against 
nonof ficial or unapproved Christian groups and other religious 
activities in the PRC. Overall, however, monotheistic 
religions of the sort descended from Middle East patriarchal 
lines are generally accorded just enough indigenous merit, 

26 



receive just enough international attention, and have just 
enough open or hidden local support to currently warrant 
grudging official tolerance within the PRC . (Tibetan Buddhism 
also enjoys, now and again, similar tolerances). So despite 
the recognition we ourselves might find for such practices, 
examples of historically Middle Eastern presences within 
modern China remain few. 

The lack of a historical Chinese presence in the Middle 
East is similar to the present relative dearth of Middle 
Eastern influence within China. Although Chinese have settled 
in almost every corner of the globe, there have been very few, 
if any, to take up residence within the Middle East.^^ Hence 
the curious dichotomy of naturally occurring and practically 
inevitable historical and commercial links between China and 
the Middle East, yet with a modern tradition prior to 1949 
largely devoid of lasting or shared cross-national and cross- 
cultural influences. We will reconsider this dichotomy later. 

B. CHRONOLOGY SINCE 1949 

Primary events occurring within China and the Middle East 
since 1949, plus other notable events of international and 
mnemonic import, mundane and tumultuous, are set in table 
format during the following pages. Direct Chinese-Middle 
Eastern interaction and concerns pertaining to their inter- 
relationships are printed in italics. Fair sprinklings of 
detail are chronicled, incorporating material indicative of 
emotive environments as well as items containing political and 

27 



diplomatic impact. This format, full yet economical, serves 
as a hard reference for discussion of post 1949 events of 
China and the Middle East; it also, in its straightforward 
fashion, helps to reduce the emotive content of a subject that 
is frequently associated with significant degrees of passion. 
It is necessary to have this type of international overview of 
primary political and social developments (in conjunction with 
contemporary U.S. domestic milestones), to better appreciate 
the interactions, and our perceptions, of two globally 
constituent regions. What might be important to us, at any 
given moment, might not be important to someone else, or 
otherwise found to be important or related in different ways. 
This overview will help to foster bird's eye views of interre- 
gional and international relationships that contributed to, or 
at least coexisted with, Chinese and Middle Eastern events and 
by extension our understanding of those events. 



YEAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1949 


1st Arab-Israeli war 




U.S. occupation of 
Japan 




Israel-Egypt cease- 


CCP forces enter 






fire 


Beijing 


Acheson is Secretary 
of State 




Israel shoots down 5 








U.K. aircraft over 








Egypt 




NATO formed 






CCP forces enter 


USSR jams VOA 






Nanjing 


Berlin blockade ends 




Israel joins UN 


CCP forces enter 








Shanghai 


Japan reparations 
payments terminated 

U.S. DOD and JCS 






CCP has about 3 


Chairman established 






million members 


Geneva Red Cross 
convention 




Syrian military coup 


Inner Mongolia joins 








CCP 


U.S. responsible for 
over 45% of world's 






CPPCC Organic Law 


total production 






Xinjiang joins CCP 








CPPCC Common Program 








PRC founded 


U.S. White Paper 






CCP forces enter 


explains loss of 






Guangzhou 


China to the CCP 






PRC demands KMT leave 








UN 


USSR detonates its 






CCP forces enter 


1st atomic device 






Chongqing 


(SEP) 






PRC has relations 








with USSR, E. Europe, 








Mongolia 


USSR atomic weapons 




Office of Israeli 




ban proposal is 




Prime Minister now in 




rejected by UN 




Jerusalem 


PRC seizes U.S. 
assets in China 





29 



YEAR 



MIDDLE EAST 



CHINA 



U.S. /OTHER 



1950 



Entire Israeli govt 
now in Jerusalem 

Israel's Law of 
Return 

Israel proclaims 
Jerusalem capital 



Marriage Law of 1950 
Agrarian Reform Law 



Pakistan is first Muslim state 
to recognize the PRC 

Israel is first Middle East 
Levant state to recognize PRC 



Arab League agrees 
to expel any member 
that makes separate 
peace with Israel 

Jordan announces 
annexation of Arab 
Palestine 

U.S., U.K., France 
(Tripartite) arms 
agreement on trans- 
fers to Middle East 



Israel decides that 
there will be no 
return by Arabs to 
Israeli-held terri- 
tory 



PRC-USSR sign 30 yr 
Friendship, Mutual 
Assistance treaty 

PRC-India Relations 



Shanghai prices rise 
70 times from May 
1949 to Feb 1950 



PRC troops told to 
liberate Tibet 

PRC demands to take 
part in U.S. -Japan 
treaty discussions 



Truman says U.S. 
will not aid ROC or 
meddle with PRC 

U.K. recognizes PRC 



Republic of India 

U.S. authorizes 
H-bomb development 



McCarthy speech 
claiming Communists 
are in State Dept 



Korean War 

Truman orders: aid 
for ROK; 7th Fleet 
to Taiwan Straits; 
military mission to 
ROC; aid for S.E. 
Asia 



U.S. -led embargo on 
all Western goods to 
PRC 



1951 



ARAMCO decision to 
split profits with 
Saudi Arabia 50-50 



30 



YEAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1951 


Israel establishes 






cont 


Dept. to recruit 








foreign scientists 


Taiwan's population 
less than 8 million 






Arab League ponders 








joint foreign policy 








PRC selects Egypt and Pakistan as 






part of 7 nation group to consider 


U.S. -Pakistan sign 




the Far East situation 


technical assistance 








agreement 




Israel wants finan- 


Taiwan's total ex- 






cial credit from any 


ports are $58m 






state, East or West 








Arab League in d 


iiro calls itself 






"Block (Hest and South Asia), to 






balance East and Uest' 








PRC opposes Japanese 








rearmament 






Egypt stays neuti 


'al at UN regarding 






Korea 








Israel-South Africa 


"Elimination of 






Civil Aviation talks 


Counterrevolution- 
aries" campaign 






PRC-Pakistan beg 


n relations 

PRC liberates Tibet 


U.S. joins OAS 




Egypt restricts Suez 








Canal shipping 


"Three-Ant i" campaign 






King of Jordan 








assassinated 




Transcontinental TV 
operational in U.S. 






1st PRC revision 


U.S. -Japan Peace and 




Iranian-U.K. oil 


of education; 


Mutual Security 




dispute 


language reform 
initiated 


Treaties 




U.K. abrogates Anglo- 








Egypt treaty of 1936 


PRC supporting Viet 






U.S., U.K., France, 


Minh 






Turkey propose joint 








Middle East command 







31 



YEAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


1 CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1951 


Israel agrees wi 


th U.K. and France 




cont 


about supporting 


direct U.S. -PRC 






talks on Korea; says troops should 






not be wasted in 


Korea 




1952 


Anti British riots in 
Egypt; U.K. -Egypt 








fighting 


"Five-Anti" campaign 
40% of peasants on 


Congressional 
Hearings on loyalty 
and security within 
the U.S. Govt 






rural mutual-aid 


ANZUS formed 






teams 


State Dept bans all 






Pre-1949 production 


travel to Communist 




Ba'ath Party founded 


peaks of heavy in- 
dustry surpassed 


countries 




King Farouk abdicates 


Mass organizations 






Hussein is King of 


give CCP direct 






Jordan 


contact with half 


Eisenhower elected; 






of all PRC adults 


Dulles becomes 
Secretary of State 


1953 


1st Parliamentary 


1st 5-yr plan 






election in Iraq 


PRC reliance on USSR 
assistance 






USSR stops relations 








with Israel 


Soviets withdrawing 
from Manchuria 


Stalin's Death 
U.S. occupation of 






CCP has 6.1 million 


Japan ends 






members 


Rosenbergs executed 




USSR renews relations 








with Israel 


Halcyon days begin 


Korean Armistice 




U.S. urges Egypt to 


(1953-1957) 






join a collective 




USSR H-bomb 




security pact 




Khrushchev to power 




Pakistan begins 


vote against 






PRC in the UN 




U.S.-ROK Treaty 




Kinq Ibn Saud dies 






1954 






USS NAUTILUS, 1st 




U.S. begins military 




nuclear submarine 




aid to Pakistan 










Population is 586 


U.S. -Japan Defense 




Nasser to power in 


million 


Agreement 




Egypt 




Dien Bien Phu 



32 



lYEAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1954 






U.S. promotes talks 


cont 




PRC- India agreement; 


about International 
Atomic Energy Agency 






5 Principles of 


Geneva Conference on 






Peaceful Coexistence 


Indochina; Dulles 
refuses to shake 






PRC-U.K. relations 


Zhou Enlai's hand 




Egypt-U.K. Suez 








agreement; Britain 


PRC shoots down U.K. 






withdraws from Suez jairliner 








1st National People's 


SEATO formed 






Congress; 1st State 






U.S. -Israel treaty of 


Constitution replaces 






Friendship, Commerce 


CPPCC 






and Navigation 


ROC-U.S. Mutual 
Defense treaty 




1955 


PRC- Afghani Stan relations 










Baghdad Pact 




Israel attacks Gaza 


PRC-ROC confronta- 
tion on Quemoy 






U.K. -Iraq defense 








agreement 


Rural collectives 








begin 


Bandung Conference 






PLA officer corps 


Warsaw Pact formed 






patterned after 








Soviets' 


Japan joins GAIT 




U.S. agrees, in 








principle, to sell 


Soviets leave Port 






arms to Egypt 


Arthur naval base 






Si no-Egyptian tfi 


}de agreement 

PRC-U.S. talks 
commence at Geneva 






PRC is midwife fc 


)r Eqyptian- 






Czech arms deal 








PRC commences atom 








bomb development 






Yemen-USSR renew 1929 








Friendship treaty 


Rural collectives and 
urban public owner- 






Egypt, Syria, Saudi 


ship are accelerated 






Arabia agree on Joint 








military command 


Compulsory military 






U.S. agrees to sell 


service begins 






arms to Israel 




1 



33 



I YEAR 



MIDDLE EAST 



CHINA 



U.S. /OTHER 



1956 



Yemen-Czech arms deal 

Pakistan becomes an 
Islamic Republic 



Egypt first Arab state to 
recognize the PRC 



U.K. withdraws from 
Iraqi bases 

Egypt-Israel threat 
of war 



"Hundred Flowers" 
campaign 



PRC-Egypt begin relations 



Mid-East arms race 
developing 



Egypt nationalizes 
the Suez Canal 



Zhou Enlai proposes 
peaceful negotiations 
with Taiwan 

Growing dispute 
between Mao Zedong 
and Liu Shaoqi 



Stalin denounced 
in USSR at 20th 
Congress of CPSU 



U.S. sends aid to 
Israel 



U.S. H-bomb air test 



U.S. refuses to 
send arms to Egypt 

U.S. Interstate 
Highway Act 

U.S. withdraws aid 
for Aswan dam 



PRC-Syria begin relations 



8th Party Congress; 
new CCP constitution: 
changes made to 
Soviet-style central 
planning 



PRC -Yemen begin relations 



Hungarian uprising 
Transatlantic Cable 



1st UN attempt to 
seat PRC = 16-33-10 



Pakistan PM visits PRC 



Egypt, Jordan, Syria 
place militaries in 
joint command 

Suez crisis: Israel 
invades Egypt; U.K. & 
France invade Egypt 



PRC begins work on 
large missiles 



International Atomic 
Energy Agency formed 



34 



YEAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1956 






USSR invades Hungary 


cont 






Eisenhower reelected 




PRC offers volunteers to assist 






Egypt during Suez crisis 


White collar and ser- 








vice sector workers 




PRC provides funds to Egypt; 


now outnumber blue 




PRC-Egypt cowmodities agreement 


collar workers 






61st meeting between 








PRC-U.S. ambassadors 








is held in Beijing 






Zhou Enlai visits Pakistan, 






India, Afghanistan and four 






other countries 




Japan admitted to 
UN 


1957 






Eisenhower Doctrine 
UN debates Kashmir 




UN urged by U.S. to 


"On the Correct Way 






pressure Israel's 


of Handling Contra- 






withdrawal to borders 


dictions among the 






of armistice 


People" by Mao 






U.S. authorizes 




Little Rock, Ark. 




cooperation with 


Piny in romanization 






Middle East against 


is developing 






communist aggression 




Treaty of Rome: 






PRC reappraises 


European Economic 




Suez Canal is opened 


relations with U.S. , 


Community (EEC) 




by UN to all but 


Japan; returns to 


begins 




the largest vessels 


Hard Line (1957-67); 








encourages worldwide 


U.K. eases trade 




Coup attempt in Jor- 


Peoples' Uars vs. 


restrictions with 




dan; all political 


Imperialism 


PRC; Italy, Japan 




parties are banned 


"Anti-Rightist" 


and FRG follow suit 




U.S. -Iran Treaty 


campaign 






Nasser is President 


24 U.S. news groups 
allowed to visit PRC 






Syria-U.S. crisis in 


on trial basis 


USSR tests ICBM 




diplomatics 


Almost all peasants 






Syria-USSR credit 


are collectivized 






agreement 


Mao in Moscow; PRC- 


USSR's Sputnik 






USSR disagree about 


Asian-African 






Middle East policy 


Solidarity Conf. 



35 



I YEAR 



MIDDLE EAST 



CHINA 



U.S ./OTHER 



1958 



Egypt-USSR assistance 
agreement 



2nd 5-yr plan 



Yemen Crown Prince 1st Arab leader 
to visit PRC; PRC-Yemeni industry 
credit and Treaty of Friendship 



1st U.S. satellite 



Iraq-Jordan form 
Arab Union 

Egypt-Syria form UAR 

Yemen and UAR form a 
federation 

Iraqi military coup; 
Hashemites overthrown 

Iraq-Jordan Union 
dissolves 

Iraq-UAR make mutual 
defense pact 



1st PRC shipment of goods to 
Baghdad 

Zhou Enlai assures Iraq of PRC 
support 



U.S. -PRC talks now 
in Warsaw 

2nd National People's 
Congress 



Mao questions value 
of formal education 



People's Communes 
are started 



U.S. Marines in 
Lebanon 



PRC bombards Quemoy 
and Matsu 



PRC-Iraq begin relations 



Ayub Khan to power 
in Pakistan 

Egypt-USSR Aswan Dam 
agreement 



Egypt represses local 
communists 

Oman-U.S. Treaty of 
Amity 



Great Leap Forward; 
voids 2nd 5-yr plan 



NASA begins 



U.S. -ROC agree that 
ROC mission does not 
include force 
against the PRC 

John XXIII installed 



36 



lYFAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1959 


8 Iraq delegations to PRC and 
3 PRC delegations to Iraq from 






December 1958 to 


September 1959 

Anti Chinese turmoil 
in Tibet 

PRC-USSR technical 






Arafat forms Fatah: 


assistance agreement 






Palestine Liberation 


through 1965 






Movement 




Castro to power 






Liu Shaoqi becomes 


U.S. -Iran Defense 




Iraq-USSR Economic 


Chairman of PRC 


pact 




agreement 








Arab Petroleum Conf. 


Factionalism within 






in Cairo 


CCP beginning 


Herter is Secretary 
of State 




UAR ambassador t< 


» PRC recalled 






Iraq-U.S. military, 


Massive drought 






economic assistance 








agreements cancelled 


Lin Biao Minister of 
Defense; PLA Party 






Ba'ath tries to 


Committees restored 






shoot Qassem 








PRC and Egypt di. 


ipute anti- 






communist issue 






U.S. -Pakistan treaty 


CCP has 14 million 






of friendship 


members 

Mao now stays away 


Peaceful uses of 
Antarctica treaty 






from direct admin- 


Rusk calls for 






istration 


reassessment of PRC 


1960 


Aswan Dam begun 




OPEC formed 




Several hundred PRC workers still 






in Yemen 


France detonates its 






PRC-Nepal Border 


1st nuclear device 




Iran says Iraq is 


Agreement and Aid 






violating Shatt 


Package 






al-Arab agreement 




U.S. giving increas- 






3rd visit of Zhou 


ing aid to South 






Enlai to India; no 


Vietnam 






resolution to border 








dispute 








Zhou Enlai visits 








Nepal 





37 



YEAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1960 






U-2 incident over 


cont 




Severe flooding; 
worst in 100 yrs 


USSR 

USS TRITON completes 




Kurdish revolt in 


PRC-Burma border 


1st underwater cir- 




Iraq begins 


agreement 

Soviet technicians 
withdrawn from PRC 


cumnavigation 




\ 
PRC-Afghan Friendship and 


Nixon-Kennedy 




Non- aggression Ti 


^eaty 

Zhou Enlai tells a 
visitor that PRC has 
taken "first step in 


debates 






a journey of 10,000 


Benelux union 






miles" 


JFK elected; Rusk is 
Secretary of State 


1961 




PRC-Albania credit 
agreement 






U.S. -Pakistan treaty 


PRC buys Canadian 






of Friendship and 


and Australian grain 






Commerce 


Entire countryside 


Yuri Gagarin flight 






now organized into 


Bay of Pigs 






70,000 communes 


1st U.S. manned 
space flight 






PRC-N. Korea Mutual 








Defense Treaty 


U.S. -USSR Vienna 




Termination of U.K. 




summit 




Protectorate in 








Kuwait 








Iraq reasserts claim 








on all of Kuwait 








PRC recognizes Kuwait 




Berlin Wall 




Egypt-Syria union is 








dissolved 


CCP has 17 million 


Hammarskjold killed 






members 


Peace Corps founded 
Eichmann convicted 




UAR-Yemen Federation 








dissolved 







38 



YEAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1962 


Iranian Agrarian 


Mao sees a trend to 






Reform Law 


revive capitalism 
within PRC/CCP 






Syrian military coup 








PRC oil and military delegations 






in Iraq 










37 nation Conference 




Coup in North Yemen 




in Cairo dealing 




forms a Republic; 


"Quotations from 


with problems of 




recognized by PRC 


Chairman Mao" is 


economic development 




and USSR; civil war 


published by Lin 






ensues between 


Biao (aka: Little 






Republicans and 


Red Book) 






Royalists 


Si no -Indian border 






Algeria Independent 


war 


Cuban Missile Crisis 




Nasser mediates between PRC and 






India 

1 






PRC delegation to UAR to explain 






PRC side of Sino-Soviet disDute 




1963 


Ba'athist coup in 


Mao reasserting 






Iraq; recognized by 


Class Struggle pri- 






PRC and USSR 


macy in PRC and CCP 






PRC -Syria econom 


c credit 


2nd Afro- Asian 




Si no-Pakistan border agreement; 


Conference 




1st PRC-Pakistan agreement on 






trade 








Military coup in 


PRC-USSR talks on 






Syria (Ba'ath) 


ideology fail 






Syria and Iraq ft 


jrm UAR; its 






Premier visits PRC 










Birmingham racial 






"Socialist Education" 


violence 






campaign 


John XXIII dies 






1st of 9 essays by 








PRC on differences 






Iraq recognizes 


between CCP and CPSU 






Kuwait 




Nuclear Test Ban 
treaty 




Ba'ath Party loses 








power in Iraq 







39 



JTEAR 



MIDDLE EAST 



CHINA 



U.S ./OTHER 



1963 
cont 



Pakistan-U.S. discuss 
Sino-Pakistan ties 



PRC-Italian Petro- 
chemical contracts 



JFK shot; LBJ takes 
office 



Zhou Enlai visits Egypt & nine 
other Middle East and African 
countries 



1964 



Arab summit discusses 
Israeli use of Jordan 
River water 



PRC-France chemical 
agreement; PRC-France 
begin relations 



1st Fatah delegation to PRC 

PRC delegation to Syria for 
aid discussions 



Israeli project for 
Jordan River water 
begins operation 

PLO is established 



"Four Cleanups" 
campaign 

Zhou Enlai on tours 
to Africa and Asia, 
including Pakistan 

Mao makes changes to 
education system 



Yemen President visits PRC; 
PRC-Yemen trade credit 



2nd Non-Aligned Conf; 
47 countries meet in 
Cairo 



Israel-Syria fighting 



PRC launches its 1st 
ballistic missile 

PRC detonates its 
1st atomic device 



Nehru dies 

U.S. terminates aid 
to ROC 



Civil Rights Bill 

Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution 

Brezhnev succeeds 
Khrushchev 

LBJ is elected 



1965 



PRC-UAR industrial credit 



Fatah's 1st action 
against Israel 



3rd National People's 
Congress; Liu Shaoqi 
and Zhou Enlai are 
reelected 



PRC-Kuwait trade agreement 

I 
Syrian Foreign Minister to PRC 

First PLO delegation to PRC 



Nasser reelected to 
3rd term 



PRC repays all funds 
borrowed from USSR 



U.S. departs from 
gold standard 

Afro-Asian Islamic 
Conf. in Bandung 



40 



I YEAR 



MIDDLE EAST 



CHINA 



U.S. /OTHER 



1965 
cont 



UAR Premier visits PRC 

I 
PRC delegation to Kuwait 

Zhou Enlai visits Cairo en route to 
Algiers Conference; Zhou Enlai also 
visits Syria; abortive attempt by PRC 
to hold "Second Bandung' conference 
in Algiers 



Herut and Liberal 
Party form Gahal 
bloc in Israel 



Cultural Revolution 
(GPCR) begins 

Lin Biao's article 
"People's Wars of 
Liberation" 



PRC gives diplomatic aid to 
Pakistan during Indo-Pakistani 
war; PRC ultimatum to India 



Pakistan-India cease- 
fire 



Military ranks abol 
ished in PLA 

Tibet Autonomous 
Region formally 
established 



Kuwait trade delegation to PRC 

I 
Syrian military delegation to PRC 



Israel provides 
Iraqi Kurds with 
arms 



UN vote to seat 
PRC now 47-47-20 



Terrorist bomb 
destroys U.S. Embassy 
in Saigon 

U.S. begins direct 
combat in Vietnam; 
continuous bombing 
of N. Vietnam 



Singapore leaves 
Malaysia 



Anti-Sukarno coup 
in Indonesia; 
thousands of ethnic 
Chinese slain or 
deported 



France 3rd state to 
launch a satellite 

Asian Development 
Bank formed 

Vatican II ends 



1966 



3rd 5-yr plan; 
voided by GPCR 



PRC opens NCHA office in Kuwait 



Neo-Ba'ath coup in 
Syria 



USSR-Syria credit 
for Euphrates dam 



PRC-FRG trade flour- 
ishing; PRC trade 
with non-communist 
world exceeds trade 
with communist states 

CCP power struggle 



Senate Hearings on 
China policy 



41 



YFAR J 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S ./OTHER 


1966 




Zhou Enlai formally 




cont 




announces GPCR 


Japan borrows total 
of $863 million (m) 






"May 7" schools 


from World Bank since 
1953; largest debtor 






Thermonuclear test 


nation 




Kurds and Iraq govt 


over Western PRC 






reach agreement 


Red Guards extremely 
active; "Four Olds" 

Liu Shaoqi demoted 






PRC now providing military aid to 






Pakistan 

1 


Tashkent Conference 




First PRC arms shipment to PLO 








Guided missile and 








nuclear test 


ASPAC founded 






Deng Xiaoping purged 


Asian Development 
Bank inaugurated 






PRC nuclear test 




1967 


U.S. aid to Israel, 




Apollo capsule fire 




1949-1967, is SI. 5 


Worker groups and 






billion ($1.5b) 


Red Guards dispute 
amongst themselves 


Soyuz I accident 




Suez closed to use 


and with others 






by and for Israel 








Arab-Israeli 6-day 








war; Israel attacks 








USS LIBERTY, occupies 








Jerusalem, Sinai, 


Turmoil in Hong Kong 






Golan and West Bank 


by Red Guards, U.K. 
police contain it 






Martial law in Jordan 


1.2 million urban 






Suez closed entirely 


youth resettled to 
countryside 1957-66 






USSR breaks relations 








with Israel 


Wuhan incident 






PRC trade credit 


to Egypt 






N. Yemen coup ends 


Hong Kong capitalism 






Civil War, returns 


begins to skyrocket 






pro-Saudi government 


PRC detonates its 






Israel applies its 


1st hydrogen device 






law to all Jerusalem 







42 



lYEAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1967 




PRC agrees to build 




cont 




railway in Tanzania 


Thurgood Marshall 




All PRC Ambassadors recalled except 


to Supreme Court 




for Ambassador to Egypt 










Nixon writes PRC 




Israel relying on 




cannot be left 




U.S. more than France 


Red Guards storm 


"forever outside the 




for military arms 


Soviet and British 
embassies 


family of nations" 




South Yemen formed, 




UNSC Resolution 242 




recognized by PRC and 








USSR 


7th PRC atmospheric 
nuclear test 




1968 




U.S. -PRC talks resume 
in Warsaw 






Iraq nuclear reactor 




TET offensive 




completed 


PLA beginning to 
restore order in PRC 






U.S. -Jordan arms 








agreement 




M.L. King, Jr. 




Yemen reconstruction bank 


assassinated 




chairman visits / 


'/?C 






U.S. -Iran arms 








agreement 








Iraqi Ba'ath Party 




Robert Kennedy shot 




again in power; coup| 






d'etat 




USSR invades Czechos- 






Revolutionary Com- 


lovakia 




Israel relies on 


mittees now at every 








level of PRC society 


Brezhnev Doctrine 




S.Yemen Foreign Minister in PRC; 






PRC-S. Yemen diplomatic relations; 






PRC economic credit to S.Yemen 










Nixon elected; 






CCP establishment 


Rogers is Secretary 




Iraqi Kurds fight 


fights GPCR to keep 


of State, Kissinger 




among themselves 


access to power 


at NSC 

USS PUEBLO captured 


1969 




PRC-USSR border 






Israel training 


fighting 






Iraqi Kurds 




U.S. relaxing bans 






9th Party Congress; 


on American contact 






GPCR formally over 


and trade with PRC 




Iran-Iraq dispute 


but turmoil remains, 






Shatt al-Arab 


Lin Biao is heir, 
new CCP Constitution 





43 



I YEAR 



MIDDLE EAST 



CHINA 



U.S. /OTHER 



1969 
cont 



Iraq Chief -of -Staff to PRC 

I 
PRC-Yemen technical school agreement 



Kuwait has to allow 
Iraqis in Umm Qasr 

Jordanian Civil War: 
1969-70 



PRC-Iraq civil air agreement 

Rogers Peace plan | 



Apollo 11 moon walk 
Nixon Doctrine 



U.S. discloses that 
USSR inquired about 
possible pre-emptive 
strike against PRC 



1970 



PRC aid delegation in S.Yemen 



PRC completes textile mill in 
Yemen 

I 
Arafat visits PRC (and USSR) 



Kurds and Iraq reach 
another agreement 



Jordan civil war 
with PLO, forces PLO 
into Lebanon; Syria 
aids PLO 



PRC is 5th state to 
launch a satell ite 



Military Security 
forces persecute 
May 16 Group 



5. Yemen delegation in PRC; 
PRC-S. Yemen aid agreement 



Egypt-Israel cease- 
fire agreements 

Nasser dies 



Population is 820 
million 



PRC completes Yemen technical 
school 

I 
Israel does not support vote to 
keep PRC out of UN; PRC gains 
1st majority vote for seat at UN 



Japan signs Non- 
proliferation Treaty 
and 4th state to 
launch a satellite 



U.S. troop reduction 
from Vietnam is 
announced 

U.S. incursion into 
Cambodia 

Kent State 

U.S. -Japan automatic 
renewal of mutual 
security pact 



Third non-aligned 
conference, held in 
Lusaka, Zambia 



44 



[YEAR 



MIDDLE EAST 



CHINA 



U.S. /OTHER 



1970 
cont 



Sultan Qaboos leads 
Omani coup 

Hafez Assad leads 
coup in Syria 

Libya, Sudan and UAR 
agree to federate; 
Syria also intends 
to join 



Mao interviewed by 
Edgar Snow 



PRC delegation in Yemen for 
anniversary 



Riots in Poland 



1971 



U.K. withdraws from 
Persian Gulf; Iran 
and Saudi Arabia are 
asked/aided by U.S. 
to fill the vaccuum 



4th 5-yr plan 



Mao willing to talk 
with Imperialists 



PRC discontinues support to 
PFLOflG 



PRC's 2nd satellite 

Kuwait recognizes the PRC 

Jordan recognizes the PRC 

Iran seizes 3 Iraqi CCP reorganization 
islands 



Egypt, Libya, Syria 
form Federation of 
Arab Republics 

USSR-Egypt treaty 



PRC builds its 1st 
nuclear submarine 



Kissinger visits PRC 



PRC-Iran establish relations; 
Pakistan assists as intermediary 



Syria closes border 
with Jordan 



Death of Lin Biao; 
prominence of PLA 
starts to recede 

PRC admitted to UN 



Second I ndo -Pakistani war; PRC 
provides moderate support for 
Pakistan: Bangladesh formed 



U.S. Navy stops 
Taiwan Strait patrol 

U.S. recognizes PRC 
as legitimate power 
on the mainland; 
citizens allowed to 
visit PRC if they 
can obtain Visas 



India-USSR Treaty of 
Friendship 

Pentagon Papers 

U.S. leaves Gold 
Standard 



U.K. 6th state to 
launch a satellite 



45 



YEARJ 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1972 




Nixon visits PRC; 






Attempted pro-Soviet 


PRC-U.S. Shanghai 


Soviet- Iraqi treaty 




coup in Egypt 


Communique 


Nixon to USSR; ABM, 






Campaign begins to 


SALT II Treaties; 






discredit Confucius 


Detente; 1st U.S. 
President in USSR 




PRC sends arms to Pakistan 










Watergate commences 




Sadat expels 21,000 


Deng Xiaoping 






Soviets 


reappearing 


Philippines 1st 
ASEAN state to rec- 




Kuwait govt dele\ 


nation to PRC 


ognize PRC 




Syria agrees to PLO 


PRC provided $4. 4b 


Okinawa reverts to 




control by Arafat 


in foreign aid from 


Japan from U.S. 




in S. Lebanon 


1953-1971 


Japan gives full 






1st PRC purchase of 


recognition to PRC; 




Clandestine meeting 


U.S. wheat 


regrets and repents 




of Israeli official 




past aggression in 




and King Hussein 


PRC, at the UN, does 
not approve of PLO 


China 




Union attempted by 


terrorism 






North & South Yemen 




Nixon reelected 




Kuwait trade deli 


igation to PRC 




1973 


Iran-Iraq begin 


PRC's 1st oil exports 






clashes over Shatt 


go to Japan 






al-Arab 


New birth control 






Iraq -Kuwait fighting 


campaign 






over Umm Qasr 


10th Party Congress; 
new CCP constitution 


U.S. leaves Vietnam 




Libya-Egypt attempt 








to form union 


French President to 
PRC; 1st W. Europe 






Syria border opened 


head-of-state visit 


Kissinger is 






in PRC since 1949 


Secretary of State 




Arab- Israeli war; 








USSR sends arms to 


PRC wants U.S. to 






Egypt 


speed normalization 


USSR threatens to 






PRC tacitly approves 


intervene in Middle 




OAPEC oil embargo 


U.S. force alert in 
response to USSR 


East fighting 




Israel now largest 








recipient of U.S. 








foreign aid 


Deng Xiaoping re- 
emerges under Zhou 
Enlai's patronage 





46 



lYEAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1973 


Israel now largely 


CCP has 28 million 




cont 


isolated in inter- 


members 


UN cease fire for 




national community 


PRC-Canada trade 


Middle East conflict 




Likud party forms 


agreement 






in Israel 


PRC begins sustained 


UNSC Resolution 338 




25 meetings between 


buying of Western 


OPEC raises price of 




PLO and Israel from 


industry and tech- 


oil by 300% 




1973-77 (unofficial) 


noloqv 




1974 




Deng into Politburo 


Japan enters MFN 
agreement with PRC 




Sadat ends complete 


Lin Biao and Confu- 






reliance on USSR arms 


cius discrediting 
campaign 






Egypt's "Open Door" 








investment policy 


Vice Premier Deng at 






Kissinger shuttle 


UN elaborates Three 






diplomacy; Nixon 


Worlds theory 






visits Middle East 




Nixon resigns; Ford 
becomes new U.S. 






PRC rejects U.S. 


President 




PLO granted observer 


wheat because of 






status in UN 


"smut" 






PRC able to supp 


y spare parts 






for Egypt's soviet arsenal 


India detonates its 








first nuclear device 


1975 


Suez Canal reopened 


4th National People's 








Congress; 1975 State 


U.S. forces in ROC 




Iraq and Kurds 


Constitution; Deng is 


are reduced 




resume hostilities 


PLA's Chief of Staff; 
"Four Modernizations" 






PRC exports more to Kuwait than 






to any other Middle East country 










U.S. suspends aid to 




Iran-Iraq accord RE: 




Israel during review 




Kurds and Shatt al- 




of regional policy 




Arab waterway 


Chiang Kai-shek dies 






Collapse of Kurdish 








resistance in Iraq 








Lebanon civil war 








resumes: bus load 


Deng visits France: 


USS MAYAGUEZ 




of Palestinians 


highest PRC official 


incident 




massacred by Maron- 


ever to visit Western 






ite Catholics in 


country 






Beirut 




Cuban troops to 
Angola 



47 



YEAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1975 


Jordan is Syria's 


PRC-EEC relations 
PRC's 3rd satellite 


Apollo-Soyuz mission 




closest Arab ally 


PRC begins active 


Helsinki Conference 




from 1973-1979 


role in UN agencies 






Syria- Iraq quarrel 


TANZAM Railroad is 






over Euphrates dam 


completed 

1st FRG head-of-state 
visit to PRC; PRC 






Syria now receiving 


opposes "permanent 






USSR's newest arms 


division of Germany" 
President Ford to PRC 




1976 




5th 5-yr plan 
Zhou Enlai dies 


USSR says detente 






12 million urban 


and revolution are 






youth resettled to 


not contradictory 






countryside 1968-75 






Sadat abrogates 1971 








Egypt-USSR treaty 


April 5th Tiananmen 
incident; Deng is 






Arabs protest land 


purged again, Hua 






seizures by Israel 


Guofeng made Acting 
Premier 






Egyptian delegati 


on in PRC; 






PRC- Egypt arms ai 


jreement 

PRC-India normalize 
relations 


Vietnam reunited 




Syria invades Lebanon 


Earthquake in N.E. : 






Entebbe incident and 


650,000 die 






rescue operation 


Severe drought 
Mao Zedong dies 






DMC Party formed 








in Israel 


Gang of Four purged; 
Hua Guofeng heads CCP 
and Military Affairs 
Commission 


Carter elected; 




PRC Muslims betti 


;r able to make 


Vance is Secretary 




Hajj pilgrimage i 


lo Saudi Arabia 


of State 



48 



YEAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1977 


Begin is first Likud 


Deng Xiaoping begins 






Prime Minister in 


to consolidate power 






Israel 








Food riots in Egypt 




U.S. arms to Iran 




PRC-Kuwait sign first cooperation 


from 1971-77 total 




protocol 


$21b (only $1.2b 








from 1950-70, $5. 7b 




Libya-Egypt border 




in 1977) 




clash 


"Production Respon- 
sibility System" in 






Both Iraq & Kuwait 


agriculture 






withdraw at Umm Qasr 








Bhutto overthrown in 








Pakistan coup 








Sadat stops debt 








payments and cotton 


CCP has 35 million 






exports to USSR; 


members 






forbids navy base 








use to USSR 


11th Party Congress; 








new CCP constitution 


UN adopts Piny in as 




Egypt allows multi- 


and revival of party 


international 




ple political parties 


control after GPCR 


standard 




2nd clandestine King 


College entrance 






Hussein and Israeli 


exams required 






meeting 


PRC $35b arms budget 






Sadat goes to Israel 


is 3rd largest; USSR 
is 1st at $140b; U.S. 






Carter calls for 


2nd at SlOlb 






Palestinian homeland 




Cuba sends troops 






PRC wants to buy 


to Ethiopia 




Arab Summit and 


Harrier jets 






Tripoli Declaration 






1978 




Deng visits Burma, 






Sadat and Saudi King 


Nepal and Bangladesh 






meet; 1st Egypt-Saudi 




Brezhnev stresses 




high level contact 


PRC ant i -USSR stance 


return to Geneva 






is alienating some 


Conference for peace 






Third World states 


in Middle East 






EEC-PRC 5-yr. trade 








agreement 






Sadat travels to 


Beijing 

Japan-PRC $20b trade 
agreement 





49 



I YEAR 



MIDDLE EAST 



CHINA 



U.S ./OTHER 



1978 
cont 



U.S. $4. 8b sale of 
advanced aircraft to 
Egypt, Israel, Saudi 
Arabia 



Israel invades South 
Lebanon, occupies 
strip along border 



PRC- Afghani Stan 
trade 

Afghan military coup 



YAR coup 

PDRY coup; pro -PRC 
president is killed 

Arab League forces a 
peace in PDRY 



5th National People's 
Congress; 1978 State 
Constitution, 1st 
10-yr plan, primacy 
of economic growth 

Revolutionary Com- 
mittees abolished 
except at lowest 
levels 

1st PRC high-level 
delegation to Phil- 
ippines 

PRC refuses talks 
with USSR because of 
border tensions 

agree to increase 



EEC is PRC's largest 
trade partner after 
Japan 

Hua visits N. Korea; 
first trip abroad by 
PRC leader since 1957 

Deng's "Open Door" 
policy 



PRC cuts all aid to 
Albania 

PRC-Japan treaty of 
peace and friendship 



USSR requests talks 
with PRC to improve 
relations 



U.S. Nonprolifera- 
tion Act 



EEC begins European 
Money System 



Panama Canal Treaty 

Carter favors sales 
of U.S. technology 
and W. Europe arms 
to PRC 



Hua Guofeng visits Iran 

Camp David Accords 
Martial Law in Iran 
Iraq expels Khomeini 



U.S. -PRC talks about 
developing PRC com- 
munications satellite 



Deng visits Japan 
50 



YEAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1978 
cont 


Syria opens border 
with Iraq 

Syria-Iraq plan a 
joint military com- 
mand 

Egyptian politics 
returns to one pri- 
mary party (NDP) 

Iraq shifting away 
from USSR to West 
for arms 

Egyptian migrant 
workers remit SI. 7b 


PRC at first supports 
Camp David 

1st PRC-U.S. student 
exchanges in 30 yrs. 

PRC buys missiles 
from France 

Mao accused of aiding 
Gang of Four 

Deng Xiaoping is now 
primary ruler in PRC 

Deng says Taiwan may 
keep its political 
system even after 
reunification 

3rd Plenum of 11th CC 

PRC conducted 22 
nuclear tests from 
1974-1978 

PRC asks ROC for mail 
service, trade and 
personal visits 


Polish Pope 

USSR-Vietnam sign 
25-yr. treaty 

Indira Gandhi jailed 


1979 


Egypt has received 
more U.S. aid by 1979 
than any one country 
since Marshall Plan 

Islamic revolution 
in Iran; Shah leaves 

PRC Deputy Prime 
Pakistan 

Syria- Iraq agree in 
principle to unite 

Pakistan adopts more 
Islamic law 

U.S. ambassador to 
Afghanistan killed 


U.S.-PRC normalize 
relations; Deng in 
U.S. says ROC need 
not disarm after 
reunification, wants 
larger U.S. presence 
in Pacific 

Minister visits 

PRC receives Most 
Favored Nation (MFN) 
trade status from 
U.S. 


Salt II negotiations 
all year in Senate 

U.S. -Philippine 5-yr 
base agreement 

USSR does not like 
Deng's anti-Soviet 
comments during his 
U.S. visit 



51 



YFAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1979 


Iraq-Saudi mutual 


PRC-Japan $2 billion 




cont 


internal security 
agreement 


oil accord 

PRC attacks Vietnam 






YAR-PDRY fighting; 


in brief land war; 






Arab League tries to 


PLA does poorly 






stop it 








Iraq makes YAR-PDRY 


Agriculture and con- 






cease-fire work 


sumer goods receive 
emphasis 






Pakistan withdraws 








from CENTO 








Israel-Egypt treaty 




Three-Mile Island 




Baghdad Summit 


PRC-Portugal nor- 
malize relations; 






U.S. cuts aid to 


agree that Macao is 






Pakistan following 


Chinese Territory 






reports of near 


with Portuguese 






nuclear capability 


Administration 


U.S. -Taiwan 
Relations Act 




PRC, via Pakistai 


7, sends regrets 






to Iran about Se^ 


1 '78 visit 

Deng says U.S. may 






Egypt given $1.5b 


monitor Soviet SALT 






military credits 


compliance from PRC 






by U.S. 


soil 


Pope visits Poland 
U.S. authorizes MX 






PRC reports success 


missile 




Iraq-Syria unity 


with a ballistic 






talks in Baghdad 


missile test 

Deng tells Japan that 
PRC will allow 100% 
foreign ownership of 
business in PRC 






Saddam Hussein to 








power in Iraq 


PRC added to Olympics 


Andrew Young resigns 
from UN after he 






PRC-U.S. total trade 


meets with PLO rep 




Pakistan says it is 


now $2. 4b per year 






continuing nuclear 








development program 







52 



YEAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S ./OTHER 


1979 


Israel-S.Africa joint 






cont 


Indian Ocean nuclear 
test 


Hua on 23 day trip to 
France, Germany, UK 

Democracy Wall 


Shah flies to NYC 
U.S. -Iran hostage 




Mosque in Mecca is 


Ministry of Justice 


crisis 




attacked 


reinstated (was 
abolished in 1959) 






U.S. Embassy burned 








in Islamabad 


PRC-USSR normalizing 
talks end without 
progress 






Afghanistan invaded 




USSR building first 




by USSR 


PRC asks USSR to 
exit Afghanistan 


nuclear carrier 




Israeli inflation at 








124% 






1980 






U.S. grain embargo 
to USSR 




PRC and U.S. agree to coordinate 






military aid for Mujahidin via 


U.S. -Turkey 5 year 




Pakistan 

1 


military agreement 




1 
PRC sends Muslim delegation to 


Sakharov exiled 




Iran for first anniversary of 






Islamic revolutic 


)n 






Pakistan dismisses 


Deng persuading CCP 






U.S. $400 million 


to limit concurrent 


Carter Doctrine 




offer as "peanuts" 


CCP and PRC office 
holders 






PRC Foreign Minii 


iter Huang Hua 


U.S. selling non- 




visits Pakistan 


lethal arms to PRC 








and ROC 




Iraqi Pan-Arab 








Charter 




Oman, Kenya, Somalia 




PRC is now Pakisi 


'lan's primary 


agree on U.S. access 




arms supplier; providing aid 


to bases 




for Afghan resistance via 






Pakistan 










Selective Service 




Israel expropriates 


6th National People's 


revived in U.S. 




land NE of Jerusalem 


Congress; Zhao Ziyang 
becomes Premier 






Saudi supports peace 




50,000 refugees/yr 




via UNSC 242 & 338 




allowed into U.S. 



53 



YEAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1980 


Saudi Arabia is 6th 






cont 


in military expen- 




U.S. attempt to 




ditures, 1st in per 




rescue hostages in 




capita; over $30b 




Iran 




purchased from U.S. 








since 1973 




Vance resigns; 






PRC tests CSSX-4 IBM 


Muskie is new 




Jordan moving from 


successfully 


Secretary of State 




Syria to Iraq 


Hua Guofeng in Japan; 






King Hussein will 


urges joint response 


France has neutron 




join peace talks if 


to USSR; 1st Chinese 


bomb 




Israel withdraws 


leader to visit Japan 






from territories; 


in over 2,000 yrs 






U.S. sells tanks to 




India 7th state to 




Jordan 


PRC-U.S. total trade 


launch a satellite 






now $4. 9b per year 


U.S. boycotts 




Israel states all 




Olympics 




of Jerusalem is its 


Coastal special 






Capital 


economic zones 


Birth of Solidarity 




PRC arms sales and workers in 






Middle East earn 


$lb/yr during 






early 1980s 








Iran-Iraq war begins 




U.S. to sell 11 
advanced computers 






PRC arms sales 1975- 


to PRC 




Syria-USSR 20 yr. 


1980 are $810m 






friendship accord 










PRC foreign trade 


Reagan elected; 




Israel at UN asks 


deficit for 1979- 


Haig is Secretary 




nuclear weapons ban 


1980 is $3. 9b 


of State 




in Middle East 


Ganq of Four on trial 




1981 


Iran delegation i 


to Beijing; PRC 


Solidarity active 




& Iran both proft 


^ss Ihird korld 


in Poland 




membership 




World refugee total 




Saudi plan forms 




12.6 million 




Gulf Cooperation 


6th 5-yr plan 






Council (GCC) 




U.S. trade in 




U.S. -Saudi Arabia $2b 




Pacific now starts 




arms deal 




to surpass Atlantic 




Jordan says Syria is 








involving Middle East 








in East-West rivalry 


PRC has $6. lb surplus 








with developing 


Space Shuttle 






countries 





54 



YEAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1981 


AWACS sale for Saudi 






cont 


Arabia 


Taiwan's population 


RDF formed 




Israel-Syria almost 


almost 20 million 






go to war 








Habib shuttle 








diplomacy 




Pope shot (wounded) 




Israel bombs Iraqi 


PRC condemns Vatican 






nuclear plant 


interference for 
naming Chinese Arch- 






U.S. -Egypt reach $2b 


bishop 






accord for two nuke 




Haig reaffirms U.S. 




power plants 




arms sales to PRC as 






Hu Yaobang becomes 


strategic imperative 




60% of Saudi work 


CCP Chairman 






force are foreign 




U.S. reports joint 






Deng heads Military 


PRC-U.S. tracking 






Commission 


post in Xinjiang 




20 changes in Iraqi 




since 1979; PRC 




government since 




denies it 




1932 Independence 


PRC-India agree to 
discuss border 

Mao portrayed as 
bri 11 iant leader who 
made "grave errors" 






Prince Fahd 8-point 








peace plan; Israel 


PRC reverts to Three 


U.S. neutron bomb 




rejects it 


Worlds rhetoric after 
hiatus of several 


production 




60% of Saudi workers 


years 






are foreign nationals 








Sadat cracks down on 








Islamic extremists 








U.S. -Israel joint 


PRC proposes PRC-ROC 






security, strategic 


reunification; ROC 






planning agreement 


rejects it 






Sadat expels 1,000 


PRC launches three 






Soviets including 


satellites on same 






Ambassador 


rocket 


Sandra Day O'Connor 
1st female Supreme 
Court judge 

U.S. debt exceeds 
$1 trillion 



55 



YFAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1981 




PRC offers sea, air 




cont 




and mail links with 


Japan-USSR agree to 






ROC 


discuss Kuriles 




Sadat killed; Mubarak 








Arafat visits Japan 








Mubarak arrests 




U.S. launches 




Islamic extremists 




Trident sub 
Polish Martial Law 




Israel annexes Golan 








Heights 


PRC- Japan $1.38b 
industrial aid accord 






Saudi Arabia/Bahrain 








say Iran is exporting 








terrorism; siqn pact 






1982 


France pledges to 


Emergence of PRC's 






rebuild Iraqi reactor 


independent foreign 
policy 






Egypt requests USSR 








industrial aid 


PRC-Poland agreement 
to increase trade 25% 






U.S. arms sales to 








Jordan increased 


PRC proposal for arms 








control at UN meeting 


Unrest in Poland 

USSR desires closer 
ties with PRC 




Sinai returned to 


PRC approves govt. 






Egypt by Israel 


personnel reduction 
from 600,000 to 






Israel acknowledges 


200,000 


FalkTands war 




supplying arms to 








Iran 


U.S. -PRC discussions 
about developing PRC 






Israel into Lebanon 


nuclear industry 






PRC promises PLO 


emergency aid to 


Shultz is Secretary 




offset Lebanese 


osses 


of State 






PRC-U.S. 5-yr textile 


Japanese 60% defense 






agreement 


spending increase 
through 1987 




PRC-Oman establi 


;h relations 






PLO expelled from S. 








Lebanon and Beirut 




Reagan urges self- 






12th Party Congress; 


rule for West Bank 




U.S. Marines enter 


new CCP constitution 


and a freeze on 




Beirut 




Israeli settlements 



56 



lYEAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1982 


Arab League summit 


Deng urges indepen- 




cont 


peace proposals for 


dent foreign policy, 






M.E. accepted by U.S. 


pragmatic ideology; 






rejected by Israel 


right to strike 
removed; Post of CCP 








Chairman abolished; 


U.S. suspects PRC of 




Civilian massacres 


Central Advisory 


helping Pakistani 




in S. Lebanon 


Commission begun 


nuclear effort; 
suspends talks on 
assisting PRC nuclear 




IPRC-U.K. talks 


Dn 
Hong Kong begin 

PRC fires its 1st 
submarine launched 
missile 


program 




Zaire-Israel renew 




Brezhnev dies; 




relations 




Andropov to power 




Zhao Ziyang in Egypt: accepts 






Israel's right tt 


3 exist; supports 


U.S. wants Int'l 




Arab League plan 




Conference on global 
monetary system, 
debt, unemployment 


1983 




Zhao Ziyang on 30 day 
visit to Africa; 






Advanced USSR arms 


cancels Zaire's $100m 






in Syria 


debt to PRC 






Ford and Carter both 


PRC press discusses 






denounce Israeli 


hi-tech revolution 






settlement policy 


sweeping the world 






Israel-Zaire 5-yr 




Soviet satellite 




military cooperation 




falls to earth 




agreement 








U.S. -Israel military 








friction in Lebanon 




IMF $5. 4b loan to 




Mubarak sees Reagan 




Brazil, largest ever 




in Washington 










Population approxi- 


UN says 20,000 




France sells Mirage 


mately 1 billion 


executions in Iran 




fighters to Iraq 




since 1979 

Reagan "Evil Empire" 




Jordan-PLO do not 




speech 




agree on Reagan's 








peace plan 




S.D.I, research 
begins in U.S. 



