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DiviNmr scaooL mm 

Noy«mb« 14. I92S 

rUrp< ^. ifUa-A^^:^, 


The Military Historical Society of Mas- 
sachusetts proposes to publish the papers 
which have been read at its meetings in a 
series of volumes under the f ollowbg titles : — 



A new and enlai^ged edition of "The Peninsular 
Campaign of General McClellan in i863|*' pnblished 
by the Society in i88z. (In Prtss.) 


•ral Pope. A new edition of the volume published 
in 1886. {InPrtss.) 



The Wilderness to Cold Harbor. 



Cedar Creek to Appomattox. 


April, 1863, to November, 1863. 


May to December, 1864. 



(/» Press.) 

Each volume will be sold separately. Price per vol- 
ume (8vo), ^2.00. 

Published for the Society by 


Boston and New York. 























NOVEMBER 14, 1925 


All rights reserved. 

The papers read before the Military Historical Society of 
Massachusetts, for the most part, have not been prepared to 
accord with a preconcerted plan, or with a view to publica- 
tion. In the process of classification they have arranged 
themselves in distinctive groups, as set forth in the scheme 
which appears herein opposite the title-page, illustrating, 
somewhat connectedly, the operations of the armies in Vir- 
ginia and of other armies in other parts of the wide region 
of war. 

The memoirs in this volume form, in a measure, an epi- 
tome of the history of the four years of conflict, as seen from 
different points of view, in special relation to the leaders and 
commanders of the greater campaigns, and will serve as an 
introduction to the monographs on those campaigns in the 
volumes which will follow in due season. 

Had the project of the volume been earlier conceived, an 
effort would have been made to obtain similar critical esti- 
mates of other distinguished commanders, upon whom, in 
crucial moments, the fortunes of the North and of the South 
depended ; to supply some of the deficiencies in the archives 
of the Society, in this respect, and to extend the range of 
view, Mr. Bopes has kindly permitted the addition of five re- 
views printed by him in the ^^ Atlantic Monthly " and ^^ Scrib- 
ner's Magazine." To the publishers of the magazines ac- 
knowledgment for the privilege of republishing these reviews 
is gratefully made. 




By John G. Ropes, Esq. 1 


By Colonel Theodore A. Dodob * 21 


By General Francis A. Walker 47 


By General James H. Wilson 69 


By John C. Ropes, Esq. . . , 97 


By John C. Ropes, Ebq. .125 


By John C. Ropes, Esq. 153 


By Colonel Henrt Stone . . * 163 


By Colonel Thomas L. Liyermorb 209 


By John C. Ropes, &q 245 

INDEX 273 


MASSACHUSETTS, 1876-1895 821 

CIETY, 1876-1895 839 


The Atulntio Monthly. October, 1891. No. 408, VoL LXVIIL "68 
AUantio Monthly." 

Badsau. Military History of UlysBM a Grant, from April 1861, to April 
1865. By Adam Badean. StoIs. New York, 1868-1881. "Badean." 

Campaigns of thb Ciyil Wab. 12 yols. Charles Soribner's Sons. 

The Army of the Cumberland. By Henry M. Cist VoL VIL "Cist" 
The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '66. By Andrew A. Hnmphreys. VoL 
Xn. " 12 Campaigns of the Ciyil War." 

CoNDUor OF THB Wab. Report of the Joint Conmiittee on the Conduct of 
the War. Supplement to Senate Report No. 142 (of the 38th Congress, 2d 
Session). 2 yols. Washington, 1886. [Printed with the Documents of the 
89th Congress, 1st Sessicm. VoL 1 contains reports of Major-Qeneral W. T. 
Sherman, and of Major^General G. H. Thomas, each paged distinctiyely.] 
"C.W. 1 Sup. Sherman's Report" "CW. 1 Sup. Thomas's Report" 

Gbakt. Personal Memoiis of U.S. Grant 2 yols. New York. "Grant's 

MoClbllak, C. G^eral Andrew A. Humphreys at Malyem Hill, Va., July 
1, 1862, and at Fredericksburg, Va., December 13, 1862. A Memoir by Can- 
well Mcaellan. St Paul: Priyately printed, 1888. 34 pages. "MoClel- 
lan's Humphreys." 

McClbllan, G. B. MoClellan's Own Story. The War for the Union ; the 
Soldiers who fought it ; the Cirilians who directed it, and his relations to it 
and to them. By Gkorge B. MoClellan, late Major-General commanding the 
Armies. New York, 1887. "O.S." 

MoClbllan, H. B. The Life and Campaigns of Major-General J. E. B. Stu- 
art, Commander of the Cayalry of the Army of Northern Yiiginia. By H. 
B. McQellan. Boston and New York, 1885. 

NiooLAT AND Hat. Abraham Lincoln : a Sstory. By John G. Nioolay and 
John Hay. 10 yols. New York, 1890. " N. & H." 

RiPLBT. The War with Mexico. By R. S. Ripley. 2 yols. New York, 1849. 

Roman. The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War between 
the States, 1861 to 1865. Liduding a brief Personal Sketoh and a Narratiye 
of his Services in the War with Mexico, 1846-48. By Alfred Roman. 2 yols. 
New York, 1884. " Roman's Beauregard." 

Shbbkan. Memoiis of General William T. Sherman. By Himself. 2 yols. 
New York, 1875. " Sherman's Memoirs." 


SwnnrOK. The TweWe DeoisiYe Battles of the War : A History of the Eastern 
and Western Campaigns, in Relation to the Actions that decided their Issne. 
By William Swinton. New York, 1867. " Sainton. Decisiye Battles." 

TuBGHiK. Ghiokamanga. By John B. Toichin. Chicago, 1888. "Tnrohin." 

Van Hobnb. History of the Army of the Cumberland, its Organization, 
Campaigns and Battles, written at the Request of Major-Gbneral Gkorge H. 
Thomas, chiefly from his Priyate Military Journal and Official and other 
Documents furnished by him. By Thomas B. Van Home, U. S. A. 2 toIb., 
and Atlas. Cincinnati, 1875. " Van Home, A. of C." 

Van Hobnb. The life of Major-Genezal George H. Thomas. By Thomas B. 
Van Home, U. S. A. New York, 1882. " Van Home's Life of Thomas." 

Walkkw. History of the Second Army Corps in the Army of the Potomac. 
By Francis A. Walker, Breyet Brig..Qen., U. S. V. New York, 1886. 
"Walker's 2d Corps." 

Wab Rboobds. The War of the Rebellion: a Com^nlation of the Official 
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Prepared under the direc- 
tion of the Secretary of War, by Byt Lieut-CoL Robert N. Scott, Thiid 
U. S. Artillery, and published pursuant to Act of Congress, approyed June 
16, 1880. Series L Vols. L-XLVL, Part I. 95 yols. Washington: Goy- 
emment Printing Office, 1880-1894. " W. R.'' 

Until the publication of VoL XXIV., Part I., the yolumes bore only the 
particular series designations in Roman numerals. As the references to the 
earlier yolumes haye been made in this book by their serial numbers, a table 
harmoniring the same with their series designadons is here giyen for the con- 
yenience of the student. 

SeriaftNoB. Serial Nob. Series Nob. Serial Nob. 

L 1 XrV 20 

n. 2 XV. 21 

m. 3 y^yj ( Part 1 22 

rV. 4 IPartlL 23 

V 5 xVTL i ^*^ ^ ^ 

VL 6 (Partn. 25 

Vn. 7 XVm 26 

Vin. 8 y^jy ( Part L 27 

IX 9 ^^'1 Partn 28 

^ ( Part 1 10 ^jr i Part L 29 

1 Partn. 11 1 Partn 30 

(Parti. 12 XXL 31 

XLjPartn 13 ^^j^CPartL 

'Partm. 14 ^^* (Partn. 

Parti. 15 xxmi^*^^ ^ 

Part n. 16 ■ ( Part IL 35 

Part n., part IL .... 17 ( Part L 36 

PartlEL 18 XXIV. ] Part n. 37 

TTTT 19 ( Part IIL 38 





Btprinttd bs ptrmimonjrom tht "Adantk MoiuUg,"/or April, 1884. 

The following is a list of the published writiiigB by Mr. Ropes, oonoerniiig 
the Civil War: — 

Life of Jambs Amobt Pebkins. In Harvard Memorial Biographies. 1866. 
VoL 1, pp. 396 to 403. 

Thb Abmt uin>EB Pope. Campaigns of the Civil War. IV. New York : 
Charles Scribner's Sons. 1881. 

A Few Words about Ssoessiok. Harvard Monthly, May, 1887. 

Memoib of Charles Dbvenb. [In] General Devens* Orations and Ad- 
dresses. Boston : Little, Brown & Co. 1891. 

The Stort of the Civil War: A Concise Acconnt of the War in the 
United States of America between 1861 and 1865. PartL To the Opening 
of the Campaign of 1862. New York : George P. Putnam's Sons. 1894. 

See List of Papers read before the Military Historical Society of Massachu- 
setts at the end of this volume. 


We have before us the military operations of General 
Beauregard ^ detailed in two large octavos. A considerable 
part of each volume consists of an appendix, containing official 
and other documents, many of them of great interest. There 
are excellent indices at the end of the second volume, both of 
the text and the documents. There are two portraits of the 
subject of the memoir. 

Colonel Boman has written a careful and exhaustive bio- 
graphy of lus chief. Beauregard, in the preface, indorses 
all lus statements and comments, excepting only his eulogi- 
ums upon Beauregard himself. The book is, we are obliged 
to say, imnecessarily long ; there is a good deal of repetition 
in it, and many episodes, especially those involving the per- 
sonal differences between General Beauregard and President 
Davis, are, in our judgment, dwelt upon with needless par- 
ticularity. But the work is xmquestionably a very valuable 
contribution to the history of the late war ; and from the 
standpoint of the student, it may well be that, looking at it 
as in great part consisting of m&moires pov/r seroir^ there is 
no excess either of material or of comment. 

No officer in the Confederate service had such a varied 
experience as Beauregard. From the capture of Fort Sumter 

1 Hie Military Operatioiis of General Beamegazd in the War between the 
States, 1861 to 1865. Indnding a brief personal sketch and a narratiTe of his 
servioes in the war with Mexico, 1846-48. By Alfred Roman, formerly GbUmel 
of the 18th Looisiana Yolonteers, afterwards Aide-de-Camp and Inspector^ 
General on the staff of General Beauregard. In two yolnmes. New York: 
Harper «& Brothers. 1884 


to the surrender of Johnston, he was ahnost constantly in 
active service, and it was his fortune to be connected with 
several of the most important and picturesque events of the 
war. It was under his direction and control that the militia 
of South Carolina surroimded Fort Sumter with their bat- 
teries and compelled its surrender. It was he who, with 
General Joseph E. Johnston, fought and won the first battle 
of BuU Bun, the cause of so much imfounded rejoicing, and 
the parent of so much vain confidence. It was he who, with 
General Albert Sidney Johnston, planned and carried out the 
brilliant and almost completely successful attack upon Grant's 
position at Pittsburg Landing, the first of a series of hard- 
fought, sanguinary, and indecisive engagements, of which our 
war furnished so many examples, (jit was through Beaure- 
gard's indomitable spirit and masterly engineering skOl that 
Fort Sumter and Charleston were so stoutly defended against 
the ironclad^^f Admiral Dahlgren and the batteries of Gen- 
eral CriUmore. } It was due to Beauregard's obstinate resolu- 
tion that Petersburg was not taken on the 16th and 17th of 
June, 1864, and the evacuation of Richmond anticipated by 
nearly a year. Finally, we find him again associated with 
Joseph E. Johnston, collecting the scattered and decimated 
forces of the tottering Confederacy, in the vain hope of arrest- 
ing Sherman's march through the Carolinas, until the surren- 
der at Grreensboro' ended the career begun at Sumter and 
Bull Run. /Wherever we see him we find him active, enter- 
prising, daring, — in fact, to the verge of rashness ; extremely 
methodical also, and most industrious. He impresses us as 
a man devoted to his profession, and simply to his profession. 
He does not seem to have been hampered by any of those 
feelings of responsibility, arising from a mingling of the 
duties of soldier and statesman, which to a greater or less 
extent imdoubtedly influenced the judgment of some of the 
most prominent generals on either side. Beaur^;ard appears 
always to have preserved a perfectly dear military head ; he 


was always capable of advising the most unwelcome measures, 
when he thought they were demanded by the situation^ to 
him Richmond even, and Charleston^ were only squares on the 
military chessboard. We shall have occasion to advert to 
this subject further on. Let us now briefly follow Greneral 
Beauregard through the war. 

After his reduction of Fort Sumter, with which we will 
not detain the reader, we find Beauregard in command of the 
main body of the Confederate forces at Manassas Junction, 
and Joseph E. Johnston in command of the troops in the 
Shenandoah YaUey. The principal Federal army, under 
McDowell, lay in front of Beaur^ard. Patterson, in the 
Valley, confronted Johnston. The enemy had adopted, under 
the advice of General Lee, a strictly defensive policy. Beau- 
regard, on the other hand, advised, as early as the 12th of 
Jxme, that Johnston should unite his forces with the main 
body, and that an effort should be made to capture Alexan- 
dria and Arlington Heights. But this suggestion was not 
received by the President with f avor,^ and things went on in 
the same way for another month, when it became evident that 
the National forces intended taking the offensive at an early 
day, and equally plain, at least to Greneral Beauregard, that 
the advance would be made against his army at Manassas, 
and not against Johnston's in the Shenandoah Valley. He 
therefore recommended the immediate transfer of the latter 
force to the main army. He sent an aide to Richmond on 
July 14 to represent the danger of a Federal advance with 
overwhelming numbers and to urge that he should be re-en- 
forced by the bulk of Johnston's army. As soon as this 
should be done, he proposed to take the offensive against the 
Federals in front of Washington. But Davis and Lee de- 
clined to act upon the suggestion. They may, as Colonel 
Boman claims, have been wrong ; but it strikes us as probable 
that the extremely sanguine hue which Beauregard gave to 



his project, and the predictions of unlimited success which 
he authorized his aide to make to the President and Greneral 
Lee, — such as " exterminating " Scott and McDowell, " driv- 
ing them into the Potomac," then going to the Valley and 
^^ destroying " Patterson, and after' this had been achieved 
re-enforcing Gramett in West Virginia and defeating McClel- 
lan, and finally crossing into Maryland, ^^ arousing the people " 
and attacking Washington, — may have had a good deal to do 
with their hesitation to take the first step which Beauregard 
proposed, the transfer to the army at Manassas of the bulk of 
the forces in the Valley. ^In fact, Beauregard's imagination, 
while it often enabled him to foresee the movements of the 
enemy with really astonishing accuracy, and to find ways and 
means of counteracting them, was generally allowed too prom- 
inent a place in his projects^ (Beauregard had a great deal 
of' the sanguine and excitame nature of a Frenchman about 
him; and this quality, tog^th^jwi^ his never- failing and al- 
way8,.X3qMie8§ ed belief that the course which he advocated 
wQul^be followed by comple te and overwhelm ing success, un- 
doubtedly jarred upon the nerves of the elderly Anglo-Saxon 
military men, Davis, Lee, Johnston, and the rest with whom 
he had to do, and created in their minds a feeling of distrust, 
which most of our readers will not fail to understand, and 
even, to a certain extent, to sympathize witE^^ Still, there can 
be no doubt that Mr. Davis and his advisers allowed their 
prejudices to carry them too far. Beauregard, in his advice 
to them at this time, as afterwards on other and also impor- 
tant occasions, was supplying a want which none of them 
could supply. \Jn imagination, in enterprise, in daring, he 
was their superior. His suggestions were, moreover, the 
suggestions of a trained military mind, in possession of all the 
facts of the case which could be at that time ascertainech)and 
so &ir as concerned the first step which he recommends, — 
that the bulk of Johnston's forces should be at once trans- 
ferred to his own conunand, — he was not only right, but the 


peril against which he was urging them to provide was even 
^ more imminent than any one then supposed. 

Beauregard's advice, as we have seen, was given on Sun- 
day, the 14th. On Tuesday, the 16th, McDowell began his 
march. On the 17th he occupied Fairfax Court House. 
Not till then was Johnston ordered to join Beauregard, and 
no part of his troops arrived till the 20th. A portion, as 
is well known, came up on Sunday afternoon, the 21st, while 
the battle was in full progress ; and had McDowell been able 
to adhere to his original plan of attacking the enemy's right, 
at Blackburn's and Mitchell's Fords, and below them, the 
battle must have taken place before a single regiment of 
Johnston's command had reached Manassas Junction, or 
Beauregard must have fallen back without a fight, which is 
perhaps more probable. 

It appears that the idea of a pursuit of the Federal forces 
after the rout at BuU Bun was never entertained, either by 
Davis, Johnston, or Beaur^ard ; the want of transportation 
rendered it out of the question. But about the last of Sep- 
tember, 1861, both Johnston and Beauregard strongly urged 
that the strength of the army should be raised to sixty thou- 
sand men, and that the war should be carried into Maryland. 
The plan was to cross at Edwards's or Conrad's Ferry, gnd 
then to ma>rch on Washington ; relying on the greater cohe- 
sion and Han of the Southern army to defeat the then raw 
troops of General McClellan. But Mr. Davis refused his 
assent, and the project was abandoned. 

We next find Beauregard sent to the West, where Albert 
Sidney Johnston had suffered serious reverses. Forts Henry 
and Donelson had been taken, with many guns and thousands 
of prisoners. The States of Kentucky and Tennessee had 
been nearly abandoned ; the Mississippi had been opened as 
far as Island No. 10 ; the Confederate forces had been widely 
separated. In this state of things, Johnston and Beauregard 
conceived the brilliant plan of reuniting at the earliest mo- 


ment the wings of the army ; calling up all outlying detach- 
ments and all possible re-enforcements, and attacking the 
Federal army under Ghrant before it could be augmented by 
the forces of BuelL We do not care to discuss the question 
how the merit of this plan is to be apportioned. Suffice it to 
say that both commanders entered heartily into it, and that 
their daring scheme for the rehabilitation of the Confederate 
cause in the West was gallantly supported by their troops. 
The battle of Shiloh, fought on April 6, 7, 1862, was a battle 
of the old-&shioned kind, — a pitched battle ; and after the 
advantage which the Confederates derived from their surprise 
of our army had been exhausted, it was a very hard-fought 
battle. It was a new experience to the troops on both sides, 
and was an education in itself. 

Beauregard has been criticised for not having accomplished 
more on the first day ; but we fail to see that anything more 
was possible. 

Corinth, a very important railway and strategic centre, to 
which Beauregard retreated after the battle, was held against 
Halleck and his greatly superior force until May 30, when 
^eauregard drew off lus army in excellent order and conditionN 
His health now requiring attention, he was relieved from 
duty. We find him next at Charleston, where he arrived in 
September of the same year. <^ere he was already well 
known and highly thought of ; and here, too, was a chance for 
him to display those resources of engineering art which he 
possessed in so great a degreer> The autumn and winter were 
occupied in providing for the assaults which were sure to be 
made in the ensuing spring. [Beauregard's activity, indus- 
try and skQl were never displayed on a better field. Finally 
the long-expected blow was delivered. On April 7, 1868, 
Admiral Dupont, with a fleet of irondads, attacked Fort 
Sumter; but after some hours of gallant and determined 
fighting, the ships were obliged to confess themselves beaten 
by the f ort8.^ 


Two months after this event Greneral GKlhnore superseded 
Greneral Hunter in charge of the land operations agsdnst 
Charleston. We observe that General Beauregard considers 
that his plan of attack was faulty. " It was fortunate," says 
Colonel Boman, speaking the views of Greneral Beauregard, 
^^ that, shortly afterwards, the new commanding general, on 
whose daring and engineering ability the North greatly relied, 
preferred making his attack by Morris Island, instead of 
on the broad and weak front of James Island, where he might 
have penetrated our long, attenuated lines, and taken Charles- 
ton in flank and rear. Nothing then could have prevented 
Sumter from falling; for there can be no doubt that General 
GiUmore would have immediately increased the armament at 
and around Fort Johnson, and have thus completely com- 
manded the interior harbor. The possession of Charleston 
and of all the South Carolina seacoast would have followed 
as a necessary sequence." It is not for us to decide between 
two such authorities, but merely to state the different views. 
That Crillmore's opponent should entertain the view that his 
plan was a faulty one in its conception is certainly an inter- 
esting fact. 

Whether General Grillmore did or did not adopt the proper 
line of attack, it is undeniable that Beauregard foiled him in 
his efforts to take Sumter and to capture Charleston. Sumter, 
its batteries silenced, was, it is true, reduced to something very 
much resembling a pile of stones and rubbish ; but the Confed- 
erate flag on the flagstaff on its summit was daily saluted, 
night and morning, xmtil the march of Sherman through 
South Carolina forced the evacuation of Charleston and its 
forts. And the book before us gives an interesting accoxmt 
of the marvellous daring, and the equally marvellous engineer- 
ing skill and fertility of resource, by which the cradle of 
secession was for so long a period defended against its power- 
ful antagonists. 

By the spring of 1864 the Federal operations against 


Charleston had virtually ceased. It was considered impracti- 
cable to effect anything further without the aid of a more 
powerful land force ; and the plans of the government con- 
templated the employment in Virginia of Greneral Crillmore 
himself, and of a large portion of the troops which he had 
been commanding in the Department of the South. In April 
Beauregard was also ordered to Virginia, to assist in the de- 
fence of Bichmond. 

General Grant, who had recently been placed at the head 
of all the armies of the United States, had determined to 
accompany the Army of the Potomac in its march from the 
Rapidan upon Richmond. He had also prepared an auxiliary 
expedition under General Butler, which should land at City 
Point, where the Appomattox empties into the James. 
Butler was instructed to make Richmond his ^^ objective 
pomt." 1 

(Qi all this, nothing, of course, was known at Richmond. 
But the somewhat ostentatious reorganization of the Ninth 
Corps, at Annapolis, awakened the suspicions of General 
Beaur^ard. He scented danger in the air. He felt sure 
that the Federal Generals intended to make a bold and vigor- 
ous campaign, and he was fully alive to the exposed condition 
of Petersburg and Richmond? But at this moment, just on the 
eve of the campaign, just when the Confederate government 
should have been completing their preparations for the de- 
fence of the capital and its approaches, he finds they have 
denuded Petersburg of troops in an ill-advised attempt to re- 
capture Newbem, North Carolina. On the 22d of April, 
1864, he arrived at Weldon ; on the 25tirlie urged upon 
General Bragg, then commanding the forces of the Confed- 
eracy, under the supervision of President Davis, the proba- 
bility of an immediate attack upon Richmond and Petersburg, 
and the danger of ^ scattering the forces of the department. 
But his representations were of no avaiT^ Full of the 
1 e7W.R-l«. 


projeet of repossessing themselyes of the coast of North 
Carolina, ^^e administration disregarded Beauregard's ad- 
vice, until, on the 4th of May, Butler, with 30,000 men, 
had landed at Bermuda Hundred. Then, indeed, there was 
a hurried concentrationTX From Plymouth and the Neuse, 
from Wihnington and from Charleston, troops were hurried 
up to Bichmond ^'with the greatest despatch." ^^ There 
was," as Davis said in his telegram of May 4, " not an hour 
to lose." 

Fortunately for the Confederates, the expedition to Ber- 
muda Hundred was not under the direction of an able and 
enterprising soldier. There was a delay of a few days before 
anything was even attempted, and then the attempt was a poor 
affair. Two good officers pf the regular army, commanded by 
a civilian general, did not make a strong board of direction. 
Beauregard had leisuro to collect his forces. By the time he 
was ready to strike — for his usual policy, and it was generally 
a good one, and it proved an especially wise one in the present 
case, was to take the offensive — he found that our troops 
had advanced towards Richmond from Bermuda Hundred, 
had taken possession of the Petersburg and Richmond 
railroad, and wero facing north; their line extending from 
the river on the right, not far from Drury's Bluff, to a 
point beyond the railroad in a westerly direction. Between 
this line and Richmond was the little army of Beauregard. 
In Petersburg was a Confederate division imder Major- 
General Whiting. Beauregard's plan was to make his main 
attack on our extrome right, close to the river, and so cut us 
off from our base at Bermuda Hundred, while Whiting's 
division was to assault us in rear. The result was a serious 
defeat for our forces, which would doubtless have been a 
more crushing one had Whiting's division participated in the 
action. But owing, it is said, to the fault of that officer, this 
part of the plan was not carried out. 

The outcome of this brilliant affair was that Greneral 


Butler's operations came abmptly to an end. He retired to 
Bermuda Hundred, fortifying the short neck of land between 
the James and the Appomattox which constituted the westerly 
line of his position ; and, when Beauregard had constructed 
a like series of works opposite to his, ^^his army," to use 
General Grant's celebrated phrase, ^' though in a position of 
great security, was as completely shut off from further opera- 
tions directly against Richmond as if it had been in a bottle 
strongly corked." ^ Having for the time being thus disposed 
of the inmiediate danger, Beauregard made, on the 18th of 
May, one of his characteristic proposals to the Confederate 
war department. 

Lee and Grant were confronting each other at Spottsyl- 
vania, some fifty or sixty miles from Richmond. This pro- 
position shows so well the military sagacity of Beauregard that 
we venture to copy the greater part of his letter : — 

*'^ Memorandum, The crisis demands prompt and decisive 
action. The two armies are now too far apart to secure 
success, unless we consent to give up Petersburg, and thus 
place the capital in jeopardy. If General Lee will fall back 
behind the Chickahominy, engaging the enemy so as to draw 
him on, General Beauregard can bring up 15,000 men to 
unite with Breckinridge [who had been sent for from the 
Yalleyj and fall upon the enemy's flank with over 20,000 
effectives, thus rendering Gbunt's defeat certain and decisive, 
and in time to enable General Beauregard to return with 
re-enforcements from General Lee to drive Butler from 
before Petersburg and from his present position in advance 
of Bermuda Hundred. Petersburg and Richmond could be 
held three days, or four at most, by the forces left there 
for that purpose. Without such concentration nothing 
decisive can be effected, and the picture presented is one 
of ultimate starvation. Without concentration General Lee 
must eventually fall back before Grant's heavy re-enforoe- 

1 67W.R.,20. 


ments, whereas the plan presented merely anticipates this 
movement for offensive purposes." ^ 

It certainly may be said that, had this plan been carried 
out, the battle would have been fought when the army imder 
Grrant was by no means as strong as it was on the day of 
Cold Harbor. But whether the united forces of Lee and 
Beauregard could have inflicted a ^^ decisive " defeat upon the 
Army of the Potomac, entrenched as it would unquestionably 
have been, we take the liberty, pace General Beauregard, 
to doubt. Yet it must be borne in mind that what he 
predicted in this memorandum actually came to pass. True 
it was that without such a concentration as he urged nothing 
could be effected, and that ^^ the picture presented was one 
of ultimate starvation ; " that is, of inaction and decay, 
resulting in inevitable and utter failure. It may well be that 
Beauregard's coimsel was not only bold but wise. 

No attention seems to have been paid to it,^ however, and 
the armies of Grrant and Lee occupied a fortnight in getting 
down to Cold Harbor ; the re-enforcements received by Grant 
during this time largely exceeding those received by Lee. To 
fight his great battle Grant took the Eighteenth Corps away 
from Bermuda Hundred. After he had delivered his ill- 
advised assault on the lines of Cold Harbor, there was for 
a time a lull in the progress of the campaign. But this was 
merely to concert a scheme, by which Grant hoped to seize 
Petersburg with his whole army, while Lee was still on the 
north bank of the James. This masterly movement, the 
successful accomplishment of which has been generally 
overlooked in considering the extremely imsatisfactory per- 
formances of the Federal army after it had arrived before 
Petersburg, was b^un on the 12th of June. 

1 68 W. a, 1021. 

s It waa sent to Seddon, Seeretary of War, by Bragg, Kay 19 (68 W. R., 
1028), with adyerse oomments for President Dayis (i&., 1024) ; and Seddon 
took no action on the plan (lb., 1025). 


General Grant saw that unless he could induce General 
Lee to believe that he was aiming at Richmond his object 
would not be achieved. Therefore, after breaking camp at 
Cold Harbor, he manoeuvred so skilfully on the Chickahominy 
and near Charles City Cross Boads that he completely deceived 
his adversary, both as to his whereabouts and his intentions. 
Smith's corps, the Eighteenth, was put on transports, and 
sent back to Bermuda Hundred, where it arrived on the 
14th, and moved at once upon Petersburg. A pontoon 
bridge was laid across the James at Windmill Point, below 
the jimction with the Appomattox, and the Second Corps, 
under General Hancock,, despite an entirely unnecessary 
delay at the crossing, for which nobody seems to have been 
responsible, reached, with two divisions, the outer works of 
Petersburg about dark on the 15th, just after Smith, who 
had come up before noon, had succeeded in capturing them. 

Ever since the 7th, Beauregard had foreseen this movement 
of Grant's. He had been obliged to weaken his small force 
by sending Hoke's division and two brigades of Johnston's 
division to Lee, in anticipation of the battle of Cold Harbor ; 
and all that he had to depend upon was the remainder of 
Johnston's division, which was in front of Bermuda Hundred, 
and Wise's brigade, Dearing's cavalry, and a few militia at 
Petersburg. On the 7th he begged Bragg to return his 
troops from Lee's army, expressing his belief that " Grrant 
• . . doubtless intends operations against Richmond along 
James River, probably on south side."^ On the 9th he 
wrote a careful memorandum to General Bragg, suggesting 
that Grant would probably operate from Bermuda Hundred 
as a base against Petersburg.^ At last, on the very morning 
when Smith's corps appeared before Petersburg, Hoke's 
division was allowed to leave Drury's Bluff for Petersburg. 
It arrived just in time for one of its brigades to participate 
in the withdrawal of the troops of Wise from the outer 
1 69 W. R., 87a « U., 886. 


line, which Smith had broken in the afternoon. Beauregard 
instantly decided that the enemy's main attack was against 
Petersburg, and he at once withdrew Johnston's division 
from the lines at Bermuda Hundred. Grracie's brigade also 
arrived from Lee's army. His forces did not exceed 16,000 
men. Colonel Boman puts them at a ^' total effective of 
about 10,000 men," but we think the larger number is nearer 
the fact. 

But not only were the Eighteenth Corps and two divisions 
of the Second Corps the assailants of Petersburg. On the 
'morning of the 16th of Jime the remaining division of the 
Second Corps appeared, and, soon after, the Ninth Corps, 
one division (Neill's) of the Sixth (the other two being sent 
to Bermuda Hundred), and, later in the day, the Fifth Corps. 
One division of the Eighteenth Corps was, however, sent to 
Bermuda Hundred. 

Beauregard's little force maintained such a firm front, and 
held still such advanced positions, that the Federal generals 
were deceived as to its strength. It was not till dark on 
the 16th that an assault was ordered. It was measurably 
successful But although a portion of the lines was carried, 
the remainder was obstinately held, and attempt after attempt 
was made during the night to recover the lost ground. The 
next morning, the 17th, Potter's division of the Ninth Corps 
made a brilliant assault on the left of our line, capturing 
guns and prisoners ; but there was no proper provision to 
support the attack, although the Fifth Corps was lying idle on 
the left of the Ninth. The other two white divisions of the 
Ninth Corps were put in during the day and evening ; but 
they were put in one after the other, without being supported 
to any effective degree either by each other or by the corps on 
the left and right, the Fifth and Second. The first division 
of the Ninth Corps, for instance, made a brilliant charge at 
dusk, and captured the enemy's works ; but it was allowed to 
be driven out again, for want of reinforcements and ammu- 


nitdon. On our right, the Second and Sixth Corps won some 
important ground, but their generals seem to have remained 
satisfied with very inadequate results. ^Jxl fact, while allow- 
ance must of course be made for the fatigue of the troops, 
it is really impossible to imderstand the utter failure of the 
Army of the Potomac to improve its golden opportunity of 
taking Petersburg on Jime 16 and 17, except on the hypo- 
thesis that Beauregard's handling of his forces completely 
deceived our commanders. His j)olicy was so daring that 
hi s adversaries- supposed they were fighting th e whole _ or 
a la rge part of the army of Creneral l^Be .A ^o one could 
imagine that with 12,000 or 15,000 men a^neral would un- 
dertake to hold such an extended front, to stick so obstinately 
to weak and imtenable positions, to try repeatedly by des- 
perate counter-assaults to recapture the ground which had 
been wrested from him. L-The tactics of the Confederate 
general were bold indeed.^ Had the Fifth Corps, at any time 
while the rest of the army was engaging Beauregard's forces, 
marched up the Jerusalem Plank Road into Petersburg, the 
whole game would have been up. But this seems not to 
have been even thought of. We repeat that it is no wonder 
that the unaccountable failure of the Army of the Potomac 
to accomplish anything of moment during these two days 
has obscured the brilliant strategy by which the army had 
these two days given to it in which to make itself master of 

For, during all this time, Lee was on the north side of 
the James, fully expecting that Grrant intended a direct 
move on Richmond. Able as Lee imdoubtedly was, he failed 
on this occasion to divine his opponent's scheme. Nor 
could Beauregard rouse him to a sense of the danger of 
the situation. /^Despatch after despatch, aide after aide, were 
sent to RichmblTd ; but the alarming news they brought was 
attributed to Beauregard's too fertile imagination^ Among 
the most curious stories in the book are those or the staff 


officers whom Beauregard sent at this time to Greneral Lee. 
It was not till Beauregard telegraphed, on the 17th, that, 
unless re-enforced, he would have to evacuate Petersburg 
by noon of the next day, that Lee consented to move to 
Petersburg ; and even then he expressed himself as ^^ not yet 
satisfied of Greneral Grant's movements." ^ 

On the morning of Saturday, the 18th, accordingly, Gren- 
eral Lee's army began to appear. On that day the same 
&tality pursued the Federal leaders as had marked their 
doings for the preceding forty-eight hours. Meade's order to 
attack at daybreak, which could have been and ought to have 
been carried out to the letter, would even then have gained 
us the possession of Petersburg. When our troops moved, 
early on Saturday morning, they found the lines of the night 
before abandoned ; in pressing on, they allowed themselves to 
be detained by the enemy's skirmishers ; finally, they arrived 
in front of the formidable positions, near the city itself, on 
which Beauregard, with excellent judgment, had placed his 
little force, and which were the positions held to the end of 
the war. Here our corps commanders saw fit to halt ; and 
while they were thus delaying in front of the thin lines of 
Beauregard, — which at that moment they could either have 
broken by a direct assault, or have turned by way of the 
Jerusalem Road, — the gallant little force which had so well 
defended Petersburg was re-enforced by the Army of Northern 
Virginia. At half past 10 o'clock in the morning appeared 
General Lee himself, at the head of Kershaw's division. 
And when, after a sufficient time had been spent in making 
preparation, the Federal army delivered their assault, it was 
a total failure. Despite of the greatest courage and self- 
devotion on the part of both officers and men, we wei^ 
repulsed at every point with great slaughter. Our want of 
enterprise had cost us dear. 

Beauregard was in Petersburg at the time of the explosion 
^ 2 Roman's Beauregard, 582; cf. 81 W. R., 664. 


of the mine, on the 30th of July, 1864, and Colonel Roman 
gives us much that is interesting and valuable in regard to 
that most imfortunate day. 

In the autumn of 1864, Beauregard was again sent to the 
West, to command the armies of Hood and Taylor. His 
authority over these officers seems not to have been very 
clearly defined. He certainly took no active part in the 
disastrous campaign of General Hood. 

But in the winter and early spring of 1865 we find him, 
at first alone, afterwards with his old comrade, Joseph E. 
Johnston, working hard to get together a respectable force, 
to arrest the progress of Sherman in the CaroUnas. Matters 
were at a desperate pass for the Southern cause. The 
^^ march to the sea " gave the Federals two armies on the 
Atlantic coast. Sherman left Savannah on the 1st of 
February, on his march northward, and to the armies of 
Grant and Lee " there came," as Swinton well says, " rolling 
across the plains of the Carolinas, beating nearer and nearer, 
the dnmis of Champion's Hill and Shiloh I " ^ Unless Sherman 
could be stopped, the Confederacy was doomed. On the other 
hand, such was the weariness of the war in the North and in 
Europe, and so precarious seemed the condition of the Federal 
finances, that a severe defeat inflicted upon Sherman, while 
in the Carolinas, might yet, so some sagacious men thought, 
restore the fallen fortunes of the South. It might accomplish 
for the Confederacy what was accomplished for the colonies 
by the bloody and indecisive battle of Guilford Court 
House, which Greene forced upon ComwaUis in March, 1781. 

But to effect this required the instant adoption of a 
policy of concentration. Augusta, Columbia, Goldsboro', 
Wilmington, Charleston, — even, as Beauregard thought, 
Bichmond itself, — should be abandoned at once. Any and 
every sacrifice of local feeling should be unhesitatingly made. 
No associations were too sacred to be given up, if only a force 
1 Swinton, DednTe BatUes, 480. 


could be raised capable of coping with Sherman's powerful 
and well-appointed army. This policy Beauregard strongly 
advocated. He soon, however, found obstacles in his way. 
The Confederacy had deeply felt the loss of Savannah. But 
to abandon Charleston was too terrible even to think of. 
General Hardee doubted and delayed at the last moment. 
Davis ordered him to postpone the evacuation of the city as 
long as was prudent, hoping ^' to save the pain of seeing it 
pass into the hands of the enemy.*' From causes like this, 
Beauregard's policy was blocked at every stage; the result 
fell &r short of his hopes. Sherman, in the mean time, was 
steadily pursuing his onward course. He compelled the 
evacuation of Augusta, Columbia, Charleston and Wilming- 
ton, as an inevitable consequence of his admirable strategy. 
He completely deceived his adversaries as to his real inten- 
tions ; he kept them separated from each other ; and it was 
not until his masterly march from Savannah to Groldsboro' 
was well-nigh completed that Johnston, who had succeeded 
Beauregard in command, was able to strike the well-meant 
but feeble blows of Bentonville and Avery$boro\ Sherman 
had deserved his success. 

After the evacuation of Bichmond and the surrender of 
Greneral Lee, Mr. Davis had an interview with Johnston 
and Beauregard at Grreensboro', North Carolina. Of this 
interview General Johnston, in the appendix to the second 
volume,^ gives a curious accoimt. The military men were all 
of a mind. They considered the situation as hopeless, and 
so expressed themselves. With them agreed the Secretary 
of War, Breckinridge, and all the members of the cabinet 
except the President and Mr. Benjamin. The latter. General 
Johnston says, ^' repeated something very like Sempronius's 
speech for war. Mr. Davis," the General goes on to say, 
^* received these suggestions of mine as if annoyed by them." 
Beauregard reports that the President said that the struggle 
1 2 Roman's Beaniegaid, 664. 


oould still be carried on to a auccessful issue by bringing out 
all the latent resources of the Confederacy, and, if necessaiy, 
by crossing the Mississippi and uniting with Kirby Smith's 
forces. But he was finally compelled to hear reason, and 
Greneral Johnston was permitted to open negotiations with 

Here we leave our subject. It needs not to be said that 
Colonel Boman's book is a very important contribution to our 
history ; that no library which aims at getting together the 
important works on the late war can omit it. It is long, 
and it is written with more minuteness on certain topics 
than seems to us to be necessary. But there may well be 
questions in the investigation of which one would find that 
these pains had all been well bestowed. The book bears 
throughout abundant evidence of a very strong feeling 
against the late President of the Southern Confederacy. 
We have purposely refrained from bringing this feature 
into prominence ; nor do we deem it necessary to say more 
here than that the reader will find in this work many grave 
charges of inefficiency, obstinacy and prejudice against the 
administration of Mr. Davis, and a good deal of evidence in 
their &ivor. 




Bum LmnimAiiT-CoLOHBL, U. S. A. 

Bead hrfort the Society on Monday evening^ Jpnl 14, 188i. 

The f oUowing are the titles of books by Colonel Dodge, oonoerning the Civil 
War: — 

A Bibi>*8-£tb View of Oub Civil War. Boston : James R. Osgood and 

Company. 1883. 
The Campaign of Chavobllobsyillb. Second edition. Boston: Tioknor 

and Company. 1881. 


The proper rank of Ulysses S. Grant as a soldier is far 
from easy to determine. Possessing in an eminent degree 
some of the qualifications wluch go to make up a great 
captain, he yet showed during his military career, on more 
than one occasion, a singular lack of aptitude in using what 
are recognized as the best methods of modem war. His 
few brilliant successes were won against generals of confes- 
sedly second-rate capacity; and when he met opponents of 
acknowledged strength, he accomplished the results he aimed 
at only with the aid of largely preponderating forces. It 
cannot be denied that Grant did accomplish a vast work 
during our Civil War ; but are we to ascribe his achievements 
to his own military skill, or to attendant favorable conditions? 
Recognizing as fully as any one the eminen|; services of 
General Grrant, mindful of that singularly self-contained 
power which compelled from all his subordinates an xmreserved 
and trusting admiration, the few suggestions laid before you 
in this paper are made rather with the purpose of calling 
out the views of others than as throwing any additional 
light on this much mooted question. As a mere question, 
it is of interest. General Grant was the finally successful 
leader of our armies during one of the greatest of modem 
wars ; he commanded in civilized warfare greater armies than 
any other general ever led; he won where all before him 
had failed. Despite all which, there is more disagreement 
as to the ability shown in his campaigns than exists with 
reference to those of any other of our generals. If no more 


can be done, it is well to gather together all the elements 
which go to make up a satisfactory record of his talent as a 
soldier. Much that will be said is by no means new ; but 
the mere assembling of some facts and opinions may lead 
others to arrive at a more satisfactory conclusion. A hasty 
glance at Grant's history, from 1861 to 1866, though it must 
of necessity be extremely superficial, is perhaps the easiest 
method of arriving at this end. 

The affair at Belmont (November, 1861) was the first 
occasion on which Grant measured swords with the enemy. 
There appears to have been no controlling reason for this 
expedition. In all of Grant's subsequent work, he seems to 
have had in view a very definite object which he was wont 
often to pursue in the face of difficulties, and which would 
have sent most other men to the right>about. The alleged 
purpose of the Belmont demonstration was to prevent Polk at 
Columbus from sending re-enforcements to Price in Missouri ; 
but an attack on Columbus itself would appear to have been 
the proper way to accomplish this result. Belmont was at 
the mercy of the guns of Columbus, and could under no 
circumstances be held. It almost seems as if the excuse for 
the expedition was that of the man in Scripture who had 
bought two yoke of oxen, and must fain go and try them. 
Grant had been entrusted with new weapons. He thought 
to essay them before venturing into a serious affray. As a 
simple demonstration, the affair was not noteworthy. Nor 
does it shed any light upon our subject of inquiry, except 
that it early showed that Grant possessed coolness and self- 

Despite his impassive exterior. Grant was really of a 
restless disposition. Perhaps his most prominent quality, 
except the dogged persistence he so constantly exhibited, was 
his desire to be always at work, pushing the enemy at some 
point. He never seemed to need recuperation for himself ; he 
was apparently never overtaxed ; he worked with the weapons 


he found at hand. He never asked for re-enf oroements ; and 
he was wont to deny his troops those periods of rest which it 
was a not always happy rule in all our other armies to afford 
them in such ample measure. 

Some attempt has been made to deny Grant the credit of 
the successes against the Confederate first line of defence, 
broken in February, 1862, at Forts Henry and Donelson; 
but he may be safely awarded a goodly share thereof. The 
capture of Fort Henry is deserving of notice only in that 
Tilghman delayed the Federal advance till the bulk of his 
force had escaped. The affair was not of long duration and 
it reflects no discredit on Graat that he was there thwarted. 
The attack on Fort Donelson was stubborn. Grant undertook 
the work with a force less than that of the enemy, though 
he was later re-enforced to an effective beyond theirs. The 
obstacles were considerable, both of groimd and weather, 
and he led but the rawest of troops. It cannot be denied that 
the fighting was spirited, and creditable in the extreme to 
new levies, as shown by the loss of 2300 men. But Grrant's 
victory here was primarily due to the divided responsibilities 
of the threefold command of the Confederates. Such men 
as Floyd, Buckner and Pillow were scarcely worthy of being 
called adversaries, while the scene before the surrender, in 
which each of these three men sought to cast the responsi- 
bility from off his own shoulders, was disgraceful indeed. 
Compared with the field of Bull Run, seven months earlier, 
with vastly greener troops, the fighting showed nothing to 
excite remark. Even Badeau acknowledges that the North 
overrated the means by the result^ — the cause by the effect. 
But the success won its usual and proper result. It is 
success which must always command reward. Grraut was the 
hero of the nation. 

The only battle, until the campaign of 1864, in which 
Grant measured weapons with a truly great soldier, now 
shortly supervened. Grant had advanced up the Tennessee 


Biyer, and massed his army at Pittsburg Landing as a threat 
to Corinth. The place was well chosen. BueU was ordered 
by Halleck, who controlled this department, across country 
from Nashville to join forces with Grant. It was purposed 
to make a descent upon the Confederate army. The enemy 
was commanded by Albert Sidney Johnston, who was perhaps 
the most promising soldier in the enemy's ranks. Johnston 
was not wont to await attack, and decided to fall upon Grant 
before the arrival of BuelL This he did (April 6, 1862) 
with a vehemence and initial success which goes far to nullify 
the claim of even General Sherman, that the army was not 
surprised. At a later period in the war, that there was 
a surprise would not have been denied. If the attack was 
actually expected, it was strange that Grrant should be absent 
— as he was never far from the post of danger — and 
stranger stiU, that the outpost service, even in those early 
days, should have been so raggedly performed. The event at 
least was to roll up the Union army as it were a scroll ; and, 
had not Johnston been killed before completing his victory, 
it would have gone hard with our forces, huddled, as they 
were, into the swamp of Snake Creek. Probably few troops 
were ever worse demoralized than all but a small leaven of 
Sherman's men, on the evening of that day. So far, Grrant 
had been defeated by Johnston. Beauregard succeeded to the 
Confederate command. This officer arrogates to himself the 
victory of BuU Rim ; but Beauregard was actually defeated 
at Bull Run. It was Joe Johnston's fresh troops which 
turned Beauregard's disaster into a Southern victory. Nor 
can any person, imless a fulsome biographer, be found who 
will rank Beauregard high as a soldier. His mistake at 
Shiloh was certainly Grant's salvation. Albert Sidney 
Johnston would never have soimded the recall at the moment 
of victory. He would have pushed home to the bitter end. 
But Beauregard lost his opportunity, and called off his men, 
thinking to complete the work on the morrow. Such morrows 


never come. During this breathing spell Buell arrived, and 
the tide of success was turned. 

There is nothing in the battle of Shiloh which can be 
warped into a creditable showing for Grant. He was not 
ready for battle, his troops were not well in hand, and until 
his splendid opponent feU he was badly worsted. He was 
saved only by the happy mistake of a second-rate general, 
and the still happier arrival of fresh and well-drilled troops. 
For some months prior to and succeeding the battle of 
Shiloh, Grrant was imder a cloud. 'Accused of disobeying 
orders and of sundry acts militating against the martinet-like 
punctilio of Halleck, he was censured, relieved of command, 
thrust one side while nominally Halleck's second and generally 
hustled about in an irritating and altogether unreasonable 
fashion. He bore his tiials well, however, though more than 
once tempted to throw up the game. No man throughout 
our war rendered more generous service, forgetful of self 
in every instance where he could accomplish good for the 
cause, than Grant. In minor stations, as well as in supreme 
command, this trait was prominent. This testimony to his 
credit cannot be gainsaid. 

Halleck's promotion to Washington again gave Grant his 
head. From now on he made it his sole aim to open the 
Mississippi. Upon neither the battle of luka nor the battle 
of Corinth can satisfactory comment be made. The former 
was an attack by Grrant with divided forces, which failed 
to co-operate, and allowed Price to escape. The latter was 
perhaps as much Eosecrans's work as Grant's, and was 
success but narrowly achieved. Grrant cannot be judged with 
fairness by these smaller operations. 

The main obstacle to the navigation of the great river was 
Vicksburg. This fortress continued to be Grant's objective 
for three quarters of a year (November, 1862, to July, 1863). 
The capture of Vicksburg from the south had been attempted 
by Williams in the spring of 1862, and Farragut had been up 


the river and had run the batteries to and fro. The canal 
scheme had been inaugurated by Williams, but was abandoned 
when he returned to Baton Eouge. It was in November, 
1862, when Grant suggested the capture of Yicksburg from 
his own base, to the General-in-Chief. Some 50,000 men 
were in this vicinity. At Washington a scheme was on the 
carpet to give McClemand sole conmiand of an expedition 
down the Mississippi. Meanwhile Grrant was maturing his 
plans for an advance on Yicksburg overland. 

A careful study of the conditions involved, as well as the 
subsequent operations, seems to indicate as the best route 
from the Memphis and Charleston Railroad to Yicksburg, one 
following along the line of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, 
or preferably, the Mississippi Central The latter had, to be 
sure, several good defensive lines, such as the Tallahatchie 
and Yallobusha, but these were susceptible of being turned 
by their head waters, and the right of an advancing army 
was well protected by the Yazoo lowlands. Grenada could 
have been made an excellent secondary depot, and the entire 
northern part of Mississippi would have been rendered 
tributary to our armies instead of to our enemy. Later, 
when Grant was in the midst of his eccentric circuit south of 
Yicksburg, every one came to this conclusion. Success alone 
justified Grant's manoeuvre ; and by the difficulties so hardly 
overcome, an advance overland in one body is clearly shown 
to have had more to conmiend it than any other plan. But 
at that time, Grrant appears to have considered a division of 
forces advantageous instead of faulty. luka had failed of any 
results worth mention for this very reason, but Grrant did not 
bear this in mind. He contemplated, in fact inaugurated, a 
march with combined forces overland, but the poor supply 
of rolling-stock along the railroad appears to have determined 
him otherwise; and lest McClemand should take from his 
control the Mississippi expedition, he put into immediate 
execution a dual plan, consisting of an attack &om the river 


by Sherman, in connection with an advance along the railroad 
by his own army. 

This scheme f idrly bristled with elements of failure. No 
possible communication during the march or at the time 
of attack could be had between the supposed co-operating 
forces. In case of disaster to the one, the other could neither 
have warning to retreat nor opportunity to assist. Neither 
army was in sufficient force to attack the city single-handed. 
The distance that each had to travel was so great that the 
common delays of land or water transportation would put 
simultaneous aggressive operations quite out of the question. 
It was almost beyond reason to expect the two plans to work 
together. If either had been a mere diversion to draw the 
enemy's opposition from the other, the idea might have been 
a fair one ; but both expeditions were in the nature of attacks 
in force, and of about equal strength. The opportunities 
for the enemy were brilliant. Grant did not believe, at 
that time, that an army could be subsisted on the coimtry, 
and feared that he could not ration his men on the scanty 
means afforded by the railroad. Moreover, the McClemand 
imbroglio was threatening and no doubt weighed heavily in 
Grrant's deliberations. Still all this cannot be held to excuse 
the adoption of what is the worst possible scheme in all cases. 
A division of forces requires a backgroimd of good luck. It 
cannot face bad fortune or accidents. 

The result of these isolated expeditions was disastrous. 
Sherman reached Chickasaw Bayou, and, supposing Grant to 
be either close at hand, or else to be holding Pemberton on 
the line of the Yallobusha, he imsuccessfully thrust his army 
in upon well-manned defences. Grrant meanwhile, for lack 
of the very divisions Sherman had carried off, had seen his 
communications cut at Holly Springs, and had been sent 
whirling back to his base on the Memphis and Charleston 
Bailroad. We can be scarcely expected to agree with Badeau 
in the following adulation: ^^From Belmont, the initial 


battle of his career, he [Grant] had never been driven from 
the field, and had never receded a step in any of his cam- 
paigns, except at Holly Springs, and then the rebels were 
in retreat before him, and Grrant, unable to follow them up 
fast enough to overtake them, withdrew, only to advance on 
another line." ^ When will biographers learn to appreciate 
the harm they inflict upon their heroes by comments such as 

Grant possessed in marvellous degree the power of bearing 
up against bad luck and disappointment. He showed many 
of the characteristics of a great man ; added the true military 
instinct, and he would have been a great soldier; but the 
latter trait is more difficult to unearth, it did not come to 
the surface in this campaign. There is no doubt that the 
capacity to do the best thing at the right moment is the 
test of all skill, and the technical rules of strategy must 
be secondary to this one thing. Perhaps Stonewall Jackson 
was the best instance of this truism. But it is well to weigh 
accurately each rule which is shown by the experience 
of the greatest soldiers to be of value, before we throw it 
aside in the special case before us. It has been intimated 
by some critics that in a wooded country like ours, the well- 
worn rules of strategy may be laid aside for others suggested 
by the occasion ; but there is nothing in the history of our 
war which goes to show this true. The tactics of the battle- 
field, particularly those of the fighting line, must of necessity 
be as much modified by topographical reasons as they 
are by improved weapons ; but the rules of strategy are as 
everlasting as the rules of logic. 

With characteristic pertinacity, despite his backset, so' 
soon as McClemand had been eliminated from his problem 
(January, 1863), Grant set his face again toward Yicksburg. 
This time he determined to operate on the Mississippi line, 
and to reach the hills which command the town by the route 

1 3 Badeau, 641. 


whlcli Sherman had fruitlessly essayed to tread. This was 
better than the former plan, but presented fewer advantages 
than the overland march. It is very apparent that Grant 
had no definite idea how to compass the capture of Yicksburg, 
when he established himself at Young's Point. In this 
he was perhaps not singular. It was unusual with our 
generals to have an elaborately wrought plan of operations. 
In fact it was the elaborate plans which uniformly failed. 
For many weary weeks after the base of the army had been 
firmly established. Grant was busy trying scheme after 
scheme which might enable him to locate himself on the 
bluffs to the north of the town. These are the keys to 
Yicksburg. Indications are by no means wanting that he 
himself began to regret that he had not adopted the overland 
route. His position was a trying one. The fickle public 
was all but ready to tire of him also, as it had on lesser 
pretexts of so many of his brother soldiers ; for a year he had 
been floundering about, with no substantial success to show. 
Something was demanded of him, if he would not forfeit the 
people's confidence. 

Grrant was called on to look the matter squarely in the face. 
Assault promised iU success from any point, while involving 
the certainty of heavy losses. To go back and try the really 
most feasible route seemed like failure acknowledged, and 
would therefore be politically ruinous, though strat^cally 
soimd. To turn Pemberton's left was a desperate undertak- 
ing. Its only merit lay in that it showed no sign of turning 
back. Supplies must come by a most circuitous route, liable 
to fatal interruption, and the fleet must nm the Yicksburg 
batteries. Choice was difficult ; but, with his usual disregard 
of obstacles, Grrant adopted the latter plan. He could face a 
difficult problem rather than a simple one. His courage grew 
with opposition. He never feared to assume any risk. In 
this case success proved it a virtue. Not so a year later in 
Yirginia. This type of courage often lacks the tempering 


element of intelligent caution. Having launched liis army on 
its perilous mission, the work was done with vigor, and it 
succeeded. But Grant's success, like not a few of Napoleon's, 
was now aided by his opponent's incapacity. Had Lee and 
Jackson been in his front, his triumph would have been hardly 
earned. Johnston had 81,000 men " for duty.'* Pemberton 
began the campaign with some 50,000. Imagine the two 
great Virginia soldiers, one within a well-fortified city in 
Grant's front, the other in the open, on his rear. Would 
the loss of 8,000 men have measured the fighting during a 
campaign and siege of two months ? Was that the measure 
of Grant's thirty days' march from the Rappahannock to the 
Chickahominy? Would 40,000 men have been cooped up by 
an opposing force not much greater ? Would such an army 
have surrendered without grievous bloodshed? The 1864 
campaign in Virginia answers these queries all too plainly. 
It cannot be denied that Johnston was a good soldier ; but, 
with all his ability, he was never distinguished as a fighter. 
His tendency was dilatory; he was never quite ready to 
attack. With a force all but equal to Grant's, he made 
no attempt to cut the knot of the difficulty. To be sure 
he felt no great reliance on Pemberton ; but he owed more 
assistance to the troops in Vicksburg than he rendered. He 
had it within his power to nullify Grant's campaign. 

Still Vicksburg fell and Grrant won the great success of 
the war. Though equal forces at this moment in the East 
were suffering thrice his loss, it was only to repel invasion. 
There were no such trophies, no such wholesale captures. By 
whatever means, Grant's was the apparent triumph ; and he 
received his well-earned laurels in the plaudits of the people. 

Grant's field was now enlarged to take in the Chattanooga 
operations. Eosecrans had obtained a foothold in that city ; 
but the enemy held us in a quasi state of siege, and it was 
necessary to drive him from our front. Grrant's restless 
activity would not allow him to sit down and wait. After 


some initial operations already devised by Eosecrans, by 
which the city was revictualled, he undertook a descent 
upon Bragg in force (November, 1863). His plans for the 
battle of Chattanooga were to hold Bragg with demonstrations 
on his left at Lookout Mountain, and in the centre across 
Chattanooga Valley; while Sherman, with abundant force, 
should assail his right at the north end of Mission Ridge. 
The design was good ; and it was natural that Grant should 
entrust Sherman with the main task. He knew him well 
and felt him equal to the work cut out ; but matters fell out 
differently &om what Grant expected. Sherman was held 
in check at Tunnel Hill, partly by natural obstacles, while 
Hooker actually turned Bragg's left at Lookout Moimtain ; 
and Thomas's men, all but in contravention of orders, 
captured Mission Badge in the centre, and at once relieved 
the pressure on Sherman. The losses show what part of the 
army did the fighting : Sherman's loss was 1600 ; Thomas's, 
4000 ; Hooker's was the least heavy. 

Li this battle of Chattanooga, then, it was to a certain 
extent in the wake of accident that there came success. 
Grrant's plan had worked to a given point, and then failed, 
because Sherman could make no further headway. Thomas's 
attack was intended to be a mere demonstration, to draw 
away, if might be, some of the enemy's forces from Sherman's 
front. Instead of such limited work, however, the Army of 
the Cumberland broke Bragg's centre, and it was this which 
won the battle. It is certain that, had these gallant men 
not reached their goal, some one would have been severely 
held to blame for their thus exceeding their, appointed task. 
There is nothing in this battle which shows any remarkable 
trait in Grrant. He deserves and will always have the credit 
of pushing his work with speed and vigor; and no doubt 
he would have accomplished his end even if the Army of the 
Cumberland had not so brilliantly captured Mission Ridge. 
We are, however, not seeking, evidence of ordinary but of 


extraordinary skill. His opponent here was by no means a 
noteworthy soldier. Braxton Bragg, though possessing some 
excellent qualities, was always defeated, and that by our own 
unsuccessful generals; his opposition to Grant's attack at 
Chattanooga was not obstinate. The total loss was small 
compared with the outcome of the battle. 

Up to this point, in fact, except at Shiloh, Grant had 
accomplished the most substantial results with the most 
moderate losses ; the public did not gauge the meagre quality 
of the opposition ; they saw only what had been gained, and 
valued the man accordingly. At Belmont, Grant had lost 600 
men ; at Shiloh, his one great battle hitherto, 12,000 ; at luka, 
1000 ; at Corinth, 2600 ; in the long Vicksburg campaign, 
8000 ; at Chattanooga, some 6000. Except at Shiloh, then, 
measuring the bitterness of the fighting by the loss, Grant 
had never yet been hard put to it. Compared with the 
Army of the Potomac, with its 3000 hors de combat at Bull 
Run; 2200 at Williamsburg; nearly 6000 at Fair Oaks; 
16,000 in the Seven Days'; 15,000 in Pope's campaign; 
12,500 at Antietam; 13,000 at Fredericksburg; 17,000 at 
ChancellorsviUe ; 23,000 at Gettysburg, — these losses give 
small chance indeed to underrate the East I Even Badeau 
acknowledges that the Army of Northern Virginia was the 
best led and strongest army in the Confederacy; steadier 
under defeat as well as in success, than any other. 

It is passing strange, then, that Grrant, as at this time he 
undoubtedly did, should have believed that the Army of the 
Potomac had never been fought aujbnd; that he should have 
imagined that Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia could 
be beaten by the same methods as Pemberton and Bragg. 
But such was the fact, and Grrant, on his taking up the work 
of the Eastern strategic field (March, ] 864), set himself the 
task to make the rugged old army do that which he thought 
it never yet had done. Grrant at this time openly gave his 
preference to hard blows over manoeuvring. ^'Continuous 


hammering " was inscribed upon Ids shield. His belief seems 
to have been that the use of skilful tactics is a symptom of 
pusillanimity. Other and greater soldiers have sometimes for 
awhile been subject to this delusion; but they have never 
needed such fearful lessons to teach them their mistake. 
Grant was to discover his error in his first clash of arms, and 
to recognize the fact that he had never yet faced a captain 
such as was the man who through so many campaigns had 
borne the proud banner of the South on the Old Dominion 
soil ; that he had never led stouter hearts against more valiant 

Grrant's first tussle with Lee, in the Wilderness, should 
have opened his eyes to the falsity of his theoiy. His loss of 
15,000 men without gain of any kind to any other mind would 
have been appalling; but though ''Grant acknowledged 
that the fighting was the hardest he had ever known, for 
Shiloh was not comparable with the Wilderness," he, says 
his biographer, ''was not discouraged after this battle." 
That indeed proved that he was stanch. But had he learned 
a lesson? That would have shown him to be discreet. 
According to Badeau, Lee was not an able soldier. This 
writer speaks of Lee's " feebleness in offensive action " in the 
Wilderness attack, and states it as his opinion that while 
"bold in conception, even in attempt, ... in execution 
he was weak."^ Assuming this to be just, where does it 
place Grant, who then led all but two to one of Lee's 
effective, and of material quite as gallant ? B^eau recognizes 
this natural conclusion, but he endeavors to rid himself of 
its effect by heaping blame on Grrant's lieutenants, from 
Meade down, for every failure of the Army of the Potomac, 
despite fighting such as Grrant had never yet conceived. 
Even Hancock "could inspire, but apparently not control 
his soldiers. In the Wilderness, all the splendid results 
of his success on the 6th of May, were lost by this same 

1 2 Badeau, 129-180. 


incapacity." ^ Apart from what we know of the Army of 
the Potomac generals, will this line of argument ever prove 
Grrant worthy to sit with CsBsar, Napoleon and Frederick ? 
Having found that Lee could check any direct advance upon 
his lines, Grant concluded to resort to what might have saved 
him much, a short three days before. He moved by the flank 
on Spottsylvania ; Lee anticipated him by one of those lucky 
accidents common to war, Anderson happening to march at 
night instead of waiting for daybreak. 

In a paper of which Grrant is the subject, we cannot refrain 
from constantly quoting Badeau. This eulogist naturally 
puts things (in however mistaken a manner) in such light as if 
possible to work in Grrant's favor, and it is a fair inference 
that Badeau's points are more or less inspired by Grant him- 
self ; though we may surely absolve Grrant from any share 
in Badeau's adulation. With reference to this check, Badeau 
claims that Lee ordered Anderson to Spottsylvania imder a 
mistaken conception of Grrant's intentions. ^^ Yet these very 
mistakes were destined to thwart the well-laid scheme of the 
national general." ^ . . . " Lee, however, could claim no credit 
for having out-generalled his rival. He had utterly misappre- 
hended Grant's design. . . . But if fortune was thus thrust 
upon Lee by his lieutenants, it was just the other way with 
Grrant. He had been baffled by the same accidents that had 
assisted his adversary, and by circumstances which his own 
generals should have rendered impossible." ^ And straight- 
way all the blame is held to fall from the shoulders of the . 
captain to those of his lieutenants. How indeed is Badeau to 
make Grant a great soldier by so belittling his opponent? 
But Lee had indeed " stumbled into a good position." * Had 
Grrant so done, in what glowing terms would Badeau have 
characterized the achievement. 

Up to this moment Grrant's hard blows had only punished 

I 2 Badean, 183. « lb., 140. 

» lb., 146. 4 lb., 146. 


the Army of the Potomac. Lee, as he found to his sorrow, 
was of other stuff than his quondam adversaries ; Grrant had 
met his match in all but material resources. Among Grant's 
qualities was wonderful staying power. Up to a certain 
point this is one of the highest virtues of a soldier, but it 
can be pushed too far. Grant was altogether too blind to 
the advantages of combining manoeuvring with direct assault. 
He could not believe that Lee had even greater endurance 
than himself ; that the Army of Northern Virginia could 
much longer resist his massed blows. He had yet to learn 
how tough was the grain of that wonderful body of men. 
The result of this mistaken estimate followed in the attack on 
the Salient in Lee's centre, with another still more grievous 
check as a result. An assailant labors under the disadvan- 
tage of attacking intrenchments. To offset this he is able 
secretly to mass his men and attack a single point, while 
his enemy must keep all portions of his line equally manned 
until he divines where the blow is to fall. To attack with- 
out studying your opponent's position is to throw away this 
manifest advantage, to refuse to add skill to mere strength 
of arm. The attacks at this point appear all to have been 
given like blows in the dark. The lamentable work at 
Spottsylvania Badeau sums up as follows : '' Eveiy manoeuvre 
had a meaning, every assault was timed. There was no blind 
butting at the enemy, but a constant endeavor to discover his 
weak points, and to strike him between the joints." ^ Upon 
Meade is placed the blame of not following up successful 

Grant might readily have flanked the enemy out of his 
position ; but he could not give up the contest. His inflex- 
ible nature would not allow him to yield to Lee. He 
knew Lee to be vastly his inferior in men, and was unable 
to believe that he could not be crushed by weight alone. 
For a week succeeding he made partial attacks at all points, 
1 2 Badeau, 168. 


shifting divisions &om place to place along the line, seeking 
a weak point in the harness of the Army of Northern 
Virginia through which to thrust his weapon. Lee met 
his every onset. No impression could be made. 

In this short campaign of little over two weeks, Grant 
lost 87,500 men, nearly one in three of his "for duty*' 
force. He accomplished nothing which manoeuvring could 
not have compassed, unless he had weakened the moral of 
his antagonist more than his own. This he had not done ; 
the Army of Northern Virginia was elated at its successful 
defence. The Army of the Potomac was disheartened at its 
losses with so little tangible result. 

Courage is a common virtue in the soldier. That combina- 
tion of physical and moral courage which enables a general 
to inflict, and unflinchingly to resist, heavy blows is the rarest 
and best ; but this courage must be tempered with skill, to 
be of the greatest use, and skill implies a discreet use of 
power. Though it was Falstaff hiding behind his shield at 
the battle of Shrewsbury who exclaimed that the better 
part of valor is discretion, yet there is, for the commanding 
general of a great army, a far deeper meaning in these 
pregnant words. 

Grrant had failed to make any impression upon Lee. He 
must resort again to the manoeuvring he contemns. While 
Grant was thus decimating the troops under his inunediate 
eye, the minor armies were moving towards the common 
centre. As only Butler's force reached its goal, these minor 
forces need not be brought up, except to call attention to the 
system of divided attacks to which Grrant still adhered. So 
far as Butler was concerned, Badeau leaves us to suppose that 
Grrant had ordered him to capture Petersburg, as a first step 
in the advance on Richmond, with the James River as a 
base ; but Grrant's orders to Butler were very vague, and he 
could scarcely have supposed that Butler would look upon 
Petersburg as a ^ine qud non in his problem, even if the 


same orders to a more skilled soldier could be twisted into 
meaning so much. The same uncertainty as to what his 
eventual operations would be appeared here, as was seen in 
the Vicksburg campaign. If Grrant really expected to use 
the James River route, he should definitely have ordered the 
capture of Petersburg. McClellan had pointed out its value. 
The map plainly showed it to be essentiaL It does not appear 
that Grrant at this time paid much heed to the James River 
plan. He believed that he could demolish Lee on the 
northern route. Thus Butler's share in the programme f aQed 
of any good end. When he was finally "bottled up" at 
Bermuda Hundred, Grant reinforced his own depleted ranks 
by the bulk of his conunand. The stalemate inflicted by Lee 
on Grrant at the North Anna was so complete, that every one 
must recognize which was the abler tactician. But in with- 
drawing from a field where he lay with forces so divided, that, 
had not Lee been obliged to husband his men to the last 
degree, it might have gone hard with him, Grrant showed 
clearly an ability to manoeuvre, which it is a pity indeed he 
had not sooner used. There again was he forced to recognize 
that his antagonist could meet his most skilful movements as 
well as his stoutest blows ; and again he moved by the left, 
but again to find the Army of Northern Virginia drawn up 
athwart his path at Cold Harbor. 

Grrant was impelled to try one more blow. Hia faith 
was still strong that he could break Lee's lines by sheer vis 
inerticB. This might still be possible if he would call to his 
aid the resources of grand tactics. He ought to have sought 
the key of his enemy's position, and to have massed his 
assault there ; but, unlike the Army of the Potomac, he had 
not learned the wonderful vitality of Lee and his veterans. 
Orders were once more issued to attack along the whole line 
at 4.80 A. M. on June 2. The want of definite plan was 
painfully apparent. Skilful manoeuvring might more than 
once have placed Lee where he would have to be the assault- 


ing party, or forfeit his stake ; but nothing of the kind is 
apparent. Grant, in his despatches, stated that Lee would 
not come out of his intrenchments to fight ; but Grrant had 
never tried the proper means to make him do so. In lieu of 
moving upon Lee's commimications, and thus compelling him 
to leave his works for the open. Grant had constantly hurled 
his men against field-works which he should have learned, by 
the experience he had recently been through, that he could 
not take. Grant's method was just what Lee preferred. He 
was right in not coming out of his intrenchments to fight. 
Moreover, an ^^ assault all along the line " was useless ; to 
obtain advantages from the great loss of life which was inevi- 
table, the dominating point of the line should have been 
developed, and the assault massed there. No reserves were 
apparently ready to follow up any advantages which might 
be gained. The extreme care in arranging details which 
should have been exercised was not to be seen. No picked 
troops were selected for the heaviest work. The orders were 
only for an ^^ assault all along the line." The rank and file 
did not even know that Cold Harbor was to be a battle. 
The old method of selecting your point of attack, picking 
your troops and properly supporting them, is by no means 
obsolete. But Grant did not deem its use advisable. We 
all admire the splendid fighting of the Army of the Potomac 
at the Wilderness, at Spottsylvania, at Cold Harbor ; but, 
like the Charge of the Light Brigade, " c'est magnifique, — 
mais ce n'est pas la guerre ! " 

The object of Grant's overland campaign had been to 
capture or destroy Lee's army. He had done neither ; but 
he had lost 60,000 men in five weeks, without inflicting 
corresponding loss upon the enemy. The Second Corps 
alone had lost 400 men a day, from the time of leaving the 
Rappahannock. The full significance of this is apparent 
when the force of each army at the inception of the campaign 
is called to mind. Grant had numbered 122,000 men ; Lee 


had but 62,000. The fearful loss, equal to his adversaiy's 
entire force, was the result of assaults in mass, undertaken 
without the aid of that skill which a great soldier never 
neglects to employ. Whenever Grant resorted to manoeuvring, 
he succeeded measurably. Whenever he attacked all along 
the line, he failed utterly. 

The theory has been advanced that there had to be about so 
much hammering, about so much loss of life and consiunption 
of energy and material, before we could hope to end the 
war ; that, so long as the South had any men or means, the 
struggle would continue. There is a groimdwork of truth in 
this proposition. The Confederacy was practically exhausted 
before it yielded ; but the corollary is likewise true. If the 
South would certainly succiunb when exhausted, it behooved 
us, on merely humanitarian groimds, to fight on conditions so 
nearly equal as to inflict the same loss upon the enemy as we 
ourselves must suffer. This had not been done; and the 
student of this final campaign in Virginia looks in vain for 
the master-stroke by which our forces, numbering two to one 
of the enemy, could compel the surrender of the Army of 
Northern Virginia without losses to us greater in number than 
the total effective of that gallant body. Lee undoubtedly 
was fighting at a great advantage, on interior lines, in his 
own State, on the defence ; but how was he overmatched in 

Criticism cannot depreciate the really great qualities or 
eminent services of Greneral Grrant. His task was one to 
tax a Bonaparte. That he was unable to put an end to the 
struggle by means less costly in lives and material, if not 
indeed by some brilliant feat of arms, cannot detract from the 
praise actually his due for determined, unflinching courage. 
It rather adds to the laurels of Lee. It cannot be asserted 
that any other Northern general could have accomplished 
more against the genius of this soldier. It was Grant who, 
in the &ce of the gravest di£Bculties, political and military, 


was able to hold the confidence of the nation and to 
prevent that party at the North which was clamoring for 
peace, from wrecking our success now all but won. But his 
truest admirers, indeed, he himself, admit Cold Harbor to 
have been a grievous mistake. And all who appreciate at its 
solid worth such ability as a soldier as Grant possessed, regret 
that in this great struggle with Lee he should have failed to 
employ the full resources which were his in abundance. 

Again to turn for a moment to Badeau's slurs upon Lee. 
He "was vigilant, but not bold."^ "Whenever he was 
obliged to assiune the offensive, he failed." " No disparity 
of numbers can account for his timidity." A Fabian policy 
" was indeed the natural policy for a second-rate commander ; 
but a man of genius or audacity should have massed his 
forces and hurled them on the divided enemy." ^ But " Lee 
was unable by some great stroke to divide and conquer his 
enemy." ^ If Lee was so lacking in abihty, where must the 
average thinker class Grant ? This is by no means a di£Bicult 
problem for Badeau. He unhesitatingly meets it by assert- 
ive dictOy "the national leader," quotha I "lost no chance, 
saw every mistake made, and seized every opportunity."* 
"His nature indeed seemed like a sword, drawn only in 
the field or in emergencies. At ordinary times a scabbard 
concealed the sharpness and temper of the blade ; but when 
this was thrown aside, amid the smoke and din of battle, the 
weapon flashed, and thrust, and smote — and won."^ Let it 
not be supposed that these quotations are made in a spirit 
of irony or unfairness; they are of use in weighing the 
subject of this paper. If an advocate, so inspired as it is 
&ir to presume Badeau to have been, must resort to such 
rodomontade as this, it may well be believed that no proper 
military defen,ce of the 1864 campaign could be conjured 
up while the biography of General Grrant was being penned. 

Grant's transfer of the Army of the Potomac to the James 

was ably done, and in mid-June the forces were put over to 

I 2 Badeaa, 219. « lb., 220. » lb., 221. * JJ., 319. » lb., 21-22. 


the south side. It is onrious, however, that even at this time, 
when the new line of operations had been fully determined 
upon, Grant should still have given no positive orders for the 
capture of Petersburg. This city was an advanced fortress 
which protected the communications of Kichmond with the 
interior ; it was a strategic point of the greatest value. No 
operations on the James could be secure without its posses- 
sion ; but neither Hancock, who was first ordered forward in 
this direction, nor indeed Meade, appears to have known that 
Grant intended that Petersburg should at once be captured. 
Specific orders to this effect had certainly not been issued, 
and Ghrant's lieutenants had been taught to wait for such. 
Ghrant's habit was to keep his own coimsel, and his subordi- 
nates learned his purpose only from his instructions for the 
work immediately in hand. Before the proper order came, 
Lee had thrown some old troops into the city; for nearly 
ten months (Jime, 1864, to March, 1866) Ghrant sat down 
before this place. There is a wearisome sameness to the 
operations during this period ; they all tended to an extension 
of our left to secure such a foothold as would enable us to 
cut Lee off from his source of supply. There was no 
attempt to work on any other plan. It almost looks as if 
Grrant, finally convinced that Lee was more than his match 
in the open, had deUberately concluded to bide his time imtil 
starvation should do the work, himself could not. This, his 
abundant resources and the confidence reposed in him, would 
enable him to do. The people had learned that some one 
man must be entrusted with supreme control, and Grant had 
the good fortune to keep alive the reliance of the nation on 
his vigor and skilful management. 

Grrant might perhaps have made more headway by leaving 
a sufficient part of his army in the trenches in front of 
Petersburg, and by moving with a heavy force far to the 
west upon Lee's commimications ; or, if it were determined to 
capture the place a main/orte^ by making a massed attack on 


some point in the centre, after suitable mining operations liad 
weakened Lee's defences and prepared for such an operation. 
But the only assault of this kind which was made was so 
lamentably managed that of necessity it failed. That, 
however, by no means proved that the plan itself was 
inoperative ; but we search in vain for anything approaching 
a brilliant feat of arms. The end came finally by natural 
means. The Army of Northern Virginia died of inanition, in 
the last ditch, as it had threatened to do, a starved, haggard 
skeleton of its old proud self. It had lost all save honor. 

It is difficult, then, to see upon what foundation to build 
the claim that, in the strict meaning of the term. Grant was a 
great soldier. He never won a battle when the %hting was 
desperate. At Shiloh Ghrant was defeated. It was Buell 
and he combined, aided by B^uregard's incapacity, which 
turned the tide on that field. In every struggle with Lee, 
until the end, when the Army of Northern Virginia was no 
longer itself, he was worsted. He never conducted a cam- 
paign to which one may point as a model for the student. 
His successes appear invariably to be due to extraneous 
conditions working to a happy result. He never met an 
opponent of recognized ability but he failed to accomplish 
the end he aimed at. Tried by the measure of the great 
captains, there is not on record a brilliant operation on a 
large scale of which Grant is the hero. 

The one difficult fact to reconcile with this estimate of 
Grant is the ready obedience and support and admiration he 
compelled from all his lieutenants and fellow soldiers. How 
much of this was due to frank appreciation of Grant as a 
soldier, how much to his strong qualities of character, and 
above all how much to the instinctive habit of obedience of 
his subordinates, it is difficult to say. The fact remains to 
Grant's credit, that his generals all yielded him as honest 
service as they did generous approbation. That Grant 
showed himself to be a great man is easy of demonstration. 


He possessed courage of the stanehest type. Defeat might 
be thrust upon him, but it never weighed him down. If he 
could not conquer, neither could he be conquered. He 
would have been unequalled in a defensive campaign. To 
lose a battle only made him more elastic in his determination 
to retrieve his loss; this quality alone, in the degree to 
which it was ingrained in Grant, stamps greatness upon any 
man who is occupied with national interests. We all know 
that the greatest of men may never happen to be placed 
where their powers can find adequate scope. Opportunity 
is the coefficient of genius; but to Grant, happily, was 
committed the management of the vastest of issues. 

Grant was an honest, imselfish patriot. He won the 
nation's suffrages for the chief command by the fortune of 
having been where persistent energy could, with the aid of 
a fair share of military talent, accomplish large results. 
With rare good fortune he was removed, both by character 
and surroundings, from the besetting danger of political 
favoritism. What he was able to do, he was always given 
the chance to do. His command was never endangered by 
the clamor of poUtical opponents. Had Ghrant's early duties 
cast his lot upon the Eastern field, he never exhibited that 
which leads one to believe that he would have been eminently 
successful But his work was fortunately in the West, 
where great successes sometimes followed moderate effort ; 
while in Virginia the heaviest of sacrifices rarely won more 
than ephemeral gain. And it is universally admitted to-day 
that the difficult military problem during our Civil War lay 
between the Appalachian and the Atlantic. 

If we cannot claim for Ulysses S. Grant a place upon the 
roll of great commanders, we none the less owe him our 
grateful admiration for the great task which he actually did 
accomplish. It was his constancy under defeat, his calm 
weighing of the value of victory, his cool determination to do 
the work he had set himself to do, apart from all considera- 


tions of self, and for duty's sake alone, which centred all 
Northern efEorts to close our fratricidal struggle in a willing- 
ness to trust this man. Though he may not have shown the 
salient qualities of a Bonaparte, a WdUngton, or a Yon 
Moltke, he is none the less part of the history of this country, 
and he will justly go down to posterity as the man who, 
through good and ill fortune alike, unflinchingly bore the 
banners of the North, despite many a doubtful hour, to a final 
happy issue. He deservedly ranks as one of the greatest of 






u. a V. 

Bead brfare the Soddy <m Monday evening^ February «^^» ^^88. 

The following is a list of die published writingB by General Walker conoem- 
ing the Civil War : — 

GsNEBAL Hakoook. Qreat Commanders Series. New York : D. Appleton & 
Co. 1894. 

HA2T00CK IN THB Wab OF THE Rebeluok. A Paper read at a Meeting of 
the New York Commandery [of the Loyal Legfion], February 4, 1891. 

HisTOBT OF THE Sbgond Abmt Cobps ht the Abmy of the Potomac. 
. . . New York: Charles Soribner's Sons. 1886. 

An Obation delivered ... at the Soldiers' Monument Dedication in Nortii 
Brookfield, January 19, 1870. Worcester: Goddard & Nye, printers. 1870. 

Oration before the City Government and Citizens of Boston, at a Meeting 
held at Tremont Temple, December 18, 1888. [In] A Memorial of Philip 
Henry Sheridan from the City of Boston. Boston : Printed by Order of the 
City Council, 1889. 

Oration [at the Twenty-first Annual Reunion of the Society of the Army of 
the Potomac, held at Portland, Maine, July 3d and 4th, 1890]. Report of 
Proceedings [pp. 18-32]. New York : Maqirowan <& Slipper. 1890. 

Major-General Charles Deybns, Justice of the Supreme Court of Massa- 
chusetts. Tam Marte quam Merourio. An Address delivered before the 
Commandery of the State of Massachusetts Military Order of the Loyal 
Legionof the United States, March 19, 1891. Boston: Pknas of Rockwell <& 
ChurchilL 1891. 


In the early afternoon of the 3d of July, 1863, a brigade 
of Vermont troops, new to battle, lay under arms along 
Cemetery Kidge, watching the march of a Confederate column, 
which, panoplied in all the majesty and terror of war, was 
bearing down upon the centre of the Army of the Potomac. 
They had borne their share of the hideous cannonade, 
intended to shake the nerve of the Union forces, when 140 
guns opened at a signal and for an hour and a half scourged 
the plain and the low crest on which our troops lay, until the 
very earth seemed to shake, and the air was fuU of bursting 
shells and their whistling fragments carrying death to every 
quarter. They had seen the Confederate column forming in 
the edge of the woods on Seminary Ridge ; 50 hardy battalions 
wheeling into place, brigade after brigade breaking from 
cover to join the desperate enterprise, while the Confederate 
chieftains, with their staffs, galloped along the lines to give the 
last orders, then took their stations at the head of their troops. 
They had seen that column, 14,000 strong, la^nched by a 
word, its right directed against themselves, and had clutched 
their muskets tighter, with quivering hands and throbbing 
hearts, as their thoughts ran swiftly on to the encounter so 
soon to come, in this their first battle. They had seen 
Veazey's 16th regiment driven in from the skirmish line, as 
the stones and timbers of a broken dam are swept onward 
before the mountainous flood of waters. At half infantry 
range, they had opened fire on the brigade of Kemper, form- 
ing Pickett's right, a fire all the more deadly because the 
men who there wielded the musket had from boyhood been 


accustomed to use the rifle along the wooded slopes or among 
the grassy vales of the Green Mountains. With mingled 
feelings of relief, for they were human, and of regret, for they 
were brave, they had seen the Confederates sheer abruptly 
off to the north, partly as the effect of the withering volleys 
poured among them by the men of Stannard and Grates, 
partly as the result of the original direction of the. column 
of assault upon the ^' clump of trees" on Gribbon's line, 
partly in consequence of that instinctive tendency to close in 
upon the centre which besets all assaulting columns. While, 
then, in hope and doubt and fear, these brave Yermonters 
awaited the result of that terrible collision, seeing themselves 
apparently excluded, by the changed direction given to the 
Confederate column, from further participation in the great 
struggle, there rode between their lines a general officer of 
princely port and of a singularly bold and commanding aspect. 
It was Hancock, come to throw the Vermont brigade upon 
the flank of the Confederate column already pressing up the 
slope on which stood the troops of GKbbon and Alexander 
Hays. It was a place where no moimted man had for hours 
been seen. It was a place where no moimted man could for 
five minutes hope to live ; and, even as Randall's Thirteenth 
Regiment, followed fast by the Sixteenth, flung itself forward, 
changing front on the right company, and opened upon the 
flank of the Confederate column, that stately figure suddenly 
drooped, the fire died out of that imperious eye, and the 
heroic leader of the left wing of the Army of the Potomac, 
there, on the front line of battle, fell stricken to the 
ground. Yet, even so, this prince of soldiers could not relin- 
quish the charge entrusted to him. Raising himself upon his 
elbow, to look over the low, tumble-down stone wall by which 
he lay, he watched with filmy eyes the progress of the %ht ; in 
a feeble and faltering voice issued his orders to commanders 
and staff, and only when the mighiy column which, forty 
minutes before, emerged from the woods on Seminary Ridge 


had collapsed under the flank attack of Stannard and the 
advance of Webb, Harrow and Hall, suffered himself to be 
borne from the field. 

That gallant soldier, that brilliant tactician, that bom 
leader of men, has passed away from earth ; and I know of 
no more fitting subject for the veterans of the war for the 
Union to contemplate to-day, than the military character and 
services of Winfield Scott Hancock. The outbreak of the 
war found Hancock, then in the thirty-eighth year of his age, 
a captain in the regular army, in charge of the quartermaster's 
depot at Los Angeles, on the Pacific coast. Christened with 
the name of America's greatest living soldier, graduated from 
the Military Academy in 1844, he had joined Scott's column 
in time to take part in the later battles of the marvellous 
campaign which ended in the capture of the Mexican capitaL 
At Molino del Bey he was in the column of attack with 
Longstreet, Pickett and Armistead, — men whom he was to 
encoimter, sixteen years later, in another and more memorable 
assault ; and was brevetted for his gallantry at Contreras 
and Cherubusco. In the long interval which followed the 
conclusion of peace, Hancock saw much instructive service 
as aide-de-camp to Greneral Clark upon the Great Plains, 
as quartermaster during the troubles with the Seminoles in 
Florida, in the border war in Kansas, in the Utah expedition 
of Harney, and upon the Pacific coast. Absolutely destitute 
of asceticism, always of hearty fellowship, fond of ease and 
given to good cheer, his stirring ambition, his intense interest 
in his profession, and his high standard of duty rendered 
these fourteen years one long term of military education. I 
doubt if there was an officer in the United States Army, who, 
during that period while political, social and industrial forces 
were preparing the war of secession, learned so much, or, to 
use the phrase of trade, ^^ turned over his capital " so often. 
Hancock was not by nature a man of lofty intellectuality. 
He had courage, — fiery, enthusiastic courage ; positive, active. 


unfaltering loyally to country and to comrade ; he had indus- 
try beyond measure ; the ambition that stirs to do great 
deeds and be worthy of high promotion ; the power of patient 
labor, that has been called genius; above all, an unrest 
while anything remained to be done, a dissatisfaction with 
what was incomplete, a repugnance at what was slovenly, 
coarse, or half-made-up. I am disposed to believe that this 
period of Hancock's life was passed to even better advantage 
than if it had comprised active operations on the large scale 
against a powerful enemy. The time was to come, all too 
soon, when lives were to be thrown away by thousands and 
money by millions ; when orders of infinite consequence were 
to be given as the result of one glance over a field as restless 
as the ocean after a storm; when the conjectures of an 
officer on the picket-line were to govern the movements of 
twenty thousand men on the morrow. Meanwhile the future 
commander of the Second Army Corps, of the left wing at 
Gettysburg and in the Wilderness, was being trained for his 
high duties by conducting the orders and correspondence of a 
military department ; fitting out expeditions of a company or 
a squadron ; supplying outlying posts ; making long marches 
with a column that would scarcely have served, a few years 
later, for his headquarters escort ; and conducting the business 
of a quartermaster's depot on the plains or on the Pacific 
coast. To a man who is willing to do things just so well that 
they will pass without censure from his superiors, caring 
himself only for pay-day and poker, such a scale of operations 
is cramping and dwarfing. To a man who is trying to do 
everything at its best, who is studying his business and 
accumulating experience against the day of larger things, 
there is no practice more instructive, enlarging, and strength- 
ening, if not pursued too long. 

