The great problems of British statesmanship

THE GREAT PROBLEMS
OF BRITISH STATESMANSHIP

THE GREAT PROBLEMS

^ OF

BRITISH STATESMANSHIP

BY

J. ELLIS BARKER

▲T7TH0B or ' HODSa^T QBRlLlXr,' < QBBAT AXD aBSATBB BBTTAIN
'THl TOtTITOATIOyS OF OBBMAJIT,' BTO.

([ /;/: ivOi'(NiA

LONDON

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.

1917

lAli tightt reserved]

k\°

^

^>'\iJ

PREFACE

The World War has created a number of most important
problems which statesmanship will have to solve during
the coming Peace Congress and afterwards. These may
conveniently be divided into three classes : Problems of
foreign policy, such as the delimitation of the national
frontiers and the creation of an international organisation
devised to ensure a durable peace ; economic problems,
such as the re-creation of national prosperity among the
war-stricken nations, the management and the repayment
of the gigantic war debt, the improvement of the relations
between capital and labour, &c. ; problems of internal organi-
sation, such as the reform of democratic government which,
during the War, in many instances has proved disappoint-
ing because of its amateurishness, dilatoriness, improvidence,
and inefi&ciency. All these problems will be considered in
the following pages.

Nothing is permanent in this world except change. The
great problems of statesmanship can be given only a
temporary solution. States and nations rise, grow, stand
still, decline, decay, and ultimately disappear. The civilisa-
tion and even the languages of the world empires of antiquity
have vanished. Caesar, when conquering the savage inhabi-
tants of Britain who were dressed in skins and who orna-
mented themselves by painting their bodies with woad,
would have laughed had a native Druid told him that the
Koman Empire would fall, and that the British savages
would not only conquer but civilise the larger part of the
world, and create an Empire far greater than the Eoman,

37398

MV

vi Preface

for he looked upon the native Briton as we do upon African
negroes. The process of national agglomeration and
dissolution will continue to the end of time. If we look
into history we find that it takes centuries to settle per-
manently the territorial conflicts which are apt to arise
among neighbour States. It took centuries to determine
definitively the differences between Britain and France, to
solve the question whether Britain should or should not
possess territory on the south shore of the English Channel.
For centuries France and Germany have fought for the
possession of the borderland, for Alsace-Lorraine, for the
control of Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland, and for all
we know they may continue for centuries to fight for these
objects. For centuries Kussia and Germany have fought
and intrigued for the possession or the control of Poland,
the Balkan Peninsula, and Constantinople, and their struggle
also may be renewed. Between certain nations there exists
htigation in perpetuity in respect of certain objects which
are valued by either. The Peace Congress cannot bring
about a permanent settlement of these great questions,
for they will continue to trouble mankind. It can at best
bring about a lasting one. It can give to the world a long
period, perhaps a century, of peace.

The roots of nations lie deep in the past. We can
understand the interests and the policy of States and gauge
the character, attitude, and probable conduct of nations
only by studying their history and development, their
experiences, and their traditions. We can neither fully
understand, nor hope successfully to solve, the great inter-
national questions, the great international quarrels, unless
we are acquainted with their historical genesis and with
the views and actions of the claimants in the past. Hence,
in considering the great problems of diplomacy, due weight
should be given not only to their present aspect and future
possibilities, but also to their historic development. This
has been done in the following pages, I have given in
them a vast number of secret treaties, despatches, and other

Preface vii

documents of the highest importance which will not be
found elsewhere.

Economic policy should be based not upon theory, but
upon experience ; not upon fancy, but upon fact. In con-
sidering the problem of developing the prosperity of Great
Britain and of the Empire, of paying off the war debt, and
of improving the lot of the workers, I have availed myself
of the lessong afforded by England's war with Eepublican and
Napoleonic France and by the American Civil War. Both
were proportionately about as costly as the present struggle
seems hkely to prove. Both were followed not by industrial
collapse and financial ruin, as was behoved by many at the
time, but by unprecedented economic development and
boundless prosperity. I have endeavoured to show that
the Great War, far from impoverishing Great Britain and
the British Empire, should greatly enrich them, provided
a wise economic poHcy in accordance with historical ex-
perience is pursued. The exhaustive and authoritative
figures given in support of that contention will be new
to most readers and should prove of the highest interest
to financiers, business men, and others.

Government, rightly considered, is not a pastime, but
a business. Like every business, it has its rules, which may
be learned from those who have been most successful in
the science and art of directing pubhc affairs. National
organisation and administration, like economic policy,
should be based, not upon abstract principles, which may
prove inapplicable, nor upon historic precedents, which
may be misleading, but upon universal experience. In
considering the inelBSciency of democratic government
as revealed by the War and the necessary reform of Great
Britain's national organisation, I have availed myself of
the views of the greatest statesmen and administrators
and the soundest thinkers of all times from Aristotle,
Isocrates, Thucydides, and Poly bins to Cardinal Kichelieu,
the elder Pitt, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Alexander
Hamilton, and Bismarck. The numerous quotations given

viii Preface

should prove of value to all who desire to be acquainted with
the views of the greatest experts in national organisation.

The present volume, like my other books, is perhaps
rather a storehouse of facts than an expression of my own
views. I hope that, nevertheless, it will prove thoroughly
readable. It may be of value to statesmen, politicians,
publicists, and the general public because of the important
documentary and statistical evidence which it contains.

The contents of the book are, for the convenience of
readers, briefly summed up in its first chapter, * The Peace
Congress and After.' All the other chapters have previously
appeared in The Nineteenth Century and After. They
attracted a great deal of attention at the time., and many
of them were reprinted in extenso not only on the Continent,
in the British Dominions, and in the United States, but even
in Japan and China. I have been urged to collect and to
republish them in book form, and I am allowed to do so by
the courtesy of Mr. Skilbeck, the editor of The Nineteenth
Century review, to whom I herewith give my best thanks.
The original articles have been revised, brought up to
date, and organically connected, and considerable additions
have been made to them.

Although it may seem immodest, I would in conclusion
say a few words as to my Hterary activity in the past.
Ever since 1900, when I began my career as a pubhcist, I
have warned this country of the danger of a war with
Germany. In all my books and in innumerable articles
printed in the leading reviews and elsewhere I have urged
unceasingly the necessity of diplomatic, military, and
economic preparation, the necessity of abandoning the
policy of * splendid isolation ' for one of alliances with
France, Eussia, Japan, and the United States, the necessity
of strengthening, developing, and organising the Empire
towards the day of trial, the necessity of strengthening
the fleet, the necessity of creating a national army, the
necessity of strengthening the British industries, and espe-
cially the iron and steel industry, by a pohcy of dehberate

Preface ix

development, by a protective tariff, the necessity of vastly
increasing agricultural production by peasant proprietor-
ship and various other means, the necessity of developing
the neglected railway and canal systems of Great Britain,
the desirabihty of an Anglo-American reunion, &c. I have
co-operated "with Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, Lord Eoberts,
and other prominent men. It is a certain satisfaction that
all the reforms which so many have urged in vain before
the War seem hkely to be carried out in consequence of it.
The ways of Providence are wonderful. Iron is tried by
fire and nations by war. A new and a greater Britain is
arising. The War may not only make the British Empire
a reality, but bring about an Anglo-American reunion.
The War, far from being an unmitigated evil, may prove
a blessing to the British race.

Many eminent people have faciHtated my task by their
assistance, their advice, and their encouragement. I would
herewith most cordially thank them for their kindness and
support.

J. ELLIS BARKER.

London, June 1917.

CONTENTS

"I.
II.
III.

IV,

V.

VI.

vu.

VIII.

IX.

X.

XI.

The Peace Congress and Aftee

The Peoblem of Constantinople

The Problem of Asla-tio Turkey

The Problem of Austrla.-Hungary

The Problem of Poland .

The German Emperor's Position

Britain's War Finance and Economic Future

Britain's Coming Industiual Supremacy .

Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

How America became a Nation in Arms

An Anglo-American Reunion .

Analytical Index

PAGB

1

14
56
105
146
190
216
257
293
349
398
433

THE GREAT PROBLEMS

OF

BRITISH STATESMANSHIP

CHAPTER I

THE PEACE CONGRESS AND AFTER

The Allies arrayed against Germany are practically agreed
on the broad principles which will guide their action at the
Peace Congress. The differences between them are rather
apparent than real. The young Russian democracy has
demanded a settlement * without annexations and without
indemnities.' That seems a purely negative programme.
The other Powers have declared themselves in favour of
a positive policy, which likewise has been summed up in
two words. They have demanded a peace which is based
on the principle of ' Restitution and Reparation.* Rightly
considered, the two demands are identical. Men who have
thrown over a Government which they detest, who have
suddenly freed themselves from heavy shackles, naturally
rejoice, and are apt to form in their joy vast plans which
spring rather from the heart than from the head. Time is
needed to awaken such men to the sober realities of this
workaday world. The heady wine of democracy has had
the same effect in Russia which it had in France at the
end of the eighteenth century. The Russian declarations

1 B

2 The Peace Congress and After

remind one of Article VI of the French Revolutionary
Constitution :

La nation française renonce à entreprendre aucune
guerre dans la vue de faire des conquêtes, et n'emploiera
jamais ses forces contre la liberté d'aucun peuple.

This ideal resolution was soon forgotten. The French
revolutionaries embarked upon wars of conquest, the
solemn declarations notwithstanding. It is to be expected
that the Russian people will before long awake to the
realities of the situation.

All the democracies are fighting for the principle of
liberty, for the right of nationalities to govern themselves
in their own way. All are strongly opposed to the principle
of absolutism, of monarchical tyranny, of race subjection
and of race exploitation. They are fighting for the freedom
of the oppressed nationalities. They are pledged to free
the exploited races and to enable them to organise and to
govern themselves in their own way. By setting free the
subject nationalities, the non-German parts of Germany will
be enabled to rule themselves and to choose their allegiance.
The territory of Germany will be sHghtly reduced. By
setting free the subject nationaHties the Austrian and
Turkish Empires, where the governing race is in a small
minority, will be dissolved into their component parts.
However, their dissolution cannot honestly be described as
partition and be compared with the partitions of Poland.
No democrat can wish to thrust back the Armenians,
Czechs, Poles, &c., under their ancient yoke.

The word * war- indemnity ' has during the last few decades
changed its meaning. Originally a war-indemnity signified
adequate compensation for the cost of an unjust war which
was exacted from the aggressor. It was a bill for damages
wantonly done. It was unobjectionable from the highest
moral point of view. Since the time when powerful military
States have robbed the defeated nations, whom they had
wantonly attacked, not only of territory upon which they

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 3

had no claim on racial grounds, but have in addition exacted
from them outrageous sums of money merely in order to
make their aggression both territorially and financially
profitable to themselves, the word * indemnity ' has become
synonymous with spoliation, and spoHation is detestable.
The word ' indemnity ' has acquired a bad odour. The Allies,
Belgium, Serbia, France, Kussia, and the rest, are certainly
entitled to claim from the Central Powers compensation for
their gigantic losses caused by a war which was forced upon
them, but they will scarcely make a profit out of such
indenmities as they may obtain. The damage done is
too large. Germany and her Allies are not rich enough ever
to repay their victims. They can pay no more than a tithe
of the damage, and they may have to rebuild with their
own labour what they have destroyed.

The territorial settlement at the Peace Congress will be
.effected in accordance with the principle of nationalities.
Racial and State limits will be made to coincide wherever
possible. However, there may be certain exceptions to the
rule. Sometimes various nationalities are inextricably mixed
in certain districts, and must be disentangled. Besides,
the smaller States created on a racial basis must be secured
against an attack from their warlike, powerful, and possibly
revengeful neighbours, and they must be able to make a
living ; they must be economically independent. Lastly,
those nations which caused the War, and which may be
inclined to renew it, must give guarantees for their good
behaviour in the future. They cannot be allowed to dominate
their smaller neighbours strategically or economically, and
may have to lose certain vantage points. Poland and
Serbia must have adequate outlets to the sea. To avoid
racial injustice, men of one race who, for pressing strategical
or economic reasons may have to be included in another
nation, should be given the option of rejoining their brothers
across the frontier and be entitled to adequate compensation
for disturbance.

There are a number of instances where friction may arise

4 The Peace Congress and After

between several nations through conflicting claims to
territory based on racial, strategical, or economic grounds.
Where there is a conflict of claims, a settlement should as
a rule be effected on the principle that the weaker claim must
give way to the stronger. This should, of course, not mean
that the smaller Power should be sacrificed to the greater,
for the settlement should be based not on might, but on
justice. Differences may, for instance, arise in arranging
the claims of Italy and Serbia to certain portions of the
Adriatic, the future of Macedonia may become a matter of
contention, &c. Most of these questions are not of first-rate
importance, and they should easily be settled, although they
may call for unlimited patience on the part of the assembled
statesmen.

Among the greatest and most difi&cult problems of the
Peace Congress are the problem of Constantinople, the
problem of Asia Minor, the problem of Austria-Hungary,
the problem of Poland, and the position of the German
Empire and its Emperor. All these have been considered
in the present volume.

Shortly after the revolution the representatives of the
Eussian democracy have waived Kussia's historic claim to
the possession of Constantinople on the principle of * No
Annexation and No Indemnities.' A young democracy is
guided rather by the heart than by the head. It follows
easily the generous impulses of the moment. By the time
the Peace Congress assembles, the Russian people may have
changed their representatives, and may have changed their
mind as to Constantinople. It seems doubtful whether the
desire of acquiring Constantinople was merely based upon
the ambition of Russia's rulers. Russia's most valuable
territories lie in the south, for the bleak north produces
little. The Black Sea and the mighty rivers leading to it
constitute Russia's principal outlet. The most precious
part of Russia's foreign trade is the Black Sea trade. It is
bound to increase indefinitely in value. Rather for economic
than for strategical reasons Russia requires free access from

GfTeat Problems of British Statesmanship 5

the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Russia's historic
desire for the acquisition of Constantinople was principally
due to the fact that she found it intolerable that the bulk
of her trade should be at the mercy of the Turks. At the
beginning of the War an overwhelming majority of the
Duma demanded for these reasons the acquisition of the
Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. The Russian people may
earher or later change their mind with regard to Constanti-
nople. That should be remembered by statesmen and
publicists before and during the Congress. Besides, it is
difficult to find a satisfactory alternative solution of the
problem of Constantinople. As the Narrows are of great
strategical value, they cannot safely be entrusted to a small
Power, for various Great Powers would endeavour to obtain
influence over it. The old intrigues for the possession of
Constantinople would recommence. There remains the
possibility of neutralising that precious site, of entrusting
the guardianship to some international body. Neutrals,
unless they are powerful, may suddenly be attacked by their
warlike neighbours, and international guarantees do not
always act as a deterrent. That has been shown in the
case of Belgium. International control, on the other hand,
is apt to lead to international intrigue, as was seen in the
case of Egypt and of Macedonia, and international occu-
pation is apt to lead to war, as is proved by the example
of Schleswig-Holstein. As Russia has on strategical and
economic grounds the strongest claims to Constantinople,
she will probably, on consideration, alter her mind, and the
Powers will be wise not to take as permanent Russia's
recent declarations, which some day she may regret. It would
be a calamity and a danger to the peace of the world if some
years hence the Russian people should say that the nations
took an unfair advantage of Russia's momentary mood
and deprived them of Constantinople, for which they have
fought and bled for centuries, at a time when they could have
had it for the asking.

The Constantinople position connects the Black Sea and

6 The Peace Congress and After

the Mediterranean on the one hand and Europe and Asia
on the other. It is strategically very important, but it is
far less important than Asia Minor. Asia Minor connects,
separates, and dominates the three oldest and most populated
Continents. It lies across the most direct route from Central
Europe to Calcutta, Bombay, Canton, and Peking. Asia
Minor, being surrounded by gigantic mountain ranges, vast
deserts, and the sea, is a natural fortress of the greatest
strength, whence Egypt, North Africa, the Caucasus, the
Kussian Black Sea Provinces, the Mediterranean countries,
and Persia and India may easily be attacked. Asia Minor
is at present sparsely populated, but is able to nourish a vast
number of people. Its wealth in minerals of all kinds may
be utihsed for military purposes. Its central position, its
impregnable natural frontiers, and its vast agricultural and
mineral potentialities might become dangerous to the peace
of the world. A strong, military Power occupying the
country might convert it into a gigantic fortress and arsenal,
and provide it with numerous railways leading towards
Egypt, the Caucasus, and Persia. A strong military Power
controlling Asia Minor might strive for the domination of the
three old continents, and its power for mischief would be
enhanced by the fact that it would dominate the two issues
of the Ked Sea, and that it could threaten from its central
position not only the Suez Canal route, but also the trade of
the Mediterranean and the sea-route to India by way of the
Cape. I have very fully considered the problem of Asia
Minor from every point of view and have made proposals
for its solution.

Austria-Hungary has about 55,000,000 inhabitants.
The Austro- Germans and the Magyars number together
only about 20,000,000, and they bitterly hate each other.
By freeing the 35,000,000 Slavs, Koumanians, and Itahans
from Austrian misrule the State of the Habsburgs would
be reduced to 20,000,000 people. Germany has controlled
the policy of Vienna in the past by making use of the
differences between the Austrians and Magyars. She has

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 7

ruled Austria with the assistance of Budapest. The loss
of her Slavs and Latins would increase Austria's dependence
upon the goodwill of Berlin and of Budapest. Austria
and Hungary might be forced to attach themselves to the
German Empire. As a consequence of the War, Germany
might be far stronger than she has been hitherto. The
AlHes have pledged themselves to set free the subject
nationalities of the Dual Monarchy. The Habsburgs, who
at one time were supreme in Germany, and who gave to the
Hohenzollems the Brandenburg Electorate and raised them
to royal rank, have suffered grievously at the hands of their
former vassals. Brandenburg- Prussia has grown great at
Austria's cost. Silesia was conquered by Prussia in 1740,
and the South German States were detached from Austria
in 1866. Austria has been Germany's tool in bringing about
the Great War. The senile Francis Joseph scarcely knew
what he was doing. The Princes of the proud house of
Habsburg would no doubt Hke to recover their indepen-
dence. They have no love for Prussia and the Hohen-
zollems. It seems not inconceivable that as a result of the
War, Austria should recover her independence, that the
Habsburg Monarchy should obtain a new lease of hfe. If
Austria should conclude a separate peace, she would be en-
titled to compensation for the inevitable loss of her Slavonic
and Latin citizens, and she might be given Silesia and South
Germany. By receiving these, Vienna would once more
rule over 30,000,000 Germans, and the 7,000,000 or 8,000,000
Magyars would no longer prove unmanageable. A balance
of power would be created within Germany. Vienna might
once more dominate Berlin, and if Austria should follow a
liberal, tolerant, and generous poUcy she might once more
attract to herself the smaller nations of South-Eastem Europe
and overshadow Prusso- Germany. A similar situation
might arise if the War should be fought to the bitter end,
and if the South German States should revolt against
Prussia's rule and attach themselves to Austria.

It remains to be seen whether Austria-Hungary and Ger-

8 The Peace Congress and After

many will patiently bear with their rulers if the War which
they began should lead to disaster and general ruin.
Possibly both the German and the Austrian peoples may
revolt, but it seems more Hkely that the Germans will hold
their Sovereign to account, for the young Austrian Emperor
was not responsible for the War. Germany has a written
Constitution according to which the sovereignty of the
Empire lies not in the hands of the Emperor, but in those
of all the allied States and their rulers. The Emperor is
merely the hereditary president of the federation. Accord-
ing to the Constitution, he is not entitled to declare war
unless Germany has actually been attacked. For a war of
aggression the consent of the Federal Council, which officially
represents all the German States, is required. In embarking
upon a war of aggression William the Second has violated
the Constitution. He is not only morally but also legally
responsible if disaster should overtake his country. A
German defeat may lead either to the severe limitation of
the Emperor's power or to the conversion of Germany into
a republic. We may experience in Germany a revolution
accompanied by civil war. A special chapter has been
devoted to the Emperor's position.

The problem of Poland is particularly important because
of the vast change which the resuscitation of that State
would efïect on the map of Europe. An independent
Polish State of 20,000,000 inhabitants might serve as a
bufïer-State between Russia and Germany. The lands of
the Poles possess vast agricultural, industrial, and mineral
possibilities. The PoHsh territories are more densely popu-
lated than is France. Within the Polish zone he the largest
coalfields on the Continent of Europe. Lodz is the Eussian
Manchester. As Brazil is the land of the Amazon and the
United States that of the Mississippi, so Poland is the country
of the Vistula. On that mighty river lie the two Polish
capitals, Warsaw and Cracow, and innumerable important
to^Tis. Poland may become politically and economically
the Belgium of Eastern Europe, it may become a most

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 9

important industrial country, but this is possible only if
she has a sufficient outlet for her manufactures and can
obtain cheaply the necessary imported raw materials, such
as cotton. Poland's natural harbour is Danzig, on the
mouth of the Vistula. That town may become the Polish
Hamburg. If Danzig should once more become Polish,
East Prussia would be separated from Brandenburg by a
broad belt of Pohsh territory, as it was in olden times. How-
ever, if the question should arise whether Brandenburg
should be separated from the province of East Prussia, or
whether Poland should be separated from the sea by Danzig
remaining in Prussian hands, it is probable that the weaker
claim would have to give way to the stronger. Agricultural
Eastern Prussia, though separated from Brandenburg, would
have access to the sea. If Danzig remained in Germany's
hands Poland would remain cut off from the sea, and the
State might languish, decline, and decay.

Many Poles desire that their country should obtain
complete independence. It seems doubtful whether their
wishes are wise. In the course of time Poland has grown
into Eussia and Russia into Poland. Her vast coalfields
make Poland a natural home of the manufacturing indus-
tries. A completely independent Poland might find both
the Russian and the German frontiers closed against her
productions. Hence it may be best for the Poles to aim
at a modified form of independence which would guarantee
to them Russia's miUtary protection in case of need and
which would leave open to the Pohsh industries the vast
and most valuable Russian markets.

The territorial claims of the various nations cannot be
permanently settled at the Peace Congress, for history knows
no permanent settlements. The settlement made may come
up for revision. Unsatisfactory settlements often lead to
war. Therefore the representatives of the Powers should
avoid not only injustice, but even the appearance of in-
justice and of unfairness. The settlement made at the Con-
gress of Vienna should serve them as a warning example.

10 The Peace Congress and After

It led to a series of wars in the course of which the Treaty
of Vienna was torn to pieces.

The great international questions [mentioned will not
be definitively solved at the Peace Congress. They will
occupy the nations during many ensuing decades. How-
ever, during the period immediately following the peace the
problems of foreign policy will probably be overshadowed
by economic problems and by questions of domestic policy.
The gigantic War has created huge national debts and has
destroyed incalculable values. The British War debt
seems likely to amount to at least £5,000,000,000. It seems
questionable whether the British people will receive any
compensation from their opponents, for the devastated
countries, Belgium, Serbia, Poland, Koumania, France, and
Russia, have the first claim upon German indemnities. It
may also happen that Britain's alhes will not be able to
repay the bulk of the sums advanced to them. The ex-
perience of the Napoleonic wars, when England financed
the Alhes, may repeat itself.

British taxation has been trebled in the course of the
War, and trebled taxation may continue indefinitely. The
vast war expenditures incurred may, however, not ruin
Great Britain. I have shown in two lengthy chapters
devoted to the economic problems that the War, far from
impoverishing the country, may greatly enrich it. The
twenty years' war against RepubHcan and Napoleonic
France created a gigantic burden of debt. It led to the
trebling of taxation. The vast increase in taxation stimu-
lated the latent energies of the nation. I have shown that
Great Britain's industrial prosperity arose during and after
the Great War, and was caused chiefly by the vastly increased
demands of the tax-collector. I have further shown by
most interesting and important statistics that the American
workers engaged in manufacturing, mining, transport, agri-
culture, &c., produce per head about three times as much
as their EngHsh colleagues because they employ better and
three times as powerful machinery and possess a better

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 11

economic organisation, &c. It follows that Great Britain
can treble her yearly output, her yearly income, and her
national wealth by Americanising her industries. The
Américanisation of the British industries has already begun.
I have shown in the chapter, * Britain's Coming Industrial
Supremacy,' that in the course of the War production per
man has approximately doubled. Production per man can
once more be doubled, and more than doubled, to the great
benefit of the workers and of the nation as a whole. In-
creased production must be based upon improved machinery,
and the better machinery is, the smaller is the exertion of
the worker.

America's vast industrial advance, as that of Great
Britain, was caused by a ruinously expensive war. The
vastly increased demands of the tax-collector consequent
upon the Civil War led not only to the greatest improve-
ment in industrial production, but also to the rapid opening
up of the West. The British Dominions have advanced
comparatively slowly in wealth and population because life
has been too easy for the inhabitants. Men work hard
only if compelled. The Dominions would be forced to open
up their gigantic domain with the greatest energy should
they decide to take over an adequate part of the financial
burden imposed by the War. The War has been fought
for the benefit of future generations. It is therefore only
fair that posterity should help in bearing the burden.

The War Debt should become an imperial obligation.
Part of the undeveloped resources of the Empire should be
assigned to its service and repayment. Part should be paid
by the present generation. The Americans combine with
their census of population a census of production and wealth.
By taking regularly a similar census of production and of
wealth throughout the British Empire, the abihty of every
part of the Empire to assist in bearing the financial burden
caused by the War might most easily and most fairly be
ascertained. Every five or ten years the financial burden
might be redistributed in accordance with the changes in

12 The Peace Congress and After

wealth and income which have taken place in the mean-
time.

High taxation in countries of boundless latent resources
is a vast advantage. It is as necessary to a State which
desires to advance quickly as adequate ballast is to a ship.
The Empire is four times as large as the United States.
Nevertheless the United States are far wealthier than is
the gigantic British Empire. The wealth of the United
States is greater than that of the British Empire, not because
the former has larger natural resources, but because the
boundless resources of the British Empire have either
been insufficiently developed or have been completely
neglected. If the War should bring about the dehberate and
energetic development of the Empire, and if the Imperial
domain should become as highly developed as the territory
of the great KepubHc, the wealth of the British Empire
should no longer be inferior to that of the United States,
but should be four times as great.

Among the internal problems of Great Britain which
will come up for settlement after the War, the reorganisation
of the body pohtic will probably occupy the foremost place.
It has been treated fully in the chapter, ' Democracy and
the Iron Broom of War.' Democracy has displayed its
faihngs during the struggle. The great problem consists
in combining liberty and popular government, which means
control by the many, with efficiency in administration and
execution. The jointly responsible Cabinet has proved
improvident, dilatory, and extremely inefficient. The reform
introduced by Mr. Lloyd George is only a temporary make-
shift. The question will have to be settled whether the
national executive should be in the hands of a single man
or of an inexpert committee. The views of the greatest
statesmen of all times favour decidedly a one-man executive.
The Americans, when establishing their republic, after
mature consideration and deliberation, chose a one-man
executive. I beheve Great Britain will be wise in following
America's example. The reform could most easily be

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 13

effected by making the Prime Minister solely responsible
for governmental action, by making the heads of the
great departments the Prime Minister's subordinates. The
American Constitution proved its excellence in time of
danger at the outbreak of the Civil War. In the chapter,
* How America became a Nation in Arms,' I have shown
how a one-man executive saved the United States from
disaster. During the Civil War the United States raised
a gigantic army and defeated in the course of four years
the rebellious South. That war destroyed nearly a million
lives and cost two-thirds of America's national wealth.
America's Civil War should be to the democracies an in-
spiration and a warning against unpreparedness. Had the
United States possessed an army of 30,000 men, the war
would either not have broken out or it would have been ended
in a few weeks. Democracy has to pay dearly for its short-
sightedness and neglect. It is inspiring that an unmiHtary,
unruly, unorganised, and peaceful people should have been
able to raise a gigantic and most efficient army. Successful
improvisation should, however, not blind fus to the danger
of neglecting miHtary! preparation in time of peace. The
United States in 1861 and England in 1914 were able to
create colossal armies ^ because they were given sufficient
time to organise themselves for war. The greatest latent
resources and the highest patriotism would prove unavailing
if in a future war a strong military Power should succeed
in seizing at its outbreak the indispensable centres (of
resistance, such as the seats of the iron and steel industry.

From the British point of view the most important
results of the War are two. The War should lead to the
unification of the Empire, and it may possibly lead to the
reunion of the British race. I have advocated for many
years an Anglo-American reunion, and I have summed up
the arguments in favour of such a reunion in the concluding
chapter of this book.

CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM OP CONSTANTINOPLE ^

As foresight is the essence of statesmanship, it seems oppor-
tune to consider the greatest and most difficult problems
with which the future Peace Conference will have to
deal. This is all the more necessary as some of the questions
which will have to be settled may cause differences among
the AlUes, unless the nations and their statesmen have
previously arrived at some understanding as to the great
Hnes on which the settlement should take place. Such a
prehminary agreement had unfortunately not been effected
when, a hundred years ago, at the Congress of Vienna,
the entire map of Europe was recast. Owing to the re-
sulting differences and the return of Napoleon from Elba,
the diplomats hastily concluded a treaty which left the
greatest and most dangerous problems badly solved or
not solved at all. Guided by the principle of legitimacy,
they considered the claims of the rulers, but disregarded
those of the nations. At the Congress of Vienna, Germany
and Italy were cut up, notwithstanding the protests of
the German and Italian people. It was only natural that
the work done in haste and under pressure by the
diplomats at Vienna led to a series of avoidable wars, and
especially to the Wars of Nationahty of 1859, 1866, and
1870-71, by which a united Italy and a united Germany
were evolved.

The nations and their rulers seem fairly agreed as to

* The Nineteenth Century and After, March 1915.
14

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 15

the broad principles on which the map of Europe should
be reconstructed at a future Congress. In the first place,
the desires of the various nationahties to be united under a
Government of their own are to be fulfilled. In the second
place, territorial rearrangement will be made which will
strengthen the peaceful nations, which will make unlikely
a war of revenge, and which will secure the maintenance
of peace for a very long time. In the third place, the
nations which have fought and suffered are to receive
suitable compensation, while those which have merely
looked on will presumably derive httle or no advantage
from the general recasting of frontiers. Apparently there
are only four questions which might lead to serious dis-
agreement among the Alhes. These are the question of
Austria-Hungary, the question of Poland, the question
of Constantinople, and the question of Asia Minor. All
four questions are closely interwoven.

Kussia is a Power which is viewed by many Englishmen
with a good deal of distrust. Many people in this country-
fear that when Germany and Austria-Hungary have been
defeated, Kussia will become too powerful. They ask,
Where will be the counterpoise to Kussia if Germany should
suffer great territorial losses, and if the Dual Monarchy
should no longer form a single State, but should become
dissolved into its component parts in accordance with the
principle of nationality ? To many Englishmen who have
watched with concern the constant and apparently irre-
sistible progress of Russia in Asia, that country is a
dangerous, aggressive Power. They remember that many
Russian generals and writers have recommended an
expedition against India ; that Czar Paul, during his
short and tragic reign, actually prepared such a venture ;
that his successor, Alexander the First, also contemplated
an attack on India by land ; that more than once Russia
has been at war with Great Britain. However, most of
those who are thinking of Russia's aggressiveness and her
former hostility to England are probably unaware that

16 The Problem of Constantinople

her hostility was not without cause ; that England, fearing
that Eussia might become too powerful, endeavoured, at
the bidding of her enemies, to prevent Eussia's expansion,
especially in the direction of Constantinople and of the
Far East ; that at the time of the Crimean War, not Eussia,
but England, was apparently in the wrong ; that Lord
Beaconsfield prevented Eussia reaping the fruit of her
victory after her last war with Turkey ; that, angered by
England's attitude and incited by Bismarck and his
successors, Eussia not unnaturally endeavoured to revenge
herself upon this country in the only part where it seemed
vulnerable.

The problems of Poland, of Austria-Hungary, and of
Asia Minor, which will be very fully considered in other
chapters, are perhaps less dangerous to the maintenance
of good relations among the AUies than is that of Con-
stantinople. The question of Constantinople has for many
decades been considered the most dangerous problem in
Europe. Constantinople is supposed to be a point of
vital interest not only to Eussia, but to Austria-Hungary,
France, Italy, and this country as well. As the Turks
have plunged into the War and have attacked the Allies,
they have forfeited England's good will and traditional
protection. The settlement of the problem of Constan-
tinople can no longer be shelved. Therefore, it seems
best to consider it frankly, dispassionately, and without
prejudice.

We have been taught in the past that * the possession
of Constantinople will decide the fate of the world,' that
* Constantinople dominates the world,' and that * Eussia's
possession of that position would be fatal to Great Britain's
position in India.' In these circumstances it seems necessary
not only to consider the character of Eussia's foreign poHcy
and of the Eussian people, but to study the problem of
Constantinople in the light of history and with special
reference to Eussia's future.

Since the time of Napoleon the question of Constanti-

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 17

nople has loomed particularly large, and probably unduly
large, on the poHtical horizon. Apparently the strategical
importance of Constantinople is at present generally over-
estimated, because the last few generations, instead of
studying critically and without prejudice the real impor-
tance of that town, have been mesmerised by the pronounce-
ments of the great Corsican warrior, and have repeated
his celebrated saying that Constantinople is ' the key of
the world,' although it is nothing of the kind.

According to many popular historians, Eussia has
* always ' tried to wrest India fiom England and to make
herself mistress of the world by seizing Constantinople.
From some of the most serious historical books, and even
from dry diplomatic documents, we learn that Eussia's
pohcy of seizing with Constantinople the dominion of the
world was initiated by her greatest ruler, Peter the Great,
who recommended that poHcy to his successors in his
celebrated poHtical testament. History, as Napoleon has
told us, is a fable convenue. Napoleon himself has skilfully
created a fable convenue around the town of Constantinople,
and most of the mistaken views as to Eussia's world-con-
quering aims have been engendered by that great genius
who has mystified England during a whole century, and
who has been responsible for a century of misunderstandings
between England and Eussia. It seems therefore timely
and necessary to consider Eussia's actions in the direction
of Constantinople and of India by means of the most
authoritative documents existing, the vast majority of
which are not given in English books. They will be new
to most British readers, and they may help in destroying
a century-old legend which has served Napoleon's purpose
of sowing enmity between Eussia and this country.

The poHtical testament of Peter the Great, which plays
so great a part in historic and diplomatic Hterature, has,
as far as I know, not been translated into EngHsh. There
are several versions of that document. The following pas-
sages, which are taken from the combined versions given

G

18 The Problem of Constantinople

by Sokolnicki and Le sur, are those which should be of the
greatest interest to English readers :

Austria should be induced to assist in driving the Turks
out of Europe. Under that pretext a standing army should
be maintained and shipyards be estabhshed on the shores of
the Black Sea. Constantly progressing, the forces should
advance towards Constantinople.

A strict aUiance should be concluded with England. . . .
Predominance in the Baltic and in the Black Sea should be
aimed at. That is the most important point. On it depends
the rapid success of the plan.

My successors should become convinced of the truth that
the trade with India is the world trade, and that he who
possesses that trade is in truth the master of Europe. Con-
sequently no opportunity for stirring up war with Persia
and hastening its decay should be lost. Kussia should
penetrate to the Persian Gulf and endeavour to re-establish
the ancient trade with the East.

The influence of rehgion upon the disunited and Greek
dissenters dwelling in Hungary, Turkey, and Southern
Poland should be made use of. They should be won over.
Kussia should become their protector and obtain spiritual
supremacy over them. . . .

Soon after opportunities will become precious. Every-
thing should be prepared in secret for the great coup. In
the deepest secrecy and the greatest circumspection the
court of Versailles and then that of Vienna should be
approached with the object of sharing with them the
domination of the world.

In the following paragraphs the author recommends
that Kussia should bring about a world-war ostensibly
regarding Turkey, that she should set all the other Great
Powers by the ears, and while they are engaged in inter-
necine struggles seize Constantinople, make war upon all
her opponents, subdue them, and make herself supreme
throughout the world.

Peter the Great died in 1725. He greatly enlarged
the Kussian frontiers, organised, modernised, and Euro-

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 19

peanised the country, and fought hard to give it an outlet
on the Swedish Baltic, where he created Petrograd. His
successors, guided by Catherine the Second, endeavoured
with equal energy to give Eussia a second outlet to the
sea .in the south, at Turkey's cost, and apparently they
carried out to the letter the recommendations contained
in the pohtical testament of Peter the Great. Prophecies
are usually correct if they are made after the event. The
famous pohtical testament was apparently written, not
in Peter the Great's hfetime, but a century after, when
Russia had succeeded in acquiring the shores of ihe Black
Sea and had become the leader of the Slav nations belonging
to the Greek Church. Peter the Great's pohtical testament
was first published in a book, * De la Pohtique et des Progrès
de la Puissance Russe,' written by Lesur in 1811, at a time
when Napoleon had resolved upon a war with Russia.
It was pubhshed to influence European, and especially
Enghsh, opinion against that country. According to
Berkholz (' Napoleon I, Auteur du Testament de Pierre
le Grand '), Napoleon himself was the author. The abrupt
telegraphic style of the composition indeed greatly resembles
that of its putative author. The best informed now
generally consider the will of Peter the Great to be a forgery.
Bismarck, who was on the most intimate terms with Czar
Alexander the Second, described it as * apocryphal ' in
the fifth chapter of his * Memoirs.' The value of Peter
the Great's will as a document reveahng the traditional
policy and traditions of Russia is nil.

The desire of Peter the Great's successors to conquer
the Turkish territory to the south of Russia, and to acquire
for the country an outlet on the Black Sea, was not un-
natural, for at a time when transport by land was almost
a physical impossibihty in Russia the country could be
opened up and developed only by means of her splendid
natural waterways and of seaports. As Russia's most
fruitful territories are in the south, access to the Black
Sea was for her development far more important than an

20 The Problem of Constantinople

opening on the Baltic. Besides, to the deeply religious
Eussians a war with the Turks was, up to the most recent
times, a Holy War, a kind of crusade. The Empress
Catherine succeeded in conquering the shores of the Black
Sea, but failed in conquering Constantinople, which she
desired to take. With this object in view she proposed
the partition of Turkey to Austria in the time of Maria
Theresa and of Joseph the Second. According to her
historian Castera, she urged the Minister of France to
advise his Government that France should join Kussia
for the purpose of partitioning the Turkish Empire. As
a reward she offered Egypt to France, the conquest of
which she believed to be easy.

Catherine's offer of Egypt to France is significant, and
should be carefully noted. For centuries France, guided
by a sure instinct of territorial values, had been hankering
after the possession of Egypt, seeing in that country a
door to the lands of the Far East and one of the most
important strategical positions in the world. The great
historian Sorel wrote in * Bonaparte et Hoche en 1797 '
that the possession of Egypt was * le rêve qui, depuis les
croissades, hante les imaginations françaises.'

France hungered after Egypt. Her thinkers had
planned the construction of the Suez Canal a century
before de Lesseps. After the outbreak of the Kevolution
her historic ambition seemed likely to be fulfilled. The
French Kepubhc was at war with England and Eussia.
England might be attacked in India by way of Egypt,
and Egypt might, at the same time, be made a base of
operations for an attack upon Eussia in the Black Sea in
conjunction with Turkey. While England and Eussia
were thus being attacked a revolution should be engineered
in Ireland to complete England's discomfiture. On the
23rd Germinal of the year VI— that is, on April 12, 1798—
the Directoire appointed the youthful General Bonaparte
commander of the Armée d'Orient, and ordered him to take
Egypt, to cut the Suez Canal, and to secure to the French

CTi\t sA^(a.C<JU ^

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 21

Bepublic the free and exclusive possession of the Ked Sea.
The aim and object of that expedition, and of the greater
plan of operations of which it was to be a part, is clearly
and fully disclosed in a lengthy memorandum on the foreign
situation, written by Talleyrand, who at the time was the
French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and placed by him
before the Directoire on July 10, 1798. We read in that
most valuable and most interesting document :

Si Bonaparte s'étabht en Egypte, quand il aura dirigé
une part de ses forces contre les Anglais dans l'Inde, qui
empêchera que la flotte française, pénétrant dans la Mer
Noire et s'unissant à celle des Turcs, aille, pour consoHder
cette puissance de l'occupation de l'Egypte, l'aider à recon-
quérir la Crimée qui est pour elle d'un bien autre intérêt
que cette région Hvrée depuis des siècles aux révoltes des
beys ? Il n'y aura pas toujours dans la Méditerranée une
nombreuse flotte anglaise. Attaqués dans l'Inde, menacés
sur leurs côtes, frappés au cœur de leur puissance par
l'insurrection de l'Irlande, dont les progrès peuvent d'un
moment à l'autre désorganiser leur armée navale, ils doivent
finir par abandonner la station qu'ils auront étabhe au fond
de la Méditerranée, et dès lors pour que nous soyons bien
reçus. La destruction de Cherson et de Sébastopol serait à
la fois la plus juste vengeance de l'acharnement insensé
des Eusses, et le meilleur moyen de négociation avec les
Turcs pour en obtenir tout ce qui pourrait consohder notre
établissement en Afrique. . . .

L'expédition de Bonaparte, s'il met pied en Egypte,
assure la destruction de la puissance britannique dans l'Inde.

Déjà Malte est en notre pouvoir ; ce succès miraculeux
serait seul un coup terrible pour le commerce de l'Angleterre,
et quand notre armement n'obtiendrait pas un autre fruit,
celui-là serait suffisant. Mais des attentes encore plus
sensibles sont réservées à cette nation, Hvrée à tous les
déchirements intérieurs qu'elle a si longtemps entretenus
chez nous. L'insurrection de l'Irlande, cimentée déjà par
le sang de quelques victimes célèbres, paraît faire des progrès
remarquables. C'est dans cette contrée que doivent aboutir
maintenant tous nos efforts. Des armes, des munitions, des

22 The Problem of Constantinople

hommes hâtons-nous de les y porter, rendons à l'Angleterre
les maux qu'elle nous a faits. Qu'une Képublique s'élève à
côté d'elle pour son instruction ou pour son châtiment. . . .
Si nous sommes bientôt en mesure de faire ce que j'ai
indiqué en parlant de la Kussie, au moins d'en annoncer
l'intention, je ne doute pas que la Porte ne sente le prix
de ce service et n'associe ses forces aux nôtres pour repousser
la Eussie loin des bords de la Mer Noire.

The war programme of the French Directoire against
England, which included an attack on Egypt, an expedition
against India, the support of Turkey, the raising of Ireland
in rebeUion, and war upon British commerce, bears a curious
resemblance to the comprehensive and world-wide war plans
of modern Germany.

Napoleon seized the Government of France and became
the heir of the grandiose world-embracing policy of the
Eepublic. He took up the plan which was designed to
destroy simultaneously the power of England and Kussia
and to make France all-powerful throughout the world.
Catherine the Second, the great enemy of the French Kevolu-
tion, had died in 1796, and had been succeeded by the
weak, eccentric, violent, and scarcely sane Czar Paul the
First. During the first years of his reign he also was hostile
to revolutionary France and had made war upon that
country, but in 1800 he quarrelled with England. Napoleon
at once utiHsed the opportunity and persuaded him to
attack England in Asia in conjunction with France. In
O'Meara's book, * Napoleon on St. Helena,' we read that
Napoleon described to his Irish surgeon the invasion planned
in the time of Paul the First as follows :

If Paul had lived you would have lost India before now.
An agreement was made between Paul and myself to invade
it. I furnished the plan. I was to have sent thirty thousand
good troops. He was to send a similar number of the best
Kussian soldiers and forty thousand Cossacks. I was to
subscribe ten milHons for the purchase of camels and other
requisites for crossing the desert. The King of Prussia was

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 23

to have been applied to by both of us to grant a passage for
my troops through his dominions, which would have been
immediately granted. I had at the same time made a
demand to the King of Persia for a passage through his
country, which would also have been granted, although the
negotiations were not entirely concluded, but w^ould have
succeeded, as the Persians were desirous of profiting by it
themselves. My troops were to have gone to Warsaw, to
be joined by the Kussians and Cossacks, and to have marched
from thence to the Caspian Sea, w^here they would have
either embarked or have proceeded by land, according to
circumstances. I was beforehand with you in sending an
Ambassador to Persia to make interest there. Since that
time your ministers have been imbeciles enough to allow
the Kussians to get four provinces, which increase their
territories beyond the mountains. The first year of war
that you will have with the Kussians they will take India
from you.

It will be noticed that Napoleon did not suggest to Kussia
an advance upon India by way of Constantinople, but by
way of the Caspian Sea, by a route similar to that which
she would follow at the present time, when an expedition
against India would be carried by the railways running
from the Caspian Sea and the Aral Sea towards the north-
west frontier of India. That is w^orth bearing in mind
if we wûsh to inquire whether Kussia's occupation of Con-
stantinople would threaten India.

Paul the First was assassinated in 1801 before he could
embark upon his fantastic expedition, and was succeeded
by his eldest son, Alexander the First. Bom in 1777,
Alexander came to the throne as a youth of twenty-four.
He had been educated by the Swiss philosopher Laharpe
in accordance with the principles of Kousseau. The great
PoHsh statesman, Prince Adam Czartoryski, an intimate
friend of his youth and of his maturer age, drew the follow-
ing portrait of Alexander in his * Memoirs ' :

Young, candid, inoffensive, thinking only of philan-
thropy and liberalism, passionately desirous of doing good.

24 The Problem of Constantinople

but often incapable of distinguishing it from evil, he had
seen with equal aversion the wars of Catherine and the
despotic folUes of Paul, and when he ascended the throne
he cast aside all the ideas of avidity, astuteness, and grasp-
ing ambition which were the soul of the old Eussian
pohcy. Peter's vast projects were ignored for a time, and
Alexander devoted himself entirely to internal reforms,
with the serious intention of making his Eussian and other
subjects as happy as they could be in their present condi-
tion. Later on he was carried away, almost against his
will, into the natural current of Eussian pohcy, but at first
he held entirely aloof from it, and this is the reason why
he was not really popular in Eussia.

Alexander was a good man and a great idealist. His
dearest wish was to free the serfs and to make the people
happy and prosperous. General Savary, Napoleon's tempo-
rary Ambassador in Eussia, reported to him on Novem-
ber 4, 1807, the following words of the Czar : * Je veux
sortir la nation de cet état de barbarie. Je dis même
plus, si la civilisation était assez avancée, j'abolirais cet
esclavage, dût-il m'en coûter la tête.* Alexander the First,
like the recent occupant of the throne, Nicholas the Second,
was a warm-hearted ideahst, a lover of mankind, and a
friend of peace, anxious to elevate Eussia and to introduce
the necessary reforms. However, Alexander the First, like
Nicholas the Second, was forced into a great war against
his will.

In a number of campaigns Napoleon had subdued the
Continent, and the French longed for peace. Still Napoleon
desired to carry out the great policy of the Directoire, to
destroy the power of England and Eussia and make France
supreme in the world. But as long as the Continent was
ready to rise against the French, Napoleon could not safely
enter upon a lengthy campaign in far-away Eussia. He
feared Eussia as an opponent as long as Europe was un-
wilHng to bear his yoke. An aUiance with Eussia would
have been invaluable to him. By securing Eussia's support

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 25

he could hope to hold Prussia and Austria in awe and to
attack, or at least to threaten, England in India. Eussia's
support could best be secured by promising to her explicitly,
or at least implicitly, the possession of Constantinople
and by making her beHeve that she was not interested in
the fate of the other European States, that their enslave-
ment by Napoleon was no concern of hers. In December
1805, while he was at war with Kussia, Napoleon significantly
said to Prince Dolgoruki, the Czar's aide-de-camp, who had
been sent to him, according to the Prince's report of the
23rd of that month, pubhshed by Tatistchelf :

Que veut -on de moi ? Pourquoi l'empereur Alexandre
me fait-il la guerre ? Que lui faut-il ? Il n'a qu'à étendre
les frontières de la Kussie aux dépens de ses voisins, des
Turcs surtout. Sa querelle avec la France tomberait alors
d'elle-même. ... La Eussie doit suivre une tout autre
politique et ne se préoccuper que de ses propres intérêts.

While, in vague words, Napoleon premised to Alexander
the First the possession of Turkey, he endeavoured to
raise the Turks against the Eussians. On June 20, 1806,
Napoleon dictated, in his characteristic abrupt style, the
following instruction for the guidance of General Sebastiani,
the French Ambassador in Turkey, which will be found in
Driault, ' La Politique Orientale de Napoléon ' ;

1. Inspirer confiance et sécurité à la Porte, la France ne
veut que la fortifier.

2. Triple Alhance de Moi, Porte et Perse contre Eussie

7. Fermer le Bosphore aux Eusses, fermer tous les ports,
rendre à la Porte son empire absolu sur la Moldavie et la
Valachie.

8. Je ne veux point partager ï'Empire de Constantinople,
voulût-on m*en ofeir les trois quarts, je n'en veux point.
Je veux raffermir et consohder ce grand empire et m'en
servir tel quel comme opposition à la Eussie.

In 1806 Napoleon made war upon Prussia. In October
of that year the Prussians were totally defeated at Jena

26 The Problem of Constantinople

and Auerstadt. The Russians came to their aid, and
Napoleon feared a lengthy campaign so far from his base.
On February 7 and 8, 1807, he defeated the Russians at
Eylau. However, the French suffered such fearful losses
that Napoleon's position was seriously endangered. Hence
he urgently desired to make peace with Russia. Relying
upon the youth, the generous enthusiasm, the warm-
heartedness, the lack of suspicion, and the inexperience of
Alexander the First, Napoleon attempted once more to
convert his enemy into a friend and ally and willing tool.
With this object in view he caused articles to be pubHshed
in the papers advocating a reconciHation of Napoleon
and Alexander in the interests of humanity, and recommend-
ing joint action by France and Russia against England,
the enemy of mankind. Napoleon knew how to convey
indirectly to the Czar numerous messages expressing his
sorrow at the fearful and needless slaughter, his desire
for peace, his goodwill for Russia, and his high esteem
for Russia's youthful ruler. Alexander became interested
in Napoleon's suggestions, and at last became infatuated
by him. He had been fascinated by Napoleon's success.
He was keenly aware of the backwardness of Russia.
Desiring to advance his country, he wished to learn from
his great antagonist the art of government and administra-
tion, for in Napoleon he chiefly admired the organiser.
On June 14, 1807, Napoleon severely defeated the Russians
at Friedland, and the Czar, following the advice of his
generals, asked Napoleon for peace. A few days later the
celebrated meeting of the two monarchs in a little pavilion
erected on a raft anchored in the river Niémen took place.
According to Tatistcheff, the Czar's first words to Napoleon
were, ' Sire, je hais les Anglais autant que vous,' and
Napoleon replied, ' En ce cas la paix est faite.'

On the Niémen, and at the prolonged meeting of the
monarchs at Tilsit which followed. Napoleon unceasingly
preached to the Czar the necessity of Franco-Russian
co-operation in the interests of peace, and the necessity

(rreat Problems of British Statesmanship 27

of breaking the naval tyranny of England. He suggested
to Alexander that he should seize Turkey, spoke of the
Turks as barbarians, and proposed that the two monarchs,
after having destroyed the power of England by an attack
upon India, should share between them the dominion of
the world. He urged that they should conclude at the
same time a treaty of peace and a treaty of alHance which
provided for their co-operation throughout the world.
Taking advantage of the Czar's easily aroused enthusiasm
and of his lack of guile, Napoleon dehberately fooled
Alexander the First and tricked him into an alhance with
France by which all the advantages fell to Napoleon. How
the Czar was treated is described as follows in his * Memoirs '
by Talleyrand, who drafted the Treaty of Tilsit :

In the course of the conferences preceding the Treaty of
Tilsit the Emperor Napoleon often spoke to the Czar Alex-
ander of Moldavia and Wallachia as provinces destined
some day to become Russian. Affecting to be carried away
by some irresistible impulse, and to obey the decrees of
Providence, he spoke of the division of European Turkey
as inevitable. He then indicated, as if inspired, the general
basis of the sharing of that empire, a portion of which was
to fall to Austria in order to gratify her pride rather than
her ambition.

A shrewd mind could easily notice the effect produced
upon the mind of Alexander by all those fanciful dreams.
Napoleon watched him attentively and, as soon as he
noticed that the prospects held out allured the Czar's
imagination, he informed Alexander that letters from Paris
necessitated his immediate return and gave orders for the
treaty to be drafted at once.

My instructions on the subject of that treaty were that no
allusion to a partition of the Ottoman Empire should appear
in it, nor even to the future fate of the two provinces of
Wallachia and Moldavia. These instructions were strictly
carried out. Napoleon thus left Tilsit, having made pros-
pective arrangements which could serve him as he pleased
for the accomphshment of his other designs. He had not

28 The Problem of Constantînople

bound himself at all, whereas, by the prospects he held out,
he had allured the Czar Alexander and placed him, in rela-
tion to Turkey, in a doubtful position which might enable
the Cabinet of the Tuileries to bring forth other preten-
sions untouched in the treaty.

According to the Treaty of Tilsit, which was signed
on July 7, 1807, Napoleon and Alexander were to support
one another on land and sea with the whole of their armed
forces. The alHance was defensive and offensive. The
two nations were to act in common in making war and in
concluding peace. Kussia was to act as mediator between
England and France, and to request England to give up
to France and her AUies all her conquests made since 1805.
If England should refuse to submit, Kussia was to make
war upon England. Thus the duties of the Czar under
the Treaty of Alliance were clearly outHned. The corre-
sponding advantages, however, were only vaguely hinted
at. Only the last article, Article 8, treated of Turkey, and
it was worded as follows :

Pareillement, si par une suite dos changements qui
viennent de se faire à Constantinople, la Porte n'acceptait
pas la médiation de la France, ou si, après qu'elle l'aura
acceptée, il arrivait que, dans le délai de trois mois après
l'ouverture des négociations, elles n'eussent pas conduit à
un résultat satisfaisant, la France fera cause commune avec
la Kussie contre la Porte Ottomane, et les deux hautes
parties contractantes s'entendront pour soustraire toutes les
provinces de l'Empire ottoman en Europe, la ville de Con-
stantinople et le province de Komélie exceptées, au joug et
aux vexations des Turcs.

In return for making war upon England, Alexander
the First received merely the promise that in certain
■eventualities France and Kussia would act together against
Turkey, and that in the event of such joint action they
would come to an understanding with a view to freeing
all the European provinces of Turkey from the Turks.
-However, Constantinople and the Province of Kumelia

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 29

were to be reserved, and not to be partitioned by the Allies.
In return for valuable service, Alexander the First received
merely a vague and worthless promise.

As, in numerous conversations, Napoleon had promised
to Alexander all he could desire, and as the Czar impHcitly
beheved in his new friend, he probably did not look too
closely into the wording of the one-sided treaty, and left
Tilsit full of admiration for the Emperor of the French.
Meanwhile Napoleon began a most cynical game with
Alexander. Although the Treaty of Tilsit did not provide
for the partition of Turkey, Napoleon continued using
the partition of Turkey as a bait with which to secure
Eussia's support against England. He went even so far
as to offer her, though only verbally, Constantinople itself.
On November 7, 1807, Count Tolstoi, the Czar's repre-
sentative in France, reported to Alexander that Napoleon
had offered Constantinople to Eussia in the following
words :

II (Napoléon) me dit que lui ne voyait aucun avantage
pour la France au démembrement de l'empire ottoman, qu'il
ne demandait pas mieux que de garantir son intégrité, qu'il
le préférait même. . . . Cependent, que si nous tenions
infiniment à la possession de la Moldavie et de la Valachie,
il s'y prêterait volontiers et qu'il nous offrait le thalweg
du Danube, mais que ce serait à condition qu'il put s'en
dédommager ailleurs.

E consent même à un plus grand partage de l'empire
ottoman s'il pouvait entrer dans les plans de la Eussie. Il
m'autorise à offrir Constantinople, car il m'assure de n'avoir
contracté aucun engagement avec le gouvernement turc,
et de n'avoir aucune vue sur cette capitale. . . . Dans la
troisième supposition qui annoncerait un entier démembre-
ment de la Turquie européenne, il consent à une extension
pour la Eussie jusqu'à Constantinople, cette capitale y
comprise, contre des acquisitions sur lesquelles il ne s'est
point expliqué.

Under unspecified circun^stances Napoleon verbally

30 The Problem of Constantinople

agreed to Russia's occupying Constantinople in return
for equally unspecified compensations for France !

While, on November 7, 1807, Napoleon professed to
be completely indifferent to Turkey's fate, and expressed
his wilHngness to the Russian Ambassador that Russia
should have Constantinople, he sent five days later, on
November 12, instructions to M. de Caulaincourt, the
French Ambassador in Petrograd, in which he frankly
stated that he desired the maintenance of Turkey's integrity,
and that he had put the project of partitioning Turkey
before Alexander solely for the purpose of attaching him
to France with the bonds of hope. In these most important
instructions to Caulaincourt we read :

Cette chute de l'empire ottoman peut être désirée par
le cabinet de Pétersbourgh : on sait qu'elle est inévitable,
mais il n'est point de la politique des deux cours impériales
de l'accélérer ; elles doivent la reculer jusqu'au moment
où le partage de ces vastes débris pourra se faire d'une
manière plus avantageuse pour l'une et pour l'autre et où
elles n'auront pas à craindre qu'une puissance actuellement
leur ennemie s'en approprie, par la possession de l'Egypte
et des îles, les plus riches dépouilles. C'est la plus forte
objection de l'Empereur contre le partage de l'empire
ottoman.

To these instructions Napoleon added hiijaself the
following marginal note emphasising his desire to preserve
the integrity of Turkey :

Ainsi, le véritable désir de l'Empereur dans ce moment
est que l'empire ottoman reste dans son intégrité actuelle,
vivant en paix avec la Russie et la France, ayant pour
limites le thalweg du Danube plus les places que la Turquie
a sur ce fleuve. . . .

The instructions to M. de Caulaincourt then continued
as follows :

Telles sont donc, Monsieur, sur ce point important de
politique, les intentions de l'Empereur. Ce qu'il préférerait

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 31

à tout serait que les Turcs pussent rester en paisible posses-
sion de la Valachie et de la Moldavie. . . .

Et enfin, quoique très éloigné du partage de l'empire
turc et regardant cette mesure comme funeste, il ne veut
pas qu'en vous expliquant avec l'Empereur Alexandre et
son ministre, vous la condamniez d'une manière absolue :
mais il vous prescrit de représenter avec force les motifs qui
doivent en faire reculer l'époque. Cet antique projet de
l'ambition russe est un lien qui peut attacher la Eussie
à la France et, sous ce point de vue, il faut se garder de
décourager entièrement ses espérances.

After informing his Ambassador that the projected
partition of Turkey was nothing but a piece of deception
whereby to secure Alexander's support. Napoleon told
him in the same instructions that the projected Franco-
Russian expedition against India was a sham, and that ho
had put it forward only with the object of frightening the
English into making peace. That most extraordinaiy and
most significant passage runs as follows :

On pourra songer à une expédition dans les Indes ; plus
elle paraît chimérique, plus la tentative qui en serait faite
(et que ne peuvent la France et la Russie ?) épouvanterait
les Anglais. La terreur semée dans les Indes Anglaises
répandrait la confusion à Londres, et certainement quarante
mille Français auxquels la Porte aurait accordé passage par
Constantinople, se joignant à quarante mille Russes venus
par le Caucase, suffiraient pour épouvanter l'Asie et pour
en faire la conquête. C'est dans de pareilles vues que
l'Empereur a laissé l'ambassadeur qu'il avait nommé pour
la Perse se rendre à sa destination.

Napoleon's saying, * The more fantastic an attempt to
attack India will be, the more it will frighten the English,'
is very amusing. There is some reason in his observation.
England is more easily frightened by bogies than by reali-
ties, and one of the bogies which has frightened her most
frequently during many decades is the bogey of Constanti-
nople which Napoleon set up a century ago.

32 The Problem of Constantinople

Being carried away by his enthusiasm and simple
trustfulness, Alexander the First, remembering and often
repeating the words w^hich Napoleon had uttered at Tilsit,
believed that Constantinople was in his grasp. However,
he and his advisers doubted that the joint expedition
against India projected by Napoleon was easy to carry
out. According to Caulaincourt's report of December 31,
1807, Alexander the First and his minister received with
some reserve the French proposals relating to that expedi-
tion. They obviously estimated more correctly the diffi-
culties which such an undertaking would encounter o-wdng
to the vast distances and the wildness of the route. They
did not share the illusions of Paul the First.

The French Ambassador in Eussia was in constant
and intimate relations with Alexander the First, and he
reported his conversations hke an accomphshed shorthand-
writer. According to a conversation with the Czar, which
he communicated to Napoleon on January 21, 1808,
Napoleon himself had admitted at Tilsit the impossibiUty
of striking at India by a march overland. The Ambas-
sador reported :

Alexandre I : L'Empereur (Napoléon) m'en a parlé à
Tilsit. Je suis entré là-dessus en détail avec lui. H m'a
paru convaincu comme moi que c'était impossible.

L'Ambassadeur : Les choses impossibles sont ordinaire-
ment celles qui réussissent le mieux, parce que ce sont celles
auxquelles on s'attend le moins.

Alexandre I : Mais les distances, les subsistances, les
déserts ?

L'Ambassadeur : Les troupes de Votre Majesté qui
sont venues d'Irkoutsk en Autriche ou en Pologne ont fait
plus de chemin qu'il n'y en a des frontières de son empire
dans l'Inde. Quant aux subsistances, le biscuit est si sain
et si portatif qu'on peut en emporter beaucoup avec peu de
transport. Tout n'est pas désert.

Alexandre I : Mais par où pensez-vous nos armées
devraient passer ?

L'Ambassadeur : Il faudrait préalablement des conven-

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 33

tions avec la Perse et la Turquie. L'Armée française,
par exemple, en ferait une avec la Porte, puisque Constanti-
nople est son chemin naturel. Celle de Votre Majesté
passerait par le Caucase, si on n'avait pas les moyens néces-
saires pour lui faire traverser la mer Caspienne.

Alexandre I ; Mon cher général, c'est un bien grand
projet. Mais que de difficultés, pour ne pas dire plus.

While in the time of Paul the First the combined
French and Kussian armies were to march upon India via
Warsaw and the Caspian Sea, Napoleon now proposed that
the French army should march via Constantinople. He
evidently sought for a pretext of occupying and controlling
that town and the Straits, and with them the Eussian Black
Sea. Meanwhile he continued playing with Alexander.
On February 2, 1808, he wrote to his Ambassador in Kussia
that he was on the point of arranging for an expedition
to India, combined with the partition of Turkey, that a
joint army of twenty to twenty-five thousand Kussians,
eight to ten thousand Austrians, and thirty to forty thousand
Frenchmen, should be set in motion towards India ; * que
rien n'est facile comme cette opération ; qu'il est certain
qu'avant que cette armée soit sur l'Euphrate la terreur
sera en Angleterre.' On February 6, 1808, Napoleon told
the Kussian Ambassador, Count Tolstoi, according to
the report of the latter, * Une fois sur l'Euphrate, rien
n'empêche d'arriver aux Indes. Ce n'est pas une raison
pour échouer dans cette entreprise parce qu'Alexandre et
Tamerlan n'y ont pas réussi. Il s'agit de faire mieux
qu'eux.'

While Napoleon was amusing Alexander with vain
hopes and fantastic proposals, the Czar had begun a very
costly war with England in accordance with the stipulations
of the Treaty of Tilsit, Feehng at last that the question of
Turkey was being treated dilatorily and with the greatest
vagueness by Napoleon, he pressed for some more definite
arrangement, and a series of non-official conferences regarding
that country took place between the French Ambassador

84 The Problem of Constantinople

in Eussia and the Eussian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Acting upon his secret instructions given above, Caulain-
court prevaricated and at first refused to consider the
question of Constantinople because that position was stra-
tegically too important to be rashly disposed of. Being
anxious to dispossess the Turks, largely for reasons of
humanity, Alexander then proposed to make Constantinople
a free town. According to Caulaincourt's report of March 1,
1808, the Czar said to the French Ambassador, * Constanti-
nople est un point important, trop loin de vous et que vous
regardez peut-être comme trop important pour nous.
J'ai une idée pour que cela ne fasse pas de difficultés, faisons-
en une espèce de ville hbre.'

The question arose what equivalent could be given
to France if Eussia should take Constantinople. At the
second conference, which took place on March 2, the Eussian
Minister of Foreign Affairs suggested that France should
occupy Egypt, stating, ' La France a toujours désiré l'Egypte.
Sous le règne de l'impératrice Catherine, elle nous avait
fait proposer par l'empereur Joseph II de nous laisser aller
à Constantinople si nous lui laissions prendre l'Egypte.'
The question of Constantinople itself had to be tackled.
On March 4 the French Ambassador, speaking, of course,
without authority, offered Constantinople to Eussia, but
claimed at the same time the Dardanelles for France.
In other words, he suggested that although Eussia might
possibly be allowed to occupy Constantinople, France
ought to dominate that town by the possession of the
Dardanelles ! Not unnaturally, the Czar, who was apprised
of these demands, refused even to consider that suggestion.

In course of time, the real intentions of Napoleon were
revealed to Eussia. The Czar recognised that Napoleon
had fooled him and had used him as a tool. The Alhance
was followed by a breach between the two monarchs, by
Napoleon's defeat in 1812, and by his downfall.

The most important documents quoted in these pages
show conclusively that the Eussian expeditions against

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 35

India prepared or discussed in the time of Napoleon were
inspired not by Paul the First and Alexander the First,
but by the great Corsican, that Alexander desired to ac-
quire Constantinople chiefly owing to Napoleon's incitement,
that the joint Franco-Kussian expedition against India
was sheer and deliberate humbug to frighten the English.
In the words of the great historian Vandal, the author of
the best book on Napoleon and Alexander the First :

The idea of partitioning Turkey was rather a Napoleonic
than a Kussian idea. Napoleon rather intended to make a
demonstration than an attack. He thought that if the
French troops crossed the Bosphorus, Asia would be tremb-
hng, and England's position be shaken to its very founda-
tions ; that in view of the menace she would be wilHng to
make peace with France.

The documents given clearly estabUsh that Napoleon
neither intended to give Constantinople to Kussia, nor to
attack England in India, that on the contrary he wanted
Constantinople for France, and that he attached greater
value to Egypt than to Constantinople. In his instructions
to Caulaincourt, Napoleon confessed that his plans could
be carried out only if he ruled the sea, that a premature
movement on Constantinople would result in England
occupying Egypt, the most valuable part of the Turkish
empire. Napoleon might conceivably have given to Kussia
Constantinople for a time, but he would have done so
only with the object of involving Kussia in trouble with
England. According to Villemain, he said : * J'ai voulu
refouler amicalement la Kussie en Asie ; je lui ai offert
Constantinople.' Commenting on these words, Vandal
tells us that, in danghng the bait of Constantinople before
Kussia, Napoleon merely aimed at involving that country
in a Hfe-and-death struggle with England.

Kather by his threats of attacking India in company
with Kussia overland than by any actual attempt at
carrying out that mad adventure, did Napoleon create

36 The Problem of Constantinople

profound suspicion against Eussia among the English,
and that suspicion has been the cause of a century of Anglo -
Kussian suspicion, friction, and misunderstandings. At
the Congress of Vienna, Lord Castlereagh opposed Eussia's
acquisition of Poland, fearing that that country might
become dangerously strong. Eeplying to the expressions
of the British representative's fears, Alexander sent Lord
Castlereagh, on November 21, 1814, a most remarkable
memorandum — the clumsy translation is that given in the
British Blue Book — ^in which we read :

Justice established, as an immutable rule for all the
transactions between the coalesced States, that the advan-
tages which each of them should be summoned to reap from
the triumph of the common cause should be in proportion
to the perseverance of their efforts and to the magnitude of
the sacrifices.

The necessity for a pohtical balance in its turn prescribed
that there should be given to each State a degree of con-
sistency and of political Conventions in the means wliich
each of them should possess in itself to cause them to be
respected.

By invariably acting in accordance with the two principles
which have been just stated the Emperor resolved to enter
upon the war, to support it alone at its commencement, and
to carry it on by means of a coahtion up to the single point
at which the general pacification of Europe might be based
on the soHd and immovable foundations of the independence
of States and of the sacred rights of nations. The barrier
of the Oder once overstepped, Eussia fought only for her
Allies ; in order to increase the power of Prussia and of
Austria, to deUver Germany, to save France from the frenzy
of a despotism of which she alone bore the entire weight after
her reverses.

If the Emperor had based his policy upon combinations
of a private and exclusive interest when the army of Napo-
leon, collected together, so to speak, at the expense of
Europe, had found its grave in Eussia, His Majesty could
have made peace with France ; and without exposing

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 37

himself to the chances of a war the issue of which was so
much the more uncertain as it depended on the determina-
tion of other Cabinets, without imposing fresh sacrifices
on his people, might have contented himself, on the one
hand, with the security acquired for his Empire ; and, on
the other hand, have acquiesced in the conditions which
Bonaparte, instructed by a sad experience, would have
been eager to propose to him. But the Emperor, in the
magnanimous enterprise to which he had applied himself,
availed himself of the generous enthusiasm of his people
to second the desires of all the nations of Europe. He
fought with disinterested views for a cause with which the
destinies of the human race were connected. Faithful to
his principles. His Majesty has constantly laboured to favour
the interests of the Powers which had raUied round the
common cause, placing his own interests only in the second
rank. He has lavished his resources in order to render
their united efforts prosperous under the firm conviction
that his AlHes, far from finding in a conduct so pure grounds
for complaint, would be grateful to him for having made
all private consideration subordinate to the success of an
enterprise which had the general good for its object.

The Czar spoke truly. He had fought in 1813 and 1814
against Napoleon for purely ideal reasons. After Napoleon's
disastrous defeat in Kussia in 1812 Kussia herself was
secure against another attack from France. Had she
followed a purely selfish poHcy, she would have left the
Western Powers to their fate. While they were weakened
in their struggle against Napoleon the powerful Eussian
army might have secured the most far-reaching advantages
to the country, and it might certainly have taken Constanti-
nople. In 1813 Alexander obviously joined in the war
against Napoleon actuated by the wish of giving at last
a durable peace to Europe. How strongly the Czar was
inspired by ideal and rehgious motives may be seen from
the Holy Alliance Treaty which he drew up in his own
handwriting, and which established that henceforth all
rulers should be guided in their poHcy solely by th, dictates

38 The Problem of Constantinople

of the Christian religion. That little-known document
was worded as follows :

In the name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trviity.

Their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, the King of
Prussia, and the Emperor of Kussia having in consequence
of the great events which have marked the course of the
three last years in Europe, and especially of the blessings
which it has pleased Divine Providence to shower down upon
those States which place their confidence and their hope in it
alone, acquired the intimate conviction of the necessity of
setthng the steps to be observed by the Powers in their
reciprocal relations upon the subhme truths which the
Holy Eehgion of our Saviour teaches :

They solemnly declare that the present Act has no other
object than to publish, in the face of the whole world, their
fixed resolution, both in the administration of their respec-
tive States and in their pohtical relations with every other
Government, to take for their sole guide the precepts of
that Holy Eehgion, namely, the precepts of Justice, Christian
Charity, and Peace, which, far from being apphcable only
to private concerns, must have an immediate influence on
the councils of princes, and guide all their steps as being
the only means of consoHdating human institutions and re-
medying their imperfections. In consequence their Majes-
ties have agreed to the following Articles : —

Article 1. Conformably to the words of the Holy Scrip-
tures, which command all men to consider each other as
brethren, the Three Contracting Monarchs will remain united
by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity, and con-
sidering each other as fellow-countrymen they will, on all
occasions and in all places, lend each other aid and assist-
ance and, regarding themselves towards their subjects and
armies as fathers of famihes, they will lead them, in the
same spirit of fraternity with which they are animated,
to protect Religion, Peace, and Justice.

Article 2. In consequence the sole principle of force,
whether between the said Governments or between their
Subjects, shall be that of doing each other reciprocal service,

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 39

and of testifying by unalterable goodwill the mutual affec-
tion with which they ought to be animated, to consider
themselves all as members of one and the same Christian
nation : the three allied Princes looking on themselves as
merely delegated by Providence to govern three branches
of the one family, namely, Austria, Prussia, and Russia,
thus confessing that the Christian world, of which they and
their people form a part, has in reahty no other Sovereign
than EQm to whom alone power really belongs, because in
Him alone are found all the treasures of love, science, and
infinite wisdom, that is to say, God, our Divine Saviour,
the Word of the Most High, the Word of Life. Their
Majesties consequently recommend to their people, with the
most tender sohcitude, as the sole means of enjoying that
Peace which arises from a good conscience, and which alone
is durable, to strengthen themselves every day more and
more in the principles and exercise of the duties which the
Divine Saviour has taught to mankind.

Article 3. All the Powers who shall choose solemnly to
avow the sacred principles which have dictated the present
Act, and shall acknowledge how important it is for the
happiness of nations, too long agitated, that these truths
should henceforth exercise over the destinies of mankind
all the influence which belongs to them, will be received
with equal ardour and affection into this Holy Alliance.

After the Peace of Vienna an era of reaction began, and
the hostiUty shown by the Governments to the people was
attributed not to Prince Metternich, who was chiefly
responsible for it, but to the Czar and to the Holy Alhance,
which was considered to be an instrument of oppression.
However, the fact that the Holy Alhance was a purely ideal
compact is attested by Prince Metternich himself in his
Memoirs. After describing its genesis, Metternich wrote :

Voilà l'histoire de la Sainte Alliance, qui même dans
l'esprit prévenu de son auteur, ne devait être qu'une mani-
festation morale, tandis qu'aux yeux des autres signataires
de l'acte elle n'avait pas même cette signification ; par
conséquent elle ne mérite aucune des interprétations que

40 The Problem of Constantinople

l'esprit de parti lui a données dans la suite. . . . Ultérieure-
ment il n'a jamais été question, entre les cabinets, de la
* Sainte Alliance,' et jamais il n'aurait pu en être question.
Les partis hostiles aux Souverains ont seuls exploité cet
acte, et s'en servis comme d'une arme pour calomnier les
intentions les plus pures de leurs adversaires. La ' Sainte
Alliance ' n'a pas été fondée pour restreindre les droits des
peuples ni pour favoriser l'absolutisme et la tyrannie sous
n'importe quelle forme. Elle fut uniquement l'expression
des sentiments mystiques de l'Empereur Alexandre et
l'application des principes du Christianisme à la politique.

Metternich described Alexander's hberal and generous
views as * chimerical, revolutionary, and Jacobinic ' in his
letters to the Austrian Emperor, and in his Memoirs and
his correspondence he prided himself that he had succeeded
in regaining the Czar to reaction. Metternich and other
Austrian and German statesmen strove to keep Kussia
backward and weak by recommending a policy of repression
and persecution. Austria and Germany have been largely
responsible for Russian iUiberahsm and Eussian oppression
in the past.

Let us now cast a brief glance at the events which
brought about the Crimean War.

During the first half of the nineteenth century Turkey
was almost continually in a state of the gravest disorder,
and its downfall seemed to be imminent. Alexander the
First had died in 1825, and had been succeeded by Nicholas
the First. BeHeving a catastrophe in Turkey possible,
he appointed, in 1829, a special committee, consisting of
the most eminent statesmen, to consider the problem of
Turkey. According to de Martens, * Recueil des traités
de la Russie,' Count Nesselrode, the Vice -Chancellor of
the Empire, stated before that Committee that the preserva-
tion of Turkey was rather useful than harmful to the true
interests of Russia, that it was in the interest of the country
to have for neighbour a weak State such as Turkey. After
thorough and lengthy discussion, the following resolutions

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 41

were adopted at a sitting presided over by the Czar
himself :

(1) That the advantages of maintaining Turkey in
Europe are greater than the disadvantages ;

(2) That consequently the downfall of Turkey would be
opposed to Eussia*s own interests ;

(3) That therefore it would be prudent to prevent its
fall and to take advantage of the opportunity which might
offer for concluding an honourable peace. However, if the
last hour of Turkey in Europe should have struck, Kussia
would be compelled to take the most energetic measures
in order to prevent the openings leading to the Black Sea
falHng into the hands of another Great Power.

During the period preceding the outbreak of the Crimean
War, Kussia's policy was directed by the principles laid
down in 1829, and the war itself was obviously due to mis-
understandings between England and Eussia, and to the
prevalence of that distrust of Kussia among Enghshmen
which Napoleon had created in the past. Foreseeing the
possibility of Turkey's collapse, the Czar desired to provide
toward such an event in conjunction with England. With
this object in view, he told the British Ambassador on
January 9, 1853 :

The affairs of Turkey are in a very disorganised condi-
tion ; the country itself seems to be falling to pieces ; the
fall will be a great misfortune, and it is very important that
England and Eussia should come to a perfectly good under-
standing upon these affairs and that neither should take
any decisive step.

Tenez ; nous avons sur les bras un homme malade — un
homme gravement malade ; ce sera, je vous le dis franche-
ment, un grand malheur si, un de ces jours, il devait nous
échapper, surtout avant que toutes les dispositions néces-
saires fussent prises. Mais enfin ce n'est point le moment
de vous parler de cela.

Five days later, on January 14, the Czar disclosed his
intentions more clearly to the British Ambassador. Fearing

42 The Problem of Constantinople

that in case of Turkey's downfall England might seize
Constantinople, and desiring to prevent that event in
accordance with the principles laid down by the Committee
of 1829 and given above, he stated :

Maintenant je désire vous parler en ami et en gentleman ;
si nous arrivons à nous entendre sur cette affaire, l'Angleterre
et moi, pour le reste, peu m'importe ; il m'est indifférent
ce que font ou pensent les autres. Usant donc de franchise,
je vous dis nettement, que si l'Angleterre songe à s'établir
un de ces jours à Constantinople, je ne le permettrai pas ;
je ne vous prête point ces intentions, mais il vaut mieux
dans ces occasions parler clairement ; de mon côté, je suis
également disposé de prendre l'engagement de ne pas m'y
étabhr, en propriétaire, il s'entend, car en dépositaire je ne
dis pas ; il pourrait se faire que les circonstances me misent
dans le cas d'occuper Constantinople, si rien ne se trouve
prévu si l'on doit tout laisser aller au hasard.

Commenting upon the Czar's confidential statements,
the Ambassador reported that he was * impressed with the
belief that ... his Majesty is sincerely desirous of acting
in harmony with her Majesty's Government.' In a further
conversation the Czar told the Ambassador on February 21 :

The Turkish Empire is a thing to be tolerated, not to be
reconstituted. As to Egypt, I quite understand the impor-
tance to England of that territory. I can then only see that
if, in the event of a distribution of the Ottoman succession
upon the fall of the Empire, you should take possession of
Egypt, I shall have no objections to offer. I would say the
same thing of Candia ; that island might suit you, and I do
not know why it should not become an English possession.

The intentions of the Czar, though somewhat vaguely
expressed, were perfectly clear. He wished to bring about
a peaceful solution of the Turkish problem in case of Turkey's
downfall. In accordance with the principles laid down
in 1829, he did not desire to see the Dardanelles in the
hands of a first-rate Power, and was unwilhng to see England

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 43

established in Constantinople and dominating the Black
Sea. He was apparently quite willing that Constantinople
and the Straits should be held by some small Power instead
of Turkey, or that the position should be internationalised
in some form or other in accordance with the ideas expressed
by his brother in 1808, so long as he could feel reasonably
secure that no foreign Power would seize the openings
of the Black Sea and attack Eussia in its most vulnerable
quarter. If England should meet him in his desire to
regulate the position of Constantinople in a way which
would not threaten Russia's security in the Black Sea,
he was quite wilhng that England should occupy Egypt.
Possibly the idea that Russia should acquire Constantinople
was at the back of his mind, but as Egypt was far more
valuable than Constantinople, he had offered beforehand
the most ample compensation to this country. Un-
fortunately, the distrust existing against Russia since the
time of Napoleon was too deeply rooted. The Czar's
proposals were treated almost contemptuously. In reply-
ing to the Czar, the British Government, adverting to the
sufferings of the Christians hving in Turkey upon which
Nicholas had dwelt, stated on March 28 :

. . . The treatment of Christians is not harsh, and the
toleration exhibited by the Porte towards this portion of its
subjects might serve as an example to some Governments
who look with contempt upon Turkey as a barbarous Power.

Her Majesty's Government beheve that Turkey only
requires forbearance on the part of its Allies, and a deter-
mination not to press their claims in a manner humiliat-
ing to the dignity and independence of the Sultan.

The English Government, being filled with suspicions,
did not even make a serious attempt to discover the aims
and intentions of the Czar. Vaguely dreading Russia,
England supported Turkey against that country. Thus
Great Britain has been largely responsible not only for
the Crimean War and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, but

44 The Problem of Constantinople •

also for the ill-treatment of the Christians and the massacres
which have taken place throughout Turkey during many-
decades.

What has created England's instinctive fear of Eussia ?
If we look at the map, if we consider size to be a criterion
of national strength, then Eussia is immensely powerful.
However, the Eusso-Turkish War, the Eusso-Japanese
War, and the present War have shown that we need perhaps
not have feared Eussia's strength so much as her weakness.
If Eussia had been stronger, if Eussia's strength had been
in accordance with the views which until lately were gener-
ally held here, the present War would not have broken out.
German soldiers evidently appraised the mihtary power
of Eussia far more correctly than did British statesmen,
who are habitually ill-informed on military matters. By
opposing Eussia in the past, England has worked not for
her own advantage and for the security of India, but for
the benefit of Germany and Austria. England's anti-
Eussian policy and Eussia's anti-British policy were largely
inspired first from Paris and then from Berlin and Vienna.
That is plain to all who are acquainted with recent diplo-
matic history.

The century-old antagonism between England and
Eussia has been the work of Napoleon, of Bismarck, and
of Bismarck's successors. The Eussian danger, Eussia's
aggressiveness, and Eussia's constant desire to seize India,
are largely figments of the imagination. Eussia has Httle
desire to possess India. If she had it she would probably
be unable to administer it. The late Czar said to Prince
Hohenlohe on September 6, 1896 : ' Who is to take India
from the English ? We are not stupid enough to have
that plan.' It would be as difiScult for Eussia to attack
India at the present day as it was in the time of the Emperor
Paul. It is true Eussia has now a couple of railways which
run up to the Indian frontier, but India also has railways ;
these will facilitate the concentration of troops at any
point at which that country may be attacked, and with

Gi^eat Problems of British Statesmanship 45

the development of transport by land and sea, and the
growth of the Empire, the danger of an attack upon India
by Kussia seems to be growing smaller from year to year.
In the picturesque language of the late Lord Salisbury,
England backed the wrong horse in opposing Kussia's
policy towards Turkey in the past.

National policy is, as a rule, in accordance with the
national character. The Kussians are rather dreamers
than men of action, rather men of quiet thought than
men of ambition. The heroes of Tolstoy and of other
great Kussian authors are not men of the Nietzsche type,
but men of peace, ideaHsts, desiring the best, animated
by a deep sense of rehgion. The strong ideahst strain
in the Eussian character has found expression not only
in the ideahst poHcy followed by Alexander the First and
Nicholas the Second, but in that of other Kussian Czars as
well. Kussia has had a Peter the Great, but she has not
had a Napoleon, and she is not hkely to have one. Those
who beheve that Russia aims at dominating the world, at
conquering all Asia, and invading India, are neither
acquainted with the Kussian character nor with the re-
sources, the capabiHties, and the needs of the country.

Kussia is a very large State. It is extremely powerful
for defence, because it is protected by vast distances, a
rigorous chmate, and very inferior means of communica-
tion. The same circumstances which make Kussia
exceedingly powerful for defence make her very weak
for a war of aggression. That has been seen in all her
foreign wars without a single exception. Last, but not
least, the Kussian people and their rulers have become
awakened to the necessity of modernising the country.
A new Kussia has arisen. Kussia has made rapid progress
during the last two decades, but her progress has perhaps
been slower than that of other nations. Hence Kussia
is still very poor and backward. She has some railways,
but her means of inland transport are totally insufficient.
She has scarcely any roads, except a few military ones.

46 The Problem of Constantinople

France has ten times the mileage of roads possessed by
Eussia. During the Great War we have frequently heard
of the absence of roads in Poland and of the impossibility
of moving troops through a sea of mud. Yet Poland is
that district of Eussia which is best provided with roads.

The peasants throughout Eussia use still almost ex-
clusively wooden ploughs with which only the surface can
be scratched. By changing their wooden ploughs for iron
ones they could plough twice as deeply and double their
harvests, but they are too poor to provide modem agri-
cultural implements. In many Eussian villages no iron
implements, not even iron nails, may be seen, and the
methods of Eussia's agriculture are still those of the Dark
Ages.

The manufacturing industries of the country are in
their infancy. The vast majority of the people can neither
read nor write, and newspapers exist only in the large
towns. If we compare the economic and social conditions
of Eussia with those existing in other countries, it becomes
clear that the principal need of Eussia is not further
expansion, but internal development, and in view of the
poverty of tl^e country the development of the great Eussian
estate is possible only in time of peace. For her the
restriction of armaments is more necessary than it is for
any other Great Power. The principal interest of Eussia
is peace. That has become clear to every thinking Eussian
and to the whole Eussian nation.

When the great Peace Congress assembles the question
of Constantinople will come up for settlement, and from
interested quarters we shall be told once more that Constanti-
nople is * the key of the world.' A glance at the map
shows that Constantinople is not the key of the world,
and is not even the key of the Mediterranean, but that it
is merely the key of the Black Sea. Prince Bismarck
possessed military ability of the highest kind, and, being
keenly aware that foreign poHcy and strategy must go
hand in hand, he kept constantly in touch with Germany's
leading soldiers. He clearly recognised the fallacy of

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 47

Napoleon's celebrated epigram. Hence, when a member
of the Eeichstag, referring to the Eastern Question, spoke
of the Dardanelles as the key to the dominion of the world,
Bismarck smilingly rephed, ' If the Dardanelles are the
key to the dominion of the world it obviously follows that
up to now the Sultan has dominated the world.' Constanti-
nople has been possessed by various States, but none of
them has so far dominated the world. In Bismarck's
words, Constantinople has disagreed with all the nations
which have possessed it hitherto. Why that has been
the case will presently be shown.

So far Constantinople has not given a great accession
of strength to the nations which have held it. Far from
considering Constantinople in the hands of Kussia as a
source of strength, Bismarck rather saw in it a source of
weakness and of danger. He wrote in his * Memoirs ' :
' I beheve that it would be advantageous for Germany if
the Eussians in one way or another, physically or diplo-
matically, were to estabhsh themselves at Constantinople
and had to defend that position.'

Kussia is almost invulnerable as long as she can defend
herself with her best weapons, her vast distances, her lack
of railways and roads, and her rigorous chmate. But the
same elements become disadvantageous to Kussia's defence
if a highly vulnerable point near her frontier can be attacked.
In the Crimean War Kussia almost bled to death because
of the difficulty of sending troops to the Crimea. Her
failure in Manchuria arose from the same cause.

At present Kussia possesses only one point of capital
importance on the sea, St. Petersburg, which can
comparatively easily be attacked by an army landed in
the neighbourhood. If she occupies Constantinople, she
must be ready to defend it, and a very large number of
troops will be required to protect the shores of the Sea of
Marmora and the Straits against an enemy.

It is not generally known that the Constantinople
position is not circumscribed but very extensive, and that
it is not easy to defend it against a mobile and powerful

48 The Problem of Constantinople

enemy, especially if it is simultaneously attacked by land
and sea. The small maps of Turkey are deceptive. It is
hardly realised that the distance from the entrance of the
Dardanelles to the exit of the Bosphorus is nearly two
hundred miles. Strategists are agreed that a Power holding
Constantinople, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles must
possess territory at least as far inland as the Enos-Midia
line — that is, the line from the town of Enos opposite the
island of Samothraki to the town of Midia on the Black
Sea. A straight line connecting these two towns would
be 120 miles long, or exactly as long as the distance which
separates London from Cardiff, Paris from Boulogne, or
Strasburg from Coblenz. It is clear that a large arm}- and
extensive fortifications are needed to defend so broad a
front against a determined attack. In addition, Eussia
would have to defend the shore of the Gulf of Saros and
the sea-coast of the peninsula of GaUpoh against a landing.
This shore-Une extends to about one hundred miles. Lastly,
she would have to defend the opening of the Dardanelles
and to prevent an attack upon the Constantinople position
across the narrows from the Asiatic mainland.

It would be difficult enough to defend this vulnerable
and extensive position if it was organically connected with
Eussia. It will of course be still more difficult to defend
it in view of the fact that Eoumania and Bulgaria, two
powerful States, separate Eussia from Constantinople.
Eussia can reach Constantinople only by sea unless she
should succeed in incorporating Eoumania and Bulgaria
in some way or other, or unless the entire north of Asia
Minor should fall into Eussia's hands, enabhng that country
to create a land connection between her Caucasian provinces
and the southern shores of the Sea of Marmora and the
two Straits. Both events appear unlikely.

The Constantinople position, if held by Eussia, would
be detached from that country. The Eussian troops
garrisoning it would be cut off from the motherland in
case of war. Hence they would have to be prepared for

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 49

a sudden attack and to be always strong enough to defend
the peninsula unaided for a very long time. They would
have to be provided with gigantic stores of food and of
ammunition. It is therefore clear that Eussia would
require a very large permanent garrison for securing the
integrity of Constantinople. In case of war she would
undoubtedly require several hundred thousand men for
that purpose. Possibly she would need as many as 500,000
men if a determined attack by land and sea was hkely ;
and herein hes the reason for the opinion of the Commission
of 1829 that it would be to Eussia's advantage if the status
quo at Constantinople was not disturbed, if a weak Power
was in the possession of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.
There are two points of very great strategical importance
in the Eastern Mediterranean : the position of Constanti-
nople and Egypt; and Egypt is undoubtedly by far the
more important of the two. When in 1797 Napoleon
reached the Adriatic he was struck by the incomparable
advantages offered by the position of Egypt, and he ear-
marked that country for France in case of a partition of
Turkey. A year later he headed an expedition to Egypt,
not merely in order to strike at England, but largely, if
not chiefly, in order to conquer that most important
strategical position for France. While the Sea of Marmora
and the Straits are merely the connecting hnks between
the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, Egypt, especially
since the construction of the Suez Canal, is the connecting
hnk of the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, of Europe
and Asia, of the most populated continents and the busiest
seas. Hence the Suez Canal route is, and will remain for
centuries, the most valuable strategical and trade route in
the world, and it is of course of particular importance to
the nation which possesses India. Bismarck said to Busch :

Egypt is as necessary to England as is her daily bread,
because of the Suez Canal, which is the shortest connection
between the Eastern and Western halves of the British

50 The Problem of Constantinople

Empire. The Suez Canal is like the nerve at the back of
the neck which connects the spine with the brain.

Those who believe in Napoleonic epigrams will find
several remarkable epigrams relating to Egypt. The great
Corsican said to Montholon, * Si j'étais resté en Egypte,
je serais à présent empereur d'Orient. . . . L'Orient n'attend
qu'un homme.' He said to Las Cases, * De l'Egypte j'aurais
atteint Constantinople et les Indes ; j'eusse changé la
face du monde.' He dictated to Gourgaud, * Qui est
maître de l'Egypte l'est de l'Inde.* The last maxim
should be particularly interesting to Englishmen. How
great a value Napoleon attached to Egypt will be seen
from his ' Memoirs ' dictated to Las Cases, Gourgaud, and
Montholon at St. Helena, and from volumes xxix., xxx.,
and xxxi. of his * Correspondence.'

If we wish to compare the relative importance of Con-
stantinople and of the Suez Canal, we need only assume
that another Power possessed Egypt and Great Britain
Constantinople. While Constantinople would be useless
to Great Britain, the occupation of Egypt by a non-British
Power would jeopardise Britain's position in India and her
Eastern trade. Napoleon, with his keen eye for strategy,
told O'Meara :

Egypt once in possession of the French, farewell India
to the Enghsh. Turkey must soon fall, and it will be im-
possible to divide it without allotting some portion to France,
which will be Egypt. But if you had kept Alexandria, you
would have prevented the French from obtaining it, and of
ultimately gaining possession of India, which will certainly
follow their possession of Egypt.

In the sailing-ship era the position of Constantinople
was far more important to England than it is at present.
Then Kussia, dominating Constantinople, might conceivably
have sent a large fleet into the Mediterranean and have
seized Malta, Egypt, and Gibraltar before England could
have received any news of the saiHng of the Kussian armada.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 51

With the advent of the electric cable, wireless telegraphy,
and steam shipping, that danger has disappeared.

From the Eussian point of view Constantinople is
valuable partly for ideal, partly for strategical reasons, and
partly because the Narrows are economically of the highest
importance to Eussia. Their closure destroys the most
important part. of Eussia's sea trade.

The glamour of Constantinople and its incomparable
position on the Golden Horn has fascinated men since the
earliest times. Constantinople might become the third
capital of Eussia, and it would, for historical and religious
reasons, be a capital worthy of that great Empire. From the
strategical point of view Eussia desires to possess Constan-
tinople not for aggression, but for defence, for protecting
the Black Sea shores. Whether, however, she would be
wise in accepting Constantinople, even if it were offered
to her by all Europe, seems somewhat doubtful. It is
true that Constantinople dominates the Black Sea. At
the same time Constantinople is dominated by the lands
of the Balkan Peninsula. In Tallejn-and's words : * Le
centre de gravité du monde n'est ni sur l'Elbe, ni sur l'Adige,
il est là-bas aux frontières de l'Europe, sur le Danube.'
Similarly Marshal Mar mont, Duke of Eagusa, one of
Napoleon's best generals, said in his * Memoirs ' that
Wallachia, Macedonia, and Bulgaria were, in his opinion,
the key of the Orient. He thought that the security of
Europe was less threatened by Eussia possessing Constan-
tinople, supposing the Austrians occupied the countries
at the mouth of the Danube, than if Constantinople was
held by French and EngHsh troops while the Eussians were
masters of the lower Danube. The reasoning of Talleyrand
and Marmont seems faultless. It will probably be con-
firmed by the British strategists, who ought to be consulted
by our statesmen on the strategical value of Constantinople.
A |demonstration of the Balkan States, especially if it
were backed by their Central European supporters, against
the 120 miles of the Enos-Midia line would obviously convert

52 The Problem of Constantinople

the Constantinople position from a strategical asset into
a very serious strategical liability. It is true that in the
event of a Eussian attack upon India, England could no
longer attack Eussia in the Black Sea in conjunction with
Turkey. However, as Constantinople is a far more valuable
point to Eussia than the Crimea or Odessa, and as the
Balkan States themselves may desire to possess Constan-
tinople, it is obvious that by occupying it Eussia would
not increase her power, but would merely expose herself
to greater dangers than heretofore.