57 



YFAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1983 


U.S. Embassy in 




USSR nuke sub sinks 


cont 


Beirut is bombed 




USSR shoots down KAL 




U.S. Navy shells 




airliner 




Druze positions 


PRC visited by U.S. 
SECDEF Weinberger 






USMC baracks bombed 








in Beirut 




U.S. -Grenada action 




PLO-Egypt restore 




Nuclear Winter 




relations 




concept 


1984 


PRC endorses idea of a Middle 






East peace conference 


Japanese company 








repairs Iranian mis- 






PRC-U.S. increase 


sile parts, via Hong 






trade agreements 


Kong and Singapore 




France agrees to sell 








$4b of air defense 


Zhao Ziyang visits 






items to Saudis 


U.S. 






U.S. Navy shells 


PRC Defense Minister 






Lebanon 


visits U.S. 






Pakistan scientist 


Deng and Brzezinski 






says Pakistan able 


talk in Beijing 






to build A-bomb 


PRC-USSR $1.2b trade 
agreement 


Chernenko to power 






Japan endorses sale 


in USSR 






items for PRC's 1st 








nuclear power plants 






U.S. Navy leaves 








Beirut coast 


PRC launches its 1st 






U.K. bans arms 


permanent satellite 






shipments to Iran 








and Iraq 


Reagan visits PRC; 
nuclear cooperation 
agreement signed 






Arafat makes 3rd 


trip to Beijing 

PRC supports global 
peace, end to arms 
race, world market. 


USSR boycotts 
Olympics 




Pakistan bans bank 


coexistence of capi- 






interest payments, 


talism and socialism 






including foreign 




Bulgaria and USSR 




banks, as violation 




implicated in Papal 




of Moslem law 




assassination attempt 



58 



I YEAR 



MIDDLE EAST 



CHINA 



U.S. /OTHER 



1984 
cont 



PLO regrouping in 
Southern Lebanon 



Egypt-USSR renew 
Ambassadorial ties 



PRC-U.K. agreement 
on Hong Kong 



First Israeli 
Coalition Government 



Jordanian company contracts to 
make four nuclear plants in PRC 
for $7 billion 

PRC-United Arab Emirates & Abu 
Dhabi establish relations 

I 
PRC trade delegations visit 
Bahrain, Abu Dhabi , Kuwait, 
and Oman 

I 
U.A.E. proposes an Arab- PRC 
Chamber of Commerce (w/22 Arab 
countries), also Arab-PRC banks 

I 
Arabs regard PRC as a prime 
country for investment 



Israeli government 
austerity plan 



U.S. deploys cruise 
missiles at sea 

Soviet Middle East 
peace plan 



Vatican denounces 
Liberation Theology 

Mexican $48. 5b debt 
rescheduled, largest 
such accord ever 

Indira Gandhi 
assassinated 



Reagan reelected 



1985 



Israel acknowledges 
clandestine airlift 
of 12,000 Ethiopian 
jews 



PRC trade delegation to Jordan 
Kuwait Oil Minister to Beijing 



U.S. selling ASW 
weapons to PRC 



PRC actively encouraging 
establishment of PRC-Saudi Arabia 
relations 



New Zealand refuses 
port visit for U.S. 
military ship 



59 



YEAR 



MIDDLE EAST 



CHINA 



U.S. /OTHER 



1985 
cont 



Muslim PRC delegation to Qatar 
asks for PRC-Qatar relations 



PRC announces major 
Israel has 260% teacher training and 
inflation rate educational reform 

PRC military regions 
drop to 7 from 11 

Kuwait Oil and Finance Minister 
in PRC; Si no-Kuwaiti investment 
committee forms to help Gulf 
invest in PRC 



U.S. allows sale of 
reactors and non- 
military technology 
to PRC 



1st Western hostage 
seized in Lebanon 



U.K. -Saudi $4. 5b 
agreement for sale 
of advanced aircraft 

4 Soviet diplomats 
kidnapped in Beirut 



7th 5-yr plan 

National Party Con- 
gress; CCP announces 
rejuvenation 



PRC arms sales 1981- 
1985 total $5. 4b; 
(4.2b to Middle East) 



First Arab-PRC top level investment 
conference in PRC Ningxia province 

PRC again supports international 
peace conference for Middle East 



Jordan, Syria want 
UN Middle East peace 
conference including 
all UNSC members 



38,000 PRC students 
overseas since 1978. 
50% in the U.S. 



Gorbachev to power 

MX missile in 
production 

Walker spy scandal 



75% of U.S. trade 
now in Pacific 



"Rainbow Warrior" 
sunk in Auckland 



U.K., Italy, Germany 
agree to build new 
jet fighter 

U.S. tests anti- 
satellite missile 



"Achille Lauro" 
hijack incident 

Pollard spy scandal 
Unrest in S. Africa 



Gramm-Rudman bill 



ui aiiiiii r\uumaii u i i i 

USSR-Japan agree to 
resume World War II 
Peace Treaty talks 



1986 



PRC rejects USSR non- 
aggression treaty 
proposal 



60 



I YEAR 



MIDDLE EAST 



CHINA 



U.S ./OTHER 



1986 
cont 



Israel-Spain begin 
relations 

Jordan says Int'l 
Middle East peace 
conference possible 



PRC insists USSR 
resolve border 
disputes, Cambodia, 
Afghanistan 



PRC has relations 
with over 120 
countries 



Egypt-PRC create the first 

Islamic Bank 



U.S. -Israel share 
SDI research 



Syrian troops in 
Beirut 



PRC eases travel and 
residence controls 
for foreigners in PRC 



PRC is 47th member of 
Asian Development 
Bank 

7th National People's 
Congress 

PRC students confront 
African students in 
Beijing; Africans 
protest PRC racism 

Hu Yaobang 1st CCP 
leader to visit W. 
Europe (U.K. , France, 
Germany, Italy), 
since 1949 



Zhao Ziyang visits Turkey 



Israel-Soviet reps 
meet in Helsinki ; 
1st official contact 
after 19 yrs 

Peres to Cameroon; 
1st Israeli PM visit 
to Black Africa in 
20 yrs 



Challenger explodes 

Gorbachev promotes 
USSR First and Lead 
By Example themes at 
24th CPSU Congress 



1st conviction of an 
American spying for 
PRC in U.S. 



U.S. Raid on Libya 
Chernobyl 



Vladivostok speech 
by Gorbachev 



61 



YEAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1986 






Japanese Education 


cont 






Minister downplays 
1910-37 atrocities 
by Japan in Korea 
and China 

U.S. sanctions 




Over 20,000 PRC workers in Iraq 


against S. Africa 




Peres-Shevardnadze 








meet at UN 




Nakasone says U.S. 
minorities reduce 






Central Committee 


total U.S. IQ 






reaffirms policy of 








economic reforms 


London Sunday Times 
prints Vanunu story 




Shamir replaces Peres 




on Israel's nuclear 




in Coalition Govt. 


U.S. Navy ships 
visit Qingdao 

Students protest in 
several cities for 
democratic reforms 


weapons program 
Reykjavik Summit 


1987 


PRC negotiates to launch 






Iranian satellitt 


J 






Waite is kidnapped 


Hu Yaobang forced to 








resign 


U.S. -Mongolia begin 
relations 






CCP decrying "bour- 








geois liberalism" 


U.S., Japan, Canada 
plan joint space 
station in the 1990s 




Israel investigates 


Li Peng says PRC 






Pollard scandal 


will not retreat from 
partial economic 






Zia says Pakistan is 


reform measures 






able to build A-bomb 




More expenditures 




Israel-USSR agree to 




for arms in 1987 




exchange consular 




than any other year 




delegations 


Zhao denounces West- 
ern influence, says 


in history 




Kuwait proposes U.S. 


reforms continue 


Turkey requests EC 




and USSR flags for 




membership 




some of its tankers 


PRC-Portugal agree on 
Macao return in 1999 





62 



YEAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1987 






USSR permits limited 


cont 


Peres proposes Int'l 




private ownership 




Middle East peace 


PRC GDP increased 






conference, Shamir 


96% from 1979 






denounces proposal 




Toshiba forbidden by 






PRC family incomes 


Japan to sell sensi- 




Egypt breaks rela- 


increased 56% from 


tive items to USSR 




tions with Iran 


1981 


USS STARK hit by two 




Iran deploys PRC 


Silkworm missiles 


missiles in the Gulf 




11 Kuwaiti Oil 




USSR stops jamming 




tankers reflagged 




VOA 




under U.S. in 


PRC warns India of 






Persian Gulf 


"unpleasant event", 


Piper Cub in Red 






says India nibbles at 


Square 






PRC territory 








PRC denies border 


Citicorp expects to 






clashes with India; 


lose most of $14. 7b 






PRC increases troops 


Third World loans 






on Indian border 


USSR sends 3 Mine- 
sweepers to join 2 
Frigates already in 
Persian Gulf 






Deng's 7-yr old 








speech on Feudal 








aspects of CCP is 








widely reprinted 






Israeli Coimunis 


t Party chief in 






PRC; is told "no 


relations with 






Israel until it c 


:eases aggressive 






foreign policy" 








USSR delegation in 


PRC shoots down 






Israel for long visit 


Vietnamese MiG-21 






Israel tests new 








missile: Jericho II 




USSR warns Israel 
not to deploy new 




Iranian pilgrims 




IBM 




riot in Mecca 


1st PRC permanent 








outposts in Spratly 


U.S. cancels support 




At least 75 Israeli 


Islands 


for Israel's 1 avi 




engineers from 1 avi 




aircraft 




project find new 








jobs in S.Africa 







63 



YEAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1987 






International Treaty 


cont 






about CFCs to 




Pakistan-India clash 




protect Ozone 




in Kashmir 








I 
PRC- Israel begin annual foreign 






minister talks on regional themes 






during UN sessions in NYC 






Five Israeli scientists reportedly 






visit Beijing to discuss upgrading 






PRC missile technology 






Mubarak, unopposed, 








reelected for 6 yrs 


U.S. withholds sale 








to PRC of high-tech 


Wall Street plummet 






items due to Silkworm 






70 Naval ships from 


sales to Iran 






U.S., USSR, U.K., 








France, Italy, Neth- 


13th Party Congress; 






erlands, Belgium in 


Deng retires as CCP 






Persian Gulf 


General Secretary; 


Japan is clearly now 






Zhao Ziyang elected 


preponderant economic 






General Secretary, 


force in the world 






calls for civil ser- 








vice exams and more 








foreign investment 








Li Peng appointed as 








Premier 


U.S. -USSR INF treaty 




Intifada begins in 








the West Bank 






1988 


U.S. exempts Pakistan 
from nonproliferation 








laws 


PRC averages 10% 
annual growth during 






Israel announces use 


preceding decade 






of force and beatings 








in West Bank 


PRC navy keeps 








steady presence in 


Noriega indicted 




U.S. LtCol kidnapped 


Spratly Islands 






in Lebanon 




Armenian unrest 




Shultz peace plan 


Unrest in Tibet 






PRC sells medium range missiles 






to Saudi Arabia; PRC technicians 






accompany missiles 










UN condemns U.S. plan 






PRC begins long-term 


to close NYC office 




Shamir in Washington 


leases near Shanghai 


of PLO 



64 



YEAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1988 




PRC begins long-term 




cont 


Saudi Arabia confirms 


leases near Shanghai 
to non-Chinese 






purchase of PRC bal- 


PRC-Vietnam fight in 






listic missiles 


Spratly Islands 






Vanunu convicted in 


Li Peng opens Nat'l 






Jerusalem 


People's Congress; 
calls for more 






Arafat in Syria; 1st 


economic reform, 1st 






time since 1983 


debates occur 


USS ROBERTS strikes 




Pakistan tests new medium range 


mine in Persian Gulf 




missile built wi\ 


:h PRC assistance 


U.K., Germany, Italy 




Israel expels Pales- 




Spain $70b agreement 




tinian-American; U.S. 




to build European 




strongly objects 


PRC family incomes 
doubled since 1978 


fighter aircraft 

EEC votes to remove 
restrictions on all 




Iran boycotts Hajj in 




capital movement by 




1988 and 1989 rather 




1992 




than accept Saudi 








quota of 45,000 (re- 


Taiwan's total ex- 


CPSU declares 




duced from 150,000) 


ports now $60. 6b 


support for 
Perestroika 




Israel completes 




USS VINCENNES shoots 




preparation on ABM 




down Iran airliner 




system 








Saudi Arabia-U.K. 








arms package 


PRC-U.S. total trade 






Jordan releases 


$8. 8b; PRC-Japan 






claim to West Bank 


total trade $17. 6b 


Developing nations 
spent 23% more for 




Iraq-Iran cease fire 




arms 1978-88 than 
they received in aid 




Iraq uses chemicals 








against Kurds: many 








flee to Turkey 








Israel 8th nation to 








orbit a satellite 


PRC announces steps 
to control inflation 






Iraq largest Third 


of 20-50% 


Gorbachev becomes 




World arms importer 




President 




1969-88 with $61b 








in arms purchases; 







65 



YEAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1988 


Saudi Arabia second 




Brazilian plan to 


cont 


largest arms buyer 
at $37b; Syria is 




halt deforrestation 




fourth 




USSR admits having 






PRC nuclear test 


deficit budgets 






indicates neutron 








bomb capability 


Bush elected; Baker 




Benazir Bhutto 1st 




is Secretary of State 




woman leader of an 








Islamic country 


PRC successfully 
launches first SLBM 






PLO recognizes Israel 








renounces terrorism 




Brazil's foreign 




PLO-U.S. begin talks 




debt is $120b, 
Mexico's debt is 




Kenya- Israel renew 




$107b, Argentina's 




relations 


Rajiv Gandhi visits 
PRC 


is $60b. 




PRC begins build 


ng Algerian reactor 






Israel forms 2nd 








National Unity govt; 


PRC students/workers 






Religious Parties 


demonstrate against 






increase their sway 


Africans studying 
in China 




1989 






U.S. Navy jets down 




Central African 




2 Libyan fighters 




Republic-Israel 








renew relations 




Europe-U.S. trade 
dispute over food 




PRC continues to nurture military 


products 




ties with Pakisti 


in, Iran, Saudis 






Khomeini calls for 








Rushdie execution 








New Soviet ideas for 




Japanese Emperor 




UN International 


PRC-Indonesia confer 


buried; Bush in 




peace Conference on 


about renewing ties 


Japan 




Middle East 


Bush visits PRC; Fang 
Lizhi incident 






Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, 








N.Yemen create Arab 








Cooperation Council 




Milken's "junk bonds" 
impacting on U.S. 




Shamir tries to hold 




financial world 




coalition together 







66 



YEAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


1 CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1989 


PRC Vice Premier 


visits Iran, Iraq, 




cont 


Turkey, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi 

1 








Unrest in Tibet; 






Mubarak in Europe; 


violence 


USSR nuke sub burns 




seeks economic aid, 




and sinks near Norway 




and support for Int'l 








Middle East Peace 
Conference 




Exxon Valdez oil 


spill 






Hu Yaobang dies 


Solidarity legalized 




Saudi Arabia-PRC establish formal 






trade relations 










Students begin to 


Hungary dismantles 




Riots in Jordan due 


demonstrate 


border fence 




to worsening econ- 








omic conditions 


Gorbachev to PRC; 


Oliver North is 
convicted 






Sino-Soviet summit 


India test fires its 
1st IBM 




U.S. urges Israel to 


Student and worker 






renounce occupied 


pro-democracy 






territories, start 


demonstrations in 






Palestinian dialogue 


Beijing and other 


Speaker Wright 






cities continue; 


resigns from House 




Khomeini dies 


Tienanmen massacre; 








Zhao Ziyang purged 


Polish elections 






Fang Lizhi finds 


International 






shelter in U.S. 


sanctions against 






Embassy 


PRC for Tiananmen 






PRC asks businesses 








to return; Deng 








Xiaoping names Jiang 


Gorbachev warns of 






Zemin as CCP General 


enormous danger to 






Secretary 


USSR from ethnic 
unrest, nationalism 






Scowcroft's secret 








visit to PRC 


S.Africa tests new 
rocket developed 
from Israeli missile 






Hong Kong bankers 


U.S. DOD fails to 






becoming primary 


approve export of 






catalyst for busi- 


supercomputers to 




West Bank schools 


ness deals in PRC 


Israel 




closed 110 days in 








1989 by Israel 




Solidarity heads new 
Polish government 



67 



YEAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1989 




PRC cautions East 




cont 




Europe against 


U.S. limits number 






political changes 


of Soviet jews able 
to enter U.S. 

Hungary allows East 
Germans to go West 




PRC Foreign Minister visits Jordan, 






Syria, Egypt, Tunisia and Iran 


India now world's 








largest importer 




Israel-Hungary renew 




of military goods 




diplomatic ties 


PRC industry grows 
16%/yr since 1979 






Arafat in France 








Mubarak proposals for 








Israeli-Palestinian 








dialogue 


U.S. -PRC military, 






USSR abstains from 


economic contacts 


India builds its 1st 




annual Arab UN 


gradually being 


submarine 




initiative to unseat 


renewed 






Israel 




Nobel Peace Prize 
goes to Dalai Lama 




Almost all hospii 


als, refineries. 






power stations and homes in Kuwait 






are built by PRC companies 


Hungarian CP becomes 








Socialist, renounces 






Nixon visits PRC 


Marxism 




Elections in Jordan; 








1st to be held in 


PRC official foreign 


San Francisco quake 




22 years 


debt is S44b 


USSR calls for NATO, 






PRC purchase of 3 


Warsaw Pact gradual 






U.S. satellites is 


dissolutions 




Ethiopia-Israel renew 


approved by White 






full relations 


House 


E. Germans have exit 
visas, Berlin Wall 




Peres visits Poland 




opened, hints of 
German reunification 




PRC Premier visits Pakistan 

1 






1 
PRC-Iran, in Teheran, agree on 






economic, technical, industrial 






and scientific cooperation 










USSR pledges not to 




N.Yemen -S.Yemen 




force Warsaw Pact 




agree to unite 


PRC exports total 
S52.5b in 1989 (S12b 


cohesion 




Baker Peace Plan for 


go to U.S.) 


U.S. -USSR summit at 




Middle East 




Malta 



68 



[YEAR 



MIDDLE EAST 



CHINA 



U.S. /OTHER 



Iraq tests 3-stage 
missile capable of 
launching satellites 

Israel helps S.Africa 
design intermediate 
range missile; helps 
also with missile 
design to launch 
satellites 

Saudi Arabia wants to 
purchase submarines 



67 Japanese banks 
begin S2b credit for 
PRC, first agreed 
to in 1985 

Scowcroft visits PRC 



Haig visits PRC 



USSR removing its 
troops from Mongolia 



Yang Shangkun visits UAE, 
Kuwait, Oman 



Egypt 



Egypt-Syria renew 
relations 



PRC criticizes USSR 
in internal document 
over events in East 
Europe and USSR 



Ceaucescu and wife 
are shot 



Non-communist govt 
in Czechoslovakia 



1990 



Ethiopia denies plans 
to divert Nile with 
Israeli assistance 

U.S. total aid to 
Israel $6b per year 



ROC building its own 
warships 

PRC requests foreign 
aid to combat its 
pollution crisis 



Qin Jiwei visits Pakistan, Bangla- 
desh to boost military cooperation 



Israel expects 
250,000 Soviet Jews 
this year 



Turkey stops flow of 
Euphrates into Syria 
and Iraq for 30 days 



Shamir fires Cabinet 
member to enforce no 
Israel-PLO contact 

Israel-Poland renew 
relations 



U.S. total aid for 
Eastern Europe is 
scheduled at SSOOm 
in 1990 



Inflation in Peru 
at 2000% annual rate 



PRC-USSR military 
staffs exchange 
visits; 1st such 
contact in 30 years 

Asian 1989 economic 
growth is 5.4% (9.3% 
in 1988); 3.2% is 
entire world average 

PRC arresting non- 
official Christian 
leaders; controls 
increase for Islam 
in western PRC 



East and West Ger- 
many continue plans 
for reunification 



USSR ends CPSU 
monopoly of power 



Lithuania declares 
independence from 
USSR 



69 



YFAri 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1990 


Israel's Coalition 


Scowcroft visits PRC 




cont 


Govt, falls 

Desire for electoral 
reform and constitu- 
tional government 








grows in Israel 




Total world military 
expense in 1990 is 




PRC Foreign Minister visits Iraq, 


$8B0b, 5% less than 




Yemens, Bahrain, 


Qatar 


peak year of 1987 




Bahrain-Hungary begin 








full relations 


PRC forms new Hong 






IMF urges economic 


Kong constitution 






reform in Egypt 


Ethnic unrest in 






Lebanon's Bekaa Val- 


Xinjiang 






ley now provides 20% 








of world's hashish 


PRC renews Fulbright 


U.S. executive order 






program with U.S. 


allows PRC students 
to remain in U.S. 




Jewish settlement 


PRC commercial launch 






tried in Christian 


of U.S. satellite; 






Quarter of Old 


PRC's 27th satellite 


Mongolia drops 




Jerusalem 




"Communist" from 






Li Peng to Moscow 


its constitution 




Li Peng visits P, 


ikistan 


2 U.S. hostages 
freed in Lebanon 




Peres unable to form 


Beijing finds $70b 






Labor government; 


of govt guaranteed 






Brooklyn Rebbe sways 


foreign loans in PRC 






Knesset for Likud; 








Shamir creating West 




U.S. Senate says 




Bank settlements 




Jerusalem is capital 
of Israel 




PRC discussing sale of new medium 






range missile to 


Iraq, Syria, Libya 






Islamic theologians 








call for regeneration 


PRC embassy diplomat 








defects in U.S.; 


450 of 600 million 






reveals PRC plan to 


telephones in world 






influence U.S. via 


found in only nine 






release of Tienanmen 


countries 




Iraq threat to 


dissidents 






destroy half of 








Israel 


PRC-Mongolia renew 
ties, plan trade 
increases 





70 



YEAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1990 


Israel launches 2nd 






cont 


sate 11 ite with mil i- 








tary characteristics 


PRC reemphasizing 
birth control; 1.4b 






Iraq has nuclear 


population expected 






weapon "trigger" 


by year 2000 {300% 
increase since 1949); 






U.S. helps Arabs at 


l.Ib by 2000 was PRC 






UN oppose USSR Jew- 


goal in 1980s; 63% 


U.S. consumes 40% of 




ish immigration to 


of population under 


all worldwide goods 




Israel 


age 30 






UAE urges Japan to 








promote peace in 








Middle East 




U.S. -Asia trade now 
$308b/year 




Mubarak visits Bi 


^ijing; Deng voices 






concern about Japanese military 






growth 




UN says world popu- 




Egypt-USSR condemn 


Yang Shangkun visits 


lation now 5.3b; 




Soviet Jews' West 


Latin America 


will be 6.25b by 




Bank settlements in 




2000, between lib 




Israel 


5% of PRC population 
now migrant laborers 


and 15b by 2099 
IMF says Eastern 






Taiwan offers reuni- 


Europe needs will 






fication proposal 


reduce aid for 
poorest countries 






Xu Jiatun makes 








"unauthorized" trip 








to U.S.; highest 








PRC official to seek 








haven outside PRC 


Japan's defense bud- 




Mid East arms ex- 




get is 3rd largest 




penditures increase 


PRC ends 20 mth 


in world 




by 4% or $10b over 


austerity program 






1989 


Schmidt in Beijing; 
exchanges notes with 
Zhao Ziyang 








USSR delegation to 


Bush renews MFN trade 






Beijing 


status for PRC 




Pakistan machine* 


> 6 nuclear war- 






heads with PRC ti 


ichnical assistance 






Israel says no UN 


50 Xinjiang Mosques 


U.S. vetoes UN 




observers allowed 


closed after ethnic 


measure to place 




in West Bank 


unrest 


observers in West 
Bank 



71 



YFAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1990 


Pakistan hires women 




43 nations now have 


cont 


pilots for commercial 




submarines; over 400 




aviation 


ROC hints at nuclear 


subs are not U.S. or 






capability 


USSR (will be 800 by 




Arab summit condemns 




end of 1990s) 




Soviet Jewish im- 








migration to Israel 










Beijing University 


U.S. -USSR Summit in 






students demonstrate 


D.C.; both caution 






on Tienanmen anni- 


Israel against West 






versary 


Bank settlement of 




Saudi Arabia now 




Soviet Jews 




world's largest 


PRC troops beat 






arms importer 


students and foreign 
reporters in Beijing 






Saudi Arabia has 








opened equivalent of 


Television reaches 






1 primary school per 


73% of PRC population 


Quayle meets Chai 




day from 1970-1990 




Ling, prominent PRC 






"Goddess of Democra- 


dissident, in White 




Peres unable to form 


cy" ship unable to 


House 




Labor Govt; New York 


broadcast 






Rabbi credited with 




Moscow opens com- 




influencing outcome 


PRC plans 4 futures 


modities exchange 






markets for agricul- 


for building items 






tural goods; Chicago 


and hi-tech goods 




Kuwait projects $5b 


Board of Trade helps 






deficit budget 


to establish them 


Japan plans 5-yr 25% 
increase in defense 




Shamir forms Likud 




spending 




Government 




Russian Federation 




PRC has about 20 


000 workers 


declares State 




in Kuwait 




Sovereignty 




PRC celebrating 1 


^,000 years of 


Hungarian Stock 




Silk Road 




Market reopens 




PLO-U.S. talks are 








suspended by U.S. 




Both Germanys use 






Fang Lizhi and wife 


single currency 




Israel pledges no 


leave U.S. Embassy 






Soviet Jews will 


for Cambridge Univ. 


USSR proposes UN 




occupy West Bank 




Trusteeship for 
Kuriles 




Assad in Egypt; says 


PRC-Indonesia agree 






Syria ready to join 


to renew relations 


Big Seven Summit; 




peace process 




Japan "allowed" to 
resume PRC aid; 




PRC launches Pak 


stani satellite; 


USSR as receiver of 




launch fee far bi 


ilow Western rates 


aid is discussed 



72 



YEAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


1 CHINA 


U.S. /OTHER 


1990 


PRC bids competitively to launch 




cont 


Arabsat communications satellite 










Ukraine declares 






Mid-level officials 


State Sovereignty 




Iraq-Kuwait feud 


say astronauts being 






over oil , exchange 


trained in PRC 


Gorbachev OKs NATO 




military threats; 




membership for 




Saudis and UAE aid 


PRC mayors visit 


reunified Germany 




Kuwait, U.S. aids 


U.S., urge renewal 






UAE 


of business ties 


Yeltsin plans end of 
state ownership and 




PRC strengthens security ties with 


central planning in 




Saudis; still considers other arms 


Russian Federation 




sales in the Midi 


He East 


by 1992 




Iranian economy grows 




E. Germany will not 




10% in 1990; public 


PRC outfits 3rd ship 


join Warsaw Pact 




sector is being 


to monitor space 


maneuvers 




privatized 


flights 


Zhu Rongji visits 




Saudi Arabian envoy meets Li Peng 


U.S. 




in Beijing 










Japan completes 




Israel Supreme Court 


Low morale within 


payment of all its 




forbids Sharon's 


PLA 


debts to World Bank 




emergency powers to 








make housing for 


Zhao Ziyang rumored 






Soviet immigrants 


to be back in govt 


U.S. defense spending 
6% less than 1989, 




West Bank schools 


PRC planning to end 


still 30% larger than 




closed 140 days in 


free urban housing; 


1980 




1990 by Israel 


shareholding of state 








industry expected 


USSR defense spending 
10% less than 1989, 




PRC Foreign Minister visits Saudi 


still 38% larger than 




Arabia; PRC-Saudis begin relations; 


1980 




ROC cuts formal ties with Saudis 






though still receives 30% of oil 


60% of world's arms 




from Saudi Arabia 


budgets belong to 








U.S. and USSR 






PRC-Singapore discuss 








diplomatic relations 






Iraq invades Kuwait 




UNSC condemns Iraq; 






Li Peng visits 


U.S. & USSR sponsor 




Turkey closes Iraqi 


Indonesia, Singapore 


arms embargo against 




oil pipeline; U.S. 




Iraq, PRC concurs 




troops to Arabia 


PRC agrees to stop 
arms aid to Pol Pot 






Pakistan considers 




Kaifu visits five 




legalizing Sharia 


PRC allows foreign 


Middle East states 




Bhutto ousted 


firms to sue PRC 





73 



YEAR 



MIDDLE EAST 



CHINA 



U.S. /OTHER 



1990 
cont 



Jordan tries to 
mediate; Israel 
keeps low profile; 
U.S. /others start 
military buildup; 
Arab League supports 
Iraqi withdrawal 



PRC wants to open a 
stock market 

PRC-ROC trade $11. 7b 
in last decade; 46% 
growth per yr; ROC 
has $7. 4b deficit 



PRC does not block UNSC decision 
allowing general embargo of Iraq 



Iraq-Iran make peace 

Thousands of foreign 
workers in Iraq and 
Kuwait forced out or 
made hostages 



PRC planning for 
Space Station and 
Space Shuttle 

Rumors of impending 
Politburo shake up 



PRC discusses possible sale 
of nuclear attack submarine to 
Pakistan 

1 
Iran Defense Minister visits PRC 



U.S. writes off $7b 
Egyptian arms debt 

Saudi Arabia-USSR 
renew relations 



State subsidies cost 
PRC $20b in 1990 
(almost 30% of 
national budget) 



PRC tries to sell arms to Iraq 
despite embargo 



Israeli delegation 
to USSR 

Only Yemen and Libya 
support Iraq; Jordan 
caught in middle 

Israel-USSR open 
consulates 



Economic Ministerial 
post given to ally 
of Zhao Ziyang 

PRC hosts Asian 
Games; Iraq excluded 

PRC-Singapore begin 
relations 



Iraq has F.A.E. bomb; PRC sold the 
required chemicals to Iraq 



UNSC condemns Israel 
for shooting Pales- 
tinians in religious 
incident 

Pakistani election; 
Bhutto loses 



PRC troops have 1st 
nuclear war exercise 

PRC supports Taiwan 
in its dispute with 
Japan over Ryukyus 



U.S. -USSR share 
intelligence about 
Middle East 

Japan provides funds 
for Western military 
costs in Middle East 

Japan-USSR discuss 
sovereignty of 
Kurile Islands 

USSR-FRG reach non- 
aggression and aid 
agreements 



U.S. proposes biggest 
weapons sale ever 
(over $21b to Saudis) 



Japan considers 
sending non-combat 
troops to Mid East, 
many others object 

Kissinger in Beijing 
with Zhu Rongji and 
Jiang Zemin 

USSR endorses 
Market Economy 

E. Germany leaves 
Warsaw Pact 

Germany reunites 

USSR begins to 
legalize freedom 
of religion 



USSR official tells 
Hussein he faces a 
likely UN attack if 
he does not withdraw 



74 



YEAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S ./OTHER 


1990 


U.S. suspends aid to 




Developing nations 


cont 


Pakistan due to its 


PRC buying arms from 


account for 85% of 




A-Bomb research 


France 


arms spending in 
world markets 




Foreign Minister Qian Qichen visits 






Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq: 


Baker visits Middle 




tells Saddam Hussein he lacks PRC 


East, also meets 




and Third Uorld support 


with Qian Qichen 




Kahane shot in NYC 




U.S. begins exit 




by Arab-American 


PRC hosts 5 U.S. 


from Philippine bases 




Israel allows one UN 


Congressmen to help 


U.S. -Singapore 




fact finder to visit 


promote relations 


military pact 




U.S. doubling troops 


EEC removes most 


Japan's 125th emperor 




in Persian Gulf 


sanctions against 








PRC from Tiananmen 


Cuba hints at better 




200,000 Soviet Jews 




relations with U.S. 




emigrate to Israel, 


Stock markets open 






1 million expected 


in Shenzhen and 


Bush-Gorbachev summit 




by 1995 


Shanghai 


Paris Charter 




UNSC demands tha 


Iraq withdraw 






from Kuwait by 15 Jan 1991; PRC 


Revolt in Liberia 




abstains 

1 


Chunnel 




Kuwait has provided approximately 






$30b in loans to PRC since 1982 






UNSC condemns treat- 


Qian Qichen meets 


Thatcher resigns 




ment of Palestinians 


with Pres. Bush 






by Israel 




Food donated to USSR 
from around the world 




GCC condemns Iraq, 


Taiwan plans formal 






wants Iran's future 


cessation of "war" 


Political Turmoil in 




aid to reduce out- 


with PRC 


India 




side influence in 








Gulf 


8th 5-vr Dlan 


Shevardnadze resiqns 


1991 


Kuwaiti Emir visits Beijing; PRC 






pledges 'full support" to restore 


1700% inflation in 




Kuwait's sovereit 

- 


jnty 


Brazil 




Gulf War; Iraq is 


Jail sentences for 






bombed; Israel and 


Tiananmen activists 


USSR troops enter 




Saudi Arabia hit by 




Lithuania 




Scuds 


PRC has $910m trade 








surplus for January; 


East Europe is an 




Iraqi aircraft flee 


exports up 40.8% and 


environmental 




to Iran; severe oil 


imports up 19.8% 


disaster 




damage to Kuwaiti 


from JAN '90 






wells and Gulf 




USSR peace proposal 
for Gulf War 



75 



I YEAR 



MIDDLE EAST 



CHINA 



U.S. /OTHER 



1991 
cont 



Iraqis confer with PRC in Beijing 
about Soviet peace proposal 



Iraq army decimated, 
Iraq consents to all 
UN peace conditions 



U.K., Japan, USSR, 
France send Foreign 
Ministers to Beijing 



PLA Generals review Middle East war; 
debate merits of modernization 



Civil war in Iraq 

U.S. urges Israel to 
trade land for peace 

GCC plus Egypt and 
Syria plan regional 
military alliance 

Arab League reviews 
regional security 



Foreign banks allowed 
to open in Shanghai 



Reformers and hard 
liners debate 
economic policies 

PRC exchanging its 
food for military 
hardware from USSR 



China discusses possible missile sale 
with Pakistan; promises U.S. /UN that 
it will be prudent 



U.S. /UN establishing 
a permanent military 
presence in the Gulf 



PRC uses de facto 
influence over Hong 
Kong's government 



Pakistan's new Prime Minister visits 
Beijing; Pakistan bank will open a 
Shanghai branch, 102 new joint pro- 
jects started, 26 of 29 are already 
finished 



Israeli peace plan 

UN condemns Iraq's 
Kurdish policies 



PRC bids to launch 
Indonesia's next 
communications sat- 
ellite 



China is reportedly helping Algeri, 
develop nuclear weapons 



Israel insists USSR 
renew ties before it 
offers a peace plan 



PRC's first wheat 
futures contract 



PRC losing more than $2b in Gulf 
contracts because it did not openly 
support use of force against Iraq 



Coup in Thailand 
Warsaw Pact disbands 



Yeltsin and Gorbachev 
in power struggle 



Japan-USSR discuss 
Kurile Island sover- 
eignty 

Political disarray 
in Yugoslavia 



Baker visits Middle 
East 

Economic strain grows 
in united Germany 

U.S. and others write 
off half of Poland's 
$31b foreign debt 



Bush meets Dalai Lama 

Massive U.S. aid 
effort for Kurds 

Gorbachev to Japan, 
discusses Japanese 
aid, Kurile Islands 
and Asian security 



Baker's third 
Middle East visit 

Japanese minesweepers 
going to Persian Gulf 



76 



JYEAR 



MIDDLE EAST 



CHINA 



U.S ./OTHER 



1991 
cont 



Israel's 2ncl test of 
U.S. financed (72%) 
Arrow missile 



PRC NPC member sa^'S 
reforms will stay 
no matter who is in 
power 



Israeli diplomat visits PRC; later 
says diplomatic ties are inevitable 



Soviet Jewish immi- 
gration to Israel 
slows; still could 
reach 1 million (25% 
of Israeli labor 
force) by mid 1990s 

Israeli military is 
14.09% of population 



PRC-USSR summit 

PRC had $lb trade 
with neighbor states 
in 1990 

3 officials associa- 
ted with Zhao Ziyang 
partially restored 



PRC delivering missiles and parts 
to Iran (from $300m order placed 
in 1987) 



Israeli airlift of 
18,000 Ethiopian 
jews 

Israel nervous about 
U.S. arms control 
proposal 

U.S. prepositioning 
materiel in Israel 

U.S. gives Israel 10 
advanced jets 

Japan urges Israel 
to assist peace pro- 
cess, stop West Bank 
settlements 



PRC Finance Minister 
says state subsidies 
not sustainable; 
grain subsidy reduced 
from 50% to 20%; 
other adjustments 
also made 

PRC buys Su-27 jets 
from USSR 

No demonstrations 
allowed on Tienanmen 
anniversary 

Jiang Qing commits 
suicide 



Israel opens Sciences and Humanities 
liaison office in Beijing 



West Bank schools 
closed 100 days in 
1991 by Israel 

Saudi Arabia wants 
to buy 50% of Nippon 
Oil in Japan ($4. 5b) 



CCP 70th anniversary 

Sharp criticism by 
PRC against western 
media, especially 
VGA and BBC 



Baker's 4th visit to 
Middle East 



30% of world's civil 
air traffic goes to 
Asia/Pacific region 

USSR plans to permit 
unrestrained travel 
in 1992 

USSR admits scrapping 
moon travel program 
in 1970s: too many 
problems 

Rajiv Gandhi 
assassinated 



USSR troops fight 
Lithuanian border 
posts 

Bush proposes arms 
control for Middle 
East 

USSR needs $250b aid 
to keep reform going 
next 5-6 years 

East-west tensions 
ease in Africa; hosts 
of local conflicts 
emerge 



USSR starts trading 
in commodities market 

USSR military is 
3.32% of population 

U.S. military is 
1.52% of population 



77 



JYEAR 



MIDDLE EAST 



CHINA 



U.S. /OTHER 



1991 
cont 



U.S. trying to halt delivery of PRC 
surface-to-surface missiles to Syria 
and Pakistan 



Jordan permits poli- 
tical parties, new 
freedoms to press and 
women, limits execu- 
tive branch 

Iraqi military is 
9,69% of population 

Saudi Arabia renews 
beheading executions 
after 10 mth hiatus; 
111 executed in 1989 

West Bank Palestin- 
ians threatened by 
illiteracy; Moslem 
nationalist and PLO 
secular youths fight 
each other 



PRC military is 
0.38% of population 

Qian Qichen visis 
Thailand, Indonesia 

PRC divorces climb; 
almost 10% of 1990 
marriages 

Qian Qichen visits 
North Korea 

PRC wants to join 
MTCR {Int'l Accord 
to limit spread of 
missile technology) 



PRC offers to supply 300m reactor 
to Pakistan 

I 

PRC helping to develop coal mines 
in Pakistan; says "vast possibilities 
exist for additional cooperation" 



Israeli mayors pro- 
test lack of funds 
for Soviet immigrants 

Israel wants $10b 
U.S. loan for Soviet 
immigrant housing 

Beirut govt, controls 
S. Lebanon for 1st 
time since civil war 
started in 1975 

Pakistan law & order 
crisis; Sharif does 
not go to Hong Kong 
and Japan 



Qian Qichen visits 
Japan 

ASEAN invites PRC 
(and USSR) to its 
July meeting 

Avon cosmetics 1st 
company to sell di- 
rect to PRC consu- 
mers: phenomenal 



Jiang Zemin says PRC 
will never permit 
opposition parties 



Japan wants rewrite 
of UN charter; UNSC 
members oppose this 
suggestion 

Yeltsin 1st popularly 
elected President of 
Russian Republic 



Leningrad renamed 
as St. Petersburg 



U.S. exports to Asia 
grow 150% in last 5 
years 

Bush renews MFN trade 
status for PRC 

World military spend- 
ing declining; 9 yrs 
at present rate to 
reach 1980 level, 18 
yrs to reach 1970s 
level 

Mt. Pinatubo eruption 

Congress makes MFN 
status conditional 
for PRC 



COMECON disbanded 

Warsaw Pact formally 
ended 

Reunified Germans 
don't like each other 
very much 

Yugoslavs begin civil 
war 



78 



I YEAR 



MIDDLE EAST 



CHINA 



U.S./OTHER 



1991 
cont 



Li Peng, Qian Qichen, Li Lanqing 
visit Egypt y Jordan , Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria and Kuwait; Arms 
control part of agenda 

PRC to attend UNSC Paris meeting 
for Middle East arms control 



Iran wants Iraq to 
pay reparations; has 
impounded Iraqi air- 
craft from Gulf war 



Algeria cracks down 
on Islamic fundamen- 
talists 



PRC sponsors search 
for new Panchen Lama 

Severe drought in 
Guangdong and Fujian 

100 million dogs in 
PRC, rabies problem; 
police squads beat 
and kill dogs in 
streets and homes 



UNSC tells Iraq to comply with 
nuclear inspections 



Shamir says Saddam 
must not regain pow- 
power; approves King 
Hussein's proposal 
removing "taboo" on 
Arab-Israeli dialogue 

U.S. threatens force 
again in Iraq over 
nuclear inspections 



PRC proposes 5 prin- 
ciples to improve 
trade with Taiwan 

PRC hard-liners 
crack down on for- 
eign press corps 

Severe flooding 
along major rivers 



PRC proposes broad arms control for 
entire Middle East: eliminate all 
CBN weapons in the region, plus gen 
eral arms reduction 



Israel asks 40% mil- 
itary aid increase 
from U.S. (from $1.8b 
to $2. 5b per year) 



Israel still builds 
new West Bank set- 
tlements; wants $10b 
loan guarantees from 
U.S. for immigration 
settling costs 



PRC approves new 
Hong Kong airport; 
U.K. agrees to leave 
$3. 2b reserves and a 
debt less than $650m 

France gives PRC 
$370m loan for 5 new 
projects 

PRC signs Nonprolif- 
eration Treaty, will 
allow inspection of 
its nuclear program 



Soviet liberals begin 
new party, try to 
end CPSU monopoly 



SIPRI says process 
of arms control now 
infinitely more com- 
plex 



Moscow and Beijing 
woo Seoul 



IBM-Apple agree to 
swap technology 

UN asks Germany to 
play bigger inter- 
national role 

NATO warns USSR not 
to interfere in East 
Europe 

Kaifu will visit 
Beijing 



Russian parliament 
allows private home 
ownership 

John Major agrees to 
visit Beijing 

India slashes red 
tape for foreign in- 
vestment; trying to 
increase trade 

Yeltsin outlaws CPSU 
cells in Russia; CPSU 
ignores him 



79 



I YEAR 



MIDDLE EAST 



CHINA 



U.S ./OTHER 



1991 
cont 



Israel agrees to 
MTCR regulations 



PRC sympathetic to 
CPSU hardliners 



CCP Officials meet Israeli Foreign 
Minister 

I 

PRC has aided Iran's nuclear program 



Saudi Arabia wants 
to create offensive 
army; U.S. objects 



PRC-backed candi- 
dates lose in 1st 
Hong Kong elections 



UNSC Permanent Member nations all 
agree to arms export limitations; 
together they account for 85% of 
global arms trading 



Israel-USSR renew 
full relations 

Middle East Peace 
Conference begins 
in Madrid 



All Kuwait oil well 
fires extinguished 



PRC announces plan 
to end all smoking 
within 10 years 



Baker visits Beijing 

PRC-Vietnam normal- 
ize relations 



Yang Shangkun in Pakistan and Iran 

Egyptian diplomat new UN Secretary- 
General ( Bout r OS Bout r OS Ghali) 

I 
Israeli delegation visits PRC 



Mid East peace talks 
continue in D.C. 



Li Peng to India; 
1st visit by PRC 
leader since 1960 



UN repeals Zionism/Racism; PRC, 
Kuwait y Oman, Egypt, Bahrain are 
absent from the vote 



New information says 
Israel knowingly 
attacked USS LIBERTY 

Last U.S. hostages 
freed in Lebanon 



PRC foreign trade 
grows 17.5% in 1991 
(total $135. 7b); $8b 
is trade surplus 

ROC has $80b reserve; 
highest in world 



Hard-line Coup in 
USSR fails 



ROK joins UN 

Paris and Bonn want 
European army 

Judge Thomas confir- 
mation hearings 

Privatization of 
East Europe: Berlin 
selling former East 
German firms at rate 
of 10 per day 



Bolshevik anniversary 
ignored 



Romanov in St Peters- 
burg 



USSR dissolves; new 
Commonwealth of Re- 
publics/Independent 
States forms; Baltic 
independence allowed 

Russia wants Japanese 
aid in return for 
resolution of Kurile 
Islands dispute 

Russia-U.S. announce 
unilateral nuclear 
cuts 



80 



YEAR 


MIDDLE EAST 


CHINA 


U.S ./OTHER 


1991 


U.S. threatens use 


1st PRC nuclear 


Russia wants to join 


cont 


of force again in 


plant begins oper- 


NATO 




Iraq 


ation, at Qinshan 






140,000 Soviet Jews 


PRC foreign reserves 


Vatican-Orthodox 




emigrate to Israel 


now $40b; PRC 1991 


dispute over East 




in 1991 (400,000 


trade surplus with 


Europe 




were expected) 


U.S. $13b 






U.S.y U.K., Russia, PRC, France 






discuss arms saTes to Middle East 


Gorbachev resigns 




Muslim fundamental- 




C.I.S. formed 




ists doing well in 


PRC will sign Non- 






1st free Algerian 


proliferation Treaty 






elections 






1992 


U.S. joins UN con- 


PLA is modernizing 


Nixon calls for aid 




demnation of Israeli 




to former USSR 




West Bank policies 


U.S. -PRC agree on 








copyright protection 


Bush in Japan with 
U.S. CEOs; urges 




Marshall law in 


Deng tours Guangdong 


opening of Japanese 




Algeria 




market 




Israel -PRC estab ish diplomatic 


U.S. stops production 




relations 




of nuclear bombs 




U.S. agrees to $10b 


PRC is world's 4th 


N. Korea developing 




loan guarantees if 


largest ship builder 


long range missile 




Israel freezes West 








Bank settlements; 


PRC world's largest 


Organized East Asian 




Israel refuses 


energy developer; 
country unable to 


crime in U.S. 




Israel-India begin 


make enough energy 


France will sign Non- 




diplomatic relations 


for its needs 


proliferation Treaty 




Iran developing ties 


Taiwan wants to buy 


ASEAN agrees to make 




with central Asian 


50 Mirage fighters 


Free-Trade zone 




Muslim Republics 


from France 


Japan wants permanent 




Li Peng visits Ul 


1 and 4 European 


UNSC seat 




countries; meets with Bush 

1 


U.S. ends high-tech 




PRC has delivered chemicals to 


sanctions against PRC 




Syria that are needed for solid- 






fuel missiles 


UN sponsoring 8 peace 








keeping missions 




Rushdie and Free 


Foreign investment 






Thought receiving 


in PRC increases 


Japan has 2% of 




support in Cairo 


71% in 1991 


world's population, 
wi 11 consume 20% of 




Israeli coalition 


PRC economists cri- 


world's uranium by 




govt falls 


ticize hard-liners 


year 2000 



81 



YEAR 



MIDDLE EAST 



CHINA 



U.S./OTHER 



1992 
cont 



Israeli embassy in 
Buenos Ares bombed 

Israel Prime Minis- 
ter to be directly 
elected in 1996 

Rabin again leader 
of Labor Party 



PRC-Iran discussing transfer of 
missile deliverance technology 



Beijing gives more 
economic freedom to 
Guangdong Province 



PLA strong supporter 
of increased reforms 
throughout PRC 



Israel begins phone 
service to Arabs 



U.S. accuses Israel of illegal 
arms technology transfers to PRC 



Sharon says Jews 
will live in all 
areas of Jerusalem 



PLA has 50% budget 
increase from 1989 
levels 



Saudi Arabia also suspected of 
arms technology transfers to PRC 

UN votes sanctions against Libya; 
PRC abstains 



Saudi King does 
not want Western 
style democracy in 
Saudi Arabia 



Jiang Zemin visits 
Tokyo; PRC wants 
Japanese Emperor to 
visit Beijing 



Butros Butros Ghali in Beijing: 
praises PRC Third \4orld leadership 



Asian Islamic Re- 
public presidents 
visit Saudi Arabia 



Arafat survives air- 
plane crash in Egypt 

Moderates prevail 
in Iranian election 



Yangtze Dam project 
approved 

PRC states intention 
to launch astronauts 
by 2000 

Fang Lizhi says PRC 
leaders no longer 
believe in Marxism 



U.S. and Russia to 
do joint fusion 
research 



U.S. presidential 
primaries 

West makes $24b aid 
package for Russia 



Japan plans breeder 
reactor program to 
generate plutonium 



Russia will require 
extensive private 
investment to keep 
reforms alive 



Satellite rescued 
by Space Shuttle 
astronauts 

Iran outraged by 
Muslim deaths in 
Yugoslavian conflict 

Congress cuts U.S. 
troops in Europe to 
100,000; 23,000 now 
stationed in Middle 
East (most are Navy) 

L.A. riots 



82 



I YEAR 



MIDDLE EAST 



CHINA 



U.S ./OTHER 



1992 
cont 



PRC missile scientists visit 
Syria 



Mujahedeen now rule 
Afghanistan from 
Kabul 

U.S. $1.8b arms sale 
to Saudi Arabia 

Israel and Hezbollah 
fight in S. Lebanon 

Jerusalem Arabs take 
Jordan funds and 
refuse Saudi funds 
for Dome of the Rock 

Saudi Arabia-Yemen 
border dispute: 
Saudis tell western 
oil firms to leave 

Last western hostage 
freed in Lebanon 



Gorbachev in Israel 

Islamic Prime Minis- 
ters are in Istanbul 
to discuss Yugoslavia 

Labor beats Likud 
in Israeli election 



PRC agrees to MTCR 

PRC explodes nuclear 
device: 70 times more 
powerful than Hiro- 
shima bomb, 6 times 
larger than U.S. & 
USSR test limit 

Indian President 
in PRC; first ever 
Indian head of state 
visit to Beijing 

PRC buying Russian 
and Ukraine tanks, 
aircraft, ships, and 
maybe also the new 
aircraft carrier 

ROK firms allowed 
to open offices in 
Shanghai 

Shanghai Mayor in 
U.S. seeking invest- 
ment funds/projects 



India buys Russian 
rocket motor; U.S. 
trade sanctions on 
India and Russia 

U.S. -India joint 
naval operations; 
India tests 1,000 
mile IBM missile 

Danes vote against EC 

Earth Summit in Rio: 
largest gathering of 
Heads of State ever; 
U.S. only nation not 
to support entire 
Treaty 

Japan approves troop 
movement overseas 

Yeltsin in U.S.; Bush 
calls U.S. and C.I.S. 
partners; Washington 
Charter; arms cuts; 
aid 

U.S. troops may go 
to Yugoslavia with 
UN group 



III. DETERMINANTS OF PRC AND MIDDLE EAST FOREIGN POLICIES 
SINCE 1949 



From the perspective of North America and the industrial 
West, components of Middle Eastern and Chinese foreign 
policies are generally unfamiliar. Only Israel has the 
pluralistic, structured (though complex) , and legally format- 
ted input from bureaucratic and other political sources, 
public and private, that we have come to associate as part of 
governmental decision making processes. By contrast, state 
machineries elsewhere in the Middle East and China seem much 
more opaque; the forces, however many or few, that ultimately 
influence policy making there are much less amenable to 
political analysis as it has developed and been construed in 
the West . 

