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A History of the British Nation 
England’s Industrial IX .*,h£nt 
England Under the 1 ^ ^ors 


The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars 










First Published . . February IQ02 

Seco?id Edition . . . June *9*5 


T HE object of the present volume is to set before the The 
ordinary reader the story of the steps by which India a “! ho *’ s 
came gradually to be painted red on the map — of the J 
development of the British Supremacy out of the Tenancy of 
a Trading company; a development fostered by the best 
brains and watered by thg best blood of Britain. I have 
attempted to do this within the compass of a single volume 
of a size and form which can be handled with ease : and to 
do it as fully as the space permits, accurately, clearly, and (I 
hope) not unattractively. 

,For th^ serious student of Indian History, such a volume 
dSn only be mad# the basis for further study ; but it should 
help ‘him tS get* a preliminary grip of the whole subject 
which will be of material assistance in classifying and in 
co-orflinating the detailed information which must be derived 
frqp) other sources. That a book is wanted which will serve 
that purposS* I injpr from the fact that in spite of a fairly 
extensive acquaintance with the literature of the subject, I 
hjve never succeeded in findiag one. Sir Alfred Lyall has 
indeed gone near to supply it in his “ British Dominion in 
India but from the time of Lord Wellesley, his narrative 
lacks the fulftess of the earlier chapters. On the other hand, 

~ such a work as Marshman’s is too bulky for the purpose — 
at le&st, it is more than four times the length of this volume. 

Macaulay’s Essays have made Clive and Warren Hastings 
more or less familiar to most of us; but the period of 
progress from Warren Hastings to the Mutiny is to most 
minds very nearly a blank. It seems tolerably obvious that 
having on our hands the responsibility for governing India, 
we ought leave the study of Indian conditions — which 
'invdves' the studfy of Indian History — entirely to candidates 


for the Indian Civil Service, while reserving, the right to 
comment on their subsequent administration on the strength 
of data derived either from our own inner consciousness or 
from newspaper articles which have been called into being 
for the purpose of advocating a particular course at a moment 
of crisis. 

Autho- In an appendix to this volume, I have given with details 
nties. a list 0 f books which may with advantage be consulted in 
dealing with particular persons, periods, and episodes — a list 
which might of itself be expanded into a volume. SThat list 
as it stands comprises: (i) Official records: (2) Standard 
Historical works : (3) Detailed Biographies : (4) Essays or 
aspects of the subject : (5) Studies at first or second hand of 
episodes or persons. For the verification of facts, the first 
class is obviously the most important , it is from the second 
and the last that we must ordinarily, for the most part fill in 
the outlines ; from the third and fourt’'' that we must obtain 
detailed specific knowledge. Here however, I may mention 
that Marshman's History is the most satisfactory general, 
account with which I am acquainted, as ElpHnstone's remains 
the standard account of the Hindu and Mohammedan periods. 
The entire series of the u Rulers of India f issued by the 
Clarendon Press, is admirably adapted for intelligent pdpular 
consumption, though suffering from the inevitable defect that 
each writer is disposed more or less conscious 1 , 10 become 
the advocate of his particular subject. And Sir Alfred 
Lyairs “ Asiatic Studies )y — may one, in such a connection 
mention also his Verses written in India ? — and Sleoman’s 
Rambles and Recollections are the most illuminating studies 
of the Oriental mind. 

I would add here some remarks on the rule I have * 
Spelling, followed in spelling Indian names. As late as thirty years 
ago it was the custom to anglicise the spelling of every word. 
Recently a Scientific method has been adopted ; Macaulay's 
Budge-budge has become Bdj Bdj ; and the Map-makers 
give us Machlipatnam for Masulipatam. On the other 
hand, while studying the period of the Sikh wars, 1 noted 
at least six different ways of spelling Firozshah; and even 
under the orthpdox editorship of Sir Willikm Hunter it* has 



been found impossible to maintain an absolutely uniform 
spelling. * 

• Again, there is one respect in which the modern orthodox 
spelling is trying : that is in the use of the accent to 
distinguish between long and short vowels. To read of the 
“Rdjd” has a peculiarly irritating effect, something like 
reading i page peppejed with words in italics, nor is it in 
anyHway helpful to have All&h&bdd thrust upon you : these 
symbols often render no aid towards discovering the syllable 
on whigh stress is laid. I have therefore generally dispensed 
with accents in *the text, but on the first occurrence of a 

# name and in the glossary I have introduced the long and 
short marks ~ w where it seemed likely that the reader would 
thereby be helped to a more correct pronunciation. 
jh ere ai& certain lyorift and names which may fairly be 
regarded as having passed into English Literature. Such 
are Arcot and Plajeey, Assaye, Lucknow, Cawnpore, the 
Mogul, rupee, sepoy. To discard these forms is very much 
li,ke writing of Aelfred and Eadward. Wherever such a 

* <orm appears tq*me to be really established, I have kept to 
it. •Where? two* forms are almost equally familiar, as with 
Haidar Ali and Hyder Ali, I have adopted the more modern 
one,* mentionirig the alternative where the name comes in 
for the first time. Where usage has not established any 
particu&V^orm, # I have endeavoured to conform to the 
system of the “Imperial Gazetteer” save for the omission of 

.jccents. Roughly speaking, Jp find the common equivalent 
of the old quasi-phonetic spelling in the modern form, and 
vice versti* the following tables may be useful : — 

Table of Transliteration 

Showing the commoner variations found in the Modern spelling. 







































ou ) 

f ao 



ow j 

\ au 

Morari Row 

Morari R ao 












Mirat ( 





c hard 



K\ abul tf , 

c soft 




g soft 








e mute in the old spelling is omitted in the modern : e.g. 
Feroz<?pore becomes Firozpur. I 

Values of Letters in Modern Spelling 

As commonly pronounced by the British in Ityiia. 

a : as a in call or palm . ii : as a in n/hn or u in t{p. 

e : as a in mate or hare . e : as e in men . 

I : as i in police . i : as i in fit . 

6 : as o in pope . 6 : as o in hSt. 

u : as oo in pool, poor . u : as u in put . 

ai : as i in site . ao, au : as ow Li owl? 

ch, ph, sh, th, j, w, and y all follow the ordinary Englis^- 
pronunciation : but p-h and t-h are sometimes sounded 
separately, n is sometimes nasal (Fr. bon), e.g. in Bhonsla. 







Boundaries — Hindqjftan — The Dekhan — Climate — Races and 
languages — The Aryan Invasion — Mohammedan Invaders — 

The Indian People — Hinduism: Caste — In modern times — Other 
religionsP-Indian Nationality — The British Conquest , . 3 



India before Mohammed — Mahmud of Ghazni — Successive 
Mussud? dynasties — The Mohammedans before Baber — The 

Tartars— Baber — rfis conquest of Hindostan— Humayun — Akbar 
— His policy— Results of his rule — Jehangir — Shah Jehan — The 
Mogul Zenith — Aurangzib . # , . . . . xa 



¥The great Mogulj^-Elements of disintegration — Aurangzib’ s first 
years— His Mohammedan fanaticism — Hindu antagonism — The 
Maratha Race— Shahji Bhonsla — Rise of Sivaji — His exploits — His 
negotiations — Sivaji and Aurangzib — Reconciliation — Successful 
defiance — Chauth — Extension of Sivaji's domain — His death — 
Aurangzib in the Dekhan — End of the Dekhan kingdoms — 
Maratha resistance — Death of Aurangzib — His successors — Rise of 
the Peshwas — Break-up of the Mogul Empire — The Nizam-ul- 
Mulkg-The new. Powers— Nadir Shah— He sacks Delhi— Extension 
Af Maratha dominions ...... 







The Indian Myth — Discovery of the Cape Route — The Portuguese 
— The British and Dutch East India Companies — First establish* 
ment of British Factories — Sir T. Roe's Embassy — Concessions to 
the British in Bengal — and on the Coromandel Coast — Develop- 
ment of French Colonial Policy : Colberf — Relations of Franc^ , 
Holland, and England — Calcutta — The Interlopers — A rival East 
India Company — Amalgamation of the two — Retrogression of the 
Dutch — The French Company — Francis Martin — Lenoir — Dumas 
The Rival National Companies —Relations of t&e Companies and 
their Governments — Constitution of the British Company in India 
— and in England. 




Distribution of the Indian Powers — Character of Government 
after Aurangzib — Franpois Bernier — European conception of a 
State — Contrast of the Oriental system — Defective Justice — Absence 
of Public Spirit — Instability of Government — Position of Moham- 
medan Nobility — Insecurity of property — Semblance anjl reality — 
The Soldiery — Condition of the Population — The European com- 




The coming world-contest — Summary of the struggle 1 — Prospects 
at the beginning — Dupleix at Pondichery — His scheme — The 
Nawab of the Carnatic checks the British — La Bourdonnais — He cap- 
tures Madras — Dupleix defeats the Nawab — Defence of Fort St David 
— Defence of Pondichery — Peace of Aix-la-chapelle — Claimants 
to the Nawabship — Dupleix and Chanda Sahib — Claimants to the 
Nizamship — British blunders — Triumph of Dupleix’s schemes — 
The turn of the tide — Robert Clive — Capture and defence of 
Arcot — French surrender at Trichi nopoli — Dupleix superseded — 
Bussy at Haidarabad — Renewal of hostilities — The last phase—* 
Lally — Frustration of his plans — Capture of Masulipatam — Eyre 
Coote — Victory of Wande wash — Fate of Lally ^ 9 * 





Different nature of the contest in Bengal — Position of the Nawab 
— and of the British at Calcutta — Suraj-ud-daulah — The Black 
Hole — The punitory expedition — Intrigues of Suraj-ud-daulah — 

The Bfttish dilemma — Conspiracy against Suraj-ud-daulah — The 
R^d and Black treaties — The gage of battle — Clive before Plassey 
— Victory of Plassey — Mir Jafar proclaimed Nawab-— Supremacy 
of Clive — His government of Bengal — Invasion by the Shahzada 
repelted — Collision with the Dutch — Clive leaves India . . 75 



% A period *of transition— A?med Shah Durani — Progress of the 
Marathas — Battle of Panipat — its results — Rise of Haidar Ali — 

The Madras Government — Renewed advance of the Marathas — 
British mis-rule in Bengal — Revolt of Mir Cassim — Munro’s 
victory at Buxsy- — Return of Clive to India — The Augean Stable 
— Suppression of military opposition — Clive and the Diwani — 
Clive's attitude t^the Mogul — and to the Country Powers — Clive’s 
achievement — English Party Politics — Attitude of Parliament 
towards Indian affairs — Directors and Proprietors — Parliament 
intervenes — North’s Regulating Act — 1774-1784 : Great Britain's 
difficulties * «3 



•pie famine of 1770 — Further advance of tHe Marathas — The 
Peshwa succession — Warren Hastings, Governor of Bengal — Shuja 
Daulah arflf the Rohillas — Hastings grants assistance to the Nawab 
— Conquest of Rohilkhand — The Bombay Council and the Peshwa- 
skip — Treaty of Surat — Battle at Arras — Treaty of Purandar — 
Complications at Puna and Calcutta — The disaster of Wargam — 
Goddard’s march — A diversion in Malwa — The Nizam, ' Haidar 
Ali and Madras — Increasing power of Haidar — Anti-British com- 
bination — Great Britain at bay — Haidar invades the Carnatic — 
Capture of Gwalior by Popham and Bruce — Its effect on the 
Marathas — Eyre Coote at Madras — Improvement in southern 
affairs — Suffren and Hughes — Death of Haidar Ali — Withdrawal 
of the French — Treaty with Tippu — Foreign Policy of Warren 
^Hastings * . * - . * • 9 B 



Operations of 1834 — Operations at the beginning of 18^5 — 1826 : ter- 
mination of the war — Considerations on the war — The Barrackpore 
mutiny — 1825: Troubles at Bhartpur — Ochterlony — Capture ot 
Bhartpur — A pause in the Expansion — Lord William Bentinck — 
Non-intervention again — Minor annexations — Metcalfe Governor- 
General ad interim — Appointment of Lord Auckland • • 179 



First stages of Ascendancy — The growth of the three Presidencies 
— The Constitution of 1784 — The Governor-General : his technical 
powers — His practical powers — The Board of Control — The Charter 
Acts of 1813 and 1833 — Political relaticfhs — Ifhe Company's Service — 

Early administrative methods — Changes under Cornwallis — Changes 
under Bentinck — Regulation and non-regulation Provinces — Three 
administrative periods — The army in India % 187 




Land-taxation the main source of Indian Revenue — The Mogul 
system — The Zemindar — Want of security — Benggj — The Englfth 
land-owner — Theory of the Zemindari Settlement — The Permanent 
Settlement : its effect on the Zemindar — Its defect— The JRyotwari 
settlements : in Madras — In Bombay — The north-west Provinces — 

The Talukdar — The village community — Theory of Thomason’s 
settlement — Objections offered tl%~reto 496 



Settled Government — Difficulty of introducing reforms — Thuggdfe 
— Its suppression — Dacoity — The conflict with it — Suttee — Need for 
its suppression — It is suppressed — Infanticide — Difficulty of dealing 
with it — Effected by minimising the most active inducements to it 
— These reforms due to British rule — The civilising of Merwara — 

The Bhils — Outram — Education— The Orientalist method — The 
learning of the West — Public works . ... 206 







The ne^ era of wars — The Panjab — The Sikhs — Nanuk, founder 
of t%e sect — Govind Singh, the organiser of the Sikhs — Develop- 
ment of the Khalsa — The Afghan Frontier — Zeman Shah — The 
Barakzai brothers — 1808 : Mission to Shah Shuja and Ranjit Singh 
— Ranjit and Shah ^huja — Estimate of Ranjit — Estimate of Shah 
Shuja — Commerce as a political end — Insight of Ranjit — Develop- 
ment of his army — His aims — Shah Shuja driven from Kabul — 
Ranjit absorbs Multan — Embroilments in Afghanistan — Ranjit 
secures Kashmir — Rise of Dost Mohammed — Shah Shuja’s attempts 
at a restoratmn — Ranjit secur^ Peshawar — Ranjit and Sindh — 
Pqfsia and Russia — RussP-Persian war, 1825 — Persia as Russia's 
prot^gg — Aggressive designs of Persia, 1834 — March on Herat, 

1837 ...... 219 



• • 

Lord Auckland — 1837 : the situation — The true British policy — 

Lord Auckland’s policy, to restore Shah Shuja — With British troops 
— The successful defence of Herat — Persistence of Auckland in his 
policy — Plan of campaign — Advance on Kandahar — Capture of 
Ghazni — Shah Shjija at Kabul — British occupation of Afghanistan 
— Surrender^of Dos? Mohammed — Murder of Bumes, November 
’41 — Mismanagement of British Authorities at Kabul — Murder 
^>f Macnaghtfn — The great disasfbr — Auckland succeeded by 
EUewborough — Events at Kandahar — Defence of Jellalabad — The 
position in April ’42 — “Withdrawal via Kabul” — The British 
prisoners — 'Bfce triumphal march back — Effect of the episode . 254 



Sindh and the Sindh Amirs— Outram — Sir Charles Napier and 
the Amirs — The Sindh war — Miani — Annexation of Sindh — 
Mutinies among Sepoys — Gwalior — Intrigues for power — The 
Gwalior Army — Withdrawal of the British Resident — Demands of 
Lord Ellenborough — Maharajpur — Puniar — New arrangements at 
Gwalicy — Lord Elj^nborough recalled «... 247 




Sir Henry Hardinge — The Panjab after Ranjit Singh — The 
Khalsa — Intrigues and Anarchy — The Sikh problem — Disposition 
of British forces — The Sikhs cross the Satlej — Mudki — Firozpur — 
Firozshah — Current criticisms on the battle — Sobraon — The Lahore 
treaty— Henry Lawrence — Treaty of Bhairowal — The Panjsfc) officers 
— Outlook in the Panjab . . . „ ^ . 356 




Position of British forces — The Multan revolt — The Campaign 
deferred — Herbert Edwardes — Sher Singh — Whish sent to Multan 
— Rising of the Khalsa — Gough’s advance — Ramnagar — Sadulapur 
— Chillianwalla — Fall of Multan — Qujerat — The Panj^b annexed — 
Henry Lawrence and the annexation— ^rhe Governing Board-t- 
Henry Lawrence transferred to Rajputana — Dost Mohammed — 
Burmese affairs — Insult to the British— preparations for war — 
Capture of Rangoon and Pegu — Annexation of Lower Burma . 366 





The annexations by conquest — The “Annexation Policy” — Dal- 
housie’s theory — The opposed theory — Conflictingt-views as to land- 
holders — Policy in the past — Nature of Dalhousie’s “departure” — 
Different grounds for annexations — The adoption question — The in- 
structions of 1834 — The case of Sattara — The tease of ^hansi — The 
case of Kerauli — The case of Nagpur — The case of Oudh — Per- 
sistent misgovemment — Alternative proposals — Annejffition of Oudh^ 

— The Berar Assignment — The Nagpur treasures — The Arcot faciily 
— Baji Rao and the Nana Sahib . . • . * 277 



2838-1848 — Public works — The Khonds of Orissa — The Gumsur 
Khonds and Macpherson — Abolition of human sacrifice — 1848-1856 
— Dalhousie and the Panjab— The Lawrence Brothers— Benefits of 
their rule — Increased importance of the Upper Provinces — Educa- 
tion — Importance of communication— Railways — The telegraph — 
Public works department — Half-penny post — Estimate of Lord 
Dalhousie . 288 






Lord fanning — Disappearance of Independent States — British 
versus Native Dominion— *The Predatory classes — The Ruling classes 
—The Industrial classes — The Sepoys — Deficiency of European 
troops — Official unconsciousness of danger — The religious dis- 
quieti^e — The British tone — The condition of Oudh — Rajputana 
and the Panjab — T-tb Bengal army — The General Service Enlistment 
Act — The Persian expedition — The cartridge incident — The Mussul- 
mans and the Nana Sahib — Signs of unrest — Was the revolt organ- 
ised ? — The outbreak ....... 297 


Breathing time — Disj^fcition of forces — Area of the mutiny — The 
Panjab secured — Series of mutinies— The force before Delhi — The 
fate of Cawnporee-Prcparations at Lucknow— Composition of the 
mutineer^armies — Their distribution — Opeiations before Delhi — 
Reinforcements fro% the Panjab — The storming of Delhi — Defence 
of ttie Lucknow Residency — Character of the siege — Perilous position 
of the garrison — Havelock’s advance to Cavvnpore — Havelock in 
OudJi — Havclock # falls back to Cawnpore — Joined by Outram — 
Rescue of the Lucknow Residency ..... 309 



Events elsewhere — Change in the situation — Campbell’s relief of 
the nSfcideney — Tantia Topi — Capture of Lucknow — Sir Hugh Rose 
— Capture qj^Jhansi — Recrudescence of the struggle in Oudh — Ter- 
mination of the contest — Who took part in the Revolt — Active 
participants — Neutral elements — General conclusions — Behaviour 
of ^)ost Mohammed •-Attitude of the Panjab — Conduct of the 
Hindostani Sepoys — Lord Canning — His Oudh proclamations — 
Canning and his critics ...... 320 



The Company’s Record — The Company’s Task— Transfer of 
Goverrypent to the^rown — Last words .... 329 



Appendices — pa gb 

I. Notes : — Impeachment of Warren Hastings — f>alhousie and 

the Army — Lord Canning • 337 

II. Authorities . ...... 3^3 

Index to Maps ........ 354 

General Index . . . . , . . V . 359 



I. India: General Map . . . Frontispiece 

II. India: Physical Features and Political 

Divisions . . 0 . . ‘ Facing page 3 

III. The Carnatic and Mysore ,, 61 

IV. The Ganges Provinces (Lower) * . . ,, 75 

V. The Maratiia Wars 147 

VI. The Panjab and Afghanistan » . 21Q 

VII. The Mutiny Area . . . * ,, 309 

VIII, The British Expansion. A: 101783 * . ,, 328 

B : to 1 808 
C : to 1833 * 

D : to 1858 


Leading^vents are jointed in heavy type. 

* Events outside the Indian radius are printed in italics. 

The name of each Governor-General is printed in small capitals, at the 
tifte of his entering on the office. 

The chapters in which events are narrated are denoted in the left hand 

§ J. From the first Mohammedan Invasion to 
the con&nencemetit of the Anglo-French struggle, 

# (/. ) Pre-Mogul period. 

II. 664 # First Jfohammedan (Arab) invasion. 

1001-1026 Mahmud of Ghazni. 

1 176-1206 Shahab-ud-Din (Mohammed Ghori). 

1189 Rictfard /. of England. 

I J06-1288 Slave Dynasty of Delhi. 

1215 +The% Great Charter. 

1272 Edward 1 . of EfigI and. 

I288-I3#i Khilji Dynasty ofcDelhi. 

1314 Bannockburn . 

<321-1412 Tughlak Dynasty of Delhi. 

1346 m Crecy. 

1347 Bahmani Dynasty in the Dekhan. 

1398 Tamerlane's Invasion. 

1414-1450 SeUfti Dynasty of Delhi. 