It followed that the outbreak of the war found Hancock 
singularly well endowed and equipped for the responsibilities 
and duties that were to devolve upon him. What he knew of 


infantry and could do with infantry, let Williamsburg and 
Fredericksburg and Gettysburg and the Salient at Spottsyl- 
vania testify. While he was not master of the science of 
logistics like Meade and Humphreys, he could conduct a 
long march, over bad roads, with artillery and trains, better, 
in my humble judgment, than any other officer of the war. 
Federal or Confederate. In a somewhat protracted experience, 
I never but once knew the Second Corps, while imder his 
conmiand, no matter how extreme the distance or severe the 
conditions, by day or by night, arrive at its destination in 
bad form, straggled and broken ; and its marches were often 
very long and trying, as on the 29th of July, 1862, when the 
corps made thirty-two miles, on a single road, with artillery 
and trains. In the supply of troops, Hancock, as the result 
of thorough training and downright hard work, and with 
the aid of one of the most capable quartermasters of the 
Volunteer service. Colonel Eichard N. Batchelder,^ achieved 
ahnost the highest possible success. A distinguished member 
of this Society, General and Judge Devens, has justly said that 
no army was ever so well fed and well clothed as the Army 
of the Potomac ; and I venture to add that, of all the corps 
of that army not one was as well fed or clothed as the 
Second ; nor do I fear that any old soldier here present will 
dissent from the opinion that regular rations, well shaped 
shoes, and warm blankets bear a very positive relation to good 
marching and hard fighting. Of the uses of cavaliy and 
artillery Hancock knew enough, first, not to think, like many 
high commanding officers, that he knew everything, or to lead 
him to interfere in the conduct of those charged with these 
highly specialized services ; and, secondly, to recognize good 
work whenever and by whomsoever done. It was but recently 
that that admirable cavalry officer. General David M. Gregg, 
of Pennsylvania, said to me that he had never known another 

^ Since the date of this paper, appointed Qoartermaster-Qeneral of the 
United States Army. 


infantry commander with whom he found it equally satis&o- 
tory to serve in the field. 

Finally, Hancock's experience before the war had made 
him a perfect master of the Begnlations, of the procedure 
proper to every department of the army and to every occaaion 
of the service, and of the forms of military correspondence 
and record. A master, I say, not a slave ; for while no man 
imderstood better the beneficial uses of red tape, no one 
knew better how to cut red tape when the occasion required. 
An essayist, Lord Macaulay, I think, in satirizing the adop- 
tion in the English language of certain Latin terms, asks us 
to imagine a Boman Consul, in his rank and pomp and 
warlike habiliments, seated in a back office in Bordeaux, a 
goose-quill over his ear, making out invoices for the skippers 
of merchant vessels. But the imion of martial and civic 
functions need not be ludicrous. It would be hard to believe 
that Scipio at Zama looked one inch more the commander 
than Hancock at Fredericksburg or Gettysburg, or bore 
himself more knightly and heroically in danger and hardship, 
in weariness and wounds; yet Hancock was the greatest 
hand at "papers" the army ever knew. My head aches, 
now, from the long night vigils, when, after some weary 
march or fight, we pored for hours over reports and returns, 
and discussed minute points of the Regulations apropos 
of the correspondence appertaining to seventy or ninety 
regiments and batteries. It is usual to make flings at this 
sort of work and express contempt for " papers " and regu- 
lations and red tape; but it is more likely that a mill or 
factory or railroad will be well managed, whose accounts 
and correspondence are always in arrears, in confusion, in 
error, than that a brigade or division or corps will be well 
administered under the same conditions. The need of order 
and system is even greater in the latter than in the former 
case. This Hancock perfectly imderstood. He deemed it 
no less important a part of his duty to study the state of 


his command through the morning reports and the monthly 
returns, than on the field of review ; and he knew that he 
oould administer a tonic to a sickly regiment through the 
order book and the letter book not less effectually than at 
Simday morning inspection. 

Such, in his qualifications for service, was Hancock as, 
at his own request, he was ordered East, in the summer of 
1861, that he might take an active part in the war which 
had broken out, amid such direful portents, on the Atlantic 
slope. For him there was not a moment of hesitation or of 
indifference as to the coming struggle. To the very centre 
of his being he was loyal to the Constitution and the laws ; 
and he never valued his commission in the army so highly as 
when it gave him a place in the front rank of their defenders. 
He knew too many of the men who, like his friend Armistead, 
had reluctantly and painfully broken the main ties of their 
lives in taking the other side, to indulge in cheap talk about 
traitors and sour-apple trees; he knew too much of the 
Southern temper to make light of the task before the nation, 
or to predict a holiday parade for the Union armies ; but with 
all his soul he stood by the Union and the government, and 
never did his faith in the ultimate triumph of that cause 
waver, even amid disappointment, disaster, and disgrace. 

On his first arrival in the East, he was assigned to duty 
with General Anderson, of Fort Sumter fame ; but he was 
himself so manifestly a commander, in every lineament, in 
every motion, that it was seen to be absurd to keep such a 
soldier on staff-duiy, when an army of hundreds of thousands 
was to be officered ; and on the 28d of September, he was 
made Brigadier-General of Volunteers, and assigned to the 
Army of the Potomac. No commander ever more carefully 
prepared in camp for success in the field than Hancock did, 
here and through all his subsequent career. Doubtless, most 
who have any impression whatever regarding Hancock, per- 
sonally, think of him as a kind of meteor on the battlefield ; 


an object of admiration or of terror ; flashing hither and 
thither; achieving his triumphs by sheer brilliancy of 
bearing, force of intuition, and mysterious power over men. 
In fact, it was with infinite labor that he forged the wes^pon 
his hand was to wield with such effect. He knew that the 
greater the force exerted, the more Ukely was the sword to 
break under the blow, unless it were perfectly wrought; and 
it was with care and pains inexpressible that he shaped 
and tempered it for the coming conflict. K at Williamsburg, 
in his first encounter with the enemy, he met and easily 
vanquished the Confederate column sent against him, led, on 
one wing, by D. H. Hill, and on the other, by Jubal Early, 
two of the ablest commanders of that army, it was not more 
by reason of the great tactical skill, calm courage, and majestic 
bearing which forever stamped upon him McClellan's epithet. 
Superb, than by reason of the long and careful training to 
which his troops had been subjected. 

Of Hancock in the winter camps of 1861, two things 
especially require to be said : Fii*st, while he was a strict and 
even stem disciplinarian, he was wholly incapable of any 
of those siUy brutalities which a few officers of the regular 
army who were set over volunteer regiments, and many 
volunteer officers who thought they were imitating regular 
army methods, indulged in during the first year of the war. 
Secondly, although a "regular" in every fibre of his being, 
Hancock was altogether destitute of that snobbishness 
regarding volunteers which was exhibited by so many small 
minds, in so many high places, during the first year of the 
Rebellion. He recognized the fact that the war was to be 
waged by volunteers. He saw that it was of supreme 
importance to promote the self-respect and self-confidence of 
volunteer regiments ; to lead them to think that they could 
do anything, and were the equals of anybody ; and that to be 
everlastingly talking about the regular army, as so many 
were, bewailing the lack of its methods and forms, instituting 


odious comparisons, and sneering at the deficiencies of the 
new troops, was a very poor way of accomplishing that object. 

Hancock not only did not sneer at volunteers, he did not 
even patronize them. He made them feel by his evident 
respect, his hearty greeting, his warm approval of everything 
they did well, that he regarded them as being just as fully, 
just as truly, just as honorably, soldiers of the United States 
Army, as if they belonged to the old Sixth Infantry. Such 
was the spirit in which Hancock met his new command. We 
know with what assiduity, patience and good feeling, what 
almost pathetic eagerness to learn and to imitate, the volun- 
teers of 1861 sought to fit themselves for their part in the 
great struggle. Hancock's thorough and cordial acceptance 
of volunteers was seen, again, in his choice of staff officers 
throughout the war. Even after he had become a corps 
commander, he showed no disposition to take an officer of the 
regular army, as such. Mitchell and Bingham, Batchelder 
and Wilson, Brownson and Livermore, Miller and Parker, 
were good enough for him. 

At the battle of Fair Oaks, Hancock's brigade, then in the 
Sixth Corps, was not called to take a part ; but, while Porter 
was waging his bitter fight against odds, at Gaines's Mill, 
Hancock's brigade was engaged in holding back the enemy 
who sought to break in our lines near the Chickahominy. 
On the following day, while the Army of the Potomac was 
beginning the first march of that dreary retreat to the 
James, the enemy again threw themselves upon Hancock's 
lines, but were beaten off by the prompt and resolute action 
of his well-trained regiments. On both these occasions 
Hancock displayed that high degree of tactical skill which 
so strongly characterized his later work in command of a 
division, of a corps, and of a wing of the army. The eve 
of Antietam found BLancock easily the most conspicuous 
brigade leader in the Army of the Potomac ; so that there was 
hardly a question who should succeed to the command of the 


First Division of the Second Corps, when, at noon of that 
memorable day, tidings were borne to general headquarters 
that the gallant Eichardson had fallen, never to mount horse 
or draw sword more. At once Hancock was sent for, in haste, 
from his brigade of the Sixth Corps, and despatched to take 
command of Sumner's old division, as it lay under arms, 
after its desperate battle around Piper's House. 

It is always more or less of an experiment to promote 
even a capable and efficient brigadier to the command of a 
division. It may be that the natural range of his powers will 
be found to have been exceeded. Even should he, in time, 
grow up to the position, it is most likely that the new charge 
wiU be exercised at first with too much either of timidity or of 
rashness, with somewhat less than a full grasp of the situation, 
with comparative feebleness of authority and influence over 
the unfamiliar body. No such painful interval of self -distrust 
or of inadequacy to new and larger commands characterized 
Hancock's successive promotions. The very day he was 
advanced from Captain and Quartermaster to be Brigadier- 
General, he was, in every sense, a general officer, confident of 
his powers, rejoicing in the exercise of his functions, and fully 
master of his place, himself, his staff and his troops. An 
hour after Hancock rode down the line at Antietam, to take 
up the sword that had fallen from Richardson's dying hand, 
one could not have told, he himself hardly knew, that he had 
not commanded a division for a year. So thoroughly had he 
prepared himself for promotion during his service with a 
brigade, so sure was he of his powers, that he stepped forward 
to the higher command, upon the field of battle, amid its 
wreck and disorder, without a moment of hesitation or doubt ; 
and at once became the leader of that division as fully 
and perfectly as Sumner had been, as Richardson had been. 
The staff knew it ; the troops felt it ; every officer in his 
place, and every man in the ranks, was aware before the 
sun went down that he belonged to Hancock's Division. In 


the oommaiid of that division, composed of fine material, 
admirably moulded by the heroic Sumner in the winter camps 
of 1861-62, and gifted with an extraordinary wealth of 
brilliant young soldiers destined to great careers, like Barlow, 
Zook, Brooke, Nugent, Patrick Kelly, Miles and McKeen, 
Hancock remained until the 10th of June, 1863. 

Time will not serve to tell the story of Fredericksburg 
and Chancellorsville. Of Fredericksburg, where, on the 
13th of December, 1862, Hancock led the brigades of 
Meagher, Caldwell and Zook out of the city, through streets 
commanded by the enemy's guns ; crossed bridges by the flank, 
at half artillery range ; and there deploying his forces, moved 
forward over a plain swept from end to end by direct and 
enfilading fires, up towards Marye's Heights, against two tiers 
of musketry, to within pistol shot of the Stone Wall which 
was held by four ranks of veteran riflemen, only desisting from 
the hopeless attempt to which he had been assigned when his 
gallant division had lost 2013 men, including 156 commis- 
sioned officers killed or wounded. Of Chancellorsville, where, 
on the 3d of May, 1863, when all others had left the neigh- 
borhood of the Chancellor House, Hancock held his division 
in two lines of battle, back to back, one fronting towards 
Grordonsville and the other towards Fredericksburg, his artil- 
lery firing down the lane between ; and so kept the enemy 
at bay until the roads leading to the rear had been cleared 
and the way was open for his own slow and orderly retreat. 

Each succeeding battle had but heightened Hancock's 
reputation for exact obedience to orders, for almost magical 
influence over men, for great tactical skill, for imflinching 
resolution, whether in attack or defence; while his admin- 
istrative abiUiy, and the strict discipline of his command, in 
camp or on the march, had clearly pointed him out as the 
rising soldier of the Potomac Army, so that, when, on the eve 
of Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania, that excellent officer, Major- 
General Couch, relinquished command of the Second Corps, on 


his assignment to the Department of the Susquehanna, every 
eye instinctively turned to Hancock as his successor. It was 
with a stem joy at the f ulfihnent of his righteous ambition ; 
with a glad confidence in his own powers ; yet, not the less, 
with an earnest sense of the responsibility thus devolved upon 
him, that, on the 10th of June, Hancock first drew his sword 
at the head of the corps which, in losing 15,000 men in battle, 
had never lost a color or a gun ; whose fair fame, he was well 
resolved, should never suffer wrong at his hands. Already 
had his reputation so far outrun even this high promotion, 
that, within three weeks of the day when he ceased to be the 
commander of a division. General Meade sent him forward to 
Grettysburg, to stay the disaster of the opening battle ; to 
take command of the three corps at the front, over two o£Scers 
his superiors in rank ; and to report upon the suitability of 
the position for the concentration of the entire army. 

In every great career, whether civil or military, there is 
one day which is peculiarly memorable ; which, by reason, in 
part, perhaps, of favorable opportunities or especially conspic- 
uous position, in part, also, through some rare inspiration, 
quickening the genius of the statesman or the warrior, be- 
comes and remains to the end the crown of that career ; the 
day which the mention of that leader's name instinctively 
suggests ; the day to which, in disappointment or in retire- 
ment, his own thoughts go back as the, to him, day of days. 
Such to Hancock was Gettysburg. From the time when, by 
his splendid resolution, force of character, and power over 
men, he checked the rout of the first afternoon, restored 
order and confidence, and formed the new lines which were 
to be held unbroken to the end, down to the hour when the 
divisions of Gibbon and Hays, leaping the stone walls and 
rail fences which had partially sheltered them during the 
cannonade and the great charge, gathered in 30 Confederate 
colors and 4000 prisoners from the shattered divisions of 
Pettigrew and Pickett, Gettysburg was to Hancock all glo- 


nous and fortunate. Even the desperate wound he received 
in the moment of victory scarcely cast a shadow upon the 
great triumph he had achieved during the first month of his 
career as the commander of an army corps. 

That the campaign of 1864 did not bring a proportional 
increase of fame was due chiefly to three causes. First, he 
had already reached an ahnost dangerous elevation in popular 
reputation, from which one was far more likely to fall than to 
rise. Secondly, Hancock's Grettysburg wound continued, 
almost from the opening of the campaign, in May, till his 
enforced departure from the field, in November, to be a 
source of weakness, suffering, and, at times, of total disability, 
requiring him frequently to seek rest in an ambulance or 
on the ground when, according to his habits as a commander, 
he would have been galloping over the field or leading 
the march of his foremost division. Thirdly, the species of 
warfare that was initiated in May, 1864, against an enemy 
acting almost wholly on the defensive, behind breastworks 
protected by slashing and abatis, and largely, also, by swamps ; 
in a region where clear ground was highly exceptional, 
and where the uncleared ground was often covered by dense 
and stubborn growths of trees and underbrush, through 
which a single woodman could with difficulty force his way, 
was one that offered few opportunities for brilliant actions. 
Indeed, the campaign of 1864 was one which, except in the 
case of a few dashing young brigade commanders, was to 
destroy reputations, and not to make them. Sheridan, 
indeed, won great fame during the year, but it was by his 
operations in the fertile and open Valley of Virginia, rather 
than in the jungles of the Wilderness or of Spottsylvania, or 
among the swamps of the Totopotomoy or the Chickahominy. 
To Hancock the loss of opportunity, through the peculiar 
character of the campaign, was greater than to any other 
commander, since those qualities in which he pre-eminently 
excelled, namely, tactical skill and personal influence over his 


soldiers in critical moments, were, on most of the battlefields 
of 1864, largely neutralized by the nature of the country. 

Yet, though that campaign afforded little opportunity for 
brilliant strokes and grand successes, the fame of Hancock 
suffered no diminution under its fearful trials. He it was 
who, bringing his troops up to the support of Gretty's fine 
division, on the Orange and Fredericksburg Plank Boad, in 
the afternoon of the 6th of May, forced back the corps of 
Hill, which had advanced to seize the Brock Eoad Junction, 
and thus intervene between the two wings of the Union 
Army. He it was who, in the early morning of the 6th, 
encountering with his own divisions and those of Getty 
and Wadsworth, the corps of Hill and Longstreet, fought 
that great Battle on the Left, in the Wilderness, which has 
become a synonym for savage ferocity and unrelenting 
determination. If the charge at Cold Harbor failed to 
secure its object, the high-heaped mounds of patriot dead 
remain a monument of unsurpassed valor and discipline. 
And it was Hancock's closely massed divisions, moving under 
his eye, which broke into that wild, spontaneous cheer, as the 
red earth of the Salient came into view, on the early morning 
of the 12th of May ; dashed forward against a storm of lead, 
and leaped the Confederate intrenchments, capturing 4000 
prisoners, 20 cannon and 30 standards. 

Some of you remember, for you were there, how from that 
bloody dawn till twelve o'clock at night, the Second Corps, 
with the good Sixth fighting on its right, held those captured 
intrenchments against the utmost efforts of Lee's veteran 
brigades roused almost to madness by the losses of the early 
morning ; how trees were cut down by the fire of musketry 
alone ; how the f oemen fired their pieces full in each other's 
faces, or gave bayonet thrusts across the intrenchments on 
which at times the hostile flags were both planted ; how, again 
and again, the trenches had to be cleared of the slain, that the 
living might have a place to stand. Over that desperate and 


protracted contact, Hancock presided, stem, strong, and 
masterful; withdrawing the shattered brigades as their 
ammunition became exhausted, supplying their places with 
fresh troops ; feeding the fires of battle all that long day and 
far into the night, until the Confederates, at last abandoning 
their attempts to retake the captured works, retired from the 
field, full twenty hours after the order " forward " had been 
given to the column of assault. 

In the brilliant strategic movement upon Petersburg, and 
in the bloody assaults which followed the miscarriage of the 
attempt to seize the Cockade City before the arrival of Lee's 
army, Hancock took a part which was abruptly terminated 
by an outbreak of his Gettysburg wound. Recovering 
from his disability, he conducted in July and August two 
expeditions to the north bank of the James Biver, of 
which time will allow me to speak only so far as to relate 
an incident strikingly characteristic of Hancock and of the 
gallant commander of the Union cavalry, who was, at this 
time, serving under Hancock's orders. 

The July expedition to Deep Bottom, as it is called, had in 
view two possible results. First, that the enemy's lines on 
that side of the river might be f oimd so thinly held as to 
allow our powerful corps of cavalry, after the Confederate 
infantry should have been pushed back upon Chapin's Farm, 
to capture Bichmond by a rush, or, at least, cut up the rail- 
roads on the north of the city. Secondly, that, failing in this, 
the movement might serve as a feint to draw a large part 
of Lee's army away from Petersburg, which the Fifth, Ninth 
and Eighteenth Corps were preparing to enter through the 
ghastly avenue that was to be laid open by the explosion of 
Bumside's mine. The first object was defeated by the rapid 
concentration of the enemy's forces ; but, as a demonstration 
in favor of Bumside, the expedition was an overwhelming 
success. So alarmed were the Confederates that they drew 
over to that side the larger part of their entire army. This, 


while favoring the projected assault upon Petersburg, was, of 
course, accompanied by no inconsiderable danger to the 
column on the north bank of the river. Critical as was the 
position on the 28th, it was rendered highly perilous when the 
Lieutenant-General, on the evening of that day, ordered Mott, 
with nearly one half the corps, back to Petersburg. This was 
to leave two small divisions, scarcely 8000 strong, to confront 
overwhelming odds throughout the succeeding day. It was, 
however, provided that the cavalry should cross to the south 
bank, leave the horses there, in the charge of every fourth 
cavalryman, and, returning, help the infantry hold their 
extended lines. In such a situation everything depended on 
the enemy's obtaining not even a suggestion of the weakness 
of our remaining column. To this end the most precise 
instructions were issued regarding the crossing ; not a man 
was to enter upon the bridge after the first break of day. 
Every subordinate comjnander was required to acknowledge 
receipt of these instructions; and then headquarters, worn 
out by the excessive exertions of the three preceding days, 
sank to rest. From the sound sleep into which I had 
fallen, I was awakened by hearing my name called from the 
General's tent. Running in, I found Hancock tossing on his 
camp bed. " Colonel," he said, " I am anxious about the 
cavalry. Go to Sheridan and say to him that he must see to 
it that not a man goes upon the bridge after it is light." I 
jumped upon an orderly's horse which was kept saddled for an 
emergency, and galloped to Sheridan's headquarters. As I 
approached, the first voice that challenged me was, not the 
sentinel's, not a staff officer's, but the voice of the great 
cavalryman himself. " Who 's that ? " I gave my message. 
^'I was thinking of the same thing," was the reply. 
" Forsyth, go down to the bridge, and if General Kautz has 
not crossed, tell him to mass his division behind the woods." 
Forsyth and myself rode together towards the bridge. A 
division of cavalry was just entering upon it. Fifteen 


minutes more, and the Confederates, who had all night 
listened to the low rumbling sounds and the dull jarring of 
the bridge, and from their lookouts had been straining their 
eyes to catch the direction of the movement, would have seen 
our troops passing to the rear, and in all probability would 
have swooped down upon our little force, and driven us into 
the river. As it tiimed out, when it became light enough for 
them to see, what they beheld was our dismounted cavalry- 
men returning from the south side, with their carbines over 
their shoulders, looking for all the world like honest infantry, 
seemingly the end of a column which had been crossing all 
night. The effect was complete. The Confederate leaders 
did not doubt that every brigade which could be taken from 
the Petersburg lines had been sent in haste across the James, 
to force a passage into Richmond. This illusion, aided by 
the activity and audacity of our skirmish line, under Miles, 
not only sufficed to save us from an attack which could hardly 
have failed to result in our destruction, but held the Con- 
federate forces closely in place twenty miles from Petersburg 
where the assault of the 80th of July was impending. 

My story carries its own moral. Here were the two men 
of the Potomac Army regarding whom it was popularly 
supposed that they won their successes by daring and 
brilliant strokes. Yet we see them lying awake at night, 
after incredible fatigues, to ponder the chances of a possible 
miscarriage. In how many critical moments of the war did 
the disappointment of weU laid plans, if not disastrous defeat, 
result because able and skilful officers deemed their duty 
discharged when they had given the appropriate orders 1 
This was not Hancock's or Sheridan's idea of a commander's 
work. They believed in giving the right orders and then 
seeing them executed; and it was to this, fully as much 
as to their more splendid qualities of soldiership, that the 
success of these two chieftains was due. 

Time will not serve to teU the story of that blackest of 


days in the calendar of the gallant leader of the Second Corps, 
when on the 25th of August, after his command had lost 
20,000 men in battle since it crossed the Rapidan, two of 
his decimated divisions, scarce 6600 strong, caught in the 
ill-constructed intrenchments at Reams' Station, were driven 
from a portion of their works by repeated assaults from 
superior force, with the loss of 7 standards, 9 cannon, and 
1700 prisoners. The agony of that day never passed away 
from the proud soldier, who, for the first time, in spite 
of superhmnan exertions and reckless exposure on his part, 
saw his lines broken and his guns taken. " Were I dead," 
said Nelson, " want of frigates would be found written on my 
heart" So one who was gifted to discern the real forces 
which in us make for life or for death, looking down upon the 
cold and pallid form of Hancock as he lay at rest beneath 
the drooping flag of his country, there on Governor's Island 
in February of 1886, would have seen "Reams' Station" 
written on brow, and brain, and heart, as palpable as to the 
common eye were the scars of Gettysburg. 

Nor can I tell of the honorable expedition to the Boydton 
Road, in October, 1864, which closed the career of Hancock 
in the field. During November, his woimds still distressing 
him, it was proposed by the President and the Secretary of 
War that he should relinquish his command, and, returning to 
the North, during the season when active operations would be 
impracticable through stress of weather, should raise a corps 
to be composed wholly of veterans who had served honorably 
through one term of enlistment. This trust Hancock 
accepted in the same spirit with which he had received and, 
so far as lay in him, had executed every commission and 
order since he left the quartermaster's camp at Los Angeles. 
In the opening of the year he took the field at the head of 
his new command, officered by well approved soldiers like 
Carroll, Brooke and Morgan; but before he was called to 
encounter the enemy, the brilliant combinations of Sheridan, 


Warren and Humphreys, the stordy valor and mdomitable 
energy of Wright and Ord, the fine soldiership and loyal 
devotion of Parke and Gibbon, had brought the long contest 
to a close; Petersburg had fallen, and with it Richmond, 
the object of four years' incessant fighting; Lee's army, 
attempting to escape, had been beset in flank and rear by 
troops that seemed for the time to have lost the sense alike 
of fatigue and of fear; battles had been fought upon the 
double-quick ; divisions and army corps had marched, or run, 
in deployed lines from daylight until dark ; and, at last, at 
Appomattox Court House, the Army of Northern Virginia, 
after performing prodigies of valor, surrounded and brought 
to bay before five^fold odds, surrendered without shame, and 
the greatest rebellion of modem times was crushed. 

I wish I could tell the hundred anecdotes that come up 
to my mind, illustrative of the character of the soldier and 
the man, Winfield Scott Hancock; what pains he took to 
encourage young officers, so that the juniors of his old division 
and of his corps fairly worshipped him, formed themselves 
on him, and were ready to die at his word; how just and 
honorable in dealing with the reputations of others, so that I 
have known him keep a staff officer riding half a day among 
the camps of the army, to find out the name of a lieutenant 
who, in the heat of some action, had brought him a message 
from another commander, that due acknowledgment might be 
made of it in Ids official report ; how courteous and consider- 
ate to the unfortunate, so that, when it was my fate to fall 
into the hands of the G>nf ederates, Lieutenant-General A. P. 
Hill sent a staff officer with the message that he had given 
orders that I should be treated with the utmost attention, 
because General Hancock had been so kind to his [Hill's] 
soldiers when prisoners; but it is time to bring this long 
paper to a dose. 





BuvR llAJOB-OnBUL, U. 8. A. ; MAJoa-OmEAL, 17. 8. T. 

Bead be/ore the Society on Tuesday evening^ Mardk 7, 1S98. 

The following is a list of the pfablished wiitiiigB by General Wilson, concern- 
ing the Civil War : — 

The Life or Ultssbs S. Gbaitt, General of the Axmies of the United States. 
By Charles A Dana, . . . ; and J. H. Wilson. . . . Published by Gktrdon, 
Bill <& Compuiy, Springfield, Mass., 1868. 

The Life and Letters of Emobt Upton, Brevet Major-General U. S. 
Army. By Peter S. Michie. With an Litrodnotion by James Harrison Wil- 
son. New York : D. Appleton and Company, 1885. 

General Sherman and his Memoirs, Litemational Review. Vol. 2, 1875, 
pages T79-817. ^ 

Life and Seryiobs of Breyet BiuaADiERrGENEBAii Andrew Jonathan 
Alexander, United States Army. A sketch from personal recollections, 
family letters and the Records of the Great Rebellion. New York, 1877. 

Reviews and Papers on Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief, Ulysses S. Grant, 
General Thomas, General McClellan, General Sheridan, General W. F. Smith, 
General Kilpatriok, General J. E. Johnston, General Ames ; the Battle of 
Shiloh, the Battle of Chickamanga, The March to the Sea; Franklin and 
Nashville, published in the New York Sun. The pursuit and Capture of 
Jefferson Davis, published in the Philadelphia Times. 

See List of Papers read before the Military Historical Society of Massachu- 
setts at the end of this vdlnme. 


The great men of history are those who are potentially 
connected with great events, those who are in supreme 
control when great deeds are performed. It matters little 
whether their personal qualities are transcendent or not if 
only they are at the head when striking and far-reaching 
changes are made in the affairs of a great nation. The roads 
by which men travel matter but little if only the aim be high 
and the end fortunate. And yet no matter how high the 
aim nor how great the faculties if they be not used on affairs 
of the first importance. Great virtues cannot make great 
men except in great emergencies. A man's success in life is 
compounded of his own gifts, his own opportunities, and the 
way in which he brings the one to bear upon the other. No 
man, simply as a man, stands for more than unity in the 
history of the race of which he is a member. As the affairs 
of races and nations are greater than those of individuals, so 
in the life equation of any man, be he soldier or statesman, 
the greater factors and forces are those which concern the 
race or the nation, and lie outside, above and beyond him. 
If nature has brought him forth at the right time and 
placed him in the right station, where great interests are at 
stake and great events are happening, he may have great 
opportunities. With great perspicacity and great resolution 
he may seize upon them, and then with great energy of body 
and mind and the greater forces of his time working with 
him, and not against him, he may play a controlling part and 
pass into history as a great maiw Just- what, qualities of 


body or mind are necessary to this result, no one can say pre- 
cisely. They may differ as much as times and opportunities 
differ. In the Homeric age, fortitude was looked upon as the 
greatest of human virtues, the one which, displaying itself in 
divine transports and heroic frenzies, could alone secure the 
favor of the gods. But at the same time, superstitions and 
omens were the daily guides of even the most elevated minds. 
Only the loftiest heroes rose superior to them. "You bid 
me," said Hector to Polydamus, "be guided by the flight 
of birds. But I heed them not whether they pass by the 
right hand towards morning and the sun, or by the left hand 
towards the vapor and the darkness. The only best omen is 
the defence of our country." 

The surroundings of men change with the lapse of ages. 
Superstition yields to science and barbarism to civilization ; 
but human ideals and aspirations remain substantially the 
same. The love of family, of country, of power and of 
leadership; the hope of wealth and glory; the feelings of 
ambition and patriotism, and, above all, the sense of duty, 
are still the master motives of man's nature. Life is more 
complex, and the interests of human society are now more 
extended and more far-reaching than they have ever been 
before; but the virtues remain imchanged and imchanging. 
We Americans are accustomed to regard thg period of the 
Eevolution as the heroic age of the Republic, and to look upon 
the men of that time as the demi-gods of our race ; but when 
the events of a later day, and the deeds of those who then 
guided the Republic through its civil and military perils, are 
considered, may we not fairly claim' that the heroic age is 
yet with us, and that our race is still the bountiful producer 
of heroes ? 

No one who knew the principal leaders of our day, as we 
knew them, can doubt it. No one who comes after us and 
reads the story of their virtues, of their fidelity, fortitude 
and persistency, of their honor, honesty and unselfishness, of 


their patient toil, their lofty aspirations, their chivalrous 
modesty, and, above aU, their sublime conception of duly to 
themselves and to the cause of national unity, can for a 
moment hesitate to assign them a high place among the 
heroes of our race. They had their peculiarities, their 
idiosyncrasies, their limitations, but it may well be doubted 
if any period of the world's history can show a larger number 
of patriots and heroes, a wider dissemination of the public 
virtues, higher ideals of public duty, or more numerous 
instances of pure, upright and courageous manhood than the 
period of the Great Rebellion I 

It was the good fortune of the older members of this 
Society to know many, if not most, of the leading men on 
both sides of the great struggle, and I venture to express the 
hope that they will tell us, while yet they may, of the per- 
sonalities and private lives of those illustrious men. So far, 
the reports, narratives and histories give us merely the driest 
official details of military movements and events. Nothing, 
or but next to nothing, is said of the individuals, their 
education, appearance, motives, peculiarities and character ; 
a little more is told of the quality of their deeds, and yet 
not enough to give us a true idea of the events in which 
they were concerned. Those great men — some . of them 
were really great, and more deserved to be — while well 
enough known to us, who were their companions, are almost 
tmknown except by name to the public, and will be entirely 
unknown to the next generation unless something effective 
is done to rescue them from oblivion. A few chosen names 
will be written large on the page of general history, but the 
personalities belonging even to them will in spite of their 
virtues and great performances disappear forever 1 

One of the most interesting and meritorious characters of 
this period was Major-General Andrew Atkinson Humphreys, 
the last conmiander of the invincible Second Corps. He was 
a gentleman, a scientist and a soldier of the highest quality. 


Our race has produced no loftier specimen of manhood; 
modem education no finer example of the scientific soldier. 
And this is as it should be, for in Humphreys it had the best 
of materials to work upon. Descended from a Welsh family, 
four generations of whom had lived in and near Philadelphia, 
and two generations had been shipbuilders and naval con- 
structors of the highest rank, he came by his qualities 
naturally. Daniel Humphreys, the great-great-grandfather, 
was a Welsh Quaker of substance and consideration, who 
came to Pennsylvania and became the owner of a large tract 
of land at Haverford in 1682. His grandson Joshua was a 
ship-carpenter, and in the practice of his trade soon became 
widely known as the leading shipbuilder of his day. He 
was the first naval constructor and adviser of the United 
States, appointed by General Washington, and while in office 
laid the foundation of the supremacy of our wooden naval 
vessels, by conceiving and carrying out the idea that they 
should be larger and stronger and carry heavier guns, and 
more of them, than the current methods of rating would 
indicate. He designed the Constitution, lovingly remembered 
in our annals as '^Old Ironsides," the Chesapeake, the 
Congress, the President and the United States, and built the 
last-named ship in his own yard. It is a sufficient tribute to 
his genius to say, that these vessels were the most celebrated 
frigates ever turned out of any shipyard in the world, up to 
that time and for many years afterwards. 

Joshua's brother Charles early entered political life, was 
a member of the Provincial Assembly and of the Conti- 
nental Congress ; but, like John Dickinson and several other 
worthy men, he voted against the Declaration of Indepen- 
dence. Joshua's son Clement was a sea-faring man who died 
young. Another son, Samuel, bom in Philadelphia in 1778, 
was bred to his father's business, and was employed before 
he was yet of age in buying live oak for the Navy. In 1815 
he was appointed Chief Constructor of the Navy, and held 


that office till he died. He was a gentieman of the highest 
character and public spirit. Of course he adhered to the 
principle laid down by his father in naval construction, that, 
class for class, those ships which were of the largest tonnage 
and strongest construction and threw the greatest weight of 
metal from their broadsides would prove the most successful 
in battle. In 1824 the Emperor of Russia, through Mr. 
Ivanoff, his 0>nsul-General at Philadelphia, invited Samuel 
Humphreys to enter his service, offering him a princely 
salary, a town and country house, and a retinue of servants ; 
but the proposition was declined with an expression of doubt 
as to his merits, and a lofty declaration of devotion and 
duty to the flag of his country. 

This modest and distinguished man was the father of 
Andrew Atkinson Humphreys, the subject of this sketch, bom 
also at Philadelphia, November 2, 1810, died at Washington 
December 27, 1883. He graduated at the United States 
Military Academy in 1831, thirteenth in a class of thirty-three 
members. His most distinguished classmates were Professor 
Boswell Park, Henry Clay, son of the orator and statesman 
of that name. Professor Norton of the Sheffield Scientific 
School, Samuel C. Ridgeley, Horatio P. Van Cleve, William 
H. Emory, Bradford R. Alden, Samuel R. Curtis and 
Charles Whittlesey. It will be observed that there are no 
great names among them, but Emory and Curtis were solid 
and substantial men, while the others were more or less 
distinguished in the various walks of life. Indeed, if one 
will turn over the pages of Cullum's Register he will be struck 
by the fact that West Point turned out during that period 
more distinguished professors, divines and civil engineers 
than soldiers. Vinton and Bledsoe, the divines; Barnard and 
Barnes, the engineers ; Cass, the railroad manager ; Bailey, the 
chemist ; Church and Alvord, the mathematicians ; Cullum, the 
scientist and biographer ; Dupont, the powder-maker ; and 
Humphrey Marshall, the orator, were all graduates of that 


time, and none of them achieved great militajy distinction. 
Lee and Meade were contemporaries of these men, and had it 
not been for the Bebellion, would have been remembered, so 
long as thej were remembered at aU, for scholarship and 
scientific attainments rather than for military achievements. 
It is, perhaps, true that most of these men who remained in 
the army were rather too old for active military service when 
the Rebellion broke out. Humphreys himself was fifty-one ; 
Lee was slightly older, while Meade, Barnard and Cullum 
were only a few years younger. 

Humphreys began his active life in the Second Artillery, 
and served in garrison, at West Point, in South Carolina, 
Georgia, Florida and at Cape Cod. He was an excellent 
draughtsman, and having a decided turn for surveying and 
engineering was frequently detailed for such work. He took 
part in the Seminole war and was engaged in the battles of 
Oloklikaha and Micanopy, bearing himself bravely but 
modestly withal, and gaining experience and breadth of 
view rather than honor. He was a serious-minded man, 
whose tendencies, as before indicated, were rather towards 
engineering and science than to the life of the camp and 
garrison as an officer of artillery serving as infantry. As there 
were but few educated civil engineers at that time in the 
country, and as our system of internal improvements was just 
being started, Humphreys, after serving five years, resigned 
his commission in the army and at once accepted service 
as a civil engineer with Major Bache, then constructing 
lighthouses on the Delaware Bay. 

The Corps of Topographical Engineers was authorized by 
Congress in 1838, and in July of that year Humphreys was 
offered and accepted the rank of first lieutenant. From that 
time forth he led a most active, studious and laborious life, 
serving on the harbor works and defences of the Great Lakes, 
in the Bureau of Topographical Engineers at Washington, 
in the Florida war, on the construction of a bridge at 


Washington, again in the Bureau of Topographical Engineers, 
and then in charge of the Coast Survey office. He reached 
the rank of Captain in 1848, and for the next twelye years 
had charge of the surveys and examinations of the Mississippi 
Biver and its delta, with a view to the improvement of its 
navigation and the protection of its lowlands from inundation. 
In the later years of this great work, and especially in the 
preparation of his report upon the Hydraulics of the 
Mississippi, he had the assistance of that distinguished 
scientist and soldier, Henry L. Abbot. The result of their 
joint labors brought their names into distinction throughout 
the world, and it is justly regarded as an enduring monument 
to their learning and ability. While on this exacting duty, 
Humphrep broke down and was permitted to visit Europe for 
the double purpose of restoring his health and studying the 
means of protecting delta rivers from overflow. On his 
return, in 1854, he was assigned to the additional duty at 
Washington of supervising and directing the explorations and 
survey which Congress had authorized for the purpose of 
deciding upon the location, feasibility and relative advantage 
of the various routes, for a railroad or a system of railroads 
to connect the Mississippi River with the Pacific Ocean. 

At that time the railroad system of this continent was in 
its youth, if not its infancy, and the construction of a line to 
the Pacific, as first suggested by Senator Breese, of Illinois, 
was deemed to be an event of the indefinite future if not 
entii^ely impossible. But Humphreys, scarcely yet recovered 
from the breakdown which culminated in a sunstroke in 1851, 
threw himself with his accustomed intensity into the task of 
bringing the results of the siirveys into order. " His mind," 
said his friend. Lieutenant Abbot, " worked like a beautiful 
machine — neglecting nothing and forgetting nothing." His 
preliminary report was finished before Congress adjourned, 
and contained such conclusions and recommendations as 
fully justified at a later and more important period the 


location and construction of the firgt line of railroad to the 
Pacific Ocean. 

Humphreys was one of those men who were never idle. He 
worked night and day, and the more he worked the more the 
Goyemment seemed to pile upon his willing shoulders. In 
1855, he was made a member of the Lighthouse Board, on 
which he served till 1862. About the same time he was 
made a member of a board, and afterwards of a commission, 
to revise the programme of instruction, and to examine into 
the organization and system of discipline at the Military 
Academy. The high duties to which he was assigned brought 
him in contact with the leading men, and especially with the 
leading politicians of the day. He had come to be an author- 
ity on all questions of science, and especially of engineering, 
and was consulted freely on nearly all the great public works 
contemplated or carried on by the Government. During the 
decade preceding the Rebellion no public character wielded a 
greater influence over the public works, especially such as were 
carried on by the army, than Jefferson Davis, Senator from 
Mississippi, and Secretary of War. A man of extraordinary 
industiy, perspicacity and decision, he, of course, discovered 
the abilities of Humphreys, and utilized them fully. A 
warm personal and official friendship sprang up between 
them, and when the war broke out, it subjected Humphreys 
to a suspicion on the part of those above him, which was as 
unjust as it was injurious. It gave rise to the false report 
that Humphreys was lukewarm in his loyalty, and would go 
South and cast in his lot with the nascent Confederacy. That 
a scientist and a savant of his distinction would have been 
warmly welcomed by Davis to the standard which he had set 
up, there can be no doubt ; but that Humphreys ever wavered 
for a moment in his loyalty, or ever dreamed of giving 
aid and comfort to the Rebellion, there is not the slightest 
ground for supposing. His whole life, both before and 
after the commencement of hostilities, gives the Ue to the 


guggestion, and it may be dismissed as an idle and baseless 
Tomor. Always an observant and reflectiye man, he doubtless 
noted with an anxious soul the signs of the eoming storm ; 
but that he ever thought of avoiding it, or of playing any 
other part in it than that of a loyal and patriotic soldier, 
no man who had the good fortime to know him will ever 

The outbreak of the Rebellion found him in Washington. 
He had passed his fiftieth year. Never a man of robust frame 
or turbulent vitality, his studious life and profound study, no 
less than his age and appearance, had marked him rather for 
the cabinet and council than for the field, and yet he made 
haste to seek active service, and was assigned to duly with 
McClellan, when the latter became General-in-Chief of the 
Army. The numerous resignations which took place at and 
before that time had brought him to the rank of Major. 
Shortly afterwards, he was appointed Additional Aide-de-Camp 
with the rank of Colonel, and this was followed in a few weeks 
by the commission of Brigadier-General of Volunteers. He 
accompanied McClellan with the Army of the Potomac to 
the Peninsula, and as Chief Topographical Engineer took part 
in all the operations and battles of that ill-starred campaign. 
He it was who, accompanied by General Henry J. Hunt, 
Chief of Artillery, selected and established the impregnable 
line on which the Army of the Potomac fought and won the 
bloody battle of Malvern Hill, and it has always been a 
matter of profound regret with those who knew him best, 
that he, instead of McClellan, had not been at that time in 
supreme command. The 'opportunity was one of the greatest 
ever offered to a commander, and if improved by McClellan, 
as it should have been, by a vigorous offensive, might have led 
to the capture of Richmond and to an entirely different course 
of events in that imfortunate year. McClellan mentions 
Humphreys, in his Report of the Peninsula Campaign, as 
having performed his duty ably and well, under great and 


unasnal difficulties,^ but does not give him special credit 
in connection with the battle of Malvern HilL Hay and 
Nicolay, however, in the Life of Lincoln, assert positively that 
it was Humphreys who selected the position and indicated 
the line upon which the battle was fought.^ Colonel Carswell 
McClellan, formerly of Humphreys' staff, brings out and 
clearly establishes the fact.^ 

On the 12th of September, 1862, Halleck, then Greneral- 
in-Chief, assigned Humphreys to the command of the Third 
Division of Fitz John Porter's Fifth Corps, composed 
entirely of new Pennsylvania troops, just passing through 
Washington to join the Army of the Potomac in Maryland. 
They were poorly equipped and armed, without adequate 
transportation or rations, and, like all new troops, overstocked 
with baggage. Through his own personal exertions, and the 
help of a hastily improvised staff, their wants were supplied 
as far as it was possible to supply them, and on the morning of 
the 14th, the division began its march through Monocacy and 
Frederick to join the army at Antietam. It arrived on the 
field on the morning of the 18th, having marched twenty- 
three miles since half past three the afternoon before. Prior 
to leaving Washington, however, Humphreys received a sharp 
note from Halleck, saying, if he " did not join his division 
immediately in the field, he would be arrested." * Inasmuch 
as he had lost no time, but had displayed extraordinary 
energy in preparing his command for the march, the threat 
made no change in his movements, but it produced a wound 
which rankled deeply. Humphreys, although a man of even 
temper and gentle manners, was not the person to submit 
tamely to an outrage from any one. Ordinarily as amiable 
as a mm, he was as fierce as a tiger when enraged. Kindly 
and considerate to others, he expected courteous treatment 
from high and low alike, and so, when the General-in-Chief 

1 5 W. R., 25. » McClellan's Humphreys, 1-9. 

3 5 N. & H., 436-437. * 27 W. R., 868, 372. 


miBJadged and insulted him, he waited only for a panse in the 
campaign to request an investigation of his conduct by a 
court of inquiry. His letter to the Secretary of War,^ giving 
a most spirited account of how he had performed his duty in 
Washington and on the* march, was followed six days after- 
wards by another, which not only corrected a misstatement 
made by McClellan, reflecting on the way in which his troops 
had arrived on the field, but brought into prominence the 
unusual celerity with which they had marched, and the 
fortitude with which these raw levies had sustained privation 
and fatigue.^ These communications showed in addition 
that Humphreys knew his rights and would submit to no 
injustice either to himself or his command. It does not 
appear that any action was ever taken on his request for a 
court of inquiry, n,or, on the other hand, does it appear that 
any reparation was ever offered for the injustice done him 
by Halleck and McClellan. 

The appearance of Humphreys on the bloody but doubtful 
field of Antietam was timely and reassuring. Although 
travel-stained, he presented at the head of his enthusiastic 
Pennsylvanians a cheerful and confident figure. He was 
a gentleman of perfect manners and habits, who always used 
the regulation equipments and wore the regulation uniform. 
His gloves and footwear were faultless ; his fine and intelligent 
face was clean-shaven, except as to the mustache; his eyes 
were gray and full of • kindliness, except when aroused by 
anger. He was about five feet, seven inches high, erect and 
graceful in carriage, and weighed at that time not far from 
one himdred and fifty pounds. There was nothing rough 
or harsh about him. Calmness, composure and self-confidence, 
without the slightest trace of assumption or bravado, were 
apparent in every feature. Altogether he was as prepos- 
sessing a figure in whatever aspect he was viewed as could 
be found in that or any other army. Like Caesar at a 

127W.R.,868. « 25., 378. 


oorresponding age, his military career was all before him; 
but unlike CaBsar he had led only a virtuous and studious 
life, without thirst for power, and with no ambition, except 
to serve his country and to assist in the maintenance of its 
unity, under the G>nstitution and the laws. 

During the torpid pursuit of Lee's army into Virginia, 
Humphreys took a leading part whenever opportunity offered; 
but nothing occurred to bring him into special prominence till 
the disastrous battle of Fredericksburg was fought. In the 
assault of Marye's Heights, rendered impregnable by a stone 
wall and dry ditch, or rifle trench, which skirt their base for 
a mile, he displayed the courage of a paladin combined 
with the abilities of a general. The groimd over which his 
division was compelled to advance was encimibered by men 
of other organizations, many of whom were lying down to 
escape the destructive fire of the enemy. Humphreys, seeing 
that musketry could accomplish nothing, ordered his men to 
draw the charges from their guns and use the bayonet, and 
by the help of his staff, brigade and regimental commanders 
led them over the prostrate forms of their fellow soldiers, 
and as far towards the enemy's lines as it was possible for 
men to go against such a storm as the well-sheltered rebels 
poured upon them. Horse after horse was killed under him ; 
but apparently unconscious of danger he tried again and* 
again to accomplish the impossible task which had been so 
inconsiderately set for him. His gallantry and aggressive 
leadership were the admiration of all who beheld him upon 
that memorable occasion. They made him easily the most 
conspicuous figure on the field that day. In admiration for 
his conduct, no less than as a rebuke to others, Bumside, 
the army commander, in a personal interview with the 
President, strongly recommended him for promotion to the 
rank of Major-GeneraL He had richly deserved it ; but the 
reward was not bestowed upon him till he had shown at 
Chancellorsville, and again at Gettysburg, that he was one 


of the most oonrageous and stubborn fighters in the army, as 
well as one of its bravest and most competent generals. 

His conduct at Fredericksburg, and his explanation of the 
failure to carry the enemy's position, have led to a discussion 
between Greneral Walker and Colonel McClellan, into the 
merits of which it is not necessary to enter here. It is 
adverted to now merely for the purpose of emphasizing the 
statement in which all agree, that the personal bravery 
and the leadership displayed upon that occasion were of the 
highest order. All who have written about them, as well 
as all who witnessed them, concur in this statement. His 
perfect intrepidity and unshaken self-possession are admirably 
exemplified by his conduct on that occasion. '^As the bugle 
sounded the charge," says Colonel McClellan, '^General 
Humphreys turned to his staff, and, bowing with uncovered 
head, remarked as quietly and pleasantly as if inviting them 
to be seated around his table, ^ Gentlemen, I shall lead this 
charge ; I presume, of course, you will wish to ride with me." ^ 
And they did ride with him right gallantly ! Of the seven 
who started five were dismounted and four wounded before 
the charge ceased. When it is remembered that his own 
son was one of the seven, and that with unobtrusive modesty 
he interposed himself as often as possible between his father 
and the rebel fire,^ it will be admitted that courage is an 
inherited virtue in that family. 

The limits of this paper will not permit a detailed account 
of General Humphreys' services during the Chancellorsville 
and the Gettysburg campaigns ; but they were characterized 
by the same unflagging energy and zeal, the same aggressive 
courage, and the same clear military sense he had always dis- 
played. Although it can hardly be claimed that the Army 
of the Potomac as a whole was engaged at Chancellorsville, 
Humphreys' division had a bloody encounter with the enemy 
near the Chancellor House, and maintained its high reputation 

1 MoQeUan's Humpbieys, 15. < lb., ZL 


for steadiness and courage. He disapproved the defensive 
attitude wMch Hooker assumed ; and, if he could have had 
his way, would have fought an offensive aggressive battle. 
Shortly after the army withdrew to the north side of the 
Rappahannock, the time of most of Humphreys' men having 
expired, his division was broken up, much to the regret 
of Meade, who had succeeded Porter in command of the 
corps, and Humphreys was transferred to Berry's old division, 
the Second of the Third Corps, then under Sickles. 

In the march to Gretiysburg, and in the position assigned to 
him, Humphreys displayed his usual self-reliance and ability ; 
and in the battle added greatly to his renown. Having 
shown his old division at Fredericksburg how to make an 
assault, it was now his good fortune to show his new division 
how to receive one. It will be remembered that Sickles, 
after having taken position in the general line, moved to the 
front about five hundred yards and occupied a ridge between 
Cemetery Hill and Bound Top ; this exposed the entire corps 
to great danger, inasmuch as its isolated position invited 
attack and deprived it of ready support. It does not appear 
from any reports that are accessible that Humphreys, who 
was without any doubt the best topographer in either army, 
was consulted in regard to the selection of this advanced 
line, but it is perhaps a fair assumption that he did not 
object to it. It was evidently good enough ground to fight 
on ; and might have been maintained, had the general line of 
battle been made to conform to, and support, this part of it. 
Be this as it may, Humphreys was in no way responsible for 
anything except the defense of the position to which he had 
been assigned. His duty was merely to obey orders and fight 
his division, which was most fiercely attacked, both in front 
and flank, in the afternoon of the second day. Speaking of 
it himself, he said he had never been under a hotter fire 
of artillery and musketry combined. In defending and 
withdrawing his own batteries, in changing front to rear 


on his right under orders, and finally in falling back to a 
better position, in the face of a terrible onslaught from the 
enemy, he displayed the most stubborn and tenacious courage, 
combined with the most surprising capacity to meet the 
emergencies of battle. His manoeuvres upon that occasion 
were not unlike Sheridan's at Stone Kiyer ; but there is 
reason to beUeye that they called for a much higher order of 
tactical skill on his own part, and for greater steadiness and 
coherence on the part of his division. An eye-witness speaks 
in the highest terms of Humphreys' personal bearing upon 
that occasion : " Throwing himself into the midst of the 
battle," closely followed by his staff, all of whom were eager 
^' to ride with him " upon this occasion, he was like a knight 
of old, ever seeking the thickest of the fight, sustaining and 
encouraging his men. In the hottest of the conflict one of 
his staff (Captain Chester) convulsively throwing up his hands, 
called out, " General, I 'm shot ; " whereupon the latter, 
who had noted the gallantry of this officer, went at once to 
his assistance, and sustained him in his saddle till a brother 
officer could take him in charge and conduct him to a 
place of safely. Almost instantaneously, a cannon shot 
disembowelled the wounded officer's horse and took off the 
head of the orderly who had started to lead him to the rear. 
At the same moment, Greneral Humphreys' own horse, 
already bleeding from seven bullet wounds, was struck by 
a shell, and, springing convulsively into the air, threw the 
Greneral violently to the ground, but fortunately the fall 
inflicted no serious injury. Grathering himself up as best he 
could, he was soon remounted and engaged as calmly in the 
exercise of his conmiand as if nothing unusual had happened. 
Nothing appeared to shake the nerves or to disturb the 
equanimity of this remarkable man. With the gentle and 
refined manner and habits of a scholar, he seemed to fairly 
revel in the storm of battle. He never sought shelter nor 
dismounted so long as he could find a horse to ride, and 


soomed to remain in the rear when the slightest duty was to 
be performed in front. All who have witnessed his conduct 
in battle concur in the statement that it was simply perfect, 
as if inspired solely by the sense of duly and absolutely 
uninfluenced by danger or the sense of fear. No emergency 
ever foimd him unprepared, no fire unwilling to &ce it. The 
only wonder is that an officer of such conspicuous intrepidity 
should have escaped alive from any battle in which his troops 
took part By whatever scale it is measured, Grettysburg 
was a great battle. It certified the quality of American 
bravery as well as American generalship to the world; it 
rendered the name of Meade and Hancock and Warren on 
the one side and of Lee and Longstreet and Pickett on 
the other, immortal ; but it also made known to such as will 
read the story that there was no stouter heart in either host 
than that which beat within the breast of Andrew Atkinson 

It is now known that when Meade's promotion to the 
command of the Army of the Potomac was announced, lus 
first thought was of Humphrep for Chief of Staff, and that 
he notified that distinguished officer that the position was at 
his disposition. It is also known that the latter declined the 
honor offered him, in order that he might participate in the 
impending battle with his division. Four days after it was 
over, he accepted the position and entered at once upon the 
performance of his onerous duties. For sixteen months he 
was constantly by the side of his friend and chief, supporting 
and sustaining him in every trial, and relieving him of a 
multitude of duties, by his wise counsel and ceaseless super- 
vision of details. It was a period of mingled hope and 
disappointment, of long marches and indecisive conflicts ; 
but it was also a period of freedom from great disaster, 
which showed that the army was handled with skill and 
prudence, if not with conspicuous ability. During this 
period it was engaged in the pursuit of Lee, back to Virginia, 


in the action of Manassas Gap, in the march of the Bapidan, 
in the operations on the Rappahannock and the combat 
at Bristoe Station, in the abortiye moyement to Mine Bun, 
and finally in that wonderful series of battles and marches 
beginning in the Wilderness and including Spottsylvania, 
North Anna, Totopotamoj, Cold Harbor, the passage of the 
James, the attack and siege of Petersburg, and the affairs at 
the Weldon Railroad, Peeble's Farm, and the Boydton Plank 

Just what part Humphreys, as Chief of Staff, took in 
devising the plans in accordance with which these operations 
were conducted, or what influence he had in causing their 
adoption, it is to be feared, can never be definitely ascer- 
tained. The official reports are silent upon such questions, 
and Humphreys himself, if he ever made any record, died 
without giving it to the world. In the " Virginia Campaign 
of 1864 and 1865 " ^ he says he drew up two projects for the 
initial movements of the army, and intimated that neither 
was fully adopted. A close reading of the text suggests the 
inference that he would have pushed the whole army through 
the Wilderness on the first day's march, and thus compelled 
Lee to give battle in the open country beyond. This result 
might or might not have been attained, and it is possible that 
it would not have brought victory to the Union arms, but, 
however great the hazard or the uncertainty, one cannot help 
wishing that the plans had been arranged and carried out in 
accordance with this idea. 

It is worthy of note, that the presence of Gh*ant, as the 
Lieutenant-General commanding all the Union armies, with 
the Army of the Potomac, without assuming immediate 
conunand of it, was imfortunate in many respects. It 
distributed instead of concentrated responsibility, and fre- 
quently gave rise to delays in the transmission and the 
execution of orders, in uncertainty, if not misunderstanding, 
1 12 Campaigns of the Ciyfl War, 12. 


as to details and who should work them out, and to a lack 
of hannony and coherence in their execution, which was 
frequently fatal to success. Grant, always considerate and 
kindly, endeavored as far as possible to give his orders in 
general terms and leave the details and the execution to 
Meade and his staff ; but with all their loyalty and ability, the 
result was in many cases far from satisfactory. Looking back 
over the events of that long and unhappy year, as they are 
now recorded, there seems to be but little doubt that Grrant 
would have done far better had he assumed immediate 
command of the army and assigned Meade, and even 
Humphreys, to the command of corps, for which both were 
pre-eminently fitted. 

It is almost useless to dwell ui)on the services of 
Humphreys as Chief of Staff, for there are but few materials 
at our command bearing upon the subject. It is known, of 
course, that while the grand and battle tactics of that 
campaign were of the simplest sort, the logistics were in many 
respects of the highest order. The dispositions for both direct 
and flank movements, for the passage of rivers, for the supply 
and subsistence of the troops, and for the care of the sick 
and wounded, were generally as good as it was possible to 
make them. In all of these matters the genius of Humphreys 
is apparent, and it is only fair to assume that whatever was 
wrong was due to the dual system of command, rather than 
to neglect on the part of the Chief of Staff to the Army of 
the Potomac. This remark is particularly applicable to the 
failure of the plan to take Petersburg, in connection with 
which both Meade and Hancock are understood to have 
claimed that if they had known that the Lieutenant-General 
intended that Smith should take Petersburg, and that they 
were expected to co-operate with him, "Petersburg would 
have been taken." Without dwelling longer upon the inter- 
esting but obscure relations which subsisted between Grant 
and Meade and between Meade and Humphreys, it is proper 


to remark that Humphreys was the breakwater and protector 
of every officer doing business with Meade's headquarters. 
He was patient and considerate with all, always accessible, 
always scrupulously kind and polite, and always ready to 
listen and explain. In every personal aspect he was a model 
Chief of Staff, and made every one who approached him, 
whether officer or private, feel that he had found a friend in 
him. It is an open secret, however, that as the campaign 
approached its final stages, Ghrant, without making any 
formal change in the faulty organization, assumed day by 
day a more direct control over the two armies and the various 
corps operating against Lee. Perceiving that this would 
ultimately result in his practical supercession, and that he 
would have less and less use for a Chief of Staff of such 
ability and distinction as Humphreys, Meade availed himself 
of Hancock's retirement, on account of wounds and disability, 
from the command of the Second Corps, to secure the place 
for Humphreys and fill the vacancy on his staff by calling 
General Alexander S. Webb to the place. 

The change was a welcome one; for, although Meade, 
notwithstanding his irascible temper and the embarrassing 
circumstances by which he was surrounded, had always 
treated Humphreys with marked kindness and consideration, 
it is not to be disguised that the latter longed for the opportu- 
nities of an active command. In assuming his new position, 
after a natural expression of diffidence in succeeding so 
distinguished a soldier as Hancock, he modestly added, " I 
can only promise you that I shall try to do my duty and 
preserve your reputation imsullied, relying upon you to sustain 
me by that skill and courage which you have so conspicuously 
displayed on so many fields." ^ 

This change took place on the 26th of November, 1864, 
and marks a new and still more glorious era in the career of 
General Humphreys. The Second Corps was not a stranger 


to him, nor was he to it. They had known each other long 
and well, and had perfect confidence in each other ; but they 
were destined to become stiU better acquainted and to conceive 
a still higher respect for each other. Although General 
Humphreys as Chief of Staff had assured General Wilson on 
the 22d of Jime that the Army of the Potomac would at 
once extend its left across the railroads leading south from 
Petersburg to the Appomattox, it had as yet utterly failed to 
do so, and although those railroads had been broken for nine 
weeks, at one time so that nothing on wheels could pass over 
them, Lee had managed to draw his supplies regularly from 
Hicksford, forty miles south of Petersburg on the Weldon 
Road, by wagons which passed round and almost in sight of 
the left flank of the Union army. It is an interesting coinci- 
dence that Humphreys on the 6th of February, 1865, nearly 
eight months after his assurances to General Wilson, began 
the movement which finally broke up this line and marked 
the beginning of the end. Gregg's division of cavalry had 
been sent out, and the Third and Fifth Corps were ordered 
to support his movement. Hatcher's Bun was bridged and 
crossed, and a severe action was had, which resulted in the 
extension of the Federal entrenchments to the Yaughan road. 
Humphreys held the extreme left, with the Fifth Corps in 
close supi)ort The Weldon railroad was at last firmly in 
their hands and the rebel supply-line broken. On the 25th 
of March, Lee, aiming a counter-blow at the Union base of 
supplies at City Point, sent Gordon on his desperate mission 
against Fort Stedman. After he was hurled back by Parke's 
splendid fighting, Wright and Humphreys, with the Sbcth 
and Third Corps, made a gallant rirposte^ gaining ground, 
which enabled Wright to deliver his fatal blow on the 2d of 

Meanwhile Grant had sent Sheridan still further out 
towards Dinwiddie Court House, where he was so roughly 
handled by Pickett and Fitz Lee on the 81st. Again 


Humphreys and Warren were in support, but the rains had 
commenced, the creeks were swollen, and the roads almost 
impassable with mud. Warren met with delay and temporary 
disaster ; but Humphreys, with Miles's division, struck the 
successful rebels in front and flank, and drove them beyond 
the White Oak road, capturing three himdred prisoners. 
Thus the Union forces cut and held firm possession of 
another line of supply and possible retreat. On the 1st and 
2d of April, Humphreys carried the rebel works in his front, 
and pushed his leading division, again under Miles, to the 
Southside Railroad at Sutherland's Station, thus, for the first 
time after the cavalry had broken it at the same spot nine 
months before, getting firm possession of that railroad and 
every closing avenue of retreat from Petersburg on the south 
side of the Appomattox Biver. This movement towards 
Sutherland's was disapproved, to the disgust of Humphreys, 
and Miles was recalled to join in the direct advance upon 
Petersburg. But the game was up, the rebel works had been 
carried by assault, the right of their army overthrown, and 
their roads all closed. There was nothing left for them to 
do but to run for it ; and thanks to Himiphreys, still more 
than to Sheridan or to any other man, the only roads for 
retreat left open were those on the north side of the river 
by Bevel's and Groode's bridges to Amelia Court House. 

Lee withdrew from Petersburg on the night of April 2, and 
the next day the pursuit began, Sheridan with the cavalry, 
and the Fifth Corps moving on Jetersville ; Humphreys with 
the Second Corps to the northward, on the road to Amelia 
Court House. On the morning of the 4th, Lee reached the 
Court House, where he lost a day to let his baggage catch up. 
The delay was fatal, for it enabled the Second and Sixth 
Corps to join Sheridan at Jetersville, and bar the road to 
Burkesville and the south. The cavalry alone could not have 
done this, for the rebel infantry could have brushed it easily 
out of the way. But when Lee found himself confronted 


by the Federal infantry, he marched northward and then 
westward, evidently hoping to pass round the Federal 
left and reach FarmviUe or Rice's Station. Humphreys, 
being in advance on the left, was the first to discover this 
movement, and made, haste to follow the enemy's retreating 
footsteps. The Fifth and Sixth Corps joined eagerly in the 
pursuit, all striving to their utmost to bring the enemy to 
bay. A running fight for fourteen miles took place between 
pursued and pursuers. " Lines of battle," says Humphreys, 
"followed closely on the skirmish line with a rapidity and 
nearness of connection that I believe to be unexampled, and 
which I confess astonished me." ^ Flat Creek, a stream from 
eighty to a hundred feet wide, scarcely caused a pause in 
Humphreys' hurrying march. At Sailor's Creek the gallant 
Grordon made a desperate stand, but was again overborne 
with the loss of three guns, thirteen colors, seventy ambu- 
lances, more than two hundred wagons, and many prisoners. 
Meanwhile Ewell's corps were split off by Humphreys, and 
captured by the cavalry. After the terrible disaster of this 
day, Longstreet, who had reached Rice's Station, abandoned 
the hope of getting off to the south, turned westward and 
crossed again to the north side of the Appomattox River at 
Farmville, while Gordon with the other half of the rebels 
crossed at High Bridge, thus dividing what there was left of 
Lee's army. 

At half past five, on the 7th, the sleepless Humphreys 
resumed the pursuit by the road nearest the river, and 
reached High Bridge just as the last rebels who had crossed 
after blowing up the redoubt, which served as a bridgehead, 
were setting fire to both the wagon bridge and the railroad 
bridge. Barlow's division, directed by Humphreys, led 
by Barlow in person, succeeded in putting out the fire and 
saving both bridges. The way was now clear for the whole 
corps to cross, which it lost no time in doing. Miles's and 
1 OS W. R., 682. 


De Trobriand's divisions pushed out on the main road for 
Lynchburg, pressing heavily upon the enemy's rear, while 
Barlow's division followed the river by the left hand westerly 
to Farmville, which he found strongly occupied by the enemy. 
The rest of the Federal Army was south of Farmville, and 
separated from Humphreys by the Appomattox Biver, but 
this did not cause him to stay his advance. At about one 
o'clock he came up with the enemy, strongly entrenched and 
covering both the stage and plank roads leading through 
Appomattox Court House to Lynchburg. Sending word to 
Barlow to re-establish connection with his left, and requesting 
Meade to bring forward the other corps of infantry, 
Humphreys endeavored to find a weak spot in the enemy's 
line, and, failing in that, tried to turn his left. Li this he 
was also unsuccessful, shortly after which night put an end to 
the conflict. 

During the entire operations of the 7th, Humphreys 
received no help whatever from any other part of the Federal 
Army, except Crook's cavalry division, which late in the day 
forded the river and made a demonstration in his favor. 
There is but little doubt that the presence of the other corps 
of infantry would have enabled Humphreys to overwhelm 
Lee and bring the conflict to a close on that day ; but the 
scattered condition of the pursuing army, the time lost in 
transmitting information, the difficulty of crossing the Appo- 
mattox, and the obvious advantage of placing the cavalry and 
at least one corps of infantry athwart the road upon which 
Lee was retreating, all intervened to prevent the realization 
of Humphreys' hopes upon that memorable occasion. On 
the other hand, it is more than probable, as claimed by 
General Humphreys, that if his corps had not '^crossed the 
Appomattox on the 7th, he [Lee] could have reached New 
Store that night, Appomattox Station on the afternoon of 
the 8th, obtained rations there, and moved that evening 
toward Lynchburg. A march the next day, the 9th, would 


have brought him to Lynchburg." ^ Following the narrative 
of Greneral Walker in the History of the Second Army Corps,* 
it may be fairly contended that Humphreys compelled Lee to 
lose time at " Farmville Heights " which he could not r^ain 
by night marches, kept him from obtaining the much 
needed supplies waiting for him at Appomattox Station, and 
secured for Sheridan and Ord the opportunity to jwst 
themsdves across his path at Appomattox Court House. 
It is also worthy of note that Grant's first letter to Lee 
demanding the surrender of his army was deHvered from 
Humphreys' front about half past seven on the evening of 
the 7th, and that Lee returned his answer within an hour 
by the same route. Grrant, Ord and Wright rested that 
night at Farmville, about eight miles in rear of Humphreys' 

There is but little more to relate. Lee abandoned his 
position under the cover of darkness and was again followed 
at half past five the next morning by Humphreys, now sup* 
ported by Wright with the Sixth Corps. Sheridan with the 
Cavalry Corps, the Fifth Corps, and the Army of the James, 
pushed forward by the road on the south side of the Appo- 
mattox towards Appomattox Station. His advanced divisicm 
under Custer reached there late in the afternoon, cutting the 
last supply-line and capturing the trains containing the last 
provisions the Confederacy had left for Lee's starving army. 
The end came next day, and Humphreys' " foot cavalry " 
was in at the death. His unerring instinct for the chase, 
his terrible persistency and aggressive temper, together with 
the astonishing celerity of his movements, had enabled him 
to outstrip everything but the cavalry, and to keep fully 
abreast with even that. The details of the surrender, which 
took place on the 9th, have been told and retold a himdred 
times, and while their interest never ceases, the limits of 
this paper will not permit their repetition here ; but read and 
1 12 Campaigns of the Giyil War, 391. > Walker, 685, et seq. 


study the wonderful stoiy as you will, one fact cannot be 
avoided or suppressed. If Sheridan was the hero of the 
cavalry in those splendid operations, Humphreys was beyond 
all doubt the hero of the infantry. His services in that 
campaign brought him to the very front rank of corps 
commanders, and showed him to be possessed of the highest 
military talents. Had the war continued there can be but 
little doubt that he would have soon passed into the list of 
army commanders, wherein, if his life had been spared, he 
would most surely have gained imperishable renown. 

And now let us compare him, as far as we may, with the 
other distinguished men of his own rank in either army. 
After this brief narrative, it will be readily admitted that in 
trustworthy courage and professional skill, in battle or on 
the march, he was the equal of any man on either side. 
He was certainly not surpassed in those virtues by either 
Hancock or Longstreet, Sheridan or Forrest, McPherson or 
Gordon, Upton or Cleburne, and no others need be named 
in this comparison. In tactical resources he was also the 
equal, if not the superior, of any or all of these great soldiers, 
with the possible exception of Upton. As a disciplinarian 
aivl military administrator he was in every respect as good if 
not better than the best. He was a far more accomplished, as 
well as a more aggressive man, than the lamented McPherson, 
and was his equal in urbanity and politeness. He had a 
better temper and a more even and trustworthy mental organ- 
ization than Sherman, and, of course, his scientific knowledge 
and equipment were much superior to those of either Grrant or 
Thomas. In some respects, notably in modesty, lofty pride, 
seK-respect, and in quiet power, he resembled the latter most 
strikingly ; but, it is to be observed, he was a much quicker 
man in his mental processes than either of the generals just 
named. Whether he would have borne the responsibilities 
of supreme command as (jrant or Lee did, or of an indepen- 
dent army as Meade, Thomas and Sheridan did, must forever 


remain a matter of oon jectore ; but reasoning from what we 
know of his conduct in inferior positions, it may fairly be 
assumed that he would have acquitted himself with credit, 
and might have done so with extraordinary distinction. 
Certain it is that, like the impatieiit runner in the Olympian 
games, he would never have merited the lash for starting up 
too soon, nor, like the laggard, have failed to deserve his 
crown by being left at the beginning of the race. Altogether, 
he was a very able, very loyal, very perfect soldier, with all 
the virtues of the heroic age and none of the vices or foibles 
of the times and profession to which he belonged. His parts 
were all in perfect harmony with each other, and he with his 

Before closing this paper it is proper to remark that these 
four years of actual war, with all the chances they presented 
to Himiphreys for distinguishing himself as a general, were 
after all only a glorious episode in the life of a scholar and 
a savant. When it had passed he returned modestly to his 
books and his scientific employment and added nearly twenty 
years more of useful labor, as Chief Engineer of the Army, to 
the great sum of his faithful and conscientious services to his 
coimtry. Those who knew him only in his last position 
would never have imagined him to have been one of the best 
and stanchest corps commanders on either side of the 
Grreat Bebellion. 




BeprinUd by permaianjrom the ''AtlarUic Monthly '* for Aprils 18S7. 


In the biographical sketch of General McQellan which is 
contributed by Mr. William C. Prime, we are informed that 
the General wrote this narrative not for the public, but solely 
for the information of his children ; that '^ he did not labor at 
it continuously, with intent to produce a book, but wrote as 
the humor seized him." Any one carefully reading the stoiy 
would, we think, be likely to frame some such conjecture as 
this as to its genesis. It is an easy, flowing narrative, not 
logically or even chronologically arranged, with few precise 
statements of the questions in regard to which there has been 
so much contention, and very little, if any, useful discussion 
of the points when they happen to be reached in the course 
of the story. There is not the slightest effort to write from 
any other than McClellan's own standpoint. Never was there 
a controversial work in which the other side was more calmly 
ignored. There is in McCleUan's mind, evidently, no room 
for the exercise of such a virtue as impartiality in deal- 
ing with such fools and knaves as the members of Mr. 
Lincoln's cabinet in 1861 and 1862. He has no doubt what- 
ever that he was the divinely appointed man by whom the 
coimtry was to ba saved. His egotism is simply colossal, — 
there is no other word for it. And all is said with such an 
utter unconsciousness of there being anything absurd in his 

^ McClellan^g Own Story. The War for the Union : the soldiers who f ought 
it ; lihe oiyilians who directed it ; and his relations to it and to them. By George 
B. MoClellan, late Major-G^eral oonunanding the Annies. New York : Charles 
L. Webster & Co. 1887. 


assuming for himself such a unique position, that the book 
must rank as one of the most characteristic autobiographies 
ever written. 

Besides the narrative, we have copious extracts from 
McCleUan's letters to his wife, and surely nothing that has 
ever been given to the public has disclosed a man^s real 
character more fully and frankly than these letters disclose 
that of General McQellan. They have all the peculiarities 
of the autobiography, only they possess the flavor of the 
time, and are much more pointed in diction. They show us 
a highly emotional man, extremely fond of his family and of 
domestic Ufe, — a man, too, of quick and warm religious 
feelings. They show us a man who likes to have everybody 
around him believe in him, who loves his soldiers for their 
manifest confidence in him, who has the strongest dislike 
of all criticism and of all supervision, who has an almost 
puerile impatience to escape from the neighborhood of 
Washington to the distant camps of the Peninsula, where 
the cheers of the troops should replace the cold and somewhat 
sceptical talk of the drawing-rooms and lobbies of the capital 

In fact, McClellan is seen to live very much in a world of 
his own making. His imagination creates a great part of the 
circumstances which appear to surround him. In his mind 
the Confederates are always seeking to devour him ; they are 
pressing him in on every side. Were it not for his wise coun- 
sel and strong arm, the country would be lost. The problem 
with him is not so much how can the Rebellion be put down, 
as how can the country be saved. His enemies invariably 
outnumber him, sometimes two to one. Twice he saves the 
capital. Once he saves Maryland and Pennsylvania also. 
No one, in his judgment, but himself could have brought order 
out of the confusion which reigned after the first Bull Bim. 
Under no other commander than himself, in his own opinion, 
would the Army of the Potomac have marched to drive the 
enemy out of Mainland after the second Bull Bun. It is 


needless to expose the futility of such assumptions. Their 
truth is contradicted by the behavior of the army on many a 
bloody and disastrous field, long after McClellan had been 
retired from conmiand. Yet McClellan seems to cherish these 
and the like opinions as if there could be no controversy as to 
their correctness. 

It is not from the narrative of such a man as this that one 
can expect to learn the facts, and in truth there is no serious 
attempt to give them. There are, so far as we have seen, 
absolutely no corrections of the many errors with which his 
Report, large portions of which, with the accompanying de- 
spatches, are incorporated into his narrative, abounds. We 
are not told that the enemy did not, in fact, as McClellan 
thought and said at the time, outnumber our army during the 
Seven Days' battles. We are still allowed to believe that they 
were '^largely superior to us in number" at the battle of 
Antietam. Both these estimates were known in 1881, when 
McClellan began the writing of this booh, to be grossly incor- 
rect; but inasmuch as to change them would involve a restate- 
ment of his case against the administration, McQellan has 
chosen to let the original and erroneous statements stand. 

We have said above that McClellan was greatly influenced 
by his imagination and feelings. Nothing can better illustrate 
this than his neglect to obtain explicit assurances from the 
Navy Department and from the naval officers on duty at 
Fortress Monroe in regard to the co-operation of the navy in 
the reduction of Yorktown and Gloucester. He had, early in 
the winter, set his heart upon operating by the way of the 
lower Chesapeake upon Bichmond. All the opposition to this 
plan manifested by the President and cabinet only served to 
make him more determined, more boimd to have his own way.- 
It was an essential feature of this plan that there should be 
^^ a combined naval and land attack upon Yorktown. . . . the 
navy should at once concentrate upon the York Biver all their 
available and most i)owerful batteries. Its reduction should 



not, in that case, require many hours." ^ We pause an 
instant to remark that it is evident from this statement that 
McClellan could not have been aware, when he wrote it, that 
the works at Yorktown were at a height of some seventy or 
eighty feet above the river. Had he known this, — and he 
surely ought to have known it, — he could not have supposed 
for a moment that the place could be taken by the fleet. But 
not only did he know nothing about the strength of the place 
against which it was, to use his own language, ^^ absolutely 
necessary, for the prompt success of this campaign, that the 
navy should at once throw its whole available force," ^ but 
when he wrote this letter the Merrimac had made her appear- 
ance, had destroyed the Congress and the Cumberland, and 
nothing but the Monitor could be relied upon to give her bat- 
tle. Letters passed between McClellan and the Navy Depart- 
ment upon this subject. All that was promised, so the naval 
men said, was that the Merrimac should not be allowed to go 
up York River. It was stated explicitly to General McClellan, 
so they always maintained, that to watch the Merrimac would 
require the main portion of the fleet, and that no naval force 
could be detached to attack the batteries at Yorktown. In 
his Report,^ McClellan denied these statements, and said that 
he discovered this to be the case only after his arrival at 
Yorktown ; that it was " contrary to what had been previously 
stated to " him, " and materially affected" his "plans." This 
accusation is repeated in the book before us.* 

But Mr. Prime has imearthed from McClellan's papers a 
letter to him from (jeneral Barnard, the Chief Engineer of 
the Army of the Potomac, who was sent to the Peninsula 
before the army was embarked, on purpose to make arrange- 
ments with the navy. This letter, which, so far as we know, 
has never elsewhere been published, is dated "Steamship 
Minnesota [then in Hampton Roads], March 20, 1862." 
From it we make the following extracts : — 

1 6 W. R., 58. 2 jft. 8 12 w. R., 8. « O. S., 254, 264 


♦*He [Hag Officer Goldsborough] says he is responsible 
to the country for keeping down the Merrimac, and has per- 
fect confidence that he can do it, but cannot spare from here 
anything except the following : — 

^*' Victoria — two eight-inch gons and one thirty-two pound 

^^ Anacostia, Freeborn, Island Belle — Potomac fleet ; 

"Octoroon — not yet arrived; Fox calls her a regular 
gunboat of four guns ; 

"Currituck — merchant steamer like the Potomac gun- 
boats, I suppose ; 

"Daylight — merchant steamer like the Potomac gun- 
boats, I suppose ; and two regular gunboats — the Chocorua, 
not yet arrived, and the Penobscot, here — these two carrying 
each two eleven-inch guns. 

" Se says he can!t famish vessels to attach YorkUyum 
simvltaneously^ but he thinks what you propose is easily 
done ; that the vessels he mentions are fully adequate to cover 
a landing^ and that, with a landing and an advance from 
here, Yorktown will fall." * 

Here, then, we have the naval officer in command at 
Hampton Roads distinctly telling the Chief Engineer of 
McClellan's army that the main business of the navy is to 
" keep down " the Merrimac ; that consequently he can spare 
but very few vessels even for the purpose of covering the 
landing of McClellan's army on the Peninsula ; and that he 
certainly cannot furnish ships with which to attack the forts. 
Nothing could be more explicit, more definite, more directly 
calculated to destroy any hope that McClellan might previ- 
ously have entertained of the active co-operation of the navy 
in the reduction of Yorktown and Gloucester. 

This letter of General Barnard's must have reached 
McClellan ten days before he started for the Peninsula. 
What explanation, then, can be given of his statements 
before referred to? 

^ The italics in all cases in this paper are onxa. * O. a, 24^-247. 


It is not easy, it must be confessed, to frame any explana- 
tion or justification of them. The excuse of forgetfuLiess 
will hardly answer, for Barnard's letter treated of a matter 
of prime and vital importance. What we believe about it is 
this : there are men so peculiarly constituted that when they 
have once set their hearts on any project, they cannot bear to 
consider the facts that militate against their carrying it out ; 
they are impatient and intolerant of them ; such facts either 
completely fall out of their minds, so to speak, as if they had 
never been heard of, or, if they subsequently make themselves 
felt, they seem to men of this temper to have assumed an in- 
imical aspect, and, what is worse, inasmuch as it is impossible 
for any man to get angry with facts, such men instinctively 
fix upon certain individuals, whom they associate in some 
way, more or less remote, with these unwelcome facts, and 
whom they always accuse, in their own thought, at least, of 
hostility or deception. Such a mind we conceive to have 
been that of General McClellan. Accordingly, we find him, 
in spite of the explicit refusal of the navy to aid in the reduc- 
tion of Yorktown conveyed to him in General Barnard's 
letter, quietly ignoring the situation, and proceeding to the 
Peninsula as if the needed co-operation had been promised, 
and, finally, in his Report and Autobiography practically 
accusing Flag Officer Gt)ldsborough of having deceived 
him, of having encouraged him to transport his army to the 
Peninsula by promises which he afterwards refused to per- 
form, — an accusation for which, as we have seen, there is 
not a shadow of justification. 

In connection with this subject, it is interesting to note 
what McClellan says touching his expectations of using the 
James Biver as a line of supply, after the Merrimac had 
made her appearance. He tells us in his Beport ^ that '^ the 
appearance of the Merrimac off Old Point Comfort and the 
encounter with the United States squadron on the 8th of 

1 6 W. R., 50, 61. 


March threatened serious derangement of the plan for the 
Peninsula movement. But the engagement between the 
Monitor and the Merrimac on the 9th of March demon- 
strated so satisfactorily the power of the former, and the 
other naval preparations were so extensive and formidable, 
that the security of Fort Monroe as a base of operations was 
placed beyond a doubt, and althxmgh the James River was 
closed to vSj the York River with its tributaries was stiU 
open as a line of water communication with the Fortress. 
The general plan, therefore, remained undisturbed, altkaugh 
less promising in its details than when the James River 
was in our corvtrcl.''^ 

Here is a distinct admission that when he determined on 
the movement to the Peninsula, McCleUan knew that the 
James Eiver would not be open to him. What, then, can we 
make of the following statement in the Autobiography? 
" This, then, was the situation in which I found myself on 
the evening of April 6: Flag Officer Goldsborough had 
informed me that it was not in his power to control the navi- 
gation of the James River so as to enable me to use it as a 
line of supply^ or to cross it^ or even to cover my left Jlank ; 
nor could he, as he thought, furnish any vessels to attack 
the batteries of Yorktown. ... I was thus deprived of the 
co-operation of the navy and left to my own resources." ^ 
And to a similar statement made in his Report he adds : 
" All this was contrary to what had been previously stated 
to meJ*^ ^ 

What can be said in explanation or excuse of such contra- 
dictory statements ? One thing certainly may be said, and 
that is this : that McClellan's Own Story is assuredly not the 
narrative of a clear-headed, or careful, or candid writer. It 
is perfectly plain that in regard to the closing of the James 
River, as in regard to the inability of the navy to attack the 
forts at Yorktown, McCleUan was abundantly informed long 
1 0. a, 264. 3 12 W. R., 8. 


before he embarked for the Peninsula. He had definite 
information on both points. But to this information he gave 
little or no heed. Notwithstanding it, he determined to go. 
Careful as he usually was of his army, cautious as he cer- 
tainly was as a rule in his operations, he was so bent on this 
his favorite project that he persisted in it even when he knew 
that the co-operation of the navy in the manner and to the 
extent desired could not be had. And he tells his story in 
such a way as to imply that the authorities of the navy had 
deceived him into going to the Peninsula by representing 
that they could keep the James Eiver open and attack the 
forts, when in truth they could do neither, as they informed 
him soon after his arrival He claims our sympathy for the 
failure of the navy to co-operate eflfectually with him. His 
imagination has so warped his mind that he cannot think of 
his plan except as being feasible ; the facts, of which he was 
well aware before he attempted to put it in execution, are to 
his mind not so much facts as objections raised by hostile 
and jealous opponents or half-hearted supporters. Instead, 
therefore, of a manly, clear, and unhesitating acceptance of 
facts, as of things which it is absolutely impossible to evade 
or to ignore, we have first a period of self-deception in regard 
to them, followed by what seems very like a disingenuous 
attempt to fasten upon others the blame of failures for which 
his own improvidence and obstinacy were solely responsible. 
Enough has been said to show how little trust is to be reposed 
in this narrative. And were our examination of the book 
limited to its value as throwing light on General McCleUan's 
character and capacity, we would gladly drop the further con- 
sideration of his wrongs, and his claims for sympathy, and 
his insinuations against others, and proceed at once to the 
more welcome task of pointing out his services and his merits. 
But we cannot quite yet do this. His accusations against the 
members of Mr. Lincoln's cabinet are so fierce, so bitter, that 
they demand some investigation. 


Stated in a few words, McClellan's main indictment 
against the administration consists in the charge that it de- 
prived him of McDowell's corps when he moved to the Pen- 
insula. Two out of the four divisions of which the corps was 
composed were, it is true, afterwards sent him, one following 
the other, but the remainder, though sometimes promised, 
never came. The corps was to have gone to the Peninsula 
with the others ; but after McClellan had gone, it was found 
that, instead of the forty or fifty thousand men whom he had 
been ordered to leave for the garrison of Washington, he had 
left considerably less than twenty thousand men. We did 
hope, before we took up the Autobiography, to find in it some 
clear statement of McQellan's own notion of the way in 
which he had complied with the President's order to ^^ leave 
Washington entirely secure," but we have been disappointed. 
The whole treatment of the subject is fragmentary and incon- 
clusive. But that is not all. McClellan writes as if the 
whole subject of the nimibers and disposition of the troops 
to be left for the defence of Washington had been put in his 
control, to be decided according to his best judgment, and he 
says that the force which he left was, " under the circum- 
stances of the case " ^ sufficient, and that ^^ the quality of the 
troops [they were mostly raw regiments] was amply good for 
the purposes in view." The truth was that the subject was 
no longer under McClellan's control ; it had been referred, 
by the President's orders, to the decision of the commander 
of the army and of his corps commanders, and had been 
passed upon. A majority of the corps commanders had 
insisted on a full garrison for the forts on the right bank of 
the Potomac, and that those on the other bank should be 
occupied, and that there should be, besides, a covering force 
of twenty-five thousand men in front of the Virginia line. 
To this decision McClellan himself had assented. Now, 
Banks having been called off into the Valley with a force of 

1 O. S., 241. 


thirty-five thousand men by the appearance of Stonewall 
Jackson, it was no longer possible to furnish the required 
number for the defence of Washington, and still carry the 
four corps to the Peninsula. There were not men enough. 
Nevertheless, the defence of Washington was the principal 
thing, in all McClellan's orders. It was only " the remam- 
der " of the army which he was authorized by the President to 
take to the Peninsula. McClellan was in the position of an 
executor whom the wiU directs to pay certain definite pecuni- 
ary legacies, and whom the will also constitutes the residuary 
legatee. What he is entitled to is, of course, only what is 
left after the legacies are paid. If, now, we conceive of such 
an executor framing in his own mind an idea that he was 
certain to get such or such a sum of money as residuary lega- 
tee under that will, and undertaking to cut down the pecuni- 
ary legacies, because, on settling up the estate, he finds he 
cannot pay them in full, and yet retain for himself the 
simi on which his imagination has become fixed, we may 
obtain a pretty accurate notion of the way in which General 
McClellan viewed his orders and performed his duties in the 
early spring of 1862. 