Although our unfamiliarity with these other political 
systems seems to reside with novel factors pertaining primari- 
ly to personality and cultural precedent, becoming familiar 
with those two factors - within different societal settings - 
requires a willingness to consider a perhaps unique spectrum 
of variables. Personality and cultural precedent are complex 
issues, and their components, therefore, are at least several. 
The trick, or solution, is to locate the appropriate variables 
and the relationships that hold between them. 

The search to locate these factors has varied. In China's 
case, discussion has been directed to whether or not bureau- 
cratic issues, power struggles, a core of rational decision 

84 



makers, or some set of variations including each of these 
should receive the lion's share of analysis. For the Middle 
East, typical choices of factors have included institutional- 
ized legitimacy, national consciousness, and theocratic 
propensities as the suitable focus for coming to grips with 
essentials of government in that region. These and other 
factors, plus the modus operandi of the questions themselves, 
will be considered in our look at determinants of Chinese and 
Middle Eastern foreign policies. 

Recommendations or preferences for any one governmental 
framework will not be made (i.e.: Chinese vs. Middle Eastern, 
Authoritarian vs. Pluralistic, Western vs. Eastern) . Nor will 
relative merits merely be compared: that is, whether or not 
facets of any national level polities and their international 
ramifications, anywhere on the globe, may be said to seek 
similar results regardless of their local idiosyncracies . The 
intent is simply to grasp, as much as possible, the aspects 
and intent of Chinese and Middle Eastern polities: why their 
priorities are as they are, why they have the perceptions that 
they do and what those perceptions are. Once this is done, 
then theoretical and pragmatic comparisons can be attempted, 
relative merits weighed, resources adjudged, and so on. 

History, politics, and policy - in one sense - are a 
matter of progression; after-the-fact hindsight allows, 
usually, for more thorough understandings of events than are 
perhaps possible during their occurrence. This detached 

85 



viewing also allows the luxury of suggesting how events and/or 
policies might have been pursued differently, for increased 
advantage of all concerned. We can certainly wonder, for 
example, what our policies and actions regarding China, and 
the Middle East, might have been - 45 or 50 years ago - if we 
had known then what we, as a people, are beginning to under- 
stand now. At the risk of sounding overly simplistic, I 
maintain that the possibility exists - always - that our world 
views might well experience modifications and thereby become 
more responsible and effective, prior to our generation of 
policies and directives, merely through our becoming more 
aware of what the other guy is thinking and why he is thinking 
that way. Structures and positions of governments should be 
studied, as much as possible, on their own merits - rather 
than as functions or extensions of our perceived requirements 
or of our own world views. 

A. PRC 

China's contemporary political processes are now largely 
referenced into two periods flanking either side of Mao 
Zedong's death. This categorization is meant to coincide with 
the two respective priorities that have dominated China's 
political world since 1949, namely those of class struggle or 
ideological primacy and the ensuing more recent appearance of 
pragmatic reforms. Neither of these categories dominated 
their respective periods completely, but from 1949 until his 
death in 1976 Mao kept the emphasis of government on ideology 

86 



and social revolution, with Deng Xiaoping focusing ever since 
on more stable and pragmatic economic reform measures. Both 
Mao and Deng regarded their efforts as absolutely necessary 
for China's modernization and reform, although they personally 
differed on how best to achieve that aim. Correlations occur 
between the two periods, as when economic retrenchment 
occurred for a few years following the Great Leap Forward 
(GLF) , and when ideological primacy resurfaced after the 
Tienanmen massacre. These permutations happened if for no 
other reason than that both Mao and Deng operated through 
similar bureaucratic layers. Mao and Deng also, along with 
Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi and several others, constituted the 
bedrock of Communist China's leadership elite from the outset; 
they shared, in various capacities and at differing times, the 
leadership decisions and elements of administrative responsi- 
bilities. This composite begins to account for the swings and 
turbulence evident in the People's Republic of China's initial 
history. A paradoxical cauldron of geography, personalities, 
catalytic patriarchy, and desires to transition from Confucian 
to institutionalized (or modernized) values further identifies 
this period. To get a better feel for China, we will start 
with some geographic and demographic groundwork: 

China, when compared to the coterminus U.S., is only 
slightly larger in area although contains a population four 
times as large (exceeding, at present, one billion) . It would 
take a combination of the peoples of Europe, plus all of North 

87 



and South America, to gather approximately the same number of 
persons. Further, average projections indicate, by the year 
2050, a resident PRC population of 1.5 billion; in the absence 
of China's birth control program and based on 1984 fertility 
rates, this figure grows to 2.1 billion by the year 2080.^^ 
In 1750 China had a population of about 200 million, which had 
already more than doubled from a level of 60 million at the 
beginning of the 15th century. It only took 100 years for 
another doubling, from 200 to 400 million, in 1850. Another 
hundred years brought the numbers to 540 million, with almost 
another doubling after that in less than 50 years, giving 
China her current host of just over one billion. In 1949, and 
previously during the Qing, perhaps 80% or more of all Chinese 
lived in the countryside, engaged in agriculture. That figure 
is now closer to 70%, which still makes China overwhelmingly 
rural. However, the remaining 25-30% constitute an urban 
group which is itself at least as large as all North Americans 
put together. One obvious concern facing China, regarding her 
people, is feeding them; she is doing this by having at her 
disposal only one half of America's total arable acreage, 
which allows about 10% of her land for cultivation. 

Another way to grasp the physical dimension of China's 
population is to consider that each of China's approximately 
3 provinces is roughly equivalent to a European country, with 
some of those provinces having populations of 100 million. 
Yet from still another perspective, if the ratio of people to 



tillable land in the U.S. was the same as it is in China, the 
U.S. would now have between 2-3 billion people instead of only 
250 million. ^^ 

China's geography includes not only the world's highest 
peaks which are still pushing upward at an annual rate of 6", 
but also many other extensive mountain ranges and deserts 
(including Asia's lowest point below sea level), that alto- 
gether cover over two thirds of her territory. The Taklimakan 
desert is considered by many to be the harshest desert in the 
world; it regularly and literally devoured ancient caravans 
and continues to extract annual tolls on travellers today. 
China shares 4,000 miles of border with the former Soviet 
Union (excluding Mongolia), another 3,000 miles with India 
(along the "roof of the world"), and has over 5,000 miles of 
coastline (not including the islands of Hainan or Taiwan, or 
the extensive major rivers and canals) . Several minority 
groups, including 20 million Muslims, figure prominently in 
China's overall political equations and may still be the local 
majorities in the large western provinces, also in the north 
and south, though account for no more than roughly 6% of the 
total population. Two major world-class river systems, 
flowing east, dominate the interior and contribute to exten- 
sive networks of lakes, canals and coastal irrigation works 
(the "inland sea"), that have been developed by residents and 
public works projects over several centuries. Other major 
rivers add further to this elaborate system. This network of 

89 



natural and man-made waterways is essential for transportation 
and food production; it has been a mainstay both for liveli- 
hood as well as a source of serious calamity (vast periodic 
flooding and drought). Massive flooding has just recently 
occurred, described as the worst within 100 years, and was 
responsible for the ruination of 25% of China's 1991 harvests. 

Not only is China's geography more apparent or stark, in 
a visual sense, than ours, but the relation it has to its 
people is more pronounced and concentrated than that of 
probably any other land mass anywhere else on the globe. For 
whereas our own history in North America encompasses, roughly, 
an extensive millenial westward migration from the Middle East 
and Persia through to and including Greece, Rome, Europe and 
finally into the New World (with spin-offs here and there on 
varying continents), China also contains a similar 4,000 year 
span of civilization that is at least as dynamic in scope but 
which could be squeezed into a geography smaller than our 
thirteen original states. Its historical development, due 
largely to its landlocked orientation, has been a growth of 
implosion and readjustment unlike the steady expansions 
experienced by Mediterranean and European cultures. 

These basic comparisons give rise to a sense of diversity 
within homogeneity, of a place with special or unique under- 
standing for units of measurement and the passage of time. A 
typical story, making use of this sense of time, is told of 
Zhou Enlai who spent a work-study summer in France in 1920 

90 



(Deng Xiaoping was also with him, as were other future CCP 
leaders) : in response to a question posed to him by a diplomat 
in Bandung about the efficacy of the French Revolution, Zhou 
Enlai said (partly in jest and partly in earnest): "It's too 
early to tell". Similarly, on another occasion, and more 
seriously than not, Zhou recounted to a visitor in 1960 that 
the PRC had only taken the first step on a journey of 10,000 
miles. China, in having been "itself for so long", and in one 
place, simultaneously balances new and old in ways that we may 
not readily recognize or be able to appreciate.^'* So while 
the Middle Kingdom has developed unique approaches to tempos 
and culture, yet its people pursue universally recognizable 
wants and desires. 

1. Before Deng Xiaoping 

The People's Republic of China did not appear over- 
night. Mao Zedong's forces passed through Beijing almost one 
year before the PRC was proclaimed. Nor was it territorily 
complete in October 1949; Tibet, though shortly thereafter 
"liberated", was not formally conjoined as an autonomous 
region until 15 years later, with other additions, reunifica- 
tions, and clarifications still yet to occur (Macao, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan) . China also continues to revise itself govern- 
mentally as well as teritorially . 

Ostensibly China is a socialist state, the last major 
communist government left on the globe (aside from Cuba and 
North Korea) , and technically could be described as such: its 

91 



Ministries, Constitution, Politburo and National People's 
Congress, the relationships between cadres and people, the 
place of the military, and so on. However, if I may, to be 
more accurate or realistic and to provide a better feel for 
the climate of the new People's Republic, all of China and its 
government is not only this array of Party Apparatus and 
governmental machinery, but also an evolving concatenation of 
paradoxes that are rife with tradition in an increasingly 
modern world. These paradoxes are routinely bandaged with 
novel resolutions regularly produced to heal emerging dilem- 
mas, whether at national, provincial or local levels. 
Moreover, the Party leadership collectively entertains a 
vision of future growth for China and the eventual resumption 
of its historical prominence within the circle of nations; 
because of the variety, quantity and speed of all that is 
happening within China, this vision is regularly revised and 
will continue to be so revised until well into the next 
century. 

It is very difficult, therefore, and perhaps impossi- 
ble, to provide a pervasive, intelligible, and certain 
definition or description, politically or culturally, of China 
and its people and government at this present point in time. 
Essentially China is in a period of indigenous transition, and 
has been so (depending on who is providing the referential 
source on this particular subject), for at least 50 years and 
possibly for as long as 200 years. ■'^ I personally regard the 

92 



transitional duration to be the latter period, and expect it 
to continue for at least another 50 to 100 years - perhaps 
even longer. The paragraphs that follow will attempt to 
provide a feel for this sense of transition now prevalent in 
China . 

When Mao Zedong's Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
acquired the reigns of government, the leadership faced a 
number of tasks. In addition to the immediate matters of 
consolidating power and establishing a new state administra- 
tion, the CCP's intended purpose was to usher China into the 
2 0th century. As such, there was much more to do than simply 
establish a new government, fill vacant posts, and publish a 
timetable. There was education to be provided and revamped, 
land reform for the agricultural countryside, inflation to 
control, wounds from major conflicts to heal, domestic 
practices to combat, industry to encourage, and basically an 
entire social and national infrastructure, in every respect, 
that needed some sort of attention. 

No doubt the most prevalent aspect of the social 
landscape was its Confucian heritage, a system that had been 
finely tuned through a score of centuries since its inception 
around the year 500 B.C.E. Confucianism itself, as it came to 
be embodied, fostered at least one paradox of its own, namely 
a silent conflict between egalitarianism on the one hand and 
the status quo - or respect for authority and its Chinese 
stratification - on the other. All good citizens were 

93 



expected "to shape their behavior and perform their duties in 
a manner commensurate with their status": i.e. maintain the 
status quo.^^ Then again, within the teachings of Confucious 
were mandates to a lack of all class distinction, that 
instruction and education should be pursued without reference 
to any inbred inequities. 

Another way of stating the above paradox is to 
contrast family with the central government. All Chinese were 
bound by filial piety to their families, then beyond that to 
their clan, village, and so on. Yet all power emanated from 
above, from the center, and hence a subtle contrasting tug of 
allegiance ensued between the two. The Chinese version of 
Confucianism that came to be officially adopted in the body 
politic encouraged all citizens not only to submit to authori- 
ty in accordance with their station in life, but also to do 
everything possible during the course of their lives to ensure 
that society's stratification and stas quo were maintained. 
The idea of plurality or of a loyal opposition simply had no 
place in Chinese thought or practice. Authority at one level 
always demurred, at least in form, to the next higher level, 
and always to the center; if a family or region had specific 
identifiable interests, then those interests were pursued only 
insofar as deference to the center could be maintained.^'' 
Periods of Warlordism and strife between dynasties have 
appeared, when regions pursued their own interests at the 
expense of the center, but these periods are the exception 

94 



rather than the norm. Preferences for order over chaos have 
long been a primary and deep seated aspect of the Chinese 
people . 

A central tenet of Confucianism stipulated that the 
ruler of society, and all who would participate in the ruling 
process, were deemed to be best equipped for governing only 
after having thoroughly studied the past. Hence education 
came to have a dynamically central place in the scheme of 
things. It wasn't long before an elaborate examination system 
became the method for identifying qualified civil servants as 
well as becoming the main route for upward mobility; civil 
officials in government were literally members of China's 
intelligentsia. In time, it also became possible for a 
limited number of persons to finance their way into this 
governmental bureaucracy through purchasing degrees rather 
than competing in the grueling examination process - provided 
their family had enough money. The exam system itself was an 
incredible journey through a maze of annual and tri-annual 
testings, often requiring 25-30 years - or more - to entirely 
complete, if successful: this process wasn't for everyone.^® 
Grades were determined on sliding scales, limiting those who 
passed to only 50 or 100 per province (i.e. : a maximum of only 
one percent of those who were tested) . 

Originally the subjects covered by the exams were a 
wide spectrum, including history, mathematics, law, and the 
Confucian corpus. The Ming dynasty (1400s), revised the exams 

95 



so that they focused around the Confucian classics, which is 
said to have contributed to the stultification of thought and 
research in general . As the rewards of government service 
were great, and successful candidates were able to raise the 
living standards and status of entire family groups, it has 
been suggested, therefore, that the country's landed or 
bureaucratic elite eventually came to focus entirely or 
primarily around the Confucian classics, which in turn drew 
attention away from other sciences, etc. This supposed 
conjunction, however, between a predisposition for the 
Confucian corpus and a corresponding lack of interest or 
expertise in other more practical or scientific avenues, is 
not universally shared. ^^ But regardless of the causal 
factors involved, although China was once far in advance of 
pre-Renaissance Europe on a host of subjects (medicine, 
warfare, astronomy, navigation, chemistry, and so on) , the 
West eventually performed an end run around the East, so to 
speak, and met China from a position of strength in the 1800s 
and beyond. ^° This was much to the embarrassment of China, 
and still is. Many Imperial civil servants, the liberal 
intelligentsia, attempted to institute reform measures to 
counteract China's lethargy; one such reform, which the 
conservative and weak Qing could no longer refuse, abolished 
the examination system in 1905, in an attempt to totally 
revamp the education system. 



96 



Another aspect of the examination milieu and of 
Confucianism in general was "Practice what you Preach": 
ethical precepts and leadership by example were deemed to be 
essential to any good ruler. The Chinese emperor, residing at 
the apex of this studied bureaucracy, therefore led by precept 
as well as by fiat. The moral example of his life was an 
important aspect of ruling. Ethical precepts, the power of 
personality, personal allegiances and maintenance of order, 
authority from above, and the status quo were all part of the 
experience of being ruled by the Son of Heaven. Corresponding 
ethical requirements and expectations were found within every 
strata of Chinese society. In that setting, who you knew (and 
who knew you), or guanxi , was just as important and more 
prominent than your position or what you knew. 

Other aspects of Confucianism which infused Chinese 
life were: paternal rule, a meritocracy by skill and also by 
status and wealth, family oriented allegiances (extending into 
the clan and region) , and an inherent optimism into the 
educability of man - therefore the goodness or malleability of 
man - regardless of how easy or difficult it might be for 
someone to find the time or resources to become educated. 
Statesmanship was seen as service to the Emperor, and conduct 
was always in accordance with your status; vertical relation- 
ships held throughout all of society. Within the family, for 
example, there were not simply brothers and sisters and 
cousins, but - with specific Chinese characters to represent 

97 



each of the following - there were older brothers or sisters, 
younger brothers or sisters, and differentiations between 
paternal and maternal relatives. 

Education, while prized by all and recognized as a 
worthy achievement and an avenue for mobility or advancement, 
was not equally available to anyone who might desire to pursue 
it. Preparation for the civil service examination cycle 
required such an inordinate amount of study that it simply 
wasn't possible for peasants to spend their first three or 
four decades away from their livelihoods so that they could 
study. There was, therefore, a very distinguishable gap, not 
easily bridged, between classical literacy found in the landed 
bureaucracy and governing strata, and utilitarian literacy 
(the ability to get by with knowing only 1,000 to 2,000 basic 
characters) . The distance between the landed intelligentsia, 
who had the resources for study, and the vast majority of 
peasants, was very real. 

Additionally, the Chinese language was itself an 
exacerbating factor in the matter of literacy; almost each 
ideogram in the language incorporated a host of meanings which 
were delineated by tonal inflection, sentence position, and 
various paired conjunctions of characters. The net result was 
to make literacy not simply a matter of being able to read but 
rather something more closely approximating an art form. 
Calligraphy is a related offshoot of this state of affairs. 



98 



and helps to indicate the centrality of language and verbal 
meaning for Chinese life. 

One comparatively simple issue related to language 
that directly affected the CCP was semantic in scope. The CCP 
had to find translations for European Marxist terminology so 
that the terminology would fit China's circumstances and be 
properly understood via Chinese ideograms. China's predomi- 
nantly rural orientation, nascent industrialization, and 
slippery semantics did not afford easy solutions to this 
requirement. Consequently, the Marxist/Leninist "proletarian" 
became the Chinese "propertyless class person", who could 
either be urban (European) or rural (Chinese) . Similarly, 
"feudal" became related to the fragmentation of sovereignty or 
to the period of Chinese history before the first unification 
(before 221 B.C.E.). Had the term "feudal" referred to 
landlord relationships, which would more closely approximate 
the European semantics, then all of China's 2,000 year history 
would have applied and the Marxist sense would have been lost, 
not to mention the attendant embarassment inherent to China 
and the CCP by such a usage. This incorporation and adjust- 
ment of European experience to fit Chinese needs is partially 
a factor of what is now referred to as Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics, although economic and nationalistic senses 
are the primary intended reference points. 

The above elements related to Confucianism and other 
aspects of Chinese life are very sketchy and brief, but 

99 



offered to suggest the variegated and traditional senses of 
life with which Chinese society had become imbued. Therefore, 
the CCP's task to reform society, without passing judgment on 
the manner in which it tried to do so, was at least awkward 
and also immense due to population size (already 3 times as 
large as North America in 1949, or 25% of the world's total), 
the ingrained nature of Chinese traditions, and also due to 
the geographical diversity within which it was located. 

The reforms, of course, were designed for the purpose 
of enhancing China's modernization process and reinstating 
China into international life on a par with other countries. 
Questions had already been asked (and are still being asked) , 
of why China, with its glorious history and enviable record of 
achievement, had become complacent without realizing its 
complacency, and consequently upstaged by the West. No ready 
answers have yet been provided, but apparently it seems that 
aspects of Confucian stratification and conservative elitism, 
the preponderance of abundant human labor for any task then 
imaginable, plus the basis of existing economics in the landed 
gentry and "squeeze" extracted by officials from taxation or 
government monopolies (canal trade, the salt market, interac- 
tion with foreigners), all combined to make the need for a 
Chinese Renaissance, or modernization, unnecessary. Capital 
development that usually heralded industrial growth simply did 
not appear as it had elsewhere (Europe, Japan) . 



100 



To be sure, China was not just a sleeping giant; in 
the 1840s it had been observed that more tonnage passed 
through Shanghai than through London, and in 17 5 there were 
more printed books in China than in all of Europe. But those 
observations just make the question of China's relative 
industrial quiescence that much more enigmatic. The requisite 
catalysts for industrialization - of the capitalistic variety 
that had emerged elsewhere - had not (yet) materialized. 
There were, in fact, severe pockets of resistance to modern- 
ization. Circumstances are recorded of peasant displeasure, 
often violent, at attempts to modernize the countryside, 
because the peasants felt the considerable hardship of extra 
and arbitrary taxation that modernization required long before 
any benefits accrued to them from the modernization itself. 
Some local persons of authority, in isolated instances, were 
also actively opposed to modernization. One such incident has 
a railroad line being ripped out after its construction, 
possibly due to the fact that its presence may have hurt 
regular income to the hierarchy from an established canal or 
other transport artery, or perhaps because it circumvented the 
vertical authority then in place between the local official 
and his provincial authority, with the wrong person (foreign- 
er?) having made the decision to construct it and thereby 
cause loss of face either to the local official, to the higher 
provincial authority, or to both.^^ 



101 



Regardless of the reason for the disparity between 
China and the West's rate of industrialization, this gap 
became readily apparent through gunboat diplomacy; many 
responsible Chinese voices had, as a result, long been in 
favor of reform measures covering the entire gamut from 
education to parliaments, including armaments, but societal 
inertia and Qing reluctance kept those voices in abeyance. 
The infamous Marble Boat, built at the behest of the Empress 
Dowager with funds already earmarked for a blue water fleet to 
buffer Japan, is the most glaring example of reforms and good 
intentions gone awry. The Marble Boat is indicative of an 
Imperial court that was unfortunately incapable of directing 
proper attention or resources even to the one goal it desired 
above all others: maintenance of the Manchu dynasty and 
empire . 

Although, in the 1950s, it was apparent to the 
Communists that wide reforms to engender modernization and 
industrialization were in fact necessary, it was not clear to 
them how to enact such reforms on a national level; both urban 
as well as rural facets were part of the whole, and the CCP 
was by this time familiar only with the countryside. The 
Soviet Union provided, at first, a convenient model for PRC 
policies and expectations; this seemed only natural as the 
Party had already been looking at Marxism-Leninism and the 
Soviet Revolution, plus many of the CCP members had studied in 
Moscow. After a decade, however, it became fairly apparent 

102 



that the Soviet model, centered on an industrialized base, was 
not appropriate for the agrarian PRC . The CCP, therefore, 
literally had to work out its policies via hard experience 
during the course of actually governing China. Mistakes would 
be made . 

The initial strength which Mao and the CCP found 
within the peasants of the rural countryside was due partly to 
China's make-up, but more a result of being forced to leave 
cosmopolitan centers in the south and east by the Nationalists 
(KMT) and Japanese, both of whom wanted China for themselves. 
After surviving the 12 -month watershed Long March into 
northern Shaanxi and finally into Yanan, the CCP proceeded to 
consolidate their position in north central China. From there 
they coordinated their fight against the Japanese (in concert 
with the KMT, at the behest of the Comintern, and after 
persuading Chiang Kaishek to do so through kidnapping him in 
1936), and also prepared for the inevitable resumption of 
conflict with the KMT after Japan was removed from China. It 
is this formative period which led, or at least encouraged, 
Mao to propound and maintain his doctrine of self-sufficiency. 

The ramifications of this insight were related to the 
historical sense felt by China as being the Middle Kingdom, or 
the Center, with little need and even less regard for others, 
except insofar as others might be useful for trade, or for 
keeping minority groups quiet near the frontiers, etc.. In 
that sense, Mao could argue that autarky was entirely accept- 

103 



able, not to mention that he also had to be concerned with 
maintaining the CCP's revolutionary spirit and wished to avoid 
any influx of non-communist ideas through contact with 
foreigners. However, the extremes associated with the autarky 
that ensued, in trying to make each province self sufficient, 
led to excesses that later required adjustment. Those 
difficulties are still being dealt with today as the Chinese 
leadership decides how best to solve matters related to 
distribution of resources and the problems of maintaining, 
consolidating, improving, or shutting down, state owned 
industries that are now either poorly located, inefficiently 
managed, or both. 

The primary factor that led Mao and the CCP to 
emphasize provincial autarky was directly related to security 
concerns. China had, by this time, experienced severe 
conflict for several years. World War II was only a facet of 
the prolonged strife that had plagued China for almost a 
decade. No sooner had the CCP dealt with the KMT than Russia 
was found to be a fairly dubious neighbor alongside, and 
inside, Manchuria, plus the United States soon entered the 
Korean conflict with troops advancing as far as the Yalu 
River. ^^ China's involvement in Korea, and her subsequent 
hot-and-cold relations with the U.S. were contributing factors 
in the leadership's mindset that led to their requiring 
strategic industries to be literally moved into the interior, 
each in a separate location. This was an immense project 

104 



which utilized the abundant human physical labor in the 
countryside. Even while this movement was taking place, the 
country managed to maintain, during its first decade, an 
average annual growth rate of approximately 5% (or an average 
of 8.2% if taken within the period through 1975)." Mao's 
doctrine of "Self-sufficiency" became the CCP's doctrine, 
applied at both the provincial and national levels. 

All things considered, the CCP had set for itself a 
monumental task. China was not only to be modernized, but 
hard traditions were to be eroded, if not eradicated, as part 
of the process or else it was felt that modernization would 
not hold. Participation by the peasantry within the process, 
and a transfer of peasant allegiance from family and clan to 
the new government and Party, required a severe whittling away 
of ingrained traditional relationships that had been in place 
for centuries. Consequently the Party essentially declared 
war on Confucianism and other cultural traditions. The Party 
knew that China had so far failed to generate the kind of 
modernization that was then apparent in Europe and even Japan, 
and therefore that widespread reform in China was required. 
A combination of May Fourth reformers, returned students from 
Europe and Japan and other seminal Chinese figures, all full 
of Marxism-Leninism and nationalism, impressed by the Russian 
revolution, and especially desirous to speed China's reforms, 
comnbined to form the CCP, and the events leading to the 
formation of the PRC began. 

105 



Traditional Chinese values were already weakened due 
to reform measures that had been attempted from the late Qing 
era and during the early Republic. Additionally, pressures on 
family and other Chinese institutions had been severe since 
the 1920s due to the tremendous disruption and dislocations 
from prolonged conflict. China had, roughly since 1921, been 
engaged in continuous struggle: a combination of civil strife 
between CCP and KMT, plus the war against the Japanese. 

The CCP in its first decades was actually channeling 
existing tides of discontent, in which the Chinese people were 
looking for relief, respite, and hoped-for opportunities to 
get on with their lives. But the Party had a larger agenda 
beyond mere relief and respite and was doing its best to 
literally revolutionize an entire society. Hence, through 
Mao's leadership, there came to be no sacred cows, and almost 
everything - except for revolution itself - was eventually 
called into question and subject to calls for exorcism. 
Children were not discouraged from denouncing their parents, 
attempts were made to bring peasants directly into the 
education process (previously associated only with the wealthy 
or well-connected civil servants) , clan loyalties and ancestor 
worship were discouraged, the marriage and agrarian laws (the 
first major reform measures) did in fact weaken Confucian 
networks . 

On the domestic front, the first major societal 
actions of the CCP were the Marriage Law and Agrarian Reform 

106 



Law in 1950. These two were nothing short of revolutionary, 
regardless of who might have pronounced them. The intent of 
the Marriage Law was to hasten the emancipation of women which 
had already begun at the turn of the century, to underscore 
the end to foot-binding which occurred shortly before in the 
1920s, and - if at all possible - to reorient domestic 
relationships and allegiance patterns by giving the woman 
equal marital rights, equal access to divorce, equal expecta- 
tion to marital fidelity as had been enjoyed by men, and 
property rights. The new law was therefore designed to 
encroach on the "three bonds" of traditional Confucianism and 
to weaken the clan and entire filial network. The marriage 
law did in fact have its desired effect, although other reform 
measures soon to follow changed even more drastically the 
overall relations between China's peasants and their families 
and the land itself. 

Agrarian reform also began simultaneously with the 
marriage law and with much the same effect, namely to remove 
the peasant from servitude and loyalty to the landlord, to 
give him incentive by having land of his own, to foster 
egalitarianism throughout the countryside by removing feudal 
relationships, and - at first - to tie the peasant to the 
Party by making him part of the process which removed and/or 
ruined the landlords (often by killing them). "Feudal", in 
this case, does mean the landlord-peasant relationship. No 
sooner, however, had the 1950 land reform been concluded 

107 



(1952), than reorganization of peasants into mutual aid teams 
began, then cooperatives (where land was still privately- 
owned) , and finally into the collectives. By 1957 almost all 
the peasants were collectivized, which reflected a tremendous 
amount of enthusiasm by Party members and also a willingness 
among the peasants to participate in the CCP reform measures. 
The CCP, based on its own agenda - again without 
passing judgment on that agenda or its methodology - was 
meeting with more than a few initial successes. The face of 
China had literally been transformed. However, the CCP was 
trying to do everything at once, or rather Mao's leadership 
was pushing the Party to pursue all, and more, of these 
attempts in short order. In the space of only a few years the 
CCP had taken control of a national government, reorganized 
the countryside, initiated a wide array of deep attacks on 
pervasive Confucian truisms, fought a war in Korea, sparred 
with the U.S. over the Taiwan Straits, decided to make an atom 
bomb, started compulsory military service and training, 
pursued self-sufficiency, collared wartime inflation, and 
started a full-scale ambivalence regarding the place of 
scholars and higher education. Success was achieved in 
weaning traditional allegiance away from the bedrock familial 
unit, although the force of that allegiance was basically 
unchanged even if the substance was changed; allegiance and 
expectations were now essentially redirected toward the Party, 
rather than transformed into something else. It's as though 

• 108 



the result, at a societal level, was to create a new and much 
larger (national) family. 

Quite possibly the major achievement of the CCP was in 
the arena of national government; everyone in China, with few 
exceptions, was now for the first time in direct and constant 
contact with the Center. Previously all contact between 
peasants and the Imperial center had been indirect through 
provincial officials; the bureaucratic gentry ensured that 
directives from above for transport or labor or rice or taxes 
were met, and then did more or less as they pleased with any 
remaining squeeze. In the PRC, local officials in the form of 
cadres likewise were found between peasants and Center, but 
peasants also belonged to organizations that interacted 
extensively with those and other cadres, or by extension the 
center, on subjects of mutual and national import. These 
local organizations ranged from work units or collectives to 
youth organizations, the military, and others. For the very 
first time in millenia, China's peasants were essentially as 
much a part of the Center's feedback loop as were the local 
officials. Albeit the layers of bureaucracy were still in 
place, and contact between peasant and central government 
passed through several human strainers, yet there was nonethe- 
less a sense of national consciousness - a sense of participa- 
tion in the national group - which was forming in the minds of 
all concerned. From another viewpoint, this new circumstance 
was also a genuinely totalitarian state. There was now more 

109 



(or less) to living in China beyond the racial sense of being 
Chinese, and fulfilling occasional dictates from an unseen 
higher authority at the center. 

Flushed with this initial success, the CCP under Mao's 
guidance proceeded to push with more and faster reforms. For 
better or for worse, Mao was obsessed with the idea of 
egalitarianism and of making that idea a reality throughout 
all of China. Hence the 1955 collectivization proceeded at a 
rapid pace, followed by the Great Leap Forward (GLF) in 1957. 
Support for this rapid pace was not automatic within Party 
ranks, but Party discipline held and the CCP dutifully 
supported the Great Helmsman's projects. (Similarly, the 
principle of the "democratic mass line" was utilized among the 
people to generate party support and common responses to 
problems or issues that might arise during the course of 
carrying out party mandated activities). 

There was danger in attempting to do too much too 
quickly, and that point was in fact reached. Prior to the 
GLF, Mao announced the Hundred Flowers campaign in 1956 with 
the intent of enlisting the support of China's educated non- 
communist elite. China's intellectuals took Mao at his word 
and began a period of immense criticism, primarily against the 
domination of a single political entity: the CCP. Both the 
Party and non-communist elite had the best interests of China 
at heart, but they did not agree with each other. Mao was 
already leading the Party away from Soviet models, but this 

110 



criticism from China's own intellectuals was too much for him. 
Technically, while the traditional role of civil servant was 
to lead by example, using a combination of classical learning 
and ethical precepts, his calling attention to the ruler of 
inadequacies or items that needed correction was a procedure 
that bordered a fine line between duty and treason. The 
intelligentsia that responded within the Hundred Flowers 
framework were obviously, in Mao's opinion, going far beyond 
duty. Accordingly, the campaign was terminated, (hundreds and 
thousands of) arrests were made, and Chinese education began 
to experience reforms of its own. 

As one of the Communist's intentions had been to 
render education equally accessible to all Chinese, and the 
peasants simply could not be inserted into traditional higher 
education, the educational structure was therefore brought to 
the peasant's level with the net result of diluting China's 
entire educational infrastructure. Education was conjoined 
with manual labor, requirements for mandated schooling were 
reduced, and seats for higher education were awarded based on 
class background rather than (solely) on intellectual attain- 
ment. Another practical paradox ensued with these particular 
reforms: education may indeed have been leveled across the 
population spectrum, but the educational resource base 
required for modernization was severely weakened. 

Mao's leadership of the CCP was not a given. He was 
involved in an ongoing struggle for primacy over the Party 

111 



which was not initially resolved until after the Long March. 
Subsequently, there was ongoing discussion within the Party 
over whether to focus on ideological reforms (Mao) , or a less 
intense procedure with fewer state controls (Liu Shaoqi, Deng 
Xiaoping) . Up until the GLF was announced, all Party members 
were behind Mao, despite what may have been their misgivings. 
Following the GLF, however, when it became apparent that the 
GLF had been a disaster rather than the glowing success 
reported by CCP cadres, Mao's leadership again came under 
question . 

At the Lushan meeting of the Central Committee in 
1959, Peng Dehuai was highly critical of what was then 
unfolding as the GLF debacle. Peng's critique, presented 
within a recurrent forum held for discussion among the Party's 
hierarchy for thrashing out policy matters, was taken by Mao 
as a personal attack. Peng was removed from his post, Lin 
Biao became Defense Minister, Liu Shaoqi succeeded Mao as 
Chairman, and the stage was set for factionalism that has 
plagued the CCP ever since. Lin Biao produced the "Little Red 
Book", steered the PLA away from the professionalism and 
modernization of Peng, and Mao sought a manner in which to 
reassert the primacy of social egalitarianism. 

To backtrack somewhat and review the State and Party 
organizations up until this point: Party and State had been 
established as two separate organizations in the PRC . On the 
state side, the primary or most visible organ between hierar- 

112 



chy and general population was the National People's Congress 
(NPC) . The NFC, elected every 5 years, elects a Standing 
Committee with Chairman and several Vice-Chairmen who function 
as a full-time outlet of the NPC. Members of the Standing 
Committee also appoint the judges to the Supreme People's 
Court. The NPC additionally elects members of the State 
Council and can also, theoretically, approve or disapprove 
national budgets. The State Council presides over the several 
Ministries of Government, has a Premier and several Vice- 
Premiers, and is described as the most important organ of 
national government. Zhou Enlai became the first state 
Premier and kept that post until he died. Membership of the 
NPC is based upon one representative for a certain number of 
Chinese (400,000 in 1978), and includes representatives who 
are members of the Party, PLA, workers, peasants, national 
minorities, and others, including a few overseas Chinese. 
Prior to the establishment of the NPC, the Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Congress (CPPCC) was established as an 
interim coalition government, comprised of CCP members as well 
as representatives from other non-CCP parties. The CPPCC 
still exists, but has little functional value. 

On the Party side, and similarly to the NPC, the CCP 
begins with the National Party Congress, composed of represen- 
tatives from lower level Provincial and Local Party Congress- 
es. The National Party Congress, like the NPC, is directed to 
convene every 5 years, and elects a Central Committee. The 

113 



Central Committee in turn elects, while in plenary session, 
the Politburo as well as the Standing Committee of the 
Politburo, also the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen of the CCP. 
The Chairman of the CCP is also head of the PLA; Mao held the 
chairmanship of the CCP from the Long March until 1976. He 
was also Chairman of the PRC until Liu Shaoqi took the post in 
1959. 

Technically the above frameworks of Party and State 
are neatly laid out, each with its areas of responsibility. 
But they hardly function in the sense that our Congress or the 
British Parliament function; the NPC and Party Congress are 
largely rubber stamp edifices, with each fully aware of which 
way the wind is blowing whenever they convene. Form without 
substance, and another paradox: deliberative government 
machinery within an authoritarian framework. Authority is 
still from above. 

Both Party and State have written constitutions. The 
first PRC constitution was adopted in 1954 and the first CCP 
constitution was adopted in 1945; significant documentary 
revisions for each have followed with dependable frequency. 
Despite the written provisions delineating responsibilities 
and avenues of decision making within the PRC and CCP, the 
actual weight or authoritative standing of any one member of 
the CCP or NPC has much more to do with his faction and 
patron, or his guanxi (connections), than with his job 
description. It is very important for any one Chinese to not 

114 



only know who someone is when dealing with that individual, 
but also who that person works for, who he knows, who his 
patron is, who is above him, who works beneath him; with that 
knowledge then it becomes possible to deal with the other 
person. 

From its inception in 1921 to the aftermath of the 
GLF, CCP membership had risen from less than a hundred to 
about 17,000,000. During this time the CCP had encroached on 
the day-to-day administrative and managerial responsibilities 
of the State Council and its Ministries. This was Mao's way 
of ensuring Party ideological control over administrative 
state machinery. ^^ After factionalism had broken out at the 
Lushan meeting, and Liu Shaoqi was head of State, Mao per- 
ceived additional need for the resurgence of ideological 
purity, and so the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 
(GPCR) was conceived in 1964. 

Beyond ensuring ideological purity, the GPCR was also 
a vehicle for Mao to regain undisputed control over Party and 
hence the State. CCP factionalism had reached the point where 
Mao was less and less the controlling figure. In an over- 
simplified manner of speaking, the GPCR was a glorified power 
struggle . 

The horrendous excesses of the GPCR are well document- 
ed, with more information becoming available on a continuous 
basis. It is not necessary to recount its progression here. 
Suffice it to say that Zhou survived, Liu and Deng were 

115 



purged, Peng Zhen (Mayor of Beijing) was the first high- 
ranking CCP member to be relieved of his post, thousands and 
thousands were injured or lost their jobs or worse, education 
suffered, universities were closed, the Gang of Four were 
making their play for power, and it became necessairy for 
regular units of the FLA to restore order after competing Red 
Guard factions began violent conflicts with each other. The 
worst turmoil was over by the end of 1967, but the entire 
experience was not entirely put to rest until the death of Mao 
in 1976 and the arrest of the Gang of Four shortly thereafter. 
Aside from this blatant disruption, much continued to 
occur in and around China. Domestically, pinyin romanization 
was well underway, and Mao finally got around to supporting 
family planning again in 1972; the birth rate had climbed to 
2.8% by 1965 from 1.6% in 1949, and the attendant population 
growth clobbered China with a population increase from 540 
million in 1949 to well over 900 million at Mao's death in 
1976. CCP membership had also risen to over 30 million (still 
about 4% of the population) . University entrance exams were 
abolished; one of the legacies of the GPCR. China's GNP had 
continued to increase an average of 8.2% per year, from a 
total of $67 billion ($67b) in 1952 to $210b by 1976; this was 
comparable to achieving an industrial base equivalent in scale 
to that of the USSR or Japan in the 1960s. ^^ China had also 
detonated her first nuclear device in 1964, her first hydrogen 
device in 1967, launched her first satellite in 1970, and 

116 



constructed her first nuclear submarine in 1971. Further, 
still on the domestic scene, Lin Biao was killed in an 
aircraft crash near the Mongolian border after having been 
suspected of planning a coup detat, Zhou survived the rad- 
icals' anti-Confucious campaign of 1972, and Deng Xiaoping was 
reinstated only to be purged a second time as a result of the 
April 5th Incident in 1976. 

Internationally, China was almost as busy as she was 
at home. After the initial PRC-USSR friendship, China had 
long ago experienced the abrupt Sino-Soviet split (1960) after 
Mao and Khrushchev disagreed over the proper pace and emphasis 
of communist revolution. In 1962 China fought briefly with 
India over a border disagreement. China and the Soviets also 
skirmished over their border, at the Ussuri River, and nearly 
went to war in 1969. The UN admitted China in 1971, and in 
that same year the U.S. and PRC began talks for normalizing 
relations. Deng started his many travels abroad with visits 
to the UN and France, and China began her first purchases of 
western wheat and technology in the early 1970s - the first 
sign of Deng's later Open Door policy. 

One final topic before moving into the post-Mao era of 
Four Modernizations and Reforms concerns security and the PLA. 
This particular subject is difficult because it is intertwined 
with paradoxical issues of its own related to authority, 
professionalization vs. politicization, modern conflict vs. 
people's war, expenditures vs. budgetary and earned income, 

117 



and its relations to Party and State. Positing the PLA's 
particular relationship to Party, at any one moment, not to 
mention its purpose, involves more than a fair amount of gray. 
As China is going through a transitionary period, so also is 
the PLA experiencing a transition regarding its relation to 
Party and State; in effect this subject is a transition within 
a transition. An entire literature exists on the PLA, and we 
will not treat it at length here.^^ We will, however, touch 
on the special relationship that PLA and CCP have experienced, 
so as to better appreciate some of the mechanics, options and 
perceptions resident within CCP leadership. This subject will 
reappear with the reforms under Deng, the interaction between 
PRC and the Middle East, the existence of policies between 
China and the Levant, and again with the implications for U.S. 
policy. The subject is_ important, even if it is treated here 
with respectful distance. 

From its inception in 1921 until the establishment of 
the PRC 28 years later, the Party's survival was closely tied 
to the health of the PLA and the PLA's own survival against 
the KMT and Japanese. There were rare times when PLA and CCP 
were basically indistinguishable (e.g.: the Long March). 
There have also been times, since 1949, when the sense of PRC 
statehood has not seemed to require military muscle to make it 
a reality. Primarily, however, there exists between PLA and 
the Party and State an uneasy middle ground, occupied more on 
some occasions by uniforms and on others by government 

118 



workers, cadres, or even businessmen. To be sure, the CCP 
would not exist were it not for the PLA's efforts during the 
civil war years, and perhaps also during the turmoil of the 
GPCR. It is also true that PLA personnel often occupied 
significant positions within the CCP and NPC . But to posit 
from these observations a specific and identifiable structure, 
role or relation of the PLA vis-a-vis the CCP is, at least for 
the time being, to posit too much. At most we will say that 
the CCP drives the PLA; despite the need for muscle to flesh 
out the Party's existence, it is not the case that the PLA 
drives the CCP. If the CCP survives for another 50 years (and 
it should, with reference only to current states of affairs in 
China today) , there will no doubt be a close relationship 
between it and the PLA. What that relationship might entail, 
or to what extent, if any, the CCP might have to change its 
composition or way of doing business, is hard to say. 

That is, some would view the PLA as an arm of the 
State, whereas others might see it primarily as a military 
which has had to deal with more than its fair share of 
governmental caprice, now doing this (espousing the Little Red 
Book) , now doing that (coalescing and modernizing) , now doing 
something else (growing its own food, making and selling its 
own weapons) . Permutations from these musings include the CCP 
as dependent on the PLA, either as currently construed, or as 
construed by external (PLA) dictate. As both the PRC and the 
PLA are still in transition, pendulums will continue to swing 

119 



and at this point the PLA will be modernizing, at that point 
it will be acting on behalf of the PRC domestically or 
internationally, and at still yet another point it will be 
looking out for its own best interests. 

As Mao's CCP looked at the PRC, it wanted to see a 
country on a par of dialogue - equally, at least - with all 
its neighbors, near and far. It also wanted to see a people 
interacting among themselves, each contributing to the State 
and each able to contribute in a manner best suited to his/her 
own talents (egalitarianism of employment and education) . 
Finally Mao's CCP wanted to see the PRC as free at least from 
strife, if not also from want. This last intent was mitigated 
against heavily due to the authoritarian vertical structure of 
control inherent to China, and due to the CCP's strenuous and 
severe measures designed to offset that inherency (not unlike 
a vicious cycle) so as to institute measures of equality. 

There were constants (the nuclear program, coordinated 
attempts to join the UN) , in the midst of caprice (GLF, GPCR) . 
The simultaneous direction of the growth and cohesion of 
China, all of China, while concomitantly promoting CCP 
revolutionary goals, presented Mao Zedong and the others 
within his circle of leadership with dilemmas that have not 
abated. 

2. Four Modernizations and Reform 

After the deaths of Zhou and Mao, a power struggle 
ensued within the leadership, pitting the radicals (Gang of 

120 



Four) against the others (the reformers: Chen Yung, Deng and 
their groups) . Until the political climate was clear of Jiang 
Qing and her remaining Gang of Four members, factionalism was 
rife. Deng was purged a second time, in April, after a 
spontaneous demonstration (the Qingming Festival); students, 
angered at the lack of official notice of Zhou's death, 
honored the deceased Premier in a fashion that was critical of 
Jiang and supportive of the moderates. The net effect of the 
"incident" was to infuriate the radicals and prompt them to 
call for Deng's demotion. Deng was their obvious target, as 
he had been Zhou's protege (notwithstanding that Li Peng was 
one of Zhou's many wards) . Hence Deng, who was still some- 
thing of a bargaining chip between the moderates (most 
recently championed by Zhou) and the radicals (led by Jiang, 
who prospered while Mao lived) , again dropped from sight. Hua 
Guofeng, who was named the compromise Acting Premier when Zhou 
died, became the Premier and first Vice-chairman of the 
Central Committee, and therefore Mao's successor. 

When Mao died, the moderates, led in this case by Hua, 
took the political initiative and arrested the Gang of Four 
before Jiang could further develop her power base. Hua then 
went on to become head of the Party and State, as well as 
Chairman of the Central Military Commission. From relative 
obscurity as a second tier Provincial official, Hua managed to 
benefit from the GPCR as many of his superiors, who were more 
visible than he, suffered at the hands of Red Guards and were 

121 



taken from their positions. Their sudden and joint departures 
added room at the top, which was further enlarged when Zhou 
and Mao died. Hua was in the right place at the right time, 
and managed to be upwardly mobile. The need to placate 
moderates and radicals with a compromise candidate, plus the 
fact that Hua was relatively weak (20 years younger than his 
new peers),' made him a safe choice for senior officials as 
they waited for the dust of Mao's death to settle. As a 
result, Hua's new positions at the top of CCP, PRC and CMC 
gave him authority over those who, a short while before, had 
all been senior to him. 

A short while later Deng applied to reassume his posts 
in the Party, and was reinstated after promising not to seek 
Hua's position. Deng, of course, broke his promise and was 
soon presenting proposals and garnering support that moved 
backing away from Hua. Almost immediately the production 
support system in agriculture began, and in less than a year 
Deng represented China while travelling to Nepal, Burma and 
Bangladesh. Hua was still the nominal head of State, but Deng 
was pressing his own agenda: Mao was criticized, the Open Door 
began, PRC-U.S. student exchanges resumed (after a 3 year 
hiatus), Deng went to Japan and the U.S. (while Hua went to 
North Korea), PRC-U.S. relations were normalized, the U.S. 
gave MFN trade status to China, university entrance exams 
returned, and finally in 1980 Zhao Ziyang became head of 
State. Deng's agenda proceeded further with the announcement 

122 



of coastal special economic zones, the Gang of Four went on 
trial, and by 19 81 Hu Yaobang became Party Chairman, with Deng 
replacing Hua on the Central Milita2ry Commission. Deng was 
neither head of State nor head of Party, but it was clear that 
he was the new and undisputed paramount ruler. 

Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were among the new faces in 
the Party's hierarchy since 1976. Both of them were to prove 
to be more than able supporters of reform programs; both were, 
in fact, members of the radical reform wing. Hu Yaobang, as 
a liberal reformer, not only targeted aspects of the economy 
and country as a whole for reform measures, but also was 
willing to practice reform within the Party: he was essential- 
ly something of a radical in his own right and too irreverent 
for his own good. Among his more egregious faults were 
straightforward suggestions that senior CCP members should 
retire, an unwillingness to promote children of senior 
officials, plus a propensity to play down the PLA's civilian 
role, none of which were popular decisions with elderly CCP 
members. (These elderly CCP officials were basically a 
generation older than both Hu and Zhao and very much familiar 
with traditional ways of doing business; this Chinese propen- 
sity has been the regular brunt of periodic campaigns against 
"corruption" and nepotism) . When students staged an escalat- 
ing series of visible demonstrations in 1986 with political 
overtones, Hu was forced to retire. Zhao succeeded him as 



123 



General Secretary of the CCP, and Li Peng appeared shortly 
afterwards as head of State. 