1415 Agincourt. 

1450-1526 Lodi Dynasty of Delhi. 

1453 Constantinople taken by the Ottoman Turks . 

1489 The Five Kingdoms of the Dekhan. 

1498 Vasco di Gama rounds the Cape and reaches Kalikat. 

Nanuk, founder of the Sikh sect,./?. 

I J07 Albuquerque at Goa. 

1517 Luther and Tetzel. 




(».) Mogul Period. 

n. 1526 Baber's Conquest of Hindoetan. 

1531 Humayun succeeds Baber. 

1533 Henry VII I' s Reformation Parliament. 

1540 Humayun expelled. Sher Shah. 

1555 Humayun restored. 

1556 Akbar succeeds Humayun. 

1558 Queen Elizabeth. • 

1588 Defeatof the Armada. Naval supremacy passes to England 
IV. 1600 English East India Company. 

1601 Dutch East India Company . 

II. 1605 Jahangir succeeds Akbar, v 

IV. 1613 British Factory established at Surat. 

1615 Sir T. Roe’s Embassy to the Mogul. 

1620 First British settlement in Bengal. 

II. 1627 Shah Jehan succeed?* Jehangir. Sivap born. 

IV. 1632 Overthrow of Portuguese frower in Indian seas. 

1639 First British settlement at Madras. 

1653 Cromwells charter to the E,I.C. 

II. 1658 Aurangzib deposes Shah Jctian. 

ill. 1659 Sivaji in the Dekhan. 

IV. 1660 Charles II. 

1661 Death of Mazarin. f t 

1662 Acquisition of Bombay from Portugal. 

1664 French E. I. C. constituted. 

1666 France and Holland in Alliance. • 

1668 England and Holland in Alliance . 

1670 France and England in Alliance. » i 
1672 War between England and Holland. 

1674 Peace with Holland. * 

1678 Secret treaty between Charles II. and Louis XIV. e- 

III. 1679 Aurangzib attacks Bijapur. 

1680 Death of Sivaji. 

1685 War between British and Aurangzib. 

1686 Fall of Bijapur. 

1687 Fall of Golconda. 

1688 William of Ora?ige becomes King of England 

IV. 1690 Establishment of Fort-William (Calcutta). 

1698 Rival English East India Company. 

hi., xx, 1700 Govind Singh (Sikh Guru)yf. 

iv. 1701 Francois Martin. 

1702 Amalgamation of E.I. Companies. 

1707 Death of Aurangzib. Bahadur Shah Mogul. 




^ (Jit.) The Mogul Disintegration . 

III. 1712 Jehandar Shah Mogul. 

1713 Treaty of Utrecht. 

Farokshir Mogul. 

1714 A ccession of House of Hanover . 

1715 Death of Louts XI V. 

if 17 Balaji Wiswanath Peshwa. 

| 1718 Puppet Moguls, under the Seiads. 

1719 Mohammed Shah Mogul. 

1720 Baji Rao I. Peshwa. 

► IV. *1721 Lenqjr Governor at Pondichery. 

in. 1724 Asaf Jah (Nizam ill Mulk) established in Dekhan. 

40 1733 Bourbon Family Compact. 

iv. 1734 Dumas Governoi at Pondichery. 

III. 1737 Extension of Maratha Ascendancy in Ilindostan. 

1739 mlVar declanyi between England and Spain . 

Nadir Shall sacks Delhi. 

IV. 1740 Dumas resists the Nagpur Raja. 

III. Balaji Ra#*Peshwa. 

Anwar-ud-Din Nawab of Carnatic. 

Sadat Khan Nawab Wazir of Oudh. 

Ali ^Aurdi Khan Nawab of Bengal, 
iv. * 74 i # Dupleix Governor of Pondichery. 

VI. 1744 l Tar declared in the l Test between France and Great 


1745 Rise of the Rohillas. 

The Nawab of Arcot protects the French. 

1746* Jacobii is m extinguished at Culloden . 

§ II. Rise of the British Power . 

(i.) Anglo-French Contest in the Carnatic . 

1746 Commencement ot the contest in the Carnatic. 

La Bourdonnais captures Madras (Sept.). 

Dupleix retains Madras. French troops defeat the 
Nawab’s army. 

1747 Unsuccessful attacks on Fort St David. 

Appearance of Griffin’s squadron. 

1748 Stringer Lawrence holds Fort St David (June). 
Unsuccessful siege of Pondichery. 



vi. 1748 Peace of Aix-la-chapelle. Restoration of Conquest 0 

Death of Nizam-ul-Mulk. Disputed euccession. 

1749 Dupleix ransoms Chanda Sahib. 

Anwar-ud-Din killed at Ambur. 

Departure of British Fleet. 

Mohammed Ali at Trichinopoli. 

Muzaffar Jang Nizam (Dec.). 

1750 Muzaffar Jang killed ; Salabat Jang Nizam. 

1751 The Nizam withdraws to tfaidarabad with Bussvf 
Robert Clive : Capture and defence of Arcot. 

1752 French surrender at Trichinopoli. Death of Chanda 

Sahib. * 

1753 Northern Sarkars granted to Bussy by Nizam. 

1754 Dupleix recalled. 

(ii.) The Company becomes a Territorial 
Power . 

1756 Suppression of the pirate Angria by Clive and Watson. 
Black Hole of Calcutta (July). 

The Seven Years’ War begins . # r 

Clive and Watson enter the Hugli (TW t 
*757 Clive in Calcutta (Jan.). 

Capture of Chandernagar (March). * 

The Omichund treaties (May). 

Battle of Plassey (June). ^ * f 

Clive supreme in Bengal. Mir Jafar Nawab. 

Pitt’s great administration begins (Junqh 

1758 Madras : arrival of Lally (April). 

Lally captures Fort St David. 

Bussy summoned to the Carnatic from l^idarabad. 
Madras besieged (Dec.). 

Development of Pitt’s Naval Policy. 

1759 Siege of Madras raised (Feb.). * 

Forde captures Masulipatam ( April). N orthern Sarkars 
ceded to British. 

Shah Alam’s futile invasion of Bengal. 

Collision with the Dutch on the Hugli. 

Victories of Quebec and Quiberon . 

1 760 Victory of Wandewash (Jan. ). 

Clive leaves India (Feb.). 





1760 Accession of George III. (Oct.). 

1761 gapture of Pondichery. End of French power in India. 
Ahmed Shah Duran i overthrows the Marathas at 

Panipat. Madhava Rao Sindhia escapes. Death of 
Balaji Rao Peshwa. 

Siege of Patna raised by Calliaud and Knox. 

1 762 Haidar All seizes the throne of Mysore. 

m Mir Cassim made Nawab of Bengal. 

1 763 Peace of Fhris. 

Massacre of Patna, and flight of Mir Cassim. 

1764 Grenville' s Stamp Act. 

Battle of Buxar: Munro overthrows the Nawab- Wazir 
of Oudh. 

1765 Olive returns to India, to “ cleanse the Augean Stable.” 
The Nawab Wazir confirmed in the throne of Oudh. 

The Mogul grants the Diwani of Bengal, and the 

Northern SaAtars, to the Company. 

1760 Clive’s reforms. The Double Batta incident. 

Rockingham Ministry ( July ). 

1767 Clive letVes India. 

Grafton Ministry {July). 

^768 Madras treaty with Nizam. 

1769 Mr\Aras treaty with Haidar Ali. 

1 7fo Loxd North's Ministry. 

1771 Shah Alam Mogul, under Maratha protection. 

1772 Disputed succession at Puna. 

Warren Hastings Governor of Bengal. 

The Company resolves to “stand forth as Diwan.” 

(Hi.) The Rttle oj Warren Hastings . 

ix., xvii. 17^3 North’s Regulating Acts. Warren Hastings appointed 

ix. Suppression of the Rohillas. 

1774 Nana«Farnavis at Puna. 

Warren Hastings Governor-General. The New 

Council and Judges. 

Clive commits suicide. 

The Calcutta Triumvirate over-rule Hastings. 

1775 Asaf-ud-daulah succeeds as Nawab- Wazir (Oudh). 
Bombay treaty of Surat with Ragoba (March). 

X. Calcutta Council supports Nuncomar against Hastings. 


x. 1775 

IX. 1776 







IX. 1780 





IX. 1782 





XI. , XVII. 

X. 1785 

Hastings* letter of Resignation. 

Beginning of American War of Independence. 

Execution of Nuncomar. 

Treaty of Purandar with Marathas. 

Lord Pigot, Governor of Madras, deposed. 

Monson (one of the Triumvirate) dies. 

The Chevalier St Lubin at Puna. 

Contest as to Hastings’ resignation. Death # f Clavering. 
Hastings predominant. * 

Burgoyne* s surrender at Saratoga. 

France openly supports America. 

Death of Chatham . ^ 

Hastings authorises a Maratha war. 

Seizure of French ports. 

Disaster of Wargam. 

Goddard’s march across Hindostan to Surat. 

Nizam’s scheme for A»>*i-Brbish confederacy. 

Contest between the High Court and Council (Calcitta). 
Spain joins France against Britain. 

Goddard in Gujerat. % 

Impey made head of the Sadr Adalat. 

Haidar Ali invades tlie Carnatic. 'Baillie’s^disaster. 
Gwalior captured by Popham. 

Eyre Coote sent to Madras (Nov./.. 

Holkar checks Goddard. 

Sindhia defeated in Malwa. 

Coote’s victories in the Carnatic. 

Negapatam captured. Braith waite’s disaster. 

Benares insurrection. 

Surrender of Yorktown. 

Suffren’s battles w : th Hughes. 

Rodney* s victory of the Saints. Naval predominana 

Shelburne ministry (July). 

Affair of the Oudh Begums. 

Treaty of Salbai with Marathas. 

Death of Haidar Ali : Tippu Sahib Sultan. 

Operations at Gudalur. Treaty of Versailles . 

Fullerton in Mysore. 

Coalition Ministry {April). Fox*s India Bill {Dec.). 
Treaty of Mangalur with Tippu. 

Pitt with Dundas in power. 

The Pitt-Dundas India Act. 

Hastings leaves India. 









§ III. Development of British Ascendancy. 

(/.) Cornwallis and Shore , 

1785 Sir John Macpherson ad interim . 

Sindhia’s claim for tribute to the Mogul repudiated. 

1786 Tippu at war with the Nizam and Puna. 

Cornwallis (Sept.). 

Arrangements made in Oudh. 

1787 Administrative reforms of Cornwallis. 

1 788 Impeachment of Warren Hastings . 

Declaratory Act on Indian Government . 

The iJizam and the Guntur Sarkars. 

1789 Letter of Cornwallis to the Nizam. 

Fall of the Bastille . 

Tippu attacks Travancore. 

179° ^Campaign ^f Mejows against Tippu. 

1791 Cornwallis’s first campaign against Tippu. lie captures 

Bangalur, but has to retreat. 

1792 Cornwallis final campaign. Tippu submits. 

Acquisition of Mysore districts. 

Beginning of Ryotwari land settlement in Madias 

0 The “ September Massacres .” 

1793 Beginning of the great French War. 

Permanent zemindar i settlement in Bengal. 

Company's Charter Act. 

Sir John Shore, afterwards Lord Teignmouth. 

1794# Death of Madhava Kao Sindhia (Mahdoji). He is suc- 
ceeded by Daulat Rao. 

1795 French influence at I T fddarabad. Raymond’s corps. 
Cape of Good Hope take ft. 

Mutiny of Bengal officers. 

I 79 <to Shore concedes the military demands. 

Baji Rao II. Peshwa. 

Bonaparte in Italy. 

1797 New treaty with Oudh. 

Mornington appointed to succeed Shore. 

Battles of Cape St Vincent and Camperdovm. 

(«.) Wellesley. 

1798 Lord Morn ington, afterwards Marquess Wellesley* 



xii. 1798 Wellesley reaches Calcutta (May). 

Alarm of Afghan invasion under Zen^in Shah. 

The Mauritius Proclamation made known (June). 

Fresh alliance with the Nizam. 

Battle of the Nile {Aug . ). 

1799 Conquest of Mysore. Death of Tippu (May). 
Re-establishment of Hindu Dynasty in Mysore. 

Partition of Mysore. 

Carnatic, Surat, and Tangier under British rulf . 

1800 Battle of Marengo. 

Malcolm’s Embassy to Persia. 

“ Subsidiary” cessions of territory by the Nifam. 

XViii, Munro engaged on Ryotwari Settlement : Madras. 

XII. Egyptian expedition under Baird. 

Death of Nana Farnavis. Rise of Jeswant Rao Holkar 
and Amir Khan, and of Ranjit Singh. 

Wellesley foiled in Hfs plaf to seize th# Mauritius, 

1801 New treaty with Oudh : Henry Wellesley. # Oudh 

territories ceded. 

Pitt resigns. 

Battles of Alexandria and Copenhagen* 

Rise of the Barakzais in Afghanistan. 

Peace of Amiens. 

Wellesley’s resignation declined.* 

XIII. 1802 Holkar defeats Sindhia and the Peshwa before Puna. 

Baji Rao surrenders Maratha independence by tfye Treaty 
of Bassein. 

1803 War with France renewed. 

Coalition of Marathas. Maratha ifrar (£tug. ). Victories 
of Assaye (Sept.), Laswari (Oct.), Argaon (Nov.). 
Treaties with Srndhia and Bhonsla. f 

1804 Napoleon made Emperor. Pitt takes office again. 

Holkar renews the Maratha war. Monson’s disaster. 
Ochterlony’s defence of Delhi. Battle X ,1 Dig. 

1805 Failure of Lake at Bhartpur. 

Wellesley retires. 

{Hi.) Non-Intervention. 

xiv. 1805 Cornwallis (July). He dies in Oct. 

Sir George Barlow (Oct.) ad interim . 

Lake’s pursuit of Holkar. Terms made with Sindhia. 
Fall of Dundas , Battle of Trafalgar ( Oct . ). 

Death of Pitt . Ministry of “ All the Talents ” (Jan. ). 


xiv. 1806 Terms made with Holkar. 

'Vfellur mutiny. Bentinck recalled from Madras. 

Battle of Jena, 

1807 Treaty of Tilsit . 

Lord Minto. 

1808 Peninsula War begins . Growing coolness between Tsar 

and Napoleon, Convention of Cintra . 

, Persian Missions of Harford, Jones, and Malcolm. 

Missions to Kabul, Panjab, and Sindh. 

1809 Barlow at Madras : collision with, Madras officers. 

Percival Prime Minister . Battles of Corunna , 

Tcfrivcra, and Wagram . 

Treaty with Ranjit Singh. Protectorate of Cis-Satlej. 
Minto supports Nagpur against Amir Khan. 

1810 Torres Vedras . 

Capture of Mauritius. 

XX. •Afghanistan ; expulsion of Shah Shuja ; the Barakzais. 

1811 Albuera . 

xiv. Seizure of Java. 

Rise of t I 9 e Pindaris. 

1812 Lord Liverpool Prime Minister , 

Napoleon's Pussian Expedition . 

Mint# superseded. 

(iv,) Renewed Expansion, 

1813 Battles of Vittoria , Dresden and Leipzig, 

XVII. % Renewal of E.I.C. charter. 

xv. Lord Moira, afterwards Lord Hastings 
£ rhurka aggression. # 

1814 Ghurka War. Early disasters. 

’ Aggression of Pindaris in Central India. 

Hastings supports Bhopal against Marathas 
Persian treaty. 

1815 Success of Ochteilony against the Ghurkas. 

Treaty with Nepal. 

Intrigues of Baji Rao Peshwa. 

European War ended by Waterloo . 

1816 Hastings resolves to suppress Pindaris. George Canning’s 


Subsidiary alliance accepted for Nagpur by Apa Sahib. 

1817 Hastings extends alliances and prepares Pindari cam* 



xv. 1817 War begins (Pindari and Maratha) Oct. 

Battles of Kirki and Sitabaldi (Nov.)% 

Suppression of Pindaris and Pathans. 

1818 Subjection of Central India. Sattara state set up. 
Surrender and deposition of Baji Kao. Maratha 

treaties. Annexation of Maratha territory. 

Panjab : Ranjit Singh takes Multan. 

1819 The Nawab of Oudh made king. 

Death of Warren Hastings.* 

Ranjit Singh annexes Kashmir. 

XVI 11. 1820 Elphinstone and the Bombay Land Settlement. 

XV. The affairs of Palmer & Co. 

xix. 1821 Captain Hall in Mervvara. 

XV. 1822 Lord Hastings resigns. 

Suicide of Castle/ eagh ; prevents Canning from assuming 
the offiie of Governor- Gene rat. 

xvi. 1823 Lord Amherst. 

Burmese challenge to war. 

1824 Burma war declared (Feb.). 

Barrackpore mutiny. * 

Rangoon taken. 

1S25 Difficulties of the troops in Burma. 

Occupation of Prome. 

Outram among the Bhils. 

The Bhartpur troubles. 

1826 Fall of Bhartpur (Jan.). 

Successes in Burma. 

Peace : cession of Assam, Arakan, and Tenasserim. 

XX. Dost Mohammed supreme at Kabul! 

Russo- Persian war. 


(v.) An Interval of Rest. 

1827 Russo-Persian rapprochement. 

1828 Wellington Prime Minister. 

Lord William Beni in ck. 

xix. 1829 Movement to check Infanticide# 

Decree abolishing Suttee. 

1830 Lord Grey Prime Minister. 

Sleeman’s campaign against Thuggee. 

XX. 1831 Mission of Alexander Burnes to Sindh and Lahore. 

1832 Reform Act. 

xvi. Annexation of Kurg and Kachar. 

Administration of Mysore taken over. 


1833 Revised Charter Act. 

Uteath of Daulat Kao Sindhia. 

Robert M. Bird in the North-West Provinces. 

1834 Increased control over Rajput princes. 

Director’s dispatch, discouraging adoption. 

The education problem acute. 

1835 Educational victory of the Western School. 

Sir Charles Metcalfe ad interim. 

Liberation of the Press. 

Dixon in Merwara. 

1836 Lord Auckland. 

1837 Accevion of Queen Victoria. 

- Persian advance on Herat. 

. Peshawar finally secured by Ranjit Singh. 

Mission of Burnes to Kabul. 

• Siege of Herat begun (Nov.). 

§ IV. Completion of British Dominion . 

(i.\* Auckland, JEllenborough and Hardinge. 

xxi. 1838 Arekland resolves to restore Shah Shuja. 
m Sieg^of Herat laised. 

# Preparations for Afghan Expedition. 

1839 British advance from Shikarpur (Feb.). 

Kandahar occupied (April). Ghazni captuied (July). 
Defith of Ranjit Singh (June). 

Restoration of Shah Shuja at Kabul (Aug.). 

184% Surrender of Dost Mohammed. 

Macnaghleu and Burnes at Kabul, with British army. 
1841 9 Rising at Kabul. IVJurder of Burnes and Macnaghten 

* 1842 Kabul Disaster (Jan.). 

Defence of Kandahar and Jellalabad. 

Lord Ei.lenborough (Feb.). 

Retirement ordered. Siege of Jellalabad raised (April). 
Nott j*nd Pollock instructed to withdraw via Kabul 

Kabul re-occupied (Sept. ). 

Triumphal withdrawal from Afghanistan. 

Charles Napier in Sindh. 

Restoration of Dost Mohammed, 
xxvi. Macpherson among the Khonds. 

P. and O. Company instituted. 


















1843 Battle of Miani (Feb.). Sindh annexed. 

Gwalior : death of Jankoji Sindhia ("'’eb.). 

Maharajpur campaign (Dec.). 

Panjab : murder of Maharaja Sher Singh. 

Thomason in the North-West Provinces. 

1844 New arrangements at Gwalior. 

Mutinies of Sepoys ordered to Sindh. 

Recall of Lord Ellenborough. 

Sir Henry afterwards Lord Hardingr. 

Domination of the Khalsa in the Panjab. 

1845 Ganges Canal. 

Sikhs cross the Satlej (Dec. 11). 

Battles of Mudki (Dec. 18) and Firozshah (Dec. 21 
and 22). 

1846 Battles of Aliwal (Jan. 26) and Sobr&on (Feb. 10). 
Lahore treaty (March). Cession of Jalandar and 

Kashmir. Sale of ^ashr ir to Ghola* Singh. 
Bhairowal treaty (Dec.). 

Repeal of Corn Lams. 

1847 Henry Lawrence in the Panjtb to end of year. 

(/V.) Dalhousie . 

1848 Lord Dalhousie (Jan.). 

Revolt of Mulraj at Multan (April). 

Herbert Edwardes before Multan (July). 

Sher Singh raises the Khalsa (Sept.;. 

Gough enters the Panjab (Nov.). 

Battles of Ramnagar (Nov.) and Sadulap^r (Dec.). 

1849 Battle of Chillianwalla (Jan. 13). 

Fall of Multan (Jan. 22). 

Battle of Gujerat (Feb. 21). 

Panjab annexed (March 30). 

Governing Board established in Panjab. 

Annexation of Sattara. Adoption Question, 

1851 Troubles with the Burmese Government. 

1852 Ultimatum to Burma. 

Capture of Rangoon (April 11). 