Various proposals have been made for deahng with
Constantinople and the Straits after the expulsion of the
Turks. Some have advocated that Constantinople should
be given to Eussia, some that the position should be given
to some small Power, such as Bulgaria, or be divided between
two or more Powers, one possessing the southern and the
other the northern shore ; others have recommended that
that much coveted position should be neutralised in some
form or other. The importance of Constantinople to
Eussia lies in this, that it is the door to her house, that he
who holds Constantinople is able to attack Eussia in the
Black Sea. Consequently Eussia and Eussia 's principal
opponents would continue to strive for the possession of
the Narrows, supposing they had been given to some small
Power, to several Powers in joint occupation, or had been
neutralised. The struggle for Constantinople can obviously
end only when the town is possessed by a first-rate Power.
That seems the only solution which promises finality, and
the only Power which has a strong claim upon the possession
of Constantinople is evidently Eussia.

Until recently it seemed possible that Constantinople
would become the capital of one of the Balkan States or
of a Balkan Confederation. Many years ' ago Mazzini,
addressing the awakening Balkan nations, admonished
them ; * Stringetevi in una Confederazione e sia Constan-
tinopoli la vostra città anfizionica, la città dei vostri poteri
centrali, aperta a tutti, serva a nessuno.' The internecine

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 53

war of the Balkan States has destroyed, apparently for
ever, the possibility that Constantinople will belong to
the Balkan peoples, and perhaps it is better that it is so.
Constantinople might have proved as fatal an acquisition
to the Balkan peoples as it has proved to the Turks, and
for all we know it may not prove a blessing to Eussia.

Those who fear that Eussia might become a danger
to Europe in the future, and who would therefore like to
see the status quo preserved both in Austria-Hungary and
at Constantinople — at first sight Austria-Hungary, as at
present constituted, appears to be an efficient counterpoise
to Eussia — seem very short-sighted. I think I have shown
that Eussia 's acquisition of Constantinople, far from in-
creasing Eussia 's military strength, would greatly increase
her vulnerabiHty. Hence the possession of Constantinople
should make Eussia more cautious and more peaceful.
Similarly, the dissolution of Austria-Hungary into its com-
ponent parts — an event which at present is contemplated
with dread by those who fear Eussia's power — would ap-
parently not increase Eussia 's strength or the strength
of Slavism, but would more likely be disadvantageous to
both. The weakness of Austria-Hungary arises from its
disunion. Owing to its disunion the country is militarily
and economically weak. If Austria-Hungary should be
replaced by a number of self-governing States these will
develop much faster. Some of these States will be Slavonic,
but it is not likely that they will become Eussia 's tools.
Liberated nations, as Bismarck has told us, are not grate-
ful, but exacting. The Balkan nations which Eussia has
freed from the Tmkish yoke, Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and
Eoumania, have promptly asserted their independence
from Eussia, and have developed a strong individuahty
of their own. The Slavonic nationalities of Austria-Hun-
gary also would probably assert their independence. For
economic reasons the small and medium-sized nations in
the Balkan Peninsula and within the limits of present-day
Austria-Hungary would probably combine, and if they

54 The Problem of Constantinople

were threatened from Kussia they would naturally form
a strong political union. A greater Austria-Hungary, a
State on a federal basis, would arise in the place of the
present State, and, strengthened by self-government, the
power of that confederation would be far greater than
that possessed by the Dual Monarchy.

Since the time when these pages were written the Kussian
autocracy has disappeared and has been replaced by the
repubhc. Many of the Eussian democratic leaders have
proclaimed that they are opposed to the autocratic pohcy of
conquest, that they do not wish to possess Constantinople.
It remains to be seen whether the new leaders of Eussia
will abandon the century-old aim of their country. Not
only the Eussian sovereigns but the Eussian people them-
selves have for centuries striven to control the Narrows
which connect the Black Sea with the Mediterranean,
guided not merely by ambition but by the conviction that
Eussia required an adequate outlet to the sea for economic
reasons. The Eussian sovereigns who tried to conquer
Constantinople followed, therefore, not a personal but a
national pohcy. When, at the beginning of the War, Eussia's
war aims were discussed in the Imperial Duma, practically
all the speakers demanded the acquisition of Constantinople.
The wealthiest districts of Eussia he in the south. The
north is largely barren. The productions of Southern
Eussia go towards the Black Sea by the magnificent Eussian
rivers and by railways. The War has shown that the Power
which controls the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles can
blockade Eussia, can strangulate the economic hfe of the
country. That is a position which may appear undesirable
even to the most enthusiastic Eussian democrats and to
the most convinced anti-annexationists. After all, a great
nation requires adequate access to the sea.

CHAPTEE III

THE PROBLEM OP ASIATIC TURKEY ^

The problem of Constantinople has perplexed and dis-
tressed the world during many centuries. Numerous wars
have been waged, and innumerable lives have been sacrificed
by the nations desiring to possess or control that glorious
city and the wonderful Narrows which separate Europe
from Asia and which connect the Black Sea and the
Mediterranean, the East and the West, the Slavonic and
the Latin- Germanic world. Hitherto it was generally
beHeved that an attempt to settle the question of Constan-
tinople would inevitably lead to a world war among the
claimant States, that their agreement was impossible.
Hence diplomats thought with dread of the question of
Constantinople, which seemed insoluble. The Great War
has broadened men's minds, and has bridged many historic
differences. It has created new enemies, but it has also
created new friends, and it appears that the problem of
Constantinople will peacefully and permanently be settled
when the Entente Powers have achieved their final victory.
However, while we may rejoice that the ever-threatening
problem of Constantinople has at last been ehminated, it
seems possible that another, a far greater and a far more
dangerous one, may almost immediately arise in its place.
The question of Asiatic Turkey is forcing itself to the front,
and it may convulse the world in a series of devastating

* The Nineteenth Century and After , June 1916.
55

56 Tïie Problem of Asiatic Turkey

wars unless it be solved together with the other great
questions which will come up for settlement at the Peace
Congress.

Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof. Not only
the map of Europe, but that of the world, will have to be
re-drawn. The coming settlement will be greater, and
may be far more difficult, than that made at Vienna a
hundred years ago. It would therefore not be surprising
if those of the assembled statesmen who are not sufficiently
acquainted with the significance, the importance, and the
danger of the problem of Asiatic Turkey should say, * We
have our hands full. Let us not touch the question of
Asiatic Turkey. That is a matter for another generation.'
That attitude is understandable, but it should not deter
those statesmen who reaUse the portent and the peril of
the Turco-Asiatic problem, and the danger of leaving it
in abeyance, from impressing upon^their less well-informed
colleagues the necessity of a settlement.

The question of Asiatic Turkey is undoubtedly a far
more difficult question than that of Constantinople. Con-
stantinople and the Straits are, as I have shown, not the
key to the Dominion of the World, as Napoleon the First
asserted, but merely the key to the Black Sea. Former
generations, uncritically repeating Napoleon's celebrated
dictum, have greatly overrated the strategical importance
of that wonderful site. The importance and value of
Asiatic Turkey on the other hand can scarcely be ex-
aggerated, for it occupies undoubtedly the most important
strategical position in the world. It forms the nucleus
and centre of the Old World. It separates, and at the
same time connects, Europe, Asia, and Africa, three con-
tinents which are inhabited by approximately nine-tenths
of the human race.

If we wish clearly to understand the importance of
Asiatic Turkey, we must study its position not only from
the strategical point of view, but also from the rehgio-
political and from the economic points of view^

^.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 57

Asiatic Turkey occupies a most commanding position,
both for war and for trade. A glance at a map shows
that Asiatic Turkey is the link and the bridge which connects
Africa with Asia and both with Europe. It occupies a
position whence three continents may easily be threatened
and attacked. The strategical importance of a site depends
obviously not only on its geographical position, but also
on its mihtary value, on the faciHties which it offers both
for defence and for attack. Looked at from the defensive
point of view, Asiatic Turkey forms an enormous natural
fortress of the greatest strength. The waters of the Black
Sea, of the Mediterranean, of the Ked Sea, and of the Persian
Gulf efficiently shelter the larger part of its borders, while
its land frontiers are equally powerfully protected by
gigantic waterless deserts and lofty mountain ranges.
Eange after range of mountains protect Asiatic Turkey
towards Russia and Persia. The non- Turkish part of
Arabia is a torrid desert, and one of the least-known and
least-explored countries in the world. In the south-west
Asiatic Turkey is protected by the barren waste of the
Sinai Peninsula, the Suez Canal, and the Sahara. Thus,
Asiatic Turkey enjoys virtually aU the advantages of an
island, being surrounded on all sides by the sea and sandy
and mountainous wastes.

Asia Minor is the nucleus, the territorial base, and the
citadel of Asiatic Turkey. High mountain walls rise on
its Black Sea and Mediterranean shores, and it is sheltered
towards the south by the mighty Taurus chain of mountains
which stretches from the Gulf of Alexandretta, opposite
Cyprus, to the Persian frontier. Thus the Taurus forms
a wall of defence from 7,000 to 10,000 feet high against
an enemy advancing upon Asia Minor from the east or
from the south, from the Red Sea and Sjrria, or from the
Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia.

The best defence is the attack. The importance of a
fortress Hes not so much in its strength for purely passive
defence as in its usefulness as a base for an attack. An

58 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey

impregnable fortress which cannot serve as a base of attack
because it lies on an inaccessible mountain or on an out-
of-the-way island can safely be disregarded by an enemy,
and is therefore mihtarily worthless. Asiatic Turkey is
a natural fortress which possesses vast possibihties for
attack, for it borders upon some of the most valuable and
most vulnerable positions in the world, and it is able to
dominate them and to seize them by a surprise attack. In
the north it can threaten the rich Caucasian Provinces
of Kussia and their oil-fields with Tiflis, Batum, Baku.
From its 600 miles of Black Sea coast it can attack the
rich Russian Black Sea provinces with the Crimea, Odessa,
Nikolaeff, and Kherson. It can easily strike across the
narrow Bosphorus at Constantinople. Towards the west
of Asia Minor, and in easy reach of it, he the beautiful
Greek and Itahan islands in the iEgean, which until recently
belonged to Turkey, and Hes Greece itself, which for centuries
was a Turkish possession. West of Turkish Syria he the
Suez Canal, Egypt, Erythrea, and the Itahan and French
Colonies of North Africa.

A powerful Asiatic Turkey can obviously dominate
not only the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles, and the Suez
Canal, but the very narrow entrance of the Red Sea near
Aden, and that of the Persian Gulf near Muscat as well.
It must also not be forgotten that only a comparatively
short distance, a stretch of country under the nominal
rule of weak and decadent Persia, separates Asiatic Turkey
from the Indian frontier. It is clear that Asiatic Turkey,
lying in the centre of the Old World, is at the same time
a natural fortress of the greatest defensive strength and
an ideal base for a surprise attack upon Southern Russia,
Constantinople, the -3Egean Islands, Greece, the Suez
Canal, Egypt, Persia, Afghanistan, and India.

Time is money. From year to year international
trafiBc tends more and more toward the shortest and the
most direct, the best strategical, routes. Asia Minor Hes
across one of the greatest lines of world traffic. It hes

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 59

across the direct line which connects London, Paris, and
Berhn with Karachi, Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, Canton,
and Shanghai. The enormous mountains of Afghanistan
and of Tibet and the great Kussian inland seas compel
the main railway Hnes connecting Europe and Asia which
undoubtedly will be built in the future to be led via Con-
stantinople and Asia Minor, and not via Kussia and Southern
Siberia. Year by year the importance of the land route
to India and China by way of Asia Minor will therefore
grow. Year by year the strategical value of the railways
running through Asia Mnor fi*om Constantinople towards
Mosul and Baghdad will increase. Asiatic Turkey com-
mands by its position the shortest, and therefore the best,
land route to India and China, the route of the future.
By commanding the Suez Canal and the Narrow Straits
which lead from the Indian Ocean to the Ked Sea and to
the Persian Gulf, that country is able to threaten with
a flank attack the sea route to India and China not merely
in one but in three places. As the opening of the Persian
Gulf hes not far from the Indian coast, it is obvious that
a strong Power holding Asiatic Turkey would be able to
threaten with its navy not only the Mediterranean route
to India and the Far East, but the Cape route as well.

The strategical position of Asiatic Turkey curiously
resembles that of Switzerland. Being surrounded by
lofty mountains, vast deserts, and the sea, Natm-e has
made Asiatic Turkey an impregnable fortress, another
Switzerland. However, while httle Switzerland dominates
by its natural strength and strategical position merely
three European States — Germany, France, and Italy —
Asiatic Turkey dominates the three most populous, and
therefore the three most important, continents of the world.

Asiatic Turkey looks small on the ordinary maps ;
but it is, as the table on page 60 shows, a very large and
extremely sparsely populated country.

Asiatic Turkey is three and a half times as large as
Germany, and nearly six times as large as the United

60

The Problem of Asiatic Turkey

Kingdom. Its population is quite insignificant. Compared
with Asiatic Turkey even Eussia is a densely populated
country. Asiatic Turkey is at present almost a desert,
although it may be made to support a very large popula-
tion, for it possesses vast possibilities, as will be shown
further on. The country has certainly room for at least
a hundred miUion inhabitants.

Austria-Hungary has become an appendage of Germany,
and Turkey a German vassal State. During many decades
patriotic Germans dreamed of creating a Greater Germany,
reaching not merely from Hamburg to Trieste, but from
Antwerp to Aden, to Kowoyt anid perhaps to Muscat and

Square Miles

Inhabitants at
Last Census

Population per
Square Mile

Asiatic Turkey

United Kingdom .

Germany

France ....

Spain ....

European Russia. .

699,342
121,633
208,780
207,054
194,783
1,862,524

19,382,900
45,370,530
64,925,993
39,601,509
19,588,688
122,550,700

28-0
372-6
310-4
189-5
100-5

64-6

far into Southern Persia. German thinkers were attracted
towards Asiatic Turkey not only because of its great past
and its vast economic possibihties, but also because of its
matchless position at a spot where three continents meet,
whence three continents may be dominated, whence Eussia
and the British Empire may most effectively be attacked,
whence the rule of the world may be won. The present
War undoubtedly was largely a war for the control of Asia
Minor.

In the middle of the last century leading German
economists and thinkers who exerted a most powerful
influence upon German statesmanship and upon German
pubHc opinion, such as Wilhelm Eoscher, Friedrich List,
Paul de Lagarde, Ferdinand Lassalle, J. K. Eodbertus,
Karl Eitter, the great Moltke, and others, writing long
before the unification of Germany, advocated the creation

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 61

of a Greater Germany embracing all the German and Austro-
Hungarian States and the acquisition of Asia Minor in
some form or other, and dreamt of the creation of an organic
connection between Berlin and Baghdad by including
the Balkan States in an Austro-German Federation. The
creation of a Greater Germany, stretching from the North
Sea to the Bosphorus, and across the Straits to the Persian
Gulf and the Indian Ocean, was lately advocated unceasingly
by many Pan-Germans. The acquisition of Asia Minor
was urged by many eminent writers and men of action,
such as Hasse, Dehn, Eohrbach, Sprenger, Sachau, Von
der Goltz, Kârger, Naumann, Schlagintweit, and many
others. I would give a characteristic example out of
many. Professor Dr. A. Sprenger, the former director of
the Mohammedan College of Calcutta, wrote in his book
* Babylonia the Eichest Land of Antiquity, and the most
Valuable Field of Colonisation at the Present Time,'
pubHshed in 1886 :

The Orient is the only territory of the earth which has
not yet been seized by the expanding nations. It is the
most valuable field of colonisation. If Germany does not
miss its opportunity and seizes it before the Cossacks have
put their hands upon it, the whole German nation will gain
by the colonisation of the East. As soon as several hundred
thousand German soldier-colonists are at work in that
glorious country the German Emperor can control the fate
of Western Asia and the peace of all Asia.

Similar views were expressed by many eminent Germans.
The Baghdad Kailway was evidently not merely a financial
enterprise of the Deutsche Bank, undertaken for the develop-
ment of Asia Minor. Konia, the natural capital of Asiatic
Turkey, lying on the Baghdad Eailway, is situated almost
exactly midway between Berlin and Karachi.
^ Let us imagine the Turkish Government in Asia replaced
by that of a strong and ambitious mihtary Power. Such
a Power would develop the country in every way, and would

62 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey

double and treble its population. It would open the
country in every direction by means of railways. It would
construct lines capable of carrying a vast amount of traffic
towards the Eussian, Egyptian, and Persian frontiers,
and it would continue the latter, * on economic grounds,'
through Persia towards Baluchistan, towards India. It
would create a powerful navy and construct strong naval
bases on the shores of the Black Sea and near the southern
openings of the Ked Sea and of the Persian Gulf. Having
done all this, it would be able to throw at the shortest notice
an immense army either across the Bosphorus into Constan-
tinople, or across the Suez Canal into Egypt, or across
Persia into India. A strong European military Power,
firmly settled in Asiatic Turkey, disposing of 2,000,000
Turkish-Asiatic soldiers and of a sufficiency of railways
and of a fleet, could make Constantinople and Egypt almost
untenable. It could gravely threaten Southern Kussia
and India and the most important sea-route of the world.
At the same time, such a Power, if it should become a
danger, could not easily be dislodged or defeated, because
the enormous defensive strength of the country would
make its resistance most formidable.

If we wish clearly to understand the strategic importance
of Asiatic Turkey and the dangers with which the world
might be threatened from that most commanding point,
we need not draw upon the imagination, but may usefully
turn towards the history of the past. In the Middle Ages
a small but exceedingly warUke Power arose within the
borders of Asiatic Turkey. Using as their base of operations
that most wonderful position where three continents meet,
Mohammedan warrior tribes swept north, south, east, and
west. They rapidly overran and conquered Egypt, Tripoli,
Tunis, Algeria, Spain, Sicily, and even invaded France
and Italy. They conquered all the lands around the Black
Sea, and subjected to themselves Arabia, Persia, Afghanistan,
and Northern India as far as the Indus and the Syr-Daria,
the ancient Jaxartes. They crossed the Straits, seized

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 63

Constantinople, the whole Balkan Peninsula, and Hungary,
and advanced up to the walls of Vienna. They seized the
rule of the sea. The word ' admiral,' from ' amir,' the Arabic
word for ' chief, commander,' the same word as * ameer ' or
' emir,' reminds us of their former naval pre-eminence.

The strategical value of Asiatic Turkey is very greatly
increased by the vast rehgio-poHtical importance of the
country. Asiatic Turkey contains the holy places of
Christianity and of Islam. Mecca and Medina exercise
an infinitely greater influence over Mohammedanism than
Jerusalem and Bethlehem do over Christianity. Mecca
and Medina give an enormous power to the nation which
possesses or controls these towns. Asiatic Turkey is not
only the religious, but also the physical centre of
Mohammedanism. From Asiatic Turkey Mohammedanism
spread in every direction. Starting thence it conquered
all North Africa down to the tenth degree of northern
latitude, and expanded eastward as far as Orenburg and
Omsk in Kussia, and penetrated through Afghanistan as
far as Delhi and Kashmir in India. The followers of
Mohammed form a sohd block which stretches from the
west coast of Morocco and from Sierra Leone across Asia
Minor deeply into Eussia and Siberia and into India.

Lying in the centre of the Mohammedan world, Asiatic
Turkey would be an ideal spot whence to organise and
to govern a great Mohammedan Federation or Empire.
Mohammedanism may conceivably have a new lease of
life. Pan-Islamism need not necessarily remain an idle
dream. A strong leader and able organiser, possessed
of the necessary prestige, might make it a reahty. Turkey
as the guardian of Mecca and Medina, and therefore of
Islam, has naturally exercised little influence over the
Islamic world. The Mohammedans throughout the world
have rejected with scorn the Turks as their leaders, be-
cause they have incurred the contempt of their brother
Mohammedans by their moral and material degeneration.
However, it seems not impossible that a strong military

64 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey

Power controlling the Holy Places might succeed once more
in controlling all Islam, and might thus be able to utiHse
the serried ranks of 300,000,000 Mohammedans against
its enemies. That idea was probably in the German
Emperor's mind when, on November 8, 1898, speaking
in the ancient town of Damascus and addressing his
Mohammedan guests, he emphatically proclaimed : * May
the Sultan of Turkey, and may the three hundred million
Mohammedans throughout the world who worship him
as their Cahph, be assured that the German Emperor will
be their friend for all time.* Since then the German
Emperor has assumed the rôle of Protector of Islam.

Mahomet was a warrior. Islam is a conqueror's creed.
A strong mihtary Power, controlhng Mecca and Medina,
might bring about a revival of conquering Mohammedanism,
and might make Pan-Islamism a dangerous reahty. The
greatest Mohammedan Powers are the British Empire,
Eussia, and France. British India alone has 70,000,000
Mohammedans, all French North Africa is Mohammedan,
and Eussia has no less than 20,000,000 Mohammedan
citizens. The religio-political importance of Asia Minor
is so very great that its control by a strong mihtary Power
might endanger not only France, Eussia, and the British
Empire, but the whole world. France, Eussia, and the
British Empire desire the maintenance of peace, and are
therefore most strongly interested in preventing a revival
of a fanatically aggressive Mohammedanism, especially
if it be directed by a non-Mohammedan Power for non-
Mohammedan ends.

The economic importance of Asiatic Turkey is exceed-
ingly great. Asiatic Turkey is the oldest and by far the
most important nucleus of Western civilisation. All the
most glorious seats of ancient power and culture had
the misfortune of being conquered by Turkish barbarians.
The wonderful empires of Babylonia, Assyria, Egypt, Phoe-
nicia, Lydia, Media, Carthage, Persia, Greece, Palestine, and
the Arab ]_Empire were seized by the followers of Sultan

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 65

Othman and his successors, and wherever the Turks went
they created nothing except disorder, ruin, and utter
desolation. The country which gave rise to the far-famed
towns of Babylon, Nineveh, Seleucia, Ctesiphon, Opis,
Artemita, ApoUonia, Corsote, Thapsacus, Baghdad, Ilium,
Pergamon, Magnesia, Smyrna, Sardes, Susa, Ephesus,
Tralles, Miletus, Halicarnassus, Antiochia, Laodicea,
Iconium, Tarsus, Berytus, Sidon, Tyre, Damascus, Palmyra,
Memphis, Thebes — this country became a wilderness.
Poverty-stricken villages, or mere heaps of debris, indicate
the sites of nearly all the greatest and most flourishing
cities of the Ancient World.

How great and how general is the desolation of Asiatic
Turkey, which formerly was one of the most densely
populated countries of the world, may be seen from the
following figures :

Sqaare MUea

Inhabitants

Population per
Square Mile

Asia Minor .

Armenia and Kurdistan

Mesopotamia

Syria ....

Turkish Arabia .

Total Asiatic Turkey .

199,272
71,990
143,250
114,530
170,300

10,186,900
2,470,900
2,000,000
3,676,100
1,050,000

62
34
14
33
6

699,342

19,382,900

28

The most densely populated vilayet of Asia Minor is
that of Trebizond, with 76 people per Square mile. It is
followed by Ismid with 71, Smyrna with 64, and Brussa
with 64 people per square mile. How small the population
is even in the most favoured and most advanced vilayets
of Asia Minor may be seen by the fact that all Bulgaria
has a population of 116-4 per square mile, Serbia 144*0,
and Italy 313-5 per square mile. The cultivated part of
Egypt had, according to the census of 1907, a population
of 915 per square mile, but it should now amount to about
1000 per square mile.

66 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey

How wonderfully countries which have been under the
withering rule of the Turk may flourish when this rule
has been abolished may be seen by the example of Greece,
Bulgaria, Serbia, and Egypt. In 1882, in the year of
England's intervention, the population of Egypt was,
according to the census of that year, 6,831,131. At the
census of 1907 it came to 11,287,359, and by now it should
amount to about 13,000,000. During the brief span of
England's occupation the population of Egypt has doubled,
and its wealth has grown prodigiously. Between 1879
and 1881, three particularly favourable years, Egypt's
imports amounted on an average to £7,000,000 per year.
In 1913 they came to £27,000,000.

Trade by itself produces but little. The vast wealth
of ancient Babylonia, Assjnria, Lydia, Media, Persia,
Phoenicia, and of the glorious Greek towns on the Western
Coast of Asia Minor was founded on the broad and solid
basis of agriculture. Asiatic Turkey was in ancient times
famous for its agricultural wealth. Numerous existing
ruins show that even the uplands in the interior abounded
in large and prosperous towns. At present Asia Minor
has only 10,000,000 inhabitants. From a statement con-
tained in the * Historia Naturalis * of Pliny, we learn that
Pompey subjected in the war against Mithridates a popula-
tion of 12,183,000. If we deduct from that number the
pirates against whom he fought, the soldiers of Mithridates,
the inhabitants of Crete, and those of Armenia and the
Caucasus, together about 3,000,000, and add the inhabitants
of Western Asia Minor who, according to Beloch, should
then have numbered from 8,000,000 to 9,000,000, the
whole of Asia Minor — ^that is, the territories this side of the
Euphrates — should have contained between 17,000,000 and
18,000,000 people two thousand years ago.

Asiatic Turkey has large stretches of good soil and an
excellent climate. Cereals of every kind, cotton, rice,
and tobacco flourish. On the lower slopes of the west
figs, olives, and grapes grow in profusion and in perfection.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 67

and in the higher altitudes flourish the pine, the fir, the
cedar, the oak, and the beech. Agriculture, aided by-
modern methods of production and transportation, should
be able to nourish an enormous population in that favoured
land, and should make it once more highly prosperous.
Besides, Asiatic Turkey is extremely rich in minerals,
including coal, gold, silver, nickel, mercury, copper, iron,
and lead, but these resources have so far remained practically
untouched. Under a good Government Asia Minor may
once more become an exceedingly wealthy and well-peopled
country. The possession or the control of Asiatic Turkey
will produce both power and wealth. A mihtary State
controlling it would convert its wealth into power. Under
its direction Asiatic Turkey would not become a second
Egypt but another military State, and its mineral wealth
would lead to the establishment of enormous arsenals and
armanent factories.

On the Turkish coast there are numerous excellent
bays and inlets where in olden times flourishing city States
carried on an active trade. Under the Turkish Govern-
ment these old harbour works, like the old towns, roads,
and canals, have been destroyed or have been allowed to
fall into ruin. In many places good harbours could be
constructed at moderate expense, and the revival of
agriculture and the exploitation of the mineral resources
of the country would once more create a flourishing coast
trade, would recreate the old Greek settlements.

Asiatic Turkey is economically very important, not only
because it is possible to increase enormously its stunted
power of production, but also because, with the building
of railways, an enormous passenger and goods traffic may
be developed on the direct line which connects Central
Europe with India and China via Asia Minor. The inter-
course between East and West is rapidly increasing. The
Suez Canal traffic came in 1870 to 436,609 tons net. In
1876 it came to 2,096,771 tons, in 1882 to 5,074,808 tons,
in 1901 to 10,832,840 tons, and in 1912 to 20,275,120 tons

68 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey

net. The geographical position of Asia Minor on the
shortest trade route connecting the East with the West,
which enriched Phœnicia, and which made Sidon and Tyre
the merchants of the Ancient World and the founders of
a far-flung sea-empire, may greatly enrich its inhabitants.

The Turks have no gifts either for government or for
business. Their administration in all its branches is a
byword for corruption, neglect, disorder, and incompetence,
and as the Turks display the same quahties, or rather
defects, in business, their trade is carried on almost entirely
by foreigners, especially by Western Europeans, Greeks,
and Armenians. In their vast Asiatic provinces the Turks
possess, admittedly, one of the richest countries in the
world, a country which imperatively calls for development.

Asiatic Turkey is the stronghold of the Turkish race.
However, only a part of the inhabitants are Turks. In
Western Asia Minor, and especially in the harbour towns,
live about 1,500,000 Greeks. Smyi-na is a Greek town.
In Eastern Asia Minor, near the Kussian frontier, dwell
about 2,000,000 Armenians. Chiefly in the south there are
about 10,000,000 Arabs. Besides these there are numerous
other races — Syrians, Kurds, Circassians, Jews, &c.

Wherever the Turks rule, they rule by misrule, by
persecution, by extortion, and by massacre. The Greeks
in the west, the Armenians in the east, and the Arabs in
the south sigh for freedom from Turkish oppression.
Hitherto Europe has been horrified chiefly by Turkish
misrule in the Balkan Peninsula, the sufferings of which
have overshadowed the equally scandalous misrule in
Asiatic Turkey. When the Turks have lost Constantinople
and have been finally driven out of Europe their singular
capacity for misgovernment will find full scope in their
Asiatic provinces. They will become a gigantic Macedonia,
and the outrageous treatment of the Greeks, Armenians,
and Arabs will bring about in Asia Minor the same dis-
orders which hitherto prevailed in the Turkish part of the
Balkan Peninsula. Here, as in the Balkans, the sufferings

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 69

of the subject nationalities will arouse among other, and
especially among the related, nations a desire to interfere
and to protect the unfortunate peoples against their masters.
The facts given in these pages allow us, then, to draw
the following conclusions :

1. Asiatic Turkey occupies a position of great defensive
strength and of great potential danger to its neighbours,
a position which dominates the three old continents. A
powerful mihtary State, possessing or controlling the
country, would be able to threaten its neighbours in some
highly vulnerable quarters. It would be able to convert
it into an enormous military camp, and it might mobilise
Islam throughout the world and bring about a gigantic
catastrophe.

2. The great latent wealth of Asiatic Turkey, its match-
less position for trade and commerce, and the fearful neg-
lect from which it suffers are bound to arouse among all
progressive nations a keen desire to open up the country
by means of railways and harbours, and to exploit its
precious agricultural and mineral resources.

3. The presence of subject nationalities — Greeks, Ar-
menians, Arabs, &c. — ^in Asia Minor, who are likely to suffer
persecution at the hands of the ruling Turks, is bound
to bring about a desire for intervention on the part
of other Powers. In view of the commanding position
occupied by Asia Minor and the possibihty of some nation
or other wishing to make use of that country for aggressive
purposes, the European Powers may as Httle be able to
act in harmony in endeavouring to create good order in
Asiatic Turkey as they were in European Turkey. Once
more philo-Turkish and anti- Turkish Powers may struggle
for ascendancy. Consequently the same intrigues and
counter-intrigues, dangerous to the peace of the world, of
which during four centuries Constantinople was the scene,
might take place in Konia or wherever the Turks should
place their new seat of Government.

Apparently the problem of Asiatic Turkey is insoluble.

70 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey

If we look merely at the world-commanding strategical
position of Asiatic Turkey and the danger which its occupa-
tion by a strong, enterprising, and ambitious military Power
would involve, not merely for its neighbours, but for the
whole world, the best solution of the problem would seem
to consist in preserving the integi'ity of Asiatic Turkey under
unrestricted Ottoman rule. It is obvious that if one military
nation should occupy part of Asiatic Turkey other nations
would become alarmed and, fearing that that most valuable
strategical position should fall entirely under the control
of that mihtary State which had first encroached upon
its integrity, the other States interested in Asiatic Turkey
would naturally endeavour to secure shares also. A general
scramble for Turkish territory would ensue. Asiatic Tur-
key would be partitioned. Russia, France, Italy, Greece,
and Great Britain, and perhaps other nations as well,
would divide the country among themselves. Its com-
manding position would generate mutual suspicion among
the sharing nations. A tension similar to that which
prevailed among the Balkan States would prevail in Asia
Minor. Dangerous friction would ensue which might lead
to a world-war for the control of Asia Minor. The policy
of partition would obviously be most dangerous to the
peace of the world.

The policy of preserving the integrity of Asiatic Turkey
in its entirety and of abstaining from all interference with
the Turkish Government would, of course, prevent these
evils, but unfortunately that policy is not a practicable
one. As Asiatic Turkey is one of the richest, and at the
same time one of the most neglected, countries in the world,
and as it lies right across one of the most necessary and
most valuable of the world's highways — across the direct
hne which connects Central Europe with India and China —
the importance of which is bound to increase from year
to year, the citizens of various nations would naturally
seek to develop the country by means of railways, pubHc
works, &c. History would soon repeat itself. Under the

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 71

cloak of economic development, important strategical rail-
ways, threatening one or the other of the States bordering
on Asiatic Turkey, would be constructed. Thus the eco-
nomic exploitation of the strategical centre of the world
by private enterprise would in all probability lead to a
scramble among the Great Powers for spheres of influence,
and to an economic partition of Asia Minor which might
be quite as dangerous as a complete territorial partition.

If the Powers should desire to make Asiatic Turkey a
purely Turco-Asiatic buffer State, a No-man's-land as
far as Europe is concerned, stipulating that both its poHtical
and economic integrity should be preserved, leaving the
Turks entirely to themselves and solemnly binding them-
selves to abstain from both political and economic inter-
ference in its affairs, the difficulty would by no means be
overcome. Turkish misgovernment, Armenian, Greek, or
Arab massacres, or some grave political incident, might
cause some Power or Powers to interfere. Then inter-
national intrigues similar to those which formerly took
place about Constantinople would begin, and they would
be far more dangerous, because they would concern a
position which is not merely the key to the Black Sea,
but which is indeed the key to the dominion of the world.
Besides, as Asiatic Turkey occupies a most valuable position
for effecting a flank attack either upon Kussia in the very
vulnerable south, or upon the British Empire in Egypt
and Asia, the enemies of Kussia and of Great Britain would
obviously endeavour to stir up trouble between the two
countries. They would strive to bring about a struggle
between Kussia and England for the control of Asiatic
Turkey. They would probably try once more to recreate
the army of an independent Turkey and to hurl it at Kussia
or at Great Britain or simultaneously at both countries.

Unfortunately it appears that the policy of leaving
Asiatic Turkey alone would be quite as dangerous as that
of partitioning it. Therefore a third policy ought to be
found.

72 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey

The strategical position of Asiatic Turkey closely
resembles, as has been shown, that of Switzerland. Switzer-
land is a small natural fortress which separates, and domi-
nates, three important Central European States. Asiatic
Turkey is a gigantic natural fortress which separates, and
dominates, the three most populous continents. Switzer-
land has been neutralised, not for the sake of the Swiss,
but for the sake of all Europe. The fact that Switzer-
land was permanently neutralised for the security of Europe
may be seen from the diplomatic documents signed by the
Allied Powers a century ago. A Declaration made at the
Congress at Vienna on March 20, 1815, which will be found
in Kluber's ' Acten des Wiener Congresses,* stated :

Les puissances appelées, en exécution du 6^ art. du
traité de Paris du 30 mai 1814, à régler les affaires de la
Suisse, ayant reconnu que l'intérêt général demande que
le corps helvétique jouisse des avantages d'une neutrahté
permanente . . . déclarent, qu'aussitôt que la diète helvé-
tique aura accédé, en bonne et due forme, aux articles con-
tenus dans la présente convention, il sera expédié, au nom
de toutes les puissances, un acte solennel, pour reconnaître
et garantir la neutralité permanente de la Suisse dans ses
nouvelles frontières.

It will be observed that Switzerland was to be made
permanently neutral for the * intérêt général.' The * acte
solennel * above mentioned was signed in Paris on Novem-
ber 20, 1815, and it stated :

. . . Les puissances qui ont signé la déclaration de Vienne
du 20 mars, reconnaissent, d'une manière formelle et authen-
tique, par le présent acte la neutralité jperjpétuelle de la Suisse,
et lui garantissent Vinviolahilité de son territoire, circonscrit
dans ses nouvelles hmites, telles qu'elles sont fixées par le
congrès de Vienne et la paix de Paris d'aujourd'hui. . . .

Les puissances signataires de la déclaration du 20 mars
font connaître, d'une manière authentique, par le présent
acte, que la neutralité et l'inviolabiUté de la Suisse, ainsi

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 73

que son indépendance de toute influence étrangère, est
conforme aux véritables intérêts de la politique européenne.

It will be noticed that the * acte solennel ' emphasised
the previous declaration by stating that the permanent
neutrahty of Switzerland was * conforme aux véritables
intérêts de la poHtique européenne.'

It is noteworthy that Kussia has been one of the most
convinced and one of the most determined champions of
Swiss neutrality. In the instructions which, on January
14, 1827, Count Nesselrode, perhaps the greatest Kussian
diplomat of modern times, sent on behalf of the Cabinet
to M. de Séverine, the Kussian Minister to the Swiss Con-
federation,^ we read :

Par sa position géographique la Suisse est la clef de
trois grands pays. Par ses lumières et ses mœurs, eUe
occupe un rang distingué dans la civihsation Européenne.
Enfin par les actes des Congrès de Vienne et de Paris, elle
a obtenu la garantie de son organisation présente, de sa
neutrahté, et de son indépendance. . . .

Dès que la diplomatie, participant aux améUorations de
tout genre qui s'opéraient en Europe, eut pour but dans ses
combinaisons les plus profondes et les plus utiles, d'établir
entre les diverses puissances un équihbre qui assurât la
durée de la paix, l'indépendance de la Suisse devint un des
premiers axiomes de la Politique. Les Traités de West-
phahe la consacrèrent, et il est facile de prouver, l'histoire
à la main, qu'elle ne fut jamais violée sans que l'Europe
n'eût à gémir de guerres et de calamités universelles.

Lors de la révolution française, la Suisse éprouva forte-
ment la secousse qui vint ébranler les deux mondes. Son
territoire fut envahi, des armées le franchirent, et des
batailles ensanglantèrent un sol que les discordes des états
avait longtemps respecté.

Lors de la domination de Buonaparte, la Suisse eut sa
part du despotisme qui pressait sur le continent. Finale-
ment apparut l'AUiance avec ses nobles triomphes, et la

^ The full text may be found in A. 0. Gren ville Murray's Droits et Devoirs
des Envoyés Diplomatiques.

74 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey

Suisse, qui avait été bouleversée pendant la tourmente
révolutionnaire, et asservie pendant le régime des conquêtes,
redevint indépendante et neutre du jour où les droits des
Nations recouvrèrent leur empire, et où la paix fut le
vœu du Monarque dont le changement était le salutaire
ouvrage.

Ce fut alors que la Confédération Helvétique occupa la
pensée de l'Empereur Alexandre de glorieuse mémoire, et
alors aussi que son indépendance reçut par les actes de 1814
et 1815 une sanction solennelle, qui compléta et assura le
rétablissement solide de la tranquillité générale.

La Suisse est par conséquent, on peut le dire, un des
points sur lesquels repose l'équilibre de l'Europe, le mode
d'existence politique dont elle jouit forme un des élémens
du système conservateur qui a succédé à trente années
d'orages, et la Russie doit souhaiter que cet état continue
à ne relever et à ne dépendre d'aucun autre.

Elle y est intéressée comme puissance, que ses principes
et le sentiment de son propre bien portent à vouloir la paix.
Elle en a le droit, comme puissance qui a signé les actes de
1814 et 1815.

The irrefutable arguments advanced with such force,
clearness, and eloquence by Count Nesselrode with regard
to Switzerland apply obviously still more strongly to the
closely similar, but far more important, case of Asiatic
Turkey.

A State which has been permanently neutraUsed by
international agreement can preserve its neutrality only
if it is sufi&ciently strong and well governed. If it is weak
its neutrality may be disregarded, as was that of Belgium.
If it is badly governed and suffers from internal disorders
it cannot be strong, and foreign nations will find reasons
for interfering in its domestic affairs. When, in the course
of the last century, Switzerland was torn by internal dis-
sensions, the great guarantors of its permanent neutrahty
and independence became alarmed. They were anxious
to intervene, and as they took different sides their inter-
vention nearly led to a great war.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 75

If the arguments given so far should, on examination,
be found to be unchallengeable, it would appear that the
problem of Asiatic Turkey can be solved only by making
that country another Switzerland — a strong, independent
and well-governed neutral buffer State.

Can Turkey be regenerated and converted into another
Switzerland ? At first sight the task seems hopeless. The
experience of centuries certainly supports those who doubt
it. The Turkish Government, both under the rule of the
Sultans and under a nominally constitutional régime,
has proved a continuous cause of oppression and revolt,
of dissatisfaction and misery, of conspiracy and rebelHon.
In fact, the Turkish Government, in whatever hands, is,
and always has been, a public nuisance, a scandal and a
pubhc danger, a danger not only to Europe, but to the
Turks themselves. The experience of centuries has shown
that the Turks cannot govern other peoples, that they
cannot even govern themselves. This being the case, it
follows that Turkey requires, for its own security and for
that of the world, guardians, or a guardian, appointed by
Europe. Only then can we hope for peace and order,
happiness and prosperity, in that unfortunate land.

The problem of appointing European guardians, or a
guardian, for Asiatic Turkey is comphcated by the fact
that various European Powers possess strong separate
interests in that country. Before considering the way in
which good government might be introduced in a neutrahsed
Asiatic Turkey we must therefore consider the special
interests of various nations which, of course, have to be
safeguarded.

Kussia has a twofold interest in that country — a senti-
mental and a practical one. In the Caucasian Provinces
of Kussia, close to the Turkish border, dwell about 2,000,000
Armenians. Their brothers in Turkey have suffered from
outrageous persecution. The fearful massacres among
them from 1894 to 1897 are still in everybody's memory.
Not unnaturally, the Kussian Armenians and the Kussian

76 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey

people themselves desire that the Armenians in Asiatic
Turkey should be humanely treated. With this object
in view the Eussian Press has demanded that Turkish
Armenia should be ceded to Eussia.

As I have shown in the chapter on * The Future of Con-
stantinople ' in considering the strategical question, the
possession of Constantinople would be for Eussia perhaps
not so much an asset as a liability. Constantinople and
the Straits cover a very large area. Its defence requires
a very considerable mihtary force and will by so much
weaken the strength of the Eussian Army. Furthermore,
its defence entails considerable difficulty because Eussia
can reach Constantinople only by sea. As Eoumania
and Bulgaria separate Eussia from Constantinople on
the European side of the Black Sea, Eussia can secure
an organic connection with that town oioly from the Asiatic
side, by acquiring the whole of the Turkish south coast of
the Black Sea. It would not be unnatural, and indeed
quite understandable, if Eussian patriots should wish, or
at least hope, that Eussia should not only acquire Constan-
tinople and Turkish Armenia, but that she should in addition
obtain easy access to that city by a secure overland route.
A narrow strip of coast would, of course, suffice for con-
structing a railway from Southern Eussia to the Bosphorus.
However, as that route would be Hable to be cut by the
Turks at many points in case of war, an attempt to link
the Bosphorus to Southern Eussia would probably involve
Eussia against her will in an attempt to occupy a large
part, or the whole, of Asia ^Minor, for thus only could the
safety of the Black Sea coast railway be assured. That
would be a very large and a very venturesome undertaking
which might have incalculable consequences to Eussia
and to the world, for Eussia would create, on a very much
larger scale, a position similar to that which would arise
if Germany should seize Switzerland.

Greece has, on the ground of nationahty, a claim on
Smyrna, the busiest harbour of Asia Minor, which is

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 77

practically a Greek town, and on certain coastal districts,
especially about Smyrna, which are largely inhabited by
Greeks. Naturally she would Hke, with the strip of coastal
territory which is primarily Greek, a proportionate sphere
of the hinterland.

Italy retains the Island of Khodes, which, by the way,
is very largely peopled by Greeks, and she is supposed to
be desirous of obtaining a piece of the mainland from the
neighbourhood of that island to Syria to the French sphere.
The sphere claimed on her behalf is rather extensive. It
contains the excellent harbour of Adalia, in the neighbour-
hood of which she has secured concessions, and includes
territories of considerable agricultural and mineral poten-
tialities where large numbers of Italian emigrants may be
able to find a home.

Great Britain has important claims upon Mesopotamia
and the Persian Gulf, and upon Arabia, as will be shown
later on.

France has strong historic and economic claims upon
Asiatic Turkey, especially upon Syria with the Holy Places
of Christianity, and upon Cilicia, which adjoins it. Her
historic claims are so very interesting and important that
it is worth while to consider them somewhat closely.

From the earliest ages France has followed a twofold
policy towards Islam. She has been the most determined
defender of Christendom against conquering Moham-
medanism when the latter was a danger to the world. At
the same time, considering a strong Turkey a necessary
factor in Europe, she has for centuries endeavoured to
support that country. France concluded her first alliance
with Turkey in 1585 and remained Turkey's ally up to
the Peace of Versailles. Since then her place as Turkey's
champion has been taken by Germany.

On October 18, 732, Charles Martel signally defeated
the all-conquering Arabs near Tours and thus saved Europe
to Christianity. In the year 800, Charlemagne sent an
Embassy to the great Arab ruler, Haroun-al-Kashid, the

78 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey

Caliph of Baghdad, the hero of the * Arabian Nights Tales,'
and received from him the keys of the Holy Sepulchre at
Jerusalem. Henceforward France became the guardian
of the Holy Tomb, and the protectress of Christianity
against Islam. In the Crusades, which were undertaken
to rescue the Holy Sepulchre from the infidels, France
played a leading part. Godefroy de Bouillon defeated
Soliman, besieged and took the Holy City in 1099 and
was elected King of Jerusalem. Owing to the prominent
position occupied by the French as leaders of all Christianity,
European Christians in general became known in the East
as Franks and are still so called by the people. A Frankish
Kingdom existed at Jerusalem till 1291. The power of
Islam grew and King Louis the Ninth, St. Louis, one of
the greatest Kings of France, spent many years of his life
in the East, vainly trying to wrest the Holy Land fi'om the
Moslems. His attitude, and that of ancient France, towards
the Eastern Christians may be seen from the following
most interesting letter which he sent on May 21, 1250, from
Saint- Jean-d 'Acre to * I'emir des Maronites du mont Liban,
ainsi qu'au patriarche et aux évêques de cette nation ' :

Notre cœur s'est rempH de joie lorsque nous avons vu
votre fils Simon, à la tête de vingt-cinq mille hommes, venir
nous trouver de votre part pour nous apporter l'expression
de vos sentiments et nous offrir de dons, outre les beaux
chevaux que vous nous avez envoyés. En vérité la sincère
amitié que nous avons commencé à ressentir avec tant
d'ardeur pour les Maronites pendant notre séjour en Chypre
où ils sont étabHs, s'est encore augmentée.

Nous sommes persuadés que cette nation, que nous
trouvons étabhe sous le nom de Saint Maroun, est une partie
de la nation française, car son amitié pour les Français
ressemble à l'amitié que les Français se portent entre eux.
En conséquence il est juste que vous et tous les Maronites
jouissiez de la protection dont les Français jouissent près
de nous, et que vous soyez admis dans les emplois comme ils
le sont euxmêmes. . . . Quant à nous et à ceux qui nous
succéderont sur le trône de France nous promettons de vous

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 79

donner, à vous et à votre peuple, protection comme aux
Français eux-mêmes et de faire constamment ce qui sera
nécessaire pour votre bonheur.

Donné près de Saint-Jean-d'Acre, etc.

Charles the Fifth, the great Habsburg Prince, who
ruled over Germany, the Netherlands, the Franche Comté,
Italy, Spain, Portugal, and their colonies, threatened to
bring all Europe under Austria's sway. King Francis the
First of France courageously opposed him and concluded
in 1535 an alliance with Sohman the Magnificent, perhaps
the greatest ruler of Turkey, who, in 1526, at the Battle of
Mohacs, had destroyed the Hungarian armies, and who in
1529 had besieged Vienna. France discovered in Turkey
a valuable counterpoise, first to the house of Austria and
later on to Kussia. In 1535, the same year in which she
concluded the alliance with Turkey, France, who had great
commercial interests in the East and who was then the
leading Mediterranean Power, concluded a commercial
and general treaty with Turkey, the ëo-called Capitulations,
which were frequently renewed. These Treaties gave to
France a preferential position within the Turkish dominions
and made her the protectress of the Christians of aU nation-
ahties. Ever after it became a fundamental principle of
French statesmanship to maintain an aUiance with Turkey
and with Switzerland, because both countries occupied
very important strategical positions whence the central
and eastern European Powers might be held in check.
The celebrated Brantôme, who lived from 1527 till 1614,
wrote in his * Vie des Grands Capitains François ' :

J'ouys dire une fois à M. le Connétable [the highest
dignitary of France] : que les roys de France avoient deux
alHances et affinitez desquelles ne s'en dévoient jamais
distraire et despartir pour chose du monde ; l'une celle des
Suysses, et l'autre celle du grand Turc.

France had allied herself to the Turks for a threefold
reason : For protecting the Christians in the East ; for

80 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey

protecting and extending the French trade in the Levant ;
for creating a counterpoise to the ever-expanding and
dangerously strong power of the House of Ha bs burg. In
an exceedingly important Memoir which M. de Noailles,
the French Ambassador to Turkey, submitted to King
Charles the Ninth in 1572, the full text of which will be
found in Testa's * Kecueil des Traités de la Porte Ottomane,*
we read :

Sire, les rois, vos prédécesseurs, ont recherché et entre-
tenu l'intelUgence de Levant pour trois principales causes,
la première et la plus ancienne était fondée sur leur pitié
et reUgion, laquelle tendait à deux fins, savoir : à la conserva-
tion de Jésus- Christ en Jérusalem, avec la sûreté du passage
tant par terre que par mer des pèlerins qui sont conduits par
vœux et dévotion à le visiter, et à la protection duquel ils
ont toujours uniquement recouru aux dits rois pour empêcher
que les armes des infidèles ne molestassent les terres de
l'Eghse, qui sont exposées aux surprises et passages de leurs
armées de mer, étant bien certain que, sans la continuelle
et dévote assistance que vos prédécesseurs ont fait à l'un
et à l'autre, il y a longtemps que ledit Saint -Sépulcre fût
rasé, le temple de sainte Hélène converti en mosquée et toute
la rehgion romaine détruite et désolée par les invasions
circasses et turquesses.

Le second a été pour établir et conserver le trafiBc que vos
sujets, et singuhèrement ceux de Provence et Languedoc,
ont de tout temps par de ça, lequel s'est tellement augmenté
BOUS le règne du feu roi Henri et le vôtre. . . .

La troisième cause pour laquelle cette inteUigence a été
entretenu par vos prédécesseurs, et depuis quarante six ans
étreinte par les feus rois François-le- Grand et Henri, a été
pour contrepeser l'excessive grandeur de la maison d'Autriche
qui avait accumulé sous la domination sienne, ou des siens,
par succession ou usurpation, les meilleures couronnes et
états de l'Europe hors la France, laquelle depuis ce
temps-là a toujours été seule au combat, tant pour
essayer de ravoir le sien que pour aller au-devant do
l'ambition de Charles- Quint et de Phihppe, son fils, qui
ont toute leur vie troublé le mond et singuhèrement l'Aile-

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 81

magne, la France et l'Italie, pour parvenir à la tyrannie de
toute la chrétienté.

The Capitulations of 1535 were repeatedly amplified,
especially in 1604 and 1740. The Treaty of 1604, concluded
in the time of the great King Henri Quatre, is so quaint
and interesting a document and it throws so strong a hght
upon the character of Ancient Turkey and upon the unique
position which France occupied in Europe and the East
three centuries ago, that it is worth while giving some
extracts from it according to the text in St. Priest's
* Mémoires sur l'Ambassade de France en Turquie ' :

Au nom de Dieu.

L'Empereur Amat [Ahmad I], fil de l'Empereur Mehemet,
toujours victorieux,

Marque de la haute famille des Monarques Otthomans,
avec la beauté, grandeur et splendeur de laquelle tant de
pays sont conquis et gouvernez.

Moy, qui suis, par les infinies grâces du Juste, Grand et
tout-puissant Créateur et par l'abondance des miracles du
chef de ses prophètes, Empereur des victorieux Empereurs,
distributeur des couronnes aux plus grands Princes de la
terre, serviteur des deux très-sacrées villes, la Mecque et
Médine, Protecteur et Gouverneur de la Saincte Hierusalem,
Seigneur de la plus grande partie de l'Europe, Asie et Afrique,
conquise avec nostre victorieuse espée, et espouvantable
lance, à sçavoir des païs et royaumes de la Grèce, de Themis-
war, de Bosnie de Seghevar, et des païs et Eoyaumes de
l'Asie et de la NatoUe, de Caramanie, d'Egypte, et de tous
les païs des Parthes, des Curdes, Géorgiens, de la Porte de fer,
de Tiflis, du Seruan, et du païs du Prince des Tartares, nommé
Qerim [Crimea], et de la campagne nommée Cipulac, de
Cypre, de Diarbekr, d'Alep, d'Erzerum, de Damas, de Baby-
lone demeure des Princes des croyants, de Basera, d'Egypte,
de l'Arabie heureuse, d'Abes, d'Aden, de Thunis, la Goulette,
Tripoly, de Barbarie, et de tant d'autres païs, isles, destroits,
passages, peuples, familles, générations, et de tant de cent
milUons de victorieux gens de guerre qui reposent sous
l'obéissance et justice de Moy qui suis l'Empereur Amurat,

82 The Probleîn of Asiatic Turkey

fils de l'Empereur Selim, fils de l'Empereur Solyman, fils de
l'Empereur Selim. Et ce, par la grace de Dieu, Kecours
des grands Princes du monde, Èefuge des honorables
Empereurs.

Au plus glorieux, magnanime, et grand Seigneur de la
croyance de Jesus-Christ, esleu [élu] entre les Princes de la
nation du Messie, Médiateur des différents qui survien-
nent entre le peuple Chrestien, Seigneur de Grandeur,
Majesté et Eichesse, glorieuse Guide des plus grands,
Henry IV, Empereur de France, que la fin de ses jours soit
heureuse. . . .

Que les Vénitiens et Anglais en la leur, les Espagnols,
Portugais, Catalans, Ragousins, Genevois, Napohtains,
Florentins, et généralement toutes autres nations, telles
qu'elles soient, puissent Hbrement venir trafiquer par nos
pays sous l'adveu et seureté de la bannière de France, laquelle
ils porteront comme leur sauvegarde ; et, de cette façon,
ils pourront aller et venir trafiquer par les heux de nostre
Empire, comme ils y sont venus d'ancienneté, obéyssans aux
Consuls François, qui demeurent et résident en nos havres
et estapes ; voulons et entendons qu'en usant ainsi, ils
puissent trafiquer avec leurs vaisseaux et galions sans estre
inquiétez seulement tant que ledit Empereur de France
conservera nostre amitié, et ne contreviendra à celle qu'il
nous a promise.

Voulons et commandons aussi que les subjects dudit
Empereur de France et ceux des Princes ses amis aUiez,
puissent visiter les saincts lieux de Hierusalem sans qu'il
leur soit mis ou donné aucun empeschement, ny faict
tort.

De plus, pour l'honneur et amitié d'iceluy Empereur,
nous voulons que les Religieux qui demeurent en Hierusalem
et servent l'Eglise de Comame [Saint Sépulcre] y puissent
demeurer, aller et venir sans aucun trouble et empêchement,
ainsi soient bien receus, protégez, aydez, et secourus en la
considération susdite.

Derechef, nous voulons et commandons que les Vénitiens
et Anglois en cela, et toutes les autres nations aliénées de
l'amitié de nostre grande Porte, lesquelles n'y tiennent
Ambassadeur^ voulans trafiquer par nos pays, ajent à y

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 83

venir sous la bannière et protection de France, sans que
l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, ou autres ayent à les empescher
sous couleur que cette capitulation a esté insérée dans
les capitulations données de nos pères après avoir esté
escrites. . . .

Et pour autant qu'iceluy Empereur de France, est de
tous les Koys le plus noble et de la plus haute famille, et le
plus parfait amy que nos Ayeuls ayent acquis entre lesdits
Boys et Princes de la créance de Jesus-Christ, comme il
nous a témoigné par les effets de sa saincte amitié : sous
ces considérations, nous voulons et commandons que ses
Ambassadeurs qui résident à nostre heureuse Porte ayent
la préséance sur l'Ambassadeur d'Espagne et sur ceux des
Roys et Princes, soit en nostre Divan public ou autres lieux
où ils se pourront rencontrer. . . .

Que les Consuls François jouissent de ces mesmes privi-
lèges où ils résideront, et qu'il leur soit donné la mesme
préséance sur tous les autres consuls de quelque nation qu'ils
soient. ... \

Nous promettons et jurons par la vérité du grand Tout-
puissant Dieu, Créateur du ciel et de la terre, et par l'âme de
mes Ayeuls et Bisayeuls, de ne contrarier, ni contrevenir à ce
qui est porté par ce Traitté de paix et Capitulation, tant que
l'Empereur de France sera constant et ferme en la considéra-
tion de nostre amitié, acceptant dès à présent la sienne, avec
volonté d'en faire cas et de la chérir, car ainsi est nostre
intention et promesse impériale.

Escript environ le 20 may 1604.

It will be noticed that by the Treaty of 1604 the
* Empereur de France ' was made the Protector of all the
Christians in the East, that France was made the guardian
of the holy places of Christianity, that the other great
Christian nations, the Venetians, the English, the Spaniards,
the Portuguese, the Catalans, the citizens of Ragusa, the
Genoese, the Neapolitans, and the Florentines were allowed
to travel and trade freely and securely in Turkey — ^under
the French flag and protected by the Consuls of France.
At that time France was indeed * la grande nation,' and

84 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey

enjoyed the greatest prestige in the East. According to
Birch's * Memoirs of Queen EHzabeth,' ' the Turks be-
lieved for a long time that England was a Province of
France.'

When, at the time of the French Ee volution, nearly all
Europe made war upon France, France tried once more
to use Turkey against her enemies. In 1792 Citoyen
Sémonville, the French Ambassador to Turkey, was given
instructions by the Convention Nationale to secure Turkey's
support and 8,000,000 livres were placed at his disposal,
of which sum 2,000,000 were to be * exclusively used for
bribing the entourage of the Grand Vizier.' We read in
that curious document :

Le nouveau ministre national doit chercher surtout à
rompre la coalition formée contre la France par Autriche,
la Prusse et la Russie, et le meilleur moyen d'obtenir ce
résultat sera de tacher de diviser ces puissances. Il est
vrai qu'on ne saurait compter sur une assistance directe à ce
sujet, de la part de la Turquie, mais la Sublime-Porte pour-
rait être très utile en se mêlant seulement, par exemple,
des affaires de Pologne, et en tachant de mettre en discorde
les dites puissances dans ce pays-là. Pour atteindre plus
facilement ce but, Sémonville pourra disposer de 8,000,000
de Hvres, dont deux millions doivent être exclusivement
employés à corrompre les entours du grand vezir et du
reis-effendi, et à entretenir de bons espions auprès de l'inter-
nonce d'Autriche et des représentants prussien et russe ;
car il est très important de s'assurer comment chacun de
ces ministres représente, à sa cour, les affaires polonaises.

In 1795 Napoleon Buonaparte, then a young general
only twenty-six years old, had fallen into disfavour and
disgrace with the Government. He had been dismissed
from the army. He Hved in penury and obscurity, and
was unemployed and practically destitute. In his despair,
on August 30 of that year, he very humbly offered to the
Comité de Salut Public his services as an artillery officer

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 85

for service in Turkey in a little-known letter which was
worded as follows :

Dans un temps oil l'impératrice de Russie a resserré les
liens qui l'unissent à l'Autriche, il est de l'intérêt de la
France de faire tout ce qui dépend d'elle pour rendre plus
redoutables les moyens militaires de la Turquie.

Cette puissance a des miUces nombreuses et braves, mais
fort ignorantes sur les principes de l'art de guerre.

La formation et le service de l'artillerie, qui influe si
puissamment dans notre tactique moderne sur le gain des
batailles, et presque exclusivement sur la prise et la défense
des places fortes, est encore dans son enfance en Turquie.

La Porte, qui l'a senti, a plusieurs fois demandé des
officiers d'artillerie et du génie ; nous y en avons effective-
ment quelques-uns dans ce moment-ci, mais ils ne sont ni
assez nombreux ni assez instruits pour produire un résultat
de quelque conséquence.

Le général Buonaparte, qui a acquis quelque réputation
en commandant l'artillerie de nos armées en différents cir-
constances, et spécialement au siège de Toulon, s'offre
pour passer en Turquie avec une mission du gouvernement ;
il mènera avec lui six ou sept officiers dont chacun aura une
connaisance particuhère des sciences relatives à l'art de la
guerre.

S'il peut dans cette nouvelle carrière, rendre les armées
turques plus redoutables et perfectionner la défense des
places fortes de cet empire, il croira avoir rendu un service
signalé à la patrie, et avoir, à son retour, bien mérité d'elle.

Had the Comité de Salut Public accepted Napoleon's
offer, he might have Uved and died unknown to history.
The world might have been spared some of the greatest
wars.

Although the first French Republic was atheistic and
anti- Christian, it carefully continued the traditional policy
of France in the East in its threefold aspect. It strove to
maintain France's supremacy in the East, desiring to use
Turkey as a counterpoise to France's enemies, to dominate
the Near Eastern markets and to maintain its ancient

86 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey

protectorate over the Christians in the East. That may be
seen from the instructions given to the French Ambassadors.
In those sent by the First Consul Buonaparte to Ambassador
Brune on October 18, 1802, we read, for instance :

1°. L'intention du gouvernement est que l'ambassadeur
à Constantinople reprenne, par tous les moyens, la supré-
matie que la France avait depuis deux cents ans dans cette
capitale. La maison qui est occupée par l'ambassadeur
est la plus belle. Il doit tenir constamment un rang au dessus
des ambassadeurs des autres nations, et ne marcher qu'avec
un grand éclat. Il doit reprendre sous sa protection tous les
hospices et tous les chrétiens de Syrie et d'Arménie, et spécial-
ment toutes les caravanes qui visitent les Lieux-Saints,

2°. Notre commerce doit être protégé sous tous les points
de vue. Dans l'état de faiblesse où se trouve l'empire otto-
man, nous ne pouvons pas espérer qu'il fasse une diversion
en notre faveur contre l'Autriche, il ne nous intéresse donc
plus sous le rapport du commerce. Le gouvernement ne
veut souffrir aucune avarie de pachas, et la moindre insulte
à nos commerçants doit dormer heu à des expHcations fort
vives, et conduire notre ambassadeur à obtenir une satisfac-
tion éclatante. On doit accoutumer les pachas et beys des
différentes provinces à ne regarder désormais notre pavillon
qu'avec respect et considération.

3°. Dans toutes les circonstances, on ne doit pas manquer
de dire et de faire sentir que si la Eussie et l'Autriche ont
quelque intérêt de locahté à se partager les états du Grand-
Seigneur, l'intérêt de la France est de maintenir une balance
entre ces deux grandes puissances. On doit montrer des
égards à l'ambassadeur de Eussie, mais se servir souvent de
l'Ambassadeur de Prusse qui est plus sincèrement dans nos
intérêts.

4°. S'il survient des événements dans les environs de
Constantinople, offrir sa médiation à la Porte, et, en général,
saisir toutes les occasions de fixer les yeux de l'empire sur
l'ambassadeur de France. C'est d'après ce principe que le
jour de la fête du prophète il n'y a point d'inconvénient à
illuminer le palais de France selon l'usage orientale, après
toutefois s'en être expHqué avec la Porte.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 87

En fixant les yeux du peuple sur l'ambassadeur de France
avoir soin de ne jamais choquer ses mœurs et ses usages,
mais faire voir que nous nous estimons les uns les autres. . . .

It will be noticed that the French Kepubhc and Napoleon
the First followed in every particular the same policy in
Turkey which in more recent times was pursued by Prince
Bismarck and WiUiam the Second.

In the Middle Ages and in the time of the first Capitula-
tions, France could easily act as the protectress of
Christianity, for she was the strongest Power in Europe
and in the Mediterranean and nearly all important States
were Eoman Cathohc. Times have changed. The other
nations no longer trade in the East under the French flag,
or appeal to the French Consuls when they are in need
of protection. Besides, with the rise of powerful Protestant
and Greek Orthodox States and of influential Armenian,
Coptic and Abyssinian Christian Churches, France can
no longer act as the protectress of the Holy Sepulchre on
behalf of all Christendom. She acted in that capacity
for the last time during the reign of Napoleon the Third.
It is not generally known that the Crimean War was not
merely a war for the control of Constantinople, but was in
the first place a struggle for the key to the Church in
Bethlehem. Small causes often have great consequences.

As the question of the Holy Places bears directly upon
France's claim to Syria, it is worth while looking into the
genesis of the Crimean War. Beforehand, we must take
note of the pecuhar position which the various States and
reHgions occupy at the Holy Sites. A map of the Church
of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem and of the buildings
attached to it is as compHcated as a map of the Holy Koman
Empire. Certain parts of the Church building belong to
the Latin and Greek Christians in common, while others
belong exclusively to Latin Christians, Greek Christians,
Abyssinian Christians, Armenian Christians, Copts, Syrians,
Eussians, Prussians. Every carpet, picture, lamp, vase

88 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey

has its owner. Of the fifteen lamps in the Angels' Chapel
in Jerusalem, for instance, five belong to the Greek Church,
five to the Latin Church, four to the Armenian, and one
to the Coptic Chm'ch. The greatest jealousy prevails
among the different Churches and nationahties. The
displacement of a Greek lamp or vase by a Latin one might
create a riot. Property of various Churches has been
displaced, stolen or burned by other Churches and sanguinary
fights have often occurred within the Holy precincts. Men
of the same religion, but belonging to different Churches,
are unfortunately frequently animated by a bhnd and
passionate zeal, and religious ceremonies performed in
their presence in an unorthodox manner appear to them
not merely a sacrilege but a deadly insult which calls for
blood. To avoid a colUsion, the Turks have devised the
most minute regulations. Still they have not been able
to prevent the Churches encroaching upon the rights of
their rivals.

During the Napoleonic period, France had taken
comparatively httle interest in the Holy Land and the
Greek Church had encroached upon the position of the
Latins. That encroachment was the direct cause of the
Crimean War. La 1854, when the war began, the British
Government pubHshed a Blue Book of 1029 pages, con-
taining nearly 1200 largely abbreviated documents. If
their full text had been given the volume would probably
have exceeded 2000 pages. That pubUcation furnished
an account of the causes of the war and was significantly
entitled ' Correspondence respecting the Eights and
Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey.'
In that correspondence various Church properties, and
especially the key to the Church at Bethlehem, played a
very great part.

As early as May 20, 1850, Sir Stratford Canning informed
Lord Palmerston :

My Lord, — A question Hkely to be attended with much
discussion and excitement is on the point of being raised

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 89

between the conflicting interests of the Latin and Greek
Churches in this country. The immediate point of diffe-
rence is the right of possession to certain portions of the
Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem.

General Aupick [the French Ambassador] has assured
me that the matter in dispute is a mere question of property
and of express treaty stipulation. But it is difficult to
separate any such question from poHtical considerations,
and a struggle of general influence, especially if Eussia, as
may be expected, should interfere in behalf of the Greek
Church, will probably grow out of the impending discussion.

Soon the question of the key to the Bethlehem Church
came to the front and monopolised the attention of all
European capitals and Cabinets. On February 9, 1852,
Aali Pasha wrote to M. de Lavalette :

La Grotte qui est la Sainte Crèche est aujourd'hui un
lieu visité par les diverses nations Chrétiennes, et il est
étabh depuis un très ancient temps qu'une clef de la porte du
coté du nord de la grande éghse à Bethléem, une clef de la
porte du coté du midi de cette éghse, et une clef de la porte
de la grotte susmentionnée, doivent se trouver entre les
mains des prêtres Latins aussi. En cas donc que ces clefs
ne se trouvent point en la possession des Latins, il faut qu'on
leurj^donne une clef de chacune de ces trois portes, pour qu'ils
les aient comme par le passé.

The Sultan, as the sovereign and ground landlord,
was called upon to decide between the quarrelhng Churches,
and he endeavoured to arrange matters by a Firman which
was to be pubhcly read. His attempt proved a failure.
Consul Finn reported to the Earl of Malmesbury on
October 27, 1852, from Jerusalem :

Afif Bey invited all the parties concerned to meet him
in the Church of the Virgin near Gethsemane. There he
read an Order of the Sultan for permitting the Latins to
celebrate Mass once a year, but requiring the altar and its
ornaments to remain undisturbed. No sooner were these
words uttered than the Latins, who had come to receive

90 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey

their triumph over the Orientals, broke out into loud ex-
clamations of the impossibiUty of celebrating Mass upon a
schismatic slab of marble, with a covering of silk and gold
instead of plain linen, among schismatic vases, and before
a crucifix which has the feet separated instead of nailed one
over the other.

The French Government backed up the Latin, and
the Kussian Government the Greek, Church. The rehgious
differences soon assumed a pohtical aspect. Kussia began
to threaten the Sultan with her army, and France with her
fleet. Colonel Eose reported on November 20, 1852, to
the Earl of Malmesbury :

The Porte's position is most disadvantageous. Against
all her wishes and interests she has been dragged into a most
dangerous and difficult dispute between the Great Powers,
who found their respective claims on contradictory docu-
ments, which date fiom remote and dark ages. The Porte,
a Mohammedan Power, is called on to decide a quarrel which
involves, ostensibly, sectarian Christian rehgious feehngs,
but which, in reahty, is a vital struggle between France and
Kussia for pohtical influence, at the Porte's cost in her
dominions.

Continuing, he reported that the Sultan had been
threatened by France with a blockade of the Dardanelles,
while the Kussian representative had declared that he
would leave Constantinople unless his demands were ful-
filled. A few weeks later Colonel Kose informed the Earl
of Malmesbury :

The complaints of the Kussian Legation here against the
Porte in the Jerusalem question are two, an ostensible one
and an undefined one. The first is that the Firman to the
Greeks has not been read in Jerusalem in full Council, and
in the presence of the patriarchs and clergy of all the diffe-
rent sects. The second one is as to dehvery of the key of the
great door of the Church at Bethlehem to the Latins.

The quarrel about the Holy Places, and especially

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 91

about the celebrated key, became more and more
acrimonious. On January 28, 1853, Lord John Kussell.
wrote regretfully from the Foreign Office to Lord Cowley :

To a Government taking an impartial view of these
affairs, an attitude so threatening on both sides appears
very lamentable. We should deeply regret any dispute
that might lead to a conflict between two of the Great
Powers of Europe ; but when we reflect that the quarrel is
for exclusive privileges in a spot near which the Heavenly
Host proclaimed peace on earth and goodwill towards men
— when we see rival Churches contending for mastery in
the very place where Christ died for mankind — ^the thought
of such a spectacle is melancholy indeed.

The Latins, backed by France, possessed keys to the
two side-doors of the Church at Bethleham, but not the
key of the main entrance, which was in the hands of the
Greek Church. Failing to receive the key, the French
Consul resolved to use force and had the main entrance
broken open by locksmiths. His action led to the following
protest on the part of Kussia :

Nous laisserons le Ministère Français juge de la pénible
sm^prise que nous avons éprouvée en apprenant qu'à son
retour à Constantinople, après un court séjour en France,
M. de La valet te avait soulevé de nouveau la question, en
exigeant de la Porte, en termes peremptoires, et sous menace
d'une rupture avec la France, la suppression du dernier
Firman ; l'envoi à Jerusalem d'un Commissaire Turc, avec
de nouvelles instructions ; la remise au clergé Latin de la clef
et de la garde de la grande Eghse à Bethléem ; le placement
sur l'autel de la Grotte de la Nativité d'une étoile aux armes
de la France, qui s'y trouvait, dit-on, jadis, et qui en avait
été enlevée ; l'adjonction au Couvent Latin de Jerusalem
d'une bâtisse attenante à la coupole du Saint Sépulcre ;
d'autres concessions enfin, qui de loin peuvent paraître des
minuties, mais qui, sur les Heux, et aux yeux des populations
indigènes, y compris même les Musulmans, sont autant de
passe-droits et d'empiétements sur les autres communautés

92 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey

Chrétiennes, autant de motifs de dissensions et de haine
entre elle et l'EgHse Eomaine, dont on prétend soutenir par
ces moyens les intérêts.

Il nous répugne de faire mention ici des scènes scandal-
euses qui ont déjà eu lieu à Jerusalem par suite de ces mesures,
auxquelles la Porte a eu la faiblesse de prêter la main, et
qui ont déjà reçu en partie leur exécution contrairement à
la teneur du dernier Firman, dont, par une autre contradic-
tion étrange, on donnait lecture aux autorités locales au
moment même où l'on chargeait celles-ci d'en violer les
dispositions principales.

D'après les derniers rapports que nous avons de la Syrie
et de Constantinople, les choses en étaient venues à Jerusalem
à ce point de confusion et de désordre que, tandis qu'un^
prélat Catholique, assisté du Consul de France, appelait à
son aide les serruriers de la ville pour se faire ouvrir la
grande porte de l'Eglise de Bethléem, bien que l'accès lui
fut ouvert par deux autres portes latérales, le Patriarche de
Jerusalem, Cyrille, vieillard vénérable, et généralement
connu par son esprit concihant et la moderation de son
caractère, se voyait obUgé de protester par écrit contre ces
actes de violence, et de partir pour Constantinople, afin
de porter ses plaintes et celles de sa nation au Sultan.

On February 9, 1853, Sir G. H. Seymour, the British
Ambassador in Petrograd, had an important conversation
with Count Nesselrode, the Eussian Chancellor, regarding
the Franco-Eussian dispute, and the celebrated key occupied
once more the place of honour. The British Ambassador
reported :

. . . Count Nesselrode observed : * We have no wish
to demand the restoration of the key of the Bethlehem
Church.' As it is always desirable to guard against misap-
prehensions, I ventured to enquire whether, in this case, a
key meant an instrument for opening a door, only not to be
employed in closing that door against Christians of other
sects ; or whether it was simply a key — an emblem. Count
Nesselrode replied, unhesitatingly, that his meaning was
that the key was to be used in giving the Latins access to

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 93

the Church, but not to be used for securing the door against
Greeks and other Christians.

At last Kussia sent Turkey an ultimatum regarding the
Holy Places in the form of proposals which were pressingly
put forward by Prince Menchikoff, and once more the
Bethlehem key was a chief object of contention. It made
its appearance in the first article of that document. Com-
menting on that ultimatum, Lord Stratford de EedcHfïe,
formerly Sir Stratford Canning, wrote to the Earl of
Clarendon :

All the proposals or demands in question, with two or
three exceptions, refer to the Greek clergy and Churches in
Turkey. They amount in substance to the conclusion of a
Treaty stipulating that Eussia shall enjoy the exclusive
right of intervening for the effectual protection of all
members of the Greek Church, and of the interests of the
Churches themselves ; that the privileges of the four Greek
patriarchs shall be effectually confirmed, and the patriarchs
shall hold their preferment for hfe, independently of the
Porte's approval.

The Crimean War arose out of a quarrel between the
Greek and Latin Churches. It was largely caused by the
fact that Kussia was unwilling to allow France to remain
any longer the protectress of Christianity in the East.

The Holy Places have for centuries been in the guardian-
ship of the Turks, and the Turks, being Mohammedans,
have been able to act as disinterested, and therefore
impartial, guardians. Great jealousy prevails between
Catholics and Protestants, between the Eastern and the
Western Churches. All the other Churches would keenly
resent it if France, by the acquisition of Syria, should
obtain the guardianship of the Holy Places, and even the
Eoman Catholics belonging to other nations would be
dissatisfied. Eussia has assumed a leading position in the
Holy Land. Every year enormous pilgrimages leave
Eussia for Jerusalem, and on the heights which command

94 The Prohleyn of Asiatic Turkey

Jerusalem and Bethlehem the Eussian Church has erected
huge buildings for its pilgrims which overshadow these
towns. In 1896 M. Emile Delmas wrote very truly in his
book * Egypte et Palestine ' : * La Russie qui est partout
ailleurs notre amie, est, dans le Levant, notre rivale
persévérante.* France's guardianship of the Holy Places
would be disliked by other nations and possibly by Russia
herself. It might involve France in most serious troubles.
France has strong economic interests in Syria and CiHcia,
where she has built railways and harbour works, and where
she possesses numerous schools, clerical establishments, &c.
Syria and CiHcia possess very great agricultural and mineral
possibilities. If France wishes to occupy and exploit
these territories she would probably act wisely in excluding
the Holy Places, putting these under an international
guardianship. However, that step would no doubt greatly
reduce the value of Syria in the eyes of the French people.
Much of its attraction would be gone.

The control of the Asiatic shore of the Black Sea would
be convenient to Russia, supposing she occupied Constanti-
nople, but it would, as has been shown, scarcely benefit
her unless she had the hinterland as well. The possession
of Sjrria would gratify, but would only moderately benefit,
France.

The control of Mesopotamia and of the Persian Gulf
and of Arabia seems almost a necessity to the British
Empire for strategical and economic reasons. Admiral
Mahan wrote in his book * Retrospect and Prospect ' :

The control of the Persian Gulf by a foreign State of
considerable naval potentiahty, a * fleet in being * there,
based upon a strong military port, would reproduce the
relations of Cadiz, Gibraltar, and Malta to the Mediterranean.
It would flank all the routes to the Farther East, to India,
and to Austraha, the last two actually internal to the
Empire regarded as a political system ; and, although at
present Great Britain unquestionably could check such a
fleet so placed by a division of her own, it might well require

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 95

a detachment large enough to affect seriously the general
strength of her naval position.

A glance at the map confirms Admiral Mahan's state-
ment. However, the control not only of the Persian Gulf
but of Mesopotamia also is an important British interest.
India is strongly protected towards the north and north-
west by enormous mountains, but can comparatively
easily be invaded by way of Mesopotamia and Persia, by
the road taken by Alexander the Great and other conquerors,
by which, as has been shown above, the railways of the
future will connect India with Central Europe. Great
Britain, as India's guardian, is therefore strongly interested
that that most important Une of approach should not be
dominated by a great military Power to India's danger.
Besides, England is on India's behalf strongly interested
in Mesopotamia for economic reasons. India suffers from
two evils : from famine and from over-population. Mesopo-
tamia hes at India's door and can, as will presently be
shown, produce enormous quantities of food and receive
many millions of immigrants. As the climate of Mesopo-
tamia is not very suitable for Europeans, it is only logical
that over-populated India should be given an outlet upon
the Euphrates and Tigris. Great Britain has a good claim
upon the control of Mesopotamia. She has developed
the trade along its rivers. British archaeologists and
engineers have explored the country, and British men of
action have for decades striven to recreate its pros-
perity. Lastly, EngHshmen have conquered it.

Mesopotamia has almost unlimited agricultural pos-
sibiHties. Babylonia and Assyria were the cradle of
Christian civiHsation and perhaps of mankind. Chapter ii.
verse 8, of the Book of Genesis tells us : * And the Lord
God planted a garden eastward in Eden ; and there he
put the man whom he had formed.' The word * Eden '
is the Sumerian word, as Assyriologists have told us, for
plain. The ancient Babylonians al^o had a myth of a

96 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey

great plain in the centre of which stood the Tree of Know-
ledge, and they possessed likewise the story of the Flood
and of the Ark. In Genesis, chapter ii. verse 14, we
read in the description of Paradise : * And the name of the
third river is Hiddekel : that is it which goeth toward the
east of Assyria. And the fourth river is Euphrates.'
Assyriologists tell us that the four rivers mentioned in the
Bible were the Euphrates and Tigris, and two of the huge
artificial canals which the ancients had constructed. In
chapter x. of Genesis we are made acquainted with Nimrod,
Babel, Erech, Accad, Calneh, Nineveh, and other Baby-
lonian names. Ur on the Euphrates near Babylon was
the birthplace of Abraham. The ancient Jews placed their
Paradise in Eden because Eden, the Mesopotamian plain,
was then the garden of the world. Herodotus, who had
visited Mesopotamia and the town of Babylon, and who
wrote about the year 450 b.c., has told us — the translation
is Eawlinson's :

But httle rain falls in Assyria, enough, however, to make
the corn begin to sprout, after which the plant is nourished
and the ears formed by means of irrigation from the river.
For the river does not, as in Egypt, overflow the corn-lands
of its own accord, but is spread over them by the hand, or
by the help of engines. The whole of Babylonia is, like
Egypt, intersected with canals. The largest of them all,
which runs towards the winter sun, and is impassable except
in boats, is carried from the Euphrates into another stream,
called the Tigris, the river upon which the town of Nineveh
formerly stood.

Of all the countries that we know, there is none which is
so fruitful in grain. It makes no pretension, indeed, of
growing the fig, the olive, the vine, or any other tree of the
kind, but in grain it is so fruitful as to yield commonly two
hundredfold. The blade of the wheat plant and barley
plant is often four fingers in breadth. As for the millet and
the sesame, I shall not say to what height they grow, though
within my own knowledge, for I am not ignorant that what
I have already written concerning the fruitfulness of Baby-

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 97

Ionia must seem incredible to those who have never visited
the country.

Among the many proofs which I shall bring forward of
the power and resources of the Babylonians the following is
of special account. The whole country under the domina-
tion of the Persians, besides paying a fixed tribute, is par-
celled out into divisions to supply food to the Great King and
his Army. Now, out of the twelve months of the year,
the district of Babylon furnished food during four, the other
regions of Asia during eight ; by which it appears that
Assyria, in respect of resources, is one-third the whole of
Asia.

Quintus Cur tins, who wrote about 50 b.c., told ub :

The pasturage between the Tigris and the Euphrates is
represented as so rich and luxuriant that the inhabitants
restrain the cattle feeding lest they should die by a surfeit.
The cause of this fertihty is the humidity circulated through
the soil by subterranean streams, replenished from the two
Kivers.

The great fruitfulness of Babylonia was praised by
many ancient writers, such as Theophrastus, a disciple of
Aristotle, Berosus, Strabo, Pliny, &c. According to
Herodotus (III. 91, 92) Babylonia and Susiana paid to
Darius a tribute of 1300 talents per year, and Egypt of
only 700. Apparently Mesopotamia was at the time
almost twice as wealthy as Egypt. According to the
ancient writers, the fruitfulness of Babylonia exceeded
that of Egypt. The account of the size of the town of
Babylon given by Herodotus seems at first sight exaggerated.
It seems incredible that Babylon should have covered an
area five times as large as that of Paris. According to the
account of Herodotus the circumference of the town was
480 stades, or 56 miles. On the other hand, the circum-
ference of the town was, according to Strabo, 385 stades ;
according to Quintus Curtius, 368 stades ; according to
CHtarchus, 365 stades ; and according to Ctesias, 360
stades. Four of the estimates given are strangely similar.

98 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey

As Babylon possessed an outer and an inner wall, it is
assumed by many that Herodotus gave figures for the outer
and the other writers for the inner line of fortifications.

Enormous towns testify to the wealth and populousness
of a country. After Babylon's destruction it became a
quarry and Seleucia and Ctesiphon were built with the
stones of that city. The former town had, in the time of
Pliny, 600,000 inhabitants, and 500,000 when destroyed
by Cassius in a.d. 165. Ctesiphon, when taken by Severus
in A.D. 232, must have been approximately as large, for
it furnished 100,000 prisoners.

Assyria and Babylonia were the wealthiest countries
of antiquity, and Mesopotamia was the richest part of the
great Persian Empire. Persia's wealth was chiefly Baby-
lonian wealth. In the Middle Ages, Baghdad arose among
the Babylonian ruins, and between the tenth and eleventh
centuries it had 2,000,000 inhabitants, 60,000 baths, 80,000
bazaars, &c. It was the capital of the gigantic Arab Em-
pire, the wealth of which was founded upon the flourishing
agriculture of the Babylonian plain.

In olden times Babylonia was perfectly irrigated. Under
the Turks, the wonderful system of canals fell into neglect.
The Babylonian plain became partly a desert and partly
a swamp. Mesopotamia, which, in olden times, was the
most densely populated part of the world, is at present the
most sparsely peopled part of the Turkish Empire, as will
be seen by reference to the table given in the beginning
of this chapter. All Mesopotamia has at present only
2,000,000 inhabitants, or fourteen people per square mile.

Sir William Willcocks, a very eminent engineer, who
has surveyed the country and planned a gigantic irrigation
system, dehvered, on March 25, 1903, before the Khedivial
Geographical Society at Cairo, a lecture on the irrigation
of Mesopotamia, in the course of which he stated :

We have before us the restoration of that ancient land
whose name was a synonym for abundance, prosperity, and
grandeur foi many generations. Kecords as old as those of

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 99

Egypt and as well attested tell of fertile lands and teeming
populations, mighty kings and warriors, sages and wise
men, over periods of thousands of years. And over and
above everything else there is this unfailing record that the
teeming wealth of this land was the goal of all Eastern
conquerors and its possession the crown of their conquests.
The Eastern Power which held this land in old historic
days held the East. A land such as this is worth resuscitat-
ing. Once we have apprehended the true cause of its present
desolate and abandoned condition we are on our way to
restoring it to its ancient fertiUty. A land which so readily
responded to ancient science and gave a return which
sufficed for the maintenance of a Persian Court in all its
splendour will surely respond to the efforts of modern science
and return manifold the money and talent spent on its
regeneration. ... Of all the regions of the earth, no region
is more favoured by Nature for the production of cereals
than the lands on the Tigris. Indeed, I have heard our
former President, Dr. Schweinfurth, say, in this very hall,
that wheat, in its wild uncultivated state, has its home
in these semi-arid regions and from here it has been trans-
ported to every quarter of the globe. Cotton, sugar-cane,
Indian corn, and all the summer products of Egypt will
flourish here as on the Nile, while the winter products of
cereals, leguminous plants, Egyptian clover, opium, and
tobacco will find themselves at home as they do in Egypt.
Of the historic gardens of Babylon and Bagdad it is not
necessary for me to speak. A land whose climate allows
her to produce such crops in tropical profusion, and whose
snow-fed rivers permit of perennial irrigation over millions
of acres, cannot be barren and desolate when the Bagdad
Eailway is traversing her fields and European capital is
seeking a remunerative outlet.

According to the painstaking and conscientious investiga-
tions of Sir William Willcocks, the irrigable area of Meso-
potamia is from two to three times as large as that of Egypt.
It follows that that country should be able to nourish
from two to three times as many people as Egypt, that
its population might be increased from 2,000,000 to about

100 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey

30,000,000. Mesopotamia might once more become one
of the great granaries of the world, and owing to its position
it ought obviously to become the granary of famine-stricken
and over-populated India. Mesopotamia might become,
and ought to become, another, and a greater, Egypt under
the united efforts of Great Britain and India. Great
Britain's experience in Egypt and in India in the best
methods of irrigation should convert the Babylonian waste
once more into a paradise.

One of the most important routes, if not the most
important, of the British Empire is the sea-route from
England to India and Australia by way of the Suez Canal.
Admiral Mahan has stated that the control of the Persian
Gulf is an important British interest because thence a
flank attack may be made on the sea-route to India and
China. A glance at the map shows that the control of
the Ked Sea is at least as important because the Bed Sea
is merely a prolongation of the Suez Canal. The Red Sea
and the Persian Gulf are long and narrow inlets from the
shores of which British shipping can easily be attacked
by means of mines, submarines, and torpedo boats. It
is therefore clear that Great Britain is most strongly
interested in the integrity of the shores both of the Persian
Gulf and of the Red Sea. Arabia forms the eastern shore
of the Red Sea and the western shore of the Persian Gulf.
As Great Britain is vitally interested in the integrity of
the Persian Gulf and of the Red Sea, she is equally strongly
interested in the integrity of Arabia. A hostile Power
controlling Arabia might make both inlets untenable to
Great Britain and block the Suez Canal somewhere between
Suez and Aden. Great Britain and India have shown in
the past that they are strongly interested in the integrity
both of Southern Persia, which forms the eastern shore of
the Persian Gulf, and of Arabia. A hostile Power con-
trolUng Arabia could not only attack British shipping in
the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, but could attack the
Suez Canal as well.

Great Problems of Britishi^iaUàmakfïvi'p\ \ ..loi

On the eastern shore of the Ked Sea lie the Holy Places
of Mohammedanism, Mecca, and Medina. AU Moham-
medans desire that their Holy places should be controlled
by an independent Mohammedan Power, not by Christian
States. Great Britain is certain to respect that wish.

If the 'arguments given in these pages should, after a
careful scrutiny, be found correct, it would appear that
the problem of Asiatic Turkey can be solved only by placing
the country under a European guardianship, and the
question arises whether several Powers or a single one
should fill this office. As several Powers possess strong
interests in Asiatic Turkey, and as the country is of the
greatest strategical importance, the ideal solution would
seem to be a joint guardianship exercised by some body
either on behalf of all Europe or on behalf of the victorious
Entente Powers. It is questionable, however, whether the
Powers exercising control over one of the most valuable
and important territories in the world will be able to act
in harmony.

Natura non facit saltum. A guardianship should not
be imposed upon Turkey by violent measures. It might
be exercised by means of the strictest financial control.
A European financial authority might be made to control
and direct the entire expenditure of Asiatic Turkey, and
might by purely financial means keep the country in order
and shape its poHcy and internal development. If we
look for a precedent we find one in the Caisse de la Dette,
a Turkish organisation directed by Europeans which has
managed the Turkish finances with conspicuous honesty
and abihty without causing serious international friction.
However, the example of the Caisse de la Dette supplies
a false analogy. The European nations acted in harmony,
when represented ;by that body, because the Caisse had no
pohtical power. That power was exercised by the Sultan
and his advisers. Hence, the European nations intrigued
against each other not in the Caisse de la Dette but around
the Sultan and his Government. If the Caisse de la Dette

loi: '^ï^elPf<mefr>. of Asiatic Turkey

should be given control over the Turkish Government its
harmony would probably come to an end and the European
Powers would strive to influence the policy of Asiatic Turkey
by bringing pressure to bear upon the international j&nancial
commission of supervision.

A condominium, whenever and wherever tried, has
proved a failure and a danger. If the European Powers
should desire to convert Asiatic Turkey into a peaceful and
prosperous buffer State, into a gigantic Switzerland, by
means of a European guardianship, the duty of controUing,
modernising, and developing the country should be left
to a single and a non-miUtary, and therefore non-aggressive,
Power acting on behalf of Europe. At first sight it would
appear that some small and capable State such as Sweden,
Holland or Belgium might act in that capacity. But there
are several objections to trusting the guardianship of so
large and so important a country to a small State. Swedes,
Dutchmen, and Belgians have little experience in dealing with
Mohammedans. Belonging to a small State, they would
not enjoy sufficient prestige with the Turks. Last, but
not least, there would always be the danger that a small
State furnishing the guardians of Turkey might be influenced
in its poUcy by the attitude of a powerful neighbour State
which thus would be able to influence the guardian of
Asiatic Turkey to its own advantage. If the European
Powers should decide to place Turkey under a guardianship,
a single, a strong, a non-mihtary and therefore non-aggi'es-
sive Power experienced in managing Mohammedans should
be selected. The only Power possessing these quahfications
is Great Britain. Great Britain might convert Asiatic
Turkey into another, and a greater, Egypt. Outwardly it
would remain an independent State with Sultan, &c. How-
ever, an inconspicuous representative of the guardian Power,
called Adviser or Consul- General, would control the Turkish
administrative and executive absolutely by controlUng the
entire finances of the country.

Asiatic Turkey, hke Egypt, would not need, and should

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 103

not possess, a real army. A police force and a gendarmerie,
possibly supported by a few thousand soldiers in case of
internal troubles, should suffice. The entire energy of
the Asiatic Turks should be concentrated upon the develop-
ment of the country. Only then would Turkey cease to
be a danger to other nations and to itself.

Great Britain would derive no benefit from its guardian-
ship, except the benefit of peace. Her activity on behalf
of Europe would be distinctly unprofitable to herself.
It is true that the Turks would have to pay salaries to a
number of British officials — a paltry matter — and that
Great Britain might possibly provide some of the capital
needed for developing the country. However, Great
Britain will, after the War, have no capital to spare for
exotic enterprises. All her surplus capital will be required
for developing the Motherland and Empire. Besides,
she has no superabundance of able administrators available
for the service of Turkey and of other semi-civilised States.
Great Britain would see in a guardianship over Turkey
rather a duty than an advantage.

li the War, as seems likely, should end in the victory
of the Entente Powers, France will probably receive Alsace-
Lorraine and possibly further German territory. Eussia
will probably obtain considerable territory from Germany
and Austria-Hungary and may receive Constantinople.
Great Britain will obtain practically no material com-
pensation, for the German Colonies can scarcely be con-
sidered as such. Great Britain has not fought for territory
but for peace. The neutralisation of Asiatic Turkey appears
to be the most necessary step for preventing the outbreak
of another world- war. While Eussia and France demand
valuable territories as a reward, Great Britain is surely
entitled to demand stability and peace as a compensation.
No Englishman has expressed the wish that Great Britain
should acquire Asiatic Turkey. The aim of the British
Government and of all Europe should be to enable Turkey
to govern herself. But in order to be able to govern herself

104 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey

Turkey must be taught the art of government, and Great
Britain might be her teacher.

It seems necessary for the peace of the world that Asiatic
Turkey in its entirety should be neutraHsed, and it seems
likely that its neutraHty can be maintained only if order
and good government are introduced into the country
under the auspices of a strong but non-military and unaggres-
sive State, such as Great Britain, which is not Hkely ever
to use the unrivalled position occupied by the Turkish
provinces as a base for attacking the neighbouring Powers
with a large army. A British guardianship would of course
not prevent French, Eussian, Italian, and Greek capital
and labour participating with England in the Government
and economic development of the country, in accordance
with the policy laid down by the European Powers in concert
and executed by Great Britain as their appointed guardian.
Thus Eussia might develop Armenia, IVance Syria and
CiUcia, Italy the district of Adalia, and Greece that of
Smyrna.