Li was a moderate reformer, i.e. a conservative or 
hardliner; his entry onto the scene was part of a compromise 
either engineered or approved by Deng to keep both moderates 
and radicals placated. It should be mentioned again that all 
CCP members were reformers, from day one, but their under- 
standing of the proper scope and speed of reform led them into 
recognizable argumentative factions, beginning with the 
meeting at Lushan. While Mao lived, there were leftists (who 
supported the GLF and GPCR) , and there were moderates (who 
measured results by quantities of food and beneficial indus- 
try, and might then also have been termed revisionists) . At 
Mao's death, however, the leftists largely lost their voice, 
and the moderates filled the vacuum. Hence the vast majority 
now comprising the CCP are these former moderates, represent- 
ing either radical or moderate reform wings. They are 
variously referred to in the western press as go-for-it and 
to-get-rich-is-glorious "reformers" on the one hand, or as 
take-it-slow and keep-central-planning-uppermost "hardliners", 
"conservatives", or "the old guard" on the other. The verbal 
distinctions thus created suggest that one group is pro reform 
and the other is not, which is not accurate. Both groups want 
and seek reform of an economic nature, but some are willing to 
trust market devices and others want to move slowly from 
central directives .^^ 

124 



As evidenced, again, by Deng's maneuvering while Hua 
was in the Politburo, and by his behind-the-scenes compromises 
to place Zhao and Li in positions of power, Deng has taken it 
on himself to perform the necessary role of CCP consensus 
builder, a task formerly handled by Zhou. There has, however, 
been a perceptible shift in how maintenance of CCP consensus 
is performed. 

Regarding Zhou, in addition to being Premier, he was 
also the Party stalwart who faithfully occupied the number 2 
position in the hierarchy from the outset (and who had more 
time on the politburo than Mao) . Zhou was the quintessential 
intermediary, the behind-the-scenes worker who performed 
invaluable services in getting things done and keeping the 
Party together throughout the United Front, GLF and GPCR. 
Zhou was also, when required, the foreign trained intellectual 
diplomat, who more often than not was China's astute "best 
foot forward" in sensitive international situations. Examples 
that come to mind are his representation of China at Bandung 
in 1955 and Geneva in 1954; the latter is particularly 
poignant, because it was there that U.S. Secretary of State 
Dulles refused to shake Zhou's proffered hand. Zhou also 
oversaw the events surrounding President Nixon's memorable 
visit to China early in 1972 . All things considered, Zhou was 
an intermediary par excellence, who performed frequently 
within that quiet capacity, especially in his later years. He 
finally came to be the power behind the throne during Mao's 

125 



illness, and was more than a little influential in directing 
the rapprochement between China and the U.S. When the 
leftists mounted their anti-Confucian campaign in 1973, he 
managed to deflect the criticism harmlessly onto the deceased 
Lin Biao. China had profitted greatly from his talents 
through the years . 

Deng, by contrast, performs the intermediary function 
in a different fashion than Zhou. Before 1976 Zhou was 
immersed between the two readily identifiable and almost 
diametrically opposed factions to each other; he took it on 
himself to keep them - and consequently China - together. 
With Deng the division between factions is not so readily 
apparent, as both want reform of more or less the same stripe 
(i.e. economic); hence both are largely on the same side of 
the fence. As such, Deng must sometimes assist - and some- 
times hinder - to keep his reform agenda moving. Before 
Tienanmen, he was something of a referee (after the Maoist and 
holdover Gang of Four influence had dissipated) . After 
Tienanmen, Deng has been more of a coach or catalyst for both 
moderates and radicals. At first he rallied the senior 
members and their extensive support networks to silence the 
wellspring of voices that erupted in Tienanmen (among stu- 
dents, workers, CCP members, even members of the PLA) , with 
the purpose being to preserve unity. Secondly, now that 
things are quiet, he is prodding and pulling the radicals to 
get them going again, hoping no doubt to resume the function 

126 



of referee. Deng's version of being the intermediary also 
requires a certain ruthlessness , because he has proved to be 
more than willing to withdraw his support from persons he 
previously openly supported (and probably also encouraged: Hu 
Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang) . 

The question that arises from these examples of Zhou 
and Deng is: "Who will serve as intermediary, as catalyst and 
referee, once Deng is no longer on the scene?" To facilitate 
this issue, Deng has preferred to have others take, ostensi- 
bly, the day to day leadership positions within the hierarchy. 
Hence Zhao and Hu, now Li and Jiang, as heads of State and 
Party. Deng has even resigned from the CMC with the probable 
intent of allowing others the added exposure and experience to 
generate or enhance their own guanxi with the PLA. He is 
giving them the opportunity to improve their own personal 
networks, their own lines of support, so as to better survive 
the inevitable future positioning within the CCP as the 
leadership decides how to pursue PRC modernization. As the 
14th Party Congress approaches, Deng has also been reappearing 
around the country, speaking out in favor of reform and doing 
what he can to reassert liberal reform measures that have 
lagged under the tutelage of Chen Yun since Tienanmen. 

Regardless of which person or group will eventually 
emerge to command the center, it seems clear that the process 
of succession is devolving more and more into an increasing 
number of voices. In 1976 the protagonists were squaring off 

127 



before Mao's death, but were nonetheless readily identifiable 
not only by faction but by leaders within those factions. 
Currently the protagonists are again squaring off, but 
delineating the participants is not so easy; the factions are 
apparent enough, but their leadership remains, to the external 
observer, somewhat obtuse. 

Deng, apparently, has allowed for the possibility of 
Jiang to assume the liberal leadership, if in fact Jiang has 
been creating and solidifying a power base; common wisdom 
posits, however, that he has not done this. Zhao Ziyang could 
reassume leadership of the radical wing, although he will need 
to distance himself from the extreme liberalism he evidenced 
at Tienanmen; this state of affairs is also unlikely. Other 
capable reformers standing by on the liberal side include Ye 
Xuanping of Guangdong and the recently elevated former mayor 
of Shanghai, Zhu Rongji. Zhu's ascendancy to the vice- 
Premiership continues to demonstrate Shanghai's prominence in 
national politics. Zhao is reportedly on the verge of formal 
rehabilitation, and has been pictured in a photograph that is 
making the rounds in CCP circles with Deng, Li Peng, Jiang 
Zemin and Yang Shangkun. He has also contributed a 58 page 
article to a official 3-volume compendium of Key Articles 
Since the 13th Congress ; his article is in the first volume, 
with liberal reformers outnumbering conservatives.^® 

On the conservative side, Li Peng is the visible front 
runner, but not a shoo-in; he is stained deeply by Tienanmen 

128 



(which, I suspect, was intentional by Deng). Li continues to 
be Deng's mouthpiece for the Party line, while others are 
actually moving China forward. Other conservatives include a 
few from the Long March generation (whose long term utility is 
doubtful), and Yang Baibing. There could also be another 
surprise compromise choice for succession to Deng, perhaps 
from the second tier of provincial officials, which further 
opens the list of hopefuls. 

In the background of all these maneuvers is the PLA: 
conceivably, in the absence of CCP consensus, the PLA could 
back a candidate or even provide a candidate of their own. 
Such dramatic insertion on its part does not ring true, 
however, with its historical relation to the CCP; typically 
the Party will thrash out their own leadership, whether or not 
that might include someone from the PLA (e.g. Yang Baibing) . 
In the unlikely event of CCP stalemate, again, the PLA could 
also, just as easily - depending on the state of the country- 
side - choose to do nothing and force the Party apparatus to 
reach a selection and also begin the process of establishing 
a succession mechanism, thereby helping to preclude similar 
dilemmas in the future. (In a round about fashion, Deng is 
already doing precisely this by drawing more players into the 
succession and deliberative process). Most likely the PLA 
would prefer to take a passive role, as it is still smarting 
from the Tienanmen debacle. Whether or not the PLA will 
repair its relationship with the people likely depends on its 

129 



professional development as well as its deportment during any 
coming episodes of national import. Mending the citizen-PLA 
relationship will take time, or an occasion of national 
significance, or on evolving mechanisms of participation in 
national government whereby the people might have a greater 
sense of responsibility for the government, or all three. 

Any thoughts on succession, or PLA-CCP and PLA-citizen 
relationships are, at this point, almost entirely speculative 
and not very profitable in and of themselves. But the element 
that does seem preeminent, and that makes the entire subject 
of China nothing short of fascinating, is the set of issues 
enveloping China's unique sense of authority. The distinctive 
conceptualization accorded by the Chinese to leadership, plus 
how this concept might be evolving, or how their modernizing 
lives might be evolving around the concept, has extraordinary 
implications. Observations and prognostications regarding 
likely transformations of this sense suggest potential 
ramifications that could reverberate profoundly throughout 
Chinese society. 

From this perspective, the most important single 
element now present in China, relative to modernization, has 
to do with the concept and place of authority . Closely tied 
to this concept are matters of leadership succession, legal 
codes, criminal vs. civil law, citizen participation in 
government, individual rights, authority from above vs. 
authority from below, institutional legitimacy, accountabili- 

130 



ty . As the sense of authority continues to transform, or as 
life evolves around it, so will these integral facets of 
Chinese society feel this transformation. In short, the very 
fabric of Chinese society is almost certainly in the midst of 
adjustment or transition; the repercussions can be expected to 
be enormous as the country unfolds. 

For this reason, what has been occurring in China is 
far and away more significant than recent events in Eastern 
Europe or even in the former Soviet Union. For especially in 
Eastern Europe, and to a lesser degree in Moscow, an existing 
idea - already alive, so to speak, but temporarily held in 
abeyance - triumphed over another momentarily embodied idea. 
But in China, a new idea (not yet formed) is evolving from 
another, namely how to best or most profitably or most 
equitably deal with authority and law and participatory 
government and morality, all amidst 20% of the world's 
population: the ramifications are simply enormous . 

Many in the West would like to name this evolving 
transformation, or aspects of it, "democracy"; only time will 
tell what in fact might emerge, or when, from the current PRC 
incubation. Very likely the Chinese will continue to call it 
something along the line of "Socialism with Chinese Character- 
istics", (if the CCP survives), regardless of the result's 
actual character. Quite frankly, it matters little what the 
Chinese or anyone else happen to call it, because the trans- 
formation will still be occurring, and it will still be 

131 



occurring in China; names in politics are indicative both of 
honest intent and also of window dressing, as well as of the 
thing in itself. These names must be taken with a large grain 
of salt, no matter where or what they are, or who pronounces 
them. 

Deng himself has just stipulated that trying to label 
a practice or policy as being socialist or capitalist is a 
waste of time and misses the point: the "correct approach is 
to judge whether something is helpful to developing the 
productive forces... strengthening the nation and improving 
living standards " .^^ He has also just mandated, through the 
Politburo, that policies of reform will remain unchanged for 
100 years, and he required conservatives to resign from posts 
in the propaganda and culture offices. Clearly Deng wants 
more economic development, plus continued hints or suggestions 
to the general population of reform through further viewings 
of programs similar to "The Yellow River Elegy" . 

The Four Modernizations (agriculture, science and 
technology, economics, and defense, in that order), first 
pronounced by Zhou, are alive and well. Deng is again pulling 
out all the stops, especially with the 14th Party Congress 
just over the horizon, for reform, reform, and more reform. 
China's industrial growth has continued at a pace beyond the 
capabilities of the energy producers to keep up. In Guang- 
dong, the annual local GNP increased 13.5% in 1991, and 
industrial output has grown by an incredible 272%, with 38% of 

132 



all local industry in that area now in the private sector. -^° 
Total GDP for China rose by 7% in 1991, which is an average to 
slow year by current PRC standards. At these rates, electri- 
city supplies would have to increase by 2 0-3 0% on average 
throughout China to avoid present shortages. Ironically, 
China's power program is one of the fastest growing in the 
world but is still inadequate as presently configured. 
China's power producing equipment must operate continuously at 
full tilt, consequently wearing out faster, and requires an 
even higher level of growth than otherwise mandated just to 
keep a status quo. Normal energy loads elsewhere in the world 
leave 15-25% of system reserve capacity dormant for periods of 
peak loads: China's reserve is 0. Coal now accounts for 70% 
of PRC ' s power generation. Plans are set to increase current 
energy supply levels almost 50% by 1995. Even Guangdong 
province, with 50% price increases for electricity, is having 
difficulty keeping pace with demand, despite a more efficient- 
ly managed energy program that can better fund its own 
development. Projections for nuclear energy show only 2-3% of 
China's energy requirements to originate from this source by 
the year 2000.^^ 

The PLA is beginning to share in the fruits of the 
Four Modernizations as well. The army has experienced 
manpower cuts to bring it more in line with a modernized 
force, also to reduce its budget, but still retains a not 
insignificant roster of 3.1 million personnel. Rank distinc- 

133 



tions have been reinstated, following their removal during 
Mao's reign. Recent budget increases, as much as 50% over 
1989 levels, are further assisting the modernizing process. 
Possibly Deng promised this added budgetary consideration as 
part of the maneuvering just prior to Tienanmen: the PLA's 
initial Four Modernization budget allocation was not to their 
liking, as they were then assigned the last of four economic 
priorities. For whatever reason, the added allocations are 
not mandated by imminent security threats to China's borders. 

Observations of the U.S. and allied military perfor- 
mance during the Gulf War caused much discussion among the 
PLA: they were impressed by the employment of technology and 
are probably directing recent budgetary largesse to that 
purpose. Funds are also probably being directed to the 
acquisition and improvement of projectible sea power, a blue 
water Navy. If and when China's foreign policies will require 
military assistance, quite possibly the circumstances will 
involve either the South China Sea, or South Asia (and the 
Indian Ocean) . 

In addition to fairly diverse western arms purchases 
(especially since the PRC-U.S. rapprochement), China has also 
been marketing her own arms and thereby generating more 
foreign currency for other purposes. A brief look at the 
elaborate bureaucracy controlling these sales will provide 
added insight into the Chinese government as a whole. 



134 



Located between the PLA and the Central Military 
Commission (CMC) are 23 arms sales related companies, which 
are purporte ^sponsible to the CMC. These companies are 
staffed at th jhest levels by family members (sons, wives, 
brothers, da- s), of high ranking CCP and PLA personnel. 
Hence decisic out arms sales (how much, what item, which 
customer) , are made primarily if not entirely within a family 
network, which includes Deng at the apex, rather than the 
institutionalized bureaucracy. The Foreign Ministry is not a 
necessary player in this decision loop; it might not even be 
informed as to sales that have been approved or pending. 
Comparatively speaking, the Chinese must have considerable 
difficulty in trying to comprehend the U.S. government's 
decision making apparatus, since so much of it is open to 
public scrutiny. 

Economic reforms at the hands of the liberals have not 
been easy. Three up and down economic cycles took place 
during the 1980s, with inflation at one point reaching 27% in 
1988. Both rural and urban sector reforms were occurring. 
Zhao wanted to lift all price controls in 1989, but was unable 
to do so. 

Meanwhile, U.S. trade with China was approximately $2b 
in 1979. By 1989 that same trade was $18b. China's total 
worldwide trade in 1980 was $38b, and it climbed to $135. 7b in 
1991. Japan is the PRC's largest trading partner, with the 



135 



U.S. second and Germany third. U.S. investment in the PRC, by 
1990, was about $4b. 

PRC officials are now reported to be allowing foreign 
companies to play greater roles in service .-.idustries . Plans 
are being considered to privatize housing, dec:, -..rol prices, 
and convert a large amount of state inc.stry into stock- 
holders' companies. Deng visited the Capital Steel Corpora- 
tion in May 1992, and complained that the CCP was not imple- 
menting enough reform measures; he is said to have mentioned 
"I don't understand economics, but I know a good economy when 
I see it". Deng is now travelling in northeast China, 
drumming up support for reform policies. Hainan, a few months 
ago, opened a stock exchange of its own, and a deputy prime 
minister from Beijing ordered it closed; after the official 
returned to Beijing it was reopened. -^^ 

It is no longer debated whether or not PRC GNP will 
surpass the former USSR's GNP. Rather the debate centers on 
when that will occur and what its significance will be; 
estimates range from an early 2 010 to somewhere later in the 
21st century." One formula states that at the beginning of 
the 1980s, China accounted for 5% of world industrial produc- 
tion as well as GNP, and the USSR 15%. But Soviet growth 
slowed in the 1980s, and China grew at over 8% a year, with 
its PCGNP doubling between 1977-1987. Now with the USSR out 
of the competition, and the original 2010 estimate already 



136 



looking a bit conservative, China will in relatively short 
order posess the second highest GNP in the world. 

It is , -o not debated that Chinese PCGNP certainly 
does not and ibly never will, in the foreseeable future, 
match that c" er nations who all have smaller populations 
(e.g.: Europ- .'apan, Oceania, the U.S.).^^ Regardless, the 
capabilities inherent within the larger PRC GNP will provide 
China with significant options. Tying present and expected 
capabilities together with historical Chinese ingenuity and 
inventiveness provides a picture full of domestic and interna- 
tional potential. 

Current calculations of PRC PCGNP vary ($260 to over 
$400), according to the formulas used for the calculation.^^ 
Regardless of the figure, China is obviously an exceptionally 
poor (per capita) country. Resources at the national level 
are likewise strained, yet due to the tremendous demographic 
base, national resources far outstrip the per capita expecta- 
tions that would be associated with smaller countries. 
Another indicator of the necessary robustness of China's 
economy, despite her meager PCGNP, the economy must create 
approximately 15 million jobs each year just to stay ahead of 
unemployment . 

Despite the reality of China, then, as a poor country, 
the government will still have tremendous resources with which 
to work. This power may be regarded as discretionary power ; 
China, unlike virtually any other nation, and despite the 

137 



general international climate of stability that is beneficial 
for its current growth, does not inherently need or prefer to 
seek alliances for security purposes, or for any other 
purpose. Without entangling alliances as ■^heck, and with 
traditional Chinese concerns fluctuating as they will, 
internally or externally, PRC choices can be expected to be 
more arbitrary than not. Chinese options will be discre- 
tionary because the Chinese will ultimately have to answer to 
fewer parties for their own choices, if they answer to anyone 
at all. China's incursion into Vietnam was ostensibly to 
teach them a lesson, and the Sino-Indian border conflicts were 
likewise of short duration. There is also a story, unproved 
but typical, stating that the Ming Court heard disparaging 
reports of how Chinese in California were being treated: a 
fleet of Junks was then dispatched to teach the Californians 
a lesson. But after the Junks reached Monterey, the crews 
liked their destination so much they decided to stay. So 
regardless of the amount, type and purpose of her directives, 
PRC power in future years will more and more be of a discre- 
tionary sort. China will be able to afford it, and will have 
few hurdles to clear, if any, in order to use that power. 

A certain few of China's concerns center on her 
borders. Since 1949, China has been eager to discuss border 
ramifications with all of her neighbors, especially India. 
New Delhi is content to rely on the 19th century British 
formula for the line between India and China, whereas China 

138 



wants nothing to do with offering legitimacy to colonialist 
intrigue of a distant era. China instead insists on direct 
talks with her current neighbors to discuss border issues, 
which will render a different and more immediate sense of 
legitimacy to the process. Other concerns China has, beyond 
her borders, center on the South China Sea and a combination 
of territory and natural resources. The PRC claims, outright, 
the Spratlys and the Paracels, but so do a number of other 
states (Taiwan, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei) ; 
this last item has potential for friction. 

As a way of utilizing and encouraging further develop- 
ment of her resources, China has been urging many of its 
students to receive educations abroad. When relations with 
PRC and U.S. were normalized in 1979, 2,230 students were 
sponsored by the government and sent overseas to receive 
higher education. In 4 years, the total number of students 
who had left China were 25,500, of which 7,000 were not 
officially sponsored. Of all the students to have left China 
in recent years, roughly half of the officially sponsored 
students were sent to schools in the U.S.-^^ According to Li 
Peng at the 7th NPC annual plenary session this year, there 
have been a total of 150,000 PRC students to go overseas 
through mid-1992, and most have not returned (this number is 
actually closer to 64,000, and many of them are in the U.S.) . 
China wants these self exiled students to come home, regard- 
less of their political persuasion (which, in itself, is a not 

139 



unremarkable tacit indication of China's hunger for reform in 

all its guises ) . 

Despite these increasing numbers of students, China 

currently has only one-tenth of the number of University level 

students as does the U.S. (and many of them are overseas). 

Given the disparities between the U.S. and PRC populations, 

this low proportion of PRC university students to population 

is actually far lower and represents a serious educational 

shortcoming which China needs to correct. China has in fact 

been aware of this unflattering discrepancy, but the typical 

Chinese relationship to intellectuals has had such a painful 

side to it that Mao's blunt response to redress that grievance 

was totally inappropriate. A recently published interview 

with Fang Lizhi, conducted prior to Tienanmen, states: 

"My (Chinese) students can barely feed 
themselves. Their wages and fellowships 
together come to less than 10 yuan a month. 
. . .my students want to keep studying with me 
in hopes of eventually going overseas. Some 
students quit school because regulations 
require that they withdraw before they can go 
abroad. . . " 

(young people) are at a loss what to do. 
They don't know what the future holds for 
China, and in China the prospects for individ- 
uals are very tightly linked to what happens 
to the country. The individual's life is 
dependent on politics. Not like Hong Kong, or 
the United States; in the United States presi- 
dents can come and go, and people aren't 
affected very much. But not so in China. "■'^ 

This interview by Fang continues further and paints a bleak 

picture in the minds of his students regarding China's chances 

for continued national progression and unity: indeed, the 

140 



concept of "national" is loath to many of them. However, we 
need to keep these specific observations in wider perspective. 

Some of these practical concerns of China's students 
came to a head prior to Tiananmen in several University- 
cities, when PRC College students actively protested against 
the presence and favoritist treatment accorded to students who 
were visiting from Africa. 

Of the Chinese students who are overseas, roughly half 
of these are sponsored by the PRC, and others pay their own 
way (usually via overseas relatives or funds from the univer- 
sities themselves as well as from the host governments).^® 
Much or most of this burgeoning expertise will sooner or later 
find its way back into China as students eventually return 
home and other scholars or practitioners wind their respective 
ways through the PRC. Recent student demonstrations in 
Beijing and elsewhere in China are especially significant 
because those same students will eventually move into the PRC 
governing structure as well as into other facets of Chinese 
industrial and social life. 

A very significant sidelight of the Tienanmen demon- 
strations indicated that although the students wanted "democ- 
racy", very few of them actually knew what it was, or rather 
how to implement it. The students failed to have a plan of 
action, which is probably now being corrected as some of them 
congregate overseas; for them, the sense of individual 
participation in "politics" was still largely foreign (not- 

141 



withstanding that traditional rule requires the "mandate of 
heaven"). Students who were quoting Lincoln and Jefferson 
over (global) TV portrayed a remarkable picture, but apparent- 
ly did not appreciate the inertia of the PRC government and 
perhaps some of the problems inherent in running the PRC, nor 
did they grasp the practicalities and implications of "democ- 
racy" . But whether or not those students actually knew what 
democracy or multi-party pluralism was, and how to implement 
it, seemed very doubtful (at least at the time of Tienanmen) . 
Occasional groups of students have been asked to explain 
democracy, and their responses indicated they did not know too 
much about it, but they certainly wanted more of it.^^ 
Tienanmen was a spontaneous outburst, and will not be the last 
such display of feeling; the students will have to do better 
next time than shout at the authorities if they wish to have 
an effect on the political process. 

China is in fact hard pressed right now to find 
meaningful occupation for many - most - of its better trained 
citizens, lending a certain malaise to their perception of how 
things are. Coupled with their recent memories of Tienanmen, 
the malaise becomes downright nasty. But it is also the case 
that in those areas where employment has been found, it is of 
the highest caliber, and these opportunities will continue to 
increase at exponential rates as China's reforms take hold. 
For better or for worse, what we see here is the proverbial 
jump-start, on a national level, of an old engine that was 

142 



retooled and is now lurching down the street as it receives 
fine tuning and gets up to speed. The students are not 
satisfied with the pace of reform, and wonder about the 
appropriateness of national direction and even national 
integrity. Not only must China work to improve the lot of its 
university students, but education in general requires much 
attention. Over 30% of rural children still drop out of 
school to work, China's national education budget is less than 
half that of other developing countries (while serving more 
students), and people generally regard education as something 
that consumes rather than as something that gives. But, all 
in all, despite these difficulties, learned complaints, and 
the overtones that we decry, safe money has it that Chinese 
national viability is a good bet. 

Possibilities of civil war can never be discounted, 
but indications suggest that sufficient vertical allegiance 
exists between the center and outlying areas to offset any 
rending of the national fabric. Stories abound about provin- 
ces ignoring the center's directives after Tienanmen regarding 
reinstitution of various conservative measures, but this need 
not indicate a lack of cohesion. Rather, it might indicate 
that the prevailing authority resides in those vertical chains 
of allegiance that come to rest with liberal personalities at 
either end rather than with conservatives. There certainly 
are precedents in China's history for Warlord activities and 
provinces in full pursuit of their own objectives, but those 

143 



examples represent a different and no longer applicable 
milieu. Deng is convinced, and perhaps rightly so, that the 
CCP survived June 1989 and the events to have overtaken East 
Europe and Moscow, by the very fact that economic reform has 
been in progress and the people are not (entirely) dissatis- 
fied: "without reform, there will only be a dead-end road". 
He goes on to say that "we (CCP) must not be afraid . . .because 
political power is in our hands. "^® Politics may, therefore, 
continue to be a pursuit for the few and not for the many. 
But as China continues to unfold, this conception may begin to 
alter along with the evolution that China's sense of authority 
is sure to develop, out of necessity and efficiency. 

China's minorities, as a factor of reform, are 
relatively marginal since they are but a fraction of the 
entire population. They also, however, are found almost 
exclusively along China's outlying provinces, and have been 
the local majorities in Tibet and Xinjiang. Many of them are 
Muslim, and China makes use of this in its public relations 
with neighboring countries to the south and west. While 
domestic reform measures are roughly similar throughout the 
provinces (except for within the SEZs), China has been 
encouraging joint ventures between these outlying provincial 
peoples and foreigners from the south and Middle East . We 
will return to this subject in Chapters IV and V. 

The era of liberal reforms prompted the government to 
relent somewhat with aspects of individual expression, and 

144 



religious practice of all sorts emerged into the daylight. 
The muslim peoples opened old mosques and started construction 
on new mosques, with this activity leading to skirmishes with 
the authorities during which several "rebels" and policemen 
(up to 50) were killed. Minority presence in China is much 
less than that of the former Soviet Union, and hence not of 
the same degree of concern to Beijing as to Moscow, but China 
still responded quickly to these difficulties and much Islamic 
activity was again curtailed. In the 1980s, especially via 
the 1982 "Document 19" administered by China's United Front, 
all religious intolerance was forbidden (although religions 
were not given inherent rights of expression) , as long as 
belief was not inimical to the state (i.e.: was "Chinese" and, 
also, not a hindrance to the new reforms) .''^ The CCP has 
taken great liberty to arrest leaders of "unauthorized" or 
"unofficial" religious groups. 

Before Zhao was purged, one method he employed to 
encourage thinking about reform and China's place in the world 
was to convene conferences about Toffler's most recent book 
Powershif t . (This was also done for Toffler's earlier work 
Third Wave , which was a best-seller in China) . Zhao urged 
policy makers to study Powershif t whenever they could, which 
became another best seller in China, second only to the 
speeches of Deng Xiaoping. ^^ 

Indigenous efforts have continued during this period 
of Dengist reform to enhance the process of eroding tradition- 

145 



al Chinese cultural barriers to modernization. The most 
notable recent effort of this type was a documentary, made in 
1988, called "The Yellow River Elegy". It was televised 
nationally, twice, and television now reaches at least 73% of 
all Chinese (the largest television station in Asia is based 
in Beijing). ^^ This documentary was harshly critical of 
Chinese icons as depicted by the Yellow River, the Great Wall, 
and the Chinese Dragon. China's traditional veneration for 
the Yellow River, around which Chinese civilization has 
developed, was lambasted for its inward turning focus, for its 
having kept China preoccupied with itself while the Europeans 
ventured forth on blue water to explore the world. Likewise, 
the Great Wall, which had been constructed at immense cost and 
intended to keep barbarians out, only succeeded in keeping 
Chinese in. Villages and homes and minds were also walled, to 
keep people and thoughts prisoner. Finally, the Dragon, which 
had become a symbol for the all-powerful Emperor, was actually 
depicting, according to the "Elegy", the limited flexibility 
of China's rulers because there was no power sharing, no 
parliaments, no loyal opposition to keep everyone on their 
toes, no free speaking or thinking. Tienanmen occurred since 
the viewing of this six-part series, and it came under severe 
attack by hardliners back in 1989. It may likely begin airing 
again in the not-too-distant future, especially now that Deng 
has forced the hardliners to resign from the propaganda and 
culture ministries. 



146 



other popular reform efforts or documentaries that 
attempted to maintain the reform efforts are the documentary 
"Black Snow" . This film speaks to the present generation of 
youth who rebel against family and traditions, then have 
nowhere to go and don't know what to do. In a lighter vein, 
the popular TV series "Stories from the Newsroom" satirizes 
the "corruption and mutual back-stabbing that pervade Chinese 
society"; it particularly pokes fun (and sharp inherent 
criticism) at nepotism, leftism, CCP favoritism, graft, 
bumbling bureaucracy, heavy handed media, robots that are more 
human than editors, and parodies of the succession struggle 
where 5 sub-editors all vie shamelessly to succeed the senior 
editor but bicker so much that the only solution is for the 
senior editor to stay on/^ 

Continued work by the CCP with the people of China 
leads to still other reform measures, which demonstrates the 
extent of reform still required within China. Party members 
have recently started to persuade Shandong and Hebei Chinese 
that proper day-care does not include burying their toddlers 
in bags of sand up to the child's chest. The children remain 
in these bags, except when the sand is changed (as a diaper), 
and receive little or no attention, play, etc. Studies show 
that these children develop slower with low IQs; their poverty 
laden parents, on the other hand, believe the children to be 
more polite, obedient and filial - important aspects of 
Confucian tradition. ^^ 

147 



A particularly half-hearted reform measure, also 
recently initiated, is a campaign to eradicate smoking; up to 
80% of PRC males may be smokers by 2000 if present trends 
continue. Hence the PRC on the one hand is encouraging the 
program, but the deficit ridden state receives up to $5. lb 
annually from the tobacco industry, which is considerably more 
income than is received from any other single source, and will 
not be easy to do without. 

China's reform efforts, in addition to the good 
reports of industrial capacity and educational awareness, also 
have a down side. The rush to reform, whether of the plodding 
central planning variety, or the get rich quick method, has 
generated difficulties with natural resource management. 
Significant environmental damage and pollution is being caused 
by tremendous industrial growth and the use of coal for most 
of the country's energy. Taipei, across the straits, with its 
head start on industrialization, has experienced severe 
ecological havoc; Taiwanese residents, in their nascent 
democracy, are just beginning to find voices to decry their 
lamentable environment. Hopefully the PRC can reign in its 
pollution before it gets out of hand. 

Severe water shortages are another side to the 
environmental damage China is now facing. Recently the Mayor 
of Beijing warned that the capital city would literally have 
to be moved if the water shortage could not be solved; ground 
water in Beijing's vicinity is being tapped so much that the 

148 



city is actually sinking. A combination of population growth, 
industrial expansion, and current shortages will result in a 
two-thirds reduction of available water in Beijing by 2000. 
The entire North China Plain, where 200 million now reside, at 
current rates of consumption, will have 6% less water than 
required by 2000. In accordance with expected increased 
demand, Beijing is expected to have a 50% water use require- 
ment increase by 2000, and Tianjin (an industrial city), 
expects to have a 120% increased rate of water consumption. 

China currently subsidizes the water supply to its 
people by up to 6 times what the individual is charged. 
Chinese industry, that is old and decades behind advanced 
countries, uses disproportionate amounts of water. One steel 
mill, which uses 330 tons of water for each ton of steel, 
compares to only 10 tons of water per ton of steel in some 
developed nations. Agriculture has been the least efficient 
user of water, with its irrigation consumption increasing 6 
times during the last 25 years; 60% of the irrigation water is 
lost in transit. China is planning to divert water north, via 
the ancient Grand Canal, to the region from the Yangtze River, 
but without improved consumption practices, this diversion of 
water will only be a temporary palliative. 

A "Green 'Great Wall'" project in Gansu province 
utilizes irrigation from the Amur to feed a new agricultural 
village of 1,200 people, where 20 years ago there was only 
desert. Parts of Gansu are so dry that the evaporation rate 

149 



is ten times the amount of average annual rainfall/^ This 
project is typical of efforts being taken in Gansu, and 
undoubtedly elsewhere, to find new space and arable land. 
However, this same effort will have to utilize less vulnerable 
irrigation techniques to avoid water loss as much as possible. 

Other subsidies that China provides are a severe 
strain on the national budget, preventing the application of 
its economic resources to other more pressing dilemmas, such 
as wage reform and new employment possibilities for workers of 
inefficient state industries that are slated for bankruptcy. 
In 1990, China spent about $20b on direct subsidies, almost 
one-third of its budget. This cost has grown 30% annually for 
the last decade; hidden subsidies (housing, transportation) , 
are not included in this figure. Wang Bingqian, the Finance 
Minister, said in March 1991 that "subsidies have reached the 
point where the state treasury cannot sustain them".^'^ Zhu 
Rongji, as Mayor of Shanghai in March 1991, was working 
towards eventual removal of all subsidies for housing. 

China's problems are many, but the resourcefulness of 
the Chinese is also something to be found in high quantities. 
This moment of time in China's hist02ry, so to speak, is unique 
because China now is eager to learn all she can from whoever 
she can. Meaning that it is now in China's interests to send 
its people everywhere, to receive guests from almost any 
quarter, and to avoid antagonizing anyone unnecessarily. 



150 



As part of a few final comments on China in this 

section, Lucian Pye remarks that had it not been for the 

turmoil of the GPCR, China would not have leaped so decisively 

into the bold reforms of the post-Mao era: 

"If China had not been scarred by the 
violent turmoil of the late 1960s and early 
1970s, the most likely alternative to Mao's 
revolutionary utopianism would have been 
little more than the dreary prospect of an 
orderly, bureaucratic form of Communism"/® 

If Pye is suggesting that the Dengist reforms would not have 

occurred at all, had it not been for the turmoil of Mao's 

GPCR, that is a debatable proposition. Then again, if he 

means by this that reform would likely have happened anyway, 

though perhaps at a snail's pace, that would seem to be closer 

to what is the case. 

For it should be noted that, during the Maoist era, 

even then the hierarchy was in constant disagreement over the 

proper scope and format of economic policies (and hence also 

the emphasis placed on political or ideological policies as 

well). Leftists were constantly looking over their several 

shoulders at the faction of Deng, Liu, Chen and others. 

Periods of economic retrenchment did occur in the PRC before 

1976 as respites from the unrelenting pressures of the GLF and 

GPCR. Indeed, after 1976, while Deng was reasserting his 

position and the Gang of Four was being removed, almost all 

the major figures remaining in the CCP were reformers of one 

sort or another, whether radical, moderate, or centrist. 

Indeed, the very reason that the GPCR occurred in the first 

151 



place was due to the economic and political retrenchment 
(i.e.: measures leading to modernization, or reforms), then 
taking place as a salve to the GLF . 

In that case, it might even be argued that if the GPCR 
had not occurred, that probably would have reflected a weaker 
position of the leftists throughout the 1960s, suggesting that 
Deng could have succeeded Zhou immediately at Zhou's death, 
and possibly also that Deng never would have been purged (in 
the 1960s or in 1976) . Hence the disruption of the GPCR would 
not have been a factor, and a modest reform program, or at 
least something closer to stability (i.e.: plodding growth), 
would likely have already been in place for a decade or more 
before Mao's death, placing China miles in front of its 
subsequent position in 1976. 

The role of Deng has had to be similar to that of all 
things to all members. His combined goal required keeping the 
CCP in power, placating the conservative faction as necessary, 
and forging ahead with reform measures whenever possible to 
enhance the inevitability of economic growth and moderniza- 
tion, or reform. Deng's agenda is hard, but he has progressed 
again and again through the arts of compromise. The network 
of his support, or guanxi , is extensive; his many years in 
Party and Army have given him contacts throughout the country. 

When Deng had to accede to Zhao's purge, Jiang's 
accession to head of the Party was no accident. From Deng's 
perspective, Jiang could appeal to the go-slow reformers since 

152 



he kept a lid, more or less, on Shanghai during the 6-4 
debacle. Plus his Shanghai background meant that he was 
familiar with economic, industrial and demographic issues of 
modernization (not to mention his cosmopolitan outlook and 
pianistic abilities with western music). Jiang was, there- 
fore, a suitable figure until the smoke from Tiananmen 
cleared. ^^ 

To return to Pye's observation about the speed or 
nature of current (post GPCR) reforms deriving their character 
by reacting to earlier events: there is plausibility in that 
assertion. Each swing of the pendulum always seems to be 
offset, sooner or later, by swings in the opposite direction. 
However, it seems eminently more plausible to maintain that 
the reforms in question would have proceeded apace regardless, 
and perhaps even at a faster overall rate. 

The biggest dilemma currently facing the CCP and PRC 
concerns, paradoxically, their own administrative well beings 
rather than that of China. China's health seems to be in 
better condition than the risks of transformation currently 
being faced by the CCP and the PRC. As for the peaceful 
evolution now ongoing within China that is postulated by 
Western journalists, and which the CCP finds to be so annoy- 
ing, and that is related to the prevalent sense of authority 
which is now evolving: that sense of authority and the Chinese 
understanding of it seems to be tied to obvious displays of 
familial or state power that render possible only one choice 

153 



or category of choices for those who are governed. If power 
could somehow be conveyed in a more subtle or institutional- 
ized fashion, if Chinese could simultaneously entertain 
opposing points of view, then the overwhelming vertical stages 
required for simple variations of policy would not be re- 
quired. Some sort of horizontal or lateral access, across a 
wide spectrum of offices or other concerns, would do much to 
facilitate institutionalized trust or reliability, where 
currently there is little or none. Computers and other 
business or educational procedural opportunities may play an 
educational role here, where they require the individual to 
entertain genuine choices between various possibilities, 
including more than one that could be correct. The national 
stage of millions may be modified by individual arenas. 

B. MIDDLE EAST 

Shifting gears from an overview of China to look at the 
Middle East requires more than a small adjustment, and a few 
ironies . With China our focus was confined to one national 
polity, but in the Middle East we must consider several, 
although the land mass (for the entire region) is roughly 
equivalent. Further, the Middle East has a much broader demo- 
graphic range than China but with a smaller population base (a 
combined 300 million in the region we are considering, or 25% 
of China's population. One third of this Middle Eastern 
population group is from Pakistan) . While these numbers are 

154 



smaller, their growth rate is almost triple that of China's, 
therefore having other varying characteristics and societal 
dimensions . 

As with China, we shall begin our look at the Middle East 
with an overview of the geography. Whereas China has the 
highest point on earth, the Middle East has the lowest spot at 
a location appropriately named the Dead Sea, 1,312 feet below 
sea level. Nothing flows out of the Dead Sea; it is so saline 
and full of other minerals that nothing can live in it. The 
overwhelming physical impressions conveyed by this region and 
the entire Middle East are the absence of moisture (except for 
coastal areas and major river systems), abrupt vertical 
changes in landscape whenever elevations change, stark 
contrasts, and heat; much of the land mass is desertified, and 
is watered by three of the largest and most ancient river 
systems in the world. 

The first of these rivers, the Nile, flows north from 
central Africa into a fertile delta region that supports 
Egypt's 53 million (up from 40 million in 1980). Histori- 
cally, the Nile's annual floods have been the irrigation 
source for Egypt's agriculture; that source is now supplement- 
ed by the High Aswan Dam, constructed in 1960 with Soviet 
assistance. West of the Nile begins the great Sahara Desert, 
spreading into and across North Africa to the Atlantic 
coastline over 1,000 miles away. 



155 



The Levant area itself, on the Eastern end of the Mediter- 
ranean, enjoys a Mediterranean climate along the coast. 
Further inland another relatively minor north-south river 
system, the Jordan, runs south from the Sea of Galilee for 
about 60 miles to the Dead Sea, providing much needed irriga- 
tion and drinking water for inhabitants of the region. East 
of the Jordan is desert, and to the west is the Judaean 
Wilderness, a dry, hilly expanse otherwise known, for the most 
part, as the West Bank, pockmarked with Arab villages and 
Jewish settlements. Jerusalem is just a little over 10 miles 
west from the northern end of the Dead Sea, and the capital 
city of Jordan (Amman) lies about 20 miles east of the river. 
East and northeast of Galilee the land rises into a plateau 
and peak area, between Syria and the Galilee, where snow 
occasionally gathers and which is much prized as a strategic 
location: the Golan Heights. Damascus, the capital city of 
Syria, sits on the lower slopes of Mt . Hermon at just 30 miles 
northeast of Israel's (current) northernmost point. 

The Jordan River valley continues north of Galilee, and is 
occupied for about 2 miles by the Jordan River (still in 
present-day Israel) . The valley area continues further north, 
with various other still smaller rivers in place of the 
Jordan, and the valley now becomes known as the Bekaa - an 
important central part of Lebanon where agriculture is found, 
as well as, incidentally, a flourishing drug trade during 
recent years. This area also has strategic significance. The 

156 



I 



Cedar forests for which Lebanon is known have long ago been 
razed. Beirut, on the coast, is almost due west of Damascus. 
Further south, midway between Beirut and the Jerusalem area, 
and also on the coast, is Haifa; this point of land forms a 
natural harbor area and is utilized as such by the Israelis. 
South of Jerusalem and the Dead Sea are the Negev and Sinai 
areas - deserts that fill the space between the Mediterranean, 
the Nile, and the Red Sea where it divides into the Gulf of 
Suez and Gulf of Aqaba . 

These four international capital cities, Jerusalem, Amman, 
Damascus and Beirut, that are the center of so much attention 
and frequently grace our television screens, could be comfort- 
ably placed between Philadelphia and Washington, D.C., or 
between Los Angeles and San Diego. 

Further north of Beirut, and primarily to the East, is 
found the second of the three major river systems in the 
Middle East: the Tigris and Euphrates. These two rivers 
combine to make one system, flow out of Anatolia's highlands, 
and meander southeastward, past ancient names such as Ashur, 
Babylon and Ur, finally generating their own delta area at the 
Persian Gulf. This delta region forms a perennial marsh that 
runs halfway to Baghdad from the Gulf and covers much of 
southern Iraq. Baghhdad itself is in the vicinity of ancient 
Babylon, and approximately in the middle of modern Iraq. 
Mountain areas are to the north, bordering Turkey, Armenia and 
Iran - where the Kurds live. 

157 



Continuing east from Mesopotamia is Persia, a mountainous 
and inhospitable region which was almost impossible for 
Alexander's Greeks to traverse. On the other side of Persia 
are more deserts, or Baluchistan, and the Middle East's last 
major river system, the Indus. This river flows south out of 
the western Himalayas near the base of K2 in Kashmir: a high, 
green, and splendid place that has been described as one of 
the most gorgeous locations on the planet. The river contin- 
ues south, through Punjab and into Sindh until it empties into 
the Arabian Sea near Karachi. Pakistan is essentially a 
glorified river valley, with the Indus running through the 
center, except for the open and hot spaces of Baluchistan that 
extend west along the coast to Iran's mountains. The river 
valley now supports a population of almost 110 millions; this 
figure represents an average annual growth factor of 3.1%, and 
has practically tripled in a few decades from only 36 millions 
in 1951. To the west, above Baluchistan, is Afghanistan and 
all its mountains. The famous Khyber Pass is a major avenue 
on the Pakistani-Afghan border, roughly mid-way between Kabul 
and Islamabad. To the east of Pakistan will be found the 
Hindu multitudes of South Asia; Bombay is just around the 
corner . 

Pushing north from Islamabad to Pakistan's border area, 
and north again about the same distance (500 straight-line 
miles) across the Karakoram Range, places us at Kashi (Kash- 
gar) in Xinjiang, or at one of China's Silk Road terminuses, 

158 



where travellers turned southwest out of China. Kashi was on 
the southern route, with the next stops being Islamabad and 
Kabul en route to Baghdad and Istanbul. Today a highway, 
completed in 1982, links Kashi and Islamabad across the 16,000 
foor high Pamirs in the Karakoram Range. Kashi itself, with 
a 2,000 year old Sunday bazaar, is on the edge of the 
Taklimakan Desert, a prominent feature of Xinjiang: the 
desert's name means "when you go in, you don't come out". 
Once the Silk Road travellers arrived in Islamabad they could 
continue west or follow the river south to the Arabian Sea. 

Nestled in between these river systems, east of the Nile, 
south of Tigris/Euphrates, and southwest of Indus (or inside 
the Fertile Crescent), is the Arabian peninsula, an area 
equivalent to the U.S. east of the Mississippi, and where 
water may well become more valuable than oil in the next few 
years. Much of the interior of the peninsula is all desert, 
a dry and alternately mountainous and sandy expanse. Coastal 
ranges are lined with wadis, or valleys ranging from a few 
feet to over a mile in width, and that change from dry 
boulders and gravel to flood waters that rise quickly enough 
to catch travellers unawares when it rains in the mountains. 
The interior is now a unified Kingdom, containing the two 
holiest shrines for the world's millions of Muslims, many of 
whom will travel each year to Mecca on the annual Hajj. A 
large southern portion of the interior is so formidable that 
it is called The Empty Quarter. 

159 



Surrounding the interior, on the east and south, are 
coastal states. Sheikdoms, sitting between the Sea or Gulf and 
the coast mountains in the south, and controlling access to 
most of the world's oil reserves. With the advent of oil and 
nationalization of its production, the last 20 years - only 
the space of time since I left High School - have seen incred- 
ible growth and construction within these states. Entire 
cities, with high rises, sewers, communications, transporta- 
tion centers, utilities, harbors, machinery, manufacturing and 
retailing, financial centers, hotels, hospitals, universities, 
and more have all grown out of the sand. They are, for the 
most part, spotlessly clean. Everyone who drives a car has 
learned to do so only in the last two decades. Aerial 
photography is not infrequently incapable of identifying these 
newly constructed areas, compared to their previous appearance 
(aside from prominent geographical features), if viewed over 
spans of only 2 years. Two examples of these "new" cities 
include Muscat (from 1970, at the location of an occupied but 
barren ancient settlement) , and Abu Dhabi (new from 1966) . By 
contrast, Cairo and Jerusalem and the other cities north of 
the desert, in the fertile crescent, have been continuously 
settled, and sometimes little changed for millenia. North of 
the interior is the Syrian desert: more hot open expanse 
leading to Damascus, Amman and the Jordan Valley. 

The Middle East, then, is an area of stark contrasts, vast 
open expanses, and rare cushions. Only a few short years ago, 

160 



travellers and residents either carried what they needed for 
survival on their person, on their camel, or had it nearby. 
Nomad hospitality is legendary. Tribal existence was the 
norm, aside from the few fixed settlements inland, along the 
rivers, and at intervals along the coasts. 

Demographically, the area is similarly diverse. Entire 
civilizations developed separate from each other along the 
three primary river systems. Travellers from Europe and Asia 
frequented the routes that criss-crossed the region. Nomad 
life coexisted with the cities. Dark skinned Egyptians 
mingled with Phoenicians and the Syrians from further north. 
Persians were a whole race apart, and the Muslims of Pakistan 
have different lifestyles and priorities, aside from Islam, 
than their coreligionists. 

The population of Jerusalem is remarkable for its vibran- 
cy, where Armenians and Greeks and Jews (Orthodox and secu- 
lar) , and Arabs and Coptics and Romans and Turks and Russians 
and Templars and still others all combined, and still combine 
to this day, to share a city with never-ending uneasy live- 
and-let-live agreements among its inhabitants. 

Some population groups share a great deal of homogeneity 
at the ancient centers (deltas, major cities) . Others reflect 
a wandering tribal existence, which is now being converted to 
sedentary pursuits by combinations of economic necessity and 
governmental fiat. Then still others carry the incredible 
diversity within which they have lived, with Jerusalem as the 

161 



prime example; Istanbul is another possible candidate, but 
beyond our purview, and also a place where riches were 
deposited instead of a place where riches grew. 

Another striking and sobering feature about contemporary- 
demographics in the Middle East are the very size and contin- 
ued growth of the resident peoples. Population growth in this 
century has been almost catastrophic, considering the limited 
resources of the region. The consequent strain on resources 
and food production, drinking water, employment prospects, 
attendant security risks and costs, and so on are immense. It 
is indeed true that water may become more valuable than oil, 
at least to the inhabitants. The new emphasis on agriculture 
and the greening of deserts, plus a burgeoning industrial 
capacity, indigenous armaments industries, and more have all 
placed demands on the local water tables that can no longer be 
met . 

The last major demographic distinction to be addressed 
here is related to the near complete arbitrary fashion with 
which the contemporary Middle East was carved. Only at one 
end of the Levant is a primarily homogenous grouping of people 
found within the recently carved national boundaries (Egypt) . 
The area as a whole is much more suited for empire or tribe 
than it is for states. Iraq is a near impossible concatena- 
tion of Marsh Arab Shi'ites, middle class Sunnis, and spirited 
Kurds, who choose to have little to do with each other; as 
part of the Ottoman Empire Iraq was a collection of 3 provinc- 

162 



es rather than one administrative unit. Moreover, the ruling 
circle resident in Baghdad emanates from a microcosm in 
Tikrit, upriver from the capital, which is hardly represen- 
tative of the country as a whole. 