Capture of Prome (Oct. ). 

Annexation of Lower Burma. 

John Lawrence chief commissioner of Panjab. 

Aberdeen Ministry. 

1853 Annexation of Jhansi. 

Annexation of Nagpur. 








1853 Assignment of Berar by the Nizam. 

Ciaims of the Arcot family, and of Nana Sahib as heir 
to Baji Rao, rejected. 

Renewal of Charter. 

Railway construction. 

Cheap postage. 

1854 Sir Charles Wood’s Education dispatch. 

Crimean IVar begins . 

1855 Electric telegraph. 

Palmerston Premier . 

Fall of Sebastopol. 

^856 End cfi Crimean War 

Annexation of Oudh (Feb.). 

(/»*.) The final stage . 

1856 Lord Canning fj?eb.). 

*(X« neral Service Enlistment Act. 

Disturbances in Oudh. 

Persian Wgr. 

1857 Jan. Cartridge incident. 

• Sporadic mutinies. 

f reaty with Dost Mohammed. 

^ hina War. 

May* 10 Mirat outbreak. 

11 Mogul proclaimed. 

* 28 Series of mutinies begins. 

June 6 Allahabad secured. 

12 Ridge at Delhi occupied by British. 

14 Gwalior Mutiny. 

26 Fall of Cawnpore. 

30 Havelock takes command at Allahabad. 

30 Siege of Lucknow Residency begins. 

July 1 7 Havelock reaches Cawnpore after hard fighting. 

29 Havelock crosses Ganges into Oudh. 

Aug. 12 Havelock falls back to Cawnpore. 

• Oudh clansmen join the Lucknow mutineers. 
Sept. 6 Siege train reaches Delhi. 

1857 Sept. 14 Storming of Delhi walls. 

15 Outram’s junction with Havelock. 

21 Delhi cleared of mutineers. 

25 Outram and Havelook enter Lucknow. 

Nov. 12 Sir Colin Campbell relieves Lucknow. 

1858 Mar. Capture of Lucknow by Sir Colin Campbell. 





1858 April Capture of Jhansi by Sir Hugh Rose. 

Canning’s Oudh proclamation. Recrudescence 
of the war in Oudh. 

Dec. End of the wax. 

Transfer of Government of India to the CrowQi. 
End of the E[. E. I. C. Lord Canning first Viceroy. 







# {Maps I and II,) 

T HE great territory to which we give the name of India Bound- 
is separated from the rest of Asia by a vast bulwark anes * 
of tremendou^ mountaii^s, fowning a kind of arc round its 
northern half, the ends of the arc resting on the sea. One 
half of her frontier is the mountains, the other half is the 
ocean. Outside the b*tier lie Biluchistan and Afghanistan, 
Turkistan, Tibet, Burma. On one side only, the western, 

<k>es the great barrier offer practicable passes. Therefore 
it is either through Sie Suleiman mountains by one of those 
gateways, or ^by crossing the sea, that the stranger has 
always made his way into India. The Himalayan chain from 
Kashmit to Assam has been an impassable wall. 

From North to South, parallel to the Suleiman range, Hindo- 
and along its*bas£, flows the great river Indus ; joined by stan * 
the united waters of five great steams. The land through 
whiqfr those rivSrs flow is the “Land of the Five Rivers,” 
the Panjgib or Punjaub. Below the junction is Sindh. 

East of Sin^Ji, east and south of the Panjab, is a great 
expanse of territory having but little water, and in part 
sheer desert, named Rajputana or Rajasthan. 

Only a little east *bf the S&tlej (Sutledge), the most 
easterly of the Panjab rivers, the Ganges and the J&mna 
(Jumna) take their rise in the Himalayas, flowing at first 
almost due south, then sweeping eastward to mingle at 
Allahabad, and thence onward in the same direction till 
the sacred stream takes a sudden turn south to empty its 
waters into the Bay of Bengal. Other great rivers join 


it on its way, the country through which they pass being 
described generally as the Ganges basin. Fr6m the mountains 
of Assam and Tibet on the far East the mighty Brahmaputra 
descends to join the Ganges almost where it reaches $te 
sea. The lower portion of the Ganges basin is Bengal; 
the name of Hindostan is sometimes restricted to the upper 
portion. <’ 

Carrying the eye southward down the map ; the mountain 
chain of the Vindhyas runs inland from the western coast, 
extending to Orissa on the east : the river ^erbadda 
(Nerbudda), flowing from East to West, Skirting its southerrf 
foothills. The Nerbadda is the southern boundary* of 
Hindostan in the larger sense of the term ; the line belfig 
continued to the East coast, corresponding approximately 
to the course of the Mahanadi (Mabanuddy). < Thus applied, 
the name of Hindostan covers the Northern half of India, 
as that of Dekhan or Deccan covers^ the southern half. 

The South of the Nerbudda, along ’the west side of the 
Dekhan, peninsula, separated from the sea by only a narrow strip 
of plain, the Western Ghats rise steeply; forming 'the western 
side of a plateau which falls slowly towards the eant, from 
which side it is comparatively, but only comparatively, easy 
of access. The stretch of plain between, the hills and the 
coast is much wider on the east than on the west. The 
course of the great rivers Godaveri and Krishna shows the 
fall of the country. The fundamental distinction to be 
observed is, that Hindostan is in the first place richer and 
therefore more tempting to the invader than the Pekhan, 
and in the second place that it is more easy of access. The 
Vindhyas form a barrier between the Dekhan ard Hindostan, 
which has generally intervened effectively to prevent the 
political subjection of the south to the t north. « 

Of the rivers, it is to be noted that the Satlej has recently 
been found to be an effective boundary between the Panjab 
and the districts on its south and east : while the Nerbadda 
has been a nominal boundary between Hindostan and the 
Dekhan. The Warda, joining the Godaveri and flowing 
to the east coast, is a line of demarcation between a wild 
country of hills and jungles eastwards anfl the mor$ cultivated 


# and civilised portion of the Dekhan plateau westwards. 

Further south, the T&ngh&b&dra and the Krishna set the 
limits to the Northward movements of aggressors from 
Mysore. The richest land in India is the basin of the 
Gahges — Ganga, the holy stream 

Certain characteristics of the climate exercise an important Climate, 
influence on the sequence of events. 

India is roughly speaking the size of Europe without 
Russia. Within that space there is room for considerable 
varieties *)f climate.* In the north, the thermometer some- 
times touches freezing point by night in the cold season : 
wjwie on the plains in the hot weather the heat becomes 
extreme. In the Dekhan the temperature is more equable. 

But in the south there is les^ cold season, the hot weather 
setting in in •March wftile in the Panjab it does not set 
in till May. 

In the Panjab and t^tsome degree on the upper Ganges, 
the mean level of the country is fairly high, and the heat 

fierce b^t dry fill the rains come ; in Bengal, where the 
level is low, the air 4s moist and the heat more enervating. 

From the eifti of May till September south-westerly winds 
blow, called the monsoons, bringing with them the rains: 
rain in» quantities entirely beyond European experience. 

Except for the modification introduced by artificial irrigation, 
the productiveness of the country depends entirely on the 
rains, and their failure means inevitable famine. In the 
North West, the monsoons cornuf^ less off the ocean, bring 
with them less water. In the Dekhan, caught by the 
Western* Ghats, much of the rainfall is exhausted before 
the eastern ^plains are reached: but over Hindostan it is 
distributed fairly evenly. The hot season interferes greatly 
with rfiilitary operations, especially for European troops; 
when the rains set in, active operations are often rendered 
almost impossible. 

In October, a sort of counter-monsoon begins blowing 
from the North East, giving the south-eastern coasts their 
rainfall, though not so lavishly as the south-western monsoons 
elsewhere. The whole stretch of the east coast below 
Bengal bfting very deficient in harbourage, naval operations 


are liable to be brought to a standstill ^hile the counter 
monsoon is blowing from October to December. 

Races and From these geographical conditions certain results follow. 

languages. p r £ m itive populations tend to be forced back into the hilly 
regions by immigrant hordes of different race. The immi- 
grants come always by the same route, through the Suleiman 
mountains, across the Panjab, and, then spread f themselves 
over all Hindostan. The primitive peoples are absorbed or 
enslaved, but make their stand at the passes into the 
Dekhan, where they hold their own very^much as the Celtif 
populations maintained their resistance to the Teutonic 
invaders in Wales, and in the Highlands of Scotland. Hesaire 
the languages of the Dekhan — Tamil, Telugu, Canarese — 
are pre- Aryan tongues ; although the later invaders who did 
succeed in making good their footing in * these regions, 
introduced also the modified language, Urdu or Hindostani, 
the language of the camp, which is a f y>rt of composite chiefly 
of Hindi (the purest offspring of Sanskrit) and Persian — 
the last having become the prevailing language of f the easteiji 
peoples for mutual intercourse very much as French achieved 
a like position though a less universal one in Europe.* 
Invaders. Many centuries before the Christian era, a branch of the 
great Aryan or Indo-European race descended upon# Hindo- 
stan, subjugating or expelling the earlier inhabitants, and 
introducing the religion, the laws, and the language of the 
conquerors. The Hindu advance was checked by the 
mountains and jungles ofMhe northern Detohan, into which 
their supremacy never seems to have penetrated, r though 
curiously enough their religion did. It is probable that 
there were subsequent Scythian incursions, but fnese invaders 
were absorbed, subjugated, or assimilated, by their Hindu 
predecessors. The descent of Alerander was a € unique 
episode, introducing no permanent Occidentalism into the 
East, no continued intercourse of East and West. The 
actual records of Hindu history are about ninety-nine parts 
myth to one part fact, which affords a large field for hypo- 
thetical reconstruction ; but after Mohammed arose, the 
warriors who carried the banner of Islam into the land of 
the Hindus were, accompanied by chroniclers whose hi^oricftl 


perceptions werjj doubtless defective, but who recognised a 
marked distinction between recording facts and inventing 
fables. These conquerors carried their arms from end to 
efcd of Hindostan, and established monarchies over great 
part of the Dekhan. The Moslem invasions culminated 
with the establishment of the Mogul or Mughal empire in 
the sixteenth century jvd. ; the hordes of Nadir Shah and 
Ahmed Shah Durani, a couple of hundred years afterwards, 
neglecting to secure any permanent foothold. 

# Now % r e can observe the elements of which is constructed The 
the India known to the Western race which was destined in ^ ndian 
itsHurn to acquire a new supremacy over the peoples of the 
East. First, the great pre-Aryan population of various 
types, speaking varying tongues, worshipping ancestors, 
native gods ,• devils innumerable, with every variety of 
primitive rite. Then a conquering Aryan race, always prob- 
ably a minority of population, establishing itself as a 
ruling patrician class all over Hindostan, professing and 
^nforcing # a religton pantheistic in idea but suggestive of a 
refined nature- worship in fact, of which the influence extends 
over The urftonquered portion of the peninsula. Then an 
admixture of warlike barbarian tribes who do not pre- 
dominate but are absorbed. Hence throughout the fertile 
plains of Hindostan, the development of a civilisation very 
far from contemptible, accompanied by the gradual evolu- 
tion of religion in two very different directions — one esoteric, 
mystical ascetic, reserved to the ‘Initiated, the other popular, 
gross idolatrous, deformed by pre-historic superstitions ; not 
without *its parallel in the absorption by primitive Christianity 
of pagan iiflaginings which it had failed to eradicate. And 
•then, century by century, wave after wave of fanatical 
Mussulman conquerors, Arab and Persian, Pathan and Turki 
and Tartar, whose political ideal is conquest for its own sake, 
save when there arises now and again a Sher Shah or an 
Akbar with larger conceptions : Mussulmans and Hindus 
always remaining separate though not absolutely without 
admixture ; while the former necessarily retain the character 
of a military caste, amongst a more or less subject population 
lautnijLinlfering them by four or five to one. 


ism : 

Caste in 

The Hindu religion has changed very considerably, as we 
have noted, from the form in which it is presented in the 
early sacred books known as the Vedas. The institution 
which has always appeared to be most essentially character- 
istic of it is Caste . This may be described as the permanent 
division of the whole Hindu society into hereditmy classes, 
whose intercourse with each other, is restricted un^er a 
religious sanction : demanding the strictest fulfilment of all 
manner of rites and observances on pain of losing caste, and 
deriving its tremendous influence from ^he conviction that 
caste extends to the life beyond the grave, controlling the 
transmigration and re-incarnations of the soul. Primarily 
all Hindus fall into two categories — the “Twice-born” and 
the rest ; which the learned seem on the whole to agree in 
regarding as a race-distinction between the Atyan andr his 
predecessor. The Twice-born, again, are in three divisions: 
the Brahmin or priestly caste, the*. ^Kshatryas (otherwise 
Rajputs) or military, and the Vaisyas or industrial. The 
rest are Sudras, not precisely slaves but altogether inferior.. 
These may be called the four original C&jtes. The basis of 
division is the hereditary distinction of function? maintained 
by the impassable character of the barrier between one caste 
and another. There is a time during which the Kshatryas 
challenge the supremacy of the Brahmins, but the attempt 
fails. It is a curious point that the law against intermarriage 
is not absolute. A man may take a wife from a lower caste 
— not indeed without penalty, but without complete degrada- 
tion ; but a woman must marry in her own caste or abtove it. 
Naturally, the Brahmins to whom the caste-distinction was of 
the greatest consequence maintained their puifty of caste 
with greater accuracy and remain at least almost pure-, 
blooded* to this day. With the others extreme strfctness 
appears to have been periodically relaxed, and the Brahmins 
are apt to deny that any of the rest have remained pure, 
though Rajputs declare themselves to be pure Kshatryas. 
Throughout Hindostan there are now races or castes, such 

* There is some doubt whether the Brahmins of the Dekhan are pure 
Brahmins, or descended from progenitors who were allowed to amalga- 
mate with the unconquered non-Aryan Dekhanis without losing* cas|e. 


as the Jats, wh<| account themselves very little lower than 
Rajputs. The Marathas, on the other hand, are said to be 
almost entirely low-caste, though some claim a Rajput descent, 
and Brahmins have held a large share in their government. 

But the practical result is, that whereas of the four original 
castes the Brahmins remain, the Rajputs or Kshatryas* have 
been littlelhodified, whil$ the rest have become indistinguish- 
able; yet among all, distinction of hereditary function and 
also of locality have been carried to such a pitch that there 
are nowesome hundreds of castes for which intermarriage, 
eating together, and other details of social intercourse, 
aga# forbidden under various pains and penalties; while to 
all the out-caste or non-Hindu is unclean, and to all the 
person of a Brahmin is sacred. 

Bwidhism, fl variant ^hich sprung out of Brahminism in Other 
India, and spread over the East, becoming the recognised rell g lons - 
religion of Chinese, Titans, and Burmese, was also for a 
time dominant in India itself, but finally gave place again to 
tjie religion whid? it had attempted to supplant; so that 
apart from Christianity practically all natives of India are 
either professing Hindus or professing Mohammedans. One 
Hindu sect, that of the Sikhs, who reject the religious 
validity # of caste altogether, has played an important part in 
history, more particularly during the last century and a half ; 
but their un§rthodoxy has not separated them from the 
Hindu body. To the Mussulmans, all alike are idolaters; 
while to all Hitidus the Mussulman is out-caste and unclean 
equally* with the Christian. 

From these considerations we can derive a comparatively Indian 
definite ide£ of what may be meant by Indian Nationality. Nation- 
A territory as large as Europe without Russia : in which the a “ y * 
population is everywhere practically divided between two 
religions extremely hostile to each other in character : with 
races and languages as divergent as those of the Celt, the 
Teuton, the Roman, and the Slav : which at no period 
known to history has been organized as one State ; — this is 
not a nation at all in the sense in which we distinguish the 
nations of Europe. In the eyes of an Oriental, it would be 
tliucl^ easier to distinguish and class at sight a Bengali 


Brahmin, a Sikh, a Ghurka, and a Marath|, than a French- 
man, an Englishman, a Spaniard, and an Austrian. The 
religious antagonism between the Calvinist and the Romanist 
is nothing compared with that between the devout followers 
of Vishnu or Khali and the followers of the Arab prophet. 

But the distinction between East and West is more than 
between nation and nation, or between creed lind creed. 
Peoples who have no sense of unity will become united to 
resist a more intensely alien force. The Maratha is more 
akin to the Pathan than to the Englishman ; as the English- 
man is more akin to the Frenchman than to the Maratha. 
There are Indian habits of mind as there are European 
habits of mind. We cannot quite formulate the distinction 
as one between Orientalism and Occidentalism, for the 
Chinaman is an Oriental who^is hArdly if at*all more* akin 
to the Indian than is the European. If we had a term to 
distinguish the Brown from the Yqllpw Oriental, generalisa- 
tion would be easier to express and less liable to misappre- 
hension when formulated. The East has its two gre^t 
divisions, which are little better adapt*! for amalgamation 
than the Indian and the European. The primary facts to 
be grasped however are two : the Indo-orientals, Pathans, 
Rajputs, Bengalis, or Marathas, may be* opposed to each 
other as Frenchmen and Germans or English may be; but 
the opposition is insignificant in comparison tg that subsist- 
ing between all of them and the European ; just as the 
type-distinctions of European nations becotie insignificant 
in comparison to that between all of them and the Indo- 
oriental. Europe might, imaginably, be formed into a 
Commonwealth — one federation of autonomous States : India 
actually is a Dominion, an Empire, where one supreme 
government controls subordinate States : but it needs a 
powerful and untrammelled imagination to conceive of 
either India or Europe as a State, single, centralised and 

The Similarly it is a mere parody of history, as we shall see, to 
British talk 0 f the British, led by Clive, having overthrown a mighty 
onques . g m pj re . un | ess the Nawab of Bengal is to be called an 
Emneror. t» 


Before Clive’j time, the Mogul Empire had already ceased 
to subsist except as a legal fiction : as a legal fiction, it 
continued to subsist for nearly half a century after the 
conquest of Bengal. 

One after another, in the course of a hundred years, the 
kingdoms and confederacies of India fell under British 
dominion^ But a cleaj century passed between the time 
when the game of king-making was begun by Dupleix in the 
Carnatic, and that when British dominion was extended to 
Peshawar ; though ^ach step forward might be called a stride, 
the process was one of gradual advance ; of the successive 
qwerthrow of Powers which had flung down the gage of battle. 
When the contest began, the Mogul empire — the only one 
which ever had any pretension to extend its sway over the 
whole peninsula, and which Slight fairly be said only to have 
clutched at Universal dominion without grasping it — was a 
mere congeries of jpjactically independent principalities. 
And when the great upheaval came in 1857, one at least of 
the most ^potent -causes which held back the native princes 
from joining it was*he revelation of the intention of a section 
of its^nost apctive promoters to use it for a Mogul restoration. 
India did not take up arms against the British for a national 
idea; ^he peoples of India had never possessed a common 
national idea. So far as there was a common motive force, 
it was entirely negative and destructive. Had the mutiny been 
successful, it would not have established a new Empire in 
India, but a collection of warring races and factions. Great 
Bntain has never pursued the policy of the phrase “ Divide 
et tmpePa” The tendency of her rule is in fact to reduce the 
impossibility of union for a single political end by a gradual 
^elimination of discordant factors : a course which will supply 
the political philosopher of a hundred years hence with very 
interesting material. The British Raj in India is the most 
gigantic political experiment that the world has known : its 
outcome still lies upon the knees of the gods. 


{Maps I, a ?id II, 

India ‘TX 7 HEN the prophet of Arabia arose and kindled the 
hummed ** torch of Islam, India was a congeries of Hindu 
m * kingdoms. Throughout Hindustan, *the military and quasi- 
military functions, including those of royalty, were roughly 
all in the hands of Rajputs and the administrative in those of 
Brahmins, while in the Dekhan these two superior castes were 
comparatively little represented, though held in due respect* 
The Rajputs were not, and are not new confined to Raj- 
putana ; which is the name given to the great district*in the 
West, which remained under Rajput dominion, and was never 
brought into complete subjection by Mohammedan con- 
querors. The rise of Mohammedanism in western and 
central Asia led to the series of Moslem conquests culminat- 
ing early in the sixteenth century with that of Baber, the 
founder of the so-called Mdgul dynasty. 

Mohammed launched the Arabs on a career of conquest 
which extended their Empire to Spain on the West, and 
over Persia on the East ; and spread their religiflh till it was 
embraced by the Afghans and Biluchis lying between Persia 
and India, and by two of the three great divisions *>f the 
Tartar race occupying central India. With the third of these, 
the Manchus, who made themselves masters of China, Indian 
history has no concern ; the other two, the Turks and the 
Mughals play an important part in Indian affairs. 

The first year of the Mohammedan era, commonly called 
the Hegira, is the year 622 a.d. Within a century, the 
Arabs had themselves crossed the Indus but theytobt§ine<f 


no foothold. Islam had been enthusiastically adopted by 
races whose reli^on was effete, but it did not offer the same 
attractions to peoples whose own faith was a lively reality. 