If, on the other hand, the Powers should not be able
to agree to a British guardianship, it would become necessary
to divide Asiatic Turkey into zones of influence. In that
case, the Turks would probably be restricted to a compara-
tively narrow territory in the centre of Asia Minor. Being
cut off from the sea and lacking great natural resources,
the few million Turks would scarcely be able to retain
their independence for long. Asiatic Turkey in its totality
would be partitioned by the Powers. Great Britain would
probably claim the control, in some form or other, of both
Mesopotamia and Arabia as her share. However, it seems
very doubtful whether the partition of Asiatic Turkey
would prove a final one. It is much to be feared that it
would lead to a disaster perhaps as great as the present
War.

CHAPTER IV

THE PROBLEM OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY ^

The War, as far as the land campaign is concerned, may-
end in three different ways. It may end in the victory
of Germany and of Austria-Hungary, it may lead to the
exhaustion of the land Powers engaged in it, and may thus
remain undecided, or it may result in the defeat of Germany
and Austria-Hungary. In each of these three eventualities,
the question as to the position and future of the Dual
Monarchy wiU be of the very greatest interest and importance
not only to all Europe but to the world.

The War has yielded a twofold surprise to all who are
interested in military affairs. The Germans have fought far
better, and the Austrians infinitely worse, than was generally
expected. At the beginning of the War the Austrian armies
utterly collapsed. It was expected by the German General
Staff that their Austrian alHes would be able to hold back
the Russian hosts from the Austro- German frontiers until
the Germans had destroyed the French armies, taken Paris,
and occupied the most valuable portions of France. Instead
of this, Austria suffered at the hands of Russia the most
disastrous defeat in her history, a defeat compared with
which her defeat at Kôniggràtz and France's defeat at Sedan
appear unimportant. GaHcia, the Bukovina, and part of
Hungary, districts inhabited by about 10,000,000 people
and possessed of enormous resources of every kind, with
Lemberg, the third largest Austrian town, were overrun by

^ The Nineteenth Century and After, November, 1914. .
105

106 The Problem of Austria-Hungary

Eussia, and even the little army of poor and war-exhausted
Serbia utterly defeated the numerically far stronger Austrian
forces sent against it. Prince Lichnowsky, referring to
Austria-Hungary, said, not without reason, to a friend
shortly before leaving London : * Germany goes to war with
a corpse hanging round her neck.*

Owing to the initial collapse of the Austrian army and
the truly wonderful achievements of the Germans against
heavy odds — achievements which one could frankly admire,
had the German soldiers by their brutahty and unspeakable
crimes not covered the German name with everlasting infamy
— ^Germany took the conduct of war completely into her
own hands and Austria became a mere cypher. The Austrian
army commanders and the Austrian Chief of the General
Staff were dismissed, and for all practical purposes the
Austrian army became an adjunct and a subordinate portion
of the German army. Austria's dependence upon Germany
was formerly disguised. Berlin did not wish to hurt the
susceptibilities of Vienna, and allowed the Austrians to
make a brave show and to pose as a Great Power. To humour
their vanity, Austrian statesmen were permitted to * lead
off* when the War for the hegemony in Europe and the
mastery of the world had been resolved upon in Berhn.
But the relations between Germany and Austria-Hungary
will never again resemble those which existed before the War.
The rulers and people of the Dual Monarchy have become
aware that they depend upon Germany's good will for their
very existence. The German people, and especially the
German officers, refer to beaten and decadent Austria with
undisguised contempt. Austria's independence is a thing of
the past. She is at present a German vassal. What will
be her future ?

If Germany should be victorious in the War on land, or
if the campaign should end undecided, Austria-Hungary
will continue to be a German appendage and for all practical
purposes a subject State. There may still be an Austrian
Emperor in Vienna, but he will be a German puppet, not

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 107

only in all questions of foreign policy, but in domestic,
administrative, and military matters as well. Germany will
certainly not relinquish her present control over the Austrian
army. Macht'politih, the policy of power, will exact pay-
ment and punishment from Austria's weakness and failure.
We must, therefore, reckon with the fact that if the War
should end in a draw, Germany and Austria-Hungary will
form a single State, possibly even in outward form. It is
conceivable that Austria-Hungary will have to enter the
German Federation. At any rate, it seems Ukely that the
German Emperor will, in case of a drawn war, rule in the
near future over 120,000,000 people and dispose of an active
army of 12,000,000 men in case of war ; that Pola, Fiume,
and Cattaro will be German war harbours in addition to
Kiel, Wilhelmshaven, and Emden ; that a vigorous policy
of Germanisation will take place throughout Austria-
Hungary ; that the Austrian Slavs will gradually become
Germans ; that the power of Germany will be doubled even
if she should not be able to retain any of her conquests. If,
on the other hand, Germany and Austria-Hungary should
be victorious on land, Germany's predominance would become
not merely European but world-wide. In that case, she
would retain in the West all Belgium and a large part of
Eastern France ; and Holland, wedged into German territory,
would undoubtedly be compelled to enter the German
Federation. In the East she would annex Kussian Poland,
and the formerly German Baltic Provinces of Kussia,
Li viand, Esthland, and Courland. In addition, Germany
would very hkely take the French colonies. Austria-
Hungary would receive a portion of Western Eussia and all
Serbia, and she would probably punish Italy's desertion by
once more converting Lombardy and Venetia into Aus-
trian provinces. For all practical purposes Germany and
Austria-Hungary would thus be a single State of 150,000,000
inhabitants, or more.

As France and Eussia would be crippled for many
decades, the great German Empire would dominate the

108 The Problem of Austria-Hungary

Balkan States and Turkey, and these would become German
protectorates. Stretching from Calais, from Havre, or
perhaps from Cherbourg, to the vicinity of Petrograd,
and from the Itahan plain to Constantinople, and to the
lands beyond the Bosphorus far into Asia, Germany, together
with her protectorates, would form a gigantic and compact
State of more than 200,000,000 inhabitants. It would
control the most valuable strategical positions in Europe
and on the Mediterranean. It would dispose of unlimited
armies, unlimited resources, and unlimited wealth. The
HohenzoUerns would rule a State far larger than the Empire
of Charlemagne. WiUiam the Second would rule the
world, for the British Empire and the United States com-
bined would scarcely be able to resist Germany for long.
Although in the present war Great Britain should be
victorious at sea, her ultimate downfall and that of the
United States would probably be merely a question of
time. Germany would rule the world, unless the power
she had gained was wrested from her in a still greater war
than the present one by the combined Anglo-Saxon, Latin,
and Slav nations. A subordinate Austria-Hungary, which
would vastly increase Germany's population and army and
which, besides, would form a bridge between Germany
and Constantinople, would evidently play a very important
part in enabling Germany to recreate the Empire of
Charlemagne on a vastly increased scale.

The military weakness of Austria-Hungary and her
internal divisions may lead to her absorption into Germany
if the land war should prove indecisive or if it should end
in a German victory. In either case, Austria-Hungary
might gradually become a homogeneous, centralised, Prus-
sianised, and powerful, though dependent, State, a kind
of Greater Bavaria, and her accession would enormously
increase Germany's power on land and sea.

However, it seems unhkely that Germany and Austria-
Hungary will be victorious, or that the War will end in

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 109

a draw. In these circumstances it is worth while consider-
ing closely the future of Austria-Hungary in cage of an
Austro- German defeat.

Austria-Hungary is not a modern State but a medieval
survival. Modern States are erected on the broad basis
of a common nationality. In modern States, State and
nation are synonymous terms, and the people feel that
they constitute a single family in a world of strangers.
In Austria-Hungary, as in Turkey, the State is not formed
by a politically organised nation. Austria-Hungary, like
Turkey, is a country which is inhabited, not by a nation,
but by a number of nations which have little in common
and which hate and persecute one another.

The Habsburg family possesses certain very marked
hereditary peculiarities. The hanging Habsburg hp and
the long narrow jaws may be traced back through generation
after generation as far as the fifteenth century. King
Alphonso of Spain curiously resembles his great ancestor,
the Emperor Charles the Fifth, who ruled four centuries
ago. Certain traits of character of the Habsburg family
are equally persistent, and among these the spirit of
acquisitiveness is particularly- marked. The Habsburgs
have been the most successful family of matrimonial and
land speculators known to history. While most dynasties
rosej^ to eminence by- placing themselves Tat J the head of
great nations and by conducting successful wars of conquest,
the Alsatian family of the Habsburgs rose from obscurity
to the greatest power by acquiring territories in all parts
of the world by judicious purchase, by exchange, and
especially by highly profitable marriages. Spain and the
countries of the New World were one of the dowries gathered
in by the Habsburg princes. Four and a half centuries
ago the witty Hungarian King Matthias Corvinus wrote
the distich :

Bella gérant alii ! Tu felix Austria nube.
Nam quae Mars aliis dat tibi regna Venus.

110 The Problem of Austria-Hungary

(Let other nations wage war ! You, happy Austria, marry.
For Venus will give you those lands which usually Mars
bestows.) The Austrian Empire is not an Empire in the
generally accepted sense of the term. It is the result of
gigantic deals in land, and of equally gigantic matrimonial
ventures. Since the earliest times the Habsburgs have
cared for land, not for people. They acquired lands right
and left, regardless of the nationality of the inhabitants
whom they got thrown in. Thus the Habsburgs ruled
at one time or another not only the ten nations which
constitute Austria-Hungary, but Switzerland, Burgundy,
Lorraine, Germany, Holland, Belgium, Italy, Spain,
Portugal, North Africa, and the countries of the New World
as well. Austria-Hungary is the residue of a much larger
fortuitous collection of States and nations. Kecognising
that Austria- Hungary is neither a State nor a nation, but
a collection of States and nations, Austrian rulers speak
habitually of their peoples, not of their people, and of their
lands, not of their land. The curious genesis of the Habs-
burg monarchy, and the fact that the so-called Dual
Monarchy is in reahty a multiple monarchy, is apparent
from the title of its ruler, who is called Emperor of Austria,
ApostoHc King of Hungary, King of Bohemia, Dalmatia,
Croatia, Slavonia, GaHcia, Lodomiria and Ulyria, King of
Jerusalem, Archduke of Austria, Grand Duke of Toscana
and Cracow, Duke of Lorraine, Duke of Salzburg, Styria,
Carinthia, Carniola, the Bukovina, of Upper and Lower
Silesia, Modena, Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla, Prince
of Transylvania, Margrave of Moravia, Princely Count of
Tyrol, &c., &c., &c.

The peoples of Austria-Hungary are organised in
two self-governing States, Austria and Hungary. These
are loosely connected by various links, and Bosnia and
Herzegovina are a joint possession of the two States.
If, for simplicity's sake, we credit each of «these
States with one half of the population of Bosnia and

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 111

Herzegovina, we find that their racial composition is as
follows :

Population of

Population of

Austria and Half

Hungary and Half

of Bosnia and

of Bosnia and

Herzegovina in

Herzegovina in

1910

1910

Grermans .

9,950,000

Magyars

. 10,051,000

Czechs

6,436,000

Roumanians .

2,949,000

Poles

4,968,000

Grermans

. 2,037,000

Ruthenians

3,519,000

Serbians

. 2,006.000

Slovenes

1,253,000

Slovacks

. 1,968,000

Serbians

1,683,000

Croatians

. 1,833,000

Italians

768,000

Ruthenians .

473,000

Roumanians

276,000

Magyars .

11,000

28,863,000

21,317,000

The ten nations enumerated in this table speak ten different
languages — the Serbians and Croats are one race and differ
only in religion — ^and each of them has a strongly marked
character and individuaUty of its own.

A composite State which is peopled by different races
can be ruled comparatively easily either on democratic
or on autocratic lines ; democratically if the different
races have full self-government, as they have in Switzerland
and Canada, and autocratically if the ruling race consti-
tutes the majority of the population. Austria is ruled by
the Germans and Hungary by the Magyars. The Germans
of Austria form about one-third of the population. The
Magyars are apparently about one-half of the population
of Hungary ; but their number is greatly overstated. In
their anxiety to Magyarise Hungary and to make a good
show, they have manipulated the census statistics, as will
be shown later on. Hungary has in reahty only between
7,000,000 and 8,000,000 bona fide Magyars. In other words,
the ruhng race, both in Austria and in Hungary, constitutes
only a minority. In both halves of the Dual Monarchy
one-third of the people rule over the remaining two-thirds.
That is not a healthy state of affairs.

112 The Problem of Austria-Hungary

Austria and Hungary, like their ally Germany, are
nominally constitutionally governed limited monarchies
endowed with representative government and all the usual
trappings of democracy. In reality Austria-Hungary,
hke Germany, is an autocracy which is governed by the
ruler and for the ruler under the observation of certain
Parliamentary forms. In Austria- Hungary and in Germany
the Emperor is the State. The Austrian Emperor, like
the German Emperor, directs the entire machinery of the
government and administration in accordance with his
will. Thus in Austria-Hungary, as in Germany, the
bureaucracy is the State, and the officials are the servants
of the Emperor- King, who appoints and dismisses them.
Parliament has no power whatever over the administrative
apparatus. The people of the Dual Monarchy are ruled
with the assistance of the Civil Service, the army, the ex-
ceedingly powerful political police, which spies upon every
citizen, the law courts, the school, the Church, and the
Press, and all seven are government institutions controlled
by the Emperor. Church and Press are no exception to
the rule. In Germany the Emperor is the official head,
the Pope, of the Protestant State Church. That perhaps
accounts for his intimate relations with the Deity. The
Austrian Church is Koman Cathohc. Its head is nominally
the Pope, but in reality it is the Emperor. In a decree
published by the Emperor Leopold the Second' on March 3,
1782, we read :

Although the priest's province is the cure of souls, he
must also be considered as a citizen and as a State official
engaged in rehgious work, for he can directly and indirectly
exercise the greatest pohtical influence over the people by
working upon their feehngs.

It may sound strange, but it is a fact that in Austria
the Church is a branch of the bureaucracy. The Press
of the Dual Monarchy is Government -inspired. Government-
subsidised, Government-muzzled, and Government-con-

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 113

trolled to a far greater extent than it is in Germany. Every
Department of State has a Press bureau of its own, and
enormous sums are spent by the Government upon the
Austrian Press. The judged of the Dual Monarchy, being
a part of the Civil Service, possess no real independence.
That may be seen by their disgraceful partisan behaviour
in political prosecutions, in which they frequently brow-
beat, fine, and expel from the court not only the witnesses
for the defence, but even the defending solicitors.

Austria-Hungary is governed by absolutism, and
absolutism can be successfully maintained only if the
people are weak and ignorant. Endeavouring to keep
the people in ignorance and subjection, the Austrian rulers
have habitually favoured the Koman Cathohc Church
and opposed education. Guided by the principle * Cujus
regio, ejus et religio,' they have persecuted Protestantism
in the most savage manner, recognising in it a revolt of
the people against established authority. Herein Hes the
reason that, although Protestantism took powerful root
in the Dual Monarchy in the time of Huss, there are in
Austria at present only 588,686 Protestants, as compared
with no fewer than 25,949,627 Eoman CathoUcs. While
the Austrian people are poor, the Austrian Church is
exceedingly wealthy and powerful. lUiteracy in Austria-
Hungary is very great. From the latest issue of the * Hand-
worterbuch der Staatswissenschaften ' we learn that of
10,000 recruits only 3 are iUiterate in Germany, 2200 are
ilhterate in Austria, and 2590 in Hungary. Among the
oppressed nationahties, for instance, in the Slavonic parts
of Austria and Hungary, ilHteracy rises to 7000 among
every 10,000 recruits. While the Austrian Government
always discouraged knowledge and independence among
the people, keeping them down by means of the officials,
the police, and the Church, it endeavoured to prevent
popular dissatisfaction by encouraging amusement and
not discouraging vice. The Austrian towns, which might
become hotbeds of revolution, are the gayest and at the

114 The Problem of Austria-Hungary

same time the most immoral towns in Europe. In 1910
of all the children born ahve 18 '25 per cent, were illegitimate
in Upper Austria, 21-9 in Lower Austria, 23*0 in Styria,
23*6 in Salzburg, and 35-6 in Carinthia. In Vienna the
percentage of illegitimate births is on an average about
forty, according to the ofi&cial statistics. Possibly they
understate the facts.

While, for the sake of making their peoples obedient,
the Austrian rulers forced them by the most savage persecu-
tion into a religious uniformity, they had no desire to
weld them together into one nation. The old principle
of the Habsburg monarchy is ' Divide et impera.* Francis
the Second, who ruled Austria at the time of the Congress
of Vienna, said to the French Ambassador :

My peoples are strangers to each other. That is all the
better. They do not catch the same poUtical disease at the
same time. If the fever takes hold of you in France all of
you catch it. Hungary is kept in order by Italian troops,
and Italy is kept down by Hungarians. Everybody keeps
his neighbour in order. My peoples do not understand
each other, and hate each other. Their antipathies make
for security and their mutual hatreds for the general peace.

Absolutism is maintained by fear. Absolute rulers in
the East and the West habitually distrust their principal
advisers, fearing that their power may become too great.
Actuated by fear and distrust, the Austrian rulers have
usually entrusted the government of the country to
mediocrities and nonentities, and have treated with
ingratitude the public servants who had rendered the
greatest services to their country. If Austria-Hungary
entered upon a war in which she was absolutely certain of
victory, her armies were commanded by a member of the
ruling house, so that the dynasty should receive new glory.
If she was likely to lose, the command was given to officers
who were afterwards dismissed and disgraced for their
incompetence. Generals von Auffenberg, Dankl, and many

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 115

other leading men have shared the fate of General von
Benedek, who was defeated at Kôniggrâtz, while Admiral
Tegethoff was very badly treated by the Government
because he unexpectedly defeated the far stronger Italian
fleet at Lissa and was made a hero by the people. Austria's
stagnation is largely due to the fact that she has usually
been governed and administered by mediocrities, and that
her armies have been entrusted to military nonentities
in time of war.

Austria-Hungary curiously resembles ancient Spain.
In both countries we have seen rulers actuated by tyranny,
treachery, cruelty, and jealousy. After all, the Spanish
and Austrian dynasties are closely related. Both possess
the same traditions and the same unbending Court cere-
monial. Austria-Hungary, like ancient Spain, pursues
not a national, but a purely'dynastic policy. The people
are merely pawns, and they are exploited, oppressed, and
treated with perfidy and ingratitude. The attitude of
the Austrian rulers towards their subjects will be apparent
from a few examples out of many. In 1690 the Emperor
Leopold the First invited 200,000 Serbs to leave their
country and to settle in Austria. They were to clear the
Eastern frontier provinces of the Turks and to defend
them against Ottoman aggression. They were promised
freedom of rehgion, and their nationality was to be respected.
During one hundred and sixty years the Serbs and their
descendants fought Austria's battles against the Turks.
They fought for Austria in Italy and on the Ehine. Not-
withstanding Austria's promises, they were deprived of their
leaders and forcibly denationalised. Their religion was sup-
pressed, the building of Serbian churches and convents was
prohibited, and during a century printing in the Serbian
language was not allowed. The books required for religious
service had to be copied by hand as late as the nineteenth
century. The Serbian saints were excluded from the
calendar, and on the sacred days of their Church Serbs
were purposely sent to forced labour. These persecutions

116 The Problem of Austria-Hungary

drove thousands of Serbs from Austria to Eussia and even
to Turkey, where at least they were allowed to practise
their reHgion.

During the struggles of the Serbians with the Turks
a century ago Austria disregarded their pitiful appeal for
help, betrayed them to the Tui-ks, and forced them to
surrender to them by closing against them the Austrian
frontier, whence alone they could obtain food. During the
Revolution of 1848 the Roman CathoHc Serbs of Austria,
the Croatians, loyally aided the Emperor against the
Hungarian revolutionists, defeated them and reconquered
Vienna. Yet after the suppression of the Hungarian
revolution they were handed over to Hungary to be ill-
used and oppressed. The Roumanians, who also had
loyally supported their Emperor against the rebelHous
Magyars, were likewise handed over to their enemies, their
protests notwithstanding. When the revolution broke out
in Hungary, the Austrian officers stationed there were
treated with the greatest duphcity by the Austrian Govern-
ment. Believing that the Hungarians would succeed in
making themselves independent, and fearing their hostihty,
the Austrian Government wished to keep them quiet and
encouraged the Austrian officers in Hungary to take service
under the Hungarian Government in order to allay its sus-
picions. A httle later when, with the help of Russia, Austria
succeeded in defeating the Hungarian armies, she had many
of the deluded Austrian officers executed for high treason.

A king or emperor who rules over a number of different
nationahties will, for convenience' sake, make one of their
languages the official language of the Government. The
Austrian Habsburgs, being German princes, not unnaturally
made German the official language and handed over to the
Austro-Germans the government of the Austrian peoples
and the administration of their lands. German became
the language of the upper classes, and of literature, for
until lately only the upper classes in Austria could read
and could afford to buy newspapers and books. Not

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 117

very long ago the Magyar, Czech, Polish, Serbian,
Eoumanian, Kuthenian, Slovenian, and Slovak languages,
which now have a great and glorious Hterature, were hardly
more than rude local patois used only by the common
people. Books in most of these languages did not exi^t.
The official language of the Magyars was Latin and German.
The debates of the Hungarian ParUament were conducted
in a mongrel Latin until a short time ago.

Joseph the Second, who ruled from 1765 to 1790, was
an enthusiast and a great admirer of Frederick the Great,
his contemporary. Animated, perhaps, by a premonition
of the rise of a great German State outside Austria, he
endeavoured to Germanise his numerous non- German
possessions. He strove to Germanise the people of the
monarchy by forcing upon them a centralised German
administration and the German language. Acting clumsily
and high-handedly, he outraged the non- German peoples
and brought about a revival of their languages. Patriotic
native philologists began to study the non- German patois
and to elevate them into a language by purifying them.
Languages which had apparently died were painfully
reconstructed out of the debris at hand. PoHsh, Magyar,
Czech, and other writers created a great and beautiful
literature in their revived languages. The cultured Magyars
abandoned Latin and German for Magyar, and the leaders
of the other nationalities also took to their rediscovered
national languages. The current of nationalism could
not be stemmed. The nationalities acquired race conscious-
ness and race pride. The rapidity with which the non-
German languages have progressed even during the most
recent times will be seen from the figures in table on page
118, which are taken from an official Austrian publication,
* Statistische Eiickblicke auf Oesterreich,' which was published
in Vienna in 1913.

Between 1882 and 1912 the number of papers and
periodicals of the Czechs increased sevenfold, and those of
the Poles more than fourfold. In 1882 there were two

118 The Problem of Austria-Hungary

German papers and periodicals to every single non-German
one in Austria. In 1912 the number of German and non-
German papers and periodicals had become nearly equal.
The huge increase of the Czech papers and periodicals is
particularly noteworthy. It has been far greater than
that of the other nationalities, because the reawakened
nationalism has grown particularly vigorous in Bohemia,
where formerly it had been most ruthlessly suppressed.

The nationalities had been murmuring for many years
against Austrian misrule, and the German-Austrians also
had become more and more dissatisfied with the reactionary

Newspapers and Periodicals printed

in Austria^

-

a
g

1^

i

1

a

a
1

i

■s

>

Total Non-
German

1882

912

176

89

24

27

85

65

466

1892

1252

374

108

24

30

67

90

693

1902

1817

631

238

41

57

99

92

1158

1912

2492

1209

389

66

96

130

153

2042

and oppressive methods of government which Metternich
had introduced after the downfall of Napoleon in 1815.
The great Ke volution of 1848 shook the monarchy, to its
very foundations. The German, Italian, and Hungarian
lands rose in arms. The Emperor and Prince Metternich
had to flee from Vienna. The revolution was overcome
with the greatest difficulty and with terrible bloodshed,
and the reconquered lands were treated with the utmost
barbarity by the victors. In 1859 the Italians rose once
more against their Austrian oppressors and, with the help
of France, wrested Lombardy from them. Still Italy
remained dissatisfied, for Austria retained Venetia. A
second war with Italy was Hkely. Since the early sixties,
and especially since the time when Bismarck had become
Prussia's Prime Minister, Prussia had begun to arm with
feverish haste and was doubhng her mihtary forces. Her

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 119

attitude towards Austria became more and more menacing.
It was clear to aU Austrians that before long the Monarchy
might have to fight a war on two fronts. In these circum-
stances it was, of course, most important that Austria, when
at war in the south and the north, should not be attacked
in the rear by the Hungarians under Kossuth's leader-
ship. A reconcihation between Austria and Hungary was
urgently required, and Vienna began to move. Austria's
necessity was Hungary's opportunity. In the third volume
of Kossuth's memoirs, on page 649, there is a report from
Budapest dated August 16, 1861, in which we read :

The Vienna Court will not give way, but is embarking
upon new and desperate experiments. In the meantime
the difficulties with which it is faced are constantly increas-
ing. Its power keeps on diminishing, and at last a moment
will arrive when it will have to fulfil all that Hungary desires,
merely in order to save the Habsburg dynasty.

Kossuth's forecast came true. Before 1866, when
Prussia and Italy together made war upon Austria, the
Magyar leaders were promised self-government. Austria
was defeated by Prussia, but she prepared everything for
an early war of revenge in which she reckoned upon the
support of France. To defeat Prussia it was necessary
to satisfy the wishes of the Magyars and to convert them
from opponents into staunch and reliable supporters with
the least delay. In the year following her defeat the
negotiations between Vienna and Budapest were hastily
concluded. By the Ausgleich, the compromise, of 1867,
the monarchy was cut in two. Vienna was to rule Austria
and Budapest Hungary. The Ausgleich established the
Dual system. Henceforth there was to be an Empire of
Austria and a self-governing Kingdom of Hungary. The
monarchy became a Dual Monarchy. The non-Magyar
nations in Hungary were handed over to the tender mercies
of the Magyars, while the Austro- Germans continued to
rule over the non- German races of Austria.

120 The Problem of Austria-Hungary

The Magyars had revolted against ahen rule. They had
claimed self-government in the name of equaUty, hberty,
and justice. However, as soon as they had obtained self-
government, they denied to the non-Magyar nations of
Hungary that hberty, equality, and justice which they had
claimed for themselves as a natural right. A German
minority oppressed and persecuted a non-German majority
in the Austrian half of the monarchy, and a Magyar minority
introduced worse than Austrian methods of government in
the Hungarian half. However, the Austrian Germans and
Hungarian Magyars did not persecute and oppress all the
other nationalities, but, faithful to the principle * Divide et
Impera,' endeavoured to weaken them by giving favours
here and there and setting them against one another. The
Poles in Gahcia were protected by the Austrians because
their goodwill would be precious in case of a war with
Eussia. At the same time, they allowed the Poles to oppress
the neighbouring Kuthenians, so that the hostility of the
Kuthenians could be used as a counterpoise if the Poles should
become too overbearing. Hungary patronised the Serbo-
Croats for similar reasons.

The Ausgleich of 1867 divided Austria-Hungary into
two States, but it did not bring about a final settlement
between the two leading races. Hungary aimed at full
equality with Austria, if not at supremacy. Austria, which
hitherto had been supreme, resisted Hungary's claims and
endeavoured to keep the control of the foreign policy of the
Dual Monarchy in her own hands, notwithstanding Hun-
gary's objections. In numerous matters of national concern,
Vienna required the consent of Budapest, and every Austrian
demand was used by the Magyars as a means for extorting
fresh concessions from their unwiUing partner. Year by
year the friction between the two countries increased.
Year by year the feehngs between Austrians and Magyars
became more bitter. The Hungarians openly threatened
to make themselves entirely mdependent of Austria, and
to leave her in the lurch. On many occasions they showed

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 121

their determination to achieve complete supremacy and make
Austria a subordinate State. On October 1, 1909, for in-
stance, the Hungarian Minister, Count Albert Apponyi,
pubUshed a decree addressed to the educational authorities,
demanding that in books and maps the words * Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy ' should everywhere be replaced by
the words * Hungary and Austria.' Austrians and Magyars,
Vienna and Budapest, loathe each other. In 1910 Austria-
Hungary had in round figures 50,000,000 inhabitants. Of
these about 18,000,000, the Germans in Austria and the
Magyars in Hungary, form the ruling nations — the 2,000,000
Germans in Hungary are left out because they are oppressed
by the Magyars — and these rule over 32,000,000 people,
the subject nationahties. Now the two ruling nations are
divided into 10,000,000 Germans and 8,000,000 Magyars
who hate each other with the fiercest hatred, while they
themselves are equally bitterly hated by the various
nationahties which they try to keep down. Hobbes*
* Bellum omnium contra omnes ' prevails in the Dual
Monarchy. The Dual Monarchy is a Dual Anarchy, and
the Anarchy which prevails in the country is largely respon-
sible for its defeats. A State which is inhabited by ten
different nations, which persecute and hate one another,
cannot progress in peace .and cannot offer a united front
against an enemy in war.

The inter-racial relations in Austria-Hungary are most
compHcated. As a full and adequate account would
require a book, I will briefly deal with the position of
only the more important nationahties, and especially
those which are most likely to be directly affected by the
present War.

GaHcia is inhabited by Poles and Euthenians. The
Poles, as has been previously stated, are the ruhng element
in GaHcia, for they have been allowed by Austria to oppress
the Euthenians, and they have been given a good deal
of freedom. On August 5, the Grand Duke Nicholas,
Commander-in-Chief of the Eussian forces, addressed the

122 The Problem of Austria-Hungary

following appeal to the Poles in Kussia, Germany, and
Austria -Hungary :

Poles, the hour has sounded when the sacred dream of
your fathers and your forefathers may be realised. A cen-
tury and a half has passed since the living body of Poland
was torn in pieces, but the soul of the country is not dead.
It continues to hve, inspired by the hope that there will
come for the Pohsh people an hour of resurrection and of
fraternal reconciliation with Great Kussia. The Eussian
Army brings you the solemn news of this reconciUation which
obhterates the frontiers dividing the Pohsh peoples, which
it unites conjointly under the sceptre of the Eussian Czar.
Under his sceptre Poland will be governed again, free in
her rehgion and her language. Eussian autonomy only
expects from you the same respect for the rights of the
nationahties to which history has bound you. With open
heart and brotherly hand Great Eussia advances to meet you.
She believes that the sword with which Poland struck down
her enemies at Grilnwald has not yet rusted. From the
shores of the Pacific to the North Sea the Eussian Armies
are marching. The dawn of a new hfe is beginning for you,
and in this glorious dawn is seen the sign of the Cross, the
symbol of suffering and of the resurrection of peoples.

During the reign of the late Czar, Eussia 's policy towards
the Poles was influenced by various currents and cross-
currents. Many prominent Eussians were more afraid
of constitutional government, of democracy, and of internal
troubles than they were of Germany and Austria-Hungary.
Consequently the pohcy of the Eussian Government towards
the Poles was hesitating and somewhat contradictory.
But even during the reign of the late Czar the tendency to
give to the Poles self-government and freedom became
constantly stronger. The leaders of the new Eussian
democracy have completely abandoned the reserve and
the suspicions with which Polish affairs have hitherto been
treated. They have whole-heartedly declared themselves
in favour of giving to the Poles complete independence in
accordance with the principles of Hberty and nationahty

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 123

which have animated the revolutionaries in converting
Eussia into a Kepublic. The outlook for the creation of
an independent Poland, embracing all the PoHsh-speaking
people, has never been fairer than it is at present.

The 5,000,000 Austrian Poles receive preferential treat-
ment from Austria, and they have little reason to be dis-
satisfied with their present position Still, if Eussia carries
out her programme and reconstitutes the ancient State of
Poland, the Gahcian Poles will scarcely care to be left out.
Pohsh independence is bound to prove more attractive than
the privileges which they receive at present from Austria,
and which may be withdrawn. Besides, the Gahcian Poles
remember the wrongs which they have suffered at Austria*s
hands. They remember not only the partition of Poland,
but also the sanguinary agricultural risings and the fearful
butcheries which Austria perpetrated in Gahcia in order
to weaken the Poles, and the infamous extinction of the
Eepubhc of Cracow in 1846. After the Eevolution of
1848 the Poles were treated worse than ever. Only after
her defeat of 1866 did Austria give them greater freedom.
If the AUies should be victorious, the loss of the Pohsh
districts of Austria seems inevitable.

Germans and Austrians have frequently told us that the
Poles are unfit to govern themselves, that they are unpro-
gressive, wasteful, unthrifty, dirty, and drunken. These
arguments as to Poland's unfitness to govern herself can
best be refuted by the following most remarkable figures :

Polish Co-

operative Societies.

-

Number

Members

Share Oapital

Deposits

Loans
Outstanding

1900
1904
1909
1912

420

849

1812

2686

297,607

509,168

916,476

1,307,120

£
1,079,929
2,370,613
4,439,337
6,309,926

£
12,420,057
19,652,581
34,944,184
46,970,354

£
12,047,717
20,165,980
39,048,734
55,203,6:2

These most remarkable figures are taken from Michalski's

124 The Problem of Austria-Hungary

book, Les Sociétés Coopératives Polonaises (Lemberg, 1914).
They refer to all Poland, and they show that the co-operative
movement, the best test of a nation's providence and pro-
gress, has made enormous strides among the Poles. In the
short space of twelve years the number of Polish co-operators
has more than quadrupled, the share capital of the societies
has increased about sixfold, and the deposits, which repre-
sent chiefly the savings of poor people, have increased from
£12,420,057 to no less than £46,970,354. People who dis-
play such remarkable prudence in their own affairs may be
entrusted with self-government.

The 3,500,000 Euthenians who inhabit Southern GaHcia
and the neighbouring districts of Hungary are part of the
great Slav family. They are part of the * Little Russians,'
who dwell in South Russia in the Ukraine. Desiring to
weaken Russia, Austria-Hungary has lately discovered that
the Ukrainains are a separate race and possess an ancient
history and language. The Austrian Government, which
is not at all desirous to stimulate nationahsm in its own
borders, has suddenly become a passionate advocate of
the national and linguistic claims of the Ukrainians. In
the realm of the Habsburgs the end justifies the means.
Men who are the enemies of nationahsm in their own country
have passionately championed the national claims of Albania
and the Ukraine. Government money has been spent without
stint in placing the claims of the Albanian and the Ukrainian
nations before the pubhc of the principal countries, by
expensive illustrated books, articles, lectures, letters to the
Press, &c. Besides, Austria has thoughtfully estabhshed
Ruthenian professorships at the Lemberg University.
The Austrians have become enthusiastic about the Ukrainian
nationahty in the hope of producing a split among the
Russians. According to Government-paid Austrian writers,
South-western Russia, with Kiev, is Ukrainian, and claims,
rightly, an individuahty and an independent national exist-
ence. The Austrian Government has raised the Ukrainian
question in order to foment troubles in Russia. Its

Great Problems of British Statesmanship) 125

attempts are likely to prove unsuccessful. The Euthenians
and their Eussian neighbours across the frontier, by what-
ever name they may be called, are one people, and their
reunion after an Austro-German defeat is inevitable.

Until 1866 all the non-German nationalities in Austria
were brutahsed by the ruUng race. Austrian persecution
was most severely felt and most bitterly resented by that
highly gifted and energetic Slav race, the unfortunate
Czechs of Bohemia. The Bohemian Czechs have been ill-
treated by Austria during many centuries. Johann Huss,
following in Wychffe's footsteps, introduced the Eeformation
there about the year 1400, partly as a protest against the
degradation of the Eoman CathoUc Church, partly, and prob-
ably chiefly, as a protest against German domination and
German brutality. Huss died a martyr. The Eeforma-
tion in Bohemia was suppressed with the greatest savagery,
and Bohemia was totally devastated. Germans were
settled among the Czechs, Eoman CathoHc dragoons were
quartered upon Protestant Bohjmians in order to * convert '
them. The Czechs were treated as helots by the Germans
settled among them up to a very recent date. When the
Prussian armies invaded Bohemia in 1866 they endeavoured
to raise the Czechs against the Austrians by addressing to
them the following proclamation :

Inhabitants of the Glorious Kingdom of Bohemia I

In consequence of the war, which has been caused against
our wishes by the Emperor of Austria, we enter your country,
not as enemies and conquerors, but full of resjpect for your
historic and national rights. To the inhabitants, without
regard of their calling, religion, and nationality, we bring not
war and destruction, but consideration and friendship.
Do not beheve, as your enemies will tell you, that we have
brought about this war through lust of conquest. Austria
has forced us to fight by threatening to attack us. But
beheve us that we have not the slightest intention to oppose
your just desire for independence and for unrestrained national
development.

126 The Problem of Austria-Hungary

Eemembering the heavy and ahnost unbearable burdens
which the Government has placed upon you in preparing
for this war, we shall not impose additional taxes, nor shall
we ask you to act against your convictions. We shall
respect and honour particularly your holy rehgion. At
the same time we shall not tolerate open resistance, and
must punish severely all treasonable acts. We leave the
issue of the war confidently to the Lord of Hosts. If our
just cause should prove victoriou^^ the moment may 'perhajps
arrive when the national aspirations of the Bohemians and
Moravians may he fulfilled in tlie same way in which those of
the Hungarians have been fulfilled^ and then may Providence
establish their happiness for all time.

The proclamation is very interesting because it throws
a strong light not only upon the dissatisfaction existing
in Bohemia, but also upon Prussian methods of warfare.

Of the 6,700,000 inhabitants of Bohemia, 4,240,000,
or about two-thirds, are Czechs and Slovaks, and the
remaining third are Germans. In the neighbouring land of
Moravia, which lies to the east of Bohemia, approximately
the same proportion of Germans and Slavs obtains. Al-
though the Czechs form the great majority of the inhabitants
of Bohemia, their language was suppressed until recently.
German was the ofi&cial language used throughout Bohemia
in the law courts and elsewhere. German inscriptions were
to be seen in the Czech villages and towns. To the casual
visitor, Bohemia seemed to be a German land. Step
by step the Czechs have ousted the Germans. To-day
Prague, that old stronghold of Germanism, is a Czech town.
So great is the hatred between Czechs and Germans that
there is practically no intercourse between the two nations.
A German will not enter a Czech restaurant or hotel in
Prague, nor will a Czech enter a German place of entertain-
ment. The two nations have separate schools, theatres,
concert rooms, banks, savings banks, co-operative societies,
&c. At the German University of Prague there were in
1910-11 1726 German students and only eighty -six Czechs.
At the Czech University of Prague there were in the same

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 127

year 4225 Czechs and only nine Germans. At the German
Technical High Schools of Prague there were 880 Germans
and thirty-seven Czechs. At the corresponding Czech estab-
hshments there were 2686 Czechs and ten Germans. In
Bohemia the two nationahties follow the policy of segrega-
tion, because the Czechs absolutely refuse to associate witli
Germans. A similar policy of non-intercourse is noticeable
between the Poles and Kuthenians at the Cracow University,
where there were in 1910-11 2771 Poles and only thirty-
four Kuthenians.

By their strength of character and strength of intellect,
and by their great artistic and scientific achievements,
the Czechs have become the leading nation among the
Austrian Slavs. Their intellectual pre-eminence may be
seen from the extent and from the wonderful progress of
their Press, regarding which figures have been furnished
on another page. The Czechs occupy a most important
position in the Dual Monarchy. Owing to its mines, its
fruitful soil, and its very highly developed industries,
Bohemia is the most valuable possession of Austria, and the
Dual Monarchy would lose it most unwillingly. Besides,
Bohemia occupies a most valuable strategical position.
Bohemia, with its surrounding mountain walls, is a strong
natural fortress, and it lies on the most direct route from
Berlin to Vieima. At present Bohemia connects Germany
and Austria, Berlin and Vienna. An independent Bohemia
would separate the two States and their capitals. An
independent Bohemia and Moravia would border to the
east upon an independent Poland. Prussia, which at present
is in contact with Austria through Silesia and Bohemia,
would be separated from the German districts of Austria
by a solid wall of Slavonic nations if Poland, Moravia, and
Bohemia should become independent States. In that
case the German parts of Austria would be in contact
with Germany only by means of Bavaria. That is an
important fact, the political and strategical bearings of
which will presently be considered.

Of the inhabitants of Bohemia and Moravia, two-thirds.

128 The Problem of Austria-Hungary

as has been said, are Slavs, and one-third are Germans.
The Germans form a broad fringe along the Austro-German
frontier. If the future frontiers of Bohemia should be de-
termined on a racial basis, about one-third of its territory
should fall to Germany. It might perhaps fall to the
kingdom of Saxony, upon which it borders, and which then
would regain some of its former importance, of which it
was deprived by Prussia exactly a century ago. After
the War the Southern States of Germany may require
strengthening against Prussia, so as to create a balance
of power within Germany.

As the Czechs have at last conquered for themselves a
position in which they can freely use their language and de-
velop their individuality, and as their influence in Austria-
Hungary, which as yet is not great, is bound to increase,
they may hesitate to cut the connection with Austria, espe-
cially as their manufacturing industries depend very largely
upon the Austrian market lor the sale of their productions.
The action of Bohemia will probably largely depend upon
that of the other nationahties. An isolated Bohemia and
Moravia, being shut off from the sea, would poHtically,
militarily, and especially economically occupy a very exposed
and insecure position, unless it could enter into a federation
with some of its neighbours.

South of Bohemia He the German districts of Austria.
These extend in a sohd block from Switzerland and Bavaria
in the west to a line about thirty miles east of Vienna.
The southern border of Bohemia forms the northern frontier
of the German territory of Austria, and the river Drau
its southern limit. If Bohemia and Moravia should cut
themselves off from German Austria, the physical connection
between German Austria and Prussia would be destroyed,
while direct contact between German Austria and Bavaria
would be retained. Bavaria and her neighbour Baden
are the most strongly Eoman CathoHc States of Germany.
Of their joint population of 9,000,000, about 6,100,000,
or two-thirds, are Eoman CathoHcs. The easy-going

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 129

Austrians sympathise far more with the people of Bavaria
and Baden than with the overbearing Prussians. An
organic connection of German Austria, Bavaria, and Baden
would give 20,000,000 inhabitants to German Austria,
and would correspondingly weaken the power of Prussia
for mischief. That block of nations might be joined by the
remaining South German States, Wurtemberg, Saxony,
and the rest, and thus a fairly even balance of power might
be produced in Germany. The German race would be
divided into almost equal halves, different in character,
religion, and tradition, and possessing different historic
capitals. They would be extremely powerful for defence,
but would presumably be less dangerous for an attack.
By uniting with Bavaria and Baden, Austria would border
on the Ehine. She would occupy once more a position of
great political and strategical importance, not only towards
Russia and the Balkan Peninsula, but also towards France.
That position should secure the peace of Europe and of
the world.

If Austria-Hungary should resolve to conclude a separate
peace, the State of the Habsburgs might once more become
the leading State of Germany. The Austrian monarch
might make it a condition that he should receive compensa-
tion for the Slavonic and Latin provinces which he is likely
to lose by being given not only the South German States,
which until 1866 followed Austria's lead, but also Silesia,
which was torn from Austria by Frederick the Great.
Prussia has grown great at Austria's expense. It would
be only a fit retribution if the process should be reversed,
and if Vienna should regain its old supremacy. If the
10,000,000 Austro-Germans were jomed by 25,000,000 or
30,000,000 South Germans and Silesians, the 10,000,000
Magyars would no longer be able to cause trouble to the
Habsburg Emperors. Berlin would no longer be able to
play out Budapest against Vienna. Austria's greatest
internal difficulty would disappear, and so would her economic
troubles. The Dual Monarchy is a poor country because

130 The Problem of Austria-Hungary

it lacks prosperous manufacturing industries. The wealth
of Austria-Hungary is supposed to be only one-third of
that of Germany. By acquiring the South German States
and Silesia the State of the Habsburgs would both
poHtically and economically regain its old paramountcy.
Austria-Himgary would become an almost purely German
State organised on a federal basis, and if the Habsburgs
should act tolerantly and liberally towards the neighbour
States, the Austrian Federation might be joined in course
of time by some of the secondary States which will arise
after the present war in the South-east of Europe.

In the south, Austria possesses two almost purely Italian
districts : the Itahan Tyrol, with towns such as Trento,
Eovereto, Ala, Bondo, Borgo, &c., and the western part of
Istria and a narrow strip of the Adriatic coast with Trieste,
Pola, Fiume, Capodistria, Zara, Sebenico, Spalato, Kagusa,
Cattaro, &c. The names of the towns mentioned show
their Itahan origin. The possession of the Italian Tyrol is a
matter of vital importance to Italy. The great and wealthy
plain of Lombardy is protected towards the north by a
crescent of mountain walls, the Alps. Italy is protected
by that powerful barrier against invasion from France and
Switzerland. But by retaining the Italian Tyrol, the
Trentino, after withdrawing from Italy, and by occupying
the mountain passes down to the foot of the mountains as
far as the Lago di Garda, Alistria occupies with her army
a wide breach in Italy's ramparts. Thus she can easily in-
vade the country and strike at Verona, Padua, and Venice
by marching to the east, or at Brescia and Milan by turning
to the west. While the east coast of Italy is flat and open,
the opposite coast of the Adriatic, occupied by Austria, is
studded with an abundance of excellent natural harbours,
the entrance to which is protected by high mountains
and by mountainous islands lying in front of it.

The positions occupied by Austria in the Trentino,
in Istria, and in Dalmatia threaten Italy's security in the
north and east, and Italy is all the more reluctant to see

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 131

them remaining in Austria's hands, as they are largely
inhabited by ItaHans, who are very badly treated by the
Austrians. Possibly the disastrous fire at the Monfalcone
dockyard, which took place soon after the outbreak of the
Great War, was caused by the resentment of the ill-treated
Italians who live in Austrian territory. Many of these
unfortunate people, although born in Austrian territory,
are not allowed to acquire Austrian citizenship, and not
infrequently they are expelled without notice from their
homes without adequate reason. Ever since 1866 the Aus-
trians have persecuted the Italians dwelling in Austria,
and have endeavoured to destroy their nationahty by deny-
ing them schools, colleges, and a university. Apparently
the Austrians have tried to punish the Italians who have
remained under their rule for the loss of Lombardy and
Venetia.

Owing to Austria's foolish policy, Italy has been filled
with the bitterest hatred against the Austrians. The
Irredenta ItaHa, Unredeemed Italy, is in the thoughts
of every patriotic Itahan, and frequent Austrian outrages
on Itahans living in Austria, on the one hand, and Itahan
passionate agitation in favour of their brothers who live
under the Austrian yoke, on the other, keep the wound
open. Many Italian societies and newspapers have been
preaching war with Austria for many years. Signor Pelle-
grini wrote in his important book, * Verso la Guerra ? —
II dissidio fra I'ltaha e 1' Austria,' pubhshed as long ago
as 1906 :

I believe we cannot live any longer under an illusion
which deceives us. We have lived under the impression that
the internal difficulties of Austria-Hungary are so great as
to prevent her from aggressive action towards ourselves and
from expansion towards the east. We have beheved that
Austria-Hungary would fall to pieces after the death of
the present Emperor. These views are erroneous. If the
political crisis in Austria- Hungary should become more
acute, and there is reason for doubting this, Austria-Hun-

132 The Problem of Austria-Hungary

gary's need to expand and to acquire new markets in the
east will become all the greater. And as long as Italian
commerce pursues its triumphant course in the east, the
more are the opposing interests of the two nations hkely
to bring about the final colhsion. . . .

We cannot continue a pohcy of vassalage which will
compromise for all time Italy's future in order to preserve
the outward form of the Triple AlHance. We must ask
ourselves : What are our interests ? Are we ready to defend
them ? What are the conditions of the Itahans who dwell
on the shore of the Adriatic under foreign domination ?
What are our interests on the Adriatic compared with those
of Austria ? What are the wishes of our people, and what
is Italy's mission in the Balkan Peninsula ? Is it possible
to avoid a conflict with Austria ? I beheve I have shown
that Austria-Hungary is at the same time our ally and our
open enemy against whom we must prepare for war. . . ,
We have to calculate in the future with the fact that the
Austro- Hungarian Empire, though nominally our ally, is
our determined enemy in the Balkan Peninsula.

Many similar views may be found in the writings of
Enrico Corradini, Sal vat ore Barzilai, Vico Mantegazza,
Giovanni Bertacchi, Innocenzo Cappa, Eomeo Manzoni,
Filippo Crispolti, Scipio Sighele, Luigi Villari, and many
others, in the pubhcations of the * Società Dante AHgheiri,'
the * Trento Trieste,' the * Giovine Europa,' the * Itahca
Gens,* and in periodicals such as II Regno, V Italia alV
Estero, II Tricolore, La Grande Italia, The Austrians
have replied to the Italian threats with counter-threats.
The * Oesterreichische Kundschau,' the most important
Austrian periodical, which is edited by Freiherr von
Chlumecky, an intimate friend of the late Archduke Francis
Ferdinand, and Danzer's Armeezeitung, the widely read
army journal, have pubhshed innumerable articles recom-
mending an Austrian war with Italy.

On the walls of the Ducal Palace at Venice may be
found some marble tablets giving the result of a plebiscite
taken in the year 1866 in Venetia, They tell us that

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 133

641,000 of the inhabitants voted for a reunion of Venetia
with Italy, and only 68 against it. Austria has never known
how to gain the affection of the people over whom she
has ruled. She occupied Venetia from 1815 to 1866. In
fifty-one years she gained among the inhabitants 68 adher-
ents and 641,000 enemies. If to-day a plebiscite should be
taken in the ItaHan Tyrol, in Trieste, Pola, and the other
ItaHan towns on the Dalmatian coast, "the result would
probably be similar. At one time or another Verona,
Venice, Milan, Florence, Turin, Naples, Palermo, Lombardy,
Venetia, Toscana, the southern half of Italy, Sicily, and
Sardinia — ^in fact, practically all Italy, except the States
of the Church — were Austrian, but nowhere in Italy will
a man be found who regrets Austria's departure or who
speaks of her occupation with affection, or even with esteem.
In Italy, as elsewhere, Austria has solely been an influence
for evil.

Although Trieste, Pola, and Fiume, and part of Istria
and Dalmatia are inhabited by many Itahans, it is by no
means certain that these towns and districts will revert
to Italy after a defeat of Germany and Austria-Hungary.
Ports and coastal positions are of value because of the
hinterland which furnishes them with trade. Large inland
States lying near the coast have the strongest claims upon
natural outlets towards the ocean. The Italian towns
on the east coast of the Adriatic are ancient Venetian
trading stations, and behind and around them hve about
10,000,000 Serbs in compact masses, the Serbians in Serbia
proper, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Dalmatia,
and the Serbo-Croats in Croatia-Slavonia. The Itahans
cannot expect that a Greater Serbia will consent to be
deprived of adequate harbours. Italian and Serbian claims
will have to be harmonised.

Serbia does not intend seizing Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Dalmatia, and Croatia-Slavonia by force ; but if these
lands are dissatisfied with Austrian rule, and wish to shake
it off and unite with Serbia, the Serbs will certainly not

134 The Problem of Austria-Hungary

deny them. The Serbians in Serbia have heen ill-treated
in the past by Austria, as has been shown in another part
of this chapter. Ever since the Kusso-Turkish War, Austria-
Hungary, covetous of Serbia's territory, has endeavoured
to ruin that country by preventing her gaining an outlet
to the sea, by controlling her foreign trade overland and
by arbitrarily interrupting and destroying it by closing
the frontier against Serbia under mendacious pretexts.
In 1885 the Austrians brought about war between Serbia
and Bulgaria for their own ends. They favoured the out-
break of the first Balkan War, hoping for Serbia's destruction.
When the AlHes were victorious, Austria-Hungary prevented
Serbia securing the smallest outlet on the sea, and then
encouraged Bulgaria to attack that country, hoping that
the second Balkan War would lead to Serbia's downfall.
Having suffered so much at Austria's hands in the past,
the heroic Serbians wish to make themselves secure for the
future by establishing a Greater Serbia, a State of 10,000,000
inhabitants, at Austria's cost, and obtaining adequate
outlets to the sea. Probably they will succeed. Their
heroism and their sufferings deserve a full reward.

Of the territory "of Hungary, 105,811 square kilometres
contain a population of which 77-61 per cent, are Magyars,
85,026 square kilometres have a population of which only
25-63 per cent, are Magyars, and 74-32 per cent. non-Magyars.
Of these, the majority are Slavs. Of the population of
the remaining territory of 88,650 square kilometres, 25-09
per cent, are Magyars, while the majority are Koumanians.
Of the whole of Hungary, four-tenths are essentially Magyar
territory, three-tenths are essentially Slavonic territory,
and three-tenths are Eoumanian territory.

In a table given in the beginning of this article, the
strength of the Magyars in Hungary was stated to be
10,051,000, according to the census of 1910. This figure
is greatly exaggerated. In order to swell their numbers,
the Magyars have manipulated the census. The citizens
are asked, in the census forms which they have 'to fill up.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 135

to state the language which they speak best or hke best.
In view of the pressure exercised by the ruhng Magyars,
many non-Magyars profess that they hke Magyar best,
even if they do not understand the language, and they
appear as Magyars in the census. Besides, the ruhng
Magyars have put pressure upon the non-Magyars to
Magy arise their names. Schoolmasters, post-office officials,
and railway men in Government services are compelled to
Magy arise their names. As a further inducement, the cost
of Magy arising one's name was reduced in 1881 from 10
crowns to 10 pence. As an aristocratic Magyar name is a
great advantage in society and in business, men with com-
mon non-Magyar names have provided themselves for ten-
pence with the most aristocratic Magyar names. Mr. Seton-
Watson has told us in his excellent book, ' Kacial Problems
in Hungary,' that Toldy, the author, was originally called
Schebel ; Hunfalvy, the ethnologist, Hundsdorfer ; Munkâcsy,
the painter, Lieb ; Arminius Vâmbéry, Bamberger ; Petofi,
the poet, Petrovic ; Zsedényi, the pohtician, Pfannschmied ;
Iranyi, Halbschuh ; Helfy, Heller ; Komlôssy, Kleinkind ;
Polônyi, Pollatschek, &c. The Magyars have Magyarised
all non-Hungarian place-names. Ancient Pressburg was
turned into Pozsony, Hermannstadt into Nagy-Szeben,
Kirchdrauf into Szepes-Vâralja, &c.

According to official Hungarian statistics, the Magyars
are about one-half of the Hungarian population. According
to the most reliable non-Magyar authorities, they are only
about one-third, numbering from 7,000,000 to 8,000,000.
In Hungary, as in Austria, one -third of the population
rules over the remaining two- thirds.

On paper Hungary is the most liberal country in the
world. It has possessed a Parhament and a Constitution
since the dawn of its history. However, under the cloak
of hberalism and legality, Hungary exercises the most arbi-
trary and tyrannous government over the non-Magyars.

Although Magyars and non-Magyars are on paper equal
before the law, and are nominally fully represented in the

136 The Problem of Austria-Hungary

Parliament at Budapest, the representatives in the Hun-
garian Parhament represent neither the subject national-
ities nor the masses of the people, but only the Magyar
oligarchy. This is strikingly proved by the following table,
which shows the composition of the Hungarian Parha-
ment during the five last electoral periods :

Result of TJunfjarian .

Elections.

Magyare,
including a

few NOD-

—

Socialists

Roumanians

BloTaks

Serbs

Total

de&cripta

1896

412

1

-

413

1901

408

4

1

413

1906

402

1

8

1

1

413

1906

387

14

7

5

413

1910

404

1

5

8

413

Of the 418 members of the Hungarian Parhament
about 400 are Magyars. The preponderant number of
non-Magyars and the numerous Socialists send the remain-
ing thirteen members. As representation shapes legislation,
the legislation of Hungary is pro-Magyar and hostile to
the non-Magyars, to the Socialists, and to the common
people. Of the men of voting age only about one-fourth
are given the franchise. As a high property quahfication
is required, only the well-to-do can vote. The non-Magyars
of Hungary are poor, partly because the Magyars settled
in the rich plains whence they drove the non-Magyars,
partly because in districts where Magyars and non-Magyars
dwell together, the former have secured for themselves the
greater part of the wealth and the best land by violence
and by political pressure.

The non-Magyars are disfranchised not only by a
high property qualification, but by deliberate violence and
trickery. If we look into the electoral statistics we find
that the more Koumanian a county is, the fewer voters
does it possess. We find further that the larger a con-

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 137

stituency is, the farther from its centre is placed the solitary-
polling booth. At election time bridges are often broken
down or declared unsafe for the passage of vehicles, in
order to force opposition voters either to walk impossible
distances, or lose their vote, and with the same object in
vidw all the horses in the outlying villages are often placed
under veterinary supervision at the last moment. The
voting is not secret, but public, and by word of mouth.
Non-Magyars are thus publicly terrorised into voting
orally for Magyar members. Thousands of voters are
disqualified for flimsy reasons by the presiding ' Magyar
when intending to vote for the opposition candidate. Often
hundreds and thousands of voters, who have travelled
all day to the polhng booth, are prevented by large forces
of military and gendarmes from voting or from entering
the village where the poll takes place. At election times
Hungary mobilises her whole army in order to terrorise
the opposition voters, and if these insist upon their legal
right of voting, they are frequently attacked by armed
mobs or shot down by the gendarmes and the military.
Every Hungarian election is accompanied by bloodshed.
According to Danzer's Armeezeitung of June 6, 1910,
Hungary mobihsed for the election of that year 202 battahons
of infantry, 126 squadrons of cavalry, and in addition had
Austrian troops sent from Lower Austria, Styria, and
Moravia to Hungary. The cost of * maintaining order *
was estimated by the journal named at from 16,000,000
crowns to 20,000,000 crowns.

The Magyars monopolise not only Parliament but the
Civil Service, the law, and the schools as well. Although,
according to the Law of Nationalities, the State should
erect schools of all kinds for the non-Magyar races, it has
never erected a single secondary school where any other
language but Magyar is used. Instead of this it has
Magyarised the few existing non-Magyar secondary schools
and dissolved the rest. Of the thirty-nine intermediate
schools in the Slovak counties, not a single one provides

138 The Problem of Austria-Hungary

instruction in the language of the people, and in the districts
inhabited by Euthenians the same condition prevails.
Of the eighty-nine secondary schools directly controlled
by the State none are non-Magyar.

The ruling Magyars most efïectively prevent the non-
Magyar people from improving their condition by excluding
them from the intermediate schools and the universities.
As the Magyars form nominally one-half, but in reality
only one -third, of the population, they should furnish at
best one half of the scholars and students at the intermediate
schools and universities.

In reaUty the overwhelming majority^of those who
attend thé higher educational establishments are Magyars.
According to the Magyar statistics for the year 1911, 49,482
pupils attending the classical intermediate schools were
Magyars, and only 11,131 were non-Magyars. For every
non-Magyar there were nearly five Magyars. In the non-
classical intermediate schools there were 2316 non-Magyars
and 8372 Magyars. In the intermediate schools for girls
there were only 572 non-Magyars and 5746 Magyars. In
the training schools for male teachers there were 1021
non-Magyars and 8856 Magyars. In those for female
teachers there were 481 non-Magayars and 4386 Magyars.
In the maternity schools there were 56 non-Magyars and
448 Magyars. In the music schools there were 2313 non-
Magyars and 7471 Magyars. In the post and telegraph
school there were 23 non-Magyars and 255 Magyars.
As all those who wish to enter into a professional career or
into Government service must have passed through the
intermediate schools, the vast preponderance of Magyar
pupils at these schools effectively prevents large numbers
of non-Magyars from becoming doctors, lawyers, teachers,
civil servants, judges, mihtary officers, &c. In 1911 there
were at all the Hungarian universities 10,653 Magyar
students and only 1273 non-Magyar students. For every
non-Magyar student there were eight Magyars. We can,
therefore, not wonder that Magyars occupy all the best

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 139

places in Hungary, especially as in making appointments
Magyars are favoured and non-Magyars discouraged.

Franz Deâk, one of the greatest Hungarian statesmen,
said in a speech delivered on January 23, 1872 :

Every nationahty has a right to demand ways and
means for the education of its children. If we wish to force
the children of the nationahties dwelHng in Hungary to
study in the Magyar language, although they do not know
it, or know it only slightly, we should make it impossible
for them to make progress. Parents would in vain spend
their money upon education, and the children would waste
their time. If we desire to win over the nationalities, then
we must not endeavour to Magyarise them at any price.
We can Magyarise them only if we make them satisfied
citizens of Hungary who are fond of the life and conditions
prevaihng in it.

Notwithstanding the warning of Deâk and of other
founders of the Hungarian State, the ruhng Magyars have
endeavoured to force the Magyar language upon the non-
Magyars by the most tyrannous means. If we look at the
educational statistics, we find that the non-Magyar schools
are rapidly decreasing in number and the Magyar schools
rapidly increasing. In purely non-Magyar districts Magyar
schools are planted, and in order to force the children to
learn Magyar from the cradle, compulsory kindergarten
schools are opened in the non-Magyar districts, where
children from three to six years old have to attend.

Notwithstanding the most far-reaching guarantees that
the character and language of the other nationalities would
be respected, Magyar is the official language in Hungary.
All pubhc proclamations and notices are issued in Magyar,
and the proceedings in the law courts take place in that
language, even when neither prosecutor nor defendant
understands it. Roumanian peasants, ignorant of Magyar,
and hving in purely Roumanian districts, have to employ
Magyar in their intercourse with the authorities, and if
they go to law they have to provide themselves with costly

140 The Problem of Austria-Hungary

and often inefficient translators and interpreters. Local
government, even in practically purely non-Magyar districts,
is monopolised by Magyars. The non-Magyars are strangers
in their own country.

Numerically the most important non-Magyar race in
Hungary are the Koumanians. According to the official
statistics, they number 2,949,000. In reahty their number
is greater, and close to them hve 275,000 Koumanians
in the Austrian Bukovina.

A glance at the map shows that the kingdom of
Roumania possesses a very awkward shape. It consists of
two long and narrow strips of land which are joined together
at a right angle. The land lying in the hollow of that angle
consists of the Austrian Bukovina and of the Hungarian
districts of Transylvania and the Banat. Owing to its
awkward shape, the concentrated Roumanian army can
defend the national territory only with great difficulty
against an invader. The acquisition of the Austrian and
Hungarian territories, inhabited nearly exclusively by
Roumanians, would fill up the hollow and would convert
Roumania into a shapely and easily defensible State.

The Roumanians in the kingdom of Roumania have
during many years observed with sorrow and indignation
the pitiful position of their brothers who live under Magyar
rule, and their leaders have frequently and most emphatic-
ally warned the Hungarian Government that its anti-Rou-
manian pohcy might have very serious consequences to
Hungary. When, in November, 1868, Count Andrassy
intimated to King, then only Prince, Charles of Roumania
that Roumania and Hungary should go hand in hand,
King Charles replied, according to his Memoirs :

I recognise the advantages of a complete understanding
between Hungary and Roumania. However, I must make
this reservation — ^that I can work hand in hand with Hungary
only when Hungary has changed her pohcy towards the
Roumanians in Transylvania. I cannot aboHsh the natural
sympathies which exist between the Roumanians on both

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 141

sides of the political boundary. I am therefore entitled
to expect that the Hungarian Government will do every-
thing that is right and fair in deaUng with the real interests
of its Koumanian subjects. In expressing this wish I do
not intend to be guilty of political interference. I lay stress
upon this point only because it is the principal condition for
bringing about a good understanding between the two
countries. Being a constitutional monarch, who owes his
position to the election of the people, I am obliged to be
guided by pubHc opinion in as far as that opinion is reason-
able. An open and sincere pohcy of kindness and goodwill
on the part of the Hungarian Government towards its non-
Magyar subjects would most ably support me in a policy
which I am prepared to enter upon.

Hungary has disregarded the emphatic and frequent
warnings of King Charles and of the leading Roumanian
statesmen and publicists. Austria-Hungary was fooUsh
enough to persecute her Italian and Roumanian citizens
after the outbreak of the present War, beheving that the
taking of hostages and the execution of leaders would
assure their fidehty. Fidelity cannot be secured by fear.
If, as appears hkely, Austria-Hungary should break up,
Roumania will certainly see that the Roumanians on her
border will be re-united to the motherland.

The subject nationahties in Austria-Hungary have been
ruled by misrule, and most of them are profoundly dis-
satisfied. I have shown in these pages that some of the
larger nations of the Dual Monarchy are likely to be absorbed
by their neighbours. GaHcia, with 8,000,000 people, is
likely to be divided between Russia and Poland ; the
Roumanian districts, with 4,000,000 inhabitants, should
fall to Roumania ; the Serbian district, with 6,000,000
people, may go to the Serbs ; and the Italian district, with
nearly 1,000,000 inhabitants, may become Italian. Bohemia
may once more become an independent State. The smaller
subject nations of Austria-Hungary may be expected to
follow the example of the greater. Austria-Hungary seems

142 The Problem of Austria-Hungary

likely to disintegrate on racial lines. In the South-East
of Europe may arise a Poland with 20,000,000 inhabitants,
a Serbia with 10,000,000 inhabitants, a Hungary with
10,000,000 inhabitants, and an Austria with 10,000,000.

Many people, fearing the danger of Russia, advocate
that Austria-Hungary should be preserved in its present
state so as to act as an efficient counterpoise to the Russian
colossus. The preservation of the Dual Monarchy is parti-
cularly strongly urged by those who fear the Pan-Slavonic
danger, who beUeve that the Slavonic nations in the Balkan
Peninsula and in Austria-Hungary will amalgamate with
Russia, that Russia will, through Serbia and Bohemia, stretch
out its arms as far as the Adriatic and Bavaria. That
fear seems scarcely justified. The Slavonic nations outside
Russia have looked to Russia as a deliverer when they were
oppressed, but these nations have a strongly marked individ-
uahty of their own, and they have no desire, after having
painfully acquired their freedom, to be merged into Russia
and to disappear in that gigantic State. In the spring of
1908 representatives of the Austrian Slavs attended a
great Slavonic Congress at Petrograd. Mr. Karel Kramarz,
a prominent Czech politician, was at the head of the Austrian
delegation, and he made to the Congress the following
declaration.

The Slavonic movement and Slavonic poUcy must be
based on the principle that all Slavonic nations are equal,
and their aim must consist not in an endeavour to form all
Slavs into a single nation, but to develop the individual
character of each of the Slavonic peoples. The aim of all
Slavs should be in the first instance to increase their own
national consciousness and strength, and in the second
to secure their mutual co-operation for promoting their
common welfare, ensuring their progress in every way and
defending themselves against German aggression.

This declaration is characteristic of the Slavs not only
in Bohemia but elsewhere. The Bulgarians and Serbians

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 143

differ greatly, although they are neighbours, and they
are not likely to amalgamate. Democratic Serbia will
merge itself neither in Bulgaria nor in Kussia. The Czechs
also have a nationality and individuahty of which they are
proud. A number of small and medium-sized Slav States
are likely to arise in the South-East of Europe. Those
who desire to re-build Austria-Hungary after its downfall
are insufficiently acquainted with the difficulty of such
an undertaking. Besides, they should remember that
diplomacy can correct, but must not outrage. Nature ;
that a lasting peace cannot be re-estabUshed in Europe
by perpetuating Austria's tyranny over her unhappy subject
nations. After all, Europe's security and peace are more
important than a mechanical balance of power. We have
no reason to fear Eussia's aggression. There is no reason
to believe that she intends to swamp her Western neighbours.
After the present War, Kussia will be exhausted for decades.
Her task for the future consists in organising and developing
her colossal territories, providing them with roads and
railways, and improving the conditions of the people.
Besides, if in twenty or thirty years Kussia should embark
upon a great war of conquest in the West, she would have
to fight nations which will be much stronger than they are
at present. The prevention of the actual German danger
is far more important than the prevention of a highly
problematical Slav peril of the future.

Austria-Hungary has outhved her usefulness. She
has always been a bad master to the unfortunate nations
who have come under her sway. Since 1307, the year
when WilUam Tell raised the Swiss in revolution against
the Habsburgs, the history of Austria is a long history of
the revolts of their subject nations. Tha dissolution of
Austria-Hungary is merely the last incident in its recent
evolution. In 1859 Austria-Hungary lost her supremacy
over Italy. In 1866 she lost her supremacy over Germany.
By the present War she will probably lose her supremacy
over the Slavs. A nation may rule over other nations only

144 The Problem of Atisiria-Hungary

if it treats them with justice. Austria has always ruled
with barbaric methods. The atrocious acts of which Ger-
many has been guilty in Belgium and France were taught
by Austria. In her campaign against Serbia she has, as
usual, taken thousands of hostages among her own peoples
in order to prevent their rising against the tyranny of
Vienna, and she has, as usual, made barbarous war upon the
weak and the helpless. Austria-Hungary is an anachronism
in a modern world. The Dual Monarchy is, and has
always been, only a factor for evil. In Germany's crime
Austria-Hungary has been an accompHce and an accessory
before the fact. Austria-Hungary has existed during many
years, not owing to its own strength, but owing to Europe's
toleration. Austria-Hungary is another Turkey. Her hour
has struck. The Empire of the Habsburgs in its present
form is Hkely to disappear. In its place will arise a number
of independent States possessing a national basis which
in time may federate for mutual protection.

The present War has a twofold object. It is a war
waged to destroy the curse of mihtarism and to free the
subject nations from their bondage. Many people have
asked by what name the present War should be known
to history. It might fittingly be called the War of Libera-
tion. Small nations, whether they are called Belgium
and Holland, or Bosnia and Bohemia, are entitled to life
and liberty. We need not deny the small nations which
should take the place of Austria-Hungary their inborn
right to life and prosperity. It is true that small States,
especially if they have no outlet to the sea, are greatly
hampered. The future, and especially the economic future,
probably belongs to the great nations. Still, the small
nations can survive, and if they cannot survive singly they
can hve and prosper by voluntary co-operation. The
small nations which are arising in the Balkan Peninsula
and in that part of Europe which is now called Austria-
Hungary, may be expected to conclude arrangements with
their friends and sympathisers for mutual defence. A

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 145

great State may arise in South-Eastern Europe. Federalism
may provide the bond which Habsburg absolutism,
Habsburg selfishness, and Habsburg tyranny failed
to create. The provision of an efficient counterpoise to
Eussia may, and should be, left to Nature and to natural
evolution.

CHAPTEE V

THE PROBLEM OF POLAND ^

A CENTURY ago, at the Congress of Vienna, the question
of Poland proved extremely difficult to solve. It produced
dangerous friction among the assembled Powers, and
threatened to lead to the break-up of the Congress. The
position became so threatening that, on January 3, 1815,
Austria, Great Britain, and France felt compelled to con-
clude a secret separate alliance directed against Prussia
and Kussia, the alhes of Austria and Great Britain in the
war against Napoleon. Precautionary troop movements
began, and war among the Allies might have broken out
had not, shortly afterwards. Napoleon quitted Elba and
landed in France. Fear of the great Corsican re-united
the Powers.

Because of the great and conflicting interests involved,
the question of Poland may prove of similar importance
and difiSculty at the Congress which will conclude the
present War. Hence, it seems desirable to consider it
carefully and in good time. The consideration of the
Pohsh Question seems not only useful but urgent.

Henry Wheaton, the distinguished American diplomat
and jurist, wrote in his classical * History of the Law of
Nations ' : ' The partition of Poland was the most flagrant
violation of natural justice and International Law which
has occurred since Europe first emerged from barbarism.'
In Koch's celebrated * Tableau des Kévolutions de l'Europe,'
written by a diplomat for the use of diplomats, and pubhshed

^ The Nineteenth Century and After, January, 1915.
146

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 147

in 1825, when the partition of Poland was still fresh in men's
minds, we read :

The partition of Poland must be considered the fore-
runner of the total revolution of the whole political system
of Europe which had been estabhshed three centuries before.
Hitherto numerous alHances had been formed and many-
wars had been undertaken with a view to preserving weak
States against the ambitions of strong ones. Now three
Great Powers combined to plunder a State which had given
them no offence. Thus the barriers which had hitherto
separated right from arbitrary might were destroyed. No
weak State was any longer secure. The European balance
of power became the laughing-stock of the new school, and
serious men began to consider the European equilibrium
a chimera. Although the Courts of St. Petersburg, Berlin,
and Vienna were most strongly to blame, those of London
and Paris were not free from guilt by allowing without pro-
test the spoliation of Poland to take place.

The Polish problem is not only a very great and extremely
interesting problem, but it is unique of its kind. It can be
understood only by those who are acquainted with the history
of Poland and of its partitions. Many Englishmen are
unacquainted with that history. Most beheve that Kussia
has been the worst enemy of the Poles, that she caused the
partitions, that Germany and Austria-Hungary were merely
her accomplices, and that Great Britain has never taken
a serious interest in Pohsh affairs.

Polish history, as usually taught, is a tissue of miscon-
ceptions and of falsehoods. In the following pages it
will be shown that not Kussia, but Prussia, was chiefly
responsible for the partitions of Poland and for the subse-
quent oppression of the Poles, that Kussia and Austria
were, in their Pohsh pohcy, merely Prussia's tools and dupes,
and that England, well informed by able and conscientious
diplomats, has with truly marvellous insight and consistency
unceasingly recommended the adoption of that hberal
and enlightened policy towards Poland which seems hkely

148 TJie Problem of Poland

to prevail at last. History has wonderfully vindicated
the wisdom and the far-sightedness of British statesmen
in their treatment of Polish affairs from the middle of the
eighteenth century to the present day. A brief résumé
of the largely secret or unknown inner history of Poland
and of its partitions is particularly interesting, because it
throws a most powerful light on the true character and the
inner workings of Prusso- German, Russian, and Austrian
diplomacy from the time of Frederick the Great, of the
Empress Catherine the Second, and of the Empress Maria
Theresa to that of Bismarck, Bulow, and Bethmann-
Hollweg. I would add that much of the material given
in the following pages has never been printed, and has
been taken from the original documents.

Frederick the Great wrote in his * Exposé du Gouverne-
ment Prussien,' his Pohtical Testament, which was addressed
to his successor :

One of the first poHtical principles is to endeavour to
become an ally of that one of one's neighbours who may
become most dangerous to one's State. For that reason we
Prussians have an alHance with Russia, and thus we have
our back free of danger as long as the alhance lasts.

He wrote in his * Histoire de Mon Temps ' :

Of all neighbours of Prussia the Russian Empire is the
most dangerous, both by its power and its geographical
position, and those who will rule Prussia after me should
cultivate the friendship of those barbarians because they are
able to ruin Prussia altogether through the immense number
of their mounted troops. Besides, one cannot repay them
for the damage which they may do to us because of the
poverty of that part of Russia which is nearest to Prussia,
and through which one has to pass in order to get into the
Ukraine.

These two passages summarise and explain Prussia's
poHcy towards Russia during the last century and a half,
and furnish a key to her subtle and devious Pohsh poHcy.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 149

During the Seven Years' War Eussia had given to
Prussia the hardest blows. Guided by the considerations
given above, Frederick the Great was most anxious to make
peace and to conclude an aUiance with Eussia. He stated
in his ' Memoirs on the Events following the Peace of
Hubertusberg of 1763,' referring, Hke Julius Caesar, to
himself in the third person :

England's faithlessness (during the Seven Years' War)
had broken the bonds between Prussia and that country.
The Anglo -Prussian alliance, which had been founded upon
mutual interests, was followed by the most hvely hostihty
and the most serious anger between the two States. King
Frederick stood alone on the field of battle. No one was
left to attack him, but at the same time no one was ready to
take his part. That position of isolation was tolerable as
long as it was only temporary, but it could not be allowed
to continue. Soon a change took place. Towards the end
of the year negotiations were begun with Eussia with a view
to concluding a defensive aUiance with that country. . . .

The King of Prussia desired to obtain influence over
Eussia. . . .

The power of the Eussians is very great. Prussia still
suffers from the blows which she had received from them
during the Seven Years' War. It was obviously not in the
interest of the Prussian King to contribute to the growth of
so terrible and so dangerous a Power. Therefore two ways
were open : Prussia had either to set bounds to Eussia's
conquests by force, or she had to endeavour to take skilful
advantage of Eussia's desire for expansion. The latter
poHcy was the wiser one, and the King neglected nothing in
order to carry it into effect.

The desired opportunity of concluding an aUiance with
Eussia arose owing to the death of the Empress EHzabeth,
his great opponent, which took place on January 5, 1762.
Her successor, the foolish and imbecile Peter the Third,
became a tool in Frederick's hands. He made peace with
Prussia on May 5, 1762, and five weeks later, on June 8,

150 The Problem of Poland

he concluded with Frederick a treaty of alliance to which
the following secret articles were appended ;

Articles Secrets :

. . . Comme l'intérêt de S.M.I, de toutes les Kussies et
de S.M. le roi de Prusse exige qu'on porte un soin attentif à
ce que la répubhque de Pologne soit maintenue dans son
droit de hbre élection, et qu'il ne soit permis ni concédé à
personne d'en faire un royaume héréditaire, ou bien même
de s'ériger en prince souverain, LL.MM. l'Empereur de toutes
les Kussies et le roi de Prusse se sont promis mutuellement
et se sont engagées de la manière la plus solennelle, à ce que,
dans tous les cas et dans toutes les circonstances, si quelqu'un
et qui que ce soit voulait entreprendre de dépouiller la répub-
lique de Pologne de son droit de libre élection, ou d'en faire
un royaume héréditaire, ou de s'ériger soi-même en souverain,
LL.MM. de Kussie et de Prusse ne le permettront pas ;
mais qu'au contraire elles écarteront, repousseront et met-
tront à néant de toutes manières et par tous les moyens, des
projets si injustes et si dangereux aux puissances voisines,
en se concertant mutuellement, en réunissant leurs forces et
même en ayant recours aux armes, si les circonstances
l'exigeaient. De plus, les deux puissances s'uniront pour
faire tomber le choix sur un Piast, après la mort du roi actuel
Auguste II, et elles se concerteront sur le choix du candidat
le plus convenable.
Articles Séparés :

. . . S.M.I. de Kussie et S.M. le roi de Prusse, voyant avec
beaucoup do chagrin la dure oppression dans laquelle vivent,
depuis bien des années, leurs corehgionnaires de Pologne et
de Lithuanie, se sont réunies et aUiées pour protéger de leur
mieux tous les habitants de la Pologne et du grand-duché
de Lithuanie, qui professent les reUgions grecque, réformée
et luthérienne, et qui y sont connus sous le nom dissidents,
et veulent faire tous leurs efforts pour obtenir du roi et de
la répubhque de Pologne, par des représentations fortes et
amicales, que ces mêmes dissidents soient réintégrés dans
leurs privilèges, Hbertés, droits et prérogatives qui" leur
avaient été accordés et concédés par le passé.

Exactly a month later, during the night from July 8

Cheat Problems of British Statesmanship 151

to 9, Czar Peter was deposed and his wife, Catherine the
Second, was elevated to the throne. On July 17 Peter
the Third was assassinated.

By the Secret Articles quoted, Kussia and Prussia
pledged themselves to maintain with their whole united
strength the right of free election in Poland, to prevent the
establishment of a hereditary PoHsh kingship, to cause
the election of a * Piast ' suitable to Kussia and Prussia in
case of the death of the ruHng King, Augustus the Second.
By the Separate Article given above, Russia and Prussia
further agreed to protect with all their power the Poles
belonging to the Russian Orthodox and to the Lutheran
rehgion who at the time did not enjoy full citizen rights
in that Roman Catholic State.

Many years before that treaty of alliance was concluded,
when Russia was disunited, weak and overrun by Eastern
hordes, Poland was a powerful State. It had conquered
large portions of Russia, including the towns of Moscow
and Kieff. Hence, many Russians saw in Poland their
hereditary enemy and endeavoured, not uimaturally, to
keep that country weak and disunited. Poland was a
repubUc presided over by an elected king. All the power
was in the hands of a numerous and mostly impecunious
nobility. The State was weak because of two pecuUar
institutions — an elected king, who might be either a Pole
or a stranger, and the Liberum Veto. In consequence
of the latter the resolutions of the Polish Diet had to be
unanimous. The Veto of a single man could prevent the
passage of any measure and cripple the Government. The
Liberum Veto, possessed by the numerous aristocracy, and
the election of a king, whose power was jealously circum-
scribed by the ruling nobility, made anarchy and disorder
permanent in Poland, and weakened that country to the
utmost. While patriotic Poles desired to establish the
strength and security of the State by reforming their Govern-
ment, by abolishing the Liberum Veto, replacing it by
majority rule, and by making kingship hereditary, their

152 The Problem of Poland

enemies wished to perpetuate Polish anarchy in order to
take advantage of it. In the Treaty of Constantinople,
concluded between Turkey and Eussia in 1700, during the
reign of Peter the Great, we find already an attempt on
Kussia*s part to perpetuate disorder and anarchy in Poland
by * guaranteeing ' the preservation of the vicious PoHsh
constitution. In Article Twelve of that Treaty we read :

Le czar déclare de la manière la plus formelle qu'il ne
s'appropriera rien du territoire de la Pologne, et qu'il ne se
mêlera point du gouvernement de cette Képublique. Et
comme il importe aux deux empires d'empêcher que la
souveraineté et la succession héréditaire ne soient point
attachées à la couronne de Pologne, ils s'unissent à l'effet de
maintenir les droits, privilèges et constitutions de cet Etat.
Et au cas que quelque puissance qui que ce soit envoyât
des troupes en Pologne, ou qu'elle cherchât à y introduire la
souveraineté et la succession héréditaire, il sera non seule-
ment permis à chacune des puissances contractantes de
prendre telles mesures que son propre intérêt lui dictera,
mais les deux Etats empêcheront, par toutes les voies
possibles, que la couronne de Pologne n'acquière la souve-
raineté et la succession héréditaire ; que les droits et constitu-
tions de la EépubUque ne soient point violés ; et qu'aucun
démembrement de son territoire ne puisse avoir Ueu.

Following the policy which Peter the Great had initiated
with some reason against Poland, Eussia and Prussia agreed
by the Secret Articles quoted not only to keep Poland
weak and distracted by preserving the constitutional dis-
order of that country, and preventing all reform, but they
further agreed to use all their influence with a view to
having elected a king suitable to themselves. Besides,
they agreed to create the most serious difficulties to the
Eepubhc by protecting the non-Eoman Cathohc Poles.
In her secret instructions, sent on November 6, 1763, to
Count Keyserling and Prince Eepnin, her Ambassadors
in Warsaw, Catharine the Second, acting in conjunction
with Frederick the Great, gave orders that the gentle

Great Problems of British Statesmanshi2o 153

Count Poniatowski, her former favourite and lover, should
be elected. She placed large funds at the disposal of her
Ambassadors for the purpose of bribery, and gave directions
that, if the Poles should oppose Poniatowski's election,
Kussian troops, acting in conjunction with Prussian soldiers,
should treat all opponents to the Kusso-Prussian candidate
as rebels and enemies. We read in that most interesting
secret document :

... II est indispensable que nous portions sur le trône
de Pologne un Piast à notre convenance, utile à nos intérêts
réels, en un mot un homme qui ne doive son élévation
qu'à nous seuls. Nous trouvons dans la personne du comte
Poniatowski, panetier de Lithuanie, toutes les conditions
nécessaires à notre convenance, et en conséquence nous avons
résolu de l'élever au trône de Pologne. . . .

. . . Que si quelqu'un osait s'opposer à cette élection,
troubler l'ordre public de la répubhque, former des confédéra-
tions contre un monarque légitimement élu ; alors, sans
aucune déclaration préalable, nous ordonnerons à nos
troupes d'envahir en même temps sur tous les points le
territoire polonais, de regarder nos adversaires comme
rebelles, perturbateurs, et de détruire par le fer et par le feu
leurs biens et leurs propriétés. Dans ce cas, nous nous
concerterons avec le roi de Prusse, et vous, de votre côté,
vous vous entendrez avec son ministre résident à Varsovie.

Soon it was whispered that Kussia and Prussia had
agreed to partition Poland. These rumours were indignantly
and most emphatically denied by Frederick the Great and
Catharine the Second. Frederick the Great made on
January 24, 1764, the following pubUc declaration through
his Ambassador in Warsaw :

. . . Les faux bruits qui se sont répandus dans le royaume
et que les ennemis de la tranquillité publique ne cessent de
divulguer, que les cours de Prusse et de Kussie voulaient
profiter des circonstances présentes pour démembrer la
Pologne ou la Lithuanie, et que le concert de ces deux cours
tendait uniquement à y faire des acquisitions aux dépens

154 The Problem of Poland

de la république ; ces bruits, qui sont aussi dénués de vrai-
semblance que de fondement, ont porté le soussigné à les
contredire, non-seulement de bouche, mais aussi par une
note préalable remise au prince primat. . . .

... Sa Majesté le roi de Prusse ne travaille et ne travail-
lera constamment qu'à maintenir les Etats de la république
en leur entier. S. M. l'impératrice de Kussie ayant le même
en vue, ce n'est que dans un pareil but que le roi s'est con-
certé avec elle.

The statement of the Prussian Ambassador was followed
by a letter from Frederick the Great himself to the Prince
Primate of Poland on July 24, in which the King, in sonorous
Latin phrases, stated that he was most anxious * ut libertates
et possessiones reipublicae, sartae omnino et intactae
maneant. Haec est sincera' ! et constans animi nostri
sententia.' Catharine the Second, with similar unequivocal
directness, pubhcly declared :

... Si jamais l'esprit de mensonge a pu inventer une
fausseté complète, c'est lorsqu'on a audacieusement répandu
que, dans le dessein que nous avons de favoriser l'élection
d'un Piast, nous n'avions pour but que de nous faciliter les
moyens d'envahir, par son secours ou son concours, quelque
morceau du territoire de la couroime de Pologne ou du
grand-duché de Lithuanie, pour le démembrer du royaume
et le mettre sous notre domination par usurpation. Ce
bruit, si peu fondé et inventé aussi mal à propos, tombe
de lui-même comme dénué de toute sorte de vraisemblance.

The British diplomats hesitated to accept these solemn
declarations. Mr. Thomas Wroughton, the British Am-
bassador to Poland, reported on June 15, 1763, from
Dresden to his Government, enclosing the Empress's Declara-
tion of May 2, 1763 :

The enclosed declaration of the Empress of Russia ap-
pears to me to be very rague ; the idea here is that there is
certainly an understanding between the King of Prussia and
that Sovereign to divide the major part of the PoHsh Do-

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 155

minions between them. I cannot by any means adopt this
sentiment, conceiving it to be inconsistent with the interest
of either of them. The manner in which that unfortunate
country is treated on both sides shows that they are as much
absolute masters of it as possible, and that without awaken-
ing the jealousy of their neighbours. Russia is inattackable
on that side at present, which she would not be if she appro-
priated to herself that barrier. I can easily imagine Polish
Prussia and the town of Dantzig to be tempting objects to
the King of Prussia, but would even Russia, on whatever
amicable footing she may be, permit him to make so formid-
able an acquisition on that side and so dangerous for the
Baltick Navigation when in the hands of so great a Prince ?

By bribery and persuasion, and by ruthless intimida-
tion, supported by the threatening presence of a large
body of Russian troops brought into the Pohsh capital,
the Russian and Prussian Ambassadors secured in 1764
the election of Count Poniatowski to the Polish throne.
He reigned in the name Stanislaus Augustus. Soon after
his election the Empress Catharine, supported by Frederick
the Great, demanded that the dissenters of Poland should
be given equal rights with the Roman CathoHcs, and these
demands were backed by force.

In his * Memoirs ' Frederick the Great described this
as follows :

Towards the end of 1765 the Polish Diet came again
together. The Empress of Russia had declared herself
Protectress of the Dissenters, part of whom belonged to the
Greek religion. She demanded that they should be per-
mitted to exercise their religion freely and to obtain official
positions on a footing of equality with the other Poles.
This demand was the cause of all the disturbances and wars
which soon broke out. The Prussian Ambassador handed
to the Pohsh Diet a memoir demonstrating that his Master,
the King of Prussia, could not view with indifference the
abolition of the Liberum Veto, the introduction of new taxa-
tion, and the increase of the Polish Army, and the Polish
Republic acted in accordance with Prussia's representations.

156 • The Problem of Poland

The Dissenters were hostile to the ruling Poles. In view
of the existence of the Liberum Vote, by means of which a
single dissentient could bring the machinery of ParHament
and Government to a standstill, the demands made by^
Eussia and Prussia could be fulfilled only if the Liberum
Veto was replaced by majority rule. However, acting
in accordance with their secret treaty, Russia and Prussia
opposed that most necessary reform. The demands made
by Russia and Prussia on behalf of Dissenters were
particularly unwarrantable if we remember that even
now Poles cannot obtain * official positions on a footing
of equality ' either in Prussia or in Russia. However,
notwithstanding the unreasonableness of the request,
the new King, w^ho possessed far more patriotism than
Frederick the Great and Catharine the Second had believed,
promised to fulfil their demands if he was given sufiBcient
time. Sir G. Macartney, the British Ambassador in St.
Petersburg, reported on November 28 (December 7), 1766 :

The King of Poland five months ago declared to Mr.
Panin by his Minister that if Russia would act moderately
he would undertake in this Diet to obtain for the dissidents
the free exercise of their religion, and in the next he would
endeavour, nay promise, to render them not only capable
of Juridicatory Starosties, but of being elected to the Nuncia-
ture. Unfortunately this proposal did not content the
Court of Petersburg. She [the Empress] thought it possible
to obtain everything she demanded, and did not compre-
hend the difficulty, the impossibility, of persuading a Great
Assembly [the most august part of which consists of Ecclesi-
asticks] to grant all at once without hesitation free participa-
tion of their privileges to a set of men whom they have been
taught to look upon as equally their spiritual and temporal
enemies. The King of Prussia by his minister here en-
deavours by all methods, fer fas et nef as, to irritate this Court
against the Poles, and as an indiscreet zeal for rehgion has
never been reckoned among that Monarch's weaknesses, his
motives are shrewdly suspected to be much deeper than
they are avowed to be.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 157

Driven to despair by the threats of armed interference,
made by the Eussian and Prussian Ambassadors, King
Stanislaus Augustus appealed on October 5, 1766, to
Catharine the Second in a most touching private letter,
which, alluding to their former intimacy and love, ended
as follows :

Lorsque vous m'avez recommandé au choix de cette
nation, vous n'avez assurément pas voulu que je devinsse
l'objet de ses malédictions ; vous ne comptiez certainement
pas non plus élever dans ma personne un but aux traits de
vos armes. Je vous conjure de voir cependant que si tout ce
que le prince Kepnin m'a annoncé se vérifie, il n'y a pas de
milieu pour moi : il faut que je m'expose à vos coups, ou
que je trahisse ma nation et mon devoir. Vous ne m'auriez
pas voulu roi, si j'étais capable du dernier. La Foudre est
entre vos mains, mais la lancerez-vous sur la tête innocente
de celui qui vous est depuis si longtemps le plus tendrement
et le plus sincèrement attaché ? Madame, De Votre Majesté
Impériale le bon frère, ami et voisin,

Stanislas-Auguste, roi.

The King pleaded in vain. Catharine the Second and
Frederick the Great were freethinkers. Their championship
of the rights of the Dissenters was merely a pretext for
crippHng Poland completely and for interfering in that
country with a view to partitioning it. Mr. Thomas
Wroughton, the British Ambassador in Poland, sent on
October 29, 1766, a despatch to his Government, in which
we read :

I had another long conversation with the King, who
represented to me in the most touching colours the situation
of his affairs and the manner in which he thinks himself
and the nation treated. He saw himself, he said, upon the
brink of the most serious danger ; that he was determined
to suffer all rather than betray his country, or act like a
dishonest man ; that Her Imperial Majesty had never pre-
tended to more than procuring the Protestants the full
exercise of their religion, and that he had laboured for many

158 The Problem of Poland

months past on that plan ; that this sudden and violent
resolution of the Empress to put them on a level with his
other subjects convinced him that religion was only a
pretext, and that she and the King of Prussia, repenting
of having placed a man on the throne that worked for the
elevation of his country, were taking measures to overset
what they themselves had done ; that he awaited the event
with the utmost tranquillity, conscious of having ever acted
on the principles of Justice and Patriotism.

The British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Andrew Mitchell,
confirmed in his despatches the views of his colleagues
in Petersburg and Warsaw as to the ultimate aims of Kussia
and Prussia in Poland. He wrote, for instance, on
November 22, 1766 :

Neither the Empress of Kussia nor the King of Prussia
would wish to see such an alteration in the constitution of
Poland as could not fail to render the Kepublick more
independent, more powerful, and of more weight and
importance than it has hitherto been in Europe.

Before the first partition of Poland the Province of
East Prussia was separated from the rest of the Kingdom
of Prussia by Polish territory. The present Province of
West Prussia, with Thorn, Dantzig, and the mighty Kiver
Vistula, formed then part of Poland. Frederick strove
to acquire that province, and with this object in view he
had advocated the partition of Poland with Eussia. How-
ever, an event occurred which seriously affected the King's
plans. In 1768 war broke out between Eussia and Turkey.
It was long drawn out and, to Frederick's dismay, Eussia
proved victorious. The King strongly desired the existence
of a powerful Turkey friendly to Prussia, which, in case
of meed, might afford valuable support to Prussia by
attacking Eussia in the flank or Austria in the rear. The
King wrote in his ' Memoirs ' :

It was in no way in Prussia's interest to see the Ottoman
Power altogether destroyed. In case of need excellent use

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 159

could be made of it for causing a diversion either in Hungary
or in Kussia in the event that Prussia was at war either with
Austria or with the Muscovite Power.

Germany's traditional philo-Turkish policy was originated
not by Bismarck and William the Second, but by Frederick
the Great.

During a long time Frederick strove to bring about a
war between Russia and Austria by teUing the Austrians
that if Russia should conquer large portions of Turkey
she would become too powerful, and w^ould become
dangerous to Austria herself, that Austria should not
tolerate the Russians crossing the Danube. As his attempts
at involving these two States in war proved unsuccessful,
he resolved to divert Russia's attention from the Balkan
Peninsula to Poland, and for greater security he wished
to make use of Austria as a tool and a partner in his designs.
As Maria Theresa, the Austrian Empress, refused to take
a hand in the partition of Poland, he began to work upon
her son and successor. Joseph the Second, born in 1741,
was at the time young, enthusiastic, inexperienced, hasty,
vain, and he thirsted for glory. He envied Frederick's
successes. Playing upon his vanity and upon that of
Prince Kaunitz, the leading Austrian statesman, Frederick
the Great obtained their support for partitioning Poland.
After a long but fruitless resistance against her son and
her principal adviser, Maria Theresa signed, it is said with
tears in her eyes, on March 4, 1772, the Partition Treaty.
However, in signing it, she expressed her dissent and dis-
approval in the following prophetic phrase :

Placet, puisque tant et de savants persormages veulent
qu'il en soit ainsi ; mais, longtemps après ma mort, on verra
ce qui résulte d'avoir ainsi foulé aux pieds tout ce que
jusqu'à présent on a toujours tenu pour juste et pour
sacré.