The Gulf states, until very recently, had inland borders 
that meant nothing to indigenous peoples who did not have, nor 
care to have, geopolitical concerns. Lebanon and Syria were 
oddly drawn by the French so as to facilitate French rule and 
maintain the heterogeneity of the area; it wasn't until the 
1950s that persons living in Syria began to feel anything like 
Syrians, and this happened only after Syria and Egypt formed 
a brief political union in 1958.^° Jordan's make-up is a bit 
less fractious, but nonetheless a superimposed structure 
inside neat lines, over a desert people, intended as a buffer 
against Bedouin for the British, and with a ruling family 
transplanted from the Hijaz (that still exists uneasily, if 
not with open feuding, with the House of Saud) . 

Saudi Arabia is perhaps the most natural of all the Middle 
East states (along with other members of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, or GCC) . Here a ruling family of one area of the 
peninsula took it on their own to unite the entire peninsula, 
or most of it, and were possibly able to do so because no 
other Colonial power truly wanted it. All empires skirted 
Arabia, preferring to stay close to the Mediterranean, rather 
than penetrate into the Arabian Desert. 



163 



Palestine, or Israel, or the Transjordan, is truly the 
most recent superimposition of a national polity sundering 
other allegiances in the Middle Eastern area. A combination 
of British rule, UN partitioning, and Jewish-Arabic war making 
have generated a state of incredible strength and purpose and 
with strains of "nationalism", yet with borders that probably 
have a greater likelihood of undergoing adjustment than of any 
other state in the world (except for those states, of course, 
that might be engaged in hostilities, or otherwise pursuing 
negotiations leading to national redefinitions) . 

To reiterate earlier suggestions regarding the fluidity of 
the Middle East (and China) , it is helpful to keep in mind the 
region's development, geography, neighbors, and avenues of 
discourse or access with surrounding regions (particularly 
China) . The Middle East is a natural window on Asia, it is a 
region of movement. 

Again, by focusing on only the primary Levantine states, 
this review is somewhat arbitrary and loses the added ingredi- 
ents of Anatolia, most of North Africa, and much of Persia, 
but will still be representative of the heart of the region 
and also of much that concerns international geopolitics. By 
necessity, a greater diversity of peoples will be covered in 
this section than was evident with the review of China, and it 
will be done with a corresponding reduction of in-depth 
coverage. 



164 



1. Israel 

The circumstances involving the establishment of this 
state are utterly unique and without precedent. Placing 
Israel into its own category for review is not meant as a 
slight or plaudit, either to Israel or to the surrounding 
Middle East states. Rather, the intent is to administratively 
facilitate review of a unique situation. 

Israel, insofar as it is a Jewish State, is almost 
entirely a nation of immigrants. Notwithstanding the cultural 
or historical attachment of Jews to Palestine and of their 
desire or wish to reside in Jerusalem, one result of their 
actual arrival after centuries of diaspora has been local 
displacement, regional hostilities, and a considerable amount 
of international diplomacy. One of the essential paradoxes of 
Zionism, the movement that begat Israel, is that it is (said 
to be) primarily secular in orientation, or nationalist, 
intending only to provide Jews with a homeland of their own. 
Hence, location should not necessarily be an issue, but 
location did in fact become a crucial issue. Indeed, Theodore 
Herzl - the movement's most effective initial director, 
although not its founder - at one point agreed to accept the 
East African Protectorate (i.e. : Kenya) from Britain as a home 
for the Jewish people; other proffered or suggested areas for 
Jewish homelands were Argentina, Cyprus, and the Sinai. ^^ 
But, of course, the Jewish homeland wound up in Palestine, 
precisely because location was an issue. At this juncture, 

165 



any attempt to try to defend zionism as secular becomes very 
difficult; Zionism is very much related to the question of 
what it means to be a Jew, insofar as being Jewish is to have 
a special relationship to a physical place (Jerusalem) , and 
apparently the majority of early Zionists believed that there 
could be no Jewish homeland unless it was in Israel. 

The internal debate of what it means to be Jewish is 
very much alive to this day in Israel. The primary governmen- 
tal figures would prefer a secular orientation for the state 
as a whole, but all Israeli governments have ruled with the 
assistance of one or more of the small religious political 
parties; the Knesset was thus obliged to maintain certain 
requirements about observing the sabbath, kosher dietary laws, 
and so on. So Israel is secular, but it isn't. Also Zionism 
is secular, but it isn't. Even with this most recent elec- 
tion, when Labor polled far better than Likud for the first 
time since 1977 and could have formed a government without 
incorporating a religious party (for the first time in 
Israel's history), an orthodox party, the Shas, was included 
in the ruling coalition. The Ministry of Interior portfolio 
will thus go to Shas. Given this state of affairs, we find 
secular Jews who in fact are contributing directly to 
maintenance of a religious state. 

We also have a few Orthodox Jews who do not support 
the (current) state, secular or sacred. They believe that 
Israel, now, is heretictical : it is a violation of the divine 



166 



will and an affront to the Messiah who will begin the State 
himself, in his own good time (but hasn't done so yet) . These 
Jews are the Neturei Karta ("Guardians of the City" in 
Aramaic) , and they have carried their beliefs to the point of 
interacting with the PLO. During the recent peace negotia- 
tions, this group had two of their members from New York City 
attached to the Palestinian delegation (in an advisory 
capacity) . Another Orthodox anti-zionist group, larger than 
Neturei Karta, is the Edah Haredit; this group will not deal 
with either the Jewish state or the PLO . ^^ While these 
relatively small groups actually live in Jerusalem (also 
elsewhere) , they do not regard themselves as citizens of 
Israel; they do not pay taxes, or serve in the army, and so 
on. 

One of the first acts of the new Israeli government in 
1948 was to proclaim the "Law of Return", stipulating that any 
Jew has full citizenship if he or she chooses to live in 
Israel. In 1989 Israel's Supreme Court reaffirmed that being 
a Jew, under the Law of Return, included Reform and Conserva- 
tive Judaism (the majority of U.S. Jews) , as well as Orthodox. 
For years the Orthodox in Israel have been trying to narrow 
the focus of this law to include only Orthodox. Recently, as 
with many other sacred and secular organizations around the 
world, some of Judaism has been rethinking its own orienta- 
tion. Hence both Reform and Conservative Jews now train and 



167 



utilize women Rabbis, and so on, which is all a bit too much 
for the Orthodox Jews to understand or accept. 

After establishing the Law of Return, Israel was able 
to in-gather Jews from all over the world, with their citizen- 
ship already established based on their being Jewish. 
Immigra-tion has been in effect long enough for other genera- 
tions of Jews, from the initial immigrants, to be born in 
Israel. These Sabras are now entering the higher political 
ranks. Many now living in Israel, and others still arriving, 
continue to be Jews born outside of Israel. Eastern Europe 
was the first primary source for the migrations to Israel. 
These first and second waves of immigrants, or aliyahs 
("coming up"), were ashkenazic in character (German or 
European based Jewry) , and received much impetus from post-war 
experiences in Europe (the holocaust). Subsequent immigra- 
tions have originated largely from Jews living in Arab or 
Islamic lands; these sephardim (Spanish or oriental based 
Jews) helped to change the composition of Jews in Israel from 
a predominantly European outlook to where the mix is almost at 
50%. Future immigration, particularly those now entering 
Israel from Russia, may tip the balance back towards the 
ashkenazim. Almost 25% of the world's Jewish peoples live in 
Israel, with about the same number or more in the U.S. 

Initial Jewish settlement in Israel was of a communal 
nature, based on kibbutzim (collective settlements) and mo- 
shavim (cooperative settlements). Agriculture and security 

168 



were both stressed. Kibbutzim and moshavim are now the 
minority, but are still prominent in that a disproportionate 
number of military (IDF) officers come from these communities: 
while representing only 8% of Israel's total population, they 
provide roughly 25-30% of all IDF officers." As of 1986, 
there were a total of 269 kibbutzim and 458 moshavim in 
operation. 

Israel's population includes a resident group of 
Israeli Arabs, those persons (Muslims, Christians and Druze) , 
who were indigenous to the area before the establishment of 
the Israeli state. Currently there are about 750,000 of these 
non-Jewish Israelis, plus another 1,800,000 Palestinians in 
the occupied West Bank. Altogether, including the occupied 
West Bank, the Jewish Israelis represent about 60% of all 
inhabitants of greater Palestine. Since current birth rates 
are higher for the non-Jews (2.62%) than for the Jews (1.34%), 
the future demographic make-up of Israel will depend upon 
immigration rates, growth rates (education) , the extent of any 
hostilities, and perhaps other variables as well. Owing to 
the immense concern for security that Israel has, plus the 
belief that a high percentage of Jews in the population is 
required to ensure security, the characteristics of Israel's 
population will continue to be closely observed by the 
government . 

Returning again to the paradox of Israel's peculiar 
stasis between the secular and religious worlds, Israel has 

169 



looked on Jerusalem as its capital city almost from the moment 
Israel's independence was declared in 1948. After unifying 
the city as one result of the 1967 war, Jerusalem's status has 
become increasingly central to any discussion involving the 
future of Israel. A lot of emotion, various interpretations 
of historical material, security requirements, international 
interest, and now resource management enter into the debate 
regarding Jerusalem's future. It is a thorny subject. To 
date the U.S. maintains a consulate there, unrelated to our 
embassy in Tel Aviv; many other countries have gradually been 
moving their embassies into Jerusalem. 

Israel's governmental structure is also unique, a 
blend of British and American democracies. The Knesset, or 
parliament, is a unicameral house with distribution of its 120 
seats dependent upon percentage polling by the several 
political parties. In other words, each party publishes its 
list of hopeful Members of the Knesset (MKs), prior to 
national elections. Its seats in the Knesset are determined 
by computing the percentage of the national vote the party 
received. Then the published party list is used, in order of 
rank from highest to lowest, to determine which party members 
fill the seats it has won. The Prime Minister is usually the 
leader, or first listed member, of the party to win the most 
seats. Since no one party will typically win a majority of 
Knesset seats, governments become ruling coalitions, and this 
is where one or more of the smaller parties, including the 

170 



orthodox, will become part of the government, even though 
these smaller parties represent only a small percentage of the 
popular vote. 

Through these continued coalitions, then, one or more 
of the orthodox parties have always been members of the 
government. This particular reality is a growing sore point 
for the country as a whole, because many Israelis feel 
uncomfortable and even resent that these small orthodox groups 
continue to have access to power, to budgets, to priorities, 
and all the rest. Recent debates over the applicability of 
the Law of Return and who is a Jew fueled this dissatisfac- 
tion, as did the occasion when a Shas Rabbi changed his mind 
about the efficacy of trading land for peace. This Rabbi, as 
a MK, communicated his decision to Shamir in the form of a 
demand, which resulted in removing the support of Shas from 
Shamir's ruling coalition. Additionally, as Labor and Likud 
have been competing with each other for the last 15 years over 
who is able to form a government, the religious parties have 
been wooed more and more by either side. Consequently they 
hold out for the biggest slice of political pie. Legislation 
and activity via the Rabbinate has been forthcoming, sponsored 
by the Orthodox, on issues of funding for Orthodox schools, 
what is and is not proper for the advertising industry (no 
women in bathing suits, thank you), the closing of pork 
processing facilities, and so on. 



171 



Another insertion of Orthodoxy into the political 
process occurred when a Brooklyn Rabbi, the leader of a 
Hasidic sect (who has never visited Israel), insisted that 
Torah mandated no land could ever be ceded away if Jewish 
lives were at stake - and hence Peres was unable to form a 
majority coalition, and the government went back to Likud. ^"^ 
In 1990, over the space of a few weeks, the orthodox Shas 
brought down Likud, and then the orthodox Lubavitch prevented 
the establishment of Labor. In short, there has been a 
growing element very much like caprice into Israeli politics, 
and Israelis are growing weary of it. Quite possibly this 
situation contributed to Labor's recent victory over Likud. 
Also, it has been recently decided, by a Knesset vote and 
against the wishes of Shamir, that starting in 1996 the Prime 
Minister will be elected directly by popular vote and not 
through the Knesset procedure of forming governments or party 
lists . 

The political spectrum in Israel, in addition to the 
national religious parties, includes a cornucopia of political 
parties. Largest among them are the Labor and Likud blocs, 
with other special interest parties on either the left or the 
right (Peace Now, from the Mapam; Shelli and Rakkah, left of 
Mapam; Maki, Israeli Communist Party; Kach, extreme right 
wing; and others), plus the Orthodox, who can be either left 
or right as we have seen. In 1949, 24 political parties 



172 



participated in the elections and 16 earned seats; by 1977, 23 
participated and 13 won seats. ^^ 

Labor's bloc is the oldest and best known political 
grouping in Israel, with its formation extending before 
initial statehood into the British Mandate period. Within 
this bloc, the Mapai party is the cornerstone: Ben-Gurion was 
its leader and became the first Prime Minister. Mapai members 
have often held influential positions within the World Zionist 
Organization and the Jewish Agency. Mapam was another Labor 
stalwart, on the left, supportive more of diplomacy and 
compromise than of unyielding policies. Other leaders that 
emerged within Labor's ranks were Levi Eshkol, Golda Meir and 
Yitzhak Rabin. 

The 1977 elections brought Likud into the government 
for the first time, and Begin became prime minister; the 
Democratic Movement for Change (DMC) party formed just before 
the election, took votes away from Labor, and the DMC ' s 15 
seats kept Labor from forming another coalition. One of the 
purposes behind Likud's formation was to insist that no land 
from the 1967 conquests would ever be returned to the Pales- 
tinians. The Herut party (Begin's, from 1948), the Liberals, 
and several other opposition parties combined to form Likud in 
1973. Other parties include the Tsomet (extreme right-wing), 
and Meretz (left wing, some of whose members support formation 
of a Palestinian state) . The newly elected Labor government 
under Rabin has made a coalition with Shas and Meretz; this is 

173 



the first government in which the orthodox National Religious 
Party (NRP) has not been a member since Israel's founding. 

Israeli society includes several interest groups, of 
which the political parties are an extension. The largest, 
most powerful and oldest societal grouping is the Histadrut, 
a glorified labor union formed in 1920. It has semi-official 
status, includes trade union leaders in its membership, shares 
a directorate with Labor, accepts contracts from developing 
countries, offers training to labor leaders and women's 
groups, etc., and sends technicians on missions to developing 
countries. Histadrut has enjoyed frequent leadership exchang- 
es between itself, the Labor Party, and the Knesset. By the 
1970s, over half of all Israelis were members of Histadrut, it 
was the country's largest employer, 90% of all organized 
workers belonged to its trade unions, 60% of Israelis were 
insured by its health fund, and 25% were employed by its 

es.^^ 

Two other very visible interest groups with political 
and/or social impact are Peace Now (PN) and the Gush Emunim 
(GE) . PN began from veterans protests after the October War 
in 1973, based on the premise that the Knesset and Ministries 
were not availing themselves of opportunities to generate 
agreements and perhaps even peace with the surrounding Arab 
communities. In the eyes of PN, climates of opinion had been 
changing within the Arab world and Israel was not adjusting 
accordingly and taking full advantage of the situation to make 

174 



peace. GE, on the other hand, emerged from the NRP as a vocal 
supporter of the view that God gave the land of Israel to the 
Israelis and Israel should not give it back to the Arabs for 
any reason whatsoever. Hence GE and other kindred groups, 
plus the Kach (who openly advocate removal of all Arabs from 
Israel and annexation of the West Bank) , are supportive of 
continued settlement construction and expansion in the West 
Bank. Kach, by the way, was a political party banned by 
Israel in 1988 due to its racism and was led by another New 
York Rabbi, Meir Kahane, who emigrated to Israel in 1971. 
While he was visiting New York on a speaking engagement in 
October 1990, Kahane was shot and killed. 

Aside from all this political intrigue, Israel has 
pursued a remarkable course of development over the last half 
century. Starting with agriculture, and now as a major citrus 
exporter, Israel parlayed burgeoning investment returns, 
strength of immigration, and considerable international aid 
into a GNP that reached $22b by 1982. However, Israel's 
predominantly socialist orientation, constant influx of 
immigrants, and absolute priority of defense created a 
lopsided state budget heavily dependent on external largesse. 
Inflation was a major problem, reaching almost 500% per year 
by 1984; it has now been brought under reasonable control and 
is down into double digits, under 20%. Israel's exports have 
increased from $300m in 1950 to $lb in 1968 and $8. 2b in 
1987." 

175 



Israel's uppermost security concerns are reflected by- 
defense expenditures that amounted to 23% of GDP in 1983: 30% 
of all national output goes to security or defense. Almost 
half of the national budget is for security, along with one 
fifth of the labor force. Per capita costs for defense have 
escalated to $1,000 as of 1978. 

Security has not only been a cause for expenditures, 
but also significant income. Military sales have provided 
Israel with as much as 2 0% of foreign income from manufactured 
items, and is recorded under the rubric of machinery and 
electronics. The country's defense ministry, in the 1970s, 
absorbed as much as 40% of the national budget and 20% of 
GNP . ^^ 

One of the most glaringly apparent aspects of Israel's 
economic life has been the amount of assistance it receives 
from external sources, especially from the U.S.. On average, 
annual aid now includes $1.2b for economic aid, $1.8b in 
military assistance, and up to $1.2b in other special allow- 
ances. When bonds sales, and other outright contributions are 
added, total annual aid to Israel from the U.S. is approxi- 
mately $6b. Translating that figure into per capita aid 
results in almost $641 per person per year. The next highest 
U.S. aid recipient is Egypt, at approximately $2b per year, or 
not quite $40 per capita. 

Israel's socialized public sector employs more people 
than any other non-communist country. As of 1982, productivi- 

176 



ty in Israel fell lower than in most of Western Europe and 
only 25% of all workers were in industry. ^^ 

Obviously Israel's economy would go under without this 
external influx of U.S. aid; quite apart from the requirements 
on which the aid is based, one has to wonder about the 
viability and survivability of Israel's economy. Part of the 
aid package is the provision that the U.S. purchase a speci- 
fied amount of Israeli materiel each year, which further 
assists Israel's arms industry. In addition to these dollars, 
Israel has been voicing the need to find an additional $70b to 
$80b over the next five years for purposes of settling the 
Russian immigration.^" 

Energy costs are as much a part of Israel's budget as 
are found elsewhere. After the Iranian revolution, that major 
source of Israel's oil supply was cut. (Israel also lost 
another supply when the Sinai was returned to Egypt) . Israel 
therefore had to rely on world markets, and by 1980 Israel's 
average annual energy import bill was over $2b, almost 10% of 
GNP. 

Closely related to Israel's economic and military 
well-being is the subject of energy and research. Which leads 
in turn to the Israeli complex at Dimona in the Negev, 
highlighted by an expose provided by a Moroccan Jew named 
Mordecai Vanunu through the Sunday Times of London (5 Oct. 
1986) . That quiet story, combined with subsequent reports, 
conjecture, and an interesting new book ( The Samson Option , by 

177 



Hersh, which may have to be taken with a grain of salt) , leads 
to the possible and likely conjecture that Israel is an 
undeclared nuclear power with as many as 100 to 200 warheads 
parked under the sand, along with having the means of deliver- 
ing those devices. Israel has launched her own satellite into 
orbit, and possesses sufficient aircraft and other battlefield 
weapons necessary for use with nuclear devices. 

On 22 September 197 9, Israel was recorded as having 
performed a low-yield nuclear test in the South Indian Ocean 
1500 miles southeast of the Cape of Good Hope; the test was 
discovered by our VELA satellite. This particular test was 
one of three, using nuclear artillery shells, with ships from 
Israeli and South African navies observing. ^^ Israel also is 
said to have conducted at least one successful low-yield 
neutron bomb test, underground in the Negev, during the mid 
1960s." 

Perhaps most remarkable and most sobering of all about 
these disclosures is that Israel further is supposed to have 
pursued an active program of targeting the USSR with nuclear 
weapons, proposing on one occasion that Israel and the U.S. 
jointly target the USSR. Pollard was providing U.S. military 
intelligence to Israel at the time, which assisted Israel in 
doing this. At the height of Pollard's activities in 1984-85, 
he was providing Israel with information about positions of 
Baku oil fields and military installations in Southern USSR. 
These are indeed sobering revelations, if true, for a nation 

178 



of four million people to suddenly de facto become one of the 
world's largest nuclear powers." 

There is another sense in which the region of Israel 
and/or Palestine is top heavy and subject to strain. The 
combination of population pressures, agriculture, and burgeon- 
ing industry are taking their toll on local water resources. 
Supplies of potable water are so tenuous, with projected 
availability so grim, that timely changes in habits, plans, 
and even livelihoods of the region's inhabitants are mandated. 

There is a necessity for regional environmental 
cooperation. Agriculture and urban development have expanded 
water usage six-fold since 1948: there simply is no longer 
enough water for Israel's agriculture and everything else. 
The Sea of Galilee (Lake Kinneret) is as low as it has ever 
been in 60 years; it's down to the point where the water will 
become saline if it drops any further. Israel's two aquifers, 
one near the coast and Gaza, the other further inland and 
under the West Bank, are both overdrawn; the water at Gaza is 
now brackish, unfit for agriculture and human consumption. 
Conservation measures were instituted last year, but they are 
hardly sufficient. Israeli agriculture needs to be redirected 
into less water intensive crops, which will take years to 
fully implement. Jews use about 9 times the amount of water 
used by Arabs; the Arab population's consumption rate is 
capped militarily by the rate they utilized from 1967 (despite 
their increasing numbers) . Added Jewish settlers to the 

179 



region from Russia, or wherever, will further overtax the 
supply. New water must be provided from the Litani, the Nile, 
from Turkey, or from desalinization/^ 

Agriculture's share of exports is 30%, and the fanners 
use 70% of Israel's water, with the government subsidizing 30% 
of the water they use. Most of this water is provided by the 
limestone aquifer under the West Bank, and the region's supply 
is dangerously low. An indication of this is provided by the 
level of the Sea of Galilee, which is now at the point of no 
return . 

One way of finding additional water resources, by the 
state, has been to employ a growing network of treatment 
plants to reuse waste water for agriculture. To find still 
more water, Israel wants to construct a canal from the Yarmuk 
to the Sea of Galilee, to move water both ways, depending on 
the season. This particular project contrasts to the Jordani- 
ans, who have been trying to dam the Yarmuk, but have been 
unsuccessful because of needing prior approval from Israel. 

Palestinians in occupied lands have been prevented 
from increasing their water supplies since 1967. New Israeli 
settlements have dropped more than 40 deep wells, some of 
which were next to Palestinian springs, causing the springs to 
go dry. Then, in some cases, the Israelis provided water back 
to the Palestinians, but only by selling it. Water has become 
a very potent issue for conservative politicians opposed to 
giving land back to the Palestinians, and also for Palestin- 

180 



ians who wish to regain their rightful share of the region's 
resources. If present usage of Gaza aquifer water continues, 
at twice the consumption rate which the aquifer can support, 
there will be catastrophic results for living standards and 
agriculture there. All of Israel, in fact, "is on the 
threshold of a catastrophe".^^ 

As if the above strains of economics, security, and 
natural resources weren't enough, the Intifidah adds ingredi- 
ents to the region that need to be addressed. Land appropria- 
tion by the Israelites for construction of settlements or 
other purposes, on top of the acquisitions made from vacancies 
left by refugees who left their homes in 1948 and 1967 (who 
are not allowed to return) , add to the tension on the West 
Bank and Gaza. The Palestinians have long been in search of 
a state of their own, to which Israel is adamantly opposed. 
Israel also has been reluctant to have any dealings with the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); since the PLO claims 
to be the lawful representative of the Palestinians, Israel's 
stance on the matter effectively deprives the Palestinians of 
a voice. Since December 1987 the Palestinians of the West 
Bank, primarily the youth, have engaged in sporadic yet 
dependable defiance, strikes, and stone throwing violence 
directed toward the Israelis. By June of 1991, anywhere from 
800 to 1,100 Palestinians were killed by the IDF as part of 
Israel's effort to curb this defiance and aggression. Addi- 
tionally, the Palestinians themselves had killed another 350 

181 



of their own, described as "collaborators". The PLO leader- 
ship was trying to control and stop these latter killings, but 
without complete success. Aside from responding in the 
streets by the IDF, Israel also routinely bulldozes the homes 
of those Palestinians suspected of violence, regularly detains 
scores or more, has cordoned off particular areas, prevented 
the locals from going to their jobs or markets, and also 
closed schools and universities in the West Bank and Gaza 
areas. This last measure, by depriving Palestinian youths of 
their education, is creating an in-house trajedy of societal 
proportions, with literacy rates among Palestinians beginning 
to suffer. The degree of importance with which the Jews 
themselves regard education makes this measure particularly 
malevolent . 

Recently deaths have been reported among Jewish 
settlers and others as the Intifadah continues to take 
invidious turns. This simmering discontent has become yet 
another issue for the planners to solve if the region is to 
attain peace and stability. One domestic effect for Israel, 
in reverse, has been that since the beginning of the Intifada, 
1 in 15 Israelis have refused to serve in occupied territo- 
ries, and 1 in 10 actually go to prison over this issue. (The 
"Peace Now" group is not among those who support selective 
service, based on where the Army sends you) . ^^ 

As a beginning response and partial answer to all of 
the above, the long awaited Middle East Peace Conference has 

182 



begun. It is a slow process, but remarkable if for no other 
reason than that all Arab-Israeli participants were in the 
same room together. This peace process is an important aspect 
of resolving Middle East antagonisms, and will be addressed 
again in chapter seven. It is often said that this process is 
characterized as a decision to either trade land for peace, 
thereby getting an agreement, or not to trade land for peace, 
thereby getting little if anything at all. There is some 
truth to this simple characterization, but behind the actual 
trading of land are all those other issues of government 
composition, interest groups, economics, and so on. The 
simple formula of land for peace has a labyrinthine foundation 
below the surface. 

2. Other Middle East States 

Our above review of Israel was the portrayal of a 
state that meets traditional criteria of being, in fact, a 
nation state. There are an entire range of perhaps insupera- 
ble difficulties to be found within the fabric of that state, 
but all the typically European nation-state trademarks are 
there, with a few others thrown in. The government is 
institutionalized, there is stability in the political process 
(despite the dozens of political parties), there is a func- 
tioning infrastructure (even if it might not be able to run on 
its own) , and the people (or at least the Jews) are active and 
involved with their government (during the electoral process) . 



183 



Before that, the review of China portrayed a country 
that was trying very hard, and slowly succeeding, to redefine 
its nationalism. In so doing, that process indicated a 
further likely and ongoing modification being made by the 
Chinese people, knowingly or unknowingly, regarding their 
perception of authority and tradition. Finally, this last 
evolutionary adjustment, enhanced by modernization and a 
growing economy, will quite possibly have profound effects on 
how the Chinese develop their law, political offices, decision 
making apparatus, systems of accountability, provisions for 
succession of central power, and so on. 

Moving now to the Other Middle East States, we find a 
grouping of dissimilar would-be nation states, each with its 
primary concerns, each with nascent governmental structures 
that do not yet have legitimacy in their own right (over and 
above the power of the personalities who occupy those offic- 
es) , each facing increasingly real-time dilemmas of needing to 
find employment for multiplying populations and the require- 
ment to husband dwindling resources, each working out its own 
accommodation with Islamic-modernization tensions, and each 
wondering how to interact with the others, with the UN, with 
the Palestinians, and with their nemesis Israel. These Middle 
Eastern states lack the advantages of Israel's institutional- 
ization, and of China's overwhelming center of authority with 
all its vertical relationships. They are somewhere in 
between, attempting to institutionalize their political 

184 



apparatus, to make accommodations between Islam and national- 
ism and modernization, and to draw their constituent popula- 
tions into the process of government. 

Each of these other major Middle East states are known 
for certain primary characteristics. Saudi Arabia, of course, 
is known for its bankroll and conservatism. Jordan usually 
plays the moderate, caught between factions, attempting to 
serve as an active or passive arbitrator. Iraq, aside from 
Baghdad and its associated cosmopolitan aspects (in better 
days), and in a thinly disguised bid to assert Arab leader- 
ship, has been focusing attention on military preparedness. 
Syria, another contender for Arab leadership, and also another 
state quick to acknowledge the virtue of muscle, has yet to be 
the center for pan-Arab thought that it would like to be, 
while working through as best it can a Byzantine political 
party to institute or carry out its ideas. Egypt, interest- 
ingly enough, has no bankroll or army or moderator impulse 
that stands out above each of its neighbors to give it an 
immediate and single reference point. However, Egypt falls 
somewhat into the all-of -the-above category, is characteristi- 
cally first in the region to carry on with a project or 
purpose later to be adopted or felt by the region, and was 
regarded by the others as a necessary partner in their 
struggle against Israel. 

Egypt's 53 million are the single most concentrated 
national population in the Levant (having rough parity with 

185 



Iran) , and are projected to double in size within 25 years at 
current growth rates to 110 millions (or the current size of 
Pakistan) . Compared to 14m for Saudi Arabia, 3m for Jordan, 
12m for Syria, and 18m for Iraq, Egypt's population alone 
(concentrated around the Nile Delta) commands a certain 
gravity or attraction in personal and cultural affairs amongst 
the Arab world. Regardless of what the respective government 
positions are with each other, Arabs from across the Middle 
East will go to and from Cairo or Alexandria for employment, 
education, culture, travel, and other activities. Ever since 
Napoleon first made Egypt aware, in the late 18th century, of 
the realities of an outside world, and since Muhammad Ali then 
changed Cairo and the Nile Delta from an agricultural backwat- 
er to an industrial and educational center actively interact- 
ing with the West, Egypt has been in the general forefront of 
regional concerns, the first in the Arab world - generally 
speaking - to pioneer the way. The most recent example of 
this was the Camp David Accords and unilateral Egyptian- 
Israeli peace of 1978 (assuming that other Middle Eastern 
states will also arrive at understandings with Israel). A 
flurry of activity in Baghdad attempted to isolate Cairo after 
the Egyptian-Israeli accords were made, but those isolationist 
measures were ultimately non-effective. 

Another feature that the other Middle East states seem 
to share, whether they want to or not, is that their current 
national governments, operating through a collection of 

186 



political edifices that preside over largely arbitrary borders 
with only minimal senses of institutionalized legitimacy, are 
all largely irrelevant or out of touch with the day-to-day 
living that occurs within their respective national borders. 
One exception to this characterization is Saudi Arabia: the 
Royal Family seems to occupy a more stable position than many 
of the surrounding heads of state. The Koran is regarded as 
Saudi Arabia's constitution, and the Royal Family governs 
through the Sharia: age-old desert traditions permeate the 
relation between royal family and the people. The pace of 
modernization within the Arabian peninsula, however, may 
require the King to speed his reform plans ahead of schedule, 
if in fact he does have a schedule for reform (as he claims) . 
While central authority in China was very much 
associated with one or more personalities, it was also tied 
into a bureaucratic edifice of several vertical relationships 
that would frequently include family members; this was so if 
for no other reason than that China is a large polity and 
there is much to keep track of. In Egypt, on the other hand, 
and elsewhere in the Middle East, central authority (especial- 
ly in the foreign policy realm) is also associated with a 
strong personality, but without attendant vertical or horizon- 
tal bureaucracy linkages. Nasser and Sadat were very much 
their own men when it came to the odd momentous decisions that 
went on to flavor Egypt for years hence. Examples of these 
include: only 14 people knew in advance of Nasser's decision 

187 



to nationalize the Suez; Sadat told no one of his decision to 
join with Libya and Syria in the Federation of Arab Republics 
in 1971; only 2 people knew of Sadat's decision to expel 
Soviets from Egypt (and only a few hours before the Soviet 
Ambassador was told); Sadat planned the 1973 war with Syria's 
Assad before telling his own Generals; only one person knew 
Sadat was going to Jerusalem in 1977/'' 

■ The Egyptian regime did try genuine multiparty 
politics in the 1970s, but reverted to a primary party (the 
government's party) with other minor parties that provide 
essentially no legal opposition. 

Egypt's primary political figure, the President, 
acquires his perceived legitimacy through the perception of 
the people of the country before he is really accepted. The 
fact that he is in office, or was elected, is ancillary to his 
needing the mantle of popular support. Generally this is done 
through momentous occasions or decisions, and since Egypt is 
a fairly homogenous place, despite its population size, such 
an occasion or decision usually involves the foreign policy 
sphere. 

The leader's ability to garner popular support through 
foreign policy decisions first requires that domestic needs 
are basically met. Egypt's population again requires a 
minimal economic growth per year just to avoid unemployment 
(currently another 1,000,000 persons every 9 months). In 
terms of food production, Egypt has been losing its scanty 



arable land alongside the Nile due to urbanization and 
flooding, and 70% of all food is imported. To counter these 
trends, the country has been trying to extend agriculture 
beyond its current bounds, into the desert, and since 1981 
this attempt has been finding some success. So far 1.6 
million acres of desert have been made arable, with most of 
that occurring since 1981 when the laws were modified to favor 
private individuals over the government; individuals were then 
allowed to purchase up to 300 acres, and companies up to 
50,000 acres (instead of 100 acres per person or company). 
The large businesses, with more resources at their disposal, 
fare better than the individuals. As a result, over all food 
production is improving: prices of fruits and vegetables have 
stabilized despite a general 30% inflation rate in the last 
few years . ^® 

This very success has generated its own difficulties, 
however. Similar to the growing dryness of the Jordan River 
valley, Egypt has faced its worst drought in a century during 
the 1980s. The Nile is the primary, and sometimes only, water 
source in a country without rainfall (the rain falls upriver, 
away from the delta) ; in recent years river traffic has been 
stranded and the strategic reservoir behind High Aswan is 
reduced by 20%. The government is looking for new aquifers, 
encouraging the discontinuance of crops such as rice and sugar 
cane, and looking for other ways to conserve. The Nile 
meanwhile continues its century-long decline of liquid volume 

189 



each year. It is expected that another 2.8 million acres can 
be brought under cultivation with available aquifer supplies, 
but this amount added to the current 6 million acres will only 
meet 50% of the country's food needs by the next century, A 
former Egyptian diplomat suggests that "the politics of the 
Middle East after 2000 will be a struggle over water". ^^ 

Egypt is also proceeding with reforms in the urban 
sector to increase economic viability. Known for its stifling 
bureaucracy, Egypt is trying to reduce the public sector, but 
in doing so will be releasing 40,000 to 150,000 new workers 
into the job market each year for the next three to four 
years. As Egyptian law does not permit a worker to be fired 
outright, the employer must present an alternative employment 
scheme to the worker in order to release him/her. According- 
ly, Cairo plans to use the Social Fund of the World Bank to 
generate new employment, although unemployment will likely 
result anyway. 

Another source of revenue for Egypt is oil and natural 
gas, of which it also has significant reserves. However, 
production has been slowing and companies (BP, Elf Aquitaine, 
and others) , are beginning to reduce their efforts in Egypt so 
as to provide more assets in better markets. They would like 
to see an improved business climate. 

Egypt is a poor country; its PCGNP is now $731.''° A 
fair amount of economic growth will be required just to retain 



190 



this status quo. Unlike China, whose PCGNP is lower but whose 
GNP is approaching superpower status, Egypt's GNP ($37b). 

The primary wish of Sadat, that economics and foreign 
relations would improve after the treaty with Israel, has not 
materialized, or at least not to the degree that was hoped 
for. The business sector continues to languish, and Israel's 
primacy with the U.S. congress over approving or disapproving 
weapons sales to the Middle East irks Cairo. As a counter to 
this Egypt is entering into production or coproduction license 
agreements to produce weapons and military support equipment 
in Egypt. This will help to boost its own economy and 
generate potential sales for Egypt in the region and possibly 
elsewhere .^^ 

Meanwhile, Islamic extremists are increasing their 
agitation for imposition of Islamic law. The Muslim Brother- 
hood, technically illegal but tolerated by the government, has 
been given access to increased employment within the bureau- 
cracy, as of a few years ago, to try and take the sting out of 
their circumstance. Recent increases in violence suggest that 
the plan is not working, or not working well enough. 

On the intelligentsia side of the dissent spectrum, a 
new play that recently opened in Cairo lampooned Arabs and 
pan-Arabism rather severely, claiming that the best attribute 
of an Arab government is its oppression of its people, and so 
on. Individual actors represented the various states, with 
examples being the Egyptian as quiet and naive, the Iraqi as 

191 



big, burly and obnoxious, the Jordanian portrayed as a 
moderate, and the Ladies as more concerned with their make-up 
than in assisting with the great problems of the day.''^ 

In Saudi Arabia the traditional form of rule is still 
maintained. The royal family makes the important decisions, 
as well as meeting other obligations; the family itself is so 
extensive that it registers as a tiny fraction of the state's 
entire population. Again, the land presents a tremendous 
spectacle to see; that plus the tremendous growth of infra- 
structure during the last two decades has done much to 
transform the Peninsula. 

Saudi Arabia's development expenses from 1968 have 
been $776b, or $65,000 per each of its 12 million citizens. 
The current 5-year plan, from August 1989, calls for another 
$2 00b expenditure. Results of those expenditures have 
included 465,000 homes, 22,200 miles of roads, 1,437,000 
telephone lines, and 8,631 elementary schools (more than one 
school per day in the last 20 years), plus over 4,000 other 
higher level schools. '^^ 

The Saudis continue to increase their agricultural 
yield each year, and now are exporters of food. Yet they are 
running into the same problem as the Nile and the Jordan 
regions with water depletion, because continued irrigation for 
wheat is expected to dry out the underground aquifers in only 
2 years. At the moment, Saudi Arabia could import wheat less 



192 



expensively than the amount that they pay to grow it, not to 
mention the potential harm to their strategic supply of water. 

Saudi ' s royal family is now going through the motions 
of reform measures, with the idea of increasing participatory 
government, although the King is very much opposed to trans- 
planting western democracy onto the Saudi peninsula. The 
House of as-Saud has been promising a majlis, or consultative 
assembly, for 30 years, but has not yet provided it. After 
the Gulf War, however, with the area's sensitivities geared to 
new expectations, the old promise resurfaced and was confirmed 
in March 1992. The announcement was not received well, 
however, because current expectations now far exceed the 
possibilities of a majlis. Rather, as propounded by the 
Islamic scholar Khalid M. Khalid in 1985, the Saudis want a 
Shura, or a genuine elected parliament. The new system would 
be based on authority emanating from the people, separation 
between authorities, a multiparty system, regular elections, 
and a free press. ^^ The Saudis basically want to live in 
Britain, and the King is having none of it. 

Some of the Saudi clergy, who were initially opposed 
to a majlis, now favor it because "they see it coming and they 
want to influence the shape it takes ".'^ Other clergy 
continue to espouse the traditional, and conservative, sharia. 
Several elements of Saudi peoples are eager to try reform 
measures; these elements include women (who performed essen- 
tial tasks during the Gulf War, but are now back in seclusion 

193 



and not liking it), professionals, other educated persons, 
members of the royal family. 

Currently the King is selected by the royal family 
council, of which he needs to retain its support. All 
decision making requires consensus within the family; because 
the family is so extensive, the net effect is to pursue 
policies that are consonant with the population at large. The 
King is finding, however, that one result of all those schools 
he has been constructing has been the development of a desire 
by his people to participate more in the world around them, 

Saudi Arabia regards Israel as the enemy, or at least 
one of the primary negative factors in the region. This sense 
of antagonism has different levels, including, obviously, the 
military level. But there is also a cultural level, with 
Israel seen as a Western outpost all too near the heart of 
Islam. On the militair/ side, Israelis make fairly routine 
(training?) overflights of Saudi territory, have made practice 
bombing runs on Tabuk, and used Saudi airspace for the attack 
on Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981. The AWACS sold to Saudi 
Arabia by the U.S. apparently have no offensive capability 
against Israel, and are not capable of detecting Israeli 
incursions, although those AWACS are able to detect flights of 
other (Arab) countries .'^^ 

Saudi Arabia also views Israel as a nemesis because 
its presence, and support by the U.S., has forced neighboring 
Arab countries to go to the former USSR for support. Saudi 

194 



Arabia has been a good military customer of the U.S., having 
been one of the best customers of U.S. arms; the Saudis have 
routinely been the customers during some of the largest 
military sales in U.S. history. Saudis have also made major 
purchases from the French and the British. 

The Saudi royal family continues to utilize opportuni- 
ties to take diplomatic pot-shots at Jordan's King Hussein; 
the antagonism between Hashemite and as-Saud has not disap- 
peared. Recently, the Saudi royal family offered a sum to 
renovate the 13-century-old Dome of the Rock shrine in 
Jerusalem. King Hussein, after he learned of this, also 
offered $8. 25m for this purpose, and the Islamic Supreme 
Council of Jerusalem accepted King Hussein's money, turning 
down the Saudis'. This episode represents a 66-yr-old Arab 
rivalry over who is the rightful caretaker of the Islamic holy 
places (Mecca and Medina also, as well as Jerusalem) , plus a 
more recent rift betweeen Saud and Hashemite over the Gulf War 
against Iraq. (The Hashemites were of the Hijaz before being 
expelled by as-Saud) . When King Fahd announced he was 
donating $9m for repair of the Dome, King Hussein immediately 
sold his London home to acquire his own donation for the 
project . 

One other facet of life on the peninsula which effects 
political decision making is the large community of expatriate 
workers. Several thousand foreigners from the U.S., Pakistan, 
Philippines, Europe, China, India, and so on have migrated to 

195 



the Middle East to earn petro-dollars and to help with the new 
construction and introduction of technology that is occurring 
throughout the region. 

Jordan, as a poor and small country nestled between 
Israel and Saudi Arabia, is not in a good location. If there 
is fighting with Israel, Jordan is almost inevitably drawn 
into it. The King is a proud and benevolent leader, usually 
in the thick of things, and no doubt is keenly aware of the 
cross channels that lie over the Middle East, as he is under 
most of them. This time last year, in an effort to foster 
moderation, growth, and undermine fundamentalism at the same 
time, the King legalized political parties and "has given 
birth to a new sort of legitimacy that depends on the democra- 
n process " .^' 

Jordan, Syria, and Israel have already experienced 
fighting over the diminishing water available from the Jordan 
River. Jordan's non-renewable aquifers are being tapped at a 
loss of 15%, and its population growth is 3.8%, the highest in 
the region. President Eisenhower in 1953 brokered an agree- 
ment whereby Jordan was to receive 275 million cubic meters 
annually from the Jordan River, but Israel and Syria take more 
than their shares and hence make this agreement impossible. 
Jordan was hoping to acquire more water from a joint project 
with Syria, based on a dam to be constructed on the Yarmuk, 
but Israel hasn't allowed it because Israel claims this would 
deprive Israel of its fair share of the Yarmuk, Syria, mean- 

196 



while, is planning 7 smaller dams on the Yarmuk for water that 
it is losing to Turkey, due to Turkey's extra utilizaiton of 
the Euphrates.'® 

As one development stemming from the participation of 
all parties at the Middle East Peace talks, Syria is now 
allowing Syrian Jews to travel and migrate to Israel. Two 
weeks ago, Israel repaired a Syrian merchant vessel that was 
having difficulties, welcomed the Syrian crew into port, and 
escorted the vessel safely back out of Israeli waters. Israel 
has also recently allowed Syrian flights over Israeli airspace 
to provision Syrian troops that are stuck on Syria's Mt . 
Hermon . '^ 

One of Syria's major distinctions prior to 1963 was a 
proclivity for frequent governmental change. Originally 
governed by the French, it was partitioned without regard to 
the inhabitants, and consequently had little to encourage any 
sense or growth of nationalism. The Ba'ath Party began in 
Syria before Israel was declared a state, and it advocated 
pan-Arabism and secularism. In 1963 there was a Ba'ath 
sponsored coup, only to be supplanted by a neo-Ba'ath coup 3 
years later. Minorities were very much a part of public life, 
as the French hadn't wanted the Sunnis to participate so as to 
keep the country divided. Druze and Alawis were predominant 
players in the coup, secularism was encouraged, economics was 
diverted to the public sector, and an elaborate Party struc- 
ture and government apparatus took shape. Hafez Assad 

197 



eventually emerged as the ruler, and the political climate 
became one of basic legitimization of Assad by the Party, 
although in actual practice power still flowed from the top 
down. The Ba'ath wanted to modernize and penetrate and 
secularize the countryside, which is not unlike what took 
place in China, yet the Syrians have provided the electoral 
process with almost complete disregard: only 5% voted in the 
1977 elections. 

Assad sees the well being of Syria as closely allied 
to that of the Palestinians, those who left their homes in 
Israel in 1948 and 1967 and are now prevented from returning 
by the Israelis. He also is much involved with the fate of 
Lebanon, which was a historical portion of Syria. As a 
minority ruler over a decidedly passive-hostile population, 
and not well liked either by Saudi Arabia or Jordan, Assad is 
at the center of any number of controversies. His growing 
isolation led or at least contributed to his turning to the 
USSR as a client state in 1980. In the late 1970s, political 
stability within Syria was very tenuous, with assassinations 
almost on a daily basis. Later, when Islamic fundamentalists 
in 1982 were conducting an intifadah of their own in the city 
of Hama, Assad simply razed the city's center, and bulldozed 
20,000 into mass graves; "all such rules of firm dealing are 
now called Hama rules ".®° 

Syria's economy has been slipping, and she also has an 
increasing birth rate, which is, overall, not that much worse 

198 



than is found elsewhere in the region. However, Syria has had 
a large military expenditure as a client state to the Soviets, 
and maintains a long-time rivalry with Iraq over leadership in 
the Gulf and greater Middle East. A 1974 project that placed 
a dam on the Euphrates, with Soviet help, has turned into a 
lemon: many of the Soviet-made generators were faulty. Plus 
much of Syrian soil contains gypsum, and when combined with 
irrigation it turns to mush. Syria is now trying to ship its 
water elsewhere, since it is unable to use it all. The dams 
that Turkey is building will cut the flow of water into Syria 
by half; Syria's own projects were badly designed, and 
Turkey's projects will exacerbate the dilemma. Syria is now 
trying to forge an agreement with Jordan about sharing the 
Yarmuk (Israel must again be party to this agreement by 
providing approval to the World Bank in order for funding to 
commence for Syria's proposed dams on the Yarmuk) . Eventual- 
ly, and not in the distant future, Syria's water and economic 
problems will supersede its ideological orientations and 
conflicts.®^ 

Aside from the political climate, Syria's general 
economic and physical climate is not inimical to positive 
growth, although her internally tumultuous national life and 
continued bad luck with major projects have not conspired to 
work in her favor. Soviet leaders apparently gave notice to 
Syria, before the break-up of the USSR, that Syria should not 



199 



expect to reach strategic parity with Israel; that is, at 
least not with Russian assistance. 

With Iraq, we have another case of poorly drawn 
national boundaries, a history of controlled competition 
internally to the country leading to Sunni and beyond that to 
Tikrit leadership. The Ba'ath Party also is the underpinning 
of the government, or nominal base. Basically there was a 
situation with a fair amount of potential, where the ideals 
espoused by the Party, if applied selectively and expeditious- 
ly, could have done much for the country and reduced instead 
of aggravated its inherent divisiveness . Despite the elabo- 
rate governmental structure, rule continues to emanante from 
the top down and major decisions are known only to a few. As 
demonstrated during the Gulf War, even Saddam's Army did not 
know what was in store, where he was taking them, what they 
were or were not going to do or face. 

The Shi'ite population of Iraq is susceptible to the 
Islamic climate that prevails in Iran, and Baghdad has been 
aware of that. Baghdad is also typically harsh on the 
northern Kurdish population; their desire is for at least 
autonomy and control of the revenues within their region; 
Baghdad has not been willing to acquiesce. 

The Gulf War evidenced the incredible mismanagement, 
stupidity, and possibly some terrible cunning, of Saddam. 
That alone is evidence of another structure in which the power 
flows from the top down, and only through a few conduits. He 

200 



obviously knows what the requirements of maintaining power are 
in Iraq. Even if the U.S. had been successful in dislodging 
him, the next ruler would most likely have come from the same 
geographical faction, or possibly a Sunni from Baghdad. The 
historical border feud between Iraq and Kuwait is not over, 
but hopefully future give and take between them will be at a 
less severe level. As for Umm Qasr, Shatt al-Arab and the 
border with Iran, those will also be ongoing concerns, no 
doubt for as long as Iraq wants to maintain her present 
national configuration. Iran would equally no doubt enjoy 
being able to redraw the map to include the marshes of 
southern Iraq, along with the shi'ite shrines and peoples 
found there. 



201 



IV. CHINESE ACTIVITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST 

Chapters IV and V are summaries, in either direction, of 
interaction between China and the Middle East. The summaries' 
brevity reflects a partial listing only: they do not reflect 
the complete number or type of activities that have been 
taking place in this arena. Information for these summaries 
was collected from sources in the public domain. For each 
item recorded, others were left out due to a paucity of 
information, as well as those other items that I am certain 
were either overlooked or missed. 

For China, to speak of the Middle East is not to speak of 
a readily defined area. China's direct contact with the 
regions beyond her frontiers occurred at various intervals and 
distances, from the Great Wall's terminus near the Gobi desert 
to Genghis Khan's march to the Mediterranean. Moreover, the 
Middle East as a term encompassing the eastern Mediterranean 
is a European invention. Contemporary PRC diplomatic rele- 
gations of this area, for reasons incorporating internal 
political reshuffling as well as increased economies of 
international perception, have alternately placed it under the 
departmental venues of African, or North African and Middle 
Eastern, or Asian, or simply Middle Eastern categories. 

In addition to this evolving sense of administrative 
placement, or rubric, of the Middle East, China has also 
experienced a revised strategic sense of the Middle East. 

202 



This revision is to some degree a matter of semantics, and 
primarily reflects the two main periods of leadership in China 
(Mao and Deng) . But even more than chronological periods, the 
evolving sense reflects the ideological side (Mao) and the 
pragmatic side (Deng) ; within the realm of foreign policy, the 
respective primacy of these two "sides" do not necessarily 
represent the corresponding primacy of Mao or Deng in Beijing. 