Of all this there was probably a latent consciousness in 
McClellan's mind. Accordingly, we do not find him care- 
fully arranging with the authorities as to the troops that 
were to be left in and about Washington, in compliance 
with the instructions of the President. On the contrary, he 
does not deign to give them any information on the subject 
until he is on board the steamer and ready to start for the 
Peninsula. Then, and then only, does he tell the Secretary 
of War what dispositions he has made. He unquestionably 
expected that these dispositions would be accepted, or at any 
rate would not be very carefully scrutinized until after he 
should have embarked his army, and that then a speedy and 
brilliant success in the field would forestall criticism. But 
he reckoned without his host. From the time the idea of 


remoying the army entered liis head he had entirely misoon- 
ceived the nature of the objections to his plan entertained 
by the President and his advisers. These objections were 
fundamental, and they were sound. They were not aimed 
at McClellan personally, as he chose to imagine. They were 
founded on a just sense of the extreme importance to the 
country of preserving Washington; and on an intelligent 
and rational aversion to see the army, of which so great 
hopes were entertained, transported to a region where its 
only means of commimication with its sources of supply must 
necessarily be by sea, the control of which by the United 
States navy was, since the appearance of the Merrimac, by 
no means an assured thing. But of the weight to which 
these considerations were rightfully entitled McClellan took 
no account whatever. To his mind objections to any plan of 
his could only spring from ignorance or malevolence. 

Here we pause a moment to direct attention to one of 
McClellan's most marked deficiencies. He seems, from the 
beginning to the end of his military career, to have been 
well-nigh incapable of dealing with the civil authorities in 
any reasonable fashion. Their lack of acquaintance with the 
art of war, their impatience at the delay which the imperfect 
state of organization and drill of his army and the condition 
of the roads in a Virginia winter rendered necessary, — for 
all which he, as a man of the world, ought to have been pre- 
pared, and ought to have been ready and cheerfully willing 
to meet and put up with, if he could not succeed in over- 
coming them by argument and instruction, — he mistook 
either for fatuous stupidity or for malicious obstructiveness. 
Hence, to all suggestions or remonstrances he replied with 
resentment mingled with contempt. Never did a man so 
wilfully and insanely throw away his chances of success. 
Had he been a competent man of affairs, he would have 
known that no conjectural advantages presented by the 
Peninsular route over the overland route could possibly make 


up for losing the confidence of the administration. Had it 
not been for his incredible conceit, he would have found in 
the President and his cabinet men who, however unfamiliar 
they might be with the learning pertaining to the profession 
of arms, were yet clear-headed, sensible, patriotic men, who 
would gladly have learned from him what they needed to 
know, and would have steadily stood by him in defeat or 
victory. But McCleUan was so eaten up with egotism that 
he despised all criticism and hated all semblance of opposi- 
tion; he was, moreover, so blind to the real truth of the 
situation that he thought that he could, by putting off all 
explanations until the army had gone, escape the mortifica- 
tion of having to renounce his favorite plan. 

Here, however, he was mistaken. Instead of changing 
their views about the indispensableness of maintaining a 
large force in and about Washington, the administration, 
on learning from Wadsworth of the paltiy array on which 
the capital must now depend for protection, detained 
McDowell's corps. And although one may think that, all 
things considered, it would have been wiser to have over- 
looked McClellan's disregard of his positive instructions, 
and allowed McDowell to go to him, yet it is really too clear 
for argument that McCleUan himself had no ground of com- 
plaint. He had disobeyed his orders, and for the predica- 
ment in which he now found himself he had only himself to 

It does not require an exceptional insight into human 
nature to guess the state of McClellan's mind and feelings 
at this juncture. Of course, it needs not to be said, he took 
no part of the responsibility to himself. In his mind, Mr. 
Lincoln had promised to him the four corps, whatever might 
happen to Washington ; the navy had agreed to keep open 
the James Eiver and to attack the batteries of Yorktown 
and Gloucester, whatever the Merrimac might undertake to 
do ; and here he was, without any fault of his own, boxed up. 


so to speak, on a little tongue of exceedingly marshy land, 
surrounded on three sides by the sea and the rivers, with a 
very powerful adversary, very strongly entrenched, in front, 
and he unable, for want of the expected co-operation of 
McDowell's corps and the navy, to turn the enemy's posi- 
tions and advance towards his goal. He thus writes to his 
wife (April 6th) : " While listening this p. M. to the sound 
of the guns, I received an order detaching McDowell's corps 
from my conmiand. It is the most infamous thing that his- 
tory has recorded." (April 8th.) " I have raised an awful 
row about McDowell's corps. The President very coolly tel- 
egraphed me yesterday that he thought I had better break 
the enemy's lines at once ! I was much tempted to reply 
that he had better come and do it himself." ^ (April 11th.) 
** Don't worry about the wretches [the administration] ; they 
have done nearly their worst, and can't do much more. I 
am sure that I will win in the end, in spite of all their ras- 
cality. History will present a sad record of these traitors 
who are willing to sacrifice the country and its army for 
personal spite and personal aims." * (April 21st.) " Had 
a letter yesterday from Francis B. Cutting, of New York, 
hoping that I would not allow these treacherous hounds to 
drive me from my path." ^ (May 3d.) " I feel that the fate 
of a nation depends upon me, and I feel that I have not one 
single friend at the seat of government." ^ 

In this unhealthy frame of mind McClellan seems to have 
remained all through the Peninsular campaign. Sometimes 
his mood is the heroic one, as where he writes to the Presi- 
dent on May 21 : "I believe that there is a great struggle 
before this army, but I am neither dismayed nor discour- 
aged ; " * or closes his gratuitous letter of advice, on July 7, 
to Mr. Lincoln, on the question of slavery, by the impressive 
words, ^^ I may be on the brink of eternity, and as I hope 
for forgiveness from my Maker, I have written this letter 

i 0. &, 308. 2 JJ., 310. • JJ., 313. * JJ., 817. • 12 W. R., 29. 


with sincerity towards you and from love for my country." ^ 
Sometimes his resentment for his supposed injuries goes 
beyond all bounds, as where he writes, on June 28, to 
Stanton: ^^If I save this army now, I tell you plainly 
that I owe no thanks to you, or to any other persons in 
Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this 
army." ^ So elsewhere, he tells his wife that he fears that 
^^ those people" '^have done all that cowardice and folly 
can do to ruin our poor country." ^ 

On the other hand, he never loses sight of his own impor- 
tance. On July 18, he writes this to his wife: "If they 
supersede me in the command of the Army of the Potomac, I 
will resign my commission at once. ... I owe no gratitude 
to any but my own soldiers here ; none to the government 
or to the country. I have done my beat for the country ; I 
eaypect nothing in return ; they are my debtors^ not I their s.^^ * 
So, again : " I have had enough of earthly honors and place. 
I believe I can give up all and retire to privacy once more, a 
better man than when we gave up our dear little home, with 
wild ideas of serving the country. I feel that I have paid 
her all that I owe her, I am sick and weary of this business. 
I am tired of serving fools. God help my country/ He 
alone can save i^." * . 

Tins from the pen of a man thirty-six years old, who had 
commanded an army just one year. With such inordinate 
ideas of his own importance, and such incredible contempt 
for and animosity towards the men who composed the admin- 
istration, did McCleUan close his first campaign. From first 
to last, from the day when he set his foot in the mud before 
Yorktown to the day when he left Harrison's Landing, we 
look in vain for any evidence of that calm, resolute, cheerful 
courage, which, if a man possess not, the army is not the 
career for him. As for his wretched talk about his having 

1 12 W. R., 74. « 2&., 61. » O. a, 449. 

* lb,, 450-451. * lb,, 453. 


overpaid his debt to his country, we cannot trust ourselves to 
speak of it at alL To take such an attitude as this, shows a 
man's views of duiy to be fundamentally unsound. 

Observe, again, the extraordinary tone which he assumed 
in writing to Mr. Stanton in regard to the proposed co-opera- 
tion of McDowell's force. He had gathered, from some ex- 
pressions in the despatches sent to him, that McDowell was to 
hold an independent command even after the junction of his 
corps with the Army of the Potomac Such an arrangement 
was extremely distasteful to McCleUan, and he was certainly 
quite right in thinking that it would work badly. But surely 
nothing can justify his sending to the secretary such an vlti- 
matum as this : '^ If I cannot fully control all his troops, I 
want none of them, but would prefer to fight the battle with 
what I have, and let others be responsible for the results." ^ 
This is to make a mere personal matter of the whole business. 
However unfortunate may be the consequence of not sending 
McDowell to join the main army, McCleUan says he prefers 
that course rather than that he should not ^^ fully control " all 
McDowell's troops, if they do come. Nothing could show more 
clearly the state of n^oral confusion into which McQellan's 
mind had fallen. Any really clear-headed man sees at once 
that if McCleUan thought that McDoweU's joining him, 
even although retaining the separate command of his troops, 
was likely to be of benefit to the cause, it was McCleUan's 
plain duty to urge that McDoweU should be sent. He might 
remonstrate, and he ought to remonstrate, against McDoweU's 
retaining any such separate conunand, as an . arrangement 
certain to interfere more or less with the success of the operar 
tions ; but unless he was of opinion that* it> would do more 
harm than good for a distinct corps, under its own independ- 
ent commander, to reinforce the Army of: the Potomac, he 
had no right to say, as he did, that in such a case he would 
rather McDoweU should not come. 

I O. a, 889, aiidi2 W« R., 48^ 


Perliaps the most extraordinary instance of the peculiar 
working of McClellan's mind is his letter of advice to Mr. 
Lincoln, written from Harrison's Landing on the 7th of July, 
only a very few days after the dose of the Seven Days' battles. 
On the 20th of June, while he was yet on the Chickahominy, 
McClellan had asked permission to lay before the President 
his ^^ views as to the present state of military affairs through- 
out the whole country." ^ To this request, which no doubt 
struck the President as a rather remarkable one, Mr. Lincoln 
replied, more suo^ that, " if it would not divert too much of " 
his (McClellan's) " time and attention from the army under " 
his ^'immediate command," he would be glad to have the 
views laid before him.^ Taking this permission in its widest 
sense, McClellan wrote his famous letter from Harrison's 

No description can do justice to this performance. Here 
is a man, with no special means of knowledge, with no polit- 
ical experience, undertaking gravely to urge the Government 
^' to determine upon a civil and military policy covering the 
whole ground of our national trouble." This policy he pro- 
ceeds to lay down and define. It is, we need hardly say, a 
strictly conservative policy. The only important part of the 
letter is that opposing in the strongest terms the " forcible 
abolition of slavery." Unless the Government take the right 
ground on this subject, ^^ the effort to obtain the requisite 
forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical 
views, especially upon slavery, would rapidly disintegrate our 
present armies." The importance which McClellan attached 
to these opinions, which were in much less than a year to be 
proved utterly and preposterously unsound, is shown by the 
high-strung tone of this epistle. He commences with repre- 
senting the rebel army in the front, " with the purpose of 
overwhelming us by attacking our positions, or reducing us 
by blocking our river communications." It is evidently a 
1 12 W. R., 48. « 16. » it., 73; O.S., 487. 


case of the lambs among the wolves, in McClellan's eyes. 
Gordon in Khartoum could not have been much more exposed 
to destruction. He closes by saying that he may himself be 
^^on the brink of eternity," and that he has written with 
sincerity towards the President and love for his country. 

Now we are perfectly willing to concede to Mr. Prime that 
this was not a political document. It may very likely not 
have been intended for political effect. But it certainly 
shows a man whose mind is heated and excited to an unnatu- 
ral degree by dwelling on matters which are none of his busi- 
ness. Who was General McClellan that he should volunteer 
his advice to the President of the United States ? Would 
even he, with all his egotism, have ventured on such a step 
as this on the 7th of July, 1861 ? What had happened 
during the year to make him a political oracle? Another 
thing is shown with painful distinctness, — the very super- 
ficial knowledge which McClellan had of the motives and the 
intentions of the masses of the Northern people, in whose 
minds the preservation or the destruction of slavery was 
always, as it was in the mind of Mr. Lincoln himself, a sec- 
ondary question, which they were quite willing to leave to 
the decision of the constituted authorities of the country. 
Whether the President ought to have retained at the head of 
the army an officer who had thus notified him that, in the 
event of a certain attitude being taken by the Government on 
the slavery question, his army would probably be " disinte- 
grated," is a question on which much might be said. All 
we need to remark here is, that there have been Presidents 
of the United States to whom it would not have beeti wise to 
write such a letter as this. 

We have seen that McClellan insisted on going to the 
Peninsula, although the appearance and exploits of the 
Merrimac had closed the James Biver. But on the 12th of 
May, a few days only after the evacuation of Yorktown, the 
Merrimac was destroyed by the Confederates themselves, and 


the James was open as far as Dmry's Bluff. The question has 
often been asked why McClellan did not then use the James 
as his line of supply, instead of the York and Pamunkey. 
He tells us himself that this was what he would have done 
had McDowell's corps been sent to him by water, and he has 
no hesitation in expressing not only his decided preference 
for the James Biver route, but his opinion ^ that the failure 
of the campaign was due to his being obliged to take up a 
position on both sides of the Chickahominy, with his line of 
supply from the White House, on the Pamunkey, very imper- 
fectly covered. He tells us that his adoption of the York and 
Pamunkey line instead of the James Biver line was due to 
the order of the 18th of May, in which he was informed that 
McDowell was to move towards Richmond to join him. 
And it may well be conceded that until McDowell was 
ordered off to the Shenandoah Valley to intercept Jackson, 
the order of the 18th did require McClellan's army to be 
on the Chickahominy. But on May 24 he is told that 
McDowell's movement is suspended, and he admits that he 
could not expect McDowell to join him ^' in time to partici- 
pate in immediate operations in front of Kichmond." ^ Why, 
then, it may pertinently be asked, did he not at once cross the 
Peninsula and establish his base on the James River? As 
yet, he had not entangled his army in the swamps of the 
Chickahominy. It was then a week before the battle of Fair 
Oaks. On the James his supplies would be fumisbed more 
easily, and his access to the neighborhood of Richmond would 
be unobstructed by swamps or rivers. Then there was the 
opportunity of crossing the James and seizing Petersburg, 
which he says himself he was sure he could have done.^ 

Finally, the enemy were known to be divided ; Jackson 
was in the Valley. That the James River was the " true 
line of operations " McClellan says he was always of opinion. 
Why, then, did he not adopt it in the last week in May ? 
iO.S.,84e. «ift.,851. »iJ.,343. 


The reason lie gives us is that the order of May 18 for 
the co-operation of McDowell was only suspended, not re- 
voked, and that therefore he could not abandon the northern 
approach and his communications with West Point.^ We 
cannot accept this reason as the true one. After the de- 
spatch of the 24th of May, in which McClellan was informed 
that McDowell was ordered away in chase of Jackson, had 
been received, it seems to us that McClellan was free to 
adopt the line of the James, if he saw fit so to do. At any 
rate, it is very certain that had he desired to do so, and been 
in doubt as to the wishes of the Grovemment, he might have 
asked the question whether the order of the 18th was to be 
considered as in any sense obligatory, now that McDowell 
had been sent off. But he never asked the question. Had 
he really seen at the time the weakness of his position 
athwart the Chickahominy and the superior advantages of 
operating from a base on the James, as he would now have 
us believe that he then did, he would have gone to the James 
the moment he heard that McDowell's promised co-operation 
had been indefinitely suspended. At the least, he would 
have applied for leave to do so. He did neither. And with 
his usual unwillingness to accept any blame for his own con- 
duct, he most unfairly lays upon the Secretary of War the 
entire responsibility of retaihing the army on the Chicka- 
hominy from the 18th of May till the 28th of June.^ 

We have said all that we care to say regarding McQellan's 
claim, or assumption, rather, that no one but himself could 
have led the army after the close of the unfortunate campaign 
of General Pope. We have read with care his account of 
the battle of Antietam. There is nothing to be learned from 
it. He does not explain to our comprehension why the 
battle was not fought the day before. His troops were all 
up; that is all, or nearly all, of those who fought on the 
17th. He does not discuss the question of the relative num- 
1 O. a, 364. « IJ., 481. 


bers of the armies in the battle, but he does say that we were 
largely outnumbered, which we now know was not the case. 
He tells us why he did not renew the battle on the 18th in 
language very characteristic of the man : ^^ I am aware of 
the fact that, under ordinary circumstances, a general is ex- 
pected to risk a battle if he has a reasonable prospect of suc- 
cess ; but at this critical juncture I should have had a nar- 
row view of the condition of the country, had I been willing 
to hazard another battle with less than an absolute assurance 
of success. At that moment, — Virginia lost, Washington 
menaced, Maryland invaded, — the national cause could afford 
no risks of defeat. One battle lost, and almost all would 
have been lost. Lee's army might then have marched as 
it pleased, on Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, or New 
York. It could have levied its supplies from a fertile and 
undevastated country; extorted tribute from wealthy and 
populous cities; and nowhere east of the AUeghanies was 
there another organized force able to arrest its march." ^ In 
thus piling Pelion upon Ossa, McClellan has no rival among 
military writers. 

His letters during the campaign are certainly among the 
curiosities of military literature. The day after the action at 
South Mountain, he says : — 

'^ September 15, Monday, 9.30 a. m. Just sent you a 
telegram informing you that we yesterday gained a glorious 
and complete victory ; every moment adds to its importance. 
I am pushing everything after them with the greatest rapid- 
ity, and expect to gain great results. I thank God most 
humbly for His great mercy. How glad I am for my country 
that it is delivered from immediate peril ! ... If I can 
believe one-tenth of what is reported, God has sddom given 
an army a greater victory than this.^^ * 

South Mountain was imquestionably a brilliant affair and 
a complete success, but there have been greater victories even 
1 0. S,, 618, « lb., 612. 


than South Mountain. The next day he has ^^no doubt 
delivered Pennsylvania and Maryland." The day after 
Antietam he writes, '^ Those in whose judgment I rely teU 
me that I fought the battle splendidly and that it was a 
masterpiece of art." ^ On the 20th he writes, " Our victory 
was complete, and the disorganized rebel army has rapidly 
returned to Virginia, its dreams of ^ invading Pennsylvania' 
dissipated forever. I feel some little pride in having, with a 
beaten and demoralized army, defeated Lee so utterly and 
saved the North so completely. Well, one of these days 
history will, I trust, do me justice in deciding that it was 
not my fault that the campaign of the Peninsula was not suc- 
cessful. • • . Since I left Washington, Stanton has again 
asserted that /, not Pope, lost the battle of Manassas No. 2 ! 
... I am tired of fighting against such disadvantages, and 
feel that it is now time for the coimtry to come to my help 
and remove these difficulties from my path. If my coimtry- 
men will not open their eyes and assist themselves they must 
pardon me if I decline longer to pursue the thankless avoca- 
tion of serving them." And again, " I fed that I have done 
all that can he asked in twice saving the country. If I 
continue in its service I have at least the right to demand a 
guarantee that I shall not be interfered with." ^ To the same 
effect on the 22d : ^^ I have the satisfaction of knowing that 
God has, in His mercy, a second time made me the instrument 
for saving the nation, and am content with the honor that 
has fallen to my lot. I have seen enough of public life. No 
motive of ambition can now retain me in the service. The 
only thing that can keep me there will be the conviction 
that my country needs my services and that circumstances 
make it necessary for me to render them. I am confident 
that the poison still rankles in the veins of my enemies at 
Washington, and that so long as they live it will remain there. 
... I have received no papers containing the news of the 
10.S., 612. 2 J5., 613, 614. 


last battle, and do not know the effect it has produced on the 
Northern mind. I trust it has been a good one, and that 
I am re-established in the confidence of the best people of 
the nation." ^ 

All these letters show McCleUan's mind to have been in 
anything but a healthy condition. They reveal to us a man 
exalted with an insufferable egotism, viewing things all out of 
their due proportion, cherishing the most bitter resentments, 
never dreaming of imputing to himself any blame whatso- 
ever, in a state of hopeless moral confusion, and practising^ 
all sorts of deceptions on his own mind. For in the bottom 
of his soul General McClellan knew that Antietam was not 
^^ a masterpiece of art," that the Army of the Potomac was 
not a " demoralized " army, and that Lee was not " utterly 
defeated," still less ^^ disorganized." But he always, as we 
before remarked, lived to a great degree in a world of his 
own, created by his own imagination. 

After the battle of Antietam, McClellan deemed it neces- 
sary or at least advisable, to refit and re-organize his army. 
He was very deficient in cavalry. The troops were short of 
clothing and of some other supplies. Hence he posted his 
army in the neighborhood of Harper's Ferry, and refused to 
follow the enemy into Virginia. Orders had no effect upon 
him whatever. He thought the army needed this rest and 
these supplies, and he now felt himself to be strong enough 
to have his own way, and to disregard the orders of the 
President, and the Secretary, and Greneral Halleck. In his 
appreciation of the needs of the army he may have been* 
right. Very likely he was. But we have never believed, and 
we do not believe now, that it was an honest difference of 
opinion about these questions, and the like, that induced the 
administration to remove General McClellan from the com- 
mand of the army. It was, in our judgment, the impossi- 
bility of establishing with him any intelligible relations. His 
attitude was so heroic, so flighty, so unpractical, so senti- 
1 0. S., 614, 615. 


mental, so insubordinate, that the authorities despaired of 
ever coming to any imderstanding with him. While Mr. 
Lincoln and his advisers took a cool and essentially correct 
view of the campaign of Antietam, regarding it as a nioder- 
ate success over an enemy who had rashly exposed himself to 
destruction, and were anxiously expecting that some move- 
ment would be made before winter should set in, McClellan 
was apparently occupying himself, during the fine October 
weather, with riding over the field, and collecting information 
for the forthcoming report of his glorious victory. To all 
their urgent appeals McClellan turned a deaf ear. There 
is to be found in his despatches and letters at this period 
that mixture of resentment and contempt which we noticed 
before, and to this was now added a new ingredient, that cer- 
tainly did not make the cup more palatable, — an inordinate 
pride at having saved the countiy from the incapables who 
directed its destinies, and from the sword of a preponderant 
foe. Had it been a mere question of shoes and horses, of 
days or of weeks, McClellan would never have been relieved 
after Antietam. But it was not. It was found impossible 
to get on with a man like McClellan, to tolerate his preten- 
sions, to accept his versions of facts. As for there ever hav- 
ing been any obstructions thrown in his way, all we can say 
is that McClellan utterly fails to give rise to a suspicion on 
this point ; that is, in our judgment. A more preposterous 
and unfounded theory, in our opinion, was never broached. 

Many as were McClellan's faults, however, it was inex- 
cusable to supplant him by Bumside. Everybody who was in 
any degree behind the scenes knew of the miserable failure 
which Bumside had made at Antietam. Why he should have 
been selected to command the army, except that he happened 
to be next in rank to McClellan, no one could imagine at the 
time, and no one has ever learned since. What would have 
happened if McClellan had been continued in command it is 
perhaps useless to conjecture. 


Greneral McClellan undoubtedly had as comprehensive and 
correct a notion of what an army should be, to be really a 
well-organized and efficient military force, as any of our gen- 
erals, and possibly he may have led them all in this regard. 
As an organizer, also, he was unquestionably one of our first 
men, although in this department he was probably equalled 
by Buell and Thomas. Nor should we forget the immense 
change for the better in the Army of the Potomac wrought 
by Hooker, in the winter succeeding the bloody defeat of 
Fredericksburg. But McClellan surpassed all our officers, 
except, possibly, Thomas and Sheridan, in the power of cre- 
ating confidence and enthusiasm among the soldiers. The 
curious thing about McClellan's hold on his men was that it 
was acquired before the army had taken the field, while it was 
yet in the lines before Washington. And equally remarka- 
ble is the fact that it was not shaken by defeat and disaster. 
This enthusiasm, too, was contagious. In the Antietam cam- 
paign it was observed to aflfect troops who had not before 
served imder him. The truth was that McClellan really 
loved his men ; he was a man of a good deal of genuine senti- 
ment ; the position he occupied as head of the army, gaining 
it, as he did, at one bound, — as it were by the decree of 
destiny, — powerfully affected his imagination, and from the 
first he accepted the role of the friend and protector of the 
soldiers, as well as that of the commander of the army. To 
officers who had risen from the command of regiments, or 
brigades, or even corps, little or nothing of this sort of thing 
was possible ; they had been too near to the men. With most 
people, in fact, such a strong feeling could never have found 
a place in their minds, from sheer lack of sentiment. But 
no one can read McClellan's letters and doubt the existence 
of this affection on his part for his men, and his thorough 
appreciation and enjoyment of their attachment to and confi- 
dence in him. For the soldiers were not slow to recognize 
the fact that in McClellan they possessed a commander who 


imported into the ordinary formalities of official and military 
duty a certain pride in them, in their achievements, and in 
their virtues, a real solicitade for them, and a warm interest 
in their welfare and comfort, not to be found in any of the 
other officers of the army. To this solicitude and this in- 
terest they responded with all their hearts, and a personal 
relation was unquestionably established very early between 
McClellan and his soldiers that is ahnost, if not quite, 
unique in the history of war. It was, of course, an element 
of strength on our side so long as McClellan commanded the 
army, although he never used it on the field of battle. With 
him, war, in all its processes, was a mere matter of calcu- 
lation, into which it was only mischievous to allow sentiment 
of any kind to enter. He thoroughly enjoyed this relation 
to his army, — it was, in fact, the only thing he did enjoy 
during his military life, — but he never made any such use 
of it as Stonewall Jackson, for instance, did of the hold which 
he had on his men. 

Of McClellan's relations to the President and the mem- 
bers of the cabinet we have already spoken. But we may 
say here that enough and more than enough is disclosed in 
the volume before us to accoimt for McClellan's failure on 
purely personal grounds. It is, in our opinion, impossible 
for any one reading this book to believe that McClellan's 
political views had any perceptible influence on his fortunes. 
There is no need of lugging in any such hjrpothesis. There 
is sufficient in the plain and undisputed facts to explain 
everything to the comprehension of any one who has seen 
much of the world. McClellan's sudden exaltation was more 
than he could bear ; he considered himself a great man, — 
the appointed saviour of his country. To the natural and to- 
be-expected ignorance of military facts and military reasons 
which he met in Washington, he opposed the pride and self- 
sufficiency of a specialist, and of a specialist who was, it 
must be confessed, uncommonly young for his years. There 


was no one in the administration who could keep him within 
proper bounds. Lincohi's practical sense was embodied in 
the uncouth garb of rusticity, and all his wise considerateness 
and wholesome advice went for nothing. As for the others, 
their attitude received at McClellan's hands absolutely no 
toleration. He never even endeavored to put himself in their 
place, nor, probably, could he have done so, had he tried. 
Hence arose inevitably a state of mutual suspicion and hos- 
tility, which continued to the time of his removal. All 
through this period both sides made mistakes, and serious 
ones. But the blame for the original falling out must rest 
with the general who attempted to evade his orders, and then 
threw upon others the responsibility he ought manfully to 
have shouldered himself. Lastly, let it be remembered that 
McClellan, as it was, had his fair share of the favors of for- 
tune. No thanks to him, to be sure, but the James Eiver 
was opened to him a week after he had taken Yorktown. 
For all that appears, he might have used that admirable line 
of operations, and escaped the unwholesome swamps of the 
Chickahominy and the forced change of base. No orders 
from the Secretary of War obliged him to suffer the Fifth 
Corps to be overwhelmed by the main army of Lee at 
Graines's Mill; and nothing in the world but his own slow- 
ness prevented his attacking Lee at Antietam the day before 
Jackson came up from Harper's Ferry. It is impossible to 
get up much sympathy for General McClellan. And we do 
not think that this book of his will raise him in the opinion 
of his countrymen. 




RqprinUd bypermiman from the "* Atlantic MoniUy ''far August, 1891. 


Probably no general In the Union army has been more 
honored and appreciated, at least in the Northern States, 
than General Sherman. His achievements in the war were 
perhaps, on the whole, more striking and brilliant than those 
performed by any other officer, Federal or Confederate. 
They were of a kind calculated powerfully to excite the im- 
agination, and they were crowned by complete and dazzling 
success. Then he was a man of most marked and individual 
traits of character. He was bold in action and in speech. 
He possessed all the peculiarly American characteristics. He 
was not only enterprising, full of resources, aggressive, but 
he was all this in a way distinctively his own ; he was the 
type of the American general in these respects. More than 
this, he took the public into his confidence to a degree that no 
other general ever thought of doing. Not that he sought 
popularity by any unfair methods, but that he could not help 
stating to the world his views and conclusions, proclaiming 
his likes and his dislikes, as he went along. And although 
he was always a very plain-spoken man, and his opinions 
frequently ran counter to the popular notions, his evident 
honesty and sincerity took wonderfully with the people. 
There has been nobody in our time like General Sherman. 

It may be too soon properly to estimate his military abili- 
ties. We are perhaps too near to the war, too familiar with 
the actors themselves, and with the local and temporary tra- 
dition about their doings ; we are perhaps too much inter- 
ested in them to be able to be thoroughly impartiaL Yet the 


contemporary generation possesses certain manifest advan- 
tages for coming to a correct judgment of the men and affairs 
of its day wUch cannot, in the nature of things, be possessed 
by the generations that come after. The men of the time 
cannot easily be grossly deceived or greatly mistaken. They 
have not gained all their knowledge from books. When they 
do read about the events through which they have passed, 
they know something about the writers of the books and their 
qualifications, and something about the events themselves 
from sources independent of the books. Eye-witnesses and 
direct testimony count, and ought to count, for a good deaL 
Let us then try to state in a very brief way what we, in this 
generation, know and think of the great soldier who has so 
recently left us. 

General Sherman was appointed to the Military Academy 
at West Point from the State of Ohio, in 1836, and graduated 
in 1840, sixth in his dass. Although during the Mexican 
war he was employed in the expedition to California, and 
therefore missed the opportunities for distinction in the field 
which the campaigns of Scott and Taylor so liberally afforded, 
and although he subsequently left the service, his appoint- 
ment in the regular army as Colonel of one of the new regi- 
ments of infantry, and also as Brigadier-General of Volun- 
teers in May, 1861, shows how highly his abilities were rated 
by his contemporaries and superiors. After the first battle 
of BuU Run, where he conunanded a brigade, he was sent to 
Kentucky to serve under General Eobert Anderson. The 
latter's health, however, soon failing him, Sherman assumed 
command of the Department of the Cumberland. Greneral 
Sherman's connection with the Army of the Cumberland did 
not long continue, for, superseded at his own request by 
Greneral Buell, he was transferred to General Halleck's 
Department of the Mississippi. Here began his connection 
with the troops which were afterwards organized into the 
Army of the Tennessee. The history of these two famous 


commands is virtually the history of the war in the Mis- 
sissippi Valley. Grant, Sherman and McPherson are the 
heroes of the Army of the Tennessee ; Buell, Bosecrans and 
Thomas of the Army of the Cumberland. 

Halleck's forces opened the campaign of 1862 with a bril- 
liant stroke. The capture of Forts Henry and Donelson 
by the troops under Grant and the fleet imder Foote, in 
February, caused the immediate fall of Nashville and the 
evacuation by the enemy of the greater part of the States of 
Kentucky and Tennessee. It was determined to push for- 
ward on the line of the Tennessee River as large a force as 
could be collected. Grant, with the confidence bom of his 
recent victory, established his army at Pittsburg Landing, or 
Shiloh, on the western side of the river, having his head- 
quarters at Savannah, some eight miles further down the 
river, — that is, to the northward, — and on the opposite 
or eastern bank. Sherman commanded a division in this 
army. Buell, now under Halleck's orders, had been directed 
to march with all his disposable forces from Nashville to 
Savannah, thence to be transferred to Pittsburg Landing, 
from which point the whole conmiand was to advance south- 
westwardly to Corinth, a town on the great railroad which, 
running from west to east, connected Memphis with 
Chattanooga, intersecting the railroad from Mobile to the 
Ohio River, and constituted one of the most important 
avenues of communication for the enemy in that region. 
It was supposed at the time that the Confederate troops had 
been thoroughly discouraged by their recent heavy losses in 
men, material and territory, and that we should have no 
serious difficulty in attaining our objective point, and thus 
opening the way for further operations. Everybody knows 
what happened : how Albert Sidney Johnston and Beaur^ard 
saw their opportunity in the exposed situation of Grant's 
army; how they rapidly and secretly gathered their forces 
together ; how they were delayed by bad weather and fright- 


ful roads, but how, on Sunday morning, the 6th of April, 
they struck the unsuspecting army of Grant a terrible blow ; 
how stubbornly and bravely Grant and his lieutenants re- 
sisted and held out, fighting to the last, Sherman especially 
distinguishing himself not only for gallantry, but for readi- 
ness and skill in making his dispositions ; how, nevertheless, 
they were pressed back in disorder ; how at the close of the 
day the advance guard of Buell's army arrived just in time 
to check the last assaults of the exhausted Confederates ; and 
how the battle was renewed the next day, and resulted in a 
great success for the Union arms. 

Grant and Sherman have always persistently maintained 
that they were not surprised at Shiloh ; but the world has 
never been able to take their statements seriously. Grant 
wrote to Halleck, the day before the battle, that he had 
scarcely the faintest idea of a general attack being made 
upon him. Sherman, the same day, wrote from Pittsburg 
Landing to Grrant at Savannah that he did not apprehend 
anything like an attack upon his position. They unquestion- 
ably said what they thought at the time. The battle began 
at half past five o'clock in the morning. Grant did not 
reach the field till after nine. It stands to reason that 
such tardiness on the part of an army commander to arrive 
on the field of battle is susceptible of no more natural, and 
assuredly of no more honorable explanation than that he was 
expecting no battle to occur. Surprised, however, as was 
the Federal commander, he was not thrown off his balance. 
Never did Grant display to better advantage the firmness 
and steadfast courage which he possessed in so unusual a 
d^ree. Sherman's conduct, too, after the fighting began, 
was above all praise. His division was made up of troops 
perfectly new, who had never been imder fire; but he 
handled them with such skill and ability that he made a 
reputation on that disastrous field. 

As a subordinate conmiander, Sherman had the rare good 


fortune of serving under a man whom He greatly admired 
and in whom he fully trusted ; and General Grant returned 
the confidence which his lieutenant reposed in him. The 
perfect understanding between these two eminent men was 
not only one of the most interesting facts of the war, but 
it was productive of great good to the public service. It 
showed in many ways how wise it is for the superior, when- 
ever it is possible to do so, to rely confidently on the subordi- 
nate ; to refrain from imdertaking to regulate his decisions 
as to matters under his own eye ; not to attempt to prescribe 
the details of his action or to criticise his dispositions in the 
spirit of a taskmaster. Cordial co-operation in their work 
was the fruit of this imique relation between Sherman and 
Grant. While it cannot be said that this part of Sherman's 
life was marked by any brilliant successes in the field, his 
reputation with the army, with Grant, his immediate supe- 
rior, and with Halleck, the General-in-Chief at Washington, 
steadily increased. He was seen to be a careful, energetic 
and trustworthy corps commander. But that was alL The 
army that reduced Vicksburg had no great battles to fight 
like those of Stone Eiver and Chickamauga. The Vicksburg 
campaign was won by superior strategy. Therefore Sherman, 
when summoned by Grant to join him at Chattanooga, in 
October, 1863, after the latter had been assigned to the 
command of all the forces in the West, brought with him no 
such reputation as a brilliant fighter as Longstreet bore when 
he came to add his veteran Virginians to the army of Bragg. 
On the other hand, Thomas, who had succeeded Bosecrans 
in conunand of the Army of the Cumberland, had just won 
great distinction by his extremely able and courageous 
conduct on the bloody field of Chickamauga, where he 
stopped the rout, rallied the fugitives, and maintained his 
position with entire and splendid success against the des^ 
perate assaults of the Confederates, flushed with their victory 
over the right of the line led by Bosecrans in person^ There 


was no denying that Thomas had proved himself not only 
equal to the situation, but superior to it. It would have 
been only just to have entrusted to him the supreme conduct 
of affairs in that region, and to have re-enforced him with all 
the troops that were available. But General Grant's great 
success at Vicksburg induced the government to give to him 
the chief command in the Mississippi Valley; and he at 
once ordered Sherman to march at the head of the Army of 
the Tennessee to the assistance of the Army of the Cumber- 
land. Moreover, Grant determined to give to Sherman the 
principal part in the forthcoming battle, by which he expected 
to raise the siege of Chattanooga. Sherman, with five divi- 
sions, was to attack the enemy's right and completely turn 
his position ; when this should have been done, Thomas was 
to attack the centre; Hooker, meanwhile, was to operate 
against his extreme left. Owing, however, to the unex- 
pectedly difficult nature of the ground, Sherman failed to 
make any impression. To create a diversion for him. Grant 
ordered Thomas's command, consisting of four divisions, to 
carry the rifle-pits at the foot of the enemy's position. In 
an incredibly short time his troops had executed this task. 
But they could not stay in the works they had won. Yet 
they had no orders to go forward. They took the matter 
into their own hands. Without orders, and to the amaze- 
ment of the commanding general, they clambered up the 
slopes of Missionary Bidge, and after a brief and brilliant 
fight they stood victorious on its summit. 

It must be confessed that in their accounts of this great 
battle, as oi Shiloh, Grant and Sherman have allowed their 
personal feelings to color, if not to distort, the narrative. 
Sherman has stated that the object of the attacks made 
upon the flanks of Bragg's position by General Hooker and 
himself ^^ was to disturb him [Bragg] to such an extent that 
he would naturally detach from his centre as against us, so 
that Thomas's army could break through his centre." And 


Grrant, in his Memoirs, obviooaly intends to convey the 
impression that this was his plan of battle, and that the 
battle was fought and won as he had planned it. Yet the 
despatches and reports prove conclusively that the movement 
which Grant ordered was intended merely to relieve Sherman 
by distracting the enemy's attention ; and that it was limited 
to the capture of the rifle-pits at the foot of the Ridge. 
General Grant's original orders to both Sherman and Thomas 
show that he intended a joint attack to be made by their 
united commands, when Sherman should have carried the 
north end of the Ridge. Instead of this, Sherman &iled, 
owing to unforeseen difficulties, to accomplish his part of the 
programme. Grant, thinking him hard pressed, ordered an 
advance to carry the rifle-pits at the foot of the Ridge, in 
order to relieve the pressure on him ; this diversion was all 
that was intended by this move. But the gallantry of the 
troops and the fortune of war turned this incidental operation 
into a brilliant success, which resembled in its execution and 
consequences the famous assault on the heights of Pratzen 
which decided the battle of Austerlitz. The glory of this 
unexpected victory belongs mainly to the troops themselves, 
and specially to the men of Sheridan's and Wood's divisions, 
and cannot properly be claimed by either Grant or his lieu- 

To Sherman, however, as Grant's favorite officer, was 
given the chief command in the West, when, in the spring 
of 1864, the new Lieutenant-General was placed in control of 
all the armies of the United States. In May of that year a 
new career opened for General Sherman, that of commander 
of a large army, and the famous Atlanta campaign began. 
At the same time. General Grrant, accompanying the Army 
of the Potomac, under G^eral Meade, crossed the Rapidan 
and advanced against General Lee. The objects of both 
commanders were similar. They were laid down clearly by 
Grant himself. On the 4th of April he wrote to Sherman : 


^^ You I propose to moye against Jolinston's army, to break 
it up and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as 
far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against 
their war resources."^ To the same effect, substantially, 
he wrote to Meade on the 9th : " Lee's army will be your 
objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there you will go 
also." 2 That Sherman clearly understood his chiefs inten- 
tion is certain. He says in his Memoirs : ^^ Neither Atlanta, 
nor Augusta, nor Savannah, was the objective, but the ^ army 
of Jos. Johnston ' [«ic], go where it might."* 

There can be no doubt as to the soimdness of General 
Grant's view. If the two armies of Lee and Johnston could 
be destroyed, there would be an end of the war. If these 
armies should not be destroyed, the occupation of the South- 
em cities would avail little. New York and Philadelphia, 
Charleston and Savannah, were held by the British in the 
war of the Revolution ; but so long as Washyigton and Ghreene 
were at the head of armies in New Jersey and the Carolinas 
the rebellion was not put down. Grant's idea of the true 
objects to be accomplished by himself and Sherman was 
unquestionably soimd and clearly stated. It is, therefore, 
rather remarkable that neither he nor Sherman succeeded, 
in the campaigns which they began in May, 1864, in accom- 
plishing these objects. At the close of that year the main 
army of Lee lay in its lines in front of Petersburg and 
Richmond ; only that part of Lee's army which he had sent 
into the Shenandoah Valley had been destroyed. This cer- 
tainly had been effected by Sheridan. Sherman, also, reached, 
occupied, demolished, and left Atlanta without destroying the 
army of Johnston and Hood. That task he finally abandoned 
to Thomas, who executed it in the memorable and decisive 
victory of Nashville. Let us briefly examine Sherman's 

Sherman imdoubtedly started out with the intention of 
169W.R., 246. >60W.R.,828. > 2 Sherman's Memdn, 26. 


fighting, and, if possible, oyerwhelming, Johnston's army. He 
had with him about a hundred thousand men, under Thomas, 
MoPherson and Sohofield, three very able commanders. His 
opponent. General Joseph E. Johnston, was, next to Lee, the 
best general in the Southern army. His army was probably 
about sixiy thousand strong. It was well entrenched at Dalton. 
We cannot, of course, foUow this most interesting campaign 
in detail. Sherman lost, at the very outset, the best and 
perhaps the only chance he had during the whole summer of 
inflicting a decisiye defeat upon his antagonist. Had he fol- 
lowed Thomas's advice, had he marched immediately, with the 
great bulk of his army, through Snake Creek Gap and seized 
the railroad in Johnston's rear at Besaca, instead of sending 
McPherson through the Gap with a comparatively small force, 
he might have ended the campaign with a sudden and brilliant 
victory. But he missed this opportuniiy, and his wary and 
skilful opponent presented him with no other. Sherman was 
compelled to turn his adversary's positions and force him to 
fall back without ever being able to bring him to bay in a 
situation where the superior numbers of the Union army 
would telL Sometimes, in his endeavor to find the weak 
places in the enemy's positions, Sherman lost more men than 
he need have lost ; and it must be said that his assaults at 
Kenesaw Mountain did not do credit to his tactical judgment. 
In his desire to bring matters to a crisis, he failed to recog- 
nize that his orders could not be carried out, and that his 
losses would not only be severe, but fruitless. Nevertheless, 
on the whole, he husbanded his army. He cannot be charged 
with having adopted the wasteful policy of " attrition," which 
Grant tried during May and June, 1864, and which cost the 
Army of the Potomac so many thousands of valuable lives, 
. with such meagre results. And in point of caring for stores, 
supplies, ammunition, and subsistence, Sherman was a marvel- 
lous provider. No one could mardi a large army through an 
unproductive country more successfully than he. But so long 


as Jolmston remained in command of the Confederate army, 
Sherman could not get at it. When Johnston was superseded 
by Hood, Sherman had indeed to repel the latter's fierce at- 
tacks upon him, but, from one cause or another, he could not 
or did not force Hood to a general battle ; aad when he had, by 
another turning movement, caused the evacuation of Atlanta, 
the Confederate army was still intact and stiU formidable. 

General Sherman thus found himself in a very difficult 
position. He had, it is true, possession of Atlanta, which the 
public undoubtedly considered to have been the objective 
point of his campaign ; certainly its capture effected a great 
change in the minds of the Northern people in respect to 
their expectation of final success in the war. But Sherman 
knew that the capture of Atlanta of itseH signified little. He 
knew perfectly well that he had not set out from Dalton with 
the object of getting possession of Atlanta, but with the ob- 
ject of destroying the main Confederate army in the West; 
and he knew, also, that he had done practically nothing towards 
carrying out his intention. He recognized, in fact, that he 
was in most respects far less favorably situated for destroying 
that army than he had been on the 1st of May ; for, difBcult 
as he had found it to be to obtain supplies in his march to 
Atlanta, — drawing them, as he was obliged to do, from 
Nashville and Chattanooga, — he had yet successfully accom- 
plished this task; he had carried his army as far south as 
Atlanta, and he had had a chance to strike the Confederate 
army in his front all the time. But now he knew he must 
stop. His line of commimication was already dangerously 
long. He could not follow up Hood's army into the interior 
of the country, relying on his existing arrangements, and 
transport with him all the stores, equipment, and ammimition 
that, in a serious pursuit of such a powerful force as the 
Confederate army was, are necessarily required. Moreover, 
he had by no means as large an army as that with which he 
had moved upon Dalton at the outset of the campaign. 


Nearly one third of his men and many of his best ofiEicers had 
to be employed in guarding the railroad, and in garrisoning 
the subsidiary depots of subsistence and ammunition. Dimin- 
ished, then, as his active army was to two thirds its original 
size, and arrived as he was at the end of his line of supply, 
what was there for him to do? 

For nearly a month after the fall of Atlanta, which took 
place on the 2d of September, 1864, the situation in Georgia 
was substantially as described above. But it would be a 
great mistake to suppose that General Sherman felt himself 
to be at the end of his resources. He applied to the problem 
before him a mind exceptionally active and ingenious, and full 
of enterprise and industry. He was constantly devising new 
plans by which the prestige which the Federal army had won 
in capturing Atlanta could be utilized, and by which, in some 
way, by combinations with other commands which were to 
operate either from the Gulf of Mexico or from the Atlantic 
Ocean, the initiative, with all its inestimable advantages, could 
be maintained. To read his correspondence at this period 
with Grant and Halleck is most interesting, albeit at times 
rather puzzling. He proposes plan after plan ; and some of 
his suggestions strike the reader as wild enough. But they 
were merely suggestions ; they did not in any way commit 
him to action. It is true that no man was ever more fertile 
in expedients than General Sherman ; but then no man was 
ever more particular than he in arranging the details of- a 
military operation. No general ever lived who realized more 
fully than General Sherman the importance of knowing just 
where every pound of beef and every ounce of ammunition 
was to come from ; and it is quite safe to say that he had not 
the slightest intention of changing his base until he had set- 
tled all these and all other important details to his own com- 
plete satisfaction. Therefore, when we find him speaking of 
a movement to be made from Mobile, utilizing the Alabama 
and Chattahoochee rivers as lines of supply, or the capture of 


SaYannah by tioopB to be sent by Grant from Viigmia, and 
then the establishment of a new base on the opper part of 
the Savannah Biyer, we may admire the fertility of the mind 
which could find such ways of escape from an oif orced inac- 
tion, and at the same time feel entire confidence that, before 
any important step should be taken, matters would be ar- 
ranged with the utmost care and precantion, so far, at any 
rate, as General Sherman's own moTiNnents were concerned. 

Nothing, howeyer, came of these suggestions, for the very 
good reason that, considerably to Sherman's surprise, General 
Hood was the one to take the initiatiye. His cavalry, under 
two able leaders, Forrest and Wheels, had during Septem- 
ber been threatening the railroad from Atlanta to Chatta- 
nooga, and also the railroads running south from Nashville, 
and in some places cutting the line for a time ; but in the 
last week of September Hood's main army broke camp and 
marohed north. The most famous episode of this movement 
of Hood's was the resolute and successful defence made on 
October 5 by General Corse of our post at AUatoona Pass, 
— one of the most memorable occurrences in the whole war. 
But we cannot go into details hero. Suffice it to say that 
Hood struck the railroad in several places, broke up the com- 
mimication for a time, but finally drow off his army, towards 
the end of October, to Gadsden, in the northern part of 
Alabama, without a serious engagement. Sherman then re- 
established the railroad service to Atlanta, and, concentrating 
the greater part of his army at Graylesville, Alabama, waited 
to see what his adversary, whose army was lying not many 
miles to the southwest, would do next. 

Sherman had been convinced by this raid of Hood's that 
Atlanta was not permanently tenable, so long, at least, as the 
Confederate Army of the West remained substantially intact, 
nor was it worth the cost of holding it. What was the good 
of remaining at such an advanced post as Atlanta, whero 
every mile of the only railway by which the army could be 


supplied offered a temptation to an enemy's army substantially 
in good order and condition ? f^or, unless he should cut loose 
from his base at Chattanooga and march south, giving up his 
hold on the railroad, or else should retreat to Tennessee, 
Sherman must remain at Atlanta, since the railroad commimi- 
cation could be extended no further. A large Federal Army 
stalemated at Atlanta, if we may use an expression borrowed 
from the chess-board, and whose long line of communications 
temptingly invited attack, was certainly a lame and impotent 
conclusion of the campaign so bravely and hopefully begun 
on the 4th of May. Some issue must be found from this 
unsatisfactory state of affairs. 

The natural thing to do, and the thing which at this time 
Greneral Sherman imdoubtedly wanted to do, was to resume 
the original plan ; that is, to make the destruction of the 
Confederate Army the sole object of the campaign. There is 
abundant evidence that when Hood's movements against the 
railroad forced Sherman not only to send Thomas to Chatta- 
nooga, but to go north himself with the bulk of the army, 
leaving only one corps at Atlanta, he greatly desired to bring 
Hood to battle. But Hood was too wary to accommodate 
him. He saw perfectly the great advantage to the Confed- 
erates in prolonging the existing state of things ; to his mind 
nothing could well be more gratifying than to see the main 
Federal Army of the West flying from point to point on the 
Chattanooga and Atlanta railroad, — here repairing a burnt 
trestle, there rebuilding a blockhouse, here, again, relaying a 
few miles of railroad track ; and all this time suffering occa- 
sional panics whenever Forrest's cavalry approached danger- 
ously near the railroads south of Nashville. Hood kept well 
to the west of the Chattanooga and Atlanta railroad ; and he 
knew that he could, in case Sherman should move against 
him, lead him a chase through a difficult country, across con- 
siderable rivers, and put him to great trouble to obtain his 
subsistence and forage. For, in moving against Hood's army 


with the intention of engaging and in the hope of destroying 
it, Sherman could not afford to use the light equipment which 
sufficed for the unopposed march to the sea ; nor would it do 
to scatter his army in order to obtain provisions, as he then 
so freely did. If he was to make Hood's army his objective, 
he must arrange his dispositions accordingly ; he must carry 
with him abundance of artillery, of ammunition, of supplies of 
all sorts, and be prepared to fight battles. This Hood calcu- 
lated Sherman did not wish to do, situated as he then was. 

And in this calculation Hood was quite right. The Federal 
commander was indeed prepared, and in fact anxious, to move 
against Hood, if Hood should be so unwise as to cross the 
Tennessee River, on his northward march, within a short 
distance of GraylesviUe, where Sherman's army lay. Not to 
oi>erate against an army which should thus recklessly expose 
its communications would indeed be unpardonable. But 
Hood had no intention of committing such a blunder as this. 
He moved westward as far as Florence, Alabama, some hun- 
dred and fifty miles west of Chattanooga, and there concen- 
trated his troops and supplies. Here he was on the 1st of 
November. Here he and Beauregard, who was advising with 
him, had fixed their base of operations for their proposed ad- 
vance on NashviUe. Now, for Sherman to march across the 
country from GraylesviUe towards Florence with a large army 
was not only not an easy task, but it involved the abandon- 
ment — so Sherman thought — of Atlanta, and an entire 
rearrangement of bases and lines of supply. On the other 
hand, to retire the army to Tennessee, and there repel an 
invasion of the enemy, seemed like a confession of defeat, or 
at least of having entirely failed to carry out the true objects 
of the spring campaign, — a thing, as Sherman thought, cer- 
tainly to be avoided, if possible. There remained another 
course, — and it was one which fascinated the Federal com- 
mander alike by its originality and its startling audacity, — 
and that was to re-enforce Thomas so as to make him equal 


to the task of repeUing the invasion, if one should be under- 
taken, while the main army, under Sherman in person, should 
mardi across the State of Georgia to Savannah and the sea. 

Bearing now in mind the great attraction which this pro- 
ject possessed for General Sherman, as appears from his 
correspondence with the Washington authorities, we must 
not be surprised to find in Sherman's letters to Grant and 
Halleck evidences of an unwillingness on his part to look the 
matter in all its bearings squarely in the face, and of a strong 
desire to dwell only on the more favorable conditions of the 
problem, and especially to present the scheme so that only its 
most attractive features should be displayed. The idea of a 
march to the sea, which should demonstrate the hoUowness 
of the Confederacy, which should amaze and delight the 
world by its novelty and its audacity, and which should yet 
involve no risk to the 60,000 picked veterans who were 
to perform the feat, took manifest possession of General 
Sherman's mind. But Grant, whose imagination, if he 
ever had any, was not excited beyond bounds even by this 
brilliant proposal of his favorite lieutenant, urged, in a let- 
ter dated November 1, upon Sherman that he had better 
^^ entirely settle " Hood before starting on his proposed cam- 
paign; that, "with Hood's army destroyed," he could go 
where he pleased " with impunity." " If you can see the 
chance for destroying Hood's army, attend to that first, and 
make your other move secondary." ^ 

This was unquestionably sound advice ; the destruction of 
Hood's army would, as Grant said, make everything possible 
in the West. The Confederacy had no other army but Lee's 
east of the Mississippi ; and if Hood's army should be broken 
up, the Gxdf and the Southern Atlantic States must fall 
before the forces of the Union. But Sherman was not to be 
dissuaded from his project. He convinced himself, and so 
represented to Grrant and Halleck, that Thomas was not only 


able to " hold the line of the Tennessee " River, but would 
" very shortly be able to assume the offensive," ^ — even talk- 
ing about ordering him to move on Selma, Alabama, before 
long.^ How far these representations were from giving Grant 
a correct notion of the actual state of things appears from 
the fact that it was not until November 80, the day of the 
battle of Franklin, that Thomas could be said to have had 
at Nashville a force large enough to be called an army. On 
that day. General A. J. Smith's corps of 12,000 men 
arrived there from Missouri ; and on the next day, Schofield, 
whose little army had been obliged to fall back from the 
Tennessee River to Franklin, where it had desperately and 
successfully defended itseH against the determined onslaught 
of Hood, made good his retreat to the same place. 

General Sherman succeeded, however, in convincing Grrant, 
who wrote to him on November 2 : " "With the force you 
have left with Thomas, he must be able to take care of Hood 
and destroy him. ... I say, then, go as you propose."^ 
Sherman thus obtained the assent of his superior to his start- 
ling project of leaving to Thomas the accomplishment of the 
task which had originally been assigned to Sherman himself, 
— the destruction of the main Confederate army in the West. 
Grant at last yielded to Sherman's persistent representations, 
and consented to assume that this task, for which in the 
spring the whole Federal army of the West was deemed no 
more than adequate, might in the fall safely be entrusted to 
a congeries of commands, then widely separated, soon, to be 
sure, to be brought together, but which could not be properly 
called an army at all until its scattered parts should be as- 
sembled. And this, too, when there was no pretence of any 
exigency demanding the presence of the greater part of the 
Federal Army of the West on the Atlantic seaboard. In view 
of such a decision as this, it is impossible not to say that 
those who made it trusted largely in their good luck. To 
1 79 W. R., MO. a lb,, 740. « lb., 594. 


transport the greater part of the Federal Army of the West 
far from the theatre of war, while the Confederate army 
in that region was still a large, well-organized, well-com- 
manded and formidable force, was certainly a most amazing 
step to take. It turned out all right, indeed ; but no one can 
read the story of Hood's invasion of Tennessee in November 
and December, 1864, without at times holding his breath. 
It seems almost as if the goddess known as the Fortune of 
War from time to time visibly interfered to hinder and de- 
range the operations of Hood and his lieutenants, and to 
further the combinations and movements of Thomas and his 
subordinates. No one familiar with this campaign can hon- 
estly say that he thinks that such luck could fairly have been 
counted on by Grant and Sherman. It is a clear case where 
the maxim Exitus acta probat is applicable, if that maxim 
ever is applicable. 

For his great march, however, Sherman, his mind now 
relieved by Grant's tardy assent from all anxiety about the 
situation in Tennessee, made his most careful preparations. 
Sixty-two thousand of the best troops in the army, well 
organized, well officered, every detail of equipment most care- 
fully attended to, full of ardor, elation, enterprise and cour- 
age, began on the 15th of November, 1864, one of the most 
unexpected and startling military movements on record. 
They met no foe until they reached the sea. The North was 
electrified, the South dismayed. And while Sherman's army 
was besieging Savannah, Hood had made his invasion ; had 
forced back Schofield from the Tennessee to the Harpeth ; 
had furiously assaulted him at Franklin, only to be repelled 
with unheard-of loss; had pursued him to NashviUe; had 
then sat down before that city as if on purpose to give 
the cool and resolute commander of the Union forces all the 
time he needed to equip and consolidate his heterogeneous 
command; and had, on December 15, succumbed utterly 
to the well-conceived and well-delivered blows of General 


Thomas, The battle of Nashville, unlike nearly all our bat- 
tles, well-nigh destroyed the beaten army. 

Hence, when Savannah surrendered, the country was 
already in a state of exultation at Thomas's glorious and 
decisive victory ; and men's minds, as always in such cases, 
welcomed with almost frantic excitement the novel sight 
of the other great Western general now arriving on the 
Atlantic coast. Savannah was presented by the victor as a 
Christmas present to President Lincoln ; and, in view of 
the destruction of the Confederate Army of the West by 
Thomas, and the addition of this splendid Western army 
under Sherman to the Union forces east of the Alleghanies, 
it was evident to the dullest understanding that the end was 
rapidly drawing nigh. And in truth the "March to the 
Sea," as Sherman had calculated it would do, absorbed 
public attention to the exclusion of everything else. Its 
novelty and audacity, the ease with which it had been con- 
ducted, the demonstration which it afforded of the superior 
power of the North, filled the pubUc mind with exultation 
and hope. The imagination of the people was captivated. 
Sherman became the hero of the day. 

Yet the propriety of the withdrawal of this army from the 
seat of war in the West can be defended only by the event. 
To have imperilled the hold of the Union government on the 
States of Tennessee and Kentucky ; to have exposed all the 
posts from Chattanooga to Nashville, to say nothing of 
Louisville, to assault and capture by the Confederate army 
under Hood ; in short, to have left so much to chance when 
everything might so easily have been made secure, was to 
count unwarrantably upon the favors of fortune. No margin 
was left for accidents. It is not easy to see why 50,000 
men would not have served Sherman's purpose as well 
as 62,000 men; and assuredly 12,000 good troops would 
have added greatly to Thomas's scanty resources, and con- 
tributed largely to insure the destruction of Hood's army, 


which alone oould give to the strat^y which sanctioned 
the withdrawal of so many troops to the Atlantic coast the 
possibility of leadiag to useful results. It is true that 
Thomas's victory practically attained this end. In the 
march of his army through the Carolinas, Sherman had to 
encounter only the remnants of Hood's defeated and dis- 
couraged troops added to the insignificent garrisons of the 
Atlantic cities; and with these forces he was abundantly able 
to cope. But Thomas's success was really unprecedented.* 
It could not fairly have been anticipated. And it would 
have been an entirely different matter for Sherman if Hood's 
whole army, or the greater part of it, had confronted him at 
the marshes and rivers over which his toilsome and difficult 
route lay. 

Sherman used his advantages with the greatest skill His 
hold on his army was perfect; there was nothing that the 
men would not do at his bidding. The labors of the march 
northward from Savannah were enormous, the weather was 
terrible, but everything was cheerfully borne. Sherman's 
masterly manoeuvres deceived and confused his adversaries. 
He aimed to reach a new base, where he should find sup- 
plies and re-enforcements, at Gk>ldsboro', North Carolina; 
he recalled the fate of Comwallis, who, in the interior 
of North Carolina, was obliged to give battle to Grreene, 
and, although remaining master of the field, was forced by 
his losses in men and ammunition to retire to Wilmington. 
Sherman turned off at Columbia to the northeast, though 
feigning with a part of his force to keep on moving north. 
Hence the enemy were unable to strike him until he was 
dose upon Goldsboro'. At Averysboro' he had a brisk and 
successful engagement ; at Bentonville the action was more 
severe, but we held our own at the end of the disty. Once 
arrived at Goldsboro' the task was easy. Here Schofield, 
with the Twenty-third Corps, joined the army; and from 
Gh>ldsboro' as a new base the march was resumed, until on 


April 14, 1865, a flag of trace was received from Greneral 
Johnston, opening negotiations for the surrender of the 
Confederate forces. 

It would not be right to close a review of General 
Shermaa's character and services without referring to his 
often - announced policy of devastation. It can hardly be 
doubted that a desire to inflict punishment on the people of 
the South for their course in breaking up the Union was 
a strong element in favor of his project of marching across 
the country. Thus, on October 9, 1864, he telegraphs to 
General Grrant : — 

" Until we can repopulate Georgia, it is useless to occupy 
it ; but the utter destruction of its roads, houses, and people 
will cripple their military resources. ... I can make the 
march, and make Georgia howl ! " ^ 

October 17, to General Schofield : — "I will make the 
interior of Georgia feel the weight of war." ^ 

October 19, to General Beckwith : — 

^^ I propose to abandon Atlanta aad the railroad back to 
Chattanooga, and sally forth to ruin Georgia and bring up 
on the seashore." * 

So, when he arrived before Savannah, he wrote to the 
Confederate General Hardee as follows : — 

" Should I be forced to resort to assault, and the slower 
and surer process of starvation, I shall then feel justified in 
resorting to the harshest measures, and shall make little effort 
to restrain my army, — burning to avenge a national wrong 
they attach to Savannah and other large cities which have 
been so prominent in dragging our country into civil war." * 

To General Grant, December 18 : — 

^^ With Savannah in our possession at some future time, 

if not now, we can punish South Carolina as she deserves, 

and as thousands of people in Greorgia hoped we would do. 

I do sincerely believe that the whole United States, North 

1 79 W. R., 162. « J&., 336. » lb,, 359. * 92 W. R., 737. 


and South, would rejoice to have this anny turned loose on 
South Carolina to devastate that State, in the manner we 
have done in Georgia, and it would have a direct and imme- 
diate bearing on your campaign in Virginia." ^ 

To General Halleck, December 24 : — 

^^ I attach more importance to these deep incisions into the 
enemy's country, because this war differs &om European wars 
in this particular. We are not only fighting hostile armies, 
but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and 
poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well as their organized 
armies. I know that this recent movement of mine through 
Georgia has had a wonderful effect in this respect. . . . 
The truth is the whole army is burning with an insatiable 
desire to wreak vengeance upon South Carolina. I abnost 
tremble at her fate, but feel that she deserves all that seems 
in store for her. ... I look upon Columbia as quite as bad 
as Charleston, and I doubt if we shall spare the public build- 
ings there, as we did at Milledgeville." ^ 

From the above citations, — and they might easily be 
multiplied, — it seems clear that General Sherman conceived 
that he was justified in causing loss and damage to private and 
pubUc properly as a punishment for political conduct. It can 
hardly be pretended that the devastation spoken of is that 
which follows naturally and inevitably in the wake of an 
invading army. If that is all that is referred to, then the 
language employed is a great deal too strong to convey the 
meaning of the writer. It is true that the orders issued to 
his army for its conduct on the great march are, though by 
no means strict, yet not in principle objectionable. Foragmg 
was to be confined to regular foraging parties ; soldiers were 
not to enter houses or commit any trespass. Corps com- 
manders only could destroy mills, houses, and like property ; 
and then solely in districts and neighborhoods where the 
inhabitants had burnt bridges, obstructed roads, or otiierwise 
1 92 W. R., 743. « JJ.,709. 


manifested hostility. It may well be believed, certainly, that 
there waa much greater license exercised than was warranted 
by the terms of these orders. But granting that this was so, 
it was due in great measure to the unavoidable circumstance 
that the army had to live off the country ; and acts of this 
nature do not tend to settle the question whether devasta- 
tion for the sake of punishment was ordered or allowed by 
General Sherman. It seems to us that General Sherman, 
in the passages cited above, did enunciate in distinct terms 
the principle that the infliction of such punishment by a 
general commanding an army is within his rights ; that is, 
that it is sanctioned by the laws of modem civilized warfare. 
If we are correct in attributing this position to Sherman, 
we cannot lose the opportunity of pointing out that the 
authorities are against him. Military operations are not 
carried on for the purpose of inflicting punishment for politi- 
cal offences. The desolation and destruction inseparable from 
them are not the result of acts done for the purpose of pro- 
ducing suffering, but are to be considered as merely incidental 
to the military movements ; and the object of military move- 
ments is to overcome armed resistance. The amount of such 
suffering cannot be unnecessarily increased without a violation 
of the humane rules of modem war. The true principle is 
stated with sufficient accuracy in Sherman's orders at the 
commencement of his great march. If he transgressed these 
rules, as it would appear from his own letters and despatches 
that he did, he cannot be defended. Whatever the Greorgians 
and South Carolinians suffered by having to supply provi- 
sions, forage, fuel, horses, or military stores of any kind to 
Sherman's invading army, whether more or less in amount, 
was a mere incident of a state of war, for which neither Gen- 
eral Sherman nor his army was to blame. But if Sherman 
purposely destroyed, or connived at the destruction of, property 
which was not needed for the supply of his army or of the 
enemy's army, he violated one of the fundamental canons of 


modem war&re; and just so far as he directed or permitted 
this, he conducted war on obsolete and barbarous principles. 
As to the facts, they are not perfectly easy to ascertain. In 
his official report, Sherman estimated the entire damage done 
to the State of Georgia at $100,000,000, of which only 
$20,000,000 ^^ inured to our advantage," the remainder being 
^^ simple waste and destruction." ^ Still, much of this may 
have been inevitable. We have no space here to review the 
evidence, and must content ourselves with stating the rule as 
we understand it. 

We cannot, in this connection, avoid remarking that Gen- 
eral Sherman was proved by the event to have been entirely 
mistaken in thinking that ^^ to devastate " the State of South 
Carolina ^^ would have a direct and immediate bearing on " 
Grant's ^^ campaign in Virginia." This is clearly a case of 
seeking far afield for a reason for a thing which a man has 
made up his mind to do. As a matter of fact, General Lee 
remained in his lines at Petersburg and Bichmond until 
the season was sufficiently advanced for Grant to conmience 
operations; and it was not until the battle of Five Forks 
had been lost that Lee evacuated his works and began his 
disastrous retreat. 

Much the same criticism may be passed upon General 
Sherman's statement, above cited, of the importance which he 
attached to ^* these deep incisions into the enemy's country," 
namely, that we were not only fighting hostile armies, but 
a hostile people, and must make everybody ^^ feel the hard 
hand of war." There is a sort of ad captandum semblance 
of logic about this remark that no doubt made it popular at 
the time. But surely it needs but a moment's reflection to 
see that nothing is gained by adding anything to the task of 
the soldier, which is to defeat and destroy the hostile force. 
To infuriate needlessly a population already known to be 
unfriendly assuredly cannot make the soldier's task easier ; on 

1 fi2 W. K., 18. 


the contrary, it must rather multiply his difficulties, and tend 
to render success less certain, besides making the population, 
when conquered, more hostile than ever before. There is, it 
must be confessed, in many of these utterances of Greneral 
Sherman's a good deal that will not stand the test of careful 
examination. They show that Sherman's mind was not occu- 
pied solely in the work which alone it was his duty to attend 
to, that is, in the endeavor to solve the military problem 
before him ; in other words, that he concerned himself more 
or less all the time with the popular and political questions 
connected with the war, — in this respect presenting a great 
contrast to Grant and Thomas. Evidences of this are to be 
found everywhere in his despatches and correspondence, — 
notably in his letters to General Hood and to the mayor 
and city government of Atlanta, in September, 1864,^ and in 
the Memorandum or Basis of Agreement between him and 
General J. E. Johnston, in April, 1865.^ At the same 
time, Sherman never for an instant pretermitted his active 
attention to the welfare of his army, or his study of the mili- 
tary problems which his masterly manoeuvres were constantly 
presenting for his solution. 

In truth, it is far from easy to draw the portrait of Gren- 
eral Sherman. Here is an officer of high rank, who began 
his service in the war at the first battle of Bull Run ; who 
received the surrender of the last of the Confederate gen- 
erals ; who was at the head of one of the finest armies in 
the country, but who never commanded in a great, stiU less 
a decisive, battle; whose most famous exploit consisted in 
marching a large and well-appointed force almost unopposed 
through the enemy's country ; and whose reputation never- 
theless stands as high, at least with the Northern public, as 
that of any of the generals of the Union. Such a sketch 
as the above certainly leaves much to be accounted for. Yet 
it is true so far as it goes. What is not stated in it con- 
1 78 W. R., 416, 418. ^ Sherman's Memoira, 356. 


tains, however, the solution of the apparent paradox. Gen- 
eral Sherman's military abilities, though not exhibited con- 
spicuously on tiie battiefield, were confessedly of a very high 
order. His Atlanta campaign proves this by universal 
admission. If we are surprised at his leaving to Thomas the 
task of resisting, and, if possible, destroying, the principal 
Confederate army in the West ; if we fail, as we fairly may, 
to see in what respect Sherman gained anything in not fol- 
lowing Grant's advice to ^^ entirely settie" Hood before 
^^ starting" on his *^ proposed campaign," we must at tiie 
same time admit that no operation in the war was more skil- 
fully carried out than that ^^ proposed campaign." It accom- 
plished all that Shennan had expected or hoped from it. It 
won not only the assent, but the admiration, of Gbant and 
Lincoln. It captivated the popular mind. Closing as it did 
with the surrender of General Joseph E. Johnston, it virtu- 
ally ended the war. And as Thomas's skill, endurance, cour- 
age, and good fortune enabled him to win the great victory 
which was the indispensable condition of success for the whole 
undertaking, the world has naturally not been over-curious 
to search for defects in arrangements which yielded such 
wonderfully complete results. 

It is nevertheless to be remembered that if Shennan had 
f pllowed up Hood, as the Washington authorities originally 
intended and desired him to do, before marching to the sea, 
the destruction of the Confederate army could hardly have 
failed to be more thorough than it was. The Southwestern 
and South Atlantic States would have been almost absolutely 
without defence; and the result of the campaign could hardly 
have been other than decisive. A certain amount of risk, on 
the other hand, it cannot be denied, attended the transfer of 
the greater part of Sherman's command to the Atlantic coast 
before Hood's army had been disposed of. Grant — who was 
easily converted to any project of his favorite lieutenant — 
and Shennan have sometimes shown a disposition to minimize 


this risk, and hence to consider the victory of Nashyille a 
very ordinary affair ; but it must not be forgotten that when 
Thomas's campaign was being fought Grant was terribly 
anxious. He did not know at the time, nor was he after- 
wards quite willing to admit, the existence of the difficulties 
under which Thomas labored, and which induced the delay 
on Thomas's part which Grant thought so unnecessary and 
so perilous to the retention of our hold on the States of Ken- 
tucky and Tennessee. But there were real and potent causes 
for Grrant's anxiety; and of course the action of General 
Sherman in carrying off sixty thousand men to the seacoast 
before the campaign in the West had been brought to a 
successful termination was the underlying cause of it alL 
Thomas, however, was equal to the occasion. He scored a 
magnificent success at Nashville. Sherman at the same time 
captured Savannah. Everything turned out marvellously 
welL Both officers showed themselves at their best. The 
risk having passed by, the North reaped the full advantage 
of the daring march. The task then before Sherman was 
one to which he was by nature wonderfully adapted, and 
which he soon brought to a triumphant end. 


CcoDomander of the Oavalxy of the Army of Korthem Ylrginift. 


Bqfrinted by permission from the " AUantic Monthly ^'^ for Marchf 1886, 


Amokq the valuable works which the South has contrib- 
uted to the history of the late war, the *^ Life and Campaigns 
of General J. E. B. Stuart " i will take a high place. The 
book is by no means a mere biography of Stuart himself ; it 
is a history, as the inscription on the side of the cover aptly 
puts it, of " the Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry." We are 
prepared, therefore, to find a full and minute account of all 
the principal and of many of the subsidiary operations of that 
force. The account, indeed, is so full and so minute that it 
will tax the patience of the ordinary reader to master the 
descriptions of skirmishes and ambushes which, unimportant, 
perhaps, in their bearing on the great events of the war, were 
yet worthy of being carefully narrated in a work claiming 
to give a complete history of the cavalry of the Army of 
Northern Virginia. To any student of the military art, 
however, these literal and exact accounts of the mode of cav- 
alry-fighting in our civil war cannot but be of very great and 
permanent interest ; while any reader who is willing to give 
the time required for following out the descriptions with the 
aid of the excellent maps which accompany the volume will 
find himself well repaid in the peculiar attraction always 
attendant on watching the varying fortunes of a fight. 

^ The life and Campaigns of Major-Qeneral J. E. B. Stnart, Commander of 
the Cayalry of the Army of Northern Virginia. By H. B. MoClellan, A. M., 
late Major, Awristant Adjutant-General, and Chief of Staff of the Cayalry 
Corps, Army of Northern Virginia. Boston and New York: Honghton, 
Mifflin & Co. Richmond, Va. : J. W. Randolph & English. 1885. 


Major McClellan was Stuart's Chief of Staff, and he is, as 
he should be, loyal to his general But, so far as we can 
diseoTer, he is actuated by an impartial spirit. Neither in 
his treatment of the Federal narratives, nor in his accounts 
of Confederate operations, do we find any evidence of parti- 
sanship. At the same time, allowance must be made for the 
fact that he writes from the standpoint of Stuart himself. 

The function of cavalry in warfare has changed very much 
in the last thirty years. For hundreds — nay, thousands — 
of years, it remained substantially the same ; the Numidian 
horse of Hannibal fought very much in the same way as did 
the cuirassiers of Napoleon. But with the introduction of 
improved firearms a change has gradually come about. We 
saw one of the last examples of the old method in the famous 
charge at BalaMava, thirty odd years ago ; but that was con- 
demned at the time as not being, strictly speaking, ^^ war." 
In our great struggle, it seems to have been recognized from 
the first that the role of the cavalry was to be auxiliary only. 
They were employed — often most unjustifiably — to do the 
picket duty for the whole army ; they were sent off on ex- 
peditions to cut telegraph wires, destroy railroads, capture 
depots of supplies, and generally to break up the enemy's 
communications. Columns of cavalry always preceded and 
covered the march of an army, and were expected to ascer- 
tain the position and intentions of the enemy. In these 
operations it of course often happened that severe fighting 
had to be done; but when infantry were encountered, the 
cavalry usually dismounted and fought as infantry. In fact, 
up to the Shenandoah Valley campaign of 1864, it was only 
when cavalry were opposed to cavalry that the hostile squad- 
rons charged in the old style, using the sabre. Whether this 
mode of fighting would ever be resorted to now is certainly 
very questionable. With the repeating small arms of to-day 
in the hands of the troopers, such splendid attacks as were 
made by both the Federal and Confederate cavalry at Brandy 


Station (or Fleetwood) would, we apprehend, never be 
attempted. It is the characteristic feature of the book before 
us that it gives all the necessary facts of a transitory yet 
very interesting phase in the history of the employment of 
cavaby in modem warfare. We have minute narratives of 
those daring raids in the rear of our armies, of which Stuart 
made at least three which were successful and famous. We 
have the details of the services performed by him when ac- 
companying a column of infantry. We have careful and 
impartial, though naturally not always correct, descriptions 
of those obstinate and spirited hand-to-hand encounters be- 
tween cavalry and cavalry which followed immediately on the 
reorganization of the Federal horse in the spring of 1863, 
and which will carry down to posterity the names of Buf ord 
and Gregg and Custer and Sheridan. The actions at Kelly's 
Ford, Brandy Station, Aldie Gap, Middleburg, Gettysburg, 
Yellow Tavern, are all described at length ; and though there 
is a great deal that might be written to fill out, or to correct, 
or even in some cases to reverse, the conclusions of Major 
McClellan, the Federal historian must acknowledge his in- 
debtness to him as a fair and honest writer on his own side. 
(Jin Stuart the Confederacy had a natural leader of cavalry. 
Daring, cool, eminently a man of resources in an emergency, 
full of the spirit of adventure, young, gay, handsome, a fine 
horseman, he carried into the somewhat prosaic operations of 
our civil war not a little of the chivalrous spirit of former 
times?) Belonging^ to one of the distinguished families of 
^^ginia. and possessed of so many undoubted qualifications 
fOT his task, his position was an assured one from the verv 
first^ ^ He took an active part in the first batde of Bull Run, 
winning the high commendation of Generals Johnston and 
Jackson. He commanded the entire cavalry of the Confed- 
erate Army on the Peninsula, (it was here that he first 
aoqidred general reputation by his daring raid around our 
army, about the middle of June, 1862. Being the first per- 


formance of the kind^ the effect it produced upon the not 
very experienced soldiers of McClellan's army was considerar 
ble, and the expedition, rash and perilous as it certainly was, 
may fairly be said to have been justified under the circum- 
stances of the caseN In August of that year Stuart tried the 
same manoeuvre agun, getting in the rear of the army of 
General Pope, and capturing some of that officer's head-, 
quarters baggage. But though this was also a very daring and 
skilfully conducted affair, it did not strike either army as 
possessing the importance of the former raid. Stuart, how- 
ever, who evidently enjoyed these expeditions, the manage- 
ment of which waB peculiarly suited to his character and 
talents, undertook, not long after the battle of Antietam, 
still another, and perhaps more venturesome, incursion. In 
October, 1862, when Lee's army was in Virginia, Stuart 
crossed the Potomac at McCoy's Ferry, a short distance above 
Williamsport ; proceeded rapidly to Chambersburg, where he 
obtained supplies of all kinds ; then taking the Grettysburg 
road as far as Cashtown, he returned by way of Emmittsburg 
to White's Ferry, just above Conrad's Ferry, where he crossed 
the Potomac, eluding with great skill and good fortune the 
Federal troops, by whom his little force seemed to be well- 
nigh surrounded. What the object of this performance was, 
beyond exhibiting to the men of both armies what a fine set 
of fellows Stuart's cavalry were, what risks they were ready 
to take, and with what audacity and coolness they could escape 
from the snares laid for them by their foes, we are at a loss 
to know. But the importance of distributing information of 
this kind is hardly to be weighed against the danger of losing 
such an auxiliary to an army as Stuart and his command. 
As it was, everything turned out well enough ; the Federal 
generals were annoyed, and the Northern public was irritated. 
But suppose that Pleasanton had not been misled by false 
reports, and that Stuart and his raiders had been taken : any 
one can see what effect that news would have had upon both 


armies. It would have been a serious blow to the confidence 
reposed by the South in their generals, and it could not have 
failed greatly to encourage the North. 

General Stuart was now to have a rare opportunity for 
distinction. In the campaign of Chancellorsville, as hitherto, 
he commanded the cavaby. On the evening of the 2d of 
May, after the crushing assault on the Eleventh Corps, the 
great Confederate leader, Stonewall Jackson, was severely 
wounded, and his place was filled by A. P. Hill, who, while 
exerting himself to repair the disorder into which the troops 
had necessarily &llen in their onward and successful move- 
ment, and to resist the counter-attacks which Sickles, at the 
head of the undismayed veterans of the Third Corps, was 
fiercely making to recover the lost ground, was wounded him- 
self. Then Lee sent for Stuart, and put him in command 
of Jackson's corps. It was a proud moment in Stuart's life, 
and a great honor for so young an officer, for he was but 
just thirty years old. The task before him was, fortunately, 
neither an ambiguous nor a complicated task. There was 
but one thing to do, and that was to fight. ^Df the batde 
which raged so fiercely on Sunday momingK^c^ the repeated^ 
desperate, persistent assaults which Stuart directed against 
our position ; of the energy and enthusiasm which he inspired ; 
and of the gallantry with which from time to time he led 
the troops himself, we have not time to speakj Fierce and 
determined as were those repeated attacks, however, nothing 
but the gross mismanagement of Hooker can account for their 
having overcome the steady and obstinate resistance of the 
troops of Sickles and Slocum. But we need not dwell on this 
ever painful episode in the war. Suffice it to say that Stuart 
acquitted himself admirably. 

His services were, however, more needed in the cavahy. 
In the severe actions which occurred in the spring and early 
summer of 1863, at Brandy Station, Aldie Gap, Middleburg, 
and Gretiysburg, cavalry met cavalry, and, as has been before 


said, the fighting was of the most approved old style, horse to 
horse, and sabre to sabre. In these engagements the Federals 
displayed a confidence and courage which had rarely been 
observed before, and which was the result of the thorough 
reorganization of our cavalry, for which the army was indebted 
to General Hooker probably more than to any one else. 

Stuart's course in the campaign of Grettysburg has been 
severely criticised as well by Confederate as by Federal 
authorities. When Lee determined on the invasion of the 
North, he left a large force of cavaby to guard the passes of 
the Blue Ridge. He took a very small force to cover the 
march of the army. The remainder he entrusted to Stuart, 
and practically gave him carte hlanche as to the route he 
should take to compass the two objects of ascertaining the 
movements of the enemy and communicating his information 
to General Lee. Stuart, instead of keeping on the right flank 
of the Confederate columns, between them and our army, 
chose the devious and complicated course of passing to the 
south of our corps while they were marching north, thus get- 
ting between them and Washington, and theiy^rossing the 
Potomac near Washington at Bowser's Ford. VjEIe expected 
to make a complete circuit around our army, as he had twice 
done before, and to bring seasonable information of Hooker's 
whereabouts and operations to his commanding officer. 
Looked at from any point of view, this plan was badJ It 
necessarily involved the separation of the cavalry from the 
rest of the army for a period, the duration of which no one 
could guess, and it exposed it, moreover, to be cut off and 
captured. QThe only recommendations of the project were its 
adventurousness, which we suspect was a pretty strong 
recommendation in the eyes of General Stiuurt, and the 
possibility of doing some damage to the communications of 
the Army of the Potomac by operating between it and 
Washingto^ With such a small force as accompanied 
Stuart, however, no great successes in this direction were 


to be looked for, while the danger of utter failure from 
the discovery of his exposed position by the Federal army 
— which, contrary to his expectation, did not rest near 
Washington, but continued to march north — daily increased. 
Not only was Stuart thus made aware of a concentration 
of the Federal army in Pennsylvania, a fact of the utmost 
importance to General Lee, but the very movements of 
the Federal corps by which this concentration was effected 
prevented Stuart from sending his information to the head- 
quarters of his commander, ^t must also be admitted that 
Stuart was far from showing that dear, strong sense which 
a man like Stonewall Jackson would have shown in a like 
situation. Having early made a trumpery capture of a lot 
of wagons and prisoners, he persisted in carrying them along 
with him, in spite of the delay they were manifestly causing. 
He never seems to have realized that so long as he was unable 
to communicate with Lee he was in a false position, from 
which he ought to make every effort to escape^ As for the 
claim put forward by Major McClellan, that Stuart hindered 
the movements of the Federal army, that, with all submis- 
sion, is an entire mistake. ^^ My main point," wrote Meade 
to ELalleck, ^^ being to find and fight the enemy, I shall have 
to submit to the cavalry raid around me in some measure." ^ 
Stuart reached Gettysburg on the afternoon of the 2d of 
July. But by that time the mischief had been done. General 
Lee, deprived of his cavalry, had been concentrating his army 
on Gettysburg, in ignorance of General Meade's movements. 
His leading divisions had, on the day before, encountered 
the First and Eleventh Corps of the Federal army near 
Gettysburg, and had beaten them after an obstinate struggle. 
The Federal general had, nevertheless, decided to concentrate 
his whole army here and await an attack. On the 2d of 
July Lee followed up his first success by driving the Third 
Federal Corps from an untenable position. Unable now to 



resist the influences of the hour, he was about to essay the 
hazardous task of assaulting the steady infantry of the 
Northern army, thinned but not a whit daunted by their ill 
luck on the past two days, and holding a strong, well-defined 
position. In truth, Lee's only chance, humanly speaking, lay 
in compelling the Federal army to attack him ; but, owing to 
his ignorance of our designs and movements, his troops struck 
their enemy unexpectedly, and having been thus far — owing 
in part, at least, to adventitious circumstances — successful, 
Lee, on the 3d of July, made that gallant, but rash, assault 
on our left centre, the utter repulse of which left Meade the 
victor of the three days' fight. Whether, if Stuart's cavalry 
had been with the main army, Lee would or could have so 
managed that Meade would have been induced to assault him 
in position, no one, of course, can say ; all we know is that 
the battle, as it was fought, was unpremeditated by General 
Lee, — that it was not the kind of battle which he had 
intended to deliver. 

General Stuart's services in the Wilderness campaign 
were very brief. Li the winter of 1863-64 our cavalry, then 
under Sheridan, had vastly improved; the cavalry of the 
Confederates, on the other hand, was weak in numbers and 
poorly equipped. Early in the campaign, Sheridan, with 
some 12,000 horse, moved in rear of the army of Lee and 
threatened Richmond. Cin a severe action at Yellow Tavern, 
Stuart was mortally wounded. He met his fate like a brave 
and good man, as he was^ Major McClellan's narrative here 
is simple and very touching. 

We have extended this review to a greater length than we 
originally intended.^But among the heroic figures of the war, 
the gallant leader of the Confederate cavalry is certainly one 
of the most attractive»«i.^ 



Bunt OoLomL, V. B. T. 
Bead hrftn At SocUty en Tuesday evening, MarA 11, 1890. 

The f oUowing is a list of the pabUshed writiiigB by Colonel Stone, oonoem- 
ing the Civil War : — 

Thb Beodqiikos of the Asht of the CxTMBBBLAin>. [Annual Oration 
deliyered at the Nineteenth Reunion of the Society of the Army of the Cum- 
berland, held at Chicago, September 19-20, 1888. In the Report of that 
Reunion, pages 71-112.] Cincinnati, 1889. 

Hood's ImrAcaoN of Tsnkesbse. [In] The Century Magazine, August, 1887, 
Vol. 84, No. 4, pages 597-616; [also in] Battles and Leaders of the Civil 
War, . . . Edited by Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarenoe Clough BueL 
4 vols.. New York, 1887, VoL 4, pages 440-464. 

Gbnbbal Qbobqb H. Thomas. [In] The AUantio Monthly, October, 1891, 
VoL 68, No. 408, pages 506-514. 

Mbmobial Bioobaphibs in the Reports of the Reunions of the Society of the 
Army of the Cumberland, 1884-1894. 

See list of Papers re&d before the Military Historical Society of Massachu- 
setts at the end of this volume. 


It has been the fortune of Greneral Thomas to create the 
conviction, in the minds of the best judges among those who 
knew him best, that he was a soldier of consummate ability. 
This conviction has sometimes been challenged ; chiefly, per- 
haps, on the ground that it was based on personal admiration 
rather than on military achievements. His career affords the 
only test of his merits. This Society is composed mainly of 
soldiers; of men who have studied, and had more or less 
experience in military operations. To the consideration of 
judges thus qualified, facts, not eulogy, constitute the highest 
appeal But even by such a tribunal, the exceptional posi- 
tion of General Thomas during the War of the BebeUion is 
entitled to its due weight. 