To preserve the appearance of legitimacy the partitioning
Powers wished to receive the consent of the Polish Diet to

160 The Problem of Poland

their act of spoliation. Frederick the Great describes how
that consent was obtained. After mentioning that each
of the partitioning Powers sent an army to Poland to over-
awe the people, and that Warsaw was occupied by troops,
he wrote in his * Memoirs ' :

At first the Poles were obstinate and rejected all proposals.
The representatives did not come to Warsaw. Having grown
tired of the long delay, the Court of Vienna proposed to
appoint a day for the opening of the Diet, threatening that
in case of the non-appearance of the delegates, the three
Powers would partition not merely part but the whole of
the country. If, on the other hand, the cession of the out-
lying districts was effected by voluntary agreement, the
foreign troops would be withdrawn from Poland. That
declaration overcame all difiSculties. The Treaty of Cession
was signed with Prussia on the 18th of September, and
Poland was guaranteed the integrity of her remaining
provinces. . . . The Poles, who are the most easy-going
and most foolish nation in Europe, thought at first that
they could safely consent because they would be able to
destroy the work of the three Powers within a short time.
They argued thus in the hope that Eussia might be defeated
by Turkey.

At the first partition Prussia, Austria, and Russia were,
according to their treaty concluded with Poland, to take
certain vast but clearly defined territories from that unhappy
State. However, by fraud and violence they greatly
exceeded the stipulated hmits. Frederick the Great tells
us with his habitual cynical candour :

The Poles complained loudly that the Austrians and
Prussians increased their shares without hmit. There was
some reason for these complaints. The Austrians used a
very wrong map of Poland on which the names of the rivers
Sbruze and Podhorze had been exchanged, and making use
of this pretext enlarged their portion very greatly beyond
the limits agreed upon by the Treaty of Partition. The
basis of the Treaty had been that the shares of the three

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 161

Powers should be equal. As the Austrians had increased
their share, King Frederick considered himself justified in
doing Hkewise, and included in Prussia the districts of the
old and the new Netze.

Careful study of the * Memoirs ' and of the diplomatic and
private correspondence of the time shows convincingly that
Frederick the Great was the moving spirit, and that he
was responsible for the first partition of Poland, that Eussia
and Austria were merely his tools and his dupes. He has
told us in his * Memoirs * that he sent the original plan of
partition to Petersburg, attributing it to the fertile brain of
a visionary statesman. Count Lynar. The late Lord
Salisbury wrote in his valuable essay * Poland,' pubUshed
in the Quarterly Review in 1863, in which, by the by, he
treated the claims of the Poles with little justice :

By a bold inversion of the real degrees of guilt the chief
blame is laid on Eussia. Prussia is looked upon as a pitiful
and subordinate accomphce, while Austria is almost absolved
as an unwilling accessory. . . .

To Frederick the Great of Prussia belongs the credit of
having initiated the scheme which was actually carried into
execution. It is now admitted, even by German historians,
that the first partition was proposed to Catharine by Prince
Henry of Prussia on behalf of his brother Frederick, and
with the full acquiescence of Joseph, Emperor of Germany.
Frederick had never been troubled with scruples upon the
subject of territorial acquisition, and he was not hkely to
commence them in the case of Poland. Spoliation was the
hereditary tradition of his race. The whole history of the
kingdom over which he ruled was a history of lawless
annexation. It was formed of territory filched from other
races and other Powers, and from no Power so liberally as
from Poland.

The fact that Frederick the Great was responsible for
the first partition of Poland is acknowledged not only by
leading German historians, but even by the German school-
books. As an excuse, it is usually stated that necessity

162 The Problem of Poland

compelled Frederick to propose that step because the anarchy
prevaihng m Poland made impossible its continued existence
as an independent State. However, German writers never
mention that the Poles themselves earnestly wished to
reform the State, and that Frederick not only opposed
that reform but greatly increased disorder by putting his
own nominee on the Pohsh throne, by causing civil war to
break out in the country, by raising the Polish Dissenters
against the Government, by occupying Poland in con-
junction with Eussia, by interfering with its elections and
Government, and by bribing and overawing its Legislature
by armed force.

The second partition of Poland in 1793 is perhaps even
more disgraceful to Prussia than was the first, because it
involved that country and her King in an act of incredible
treachery. Frederick the Great died in 1786. His successor,
Frederick WilHam the Second, was a worthless individual,
and he brought about the second partition by means which
his uncle would have disdained. Mr. M. S. F. Scholl, a
German diplomat of standing, described in Koch's classical
* Tableau des Kévolutions de l'Europe,' which is still much
used by students of history, and especially by diplomats,
the infamous way in which Prussia betrayed Poland at the
time of the second partition in the following words :

While in France, during the Kevolution, the nation was
seized by a sudden rage and aboHshed all institutions and
all law and order, giving itself up to excesses which one would
have thought to be impossible, another nation in the North
of Europe, which was plunged in anarchy and oppressed
by its neighbours, made a noble effort to estabHsh good order
and to throw off its foreign yoke.

The Poles had persuaded themselves that they might
be able to change their vicious Constitution and to give
renewed strength to the Government of the Pohsh Eepubhc
during a time when Eussia was occupied with wars against
Sweden and Turkey. An Extraordinary Diet was convoked
at Warsaw, and in order to aboHsh the inconvenience of

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 168

the liherum veto, which required unanimity of votes, it
adopted the form of a Confederation. The Empress,
Catharine the Second of Kussia, approached the Pohsh Diet
and endeavoured to conclude with it an alliance against
the Turks. Her plan was spoiled by the King of Prussia,
who, in consequence of arrangements made with England,
did all in his power to rouse the Poles against the Eussians.
He encouraged them by offering them his alliance to under-
take the reformation of their Government which Prussia
had recently guaranteed. A Committee of the Pohsh Diet
was instructed to draw up a plan of a Constitution designed
to regenerate the Repubhc.

The resolution taken by the Diet was likely to displease
the Empress of Russia, who considered that step as a formal
breach of the Treaty between Russia and Poland concluded
in 1775. As the Poles could foresee that the changes which
they desired to effect were likely to involve them in differences
with the Empress of Russia, they ought before all to have
thought of preparing their defence. However, instead of
improving their finances and strengthening their army, the
Diet lost much in discussing the projected new Constitution.
Prussia's protection, of which they had officially been as-
sured, made the Poles too confident. The alHance which the
King of Prussia actually concluded with the Repubhc on
March 27, 1790, gave them a feehng of absolute security.
King Stanislaus Augustus hesitated a long time as to the
attitude which he should adopt. At last he joined that
party of the Diet which desired to draw Poland out of the
humihating position in which she had fallen, llie new
Constitution was proclaimed on May 3, 1791.

Although that Constitution was not perfect, it was in
accordance with Poland's conditions. It corrected the vices
of her ancient laws, and although it was truly Republican
in spirit, it avoided the exaggerated ideas to which the
French Revolution had given rise. The throne was made
hereditary. The absurd liherum veto was abolished. The
Diet was declared permanent and the legislative body was
divided into two chambers. The lower one was to discuss
laws. The upper one, the Senate, presided over by the
King, was to sanction them and to exercise the veto. The

164 The Problem of Poland

executive power was entrusted to the King and a Council
of Supervision composed of seven responsible Ministers. . . .

The exertions made by the Poles for ensuring their
independence aroused Eussia's anger. As soon as the
Empress of Kussia had concluded peace with Turkey, she
induced her supporters in Poland to form a separate con-
federation which aimed at revoking the innovations which
the Diet of Warsaw had introduced. It strove to bring the
old Polish constitution once more into force. That con-
federation was concluded on the 14th of May 1792, at
Targowice, and the Counts Fehx Potocki, Kzewuski, and
Branicki were its leaders.

The Empress of Kussia sent an army into Poland in
support of the new Confederation, and made war against
those Poles who were in favour of the new constitution.
Only then did the Poles seriously think of vigorous counter
measures. The Diet decreed that the Polish Army should
be placed on a war footing, and a loan of 33,000,000 florins
was arranged for. However, when the Prussian Ambassador
was asked to state what assistance the King, his master,
would give in accordance with his pledges contained in the
Treaty of Alliance of 1790 — according to Articles 3 and 4
he was to furnish the Republic with 18,000 men, and in case
of need with 30,000 men — he gave an evasive answer which
threw the patriotic party into despair.

The refusal of the Polish Diet to sanction a commercial
proposal by which Poland would have abandoned the towns
of Danzig and Thorn to Prussia had angered that monarch
against the Poles, and the Empress of Russia did not find it
difficult to obtain the Prussian King's consent to another
partition of the country. The aversion which the sovereigns
felt against everything which resembled the French Revolu-
tion, with which, however, the events in Poland, where
King and nation acted in harmony, had nothing in common
except appearances, strongly influenced the Berlin Court
and caused it to break the engagements which it had con-
tracted with the Republic.

The Poles understood the danger of their position.
Their enthusiasm cooled, and the whole Diet was seized
with a feeling of consternation. Having to rely on their

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 165

own strength, and being torn by dissensions, the Poles were
unable to face their Eussian opponents with success. The
patriotic party was unfortunate in the campaign of 1792.
After several victories the Kussians advanced upon Warsaw
and King Stanislaus, who was easily discouraged, joined the
Confederation of Targowice, denounced the Constitution of
the 8rd of May, and subscribed on the 25th of August 1792
to all the conditions which the Empress of Kussia prescribed.
An armistice was declared, and in consequence of its stipula-
tions the Polish Army was reduced. In virtue of the Con-
vention of Petersburg of the 23rd of January 1793, concluded
between Prussia and Kussia, the Prussian troops entered
Poland and spread throughout the country, following
Kussia's example. Proclamations of the Courts of Berlin
and St. Petersburg were pubhshed, by which these States
took possession of those districts of the country which their
troops had occupied. The adoption by Poland of the
principles of 1789 and the propagation of the democratic
principles of the French by the Poles were given as reasons
for the second partition of Poland. . . .

The partitioning Powers renounced once more all rights
and claims to the territories of the Republic, and bound
themselves to recognise, and even to guarantee, if desired,
the Constitution which the Polish Diet would draw up with
the free consent of the Polish nation.

Notwithstanding the reiterated promises of respecting
the integrity of the much-reduced country, the third partition
took place in 1795.

From the very beginning Prussia, Austria, and Russia
treated Poland as a corpus vile, and cut it up like a cake,
without any regard to the claims, the rights, and the pro-
tests of the Poles themselves. Although history only
mentions three partitions, there were in reality seven.
There were those of 1772, 1793, and 1795, already referred
to ; and these were followed by arbitrary redistributions
of the Polish territories in 1807, 1809, and 1815. In none
of these were the inhabitants consulted or even considered.
The Congress of Vienna established the independence of

166 The Problem of Poland

Cracow, but Austria-Hungary, asserting that she considered
herself ' threatened ' by the existence of that tiny State,
seized it in 1846.

While Prussia, Austria, and Kussia, considering that
might was right, had divided Poland amongst themselves,
regardless of the passionate protests of the inhabitants,
England had remained a spectator, but not a passive one,
of the tragedy. She viewed the action of the Allies with
strong disapproval, but although she gave frank expression
to her sentiments, she did not actively interfere. After
all, no English interests were involved in the partition.
It was not her business to intervene. Besides, she could
not successfully have opposed single-handed the joint action
of the three powerful partner States, especially as France,
under the weak Louis the Fifteenth, held aloof. How-
ever, EngUsh statesmen refused to consider as valid the
five partitions which took place before and during the
Napoleonic era.

The Treaty of Chaumont of 1814 created the Concert
of Europe. At the Congress of Vienna of 1815 the frontiers
of Europe were fixed by general consent. As Prussia, Austria,
and Russia refused to recreate an independent Poland,
England's opposition would have broken up the Concert,
and might have led to further wars. Unable to prevent
the injustice done to Poland by her opposition, and anxious
to maintain the unity of the Powers and the peace of the
world, England consented at last to consider the partition
of Poland as a fait accom'pli, and formally recognised it,
especially as the Treaty of Vienna assured the Poles of
just and fair treatment under representative institutions.
Article 1 of the Treaty of Vienna stated expressly :

Les Polonais, sujets respectifs de la Russie, de l'Autriche
et de la Prusse, obtiendront une représentation et des institu-
tions nationales réglées d'après le mode d'existence politique
que chacun des gouvernements auxquels ils appartiennent
jugera utile et convenable de leur accorder.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 167

By signing the Treaty of Vienna, England recognised
not explicitly, but merely implicitly, the partition of Poland,
and she did so unwillingly and under protest. Lord Castle-
reagh stated in a Circular Note addressed to Kussia, Prussia,
and Austria that it had always been England's desire that
an independent Poland, possessing a dynasty of its own,
should be established, which, separating Austria, Eussia,
and Prussia, should act as a buffer State between them ;
that, failing its creation, the Poles should be reconciled
to being dominated by foreigners, by just and liberal treat-
ment which alone would make them satisfied. His Note,
which is most remarkable for its far-sightedness, wisdom,
force, and restraint, was worded as follows :

The Undersigned, His Britannic Majesty's Principal
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Plenipotentiary
to the Congress of Vienna, in desiring the present Note
concerning the affairs of Poland may be entered on the Proto-
col, has no intention to revive controversy or to impede
the progress of the arrangements now in contemplation.
His only object is to avail himself of this occasion of tempe-
rately recording, by the express orders of his Court, the
sentiments of the British Government upon a European
question of the utmost magnitude and influence.

The Undersigned has had occasion in the course of the
discussions at Vienna, for reasons that need not now be gone
into, repeatedly and earnestly to oppose himself, on the
part of his Court, to the erection of a PoUsh kingdom in
union with and making a part of the Imperial Crown of
Eussia.

The desire of his Court to see an independent Power,
more or less considerable in extent, established in Poland
under a distinct Dynasty, and as an intermediate State
between the three great Monarchies, has uniformly been
avowed, and if the Undersigned has not been directed to
press such a measure, it has only arisen from a disinclination
to excite, under all the apparent obstacles to such an arrange-
ment, expectations which might prove an unavailing source
of discontent among the Poles.

168 The Problem of Poland

The Emperor of Kussia continuing, as it is declared, still
to adhere to his purpose of erecting that part of the Duchy
of Warsaw which is to fall under His Imperial Majesty's
dominion, together with his other Polish provinces, either
in whole or in part, into a kingdom under the Russian
sceptre ; and their Austrian and Prussian Majesties, the
Sovereigns most immediately interested, having ceased to
oppose themselves to such an arrangement — the Under-
signed adhering, nevertheless, to all his former representa-
tions on this subject has only sincerely to hope that none of
those evils may result from this measure to the tranquillity
of the North, and to the general equihbrium of Europe,
which it has been his painful duty to anticipate. But in
order to obviate as far as possible such consequences, it is of
essential importance to establish the public tranquillity
throughout the territories which formerly constituted the
kingdom of Poland, upon some solid and liberal basis of
common interest, by applying to all, however various may
be their political institutions, a congenial and conciliatory
system of administration.

Experience has proved that it is not by counteracting all
their habits and usages as a people that either the happiness
of the Poles, or the peace of that important portion of
Europe, can be preserved. A fruitless attempt, too long
persevered in, by institutions foreign to their manner and
sentiments to make them forget their existence, and even
language, as a people, has been sufficiently tried and failed.
It has only tended to excite a sentiment of discontent and
self-degradation, and can never operate otherwise than to
provoke commotion and to awaken them to a recollection of
past misfortunes.

The Undersigned, for these reasons, and in cordial
concurrence with the general sentiments which he has had
the satisfaction to observe the respective Cabinets enter-
tained on this subject, ardently desires that the illustrious
Monarchs to whom the destinies of the Polish nation are
confided, may be induced, before they depart from Vienna,
to take an engagement with each other to treat as Poles,
under whatever form of political institution they may think
fit to govern them, the portions of that nation that may be

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 169

placed under their respective sovereignties. The knowledge
of such a determination will best tend to conciliate the
general sentiment to their rule, and to do honour to the
several Sovereigns in the eyes of their Polish subjects. This
course will consequently afford the surest prospect of their
living peaceably and contentedly under their respective
Governments. ...

This despatch was sent on January 12, 1815, a century
ago. The warnings were not heeded and the past century
has been filled with sorrow for the Poles and with risings
and revolutions, as Lord Castlereagh clearly foretold.

In their reply, the Kussian, Prussian, and Austrian repre-
sentatives promised to act in accordance with England's
views. However, soon after the overthrow of Napoleon,
reaction set in. The promises made to the peoples at the
Congress of Vienna, and the claims of the nationaUties,
were disregarded. Representative government was either
not estabhshed, or, where estabhshed, was destroyed.
Under the guidance of Prince Metternich, the evil genius
of Austria, an era of petty tyranny and of persecution began.
An example will show how the Poles were treated. On
May 15, 1815, King Frederick William the Third of Prussia,
on taking possession of the. Polish territories which fell to
him under the Treaty of Vienna, addressed the following
proclamation to the inhabitants :

Inhabitants of the Kingdom of Poland ! In again taking
possession of the district of the former dukedom of Warsaw,
which originally belonged to Prussia, I wish to define your
position. You also have a Fatherland, and you receive
proof of my appreciation for your attachment to me. You
will be incorporated in the Prussian Monarchy, but you
need not abandon your nationality. You will take part
in the constitution which I intend granting to my faithful
subjects, and you will receive a provincial constitution
similar to that which the other provinces of my State will
receive. Your religion shall be respected, and the clergy

170 The Problem of Poland

will receive an income suitable to its position. Your
personal rights and property will be protected by the laws
which will be made with your collaboration. The Polish
language shall be used side by side with the German language
in all public transactions and affairs, and every one of you
shall be able to obtain official positions, honours, and
dignities according to his ability.

In 1813, at the beginning of the War of Liberation
against Napoleon, Frederick William the Third had solemnly
promised a constitution to the Prussian people. At that
moment he needed their help. That promise, which was
received with the greatest enthusiasm, was renewed in the
document given above and in many others, but it was not
kept, although the King Hved till 1840. He and his suc-
cessors treated the Poles with absolute faithlessness. Not
a single one of the promises made to them in the Proclama-
tion quoted was observed. During a century Prussia has
disregarded her pledges of fair and equal treatment. Instead
the Poles were persecuted and oppressed in Prussia, and
their persecution in Austria, and especially in Kussia, was
largely, if not chiefly, due to Prussia's instigation.

Since the time of Frederick the Great, and in accordance
with his advice given in the beginning of this chapter,
Prussian statesmen, distrusting and fearing Kussia, aimed
at maintaining the most intimate relations with that country,
for Kussia's support was most valuable, while her hostihty
was dangerous. Fearing and distrusting Kussia, they
strove to keep that country weak. Animated by fear and
distrust, they aimed at possessing themselves of a powerful
weapon which could be used against the Northern Power
in case of need.

These three purposes of Prussian statesmanship could
best be served by inducing Kussia to pursue in her Polish
districts a poHcy which exasperated the Poles, which created
disaffection on her most vulnerable frontier. Kussia was
an autocracy, and the Poles, remembering their ancient
Repubhc, have always been democratically incUned. An

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 171

autocrat is naturally afraid of revolution and conspiracy.
Taking advantage of these feelings, Prussia succeeded
during more than a century in influencing and guiding
Russia's poUcy to her advantage. She unceasingly pointed
out to the Czar that the three States which brought
about the partition of Poland were equally interested in
combating democracy and revolution. The Poles were
depicted to the Russians as bom revolutionaries and
anarchists.

Russia had good reason to fear a Polish rising on her
western, her most vulnerable, frontier, on which dwell
nearly 12,000,000 Poles. The Poles are exceedingly warlike,
and Russia has in the past found it extremely difficult to
suppress their risings. Besides, an invader could always
hope to raise the Poles against the Czar by promising them
liberty, as was done by Napoleon the First in 1812. Prussian
statesmen never tired of pointing out to the Czar that the
danger of a PoHsh revolution could be overcome only by
severe repressive measures taken jointly with Prussia.
Thus Prussia and Russia were to remain partners, being
jointly interested in the persecution of Poland. Poland's
unhappiness was to be the cement of the two States.
For the same reason for which Frederick the Great de-
sired to preserve disorder in Poland, his successors desired
to see chronic dissatisfaction prevail in Russia's Western
Provinces.

Prussia contemplated with fear the possibility of Poland
receiving her independence. It is clear that the re-creation
of an independent Poland within the limits of 1772 would
affect Russia only slightly, but would damage Prussia very
severely. The Prussian Poles dwell in dense masses in
Southern Silesia, one of the wealthiest coal and industrial
centres of Germany, and in the provinces of Posen and
Western Prussia. If the province of Posen should once
more become Polish, the distance which separates Berlin
from the eastern frontier of Germany would be reduced
to about one half. The capital would be in danger. If

172 The Problem of Poland

the province of West Prussia, with the mouth of the
Vistula and the port of Danzig, should once more become
Polish, Prussia's position in the province of East Prussia
would be jeopardised, for Polish territory would once more
separate it from the rest of the Monarchy. Eussia, on the
other hand, with her boundless territories, could easily
bear the loss of her Polish provinces, especially as her capitals
lie far from the frontier. Prince Biilow stated, not without
cause, in the Prussian Diet on January 19, 1908 : * The
Polish question is, as it has ever been, one of the most
important, nay, the most important, question of Prussia's
policy.*

In modem Eussia there have always been absolutist and
liberal-minded Czars and a reactionary and a progressive
party. Those who depicted Eussia as a land of pure and
undiluted absolutism, and her Czars as a race of cruel and
unenlightened despots, were not acquainted with Eussian
history. While the reactionary party in Eussia favoured
the policy of oppressing the nationaUties, the liberal-minded
were in favour of a wisely limited constitutionalism. They
desired to give representative institutions to the people and
some suitable form of self-government to the Poles.

In 1859 Bismarck became the Prussian Ambassador
in Petrograd. At that time Eussia was recovering from
the effects of the Crimean War, and many of the most
enlightened Eussians had become convinced that her defeat
was largely due to her backwardness, that her backwardness
was caused by her unprogressive institutions, that a more
liberal policy in the widest sense of the word was needed.
The Czar himself and his principal adviser. Prince
Gortchakoff, were in favour of Liberalism and of Constitu-
tionalism. Both desired to give greater freedom to the Poles.
However, Bismarck, following the policy of Frederick
the Great, resolutely opposed their policy in Prussia's interest.
Owing to his persuasiveness and personal magnetism,
that great statesman obtained the ascendant over the Czar
and induced^him to pursue a reactionary policy towards

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 173

the Poles. Lord Cowley, the British Ambassador in Paris,"
reported to Earl Kussell on March 26, 1863 :

I have had a curious conversation with the Prussian
Ambassador, and not altogether without importance, as
showing that the Prussian Government has, if possible,
greater repugnance to the restoration of Polish independence
than the Cabinet of St. Petersburg itself. Adverting to the
well-known desire of the Emperor to accomplish this event,
Count Goltz said that it was a question of life and death
to Prussia. ... In the course of this conversation Count
Goltz said that M. de Bismarck, while Prussian Minister at
St. Petersburg, had strenuously and successfully opposed
the few concessions made to Poland by the present Emperor.

In his * Memoirs ' Prince Bismarck candidly described his
anti-Polish poUcy in Kussia as follows :

In the higher circles of Eussian society the influences
which made for Poland were connected with the now out-
spoken demand for a constitution. It was felt as a degrada-
tion that a cultivated people like the Eussians should be
denied institutions which existed in all European nations,
and should have no voice in the management of their own
affairs. The division of opinion on the Polish question
penetrated the highest military circles. Those Eussians
who demanded a constitution for themselves pleaded at
times in excuse for the Poles that they were not governable
by Eussians, and that as they grew more civilised they
became entitled to a share in the administration of their
country. This view was also represented by Prince
Gortchakoff.

The conflict of opinion was very lively in St. Petersburg
when I left that capital in April, 1862, and it so continued
throughout my first year of ofi&ce. I took charge of the
Foreign Office under the impression that the insurrection
which had broken out on January 1st, 1863, brought up
the question not only of the interests of our Eastern provinces,
but also that wider one, whether the Eussian Cabinet were
dominated by Polish or anti-Polish proclivities, by an effort
after Eusso-Polish fraternisation in the anti-German Pan-

174 The Problem of Poland

slavist interest or by one for mutual reliance between
Eussia and Prussia.

For the German future of Prussia the attitude of Eussia
was a question of great importance. A philo-Polish Eussian
policy was calculated to vivify that Eusso -French sympathy
against which Prussia's effort had been directed since the
peace of Paris, and indeed on occasion earlier, and an alliance
(friendly to Poland) between Eussia and France, such as was
in the air before the Eevolution of July, would have placed
the Prussia of that day in a difficult position. It was our
interest to oppose the party in the Eussian Cabinet which
had Polish procHvities, even when they were the proclivities
of Alexander II.

That Eussia herself afforded no security against fraterni-
sation with Poland I was able to gather from confidential
intercourse with Gortchakoff and the Czar himself. Czar
Alexander was at that time not indisposed to withdraw
from part of Poland, the left bank of the Vistula at any rate —
so he told me in so many words — while he made unemphatic
exception of Warsaw, which would always be desirable as a
garrison town, and belonged strategically to the Vistula
fortress triangle. Poland, he said, was for Eussia a source
of unrest and dangerous European complications ; its Eussi-
fication was forbidden by the difference of religion and the
insufficient capacity for administration among Eussian
officials.

. . . Our geographical position and the intermixture of
both nationahties in the Eastern provinces, including Silesia,
compel us to retard, as far as possible, the opening of the
PoHsh question, and even in 1863 made it appear advisable
to do our best not to facilitate, but to obviate, the opening
of this question by Eussia. It was assumed that Uberal
concessions, if granted to the Poles, could not be withheld
from the Eussians ; Eussian constitutionalists were therefore
philo-Polish.

Eussia's history has often been most unfavourably
affected, and the clearly expressed will of the Czar himself
been totally deflected, by the incompetence of a single
powerful individual. The Czar Alexander was a kindly,

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 175

liberal-minded, and broad-minded man, and he was, as
we have learned from the testimony of Bismarck and Lord
Cowley, very favourable to the Poles and to their aspirations.
He intended to give the Poles a full measure of self-govern-
ment, and he entrusted an eminent Pole, Count Wielopolski,
an old revolutionary of 1830, with that difi&cult task.
Wielopolski, though probably well meaning, was tactless,
rash, and inclined to violence. Some of his measures had
caused dissatisfaction among the Poles and had led to riots.
Wielopolski resolved to rid himself of his opponents, who
were chiefly young hot-headed enthusiasts, by enrolling
them in the army, and sending them for a long number of
years to Siberia and the Caucasus. By his orders numerous
young men, belonging to good families, were to be arrested
in their beds by soldiers during the night of January 1,
1863. In the words of Lord Napier, the British Ambassador
in Petrograd, * the opposition was to be kidnapped.* That
foolish and arbitrary step led to a widespread revolt and
a prolonged but hopeless struggle between Polish guerillas
and Eussian soldiers. Bismarck, who had unceasingly re-
commended a policy of reaction while he was in Petrograd,
made the best use of his opportunity, and he did so all
the more readily as Prince Gortchakoff was a friend not only
of Poland but also of France. Foreseeing a struggle between
Prussia and France, Bismarck desired to obtain Eussia's
goodwill, to create differences between that country and
France, and to discredit the Francophile Prince Gortchakoff
with the Czar. Sir A. Buchanan, the British Ambassador
in Berlin, informed Lord Eussell on March 21, 1863 :

Prince Hohenzollern, in speaking to me some days ago
with regret of the foreign policy of the Prussian Government,
said that one of its principal objects has been the overthrow
of Prince Gortchakoff, whose wish to promote an alliance
between France and Eussia is, they believe, the only obstacle
in the way of re-establishing the relations which existed be-
tween the three Northern Courts previously to the Crimean
War.

176 The Problem of Poland

Bismarck exaggerated to the Czar the scope, character,
and consequences of the Pohsh revolt to the utmost, and
while France and England expressed their sympathy with
the Poles, and reproached Wielopolski for his blundering,
Bismarck hastened to demonstrate his attachment to
Eussia and his devotion to the Czar by offering Prussia's
assistance in combating the revolutionists. On January
22, 1863, the first sanguinary encounter took place. Ten
days later, on February 1, General Gustav von Alvensleben
was despatched by Prussia to the Czar with proposals for
joint action against the Poles. Sir A. Buchanan, the British
Ambassador in Berlin, telegraphed on February 12 to
Earl Kussell :

Insurrection in Poland extending, and numbers of Kus-
sian troops said to be insufficient for its suppression. . . .
Two corps of observation are forming on the frontier, and
assistance, if required, will be afforded by Prussia. Bis-
marck says Prussia will never permit the establishment of
an independent kingdom of Poland.

Two days later the British Ambassador telegraphed :

. . . General Alvensleben, who is now in Warsaw,
having arrived there two days ago from St. Petersburg, has
concluded a military convention with the Kussian Govern-
ment, according to which the two Governments will recipro-
cally afford facihties to each other for the suppression of
the insurrectionary movements which have lately taken
place in Poland. . . .

The Prussian railways are also to be placed at the disposal
of the Kussian military authorities for the transport of
troops through Prussian territory from one part of the
kingdom of Poland to another. The Government further
contemplate, in case of necessity, to give military assistance
to the Kussian Government for the suppression of the
insurrection in the kingdom ; but I am told that no engage-
ment has yet been entered into with respect to the nature or
extent of such assistance. In the meanwhile, however,
four corps of the Prussian Army are concentrating on the

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 177

frontiers under the command of General Waldersee, whose
headquarters are at Posen.

To demonstrate Prussia's zeal for Russia, one third of
the Prussian Army was placed at Russia's service on the
Polish frontier, to help in suppressing the rising of a number
of men armed chiefly with scythes and pistols.

For reasons given in these pages, Bismarck was alarmed
by the possibility that the Czar might establish an inde-
pendent Poland on Prussia's border. Sir A. Buchanan, the
British Ambassador in Berlin, informed Earl Russell on
February 14, 1863 :

M. de Bismarck, in acquainting me a few days ago with
his intention to take measures in concert with the Russian
Government to prevent the extension of the insurrectionary
movements which have lately taken place in Poland, said
the question was of vital importance to Prussia, as her
own existence would be seriously compromised by the
establishment of an independent kingdom of Poland. I
asked whether he meant to say that if Russia found any
difficulty in suppressing the insurrection, the Prussian
Government intended to afford them military assistance ;
and he not only replied in the affirmative, but added that
if Russia got tired of the contest and were disposed to with-
draw from the kingdom — a course which some Russians were
supposed to think advantageous to her interests — the
Prussian Government would carry on the war on their own
account. . . .

The Emperor William the First, who at the time was
only King of Prussia, frankly said to the British Ambassador,
according to his telegram on February 22, 1863 :

It was equally the duty and the interest of Prussia
to do everything in her power to prevent the estab-
lishment of an independent Polish kingdom, for if the
PoHsh nation could reconstitute themselves as an indepen-
dent State, the existence of Prussia would be seriously
menaced, as the first efforts of the new State would be to

178 The Problem of Poland

recover Dantzig, and if that attempt succeeded, the fatal
consequences to Prussia were too evident to require him
to point them out.

While Prussia, for purely selfish reasons, advocated a
policy of persecution and repression towards the Poles,
which would only increase their resentment to the advantage
of Russia's enemies. Great Britain, following her traditional
poHcy of disinterested detachment and wise humanity,
recommended once more the adoption of a liberal policy
towards the Poles in accordance with the stipulations of
the Treaty of Vienna. Earl Russell sent to the British
Ambassador in Petrograd on March 2, 1863, the following
most remarkable despatch :

My Lord, — Her Majesty's Government view with the
deepest concern the state of things now existing in the
kingdom of Poland. They see there, on the one side, a
large mass of the population in open insurrection against
the Government, and, on the other, a vast military force
employed in putting that insurrection down. The natural
and probable result of such a contest must be expected to
be the success of the military forces. But that success, if
it is to be achieved by a series of bloody conflicts, must be
attended by a lamentable effusion of blood, by a deplorable
sacrifice of life, by widespread desolation, and by impoverish-
ment and ruin, which it would take a long course of years
to repair.

Moreover, the acts of violence and destruction on both
sides, which are sure to accompany such a struggle, must
engender mutual hatreds and resentments which will em-
bitter, for generations to come, the relations between the
Russian Government and the Polish race. Yet, however
much Her Majesty's Government might lament the existence
of such a miserable state of things in a foreign country,
they would not, perhaps, deem it expedient to give formal
expression of their sentiments were it not that there are
peculiarities in the present state of things in Poland which
take them out of the usual and ordinary condition of such
affairs.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 179

The kingdom of Poland was constituted and placed in
connection with the Eussian Empire by the Treaty of 1815,
to which Great Britain was a contracting party. The present
disastrous state of things is to be traced to the fact that
Poland is not in the condition in which the stipulations of
that Treaty require that it should be placed. Neither is
Poland in the condition in which it was placed by the Emperor
Alexander I, by whom that Treaty was made. During
his reign a National Diet sat at Warsaw and the Poles of
the kingdom of Poland enjoyed privileges fitted to secure
their pohtical welfare. Since 1832, however, a state of
uneasiness and discontent has been succeeded from time
to time by violent commotion and a useless effusion of blood.
Her Majesty's Government are aware that the immediate
cause of the present insurrection was the conscription lately
enforced upon the Polish population ; but that measure
itself is understood to have been levelled at the deeply-
rooted discontent prevailing among the Poles in consequence
of the political condition of the kingdom of Poland.

The proprietors of land and the middle classes in the
towns bore that condition with impatience, and if the
peasantry were not equally disaffected they gave little
support or strength to the Russian Government. Great
Britain, therefore, as a party to the Treaty of 1815, and as a
Power deeply interested in the tranquillity of Europe, deems
itself entitled to express its opinion upon the events now
taking place, and is anxious to do so in the most friendly
spirit towards Russia, and with a sincere desire to promote
the interest of all the parties concerned. Why should not
His Imperial Majesty, whose benevolence is generally and
cheerfully acknowledged, put an end at once to this bloody
conflict by proclaiming mercifully an immediate and un-
conditional amnesty to his revolted Polish subjects, and
at the same time announce his intention to replace without
delay his kingdom of Poland in possession of the political
and civil privileges which were granted to it by the Emperor
Alexander I in execution of the stipulations of the Treaty
of 1815 ? If this were done a National Diet and a National
Administration would in all probability content the Poles
and satisfy European opinion.

180 The Problem of Poland

You will read this despatch to Prince Gortchakoff and
give him a copy of it.

Earl Kussell's wise suggestions were sympathetically
received at Petrograd, and on March 31, Czar Alexander
published in the Journal de St. Pétershourg a manifesto
in which he stated that he did not desire to hold the Polish
nation responsible for the rebellion, and promised to intro-
due a systejn of local self-government in Poland, admonishing
the rebels to lay down their arms. Unfortunately, they did
not do so. A prolonged campaign was necessary to
re-establish order in Poland, and meanwhile the Czar had
been so much embittered through the agitation of the
Russian reactionaries and their Prussian friends, and by
the follies of some of the Polish leaders, that he deprived
Poland of her constitution. Urged on by the statesmen at
Berlin, another period of repression began. On February
23, 1868, Poland was absolutely incorporated with Russia,
and the use of the Polish language in pubUc places and for
pubhc purposes was prohibited.

Ever since, Bismarck and his successors have endeavoured
to create bad blood between Russia and her Polish citizens,
being desirous of retaining Russia's support at a time when
she was drifting towards France. Solely with the object
of demonstrating to Russia the danger of the Polish agitation
Bismarck introduced in 1886 his PoHsh Settlement Bill,
by which, to the exasperation of the Prussian Poles, vast
territories were bought from Polish landowners and German
peasants settled on them. When the Conservative party
wished to oppose that policy in the Prussian Parliament
as being unpractical, its leader was, according to Professor
Delbruck's testimony, expressed in his book * Regierung
und Volkswille,' urged by the Chancellor to vote for the Bill
because its passage was necessary ' for reasons of foreign
policy.*

During a century and a half Russia's Polish policy has
been made in Germany. During 150 years Russia has perse-

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 181

cuted and outraged the Poles at Prussia's bidding and for
Prussia's benefit. The confidential diplomatic evidence
given in these pages makes that point absolutely clear.

Until recent times Kussia was a very backward nation,
and, not unnaturally, she endeavoured to learn the arts of
government and of civiUsation from Germany, her nearest
neighbour. Unfortunately, Germany did not prove a
fair and unselfish friend to Kussia. Germany aimed not
so much at advancing Kussia as at benefiting herself.
German rulers and statesmen saw in the Kussians good-
natured savages to be exploited. Impecunious German
princes and noblemen went to Kussia to make a fortune,
and poor German princesses married Kussian princes.
Thus German influence became supreme not only in the
Kussian Army and Administration, but even within the
Imperial Family.

During 150 years German influence was supreme in
Kussian society. While, during this period, Prussia, and
afterwards Germany, unceasingly urged Kussia to oppress
and ill-treat her Poles, England consistently recommended
Kussia to adopt liberal treatment as being in Kussia's
interest.

One of the first British diplomatic despatches deahng
with the partition of Poland is that of Mr. Thomas Wrough ton,
dated June 15, 1763, and given in these pages. In that
remarkable document the forecast was made that Kussia
would scarcely consent to a partition of Poland, partly
because such a partition would strengthen Prussia too
much, partly because an independent Poland would form
an efi&cient buffer State between herself and the Western
Powers. He wrote : * Kussia is inattackable on that side
at present, which she would not be if she appropriated to
herself that barrier.' Since then Kussia has more than
once had occasion to regret that she was the direct neighbour
of Prussia, and that she had given large Polish districts
to that country.

Soon after the begiimiiag of the present War the Grand

182 The Problem of Poland

Duke Nicholas, the Commander-in-Chief of the Kussian
forces, addressed an appeal to the Poles of Kussia, Germany,
and Austria-Hungary in which he promised them the
re-creation of a kingdom of Poland, comprising all Poles
dwelling within Kussia, Austria, and Germany, under
Kussia's protection. The full text of that remarkable
manifesto will be found in the chapter * The Problem of
Austria-Hungary.' The enemies of Kussia have sneeringly
described that document as a death-bed repentance, and
have complained that it was not issued by the Czar himself.
Of course, the Grand Duke acted in the name and on behalf
of the Czar. That needs no explanation. If the Czar was
not of the Grand Duke's mind he would of course have
disavowed him. Besides, Kussia's resolve to give full
liberty to the Poles was not born from the stress of the War.
It was formed long ago. However, it was obviously imprac-
ticable to give full self-government to the Kussian Poles
without laying the foundation of a Greater Poland. Hence
such a step on Kussia's part would have met with the most
determined opposition and hostility in Germany and Austria-
Hungary, and it would most probably have been treated
as casus helli. Lord Cowley, the British Ambassador in
Paris, informed Earl Kussell, on March 26, 1863, * The
Russian Government could make no concessions of any
value to the Pohsh Provinces which would not lay the
foundation of the re-establishment of the kingdom of
Poland.' Lord Napier, the British Ambassador in Petro-
grad, informed his Government on April 6, 1863, that * The
restoration of the PoHsh State on the basis of nationahty
will assuredly not be effected while the strength of Kussia
and Germany remains unbroken. During the struggle,
whatever may be the fate of Poland, the frontier of France
would be pushed to the Khine.' That remarkable prophecy
seems likely to come true.

Formerly there was no Pohsh nation. The Poles consisted
of 150,000 nobles and of many millions of ill-treated serfs.
Hard times and misfortune have welded the Poles into a

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 183

nation. The property-less serfs have become prosperous
farmers, and the people of the middle and of the upper
class have become earnest workers. Between 1900 and
1912 the deposits in the Polish Co-operative Societies have
increased . from £12,420,057 to £46,970,854. In every
walk of hfe Poles have achieved most remarkable successes.
Although education among the Poles, especially among
those in Kussia and Austria-Hungary, is still extremely
backward — there are only i^o Polish universities — the
Poles have created a most wonderful literature. The Polish
hterature is the richest among the Slavonic hteratures, and it
need not fear comparison with any of the Western literatures.
In music and in science also Poles have accomplished great
things. Among the leading modern writers is Sienkiewicz,
among the greatest living musicians is Paderewski, among
the leading living scientists is Madame Curie-Sklodowska.
Formerly, the Poles were thriftless and incompetent in
business and agriculture. How wonderfully they have
changed may be seen from the fact that in the Eastern
Provinces of Germany they are rapidly ousting the Germans,
although these receive most powerful support from the
State. Notwithstanding the enormous purchases of land
made under the Settlement Acts, by which £35,000,000
have been devoted to the purchase of Polish land for German
farmers, the Germans have on balance since the year 1896
lost 250,000 acres of land to the Poles in the Polish districts.

The Poles are to a certain extent to blame for their
misfortunes. In the past they have lacked self-command
and a sense of proportion. It is noteworthy that during
the revolution of 1863 PoHsh leaders pubHshed in Paris
maps of an independent Poland, which comprised large
and purely Kussian districts with towns such as Kieff, on
the ground of historical right. Yet Kiefï was the cradle of the
Kussian Orthodox faith.

In Western Eussia, in Eastern Prussia, and in Galicia,
there dwell about 20,000,000 Poles. If the War should
end, as it is likely to end, in a complete victory of the

184 The Problem of Poland

Allies, a powerful independent State of Poland will arise.
The united Poles will receive full self-government under the
protection of Kussia. They will be enabled to develop
their nationality, but it seems scarcely likely that they
will separate themselves entirely from Kussia. Their
position will probably resemble that of Quebec in Canada,
and if the Russians and Poles act wisely they will live as
harmoniously together as do the French-speaking * habit-
ants * of Quebec, and the EngUsh-speaking men of the
other provinces of Canada. Federation should prove a guar-
antee of freedom and a bond between the two peoples.

Russia need not fear that Poland will make herself
entirely independent, and only the most hot-headed and
short-sighted Poles can wish for complete independence.
Poland, having developed extremely important manufac-
turing industries, requires large free markets for their output.
Her natural market is Russia, for Germany has industrial
centres of her own. She can expect to have the free use
of the precious Russian markets only as long as she forms
part of that great State. At present, a spirit of the heartiest
goodwill prevails between Russians and Poles. The old
quarrels and grievances have been forgotten in the common
struggle. The moment is most auspicious for the resur-
rection of Poland.

While Prussia has been guilty of the partition of Poland,
Russia is largely to blame for the repeated revolts and
insurrection of her Polish citizens. The late Lord Salisbury,
who as a staunch Conservative could scarcely be described
as an admirer of the Poles, and who in his essay ' Poland,'
printed in 1863, treated their claims rather with contempt
than with sympathy, wrote in its concluding pages :

Since 1815 the misgovernment of Poland has not only
been constant but growing. And with the misgovernment
the discontent has been growing in at least an equal ratio.
Yet they ought not to have been a difficult race to rule.
The very abuses to which they had been for centuries exposed
should have made the task of satisfying them easy.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 185

Eussian statesmen might well bear in mind the recom-
mendations of that great statesman as to the way by which
Kussia might satisfy her Poles. Lord Salisbury wrote :

The best that can be hoped for Poland is an improved
condition under Eussian rule. The conditions which are
needed to reconcile the Poles to a Eussian Sovereign are
manifest enough and do not seem very hard to be observed.
The Poles have not only been oppressed but insulted, and in
their condition insult is harder to put up with than oppres-
sion. A nation which is under a foreign yoke is sensitive
upon the subject of nationality. ... If Eussia would rule
the Poles in peace she must defer to a sensibility which
neither coaxing nor severity will cure. All the substance of
power may be exercised as well through Polish administra-
tors as through Eussian. The union between the two
countries may for practical purposes be complete, though
every legal act and every kind of scholastic instruction be
couched in the Polish language.

It would be hazardous, and it would probably be foolish,
to separate Poland completely from Eussia. Poland has
grown into Eussia and Eussia into Poland. After all, it can-
not be expected that Eussia will abandon her principal and
most promising industrial district with two of her largest
towns. In politics one should endeavour to achieve only
the practical. The question therefore arises : How much
self-government will Eussia grant to Poland ? Will she
give her a separate legislation, taxation, post ofi&ce, coinage,
finances, army ? The arrangement of these details may
prove somewhat difficult. It is to be hoped that during
the negotiations between Poles and Eussians regarding
a settlement the Poles will endeavour to be cool and
reasonable, and that the Eussians will be trusting and
generous. Happily, a spirit of hearty goodwill is abroad
in Eussia.

The greatest grievance of the Polish nation is not that
it lives under foreign rule, but that it lives under oppression,
^nd that it has been parcelled out among several States.

186 The Problem of Poland

Owing to the partition of Poland, Poles have been taught
to consider as enemies men of their own nationality living
across the border, and they have been compelled by their
rulers to slaughter each other.

In the Great War more than a million Polish soldiers
have been engaged against their will in a fratricidal war.
That terrible fact alone constitutes a most powerful claim
upon all men's sympathy and generosity.

Although Eussia has in times past treated the Poles
far more harshly than has Prussia, and although the Ger-
man Poles are far more prosperous than are the Eussian, the
Poles see their principal enemy not in Eussia but in Prussia.
After all, the Eussian is their brother Slav, and they are
proud of their big brother. Besides, they recognise that
Eussia has been misguided by Prussia, and that Prussia
was largely responsible for Poland's partition and for
Eussia's anti-Polish policy. The bitterness with which
the Prussian Poles hate Prussia may be seen from the
Polish newspapers published in Germany, which, during
many years, have successfully advocated the policy of boy-
cotting Germans and everything German, both in business
and in society. The Dziennik Kujawski of Hohensalza
wrote on January 18, 1901 :

To-morrow the kingdom of Prussia celebrates the second
century of its existence. We cannot manifest our joy,
because Prussia's power has been erected chiefly upon the
ruins of ancient Poland. Prussia's history consists of a
number of conquests made by force and in accordance with
the old Prussian principle revived by Bismarck, * Might is
better than right.' Prussia's glory has been bought with
much blood and tears, and she owes her existence chiefly
to Poland's destruction.

In the Gazeta Gdanska of November 24, 1906, published
in Dantzig, we read :

The Prussian and the Eussian. — If one asks a Pole
whether he would rather live under German or under

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 187

Kussian rule, his reply will be * I would a hundred times
rather have to do with Eussians than with Germans, and
the Prussians are the worst of Germans.' Many Poles will
scarcely be able to tell why they hate the Prussians. Many
will find their preference illogical. Still it is there. From
the fullness of the heart speaketh the mouth. After all, the
worst Kussian is a better fellow than the very best German.
That feeling lies in our blood. The Kussian is our Slavonic
brother, and in his heart of hearts every Pole is glad if his
brother is prospering and when he can tell the world * There
you see our common Slavonic blood.' The more we hate
the Prussians, the more we love the Russians.

The Gazeta Grudzionska, of Graudenz, wrote in March
1899:

Take heed, you Polish women and Polish girls ! Polish
women and Polish girls are the strongest protectors of our
nationality. The Poles can be Germanised only when
Germanism crosses our Polish doorstep, but that will never
happen, if God so wills it, as long as Polish mothers, Polish
wives, and Polish maids are found in our houses. They will
not allow Poland's enemies to enter. For a Polish woman
it is a disgrace to marry a German or to visit German places
of amusement or German festivals. As long as the Polish
wife watches over her husband and takes care that he bears
himself always and everywhere as a Pole, as long as she
watches over his home and preserves it as a stronghold of
Polonism, as long as a Pohsh Cathohc newspaper is kept in
it, and as long as the Polish mother teaches her children to
pray to God for our beloved Poland in the Polish language,
so long Poland's enemies will labour in vain.

Innumerable similar extracts might easily be given.

When the peace conditions come up for discussion at
the Congress which will bring the present War to an end,
the problem of Poland will be one of the greatest difficulty
and importance. Austria-Hungary has comparatively little
interest in retaining her Poles. The Austrian Poles dwell
in Galicia outside the great rampart of the Carpathian

188 The Problem of Poland

mountains, which form the natural frontier of the Dual
Monarchy towards the north-east. The loss of Galicia,
with its oilfields and mines may be regrettable to Austria-
Hungary, but it will not affect her very seriously. To
Germany, on the other hand, the loss of the Pohsh districts
will be a fearful blow. The supreme importance which
Germany attaches to the Polish problem may be seen
from this, that Bismarck thought it the only question
which could lead to an open breach between Germany
and Austria-Hungary. According to Crispi's Memoirs,
Bismarck said to the Italian statesman on September 17,
1877:

There could be but one cause for a breach in the friend-
ship that unites Austria and Germany, and that would be
a disagreement between the two Governments concerning
Polish policy. ... If a Polish rebellion should break out
and Austria should lend it her support, we should be obliged
to assert ourselves. We cannot permit the reconstruction
of a Catholic kingdom so near at hand. It would be a
northern France. We have one France to look to already,
and a second would become the natural ally of the first,
and we should find ourselves entrapped between two
enemies.

The resurrection of Poland would injure us in other
ways as well. It could not come about without the loss of a
part of our territory. We cannot possibly relinquish either
Posen or Dantzig, because the German Empire would remain
exposed on the Bussian frontier, and we should lose an outlet
on the Baltic.

In the event of Germany's defeat a large slice of Poland,
including the wealthiest parts of Silesia, with gigantic coal
mines, ironworks, &c., might be taken away from her;
and if the Poles should recover their ancient province of
West Prussia, with Dantzig, Prussia's hold upon East
Prussia, with Koenigsberg, would be threatened. The
loss of her Polish districts would obviously greatly reduce
Germany's miUtary strength and economic power. It

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 189

may therefore be expected that Germany will move heaven
and earth against the re-creation of the kingdom of Poland,
and that she will strenuously endeavour to create differences
between Eussia and her Allies. The statesmen of Europe
should therefore, in good time, firmly make up their minds
as to the future of Poland.

CHAPTEK VI

THE GERMAN EMPEROR's POSITION

While many people have discussed whether Germany was
responsible for the War, nobody has inquired whether the
German Emperor, in declaring war upon Russia and France,
acted in accordance with the German Constitution, or
whether he exceeded his powers.

It is fairly generally assumed that the Emperor was
entitled to make war upon the two countries — that the
question of war and peace lay within his discretion. In
the following pages it will be shown that the Emperor
exceeded his carefully Hmited powers — that he acted un-
constitutionally.

The question whether the Emperor acted constitutionally
or unconstitutionally is not merely a professorial but a
very practical one. British statesmen and rulers enjoy
a very great latitude because the British Constitution is
unwritten. They can either find for their action some
precedent in the past or construct a precedent from the
past. In case of need they can create a new precedent,
and the question whether their action was constitutional
or not is one which may be discussed by experts in con-
stitutional law, but is incomprehensible for the broad masses
of the people. In Germany matters are different. All
citizens are familiar with the written Constitution, with
which they are made acquainted in the schools. Popular
editions with explanations can be bought in every book-
shop for a few pence, while the educated are acquainted
with the commentaries on the Constitution by Laband,

190

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 191

Arndt, and many other writers. The question whether
the Emperor, in making war upon Russia and France, acted
constitutionally or unconstitutionally may in due course
become a very urgent one. The German people do not
object to unconstitutional action on the part of their rulers
if the measures taken prove successful and beneficial.
That may be seen by the ease with which the Prussian
Diet passed an Act of Indemnity with regard to Bismarck's
Government in opposition to the will of Parliament, when
the victory of 1866 over Austria had proved that the Prussian
Government had been right in increasing the army very
considerably against the will of Parliament. Nothing is as
successful as success. If, however, the present War should
end in Germany's defeat the German people will not only
ask whether Germany commenced the War, but whether
the German Emperor, in declaring war, acted lawfully or
unlawfully, and he may be held to account.

The widely held belief that Germany is a highly cen-
tralised State, that WilHam the Second is the sovereign and
the practically unlimited ruler of the country is erroneous.
Germany is a federation . of independent States. The sov-
ereignty of the empire reposes not in the King of Prussia,
but in the allied States themselves. The King of Prussia,
being the most powerful of the German monarchs, is merely
the hereditary president of the Federation. The best defi-
nition of the German Empire has, perhaps, been given by
President Wilson in his book * The State,' in which we read :

The German Empire is a Federal State composed of
four kingdoms, seven grand-duchies, four duchies, seven
principalities, three free cities, and the Imperial domain of
Alsace-Lorraine, these lands being united in a great ' corpora-
tion of public law ' under the hereditary Presidency of the
King of Prussia. Its Emperor is its President, not its
Monarch. . . . The new Empire bears still, in its constitu-
tion, distinctest traces of its derivation. It is still a dis-
tinctly Federal rather than unitary State, and the Emperor
is still only its constitutional President. As Emperor he

192 The German Emperor^ s Position

occupies not an hereditary throne, but only an hereditary
ofi&ce. Sovereignty does not reside in him, but * in the
union of German Federal Princes and the free cities.* He is
the chief ofiScer of a great political corporation. . . . It is a
fundamental conception of the German constitution that

* the body of German sovereigns, together with the Senates
of the three free cities, considered as a unit — ianquam unum
corjpus — is the repository of Imperial sovereignty.'

The fact that the German Emperor is not the sovereign
of the Empire but merely its hereditary President, that
the Imperial power is possessed by the allied States them-
selves, is known to almost every German. In the last
issue of * Meyer's Encyclopedia * we read :

According to the ImperialJConstitution of the 16th April,
1871, the German Empire is ' an everlasting confederation '
which the German Princes and free towns have concluded

* for the protection of the territory of the confederation and
the rights thereof as well as for the promotion of the welfare
of the German people.' The Imperial power is possessed
by the Allied States. Their organ is the Federal Council.
The Presidency of the Confederation belongs to the Prussian
Crown. The Presidential rights are a Prussian privilege,
and they are enumerated in the German Constitution. With
the Presidency of the Confederation is connected the title
German Emperor, not Emperor of Germany, for the Emperor
is not sovereign of the Empire. He exercises his powers

* in the name of the Empire ' or * in the name of the Allied
Governments.'

If we wish to discover whether the Emperor, in making
war upon Eussia and France, acted constitutionally or
unconstitutionally, we should study the text of the German
Constitution and the commentaries upon that document
by the most authorised statesmen and professors, and
especially by the allied sovereigns themselves. The preamble
of the Constitution states :

His Majesty the King of Prussia in the name of the North
German Confederation, His Majesty the King of Bavaria,

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 193

His Majesty the King of Wurtemberg, His Eoyal Highness
the Grand Duke of Baden, and His Royal Highness the
Grand Duke of Hesse and by Rhine, for those parts of
the Grand Duchy of Hesse which are south of the river
Maine, conclude an everlasting Confederation for the pro-
tection of the Territory of the Confederation and the rights
thereof, as well as for the promotion of the welfare of the
German people. This Confederation will bear the name
* German Empire.'

It should carefully be noted that in the short preamble
it is explicitly stated that the German Empire was formed
for the purpose of defence.

The fourth chapter of the Constitution, which is super-
scribed * The Presidency,' consists of articles eleven to
nineteen. The first portion of article eleven reads as follows :

The Presidency of the Confederation belongs to the
King of Prussia, who bears the name of German Emperor.
The Emperor has to represent the Empire internationally,
to declare war, and to conclude peace in the name of the
Empire, to enter into aUiances and other treaties with Foreign
Powers, to accredit and to receive Ambassadors.

The consent of the Federal Council is necessary for the
declaration of war in the name of the Empire, unless an
attack on the territory or the coast of the Confederation
has taken place. »

The purely defensive character of the German Empire
is expressed not only in the short preamble of the con-
stitution, but also in this most important article eleven, from
which we learn that the German Emperor may not declare
war in the name of the Empire * unless an attack on the
territory or the coast of the Confederation has taken flace'
that for the declaration of a war of aggression, * the consent
of the Federal Council is necessary.' The Federal Council
is not a popular representative body, but a body which
represents all the individual States themselves. In other
words, the Constitution stipulates that the German Emperor

194 The German Emperor'' s Position

may make war only if Germany has actually been attacked,
that a war of aggression on Germany's part can be effected
only by the will of the individual States united in the Federal
Council.

The German Empire is the successor of the North
German Confederation, which was formed by Prussia,
Saxony, and various other States after the Prusso-Austrian
war of 1866. The German Constitution of 1871 is almost
word for word the same Constitution as that of the North
German Confederation of 1867. There is only one material
and important difference between the two Constitutions.
It consists in the alteration which was made in the most
important article eleven. That article was worded as
follows in the Constitution of the North German Con-
federation of 1867 :

The Presidency of the Confederation appertains to the
Crown of Prussia, which, in the exercise thereof, has the right
of representing the Confederation internationally, of declar-
ing war and concluding peace, of entering into Alhances and
other Treaties with Foreign States, of accrediting and receiv-
ing Ambassadors in the name of the Confederation.

The King of Prussia, as President of the North German
Confederation, had the right of * declaring war and con-
cluding peace.' As no condition was attached, he could
in the name of the Confederation declare not only a war
of defence but also a war of attack. That right was Hmited
four years later, when the Prussian King and German
Emperor was restricted to declaring war only if * an attack
on the territory or the coast of the Confederation has taken
place.' The war-making power of the King of Prussia
was thus limited by the express wish of the South German
sovereigns, who did not desire to be dragged into a war
against their will, who had seen Prussia victorious in three
consecutive wars, and possibly feared that she might rashly
embark upon another war which might have a less fortunate
result than the previous ones. Besides, the South German

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 195

sovereigns, and especially the King of Bavaria, did not
wish to subordinate themselves to the King of Prussia.
They desired that the King of Prussia as Emperor should
merely be primus inter 'pares and that the fact that he was
not Emperor of Germany should be expressed even in his
title. He was merely to be German Emperor. Prince
Bismarck has told us in his Memoirs that William the
First objected to that title. He wrote :

His Majesty raised a fresh difficulty when we were fixing
the form of the Imperial title, it being his wish to be called
Emperor of Germany if Emperor it had to be. . . . In the
final Conference of January 17, 1871, he declined the
designation of German Emperor, and declared that he would
be Emperor of Germany or no Emperor at all. ... I
urged that the title Emperor of Germany involved a sovereign
claim to the non- Prussian dominions which the Princes were
not inclined to allow ; that it was suggested in the letter
from the King of Bavaria that ' the exercise of the Presiden-
tial rights should be associated with the assumption of the
title of German Emperor.'

The Sovereigns of the south, and especially the Bavarian
King, feared that they might become mere cyphers under
Prussia's leadership, that their independence would be
lost, that their individuality would be entirely merged in
the German Empire. They wished to have their position
guaranteed not only by the Constitution but also by binding
promises made by Prince Bismarck on behalf of Prussia.
On November 27, 1870, Prince Bismarck wrote to King
Ludwig of Bavaria with regard to the proposed creation
of a German Empire :

The title German Emperor signifies that his rights have
originated from the voluntary concession of the German
sovereigns and tribes. History teaches that the great
princely houses of Germany never regarded the existence of
an Emperor elected by them as derogatory to their high
position in Europe.

196 The German Emperor's Position

In his reply, dated December 2, 1870, King Ludwig
wrote to Prince Bismarck :

I hope, and hope with assurance, that Bavaria will in
the future preserve her independent position, for it is surely-
consistent with a loyal unreserved Federal policy, and it will
be safest to obviate a pernicious centralisation.

Prince Bismarck wrote in answer to the King :

Your Majesty rightly presumes that I expect no salva-
tion from centrahsation, that I perceive in that very main-
tenance of the rights which the Federal Constitution secures
to individual members of the Federation the form of develop-
ment best suited to the German spirit, and, at the same time,
the surest guarantee against the dangers to which law and
order might be exposed in the free movement of the poli-
tical life of to-day. The hostile position taken up by the
Eepublican party throughout Germany in regard to the
re-estabhshment of the Imperial dignity, through the ini-
tiative of your Majesty and of the Federal princes, proves
that it is conducive to promoting the Conservative and
Monarchical interests.

The King of Bavaria's fears and doubts regarding the
position of Prussia were not entirely dispelled by the wording
of the Constitution and by Bismarck's assurances. Hence
he wrote to the Imperial Chancellor on July 31, 1874,
regarding the Federal principle, and in reply Bismarck
wrote on August 10 :

Apart from personal guarantees, your Majesty may
securely reckon on those comprised in the very Constitu-
tion of the Empire. That Constitution rests on the federal
basis accorded in the treaties of federation, and it cannot
be violated without breach of treaty. Therein the Constitu-
tion of the Empire differs from every national Constitution.
Your Majesty's rights form an indissoluble part of the
Constitution of the Empire. They rest on the same secure
basis of law as all the institutions of the Empire. Germany,
in the institution of its Federal Council, and Bavaria, in its

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 197

dignified and intelligent representation on that Council,
have a firm guarantee against any deterioration or exaggera-
tion of efforts in the direction of unitarian aspirations. Your
Majesty will be able to place the fullest confidence in the
security of the treaty-guarded law of the Constitution, even
when I no longer have the honour of serving the Empire as
Chancellor.

Not only the King of Bavaria but other sovereigns also
wished to assert their independence and to guard them-
selves against being dragged into a war against their will
by the King of Prussia. They asserted their constitutional
rights on suitable occasions. For instance on June 7, 1875,
at the time when it was believed that Bismarck contem-
plated an attack upon France, von Mittnacht, the Wurtem-
berg Prime Minister, wrote to Prince Bismarck :

Germany places the greatest confidence in the diplomatic
representation of the Empire by the Emperor and in the
direction of Germany's policy by your Serene Highness. At
the same time it should be pointed out that for a declaration
of war in the name of the Empire the consent of the Federal
Council is required unless the Federal territory is threatened
with an attack.

Bismarck essayed to define the position of the Emperor
and that of the other sovereigns of Germany not only in
the written Constitution and in confidential letters which
he exchanged with the sovereigns and statesmen of the
Southern States, but also in public speeches on the Con-
stitution. For instance, in his speech in the Eeichstag
on April 9, 1871, he expressly stated that the sovereignty
of the Empire was not in the hands of the Emperor, but
in those of the AUied Governments. He said :

I believe that the Federal Council has a great future
because for the first time an attempt has been made by its
creation to concentrate power in a federal board which
exercises the sovereignty of the whole Empire although it
does not deprive the individual States of the benefits of

198 The German Emperor's Position

the Monarchical Power or of their ancient republican
government. The sovereignty of the German Empire does
not lie in the hands of the Emperor, but in those of the
alHed Governments as a whole. At the same time it is
useful if the wisdom, or, if you like, the unwisdom, of twenty-
five individual governments is brought into the delibera-
tions of the Federal Council, for thus we obtain a variety
of views which we have never had within the Government
of any single State. Prussia is great, but she has been able
to learn from the small and from the smallest States, and
these have learned from us. . . . My experience has
taught me to believe that I have made considerable progress
in my political education by participating in the delibera-
tions of the Federal Council owing to the stimulating friction
provided by twenty-five German Governments, and thus
I have learned a great deal in addition. Therefore I would
ask you : Do not touch the Federal Council ! I see in it
a kind of Palladium of our future. I see in it a great guar-
antee for Germany's future.

The Chancellor laid particular stress upon the fact that
the German Empire was created for defence, that the
existence of article eleven, quoted in the beginning of this
chapter, guaranteed Germany against a wanton war of
aggression. In his speech delivered in the Reichstag on
November 4, 1871, he stated :

A strong guarantee for the peacefulness of the new Empire
lies in this, that the Emperor has renounced the unlimited
right to declare war which he possessed in his former position
as King of Prussia. In this renunciation lies a strong guar-
antee against a wanton war of aggression. . . . The guaran-
tee lies in this, that according to the constitution the Federal
Council must consent to a war of aggression. By the right
given to it by the Constitution the Federal Council cannot
prevent mobilisation, but it can prevent a declaration of war.
It cannot prevent preparation for war which the Emperor
has recognised to be necessary, for the co-operation of the
Federal Council is only required in the action of declaring
war unless the war is purely a war of defence which has
been forced upon Germany by an attack upon its territories.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 199

In this respect the Federal Council may be compared to an
enlarged Cabinet.

It is only fair to add that Bismarck did not disregard
the possibility of Germany having to act on the aggressive.
Hence he added :

As regards the theory of a war of aggression conducted
by Germany for the purpose of defence which was mentioned
by a previous speaker, I believe that the attack is often the
most efficient form of defence. It has been a frequent
occurrence, and it is very useful for a country, such as
Germany, which is situated in the centre of Europe and
which can be attacked from three or four directions. It may
be necessary to follow the example set by Frederick the Great,
who, before the Seven Years' War, did not wait until the
net in which he was to be caught had been thrown over
his head, but tore it to pieces. I believe that those are in
error who imagine that the German Empire will quietly wait
until a powerful opponent or mighty coalition consider
the moment favourable for an attack. Only an unskilful
diplomacy could act thus. In such a case it is the duty of
the Government to select a moment for making war when
the danger is smallest and when the struggle can be fought
at the lowest cost to the nation and at the least danger,
provided, of course, that war is really unavoidable. The
nation can expect that in such a case the Government will
take the initiative.

The fact that Bismarck disapproved of a war of aggression
such as the present one may be clearly seen from numerous
important s1?atements of his, some of which I quoted in
my book, ' The Foundations of Germany ' (Smith, Elder
& Co., 1916).

Naturally the professors of Constitutional Law who
commented upon the Constitution expounded it in accord-
ance with its plain meaning and with the teachings of Prince
Bismarck. They taught, up to the outbreak of the present
War, that the sovereignty of the country was not in the
hands of the Emperor, but in those of the Allied States,

200 The German Emperor's Position

that the Emperor was not the monarch of Germany, but
merely the President of the Confederation, and that he was
not entitled to declare a war of offence except with the
consent of the non-Prussian States. For instance, Professor
Laband wrote in his most important standard work, * Das
Staatsrecht des Deutschen Keiches * in four huge volumes,
of which the fifth edition appeared shortly before the War :

The foundation of the North German Federation and of
the German Empire was effected not by the German people
but by the German States. All actions which brought
about the creation of the Confederation were actions of
these States. By entering into the Confederation they
divested themselves of their sovereignty, but not of their
individuality, as States. Their individuahty continued
unbroken and became the foundation of the Federal State.
It follows that not the individual citizens are the members
of the Empire, nor that the citizens in the aggregate possess
the power of the Empire. The members of the Empire are
the individual States. The German Empire is not an or-
ganisation composed of milHons of members who constantly
increase in numbers, but is an association of twenty-five
members. . . .

It must be observed that no new legal institution has
been created by re-estabhshing the Imperial dignity. The
idea of the presidency of the Confederation has not been
altered by connecting with it the title Emperor. The
historical events which led to the resuscitation of the Imperial
title, the reasons and motives with which the Constitution
was submitted, the discussion accompanying it, and espe-
cially Article XI of the Imperial Constitution itself, show with
indubitable certainty that the Emperor's position is com-
pletely identical with that of the presidency in the North
German Federation, and that the Emperor, apart from his
title and insignia, has no rights except the right of President.
. . . The Emperor is not sovereign of the Empire. The
sovereign power rests not with him, but with the German
allied sovereigns and free towns as a whole. If he acts in
the name of the Empire, he acts not in his own name but in
the name of the Empire.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 201

The facts given in these pages prove conclusively that,
according to the German Constitution, the Emperor was
not entitled to declare a war of aggression, that he acted
unconstitutionally in attacking Eussia and France. The
question has now to be considered whether, in case the
War should have an unfortunate end for Germany, the
Emperor can justify his action by referring to the stipu-
lations of the Austro- German Treaty of AUiance of 1879.
It is almost universally believed, even in the best-informed
diplomatic quarters, that the celebrated Dual Alliance
Treaty is a defensive and offensive Treaty. That is a grave
error. The Austro- German Treaty was meant to be, and
is, a purely defensive instrument. This will be seen from
its text and from the ofiBcial note introducing it. Both
the Prefatory Note and the Treaty itself were first pubUshed
in the Berlin Official Gazette of February 8, 1888, and I
herewith give the full text of both. The translation was
made by the Foreign OfiSce and it was published in vol.
78 of the British and Foreign State Pajpers :

The Governments of Germany and of the Austro-Hun-
garian Monarchy have determined upon the publication of
the Treaty concluded between them on the 7th of October
1879, in order to put an end to doubts which have been
entertained in various quarters of its purely defensive
character, and have been turned to account for various
ends. The two allied Governments are guided in their
policy by the endeavour to maintain peace and to guard, as
far as possible, against its disturbance ; they are convinced
that by making the contents of their Treaty of Alliance
generally known they will exclude all possibility of doubt on
this point, and have therefore resolved to publish it.

Treaty of Defensive Alliance between Austria-Hungary and
Germany. Signed at Vienna, October 7, 1879.

Inasmuch as their Majesties the German Emperor, King
of Prussia, and the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary,
must consider it their inalienable duty to provide for the

202 The German Emperor^ s Position

security of their Empires and the peace of their subjects
under all circumstances ;

Inasmuch as the two Sovereigns, as was the case under
the former existing Treaty, will be enabled by the close
union of the two Empires to fulfil this duty more easily and
more efficaciously ;

Inasmuch as, finally, an intimate co-operation of Germany
and Austria-Hungary can menace no one, but is rather
calculated to consolidate the peace of Europe on the terms
established by the stipulation of Berlin ;

Their Majesties the German Emperor and the Emperor
of Austria, King of Hungary, while most solemnly promising
never to allow their purely defensive Agreement to develop
an aggressive tendency in any direction, have determined
to conclude an alliance of peace and mutual defence.

With this object their Majesties have named as their
Plenipotentiaries :

His Majesty the German Emperor, His Majesty's Am-
bassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Lieutenant-
General Prince Henry the Seventh of Reuss, &c. ;

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary,
His Majesty's Privy Councillor, Minister of the Imperial
House and for Foreign Affairs, Lieutenant Field-Marshal
Julius Count Andrassy of Csik-Szeut-Kirâly and Kraszna-
Haka, &c. ;

Who have this day at Vieima, after the exchange and
mutual verification of one another's full powers, agreed as
follows :

Art. I. — Should, contrary to their hope, and against the
loyal desire of the two High Contracting Parties, one of the
two Empires be attacked by Russia, the High Contracting
Parties are bound to come to the assistance one of the other
with the whole war strength of their Empires, and accord-
ingly only to conclude peace together and upon mutual
agreement.

II. — Should one of the High Contracting Parties be at-
tacked by another Power, the other High Contracting Party
binds itself hereby, not only not to support the aggressor
against its high ally, but to observe at least a benevolent
neutral attitude towards its fellow Contracting Party.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 203

Should, however, in such a case the attacking Power be
supported by Kussia, either by an active co-operation or by
military measures which constitute a menace to the Party
attacked, then the obligation stipulated in Article I of this
Treaty, for mutual assistance with the whole fighting force,
becomes equally operative, and the conduct of the war by
the two High Contracting Parties shall in this case also be
in common until the conclusion of a common peace.

III. — This Treaty shall, in conformity with its peaceful
character, and to avoid any misinterpretations, be kept
secret by the two High Contracting Parties, and only be
communicated to a third Power upon a joint understanding
between the two Parties, and according to the terms of a
special Agreement.

The two High Contracting Parties venture to hope, after
the sentiments expressed by the Emperor Alexander at the
meeting at Alexandrowo, that the armaments of Eussia
will not in reality prove to be menacing to them, and have
on that account no reason for making a communication ;
should, however, this hope, contrary to their expectation,
prove to be erroneous, the two High Contracting Parties
would consider it their loyal obligation to let the Emperor
Alexander know, at least confidentially, that they must
consider an attack on either of them as directed against
both.

In virtue of which the Plenipotentiaries have signed
this Treaty and affixed their seals.

Vienna, October 7, 1879.

(L.S.) H. VII, P. Eeuss.
(L.S.) Andrassy.

It will be noticed that indeed the Austro- German Alliance
bears a purely pacific and defensive character. The Official
Note inserted in the Government Gazette, introducing
it, refers to * its purely defensive character.' If we read
the Treaty itself we find it stated in its preamble that it
has been concluded * to consoHdate the peace of Europe,*
that it is a * purely defensive Agreement,' that it is ' an
alliance of peace and mutual defence.' The purely defensive

204 The German Emperor^s Position

character of the Austro- German Treaty of Alliance cannot
be denied, nor can it be explained away. Germany was
under no obligation to come to Austria's aid in a war in
which that country was the aggressor. It follows that the
German Emperor cannot justify his attack upon Eussia
and France by explaining that he was bound by treaty
to come to Austria's aid. The fact that the Austro- German
Treaty was a purely defensive one appears not only from
the Treaty itself but from Prince Bismarck's commentaries
upon the AlHance. Reference to my book, * The Foundations
of Germany,' will furnish numerous most emphatic state-
ments of the Chancellor according to which Germany was
under no obligation to help Austria, should the latter be
involved in war with Russia in consequence of Austrian
aggressive action in the Balkan Peninsula.

On June 15, 1888, the Emperor Frederick died and
Wilham the Second ascended the throne. A few days
later, on June 25 and 27, he addressed the German Imperial
and the Prussian State Parliament in person, reading to
these assemblies his speech from the throne. In these
addresses, which opened his reign, he solenmly promised
to observe the Constitution and, in accordance with the
Constitution, not to declare war unless the Empire or its
Allies should actually be attacked. The Emperor stated in
his speech to the Reichstag on June 25 :

The most important tasks of the German Emperors
consist in securing the Empire politically and mihtarily
against attacks from without and in watching the execution
of the Imperial laws within. The foremost Imperial law is
the German Constitution. It is one of the foremost rights
and duties of the Emperor to observe and to protect the
Constitution and the rights granted by it to the two legisla-
tive bodies of the nation and to every German, and also to
the sovereign. . . .

In the domain of foreign policy I am resolved to keep
peace with all nations to the best of my endeavour. My
love for the German army and my position towards the

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 205

military forces will never lead me into temptation to deprive
the country of the benefits of peace unless war should become
a necessity, having been forced upon us by an attack upon
the Empire or upon its Allies. The German Army is in-
tended to protect our peace, and if peace is broken the
Army must be able to regain it with honour. It will be
able to do this with God's help owing to the strength which
it has received in accordance with the recent military law
which was unanimously passed. It is far from my heart
to use the armed strength of the country for wars of aggres-
sion. Germany neither requires further mihtary glory
nor conquests, having estabhshed by war her justification to
exist as a united and independent nation.

Our alliance with Austria-Hungary is generally known.
I adhere to it with German fidelity not merely because it has
been concluded but also because I recognise in this defensive
alliance the foundation of the European Balance of Power.

Two days later, on June 27, William the Second, as
King of Prussia, opened the two Prussian Houses of Parha-
ment and addressed them in person as follows :

. . . Since, owing to my father's death, the throne of
my ancestors has come to me, I have felt the need at the
beginning of my reign to assemble you around me without
delay and to give before you a solemn vow and to swear the
oath prescribed by the Prussian Constitution :

I vow that I will observe the Constitution of the hingdom
firmly and inviolably, and that I will rule in accordance with
the Constitution andjhe Law, So help me God I

. . . Like King William the First, I will, in accordance
with my solemn vow, faithfully and conscientiously observe
the laws and the rights of the popular representation, and
with equal conscientiousness I will preserve and exercise
the rights of the crown, as established by the Constitution,
in order to hand them on in due course to my successor on
the throne. It is far from me to disturb the confidence of
the people in the soHdity of our legal conditions by striving
to increase the rights of the crown. The legal extent of my
rights, as long as these are not questioned, suffices to secure

206 The German Emperor'' s Position

to the State that measure of monarchical influence which
Prussia requires owing to her historical development, her
present position and her place in the Empire, and the feelings
and habits of the people. I am of opinion that our Constitu-
tion contains a just and useful distribution of powers among
the various governing factors, and for this reason, not only
on account of my vow, I shall observe and protect it.

In the two most important speeches quoted, the Emperor
solemnly promised to the nation on his ascent to the throne
' to observe and to protect the Constitution,' not to increase
his powers * by striving to increase the rights of the crown,*
and not to declare war * unless war should become a necessity,
having been forced upon us by an attack upon the Empire
or upon its AlHes.' It is also worth noting that the Emperor
described the Austro- German Alliance* as * this defensive
aUiance, the foundation of the European Balance of Power.'
Nothing could be more expUcit than the assurances and
undertakings given in these words. The two speeches,
though read by the Emperor, embody of course not merely
the Emperor's views but also those of Prince Bismarck,
who apparently drafted them in collaboration with the
Emperor. Bismarck was an excellent judge of character.
Apparently he hoped to bridle the Emperor's impetuous-
ness by causing him to declare in the most solemn manner
that he would observe the Constitution and not make war
unless Germany should actually be attacked. His hopes
that the solemn promises of the Emperor would restrain him
during his reign have been disappointed.

According to the Constitution, every Imperial Act has
to be countersigned by the Imperial Chancellor who, by
countersigning, assumes responsibihty for it. Of course
the responsibihty of the Imperial Chancellor becomes a
mere formality without meaning if the Emperor appoints
to the Chancellorship a man without strength of character
who readily countersigns the Imperial orders as they are
given. Soon after his accession to the throne WilHam
the Second showed that he meant to be his own Chancellor,

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 207

that he had no use for a Chancellor who possessed ability
and independence of mind. He dismissed Bismarck
and has since then appointed pHable men in his stead.
Bismarck's four successors were without exception men
of great pHabiUty. Probably Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg
is the most pliable of them all. To the alarm and concern
of the old Chancellor, the young Emperor endeavoured to
govern Germany and to direct the foreign and domestic
pohcy of the country in accordance with his personal views
and moods, violating the spirit, if not the wording, of the
Constitution. Considering himself the Trustee of the
Empire, Bismarck endeavoured during the years of his retire-
ment from ofi&ce to create a counterpoise to the dangerous
impetuousness of the Emperor, who wished to grasp all
power, by recommending, on numerous occasions, the
jealous preservation and defence of the Constitution. For
instance, on August 10, 1891, a year after his dismissal,
addressing representatives of the University Students of
Germany, Prince Bismarck stated :

In order to unite Germany the individual dynasties and
governments of Germany had to co-operate. All former
attempts at carrying out the idea of unifying Germany were
bound to fail because the dynastic forces were under-
estimated. ... I see the task of the future, mainly, in
preserving the existing. If I recommend preserving the
existing, I mean of course that the Imperial edifice should
be improved and completed. What, then, should be pre-
served ? I would most urgently recommend you for the
future to preserve the Imperial Constitution. Lay that to
your heart. The Constitution is imperfect, but it was the
best Constitution that could be obtained. Cultivate, then,
the Constitution. Watch jealously over the Constitution,
and see that the rights established by the Constitution are
not diminished. I am not a friend of centralisation. I say
again : Watch over the Imperial Constitution even if, later
on in life, it should not please you. Do not advise any
alteration unless all the States agree to it. That is the first
condition for the political welfare of the Empire.

208 The German Emperor's Position

In July 1892 Prince Bismarck made a speech at Kissingen,
in which he particularly dwelt on the danger to the nation
of appointing to the Chancellorship an obedient official, a
mere Imperial Secretary, and, foreseeing the danger of an
Imperial absolutism exercised through a pUable Chancellor,
demanded the creation of a counterpoise to the Emperor.
He said in the course of that remarkable speech :

I should have liked to continue the work, but our young
Emperor will do everything himself. . . .

The German Reichstag does not fulfil my expectations
that it would be the centre of national life as I had hoped
at the time of its creation. If one wishes to strengthen
the Reichstag one must increase the responsibility of the
Ministers. The Constitution of Prussia promises a law which
will make Ministers responsible for their actions. Such a
law has, however, not been promulgated, and ministerial
responsibility does not apply to the Empire. Hence anyone
can become Imperial Chancellor even if he is not qualified
for that position. Consequently the office of Imperial
Chancellor may be lowered so that the Chancellor will become
merely a private secretary, whose responsibiUty is limited
to doing what he is told without selecting what is useful or
examining proposals. ... If responsibility was enforced
by law no one would become Imperial Chancellor unless he
possessed the necessary quaUfications. . . .

When I became Minister, the Crown was in difficulties.
The King was discouraged. His Ministers refused to sup-
port him. He wished to abdicate. When I saw this I
strove to strengthen the Crown against Parliament. Per-
haps I have gone too far in this direction. We require
a counterpoise. I believe that frank criticism is indispens-
able for a monarchical government. Otherwise it degene-
rates into an official absolutism. We require the fresh
air of public criticism. Germany's constitutional life is
founded on it. When Parliament becomes powerless,
becomes merely an instrument of a higher will, we shall
come back again in due course to the enlightened abso-
lutism of the past. Theoretically that may be the most
perfect form of government, a divine form of government.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 209

However, it is practically unacceptable because of human
inadequacy.

In a speech dehvered August 20, 1893, Prince Bismarck
stated :

In our attempts at unification we must not go beyond
the Constitution. The German Constitution has not only
demanded vast sacrifices in human lives and in blood. It
was an exceedingly difficult work to combine the opposing
interests which had been at variance for centuries. It was
exceedingly difficult to unite them in such a manner that at
last all were satisfied or at least contented. The fact that
the Constitution is touched and shaken fills me with grave
cares in my old age.

On June 12, 1890, only a few months after his dismissal.
Prince Bismarck said, addressing a deputation of Stuttgart
citizens :

The dynasties have appeared to me a guarantee of
Germany's unity. With their assistance the work of unifying
Germany, which had been begun in battle, was completed.
... I have never been an advocate of Imperial centralisa-
tion, and I have made it my task as Imperial Chancellor
to protect the rights of the individual States against illegiti-
mate encroachments.

During the eight years w^hich Bismarck spent in retire-
ment he frequently urged his countrymen in speech and
in writing to preserve the German Constitution inviolate,
not to diminish the rights of the individual States, to create
a counterpoise to the Emperor's impetuousness and to his
attempts at governing Germany as if it were a Greater
Prussia, and not to embark upon an aggressive war, nor
to support Austria should she come into collision with
Kussia by an attack in the Balkans, because in that case
Germany was under no obligation to help Austria and had
no interest in being involved in a great war over Balkan
questions.

In attacking Kussia and France the German Emperor

210 The German Emperor'' s Position

not only violated the Imperial Constitution but he acted
with an absolute disregard of the maxims of State which
the creator of Modern Germany had laid down, and he
cannot even plead that he was compelled to go into war
because of the Austro-German AUiance. His contravention
of the German Constitution may possibly in course of time
assume an exceedingly serious aspect.

Prince Bismarck stated in his posthumous * Memoirs ' :
* The Federal Council represents the governing power of
the joint sovereignty of Germany.* According to the
German Constitution, * the consent of the Federal Council
is necessary for the declaration of war in the name of the
Empire, unless an attack on the territory or the coast of
the Confederation has taken place.* The Emperor could
constitutionally and legitimately attack Russia and France
only after an attack on German territory had actually
occurred. In order to make an aggression legitimate, a
foreign attack upon Germany had either to be brought
about or to be invented. Germany went to war because,
according to the official version, ' war was forced upon her,*
because German territory was attacked both by Russia
and France. On August 4 the German Chancellor, von
Bcthmann-Hollweg, stated in the Reichstag :

The Emperor gave orders that the French frontier should
be respected under all conditions. With one single excep-
tion that order was strictly obeyed. France, which mobilised
at the same hour as Germany, declared to us that she would
withdraw her troops to a distance of 10 kilometres from the
frontier. But what happened in reality ? Flying machines
throwing bombs, cavalry patrols and companies of French
infantry breaking into Alsace-Lorraine ! By acting thus
France has broken the peace and has actually attacked
Germany although a state of war had not yet been declared.

As regards the exception mentioned I have received the
following report from the Chief of the General Staff :

' Of the French complaints regarding the violation of
the frontier only a single one must be admitted. Against
express orders a patrol of the XIV. Army Corps crossed the

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 211

frontier on the 2nd of August. Apparently it was com-
manded by an officer. It seems that they were shot, for
only one man has returned. However, long before this
single crossing of the frontier took place French flying
machines have thrown bombs upon the German railway lines
as far as the South of Germany, and French troops have
attacked German troops protecting the frontier at the
Schlucht Pass. In accordance with orders given the German
troops have limited themselves entirely to the defensive.*

This is the report of the General Staff.

Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity, and neces-
sity knows no law ! Our troops have occupied Luxemburg
and perhaps have entered upon Belgian territory.

According to the Report of the Chief of the General
Staff, von Moltke, the French began the war by attacking
by means of flying machines, &c. Since August 4,
when that mendacious statement was read in the German
Reichstag, it has been repeated innumerable times by
German officialdom and by leading private men. In the
German White Book, which was published in English for
the benefit of Americans, we read :

A few hours later, at 5 p.m., the mobilisation of the
entire French army and navy was ordered. On the morning
of the next day France opened hostilities.

In the book * Truth about Germany — Facts about the
War,' which was Hkewise issued for the benefit of Americans
under the joint supervision of Prince Biilow and many
other of the best-informed Germans, it is stated :

Before one German soldier had crossed the German
frontier a large number of French aeroplanes came flying
into our country across the neutral territory of Belgium
and Luxemburg without a word of warning on the part of
the Belgian Government. At the same time the German
Government learned that the French were about to enter
Belgium. Then our Government with great reluctance
had to decide upon requesting the Belgian Government
to allow our troops to march through its territory.

212 The German Emperor^ s Position

According to the celebrated legal authority, Professor
Josef Kohler, France attacked Germany not from the air but
by invasion across the frontier. He wrote in the book ' Die
Vernichtung der englischen Weltmacht/ pubhshed in 1915 :

You know that when we offered France neutrality the
French replied to our offer by sending troops across the
frontier, violating thus the Law of Nations established by
the Hague Convention.

The German Declaration of War upon France stated :

M. le Président, the German administrative and military
authorities have estabHshed a certain number of flagrantly
hostile acts committed on German territory by French mili-
tary aviators. Several of these have openly violated the
neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that
country ; one has attempted to destroy buildings near
Wesel ; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel ;
one has thrown bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and
Nuremberg.

I am instructed, and I have the honour, to inform your
Excellency, that in the presence of these acts of aggression
the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with
France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power. . . .

SCHOEN.

According to Herr von Below Saleske, the German
Minister in Brussels, Germany was attacked by France,
neither by aeroplanes, nor by an ordinary attack across
the frontier, but by an attack from airships. In an inter-
view which he asked for at 1.30 a.m. on August 8, 1914,
Herr von Below Saleske made that statement, according
to a Memorandum published in the Diplomatic Correspon-
dence issued by the Belgian Government. The Memorandum
nms as follows :

A l'heure et demie de la nuit, le Ministre d*Allemagne a
demandé à voir le Baron van der Elst. Il lui a dit qu'il
était chargé par son Gouvernement de nous informer que
des dirigeables français avaient jeté des bombes et qu'une
patrouille de cavalerie française, violant le droit des gens,

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 213

attendu que la guerre n'était pas déclarée, avait traversé
la frontière.

Lately the assertion that France began the war upon
Germany, by an attack either by land or from the air, has
been less frequently heard. The insistent inquiries made
by German politicians at the military headquarters in
Berlin and in South German towns have failed to discover
the place where, according to the statement of the Chief
of the General Staff which was read by the German Chan-
cellor in the Keichstag, * French flying machines have thrown
bombs upon the German railway lines as far as the South
of Germany.' When the question of responsibility for
the War is judicially investigated, it will, perhaps, appear
who it was that created a colourable pretext for Germany's
aggression by pretending that France had been the first
to strike at Germany. It will then appear whether the
untrue statement of the General Staff was made by order
of the Emperor, or whether it originated in the General
Staff itself ; whether the Emperor demanded that a pretext
should be created, or whether the military leaders, especially
von Moltke, who were notoriously anxious for war, invented
the French attack in order to force the Emperor's hands.
My impression has been for a long time that the latter was
the case, as I endeavoured to show in an article pubhshed
in The Nineteenth Century and After} Very likely Herr
von Jagow and the Imperial Chancellor acted perfectly
honâ fide when they explained at the critical moment that
they had been unacquainted with the text of the Austrian
ultimatum to Serbia. The surmise that the military leaders
first brought about the diplomatic crisis, and then forced
the hands of the Emperor and of the Imperial Chancellor
by inventing a French attack upon Germany, is strengthened
by the admission of the Secretary of State, von Jagow, and
of his Under-Secretary, Herr Zimmermann, in their conversa-
tion with the French Ambassador and the Belgian Minister

^ * How the Army has ruined Germany,' The Nineteenth Century and
After, April 1916.

214 The German Emperor's Position

in Berlin, that they were powerless, that the control of the
diplomatic situation was in the hands of the military leaders.

Future investigation will probably show that the military
party, by a false report, engineered a deliberate and carefully
planned violation of the German Constitution, that they
made the Emperor their tool. However, if the war was
brought about by the pressure of the military firebrands,
and by the deliberate concoction of a French attack, the
Emperor cannot plead irresponsibility for his action. Qui
facit yer alium facit 'per se. The principal is responsible for
the actions of his agents. A surgeon cannot plead that he
is not responsible for a fatal operation, that he acted against
his conviction, that he was forced into it by the demands of
his dresser. A lawyer cannot plead immunity because he
acted against his conviction, owing to the urgent advice
of his clerk. If the War should end in Germany's defeat,
the German Emperor may be held responsible by the German
people and he cannot then shift his responsibility on to the
military leaders, nor will it suffice if he should explain
that he had punished the late von Moltke for his intrigue
by dismissing him at the earhest opportunity.

The German Constitution is on the one hand a charter
of popular liberties which grants to the German nation
certain rights, such as ParHamentary representation with
a democratic franchise. It is, on the other hand, a pact
concluded between Prussia and the German States whereby
their relations are regulated, and whereby Prussia's authority
and competence as the presiding State of the Confederation
are carefully determined and limited. The German Con-
stitution delimits punctiUously the functions and powers
of the Emperor-President. In accepting the Imperial
Crown and in promising to observe the Constitution, the
King of Prussia, as German Emperor, bound himself to
observe the fundamental regulations of the Empire, which
were devised not only in the interest of the dynasties
or of the individual States, apart from Prussia, but in the
interest of the German nation as a whole.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 215

The minor States were, according to the Constitution,
to act as a brake upon a rash and impulsive Prussian King.
Hence, not only the South Germans but the Prussians also
are strongly interested in the careful observance of the
Constitution on the part of the King-Emperor. The
sovereigns of the minor States are not merely ornamental
Lords-Lieutenant but are, according to the Constitution,
partners in the Imperial concern, in which they possess
a controlling interest if a war of aggression is planned by
the Emperor.

The sovereigns of the minor States insisted upon the
limitation of the Emperor's power, not merely in their
personal interest or in that of their States, but in that
of all Germany, of the German nation. Hence, the limita-
tions demanded by them, restricting the Emperor's powers
with regard to the declaration of war, were considered
reasonable by Bismarck and by the old Emperor and by
his advisers, and they were readily assented to as being in
the best interest of the nation and of the Emperor himself.

Kightly considered, the German Constitution is a deed
of partnership concluded between the King of Prussia
and the German sovereigns and free towns on the one hand,
and between the Emperor and the German people on the
other hand. The Imperial dignity was in 1871, and again
in 1888, bestowed upon the King of Prussia on conditions.
William the Second has broken the formal pact between
himself and his brother sovereigns and between himself
and the nation, notwithstanding his solemn declarations
made at the time of his accession, either owing to his wilful-
ness or owing to his weakness, either because he wished to
embark upon a war of aggression, or because he allowed
himself to be forced into such a war, which violates the
Constitution, by the intrigues of the military party. It
seems by no means improbable that the German sovereigns
and people will hold the German Emperor accountable
should the War end disastrously for Germany.

CHAPTER VII

A FORECAST AND A WARNING ^

Late in 1915, Mr. Montagu stated in the House of Commons
that the British War expenditure came to £5,000,000 a day,
that the War was swallowing up half the national income.
This was evidently a very serious understatement. Five
million pounds a day is equal to £1,825,000,000 a year.
According to the * British Census of Production,' published
in December, 1912, and relating to the year 1907, the national
income of that year amounted to £2,000,000,000. Even
the most optimistic statisticians have not seen in that figure
a very great understatement. It therefore appears that
the British War expenditure per day was at that time
approximately equal to the entire national income per day
in normal times. It need, however, scarcely be pointed out
that the War, which has taken millions of able-bodied British
men from the productive occupations, and which has
diverted the industries from the production of useful
commodities to that of war material, has very seriously
diminished the true national income. Besides, with the con-
stantly increasing numbers of the British Army, and the
steadily growing financial requirements of the Alhes for
British loans and subsidies, the daily War expenditure of
this country has continually kept on increasing. Hence,
the daily cost of the War may now greatly exceed the whole
of the national income.

^ The Nineteenth Century and After, December, 1915.
216

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 217

The vastness of Great Britain's War expenditure staggers
the imagination not only of people in general but even that
of financiers and statisticians. It can be visualised only by
comparison. The Franco-German War of 1870-71, which
lasted nine months, cost Germany £60,000,000 ; the Panama
Canal, the greatest and the most expensive engineering under-
taking the world has seen, cost the United States in ten
years £80,000,000 ; the Boer War, which lasted three years,
cost this country £250,0C0,000. It follows that Great
Britain has spent on the War, at the comparatively moderate
rate of £5,000,000 per day, every two weeks almost as much
as the total cost of the Panama Canal, and that she has spent
every two months considerably more than she did during the
whole of the protracted campaign against the Boers.