The Middle East had long been regarded as an important 
area relative to China. Consensus among the CCP in Beijing 
was that control of this region by a hostile power would lay 
bare the approaches to China. ®^ A combination of observation 
of the progress of World War II, early understanding of 
Marxism, and a decidedly Chinese streak of individualism led 
to China's postulation of the Middle East as a heart of the 
Intermediate Zone (also as part of the Third World) . The 
Three Worlds theory was not officially propounded until 1974, 
but its development hung over Beijing in the years prior. 

Basically, Beijing claimed that the USSR and U.S. were in 
a direct struggle for world domination, with control of the 
Middle East therefore representing a necessary aspect of 
gaining control over the intermediate zone. This heart of the 
intermediate zone, or at least one of its hearts, was in turn 
necessary to effect control over China. 

From World War II, when China was concerned that the 
Middle East not fall into Axis hands, to subsequent CCP 
development of the Three Worlds theory where the Middle East 

203 



became the locus of struggle between U.S. and USSR (a Chinese 
variant of the bipolar world theory) , the Middle East retained 
a central position of importance in Chinese political think- 
ing. Whether from the standpoint of hot struggle against the 
Germans, or cold struggle against the U.S. and former USSR, 
China was concerned to keep the Middle East free of outside 
big-power influence. Even now, with the Middle East seen more 
as a center of economics, and Third World rhetoric passe, it 
remains crucial not only to Middle East integrity but to the 
perceived well being of China in a stable world that the 
Middle East remain free of hegemonic influences. 

From this vantagepoint , China's first main contact with 
the states in that area occurred at Bandung in 1955. The 
diplomatic forum afforded by that gathering, and China's 
presentation of her Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, 
reaped large diplomatic and practical rewards with much direct 
interaction starting between them almost immediately after the 
Conference. These Five Principles reflect largely the 
pragmatic side of CCP thinking, with the Three Worlds theory- 
overlapping both ideology and pragmatism, and Lin Biao's 1965 
"Long Live the Victory of People's War" article representing 
the radical, or ideological, side. 

Beginning in 1955, then, China normalized relations with 
four Middle Eastern states and began an ever increasing series 
of trade and economic agreements. China also had another side 
to her activity in the Middle East and elsewhere. With the 

204 



memory of the CCP victory still fresh in their minds, the CCP 
leadership was quick to offer diplomatic encouragement (moral 
support) and whatever materiel assistance could be found for 
revolutionary efforts in wars of national liberation found 
around the globe. It is important to note here, however, that 
despite this willingness on the part of China to help, however 
she might, with People's Wars, this was not a blanket policy. 
China's dictum of self-reliance often meant that the home team 
might have to fend for themselves. China also would not 
support liberation struggles against governments, right or 
left, that were themselves free of colonial domination. 

In the Middle East, China's contact with armed struggle 
occurred with the PLO, and the PFLO/PFLOAG. Arafat first 
traveled to China in 1964, and assistance for the PLO included 
weapons, training, and probably advice. By 1971 China 
discontinued its assistance to PFLOAG, and in 1972 at the UN 
China announced its disapproval of PLO terrorism. China had 
been engaged with other economic initiatives in the Middle 
East prior to 1971, but at this point in time China had gained 
entrance to the UN, normalized relations with the U.S., and 
Deng was rejoining the CCP. China's interest in the Middle 
East had retained the flavor of encouraging independence from 
hegemony, but the People's War sidearm was being muscled out 
by the pragmatic missile and "neutral" arms sales to any 
national players in the Middle East. China's aims remained 
constant, her approach had adjusted. 

205 



As is evident from the above paragraphs, placement of 
topics within these next few pages will be somewhat arbitrary; 
many could be listed under two or more headings. As an 
example: arms sales could be listed under security, or 
economic, or diplomatic headings, and found under China (as 
the seller) or the Middle East (as the buyer) . 

A. ECONOMIC 

Economic ties between the Middle East and China have been 
developing for the last several decades. In 1955 a Sino- 
Egyptian trade agreement was concluded, and Egypt has since 
been one of the primary trading partners of China. 

China's economic links with Kuwait go back to 1965 when 
the first cooperation protocol between them was signed. Other 
arab states with which China now has substantial trade 
agreements and/or other joint projects include Syria, the 
U.A.E., Jordan, Iraq (before the Gulf War), Pakistan, and 
elsewhere through North Africa. 

From 1956 to 1975, China sponsored the following numbers 
of official delegations to the Middle East: 19 in 1956, 3 in 
1957, 6 in 1958, 3 in 1959, 4 in 1960, 5 in 1961, 11 in 1962, 
5 in 1963, 13 in 1964, 20 in 1965, 19 in 1966, 3 in 1967, 1 in 
1968, in 1969, 6 in 1970, 2 in 1971, 22 in 1972, 13 in 1973, 
15 in 1974, 8 in 1975. These delegations included members 
whose interest was economic as well as military. Other parts 
of the Middle East (e.g.: Morrocco, Algeria, Tunis, etc.), had 
visiting delegations from China as well. 

206 



It should be remembered that, aside from contact with 
other countries in the Socialist sphere, the first major 
contact China had with the world at large was at and after 
Bandung (i.e.: the Middle East). It is also very intriguing 
to note that after Tienanmen, when China was anxious to place 
her trade patterns and volume back into a higher gear, the 
Middle East was China's first destination. Yang Shangkun and 
a large delegation visited Kuwait in December 1989, in search 
of economic trade and funding to take the place of Western 
trade that had been cut due to Tiananmen. He arrived in 
Kuwait after having visited Egypt and the U.A.E., and planned 
to continue on to visit Oman. Abu Dhabi guaranteed that trade 
and economic cooperation would increase between the U.A.E. and 
China. The U.A.E. also expressed its thanks to Yang that 
China had not yet "set up ties with Israel".®^ 

China has had upwards of 10,000 workers in Kuwait, and 
others elsewhere throughout the region (Iraq, Oman, Saudi 
Arabia) . The currency remittances they provide back to the 
PRC are substantial. 

B . SECURITY 

Arms sales by China are a strong source for currency, and 
a well known aspect of Middle Eastern events. These sales not 
only help China to meet the objectives it has established for 
itself, but also provide foreign currency reserves. Sales are 
made either directly from China to the Middle East country, or 

207 



involve third parties (North Korea) . In addition to conven- 
tional weapons sales, China has also been providing nuclear 
technology to the region (Algeria, Pakistan) . A few typical 
examples of these sales are as follows: 

Throughout the bulk of the Iran-Iraq conflict, China 
quietly sold materiel to both Iran and Iraq, all the while 
maintaining a formal and strict neutrality. These goods were 
passed through other intermediaries. 

After Afghanistan was invaded by the USSR, China joined 
Saudi Arabia and the U.S. in getting arms to Afghanistan, with 
the joint effort coordinated through Pakistan. 

In March 1991, Syria purchased Scud-C missiles from North 
Korea, with Saudi financing. In November 1991, the U.S. 
elicited a promise from Beijing that China would not export 
its M-9 missiles to Syria; a week later, China purportedly 
agreed to help Syria construct its own missiles. On 10 
February 1992, PRC missile technologists visited Syrian 
industrial plants near Hama and Aleppo. On 22 February 1992, 
Bush reinstated a previous trade agreement between the U.S. 
and China regarding satellite parts and high-speed comput- 
ers.^^ 

Qin Jiwei (China's Defense Minister) visited Pakistan and 
Bangladesh, in February 1990, to boost military cooperation. 
Li Peng had already visited these countries a few months 
earlier in November 1989 as part of his post-Tienanmen 
circuit . 

208 



China had sold calutrons to Iran, and was helping Iran to 
construct a small reactor in 1990. Three years ago, China 
started to help Algeria construct their own reactor. The 
Pakistanis machined 6 nuclear warheads last July with Chinese 
sales and technical assistance.®^ 

Conventional wisdom has posited that Israel and China 
began a military liaison, a few years ago, and the appearance 
was given then of future increased activity between them as a 
very likely probability. They have indeed normalized rela- 
tions. Israel is a veritable gold mine for R&D, battlefield 
lessons learned (with some of the most sophisticated equipment 
available anywhere) , and a source for comparisons between 
Western (U.S., European, Israeli), Eastern (Soviet), and Other 
(Arabic, desert, asian) , equipment and tactics. There are 
other accounts as well of Israeli technology sales, both 
recent and long-standing, to China (Patriot missile?), armor 
gun sights, improved gun fire control, avionics, and others. 
Israel has a burgeoning high tech industryand would like to 
find a backer to help them fund it; INTEL'S 3 86 computer chip 
was developed in Israel. Israel also has an interest in 
indigenous aviation design. Other Israeli skills are more 
prosaic in nature, and will not be mentioned here, but are of 
no less interest to China. Israel is already providing China 
with expertise regarding water management and irrigation, 
animal husbandry, military hardware for tanks, and possibly 
other items. 

209 



Israel is not unlike a laboratory, where various other 
nations may vicariously learn valuable skilly and insights 
into human and technical matters, ranging completely across 
the spectrum from military items to industry and agriculture, 
or even economics and the effectiveness of governmental 
policy. China knows this and would no doubt like to gain as 
much access to this laboratory as possible. 

C . DIPLOMATIC 

Aside from tentative feelers with Pakistan and Egypt, also 
some unrequited feelers from Israel, China's first real 
diplomatic activity and success with the Middle East came with 
its participation in the Bandung Conference. At that confer- 
ence Zhou Enlai met with Nasser, Palestine leader Shukairy, 
and diplomats from Syria and Lebanon. Within a year, China 
had normalized relations with Egypt, Syria and Yemen. 
Relations had already been normalized with Afghanistan just 
prior to Bandung. 

As part of the Korean War experience, China requested both 
Egypt and Pakistan as members of a 7-nation commission to 
consider the Far East situation and make recommendations. 

From 1953-1957, China emphasized peaceful coexistence 
between communist and non-communist countries. That emphasis 
was soon to pass, however, as China entered the turbulent 
years of the GLF and GPCR. 

Very instructive to note is the enlightening fact that, 
during the GPCR when all diplomats were recalled to China for 

210 



consultation, the Chinese ambassador to Egypt stayed in Egypt; 
he was the only PRC diplomat not to leave his post. 

As of 1988, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Bahrain still had not 
normalized relations with the PRC. One of mainland China's 
primary intents since its inception has been to isolate Taiwan 
diplomatically. This was done to facilitate PRC entrance into 
the UN, also to encourage Taiwan to think about eventual 
reunification with the Mainland under Beijing's suzerainty. 
The People's Republic has in fact been successful in acquiring 
full relations with all Middle Eastern countries, although 
since Tienanmen there has been a resurgence of interest 
through the region in Taiwan, 

PRC and Israel have held regular discussions at the 
Foreign Ministry level each year in New York since 1987 when 
the UN General Assembly convenes. These were a precursor to 
normalization, and China initially claimed, of course, that 
they were solely for multilateral discussion of regional 
topics of interest to both and not bilateral topics.®^ 

After Tienanmen, China's first international forays to 
repair diplomatic damage (as well as to reconstruct trade) , 
were into the Middle East, to try to repair her image and to 
generate some external economic activity. Yang Shangkun, with 
a large delegation, visited Egypt, Kuwait, U.A.E. and Oman to 
discuss bilateral concerns, economic interaction and PRC 
assistance via the UNSC in resolving the Iran-Iraq talks. ®^ 
Only a few months after Tiananmen, Qian Qichen made multiple 

211 



stops throughout the region by calling on Jordan, Syria, 
Egypt, Unisia and Iran. Li Peng also visited the Middle East 
in the winter of 1989, stopping at Pakistan. After Yang 
Shangkun's junket was completed, Qin Jiwei returned to the 
region (Pakistan and Bangladesh) , to improve military competi- 
tion. 

It has been suggested that China's foreign policy in the 
Arab world reflects China's general foreign policy as a whole. 
I submit that this statement is more appropriate when re- 
versed: that China's general foreign policy reflects China's 
foreign policy in the Arab world. ^® 

Through a calculated program of economics and diplomacy, 
Beijing succeeded in isolating Taiwan internationally. This 
helped the PRC to gain its seat in the UN and access to the 
various other diplomatic and economic doors around the world. 
All Middle Eastern states now recognize PRC vice Taiwan. 
Meanwhile, Taiwan had provided significant assistance to Saudi 
Arabia (building projects and personnel training), as well as 
to other Middle Eastern states. 

The recent emergence of independent central Asian Islamic 
states is of considerable concern to China. The PRC ' s 
displeasure with Moscow in losing its grip on the USSR is not 
just because China is now the last socialist nation, but also 
because central asia is now potentially more volatile than 
ever before. Beijing's resettlement of millions of Han 
Chinese into Xinjiang has inserted a calming (i.e.: bureau- 

212 



cratic) influence into those broad provincial areas, but as of 
late 1991 the Muslims maintained their majority and no doubt 
have a healthy birth rate. 



213 



V. MIDDLE EAST ACTIVITIES IN CHINA 

A. ISRAEL 

Coininents regarding Israel's activity in China mirror those 
offered in the previous chapter. There is much conjecture, 
but little black and white evidence in the public domain. It 
is thought, with a high degree of likelihood, that Israel has 
provided China with up to $3b worth of arms, plus expertise 
and sales in the areas of animal husbandry, drip irrigation, 
weapons upgrades for tanks and avionics. 

Israel has long been suspected of illegally transferring 
U.S. arms to China (also Thailand, South Africa, Venezuela, 
Ethiopia, and others) . Most recently, this suspicion concerns 
Israeli sales of Sidewinders and Patriot missiles to China. 
PRC has reverse engineered the Sidewinder and sold it to Iraq. 
Moshe Arens has said: "No one should find it unusual that 
Israel will, from time to time, sell items to other countries, 
including China ".®^ 

Whereas Israel was the first Middle East state to recog- 
nize the PRC in 1950, full diplomatic relations between the 
two were waylaid first by the Korean War and then by Bandung, 
when China saw more political capital to be gained by ap- 
proaching the Arab states rather than Israel. 



214 



B. OTHER MIDDLE EAST STATES 

Activities of the other Middle East states in China are 
also mirrored, largely, by comments in the preceding and 
following chapters. A few additional comments follow. 

China is very eager to have Middle Eastern capital applied 
to its provinces, and accordingly has courted the Gulf States 
and others in the Middle East to encourage financial activity. 
Kuwait has provided a number of loans to China, with one of 
these mentioned here: 

Between 1982 and 1984 Kuwait loaned China $150m for four 
projects, including the Xiamen Airport. ^° China, previously, 
had been Kuwait's primary initial contractor, before the Gulf 
War, for construction of almost all the new Kuwaiti homes, 
power stations, refineries, and hospitals. 

The entire period from Bandung (and even before) 
through to the present is marked by increasing trade between 
the Middle East and China. This is especially true in the 
early-to-mid 1980s, when a multitude of trade agreements, 
projects, and joint financial institutions were started. 

A symposium in 1986, held in Yinchuan (Ningxia) , was 
intended to attract Arab investment, begin exploitation of 
local natural resources, initiate Chinese technology transfer 
to the Middle East, and of course to enhance trade. A similar 
symposium was held in 1984 in Urumqi ; that area, by 1986, had 
attracted up to $100m in foreign investment, plus major trade 
contracts with Syria, UAE and Kuwait." 

215 



In November 1991, when China was still trying to 
regain its international prestige and activity after the 
Tienanmen incident, the Emir of Kuwait was visiting Beijing, 
ostensibly for trade discussions, at the same time as U.S. 
Secretary of State Baker. Baker's visit was the PRC ' s biggest 
diplomatic coup since Tienanmen, but the People's Daily gave 
the following coverage to those two events: the Emir of Kuwait 
received a large story, which dwarfed a smaller front-page 
story about Baker's visit to Beijing. ^^ 

There is no reason why the advantages sought by Israel 
in China can not also be sought by the other Middle Eastern 
states. Pakistan is an immediate case in point, where a 
healthy pollination of Chinese technology is enhancing that 
state's strategic position; presumably there is, or will be, 
reciprocity. 



21( 



VI. POLICY SUMMARIES 

There is a spirit akin to the "Wild West" now in China and 
also in the Middle East, related both to their own spirit and 
to the unfolding of the New Order. It is a spirit where the 
inhabitants of both regions sense new horizons and are busy 
with participating in the several events leading to those 
horizons. It is this spirit, found here and there elsewhere 
in the world as well, which will find its natural expression 
primarily between these two regions toward each other; that, 
plus their geographical and historical proximities, the 
precedents of the Silk Road, their fluid characters, and their 
emerging needs, will encourage interaction between them. Both 
regions will have other activities as well, and those other 
activities may well overshadow (in volume) the activity 
between China and the Middle East. Chances are much better 
than fair that China will (eventually) be eveirywhere, or 
wherever she pleases: this activity will be economic in 
private or public sectors, it might also be diplomatic, or 
possibly even military; as the U.S. is "everywhere", so also 
might China be "everywhere" (and Japan, and Europe) . In that 
sense, positing Chinese-Middle East activity is to posit 
nothing, precisely because the PRC will have tentacles almost 
everywhere. But despite such ubiquitous activity, the 
connections between China and the Middle East will be special, 
closer than others, for all the reasons mentioned above. 

217 



After noting that China's government is more precisely a 
government of persons rather than institutions, we might ask 
if "policies" can be resident within this personalized 
structure. The fairly detailed presentation of China's 
hierarchy was provided in chapter three so as to better be 
able to grasp the intricacies of public and private decision 
making by ruling members of the CCP. While the structure of 
China's government is vested in its personalities with an 
institutional framework growing around them, and we are led to 
suspect that the PRC ' s governing practice is more fluid than 
ours, we can still observe PRC activities that remain constant 
over a period of years, despite personnel turnovers and other 
vicissitudes. As constancy of effort is taken to represent 
policy, therefore we can expect to find Chinese policies, even 
though they might be politically resident in an unfamiliar 
manner . 

Considerable time was taken earlier to review the politi- 
cal aspects of these regions, particularly China. This was 
done to tir^ and convey the senses of energy and change 
prevalent within them, as well as to suggest some of their 
needs. It is necessary to have a flavor of the change or 
evolution coursing through the polities of the Middle East and 
also through China to posit the conclusions of this thesis. 
It is necessary to know that China will always by reforming, 
regardless of who is in power, and also to recognize the 
importance China places on the Middle East. It is necessary 

218 



to know that the Middle East is experiencing unprecedented 
growth of infrastructure and demographics, that polities there 
have yet to establish the degree to which they will become 
institutionalized, that Islam is in a process of readjustment 
or rethinking. It is necessary to sense the fluid nature of 
peoples and (historical) geographical proximity of China and 
the Middle East. Without these flavors, or senses, it is not 
enough simply to posit or list trade and delegation exchanges 
between these two (or any other) regions, and then be able to 
say that they will continue. The Silk Road is being reborn, 
and in a big way. 

A. DOES CHINA HAVE OR EXERCISE A "MIDDLE EAST POLICY?" 

The first item that must be addressed here is a tribute to 
Zhou Enlai who, quite likely, was the cotter pin who held 
China's foreign policy together. Throughout domestic calm or 
upheaval, much of the continuity that China experienced with 
foriegn policy matters was probably attributable to Zhou's 
activities as Premier, confidant, and mediator. He also was 
very much a realist - he had to be - so as to know how and 
where and when to direct his attentions. 

To say that the PRC has goals or wants in the Middle 
Eastern region need not imply that China has an active intent 
to somehow physically penetrate that region. Diplomatic 
maneuvering from within the PRC, UN, or other organizations, 
as well as the existence of economic trade, occasional 
assistance packages, etc., may all count as activities and as 

219 



policy directives and all may count decidedly toward this or 
that outcome in the Middle East region. So to say that China 
has activities or goals elsewhere need not be demonstrated by 
anything more than certain perceptions in Beijing and, for 
example, perhaps the existence of certain practices within the 
SEZs or western provinces, where economic interaction is 
likely or desired to occur. 

China's habit of self -portrayal as a Third World country 
is, at best, of dubious veracity. China has persisted with 
this portrayal from the time of Bandung, as a calling card for 
its never ending search for economic and diplomatic partners. 
Although China has a very poor PCGNP, and will likely retain 
a relatively poor PCGNP in the forseeable future, her GNP is 
not the stuff of a developing country. The section on 
Superpowers explains this more fully. Secondly, in the light 
of present day geopolitics, it is highly unlikely that there 
are any Third World countries. The Third World refers to a 
group of states that are non-alligned (relative to the U.S. 
and former USSR) and developing, probably also with a history 
of having been victimized, more or less, during the age of 
colonialism. With the Cold War over, however, and the 
subsequent categories of state types revised, there are 
several more variables that go into classifying a state aside 
from criteria of polarity. There are developing, and poor, 
and debt-ridden states; the Third World state of just a few 



220 



years ago is no longer, because there is no First or Second 
World state. 

Any policy that China might adopt can be expected to be 
beneficial for herself, at least from China's point of view, 
and China's premier goal, at the moment, is to modernize. We 
can also expect, therefore, that policies related to the 
Middle East will somehow be beneficial for China's moderniza- 
tion. For modernization to occur, China prefers and requires 
a stable international environment, hence her policies might 
also be expected to enhance international stability from the 
understanding China has as to what stability actually con- 
notes. We need to remember that China's understanding of 
stability may not necessarily be similar to our own under- 
standing of that concept . 

China also believes that since the demise of the USSR, the 
world has become a potentially turbulent place. Li Peng in 
October 1990 mentioned that things are "more dangerous now 
that the Cold War is over and the New Order is not yet 
established".^^ Taking note of China's current policy for 
the Middle East (and Central Asia) , will say a lot about 
China's view of that region as well as the current state of 
world affairs. 

If, however, instead of considering all the information 
available to us and we focused on only one or two specific 
issues, it is not difficult to see that in place of long term 
or regional policy we might find directives of a more tran- 

221 



sient nature. In this way it is not too difficult to appreci- 
ate how a conclusion (focusing only on, e.g., arms sales), 
might suggest that activity amongst China and portions of the 
Middle East is sporadic at best and/or opportunistic at worst. 

Discussion of the topics in this section, and throughout 
this chapter, will generally follow the headings provided, 
although some topics may be found under more than one heading 
(e.g. : arms sales could be discussed under economic, security, 
and diplomatic sub-headings). 

1 . Economic 

China's long term interest in the Middle East has not 
been unrelated to that region's newly acquired wealth. The 
Middle East, in a manner of speaking, has provided China with 
the best of all possible external worlds: in addition to 
diplomatic and security benefits, activity with the Middle 
East region can also generate needed foreign exchange and, in 
so doing, demonstrate that the PRC is a reliable neighbor. As 
of 1985, China's economic interests in the Middle East 
included these generic facets: to sell as many PRC products as 
possible, to export surplus labor to the region, and to 
attract investment for projects inside China. 

Despite the checkered history of China's involvement 
in the region, these facets or principles seem to hold 
throughout . One example that stands out centers around 
China's presence in the Yemen during the 1960s and early 
1970s. Chinese workers were present in the region simulta- 

222 



neously with others from the USSR. Both of them were working 
on road construction, amidst local hostilities. Despite the 
situation, the Chinese were steadfast in their pursuit, and 
left some of their number behind in roadside graves, because 
they were there to construct a road and not to dodge bullets 
or wait until the storm passed. By contrast, the Soviets 
worked on the road as they could, preferring to take everyone 
home with them. Other observations, based on comparisons 
between PRC and (former) Soviet workers, indicate that the 
Chinese do what they indicated they would do, do it well 
enough, and then go home.^^ There is no quid pro quo extrac- 
tion. That alone makes Chinese assistance very attractive, 
when compared to U.S. or former USSR expectations. 

Another aspect of Chinese labor characteristics is 
uhat, quite regularly, a group of workers will only stay in 
one location, or on one job, for about 6 months, then go home, 
to be followed by another group of workers. In this fashion 
more workers are taught skills, and more receive experiences 
than otherwise would have occurred. It is as if the Middle 
East were a big OJT laboratory. In 1988 there were about 
10,000 Chinese expatriate workers in Kuwait, with similar 
numbers elsewhere in the Middle East. 

Insofar as China portrays itself as an "Islamic 
state", depending on who the audience is, there are no doubt 
officials in Beijing who would like nothing better than for 
Muslims in the Gulf region and in Xinjiang and Ningxia to 

223 



jointly develop thriving trade, industry, and perhaps even 
research. By doing all of this, presumably there would be 
less and less room for complaint by China's minorities about 
whatever, so long as they consent to remain within greater 
China, thus solidifying Beijing's rule over her vast frontier 
and allaying any lingering concerns about defense and security 
matters. Trade and activity of this sort could also be 
developed between China's frontier provinces and the new 
central Asian republics; activity in that region and of that 
type is a natural. 

Now, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there 
is opportunity as well as danger for China with the recent 
appearance of independent Muslim central asian states. The 
opportunity is for the Chinese Islamic population, drawing on 
a stronger center tradition and access to national resources, 
to set up shop with their neighbors and turn the area into a 
big bazaar. If trade between the two could be coordinated, 
with Xinjiang's goods regularly reaching Shanghai and Central 
Asian goods already linked to Europe, a thriving "steppe 
economy" could be harnessed. The danger, of course, is in the 
potential national separatist feelings that could spread 
(further) into Xinjiang and Tibet. Additional ready-made 
trade routes would also lead into Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
That entire area is set to move, and Beijing would love to see 
it happen, provided - of course - that separatist passions 



224 



could be held in check, or overridden by the attendant 
prosperity engendered by a continental bazaar. 

China now has the political trust (or at least the 
growing neutral recognition), of most Middle East countries. 
This is something that China wants to nurture, and utilize as 
much as possible for her benefit in the process of securing 
the above. ^^ 

2 . Security- 
It was mentioned earlier that China would prefer to 
have a stable international environment within which to pursue 
her modernization, so as not to be upset by external wars or 
other turbulence. The stable environment would allow China to 
focus her energies on putting her own house in order and get 
up to speed. What is not clear from this general perception 
is what China actually regards as stable. 

Using the Iran-Iraq conflict as an example, with 
China's professed neutrality throughout that war, and also 
with China's sale of arms to both sides through intermediar- 
ies, it would seem then that stability, for China, does not 
require the absence of all conflict. For China, the Iran-Iraq 
conflict had the effect of keeping the USSR and U.S. off 
balance, at least in the Gulf and/or Middle East region, if 
not world-wide. Insofar as individual actors and self 
sufficiency are prized national characteristics, and insofar 
as hegemony from any one source is seen as threatening, it 
appears then that this lengthy conflict between Iran and Iraq 

225 



contributed to stability (for China) through requiring the 
Soviets and U.S. to keep one eye over their shoulder, and 
hence unable to focus entirely on the Middle East as a whole, 
or on any other region. Keeping the superpowers looking out 
of one eye, instead of two, is thus what China regards as 
stable . 

China is large enough that she does not seriously have 
to worry about being attacked by her neighbors. China also 
has a credible, even if nascent, nuclear deterrent with which 
to ward off larger and farther away neighbors. Indeed, by 
having kept the (other) powers-that-be off balance (with the 
Iran-Iraq war) , China herself was more balanced; stability, 
for China, might very well mean the presence of low grade 
conflict in various places around the globe, as long as that 
conflict is not in China. This perception of stability will 
hold until China is up to speed, or until there is no more 
danger from other superpowers acquiring hegemonistic sway, or 
until all the other developing nations are strong enough to 
withstand the need to accept someone else's (read the U.S.') 
influence. Hence China, in her view, was able to maintain her 
neutrality while selling arms to both sides, or perhaps 
precisely because China was selling to both sides. 

For this off-balance friction to occur and keep the 
great powers at least somewhat preoccupied, it is not neces- 
sary to generate actual hostilities. It is enough simply to 
generate the possibilities of potential conflict to keep the 

226 



I 



other powers off balance. Hence China's missile sales to 
Middle East countries. With Syria and Saudi Arabia and Iraq 
and Iran all able to target others among themselves, including 
Israel, the political equations become more complex and make 
it harder for interested nations outside the region (the U.S.) 
to maintain constant policies, or even dispassionate overviews 
of the circumstances. 

Other reasons that China has for developing good 
relations with the Middle East include not only her general 
intent to foster international security and stability (i.e.: 
peace on a global scale, within which the Middle East obvious- 
ly has a place) , but also a more direct interest in securing 
immediate tactical gains advantageous to China's local, 
regional and ultimately global intentions. Pakistan figures 
prominently in such considerations as exemplified by the not 
inconsiderable efforts made by the PRC to keep on good 
relations with the Pakistanis. Such efforts help to provide 
a counterweight for China against both South Asia (India) , and 
Russia, as well as aiding to further secure portions of the 
PRC border, assist with establishing relations with other 
Islamic states, provide more avenues of contact with the rest 
of the Middle East (and other states: N.B. Kissinger's initial 
contact with the PRC via Pakistan) , and to possibly provide 
future naval facilities accessible to China within the Indian 
Ocean (N.B. PRC assistance with the construction of port 
and/or base facilities at Karachi) . 

227 



The subject of security from China's vantage point 
must also include Beijing's concern regarding potential 
Islamic unrest in Xinjiang and other outlying areas. This 
concern has been heightened by the establishment of the 
Central Asian Republics. Unrest simmers in those areas. The 
government has tried to lessen it by relocation of Han to the 
area, and by relaxing restrictions on some religious activi- 
ties. Nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism still fester, 
however. Beijing would very much like to see economic 
development of the area, either through contacts with neigh- 
boring Central Asian Republics or with Arabs or Persians from 
the Gulf area (with their checkbooks), and growing skills. 

a. Technology and Lessons Learned (Israel) 

China routinely utilizes a unique strength via its 
penchant and ability to reverse engineer materials and 
gadgets, small and large. By this approach, China is able to 
purchase a few items, remake them into items they want or 
need, and then make others on a production basis. This 
process is routinely followed with military hardware and 
whatever else. 

It should therefore come as no surprise that China 
seeks to purchase quantities of this and that, not only for 
purposes of employing the new item, but for dismantling it and 
incorporating its principles into something that is Made-in- 
China. Undoubtedly one of China's goals and expectations for 
being in the Middle East, whether via Israel or one of the 

228 



Islamic states (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran), is to gain access 
to the multitude of technology that is finding its way into 
the area, whether it's from the U.S., former USSR, Europe, or 
indigenous to the region. Recent disclosures of Patriot 
Missile technology falling into the lap of China is a case in 
point. This thesis makes no claim as to whether this particu- 
lar incident was an Israeli or Saudi indiscretion, whether it 
occurred via paper transfer, part transfer, or on-site 
inspection, or even if in fact it occurred at all. The point 
is that this sort of occurrence is one of the expectations and 
goals, de facto if not de jure, that China most definitely has 
with regard to the Middle East. 

No other region in the world has such a direct and 
steady convergence of materiel and interests flowing into it, 
whether these external sources are North American, European, 
Russian, South African, or now East Asian. Israel was 
highlighted in the sub-heading to this section because she has 
been the major recipient of largesse, bought or donated, in 
the Middle East. The U.S. intelligence community has long 
suspected the illegal turn-over of U.S. hardware by Israel to 
third parties. 

b. Offsetting Other Non-Middle Eastern Powers 

It is in China's interest for the Middle East to 
be its own keeper, rather than to have another power dominant 
in the area. A preponderant U.S. or former USSR in the Middle 
East would only serve to weaken China's southwest asian flank. 

229 



China would rather deal with the indigenous peoples of the 
Middle East rather than with other powers speaking through or 
over or for them. 

As indicated by the discussion on stability, China 
recognizes and prefers the virtues of self-sufficiency, 
especially when those traits contribute to China's increased 
flexibility. China's initial concern is domestic which leads, 
in turn, to desires for exterior stability. International 
stability, on the whole, does not preclude local brush fires, 
especially if those fires further dilute hegemonic influence 
of any one power in that region. 

China would rather see Israel as completely 
independent, not beholden to anyone else, if in fact this 
would add to the innocuousness of the region. But if the 
affect were reversed, and the states (Israel and/or the other 
Middle Eastern countries) , became overly aggressive or 
independent to the point of being meddlesome, then China may 
also find it advantageous to keep closer tabs on her Middle 
Eastern neighbors. While PRC appears to desire an indigenous 
Middle East, it could be, eventually, that the clamor of 
voices from that region will soften PRC ' s insistence on 
complete " indigenization" of the Middle East. China may find 
herself sucked down the same diplomatic hole as everyone else. 
The other Middle Eastern states likewise find themselves more 
beholden to outside powers than they would prefer. 



230 



China's presence in the region obviously dilutes 
the presence of other external powers, not only the U.S. and 
former USSR, but also Europe, Taiwan, South Africa, and etc.. 
As mentioned above, the diluting of other voices within the 
Middle East, aside from the indigenous ones already there, 
would be to China's liking. Two immediate and related effects 
of such a dilution: remove a potential threat from China's 
flank and concomitantly make it easier for China to maneuver 
in that region. Maneuverings may be economic, diplomatic, 
even military. 

China precedes to act primarily via bilateral 
relations, eschewing alliances or treaties or promises 
(outside the realm of institutions such as the UN) . But 
despite this singular procedural quality, I maintain that 
China seeks to acquire regional influence (or even interna- 
tional influence) , via these bilateral relations and/or 
activities. By affecting a region through her presence, or 
arms sales, or other economic initiatives, she inserts a 
ripple effect into the equations considered by other states as 
they compute current international realities. 

Some view China's interests in the Middle East as 

not, necessarily, for the benefit of the Middle East: 

"China's policy toward the Third World is 
not formulated in a vacuum. It has long been 
heavily influenced by broader Chinese policy 
concerns. Thus, even though Chinese spokesmen 
repeatedly have maintained that support for 
Third World concerns remains at the center of 
Chinese foreign policy, careful examination of 
the record over the past decade shows that 

231 



such concerns at best have a secondary role to 
play in determining China's 1980s approach to 
foreign affairs. The examination shows that 
China's foreign policy is based primarily on 
its perceived need for stability, security and 
development, a policy that depends chiefly on 
China's relations with the United States and 
the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, China does 
retain a strong interest in maintaining an 
image of close identification with the devel- 
oping countries and has demonstrated a tenden- 
cy to do so whenever it will support, or at 
least not seriously jeopardize, its primary 
needs of stability, security and development." 

The primary concerns of these leaders have 
not focused on support for the Third World; 
they have focused on efforts to guarantee 
Chinese national security, maintain internal 
order, and pursue economic development."^^ 

"The interrelationship of 'independent 
foreign policy' concepts demonstrates the 
typical way China continues to use its stance 
toward the Third World to define the pattern 
of its relationship to the two superpowers and 
as a means of maintaining its distance from 
them. Chinese explanations of their policy 
are, of course, idealized if not self-serving. 
While the independent foreign policy is no 
doubt conceived as a long-range strategy, it 
is also subject to change based on changing 
relationships with the superpowers and on 
international developments in general. Any 
particular Chinese policy approach represents 
a conceptualized reaction to very real events 
and to perceptions of Chinese self-inter- 
est."" 

"China's efforts to position itself as a 
Third World leader can be interpreted in light 
of the effort to find supporters in (its) 
quest for independence from Superpower control 
- hence the current strong emphasis on Third 
World identity." 

Experience of foreign encroachment and 
past Chinese humiliation combine with a tradi- 
tional preference for self-reliance and a 
cultural concept of Chinese superiority to 
prevent China from easily trusting other 



232 



states or dealing with them on an equal ba- 
sis" . 

China is, in fact, still fighting its way 
out of centuries of isolation, still deciding 
how it can maintain its security and "Chinese- 
ness" while implementing an apparently neces- 
sary integration into the international commu- 
nity. Despite the notions of some outsiders 
to the contrary, China's foreign policy con- 
tinues to be propelled by national interests 
rather than ideology. Identification with the 
Third World contributes toward achievement of 
those basic Chinese goals that do not change 
under successive leaderships: achievement of 
national security and international recogni- 
tion of China's rightful position of promi- 
nence and authority" . 

Beijing is conscious of its national self- 
interests and is unlikely to compromise them 
for the sake of hallowed Third World princi- 
ples. Instead, China's representatives have 
adopted a conservative modus operandi which 
balances criticisms of the First and Second 
Worlds with Beijing's own search for develop- 
ment assistance and the protection of interna- 
tional conventions". 

The future of China's relationship with 
the Third World remains uncertain, although 
China's self -identification with that group 
will almost certainly continue well into the 
21st century. Because it is difficult to 
define the Third World and because Chinese 
policy is so clearly driven, as it must be, by 
China's own national concerns, China's Third 
World relations will undoubtedly depend more 
and more on individual relations with Third 
World states. ...China's need to deal 
separately with Third World nations, to come 
out from the refuge of an umbrella Third World 
policy, will become increasingly clear as the 
points of conflict between China and Third 
World countries develop unevenly - as they are 
bound to do. "^^ 

That China pursues her own agenda while purporting 

to assist others is not, nor should it be, surprising. What 

this points out is the necessity for us to be familiar with 

233 



what China's concerns actually happen to be, the time table 
that China expects them to occur by, and domestic variables 
that color China's own decision making. 

Harding suggests that the PRC will work through 
bilateral channels, primarily or only, in the course of her 
diplomatic and/or international activities, rather than seek 
regional or Third World leadership roles (as Lillian Craig 
Harris suggests ).^^ I submit that China will actively seek 
de facto regional roles or influence through selective 
bilateral relationships, thereby effectively offsetting 
hegemonic influences of other great powers (and any other 
would-be usurper of regional influence, be it Russian or 
European or Japanese or South Asian or whatever) . This type 
of interest from the PRC will be most certainly directed 
toward the Middle East; the Middle East has long been recog- 
nized by China's leadership as playing a critical role in 
international stability and even in the safety of China 
itself .^°° 

An initial relative scarcity of resources avail- 
able for external distribution or otherwise to be allocated 
via international programs of aid or assistance kept China 
from being able to compete with other nations (especially the 
USSR), through economic largesse. The PRC also experienced a 
unique series of domestic constraints and internal growing 
pains (the GLF and GPCR) that hampered efforts to implement 
consistent foreign policy applications. 

234 



By the time China began a more active Middle East 
role in the middle 1950s, her emphasis, like that of the 
Soviets, had shifted to a predominantly Arab approach. Israel 
was relegated to aggressor status. Various subsequent trade 
agreements began with Egypt in 1955. The intermediary aspect 
of China's Middle East activity also was demonstrated in 1955 
as the PRC acted as midwife between Egypt and Czechoslovakia 
to arrange an arms deal for Egypt; such third party inputs, or 
more distant political support and encouragement, was fre- 
quently China's vehicle of choice (or only vehicle), for 
Middle East involvement . ^°- By early 1956 Egypt was the 
first Arab state to establish diplomatic relations with China. 

The Suez crisis of 1956 generated comparatively 
immense Chinese concern, both of a practical and rhetorical 
nature. Offers of monetary support and manpower assistance 
(250,000 troops), were made to Cairo from Beijing. ^°^ Mean- 
while, Syria and Yemen joined Egypt in establishing diplomatic 
relations with the PRC, followed by Iraq in 1958. 

Growing contacts with Yemen led to Chinese 
involvement in the revolutionary struggles located on the 
southern Arabian peninsula; PRC advisors and materiel assisted 
the PFLOAG until 1971. Chinese workers also assisted with 
road building and related projects in Yemen during the early 
1960s. The establishment of the PLO in 1964 was followed by 
PLO delegations to China in 1965 and PRC support (arms and 
training as well as rhetoric), for the PLO in 1966. As China 

235 



grew away from her combative revolutionary approach to 
international afairs, she toned down her rhetoric and assis- 
tance, but without altering the sense of importance associated 
with the Middle East. Further PRC contact with the PLO grew 
increasingly moderate, culminating in the 1971 PRC statement 
that PLO terrorism was not condoned, although PRC support for 
the PLO continues. These years also saw Chinese rhetorical 
support (and minimal practical support) , for other revolution- 
ary groups or movements elsewhere in Asia and Africa. 

China's activity in the Middle East turned a 
corner as the 1970s began. PRC withdrawal from regional 
revolutionary conflicts preceded diplomatic recognition by 
Kuwait in 1971; by 1975 the range and quantity of Chinese 
exports to Kuwait exceeded those to any other Middle East 
state. China's diplomatic relations now included all Middle 
East states except Saudi Arabia, Israel, Bahrain and Qa- 
tar. ^°^ 

The 1980s saw continued Chinese political modera- 
tion in the Middle East and elsewhere. The PRC was generating 
over $1 billion of welcome foreign exchange from that region 
during each year of the early 1980s. Arms deals and trade 
continued with other Middle East countries, both those with 
official PRC relations and those without, although prior ties 
of PRC assistance to ideological lines or revolutionary 
pursuits were no longer evident. Chinese activity in the UN 
supported "Third World" aspirations as the first PRC veto in 

236 



1981 attempted to aid Tanzania's Salim A. Salim gain the UN 
Secretary Generalship from Waldheim.^°^ The Iran-Iraq war of 
1980 eventually found Chinese aid going to both belligerents, 
as well as elsewhere in the Gulf region; the PRO missile sale 
to Saudi Arabia in 1988 was one of the final results of that 
conflict . 

In this region China is able, with relatively minimal 
input, to either: 1) offset U.S. and other influence and/or 
designs; 2) keep a certain level of friction between the U.S. 
and other powers by maintaining (just enough) regional 
instability, though not to the level that threatens interna- 
tional stability; or 3 ) to assist U.S. and/or other (former 
USSR) objectives in the vicinity by acquiescence or direct 
collusion. Even with a quiet presence there China is able to 
significantly affect the international equation as it pertains 
to the Middle East. 

Among contiguous states, China's main concerns are 
Korea, Japan, Southeast Asia and South Asia (also, of course, 
the former USSR) . Like Russia, the number of potential 
disgruntled neighbors is large, but China's great advantages, 
however, include knowing that anyone would be foolish to 
seriously invade or otherwise begin hostilities with China, 
also that China does not suffer from the potentially debili- 
tating internecine strife of competing nationalities (as might 
the USSR). The PRC ' s huge population, indigenous resources 
and growing technological capability would provide insurmount- 

237 



able barriers to any would-be antagonist. Only India could 
perhaps survive such a struggle with China, although the cost 
would be enormous, for doubtful outcomes. 
3. Diplomatic 

By contrast to the former USSR, most of China's 
international activity (aside from the Korean War) , from 1950 
to the mid 1970s consisted primarily of diplomatic maneuver- 
ing. The few economic resources that were available for 
"hands on" PRC foreign policy were utilized where they were 
expected to most effectively promote China's interests. 
Within the Middle East China's efforts centered on Egypt, 
Kuwait and the southern Arabian peninsula, as she continuously 
tried to buttress her position vis-a-vis Taiwan and the UN. 

It has been suggested that with the USSR's demise, 
China is actively seeking to promote itself as a Socialist 
counterweight to U.S. primacy in the Middle East, South 
Africa, and elsewhere . ^°^ This, I manitain, has been one of 
China's aims throughout, regardless of the position or health 
of other great powers. That is, whether it was the U.S. or 
former USSR now in the Middle East, China would seek to 
promote a counterweight, any counterweight, against it: this 
could be a socialist counterweight, or an economic alternative 
counterweight, or etc.. 

China in 1990 has been celebrating the 2,000th anni- 
versary of the Silk Road. Aside from enjoying this birthday, 
one ostensible purpose of the lengthy event is to help clear 

238 



away the negative image caused by Tienanmen. The June 1989 
massacre set China's diplomatic initiatives back quite a lot, 
especially with regard to the large industrial powers. But 
China's response to repair that episode has been to ply the 
Middle East with visits, increased trade and economic packag- 
es, and gradually work her way back into the international 
mainstream. 

a . Taiwan 

It is very much in mainland China's interests, in 
its dealings with Taiwan, to isolate it diplomatically and 
otherwise. If Taiwan could be effectively isolated within the 
international community, then China would have easier access 
to Taiwan's diplomatic ramparts. Recent pragmatic and 
constructive initiatives coming from both Beijing and Taipei 
have been directed toward each other, and imply an interest on 
both sides to pursue constructive avenues towards discussion. 

Regarding eventual reunification of PRC and ROC, 
the question is becoming not so much a matter of if as it is 
of when. Taiwan's concerns include having to experience a 
drop in living standards, or being swamped by a possible swarm 
of job seekers. China, in turn, is doing her best to close 
the PCGNP gap, at least between Taiwan and the coastal 
provinces . 

The Tiananmen episode hurt China's efforts in this 
diplomatic sphere with Taiwan, as well. Although the PRC 
established full diplomatic relations with all countries in 

239 



the Middle East, Taiwan has continued to maintain some 
contacts in that area. Immediately after the events of 
Tienanmen, through April 1990, Taipei has had more success 
with Third World countries than has Beijing.^°^ 
jb. Reduce Great Power Influence 

Reduction of Great Power (read U.S. and USSR) 
influence in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan, has 
long been a central tenet of China's foreign policy efforts, 
and very similar, if not identical, to Beijing's desire to 
render the Middle East influence-free. A curious twist of 
fate has helped to provide at least this one policy of China's 
with great success. For not only did the USSR pull out of 
Afghanistan, but its demise (not appreciated by the conserva- 
tives or the liberals in Beijing) , has also removed USSR 
presence from all of Central Asia. China now must deal with 
the independently minded Republics just on the other side of 
her borders; Beijing is clearly concerned about the impact of 
potential Muslim or pan-Turkic nationalism, especially as it 
might develop in Kazakhstan, Kirgyzstan and Tajikistan, on her 
western-most, troublesome, and strategic provinces of Tibet 
and Xinjiang. 

China provided direct assistance (via Pakistan) , 
to the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan during Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. This assistance started before the invasion, but 
was most extensive, in conjunction with aid from the U.S. and 
Saudi Arabia, after the Soviets were inside Afghanistan. 

240 



China's aid included the provision of military training to the 
Afghans. Of all the PRC aid that went to the Afghans, some of 
it was direct, although much was coordinated (and even paid 
for) by the U.S. via Pakistan. 

B. DOES ISRAEL HAVE OR EXERCISE A "CHINA POLICY?" 

Israel, of all the countries under consideration in this 
chapter, probably has the most pronounced ideas and intents of 
how to proceed with the Israeli-Chinese rapprochement, and 
also of what Israel hopes to find in that relationship. 

A fact of Israel's existence has been a considerable 
amount of isolation. To counter this trend, and make some 
friends in the process, Israel sought relations and interac- 
tion with other developing countries (Africa, Latin America, 
Oceania, and elsewhere) . At the peak of this activity, Israel 
had sent over 7,000 various experts on official bilateral and 
multilateral missions, and more than 20,000 people came from 
these countries to Israel for training. ^°^ But the Arab 
countries were also getting more involved with the pan-African 
movement and OAU, which was being reciprocated by the African 
countries towards the Arabs. In 1973, after the war, most 
African states (except for Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland, and 
Botswana, severed relations with Israel). 

Israel, of all the Middle Eastern countries, has demon- 
strated the most long-standing interest in establishing 
relations with China and, as is the case with relations 
between any two countries, is no doubt doing what she can to 

241 



ensure that the relationship remains viable and/or interest- 
ing, if not profitable, for China. 

Israel began her attempt to secure diplomatic access to 
China by being among the first states in the world, and the 
first in the Levant, to recognize China in 1950, For various 
reasons, including the Korean War, China was unable and 
unwilling to reciprocate, and then became involved in the 
Bandung spirit which led China to court the Arabs instead of 
Israel. Israel has much to gain from increasing her outlets 
to the world, and can be expected to pursue her new access to 
China with due diligence; this is true whether for reasons of 
economics, security and R&D, or increased diplomatic exposure. 

1 . Economic 

Avrahim Tamir, director-general of Israel's Foreign 
Ministry, said in 1988: "The Far East has two-thirds of the 
world's population and its emerging economic superpowers ... if 
we don't change our perception, we will lose the future". 
That quote just about says it all; Israel is plainly aware, or 
at least more so, of where respective population strengths are 
located, and so on. Israel's director-general of economic 
affairs at the Foreign Ministry, Yitzchak Minervi, proceeded 
to visit Beijing in October 1988. At the visit China "ex- 
pressed a willingness to supply Israel with oil and coal, 
while the Israeli representative was said to have come with a 
list of some twenty proposals for helping China in such fields 



242 



as farming, technology, medicine, industry, fishing, and 
energy, well beyond restricted defense aid".^°® 

It is obviously in Israel's interest to generate as 
many outlets or avenues for trade and diplomatic interaction 
as possible. Not only trade, but also potential sources to 
share costs of R&D, and perhaps even actual production of 
whatever, either as a shared venture for domestic purposes 
only (e.g.: defense), or for joint profit on international 
markets. The UN (Israel's original benefactor), and the U.S. 
(Israel's current benefactor), cannot be depended on forever 
to provide the external support Israel has required to survive 
and thrive. 

a. New Markets 

China is obviously full of potential to be a 
recipient of Israeli goods. It is the old capitalist dream of 
being able to tap that market. Israel hasn't the capacity to 
produce enough to saturate China's market (no one does), 
meaning that Israel, once having gained access, could pull out 
the stops and reap considerable rewards. 

There has been considerable quiet evidence that 
Israel was offering or providing assistance to China during 
the late 1980s in the following areas: countertrade, technical 
assistance, and agricultural programs. ^°^ For sensitive 
reasons, not wishing to upset the sensitivities of Arab states 
or the U.S., etc., this information was not waved about in 
public by the politicians. 

243 



Israel's standing throughout the world is still 
not on easy street. For example, their embassy in Buenos 
Ares, Argentina, was destroyed by a bomb on 17 March 1992; the 
Argentine government suspected terrorists, internal and 
foreign, who performed the deed. Argentina now has the 
largest Jewish community in South America (220,000), is a 
haven for World War II Nazis, and they are upset at 
Argentina's improving ties with Israel. 
Jb. Diversification 

A combination of avenues for support, regardless 
of the ties of world Jewry or other links, would make it 
easier for Israel to follow her own dictates rather than the 
wishes of someone else. As always, the more avenues of 
support for Israel, the better. Israel will always attempt to 
keep the voices of support pluralistic, or disjointed, rather 
than a harmonized chorus with shared intent and/or direc- 
tion/purpose . 