The natives of India never accepted it save at the point of 
the sword; and a stronger impulse to conquest than that 
which inspired the Arabs was required to subdue Hindostan 
by force <#arms. 

Froln time immemorial, it has been a recognised custom Mahmud 
in the east for monarchs to elevate capable slaves into oi Ghazni * 
provincial governors. It has also been the custom for them 
4 o depend largely on slave or mercenary troops drawn from 
fighting tribes beyond their own actual dominions. Towards 
the close of the tenth century, a Turk slave named Alptegin, 
made governor of Afghanistan, established himself as an in- 
dependent sovereign, with an ftrmy composed partly of Turks 
and partly of Afghans. His successor was another Turk 
slave to whom he gave his daughter in marriage ; and their 
son was the famous IVfiiRmud of Ghazni. 

Between the years 1000 and 1030 Mahmud made twelve 
Sxpeditiorft into I^dia, carrying his arms to Somnath in 
Gujerat (wh^ice he # took away the sandal-wood gates of a great 
Hindu shrine, whereof more was heard in 1842), and to 
Kanau^ half-way between Lucknow and Agra. He came, 
however, not to stay but to collect treasure and to spread 
the Mohamnjeday faith. It was not till the last quarter of 
the following century that the Ghori dynasty — probably 
Afghan — founded a Mohammedan dominion in India. 

Betovegn 1176 and 1206, Mohammed Ghori, otherwise Successive 
called 9hahab-ud-din, conquered all the countries of the Mussul " 
Ganges basin, with much of Rajputana. An entire Rajput dynasties, 
clan migrated bodily in consequence from Kanauj to Jodpur. 

*The Ghori dominion broke up into separate kingdoms 
almost immediately. Another dynasty, taking its rise from 
a Turk slave of Shahab-ud-din, took up the reins of empire 
at Delhi. These “ slave ” emperors practically end with the 
energetic, but unattractive Balban; whose successor made 
way in 1288 for a fresh dynasty, the Khilji, of Afghan stock. 

During the next five and twenty years, the Delhi empire 
which already included the whole of Hindostan with varying 


degrees of effectiveness was extended by Ala-ud-din over 
most of the Dekhan. His successor was dethroned in a 
revolt which again raised a Turk family to the highest place. 
This, the Tughlak dynasty, brought a larger share of tfee 
whole peninsula under Mohammedan dominion than could 
be claimed even for Aurangzib ; but the success was short- 
lived. Before 1350, a part of the Dekhan had rf verted to 
its Hindu princes, and the whole of ‘it as well as Bengsfi, was 
in revolt against the Delhi monarchy. The collapse of the 
Empire was completed by the devastating invasion Qf Timur 
or Tamerlane in 1398. For a century and a quarter there-* 
after there was no really dominant power in India. JLn 
Hindostan some Rajput princes recovered complete in- 
dependence; the Delhi government fell into the hands of 
a Seiad dynasty (i.e, a familf claiming desosmt from* the 
Prophet) for fifty years, and then into those of the Lodi 
(Afghan) dynasty, who once more added the Panjab and 
Sirhind to the surviving fraction of*tfie old empire. Else- 
where, in Gujerat, in Malwa, in Bengal, Mohammedans 
retained the supremacy, but in separa4e monarthies. In 
the Dekhan for some time after the revolt ( from the Tughlaks 
the Mohammedan “ Bh&m&ni ” dynasty was the chief power, 
with the Hindu kingdom of Bijanagar (Beejanugger) or 
Vizayanagar on the west holding second place. During 
the fifteenth century, the Bhamanis extended tl^ir dominion 
over the Hindus ; but early in the next century the kingdom 
broke up into the three* main Mohammedan States of 
Bijapur, Ahmednagar (Ahmednugger) and Golconda, &nd 
two minor ones. • 

Moham- With the coming of Baber in 1524a new era w;ay be said 
-f- to commence. From the first successes of Shahab-ud-din 
Baber? (Mohammed Ghori) in 1193 to Baber's invasion, no fresh 
conqueror had led victorious armies into Hindostan save 
Tamerlane ; who had appeared and disappeared merely, like 
a devastating pestilence. A Mohammedan empire had been 
established. Its successive dynasties, Afghan or Turk, had 
wrested the government from each other, but each had 
arisen within the empire. Their dominion, extending at an 
early stage over most of Hindostan, w^f carried ^nto the 


Dekhan; and then Mussulman generals and governors set 
themselves up as independent potentates, resting their power 
mainly on armies composed of Turks, Mughals, and Afghans, 
exacting revenues from their Hindu subjects. The process 
of Moslem conquest was simple. Professedly its primary 
intent was the spread of Islam, It offered to the infidel the 
three alteratives — conversion, tribute, or death. When it 
was resisted, victory wasp followed by the slaughter of the 
fighting men, and sweeping measures of enslavement for 
their women and children. Those who yielded timely 
submission, were treated as subjects, not on an equality with 
the conquerors; still they were spared the merciless treat- 
merft meted out to those who resisted. But everywhere, to 
the Hindus, the Turks or Mughals or Afghans alike were 
foreign conquerors of an flien and detested religion. 

Thhs when tiaber came, he was not a Moslem smiting or 
subduing the infidel, but a Moslem overthrowing Moslem 
Powers. The amalganTSufion of the invaders and the invaded 
— of the new and the old Mohammedan ruling classes — was 
a* easy matter. Mohammedan dominion was again organised; 
but again its extension beyond Hindostan was soon followed 
by disruption,' *and the Mogul Empire would have given place, 
in all probability, to a recovered Hindu ascendancy, but for 
the introduction into India of the new European factor. 

Ever since the establishment of the Arab Empire, the Turk The 
and Mughal divisions of the Tartar race had supplied Tartar- 
dynasties and mercenary troops £pr the various kingdoms 
whicfe rose and*fell in Western ana Central Asia. Early in 
the thirfeqpth century, about the time when in England the 
barons were extorting the Great Charter from John, the 
Mughals untfer Chenghis, Jenghis, or Zenghis Khan, swept 
over half the Eastern world slaughtering and burning ; 
happily tor India, they*left it practically alone. Less than 
two centuries later, Tamerlane the Turk, with hordes of 
Turks and Mughals, emulated the deeds of Jenghis Khan, 
incidentally falling upon Hindostan. Tamerlane's descend- 
ants held among them vast territories in central Asia; of 
whom one was Baber, born of a Mughal mother in 1482. Baber, 
His figure stands out in the page of history, picturesque, 


romantic, fascinating; a soldier and a poet, revelling in 
adventure, buoyant of spirit in adver^y, generous in 
prosperity, rejoicing in deeds of prowess and at the same 
time enjoying the society of men of wit and wisdom. His 
large humanity did not indeed lift him entirely clear of the 
inhumanities which were to be taken for granted in every 
Asiatic conqueror, and more particularly in any Tartar; his 
attitude on such points as the slaughter of stubborn opponents 
must be compared not with contemporary European standards 
but with those of the days of Charlemagne. He did not 
organise the empire he won ; but the^ winning of it was «i 
brilliant achievement the work of a born leader and a 
singularly attractive personality. * * 

The Lodi Kings of Delhi had extended their sway over 
the Panjab to the North Wesfc and c Behar on^the East : but 
Oudh, Behar and the Panjab all revolted. Baber, 4 after 
adventures enough, between the ages of twelve and twenty- 
four, to satisfy for life half a dozfcr. potentates of mature 
age, had found himself king of Kabul in 1506: after a 
variety of further vicissitudes he was stih king of Z£abul when 
in 1524 the revolting governor of the Panjab invjted his 
Baber assistance. Baber promptly responded to the invitation, 
^ndiT * nva< ^ n £ anc * ta king possession of the Panjab ; but he found 
n ia * it necessary to return to Kabul, leaving a lieuterfant who 
advanced against Delhi, but was severely defeated. In 
December, Baber returned with an arniy of only 12,000 
men ; shattered at PanipaJ the Delhi monarch's troops, which 
outnumbered his own by something like tfen to one * and 
in May 1525 was master of Delhi and Agra. Those chiefs, 
however, who had already been more or less in^revolt against 
the Lodi King were in no hurry to acquiesce in the domina- 
tion of Baber and the small army, very unlike the vast 
hordes of Tamerlane, which he had brought with him. But 
Baber's troops, encouraged by a tone and spirit on the part 
of their commander which find an apt parallel in those of 
Edward III. at Crecy, and of Henry V. at Agincourt, stood 
by him loyally; successes brought submission and fresh 
adherents ; and before the end of the following year, all the 
Mussulman territories that had owned submission to the 


Delhi kings accepted the rule of the Turk, misnamed 
Mughal, who foiifided the dynasty known to the English as 
that of the Moguls. 

flow however the independent Rajput princes of Raj- 
putana and Malwa continued to do battle with the new 
monarchy- The armies met and lay facing each other at 
Sikri, son» twenty miles from Agra; a panic was all but 
created among the Tartar forces by an astrologer who 
proclaimed that the planets foretold their certain destruction, 
but agaii^ Baber appealed to their chivalry with success ; 

Syery man swore to conquer or to die ; and they conquered. 

The, rest of that year and of the year following were occupied 
in # establishing the Mogul government on the borders and in 
Oudh and Behar. In 1529, Bengal also was added to 
Babers dominions, and sin 15*30 he died, being succeeded 
by his son Humayun. 

In six years Baber, had made himself lord of nearly all of 
Hindostan ; but the achievement was mainly due to his own 
unique personality ; elements of stability were conspicuously 
venting in *the empijjp which his son inherited. Humayun Humayun. 
had brothers ^ho also according to Oriental custom, disputed 
the succession and succeeded in appropriating Kabul. He 
then became engaged in a war with Gujerat; and in the 
meantimfe a noble of the Afghan stock, Sher Khan (soon to 
become Sher Shah) got possession of Behar and Bengal. 

When Humayun was free from the Gujerat complication, 
he marched against Sher Shah but the latter avoided 
facing bis full strength in the field until the Mogul army 
began to ^row demoralised ; and then by unusually skilful 
strategical aud tactical moves succeeded in surprising him 
and scattering his army. Later on Sher Shah again inflicted 
oA him £0 serious a defeat that he had to make his way to 
Kabul as a fugitive (1540). 

For the next five years, Sher Shah reigned and reigned 
well in Hindostan, anticipating Akbar’s methods; for ten 
more his successors reigned ill. The provinces revolted ; 
Humayun after fifteen years of exile, made his way back to 
India and recovered Delhi and Agra. But he had hardly 
returned when he mgt with a fatal accident ; and Akbar, the 
Rft 9 


greatest of the Moguls ascended the throne, being thirteen 
years of age (1556). 

The affairs of the rival monarchy were curiously enough in 
the hands of a Hindu minister of low caste, who showed 
conspicuous ability and valour, feut Bairam, the young 
Akbar’s guardian, was a Turkman of tried capacity the army 
of the Afghan dynasty with its Hindu leader walb met and 
vanquished at Panipat, a very favourite battlefield : the 
Panjab had already been subdued ; and the house of Timur 
(Tamerlane) was once more dominant by force of arms in 
Hindostan. ^ 4 

Akbar. Akbar came to the throne two years before the accession 
of Elizabeth in England ; he died two years after her. The 
reigns of his son and grandson covered another half century ; 
that of Aurangzib fifty years mom, a quite extraordinary 
period for four generations of rulers, though just exceeded by 
Henry III. of England and his three successors. Vlt was the 
glory of Akbar that he was no merfe bonqueror, but the real 
creator of a true and majestic empire such as India had 
never known ; not the mere military dejootism of*a conquef- 
ing race, but a rule under which the Hindu and the Mussul- 
man found approximately equal scope. It was reserved for 
Aurangzib to desert his great ancestor’s policy and, by 
reverting to a militant Mohammedanism, to destroy the 
sclieme of unity which it was Akbar’s chief aim to foster. 

During the first years of Akbar’s reign, until he reached 
the age of eighteen, the government was abljr but arrogantly 
administered by Bairam, who recovered the Imperial Jemtory 
as far east as Behar, as well as the districts of Malwa border- 
ing on the Jamna provinces. At the age of eighteen, Akbar 
suddenly asserted himself, and terminated the period of his 
tutelage, showing much magnanimity towards thf fallen 
minister ; who however was shortly afterwards assassinated 
by a private enemy. 

In the circumstances in which the young monarch found 
himself, tlje mere maintenance of a military despotism would 
have been a task demanding unusual ability. Of the 
Mussulmans in his dominions, a great proportion were 
Afghans, favouring an Afghan dynasty in preference to the 



Moguls. The Hindus regarded Moguls and Afghans 
impartially as foreign conquerors. Akbar’s own dynasty 
had begun with Baber, who had himself only entered India 
some five and thirty years before; while Humayun had 
passed fifteen of the intervening years in exile. *His grand- 
father’s nulitary exploits were an inadequate basis for Akbar's 
empire ovct Hindostan to rest upon. Carried on according 
to theT)ld lines, the reign would have resolved itself into an 
endless series of revolts, probably ending with a struggle for 
the succe§sion between the sons of the monarch, and a sub- 
version of the dynasty at an early date. 

Akbar however, invented a ^p olicv. foreshadowed by. Sher Akb^^/ 
§§ ah t but otherwise unprecedented in Hindostan : a policy 
not so much of dominion as of union. It was hirnormal 
practice, when#Afghans 8r Raputs set him at defiance, first 
to crush their resistance and then to give their chiefs high 
rank in the empire, ^jometimes, a chief would take advan- 
tage of this magnanimity to plot further revolts: but in 
general the effect was to convert enemies into loyal 
supporters.* In particular, the Rajput princes with the 
exception of tfie irreconcilable Rana of Udaipur (Oodeypore) 
found themselves adopting an entirely new attitude. Instead 
of beinj* under the dominion of Afghan and Turk governors 
and armies, they became themselves princes of the Empire. 

Their daughters jyere numbered among the wives of the 
Imperial family; they themselves commanded the imperial 
armies and adn^jnistered the imperial provinces. The Hindu* 
cea&d%to be taxed for not being a Mussulman. The in- 
tolerance® of Islam, officially mitigated by a monarch who 
was ready t# listen to and argue with Brahmin pandits and 4 
Jesuit missionaries, became unofficially also greatly relaxed. 

Akbar shose his servants with immense skill, and the revenue 
arrangements made by Todar Mai — himself a Hindu — 
diminished the burden of taxation while greatly increasing 
the Imperial receipts. 

Given oriental conditions to work in, Akbar appears tov 
have more nearly realised the Platonic deception of the 
pniiosqpher-king tlian any monarch of history, except Marcus 
JfiSrSiusr* Uaber h§d been almost an ideal mediaeval knight 


Results qf 
^lils rule. 



Akbar was a modem in mediaeval surroundings ; great as a 
soldier, great as a statesman, a thinker of no mean order ; 
personally brave with the most daring, generous and humane 
beyond the highest standards of his day. By the time that 
he was fifty years old, all Hindostan with Kabul beyond the 
mountains formed one vast organised dominion, throughout 
which something very like equal government and fcqual rights 
prevailed for Hindus and Mussulmans. 1 

Akbar failed in a long effort to bring under his rule the 
mountain tribes of that northern frontier, which at this day 
is hardly under the control of the British government Oh 
the other hand, he became during the last twelve years of 
his life engaged in wars in the Dekhan, which resulted \n 
the annexation of Khandesh and part of Berar; but the 
three great Mohammedan kingdom# of Ahmetf nagar, Bj^apur, 
and Golconda remained independent, to be only by degrees 
overthrown during the next hundred years. 

The empire which passed to the successor of Akbar on 
the great king’s death in 1605 was a mighty heritage, em- 
bracing more than half India. Tte vast territory was 
divided into governorships, none of them laige enough to 
offer inducements for attempts at independence. The en- 
lightenment of the monarch had placed a check on ( ex- 
travagantly inhuman practices, such as the compulsory self- 
immolation of widows among the Hindus, 4 while it had 
protected them from interference with their less objectionable 
observances, and had raked their status ii\ relation to the 
dominant Mohammedan races. Taxation had been sedficed, 
and the tyranny of local or provincial magnates brought 
under restraint. c 

The accession of the king’s son, Selim, now known as 
Jehangir, hardly gave promise of a g continuation pf such 
beneficent government ; for the new ruler had shown un- 
mistakable signs of a cruel disposition, and a taste for 
debauchery. Happily however, he had not been long on the 
throne, when he married the celebrated Nur JehSn, who exer- 
cised over him a supreme, and usually most salutary influence* 

was, not cons^i^pufijdther 
4gjJ«g?$l8jS of , territory or developojgnt^ of jw|ar»i«|ti0ft.- 



In Hindostan, ^.kbar’s principles of administration were 
maintained, though probably the whole moral atmosphere and 
the ethical standards of governors and officers were lowered./ 

The Imperial pomp and magnificence gave the tone to the 
nobility, and European travellers found not a little to admire, 
while the* were struck by the venality of officials. *Tn the 
Dekhan, throughout the reign, Ahmednagar under the 
government of an Abyssinian minister named Malik Amber 
maintained its position successfully, its ruler proving in the 
game of war, a matqji for the Mogul commanders, except 
ftince KMrram, later known as Shah Jehan. Before he 
was five and twenty, this prince showed extraordinary abilities 
both political and military. But the inherent weakness of 
all oriental monarchies becamg apparent when the queen 
Nur Jehan began to intrigue against his succession. From 
1620 Shah Jehan (who had already been granted the royal Shah 
title) was in perpetual ^vplt, or on the verge of it, not with Jehan. 
the design of displacing his father, but in self-defence ; and 
although on the Emperor's death, in 1627, he established 
himself on the thror.% with little difficulty, he in his turn, 
found thirty years later that the precedent of filial dis- 
obedience is one which the next generation is particularly 
ready to jopy. 

The death of Malik Amber shortly before that of Jehangir 
altered tib regions between the Dekhan and the empire of 
Hindostan. The kingdom of Ahmednagar under a less 
capable ruler t^an the Abyssinian, could neither avoid 
collisfbn* with the Mogul, nor resist his armies ; and the| 
reign of Shah Jehan saw the ruin of that kingdom and the; 
partition of it* territory between the Empire and the astute* 
prince of Bijapur ; who turned the contest to his own? 
advantage, while the les^ skilful monarch of Golconda found! 
himself compelled to pay a heavy tribute to the Mogul. 4 
During the war with Ahmednagar, the name of a Maratha 
chief for the first time appears prominently. This was 
Shahji Bhonsla, whose sonjSivajLwas the founder of Maratha 
greatness. Shahji supported the dynasty of Ahmednagar 
till the cause had become entirely hopeless ; after which he 
became att^hed to Bjjapur, 


This war was finished before Shah Jehan J^ad been reigning 
ten years, and for a considerable time thereafter the only 
serious military operations were carried on beyond the Afghan 
frontier of India, where the future monarch Aurangzib learned 
some of the unpleasant lessons of failure. Transferred to the 
Dekhan, his armies met with more success, and tfee crooked 
methods of his policy found scope. In 1657, Shah Jehan 
fell ill ; the usual antagonism among the sons who were each 
of them prepared to bid for the succession arose : arid Aur- 
angzib made up his own mind that the question wowld be best 
settled by his own occupation of the throne, and the depoli- 
tion of his father. This plan he carried out in the course^of 
1658 from which date his reign begins. Shah Jehan was 
simply deprived of power, jput otherwise was treated with 
respect and honour for the remaining years his life. * 

The Mogul When the deposed Shah Jehan had succeeded his father 
zenith. at the age of thirty-seven, he had ^ready for fifteen years 
been constantly and honourably engaged in war, in ad- 
ministration, and in diplomacy; and latterly he had been 
ill-rewarded. When the sceptre of tht Moguls fell definitely 
into his hands, he proved a less strenuous ru$er than might 
have been expected from his earlier record ; perhaps because 
he now had the opportunity for gratifying other tastes. He 
had no craving for conquest ; nor did he change the methods 
/ of administration. Nevertheless, he war by,, no means un- 
worthy to be the grandson of Akbar. Until the latter days 
when his sons began to dispute about the , succession, peace 
reigned within the wide borders of Hindostan itself^ He 
did not fully maintain the policy of equality for Hindus and 
Mussulmans ; but his departure from it was nbt very grave : 
under him, Hindostan obtained a high pitch of prosperity, 
the highest it had known. Hence, although no additional 
burdens were laid upon his subjects, the imperial revenues 
were greatly enhanced ; and while there was no curtailment 
of the expenditure on public works of utility, an immense 
outlay on mere magnificence was rendered possible without 
diminishing the balance in the imperial treasury. The cities 
of Hindostan obtained an unprecedented splendour ; it was 
the wealth of Shah Jehan that constructed the famous ?ea- 



cock Throne; to him India owes many of the wonderful 
buildings which have excited the astonished admiration of 
so many travellers, and most of all the incomparable Moti 
Masjid or Pearl Mosque, and the Taj Mahal, the mausoleum 
of hisyavourite wife, at Agra. vThe highest panegyrics of the 
Mohammedan historians are reserved for the Mohammedan 
zealot Aurangzib ; Akbar the liberal and unorthodox creator 
of tHh Empire demands universal admiration however 
grudging ; but the golden age of the Mogul dominion is the 
reign of Shah Jehan. § 

• But in the East, though a great man build up a noble Aurang- 
empire, and his son and his son’s son maintain it, so soon 
as the sceptre falls into incapable hands, dynasty and empire 
crumble together. Shah Jehan’s successor maintained the 
empire and enlarged itf borcfers — but in so doing he pre- 
pared the way to make its collapse the more complete and 


{Maps 1 \ and II 5; 

The great 'T'HROUGHOUT the three great reigns last chronicled, 
Moguls. A the effective extent of the Mogul dominion in India 
corresponds practically with Vhat € we have •called Greater 
Hindostan ; Mohammedan dynasties at Ahmednagar, Bijapur, 
and Golconda dominating the Dekljap, Both in Hindostan 
and the Dekhan the tendency to religious toleration had 
been fairly maintained ; and though ceteris paribus the 
Mussulman was preferred to the Hindi* by the ruling powers, 
the latter was by no means excluded from offioes of honour, 
responsibility and emolument, nor could it fairly be said 
that the Hindu religion suffered definite persecution^ 

Elements In the eyes of faithful Mohammedans Aurangzib is the ' 
of disin- greatest of his line. Others find that bott\ the € ends which he 
tegration. get before himself and the methods by which he pursued 
them led directly to that Collapse of the Mogul Power which 1 ' 
followed immediately on his death; and that 4hfi re- 
vival of militant Hinduism, which had almost disappeared 
for a century, made use of and was fostered by l&e emperor’s 
intolerant Mohammedanism, associated with his aggressively 
destructive policy towards the Mohammedan kingdoms of 
the south. In grasping at the Dekhan, he extended the 
bounds of the Empire too far for efficient control by the 
central power, while the Hindu Marathas utilised the strife of 
their nominal over-lords to develop a power which before the 
middle of the eighteenth century had become at least as 
formidable as any existing Moslem State. To the same 
period, and largely to the same intolerant attitude on tl#e 


part of the Emperor, must be ascribed the formation of the 
disciples of the flindu reformer Nanuk, in the North West 
into a fighting sect under the Guru Govind Singh ; whereof 
lajer on came important developments ; the Sikhs of the 
Panjab becoming a barrier against Afghan incursions, and 
then an ^organised State which in its turn challenged the 
British ctominion, and has subsequently after annexation 
supplied our armies with many of their most trusty troops. 