The War has so far cost about £3,000,000,000. The
national capital of Great Britain is usually estimated to
amount to about £15,000,000,000. As the struggle seems
likely to continue, it may eventually swallow a sum equal to
one-third of the British national capital, if not more. Interest
will have to be paid on the gigantic War debt. Its capital
must, by purchase, gradually be reduced to manageable
proportions, and in addition untold millions will be required
every year for the support of the crippled and incapacitated
veterans, and for the widows and orphans. Before the War,
Budgets of £200,000,000 per year seemed monstrous. After
the War, Budgets of £500,000,000 may seem modest. If we
now remember that years of hard times followed the rela-
tively cheap Boer War we can well understand that statesmen
and business men look with grave anxiety and alarm into
the future, and at the mountainous debt which Great Britain
is rapidly piling up, and that they are asking themselves :
Can this over-taxed country stand the additional financial
burdens ? Will not the War destroy the British industries
and trade, drive the country into bankruptcy and ruin, or
at least permanently impoverish Great Britain ? In the
following pages an attempt will be made to answer these
questions.

218 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future

In endeavouring to solve the great problems confronting
them the most eminent statesmen and soldiers of all times
have turned for their information and guidance to the
experience of the past, to the teachings of history. A hun-
dred years ago Great Britain concluded her twenty years'
struggle with Kevolutionary and Napoleonic France, in
the course of which she spent about £1,100,000,000, a sum
which greatly exceeded one-third of the national capital of
the time. What, then, can we learn from Great Britain's
experience ? How was the Napoleonic War financed ? What
were the consequences of that gigantic expenditure upon the
British industries, British trade, and the British finances ?
Unfortunately, scientific history has been greatly neglected
in this country. The existing accounts of the Napo-
leonic struggle are exceedingly unsatisfactory. They con-
sist partly of pleasantly written popular books designed to
while away the idle hours of the leisured and the uninformed,
partly of books written by Party men for Party- political
purposes in which are exposed the wickedness of the Tories
or the stupidity of the Whigs, the narrow-mindedness of the
Protectionists or the recklessness of the Free Traders. It is
humiliating that an impartial documentary history of the
Great War and of its economic aspects remains still to be
written. The past should be a guide to the present. I
propose in these pages to summarise the economic teachings
of the Great War by means of most valuable evidence which
will not be found in any of the histories of that struggle,
and, fortified by the necessary data, an attempt will be made
to apply their lesson to the present and to make a forecast
of Britain's economic future.

The Great War between France and Great Britain
began in 1793 and lasted, with two interruptions (1802-03
and 1814-15) until 1815. It cost this country about
£1,100,000,000, but as that figure is not in accordance with
tradition it may be challenged. I will therefore give my
reasons for using it.

It is not easy, in analysing national expenditure during a

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 219

time of war, to state exactly what part of it is peace ex-
penditure and what is war expenditure. Most writers on
pubHc finance have stated that the War with France cost
this nation about £800,000,000. That seems to me to be
far too low a figure. If we wish to ascertain the cost of a
war we cannot do so by mechanically adding up all expendi-
ture which is labelled * War Expenditure,' for much of it
will appear under civil heads. Therefore, we must endeavour
to find out, firstly, how much debt was incurred for the war,
and, secondly, by how much the current national expenditure,
which is raised by taxation, was increased during the war
and presumably owing to the war. Let us make this test,
for it will furnish us with some exceedingly interesting data
which will be of great value in the course of this investigation.
Before and during the Great War the British National
Debt increased, according to McCulloch's * Account of the
British Empire,' as follows :

The British
National Debt

Annaal Charge

National Debt in 1776
Debt incurred during American War,
1775-84

Total

Repaid during peace, 1784-93

Debt at commencement of Great War in
1793

Debt contracted during the Great War,
1793-1815

National Debt on 1st February, 1817 .

£
128,583,635

121,267,993

£
4,471,571

5,089,336

249,851.628
10,501,480

9,560,907
249,277

239,350,148
601,500,343

9,311,630
22,704,311

840,850,491

32,015,941

It will be noticed that the British National Debt grew
by £601,500,000 during the Great War.

Between 1792 and 1815 the national expenditure, the Tax
Kevenue, and the interest paid on the National Debt in-
creased, according to the following interesting table, which
is taken from Porter's * Progress of the Nation,' as follows.

220 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future

It deserves to be studied with care, especially as we shall
have to revert to it in the course of this chapter.

National Revenue and Expendilure.

-

National Expenditure

Tax Revenue

Interest paid on
National Debt

£

£

£

1792

19,589,123

19,258,814

9,767,333

1793

24,197,070

19,845,705

9,437,862

1794

27,742,117

20,193,074

9,890,904

1795

48,414,177

19,883,520

10,810,728

1796

42,175,291

21,454,728

11,841,204

1797

50,740,609

23,126,940

14,270,616

1798

61,127,245

31,035,363

17,585,518

1799

55,624,404

35,602,444

17,220,983

1800

56,821,267

34,145,584

17,381,561

1801

61,329,179

34,113,146

19,945,624

1802

49,549,207

36,368,149

19,855,558

1803

48,998,230

38,609,392

20,699,864

1804

59,376,208

46,176,492

20,726,772

1805

67,169,318

50,897,706

22,141,426

1806

68,941,211

55,796,086

23,000,006

1807

67,613,042

59,339,321

23,362,685

1808

73,143,087

62,998,191

23,158,982

1809

76,566,013

63,719,400

24,213,867

1810

•76,865,548

67,144^42

24,246,946

1811

83,735,223

65,173,545

24,977,915

1812

88,757,324

65,037,850

25,546,508

1813

105,943,727

68,748,363

28,030,239

1814

116,832,260

71,134,503

30,051,365

1815

92,280,180

72,210,512

31,576,074

1816

65,169,771

62,264,546

32,938,751

Tc

tal Tax Revenue, ]

792-1815: £1,082,(

)13,370.

In looking over this table it will be noticed that the
revenue derived from taxes increased from £19,258,814 in
1792 to £72,210,512 in 1815. Nobody can say with absolute
certainty how much of this increase was due to the automatic
expansion of the ordinary peace expenditure, and how much
to the War. Therefore, we must make an estimate. We
shall probably be fairly correct if we assume that the national
expenditure, and with it the tax revenue which should
provide for it, would, from 1792 to 1816, have gradually
increased by, let us gay, 60 per cent., that is, from £19,000,000

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 221

in round figures to £31,000,000, had there been peace. That
gradual increase over the whole period under review would
give us an average yearly expenditure of £25,000,000 per
year, and an equally large tax revenue to balance it. During
the twenty-four years from 1792 to 1915 the total
British Tax Eevenue should therefore have amounted to
£600,000,000, had peace been maintained. As, however,
the British Tax Eevenue from 1792 to 1815 amounted in
the aggregate to no less than £1,082,000,000, we may assume
that of the revenue raised by taxes between 1792 and 1815,
£482,000,000 were raised owing to the war. Hence, the
true cost of the Great War should consist of £601,500,000
raised by loan, and of £482,000,000 raised by taxation, or
£1,083,500,000 in all. My estimate that the British War
expenditure in the Great War came to about £1,100,000,000
should err, if at all, on the side of moderation. Let us now
endeavour to gauge the significance of the gigantic financial
effort made by this country by looking at it from the con-
temporary point of view.

In 1814 Mr. P. Colquhoun, an eminent writer on eco-
nomics and statistics, pubKshed his excellent 'Treatise on the
Wealth, Power, and Resources of the British Empire.' It
was based on the Treasury statistics. According to him the
whole private and pubhc property of the nation represented
a money value of £2,736,640,000. It is noteworthy that
of that sum £1,200,640,000 was in respect of agricultural
land alone.' Manufacturing, commerce, and trade, which
now are the principal wealth-creating resources of the
country, were evidently of relatively small importance at
the time. According to his painstaking and conscientious
investigations, the national income amounted then to
£430,521,372 per year. Its composition is shown in the
table on page 222.

If we accept as correct my estimate that Great Britain's
expenditure on the war with France amounted to about
£1,100,000,000, it follows that a century ago Great Britain
spent on the war a sum about equivalent to the national

222 BritairCs War Finance and Economic Future

income of two and a half years, and considerably larger than
one -third of the entire national capital. If, a century ago.
Great Britain was able to spend on war more than one-third
of the national capital, she should certainly be able to make
proportionately as great a financial sacrifice at the present
time, when rapidly producing machinery has taken the place
of slowly producing agriculture, when capital lost or diverted
by the War can more quickly be replaced. As the national
capital amounts at least to £15,000,000,000, Great Britain
should now be able to spend again more than one-third, or
from £5,000,000,000 to £6,000,000,000, on war. If the
Empire as a whole should finance the War, that amount

National Income. £

From agriculture ....

From mines and minerals

From manufactures

From inland trade

From foreign commerce and shipping

From the coasting trade

From fisheries, excluding Newfoundland

From banks ....

Foreign income ....

216,817,624

9,000.000

114,230,000

31,500,000

46,373,748

2,000,000

2,100,000

3,500,000

5,000,000

Total 430,521,372

could easily be doubled. Of course some allowance
must be made for the fact that whereas a hundred years
ago British war expenditure was spread over twenty years,
it will now be spread over a much shorter period. Hence,
the necessary economic measures, similar to those which
were taken a century ago, must not be taken dilatorily
but speedily.

Before considering the consequences of the nation's
gigantic expenditure upon its economic position and future,
let us briefly study the means by which, a century ago. Great
Britain raised the colossal funds required for the war against
France, for such an investigation will supply us with some
very valuable precedents.

A hundred years ago, as now, the war was paid for
partly with the proceeds of loans, partly with funds pro-

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 223

vided by taxation. If, as I have endeavoured to show,
the war cost this country £1,100,000,000, it appears that
£600,000,000, or three-fifths, were raised by loans and
£500,000,000, or two-fifths, by taxation. If we now turn
back to the interesting table of national revenue and expendi-
ture previously given, it will be seen that taxation was
enormously increased during the Napoleonic era. Between
1792 and 1815 it increased from £19,258,814 to £72,210,512,
or was almost quadrupled, and as the substantial increase
of taxation only began in 1796, it was almost quadrupled
in the small space of twenty years ! How great was the
financial sacrifice made by the nation during the Napoleonic
wars may be seen by the fact that British taxation was
generally considered to be * intolerably high ' before the
war began. It was indeed very high. If we look at the
table of British National Debt given in the beginning of
this chapter, it appears that the National Debt had been
almost exactly doubled by the costly war with the American
Colonies, France, Spain, and Holland from 1775 to 1784,
that this country entered the Napoleonic War with the dead
weight of an enormous war debt • pressing on it. From
the table of National Kevenue and Expenditure it appears
furthermore that in 1792 no less than practically one-half
of the entire national expenditure consisted of interest
paid on the National Debt, that one-half of the Budgetary
expenditure in time of peace was, in fact, expenditure caused
by the previous wars.

During the Napoleonic War the public burdens were
vastly increased. Keference to the table of National Ke-
venue and Expenditure shows that the interest paid per
year on the National Debt increased from £9,767,333 in
1792 to no less than £32,938,751 in 1816, growing no less
than three and a half fold. The British national expendi-
ture of 1792 was at the time rightly considered to be a very
heavy one. It was exactly twice as large as in 1775.
Yet, between 1813 and 1816 Great Britain spent on an
average per year on interest on the National Debt alone

224 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future

50 per cent, more than the total amount of the British
national expenditure of 1792, and three times as much as
the whole national expenditure of 1775.

We have no reason to complain of the present war taxes.
Compared with those estabhshed during the Napoleonic
time they are very light indeed.

Now let us study the way by which Great Britain raised
her war taxes during the Great War.

As the Budgets of a century ago form in their bulky
original a maze in which the uninitiated are lost, I would
give a useful analytical digest of the Budget revenue for the
year 1815, taken from the second volume of Mr. Stephen
Dowell's valuable * History of Taxation and Taxes in
England.' Details of the revenue of Great Britain, exclusive
of Ireland, are shown in the table on page 225.

The revenue from taxes in Ireland for the year 1815,
ending January 5, 1816, was, in British currency, equal to
£6,258,723.

It will be noticed that a century ago, as now, the direct
taxes on capital and income and the taxes on luxuries
such as beer, wine, spirits, sugar, tea, coffee, tobacco, houses,
coaches, &c., provided the bulk of the revenue. However,
not only these but everything taxable was taxed. Exports,
imports, and internal trade, coal and timber, raw materials
used in the industries and manufactured articles produced
in Great Britain, all had to pay their share. Sydney Smith,
the witty Canon of St. Paul's, wrote in an article in The
Edinburgh Beview in 1820 :

We can inform Brother Jonathan what are the inevitable
consequences of being too fond of glory. Taxes upon every
article which enters into the mouth, or covers the back, or
is placed under the foot. Taxes upon anything that is
pleasant to see, hear, feel, smell, or taste. Taxes upon
warmth, light, and locomotion. Taxes upon everything on
earth, or under the earth, on everything that comes from
abroad, or is grown at home. Taxes on the raw material,
taxes on every fresh value that is added to it by the industry

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 225

DiEEOT Ta:

£ES £ £

The land tax

. 1,196,000

Taxes on houses and establishments

. 6,500,000

Income tax . . . . ,

. 14,000,000

Tax on succession to property

. 11,297,000

Property insured .

918,000

Property sold at auction

284,000

Coaches and cabs . . . .

471,608

Tonnage on shipping

171,651

25,43S,259

Taxes ox Articles of Consumption.

Food, Drink, and Tobacco : £ £

Salt 1,616,671

Sugar 2,957.403

Currants, raisins, pepper, and vinegar . 541,589

Beer 3,330,044

Malt 6,044,276

Hops 222,026

Drink Licenses 200,000

Wine 1,900,772

Spirits . 6,700,000

Tea 3,691,350

Coffee 276,700

Tobacco 2,025,663

29,406,494

Raw Materials and Customs Duties :

Coal and slate 915,797

Timber 1,802,000

Cotton wool 760,000

Raw and thrown silk .... 450,000

Barilla, indigo, potashes, bar iron, and furs 297,000

Hemp 285,000

Export duties 364,417

Various import duties .... 1,188,000

6,062,214

Taxes on Manufactures :

Leather 698,342

Soap 747,759

Bricks and tiles 269,121

Glass 424,787

Candles 354,350

Paper 476,019

Printed goods . . . . ' . 388,076

Newspapers 383,000

Advertisements . ; . . . 125,000

Plate 82,151

Various 132,116

Stamp Duties.

Bills and notes 841,000

Receipts 210,000

Other instruments 1,692,000

4,080.721

2,743,000

Grand total £67,730,688

Q

226 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future

of man. Taxes on the sauce which pampers man's appetite,
and the drug which restores him to health ; on the ermine
which decorates the judge, and the rope which hangs the
criminal ; on the poor man's salt and the rich man's spice ;
on the brass nails of the coffin and the ribbons of the bride ;
at bed or board, couchant or levant, we must pay. The
schoolboy whips his taxed top, the beardless youth manages
his taxed horse with a taxed bridle on a taxed road ; and
the dying Englishman, pouring his medicine, which has
paid seven per cent., into a spoon that has paid fifteen per
cent., flings himself back upon his chintz bed which has
paid twenty-two per cent, and expires in the arms of an
apothecary who has paid a licence of One hundred pounds
for the privilege of putting him to death. His whole
property is then immediately taxed from two to ten per
cent. Besides the Probate large fees are demanded for
burying him in the chancel. His virtues are handed down
to posterity on taxed marble and he will then be gathered
to his fathers to be taxed no more.

The manner by which British taxation was increased in
the course of the Great War may be gauged by comparing
the peace Budget of 1792 with that of 1815. The following
figures give a summary comparison :

Direct taxes ......

Taxes on food, drink and tobacco .
Taxes on raw materials and customs
duties ......

Taxes on manufactures ....

Stamp duties ......

In 1792

3,837,000
9,035,783

1,467,000

1,656,000

752,000

InlSlS

25,438,259
29,406,494

6,062,214
4,080,721
2,743,000

It will be noticed that the taxes on food, drink, tobacco,"
raw materials, imports, and on manufactures increased
between 1792 and 1815 from three to four-fold, and that
the stamp duties were raised at a similar ratio, while the
direct taxes, that is, the taxes on the income and the pro-
perty of the well-to-do, and on their establishments, increased

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 227

almost sevenfold. If we bear in mind that a century ago
British foreign trade was carried on chiefly with the Con-
tinent of Europe and the United States, that during many
years practically the whole Continent was closed by
Napoleon to British trade, that from 1812 to 1815 Great
Britain was at war with the United States, that the British
Colonies were quite unimportant, that in 1800 Canada had
240,000 and Australia only 6500 inhabitants, that the only
valuable British Colonies were the West Indies, that in
consequence of the closing of the principal British markets
business was extremely bad, that commercial failures were
very numerous, that several harvests had failed, that bread
was scarce and very dear, that gold had disappeared, that
the forced paper currency had rapidly depreciated, so that
a guinea at one time was worth twenty-seven shillings in
paper, we can appreciate the economic sufferings of the
British people and their determination and staying power,
their civic heroism and their moral fibre. They paid during
those hard times three and four times as much in taxes as they
had done during the years preceding the war. As, therefore,
a hundred years ago, and under far more difficult economic
circumstances than those which obtain at present, the British
people were able to bear a burden of taxation from three to
four times as heavy as that to which they had been
accustomed, the British people of to-day will also be able to
pay far more in taxes than they have done hitherto, although
there will, of course, be grumbling and suffering. Nations,
and especially nations which hve luxuriously and wastefully,
have almost an infinite capacity of paying taxes. That
is one of the lessons of the Great War with France.

Great Britain habitually makes war lavishly and waste-
fully. That lies in the national character. Out of the
forty years from 1775 to 1815 nine years were spent in an
enormous war with the American Colonies, France, Spain,
and Holland, and twenty years n a still greater war with
Eepubhcan and Napoleonic France, and her alKes and
vassals. During these forty years, as we may see by referring

228 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future

to the little table given in the beginning of this chapter,
the National Debt and the yearly interest paid on it increased
about sevenfold. Frederick the Great, Napoleon the
First, and many other men of eminence, both in England
and abroad, believed that the enormous British National
Debt, and the ever-increasing burden of taxation, would
impoverish and ruin England. Yet, at the end of the
forty years' war period, England was undoubtedly far
wealthier than she had been at its beginning.

After the conclusion of that terrible war period the
expected collapse of the British industries and of British
commerce did not take place. On the contrary, all the
British industries and British commerce expanded in an
unprecedented manner. It has so frequently been asserted
by economic and general historians who write history in
order to prove a case, or to establish a doctrine, who write
party pamphlets in book form, that England's economic
expansion was consequent upon, and due to, the introduction
of Free Trade, that that fallacy has been very widely
accepted as truth. The abohtion of many of the
innumerable taxes imposed during the Great War no doubt
proved a powerful stimulus to certain industries. Still,
Great Britain's most wonderful progress in trade and
industry, in banking and shipping, in agriculture and
mining, took place before Free Trade was introduced.
It was effected during and shortly after the forty years
of almost incessant warfare, and was, as I shall endeavour
to show, chiefly due to these wars and to the burdens which
they imposed upon the nation. Before endeavouring to
prove this, it is necessary to show that the greatest economic
advance of this country took place before 1846, the year
when Free Trade was introduced.

The supply of men, as Adam Smith wisely remarked,
is regulated by the demand for men. In prosperous times,
when work is plentiful, the people increase rapidly. Between
1801 and 1841 the British population almost doubled,
growing from 10,942,646 to 18,720,394. Agriculture and

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 229

the manufacturing industries flourished. As in 1841, ac-
cording to Porter's * Progress of the Nation,' only about
3,000,000 British people hved on imported wheat, it
obviously follows, as that distinguished statistician pointed
out, that British agricultural production must have increased
by 50 per cent, in the meantime. The expansion of British
agriculture may be seen not only by the large increase
of the population, which rehed almost exclusively on home-
grown food, but also by the increasing yield of agricultural
rent, which, according to McCulloch's * Statistical Account
of the British Empire,' grew as follows :

AgricuUural Rent

1800 .

£22,500,000

1806 .

25,908,207

1810 .

29,503,074

1816 .
1843 .

34,230,462
40,167,089

Now let us look at the progress of the British manu-
facturing industries. The following tables are extracted
from Porter's book, * The Progress of the Nation,' 1851.
I would add that Mr. Porter was the chief of the Statistical
Department of the Board of Trade, and the founder of
the Statistical Society, and he was later on Secretary to
the Board of Trade.

As the statistics relating to British industrial produc-
tion during the first half of the last century are somewhat
defective, the progress of the British manufacturing
industries, as a whole, and of British trade, can best be
gauged from the increase in the populations of the principal
manufacturing and trading towns. These increased rapidly
as is shown in a table on page 230.

It will be noticed that between 1801 and 1841 the
population of Manchester, Liverpool, and indeed most of
the towns given, grew threefold and more than three-
fold. These figures sufiice to show that the British manu-
facturing industries and British trade expanded at an
incredible rate of speed before 1846.

230 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future

The textile industry, in its various branches, is the
greatest British manufacturing industry, and its rise is
frequently, although erroneously, attributed by many to

Population of British Towns.

—

1801

1811

1821

1831

1841

Manchester and Salford

94,876

115,874

163,635

237,832

311,009

Liverpool .

82,295

104,104

138,354

201,751

286,487

Birmingham

70,670

82,753

101,722

143,986

182,922

Leeds .

53,162

62,534

83,796

123,393

162,074

Sheffield .

45,755

53,231

65,275

91,692

111,091

Wolverhampton

30,584

43,190

53,011

67,514

93,245

Bradford .

13,264

16,012

26.307

43,527

66,715

Oldham

21,677

29,479

38,201

50,513

60,451

Preston

12,174

17,360

24,859

33,871

50,887

Bolton

17,966

24,799

32,045

42,245

51,029

Leicester .

17,005

23,453

31,036

40,639 60,806

Nottingham

28,861

34,253

40,415

50,680 1 53,091

Macclesfield

13,255

17,143

23,154

30,911 i 32,629

Coventry .

16,034

17,923

21,448

27,298 ' 31,032

Hudders field

7,268

9,671

13,284

19,035 : 25,068

Rochdale .

8,040

10,392

12,998

18,351 24,272

Northampton

7,020

8,427

10,793

15,351 21,242

Free Trade. Measured by the quantity of raw material
imported — the best test available — the British textile in-
dustries, according to Porter, developed as follows :

Imports of

—

Raw Cotton

Raw Silk

Raw Wool

Lbs.

Lbs.

Lbs.

Lbs.

1801

54,203,433

960,0001

7,371,774

1805

58,878,163

—

8,069,793

1815

92,525,951

1,476,389

13,640,375

1825

202,546,869

3,604,058

43,816,966

1835

333,043,464

5,788,458

42,604,656

1845

721,979,953

6,328,159

76,813,865

Between 1801 and 1845 the importation of raw silk
increased about sevenfold, that of raw wool more than
tenfold, and that of raw cotton more than thirteen-fold.

1 Ten years average.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 231

The British iron production increased, according to
Porter, as follows :

British Iron Production.

1806
1825
1835
1840
1845

258,000 tons.

581,000 tons.
1,000,000 tons.
1,500,000 tons.
1.700,000 tons.

Between 1806 and 1845 the British iron production
increased nearly sevenfold.

The expansion of all the British manufacturing indus-
tries was so rapid after 1815 that they speedily acquired
practically a world monopoly. In 1845 Great Britain was
indeed, to use Cobden's words, the workshop of the world.

Modern manufacturing is based on coal. The command-
ing position which the British industries had obtained
during and after the Great War can best be gauged by
Great Britain's production of coal. According to K. C.
Taylor's valuable * Statistics of Coal,* a bulky handbook
pubhshed in 1848, the world's production of coal in 1845
was as follows :

—

Production of
Coal in 1845

Percentage of
World's Production

Great Britain .....
Belgium ......

United States

France

Russia

Austria

Total

Tons
31,500,000
4,960,077
4,400,000
4,141,617
3,500,000
659,340

Per Cent.
64-2
101

8-9

8-4

7-0

1-4

100-0

49,161,034

In 1845 Great Britain not only produced two-thirds
of the world's coal and two-thirds of the world's iron, but
also worked up two-thirds of the world's raw cotton.

During the war, and during the three decades of peace
which followed the Congress of Vienna, Great Britain became
the workshop of the world. The predictions of Napoleon
and of many statesmen, financiers, and economists, that

232 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future

the enormous National Debt and the huge burden of taxation
would utterly impoverish Great Britain, were triumphantly
refuted. In no other period of the nation's history did its
wealth progress at a more rapid rate. The principal cause
which led to this marvellous economic development was,
in my opinion, illogical as it may sound, the great burden
which forty years of almost incessant warfare had laid upon
the British people. Men do not love exertion, do not love
work. They are born idlers who endeavour to enjoy hfe
without exertion. They will not work hard — there are,
of course, exceptions — unless compelled. Men, being born
idle and improvident, live without labour in all chmes where
a kindly Nature has provided for their wants. Necessity
is not only the mother of invention, but also the mother of
labour, of productivity, of thrift, of wealth, of power, and
of progress, and the greatest civilising influence of all is the
tax-collector. The tax-collector converted the backward
and happy-go-lucky British nation into a nation of strenuous
and intelhgent industrial workers.

Men hke their comforts and their amusements, and
they are apt to spend very nearly all they earn. If their
taxes are suddenly very greatly increased, their first impulse
is to stint themselves, but as this is a painful process, they
soon endeavour to provide the money required by the tax-
collector by harder work, or by more intelhgent exertion.
During the forty years period of almost incessant war, and
during the three decades which followed the Peace of Vienna,
taxes were increased enormously, and as the increased taxes
could scarcely be provided for by the unpleasant virtue of
thrift, the people began to exert their ingenuity and strove
to increase their income by increasing production. At the
end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth
century, two periods of greatly increased taxation, British
genius was applied to money-making, to industry, and to
invention in an unparalleled manner. Not chance, but the
constantly and colossally growing demands of the tax-col-
lector led to the introduction of the steam-engine, of labour-

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 233

saving machinery of every kind, of modern manufacturing,
of modern commerce and banking, of railways, and of
steamships.

The time when taxation was trebled and quadrupled saw
the rise of inventive geniuses such as Watt, Boulton, Brindley,
Trevethick, Telford, Brunei, Maudesley, Bramah, Nasmyth,
George Stephenson, Hargreaves, Arkwright, Crompton,
Cartwright, Horrocks, Smeaton, Priestly, Dalton, Faraday,
Davy, Wedgwood, and many others. The resources of the
country were carefully studied and energetically developed.
Excellent roads were built to facihtate trafiBc. The activity
of the Duke of Bridgewater, and of other men, gave to
England the then best system of inland waterways. The
Duke of Bedford, Kay, and Coke of Norfolk gave a tre-
mendous impetus to scientific agriculture. Eowland Hill
introduced the penny postage. By the perfection of the
organisation of joint-stock undertakings, the building of
costly railways, of factories on the largest scale, and the
evolution of modern banking, were made possible.

During the end of the eighteenth and the first half of the
nineteenth century, EngHshmen were the most enterprising
men in the world. They not only made the principal
inventions of modern industry, but they were invariably
the first to exploit the industrial inventions made by other
nations. Since then, Enghsh enterprise and Enghsh in-
ventiveness have sadly dechned. Most industrial inven-
tions and improvements are made nowadays in Germany
and in the United States, and the most valuable industrial
inventions and discoveries made by Englishmen are ex-
ploited not in England, but in Germany and America. The
British discovery of making dyes from coal-tar led to the
establishment of an enormous coal-tar dye industry in
Germany. Although an Englishman invented the valuable
automatic loom, only a few automatic looms are to be
found in this country, while hundreds of thousands are
employed in the United States. Many similar instances
might be given.

234 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future

During the last fifty years, England has undoubtedly
grown slack. Many British industries have remained
stagnant or have dechned, while those in the United States
and in Germany have mightily expanded. Great Britain
was the workshop of the world in 1845, but she occupies no
longer that proud position. What is the cause, or what are
the causes, of this extraordinary change ? There are many
causes, but the principal cause is undoubtedly this, that
when England had become industrially supreme and very
wealthy, the people were no longer compelled to work hard.
Having established their position in the world of industry and
commerce. Englishmen began to take their ease. Self-
indulgence took the place of industry. Both the employers
and their workers began to neglect their business at a time
when necessity compelled the German and American peoples
to concentrate their entire energy upon the development of
their commerce and their industries.

I have endeavoured to show in these pages that the
wonderful development of the British industries during
the end of the eighteenth and during the first half of the
nineteenth century was due not to chance, but to high
taxation — that not chance, but the pressure of high taxation
produced the invention of the steam-engine and of labour-
saving machinery of every kind. It is to be hoped that the
vastly increased demands of the tax-collector will once more
stimulate inventiveness and industry in this country to
the utmost, that necessity will cause EngHshmen to discover
new avenues which lead to prosperity, that the gigantic cost
of the present War will be as easily borne as that of the Great
War a century ago. However, we need not reckon upon the
discovery of new processes and the invention of new machines.
Great Britain can easily provide for her financial require-
ments, however long the War may last, by the simple
process of Americanising her industries. Great Britain is
blessed with an excellent climate and a most favourable
geographical position. She is the only country in the
world which, owing to the situation of its coalfields, can

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 235

manufacture practically on the sea-shore, whereas other
nations are greatly hampered by being compelled to manu-
facture far inland. Besides, Great Britain possesses a
gigantic and invaluable undeveloped estate in her vast
Dominions and Colonies. Great Britain and the British
Empire have absolutely unhmited resources which are partly
not exploited at all, and partly quite insufficiently utihsed.
The greatest resource of every nation is, in Colbert's
words, the labour of the people. Unfortunately, the labour
of the British people is very largely wasted. If we compare
the productivity of labour in this country and in the United
States, we find, incredible as it may sound, that American
labour is about three times as efficient as is British labour,
that one American worker produces approximately as much
as do three British workers. This assertion can be proved
by means of the British and the United States censuses
of production. The British census of production refers to
the year 1907 and the American census to the year 1909.
The two years he so near together that one may fairly
compare the results given. There is, of course, a difficulty
in comparing the efficiency of British and American labour.
In the first place the industries in the two countries have not
always been officially classified in the same manner. There-
fore many industries, such as the iron industry, cannot be
compared by means of the census figures. In the second
place the quahties of American and British produce fre-
quently differ widely. These considerations have necessarily
narrowed the range of comparable figures. The following
table contains statistics relating to some British and
American industries which may fairly be compared. They
will show conclusively that in many of the comparable
industries the American workers produce approximately
three times as large a quantity of goods as do their Enghsh
colleagues, and that they succeed in producing three times
as much, not because they work three times as hard, but
because, as is also shown in the table, the United States
use in the identical industries approximately three times

236 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future

as much horse-power per thousand men as does Great
Britain. The following figures are extracted from a fuller
table which appeared in an article of mine published in
The Fortnightly Review for August 1913, to which I would
refer those who desire further details. They were much
discussed at the time, but they have hitherto not been
successfully challenged.

—

Production
per Year

Number of
Wage-
eamera

Horse-power
Employed

Horse-
power per
Thousand
Wage-
earners

Value of
Produc-
tion per
Wage-
earner
per Year

Boots and Shoes :

£

£

United Kingdom

20,095,000

117,565

20,171

172

171

United States

102,359,000

198,297

96,302

486

616

Cardboard Boxes :

United Kingdom

2,067,000

19,844

2,288

114

106

United States

10,970,000

39,614

23,323

690

276

Cement :

United Kingdom

3,621,000

18,860

60,079

3,196

192

United States

12,641,000

26,775

371,799

13,873

472

Clothing :

United Kingdom

62,169,000

392,084

17,837

45

168

United States

190,560,000

393,439

65,019

165

, 484

Cocoa, Chocolate, and

Confectionary :

United Kingdom

16,171,000

54,629

19,898

346

296

United States

31,437,000

47,464

46,463

980

662

Cotton Goods :

United Kingdom

132,000,000

559,673

1.239,212

2,214

236

United States

125,678,400

378,880

1,296,517

3,423

332

Clocks and Watches :

United Kingdom

613,000

4,448

650

125

137

United States

7,039,400

23,857

14,957

628

296

Cutlery and Tools :

United Kingdom

2,047,000

12,485

6,248

420

164

United States

10,653,200

32,996

68,294

2,069

323

Firearms and Am-

munition :

United Kingdom

677,000

4,444

2,619

595

152

United States

6,822,400

14,715

17,840

1,214

464

Cloves :

United Kingdom

1,056,000

4,532

609

113

233

United States

4,726,200

11,354

2,889

266

416

Hats and Caps :

United Kingdom

5,256,000

28,420

6,142

181

149

United States

16,598,000

40,079

23,624

688

414

Ch'eat Problems of British Statesmanship 237

—

Production
per Year

Number of
Wage-
earners

Horse-power
Employed

Horse-
power per
Thousand
Wage-
earners

Value of
Produc-
tion per
Wage-
earner
per Year

Hosiery :

£

£

United Kingdom

8,792,000

47,687

7,784

163

184

United States

40,028,600

129,275

103,709

804

309

Leather Tanning and

Dressing :

United Kingdom

18,289,000

26,668

22,609

847

686

United States

65,574,800

62,202

148,140

2,389

1,054

Matches :

United Kingdom

862,000

3,865

1,591

408

223

United States

2,270,600

3,631

6,224

1,729

625

Paint Colours and

Varnish :

United Kingdom

9,127,000

10,674

14,576

1,376

863

United States

24,977,800

14,240

66,162

4,012

1,754

Paper :

United Kingdom

13,621,000

40,955

172,224

4,201

330

United States

63,631,000

76,978

1,304,265

15,846

705

Pens and Pencils :

United Kingdom

791,000

6,025

1,450

241

131

United States

2,539,000

6,058

4,261

710

419

Printing and Pub-

lishing :

United Kingdom

13,548,000

34,210

38,611

1,133

396

United States

147,757,200

258,434

297,763

1,154

672

Silk :

United Kingdom

6,345,000

30,710

18,867

608

142

United States

39,382,400

99,037

97,947

089

398

The figures given, which have not been selected for the
purpose of ' making a case,' show irrefutably that the
British manufacturing industries as a whole are almost
incredibly inefficient. Wherever we look we find that the
American worker produces per year approximately three
times as much as does his British colleague. Even the
British cotton industry, the premier industry of the country,
is, both on the spinning and on the weaving side, not pro-
vided with the best labour-saving machinery, as I pointed
out very fully in an article in The Nineteenth Century review
some years ago.^

1 ' Will a Tariff Harm Lancashire ? — A Lesson from America,' The
Nineteenth Century and After, August, 1912.

238 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future

The comparison of production per wage-earner per year
in England and the United States is based upon wholesale
prices. It is true that the shop prices of many commodities
are higher in the United States than in England. However,
this difference is due very largely to the fact that the
American retailers require a larger profit because they have
larger expenses, and because the business of distribution
is more costly in the United States than here because dis-
tances are greater. In most cases the wholesale prices of
comparable commodities are nearly identical in both
countries. The fact that the American workers produce
on an average approximately three times as much as their
British colleagues employed in the same industries can
therefore not be gainsaid.

It is, of course, generally known that in many cases
American workers employ far more perfect machinery
than do their British colleagues, but it is not generally
known, and it seems almost unbelievable, that the American
workers employ, besides better machinery, about three
times as much power as do the British workers engaged in
the same trades. If we allow for the fact that the American
industries possess not only better machines, but in addition
three times as much power with which to drive them, it
is obvious that the mechanical efficiency of the American
industries is considerably more than three times as great
as that of the corresponding British industries.

At the time when Great Britain was the workshop of the
world, McCuUoch wrote in his * Account of the British
Empire * : * A given number of hands in Great Britain
perform much more work than is executed by the same
number of hands almost anywhere else.' That statement,
which was true in the middle of the last century, is true
no longer. Unfortunately the British industries have become
lamentably inefficient, not only in comparison with those
of the United States, but of Germany and of other countries
as well. The greatest asset of a State is its man-power.
Much of the British man-power is wasted. By Americanising

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 239

the British manufacturing industries we can obviously
double and treble the national output, and can thus double
and treble the national income. That has been made
abundantly clear by my analytical comparison.

The lamentable inefficiency of British production is
apparent not only in manufacturing, but in agriculture
and mining as well. The Coal Tables of 1912, pubhshed
by the British Board of Trade in March, 1914, contain many
interesting figures relating to coal production in England
and abroad. Coal is the bread of the manufacturing indus-
tries. Its importance to the nation can scarcely be exag-
gerated. Let us see how British coal production compares
with coal production elsewhere.

Tons of Coal Produced per Annum per Person Employed.

-

United
Kingdom

United States

AostraUa

New Zealand

Canada

1886-90

312

400

333

359

341

1891-95

271

444

358

388

376

1896-1900

298

494

426

441

457

1901-5

281

543

437

474

495

1906-10

275

596

462

470

439

1908

271

538

600

478

422

1909

266

617

388

456

400

1910

257

618

449

478

453

1911

260

613

485

487

395

1912

2441

660

642

603

472

It will be noticed that the coal production per man per
year is almost twice as large in AustraHa, New Zealand,
and Canada as it is in the United Kingdom, and that it is
almost three times as large in the United States as it is in
this country. This startUng difference can only partly
be explained by the fact that in many cases the coal seams
are thicker in the United States than in Great Britain,
and are to be found at a lesser depth. This startling dis-
crepancy in output is largely, if not chiefly, ascribable to
this, that the British miner, as the British industrial worker,

^ Strike year.

240 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future

is hostile to improved machinery, and is determinedly
bent upon limiting output. It is ominous that, whereas
British coal production per man has steadily been decreasing
during the last thirty years, American, Austrahan, New
Zealand, and Canadian coal production per man has been
steadily increasing. The British miner has unfortunately
succeeded in more than nullifying the technical improve-
ments made in coal production which in other countries
have greatly increased production per man.

While an increasing coal production per man in America,
Austraha, and New Zealand has brought about the cheapen-
ing of coal, or has at least prevented it becoming dearer,
greatly increased wages notwithstanding, the reduction in
the British output per man, combined with increased wages,
has fatally increased the price of British coal. This will
appear from the figures given in the table on page 241.

The figures given show that the British coal-miners
have succeeded in reducing the output of coal per man
and creating an artificial scarcity. In former years British
coal was approximately as cheap as American coal, and in
some years it was cheaper. Of that advantage the manu-
facturing industries have now been deprived. Of late years,
owing to increased wages and reduced output, EngUsh
coal prices have been 60 per cent, higher than American
coal prices. Hence the British manufacturing industries
suffer not only from insufficient output due to inefficient
machinery and insufficient power to drive it, but also from
unnecessarily high coal prices. McCulloch wrote in his
* Account of the British Empire *^^:

Our coal mines have been sometimes called the Black
Indies, and it is certain that they have conferred a thousand
times more real advantage on us than we have derived from
the conquest of the Mogul Empire, or than we should have
reaped from the Dominion of Mexico and Peru. . . . Our
coal mines may be regarded as vast magazines of hoarded
or warehoused power ; and unless some such radical change
should be made on the steam engine as should very decidedly

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 241

lessen the quantity of fuel required to keep it in motion,
or some equally serviceable machine, but moved by different
means, be introduced, it is not at all likely that any nation
should come into successful competition with us in those
departments in which steam engines, or machinery moved
by steam, may be advantageously employed.

Average Value of Coal per Ton at the Pifa Mouth.

-

United Kingdom

United States

Australia

New Zealand

8. d.

8. d.

8. d.

«. d.

1886

4 10

6 4i

—

—

1887

4 9|

6 6i

9 2

10 10

1888

5 Of

6

9

10 11

1889

6 4i

5 3^

8 11

11 3

1890

8 3

6 2Î

8 6

11

1891

8

5 3i

8 9

11 4

1892

7 3i

5 4Î

7 11

11 3

1893

6 9^

5 4

7 5

11 1

1894

6 8

6 1

6 8

11

1895

6 OJ

4 9i

6 4

11 1

1896

6 lOi

4 9i

6 2

10 10

1897

5 11

4 7i

6 11

10

1898

6 4i

4 5

6 9

10

1899

7 7

4 8^

6 1

10

1900

10 9i

5 3Î

6

10 9

1901

9 4^

5 6i

7 7

10

1902

8 2|

5 8i

7 9

10 11

1903

7 8

6 7

7 4

10 9

1904

7 2i

6 10Î

6 10

10 9

1905

6 IH

6 8

6 2

10 7

1906

7 3i

5 9è

6 3

10 7

1907

9

6 IH

6 10

10 7

1908

8 11

6 111

7 4J

10 4i

1909

8 Of

5 7i

7 6i

10 10*

1910

8 2i

5 lOJ

7 6è

11 li

1911

8 1Î

6 lOf

7 6è

10 lOi

1912

9 Of

6 1

7 6i

10 Hi

McCulloch, as his contemporary Mr. Cobden, believed
that England was, and always would remain, the workshop
of the world because this country had then virtually a
monopoly in the production of coal. It has been shown
on another page that this country produced in 1845 twice
as much coal as did all the other countries of the world
combined. By making coal artificially scarce and dear,

242 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future

the British miners, who in their fatal policy have been
supported by short-sighted Governments of either party,
have taken away from the British industries one of the
greatest advantages which they possessed and threaten
to ruin them altogether.

The masters, the men, and the poHticians have probably
been equally responsible for the inefficiency of the British
manufacturing industries and of British mining. British
employers have come to consider business to be a bore, if
not a nuisance. During the last few decades they were
quite satisfied with the condition of their business as long
as they made an income with httle exertion, and they
were ready to leave the supervision and direction of their
affairs to a manager. They took little note of the scientific
and technical progress made in other countries. They
looked upon new methods, upon improved organisation,
upon scientific processes of production, and upon improved
machinery with indifference, if not with dislike. That
indifference to progress was particularly noticeable in the
case of limited liabiHty companies, especially when they
were controlled by amateur directors, or by men who had
only a very small stake in the business. Compared with
the United States, British transport by railway also is
lamentably behindhand and inefficient, and the result is
that American railway freights are far lower than British,
although American railway wages are three times as high
as are British wages.

While British masters were opposed to industrial progress
and to all innovations from conservatism, from indifference,
or from sheer laziness, their men looked upon improved
organisation and machinery with positive and undis-
guised hostility, for they had been taught by their leaders
that their greatest interest lay in a high wage and in a low
output, that every increase in output injured the other
workers and themselves. It seems incredible that such a
foolish fallacy should have been allowed to restrict and
stifle the development of the British industries. Unfor-

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 243

tunately the British workers as a whole have been almost as
hostile to the introduction of modern methods and improved
machinery as they were in the machine-smashing era a
century ago. The world is a great co-operative society.
Men are paid money wages, but as they spend them in
purchasing goods they are in reahty paid in goods, in food,
clothes, &c. A man who produces food is paid in clothes,
and a man who makes clothes has to buy food. If both
produce * scientifically ' as little as possible they will lack
food and clothes, whatever their money wages may be.
If, on the other hand, both produce much there will be
abundance and prosperity. Production determines wages.
Small production and high wages are incompatible. High
production and high wages go hand in hand. In the United
States wages are from two to three times as high as in this
country because production per man is from two to three
times as great ; and as production is from two to three
times as great, goods are very little dearer in the United
States than in England, high wages notwithstanding. The
result is that the very highly paid American workmen
can purchase with their large wages an abundance of food,
clothes, &c., and can save large amounts in addition.

In the lengthy table summarising British and American
production per worker per year printed on pages 236-237,
the gross value of the goods produced is given. Of course,
a worker who converts in a day a piece of leather into a pair
of boots worth fifteen shillings does not really produce
fifteen shillings' worth of goods. To arrive at the real value
of his day's work we must deduct from the value of the
goods made by him the cost of the raw material and the
general factory expenses. By deducting these we arrive at
the net production per worker per week. Details will be
found in the table on page 244. The figures given are
based on the Censuses of Production.

It will be noticed that in the trades enumerated the
American workers produce per week as a rule from two to
three times as much, net, as their British colleagues. As

244 Britain^ s War Finance and Economic Future

no worker can possibly obtain for his work more than the
entire value of his work, it is clear that the British worker
in cardboard boxes, for instance, cannot obtain more
than £1 per week unless he produces more. This table
explains why wages were high in America and relatively low

Net Produce per Worker per Week.

In the United

In tlie United

Kingdom

States

£8. d.

£ s. d.

Boots and shoes . . .

1 7 4

3 10

Cardboard boxes ....

1

2 15 10

Butter and cheese . .

2 8 1

8 3 1

Cement ......

2 10 10

4 17 8

Clothing ......

1 3 11

4 7 4

Cocoa, chocolate and confectionery .

1 12 3

4 18 5

Cotton goods .....

1 10 5

2 13 9

Clocks and watches ....

1 7 9

4 3

Cutlery and tools ....

1 8 1

4 1 6

Dyeing and finishing textiles

1 18 11

4 4 3

Gasworks .....

4 1 1

11 16 7

Firearms and ammunition

2 2 8

4 9 2

Gloves

1 11 2

3 10 9

Hats and caps ....

1 6 10

4 1 10

Hosiery

1 3 6

2 2 8

Leather tanning and dressing .

2 5

4 13 1

Lime

1 13 5

3 2 4

Brewing and malting

6 7 3

19 10 5

Matches

1 13

7 3 I

Paint and varnish ....

3 16 2

12 9 3

Paper

2 2 8

5 3 5

Pens and pencils ....

1 9 8

4 5 9

Printing and publishing .

3 13 1

7 16 11

Railway carriages, &c.

2 7 4

4 5

Silk

1 1 2

3 9 3

Soap and candles ....

2 19 8

11 7 8

in this country, up to the outbreak of the present War, in the
course of which British wages have materially increased.

Unfortunately, the politicians of both parties have very
largely contributed to the backwardness and stagnation
which is noticeable in British business. Desiring to obtain
votes, they have unceasingly flattered both masters and
men. They have told the employers that Great Britain

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 245

was the richest country in the world, and that she was
industrially far ahead of all countries. They have not
only not prevented the workers reducing their output to
the utmost, but they have actually encouraged them in
that suicidal policy by their legislation. Striving after
popularity, after votes, the politicians have thus encouraged
idling on the part of both employers and employees, and
have opposed modern organisation and modem improve-
ments. While encouraging labour to combine and to restrict
production, they have opposed the combination of employers
to increase efficiency. For decades both parties advocated
Free Trade chiefly because that policy furnished an excellent
party cry, furnished votes.

If we wish to ascertain the causes of British industrial
stagnation and relative decline, it is well to listen to the
opinion of foreign experts. Let us in this manner consider
the causes of the relative decline of the British iron industry.
In 1845 two- thirds of the world's iron was produced by
Great Britain. German iron production was then quite
unimportant. At present German iron production is far
ahead of iron production in this country. According to a
valuable German technical handbook, * Gemeinfassliche
Darstellung des Eisenhiittenwesens,' Dusseldorf, 1912, the
production of iron and steel in Great Britain and Germany
has developed as follows ;

_

Iron Production.

Steel Production.

In Germany

In Great Britain

In Germany

In Great Britain

Tons

Tons

Tons

Tons

1865

975,000

4,896,000

100,000

225,000

1870

1,391,000

6,060,000

170,000

287,000

1875

2,029,000

6,432,000

347,000

724,000

1880

2,729,000

7,802,000

624,000

1,321,000

1885

3,687,000

7,369,000

894,000

2,020,000

1890

4,658,000

8,033,000

1,614,000

3,637,000

1895

5,465,000

7,827,000

2,830,000

3,312,000

1900

8,521,000

9,052,000

6,646,000

5,130,000

1905

10,988,000

9,746,000

10,067,000

5,984,000

1910

14,793,000

10,380,000

13,699,000

6,107,000

246 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future

Why has Germany, whose production of h'on and steel
was formerly insignificant, so rapidly and so completely
outstripped Great Britain, which possesses the greatest
natural facilities for producing iron and steel ? The German
handbook mentioned is pubUshed by the Union of German
Iron Masters, a purely professional association. It considers
this question exclusively from a business point of view. It
significantly states :

No land on earth is as favourably situated for iron produc-
tion as is England. Extensive deposits of coal and iron,
easy and cheap purchase of foreign raw materials, a favour-
able geographical position for selling its manufactures,
reinforced by the great economic power of the State, made
at one time the island kingdom industrially omnipotent
throughout the world. Now complaints about constantly
increasing foreign competition become from day to day
more urgent. These are particularly loud with regard to
the growing power of the German iron industry. It is under-
standable that Great Britain finds it unpleasant that Ger-
many's iron industry should have become so strong. How-
ever, Germany's success has been achieved by unceasing
hard work. . . .

The unexampled growth of the German industry began
when, on July, 15, 1879, a moderate Protective Tariff was
introduced. Until then it was impossible for the German
iron industries to flourish. Foreign competition was too
strong. . . .

The German Trade Unions, with their Socialist ideas, are
opposed to progress. If their aspirations should succeed,
the German iron industry would be ruined. An attempt
on the part of the German Trade Unions to increase the
earnings of the skilled workers by limiting the number of
apprentices, the imitation of the policy which has been
followed by the British Trade Unions, would produce a
scarcity of skilled workers in Germany as it has done in
England. The British iron industry should be to us Germans
a warning example. The English Trade Unions with their
short-sighted championship of labour, with their notorious
policy of * ca' canny ' (the limitation of output), and with

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 247

their hostility to technical improvements have seriously
shaken the powerful position of the British iron trade.

Most people see in Trade Unions an organisation which
may become dangerous to the national industries by pro-
moting strikes. Strikes, however, are of comparatively
httle danger. They are like a virulent, but intermittent,
fever. The most pernicious feature of the British Trade
Unions is their policy of Umiting output, and their hostihty
to improvements in organisation and machinery. Their
activity has upon the body economic an influence similar to
a slow fever which leads, almost imperceptibly, to atrophy,
to marasmus, and to death.

The War will be long drawn out. It may cost
£4,000,000,000, £5,000,000,000, and perhaps more. It may
swallow up one-third, and perhaps one-half of the national
capital. It may permanently double, or even more than
double, taxation. I have endeavoured to show by irre-
futable evidence that the British manufacturing industries
and British mining are inefficient, that, by introducing the
best modem methods, British production and British income
can be doubled and trebled. Unfortunately, British agri-
culture is as' inefficient as are the manufacturing industries
and mining. Space does not permit to show in detail how
greatly British agricultural production might be increased.
I have shown in various articles published in The Nineteenth
Century review^ and elsewhere that, on an agricultural
area which is only sixty per cent, larger than that of this
country, Germany produces approximately three times as
much food of every kind as does this country. British and
German agriculture are summarily compared in the tables on
page 248. They are based upon the official statistics.

As the German area under woods and forests is eleven
times as large as the British, and as the German woods
produce far more timber per acre than do the British, the

* See The Nineteenth Century and After, September, October, and
December, 1909.

248 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future

German timber production is probably about twenty times
as large as the British.

The cultivated area of Germany is 60 piBr cent, larger
than the British cultivated area. If agriculture were
equally productive in both countries, Germany should
produce only 60 per cent, more than does the United
Kingdom. However, we find that Germany produced
in 1912 about ten times as much bread-corn as the United

\

United Kingdom

(Jermany

Total area

Cultivated area ....
Woods and forests

Acres

77,721,256

46,931,637

3,069,070

Acres

133,585,000

78,632,139

34,272,841

Production in 1912.

—

United Kingdom

Germany

Tons

Tons

Wheat and rye ....

1,568,700

15,958,900

Barley

1,320,400

3,482,000

Oats .

2,915,900

8,520,200

Potatoes .

5,726,342

50,209,500

Hay .

14,024,222

36,524,915

Cattle

11,914,635

20,182,021

Cows

4,400,816

10,944,283

Horses

Not ascertainable

4,523,059

Pigs .

3,992,549

21,923,707

Sheep .....

28,967,495

5,803,445

Kingdom, about two-and-a-half times as much barley,
about three times as much oats, about nine times as much
potatoes, and about two-and-a-half times as much hay.
In addition to these comparable crops Germany produced
about 2,000,000 tons of sugar from nearly 20,000,000 tons
of beet, and vast quantities of tobacco.

According to the latest comparable statistics, Germany
has about twice as much cattle as this country, about two-
and-a-half times as many milch cows, and about five-and-a-
half times as many pigs. The United Kingdom is superior

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 249

to Germany only in sheep, which live largely on derehct
grass land, and which are of comparatively Httle value,
five sheep being reckoned equal in value to two pigs.

Comparison of the figures given shows that on an agri-
cultural area which is only 60 per cent, larger than that
of this country, Germany produces approximately three
times as large a quantity of animal and vegetable food.
The inferior productiveness of British agriculture is probably
ascribable to the form of its organisation. German agri-
culture is based on freehold ownership, British agriculture
on rent. The sense of property induces German, French,
and other agriculturists to do their best. Competition
for freehold farms drives up their price, and the high price
of land compels Gi3rman and other agriculturists working
under the freehold system to increase agricultural production
to the utmost. In Great Britain farmers rent their farms
at so much a year. The tied-up farms are apt to remain
unchanged from century to century. Fields remain un-
altered, and so does cultivation. British farmers follow
the old routine, and as landowners would make themselves
unpopular by raising the rent, necessity does not provide
the stimulus of agricultural progress which the freehold
system creates in other countries. Largely for psycho-
logical reasons British agriculture is conservative and
stagnant. A century ago Arthur Young wrote : * The
best manure for a field is a high rent.' British landlordism
is largely responsible for British agricultural stagnation.
The introduction of the freehold system would raise the
price of agricultural land and would compel agriculturists
to double and treble their output.

If the facts and figures given in these pages are correct —
I do not think that they can be successfully challenged—
it follows that Great Britain can easily pay for the War
by introducing, in all her industries, the best and most
scientific methods which have been so extraordiuarily suc-
cessful elsewhere.

The tax-collector is, as I have stated before, perhaps

250 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future

the most powerful factor of industrial progress. His
greatly increased demands will compel the employers of
labour to increase production to the utmost, to replace
labour-wasting with the best labour-saving machinery, to
Americanise industry. However, the exertions of the
employers will prove a failure unless the workers can be
convinced that they are ruining not only the national
industries but also themselves by their insane policy of
antagonising all mechanical improvements and of restricting
output. The pohticians in power can do much to enable
employers of all kinds to double and treble production by
pursuing in economic matters no longer a vote-gaining
pohcy, but a business poHcy recommended by the ablest
business men. The expert should replace the amateur
in shaping and directing national economic pohcy. The
War might, and ought to, lead not to Great Britain's
bankruptcy, but to its industrial regeneration. It should
be followed by a revival of industry similar to that which
took place after the Great War a century ago.

The natural resources of the British Empire are un-
limited. They are far greater than those of the United
States. Owing to the War and to the stimulus which high
taxation will provide, a tremendous economic expansion
should take place both in Great Britain and in the
Dominions which might place the British Empire
permanently far ahead of the American Commonwealth.
However, individual unco-ordinated effort will not bring
about such a revival. A united national and imperial
effort under the control of a business Government which
leads and inspires is needed. If pohticians continue their
shiftless hand-to-mouth pohcy, if they continue thinking
mainly of votes and neglecting the permanent interests
of nation and Empire, the efforts of individuals to recreate
the British industries and to give to the British Empire
and to this country a modern economic organisation are
bound to fail.

In view of the colossal war expenditure thrift is urgently

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 251

needed. Unfortunately, the British nation is a very-
improvident nation. This may be seen from the following
figures :

Savings Banks Deposits.

In the United States

In Germany

In the United Kingdom

£

£

£

1880

163,821,000

130,690,000

77,721,000

1890

310,005,000

256,865,000

111,285,000

1900

477,944,000

441,929,000

186,006,000

1907

699,082,000

694,455,000

209,654,000

1912

945,481,000

933,990,000

236,916,000

Between 1880 and 1912 the Savings Banks Deposits
increased in round figures in the United States and in
Germany by £800,000,000, and in the United Kingdom by
only £160,000,000, increasing about sixfold in the United
States, about sevenfold in Germany, and only threefold
in this country. During the five years from 1907 to 1912
they increased in round figures in the United States by
£245,000,000, or 35 per cent. ; in Germany by £240,000,000,
or 35 per cent. ; and in the United Kingdom by a paltry
£25,000,000, or 12 per cent. The record of the Savings
Banks Deposits is particularly humiliating for this country
if we remember that the German and American workers
have thousands of miUions in freehold land and houses,
co-operative societies, &c.

Of the enormous sums spent upon the War the bulk is
expended in Great Britain, and goes, with comparatively
unimportant deductions — the profits made by employers
and middlemen — ^from the coffers of the well-to-do into
the pockets of the working masses in the form of wages.
The Government has exhorted the people repeatedly to
be thrifty, and it has enforced thrift upon the moneyed
by very greatly increasing direct taxation. The well-to-
do are no doubt living more thriftily than they did before
the War. The working masses are far more prosperous

252 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future

than they have ever been. Wages have risen enormously ;
but unfortunately the masses save little. They spend
their vastly increased earnings largely on worthless amuse-
ments and foolish luxuries. Owing to the wholesale trans-
ference of capital from the rich to the workers taxation
should be remodelled.^ It is true that a century ago, in
the war against France, practically the whole of the increased
taxation was placed on the shoulders of the opulent. How-
ever, at that time wages remained low during the war.
Hence the workers could not contribute much to its costs.
Now the position is different. Millions which are urgently
required for defence are wasted recklessly by the masses.
Universal thrift is needed. The Government should, with-
out delay, increase thrift among the masses partly by taxing
worthless amusements, and partly by organising thrift
among the workers. Here, also, individual attempts
can achieve Httle. The workers must be taught that they
should now put by a competence upon which they will
receive unprecedentedly high interest, especially as great
and widespread distress may follow the War. Employers
throughout the country should be prevailed upon by the
Government to give on the Government's behalf premiums
for savings. All employers should be requested to induce
their workers to put as large as possible a portion of their
increased wages into War stock. Through the employers
the Government should search out the workers in the
factories and induce them to put by money week by week
to their benefit and to that of the nation as a whole.

On November 2, 1915, Mr. Asquith stated in the House
of Commons :

The financial position to-day is serious. The extent to
which we here in this country are buying goods abroad in
excess of our exports is more than £30,000,000 per month,
against an average of about £11,000,000 per month before
the War ; and at the same time we are making advances to

^ Many of the reforms advocated in the following pages were introduced
since their publication in TJie Nineteenth Century review.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 253

our Allies and to others, which were estimated by my right
hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his Budget
speech to amount to a total during the current financial
year, to say no more of what is to come, to £423,000,000. . . .
This is a burden which, rich as we are, resourceful as we
g<re, we cannot go on discharging unless there is on the part
of the Government, as well as on the part of individuals,
the most strict and stringent rule of economy, the avoid-
ance of unnecessary expenditure, the curtailment of charges
which under normal conditions we should think right and
necessary, and, if I may use a homely expression, cutting
our coat according to the cloth with which we have to make
it. . . . I would once more say with all the emphasis of
which I am capable, that we cannot sustain the burden
which this great War has laid upon us unless as indi-
viduals, as classes, as a community, and as a Government,
we make and are prepared to make far greater sacrifices
than we have hitherto done in the direction of retrenchment
and economy.

Mr. Asquith thus recommended on November 2, 1915,
retrenchment and economy in the most emphatic language.
He informed the nation that thrift and the avoidance of
unnecessary expenditure was most necessary on the part
of individuals and the nation as a whole. Yet the nation
Hves approximately as luxuriously as ever. The well-
to-do, whose income has been greatly reduced by the War
and by additional taxation, have curtailed their expenditure
to some extent, but scarcely sufficiently, while the masses
of the people spend far more on luxuries than they ever
did before. Theatres, restaurants, music-halls, picture
theatres, and pubUc-houses are nightly crowded, and
working men who are reaping a golden harvest purchase
for their family gramophones, silk dresses and furs, pianos
which are often only used for show, &c. Most people
undoubtedly wish to save, but they spend very freely,
perhaps not so much from self-indulgence as from mis-
placed kindness of heart. Men and women hesitate to
reduce their expenditure on luxuries because such reduction

254 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future

would inflict injury on the providers of luxuries. The
thousands of millions which will be required for the conduct
of the War cannot be provided by saving the odd pence.
They can be found only by the wholesale reduction of
expenditure on luxuries, by putting the providers of the
luxuries out of business. An able worker or business man
can always adjust himself to changed circumstances.
Dismissed servants will be able to find more useful work
in shops and factories. Dismissed gardeners can use
their experience in agriculture to better advantage to the
nation. Manufacturers of luxuries and their workers,
and shopkeepers who deal in luxuries, can change the
character of their trade. It is impossible to carry on
* business as usual * and to provide the untold miUions
needed for the War.

If we compare Great Britain's imports of luxuries
during the first seven months of 1914 when there was peace,
with the first seven months of 1915 when she was at war,
we find the following :

Importé during Seven Months up to July

31.

1914

1915

£

£

Poultry and game ....

797,492

477,683

Tinned sardines

455,041

608,231

Grapes .

109,336

40,103

Almonds .

298,101

308,934

Oranges .

1,693,206

1,982,823

Cocoa manufactures

937,785

1,385,162

Currants

331,114

543,895

Raisins .

181,496

417,417

Fruit preserved in sugar

679,776

835,527

Confectionery .

82,817

81,670

Ornamental feathers .

1,043,126

462,082

Fresh flowers .

206,837

163,306

Ivory

78,178

42,246

Cinema films, &c.

1,490,636

985,087

Watches and parts .

871,611

673,221

Silk manufactures .

9,824,057

8,537,989

Glacé kid

921,648

876,193

Gloves ....

962,892

434,149

Motor cars, and parts

5,240,819

4,249,976

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 255

The few items in this list are representative. Space
does not permit to analyse the imports of luxuries in greater
detail. Production has been thrown out of gear throughout
the world. Hence the imports of Great Britain have
been reduced largely because the exporting nations could
not export as usual. Many of the luxuries imported into
Great Britain come from France, Germany, Austria-Hungary,
Italy, and Turkey. A glance at this list shows that in
some instances the imports of luxuries have fallen severely,
perhaps because the exporting countries could not send
the goods. In other cases the imports of luxuries are as
large as usual or even larger than usual. The importation
of almonds, oranges, chocolates, currants, raisins, fruit
preserved in sugar, greatly increased notwithstanding the
War, while the imports of manufactured silks, confectionery,
flowers, watches, and motor cars and parts diminished only
sUghtly. If the consumption of imported luxuries was
very much as usual, we may safely estimate that the con-
sumption of home-made luxuries was also very much as
usual.

Luxurious expenditure cannot easily be checked by
voluntary effort, but it can easily be diminished by legisla-
tion. Amusements, especially those of the worthless kind,
might be taxed, and the importation of foreign luxuries
can be stopped completely, or almost completely, by
prohibitive enactments. A short while ago the Govern-
ment explained in the House of Commons that in blockading
Germany foreign luxuries were not stopped because their
importation, while not increasing Germany's military
strength, weakened and damaged her financial position.
One of the greatest financial problems for England consists
in paying for her enormous imports. The most obvious
step for improving Great Britain's financial position consists
in ruthlessly cutting off the importation of all imported
luxuries. The import duties put on motor cars, cine-
matograph films, &c., are a small step in the right direction.
Import duties should without delay be put on all imported

256 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future

luxuries, and even on those manufactured necessities
which can be produced in this country. The question of
fiscal purism, the question of Free Trade and Tariff Eeform,
questions of party politics and of vote-catching, should
not be allowed to undermine the financial position of this
country at a time when it fights for its very life.

The War is costing Great Britain about £2,000,000,000
a year. It will probably before long cost considerably
more. This country will, as I have endeavoured to show,
be able to make up, and more than make up, for her War
expenditure, however large it may be, by vastly increasing
production, by reorganising, by Americanising, her industries.
But the victory of the Entente Powers obviously depends
very largely on Britain's financial strength. The immediate
need of the country is therefore labour and thrift. Strenuous
labour and careful thrift are required to tide this nation
over the anxious months of war which will determine
whether the world will become German or Anglo-Saxon,
subject or ^ free.

CÏÏAPTEK VIII

Britain's coming industrial supremacy ^

It seems likely that the War will swallow approximately one-
half of Great Britain's national wealth. So far it has cost
this country more than £3,000,000,000. Before it is over
the British war expenditure may be increased to
£5,000,000,000 or £6,000,000,000. To that gigantic sum
will have to be added pensions for incapacitated soldiers,
war widows, and orphans, and compensation for losses
caused by the War, which together may require another
£1,000,000,000. If, finally, we make due allowance for the
financial value of the precious lives lost it will appear that
the War will absorb about £7,500,000,000, a sum which is
approximately equal to one-half of Great Britain's national
wealth.

Opinions as to the economic consequences of the War are
divided. Some assert that the gigantic losses incurred will
industrially cripple Great Britain and all Europe and that,
they will greatly strengthen the industrial and financial
predominance of the United States. They tell us that
Great Britain will decUne economically and politically,
and become another Belgium ; that the United States will
become the leading Anglo-Saxon nation for the same reason
for which Carthage became the heir to the world empire
created by Phoenicia, her mother State ; that Washington
will eventually become the capital of a great Empire ; that
war-ruined and pauperised Europe will become practically
an American dependency ; that the world will become

* The Nineteenth Century and After, October, 1916.

\ 257 s

258 Britain's Coming Industrial Supremacy

American. That view is widely held on the other side of
the Atlantic, where it is causing lively satisfaction. Other
people vaguely believe that Great Britain is * the richest
country in the world/ and that the United Kingdom can
easily bear the gigantic financial burden which the World
War has laid upon its shoulders. In considering a great
economic problem the doctrinaire turns to theory while the
practical statesman applies to experience for guidance.
Experience is no doubt the safer guide. Let us then con-
sider the problem of the economic future from the practical,
and particularly from the British, point of view.

The widely held opinion that Great Britain is * the richest
country in the world * is erroneous. According to the
* World Almanac and Encyclopedia ' of 1916, the American
equivalent of ' Whitaker's Almanack,' the national wealth
of the British Isles, the British Empire, and the United States
is as follows :

£

United Kingdom 17,000,000,000

British Empire 26,000,000,000

United States . . . " . . . 37,547,800,000

From the same source we learn that the insurances in
force came to £6,281,120,800 in the United States and only
to £1,174,042,400 in Great Britain.

According to the American estimate the wealth of the
United States is considerably more than twice as great as
that of the United Kingdom, and is nearly 50 per cent, larger
than that of the British Empire as a whole. As, during
recent years, American wealth has been growing about
three times as fast as British wealth, there is apparently
much reason for believing that, owing to the heavy handicap
imposed upon the United Kingdom by the War, the United
States will in future outpace economic Great Britain at a
faster and more furious rate than ever.

Let us glance at the foundations of America's vast
wealth.

The United States are infinitely richer than Great

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 259

Britain because they possess a greater population and far
greater developed natural resources. While Great Britain has
47,000,000 inhabitants the United States have 105,000,000
people. In man-power the United States are more than
twice as strong as the United Kingdom. Only 6 per cent,
of the inhabitants of the world are Americans, yet among
the nations of the earth the United States are the largest
producers of wheat, maize, oats, tobacco, cotton, timber,
cattle, pigs, coal, petroleum, iron and steel, copper, silver,
zinc, lead, aluminium, woollen and cotton goods, leather,
silk, &c. The relatively small number of Americans produce
one- fifth of the world's wheat, gold and silver, one- fourth of
the world's zinc, one- third of the world's oats, iron ore, pig
iron, and lead, two-fifths of the world's steel, coal, and
tobacco, one-half of the world's aluminium, three-fifths of
the world's copper, two-thirds of the world's cotton, pe-
troleum, and maize. * God's own country,' as the Americans
call it, has indeed been blessed.

The United States are far ahead of all other nations not
only in developed and exploited natural resources but also in
mechanical outfit. The engine-power of the United States
is vastly superior to that of Great Britain and of the British
Empire. According to the last British and American
Censuses of Production the manufacturing industries of
the United States employ 18,675,376 horse-powers, while
the British industries employ only 8,083,841. I have shown
in the previous chapter that per thousand workers the
American industries employ from two to three times as
many horse-powers as do the identical British industries.
An even greater superiority in the employment of labour-
saving machinery will be found in mining, agriculture,
inland transport, &c. Besides, the United States have avail-
able in their water-falls at least 40,000,000 horse-powers,
of which, in 1908, 5,356,680 horse-powers were developed,
while the water-powers possessed by the United Kingdom
are quite insignificant. America's superiority in mechanical

260 Britain's Coming Industrial Supremacy

outfit may perhaps best be gauged from the following
remarkable figures :

United Kingdom
British Empire
All Europe
United States .
The World

Miles of Railway.

Miles
23,441
134,131
207,432
264,732
665,964

It is noteworthy that the 105,000,000 Americans have
more miles of railway than the 440,000,000 citizens of the
British Empire and the 600,000,000 inhabitants of all
Europe. Several private railway systems, such as the
Pennsylvania System, the Harriman System, the Gould
System, and the Moore-Eeid System, have about as many
miles of railway as has the whole of the United Kingdom,
while the mileage of the Vanderbilt System is actually 10
per cent, larger than that of the United Kingdom. Great
Britain has 780,512 telephones, while the United States
have no less than 9,552,107 telephones.

National wealth is either developed or undeveloped,
either exploited or latent. The statistics as to the wealth
of nations given refer, of course, only to the former, not to
the latter, for the latent wealth is not susceptible to statistical
measurement. America owes her vast wealth not to the
fact that she has exceptionally great natural resources,
but to the fact that her natural resources have been exploited
with the utmost energy. That may be gauged from the
figures of American engine and water power and from the
railway and telephone statistics given. Measured by
undeveloped and unex'ploited resources, by latent wealth,
the British Empire, Eussia, and perhaps China also, are
far richer than the United States. The United States,
including Alaska, Hawaii, and Porto Eico, have an area
of 3,574,658 square miles, while the British Empire, not
including the Colonies conquered from Germany, com-
prises no less than 12,808,994 square miles. Providence has
distributed its favours fairly evenly. There is no reason

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 261

for believing that the United States have been given an
unduly great share of the good things of this world. We
may therefore conclude that the British Empire, though
actually much poorer, is potentially much richer than the
United States.

In developed and exploited resources the United States
are undoubtedly far ahead of the British Empire, but in
undeveloped and unexfloited resources the British Empire
is undoubtedly far ahead of the United States. It is wrong
to say that Great Britain is the richest country in the world,
but it may safely be asserted that, by its extent and natural
resources, the British Empire, which spreads through all
climes, possesses the greatest potential national wealth in
the world. It is therefore obvious that the incomparable
latent riches of the Empire may be converted into actual
wealth and power, provided they are vigorously and wisely
exploited.

Wealth depends after all not so much on the possession
of great natural resources as on the action of men. Two
centuries ago wealthy North America nourished only a
few thousand roving Indians and a small number of white
settlers and traders. An Indian, a Chinaman, or a Kafi&r
who, engaged at his home in agriculture or in manufacturing
in the literal meaning of the word, produces perhaps a
shillingsworth of wealth per day, will learn in a few weeks
to produce thirty or forty shillingsworth of wealth per day
if transferred to Great Britain or the United States. Land
and natural resources are limited, but wealth production by
the employment of the most modern methods is absolutely
unlimited. In certain industries a single man can produce
now more wealth than could a thousand men a century
ago. Yet fifty years hence men may look with the same
surprise at the automatic loom or the steam-hammer with
which we look now at the hand-loom and the hand-forge.

The British Empire resembles the United States in
many respects. Both extend through all cUmes. Both
possess vast and thinly populated areas endowed with

262 Britain's Coming Industrial Supremacy

the greatest agricultural, sylvan, mineral, industrial, and
commercial possibilities. In both only a few small patches
are reserved to the manufacturing industries. In view of
the resemblance of the United States and the British Empire
it is clear that Britain may learn much from the example
set by the Great Republic in the development of its natural
resources. Moreover, half a century ago the United States
passed through an experience similar to that through which
Great Britain and the Empire are passing at present. The
Civil War of 1861-1865, as I have shown in the chapter
entitled * How America became a Nation in Arms,' de-
stroyed about a million lives at a time when the United
States had less than 85,000,000 white and coloured in-
habitants, and cost altogether about £2,000,000,000. In
1860 the national wealth of the United States amounted,
according to the Census, to only £3,231,923,214. It
follows that the Civil War cost a sum equivalent to two-
thirds of America's national wealth. Yet the war did not
impoverish the country, but, incredible as it may sound,
greatly enriched it. I shall endeavour to show that the
Civil War created the impetus which made the United
States the richest nation in the world, and that the present
War will vastly benefit the allied nations, and especially
the British Empire, provided they will profit by the great
and invaluable lesson furnished by the United States.

In the tenth volume of the excellent * Life of Abraham
Lincoln,' written by Messrs. Nicolay and Hay, we read :
* The expense of the war to the Union (the Northern States)
over and above the ordinary expenditure was about
$3,250,000,000 ; to the Confederacy (the Southern States)
less than half that amount, about $1,500,000,000.' Accord-
ing to the latest accounts the Civil War pensions, which
required $164,887,941 in 1915, have hitherto absorbed
$4,614,643,266, or nearly £1,000,000,000, and the pay-
ments will go on for many years to come. If we add to
these gigantic figures the increased local expenditure in
the United States during the war, the valuable property

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 263

destroyed in the fighting, and the financial value of almost
a million lives lost, it will be seen that the war has cost
the United States vastly more than £2,000,000,000. The
war absolutely ruined the wealthy cotton, sugar, and tobacco
industries of the South, pauperised the Southern States,
led to the destruction of innumerable farms and buildings
in the war zone, destroyed America's shipping, closed the
Southern markets to the commerce of the North and
seriously hampered agriculture throughout the Union
because millions of able-bodied men were drafted into the
Army. How disastrously American agriculture was affected
by the Civil War can best be seen from the Livestock
Statistics, which give the following picture :

Farm Animal».

-

OatUe

Horses

Moles

Pigs

Sheep

1860 .
1867 .

26,616,019
20,079,729

6,249,174
5,401,263

1,161,148
822,386

33,612,867
24,693,534

22,471,276
39,385,386

Owing to the necessity of war agriculture in general
had to be largely neglected. Discrimination was necessary
between the essential and non-essential. The vast demand
for wool for uniforms made necessary an increase in sheep.
Their number grew during the war by 17,000,000. Other
animals had to be neglected. Hence the number of cattle
declined by 5,500,000, horses dechned by 850,000, mules
by 350,000, and pigs by 9,000,000. While production and
trade suffered in many directions, national expenditure and
taxation increased at an unprecedented and almost incredible
rate. The financial burden caused by the war may be
summarised in the fewest possible figures as follows :

National Expenditure

Cost of Army

Cost of Navy

I860
1865

Dois.
63,200,876
1,295,099,290

Dois.
16,472,203
1,030,690,400

Dois.

11,514,650

122,617,434

264 Britairûs Corning Industrial Supremacy

—

PubUc Debt

Annual Interest on Debt

1860

1865

Dois.
59,964,402.01
2,674,815,856.76

Dois.
3,443,687
137,742,617

In five short years the national expenditure of the
United States increased a little more than twenty-fold,
chiefly owing to the cost of the army, which increased more
than sixty-fold. During the same period the pubhc debt
and the interest payable on it grew more than forty-fold.
To provide for this colossal financial burden the American
national revenue was increased from $41,476,299 in 1861
to $112,094,946 in 1863, to $322,031,158 in 1865, and to
$519,949,564 in 1866. In five years it grew almost thirteen-
fold. However, notwithstanding the total ruin of the South,
and the hampering influence of the war in the North,
the national wealth of the United States grew at a pro-
digious rate between 1860 and 1870, the Census years.
According to the Censuses the real and personal estate of
the Americans compared in the two years as follows :

National Wealth

Population

Wealth per Head

I860 .
1870 .

Dois.
16,159,616,068
30,068,518,507

31,443,321
38,558,371

Dois.
613.92

779.83

Of the ten years under consideration four years, except
a few days, were occupied by the devastating war. Yet the
national wealth of the United States almost doubled during
the decade, and the wealth per head of population increased
by almost 60 per cent. This is particularly marvellous in
view of the fact that large districts of the United States
were far poorer in 1870 than in 1860, for the enormous
ravages caused in the South could not quickly be repaired.
By * great divisions ' the wealth per head was changed.
This change is shown in the tables on page 265.

It will be noticed that wealth per head increased at a

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 265

moderate rate in the North-Central and Western States,
which are chiefly devoted to agriculture, while it increased
at an enormous rate in the North Atlantic Division, the
principal seat of the manufacturing industries and com-
merce. On the other hand wealth per head dechned disas-

United States

N. Atlantic
States

N. Central
States

S. Atlantic
States

I860 ....
1870 ....

Dois.
614
780

Dels.
628
1243

Dels.
436
736

Dois.
637
384

South Central States

Western States

1860

1870

Dois.
698
334

Dels.
434
843

trously in the South Atlantic and the South-Central Divisions,
the home of the defeated slave-holding States.

As the comparisons given are perhaps a httle too summary
it will be worth while to compare the wealth of some of the
more important States in 1860 and 1870. According to the
United States Censuses their wealth has changed very
unequally. Statistics will be found on page 266.

While during the decade the wealth of the Southern
States shrunk to one-half and even to one-third notwith-
standing six years of peace, the wealth of the Northern
States increased prodigiously. That of Illinois, Massa-
chusetts, and Pennsylvania grew two-and-a-half-fold,
that of New York increased three-and-a-half-fold, and
the wealth of the ' new ' agricultural States in the West
grew even more quickly. The wealth of Kansas increased
sixfold, and that of Nebraska nearly eightfold. During
the decade 1860-1870 the wealth of the manufacturing
States and of the wheat-growing States of the Far West
grew at an unprecedented rate. The simultaneous develop-
ment of industry and agriculture during the decade 1860-

266 BritairCs Coming Industrial Supremacy

1870 coincided with, and was chiefly due to, the American
Civil War. That is recognised by many scientists and writers
who have studied that period. Mr. E. L. Bogart, in his
* Economic History of the United States/ wrote :

The Civil War, by practically cutting off foreign inter-
course, immensely hastened the growth of domestic indus-

Southern States.

1860

1870

Alabama

Georgia .....

Louisiana

Mississippi. ....
South Carolina ....
Texas

Dois.
495,237,078
645,895,237
602,118,586
607,324,911
548,138,754
365,200,614

Dois.
201,855,871
268,167,207
323,125,666
200,197,345
208,146,989
169,062,542

Northern States.

I860

1870

Dois.

Dois.

Connecticut ....

444,274,114

774,631,524

Illinois .

871,860,282

2,121,680,579

Indiana .

528,835,371

1,268,180,643

Iowa

247,338,265

717,644,750

Kansas .

31,327,895

188,892,014

Massachusetts

815,237,413

2,132,148,741

Minnesota

52,294,413

228,907,590

Missouri .

501,214,398

1,284,922,877

Nebraska.

9,131,398

69,277,483

New York

1,843,338,517

0,500,841,264

Ohio

1,173,898,422

2,235,430,300

Pennsylvania

1,416,501,848

3,803,340,112

Wisconsin ....

273,671,668

702,307,329

tries. The industrial revolution thus inaugurated has been
compared with that in England one hundred years before.
It certainly marks a turning-point in the economic develop-
ment of the country as distinct as that in political life and
more significant in its effects than the earlier industrial
revolution, introduced in this country fifty years before by
the restrictive period.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 267

Another American writer, Katharine Coman, stated in
her ' Industrial History of the United States ' :

The war demands, coupled with the protective tariff,
induced an extraordinary activity in every department of
business enterprise. Universal buoyancy and unbounded
confidence in the future rendered it easy to borrow money
at home and abroad. European capitalists invested readily
in the United States securities, railroad bonds and mining
stock, and the resources of the country were exploited as
never before.

Theodor Vogelstein wrote in his book * Organisations-
formen der Eisenindustrie und Textilindustrie in England
und Amerika ' (Leipzig, 1910) :

The manufacturing industries of the North came out
of the war in a splendid condition. The enormous exertions
made during the struggle, by which more than a milUon of
the best workers were withdrawn from economic life, pro-
moted the replacing of human labour by machine labour
to an unusual extent. The necessity of paying interest
on the large loans raised abroad naturally stimulated very
greatly the export trade. On the other hand, imports,
except of such goods as were required for the army, suffered.
Lastly, the war brought with it a system of rigid protection,
of a protection more severe than any American manufacturer
would have thought possible in his wildest dreams. One of
the greatest errors which one may encounter over and over
again, even in scientific publications, is the idea that rigid
American protectionism was created in 1890. ... It is
no mere coincidence that 1866, when Congress began to
abolish internal war taxes, and left unaltered the corre-
sponding import duties, saw the rise of the first American
Trust.

When hostilities began between the North and the South,
the United States had only a few thousand troops, and were
utterly unprepared for the gigantic struggle. The vastness
of the conflict, the employment of millions of soldiers,
naturally created an enormous demand for weapojis, and

268 Britain'^ s Coming Industrial Supremacy

munitions, vehicles, railways, telegraphs, and manufactures
of every kind. As the American foreign trade was very
seriously restricted through reasons which will be discussed
further on, and as the majority of the able-bodied men were
withdrawn from the economic activities and enrolled in
the army, a greatly reduced number of workers in field and
factory had suddenly to provide an immensely increased
output. The necessity of vastly increasing individual
production compelled employers to introduce the most
perfect and the most powerful labour-saving machinery
available both in agriculture and in industry. Professor
E. D. Fite wrote in his excellent book * Social and Industrial
Conditions in the North during the Civil War ' :

Three things saved the harvest : the increased use of
labour-saving machinery, the work of women in the fields,
and the continued influx of new population.

Up to this time the use of reaping machines had been
confined almost entirely to some of the large farms of the
West. . . . Grain was generally sown by hand. These
processes required the work of many men, so that when the
able-bodied began to go to war, with large harvests left to
garner, new methods and new implements were absolutely
necessary if the crops were to be saved.

Immediately interest in labour-saving machinery and
in the relative merits of the different machines became
widespread, and next to enthusiasm over abounding crops
in time of war was the most striking characteristic of the
world of agriculture. . . . The old apathy was gone. The
war suddenly had popularised methods of cultivation in
which the agricultural papers had striven in vain for a decade
to arouse interest.

The Scientific American of February 12, 1864, stated :

The total number of mowers manufactured increased
from 35,000 in 1862 and 40,000 in 1863 to 70,000 in 1864 ;
estimating the number for 1861 at 20,000, this would make
the number for the four years 165,000, compared with 85,000
the number made in the preceding ten or twelve years.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 269

Owing to the great improvements in agricultural
machinery, agricultural production increased rapidly, and
the losses caused by the war were soon made good. I have
shown in the beginning of this chapter that between 1860
and 1867 the number of cattle, horses, mules, and pigs de-
creased very severely owing to the war. Between 1867
and 1877 the number of farm animals increased rapidly, as
follows :

Farm Animals.

-

Cattle

Horses

Mules

Pigs

Sheep

1867
1877

20,079,725
29,216,900

5,401,263
10,155,400

822,386
1,443,500

24,693,534
28,077,100

39,385,386
35,804,200

The great improvement in agricultural apphances and
machinery enabled a few men to do the work of many.
The steam plough, the seed-casting machine, the reaper,
the self-binder, and the railway made possible the opening
and the vigorous exploitation of the rich agricultural plains
of the West, notwithstanding the scarcity and the dearness
of labour and the inaccessibihty of the far-away interior.
But for these machines the enormous agricultural wealth of
the North American prairies would still be unutiHsed.

The Civil War gave a powerful stimulus to the develop-
ment of the American railway system, especially as transport
by the ^Mississippi was interrupted by the war, for the
mouth of that mighty river was in the hands of the rebels.
Professor Fite has told us :

The Mississippi formerly had been the outlet, carrying the
grain and other produce to New Orleans, whence it was
distributed in all directions. After the war closed the river,
if the railroads had not been in existence, the West would
have been isolated without a market ; and it was believed
by some that, rather than lose this, the section would have
followed its market into secession. . . .

The new routes of trade to the Atlantic coast were

270 Britain's Coming Industrial Supremacy

developed rapidly indeed, thanks to the wonderful increase of
the crops even more than to the closing of the river. . . .
The receipts and shipments of the port of Chicago grew
apace, and were typical of the growth of the new routes
eastward. Starting in 1838 with a shipment of 78 bushels
of wheat, and gradually thereafter increasing her shipments,
but never before 1860 sending out over 10,000,000 bushels
of wheat and wheat flour, this new city in each year of the
war shipped on the average 20,000,000 bushels of wheat
and wheat flour ; her yearly corn exports, in the past never
above 11,000,000 bushels, now averaged 25,000,000 bushels.

The closing of the Mississippi route, the abundance of the
harvests and the vast transport requirements of the Army
very greatly increased the pressure of railway traffic. It
could be handled only by greatly increasing the efficiency
of the railroads. Necessity thus led to the introduction of
scientific railway management. Hitherto railways had
been built haphazard by enterprising capitalists. Unre-
stricted individualism and the desire to hamper competitors
had led to the introduction of at least eight different gauges,
which varied from 4 feet 8J inches to 6 feet. The war
forced the railways to combine and to adopt a single gauge.

The standardisation of railways was gradually evolved.
An Imperial railway system was created which found its
highest expression in the Interstate Commerce Commission
of 1887. The United States have private railways, but an
Imperial railway system owing to the supervision and control
exercised by the Interstate Commerce Commission through-
out the Union. During the war the weak iron rails, which
rapidly wore out, vere replaced by heavier iron and especially
by steel rails. Stations, goods yards, and sidings were
enlarged. MiHtary and economic pressure made the rapid
extension of the railway system indispensable. Notwith-
standing the war the length of the American railways was
increased from 30,626 miles in 1860 to 36,801 miles in 1866,
or by 20 per cent. In consequence of the vast increase in
railway business and of the improvements in handling

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 271

the traffic which were introduced the American railways
flourished greatly during the war. The American Railway
Becord of January 8, 1863, wrote, in reviewing the year
1862 :

The year 1862 will ever be remembered in railroading
as one of the most prosperous that has ever been known.
The railroads never earned so much in the whole course
of their existence as they have during this much-dreaded
year.

The American Railroad Journal of January 2, 1864,
declared in reviewing the business of the year 1863 :

The railway system has greatly flourished the past year.
The Companies have got out of debt or largely diminished
their indebtedness, their earnings are increasing, their
dividends have become regular and inviting. The past
year has been, therefore, the most prosperous ever known
to American railways.

Modem war is carried on by weapons and by machines.
It is fought quite as much in the factory as in the field. The
Civil War, while greatly promoting the development of
America's agriculture and of the American railways, had
not unnaturally the most far-reaching and the most strik-
ing effects upon the American manufacturing industries.
Without their help the North could not possibly have won
the war. Before 1861 the United States manufactured
little. They imported vast quantities of manufactured
goods of every kind from Europe, chiefly from Great Britain.
Therefore, when the war broke out the Americans found that
they lacked not only weapons and ammunition but wool
and cloth for uniforms, boots, &c., as well.

The heavy cost of imported goods, the unfavourable
position of the American exchange, and the disincHnation
to buy the commodities needed at an extortionate price
and a ruinous exchange in Europe made necessary not only
the rapid creation of war industries but that of general

272 Britain's Coming Industrial Supremacy

manufacturing industries as well. The war had totally
disorganised America's foreign trade. It had stopped the
exports of cotton, tobacco, and sugar which were produced
in the revolted South, with which foreign imports were very
largely paid for. How seriously America's foreign trade
had been affected thereby may be seen by the fact that
American exports shrank from $333,576,057 in 1860 to only
$166,029,303 in 1865. They declined to one-half. During
the same period imports were reduced from $353,616,119
to $238,745,580. However, soon after the war the American
export trade expanded rapidly.

In view of the total disorganisation of the foreign trade
and of the foreign exchange the United States were no longer
able to buy manufactured goods in Europe and to pay for
them chiefly with cotton, sugar, and tobacco. Necessity
forced them to become self-supporting as far as possible.
To encourage the American industries to produce those
goods which hitherto were imported from abroad the
American Government took a step comparable to that
which the British Government took during the present War.
With the intention of discouraging imports heavy taxes were
imposed upon imported goods. The change effected in
America's Fiscal Policy, owing to the stress of war, may be
seen at a glance by the following table :

1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1912

Customs Receipts

Daties per cent,
ad valorem

39,582,126

18-84

49,056,398

3619

69,059,642

32-62

102,316,153

36-69

84,928,261

47-56

179,046,652

48-33

176,417,811

46-67

164,464,600

48-63

180,048,427

47-22

304,899,360

40-12

It will be noticed that the ad valorem duties were twice

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 273

as high in 1862 as in 1861, and that they were considerably
increased in 1865. Since then import duties have on an
average been only little below 50 per cent, ad valorem on
dutiable articles. Only during the last few years has the
duty declined to an average of about 40 per cent.

Before the Civil War iron and iron ware had been one of
the principal American imports. The Civil War laid the
foundations of the gigantic iron and steel industry of the
United States which is at present by far the largest in the
world. Professor Fite wrote :

The progress of manufactures involving the raw materials
of the mines was marked. Iron was used in all branches of
manufacturing, and its growing consumption was an indica-
tion of general industrial progress. ... Of all the flourish-
ing centres of iron manufacturing Pittsburg was the largest ;
here in one year six extensive iron mills were erected, and in
the last year and a half of the war $26,000,000 worth of
iron and steel were manufactured.

The report of the American Iron and Steel Association
of 1871 stated :

In 1860 205,000 tons of iron rails were made in the
United States, the largest amount ever made in any one
year up to that time ; 187,000 tons were made in 1861,
213,000 tons in 1862, 275,000 tons in 1863, 335,000 tons
in 1864, and 356,000 tons in 1865. In 1853 importations
reached 358,000 tons, the highest figure reached in the
'fifties ; 146,000 tons were imported in 1860, 89,000 tons in
1861, 10,000 tons in 1862, 20,000 tons in 1863, 146,000 tons
in 1864, and 63,000 tons in 1865.

The Civil War was instrumental in creating the gigantic
American clothing and boot and shoe industries. Professor
Fite tells us :

At first uniforms were very scarce ; in the various
United States garrisons, when the war came, there were
only enough on hand to accommodate the regular army of
13,000 men, and but few factories were fitted for making

274 Britain's Coming Industrial Supremacy

cloth for military purposes. . . . When the War Depart-
ment made heavy purchases of army cloth in England and
France in order to meet the crisis, the almost savage cry arose
in some quarters : * Patronise home industries.' . . .

In the succeeding years the woollen factories were able
to cope with the situation, and no more complaints were
heard ; the millions of soldiers were clad in products of the
country's own mills. The annual military consumption
of wool in the height of the war was 75,000,000 pounds, for
domestic purposes 138,000,000 pounds more, a total con-
sumption for all purposes of over 200,000,000 pounds, against
85,000,000 pounds in times of peace.

The progress of the woollen factories, most of them
located in New York and New England, was enormous ;
every mill was worked to its fullest capacity, many working
night and day, Sunday included. In all 2000 sets of new
cards were erected, representing many new mills. As the
report of the New York Chamber of Commerce said, the
progress seemed scarcely credible. . . .

The ready-made clothing industry was as necessary for
clothing the army as were the sheep farms and the woollen
mills. . . . The trade thus created did supplant importa-
tions from the East side of London. By the middle of the
war the importations ceased, and then the country succeeded
in clothing its army of over a million men almost entirely
by native industry, not only furnishing a large percentage
of the wool for manufacturing all the cloth, but making the
uniforms.

Much of this success was doubtless due to the sewing
machine then but recently invented. . . . The manufacture
of clothing was greatly stimulated. Men's shirts, which
required fourteen hours and twenty minutes for making
by hand, by the machine could be made in one hour and
sixteen minutes. . . .

The shoe industry likewise benefited by the sewing
machine ; in fact, was converted by it from a system
of household manufacture to the modern factory system.

During the Civil War British cotton thread, which
hitherto had had practically a monopoly in the United States;

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 275

was replaced by American cotton thread. In the words of
Professor Fite :

Cotton thread continued to be used, with the more or
less complete substitution of American-made for the English-
made product, which had been almost the only thread sold
before the war. Through the influence of the heavy war
tariff three-fourths of the market came to be supplied
from home. The advance in the price of * Coats,' which
finally reached four times its old value, created a chance
for American manufacturers, which was readily seized upon,
and a vast new industry sprang up ; the Willimantic
Company, with a new plant worth $1,000,000, Green
& Daniels, and other firms appeared. At Newark, New
Jersey, an English firm built a very large plant to manu-
facture their product on this side of the tariff wall and thus
reap its advantages.

The huge modern meat-packing industry of Chicago also
was greatly stimulated, if not created, by thé war. Professor
Fite wrote :

Progress in hog-packing was centred chiefly in Chicago.
The industry here had been progressing slowly for almost
thirty years, when suddenly, as the result of the unusual
transportation conditions arising out of the closing of the
Mississippi Eiver, the yearly output rose from 270,000 hogs
in 1860, the largest number packed in any one year before
the war, to 900,000.

Many other industries, too numerous to mention, owed
their creation, or their powerful expansion, to the war.

Industrial efficiency and productiveness are increased
not only by improved labour-saving machinery but by an
improved organisation as well. Industrial co-operation
and the division of labour can be carried to the greatest
perfection only by a concentration of energy and direction,
by manufacturing on a large scale, by eliminating unnecessary
and therefore wasteful competition. Owing to the pressure

276 Britain's Coming Industrial Supremacy

of the war a powerful tendency towards industrial con-
solidation arose. Professor Fite has told us :

As soon as expansion set in it was evident that the
existing industrial machinery was inadequate to the tasks
imposed upon it. Industrial enterprises in the past under a
system of free competition had been very numerous, and
each had been conducted on a small scale ; there was no
unity of effort in allied lines and over large areas of territory,
while in some cases unwise laws had created inequalities.
This lack of unity needed to be corrected, more harmony
among common interests introduced, and unequal privileges
swept away, if business was to be transacted on an increased
scale. This was the fundamental reason for the sudden and
pronounced tendency towards consolidation that charac-
terised the world of capital as soon as the war began, although
other factors doubtless contributed to the same end, such
as internal taxes, large fortunes, the progress of inventions,
peculiar transportation conditions, the tariff, high prices, and
the assaults of the labouring classes. . . .