Israel's economy is more likely to develop on the 
side of high tech rather than mass production or agriculture, 
due simply to its relative small size and diversity. Hence 
Israel has the added requirement to produce a wide variety of 
smarter goods, and to have a broader distribution available 
for those goods. This in turn generates additional needs for 
Israel to lock in the initial funding required to work in this 
high tech arena. 



244 



As another example of Israel's intent to buttress 
its own support, economically and diplomatically, it has been 
seeking and establishing broader ties with South Africa 
recently. In 1991 South Africa's President visited Israel, 
which was the first time since 1978 for a South African leader 
to be in Israel. Israel lifts sanctions against South Africa 
in July 1990 . 

2 . Security- 
National security is the premier agenda for every 
Israeli government. One of the benefits Israel hopes to 
achieve by having established relations with China is to 
somehow have a voice in China's arms sales to the Arabs, 
although it is unlikely that Israel might gain, with China, 
the same access to decision making about which weapons the 
Arabs recieve, as with the U.S. Prospects for generating a 
China Lobby would seem to be nebulous at best. However, this 
could be difficult, unless Israel can find some way of making 
themselves appealing or valuable to the Chinese. After 
representing Israel at the normalization procedure in Beijing, 
David Levy (Israel's Foreign Minister) spoke with Qian Qichen 
and discussed, among other things, the arms race in the Middle 
East. Levy believed that "the fact that we are listening to 
one another .. .will somehow stem this flow of arms."^^° The 
imperative nature of grasping this particular problem of arms 
proliferation was literally brought home to Israel during the 
Gulf War, when Israel experienced being the recipient of SCUD 

245 



missiles launched from Iraq as part of Iraq-Kuwait Gulf War, 
18 Jan 1991 (Israel did not respond). 

Again, with the U.S. as the primary and perhaps only- 
backer of Israel for security purposes, aside from Israel's 
own burgeoning industries and other European suppliers, Israel 
more and more places herself at risk to being dictated to 
regarding what equipment she may have and even what she may do 
with it. To Israel, this is not attractive, to say the least. 

It is conjectured that China, as of 1987, had pur- 
chased as much as $3b of military equipment from Israel, ^^^ 

a. Possible R&D Assistance 

Again, obviously, China is probably better 
situated to gain more from, and to better utilize through 
reverse engineering, R&D than any other country in the world. 
China is also probably better situated to participate in 
whatever R&D projects she wishes, with whomever she wants to 
participate with, than any other country - at least in the 
long run. This is due to her relative isolation from other 
entangling alliances and the obligations/restrictions imposed 
by those alliances, plus China's relative wealth (on a 
national scale) , that will allow her to pursue almost any- 
thing. Israel is "banking" on this set of realities, that 
China could readily make use of R&D, and that Israel can 
provide it for them. The only true restrictions China will 
face, regarding R&D, will come from her perceptions of the 



246 



I 



reactions of others and whether or not China will wish to 
respond to those perceptions. 

Israel has certain projects that she would very 
much like to proceed with, such as the Lavi fighter aircraft. 
However, the expense of the unit, its proposed utility and so 
on were not conducive to the U.S. to warrant continued funding 
of that project for Israel. Hence Israel received another 
pill of awareness reminding her of the degree of dependence 
(to the U.S.) she is in right now. 

To that end, and from Israel's point of view, the 
encouragement of the development of internal lines of communi- 
cation (i.e.: infrastructure) within China is a good thing. 
Ironically, strengthening China will have the concomitant 
effect of keeping her pliant and malleable. Isolating China 
will make her moody and possibly dangerous, in a capriciously 
unpredictable sort of way. Israel seems to have grasped this 
fact, and is proceeding with her program of economic and 
diplomatic diversification. 
b. Diversification 

There is evidence that Israel was offering and 
probably providing military assistance to China from the late 
1980s on, as was mentioned above. ^^^ For China, this is 
good, at least for the moment. China is in the midst of 
modernizing her forces, and also of reconfiguring her forces. 
Assistance of the sort that Israel might be able to provide 
would be very handy. This type of assistance will not always 

247 



be useful, because China will, sooner or later, make all the 
adjustments and additions she wants (militarily) . At that 
point, Israel will need to make a readjustment in terms of 
what Israel might continue to be able to provide which China 
would find useful. 

The danger to this approach is that, sooner or 
later, if China manages to come up to speed, China herself 
will be able to provide all and more than what she needs or 
wants. At that point, Israel will have to find something else 
to do or offer, if she wishes to be unique. 

One obvious immediate goal for Israel is to find 
a plethora of markets within which to sell her war products 
and thereby help to keep them affordable. China just might be 
able to provide some help in this respect. 

Defense Minister Arens visited Beijing in November 
1991, followed by a business delegation and the head of a 
state-run arms manufacturer. Various sources have confirmed 
Israel as having sold items to China in the areas of missiles, 
guidance systems, and fire-control systems for tanks. Israel 
is also strong in avionics, tank armor and armaments, and may 
well have sold some of these items to China as well: "Israel 
is known to be less than scrupulous about onpassing embargoed 
arms technologies, as recently revealed in South Africa". ^^^ 
This trip by Arens to Beijing was preparatory to subsequent 
Israel-PRC normalization. 



24! 



3. Diplomatic 

Unlike other states, Israel's relation to the effects 
of diplomacy is much closer to home. It was diplomacy (in 
equal or greater weight than economics or other concerns), 
that first gained for Israel her charter as an independent 
state. It is the continued use of diplomacy, with at least as 
much importance or clout as economic and military venues, that 
continues to retain for Israel her lines of support and her 
viability as an independent state. 

Israel is also concerned about China's arms sales to 
the Middle East in general, some of which are ironically 
improved by virtue of Israel's own initial assistance to 
China. With normalization, Israel feels it will have a 
greater voice in calling China's attention to this concern. 

a . Recogni tion 

Direct recognition by China is expected to be a 
boon to Israel's diplomatic maneuverings . Such recognition 
would do much to open other doors for economic, etc., interac- 
tion, as well as provide another (ostensibly) friendly voice 
within international councils/perceptions. With each advan- 
tage comes disadvantages: China's increased presence, or more 
immediate accessibility, via diplomatic normalization of 
relations may also increase the weight of Israel's reliance 
upon China, if the PRC should ever be displeased with Israeli 
actions/reactions, on whatever subject. 



249 



b. Dilute U.S. Influence 

This factor, above all the others, and throughout 
all the others, is a primary concern for Israel in its quest 
for diversification. It will reduce the necessity of main- 
taining an exceptional lobbying apparatus in the U.S., and it 
will possibly broaden avenues of financial support. This 
potential added support, however, will not be of the variety 
and quality and dependability of the sort found through the 
U.S. Jewish community. Israel will have to play a careful 
diplomatic game for many years, while at the same time 
endeavoring to stabilize and wean their economy away from 
reliance on external largesse. 

C. DO OTHER MIDDLE EAST STATES HAVE OR EXERCISE A "CHINA 
POLICY?" 

The answer here is also yes, but possibly to a lesser 
degree, relatively speaking, than the policy maintained by 
Israel, or than that evidenced by China towards the Middle 
East. This is partially because the other Middle East states 
are still learning their statecraft, and partially because of 
the plethora of voices resident within the Levant. 

Egypt, influenced partially by Soviet contributions to the 
Allied effort during World War II, was the first Arab state to 
establish continuous relations with the USSR in 1943. Iraq 
and Lebanon followed suit in 1944. In 1947 the USSR voted in 
favor of the Palestine Partition, then in 1948 was the second 
state (after the U.S.) to recognize Israel and even helped 

250 



supply arms to that new country, thus assisting the initial 
Zionist war effort. Shortly after, however, the Soviets 
reoriented their efforts in favor of the Arab states and 
Israel grew more isolated. 
1 . Economic 

The benefits of interaction with China are much the 
same for the other Middle East states as they are for Israel. 
Perhaps even more so, because most external powers interacting 
with the Middle East historically have wanted a slice of the 
Middle East pie (oil rights, profit sharing, base agreements, 
landing rights, overflight rights, etc) . China does not give 
this appearance; her "slice" may simply be the added benefits 
to security and diplomatic maneuvering and economics afforded 
by interaction with the Middle East. China simply doesn't 
have a history of interfering in that region, nor does she now 
indicate or show a desire that she wants to do so. That alone 
makes China especially appealing to the Levant, and more than 
offsets any real or apparent quality dilemmas with Chinese 
goods or range of services available through aid. Most of the 
benefit in Chinese/Middle East interaction now goes to China 
anyway . 

a. New Markets 

Abu Dhabi, in the Gulf Coast, is planning trade 
missions to go to the Far East. Abu Dhabi's earnings are now 
$15b/yr from oil revenues (and they are pumping extra to make 
up for the shortfall by Kuwait and Iraqi), plus $90b/yr from 

251 



investments. Abu Dhabi, and the other Gulf states, are 
looking wisely to increase their economic interaction over- 
seas . ^^^ 

A major concern of Oman is precisely to increase 
their avenues of economic participation, either by inviting 
activities into the country, or by utilizing investment and 
going abroad. Oman among all the Gulf states has a cosmopoli- 
tan tradition, and has hosted several leading Chinese delega- 
tions in the process of exploring economic alternatives. 

One can only wonder at the reactions of the other 
Middle Eastern states to this new circumstance. We are aware 
of Chinese arms sales to the region, but little mention is 
made of Chinese economic ventures into or out of the Middle 
East. As of 1985, indirect trade between China and Saudi 
Arabia had reached $100m annually. 

Prior to the Gulf hostilities between Iraq and 
Kuwait, China had done extensive contract work in Kuwait. It 
is said that most of the public buildings there were built by 
the Chinese, although contracts for their reconstruction after 
the war have gone to U.S. companies. 
b. Location for Investment 

The Director of the Arab Fund for Economic and 
Social Development, Abdul-Latif Yousif Al Hamad, believes that 
a united Gulf market could take the place of Hong Kong as an 
international banking center when Hong Kong reverts to China 
in 1977. This would require the GCC states to pool their 

252 



financial and human resources, and work together to defend and 
develop their position. This is seen as a genuine possibility 
by the Gulf residents, with their advantage increased by 
geographic advantages. However, if they do not act soon, and 
act together, this idea to replace Hong Kong could be swamped 
by globalization . ^^^ 

In December 1984, a manager of the International 
Business and Credit Bank told the correspondents of Xing Hua 
News Agency that Middle East investors regard China as one of 
the best countries for investment in the world. ^^'^ Certainly 
the rate of return on investment will be good, provided the 
investment itself survives. 

As mentioned previously, China as a vehicle for 
investment or other services is generally regarded favorably 
within the Middle East, relative to what the Middle East has 
experienced when receiving help from other sources (Britain, 
U.S., USSR, and so on). 
2 . Security 

The topic of security, between China and the Middle 
East, needs little introduction. At the height of arms sales 
during the Iran-Iraq war, China was selling about $2b worth of 
weapons annually, with most of that going to the Middle East. 

As for the arms sales to the Middle East that origi- 
nate with the U.S., Israel exercises a fair amount of veto 
power over how much and what type may be sold to other Middle 
East states. For this reason alone, it is not hard to imagine 

253 



a hard pressed or determined buyer going out to find another 
supplier, regardless of whatever else the buyer might think of 
the seller. 

a. "General Store" 

In keeping with China's general attractiveness to 
Arabs as a source of aid and/or investment, and also of 
China's apparent willingness to sell whatever is available 
(provided that "stability" is maintained), and in keeping also 
with China's desire to offset the influence of other major 
powers, it makes a great deal of analogous sense to consider 
China as an international "General Store", or 7-11, open 24 
hours a day, 3 65 days a year. 

This is not meant to be sarcastic or belittling, 
but to emphasize the nature of the economic reality now facing 
the world. But having said this, I still do not want to 
suggest that money is the only criterion used by China when 
considering a sale of whatever. The other factors that go 
into the sale are all of the above: modernizing China, 
maintaining stability in the region, offsetting the influence 
of other powers. As an example of this type of selective 
largesse: in Oman the local Chinese medicine clinic (two of 
them, staffed by Chinese) , received just as much press as any 
of the arms sales in the gulf, and that was while the allied 
armada was massing for the attack on Iraq to free Kuwait. 



254 



Jb. Diversification 

The obvious entry in this section starts with the 
Saudis, who were not happy with their inability to purchase 
Lance missiles from the U.S., so they went to China instead. 
There is another entry to make for the Syrians, who recently 
managed to acquire needed materials for their own construction 
of missiles (so China could say the PRC didn't sell any 
missiles to Syria) . 

Added to this are other instances of China's 
assisting Middle Eastern countries (Algeria, Pakistan) with 
materials and advice for the construction of nuclear facili- 
ties . 

3. Diplomatic 

Aside from groups such as the FLO, who need all the 
support they can find, diplomatic muscle has not been a 
primary goal sought by the Middle Eastern countries with 
respect to China. They are impressed, of course, with the 
weight China carries by having a permanent seat on the United 
Nations Security Council, but in terms of individual bilateral 
recognition, that has not been a primary goal. 

In 1964, Arafat helped to establish the FLO liaison 
office in Beijing. His third visit to China occurred in May 
1984, and in December 1991 he visited there again. China has 
consistently supported the FLO through moral support, and also 
through materiel and training during the early stages of their 
relationship. China has since taken a more moderate or 

255 



balanced tone with the PLO; shortly after Arafat's visit to 
Beijing in December 1991, China's Vice Foreign Minister Yang 
Fuchang visited Israel to discuss normalization plans. 

As but one example of China's regional presence now in 
the Middle East, even in view of their overall relatively 
modest investment in the area, the New UN Secretary General 
praised China as a "leader and defender of the developing 
world". The new Secretary General is Boutros Boutros Ghali, 
an Egyptian, who made those remarks during a visit to Beijing 
on 13 April 1992 . 



256 



VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 

Before delving into policy implications for the U.S. 
regarding China and the Middle East, initial comments on world 
affairs and the nature of foreign policy will assist our 
methodology and provide additional support for the conclu- 
sions . 

The requirement is little short of paramount for America 
to be judicious and steady with its policy decisions in the 
coming years. Much is changing in the world, much more than 
mere discussion about Bipolarity being superceded by Multipo- 
larity. Polities the world over are reorienting themselves as 
the New Order continues to unfold. Europe is on the verge of 
political union, Moscow now rules a nation (and perhaps a 
Commonwealth) instead of an empire, the UN is gaining new 
responsibilities, China is evolving, the Middle East is 
joining the global community, satellite coverage is being 
provided for all of China and East Asia, Cold War antagonisms 
are fading^^^ and both older and newer frictions are surfac- 
ing. ^^® 

Additionally, global environments and economics are also 
changing; they themselves are perhaps the primary impetus for 
the evolving New Order. Economies are expanding, but domestic 
spending is tight. Many developing nations, not to mention 
the U.S., are heavily in debt and seeking ways to reschedule 
their obligations or otherwise lessen the repayment severity. 

257 



The U.S. SScL bailout alone has a higher price tag than our 
bill for World War II. Gaps between rich and poor, both 
domestically and internationally, have grown exponentially in 
the last 30 years: on average, 20% of the population controls 
80% of the wealth. Evidence of environmental despoliation in 
Eastern Europe, also Taiwan, China and East Asia, plus the 
developing countries, has created a new global issue that is 
attracting everyone's attention. The recent UN sponsored 
environmental discussion and treaty preparation at Rio was the 
largest gathering of heads of state ever to occur; ecological 
concerns are rapidly becoming priorities with domestic as well 
as foreign agendas . 

Asia, now with well over half of the world's population, 
figures more and more prominently in U.S. politics and 
economics. The Pacific Rim is fast supplanting every other 
region of the globe in just about every measurable category. 
Six of the nine largest armies of the world, not including the 
U.S. and former USSR, are located in the region; the next five 
are found in the Middle East and Taiwan. ■'^^ For the last 2 
years, average annual economic growth in Asia has been almost 
10%, with this expected to continue; during the next decade 
Asian growth rates are projected to double those of the U.S. 
and Europe. ^^° In 1980, half of all U.S. gross trade was in 
the Pacific. By 1986, this trade grew to be an overwhelming 
majority (75% more than with Atlantic countries) . ■'^^ It is 
anticipated that by 2000, U.S. trade in the Pacific will be 

258 



twice as much as that in the Atlantic. Much of this trade is 
with Japan and the NICs, also ASEAN, but there is nothing to 
suggest that China will not eventually share her respective 
percentage (an enormous percentage) , of this economic activi- 
ty. 

Economies in the region, even across the Pacific, are 
highly intertwined: multinational companies, instantaneous 
communications, rapid transit, floating currencies, cross- 
national television, shared environmental concerns, fluid 
skilled adult relocations, investments and more are combining 
to reduce national purviews. Such is the close interaction of 
the region that it has been suggested, for example, that 
Japanese representatives in the not-too-distant future may 
well be in Washington and vice versa, with these officials 
having at least observer status if not themselves becoming 
active participants in the political process. ^^^ When and if 
this occurs, officials between Washington and Brussels may 
also likely make exchanges. 

Central Asia is now a big question mark, as five new 
Republics have appeared through the USSR's demise. A host of 
new international ramifications emerge in the process of 
sorting out traditional rivalries and tensions in that area, 
not to mention reassessing former Soviet relations with the 
Northern Tier (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey) . China as 
well will be keenly interested in developments in the region, 
as Tibet and Xinjiang border on three of those five new 

259 



Republics. Secretary of State Baker travelled there shortly- 
after their formation to make assessments and try to insert a 
modicum of stability through diplomatic activity and recogni- 
tion. 

Traditional U.S. emphasis on NATO and Europe ought not to 
be discarded, but readjusted; there must be due recognition of 
current and future centers of trade, populations, and all of 
their attendant concerns. An editorial by Kissinger, early in 
1989, saw Europe as the continued undisputed center of future 
global events, despite Gorbachev and perestroika; the events 
in Berlin, Beijing, Moscow, and the Persian Gulf, which were 
then just around the corner, had unfortunately for Kissinger 
not yet occurred. ^^^ One example of this shifting emphasis 
has been military reallocations by Congress: U.S. troop 
strength in Europe has recently been cut to 100,000, with 
future cuts likely as Europe readjusts. Meanwhile, 23,000 are 
now stationed full time in the Persian Gulf region (75% of 
those are with the Navy) . 

As for the current state of world affairs in terms of 
armaments, modern weaponry is coming into a world of its own. 
One indication of how weaponry impacts our lives is provided 
by this comparative review on space requirements for tactical 
troop movements: in Ancient times, 1 square kilometer was 
required for 100,000 troops. Napoleon required 20 square 
kilometers. World War I saw that requirement increased to 248, 
World War II increased it further to 3,000, Israel's Yom 

260 



Kippur War needed 4,000 square kilometers for 100,000 men, and 
1978 NATO maneuvers in West Germany required 55,500 square 
kilometers for 100,000 men.^^^ Participating units in World 
War IT'S nautical battle for Midway utilized much of the 
entire Pacific Ocean; current naval architecture and technolo- 
gy allows for future nautical engagements to cover multiple 
ocean groups. The recent Gulf War saw a UN coalition of 
scores of unlikely allies opposing Iraq; the combination of 
high-tech and medieval tactics that ensued, even through a 
relatively short duration, completely engulfed the region 
(including Iran, whose passive acquiescence generated as many 
ramifications as her active participation would have) . 
Hostilities in the contemporary arena, then, especially on 
sensitive issues, have broad tentacles and are not to be taken 
lightly. 

It is clear, then, that proper response to the question of 
U.S. policy regarding China and the Middle East in the 1990s 
and beyond, with special reference to China's own interaction 
with the Middle East, requires that we take into account 
several variables, in differing regions, that may well affect 
or otherwise be affected by the U. S . -PRC-Middle East triangle. 
Moreover, the Middle East is very fast becoming a region 
unlike anything which we have seen or known in that area 
within corporate memory, and is doing so very much at the 
visible heart of extensive trade routes and the not-so-visible 
heart of religious and emotional concerns. Ramifications for 

261 



any one issue involving these relationships may well spill 
over into other issues. 

Items, therefore, that may likely affect our dealings with 
the PRC and/or the Middle East, over and above relations that 
might exist directly between the Middle East and China, or 
between the three of us together, include: the UN's evolving 
roles, China and the Spratlys and the Paracels, the Soviet 
Union's dissolution, Europe's emergence as a unified bloc, 
trade blocs in general, regional security concerns plus the 
arms trade, technology and communication advances, the 
phenomena of fundamentalism, and resource management to 
include ecological concerns. Each of these items is a subject 
in itself. But the speed with which various concerns are 
called to our respective attention, or with which they are 
intertwined, causes us to be mindful of the others while 
directing specific attention to any one of them. 
Two more comments on method before proceeding: 
1) It was stated earlier that our world views might well 
experience modifications and thereby become more effective and 
responsible, prior to our generation of policies and direc- 
tives, if we first became aware of what the other guy was 
thinking and why he thought that way.^" The other side of 
this, of course, is that we also have thoughts, in a certain 
collective manner, and do so - or try to do so - as responsi- 
bly as possible. Which is quite a mouthful. Because it 
requires us, in the realm of policy, to be as absolutely 

262 



certain as possible about the other guy, about what he is 
thinking and why, about the environment in which he lives, 
plus what he wants for his life - in addition to knowing those 
things about ourselves. Then , and only then, may we proceed 
with policy and its implementation. 

A natural question at this point is to ask where we should 
first direct our attention: to the other guy or ourselves? 
Because knowing one effects how we know the other. There is 
no rule, other than that we do both as best we can. Chicken 
or egg dilemmas do not apply, for we start wherever we happen 
to be, and the rest is a process. Usually we begin with 
ourselves, but understanding someone else helps us to know 
ourselves (and vice versa) , much as learning another language 
provides insight into our own. It is a back and forth 
process, which, sooner or later, hopefully incorporates 
dialogue, communiques, and all the rest. If there is no 
dialogue, then we do everything possible to make genuine 
dialogue happen, ensuring throughout that the integrity of 
everyone concerned is scrupulously maintained. Every fence 
has (at least) two sides; if we live with fences, then we need 
to demarcate them and become mutually comfortable and familiar 
with each side, arrange for its maintenance and security, and 
so on. If we live without fences, or with gates or other 
access from side to side, then we need to be prepared for 
subsequent developments and recognize, all the more, that 
effective dialogue is a sine gria non. 

263 



(When we broach the extremely sensitive realm of suggest- 
ing or even claiming what the other guy should do, aside from 
what he wants to do, we run the risk of being no more effec- 
tive than the most extreme fanatic regarding whatever) . 

2) Still yet another assumption surfacing through these 
pages is the accepted premise that, all things being equal, it 
is the case that people will - for the most part - choose the 
positive (or better, or good) side of an issue, provided the 
individual or group has all the pertinent information and 
facts at their disposal. Which is not unlike Confucianism. 
In other words, if someone knows the good, then they will 
choose the good, which is why dialogue and exchange and educa- 
tion become so meaningful. Now this proposition is by no 
means certain, for it depends on what any particular group or 
society regards as acceptable or necessary, and has been much 
debated from the Greeks through to the present (if for no 
other reason than simply a lasting curiosity over how best to 
prove or disprove it) . But regardless of its place in 
reality, and whether or not it is true or only just wishful 
thinking, I mention it here because it is incumbent on us to 
ensure that "good" decisions are made, to ensure that all the 
education and training and quality of life necessary to enact 
proper decision making are available not only to ourselves but 
also to all those with whom we interact. 

A tricky aspect of this is in the manner of providing or 
recognizing the tools (education, etc.), available to all who 

264 



need them, without impairing the system which receives or 
perhaps already has some of those tools, or without assuming 
that since "they" are not like "us" it therefore becomes 
necessary for "them" to first change in order to benefit from 
(our) tools and education. 

Dialogue is learning as well as teaching, accepting as 
well as proselytizing, with the entire process leading to 
agreements, compromises, and hopefully further appointments. 
Dialogues, by definition, require participation from more than 
one party: if the required participation is not present, then 
the dialogue is either shut down or someone takes the trouble 
to somehow, and respectfully, inform the other that some sort 
of agreeable participatory exercise must occur. The sun 
shines over all of us. Each fact must be considered, not just 
those that might be in front of our noses, or those which we 
prefer. Responsibility is sometimes extremely difficult, and 
might even be impossible under severe cases; perhaps a proper 
response in those instances, all things being equal, would 
simply be to keep the doors clean, strong, and open (or hinged 
and able to open) , then hunker down and wait. If we were ever 
to come under attack, then we respond accordingly, proportion- 
ately , and, if neccessary, we "whip their ass".^^^ Where 
other measures might be required for the sanctity of life and 
freedom of choice, then so be it.^^^ These procedures are 
all aspects of passive and active diplomacy, as Clausewitz 
reminds us. Anything less is irresponsible. 

265 



A. U.S. AND THE PRC 

China's overriding concern, as we have seen, is to 
modernize. The absolute crux of any U.S. policy process with 
regard to China in the 1990s and beyond is recognition of this 
fact , as well as, especially, also recognizing that virtually 
all of China's leaders are themselves reformers . They are all 
entirely intent on reforming China. They differ, however, on 
their understanding of how reform is to occur. Therefore, 
again, during this current period of Four Modernizations, some 
are "liberals" or "reformers", while others are "hardliners" 
or "conservatives". Under Mao, all of them would have been 
"moderates" (with the Maoists being "leftists"). There are 
undoubtedly some leftists in the government today, but their 
heyday is over; the moderate distinctions which now prevail 
were less pronounced during the 1950s and 1960s. 

This current hierarchy of Chinese rulers, with its 
differences of reformist categories, generates interesting 
responses when superimposed on the ethical realm. First of 
all, the fact that the hierarchy is entirely reformist of one 
stripe or another, is "good", in a strictly utilitarian and/or 
historical sense. Beyond that, the choices they make of how 
or even why to enact this reform, as liberals or hardliners, 
and how they choose to be liberal or conservative, can be 
"good" or "bad" . There are at least two levels of activity 
within the Chinese political spectrum as presently configured. 
It is of crucial importance for us to note these two strata; 

266 



on the one hand we can appreciate the underlying and primary- 
task that all members of the PRC hierarchy are genuinely 
involved with, on the other hand we can, as required, respond 
more critically regarding their methodology and day to day 
choices . 

Passing judgment on an official's methodology, simulta- 
neously along with the fact that he/she occupies a place in 
the government to begin with, is wrong. To pass judgment on 
a hardliner simply because it is expected that there was 
nothing he/she could do that was beneficial for China, 
regardless of the probability that it would be excruciatingly 
slow, is wrong. 

On top of these two strata, there is the intriguing and 
difficult position currently occupied by Deng. As mentioned 
before, not only does he balance conservatives and liberals, 
but he alternately supports one faction, then the other, 
despite his preference for reform at full speed ahead. While 
he has been trying to retire older (conservative) members, and 
bring younger technocrats and others likely to back liberal 
reform measures into the CCP, he still needs the support of 
his major players to maintain the viability of the CCP. This 
was especially true after Tiananmen. Regardless of appearan- 
ces that take center stage from one month to the next, it is 
unwise to pin specific labels on Deng, especially if those 
labels are of a conservative bent. 



267 



It is absolutely imperative for the U.S. to keep China, as 
much as possible, interacting with the world community. China 
will, eventually, reach the point where few options will be 
unavailable to her; for China to be in such a position and at 
the same time shunned by the world community, hence alone or 
not on speaking terms with other states, would certainly not 
give China much reason to make decisions that would be in 
concert with the best interests of the international communi- 
ty. It simply makes good sense, not to mention the opportuni- 
ty we might have in passing to share other alternatives or 
options with the Chinese, to continue as much contact with 
them as possible. We must keep China involved in a two way 
street of exchange and interaction. 

1. Ideology and the "Death of Communism" 

Among China's classical corpus is a work entitled The 
General Mirror for the Aid of Government . It was compiled 
before 1086, as an aid to Chinese Emperors on how to best 
conduct their business. Mao studied this work while in Yanan 
after the Long March. Deng was also a student of this work, 
and studied it thoroughly while living in Nanchang, Jiangxi, 
after being purged from the central government during the 
GPCR. On Aug. 3, 1972, Deng wrote to Mao, at Zhou's sugges- 
tion, admitted that he had made mistakes, and confessed that 
he had been wrong with saying in 1962 (after the GLF) , that it 
mattered not whether a cat was black or white so long as it 
caught the mouse. In February 1973 Deng and his family left 

268 



Nanchang and the Jiangxi tractor factory for Beijing; on March 
10, Mao and Zhou formally proposed to restore Deng as vice 
premier of the State Council. ^^® 

These episodes and many others indicate that there is 
something else going on within the CCP than just a borrowing 
of Marxist thought, or even the creation of Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics. There is something very "Chinese" 
about what Mao and Zhou and Deng have been doing (and also 
with Chiang Kaishek and Sun Yixian before them) . Obviously, 
to recount the early history of the CCP is to discover the 
Russian influence, the Moscow trained Party officials, the 
Comintern directives, and the constant references by Mao to 
the need for maintaining Marxism over revisionism. But there 
are other influences or aspects of the early CCP as well, such 
as the modernization attempts that had been ongoing for almost 
a century within China, the legacy of the May Fourth movement, 
the influence of Europe, Japan and the U.S. as well as that of 
Russia, and the difficulties of voicing or representing 
western ideas through the Chinese language. 

This last item is significant, because regardless of 
the ideas being translated into Chinese, whether they are 
religious, political, or whatever, direct translation from 
western Judeo-Christian romanization into the ideogrammatic, 
Confucian and Buddhist milieu of the Chinese language is just 
about impossible. This one hurdle is almost enough in itself 
to question whether what the Chinese have been doing can be 

269 



best described as Coinmunist , in the Soviet sense, rather than 
any other label. That is, no matter what revolutionary system 
the Chinese might have borrowed, it would eventually have had 
to be translated so as to give primary weight to the Chinese 
countryside, as we have seen, and so on. As for other issues 
such as the primacy of central planning (Soviet style) rather 
than decentralized control: this topic has been an ongoing 
subject of debate within the CCP since before the GLF . The 
CCP has basically agreed that modifications to the Soviet 
model had to be made for proper utilization within China, but 
the degree and scope of modifications have been debated ever 
since . 

As for Deng's successor, there is probably no one 
within China who has the same authority to keep the military 
and political coalition together, as we mentioned earlier. ^^^ 
However, to therefore say that China will probably follow the 
route just taken by the USSR under Gorbachev (dissolution) is 
not at all self evident. Gorbachev's focus was on political 
reform, whereas Deng's Four Modernizations have been economic. 
What we do not know is the extent of Chinese political reform 
that will follow from those economic changes, or even how 
inevitable such political changes might be. Some changes are 
inevitable, and dissolution is certainly one of the possibili- 
ties, but there are others at least as probable if not more 
so, and they include: 



270 



I 



While the overall transition which China is experienc- 
ing may well continue for another 100 years or so, the point 
at which China enters some sort of representative government 
may not be quite as distant. The type of "representative" 
government which might emerge, or the degree to which input 
from below enters into the decision making apparatus, depends 
much on the corresponding development of things such as law, 
communication, mechanisms for redress of grievances and - if 
need be - alterations of governmental composition, accessibil- 
ity of economic advancement, quality of life, education, and 
so on . 

It is not impossible that the Chinese predisposition 
for a strong center, or a version of some sort of beneficent 
authoritative figure, will continue to hold sway at the apex 
of a pyramid, as long as, for example, those at the lower 
rungs are satisfied that their concerns, needs, etc., were 
being taken into account. If advances in communication 
continue to make themselves available to all elements or 
aspects of society, which certainly appears as though this 
will be the case, it is not hard to imagine that a consider- 
able degree of information would be available to whomever was 
at the bottom of this pyramid, hence the pyramid itself would 
have to be carefully responsive to its members in order to 
retain its integrity, continuity, longevity, and all the rest. 
The mandate of heaven might still somehow apply, though in a 
more timely manner. In other words, it does not seem impossi- 

271 



ble or even unlikely that a Chinese government could emerge in 
years hence that would be entirely satisfactory (and "accessi- 
ble") to its people, yet be quite unlike what we now under- 
stand as representative democracy, or a federal republic. 
Plus, even though the governmental apex might well retain a 
certain appearance of immutability, yet it could preside over 
a vast array of ongoing change and innovation, provided - of 
course - that all, or a sufficient majority within the 
pyramid/society, were truly satisfied that their requirements 
for quality of life were being met. 

Regardless of the fate of the term "communist", 
relative to the PRC, it is the studied opinion here that 
ideology is, at best, an adjunct to other factors in the long 
and short term courses of a nation's business. Fang Lizhi 
firmly espouses that the hierarchy no longer believes in 
Marxist principles (if they ever did).^-^° 

Many in the West are now hailing the death of commu- 
nism, or otherwise wondering how it has "changed", perhaps 
even expecting new and wonderful things for the simple reason 
that "Communism" is becoming unalterably compromised with 
capitalistic ingredients. Quotes from Lenczowski and Hamrin 
on the idea or role of ideology will provide frameworks for 
discussion : 

Carol Lee Hamrin 

"Ideology plays a dynamic role (in all politi- 
cal systems), to a greater or lesser extent. 
That ideology is malleable does not in any way 



272 



dismiss the fact that it performs certain 
functions in shaping policy behavior" . 

Policies require 'justification' or 'ration- 
alization', although this is something more 
important than cynical window dressing for 
naked pursuit of national interest." 

Enforcement of ideological orthodoxy serves 
actively to screen out ideas. (Assumptions 
and prevailing world views also serve this 
purpose) . " 

Imposing Orthodoxy renders illegitimate any 
policy options that would threaten the inter- 
ests of those in power." 

Foreign policy flexibility is (therefore) 
constrained. In the short term, some policy 
moves are easier and some more difficult. In 
the long term, major departures in strategy 
are almost always postponed; thus major chang- 
es in policy occur normally only with a shift 
in the leadership and without careful fore- 
thought and planning. "^■'^ 



George Lenczowski 

"It is possible to debate whether (ideology) 
is an independent entity, using the power of 
the Soviet state, or whether the Soviet state 
has employed ideology as a useful psychologi- 
cal device . " 

Ultimately, a dynamic Soviet state interest to 
expand and dominate is complemented by Commu- 
nist ideology and vice versa." 

Interpreters (Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, 
Gorbachev) , of dogma face the age-old dilemma 
inherent in the adaptation of any old and 
petrified document to current reality: either 
the reality had to be molded to suit the dogma 
or the dogma had to be changed." 

Any change in dogma is risky: the modifier is 
either a heretic (i.e. revisionist), or, if he 
becomes the victorious leader, the true be- 
liever . " 



273 



Any comprehensive analysis of Soviet policies 
should not, therefore, rest on a mere recon- 
struction of observed behavior. To understand 
the mainsprings of such policies, it is neces- 
sary to take into account their doctrinal 
foundations and to follow the evolution, if 
any, of ideology.""^ 

Hamrin's position supports the role of ideology; for 
Hamrin, ideology has a role not only within an ostensibly 
ideological system, but also within any political system. 
Lenczowski, on the other hand, does not provide ideology with 
the same leverage, if he provides it with any leverage at all. 
Rather than say outright that ideology serves no purpose, 
however, he says that the same political outcome may be 
observed whether ideology is claimed to be the originator or 
not . 

Hamrin's assumption is that, given the ubiquitous 
presence of ideology, and once ideology is given sway, it does 
not cease to relinquish that sway. This premise is very 
problematic. For example, even during the personal rule of a 
Mao Zedong, where ideology supposedly has all the advantages, 
it is difficult to say with certainty that decisions about 
policy occur without forethought or planning, or that static 
natures of policy are due primarily to ideology. 

There is the further qualifier that interpersonal 
relationships vary from culture to culture, which in turn 
largely account for the not insignificant differences we 
observe between democracies (U.S., U.K., West Germany, Japan, 
Canada, Italy) , not to mention the differences between the 



274 



formerly so-called communist bloc. The mechanisms of govern- 
ing encompass a broader scope than mere bureaucratic structure 
or the "reasons why" certain procedures are followed or 
beliefs held. No doubt certain ruling individuals follow 
prescribed procedures because they are correct or because they 
believe in "the creed" above all else, but a ruling structure 
that deals in realities and maintaining its own position makes 
decisions because they are prudent or necessary. Structure 
wins over creed. Basically, it was not primarily ideology 
that safeguarded Mao's position (which was contested) , but his 
early successes, the force of his personality and guanxi, and 
the PLA. Likewise, reforms are being propounded by Deng to 
give needed life to structures, not in order to find a pure or 
correct socialism or communism. The Cultural Revolution was 
largely a power struggle, not merely an exercise in ideologi- 
cal purity. 

Probably the most telling aspect of China's modified 
communism was its initial appeal to the individual Chinese 
peasant, unlike previous domestic rule in China and guaranteed 
to give Mao at least the peasant's curiosity if not his 
loyalty. Mao's utilization of translation, etc., for purposes 
of leading and conveying ideas was a standard Chinese prac- 
tice: that those phrases happened to incorporate or embody 
Marxist or Leninist thinking is secondary. If it were not 
Marxist then it obviously would have been something else. The 
point is that very similar things, Chinese things, would have 

275 



been done regardless of the reasoning provided; nomenclature 
is, in the final analysis, supremely irrelevant. 

In this sense, Lenczowski is more correct by suggest- 
ing that ideology and the state serve or complement each 
other. Leaders make choices, and in the course of exercising 
judgment choose whether or not to chart new ground or follow 
existing territory. 

When Hamrin speaks of "a general ideological vacuum" 
during the early 1980s as "the achilles heel of the (PRO 
reformers", I believe she oversimplifies the dilemma of 
instituting various novel reforms into a traditional societal 
structure . ^" 

It was earlier suggested that dialogue was essential 
for any interaction between groups, that education or a 
sharing of ideas was somehow a part, a prerequisite, for 
dialogue. With that in mind, it is very instructive to note 
the degree of North American culture and/or entertainment now 
circling the globe and penetrating places like China. That 
alone has probably had more effect on the Chinese (and French, 
and Japanese) , populous than any heretofore diplomatic 
interchange. The ability to turn on the TV and see Hong Kong 
or Taiwan or Bangkok or Seoul television programs, many of 
which might well have originated within the U.S., can be a 
very powerful stimulous. Any number of subtle impressions 
deposit themselves, so to speak, with the viewing audience, 
such as economic choices, evolving western ideas of gender 

276 



roles and sexual harassment, pluralism and participatory 
government, etc. 

2. Superpowers? 

In order to state if China is a superpower, it becomes 
necessary to define what a superpower is. It is presently 
accepted that the U.S. is a superpower. It was previously 
also accepted, just a short while ago, that the former USSR 
was a superpower. Virtually every book printed until the 
early 1990s, when discussing superpower reactions or relations 
or competitions, invariably spoke both of the U.S. and USSR as 
superpowers; only with rare exceptions was mention ever made 
of China in this regard. 

Now, however, we see that the USSR was a very strong 
nut but with disparate pockets of meat inside, so disparate as 
to be non-mutually supportive (i.e.: a lousy economy). 
Indeed, that paucity of meat has given rise to questions of 
whether or not the USSR could have in fact utilized the 
strength of its shell, for any appreciable purpose or lengthy 
intent, other than defense of the homeland. After achieving 
this hindsight, our former certitude of assuming superpower 
status for the USSR now develops into a question if that 
status was appropriate in the first place. 

Russia is still a strong country. The Central Asian 
Republics, members of the C.I.S., are also strong countries. 
As also are Israel, France, Pakistan, Iran, and (in the near 
future, again) Iraq. It doesn't require superpower status to 

277 



be "strong", or to be able to throw the world upside down or 
divide the global coiranunity into divergent hostile camps 
literally overnight. Russia is so strong as to actually be 
dangerous; bureaucrats and academicians now ask themselves if 
Russia can control the weaponry at its disposal, if it can 
prevent the disappearance of an insignificant warhead, if it 
can keep its troops from selling their arsenals. Superpower 
status, it would seem, requires not only strength but a 
certain stability and/or cushion (i.e.: infrastructure), from 
which to direct that strength. 

To be ranked a superpower, therefore, requires not 
only a strong shell, but enough meat to hold it together and 
to keep it vibrant. Resources, population, infrastructure, 
economic and military strength, all far in excess relative to 
international neighbors, are superpower prerequisites. Even 
if these attributes are only perceived by others as resident 
in the superpower, or as inevitable potentials that require 
others to reassess their own actions in light of the looming 
colossus over the horizon, this is enough to grant superpower 
or candidate superpower status. Japan is on the verge of 
acquiring this rank; Japan will also never quite make it. A 
unified Europe is another superpower candidate; the odds are 
excellent of this occurring. As for China - there is no doubt 
that superpower status will someday be appropriate: the 
question is when. Tacit recognition of this reality has 
already been accorded China by other countries (e.g.: Israel 

278 



and Japan) . This awareness of China as superpower, or as 
candidate superpower, needs to spread, not because it is good 
or bad, but because it is real. 

By 2 010, given a Chinese average growth rate of only 
4.7%, China would surpass the former USSR and be at 50% of 
U.S. GNP (although have only 10% of U.S., European, or 
Japanese PCGNP) . It's quite possible, due to sheer population 
pressures, that China will always be stuck with PCGNP that is 
appreciably lower than any other developed area of the globe. 
Despite this fact, China's diversity and infrastructure would 
guarantee continued growth, whether or not she was an active 
member of the international community. The PRC ' s infrastruc- 
ture is probably already more than sufficient to maintain its 
own industrial modernization, although the rate of growth 
might be slower since the Chinese operate from a smaller 
PCGNP. Then again, as China is at least five times as 
populous as any other country, having a low PCGNP is not a 
major impediment for development of national resources; at 
worst, China's GNP growth would be normal instead of meteoric. 
For decades after World War II, the U.S. relied primarily on 
its own market to fuel GNP: such a procedure for growth is 
certainly feasible (it also has been responsible, as we know, 
for the corresponding lack of U.S. ability to effectively 
compete, now, in international markets). ^^^ In fact, since 
much of China still lags decades behind the rest of the 
industrialized world, and also since China could fuel its own 

279 



GNP, then theoretically China could survive a global depres- 
sion with comparative ease, serving possibly even to facili- 
tate general recovery from such a catastrophe. All things 
considered, the conservative growth rate of 4.7% posited for 
PRC development by 2010 guarantees that China will become the 
number two economic power and the eventual challenger to, 
sharer and/or successor of America's global position. ^^^ 

Jonathan Pollack suggests another way of viewing 
China's eventual superpower status: 

"...weapons, economic strength, and power 
potential alone cannot explain the imputed 
significance of China in a global power equa- 
tion. ...China has very shrewdly and even 
brazenly used its available political, econom- 
ic, and military resources. ...As a result, 
China becomes all things to all nations. For 
all these reasons, China has assumed a singu- 
lar international position, both as a partici- 
pant in many of the central political and 
military conflicts in the post war era and as 
a state that resists easy political or ideo- 
logical categorization... Indeed, in a cer- 
tain sense China must be judged as a candidate 
superpower in its own right - not in imitation 
or emulation of either the Soviet Union or the 
United States, but as a reflection of Peking's 
unique position in global politics . "^^^ 

While numbers do not tell the full story, the follow- 
ing items are intriguing and further buttress the prognosis of 
China as superpower: 

USA PCGNP was $5000 during our first ICBM 
test. China's PCGNP during their first ICBM 
test (its range was 7000 nautical miles) was 

$400."' 

Based on 7% GNP annual growth, China's year 

2000 GNP ($1600b) will exceed the (former) 
USSR year 1978 GNP ($1254b) . China's growth 



280 



has actually averaged 9% during the late 1970s 
and into the 1980s. 

By 1990, China - if she wishes - will be able 
to spend $100b annually for defense (at 1979 



Recently, 10% of all PRC industrial output 
goes into defense. ^^^ 

The PRC became the 10th largest shipbuilder in 
1980.''° 

Although the PRC is approx. 75% rural and 
requires extensive agricultural investment, 
that still leaves, currently, 335 million 
persons for urban industrialization (91 mil- 
lion in Japan, 189 million in the U.S., and 
Manchuria alone is as big as Western Europe) . 
A shift in PRC population to urban areas is 
already occurring, but even if that shift was 
controlled or forbidden, quality in the indus- 
trial base could be maintained by the CCP 
merely by threatening to relocate urban dwell- 
ers into the countryside and vice versa. '^' 

In Japan and the East Asian Four, the growth 
of economic performance was due to growth in 
productivity (i.e.: personal skills, training, 
etc.), and not due to inputs into production 
(i.e.: capital, etc.). China is well along 
the path of growth in productivity. 

China in the early 1930s had a University 
enrollment of 40,000. In all of sub-saharan 
Africa there were only about 70,000 students 
in secondary school as late as 1960. ^'^ 

"China's total foreign trade has grown 
from $38b in 1980 to $135. 7b in 1991. About 
one third of this passes through Hong Kong, 
and most of Hong Kong's direct trade repre- 
sents ultimate trade with the U.S."''^ 

As a superpower candidate that is potentially self- 
sustaining, China should be encouraged to remain an active 
participant in international matters. There is no need to 
have her discretionary power available to rulers in Beijing 



281 



without any corresponding feedback or dialogue from the U.S. 
and others to temper their judgment about why or how they 
employ their discretionary power. Isolating Beijing serves no 
productive purpose. 

Those who persist in believing that the U.S. could 
actually "punish" or hurt Beijing by withdrawing Most Favored 
Nation (MFN) trade status, or by the imposition of general 
sanctions, simply do not have a clear picture of the multitude 
of facets that combine to form China. Rescinding MFN would in 
fact slow the rate of China's GNP growth, but the net effect 
would be diametrically opposite than intended by those wishing 
to punish the PRC . While the U.S. market would no longer be 
as accessible to China, other world-wide markets probably 
would be, especially those markets not sympathetic to U.S. 
policy ends. Further, as a considerable amount of Hong Kong 
trade is with the U.S., an effect of slowing China's GNP would 
actually be to hurt the U.S. and not China, because China 
would keep growing (albeit slower), whereas America's already 
slow GNP would become even slower (probably with the loss of 
some employment) , plus the rescission of MFN could well invite 
retaliatory measures. On top of that, the passage of each 
year makes other markets stronger, relative to the U.S. 
market, as they grow and establish themselves; this does not 
mean that we are weakening, but that the world's resources are 
experiencing broader distribution. Hence withdrawal of MFN in 
1993 would not be as painful as it might have been in 1983; 

282 



but regardless of the level of pain it might inflict, rescind- 
ing MFN is not a good idea. It would be instructive for those 
who think China can be "punished" or "hurt" to note a Congres- 
sional joint study, with inputs from almost 60 independent 
sources of widely diverging and responsible views, that 
despite China's innumerable problems through the 1990s and 
beyond, somehow she will "muddle through". ^^^ Lastly, Fang 
Lizhi makes the eminently plausible suggestion that a few 
specific and achievable political requirements, attached to 
MFN, are attainable measures and beneficial to all parties, 
rather than the barn door approach which would be ignored by 
Beijing and not provide anyone with anything positive whatso- 
ever. 

Lastly there is the undeniable effect where moderniza- 
tion of China assists the process of reform intended by the 
ruling hierarchy. Increasing the trade, investment, and cash 
flow in China obviously enhances modernization. However, 
modernization also has the effect of increasing individual 
responsibilities and personal realms of activity; how these 
might spill into the political arena and/or be part of the 
evolution of China's deep rooted sense of authority, remains 
to be seen. The point is, modernization helps China and 
hinders the CCP (as presently configured) , which may or may 
not be apparent to current Chinese leaders; by the same token, 
retarding modernization would hurt China without necessarily 



283 



hurting the CCP. We saw that the Tienanmen events strength- 
ened the hardliners' position, though only temporarily. 

For those who think we compromise our principles by 
not withdrawing MFN, nothing could be further from the truth, 
precisely for the reasons elaborated here. Responsible trade, 
within the realms permitted by national security concerns, is 
the best thing we can do for the Chinese; those who truly wish 
to hurt the "Butchers of Beijing" should encourage trade, not 
restrict it. 

a. Kezmedy, Nye, Toffler, et. al. 

In recent years, a plethora of voices have emerged 
describing purported aspects of U.S. decline, the juggernaut 
of world trade, and so on. The following are just a few 
comments on those issues: 

As in the discussion of what being a superpower 
meant, the topic of national decline also requires a relative 
comparison with other states. During the first post-war 
decade, the U.S. provided over 40% of the world's entire GNP. 
Even in 1960 that figure was over 33%, but currently it is 
probably less than 2 0%.^^^ These numbers do not mean that 
the U.S. is shrinking. The truth is quite the contrary. What 
these numbers mean is that the rest of the world has finally 
picked up steam. That result is what we intended and worked 
for after World War II. We ought not to decry those results 
now that we have to become competitive again. (Indeed, it is 
arguable that the U.S. never really had to compete on an 

284 



international level, at least not at the extent required 
today, either due to our preoccupation with home or through 
the distinctiveness of our North American products prior to 
World War II) . 

To underscore this point, Kennedy specifically 
states that the rate of post-V7ar growth for Britain and the 
U.S. was "unlikely to be as high as in those countries 
recovering from years of military occupation and damage", also 
that the Allies' decline and the growth of Germany was both 
relative and natural. ^^"^ Great Power status (and by exten- 
sion superpower status), is a joint function of the balance 
between defense, consumption and investment (or military, 
economy and infrastructure); when all three are present, then 
Great Power status is achieved. When these elements are 
present dispro-portionately, then Superpower status is 
achieved. (By this description, it might be said that the 
USSR was never a superpower) . That a country may once have a 
surfeit of these elements relative to its neighbors, only to 
lose them or be surpassed, is not to say that decline took 
place, but that natural growth occurred. 