Unlik^ the Marathas, however, the Sikhs do not become a 
recogni^fd factor in the situation till the close of the 
^eighteenth century. f Their growth will form the subject 
of a later chapter : we have here to follow the aggressive 
gn<j. disinteg ra ting policy of Aurapgzjb, the growth of the 
Marathas, and the breaking up of the unwieldy Empire into 
greaj provinces, nominally su l *ject to the Mogul or Padishah 
at Delhi, really independent sovereign States ; with whom we 
were to fight or over whom we were to extend our protection, 
until according to circftnfctances, they were ultimately absorbed 
into the Protectorate or the Dominion of Great Britain. 

• The accession of ^.urangzib (1658) and the deposition of Aurang- 
Shah /ehan # were followed according to Oriental custom by Zlbs first 
a period of contested successions. Three brothers, their ycar *‘ 
sons, a son of his own, and the Rajput chiefs of Jeipur and 
Jodpur* with their varying combinations, kept Aurangzib 
(otherwise known as Alam Gir) fully occupied for some four 
years before fiis position was definitely secured ; and possibly 
the remarkable courage, self-possesion and resource which he 
dispk^yed whefl suffering from a severe illness, went far in 
deciding*waverers to support his cause. It was not, however, 
till he had* been on the throne for more than twenty years 
that he began that series of campaigns in the Dekhan which,/ 

Miile adding greatly to the extent of his empire, made it 
practically impossible* to preserve its integrity. But in the 
interval the lust of conquest made him pursue through his 
viceroys a policy in the Dekhan which weakened the 
Mohammedan states of Bijapur and Golconda, and thereby 
enabled the Maratha Sivaji to lay the foundations of a far 
more formidable Power ; one, moreover, which being Hindu 
yritb Hindu sympathies, was infinitely more destructive of 


the Mogul supremacy throughout Hindostan itself. It is 
probable, however, that Aurangzib would ' have thrown his 
full energies into the suppression of Sivaji at an earlier date, 
but for the troublesome necessities of campaigns on the 
Afghan frontier where the methods and manners of the 
Auiang- tribesmen were very much what they are to-day. - 
hammedan ^^en contest * n the North was brought ib an end, 
fouaticism! Aurangzib found himself involved, by the intolerant Bigotry 
of his Mohammedan predilections, in a prolonged struggle 
with the Hindu Rajputs. In part the character of his 
innovations on the tolerant practice of' his predecessors wak 
something of the same kind as might have been found in the 
rule of an austere Puritan, set down to govern autocratically 
a population consisting mainly of Roman Catholics whose 
religious observances he regarded as idolatrqps, and Y?hose 
amusements he accounted as inventions of the Arch Enemy. 
But besides the decrees which were felt as insulting to 
the Hindu religion, he altered the C irfcidence of taxation in 
accordance with the dictates of Mohammedan law ; whereby 
relief was nominally given to large trades, though practically 
the revenue officers merely continued to enforqe the charges 
while rendering no account of them ; the taxes from which the 
commonalty suffered were left untouched : and presently he 
directly differentiated between Hindus and MohamfSnedans, 
by reducing the customs claims against the latter by one-half. 

Then he went further, issuing to all his"' principal officers 
orders for the general exclusion of Hindus from appoint- 
ments; and re-instituted the poll-tax on “\nfidels which 
had originally been imposed as a kind of commutation of 
the alternative of death or conversion, but had begn abolished 
Hindu an- at the beginning of Akbar’s reign. These measures had the 
tagonism. effect of creating general disaffection among the HinduS, 
and of strengthening their sympathy with the ftfarathas 
throughout the Dekhan; moreover in conjunction with 
another act of Aurangzib, they had the effect of permanently 
alienating practically all Rajputana, and turning the hitherto 
constant and loyal support of its chiefs into a hostility to the 
Moguls either latent or active. This act was the emperor's 
attempt to get into his own hands the widow and children of 


Jesw&nt Singh Jodpur (who died at Kabul during the 
settlement of the Afghan troubles) on their way back through 
the Panjab. The Rajputs smuggled the Rani and the 
princes out of camp, and then fought stubbornly in pro- 
fessed defence of substitutes left behind in their place— 
whom Aurangzib afterwards made a point of treating as the 
genuine family of Jeswant Singh. Raj Singh of Udaipur 
threw in his lot with the* Jodpur people; the Mogul marched 
armies against them with orders to burn and destroy, and to 
carry of women and children. The Rajputs retaliated by 
•intriguing with his sons, and persuading one of them, Akbar, 
to revolt and join them. Akbar’s army however was per- 
suaded to return to its allegiance, and the prince made his 
way to the Maratha country as promising a more favourable 
field of opei^tions ; tlfis bdfcg about the time of Sivaji’s 
death (1680). The necessity of reducing the Dekhan had 
now become so important that Aurangzib patched up a peace 
with the Rajputs on 0 terms which saved his credit, but 
nothing more; while their loyalty of a century had been 
‘finally and fatally destroyed. 

Five and^twentjr years before, the Marathas had not begun The 
to exist as a Power. The home of that race lies roughly Maratha 
within a mountainous triangle, having the West coast from race ‘ 
Goa n&rthwards to Kandesh as its base, and its apex near 
Nagpur; fojj the most part within the domains of Ahmed- 
nagar and Bijapur while those two monarchies were flourish- 
ing. The race, including its chiefs is of low caste, though 
hele%and there a claim with possible justification is put 
forward* to an infusion of Rajput blood. The numerous 
Brahmins^politically associated with them, are presumably 
of different race, duly and religiously honoured as Brahmins ; 
having in one case of primary importance acquired political 
leadership, but beingf more often found in the character of 
ministers or diplomatists than in that of military chiefs. 

The Marathas are little mentioned until the beginning of 
the seventeenth century, when they were beginning to acquire 
a high fighting reputation especially as light horse. At that 
time two of them, Jadu Rao and Mal&ji Bhonsla weresbahji 
^prominent soldiers in the service of Ahmednagar. Shahji Bhonsla, 


Bhonsla, son of the latter, was married to Jadu’s daughter, 
the fruit of the union being Sivaji the founder of the Maratha 

Shahji played an effective part and acquired lasge 
possessions, in the struggle of Ahmednagar against Shah 
Jehan. When the kingdom fell, the lands of Shahji and 
his services went to the kingdom of Bijapur, ShaJrji himself 
going to the jaghir* granted to him ‘at its southern extfemity 
in Mysore, and leaving the young Sivaji to be educated on 
Rise of his northern jaghir at Puna. >Here at a very carnage the 
Sivaji. y OU th appears to have conceived the idea of gradually resus- 
citating a Hindu power, by the ostensible process of merely 
securing a strong strategical position for himself among thh 
hills, without any actual appearance of treasonous designs 
against the Bijapur sovereignty. His methods, however, 
carried him a good deal further than seemed compatible 
with loyalty ; his father remonstrated in vain, and was 
punished for his failure by suspicfoff and imprisonment 
Sivaji thereupon sought protection for himself and interven- 
tion on behalf of his father from Shah % Jehan, and obtained^ 
it. Shahji was formally released to attend tp affairs in 
Mysore, and Sivaji promptly renewed his aggressive action 
in the North ; maintaining, in spite of a premature incursion 
into Mogul territories, the fiction of loyalty to the Empire. 

Just about the time when Aurangzib was occupied in 
dethroning Shah Jehan, Sivaji dealt a tremendous blow 
* to Bijapur by decoying ai*. army which the monarch had 
sent against him into the mountain defiles, fon pretext* of 
submission, and there falling on and slaughtering them 
after treacherously assassinating their commander with his 
own hand. The instrument with which the deed was done 
is known as the " tiger’s claw ” — a sharp steel claw concealed* 
in the assassin’s hand, and thrust info the victim in the 
act of embracing. Overwhelming forces were sent to punish 
him, but he evaded capture; revolts in other parts of the 
kingdom drew the royal army off ; and in 1662 his father 
Shahji succeeded in negotiating terms which left him master 
of a territory about half the size of Great Britain, with a 
* J&gkir : an estate held on condition of n^Uiiary service. 


population eminjntly fitted to provide an army of the most 
serviceable type, and numbering more than fifty thousand 
fighting men — the nucleus of the great Maratha dominion. 

, Sivaji had hardly made his peace with Bijapur when he Sivaji's 
was again moved to turn his arms against the Mogul ex P loiu - 
territories. The imperial commander, Shaista Khan, marched 
from Aui\ngabad to chastise his insolence, and took posses- 
sion Of Puna (Poonah). * The Maratha however with a small 
escort contrived to enter the town along with a marriage 
procession, made for^the house where the general was to be 
^ound, surprised it, and all but captured Shaista Khan 
himself, besides slaying his son and most of his attendants. 

Slaving accomplished this feat, he successfully effected his 
retirement; winning by the performance much popularity 
and , applause^ and alsd causing a serious quarrel between 
the Khan and Jeswant Singh of Jodpur who had reinforced 
him. Sivaji followed % up his success by a raid to the north- 
west and the looting of Surat ; though his attack on the 
European factories there was repelled. Moreover, he em- 
ployed himself in fitting out a fleet with which he raided 
the souther^ ports # of Bijapur ; and set himself up as an 
independent sovereign, with Raighar, near Puna, as his 
capital, coining money and assuming the title of Raja. Jey 
Singh atoother of the Rajputana princes was now sent by Sivaji 
Aurangzib to^supgress Sivaji and go on to attack Bijapur ; negotiates, 
and the Maratha, thinking the enemy too strong, at once 
set about making terms. The^ results were exceedingly 
favourable; for while he was obliged to surrender more 
than half* his forts with the territories attached, and to hold 
the remainder not as an independent kingdom, but as a 
jaghir from the Mogul, he was compensated by a somewhat 
indefin^e grant of claims on the revenues of Bijapur districts, 
which were subsequently found to be most conveniently 

The services which he rendered in the following Bijapur Sivaji and 
campaign were succeeded by a highly characteristic episode. Aumng- 
Aurangzib invited him to Delhi, and he went, probably * lh * 
feeling very well pleased with himself. The invitation, 
hpwever, expressed tj>e limit of the emperor’s condescension ; 


and his reception was not only cold but contemptuous. His 
protests were not taken in good part, ana he soon found 
himself practically a prisoner. Feeling the risks of the 
situation, he succeeded in getting himself carried through the 
lines of sentinels concealed in a basket, took horse, and then 
travelling in various disguises succeeded in reaching his own 
country nine months after his escape from Ddihi. Jey 
Singh’s operations in Bijapur miscarried, and the' Raja 
himself died; being replaced by a prince of the blood, 
associated with Jeswant Singh. The^Jodpur Raja being 
always particularly well disposed towards Hindus, used hii 
influence to obtain fresh terms for Sivaji, of a still more 
favourable character than before ; including the restoratioh 
of a part of the confiscated territory, the grant of a new jaghir 
in Berar, and the recognition <$f his tttle as Raja. 

Recon- Sivaji used this period of professed reconciliation with the 
ciliation. em pe ror| first to threaten the kingdoms of Bijapur and 
Golconda, which preferred paying a' tribute to fighting ; and 
secondly to organise his own government which was highly 
systematised ; all the principal civil *and several of the 
military posts being in the hands of Brahmins. *. « 

Aurangzib’s friendliness was however of a deceptive 
character, his real object being to draw Sivaji into his power 
again without actual war. But Jeswant Singh and thfe prince 
Moazzim, were quite capable of playing a double game, and 
it was not long before both sides were aware that duplicity 
was at work. Consequently Aurangzib at last decided on 
open war as the better course. * * • 

Successful The results were decidedly favourable to Sivaji; who 
defiance. ca pture<J a number of forts, notably the apparently inaccessible 
one of Singhar, near Puna, and again ravaged Mogul 
territory as far north as Surat which he plundered /or the 
second time. The Mogul armies were* seriously handicapped 
by the emperor’s distrust of all his principal officers, which 
' led him into the unfortunate practice of having two or more 
generals, none of them definitely in supreme command, and all 
on the watch and suspicious of each other. From want of 
co-operation between the imperial forces Sivaji was enabled 
for the first time to inflict a severe ^Jefeat on them in 


the open field (1^72) : with the usual result for them of 
ill success, in tne removal of the commanders and the 
appearance of a new viceroy for the Dekhan. The need 
however for military measures in other parts of the Empire 
made it necessary to suspend active operations against 
the Marathas for a time. 

The institution known as chauth or chout dates from this Chauth. 
last indursion of Sivaji inlo Mogul territory. He demanded 
one-fourth of the revenue of the invaded provinces as' 
blackmai^in the sense in which that term was applied by the 
reivers of the Scottish highlands — a payment in consideration r 
of which the contributing districts were to be guaranteed by 
ttffe blackmailer against further spoliation. 

The suspension of hostilities by the Mogul government Sivaji ex- 
left §ivaji freg to ex^fcd hii conquests southward and 
eastwards over Bijapur territory, the death of the Bijapur 
king having left a young child on the throne. His pose as wards, 
a hero of Hinduism, add his further assumption of regal 
dignities and splendours, set the imperial forces in motion 
against him once moje : but only to bring about vigorous 
retaliatory incursions Into Berar and even Gujerat. Sivaji 
then turned his attention once more to the south, and 
making an alliance with the King of Golconda who undertook 
to cover >kis rear against possible attacks from Bijapur or on 
the part of the Mogul, he set about the subjugation of the 
greater part of Mjsore and the Carnatic ; occupying part of 
the conquered territory and leavingfpart in possession of the 
previous propriefor on condition of receiving half the revenue. 

This applied to the tract which had been held as a jaghir by 
his father $hahji. The aggression of the Moguls in the 
meantime enabled him to carry his plans to formal complete- 
ness; their attack on Bijapur causing the regency there to 
call for Siivaji’s assistance, as the price of which he demanded 
the entire cession of Sivaji’s jaghir, and of other territory in 

But death prevented him from making his dominions Death of 
secure. He fell ill and died early in 1680. ^Though the Siva ih 
son of a great magnate, he had practically started his own 
career as a brigand jhief. By treachery, cajolery, and sheer 


hard fighting he had when he died at the^age of fifty-three 
made himself and his Marathas masters of the Konkans — 
the coast and mountain strip running from Goa up to 
Kandesh — and of half Mysore and the Carnatic ; laying uery 
substantially the foundations of the great Maratha Dominion. 
He was succeeded by his son Samb&ji, a dissolute and 
violent prince who had already once deserted to t!$e Moguls ; 
a succession with the usual accompaniments of & rival 
nominee, much bloodshed, and serious if temporary dis- 
integration of the Maratha power. 

Aurang- In 1683 Aurangzib had made terms with the Raja 6f 
Zlb m the Udaipur; Sambaji was acknowledged head of the Marathas and 
Dekhan, had just been joined by the Mogul prince Akbar. With 'a 
curious lack of perception Aurangzib, who had resolved to 
make himself master of the Rekhan, decided f Jto destroy the 
monarchies of Bijapur and Golconda before curbing the 
Marathas — perhaps imagining that the last named would no 
longer prove really formidable noVthat Sivaji was dead. 
He also found this a fitting opportunity for pressing the 
enforcement of the revived poll-tax^on Hindus, thereby 
exciting the animosity of the great bulk of, the Dekhan 
population. Finally, he adopted a plan of campaign 
unsuited to the country in which he had to work; and 
vitiated by that distrust of any and every general which led 
him to combine incompatibles in one command, and to 
allow no one a sufficient body of troops* for the particular 
ends that he was ordered to achieve. Consequently one 
prince marched through the Konkans (where the Marithas 
evaded battle), losing men and killing horses* in large 
numbers by the way ; and another prince moved, on Bijapur 
from the north-east. When these two armies had got well 
to the south, Sambaji emerged, and raided into Gujarat arid 
Berar: the princes in the meantime? finding themselves in 
insufficient force to attack Bijapur with effect. 

End of the Finding that Sambaji was now in alliance with Golconda, 
Dekhan Aurangzib turned on the latter kingdom, where the rivalry 
“s* 0 f the Mussulman commander and the Brahmin chief minister 
resulted in the desertion of the former with most of the army 
— which, as always in the Mohammedai^ kingdoms, consisted 


largely of Pathan^ or Afghans : the capital, Haidarabad, was 
sacked, and a heavy money payment exacted from the king. 
Reverting to Bijapur, where the resistance seems somewhat 
unaccountably to have melted away, he captured it very 
shortly after completing the investment, and then once more 
fell upon Golconda ; abolishing the two monarchies, absorb- 
ing them^into provinces of the Empire, and establishing a 
imilitafy occupation as far south as Tanjur. These successes 
were rounded off by the unexpected capture of the person of 
Sambaji^md his execution ; followed not long after by the 
Capture of Raighar, and with it Saho the infant son and 
recognised heir of Sambaji. 

m Now ensued a long guerilla war. Raja Ram, uncle ofMaratha 
Saho, acting as regent in his name, escaped from the Konkans resistance, 
where large l^ogul forces we A; in comparatively dangerous 
proximity, to the strong fort of Jinji or Gingee in the Carnatic ; 
while all over the Ma^atha country the chiefs were instructed 
and encouraged to caS-ry into the Mogul territories an 
organised and lucrative system of raiding and plundering. 

The next few years passed in a process of the gradual reduc- 
tion <*f Martha forts by the emperor, and the constant 
retaliatory raids of the Marathas : a process under which on 
the whole the Marathas seemed to thrive, not only carrying 
their incursions into Malwa, but presently attaining such 
strength as t^ set ^about recapturing the captured forts : while 
a constantly increasing demoralisation was sapping the 
effectiveness of the Mogul armiei. 

Aft4ast, in 1707, in the forty-ninth year of his rule, and Death of 
the eighty-ninth of his life, the last great ruler of the Mogul Aurangzib 
family dieA A grim and austere zealot, with an immense „ 
capacity for work, a remarkable grasp of detail, and insatiable 
ambition, he extended the bounds of his empire far beyond 
the limits of his ancesfral dominion ; but in such wise that it 
straightway fell to pieces in fact if not in form as soon as the 
reins dropped from his hands ; and even in the hour of his 
death the coming doom of the Empire was foreseen by 
shrewd observers. 

After Aurangzib's death, definite policy disappears from Aurang- 
tbe counsels of his successors. His son Moazzim, who had zib ’ s suc " 

9 cessors. 


seen much service and acquitted himself ^ith credit in the 
Dekhan, became emperor under the title of Bahadur Shah, 
being already over sixty years old. The five years of his 
reign were mainly occupied in maintaining the throne against 
his brothers and in composing complications in Rajputana. 
Incidentally, Saho the grandson of Sivaji was set at liberty, 
and Maratha activities were in some degree abforbed by 
internal dissensions in consequence; the son of the late 
regent having been set up as a rival claimant to the succes- 
sion. Bahadur Shah was succeeded # by his son rjehandar 
Shah, who in his turn was deposed and executed by 3 
nephew, Farokshir, a year later, the control of the govern- 
ment falling into the hands of the Seiads, Abdallah Khan an 3 
Hosein Ali, of Mohammed’s line. (1713.) 