Bom in Virginia, in 1816, — when that State was still 
the mother of Presidents, — young Thomas was trained in 
supreme devotion to her name and history. Every fibre of his 
being thrilled at the contemplation of her achievements in war 
and peace. Within a short distance from his birthplace lay 
Yorktown, where was won the last decisive battle for American 
independence. Soldiers who had served under Washington 
from Valley Forge to final victory, poured into his youthful 
ears the stories of their hardships and the greatness of their 
leader. The war of 1812, in which Virginia suffered much 
desolation, had just ended. Madison was President, to be 
followed by Monroe, the fourth Virginian of the five Presi- 
dents during the first thiriy-six years of our national life. 
Marshall was Chief-Justioe, and was to hold, unrivalled, that 


eminent position till Thomas had grown to manhood. With 
an interval of only seven years, the secretaryship of State 
was filled by Virginians, till Monroe laid down the office to 
become President. William Wirt was Attorney-General for 
twelve years, — still a great name after two generations. 
It seemed impossible that the government could be carried 
on without one or more Virginians in the Cabinet; and 
the counsels of Virginians in Congress largely prevailed. 
Kobert E. Lee, trained in the same school of doctrine, 
became so blindly the slave of its traditions, that, in 1861, he 
resigned his commission in the army, though he confessed, 
when he did it, that he recognized ^^ no necessity for the state 
of things into which Virginia had been drawn." With all 
his alleged ^^ devotion to the Union, and the feeling of loyalty 
and duty of an American citizen," he could ^^ not take part 
against his native State." Thomas, ahnost alone, save 
Scott, of officers of high rank in the army, and conspicuous 
social position, remained true to his oath and his flag. Of 
the ninety-seven Virginians whose names are in the Army 
Begister for January 1, 1861, only seven of the line of the 
army are found in that for January 1, 1862. That Thomas 
was one of the seven, proves him a man of no common mould. 
This fidelity, in one so bom and reared, should have aided in 
his advancement, as time and events demonstrated his capa- 
city. But it worked rather to his detriment. Unquestionably, 
Ghrant and Sherman owed as much, for the early and constant 
recognition of their merits, to the fact that they were 
constituents and wards of representatives like Washbume and 
senators like John Sherman, as to anything they did in the 
field. In political life, too, the loyalty of Southern men was 
conspicuously rewarded. Andrew Johnson became possible 
President only because he was a Southerner. But the fact 
that Thomas was a Virginian excited, at first, groundless 
suspicion ; and afterwards delayed appreciation. There was 
no one at hand, in Washington, when honors were to be 


conferred, to remember this modest, truthful, untiring, always 
successful soldier. Wliateyer recognition came to him came 
late, and was compelled by his own soldierly devotion and 

He was fortunate in his ancestral inheritance. Descended 
on his father's side from Welsh parentage, as the name 
indicates, — from that people who, almost alone of all 
Europe, remained imconquered by the arms or arts of 
Csesar, — and, on his mother's, from those Hugu^iots of 
France who kept the faith against all consequences, it is 
easy to trace, in his mental and moral traits, as weU as in 
his physical appearance and bearing, the influence oS. such 
heredity. The mingling of tiie somewhat opposing qualities 
he drew from each — a gentle voice and manner, quick, high 
temper, imconquerable courage, inflexible will, delicate sen- 
sitiveness, a commanding sense of duty — was admirably 
harmonized into a well-rounded character. He was already 
quite mature in years and intellect wh^i, in 1836, he entered 
the Military Academy. Passing through Washington on his 
way to West Point, he called to thank Mr. Mason, his 
Kepresentative, — afterwards Secretary of the Navy, — for 
his appointment. Mr. Mason said to him: ^^No Cadet 
from our district has ever yet graduated. If you do not, I 
never want to see your face again." His career at the 
Academy was highly creditable. From twenty-sixth in rank 
at the end of the first year, he rose to be twelfth at 
graduation. He was successively cadet-corporal, sergeant, 
and lieutenant. He averaged twenty-two demerits a year. 
His traits of character and appearance, and his Virginia 
birth, brought him the nickname of George Washington. 
Assigned, at graduation, to the Third Artillery as Second 
Lieutenant, he was sent in November, 1840, to Florida, to 
take part in the closing scenes of the Seminole War. In a 
highly successful expedition, resulting in the capture of 
forty-nine Indians, he won the brevet of First Lieutenant, 


November 6, 1841, "for gallantry and good conduct/' — 
alone of all his contemporaries the recipient of sach an 
honor. His immediate commander, Captain Wade, and 
the department commander, Colonel Worth, make special 
mention of his valuable and efficient services. 

In August, 1845, he was sent to the Mexican frontier. 
He was at Corpus Christi and on the Rio Grrande till the 
battle of Monterey, in which he took part. In this action, 
General Henderson, commanding the Texas Volunteers, thus 
speaks of him: "I beg leave to compliment Lieutenant 
Thomas for the bold advance and efficient management of 
the force under his charge. When ordered to retire, he 
reloaded his piece, fired a farewell shot at the foe, and 
returned imder a shower of bullets." General Twiggs, his 
division commander, mentions him as " deserving the highest 
praise for skill and good conduct under the heaviest fire of 
the enemy." " For gallantry and meritorious conduct " here 
he won his second brevet, as Captain, to date from September 
23, 1846. He was one of the few regular officers left 
with General Taylor, when the main army, under Scott, 
advanced to the City of Mexico. In the battle of Buena 
Vista, February 22-23, 1847, he bore a still more efficient 
part. Li every report, his name is mentioned with high 
praise. Of the twenty-five killed, woimded and missing 
in the two companies of regular artillery in that battle, 
eighteen were from Thomas's company. Captain T. W. 
Sherman, — of Sherman's Flying Artillery, — his immediate 
commander, speaking of the tenacity with which the ad- 
vanced and exposed position was held, says that he found 
Lieutenant Thomas on the plateau, ^^who had been con- 
stantly engaged during the forenoon in the preservation 
of that important position ; " that he behaved nobly through- 
4>ut the action, and his coolness and firmness contributed 
not a little to the success of the day; and that he 
*^more than sustained the reputation he has long enjoyed 


in his regiment as an accurate and scientific artillerist." 
General Wool ascribes our success to the artillery, and 
expresses great admiration of five officers whom he names, — 
Thomas the junior among them, — "to whose services,*' 
he says, " we are mainly indebted for the great victory 
over more than 20,000 men. Without our artillery, we 
could not have maintained our position a single hour.** 
General Taylor also names Thomas as among those officers 
who " in every situation exhibited conspicuous skill and 
gallantry." Ripley, in his History, describes the operations 
of the artillery in great detail, and says that at a critical 
moment, when threatened by an overwhelming foe, Thomas 
kept up his fire on the advancing enemy, retreating only 
by the recoil of his pieces.^ For this battle, he was again 
brevetted, — this time as Major, — for "gallant and merito- 
rious conduct," to date from February 23, 1847. Thus, in a 
period of less than five and a half years, he had won three 
brevets, an almost unprecedented distinction in the annals of 
the army up to that time. It was not until nearly seven 
years later, December 24, 1853, that he was promoted to a 
captaincy. The citizens of his native county of Southampton, 
proud of his honorable career, in July, 1847, presented him 
a magnificent sword, in token of their appreciation of his 
" patience, firmness, fortitude and daring intrepidity." 

Meantime, he was employed on almost every kind of duty 
that falls to a subaltern : quartermaster, commissary, recruit- 
ing officer, battery commander, — in Texas, Louisiana, 
Florida and Boston. From his post at Fort Independence, 
he was detailed, April 1, 1851, as Instructor of Cavalry and 
Artillery at the Military Academy. He remained on that 
duty three years. Among those who then came under his 
instruction were many of the most distinguished officers in 
the War of the Rebellion: Slocum, Stanley, McCook, 
McPherson, Crook, Sheridan, Hood, Custis Lee, Buger, 

1 1 Ripley, 418. 


Howard, J. E. B. Stuart, and others. All of those named 
on the Union side served under him, and most of those on the 
rebel side against him, during the war. On the expiration 
of his tour of duty at West Point, he was sent May 1, 1854, 
to Fort Yuma, in Lower California, a place of absolute exile 
from all the surroundings and comforts of civilization. But 
he made his exile pleasant and profitable by the investigation 
of geography and natural history, studies which always 
fascinated him. The Museums of the Smithsonian Insti- 
tution contain many specimens of unique value from his 

Early in 1855, the army was enlarged. Of one of the 
new cavalry regiments, — the Second, now the Fifth, — 
Captain Thomas, then junior captain of artillery, was 
appointed Major. The appointment had been offered to 
Captain Braxton Bragg of the same regiment, who declined, 
as his resignation, accepted a year later, had already been 
determined upon. He is said to have recommended Thomas. 
If so, he unwittingly made amends for his subsequent 
mischief. These new cavalry regiments were the chmcest 
in the army. In no similar case were such pains taken in 
the selection of officers. Jefferson Davis was Secretary of 
War, and was chiefly responsible for the names. Sumner, 
already a veteran, was made Colonel of the First, with Joseph 
E. Johnston, Lieutenant-Colonel, and Emory and Sedgwick 
for Majors. In the Second, Albert Sidney Johnston was made 
Colonel, Robert E. Lee, Lieutenant-Colonel, and Hardee and 
Thomas, Majors. The most significant fact, however, was 
that more than two-thirds of the officers were of Southern 
birth and residence. From the Second Cavalry, twenty-four 
entered the rebel service, of whom twelve became general 
officers, Sidney Johnston and Lee holding the highest posi- 
tions from the outset. Among such professional and personal 
associations, Thomas passed the six years preceding that 
April day in 1861, which decided the fate of the republic. 


The greater part of this time he was in Texas, where every 
influence, together with his own ahnost morbid aversion to 
politics, conspired to minimize the sentiment of allegiance 
to the government, imder the anticipated change of adminis- 
tration; while the imbecility of the existing administration 
pointed ahnost inevitably to approaching dissolution. 

While thus stationed in Texas, Major Thomas sent a 
communication to the adjutant-general, dated July 7, 1857, 
when the Utah expedition under Sidney Johnston was fit- 
ting out. In it he detailed the information he had gained 
while an artillery officer at Fort Yuma, three years before, 
concerning the possible navigability of the Colorado Kiver. 
He gives the facts he had learned from careful questioning of 
the Hamok-ain, the Navajo, and the Pay-Ute Indians, which 
led him to think that the river was navigable to within one 
hundred or two hundred miles of Salt Lake City. If that 
were so, he concludes, ^^ it will be not only the most direct, 
but the most convenient and safest route to convey supplies 
to the troops stationed in Utah Territory." This letter shows 
not merely great interest in geography, as well as in his 
own profession, but it also gives evidence of an intelligent 
study of philology, as well as of close observation. In that 
self-constituted, but commanding, inner circle which, in 
every society, sits in judgment and forms a kind of court 
of appeals, Thomas had received the verdict of absolute 
approval, — so far as the army is concerned, — as early as 
1855. But, outside the army, he was little known. Even in 
so important a crisis as April and May, 1861, when he was 
so rapidly promoted, he was to the authorities at Washington 
merely a name ; though in the army, which for twenty years 
had witnessed his capacity, fidelity and power, that name was 
a synonym for whatever was most excellent in the profession 
of arms. Unfortunately, most of those who best knew him 
had deserted the cause of their country. Thus, while the 
Johnstons, and Lee, and Bragg, and Hardee — the most 


competent witnesses — were incapacitated to testify, the very 
fact that he had been their approved confidant and &iend 
now counted against him. He could not speak for himself 
except by deeds ; and what he had done was overlooked in 
the hurly-burly of the present. 

On the 1st of November, 1860, before the presidential elec- 
tion, Major Thomas left Texas on a long leave of absence, 
granted some months before. A railroad accident, from the 
effects of which he never fully recovered, compelled him to 
remain in New York City through most of the following 
winter. Those who knew, or can remember, the atmosphere 
of that city at that time, especially that breathed in the cor- 
ridors of the New York hotel at which he made his home, 
know that nowhere, even in Virginia or South Carolina, was 
secession more openly or ardently advocated. Here he saw, 
with inexpressible anxiety, the rising of the coming storm. 
He was a soldier in the fullest sense of the term. For twenty 
years he had had no thought, or wish, or capacity but to 
serve his country in his chosen profession. As State after 
State went through the form of secession, and fort after fort 
was abandoned by the administration, it began to seem to him 
as though he would soon have no coimtry to serve. His regi- 
ment had been treacherously surrendered by Twiggs to a mob 
of Texas insurgents. The remnants of it began to arrive in 
New York early in ApriL On the 10th, he received orders 
revoking the unexpired portion of his leave, and directing 
him to conduct the companies already landed to Carlisle 
Barracks, for reorganization. He cheerfully obeyed the 
order. On his way there, the guns opened against Fort 
Sumter. His answer to the challenge was immediate and 
significant. On his arrival at Carlisle, he sought a magis- 
trate, before whom, with the profoundest solemnity, he 
renewed his oath of allegiance to the United States of 
America. On the 20th, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert E. Lee 
left Arlington for Richmond and entered at once upon the 


service of Yirgmia, though his resignation from the Army of 
the United States was not yet accepted. On the 25th, 
Major Thomas was promoted to be lieutenant-colonel to fill 
the vacancy made by Lee's defection. A week later, on the 
3d of May, he was promoted to be colonel, in place of 
Sidney Johnston, who had forwarded his resignation from 
Califomia, and was stealthily making his way overland to 
Texas, to join his fortunes with that State, when he found 
that his own State of Kentuchy remained stead&st in the 

On the 27th of April, the Department of Pennsylvania 
was created, with General Sobert Patterson as commander. 
In the organization of troops in this department, Colonel 
Thomas, on the 29th of May, was assigned to the command of 
the First Brigade consisting of part of his own regiment and 
three regiments of three months militia from Pennsylvania. 
On the 12th of June, he led the advance to the Potomac 
River at Williamsport. On the 2d of July, he crossed into 
Virginia at the head of his brigade, where he encoimtered 
and helped put to flight a force of Virginia troops under 
Stonewall Jackson and J. E. B. Stuart, aggregating 2,600 
men. Thus his first encounter with the enemy during the 
Bebellion was in his own State, and was entirely successful 
Though but slight resistance was made, all the moral effects 
of victory were with the Union troops. Colonel Thomas's 
admirable bearing is spoken of in all the reports, and was 
never forgotten by any who saw it. Among the soldiers then 
in the ranks was Samuel J. Randall, since Speaker of the 
House of Representatives of the United States. On the 8d 
of August this private soldier wrote to his old friend, Thomas 
A. Scott, just appointed Assistant Secretary of "War : " I 
notice that the Grovemment is now considering the appoint- 
ment of proper persons to be brigadier-generals. In the 
name of God, let them be men fully competent. . . . [For 
nearly three months] we have been under command of 


Colonel Greorge H. Thomas. . . • He is thorouglily compe- 
tent to be a brigadier-general, has the confidence of every 
man in his command for the reason that they recognize 
and appreciate capacity. . . . This appointment would give 
renewed vigor and courage to this section of the army. I 
am, as perhaps you know, a private in the First City Cavalry 
of Philadelphia, and I never saw Colonel Thomas until I 
saw him on parade, and our intercourse has only been such 
as exists between a colonel and one of his soldiers ; hence, 
you see my recommendation comes from pure motives, and 
entirely free from social or political considerations. . . • You 
will do the country a service by giving my letter a serious 
consideration.'' ^ But it required more than the recommen- 
dation of a private soldier, even like Samuel J. Eandall, to 
secure such an appointment. When the first list came out, 
among the thiriy-eight appointed as Brigadier-Grenerals of 
Volimteers, to date from May 17, 1861, were Fitz John 
Porter, Patterson's Adjutant-General; Charles P. Stone, a 
brigade commander ; George A. McCall, of the Pennsylvania 
militia; and Charles S. Hamilton, Colonel of a Wisconsin 
regiment, all of whom were in that column ; to say nothing 
of men like Sigel, and Prentiss, and McClemand, and 
Blenker, elsewhere ; but the name of Colonel Thomas, who 
had done more than any other there, was lacking. It is 
worthy of mention, also, that when, after the disaster at Bull 
Bun, General Patterson was made the scapegoat for that 
catastrophe, Thomas imhesitatingly took his part in the 
controversy that ensued. 

Early in August General Robert Anderson was assigned to 
the command of the Department of the Ctunberland. He in- 
sisted on the appointment of Colonel Thomas ; and it was only 
in consequence of his urgency that, on the 17th of August, 
the latter was made Brigadier-General of Volimteers, and 
assigned to that department, with which he was identified till 

1 Van Home's Life of Thomas, 37. 


the close of the war. He stood 55th in the list, though in 
the old army he had ranked every one of those who became 
his superiors in the Volunteer service. On the 6th of 
September he reported for duty at Louisville, and from that 
day till the last soldier was mustered out, did not have or 
seek an hour's intermission from active duty. The first work 
in his new department was the organization and instruction 
of the rawest of raw recruits from Kentucky and Tennessee. 
No task could be more irksome than the discipline of these 
wild mountaineers. Every one of them deemed himself 
already amply able to fight, and each as good as any other, 
officers included. It was proper work for the drill sergeant, 
not for the general. But he gave himself to it with a patience, 
assiduity and f aithfuhiess which soon transformed the uncouth 
refugees into soldiers unsurpassed for endurance, courage and 
energy. He had hardly reached Louisville before he found 
that the rebel State Guard, under the leadership of Buckner, 
Breckinridge and others, was planning an encampment at 
Lexington, ostensibly for drill, really to seize the arms in the 
arsenal at Frankfort and subvert the State government. 
Their purposes were similar to those of the militia at Camp 
Jackson, in St. Louis, which was broken up by General Lyon 
in May previous. Without orders or advice. General Thomas 
silently marched a regiment to the Fair Grround the night 
before the day of rendezvous. Thus without collision, he 
defeated the scheme. Breckinridge and his followers fled 
the next night. This foresight and promptitude gained a 
moral victory and unquestionably prevented an effort — most 
likely a successful effort — at bloody revolution in the capital 
of Kentuciy. It was all done so quietly that nobody then 
realized the importance of the service thus rendered. It is 
only now, in the light of history and of all the surrounding 
and subsequent circumstances, that its value is seen. Grreat 
reputations have sometimes been won for less useful services. 
From the outset, it had been the purpose of the government 


to send an expedition into East Tennessee, to help free that 
beleaguered and persecuted region from rebel oppression. 
Delay followed delay, till the coming of winter put a stop to 
further effort. General Thomas had moved as far as Somerset, 
in southeastern Kentuchy , — making only seventy-five miles 
in eighteen days, — when, at daylight on the 19th of January, 
1862, at Logan's Cross Roads, about twelve miles from 
Ctunberland River, his outposts were driven in by the advance 
of nine rebel regiments of infantry, two battalions of cavahy, 
and two batteries of artillery. It was a cold, rainy, cheerless 
morning. He had with him five regiments of infantry, a 
battery, and a regiment of cavalry. As the cavalry vedettes 
were attacked, the colonel of the advance regiment of infantry, 
after ordering the long roll beaten, rode back to Thomas's 
headquarters, to ask what he should do. When Thomas 
reached the field, soon after, he foimd the two regiments 
which formed the front Une slowly falling back, their 
ammunition nearly exhausted. His presence at once gave 
confidence and steadiness to the' men, who needed only a 
leader. Two other regiments soon arrived, which, with the 
battery, restored the line. For some hours the %hting 
continued without much advantage to either side. About 10 
o'clock, hearing of the approach of two additional regiments, 
Greneral Thomas ordered a charge by the 9th Ohio — a 
German regiment well drilled in bayonet exercise — on the 
rebel left. About the same time. General Zollicoffer, 
commanding the rebel advance, was killed. The result was 
instantaneous and overwhelming. The entire Confederate 
line was thrown into confusion and began a disorderly retreat, 
which lasted till night. The demoralized remnant reached 
the fortifications on the banks of the Cumberland, from which 
they had marched the evening before confident of the rout 
or capture of Thomas's isolated regiments. The pursuit was 
relentless. By dark, the works were surrounded. During 
the night, such as could, escaped across the river, leaving 


behind guns and all their transportation and supplies. The 
rebel force outnumbered the Union troops nearly two to one. 
They were commanded by Greneral George B. Crittenden, 
who had been especially assigned to that post by Jefferson 
Davis. The Union loss was 89 killed, and 207 woimded. 
The rebel, 192 killed, 309 wounded, and 167 prisoners, 
besides 12 guns and much property. The Confederate force 
was so thoroughly demoralized that it never came together 
again as a separate organization. Greneral Crittenden's 
career was ended. General Sidney Johnston, at Bowling 
Grreen one hundred miles west, when he heard of the disaster, 
wrote to Richmond: ^^If my right is thus broken, as stated, 
East Tennessee is open to invasion, or if the plan of the 
enemy be a combined movement upon Nashville, it is in 
jeopardy. . . . The country must now be roused to make 
the greatest effort they will be called on to make during the 
contest. . . . Our people do not comprehend the magnitude 
of the danger that threatens." ^ 

To the authorities at Washington, the news of the victory 
came as a burst of sunshine after a long and stormy season. 
It was the first real triumph since the dreadful day at Bull 
Run. Stanton had not been Secretary of "War a week when 
the glad tidings reached him. In an exuberant order, he 
returned the thanks of the President ^^ to the gallant officers 
and soldiers who won that victory," and promised that, 
when the official reports were received, "the military and 
personal valor displayed in battle will be acknowledged and 
rewarded in a fitting manner."^ This promise, so far as 
Thomas was concerned, was never fulfilled. His name was 
not mentioned in orders then or afterward. Three regimental 
commanders, were, indeed, made brigadier-generals, one of 
whom had so acted that General Thomas ever after refused 
to hold any intercourse with him. Even the commissions 
that were granted did not bear date from the battle for which 
1 7W.R.,844. «7W.R., 102. 


they were conferred ; wliile the organizer and leader, wliose 
presence and conduct alone made victory possible, was forgot- 
ten or overlooked. 

Immediately following this brilliant victory came the move- 
ment against Fort Donelson, and Grrant's great triumph there. 
The East Tennessee expedition was recalled and the Army of 
the Cumberland marched to Nashville, and thence to the 
field of Shiloh. In this last movement Thomas's division 
was in the rear, and did not reach the Tennessee River till 
the battle was over. Later, when Halleck took the field, he 
so reorganized the forces that Thomas was placed in com- 
mand of the right wing, made up of his own division and the 
bulk of Grant's Shiloh army. He thus, practically, super- 
seded Grant, who was made second in conunand, a position 
that gave him neither power nor responsibility. Undoubt- 
edly, here began that misunderstanding, or lack of good 
understanding, between the two generals which was never 
cleared up, and which operated greatly to the detriment of 
the service. They ought to have been the closest of friends. 
If Thomas, rather than Sherman, had been Grant's chosen 
lieutenant in the great campaigns which followed, it is im- 
possible not to believe that their results would have been far 
more effective. But Thomas had not the arts of the cour- 
tier ; and Grant brooded over the slights which Halleck had 
put upon him, and for which Thomas was made the vicarious 

On the 25th of April, 1862, on the reconunendation of 
Buell and Halleck, Thomas was made Major-General of Vol- 
unteers to fill the vacancy caused by the death of C. F. Smith. 
In June, after the occupancy of Corinth, he was relieved at 
his own desire from the command of the five divisions 
of the right wing, and with his old division rejoined Buell's 
army. From the 1st of July to the Ist of October, that 
army underwent as arduous, and, as it then seemed to them, 
as purposeless hardships as ever fell to the lot of soldiers. 


LeaTing Corinth with the avowed purpose of occupying 
Chattanooga, it found itself, on the 1st of October, at 
Louisville, three hundred and fifty miles in the rear of its 
original destination. Here the command of the army was con- 
ferred on Thomas.^ His answer was : "General Buell's prep- 
arations have been completed to move against the enemy, and 
I dieref ore respectfully ask that he may be retained in com- 
mand. My position is very embarrassing, not being so well 
informed as I should be as the commander of this army, on 
the assimiption of such responsibility." ^ General Buell was 
accordingly continued in command. Under him was fought, 
on the 8th of October, the important and successful battle 
of Perryville, in which the troops with Thomas were not en- 
gaged. On the 80th, Buell was superseded by Bosecrans. 
It is not easy to see why, if Thomas was the fit man to super- 
sede Buell on the 24th of September, another should have 
been designated on the 30th of October. But he accepted 
the choice loyally, not without a protest, however, against 
having a junior in rank placed over him ; ^ a protest nullified 
by the arbitrary antedating of Rosecrans's appointment as 
Major-General, from its original day, August 16, to the 
21st of March. Under its new commander, the army re- 
turned to Tennessee, the leading division reaching Nashville 
on the 7th of November. Thomas, who during the early 
summer had made himseU thoroughly familiar with all the 
approaches to Chattanooga, advocated an immediate advance, 
at least to the Cumberland mountains, and presented a plan 
for the movement, substantially that which was followed so 
successfully six months later.^ But it was received in silence. 
No attempt at advance was made till the end of December, 
when the enemy were found concentrated and fortified at 

In the bloody and long continued battle of Stone's Biver, 
fought near that place in the closing hours of 1862 and the 

1 23 W. p., 689. « 25., 656. » B., 667. * 30 W. R., 61. 


opening days of 1863, Thomas commanded the centre. His 
whole force consisted of five divisions; but only two were 
with him during the first day's fight, and a single additional 
brigade joined him the second day. Within an hour after 
the opening of the battle at daybreak of December 31, the 
whole right wing of the Union army was driven from the field, 
half of it in dire confusion. On the action of Thomas's two 
divisions then depended the fate of the day. As Sheridan, 
whose division joined Thomas's right, and who maintained 
his organization unbroken, was driven back by overwhelming 
numbers, — his ammunition exhausted, his three brigade com- 
manders dead on the field, and nearly one-third of his men 
killed or wounded, — Thomas met the shock with unmoved 
firmness. He had sent forward a brigade to relieve the pres- 
sure upon Sheridan ; and, when this was also forced back, 
the rest of his line was ready and held its ground. His 
whole force in action numbered about 11,000 men. His loss 
was 2,678, more than twenty-four per cent. One of his bri- 
gades lost over forty per cent. Alone of all the troops in 
line that morning, except the division that joined his left, he 
was unshaken by any assault; and continued to hold the 
ground he had chosen till the enemy, three days later, aban- 
doned the field. It was a brigade of his, also, which, on the 
afternoon of January 2, charged across the river, captured 
a battery, and so shattered Breckinridge's division, which 
had been sent against Bosecrans's left flank, that Bragg felt 
compelled to order the retreat of his whole army, — leaving 
the Union forces in possession of the field. 

Not merely in the storm of the battle was Thomas firm 
and immovable. In the anxious and sorrowful council 
of war held by the commanding general on the night of 
December 31, amidst the wreck of the Union forces, when 
the question was discussed of maintaining the ground, or 
of retreating to Nashville or elsewhere, his mind was equally 
fixed. During most of the discussion he was &st asleep. 


When waked with the question of whether he could cover 
the rear of the retiring army, his sole answer was, ^' This 
army can't retreat," and he went to sleep again. 

It was near the end of June before the advance from 
Murfreesboro' began. By a series of most skilful manoeuvres, 
the enemy, in the space of two weeks, was forced across the 
Tennessee River into Chattanooga. Another halt of six 
weeks followed. On the 16th of August began the move- 
ment which, a month later, culminated in the battle of 
Chickamauga. In this battle, by the universal testimony 
of friends and foes, Thomas's heroic and inspiring leadership 
saved the army from final destruction. But, what is of equal 
consequence, his action at the very opening of the contest, by 
his unordered and unexpected assault on the enemy's right, 
prevented the accomplishment of Bragg's cherished purpose 
of placing his own army between Eosecrans and Chattanooga, 
and so cutting off all communication between the Union force 
and its only base of supplies. This early collision was acci- 
dental and unanticipated. But the promptness with which 
Thomas took advantage of the unlocked for collision, and 
turned it to good account, showed great generalship. The 
same great generalship marks every stage of the encounter 
on his part General Grarfield's telegraphic report, written 
at 8.40 on the night of September 20, when fresh from 
the sight of the heroic defence, shows us the final result 
in a few strong words: ^^ General Thomas has fought a 
most terrific battle and has damaged the enemy badly. . . . 
Longstreet's Virginians have got their bellies fulL ... I 
believe we can now crown the whole battle with victory." ^ 
And Mr. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, who was also 
on the ground, telegraphed to Washington: "Our troops 
were as immovable as the rocks they stood on. . . . Thomas 
seemed to have filled every soldier with his own unconquerable 
firmness."^ When, at dark, under orders from General 
1 60 W. E., 146. « R., 1 W-196. 


Bosecrans in Cliattanooga, the army fell back to BossTilIe, 
every man in it knew and felt that Thomas was, indeed, ^ the 
Bock of Chickamauga." 

It has sometimes been intimated that the Western armies 
were successful because they did not encounter such troops 
as Lee commanded in Virginia. Comparisons of this kind 
are of little value, since, in each army, Eastern and Western 
troops were intermingled. When Longstreet's corps, which 
had been counted the flower of Lee's army, on the afternoon 
of September 2Q, — led by such division commanders as 
Hood and Kershaw, and others equally gallant, — after the 
rout and dispersion of Bosecrans's right wing, surged up 
against the semi-circle of men of whom Thomas was the 
centre, with ranks thinned, and ammunition reduced, with 
few cannon and no reserves, everything gone but manhood 
and the ground they stood on, — it recoiled from those 
invincible lines, as completely baffled and broken as when, 
nearly three months earlier, the remnant of Pickett's men, 
mowed down by the fire of a hundred guns, and assaulted 
front and flank, drifted back from the heights of Cemetery 
Bidge and gave up the field of Gettysburg. Nor, later still, 
did the same troops meet any better success in their attempt 
to capture Knoxville. These were the only occasions when 
any of Lee's troops encountered the armies of the West. 
The result was not encouraging. Longstreet's loss, killed, 
wounded and missing, on the 20th of September, was 7,866 
out of 22,882 engaged; nearly thirty-five per cent, of the 
number taken into action. 

A month after Chickamauga, on the 20th of October, 
General Th(»nas superseded General Bosecrans. He accepted 
the command reluctantly ; not through any false modesty as 
to his own capacity or fitness, but because he believed that 
Bosecrans ought to be permitted to work out his plans for 
the supplying of his army. This, however, was not left to 
any option. Both the War Department and General Ghrant 


were of opinion that, at all events, Rosecrans should be 
relievecL On the 30th of September, the Secretary of War 
had written to Mr. Dana: "The merit of General Thomas 
and the debt of gratitude the nation owes to his valor and 
skill are fully appreciated here, and I wish you to tell him 
so. It was not my fault that he was not in chief command 
months ago." ^ He was thus, for the first time, in a position 
to show, on a large scale, his capacity as a general. But the 
post was soon made far from independent. Simultaneously 
with his assignment, GrenenJ Ghrant was made Commander 
of the Military Division of the Mississippi, and came to 
Chattanooga to give his personal oversight to matters there. 
Thus, while Thomas was held to all the responsibilities at a 
critical juncture, he was so directly under the eye of his 
superior as to impede, or repress, proper freedom of action, 
especially in view of the known prejudice entertained by 
Grant. His situation was much like that of General 
Meade, after Grant, as General-in-Chief, took the field in 
Virginia. Before Grant's arrival, Thomas, as the result of 
the observations of General W. F. Smith, had elaborated a 
plan for shortening the wagon haul between Chattanooga 
and Bridgeport to only eight miles, by using Brown's Ferry, 
hitherto held by the enemy, and by calling up to Wauhatchie 
a part of the troops sent from Virginia under General Hooker. 
The great problem at Chattanooga was how to get meat and 
drink. This Thomas soon solved, so that, on the 31st of 
October, he joyfully announced to Halleck : " We can easily 
subsist ourselves now, and will soon be in good condition." ^ 
The results of this plan were equal to a great victory, and 
success was gained by a Union loss of only 82 killed and 
344 wounded, the greater part of the loss being met in a 
night attack made on Hooker, in Lookout Valley, in which 
our late associate. General Underwood, received his serious 
and disabling wound. 

1 62 W. R., 940. « 64 W: R., 41- 


If the battle of Chickamauga displayed Thomas's quality 
in defensive action, Missionary Ridge showed his offensive 
ability in an equally high degree. The opening of this great 
action was delayed four days to enable Sherman's belated 
columns to reach the designated spot. On the 18th of 
November, orders had been issued "for attacking the 
enemy's position on Missionary Bidge by Saturday [the 
2l8t] at daylight." ^ Thomas's duty was to " co-operate with 
Sherman," by having his troops well concentrated on his left 
flank, "toward the northern end of Missionary Bidge."* 
The brunt of the action was to be borne by Sherman. As 
he was still far in the rear, the execution of these orders was 
postponed. On the night of the 22d, a deserter from the enemy 
reported Bragg as retreating. Early on the morning of the 
23d, Thomas was ordered " to ascertain at once the truth or 
falsity " of his story.^ Under this order, he advanced with 
the two divisions of Wood and Sheridan, drove the enemy 
from Orchard Knob " in the most gallant style," ^ and thus 
gained a commanding position, half way to the Bidge, which 
enabled him, after Sherman's repulse, on the 25th to carry 
the steep heights in his front. He showed his usual timeli- 
ness of action, by " having done on the 23d what," Grrant 
says, " was intended for the 24th." ^ The truth or falsity 
of the deserter's story could easily have been ascertained by 
the reconnoissance of a single brigade, or less. It was the 
ample manner in which the preliminary work was done 
under his provident direction which secured the final triumph. 
It is generally represented that the battle was carried out 
exactly as planned by General Grrant. Nothing could be 
more unjust either to Grant or Thomas than such represen- 
tation. Grrant's plan was most admirable and skilfuL He 
meant to turn Bragg's right by sending Sherman's army 
against it, on the north end of the Bidge; and then, by 
rapidly following up his advantage, gain the whole C!hicka- 

1 55 W. R., 31. ^ lb. 8 U., 32, 41. * ift., 32-83. » lb., 33. 


manga Valley, at Bragg's rear, and so cnt off his retreat. 
The work assigned to Thomas was to hold Bragg's centre, 
along the summit of the Ridge. General Thomas, in his 
report, modestly says : ^' The original plan of operations was 
somewhat modified to meet and take the best advantage of 
emergencies, which necessitated material modifications of the 
plan. It is believed, however, that the original plan, had it 
been carried out, could not possibly have led to more success- 
ful results." ^ It could hardly have led to a more decisive 
victo^ ; but if Sherman and Hooker had succeeded, as Grrant 
meant they should, in gaining Bragg's rear, the results might 
have been more successful, since the greater part of Bragg's 
army might thus have been captured. Ghrant never meant, 
and never ordered, an assault upon Missionary Ridge by the 
Army of the Cumberland. 

On the morning of the 25th of November, four days later 
than Grant had planned for. General Sherman was lying with 
his troops across the north end of Missionary Ridge. His 
whole command, four divisions and a brigade, numbered 
24,915 men. With these at his call, he made an unsuccess- 
ful assault upon the rebel lines, manned by 18,200 men. His 
losses amounted to 202 killed, 1,094 woimded, 288 missing ; 
a total of 1,584. The rebel loss in his front was 142 killed, 
952 wounded, 216 prisoners ; a total of 1,810. The force 
with which, in the afternoon, Thomas assaulted the face of 
the Ridge, amounted to 24,536 men. Opposed to him, in 
their fortified works on the summit, and in the double line of 
rifle-pits at the foot and half way up the Ridge, were 19,388 
men. The rebel loss in this successful assault was 221 killed, 
1,228 wounded, 8,920 prisoners ; a total of 5,869. The 
Union loss was 416 killed, 2,884 wounded, 20 missing ; a 
total of 8,270. It was the work of one hour and five 
minutes from the firing of the dignal guns. Sherman's loss, 
killed and wounded, was less than seven per cent. ; Thomas's 



more than thirteen per cent, of the forces engaged. The 
rebel loss, killed and wounded, in Sherman's front, was six 
per cent. ; in Thomas's, eight per cent, of the forces engaged. 
Both Grant and Sherman represent that the lines in front of 
Thomas were weakened, to enable the rebels to mass against 
Sherman. This assertion is clearly disproved by the official 
records, which locate every part and movement of the rebel 
forces. The troops that operated against Sherman were those 
which, the day and night before, evacuated Lookout Moun- 
tain, and those which had been in Chickamauga and Chatta- 
nooga valleys. The forces on Missionary Bidge, in front of 
Thomas, was not weakened by a single man during the three 
days of preparation and combat, except as they were killed, 
wounded or captured by Thomas. In his movement against 
the north end of the Bidge, Sherman had more men under 
his command than Thomas had for his movement ; and to 
Sherman was assigned the task of making the successful 
assault. The number of men he had to encounter was less 
than that which confronted Thomas. General Bragg, in his 
report, says the position carried by the Army of the Cumber- 
land ^^ was one which ought to have been held by a line of 
skirmishers against any assaulting column." ^ 

The charge by the Army of the Cumberland up the steep 
slope of Missionary Bidge was, indeed, unordered and unex- 
pected by the commanding general. The men themselves 
began it by an uncontrollable impulse. In that respect it 
was not the work of any general. But if those men had 
been trained under a general of less heroic mould, would they 
have undertaken, or executed, an enterprise so hazardous as 
to be almost impossible? It was the confident spirit with 
which General Thomas had inspired them which made the 
impulse unconquerable and the action successful. To quote 
Mr. Dana again: '^The storming of the Bidge by our 
troops was one of the greatest miracles in military history. 

1 55 W. R., 666. 


. • • Neither Grant nor Thomas intended it. . • . The 
unaccountable spirit of the troops bore them bodily up those 
impracticable steeps, over the bristling rifle-pits on the crest, 
and the thirty cannon enfilading every gully. • . . The 
generals caught the inspiration of the men, and were ready 
themselves to undertake impossibilities." ^ Even while the 
shouts of victory were still filling the air, the shrill whistle 
of the first steamboat, loaded with supplies, coming up the 
reopened river, told the story of future plenty, after the long 
starvation; and added another proof, if one were needed, 
to the willing minds of his enthusiastic soldiers, that their 
commander could feed as well as fight them. It was the 
final test alike of his greatness in battle and his providence 
in the care of them. 

When, on the 8d of March, 1864, Grrant was made 
Lieutenant-General, it was natural that he should secure the 
assignment of Sherman as his successor in the conunand of 
the Military Division of the Mississippi. Thus Thomas was 
again placed under command, not merely of his junior in 
rank, but of one who had served under him during the 
advance on Corinth. But he entered as heartily upon the 
work of the new campaign as though he himself were com- 
manding general. The Confederate Army, now under Greneral 
Joseph E. Johnston, lay at Dalton, thirty miles southeast of 

On the 28th of February, Thomas submitted to Greneral 
Grant, then commanding the Military Division, a proposition 
based on a reconnoissance from which he had just returned, 
for a movement with his own army against the enemy, which, 
he believed, would overcome all opposition as far, at least, as 
Atlanta.^ His first move, in the plan he submitted, was 
identical with that afterward unsuccessfully attempted by 
General Sherman: that is, to hold Johnston at Dalton 

1 56 W. R., 69. 

s 68 W. B., 489; G. W. 1 Sap., Thomas's Report, 197, 201-202. 


by a demonstration at Buzzard Roost, and by a rapid and 
secret movement through Snake Creek Crap, with the bulk of 
his army, seize Kesaca, cut the rebel communications and then 
overthrow the enemy. That such a movement would have 
been successful, nobody who carefully studies the physical 
features of the country and the situation of things at the 
time can doubt. Polk's corps and a division from Mississippi 
had not yet joined Johnston, and would have been entirely cut 
off from making the junction. Sherman borrowed this plan, 
but bungled in carrying it out. Instead of throwing the 
bulk of his army through the Gap upon Besaca as Thomas 
intended, he held most of it about Buzzard Boost, and along 
the inaccessible palisades to its right and left. Then he sent 
less than a quarter part through the Gap. This quarter, 
under McPherson, finding the task more hazardous and of 
greater magnitude than had been anticipated, instead of 
seizing Besaca returned to the Crap, fortified it, and waited 
for re-enforcements. The whole scheme was thus revealed 
to Johnston, who, finding the road still open, prudently and 
safely withdrew. A bloody and indecisive battle of two 
days followed, and Johnston again withdrew without loss of 
men or material except such as were destroyed in the fight. 
Had General Thomas's scheme been properly carried out, 
Johnston's army ought, by every rule of warfare, to have 
been entirely cut off from its base, and scattered in disorder 
through the inhospitable mountains of northern Georgia and 
the western Carolinas, within one week after the opening of 
the campaign. Sherman's obstinate determination to gain 
for his own old and smaller army all the glory of the anti- 
cipated triumph, alone prevented the consummation of so 
decisive a result. Of the combined aggregate of 100,000 men 
under his command, McPherson had 25,000 and Schofield 
14,000; while Thomas had 61,000, — nearly two thirds of 
the whole. Yet each of these separate armies was treated as 
on the same footing, though when hard work was to be done 


the figures show that most of it fell on Thomas. His loss in 
killed and wonnded during the campaign, prudent and saving 
of life as he always was, amoimted to thirty-two per cent, of 
his original force ; while McPherson's was twenty-six per 
cent., and Schofield's less than sixteen. 

The only successful assault made upon the enemy's lines 
was by Thomas's old corps, — the Fourteenth, — at the battle 
of Jonesborough, on the 1st of September, resulting in the 
utter rout of the rebels, and the capture of Govan's brigade. 
That night Atlanta was abandoned, and the next morning 
the city was surrendered to the Twentieth Corps. The great 
campaign ended, as that of Halleck against Corinth more 
than two years before had ended, with the occupation of the 
abandoned city. But there was no diminution of courage or 
enterprise in the rebel army. During this campaign. General 
Thomas's army participated in all the battles, except that of 
the 22d of July, in which McPherson was killed. From all 
share in this it was withheld by General Sherman, on the 
expressed ground that ^' if any assistance were rendered by 
either of the other armies, the Army of the Tennessee would 
be jealous." 1 All day long, the Army of the Cumberland, 
under Thomas, lay within hearing of that desperate encoun- 
ter, and in sight of its smoke, — close to the fortifications of 
Atlanta, held mainly by Georgia militia, — longing and 
wondering for the word which should send them over the 
works, and through the beleaguered city, upon the rear of 
the force so vehemently assailing the Tennessee army under 
Logan. The word never came. The enemy withdrew into 
the city, which they held for six weeks longer. The Army 
of the Tennessee was spared the infliction of that pang, 
which, to General Sherman's fancy, could not be assuaged 
even by the capture of the town, or the overthrow of the 

General Thomas, on this campaign, shared with the other 

^ 2 Sherman's Memoizs, 82. 


commanders in the battle of Resaca, the assault on Kenesaw, 
and the engagements of Ezra Church and Jonesborough. At 
New Hope Church, Pickett's Mill, Kolb's Farm, Marietta, 
Vining's Station and Peach Tree Creek, his army fought 
unaided. At Peach Tree Creek, on the 20th of July, Hood 
signalized his assumption of command by a most determined 
and persistent attack upon a part of Thomas's force, while 
in the act of crossing the Creek. The assault was made 
substantially by the same force that, two days later, fell 
upon McPherson. It was even more signally repulsed. The 
attack fell mainly upon five divisions, — three of the Twentieth 
Corps, and one each of the Fourth and Fourteenth. General 
Thomas was at the very front when the assault began. He 
aided personally in arranging the lines and placing the guns. 
Hood never fought with greater desperation, or was more 
decisively repulsed. The Union loss was over 1,800 ; that 
of the rebels was estimated at 7,000. To this most spirited 
engagement, in which as many men were engaged ajs in that 
of July 22d, and the results of which were equally impor- 
tant. General Sherman makes only the faintest allusion in his 
report. In his Memoirs, he dismisses it with about the same 
number of lines as he gives pages to the latter, — in which 
the Union loss was less than 2,000, and the rebel loss 
estimated at 10,000. It is hardly to be wondered at, that, 
with such historians, General Thomas has failed to receive 
just recognition. The publication of the Official Records will 
alone afford means of learning the truth. Meantime, a 
whole generation has grown up, whose chief sources of infor- 
mation about the great events in which he bore so leading a 
part are the partial and imperfect accounts given by Grant 
and Sherman ; Grrant, misled by those to whom he entrusted 
the collection and arrangement of the records ; Sherman, by 
his own prejudice, and his amazing indifference to historic 

Soon after the occupancy of Atlanta by the Union forces, 


General Thomas proposed to General Sherman to take his 
army and march to the sea.^ This suggestion was declined, 
as that for the movement through Snake Creek Crap in the 
early spring had been. Instead, on the 29th of September, 
Thomas was sent back to Tennessee, with only two divisions 
of infantry, to oversee the petty task of expelling the guerrilla 
band of Forrest, who was playing havoc in that State. The 
work was speedily accomplished, and General Thomas pre- 
pared to return to Atlanta, where he had left his personal 
effects, his headquarters and most of his staff. But when 
Sherman finally determined to lead the army to the sea him- 
self, he ordered Thomas to remain in the rear, — soon to be- 
come the only front of battle. Selecting for his own use the 
two largest of Thomas's corps, numbering about 80,000 
infantry, and all his mounted cavalry, more than 5,000, 
Sherman left, to defend Tennessee, his two weakest corps, — 
together numbering about 22,000 infantry with 4,000 dis- 
mounted cavalry. These two corps were of separate armies, 
and had never operated together, except that each had served 
on the Atlanta campaign. How, at last, with a noble rem- 
nant of the Sixteenth Corps, imder A. J. Smith, and the newly 
organized and remounted cavalry, under General Wilson, he 
welded them all, in an incredibly short time, into a powerful 
and homogeneous army, and at Nashville destroyed the force 
which Sherman with nearly three times the number had 
failed to overthrow, has before been told.^ 

This battle of Nashville was the last, as the battle of Mill 
Spring was the first, of the great victories in the southwest. 
In each. General Thomas was in chief command. The plan 
and execution of both were his. As they were the only bat- 
tles for which he alone bo^ the sole responsibility, his chief 
claim to generalship must rest upon them. Without going 

1 Van Hornets life of Thomas, 255. 

^ Colonel Stone's acoonnts of the bathes of Franklin and Nashville wiU be 
pnblished in this series of Papers of the Military Historical Society. — Editob. 


into a detailed analysis, it is enough to say that, in each, 
he annihilated his opponent. In the first, he was consider- 
ably outnumbered ; in the last, his own slight superiority in 
numbers was more than offset by the strongly fortified position 
of the enemy. In the first he changed his tactics, at the criti- 
cal moment, from defensive to offensive, with striking success ; 
in the last, he was on the offensive from beginning to end. 
The impression that the enemy did not fight with spirit 
and determination at Nashville is not sustained by the facts. 
It is true, the loss of life was less than in many other battles 
not so persistently fought. This argues the greater skill on 
his part, in the planning and execution of the work, so as to 
produce decisive results with comparatively little bloodshed. 
The capture of over 10,000 prisoners, — nearly one-third the 
enemy's whole force, — with seventy-two guns, is, I think, 
unprecedented during the War of the Rebellion, in an open 
field fight, between nearly equal numbers, and where the 
enemy had command of more than one line of retreat. The 
captures at Fort Donelson and Vicksburg were of fortified 
places, so completely invested that escape was impossible. 
Not even Sheridan, in the Valley or at Five Forks, won a 
more overwhelming victory than Thomas at Nashville, or 
showed greater energy and vigor in assault or pursuit ; and 
the preponderance of numbers was decidedly greater in 
Sheridan's case. 

It is true, Thomas did not completely cut off Hood after 
the battle, as Grant did Lee after Petersburg. But all the 
circumstances were widely different. When Grant's pursuit 
began, he certainly outnumbered the enemy more than two to 
one ; and a large part of his force was already well advanced 
beyond Lee's right flank. He had choice of several roads 
parallel to the enemy's line of retreat; whatever streams 
he had to cross were fordable, and it was warm and bright 
spring weather. Thomas, on the contrary, had but a single 
line of pursuit, which the enemy had already desolated ; he 


had at least two formidable streams to cross before reaching 
the Tennessee Biver. It was midwinter and the weather 
was freezing cold ; his pursuing force was scarcely superior 
to that of the enemy in numbers, and his pontoniers were 
untrained and soon became benumbed in the icy streams. 
Besides that, his most promising plan for the capture of 
Hood's army came to nought, through causes entirely beyond 
his controL He had sent by rail immediately after the bat- 
tle, through Stevenson and Decatur, a sufficient force under 
General Steedman, his most energetic division commander, 
to occupy the south bank of the Tennessee to confront Hood 
as he should cross, and compel his surrender. To the 
success of such a scheme every hour was vital ; and if, by 
an appearance of dilatoriness in immediate pursuit, he could 
persuade Hood to delay a little, the chances of Steedman's 
success would be greatly increased. Steedman was detained 
at Murfreesboro', through what he denounced as ^^ the crim- 
inal negligence, incompetency and indifference of a portion 
of the railroad employes," ^ nearly forty-eight hours. On the 
27th his whole force was across the river, within striking 
distance of Hood's place of crossing, but it was just too late. 
The main rebel army was already over, and the rear guard 
crossed that night and made good its escape. Steedman's 
small cavalry force overtook the trains, and on the 31st of 
December destroyed over 800 wagons and 78 pontoon boats,, 
besides capturing many prisoners. But for the unaccountable 
delay at Murfreesboro', there is every reason to believe that 
Hood would have been compelled to surrender his whole 
force, one hundred and twenty-five miles from the battle- 
field, ten days after the fight. 

The head of Thomas's pursuing column was at the 

Tennessee Biver on the morning of December 28,. having 

made that distance in eleven days, with fighting every day, 

through the very worst winter weather. In the pursuit from 



Petersburg to Appomattox, the head of Grant's army led by 
the tireless Sheridan also fought every day, and marched 
seventy-five miles in seven days. The world is justly full 
of praise and wonder at the extraordinary energy shown 
in that relentless pursuit. Yet Thomas's pursuit was more 
rapid, the natural obstacles to be overcome far greater than 
any Grant encountered, and the resistance offered by Hood 
fully equal to that made by Lee. The losses in each case 
tell that part of the story. From the 29th of March till 
Lee's surrender, Grant lost a little less than 10,000 men, 
about nine per cent, of the number actually engaged. The 
loss in Thomas's army from the 15th to the 28th of December 
was about 5,000, over twelve per cent, of the number actually 
engaged. These facts speak for themselves, and suggest 
their own moral 

The battle of Nashville was also the first in the West, 
if not the first during the war, in which cavalry was used 
like infantry in assaulting fortified lines. Under Sherman, 
on the Atlanta campaign, the cavalry was not only made 
insignificant, it was treated with every species of indignity; 
still, as in its earliest days, it was a by-word. Numbering 
at the outset over 12,000 well-mounted men, under able 
and energetic commanders like Grarrard and McCook and 
Stoneman and Minty and La Grange, it woidd be difficult 
to discover that it accomplished anything commensurate with 
its numbers and capability. To the extent of his capacity, 
Sherman minimized its fighting qualities. In almost every 
enterprise it undertook, it found itself outnumbered and 
was badly worsted. Yet less than half these same men, 
re-enforced by Hatch's admirable division from Missbsippi 
and some new regiments from Indiana, recruited to full 
ranks, remounted, concentrated, encouraged and properly 
handled, performed the arduous duty of retarding Hood's 
advance; then, under Wilson, at the battle of Franklin 
defeated Forrest; at the battle of Nashville vied with the 


infantry in daring and success; and led the pursuit of 
Hood's retreating columns with unsurpassed energy and 
endurance. In the use to which he so successfully put this 
important arm of the service, Thomas gaye another proof of 
that quickness and versatility of mind which is one of the 
marks of a great captain. 

One secret, not only of Thomas's unvarying success, but of 
his wonderful hold upon the confidence and affection of his 
army, is the fact that every one in it was, to him, a man and 
a soldier. He did not show his appreciation of their good 
conduct by many words of praise ; but he showed in every 
way that he always expected the highest residts. To secure 
such results, he devoted himself with unceasing application. 
Thus he was unremitting in his care that they shoidd be well 
supplied, well looked after and always brought to the right 
place at the right time. His mind was always vigorous, alert, 
quick to perceive, to decide, to act. His personal movements 
were generally very deliberate, — chiefly because he was a 
constant sufferer, and hasty or violent exertion produced 
acute pain. He never mounted his horse without a wrench, 
and it was almost agony to ride fast. He never spoke of his 
sufferings, and it is only since his death that I learned of 
them. " I have educated myself not to feel," he once said, 
rather sadly, to an intimate friend. But, with all this 
deliberativeness of movement, on a march or a campaign, 
he saw every part of his army every day. On the Atlanta 
campaign especially, when every day brought at least a 
skirmish, he invariably made his way along to the head of the 
column. If, when he was at the rear, the sounds indicated 
contact with the enemy, he pushed on to the very front, where 
he often dismounted and walked to the outer skirmish line, to 
reconnoitre. Only in this way, in that obscure country, could* 
any idea be obtained of the position of the enemy and of his 
own troops. It was a constant fight in the dark; but his 
wood-craft was almost unerring. He could make his way 


through the thickest forest, and come out at the spot he 
aimed for. When under fire his movements, whether on foot 
or mounted, were as deliberate as at any other time. If not 
indifferent to danger, he was never influenced by a sense of 
it. He seemed unconscious of fear ; his manner in the heat 
of battle was the same as at any other time — always 
imperturbable, resolute, self-possessed, imhurried. In the 
crisis of an engagement he was like the great surgeon, who, 
in a capital operation, said he had not time enough to be in a 
hurry. He was never seen riding up and down his lines, 
waving his sword, shouting, or going through any of those 
ceremonies which constitute the picturesque part of general- 
ship. Not thus did he command the absolute confidence 
and obedience of his devoted soldiers. But whenever and 
wherever they saw him, they knew that all was right, and 
they read in his fixed countenance the resolve that was always 
the harbinger of victory. So, also, on the march nobody ever 
saw him, with an escort trailing behind him, dashing past a 
moving column of troops, throwing up dust or mud, and 
compelling them to leave the road to him. If anybody 
had the right of way it was they, not he. He would break 
through the woods, or flounder across a swamp, rather than 
force his men from the road, and so wear them out by 
needless fatigue. No detail escaped him^ however apparently 
insignificant. ^^The fate of a battle may depend on a buckle," 
he once said to a battery commander who had carelessly 
allowed his harness to break. 

He sometimes had terrific outbursts of temper. It was 
usually under complete control, but when it did break out it 
was volcanic. He once so alarmed a teamster who, when his 
mules were stalled, was beating them over the head with the 
butt of his whip, that the poor fellow took to the woods to 
escape he knew not what &te. Again, when the servants 
and orderlies about his headquarters were chasing a stray 
goose and making a great shouting and disturbance, he 


flamed out so that everybody ran and liid from his wrath ; 
while the poor goose, after a short circling flight, lighted at 
his feet as if for protection and safety. And, indeed, to all 
dumb animals he was a friend and protector ; stray dogs and 
homeless oats, no less than horses, found with him a refuge. 
It was exhibitions of meanness or cruelty to those who coidd 
not defend themselves, rather than any great faults or crimes, 
which chiefly stirred his passion. The violation of a flag 
of truce under which some of the escort were robbed of 
overcoats and blankets, and Bragg's failure to render proper 
return, led him to such vehemence of language as even 
treason to the flag did not call forth. But such outbursts 
were very infrequent, only often enough to show that it would 
not do to trifle. Habitually, he was the gentlest and kindest 
of men ; thoughtful of others, considerate to all, approachable, 
with no affected dignity, and entirely free from every sort 
either of obsequiousness or patronage. He had great fondness 
for light humor and pleasantry, and Uked as he sat by the 
camp fire to hear the droll anecdotes and adventures of his 
soldiers. He was never idle; when not engaged in necessary 
active duty, he liked to occupy himself with some mechanical 
work, for which he had great fondness and aptitude, or with 
the study of science, history or philosophy. He was not 
an omnivorous reader, was rather given to reflection than 
acquisition. Besides the literature and science of his own 
profession, with which he was thoroughly acquainted, he was 
well versed in constitutional law, or rather, perhaps, in the 
Constitution itself, which he studied and thought upon contin- 
ually with all diligence. It was his political Bible, which he 
accepted unquestioningly, and maintained manfully. 

Bom in a slave State, and passing nearly all, his life in 
slave-holding communities, he never liked the institution. 
Among his early experiences were the horrors of the Nat 
Turner insurrection, which took place in his native county. 
His only personal relation to slavery was the purchase of 


one or two servants, when so situated that he oould not do 
otherwise. But he never sold them, and afterwards gave 
them their freedom at great trouble and expense to himself. 
His keen sense of justice revolted against the crime of 
unrewarded labor. When the enlistment of colored men as 
soldiers was authorized, he heartily aided the scheme, and 
always gave the colored troops their due share of work and 
of credit. 

He easily commanded men, rather by inherent force of 
character than by arbitrary rule, so that his troops always 
tried to do their best as much for his sake as their own. An 
extraordinary illustration of his power over men was given at 
the Reunion of the Western Armies at Chicago, in December, 
1868. It was just after Grant's election to the Presidency, 
and there was assembled there the largest collection of officers 
gathered together since the close of the war. At the great 
banquet in the immense hall of the Chamber of Commerce, 
more than two thousand men were seated at the tables, and 
the wine flowed freely. By the time the speaking began, 
the hubbub and turmoil were indescribable and apparently 
uncontrollable. Sherman presided; Terry and Schofield 
and Slocimi and Hurlbut and Logan and Oglesby and 
Schurz, all practised orators, attempted to speak; with 
most, it was mere dumb pantomime; with others, it was 
merely the handing of manuscripts to the reporters. Thomas 
alone, out of all the number, secured a quiet and listening 
attention from beginning to end. It was a spontaneous and 
almost unconscious tribute to his commanding bearing and 

He had also the rare faculty of concentrating his whole 
attention upon the subject before him, hence all business 
was quickly disposed of. Colonel Thruston, Judge-Advocate 
on his staff, writes : ^^ It was a matter of surprise to me to 
find how remarkably familiar and accomplished he was with 
all matters of military law and precedent. . . . During two 


years in the judge-advooate's department, I devoted almost 
my entire time to fitting myself for the duties of my 
position, sending to Europe for books, and reading everything 
pertaining to military law and that branch of the service. 
Yet, in the consideration of questions of law, the General was 
always ready with useful suggestions and counsel, and seemed 
to have given more consideration to these subjects than any 
other officer of his army. During his earlier days he had 
made a careful study of court-martial law and had prepared 
notes of decisions, showing how painstaking he was in 
making himself master of all departments of his profession.^' 
The same thing might be said of him in r^ard to the 
adjutant-general's department, although he seemed to attach 
less importance to that than to some other branches of the 
service. He made it a rule, also, to finish up all his work 
to the minutest detail before any important movement was 
begun. Wherever his signature was required, even if it were 
only in a copy-book, he invariably signed his name himself. 
On a campaign, he required that all necessary documents and 
papers should be completed every day; and his adjutant- 
general's wagon was a model of convenience and utility. 

All his personal habits marked him as a gentleman of 
refinement and self-control. He was extremely neat in dress 
and person, and free from every kind of offensiveness of 
speech or manner. He hated vulgarity and loudness and 
pretension. While not a puritan, certainly not of the type 
Macaulay describes, but a lover of all manly sports and 
exercises, with great enjoyment of jollity and good fellowship 
in others, he was himself abstemious and moderate in all 
things. He drank less whiskey than any officer I knew in 
the service who drank any at all, never taking it to while 
away an idle hour or for mere companionship, but only when 
tired or exhausted. Yet he always produced it when visited, 
and kept a staff officer who was an expert in mixing toddies. 
He never smoked ; his private life was as pure and stainless 


as a saint's ; he lived always in the full light of day, with no 
secrets to hide and no habits of which to be ashamed. He 
was a strong, rugged, vigorous, complete, well-rounded man, 
physically, mentally and morally. 

No portrait that I have ever seen of General Thomas 
begins to do justice to the manly strength and comeliness of 
his form and face. In any assembly, he would be noticeable 
for the grace and easy dignity of his bearing, as well as for 
his countenance, marked by dear intelligence, and a winning 
smile which lighted up all his features. His brow was very 
heavy and projecting, and so overshadowed his eyes, — which, 
as General Garfield well says, ^^were cold gray to his enemies, 
but warm deep blue to his friends," — that, in sitting for a 
photograph, their light and expression were almost wholly 
lost. Such pictures wear a grim and ahnost forbidding look, 
entirely at variance with his ordinary, every-day appearance. 
But, at all times, one could read in his every look the story 
of resistless strength, which neither time nor fate could 
overcome. His whole appearance expressed unconquerable 
power, as gentle but ineradicable as one of the elemental 
forces. His voice was singularly pleasant and attractive, 
and all gladly listened to its musical tones. His inherent 
dignity forbade undue familiarity; but with the members 
of his personal and military &mily, there was unbounded 
freedom of intercourse. The men in the ranks never 
hesitated to seek him out if they wanted anything, and were 
sure to receive considerate attention. He once went on the 
bail-bond of one of his old soldiers, whom he knew only as a 
sentinel about Ms headquarters, when sued for a debt for 
which another was responsible, walking down to the magis- 
trate's with him as if it were the natural thing for a major- 
general to do. 

In the everlasting search for an available candidate for the 
Presidency which marks our politics, it was inevitable that 
a man of such mark and character should be one of the 


possible selections. Throughout the Southwest, where the 
men who had served under him were in the majority, he was 
unquestionably the favorite in 1868. In Ohio and Tennessee, 
especially, strong organizations were formed to secure his 
nomination, and they felt sanguine of success. Silent acqui- 
escence on his part was all they asked. But that was 
precisely what they fdled to secure. Not only did he refuse 
that, but he enjoined, as a personal obligation upon his 
friends, that they should see to it that his name should not 
be brought forward. " I have learned the trade of a soldier," 
he said, ^^ and I am too old to learn another." A letter of 
his written in March, 1867, so well reveals his feelings and 
character that I quote nearly all of it : — 

^^ There are many reasons why I cannot consent to be a 
candidate for the Presidency. 

<^ First : I am wholly disqualified for so high and responsible 
a position, being but a mere tyro in the science of statesman- 

<^ Second : I have not the necessary control over my tem- 
per, nor have I the faculty of conforming to a policy and 
working to advance it, unless convinced within myself that 
it is right and honest. 

^^ Third: My habits of life, established by a military 
training of over twenty-five years, are such as to make it 
repugnant to my self-respect to have to induce people to do 
their duty by persuasive measures. If there is anything that 
enrages me more than another, it is to see an obstinate 
and self-willed man oppose what is right, morally and 
l^ally, simply because under the law he cannot be compelled 
to do what is right. 

*^ Fourth: I can never consent, voluntarily, to place myself 
in a position where scurrilous newspaper men and political 
demagogues can make free with my personal character and 
reputation, with impunity. 

^^ Fifth: I have no taste whatever for politics. Besides, 


restrictions have recently been thrown around the President, 
by Congress, which virtually deprive him of his just powers 
and rights under the Constitution. I ooidd never consent to 
be President so long as that officer is deprived of the exercise 
of all the rights, privileges and duties guaranteed to him by 
the Constitution. 

^^ I coidd name many more equally valid reasons for not 
wishing the office. I will name only one more, and that not 
the least ; I am poor and cannot afford it. ... I therefore 
sincerely hope that I may not be compelled to decline in a 
more formal manner, which, if nominated, I shall certainly 

It is needless to say that several such letters as this, written 
about the same time, to influential people in various places, 
produced the desired residt. There was no mistaking their 
meaning or sincerity. Yet he underrated his qualifications. 
In the chaotic condition of things throughout Tennessee 
and the other states under his command during the critical 
period of reconstruction, where he exercised autocratic power, 
an infinite number and variety of questions came up for 
adjudication; and his orders always were based on broad 
grounds of law and justice. His testimony before the 
Reconstruction Committee in 1866 clearly shows his fairness 
and impartiality. One looks in vain for any trace of bitterness 
or hostility toward the people of the South, though of all men 
living, he might be pardoned for entertaining and expressing 
such feeling. This judicial habit of mind also raised him 
above all political considerations in his dealing with men 
and events. He never was swayed in the slightest by any 
thought as to the influence his action might have upon his 
own personal fortunes. Indeed, he more than once, by his 
insistence on what he deemed right and just, stood in the 
way of his own advancement. A notable instance of this 
is his conduct, when Andrew Johnson, in February, 1868, 
nominated him to be Lieutenant-General and General by 


brevet. Undoubtedly Johnson^s purpose was to assign Thomas 
to duty according to his brevet rank, and so supersede Grant 
by him. To many men, perhaps to most men, this woidd have 
proved a great temptation, especially if one felt as Thomas 
did, that Grant had treated him unjustly. How it affected 
him is shown by his letter to the President of the Senate, in 
which he says : — 

^^For the battle of Nashville, I was appointed a Major- 
General in the United States Army. My services since the 
war do not merit so high a compliment ; and it is too late 
to be r^arded as a compliment, if conferred for services 
during the war. 

^^I therefore earnestly request that the Senate will not 
confirm the nomination." 

At the same time he wrote the President a similar letter, 
requesting him to recall the nomination. So ended this 
mischievous attempt to seduce General Thomas and to 
degrade General Grant. 

In the great work of giving a faithful record of the career 
of the graduates of the Military Academy, which General 
Cullimi has performed with such fulness and impartiality, 
there are but two officers named whose record of service 
equals, in length, that of General Thomas, and these are 
both in the Engineer Corps. Neither Grant, nor Sherman, 
nor Sheridan can boast of such an amount and variety of 
duty. He took part in more than thirty actions, and every 
one of them added to his skill and experience, as well as to 
the confidence with which his soldiers always regarded him. 
He captured more guns in single battles on the open field 
than any of the other commanders during the war: 40 at 
Missionary Ridge, 50 at Nashville, 25 on the pursuit after 
that battle. If he ever lost a gun, he made the account good 
by the capture of a corresponding number in the same 
engagement. In all, he took in the open field 183 guns, 
over 25,000 prisoners and over 15,000 deserters. Nearly 


one half of the regiments and batteries which served under 
him veteranized during the winter of 1863-64. 

If Sheridan had never commanded in any other battles 
than Booneville and Five Forks, — the first and the last of 
the battles of his own planning, — and, in all his intermediate 
career, had fought under the eye and direction of a superior, 
he would still be recognized as a great general, all whose 
actions bear the stamp of his peculiar military genius. Some 
illustration might, indeed, be lacking to demonstrate the 
variety and extent of his powers. But from what is seen 
of his independent character in those two striking examples, 
all his other qualities may be naturally inferred. If Sherman 
had never been in chief command, except on his unavailing 
enterprise against Vicksburg in December, 1862, and his 
almost fatal over-confidence at Bentonville in 1865, — the 
first and the last of his independent actions, — we should 
still have ample testimony to his failure to inflict any very 
serious loss upon the enemy, and to his unbroken habit of 
fighting by detachments and without decisive results ; while, 
at the same time, we could not fail to recognize the wonderful 
skill with which he could march, supply and handle an army 
everywhere except upon the battlefield. In the same manner. 
Mill Spring and Nashville — the first and the last battles of 
Thomas- s planning and execution — reveal the quality of his 
genius, and show us by their completeness the possession of 
abilities which go to make up a great captain. Lacking 
perhaps, certainly never showing the audacity which some- 
times helped Csesar and Napoleon to win, almost contrary to 
fortune ; yet, in all the important elements requisite for a 
true soldier of the republic, nothing seems lacking, — neither 
native ability, nor industry, nor character, nor patience, nor 
skill, nor readiness in emergencies, nor courage, nor self- 
reliance, nor unfailing success, nor unswerving fidelity to the 
highest calls of duty. What Napier says of the Duke of 
Wellington may as fitly be said of Thomas : ^< He held his 


anny in hand, keeping it with unmitigated labor always in a 
fit state to march or to fight, and thus prepared, he acted 
indifferently as occasion offered, on the offensive or defensive, 
displaying in both a complete mastery of his art/' 

To quote Napier again, in summing up the attributes 
of a great captain: ^^The certain mark of a master spirit 
in war is that most rare faculty of coming to prompt and 
sure conclusions on sudden emergencies. Without this, a 
commander may be distinguished, he may be a great man, 
but he cannot be a great captain." Numerous instances 
show that Thomas had this essential faculty in a very high 
d^;ree. His exhibition of it at Mill Spring has already 
been noticed ; how, at the critical moment, he changed from 
defensive to offensive, and so won a complete victory. At 
Stone's River, while generally on the defensive, yet his send- 
ing forward a brigade into the Cedars, to check the column 
that was overwhelming Sheridan till the latter could establish 
and maintain a new and firm line, saved the centre from 
being crushed, and so kept a salient toward the enemy which 
could not be carried. At Chickamauga, he brought on the 
battle by sending forward a division to cut off a brigade, 
erroneously reported as detached from all support ; when he 
found that he had confronted a formidable line of battle, 
marching to turn his own left, he instantly brought his other 
divisions into line and into action to meet the unexpected 
emergency, and held his own throughout the day, against all 
odds, so that the enemy utterly failed to secure the prize 
so ardently coveted. Late in the afternoon of the second 
day, when ordered to retire to Bossville, he carried out the 
hazardous undertaking by a display of audacity hardly found 
in any other of his actions. Having given orders how each 
division was to be withdrawn, he placed himself at the head 
of one of them, and, by a terrific charge in column, broke 
through the opposing line, and then, sweeping around its 
rear, gathered in guns and hundreds of prisoners. Under 


cover of this most daring attack, the rest of the army was 
withdrawn, in comparative ease and safety, from the very 
presence of and contact with the enemy. His ample pro- 
vision on the 23d of November, 1863, by which, unordered, 
he carried and held the decisive position on Orchard Knob, 
and so made victory possible and complete, has been men- 
tioned. At Little Kenesaw, on the 18th of June, 1864, he 
gained, by a spirited assanlt, a commanding point which 
compelled Johnston to fall back to the main mountain. His 
conduct at Peach Tree Creek and Jonesborough, already re- 
ferred to, reveal the same quality of an instantaneous grasping 
of the situation, and of corresponding promptness of action. 

Few officers during the War of the Rebellion received 
more of formal, official praise, real and sincere, but bringing 
no access of power or opportimity, than he. The legislature 
of Ohio thanked him, after the battle of Mill Spring ; the 
Congress of the United States thanked him for Hood's signal 
defeat at Nashville; the State of Tennessee thanked him, 
had his portrait painted, and presented him a magnificent 
gold medal; the Secretary of War, sending him notice on 
Christmas Eve, 1864, of his appointment as Major-General, 
declared : ^^ No commander has more justly earned promotion 
by devoted, disinterested and valuable service to his coun- 
try."^ Yet his military reward, after it all, consisted in 
dividing up his army, and scattering its fractions, under 
subordinate commanders, to all points of the compass to reap 
independent honors. 

General Grrant, in his Memoirs, gives an estimate of 
Thomas's character based on very imperfect knowledge, 
though exceedingly just as far it goes. He says : " Thomas's 
dispositions were deliberately made, and always good. He 
could not be driven from a point he was given to hold. I 
do not believe," he adds, " that he could ever have conducted 
Sherman's army from Chattanooga to Atlanta against the 
1 94 W. R., 829. 


defences and the commander guarding that line, in 1864. 
On the other hand, if it had been given him to hold the 
line which Johnston tried to hold, neither that General, nor 
Sherman, nor any other officer could have done it better." ^ 
This is very high praise, and goes as far as Grant's acquaint- 
ance with Thomas fairly justifies. But there are multitudes 
of soldiers who believe they knew Thomas better than Grrant 
did, and who believe that he would not, indeed, have con- 
ducted that campaign as Sherman did; but that if the 
conduct of it had been in Thomas's hands, the residts would 
have been something vastly different from the barren occupa- 
tion of an abandoned city, at the end of four months' incessant 
fighting which left the enemy relatively as strong and defiant 
as at the beginning. The battle of Nashville is, after all, 
that on which the fame of General Thomas must ultimately 
depend. Though reckoned by Swinton as among the decisive 
battles of the war, it has not thus far commanded the study 
and attention its magnitude and importance deserve. Most 
of those who have thus far written our war history fail of 
apprehending its supreme consequence. Defeat at Nashville 
involved ruin to the national cause more complete and effect- 
ual than at any other point in the whole sphere of action. 
There was nowhere any available army to stem the tide, in 
case of disaster there. Thomas had to create the force which 
annihilated Hood. If , as is just, the measure of a soldier's 
greatness and glory is to be computed by the magnitude of 
the evils from which his victory saves the nation, as well 
as by the positive benefits conferred, no one of our generals 
deserves higher rank or greater honor. 

Popular attention has been, not unnaturally, concentrated 
chiefly on Grrant and Sherman. The Titanic blows of 
the one, and the coruscating brilliancy of the other, have 
alternately astonished and dazzled men's judgments and 
imaginations. But time, which is said to set all things even, 
1 Qrant's Memoirs, 256. 


will at last restore, or reveal, the proper perspective. Then 
it will be seen that, next to the surrender at Appomattox, 
the one blow under which the Rebellion reeled and tottered to 
its fall was that delivered by Thomas at Nashville. When 
that battle ended, but a single army remained to vex the 
peace of the Republic. The gigantic Colossus which had 
so long bestrode the land henceforth had but one foot left 
to stand upon; the other had been crushed to pieces at 



Majoe akd Bum Ooloiil, Firh ISmw Hamfshiu YocuMnDBs; Oombil, 
Ksir HAMnHBB YoLuimu. 

Bead before the Society <m Tuesday evening , February S, 1892. 


The fame of General Thomas aa a patriot and a soldier is 
established beyond question. It is not the lightest testimony 
to his power as a leader of men that his followers and 
admirers, not reconciled with the fortune which gave Grant 
and Sherman more extensive commands than his, or restricted 
his genius to the conduct of campaigns less important than 
theirs, ask the world, even at this late day, to revise its 
judgment of him. They do not admit that his military 
genius was less eminent in one direction than in another, and ' 
they insist that, abler than Sherman and the equal of Gbrant, 
he would have done as well as the latter and better than the 
former, if he had been given their opportunities. It would 
be a thankless and a profitless task to examine these conten- 
tions in a critical way, if they consisted of nothing more than 
an estimate of Thomas from the point of view of loyal 
friends ; but because they have extended to a disparagement 
of Grant and Sherman, and to a denial of the received 
accounts of some of their greatest achievements, these 
contentions have become the proper subject of critical 
examination, in the interest of the truth of history. The 
same is true of the charge that, in the first days of the War 
of the Rebellion, Thomas failed to receive due recognition 
because he was a Virginian ; that the reward to him and his 
officers for Mill Springs, the first important Union victory, 
was tardy and inadequate ; that, later in the war, jealousy or 
want of appreciation in the authorities retarded the promotion 
he had earned; and that he was repeatedly passed over in the 


assignment of inferior men to commands which should have 
been given to him. It has also been said that Thomas's 
reputation has suffered for want of biography and memoirs 
such as Grant's and Sherman's, but this leaves out of the 
account not only Van Home's history of the Army of the 
Cimiberland, which, written at the request of Thomas and 
from materials ^^ mainly collected and supplied by him," was 
published in 1875,^ the year in which Sherman's memoirs 
appeared and ten years before Grant's, but also Cist's History 
of the Army of the Cumberland. 

It is the attempt of the present paper to test the assertions 
above recapitulated, by the evidence presented in the Beoords 
of the armies, published by the War Department, which must 
always hereafter be regarded as the fountain-head of our 
military history from 1861 to 1865. It will be well to state 
in the outset, that in the important matter of numbers the 
conclusions reached will often, perhaps alwajrs, be found to 
differ from what is commonly accepted as the fact. The 
men actually bearing arms were much fewer than those 
ordinarily counted in the strength of the army. Often the 
force actually on the battlefield embraced only infantry and 
artillery. Not infrequently whole brigades of infantry 
belonging to one army or the other were absent on detached 
duty, and always a considerable portion of the force reported 
as ^^ present for duty " consisted of non-combatants, such as 
musicians, and those employed in the quartermaster, commis- 
sary and medical departments. The Confederates classed 
their fighting force by itself as the *' effectives present," and 
usually the returns of this force excluded the officers and 
included only the men bearing muskets. 

The writer's admiration for the military character and lofty 

spirit of Greneral Thomas has not been diminished by his 

studies for this paper, and he shares the impatience with 

which those who followed Thomas in the field hear the 

^ Van Home's Life of General Thomas was published in 1882. 


suggestion that any other motive than patriotism and fealty 
of the highest type led him to draw his sword in the nation's 
cause. In this he followed the example of another Virginian, 
his illustrious friend General Scott, who, at the outbreak of 
the Rebellion, discharged his duty in supporting the govern- 
ment at the Capital, with a martial soul a world removed 
from the possibility of defection. 

Coming now to the statements which are to be considered, 
we read that although Thomas ^^ encountered and helped put 
to flight " Jackson's troops, Jiily 2, 1861, at Falling Waters 
on Virginia soil,^ soon afterwards his loyalty was suspected 
when there was question of his promotion at Washington, 
and we discover in the Record that it was not Thomas's but 
Abercrombie's brigade which put the Confederates to flight in 
that action. Thomas's infantry was not under fire. Thomas's 
loyalty was so far above suspicion that even before this action 
he had been promoted from Major to Colonel of the Second 
United States Cavalry, and afterwards he was made 
Brigadier-General of Volunteers in advance of Abercrombie, 
and was preceded in this rank by only three of the officers 
who were with him under Patterson in the Shenandoah 
Valley, — Porter, Stone and Morell. In November, Thomas 
was assigned by Buell to the command of the Union line in 
Kentucky, which extended from London to Columbia. The 
Confederates facing this line had pushed a force under 
Zollicoffer across the Cumberland in front of Mill Springs, 
and, December 29, Buell directed Thomas to move down on 
the left of this force and endeavor to cut it off from the river, 
while Schoepf s command at Somerset should attack it in 
front ; and in communicating the order he wrote to Thomas 
as follows : " The result ought to be at least a severe blow to 
him or a hasty flight across the river. But to effect the former 
the movement should be made rapidly and secretly, and the 
blow should be vigorous and decided. There should be no 


delay after you arrive." ^ Thomas marched to Logan's Cross 
Roads and there halted January 17, about ten miles from the 
enemy's camp, to await the arrival of four of his r^^iments 
which were detained in the rear by bad roads. Crittenden, 
the Confederate commander at Mill Springs, on the same day 
got news of Thomas's movement, and on the 18th sent two 
regiments across the river, thus raising the force there to eight 
regiments of infantry, three battalions of cavaky and twelve 
pieces of artillery,^ reported as 4,000 strong, and, taking the 
resolution to attack Thomas before he could join with Schoepf 
or receive his belated regiments, marched at midnight and 
fell on Thomas's advance at daylight. Thomas had seven 
regiments of infantry, one of cavalry and two batteries.® 
The numbers are not reported. They probably were a little 
less than the Confederates. As his advance retired before 
the enemy, Thomas ordered up the rest of his troops and a 
hot fight ensued, in which the enemy were put to flight with 
a loss of 533 to Thomas's loss of 253.^ We search the 
Record in vain for evidence to support the account which 
describes Thomas as turning a repulse into a defeat by 
changing from the defensive to the offensive, and ordering a 
charge when the enemy were shaken by the loss of their 
commander. Their commander, Crittenden, did not fall. 
Zollicoffer commanded one of the brigades. When he was 
killed only two i*egiments had been engaged, and afterwards 
the Confederates made a general advance. They were put 
to flight by a charge in flank, which McCook reported to 
Thomas that he made upon his own judgment.^ The reports 
leave no doubt that Thomas here displayed the same traits 
which afterwards distinguished him in greater battles. He 
was undisturbed by the sudden and unexpected attack of the 
enemy, and he ordered his brigades forward and put them in 
action with calm and confident courage. Without doubt, he 

1 7 W. B., 78. « 26., 106. » 26., 7&-102. 

« Ih,, 82, 108. » i&., 94. 


rode the field with that impressiye bearing which so often 
lent courage and firmness to those who were with him in 
time of trial It would seem that if, instead of halting on the 
17th, he had called Schoepf with his 5,000 men ^ down from 
Somerset (which was only eight miles from him and about 
twelve miles from the enemy), and had moved on the enemy 
ijiat night with as great celerity as they moved on him the 
next night, he would have caught them with a force much 
smaller than his own, and would have had a fair chance of 
capturing or destroying all of them. The inquiry also arises, 
whether his march was as rapid as it might have been. His 
force spent seventeen dajrs in making the distance of about 
sixty-five miles between Lebanon and Logan's Cross Roads, 
although speed was repeatedly urged by Buell.^ The weather 
and roads were very bad; but between the 14th and 17th of 
the same month, McClemand marched a column of 4,000 
infantry seventy-five miles in Western Kentucky in the same 
inclement weather.^ 

Although the loss of the enemy in the battle was small, the 
victory at Logan's Cross Roads gave great encouragement to 
loyalty in Kentucky ; and so welcome was it at Washington 
that four of Thomas's colonels comihended by Buell^ were 
made brigadiers ; and Thomas's appointment as Major-General 
in April, 1862, in advance of forty-two of the fifty-five 
brigadiers senior to him, including Sherman, although urged 
by HaUeck for his immediate purpose,^ must have been made 
in recognition of his leadership in this battle, for he had 
fought no other. Halleck desired his promotion in order 
that in reorganizing the army after Shiloh for the advance 
on Corinth, he might place Thomas in command of the right 
wing. . It has been said that in doing this he caused Thomas 
to supersede Grant, and that it was ^^a slight Grant never 
forgot;"® but the right wing was newly created by this order, 

1 7 W. R., 484, 486. « 16., 82, 680, 649, 668. » lb., 08-70. 
«i&.,77. •28W.B.,a63. • 68 AtUntio Moothlj, 609. 


and only a portion of Grrant's army was included in it.^ 

HaUeck at the same time made Grrant '^ second in command " 

of the army, an anomaloas position which proved very 

distasteful to Grrant. There is no evidence that Gbrant was 

prejudiced against Thomas by these changes. His choice of 

Thomas in preference to Bosecrans in October, 1863, to 

command the army at C!hattanooga, is evidence to the 


In passing it is to be said, that it seems that it was not, as 

has been asserted, at Thomas's request that he was afterwards 

relieved from his command of the right wing of Halleck's 

army. In his letter of October 80, 1862, to HaUeck, he 

says : ^^ As soon as the emergency was over, I was relieved 

and returned to the conmiand of my old division. I went to 

my duties without a murmur, as I am neither ambitious nor 

have I any political aspirations." ^ The feeling betrayed by 

him in this letter heightens the great magnanimity of his 

act of September 80, in declining to supersede Buell in the 

command of the Army of the Ohio, on the ground that the 

latter ought to be allowed to carry out the plans which he had 

formed.^ BueU, on his part, on the same day announced 

Thomas as second in command.^ Perhaps the fact that he 

held this title when the battle of Perryville was fought, eight 

days later, prejudiced him at Washington when, after the 

battle, Bosecrans was preferred to him as Buell's successor.^ 

But there is no evidence that Thomas was at fault in the 

battle, unless it was in retaining the nominal position of 

second in command without the opportunity to exercise 

authority commensurate with the title. The battle occurred 

in this wise: On October 7, Buell, moving with three 

corps to attack Bragg at Perryville, ordered Thomas to 

iidvance with Crittenden's corps and put it in order of battle 

1 IIW.R.,144. 

« 2 Grant's Memoln, 18-10, 26; 53 W. R., 404 ; 65 W. R^ 11. 

»23W.R.,657. *1J.,555. 

-» i6., 560. • 16., 640. 


on the right of tibe army, and then report for orders.^ Buell 
apparently did not suspect that the enemy might attack, and 
being ill, and not intending to deliver his attack until the 
next day,^ he was not with his advance, so that although 
Bragg attacked his left flank early in the day and gave 
vigorous battle for several hours, Buell did not learn that a 
battle was going on until late in the day, and Thomas, 
although he had heard the cannonading, was led to believe, 
by reports from Buell's and the next corps commander's head- 
quarters, that there was no* serious engagement, and being left 
without instructions from BueU, took no part in the battle. 
Bragg reported that he had 14,500 infantry and 1,500 
cavaby.® BueU reported his force at 58,000.* The battle 
was a fierce one and the Confederates were repulsed with a 
loss to them of 3,396,^ and to the Union army of 4,241.^ Not 
one half of BueU's force was brought into action. It is not 
surprising that in casting about for a vigorous and capable 
leader to succeed Buell, the authorities at Washington at this 
time preferred Bosecrans, who a week before the battle of 
Perryville had routed the enemy at Corinth, inflicting a loss 
of 6,000, to a loss on his part of 8,310.7 

Bosecrans, moving southward from Nashville to attack 
Bragg's army, encountered it near Murfreesboro', Tennessee, 
in the battle of Stone's River, December 31, 1862. We are 
told in one account of this battle that the right being ^' swept 
from the field, the left threatened with disaster," Thomas 
with two divisions '^maintained his groimd, beating back 
every assault," and " held fast the critical point ; " ® and in 
another account from the same loyal pen that '^ the whole 
right wing of the Union army was driven from the field, half 
of it in dire confusion," aud that '^ on the action of Thomas's 
two divisions then depended the fate of the day ; " that as 

1 28 W. R., 558, 580. « 22 W. R., 186, 187, 276, 276, 1026. 

»J5., 1092. *ii.,1028. 

» ii., 1112. • iJ., 1036. 

' 24W.R., 78,126,176,382,383,884. • 68 AtUntio Monihlj, 510. 


Sheridan was driven back ^^Thomaa met the shock with 
unmoved firmness. He had sent forward a brigade to relieve 
the pressure upon Sheridan ; and, when this was also forced 
back, the rest of his line was ready and held its ground. . . • 
Alone of all the troops in line that morning, except the 
division that joined his left, he was unshaken by any assault, 
and contiQued to hold the ground he had chosen till the 
enemy, three days later, abandoned the field." ^ By the 
Record it appears that Eosecrans had 39,440, and Bragg 
had 88,635 infantry and artillery in action on the day in 
question.^ Rosecrans drew up his army faciQg Stone's 
River, his right wing of three divisions under McCook, his 
centre of two divisions under Thomas, and his left of three 
divisions under Crittenden. Bragg's army was drawn up on 
the opposite side of Stone's River in line nearly parallel to 
the Union line but extending beyond the Union right flank. 
Each commander resolved to attack with his left wing. 
Early in the morning (December 81) Rosecrans advanced 
from his left, but before engagement could take place Bragg 
with his left attacked Rosecrans's right with great vigor, and 
turning the flank of Johnson's division, which was on the 
extreme right, drove it back, and then fell on and forced back 
the other two divisions (Davis's and Sheridan's) of the right 
wing and Negley's division of Thomas's command ; ^ but, a 
stout resistance was made, notably by Sheridan's division, 
which made front against the enemy for several hours. ^ 
Thomas had Rousseau's division, 4,688 strong, in reserve. 
Rosecrans withdrew his left as soon as the gravity of Bragg's 
attack was manifest, and he sajrs in his report : '^ General 
Thomas was immediately despatched to order Rousseau, then 
in reserve, into the cedar brakes to the right and rear of 
Sheridan," ^ and that Crittenden was ordered to send Van 
Cleve's division and Barker's brigade, from the left wing, in 

1 AMe, 180. s 29 W. B., 200 «t uq., 808, 406, 674, 676. 

«i&.,256,40& « 25., 818, 840, 878, 407. • 16., 108. 


on the right of Bousseau.^ Bousseau deployed in the posi- 
tion indicated by Bosecrans, and then had to retreat ;^ he 
re-formed on a new line in the rear, with the aid of the re- 
enforcements which Bosecrans had sent from the left wing, 
which formed on his right. He says in his report that 
repeated assaults of the enemy were repulsed in this position, 
adding : ^^ During the last assault I was informed that our 
troops were advancing on the right, and saw troops, not of my 
division, led by General Bosecrans, moving in that direction. 
I informed General Thomas of the fact, and asked leave to 
advance my lines. He directed me to do so. We made a 
charge upon the enemy and drove him into the woods. • . . 
This ended the fighting of that day."® The reports of 
Crittenden aad his officers confirm this, aad also show that 
they made front against the enemy, which had driven back 
the right wing, all the rest of the day.^ These three brigades 
which Bosecrans brought from the left wing numbered 3,761 
men.^ These facts are inconsistent with the assertion that 
Thomas's line remained unmoved, or that it alone saved the 
right wing, and it is to be noted that there is no evidence 
in the Becord that Thomas sent forward a brigade to relieve 
the pressure on Sheridan.^ 

Turning now to the reports of the commanders in the left 
wing, we find no evidence that it was threatened with disaster 
or that it left the fate of the day to depend on Thomas. We 
have already seen that it spared three brigades to go to the 
aid of Thomas and the right wing. Of the remainder, the 
only brigade which was forced back was Cruft's of Palmer's 
division, which had place in the origin^ line, next on the left 
of Negley's division, and which after a long and hot action 
was flanked by the enemy because Negley gave way, 
exposing its flank. The remaining four brigades of the left 

1 29 W. R., 198, 8T7. « 16., 373. 874, 87a 

• ii., 87a * lb., 449, 500, 574, 588. 