When once started, concentration of manufacturing
went on swiftly. Soon after the war was over the special
commissioner of the revenue noted a rapid concentration
of the business of manufacturing into single vast estab-
lishments and an utter annihilation of thousands of little
separate industries, the existence of which was formerly a
characteristic of the older sections of the country. . . .

Never in the history of the country up to that time had
there been such a strong tendency towards united and har-
monious action on the part of the employing classes, whether
this resulted in a complete merging of one company into
another or looser and more temporary organisations to
consider the subject of prices, internal taxes, the tariff,
or wages ; never had there been such an incentive to
consolidation and union. Combination in every hne was
the tendency of the hour. A determination was growing
to merge small, isolated units, often hostile to each other,
into larger and more harmonious groups ; big corporations
supplanted smaller ones ; things were done on a more exten-
sive scale than had ever before been attempted. Although

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 277

the new spirit appeared suddenly, it did its work thoroughly,
and while it was not carried as far as at the present time,
it must still be recognised that its advent created a new
epoch in industrial and commercial life, the foundation for
all that has come later. There was a definite turning away
from the independent self-reliant localism and small units
of the past, a decided right-about toward centralisation. . . .

Another element entering into the situation was the
peculiar effects of internal taxes. There was a tax on the
sales of most industrial products, placed finally at 6 per cent.
ad valorem, which bore heavily on manufacturers, inas-
much as most products represented more than one process of
manufacture. . . .

The manufacturer with little capital, who could afford
only a small establishment, was discriminated against in
favour of the rich man ; if the cotton manufacturer could
afford not only to spin but also to weave, he escaped one
tax ; if he could have his own dyeworks, he escaped another
tax. Such a man, after enlarging his plant, could undersell
his poor neighbour. Concentration in manufacturing, there-
fore, came to be the rule, for the more nearly complete and
comprehensive the plant, the less was the tax.

During the Civil War the American manufacturing in-
dustries expanded with almost incredible vigour. Professor
Fite briefly summed up the principal causes of their expansion
in the follow^ing words :

For this progress of manufacturing there were many
reasons. First, the ordinary needs of the country were
greater than usual. . . .

Then the paper money régime was in full swing, and
money was plenty and prices soaring. There was, too, the
incentive of the tariff, not a session of Congress passing
without some raising of these bars to foreigners. Every
manufacturer, great and small, was conscious of more
buoyancy and freedom as he realised that under the cloak
of the supposed needs of revenue with which to wage the
war he was rapidly dispensing with foreign competition
with all its attendant risks ; examples of industries benefited
in this way were sugar, thread, iron, steel rail, and woollen

278 Britain's Coming Industrial Supremacy

manufacturing. But greatest of all incentives were Govern-
ment contracts, which generally have a way of bringing
higher prices than ordinary sales, and which at this time
became more and more lucrative as foreigners were effectually
barred from competition. Fortunate the manufacturer who
had such contracts, and small the number who did not
have them. Contemporary opinion plainly inclined to the
view that a Government contract was the manufacturer's
greatest opportunity.

The best and the most imposing picture of the pro-
gress of the American manufacturing industries during the
decade in which the Civil War occurred is furnished by
the dry statistics of the American Censuses of 1860 and
1870. While Professor Fite in his excellent accoimt describes
to us the causes, the Censuses merely give the facts. They
confirm the views expressed by Professor Fite and they
show the following remarkable and almost unbehevable
progress during a period of war :

I860

1870

Manufacturing establishments

Capital employed

Hands employed

Wages paid ....

Value of products

140,433

$1,009,855,715

1,311,246

$378,878,966

$1,886,861,676

252,148

$2,118,208,769

2,053,996

$776,584,343

$4,232,326,442

Between 1860 and 1870 the number of manufacturing
establishments increased by 80 per cent, and their capital
was more than doubled. The number of hands employed
increased by 55 per cent., and the wages paid to them and
the value of products turned out increased each by more
than 100 per cent. That is truly a wonderful record. The
figures given prove conclusively that the Civil War, not-
withstanding its destructiveness and huge cost, did not
ruin the American industries but caused their rise and
prosperity.

As the table given treats summarily the American

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 279

industries as a whole, their progress can perhaps more
correctly be gauged by a more detailed comparison of their
output according to the Censuses :

Value of Industrial Production,

In 1860

In 1870

Dola.

Dois.

Agricultural implements

17,487,960

52,066,875

Bricks and tiles .

11,263,147.

29,302,016

Hosiery

7,280,606

18,411,564

Cotton goods

115,681,774

177,489,739

Indiarubber goods

6,768,450

14,566,374

Pig iron

20,870,120

69,640,498

Rolled iron .

31,888,705

120,311,158

Cast iron

36,132,033

99,843,218

Forged iron.

2,030,718

8,385,669

Lumber

96,715,864

210,159,327

Machinery .

61,887,266

138,519.246

Nails and tacks .

9,857,223

23,101,082

Sewing machines .

4,255,820

13,638,706

Silk manufactures

6,607,771

12,210,662

Steel .

1,778,240

9,609,986

Tobacco and snuff

21,820,535

38,388,359

Tobacco and cigars

9,068,778

33,373,685

Woollen goods

61,894,986

155,405,358

Worsted goods .

3,701,378

22,090,381

Comparison of the figures given shows that between
1860 and 1870 the production of agricultural implements,
bricks and tiles, indiarubber goods, pig iron, cast iron,
machinery, sewing machines, cigars and woollen goods
increased threefold, that the production of rolled iron and
forged iron increased fourfold, and that the output of
steel and worsted goods increased no less than sixfold.
These figures, which have not been picked in order to make
a case, but which are all those given in the American Censuses,
prove that the war enormously benefited the American
manufacturing industries, that the great struggle between
the North and the South brought about the rapid expansion
of American manufacturing which carried the United
States to the first rank among industrial nations.

Nations are born in war and die in peace. Peace creates

280 Britain^ s Coming Industrial Supremacy

sloth, neglect, intrigue, and dissension. A keen sense of
danger, on the other hand, is the most powerful unifying
factor known to history. The hostihty of Austria united
Switzerland, Hungary, and Italy and is uniting the Southern
Slavs. The hostility of France united Germany. The
hostility of England united the quarrelling American
Colonies and creaeed the United States. The hostihty
of Germany is welding the British Empire into an indis-
soluble whole.

Wars, though disastrous to individuals, often prove a
blessing to nations. They unite and toughen men. They
prepare them for the struggle of life both in the mihtary
and in the economic sphere.

Success in trade and industry, as in war, depends after
all not so much on the possession of dead resources as on
the intelHgence, abiUty, energy, and industry of men.
Most men are bom idlers. They prefer ease and comfort
to physical and mental exertion. Hence they dislike and
oppose change and progress. Necessity is the mother
not only of ingenuity and of invention but of labour and of
thrift, and therefore of economic progress and of wealth.
Herein Hes the reason that the countries most blessed by
Nature are often the poorest and the least progressive.
Great Britain's former industrial predominance was founded
not in peace but in war. It was created, as I have shown
in the previous chapter, during the period 1775-1815. Of
these forty years thirty were spent in colossal wars, the
war with the American Colonies and their European aUies,
and the gigantic war with RepubUcan and Napoleonic
France. These wars gave to Great Britain her late pre-
eminence in commerce and industry. Necessity, especially
the enormous increase in taxation, made vastly increased
production indispensable. It led to the introduction of
the steam engine, of modern industry, of modem commerce,
of modern agriculture, of modem transport, and of modem
capitalism. It brought about the industrial revolution.

Peace and ease have almost unnoticed deprived Great

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 281

Britain of the foremost industrial position which she had
obtained during the Great War, and which now is possessed
by the United States. The present War should not only-
unite the British Empire but should once more give to the
British people the foremost position in the economic world,
provided they make wise and energetic use of their
opportunities. On the other hand, the United States, far
from enriching themselves at the cost of the fighting
nations, far from coining the sweat and blood of the Allies
into dollars, may, through peace and ease, fall a prey to
that fatal self-complacency and stagnation from which
political and industrial Britain has suffered for decades and
from which she has been saved by the War. Before long
the Great EepubUc may begin to stagnate and decline
and become a victim of her undisturbed material prosperity.
It seems not impossible that, owing to the War, the United
States will henceforth decline, not only politically but
economically as well, while Great Britain will once more
become economically the leading Anglo-Saxon nation.

Let us now consider the economic effects of the War
upon Great Britain and upon the Empire as a whole.

In the chapter on * Britain's War Finance and Economic
Future,' I showed by means of irrefutable figures, which
have attracted the attention of the principal technical
papers and of many eminent industrialists, that the American
workers in factories, mines, &c., produce per head from
two to three times as much as their British colleagues
engaged in the same callings ; that the vastly greater
output of the American workers is due to the employment
of far more powerful and far more efficient machinery, better
organisation, a greater desire for progress on the part of
the manufacturers, and a comparative absence of a delibe-
rate limitation of output on the part of the workers. I
showed that Great Britain could double and treble her
income and wealth by doubling and trebling her engine-
power upon the American plan and by improving her
organisation. I showed that she could easily pay, and

282 Britain's Coming Industrial Supremacy

more than pay, for the War by Americanising her industries.
Since the time when those words were printed ^ the Américan-
isation of British industry has begun. The pressure of
necessity has brought about many of the necessary changes.
The British employers have been awakened to the need
of progress and reform, and the British Trade Unions
have abandoned in part their fatal policy of restricting
output and antagonising improved machinery.

Before the War the United Kingdom had, in round
numbers, 18,000,000 male and female workers employed
in agriculture, industry, commerce, domestic service, &c.
Since then about 6,000,000 men have joined the Army and
Navy, while, according to Mr. Montagu's statement made
in the House of Commons on August 15, 1916, 2,250,000
men and women are engaged in making mimitions under
the Ministry of Munitions. If we estimate that, in addition
to these, 750,000 men and women not under the Ministry
of Munitions are engaged on war work, it appears that the
War has reduced the number of British workers by exactly
one-half. However, the loss in man-power is probably
not 50 per cent, but about 60 per cent., because the youngest,
the strongest, and the most efficient workers are either
in the Army and Navy or engaged on war work. The
consumption of the country is about as great as it was in
peace time, for, while private demand for goods is smaller
here and there, the reduction effected by the economy of
some is probably counter-balanced by the increased spending
on the part of the workers, and especially by the enormous
demands for ordinary goods for the use of the Army and
Navy. The British exports for the ûrst seven months of
1916 were, but for £10,000,000, as large as those during
the corresponding seven peace months of 1914, although,
allowing for the rise in prices, they were considerably
smaller.

It therefore appears that with only one-half of her
workers Great Britain produces now approximately as

1 September, 1915.

Great Problems of British Statesvianship 283

large a quantity of ordinary goods as she did with all her
workers before the War. In other words, the output per
worker has approximately doubled. Necessity has led
to more intensive and more scientific production, to better
organisation, to the introduction of the most modem methods
and of the most perfect machinery, not only in the manu-
facture of munitions of war, but in ordinary manufacturing
as well. It has been stated that during the War the United
Kingdom has imported £200,000,000 worth of American
machinery. The vast advance made in manufacturing
will no doubt be of permanent benefit to the nation. The
new and efficient processes will not be abandoned for the
old and wasteful ones. Mr. Montagu stated in the House
of Commons on August 15, when describing the activity of
the Ministry of Munitions, according to the verbatim report :

Old-fashioned machinery and slip-shod methods are
disappearing rapidly under the stress of war, and whatever
there may have been of contempt for science in this country,
it does not exist now. There is a new spirit in every depart-
ment of industry which I feel certain is not destined to dis-
appear when we are at hberty to divert it from its present
supreme purpose of beating the Central Powers. When that
is done, can we not apply to peaceful uses, the form of
organisation represented by the Ministry of Munitions ? I
am not thinking so much of the great buildings which con-
stitute new centres of industry, plaimed with the utmost
ingenuity so as to economise effort, filled with machines of
incredible efficiency and exactitude. I wish rather to
emphasise the extent to which all concerned — and each
section is vital to our objects — are co-operating to obtain
the best results from the material in our hands. We have
the leaders of all the essential industries now working for us
or co-operating with us in the Ministry. The great unions
render us constant assistance in the discussion and solution
of difficulties, whether with our officers or within their own
body. On technical questions of the most varied character
we have the advantage of the best expert advice in the
country.

284 Britain'^ s Coming Industrial Supremacy

We have in being, now that British industry is organised
for war, the general staff of British industry. I am sure
that we should sacrifice much if we did not avail ourselves
of that staff to consider how far all this moral and material
energy can be turned to peaceful account.

Sir W. Essex, a great industrialist, said at the same
sitting :

I think the products of this Armageddon are going to
be real and substantial. I know the price we shall pay for
it will be enormous, but we shall not begrudge it, or a tithe
or a hundredth of it, but a great by-product will be that our
mechanical industry and our chemical industry, and all the
industries which are touched — and hardly an industry is not
touched more or less intimately — will have been revivified,
modernised, and invigorated to an incredible degree, and
that must of necessity react on the whole industrial work of
our Empire, and will not only maintain, but enormously
enhance all the advantages which as a manufacturing nation
we have hitherto enjoyed. . . .

These men [the leaders of industry who are co-operating
with the Ministry of Munitions] are going up and down, week
in and week out, month in and month out, energising the
thousands of factories which are under the control of the
Ministry of Munitions, bringing them up to date in their
workshop methods, making them acquainted in many cases
I know with tools, the like of which they had no previous
knowledge of save by hearsay, bringing them up also to
new methods, new systems, and organisation until — this
is the common testimony of many of the proprietors of
these factories — ' We did not know our business until we
got linked up with the Minister of Munitions.' You are
able by this aggregation of the manufacturing industries of
the country here employed to level up the whole, and that,
I take it, would be a by-product of incalculable value to
the industry of this country, and must enormously affect
it for good and make for our advantage in the future com-
petition with other races of the world.

The necessity of war has not only vastly increased the

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 285

efficiency of the existing industries, but has caused power-
ful new industries to arise. Vast quantities of chemicals,
electrical apparatus, glass, optical-ware, machinery, tools,
&c., which formerly were imported from abroad, are now
manufactured in this country, especially as import pro-
hibitions have provided a powerful stimulus. The War
has greatly promoted technical education and increased
technical ability, for skilled workers in enormous numbers
were wanted. Hence hundreds of schools had to be created
in which unskilled workers were converted into highly
skilled ones. Inventiveness was stimulated by the neces-
sity to manufacture numerous articles which hitherto were
made abroad by secret processes. Last, but not least,
the War has led to the creation of huge model factories
for making munitions, compared with which the great Wool-
wich estabhshment is small and out of date. These giant
factories will not be pulled down after the conclusion of
peace, but will, of course, be adapted to the production
of ordinary goods. Great Britain will undoubtedly follow
in this the example set by the United States after the Civil
War.

The War has doubled the manufacturing efficiency not
only of Great Britain, but of France, Kussia, Italy, and
Japan as well. When the struggle is over, the United States
will no longer compete with industrial nations possessed of
an antiquated outfit whose output per man is exceedingly
low owing to the use of inefficient and labour-wasting
machinery and methods. During the War the most impor-
tant industries of the whole world have become Americanised.
The United States will henceforth have to compete on equal
terms in an Americanised world. They may discover that
the War has destroyed their industrial paramountcy.

The change effected by the War will be particularly
striking in the iron and steel industry, the most important
of all manufacturing industries. Before the struggle the
United States and Germany dominated the world's iron and
steel trade, and Britain's position had sunk very low indeed.

286 Britain's Coming Industrial Supremacy

as the following figures show, w^hich are taken from the
* Statesman's Year Book ' :

Production of Iron
in 1912

Production of Steel
in 1912

United States ....
Germany .....
United Kingdom ....

Tons

29,727,000

17,582,000

8,751,000

Tons

31,251,000

17,024,000

6,903,000

In 1912 the United Kingdom produced only about one-
half as much iron as Germany, and one-third as much iron
as the United States. In the same year the United Kingdom
produced only about one-third as much steel as Germany
and one-fifth as much steel as the United States.

Germany's defeat will no doubt lead to the decline of her
mightiest industry. The bulk of the iron ore employed by
the German iron industry came before the War from German
Lorraine, Luxemburg, and the French districts close to the
German frontier. The principal iron deposits on the Con-
tinent are dominated by the guns of Metz and Diedenhofen
on the one hand, and of Verdun and Nancy on the other.
Germany's desperate attack upon Verdun was probably
largely due to the wish to deprive France of her steel.
France's acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine will deprive Ger-
many of the bulk of her iron ore and make France the
proprietor of the largest iron deposits in Europe. The iron
ore in sight in the small Lorraine-Luxemburg district is
approximately as plentiful and as rich in metal as the iron
ore of the United States.

Iron-smelting requires of course vast quantities of coal.
About a ton and a half of coal is needed for every ton of
iron ore. Unfortunately France has little coal, and has to
import vast quantities of coal, although her iron industry is
at present of comparatively little importance. The output
of the French coal-mines can apparently not be greatly
increased. Near the German frontier, but outside Alsace-
Lorraine, on the Saar River, there are German coal-mines

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 287

which France might acquire, but these do not yield a satis-
factory coke for iron- smelting. Hence Germany uses West-
phalian coal for smelting the iron of Lorraine. Possessing
the Lorraine ore beds, France would lack coal wherewith to
smelt it. She would therefore either have to import coal
from Westphaha or England for exploiting that vast resource,
or she would have to send a large part of the Lorraine ore
to Germany or England for smelting. Great Britain and
France have been partners in war and should be partners
in peace. They might jointly exploit the vast ore deposits
mentioned. By co-operating, England and France might
dominate not only the iron trade of Europe, but perhaps
that of the world. They might leave far behind them the
iron industry of the United States

In consequence of the War the industrial output of the
United Kingdom, as that of the United States after the Civil
War, may be doubled and trebled. The United Kingdom,
like the small industrial area of the United States, will find
its best and safest market for a vastly increased industrial
output in the Dominions and Colonies, in its Far West.
After the Civil War the United States developed their great
estate with the same energy with which they had conducted
the war. I have shown in the beginning of this chapter
that the United States, with their comparatively small
territory; have almost exactly twice as many miles of rail-
way as has the whole of the British Empire]with its immense
territory. Hundreds of thousands of miles of railway are
required throughout the British Empire. The opening of
the Dominions and Colonies by means of railways alone
will give full employment to the vastly enlarged iron and
steel industries of Great Britain and the Dominions for
decades to come. The British Dominions have room for
hundreds of millions of white settlers. After the end of the
Civil War money had to be made to pay off the war debt.
To make money, the Far West had to be opened up by means
of railways and immigrants, for railways and settlement must
go hand in hand. The numerous immigrants kept fully

288 Britain's Coming Industrial Supremacy

employed not only the American iron and steel industry
which the war had created, but all the American industries
which had been immensely enlarged during the struggle.

In territory and in latent resources the British Empire is
far superior to the United States, but in developed and
exploited resources, in industrial power, wealth, and white
population, the Empire is very inferior to the Great Republic.
Between 1871 and 1911 the population of the United States
increased by 53,500,000, that of Germany increased by
25,400,000, while the white population of the British Empire
grew by only 21,500,000. That comparison is humiUating
for the British Empire. If the same rate of progress or a
similar rate should continue to prevail, the British Empire
would in course of time become a second-rate or a third-rate
Power.

Wealth is power. The British Empire should endeavour
to be the leading Anglo-Saxon nation, not only in territory,
but in white population and wealth as well. Hitherto
the development of the Empire has been restricted by a
small-minded parochial policy of the component parts, by
lack of Imperial organisation and co-operation. The great
Imperial domain can be adequately protected and exploited
only by the Empire as a whole, by a truly Imperial Govern-
ment, by Empire-wide co-operation. Immigration and
emigration, transportation by land and water, the planful
opening and settlement of the vast empty spaces of the
Empire, and the question of inter-Imperial trade must be
settled imperially, not parochially. If that is done, there
is every reason to believe that in a few decades the British
Empire will be far ahead of the United States both in white
population and in wealth.

It may be argued that the British Dominions and Colonies
cannot be developed as rapidly as the United States, although
the resources of the former are greater than those of the
latter, because the United States are a single country which
nature has opened up by a number of magnificent rivers.
That argument is erroneous. The United States are not

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 289

a State, but a number of States, which jealously defend their
State rights and which do not readily co-operate. Besides,
the seas are the Mississippi, the Missouri, and the Hudson
of the British Empire. They do not separate, but connect
the different parts.

In consequence of the Civil War, the United States stan-
dardised their chaotic railway system, as has been shown.
They placed it under imperial control, and gradually evolved
a unified and national system by means of the Inter-State
Commerce Commission. Cheap transport and freight and
equitable rates are the best means for opening up the Empire
rapidly. The Governments of the Empire should learn
from America's lesson and control transport by land and
water throughout the Empire. At present private railway
companies and shipping companies direct, divert, stimulate,
or restrict the imperial trade according to their convenience,
or even penalise British and facilitate foreign trade for their
own benefit. The transport companies by land and sea
must be taught that the interests of the Empire are more
important than those of their shareholders.

An Imperial Government in the full sense of the term
should investigate and take stock of the Imperial resources,
for they are unknown. It is nobody's business to study
and describe the resources of the Empire. No ofi&cial survey
has even been made of England's coal beds. The resources
of the Empire are exploited, or wasted, at will by private
individuals. The mineral resources of the United States
have been explored and described by the American Geo-
logical Survey, which has rendered invaluable service, and of
recent years the Americans have embarked upon the policy
of preserving their natural resources under the guidance
of their national Conservation Commission. An Imperial
stocktaking is necessary. The Empire belongs to the race,
not to a few capitaUsts. Its exploitation should be guided
by national and Imperial interests. Yet such guidance
need not restrict very much the activities of enterprising
capitalists.

290 Britain^ s Coming Industrial Supremacy

The British race will scarcely suffice to fill up the vacant
lands of the Empire. The Dominions will become keen
competitors with the United States for desirable immigrants.
Hitherto the bulk of European emigrants have gone to the
United States, but the British Empire may be able to divert
the stream. For decades men have gone to the United
States not only because it was easy to make money in that
country, but also because the United States were considered
a home of freedom, the champion of liberty. America's
prestige as a defender of freedom and liberty has probably
suffered owing to her attitude during the first two years of
the War. Men wishing for liberty may henceforth rather
go to the British Empire than to the United States. The
planful development of the Imperial domain by the building
of railways and the cheapening of transport will bring
hundreds of thousands of desirable emigrants to the British
Empire.

The tariff poHcy of Great Britain and the Dominions
will have the most far-reaching influence upon the economic
development of the Empire. A common-sense tariff policy
will further the settlement and exploitation of the Imperial
estate, while a doctrinaire, a vote-catching, or sectional
policy will condemn the Empire to stagnation and decline.
The development of the United States has been helped im-
mensely by the fact that they form a single market. The
British Empire, like the United States, is so vast that there
need be no jealousy among the component States. British
industry, Hke the industry of Pennsylvania or Illinois,
cannot provide all the manufactured goods wanted by the
Empire. There is room for manufacturing centres in all
parts of the Empire. A narrow spirit of monopoly and
exclusion or a cosmopolitan fiscal policy advocated by
doctrinaires would greatly, and perhaps fatally, hamper
the Empire's development in population and wealth.

The War, as has been shown at the beginning of this
chapter, may cost about £7,500,000,000. That is a colossal
burden, and the British Empire should endeavour to pay off

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 291

the debt with reasonable speed. The War was waged not
merely for the benefit of the United Kingdom, but for that
of the British Empire as a whole. It seems therefore only
fair that the British Dominions should assume their full
share of the cost of the War, especially as the assumption
of their part of the burden should prove highly beneficial
to them.

A large increase in taxation throughout the Dominions
would most powerfully stimulate production. Hitherto the
development of the Empire has been hindered very seriously
by the fact that too many emigrants have endeavoured to
make a living not by production, but by trade and specula-
tion. Nearly 40 per cent, of the inhabitants of Australia
live in the five capital towns, while the vast expanses of
the country remain empty. Nearly 50 per cent, of the
inhabitants of New South Wales and Victoria live in Sydney
and Melbourne. Several years ago, when I was in the West
of Canada, I found that the principal industry consisted in
gambling in real estate. The Dominions have developed
so slowly very largely because money was too cheap, taxes
were too low, and life was too easy. Men could make a
good living by little work. If Great Britain should, by
the unwillingness of the Dominions, be forced to take over
an unduly large share of the war debt, it may be ruinous not
only to the Mother Country, but to the Empire as a whole,
especially if the Dominions should practise at the same time
an exclusive policy towards British manufactures. Happily
this seems unlikely.

The War has been waged not only for the present genera-
tion, but for future generations as well. It seems therefore
only fair that part of the cost should be borne by future
generations. It might be thrown in part on the latent and
undeveloped resources of the Empire, which might be pooled
for the purpose of repaying the war debt. The other part
of the cost, to be paid by the present generation,[might^be
allocated to the various States of the Empire according to
the number of the people and their wealth per head, so that

292 BritairCs Coming Industrial Supremacy

the burden should be borne fairly and equally by all.
Periodically the allocation might be revised and a redis-
tribution effected in accordance with changing circum-
stances.

The latent resources of the Empire are boundless. There
is every reason to believe that the British Empire, if wisely
governed and administered, will exceed the United States
in white population and in wealth in a few decades. The
War will apparently devour a sum equal to about one-half
of Great Britain's national wealth, but that fact need not
disturb us. The Civil War cost the United States a sum
which was equal to about two-thirds their national wealth
at the time. During the fifty years which have elapsed since
its conclusion, the wealth of the United States has grown at
so rapid a rate, largely in consequence of that war, that
to the present generation the gigantic war cost seems almost
trifling. The sum of £7,500,000,000, though equal to one-
half of Great Britain's national wealth, comes only to about
one- fourth of the Empire's national wealth. In a few decades
the cost of the World War may appear as small to the citizens
of the British Empire as that of the Civil War appears now
to most Americans and that of the Napoleonic War to most
Englishmen of the present. The war with Napoleon created
England's economic supremacy. The Civil War created
the industrial supremacy of the United States. The present
War should give the industrial supremacy of the world to
the British Empire.

CHAPTEK IX

DEMOCBACY AND THE IRON BROOM OF WAR^

AN ANALYSIS AND SOME PROPOSALS ^

Gold is tested by fire and nations by war. The World
War has glaringly revealed the improvidence, the inefficiency,
and the wastefulness of the democratically governed States.
France, though utterly defeated by Germany in 1870-71,
and frequently threatened by her with war since then,
especially in 1905 and in 1911, when a German attack seemed
almost inevitable, was quite unprepared for her ordeal.
A fortnight before the fatal ultimatum was launched upon
Serbia, at a moment when the tension was very great,
and when Germany was possibly hesitating whether she
should strike or not, Senator Humbert revealed to the
world in an official report which created an enormous
sensation throughout Europe, that the French fortresses
were unable to resist efficiently a modern siege, that the
French Army lacked heavy guns, ammunition, rifles, and
uniforms, that France had in stock per soldier only a single
boot, thirty years old. Belgium separates France from
Germany. The numerous purely strategical railways which
Germany had constructed towards the Belgian frontier
had clearly revealed her hostile intentions towards her
small neighbour. Belgium, having a population of 8,000,000,

* The Nineteenth Century and After, February, 1916.

' Most of the ' proposals ' contained in the following pages were carried
out by Mr. Lloyd George on his taking over the premiership, eleven months
after their publication in The Nineteenth Century review. This was probably
due purely to coincidence, for the reforms introduced in the national organisa-
tion were logical and necessary.

293

294 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

might easily have raised an army of 500,000 or 1,000,000
men. Such an army, supported by modern fortresses, would
certainly have caused Germany to respect Belgium's
neutrality. The test of war found the Belgian fortresses
and army totally inadequate. Except for her Fleet, Great
Britain was equally unprepared for the War. She has
since then raised a huge army, but disappointment and
failure have been the result of her diplomatic action in
Turkey and Bulgaria, and of her military efforts at the
Dardanelles, on the Vardar, in Mesopotamia, and elsewhere.
Poor and backward Kussia, on the other hand, surprised
the world by her preparedness, and invaded Eastern Prussia
and Galicia soon after the opening of hostiUties.

Comparison of the improvidence, inefficiency, and waste-
fulness displayed by democratic France, Belgium, and Great
Britain with the war-readiness and efficiency of the auto-
cratically governed . States, and especially of Germany,
has clearly revealed the inferiority of democracy in war-
fare and in national organisation. It is easy to make
sweeping generalisations. Many people have proclaimed
that democracy has proved a failure, that the doom
of democracy is at hand, that the iron broom of war will
sweep it into the limbo of forgotten things. England has
invented modern representative and democratic govern-
ment. The national organisation of most civiHsed States
is modelled upon that of this country. Let us then inquire
whether democracy is indeed a failure, or whether, like
every institution in this world, it has merely certain
failings which can be remedied. If it possesses grave but
remediable defects, let us try to find a cure. England,
who has evolved representative Government, should be
the first to deal with its faults and to introduce the necessary
changes.

In the fourth century before Christ Aristotle wrote
in his book ' Politics ' : * It is not for what is ancient, but
for what is useful, that men of sense ought to contend ;
and whatever is distinguished by the former quality cannot

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 295

be expected to possess much of the latter.' About the
same time Thucydides stated in his history : ' It is the
custom of mankind, even where their own country is con-
cerned, to acquiesce with complacent creduKty in the tradi-
tions of former ages without subjecting them to the test
of critical examination.' Flattery and misplaced admira-
tion are far more dangerous than honest hostihty. The
British Constitution has suffered more from its friends
than from its enemies. It has been dealt with in innumer-
able books, but unfortunately most of these are written
in a spirit of bUnd and uncritical admiration. Besides,
practically all who have written on the British Constitu-
tion treat it as if it were an ancient Gothic cathedral or some
other venerable relic of the past. They look upon it with
awe from the point of view of the antiquary, the historian,
the artist, and true believer. They do not recognise that
a constitution is in the first place not a work of art, but
an instrument of government. They describe to us in full
detail its ancient history, the gradual changes it has under-
gone, its Gothic intricacies and .irregularities, and its
present aspects, but they fail as a rule to inquire whether it
answers its practical purposes. Walter Bagehot, one of
the very few men who endeavoured to consider it from the
practical point of view, wrote in his book * The English
Constitution' :

The characteristic merit of the English Constitution is
that its dignified parts are very complicated and somewhat
imposing, very old and rather venerable ; while its efficient
part, at least when in great and critical action, is decidedly
simple and rather modern. We have made, or rather
stumbled, on a constitution which — though full of every
species of incidental defect, though of the worst workmanship
in all out-of-the-way matters of any constitution in the world
— ^yet has two capital merits : it contains a simple efficient
part which, on occasion and when wanted, can work more
simply and easily, and better, than any instrument of govern-
ment that has yet been tried ; and it contains likewise

296 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

historical, complex, august, theatrical parts which it has
inherited from a long past — which take the multitude —
which guide by an insensible but an onmipotent influence
the associations of its subjects. Its essence is strong with
the strength of modern simplicity ; its exterior is august
with the Gothic grandeur of a more imposing age.

In view of the experience of the World War, or, indeed, of
any great war in which this country has been engaged,
Bagehot's emphatic assertion that the EngUsh Constitution
' in great and critical action is decidedly simple and rather
modern,' that * when wanted it can work more simply and
easily, and better, than any instrument of government
that has yet been tried,' can only be described as a ludicrous
travesty and perversion of fact. Unfortunately his view
is representative of that of most constitutional writers.

Statesmanship is not an abstract science, not a science
based upon theory, but an eminently practical science, a
science which is based on experience. A serious disease
should not be subjected to empiric treatment. A wise
physician will carefully diagnose the case submitted to him
before considering the remedy. Let us then consult some
of the greatest and wisest statesmen of all times. Their
opinions, which are based on unrivalled experience, will
provide us with invaluable guidance, and the importance of
the views given in the following pages will be greatly en-
hanced by the fact that most of them will be new to British
readers.

Aristotle, the friend and teacher of Alexander the Great,
whose book ' Politics ' should be read by every statesman
and politician, wrote : ' An error in the original structure
of government often proves ruinous both to republics and
to aristocracies,' The ancient Greeks had much experience
of the practical working of democracy. They saw their
democracies first assailed by the military obligarchy of Sparta
and then destroyed by the Macedonian autocracy under
King Philip. Their greatest thinkers believed that their

Great Problems of British Statesmanshijo 297

downfall was due not to the chance of war, but to ' a fatal
error in the original constitution of their government.' They
believed that democracy was, owing to its very nature, a
less efficient form of government than monarchy. Aristotle
wrote in his book ' Politics ' :

That which is a common concern to all is very generally
neglected. The energies of man are stimulated by that
which depends on himself alone, and of which he only is
to reap the whole profit or glory. In concerns common to
him with others, he employs with reluctance as much atten-
tion and activity as his own interest requires. He neglects
that of which he thinks other men will take care, and as
other men prove equally negligent, the general interest
is universally abandoned. Those families are commonly
the worst served in which the domestics are the most
numerous.

Isocrates, one of the greatest Greek orator-statesmen,
whose works are very Httle known, wrote in his ' Third
Oration ' :

Democracies honour those who by delusive eloquence
govern the multitude, but monarchies those who are most
capable in managing the affairs of the nation. Monarchies
surpass democratic governments not only in the ordinary
routine of administration, but especially in war, for mon-
archies are more able than are democracies to raise troops,
to use them to advantage, to arm in secret, to make military
demonstrations, to win over some neighbours, and to over-
awe others.

All are acquainted with the military events which brought
about the downfall of Athens, the wealthiest and most
powerful Greek repubhc, whose fleet ruled the sea, but few
know its hidden causes. In the second century before
Christ the Greco-Koman Polybius, the most statesman-hke
historian of antiquity, who was not only a great writer, but
a diplomat and general as well, and who wrote history from
the point of view of the statesman, stated that Athens fell

298 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

because a change in her constitution had deprived her of a
single head. He wrote :

Athens, having been raised by the ability of Themistocles
to the greatest height of power and glory, shortly afterwards
sank into weakness and disgrace. The cause of this sudden
change lay in the inappropriate constitution of the Govern-
ment, for the Athenian State was like a ship without a
captain.

His views are confirmed by Thucydides, a contemporary
of Pericles, who was an eye-witness of the decline and fall
of Athens. Writing in the fourth century before Christ,
he tells us that in the time of Pericles, Athens, though
a republic in name, was, owing to the great prestige of
Pericles, a monarchy in fact, and that her greatness declined
when, after his death, the State became a true democracy
and a prey to party- political strife. He wrote :

Pericles, a man of acknowledged worth and ability, whose
integrity was undoubtedly proof against corruption, kept
the people in order by gentle management, and was not
directed by them, but was their principal director. He had
not wormed himself into power by dubious methods. There-
fore he was not obliged to soothe and praise their caprices,
but could oppose and disregard their anger with peculiar
dignity. Whenever he saw them bent on projects injurious
or unreasonable, he terrified them so much by the force of
his eloquence that he made them tremble and desist, and
when they were disquieted by groundless apprehensions, he
animated them afresh into brave resolution. The State,
under him, though called a democracy, was in fact a mon-
archy. His successors were more on a level with one
another, and as every one of them aspired to be their
leader, they were forced to cajole the people, and so to neg-
lect the concerns of the pubhc. This was the source of
many grievous errors of statesmanship, as must unavoidably
be the case in any great community which is possessed of
large dominions.

Pericles had introduced the pernicious system of con-

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 299

verting into an object of gain those services rendered to the
nation which formerly were rendered gratuitously and which
had been considered a trust and an honour. He died, and
politicians desirous of power endeavoured to obtain it by
cajoling, flattering, and bribing the masses, by outbidding and
by attacking one another. Aristotle has told us in his book,
' Pontics ' :

Pericles, by granting fees to the judges and jurymen,
and converting a matter of duty into an object of gain, still
further debased the composition, and increased the tyranny,
of the Athenian tribunals. What Pericles had left imperfect,
succeeding demagogues supplied. One democratical regula-
tion followed another, until the government assumed its
present form, or rather its present deformity.

Henceforth domestic poHtics monopolised public atten-
tion in Athens. Politicians anxious for power, for votes,
filled the ears of the people with promises and with mutual
denunciations, and in the heat and passion of the faction
fight the national interests were completely neglected.
Thucydides informs us :

Engaged in contests for power, the Athenians did not
pay sufficient attention to the army abroad and were em-
broiled in mutual altercations at home. . . . They would
not have been conquered, had not their own domestic feuds
at last utterly disabled them from resisting their enemies.

Men strongly divided with regard to domestic pohtics
and goaded to passion against one another by their leaders
will not easily bury their feuds and act in common if united
action is urgently wanted to preserve the State from destruc-
tion. Besides men who have become used to hear all sides
cannot in any case decide quickly. If opinions differ,
influence necessarily takes the place of reason, and if the
opposing parties cannot unite on energetic action, a weak,
and probably foolish, middle course, acceptable to both
parties will be adopted after infinite procrastination and
delay. MachiavelH, who, as Secretary of State to the

300 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

Kepublic of Florence, knew a great deal of the practical
working of democratic institutions in time of national
emergency, wrote in his ' Discorsi ' :

In all matters of difiûculty wherein courage is needed for
resolving, vacillation will always be met with whenever
those who have to deliberate and decide are weak. Not less
mischievous than doubtful resolves are those which are late
and tardy, especially when they have to be made on behalf
of a friend. From their lateness they help none, but hurt
ourselves. Tardy resolves are due sometimes to want of
spirit or want of strength, or to the perversity of those who
have to determine. Sometimes they are due to the secret
desire of pohticians to overthrow their opponents or to
carry out some selfish purpose of their own. Hence these
men prevent the forming of a decision, and only thwart
and' hinder.

Vacillation, lateness, and tardiness are in MachiavelU's
opinion the characteristics of divided counsels which are
habitually found in Governments by discussion — ^in demo-
cracies. His statement that vacillation and delay are
particularly harmful if a friendly nation requires support
is strikingly illustrated by the fatal delay of democratic
Britain and France in coming to Serbia's aid.

Frequently during the War the British Government has
been reproached in innumerable newspaper articles that it
is always too late both in its diplomatic and in its mihtary
activities, that statesmen are discussing when they should
be acting, that they lack initiative, that they are always
surprised by the enemy, that they are acting only after the
event, that nothing is done in time. These reproaches
irresistibly remind one of similar taunts levelled at the
Athenians by that great statesman and patriot Demos-
thenes, who, like the late Lord Koberts, tried in vain to
arouse the misguided and pleasure-loving citizens to a
sense of the danger which threatened them from an am-
bitious neighbour King and his powerful national army.
In his ' First Philippic,' that great orator said :

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 801

Why, Athenians, are the festivals in honour of Athenae
and of Dionysus always celebrated at the appointed time —
festivals which cost more treasure than is usually expended
upon a whole fleet and attended by larger numbers and
greater magnificence than any other, event in the world —
while all your expeditions have been too late, as that to
Methone, that to Pegasae, and that to Potidaea ? I will
tell you the reason. Everything relatmg to your amuse-
ments is carefully studied and ordered beforehand. So
everyone of you knows long before the event who is to
conduct the various entertainments, what he is to receive,
where he is to go, and what he has to do. Nothing is left
uncertain or undetermined. But in affairs of war and in
warlike preparations there is no order, no certainty, no
regulation. Only when events alarm us we appoint our
Trierarchs. Having done so, we dispute with them, and
lastly we consider the question of supplies for war. . . .
It is shameful, Athenians, that we deceive ourselves by allow-
ing all disagreeable news to be suppressed, that we listen
only to the pleasing speeches of our leaders, and that we
thus delude ourselves ; that by putting off everything
unpleasant, we never move until it is too late ; that we
refuse to understand that those who would wage war suc-
cessfully should not follow, but direct, events.

In the * Fourth PhiHppic ' Demosthenes stated :

You, Athenians, have never made the necessary disposi-
tion in your affairs, or armed yourselves, in time, but have
ever been led by events. Then, when it proves too late to
act, you lay down your arms. If another incident alarms
you, your preparations are once more resumed in general
tumult and confusion. But this is not the way to obtain
success. . . . When Philip was preparing, you, instead of
doing the like and making counter-preparations, remained
listless, and, if anyone spoke a word of warning, shouted
him down. When you receive news that any place is lost
or besieged, then you listen and prepare. But the time to
have heard and consulted was when you declined to listen,
and the time to act and employ your preparation is now
when you are hearing me. Such being your habits, you are

302 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

the only people who adopt this singular course. Other
nations dehberate before action. You deliberate after
action.

While King PhiHp was preparing everything for his
attack upon Athens, the leaders of the Athenian democ-
racy were fighting one another for votes and influence, for
place and power. Demosthenes sadly stated in his ' First
Philippic ' :

If we sit at home listening to the mutual recriminations
of our orators we cannot expect the sUghtest success in any
direction. . . . They may promise and assert and accuse
this person or that, but to such proceedings we owe the ruin
of our affairs.

In his * Oration for the Liberty of the Khodians '
we read :

You, Athenians, must fight a double battle. Like others,
you have your open enemies, but you have enemies still
more dangerous and alarming. You have to overcome in
the first place the opposition of those of your own citizens
who, in this assembly, are systematically engaged against
the interests of their own country. And, as they are ever
strenuous in their opposition to all useful measures, it is no
wonder that many of our designs are frustrated.

Athens owed her downfall to her party-political divisions,
to the fact that she had many heads, but no head, to the
fact that the Athenians, engaged in an unending struggle
for power, were taught to place party above country and
self above the State. Trusting to their democratic orator-
politicians, who desired to be popular, who desired to please,
the misguided people delayed preparation and action against
their enemies until it was too late.

If we study the history of Athens at its source, it becomes
clear that that great republic rose to eminence during the
time when it was a democracy in name but not in fact ;
that it was a great, efficient, and wisely governed Power as

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 303

long as it was ruled by an aristocracy and was guided by a
single man of great ability, such as Aristides, Themistocles,
Cimon, Pericles ; that it began to decline when it became
a true democracy, when the controlling power in the State
fell into the hands of the people, when ambitious or needy
politicians and adventurers, contending for power, divided
the nation, corrupted and destroyed the patriotism of the
people, and taught them to exploit the State and to consider
it as an institution which existed mainly to administer to
their wants and their vices, to their love of ease and of self.
The policy of Athens was bound to be improvident, hasty,
reckless, and fooHsh when the affairs of State were no longer
directed by the abiUty of the experienced few or by the
wisdom of a single eminent man, but by the momentary
emotions and the shortsightedness of the crowd.

In Athens public affairs were discussed and decided by
the people, assembled in their thousands in the market-place.
It may therefore be objected that the Athenian democracy
cannot in fairness be compared with modern democracies
which have evolved highly developed representative institu-
tions. It may be said that in Great Britain not the people
nor the elected representatives, but a small and select body,
the Cabinet, enjoying great latitude for action, discusses
policy and decides and directs in the greatest secrecy. Let
us then study the cause of the decline and fall of another
great commercial, maritime, and colonising republic, of
Venice. The case of Venice should be particularly interest-
ing because the Constitution of that State curiously re-
sembles that of this country as established in the eighteenth
entury. In fact, it may be said that the British Constitu-
tion, as we know it now, was modelled upon that of Venice.

Venice, like Great Britain, did not possess a written
and fixed Constitution. The Venetians recognised that
government by a crowd is bound to be a failure. The con-
trolling power of the State, which at first had been held by
the Doge and then by representative assemblies, passed into
the hands of the Council of Ten, which originally had been

304 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

merely a judicial committee. The Senate of Venice may
fairly be compared to the British House of Commons, and
the Council of Ten to the British Cabinet. The Council of
Ten acted in conjunction with the Senate, and its power was
practically unlimited. Like the British Cabinet, it carried
on its work in absolute secrecy. It was not dependent upon
public opinion. The Doge, the Duke, who had been all-
powerful at the time when Venice rose from insignificance,
to greatness, had been deprived of all authority. He was
a mere figure-head. H^ was, as we are told, * rex in purpura,
senator in curia, in urbe captivus, extra urbem privatus.'
The Doge was indeed a captive in a golden cage. He was
not allowed to open the despatches which were addressed
to him, as the head of the State, by foreign sovereigns. His
palace, and even his person, were liable to be searched at
any moment. In fact, he was a prisoner of the Ten. To
make his revolt unlikely, only very old and feeble men were
elected Doge. He was held responsible during his lifetime
with his liberty and his head, and after his death with his
estate. Venice was an aristocratic republic. The people
were powerless. Owing to the absence of anything resem-
bling popular control or public opinion, the authority of
the Ten, acting in conjunction with the Senate, was of the
greatest.

Although much power was thus concentrated into the
hands of a small secret Council, Venice declined and decayed.
Government by councils and committees proved fatal to her.
In 1677 was published a remarkable book, ' Histoire du
Gouvernement de Venise.' It was written by Amelot de la
Houssaye, a diplomat and a keen student of political affairs,
who during several years was attached to the French
Embassy in Venice, and who had made a special study of
that wonderful State. In a chapter * On the Principal
Causes of the Decline of Venice ' we read :

The Eepublic of Venice has had the same fate as that of
Sparta. Both were flourishing as long as they were small.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship S 05

Both have decKned after extending their territory. Herein
hes the first cause of the dechne of Venice. Its second cause
may be found in the slowness of its dehberations. Slow-
ness of action, it is true, is a fault which is found in all de-
mocracies, but it is extreme in Venice. Their Senate seems
to be sometimes asleep. So difficult it is at times to cause
it to move.

The Venetians were advised in good time of the prepara-
tions made by Turkey for invading the Island of Crete.
Nevertheless, they did not think of preparing their defence,
as if they had never suffered from the perfidy of the Turks,
or as if Heaven had assured them that the powerful expe-
dition prepared by Turkey was not directed against their
own possessions. Their confidence was founded upon the
promises of a Turk who had told them that the military
preparations of the Porte were directed against Malta.
They were bhnd to their danger, and they refused to heed
the advice of Sorance, the Venetian ambassador at Con-
stantinople, who had warned them of their peril and en-
treated them unceasingly to take precautions. Fearing to
offend the Turks by showing their suspicion, they did not
arm, but trusted for their security to their alhance with the
Turks, which had recently been renewed. Thus their fortress
of Saint Theodore was taken by surprise and Candia besieged.
Only then would they believe that the Turks were hostile
to them. . . .

The Venetians lost Cyprus in a similar manner. They
could not make up their mind what to do, although Jerome
Mane, their admiral, and Pascal Cicogne, their general at
Candia, urged them not to wait until attacked by the Turks,
but to fight the Turkish fleet on the sea, and so prevent a
hostile landing.

By similar irresolution the Senate lost in the last cen-
tury the whole of the Venetian territory on the mainland.
The Venetian government could not make up its mind as
to the policy to be pursued until the sovereigns united in
the League of Cambray had invaded the Venetian posses-
sions. . . .

The third cause of the disorder in the affairs of Venice
lies in the fact that the Senate is composed of a large

306 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

number of members. Hence bad proposals are more likely
to be adopted than good ones, especially if a bad policy is
outwardly attractive, and therefore popular, while a wise
policy seems unpleasant. In Venice, as in ancient Athens,
wise men may propose, but fools deliberate. The resolu-
tions are formed by a majority. The votes of fools have as
much weight as the votes of wise men, and fools are more
numerous than are men of understanding.

Lastly, the Venetian Senate is, in time of danger, liable
to steer a middle course, which is the worst course of all.
If two different policies are proposed, one brave and daring,
and the other timorous and cowardly, the Venetians are
apt to follow a poHcy which is partly brave and partly
cowardly without inquiring whether it is wise and whether
it will avert the danger.

The extracts given from the book of the French diplomat
make it clear that Venice, in times of great emergency,
when rapid and decisive action was required, was as short-
sighted, vacillating, and hesitating as was Athens, that in
the later centuries of her existence she was never prepared
for war, and was always forestalled by her enemies, all timely
warnings notwithstanding. Three centuries ago Turkey
fooled Venice in exactly the same manner in which she fooled
Great Britain in 1914 and in which Bulgaria fooled her in
1915. Over the grave of Venice, as over that of Athens,
the words ' Too late ' may be inscribed. Venice, like ancient
Athens in the time of her decline, had many heads but no
head. Improvidence and irresolution arising from divided
counsels destroyed both.

If we survey the history of the world we find that nearly
all true democracies have been exceedingly short-lived, that
they have gone the way of Athens. The republics which
flourished were, like Carthage and like Athens in the time
of her greatest glory, aristocracies directed by single men of
genius. The Kepublic of the Netherlands, hke that of
Venice, was an aristocracy. William the Silent, her Stadt-
holder, was her Themistocles. He established the power

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 807

of the Kepublic, and his successors of the House of Orange,
the Princes Maurice, Frederick Henry, and William the
Second, maintained it. At that time she ruled the sea,
colonised the world, dominated the world's trade, and was
the richest State in Europe. In 1650 the Dutch Eepublic
changed its Constitution. It abohshed the Stadtholder,
whose supreme position had aroused the envy of the demo-
crats. The politicians were established in power. From
1650 to 1672 the Netherlands were a true Republic. Her
politicians quarrelled among themselves hke those of Athens
and Venice. Her counsels were divided, and during the
twenty-two years of democratic control she experienced
defeat after defeat and lost her naval supremacy, her world
trade, and her greatness. The Dutch wealth and power fell
to England, ruled by one man, by Cromwell. Improvidence
and irresolution springing from the rule of political com-
mittees brought about her decHne.

It is only natural that aristocratic or oligarchial repubhcs
have shown a greater vitality than democratic ones. Aris-
tocratic Venice existed during nearly a thousand years.
The wealth of the wealthy can be preserved only by pru-
dence, foresight, and timely energy. It may be destroyed
by a defeat, and it may be preserved or increased by a timely
victory. Wealthy men are therefore apt to take more pro-
vident and more statesmanlike views in matters of foreign
policy than the labouring masses, which live from day to
day. Besides, the wealthy and the powerful are as a rule
far better informed on foreign affairs than the poor and the
ignorant, who may easily be deluded by wily agitators. If
one set of politicians proposes to the people a wise and
patriotic, though costly, policy of military preparedness in
view of possible dangers from without, while another set
promises them peace, higher wages or a reduced cost of
living, and disarmament, and holds up the former policy —
which is supported by the well-informed rich — and its
supporters to odium, the people will readily vote for a
policy of unpreparedness and for a reduction of armaments.

308 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

Before the War the French, Belgian, and British armies
were starved, and national defence was neglected because
the workers were told by their leaders that not Germany,
but domestic capitalism, was their greatest enemy. Before
the War adequate military preparation was systematically
opposed in France, Belgium, and Great Britain by politicians
who pandered to the short-sighted and ill-informed masses.
The story of Athens in the time of Demosthenes repeated
itself.

The question now arises whether ineflSciency and improvi-
dence are inseparably connected with democracy, whether
it is not possible to combine the advantages possessed by
democracy with the governmental efficiency and foresight
which are found in highly organised and semi-military States
such as Germany, whether it is not possible to blend repre-
sentative government and one-man rule. Before deciding
whether this is feasible we must inquire into the causes of
the governmental efficiency which is found in the most
highly developed monarchical States.

The efficiency of a nation, as of any commercial or
industrial undertaking, depends mainly on two factors : its
organisation and its direction, its Constitution and its
director or directors.

If we study the organisation of the most successful
monarchies of all time, we find two different types. Some
have been ruled by a prince of the greatest genius who
governed in person, who was his own Prime Minister, such
as Peter the Great of Kussia. Some have been ruled by men
of moderate, or even of small, capacity who have entrusted
an able Minister with the task of government, such as
Germany under William the First and Bismarck. It is
frequently asserted that the combination of a William the
First and of a Bismarck is unique or almost unique. That
view is erroneous. A wise king rules, but does not govern.
Monarchy is a business which is best carried on through a
manager. The direct rule of the sovereign is dangerous
for the nation and for himself, even if the monarch is a man

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 309

of the greatest genius. That may be seen by the example
of Napoleon the First. For psychological reasons alone
the highly technical and laborious task of government is as
a rule far more ably fulfilled by a patient and painstaking
Minister who lives for his work than by a high-spirited,
though able, sovereign who necessarily can only devote part
of his time to the^dry and tedious details of administration.

The most successful States have been raised to greatness
not through a great ruler but through a great statesman,
such as Bismarck, working under a ruler of moderate abihty.
Civilisation arose in the East. Every Eastern ruler has his
manager, his Vizier. Moses had his Aaron, Pharaoh his
Joseph, and Solomon his Asaph. According to the Moham-
medan tradition, these were the Viziers of Moses, Pharaoh,
and Solomon. The foundation of the greatness of France
was laid by the co-operation of the able Henry the Fourth
and of Sully, his great Minister, and by Kichelieu and
Mazarin, who governed France in the King's name under the
rule of the incapable Louis the Thirteenth and during the
minority of Louis the Fourteenth. These statesmen raised
France to the greatest glory and made her wealthy and
powerful. Louis the Fourteenth, though personally highly
gifted and well supported by great Ministers such as Colbert
and Louvois, wishing to govern himself, weakened France
through his impetuousness and pride. As the greatness
of Germany has been established by Bismarck working under
the conscientious but moderately gifted William the First,
and that of France by three all-powerful Ministers, Sully,
Kichelieu, and Mazarin, so that of Sweden was the work of
Oxenstierna, who co-operated with the great genius King
Gustavus Adolphus. His work was destroyed by the
rashness and pride of Charles the Twelfth as that of Bis-
marck seems likely to be destroyed by the pride and vanity
of William the Second.

Many Enghshmen are interested in the science of legis-
lation, but only a few in that of national administration and
organisation, although the latter is infinitely more important

310 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

than the former. While the hterature deaUng with legis-
lation and with domestic politics in all its branches is exceed-
ingly vast, there is not a single book in the English language,
except perhaps the American Federalist, which deals ade-
quately and critically with the science of national organisa-
tion and administration. As the nation-builders of England
have apparently not recorded their views as to the best form
of national organisation, we must turn for information to
the great constructive statesmen of the Continent and of
the United States.

Eichelieu, the great orgaijiiser of France, one of the
wisest statesmen of all time, stated his views on government
in his little-known * Testament Politique.* It was written
for the use and guidance of King Louis the Thirteenth, to
whom it was dedicated, and for that of his successors and of
the future Ministers of France. In Chapter VIII. * Du
Conseil du Prince,' which might be translated * On the
Cabinet,* we read :

Among statesmen it is a much debated question whether
it is better that a sovereign should govern the State in
person, according to his own views, or whether he should be
largely guided by his Council and do nothing without its
advice. Either form of government might be advocated in
bulky volumes.

The worst government, in my opinion, is one which is
entirely in the hands of a sovereign who is so incapable,
and at the same time so presumptuous, that he pays no
attention whatever to any council. The best government
of all is one where the mainspring is the will of the sovereign
who, though capable of deciding for himself, possesses so
much modesty and judgment that he does nothing unless
he is supported by good advice, acting on the principle
that several eyes see more than a single one. . . .

A highly-gifted ruler is a great treasure to his State, and
an able council in the fullest sense of the word is no less
precious. But the co-operation of an able ruler and a good
council is of inestimable value because on such co-operation
is founded the happiness of States.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 311

There are no doubt only few sovereigns who can govern
their States without assistance, but even if there were many-
such gifted men they should not endeavour to administer
it by themselves. . . .

Many qualities are required in a good minister, and the
most important are four : ability, faithfulness, courage, and
industry.

The abihty of ministers does not consist in that form of
self-conceit which is usually found in pedants. Nothing is
more dangerous for a State than men who endeavour to
govern it by means of abstract principles drawn from books.
Such men have completely ruined States because the rules
of the past cannot always be apphed to the present, for time,
place, and persons differ. . . .

In considering the ability of ministers, two facts are of
particular importance. In the first place, men of the
greatest natural genius are often more dangerous than useful
in handling affairs of State unless they have more lead
than quicksilver in their composition. Many men are fertile
in good ideas. They abound with original thoughts. How-
ever, such men are often so changeable in their plans that
in the evening they have abandoned their intentions of the
morning. They have so little staying power and logic
that they change their good plans as readily as their bad
ones, and never steadily pursue any policy. I may say with
truth, and I know from experience, that the unsteadiness
and changeableness of such people is no less dangerous
in the management of national affairs than the ill-will of
others.

The second fact which must be borne in mind is that
nothing can be more dangerous for a State than to give a
position of great authority to men who have not sufficient
gifts to guide themselves, but who, nevertheless, believe that
they have so much ability that they need not be guided by.
others. Men of that stamp can neither form a good plan for
themselves nor follow the advice of those who might give
them good counsel. Hence they commit constantly very
great mistakes. One of the greatest vices which a public
man may possess is presumption. Although humihty is not
required in those whose destiny it is to administer a State,

312 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

they should possess modesty. Modesty is absolutely neces-
sary to them, especially as the most capable men are often
least able to bear with assistance and advice, without which
even the ablest men are little fit to govern. Men of the
greatest genius, unless possessed of modesty, are so much
enamoured with their own ideas that they are apt to condemn
the proposals of all other people, even if their views are better
than their own Hence their natural pride and their high
position are apt to make them altogether unbearable. Even
the very ablest man must often listen to the advice of men
whom he believes to be less able. It is prudent for a minister
to speak little and to listen much, for one can profit from all
kinds of advice. Good advice is valuable for itself, while
bad advice confirms the good. . . .

The leading men must be industrious, as I have stated.
However it is not necessary that a man directing pubhc
affairs should be working unceasingly. On the contrary,
nothing is more harmful for him than unceasing labour.
The nature of affairs of State makes relaxation necessary,
and the more important the office is the more necessary is
relaxation. The physical and mental strength of man is
limited, and unceasing labour exhausts both in little time.
It is necessary that those who manage affairs of State should
make these their principal pre-occupation, and that they
should devote to them their whole mind, their whole thought,
and all their strength. Their greatest pleasure should con-
sist not in their amusement, but in their success. States-
men directing the affairs of a country should survey the
whole world in order to be able to foresee the events of the
future. Then they will be able to take measures against
the evils which may come, and to carry through those
measures which are required in the national interest.

As the number of the physicians is often responsible for
the death of the patient, even so the number of ministers is
more often harmful than advantageous to the State. I
would add that no more than four ministers can be usefully
employed, and one of these should be invested with superior
authority. This leading minister should be the mainspring
of the State. He should be like the sun in the firmament.
He should be guided only by his intelligence and should guide

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 313

those around him. I hesitate to put forward this idea, for
I may appear to be pleading my own cause. Still, I should
find it easy to prove from Holy Writ, and from authoritative,
sacred, and profane writers, the necessity of a principal
minister. Besides, I would say that the confidence with
which your Majesty has always honoured me during the time
when I have guided the policy of France was due to your
own free will. Posterity will find that the authority which
I have always enjoyed in your councils has been legitimate.
Therefore, I beheve that I may freely speak upon the subject
without being suspected of questionable motives.

The envy which naturally arises among men of equal
authority, as among States of equal power, is too well known
to make it necessary that I should prove at length the truth
of the fact that a single minister should occupy the pre-
eminent position described above. My experiences have been
so convincing with regard to this principle that I think I
should fail in my duty before God did I not state in formal
terms in this my testament that there is nothing more
dangerous to a State than to entrust its administration
and government to a number of men enjoying power and
authority. A step which one minister desires to undertake is
liable to be opposed by another, and unless the minister who
possesses the best idea is at the same time most skilful in
steering them through, his plans will always be brought to
nought by an opponent gifted with greater power of persua-
sion. Each of the opposing ministers will have his followers.
These will form parties in the State, and thus the strength of
the country, which ought to be united, will be divided. As
the sicknesses and death of man are caused by the oppos-
ing humours of his body, even so the peace of States is dis-
turbed by the disunion and the conflict of men of equal
power, who direct the fate of nations, and these dissensions
are apt to produce evils which at last may bring about the
downfall of the nation.

If it is true that monarchical most closely resembles
divine government by its outward form, if it is true that a
monarchy is superior to all other forms of government, as
the greatest sacred and profane writers have told us, one may
boldly state that the sovereign should entrust the manage-

314 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

ment of the State to one particular person above all others,
for he cannot, or, if he could, would not, have his eye con-
stantly on the chart and on the compass. That stands to
reason. Exactly as several pilots never direct simultaneously
the rudder, even so the rudder of the ship of State should
never be controlled by more than one man at a time. The
steersman of the ship of State may well receive the advice
of other men, and he should even ask for it. Still, it is for
him to examine the advice given, and to direct the course of
the ship to the right or to the left according to his judg-
ment, in order to avoid rocks and to steer his course. . . .
I am well acquainted with the ability, honesty, and courage
which are required in ministers of State. As the controlling
minister of whom we have spoken must stand above the
other ministers in power and authority, so he must be
superior to them by his personal qualities. Consequently
the character of the person chosen to direct the State must
be carefully examined before appointment.

The sovereign must personally know the man whom he
entrusts with so great a responsibility. But although the
leading minister must be appointed by the sovereign, his
choice should, if possible, find the approval of the public, for
general approval will increase the minister's abihty to do
good. It is easy to depict the quahties which a principal
minister should possess, but it is difficult to find these gifts
united in any single person. Still, it must be stated that
the happiness or the misfortune of States depends upon the
choice made. Hence sovereigns are compelled either to
undertake themselves the heavy burden of government, or
to select a man who will so conduct the affairs of the nation
that their selection is approved of in earth and in Heaven.

i Kichelieu believed a monarchy to be the best form of
government. He thought that the best organised monarchy
was not one which was governed by the monarch in person,
be he ever so gifted, but one which was governed by an able
monarch supported by an able Council of Ministers, because
even a ruler of inferior ability could rule well by entrusting
the national government to eminent Ministers. He attached
the greatest value to their ability, experience, and character.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 315

In Kichelieu's opinion, as in that of Prince Bismarck, the worst
ministers are brilliant and dazzling men, lacking thorough-
ness, and men of book-learning and of preconceived notions,
doctrinaires. Unfortunately, men of these two types easily
impose upon the masses. Hence they are usually found in
democratic Cabinets. Kicheheu thought it most important
that Ministers should possess that quiet modesty which is
always found in men who thoroughly know theh* business,
in great experts. He wished that Ministers should devote
their activities entirely to their office, concentrating all
their thoughts and ambitions upon their departments. He
thought that the Council of Ministers should be small ob-
viously because only a small council can deliberate in secret
and can decide rapidly. He advised that the Cabinet should
consist of no more than four men, that one of the four should
be given authority above the remaining three, and that these
three Ministers should not be the equals of the principal
Minister but his assistants, his subordinates. Particular
attention should be paid to the fact that RicheHeu attached
the very highest value to the subordination of the Ministers
to a principal Minister, and that he condenmed emphatically
a Cabinet of Ministers possessing, at least nominally, equal
authority such as those who form the British Cabinet. In
Eichelieu's words : ' There is nothing more dangerous to
a State than to entrust its administration and government
to a number of men enjoying equal power and authority.*
His arguments in favour of concentrating all ministerial
responsibiUty into the hands of a single presiding and
directing Minister are unanswerable. Lastly, Eichelieu re-
commended that the position of principal Minister should be
entrusted only to a man most eminent both in ability and
in personal character, and that, if possible, a popular man
should be chosen. The ideal Prime Minister and his minis-
terial assistants should not be overburdened with work,
but should have sufficient leisure to be able to think ahead,
and to prepare ;£or the future, for otherwise he would be
worn out with labour, and, being too much occupied with

316 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

current' affairs, would be surprised by the march of events.
It will be noticed that government by means of a Cabinet,
as practised in this country, is in every particular dia-
metrically opposed to the form of national organisation
which the great Cardinal described as the most perfect and
the most efficient.

Eichelieu lived three centuries ago. Nevertheless, the
broad principles of efficient government expounded by him
have not been superseded. Experience has proved their
worth. Let us now trace the development of modern
national organisation in the best organised State, in Germany.

Brandenburg-Prussia has had the rare good fortune of
having possessed some most highly gifted rulers endowed
with administrative genius and ability of the highest kind :
Frederick William the Great Elector, who ruled from
1640 to 1688, Frederick William the First, who ruled from
1713 to 1740, and Frederick the Great who ruled from
1740 to 1786. These three sovereigns, w^ho together ruled
during no less than 121 years, raised Brandenburg-Prussia
by their personal labours from insignificance to the rank
of a prosperous Great Power. They governed the country
in person, and directed and controlled themselves the whole
administration. They presided over the ministerial councils,
heard and weighed the opinions of their counsellors, and
then decided. They established the tradition that the
ruler of Prussia is his own Prime Minister, a doctrine to
which Eichelieu was strongly opposed. Capable rulers
were followed by lamentably incapable ones. The personal
misgovernment of Frederick William the Second and
Frederick William the Third brought about Prussia's decline
and downfall.

The Napoleonic War had ended in the triumph of Great
Britain. At the peace England was richer and more power-
ful than she was when the war began. Her prestige in
Europe was unhmited. All nations desired to copy her
political institutions and her economic policy. The British
Government was carried on by a Cabinet of jointly

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 317

responsible Ministers, presided over by a Prime Minister.
It was, therefore, only natural that Prussia, in reorganising
the country, created a Cabinet of jointly responsible Ministers
presided over by a Prime Minister. However, there was
a profound difference between the two Cabinets. The
Prussian Prime Minister was to be the King's Manager.
Bismarck stated on January 24, 1882 :

In Prussia the King himself governs. The ministers
may put on paper the orders which the King has given, but
they do not govern. In the words of the Prussian Constitu-
tion, * The King alone possesses the power of the executive.'
Cabinet Ministers are not mentioned in that document.

The Prussian Ministers are the King's servants, not the
country's.

The great characteristic of Bismarck was his clear critical
faculty. He refused to believe that a form of government
or an economic poUcy was best because it existed in England.
He thought government by means of a jointly responsible
Cabinet an evil, even if it were directed, or presided over,
by the King who was able to order the Ministers whom
he had appointed to do this or that, whether they approved
or disapproved. He shared Eichelieu's opinion that * there
is nothing more dangerous to a State than to entrust its
administration and government to a number of men enjoying
equal power and authority.' He considered that joint
responsibility meant irresponsibility, friction, delay,
inefficiency. Therefore, when he created in 1866 the North
German Federation, the forerunner of the German Empire,
he concentrated all power into the hands of a single principal
Minister, giving him sole responsibility and making the
other Ministers his subordinates. This organisation was
later on taken over by the German Empire. The Empire
has only a single responsible Minister, the Imperial Chan-
cellor, and the subordination of his ministerial assistants
has been emphasised in their very title. While Prussia
has a number of Ministers and a Prime Minister the

318 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

German Empire has a Chancellor supported by a number of
' Secretaries of State.'

As the German Liberals, who loudly advocated Free
Trade and Cabinet Government * as in England ' for the
North German Federation and the German Empire, were
opposed to the absolute supremacy of a single Minister,
Bismarck had to defend this form of government on
numerous occasions. He stated, for instance, in the Reichstag
of the North German Federation, on April 16, 1869 :

A strong, active, and progressive Government is required.
Yet it is desired that for every decision several Ministers of
equal authority should be responsible. It is believed that
by their appointment all the evils of this world may be
cured. A man who has been at the head of a Cabinet and who
has been forced to form decisions on his own responsibility
is not afraid to act, though he alone is responsible, but he
shrinks from the necessity of convincing seven people that
his measures are really the best. That task is more difficult
than that of governing a State. All members of a Cabinet
have an honest and firm conviction. The more honest
and the more capable Ministers are, the more difficult they
will find it to give way to any other man. Every one of the
Ministers is surrounded by a number of pugnacious perma-
nent officials, who also have convictions of their own. In
any case it is difficult to convince a man. One persuades
a man occasionally, or gains him over through courtesy,
but one has to do this seven times. I am firmly convinced,
and my opinion has been created by practical experience,
that government by means of a Cabinet, by means of a
board, is a constitutional error and mistake which every
State should endeavour to get rid of as soon as possible.
I would not lend a hand to impose that mistaken institution
of a Cabinet upon the North German Federation. I believe
that Prussia would make an immense step forward if she
would adopt the principle of the North German Federation,
according to which only a single Minister is responsible.

Responsibility is possible only in the case of a single
individual who in his person can be held responsible for his
action. If the same individual is member of a Cabinet, he

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 319

may answer that he has been outvoted by his colleagues, or
he may say that the opposition he experienced made his
intended measures impracticable, that a bill he intended to
bring in has been delayed for seven years because seven
honest men could not agree on its text. Besides, in every
board discussion the moment arrives at last when the decision
has to be left to chance, to the toss of a coin.

He said in the Keichstag on December 1, 1874 :

What guarantee of moral responsibility have you in the
case of any institution unless responsibility is borne by
a single person ? Absolutely none. Who is responsible
in a Cabinet, consisting of eight or ten independent Ministers,
none of whom can take an important measure unless the
majority of his colleagues support it ? Who is responsible
for the resolutions of a parliamentary majority ? It is
clear that it cannot be sought for in any individual, because
in the case of a majority vote everybody is entitled to say
that he was not in favour of the measure taken, but that
others were opposed to him. . . .

I believe that national affairs can be conducted in a
spirit of unity only if the Government is presided over by a
man who is able to give orders. I should, of course, raise
difficulties to myself if I should frivolously or too easily
make use of that power. On the other hand, the ability
to give orders is a weapon, the possession of which is known
to all, and therefore it becomes rarely necessary to use it.

He stated in the Eeichstag on November 22, 1875 :

The position of a Prime Minister of Prussia is ungrateful
because of his powerlessness. One can be i^esponsible only
for that which one does with one's own free will. A board is
irresponsible, for later on it is impossible to discover the
men who formed the majority which passed this or that
measure. Joint responsibility is a fiction. It may be very
convenient to leave resolutions to a Cabinet and to say the
Cabinet has resolved to do this or that. However, if you
inquire how the resolution was arrived at, every Minister
will shrug his shoulders and tell a different tale, for if there
has been failure no one cares to assume responsibility.

320 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

In his posthumous memoirs, his poUtical testament,
we read :

Official decisions do not gain in honesty and moderation
by being arrived at collectively, for, apart from the fact that,
in the case of voting by majority, arithmetic and chance
take the place of logical reasoning, that feeling of personal
responsibility in which lies the essential guarantee for the
conscientiousness of the decision is lost directly it comes
about by means of anonymous majorities. . . .

The board character of the- Prussian Ministry, with its
majority votes, daily compels Ministers to compromise and
surrender to their colleagues. A real responsibihty in high
pohtics can only be undertaken by one single directing
Minister, never by a numerous board with majority voting

Many similar pronouncements of his might easily be
given.

Bismarck was a keen student of history, and had learned
its lessons. He was aware that divided counsels had been
responsible for confusion in policy and administration and
for the dow^nfall of States since the earliest times ; that
divided councils had sapped the strength, and destroyed,
kingdoms and ohgarchies, aristocracies and democracies ;
that no organisation can be efficient which is nominally
controlled by many heads — which has no real head but
at best a figurehead ; that a nation, like an army, or
like a commercial undertaking, can be successfully and
responsibly directed and controlled only by one man.

Kichelieu and Bismarck were the greatest civilian states-
men of modern times, and Frederick the Great and Napoleon
the First were the greatest military statesmen. They were
certainly at least as eminent as organisers and adminisr
trators as they were as generals. Not unnaturally both
were in favour of a single and undivided control of the
national government and administration, and were abso-
lutely opposed to divided control because the latter
means no control, but drift, delay, inefficiency, intrigue,
and disaster.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 321

Frederick the Great stated in his ' Essai sur les Formes de
Gouvernement ' of 1777 :

If a ruler abandons the helm of the ship of State and
places it into the hands of paid men, of Ministers appointed
by him, one will steer to the right and another to the left.
A general plan is no longer followed. Every Minister disap-
proves of the actions of his predecessor, and makes changes
even if they are quite unnecessary, wishing to originate a new
policy which is often harmful. He is succeeded by Ministers
who also hasten to overthrow the existing institutions in
order to show their ability. In consequence of the numerous
innovations made none can take root. Confusion, disorder,
and all the other vices of a bad administration arise,
and incapable or worthless officials blame the multitude of
changes for their shortcomings.

Men are attached to their own. As the State does not
belong to the Ministers in power they have no real interest
in its welfare. Hence the Government is carried on with
careless indifference, and the result is that the administra-
tion, the public finances, and the army deteriorate. Thus
the monarchy becomes an oligarchy. Ministers and generals
direct affairs in accordance with their fancy. Systematic
administration disappears. Everyone follows his own
notions. No link is left which connects the directing
factors. As all the wheels and springs of the watch serve
together the single object of measuring time, all the springs
and wheels of a Government should be so arranged and co-
ordinated that all the departments of the national adminis-
tration work together with the single aim of promoting the
greatest good of the State. That aim should not be lost
sight of for a single moment. Besides, the individual
interests of Ministers and generals usually cause them to
oppose each other. Thus personal differences often prevent
the carrying through of the most necessary measures.

National disasters of the greatest magnitude are obviously
the most searching tests of the value of the national organisa-
tion. The Seven Years' War was fought chiefly on Prussian
soil. The country had been overrun by hostile troops, had

322 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

been utterly devastated, and had in part become abandoned
by man. Yet, ten years after the war the population, the
income and the wealth of Prussia were considerably greater
than at its beginning, as I have shown very fully in another
book which supplies a mass of documentary information
on Frederick the Great as an organiser and administrator.^
In it will be found copious extracts from the King's writings,
and especially from his two Political Testaments, which
have not previously been published in English.

Now let us see what the administration of Napoleon
the first can teach us.

Napoleon the First was an organising genius. His
military triumphs proved ephemeral, but in the domain
of national organisation and administration his work has
endured. Professor Pariset wrote justly in the * Cambridge
Modern History ' :

Bonaparte directed the reorganisation of France, and
never perhaps in history was a work so formidable accom-
plished so quickly. Order and regularity were established
in every branch of the administration. The greater part
of the institutions founded during the Consulate have sur-
vived to the present day, and it is no exaggeration to state
that it was Bonaparte who created contemporary France.

The French Eevolution had destroyed the work of
eight centuries and had left nothing but ruin and disorder.
The Treasury was empty. The taxes failed to come in.
The paper money was greatly depreciated. No loans could
be raised. The nation had repeatedly become bankrupt.
The consecutive revolutionary Governments were govern-
ments of many heads. Although the revolutionary leaders
were men of the greatest abiUty, divided councils and the
influence of popular passion had caused them to adopt
the most insane measures. They had madly destroyed
the national organisation and the national credit. In
1796 the louis d'or of twenty-four francs was worth from

1 The Foundations of Germany, Smith, Elder & Co., 1916.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 323

6107 francs to 8137 francs in assignats. A pair of boots
which cost thirty francs in gold cost about 10,000 francs
in paper. In 1799, at the end of which Napoleon became
First Consul, the 5 per cent. Eente reached the minimum
price of seven, yielding thus 71| per cent, to the purchaser.
Unrestricted self-government had produced administrative
anarchy throughout the provinces. Edmond Blanc tells us in
his ' Napoleon I, ses Institutions Civiles et Administratives ' :

For a long time no money had been available for con-
structing or repairing roads and bridges, and these had
fallen into decay. Koads no longer existed. Where they
had been, the ground was full of holes yards wide and
deep, in which carts and carriages disappeared. Fourcroy
reported that in travelling from Tours to Poitiers and to La
Rochelle, and thence to Nantes, his carriage was broken six
times, and that eleven times he was compelled to employ
several teams of oxen for drawing it out of the mire. Carters
would only proceed in numbers so as to be able to assist one
another, and would frequently travel across the cultivated
fields because passage through them was easier than along
the so-called roads. At night the roads were unusable, and
carters could often do no more than three or four miles per
day.

This state of affairs had made transport by road very
expensive. The internal trade of France came almost to
an end. Wheat which fetched 18 francs in the market at
Nantes cost 36 francs at Brest. Hence, scarcity prevailed
in many departments. During the first years of the Direc-
toire, out of 85,000 people in Rouen no less than 64,000 had
to be supplied Vvith bread by public distribution. During
the Directoire r.nd the first few years of the Consulate the
problem how to feed the people was the principal preoccupa-
tion of the Government. France, like modern India, lived
under the dread of impending famine.

The canals of France were as neglected as the roads.
The harbours of Eochefort and Fréjus were filled with mud.
The vast drainage works of the time of Louis the Fourteenth
had fallen into ruin, and so had the dykes which protected
the country against floods. The roads were infested with

324 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

robbers. The administration of the law had broken down,
and the prevaiUng insecurity had led to the standstill of
business.

On December 24, 1799, Napoleon was made First Consul,
and on the evening of that day he dictated to his friend
Eoederer a proclamation in which he promised to the people
not only independence and glory, but also the creation
of an orderly administration, the re-establishment of the
national finances, the reform of the laws and the re-creation
of the prosperity of the utterly impoverished nation. To
the surprise of the world he carried out that colossal pro-
gramme within a few years. He created order in the local
and national government and security of the person and
of property. Soon the taxes were once more regularly
paid. Kapidly the laws wore improved and codified. Koads;
canals, and public works of every kind were constructed.
A new France arose. The 5 per cent. Eente, which in
1799 had touched seven, touched 44 in 1800, 68 in 1801,
and 93-40 in 1807. According to a statement which on
February 25, 1813, Comte de Montalivet, Napoleon's Minister
of the Interior, placed before the Corps Législatif, France
spent, from 1804 to 1813 alone, the following gigantic
sums on public works :

Francs

Fortresses, arsenals, and barracks . . . 143,669,600

Roads and highways 277,484,549

Bridges 30,605,356

Canals, river regulation, and draining of swamps . 1 22,587,898

Sea harbours and dykes 117,328,710

PubUo works in Paris 102,421,187

Public buildings in the provinces .... 149,108,550

Imperial residences and Crown properties . . 62,054,583

Total 1,005,260,433

Napoleon had an unlimited power for work. His
Ministers, like those of Eichelieu, Bismarck, and Frederick
the Great, were his servants. They were independent of
Parliament. The initiative for legislation and adminis-
tration was given to the Conseil d'État, a most interesting

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 325

and most valuable institution which had the same function
in the State that a powerful General Staff has in an army.
It contained men of the very highest ability and distinction
belonging to all parties — red revolutionaries, moderates,
royalists, exiled and former nobles, administrators, generals,
admirals, and great lawyers. It possessed five sections for
Finance, Legislation, War, Navy, Home Affairs. Each
section discussed and prepared its own measures, and these
were then submitted to, and discussed by, the whole council.
The Code Napoléon was thus evolved. Napoleon himself
took a very active part in these plenary sittings, attending
often during seven or eight hours and scrutinising every
proposal. As the Conseil d'État worked behind closed
doors, no speeches addressed to the electors were made in
it. Discussion was carried on by brief and telling argument.
No time was wasted. The result was that innumerable
vast reforms were brought forward at almost incredible
speed, and that every Government measure was wise and
was carefully worked out in all details, embodying not only
the views of the technical experts but the experience of the
foremost men of France as well.

Both Frederick the Great and Napoleon the First by
concentrating all the administrative power into their own
hands, were able to repair in a few years unprecedented
ravages and to convert chaos, poverty, and starvation
into order, wealth, and plenty. Boards and councils are
slow-moving and timorous bodies wedded to precedent
and hampered by obstruction, intrigue, and sheer stupidity.
No Cabinet of Ministers could have achieved a tithe of
the national reconstruction and reorganisation accom-
plished so rapidly by Frederick and Napoleon.

The greatest statesmen of the New World agree with
the greatest statesmen of the Old in beheving that the
national government should be controlled and directed not
by a Cabinet, not by a number of men of equal authority,
but by a single individual supported by a council of able
men of his own choosing, his subordinates. The founders

326 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

of the United States placed the Executive into the hands
of a practically irresponsible President who was free to
appoint his Ministerial subordinates who cannot be forced
out of office by a parHamentary vote. The American
President is an elected king possessed of vast power, and in
time of war he is the actual commander-in-chief of the
Army and Navy. The greatest American statesmen, the
makers of the Constitution, entrusted the Executive to a
single man, beheving that only thus efficiency and true
responsibihty could be ensured. I have given their views
very fully in the following chapter, to which I would refer
those who desire detailed information. Alexander Hamilton,
the greatest constructive statesman of the United States,
wrote in the Federalist :

Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any com-
mon enterprise or pursuit there is always danger of difference
of opinion. If it be a public trust or office, in which they are
clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar
danger of personal emulation and even animosity. . . .
Men often oppose a thing merely because they have had no
agency in planning it, or because it may have been planned
by those whom they dishke. But if they have been con-
sulted and have appeared to disapprove, opposition then
becomes, in their estimation, an indispensable duty of self-
love. ... No favourable circumstances palliate or atone
for the disadvantages of dissension in the executive depart-
ment. Here they are pure and unmixed. There is no point
at which they cease to operate. They serve to embarrass
and weaken the execution of the plan or measure to which
they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of it.
They constantly counteract those quaUties in the Executive
which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition,
vigour and expedition, and this without any counterbalancing
good. In the conduct of war, in which the energy of the
Executive is the bulwark of the national security, everything
would be to be apprehended from its plurality. . . .

But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the
Executive is that it tends to conceal faults and destroy

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 327

responsibility. ... It often becomes impossible, amidst
mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the
punishment of a pernicious measure, or a series of pernicious
measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to
another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible
appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense about
the real author. ... * I was overruled by my council.
The council were so divided in their opinions that it was
impossible to obtain any better resolution on the point.'
These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether
true or false. And who is there that will either take the
trouble or incur the odium of a strict scrutiny into the
secret springs of the transaction ?

Alexander Hamilton's views curiously agree with those
of Prince Bismarck previously given.

To the readers of these pages it will be clear that the
greatest statesmen of the European Continent and of the
United States were absolutely opposed to entrusting the
control of the national government and administration to a
Cabinet of jointly responsible Ministers, beheving that
efficiency was incompatible with that form of government.
It will be clear to them that the greatest statesmen of modern
times beheved a body, such as the British Cabinet, a source
of division, of weakness, and of danger ; that they considered
that such a body would, owing to its divided councils, create
disorganisation and confusion ; that joint responsibiHty
would destroy all real responsibility ; that the control of
affairs by a number of men would chiefly be productive
of hesitation, vacillation, and delay, and make secrecy and
rapid action impossible.

Those who write or speak about the British Constitution
habitually treat the control of national affairs by a number
of jointly responsible directors, who are supposed to act
unanimously in all matters of importance, as if this arrange-
ment were a matter of course, as if it had existed since time
immemorial and had by its very antiquity proved its excel-
lence. They treat it as if it were the last word and the

328 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

highest expression of national organisation. In reahty
the national organisation of Great Britain, which formerly
was highly centraHsed and extremely efficient, has gradu-
ally much deteriorated. Let us see what we can learn
from that most important part of Britain's history which
is usually not mentioned in the text-books.

In the olden days Great Britain was governed by powerful
Kingô with the assistance of a Council. The local adminis-
tration was entrusted to great noblemen who acted as the
King's representatives, for a regular civil service with
salaried officials is a very modern invention. These noble-
men were paid by being allowed to exploit the land granted
to them and the people dwelling thereon, and in return
they had to keep order and to support the King. In course
of time the power of the noblemen grew at the cost of
the King, against whom they frequently revolted. Tliey
considered themselves the nation and dominated Parlia-
ment, the King's Council, and the King himself, and ruled
the country. The most powerful noblemen occupied then
a position not dissimilar to that now held by party leaders
and, like party leaders, they fought one another for
supremacy. They ruined the nation by their personal
feuds. These disorders and abuses, which might have
ended in England's downfall, were abolished by the energetic
rulers of the House of Tudor, who reorganised the dis-
tracted and impoverished country and made it united, rich,
cultured, and powerful. Professor Marriott tells us in his
excellent book, * English Pohtical Institutions ' :

From 1404 to 1437 the King's Council was not merely
dependent upon Parliament, but was actually nominated
by them. But the result was a dismal failure. . . . The
result was that while Parliament was busy in establishing its
rights against the Crown, the nation was sinking deeper and
deeper into social anarchy. . . The people, reduced to
social confusion by the weak and nerveless rule of the Lan-
castrians, emerged from the Wars of the Koses anxious for the
repose and discipline secured to them by the New Monarchy.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 329

For a century the Tudors continued to administer
the tonic which they had prescribed to the patient suffering
from disorder and economic anaemia. The evolution
of the Parhamentary machinery was temporarily arrested,
but meanwhile the people grew socially and commer-
cially. Aristocratic turbulence was sternly repressed ;
extraordinary tribunals were erected to deal with powerful
offenders ; vagrancy was severely punished ; work was found
for the unemployed ; trade was encouraged ; the navy was
organised on a permanent footing ; scientific training in
seamanship was provided ; excellent secondary schools were
established — in these and in many other ways the New
Monarchy, despotic and paternal though it was, brought
order out of chaos and created a New England.

Let us now briefly survey how the Fredericks and
Bismarcks of the Tudor period created this New England.

About the year 1470, during the reign of King Edward
the Fourth of the House of York, Sir John Fortescue, the
Chief Justice of the King's Bench, wrote a most interesting
and important treatise, * The Governance of England.'
A particularly remarkable chapter, the fifteenth, deals
with the Cabinet question, and is entitled * How the King's
Council may be Chosen and Estabhshed.' In sHghtly
modernised EngHsh it runs as follows :

The King's Council was wont to be chosen of great
princes and of the greatest lords of the land, both spiritual
and temporal, and also of other men that were in great
authority and office. Which lords and officers had in their
hands also many matters of their own to be treated in the
Council, as had the King. Wherefore, when they came
together, they were so occupied with their own matters,
and with the matters of their kin, servants, and tenants,
that they attended but little, and sometimes not at all, to
the King's business.

And also there were but few matters of the King's, but if
these same matters touched also the said counsellors, their
cousins, their servants, tenants or such others as they owed
favour to, what lower man was there sitting in that Council

330 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

that durst speak against the opinion of any of the great
lords ? And why might not then men, by means of corrup-
tion of the servants, counsellors, and of some of the lords,
move the lords to partiahty, and make them also favourable
and partial as were the same servants or the parties that so
moved them ?

Then could no matter treated in the Council be kept quiet.
For the Lords oftentimes told their own advisers and ser-
vants that had sued to them for those matters how they had
sped in the Council and who was against them. How may
the King be counselled to refrain giving away his land, or
giving ofi&cers grants or pensions of abbeys by such great
lords to other men's servants, since they most desire such
gifts for themselves and their servants ?

Which things considered, and also many others which
shall be showed hereafter, it is thought good that the King
had a council chosen and established in the form that
follows, or in some other form like thereto. First that there
were chosen twelve ecclesiastics and twelve laymen of the
wisest and best disposed men that can be found in all parts
of this land, and that they be sworn to counsel the King after
a form to be devised for their oath. And, in particular,
that they shall take no fee, no clothing, and no reward from
any man except from the King as do the justices of the
King's Bench and of the Common Pleas when they take
their offices. And that these twenty-four men be permanent
councillors, but if any fault should be found in them, or if
the King should desire it by the advice of the majority of
the Council, he should change any of them. And that every
year be chosen by the King four lords spiritual and four
lords temporal to be for that year of the same council,
exactly as the said twenty-four councillors shall be.

And that they all have a head or a chief to rule the
Council, one of the said twenty-four, and chosen by the
King and holding his office at the King's pleasure, which may
then be called Caipitalis consiliarius. . . .

These councillors might continually, and at such hours
as might be assigned to them, discuss and deliberate upon
the matters of difficulty that have fallen to the King, and
upon the policy of the realm, how the going out of money

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 331

may be restrained, how bullion may be brought into the
land, how plate, jewels, and money lately taken out of the
country may be got back again. For all this truly wise
men will soon find the means. Also how the prices of
merchandise produced in this country may be maintained
and increased, and how the prices of merchandise imported
into England may be lowered. How our navy may be
maintained and augmented, and upon such other points of
policy which are of the greatest profit and advantage to this
country. How also the laws may be amended in such
things in which they need reform.

Through the activity of the Council the Parliament will
be able to do more good in a month by way of amending
laws than they do now in a year, if the amendments proposed
be debated and made ripe for their hands by the Council.

Sir John Fortescue complained that the ' greatest lords '
of the King's Council, the Cabinet of the time, attended
chiefly to their own business and to that of their friends and
retainers, neglecting that of the King and Nation, that they
practised a shameless favouritism, did not keep secret the
affairs of State, and thus made a wise policy and efficient
administration impossible. He proposed that a new council
of twenty-four of the wisest and best- disposed men should
be estabhshed, one-half being laymen, and one-half clerics.
Before the Keformation the Church represented learning
and was comparable to the professional classes of the present
day. Besides Churchmen had learnt the art of organisation,
of administration and of government through their Church.
Lastly, as the Church was an international body. Churchmen
were best acquainted with international affairs. Hence,
ecclesiastics were the greatest administrators and diplomats
of the time. The twenty-four councillors were not to be
* great lords,' corresponding to eminent politicians of the
present. They were to be chosen on the ground of their
capacity for business and to be permanently employed. In
modern language, they were to be permanent officials,
experts. They were to be reinforced by four lords spiritual.

332 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

and four lords temporal, corresponding to Members of
Parliament of the present day, but these were not to be
permanent members of the Council, for they were to be
chosen every year. The President of the Council, it is worth
noting, was to be taken from the permanent official members,
not from the powerful representatives of the nobility or the
Church, and he was to act as manager for the King who was
to be the real head of the Council. Sir John Fortescue
wished to create a Council which combined the functions of
the present Cabinet with those of Napoleon's Conseil d'État
described in these pages, for the Council was to prepare all
measures which were to be submitted to Parliament making
them ' ripe for their hands.'

Sir John's wish to reduce the power usurped by the
territorial and clerical magnates and to increase that of the
King, for the Nation's good, and his wish to have the
national policy and administration controlled by a king,
supported by the most eminent experts, was soon to be
fulfilled. In 1485 the wise and energetic Henry the Seventh
came to the throne. He did not allow the powerful nobility
to dominate him or his Council. He governed the country
himself, supported by the ablest men of the land. The
great Lord Bacon has told us :

He was of a high mind and loved his own will, and his
own way ; as one that revered himself, and would reign
indeed. Had he been a private man he would have been
termed proud. But in a wise prince it was but keeping of
distance, which indeed he did towards all ; not admitting
any near or full approach, either to his power or to his secrets,
for he was governed by none. . . .

To his council he did refer much and sat oft in person,
knowing it to be the way to assist his power and inform his
judgment. In which respect also he was fairly patient of
liberty, both of advice and of vote, till himself were declared.
He kept a straight hand on his nobihty, and chose rather
to advance clergymen and lawyers which were more ob-
sequious to him, but had less interest in the people, which

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 333

made for his absoluteness, but not for his safety. He was
not afraid of an able man, as Louis the Eleventh was ; but,
contrariwise, he was served by the ablest men that were
to be found, without which his affairs could not have pros-
pered as they did. Neither did he care how cunning they
were that he did employ, for he thought himself to have the
master-reach. And as he chose well, so he held them up
well. . . .

He was a prince, sad, serious, and full of thoughts and
secret observations, and full of notes and memorials of his
own hand, especially touching persons ; as whom to employ,
whom to reward, whom to inquire of, whom to beware of,
what were the dependencies, what were the factions, and the
like ; keeping, as it were, a journal of his thoughts.

King Henry the Seventh, who had found England
impoverished and distraught, left to his son, Henry the
Eighth, a well-ordered and prosperous country and an
overflowing treasury.

Henry the Eighth, his son, was only eighteen years old
when he succeeded his father, and very naturally he was not
able to govern in person through a Council. The Govern-
ment was carried on by the King through a Manager, first
through Cardinal Wolsey, who raised England's prestige
to the highest point by his foreign policy, and afterwards
through Thomas Cromwell, who carried through the Refor-
mation. Henry's rule was of the greatest benefit to the
country. In Professor Pollard's words :

Henry the Eighth took the keenest interest from the
first in learning and in the navy. ... No small part of
his energies was devoted to the task of expanding the Royal
authority at the expense of temporal competitors. Wales
and its marshes were brought into legal union with the rest
of England, and the Council of the North was set up to bring
into subjection the extensive jurisdictions of the Northern
Earls. ... It was of the highest importance that England
should be saved from rehgious civil war, and it could only
be saved by a despotic government. It was necessary for
the future development of England that its governmental

334 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

system should be centralised and unified, that the authority
of the monarchy should be more firmly extended over Wales
and the western and northern borders, and that the still
existing feudal franchises should be crushed ; and these
objects were worth the price paid in the methods of the Star
Chamber and of the Councils of the North and of Wales.
Henry's work on the navy requires no apology ; without it
Elizabeth's victory over the Spanish Armada, the liberation
of the Netherlands, and the development of English Colonies
would have been impossible ; and of all others the year
1545 best marks the birth of the English naval power.
He had a passion for efficiency, and for the greatness of
England and himself.

King Honry the Eighth died in 1547, and between that
year and 1558 the country was under the rule of the child-
king Edward the Sixth and of Queen Mary, Bloody Mary,
of painful memory. Under their weak and only nominal
rule, England was once more torn by party strife, and at
the advent of Queen Elizabeth in 1558 disorganisation and
poverty had become great and general. Froude has told
us in his History :

On all sides the ancient organisation of the country was
out of joint. The fortresses from Berwick to Falmouth were
half in ruins, dismantled, and ungarrisoned. The Tower
was as empty of arms as the Treasury of money. . . . Bare
of the very necessaries for self-defence, the Queen found
herself with a war upon her hands, with Calais lost, the
French in full possession of Scotland, where they were
fast transporting an army, and with a rival claimant to her
crown, whose right, by the letter of the law, was better
than her own. Her position was summed up in an address
to the Council as follows : * The Queen poor ; the realm
exhausted ; the nobihty poor and decayed ; good captains
and soldiers wanting ; the people out of order ; war with
France ; the French King bestriding the realm, having one
foot in Calais and the other in Scotland ; steadfast enemies,
but no steadfast friends.' The Spanish Ambassador, the
Conde de Feria, reported shortly after Ehzabeth's accession :

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 335

* His Majesty had but to resolve, and he might be master of
the situation. . . . The realm is in such a state that we
could best negotiate here sword in hand. They have neither
money, leaders, nor fortresses.'