Thenceforth, the empire became a mere hot-bed of intrigues, 
open revolts, and gradual assertion by viceroys of de facto 
(though not de jure) independence;, the fruits of these 
troubles being appropriated mainly by the Marathas. Among 
Rise of the them, two families first rise into prominence — that of the 
Peshwas. Brahmin Balaji Wiswanath, from whonr sprang the Peshwas 
who gradually obtained recognition as the real heads ♦of the 
Maratha confederacy : and that of Pantoji Bhonsla, who, 
though apparently not connected with the family of Sivaji, 
for a long time contested the supremacy of the Peshwas 
— each appearing in the character of a hereditary minister of 
the nominal monarch, Sivaji’s descendant. The marked 
ability not only of BalajP Wiswanath, but still more of his 
son Baji Rao and his grandson Balaji Rao ultimately set&red 
the Peshwa predominance; three other families — theGaikwars 
of Baroda, the Sindhias, and the Holkars — alss> acquiring 
prominence, but none of them for many years aspiring to 
the actual supremacy of the Maratha confederacy ; wjiile the 
Peshwas themselves continued to recognise the nominal 
authority of Sivaji’s successors. 

Breakup The immense extension of the Maratha power over the 
of the vast dominion shewn in the Map (II) really took place 
Empire* rou ghly between 1720 and 1750; the imperial province of 
* the Dekhan, with the Carnatic under a subordinate governor 
or Nawab being consolidated during much the same period 


into a powerful independent state by the Nizam-ul-Mulk, 

Asaf Jah. The death-blow to the real Mogul Power was 
dealt by the great invasion of Nadir Shah from Persia, and 
the* sack of Delhi in 1739. 

The administration of the Seiads (17 13-17 20), which 
terminate^ shortly after the accession of Mohammed Shah 
to the # throne of the Moguls, is notable chiefly for the treaty 
made with Saho by Hosein Ali — whereby the Maratha was 
officially confirmed in authority over all the districts possessed 
by Sivaji^as well as subsequent conquests, and also in his 
claim to the chauth (one fourth of the revenue) of the 
Dekhan, and ten per cent, of the remaining revenue; in 
return for which he was to guarantee the whole district 
against any depredations, to furnish 15,000 horse, and to 
pay a tribute of about ^100,000 recognising what may be 
called the Suzerainty of the Emperor. This treaty was 
repudiated at the tii*ie # by Farokshir, but was confirmed 
afterwards by Mohammed Shah. 

For a brief period after the fall of the Seiads, Asaf Jah, Asaf Jah, 

already viceroy of the* Dekhan, acted as Wazir. It was not the Nizam- 

long htfweverebefore.he became disgusted with the court, and ul_Mulk * 

withdrew to his province, in which from thenceforth he 

made the merest pretence of submission to the Imperial 

authority, at the same time encouraging the aggressive 

advance of tfce fyj, arat h a s in Hindostan in order to divert 

them from hostilities in the Dekhan itself. Haidarabad 

now becomes tj^e capital of the Nizam's dominions. The 

Carrfetfc remained under the governorship of the family to 

which it httd been delegated about 17 10 by a predecessor of 

the Nizam. • 


# Between 1720 and 1730, then, the great divisions and The new 
dynasties with whom the British were shortly to come into Powers, 
conflict have approximately taken form. The grandson 
of Sivaji is at the head of the Maratha nation; Balaji 
Wiswanath the Peshwa, (succeeded by his son Baji Rao), 
and the Bhonsla, are the two chief ministers whose 
offices are to become hereditary ; Sindhia, Holkar, and 
the Gaikwar, are taking their places as the leading chiefs, 
though they have net yet absorbed the tracts of Hindostan 


which are to be acquired by them in th| next few years. 
The Nizam has virtually declared the independence of the * 
Dekhan. Rajputana is practically an independent con- 
federacy. Sadat Khan, founder of the family of the Ovdh 
kings is coming to the front in that province; Ali Vardi 
Khan, grandfather of the notorious Suraj-ud-Daulah (of the 
Black Hole) is about to acquire a similar asc&dancy in 
Bengal. * * 

Between 1730 and 1740 Baji Rao practically obtained 
from the Mogul the cession of Malw^, of Gujer#, and of 
Bandelkhand (Rundelcund). But his progress was tempor- 
arily checked by the unexpected and devastating invasion 
* of Nadir Shah. 

Nadir Since the arrival of the Moguls in Hindostan there had 

Shah, b een no g rea t invasion through thfe Afghan passes. It was 
a Persian invader who at length shattered the Mogul power, 
leaving the emperor practically at the ( mercy of his viceroys 
and of the Marathas. About 1 7 2*0 the Safavi or “ Sofy ” 
dynasty of Persia was dispossessed by the Afghan tribe of 
Ghilzais, whose chief, Mahmud, madethimself Shah. But*a 
great Persian warrior arose, Nadir Kuli, who turn drove 
out the Ghilzais ; and after waging successful war against the 
aggression of the Western Turks, during which time figure- 
heads of the Safavi family occupied the throne, was him- 
self elected to the crown as Nadir Shah, ig 1736. The 
annexation of Afghanistan as far as Kandahar — the Ghilzai 
country — brought Nadir Shah’s borders in contact with those 
of the Mogul empire, which still embraced tlhazni (Gtflnee) 
and Kabul. Nadir Shah regarded the conduct of the 
Delhi court in connection with a diplomatic incident, as an 
adequate casus belli. Kabul was promptly taken : while the 
Mogul court, regarding the danger from* Afghanistan as 
distant, and that from the Marathas as urgent, paid little 
attention to what was going on beyond the Indus. But the 
hill tribes did not offer the expected resistance to the invader ; 
the Sikhs, who later on became a formidable barrier, had 
recently been almost crushed out of existence ; and Nadir 
Shah was very soon across the Satlej. The Mogul army 
was routed with ease, and the Mogul himself had # to 


visit Nadirs cjmp and tender submission. (March 
1739.) The two monarchs, on apparently friendly terms, The sack 
proceeded to Delhi accompanied by Nadir’s army. The 0 * Dellli * 
mob rose against the invaders; and after many had been 
killed, Nadir, who at first had attempted to restrain the 
disturbance, lost his self-control, and ordered a general 
massacre, which was not stayed till the slaughter had 
continued with every accompaniment of uncurbed ferocity 
for the greater part of a day. The city was then systemati- 
cally andathoroughly picked ; the inhabitants were compelled 
ifhder torture to disclose their treasures ; persons of position 
were held to ransom. It was not till the country had been 
sucked dry of treasure like a squeezed sponge that Nadir 
Shah restored the crown to Mohammed Shah and withdrew; 
having had th% trans-Incftis do&inions of the Moguls ceded 
to him, in addition to the untold booty he was carrying 

These events bring us down to the time when the French- 
man Dupleix, in the Carnatic began to lay his plans for that 
aggressive policy whicfc forced French and British alike into 
the arefia of fiative .politics. For nearly a decade, however, 
the complications with the European Companies were con- 
fined to the Carnatic, and acquired no importance in the 
eyes of the native rulers ; and this chapter may appropriately 
conclude witl^ a ^ymmary of the Maratha extension during 
that period. 

The Peshwa J^ad been completely taken aback by Nadir’s Extension 
invaMon, and his first thought was that Hindostan must 
unite agamst the common enemy. But when the Persian omimo • 
monarch retired, and seemed to have no intention of return- 
ing, matters assumed a different aspect. The Bhonsla, now 
established at Nagpur in Berar, extended his predatory 
incursions southward into the heart of the Carnatic and 
northward up to the Ganges. Balaji Rao, who succeeded 
his father as Peshwa in 1740, at first supported the Moguls, 
getting his own claims on Malwa confirmed : but he then 
made terms with the Nagpur Raja, with the result that the 
latter obtained further cession of territory as far as Kattak 
(Quttack) in Orissa, and received chauth from the Nawab of 


Bengal. Malwa was apportioned to Holkaj, and Sindhia, and 
Gujerat to the Gaikwar; so that the Maratha domain now 
reached from sea to sea between the Ganges basin on the 
north and the Nizam’s dominions on the south. „ 

Finally the death of the Raja Saho without issue in 1749 
was followed next year by the recognition of the Peshwa 
as head of the whole Maratha confederacy, at Pufra ; with a 
roi faineant lacking even the shadow of authority, r in the 
person of a supposed grandson of Raja Ram (the regent 
when Sambaji died) to represent the h<juse of Sivaji, 


{Maps I and II) 

T T NTIL the close of the fifteenth century, India was an 

almost mythical country to the nations of the west The 
Alexander had entered the Panjab, and after him occasional 
Greeks penetrated intc* Hindustan ; but it lay beyond the My 
borders of the Roman empire, beyond the range of maritime 
adventure. The sailors of Venice and Genoa were limited 
virtually to the Mediterranean, and the commerce of India 
found its way to European markets mainly through the 
Levant. But the gjpat Oceanic movement of the fifteenth 
qjgjituiy brought about the discovery of America by 
Columbus and of ’the Cape Route to India, first sailed by Discovery 
Vasco di Gama in 1497. The great commerce passed from ^y t e e ^ ai)e 
the Italian States to the countries with an Atlantic sea-board, 

Spain and Portugal leading till their supremacy was challenged 
by England ^tnd ‘Holland and finally by France. 

The great discoveries led to# a remarkable Papal pro- 
nouncement, $y which the new world was parted between 
Spain apd Portugal. The new century was more than 
half over before English sailors began to make a claim in 
America on their own account : and the Portuguese had 
been established on the coast of India, and in the Spice 
Island^, for a full hundred years before the English and 
the Dutch commenced active trading operations in those 
regions. Th p ^Po rtu gue se^ then, were the pioneers. Their The Porta- 
energy in ^me early part of the sixteenth century wasguese. 
immense; and in the first quarter of it, Albuquerque had 
already established a maritime empire in the Indian Ocean. 

The Mogul dominion was not yet created : the Maratha name 
9 39 


was unknown. The Portuguese ruled, the f.ea, but made no 
tftgSSBL i>X .tod. Their principal 

settlement at Goa on the Malabar coast was practically 
impregnable. TrT India, they had not to deal with a folkrso 
unsophisticated in the arts of war as was found by the 
Spaniards in Mexico and Peru ; the Indian artillery was good 
and plentiful ; still the lesson was early learned of the differ- 
ence between European and Oriental discipline, and it was 
quickly found that a handful of resolute adventurers could 
defy a host of native levies. On thj other han#l it was 
soon apparent that while the presence of Portuguese fleerf 
offered no menace to the Country Powers, the trade they 
brought was extremely desirable. Yet the kings of Gujeraf* 
and the Dekhan coast varied between fear and favour 
towards the foreigners ; and twice it least gi^at combined 
attempts were made to annihilate them, about the middle of 
the century and again in 1570. Thf attempts were met 
and frustrated with stubborn valour, and the Portuguese 
fleets remained supreme. 

But in 1580 the absorption of Portugal by Spain robbed 
the smaller country of life and energy. A few years later, the 
independence of Holland had become an established fact and 
the naval supremacy had passed from Spain to the land of 
Drake and Hawkins. In India the Empire of Hindostan 
had again taken enduring form under Akb^r. English 

merchants began to dream of wealth to be gathered in the 
East as well as in the Wesft A merchant adventurer named 
Fitch, carrying letters from Elizabeth herself, 'made a tool of 
enquiry in India, bringing home golden reports. *Jn i 
in^ a^ sociat ion .was formed in London for Eastern fraae 
y|tich w as . incorporated . .by, Charter in the following year^ 
The wjth exclusive rights. The East India Company was, horn. 

British and Dutch ships had already rounded the Cape; in 1603 the 

Eutfefe finished. T 

Com- Within Asiatic waters, these companies behaved practically 
panies^as if they were sovereign Powers, their proceedings having very 
little connection with the diplomatic relations between their 
^governments at home. In effect, they were given exclusive 
rights as against other traders and werf then left to tak% 



care of themselves# If they thought fit to raid each other’s 
factories (as trading stations were called) and to sink each 
other’s ships, no one except the injured Company objected 
unless in very flagrant cases : and the injured Company re- 
taliated when opportunity offered. 

The Portuguese, with military establishments at Aden and 
Ormuz^on the Persian Gul£ at Surat and Goa, at Masulipatam 
and Hugli, dominated the Indian littoral. They claimed an 
exclusive right to the entire trade both there and in the 
Spice Islands. During forty years, the Dutch gradually 
superseded them in the Islands, and it was in the Islands 
also that the English Company began its operations ; which 
when successful were extremely profitable. But within a 
very few years, it turned its attention to India : the Portuguese 
were defeated *n attempting to suppress an expedition to 
Surat : the Mogul Jehangir was favourably disposed to com- Establish- 
petition against the Portuguese : and in an Imperial^^of 

fi rman authorised the establishment of British factories at factories. 
Surat and some other places. 

w# The next important* step was the famous embassy of Sir Sir T. 
Thomasf Roe from J^mes I. of England and VI. of Scotland Ro £* s 
to the Court of Jehangir. Sir Thomas was much im- cm assy ' 
pressed by the splendour of the Court and the venality of the 
courtiers. He did not like the Prince who afterwards became 
Shah Jehan, a#d l}js admiration for Jehangir was qualified. 

But he obtained concessions. 

In 1632, th^ Portuguese having taken an aggressive 
attitude in Bengal their power was destroyed by Shah Jehan. 
r ?he English were then allowed to establish a factory on the 
Ganges Della, but under close restrictions; the memory of 
thf Portuguese being fresh. Shortly after, however, the 
good offices of a* European surgeon being requisitioned for Conces- 
a daughter of the Emperor, Mr Boughton performed his sionstothe 
task so successfully that he was invited to choose his own Bengal 
reward; and he chose nothing for himself, but much for 
the Company — the right of trading duty-free in Bengali 
and of establishing factories. , The request was granted J 
Houghton went to Bengal to make the arrangements ; while 
tfaqre he was again sailed in professionally, by the Prince 


who was Governor of the province; arjd his success was 
again rewarded by a permission to the Company to establish 
3, factory at Hy gli. In 3^6 gg, by the invitation of the Hindu 
and on the Raja, another factory was established on the Coromapdel 
coast, and fortified under the title of Fort St George; the 
Coast. c ^y which grew up around it developing into Madras. 

The civil wars in England delayed activd progress. 
Portugal had now fallen out of the contest, and the' rivalry 
in Asiatic waters was between English and Dutch. The 
advantage lay on the side of the latter, their Company being 
intimately associated with the States Government, while the 
English were dependent on private energy and enterprise, 
which were handicapped by the civil broils. The Protector 
dealt vigorously with the Dutch, and the position was a good 
deal improved under his rule-; butHhese circumstance# were 
to a great extent responsible for the comparatively large 
share which India occupied of the British Company's 
attention, as against the Islands. 1 

About the year 1660 three important events took place — 
the accession of Aurangzib in India; the restoration *of 
Charles II. in England ; and the death of Cardinal Mazarin 
in France. There Louis XIV. himself assumed the direction 
Develop- of the State, and Colbert became his chief minister. For 
French SOme years to come, the political relations of England, 
Colonial France and Holland shifted perpetually, the European 
policy by interests of England and Holland agreeing, while their 
Colbert, commercial interests wete in constant antagonism. More 
over, Colbert resolved that France should enter *cm the 
Oceanic riyairy ; French fleets and harbours had unexampled 
sums spent on them, and the French Government gave 
financial support to Colonial enterprise. Under Colbert's 
auspices aJFrench East India Company yjas> formed in 16 64. 
which ^£er_yarious vicissitudes finklly formed Jts Xnaian 
headqua rters at Pon dicherv under the remarkably able 
control ana guidance of Fran^i^Iartin. 

One early consequence of the Restoration in England was 
the qgggign of J^ffibaxtojhe English Portugal, 

under the Royal Marriage Treaty. The Crown, not seeing 
its way to making the most of the gift^ transferred it a fjew 



years later to t|pe East India Company; and it shortly 
became the principal British settlement on the West Coast. 

Temporary alliance with England against Holland enabled Conmli- 
the* French Company to make a footing good in India ; the {^ t ^ s re * 
flight of James II., and the accession of his son-in-law between 
“ Dutch William ” in England then definitely united the France, 
Dutch and the British against the aggressive policy °f^ lland 
Louis^ and from this time, as far as India is concerned, England. 
Dutch hostility ceases to be an active factor in the Com- 
pa ny ’s calculations. ^But a consciousness of the coming 
disintegration of the Empire grows. 4 s early as 1685, the 
British had been audacious enough to levy war against the 
Mogul on account of grievances, and were in danger of 
being wiped out of the country, when they were saved 
practically owpig to th£ Moslem fanaticism of Aurangzib. 

The capture of pilgrim-ships on the way to Mecca pointed 
to a danger which t he was not prepared to face. This 
together with a generaf sense of the financial advantage 
derivable from the Company’s trade, induced the Mogul to 
dbme to terms, and aliow a fresh settlement in Bengal. The 
factories havyig been destroyed, \ new sett lement was made 
on the banks of th*e Hugli, which developed into Cakujte. Calcutta. 
Five years later, under the pressure of a revolt in OrissaJ 
permission was given to erect the fortifications which became 
known as For t Willj am. 

Xtye Company's* monopoly of trade had long been a source The Inter- 
q { antagonism to them on the pan* of other merchants. In lopers. 
the abstract, tfte argument of the free-traders was sound ; 
in the concrete, it was vitiated by conditions which the 
economic ssis left out of count. Trade with India was 
only possible if the traders were protected by land and 1 
sea. International Law gave practically no protection, and 
^iJovernment was not prepared to provide it. The traders 
therefore must be in a position to protect themselves. This 
the Company was able to do ; interlopers, as the unlicensed 
traders were called, were not. Moreover the Company could 
control their own servants on land, and their own ships by 
sea ; but they were held responsible by the Native authori- 
ties for the conduct # of all traders of their own nation; and 


this gave them a fair title to demand that none should be 
recognised who were not under their control. A Parlia- 
mentary Resolution affirming the right of free trading, 
hampered the Company, and increased the activity" of 
interlopers; many of whom in effect became mere pirates, 
while the Company’s servants were held liable, for their 

Cromwell in his day, had been much tempted by the offer 
of an association which desired to set up as rivals of the old 
Company; but he had not yielded. Now at the cl 6 se of the 
century, another attempt of the same kind was made, and for 
A rival a time succeeded. A new Company was formed, which 
East India offered an immense price for a charter ; the existing Company 
mpa could not make an adequate comoetitive offer ; the new 
Company was incorporated, 'and tfie result <was temporary 
chaos. The Native functionaries pocketed huge donations 
from both parties ; the competition rbetween them raised 
prices ; while each- was alternately charged with the re- 
sponsibility for the exploits of the notorious pirate, Captain 
Amalga- Kidd. Happily, both were quick to fecognise that alliance 
Ration of W as better than rivalry; and in 1 ^02 the two Corflpanies 
t panics" ^amalgamated. Once more a single Company was 
supreme, with a Charter giving the right to make war and 
to conclude ^peace with any non-Christian Power in the East; 
having jurisdiction over British subjects,, and authority to 
suppress interlopers. 

puring the earlier portion of the century, the .Company 
is principally occupied in trying to pbtain concession^ irom 
Viceroys or from the Mogul, and complaining bitterly of the 
price which had to be paid for them. The mo§t important 
of these was granted in by a firman of the Mogul 

Farokshir, who was cured of an alpmingf disease f .by Dr 
Hamilton ; the reward asked and obtained, as in the 
previous case of Boughton, being privileges for the Company 
in Bengal. The transaction incidentally gives a curious 
illustration of a powerful Viceroy’s evasion of the Imperial 
^decree. ^e Brjtji^h^were given permission to purchase- the 
1 zemin dari or lordship of a number of. towns in the Calcutta 
^Strict, but the Viceroy forbade the zemihdars tp 



During this pejiod, the Dutch fell more and more into Retrogres- 
the background. As Portugal had failed to maintain |i° n ?f the 
strength sufficient to meet the strain of a great Oceanic Dutc * 
Empire, so Holland also became exhausted by the perpetual 
struggle in Europe, first with Spain, then with France, en- 
hanced by the destructive naval conflicts with England, and 
sank to the position of a Power of the second rank ; while 
in India the French under a series of able organisers and 
administrators took the place of the Dutch as the leading 
competitor with GreatjBritain. 

• Tlie earliest efforts of the French were devoted to the The 
establishment of a station not in the Indies but on the route French 
thither. Before Colbert’s time, they had tried to secure a ^ omp 
position in Madagascar, which for some while continued to 
be th$ headqujrters of tfteir Eastern trade. There however, 
the situation was always precarious, owing to the climate, 
the animosity of the jiatives, and the difficulty offered for 
military movements by the nature of the country. Early 
in the eighteenth century, the station was transferred to 
tHe neighbouring JsJe*. of France and Bourbon, otherwise 
known*as th§ Mauritius ; from whence La Bourdonnais in 
1746 and Suffren In 1782 conducted the operations which 
for the time threatened to w T in for the French the superior 
position in Eastern waters. 