» ii., 201. • ^Jrte, 180. 


wing, 6,498 strong,^ under Crittenden, aided by Sheridan's 
men, who came into action again after supplying themselves 
with ammunition, held their position in the line with severe 
fighting until night. In fact, they were the only troops who 
maintained their original position.^ The reports give a great 
deal of evidence of the bravery and resolution of Thomas, but 
the same is true of Bosecrans. He appears to have been 
fully equal to meeting the disaster which had overtaken his 
right, and the Record furnishes no evidence that Thomas 
took charge of the field or exercised command over any 
other troops than those of his two divisions. 

Thomas's next battle was Chickamauga, in September, 1863. 
Rosecrans had crossed the Tennessee below Chattanooga, and 
thereby so threatened Bragg's line of communication with the 
South that he retreated from Chattanooga to the vicinity of 
Lafayette. Bosecrans took possession of Chattanooga, and 
then, in the belief that Bragg was retreating to Rome,^ pressed 
on to strike him, sending Crittenden's corps from Chattanooga 
to Ringgold, and Thomas's and MoCook's corps over the 
Cumberland Mountains, the former to Stevens's Gup and the 
latter to Alpine. On the 11th he became convinced that Bragg 
had been re-enforced by Johnston, and that at Lafayette, 
opposite the Union centre, he awaited re-enforcements from 
Virginia to take the offensive. Rosecrans then ordered 
Crittenden and McCook to close on Thomas, and the latter to 
await them in the position then held by him in front of 
Stevens's and Cooper's Gaps in Lookout Mountain. This 
accomplished, Rosecrans moved the whole line to his left 
down the Chickamauga River, which he sajrs was ^^with a 
view to covering the Lafayette road toward Chattanooga, and 
facing the most practicable route to the enemy's front." ^ 
This movement was begun on the 18th and was continued 
until the next morning, when the enemy were encountered 

1 29 W. R., 201. > 15., 194, 449, 460, 400, 461, 545, 561. 

• 50 W. R., 52 «t 9eq, * lb,, 55. 


and the battle b^;an. We are told in one of the recent 
accounts to which reference has been made above, that 
Thomas ^^ by wearisome marches day and night " placed his 
corps ^^ in front of the enemy's right, urgently striying" to gain 
the road to Chattanooga, the one line of safety for the Union 
Army; " and that here on September 20, when the whole 
right wing was swept from the field, he '^with only the 
remnants of six divisions and two brigades " held his ground 
against eleven divisions of twice his numbers until with the 
approach of night, when his ammunition was nearly exhausted, 
he attacked and broke through the enemy's lines.^ The 
following is the story as told by the Record : Eosecrans had 
not made his movement to the left a moment too soon, for 
Bragg had abeady ordered an advance from his right, which 
there extended beyond Bosecrans's left. In the movement to 
the left Thomas passed by Crittenden's corps, thus taking 
position on the left flank of the army, and on the morning of 
the 19th, unaware of Bragg's movement, which had already 
begun, he sent forward a division to locate and capture what 
was reported to him to be a single brigade in his front.^ 
Thomas's attack was met by a fierce counter attack from 
Bragg's advance near Beed's Bridge,® and the battle became 
so general that all the rest of Bosecrans's infantry, except the 
reserve corps, became involved in the battle. The result 
was that Bragg's attack failed. In his report he sajrs ^^ the 
enemy • • . seemed disposed to dispute with all his ability 
our effort to gain the main road to Chattanooga in his rear."^ 
There is no mention in his order for the attack, of any 
purpose of gaining this road, and Hill, whose corps was on 
the right flank of his army, in his report throws doubt upon 
Bragg's intimation that he had such a purpose.^ Although 
Thomas felt that it was desirable to cover this road, yet, so 
far as the Beoord goes, he does not seem to have thought that 

1 68 Atlantic Monthly, 510. > 60 W. R., 249. 

« J&., and 51 W. R., 31. * 61 W. R., 32. » 26., 143, 144. 


it would be of paramount importance in the action which 
impended for the next day, in which Bosecrans confidently 
expected a successful result.^ 

In the course of the day's battle Johnson's division of 
McCook's corps and Palmer's division of Crittenden's corps 
had been sent to Thomas and had been placed in his line, so 
that at the close of the day he had them under his command, 
with three of his own divisions under Brannau, Reynolds and 
Baird. The order of these divisions from right to left was 
Brannan, Reynolds, Palmer, Johnson, Baird,^ with the right 
flank on Missionary Ridge and the left flank on the road 
leading from Reed's Bridge to RossviUe, the line crossing 
the main Chattanooga road running from Grordon's Mill to 
Rossville. Negley's division of his own corps had been 
separated from him early in the day, and at this hour was 
between Thomas and the troops further on llie right.^ At a 
conference held at midnight between Rosecrans and his corps 
commanders,^ it was settled that Thomas should maintain the 
line then held by him, that McCook should form on Thomas's 
right, and that Crittenden should be held in reserve near 
McCook.^ At six a. m. of the 20th Thomas sent a despatch 
to Rosecrans saying, ^^ Since my return this morning I have 
found it necessary to concentrate my lines more. My left 
does not now extend to the road that branches off at 
McDonald's house to Reed's Bridge. I earnestly request 
that Negley's division be placed on my left immediately. 
The enemy's skirmishers have been discovered about three 
quarters of a mile from our left picket-line, facing toward the 
Rossville road. A division on my left would be exactly in 
their front. . . . General Baird has just reported to me 
that the enemy are moving towards our left."® The road 
mentioned by him was the road to Chattanooga. Thomas 
then had eleven brigades in his front line and three brigades 

1 60 W. B., 136. « 16., 136. » lb,, 56, 829. 

* 16., 57, 135. » i6., 69. • J6., 137-138. 


in reserve. The eleven brigades were in two lines, one in rear 
of the other, so that the front line was equivalent to five and 
a half brigades, while those in the rear equalled eight and a 
half brigades.^ If Thomas had thought it was vital to cover 
the road to Chattanooga, it is incredible that he would not 
have prolonged his line to the left by moving out some of his 
men from the rear. The various accounts of the battle seem 
to have assumed that this was the only road to Chattanooga 
by the way of Rossville, but the map shows one still further 
to the left which was always open to the enemy, and one to 
the right which led by the Snodgrass house to Bossville. The 
latter was not uncovered by our line at any time during the 
battle which ensued on the 20th. Upon receiving Thomas's 
despatch of 6.30 a. m., Sosecrans at once ordered Negley to 
Thomas's left,^ and Steedman, of Grranger's reserve corps, at 
Bossville was informed of Thomas's report of the enemy on 
the left and warned to be ^^ on the lookout," ' Granger himself 
having been told on the evening before he must help ^^ in the 
fight to-morrow by supporting Thomas,"^ and to post his 
corps ^^on the eastern slope of Missionary Ridge to support 

Beatty's brigade, of Negley's division, reached Thomas and 
was posted on his left before the battle opened,^ but the other 
two brigades of Negley's division were detained, by reason of 
delay in the movement of the troops that were to take their 
place, and did not reach Thomas until some time after the 
battle had begun.^ Bragg had divided his army into two 
wings, the right under Polk and the left under Longstreet, 
and he ordered Polk, who was opposite Thomas, to attack at 
daydawn and Longstreet to then take up the attack promptly.^ 
The attack was begun by Polk's command^ between 8.30 and 

1 60 W. R, 277, 278, 287, 801, 810, 867, 860, 871, 879, 400, 417, 429, 441, 686, 
« B., 69. « lb,, 18a * 62 W. R., 741. 

*60W.R.,69. •!&., 867. 7I5.,68,489. 

« 26., 88. • U., 14L 


9 A. M.,^ upon the left flank and front of Baird's division, 
then in position on the left of Thomas's line, and in the course 
of an hour or two afterwards it extended to the right so far 
as to involve the divisions of Johnson, Palmer and Beynolds.^ 
The attack on the front of these divisions was everywhere 
repulsed, but the attack on Baird's flank became so serious 
in the estimation of Greneral Thomas that he repeatedly sent 
to Bosecrans for re-enforcements. The latter hastened the 
remainder of Negley's division off for Thomas, and Garfield 
his chief of staff wrote to McCook on the right at 10.10 
A. M., ^^ General Thomas is being heavily pressed on the left. 
The general commanding directs you to make immediate 
disposition to withdraw the right so as to spare as much 
force as possible to re-enforce Thomas. The left must be 
held at all hazards, even if the right is withdrawn wholly 
back to the present left. Select a good position back this 
way and be ready to start re-enforcements to Thomas at a 
moment's warning," ^ following this at 10.30 with an order 
to send two brigades of Sheridan's division to support Thomas 
with all possible despatch ;^ but at 10.35 he wrote to Thomas, 
^^The general commanding directs me to say, if possible 
refuse your left, sending in your reserves to the northward, 
as he would prefer having Crittenden and McCook on your 
right." ^ Thomas replied, ^^The enemy are pushing me so 
hard that I cannot make any changes. The troops are 
posted behind temporary breastworks ; " ^ and at 11 A. M. he 
wrote, ^^ The enemy penetrated a short time since to the road 
leading to McDaniels's [McDonald's] house, and I fear they 
are trying to cut off our communications with Bossville 
through the hiUs behind the centre of our army. I think, 
therefore, it is of the utmost importance that Negley's division 
be ordered to that point, — the left of my line." ^ Bosecrans 
replied that Negley was on the way, and that Brannan's 

160W.R.,277. «J5., 441, 685-686, 714 «J5.,489. 

*J5. * 16., 188. •16. TJ6. 


reserve brigade was available, and upon another call for 
re-enf oroements coming from Thomas immediately after- 
wards, he ordered Van Cleve's division from Crittenden's 
corps to his assistance.^ It will be of advantage at this 
point to ascertain the numbers of the contending forces. 
Polk attacked with Hill's and Walker's corps. They state 
in their reports that these two corps entered the battle on 
the 19th with 15,417 men.* On the 19th, Hill's corps of 
8,884 men had lost 476.« In Walker's corps, Liddell's 
division, reported as 3,175 strong on the 18th, lost 105 on 
that day and 1,393 September 19-20.^ Assuming half this 
loss to have been suffered on the 19th, the strength of the 
division on the 20th was 2,374. Gist's division, which lost 
heavily on the 19th, is reported to have entered the action on 
the 20th with about 1,980.^ These figures would leave the 
force which attacked on the 20th as about 12,800. When 
Polk's attack began it seems that Thomas had about 17,500 
present equipped for duty. This number is arrived at as 
follows: Thomas's corps niunbered 12,458. The force of 
Negley's two absent brigades is not given, but as they 
contained seven regiments of infantry and a battery, while 
there were fifty-four regiments and eleven batteries in the 
corps, it seems safe to assume that these two brigades num- 
bered 1,750, and upon this assumption he had of his corps 
10,700 men present on the 19th.* Palmer had 5,000 men. 
Assuming Johnson's divison to constitute one-third of the 
Twentieth Corps, it had 3,300 men. The losses of these two 
divisions on that day are not given ; but assuming that it was 
one half of the total of 3,010 on both days, there were over 
6,800 men left for the battle of the 20tL7 Of all the troops 
which Thomas had in rear of his front line, it appears that 
only one brigade and a portion of another were moved to con- 

1 BOW. R., 58,69. « 61 W. R, 146, 243. »B., 198,202. 

* B., 243, 251, 254. * B., 246. 

• 50 W. R., 41, 170, 371, 378, 886, 717, 720. ' B., 174, 176, 617, 720. 


front the Confederates who were coming round the left flank, 
and considerable numbers had no share in repelling any part 
of Polk's line,^ and it is not possible to discover in the Eecord 
the evidence of anything which should have prevented Thomas 
from moving his reserves to his left as Sosecrans requested, 
or which justified him in calling for aid from Crittenden or 
McCook. In fact, the attack on the left was completely 
beaten off without the aid of any of the troops sent by these 
commanders.^ Hill says in his report, " The whole corps had 
failed in its attack. ... A heavy pressure upon us when first 
disordered by the repulse might have been serious.'' ^ 

When Kosecrans had started all the re-enforcements for 
Thomas, there remained beyond the right of the latter's 
conunand Wood's division of Crittenden's corps and Davis's 
division of McCook's corps, in the front line, and Laiboldt's 
brigade of Sheridan's division in reserve.^ At this time 
Longstreet, holding back his right (which extended in front 
of Thomas) because of the failure of Polk's conmiand next 
to him to make the expected impression on the Union lines,^ 
was advancing with his left under Hood to attack in the 
vicinity of Brotherton's, — the point where Wood's division 
joined Brannan's division, which was the extreme right of 
Thomas's command. At this juncture a most unhappy 
mistake occurred. An of&cer of Thomas's staff, at about 
10.45, informed Rosecrans that Brannan's division was out 
of line, and that the right of Reynolds's division, which was 
next on the left, was exposed, while in fact Brannan's division 
was in its place but somewhat retired, as if en ichdon. 
Rosecrans, yet unconscious, and apparently unsuspicious, of 
the line which, under cover of the forest, was sweeping down 
on his right, promptly ordered Wood to "close up on 

1 60 W. R., 2T7, 278, 287, 301, 310, 317, 367, 369, 371, 379, 401, 417, 429, 441, 
448, 536, 714, 1040. 
a lb., 278. » 61 W. R., 143-144. 

* 60 W. R., 69, 680. * 61 W. R., 288. 


Reynolds as fast as possible, and snpport him."^ Wood 
faced to the left and came up against Brannan's division, but, 
ignorant of the error in fact which had caused Bosecrans 
to send him the order, padsed in rear of Brannan to obey 
the order literally. On the way he met lliomas, who told 
him that Reynolds did not need support, and took the re- 
sponsibility of ordering him to the extreme left wing to 
support Baird's division.^ An attempt was made by McCook 
to close up the gap left by Wood with Davis's division,' but 
before this was accomplished Hood's line swept through this 
gap so rapidly as to cut off and cany away several regiments 
from the rear of Wood's column and a brigade of Van Cleve's 
division as they were marching to the left. 

The withdrawal of the re-enforcements for Thomas had 
left in the line of the right wing of the army only Davis's 
division of two brigades and Laiboldt's brigade of Sheridan's 
division, numbering in all not over 2,600 men.^ Hood's line 
enveloped them on the right flank, and quickly swept them 
back.^ Sheridan with his two other brigades was hastening 
towards Thomas when Hood's men, coming round the right 
flank of Pavis, struck him. He halted and faced them, but 
was forced back. He made repeated stands, until, discovering 
that the enemy had pushed between him and the left wing of 
the army, he endeavored to join Thomas by the Dry Creek 
Valley Road.^ Finding the enemy had pushed to this road, 
and were in his path, he marched to Thomas by the way of 
RossviUe, and a little before nightfall joined Thomas's left in 
advance of Rossville, but did not come into engagement with 
the enemy .7 He had with him not over 2,500 men.' The 
three regiments of Wood's division which were carried away 
numbered 452.^ The brigade of Van Cleve's division which 
was carried away numbered on the 19th 1,384.^^ The sum of 

1 60W.R.,69,e85. « J5., 251, 686. « J5., 400, 600. 

* B., 42, 490, 600, 680. * J5., 600. « 15., 680-681. 

» U., 681, 684, 697. • B., 681. » J5., 648, 666. ^ J5., 810. 


all these numbers is 6,936. This is probably an excessive 
estimate of the strength of what has been called the right 
wing, which was swept away. All the rest of the army had 
joined, or were marching to join, Thomas. Longstreet's men, 
turning to the right, struck the right flank and rear of 
Brannan's division, and forced it to swing backwards, and 
then Wood and Van Cleve joined Brannan, and they formed 
a new line facing the direction of Longstreet's attack in flank, 
and made front against the enemy.^ At about 2 p. M., 
Thomas, unaware of the disaster on the right, riding towards 
his right, and still expecting to see Sheridan coming to 
re-enforce him,^ was undeceived by the onset of Longstreet's 
troops from the right in place of Sheridan. A stubborn bat- 
tle then ensued on this flank. Grranger, hurrying up from 
Rossville, joined Thomas with three brigades. The strength 
of two of these brigades is given as 3,913.^ If we assume 
that the other (McCook's) had half this number, we make 
Grranger's force 5,870, and the conclusion is reached that the 
total force which came under Thomas's command, excluding 
Sheridan's men, was, all told, about 32,000. Longstreet 
reports his force at 22,882.^ Cheatham's division, which 
joined in the later attacks of the right wing, is reported at 
4,778.* Adding Polk's force of 13,000, as above estimated, 
we flnd the total force of Bragg's army to have been little 
over 40,000.® Between 3 and 4 o'clock Garfield brought an 
order from Bosecrans to Thomas, to take command of the 
forces and assume a threatening attitude at Rossville.^ 

1 60 W. R^ 402. 9 B., 262. « B., 866. 

* 61W.R.,291. » 15., 79, 82. 

* Colonel Dawes, in Batdes and Leaders of ihe (HtiL War, toL iiL p. 676, 
waag the retnnis of " present for duty," Augost 81, in Hood's and MoLaws*s 
divisions (49 W. R., 681), estimates the Confederate force at Chiokamanga 
at 71,661 ; bnt this apparently indndes Wofford*s and Bryan's brigades of 
McLaws's diyision, which were not present (61 W. R., 18), and it also indndes 
those lost before September 20 and the oayalry, which are not indnded in the 
above estimate of 40,000. 

^ 60 W. B., 140, 263, 266. 


Thomas maintained a firm attitude until about 5.30, when he 
ordered the retreat. In beginning the movement to the rear, 
discovering the enemy in his path, he cleared them away by a 
charge of Reynolds's division. The enemy made attacks on 
several of the divisions as they were retiring, but met with no 
success, and Thomas secured his new position at Bossville. 
The disorder caused by Longstreet's irruption on Bosecrans's 
right might well have brought disaster upon the whole 
army if it had not consisted of brave and veteran soldiers. 
Thomas in this battle displayed the greatest quality as a 
fighter on the defence, and his admirable poise, coolness 
and imperturbability were doubtless worth an army corps. 
Whether his perception of what was to be expected from 
the enemy was such as we look for in a profound strategist, 
or whether his conservatism was responsible in any degree for 
the disaster due to unnecessarily stripping the right wing to 
re-enforce the left, is a question. 

In his report Thomas makes no mention of sending the 
&tal message to Bosecrans which brought Wood's division 
out of the line, and makes no justification of his appropriation 
of this division. Bosecrans says that Captain Kellogg 
brought the word.^ Van Home does not say who brought it.^ 
Turchin, in his history of the battle, says that Captain 
Kellogg heard it from Reynolds, and accepted it as a fact, 
and reported it to Bosecrans,^ and the latter adopted this 
theory in a letter to the Adjutant-Greneral, January 12, 1864.* 
Cist, in his history of the Army of the Cumberland, says 
that Lieutenant-Colonel Yon Schrader of Thomas's staff, 
after riding the lines, reported the alleged fact to Thomas, 
and that the latter sent the information to Bosecrans.^ 
Much blame has been thrown on Greneral Wood for not 
discovering that the order to close up on Beynolds could not 
be fulfilled literally, and for not reporting to Bosecrans for 

1 60 W. R., 69. 9 1 Van Home, A. of C, 847. « Tniohin, 112. 

*60W.R, 1017. *Ci»t,206. 


instructions when he discovered this fact. The inquiry arises 
whether Greneral Thomas did not commit a graver fault in 
ordering Wood's division still farther away without consult- 
ing Bosecrans. 

The " legend '' of a map entitled, " Tactical Study of the 
Battlefield of Chickamauga," issued by the War Department 
(Sheets 5 and 6), for which Captain Kellogg was responsible, 
stated that Brannan's division, having been placed in reserve 
for Thomas on the night of the 19th, was moved to the front 
without his knowledge on the morning of the 20th.^ This 
seems to be inconsistent with the reports,^ and Van Home's 
history.^ The writer is informed from the War Department 
that Captain Kellogg based his statements on the memory of 
himself and others; and General Bosecrans writes that the 
legend is wrong.* 

Immediately after this battle, when Grant was placed 
in conunand of the operations between Virginia and the 
Mississippi, he chose Thomas to command the Army of the 
Cumberland as we have seen.^ It has been said that it 
would have been only just to have entrusted the supreme 
conduct of affairs in the region around Chattanooga to 
Thomas instead of Grant. This leads to a comparison of 
their records up to that time. Thomas had won the victory 
of MiU Springs, and had commanded the right wing at the 
siege of Corinth, a corps at Stone's River and the left 
wing at Chickamauga. Grrant's first battle at Belmont in 
November, 1861, was not glorious because, having landed to 
attack a force there, he was obliged to take to his boats again, 
but tactically it was to his credit, for, with a force of 3,114 
men, he, with a loss of 485, broke up the enemy's camp, 
inflicted a loss of 641, and with raw troops effected a safe 

^ The legend of Plate zItL of the Atlas to aooompany the War Records, 
published in 1892, since this paper was -written, does not contain this state- 

3 6OW.R.,57,4O1,1O40. * 1 Van Home, A. of C, 842. 

* Supra, 248. » 68 W. R., 404 ; 66 W. R., 11. 


and orderly embarkation in the face of a force made superior 
to his by re-enforcement.^ In February, 1862, he started 
from Cairo for Fort Henry, sixiy miles up the Tennessee 
River. The Confederates abandoning the fort on the ap- 
proach of the navy, he marched at once for Fort Donelson, 
eleven miles away. The navy attacked and was repulsed. 
The enemy made a sortie which was repulsed, and Grant 
pushed up against the work. The commander and several 
thousand men fled on the night of the 15th, and on the 16th 
the fort was surrendered with a force reported by Buckner 
as 9,000 men.^ Grant in his Memoirs states that 14,623 
surrendered, and that the total Confederate force opposing 
him at first was 21,000.^ Buckner reported the total force 
as not over 12,000,* and Pillow reported it at 13,000.* The 
Becord does not state Grrant's . force, but he states it in his 
Memoirs as 27,000.« 

At Shiloh, April 6, 1862, with a force reported as number- 
ing 37,593 present for duty,^ he was attacked by Johnston 
with a force reported as having 40,335 effectives.® Probably 
Ghrant's " present for duty " should be reduced ten per cent, for 
a comparison. His army was forced back for a mile or two 
to the Tennessee River, and there with the aid of Nelson's 
division of 4,541 men from BueU's army and two gunboats 
he took up a new line,^ and on the next day, re-enforced by 
Wallace's division of his own army and about 20,000 men 
of Buell's army, he drove the enemy from the field,^*^ inflicting 
a loss of 10,694, and suffering a loss of 13,047.^ 

The Record disproves the statement so often made that the 
Union Army was surprised. It shows that the battle was 
opened by the attack of an advance party from one of the 
Union divisions,^ and that eachr division was in* line of battle 

I 3 W. R, 269, 271, 810, 825, 827; 846, 860. « 7 W. R., 836. 
« 1 Grant's Memoirs, 814-816. * 7 W. R., 885. » B., 288. 

« 1 Grant's Memoin, 815. ^ 10 W. R., 112. « !&, 896. » 26., 824 
^ lb,, 108; 11 W. R., 148; 1 Van Home, A. of C, 112, 115. 

II low. R., 108, 896. wj6.,27a 


to receive the enemy's attack.^ MePherson says, " It was 
well known the enemy was approaching our lines, and there 
had been more or less skirmishing for three days preceding 
the battle." ^ Hardee, who commanded the G>nfederate 
advance, says, "At early dawn the enemy attacked the 
skirmishers in front of my line; "^ and Bragg says, "The 
enemy did not give us time to discuss the question of attack, 
for soon after dawn he commenced a rapid musketry fire on 
our pickets." ^ The belief that there was a surprise seems to 
rest mainly on Grrant's despatch to Halleck of April 6, " I 
have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one) 
being made upon us, but will be prepared should such a 
thing take place," ^ and Sherman's despatch to Grant of same 
day, " I have no doubt nothing will occur to-day more than 
some picket firing."^ Sherman was right, for nothing 
more did occur that day, and although Grrant's prophecy was 
wrong, it ought to have been right. Corinth, where the 
Confederates were, was only twenty miles from Pittsburg 
Landing, where Grrant had landed three weeks before. At 
least ten days before it was evident to Johnston that Grant's 
purpose was to seize Corinth,^ and it would not have been a 
violent presumption that Johnston knew of Buell's march from 
Nashville to join Grant, which began as early as March 18,® 
and as Johnston had waited until Buell was within ten miles 
it was not reasonable to suppose that he would attack at that 
juncture, having refrained during so long a time when Grrant 
was alone. His only justification for leaving his strong 
defensive position was the attempt to beat Grant before BueU 
could arrive.® The logical result of his delay was the total 
and bitter defeat which his army suffered. Bragg wrote to 
Beauregard the next day on the road to Corinth : " Our con- 
dition is horrible. Troops utterly disorganized and demor- 

1 10 W. R., 114, 148, 203, 248, 278. « lb., 181. » B., 668. 

* B., 464. * B., 89. « 11 W. R., 93-94. ^ B., 861. 

•B.,42,46. »10W.R,385; 11 W. R., 381, 383, 387. 


alized. . . . Our artillery is being left all along the road by 
its officers ; indeed I find but few officers with their men." ^ 
*'^ The men are exhausted, dispirited, and work with no zeal ; " '^ 
and Breckinridge wrote to Bragg, " My troops are worn out 
and I don't think can be relied on after the first volley." ^ 

Grant's presence at Savannah, eight miles down the river, 
was not due to false securiiy. Buell had asked him to meet 
him there on his arrival, which took place on the evening of 
the 5th,^ and Grant had more reason to fear an attack on 
his depot at Crump's Landing, four miles below Pittsburg 
Landing, than on the latter place. At Savannah he was 
below both places, and within easy reach of either by 

Halleck refuted the charge that the army was surprised 
in a report to the Secretary of War, having made careful 
inquiry soon after the battle.* 

When Halleck went to Washington in the following July, 
Ghrant was placed in command of the operations in West 
Tennessee, Kentucky and Mississippi. He directed the 
campaign in which the actions at luka and Corinth were 
fought, and in December he began the series of operations 
for the capture of Vicksburg. After the resolute but vain 
efforts to seize a position from which to approach it on the 
east side of the Mississippi, being urged by Halleck to join 
forces with Banks to operate against Port Hudson or 
Vicksburg,^ on the 12th of April he started down the west 
side of the river, passed Vicksburg, and then crossed the 
river, attacked and routed about 6,000 Confederates under 
Bowen at Port Gribson, May 1.^ Then learning that Banks 
was off in Louisiana,^ without delay he pushed into the 
interior, brushed aside the advance of the enemy,^^ pene- 

1 11 W. R., 308. « Ib.y 399. « 16., 400. 

* J&., 91 ; 10 W. R., 291. * 10 W. R., 175, 178, 179. 

«JJ.,98, 99. 7 86W.R.,26. « B., 26, 29, 84. 

» 88 W. R., 223, 225. " 86 W. R., 36. 


trated between the armies of Pemberton at Vicksburg and 
Johnston at Jackson,^ and after defeating the latter turned 
the whole force on Vicksburg, and, investing that place, 
compelled its surrender with 30,000 men July 4.^ Johnston's 
effective force behind him was reported June 25 at 28,164,^ and 
the losses of the Confederates in action are set down in the 
incomplete reports as over 6,350.* Their total force is thus 
shown to have been at least 64,500. Grant's force present 
for duty, all told, up to his arrival before Vicksburg, was a 
little less than 57,000.^ The strategy which accomplished 
such results was of a kind unheard of in our war up to that 
time, and was worthy of the most brilliant commanders in 
history. It would have been strange if the authorities at 
Washington, seeking for a leader to drive the G>nf ederates 
from East Tennessee, should have preferred Thomas, even 
with all his noble qualities, to a general with this record of 
incessant activity, successful strategy and aggressive tactics. 
Grant assumed command October 18, arrived at Chattanooga 
on the 23d,^ and on November 18 issued orders for the 
attack on Bragg's army, which, following the Union army 
from the battie of Chickamauga, had taken position on 
Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain in the face of 
Chattanooga.7 Sherman had brought up a part of tiie Army 
of the Tennessee on the other side of the Tennessee River. 
He was to attack on the left, while Thomas attacked on the 
centre and on the right. Grant wrote to Thomas, "The 
general plan, you imderstand, is for Sherman ... to effect 
a crossing of the Tennessee River just below the mouth of 
Chickamauga, . . . and to secure the heights from the 
northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the 
enemy can concentrate against him. You will co-operate 

1 86 W. R., 36. « B., 44. » 38 W. R., 97a 

* 37 W. R., 82, 99, 112, 328, 654 

* Indadiiig the 4th Diyisioii of the 16Ui Coips, 37 W. R., 148, 154; 38 W. 

* 54 W. R., 706. ' 55 W. R., 31. 


with Sherman. The troops in Chattanooga Valley should 
be well concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the 
necessary force to defend fortifications on the right and 
centre, and a movable column of one division in readiness to 
move whenever ordered. This division should show itself as 
threateningly as possible on the most practicable line for 
making an attack up the valley. Your effort then will be 
to form a junction with Sherman, making your advance 
well toward the northern end of Missionary Ridge, and 
moving as near simultaneously with him as possible. The 
juncture once formed, and the Ridge carried, communications 
will be at once established between the two armies by roads 
on the south bank of the river. Farther movements will 
then depend on those of the enemy." ^ Sherman having 
started up the river for the crossing, Thomas on the 23d, 
under orders from Grant to ascertain whether Bragg was 
retreating as had been reported,^ assaulted Bragg's advanced 
line in front of the town and seized and held Orchard Enob ; 
and the next morning Hooker, being sent by Thomas to make 
a demonstration against the enemy's left flank on Lookout 
Mountain to divert them from Sherman while he was crossing 
the river, carried the point and eastern slope of the mountain 
at about midday.' Sherman crossed the river and seized the 
northern end of the Ridge on the same day.^ Grant then 
wrote to him : ^^ You will attack the enemy at the point most 
advantageous from your position at early dawn to-morrow 
morning (25th instant). General Thomas has been instructed 
to commence the attack early to-morrow morning. He will 
carry the enemy's rifle-pits in his immediate front, or move to 
the left to your support, as circumstances may determine 
best." ^ And to Thomas : ^^ I have instructed General 
Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in the morning, and 
your attack, which will be simultaneous, will be in co-opera- 

1 66 W. B., 31. « 16., 88, 41. • J5., 43, 96, 106, 100. 

* J5., 88, 84. » U., 43. 


tion. Your command will either carry the rifle-pits and Ridge 
directly in front of them or move to the left, as the presence 
of the enemy may require/' ^ Sherman attacked with great 
vigor but could not get beyond the railroad tunneL^ Grant 
reports that he had intended to delay the attack on the centre 
for Hooker's appearance on the left flank of the enemy via the 
Chattanooga Valley, the Summertown road and Rossville 
according to orders.' Sherman apparently did not under- 
stand the delay, for at 12.45 P. M. he asked, ^^ Where is 
Thomas ? " * Thomas replied at 1 p. m. from Orchard Knob, 
*'*' I am here ; my right [Hooker] is closing in from Lookout 
Mountain toward Missionary Ridge." ^ The enemy were 
then seen massing re-enforcements on their right against 
Sherman,^ and Baird's division was despatched from Thomas 
to re-enforce him, but he sent word to Grant that he did not 
need re-enforcement and Baird formed on Thomas's left.^ 
Grrant says in his report that he then directed Thomas to 
move forward the centre, ^^ and carry the rifle-pits at the foot 
of Missionary Ridge, and when carried to re-form his lines on 
the rifle-pits with a view to carrying the top of the Ridge." ' 
Thomas's troops not only obeyed the order to carry the rifle- 
pits, but also of their own accord, without halting to re-form, 
pushed on and carried the Ridge, and the enemy were routed. 
It has been asserted that Grrant did not intend to cany 
the Ridge by this attack, that no order to that effect can be 
found, and that the movement was intended as a mere 
diversion in Sherman's favor. The latter assertion seems 
inconsistent with the fact that Sherman had just before 
declined re-enforcements. It is probable that Grant gave his 
order to Thomas orally as they were together. No written 
copy is contained in the Record, but what seems to be 
conclusive evidence that it contemplated carrying the Ridge 

1 56 W. R., 44. 3 lb., 674-676. » lb., 34, 06, 112, 113, 116. 

* 25., 44. » 16. • B., 34, 78, 96, 760. 

TU.,608. ^ Ib,,ZL 


is found in Baird's report. He says that an officer of 
Thomas's staff brought him an oral order to take the rifle- 
pits, and told him that ^^ this was intended as preparatory to 
a general assault on the mountain, and .that it was doubtless 
designed by the major-general commanding that I should 
take part in this movement, so that I would be following his 
wishes were I to push on to the summit."^ One writer 
intimates that Thomas deserves credit for the spontaneous 
action of his troops because his long command over them had 
infused them with the spirit which actuated them.' The 
Record hardly sustains this proposition, for it shows that of 
the four divisions which made the assault, Sheridan's and 
Wood's which were in the centre were not of Thomas's corps 
and had been under his command only five weeks. 

It has also been said that Ghrant had determined to give 
Sherman the principal part in this battle, and that this was 
unwarranted in view of Thomas's greater experience and 
successes, but the Record does not confirm this view. While 
it is clear that Grrant intended to have Sherman seize the 
Ridge as far as the tunnel before Thomas should attack in 
the centre, yet we have already seen that Thomas's attack 
was intended to be concurrent with Sherman's when the latter 
had reached the tunnel, and we find that his force was greater 
than Sherman's. The latter had the divisions of M. L. 
Smith, Ewing and J. E. Smith of his own army and the 
division of Davis of Thomas's army, in all numbering 19,317 
present for duty.' It appears that it was not originally 
intended that Howard's corps should come under his com- 
mand, but joining him during the battle it brought 6,370 
present for duty, thus making his total force 25,687.* 
Osterhaus's division of his army numbering 3,734 present for 
duty^ was under Thomas's command, and the total of his 
infantry and artilleiy present for duly was 40,963.® Of the 

1 65 W. R., 606. « AnU, 186. « 65 W. R., IS. 

* J5., 849. * 16., 13, 96. « 16.. 12-14 


troops from the Army of the Cumberland, Sherman put into 
action only one battery and three regiments. In this case as 
in others at least ten per cent, should be deducted from the 
"present for duty" of the Union armies to compare them 
with Confederate reports of " eflfectives present." It appears 
that three weeks before, the twenty-six brigades of infantry 
and the artillery which engaged in the battle on the 
Confederate side, numbered about 33,000.^ The force 
opposed to Sherman at the tunnel was Cleburne's division of 
four brigades, numbering 5,213 effectives,^ and six or seven 
brigades from other divisions.^ The force opposed to Thomas's 
four divisions of 27,216 present for duty, which attacked in 
the centre, comprised fourteen brigades, numbering about 
17,900 effectives.* In the course of the battle three ^ of these 
brigades were sent to make part of the above mentioned 
force opposing Sherman. 

March 12, 1864, Grant was given the command of all the 
armies and Sherman was given the command extending from 
Arkansas to East Tennessee.^ Commenting upon this, one 
writer has said that Thomas " had held far greater responsi- 
bilities than Sherman, — had commanded larger armies, had 
taken leading part in more battles, had achieved far more 
important results, and had always been successful," ^ and that 
it was a public misfortune that Grrant did not display towards 
Thomas at least a portion of the friendship and confidence 
which he entertained for Sherman. If this means that the 

^ The artillery of Walker's diTision, esdmated at 315, and ReynoldB's brigade, 
estimated at 068, as one-third of Bnokner's division ; and 300 deducted from 
Wright's brigade for absent regiments. 55 W. R., 700. 

« 16., 656. 

* Wright's, Le-wis's, Brown's, Cnmming's, Maney's, bemdes one not identified, 
and possibly Pettus's. lb,, 707, 708, 730, 726, 740, 753, 735, 751, 725. 

* Hindman's, Walker's and Stewart's diyidons, two brigades of BreckiB- 
ridge's division, estimated at 3,774, and Reynolds's brigade. 16., 740, 741, 747> 
748, 730, 656. 

ft Chmiming's and Maney's, and one not identified. 16., 735, 751. 

* 50 W. R., 58. 7 68 AUantio Monthly, 511. 


command in the West should have been given to Thomas 
rather than to Sherman, a summary of the latter's career as 
contained' in the Record should be compared with Thomas's 
up to this date. Sherman commanded a brigade at Bull Eun. 
In April, 1862, at Pittsburg Landing he won the approbation 
of every one by his resolute opposition on the first day with 
his division of 8,800 men, and on the second day he led it to 
victory. On the 28th of May in the siege of Corinth with 
his division re-enf orCed by two brigades he fought a successful 
engagement in the presence of Grant and Thomas.^ In 
December he took four divisions of 32,000 men 2 in the 
expedition down the Mississippi against Yicksburg and made 
the unsuccessful attack on Haynes Bluff.^ He says in his 
report that the attack was necessary to a successful accom- 
plishment of his orders,^ and that he attributes the ^^ failure, 
to the strength of the enemy's position." ^ A fortnight later 
he commanded one of the two corps in the successful attack 
on Arkansas Post, where with a loss of 1,061 men^ a fort, 
with 17 pieces of artillery and 5,000 men, was captured.^ 
In the Yicksburg campaign he conunanded a corps of 20,000^ 
and took part in the siege and the battle of Jackson and the 
assaults of May 19 and 22.^ If anything more than this 
record were necessary to justify Grant in choosing Sherman 
as his lieutenant in the West, his incessant activity and his 
hearty and prompt support of Grant in everything which had 
been essayed — in good and in evil fortune — would have 
justified Gbrant in confiding to him the charge of the great 
campaign which was to begin with the spring of 1864. 

As the publication of the War Department Records has 
not yet reached the Atlanta campaign, it is not within the 
scope of this paper to compare Sherman and Thomas in that 

1 10 W. R., 743. « 24 W. R., 608, 604. « 16., 605 ef teq. 

* 16., 606. « 16., 610. • 16., 719. 

7 J6., 708, 780, 783, 791. • 38 W. R.. 249. 

• 36 W. R., 54, 55, 751 et seq. 


campaign, but certain parts of the correspondence between 
them and Grant upon the eve of the march to the sea throw 
such light upon the question whether Sherman in taking 
away so large a force as he led to the coast unjustifiably 
weakened Thomas or imperilled the national cause in Ten- 
nessee, that it will not be unprofitable to notice them here. 
One writer has said that while Sherman took away 62,000 
men he left with Thomas only ^^ 25,000 men, — the remnants 
of the two smallest corps, including all dismounted cavalry, 
all sick and wounded."^ Turning to the correspondence, 
we find a report of Sherman to Gbant, November 1, that 
Thomas had 40,000 to 45,000 men and that two divisions 
were on the way to him from Missouri,^ and a despatch from 
Sherman to Thomas, November 2, as follows : " According to 
Wilson's account, you will have in ten days full 12,000 
cavalry, and I estimate your infantry force, independent of 
railroad guards, full 40,000 men, which is a force superior 
to the enemy." ^ Thomas in his report of the campaign 
estimates Hood's force which was then at Florence, Alabama, 
about a himdred miles south of Nashville, at 52,000 to 
60,000.^ We shall not be able to determine whether it 
was within these limits until the Confederate reports are 
published, but it is safe to assume that Thomas did not 
underestimate it, in view of his knowledge at the time of 
making his report, which was after he had met and defeated 
this force.^ Sherman was unable to divine whether Hood 
would f oUow him as he marched into Greorgia or would try 

^ 68 Atlantic Monthly, 511-512. 

s G. W., 1 Sup., Sherman's Report, 251. 

* Ib,^ 252. Thomas also states his effeothre foroe, «»Tft1n«ling that gaaidiiy 
the railroad and varions posts, as about 29,700. 

« B., Thomas's Report, 369. 

' The War Records published since the aboye was written state the ^ present 
for duty " under Thomas's command, Noyember 20, as 71,473 ; and the ** present 
for duty " in Hood's command, November 6, as 35,662, of which 30,599 were 
effectives, and to which, apparentiy, at least 5,500 should be added, for Foneat'a 
and Roddey's cavalry. 93 W. R., 52, 648, 67a 


to invade Tennessee. He wrote to Thomas October 29, " I 
will give you notice when I start. All preparations are 
now progressing, but I want to know Hood's movements and 
how well you are prepared before I start ; " ^ again on the 
31st, ^^You must unite all your men into one army, and 
abandon all minor points, if you expect to defeat Hood. He 
will not attack posts, but march around them ; " ^ and again 
from Kingston about half way from Chattanooga to Atlanta 
November 10, "All will be ready to start from here the 
day after to-morrow. Keep me well advised. I think you 
will find Hood marching off, and you should be ready to 
follow him;"* and on the 11th, "I can hardly believe 
Beauregard would attempt to work against Nashville from 
Corinth as a base at this stage of the war, but all information 
seems to point that way. If he does, you will whip him out 
of his boots. ... I still believe public clamor will force him 
to turn and follow me." ^ On the next day Thomas vrrote, 
" I have no fears that Beaur^ard can do us any harm now, 
and if he attempts to follow you I will follow him as far as 
possible. If he does not foUow you, I will then thoroughly 
organize my troops, and, I believe, shall have men enough 
to ruin him unless he gets out of the way very rapidly." * 
This was the last despatch between them. On that day 
^conmiunications were broken, and Sherman's army marched to 
Atlanta. It marched out of that place for the Atlantic coast 
on the ISth. After this correspondence it would seem that 
Sherman's consideration for Thomas was not open to ques- 
tion. That the force left with Thomas was sufficient was 
proven by the event. Whatever risk resulted later from 
Schofield's position at Franklin and Spring Hill was due to 
Thomas's choosing to have him at Franklin rather than at 

Sherman had before him the neoessily of living on the 

^ C. W., 1 Sup., Shennan't Report, 245. < i&., 24a 

• It., 264. * 15., 266. » ib., 267. 


country in a marcli of three hundred miles. How easy or 
how difficult this was to be could not be foreseen. It was 
possible that a full half of his army would have to scatter 
itself over the coimtry to search for food and forage, and it 
was also possible that serious obstacles might be thrown in 
the path of the army which would detain it and seriously 
embarrass it unless its numbers were sufficient to sweep 
opposition from its path and dear the road of physical 
obstacles without delay. A great preponderance of numbers 
over any possible opposing force was necessary for these 
contingencies. Again, if Hood had taken the course of 
following on Sherman's heels, he too might have brought 
disaster upon a force not greatly stronger than his own. 
On the other hand. Hood in attempting to invade Kentucky, 
much more in sitting down before a fortified place held by 
Thomas, with his railroad to the South broken up and his 
source of supplies harried up by Sherman, was sure to be at 
a great disadvantage against equal numbers, and in an actual 
attack on fortifications he could have no hope. There were 
reasons for giving Sherman and Thomas entire confidence 
in the ability of the latter, with the force left him, to defeat 
Hood if he turned northward. Besides this, Thomas had the 
resources and men of the whole North at his back. 

[The originals of the following letters have been placed 
with the manuscript of this paper in the Archives of the 
Society by Colonel Livermore.] 

War Department, War Records Office, 

WASHiKaTON, December 29, 1891. 

My DEAB Sir, — I beg to acknowledge the receipt of 
your favor of the 27th inst., in regard to "The Tactical 
Study of the Battlefield of Chickamauga," which has 
recently been issued by the War Department. As that work 
was not published by this office, I am only familiar, in a 
casual way, with the text of the legends that are inscribed 


on the several maps ; I only know that it was done with the 

greatest care by an officer of the highest character and 

capacity, from his trauiing, for the work, which, from his 

association with General Thomas as an aide during the battle, 

he was peculiarly weU fitted to undertake. I will, therefore, 

refer your letter to him, and he will explain to you the 

authorities upon which his statements were based, and I 

remain, Faithfully yours, 

Geobge B. Davis, 

Major, U. S. A. 
To T. L. LiyxBMQBX, Emi. 

War Department, War Records Office, 

WASHiNaTON, December 80, 1891. 

Mt dear Snt, — I have seen Colonel Kellogg, with 
reference to the legends on the Chickamauga maps, and he 
tells me that his data concerning all points not covered by 
the Union and Confederate reports of the battle were 
derived mainly from what he himself saw, as an aide-de- 
camp for Major-General Thomas, during the battle, and 
what was known to other general and staff officers, and 
others, who were participants in the battle, and had to do 
with the movements on Sunday afternoon, along General 
Thomas' line. 

If there is anything further in the way of information I 

can give you, I hope you will conmiand me freely, and I 

remain, Faithfully yours, 

Geobge B. Davis, 

Major, U. S. A. 
To T. L. LiVKBiiosB, Emi. 

WASHDroTOK, D. C, January 13, 1802. 

Mt deab Colonel, — Replying to yours received about 
one week ago : I have not yet had time to examine the maps 
nor the legend of the atlas of which you speak ; but, from 
what you say, it must be in error and the reports correct. 

Brannan's division was reported to have one brigade on 


the line of Beynolds' right at the time the orders were made 
out and deliyered to the corps commanders at headquarters in 
the widow Glenn's house on the night of the 19th. 

Beginning very early after daylight on the morning of the 
20th, Greneral Thomas and I rode the full length of his line, 
beginning on the left and passing to the right. That matter 
was spoken of, and it was said that we would leave that 
brigade in line of battle, and that Brannan should hold the 
other two as reserves for emergencies. 

I am Sony that any such mistake should have crept into the 

Greneral Thomas and I were at the right of Brannan's 
brigade, and a little in the rear, when, saying I would send 
him Negley as soon as I could, I left him. 

Very truly yours, 

CoiAHXL Thoxas L. LiyXBXOBB. 

This letter was written in reply to my inquiry as to the 
correctness of the legend on War Department Map of 
Chickamauga to the effect that Brannan's division was moved 
from the reserve into the line without Thomas's order or 
knowledge. T. L. L. 




Bqninted bjf permi$$ion/nm '* Scribner^g M(igazine^^ /or Jum^ 1891, 


The death of General Sherman removes the last of the 
conspicuously successful generals of the Union forces. It is 
true that there are still living in the North generals who have 
commanded large armies with distinction, who have fought 
and won great battles. But neither Buell nor Rosecrans, 
neither Pope nor Banks, remained in active command till the 
dose of the war. The day of final triumph found others in 
their places. Hence it may not be inappropriate at this time, 
when, arrested by the death of the brilUant officer who has so 
recently left us, the minds of those who have lived through 
the war naturally turn to the scenes they have witnessed and 
the experience they have passed through, to glance at some 
of the more salient features and characteristics of our late 

The magnitude of the task which the North proposed to 
itself — the conquest of such a vast territory, defended by 
such an able, resolute and gallant people — was not fuUy 
seen at the beginning. Many were the oflFers of troops which 
the Washington Government refused in the spring of 1861. 
The splendid opportunity, which then existed and never came 
again, of increasing the i*egular army to a force exceeding 
a hundred thousand men, was carelessly thrown away. 
Sherman, who insisted that at least two hundred thousand 
men would be required for the single task of opening the 
Mississippi Biver, was regarded, even as late as the fall of 
1861, by many persons, as almost insane. 

Similar misconceptions prevailed among our Southern 


neighbors. Their authorities made no use of the opportunity 
which existed at the outset of the war of carrying cotton 
to England and drawing biUs against it for the financial 
needs of the Confederacy. The orders which they sent to 
Europe for the purchase of arms and ammunition were wholly 
inadequate to their needs. Their preparations for defending 
their borders against the threatened invasion of the North 
were exceedingly imperfect. 

Nor was this to be wondered at. The people of the United 
States then were and are still an immilitary people, — like 
their cousins on the other side of the water. They are, it 
is true, by no means averse to fighting ; they are unquestion- 
ably as obstinate and resolute fighters as any people on earth. 
But that is quite a different thing from being a military 
people. The " art military " was cultivated by but few of 
the officers of the regular army ; to the major part of them 
and to the public at large it was nearly unknown. Hence, 
the recommendations of sagacious military men, like Sherman, 
on our side, and J. E. Johnston, on the other, were made 
to imreceptive ears, and were received with that peculiar 
impatience with which people of average abilities and fair 
success in life hear unwelcome advice on a subject of which 
they know nothing, but which in their hearts they believe 
to be a very simple matter. 

The North was the first to rise to the height of the 
situation. Not only did the mortifying issue of the first 
battle of Bull Run put an end to the easy-going confidence 
with which up to that time her prosperous communities 
had anticipated a speedy victory, but it had the effect also 
of rousing that strong and determined purpose to achieve 
success, which had always characterized the energetic, inde- 
&tigable, resolute workers of the Eastern and Western 
States from Maine to Minnesota. The Northern people, 
accustomed to the control of ample resources and to the 
carrying on of large business undertakings, made their 


preparations in the winter of 1861 and 1862 on a large scale. 
There was no stint anywhere. Men, money, ships, guns, 
horses, equipment of every kind, were freely forthcoming. 
The spring of 1862 saw large armies, admirably appointed, 
weU-drilled and well-officered, standing on the borders of 
the Confederacy, waiting only the order to march; a well- 
equipped navy not only held all the Southern coast in the 
grip of its blockade, but dominated the great rivers which 
commanded the communications of aU the advanced posts of 
the enemy in the West. And these vast hosts were full of 
a genuine and strong devotion to the cause of their country. 

On the other side of the line there was little at this time 
to encourage the friends of the South. A careless confi- 
dence, degenerating often into contempt for their adversaries, 
combined with the unfamiliarity of the Southern planter with 
the conduct of great business enterprises, was evidenced in 
the weak army which J. E. Johnston opposed to that of 
McClellan in the East, in the whoUy inadequate preparations 
of A. S. Johnston to maintain the hold of the Confederacy 
in the States of Kentucky and Tennessee, in the insufficient 
defences of New Orleans. When the storm had passed away. 
New Orleans had fallen ; Kentucky and Tennessee were 
under Federal control; the Mississippi was free as far as 
Vicksburg ; and it was Bichmond and not Washington that 
was in imminent peril. 

But the series of disasters with which the year 1862 
opened did not daunt the spirit of the South; on the 
contrary, the soldiers and people of the Confederacy, now 
realizing for the first time the desperate nature of the 
contest, strengthened themselves in their determination never 
to yield, and redoubled their eflforts. The levies of the North 
were met by nearly the entire military strength of the South. 
In place of the comforts and luxuries which were ruthlessly 
taken away by the invasion and the blockade, was now to be 
seen the patient and enduring temper which can dispense 


with all that is not of absolute necessity. The Southern 
generals met the superior numbers of their foes with an 
audacity and enterprise which they had not hitherto shown 
that they possessed. Six weeks after Fort Donelson had 
surrendered with 15,000 men, and Kentucky and the greater 
part of Tennessee had been abandoned to the Union arms, 
the scattered and demoralized forces of the Confederacy 
in the West were united under the lead of Albert Sidney 
Johnston. That able and daring officer at once took the 
initiative. Grant at Shiloh was surprised by one of the most 
sudden, fierce and determined onslaughts known to military 
history ; and although he, with the aid of a portion of Buell's 
army, held his own, and finally succeeded in forcing his 
opponent to retire, the whole affair showed how far the South 
was from being willing to accept defeat. So in Virginia, 
Stonewall Jackson, by his marvellous sagacity and daring 
enterprise, entirely disconcerted the plans of the Washington 
Grovemment for massing an overwhelming force against 
Richmond; and, on Jackson's finally uniting his force to 
that of Lee, McClellan, whose peculiar characteristics were ill 
suited to deal with such emergencies, was forced to undertake 
a dangerous and difficult retreat from the immediate neigh- 
borhood of Richmond to Harrison's Landing on the river 

The Federal Government, with a praiseworthy desire to 
stop unnecessary expense and a happy credulity as to the 
certainty of the success which they were sure must result 
from their really enormous military preparations for the 
spring campaign, had, early in April, 1862, actually stopped 
recruiting, and the Army of the Potomac now urgently 
needed re-enforcements. But the people of the North were in 
their comprehension of the situation far ahead of their rulers. 
The governors of the Northern States met together, and 
begged President Lincoln to call for 300,000 men. Mr. 
Lincoln was really astounded at the size of the requisition 


wMch he was desired to make upon the patriotism of the 
comitry. He thought at first that half the number would 
do. But the governors, Andrew, Morgan, Curtin, Morton 
and the others, able men of affairs and of large experience, 
and who were moreover the representatives and spokesmen 
of the business men of the North and West, knew better, 
and 300,000 it was. 

These illustrations show how the emergencies of the war 
served to bring out the resolute and unyielding traits 
belonging to our race, — the unconquerable determination 
to meet and conquer every difficulty, either by some new 
contribution of force, or by some desperate and daring 
expedient, or by patience and perseverance under existing 
circumstances. The war thus becomes psychologically inter- 
esting as an exhibition of the Anglo-Saxon race on trial, and 
on a grand theatre. 

What we have just said about the governors of the 
Northern States and President Lincoln leads naturally to 
the characteristics of the latter's administration during the 
war. It certainly cannot be said to have been a brilliant 
administration. There can be no doubt that an enormous 
amount of money was unnecessarily spent, a great many men 
needlessly sacrificed and a great deal of time uselessly 
consumed. The resources of the North were vast, and they 
were tendered to the government with a patriotism and 
liberality that knew no measure. But the task was one 
that would have taxed the abilities of the most experienced 
ruler, and Mr. Lincoln was anything but an experienced 
ruler. Wisely, economically and judiciously to collect and 
dispose of the enormous resources of the United States 
required a familiarity with the conduct of affairs on a large 
scale, utterly beyond anything with which the President had 
ever had anything to do in the whole course of his Hfe. 
Abraham Lincoln, though new to public office, was probably 
the wisest and most sagacious statesman we have ever had in 


this country ; his political management of a&drs during the 
war illustrated his great qualities and won the admiration of 
all men. But the military tasks imposed by the war were 
not only entirely outside of Mr. Lincoln's previous expe- 
rience, but even he, wise and sensible as he was, did not at 
first realize that in such matters he had better consult 
experts, and be guided by them. His first appointments in 
the army were made almost at random. Major-generals, 
brigadier-generals, colonels, lieutenant-colonels, without tech- 
nical training and of no military experience, appeared like 
comets at the head of armies and departments, or invaded 
the hitherto sacred quarters of the officers of the regular 
army, and many were the blunders with which the fates 
avenged these uncalled-for and injudicious vagaries of the 
new President. 

In this connection it is interesting to note the difference 
between the mistakes into which President Lincoln fell in his 
management of military affairs, and those made by his rival 
on the other side of the line. The Illinois lawyer was, as we 
have just said, absolutely without any knowledge of military 
matters, and, what was quite as important, he was entirely 
unacquainted with the personnel of the army. Mr. Davis, 
on the other hand, had been educated at West Point, and 
had moreover been Secretary of War. To him the officers 
of the army were as well known as are the members of the 
bar to a lawyer in large practice. The characters, special 
acquirements, abilities, defects, of the leading lawyers of a 
great city are always more or less accurately known to their 
brethren, while a layman coming from another city must 
pick up his information about them as best he can. So 
it was with the two Presidents. Mr. Lincoln's want of 
acquaintance with the army displayed itself in sundry 
astonishing appointments to high commands. Mr. Davis, 
on the other hand, knew his men perfectly welL At the same 
time there were disadvantages, and those real ones, which 


were inseparable from the relation in which the President of 
the Southern Confederacy stood to the high officers in its 
service. There was, first, the ahnost inevitable tendency of a 
man in his position, who has been educated for the army, 
to meddle in the actual conduct of military operations, a 
tendency to which Mr. Davis not infrequently yielded, and 
from which several of the most distinguished generals of the 
South suffered from time to time ; and, secondly, there was 
the personal relation between Mr. Davis and the leading 
officers, men of somewhere near his own age, and in regard 
to whom he, naturally enough, entertained the usual personal 
feelings that every one has for those whom one has always 
known. Hence, while it cost Mr. Lincoln nothing to relieve 
any officer whom he thought to be unfit for his work, or to 
sustain one who was, as he thought, doing it weU — they 
being all, or nearly all, personally imknown to him — it was 
an open secret that Mr. Davis's preferences and dislikes 
interfered, in the opinion of many good judges, with his 
management of the military affairs of the Conf edenuy. 

It is plain from what has just been said, that the errors of 
the Northern President were of a kind that experience could 
be expected to cure, — that is, if he were at bottom a man of 
sense, which Mr. Lincoln certainly was, while those peculiar 
to Mr. Davis's administration were not likely to become 
ameliorated by lapse of time. And this turned out to be 
the fact Mr. Lincoln's ability to select men for high mili- 
tary command increased visibly from year to year during the 
war ; and not only was this the case, but his ability to give 
them an intelligent and appreciative support and encourage- 
ment, if they deserved it at his hands, became with every 
year more and more apparent. The President became, in 
fact, a diligent student of the war. He found in time that 
the rules of war were only the rules of sound sense and 
experience applied to a subject the general principles of 
which, although he knew nothing of them at the b^;inning 


of his administration, he found himself able without great 
difficulty to acquire and act upon. Hence his conduct of 
affairs became with each year more judicious and capable. 
No generals could ask from any government for more con- 
siderate and intelligent support than that usually accorded by 
Mr. Lincoln to General Grant and Greneral Sherman. On 
the other hand, Mr. Davis's peculiarities grew every year 
more and more pronounced. It is not necessary to give illus- 
trations at length; it will suffice to compare the steady and 
unwavering backing which General Sherman received in his 
Atlanta campaign with the treatment of General Johnston 
by the 0)nf ederate Gt>vemment. 

At the same time, it would be foolish and useless to deny 
that in one respect, and that a very important one, Mr. 
Lincoln's administration of military affairs cannot be said 
to have improved with the progress of the war. We refer, 
of course, to the influence which the supposed necessities of 
politics had upon appointments to high command and assign- 
ments to duty in the field. Not even the most devoted 
admirers of President Lincoln would undertake to maintain 
that he always acted up to his lights as the G>minander-in- 
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States in all the 
conmiissions which he conferred, or in all the tasks which he 
laid out to be performed by the soldiers and sailors. For 
instance, it will hardly be pretended that Mr. Lincoln's 
military judgment had not in the spring of 1864 reached a 
point of development quite adequate to the task of refusing 
to General Butler the conmiand of the two corps destined to 
make the co-operative movement on Richmond. To suppose 
that Mr. Lincoln did not know better than this is to do 
gross injustice to his mental faculties. Everybody in the 
United States who knew anything about military matters, 
who had followed with the slightest attention the course of 
war, was amazed at the selection of Butler, not because he 
was not an able man, or a patriotic man, but because he had 


given no evidence of capacity for such a responsible task, and 
because there were plenty of men to be had who had shown 
talent of a high order. Mr. Lincoln must have known, we 
repeat, that to entrust this important duty to Butler was not 
a thing which could be defended on purely military grounds ; 
more than this, he knew as well as anybody that it was not 
common sense to do it. But he did it, nevertheless; and 
against the known wishes of the officer who had just been 
called by Congress to take the general charge and manage- 
ment of all the military operations. For Grant desired that 
this important command should be given to General William 
F. Smith, whose brilliant operations near Chattanooga had 
deservedly won the highest encomiums. Whether any sup- 
posed political necessity could justify the course which Mr. 
Lincoln saw fit to pursue on this and similar occasions is, 
to make the best of it, exceedingly doubtful. Certainly no 
political crisis at that time was impending which could serve 
as such a justification. Conmion sense and the plainest prin- 
ciples of duty alike demand that the conduct of military 
movements shall be entrusted to the most skilful and compe- 
tent officers who can be found. And although the American 
people, with their wonted tolerance and charity, have long 
since forgotten and forgiven these acts of a president whose 
devotion to the cause of his country was so conspicuous and 
sincere, yet some consideration of them cannot be omitted in 
making an estimate of Mr. Lincoln's administration of our 
military affairs. 

In looking back at the war after the lapse of so many 
years, its characteristic features stand out far more clearly 
than they did at the time. We must acknowledge that the 
lack of a sound military direction at Washington for the first 
three years protracted the struggle by expending our efforts 
to a very considerable extent in useless or ill-considered plans. 
Things certainly went better when Grant was called to take 
the entire control; but even under him there were costly 


and unnecessary expeditions, and not a little scattering of 
forces which might have been concentrated to give additional 
strength to the blows which he was preparing to strike. On 
the other side, also, we see the same faults. If the trans- 
Mississippi troops had been placed under Johnston's orders, 
who can tell how long that able soldier might not have held 
Vicksburg? Had Beauregard's and Johnston's advice been 
heeded in the last few months even, it is possible that a 
really formidable army might have been collected to confront 
Sherman in the Carolinas. But the very natural tendency 
of the invader to attack many points at once, and the equally 
natural tendency of his antagonist to be prepared for defence 
at all points, operated to multiply occasions of conflict and 
rendered the main operations of the war less formidable and 
striking than they might have been made. 

In the conduct of their campaigns the generals in our war, 
on both sides, showed themselves better strategists than tacti- 
cians. The safety of the armies was very rarely compromised 
by lack of due precautions to keep up the communications. 
The manoeuvring was sometimes very skilfuL The operations 
of the Atlanta campaign contain admirable illustrations of 
good strategy on the part of both commanders,^ and there are 
other instances in plenty, of which the operations of Jackson 
in the Shenandoah Valley in the spring of 1862 are, perhaps, 
the most conspicuous. But, mainly owing, we suspect, to the 
absolute lack of experience before the war in seeing large 
bodies of men and observing their movements, it certainly 
seemed to be well-nigh impossible for the American general, 
when he took the offensive, to get his battle fought as 
he intended it should be fought. Witness General J. E. 
Johnston's battle at Seven Fines ;^ General Lee's battles 

^ Wliile this is bong wzitten the news amyes iliat General Joseph B. 
Johnston, Sherman's g^reat antagonist in that campaign, has passed away. Of 
the Gonf edeiate officers, he was second only to Lee. 

* As ihe Confederates term the action of May 81, 1862. 


at Malvern Hill and at Gettysburg; General MoGlellan's 
battle at Antietam. These are instances of battl& under- 
taken with preparation — though this is not so true of 
Malvem Hill as of the others — and with a plan in each case 
deliberately adopted, to carry out which the commanding 
general used his best endeavors. Yet the result was noto- 
riously far from satisfying his just expectations. General 
Thomas's battle of NashviUe constitutes a brilliant exception 
to these remarks. The easier tactical task of repelling an 
attack was often most ably performed, as, for instance, 
by Lee at Antietam and Eredericksburg, and by Meade 
at Gettysburg. Then there were generals, the most con- 
spicuous of whom were Grrant and Sherman, who, though 
brilliant strategists, never paid great heed to directing the 
details of the conflicts which their manceuvres had rendered 
certain to occur. The battles near Atlanta in July, 1864, 
and the series of bloody actions in May and June, of the 
same year, in Virginia, illustrate this. 

The mode in which cavalry was employed in our war varied 
a good deal with different conmianders, and in different 
stages of the war. From the time when the Black Horse 
Cavalry struck terror into the demoralized three months' 
volunteers at the first battle of Bull Run to the day when 
Sheridan's powerful cavalry corps held Lee's line of retreat 
from Appomattox G>urt House, both sides doubtless learned 
much regarding the employment and functions of mounted 
men. But American generals did not, it must be confessed, 
take readily to the task of handling properly this arm of the 
service. Very likely the fact that cavalry could no longer be 
expected to perform on the field of battle the duties which 
had hitherto constituted their chief and most glorious 
function, rendered our officers doubtful as to the new uses to 
which they should put their horse. At first, picket duty 
seemed most attractive — not to the cavalry, of course, but 
to the general commanding the army — and horses and men 


were freely and ruthlessly sacrificed in this way. Then there 
was the important but humble task of guarding trains. But 
what fascinated alike the imagination of the trooper and the 
ingenious mind of the American general was a raid, designed 
to bum bridges and tear up railroad tracks, to destroy 
supplies, capture trains and the like. An operation of this 
kind necessarily involved great risks, but, bordering, as it did, 
in its characteristic features, on partisan warfare, it possessed 
great attractions for the cavalry themselves. What good 
was accomplished in this way has never been figured up. 
Stuart's raid round McClellan's lines in June, 1862, may 
have served a useful purpose in creating a feeling of insecurity 
in the Army of the Potomac ; but the only tangible result of 
the repetition of the performance in August of the same year 
was the capture of the overcoat of the Federal commander ; 
whUe, when for the third time the manoeuvre was tried, in 
the Gettysburg campaign the next smnmer, the march of the 
Federal army northward actually prevented the Confederate 
cavalry from rejoining their main army and reporting the 
movement of the Federals. It was much the same thing in 
our experience. Hooker, the first general to set a proper 
value on his cavalry, no sooner got a large and finely mounted 
and equipped body of cavalry together, than he sent them off, 
a fortnight before he commenced his own campaign, to 
destroy the enemy's communications and supplies, and to 
render their retreat, in the event of a Federal success in the 
impending struggle between the two armies, more disastrous 
than it otherwise could be. The result of this farseeing 
move was to deprive the Army of the Potomac of the infor- 
mation which would have prevented the great disaster of the 
campaign of Chancellorsville. 

In the march on Gettysburg, in the summer of 1863, 
General Meade employed his cavalry with excellent judgment. 
The signal services rendered by Buford on July 1, and the 
gallant and successful fight on our right flank on July 8, 


fully justified his policy of keepiog his cavalry well in hand, 
and under his own eye. But this policy was entirely reversed 
by General Grant. The campaign of 1864 had hardly 
opened when Sheridan was allowed to go off, on his own 
suggestion and evidently against Meade's judgment, with 
nearly all the cavalry of the army, on a raid toward 
Kichmond, and it was not until Grant had crossed the 
Pamunkey that the cavalry rejoined the main body. Then, 
for a very few days, they remained with the army, and 
rendered excellent service, among other things capturing and 
holding Cold Harbor. But when, a fortnight later, the 
army had got down before Petersburg, Sheridan was on 
another raid, and the opportunity which really existed during 
the 16th and 17th of June of taking Petersburg when its 
defenders numbered less than 15,000 men, was unknown at 
headquarters, simply for lack of cavalry to make the needed 

It will hardly be questioned that the conspicuous successes 
which Sheridan won in the Appomattox campaign have 
demonstrated beyond doubt or cavil that the best service to 
which cavalry can be put in modem warfare, is to be rendered 
in conjunction with the operations of the main army. But 
that this service was rendered in this campaign by Sheridan's 
cavalry was certainly not due to General Grant. He had 
planned for Sheridan, and had ordered him to execute, a move- 
ment on the upper James, with a view of destroying the enemy's 
supplies and communications, and after having accomplished 
these tasks, he was to join Sherman, in the Carolinas, or else, 
if that were found impracticable, he was to fall back to 
Winchester in the Shenandoah Valley. Fortunately for the 
country, Sheridan found it impossible to carry out his orders, 
and he therefore made his way to General Grant at City 
Point. Even here, both Sheridan and Rawlins, Grant's chief 
of staff, a thoroughly practical and able man, were by no 
means sure at first that Ghrant intended to have Sheridan's 


command included in the force which waA destined for the 
campaign which was then just about to open ; and it is quite 
certain that Grant inclined even at this period to the opinion 
that Sheridan would do weU to cut loose from the Army of 
the Potomac and join Sherman in North Carolina. 

Other instances of this strange inability or unwillingness 
of the American general to make use of cavalry in connection 
with the operations of the main army readily occur. Sherman, 
as is well known, in his Atlanta campaign, did not rely to 
any great extent on his horse, although the opportimities for 
employing cavalry to advantage must have been of constant 
occurrence from the time he left Dalton. And in his march 
across the country to Savannah, he took with him only two 
brigades, in all about 5,000 men. 

At the close of the war, however, this arm of the service 
had gained due recognition. Not only was the country 
ringing with the achievements which Sheridan, at the head of 
his 10,000 horse, had obtained in the Appomattox campaign 
in cooperation with the Army of the Potomac, but Wilson, 
at the head of a similar force, fresh and admirably mounted 
and equipped, was overrunning the now almost deserted 
States of Alabama and Georgia, destroying and defeating 
everything that came in his way. In this case there was, it 
is true, no army for the cavalry conmmnder to co-operate 
with. But this movement of Wilson's was no ordinary raid, 
for he was practically sure of meeting no opposition which 
his force was not quite adequate to overcome ; it was rather 
the march of an invading column. 

The views above given as to the employment of cavalry on 
raids differ, we presume, from those entertained during the 
war by most of the leading generals on both sides. Yet there 
is nothing, we submit with confidence, in which the effect of 
the lapse of time is more discernible than in changing our 
views of cavalry raids. It is almost inconceivable to us now, 
that Greneral Lee should have sent Stuart, with less than 


2,000 cavalry, in October, 1862, just after the battle of 
Antietam, to ride throngli the towns and counties of central 
Pennsylvania, picking up horses, clothing, boots and shoes, a 
few prisoners, and what not, and running the most imminent 
risk of being captured with his whole command. What 
possible good could Stuart do to the Confederacy with his 
petty booty, which could be compared for a moment with the 
exultation with which the news of his capture would have 
been received at the North, and the injiuy which it would 
have been to Greneral Lee's army to have lost its great 
cavalry leader? So in the Grettysburg campaign — when Lee 
actually gave Stuart cctrte blancJie to do as he liked — whether 
to keep between the Army of Northern Virginia and the 
Army of the Potomac, or to attempt to make the circuit of 
the latter army. What Lee and Stuart had in their minds 
as conceivably — by any effort of the imagination — of more 
importance than the ascertainment by the G>nf ederate cavalry 
from day to day of the movements of the Federal Army and 
the conveyance of this information promptly to Greneral Lee's 
headquarters — it is certainly not easy to conjecture. At 
that stage in the war, it was out of the question that the 
Federal Army should be ^^ rattled " by any such game as this. 
Both officers and men were altogether too well seasoned to 
war to care very much where Stuart's 4,000 or 5,000 men 
might be. The trains were well guarded ; all Stuart suc- 
ceeded in bagging were 125 wagons and 400 or 500 
prisoners ; but, as this was all he had to show in justification 
of his course, he brought them all in, notwithstanding the 
continual delays caused by such impedimenta. General 
Halleck was probably the only Federal officer at all worried 
by this eccentric movement of Stuart's, and he kept telegraph- 
ing Meade, who was in command of the Army of the Potomac, 
to take measures to capture Stuart's column, which might, 
so Halleck thought, do unknown damage somewhere. But 
Meade, intent on the great task before him, was not to be 


diverted by any side-show like this. " My main point," he 
oooUy and dryly wrote to Halleck, " being to find out and 
fight the enemy, I shall have to submit to the eavalry raid 
around me in some measure." ^ 

The truth is, that, considering the great difficulties which, 
during the period of our war, attended the raising of a well- 
drilled, well-equipped and well-mounted body of horse, it was 
not good policy for any commander, and especially for any 
Confederate conmiander, to take needless risks with his 
cavalry, or to subject it to unnecessary hardship and loss. 
While it is perfectly true that occasions where a body of horse 
could be utilized in actual combat were infrequent, it must be 
remembered that cavalry had other and often much more 
important functions to perform than taking part in a pitched 
battle, and that for the due performance of these duties the 
utmost efficiency of both horses and men was required. Take 
as an illustration the work of Sheridan's command in the last 
campaign. Here was a corps of cavalry, admirably com- 
manded and sufficiently large to take care of itself for a 
moderate time. Preceding and covering the march of the 
infantry, ascertaining the. right roads, seizing the important 
points in advance of the arrival of the main columns and 
holding them until support arrived, it rendered the task of 
the infantry and artillery, which constituted the main army, 
immeasurably easier and much surer of successful accomplish- 
ment. Finally, in actually getting ahead of the flying foe 
and barring his retreat, Sheridan's horse showed to perfection 
what cavalry can do in modem war. But in order that 
cavalry can render such service as this, their strength and 
efficiency must be carefully preserved until the decisive 
moment arrives. And the decisive moment is the moment 
when the great collision between the two armies takes place. 
For in spite of all the railroad ties that were torn up, and of 
aU the bams that were burned. General Lee did not leave 



Petersburg and Bichmoiid until the result of the battle of 
Five Forks rendered it impossible for him to remain in his 
lines ; and the battle of Five Forks was won by infantry and 
cavalry acting together. 

Whatever doubts may have existed in the minds of 
American generals in regard to the proper modes of employ- 
ing cavalry, there was never any question of a similar nature 
as to the proper function of artillery. Differences of opinion 
there certainly were as to the organization of this arm; 
attention has recently been called to them in an able paper 
by the late General Hunt, Chief of Artillery of the Army of 
the Potomac, read before the Military Historical Society of 
Massachusetts about a year before he died, and printed for 
the first time in the Journal of the Military Service Institu- 
tion for March, 1891. His conclusion is unquestionably 
sound ; it is ^' that with proper organization and administration 
our artillery in the Civil War, good as it was, might have 
been made more serviceable and produced greater results ; " 
but he admits, and in fact claims, that the efficiency of this 
arm of the service in the late war was most marked. This 
was, by the way, as true of our adversaries as of ourselves. 
The American soldier seems, in fact, to take naturally to 
artillery. From the beginning, the guns were well served. 
In process of time, the chiefs of artillery, as well of the 
various corps as of the armies themselves, came to be famous 
men. It was a pity that the full rank to which the Federal 
officers performing these duties were fairly entitled was never 
accorded to them by their government. But the matter 
being a somewhat complicated one. Congress could never be 
got to pay proper attention to the organization of the artillery. 

Infantry, of course, constitutes the main body of all modem 
armies, and by the quality of its infantry an army must be 
judged. The capacity of Americans to make excellent 
soldiers was proved in the war beyond a question. That 
hundreds of thousands of men, most of them entirely 


unacquainted with the elements, even, of discipline and 
drill, were transformed in so brief a period into officers and 
soldiers was certainly one of the wonders of our time. But 
the material was, in the main, of the best; the desire to 
master the new trade well-nigh universal and very strong; 
and there were from the beginning many opportunities for 
practising what had been learned. The armies of 1862 were 
far and away superior to the levies of 1861. The armies of 
1863 were decidedly superior to those of 1862. But in 1868 
it is probable that the highest point of efficiency was reached 
in both the Federal and G>nf ederate armies in the East, and 
certainly in the Western army of the Confederacy. From 
the autumn of 1863 these three great armies began to become 
less serviceable. Let us see why. 

Take, first, the Army of the Potomac This army, when it 
fought at Grettysburg, in July, 1863, contained, it is true, 
some poor troops, but it contained few or no green raiments, 
and no raw recruits whatever. The officers and men were 
veterans, the greater part of whom had had two years' service 
in the field. They had known victory and defeat; they 
could march and they could fight ; they had had all sorts of 
experiences, and were not to be astonished nor greatly 
troubled by anything that could happen to them. Had a 
proper policy been pursued in regard to the inevitable 
losses, had the old regiments been kept up assiduously to the 
TOfl-Tinnim strength, or to anything like the maximum 
strength, the Army of the Potomac would not only have been 
stronger at Gettysburg, but it would have gained in eveiy 
way during the winter which ensued. It would have been 
superior in point of efficiency when it entered on the campaign 
of 1864 to the army which fought at Grettysburg, for the 
prestige of that great victory would have been the heritage of 
all its regiments, and would have inspired the new recruits as 
weU as the old soldiers. But this great advantage was thrown 
away by the people of the North, or at least by the greater 


part of the Northern States. Instead of building up the old 
regiments, new ones were raised* Instead of utilizing the 
army's capital, if we may so call it, of long service, thorough 
acquaintance with the duties of officers and soldiers, memories 
of labors, dangers and sufferings shared in common, of dark 
and bloody days of defeat manfully and patiently borne, of 
glorious scenes of victory rewarding steadfast valor and 
unremitting energy, — the greater part of the North blindly 
and recklessly threw it away. Veteran regiments, whose 
names and numbers had become deservedly famous, whose 
very traditions would forever have secured their efficiency, 
were allowed to waste away until they scarcely equalled a 
couple of full companies, and their places were taken by 
troops who had never smelt powder nor seen the face of the 
enemy. It is difficult to speak with patience of this wretched 
business. It is pleasanter to turn to those few States which, 
like Wisconsin and Illinois, kept up to their full strength the 
regiments which had first gone out, and with whose names 
were associated the honor due from the State to the steadfast 
performance of duty and to gallant deeds of arms. But it is 
plain that no army re-enforced in numbers as was the Army 
of the Potomac after the battle of Gettysburg could be ex- 
pected to improve in efficiency, — on the contrary, it is but too 
evident that it must sensibly decline. The army with which 
Grant crossed the Rapidan on May 3, 1864, was no doubt 
larger by some 20,000 or 30,000 men than that which 
began the battle of Gettysburg ; but among the old regi- 
ments was much worthless material — men whose enlist- 
ments had been induced by the extravagant bounties then 
paid by the States and cities of the East to get their quotas 
filled — and then there were plenty of absolutely new 
regiments, which had not been organized six months. On 
the other side of the river the army of Lee was weaker than 
it was at Gettysburg, for the very decisive reason that it had 
not been able to make up its losses in that terrible fight. 


It had seen its best days. And the same remark applies to 
the main G>nf ederate army in the West. The sanguinary 
struggle of Chickamauga had cost the G>nf ederates dear ; 
and, followed, as it was, by the recall of Longstreet's corps 
to Virginia, and also by the rout of Missionary Ridge, it was 
not possible for J. E. Johnston, who replaced the unfortunate 
Bragg, to take the field with a force anythiug like as efficient 
as that which so fiercely attacked Bosecrans in September, 

The national instinct on this subject is perfectly correct. 
It was at Gettysburg and Chickamauga that our American 
armies were at their best and did their best. Never were 
they — either before or after those memorable engagements 
— so strong, so weU officered, so fierce, so determined to win, 
so resolved not to yield. They were then, we repeat, at their 
best — containing none but seasoned troops, under veteran 
officers, inured to war, both armies confident of victory, and 
pretty nearly, taking all things together, equally matched. 
And no one can read the story of those great battles without 
being proud of his country and his race, for never was there 
more resolute and obstinate and gallant fighting done, nor 
ever were severe losses more unshrinkingly borne. Nor can 
it be truly said of either of these battles that the beaten 
army did not fight as hard and as long as its more successful 
antagonist. There is glory enough for aU. Hence it is fitting 
that both fields — Gettysburg and Giickamauga — should be 
dedicated to the perpetual remembrance of the great battles 
so worthily fought there. 

It may have been noticed that the Federal Army of the 
West was not included in the foregoing estimate. We are 
disposed to think that, unlike the armies of Johnston, Lee and 
Grant, the army commanded by Sherman entered upon the 
campaign of 1864 in better condition in every respect than it 
ever was in before. It had had ample time to repair the 
losses of Chickamauga ; it had not been weakened, as had its 


antagonist, by the withdrawal of a part of its force for 
service elsewhere; its losses at Missionary Ridge had not 
been large, and its success there had been of the most strik- 
ing and brilliant kind. It was composed in the main of 
Western regiments that had enlisted in 1861, and had, to a 
great extent, at least, been kept up to a fair average of 
strength by the wiser and more military policy which the 
Western States generally adopted in the matter of recruiting 
their contingents, of which we have spoken above. Hence 
General Sherman's army reaped the full benefit of all the 
most favorable military conditions that can affect the effi- 
ciency of an army. Its unity had been strictly preserved ; 
it had not been depleted by losses or by detachments ; it had 
not been '^ watered " by the addition of raw troops. It was 
under a commander who was the idol of his men, whose great 
abilities were universally and cheerfully acknowledged, and 
who possessed the entire confidence of the General-in-Chief 
and the Government at Washington. And these favorable 
conditions continued to the close of the war. In Sherman's 
progress toward Atlanta, although it was marked at times by 
severe fighting, the losses were never excessive, considering 
the size of the army. While Grant, by his reckless and 
wasteful attacks, was throwing away his veterans ten thou- 
sand at a time, and in fact actually changing the very structure 
of the Army of the Potomac, his lieutenant in the West 
marched into Atlanta with practically the same army with 
which he had set out from Dalton. There had been suffered, 
it is true, some losses that might have been avoided, but 
neither these nor the unavoidable casualties of the campaign 
materially affected the identity or the strength of the com- 
mand. The army which entered Atlanta was the army of 
Chickamauga and Missionary Ridge, of Peach Tree Creek 
and Decatur. Its career had been one of almost uniform 
success. The veteran troops had had their confidence in 
their leader and in themselves largely augmented by their 


experience in this campaign. They felt themselves stnmg 
enough for anything. They were ready for new tasks. 
They were full of enterprise and hope. And not only the 
admirably conducted march of Sherman to Savannah, and his 
still more brilliant march from Savannah to Groldsboro\ but 
the resolute and steady resistance which Thomas was at the 
same time making to Hood's invasion of Tennessee, crowned 
as it was by the decisive victory of Nashville, show, perhaps 
better than any other events in the war, what an American 
army, well kept up in strength, and boldly but judiciously 
managed, can accomplish. 

In the beginning of this paper we spoke of the magnitude 
of the task which the North proposed to itself. It was not 
without apparent reason that the world doubted and smiled 
in derision at the presumption of the Northern Gx>vemment in 
thinking that it could succeed in such a gigantic undertaking. 
Was it possible that a nation with such an insignificant navy 
could establish an effective blockade over three thousand 
miles of sear<5oast ? Did the Northern generals suppose that 
armies, large enough to overcome the fierce and universal 
resistance which was to be expected, could live on the country 
they were invading ? And if not, did not the great distances 
to be traversed render the problem of transportation and 
subsistence well-nigh an insurmountable one? Some suc- 
cesses, no doubt, the great superiority of the North in men 
and material might enable it to win; very possibly the 
boundary might be pushed back a certain distance. But for 
the Northern forces to overrun the South, or to follow up the 
Southern armies into the interior of the country, and there to 
maintain themselves in the midst of an unfriendly popula- 
tion and on a soil in great part destitute of the means of 
subsistence, as a great portion of the Southern Confederacy 
unquestionably was, seemed to many disinterested and clear- 
headed men of those days well-nigh impracticable. It is true 
that neither Lord Palmerston nor the Emperor Napoleon the 


Third indined to the side of the North; nevertheless we 
believe that it was not by any means wholly due to their 
unwillingness to see us succeed that they predicted our failure. 
We believe that they judged the probabilities of the case 
by the light of experience; and, judging by the light of 
experience, it was not likely that the North would succeed if 
the South should resolutely persist in endeavoring to main- 
tain her independence by force of arms. Lord Palmerston 
and the Emperor of the French were probably as well 
qualified to have an opinion on this subject as any two men 
in Europe; the one had been Secretary at War from 1809 to 
1815, in the time of the first Napoleon ; the other, although 
not a soldier himself, had been a diligent and intelligent 
student of the campaigns of his great unde. Both these 
experts predicted the failure of the North. And it may 
safely be admitted that if the conditions of warfare had been 
the same in 1861 as they were in 1815, or, in our judgment, 
as late as 1850, their prediction would in all probability have 
been fulfilled. 

But the conditions were not the same. Steam and 
electricity had in the intervening time asserted their power, 
and had rendered possible for a McClellan or a Grant what 
had been impossible for a Napoleon. It was found that the 
capacity of the territory, through which it was proposed to 
move an army, for the task of supporting that army might 
generally be disregarded. It was found perfectly feasible to 
maintain a large force for any length of time in regions where 
no subsistence of any sort or kind was furnished by the soiL 
It was found that water-transportation of men and supplies 
was as certain and uniform, as much to be relied upon, as 
transportation by land; that the winds and waves of the ocean 
and the strength and direction of the flow of rivers could 
equally be ignored when it waa proposed to transport troops, 
or subsistence, or ammunition, to a given spot. It was found 
that a blockade maintained by steam vessels, though not 


absolutely perfect, was a far more certain and constant check 
on foreign intercourse than could be effected by any employ- 
ment of sailing vessels. By the telegraph all available 
resources could be utilized without the loss of a moment, and 
all information instantaneously communicated to or from 
headquarters to or from any part of the theatre of war. In 
other words, machinery had in the progress of time become 
one of the great factors in military operations, and its intro- 
duction worked as marked a revolution in the practice of 
commanders on land and sea, as its adoption for purposes of 
manufacture or of intercommunication had worked in the 
world of business and ordinary life. And, what was of the 
greatest importance to the North, the advantages of this great 
change in matters of warfare were absolutely at the call of 
the stronger and more wealthy of the two combatants. 

There had been but little in the way of example to follow. 
Steam-vessels had, it is true, supplied in great part the allied 
armies in the Crimea. There had also been a short rail- 
road constructed for the accommodation of the English from 
Balaklava to the front, but it had taken a great while to build, 
and it was not very serviceable after it was built. The French 
and Austrians had also used their railroads in the short 
Italian war of 1859. But there was really not much to serve 
as a precedent. 

The task of developing the possibilities of the use of 
steam and electricity in warfare was, therefore, first tried 
on a large scale in the war of secession. Naturally and 
inevitably it fell to the North to deal with the subject with 
the greater thoroughness and ingenuity of application. For 
the North could overcome the great natural difficulties pre- 
sented by the geographical conditions under which the war 
was to be carried into the Confederacy only by utilizing to 
the full the vast resources it possessed through the powerful 
agency of steam, and the incalculable assistance afforded by 
the electric telegraph. And it will probably be conceded 


without demur, that no people ever lived more capable of 
making ingenious and useful applications of steam and 
electricity to war or to anything else, than the people of the 
Northern States. 

The first thing to do was to enlarge the navy so as to 
compass a blockade of the Southern coast, and the next thing 
was to build a navy for use on the great rivers which run 
through the heart of the Confederacy. That both tasks were 
successfully accomplished in a very brief period reflects the 
greatest credit on the officers of the navy. We have not time 
here, nor is this the place, to give the details ; but in a couple 
of months or thereabouts the blockade had become reasonably 
effective on the Atlantic seaboard and in the Gulf of Mexico ; 
and, partly by purchasing river steamers and refitting them, 
and partly by building new and armor-plated vessels, the 
Federal Government, early in 1862, had procured a fleet on 
the Mississippi and its tributaries, which laid those great 
avenues into the interior of the South open to the Northern 
invaders. The first fruit of the employment of this naval 
force in conjunction with the army was the capture of Fort 
Donelson in February, 1862, with its entire garrison, entailing 
the evacuation, by the Confederate General A. S. Johnston, of 
the greater part of the States of Kentucky and Tennessee. 