The position was truly a desperate one. It seemed
inevitable that Great Britain would be conquered by France
and Spain. To the surprise of the world. Queen Elizabeth
once more created order in the country and made Great
Britain more powerful, flourishing, and cultured than she
had ever been in the past. She accomplished that mar-
vellous feat not through her own genius but through the
great ability of Lord Burleigh, the Bismarck of the time.
In Froude's words : The wisdom of Elizabeth was the wisdom
of her Ministers, and her chief merit lay in allowing her policy
to be guided by Lord Burleigh.

The golden age of the Tudors was created by three all-
powerful Ministers who with heart and soul worked for
their country. Both Cardinal Wolsey and Thomas Cromwell
governed the country during ten consecutive years, and
Lord Burleigh toiled unceasingly on behalf of his Queen
during no less than forty years. One-man government
exercised through a single responsible and all-powerful
Minister raised impoverished and diminished England to
the greatest glory.

With the death of Queen EHzabeth in 1603 the Hne of
Tudor monarchs came to an end. To England's misfortune
these able, energetic, wise, and far-seeing rulers were suc-
ceeded by the weak, headstrong, capricious, and incapable
Stuarts, who never felt at home in England, James the
First, Charles the First, Charles the Second, and James
the Second. They endeavoured to govern through Court
favourites. They brought the Crown into contempt. They
were followed by foreigners, by dull and weak monarchs,
and the prestige of the Crown dechned still further.
The capable WilHam the Third, a Dutchman, was suc-
ceeded by Queen Anne, the daughter of James the Second,
whose husband was a Danish Prince, and at her death, in

336 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

1714, the Crown was given to George the First, the Elector
of Hanover, a grandson of a daughter of James the First.
He was installed by the aristocracy, which desired to keep
all power in its own hands. George the First, like a Venetian
Doge, was to be merely a shadow-king, a puppet of those
who had made him. He felt a stranger in England, he
never hked the country and the people, he did not know
EngHsh, he painfully communicated with his Ministers in
broken and ungrammatical Latin, and he was told by those
who had installed him that his whole duty consisted in
wearing his crown, drawing his pay, and saying ditto to
his Ministers. According to Coxe's * Walpole,' the French
Ambassador reported to his Government on July 20, 1724,
when George the First had been King for ten years :

The King, leaving the internal government entirely to
Walpole, is more engaged with the German Ministers in
regulating the affairs of Hanover than occupied with those
of England. ... He has no predilection for the Enghsh
nation, and never receives in private any English of either
sex. ... He rather considers England as a temporary
possession, to be made the most of while it lasts, than as a
perpetual inheritance to himself and family. He will have
no disputes with the Parliament, but commits the entire
transaction of that business to Walpole, choosing rather
that the responsibihty should fall on the Minister's head
than his own.

As the foreign King did not preside over the Ministerial
Councils, whose proceedings he could not follow owing
to his ignorance of Enghsh, the Ministers decided without
him in his absence. Thus the present form of Cabinet
government arose.

George the Second, who had a German consort, felt
almost as much a stranger in England as did his father.
He did what he was told by his Ministers, whose omni-
potence became still more firmly estabhshed. He told Chan-
cellor Hardwicke * The Ministers are the King in this country.*
The wives of George the Third, George the Fourth,

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 337

and William the Fourth also were German Princesses.
Monarchy and Government drifted apart. England became
an oligarchy. Her government, as that of Venice, fell into
the hands of aristocratic factions which dominated ParHa-
ment, filled all offices with their relatives and friends,
fought one another for place and power, and divided the
country against itself. They ruled largely by intrigue and
corruption and they desired to enjoy power without
responsibihty.

The Cabinet is a Committee of the Privy Council from
which it has sprung. The Act of Settlement of 1700 provided :

That from and after the time that the further limitation
by this Act shall take effect, all matters and things relating
to the well governing of this kingdom, which are properly
recognisable in the Privy Council by the laws and customs of
this realm, shall be transacted there, and all resolutions
taken thereupon shall be signed by such of the Privy Council
as shall advise and consent to the same.

England's new rulers wished to replace the divine right
of kings by the divine right of party leaders. Personal
responsibihty was felt by the men in power to be an incon-
venience. The paragraph quoted was repealed in 1706.
The fiction of the joint responsibihty of the Cabinet was
created in order to make the responsibihty of individual
Ministers unascertainable. The British Cabinet Council,
Uke the Venetian Council of Ten, its prototype, sits in secret.
Nothing is transacted in writing. No notes are allowed to
be taken. No records of the proceedings are kept for the
information and guidance of future generations. As in
a conspiracy, no traces are left which might help to attribute
the responsibihty for decisions arrived at to any individuals
or enable posterity to discover the reasons why they were
taken.

Committee government through a Cabinet has proved
as improvident, dilatory, inefficient, and wasteful in England
as it has in Venice. The British Government was a by-

338 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

word of inefficiency during the rule of the Georges, except
in the time of the elder Pitt, the great Lord Chatham.
Then it suddenly became most efficient because Pitt's
powerful personality absolutely dominated his nominal
colleagues. Under his energetic direction England once
more enjoyed one-man rule. Pitt converted defeat, humilia-
tion, and disorder into efficiency, order, and victory.
His ministerial colleagues were his subordinates. Important
decisions were taken by an inner Cabinet composed of Pitt,
Holderness, and Newcastle. Basil WiUiams, in his excellent
* Life of William Pitt,' has briefly and correctly described
his government as follows :

Much as he asked from his subordinates, Pitt gave more
himself. He had trained himself for directing campaigns
by his military studies, for diplomacy by his industry in
acquiring a knowledge of French history and standard
works on treaties and negotiations. . . . Where his own
knowledge was deficient he was always ready to learn from
those better informed. . . . His regular system of intelli-
gence from foreign countries was admirably organised. . . .
All these advantages — a well-ordered office, his own industry
and knowledge, good intelligence — ^were subservient to the
daemonic energy with which he executed his plans. His
maxim was that nothing was impossible. When an admiral
came to him with a tale that his task was impossible, ' Sir,
I walk on impossibihties,' replied Pitt, showing his two
gouty crutches, and bade him be off to the impossible
task. ...

Pitt's Cabinet, on the whole, worked well with him, for
the members rarely ventured to oppose him. Newcastle
was cowed and could always be brought to reason by a
threat of resignation by Pitt ; Holderness was too devoid
of convictions to give much trouble ; the Lord Keeper
Henley had not found his feet ; Temple was devoted to his
brother-in-law, and not yet jealous ; Anson and Ligonier
were really no more than chiefs of the Navy and Army
staffs ; Legge was timid ; Halifax, of the Board of Trade,
was only admitted on sufferance ; Devonshire and Bedford

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 339

took little part ; Hardwicke was kept in order by Granville,
who had generally dined and pleased himself with unpalatable
truths about his colleagues ; and Mansfield, if he ever had
an opinion to express, was reduced to silence by Pitt's
withering ' The Chief Justice of England has no opinion to
give on this matter.'

Pitt made Cabinet government a success by subordinating
the Ministers to his imperious will and his vast abiHty,
by not allowing his so-called colleagues to restrain his
daemonical energy and his all-embracing genius.

To those who have studied Enghsh history at its source
it is clear that Great Britain was most progressive, that
her government was most efficient, and that her diplomacy
and army were most ably handled in the time of the Tudors,
of Cromwell, and of the elder Pitt, when she enjoyed the
advantages of one-man government. England's experience
confirms the views of RicheUeu, Bismarck, Frederick the
Great, Napoleon the First, Alexander Hamilton, and of the
greatest statesman of antiquity given in these pages.

Unfortunately the British Cabinet tends to become from
year to year more unwieldy and more inefficient. A friendly
and discriminating American critic, Professor Lowell, wrote
in his classical book, * The Government of England ' :

The number of members in the Cabinet has varied very
much at different times, and of late years it has shown a
marked tendency to increase. . . . The development of
the parliamentary system has made it necessary for the
Cabinet to have an ever stronger and stronger hold upon
the House of Commons ; and, therefore, the different shades
of feeling in the party that has a majority in that House
must be more and more fully represented in the Cabinet.
This alone would tend to increase the number of its members ;
but far more important still is the fact that a seat in the
Cabinet has become the ambition of all the prominent men
in Parhament. Consequently the desire to be included is
very great, and the disappointment correspondingly acute.
For these various reasons there is a constant pressure to

340 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

increase the size of the Cabinet. The result is not without
its evils. A score of men cannot discuss and agree on a
policy with the same readiness as a dozen. There is more
danger of delay when action must be taken. There is a
greater probability of long discussions that are inconclusive
or result in a weak compromise. There is, in short, all the
lack of administrative efficiency which a larger body always
presents, unless, indeed, that body is virtually guided and
controlled by a small number of its own members.

The unwieldiness and inefficiency of British Cabinets
are still further increased by a very important factor which
Professor Lowell has not mentioned. The Prime Minister
and other influential Ministers who wish to control the
national policy through the Cabinet endeavour to strengthen
their position by keeping some of the ablest men outside
the charmed circle and by introducing into it a number of
nonentities, a bodyguard of their own, which increases
their influence and voting power and correspondingly
diminishes the Cabinet's efficiency. This residuum of
nonentities is naturally sometimes fought for by the leading
Ministers who wish to secure its support. Lord John Kussell
significantly wrote to Lord Lansdowne on May 28, 1854 :
* It seems to me that the presence of many able men in the
Cabinet tends to discordance of opinion and indecision.' In
the third volume of Morley's * Gladstone ' we read, * A shght
ballast of mediocrity in a Government steadies the ship
and makes for unity.'

Great Britain is governed by a Cabinet composed of the
most eminent party leaders and of those of their followers
whom they wish to have near at hand. The management of
Army and Navy, the direction of the diplomatic service,
&c., are political prizes, are * spoils of office.' The highest
administrative positions have become political perquisites.
They are given to men not for their administrative quahfica-
tions, but exclusively on account of their pohtical and social
influence without any regard to their aptitude. High office
is often given to poUticians who have had no practical

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 341

experience whatever in administration, and sometimes to
men who are utterly unfitted for a Ministerial post. No one
can faithfully serve several masters. As a pohtician- minister
has probably a business of his own to attend to and must
devote much time to party politics in the House of Commons,
he can attend only perfunctorily to the business of State.
Naturally, disorder, delay, and stagnation in departmental
administration is the result. In former ages the national
Government was mismanaged by Court favourites. Their
place has been taken by party favourite^.

The Cabinet is supposed to decide all important questions
unanimously. The Army, the Navy, the Diplomatic Service,
the national finances, &c., are nominally directed by a
single amateur, but in important questions each service is
directed by the combined wisdom of some twenty amateurs.
One of these knows a httle of the business in hand, and the
remaining twenty-one know less. Thus, a party politician,
who all his Hfe has done nothing except make speeches,
has suddenly to take over the functions of a general, an
admiral, a diplomat, an expert on agriculture, an authority
on shipping and finance, &c., in rapid succession. To do
this efficiently he must have a greater and more universal
genius than was vouchsafed to Napoleon the First or to the
elder Pitt. Jack-of-all-trades are masters of none. Napoleon
wrote to Berthier on October 24, 1803 :

L'expérience prouve que le plus grand défaut en admini-
stration générale est de vouloir faire trop ; cela conduit à
ne point avoir ce dont on a besoin.

In former ages when matters were simple, when the
public services were rudimentary, when a few clerks and a
door-keeper could handle the business of one of the great
Government departments, it was perhaps possible for an
amateur to direct successfully a department of State. Now,
when the administrative departments have grown to gigantic
size, and when the Services have become all-embracing and
highly technical, none but great experts can satisfactorily

342 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

iiianagG a great department. Aristotle wrote in the fourth
century before Christ :

A State requires many assistants and many superin-
tendents. . . . We observe that the division of labour
greatly facilitates all pursuits, and that each kind of work
is best performed when each is allotted to a separate
workman. To the complicated affairs of Government this
observation is particularly applicable.

If a careful division of administrative labour, if Govern-
ment by speciahsts was recognised to be necessary in the
tiny Greek City-States 2300 years ago, how much more
necessary then is expert government in a modern world-
empire of 400,000,000 inhabitants ?

Blackstone wrote in the time of Frederick the Great in
his celebrated * Commentaries * :

It is perfectly amazing that there should be no other state
of life, no other occupation, art, or science, in which some
method of instruction is not looked upon as requisite, except
only the science of legislation, the noblest and most difficult
of any. Apprenticeships are held necessary to almost every
art, commercial or mechanical : a long course of reading
and study must form the divine, the physician, and the
practical professor of the laws ; but every man of superior
fortune thinks himself born a legislator.

During the last three centuries British national organisa-
tion has progressively deteriorated.

Napoleon wrote at St. Helena un mauvais général vaut
mieux que deux bons. War is a one-man business. The
greatest generals of all time — lack of space prevents giving
their opinions in this place — have stated that nothing is
more dangerous in warfare than to allow mihtary operations
to be directed by a military council, by a council of experts.
The great War' was for a long time directed not by a council
of mihtary experts, but by a council of pohticians, by the
Cabinet. When Mr. Churchill was reproached for the failure

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 343

of the Dardanelles Expedition, Mr. Asquith declared in the
House of Commons that Mr. Churchill was not to blame, that
it had been approved of * by the Cabinet as a whole,' and
the House and the country were perfectly satisfied with
that explanation. No one asked whether that expedition
had been originated and approved of by the experts ! As
long as mihtary operations are jointly directed by a body
of amateurs, disaster is more hkely to be the result than
success. The British Government, as hitherto constituted,
is not the organisation of efficiency, but its negation. It
is an organisation similar to that which caused the down-
fall of Poland. It is the organisation of disorganisation.
Amateurs are bound to govern amateurishly, and their
insufficiency will be particularly marked if they have to
run an unworkable Government machine and are pitted
against perfectly organised professionals.

The assertion that inefficiency is inseparable from
democracy is not true. Democracy means popular control,
but popular control need not mean disorganisation. It
need not mean government by amateurs. A highly suc-
cessful business may have a number of amateur directors,
but these will in reality be merely supervisors. The actual
management and direction will be left to an expert manager.
Similarly, a jury of twelve good men and true does not
expound the law, but leaves that technical duty to a single
expert, the judge. The fact that democracy and the highest
efficiency are compatible is illustrated by the British police,
which is at the same time the most democratic, the most
efficient, and the least corrupt police force in the world.
However, the London police are directed not by a board
of politicians, but by a single great expert, who possesses
vast powers, and who is controlled by politicians to whom
he is personally responsible. Committees are excellent
for investigation and dehberation — twenty eyes see more
than two — but they are totally unsuitable for decisive
and rapid action, 'especially in the age of railways and
telegraphs. Only one man can usefully command a ship,

344 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

conduct an orchestra, manage a business, or direct a State,
especially in difiQcult times.

The rules of good organisation are simple and few.
They demand

(1) That a single man of the highest directing abihty
should be in sole control and should be solely responsible.

(2) That he should be supported by a number of expert
assistants, and that he should be able to draw either on
their individual or their combined advice, according to the
nature of the problem before him.

(3) That every man should have only one job, and that
every man should attend only to his own job.

A commercial business directed jointly by twenty- two
amateur directors of nominally equal authority, who can
only act when they are unanimous, would go bankrupt in
a very short time. A business so incompetently organised
does no exist. If such an organisation is totally unsuitable
for a business where, after all, only a sum of money is at
stake, how much more unsuitable then is it for a nation and
empire where the existence of 400,000,000 people is at stake ?
The British Empire has poured out lives and treasure with-
out stint, and the results achieved so far — the action of
the Fleet excepted — have been far from encouraging.
The return for the gigantic sacrifices made has been totally
inadequate. The strength of Great Britain and of the
Empire cannot indefinitely be wasted with impunity. The
organisation of Great Britain cries for immediate reform.
Continuance of organised disorganisation, of haphazard
warfare, directed by inexpert committees, may have the
gravest consequences to this country.

A democracy has a great advantage over a monarchy
by being more able to adapt its constitution to changing
conditions. The wonderful vitahty of Ancient Eome was
largely due to its adaptabiUty, to the fact that the State
had an institution, the Dictatorship, by which the Eepublic
could rapidly be converted into a monarchy in time of
danger. MachiavelH has told us in his ' Discorsi ' :

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 345

Among the institutions of Eome, that of the Dictator-
ship deserves our special admiration. The ordinary institu-
tions of a Commonwealth work but slowly. No Councillor
or magistrate has authority to act alone. In most cases
several must agree, and time is required to reconcile their
differences. Hesitation is most dangerous in situations
which do not brook delay. Hence every repubhc ought
to have some resource upon which it can fall back in time
of need. When a repubhc is not provided with some such
safeguard, it will either be ruined by observing its Constitu-
tional forms, or it will have to violate them. However, in a
repubhc nothing should be done by irregular methods, for
though the irregularity may be useful, it would furnish a
pernicious precedent. Every contingency cannot be fore-
seen and provided for by law. Hence those republics which
cannot in a sudden emergency resort to a Dictator or some
similar authority may in time of danger be ruined.

The Dictator was originally called Magister yopuli.
According to Dionysius he was nominated by the Senate
and approved of by the people. Later on he was appointed
by the Consuls, the highest civil authorities, whom he
superseded. He was not a high-handed tyrant but a
popular leader elected by the representatives of the nation.
While the Consuls could act only with the co-operation of
the Senate, the Dictator could act on his own responsibility.
However, his power was Kmited. He was appointed only
for six months. He had no power over the Treasury, but
had to come to the Senate for money. The power of the
purse remained with the representatives of the nation.
Kome was repeatedly saved from ruin by a Dictator when
its Civil Government was unable to deal with the situation.
We may learn from Rome's example. A Dictator is wanted.

As the Cabinet in its original shape has proved totally
unsuitable for conducting a great war, an inner Cabinet of
six has been evolved. It remains to be seen whether six can
successfully accomplish the work of direction which, accord-
ing to the greatest statesmen and the practical experience
of all time, should be left to a single man. If the committee

346 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

of six should prove unsatisfactory, the Government should
frankly declare its inability to deal efficiently with the
situation and ask ParHament, without delay, for power
to effect the necessary constitutional changes. The leading
politicians themselves must surely recognise that they can-
not successfully direct a war. The simplest way of con-
centrating control into one hand would obviously consist
in increasing the authority of the Prime Minister, making
him solely responsible to ParUament for the conduct of the
national business in all its branches, making the other
Ministers distinctly his subordinates and appointing to the
direction of every Department not poUticians but the best
experts that can be found. Only the Prime Minister should
attend ParHament, for ministers cannot at the same time
attend to Parhament and their Departments. The greatest
administrative experts would undoubtedly furnish a far
stronger advisory council to the Prime ^linister than a
Cabinet of pohticians, however eminent and of whatever
party. Statesmanship and party poUtics must be kept
strictly apart. The direction of the nation and the lead-
ing of the House require totally different quaUfications.
To enable the Prime Minister to give his undivided atten-
tion to national affairs the two offices should be separated
by law. Otherwise national affairs will continue to be sub-
ordinated to party matters and be perfunctorily attended to
for lack of time. In addition, an advisory Council modelled
upon Napoleon's Conseil d'État, as described in these pages
and foreshadowed by Sir John Fortescue in his * Governance
of England,' might be created by resuscitating the moribund
Privy Council. The Privy Council might once m.ore become
a most valuable institution, a national inteUigence depart-
ment, for investigating matters, preparing laws, &c. lU
ranks should be greatly strengthened. At present it includes
too many pohticians and society leaders and too few experts.
It should be composed of the ablest men in every branch
of human knowledge and activity. It is noteworthy that
at present science is quite unrepresented on that Council.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 347

Wars are not won by speeches. The province of poli-
ticians is speech, that of statesmen action. Men of words
are rarely men of action, and men of action rarely
men of words. Eicheheu, Cromwell, Frederick, Napoleon,
Bismarck, were wretched speakers, and most great speakers,
the elder Pitt excepted, wretched statesmen. To entrust
the direction of the State to men of words seems as inappro-
priate as to entrust a valuable racehorse to a plausible
sporting journahst. It is questionable whether another
set of amateurs will do better than the present one, for
the fault Hes chiefly with the system. Government by
debating society has proved a failure. It should be abolished
before it is too late. The situation seems to call for three
reforms : (1) A solely responsible Prime Minister exclu-
sively engaged with national business ; (2) the replacing of
poHtician-ministers by the best experts ; (3) the creation of
an efficient Privy Council to serve as a national inteUigence
department.

The traditional organisation of Great Britain is an
anachronism and a danger. Every statesman must be
convinced of its insufficiency and inaptitude. Happily
it can easily be modernised and immensely strengthened.
The advantage of democracy, which means popular control
over the Government, can easily be combined with an efficient
and well-ordered administration carried on by experts.
If the national organisation were reformed in the manner
indicated. Great Britain would no longer suffer disappoint-
ment after disappointment in war through inexpert direc-
tion and divided councils. She would no longer be surprised
by events. The AlUes would no longer offer a chiefly passive
resistance to Germany's onslaughts. The War would be
greatly shortened. Efficiency would be met with efficiency,
and greater numbers and resources would rapidly prevail.
England's example of reorganisation would no doubt be
followed throughout the world. The saying that democracy
means improvidence, inefficiency, wastefulness, bungUng,
amateurishness, and delay would cease to be true. Well-

848 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War

organised Great Britain would become an example to
democracy throughout the world. The democratic form of
government which, in consequence of the War, has lost
prestige everywhere, would be rehabiUtated and obtain a
new lease of life.

CHAPTEE X

HOW AMERICA BECAME A NATION IN ARMS : ^

SOME LESSONS FOR PEACEFUL DEMOCRACIES AND THEIR

LEADERS 2

On December 10, 1914, Professor C. K. Webster stated
in his inaugural lecture delivered before the University
of Liverpool :

You will look in vain for the books which can teach
Englishmen the connection of their own country with the
political life of the Continent during the nineteenth century.
Such books cannot be improvised on the spur of the moment
in the midst of a national crisis. . . . Few will dispute
that the study of our diplomatic history in the past century
is of real and immediate importance to-day. Yet the work
has scarcely been begun. There is, for example, as yet no
adequate record of the part England played in the great
reconstruction of Europe after the Napoleonic Wars. . . .
Neither Canning nor Palmerston is known to us, except by
loose and inadequate records.

This statement is exceedingly humiliating. It seems
incredible, but unfortunately it is only too true. While
the art of vote-catching, called politics, has been assiduously
studied in all its branches, the science of statesmanship
in the broadest sense of the word, has been completely
neglected. The most important of all human sciences is

1 The Nineteenth Century and After, September, 1915.

2 The recommendations contained in the following pages have since
been adopted.

349

350 How America became a Nation in Arms

apparently thought unworthy of study. It is not taught
at any of the British Universities, and it is disregarded by
those who strive to obtain place and power by way of the
ballot-box. Fifty years ago the United States fought
a gigantic war, in the course of which they became a nation
in arms. Yet there is in the Enghsh language no adequate
documentary account of that struggle, from which the
Anglo-Saxon democracies may derive the most necessary
and the most salutary lessons for their guidance, lessons
which should be invaluable to them at the present moment.
The fact that the United States introduced conscription
during the Civil War is Scarcely known in England. In a
lengthy article on conscription in the * Encyclopaedia
Britannica,' an historical and philosophical account of
compulsory service in France and Germany is given, but
the fact that America introduced conscription is not even
mentioned ! Ninety-nine out of every hundred well-edu-
cated Enghshmen ignore the means whereby the United
States raised millions of soldiers at a time when their popu-
lation was very much smaller than that of the United
Kingdom is at present.

The main facts and the principal documents relating
to the American Civil War are buried deeply in the contem-
porary journals and in bulky ofiScial publications such as
the * Official Eecords of the Union and Confederate Armies *
published by the American Government between 1880 and
1900, a work which is about five times as large as the
* Encyclopaedia Britannica,' but which is practically un-
usable because it is merely an inchoate, incoherent, and
confusing collection of documents which lacks an index.
In the following pages an attempt will be made to rescue
the most important facts and documents from obHvion
and to deduce from them the principal lessons which they
supply to the Anglo-Saxon peoples of both hemispheres
for their encouragement and their guidance in the present
crisis.

The American Civil War began on April 12, 1861, at

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 351

4.30 A.M., when the Southern Army commenced the bom-
bardment of Fort Sumter, which dominates the mouth of
Charleston Harbour, and which was garrisoned by Union
troops. In the Southern States secession and rebelHon
had been preparing, both secretly and openly, for a long
time. Yet the United States Government had neglected
making any preparations for the inevitable struggle. Pre-
sident Buchanan, who was in office from 1857 to 1861,
was well-meaning, scrupulously honest, kindly, but weak.
He was deeply rehgious and philanthropical, and he loved
peace and his ease. He disMked trouble and wished to
leave the settlement of the gravest problem of his country
to the next President. Fearing to precipitate the struggle,
he made no preparation to meet the crisis, and allowed the
Southern forts and arsenals to be seized by the secessionists.
Abraham Lincoln had been elected as his successor. He
was inaugurated on March 4, 1861, at a moment of the
severest tension between North and South, only five weeks
before the cannon began to speak. He was a minority
President, for the voting at the Presidential contest had
been as follows :

For Lincoln (Republican Party) . . . 1,857,610 votes
For Douglas (Democratic, non-Interventionist,

Party) 1,366,976 „

For Breckinridge (Democratic, pro-Slavery, Party) . 847,953 „

For Bell (Constitutional Union Party) . 590,631 „

Total .... 4,662,170 votes

As at the Presidential Election of 1912, the largest American
party had split in two and had failed to return the President.
Only 40 per cent, of the people had voted for Lincoln.
His position was one of unexampled difficulty. He was a
novice at his office, he had entered it at a moment of the
gravest danger, he was quite inexperienced in dealing with
national, as distinguished from local affairs, he represented
only a minority of the people, and he was surrounded by
treason and intrigue. On January 1, 1861, the United
States Army was only 16,402 men strong, and of these 1745

352 How America became a Nation in Arms

were absent. These few troops were distributed in small
parcels all over the gigantic territory of the Union to hold
the marauding Indians in check. The Navy had been
scattered over distant seas. The arsenals of the North
were ill-supplied with arms. Washington, the Federal
capital, lay on the border between North and South, within
easy reach of the army which the South had collected
threateningly close to that city before opening the attack
on Fort Sumter. Washington lies on the left bank of the
Potomac. It is dominated by the heights on the right
bank of that river, and these were in the hands of the insur-
gents. On April 12, the day when the bombardment of
Fort Sumter began, the following telegram was sent from
Montgomery, Alabama, the temporary capital of the
Southern States, to all parts of the Union :

An immense crowd serenaded President Davis and
Secretary [of War] Walker at the Exchange Hotel to-night.

The former is not well, and did not appear. Secretary
Walker appeared and declined to make a speech, but in a
few words of electrical eloquence told the news from Fort
Sumter, declaring in conclusion that before many hours the
flag of the Confederacy would float over that fortress.

No man, he said, could tell where the War this day
commenced would end, but he would prophesy that the flag
which now flaunts the breeze here would float over the dome
of the old Capitol at Washington before the first of May.
Let them try Southern Chivalry and test the extent of
Southern resources, and it might float eventually over
Faneuil Hall [in Boston] itself.

Immediately on the outbreak of war the railways and
telegraphs around Washington were cut. The city was
completely isolated from the outer world. The State of
Maryland, to the north of the Federal capital, prevented
a few rapidly mobilised Militia troops from New York and
Boston reaching the seat of the national Government.
Washington was denuded of troops and was hastily barricaded
to protect it and the President against a cowp de main.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 353

The gallant South had furnished to the State a dispropor-
tionately large number of able officers and of high officials.
Local patriotism was exceedingly strong in the Southern
States. Hence many of the best miUtary and naval officers
and many of the ablest Civil Servants resigned immediately
after the outbreak of the Civil War and joined the Southern
forces, crippling simultaneously the Army, the Navy, and
the national administration in all its branches. On April 20;
eight days after the bombardment of Fort Sumter, General
Kobert E. Lee, who was considered to be the ablest officer
in the United States Service, and who had been offered the
active command of the Union Army, resigned his commission
to the general consternation of the North, and crossed the
border. Altogether 813 commissioned officers resigned and
joined the rebellion. According to Moore's * Rebellion
Record,' the Southern States received from the Regular
Army the following generals, most of whom resigned their
commissions between December 20, 1860, the date when the

State of South Carolina seceded, and January 1, 1862 :

•

Generals ......... 8

Lieutenant-Genorals . . . . . .15

Major-Grenerala ....... 48

Brigadier-Generals HI

The Secretary of War, in his Report of July 1, 1861,
stated that * but for this startling defection the rebellion
never could have assumed its formidable proportions.'

The guns bombarding Fort Sumter had given the signal
for the collapse of the Government. The position which
was created by the outbreak of the rebellion was graphically
described by President Lincoln in his message to Congress of
May 26, 1862, as follows :

The insurrection which is yet existing in the United
States and aims at the overthrow of the Federal Constitution
and the Union was clandestinely prepared during the winter
of 1860 and 1861, and assumed an open organisation in the
form of a treasonable provisional Government at Mont-
gomery, in Alabama, on the 18th day of February, 1861.

2a

354 How America became a Nation in Arms

On the 12th day of April, 1861, the insurgents committed
the flagrant act of Civil War by the bombardment and the
capture of Fort Sumter, which cut off the hope of imme-
diate conciliation. Immediately afterward all the roads and
avenues to this city were obstructed and the capital was put
into the condition of a siege. The mails in every direction
were stopped, and the hnes of telegraph cut off by the insur-
gents, and military and naval forces which had been called
out by the Government for the defence of Washington were
prevented from reaching the city by organised and combined
treasonable resistance in the State of Maryland. There
was no adequate and effective organisation for the public
defence. Congress had indefinitely adjourned. There was
no time to convene them. It became necessary for me to
choose whether, using only the existing means, agencies,
and processes which Congress had provided, I should let
the Government fall at once into ruin, or whether, availing
myself of the broader powers conferred by the Constitution
in cases of insurrection, I would make an effort to save it. . . .

The leaders of the Secession movement had skilfully
chosen the most suitable time for action. They believed
that at the critical moment all would be confusion at Wash-
ington, that, lacking an adequate army and an experienced
leader, the Northern States would not dare to act with
vigour, that the new President would hesitate to adopt a
course which might lead to civil war, and that, if after all
war should break out, they would have numerous auxiliaries.
The Southern States had a monopoly in the production of
cotton. The leaders of the South believed that the demand
for cotton in England and France would put a speedy end
to any blockade of the Southern ports which the United
States might wish to undertake. They thought that the
great Democratic Party of the North, which, if united, was
far stronger than the Eepublican Party which had elected
Lincoln, would refuse to support the President if he should
wish to re-take the Southern forts and arsenals by force.
They believed that the industrial North had degenerated
and that it would prove an inefficient opponent to the

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 355

agricultural South where every man knew how to ride and
how to handle a gun.

When the South struck its blow for independence there
certainly was confusion in Washington and throughout the
States of the North. In describing the condition of the
country in 1861 the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the
War reported : ' There was treason in the Executive Man-
sion, treason in the Cabinet, treason in the Senate and the
House of Eepresentatives, treason in the Army and Navy,
treason in every department, bureau and office connected
with the Government.' The position of affairs was more
fully described in the First Executive Order in Eelation to
State Prisoners, which was issued on behalf of the President
by Mr. Edwin M. Stanton, the Secretary of War, on
February 14, 1862. He wrote :

The breaking out of a formidable insurrection, based on a
conflict of political ideas, being an event without precedent
in the United States, was necessarily attended by great
confusion and perplexity of the public mind. Disloyalty,
before unsuspected, suddenly became bold, and treason
astonished the world by bringing at once into the field
military forces superior in numbers to the standing army
of the United States.

Every Department of the Government was paralysed by
treason. Defection appeared in the Senate, in the House of
Eepresentatives, in the Cabinet, in the Federal Courts ;
Ministers and Consuls returned from foreign countries to
enter the insurrectionary councils or land or naval forces ;
commanding and other officers of the army and in the navy
betrayed the councils or deserted their posts for commands
in the insurgent forces. Treason was flagrant in the revenue
and in the post office service, as well as in the Territorial
Governments and in the Indian reserves.

Not only Governors, Judges, Legislators, and Ministerial
Officers in the States, but even whole States rushed, one after
another, with apparent unanimity into rebellion. The
capital was besieged and its connection with all the States
cut off.

356 How America became a Nation in Arms

Even in the portions of the country which were most
loyal political combinations and secret societies were
formed furthering the work of disunion, while, from
motives of disloyalty or cupidity, or from excited passions
or perverted sympathies, individuals were found furnish-
ing men, money, and materials of war and supplies to
the insurgents' military and naval forces. Armies, ships,
fortifications, navy yards, arsenals, military posts and gar-
risons, one after another, were betrayed or abandoned to
the insurgents.

Congress had not anticipated, and so had not provided
for, the emergency. The municipal authorities were power-
less and inactive. The judicial machinery seemed as if it
had been designed not to sustain the Government, but to
embarrass and betray it.

Foreign intervention, openly invited and industriously
instigated by the abettors of the insurrection, became
imminent, and has only been prevented by the practice of
strict and impartial justice with the most perfect moderation
in our intercourse with nations. . . .

Extraordinary arrests will hereafter be made under
the direction of the military authorities alone.

At the touch of war all the factors of national str^gth,
the Army, the Navy, and the Civil Administration, had
broken down. Consternation and confusion were general.
At the head of affairs was a quaint and old-fashioned country
attorney from the backwoods, possessed of a homely wit
and infinite humour, ignorant of national government,
surrounded by treason and besieged by a mob of clamorous
ofiSce-seekers who blocked the ante-rooms and the passages
at the White House, sat on the stairs and overflowed into
the garden. Congress was not in session. Washington was
isolated and threatened. It was questionable whether
the two Houses of the Legislature would be able to meet in
the Federal Capital. Many people in the North sympathised
secretly with the South. Few officials could be trusted.
The position was desperate. Everything had broken down
except the Constitution. In the hour of the direst need the

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 357

American Constitution proved a source of the greatest
strength and it saved the country.

The American Constitution had been planned not by
poHticians but by great statesmen and soldiers, by the able
and energetic men of action who had fought victoriously
against England. They had wisely, and after mature
deliberation, concentrated vast powers in the hands of the
President, and had given him almost despotic powers in a
time of national danger. President Lincoln unhesitatingly
made use of these powers. It will appear in the course of
these pages that the Southern States were defeated not so
much by President Lincoln and the Northern Armies as
by the Fathers of the Commonwealth, who in another
century had prepared for the use of the President a
powerful weapon which would be ready to his hand in
the hour of peril.

Those who wish to understand the foundations of
American statesmanship as laid down by the American
nation-builders, should not turn to Lord Bryce's excellent
volumes but should go to the fountain-head, to the pages of
The Federalist. The Federalist was pubhshed in a number of
letters to the Press for the information of the pubhc in
1787-88, at the time when the American Constitution was
being painfully evolved by the Convention and was being
discussed by the pubhc. The authors of The Federalist
were three of the greatest American statesmen — Alexander
Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, and the hon's share
was taken by that great genius, Hamilton. The Federalist
was, and is still, the ablest and the most authoritative
exposition of the Constitution. It contains the Arcana
Beijpuhlicae. It is the American statesman's Bible. It has
inspired America's leading men to the present day, and
among them Abraham Lincoln. If we wish to understand
America's pohcy in the Civil War we shall do well to acquaint
ourselves at the outset with some of the most important
views contained in The Federalist,

The founders of the American KepubHc were democrats

358 How America became a Nation in Arms

but not demagogues. They were statesmen who feared the
rise of demagogues. It is highly significant that we read
in the very first letter of The Federalist : * History will
teach us . . . that of those men who have overturned the
liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun their
career by paying an obsequious court to the people ; com-
mencing demagogues and ending tyrants.* The Fathers of
the American Commonwealth were not sentimentahsts but
statesmen and men of common sense. They did not beUeve
that an era of universal peace was approaching or was
possible, that monarchy meant war and democracy meant
peace, that popular government or * democratic control,*
as it is now usually called, would bring about the millen-
nium. In the sixth and seventh letters of The Federalist
we read :

. . . Nations in general will make war whenever they
have a prospect of getting anything by it. . . .

. . . There are still to be found visionary or designing
men who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual
peace between the States though dismembered and alienated
from each other. The genius of repubhcs (say they) is
pacific ; the spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften
the manners of men. . . .

Have republics in practice been less addicted to war than
monarchies ? Are not the former administered by men
as well as the latter ? Are there not aversions, predilec-
tions, rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisitions that
affect nations as well as kings ? Are not popular assemblies
frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment,
jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent pro-
pensities ? Is it not well known that their determinations
are often governed by a few individuals in whom they place
confidence, and are, of course, liable to be tinctured by the
passions and views of those individuals ? Has commerce
hitherto done anything more than change the objects of
war ? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and enter-
prising a passion as that of power or glory ? Have there
not been as many wars founded upon commercial motives

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 859

... as were before occasioned by the cupidity of territory
or dominion ?

Believing that the United States were hkely to be in-
volved in further wars, the founders of the American EepubHc
wished to strengthen the State by making the President
powerful and independent, by giving him almost monarchical
authority in time of peace and by making him a kind of
Dictator in time of war. The United States Constitution
states : ' The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States and of the Mihtia
of the several States when called into the active service of
the United States.* In time of danger State rights were to
disappear, the mihtary independence of the individual
States was to come to an end.

Unlike the British Prime Minister, the American Presi-
dent is free from popular and Parhamentary control. He
can at any time repudiate a majority of both Houses. He
can veto any act of Congress even if it is supported by large
majorities, and he has frequently done so, for he is supposed
to act solely in the interests of the nation and in accordance
with his own conscience without regard to party majorities
and party intrigues. He can place at the head of the Army
and Navy any man he chooses, or he can command in person
and no one can question his action. His Cabinet, the
Secretaries of State, are nominated by him, and they are
his subordinates. They are the President's, nor the people's,
servants. They have no seat and no voice in Congress.
They are supposed to stand, like the President, outside and
above party, to be servants of the nation as a whole. The
Ministers, hke the President, cannot be removed by a chance
majority. The President and his Secretaries of State are not
BO constantly hampered in their actions by the fear of losing
popularity and oJB&ce as are British statesmen. The founders
of the Commonwealth gave to the President a vast and
truly royal authority because they beheved that a national
executive could be efficient only if it was strong, and that

360 How America became a Nation in Arms

it could be' strong only if it was independent of party ties
and entrusted to a single man. We read in the thirty-
seventhpetter of The Federalist^ written by Madison :

The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one
side not only that all power should be derived from the
people, but that those entrusted with it should be kept in
dependence on the people by a short duration of their
appointments ; and that even during this short period the
trust should be placed not in a few, but in a number of hands.
Stability, on the contrary, requires that the hands in which
power is lodged should continue for a length of time the
same. A frequent change of men will result from a frequent
return of elections, and a frequent change of measures from a
frequent change of men, whilst energy in government requires
not only a certain duration of power, but the execution of it
by a single hand.

Hamilton, Jay, Governor Morris, John Adams, and other
leading men of the time were so much in favour of a strong
executive that they advocated that American Presidents,
hke British Judges, should be appointed for life and should
be removable only by impeachment.

The doctrine that a Government, to be efficient, requires
not many heads but a single head, that a one-man Govern-
ment, a strong Government, is valuable at all times, and
especially in time of national danger, was more fully
developed by Hamilton in the seventieth letter of The
Federalist. He ^vrote :

. . . Energy in the Executive is a leading character in
the definition of good government. It is essential to the
protection of the community against foreign attacks ; it is
not less essential to the steady administration of the laws ;
to the protection of property against those irregular and
high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the
ordinary course of justice ; to the security of liberty against
the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of
anarchy. Every man the least conversant in Roman history
knows how often that repubhc was obliged to take refuge

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 361

in the absolute power of a single man under the formidable
title of Dictator. . . .

There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments
or examples on this head. A feeble Executive implies a
feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is
but another phrase for a bad execution ; and a government
ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in prac-
tice, a bad government. . . .

The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive
are, first, unity ; secondly, duration ; thirdly, an adequate
provision for its support ; fourthly, competent powers.

Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most
celebrated for the soundness of their principles and for the
justice of their views have declared in favour of a single
Executive and a numerous legislature. They have, with
great propriety, considered energy as the most necessary
qualification of the former, and have regarded this as most
applicable to power in a single hand ; while they have, with
equal propriety, considered the latter as best adapted to
deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to conciliate
the confidence of the people and to secure their privileges
and interests.

That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed.
Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch will generally
characterise the proceedings of one man in a much more
eminent degree £han the proceedings of any great number ;
and in proportion as the number is increased these qualities
will be diminished.

Great Britain is ruled by a Cabinet, by a number of men
who are nominally equal, and the Prime Minister is their
President, he is primus inter fares. The British Cabinet
Ministers take resolutions collectively and they act, at
least in theory, with unanimity. As they act unanimously,
there is no individual, but only collective, responsibility
for Cabinet decisions. Until recently twenty-two Cabinet
Ministers were collectively responsible for every important
decision, even if the decision required high expert know-
ledge which few, if any, of them possessed, or if it con-
cerned only a single Department — such as the Army or

362 How America became a Nation in Arms

Navy — with which twenty Ministers out of twenty-two
in the Cabinet were quite unacquainted. An anonymous
author wrote some years ago of the British Cabinet that
it had many heads but no head, many minds but no mind.
Government by a crowd is a danger in war time. Hamilton
clearly foresaw the weakness and danger of governing by
means of a committee of politicians, especially in time of
war. His opinion is so interesting, so weighty, and so
valuable, and it apphes with such force to Cabinet Govern-
ment as practised in Great Britain up to the present crisis,
that it is worth while to give it in extenso. He stated in
the seventieth letter of The Federalist, with regard to
government by Cabinet, by means of an executive council :

The experience of other nations will afford little instruc-
tion on this head. As far, however, as it teaches any-
thing, it teaches us not to be enamoured of plurality in
the Executive. . . .

Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any com-
mon enterprise or pursuit there is always danger of difference
of opinion. If it be a public trust or office, in which they are
clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar
danger of personal emulation and even animosity. From
either, and especially from all these causes, the most bitter
dissensions are apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they
lessen the respectability, weaken the authority, and distract
the plans and operations of those whom they divide. If they
should unfortunately assail the supreme executive magis-
tracy of a country, consisting of a plurality of persons, they
might impede or frustrate the most important measures of
the government in the most critical emergencies of the
State. And, what is still worse, they might spUt the com-
munity into the most violent and irreconcilable factions,
adhering differently to the different individuals who com-
posed the magistracy.

Men often oppose a thing merely because they have had
no agency in planning it, or because it may have been
planned by those whom they disHke. But if they have
been consulted and have appeared to disapprove, opposition

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 863

then becomes, in their estimation, an indispensable duty of
self-love. . . .

Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences
from the source just mentioned must necessarily be sub-
mitted to in the formation of the legislature ; but it is un-
necessary, and therefore unwise, to introduce them into the
constituent of the Executive. It is here, too, that they may
be most pernicious. In the legislature promptitude of
decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. . . .

But no favourable circumstances palUate or atone for
the disadvantages of dissension in the executive depart-
ment. Here they are pure and unmixed. There is no
point at which they cease to operate. They serve to em-
barrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure
to which they relate, from the first step to the final conclu-
sion of it. They constantly counteract those qualities in
the Executive which are the most necessary ingredients in its
composition, vigour and expedition, and this without any
counterbalancing good. In the conduct of war, in which
the energy of the Executive is the bulwark of the national
security, everything would be to be apprehended from its
plurality. . . .

It must be confessed that these observations apply with
principal weight to the first case supposed — that is, to a
plurality of magistrates of equal dignity and authority, a
scheme, the advocates for which are not likely to form a
numerous sect ; but they apply, though not with equal,
yet with considerable, weight, to the project of a council,
whose concurrence is made constitutionally necessary to
the operations of the ostensible Executive.

An artful cabal in that council would be able to distract
and to enervate the whole system of administration. If no
such cabal should exist the mere diversity of views and
opinions would alone be sufficient to tincture the exercise of
the executive authority with a spirit of habitual feebleness
and dilatoriness.

But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the
Executive, and which lies as much against the last as the
first plan, is that it tends to conceal faults and destroy
responsibihty. Kesponsibility is of two kinds — to censure,

864 How America became a Nation in Arms

and to punishment. The first is the more important of the
two, especially in an elective ofiSce. Man, in a public trust,
will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him
unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner
as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. But the
multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of
detection in either case. It often becomes impossible,
amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame
or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or a series of
pernicious measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from
one to another with so much dexterity, and under such
plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in
suspense about the real author. The circumstances which
may have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are
sometimes so complicated that, where there are a number
of actors, who may have had different degrees and kinds of
agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that
there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable
to pronounce to whose account the evil which may have
been incurred is truly chargeable.

* I was overruled by my council. The council were so
divided in their opinions that it was impossible to obtain
any better resolution on the point.' These and similar
pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true or false.
And who is there that will either take the trouble or incur the
odium of a strict scrutiny into the secret springs of the
transaction ?

War is a one-man business. To the founders of the
American Eepublic it seen;ied so essential and so self-
evident that only a single hand could direct the Army and
Navy efficiently and * with decision, activity, secrecy and
despatch ' that they thought that the paragraph of the
Constitution which made the President Commander-in-
Chief of both Services was unchallengeable and required
neither explanation nor defence. That paragraph is curtly
dismissed by Hamilton in the seventy-fourth letter of The
Federalist, as follows :

The President of the United States is to be * Commander-
in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and of

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 865

the Militia of the several States when called into the actual
service of the United States.' The propriety of this provi-
sion is so evident in itself, and it is, at the same time, so
consonant to the precedents of the State constitutions in
general, that little need be said to explain or enforce it.
Even those of them which have in other respects coupled
the chief magistrate with a council have for the most part
concentrated the miHtary authority in him alone.

Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction
of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which dis-
tinguish the exercise of power by a single hand. The direc-
tion of war implies the direction of the common strength,
and the power of directing and employing the common
strength forms a usual and essential part in the definition
of the executive authority.

War is a one-man business. The maxim that a nation
at war should be directed by a single man, not by a council,
which the greatest statesmen and soldiers of all times have
recognised and which Hamilton and Washington have
preached, has sunk deeply into the American mind. Pre-
sident Lincoln illustrated the necessity of unity in the
direction of national affairs in time of war in his homely and
inimitable way. He wrote in his Message to Congress
of December 8, 1861 :

It has been said that one bad general is better than two
good ones, and the saying is true if taken to mean no more
than that an army is better directed by a single mind,
though inferior, than by two superior ones at variance and
cross-purposes with each other.

And the same is true in all joint operations wherein those
engaged can have none but a common end in view and can
differ only as to the choice of means. In a storm at sea
no one on board can wish the ship to sink, and yet not
infrequently all go down together because too many will
direct and no single mind can be allowed to control.

President Lincoln, though a great character and a
great citizen, can scarcely be called an exceptionally
great statesman. He certainly was not brilliant. He

366 How America became a Nation in Arms

was endowed with homely common sense and was honest,
unprejudiced, industrious, conscientious, fair-minded, pains-
taking, patient, warm-hearted, fearless, determined, patriotic,
a democrat but by no means a demagogue. He was a
model citizen who quietly and resolutely would do his duty,
would do his best, and who was not afraid of responsibility
if an important decision had to be taken. At the outbreak
of the Civil War, when all the factors supporting the Govern-
ment's authority had broken down. President Lincoln fell
back on the Constitution. He rather rehed on its spirit
as it appears in The Federalist than on its wording, and he
did not hesitate to strain his powers to the utmost in order
to save the State. On April 15, immediately after the
bombardment and fall of Fort Sumter, he called upon the
governors of the individual States to raise 75,000 men
of State Militia in proportion to their inhabitants and to
place them into the service of the United States and under
his command. These 75,000 men were called upon to serve
only for three months, not because the President or his
Cabinet beheved that the War would last only ninety
days, but because, according to the Act of 1795, the President
had authority which permitted * the use of the Militia so
as to be called forth only for thirty days after the com-
mencement of the then next session of Congress.'

A musty law circumscribed and hampered the President's
action but it did not hamper it for long. Very soon it
became evident that that preliminary measure was totally
insufficient, that energy and novel measures were required
to overcome the dangers which threatened the Northern
States from without and from within. Eelying on the
spirit of the Constitution and on his duty to defend the
Union at all costs, President Lincoln, to his eternal honour,
did not hesitate to make illegal, but not unscrupulous, use
of dictatorial'Jpowers. On April 27 he directed General
Scott to suspend the privilege of Habeas Corpus, if necessary,
in order to be able to deal with treason and with opposition
in the Northern States. On May 3 he decreed by procla-

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 367

mation that the regular army should be increased by
22,714, or should be more than doubled, and that 18,000
seamen should be added to the Navy. At the same time
he called for forty regiments, composed of 42,034 volunteers,
to serve during three years. President Lincoln candidly
explained the necessity for these high-handed and obviously
illegal measures as follows in his Message to Congress of
July 4,11861 :

. . . Kecurring to the action of the Government, it may
be stated that at first a call was made for 75,000 militia,
and rapidly following this a proclamation was issued for
closing the ports of the insurrectionary districts by proceed-
ings in the nature of blockade. So far all was believed to be
strictly legal. At this point the insurrectionists announced
their purpose to enter upon the practice of privateering.

Other calls were made for volunteers to serve for three
years, unless sooner discharged, and also for large additions
to the regular army and navy. These measures, whether
strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under what ap-
peared to be a popular demand and a public necessity ;
trusting then, as now, that Congress would readily ratify
them. It is believed that nothing has been done beyond
the constitutional competency of Congress.

Soon after the first call for militia it was considered a
duty to authorise the commanding general in proper cases,
according to his discretion, to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, or, in other words, to arrest and detain,
without resort to the ordinary processes and forms of law,
such individuals as he might deem dangerous to the public
safety. This authority has purposely been exercised but
very sparingly. Nevertheless, the legaHty and propriety of
what has been done under it are questioned, and the atten-
tion of the country has been called to the proposition that
one who has sworn to * take care that the laws be faithfully
executed ' should not himself violate them. Of course,
some consideration was given to the questions of power and
propriety before this matter was acted upon. The whole
of the laws which were required to be faithfully executed
were being resisted and failing of execution in nearly one-

368 How America became a Nation in Arms

third of the States. Must they be allowed to finally fail of
execution, even had it been perfectly clear that by the use
of the means necessary to their execution some single law,
made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen's liberty
that, practically, it reheves more of the guilty than of the
innocent, should to a very limited extent be violated ? To
state the question more directly, are all the laws but one to
be unexecuted and the government itself go to pieces lest that
one be violated ? Even in such a case would not the official
oath be broken if the government should be overthrown
when it was believed that disregarding the single law would
tend to preserve it ? But it was not believed that this
question was presented. It was not believed that any law
was violated. The provision of the Constitution that * the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended
unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety may require it,' is equivalent to a provision — is a
provision — that such privilege may be suspended when, in
case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety does require
it. It was decided that we have a case of rebellion, and that
the public safety does require the qualified suspension of the
privilege of the writ which was authorised to be made.
Now it is insisted that Congress, and not the Executive,
is vested with this power. But the Constitution itself is
silent as to which or who is to exercise the power ; and as
the provision was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it
cannot be believed the framers of the instrument intended
that in every case the danger should run its course until
Congress could be called together, the very assembling of
which might be prevented, as was intended in this case, by
the rebellion.

Democracy loves strength, loves plain speaking, loves
a man. The President's energetic though high-handed
and unconstitutional action was enthusiastically approved
by the people throughout the loyal States, and was later
on legalised by Congress by means of a resolution.

At the beginning of the war the Northern States^were
almost unarmed. The Government had completely neg-
lected the Army and Navy. In the country was only a

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 369

scanty supply of arms and ammunition. Under Buchanan's
presidency an incapable, if not a treacherous, Secretary of
War, who later on joined the Southern forces, had allowed
large numbers of arm.s to be removed from arsenals in the
North to arsenals in the Southern States, where they were
seized by the Secessionists. For the supply of muskets the
Government depended chiefly on the Springfield Armoury,
and upon that at Harper's Ferry. The capacity of the pri-
vate manufacturers was only a few thousand muskets a
year, and after the destruction of the arsenal and armoury
at Harper's Ferry on April 19, 1861, which contained 15,000
muskets, and which otherwise might have fallen into the
hands of the Confederates, the resources of the Government
were seriously diminished. The want of arms limited the
call of the President on April 15 to 75,000 men, and many
regiments were detained for a long time in their camps in
the different States until muskets could be imported from
Europe. Orders for weapons were hastily sent abroad, and
many inferior arms were imported at high prices. The
Springfield Armoury, the capacity of which was only about
25,000 muskets per year, was rapidly enlarged, and its
production, assisted by outside machine shops, was brought
up to about 8000 muskets per month at the end of 1861, and
to about 15,000 per month shortly afterwards. The United
States had to pay for their neglect of military preparations
in the past. Everything had laboriously to be created.
Meanwhile confusion was general. The Army which had
been collected was merely a mob of ill-armed men. During
1861 the State of Indiana, for instance, had raised and sent
into the field in round numbers 60,000 men, of whom 53,500
were infantry. The statement shown in the table on
page 870, taken from * Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia,'
shows what arms they received during the year.

In their need, anything that had a barrel was used to
arm their troops. The Southern States even fell back upon
shot-guns and ancient fowling-pieces. Gradually order was
evolved out of chaos. The inborn energy and talent for

370 How America became a Nation in Arms

organisation of the race asserted themselves. The North
was far superior to the South in population, wealth,
machinery, and appliances of every kind. In the course of
time a large, well-organised, and well-equipped army arose.
At the beginning of 1862 the Southern States were
threatened with invasion by large armies. A great forward
movement of the Northern forces was ordered to begin on
February 22, and rapid progress was being made. Forts
Henry and Donelson were rapidly captured from the rebels,
Bowling Green and Columbus had to be evacuated, and

Muskets avd Rifles.

Prussian muskets ...... 4,006

United States rifles 5,290

Padrci rifles 6,000

Belgian rifles 957

New percussion muskets ..... 7,299

Altered percussion muskets ..... 8,800

Long-range rifles ....... 600

Springfield rifles 1,830

Short Enfields 960

Long Enfields 13,898

Saxony rifles 1,000

Austrian rifles, -54 cal 3,822

Mississippi rifles, -54 cal. ..... 362

Nashville surrendered. The entire line of defence formed
by the Southern States towards the west was swept away,
and a march by the Northern troops into the heart of the
South-western States seemed imminent. Consternation
seized upon the Southern people. The Southern Army of
1861 was composed chiefly of volunteers who had enhsted
for twelve months. The voluntary system had yielded
all it could yield. It became clear that the Southern States
could not successfully be defended by volunteers against the
North, that national and compulsory service was needed.
The Southern Government was aroused to action, and with-
out hesitation President Jefferson Davis sent a message
to the Confederate Congress, in which he laid down that it
was the duty of all citizens to defend the State, and in which
he demanded the introduction of conscription for all men

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 371

between eighteen and thirty-five years. This most important
document was worded as follows :

To the Senate and House of Befresentatives of the
Confederate States

The operation of the various laws now in force for raising
armies has exhibited the necessity for reform. The frequent
changes and amendments which have been made have
rendered the system so complicated as to make it often quite
difficult to determine what the law really is, and to what
extent prior amendments are modified by more recent
legislation.

There is also embarrassment from conflict between State
and Confederate legislation. I am happy to assure you of
the entire harmony of purpose and cordiality of feeling
which has continued to exist between myself and the
executives of the several States ; and it is to this cause
that our success in keeping adequate forces in the field is to
be attributed.

These reasons would suffice for inviting your earnest
attention to the necessity of some simple and general system
for exercising the power of raising armies which is vested in
Congress by the Constitution.

But there is another and more important consideration.
The vast preparations made by the enemy for a combined
assault at numerous points on our frontier and seaboard
have produced results that might have been expected. They
have animated the people with a spirit of resistance so
general, so resolute, and so self-sacrificing that it requires
rather to be regulated than to be stimulated. The right of
the State to demand and the duty of each citizen to render
mihtary service need only to be stated to be admitted. It is
not, however, a wise or judicious policy to place in active
service that portion of the force of a people which experience
has shown to be necessary as a reserve. Youths under the
age of eighteen years require further instruction ; men of
matured experience are needed for maintaining order and
good government at home, and in supervising preparations
for rendering efficient the armies in the field. These two

372 How America became a Nation in Arms

classes cgnstitute the proper reserve for home defence, ready-
to be called out in case of any emergency, and to be kept
in the field only while the emergency exists.

But in order to maintain this reserve intact it is neces-
sary that in a great war like that in which we are now
engaged all persons of intermediate ages not legally exempt
for good cause should pay their debt of miUtary service to
the country, that the burdens should not fall exclusively
on the ardent and patriotic. I therefore recommend the
passage of a law declaring that all persons residing within
the Confederate States between the ages of eighteen and
thirty-five years, and rightfully subject to military duty,
shall be held to be in the military service of the Confederate
States, and that some plain and simple method be adopted
for their prompt enrolment and organisation, repealing all
of the legislation heretofore enacted which would conflict
with the system proposed.

It will be noticed that President Jefferson Davis demanded
not only conscription, but practically the total surrender of
State rights. He wished the confederation of Southern
States to fight hke a single State, recognising that concen-
tration increases strength. A Conscription Act was rapidly
passed on April 16, 1862.

As conscription for all men from eighteen to thirty-five
years did not suffice to fill the depleted ranks of the Southern
Army, it w^as made more rigorous. An order by Brigadior-
Goneral John H. Winder dated August 1, 1862, stated :

The obtaining of substitutes through the medium of
agents is strictly forbidden. When such agents are employed,
the principal, the substitute, and the agent will be impressed
into the military service, and the money paid for the sub-
stitute, and as a reward to the agent, will be confiscated to
the Government. The offender will also be subjected to
such other imprisonment as may be imposed by a court
martial.

As desertion from the ranks had weakened the Southern
Army, the Press appealed to the citizens of tho^ South to

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 373

assist in the apprehension of deserters and stragglers. All
men and women in the country were exhorted to * pursue,
shame and drive back to the ranks those who have deserted
their colours and their comrades and turned their backs
upon their country's service.* Still further exertions were
required to prevent the Northern troops invading the
Southern States in force. Hence, in September 1862, the
Confederate Congress passed another Act of Conscription
which called out for mihtary service all men between the
ages of thirty-five and forty-five. The most important part
of this Act was worded as follows :

An Act to amend an Act entitled *An Act to 'provide further
for the Public Defence,' approved April 16, 1862.

The Congress of the Confederate States of America do
enact That the President be and he is hereby authorised to
call out and place in the mihtary service of the Confederate
States for three years, unless the war shall have been sooner
ended, all white men who are residents of the Confederate
States between the ages of thirty-five and forty-five years
at the time the call or calls may be made, and who are not
at such time or times legally exempted from military service ;
or such part or parts thereof as, in his judgment, may be
necessary to the public defence, such call or calls to be made
under the provisions and according to the terms of the Act
to which this is an amendment ; and such authority shall
exist in the President during the present war as to all
persons who now are or may hereafter become eighteen
years of age ; and when once enrolled all persons between
the ages of eighteen and forty-five years shall serve their
full time.

Years of fighting reduced the ranks of the Southern
armies. They could hold their own against the over-
whelming numbers of the North only by extending the
age hmit of compulsory mifitary service still further, by
making conscription still more rigorous. In February
1864 a general mihtary Act was passed which enrolled all

374 How America became a Nation in Arms

white men from seventeen to fifty years in the Army.
It stated :

1. That all white men, residents of the Confederate
States, between the ages of seventeen and fifty shall be
in the miUtary service of the Confederate States during
the war.

2. That all between the ages of eighteen and forty-five
now in service shall be retained during the present war in
the same organisations in which they were serving at the
passage of this Act, unless they are regularly discharged or
transferred. . . .

4. That no person shall be reHeved from the operation of
this Act by reason of having been discharged where no
disabihty now exists, nor by reason of having furnished a
substitute ; but no person who has heretofore been exempted
on account of religious opinions and paid the required tax,
shall be required to render military service.

5. That all between seventeen and eighteen years and
forty-five and fifty years of age shall form a reserve corps,
not to serve out of the State in which they reside. . . .

7. That any person of the last-named failing to attend at
the place of rendezvous within thirty days, as required by
the President, without a sufficient reason, shall be made to
serve in the field during the war.

The American Civil War had begun in April 1861. At
its commencement the people in the North had believed
that, owing to their overwhelming superiority in numbers,
in wealth, and in resources of every kind, they would be able
to subdue the insurgent States by armies raised on the
voluntary principle within a reasonable time. However,
the war dragged on interminably. Enthusiasm for volun-
teering diminished, men became cool and indifferent. Owing
to the reduced number of workers wages rose very greatly
throughout the Union, and men turned rather to the factory
than to the Army. Week by week the expenditure in blood
and treasure increased. At last the people in the North
began to see the necessity of abandoning the voluntary

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 375

system and of imitating the Southern States by introducing
compulsory service. It will be of interest to see the way in
which public opinion veered round. In his Eeport of
March 17, 1866, the Provost-Marshal- General James B. Fry,
the head of the great Kecruiting Department of the Northern
armies, described this change in opinion under the heading
* Public Eecognition of the Necessity of a General Conscrip-
tion,' as follows :

During the latter part of 1862 the necessity for a radical
change in the method of raising troops in order to prosecute
the war to a successful issue became more and more apparent.
The demand for reinforcements from the various armies in
the field steadily and largely exceeded the current supply
of men. The old agencies for fiUing the ranks proved more
and more ineffective. It was evident that the efforts of the
Government for the suppression of the rebellion would fail
without resort to the unpopular, but nevertheless truly
republican, measure of conscription. The national authori-
ties, no less than the purest and wisest minds in Congress,
and intelligent and patriotic citizens throughout the country,
perceived that, besides a more reliable, regular, and abundant
supply of men, other substantial benefits would be derived
from the adoption and enforcement of the principle that
every citizen, not incapacitated by physical or mental
disability, owes miUtary service to the country in the hour of
extremity. It would effectually do away with the unjust
and burdensome disproportion in the number of men
furnished by different States and localities. •

But it was not easy to convince the public mind at once
of the justice and wisdom of conscription. It was a novelty,
contrary to the traditional military policy of the nation.
The people had become more accustomed to the enjoyment
of privileges than to the fulfilment of duties under the
General Government, and hence beheld the prospect of
compulsory service in the Army with an unreasonable dread.
Among the labouring classes especially it produced great
uneasiness. Fortunately the loyal pohtical leaders and
Press early realised the urgency of conscription, and by
judicious agitation gradually reconciled the public to it.

376 How America became a Nation in Arms

When the enrolment Act was introduced in Congress in
the following winter the patriotic people of the North
were wiUing to see it become a law.

Early in 1863 the Bill introducing conscription was
placed before Congress at Washington, and was discussed
by both Houses. The debates were brief and the speeches
dehvered are most interesting and enhghtening at the
present moment, when the principle of conscription is still
discussed not only in Great Britain but throughout the
British Empire. Let us hsten to the principal arguments
in favour of conscription.

Mr. Dunn, representative of Indiana, urged the necessity
of conscription in the following words :

The necessity is upon us to pass a Bill of this character.
We have many regiments in the field greatly reduced in
numbers. ... It is due to the gallant men remaining in
these regiments that their numbers should be promptly
filled up. This cannot be done by voluntary enhstment,
on account of the influence of just such speeches as are made
here and elsewhere denouncing the war ; many make a
clamour against the war as an excuse for not volunteering.
Moreover, a draft is the cheapest, fairest, and best mode of
raising troops. It is to be regretted this mode was not
adopted at first. Then all would have shared alike in the
perils and glories of the war. Every family would have
been represented in the field, and every soldier would have
had sympathy and support from his friends at home. The
passage of this Bill will give evidence to the rebels that the
nation is summoning all its energies to the conflict, and it will
be proof to foreign nations that we are prepared to meet
promptly any intermeddling in our domestic strife. The
Government has a right in war to command the services of
its citizens, whom it protects in war as well as in peace.
We, as legislators, must not shrink from the discharge of
our high responsibihty.

Mr. Thomas, Kepresentative of Massachusetts, stated :

For the last six or nine months a whole party — a strong
party — has deUberately entered into a combination to dis-

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 377

courage, to prevent, and as far as in it lay to prohibit, the
volunteering of the people of the country as soldiers in our
army. Members of that party have gone from house to
house, from town to town, and from city to city urging their
brethren not to enlist in the armies of the nation, and giving
them all sorts of reasons for that advice. . . .

Mr. Speaker, this is a terrible Bill ; terrible in the powers
it confers upon the executive, terrible in the duty and burden
it imposes upon the citizen. I meet the suggestion by one
as obvious and cogent, and that is that the exigency is a
terrible one and calls for all the powers with which the
Government is invested. . . .

The powers of Congress, within the scope of the Constitu-
tion, are supreme and strike directly to the subject and hold
him in its firm, its iron grasp. I repeat what at an early day
I asserted upon this floor, that there is not a human being
within the territory of the United States, black or white,
bond or free, whom this Government is not capable of
taking in its right hand and using for its miHtary service
whenever the defence of the country requires, and of this
Congress alone must judge. The question of use is a question
of policy only. ... It is, in effect, a question to this nation
of life or death. We hterally have no choice.

Mr. Wilson, Senator for Massachusetts, said :

We are now engaged in a gigantic struggle for the pre-
servation of the life of the nation. ... If we mean to main-
tain the supremacy of the Constitution and the laws, if we
mean to preserve the unity of the KepubHc, if we mean
that America shall live and have a position and name among
the nations, we must fill the broken and thinned ranks of our
wasted battahons.

The issue is now clearly represented to the country for
the acceptance or rejection of the American people : an
inglorious peace with a dismembered Union and a broken
nation, on the one hand, or war fought out until the rebellion
is crushed beneath its iron heel. Patriotism accepts the
bloody issues of war, rather than peace purchased with the
dismemberment of the Kepublic and the death of the nation.

If we accept peace, disunion, death, then we may speedily

378 How America became a Nation in Arms

summon home again our armies ; if we accept war, until the
flag of the Eepubhc waves over every foot of our united
country, then we must see to it that the ranks of our armies,
broken by toil, disease, and death, are filled again with the
health and vigour of life. To fill the thinned ranks of our
battalions we must again call upon the people. The im-
mense numbers already summoned to the field, the scarcity
and high rewards of labour, press upon all of us the convic-
tion that the ranks of our wasted regiments cannot be
filled again by the old system of volunteering. If volunteers
will not respond to the call of the country, then we must
resort to the involuntary system. . . .

Senator MacDougall of California stated :

I regretted much, when the war was first organised, that
the conscription rule did not obtain. I went from the ex-
treme east to the extreme west of the loyal States. I found
some districts where some bold leaders brought out all the
young men and sent them or led them to the field. In other
districts, and they were the most numerous, the people made
no movement towards the maintenance of the war ; there
were whole towns and cities, I may say, where no one volun-
teered to shoulder a musket and no one offered to lead them
into the service. The whole business has been unequal
and wrong from the first. The rule of conscription should
have been the rule to bring out men of all classes and make
it equal throughout the country. . . .

Mr. Sargent, Kepresentative of California, said :

For a want of a general enrolment of the forces of the
United States and a systematic calling out of those forces,
we have experienced all the inconveniences of a volunteer
system, with its enormous expense, ill discipline and irregular
efforts, and have depended upon spasmodic efforts of the
people, elated or depressed by the varying fortunes of war
or the rise or fall of popular favourites in the Army. I
believe I hazard nothing in saying that we should have lost
fewer men in the field and from disease and been much
nearer the end of this destructive war had we earlier availed

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 379

ourselves of the power conferred by the Constitution and at
last proposed to be adopted by this Bill. For short and
irregular efforts no force can be better than a volunteer
army. With brave and skilful officers and a short and active
term of service, volunteer troops are highly efficient. But
when a war is to last for years, as this will have done, how-
ever soon we may see its termination, it must depend for
its success upon regular and systematic forces. . . . Such
filling up is not possible to any degree under the volunteer
system, as the Government has had occasion to know in
this war. . . .

The practical operation of the volunteer system has been
that the earnest lovers of the country among the people, the
haters of the rebellion, the noblest and best of our citizens,
have left their homes to engage in this war to sustain the
Constitution ; while the enemies of civil hberty, those who
hate the Government and desire its failure in this struggle,
have stayed at home to embarrass it by discontent and
clamour. By this system we have had the loyal States
drained of those who could be relied upon in all political con-
tests to sustain the Government ; going forth to fight the
manly foe in front, the covert foe left behind has opened a
fire in the rear. Under the garb of democracy, a name that
has been so defiled and prostituted that it has become synony-
mous with treason and should henceforth be a byword and
hissing to the American people, these demagogues in this hall
and out of it have traduced the Government, misrepresented
the motives of loyal men. . . . The Bill goes upon the pre-
sumption that every citizen not incapacitated by physical
or mental disability owes military service to the country in its
hour of extremity, and that it is honourable and praise-
worthy to render such service.

The views given fairly sum up the opinion held by the
majority of the American people in the North and by that of
their representatives at Washington who passed the Conscrip-
tion Act without undue delay against a rather substantial
minority. The principal provisions of the Act of March 3,
1863, establishing compulsory miUtary service and exempt-
ing certain citizens, furnish so valuable and so interesting

380 How America became a Nation in Arms

a precedent to the fighting democracies that it is worth
while giving them in this place. We read in the Act :

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Bepresentatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled : That
all able-bodied male citizens of the United States, and per-
sons of foreign birth who shall have declared on oath their
intention to become citizens under and in pursuance of the
laws thereof, between the ages of twenty and forty-five years,
except as hereinafter excepted, are hereby declared to
constitute the national forces, and shall be liable to perform
military duty in the service of the United States when called
out by the President for that purpose.

Section 2. And be it further enacted : That the following
persons be and they are hereby excepted and exempt from
the provisions of this Act, and shall not be hable to mihtary
duty under the same, to wit : Such as are rejected as physi-
cally or mentally unfit for the service ; also, first, the Vice-
President of the United States, the heads of the various
Executive Departments of the Government, and the Gover-
nors of the several States. Second, the only son liable to
military duty of a widow dependent upon his labour for
support. Third, the only son of aged or infirm parent or
parents dependent upon his labour for support. Fourth,
where there are two or more sons of aged or infirm parents
subject to the draft, the father, or if he be dead the mother,
may elect which son shall be exempt. Fifth, the only
brother of children not twelve years old, having neither
father nor mother dependent upon his labour for support.
Sixth, the father of motherless children under twelve years
of age dependent upon his labour for support. Seventh,
where there are a father and sons in the mihtary service of
the United States as non-commissioned ofi&cers, musicians,
or privates, the residue of such family and household, not
exceeding two, shall be exempt. And no person but such
as herein excepted shall be exempt. Provided, however,
that no person who has been convicted of any felony shall
be enrolled or permitted to serve in said forces.

In each district a Provost-Marshal, acting under the
Provost-Marshal- General, an examining surgeon, and a

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 381

commissioner constituted the Board of Enrolment. The
enrolHng officers were directed to em'ol all able-bodied per-
sons within the prescribed ages and to judge of age by the
best evidence they could obtain. They were required to
make two classes in their returns, the first of all men between
twenty and thirty-five years, and the second of all between
thirty-five and forty-five years. If we wish to learn how
the Conscription Act worked in the unruly North, where an
enormous percentage of the population liable to military
service consisted of immigrant foreigners who often were
ill- acquainted with the English language, we should turn
to the Eeport which the Provost-Marshal- General made to
the Secretary of War on March 17, 1866. We read :

The Act of Congress creating the office of Provost-Mar-
shal-General was approved March 3, 1863. I was appointed
to it March 17, 1863.

Within a few weeks from that date the network of organi-
sation adopted under the law was extended over the loyal
States and the counties and towns of the same, and the
principal duties of the Bureau [the Provost-Marshal-
General's], to wit, the arrest of deserters, the enrolment of
the national forces for draft, and the enlistment of volun-
teers had been commenced.

When the Bureau was put in operation the strength of
the Army was deemed inadequate for offensive operations.
Nearly 400,000 recruits were required to bring the regiments
and companies then in service up to the legal and necessary
standard. Disaster had been succeeded by inactivity, and
the safety of the country depended on speedy and continued
reinforcement of the Army. The insufficiency of the system
of recruitment previously pursued had been demonstrated,
and the Army was diminishing by the ordinary casualties
of war, but more rapidly by the expiration of the terms for
which the troops had engaged to serve. To meet the emer-
gency a new system of recruitment was inaugurated. The
General Government, through this Bureau, assumed direct
control of the business which had heretofore been transacted
mainly by the State Governments. . . .

382 How America became a Nation in Arms

The following is a condensed summary of the results of
the operations of this Bureau from its organisation to the
close of the war :

(1) By means of a full and exact enrolment of all persons
liable to conscription under the law of March 3, and its
amendments, a complete exhibit of the military resources
of the loyal States in men was made, showing an aggregate
number of 2,254,063 men, not including 1,000,516 soldiers
actually under arms when hostilities ceased.

(2) 1,120,621 men were raised at an average cost (on
account of recruitment exclusive of bounties) of 9*84 dois,
per man ; while the cost of recruiting the 1,356,593 raised
prior to the organisation of the Bureau was 34*01 dois, per
man. A saving of over 70 cents on the dollar in the cost of
raising troops was thus effected under this Bureau, not-
withstanding the increase in the price of subsistence, trans-
portation, rents, &c., during the last two years of the war.

(3) 76,526 deserters were arrested and returned to the
Army.

The vigilance and energy of the officers of the Bureau in
this branch of business put an effectual check to the wide-
spread evil of desertion, which at one time impaired so seri-
ously the numerical strength and efficiency of the Army.

(4) The quotas of men furnished by the various parts
of the country were equalised and a proportionate share of
miUtary service secured from each, thus removing the very
serious inequality of recruitment which had arisen during
the first two years of the war, and which, when the Bureau
was organised, had become an almost insuperable obstacle
to further progress in raising troops. . . .

The introduction of compulsion acted as a powerful
stimulus to voluntary enhstment throughout the Union,^
and, in consequence of this revival of voluntary enlistment,
the number of men compulsorily enlisted was not as great
as it might have been, especially as the compulsory system
was not exploited to the full. Only a comparatively moderate
number of those who by law were declared to be Hable for

1 This was due to the fact that the individual States vied with one
another to fill their quota so as to make compulsion unnecessary.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 883

military service were called upon to join the Army.^ On
the other hand, the moral effect of the passing of the Con-
scription Act was very far-reaching and salutary. The
Provost-Marshal-General's Report stated :

The historian who would trace accomplished results to
their true and genuine causes must assign to the law constitut-
ing this Bureau a most important place among the agencies
by which the great work of restoring the national authority
has been so happily accomplished. The true turning-point
of the War was reached when the first ' draft wheel ' began
to revolve, under the provisions of the Act of March 3,
1863. The general effect of this law throughout the country
has been highly favourable to loyalty. No one department
has brought its operations so directly and closely home to
the people, or has given such a feeUng of security, such a
confidence in and such assurance of the power of the Govern-
ment to preserve itself, conquer its enemies, and protect all
its citizens. Next to the success of its arms, the ability of
the Government to bring men into the field at its call, and
the manner in which it has been done by this Bureau in
the execution of the * enrolment act,* in spite of innum-
erable and apparently insuperable difficulties, has best de-
monstrated that power.

The Conscription Act of 1863 was a most beneficial
measure, but it had several grave defects. It failed to
place upon the men liable for military service the duty
of coming forward without delay. Hence the Government
had to search them out. The Official Report tells us :

Instead of endeavouring to search out and hunt up every
person liable to military service through the agency of a
vast multitude of petty enrolling officers, upon whose capa-
city and fidelity it is not possible in all cases to rely, I think
the Government should impose its supreme demands directly
upon the people themselves, and require them, under the
sternest penalties, to report themselves for enrolment.
If the Government has a right to the military service of
its citizens in times of public peril, rebellion, and war, it

384 How America became a Nation in Arms

has a right to secure such services in the simplest, cheapest,
and most direct manner.

Enrolled men whose names had been drawn from the
wheel for service and who failed to obey the call were liable
to the extreme penalty, for the Provost-Marshal- General
published the following opinion of the Solicitor of the War
Department to all concerned :

When a person has been drafted in pursuance of the
Enrolment Act of March 3, 1863, notice of such draft must be
served within ten days thereafter, by a written or printed
notice, to be served on him personally, or by leaving a copy
at his last place of residence, requiring him to appear at
a designated rendezvous to report for duty. Any person
failing to report for duty after notice left at. his last place
of residence or served on him personally without furnishing
a substitute or paying 300 dois., is pronounced by law to be
a deserter ; he may be arrested and held for trial by court-
martial and sentenced to death. If a person, after being
drafted and before receiving the notice, deserts, it may still
be served by leaving it at his last place of residence, and if
he does not appear in accordance with the notice, or furnish
the substitute, or pay the 300 dois., he will be in law a deser-
ter, and must be punished accordingly. There is no way or
manner in which a person once enrolled can escape his public
duties, when drafted, whether present or absent, whether he
changes his residence or absconds ; the rights of the United
States against him are secured, and it is only by performance
of his duty to the country that he will escape liability to be
treated as a criminal.

Deserters were proceeded against with great energy.
Death sentences for desertion were not infrequent, but
in many cases they were commuted. Still, from the table
given later on it appears that 261 soldiers of the Northern
Army were executed. Among these were a good many
deserters.

The Union Government had made the unfortunate
mistake of allowing men who had been enrolled as liable

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 885

for military duty and who had afterwards been ' drafted '
for service to escape their duties by the undemocratic
expedient of finding a substitute or of paying $300. That
provision was naturally much resented by the poorer classes,
and especially by alien immigrants in the large towns.
The Opposition made the utmost use of their opportunity,
denounced the Government, and incited the masses to
resistance. The Provost-Marshal-General's Report tells
us that the people were incited against the Government
* by the machinations of a few disloyal political leaders,
aided by the treasonable utterances of corrupt and profli-
gate newspapers . . . by a steady stream of political poison
and arrant treason.' While the Goyernment was obeyed
in the country, these incitements led to sanguinary riots
among the worst alien elements in several towns, especially
in New York, Boston, and Troy. A large part of New
York was during several days devastated by the mob, and
the suppression of the rising cost more than 1000 lives.
When order had been re-established Mr. Horatio Seymour,
the Governor of New York, expressed doubt whether con-
scription was constitutionally permissible, and asked Presi-
dent Lincoln to obtain a judicial decision on that point.
The President replied on August 7 :

. . . We are contending with an enemy who, as I under-
stand, drives every able-bodied man he can reach into his
ranks, very much as a butcher drives bullocks into a slaugh-
ter-pen. No time is wasted, no argument is used.

This produces an army which will soon turn upon our
now victorious soldiers already in the field, if they shall not
be sustained by recruits as they should be. It produces an
army with a rapidity not to be matched on our side, if we first
waste time to re-experiment with the voluntary system,
already deemed by Congress, and palpably in fact, so far
exhausted as to be inadequate ; and then more time to ob-
tain a court decision as to whether the law is constitutional
which requires a part of those not now in the service to
go to the aid of those who are already in it, and still more

2 c

386 How America became a Nation in Arms

time to determine with absolute certainty that we get those
who are to go in the precisely legal proportion to those who
are not to go.

My purpose is to be in my action just and constitutional,
and yet practical, in performing the important duty with
which I am charged — of maintaining the unity and the free
principles of our common country.

Shortly afterwards conscription was enforced through-
out New York with the energetic assistance of Governor
Seymour, who clearly recognised the pertinence of the Presi-
dent's arguments.

Let us now consider the principal facts and figures relat-
ing to the Civil War.

It began on April 12, 1861, with the bombardment of
Fort Sumter ; it ended on April 9, 1865, with the surrender
of General Lee and his army to General Grant at Appomat-
tox Court House. Except for three days the war lasted
exactly four years. The history of the Civil War is at
the same time inspiring and humiUating. It is inspiring
because of the patriotism, the heroism, the ability, and the
resourcefulness which were displayed by both combatants.
Both showed that it was possible to improvise huge and
powerful armies. It is deeply humihating because the Civil
War is a gigantic monument of democratic improvidence
and of unreadiness, of governmental short-sightedness,
and of criminal waste, of bungling, and of muddle. The
North possessed so overwhelming a superiority in population
and in resources of every kind, and had had so ample a
warning of the threatening danger long before the trouble
began, that the war would probably never have broken out
had the Northern statesmen exercised in time some ordinary
foresight and caution, as they easily might have done and
as they ought to have done. If some precautions had been
taken, and if, nevertheless, the Southern States had revolted,
their subjection might have been effected wrthin a few
months at a comparatively trifling expenditure of blood
and treasure. How crushing the numerical superiority

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 387

of the North was over the South will be seen from the
Census figures of 1860, which supply the following picture :

American Pofulation in 1860.

Population of Northern and Western States . 22,339,978

White Population of Southern States . 5,449,463

Coloured „ „ „ „ . 3,653,880 9,103,343

Total 31,443,321

If we compare the total population of the antagonists,
it appears that the North had twenty-five inhabitants to
every ten in the South, both white and coloured. However,
as the Southern negroes did not furnish soldiers during the
war, we must deduct their number. Thus we find that
for every ten possible combatants in the South there were
no fewer than forty in the North. In 1860 the Northern
States had two-and-a-half times as many inhabitants and
four times as many men able to bear arms as had the
Southern States. In addition, the Northern States possessed
infinitely greater wealth, and infinitely greater resources
of every kind, than did their opponents. James Ford
Ehodes, in his excellent * History of the United States from
the Compromise of 1850,' briefly and correctly compared
their position as follows ;

The Union had much greater wealth, was a country of a
complex civilisation, and boasted of its varied industries ;
it combined the farm, the shop, and the factory. The
Confederacy was but a farm, dependent on Europe and on
the North for everything but bread and meat, and before
the war for much of those. The North had the money
market, and could borrow with greater ease than the South.
It was the iron age. The North had done much to develop
its wealth of iron, that potent aid of civilisation, that necessity
of war ; the South had scarcely touched its own mineral
resources. In nearly every Northern regiment were me-
chanics of all kinds and men of business training accustomed
to system, while the Southern army was made up of gentle-
men and poor whites, splendid fighters of rare courage and

388 How America became a Nation in Arms

striking devotion, but as a whole inferior in education and
in a knowledge of the arts and appliances of modern life
to the men of the North. The Union had the advantage of
the regular Army and Navy, of the flag, and of the prestige
and machinery of the national Government ; the Ministers
from foreign countries were accredited to the United States ;
the archives of what had been the common Government
were also in the possession of the Union. . . .

From the ofiScial statistics available it appears that
the wealth of the Union was in 1860 about fifteen times
as great as that of the Southern States, which were merely
producers of food and raw materials. In the course of the
war the economic supremacy of the North increased very
greatly, for while the manufacturing power of the Northern
States expanded rapidly, the economic position of the
Southern States deteriorated continually. Northern warships
blockaded the coast of the South, and the Southerners
could neither sell their staple products — especially cotton
and tobacco — nor import the machines, weapons, and
manufactures of every kind which they needed. While
the North was self-supporting and could freely import
from abroad all it required, the South was thrown on its
own resources, and before long the people lacked even the
most essential things. Hence their sufferings were terrible,
while the people in the North lived in relative comfort
and affluence.

The people, both in the South and in the North, made
a most gigantic mihtary effort. The Secretary of War
laid before Congress information from which it appeared
that the Northern States furnished altogether the gigantic
number of 2,653,062 soldiers. If this colossal aggregate
is reduced to a three -years' standard, they furnished no
less than 2,129,041 men. If we compare this figure with
the total population of the Northern States given above, we
find that the North sent to the army 10 per cent, of the
total population. The official figures relating to the mili-
tary effort of the South are incomplete and not reliable.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 389

Estimates vary. However, when we draw the average
of the various estimates it appears that the Southern States
furnished to the army about one milKon men, or approxi-
mately 20 per cent, of the white population.

The war entailed colossal losses in men and money.
According to the accounts furnished in the Official Kecord
the war losses of the Northern Army were as follows :

Losses of Northern Army

Volunteers

Officers

Men

Total

Killed in action

4,057

61,654

65,711

Of wounds received in action

2,164

39,912

42,076

Of disease ......

2,688

218,806

221,494

Accidental (except drowned)

141

3,869

4,010

Drowned ......

102

4,749

4,851

Murdered ......

36

468

504

Killed after capture ....

14

89

103

Suicide ......

24

340

364

Executed by U.S. military authorities.

—

261

261

Executed by enemy ....

4

60

64^

Sunstroke. .....

6

301

306

Other known causes ....

61

1,910

1,971

Causes not stated ....
Aggregate . . . .

28

11,987

12,015

9,324

344,406

353,730

Losses of Northern Regular Army
Grand Aggregate— Regulars and

260

5,538

5,798

Volunteers ....

9,584

349,944

359,528

These figures are considered by many authorities to be
an under-statement. Some estimate that the Northern
States lost approximately 500,000 lives through the war.
Through death the Northern Armies lost about 20 per
cent, of their men, and the losses come to about 2 per cent.
of the whole population. The war losses of the Southern
States were approximately as great as those of the North.
Apparently about one-half of the Southern Army died,
and the deaths caused by the war equal almost 10 per
cent, of the white population of the South. Altogether
the American States combined lost between 700,000 and
1,000,000 lives in four years' warfare.

390 How America became a Nation in Arms

The economic losses caused by the war were enormous.
Estimates vary, but the most reHable one gives the figure
of 10,000,000,000 dollars, or £2,000,000,000. The war-bill
of the United States continues, mounting up through the
payment of pensions which entail at present an expenditure
of about £30,000,000 a year. The Civil War crippled the
North financially for many years, but it ruined the South.
Between 1860 and 1870 the taxable wealth of Virginia
decreased from 793,249,681 dollars to 327,670,503 dol-
lars ; that of South Carolina from 548,138,754 dollars to
166,517,591 dollars; that of Georgia from 645,895,237
dollars to 214,535,366 dollars, &c.

Let us consider now the principal lessons of the Civil
War.

If the American statesmen had exercised merely reason-
able caution and foresight, the war would probably never
have occurred. The principal towns of the South He near
the sea border in spacious bays or up-river. They were
protected against an attack from the sea by strong forts.
By adequately garrisoning these forts in time, as General
Scott, the Head of the Army, had advised President
Buchanan, the American Government could have dominated
the rebeUious towns, and could have cut their connection
with the sea, as had been done with the best success at the
time of the nullification troubles of 1832. Unfortunately,
President Buchanan paid no attention to the views of his
miUtary experts.

Washington said in his fifth Annual Address : * If we
desire to avoid insult we must be able to repel it. If we
desire to secure peace, it must be known that we are at all
times ready for war.' He and many of the founders of the
Eepubhc had pointed out in The Federalist and elsewhere
that it was dangerous for the country to rely merely on
an untrained militia, and had urged the necessity of main-
taining an adequate standing army. Unfortunately their
warnings were not heeded by the short-sighted and unscrupu-
lous politicians. Had the United States possessed a small

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 391

standing army ready for war the Southern States would
scarcely have dared to rise, and had they done so their
power could easily have been broken. In the opinion of
many American military experts a standing army of 50,000
men would have sufficed to end the war in a few months.
The disregard of the views of the mihtary experts, and the
criminal levity and recklessness of self-seeking politicians
cost the United States approximately a million lives and
£2,000,000,000. They paid dearly for their previous improvi-
dence and their neglect of mihtary preparations.

When the bombardment of Fort Sumter began, when
the army, navy, and the whole administrative and judicial
apparatus broke down, the dissolution of the Great Kepublic
seemed inevitable. The Union was saved by a man of
sterling character but of merely moderate abihty, by a great
citizen, but scarcely a statesman of the very first rank.
Abraham Lincoln was animated by an unwavering faith
in the Union and in the righteousness of its cause. Undis-
mayed by disaster, he rallied the waverers, encouraged
the downhearted, and created harmony among the quarrel-
ling parties. When matters seemed desperate, he mobi-
lised the country, raised a huge army, and saved the State
by his exertions. Had a Buchanan or a Johnson been in
power the Union would undoubtedly have been lost. He
did not hesitate to exceed his constitutional powers and
to act as a Dictator when the fate of his country was at stake.
In Lord Bryce's words, ' Abraham Lincoln wielded more
authority than any single Enghshman has done since Ohver
Cromwell.' One-man rule undoubtedly saved the United
States.

A democratic Government which at any moment may
be overturned by a hostile majority lives precariously
by popularity, by votes. Popularity is therefore indispens-
able to the politicians in power. It is more necessary and
more precious to them than national security and adminis-
trative efficiency. The result is that a Government which
is dependent from hour to hour for its life on the popular

392 How America became a Nation in Arms

will and the popular whim must be guided by the momentaiy
moods and impulses of the ill-informed masses. It must
pursue a hand-to-mouth policy. Fearing to endanger its
position by taking the initiative, it will, as a rule, wait for
a popular demand for action. It will often refuse to act
with foresight and even with common sense, but will
readily obey the clamour of the noisiest but least well-
informed section of the Press and the pubUc. Hence a
democratic Cabinet cannot act with foresight. It cannot
unite on necessary, wise, and far-sighted action. On the
other hand, the disunited ministers, who are merely waiting
for a popular lead, will readily agree on some useless, foolish,
or even mischievous measure, provided it is popular, provided
it is demanded with sufiûcient clamour and insistence by
the prejudiced, and by those who live by pandering to the
short-sightedness and to the momentary moods and emotions
of the masses and act as their spokesmen.

The founders of the American Commonwealth, like all
great statesmen, recognised that a Government can act
with energy, sagacity, foresight, secrecy, and despatch —
qualities which are indispensable in critical times, and
especially in war — only if there is absolute unity of purpose,
if the executive is in the hands of a single man who is
assisted by eminent experts. In Great Britain a Cabinet
composed of twenty-two personages was supreme. Of these
only one man, Lord Kitchener, was a military expert. As,
according to tradition, the Cabinet forms its decisions unani-
mously, it is clear that that unwieldy and inexpert body
could act neither with energy nor with secrecy, neither with
despatch nor with foresight. It could scarcely act with
wisdom or with common sense. It is difificult to secure
agreement among twenty-two men. As an energetic and
provident poHcy will probably be opposed by the timorous,
or the short-sighted, a compromise between action and
inaction, between wisdom and folly, becomes necessary, for
otherwise the Cabinet will split. Hence a safe common-
place poHcy, a weak and dilatory, shilly-shally pohcy, a

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 398

policy of vacillation, of make-believe, and of drift, was
likely to be adopted. Foresight became impossible. At
best half- measures were taken, and urgently necessary
energetic action was delayed until it was too late, until
disasters, which could no longer be explained away, had
occurred and had demonstrated even to the dullest and to
the most obstinate members of the Cabinet the folly of
their opposition.

Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Nelson, Moltke, indeed
all great generals and admirals whose views are known, have
stated that war is a one-man business, that in war the worst
possible direction is that of a military council. It is true
that great commanders have often called councils of war,
but they have done so only for advice, not for direction.
If, according to the greatest leaders, it is dangerous to
entrust the direction of mihtary or naval operations to a
council of war composed of great experts, how much more
dangerous then will it be to entrust it to a council of politicians
unacquainted with war ! Apparently the twenty- two men
who formed the late Cabinet had the supreme direction not
only of the country's domestic and administrative policy,
but that of its armies and fleets as well. Herein lay the
reason that more than once during the war we have seen
inadequacy, vacillation, hesitation, improvidence, and
incompetence ; that belated half-measures and quarter-
measures have sometimes been taken when immediate
and energetic action was imperatively called for. Unani-
mity, energy, foresight, secrecy, and despatch, in one word,
efficiency, is difficult enough in business jointly transacted
by twenty-two men belonging to one party. Will it be
easier to obtain unanimity in Cabinet decision, will the
Government act with greater wisdom, foresight, energy,
and rapidity when there is a CoaHtion Cabinet, when one
half the Ministers belong to one party and the other half
to the late Opposition ?

It is, of course, highly desirable that in a time of crisis
the country should possess a strong national Government,

394 How America became a Nation in Arms

a Government representing not a party but the nation as
a whole. However, as a Cabinet cannot possibly act with
unanimity, foresight, energy, rapidity, and secrecy, it seems
indispensable that the Cabinet should entrust the supreme
direction of affairs to a single strong man supported by a
small number of expert advisers who are not his equals
but distinctly hia subordinates. A democracy at war
requires for its salvation a kind of Dictator, an Abraham
Lincoln, and British statesmen will do well to ponder over
the most important views of the founders of the American
Commonwealth given in the beginning of this chapter.

Many politicians and numerous organs of the Press
have urged that the situation calls for a Dictator, and have
regretted that no man of transcendent ability has come
forward to whom the Government could be entrusted for the
duration of the War. It is, however, perhaps unnecessary
to wait for the advent of a Chatham. Government by a
single man of moderate, or even of inferior, ability, will prob-
ably prove far more efiScient than government by twenty-
two very able men, non-experts, who possess, at least
theoretically, equal power and authority in directing the
affairs of the nation. The British Constitution is unwritten,
is fluid, is adaptable to the necessities of the moment.
It has been created by gradual evolution, and it lends itself
easily to the creation of a one-man Government for the
duration of the War. The Prime Minister need only be
made solely responsible for the conduct of the Government
in all its branches during the War. By thus increasing
the power of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet Ministers
would be made responsible merely for their departments.
They would be responsible to the Prime Minister, and he
to Parliament. Cabinet Ministers could therefore devote
themselves practically entirely to their administrative
duties. They would become the Prime Minister's subordin-
ates. He would assume sole responsibility for important
decisions. He would consult the Cabinet Ministers, but
could no longer be hampered in his action by the opposition

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 395

of one or several of his colleagues. The direction of affairs
would no longer be in the hands of an unwieldy body, such
as could not successfully direct any business. The State
would possess a managing director, as does every business,
and thus foresight, unity, energy, despatch, and secrecy
in action might be secured.