Xq India ijself, Colbert’s Company was first allowed to 
open a factory at ^urat; and a little later, when the English 
and French were w alliance againlt the Dutch, they made 
gpocfra footing ^>n the Coromandel or Caj^ngtic^ coast. The 
kingdom ®f Bijapur had not yet perished, and that district 
still formed a part of it. Francois Martin, left in charge of fran^oi* 
the Carnatic settlement, made friends with the Governor. ¥ arUn * 
Temporary difficulties had arisen in the way of investing the 
specie at his disposals merchandise, but a loan to the 
Native Governor, a man of honour, was safe and profitable. 

When circumstances made it desirable to call in the loan 
some years later, Martin being by that time established at 
Pondichery, it was found more convenient to the Governor 
and more advantageous to the French, that a grant of land 
should be made, ag an equivalent. It was consistently 


Martin’s policy to impress native rulers */ith the idea that 
the French were desirable and useful tenants ; and so suc- 
cessful was he that the fortification of Pondichery in 4 » 9 > 
instead of being looked on with jealousy, met with their 
favourable approval. A serious check to the rising and 
prosperous community occurred when it passed for a time 
into the hands of the Dutch. Martin returned to France, 
and when there succeeded in so impressing on the authorities 
the importance of the place, that its restoration was one of 
*,the stipulations in the treaty of Rysgyrick (1697^ Martin 
went back as Governor, and head of the whole of the 
French settlements in the East ; and from that time 
Pondichery continued to flourish. 

In 1688. the fa ctory of Chan day) agar on the Hugh was 
opened, but it was not till* Duple ix was se$t there %bout 
1730 that the Bengal trade was really develop^. In the 
meantime, Surat had been given up> altogether, with dis- 
credit, a heavy debt being left behind. The ill effects were 
LgQQjj-. successfully removed by Governor Lenoir of Pondichery; 
who, receiving unexpected supplies from France with a 
promise of more to follow, wisely considered the liquidation 
of the Surat debt as, indirectly, a better investment than the 
purchase of merchandise. French credit was so immensely 
enhanced by this transaction, that when fresh financial 
difficulties arose almost immediately afterwards,* Assistance 
which would otherwise certainly not have been forthcoming 
was freely and without hesitation rendered c by the wealthy 
Natives. In 1725 a new fortified pprt was secured tofi the 
^Malabar coast by the establishment of the French at Mahi, 
the name of which was changed to Mahe in honour of La 
Bourdonnais, who had it as one of his Christian names. 

Finally, the prestige of the French in the Carnatic was 
J raised to an unprecedented level by ‘the cool and far-sighted 
Dunyas, courage of Lenoir’s successor Dumas. He had cultivated 
the friendliest relations with the reigning Nawab (the 
lieutenant of the Nizam) and his kinsman. In 1739 the 
restless Bhonsla, the Maratha Raja of Nagpur, invaded the 
Carnatic. The Princes placed their wives and families 
under the protection of Dumas at JPondichery, and j^e 


accepted the change. The Maratha defeated the Nawab’s 
armies, and ordered Dumas to surrender the families on 
pain of Pondichery being demolished. Dumas showed his 
env$y over the place, and indicated that the Bhonsla might 
come and take the families if he could, but that Pondichery, 
their city of refuge, would be held against him to the last. 

The attitude of defiance was tempered by a polite present 
of sundry bottles of “cordial waters,” and the Marathas 
amicably retired. The Nizam was greatly impressed by the 
Frenchmans courage yid address, and he was rewarded by 
Imperial honours, and the official designation of a “Com- 
mander of five thousand.” 

This then, about 1741, was the position of the two rival The rival 
companies. T^he British had been in the field about twice 
is long as the french. Vhey h^ld important fortified settle- 
ments ; in the Carnatic at Madras, with the subsidiary fort 
of St David some hundred miles to the south : on the % 

Hugli at Calcutta or Fort William : on the west coast at 
Bombay : besides minor factories, as at Surat and Patna. 

TRe French, besides minor factories, had Pondichery in the 
Carnatic, Cha^darnagar on the Hugli, and Mahd on the west 
coast. The Dutch and Portuguese also had their establish- 
ments at Goa, Chinsura, Negapatam, and elsewhere: but 
they took no effective part in the struggle. 

Essentially, Jhe conditions were nearly the same for both. 

# Governors in India could follow Jheir own line, without 
waiting for the endorsement of Directors at home : but if 
the IM*ectors ultimately refused endorsement, the Indian 
Governor was liable to complete shipwreck. What Directors 
at home wanted was dividends ; they could be relied on to 
estimate Glory in pounds, shillings and pence. But there 
was an important •difference in their several relations to the 
f National ^Government a f home. The French Company was Relations 
a perpetual tax on the Exchequer: the English Company ojHhe 
paid money into it. Consequently there was a standing t0 
inducement to the British Government to support the their 
Company even at some risk. In France the inducement Govern- 
was to be deaf to the Company’s appeals. Consequently, ^ nts * 
though the Indian (governors of both might be equally 


; enterprising, the attitude at home was m$re antagonistic to 
. enterprise in France than in England. If by any accident 
the will to back the respective Companies should become 
equalised, the present strength of the two in India was fgirly 
equal, but the French had the advantage of the special 
prestige acquired by Dumas with .the Natives : so that a 
contest would turn on the comparative ability of the home- 
governments to throw their weight into the scale. As it was 
however, the favourable inclination of the British Govern- 
ment was the stronger, and events proved its paval pre- 
ponderance to be so complete as entirely to cancel aay 
advantage won by the temporary superiority of the French 
personnel upon Indian soil. 

G>nstitu- Finally we may observe the Constitution of the British 
£kro.of the Company, as bearing upon *ifie problems developed \$hen it 
CoVnoany became an actua ^ territorial Power. In India itself, the 
in India. Company’s possessions were divide^ between three inde- 
pendent Presidencies, in Bengal, Madras and Bombay. 
/ Each Presidency had its own Governor and Council, with 
its servants graded as senior and , junior Merchants, and 
Writers. The salaries of all were so low tha{, they„were in 
effect allowed to increase their incomes by unrestricted 
private trading. The governing bodies had jurisdiction 
within their own areas ; but whatever lands they held, they 
held as tenants of the Country Powers. They had authority 
to raise troops, of which they maintained’only a few hundreds 
until the practice of raising and training regiments of Sepoys 
was developed ; and their chief settlements were fortified ; 
but none of the Carnatic ports had adequate <, harbourage 
for shelter when the monsoons set in. n , 

Home con- The power however of , the authorities in Indict was 

stitution ofmpdified ^ that of the superior authorities at J^oijie. 
the E.I.C l^ e n twelve months was about the least time that could 
pass between the sending of a dispatch and the receipt of 
, the answer thereto, it was obvious that very much must be 

left to the judgment of the authority on the spot. Yet it 
was necessary to avoid steps which would involve a grave 
risk of censure, and no line of policy could be adopted 
whichjyould seriously subvert that laid down in instructions 



from home. Fiqplly, it was possible for collisions to occur 
between the two governing bodies in London — the Court 
of Proprietors, consisting of all who held five hundred pounds 
wojth of stock, to whom lay the final appeal, and the Court 
of Directors, elected from the Proprietors, in whose hands 
was the general management; to which possibility may be 
added that of Parliamentary pressure, whenever questions 
could* be raised as to tfie scope of the Company’s Charter, 
and the legitimacy of introducing modification therein. 



T^HE direct contest between French and British in India 
began in the fifth decade of the eighteenth centuiy. 
A hundred years before, all Hindostan — from the Indus to 
the Brahmaputra, from the Himalayas to the Nerbadda — 
had for some time acknowledged one sovereign. South of 
the Nerbadda, though the 'great kingdom Ahmetjnagar 
was in its last throes, Bijapur and Golconda still maintained 
independence. Between 1640 and 1700, for the most part 
in the long reign of Aurangzib, all three bowed to the yoke 
of the Mogul : but during the same period, Sivaji made his 
Marathas de facto lords over great* part of the Dekhan. 

Distribu- At the end of the next forty years, the Mogt^ was feigning 
t^ion of the at Delhi by permission of Nadir Shah the Persian : the 
Towers 0 g° vernor Oudh called himself the Mogul’s Wazir, but 
was independent ; the governor of Bengal and Behar was 
equally independent : the Marathas had extended their rule 
over so much of Hindostan as lay between the Chambal, 
the Jamna, and the Nerbadda ; as well as over parts of the 
Dekhan. Over the rest of the Dekhan *the Nizaa* held 
sway, with the barest pretence of acknowledging the over- 
lordship of Delhi, and having delegated his authority over 
the Carnatic to a loyal Nawab of his own choosing. 

- The Panjab was a hunting ground for Afghan invader : 
Rajputana, a collection of principalities where tfb strong 
hand ruled, and the chiefs had long unlearnt any but the 
most primitive arts of government. And upon the sea 
coast, or on a great estuary, here and there was a petty 
colony of European traders, French or British or Dutch; 
owning two or three forts and a few companies of drilled 
white men. 



During the lafgt century there was no respect in which Character 
India had progressed. In the Dekhan the rule of the Mogul 
governors was no whit better than that of the royal lines of men t since 
Bijppur and Golconda. The Marathas were as rapacious as Aurang- 
the Mussulman Lords, more blood-thirsty and restless, even zlb * 
less vexed with theories about the good of the governed. 

The Provincial Governors of the Empire were concerned in 
establishing their own power and independence. Before the 
disintegration set in, Aurangzib had deserted the comparatively 
liberal policy of his ^predecessors. In those years, every 
reproach that could be urged against the Mogul government 
became intensified ; and hjstory gives no sign that there w$s 
anywhere existing either the will or the capacity to reorganise 
order out of the growing chaos. 

Inynense progress ha3 been'Tnade under the wise sway of 
Akbar; but it had been his task to introduce order and 
system where they ha^ never yet prevailed, at the same time 
that he was establishing^ new dynasty. No great positive 
prosperity could therefore be reached. The way was made 
ready by him for hi* son and grandson, and it is only 
natural. that, by common consent, the most prosperous period 
of Hindostan was in the reign of Shah Jehan. When 
Aurangzib seated himself upon his father’s throne, there arrived 
at the court of the old Mogul a French Physician, Francois Francois 
Bernier, who # left to posterity sundry vivid descriptions of Bernier, 
men, manners, and* events in India as he saw them with keen 
observant eyes and an honest, intelligent brain. From him 
we xmy learn wlfat the Mogul Empire was capable of at its 
formal best — that is, when not under the control of that 
rare creation, a despot who was at once an idealist and a 
practical man — the best that could be provided except by 
art Akbar succeeding an Akbar ; the best that could be 
maintained even for a* short time, under any system of 
Oriental despotism. 

The earliest records of Greeks and Romans assume the European 
conception or idea of a State, a Body Politic ; a systematic 
relation between the grades of society ; a unity pervading 
each particular society and distinguishing it from others^ 

This conception permeates all the peoples of Europe, ff 


one State conquers another, the citizens |pf the conquered 
State sooner or later become citizens of the conquering one. 
The ruling and privileged classes always recognise that the 
State as a whole has claims upon their individual services, 
and that they have some sort of obligations towards the 
classes below them. The normal condition of affairs is an 
organised government which recognises and enforces in a 
general way the right to protection * of life and properfy, and 
it is the business of the sovereign power to ensure these 
things in some degree. There are in gvery State intervals of 
anarchy, when every man lives by the strength of his own 
arm and the wiliness of his own brain ; but these intervals 
are abnormal. Hence there is a general encouragement to 
industry : the private citizen can count, at least up to a 
certain point, on enjoying fhe frulTts of hi| labours, and 
profiting by his accumulations and thrift. The theory is that 
the State is organised for the comnjon benefit of all its 
constituent members, though some r may claim a larger share 
than others in that benefit. 

JJo.swcb 1° India, however, this idea of th# State was practicaMy 
non-existent. The object of Government w*is to .egtjagt 

EiSS^from the country the largest amount* of revenue for the 
governing members; and to maintain at disposal a mass of 
troops which could prevent rebellion, and extend dominion. 
Every monarch was constantly occupied either in making 

QdenSlwar on his neighbours, to exact tribute or capture their 
thrones, or in defending his own throne against foreign * 
aggressors or rebels within the borders. The Empire was 
parcelled out into Provinces of whose rulers two things were 
expected — that they would march troops in Jhe Mogul’s 
service, and that they would produce funds for the Mogul’s 
treasury. The Provinces were sub-divided into districts 
whose rulers owed a like responsibility to the Provincial 
Governors. Rules and regulations of procedure were laid 
down, on which was based the calculation of the amount 
which was required to be produced; but so long as that 
amount was forthcoming, the man at the top cared very 
little how far his subordinates kept to the rules in producing 
it The district officer saw that the local magnate provided 



as much as the Lsessment required, and as much more as 
he could see his way to extract The local magnate exacted 
of course from the populace as much as would satisfy the 
district officer : but there was practically no check on 
additional extortions; since there was no real means of 
appeal to a higher power, no court before which misrule 
could* be challenged. Industry became absurd, when the Defective 
possession of savings in any form was simply an incitement JjfEEe* 
to extortion ; justice was a mere travesty when its appointed 
administrators gave their awards in accordance with the size 
of the douceurs offered by the respective litigants. 

Good governors were of course to be found as well as bad, 
and the good governor would at any rate seek to appoint 
subordinates of comparatively &gh character ; but the system 
offered no security. A vigorous expression of public opinion 
and a high individual sense of public spirit might at times 
and in places counteract the strong temptations to venality 
and indifference; but public spirit was rare and public 
(jpinion was yoiceless. 

In Europe, public spirit is engendered by ideas of family Absenceof 
honour and 6y service traditions. " 

In the one case a certain standard is maintained because - in * 
by falling utterly below it a man loses social caste : in the 
other, it is maintained by esprit de corps . But India was the 
land of adv&iturars. Power was the reward of the daring 
swordsman or the crafty intriguerf whose antecedents were 
no Jjar to success. Many a governor had commenced his 
career as a slave. Such men had no traditions to live up 
to. They fought for their own hand, and when they acquired 
power, use& it for their own immediate gratification, knowing 
the uncertainty of the tenure under which they held it. 

The# keynote of tlje whole system is Instability. In Instability 
Europe, every reigning dynasty ruled in virtue” oT ctescent 
more or less direct from ancient princes : the Moguls in 
India dated no further back than the reign of our Henry 
VIIL The individual monarch secured himself on the 
throne usually at the cost of a war with one or another of 
his brothers, and possibly with his own father. He held it 
vith a consciousness that as soon as his sons were grown 


up, he might have to fight them for it in^turn. He lived 
of necessity in an atmosphere of suspicion. Jehangir 
intrigued against Akbar, Shah Jehan was in arms against 
Jehangir, Aurangzib deposed Shah Jehan; and his oWn 
latter days were a burden to him by reason of his perpetual 
suspicions of his own sons. Yet the circumstances, from 
the accession of Akbar to the death of Aurangzib a hundred 
and fifty years later, were extraordinarily favourable; in- 
asmuch as there were but four reigns covering the whole 
period ; and it might generally be sa<d that the longer $ 
monarch occupied the throne the firmer grew his seat. 

Position Still more uncertain was the position of the Omrahs, the 
Mussulman l° r( * s anc * officers. Their functions were not 
rnedan hereditary, but terminable pimply # at the royal pleasure. 

Nobility. Their possessions were granted as from the Mogul, 1 and 
might be renewed by him at will. It was only when the 
Empire was already breaking up tfyat 4 :hey began to found 
families. After the Mogul family, there was no Mussulman 
house of front rank in India whose rise was not subsequent 
to the death of Aurangzib, except that of Haidarabad : 
founded by the Nizam-ul-Mulk, himself a Oistinghished 
officer of Aurangzib, who established his family because he 
outlived his master by forty years. Had he died twenty or 
even ten years earlier, the Dekhan would have passed into 
other hands. In short, before the eighteenth, century no 
Mussulman House could* be said to exist. Akbar in his « 
boyhood had a great minister, Bairam; aryl Bairam’s son 
became one of his greatest generals ; but even tha't^was 

Insecurity Hereditary position did indeed belong to fTie Rajput 
ot pro- chiefs, who traced their genealogies to remote antiquity. 

*** y * There were even Mussulman prince^ as af Bhopal* whose 
dynasties were continuous; but in almost all cases, their 
power was local, limited, and maintained because it was so. 
The Rajas of Jodpur and Jeipur and Udaipur were usually 
prominent men, sometimes trusted officers of the Empire; 
but their dominions were all in the comparatively barren 
regions of Rajputana. Briefly, heredity in the possession of 
property applied with effect only to small estates, and did 


not serve as a ^protection against open appropriation or 
practical confiscation by higher powers, though it gave the 
chief or the village community a degree of protection as 
against neighbours of the same status : while the accumula- 
tion of personal wealth in the form of portable property 
merely provided a magnet attracting the greed of officials, 
who had achieved their own position mainly by making it 
worth the while of their superiors to appoint them. 

Under such conditions no very high pitch of prosperity Semblance 
could wall be attained. Wealth could only accumulate in 
fhe hands of the few nobles who had strength and wit to 
keep it by force. The Court was magnificent, beyond 
European parallel ; but there the splendour ended. There 
were glorious buildings at Delhi and Agra ; but apart from 
mosques and palaces, tliese citfes were constructed more as 
if intended to be temporary camps than anything else. The 
Moguls raised monumental structures, they made some great 
roads and canals. But* this had more to do with making 
things pleasant for themselves and their entourage , than with 
fhought for the public good. The works were constructed 
by the forced labour of the peasantry in the districts selected 
for Imperial residence. And it is to be remarked that 
wherever the Mogul was in person, there also was a 
large army, with innumerable camp-followers. As the great 
Court movec^ from spot to spot in its leisurely progresses, the 
populace was subjected to constant and heavy contributions. 

The emperors were in the habit of holding audiences for 
disj^nsing jusflee, and they enjoyed the role — which indeed 
they filled with credit — of “protectors of the poor” in a 
strictly personal capacity ; but one cadi or magistrate could 
accomplish more injustice in a day than the Mogul could 
remedy in a wetk. When the ordinary channels of the law 
were Hopelessly polluted, and no effort was made to cleanse 
them, the beneficent decisions in occasional cases were a very 
inefficient antidote. The high standard set by Akbar himself 
and the men he selected was not maintained even by his two 
immediate successors, as was testified by Sir Thomas Roe in 
Jehangir’s time, and by Bernier in the last days of Shah 
Jehan. \\ hen the ruler never hesitated to make away with 


any inconvenient person, human life was Cikely to be held 
cheap ; when he could transfer any subject's property to his 
own coffers without scandal, respect for the rights of others 
was not likely to prevail in less exalted ranks. * 

The The armies of the Moguls were counted in myriads ; but 
soldiery, they were in fact made up in great part of very ill -cji^cipline d 
jjjL&rQenaries. Their military value was gauged — and 0 over- 
rated — by Bernier, when he said that Condd or Turenne 
with twenty-five thousand Frenchmen could shatter the 
whole power of the Empire. The support of this vast 
number of troops, of whom an immense proportion wer£ 
mounted, was a constant drain on the resources of the 
country; and the soldiery supplemented their legitimate 
maintenance by forcible exactions. Matters became worse 
with the development of the* Maratha power, t whose hordes 
of light horsemen swept the country, stuffing their saddle- 
bags as they went, and claiming chautii from the rulers in 
addition to their other spoils. They surged northward up 
to the gates of Delhi and southward into the Carnatic : in 
self-defence, Calcutta had to construct *ihe famous “ Maratha 
ditch ” ; where they passed, rapine and pillage ftccompanied 
them. And finally, where there were hills, there were 
fortresses, and where there were fortresses there were 

Condition Oppression and lawlessness were not jnde^d carried to 
of the the point at which industry perishes altogether ; the same 
popula- sort 0 f protection was extended to the trading classes as 
Uon * was granted to Jews in Mediaeval Europe r ; they Wefe a 
convenience to their masters, as long as they could pay 
ransom. But enterprise has little chance under*such con- 
ditions; its rewards are insufficient save in the eyes of the 
few; and commerce was further hampered by the imposition 
o| , innumerable taxes, market dues, 'and tolls. The mass 
of the population attempted to do little more than to live 
from hand to mouth, with at the most an effort to collect 
and bury in some secret place enough to provide the cost 
of marrying a daughter. 

Such were the general results of Mohammedan or Maratha 
supremacy. TJjg&jpg. no : .induQsmenW to. JOTg*. except 


where a particular f Govemor happened to be endowed with 
a higher sense of duty, or a keener perception of the sources 
of wealth, than most of his compeers. There were such 
exertions, and so one district or another, one town or 
another, would flourish for a season; but there is small 
room to doubt that in respect of the prevalent conditions 
of life/ India at the tirje when the House of Hanover 
succeeded to the throne of Great Britain was five hundred 
yfjjtrs behind Europe: while she showed no sign of con- 
taining wifhin herself tlfe germs of redemption. 