The task of providing subsistence and forage for the armies 
of both the North and South during the long months of 
winter and spring, when the roads were well-nigh impassable 
and the surrounding country afforded next to nothing which 
could be of service, was immensely simplified by railroads. 
It might be thought at first sight that the advantage of this 
arrangement lay with the army which was on the defensive, 
as their opponents would naturally be obliged to cut loose 
from their railroad communications in any forward movement. 
But it should be considered that the all-important thing for 
the North, whose resources so immeasurably exceeded those 
of the South, was to maintain as large an army as it could 


get together at a point from which, aa soon as the season 
opened, operations could be successfully commenced; and 
that railroads and steamboats made it always possible for the 
North to accomplish this. Thus, during the winter of 1864 
and 1865, somewhere near 130,000 men were comfortably 
quartered and supplied in the Federal lines from Bermuda 
Hundred to Petersburg, in a country where absolutely nothing 
was furnished from the soil or by the inhabitants; and when 
the time came, Grrant was able to open the campaign with an 
oyerwhelming superiority of force. If the railroads now in 
operation in Russia had existed in Napoleon's day, it may 
well be believed that he would have supplied his immense 
army with subsistence and forage during the winter of 1812 
and 1813, and would haye made a success of his invasion. 
And, it may equally well be believed, that, had it not been 
for the railroads in France, the Prussians could never have 
maintained during the winter of 1870 and 1871 the enormous 
army which surrounded and finally reduced Paris. 

We must bring these remarks to a close. The war is now 
receiving at the hands of the American people its due measure 
of attention. Much of this is naturally devoted to the accu- 
mulation and arrangement of evidence, and to the elucidation 
of disputed questions of fact. Much of it is given to the 
study of the characters and actions of the prominent leaders, 
and to forming correct estimates of their respective shares in 
bringing about the great events of the time. Our principal 
object in writing the foregoing pages has been to draw a few 
of the military inferences and conclusions which, it seems to 
us, the narrative of the admitted facts warrants. This task 
of criticism has an importance of its own. For it is only by 
clearly perceiving and frankly recognizing the lessons taught 
by our own experience that we can hope to apprehend 
correctly the military problems of the future. 


Abbot, H L., Bvt. Brig.-Gen., U. S. A., 
associated with Hnrnphreys, 77 ; 
his tribnte to Humphreys, t6. 

Aberorombie, J. J., Col., 7th U. S. In- 
fantry, Confederates at Falling Wa- 
ters, Ya., July 2, 1861, repulsed by, 
213 ; Thomas commissioned Brig.- 
Gen. in advance of, 213. 

Alabama, Wilson's 1864 raid in, 260. 

Alabama River, in Sherman's plans, 
autumn of 1864, 137. 

Alden, B. R., Capt. U. S. A., daas- 
mate of Gen. Humphreys at West 
Point, 75. 

Aldie Gap, Va., action at, 157, 150. 

Alexander, Emperor of Russia, offered 
Samuel Humphreys an appointment, 

Alexandria, Va., its capture advised in 
1861, by Lee, 5. 

Allatoona Pass, the U. S. post at, de- 
fended Oct 5, 1864, by Gen. Corse, 

Alpine, GhL, McCook's corps sent to, 
Sept., 1863, in pursuit of Bragg, 

Alvord, B., Bvt. Brig.43en., U. S. A, 
a graduate of West Point, 75. 

Amelia Court House, Va., the only 
roads left for escape of Lee, AprU. 
2, 1865, those to, 91 ; pursuit of Lee 
by Humphreys to, t6. ; Lee's loss of 
a day there, t6. 

Anaooetia, U. S. gunboat, 103. 

Anderson, R., Brig.-Gen., U. S. A., 
Hancock's first service at Washing- 
ton with, 1861, 55 ; assigned to com- 
mand of Department of the Cum- 
berland, Aug. 15, 1861, 174 ; Thomas 
made Brig.-Gen., U. S. Y., at his 
instance, and asngr^^ed to his I>ept, 
Sept., ib, ; his command in Ken- 
tucky, 128; W. T. Sherman's ser- 
vice under, t6. ; by order of Oct. 6, 
1861, relieved of command of Dept. 
of Cum. superseded Oct. 8, by Sher- 
man, 128. 

Anderson, B. H., Maj.-Gen., C. S. A., 

by accident anticipated Grant's 
movement to Spottsylvania, 36. 

Andrew, J. A., Grovemor of Massachu- 
setts, concerned in recommendation 
of a call for 300,000 men, 251. 

Anglo-Saxon race on trial in the Civil 
War, 251. 

AnnapoUs, Md., Ninth Corps at, spring 
of 1864, 10. 

Antietam, McClellan's overestimate of 
the Confederate streng^ at. 101, 
118 ; McClellan's statements of, crit- 
icised, 117-118 ; enthusiasm excited 
by McCleUan in campaign of, 122 ; 
158; the battle not a masterpiece 
of art, 120; Bnmside's failure at, 
121 ; Hancock given command of 
Ist division, 2d Corps, at, 57-58; 
Humphreys hurried to, 80 ; time of 
his arrival, t6.; McClellan's mia- 
statement concerning Humphreys, 
80-81 ; battle not fought as intended 
by McClellan, 257; the easier task 
of repelling an assault illustrated 
by, ib, ; Union loss at, 34 ; Stuart's 
raid in Penna., after, 261. 

Appomattox Campaign, April 2-9, 
1865, the demonstration of best uses 
of cavalry in, 259 ; renown of Sher- 
idan's achievements in, 260. 

Appomattox Court House, Ya., Lee's 
Ime of retreat from, held by Sheri- 
dan, 257 ; Sheridan and Ord aoroas 
Lee's padi at, 94 ; reached by Hum- 
phreys April 7, 93 ; surrender of Lee 
at, April 9, 1865, 67. 

Appomattox River, 10, 12, 14 ; prcnect 
to extend Union left to, June, 1864, 
90 ; in the attempt to escape of Lee's 
army, 92 ; the Union army divided 
by, 93 ; ^ time lost in communicating 
across, ib, 

Appomattox Station, Ya., but for 
Humphreys Lee might have reached, 
April 8, 93 ; and obtained supplies 
at, 94 ; his supply line cut and sup- 
ply trains captored by Custer at, 
April 8, iL 



Arkansas, within Department of the 
Mississippi, 1864, 288. 

Arkansas Poet, Ark., captured by 
Sherman, Jan. 11, 1863, 230. 

Arlin^n, Va., left by Lee, April 20, 
1861, to enter service of Virginia, 
172 ; its capture in 1861 advis^ by 
Lee, 5. 

Armistead, L. A., Brig.-Qen., C. S. A., 
at Molino del Rey, 51 ; mentioned, 

Army, Confederate, no disparity be- 
tween that of the East and that of 
the West, 182. 

Army of Northern Va. : strongest of 
the Confederacy, 34 ; Stuart^s free- 
dom to separate from, June-July, 
1863, 261 ; its strength diminished. 
May 3, 1864, 265 ; unable to make 
up for losses at Gettysburg, ib. ; at 
its best at Gettysburg, 266 ; Grant's 
error as to its power of resistance, 
87 ; elated by Grant's failure, 1864, 
88 ; at Cold Harbor, 39 ; at Peters- 
burg, June 18, 1864, 17 ; its advan- 
tage in fighting on interior lines, 41 ; 
its death in the last ditch, 44 ; cap- 
tured, 67 ; history of the cavalry of, 
reviewed in MoClellan's Stuart, 155- 

Army of the Cumberland: Anderson 
assigned, Aug. 15, 1861, to the com- 
mand of, 174 ; W. T. Sherman as- 
signed to service in, Au&f. 28, 1861, 
1^ ; Thomas assigned to service in, 
Sept. 6, 1861, 174 ; Anderson relieved 
of command, Oct. 6, 1861, 128 ; W. T. 
Sherman given the command, Oct. 8, 
t6.; Buell appointed to command, 
Nov. 15, 1861, t6. ; its victory under 
Thomas, at Logan's Cross Roads, 
Jan. 19, 1862, 176-177; advance on 
Nashville, 178; did not particiroite 
at Shiloh, t6. ; reorganized by Ual- 
leck after Shiloh, 215; oommand 
of right wing given to Thomas, ib. / 
the command resigned by Thomas, 
216 ; after Corinth, its destination 
Chattanooga, 179 ; at Louis viUe, 
Oct. 1, 1862, t6. ; the command given 
to Thomas, and declined by him, t6. ; 
Buell continued in command, t6. ; at 
battle of Perryville, i6. ; Rosecrans 
given command, Oct 30, 1862, 179 ; 
at Nashville, Nov. 7, t6. ; at battle 
of Stone's River, 179-180 ; in Chick- 
amauga campaign, 181 ; battle of 
Chickamauga, Sept. 19-20, 1863, 
181-182, 220-230; inspired by 
Thomas, 181 ; at its best at Chicka^ 

mauga, 266 ; Cist's History of, cited 
as to die fatal message at Chickar 
manga, 229; retired to Rossville, 
after battle, 182 ; Thomas iq>pointed, 
Oct. 16, 1863, to command of, 131, 
230 ; he assumed command of, Oct. 
20, 1863, 182 ; strength of, at be- 
p^inning of Atlanta campaign, 188 ; 
m all the battles but that of July 
22, before Atlanta, 189 ; most of the 
hsffd work given to, t6. ; its losses, 
ib.; its interests made sul^ervient 
to Army of the Tennessee by Sher- 
man, 188, 189; Missionary Ridge, 
captured by, Nov. 25, 1863, 33; 
the capture made without (^ers, 
132, 1&, 184, 185, 186, 187; spon- 
taneous and heroic character of the 
charge, 186, 187 ; compared to the 
assault on Pratzen, 133; the glory 
due to the troops themselves, ib. ; 
inspired by Thomas, if not ordered 
by him to charge, 186; two of the 
divisions under Thomas' command 
but five weeks, 237 ; Buell, Rose- 
crans and Thomas its heroes, 129; 
also called for a period Army of the 

Army of the James : W. F. Smith de- 
sired by Grant to command, 1864, 
255 ; the command given to Butler, 
ib. ; at Bermuda Hundred, May 4, 
11; "bottled up" by Beauregard, 
12 ; under Ord, in pursuit of Lee, 
April 8, 1865, 94. 

Army of the Ohio: Thomas refused 
to supersede Buell in command of, 
216. See Army of the Cumber- 

Army of the Potomac : Barnard, Chief 
Engineer of, 1862, 102; U. S. gun- 
boats provided for protection of, 
in transportation to the Peninsula, 
103 ; Humphreys' service in, during 
Peninsular campiugn, 79 ; retreat to 
the James, 1862, 57; 113; its need 
of re-enforcements, July, 1862, 250 ; 
McClellan superseded by Bumside 
in command of, 121 ; insecurity in, 
caused by Stuart's raids, 258; im- 
proved by Hooker, 121 ; at Chan- 
oellorsville, 83; deprived of aid of 
cavaliT in Chancellorsville campaign, 
258 ; Meade given command of, 86, 
261 ; Humphreys, Chief -of-Stafl! of, 
86-89 ; attack on its centre on Cem- 
etery Ridge, July 3, 1863, 49-51; 
veterans engaged at Gettysbuiv, 
264 ; at its best at Gettysburg, 266 ; 
Stuart's failure to dainage, in ad- 



vance to Gettysburg, 160-161 ; be- 
lieved by GraDt, 18&, never to have 
been thoroughly -well fought, 34; 
Grant with, 1864, 10; diffioultiea 
involved in the double command, of 
Grant and Meade, 87-88; crossed 
the Rapidan, May 3, beginning 1864 
campaign, 133 ; its wonderful fight- 
ing in the Wilderness, 40 ; transfer 
to the James, June, 1864, 42 ; its 
strength, 40; Beauregard's plan to 
defeat, 13 ; before Petersburg, June 
15, 16 ; failure there, 16, 17 ; Hum- 
phreys given command of 2d Corps, 
89 ; Gr^t inclined to deprive it of 
the aid of Sheridan, 1865, 260 ; the 
achievements of Sheridan in March 
' and April, 1865, in co-operation with, 
ib.; scheme to cut Lee's rtulway 
communications delayed, 90; chief 
sufferer from Grant's system, 37; 
its losses under Cbant's system of 
attrition, 135 ; its waste under Grant, 
267 ; disheartened by its losses, 38 ; 
familiar with Lee's vitality, 39 ; its 
failures, 1864-1865, not charged to 
Grant by Badean, 35 ; the affec- 
tion of, for McClellan, 122, 123 ; be- 
lieved by McClellan capable of obe- 
dience only to him after Pope cam- 
paign, 100, 116; Hancock its most 
conspicuous brigade leader, 57; its 
losses in battle, 34; well-fed and 
clothed, 53 ; development of cavalry 
in, 160, 162, 257-258 ; development 
of infantry in, 264-266 ; the disad- 
vantage resulting to, by disbanding 
veteran regiments, 255; larger but 
less efficient May 3, 1864, ib. 

Army of the Tennessee, Confederate : 
at its best at Chickamauga, 266; 
routed at, ib.; depleted thereafter, 
ih.; Johnston superseded Bragg in 
command of, 134, 135, 266 ; its de- 
struction Sherman's sole object, 133- 
134 ; strength of, at Dalton, 135 ; its 
position at Resaca, ib, ; under com- 
mand of Hood, 136; repulsed at 
Allatoona Pass, 138 ; in position at 
Gadsden, Ala., ib. ; not destroyed 
by Shei-man, 134, 140-141 ; position 
at Florence, 140 ; defeated at Frank- 
lin, Nov. 30, 1864, 142, 143 ; de- 
feated at Nashville, Dec. 15, 143- 
144 ; nearly destroyed by Thomas, 
144 ; Sherman confronted by rem- 
nants of, 145. 

Army of the Tennessee, Union : at its 
best at Chickamauga, 266 ; ordered 
to Chattanooga, 132 ; Hooker's dem- 

onstrations dnrine tbe crossing of the 
Tennessee by, 235; brought up to 
Missionary Ridge by Sherman, 234 ; 
its losses not large in that battle, 
267 ; Sherman's connection with, 
128 ; his partiality for, 188 ; the priv- 
ilege of taking Atlanta reserved for, 
189; its good condition, spring of 
1864, 266-267 ; its troops veterans, 
267-268; its self-confidence, 268; 
enthnsiaam caused by successes, ib, ; 
a model army, ib, ; its oompoeition, 
267 ; its unity preserved, ib, ; Sher- 
man idolized by, ib, ; its battle 
record, ib,; Grant, Sherman, and 
McPherson its most distinguished 
heroes, 129. 

Artillery, U. S. Army, 3d regt, 
Thomas' connection with, 1840-li^, 

Artillery, the development of the ser- 
vice, during the civil war, 263; 
might have been better, ib. ; natural 
aptitude of American soldier for, 
ib,; distinction attained by officers 
of the corps of, ib. ; officers never 
accorded the rank to which they 
were entitied, ib, ; indifference of 
Congress to the service, t6. 

Atlanta, Ga., the capture of, not Sher- 
man's object, 134, 136 ; his neglect 
of details in battles near, July, 1864, 
257 ; the privilege of capture of, re- 
served for Army of the Tennessee, 
189; not captured July 22, 1864, 
189; abandoned by Confederates 
Sept. 1, 1864, 189; occupied by 
Sherman, Sept. 2, 1864, 136, 137, 
189 ; 190 ; the political character of 
his letters to mayor of, 150; rail- 
road to Chattanooga threatened, 
Sept., 1864, 138 ; out by Hood, Oct., 
lb, ; repaired by Sherman, t6., 139 ; 
Thomas sent to Tennessee from, 
Sept. 29, 1864, 191 ; its littie value 
while Hood was nnconquered, 136, 
137, 138, 139 ; its abandonment con- 
templated, 140, 146; Sherman's 
army be^ua its march to the sea 
from, Nov. 15, 1864, 241. 

Atlanta Campaign, b^^ May, 1864, 
133; Sherman's abilities displayed 
in, 151 ; 239 ; Lincoln's support of 
Sherman in, 2i54 ; the skilful strategy 
of, 256; Sherman did not rely on 
cavalry in, 260 ; the value its service 
might have been in, ib. ; the integ- 
rity of organization of Shermairs 
army preserved from Dalton to, 267 ; 
Thomas thought by Grant to have 



been leas competent than Sherman 
for command of , 206-207. 

Atlantic seaboard of the U. S., a reason- 
ably effectiye blockade maintained 
during oiyil war on, 271. 

Angnsta, Qa., the capture of, not Sher- 
man's object, 134 ; its abandonment 
advocatea 1865, by Beauregrard, 18 ; 
eyacuated, 19. 

Austerlitz, compared to Chattanooga, 

Ayerysboro*, N. C, engagement at, 
March 16, 1865, 145; Johnston's 
feeble blow at, 19. 

Bache, H., Maj., U. S. A., Hum^ireys 
with, in building lighthouses, 76. 

Badeau, A., his comment on -value of 
success at Fort Donelson, 25 ; cited 
as to Grant's reverse at Holly 
Springs, 30 ; ofnnion of Lee's army, 
34 ; his overestimates of Qrant, 30, 
35, 36, 37, 42 ; an injustioe to Grant, 
ih. ; poor opinion of Lee as a soldier, 
35, 36, 42. 

Bailey, J. B., Professor, U. S. Military 
Academy, a graduate of West Point, 

Baird, A., Brig.-G^n., U. S. V., in com- 
mand 1st division, 14th Corps, left 
wing, battle of Chickamauga, his 
position Sept. 19, 222 ; attacked by 
Polk, Sept. 20, 224 ; Wood ordered 
by Thomas to the support of, 227 ; 
in command of 3d division, 14th 
Corps, at Missionary Ridge, his diyi- 
sion sent to re-enforce Sherman, but 
was not required, 236 ; he took po- 
sition on Thomas' left, ih, ; evidence 
in his report that Grant wished the 
Ridge to be assaulted, 237. 

Balal^iva, railroad built by the Eng- 
lish from, during Crimean War, 270 ; 
the cavalry charge at, 40, 1.56. 

Baltimore, Md., saved by McClellan, 

Banks, N. P., Mai-Gen., U. S. V., 
called to oppose Jackson in Shenan- 
doah Valley, 107-108; Grant urged 
to join, 233 ; in Louisiana, May, 1^, 
ih, ; did not remain in active com- 
mimd till close of the war, 247. 

Barlow, F. C, Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. V., 
as CoL, 61st N. Y. V., 1st brigade, 
1st division, 2d Corps, 1862, 59 ; High 
Bridge over Appomattox, saved from 
destruction by, April 7, 1865, 92 ; 
his di-vision in pursuit of Lee di- 
rected towards Farmville, 93. 

Barnard, J. G., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A., 

a graduate of West Point, 75, 76; 
Chief Engineer, Army of the Poto- 
mac, 1861-1862, 102 ; his letter to 
McClellan of March 20, 1862, con- 
cerning naval co-operation, 102-103, 

Barnes, J., Byt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. V., a 
graduate of West Point, 75. 

Batchelder, R. N., Brig.-Gen., Quarter- 
master-General, U. S. A., his service 
as Col., U. S. v., with Hancock, 53 ; 
on Hancock's staff, 57. 

Baton Rouge, La., Gen. Williams at, 
August, 1862, 28. 

Beatty, J., Brig.-Gen., U. S. Y., in oom- 
mand of Ist brigade, 2d division, 14th 
Corps, his brigade joined Thomas 
before battle o? Chickamauga, Sept. 
20, 223. 

Beauregard, G. T., General, C. S. A., 
Roman's Life of, reviewed, 3-20; 
his capture of Fort Sumter, 4, 5 ; his 
project against Washington, July, 
1861, 5-6 ; in Sept., 17 ; in command 
at Manassas, 1861, 5 ; urged the 

1' unction of Johnston's forces with 
lis own, 5, 6, 7 ; battle of Bull Run, 

1861, 4, 5-7 ; his claim of victory at 
Bull Run, incorrect, 26 ; pursuit of 
McDowell not entertained by, 7; 
urged increase of army, t6. ; sent to 
the West, ih.; his plans for cam- 
paign, 7-8 ; did all ne could, 8 ; his 
plan to surprise Grant at Pittsburg 
Landing, 129; in command, April 
7, battle of Shiloh, 4, 8, 26 ; defeated, 
26; Bragg's report to, of horrible 
condition of ai-my, April 7, 232-233 ; 
Corinth evacuated by. May 30, 1862, 
8 ; in command at Charleston, Sept., 

1862, ih. ; his defence of Fort Sumter, 
1861, 4 ; in 1863, 8 ; aided by Hun- 
ter's faulty plan, 9 ; employed in 
defence of Kichmond April, 1864, 
10, 11 ; his advice disregarded, 11 ; 
given leisure by Butler to collect 
forces, 11 ; BuUer bottled up by, 
11-12 ; his plan of campaign May 
18, 12-13 ; disregarded, 13, 13 note ; 
its probable effect, 13-14 ; defeooe 
of Peteisburg, 1864, 4 ; his memo- 
randum of June 9, 14 ; his strength, 
June 15, 15 ; his skilful tactics at 
Petersburg, 16 ; Grant's movement 
on Petersburg foreseen by, 14; his 
weakened forces, ih. ; called on 
Bragg for re-enforcements, t6.; his 
calls for re-enforoements disregard- 
ed, 16 ; the evacuation of Petersburg 
his alternative, 17 ; re-enforced by 



Lee, Jnne 18, t&. ; hit g^ood dispon- 
tions of forces at Petersburgf ib.; 
at PeteTsbarg, July 30, 18 ; his ad- 
Tice not heeded, 1864-1865, 256; 
given command in the West, 1864, 
18; in co-operation with Hood, at 
Florence, Ala., Nov., 1864, 140 ; his 
plans conjectured to be directed to- 
wards NashvUle, Nov., 1864, 241; 
Sherman believed he would be forced 
to follow to Georgia, ih.; Thomas 
without fear of harm from, 241 ; 
with Johnston in spring of 1865, 
operating against Sherman, 18; 
superseded by Johnston, 19 ; battle 
of Greensboro', 4; interview with 
Davis and Cabinet, at Greensboro', 
19; his plan to continue the war, 
18 ; disregarded, 19 ; his merits as a 
oonmiander, 4, 6 ; not* of high rank 
as a soldier, 26 ; his characteristics, 
6 ; distrusted by Davis, t6., 16. 

Beckwith, A., Bvt. Mai-Gen., U. S. A., 
Sherman's letter of Oct. 19, 1864, to, 

Belmont, Mo., Grant's engfagement at, 
Nov. 11, 18i81, 24 ; purposeless, ib, ; 
29; not glorious, 280; the reasons 
why, ib. ; the importance of results 
of, ib, ; a tactical success, ib. ; Union 
losses, 34. 

Benjamin, J. P., Sec'y of State, C. S. 
A., at Greensboro' conference, 19. 

Bentonville, N. C, Sherman's engage- 
ment March 20-21, 1865, at, 145 ; 
his over-confidence, 204 ; Johnston's 
blow feeble at, 19. 

Bermuda Hundi«d, Va., Butler landed 
at, May 4, 1864, 11 ; position of 
Union troops at, ib.; Union forces 
bottled up, 12 ; 18th Corps taken to 
Cold Harbor from, 13 ; sent back to, 
14; Johnston's division before, t6. ; 
supposed to be in Grant's scheme 
against Petersburg, 14 ; number of 
men transported by railroad, 1864- 
1865, from, 272. 

Berry, H. G., Brig.-Gen., U. & V., 
succeeded by Humphreys in com- 
mand of 2d division, 3d Corps, Feb. 

Bevel's, or Bevill's, Bridge,over Appo- 
mattox River, one of the two roaos of 
escape left for Lee, April 2, 1865, 

Bingham, H. H., Major, U. S. V., 
Judge Advocate, on Hancock's staflF, 

Blackburn's Ford, Bull Run, in Mc- 
DoweU's plan, July, 1861, 7. 

Black Horse Cavalry, Payne's, Con- 
federate, its effect at Bull Run, 

Bledsoe, A. T., Assist. SeoV of War, 
C. S. A., a graduate of West Point, 

Blenker, L. M., appointed Brig.-Gen., 
U. a v.. May 17, 1861, 174. 

Blockade, the incredulity of foreign 
powers as to its maintenance by the 
V, S., 268; a navy created for the 
purpose, 271; made reasonably ef- 
fective, ib. 

Blue Ridge, Va., Lee's provision to 
guard passes of, in advance to Ctettys- 
burg, 160. 

Boydton Road, Va., expedition of Oct., 
18^, to, 66, 87. 

Booneville, Mo., battle of, July 1, 1862, 
the first planned by Sheridan, 204. 

Boston, Mass., Fort Lidependenoe, 
Thomas stationed at, 1850, 168. 

Bowen, J. S., Brig.43en., C. S. A., de- 
feated by Grant, May 1, 1863, at 
Port Gibson, 233. 

Bowling Green, Ky.» A. S. Johnston 
at, Jan., 1862, 177. 

Bragg, B., Gen. C. S. A., declined ap- 
pointment of Major in 2d U. S. Cav- 
alry, ia55, 170; joined the Confed- 
erate army, 171 ; in command of 2d 
Army Corps at Shiloh, statement as 
to Union attack, April 6, 1862, 232 ; 
his report of horrible state of ihe 
army after Shiloh, t6. ; Buell's move- 
ment to attack him at Perryville, 
216 ; repulsed by Buell's left wing, 
Oct. 8, 1862, 217 ; his strength at 
Perryville, 217 ; his loss, ib. ; Rose- 
crans' movement, Dec., 1862, to at- 
tack, t6. ; battle of Stone's River, 
Dec 31, 1862-Jan. 3, 1863, 217-220; 
his strength, 218 ; his position, t6. ,* 
his plan to attack Union right, t6. ; 
gravity of his attack, ib, ; defeated, 
179-180, 219 ; his retreat from, 180 ; 
forced into Chattanooga, 181 ; re-en- 
foroed by Long^treet, 131 ; his re- 
treat, Sept., 18&, from Chattanooga 
to Lafayette, 220 ; believed by Ro^ 
erans to be retreating to Rome, ih. ; 
pursuit of, t6. / believed to have 
been re-enforced by Johnston, 220 ; 
and to be waiting. Sept 11, for re-en- 
forcements from Va., ib,; encoun- 
tered, Sept 19, in position on Chickar 
mauga Kiver, ib,; his intention to 
block road to Chattanooga ques- 
tioned, 221-222, 223; his attack on 
Thomas, 221 ; the attack failed, i6. ; 



his dispositioim for battle of Sept. 
20, 223 ; his right wing under Polk, 
ih. ; his left -wing under Longstreet, 
t6. ; the battle of Sept 20, 224-229 ; 
strength of right -win^, 225; his 
loss Sept. 19, u), ; the irmption of* 
his forces on Thomas* right, 227; 
damage done by, t&. ; Longstreet's 
attack on Thomas, 228; defeated, 
181-182 ; strength of his left wmg, 
228 ; total of his force, ih. ; his loss, 
182; his position on Missionary 
Ridge, taken after Chickamauga, 
234; Grant's plans against, 33; plan 
of attack issued Nov. 18, 234 ; bat- 
tle of Missionary Ridge, Nov. 25, 
184-187, 234-238 ; objects of attacks 
of Hooker and Sherman on his flanks, 
132, 184; reported, Nov. 22, as re- 
treating, 184; Thomas ordered to 
ascertam if he was retreating, Noy. 
23, 235; his advanced line seized 
by Thomas, ib,; his forces driyen 
from Orchard Knob, Nov. 23, 184 ; 
his left on Lookout Mountain turned 
by Hooker, 33; his position on the 
Ridge captured by assault of Thom- 
as' forces, Nov. 25, 33, 132, 184, 
185, 186, 187 ; plan to cut off his 
retreat in Chickunauga Valley, 185 ; 
his loss on Missionary Ridge, t&. ; his 
statement concerning the strength of 
his position, 186; his Army of the 
Tennessee depleted after Missionary 
Ridge, 266 ; superseded by Johnston 
in command, t6. ; his command in 
Virginia, April, 1864, 10; Beaure- 
gard's prognostications of Grant's 
plans, June 9, 1864, addressed to, 
14 ; not an obstinate antagonist, 34 ; 
fighting him, not like fighting Lee, 
t6. ; always defeated, 34. 

Brandy Station, or Fleetwood, cavalry 
attacks at, 156-157, 159. 

Brannan, J. M., Bru^.-Gen., U. S. V., 
in command of & division, 14th 
Corps, left wing, at battle of Chick- 
amaufi^a, his position, Sept. 19, 222 ; 
at Thomas' disposition, Sept. 20, 
224-22.5; the fatal message as to 
rectification of his line, 226 ; his di- 
vision in its proper place, ib. ; the 
unfortunate effect of the message, 
227-230 ; that his division moved to 
the front was known to Thomas, 
230, 230 note, 244. 

Breoldnridge, J. C, Maj.-Gen., C. S. A., 
his conspiracy to capture Kentucky 
state arms, frustrated by Thomas, 
175 ; his report of demoralization of 

his troops after Shiloh, April 8, 

1862, 233; his division shattered by 
Thomas at Stone's River, 180; at 
battle of Missionary Ridge, 238 
note 4 ; as Sec'y of War at the 
Greensboro' council on the lost 
cause, 19. 

Bridgfeport, Ala., sh<nt route from 

Chattanooga attained, 183. 
Bristoe Station, Va., battle at, Oct 14, 

1863, 87. 

Brock Road Junction, Va., attempt of 
A. P. Hill to seize. May 5, 1864, 62. 

Brooke, J. R., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., a 
Col. in command of 4th brigade, 
1st division, 2d Corps, 1863, 59; in 
veteran corps, organized by Hancock, 
1864-1865, 66. 

Brotherton's Farm, Union right wing 
near, Sept 20, 1863, 226. 

Brown, J. C, Brig.-GJen., C. S. A., of 
Stevenson's division, at Missionary 
Ridge, 238 note 3. 

Brown's Ferry on Tenn. River, Con- 
federates dislodged from, by Thom- 
as, Oct 27, 1863, 183 ; Union loss 
at, ib, 

Brownson, E. B., Capt, U. S. V., oa 
Hancock's staff, 57. 

Bryan, G., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., his 
brigade, of Longstreet's division,, not 
present at Chickamauga, 228 note. 

Buckner, S. B., Maj.-Gen., C. S. A*, 
his scheme to capture the state 
arms of Kentucky, frustrated by 
Thomas, 175; Fort Donelaon sur- 
rendered by, Feb. 16, 1862, 25, 231 ; 
the number of men surrendered, ib, ; 
in battle of Missionary Ridge, 238 
note 1. 

Buell, D. C, Maj.-Gen., U. S. V., in 
command of Army of the Cumber- 
land, Nov. 15, 1861, 128; his line 
under Thomas in Kentucky, Nov., 
1862, 213 ; Thomas ordered, Dec. 29, 
to Mill Springs, 213 ; his promotions 
after Logan's Cross Roads, 215 ; or- 
dered to join Grant on the Tennessee, 
26, 128 ; his march begun March 18, 
232 ; his coming presumably known 
to Johnston, ib. ; within ten miles 
of Grant, April 5, ib. ; Confederate 
plan to attack, before his arrival, 8, 
26; his participation in the battle, 
April 7, 27, 130, 231, 250; his share 
in the victory, 44; his recommen- 
dation of Thomas to rank of Maj.- 
Gen., 178; Thomas rejoined him 
June, 1862, ib. ; Chattanooga his ob- 
jective. Sept, 1862,179; at LouisvUle, 



Oct If t&. ; snpeneded by Thomas, 
lb.} Thomas having declined, he 
remained in command, t6. ; Thomas 
appointed second in oonunand by, 
216 ; the battle of Perryville, Oct. 
8, 1862, 179 ; his orders to Thomas 
as to Perryville, 216-217 ; being ill 
took no part in battle, 217; his 
strength then, ib.; superseded by 
Roseorans, Oct. 30, 179, 216 ; as an 
org^anizer, compared with McClellan, 
122 ; one of the heroes of the Army 
of the Cumberland, 129; not in ac- 
tive command after Oct., 1862, 247. 

Bnena Vista, battie, Feb. 22-23, 1847, 
Thomas' distinguished service at, 

Buf ord, J., Maj.-Qen., U. S. V., his dis- 
tinguished cavalry service, 157 ; his 
signal services, July 1 and 3, 1863, 
Gettysburg campaign, 258-259. 

BuU Run, Va., battle of 1861, 4, 5-7, 
177 ; Union loss at, 34 ; awakenins^ 
to g^vity of the war at the North 
after, 248 ; Sherman in command of 
brigade at, 128, 239 ; Stuart at, 157 ; 
effect of Confederate Black Horse 
Cavalry at, 257 ; Patterson made the 
scapegoat of disaster at, 174 ; fight- 
ing at Fort Donelaon compared with, 

Bull Run, second battle, 1862, 100; 
McClellan resented the attribution 
of defeat to him, 119. 

Bureau of Topographical Eng^ineers, 
Humphreys attached to, 76. 

Burkesville, Va., road of escape to 
Lee barred there, April 4, 1865, 91. 

Bumside, A. E., Maj.-Gen., U. S. V., 

flven command of Army of the 
btomac, Nov. 10, 1862, 121 ; not 
suited to the position, t6. ; his fail- 
ure at Antietam, t6. ; his mine at 
Petersburg, 63 ; Humphreys reoom- 
mended for promotion by, 82. 

Butler, B. F., Maj.-Gen., U. S. V., his 
expedition into Virginia, in com- 
mand of Army of the James, 1864, 
10; landed at Bermuda Hundred, 
May 4, 11, 38; "bottled up," 12, 
39; Beauregard's plan against, in 
event of capture of Petersburg by, 
12 ; Grant's orders to, indefinite, 38, 
39 ; his position and continuance in 
the army due to political influence, 
254-255; not an able or patriotio 
man, 254. 

Buzzard Roost, Ga., in Thomas' pro- 
ject against Johnston, 1864, 188 ; in 
Sherman's oper&tions, ib. 

Cesar, Grant in comparison with, 36 ; 
Humphreys in contrast to, 82 ; 
Thomas lacked his audacity, 204; 
the Welsh not conquered by, 167. 

Cairo, Dls., Grant left, Feb. 2, 1862, 
for Fort Henry, 231. 

Caldwell, J. C, Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., 
in command of 1st brig^e, 2d Corps, 
at Fredericksburg, 1862, 59. 

California, Sherman served in, during 
Mexican War, 128; Thomas sta- 
tioned at Fort Tuma, 1854-1855, in, 

Camp Jackson, St Louis, broken up 
by Lyon, May, 1861^175. 

Carlisle Barracks, Pa., Thomas ordered 
to, April 10, 1861, 172; his renewal 
of oath of alleg^iance at, ib. 

Carroll, S. S., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A., 
in veteran corps organized by Han- 
cock, 1864-1865, 66. 

Casihtown, Pa., visited by Stuart in 
raid of Oct., 1862, 158. 

Cass, G. W., a graduate of West Point, 

Cavalry, its function in warfare, 156 ; 
development of, during the rebellion^ 
id., 157, 159, 257-258 ; raids of, futile, 
2.58, 260-262 ; improved by Hooker, 
160, 260-262; unfortunately em- 
ployed by Hooker in Chancellorsville 
campai^, 258 ; good use of, made by 
Meade m Gettysburg campaign ib. ; 
Buford's services with, July 1 and 
3, 1863, 258-259; mistaken use of, 
by Grant, 1864, 259 ; Sherman's in- 
difference to, 260 ; treated with in- 
dig^ty during Atlanta campaign, 
194; its fighting q^ualities mini- 
mized by Sherman, tb. ; employed 
by Thomas ag^ainst fortified Imes at 
Nashville, ib. ; its stren^^, tb. ; its 
energetic commanders, tb.; its ser- 
vices in retarding Hood's advance, 
ib,; Forrest defeated at Franklin 
by, ib.; Thomas' use of, 195; op- 
^^anized and conunanded by Wilson 
m Thomas' 1864 campaign, 191; 
his raid Alabama and Georgia, 1864, 
with, t&.; Lee's mistaken use of. 
260-261; Lee not conquered until 
there was a proper co-operation of 
infantry and, 262-263; improved 
under Sheridan, 162; its strengfth, 
1864, ib. ; the success of Sheridan in 
Appomattox oampaigpi a demonstra- 
tion of the best use of, 259, 262; 
his force displayed the perfection of 
the use of, 262 ; its recognition at 
dose of the war, 260. 



Caralry, U. S. Army, lat refft., 1855. 
Sumner, Colonel of, J. E. Johnston, 
Lt. Col., Emory and Sedgfwiok, Ma- 
wrs, 170: 2d regt., 1855, A. S. 
Johnston, Colonel, K. K Lee, Lieut. - 
Col., Hardee and Thomas, Majors, 
170 ; twenty-four of its ofliceni en- 
tered rebel service, ih. 

Cemetery Rid^, Gettysburg, pictured 
in battle of July 3, 49-51 ; Hancock 
wounded at, 50 ; Humphreys* posi- 
tion at, 84 ; Rckett repulsed at, 182. 

Chambersburg, Pa., visited by Stuart 
in his Oct, 1862, raid, 158. 

Champion Hill, Miss., battle of May 
16, 1863, mentioned, 18. 

Chancellor House, Hancock's position 
at, 51) ; Humphreys' affair at, 83. 

Chanoellorsville, Va., battle of May 
2-4, 1863, Hancock's service at, 
May 8, 59 ; Hooker *s g^ross misman- 
agement at, 159; his mistaken em- 
ployment of cavalry in the cam- 
paign, 258 ; Humphre3rs' services at, 
82, 83; Union loss at, 34; A. P. 
Hill and Jackson wounded at, 158 ; 
Stuart given command of Jackson's 
corps at, ih. 

Chapm's Farm, near Richmond, 63. 

Charles City Cross Roads, Va., in 
Grant's movement on Petersburg, 

Charleston, S. C, defended by Beaure- 
gard, 1861, 4 ; in 1862, 8 ; Hunter in 
command before, 9; might have 
been taken, 1863, 9 ; Union opera- 
tions discontinued, 1864, 9-10; 
troops called to Richmond from, 
May, 1864, 11 ; its abandonment 
advocated, 1865, by Beauregard, 18 ; 
his advice not entertained, 19 ; de- 
layed evacuation of, ih, ; evacuated, 
1865, 9, 19 ; Sherman thought Colum- 
bia ** as bad as," 147 ; in Beaure- 
gard's opinion, only a military posi- 
tion, 5 ; its possession of little value 
to the British, 134. 

Chattahoochee River, in Sherman's 
plans, autumn of 1864, 137. 

Cluittanooga, Tenn., Buell's destina- 
tion, not reached Oct. 1, 1862, 179 ; 
Thomas' plan of advance to, ignored, 
ih,; Rosecrans' advance on, from 
Murfreesboro' beg^n June 24, 1863, 
181 ; the Confederates forced into, 
t6. ; Bragg's communications at, 
threatened Sept. 8, 220 ; his retreat 
from, Sept. 8, ih, ; occupied by Rose- 
erans, Sept 9, ih. ; pursuit of Bragg 
from, ih.; Rosecrans' movement to 

ChiokamaugaRiver from,t&. ; Bn^s 
intention to block road to. Sept 19- 
20, questioned, 221-223 ; the roads 
to, 223 ; Bragg's position overlook- 
ing, taken a&r Ctiickamauga, 234 ; 
the criticism of choice of C&ant for 
supreme command at, instead of 
Thomas, discussed, 230; Thomas 
chosen by Grant for command at, 
216; the problem of supplying army 
at, solved by Thomas, 183 ; the ser- 
vices of W. F. Smith at, 183, 255 ; 
Grant arrived at, Oct 23, 1863, 234 ; 
his operations at, 32-34 ; his plan to 
concentrate his troops in vauey, on 
Thomas' left flank, 235 ; his orders 
for attack on Bragg at, Nov. 18, ih, ; 
batUe of, Nov. 23-26, 1863, 131-133, 
183-187 ; see Missionary Ridge ; a 
base of supplies for Sherman, 136 ; 
railroad to Atlanta cut and repaired, 
138, 139; distance from Florence, 
Ala., 140; exposed by Sherman to 
capture by Hood, 144; Thomas 
thought by Grant less competent 
than Sherman for command of move- 
ment to AUanta from, 206-207; 
129 146 241. 

Cheatham,' B. F., Maj.-Gen., C. a A., 
strength of his division at Chioka- 

Cherubusco, Hancock brevetted for 
gallantry at, 51. 

Chesapeake Bay, in McClellan's plan 
of campaign, 101. 

Chesapetuce, tl. S. man-of-war, built 
by D. Humphreys, 74. 

Chester, W. H., Capt, U. S. V., mor- 
tally woimded at Gettysburg, 85. 

Chicago, His., Reunion of Western 
Armies, Dec., 1868, at, 19a 

Chickahominy River, Va., 12, 57, 61, 
114 ; concerned in failure of McClel- 
lan's campaign, 116, 117; Grant's 
movement on, June, 1864, 14. 

Chickamanga, battle of, Sept 19-20, 
1863, 131, 181-182, 220-230; move- 
ment to, begun Sept 18, 220-221 ; 
the movement timely, 221 ; the left 
wing, commanded by Thomas at, 
221, 230 ; the battle brought on by 
an attack not ordered by Thomas, 
181, 205, 221 ; met by a counter 
attack near Reed's Bridge, 221 ; 
Bragg's intention to block road to 
Chattanooga questioned, 221-222 ; 
position of Union forces. Sept 19, 
222 ; the enemy repulsed, 221 ; the 
plan of battle of Sept 20, adopted 
in council, night of Sept 19, 222 ; 



dispositions changed by Thomas' 
wish early Sept. 20, 222 ; Thomas re- 
enforced, 223 ; attack Sept. 20, begnn 
by Polk on Thomas' extreme left, 
224 ; extended to his entire line, ib. ; 
attack everywhere repulsed, ib. ; at- 
tack most serious on Baird, t&. ; re-en- 
forcements oaUed for, and sent, 224- 
226; Confederates penetrated the 
line prior to 11 A. M., ib. ; strong^ 
of Union left wing Sept 20, 225 ; 
strenc^ of Confederate force op- 
posed to, 225; mistaken message 
carried to Rosecrans by one of 
Thomas' aidesy 226; misfortune 
caused thereby, in remoyal of 
Wood's division from Union line, 
227-280 ; the irruption of enemy in 
gap left by Wood s movement, 227 ; 
the Union forces swept away by 
Hood, ib.y 228 ; Sheridan moving to 
left wing struck and forced back, 
227; Thomas' right assaulted by 
Longstreet, about 2 p. m., 228 ; this 
assault resisted until 5.30 P. M., 228- 
22i) ; the g^reatest qualities displayed 
in this defence by Thomas, 184, 2i29 ; 
his retreat to Koesville, ib. ; the 
attacks on Thomas in retreat un- 
availing, ib.; his great services at, 
ib.; his faculty for meeting emer- 
gencies, instanced at, 205 ; cost of 
the battle to the Confederates, 266 ; 
both armies of the West at their best 
at, 1*6. ; honors due to memory of, t&. ; 
Tactical Study of the Battlefield of, 
its legend incorrect, 230, 230 note 1, 
243-244; position taken by Bragg 
on Missionary Ridge after, 234; 
Sherman opposed Nov. 25 by forces 
which had been at, 186 ; the Union 
army the same at Atlanta as at, 

Chickaraauga River, Rosecrans' move- 
ment. Sept 18, 1863, to, 220 ; Bragg 
encountered on. Sept 19, ib. ; &e 
Union movement timely, 221 ; in 
Grant* s plans, Nov. 18, for Sher- 
man's advance, 234. 

Chickaraauga Valley, plan to out 
Bragg's retreat in, 185. 

ChickaiBaw Bayou, Sherman's action 
at, Dec. 28, 1862, 29. 

Chocorua, U. S. gunboat, 103. 

Church, A. £., Prof, of Mathematics, 
U. S. Mil. Acad., a g^duate of West 
Point, 75. 

Cist, H. M., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., his 
History of the Army of the Cumber- 
land referred to, 112 ; his version of 

story of fatal message at battle of 
Chickamanga, 229. 

City Point, on James River, Butler's 
expedition, 1864, to, 10; Ghvdon's 
unsuccessful attempt at, 1865, 90; 
Sheridan at, March 27, 259. 

Clarke, F. H., Bvt Maj.-Gen., U. S. A., 
Hancock with, in the West, 51. 

Cl^, Henry, jr., classmate of Gen. 
Humphreys at West Point, 75. 

Cleburne, P. R., Maj-Gen., C. S. A., 
opposed to Sherman, battle of Mis- 
sionary Ridge, his strength, 238; 
compared with Humphreys, 95. 

Coast Survey Office, Humphreys in 
Cham of, 1844-1849, 77. 

Cold Harbor, Va., battle of, May 31- 
June 12, 1864, 13, 40, 42, 87 ; failure 
of charge at, 62 ; Grant's movement 
from June, 12, 13, 14 ; Grant blocked 
at, 39. 

Colorado River, Thomas' report on, 
1867, 171. 

Columbia, Ky., Union line extended 
from London to, Nov., 1862, 213. 

Columbia, S. C, Sherman's strategy in 
movement to, 145; r^rarded by 
Shennan ^*as bad as Charleston," 
147; its abandonment advocated, 
1865, by Beauregard, 18 ; evacuated, 

Columbus, Ky., Polk in command at, 
Nov., 1801, 24; Belmont attacked 
instead of, t&. 

Confederate €k>vt, failure to compre- 
hend, 1861, the magnitude of the 
war, 247; its shortsighted financial 
policy, 248; did not employ cotton 
to advantage in England, 1861, ib. ; 
its inadequate provision of arms and 
ammunition, to.; inadequate prepa- 
rations for war, 249; not daunted 
by disasters of 1862, t6.; its treat- 
ment of J. E. Johnston, 254. 

Congress of the U. S., see United States 

Congress, U. S. man-of-war, built by 
D. HumphreyB, 74 ; destroyed by 
the Merrimac, 1862, 102. 

Conrad's Ferry, Potomac River, 7, 158. 

Constitution, U. S. man-of-war, built 
by D. Humphreys, 74. 

Contreras, Hancock brevetted for gal- 
lantry at, 51. 

Cooper's Gap, Lookout Mountain, 
Tliomas in position at, 220. 

Corinth, Miss., twenty miles from Pitts- 
burg Landing, Confederates in posi- 
tion at, April, 1862, 232; the pur- 
pose of Grant to seize, known to 



Johnston, ih, ; horrible itate of rebel 
army in retreat from Shiloh to, April 
8, t6.; Armv of the Cumberland 
reorganized April, 1862, for the ad- 
vance on, 215 ; threatened by Qrant, 
April, 1862, 26 ; Sherman under com- 
mand of Thomaa in advance on, 187 ; 
Thomas in command of right wing 
at meg^ of, 230 ; Sherman's sncceas- 
fol engagement at. May 28, 239; 
evacoated by Beanregaid, May 30, 
1862, 8; an abandoned city when 
ooonpied by Eblleck, 189 ; battles of 
Oct. 3-4, 1862, 233 ; Grant^s conduct 
of battle criticized, 27; Rosecrans' 
share in it, ih, ; the enemy routed by 
Rosecrans at, Oct. 3-4, 1862, 217; 
Union loss at, 34 ; 129, 179. 

Comwallis, Lord, Lieut-Gen., British 
Army, batUe of Quilford C. H., 1781, 
18 ; Sherman^s position in North 
Carolina compared to that of, 145. 

Corps of Topographical Engineers, 
U. S. A., organized, 1838, 76 ; Hum- 
phreys a 1st lieut of, 1838, ih. 

Corpus Christi, Texas, Thomas sta- 
tioned at, Aug., 1845, 168. 

Corse, J. M., Bru^.-Gen., U. S. V., his 
defence of U. o. post at AUatoona 
Pass, Oct. 5, 1864, 138. 

Cotton not employed by the Confeder- 
acy to advantage in England, 1861, 

Couch, D. N., Maj.-Gen., U. S. V., suc- 
ceeded by Hancock in command of 
2d Corps, 59-60 ; assigned to Dept. 
of Susquehanna, 60. 

Crimean War, steam-vessels and rail- 
roads employed in, 270. 

Crittenden, G. B., Maj.-Gen., C. S. A., 
in command before Mill Springes, 
Jan., 1862, brought re-enforcements 
across the Cumberland, Jan. 18, 214 ; 
attacked Thomas, at Logan's Cross 
Roads, Jan. 19, 176, 214; his 
strength, ih, ; totally defeated, 176- 
177, 214 ; termination of his military 
career, 176. 

Crittenden, T. L., M^j.-Gen., U. S. V., 
in command 2d Corps Army of the 
Ohio, ordered to position at Perry- 
ville, Oct. 7, 1862, 216 ; in command 
of three divisions and of left wing 
at Stone's River, Dec. 31, 1862-Jan. 
3, 1863, 218; ordered to send re-en- 
forcements to right wing, Dec. 31, 
218 ; made front ag^nst the enemy, 
219 ; no evidence i£at he was threat- 
ened wil^ disaster, t6. ; ptart of his 
command forced back, t6.; Sher- 

idan's aid to left wing, 219; four of 
his brigades alone of all Uie army 
retained their original position, t6.; 
sent to Ringgold, Sept., 1863, 220; 
ordered to new position, Sept. 11, 
t6. ; at battle of Chickamauga, 221 ; 
a division of his corps sent to Thom- 
as, 222; his position in reserve for 
Sept. 20, t6.; Thomas directed to 
employ Ids forces, 224 ; Van Cleve's 
division ordered to support Thomas, 
225; propriety of Thomas' call for 
aid fiom, questioned, 226; Wood's 
division of nis command, ib. 

Crook, a, Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A., 
under Thomas' instruction at West 
Point, 169; his cavalry division co- 
operated with Humplureys, April 7, 

Cruft, C, Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., in com- 
mand of 1st brigade, 2d division, 
left wing at Stone's River, forced 
back, 219. 

Crump's Landing, four miles from 
Pittsburg Landing, Grant's fears of 
an attack at, April 5, 1862 233. 

Cullum, G. W., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A., 
a graduate of West Point, 1833, 75 ; 
his Biographical Register, t6., 76, 

Cumberland, Army or Department of, 
see Army or Department of the 

Cumberland Mountains, Thomas and 
McCook sent across. Sept, 1863, in 
pursuit of Bragg, 220. 

Cumberland River, Confederates cross, 
to MUl Springs, Jan. 2, 1862, 213; 
Logan's Cross Roads, twelve miles 
from, 175. 

Cumberland, U. S. man-of-war, de- 
stroyed by the Merrimao, 1862, 

Cumming, A., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., of 
Stevenson's division, at Missionary 
Ridge, 238 notes 3, 5. 

Currituck, U. S. gunboat, 103. 

Curtin, A. G., (Jovemor of Pennsylva- 
nia, concurred in reconmiending call 
for 300,000 men, 251. 

Curtis, S. R., Maj.-Gen., U. S. V., class- 
mate of Gen. Humphreys at West 
Point, 75. 

Custer, G. A., BvtMai.-Gen.,*!;. S. V., 
out Lee's last supply line and cap- 
tured supply trains, April 8, 1866, 
94; his distinguished cavalry ser- 
vice, 157. 

Cutting. F. B., his advice to McClel- 
lan, April, 1862, 111. 



Dahlgren, J. A., Rear Admiral, 
U. S. N., leoBted at Charleston, 4. 

Dalton, Ga., 136; Johnston's position 
at, 1864, 185, 187; distance from 
Chattanoon^ t6. ; evaouated by 
Johnston, 188; the integ^ty of or- 
ganization of Sherman^s army pre- 
served from, to Atlanta, 267; the 
Talue cavalry might have been to 
Sherman after leaving, 260. 

Dana, G. A., Assist. becV of War, 
1864-1866, his report of battle of 
Chiokamanga, Sept 20, 1863, 181 ; 
Stanton^s message of approbation to 
Tliomas, through, 183 ; his report of 
capture of Missionary Ridge cited, 

Davis, G. B., Major U. S. A., in charge 
of publication of War Records, his 
letters to Col. Livermore, concerning 
the '' Tactical Study of the Battle- 
field of Chiokamauga,'' 243-244. 

Davis, J., President, C. S. A., his 
knowledge of military affairs, 252- 
254 ; superior to Lincoln's, tfr. ; ed- 
ucated at West Point, 1824-1828, 
252; U. S. Secretary of War, 1863- 
1857, tfr.; his appointments, 1855, 
to cavaliT reeiments, 170 ; his rela- 
tions with Humphreys, 78; his ac- 
quaintance with the personnel of the 
U. S. Army, t6. ; md not approve 
of scheme to capture Alexandria 
and Arlington, 1861, 5, 6; pursuit 
of Union forces after Bull Run, not 
entertained by, 7; Petersburg de- 
nuded of troops, April, 1864, by, 10 ; 
called troops to Richmond, May 4, 
1864, 11 ; his order to delay evac- 
uation of Charleston, 19; inter- 
view at Greensboro', N. C., with 
Johnston, t6. ; unwillingness to give 
up the cause as lost, 19-20; con- 
sented to Johnston's surrender, 20; 
his administration censured, t6. ; his 
interference in the conduct of mili- 
tary affairs, 253 ; influenced by per- 
sonal feelings for or against Coiued- 
erato officers, tfr. ; his conduct did 
not improve, t6., 254; his relations 
with Beauregard, 3. 

Davis, J. C, Brig.-Gen., U. S. A., in 
command of 1st division, 14th Corps, 
in right wing at Stone's River, forced 
back by enemy, Dec. 31, 218; his 
position at Chickamauga, Sept. 20, 
226; his attempt to close g^ap in 
Union line, 227 ; in command of 2d 
division, 14th Corps, under Thomas 
at Chattanooga, 237. 

Dawes, R C, Col. U. a V., his ea- 
timato of Confederate strength at 
Chickamauga cited, 228 note ; the 
estimate criticized, t^. 

Daylight, U. S. gunboat, 103. 

Dearing, J., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., his 
cavalry at Petersburg, June, 1864, 

Decatur, Tenn., 193 ; the Union army 
at Atlanta the same as at, 267. 

Declaration of Independence, John 
Dickinson and Charles Humphreys 
opposed, 74. 

Deep Bottom, Va., Hancock's expedi- 
tion to, July, 1864, 63; the objects 
of it, t6. 

Delaware Bay, Humphreys employed 
in building lighthouses on, 76. 

Department (Military) of Pennsylva- 
nia created, April 27, 1861, 173; 
Patterson placed in command, t^. ; 
Thomas' services in, 173-174. 

Department of the Cumberland, com- 
mand given Aug. 15, 1861, to An- 
derson, 128, 174; Sherman assigned 
to, 128; Thomas assi^n^ to, ib,; 
Sherman in command of, Oct. 8, 
1861, 128 ; succeeded by Buell, ib. 

Department of the Mississippi, Halleck 
in command of, March 11, 1862, 26, 
129; Sherman under command of 
Halleck in, 128. 

Department of the Susquehanna, Couch 
assigfued to, 60. 

De Trobriand, R., Bri^.-Gen., U. S. V., 
his division in pursuit of Lee, April 

Devens, C, Brig.-Gen., U. S. A., cited 
as to comforts of Army of Potomac, 

IHckinson, John, voted against the 
Declaration of Independence, 74. 

Dinwiddie, Court House, engagfement 
of March 31, 1865, 90. 

Division of the Mississippi, see Mili- 
tary Division of the Miraissippi. 

Doneison, Fort, see Fort Donelson. 

Drewry's or Drury's Bluff, the James 
River open to. May 12, 1862, 116 ; 
Union position at. May, 1864, 11 ; 
Hoke's division sent to Petersburg 
from, June 15, 14. 

Dry Creek Valley Road, followed by 
Sheridan, Sept 20, after repulse by 
Hood, 227. 

Dupont, H., Maj.-€}eii., C. S. A., a 
graduate of West Point, 75. 

Dupont, S. F., Rear Admiral, U. S. K., 
unsuccessful attack on Fort Somtor, 
April 7, 1863, a 



Enlj, J., Bri^^Gen^ C. & A. (1S61), 
defeated by Hancock at WiUiaois- 
burg, ^Jfi, 

£dward*s Ferry, PoComae Rirer, 7. 

Eighteenth Corps, U. S. A., at battle 
of Cold Harbor, 13 ; tent baek to 
Bermoda Hnndnd, 14 ; sent against 
PeterBbiug, t&. ; outer works carried 
by, ib. ; before Pet ei s bui g, Joly, 
1864, m. 

Electric telegn^^ its Talne in time of 
war, 2m-*U0; the capabilities of 
the people of the Northern States in 
the otilkation of, 271. 

Elerenth Corps, U. S. A., emshing as- 
sault on, at ChancellotsriUe, 159; 
beaten, Joly 1, at Gettysburg, 161. 

Emmittsborg, Md., visited by Stoart 
in Oct., lHt)2, raid, 15a 

Emory, W. H^ Brt. Maj.-Gen., U. a A^ 
claannate of Gen. Humphreys at 
West Point, 75; Major, 1st U. S. 
Cavalry, 1855, 170. 

England, the Confederate Govt short- 
sighted as to use of cotton in, 248 ; 
its people not military, ib, 

Ewell, R. S., Lieut-Gen., C. S. A., his 
corps captured by Sheridan, April 
6, 1865, 92. 

Ewing, BL, Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., in 
command of 4th division, 15th Corps, 
under Sherman at Chattanooga, 2o7. 

Ezra Church, G^, Thomas in battle of, 
July 28, 1864, 190. 

Fairfax Court House, Va., McDowell 
left position at, July 16, 1861, 7. 

Fair Oaks, battle of May 31-June 1, 
1862, Union loss at, 34 ; not fought 
as intended by Johnston, 256 ; BLan- 
oook not engaged, 57. 

Falling Waters, Va., engagement July 
2, 1861, Thomas* participation in, 
173 ; Thomas not under fire at, 213 ; 
Confederates repulsed by Abercrom- 
bie at, t6. 

Farmville, Va., Lee's hope to escape 
at, 92 ; Longstreet at, April 6, t6. ; 
Barlow sent to, April 7, 93 ; part of 
the Union army in position south of, 

Farmville Heights, Lee compelled by 
Humphreys to lose time at, 94. 

Farragnt, D. G., Rear Admiral, U. S. N., 
Vicksburg batteries passed by, 27- 

Fifth Corps, U. S. A., overwhelmed at 
Gaines^ Mill, 124; under Porter, 
composed of Pennsylvania troops, 
80 y Humphreys in command of 3d 

dxnmam, A.; at Petersbnrg, Jnae 
17, 1864, 15, 63; its unimproved 
opporConity at, 16; eoaunanoed by 
Meade, 84 ; 3d cKvirioa broken np. 
ib. ; movement am Weldon Railroad, 
00; witk SheridaB in pnxsnit of Lee, 

Ffast Corps, U. & A^ beaten, July 1, 
at Gettysborg, 161. 

Five Forks, Va., battle of April 1, 1885, 
the victory at, no greater than 
Thomas' at NashviUe, 192 ; planed 
by Sheridan, 20i; Petersburg and 
Richmond not abandoned by Lee 
untfl after, 149, 263. 

Flat Creek, Va., 9L 

Fleetwood or Brandy Station, eavahy 
attack at, 156-157, 159. 

Florence, Ala., Hood's movement to, 
140; in position at, Nov. 1, 1864, 
t6., 240. 

Florida, Seminole War, 51, 76, 167; 
Thomas stationed in, 168. 

Floyd, J. B., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., hk 
share in surrender of Fort Donelsoo, 

Foots, A. H., Commodore, U. S. N. 
(1862), his oo-operadon witli Grant 
in capture of Forts Henry and 
Donelson, 129. 

Forrest, N. B., Maj-Gen., C. S. A., his 
operations in Sept., 1864, 138; in 
Oct , 139 ; Thomas sent to Tennessee 
to expel, Sept 29, 191 ; defeated at 
battle of Franklin, 194 ; Humphreys 
not surpassed by, 95. 

Forsyth, J. W., Lt-CoL U. a V. , Chief- 
of -Staff , in episode at Deep Bottom, 
July 28, 1864, 64. 

Fort Donelson, on Cumberland River, 
Grant's advance from Fort Henry 
on, Feb. 12, 1862,231 ; his strength, 
250 ; attack of U. S. fleet repulsed, 
231 ; sortie of Confederates repulsed, 
ib. ; the commander and part of 
force escaped Feb. 15, t6.; surren- 
dered by Buckner, Feb. 16, 7, 25, 
129, 177, 231, 250 ; number of men 
surrendered, ib. ; 250 ; in its capture 
the new fleet of U. S. gunboats em- 
ployed, 271 ; the evacuation of Ken^ 
tuoky and Tennessee by Confeder- 
ates the result of its capture, ib. ; 
fighting at, compared with Bull 
Run, 25 ; an overrated victory, t6. ; 
compared with battle of Nashville, 

Fort Henry, Tenn. River, sixty miles 
from Cairo, 231 ; Grant started for, 
Feb., 1862, t6. ; abandoned by Con- 



federates on approach of U. S. fleet, 
7, 26, 129, 231. 

Fort Independence, Boston, Mass., 
Thomas stationed at, 168. 

Fort Johnson, S. C, 9. 

Fort Monroe, Va., 101 ; transportation 
of U. S. troops to, protected, 103 ; 
McClellan^s confidence in, as a base, 

Fort Stedman, Ya., Gordon^s attempt 
on, March, 1865, 90; repulsed by 
Parke, ib. 

Fort Sumter, S. C. captured 1861, by 
Beaureg^ard, 3, 4, ^ ; defence of, by 
Beaureffard, 1861, 4; in 1863, 8; 
might haye been taken, 1863, 9; 
not taken until 1865, tb, ; 55. 

Fort Yuma, Lower California, Thomas 
stationed at, 1854, 170, 171. 

Fourth Corps, U. S. A., in engagement 
of Peach Tree Creek, 190. 

Fourteenth Corps, U. S. A., in engagfe- 
ment of Peach Tree Creek, July 
20, 1864, 190 ; successful assault at 
Jonesboro', 189. 

Fox, G. v., Assist. Sec'y of the Navy, 

France, the use of railroads to the 
Prussians in, 1870-1871, 272. 

Frankfort, Ey., consfnracy of rebels to 
seize the state arms at, frustrated by 
Thomas, 175. 

Franklm, Tenn., Schofield*s with- 
drawal to, 142 ; his position at, the 
cause of ruk to Thomas, 241 ; battle 
of, Nov. 30, 1864, Thomas' strength 
at, 142 ; Hood repulsed at, 142, 143; 
Forrest defeated at, by Hatch under 
Wilson, 194 

Frederick, Md., 80. 

Frederick the Great, Grant in compari- 
son with, 36. 

Fredericksburg, Va., battle of Dec. 13, 
1862, Humphreys' charge at, 82, 83, 
84 ; Hancock at, 54, 59 ; Union loss 
at, 34 ; an illustration of the easier 
task of repelling an assault, 257; 
mentioned, 59, 1^. 

Freeborn, U. S. gunboat, 103. 

Gadsden, Ala., Hood's position at, Oct., 
1864 138. 

Gaines' Mill, Va., battle of June 27, 
1862, Hancock's service at, 57 ; 5th 
Corps overwhelmed at, 124. 

Garfield, J. A., Brig. -Gen., U. S. V., 
Rosecrans' Chief-of-Staff, orders to 
McCook and Sheridan, at Chicka- 
mauga, communicated by, 224 ; or- 
ders to Thomas, t6., 228 ; his report, 

Sept 20> 1863, of Thomas at Chick- 
amauga, 181 ; his description of 
Thomas. 200. 

Gamett, K. S., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., in 
Beauregard's plans, 1861, 6. 

Garrard, I. , Col., 7th Ohio VoL cavalry, 
with Thomas, 1864, 194. 

Gates, T. B., CoL, 80th N. Y., U. & V., 
his forces on Cemetery Ridge, July 
3, 1863, 50. 

Ghiylesville, Ala., Sherman's army con- 
centrated at, 138; danger to Hood 
in an advance on, 140. 

Georgia, Sherman's march projected, 
14&-141 ; executed, 143-144 ; his pro- 
jectsof devastation in, 146-150; his 
right to subsistence in, 147-148 ; his 
estimate of damage inflicted by him 
in, 149 ; Wilson's 1864 raid in, 260. 

Getty, G. W., Brig.-Gen., U. S. A., sup- 
ported b;^ Hancock, May 5, 1864, 62 ; 
in the Wilderness Battle of the Left, 
May 6, t6. 

Gettysburg, Pa., visited in his raid of 
Oct., 1862, by Stuart, 158 ; battle of, 
July l-i3, 1863 ; Buford's service at, 
July 3, 258-259; Union left wing 
commanded by Hancock, 52 ; 54 ; 
battle of Cemetery Ridge, July 3, 
1863. 49-51 ; Hancock wounded, 50, 
61; his use of infantry at, 53; his 
services at, 60-61 ; Humphreys' ser- 
vices at, 82, 83-86; his march to, 
84 ; his position at, ib, ; his manoeu- 
vres and gallantry at, 85; a great 
battle, 86 ; Pickett's charge, 182 ; the 
battle not fought as intended by 
Lee, 162; 257 ; his rash assault, 162 ; 
Stuart's service at, 157, 159; Union 
loss at, 34 ; condition of Army of the 
Potomac at, 264 ; Army of Northern 
Virginia unable to make up for losses 
at, 265; both armies at their best 
at, 266. 

Gettysburg Campaign, futility of Stu- 
art's raid during, 160-162, 258, 261- 
262 ; excellent use of cavalry made 
by Meade during, ib,; Lee's plans 
in, 160. 

Gibbon, J., Brig.-Gen., U. a V., at 
Cemetery Ridge, July 13, 1863, 50, 
60 ; his services in ending the war, 

Gillmore, Q. A., Maj.^^n., U. S. V., 
superseded Hunter in command of 
Dept of the South, June 12, 1863, 
9 ; resisted at Charleston, 1863, 4 ; 
foiled by Beauregard, ib, ; employed 
in Virginia, 1864, 10. 

Gist, a R., Brig.-Gen., C. a A., strength 



of his division at Ghickamauga, April 
20, 225. 
Glenn, Mrs., Roseorans* headquarters 
at her house, battle of Chiok^nanga, 

Gloucester, Va., McClellan's plans for 
reduction of, 101, 103, 110. 

Goldsborough, L. M., Rear Admiral, 
U. S. N., in command of U. S. fleet 
in Hampton Roads, 1862, 103, 104 ; 
responsible for the neutralization of 
the Merrimao, 103 ; his provision of 
gunboats to McClellan, ib, ; unable 
to provide vessels to attack York- 
town, t6., 104, 105. 

Goldsborough, N. G., its abandonment 
advocated, 1865, by Beauregard, 18 ; 
Sherman's brilliant march from Sa- 
vannah to, 19, 268 ; his new base at, 
145; re-enforoed by Schofield at, 

Goode's Bridge, over Appomattox 
River, Va., one of the roads of es- 
cape left for Lee April 2, 1865, 91. 

Gordon, 0. G., Maj.-Gen., British army, 
at Khartoum, 115. 

Gordon, J. B., Maj.-Gen., G. S. A., his 
attempt on Fort Stedman, March 25, 
1865, 90; repulsed by Parke, t&.; 
his unsuccessful engagement April 6, 
1865, at Sailor's Creek, 92 ; crossed 
the Appomattox at High Bridge, t6. ; 
compared with Humphreys, 95. 

Gordon's Mill, Ga., Thomas' position, 
Sept. 19, 1863, on road to Kossville 
from, 222. 

Gordonsville, Va., 59. 

Govan, D. C, Brig.-Gen., G. S. A., his 
bri^^e captured at Jonesboro', 189. 

Government of the Confederacy, see 
Confederate Government. 

Government of the U. S., see U. S. 

Governor's Island, N. T., EEancock's 
death at, Feb. 9, 1886, ^, 

Grade, A., jr., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., his 
brigiide at Petersburg, 15. 

Granger, G., Maj.-Gen., U. S. V., at 
battle of Chickamaugfa, in reserve, 
223; ordered to support Thomas 
Sept. 20, t6. ; his position on Mission- 
ary Ridge, ib.; hurried from Ross- 
ville to join Thomas in repelling 
Longstreet, 228; strength of force 
brou^t to aid Thomas, t6. 

Grant, U. S., General, U. S. A., the 
early recognition of his merits due 
to the pardality of Washbume, 166 ; 
discussion of his military ability, 23- 
46; his affair at Belmont, Nov. 7, 

1861,24; his losses, 34; the battle 
wanting in glory, 24, 230 ; the rea^ 
sons why, ib. ; the important results 
of, t6. ; started Feb. 2, 1862, from 
Cairo for Fort Henry, 231; Fort 
Henry abandoned, 25, 129, 231 ; 
Fort Donelson invested, Feb. 12, ib. ; 
attack by U. S. fleet repulsed, t6. ; 
sortie of enemy repulsed, t6.; the 
fort surrendered, Feb. 16, 25, 129, 178, 
231 ; the number of men captured, 
231; the strength of, ib,; an over- 
rated victory, 25; important results 
of, 271 ; under a cloud, Biaroh 4-15, 
1862, 27; censured by Halleck, ib.; 
his position, March 10, 1862, at Pitts- 
burg Landing well chosen, 26, 129 ; 
his headquarters at Savannah, t6. ; 
Buell ordered to join him, 26 ; John- 
ston knew that Buell was on the way 
to join, 232 ; and that the capture of 
Corinth was the purpose of, ib. ; plan 
of Confederates to attack befcnre 
Buell's arrival, 8, 26, 129 ; the bat- 
tle delayed until Buell was within 
ten miles of, 232 ; his strength, April 
5, 231 ; the Confederate strength, 
t6.; at Savannah when the battle 
began, 26 ; cause of his absence from 
Pittsburg Landine, April 6, 233 ; con- 
ference with Buell, April 5, ib. ; his 
apprehensions of attack at Crump's 
Liuiding, ib. ; attacked by Johnston, 
April 6, 4, 26, 130, 231, 250 ; the at- 
tack a surprise, 4, 26, 130, 250; his 
statement that the army was not sur- 
prised distrusted, 26, 130, 132; the 
charge of surprise refuted by Hal- 
leck, 233 ; the charge disproved by 
the Record, 231-233 ; his despatch 
to HaUeck of April 5, 1862, 130, 232 ; 
and Sherman's despatch to, contain 
the data for proposition that the 
Union army was surprised April 6, 
ib.; his stubborn resistance, 130; 
forced back to Tennessee River, 26, 
231; defeated, April 6, 44; re-en- 
forced, he defeated Beauregard, 
April 7, 230, 250 ; his success, April 
7, caused by BeaurRg^ard's short- 
comings, 26, 27 ; his losses, 34, 231 ; 
Confederate losses, 230 ; made sec- 
ond in command to Halleck, April 
30, 27, 216 ; command of a part of 
the Army of Tennessee given to 
Thomas, 178; his position anoma- 
lous and distasteful, 216 ; Halleck's 
slights brooded over, 178 ; his po- 
sition improved by Halleck's pro- 
motion, 27 ; his command July-Oct., 



1862, 238; big object to open the 
Miflsiflsippi, 27; the battle of Inka 
fought, Sept. 19-20, 1862, 27, 28, 
233 ; his loes at, 34 ; not to his credit, 
27 ; the battle of Corinth, Oct 3-4, 
1862, 27, 233; his conduct of, criti- 
cized, 27 ; his 1862 campaign agunst 
Yicksbu^ unsuccessful^ 233 ; his re- 
verse at Holly Springs, Dec. 20, 1862, 
29-30 ; his Vicksburg campaign, No- 
vember, 1862-July, 1863, 27-32, 233 ; 
his plans affected by report of pro- 
ject to give command to McClemand, 
28, 29, 30; capture of Vicksburg 
suggested, 28 ; his overland scheme, 
28-29; his plans criticized, 28; no 
hope of subsistence from conntry, 
29 ; his plans indefinite, 31 ; his 
strength, 234 ; his advance on, 233 ; 
urged by Halleck to join Banks, t6. ; 
passed Vicksbuig April 12, 1863, ih. ; 
captured Port Gib^n, May 1, t6. ; 
Johnston defeated by. May 14, at 
JacksoD, 234; Pemberton surren- 
dered Vicksburg to, July 4, t6. ; 
number of men surrendered, ib.; 
strength of Confederates, ih,; his 
success at Vicksburg aided by his 
opponent's incapacity, 32 ; the great 
success of the war, t6. ; his superior 
strategy, 131 ; unheard of theretofore 
in the civil war, 234 ; worthy of the 
great commanders of history, ih,; 
given command of Military Division 
of the Mississippi, Oct. 16, 1863, 183, 
230, 234 ; his promotion the reward 
for Vicksburg, 132 ; comment on his 
appointment instead of Thomas, 234 ; 
assumed command, Oct. 18, ih. ; ar- 
rived at Chattanooga, Oct 23, 183, 
234; his operations at Chattanooga, 
Oct 23-Nov. 25, 32-34, 131-133, 
184-187, 234-238 ; would not wait 
for attack by Bragg, 32-33 ; issued 
orders for attack, Nov. 18, t6., 184, 
234 ; the execution of his order de- 
layed, 184, 185 ; his plan of attack, 
234-236; his plan admirable and 
skillful, 184 ; ms orders to Thomas, 
234-235 ; his orders to Sherman, 235 ; 
his purpose to give Sherman the duty 
of main attack, 184, 185 ; the asser- 
tion that he intended to give Sher- 
man the chief part in tiie battie 
questioned, 236; his intention that 
Thomas and Sherman should co-oper- 
ate, 2^^5-236; Thomas ordered to 
carry rifle-pits at foot of Missionary 
Ridge, 230; his dispositions at the 
Ridge, 185; the assault on the Ridge 

not intended by him, 33, 185, 187, 
236 ; the assertion that he did not in- 
tend to carry the Ridge by Thomas' 
attack questioned, 236 ; evidence that 
Thomas was expected to carry the 
Ridge, 237; the troops eng^aged in 
assault, not of Thomas' corps, and 
but five weeks imder his command, 
t6. ; the statement that the battie of 
Chattanooga was fought according 
to plan, distrusted, 133, 184-185 ; sus- 
tained, 236-237 ; the battie displayed 
no remarkable trait in him, 33 ; his 
opponent not obstinate, 34 ; his losses, 
ih,; made General-in-Chief, March 
8, 1864, 10, 187, 238; his plans, 10; 
Beauregard's plan for defeat of, 12 ; 
Butier "bottled up" at Bermuda 
Hundred, ih, ; desired W. F. Smii^ 
for command of Army of the James, 
1864, 255; his orders of April 9, 
1864, to Meade to make Lee's army 
his objective, 134; the correctness 
of his policy, ih, ; his advance witii 
Army of the Potomac into Virginia, 
133 ; his stre^igth, 40 ; attacked by 
Lee in the WUdemess, 35 ; his flank 
movement to Spottsylvania antici- 

gated by chance, 36 ; his position at 
pottsylvania. May, 1864, 12; his 
mistaken attack on the Salient, 37 ; 
stalemated on the North Anna, 39 ; 
blocked at Cold Harbor, t6. ; battie 
of Cold Harbor, 13, 14 ; his mistake 
at Cold Harbor, 42 ; his plan against 
Petersburg, 13 ; his able transfer to 
the James, 18, 42, 43 ; deceived Lee, 
14, 16, 17; indefiniteness of his 
orders as to Petersburg, 38, 39, 43, 
88 ; his chances at Petersburg, 43- 
44 ; his scheme to draw Lee's army 
from Petersburg, 63-65, lus failure 
to make an impression on Lee, in 

1864, 37, 38, 40, 41 ; the character 
of the campai^, 61-62; paid no 
heed to James River route, 39 ; his 
determination to defeat Lee on 
northern route, t6. ; his plans not de- 
fined, t6.; did not compel Lee to 
leave his entreochments, 40 ; inscru- 
table as to his intentions for Sheri- 
dan, March, 1865,260; sent Sheri- 
dan, March 29, 1865, to Dinwiddie 
C. H., 90; at Farmville, April 7, 

1865, 94 ; his first letter to Lee, de- 
livered from Humphreys' front, t6. ; 
the conditions for capture of Hood 
at Nashville unlike those for capture 
of Lee, 192 ; his attitude to Army of 
the Potomac and Meade criticized. 



87-88 ; the difficulties ioTolTed in a 
double oommand, ih. ; his consider- 
ate treatment of Meade, 88; his 
gradual assumption of control, 89 ; 
his system of attrition oridcued, 
135 ; his waste of his army in 1864, 
267 ; his losses in fire weefci, 40 ; his 
losses in first ten weeks, 1864, 38 ; 
the improYement in conduct of mili- 
tary affairs, 1864-1865, under, 255 ; 
his management criticized, 255-256 ; 
a hero in no great military operation,* 
44 ; not possessed of true military in- 
stinct, 30 ; causes of his success, 45 ; 
disreg^ard of difficulties, 24, 31 ; pref- 
erence for a difficult plan, t6. ; his 
custom to divide his forces, 27, 28, 38 ; 
his neglect of details in battles, 257 ; 
his experiments at Vicksburg, 31 ; 
a brilliant strategiBt, 257 ; his pref- 
erence for hard blows to manoBuver- 
ing, 34-35, 39, 40, 135 ; would not 
employ stratcOT, 37; his diBCovery 
of the error, ^ ; compelled to ma- 
ncBuvre, 38 ; his mistaken use of oaT- 
alry, 259 ; Sheiidan^s successful use 
of cavalry in 1865, not due to, t6. ; 
his plans for Sheridan not practi- 
cable, ih. ; a great man, 44, 45 ; an 
unselfish patriot, 27, 45 ; his great 
services, 23 ; adrairatiou due him, 
45 ; his restless disposition, 24 ; never 
absent from post of danger, 2Q ; his 
courage, 31 ; his tenacity of purpose, 
24 ; ms staying power, 37 ; a nero 
of Army of the Tennessee, 129; 
loyalty of his brother officers and 
soldiers, 44; Lincoln s support of, 
254 ; possessed of the confidence of 
the nation, 42, 43 ; Badeau's over- 
estimates an injustice to, 35, 36, 37, 
42 ; his failures attributed by Badeau 
to his lieutenants, 35; his position 
in comparison with great generals of 
history, t^, 41, 46 ; his successes due 
to incapacicy of opponents like some 
of Napoleon^s, 32 ; Humphreys com- 
pared with, 95 ; his underestimate of 
Lee, 34, 37 ; his tacit acknowledg- 
ment of Lee^s superiority, 43; his 
relations with Sherman : the com- 
mand of the Department of the 
Mississippi g^ven to Sherman, 133 ; 
the choice of Sherman instead of 
Thomas, 238 ; the question discussed, 
239; Sherman fought at Corinth, 
May 28, 1862, in the presence of, 
239 ; his confidence in Sherman, 131 ; 
Sherman's unvarying support of 
Grant, 239 ; the favorite officer of. 

133; his partiality for, 151; his 
orders to Sherman of April 4, 1864, 
to make Johnston's army his objee- 
tive, 133-134 ; his anxieties becaose 
of Hood, 152; the destmotiim of 
Hood, Sherman's first duty, 141; 
Sherman's disregard of otden to 
destroy Hood, 151 ; Sherman's propo- 
sitions to. Sept, 1864, 137, 138, 141 ; 
his unwillingness to accede to the 
**Biarch through Georgia" plan, 
141 ; permission for march given, 
Nov. 2, 1864, 142, 143 ; the straigth- 
ening of Thomas' army a condition 
of his consent, 142 ; data as to the 
forces taken to Georgia and left 
with Thomas, 240; his admiration 
of Sherman's march, 151 ; l^ier- 
man's proposition to devastate Geor- 
gia, in letter of Oct 9, 1864, to, 146; 
as to South Carolina, in letter of 
Dec. 18, 146 ; his cainpaign in Vir- 
ginia not affected by Sherman's de- 
vastation of South Carolina, 149; 
Sherman's purpose to join him in Va., 
1865, 18; Sherman compered to, 
150; his relations with Thomas: 
claims made to the disparagement 
of, examined, 211-244; resented 
Halleck's giving command of right 
wing of army to Thomas, 178 ; cause 
of his misunderstanding with Thom- 
as, t6. ; Thomas made the victim of 
his grudge sgainst Halleck, ih. ; that 
the giving of command of right wing 
to Thomas was thought a sUght by, 
questioned, 215-216 ; that Thomas 
was made to suffer in consequence, 
doubted, ih.; his prejudice against 
Thomas, 183 ; evidence of an al^noe 
of prejudice, 216 ; Thomas held to ail 
the responsibilities at Chattanooga 
by, 183 ; appointed to command of 
Mississippi Department instead of 
Thomas, 230 ; lus opinion that Rose- 
crans should be relieved, 182-183; 
the command of the Army of the 
Cumberland gfiven by him to 
Thomas, 230; his statement that 
the rebel lines in Thomas' front 
were weakened Nov. 25, disproved, 
186 ; Sherman preferred before 
Thomas to succeed him in com- 
mand of Mississippi Dept, 187; 
advantage which he would have 
gained had he taken Thomas in- 
stead of Sherman into favor, 178; 
Thomas' plan of Feb. 28, for a move- 
ment to Atlanta submitted to, 187 ; 
Thomas' refusal of promotion offered 



by Johnflon to demde, 20^208; 
ma estiroate of Thomas criticized, 
206; his praise of Thomas insaffi- 
dent, 151-152, 207; Thomas' repu- 
tation obeonred by, 207 ; oomparison 
of his serrioes irith Thomas', 192, 
203 ; the losses of Thomas compared 
with those of, 192 ; his capture of 
Lee, contrasted -with Thomas' fail- 
ure to cat o£E Hood's retreat after 
NashvilJe, 192-194. 

Greene, N., Maj.-€}en., battle of Guil- 
ford C. H., 1781, 18, 134, 145. 

Greensborongh, N. C, conference of 
€!onf ederate eovemment and mili- 
tary commanders at, 19 ; Confeder- 
ate army surrendered at, 4, 20. 

Gregg, D. M., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. V., 
hn opinion of Hancock as a cavalry 
commander, 53-54; movement of 
his cavalry, Feb., 1865, 90 ; his dis- 
tingfuished cavalry service, 157. 

Grenada, Miss., suitable as a d^pdt in 
an advance on Vicksburg, 28. 

Gulf of Mexico, a reasonably effec- 
tive blockade maintained by the 
U. S. during civil war, in, 271 ; con- 
sidered in Sherman's plans, Sept., 
1864, 137. 

Guilford Court House, N. C, battle of 
March 15, 1781, 18. 

Hall, N. J., Cd., U. S V., in command 
of 3d brigade, 2d division, 2d Corps, 
at Cemetery Ridge, July 3, 1863, 

Halleck, H. W., Maj.-Gen., U. S. A., 
in command of Department of the 
Mississippi, March 11-July 11, 1862, 
128; Sherman transferred to his 
command, ih,; Forts Henry and 
Donelson captured by his forces un- 
der Grant, 129; accused Grant of 
disobedience, 27; Buell ordered to 
Pittsburg lianding by, 129 ; Grant's 
despatch of AtoU 6, 1862, to, 130, 
232 ; refuted charge that Ibe army 
was surprised at Shiloh, 233; the 
reorganization of Army of the Cum- 
berland, by, 178, 215 ; recommended 
Thomas for rank of Maj.-Gbn., 215 ; 
Thomas given command of right 
wing of bus armv by, 178, 215 ; G^rant 
made second m command, 216 ; 
Thomas made by Gtrant to suffer for 
faults of, 178; Ghaut's resentment 
questioned, 215; Corinth occupied 
by. May 30, 1862, 8 ; an abandoned 
city when captured, 189; Thomas 
relieved of conmiand of right wing, 

by, 216; app(finted, July 11, 1862, 
General-in-Chief, 27, 233; Grant 
urged by, to join Banks, t6. ; in- 
formed by Thomas of success at 
Brown's Ferrv, 183 ; his orders dis- 
regarded by McClellan, 120 ; Hum- 
phreys reprimanded by, 80; repri- 
mand resented and answered, 80-81 ; 
no reparation made, 81 ; his alarm 
because of Stuart's raid, June-July, 
1863, 261 ; his orders to capture 
Stuart not obeyed, tfr. ; Meade's let- 
ter to, concenung the raid, 161, 261- 
262; his respect for Sherman in- 
creased, 131; Sherman's correspon- 
dence with, Sept., 1864, 137 ; Sher- 
man's proposition to punish South 
Carolina announced to, Dec. 24, 
1864, 147. 

Hamilton, C. S., appointed Brig.-Gen., 
U. S. v., May 17, 1861, 174. 

Hampton Roads, GoldiBborough in 
oommand of U. S. fleet m, 1862, 102, 

Hancock, W. a, Mai-Gen^ U. S. A., 
a cadet at West Point, 1840-1844, 
51 ; in war with Mexico, 51 ; his 
Western service, ib.; in Seminole 
War, ib. ; in border wars in Kansas, 
ib,; in Utah expedition, %b,; cap- 
tain, 1861, stalioned at Los Angeles, 
California, 51, ^ ; transferred at hk 
own reo uest from California to ser- 
vice in the East, 1861, 55 ; appointed 
Sept 23, Brig.-Gen. of Volunteers, 
ib,; his regard for Volunteers, 56- 
57 ; McClellan's epithet for, 56 ; 
Volunteer officers on his staff, 57; 
his service at Williamsburg, 53, 56 ; 
not engaged at Fair O^^ks, 57 ; lus 
service at Gaines' Mill, ib, ; repulse 
of enemy in retreat to the James, ib, ; 

Sromoted at Antietam to command 
ivision, 58; his ready assumption 
of duty, t6. ; at Fredericksburg, in 
assault on Marye's Heights, Dec. 13, 
1862, 59; at Chancellorsville, May 
3, 1863, t6.; succeeded Couch to 
command of 2d Corps, June 11, 1863, 
52, 59-60; responsibilities commit- 
ted to, by Meade at Gettysburg, 60 ; 
his appearance at Cemetery Ridge, 
July 13, 1863, 50; wounded, 50, 61 ; 
effect of his wound, 61» 63, 66 ; cli- 
max of liis military career, 60 ; his 
services at Gettysburg, ib.; char- 
acter of 1864 campaign unsuited to 
display of his abilities, 61 ; his services 
in the Wilderness, 62; the unsuc- 
oeatrful charge at Cold Harbor, ib, ; 



the capture of the Salient, t&., 63 ; 
orosBed James River, June 14, 1864, 
14 ; before Petersburg', June 15, ih, ; 
not advised of Grant's purpose to 
capture Petersburg, 43, 88 ; his ser- 
vices at Petersburg tenninated by 
outbreak of wound, 68 ; his expedi- 
tion to Deep Bottom, July, 1864, 63- 
64; an incident in the expedition, 
64; his vig^nce, 65; the disaster 
at Ream*s Station, 66 ; its effect on 
him, t6. ; the expedition to Boydton 
Road, his last service in the field, 
66 ; relinquished his command, Nov. 
26, 1864, 66, 89; succeeded in com- 
mand of 2d Corps by Humphreys, 
89 ; charged with creation of a corps 
of veterans, Nov. 27, 1864-Feb. 27, 
1865, ih. ; his high character, 51 ; 
his training, 52 ; as a commander 
of infantry, 53 ; his military quali- 
fications, 53-55 ; his tactical skill, 
59 ; his influence over his men, tfr. ; 
his consideration for meritorious 
services, 67; his encouragement of 
young ofiicers, t6.; his faithfulness 
in execution of his trusts, 66; his 
credit with A. P. Hill, 67 ; Badeau's 
opinion, of, 35; did not surpass 
Humphreys in courage and mrofes- 
sional skill, 95 ; his death, Feb. 9, 

Hannibal, his cavalry system like Na- 
poleon^s, 156. 