Nye deals with much the same information, suggest- 
ing that the U.S. can draw on its strengths and prepare a 
strategic vision for ensuring the world's continued economic 
and social evolution through unrestricted trade. This latter 
suggestion is more of a mandate, due to the requirement for 
maintaining open access to trade and other interaction as the 

285 



world continues to grow smaller. If trade blocs were to 
develop, tit for tat measures would actually increase the cost 
of domestic economies rather than provide protection as 
intended. ^^' 

Reich touches on yet another aspect of global 
economies, namely that regardless of ultimate ownership of a 
particular product, what counts is the skill of your work 
force, because they are your real asset. ^'^^ He goes on to 
reiterate that closed borders and trade wars serve to do more 
damage than not . 

Toffler's work addresses the interdependence of 
contemporary life, but he goes beyond this and speaks of much 
more fundamental change. Evolutions are now occurring which 
will have the same impact that previously occurred with the 
shifts from hunting to agriculture and from agriculture to 
industry. The "powershift" now underway, which will profound- 
ly alter the manner in which we do things, has to do with 
speed and how economies and societies process information. 
Wealth and power are now more dependent upon knowledge than 
upon industrial might or raw armies. What you know, how fast 
you know it, and the timeliness of deliveiry is what counts in 
today's world. Again, continued interaction amongst societies 
is crucial for cooperation and access to necessities. Speeds 
of transactions and economies will approach real time; we can 
expect, as a matter of natural course, interaction to cross 
national borders in ways unimaginable a short while ago.^^^ 

286 



These comments all point to emergent times where 
advances in communications and other processing devices 
(computers, etc.), will have ineradicable effects on how we 
live our lives and who we live them with. Flexibility and 
openness are key elements. The U.S. may well be in a relative 
state of "decline", but simultaneously the U.S. will be miles 
ahead of other societies regarding issues of quality of life, 
legal matters, education, religious tolerance, family, and the 
new universal culture where races, cultures, creeds, and 
genders genuinely intermix. Some of these issues seem 
ephemeral and not the stuff of national pride, but those areas 
that represent the highest danger for potential and real 
damage in the decades ahead are precisely those areas where 
fanaticism, ideology and nationalism gone awry - old solutions 
for new dilemmas - will interrupt requisite global interaction 
and interdependence, try to assert themselves, and cause 
friction and harm to the possible point of hostilities. 

These several authors, then, provide more ammuni- 
tion for the premise that efforts must be made to maintain 
interaction with China and to draw China into further partici- 
pation in the world community. 

The Chinese themselves are pursuing various 
avenues of activity, as we have seen. We have also seen that 
a very natural outlet for Chinese interest and activity is 
into and through the Middle East. The U.S. should not be 
upset by this turn of events, as long as international 

287 



standards of decency, and so on, are met. It would be 
appropriate, in fact, for the U.S. to encourage Chinese 
involvement in the Middle East and wherever else, as long as 
it is not intended in an exclusive manner. ^^° 

Perspectives from Stephanie Neuman are added to 
this section to highlight aspects of the evolving New Order, 
also for the opportunity to stress that her difficult position 
is now irrevocably untenable. Neuman 's premise has been that 
the superpowers and other primary arms suppliers, in the event 
of major conflicts, could and would - through concerted and 
mutual overt or covert action - affect the outcome of the 
conflict by regulating the flow of arms to that region. 
Regardless of how nice it would be if this were true, the 
sources for arms have - like everything else - grown and 
represent not only an increase in suppliers or retailers, but 
also in producers. 

Traditional producers of armaments are of course 
still active. These include the U.S., C.I.S. (former USSR), 
France, Germany, Britain, Italy, China, Israel, and oth- 
g^gisi There are also additional producers entering the 
world arms industry, and old producers that are becoming more 
active. Additionally, as the New Order emerges, those 
countries who once may have relied on the U.S. or some other 
power to provide their security, now are relying more on 
themselves. Hence arms sales are finding new buyers. 



288 



During the Iran-Iraq war, China's arms supplies to 

those beliggerents were not part of U.S. and USSR equations to 

control that conflict, rather the U.S. and USSR were reacting 

to the PRC ' s sales/inputs to the region. These sales by China 

indicated her willingness to be independent as an arms 

producer and supplier; China did not first confer with the 

U.S. or USSR before proceeding with those transactions. In 

the words of a then contemporary observer: 

"The extension of the Iran-Iraq war runs 
counter to the will of the two superpowers, 
but they cannot press the beliggerents to 
cease fire as they did in the Arab-Israeli war 
in 1973 . The ability of the superpowers to 
control Middle East affairs is diminish- 
ing."^" 

As China, Israel, Brazil, and other producers of 
arms become more active and independent, the ability of any 
one power, or any one pair or trio of powers, on a regular 
basis, to control the flow of arms to any particular area, 
will be severely curtailed. Each case may well require 
another coalition, diplomatically or in the field, to control 
the flow of goods into and out of the region. 

A significant aspect of (former) USSR and PRC 
relations with the Middle East has been their respective 
participation in the flow of arms to that region. In 1985 35% 
of the world's arms imports went to the Middle East region, 
which is a decrease from 1983 when the Middle East recorded 
its highest intake of weaponry. While the U.S. and (former) 
USSR together accounted for approximately 63% of all arms 



289 



sales worldwide and over half of the arms sales going to 
developing countries, China's arms exports reached $2b in 
1984, or half that of France and one fifth that of the U.S.. 
Most of the PRC ' s arms sales have been going to the Middle 
East and represent an older, though reliably constructed, 
style of conventional weaponry which carries a lower price tag 
than that of munitions available elsewhere. Even though over 
half of all developing country's military needs are being met 
by the U.S. and USSR, this added PRC source - again, almost 
entirely going to the Middle East, sometimes via unofficial 
channels - was an important factor which alone helped Iran and 
Iraq to continue their war for 8 long years. The Soviet (and 
American) arms exports represent fairly constant figures 
throughout at least the preceding decade, whereas the PRC 
figures indicate a sharp increase from a modest $175m level in 
1977 to their current amounts. The $2b of Chinese arms sales 
in 1984 fell to $575m in 1985 and $l.lb in 1986 as Middle East 
demand slackened, but clearly the PRC capacity for production 
and sales is there. These figures represent the following 
percentages of total national exports: China 7.2% ($2b); 
France 4.2% ($4. lb); USA 4.9% ($10. 6b); USSR 19.7% ($18b).^" 
3 . The UN and Regional Issues 

Concomitantly, it likewise behooves the U.S. to 
maintain the strength and dispassionate character of interna- 
tional organizations, particularly the UN. 



290 



As we've seen, China is interested in stability, but 
a stability where everyone is an independent actor, or at 
least not dominated by the influence of any one major power or 
superpower. This would be analogous, relative to the Cold War 
period, of international anarchy, with China being the largest 
bulwark to safeguard against it (the center) . Typically China 
does not think in terms of alliances: "good relations do not 
require an alliance" . ^^^ (This is the case even though China 
may have sought normalization with the U.S. to offset Soviet 
activity and less-than-agreeable presence along her northern 
border) . As such, it therefore becomes incumbent on us to 
keep China involved in international organizations. 

Other regional issues that come to mind, and which 
will be front and center both in China and the Middle East, 
have to do with the environment. This is no longer a "pretty" 
subject, to clean up the park or regional waterway. Rather, 
this subject is taking on serious implications, with ramifica- 
tions similar to those regarding the eventual disappearance of 
liquid fossil fuel reserves. What happens when there is not 
enough water to drink in the Nile, in the Jordan, when Turkey 
gathers so much water behind the Ataturk Dam that Syria and 
Iraq lose 40% of the Euphrates? Desalinization is one answer. 
Whatever the response, it needs to be an international effort, 
and both China and the Middle East need to participate in the 
formulation and implementation of that effort. 



291 



Then, once desalinization occurs, subsequent popula- 
tion growth can not be allowed to grow unchecked, without some 
sort of responsible mediation. There are still other resourc- 
es to think about, employment to find, and space to breathe 
in. 

Regarding U.S. security requirements, much discussion 
is now centered on the Pentagon's recent draft proposal of 
endeavoring to keep the U.S. a military superpower. Further, 
not only to keep the U.S. in superpower status, but also to 
prevent anyone else from acquiring that same status. Without 
wanting to sound alarmist or defeatist, I doubt if that is a 
workable policy. It almost sounds like a blueprint for 
confrontation; the world as it is developing does not need any 
more confrontation built into it. We should remain strong, 
but if others also wish to become militarily strong, it will 
be difficult for us to preclude that. 

The opening paragraphs in this chapter spoke of 
intertwined and interacting economies, changing environments, 
new trade patterns, an evolving New Order. The prognosis was, 
aside from a period of transition, basically good - even going 
so far as to postulate the high probability of having Japanese 
and/or EEC representatives in our Congress. Regardless of how 
shocking or unorthodox that particular scenario might seem, 
there are other far less sanguine alternatives. If old 
solutions are attempted for current dilemmas, if nationalism 
is resurrected as a panacea, if ideology (east-west) or racism 

292 



(occident-orient ) or wealth (north-south) become rallying 
points, then sparks may well fly. Hard and fast trade blocs 
could also generate unassuageable competition, leading again 
to sparks. Sparks, as part of contemporary arsenals, with 
delivery mechanisms, throw weight, TNT equivalencies, and ever 
increasing accessibility (whether over-the-counter or via 
basement laboratories), will render future overt arguments to 
be very deadly and painful, as well as probably unnecessary, 
regardless of how short or long the altercation might be. It 
is absolutely imperative that the U.S. mandate, therefore, as 
a basis for all of its policy directives, the requirement to 
establish and maintain dialogue, leading to interaction on a 
less-than-hostile plane. This mandate must include support of 
the United Nations and other world bodies. 

B. U.S. AND THE MIDDLE EAST 

Interdependence between the U.S. and the Middle East was, 
for several years, increasing almost on a daily basis. Israel 
was alternately a democratic outpost in the region, or our 
strategic ally to offset the strength of the Soviet Union. 
The Islamic states were, of course, the great providers of 
oil, and as such could be counted on to receive support from 
almost any major industrial power in the world. Small items 
that affected the Middle East were also felt in various places 
around the globe. 

Both Israel and the Arabs had procured and/or built vast 
quantities of sophisticated arms. The Sinai, Negev, and Golan 

293 



Heights were battlefields three times over, and new antago- 
nisms have extended hostilities into other quarters of the 
Islamic world. Mistrust between Persian and Arab is no less 
than it has ever been, and even the Arabs themselves are now 
looking over their shoulders . 

In addition to all this, the world decided to become a 
different place. We still have two superpowers, but their 
locations have changed, and one is doing his best to grow out 
of adolescent development stages. Europe's police vigilance 
has dissipated, and activity on the Pacific is escalating in 
exponential increments. 

Returning to the Middle East, we now have the same oil 
producers, but the strategic value of Israel - aside from the 
question of its survival as one country - is now of some 
question. The central role the U.S. has played in the region 
since World War II is also evolving. We needn't protect the 
northern tier, at least not from Soviet hordes (but rather, 
perhaps, from Islamic Fundamentalism). Israel is now on 
speaking terms with the two other Major Powers who once tried 
to make life so difficult for her. One of them is even giving 
Israel a sizable chunk of its population, as they emigrate 
south. 

New questions arise as to who has what responsibility now, 
and for what, or against what. Israel is still armed to 
extremis, and has the most potent, inch for inch, arsenal in 



294 



the world, as well as a mobilization factor that is terribly 
efficient . 

What does the U.S. do now, with the Middle East almost a 
different place? What emphasis do we continue to provide on 
the peace process that has gotten underway? 
1. Israel 

Israel's "presence" within the U.S., as well as the 
Levant, has always been significant: personal ties, families, 
the Israeli lobby, military supply lines and increased high- 
tech interaction (Star Wars), to name a few. 

Two items that focus in even further when thinking of 
this relationship: Israel's mind boggling annual aid figure 
from the U.S. that obviously is carrying their economy, and 
their hefty military arsenal (not to forget about Dimona) . 

Any policy developments between the U.S. and Israel in 
the coming years must address at least these two items. We 
should add a third: namely that of the Middle East regional 
(and international) peace process that is now underway. 

In dealing with those items, other issues will present 
themselves, and they include the state of the Levantine 
environment (water) , population pressures on economies that 
are already strained (including Israel's), and the matter of 
deciding how to go about maintaining a viable (conventional) 
deterrent in the Middle East, when each opponent has an entire 
array of hostile options from which to choose. 



295 



Sooner or later, risks have to be taken; every 
possible contingency simply can't be protected against or 
warded off. But which risk? And who takes it? 

Now that there is a big "General Store" over the 
horizon, that adds another interesting variable to the already 
complex equation. 

Clearly, decisions can not be made without consulta- 
tion, and no one should expect to receive what he wants, and 
perhaps not even what he or she thinks he or she might need. 
There will have to be introduced into the region a mechanism 
whereby armaments can be kept track of, and perhaps with that 
some sort of ceiling specifying what the arbitrary cut-off 
point will be for weapons that are too dangerous and those 
that are OK. 

Equally as clear, the Israel economy will have to 
stand on its own feet. Since the aid amounts are so incredi- 
ble, some sort of phased program specifying so much percent 
per year reduction in aid, with annual review of the formula, 
as long as the aid keeps going down. Figures showing only 25% 
of the labor force in industry, with a socialized center, and 
productivity lower than most of western Europe, do not 
indicate a healthy situation. 

Israel's slice of the U.S. aid pie is one-fifth of 
total U.S. economic, development, and military aid ($3b/year), 
plus another $3b/yr from other sources. U.S. annually has 
been buying $lb of defense related items from Israel. On top 

296 



of these numbers, Israel has 20% of its work force in defense 
related industries; if the U.S. was to reduce this defense 
related support, it would be a significant blow to Israel. 

Israel is basically addicted to U.S. aid, and needs to 
start some sort of antabuse or AA program; Israel should be 
able to stand on its own two feet. Current per capita U.S. 
aid to Israel is $680, for Egypt it's $41, $4.80 for Pakistan, 
and $1 for Africa. ^^^ With the imbalances now so prevalent 
the world over, those ratios simply must become more equita- 
ble. The New Order requires that we do what we can to redress 
these imbalances . 

As for environmental resources, the inhabitants will 
have to be the keepers of that issue, and decide how much they 
want to do without, or how much they are willing to pay 
(extra) to not do v/ithout (desalinization) . 

Israel historically is not shy about following its own 
dictates, or what it perceives to be in its best (security) 
interests. We need only to recall the (still unresolved) USS 
LIBERTY affair, also the Pollard spy scandal, and other items, 
to realize the implications of Israel's intentional power. It 
is crucial that we keep Israel involved somehow with interna- 
tional organizations, much as it was crucial to do the same 
with China. It will not be healthy for either China or Israel 
to go off on their own to who knows where. 

The UN should try as best it can to keep tabs on these 
several issues, and feel free, within proper jurisdiction 

297 



guidelines, to step in and see how watertight the ships of 
state are. 

a. Arab-Israeli Dilemma 

The Arab-Israeli dilemma alone poses difficulties 
that 4 years of diplomacy and several wars have not managed 
to solve; in its most simple formulation the dilemma seems to 
have devolved into a problem involving an exchange of territo- 
ry for peace, although other ingredients underlie this 
exchange. Compounding this dilemma are: 1) complex Israeli 
politics; 2) Arab Petrol politics infused with degrees of 
Islamic fervor; 3) indigenous technologies; 4) typically 
unquestioned U.S. support to Israel; 5) (former) Soviet 
presence within the region; 6) UN involvement; 7) old fash- 
ioned hatred weaving through different strata; 8) an increas- 
ingly internationalized interest in this problem by other 
states including China; 9) the dilemmas attendant to tensions 
or other outcomes when religious value is associated with 
physical places or symbols. 

The Knesset must be receptive to peace issues. 
Deliberate sandbagging to gain time and a larger status quo 
are not honorable methods. Shamir, on the day after the 
elections, openly said that if he had had the opportunity, he 
would have dragged out the peace talks as long as possible so 
as to build as many settlements as possible all over the West 
Bank. Intransigence, regardless of the side of the fence that 
it's on, is equally damaging to the fence. 

298 



It should be noted that: 1) Israel's negotiating 
team for the Mid East peace talks indicated that Israel is 
prepared to bargain with Syria over new borders - a reference 
to the Golan Heights - but not insofar as it would mean a 
return to the 1967 frontiers; 2) Retired senior officers, in 
1972, were more willing to trade land for peace than was the 
Israeli population in general. 

The U.S., or the UN, may have to decide to what 
extent it is willing, or unwilling, to allow its policies and 
actions to be dictated by religious ideologies. In other 
words, the separation of Church and State as an issue is not 
yet settled, because it may well have to be applied on a 
global basis, and not just internally by various national 
polities. Applicable topics include the status of Jerusalem, 
international terrorism, nationalism that is indistinguishable 
from proselytizing. 

b. Israeli U.S. Lobby 

The legendary Israeli lobby, that is "virtually 
unmatched" , might acquire principles in keeping with the 
realities of a complex situation. The sixty pro-Israel PACs 
in the U.S., up against only 2 or 3 pro-Arab PACs, are holding 
forth in a grand manner, but also in a very grand style; the 
style does not match the complexity. As a small example of 
their power, the Israeli military attache went to the Pentagon 
in October 1973, and requested Maverick anti-tank missiles: 



299 



"If you can get the missiles, we can take care of 

6 

Another example of resources, where the cost does 
not quite match the justification: Carter decided in March 
1979 to provide Israel access to the KH-11 satellite, some- 
thing Israel had wanted since its launch 3 years earlier. 
This decision was very unpopular with U.S. Intel community, 
because it meant that the satellite's fuel would be used 
faster, and it would be less available for U.S. agencies. 

As if all that were not enough, AIPAC was prepared 
to argue (over a year ago) that a further increase in U.S. aid 
to Israel was justified, "even if programs for Americans must 
be cut back".^" That does not compute. 
2. Other Middle East States 

The Middle East is clearly in the midst of an exciting 
stage in its history. Lifestyles are changing, relationships 
and responsibilities are undergoing redefinition, new possi- 
bilities and new requirements are being tempered by tradition- 
al textual interpretations. There is clearly much to be done, 
and much to redefine. The region should be able to deal with 
itself without resort to hostilities. When aberrations are 
noted, there needs to be some sort of procedure to be able to 
deal with it. 

If and when fundamentalist regimes are voted in by 
democratic means, we should not exert undue influence to 



300 



having them removed. Sooner or later they will be voted out; 
the inhabitants must reach those conclusions themselves. 

Recent finds, via satellite and ancient maps, of the 
lost Arabian city of Ubar in present day Oman provide glimpses 
of a time when the Silk Road was in full tilt; how appropriate 
for that city to be unearthed when the Silk Road is about to 
go back into operation. Also the discovery, in the same 
fashion, of what may be the ancient metropolis of Saffara near 
what is now Salalah. This second site probably controlled the 
entire coastal sea trade from at least 1500 B.C.E. until 300 
C.E., when both cities were abandoned, probably because the 
frankincense trade lost its value after the Roman Empire 
collapsed. ^^^ 

Regional methods of discourse and redress and planning 
should be devised. The GCC and ACC, along with the UN and 
current Peace process should all be investigated for timeli- 
ness, purpose, efficacy, and all the rest. Clearly the region 
is not communicating or performing as optimally as it could 
be. 

a. Infrastructure and Resources 

Environment is now just as crucial an issue as 
ideology ever was. Who lives where is surely just a moot 
question, if in fact underlying it is the reality that no one 
is able to live anywhere. In a semi-perverse kind of way, 
"quality of life" now has a real tangible side to it. The 
fact that water is rapidly becoming another precious commodity 

301 



throughout the Middle East, and a primary bargaining chip or 
bone of contention between states, speaks of the way resources 
have been mismanaged. 

The other intangible environment should be 
addressed. Religion and government need to accommodate each 
other. Fear or misunderstanding ought not be the principles 
which guide unknowns. Governments need to be able to communi- 
cate to other governments, and the inhabitants need to gear up 
for a period of potential protracted change. 

Water resources again need to be examined and 
equitably resolved: the Jordan River basin, Dead Sea, Arabian 
Aquifer, desalinizatin : they are issues that mandate regional 
interaction, and not unilateral control. 
b. Islam 

The Middle East is probably experiencing, as we 
saw in chapter three, a similar adjustment in its relationship 
to the practice of power as now occurring in China. Starting 
with the patriarchal tradition, conjoined with Islam (where 
sacred and secular are indistinguishable) , and experienced 
through a Sheikh or Imam or Sultan or some other figure whose 
word was literally law, and where law was not complicated but 
fairly black and white {lex talionis in the desert), the 
result is more of a familiarity with or expectation of 
absolutes, rather than discussion or voting or even the work 
of a jury. From this it follows that Sadat and King Fahd and 
Saddam and King Hussein are, to a certain extent, solitary 

302 



figures. Also that they are even expected to be that way. In 
other words, they continue to utilize time honored methods, 
but in settings where populations have mushroomed, education 
is engendering opportunities, the rank and file are finding 
choices and want to choose, and nascent (but basically 
foreign) institutions of national scope are just beginning to 
find their way in a world still in the shade, more or less, of 
patriarchy. Also, these rulers are aware of possibilities 
that the rank and file are not, the hierarchy have intelligen- 
tsia in their families, more and more persons are being 
schooled in other cultures, and Islam is having to deal with 
modernization in a big way. 

Typically the response has been to attack 
westernization as evil or imperialistic. But in order to 
compete with modernization, to garner its benefits without the 
dross, Islam will first have to embrace it and make its own 
determination instead of standing afar off 

Islam is struggling to define what is Islamic. 
Somehow it needs to be able to function in the contemporary 
world without thinking that the world is out to get it . Means 
need to be established whereby Middle East/Arab nations find 
ways to compete with non-Islamic countries (in economic 
markets, on the battlefield, in the classroom) . 

Among the changes we are dimly witnessing may well 
be the forefront of an Islamic Reformation, or another way in 



303 



which the Koran is seen so as to become a part of life, 
instead of life itself, or to understand life more equitably. 
d. An Honest Broker 

Israel will have to generate an effective combina- 
tion of creative diplomacy with military and commercial R&D to 
combat the regional advantage provided by the petro-dollars of 
her neighbors. More and more, whether it's missiles or salt 
resistant plants, it can be had in exchange for $ or services. 
Israel will not find that working from strength will be 
sufficient, because everyone will be a goliath in a few years. 

Quite possibly the U.S. will eclipse its opportu- 
nity to serve as an honest broker in the Middle East, espe- 
cially after recent history. Part of that lies with the Arabs 
having been diplomatically and collectively behind the Eight 
Ball for so long. Part of that lies in the seeming duplicity 
with which the U.S. has apportioned its decisions and aid. 
But an International Conference is in the works, which means 
that Russia and the PRC, among others, are on the scene. It 
might even mean that China alone becomes the "disinterested" 
mediator; the "General Store" with a heart. 

What is clear in the midst of all this conjecture, 
is that the U.S., as part of its policy formulation prepared- 
ness, will need to be able to gauge as accurately as possible 
the intentions and perceptions of the C.I.S., PRC and Middle 
East. Again, ideology and polarity should not be topics that 
hold sway or overwhelm; they must be reconsidered to emphasize 

304 



the need for clarity and to avoid categorizing issues under 
traditional rubrics that may have long since ceased to be of 
value, if indeed they ever had any value. The methodology of 
analyzing issues - knowing what to analyze - is seen to be 
just as important as the issues themselves. 
3 . The UN and Regional Issues 

The UN is acquiring its own raison d'aitre. The Gulf 
War, engineered by President Bush, may have sent more prece- 
dent in the direction of the United Nations Security Council 
than was perhaps intended. The U.S. must come to grips with 
our relative position; the U.S. must stand for what it 
believes and believe what it stands for, but it should not 
coerce, and should also recognize that the goals and percep- 
tions of an international body will not always coincide with 
those of our own; when that happens, we must not assume that 
one side or the other is correct. 

Israel's refusal to allow UN observers into Gaza and 
the West Bank spells another ominous precedent; unfortunately, 
such a precedent cannot be encouraged. It could be that we 
are entering an era where the primary roles for armed forces 
are international peace keeping, or some sort of environmental 
policing. 

Recent discovery of oil in a disputed region between 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen is starting to draw out true colors 
among the inhabitants of the Peninsula. Yemen desperately 
needs the money from oil revenues, and regards the territory 

305 



in question as Yemen's. Saudi won control over the area in 
1934 during a war with N. Yemen, and the treaty will be up for 
renewal in 1994. Yemen is now producing 200,000 bpd, and 
expects new finds to generate a total of 800,000 bpd; 12 of 
the 20 oil concessions currently working this oil find are in 
this area claimed by Saudis. 

One of Saudi Arabia's concerns might reflect that with 
a larger population in Yemen (13m) than in Saudi Arabia (10m), 
this oil find might well tip the balance scales over a period 
of 20 years or so in the direction of Yemen. Yemen's unifica- 
tion is doing well, but the country needs income from the oil. 
Current production is 220,000 bpd, and is expected to rise to 
350,000 bpd by 1995. 

Yemen joined Iraq, Jordan and Egypt to form the Arab 
Cooperation Council before Gulf War, to balance the GCC . 
During the Gulf War, Yemen appeared to back Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia evicted about 800,000 Yemeni migrant workers (hundreds 
of millions of remittances per year) ; unemployment increased 
by more than a third and now 40%. Saudi Arabia is serious 
about this episode, and has said it will take "any necessary 
action to protect the sanctity of its borders" in a letter to 
the oil companies in the region. The Saudis must genuinely be 
concerned, even scared. Hunt Oil of Texas is the only 
concession to ignore the Saudis, and continues to pump 180,000 
bpd in the Marib area.^^^ 



306 



One hopeful indication is the slowing of population 
growth around the world. Egypt and Thailand family preferenc- 
es are changing from 4 children per family (cpf) in the 1970s, 
to just over 2 cpf in the 1980s. But only half of all women 
in the developing world yet have access to family planning. 
East Asia has compiled the best record for reducing population 
growth, from 6.1 cpf in early 1960s, to 2.7 cpf in late 1980s. 
70% of couples in China practice some form of birth control. 
World population, now 5.4 billion, has more than doubled this 
century and can be expected to rise to 6.2 billion by the year 
2000. UN projections are forecasting that number to double 
again, or perhaps to even triple, before stabilizing in the 
middle of the next century. Pakistan's current population 
could also double again in another 20 years at its present 
rate of growth. (Japan's birth rate now 1.53, which is a 
declining rate, and one of the lowest among industrialized na- 
tions) .^'° 

As a major supplier of weapons for Israel, the U.S. is 
being left in the lurch: a 1977 GAO study found that it took 
the U.S. four years to rebuild its supply of M-113 tanks after 
the Israeli 1973 war, due also to the U.S.' policy of continu- 
ing weapons sales and deliveries to other international 
customers (e.g. Morocco), before supplying our own troops. 

The U.S. confirmed Saudi Arabia's illicit transfer of 
military hardware, reportedly indicated to us by two PRC 
diplomats, to Iraq, Syria and Bangladesh. This transaction 

307 



is, by present standards, fairly harmless, coming as it does 
in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Saudi Arabia is now trying 
to purchase 72 F-15 aircraft from U.S. (San Diego Union- 
Tribune, 21 April 1992). 

Saudi Arabia, after the Gulf War experience, is 
seeking to thoroughly improve its own forces to the extent of 
having offensive capabilities. The U.S., seeking its own land 
based materiel located in the region, and not looking forward 
to a squabble between the Saudis and Israelis, is not support- 
ing the Saudis desire on this point. In terms of expenditure, 
by 1980 Saudi Arabia was ranked 6th overall and 1st in per 
capita military spending. The Saudi total military budget was 
then $20. 7b. Military purchases from the U.S., through 1980, 
totaled $34. 9b (most of which had been made since 1973). In 
that same Gulf region, from 1950-1970, a total of $1.2b of 
U.S. arms went to Iran, and from 1971-1977 that figure 
escalated to $21. Ob, with $5. 7b in 1977 alone. "^" 

The U.S., therefore, needs to come to terms with how 
it allocates aid funding, needs to accept its position as the 
major arms supplier for the Middle East, and needs to encour- 
age the peace process, along with doing what it can to 
alleviate and solve pressing environmental problems (that will 
shortly be crises) . 

Charles Birch, the 1990 Templeton Prize winner, speaks 
to some of these issues in his book On Purpose , and he 
suggests very simply that we need to be concerned about our 

308 



surroundings whether or not they are useful to us. We no 
longer have the luxury of choice over what to save and what to 
despoil: there are no more Wild Wests. Quality decisions 
require seeing or placing equal value on all things. Generic 
values, rather than mere management, will make the difference. 

Policy formulation's new challenge will be to cut 
across traditional national fences and address the heart of 
the issue(s). Ideologies, assumptions, and prejudices, 
whether of nationalistic, religious, or worse varieties, 
simply do not apply any more, and can not be tolerated. 

To reiterate earlier suggestions regarding the 
fluidity of the Middle East and China, it is helpful to keep 
in mind the region's development, geography, neighbors, and 
avenues of discourse with surrounding regions (particularly 
China) . The Middle East is a natural window on Asia, it is a 
region of movement . 

In retrospect, regarding Chinese-Middle East rela- 
tions: I discovered little in the literature that dealt with 
the subject as a whole. Aside from sporadic articles, plus a 
few pre-Tienanmen journal pieces that broached the topic of 
"China wooing the Arabs", there are exceptionally few students 
of this subject. Even if we do not take an interest in the 
relationship between those two regions, both the Middle East 
and China are doing just that: there is considerable activity 
between them, and it is going to increase. 



309 



APPENDIX - SIGNIFICANT CALENDAR YEAR DATES FOR CHINA AND THE 
MIDDLE EAST 



CHINA: 



Founder's Day (ROC) 
New Year's Day (PRC) 
New Fourth Army Incident 
Zhou Enlai 
La Ba Festival 
Abdication of Pu Yi 
Chinese New Year 

aka: Spring Festival 
Lantern Festival 
Feb. 28 Incident (ROC) 

aka: 2-28 
Qingming Festival 

aka: Clear and Bright Festival 
April Fifth Incident 5 Apr 

aka: 4-5 Revolutionary Act 
May Day 

May Fourth Movement 
May Thirtieth Incident 
Tienanmen Massacre 

aka: Tienanmen (or) 6-4 
Dragon Boat Festival 
Marco Polo Bridge Incident 
Army Day 

Month of Ghosts begins 
Double Seventh Festival 
Moon Festival 

aka: Mid-Autumn Festival 
Confucious' Birthday 

aka: Kongfuzi 
National Day (PRC) 
National Day (ROC) 

aka: Double Ten; 10-10 
Double Ninth Festival 
Overseas Chinese Day (ROC) 
Chiang Kaishek 
Sun Yixian 
Mao Zedong 



1 Jan 










1 Jan 










4 Jan 


1941 








8 Jan 


1976 (d) 








22 Jan 


( 8th day, 


12th 


lunar 


month) 


12 Feb 


1912 








13 Feb 


( 1st day, 


1st 


lunar 


month) 


27 Feb 


(15th day. 


1st 


lunar 


month) 


28 Feb 


1947 









5 Apr (15 days after Spring Equinox) 
1976 



1 May 










4 May 


1919 








3 May 


1925 








4 Jun 


1989 








15 Jun 


( 5th day, 


5th 


lunar 


month) 


7 Jul 


1937 








1 Aug 


(PLA founded in 


1927) 




9 Aug 


( 1st day. 


7 th 


lunar 


month) 


15 Aug 


( 7th day. 


7th 


lunar 


month) 


21 Sep 


(15th day. 


8th 


lunar 


month) 


28 Sep 


551 B.C.E. 






1 Oct 


1949 








10 Oct 


1911 








15 Oct 


( 9th day. 


9th 


lunar 


month) 


21 Oct 










31 Oct 


1887 - 5 


Apr 197 5 




12 Nov 


1866 - 12 


Mar 1925 




2 6 Dec 


1893 - 9 


Sep 1976 





310 



ISRAEL 



Fatah Day 


1 


Jan 






Purim 


19 


Mar 






Egyptian-Israeli Peace 


26 


Mar 


1979 




Pesach (Passover) 


18 


Apr 






Holocaust Remembrance Day 


30 


Apr 






Theodor Herzl 


2 


May 


1860-1904 




Independence Day 


14 


May 


1948 




Six Day (June) War 


5 


Jun 


1967 




Shavuot 


7 


Jun 






Rosh Hashana 


28 


Sep 


(1st and 2nd 


days of 


Yom Kippur 


7 


Oct 


(10th day of 


Tishri) 


October (Yom Kippur) War 


6 


Oct 


1973 




Sukkot (Tabernacles) 


12 


Oct 






David Ben Gurion 


16 


Oct 


1886-1973 




UNSC Resolution 338 


22 


Oct 


1973 




1956 (Sinai-Suez) War 


29 


Oct 


1956 




Balfour Declaration 


2 


Nov 


1917 




Chaim Weizmann 


17 


Nov 


1874-1952 




UNSC Resolution 242 


22 


Nov 


1967 




Intifadah Anniversary 


8 


Dec 


1987 




Hanukkah 


20 


Dec 


(2 5th day of 


Kislev) 



OTHER MIDDLE EAST STATES: 



Islamic Calendar; The Muslim calendar is based on actual 
sightings of the moon. Accordingly, the observations of 
various feast days may vary by one or two days from place to 
place. The Islamic (lunar) year is 11 days shorter than the 
Gregorian (solar) year; hence Islamic feast days occur 11 days 
earlier each year when measured on the Gregorian calendar. 



Lailat Al-Ma'raj (Prophet's Night Journey to Heaven, 

aka: Ascension Day) 27 Rajab 1 Feb 1992 

Ramadan Mth before Shawwal 5 Mar 19 92 

Eid Al-Fitr (End of Ramadan) 

1 Shawwal 4 Apr 1992 

Hajj (Mecca Pilgrimage) 9 Dhu'l-Hijja 10-18 Jun 1992 
Eid Al-Adha (Feast of the Sacrifice) 

10 Dhu'l-Hijja 11 Jun 1992 

Muslim New Year 1 Muharram 1411 13 Jul 1991 

Mawlid Al-Nabi (Muhammad's Birthday) 

12 Rabia 17 Sep 1991 



311 



OTHER MIDDLE EAST STATES (cont)t 



Western Calendar; 



New Year ' s 
Army Day- 
Tree Day 
Anniversary of '63 

Revolution 
Anniversary of '79 

Islamic Republic 
"Desert Storm" 
Accession of 

Shaikh Khalifah 
National Day 
Revolution Day 
Nowruz 

Independence Day 
Sinai Day 
Labor Day 
Independence Day 
Evacuation Day 
National Day 
Revolution Day 
Revolution Day 
Iraq's Kuwait Invasion 
Accession of Ruler 
King Hussein's Accession 
Independence Day 
National Day 
Armed Forces Day 
King Hussein's Birthday 
National Day 
Sultan Qaboos ' 

Official Birthday 
Independence Day 
National Day 
National Day 



1 Jan 


(Bahrain/ Iraq/Kuw/Leb/Syria/UAE) 


6 Jan 


(Iraq) 


15 Jan 


(Jordan) 


8 Feb 


(Iraq) 


11 Feb 


(Iran) 


17 Feb 


'91 (Iraq/UN Coalition States) 


22 Feb 


(Qatar) 


25 Feb 


(Kuwait) 


8 Mar 


(Syria) 


21 Mar 


(Iraq) 


17 Apr 


(Syria) 


25 Apr 


(Egypt) 


1 May 


(Lebanon/Egypt /Iraq/ Jordan) 


25 May 


(Jordan) 


18 Jun 


(Egypt) 


14 Jul 


(Iraq) 


17 Jul 


(Iraq) 


23 Jul 


(Egypt) 


2 Aug 


'90 (Kuwait/Iraq) 


6 Aug 


(Abu Dhabi) 


11 Aug 


(Jordan) 


3 Sep 


(Qatar) 


23 Sep 


(Saudi Arabia) 


6 Oct 


(Egypt) 


14 Nov 


(Jordan) 


18 Nov 


( Oman ) 


19 Nov 


( Oman ) 


22 Nov 


(Lebanon) 


2 Dec 


(UAE) 


16 Dec 


(Bahrain) 



312 



FOOTNOTES 



1. The Middle East is still "coalescing" and has arguably been 
involved in that process since long before the middle of the 20th 
century. However, for purposes of this discussion, a temporal 
sounding board (which, when placed at 1949, is not entirely 
incorrect), is helpful to facilitate the generation of regional 
perspectives . 

2. Lucian W. Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre (University of 
Michigan, 1988) Chapter I. 

3. Bruce Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A History of 
China's Quest for Seapower (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 
1982) 28-43. 

4. According to James Chambers' The Devil's Horsemen , Mongolian 
advances beyond the Danube were halted only due to Genghis Khan's 
fortuitous death, requiring the collective absence of his Field 
Commander sons from their lines of advance for attention to 
requisite familial burial proceedings and rites of succession in 
Mongolia. The resultant hiatus included a redistribution of power; 
when added to logistic complications, this provided the breather 
required by a sleepy, divisive and incredulous Europe to stave off 
further Mongol encroachments. 

5. This predilection was responsible for the initial breakup of 
the Indian sub-continent into two (now three) states after gaining 
independence from Britain, not to mention the current strife 
occurring in India. It is also a major concern for the Soviets as 
many of their southern constituent Republics are composed primari- 
ly, if not entirely, of Islamic peoples. 

6. Yitzhak Shichor, The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy 
1949-1977 (Cambridge University Press, 1979) 2. 

7. Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy , 
(University of California Press, 1970) 10-18. Lillian Craig 

Harris and Robert L. Worden, eds, China and the Third World 
(Dover, Massachusetts: Auburn House, 1986) Chapter II. 

8. Kaifeng, in Henan, once housed the largest Jewish settlement in 
China. They arrived via the Silk Road around 1040 A.D., becoming 
very active in local society. The last rabbi in Kaifeng died in 
1850; a few hundred Sinified descendants remain. "China Discourag- 
es Ties With Jewish Minority, " Christian Science Monitor (CSM) (17 
July 1990) 5. 



313 



9. The Chinese government has been making efforts to resettle Han 
Chinese into outlying provinces; that process is intended, at least 
in part, to offset local Islamic majorities. CSM (2 August 1988) . 

10. Zhongqing Tian, "China and the Middle East: Principles and 
Realities," Middle East Review (Winter, 1985/86) 7. 

11. John King Fairbank, The Great Chinese Revolution; 1800-1985 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1987) 357. 

12. Michel Oksenberg, Remarks made at the World Affairs Council 
(WAC) of Northern California Symposium on Choices for China at 

Asilomar, 27-29 April, 1990. 

13. Fairbank 7. 

14. Fairbank; also Harlan W. Jencks, From Muskets to Missiles 
(Westview, 1982) . 

15. Frederic M. Kaplan, Julian M. Sobin and Stephen Andors, eds . , 
Encyclopedia of China Today (New York: Harper & Row) 218. 

16. Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics (Harvard University 
Press, 1985) Chapters III and VII. 

17. Ichisada Miyazaki, China's Examination Hell; The Civil Service 
Examinations of Imperial China (Yale University Press, 1981) . 

18. Kaplan 218-219; John King Fairbank, The United States and 
China (Harvard University Press, 1980) 74-77; Joseph Needham, 
Science in Traditional China (Harvard University Press: 1981) 128- 
131. 

19. Examples of items that first appeared in China are gunpowder, 
the compass, and printing, not to mention the mysteries of 
acupuncture, plus literairy and artistic achievements. The first 
three items were said to have been the core around which Europe was 
later to grow. 

20. This issue is discussed further in: Fairbank Chapters VII & 
VIII. Also in Albert Feuerwerker, China's Early Industrialization 

(Harvard University Press, 1968) . 

21. China and the USSR had not yet signed their 30 year Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation. 

22. Dwight H. Perkins, China: Asia's Next Economic Giant? 
(University of Washington Press, 1986) 9; Harry Harding, China ' s 
Second Revolution; Reform After Mao (Brookings Institution, 1987) 
30. 

23 . Harding 27 . 

314 



24. Harding Chapter II. 

25. It was the "hard liner" Li Peng who said, in 1987, that there 
would be no retreat from partial economic reform measures. 

26. Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) (13 February 1992). 

27. CSM (10 March 1992). 

28. Claude A. Buss, "Hong Kong and Beijing: Trip Report", (March 
1992) . 

29. FEER (11 June 1992). 

30. Seattle Sun (28 June 1992). 

31. Andrew Marshall, DOD Analyst, at "U.S. in the Pacific" 
Conference, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 

(August 1987) . 

32. It should be noted, however, that any significant increase in 
PCGNP, especially the current official target of $1000 by year 
2000, will produce an immeasurable effect on a population whose 
current PCGNP is around $400. Not only would such an increase 
generate presumable improvements in individual living standards, 
but would also - most likely - correspond with developments in 
mobility, education, information sharing and general pluralism 
within a society that has known, universally, great hardship and 
arbitrary dictates. 

33. Dwight H. Perkins suggests a 1985 PCGNP of $500, which is 
almost twice the official number. Journal of Economic Literature 
(June 1988) . 

34. Leo A. Orleans, Chinese Students in America (Washington, 
D.C. : 1988) 79-80. 

35. Fang Lizhi, Bringing Down the Great Wall (Knopf, 1991) 234- 
236. 

36. Committee on Scholarly Communication with the PRC, A Relation- 
ship Restored: Trends in U.S. -China Educational Exchanges, 1978- 
1984 (National Academy Press, 1986) ; and Orleans Chinese Students 

37. From Li Yunqi , of Stanford, at the WAC N. Ca . symposium on 
Choices for China at Asilomar, 27-29 April, 1990. 

38. CSM (10 March 1992) . 

39. CSM 

40. Alvin Toffler, Powershift (New York: Bantam Books, 1990) xx. 

315 



41. International Herald Tribune (IHT) (23 May 1990). 

42. Los Angeles Times (LAT) (25 February 1992). 

43. CSM (29 January 1990). 

44. Asahi Evening News (AEN) (28 September 1990). 

45. Daily Yomiuri (DY) (27 May 1991). 

46. Pye, Mandarin 132. 

47. Information provided by PRC student, former employee of Jiang, 
now in U.S. ("Choices for China" Conference, sponsored by World 
Affairs Council of Northern California, Asilomar; 27-29 April 

1990) . 

48. R. D. McLaurin, Don Peretz, and Lewis M. Snider, Middle East 
Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1983) 239-241. 

49. Fred J. Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma (Syracuse University 
Press, 1985) 4, 543. 

50. NYT (1 May 1992) . 

51. McLaurin 157. 

52. LAT (30 April 1990) . 

53. McLaurin 135-136. 

54. McLaurin 155. Asher Arian, Politics in Israel (Chatham 
House, 1985) 28-30. 

55. Aaron S. Klieman, Israel and the World after 40 Years 
(Pergamon-Brassey's, 1990) 27. 

56. McLaurin 144. 

57. McLaurin 175. 

58. CSM (24 June 1991) . 

59. Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option (New York: Random House, 

1991) 271-283. 

60. Hersh 131. 

61. Hersh. 

62. CSM (19 August 1991). 



316 



63. CSM (14 March 1990). 

64. KPBS-TV (2 March 1992). Documentary on the Intifadah. 

65. McLaurin 32-33 . 

66. CSM (16 January 1992). 

67. CSM (8 March 1990) . 

68. The Middle East Review: 1990 59. 

69. McLaurin 66. 

70. CSM (4 March 1992). 

71. CSM {15 May 1990) . 

72. CSM (16 March 1992). 

73. CSM (5 June 1991) . 

74. McLaurin 209. 

75. CSM (12 June 1991) . 

76. CSM (8 March 1990) . 

77. "All Things Considered", National Public Radio (28 April 
1992) . 

78. NYT (5 March 1992) . 

79. "All Things Considered", National Public Radio (4 December 
1991) . 

80. Schichor 2. 

81. Hashim S. H. Behbehani, China's Foreign Policy in the Arab 
World (London: KPI, 1981) Appendix 5. 

82. The Japan Times (TJT) (26 December 1989). 

83. NYT (5 March 1992) . 

84. CNN (28 May 1991) . 

85. From discussion with a Chinese UN Mission official in New 
York, June 1988. 

86. Associated Press (26 December 1989). 

317 



87. Behbehani 42 8. 

88. CNN (13 March 1992). 

89. Zhongqing 13. 

90. "Made in China: sold in the Middle East", The Middle East No. 
143, September 1986. 

91. San Diego Union (SDU) (16 November 1991). 

92. National Public Radio (December 1991). 

93. From conversations with embassy officials in Muscat, and also 
with John Duke Anthony. 

94. Zhongqing 13. This was also confirmed by discussions with 
U.S. Embassy officials in Muscat, and with John Duke Anthony of the 
U.S. -Middle East Foundation in Washington, D.C. 

95. Harris & Worden 14-15. 

96. Harris & Worden 61. 

97. Harris & Worden 3-4, 9-10. 

98. Lillian Craig Harris, China's Foreign Policy Toward the Third 
World X. 

99. Shichor. 

100. Harris 75. 

101. Harris 62. 

102. CSM (21 October 1991). 

103. Harding, Asilomar, April 1990. 

104. McLaurin 169. 

105. Klieman 161. 

106. Klieman 170. 

107. LAT (25 January 1992). 

108. "China and the Middle East", The Middle East (September 
1987) . 

109. Klieman 170. 

318 



110. PEER (16 Jan 1992) . 

111. PEER (November 1991). 

112. PEER (30 November 1989). 

113. Zhongqing 13. 

114. Opening of the Berlin Wall in late 1989; North and South 
Korea sign an Armistice two years later. 

115. Civil War between the Serbs and Croats in what was formerly 
Yugoslavia; sporadic fighting throughout the new Central Asian 
Republics based on politics and ethnic/religious tensions; multiple 
claims on the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. 

116. Excluding the U.S. and former USSR, they are in order of 
size: China, India, Vietnam, North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan. 
The other three largest are Prance, Germany, United Kingdom. 
Taiwan is 14th, and the others (not necessarily in order of size) 
are: Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Israel. Japan is 23rd (although expendi- 
tures are at the same level as France, Germany, and Britain) . 

117. "The World's Biggest Boom", World Monitor (December 1991). 

118. Remarks by James H. Webb, Jr., Secretary of the Navy, at a 
National Press Club Luncheon (Washington, D.C.: 13 January 1988). 

119. Toffler 464. 

120. "Kissinger's World View", CSM (6 January 1989). 

121. Lester R. Brown, State of the World: 1991 (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 1991) 134. 

122. Chapter one, p. 4, and chapter three, p. 86. "The other guy" 
and "he" are used here strictly in generic senses. These terms 
represent male and female, groups, individuals, polities, regions, 
and so on. 

123. As quoted from various military greats. 

124. A case in point where direct intervention might be required 
is the current strife in the area formerly known as Yugoslavia. 
The discord there is reaching proportions that endanger adjoining 
areas, not to mention the utter mindlessness with which the strife 
is proceeding. 

Another case where potential direct intervention would not 
apply, are the June 1989 events of Tienanmen. No matter how 
deplorable we might regard that occurrence, it was contained within 
the polity and of short duration. Other avenues of showing our 



319 



displeasure were available to us, and we in fact used them 
correctly. 

125. Harrison E. Salisbury, The New Emperors (New York: Little, 
Brown, & Company, 1992) 319-336. 

12 6. MacFarquhar, Asilomar. 

127. SDU (26 April 1992). 

128. Harris & Worden 35-37. 

129. George Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East 
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Policy 

Research, 1971) 2-3. 

130. Harris & Worden 44. 

131. "The World's Biggest Boom", World Monitor (December 1991). 

132. Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead (New York: Basic Books, 1990) 
130-131. 

133. Harry Harding, ed., China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s 
(Yale University Press, 1984) 173-4. 

134. Dwight Perkins, International Consequences of China's 
Development . This is a splendid case of reverse engineering, even 
if only from a distance. 

13 5. Dwight Perkins, International Consequences 

136. Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, Arms Transfers to the 
Third World, 1971-85 (SIPRI: Oxford, 1987) 85. 

137. Bruce Swanson, 8th Voyage of the Dragon (USNI Press, 1982). 

138. Perkins, International Consequences 

139. Perkins, China: Asia's Next? 

140. Buss 4. 

141. DY (16 May 1991) . 

142. "The New Orient Express", World Monitor (November 1988). 

143. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New 
York: Random House, 1987) 423, 427. 

144. Nye Chapter VIII. 



320 



145. Robert B. Reich, The Work of Nations (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1991) . 

146. Toffler. 

147. This does not include the Spratlys and Paracels. Clearly 
China's interest in these Island groups exceeds current interna- 
tional norms, even if the Chinese may actually believe in the 
justification of their claims. 

148. The C.I.S., if not as active as was the USSR with production 
of armaments, at least for the moment, still has stockpiles of 
materiel that it is redistributing and selling. 

149. Zhongqing 12. 

150. World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1987 . ACDA, 
Washington, D.C. 

151. Buss 14. 

152. CSM (20 March 1990). 

153. CSM (28 June 1991) . 

I 154. CSM (20 March 1990). 

155. SDU (21 April 1992). 

156. NYT (7 June 1992) . 

157. CSM (17 September 1991 and 8 July 1992). 

158. Morris Mehrdad Mottale, The Arms Buildup in the Persian Gulf 
(University Press of America, 1986) 50. 



321 



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342 



Thesis 
I S336456 

1 




^^trnese-Hiddle East 
relations and the xr 
implications for U.S 
policy- 



1 



Thesis 

S336A56 

c.] 



Schieck 

Chinese-Middle East 
relations and their 
implications for U.S. 
policy.