Many Englishmen extol the voluntary system and
oppose compulsory service because in their opinion compul»
sion, conscription, is undemocratic. Most of these are quite
unaware that the greatest, the freest, and the most unruly
democracy in the world gladly submitted to conscription
half a century ago, and appear to forget that France and
Switzerland recognise that the first duty of the citizen
consists in defending his country. If the United States
found conscription necessary to prevent the Southern
States breaking away and forming a government of their
own, how much more necessary is the abandonment of
the voluntary system when not merely the integrity but the
existence of Great Britain and of the Empire is at stake !

The American War was unnecessarily protracted because
the North had never enough troops to crush the rebellion.
On July 3, 1862, President Lincoln wrote despairingly a
confidential letter to the Governors of various States worded
as follows :

I should not want the half of 300,000 new troops if I
could have them now. If I had 50,000 additional troops
here now, I believe I could substantially close the War in
two weeks. But time is everything, and if I get 50,000 new
men in a month I shall have lost 20,000 old ones during the
same month, having gained only 30,000, with the difference
between old and new troops still against me. The quicker
you send, the fewer you will have to send. Time is every-
thing. Please act in view of this. . . .

While the Southern States armed their whole able-bodied
population at an early date, the Northern States were late
in introducing conscription. Besides, conscription was with

396 How America became a Nation in Arms

them only a half-measure, as has been shown. They in-
troduced it only on March 3, 1863, two years after the
outbreak of the war, and as they failed to arm all available
men the war dragged on for two whole years after conscrip-
tion had been introduced. The four-fold superiority in
able-bodied men and the fifteen-fold superiority in wealth
would undoubtedly have given to the Northern States a
rapid and complete victory had they acted with their entire
national strength at the outset.

The United Kingdom and the British Empire have made
enormous efforts, but greater ones will be needed. The
United States have provided this country with a great and
inspiring precedent. The Northern States placed 10 per
cent, and the Southern States 20 per cent, of their entire
population in the field, as has been shown on another page.
If Great Britain should follow the example of the Northern
States she alone should be able to raise 4,500,000 men.
If she should follow the example of the South she should be
able to provide 9,000,000 soldiers. The British losses during
the first years of war have been appalling, but they are small
if compared with those incurred by the Americans in the
Civil War. If Great Britain should lose men at the same
rate as the Northern States, her dead would number about
1,000,000. At the proportion of the Southern States her
dead would number about 4,000,000. Great Britain and
her daughter-States have an opportunity of demonstrating
to the world that they have as much energy, resourcefulness,
patriotism, and vitality as the men who laid down their lives
in the terrible campaign of 1861-65. If the United States
were ready to make the greatest sacrifices for preserving
their Union, the United Kingdom and the Dominions shoula
be wiUing to make sacrifices at least as great for the sake of
their existence.

The story of the Civil War provides invaluable lessons
to this country. It shows that the United States were
saved by two factors, by one-man government and by
conscription. It shows that far greater exertions than those

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 397

made hitherto are wanted by Motherland and Empire — and
that they can be made. It shows that the sooner con-
scription is introduced throughout the Empire, the more
energetically national service is enforced, and the more fully
the whole manhood of the Empire States is employed in
the War, the smaller will be its cost in blood and money, and
the sooner it will be over. At the same time, the Civil
War furnishes the gravest warnings to the United States.
It should show them the danger of unpreparedness. The
European crisis may become their crisis as well.

At the dedication of the Soldiers' Cemetery in 1863,
Abraham Lincoln pronounced the following immortal
words :

It is for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining
before us — that from these honoured dead we take increased
devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full
measure of devotion — that we here highly resolve that these
dead shall not have died in vain, that this nation under
God shall have a new birth of freedom, and that government
of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish
from the earth.

These words are known by heart by every American
schoolboy. They may well serve as a memento and as a
motto to Englishmen of the present generation and inspire
them in the heavy task which lies before them.

CHAPTEE XI

AN ANGLO-AMERICAN REUNION^

On Christmas Eve, 1814, in the old Carthusian Convent in
the city of Ghent, a peace was signed which brought to an
end the Anglo-American War of 1812-14, and on Christmas
Eve, 1914, occurred the one hundredth anniversary of that
memorable event. To celebrate worthily the Hundred
Years' Peace between the British nation and the United
States powerful committees were formed in the United
States, in Canada, and in this country, and they resolved
to observe it by religious services and various festivities,
by purchasing, by popular subscription, Sulgrave Manor,
Washington's ancestral home in England, by placing a
statue of George Washington in Westminster Abbey, by
erecting monumental arches and columns on the United
States- Canadian boundary, by erecting imposing memorial
buildings in London, New York, and elsewhere, by creating
a park at the Niagara Falls and a toll-free International
Peace Bridge over the Niagara Eiver which separates the
United States from Canada, and by giving prizes for
improved text-books on Anglo-American history, designed
to improve relations between the two countries. Senator
Burton introduced a Bill in the United States Senate pro-
viding for the creation of a Peace Celebration Committee,
and appropriating £1,500,000 to be spent on the celebration
provided that the nations of the British Empire would
furnish ' such sum or sums as will equal the amount or

^ The Nineteenth Century and After y September, 1913^
398

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 399

amounts thus appropriated.' The War has interfered with
the planned celebration, and perhaps it is for the best.

The promoters of the movement obviously intended to
celebrate the Hundred Years' Peace by improving the
relations between the British and American peoples, and
they were prepared to spend money lavishly for that purpose.
But would they have achieved their aim by giving large
commissions to a number of sculptors, architects, and monu-
mental masons, who might only have succeeded in producing
monumental eyesores, and by creating on the Niagara
frontier a park and a toll-free Peace Bridge ? The Niagara
is the American Blackpool. It is visited every year by more
than a million cheap trippers, who are conveyed there at
a very small price in railway trains which are crowded to
their utmost capacity. Apart from the two railway bridges
there is already an excellent passenger bridge over the
Niagara which people can cross by electric tram for the
modest sum of ten cents. Did the promoters of the peace
celebrations seriously believe that they could bridge the gulf
which until lately unfortunately still divided the British
and American nations by constructing promiscuously and
at very large expense a number of imposing and possibly
unbeautiful stone monuments and a totally unnecessary
bridge, which would have no practical benefit except that
of saving the trifling sum of ten cents per head to swarms .
of hilarious excursionists, who, anxious to see the sights
on the other side, or to get something to eat, would rush
across the toll-free bridge without giving a moment's
thought to its symbolical meaning ? Were not the excellent
people on the Peace Celebration Committees bent upon
spending their money and their energy in the wrong
direction ?

On Christmas Eve the angels sang * On earth peace,
goodwill toward men.' The Peace of Ghent was most
auspiciously signed on Christmas Eve, and the idea of
celebrating its centenary by taking steps which would
increase the goodwill between the two great branches of

400 An Anglo-American Reunion

the Anglo-Saxon race and secure their peace for all time
was excellent. However, experience teaches us that peace
and goodwill between nations cannot be secured by wasting
money on stone monuments and bridges and that inter-
national agitation by private committees does little to bring
nations together. From the invasion by William the
Conqueror in 1066 to the surrender of Fashoda in 1898
England and France have passionately hated one another
and have almost incessantly been at war. Yet to-day
France and Great Britain are excellent friends. How has
that marvellous and almost incredible change been brought
about ? By the Anglo-French Agreement of April 8, 1904,
concluded between Lord Lansdowne and Monsieur Delcassé,
which settled all outstanding questions and abolished all
friction between the two nations, and by the conclusion of
an understanding whereby the two countries have resolved
to support one another in case of need. Through the action
of their leading statesmen, France and Great Britain have
discovered that they need one another and that they ought,
in their own interest, to support one another. The long-
continued efforts of well-meaning individuals in France
and Great Britain to bring the two countries together proved
fruitless. It is w^orth noting that France and Great Britain
had become firm friends long before the great War, although
many of the text-books used in the French schools still
described Great Britain as the hereditary enemy of France,
and although many of the books used in the British schools
reciprocated the compliment.

After all, the influence of well-disposed private indi-
viduals, of bodies such as Chambers of Commerce, and of
the schools is very much overrated. Nowadays the people
receive their political education not from schoolmasters
and social leaders but from the Press. The newspapers
exercise a far more powerful influence upon public opinion
than school and society combined. Diplomacy, the actions
of statesmen, not schoolmasters and social leaders, brought
France and Great Britain together overnight, and soon the

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 401

French and British nations unlearnt what they had been
taught about one another in the schools, and learnt to
respect and trust one another, and, in case of need, to defend
one another.

If statesmanship was able to bring together France and
Great Britain, two nations of different race, different ideas,
different habits, different thought, and different speech,
which have fought one another almost unceasingly during
nine centuries, it should surely not be impossible to bring
the United States and Great Britain once more together by
the conclusion of a second and final peace treaty, by a treaty
whereby the two great Anglo-Saxon nations might pledge
themselves to support one another in perpetuity in case
of a great emergency, by a treaty which would most fitly
be concluded on the next anniversary of the Treaty of
Ghent, and which would secure their peace and security
practically for all time. That would, I venture to assert,
be its most appropriate celebration. I shall endeavour to
show the necessity of such a treaty in the following pages,
but before doing so I think I ought to deal briefly with
the causes which until recently have kept the two nations
asunder.

The fact that Great Britain and the United States have
been at war has been almost forgotten in this country, but
it is keenly remembered in America. That is only natural.
In the course of her long and chequered history Great Britain
has been at war with many powerful nations, but the United
States have had only one great foreign war, and, owing to
their geographical position, they have had hitherto a possible
enemy only in that nation which is supreme at sea. If
the American history-books had not contained long and
highly-coloured accounts of * America's fight for freedom
against England's tyranny,' and of * America's heroism
and England's treachery,' they would have made very dull
and uninspiring reading indeed.

National patriotism demands to be inflamed by the heroic
deeds of one's ancestors. The Americans have every reason

% D

402 An Anglo-American Reunion

to be proud of their fight against England, and it is only
right and proper that they have made the most of it and so
strengthened their spirit of patriotism and of nationalism.
However, although all Americans are proud of their victory
over England, a large and constantly growing number of
them have begun to recognise that the English nation is
not a nation of tyrants and of inhuman monsters, that at
the time of the American Eevolution not all the wrong was
on the side of England and all the right on that of the
American Colonists, that the war was caused rather by
mutual misunderstandings than by the evil dispositions of
the English Government and the English people, and there-
fore they feel a little ashamed of the patriotic exuberance
of some of their countrymen.

Nations are usually welded together by war. Without
the Anglo-American war there might have been American
States, but these would scarcely have formed a firmly knit
American State and an American nation. Besides, no
great State, and especially no great democratic State, and
no great federation of States, has ever been established
without war. In every family of strong, healthy, and
high-spirited boys there are fights. However, these do not
lead to eternal enmity or to a permanent estrangement,
but to increased mutual respect and to a better understand-
ing. There have been great fraternal fights in Great Britain,
Germany, Switzerland, France, and in the United States
themselves, and it was only natural that there should have
been such a fight between the United States and Great
Britain. Lastly, the losses and sufferings which the Anglo-
American war caused to the Americans have been much
exaggerated. When I was in the United States I was
seriously informed by eminent and competent men that the
yearly celebration of the Fourth of July, the day of the
Declaration of Independence, when patriotism impels
Americans to let ofï in the streets fireworks and revolvers,
had in the course of time claimed a heavier hecatomb of
life than the Anglo-American war.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 403

In the American school books Great Britain is usually
described as the hereditary enemy of the United States.
It is true that much bitterness against the United States
prevailed in England long after the conclusion of the Anglo-
American Peace Treaty. It was only natural that the loss
of our greatest possession created abiding resentment,
especially as Americans kept open the sore by numerous
provocations and by frequent endeavours to damage Great
Britain and Canada. Of course provocation met with
counter provocation. However, it should in fairness be
remembered in the United States that, notwithstanding
all mutual misunderstandings and disputes which have
taken place in the past, Great Britain has more than
once acted as America's good friend. Great Britain has
preserved the United States more than once from the in-
tended intervention of European Powers, she has prob-
ably preserved them from dangerous wars, and she has
undoubtedly been responsible for the promulgation and
the defence of the Monroe Doctrine which has estab-
lished the principle ' America for the Americans.' The
fact that Great Britain was responsible for the declaration
of the Monroe Doctrine is so important and is at the same
time so little known both in Great Britain and in the
United States that it is worth while to give briefly the
secret history of that doctrine, which has become the
fundamental principle and the sheet anchor of America's
foreign policy.

After the Napoleonic Wars a reign of reaction began
on the Continent of Europe. The Holy Alliance strove to
destroy the democratic governments and institutions which
the revolutionary period had called into being throughout
the world, and to introduce a universal despotism. At
Verona, on November 22, 1822, the Powers which had
fought against Napoleon signed a secret treaty, to which,
however, only the names of Metternich (Austria), Chateau-
briand (France), Bernstorfï (Prussia), and Nesselrode
(Eussia) were appended, for England refused to be a party.

404 An Anglo-American Reunion

The first two Articles of this instrument are of special interest,
for they read as follows :

The undersigned, specially authorised to make some
additions to the treaty of the Holy Alhance, after having
exchanged their respective credentials, have agreed as
follows ;

Article I. The high contracting Powers, being con-
vinced that the system of represantative government is
as incompatible with the monarchical principles as the
maxim of the sovereignty of the people is with the divine
right, engage mutually, in the most solemn manner, to use
all their efforts to put an end to the system of representative
government, in whatever country it may exist in Europe,
and to prevent its being introduced in those countries where
it is not yet known.

Article II. As it cannot be doubted that the liberty of
the Press is the most powerful means used by the pretended
supporters of the rights of nations, to the detriment of those
of Princes, the high contracting parties promise reciprocally
to adopt all proper measures to suppress it, not only in their
own States, but also in the rest of Europe.

In Henderson's * American Diplomatic Questions ' we
read :

The Congress adjourned with the understanding that
France, in the name of the Holy AUies, should send an
army into Spain * to put an end to the system of repre-
sentative government ' which w^as struggling for existence
beyond the Pyrenees. A French army, under the Due
d'Angoulême, crossed the frontier, and after a feeble
resistance from the revolutionists restored Ferdinand to a
despotic throne. The next step of the aUies seemed to be
reasonably certain — a movement against the South Amercian
revolutionists.

The advisability of taking such a step had already been
broached at Vienna, and freely discussed at Verona.
Reports of these contemplated movements in the Americas
had reached Washington, and had impressed the administra-
tion with a deep feeling of concern. It was feared that

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 405

France might demand Cuba as a price for restoring
Ferdinand.

. Through its agents the British Government had become
aware of the danger threatening the United States from the
Continent of Europe. Mr. Canning, the British Foreign
Secretary, sought an interview with Mr. Eichard Kush, the
United States Minister to Great Britain, and Mr. Kush
repor^'^d the gist of his conversation with Mr. Canning
immediately to Mr. J. Q. Adams, the Secretary of State at
Washington. Mr. Kush referred to a note which Mr.
Canning had previously sent to the British Ambassador in
Paris. In that note the British Foreign Secretary had
stated : * As his Britannic Majesty disclaimed all intention
of appropriating to himself the smallest portion of the late
Spanish possessions in America, he, Mr. Canning, was
satisfied that no attempt would be made by France to bring
any of Spain's possessions under her dominion either by
conquest or by cession from Spain.' Commenting upon
this important note Mr. Kush reported to the United States
Secretary of State :

By this we are to understand in terms sufficiently
distinct, that Great Britain would not be passive under such
an attempt by France, and Mr. Canning, on my having
referred to this note, asked me what I thought my Govern-
ment would say to going hand in hand with the British
Government in the same sentiment ; not, as he added, that
any concert in action under it could become necessary
between the two countries, but that the simple fact of our
being known to hold the same sentiment would, he had no
doubt, by its moral effect, put down the intention on the
part of France, admitting that she should ever entertain
it. . . . Kevertmg to his first idea, he again said that he
hoped that France would not, should even events in the
Peninsula be favourable to her, extend her views to South
America for the purpose of reducing the colonies, nominally,
perhaps, for Spain, but in effect to subserve ends of her
own ; but that, in case she should meditate such a poHcy,

406 An Anglo-American Reunion

he was satisfied that the knowledge of the United States
being opposed to it, as well as Great Britain, could not fail
to have its influence in checking her steps. In this way he
thought good might be done by prevention, and peaceful
prospects all around increased. As to the form in which
such knowledge might be made to reach France, and even
the other Powers of Europe, he said, in conclusion, that
that might probably be arranged in a manner that would
be free from objection.

On August 20, a few days after this conversation, Mr.
Canning sent to Mr. Kush a letter marked * Private and
confidential ' in which he said :

Before leaving town I am desirous of bringing before you
in a more distinct, but still in an unoflBcial and confidential
shape, the question which we shortly discussed the last
time that I had the pleasure of seeing you. . . . We con-
ceive the recovery of the American colonies by Spain to
be hopeless. . . . We aim not at the possession of any
portion of them ourselves. We could not see any portion
of them transferred to any other Power with indifference.
If these opinions and feehngs are, as I firmly believe them
to be, common to your Government with ours, why should
we hesitate mutually to confide them to each other and to
declare them in the face of the world ?

If there be any European Power which cherishes other
projects, which looks to a forcible enterprise for reducing
the colonies to subjugation, on the behalf or in the name of
Spain, or which meditates the acquisition of any part of
them to itself, by cession or by conquest, such a declaration
on the part of your Government and ours would be at once
the most effectual and the least offensive mode of intimating
our joint disapprobation of such projects. . . . Nothing
could be more gratifying to me than to join with you in
such a work.

Commenting upon the foregoing letter Mr. Kush reported
to Mr. Adams on August 23, 1823 :

. . . The tone of earnestness in Mr. Canning's note,
and the force of some of his expressions, naturally start the.

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 407

inference that the British Cabinet cannot be without its
serious apprehensions that ambitious enterprises are medi-
tated against the independence of the South American
States. Whether by France alone I cannot now say on
any authentic grounds.

On August 23 Mr. Canning sent to Mr. Kush another
* Private and confidential ' letter, in which he said :

I have received notice — but not such notice as imposes
upon me the necessity of any immediate answer or proceed-
ing — that as soon as the mihtary objects in Spain çire
achieved (of which the French expect, how justly I know
not, a very speedy achievement) a proposal will be made for
a Congress, or some less formal concert and consultation,
especially upon the affairs of Spanish America.

Mr. Adams, the American Secretary of State, communi-
cated the news which he had received from Mr. Eush to
the President of the Republic, Mr. Monroe, and President
Monroe wrote for advice to his eminent predecessors in
office, Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison, two of the surviving
foimders of the American Republic, who had co-operated
with George Washington and Benjamin Franklin.

Mr. Jefferson replied on October 24, 1823 :

Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to
entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe ; our second,
never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic
affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests
distinct from those of Europe, and particularly her own. . . .
One nation, most of all, could disturb us in this pursuit ;
she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in it. By
acceding to her proposition we detach her from the bands,
bring her mighty weight into the scale of free government,
and emancipate a continent at one stroke, which might
otherwise Hnger long in doubt and difficulty. Great Britain
is the nation which can do us the most harm of any one, or
all, on earth ; and with bar on our side we need not fear the
whole world. With her, then, we should most sedulously
cherish a cordial friendship ; and nothing would tend more

408 An Anglo-American Reunion

to knit our affections than to be fighting onca more, side
by side, in the same cause.

Mr. Madison wrote to Mr. Jeiïerson on November 1;
1823:

With the British power and navy combined with our
own we have nothing to fear from the rest of the world ;
and in the great struggle of the epoch between hberty and
despotism we owe it to ourselves to sustain the former,
in this hemisphere at least.

From the sixth volume of the * Memoirs ' of Mr. J. Q,
Adams, who at the time was the United States Secretary
of State, we learn that he did not believe that the Holy
Alliance had any intention of ultimately attacking the
United States ; but, if they should subdue the Spanish
provinces, they might recolonise them and partition them
out among themselves. Eussia might take California, Peru,
and Chile ; France Mexico, where she had been intriguing
to get a monarchy under a Prince of the House of Bourbon,
as well as at Buenos Ayres ; and Great Britain, if she
could not resist this course of things, would take at least
the island of Cuba as her share of the scramble. Then
what would be the situation of the United States—Eng-
land holding Cuba, and France Mexico ?

The danger that France, supported by the Powers of
the Holy Alliance, would interfere on the American Con-
tinent was great, and this was generally recognised in
America. In the North American Beview for October,
1823, we read, for instance :

If success should favour the allied monarchs, would they
be satisfied with reforming the Government of Spain ?
Would not the Spanish colonies, as part of the same Empire,
then demand their parental attention 9 And might not
the United States be next considered as deserving their
kind guardianship ?

On December 2, 1823, President Monroe published his

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 409

annual message, which contains the declaration of the
Monroe Doctrine — one ought really in fairness to call it the
Canning-Monroe Doctrine — in the following words :

The occasion has been judged propar for asserting as a
pnnciple in which tha rights and interasts of the United
States are involved, that the American continents, by the
free and independent condition which they have assumed
and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects
for future colonisation by any European Powers. . . . We
owe it, therefore, to candour, and to the amicable relations
existing between the United States and those Powars, to
declare that we should consider any attempt on their part
to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere
as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing
colonies or dependencies of any European Power we have
not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the govern-
ments who have declared their independence and main-
tained it, and whose independence we have, on great con-
sideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could
not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing
them, or controlHng in any other manner their destiny by
any European Power, in any other Hght than as the mani-
festation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United
States.

After the reading of President Monroe's famous message
Mr. Henry Clay, Speaker of the House of Kepresentatives,
caused the following resolution to be introduced :

Kesolved by the Senate and House of Kepresentatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled.
That the people of these States would not see, without
serious inquietude, any forcible intervention by the alHed
Powers of Europe, in behalf of Spain, to reduce to their
former subjection those parts of the continent of America
which have proclaimed and estabhshed for themselves,
respectively, independent governments, and which have
been solemnly recognised by the United States.

Commenting upon the genesis of the Monroe Doctrine

410 An Anglo-American Reunion

Mr. Henderson wrote in his book, * American Diplomatic
Questions ' :

If England had, after all, joined the allies in their schemes
it is much to be doubted whether the President's message
of 1823 would have seriously embarrassed them in the
ultimate perfection of their Spanish- American plans ; but
the reaHsation that Great Britain, with her powerful navy,
endorsed in the main the sentiments of President Monroe
cast a gloom over the propagandists of divine right, and
the great South American project was abandoned.

The American Civil War broke out in the beginning of
1861. Mexico was at that time in the throes of a revolution,
and she refused to satisfy her Spanish and French creditors
and to do justice to Great Britain for having broken into
the British Legation and carried off £152,000 in sterling
bonds belonging to British subjects. The British claims
were substantial and hona-fide. The French and Spanish
claims were more or less doubtful. Great Britain, France,
and Spain agreed upon joint action for the protection of
their interests, and British, French, and Spanish warships
sailed for Vera Cruz with the avowed intention of taking
possession of the Custom Houses of two or three Mexican
ports for the purpose of satisfying the claims of their Govern-
ments. However, within a few weeks after the arrival of
these ships, and before the Allies had done much more than
seize Vera Cruz, the English and Spanish commanders
became dissatisfied with the adventurous action of the
French and the English and Spanish forces withdrew in
April, 1862. While Great Britain and Spain merely sought
to obtain satisfaction for the claims of their citizens, France,
taking advantage of the American Civil War, evidently
intended to violate the Monroe Doctrine and to establish
herself firmly and permanently on the American Continent
under the pretext of satisfying some very shadowy demands
of her subjects upon Mexico. It is a well-known fact that
it was one of the favourite projects of Napoleon the Third

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 411

to create on the American Continent a great Latin- American
State or Confederation controlled by France, a monarchical
counterpoise to the United States. We can therefore not
be surprised that the secret instructions which Napoleon
the Third sent to General Forey, the Commander-in-Chief
of the French Expedition, contained the following statement
of France's pohcy :

If Mexico preserves her independence and maintains
the integrity of her territory, and if a suitable Government
bo constituted there with the assistance of France, we shall
have restored to the Latin race on the other side of the ocean
its strength and prestige. . . . Mexico thus regenerated
will always be favourable to France. ... As now our
miUtary honour is pledged, the exigencies of our policy and
the interests of our industry and our commerce make it
our duty to march upon Mexico, to plant there boldly
our standard, and to estabhsh there a monarchy, if this is
not incompatible with the national sentiment of the country,
but at all events a government which promises some stabiUty,

Taking advantage of the embarrassment of the United
States, Napoleon the Third endeavoured not only to create
a powerful monarchy on American soil but to intervene
in the struggle between the North and the South with the
object of permanently weakening the United States. In
Moore's ' Digest of the International Law of the United
States ' we read :

On October 30, 1862, Napoleon instructed the French
ambassadors to Great Britain and Kussia to invite those
Powers to join France in requesting the beUigerents to
agree to an armistice of six months, so as to consider some
plan for bringing the war to an end. . . . Great Britain
promptly and unquahfiedly dechned the proposition.

Napoleon's policy was frustrated partly by the mis-
management of the French Generals, partly, and probably
chiefly, by the unsympathetic attitude of Great Britain.
If Great Britain had actively, or merely passively, supported

412 An Anglo-American Reunion

Napoleon, the American Civil War might have had a very
different ending. The great American Eepublic might
have been divided against itself for all time.

During the Civil War Great Britain rendered undoubtedly
very valuable services to the United States. However,
Great Britain's attitude towards the United States and her
unflinching opposition to European intervention on the
American Continent, first by the Holy AlHance and then
by France, was soon completely forgotten because of the
unfortunate Alabama occurrence. So great was America's
anger at the Alabama incident that when, shortly after the
close of the Civil War, the British Government promoted
the unification of her Canadian possessions by the creation
of a single Dominion, violent objections were made in the
United States that Great Britain's action was in violation
of the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine, and the United States
Congress considered a resolution which voiced the uneasi-
ness of the country at witnessing * such a vast conglomera-
tion of American States established on the monarchical
principle in contradiction to the traditionary and constantly
declared principles of the United States, and endangering
their most important interests.' Great Britain agreed
to go to arbitration on the American Alabama claims.
The United States demanded the colossal sum of
£9,476,166 13s. éd. for the damage done by that cruiser.
By an impartial international tribunal they were awarded
£3,229,166 13s. id. (note the ISs. 4d. !), which was paid to
them by Great Britain, but even that sum was twice as
large as it ought to have been, for, after all claims had been
satisfied, there remained a surplus of £1,600,000 in the
hands of the United States Government.

During the Spanish- American War of 1898 all Europe
was hostile to the United States except Great Britain.
Before Manila a collilion between the German and the
American fleets was prevented with difficulty. France and
other Powers seemed strongly disposed to take Spain's
part. Once more, joint action by European Fowers against

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 413

the United States appeared to be impending. Great
Britain was sounded, but once more she refused to support
or to countenance European intervention. The Power
which is supreme at sea once more protected the Monroe
Doctrine.

In 1902 Great Britain was induced by Germany to
blockade, in company with her, the Venezuelan ports, in
order to obtain satisfaction for flagrant wrongs done by
Venezuela to her citizens. However, as British public
opinion was strongly opposed to co-operation with Germany
on the American Continent, Great Britain readily con-
sented to arbitration.

History, as Napoleon the First has told us, is a fable
agreed upon, and often it is a tissue of fables. According
to many of the popular history books used in the United
States schools Great Britain is a Power which, animated
by tyranny and selfishness, has always been hostile to the
United States. In the United States the fact that Great
Britain was largely responsible for the formulation and the
proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine, and that she has
consistently defended that doctrine by placing her fleet
between the military Powers of Europe and the United
States, is scarcely ever mentioned, and the fact that Great
Britain is and always has been as strongly opposed to the
settlement of one of the great military Powers in the New
World as are the United States themselves, is practically
unknown. It is an error to speak of the Monroe Doctrine
as the leading principle of American policy, for the Monroe
Doctrine — one ought in justice always to call it the Canning-
Monroe Doctrine — is also a leading principle of British
fpreign policy. It is an Anglo-American doctrine. Bis-
marck once described the Monroe Doctrine as * an inter-
national impertinence.' Perhaps it is an international
impertinence. Still, the European Great Powers 'have
respected it even at a time when the American fleet was
quite insignificant. Why have they done so ? Because
they knew that the British fleet would, in case of need,

414 An Anglo-American Reunion

protect the United States. Foreign nations have discovered
that the route to New York and to Washington goes via
London. But for the British fleet the Powers of Europe
would long ago have torn the Monroe Doctrine to shreds
and have established themselves on the American Continent.

Englishmen, when discussing Anglo-American relations
with Americans, are apt to adopt an apologetic attitude
because of the mistakes which their Government and their
forefathers made in the time of George the Third. That
attitude of penitence is, I think, uncalled for. Mistakes
were made on both sides at the time of the American Kevolu-
tion and afterwards ; fights between blood relations are
natural and common ; and since the time of the Anglo-
American Peace Great Britain has powerfully supported
the United States whenever an opportunity arose, making
their interests her own.

The late Professor Seeley's frequently quoted assertion
that Great Britain has created the British Empire * in a fit
of absence of mind ' is scarcely correct. Great Britain
follows neither a policy of absent-mindedness, as Professor
Seeley has told us, nor a policy of sordid self-interest as her
adversaries maintain. Great Britain follows a policy not
of interest but of sentiment. She has consistently striven
to enlarge her dominions, not in order to exploit them — it
is very doubtful indeed whether on balance her possessions
yield a profit to the Motherland — but in the instinctive desire
of reserving the vast and fruitful territories of the New World
to the Anglo-Saxon race. She has been actuated not by
blood-lust nor by lust of conquest but by race-instinct, and
she has acquired her vast possessions not for herself but
for the Anglo-Saxon race. Therefore she views not with
jealousy but with approval America's prosperity and
America's expansion. Her policy has been racial, senti-
mental, and, on the whole, possibly unprofitable to her
citizens. That cannot too frequently be stated. If Great
Britain's policy were guided by self-interest, envy, perfidious-
ness, and trade jealousy, as we are so often told, she would

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 415

have worked for the downfall of the United States, and
would at the same time have avenged her former defeats
and ridded herself of a powerful competitor. She has had
many opportunities to expose the United States to the
greatest dangers, without any risk to herself, by merely
allowing the European Powers to attack them, but she has
steadfastly resisted their temptations to countenance Euro-
pean aggression.

The great democratic Kepublic is naturally not beloved
by the mihtary monarchies of Europe. They see in it a
great danger and desire its downfall. Hence many Conti-
nental writers have recommended that a pan-European
coalition should be formed against the United States. Time
after time the States of the Continent have endeavoured
to secure Great Britain's support, or at least her neutrality,
in order to be arble to encroach upon the Monroe Doctrine
or to strike at the United States, but they have always failed.
Great Britain's refusal to countenance European aggression,
even passively, has sprung from her race instinct, not from
her fear of losing Canada. In the first place, the United
States would have had no cause to attack Canada if Great
Britain merely maintained a strict neutrality in the event
of a war between the United States and some European
Power or Powers. Secondly, the United States would not
find it very easy to conquer the Dominion. Last, and not
least, it must not be forgotten that, while the Continental
Powers could never obtain Great Britain's support against
the United States, Great Britain herself would probably
very readily have received the support of the Continental
Powers against the great Eepublic had she gone to war with
that country. If, for instance. President Cleveland's high-
handed action regarding Venezuela in 1895 should unhappily
have led to an American attack upon Canada, Great Britain
need not have stood alone. That fact should be borne in
mind by all those on both sides of the Atlantic who believe
that Great Britain's attitude towards the United States
has in the past been dictated by her fear of losing Canada.

416 An Anglo-American Reunion

An Anglo-Saxon reunion is highly desirable upon ideal
grounds, and it is equally necessary to the British Empire
and to the United States for the most potent practical
reasons. The first instinct of nations, as of individuals,
is that of self-preservation, and their principal requirements
are peace and security. At first sight the British Empire
and the United States appear to be very differently situated.
The one is a widely scattered island-Empire which is
extremely vulnerable, being exposed to attacks on many
sides, while the other is a firmly knitted and homogeneous
Continental State, difficult to attack and impossible to
conquer. However, these outward geographical and
structural differences merely obscure the fact that the
British Empire and the United States are similar in
character,, that they have identical interests, that they are
threatened by the same dangers, that they suffer from the
same disadvantage of lacking powerful standing armies,
that both can be attacked only by sea, and therefore depend
upon their fleet for their security from attack, and that
consequently both are equally strongly interested that
neither one of the great miUtary Powers nor a combination
of military Powers should become supreme at sea.

Admiral Mahan, the great American naval writer, said,
in 1890, in the Atlantic MontJily :

While Great Britain is undoubtedly the most formidable
of our possible enemies, both by her great navy and by the
strong positions she holds near our coasts, it must be added
that a cordial understanding with that country is one of
the first of our external interests. Both nations doubtless,
and properly, seek their own advantage ; but both, also,
are controlled by a sense of law and justice, drawn from the
same sources, and deep-rootad in their instincts. What-
ever temporary aberration may occur, a return to mutual
standards of right will certainly follow. A formal aUiance
between the two is out of the question, but a cordial recogni-
tion of the similarity of character and ideas will give birth
to sympathy, which in turn will facihtate a co-operation

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 417

beneficial to both ; for if sentimentality is weak, sentiment
is strong.

If we look more closely into the circumstances of the
British Empire and of the United States, we find that they
are in a very similar position. The United States are no
longer an invulnerable continental State. Their interests,
which were formerly purely continental, have become
world-wide. By the acquisition of Hawaii, the Philippine
Islands, Porto Eico, Guam, Samoa, the Panama Canal,
and by their interest in Cuba and many other islands and
territories which are of great strategical importance to
them, they also have become a widely scattered and very
vulnerable Empire, and their vulnerability is all the greater,
as the United States army and navy are considerably weaker
than are the British army and navy. The loss of the
magnificent Pearl Harbour on the island of Oahu, which
lies midway between the Pacific Coast and Asia, would,
as is generally recognised in America, be as serious a loss
to the United States as the loss of Gibraltar would be to
Great Britain, and the loss of the Panama Canal would
probably be more serious to them than the simultaneous
loss of the Mediterranean route and the Cape route to the
East would be to Great Britain and the British Empire.

In 1894 Admiral Mahan published in the North Ameri-
can Eevieiv a paper entitled * Possibihties of an Anglo-
American Reunion,* in which he said :

Partners, each, in the great commonwealth of nations
which share the blessings of European civihsation, Great
Britain and the United States alone, though in varying
degrees, are so severed geographically from all existing
rivals as to be exempt from the burden of great land armies ;
while at the same time they must depend upon the sea, in
chief measure, for the intercourse with other members of
the body of nations upon which national well-being depends.

To Great Britain and the United States, if they rightly
estima,te the part they may play in the great drama of human

2 E

418 An Anglo-American Reunion

progress, is entrusted the maritime interest, in the broadest
sense of the word.

I am convinced firmly that it would be to the interests
of Great Britain and of the United States and for the benefit
of the world that the two nations should act together
cordially on the seas.

Admiral Mahan was right. As Great Britain and the
United States have no enormous standing armies, as they
are not likely ever to have standing armies capable of
facing those of the great military States, and as they do
not desire to become a nation in arms in the continental
sense, they must perforce control the seas so as to be able
to keep the huge armies of Europe, and perhaps of Asia
as well, at arm's length. Let the great military nations
of Europe share the rule of the land in Europe, but let the
Anglo-Saxons share between them the rule of their own
seas in which they are equally vitally interested. Whether
Great Britain or whether the United States rule the seas
is, after all, of minor importance. The thing that matters
is that the seas should be ruled by the peaceful Anglo-
Saxons and not by a great military nation.

Providence and the wisdom and energy of its early
rulers and colonisers have greatly favoured the Anglo-Saxon
race. A glance at the map shows that practically all the
most valuable and the most promising territories and
strategical positions in the world are owned or controlled
by the Anglo-Saxon nations. To civilised nations the value
of extensive territories lies chiefly in this, that they afford
an outlet to their surplus population. The more thinly
populated territories situated in a temperate zone are, the
greater is their value to them.

The policy of powerful nations is guided not by their
momentary dispositions but by their great and abiding
interests. Self-preservation is their first instinct and their
first duty. All the great military nations of the Continent
of Europe, Russia alone excepted, and China and Japan,
are greatly over-populated, and are therefore in urgent

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 419

need of territories in a temperate zone, for, without the
possibiHty of expansion under the national flag, they are
bound to stand still and then to decline in relative power
and influence. The future belongs evidently to those
countries which possess vast reserves of thinly populated
territories. How happy, in this respect, is the position of
the United States and the British Empire will be seen from
the following table :

Population at Last Census

United Kingdom .

In 1911

45,216,665 ]

people

=372-6 per sq. mile

Japan .

>>

49,582,505

>»

=335-8

Germany

„ 1910

64,925,993

„

=331-0

Italy .

„ 1911

34,687,000

,,

=313-5

China Proper

»>

407,253,029

,,

=266-0

Austria

„ 1910

28,671,934

,,

= 246-7

>>

France .

„ 1911

39,601,509

,,'

= 191-2

>»

Hungary

„ 1910

20,886,487

,,

= 166-6

Russia in Europe

. „ 1897

105,413,775

,,

= 55-2

>»

British Empire

. „ 1911

417,148,000

»»

= 36-8

United States and

Possessions

„ 1910

101,840,367

„

= 13-7

The British Empire and the United States have room for
hundreds of millions of people. Therefore it is only natural
that the military Powers, which have a population of 200
people and 300 people and more per square mile, look with
longing and envy to the vast, fruitful, highly mineralised
and thinly populated territories, situated in a temperate
zone, which are owned and controlled by the Anglo-Saxon
nations, especially as these hold in addition all the most
important strategical points which command the approaches
to their world-wide possessions.

The Continent of America lies midway between over-
populated Europe and over-populated Asia. Its east coast
is coveted by the overcrowded European, and its west
coast by the overcrowded Asiatic, nations. How thinly
some of the most desirable parts of the United States are
populated is seen by comparing the size and the population
of some of the American States with the size and popula-
tion of some great empires. The German Empire has a

420 An Anglo-American Reunion

territory of 208,770 square miles and a population of
64,925,993. The single State of Texas is considerably larger,
for it contains 265,896 square miles. Yet Texas has a
population of only 3,896,542. Per square mile there are
14-8 people in Texas and 331*0 in Germany. As Texas
has a rich soil, an excellent climate, and great natural
resources, it could probably support a population of
40,000,000.

It has often been asserted by men anxious to make
mischief that the Japanese are casting covetous eyes upon
California. They have certainly every reason to envy the
Americans the possession of that paradisaical country,
but they are scarcely likely to contemplate seriously its
acquisition. Still the temptation is there. The Empire
of Japan contains 147,657 square miles, while California
contains 158,297 square miles. Japan has 49,582,505
inhabitants, but California, though it is slightly larger than
Japan, has only 2,377,549 inhabitants. Per square mile
there are 335*8 people in Japan but only 15*3 in California.
The two other American States on the Pacific Coast, Oregon
and Washington, extend to 165,826 square miles, and
their population is only 1,814,755. How vast the territories
of the United States are may be seen from the fact that
the United States without Alaska are exactly twice as
large as is the enormous Empire of China, that they are
fifteen times as large as Germany, and twenty-five times as
large as the United Kingdom.

The nations of the world envy the British Empire and
the United States, not so much for their industries, their
trade, and their wealth, as for their boundless latent
resources, which promise to give them the dominion of the
world, or at least world-wide predominance, if they are
united. The United States receive perhaps a greater share
of ill-will than does the British Empire. They are disliked
owing to their enormous wealth, their ruthless energy, their
aggressive methods, and especially owing to the Monroe
Doctrine. On the Continent of Europe it is generally con-

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 421

sidered, and not without reason, that by that doctrine the
United States have virtually declared a protectorate over
the whole of Central and South America, and that they will
annex these countries when time and opportunity are
favourable.

The Monroe Doctrine is an American doctrine, not an
international one. It is, as Bismarck truly remarked, an
international impertinence. It can become generally ac-
cepted and respected only if the United States are strong
enough to defend it against all comers. Hitherto they have
been able to leave the defence of the Monroe Doctrine largely
to Great Britain, as has been shown in the foregoing pages.
Many thoughtful Americans believe that, in view of the
insufficiency of their miHtary and naval armaments, the
Monroe Doctrine «is a provocation to the world at large and
a danger. A distinguished American military author,
Mr. Homer Lea, wrote in * The Valor of Ignorance,' a book
which received the highest praise from President Roosevelt :

In the history of mankind never before has one nation
attempted to support* so comprehensive a doctrine as to
extend its political suzerainty over two continents, com-
prising one-fourth of the habitable earth and one-half of its
unexploited wealth, in direct defiance of the whole world
and without the slightest semblance of military power.

The Monroe Doctrine is Promethean in conception but
not so in execution. It was proclaimed in order to avoid
wars ; now it invites them.

The Monroe Doctrine, if not supported by naval and
military power sufficient to enforce its observance by all
nations, singly and in coalition, becomes a factor more
provocative of war than any other national policy ever
attempted in modern or ancient times.

The maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine requires un-
doubtedly a fleet strong enough to defend America against
any Power or any conceivable combination of Powers. It
can be defended only by irresistible force. In Admiral
Mahan's words, * There is no inalienable right in any

422 An Anglo-American Reunion

community to control the use of a region when it does so to
the detriment of the world at large.' The maintenance of
the Monroe Doctrine is not founded on right but on might.
The Panama Canal will greatly increase the vulnerabiUty
of the United States. A distinguished United States Govern-
ment Commission, presided over by Admiral Walker,
reported :

The Canal is but one link in a chain of communications
of which adjacent hnks are the Caribbean Sea on the east
and the waters of the Pacific, near the Canal's entrance,
on the west. Unless the integrity of all the links can be
maintained, the chain will be broken. The Power holding
any one of the hnks can prevent the enemy from using
the communication, but can itself use it only when it holds
them all. The Canal would be a prize of extraordinary
value ; it would be beyond the reach of reinforcement if
the enemy controlled the sea.

The enormous importance of the Canal becomes clear
by giving the matter a httle thought. If, for instance, in
a war with the United States, Japan should seize the Panama
Canal, she could attack the Atlantic coast of the Kepubhc,
and if Germany should seize it she could attack the United
States simultaneously on her Atlantic and Pacific coasts.

Of late all the great mihtary Powers have increased their
navies with feverish haste. Between 1900 and 1913 the
naval expenditure of the eight Great Powers has exactly
doubled, increasing from £87,000,000 to £174,000,000,
while their mihtary expenditm-e has increased by only 40
per cent. Germany trebled her naval expenditure from
£7,900,000 in 1900 to £23,400,000 in 1913, and so did Austria
and Italy by increasmg thens from £6,400,000 to £18,100,000
during the same time. The Japanese also have greatly
increased their fleet. The Great War has been largely a
maritime war, a war for maritime objects, for sea power
and colonies.

Germany and Japan and many other comitries urgently
require colonies. The fact that Germany requires them is

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 423

of course known, but it is generally believed that Japan
has acquired adequate outlets for her surplus population
in her wars with China and Eussia. That is not the case.
Her new possessions are very densely populated, and there-
fore give very little scope to the Japanese. The population
of Korea is 115*9 per square mile, that of Formosa is 215*6
per square mile, and that of Kwantung is 341*6 per square
mile ; while that of Cahfornia is only 15*3, and that of
Mexico 17*7 per square mile.

Twenty years ago the German Emperor proclaimed
* Germany's future lies upon the water.* Not only Germany
but the other great and over-populated military States of
Europe and Japan as well have become convinced that
their future also lies upon the water, that they can secure
sufficient elbow-room only by wresting adequate territories
situated in a temperate zone from those nations which,
fortunately for them, lack large armies. Herein lies the
reason that the great miUtary States have been creating
large navies with the utmost speed, and the danger is great
that some of them should at some time or other combine
for the purpose of destroying the land monopoly of the
Anglo-Saxons and of securing for themselves * a place in
the sun,' as the German Emperor picturesquely called it.
Besides, the Anglo-Saxon nations are not loved abroad.
Democracy dislikes militarism and militarism fears, hates,
and despises democracy.

For many years American miHtary and naval men have
been watching Germany and Japan with concern, and have
been wondering what attitude Great Britain would adopt
in case the United States should be involved in a war either
with one of these nations or with both, and what attitude
the United States should adopt should Great Britain be
seriously menaced by Germany. Admiral Mahan wrote
in his book * Naval Strategy,' published in 1911 :

If Germany should wish to embark her fleet in a
trans- Atlantic venture, how far will her relations with other
European States allow her to do so ?

424 An Anglo-American Reunion

Should our Pacific coast citizens precipitate us into a
war, or even into seriously strained relations, with Japan,
that pressure upon us would add to the force of Germany's
fleet.

Where ought Great Britain to stand m case we have
troubles with Germany ? And where ought we to stand
in the reverse case ?

Great Britain does for the moment hold Germany so
far in check that the German Empire can do no more than
look after its European interests ; but should a naval
disaster befall Great Britain, leaving Germany master of
the naval situation, the world would see again a predominant
fleet backed by a predominant army, and that in the hands
not of a State satiated with colonial possessions as Great
Britain is, but of one whose late entry into world conditions
leaves hsr without any such possessions at all of any great
value. Although the colonial ambitions in Germany are
held in abeyance for th3 moment, the wish cannot but exist
to expand her territory by foreign acquisitions.

It is this line of reasoning which shows the power of the
German navy to be a matter of prime importance to the
United States. The power to control Germany does not
exist in Europe except in the British navy.

Admiral Mahan, the most eminent naval writer of modem
times, recommended the co-operation of Great Britain and
the United States, not for ideal reasons, but because he
believed that Anglo-American co-operation on the seas is
a necessity.

Great possessions are to their owners a responsibiHty
and a danger unless they are adequately guarded. Neither
the United States nor Great Britain are likely ever to
possess standing armies that can be pitted against the vast
military hosts of the Continental Great Powers and of
Japan, because the spirit of the people is impatient of com-
pulsion, restraint, and discipline, in time of peace. As it
takes a long time to improvise armies, they must put their
trust in their fleets.

Before the Great War the American fleet was weaker

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 425

than the German fleet and was inferior to it in organisation,
in certain types of ships, and in armaments, especially in
reserve stores of guns and ammunition. The American
fleet was then on paper about 50 per cent, stronger than the
Japanese fleet, but it seemed questionable whether the
American fleet equalled the Japanese fleet in organisation,
preparedness, and efficiency.

The British fleet is the strongest in the world. It is
more powerful than it has ever been, but with the advent
of the submarine, the influence of maritime power has been
greatly weakened unless it is overwhelming.

The great military nations of the world naturally base
their hopes of expansion at the cost of the Anglo-Saxons —
as the world is divided they can expand only at the cost of
the Anglo-Saxons — upon the inadequacy of the Anglo-
Saxon fleets and the disunion of the two gi*eat Anglo-Saxon
nations, for they know full well that it would be hopeless
to challenge Anglo-Saxon supremacy on the seas if Great
Britain and the United States were firmly united. In
endeavouring to build up large navies they may in the future
strain their resources to the utmost, hoping that by combin-
ing they will be able to overwhelm, or to overawe, either
Great Britain or the United States. While Great Britain
and the United States may in the future not be able to defeat
single-handed any conceivable combination of naval Powers
which may attack them, they can face the world if they are
united. Herein lies the necessity for their reunion. Admiral
Mahan wrote in his book ' Eetrospect and Prospect' : * As the
w^orld is now balanced, the British Empire is in external
matters our natural, though not our formal, ally.'

The race instinct is strong on both sides of the Atlantic.
In Great Britain and in the United States it is instinctively
felt that one nation depends for its. security largely upon the
other, and that neither nation can allow the other to go
down. The United States and Great Britain are in the same
boat. Great Britain realises that it would be a calamity
to see the United States defeated by a great military nation.

426 An Anglo-American Reunion

which would probably settle on the American Continent
and militarise it, and the United States reccgnise that they
would become the immediate neighbours of the military
Great Powers of Europe if the British fleet should be de-
stroyed. So far militarism in its most objectionable form has
been restricted to the European Continent and to Japan.
The defeat of the United States or of Great Britain might
bring about the militarisation of the world.

The greatest interest of the overcrowded military nations
of Europe and Asia is expansion. The greatest interest
of the Anglo-Saxon nations is peace, security, and the
restriction of armaments. These blessings can scarcely
be obtained by the federation of the world, dreamt of by
the late Mr. Stead, or by the federation of Europe, proposed
by other dreamers, but only by the federation of the Anglo-
Saxon nations. Experience shows that the world can be at
peace only if it is controlled by one nation. It will be at
peace only when the 'pax Eonmna has been replaced by the
fax Britannica, by the peace of the Anglo-Saxons, when the
mihtary Great Powers have, owing to the growth of the
Anglo-Saxon nations, become military small Powers. The
world must either become Anglo-Saxon or fall a prey to
militarism.

The arguments in favour of an Anglo-American Keunion
are overwhehning. Great Britain and the United States are
one in language, spirit, and tradition — in short, in all the
things that count. The argument that they cannot com-
bine because one is a monarchy and the other is a republic
is a fallacious one. Both are democracies. They differ
only in the outer form, but not in the essence and the spirit,
of their government. Great Britain has an hereditary
president and the United States have an elected king.
Eight ly considered, Great Britain is the more democratic
nation of the two. The King of England has far less power
than the President of the United States. Besides, the will
of the people is more likely to prevail in Great Britain than
in the United States, because Great Britain has an unwritten,

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 427

flexible, and therefore truly democratic, constitution, while
the United States have a written, almost unchangeable,
anxi therefore somewhat antiquated, constitution. King-
doms and republics may be joined in a single federation.
The Empire of Germany, for instance, contains three repub-
lics. Last, but not least, democratic nations combine not
because their outward forms of government are identical
but because they are of one race and have the same interests.
The United States and Great Britain should be united on a
basis of race solidarity and of the identity of their vital
interests. The objection that Great Britain is a European
nation with European interests is contradicted by Professor
Coolidge, of Harvard University, in his book ' The United
States as a World Power,' as follows :

Are we to regard Imperial Britain as a European Power,
when the greater part of her external interests and difiSculties
are connected with her situation on other continents ? Are
not the vast majority of Englishmen more in touch in every
way with Australians, Canadians, Americans than they
are with Portuguese, Italians or Austrians of one sort or
another ? What strictly European interests does England
represent ?

Eome was not built in a day. The reunion of the Anglo-
Saxon nations will take time, but it is bound to take place
for it is logical and inevitable. The growth of the miUtary
Powers and the rapid increase of their fleets must auto-
matically bring about an Anglo-Saxon reunion earlier or
later. The Hundred Years' Peace would, I think, be most
appropriately celebrated by the conclusion on its next
anniversary of a treaty of defence by the two great Anglo-
Saxon nations, of a treaty which would guarantee to them
their peace and the secure possession of their territories,
and which would deprive foreign nations of the temptation
to attack them singly. Such a step would slacken, or bring
to a stop, the naval armament race.

Great Britain extends a fraternal hand to her kinsmen
across the sea. How completely she has forgotten the revolt

428 An Anglo-American Reunion

of her colonies may be seen by the fact that Earl Grey pro-
posed in 1913 to erect the statue of George Washington in
Westminster Abbey among England's heroes, and to present
by public subscription Sulgrave Manor, the ancient family
home of the Washingtons in England, to the American nation.
Never in the history of the world has a revolutionary leader
been more greatly honoured by those against whom he
took up arms.

Since the time when these pages were written the Great
War, which I had foreseen and frequently foretold, has
broken out, the United States have joined the AUies in
their fight for freedom and against tyranny, a new chapter
has been opened in the history of the world. An Anglo-
American reunion has come within the limits of possibiUty.
The World War may wipe out completely the memory
of past misunderstandings and of ancient wrongs. The
firmest cement between nations is the remembrance of
dangers borne in common.

The fathers of the American Eepublic who had cut
themselves adrift from England, thought that the Great
Eepublic should pursue a purely American policy. In his
celebrated Farewell Address of 1796, his poHtical testament,
Washington laid down the principles of America's foreign
policy in the following words, which are known to every
American citizen :

Observe good faith and justice towards all nations.
Cultivate peace and harmony with all. Keligion and
morality enjoin this conduct ; and can it be that good
policy does not equally enjoin it ? It will be worthy of a
free, enlightened, and, at no distant period, a great nation,
to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example
of a People always guided by an exalted justice and
benevolence. . . .

Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence, I conjure
you to believe me, fellow-citizens, the jealousy of a free
people ought to be constantly awake, since history and

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 429

experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most
baneful foes of repubUcan Government. . . .

The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign
nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have
with them as little Political connection as possible. So far
as we have already formed engagements, let them be ful-
filled with perfect good faith Here let us stop. Europe
has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a
very remote, relation. Hence she must be engaged in
frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially
foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be
unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the
ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary com-
binations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

Our detached and distant situation invites and enables
us to pursue a different course. . . . Why forego the
advantages of so peculiar a situation ? Why quit our own
to stand upon foreign ground ? Why, by interweaving
our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our
peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition,
rivalship, interest, humour, or caprice ? 'Tis our true
policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion
of the foreign world.

The policy of isolation and non-interference recom-
mended by Washington and his contemporaries has had
to be abandoned. America has become a true World-
Power. Commenting upon Washington's Farewell Address
and the necessity of abandoning the traditional policy
of the United States, I wrote in The Nineteenth Century
Review in May, 1914, in commenting upon the Mexican
imbroglio :

Washington wrote in his Farewell Address, * Europe
has a set of primary interests which to us have none, or a
very remote, relation.' That assertion was formerly correct,
but is so no longer. Nowadays Great Britain is vitally inter-
ested in American, and the United States are equally vitally
interested in European, policy. Neither can safely allow
that the position of the other should become jeopardised.

430 An Anglo-American Reunion

Both are vitally interested in the maintenance of the balance
of power in Europe. Both are vitally interested in seeing
the military Great Powers of the world divided against
themselves. If these should combine, or if one of them
should obtain the supremacy in Europe, it might mean
the end not only of Great Britain but also of the United
States.

When Washington wrote, * 'Tis our true policy to steer
clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign
world,* the United States could stand alone. At that time
a combination of military Powers possessed of powerful
navies was inconceivable. Besides, formerly the United
States could be attacked by no European nation except
Great Britain, because all the other nations lacked ships.
As the United States cannot safely meet single-handed
a joint attack by the Great Powers, they must endeavour
to meet a hostile combination by a counter-combination.
If serious complications should arise out of the Mexican
War, we must stand shoulder to shoulder with the United
States, with or without a treaty of alliance. In defending
the United States against a joint attack of the military
Great Powers we defend ourselves. Policy should be not
merely national but should be racial. Accidents have
divided the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race,
but necessity may again bring them together. Herein
lies the hope of the future. We may not approve of Mr.
Wilson's policy, but we must bear in mind that he has
acted with the best intentions. America's troubles are
our troubles. We cannot afford to see the United States
defeated or humiliated. The present moment seems
eminently favourable not only for offering to the United
States our unconditional support in case of need, but for
approaching them with a view to the conclusion of a care-
fully limited defensive alliance. Such an alliance would be
the strongest guarantee for the maintenance of the world's
peace. The Mexican War may have the happiest conse-
quences upon Anglo-American relations, and it may eventu-
ally bring about an Anglo-American reunion.

At the time these lines were written the political horizon

Great Problems of British Statesmanship 431

of Europe seemed free from clouds. On the other hand,
it appeared possible that the Mexican trouble might involve
the United States in difficulties with some European mihtary
Power or Powers. It seemed more likely that Great Britain
might have to come to the aid of the United States than the
United States to the aid of Great Britain. Providence
has willed it otherwise, and perhaps it is better so. If, as
is devoutly to be hoped, the Anglo-American brotherhood
in arms should lead to the establishment of a great brother-
hood in peace of all the Enghsh- speaking peoples — to an
Anglo-American reunion — a great step would have been
taken in strengthening the cause of freedom and the peace
of the world. The British Empire and the United States
combined would not dominate the world. Anglo-Saxondom
has no desire for such domination. Possessing only small
standing armies, merely a police force, other States need
not fear their aggression. On the other hand, the numbers
of their citizens, the power of their industries which can
be mobilised for war, and their great wealth, would make
the combined Anglo-Saxon nations the most powerful factor
in preserving the peace of the world, while their own peace
would in all probabiUty be secured by their reunion for
an indefinite period. Nowhere in the world does the white
population increase more rapidly than in the United States
and in the British Dominions. To all who have the welfare
of the Anglo-Saxon race at heart it must be clear that not
the least benefit of the Great War would consist in the
reunion of the two branches of the Anglo-Saxon race, in
the recreation of the British Empire in its greatest glory.
The hope to secure the peace of the world by arbitration
treaties or by some great international organisation such
as a federation or a great league of nations, may prove an
illusion. All attempts to ehminate war by mutual agree-
ment among States have failed since the time when the
Greek States created their Amphyctionic Council. All
endeavours to link together the satisfied and the land-
hungry nations and to combine them for the defence of the

432 An Anglo-American Reunion

territorial status quo may prove futile. The peace of the
world can most easily be maintained not by creating an
artificial and unnatural partnership between nations of
different and, perhaps, irreconcilable aims and interests,
a partnership which will break down at the first opportunity,
but by creating a permanent partnership between the
freedom-loving and peace-loving Anglo-Saxon nations
which in addition have the advantage of belonging to the
same race, of speaking the same language, of having the
same ideals, the same laws, and the same traditions. A
British-American union devised for the protection of their
possessions against foreign attack should be the most
powerful instrument imaginable not only for protecting
the future peace of the Anglo-Saxons but also for protecting
the peace of the world.

ANALYTICAL INDEX.

Note. — The letter ' f ' following a page number signifies * and following
page ' ; ' ff,' ' and following pages.'

Â

Adriatic, Position on the .....

Agriculture, British and German compared .
„ Development of, 1800-43
„ „ Reason of backwardness of

Alabama Incident ......

Alexander I and Lord Castlereagh at Vienna Congresss
„ and Napoleon I . . . .

„ Czartoryski on character of

Alexander II, Policy of, towards Poland

Alliance, Austro-German, of 1879, Text of

„ Holy, Activities of, in Spain and New World
„ „ Treaty and text of . . .

„ „ „ Additions to, made in Verona

Alsace-Lorraine, Importance of iron beds in .

Amelot de la Houssaye on Government of Venice .

America — See United States.

Anglo-American Differences, how kept alive

Anglo-American Reunion, Admiral Mahan on

Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 ....

Arabia, Strategical value of

416 ff

4, 130 ff
247 ff
. 229
. 249
. 412
. 36 f
. 24 ff
. 23 f
. 172 ff
.201 ff
.403 ff
. 36 ff
.403 f
.286f
304 ff

401 ff

423 f, 425

. 400

. 94 f

Aristotle on Democracy and Government
Army, American — ^ee United States.
Army, British. See England.
Asia Minor, Populousness of, in antiquity

„ „ Strategical and economic significance of
Asiatic Turkey, Danger of integrity of .

„ „ Danger of partition of .

„ „ England should become its guardian

„ „ England's claims to

„ „ France's claims to

„ „ German leaders on value of .

„ „ Greece's claims to

„ „ Italy's claims to .

„ „ Nationalities of .

„ „ Neutralisation of, desirable, .

„ „ Position of, resembles that of Switzerland

„ „ Russia's claims to ...

433

294, 296, 297, 299, 342

68

. 66

6, 56 ff

f, 70 f, 102

70

101 ff

77

77 ff

60 ff

76 f

77

68

101 ff

72 ff

75 f

74 ff.

2»

434

Analytical Index

PAGE

Asiatic Turkey, Sparse population of .... 60, 65

„ „ Strategical and economic significance of . . 56 ff

„ „ Value of, in hands of strong military Power . 57 ff, 61 ff

Assyria and Babylonia, Ancient prosperity of . . . . 95 ff

Athens, Causes of decline of . . . . . . . .294 ff

Ausgleich of 1867 in Austria-Hungary 119 ff

Austria-Hungary, Ausgleich of 1867 in . . . . . .119 ff

Characteristic ingratitude of . . 114 f, 116 f

Church in, is part of the bureaucracy . . .112

has created Ulcrainian movement . . . 124 f

Hates and persecutes the Italians . . .130 ff
Illegitimacy in . . . . . . . 113 f

Illiteracy in . . . . . . .113

Ill-treatment of Serbia by, since 1690 . . . 115 f

is a mediaeval survival . . . . .109

is and may remain a German vassal . . . 106 ff
is governed by the maxim Divide et Impera. 112, 114
may establish a federation after the War . 143 ff

Nationalities of, enumerated . . . .111

Position of, 6 ff, 105 ff

„ Czechs in .... . 125 ff

„ Italians in ... . .130 ff

„ Poles in 120 ff

„ Rumanians in . . . . .140 ff

„ Ruthenians in . . . 120, 121, 124

Possibility of acquisition of South German States

and Silesia by . . . . 6 f, 128 ff

Press of 112 f, 117 f

Prince Lichnowsky's opinion of . . . . 106
Probability of disintegration of . . . . 141 f

Religions in 113

Revolution of 1848 in 118 ff

Suppression of nationalities in . . . .115 ff
The Emperor is the State in . . . .112

The problem of 105 ff

tried to Germanise nationalities under Joseph II 117
Austro-Gonnan Alliance Treaty of 1879, Text of . . . 201 ff

Babylonia and Assyria, Ancient prosperity of . . . . 95 ff

Bacon, Lord, on Cabinet Government 332 f

Bagehot, on British Constitution 295 f

Baghdad Railway . . 59, 61

Balkan States 3, 4, 48, 51, 52, 53

Bavaria, King of, and German Constitution 195 ff

Belgium, Unreadiness of, in 1914 293 f

Benedek, Field-Marshal, ungrateful treatment of . . . .115

Bismarck, and Anglo-Russian antagonism ..... 44

Anti-Polish policy of, British diplomats on 173, 175, 176, 177
„ laid down that German Emperor might not declare war of

aggression ........ 198 f

„ on Cabinet Government . . . 317, 318, 319, 320
„ on his Polish policy 173 f, 188

Analytical Index

Bismarck on ingratitude of liberated nations

„ on Monroe Doctrine ......

„ on Political Testament of Peter the Great
„ on strategical significance of Constantinople .
„ on „ „ of Egypt and Suez Canal

„ on the German Constitution and the rights of
Emperor ...... 195

„ opposed a war of aggression

„ successfully opposed Liberalism in Russia

,, „ „ Russian concessions to the Poles

Blackstone on democracy and amateurishness

Bohemia and Moravia, Position of

Brantôme on Franco-Turkish Alliance

Buchanan, President, Weakness of

Budget, British, of 1815, details of

Budgets, British, of 1792 and 1815 compared

435

PAGE

. 53
. 413
. 19
. 46 f
. 49 f

the

ff, 207 fï
. 199
. 172
.172 ff
. 342
.125 ff
. 79

351, 391
.225 ff
.226 ff

317

C

Cabinet, British, and Act of Settlement
„ „ Lord John Russell on .

„ „ Lord Morley on

„ Government, Alexander Hamilton on
„ „ Bismarck on

„ „ Blackstone on

„ „ Evolution of, in England

„ „ Frederick the Great on

„ „ Lord Bacon on .

„ „ Napoleon I on ? .

„ ,, Professor Lowell on

„ „ Richelieu on

,, Sir John Forescue on

Weakness of 12 f, 312 ff
William Pitt and
Canning, George, and Monroe Doctrine
Canning, Sir Stratford, and Crimean War
Capitulations, History of Turkish
Oastlereagh, Lord, at Congress of Vienna
Charles, King of Rumania's protest against

manians in Hungary ........ 140 f

Civil War — See United States.

Coal, Prices of, in England and elsewhere compared . . . 241

„ Production in England, 1806-45 231

„ „ per man in England and elsewhere compared . 239 ff

Congress of Peace and After. . . . . . . .Iff

Conseil d'Etat, Advantages of ...... . 324 f

Conscription, American — See United States.

Constantinople, Bismarck on strategical significance of . . . 46 f

„ Danger of neutralising or of giving it to small Power 4, 52

„ Exposed position of . . . . . . 47 ff

„ in Russian hands would require huge garrison . 48 f

„ is dominated by Balkan Peninsula ... 51

„ Marmont on strategical significance of . . .51

„ Mazzini on . . . . . . . .52

. 337
. 340
. 340
326 f, 360 f, 362 ff
317, 318, 319, 320
. 342
.327 ff
. 321
. 332 f
. 341
.339 f
.310 ff
.329 ff
ff, 343 ff, 361 ff, 391 ff
. 338 f
.405 ff
88 f, 93
. 79 ff
36 f, 167 ff
ill-treatment of Ru-

436

Analytical Index

Constantinople, Napoleon I and ....
„ promised to Russia by Napoleon I

„ Russia's claims to . . .

„ Talleyrand on strategical value of.

„ The problem of .

Constitution, American — See United States.
„ British, Bagehot on .

„ „ was modelled on that of Venice

„ weakness of. . 12 f, 294 ff, 343
„ German, and Emperor's powers

Co-operative Societies, Polish, Record of
Cotton Industry, Development of British, 1801-45 .
Cracow, Republic of. Extinguished by Austria
Crimean War, Causes of . . : . .
Czartoryski, Prince Adam, on Alexander I
Czechs, Position of, in Austria-Hungary

„ Prussia appeals to the, against Austria in 1866

PAGE

. 16 ff

. 25 fï

4 f, 51, 54

. 51

4 f, 14 fE

. 295 f

303 ff, 336 f

361 fE, 391 fï

.190fï

. 123 f, 183

. 230

. 123, 165 f

. 40 lï, 87 ff

. 23

.125 lï

. 125 f

D

Dalmatia 4, 130, 133

Debt, British National, How to deal with the 10 ff, 249 ff, 287 ff, 291 fï
„ „ „ Increase of the ..... .218 fE

Democracy and Government, Alexander Hamilton on

326 f, 358, 360 f, 362 fE
Amelot do la Houssaye on . .304 fE

Aristotle on 294, 296, 297, 299, 342

Bismarck on . . 317, 318, 319, 320

Blackstone on .... 342

Demosthenes on . . . 301 f, 302
Frederick the Great on . . .321
Tsocrates on .... . 297

Lord Bacon on . . . . 332 f

Machiavelli on . . . . 300, 345

• Napoleon I on . . . 322 fE, 341

Professor Lowell on . . . . 339 f

Polybius on 298

Richelieu on 310 fE

Sir John Fortescue on . . .329 fE

Thucydides on . . . 295, 298, 299

William Pitt on . . . 338 f

„ Inadequacy of, in war 293 fE

Demosthenes on Democratic Government .... 301 f, 302

Dictatorship, Advantages of 344 fE, 394 f

„ Machiavelli on, ....... 344 f

E

Egypt, Bismarck on strategical value of

Historic longing of France for possession of
Napoleon's desire for ...

Napoleon on strategical value of
ofiEered by Russia to England in 1853
Strategical importance of .

Elizabeth, Government of Queen .

49 f
20 fE
20 fE

49 f

42

20 fE

334 f

Analytical Index 437

PAGK

Emperor, German — See German Emperor.

Empire, British, Bismarck on value of Egypt to . . . . 49 f

„ „ Insignificance of, in 1800 ..... 227

Possibilities of the . .11 ff, 258 fE, 287 ff, 289 ff
„ „ should assume part of War Debt . . . 11 f, 291 f

„ „ Wealth and potentialities of, and of United States

compared . . . 258 ff, 287 ff, 290 ff

„ „ why envied by other nations . . , .418 ff

Engine- power in Great Britain and United States compared . .235 ff

England, Agricultural development of, 1800-43 .... 229

Agriculture of, and German agriculture compared . .247 ff

and Russia at war in time of Napoleon I ... 33

„ „ Cause of distrust between . . , 15 ff, 44 f

„ „ in Crimean War . . . . . . 41 ff

and United States during Venezuela trouble . . . 413
>, „ „ how estranged ..... 401 f

„ „ „ England's consistently friendly attitude

414 ff, 425 ff
Atlitude of , towards partition of Poland 154 ff, 166 ff, 176 ff, 178 ff
Claims of, to part of Asiatic Turkey .... 77

Coal production in 231, 239 ff

Consistently friendly policy of, towards United States 414 ff, 425 ff
Economy, Mr. Asquith on necessity of, in . . . 252 f
Evolution of Cabinet Government in . . . .327 ff

has put's ued a racial, not a national, policy . 414 ff, 425 ff
how reconciled with Franco . . ... . . 400 f

industrial development of 1800-^6 229 ff

Luxury in, at beginning of the War . . . .253 ff

Napcleou proposes Indian invasion to strike at . 22 f, 31 ff
National income of, in 1814 ...... 221 f

in 1907 216

Neglect of history in ...... . 349

Prodttction and engine-power per man in . . .235 ff

Population, increase of, from 1801-41 .... 228 f

SaviEgs Banks Deposits in Germany, United States, and in 251
spent in war against Napoleon one-third of national

vealth and income . . . . . .221 ff

Study of statesmanship neglected in ... . 349 f

supported United States during war against Spain . .412 ff

supported United States against Holy Alhance . .403 ff

supported United States against Napoleon III . .410 ff

Vast increase of production in, during the War . .282 ff

Vast war programme of Directoire against . . . 20 ff

Wages in, and in United States compared . . .243 ff

War finance and economic future of . . . . 216 ff

Wealth of, and of United States compared . . .258 ff
Executive — See Cabinet.
Expenditure, Increase of national, during Napoleonic War . .219 ff

Federalist, Extiaots from, on Government 326 f, 357 ff, 360 f, 362 ff, 364 f
Fortescue, Sir John, on Democracy and Cabinet Government . .329 ff
France — See aUo Napoleon.

„ and Syria . . . , 87 ff

Analytical Index

438

PAGE

France, Claims of, to part of Asiatic Turkey . . . 77 ff, 93 f, 104

Conseil d'État, Advantages of . . . . . . 324 f

Economic ruin of," at French Revolution . . . .322 fE

Historic policy of, towards Turkey . . . . . 78 ff

History of Protectorate over Eastern Christians . . . 78 ff

how reconciled with England ...... 400 f

Reorganisation of, by Napoleon I . . . . .322 ff

should she continue protecting Eastern Christians ? . 87 ff, 93 f
Franco-Turkish Alliance, History of the . . . . . 78 ff

Frederick the Great on Cabinet Government . . , . .321
„ „ Policy of, regarding Poland . . . .148 ff

„ „ „ towards Austria .... 159

„ „ „ towards Russia . . . 148 ff, 159

Turkey . . . . 158 f

„ ,, Secret Treaty of , with Russia, regarding Poland .149 ff

„ ,, was moving spirit in partition of Poland . . 161

Frederick William III broke his promises to the Poles . . .169 f

Free Trade not responsible for Britain's industrial development .228 ff

G

Galicia, Racial position in 130, 121, 124 f

George I and British Constitution. . . . . , . . 336

German-Austrian Alliance of 1879, Text of . . . • . .201 ff

German Emperor has no right to declare aggressive war . j 193 f, 198 ff

„ „ is not the Emperor of Grcrmany . . j . .195 ff

„ „ Position of the j . .190 ff

„ „ Prince Bismarck on rights and power of I . .195 ff

„ „ was possibly tool of army in declaring war .213 ff

Germany — See also Prussia, Frederick the Great, Bismarck, &c.

„ Agriculture of, and British agriculture compared . .247 ff
„ and Austria-Hungary . . . . . . 6 ff, 105 ff

„ and Asia Minor . . . . . . \ . . 57 ff

and United States 4^9 f, 422 f, 424

„ Bavaria and the Constitution of .... . 195 ff

„ has been created for defence . . . . . . 193 f

„ has made Austria-Hungary her vassal . . . . 106 f

„ Iron industry of, and British iron industry compaied 245 ff, 286 f
„ „ „ based on Alsace-Lorraine ore beds . . 286 f

„ is a federation, not a single State 191 ff

„ Savings Banks Deposits in ..... . 251

„ Sovereignty of, resides not in Emperor . . . .192 ff

„ why pretended having been attacked in 1914 . . .210 ff

„ would dominate Europe after absorption of Austria-Hungary 107 f

Ghent, Treaty of 398

Great Britain — See England.

Greece, Claims of, to part of Asiatic Turkey . . . , . 76 f, 104

Habsburgs follow a purely dynastic policy
„ Hereditary peculiarities of
„ Ingratitude of, towards eminent men
„ Matrimonial and territorial policy of
Rise of

.112 ff
. 109
. 114
. 109 f
. 109 f

Analytical Index

439

PAGB

Habsburgs tried to Germanise Austria-Hungary . . . .117

Hamilton, Alexander, on Cabinet Government . 326 f, 360 f, 362 fi

Henry VII, Government of 332 f

Henrf VIII, Government of 332 f

Hoheilohe, Prince, quoted ........ 44

Holy Alliance, Activities of, in Spain and the New World . .403 fE
„ „ Treaty and text of . . . . . . 37 ff

„ „ „ Additions made to, at Verona . . .403 £E

Holy Paces of Christianity, Position of 87 ff

Horse-p)wers in British and American industries compared . .235 ff

„ Total in Great Britain and United States compared . 259

Hundrec Years' Peace Celebration 398 ff

Hungarj — See also Magyars.

Deâk recommended racial toleration .... 139

Educational injustice in .
Trowing ascendancy of, over Austria
lostility to Austria
i an oligarchy . . . .

Msleading racial statistics of .
Copression of nationalities in .
„ Rumanians in .

Pxliamentary institutions of, are a fraud
Rcial tyranny of .
Rtzolution of, in 1848 .

.138 ff
.120 f
116, 117, 119 ff
. 135
. 134 f
. 120 f
.139 ff
.135 ff
.134 ff
.118 ff

I

Idleness natral to men ........ 232

Income, Britsh national, in 1814 ....... 221 f

Industry, deelopment of British, 1800^6 229 ff

India, Difficity of invading. . . . . . . . 44 f

„ Interst of, in Mesopotamia and Persian Gulf . . . 94 ff

„ Plannd invasion of, by revolutionary France . . . 21 ff

by Napoleon I . . . . 22 f, 31 ff

Iron and atel industries, British, German criticism of . . . 246

Development of British, 1800-46 . .231

„ „ , „ German, are dependent upon Lorraine ore

beds 286 f

„ „ „ in Germany and United Kingdom com-

pared .... 245 ff, 287

„ „ „ in United States and United Kingdom .

compared . . . • .286

Irredenta ItUa 130 ff

Islam — See iohammedanism.

Isocrates onDemocracy and Government . . . . . 297

Istria -L, 130, 133

Italians, Posion of, in Austria-Hungary ..... 130 ff

Italy, Claimiof, to part of Asiatic Turkey .... 77, 104

„ is hatl by Austria-Hungary . . . . . . 130 ff

Japan and te United States

Jefferson, Bsident, and Monroe Doctrine

Jerusalem— 'ee Holy Places.

Joseph II, ted to Germanise Austria .

419 f, 422 f
. 407 f

. 117

440

Analytical Index

Kossuth, Louis, Policy of

PAGB

119

Labour, Productivity of, in Great Britain and United States com-

pared .......... 235 ff

Lincoln, President, and Civil War

„ „ Autocratic power of

„ „ Character of .

„ „ introduces conscription

„ „ Lord Bryce on

„ „ on advantage of one-man

„ „ on bitter need of troops

„ „ on New York draft riots

,, „ Speech on the fallen

„ „ Suspends Habeas Corpus

„ „ was elected by a minority

Lowell, Professor, on Cabinet Government

Executive

351, 353 f, 356,365 ff
.391 f
36i f, 391
.374 ff
. 391
. 365
. 395
.385 f
. 397
.367f
. 351
. 339

M

Machiavelli on advantages of Dictatorship

„ on Democracy and Grovernment .

Machinery, in Great Britain and United States compared
Madison, President, and Monroe Doctrine
Magyars, how distributed in Hungary .

„ monopolise Civil Service, Parliament, &c.
„ Racial tyranny of .
„ Relations between Austrians and
„ SmaU number of .
Mahan, Admiral, on Anglo-American reunion

„ „ on importance of Persian Gulf

Malta and revolutionary France ....

Manufacturing industries — See Industries.
Maria Theresa and partition of Poland .
Marmont on strategical value of Constantinople
Mazzini on Constantinople .....

Mecca and Medina ......

Mesopotamia, England's claims to . . .

„ Former prosperity of . . .

„ Possibilities of irrigation in

Metternich, Prince, on Holy Alliance .

Mexico, Napoleon Ill's designs on . . .

Troubles of, in 1861 ....

Mohammedanism, Position and possibilities of
Monroe Doctrine, Bismarck on the

„ Danger of the, to the United States

„ Genesis of. •

„ has consistently been defended by England

„ Homer Lea, on .

„ how regarded on the Continent .

„ President Jefferson and

„ President Madison and

IK

416

. 344 f
. 300
.235 ff
. 408
. 134 f
.135fi
.134 ff

117, 119 ff
ill, 134

423 f, 425
. 94 f
. 21

. 159
. 61
. 52
63, 101
. 94 ff
. 95 ff
. 98 ff
. 39 f
.410 ff
. 410
. 62 ff
. 413
.420 ff
.403 ff
.413 ff
. 421
. 421
. 407 f
. 408

Analytical Index 441

PAGE

Monroe Doctrine proposed by England . .... .403 fE

Text ofj 409

Munitions, British Ministry of 283 fE

N

Napoleon I, Achievements of, as an organiser

,; advocates invasion of India . . . .22

„ advocates reconciliation with Russia

„ :^^and Alexander I conclude Peace and Treaty of Tilsit
„ fand Alexander I meet on the Niémen
and Constantinople

;i

[and Peter the Great's Political Testament .
desires Russia's alliance against England
Eastern policy of .... .

Instructions of, regarding Turkey
on strategical value of Egypt and Suez Canal
„ Policy of, regarding Egypt

„ 'proposes partition of Turkey

„ proposes that Russia should have Constantinople

„ tried to dupe Alexander I at Tilsit

„ wished to push Russia back into Asia

Napoleon Ill's designs on Mexico in 1861
National Debt — See Debt, National.
Nesselrode, Count, and Crimean War ....
„ „ on neutrality of Switzerland

„ „ Policy of, regarding Turkey

New York draft riots
Nicholas T, Policy of, regarding Turkey
Nicholas II, quoted . ......

20fiE,

.322 ff
f, 31 ff
. 26
. 26 ff
. 26
. 16 ff
. 19
. 24 ff
. 25 ff
. 86 f
49 f
. 20 ff
. 25 ff
. 25 ff
. 26 ff
. 35
.410 ff

. 91 ff
. 73 f
. 40
. 385 f
. 40 ff
. 44

O

O'Meara, quoted

One-man Executive, Advantage of
Organisation, Rules of good
Output, Limitation of, in England

22 f 50

308 ff, 344 f, 360 ff

. 344

. 246 f, 250

P

Palestine — See Holy Places.

Palmerston, Policy of, towards Turkey . . . . . . 88 ff

Panama Canal, Vulnerability of ...... . 422

Panslavism, unjustified fear of ...... . 142 f

Paul I of Russia and invasion of India . . . . . ,22 f

Peace Congress, The, and After . . . . . . .Iff

Peace is responsible for England's industrial backwardness . 234, 280 f

Pericles, Character of 298, 299

Persian Gulf, Strategical importance of . . . . 94 f, 100
Peter the Great, Political Testament of 17 ff

„ „ proposes partition of Poland .... 162

Peter III, Secret Polish treaty with Frederick the Great . .149 ff

Pitt, the Elder, and Cabinet Government 338 f

Poland and Congress of Vienna . . . . . . .166 ff

„ Bismarck's policy towards .... 172 ff, 180, 188

442

Analytical Index

.148 fE

161, 184, 185

. 159

.149 fE

Catherine

Poland British diplomatic reports on

154, 156, 157, 173, 175, 176, 177, 178
„ First partition of, Catherine the Great and . . .152 fE

„ „ „ „ Frederick the Great and

„ „ „ „ Lord SaHsbury on

,, „ „ „ Maria Theresa and

„ Peter III and
„ „ „ „ Stanislaus Augustus' appeal to

the Great
„ Great past of .....

„ independent, value of, as a bufEer State
„ Partition of, England's remonstrance against
„ „ „ Henry Wheaton and Koch on.

„ „ „ Lord Castlereagh's protest against

„ „ „ Peter the Great and

proposed in 1700

166 fE,

. 36.

157

151

181

178 fE

146 f

167 fE

152

152

„ Prussia's poUcy towards, was part of her Russian poUcy 148 ff, 170 flE
„ Record of co-operative societies in . . . . 123 f, 183

„ Recreation of, independent, consequences of, to Russia and

Germany 171 fE

„ Rising of, in 1863 175 fE

„ „ „ „ British diplomatic reports on

173, 175, 176, 177
„ „ „ „ Earl Russell's despatch on . . .178 fE

„ Second partition of ....... .162 fE

„ should preserve connection with Russia . . 8 f, 183 fE

* „ The problem of 8 f, 146 fE

„ Third partition of 165

„ Weakness of Government of . . . . . . 151 f

Poles, Denationalisation of, England's attitude towards 166 fE, 178 fE

„ Grand Duke Nicholas' appeal to . . . . . 121 f

„ Numbers of ........ . 183

„ Position of, in Austria-Hungary . . . . . . 120 fE

„ Prussia's treatment of the ...... 169 f

„ Russia's poUcy towards the .... 122 ff, 146 fE

Polybius on Democracy and Government ..... 298

Prague, National position in . . . . . . . 126 f

President, American, is Commander-in-Chief of Army and Navy . 364 f
Power of the ... 326 f, 359 fE, 391

Privy Council, Advantages of eflScient . . 329 fE, 332, 337, 346 f

Production, British and American, per worker compared . .235 fE

„ British, per worker has doubled during War . .282 fE

Protectorate, French, over Eastern Christians . . . . 78 fE

Prussia — See also Gtermany.

„ Appeals to Czechs against Austria in 1866 . . . 125 f

„ Greatness of, established by three great riders . . .316

„ Land purchase policy of, in Polish districts . . .183

Polish policy of 148 fE, 170 ff, 186 f

„ Polish newspapers on Government of . . . . 186 f

Reunion, an Anglo-American
Richelieu, on Cabinet Government
Rumanians, Ill-treatment of, in Hungary

13, 398 ff
.310 ff
.140 fiE

Analytical Index

Russell, Lord John, and Crimean War .

Russia, and Turkey in Crimean War

„ Backwardness of ... .

„ Cause of distrust between England and

„ Claims of, to Asiatic Turkey

„ Claims of, to Constantinople

„ Economic value of Constantinople to

„ Exploitation of, by Germany .

„ Frederick the Great's policy towards

„ Fundamental peacefulness of

„ Interests of, in Holy Lai.d

„ offers England Egypt in 1853 .

„ Polish policy of ... .

„ „ „ was made in Germany

Ruthenians in Austria- Hungary .

40 ff.

443

PAGE

91
87 if
. 45 f
15 ff, 44 f
75 f, 104
4 f, 19 f
4 f, 19 f
. 181
.148 ff
45, 142 f
. 93 f
. 42
.147 ff
. 180 f
120, 121, 124 f

S
St. Louis, Letter of, to Maronites .....

Salisbury, Lord, on Crimean War .....

„ „ on Poland ..... 161

Savings Banks Deposits, in England, Germany, and United States
Serbia, Ill-treatment of, by Austria, since 1690

Position of .... 3, 4, 48, 51, 52,

Serbians, Number of ....... .

Slavonic Congress of 1908 .......

Smith, Sydney, on British taxation .....

Spanish-American War, England's attitude during .

Statesmanship, Study of, neglected in England

Suez Canal, Bismarck on strategical value of . . .

„ „ Construction of, ordered by revolutionary France

„ „ Great increase in traffic of

„ „ Importance of .

„ „ Napoleon on strategical value of ...

Sumter, Bombardment of Fort ......

Switzerland, why neutralised at Congress of Vienna

Sjrria, French claims to ... . • .

184.

78 f
45
185
. 251
115 f, 134
53, 133 f
. 134
. 142
.224f
. 412
. 349 f
. 49 f
. 20
. 67
. 100
. 49 f
. 351
. 72 ff
. 87 ff

T

Talleyrand, diplomatic activities of . . . . . 21 f, 27 f

„ on strategical value of Constantinople .... 51

Taxation, British, in 1792 and 1815 compared . . . .226 ff

„ in 1815, details of 225 ff

„ „ Increase of, during Napoleonic War . . .219 ff

„ „ Sydney Smith on 224

high, benefit of 10 ff, 232 f

„ „ reformed British industry . . . .232 ff

Tax-collector is the greatest civilising factor .... 232

Telephones in United States and Great Britain compared . . 259
Thucydides on Democracy and Government . . . 295, 298, 299

Tilsit, Peace and Treaty of 26 ff

Trade unions, British, most dangerous feature of ... 247

Trentino 130

Trieste 130, 133

444

Analytical Index

Turkey and Russia in Crimean War
Asiatic — See Asiatic Turkey.
Frederick the Great's Policy towarda
History of Capitulations ....
Napoleon I's instructions regarding .
Partition of, proposed by Catherine the Great
„ „ by Napoleon I

Tyrol

PAGE
40 ff

158 f

79 1Ï

8G f

20

25 ff,

130

U
Ukrainian movement ......... 12-1 f

United Kingdom — See England.

United States — See also Lincoln, Monroe Doctrine, Hamilton, &e.

Advantages of Constitution of . 12 f, 325 fif, 357 flf, 366 ff
and England,^England has been consistently friendly

towards former . . 414 ff, 425 ff

„ „ how kept estranged . . . 414 ff,

and Germany . ... 419 f, 422 f, 424

and Japan 420, 423

Army, desertions from ..... 372, 384

„ strength of, in 1861 351 f

Civil War, Confusion during . . . . . 355 f

Cost of . . ... .262 ff

could have been avoided . .13, 390 f

created industrial supremacy of . . 280 f

defective armaments .... 369 f

Effect of, upon agriculture . 263, 268, 269

„ „ fiscal policy . . . 272

,, „ industrial organisation . 277

„ Machinery . .268, 275 ff

• „ „ manufacturing industries

266 ff, 271 f, 273 ff
„ „ National Debt and taxa- •

tion. . . .263f

„ „ Population and wealth .264 ff

„ • „ railway development .269 ff

Habeas Corpus suspended . . .366 ff

Losses during ..... 389 f

Number of soldiers raised during . . 388 f

Outbreak of 350 ff

President Lincoln's difficulties during .351 ff

Treason during . . . . . 355 f

Coal production in Great Britain and, compared .239 ff

Engine-power „ „ „ .235 ff

Importance of conservation movement in . . 289

„ - Geological Survey in . . . 289

„ Inter-State Commerce Commission in 289

I^Iilitary achievements of, in Civil War . .13, 349 ff

„ Unpreparedness of, in Civil War . 13, 351 ff

Population and wealth of, before Civil War . . 387 f

Potentialities of British Empire and, compared . 260

President, Powers of 359 ff

Production per worker in Great Britain and, com-
pared 235 ff

Analytical Index 445

PAGE

United States— Reunion with Great Britain . . . . 13, 398 ff
„ „ Railway mileage in British Empire and, compared . 260

„ „ Savings Banks Deposits in Great Britain and, com-

pared ........ 251

„ „ Situation in, before Civil War 350 ff

„ „ Supported by England against Holy Alliance . .403 ff

„ „ „ „ „ Napoleon III . .410 ff

„ „ „ „ during war with Spain . 412 f

„ „ Telephones in United Kingdom and, compared . 260 f

„ „ Total horse-powers in United Kingdom and, com-

pared ........ 259

„ „ Wages in Great Britain and, compared . . . 243 f

„ „ Water-powers in . . . . . . . 259

„ „ Wealth of, and of British Empire, compared

258 ff, 287 ff, 290 ff
„ „ were unified by war with England . . . 412

„ „ why envied by other nations . . . .418 ff

V

Vpndal, Albert, quoted ........ 35

Venezuela trouble . . . . . . . . .413

Venice, Causes of decline of . . . . . . . .303 ff

Venice, Constitution of, resembled that of England . 303 ff, 336 f

Verona, Congress and Treaty of ...... . 403 f

Vienna, Congress 9 f, 36 f, 72 f, 106 ff

W

Wages in Great Britain and United States compared . . . 243 f
War, Beneficial effect of, upon industry . 232 ff, 251 ff, 280 ff

216 ff, 257

.218 ff

10 ff, 249 ff, 287 ff, 291 ff

. 402

Cost of the Great
„ „ „ against Napoleon I

„ Debt, How to deal with the
„ unifies nations

Washington, George, on preparedness for war .... 390

Political Testament of . . . .428 ff

Wealth, National, of United States and British Empire compared .258 ff

Willcox, Sir W., on irrigation of Mesopotamia . . . . 98 ff

William II has violated the German Constitution . . .8, 204 ff

„ vowed to observe the Constitution . . . .204 ff

„ was possibly forced by army into War in 1914 . . 213 f

Workers, British, Production of, has doubled during War . .282 ff

AT THE RALT.ANTYNE PRESS

PRINTED BY SPOTTISWOODE, BALLANTYNE AND CO. LTD.

COLCHESTER, LONDON AND ETON. ENGLAND

OTHER WORKS BY J. ELLIS BARKER.

MODERN GERMANY: Her Political and

her Economic Problems, Ambitions, and the

Causes of her Successes and her Failures. 5th

very greatJy enlarged Edition. 75. 6d. net.

" We are always glad to welcome what may be called a bird's-eye
view of the conditions prevailing in continental countries, and this
must be especially the case with regard to Grermany . . . Much
useful information is contained in these pages." — The Spectator.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY :

A Documentary Account revealing the Causes of
her Strength, Wealth, and Efficiency. 75. 6d. net.

" It would be difficult to overrate the value of Mr. Barker's work.
I know of no other man, living or dead, who has so effectively drawn
aside the curtain that conceals from the English-speaking people the
naked truth about the Hohenzollem and his subjects." — Referee.

GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN :

The Political, Naval, Military, Industrial, Finan-
cial, and Social Problems of the Motherland and
Empire. 2nd and Enlarged Edition. 10s. ^d. net.

** A work so comprehensive must necessarily touch a multitude of
points of controversy ; but few persons interested in its subject
could read it without learning something and having their ideas
cleared." — The Scotsman.

BRITISH SOCIALISM: An Examination of
its Doctrines, Policy, Aims, and Practical Pro-
posals. 10s. ^d. net.

" No review could do justice to this admirable book ; the reader
should buy or borrow it and study it for himself. It bears directly
on almost every problem of modem legislation and of modem life."
—The Daily Mail.

THE RISE & DECLINE A^, NETHER-
LANDS : A Political and Economic History.

10s. U. net.

" There is nothing in any language like it, and when all is said it
remains one of the most striking additions recently made to the
political library." — Mr. J. L. Garvin, in the Fortnightly Review.

LONDON; JOHN MURRAY

WAR-TIME READING

WITH THE NEW ARMY ON THE SOMME: My Second

Year of the War. By Frederick Palmer. 6s. net.

A REGIMENTAL SURGEON IN WAR AND PRISON.

By Captain R. V. Dolbey, M.B., M.S. (Lond.), F.R.C.S., R.A.M.C.

5s. net.

BETWEEN THE LINES. By Boyd Cable. Author of "Action
Front,'* etc. New and cheaper edition. 2s. 6d. net.

WAR FLYING. By a Pilot. The intimate record of a pilot. Vital,
vivid, (good actual stuff, vrrittea with competence. 2nd Impression.
It. net.

THE STRAITS IMPREGNABLE. By Sydney de Loihe.
**The Epic of the Gallipoli Heights." 5s. net.

THE MAN WHO SAW, and other Poems arising out of

the War. By Sir William Watson. 3s. 6d. net.

GRAPES OF WRATH. By Boyd Cable. Author of "Between
the Lines," etc. 2nd Impression. 5s. net.

THE PAN-GERMAN PLOT UNMASKED. Berlins for-

midable peace-trap of the drawn war. By André Chéradame. Trans-
lated by Lady Frazer. With an Introduction by the Earl of Cromer,
O.M. With 31 maps. 2nd Impression. 2s. 6d. net.

THE WAR AND THE NATION, a study in Constructive
Politics. By W. C. Dampier Whetham, F.R.S. 6s. net.

BRITISH AGRICULTURE: The Nation's Opportunity.

Being the Minority Report of the Departmental Committee on the
Employment of Sailors and Soldiers on the Land. By the Hon.
Edward G. Strutt, Leslie Scott, K.C., M.P., and G. H. Roberts, M.P.
2nd Impression. 3s. 6d. net.

SERVANTS OF THE GUNS. By Jeffery E. Jeffery. 5s. net.

LITTLE GREY SHIPS. By J. J. Bell. Author of "Wee
Macgreegor." 2nd Impression. 2s. 6d. net.

BALLADS OF BATTLE. Written and Illustrated by Sergeant
Joseph Lee, Black Watch. 3rd Impression. 28. 6d. net.

THE AWAKENING OF AN EMPIRE. By Robert Grant
Webster, LL.B. 6s. net.

LONDON : JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W. 1.

THIS BOOK IS DITE ON" THE LAST DATE
STAMPED BELOW

AN INITIAL FINE OF 25 CENTS

WILL BE ASSESSED FOR FAILURE TO RETURN
THIS BOOK ON THE DATE DUE. THE PENALTY
WILL INCREASE TO SO CENTS ON THE FOURTH
DAY AND TO $1.00 ON THE SEVENTH DAY
OVERDUE.

MAY 4 1937

MAR 12 1943

FFB IB 1979

REc. ciR. .IAN 1 « iqyq

LD 21-100m-8,'34

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY

U. C. BERKELEY LIBRARIES

CD^7^DôS^^