Hardee, W. J., Lieut.-G^n., C. S. A., 
Major, 2d U. S. Cavalry, 1855, 170; 
joined the Confederate army, 171 ; 
m command of Confederate advance 
at Shiloh, his statement that hostil- 
ities beg^ by Union attack, April 
6, 232; Sherman*s threat to, in 
demanding surrender of Savannah, 
146 ; his delay in evacuating Charles- 
ton, 19. 

Harney, W. a, Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A., 

Harper's Ferry, Ya., Jackson's move- 
ment to Antaetam from, 124 ; Mc- 
Clellan's position near, after Antie- 
tam, 120. 

Harpeth River, Tenn., Schofield's re- 
treat to, Nov., 1864, 143. 

Harrison's Landing, Va., 112 ; McClel- 
lan forced to, by Lee and Jackson, 
250 ; McQellan's letter to Lincoln 
from, 114. 

Harker, C. G., Col. 65th Ohio Infantry, 
in command of 3d brigade, 1st divi- 
sion, left wing, at Stone's River, or- 
dered to re-enforce right wing, 218. 

Harrow, W., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., 
at Cemetery Ridge, July 3, 1863, 

Hatch, E., Brig.-Gen., U. S. A., in 
command of 5th division, his services 
in retarding Hood's advance, and at 
battle of Franklin, 194. 

Hatcher's Run, Va., battle at, Feb. 
5-7, 1865, 90. 

Haverford, Pa., the home of General 
Humphreys' family, 74. 

Hay, J., and J. G. Nicolay, Humphreys 
given credit by, for service at Mal- 
vern Hill, 80. 

Hays, A., Brig.-Gen. U. S. V., at Cem- 
etery Ridge, July 3, 1863, 50, 60. 

Haynes Bluff, Miss., Sherman's nnsno- 
cessful attack on, 239. 

Henderson, A., Bvt. Brig.-Gen., UJS.A., 
Thomas at Monterey, complimented 
by, 168. 

Henry, Fort, see Fort Henry. 

Hicksford, Va., Lee's d($pdt of sap- 
plies, 1865, 90 ; oommunic4itions 
with, out, t6. 

High Bridge across Appomattox, 
crossed by Gordon, April 6, 1865, 
in attempt to escape, 92 ; saved from 
destruction by Barlow, April 7, %b. ; 
crossed by Lee's pursuers, ih. 

HiU, A. P., Lieut-Gen., C. S. A., in 
command of Jackson's corps May 
2, 1863, at Chanoellorsville, 159; 
wonnded there, ih.; repulsiad by 
G^ttv and Hancock, Mav 5, 1864, in 
the Wilderness, 62 ; in the battle of 

Hill, D. H., Lieut-Gen., C. S. A., de- 
feated at Williamsburg by HancNOok, 
56 ; on right flank of Bragg's army 
Sept. 18, at Chickamauea, 221 ; his 
strength and loss at Chickamauga, 
Sept. 19, 225 ; under Polk in attack 
on Thomas, May 20, t6. ; his state- 
ment that the attack failed cited, 

Hindman, T. C, Maj.-Gen., C. S. A., 
at batUe of Missionary Ridge, 238 
note 4. 

Hoke, R. F., Mai.-Gen., C. S. A., his 
division sent from Petersburg to 
Cold Harbor, June, 1864, 13; sent 
back, June 15, 14. 

HoUy Springs, Miss., Grant's oommn- 
nications cut at, 29, 30. 

Hood, J. B., General, C. S. A., cadet 
at West Point, 1849-1853, under 
Thomas' instruction, 169; at bat- 
tle of Chickamauga, 182 ; under 
command of Longslreet Sept. 20, 



226; his advance to attack Union 
right wing) ih, ; availed of the gap 
in Union line, attacked rear of 
Wood's column, 227; Union forces 
carried away by, ih.; Sheridan at- 
tacked and forced back by, ih.; 
Col. Dawes' estimate of his strength 
cited and criticized, 228 note ; re- 
pnlsed by Thomas at Peach Tree 
Creek, 190; his attack on McPher- 
son, lb,; his army unconqnered, At- 
lanta of little value to Sherman, 
138; superseded Johnston in com- 
mand of Confederate Army of the 
Tennessee, June 18, 1864, 136; 
would not be drawn into a general 
battle by Sherman, 136; Sherman 
could not follow him, t&., 140; his 
own problems, 140 ; his movement, 
Oct., 1864, 138 ; the attack at Alla- 
toona Pass, t6. ; retired to Gadsden, 
Ala., (6.; evaded battle with Sher- 
man, {&., 139 ; Sherman's failure to 
destroy him, 134, 140-141 ; his de- 
struction a requisite with Qrant, 141 ; 
Sherman's ^an to commit his de- 
struction to Thomas, 141-142 ; under 
Beauregard's command, 18 ; his 
strength, Nov., 1864, 240, 240 note 5 ; 
his movement to Florence, 140, 240 ; 
his conference with Beauregard, t6. ; 
Sherman unable to conjecture if he 
would be followed to Georgia by, 
t6. ; information of, desired by Sher- 
man before starting on his march, 
241 ; possible consequences had he 
been followed by, 242 ; his problem 
in an invasion of Kentucky, ib, ; his 
possible chances on the withdiawal 
of Sherman into Georgia, 144; his 
advance into Tenn. retarded by 
Hatch, 194 ; his defeat at Franklin, 
Nov. 30, 1864, 142, 143; his defeat 
at Nashville, Dec. 15, 143-144, 191- 
195 ; 242; his %hting spirited, 192; 
annihilated by Tliomas, 207 ; his re- 
sistance to Thomas as great as Lee's 
to Grant, 194 ; not cut off in retreat 
by Thomas, 192-198 ; pursuit of, 
impeded, 193; Steedman prevented 
from interoeptiug, t6.; his escape, 
t6., 195 ; the oon^tions for his cap- 
ture unlike those for capture of Lee, 
192-193 ; Thomas' resistance to, and 
victory over, an evidence of the 
merit of an American army, 268; 
the destruction of his army involved 
the fall of the Gulf States, 141 ; con- 
sequences conjectured, if Sherman 
had continued his opponent, 161 ; the 

political character of Sherman's let- 
ters to, 150. 

Hooker, J., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A., 
Army of the Potomac improved by, 
122 ; the first Union genend to value 
cavalry, 258; his improvement of 
the cavalry, 160, 258; his uses of 
cavalry in Chanoellorsville campaign 
a misfortune, 258 ; his plan at Clum- 
cellorsville disapproved by Hum- 
phreys, 84; his gross mismanage- 
ment at Chancellorsville, 159 ; his 
position in advance to Gettysburg 
not reported to Lee by Stuart, 160 ; 
his affair in Lookout Valley, 1868, 
183 ; at battle of Chattanooga, 182 ; 
his demonstration to divert enemy 
while Sherman crossed the Tennes- 
see, Nov. 24, 235 ; Bragg's left on 
Lookout Mountain, turned by, 83, 
235 ; his loss, 33 ; his movement 
Nov. 25, 236 ; intended by Grant to 
cut off Bragg's retreat, 185. 

Howard, O. O., Maj.-Gen., U. S. V., a 
cadet at West Point, 1850-1854, 
under Thomas' instruction, 170 ; 
commander of 11th Corps, Army of 
the Cumberland, joined Sherman 
during battle of Chattanooga, 237. 

Huguenots, Gen. Thomas' mother of a 
family of, 167 ; their loyalty to their 
faith, ib, 

Humphreys, A. A., Maj.-€}en., U. S. A., 
his ancestors and family, 74r-75; 
bom, 1810, 75; died, 1883, t6./ a 
cadet at West Point, 1827-1831, ih, ; 
his classmates, t&. ; his service after 
^p«duation, 76; in Seminole War, 
lb, ; resigned army commission, 1886, 
t6.; employed in building light- 
houses, lb. ; entered Corps of Topog. 
Engineers, 1888, ih. ; service in Bu- 
reau, i6., 77; bridge built by, 76- 
77 ; in Coast Survey office, 77 ; at- 
tained rank of Captun, 1848, ih.; 
survey of Mississippi Delta, t6. ; loss 
of health and visit to Europe, ih. ; 
survey of railroad route to the Pacific, 
ib. ; member of Lighthouse Board, 
78; member of commission to ex- 
amine West Point Academy, ih. ; his 
relations with Jeff. Davis, ih.; his 
loyalty, t6. ; assigned to duty with 
McClellan, 1861, 79; his rapid mro- 
motion to rank of Brig.-Gen. of Vol- 
unteers, 79 ; Chief Topo^. Engineers, 
Peninsular Campmgn, ib.; selected 
position on Malvern Hill, t6., 80; 
mentioned in MoClellan's report, 79, 
given command of 8d division, 5th 



Corps, Sept 12, 1862, 80; hk maroh 
to Antietam, 80, 81 ; oeiunired by 
Halleck, tfr. ; oenaure resented by 
him, ib, ; demand for ooort of in- 
quiry, 81 ; MoClellan's misstatement 
of hu time of arrival, ih. ; his service 
at Antietam, ih. ; his servioes at 
Fredericlubaiig:, 82, 83 ; his charge, 
82 ; his assault of Marye's Heights, 
82 ; the most conspicuous fiinire of 
that day, ih. ; recommended for pro- 
motion by Bumside, t6. ; his services 
at Ghancellorsville, 82, 83 ; his affair 
at Chancellor House, ib. ; disM>- 

g roved of Hooker's conduct of battle, 
4 ; his division in 5th Corps broken 
up, t6. ; eiven conmnand of 2d di- 
vision, 3d Corps, ib,{ his mardi to 
Gettysburg, 84 ; his position there, 
ib, ; not consulted as to positions, 
ib, ; his statement of severi^ of fire, 
ib, ; his nuuMBUvres, 85 ; his bravery 
and equanimity in the battle, ib. ; his 
care of CoL Chester, ib. ; his mishap, 
ih, ; appointed Chief - of - Staff to 
Meade, 86 ; his services in that posi- 
tion, 86-89 ; his book Virginia Cam- 
Mign of 1864-1865, dted as to the 
Wilderness, 87 ; as to pursuit of Lee 
to Appomattox, 94 ; relations be- 
tween Moade and, 88; the model 
Chief -of -Staff, 89; given the com- 
mand of 2d Corps, Nov. 26, 1864, 
89; hisletter of acceptance, t&.; his 
former relations to the Corps, t6. ; 
project ag^nst Lee*s supply-line 
communicated to Wilson by, 90; 
executed, Feb. 6, 1865, by, ib. ; his 
position in Weldon Railroad affair, 
%b, ; with Wright, succeeded in affair 
on Quaker Road, ib, ; in engagement 
on White Oak Road, March 31, 91 ; 
the Crow House redoubt carried by, 
April 2, ib,; gained possession of 
the Southside Railroad at Suther- 
land's Station, ib. ; in pursuit of Lee, 
ib. ; his running fight, April 6, 92 ; 
battle of Sailors Creek, id. ; on the 
heels of Lee at High Bridge, April 
7, ib. ; Union army divided by the 
Appomattox, 93 ; his engagement of 
April 7, ib. ; received assistance from 
Crook only, ih. ; his hope to capture 
Lee, April 7, ib, ; the importance of 
his movement to prevent Lee's es- 
cape, t6., 94 ; (Grant's letter to Lee 
demanding surrender, delivered 
from, ib, ; his pursuit April 8, ib. ; 
the hero of the infantry m the pur- 
suit of Lee, 96; 67; his position 

among commaiiden, 95; hiseztn- 
ordinary abilities, ib,, 96; his ser- 
vices subsequent to the war as Chief 
Engineer of the Army, ib. ; his per- 
sonal appearance, 81 ; his character, 
i6.,83; hi8gaUantry,82,83, 85,86; 
his patriotism, 83 ; a master of logis- 
tics, 53 ; his qualities as a fighter, 

Humphreys, Charles, member of Con- 
tinental Congress, 74. 

Humphreys, Clement, 74. 

Humphreys, Daniel, the General's 
flnreat-great g^randfather, a Welsh 
Quaker, 74. 

Humphreys, Joshua, the (General's 
grandfather, first naval constructor 
of the U. S., 74. 

Humphreys, Samuel, the General's 
father. Chief Constructor, U. S. 
Navy, 74-75 ; declined to expatriate 
himself, 75. 

Hunt, H. J., Bvt Maj.-Gen., U. S. A., 
Chief of Artillery, Army of the Poto- 
mac, his paper on the artillery ser- 
vice cited, 263 ; accompanied Hum- 
phreys in selecting position on Mal- 
vern HiU, 79, 

Hunter, D., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A., 
in command, Jan. 21-June 3, 1863 ; 
before Charleston, 9; his plans 
thought to be faulty by Beaur^^ard, 

Hurlbut, S. A., Maj..Gen., U. S. V., at 
Army Reunion, Chicago, 1868, 198. 

Dlinois, maintained its regimental 
organizations through the war, 265. 

Independence, Fort, see Fort Inde- 

Indiana Volunteers, with Hatch, 1864, 

. 194. 

Infantry, the development of, during 
the Civil War, 263-268 ; the im- 
provement of efficiency of, 264; 
highest degree reached in 1863, ib. ; 
the advantage which would have 
been grained by mixing g^reen troops 
with veterans, 264-2^ ; the advan- 
tage of preservation of veteran r^- 
ment organizations, 265. 

Ishmd BeUe, U. S. gunboat, 103. 

Island No. 10, Mississippi River opened 
to, April 1, 1862, 7. 

Italy, war with Austria, 1859, rail- 
roads used during, 270. 

luka, batUe at, Sept. 19, 1862, 233; 
Ghent's conduct of, criticized, 27, 28 ; 
Union losses, 34. 

Ivanoff, T., Russian Consul-General 


at Philadelphia, offered Samuel 
Humphreys appointment in Roaeia, 

Jaokson, Gamp, St. Louie, broken up 
by Lyon, 176. 

Jackson, Miss., Johnston defeated by 
Grant at, May 14, 1863, and city cap- 
tared, 284 ; Sherman's participation 
in the siege and battle of, 239. 

Jackson, T. J., "Stonewall," Lieut.- 
Gen., G. S. A., repubwd by Aber- 
orombie at Falling Waters, July 2, 

1861, 178, 213; his campaign in the 
Shenandoah VaUey, 1862, 108, 116, 
117 ; his strategy in the campaign, 

1862, 256; disconcerted plans of 
XJ. S. GoYt., 250; with Lee caosed 
McGlellan's retreat to the James, 
xb. ; at Antietam, 124 ; wounded at 
Ghancellorsville, 169; after A. P. 
Hill was wounded, the command of 
Gorps g^ven to Stuart, ih. ; his mili- 
tary instinct, 80; would not have 
yielded Vicksburg readily, 32 ; com- 
pared with McGlellan, 128; Stuart 
commended at Bull Run by, 157; 
would not have made Stuart's mis- 
take in Gettysburg campaign, 161. 

James, Army of, see Army of Uie 

James Island, Gharleston Harbor, might 
have been taken, 1863, 9. 

James River, Va., closed by rebel ram 
Merrimac, 105, 115 ; McGlellan's as- 
sumption that the navy could open, 
105, 106, 110; opened by destruction 
of the Merrimac, May 11, 1862, 116; 
his reason for not taking it as a line 
of advance, 116-117; his best line, 
ib. ; his movement to, June, 1862, 57 ; 
forced to, by Lee and Jackson, 250 ; 
its value as a route to Richmond, 
pointed out by McClellan, 89 ; But- 
ler not instructed definitely to make 
his base on, 38 ; passage of, by Army 
of Potomac, 1864, 13, 42, 43 ; crossed 
by the 2d Gorps, June 14, 14 ; Han- 
cock's expedilions to, 1864, 63 ; 
Grant's plans for employment of 
Sheridan on, 1865, 259 ; City Point 
on, 10; 11, 13,87. 

Jerusalem Plank Road, open to Peters- 
burg for the 5th Gorps, June 16-17 
18^4, 16, 17. 

Jetersville, Va., Sheridan pursued Lee 
on the road to, April 2, 1865, 91 ; and 
was joined there by 2d and 6th Gorps, 

Johnson, A., President, chosen Vice- 

President because he was a South- 
erner, 166; Thomas nominated by, 
for rank of Lieutenant-General and 
General, Feb., 1868, 202-203 ; Thom- 
as' letter to, declining the rank, 203 ; 
his purpose to degn^ Grant, t6. 

Johnson, Fort, see Fort Johnson. 

Johnson, R. W., Brig.-Gen., U. S. A., in 
command of 2d division, 20th Gotds, 
his position on extreme of ri^t 
wing at Stone's River, 218 ; his flank 
turned, ih. ; sent to left wing, Sept. 
19, battle of Ghickamanga, 222; 
his position in line of battle, i6. ; es- 
timate of his strength, Sept. 20, 225. 

Johnston, A. S., Genial, G. S. A., GoL 
2d U. S. Gavabry, 1855, 170 ; in com- 
mand of Utah expedition, 1857, 171 ; 
resigned his U. S. army comnussion, 
178; joined the Gonfederate army, 
t6. ; Thomas promoted to fill his 
place, ih.; his inadequate prepara- 
tions in Kentucky and Tennessee, 
249 ; the Western Gonfederate forces 
united under his command, Aiaroh, 
1862, 250; the effect of Union vic- 
tory at Logan's Gross Roads on, 
177 ; hiB evacuation of Kentucky and 
Tennessee, 271 ; his strong position 
at Corinth, 232 ; the initiative taken 
hy* against Grant, ih,; joined by 
Beauregard, 7 ; their scheme to at- 
tack Grant at Pittsburg Landing, 
7-8, 26; presumably knew Granrs 
intention to seize Gorintb, 232 ; and 
that Buell was coming to join Grant, 
ib, ; his purpose to beat Grant before 
Buell's arrival, 8, 26, 129, 232; de- 
layed too long, 232; his strength, 
231 ; battle of Pittsburg Landing, or 
Shiloh, 4, 8 ; Grant atta^ed by, April 
6, 1862, 4, 26, 130, 231, 250 ; the at^ 
tack a surprise, 4, 26, 130, 132, 250 ; 
the charge of surprise refuted, 231- 
233 ; dented Grant April 6, 26, 44, 
231; killed, 26; his army totally 
defeated, April 7, 26-27, 130, 231 ; 
would not have retreated, April 7, 
26 ; his strength, 231 ; a trnly great 
soldier, 25, 26. 

Johnston, J. £., Ctoneral, C. S. A., 
Lieut-Col. Ist U. S. Cavalry, 1856, 
170; joined the Gonfederate army, 
171 ; m command Shenandoah Val- 
ley, June 18-July 18, 1861, 5 ; plan 
for union of his army with Beaure- 
gard's, 5, 6; ordered to Manassas, 
July 17, 7; batUe of Bull Run, 
July 21, 1861, 4 ; saved the day, 26 ; 
did not contemplate pursuit after 



Bull Run, 7; vagod increase of 
army, ib, ; advised invasion of Mary- 
land, tfr. ; the battle at Seven Pines 
not fought according to orders of, 
256 ; defeated by Grant at Jaokscm, 
May 14, 1863, 234; his strength, 
July 25, 32, 234; conjecture as to 
his success if he had been in com- 
mand at Vicksburg, 256 ; Bragg 
believed by Rosecrans Sept. 11, to 
have been re-enforced by, 220; su- 
perseding Bragg he assumed com- 
mand of the Army of the Tennessee, 
Dec. 27, 1863, 266; the army de- 

Sleted when he took command, ib, ; 
herman's opponent, 1864, 135; his 
strength, 1864, 135; his position at 
Dalton, Ga., 135, 187; Sherman^s 
error in not striking the rear of his 
army at Resaca, 135 ; the battle of 
Resaca, May 14-15, 1864, i6., 188; 
his evasion of Sherman, thereafter, 
136 ; repulsed by Thomas at Little 
Eenesaw, 206; not re-enforced by 
Polk's corps prior to May 10, 1864, 
188 ; his army to be Sherman's ob- 
jective under orders of April 4, 1864, 
133-134 ; his army should have been 
destroyed by Thomas' scheme, prop- 
erly executed, 188 ; his army not de- 
stroyed, 134 ; superseded by Hood, 
June 18, 1864, 136 ; two of his bri- 
gades at Ck>ld Harbor, 14 ; his divi- 
sion before Bermuda Hundred June, 
1864, ib, ; brought to Petersburg, 15 ; 
operations in the Carolinas, 1865, 17 ; 
Beauregard and Hood superseded 
bv, March, 1865, 19 ; distrusted by 
Sherman, t6. ; his ineffective engage- 
ments at Bentonville and Averys- 
boro', lb.; interview with Davis at 
Greensboro', t6. ; negotiations, April 
13, 1865, opened wim Sherman, 146, 
150 ; surrender at Greensboro', 4, 20, 
150, 151 ; Beauregard distrusted by, 
6 ; Stuart at Bull Run, commended 
by, 157 ; next to Lee, the best Con- 
federate commander, 135 ; his saga- 
cious advice not heeded by the Con- 
federate Govt., 248, 256; his weak 
• army, 1861, 249; his treatment by 
his Govt., 254 ; his death, 1891, 256, 
note 1 ; 207. 
JonesboroughjGa., battle of Sept. 1, 
1864, 189 ; Thomas engaged in, 190 ; 
his faculty in emergencies instanced 
St, 206. 

Kansas, Hancock's serrioe during bor- 
der troubles in, 51. 

KautB, A. v., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., at 
Deep Bottom Bridge, July ^ 1864, 

KellcMPg, S. C, Capt, U. S. V., an aide 
on Thomas' staff, at battle of Chiok- 
amaucH, 243; bearer of message 
from Thomas to Rosecrans which led 
to disaster at Chickamauga, 229; 
responsible for legend on War Dept. 
map, 230, 243. 

Kelly\ Ford, Va., action at, 157, 159. 

Kelly, P., Col., 88th N. Y., U. S. V., in 
2d brigade, 1st division, 2d Corps, 

Kemper, J. L., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., 
in attack July 3, 1863, on Cemetery 
Ridge, 49. 

Keneeaw Mountain, Ga., battle of June 
10-July 2, 1864, not to Sherman's 
credit, 135 ; Thomas in battle of, 190, 
206. See Little Kenesaw. 

Kentucky, loyal to the Union, 173 ; 
under Anderson's command, 1861, 
128 ; evacuated by Confederates, 
1862, 7, 129 ; evacuation caused by 
their loss of Fort Donelson, 271 ; 
Thomas frustrated rebel conspiracy 
to seize state arms, 175 ; inadequate 

5 revision made by Confederates for 
efeuce in, 249; under Union con- 
trol in 1862, t6., 250 ; Union line in, 
Nov., 1862, extended from London 
to Columbia, 213 ; Confederate ad- 
vance to Mill Springs, 213 ; encour- 
agement to loyal^ given by victory 
at Logan's Cross Roads, 215 ; opera- 
tions under Ghunt's command July- 
Oct, 1862, 233; the control of the 
U. S. in, imperilled by Sherman, 
1864, 144. 

Kershaw, J. B., Maj.-Gen., C. S. A., at 
battle of Chickamauga, 182 ; his 
division at Petersburg June 18, 1864, 

Khartoum, in the Soudan, 115. 

Kingston, Ga., Sherman's letter to 
Thomas, Nov. 10, 1864, from, 241. 

Knoxville, Tenn., Confederates unsuc- 
cessful at, 182. 

Kolb's Farm, Ga., Thomas in engage- 
ment at, 190. 

Lafayette, Ga., Bragg retreated to. 
Sent, 1863, from Chattan<Mga, 220. 

La Grange, O. H., CoL 1st Wisconsin 
cavalry, commander of 2d brigade, 
1st division, cavalry corps, with 
Thomas, 1864, 194. 

Laiboldt, B., Col. U. S. V., in command 
of 2d brigade, 3d division, 20th Corps, 



hiB position in right wing, battle of 
Chicfcamatiga, Sept. 20, 227. 

Lebanon, Ey., distance &om Logan's 
Gross Roads, 215 ; Tbomas 17 days 
marching from, ih. 

Lee, Fitzhugh, Maj.-Qen., G. ^. A., his 
attack on Sheridan at Dinwiddie 
G. H., March 31, 90. 

Lee, G. W. G., Maj.-Gen., G. S. A., a 
cadet at West Point, ]8o(V-1854, un- 
der Thomas' instruction, 169. 

Lee, R. E., Qeneral, G. S. A., a cadet 
at West Pomt, 1826-1829, 76.; 
Lieut-GoL, 2d U. S. Gavalry, 1855, 
170 ; his devotion to Virginia, though 
deprecating secession, 166, 171 ; en- 
terod the service of Virginia, April 
20, 1861, before his resignation from 
U. S. army had been accepted, 172- 
173 ; his place filled by promotion 
of Thomas, 173 ; his defensive pol- 
icy, 1861, 5 ; recommended union 
of armies under Beauregard and 
Johnston, 5 ; advised capture of Ar- 
lington and Alexandria, 5 ; Beanre- 
g^ard's scheme ag^ainst Washington, 
not approved by, 5, 6 ; overwheuued 
5th Cfoips at Oaines' Biill, 124 ; with 
co-operation of Jackson forced Mc- 
Glellan to the James, 250 ; Malvern 
Hill not fought as he intended, 256- 
257; his invasion of Maryland and 
Pennsylvania, 1862, 117, 118, 119, 
120 ; McGlellan's delayed attack on, 
at Antietam, 124 ; battle of Antie- 
tam, 117, 118, 119, 120; batUe of 
South Mountam, 118, 119; not ut- 
terly defeated by McGlellan, 120; 
torpid pursuit of, after Antietam, 
82, 120; g^ve Stuart command of 
Jackson's corps at Ghanoellorsville, 
159 ; his Gettysburg campaign, 59, 
160; Stuart of no service to him, 
160-161; Ms ignorance of where- 
abouts of Union army, 160, 161 ; 
his sole chance in battle of Gettys- 
burg, 162; failure of his plans at, 
ib. ; battle not fought as mtended 
by, 256-257; pursuit of, 86; un- 
able to make up for losses at Get- 
tysburg, 265; believed by Grant 
1863, never to have been ably fought, 
84; his army made Meade's objec- 
tive by orders of April 9, 1864, 
134; in Beauregard's plan of May 
18, 12, 13; his army May 3, 1864, 
weaker than on July 1, 1863, 265 ; 
his streng^ at the begfinning of 
1864 campaign, 40; battle of the 
Wilderness, £& ; he should have been 

made to nve battle beyond the Wil- 
derness, 87 ; Grant by chance out- 
gfeneraled by, at Spottsylvania, 36 ; 
his position. May, 1864, at Spottsyl- 
vania, 12 ; his veterans beaten at 
the Salient, May 12, 1864, 62-68; 
his stalemate to Grant on the North 
Anna, 89 ; Grant blocked at Gold 
Harbor, ih. ; battle of Gold Harbor, 
13, 14 ; woidd not leave his entrench- 
ments, 40 ; ig^rant of Grant's move- 
ment to the James, 13, 14, 16, 17, 
42, 43; sent troops to Petersburg, 
15, 17; his army supposed to be 
there, 16; himself at Petersburg, 
17; feint to draw his army from 
Petersburg July, 1864, 63, 64 ; the 
position of his army at close of 1864, 
134; the Gonfederacy had but his 
army and Hood's east of the Missis- 
sippi, 141 ; Grant became his an- 
tagonist, 1865, 89; his Shenandoah 
Army destroyed by Sheridan, 134 ; 
Grant's plan to cut his communica- 
tions, 43 ; execution of plan delayed, 
90 ; his supply-line to Hicksf ord cut, 
ih. ; his attempt on Gity Point, Union 
base of supplies, t6. ; foiled, ib. ; his 
position at Petersburg not altered 
by Sherman's operations, 149 ; with- 
drew from Petersburg April 2, 91 ; 
his only roads of escape, t6. ; pursuit 
of by Humphreys and Sheridan April 
6-7, 91-94; a day lost by him at 
Amelia G. H., Apnl 4, 91 ; his road 
barred at Burkesville, April 4, i6. ; 
his attempt to evade, 91-92 ; his hope 
to reach Farmville or Rice's Station, 
92 ; his army divided, April 6, ib, ; 
he might have been captured April 
7, 93 ; Humphreys prevented nim 
from reaching Lynchburg, 93 ; com- 
pelled by Humphreys to lose time, 
April 8, 94 ; abandoned his position 
with his starving army, t6. ; nis line 
of retreat from Appomattox held by 
Sheridan, 257; Grant's deinand of 
surrender, 94; his reply, t6.; his 
surrender, 19, 67, 94 ; conquered by 
starvation, 44; the proposition that 
his army was more formidable than 
Western armies discussed, 182; re- 
sistance offered by Hood to Thomas 
as g^at as that to Grant by, 194 ; 
conditions of capture for Hood after 
Nashville unlike those for capture 
of, 192 ; would have been a difficult 
opponent at Vicksburg, 32.; his ad- 
vantage of interior lines, 41 ; his su- 
periority, compared with Grant, ib^ 



44 ; his eampaigns models for stody, 
44 ; Badeaa^B poor opinion of, 35, 86, 
42; hia distnut of Beauregard, 6; 
Homphreys* abilities in supreme 
command like Lee's, questioned, 95 ; 
Longstreet's corps tne flower of 
army of, 182; his mistaken use of 
cavalry, 260-261; the gravity 
Stuart's loss would have been to, 
261; freedom given to Stuart in 
Gettysburg campaign by, ih,; his 
purpose in these raids not explained, 

Lewis, J. H., Briff.-Gen., C. S. A., of 
Breckinridge's division at Missionary 
Ridge, 238 note 3. 

Lexington, Ky., projected encampment 
of rebels at, 1861, 175. 

Liddell, St. J. R., Biig.-Gen., C. S. A., 
strength of his division. Walker's 
corps, Sept. 18, 1863, and losses at 
Ghickamauga, Sept. 19-20, 225. 

Lincoln, the ^resident, his orders for 
defence of Washington warranted, 
107, 109 ; disregarded bv MoClellan, 
107, 108, 109; his relations with 
McClellan, 123, 124 ; MoClellan's de- 
lay in announcing his disposition of 
army to, 108; MoClellan's conten- 
tion as to deprivation of McDowell's 
co-operation, 107-113; McClellan's 
wrong conslxnction of the promises 
of, 110; his advice to McClellan of 
April 10, 111 ; McClellan's letter of 
M&y 21, to, t6. ; permission granted 
to McClellan to write on ** present 
state of military affairs," 114 ; Mc- 
Clellan's letter of advice to, July 7, 
111 ; its vresumption, 114-115 ; ad- 
vised by McClellan on slavery ques- 
tion, 114-115 ; McClellan's contempt 
for the cabinet of, 99, 106 ; McClel- 
lan's contempt for, 111 ; Bumside's 
recommendation of Humphreys for 
promotion to, 82; Savannah pre- 
sented as a Christmas gift to, 144 ; 
his admiration of Sherman's Geoigia 
campaign, 151 ; his call for 300,000 
men, 1^2, 250-251 ; lus administra- 
tion discussed, 251-256; not bril- 
liant, 251 ; unnecessarily extrava- 
gant, t6. ; he was not an experienced 
ruler, ih. ; the most wise and saga- 
cious statesman known in the U. S., 
t&. ; incompetent for direction of 
military attairs, 252 ; his manage- 
ment of military affairs and Davis', 
compared, 252-254; his poor early 
appointments to the army, 252 ; his 
judgment improved, 253; his sup- 

port of Grant and Shi^rman, 254 ; 
submitted to political influence, 254- 
255 ; illustrated by support of But- 
ler, t6. ; Life of, by Hay and Nicolay 
cited, 80. 

Little Kenesaw, Ga., Thomas' assault 
at, June 18, 1864, 206. 

Livermore, T. L., Col., U. S. V., on 
Hancock's staff, 57 ; letters of Davis 
and Rosecrans to, concerning the in- 
correct legend on War Dept. map, 

Logan, J. A., Maj.-Gen., U. S. Y., in 
the affair before Atlanta, July 22, 
1864, 189 ; at Army Reunion, Chi- 
cago, 1868, 19a 

Logan Cross Roads, near Mill Spring, 
Ky., batUe of Jan. 19, 1862, Con- 
federates in position before MUl 
Springs, Dec 2, 1861, 213 ; Thomas 
ordered to, Dec. 29, ib, ; arrived at 
Logan's Cross Roads, Jan. 17, 1862, 
from Somerset, 214; Confederates 
re-enforced Jan. 18, ih, ; Thomas 
attacked by Crittenden, June 19, 
176, 214 ; his advance fell back, ib, ; 
no evidence in Record to indicate 
a repulse, 214 ; Confederates routed 
by a charge at 10 ▲. m., 176 ; the 
flank charge made by McCook, 214 ; 
ZoUiooffer killed, 176, 214 ; a relent- 
less pursuit to Cumberland River, 
176 ; captures, 177 ; the Confeder- 
ate force never reorganized, t6. ; the 
termination of Crittenden's military 
career, ib. ; the Confederate strength, 
214 ; the Union strength, 176, 214 ; 
the losses on each side, 177, 214 ; the 
effect on A. S. Johnston, 177 ; an en- 
couragement of loyalty in Kentucky, 
215 ; the effect at Washington, t6., 
215 ; the first Union victory since 
Bull Run, 177; Thomas' first West- 
em victory, 191, 204, 205 ; his charac- 
teristic traits displayed at, 191, 204, 
205 ; his services slighted by Govt., 
177; thanked by Ohio, 206 ; no evi- 
dence in Record that Thomas changed 
from defensive to offensive, 214 ; his 
policy of delaying engagement from 
Jan. 17 to Jan. 19, questioned, 215 ; 
the slowness of his march questioned, 
ib. ; lus colonels promoted, 177, 215 ; 
his own promotion to rank of Major- 
General dependent on reputation 
made at, 215, 230 ; called also Battle 
of Mill Springs, 191, 204, 205, 206, 

London, Ky., Union line extended, 
Nov., 1862, to Columbia from, 213. 



Loii£8treet, J., LieQt.-Gen., G. S. A^ at 
Molino del Rey, 51 ; in oommaiid of 
Brftgg's left winff at Chiokamanga, 
Sept 20, 223 ; hu orden to attack, 
ib.; his assaolt on Thomas, abont 
2 p. M., 228, 229; his strength, 228 ; 
defeated by Thomas at Chicka- 
mauga, Sept 20, 1808, 181, 182 ; his 
loss, 182 ; his corps the flower of 
Lee's army, tfr. ; recalled to Vir^^inia 
after batde of Missionary RicU^, 
266 ; in Wilderness, battle of S&y 
6, 1864, 62 ; his attempt to escape 
abandoned, 1865, 92 ; did not surpass 
Humphreys, 95 ; his brilliant reputa- 
tion as a fighter, 131. 

Lookout Mountain, Tenn., Thomas' po- 
sition at Chips in, 220 ; bragg's posi- 
tion on, after Chickamauga, 234; 
carried by Hooker, Nov. 24, 33, 285 ; 
his movement to Mission Ridge from, 
Nov. 25, 236 ; Sherman, opposed by 
forces from, 186. 

Los Angeles, California, Hancock 
stationed at prior to 1861, 55, 66. 

Louisiana, Thomas stationed in, 1868, 
168 ; Banks in, spring of 1863, 233. 

Louisville, Ey., Thomas on duty at, 
Sept 6, 1861, 175 ; exposed by Sher- 
man to capture by Hood, 144. 

Lynchburg, Va., Miles and De Tro- 
briand sent in pursuit of Lee, to- 
wards, 98; the Confederates en- 
trenched on road to, April 7, ib.; 
Jjoe prevented by Humphreys from 
reaching, t6., 94. 

Lyon, N., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., rebel 
Camp Jackson broken up by, May, 
1861, 175. 

Macaulay, T. B., cited, 54, 199. 

McCall, G. A., appointed Brig.-Gen., 
U. S. v., May 17, 1861, 174. 

MoCleUan, Carswell, CoL, U. S. V., 
Humphreys* claim as to selection of 
Union position on Malvern Hill 
proved by, 80 ; his account of Hum- 
nhreys* charge at Fredericksburg, 

McCiellan, O. B., Maj.-Gen., U. S. A., 
his " Own Story " reviewed, 9^124 ; 
the ori^^ of the book, 99 ; his ego- 
tism displayed in, ib. ; its merits of 
style, tfr., 100; entirely subjective, 
ib.; the errors of his Report per- 
petuated in it, 101 ; the opposition 
to his Peninsular plan, ih. ; nis dis- 
regard of orders tor the defence of 
y^shington, 107, 108 ; his assump- 
tion as to the forces at his dispo- 

sition, 108, 110 ; his announcement, 
April 1, 1862, of his disposition of 
the army, 108; ignorant of the 
topography of Torktown, 102; his 
contention with respect to the co- 
operation of the navy at Yorktown, 
101-106 ; Barnard's report concem- 
hng the navy, March 20, 1862, 102- 
1(3; his unwarranted dependence 
on the navy, 101-106, 110 ; his erro- 
neous estimates of the Confederate 
strength, 101 ; value of James River 
as a route to Richmond, 39; his 
n^lect of that route discussed, 116- 
117 ; his army in Chickahominy 
swamps, 116-117 ; Humphreys with, 
in Peninsular campaign, 79 ; his 
contention, as to deprivation of Mc- 
Dowell's co-operation, 107-113, 116- 
117 ; his complaints. 111 ; McDowell 
was not expected to participate in 
operations before Richmond, 116 ; 
his resentment of McDowell's inde- 
pendent command, 113; forced to 
the James by Lee and Jackson, 250 ; 
no mention of Humphreys' service 
at Malvern Hill in his report, 79 ; 
opposed by a weak army under 
Johnston, 249 ; his assumption that 
after Pope's fiulure he only could 
have commanded the army, 100, 1 16 ; 
the batUe of Antietam discussed, 
117-118; 120; his delay in attack, 
117, 124; the battie not fought as 
intended by, 257; his uncorrected 
misstatement of Humphreys at An- 
tietam, 80-81 ; his battle of South 
Mountiun glorified, 118-119 ; his po- 
sition Sept-Oct, 1862, 120; his 
delays, 120, 121 ; stopped to refit and 
reorg^anize, ih,; futility of Stuart's 
raid round his army, 258 ; his rela- 
tions with the Qovemment, 123-124 ; 
the Gk>vemment not responsible for 
his failures, 124 ; his contempt for 
the Government, 99, 111, 112; his 
inability to adimt himself to the civil 
authorities, 109-110, 120, 121 ; dis- 
regarded orders, 120, 121 ; removed 
from command, ib, ; reasons for re- 
moval, ih. ; superseded by Bumside, 
lb, ; his self-confidence expressed in 
letter to Lincoln, May 21, 111 ; his 
offer to advise Lincoln, June 20, 1 14 ; 
his letter of advice to Linooln of 
July 7, 111; its presumption, 114- 
115 ; his letter to Stanton, June 28, 
112; his genius for organization, 
122 ; affection of the army for, t6., 
123j his power of exciting enthu- 



giasm in the army, 122 ; his weari- 
ness of command, 112 ; his debt to 
his country paid, t6., 113 ; a man 
of emotional nature, and of religions 
feelings, 100 ; divinely appointed to 
save the Union, 09, 100, 112, 118, 
119; twice saved the Union, 118, 
119 ; his inconsistency of statement, 
116; his unhealthy mind, 120; his 
wilfulness, 115, 120; his letters to 
his wife cited, 100, 111, 112, 118, 
119, 120; his epithet for Hancock, 

McClellan, H. B., Maj., C. S. A., his 
Life and Campaigns of Stuart re- 
viewed, 155-162; Chief -of-Staff to 
Stuart, 156; his conclusions as to 
battles, not final, 157; his defence 
of Stuart^s movement in Gettys- 
burg campaign, 161 ; his account of 
Stuart's death, 162. 

McClemand, J. A., Brig.-Qen., U. S. A., 
appointed Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., May 
17, 1861, 174 ; his march in Western 
Kentucky, 215 ; project to give him 
oommana of Miwissippi expedition, 
28 ; Grant's purpose to keep control, 
28 29 30. 

Mcdwk,' A.M. D., Maj.-Gen.,U.S. v., 
a cadet at West Point, 1847-1852, 
under Thomas' instruction, 169 ; in 
command of 14th Army Corps, Dec. 
14, 1862, Jan. 12, 1868, in command 
of three divisions and right win^, 
battle of Stone's River, 218; attacked, 
t&. ; not saved by Thomas, 219 ; in 
command of 20th Corps, Jan.-Oct., 
1863 ; sent in pursuit of Bragg over 
Cumberland Mountains, 2^; his 
TOsition at Stevens' and Cooper's 
Gaps, Lookout Mountain, ib. ; his 
position Sept. 19, at Chickamauga, 
222 ; a division of his corps sent to 
left wing, Sept. 19, battle of Chicka- 
mauga, ih. ; Granger ordered to sup- 
port, 228 ; his position, Sept. 20, ih. ; 
ordered to re-enforce Thomas, 224 ; 
Thomas directed to employ him on 
his right, t6. ; his stren^i, 225 ; re- 
enforcements sent to Thomas not 
required, 226; the propriety of 
Thomas' call for aid from, Sept. 20, 

Suestioned, ib. ; his attempt to close 
^e gap made by withdrawal of 
Wood's division, 227. 
McCook, D., Col., U. S. v., in com- 
mand of 2d brigade, 2d division, 
Granger's Reserve Corps, estimate 
of hu strength, Sept. 20, Chicka- 
mauga, 228. 

MoCook, E. M., Brig.-GeiiM in oom- 
mand of Ist division. Cavalry Corps, 
with Thomas, 1864, 194. 

McCook, R. L., CoL, 9th Ohio Infantry, 
in command of 8d brigade, Ist oU- 
vision. Army of the Ohio, his charge 
at Logan's Cross Roads put Gm- 
federates to flight, 214. 

McCoy's Ferry on Potomac, Stuart 
crossed river at, Oct., 1862, 158. 

McDonald's House, Chickamauga Val- 
ley, Thomas' position near road to, 
Sept. 20, 222 ; Confederates pene- 
trated to road leading to, 224. 

McDowell, L, Maj.-Gen., U. S. V., his 
position June->Jnly, 1861, 5 ; Beau- 
regard's plan to exterminate, July, 
6 ; in Sept., 7 ; began march to Bull 
Run, July 16, 7 ; ms plan of attack 
not executed, ib, ; McClellan's con- 
tention as to the deprivation of his 
co-operation, 107-113; retained for 
defence of Washington, 107, 110; 
his independent command resented 
by McClellan, 113 ; his expedition to 
the Shenandoah VaUey, 116-117; 
to his withdrawal McClellan attrib- 
uted the failure of his campaign, 
ih.; McClellan did not expect him 
to participate in operations before 
Richmond, 116. 

McKeen, H. B., Col.,U. S. V., 59. 

MoLaws, L., Maj.-Gen., C. S. A., Col. 
Dawes' estimate of his strength at 
Chickamauga, Aug. 31, 1863, cited, 
228 note. 

McPherson, J. B., Maj.-Gen., U. S. A., 
a cadet at West Point, 1847-1852, 
under Thomas' instruction, 169; as 
Lieut-Col. U. S. A., Chief Engineer 
on Grant's staff, at battle of i^iloh, 
statement that the advance of enemy 
was known, April 6, 1862, 232 ; un- 
der Sherman's command, 1864, 185 ; 
his strength at beginning of 1864 
Atlanta campaign, 188; his losses, 
189; his movement through Snake 
Creek Gap, May 7-18; attacked by 
Hood's forces, July 22, 190; killed 
in battle of Jiily 22, before Atlanta, 
189; a hero of the Army of the 
Tennessee, 129; Humphreys not 
surpassed by, 95. 

Madison, J., I^sident, 165. 

Malvern Hill, Va., position of Union 
army selected by Humphreys, 79-^ ; 
the battle not fought as intended by 
Lee, 257. 

Manassas Gap, Va., action at, July 23, 
1863, 87. 



MHnaaRwi! Jonotioii, Beanregard in oom- 
mand at, 1861, 5 ; Joho^n ordered 
to, July 17, 7; batUe of 1862, 100, 

Maney, F., Maj. G. S. A., of Walker's 
diviBioii at Missioiiary Ridge, 238 
notes 3, 5. 

March to the Sea, Sherman's sneoess- 
fnl work, 141-144; its utility dia- 
oassed, 151 ; the plan suggested by 
Thomas, 191. 

Marietta, Ga., Thomas in engagement 
of, July 3^, 1864, 190. 

MazshaU, H., Brig.-Gen., 0. S. A., a 
gfraduate of West Point, 75. 

Mushall, J., Chief Justice, a Virginian, 

Marye's Heights, Fredericksburg, Han- 
cook's moYcment agfunst, Dec 13, 
1862, 59 ; Humphreys' assault, 82. 

Maryhmd, Beauregard's plan to rouse, 
6; invasion of, urgfed, 1861, 7; in- 
vaded by Lee, 1862, 118, 119; Stu- 
art's Oct., 1862, raid in, 168 ; Mc- 
Glellan's belief that the State was 
saved by him, 100, 119. 

Mason, J. T., Member of Congress, 
Thomas' interview with, 1836, 167; 
cadets from his district unsuccessful 
at West Point, t6. 

Meade, G. G., Maj.-Gen., U. S. A., a 
cadet at West Pomt, 1831-1835, 76 ; 
given command of Army of Poto- 
mac, June 28, 1863, 86; his indif- 
ference to Stuart's raid, June->July, 
186.3,161,261; his letter to HaUeck 
declining to capture Stuart, 261-262 ; 
responsibilities at Gettysburg en- 
tmsted to Hancock by, 60 ; Lee ig- 
norant of movements of, 161 ; ms 
victory at Gettysburg possibly de- 
pendent on Stuart's absence from 
Lee, 162 ; Humphreys his Chief -of- 
Staff, July 8, 1863-Nov. 25, 1864, 
86; Grant with in Virginia, 1864, 
133 ; orders for campaign of April 
9, 134; his difficulties in command, 
under G^rant, 87-89; relations be- 
tween G^rant and, obscure, 88; his 
order to attack Petersburg June 18, 
not fuUy carried out, 17; ignaorant 
that Grant intended to take Peters- 
burg, 43, 88 ; his relations with Hum- 
phreys, 88, 89; made Humphreys 
commander of 2d Corps, ih.; ap- 
pointed Webb Chief-of-Staff, ih.; his 
irascibilitv, i&. ; Humphreys' sugges- 
tions to, April 7, 1865, 93 ; his gen- 
eralship at Gettysburg, 86 ; his ex- 
cellent employment of cavalry in 

advance to Gettysburg, 258 ; Grant's 
use of cavalry, 1864, not approved 
bv, 259; a master of logistics, 53; 
blamed by Badeau, 35, 37 ; compared 
with Humphreys, 95. 

Meagher, T. F., Brig.-Gen., U. S. A., 
at Fredericksburg, 1862, 59. 

Memphis, Tenn., 129. 

Memphis and Charleston Railway, best 
route to Vicksburg, 28, 29. 

Merrimao, Confederate ram "Vir- 
ginia," her service, 1862, 102 ; her 
neutralization promised, 102-103 ; 
engagement with Monitor, March 9, 
1862, 104-105; mentioned, 109, 110; 
destroyed by the Confederates, May 
11, 1862, 115. 

Mexico, war of U. S. and, Hancock's 
service in, 51 ; Sherman served in 
California during, 128 ; Thomas' ser- 
vice in, 168-169. 

Mexico, GKilf of, see Gulf of Mexico. 

Micanopy, Florida, battle Seminole 
War, Humphreys engaged in, 76. 

Middleburg, Va., actions at, June 17- 
19, 1863, 157, 159. 

Miles, N. A., Maj.-Gen., U. S. A., 59; 
in engagement on White Oak Road, 
March 31, 91 ; at Sutherland's Sta- 
tion, April 2, t&. ; in pursuit of Lee, 
April 6-7, 92. 

Military Division of the Mississippi, 
comprising the Department of tne 
Ohio, of t£e Cumberland and of the 
Tennessee, command of, given to 
Grant, Oct. 16, 1863, 183, 2^; com- 
mand of given to Sherman, March 
12, 1864, 133, 187, 238. 

Milledgeville, Ga., public buildings 
spared by Sherman, 147. 

Mill Springs, Ky., battie of, Jan. 19, 
1862, 191, 204, 205, 206, 211, 280. 
See Logan's Cross Roads. 

Mine Run, Va., abortive movement to, 
Nov. 26-Dec. 4, 1863, 87. 

Minnesota, U. S. S., 102. 

Minty, R. H. G., Col. 4€h Mich. Cav- 
alry, in command of 2d brigade, 2d 
division. Cavalry Corps, with Thom- 
as, 1864, 194. 

Missionary Ridge, Chattanooga, Tenn., 
battie of Nov. 23-25, 1863, 32-34, 
132-133, 184-187, 234-2.S8; Bragg's 
position on, 33, 234; the character 
of defences, 186 ; a small force suf- 
ficient to hold the Ridge, 186; 
Thomas' position on, Sept. 19, 222 ; 
Sherman's position on, Nov. 24, 235 ; 
Grant's plan of attack on, issued 
Nov. 18, 1863, 184; 234; ordezs to 



Sherman, 235; ordera to Thomas, 
184, 234, 235; report that Bragrg 
was retreating from, 184 ; Thomas 
carried Orohiffd Knob, Nov. 23, ift., 
235; Thomas instrocted to capture 
rifle-pits and Ridge, Nov. 25, 236; 
his troops exceed^ orders and cap- 
tured the Ridge, 33, 132, 133, 184, 
185, 186, 187, 236 ; the Union charge 
a miracle of military history, 186; 
Grant's purposes as to assault dis- 
cussed, t6., 2d7 ; the time of duration 
of battle, 185 ; the Union strength, 
ib, ; Sherman's strength, 237 ; Thom- 
as' strength, t&. ; uie Confederate 
strength, 185, 238; the losses on 
both sides, 185-186; the losses of 
the Union army not larg^ at, 267 ; 
flnons captured at, by Thomas, 203 ; 
Bragg's army depleted at, and after, 
266; the Union army at Atlanta 
the same as at, ih, 

Mississippi, Military Division or De- 
partment of, see Military Division of 
the Mississippi 

Mississippi, operations in, under Grant's 
command, July-Oct., 1862, 233. 

Mississippi Central Railway, a route to 
Vicksburg, 28. 

Mississippi Kiver, Humphreys' survey, 
1850-ia>l, and report, 77; a fleet 
of gunboats created by the U. S. to 
operate in, 271 ; Sherman's estimate 
of force necessary to open, 1861, 
247 ; open, April 1, 1862, to UUnd 
No. 10, 7 ; Grant's purpose to open, 
27 ; opened to Vicksburg, 1862, 249 ; 
Chramt s failure to take Vicksburg 
ttova. east side of, 233; projected 
appointment of McClemana to com- 
mand on, 28 ; Davis' project to con- 
tinue the war beyond, 1865, 20. 

Mississippi Valley, history of the war 
in, Ihe history of the Army of the 
Cumberland, and of the Tennessee, 

Mississippi U. S. Volunteers, under 
Hatch, 1864, 194. 

Missouri, A. J. Smith's corps trans- 
ferred to Nashville from, 142; two 
divisions from, added to Thomas' 
army, Nov., 1864, 240. 

Mitchell, W. G., Bvt Brig. -Gen., 
U. S. v., on Hancock's staff, 57. 

Mitchell's Ford, Bull Run, in McDow- 
ell's plan, 1861, 7. 

Mobile, Ala., 129 ; movement to pro- 
posed by Sherman, Sept., 1864, 137. 

Mobile and Ohio Railway, a route to 
Vicksburg, 28. 

Molino del Rey, Hancock, Armistead, 
Longstreet, and I^kett, in battle 
of, 51. 

Monitor, U. S. gunboat, engaranent 
with the Merrimao, March 9, 1862, 

Monocacy, Md., 80. 

Monroe, Fort, see Fort Monroe. 

Monroe, J., President, 165, 166. 

Monterey, battle of, Thomas' good ser- 
vice at, 168. 

Morell, G. W^ Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., 
cadet at West Foint, 1831-1835, 
oommissioned Briff.-Gen., U. S. V., 
Aug. 9, 1861, in advance of Thcmias, 

Morgan, C. H., Bvt. Brig. -G^n., 
U. S. v., in veteran corps organised 
by Hancock, 1864-1865, 66. 

Morgan, £. D., Governor of New Tork, 
concurred in recommending a call 
for 300,000 men, 1862, 251. 

Morris Island, Charleston harbor. Hun- 
ter's plans against, faulty, 1863, 9. 

Morton, O. P., Governor of Indiana, 
concurred in recommending call for 
300,000 men, 1862, 251. 

Mott, G., Bvt. Maj..Gen., U. S. V., 
called to Petersburg July 28, 1864, 

Murfreesborough, Tenn., Confederates 
concentrated at, Dec., 1862, 179; 
the battle of Stone's River, Dec. 31, 
1862-Jan. 3, 1863, 179-181, 217-220 ; 
the advance from, towards Chatta- 
nooga, begun June 24, 1862, 181 ; 
Steedman in expedition to intercept 
Hood detained at, Deo. 20-22, 1864, 

Namer, Sir W. F. P., his account of 
Wellington cited, 204-205. 

Napoleon I., his cavalry system like 
Hannibal's, 156; the effect of the 
use of railroads in his Russian cam- 
paign conjectured, 272; Grant in 
comparison with, 36, 41, 46 ; Thom- 
as did not show Ihe audacity of, 204 ; 

Napoleon UI., his sympathies not with 
the North, 268-269; his prediction 
of failure, ib, 

Nashville, Tenn., a Union movement 
on, apprehended by A. S. Johnston, 
Jan., 1862, 177 ; the fall of, Feb. 
23, 1862, caused by the capture of 
Fort Donelson, 129; Army of the 
Cumberland's advance to, 178; Bu- 
ell's forces at, ordered to Pittsburg 
Landing, 129; his march begun. 



March 18, 282 ; retormng from Per- 
ryyille, arriyed at, Not. 1862, 179 ; 
a base of sapolies for Sherman, 1864, 
186 ; railroads ruming south from, 
threatened. Sept, 1864, 188 ; distance 
of Florence, Ala., &om, 240; de- 
fence of, assigned to Thomas, 184 ; 
exposed by withdrawal of i%erman, 
to captore by Hood, 144; Thomas 
chose to have Sohofield at Franklin 
rather than at, 241 ; Hood's pursuit 
of Thomas to, 148 ; besieged by 
Hood, t&.; the battle of, 191-195; 
fought according to iJan, 257 ; the 
^an solely Thomas', 191, 204 ; his 
strength at, Nov. 80, 1864, 142; 
enemy strongly fortified before, 192 ; 
Thomas' change &om defensive to 
offensive, t&. ; the cavalry employed 
in assault of fortified lines at, 194 ; 
Hood annihilated, 148-144 ; 192, 268 ; 
Thomas' captures, 192, 208; com- 
pared with other victories, 192 ; con- 
ditions unfavorable for captiue of 
Hood, 192-198; the pursmt after, 
198 ; Thomas thanked by Congress 
after, 206 ; honored by Tennessee, 
ih. ; promoted to rimk of Major- 
General U. S. A. for this victory, 
ib, ; his fame dependent on, 207 ; in- 
cluded by Swinton among the twelve 
decisive battles, t6. ; a defeat would 
have mined the national cause, ih. ; 
the result caused the Confederacy 
to totter, 206; disposition to con- 
sider the victory an ordinary affair, 

Navy Department of the U. S., Mo- 
Qellan^ contention, wiUi, 101, 106 ; 
only promised to neutralize the Mer- 
rimac, 102-106. 

Negley, J. S., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., in 
command <^ 2d division, at Stone's 
River, forced back Dec. 81, 218, 
219 ; in battle of Chickamauga, 222- 
225 ; hu division asked for at 6 A. if. 
Sept. 20, by Thomas, 222 ; sent at 
6.80 A. M., 228, 244; one of his bri- 
g^es reached Thomas before bat- 
tie, the others detained, t&.; called 
for again by Thomas at 11 A. IL, 
224 ; his strength, 225. 

Neill, T. H., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., in 
command of 2d division, 6Ui Com, 
before Petersburg, June 16, 1864, 15. 

Nelson, W., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., in 
command of iih. division Army of 
the Ohio, Grant re-enforced at bat- 
tle of Shiloh, by, 281 ; his strength 
April 7, 1862, ih. 

Neuae River, N. C, troops called from, 
to Richmond, May, 1864, 11. 

Newbem, N. C, Confederate plan 
against, 1864, 10. 

New Hope Church, Ga., battle of May 
25-nJune 5, 18&I, Thomas engaged 
in, 190. 

New Jersey, Washing^n unoonquered 
in, rendered the possession oi New 
York of little value to the British, 

New Orleans, La., Confederate de- 
fences insufficient at, 249 ; under 
Union control, 1862, t6. 

New Store, Va., but for Humphreys, 
Lee might have reached, April 7, 

New York City, its possession of little 
value to the British, 184; Thomas 
at, winter of 1860-1861, 172 ; the ad- 
vocacy of secession at his hotel, ib. ; 
<»rdered to Carlisle Barracks, from, 
April, 1861, ib. 

Nicolay, J. G., see Hay, J. 

Ninth Corps, U. S. A., reorganized, 
1864, 10; before Petersburg, June 
16, 1864, 15, m July, 68. 

North Anna Kiver, Ya., Grant stale- 

mated by Lee on, 89 ; 87. 
North Carolina, command of coast, 

1864, striven for by Confederates, 
10-11 ; Confederate forces caUed 
from, 11 ; Sherman's march through, 
145; his position in, compared to 
that of ComwalliB, 145. 

Northern States of the U. S. See 
United States, Northern States. 

Norton, W. A., Professor, a cadet at 
West Point, 1827-1831, 75. 

Nugent, R., Bvt Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., 
a Col. in Ist'division, 2d Corps, 1861- 
1862, 59. 

Numbers or strength of forces, ques- 
tions involved in treating, 212. 

Octoroon, U. S. gunboat, 108. * 
Official Records, the fountain-head of 
military history of the U. S., 1861- 

1865, 212 ; appealed to, for rectifica- 
tion of history, 190 ; examined with 
respect to the claims made for 
Thomas to the disparagement of 
Grant and Sherman, 212 et $eq. ; its 
evidence that the Union Army was 
not surprised at Shiloh, 281-288; 

Oglesby, R. J., Maj.-Gen., U. S. V., 
at Army Reunion, Chicago, 1868, 

Ohio, Sherman appointed to West 



Point from, 1836, 128; Thomas 
thanked by, after Mill Spring, 200 ; 
organizations formed in, to seoore 
nomination to Preaidenoy for Thom- 
as, 201. 

Ohio Volunteers, 9th reg^ (Qerman) 
its charge at Logan's Gross Roads, 

Ohio River, 129. 

Ohio, Army of, see Army of the Ohio. 

Old Point Comiort, appearance of the 
Merrimac off, 104. 

Oloklikaha, battle, Seminole War, 
March 31, 1836, Humphreys at, 76. 

Orange and Fredericksburg Plank 
Road, action of May 5, 1864, on, 62. 

Orchard Knob, Missionary Ridge, cap- 
tured by Thomas, Nov. 23, 1865, 
184, 235 ; Union position on Not. 25, 
236; Thomas' faculty of meeting 
emergencies instanced at, 206. 

Ord, E. O. C, Maj.-Gen., U. a V., 
across Lee's path, AprU 7, 94; at 
Farmville, April 7, ib. ; his services 
in ending the war, 67. 

Osterhaus, P. J., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., 
in command of Ist division, 15th 
Corps, with Thomas at Missionary 
Ridge, 237. 

Pacific Railway, Humphreys' survey, 
and report on a route for, 77-78. 

Palmer, J. M., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., 
in command of 2d division, 14th 
Corps, at Stone's River, 219 ; trans- 
fen^ to left wing Sept. 18, battle 
of Chickamauga, 222 ; his position 
in line of battle, t&. ; his strength 
Sept 20, 225. 

Palmerston, his sympathies not with the 
North, 268-269; his experience in 
affairs of state, 269 ; predicted fail- 
ure to the North, t&. 

Pamunkey River, Va., one of McClel- 
lan's routes of conmiunication, 116. 

Paris, France, the Prussian army sup- 
plied by railroad during siegpe of. 

Park, Roswell, Professor, a cadet at 
West Point, 1827-1^31, 75. 

Parke, J. G., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A., 
his repulse of Gordon, March, 1865, 
at Fort Stedman, 90 ; his services in 
ending the war, 67. 

Parker, I. B., Capt., U. S. V., on Han- 
cock's staff, 57. 

Patterson, R., Maj.-Gen., U. S. V., 

flven command of Department of 
ennsylvania, April 27, 1861, 173 ; 
his position in va., 5 ; Thomas as- 
signed to command of a brigade 

under him, 173; his advance into 
Viiginia, ih. ; engagement at Falling 
Waters, ih,; Beifturegard's plan to 
destroy him, 6 ; made the scapegoat 
of Bull Run disaster, 174 ; supported 
by Thomas in the ensuing contro- 
versy, i6./ 213. 

Peach Tree Creek, (Ja., Thomas in 
engagement of, July 20, 1864, 190; 
Hood repulsed at, t6. ; Union loss, 
ib. ; slight allusion to, in Sherman's 
report, t6. ; Thomas' faculty in emer- 
gencies instanced at, 206 ; the Union 
army the same at Atlanta as at, 267. 

Peeble's Farm, Va., battle of Sept 30, 
1864, mentioned, 87. 

Pemberton, J. C, Lieut-Gkn., C. S. A., 
in command at Vicksburg, supposed 
by Sherman to be held by Grant 
Deo., 1862, 29 ; Grant's phm to turn 
left wing of, at Vioksbuig, 31 ; his 
strength, 32 ; surrendered to Grant, 
July 4, 1863,234; number of men 
surrendered, t&. ; fighting him not to 
be compared to fighting Lee, 34. 

Peninsular Campaign, 1862, govern- 
mental opposition to phui) 101 ; cause 
of its failure, 116-117 ; Humphreys' 
services during, 79. 

Pennsylvania, believed by MoCleUan 
to have been saved by him, 100, 118, 
119; Stuart's futile raid in, Oct, 
1862, 158, 261; invaded by Lee, 
1863, 59 ; Stuart's raid in, 1863, 261 ; 
the Confederates suffered the greater 
disadvantage from, ih,; concentra- 
tion of Union army in, known to 
Stuart but not to Lee, 161. 

Pennsylvania, Military Department of, 
see Department of Pennsylvania. 

Pennsylvania' Volunteers, 1st City 
(Philadelphia) Cavalry, with Patter- 
son, July, 1861, 174; three months 
militia in Thomas' brigade, 1861, 
173 ; 5th Corps formed of, 1862, 80 ; 
their march to, and good conduct at 
Antietam, 80-81 ; by expiration of 
term of service 1st division, 5th 
Corps broken up, 84. 

Penobscot, U. S. gunboat, 103. 

PerryviUe, Ky., battie of Oct 8, 1862, 
179 ; Thomas second in command to 
Buell at, 216 ; he was not engaged, 
179 ; ignorant that a battie was being 
fought, 217 ; prejudice against him 
surmised, because of his inactivity at, 
216 ; Buell's orders to Thomas, for 
battie, 216-217; Buell, being ill, 
took no part, 217. 

Petersburg, Va., McClellan's n^leoted 



ohanoe in 1862, to aeize, 116 ; its im- 
portance in the defence of Rich- 
mond, 43 ; defended by Beanregud, 
1864, 4; his apprehensions for, 
April, 1864, 10; the surrender of 
contemplated in his plan of May 18, 
12 ; estimate of Confederate forces 
at Jnne 15, 15 ; Grant's plans against, 
13, 14 ; Union forces before, 15-16 ; 
outer works carried, June 15, 14; 
Grant's orders indefinite as to cap- 
ture of, 38, 39, 43 ; the cause of f afl- 
nre to take, June 16, 17, 1864, 88 ; 
unimproved chance for 5th Corps to 
enter, 16 ; Lee's army sent to, 17 ; 
unsuccessfully assaulted, ib. ; might 
have been taken June 18, t&. ; mme 
exploded, July 30, 18, 63 ; Hancock 
prevented from continuing at siege 
of, 63; the feint to draw Lee's 
troops from, 63-65; Grant's siege 
of, 43 ; 87 ; the number of men 
transported to, winter of 1864-1865, 
272 ; Lee's army before, dose of 1864, 
134; his position at, not changed 
hy Sherman's operations, 149; not 
abandoned by Lee until after Five 
Forks, 263; Lee withdrew from, 
April 2, 91, 149 ; occupied by Union 
forces, 67 ; conditions for capture of 
Lee after, di£Perent from those at 
Nashville, 192. 

Petersburg and Richmond Railway, 
in possession of Union forces, May, 
18j54, 11. 

Pettigrew, J. J., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., 
prisoners from his division taken at 
Gettysbuing, 60. 

Pettus, E. W., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., of 
Stevenson's division, at Missionary 
Ridge, 238 note 3. 

Philadelphia, Pa., its possession of 
little value to the British, 134 ; Ist 
City Cavalry of, with Patterson, 1861, 

Pickett, G. E., Maj.-Gen., C. S. A., at 
Molino del Rey, 51 ; at Gettysburg, 
182 ; his attack, July 3, 1863, on 
Cemetery Ridge, 49 ; prisoners taken 
from at (Gettysburg, 60 ; his attack 
on Sheridan, at Dinwiddle C. H., 
March 31, 90. 

Pickett's Mills, Ga., Thomas in en- 
gagements at, 190. 

Pifiow, G.J. Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., at 
Fort Donelson, 25 ; his statement of 
total strengih there, 231. 

Piper's House, Antietam, 58. 

Pittsburg Landing, Tenn., occupied by 
Grant March 10, 1862, 129, 232; 

Grant's position well chosen, 26; 
battle of, see Shiloh. 
Pleasanton, A., Bvt Maj.-Gen, U. S. A., 
failed to capture Stuart, raid of Oct 

1862, 158. 

Plymouth, N. C, troops caUed to Rich- 
mond from. May, 1864, 11. 

Polk, L., Lieut.-Gen., C. S. A., in com- 
mand at Columbus, 1861, 24; in 
command of Bragg's right wing at 
Chiokamauga, 2^; his attack on 
Union left, began battle of Sept 20, 
ib.; his strength, 225, 228; he at- 
tacked Thomas with Hill's and 
Walker's corps, 225; his failure in 
attack, 224, 225, 226 ; did not join 
Johnston prior to May 11, 1864, 188. 

Pope, J., Brig.-Gen., U. S. A., Stuart's 
Aug., 1862, raid in rear of his army, 
158; McClellan believed the army 
would obey only him after defeat 
of, 117; his defeat attributed to 
McClellan, 119; losses in his Vir- 
ginia Campaign, 34; did not con- 
tinue in active command till end of 
war, 247. 

Porter, F. J., Maj.-Gen., U. S. V., ap- 
pointed in advance of Thomas, Brig.- 
Gen., May 17, 1861, 174, 213 ; Patter- 
son's Adjutant - General, t6.; at 
Gaines' Mill, 57 ; his 5th Corps, of 
Pennsylvania troops, 80; succeeded 
by Meade, 84. 

Port Gibson, Miss., Confederates under 
Bowen defeated May 1, 1863, by 
Grant at, 233. 

Port Hudson, La., Grant urged to join 
Banks to operate against, spring of 

1863, 233. 

Potomac, Army of, see Army of the 

Potomac River, crossed by Patterson, 
July 2, 1861, at Williamsport, 173 ; 
U. S. fleet of gunboats in, 1862, 103 ; 
question of garrisons for forts on, 
107 ; Stuart m his Oct., 1862, raid 
crossed at McCoy's Ferry, 158; on 
his return at White's Ferry, ib.; 
crossed by Stuart at Rowser's Ford, 
Gtettysburg Campaign, 160. 

Potter, R. B., Bvt Maj.-Gen., U. S. V., 
his assault, June 17, at Petersburg, 

Pratzen, Heights of capture of, com- 
pared to the capture of Missionary 
Ridge, 133. 

Piwntiss, B. M., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., 
appointed May 17, 1861, 174. 

Presidency, nomination for, declined 
by Thomas, 1867, 201-202. 



Preddent, U. S. man-of-war, built by 
D. HmnphreyB, 74. 

Pricef S., Maj.-Qen., C. S. A., in Mis- 
souri, 1861, 24; Grant's affair at 
Belmont to prevent re-enforcing, t6. ; 
his escape at Inka, 27. 

Prime, W. C, editor of " Own Story," 
his sketch of McClellan cited, 00; 

Prossian army, the ralne of railroads 
for supplying, during siege of Paris, 
winterof 1870-1871, 272. 

Railroads, their use in time of war, 
270 ; their value to the U. S. during 
civil war, 271-272. 

Randall, F. V., Col., U. S. V., his 13th 
regt Vermont Volunteers at Cem- 
etery Rid^, July 3, 1863, 50. 

Randall, S. J., recommended the pro- 
motion of Thomas as Brig.-Gen., 
173-174; a private in 1st Phila. 
cavalry, 174. 

Rapidan Kiver Va., 10, 87; crossed 
by Grant, May 3, 1864, 66, 133, 265. 

Rappahannock, River, Va., 40, 84, 87. 

Rawlins, J. A., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., 
Grant's Chief-of-Staff , 259. 

Reams' Station, Va., on Weldon rail- 
road, disastrous affair of August 
25, 1864, at, 66. 

Reconstruction Conmiittee of Con- 
g^ress, Thomas' testimony before, 

Recruiting stopped, April, 1862, by 
U.S. Govt, 250; the call for 300,000 
men, 250-251. 

Reed's Bridge, Chickamauga River, 
battle of Chickamaugfa beg^ at, 
221 ; Thomas' position on road to 
Rossville from, Sept. 10, 222. 

Resaca, Ghi., Sherman's lost chance to 
strike enemy at, 135, 188; Thomas 
in battle of, 100. 

Revolution, War of, the possession of 
cities of little value to the British, 
Washington unconquered, 134. 

Reynolds, A. W., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., 
estiraaid of his brigade in battle of 
Missionary Ridge, 238 note 1. 

Reynolds, J. J., Mai.-Gen., U. S. V., 
in command of 4th division, 14th 
Corps, left wing, battle of Chicka- 
mauga, his position Sept. 10, 222 ; 
fatal message carried to Roseorans, 
that the right of his division was 
exposed, 226; said to have been 
communicated to Capt. Kellogg by, 
220 ; one of Brannan's brigades on 
line of his right, 244 ; Wood ordered 

to his support Sept 20, 227; Wood 
told by Thomas toat his support was 
not needed by, ih. 

Rice's Station, Va., an alternative in 
Lee's plan of escape, 02 ; Longstreet 
abandoned it, as a chance of escape, 
April 2, t6. 

Richardson, I. B., Maj.-Gen., U. S. V., 
mortallv wounded at Antietam, 58. 

Richmond, Va., plans of U. S. Govt 
against, disconcerted, 1862, by Stone- 
wall Jackson, 250 ; McDowell not ex- 
pected to participate in May opera- 
tions before, 116 ; the James luver, 
McClellan's best route to, 116; Mc- 
Clellan forced to the James from, 
ih. ; Butler in movement on, 1864, 
254 ; value of Petersburg to, 43 ; 
Beauregard called to defence of, 
April, 1864, 10; his plans involved 
surrender of, 12 ; Union advance on. 
May, 1864, 11; Grant's plans not 
known at, 1864, 10; troops called 
to defence of. May, 1864, 11 ; opera- 
tions against from Uie south blocked^ 
12; threatened by Sheridan May, 
1864, 162 ; hope of capture by cav- 
ahy, July, 186&, 63, Lee's army be- 
fore, close of 1864, 134 ; Lee's dispo- 
sitions before, not changed by Sher- 
man's operations, 140 ; not abandoned 
by Lee until after Five Forks, 263 ; 
evacuated, 10, 67; its evacuation 
anticipated by Beaureg^ard, 4, 18; 
only a military position to him, 5, 
12, 18. 

Richmond, Confederate Government 
at, see Confederate Government 

Ridgely, S. C, a cadet at West Pdnt, 
1827-1831, 75. 

Ringgold, Gku, Crittenden^s corps sent 
to, in pursuit of Bragg, Sept, 1863, 

Rio Grande, Thomas stationed on, 
1846, 168. 

Ri^ey, R. S., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., his 
History cited as to Thomas' services 
at Buena Vista, 160. 

*^ Rock of Chickamauga," name earned 
by Thomas. 182. 

Roman, A., CoL, C. S. A., his book on 
Beaureg^ard reviewed, 3-20; his 
critidsm of Davis and Lee, 6 ; cited 
as to operations at Charleston, 1863, 
0; estimate of effectives at Peters- 
burg, 15 ; his account of mine explo- 
sion valuable, 18; his book impor- 
tant, 20. 

Rome, Ga., Bragg believed to be re- 
treating to, Sei^, 1863, 220. 



RoMonuu^ W. Sm Mai-Gen., U. S. Y., 
CkmfederateB rooted at Corinth by, 
Oct. 3^, 1862, 217 ; his loes, i&. ; his 
share of credit for battle of Corinth, 
27 ; Bnell snpeneded in oonunand 
of Army of Cnmberhund by, Oct. 30, 

1862, 179, 216; promoted oyer 
Thoinas, ib. ; this appointment given 
for his sneoess at Corinth, 217 ; his 
moTement from Nashville, against 
Bragg, Deo. 26, 1862, ib.; Bragg*s 
army encountered near Mnrfrees- 
boro', ib.; battle of Stone^s River, 
near Morfreesboro*, Tenn., Dec 31, 
1862-Jan- 3, 1863, 17^180, 217- 
220 ; his position, 218 ; his stren^^ 
at, ib,; Confederate position, t&.; 
the Confederate strength, ib. ; plan 
of each commander to attack with 
his left wing, ib.; Bragg's attack 
on the right wing, ib. ; Union at- 
tack abimdoned, that Uie right 
might be sustained, t&.; Davis and 
Sheridan took brunt of attack and 
were forced back, t&. ; the flank of 
division turned on extreme right, 
ib. ; forces sent to support of right 
wing by, 218, 219 ; troops led by, in 
last assault on right wing, ib. ; enemy 
driven into woods by Rousseau, ib. ; 
his left wing not in peril, 219 ; only 
part of the forces of the left wing 
maintained their original position, 
220; the battle savc^ by Thomas, 
179-180; Bragg retreated, Jan. 3, 
180; the Tennessee, below Chatta- 
nooga, crossed by, 220 ; Bragg*s line 
of communications threatened by, 
t&. ; Chattanooga occupied by, ib. ; 
Bragg pursued by, ib.; Union line 
moved to Chickamauga River, Sept 
18, 1863, ib. ; his headquarters at 
Widow Qlenn's house, 244, the 
battle of Chickamauga, Sept. 19-20, 

1863, 181-182, 221-230; Thomas 
placed on left flank of, 221 ; attack 
on Bragg near Reed^s Bridge, ib.; 
Bragg fuled in his counter attack, 
221 ; Confederate dispositions for 
Sept 20, 222 ; Union plan for battle 
settled in council, night of Sept 19, 
ib.; his dispositions for Sept 20, 
ib. ; the Union line inspected morn- 
ing of Sept 20, by Thomas and, 244 ; 
dispositions changed by Thomas* re- 
quest, 222; Thomas* lines further 
concentrated morning of Sept 20, 
ib.; the Union strength, 225, 228; 
the Confederate strength, t6. ; the 
battle of 20th begun by Confederate 

attack, under Polk, on left flank of, 
221, 228-224 ; extended by decrees 
over four of the Union divisions, 
224; enemy repulsed everywhere 
prior to 10 A. iL, t6. ; attack on ex- 
treme left most serious, ib. ; the line 
penetrated b^ enemy between 10.30 
and 11 A. IL, \b. ; the left re-enforoed, 
224-225; the attack on Union left 
repulsed without the aid of re-en- 
forcements sent by, 226; the error 
in movement of Wood's division, 
^6-227, 22^230, 243-244; ques- 
tion of the fatal message discussed, 
1*6.; his letter to Col. Livermore, 
Jan. 13, 1892, concerning the posi- 
tion of Brannan*8 division, 244 ; con- 
sequences of the error, the enemy 
under Hood entered the gap left by 
withdrawal of Wood, 227 ; captures 
made by Hood from Wood's rear, 
ib. ; no mention by Thomas in his 
report, of the message, 229 ; Thomas' 
action in ordering Wood to his left 
without reference to, criticised, 230 ; 
the number of Union right wing 
swept away by Hood, 227 - 228 ; 
Longstreet's attack on the Union 
right, 226, Thomas attacked about 
2 p. M. by Longstreet, 228 ; enemy 
repulsed, 229 ; die forces remaining 
On Union right after sending re-en- 
forcements to the left, 226 ; Thomas 
ordered to position at Rossville, be- 
tween 3 and 4 p. M., 228 ; retreated 
to Rossville about 6.30 P. m., 229 ; 
new position at Rossville, ib. ; roads 
from Chickamauga to Chattanooga, 
222 ; question as to defence of main 
road to Chattanooga, 221-223; 
Union rlrht wing routed and dis- 
persed. Sept 20, 182; saved by 
Thomas, 131, 182 ; pomtion at Chat- 
tanooga, 32; his preparations for 
operations, 33 ; superseded by 
Thomas in command of Army of 
the Cumberhind, Oct 19, 1863, 131, 
182; a hero of the Army of the 
Cumberland, 129, his skillful ma. 
noeuvres Aug. 16-Se|>t 18, 1863, in 
Chickamauga campaign, 181 ; his 
bravery and resolution in that battle, 
220 ; (Ud not remain in active com- 
mand until the end of the war, 247. 
Rossville, Ga., Thomas* position. Sept 
19, on road to, 222; not the only 
road to Chattanooga, 223 ; Thomas 
suspected attempt of enemy to out 
his communications with, Sept 20, 
224; Sheridan joined Thomas at 



nightfall Sept 20, 227 ; morexnent of 
Granger from, Sept. 20, to sapport 
Thomas in attack from Longstreet, 
228; Thomas retreated to, about 
5.30 p. IL, 229 ; he seoored his new 
TOsition at, without much loss, ih. ; 
Kosecrans after Ghickamauga retired 
to, 182 ; Thomas' faculty for meet- 
ing emergencies instanced in move- 
ment to, 205-206. 

Round Top, (Gettysburg, Humphreys* 
position on, 84. 

Rousseau, L. H., Ma^.-Qen., U. S. Y., in 
command of 2d division, under Thom- 
as at Stone^s River, his strength, 218 ; 
in reserve, t&., ordered to right wing, 
ib. ; repuUed, 210 ; re-formed on new 
line, ih. ; enemy rejiulaed and driven 
into the woods by, ib, 

Rowser's Ford, Potomac River, crossed 
by Stuart, in advance to Gettysburg, 

Ruger, T. H., Bvt Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., 
a cadet at West Point, 1850-1854, 
under Thomas' instruction, 169. 

Russia, conjecture as to the result of 
Napoleon s campaign in, aided by 
railroads, 272. 

St Louis, Mo., Gamp Jackson, broken 
up by Gen. Lyon, 175. 

Sailor's Creek, Va., engagement at 
April 6, 1865, 92 ; GOT£>n's losses 
at, 1 6. 

Salient, the attack on, not well con- 
ceived, 37 ; Hancock's services in the 
capture of. May 12, 1864, 62-63. 

Salt Lake City, Thomas' report on the 
Colorado River as a route of com- 
munication with, 171. 

Savannah, Ga., its possession of little 
value to the British, 1781, 134; the 
possession of, not Sherman's ob- 
lect, 134 ; Sherman's march to, pro- 
jected, 137, 138, 141 ; besie^ by 
Sherman, 143 ; Us threat to Hardee 
at, 146 ; a Christmas gift to Lincoln, 
144 ; gravity of its loss to the Con- 
federacv, 19 ; effect of surrender of, 
144 ; Sherman's admirably con- 
ducted march to, 268 ; his still more 
brilliant march &om, t6. ; Sherman's 
march northward from, begun Feb. 
1, 1865, 18, 145 ; his small cavalry 
force in march to, 260. 

Savannah River, 138. 

Savannah, Tenn., eight miles from 
Pittsburg landing, 233 ; conference 
with Bnell evening of April 5, cause 
of Grant's absence from Pittsburg 

Landing morning of April 6, 233 ; 
Grant's headquarters at, 129. 

Schoepf, A., Brig.-Gen., U. S. A., his 
command ordered Deo. 29, 1861, to 
attack Confederates at Mill Springs, 
Ky., 213; Crittenden's plan to at- 
tack Thomas before he could be 
joined by, 214; Thomas' delay in 
waiting for, Questioned, 215. 

Schofield, J. M., Maj.-Gen., U. S. A., 
under German's command, 1864, 
135 ; his strength at begiiming of 
Atlanta campaign, 188; his losses, 
189 ; his retreat to Frainklin, Nov., 
1864, 142, 143 ; the risk to Thomas 
by his position at Franklin and 
Spring Hill, 241 ; Sherman's letter 
to, Oct 17, 1864, 146; re-enforoed 
Sherman at Goldsboro', N. C, 145 ; 
at Army Reunion, Chicago, 1868, 

Schraeder, A. von, Lieut-Col., Assist 
Inspector General, 14th anny Corps, 
said to have reported to Thomas that 
Reynold's right was exposed. Sept 
20, Chickamauga, 229. 

Schurx, C, MaJ-Gen., U. S. V., at 
Anny Reunion, Chicago, 1868, 19a 

Scott, T. A., Assist. Sec'y of War, 1861- 
1862, Thomas recommended for ap- 
pointment as Brig.-Gen., to, 17^ 

Scott, Winfield, Lieut.-Gen., U. S. A., 
Hancock with, in Mexico, 51 ; 168 ; 
a Vimnian loyal to the Union, 166, 
213 ; Beaureg^ard's plim to extermi- 
nate, 6. 

Second Corps, U. S. A., command of 
1st division, given to Hancock at 
Antietam, 57-58 ; Hancock suc- 
ceeded Couch in command of, June 
24,1863,52,59-60; his care of , 53 ; 
in battles of the Wilderness, May 
6, 6, 1864, 62 ; capture of the Sa- 
lient. May 12, 62-63 ; crossed the 
James June 14, 1864, 14 ; two divi- 
sions before Petersburg, June 15, 15 ; 
the third division, also, June 16, 15, 
16 ; disaster of Reams' Station, Aug. 
25, 1864, 66 ; Humphreys g^ven com- 
mand of, Nov. 26, 1864, 89 ; his for- 
mer relations with, 89-90; its last 
commander, 73 ; in pursuit of Lee, 
April 2-8, 91-94; its losses, 40; 
Walker's histo^ of, 94. 

Sedprick, J., Maj.-Gen., U. S. V^ 
Major, Ist U. S. Cavalry, 1855, 170. 

Selma, Ala., project of a movement by 
Thomas to, 142. 

Seminary Ridge, Gettysburg, advance 



of Confederates from, Jnly 3, 49, 

Seminole War, Florida, Hancock served 
in, 51 ; Humphreys' serrioe in, 76 ; 
Thomas' service in, 167. 

Seven Days Battles, Jnne 25-Jiily 1, 
1862, Union losses in, 34. 

Seven Pines, or Fair Oaks, battle of 
May 31-Jane 1, 1862, not fonght as 
intended by Johnston, 256; Han- 
cock not engaged, 57; Union loss 
at, 34. 

Shenandoah Valley, Va., Johnston in 
command in, 1861, 5 ; Jackson's ex- 
pedition to, 1862, 108 ; his strategy 
m, 256 ; Banks sent to protect, lu7, 
106 ; McDowell's expedition to, 116- 
117 ; cavahnr fighting of old style, 
campaign of 1864, 156 ; destruction 
by Sheridan of Lee's army in, 134 ; 
Sheridan's victory in, no greater than 
Thomas' at Nashville, 192 ; Grant's 
1865 plans for employment of Sheri- 
dan in, 259. 

Sheridan, P. H., General, U. a A., a 
eadet at West Point, 1848-1853, 
under Thomas' instruction, 169 ; the 
battle at Boonville, Mo., July 1, 

1862, the first planned by him, 204 ; 
at battle of Stone's River, 180, 218 ; 
his resistance of enemy, ib, ; forced 
back, Dec. 31, t&. ; Rousseau sent to 
his right and rear, t&.y re-enforced 
by Tbomas, 180, 205 ; no evidence 
that Thomas sent a brigade to relief 
of, 219 ; his aid to left wing, 220 ; 
lus manoeuvres at Stone's River, 
likened to Humphreys' at Gettys- 
burg, 85 ; at battle of Chickamauga, 
ordered to send two brigades to sup- 
port Thomas, Sept. 20, 224 ; in mov- 
mg towards Thomas, attacked by 
Hood's force, 227, forced back, t&. ; 
did not join Thomas until nightfall, 
at Rossville, ib, ; Thomas attacked 
by Longstreet when he expected, 
228 ; his streng^ in going to liiomas' 
aid, 1*6. ; in command of 2d division, 
4th Corps, his forces with Wood's 
captured Orchard Knob, Nov. 23, 

1863, 184; participated in the as- 
sault by which Missionary Ridge 
was captured. 237 ; the share of his 
division in the victory at Chatta- 
nooga, 133 ; the 1864 Va. campaign 
g^ve opportunities for display of Us 
abilities, 61 ; incident of his vigi- 
lance, 64-65 ; U. S. cavalry improved 
by, winter of 1863-1864, 162 ; the 
strength of his force, 1864, t&. ; Con- 

federate Shenandoah army destroyed 
by, 134; his mistaken expeditions, 
1864, 259 ; his uncertainty as to em- 
ployment in Appomattox Campaign, 
%h,; his expedition to Dinwidcue, 
C. H., 90; Five Forks, the last 
battle planned by him, 204 ; Hum- 
phreys' efforts not surpassed by, in 
pursuit of Lee, 91, 95 ; across Lee's 

gath, April 7, 94 ; in pursuit of, April 
, ib, ; his position, April 8, ib, ; Lee's 
line of retreat from Appomattox, 
held by, 257; his great achieve- 
ments in the Appomattox cam- 
paigpi, 66, 260 ; the utility of his ser^ 
vice, 262 ; a demonstration of best 
use of cavalry, 259, 262 ; his victo- 
ries in the Shenandoah and at five 
Forks compared with Thomas' at 
Nashville, 192 ; compared with Mo- 
Clellan, 122 ; the hero of the cavalry, 

Sherman, John, U. S. Senator, early 
recognition of the merits of Gen. 
Sherman, due to, 166. 

Sherman, T. W., Bvt Maj.-Gen., 
U. & A., Thomas with, at Buena 
Vista, 168. 

Sherman, W. T., General, U. S. A., a 
cadet at West Point, 1836-1840, 128 ; 
his service in California during Mexi- 
can war, ib.; left the army, 1853, 
ib, ; commissioned Colonel in reg^ular 
army, at the beginning of the Re- 
bellion, ib,; Brigadier-General of 
Volunteers, May 17, 1861, ib,; the 
early recognition of his merits due 
to his brother John, 166; com- 
manded a brigade at Bull Run, t&. ; 
150, 239 ; transferred to Kentucky 
Aug. 28, 1861, ib, ; in command of 
Army of the Cimiberland, Oct. 8, 
t&. ; voluntarily resided the com- 
mand, 1*6.; superseded by Buell, 
Nov. 9, t6. ; transferred to Depart- 
ment of Mississippi, t6. ; Thomas 
promoted to rank of Major-Gen. in 
advance of him, 215 ; his estimate of 
force necessary for opening the Mis- 
sissippi, 1861, 247; his sagacious 
advice not heeded, 248 ; in command 
of a division at battle of Shiloh, 129 ; 
surprised at Shiloh, 4, 8, 26, 27, 130, 
250 ; his claim that he was not sur- 
prised at ShUoh doubted, 26, 130, 
132 ; his statement sustained, 231- 
233; his despatch to Grant, April 
6, 1862, considered as evidence tnat 
the Union army was surprised at 
Shiloh, April 6, 232 ; his prediction 



of nothing but picket-firing April 5, 
justified^ ih. ; some of his troops not 
demoralized April 6, 26 ; his sendees 
at Shiloh, 239 ; his distinction won 
there, 129 ; his oondnot above praise, 
130; his snooeesfnl engagement at 
Corinth, May 28, 1862, 239 ; his nn- 
snocessfnl expedition against Vicks- 
bnrg, Dec., 1862, xb.; his unsuo- 
cestful operations at Chickasaw 
Bayon, Dec. 28-29, 1862, 29; his 
share in Vicksbnn^ campaign, 1863, 
239 ; Arkansas Post captured by 
Jan. 11, 1863, ih.; summoned by 
Grant to Chattanooga, Oct 1863, 
131, 132 ; the attack postponed from 
Nov. 21 to 25, because of his delay, 
184 ; nart of Army of the Tenn. 
brought up by, 234; the main at- 
tack assigned to him, 184, 185 ; that 
€bant intended him to take the chief 
part in battle questioned, 236; his 
failure to make an impression, 132, 
133 ; held in check at railway tun- 
nel, 33, 184, 185; re-enforcements 
sent to, not requiinsd, 236 ; Thomas* 
attack on rifle-pits intended as a di- 
yendon in favor of, 132, 133 ; the as- 
sertion not sustained, 236 ; his state- 
ment that Bragg massed his troops 
against him, disproved, 186 ; his loss, 
83, 185-186; his strength greater 
than Thomas*, 186; his strength 
smaller than Thomas', 237 ; strength 
of force opposed to him, 185, 186, 
238 ; the loss of rebels in his front, 
185 ; intended ^by Gbant to out off 
Brafg's retreat, ih, ; his account of 
battle colored by personal feelings, 
132 ; as Grant's favorite officer ap- 

S minted to the command of the 
iiitary Division of the Mississippi, 
March 12, 1864, 133, 187, 238 ; extent 
of his command, 238 ; flie claims of 
a class of Thomas' admirers made 
to the disparagement of, examined, 
211-244; the claims stated, 211- 
212 ; Thomas' junior in rank and 
command, 187; the variety of his 
services not so large as Thomas', 
203 ; his services and Thomas' com- 
pared, 239 et seq. ; Thomas' reputa- 
tion lessened by the prejudice and 
indifference to historic truthfulness 
of, 190 ; Thomas' gloryobscured by, 
207 ; the opinion that Thomas would 
have conducted the Atlanta cam- 
paign better than, 207 ; Thomas be- 
lieved by Grant not so competent to 
conduct the campaign as, 206 ; the 

proposition that the command should 
nave been given to Thomas instead 
of to, discnned, 239; his strength 
at beginning of 1864 campaign, lo5 ; 
ordeii^ to make Johnston's army his 
object, not the capture of cities, 134 ; 
evaded by Johnston, 136 ; he adopted 
Thomas' plans in Atlanta campugn 
but bungled in executing them, 1^— 
188 ; his lost chance to defeat John- 
ston at Resaca, 135 ; Kenesaw Moun- 
tain battle not to his credit, ib. ; 
sli^t allusion in his report to affair 
at Peach Tree Creek, 190 ; the privi- 
lege of capture of Atlanta, July 22, 
reserved for his own army, 189 ; the 
dtv not captured then, ih, ; his diffi- 
cult position after capture of Atlanta, 
136, 137 ; his possession of Atlanta 
of little value. Hood nnoonquered, 
138 ; his army stalemated, 1^ ; his 
phins after &pt. 2, 1864, 137-138; 
his army concentrated at Ghiylesvillet 
Ala., 138 ; surprised by Hood's Octo- 
ber raid, ih.; hiis communications with 
Chattanooga cut, t6. ; re-established, 
ih.; his experiment to draw Hood 
into battle unsuccessful, 136, 139 ; 
his difficulties in a pursuit of Hood, 
139>140 ; his wish to destroy Hood, 
139; Thomas sent to Chattanooga, 
ih,; Johnston's and Hood's anmes 
not destroyed by, 134, 135, 136, 139; 
the destruction of Hood assigned to 
Thomas by, 134, 140, 141, 142, 191 ; 
project against Savannah, 138; his 
project of the ** March throu^^ Geor- 
gia," 141 ; suggested by Thomas, 
191 ; unwilliDgnees of Grant to ac- 
cede to the plan, 141 ; obtained per- 
mission for his march from Grant, 
Nov. 2, 142 ; Thomas given the two 
weakest corps of, 191 ; the paucity 
of forces assigned to Thomas, 144- 
145, 151 ; the number of forces as- 
signed to Thomas for operations in 
Tenn., 240, 240 note 5 ; the strength 
of Hood's force, ih.; assured by 
Thomas that he would have men 
enough, 241 ; Thomas' force suffi- 
cient, ih. ; his instructions to Thom- 
as, t&. ; his expectations from him, 
142; his confidence in, 241, 242; 
his dependence on, justified, 145; 
ignorant of his difficulties, 152 ; the 
army destroyed at Nashville which 
had not been overthrown by, 191; 
the misfortunes imperilled by Sher- 
man's withdrawal of a part of his 
army into G^rgia, 144 ; the proposi- 



taon that the national eanae was im- 
perilled by his Qeorgia campaign of 
1864, disoassed, 240 et seq.; the 
strength of his army, 143 ; its size 
criticized, 144, 145 ; nnable to form 
a conjecture of Hood's plans, 240- 
241 ; his nroblem had hebeenfoUowed 
by Hooa, 242; the march begun, 
Not. 15, 1864, 143, 241 ; the neces- 
sities and difficulties of his march, 
241-242 ; his plan of living on the 
inyaded country justified, 147-148 ; 
the fortunate results of the m^rch, 
143; admirably conducted, 268 ;Sa. 
yannah besieged, 143 ; his threat to 
Hardee, 146; Savannah captured 
Dec. 21, 144, 152 ; a Christmas gift 
to Lincoln, 144; compared with 
Comwallis, 145; the hero of the 
day, 144; the exultation over the 
success of, ib. ; left Savannah, Feb. 
1, 1865, 18, 145 ; his march through 
the Garolinas, 4,9, 19, 268; opposed 
by Johnston and Beauregard, 18; 
would have been confronted by a 
formidable army had the advice of 
Beauregard and Johnston been 
taken, 256; his advantage in hav- 
ing only liie remnant of Hood's 
army to contend with^ 145; his 
movement to Columbia, t&. ; his en- 
gagement at Averysboro', t&.; at 
Bentonville, t&, ; his over-confidence 
there, 204 ; re-enforced by Schofield 
at Goldsboro', 145 ; plan for Sheri- 
dan to join him in the Carolinas, 259, 
260; negotiations for surrender of 
Johnston begun, April 14, 146, 150 ; 
Johnston's surrender April 26, 20, 
151 ; his characteristics of boldness 
in action and speech, 127; a bril- 
liant strategist, 19, 257 ; his skillful 
strategy in Atlanta campaign, 256 ; 
his f erdlity in expedients, 137, 138 ; 
his masterly manoeuvres, 145; the 
skill with which he used his advan- 
tages, ib. ; a marvellous provider for 
his army, 135, 137 ; his conservation 
of his army, 135 ; his army in better 
condition than ever before, at be- 
ginning of 1864 campaign, 266; 
fighting under, severe, but losses 
not large, Atlanta campaign, 267; 
his campaigns in Qeorgia and the 
Carolinas displayed the possibilities 
of an American army, 268; honor 
paid him, 127 ; a hero of the Army 
of the Tennessee, 129 ; idolized by 
his men, 267 ; possessed the confi- 
denoe of Qrant, t6. ; his harmonious 

relations with Orant, 130-131 ; his in- 
cessant activity and prompt support 
of Grant, 239 ; compared with Hum- 
phreys, 95; Lincoln's support of, 
254; the last of the conspicuously 
successful Union generals, 247 ; his 
right to his great reputation ques- 
tioned, 150-151 ; evidences oi his 
great generalship, 204 ; the advan- 
tage gained by his march questioned, 
151 ; his unnecessary desteuction of 
property criticized, 147-150; his 
policy of devastation discussed, 146- 
149 ; his despatches to Grant, JBeck- 
with, Halleck and Schofield, prom- 
ising to punish Georgia and South 
Carolina, 146-147 ; his want of suc- 
cess in independent actions, 204 ; his 
assumption of political responsibili- 
ties, 150; his neglect of details in 
batdes of July, 1864, near at Atlanta, 
257; the fighting qualities of the 
cavalry minimizml by, 192; his in- 
difference to the use of cavalry, 260 ; 
contrasted with Grant and Thomas, 
150; advantage to Grant had Thom- 
as been taken into favor instead of, 
178; at Army Reunion, Chicago, 
1868, 198. 

Shiloh, battle of April 6-7, 1862, 4, 8, 
18, 26-27, 129^130, 231-233 ; Confed- 
erate strength, 231 ; Union streng^, 
ib. ; the Confederate plan, 7-8, 26, 
129,232; the Confederates surprised 
by Union attack, 232; the Union 
army surprised, 4, 8, 26, 27, 130, 250 ; 
the statements of Grant and i%er- 
man that they were not surprised, 
distrusted, 26, 130, 132 ; the charge 
of a surprise refuted by Halleck, 
233; evidence in Record that the 
Union Army was not surprised, 231- 
233 ; Grant repulsed April 6, by A. 
S. Johnston, 26, 130, 231 ; Johnston 
killed, 26 ; Beauregard in command 
April 7, 26 ; Grant, re-enforced, de- 
feated Beauregard, April 7, 27, 130, 
231, 250; Confederate loss, 231 ; 
Union loss, 34, 231; discussion of 
Chant's ability as displayed at, 26- 
27, Sherman's ability displayed at, 
129,1:^,239; Thomas not engaged, 
178; fighting at, not comparable 
with tluit of the Wilderness, 35; 
Army of the Cumberland reorgan- 
ized after, 215. 

Sickles, D. E., Maj.-Gen., U. S. V., at 
Chancellorsville, 159 ; in command 
of 3d Corps, 84. 

Sigel, F., Maj.-Gen., U. S. V., appointed 



Brig-Gen., U. S. V., May 17, 1861, 

Sixth Corps. U. S. A., EUmcook pro- 
moted itom, oommand of a brigade 
of, at Antietam, 58 ; at the captnre 
of the Salient, May 12, 1864, 62 ; at 
Petersburg and Bermuda Hundred, 
June 16, 15, 16 ; in pursuit of Lee, 
91, 92, 94. 

Sixteenth Corps, U. S. A., under A. J. 
Smith, with Thomas in Tennessee, 

Slavery, Thomas' dislike of, 197 ; Mc- 
Clellan's adyice to Linooln oonoeru- 
ing, 114-115. 

Slocum, H. W., Mai-Gen., U. S. V., 
a cadet at West Point, 1848-1852, 
under Thomas' instruction, 169; at 
Chancellorsville, 159; at Army Re- 
union, Chic^^o, 1868, 198. 

Smith, A. J., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A., 
in command of 16th Corps, -with 
Thomas in Tennessee, 191 ; at Nash- 
TiUe, Not. 80, 1864, 142 ; his strength, 

Smith, C. F., Maj.-Gen., U. S. V., on 
the death of, his place filled by 
Thomas, 178. 

Smith, J. E., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., in 
command of 2d division, 17th Corps, 
under Sherman at Chattanooga, 287. 

Smith, Kirby, Lieut.-Gen., C. S. A., 
Davis' project to continue the war 
by uniting Johnston's with forces of. 

Smith, M. L., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., in 
command of 2d division, 15th Corps, 
under Sherman at Chattanooga, 237. 

Smith, W. F., Bvt Mav-Gen., U. S. A., 
in co-operation with Thomas at Chat- 
tanooga, 183 ; his services there, 255 ; 
desired by Grant for command of 
Army of the James, ib. ; in com- 
mand of 18th Corps, May 2-July 19, 
1864, at Cold Harbor, 18 ; sent to 
attack Petersbui^, 14 ; captured out- 
er works before Petersburg, June 15, 
14, 15; Hancock and Meade igno- 
rant of plan that Petersburg should 
be taken by, 88. 

Smithsonian Institution, Thomas' con- 
tributions to, 170. 

Snake Creek, Tenn., in battle of Shi- 
loh, 26. 

Snake Creek Gap, Ga., in Thomas' plan 
of movement on Resaca, 188, 191 ; 

. Mcpherson's operations at, 135, 188 ; 
Sherman's failure to move on Re- 
saca, through, t&. 

Snodgrasa House, Chickamauga Val- 

ley, road to Rossville by way of, 

Somerset, Ky., Sohoepfs command at, 
Dec, 1861, 218, 215; Thomas at, 
Jan. 1862, 176. 

South or Southern States, see United 
States, Southern States. 

Southampton Co., Va., a sword given 
to Thomas for services in Mexican 
War, by citizens of, 168. 

South Carolina, Sherman's propositioa 
to punish, 146, 147, 149. 

South Mountain, battle of Sept. 14, 
1862, glorified by McClellan, 118, 

South Side Railroad, Va., poesessbn of, 
gained by Miles, 91. 

Spottsylvania, Va., Grant's strategy at, 
36 ; his failure at, 37 ; extraordinary 
fighting of Union army at, 40 ; men- 
tioned, 61, 87. 

Spring Hill, Tenn., Schofield's position 
at, a cause of risk to Thomas, 241. 

Stanley, D. S., Bvt Maj.-Gen., U. S. A., 
a cadet at West Point, 1848-1852, 
under Thomas' instruction, 169. 

Stannard, G. J., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., 
his forces on Cemetery Ridge, July 
8, 1863, 50; his effective flank at- 
tack, 51. 

Stanton, R M., Sec'y of War, 1862- 
1868, his congratulatory order after 
battle of Logan's Cross Roads, 177; 
McClellan's announcement of his dia> 
position of the army to, April 1, 1862, 
108 ; ELalleck's refutation of charge 
that the Union army was surprised 
at Shiloh in report to, 283 ; M!cClel- 
lan's letter of June 28, to. 111 : his 
letter to, resenting McDowell's inde- 
pendent command, 113; cluuged by 
McClellan as the cause of his failure, 
117 ; his attribution of Pope's defeat 
at Bull Run to McQellan, 119 ; his 
orders disregarded by McClellan, 
120; Humphreys' report of his 
march to Antietam in fetter to, 81 ; 
his approbation of Thomas, 183. 

Steam-vessels, their aid in time of war, 

Stedman, Fort, see Fort Stedman. 

Steedman, J. B., Maj.-Gen., U. S. V., 
at Chickamauga, 223 ; Thomas' most 
energetic division commander, 193; 
sent to intercept Hood in retreat to 
Tenn. River, t&.; his detention at 
MurfreesboK)', Dec. 20-22, 1864, ib, ; 
failure of his errand, t&. ; injuries to 
Hood inflicted by, Deo. 81, t6. 

Stevens' Gap, Lookout Mountain, 



Thomas' Corps sent to, Sept, 1863, 
in pureuit of Bragg, 220. 

Steyenson. Tenn., 193. 

Stewart, A. P., Maj.-Gen., C. S. A., at 
Missionary Ridge, 238 note 4. 

Stone, C. P., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., com- 
manded brigade nnder Patterson, 
July, 1861, 174; appointed May 17, 
t6., 213. 

Stoneman, G., Maj.-Gen., U. S. A., en- 
ergetic cavalry commander, with 
Thomas, 1864, 104. 

Stone's River, near Mnrfreesborongh, 
Tenn., battle of Dec 31, 1862,-nJan. 3, 
1863,179-180,217-220; Confederates 
nnder Bragg, Union forces nnder 
Rosecrans, 217 ; Union streng^th, 218, 
Confederate strength, ih,; Thomas 
commanded a corps, 230; his posi- 
tion the centre, 180; his strength, 
t6.. Union position and disposition 
of forces, 218 ; Confederate position, 
1*6. ; each commander planned to at- 
tack with his left wing, t&. ; Bragg's 
attack so vigorons that Rosecrans' 
was suspended, ih.; the extreme 
Union right flank turned, t6. ; with- 
in hour the right wing driven from 
the field, 180; Davis and Sheridan 
forced back, t&., 218 ; a brigade sent 
to support Sheridan by Thomas, 180 ; 
no evidence in Record that the brig- 
ade was sent, 219 ; the right wing 
strengthened by forces from centre 
and left wing, 218-219 ; led to position 
by Rosecrans, 219 ; Rousseau mm. the 
centre repulsed, ih. ; then repulsed 
the enemy, ih- ; Thomas unmoved, 
180; part of left wing only kept 
their original position, 220 ; tiie left 
wing not threatened with disaster, 
219-220 ; the right wing not saved 
by Thomas alone, 219 ; his loss, 180 ; 
he was not in command of battle, 
220 ; his firmness, bravery and reso- 
lution, 180, 220 ; displayed his abil- 
ity in an emergency, 205, 219 ; the 
bravery and resolution of Rosecrans, 
220 ; aid to left wing given by Sheri- 
dan, ih, ; his manoeuvres like Hum- 
phreys' at (Gettysburg, 85 ; Thomas* 
successful charge, Jan. 2, 180; the 
cause of Bn^'s retreat, ' t&. ; the 
Army of the Tennessee had no bat- 
tie to fight Uke this, 131. 

Stone W^ Marye's Heights, Freder- 
icksburg, Hancock's losses at, Dec. 
13, 1862, 59; Humphreys' assault, 

Stuart, J. £. B., Maj.-Gen., C. S. A., 

his Life by H. 6. McClellan reviewed, 
155-162; a cadet at West Point, 
1850-1854, nnder Thomas' instruc- 
tion, 170; with Jackson at Falling 
Waters, 1861, 173; at Bull Run, 
1861, 157; Ids raid round Union 
army,^ June, 1862, 158 ; his Aupist 
raid, t&. ; his Oct. raid in Maryland 
and Pennsylvania, 158, 261, its futil- 
ity, t6. ; given command of Jackson's 
Corps at Chancellorsville, May 2, 
I860, 159 ; hb distinguished service 
there, ih, ; his service at Brandy Sta- 
tion, 1863, 157, 159; at Aldie Gap, 

157, 159; at Middleburg, 157, 159; 
his raid in Gettysburg campau^n, 
160-162; criticized, ib., 261; Lee 
deprived of his aid by the raid, 
161, 162, 261; his strength, 261; 
disregarded by Meade, 161, 261 ; de- 
fended by McClellan, 161 ; in com- 
mand of the Confederate cavalry 
in Virginia, 157; poorly equipped 
and w^ 1863-1864, 162 ; his ser- 
vices brief in Wilderness campaign, 
ib,; mortaUy wounded at Yellow 
Tavern, 16. ; his personal appearance 
and characteristios, 157; a natural 
leader of cavalry, ib. ; his most dis- 
tinguished actions, t6., 159; com- 
mended by Johnston and Jackson, at 
Bull Run, 157; the policy of his 
raids discussed: their futility, 158, 
160, 258, 261-262 ; the Confederates 
suffered the g^reater disadvantage 
from, 261 ; Lee's policy in the em- 
ployment of, not wise, 261-262 ; his 
raid of Oct. 1862, the booty acquired 
not commensurate with the risk run, 

158, 261 ; his strength, ih, ; his free- 
dom of action in Gettysburg cam- 
paign, 1*6. ; his objects in the expedi- 
tion not explained, ih. ; his failure to 
aid Lee, t&. ; the poor results of, t&. 

Sumner, K V., Maj.-Gen., U. S. V., 
Col., 1st cavalry regt., 1855, 170; 
Hancock given command of his divi- 
sion at Antietam, 58; his develop- 
ment of the division, 59. 

Sumter, Fort, see Fort Sumter. 

Susquehanna, Department of, see De- 
partment of the Susquehanna. 

Sutherlands Station, Va., engagement 
at, April 2, 1865, 91. 

Swinton, W., cited as to approaching 
doom of the Confederacy, Feb. 1, 
1865, 18. 

Tactical Study of the Battlefield of 
Chickamauga, a map published by 



the War Department, its inooneot 
legrend in the first issue, 230, 230 
note 1, 243-244. 

Tallahatchie River, Miss., available for 
defensive line, in an advance to 
Vicksburg, 28. 

Taylor, R., Lient-Qen., C. S. A., nn- 
der Beauregard^a command, 18d4, 18. 

Taylor, Z., Maj.-Gen., U. S. A., Thom- 
as with in Mexico, 168 ; his notice 
of Thomas in report of Bnena Vista, 

Tennessee, inadequate provision by- 
Confederates for defence in, 249; 
under Union control, 1862, t6., 250 ; 
Thomas* expedition to, Jan. 1862, 
176 ; the evacuation by Confederates 
the consequence of capture of Fort 
Donelson, 7, 129, 271 ; the eastern 
part within the Military Division of 
the BiissisBippi, 238 ; Grant's opera- 
tions in, July-Oct, 1862, 233 ; 234 ; 
Thomas sent to, from Georgia, Sept. 
29, 1864, 191 ; a retreat to, an alter- 
natiye for Sherman, Oct, 1864, 139 ; 
not feasible, a confession of defeat, 
140 ; the control of the U. S. in, im- 
perilled by Sherman, 144 ; Sherman 
left Thomas in, with two of his 
weakest corps, 191 ; invaded by 
Hood, 142-143; Thomas honored 
by, after Nashville, 206; Thomas* 
success in, an evidence of the merit 
of an American army, 268 ; nomina- 
tion of Thomas for Presidency, 1867, 
advocated in, 201 ; Thomas* com- 
mand after the war, in, 202. 

Tennessee River, Union forces on, 
1862, 129; the capture of Forts 
Henry and Donelson, ib., 231 ; 
Grant's advance, 1862, to Pittsburg 
Landing on, 26 ; his positdon on, be- 
fore battle of Shiloh, 232; Union 
army forced back to, April 6, 1862, 
231 ; Thomas did not reach, in time 
to participate at Shiloh, 178 ; crossed 
by Koeecrans in Sept. 1863, advan- 
cing on Chickamanga, 220 ; Bragg 
forced across, into Chattanooga, 181 ; 
forces brought up to Chattanooga, 
Nov. 26, 1863, from, 234; Hood's 
dangers in crossins^, 140; Thomas 
expected to hold the line of, 142 ; 
Sohofield's retreat from, Nov. 1864, 
t6. ; Thomas* pursuit of Hood from 
Nashville to, 192-193; faUure of 
Steedman to intercept Hood at, 193 ; 
Thomas reached, Dec. 28, 193. 

Tennessee, Volunteers, drilled at Louis- 
ville, 175. 

Tennessee, Army of, see Army of ih.e 


Terry, A. H., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U.S. A., 
at Army Reunion, Chicago, 1868, 

Texaih Thomas* service in, 1856-1860, 
168, 171 ; left by him, Nov. 1, 1860, 
172; his regiment in, surrendered 
^y 'I'^^iSTir^f t^*> ^ •^ Johnston 
joined Confederate army in, 173, 

Third Corps, U. S. A., under Sickles at 
Chancellorsville, 84, 159 ; 2d division 
commanded by Humj^ireys, 84; 
driven from position, July 2, at 
Gettysburg, lol ; employed in cnt- 
ing Lee's communications, April 

Thomas, G. H., Maj.-Gen., U. S. A., a 
soldier of consummate ability, 165, 
211-213 ; his patriotism unimpeach- 
able, 212-213; bom in Virginia, 
1816, 165 ; his ancestry, 167 ; his in- 
herited characteristics, ih. ; his edu- 
cation in patriotism, 165 ; his loyalty 
to the Umon at outbreak of the civil 
war, 166 ; he was like Scott in sup- 
porting the Govt., 213 ; one of seven 
loyal Virginians in the army 1862, 
16(3 ; suspicion excited by his south- 
em birth, ih, ; his loyalty above sus- 
picion by the Government, 213 ; his 
merits not recognized early, 166; 
promoted from rank of Major to 
Colonel between April 10 and May 
3, 1861, 213 ; a cadet at West Point, 
1836-1840, 167 ; his interview with 
J. T. Bfason, ih. ; his rank at West 
Point. t&. ; his soubriquet '* George 
Washington," i&. ; as 2d Lieut., 3d 
Artillery in Seminole War, t6. ; bre- 
vetted Ist Lieut., 168 ; his service in 
Mexican War, 168-169; his first 
post, 168 ; complimented at Monte- 
rey, ih, ; brevetted Captain, ib. ; his 
service at Buena Vista, ih, ; brevet- 
ted Major, 169 ; full Captain, 1853, 
ih. ; hu varied duties and places of 
service, 1847-1851, ib, ; Instructor 
at West Point, 1851-1854, ib., 170; 
cadets, afterwards distinguished, 
under his instruction, 168-170 ; sent 
to California, 1854, 170 ; his scienti- 
fic occupations there, ih. ; appointed 
Major, 2d Cavalry, 1855, t^. ; sta- 
tioned in Texas, 171 ; his report on 
the Colorado River, July 7, 1857, 
ib. ; his reputation in the army, ib, ; 
injured in a railroad accident, 172 ; 
left Texas, Nov. 1, 1860, on leave of 
absence, ib, ; at New York, winter 



of 1860-1861, tb. ; his aiudetieB be- 
oftDse of pditioal affun, ih,; his 
regiment surrendered by Twiggs, 
ih, ; ordered April 10, 1861, to Car- 
lisle Barracks, ih. ; renewed his oath 
of allegianoe, ih. ; unknown at Wash- 
ington, 171 ; promoted April 25, 
1^1, to lient.-colonelcy in place of 
R. E. Lee, 173 ; promoted, May 3, 
to colonelcy, in place of A. S. John- 
ston, 1*6., 213 ; May 29, assigned to 
command of brigade under Patter- 
son, 173 ; Jnne 12, led adyance to 
Potomac, ih. ; crossed into Va., Jnly 
2, ih.; in engagement at Falling 
Waters, ih. ; not nnder fire, 213 ; re- 
commended by S. J. Randall, Aug. 3, 
for promotion as Brigadier-General, 
173; not promoted until Aug. 17,174; 
commissioned prior to Abercrombie, 
213 ; preceded in this rank by three 
of his fellow officers of 1861 Va. 
campaign, ih. ; transferred to Ander- 
son^s command, Dept. of the Cum- 
berland, 174; disparity of his pro- 
motion with tbat of his fellow offi- 
cers of regular army, 175 ; at Louis- 
ville, Sept 6, 1861, ih. ; his uninter^ 
rupted devotion to duty, t6. ; his 
services in organizing Army of the 
Cumberland, U>. ; the seizure of state 
arms by rebels, prevented by, ih. ; 
in Nov. assigned by Buell to com- 
mand of Union line from London to 
Columbia in Kentucky, 213; Dec. 
29, ordered to oppose Confederate 
advance at Mill Springs, t6. ; arrived 
at Logan's Cross Roads, Jan 17, 214. 
Battie of Logan's Cross Roads or 
Mill Springs: attacked by Critten- 
den at daylight, Jan. 19, 176, 214 ; 
his advance renments fell back be- 
fore attack, 176, 214; lack of evi- 
dence to indicate a repulse, 214 ; a 
charge at 10 A. M., threw Confeder- 
ates into confusion, 176; the flank 
charge was made by McCook, ih.; 
Zollicoffer killed, 176, 214 ; a relent- 
less pursuit, 176 ; the enemy's guns 
and supplies captured, 177 ; the 
Confederate force never reorganized, 
t6. ; the termination of Crittenden's 
military career, t6. ; the Confederate 
strengtii, 214 ; the Union strength, 

176, 214; the losses of each side, 

177, 214 ; the effect on A. S. John- 
ston, 177 ; the effect at Washington, 
t6., 215 ; the first Union victory since 
Bull Run, 177 ; Thomas' first vic- 
tory in the West, 191, 204, 205 ; 

280 ; no evidence in Record that his 
plan was chang^ during action 
ttom defensive to offensive, 214 ; his 

5olioy of delaying eng^agement from. 
an. 17 to Jan. 19, questioned, 215 ; 
the slowness of his march questioned, 
ih.; four of his Colonels promoted 
in consequence of battie, 177, 215 ; 
his services slighted by the Govern- 
ment, 177 ; his promotion to rank of 
Maj.-GJen., dependent on reputation 
earned in this battie, 215. 

Feb.-Dec 1862: transferred to 
Shiloh, but did not participate in 
battie, 178 ; on the recommendation 
of Buell and HaUeck appointed 
Major-General of Volunteers, 178, 
215 ; chosen by Halleck to command 
right wing, April 9, 178, 215 ; Grant 
made second in command of the 
army, 216 ; the cause of his differ- 
ences with Grant, 178; the right 
wing at siege of Corinth commanded 
by, 230 ; the engagement of May 28, 
1862, fought in presence of, 239; 
renounced command of right wing 
in June, and rejoined Buell, 178, 
216 ; command of the Army of tiie 
Ohio given to, 179 ; his reasons for 
refusing the command, %h.; his 
mag^nanimity in declining to super- 
sede Buell, 216; made second in 
command of the Army of the Ohio, 
Sept. 30, 1862, ih.; ordered to form 
line of battie at Perryville, Oct. 7, 
1862, ih. ; not eng^aged in battie of 
Perryville, 179, 217 ; ignorant of the 
battie, ih.; surmise that his inac- 
tivity caused a prejudice at Wash- 
ing^n, 216 ; on removal of Buell, the 
command of army was not g^ven to, 
179 ; the action of Govt, questioned, 
ih.; Rosecrans g^ven Buell's place, 
instead of, 216, 217; his letter to 
Halleck of Oct. 80, 1862, 216; his 
plan of advance to Chattanooga ig- 
nored, 179. 

Battie of Stone's River : Dec. 31, 
1862-Jan. 3, 1863, 179-180, 217-220 ; 
in command of the centre, 180, 218 ; 
his strength, 180, 218, 230 ; he saved 
the army, Dec 31, 180; that the 
day was saved by, questioned, 217- 
218 ; Sheridan re-ei2Forced by, 180 ; 
no evidence that he sent a brigfade 
to relieve Sheridan, 219 ; Rousseau's 
division ordered to right wing, 218 ; 
repulsed, 21 9; successful charge made 
by Rousseau, by permission of, t&. ; 
his line did not remain unmoved, ib. ; 



alone did not saye the right wing, 
i6.; one of his brigades shatteml 
Breckinridge's division Jan. 2, 1865, 
180 ; his losses, t6. ; no evidence in 
Record that he took charge of the 
field, Dec. 31, 220; his bravery and 
resolution, ih. ; immovable in battle 
and council, 180-181 ; refused to con- 
sider the proposition to retreat, Deo. 
31, 1862, th. 

Battle of Chiokamanga : in the 
Ghickamauga Campaign, sent in pur- 
suit of Bragg to Stevens* Gkp, 220 ; 
in position at Stevens* and Cooper's 
Gaps, ih.; the battle of Chioka- 
manga, Sept. 19;-20, 1863, 181-182, 
220-230 ; his position at Chiokaman- 
ga, 132; in command of left wing, 
221, 230 ; the surmise of Bragg's in- 
tention to block road to Chattanooga 
questioned, 221-222, 223 ; the posi- 
tion of his forces, Sept. 19, 222 ; un- 
aware of Braeg's advance, Sept. 19, 
ib. ; his attack near Reed's Bridge 
met by counter attack by Bragg, ih, ; 
Bragg repulsed, t6. ; die pUm for 
batUe of Sept. 20, adopted m coun- 
cil at midnight, ih. ; Uie Union line 
inspected at daylight, Sept. 20, by 
Rosecrans and, 244 ; his line concen- 
trated, 222 ; still further revised, ib. ; 
at his request Negley ordered to the 
left of, 223; his strength, 222-223, 
225 ; Confederate strength, t6. ; at- 
tack on left flank by Polk, 224 ; the 
attack extended alon^ his line, t&. ; 
repulsed everywhere, ib, ; attack on 
Baird, extreme left, most serious, t6. ; 
re-enforcements called for, ih.; re- 
enforoements sent, t&., 225 ; the at- 
tack repulsed without aid of re-en- 
forcements, 226 ; his inability ^ to 
employ his reserves questioned, ih. ; 
the mistake caused by an aide of, 
226 ; Capt. Kellogg on his staff, 229, 
230, 243 ; the mi^ortune caused by 
removal of Wood's division from the 
line, 226-227, 229-230, 243-244; 
Wood ordered to extreme left by, 
227; Sheridan diverted by attack 
from Hood, in attempt to join, 227 ; 
the body of the army sent to the 
support of, 228 ; his right attacked 
by Xion^treet, t&. ; the attack re- 
pulsed, lb. ; his strength after 2 p. M., 
ib.; strength of enemy opposed to 
him, ib.; ordered between 3 and 4 
p. M. to a new position at Rossville, 
ib. ; his retreat about 5.30 P. M. to 
Rossville, 229; the attacks on, in 

retreat, repnlsed, ib. ; his new posi- 
tion at Rossville, ib, ; his great qual- 
ities exhibited in re^stanoe of Ik>ii^- 
street, ib.; the message carried to 
Rosecrans by his aide not mentioned 
in his report, ih. ; the question of 
the message discussed, 229-280, 
243-244 ; ue eravity of removal of 
Wood to his left, 230; his action 
questioned, ib, ; his great services 
181-182; saved the Army of the 
Cumberland from destruction, 181 ; 
Garfield's tribute to, ib, ; Dana's 
tribute to, t6. ; the '* Rock of Chick- 
amauga," 182 ; chosen by Grant, to 
command Army of the Cumberhindf 
131, 182, 216, 230; reluctant to ac- 
cept the command, 182 ; his loyalty 
to Rosecrans, ih.; the criticism of 
choice of Grant for supreme control 
at Chattanooga instead of, discussed, 
230, 234 ; his achievements compared 
with Chrant's, ib, ; his solution of 
problem of supplying army at Chat- 
tanooga, 183 ; his letter to Halleck, 
Oct. 31, ib,; the Confederates dia- 
lodged at Brown's Ferry, ib.; the 
restraint imposed on, under Grant, 

Battie of BiCssionary Ridge, Not. 
23-25, 1863 : the phm of battie com- 
municated to, Nov. 18, 184, 234 ; the 
attack delayed, 184 ; g^ven command 
of centre and right at Missionary 
Ridge, 185, 234; ordered to co- 
operate with Sherman, 184, 234- 
235; ordered, Nov. 23, to ascertain 
if Bragg was retreating, 184 ; cap- 
tured %hard Knob, Nov. 23, 184, 
235 ; gained position to assault the 
ridge, 184 ; instructed to move early 
morning, Nov. 25, 235 ; and to cany 
enemy's rifle-pits, t6., 236; to cre- 
ate a diversion for Sherman's benefit, 
132 ; his attack on rifle-pits not in- 
tended as a diversion m favor of 
Sherman, 236; Baird sent to re- 
enforce Sherman by, ih. ; Burd not 
being required, formed on left of, 
1*6.; informed Sherman of his posi- 
sition at 1 p. M., t6. ; his troops with- 
out orders captured Mi^ionary 
Ridge, 33, 132, 133, 184, 185, 186, 
236 ; if the chaige was not ordered 
by him, it was the effect of his in- 
fluence, 186; the assertion that the 
spirit which inspired the assault was 
due to his influence questioned, 237 ; 
the troo^ who made assault were 
not of his corps, ib, ; evidence that 



Grant intended an aaaaolt on the 
Ridge, t&., 237 ; one of his staff gave 
order to Baard to carry rifle>pits, 
and to posh on to sammit of Ridge, 
ih. ; the assertion that (}rant in- 
tended Sherman to take chief part 
in battle questioned, t6. ; his attack 
and Sherman's intended to be oon- 
eorrent, ib,; the total strength of 
Confederates, 238; Sherman's and 
Grant's statements that the lines 
were weakened in front of, dis- 
proved, 186 ; the strength of forces 
opposed to him, 185 ; the Confed- 
erate strength opposed to Sherman 
less than that opposed to, 186, 238 ; 
his strength at Miasion Ridge, 185 ; 
inferior to Sherman's, 186 ; superior 
to Sherman's, 237 ; the strength of 
each, ih.; his loss, 33, 185-186; the 
defensive works opposed to him, 
185; his statement as to modifica- 
tion of plan, 1*6. ; the statements of 
Grant and Sherman as to the duty 
of, at Missionary Ridge, distrusted, 
132, 133 ; sustained, 237-238. 

Atlanta Campaign : Sherman pre- 
ferred for command of Division of 
the Mississippi instead of, 187, the 

Proposition that the command should 
ave been nven to, discussed, 239 ; 
that he had held greater responsibili- 
ties prior to March 12, 1864, than 
Sherman, questioned, 238 ; Sherman 
his junior, 187; under Sherman's 
command, 1864, 135 ; his proposition 
of Feb. 28, for a movement to At- 
lanta, 187-188 ; adopted by Sher- 
man, who bungled in executing it, 
t6. ; the plan properly executed 
would have been successful, 135, 
187 ; the interests of his army sac- 
rificed by Sherman for benefit of 
his own, 187 ; given the hardest work 
to do, 189 ; the assault at Jonesboro', 
t6., 190; in all the battles of the 
Atlanta campaign except that of 
July 22, 189; excluded from that 
affair because of jealousy of Army 
of the Tennessee, ib.; enumeration 
of battles and engagements in which 
he participated, 190 ; his successful 
affair wiUi Hood at Peach Tree 
Creek, t6. ; the affair slightly noticed 
by Sherman, t6. ; Sherman's preju- 
dice against, t6. ; his plan of a maroh 
to the sea adopted by Sherman, 191. 
Tennessee campaign: sent to 
Tennessee to expel Forrest, 139, 191 ; 
the destruction of Hood's army as- 

signed by Sherman to, 134, 140, 141, 
142, 191 ; the proposition that the 
national cause in Tennessee was im- 
perilled by the Georgia campaign of 
1864, discussed, 240 et seq, ; Sher- 
man's two weakest corps g^ven to, 
191 ; the paucity of the forces as- 
signed to, 142, 144-146, 151 ; the 
number of his forces, 240, 240 note 
5; Sherman assured by, that he 
would have men enough, 241; the 
force sufficient, t&. ; the strengthen- 
ing of the army of, condition of con- 
sent to Sherman's project against 
Savannah, 142 ; not possessed of an 
army strong enough for his purposes, 
unta Nov. 30, t6., 191 ; the strength 
of Hood's army, Nov. 1864, 240, 240 
note 5 ; correspondence with Sher- 
man, 241 ; communications between, 
broken Nov. 15, 1864, ib.f Sher- 
man's expectations from, 141-142 ; 
his confidence in, justified, 152, 242 ; 
the difficulties of, unknown to Sher- 
man, 152 ; the only risk taken by, as 
to Schofield's position, was of his own 
choosing, 241; the resources and 
men of the North available to, 242 ; 
defeated Hood in the battle of Frank- 
lin, Nov. 30, 142, 143. 

Battle of Nashville, Dec. 15-16, 
1864 : the last of the great victories 
of, 191 ; the strategy of the battle, 
192 ; fought according to plan, 257 ; 
Hood completely defeated, 143-144, 
145, 152 ; his success unprecedented, 
145; prisoners captured, 192; his 
failure to capture Hood's entire 
army, 192-193 ; the conditions differ- 
ent ^m Grant's after Petersburg, 
1*6.; obstacles in pursuit of Hood, 
193 ; failure of his plans for Steed- 
man, ib. ; his losses m pursuit com- 
pared with Grant's in pursuit of Lee, 
194 ; exultation over his victory, 144 
favored in his campaign by luck, 143 
the disposition to minimize the risk 
and victory, 152 ; the victory his chief 
claim to generalship, 191, 207 ; com- 
pared with other victories, 192 ; an 
evidence of the possibilities of an 
American army, 268 ; included by 
Swinton among the decisive battles, 

His military record and qualifica- 
tions: his variety of service, 203; 
the number of actions in which he 
took part, t&. ; his captures of gr^ 
and prisoners, ib,; his generalship, 
204; his employment of cavalry 



against fortified lines, 194 ; his uses 
of cavalry, 104-105; never showed 
the audacity of CsBsar and Napoleon, 
204; possessed a power over his 
army like Wellingfton's, 204-205; 
also his accuracy of judgment in 
emergencies, 205 ; instances of this 
faculty, 205-206; his attention to 
details, 199; praise excited by his 
achievements, 206 ; thanked by Ohio, 
after Mill Springs, t6. ; by Congress 
after Nashville, ih. ; by Tennessee, 
t6. ; his portrait painted for Tennes- 
see, and a gold medal given him by 
that state, ib. ; promoted to rank of 
Major-Genera], Dec. 15, 1864, i6. ; 
Stanton's letter announcing promo- 
tion, ih. ; the office of Lieat.-Gen. 
declined by him, 202-203 ; the Sen- 
ate requested by him not to confirm 
the nomination, 203 ; his attitude to- 
wards the presidency, 200-201 ; his 
letter of March, 1867, refusing nomi- 
nation, 201-202 ; his feelings to- 
wards the South, 202 ; his exercise 
of power in his niilitary department 
after the war, lb. ; his study of U. S. 
Constitution, 197; present at Re- 
union of Western Armies at Chicaeo, 
1868,198; attention commanded by 
him at, t6. ; his legal acquirements, 
198-199 ; his power of commanding 
confidence and affection, 195-196 ; 
his recognition of good service, 195 ; 
his care for his army, ib. ; his hero- 
ism under physical sufferings, ih. ; 
his personal reconnaissances, t6. ; his 
skill in wood craft, t&., 196 ; his fear- 
lessness and indifference to danger, 
196; imperturbable and self-con- 
tained, ib. ; not given to display, ib. ; 
consideration for others, t6., 197 ; 
his control of a violent temper, ib. ; 
his humanity, t6. ; his gentleness, 
dignity, humor, ib. ; his scholarly 
traits, (6. ; his dislike of slavery, 
t&. ; his liberation of his slaves, 198 ; 
his personal habits, 199-200; his 
temperance, 199; his personal ap- 
pearance, 200 ; compared with Ghrant, 
Sherman and Sheridan, 203, 204; 
with McClellan, 122; with Hum- 
phreys, 95; his glory obscured by 
Grant's and Sherman's, 207 ; the lack 
of good relations a disadvantage to 
Gh^nt, 178 ; made by Grant to suffer 
for the faults of Halleck, i6. ; Grant's 
imperfect knowledge of, 206 ; 
Grant's comments on, cited, 206- 
207 ; Uiought by Grant leas compe- 

tent than Sherman for command of 
Atlanta campaign, 206-207 ; contra- 
ry opinion entertained, 207 ; Ghwit^s 
praise of, ib. ; Grant's prejudioe 
against, 184 ; the charge of a preju- 
dice questioned and discussed, 215— 
216 ; no evidence of prejudice, 216 ; 
238; the claims made to the dis- 
paragement of Grant and Shermaa, 
examined, 21 1-244 ; the claims stated, 
211-212 ; tested by the Official Re- 
cords, 212 et sea. 

Thruston, Bvt. Biig.-Gen., U. S. V., 
Judg^ Advocate, Inomas' staff, cited 
as to the General's legal acquire- 
ments, 198-199. 

Tilghman, L., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., his 
escape from Fort Henry, 25. 

Totopotomoy River, Va., 61, 87. 

Turchin, J. B., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., 
his statement as to fatal message to 
Rosecrans at Chiokamauga, cited, 

Twentieth Corps, U. S. A., its strength 
under McCook at Chickamauga, Sept 
19-20, 1863, 225; at engagement of 
Peach Tree Creek, July 20, 1864, 190. 

Twenty-third Corps, U. S. A., under 
Schofield, re-enforced Sherman at 
Goldsboro', March 25, 1865, 145. 

T^^gs, D. E., Maj..Gen., C. S. A., 
Thomas at Monterey, praised by, 
168; surrendered U. S. forces to 
Texas, Feb. 23, 1861, 172. 

Underwood, A. B., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., 
U. S. v., wounded in affair oi Look- 
out Valley, Oct. 29, 1863, 183. 

United States, the people not military, 
248; their comprehension of military 
situation, 1862, 250: Lincoln, the 
wisest and most sagacious stateman 
in the history of, 251-252. 

', Northern States: realization 

of the magnitude of the war, after 
the first Bull Run, in, 248 ; the peo- 
ple trained in large affairs, ib. ; am- 
Ele provision for the support of Govt., 
49; preparations for defence, ib.; 
recruiting in, stopped, April, 1862, 
250 ; the Governors of, counselled a 
call for 300,000 men, 250-251 ; their 
vast resources, 251; their capabili- 
ties in the ingenious utilization of 
steam and electricity, 271. 

•, Southern States : want of fa- 

miliarity with large affairs in, 249 ; 
careless confidence of success and 
contempt of their adversaries in, 
ib.; not daunted by disasters of 



ih.; their military strength 
wholly employed, xh.; their patient 
enduranoe under deprivation of oom- 
f ortB, ib, ; the merits of their eener- 
als, 250 ; unwilling to accept defeat, 
ih,; western forces united under A. 
S. Johnnson in March, 1862, ib. 
-y Congress, Thomas thaiUced by, 

after Nashville, 206 ; indifference of, 
to the artillery service, 263. 

-, Government: failure to com- 

prehend, 1861, the magnitude of the 
war, 247, 268; did not heed Shei^ 
man's sagacious advice, 248 ; its plans 
disconcerted by Stonewall Jackson, 
250; for sake of economy stopped 
recruiting, April, 1862, ib, ; the need 
of re-enforcements, July, 1862, ib, ; 
unwilling consent to call for 3(X),000 
men, t&., 251 ; its unnecessary ex- 
travagance, ib,; its lack of sound 
military direction, 255 ; the inciedu- 
lity of foreign nations as to its suc- 
cess in the war, 268 ; the problems 
it was called on to solve, ib. ; the ad- 
vantage of modem scientific agen- 
cies to, 260-270 ; its employment of 
steam-vessels, ib,; of the electric 
telegraph, 270; iA railroads, ih,; a 
navy created for blockade, by, 271 ; 
a navy created to operate in southern 
rivers, t&. ; blockade made reasonably 
effective, ib,; Thomas unknown to, 
April 16, 1861, 171 ; effect on, of his 
victory at Logan's Cross Roads, Jan., 
1862, 177 ; surmise of pre judice against 
Thomas, because of his inactivity at 
Perryville, Oct 8, 1862, 216 ; Roee- 
erans chosen to succeed Buell, 217 ; 
Halleck made General-in-Chief by, 
27, 238 ; scheme of, to make MoCler- 
nand commander of Mississippi ex- 

i8im>i ex- 
; Grants 

pedition, 1862, 28, 29, 30 
victory at Vicksburg caused him to 
be given command of Military Divi- 
sion of Mississippi by, 234 
United States Military Academy, West 
Point, N. Tm Jefferson Davis a cadet 
at, 1824-1828, 252 ; W. S. Hancock 
a cadet at, 1840-1844, 51 ; A. A. 
Humphreys, a cadet at, 1827-1831, 
76 ; W. T. Sherman, a cadet at, 1836- 
1840, 128 ; G. H. lliomas, a cadet at, 
1836-1840, 167 ; Instructor of Cav- 
alry and Artillery at, 1851-1854, 169 ; 
distin^iuished class under him, 169- 
170 ; its non-military sradnateA, 75 ; 
Cullnm's Biographical Register of 
Officers and Graduates of, 75, 76, 

United States, U. S. man-of-war, buOt 
by D. Humphreys, 74. 

Upton, £., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A., 
compared with Humphreys, 95 ; his 
g^reat tactical ability, ib, 

Uteh, expedition to, under A. S. John- 
ston, 1857, 171. 

Valley Forge, Pa., 165. 

Van Cleve, H. P., Brig.-Gen. U. S. V., 
a cadet at West Point, 1827-1831, 
75 ; in command of 3d division, left 
wing, at Stone's River, ordered to 
re-enforce right wing, Dec 31, 1862, 
218 ; ordered to support Thomas at 
Chickamauga, Sept 20, 225; a bri- 

Side of his division carried away by 
ood, 227; the streoigth of that 
brigade, ib.; in the line formed to 
resist Longstreet's attack, 228. 

Van Home, T. B., Chaplain, U. S. A., 
his History of the Army of the Cum- 
berland published prior to the Me- 
moirs of Grant and Sherman, 212 ; 
his Life of Thomas published in 
1882, 112 note; silent as to bearer 
of fatal message at Chickamauga, 

Vanghan Road, Va., eng^agement, Feb. 
5-7, 1865, 90. 

Veazey, W. G., Col. U. S. V., his regi- 
ment, 16th Vermont, at Cemetery 
Ridge, July 3, 1863, 49. 

Vermont Volunteers, 13th and 16th 
regts. at Cemetery Ridge, July 13, 

Veteran regiments, the importance of 
preserving organizations disregard- 
ed, 265; the organizations preserved 
by Wisconsin and Illinois, tb. 

Vicksburg, Miss., the Mississippi River 
opened to, 1862, 249 ; Williams' at- 
tempt to capture, 1862, 27; batter- 
ies run by Farragut, 27-28; canal 
scheme abandoned, 28; Sherman's 
onsncceesful expedition to, Dec, 
1862, 204, 239 ; discussion of Grant's . 
plans against, 27-32; their indefi- 
niteness, 31, 39; his operations at, 
Dec, 1862-Jan., 1863, 233 ; his oper- 
ations April-July, 1863, 233-234; 
routes to, 28 ; route chosen by Grant, 
30; surrendered, July 4, 1863, 32, 
264 ; Grant's looaes in the campaign, 
34 ; won by superior strategy, 131 ; 
conditions for captures at, compared 
with Aose of Nashville, 192 ; conjec- 
ture as to results had Johnston com- 
manded at, 2.56 ; Sherman's services 
in the campaign, 239. 



Victoria, U. S. gronboat, 103. 

Vining^B Station, Gku, Thomas in en- 
gagement of, 190. 

Vinton, F., Rey., a cadet at West 
Point, 1826-1830, 75. 

Virg^inia, Thomas bom in, 165; its 
suffering in War of 1812, 105 ; Presi- 
dents provided by, ih. ; statesmen 
provided by, 166; the number of 
men from, in the U. S. Army Jan., 
1861, who remained in service, Jan., 
1862, 166 ; Lee's devotion to, though 
deprecating secession, 166 ; prior to 
Thomas, no cadet from his district 
had been graduated at West Point, 
167 ; Stonewall Jackson's successful 
operations in, 250 ; re-enforcements 
sent to Bragg in Tennessee from, 
220; 230; Longstreet recalled to, 
after Missionary Ridge, 266 ; oper- 
ations against Charleston discon- 
tinued for sake of 1864 campaign in, 
10 ; Grant's neglect of details in the 
battles of May and June, 1864, in, 

Vuginia volunteers, under Longstreet 
re-enforced Bragg in Tennessee, 131 ; 
defeated by 'Hiomas, at Chicka- 
mauga, 181, 182 ; their loss, 182 ; 
the flower of Lee's army, ib. 

Wade, R. D. A., Capt.,U. S. A., men- 
tioned Thomas in his report, Semi- 
nole War, 168. 

Wadsworth, J.S., Brig. -Gen., U.S.V., 
hiB report of forces left for defence 
of Washington, 110; in the Wilder- 
ness, May 6, 1864, 62. 

Wales, Gbn. Humphreys' family came 
from, 77 ; Gen. Thomas', also, 167 ; 
its people not conquered by Ciesar, ih. 

Walker, F. A., Bvt.Brig.-Gen. U. S. V., 
concerned in episode of July 28, 1865, 
at Deep Bottom, 64; consideration 
received when a prisoner of war, 
from A. P. Hill, 67 ; 83 ; his Hk- 
tory of the Second Army Corps, 94. 

Walker, W. H. T., Maj.-Gen., C. S. A., 
his strength, Sept. 18, 225 ; his losses, 
Sept. U)-20, ih, ; attacked Thomas 
under Polk, Sept. 20, Chickamauga, 
ih, ; estimate of his artillery at baUle 
of Missionary Ridge, 237 note 1, 
mentioned, t6., note 4. 

Wallace, L., Maj.-Gen., U. S. V., in 
command of 3d division. Army of 
the Tennessee, engaged at Shiloh, 
April 7, 1862, 231. 

War Department, its publication, Tac- 
tical Study of the Battlefield of 

Chickamauga, 220, 230, 230 note 1, 
243, 244; dissatisfied with Rom- 
crans, after Chickamauga, 182. 

Warren, G. K., Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A., 
his delay and disaster on White Oak 
Road, March 31, 91 ; his services in 
ending the war, 67. 

Washbume, £. B., Member of Con- 
gress, the eariy recognition of 
Grant's merits due to, 166. 

Washington, D. C, Bureau of Topo- 
graphical Engineers, 76; bridge 
built by Humphreys at, 76-'^; 
Beauregard's plan, July, 1861, 
against, 5, 6 ; in Sept., 7 ; question 
of the defence of, 1862, 107-113 ; 
McClellan's insufficient provision 
for, 107, 106, 110 ; Banks not availa- 
ble for, 107-108 ; McCleUan's beUef 
that he had saved, 118, 119 ; Hum- 

Shreys hurried to Antietam from, 
0; Stuart passed between Union 
army and, in advance of Gettysburg, 
160 ; U. S. Government at, see U. S. 

Washington, George, 134, 165; ap- 
pointed D. Humphreys, U. S. naval 
constructor, 74. 

Webb, A. a, Bvt. Maj.-Gen., U. S. A., 
at Cemeterv Ridge, July 3, 1863, 
51 ; succeeded Humphreys as Chief - 
of-Staff to Meade, 89. 

Weldon, N. C, Beauregaid at, April 
22, 1864, 10. 

Weldon and Petersbuie, Railroad, 
affairs at, 1866, 87 ; Lee's supply- 
line, 90 ; captured, i&. 

Wellington, Thomas' power over his 
army and accuracy of judgment in 
emen^enoies like, 204-205. 

West Point, N. Y., U. S. Military 
Academy at, see U. S. Military Aca- 

West f'oint, Va., in McCleUan's plans, 

West Virginia, in Beauregard's plan, 
1861, 6. 

Wheeler, J., Maj.-Gen., C. S. A., his 
operations. Sept, 1864, 138. 

White's Ferry on Potomac, Stuart 
crossed at, returning from Oct., 1862, 
raid, 158. 

White House, on Pamunkey, McClel- 
lan's base oiP sunplies, 116. 

White Oak Road, Va., engagement 
of March 31, 1865, 91. 

Whiting, W. H. C, Maj.-Gen., C. S. A., 
Petersbure occupied by. May, 1864, 
11 ; in Seanregard's plans, ih, ; 
failed, ih. 



Whitdesey, C, CoL, U. S. Y., a cadet 
at Weet Point, 1827-1881, 75. 

Wilderness, Va., battle of, 85 ; seyerity 
of fightmg, 85, 40; Humphreys' 
oritioism of advance to, 87 ; Union 
left wing commanded by EUncook, 
52; his services in. May 5 and 6, 
1864, 62; Stuart's service in the 
campaign brief, 162 ; 61, 87. 

WiUiams, T., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., his 
attempt to capture Vicksburg, 1862, 
27; his canal scheme abandoned, 
28 ; his return to Baton Roug«, t6. 

Williamsburg, Va., battle of May 5, 
1862, Hancock at, 58; HiU and 
Early defeated by Hancock at, 56 ; 
Union loss at, 84. 

Williamsport, Pa., 158; Patterson 
crossed the Potomac at, July 2, 1861, 

Wilmington, Nt C, Comwallis' retire- 
ment to, after battle of Quilford 
C. H., 145 ; troops called to Rich- 
mond from. May, 1864, 11 ; its 
abandonment advocated, 1865, by 
Beauregard, 18 ; evacuated, 19. 

Wilson, J. H., Bvt.Maj.-Gen.,U. S. A., 
in command of cavalry, MUitair 
Division of the Mississippi, with 
Thomas in Tennessee, 191 ; his 
force, 240 ; Forrest defeated by, at 
Fruiklin, 194 ; his raids in 1864, in 
Alabama and Georspa, 260 ; 90. 

Wilson, W. P., CoL, U. S. V., on Han- 
cock's staff, 57. 

Winchester, Va., in Grant's 1865 plans 
for Sheridan, 259. 

Windmill Point, James River, 2d 
Corps crossed at, Ma^ 14, 1864, 14. 

Wirt, W., Attomey-deneral, a Vir- 
ginian, 166. 

Wisconsin, maintained its regimental 
organizations through the war, 265. 

Wise, H. A., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., his 
brigade at Petersburg, June, 1864, 

Wofford, W. T., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., 
his brigade not present at Chicka- 
mauga, 228 note. 

Wood, T. J., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., in 
command of Ist division, 21st Corps, 
his position Sept. 20, at battle of 
Chiokamaugra, 226 ; victim of unfor- 
tunate message, t6. ; ordered by 
Thomas to his extreme left, 227 ; 
his withdrawal left the gyi for 
Hood, ib.; his losses from Hood's 
assault, 1*6.; formed new line with 
Brannan and Van Cleve, to resist 
Longstreet, 228 ; censured for obey- 

ing order, 229; the' propriety of 
Thomas' order to him Questioned, 
280; in command of 8a division, 
4th Corps, his forces participated in 
the capture of Orchard Knob, Nov. 
23, 18&, 184; in assault and capture 
of Missionary Ridge, Nov. 25, 237 ; 
his share of victory at Chattanooga, 

Wool, J. E., Maj.-Gen., U. S. A., 
Thomas at Buena Vista mentioned 
by, 169. 

Worth, W. J., Bvt. Maj.-Gen.,U.S. A., 
Thomas mentioned by, in his report, 
Seminole War, 168. 

Wright, H. G., Maj.-Gen., U. S. A., 
in command of 6th Corps, 90; the 
defences before Petersburg^captured 
by, Ajwil 2, 1865, t6. ; at Farmville, 
night of April 7, 94; in pursuit 
of Lee, Apru, 8, t6. ; his services in 
ending the war, 67. 

Wright, M. J., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., in 
battle of MusiiHiary Ridge, 238, note 

1, note 2. 

Tallobusha River, Miss., avulable in 
an advance on Vicksburg, 28 ; 29. 

Tazoo River, Miss., available for pro- 
tection in advance on Vicksburg, 28. 

YeDow Tavern, Va., engagements at, 
1864, 157 ; Stuart mortally wounded 
at, 162. 

York River, Va., promise of the Navy 
Dept. that the Merrimac should not 
enter, 101, 102 ; McOellan's depend- 
ence on, for communication with 
Fort Monroe, 105; his reason for 
taking it as a line of action, 116. 

Yorktown, Va., Thomas' birthplace 
near, 165; McClellan's plan for 
naval co-operation in reduction of, 
101 ; his ignorance concerning, 102 ; 
vessels not promised to attack, t&., 
103, 104, 105, 106, 110; mentioned, 
112, 115. 

Young's Point, La., Grant's uncertain^ 
ties at, 81. 

Yuma, Fort, see Fort Yuma. 

Zoliooffer, F. K., Brig.-Gen., C. S. A., 
in position before Mill Springs, Dec. 

2, 1861, 213; Thomas' movement 
against, t6. ; in battle of Logan's 
Cross Roads, Jan. 19, 1862, 176- 
177, 191, 204, 205, 206, 211, 214; 
killed, 176, 214. 

Zook, S. K., Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., in 
1st divinon, 2d Corps, 59 ; at Fred- 
ericksburg, 1862, ib. 




Bbbyet Captain EDWABD B. BOBINS. 



Bbxyet Major-Gbnbral CHARLES DEVENS. 



Bhxtr Bbioadisb-Gbnbbal FRANCIS A. WALKER. 


Bbxyet Captain EDWARD B. BOBINS. 




Bbbybt Captain HOWABD STOCKTON: 


Bsbyxt BbioadibbpGbnbral FBANCIS A. WALKEBt 


Bbbybt Captain EDWARD B. BOBINS. 



Bbbybt Captain HOWARD STOCKTON. 

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The namet of Memben who have died are indiaUed If am oKerufc. 


Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. 
Colonel, Fifth MassachoeetU Cavalry. 


Brevet Major-General, U. S. A. 

Lieutenant-Colonel, Twenty-foorth Infantry, U. S. A., 1866-1870. 

Brevet Major-General, U. S. Y. BrigadieMSeneral, U. S. Y. 

Brevet Major, U. S. Y. 
Captain and Assistant Ad jntanMSeneral, U. S. Y. 


First Lieutenant, Second Massachusetts Cavalrj, U. S. Y. Resigned member- 


Brevet Major-General, U. S. Y. Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. 

Professor, U. S. MUlitary Academy, 1871-1893. 

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Brevet Captain, U. S. Y. 

Second Lieutenant, Fifth Massachusetts Battery. 


Government Historian of the Battle of Gettysburg. Died December SS, 1894. 


Captain, Second Massachusetts Infantry, U. S. Y. Died June 98, 1898. 


Brevet Colonel, U. S. Y. 

Captain, Eighteenth Massachusetts Infantry. 



Brevet Major-Gkneral, U. S. Y. 

Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. Died December 17, 1876. 


Major, Twenty-eixth New York Cavalry, U. 8. V. 


Major, Fifth Massachusetts Cavalry, U. S. Y. 

Professor of Physiology, Harvard University. Resigned membershlpw 




First Lieutenant, Third Massachusetts Heavy Artillery, U. 8. Y. 



Lieutenant-Colonel, Forty-fonrth Massachusetts Infantiy, U. 8. Y. 


Captain and Aide-de-Camp, U. 8. Y. 


Brevet Colonel, Captain, Aide-de-Camp, U. 8. Y. Died December 20, 189& 


Assistant Professor of History, Harvard College. 


Captain and Aide-de-Camp, U. 8. Y. 


Brevet Major-General, U. 8. Y. 
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Brevet Colonel, U. 8. Y. 

Major, First Massachusetts Cavalry. Died January 17, 1898. 


Brevet Brigadier-General, U. 8. Y. 
Colonel, Second Massachusetts Cavalry. 



Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. 
Lieutenant-Colonel, First Ifaetachiuetts Caraiiy. 


Major and Assistant Adjatant-G«nefBl, U. S. V. 



Brevet Major-General, U. S. Y. 
Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. 

Attomey-General of the United SUtes ; Justice, Supreme Court of 
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Brevet Colonel, U. S. Y. 

Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. A. 

Captain, U. S. A. Retired. 


First Lieutenant, Fourth Massachusetts CaTiliy, U. S. Y. 


Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. 

Lieutenant-Colonel, Thirty-eixth Massachusetts Infantry. 


Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. Y. 

Major and Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. Y. 


Brevet Colonel, U. S. Y. 
Lieutenant-Colonel, Twenty-fourth Massachusetts Infantry. 



Assistant Paymaster, U. S. N., 1864. 



Lieutenant-Colonel, Second Massachusetts Cavalry, U. S. Y. 

MEMBES8. 825 



Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. Y. 
Major, Second Massachiuetts Inftntiy. 


Brevet Major-General, U. S. Y. 
Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. Died Angnst 80, 1886. 


Major and Judge Advocate, U. S. Y. 

Bojall Professor of Law, Harvard University. 


Colonel, Fiftj.fifth Massachnsetts Infkntry, U. S. Y. 


First Lieutenant Forty-fifth Massachosettt Infantry, U. S. Y. 


Assistant Professor of History, Harvard College. 


Lieutenant-Colonel, Second California Cavalfy, and Aide-de-Camp, U. S. Y. 


Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, U. 8. Y. 
Medical Director, Fourth Army Corps. 


Captain Fifth Biassachnsetts Cavalry, U. S. Y. 


Brevet IJeutenant-Colonel, U. S. Y. 
Major, First Massachusetts Cavalry. 


Colonel, Thirty-third U. S. Colored Troops. 


First Lieutenant, and Assistant Suigeoo, U. S. A. 




BrvDrt lieatMMBtpCokBd, U. & T. 
GsptaiB tad Aid«-d*43Hip, U. 8. T. 


GupCain Fortjr-lovth MiMirliimitN UhMrf, U. & T. 

BrtTct Major, U. & T. 
Cftpteiiif Tint Ohio Light ArtOkrj. 

BrtTctCtpUiii, U. S. v. 
Fint Uontaninf, ThirtMOth Ntw Hmpihirt Ufaatrj. 


Captain, Thirtj-llfth Maaaachoaetti Infantij, U. S. T. 
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Major and Brarat Cokmal, Fifth Now Hampahira Inlutij, U. 8. Y. 
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Colonel and Afsfetant Adjatant43enera], MassachnaetU Volunteer Militia, 
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McLean Profeeaor of Histoiy, Harrard College. 

Brevet Cobnel, U. S. V. 
Captain, Third Biaeeachasetta Batteiy. 


Breret Major, U. S. V. 

Captafai, Twentieth MaaeachnaetU Infiatiy. Died September 24^ 1884. 



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Private, Tliirty-sizth Massachusetts Infantry, U. S. Y. 
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Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. 

Colonel, Twenty-fourth Massachusetts Infantry. 


Private, Twenty-nhith Massachusetts Infantry, U. S. Y. 


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Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. A. 

Captain Corps of Engineers, U. S. A., 1863-1866. 

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Brevet Brigadier-General U. S. Y. 

Lientenant-Colonel, Thirty-ninth BCassachosetts Ihfiatry. 


Captain, Second Massachusetts Infantry, U. S. Y. Died January S8» 187t^. 



First Lieutenant, Thirty-ninth Massachusetts Infantiy, U. 8. Y. 


Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. 

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828 MEMBEB8. 


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Colonel, Fourth Massachnsetts CaTaliy, U. S. V. 




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Captain, First New York Engineers. 

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Breyet Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. 
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Acting Assistant Paymaster, U. S. N., 1862-1865. 



Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. 
Colonel, Fifth Massachusetts Cavaliy. 


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Brevet Bfajor, U. S. Y. 
Captain and Aide-de-Camp, U. S. Y. 

Arnold Professor of Arboriculture, and Director of the Arnold Arboretum, 
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Captain, Independent Kentucky Battery, Field Artillery, U. S. Y. 
Professor of Geology and Dean of the Lawrenoe Scientific School, Harrard 


Breyet Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. 

Lieatenant-Ck>Ionel, Twenty-second MassachoMtts Infantry. 


BreyetMajor, U. S. Y. 

First Lieutenant, Second U. S. Sharpshooters. 


Captain, Fifty-sixth Massachosetta Infantry, U. 8. Y. Died December 11, 1893. 


Brevet Major, U. S. Y. 

Captain, Tenth Massachusetts Battery. Died Angnst 19, 1891. 


Lieutenant, U. S. N. Betired. Besigned membership. 


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Major and Judge Advocate. 


Brevet Brigadier-General, IT. S. Y. 
Major and Assistant AdjutantpGeneraL 


Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. 

Lieutenant-Colonel, Twenty-fourth MassadiOBetts Infantry. 


Brevet Captain, U. S. A. 

First Lieutenant, Ordnance Corps, U. S. A. 

Captain and AddiUonal Aide-de-Camp, U. S. Y. 


Brevet Colonel, U. S. Y. 

lieutenant-Colonel, One Hundredth U. S. Colored Troops. 

830 MEMBEB8. 


Breyet Lieatenant-Colonel, U. S. A. 
Captain, Seventeeth Infantry, U. S. A. 


Professor of Political Economj, Harvard College. Besigned memberBhip. 



Major, First Bhode Island Cavalry, U. S. Y. 


Brevet Major-General, U. S. V* 

Brigadier-General, U. S. V. Died Jannaiy 14, 1888. 


Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. 

Colonel, Sixty-first MassachusetU Infantry. Died June 11, 1887. 


Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. V. 

Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V. 

President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 


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Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. 

Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. Y. 

Captain, Seventeenth and Nineteenth Iniantry, U. S. A., 1868-1870. 

Brevet Captain, U. S. Y. 
First Lieutenant, Fifth Maine Battery. Acting Inspector-General of Artillery. 


Captain Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry, Acting Assistant Inspector-General. 
Died August 28, 1894. 



Lieutenant-Colonel of Artilleryi 0. S. A. 

Chief of Ordnance, Second Corpe, Aimy of Northern Virginia. 

Died September 17, 1889. 


Colonel and Adjutant-General, C. S. A. 


Second Uentenant, first Connecticut Artillery, U. S. V. 
President of Brown University. 

Major-General, U. S. V. 


Captain of Cavalry, U. S. A. 


Captain, Subsistence Department, U. S. A. 

Aide-de-Camp to the Major-General commanding the Army. 


Brevet Brigadier-General, IT. S. V. 
Lieutenant<>>lonel, Thirty-fifth Ohio Infantry. 


Brigadier-General, U. 8. A. 

Brevet Major-General, U. S. V. Brigadier-General, U S V. 


Died August 21, 1878. 


Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V. 



Brevet Major-General, U. S. Y. Brigadler-GenenU, U. 8. Y. 
Governor of the Sute of Maine. 
Formerly President of Bowdoin College. 


Second Lieutenant, Fifth ArtUlery, U. S. A., 1870-1882. 


Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. 
Colonel, Nineteenth Maine Infantiy. 


Major-General, U. S. Y. 

Commandant, Twenty-third Army Corps. 

Brevet Major, U. S. A. 
Captain, Fourth Artillery, U. S. A. 


Major and Judge Advocate, U. S. A. 
In charge of publication of the War Reoorda. 


Brevet Lieutenant<}o1onel, U. S. Y. 
Major, Fifty-third Ohio Infantry. 


Captain, U. S. N. 


Colonel, Thirteenth and Forty-ointh Yirginia Infantry, C S. A. 


Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. 

Lieutenant-Colonel and Aeslstant Adjutant General, U. S. Y. 

First Lieutenant, Sixth Infantry, U. S. A., 1864-1865. 


Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. A. 
CapUin, Fifth Artillery, U. S. A., 1864-1875. 


LientenantFCommander, U. S. N. 

MEMBSB8. 838 


Colonel, Corps of Eogineen, U. S. A. 

Saperintendent of the U« S. Militaiy Academy, West Point, N. T. 


Brigadier-General, U. S. V. 
Captain, Sixteenth Infantry, U. S. A., 1861-1863. 

Governor of the Sute of Wisconsin, £. £. and M. P. of the United States to 
Spain, 1880-188S. 

Brigadier-General, U. S. A. 
Chief of Ordnance Department, U. S. A. 

Breyet Colonel, U. S. V. 
Captain and Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. Y. 

Brevet Major-General, U. S. V. 
Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. 


Captain, U. S. N. 

Assistant Secretary, Navy Department, 1861-1866. Died October 29, 1883. 


Major-General, U. S. Y. * 


Brevet Major-General, U. S. A. 

Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. A. Died Joly 11, 1894. 


Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. 

Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjotant-General, U. S. Y. 


Captain, First Yirginia Cavalry, C. S. A. 


Lientenant^lonel, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A. 

Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. Y. 
Captain and Aide-de-Camp. 


Major, Twenty-ninth Mahie Infantry, U. S. Y. 

884 MEMBEB8. 

Commander, U. S. N. 


Brevet Major-General, U. S. Y. 
Brigadier-General, U. 8. Y. 


Captain, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A^ 1886-1889. 


Brevet Bfajor-General, U. S. Y. 
Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. 


Major-General, U. S. A. Died February 9, 1886. 

Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. 
Colonel Fif^-fifth Massachosetts Infantry. 


First Lieutenant, Fourth ArUllery, U. S. A. 


Major-General, C. S. A. 


Brevet Blajor, U. S. Y. 

Captain, First Massachusetts Cavalry. ^ 


First Lieutenant, Twenty-eecond Infantry, U. S. A. 


Captain, Engineer Corps, C. S. A. 


First Lieutenant, Aide-de-Oamp and Assistant Inspector-General, C. S. A. 


Captain, First Artillery, U. S. A. 

Second Lieutenant Fortieth New Tork Infantry, U. S. Y. 



Brevet Major-General, U. S. A. 

Chief of Engineers, U. S. A. Died December 27, 1888. 


Brevet Major-General, U. S. A. 

Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac 

Brigadier-General, U. S. V. Died Febmary 11, 1889. 


Captain, Seventy-fourth Ohio Yolonteers. Died December 2, 1894. 


Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. 
Colonel, First Maine Veteran VolonteerB. 


Chaplain, Army of Northern Virginia, C S. A. 
Chaplain of the University of Virginia. 


War Department, Washington, D. C. 


Brevet Blajor, U. S. V. 

Captain and Commissary of Subsistence. 


Captain of Cavalry and Aide-de-Camp, Aimy of Northern Virginia, C. S. A. 


Major, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A. 


Lieutenant-General, C. S. A. 


Rear-Admiral, U. S. N. Retired. 

Captain of Artillery, C. S. A. 


Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. V. Assistant Adjutant-General, and Chief 
of Staff, Fourteenth Army Corps. 

836 MSMBES8. 

• iBviN Mcdowell, 

Major-GciMn], U. S. A. Di«d IU7 4, 18». 

Captmin, U. S. N. 


Major-G«oena, C. 8. A. 


Lkateiuuit-Colooel, 0. S. A., Aid»4e-0Mnp to Genenl Robert E. Lee. 


Brevet Ueutenant-Odonel, U. 8. V., CtipUin, U. & Y. Ceptain, U. & A^ 

Aide-de-camp to Major-General George G. Meade. 


Breyet Major-General, U. S. A. 
Quartermaster-General, U. S. A. Died Jannary 9, 180S. 

Major-General, U. S. A. 


Brevet Colonel, U. S. Y. 

Major and Aide-de-Camp, U. S. A. 

Lieutenant-Colonel and Aaaistant Adjatant-Genera], U. S. Y. 


Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. Y. 

First Lieutenant, Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania Inlantry. 


Brevet Major-General, U. 8. Y. 
Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. Died April 86, 1884. 


Captahi and Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. Y. 
Chief of Sta£F of Major-General Ronssean. 


Captain, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A* 


Died September 8, 1894. 

MEMBEB8. 337 


Brevet Major-General, U. S. A. 
Colonel, Corps of EogineerB, U. 8. A. 


Commodore, U. S. N. Died Jane 10, 1879. 


Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. A. 

Major and AesiBtant Adjutant-Genenl, U. 8. A. Died June 2, 1878. 


Brevet LieatenantpCoIonel, U. 8. Y. 
Captain, Fifth Pennsylvania Cavaliy. 


Captain, Thirtj-ninth Infantry, U. & A. 

Captain, Ordnance Corps, U. 8. A. 


Major and Assistant AdjotantrGeneral, Frenoh's Diviaion, Stewart's Corps, 
Army of the Tennessee, C. 8* A. 


Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. A. 

Major, Third Artillery, U. 8. A. In charge of publication of the War Rec- 
ords. Died March 6, 1887. 


Lieutenant, Fourth Ohio Cavalry, U. a V 

Captain, U. 8. N. 


Brevet Brigadier-General, U. 8. V. 
Colonel, Seventh U. 8. Colored Troops. 


General, U. 8. A. Died February 14, 1891. 

338 MEMBEB8. 


Brevet Major-Genenl, U. S. A. 

Bfajor-General U. S. Y. 

Major, €k>rpe of Eogineers, U. S. A. BetlrwL 


ABsittAnt Secretory of the Navy, 1890-1888. 


Captain, Second Maseachusetts Infantrjr, U. S. Y* 


Brevet Major-General, U. S. A. 
Adjutant-General, U.S.A. Died May 10, 1888. 


lieutenant-Colonel and Aasistant Adjutant-General, C. 8. A. 


Rear-Admiral, U. S. N. ' 


Brevet Major-General, U. S. A. Died August 8, 1889. 


Brevet Major- General, U. S. A. and U. S. Y. 

Brigadier-General, U. S. Y. 

Preeident of the College of the City of New Toik. 


Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp, C. S. A. 


Captoin and Assistant Adjntont and Inspector^jreneral, C. S. A. 
Aide-de-Camp to General D. R. Jones and General M. D. Cone. 


Brevet Major-General, U. S. A. 

Major-General, U. S. Y. 

LieutenantrCobnel, Thirty-fifth Infantry, U. S. A. 


Captoin, Fifth Artillery, U. S. A. Retired. 

Second Lieutenant, Second New Tork Heavy Artillery, U. S. Y. 


SiHOE its organization, reports and papers have been read before tbe Society on 
the following subjects: — 


1. Pattbb80H*s Campaign, 1861. 


S. Campaion against Jackson, fbom Winchbsteb to Port Bepubuc, 




1. General HcClellan*s Plans for the Campaign of 1862, and the 

Alleged Interference of the Government with them. 
JOHH 0. fiOPBS, Sbq. 

2. The Siege of Torktown. 


3. The Period which elapsed between the Fall of Torktown and 

THE Seven-Days' Battles. 


4. The Seven-Dats' Battles: — 


Gaines's Mill, 

White Oak Swamp, 

Glendale. ^ 


5. The Seven-Days' Battles: — 

Malvern Hill. 


6. Comments on the Peninsular Campaign. 



1. Thx Charaotxb or GBincRAL Hallbck's Militaby ADMunsTBAnoH ni 


Oebebal Pope. 





3. Second Pabt, to the Twentt-eiohth of August. 

JOHN 0. B0PE8, Sbq. 

4. Thibd Pabt, to the Ebd of the Cakpaiob. 

JOHN 0. BOPBS, Sbq. 

5. The Twexttt-sbybbth Day of August. 


6. The Battle of CnAiiTiLLYy Fibst of Septembeb. 

7. The Numbebs of the Two Abmies. 

TUb paper was f nmlahed to, but was not read at a maaWng of the Sooietj. 

8. The Case of Fitz-Johv Pobteb. 


9. The Conduct of Gbnbbal McClbllan at Albxandbia in August, 1862; 

the Natube and Extent of his Command; and his Alleged Neg- 
lect TO SuppoBT the Abmt OF Genebal Popb. 


10. The Same Subject. 


11. Review of the Repobts of Colonel Haven and Genebal Weld. 

colomb. theodore lyman. 


12. Thb Corduot of Gbnb&als HoOlkllan akd Hallbck nr August, 1889, 



18. Thb Hbabuto vk thb Casb of Fitz-Johh Portbb. 
JOHN 0. BOFBS, Sbq. 


1. Thb Battlb of Ahtibtam. 


S. Thb Allboed Delay ur the Concbetbatioh of the Abxt of the 
Potomac, ahd the Reasons why the Seooitd Gobps did hot bntbb 
UTTO the Action eablibr on the Day of the Battle. 
Mami JOHN 0. OBAT. 

8. Strategy of the Campaign of Shabfsbubg, ob Antietam. 


4. The Militaby Situation in Northern Virginia, from the First to 

Fourteenth Days op November. 


5. Fredericksburg, December Elbyenth to Fi f t een t h. 



1. The Disaster to the Eleventh Ck>RP8 at Chancbllorsyille. 

S. The Fight of Sunday, BiIay Third, at Chancellorsyillx. 

8. Sedgwick at Chancellob8Villb« 


4. The Battle of Chancbllorsyille. 


Ihete pspan, bj Oolonel Dodge, havt bttn flubodted in Us book **Thb Oinnn||n d CbMwtl- 





6. Thb Battlb op Chan CBLLOB8YILLK. (Contributed, but not read bj) 



L Thb Numbebs of thb Two Abmibs at thb Battlb of OBrmBUBa. 


2. Thb Caubbs of thb Cohfbdbratb Failubb at Gbtttbbubo. 
i obxelt 8. cubtib. 

8. Thb Stbatbot of thb Obtttsbubo Campaign. 


4. Thb Lbft Attaok (Ewbll's) at Obtttsbubo. 

Oaraiv EDWABD N. WUilTlEB. 

5. Pickbtt'b Chabgb. • 


6. Thb Bboulabs at Gbtttsbvro. 


7. Thb Battlb op Bribtob Station. 

Tliii paper mm embodied hi General Walker*! ** Hirtory d the Seoood Army Corpe.** 


h Grant's Campaign in Yibginia, 1864. 

JOHN C. B0PE8, Sbq. 

3. Thb Usblessnbss of thb Maps furnishbd to thb Staff of thb Army 
OF THB Potomac previous to thb Campaign of liAT, 1864. 
golohbl theodobb ltman. 

8. Notbs and Beoollbctions of thb opening of the Campaign of 1864. 


i. The Battle of the Wilderness. 



6. Thx Sams Subject. 


8. Trb Sixth Cobps nr the WiLDEBinEss. 


7. The Opebatioks of the Abmt or the Potomac fbom the Seybhth 

TO THE Eleventh Days of Mat. 


8. The Capture of the Salient at Spottstlyania, Mat Twelfth. 


9. Rbyiew of Gensbal Bablow*8 Papeb. 


10. The Captube of the Salient. 


IL The Opebationb of the Abmt of the Potomac fbom Mat Thir- 
teenth to June Second, inclusive. 


12. The Battle of Cold Habbob, June Fibst to Thibd. 

18. Same Subject. 

JOHN C. B0FE8, BiQ. 

14. The Opebations of the Abmt of the Potomac, fbom the Fifth to 

Fifteenth of June. 


15. The Failube to take Petebsbubo on the Fifteenth Day of June. 

colomil theodobb ltmah. 

18. The Same Subject. 


17. The Failube to take Petebsbubo on the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, 

AND Eighteenth Days of June. 


18. The Opebations at Bebmuda Hundbed on the Sixteenth, Seven- 

teenth, AND Eighteenth Days of June. 



19. The PsTKBaBURO "Murm, July Twehtt-Nihth. 

90. Trb Same Subject. 


91. The Movekeht against Petersburg. 


99. The Operatioes agaiest the Weldon Railroad ur August. 

98. The Siege of Petersburg after the Capture op the Weldon Rail- 


94. The Battle op Ream's Station, August Twentt-Fibst-Twentt-Sizth. 


95. The Expedition to the Botdton Plank Road in October. 


96. The Operations op the Cavalry op the Army of the Potomac in 



97. The Talley (Sheridan's) Campaign op 1864 

lAomrAiiT L. W. Y. KSBRfOK. 

98. The Battle op Cedar Creek, October Nineteenth. 


99. The Same Subject. 



1. The Numbers op General Lee's Army at the Opening of the Cam- 

paign, March Twbnty-Fipth. 

colobb. theodobe lyman. 

2. Operations op the Fipth Corps, BfARCH Twenty-Seventh to Thirty- 

First : Qrayrlly Run. 



8. Thx Battlb op Fits Fobkb, Apbil First. 


4. Thb Same Subject. 


5. The Storming of the Lines of Petersburg, bt the Sixth Corps, 

April Second. 


6. The Battle of Sailor's Creek, April Sixth. 


7. A Narrative of the Appomattox Campaign. 


8. Grant's Campaigns against Lee. 



General Grant as a Soldier. 


The Militart Character and Services of Major-Gbnebal Wdifield 

Scott Hancock. 

oihbul fbancis a waueeb. 

Hajor-General Andrew Atkinson Humphreys. 

General Rawlins. 


General George H. Thomas. 


General Thomas in the Record. 



Thb Battle of Shiloh, April Sixth-Seventh, 1868. 
colohbl henbt stonb. 


Thx Sams Subject. 


Thb Kxhtuckt Campaign of 1862. 

Captaiv N. B. BHALEB. 

The Operatiohb or Gbkeral Buell in Tennessee and Kentuckt in 



The Chickaxauoa CAMpAiaN, September Ninetebnth-Tw en t uc th, 



The Last Battles before Chattanooga, Ootobeb-Noyembeb, 1863. 

An HisTORiCAii Sketch of the BfiLiTART Operations round Chat- 
tanooga, Tennessee, September Twenty-Second to November 
Twenty-Seventh, 1863. 



The Opening of the Atlanta Campaign, May Sixth, 1864. 

From the Oostenaula to the Chattahoochee. 

The Siege and Capture of Atlanta, July Ninth, September Eighth, 



A Review of the Atlanta Campaign, May Fourth to September 
Eighth, 1864. 

Battle of Franklin, November Thirtieth, 1864. 

Battle of Nashville, December Fiftbenth-Sixtbentr, 1864. 

General Sherman's plans after the Fall of Savannah. 





MiUTABT Operations aoaihst Chablbstok, 1803. 

Opbbatiobs against Chablbston, 1868. 


Opbeatiobs or Nobth Caboliba, 1861-1862. 


Trb Dbpabtmbht of Nobth Cabolina undbb Gebbbal Fostbb, 1862-63. 


Thx Cuicbbblabd. 

Oaraiv THOMAS 0. SSLFRIDOB, U. & N. 

Thx Assault on Pobt Hudson, Mat, 1863. 


Trb Red Biyxb Expedition, Maboh-BIat, 1864. 

Trb Battlb of Mobile Bat, August Foubth, 1864. 
oommodom fozhall a. parker, u. s. n. 

The Captube of Mobile, Maboh Twentt-Sbventh to Apbil Ninth, 


MoDEBN Battles. 


A wrff .T.MR Y- 


Catalbt in Tibginia dubing trb Wab of the Bebbluon. 
oolobb. benjamin w. orowninbhield. 

Aspects of the Medical Sebyice in the Abmus of the U. S. 
DUBING the Bebbluon. 


The Nobthebn Tolunteeb. 



Thb Nbobo A8 a Soldikb nr the Was of ths Rkbeluov. 

Thx Natal Bbioadx. 

J JOHN a 80LKT, U. & H. 


Mt Captivitt. 


FsBaoNAL Rbmixiscbhobs op ths Wak, 1861-1880. 

OoasKunmk W. 6. 8ALrONSTALL» U. & H. 

RBOOLLBcnom of Staff avd Rkoimbiital Lifb. 

BRITAIN, 1812-1814, 

The Fight betwebm thb Java amd the Gonstitdtiov. 
Itmnmujn JOHN 0, BOLET, U. B. N. 

Thb CHBaAPBAKB abd thb Shabmob. 

JjmarnotAjn-QQmuMDMtL J. 6. EATON, U. B. N. 


Thb Battlb of Bubba Ti8ta. 


The Battles of Cobtberas abd Cherububoo. 

The Battles of Holibo del Ret abd Chapultefeo. 


The Fibst Campaiob of Bobapabtb ib Italy, 1796. 

The Campaigb of Waterloo: The Qroucht Cobtboybbst. 

\ M