As for the little European communities, they consisted The 
practically of exiles, many of whom never set foot again on European 
their native shores after they had once landed in India : or, mun "ities. 
if thev did so, found that* the habits they had contracted in 
the Isast were* not easily made compatible with Western 
social conditions. The extent to which they were cut off 
from European associates is not readily realised until we 
remember that a favourable voyage round the Cape rarely 
occupied much less than six months; and that something 
like a year and a half Actually elapsed between the time of 
Clives SailingVrom England, and his landing at Madras. 





{Map III ) 

A BOUT the time when Nadir Shah was sacking Delhi, The 
Robert Walpole m England was lamenting the violent 
outburst of public feeling which plunged the country into a contest 
struggle with Spain. % That Spanish war was in a way the 
beginning of the fierce coptest for dominion beyond the seas, 
which terminated after a complete triumph of the British in 
the Peace of 1763. Commercial rivalry with Spain in the 
South Seas, colonial rivalry with the French in North America, 
and commercial rivalry with the French in India, induced 
wars which by sea, or on the American continent, or in India, 
continued practically without an interval for twenty-four years 
and ended by giving Britain the complete dominion of the 
ocean, and e*pelliug the French as a Power from America 
and India alike. 1 

Wjign Walpo]^ went to war with Spain very much against Summary 
his own will, the presumption was strong that sooner or later of the 
France would throw her weight into the scale along with the stru £B le * 
siste r Bourbon Monarchy. A secret treaty for the aggrandise- 
ment of the Bourbon houses was in existence ; and it was the 
English minister^ firm conviction that the combined fleets of 
France and Spain would prove too strong for that of England. 

But war, declared against Spain in 1739, was not formally 
declared with France until 1744; in 1746 Great Britain was 
finally freed from the haunting spectre of civil strife which 
had vexed her statesmen ever since the expulsion of James 
II* t by the collapse of the last Jacobite rising; and when a 


general peace was concluded in 1748, .she had definitely 
succeeded in holding her own, though no settlement was 
reached of the questions which had been the ostensible 
causes of the conflagration. The struggle was renewed in 
1756, when the British under the guiding genius of the 
elder Pitt developed an overwhelming naval supremacy which 
paralysed the resistance of the French in lands whic£ could 
/r only receive reinforcements by sea.^ Had Britons and French 
in India been left to fight their quarrels out between them- 
selves, it is at least possible that French, not British, would 
have become the arbiters of India. But they were not left 
to themselves; their battles were fought at Quiberon and 
‘Quebec as well as at Trichinopoli and Wandewash; and 
afterwards France was never able to place a rival armament 
in India. • 

Prospects At the time, however, when the challenge was planned, 
of the t h e chances of the issue were extrcvnely doubtful. Had 
s rugg e. p rance p ursue d in the first war, o. had Pitt failed to pursue 
' in the second, a vigorous naval policy, the position of affairs 
might very possibly have been reversed. As it turned dut 
it is hardly too much to say that the British entered upon 
the inheritance which Dupleix prepared, 
at Dupleix had been for some years at Chandernagar on 
cherv t ^ ie when he was appointed to the leading post of 

Governor of Pondichery in succession to Dunjas. There he 
arrived in 1^41. About the time when he was leaving 
Bengal, Ali Vardi Khan' previously Governor of Behar, had 
intrigued himself into the position of Nawab of Beha* and 
Bengal. In the Carnatic Dupleix found a new Nawab, 
Anwar-ud-dm, only just appointed by the to the 

exclusion of a family which had held the office for thirty 
years. A year or two earlier, Nadir Shah had sacked the 
home of the Padishah himself. The instability of Oriental 
dynasties, in short, had only just been emphatically and 
variously illustrated, and the already immense age of the 
Nizam pointed to a prospect of its further illustration in the 
immediate future. 

The Hence two ideas presented themselves to the mind of 
*Dupleix. dupleix in close association. If the Europeans gave their 



minds to doing it j they could make themselves the deter- 
mining factor in the rivalries of natives ; if the French got 
rid of the English they could secure that position for them- 
selvqg, and if they worked skilfully for that position they 
would be able to get rid of the English. Further, although 
in the field Dupleix was not adapted for soldiering, he had an 
intelligent perception of sundry military principles whereby 
he forniulated the law thay the kind of discipline prevailing in 
the levies of native princes was of very little value against 
the kind <pf discipline which prevails among the most in- 
adequate European troops, while the European discipline 
could be imparted to native troops by European officers. 

In i j44 France and Great Britain went to war; but the Check to 
French ana British East India Companies' Directors at home 
were jinking about dividends, not politics, and instructed Carnatic, 
their officials in*India to maintain friendly relations. Their 
officials in India saw patters in a different light. Governor . u 
Morse at Madras, and Governor Dupleix at Pondichery, each 
meant to use the opportunity for a blow at his commercial 
rivals. Dupleix, however, had laid his plans: Morse had 
not. Xhe British at the outset found their intention of 
marching on Pondichery frustrated by a warning from the 
Nawab that they would move at their peril : nor had it 
occurred to any one that such a threat could possibly be 
defied. Dupleix had taken time by the forelock, and secured 
the condescending protection of Anwar-ud-din till he himself 
should be ready to strike. 7 

Th&p however* was a merely precautionary move. At La Bour* 
that time, tl>e islands of the Mauritius were a French Naval donna,s * 
station. The Commander there was La Bourdonnais, a man , >t 
of great ability and energy. Dupleix had been for some time 
in*communicationwith him, when an English squadron under 
Peyton appeared before Pondichery, prepared to ignore — 
from the sea — the Nawab’s prohibition of hostilities. But 
Peyton had hardly arrived when La Bourdonnais also came 
on the scene of action with ships and troops. Peyton found 
himself obliged to withdraw. La Bourdonnais sailed for 
Madras; the Governor made a vain appeal to the Nawab 
for the protection previously extended to the French ; there 


He was no force in the place to resist La pourdonnais, and in 
captures September 174$, after a short bombardment, Ma dras sur - 
ras ‘ rendere d* The Admiral had promised that the to^sSould 
Se restored on payment of a ransom ; but Dupleix repudi- 
ated the terms, declaring that La Bourdonnais had acted 
without authority. There was a hot altercation, but Dupleix 
was in the stronger position : and La Bourdonnais’s ships 
were not in a condition to await (the approaching nSonsoon. 
He had to withdraw, leaving som^ troops, to the Mauritius — 
whence he was almost immediately recalled, to^be thrown 
into prison by way of encouragement — and Dupleix took 
possession of Madras, explaining to the Nawab that this 
was merely a preliminary to handing it over to him. 

It was not long, however, before Anwar-ud-din came to 
the conclusion that the presumptuous Frenchman 0 meant 
to keep Madras himself ; whereupon he 'sent his son at 
the head of some ten thousand mep to compel obedience. 
Dupleix Then Dupleix put his theory to the test. The garrison, 
defeats the numbering not more than five hundred men, sallied out 
forces? against the Nawab’s troops, and routed them. Reinfoi£e- 
ments, consisting of two hundred and thirty Europeans, 
and seven hundred sepoys — natives drilled on the European 
model, and under European officers — were on their way 
to Madras, and again scattered the native levies. Quite* : 
suddenly it was revealed that odds of twenty to one were' 
by no means sufficient to ensure victory against Europeans 
and sepoys in combination. 

Defence of Madras had fallen, and its English occupants ha$ been 
paraded through Pondichery as prisoners of war, but Fort 
v,d * St David, a hundred miles to the south, was standing. 
Two attempts to capture it were, however, repelled, and the 
appearance of a small British squadron under Griffin sufficed 
to check active hostilities without* enabling the British to 
assume the offensive. In June of the following year (1748) 
the attack on Fort St David was vigorously renewed, but 
triumphantly repelled by Major Stringer Lawrence who had 
recently taken over the command. In August a^con siderable 
fleet from England commanded by Boscawen appeared off 
Pondichery, and the f renc h port was tiealeged. The siege 



was very ill mana^fed, and the defence brilliantly conducted. Defence 
After fifty days, Boscawen was obliged to withdraw by the of Pondi- 
approach of the monsoon — for the harbourage on the c ery * 
Coromandel coast was quite inadequate under these con- 
ditions. T he ra ising of the siege was a triumph for the 
FrencJ^^ whose military "prestige was now incomparably 
mgher f than that of their rivals and their interest at the 
Nawab’s court proportionately stronger: and the news of 
the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle prevented the return of Peace of 
Boscawen* when the n»onsoons should be over. Chapelle, 

*One result of the treaty however, was not to Dupleix’s a nd re- 
taste. In the course of the war, the British in America storation 
had taken Louisburg on the St Lawrence from the French: 
and Dup lex h ad to gi^ up Madras, in India in return 
for the restoration of Louisburg in Canada. 

There was peace between France and England, and the 
two Companies were ho longer at liberty to make war on 
each other; both however, were bent on carrying on the 
struggle, and a means of doing so was promptly discovered. 

Bdt while the British Waited upon fortune, Dupleix created 
his own^Jpporturiity. t A 

n Anwar-ud-din had been, as we have observed, appointed ^^ ants 
Nawab of the Carnatic by the Nizam in 1740 : displacing a f 0 y l ^ n 
family which, in the person of Sadutulla, had begun to rule Nawab- 
in 1710. Sadutulla had been succeeded in 1732 by his skip. 

# nephew Dost Ali ; both had be^n good and popular 
governors and the Nizam had not found it convenient ’: 
to infbffere. A* few years later, the Marathas raided the 
Carnatic in force : Dost Ali was killed. His son, Safdar Ali, 
in turn wa* proclaimed Nawab. He had two brothers-in- 
law : one Charida^§^,hib r who was able, popular, and bore a 
very high cKaractSr. With the connivance of Safdar Ali, who 
feared Cftanda Sahib as a*possible rival, the Marathas attacked 
and captured the latter and carried him off to Satara, where 
they held him to ransom. He however, in anticipation of 
disturbed times, had already placed his family in charge of 
Dumas at Pondichery ; a confidence of which, as we have 
seen, the Governor had shown himself thoroughly worthy. 

Then Safdar Ali had jpeen assassinated by the other brother- 


in-law ; the Nizam had considered it time^to interfere with a 
strong hand; Anwar-ud-din was appointed Governor, and 
Guardian of Safdar All’s young son, and on the boy’s death 
shortly after was formally made Nawab, • 

Thus, when the war between French and English formally 
Dupleix terminated in 1748, Chanda Sahib represented the family of 
Chanda S^utulla, which had during its power endeared itself* to the 
Sahib, population. He himself was deservidly a favourite with them : 
but he was a prisoner at Satara. Anwar-ud-din was an old 
and fairly capable soldier, but was del iked both fiersonally 
and as a supplanter of the popular house. Chanda Sahib 
was bound by strong ties to the French. Dupleix con- 
ceived the idea of obtaining the release of Chanda Sahib 
andf establishing him on the throqc of the Carnatic : and 
as the first step, provided a^ ransom sufficient to satisfy the 

King-making in the Carnatic was ^he scheme by which 
Dupleix intended to accomplish his purposes ; but circum- 
Rival stances enlarged the scope of his operations. Just at this 
C * ai to^the t * me ^ zam Asaf J a ^ bimseff died ; whereupon tfie 

Nizam- succession was immediately seized by his sort Jang, 

ship, and claimed by a grandson Muzaflfar jang : who affirmed that 
the Mogul himself had made the appointment It was 
natural that the two claimants, Muzaffer Jang, and Chanda 
Sahib, should make common cause against the de facto 
Nizam, and Nawab, whi\^ Dupleix could support them under 
colour of loyalty to the Imperial Power. Muzaffar Jang 
and Chanda Sahib marched into the Carnatic, accorftjSanied 
by a contingent of French and Sepoys under the able French 
general Pussy. Anwar : ud-din was defeated af*d slaioat 
Ambur (July J while his son Mohammed Ali escaped 
to Trichinopoli : Bussy and his contingenf having rendered 
invaluable service in the fight. f f 

Blunders Meantime the British had been wasting their energies in 
J* Jhe a futile and aimless attempt to restore the incompetent ex- 
1 Raja of the little Maratha principality of Tanjur, in the 
place of his brother the reigning Raja. The attempt failed, 
and the Company gained nothing but the cession of the 
fort of Devikota. Nor could they ris^ to the occasion when 



the successful iribve of Dupleix ought to have opened their 
eyes to the necessity for prompt and energetic action. They 
allowed the fleet and most of the land forces to depart for 
England ; and, in response to Mohammed Alt's appeal for 
their assistance sent him a hundred and twenty men. 

Dupleix saw that the course for his candidates for office 
to fellow was the immediate and complete suppression of 
Mohammed Ali; whiclf would then enable them to con- 
centrate against Nasir Jang. But Chanda Sahib wasted 
time ins a prolonged attack on Tanjur: so that before he 
Irould move on Trichinopoli, Nadir Jang had himself ap- 
peared in the Carnatic with a vast army, joined by a British 
contingent from Madras under Major Lawrence. As the 
result of an engagement, Ij^uzaffar Jang fell into his uneje’s 
hands and Chanda Sahib had fo fall back on Pondichery. 

The resourceful Frenchman however, at once opened Triumph 
negotiations with N&ir Jang, in the course of which he dis- . . , 
covered that several of*the chiefs were ill-affected towards schemes* 
him. With them he immediately began to intrigue; and 
Vhile Nasir Jang la^idle at Arcot, made a dash at Masuli- 
patan^hicli was captured, attacked Mohammed Ali and put 
him to flight, and seized the strong fort of Jinji. Nasir Jang 
was now disposed to revert to Dupleix's terms, which in- 
volved the liberation of Muzaffar Jang and the recognition of 
Chanda SahjJ) as Nawab of the Carnatic : but an engagement 
was brought on f>y the French f§rce marching from Jinji, 
which was unaware that the treaty had been actually ratified: 

Jang vftks assassinated on the field of battle: and 
^uzaff^r Jang was again hailed as Nizam. 

This took place in December 1749. The result was that 
Dupleix’s candidates now appeared to be completely masters 
p? the .Bekhan and the Carnatic, and he himself received the 
official® Nawabship frotn the Mogul. Nor was the position 
materially affected by tjj jp death of Muzaffar J a ng in Jam 
1750 in a skirmish with rebels on his way back to Haidara- 
bad : for Bussy, who was with him, secured the succession to 
his own nominee, Salaba t Ja ng, whom he accompanied to the 

With his instinctive appreciation of the effects of display 


on Oriental minds, Dupleix set up a pilllr near the spot 
where Nadir Jang fell recording his own glories, and named 
the place DupleixTfttehabad — the city of the Victory of 
Dupleix. • 

The turn Mohammed Ali however, was again holding Trichinopoli, 
of the tide. an< j Chanda Sahib marched against him early in 1751. But 
the, tide of Dupleix’s success had now reached it?, highest 
point. V 

A new Governor, Mr Saunders, had recently arrived at 
Madras, who was alive to the immense need of tigorous 
counteraction to the French. He dispatched reinforce-* 
ments to the force at Trichinopoli; but, what was of more 
importance, he gave an independent command to Robert 


I r 

ihe founder of our Indian Empire was now ^n his twaaty- 
sixth year. He had arrived at Madras in the capacity of a 
“writer” — ue. a junior clerk in the empflby of the East India 
Company — at the age of nineteen.* At the first outbreak 
of hostilities, he had volunteered ; when Madras fell, he 
escaped to Fort St David, in the defense of which, as well atf 
in the operations against Tanjur, he had shown •eonsyfeuous 
bravery and coolness ; and was allowed to change his 
writership for a commission in the Company’s service. Now 
his opportunity had come. He pointed out to Saunders that 
a direct relief of Trichinopoli would be vain, but that a 
diversio n might be cflfectq j by, a biowjtf Arcot, the Nawab’s 
capital. Desperately audacious as the scheme was, Saunders 
resolved to take the risk. With eight officers, only tVrf> of 
Capture of whom had been in action before, two hundred British 
Arcot * soldiers, and three hundred Sepoys, Clive started on his 
perilous expedition. So suddenly was the blow conceived, 
so swiftly executed, that on his arrival at An:ot the garrison 
was seized with panic and evacuated the fort witlSout a 

The young commander made instant preparations to stand 
a siege. The fugitive garrison, far more numerous than his 
own little force, rallied and encamped close by. Clive again 
surprised them in a night attack, slew large numbers of them, 
and withdrew without loss* 


perfectly , Chanda Sahib Defence c 

at Tricninopoli immediately divided his forces, (thereby Arcot * 
affording considerable relief to the beleaguered troops), in 
older to send four thousand of them to recover Arcot* 

These with other detachments collected by the way — in- 
cluding a small body of French from Pondichery — formed 
$n jpvesting array, of ten thousand men: with Chanda 
SahiPs son Raja Sahifc# in command. For fifty days, Clive 
with his little force, already much reduced, held the feeble 
fortifiaftions of Ar#ot. The fame of the bold defence 
^spread : the native chiefs began to revise their estimates of 
British enterprise and valour, hitherto painfully low. The 
sepoys in the little garrison shewed their devotion by offer- 
ing to live on the wafcer used for boiling the rice in order 
that the graip might be reserved for the Europeans. Raja 
Sahib, fearing that relief might come, resolved to storm the 
place: but Clive &as ready. The desperate valour and 
activity of the besieged completely foiled the besiegers 
after a hot contest. The siege was raised and Raja 
^ghib retired. Clivt? sallied forth and again defeated him 
at Ami, afcd yet # again, having been at last joined by 
considerable reinforcements and by a band of Marathas, 
at Kaveripak : presently thereafter razing Dupleix-Fatehabad 
to the ground. 

The defence of Arcot (1751) was the turn of the tide. 

The prestige which had hitherto# accompanied the French 
arms was now matched if not excelled by that of the British. 

A iffeV and brTlliant leader had suddenly come to the front, 
and Stringer Lawrence was just returned to the scene of 
action. Che very able French commander, Bussy, was at 
Haidaradad; in the Carnatic, Law of Laureston (of an 
exiled Scottish* house) — an admirable subordinate but an 
incapstble chief — was with Chanda Sahib's forces. 

Lawrence and Clive proceeded against the investing army 
before Trichinopoli, where Mohammed Ali had purchased by 
promises a very unsubstantial assistance from Morari Rao, French 
the Maratha chief of Guti, and from the Raja — or rather the surrender 
regent — of Mysore. : Law with his * 

army and Chanda Si^iib’s were manoeuvered into an impossible ™ * 


position, and compelled to surrender ; an<! Chanda Sahib 
himself was murdered. If Bussy had secured the Nizam, 
Mohammed Ali, the British prot^g£, was at any rate Naw qb 
of the CayjSK (June y£2). f 

Super- pupleTx However, Continued to display an astonishingly 
a ^ 8ion .°^ resourceful activity in carrying oh the contest: por wasit 
up eix. |p^y t h e British, but they of his own households that 
destroyed him. His imperial scheme ^awakened no responsive 
andour in the breasts of directors at home ; but for his 
ej^imous personal outlay in giving thdm effect, the$> wouM 
h#ve broken down long before for want of financial support. 
The French East India Company resolved to supersede the 
too enterprising Governor, who returned home in 1754 to 
meet with nothing but insult £nd spoliation ; leaving a safe 
commercial gentleman in charge at Pondichery#* Both Clive 
and Lawrence returned to England. The two Companies 
agreed to interfere no more with native politics. Despite 
these amicable arrangements, the declaration of war between 
Britain and France in 1756 caused the renewal of active 
hostil ities in India in 1 2 S ^ : and in fhe meantim^various 
events had taken place which were not without Ihfluerfte on 
the course of the last struggle. 

Bussy at S^labat Jang, the last Nizam placed on the throne by the 
** ai< bad tUm ^fortune’s wheel, had retired to Haidarabad in the spring 
'of 1751, and Bussy had gone with him. # Th* succession 
was of course disputed by%a brother, who bribed the Peshwa 
(now definitely supreme in the Maratha confederacy) and the 
Bhonsla to attack the Nizam ; but Bussy’s military skfllf his 
troops, and his artillery, played havoc with the invaders, who 
were finally conciliated by a cession of territory?* Shortly 
afterwards, a similar ce^ion— that of the N orthem Sar kar£ 
or Circars, a large and rich district — was "made* to Bussy 
himself for the maintenance of his '‘forces. In 17^5, the 
Nizam made an expedition to the south against Morari Rao 
and the Mysore Raja, in which Bussy again illustrated the 
invincible superiority of European methods in the field. 
Attempts were made to upset his influence, but they were 
foiled, and in 1757 he was still supreme at Haidarabad. But 
in 1757, Clive also was back in India;, not in Madras, but 


occupied with th# conquest of Bengal, which placed new and 
immense resources in the hands of the British Company. 

It was generally understood in 1756 that war was soon to Renewal 
be* expected in Europe, and the attitude the Companies 
would adopt towards each other in India was uncertain. 

Clive, returning to India after a visit to England where he 
had Ijeen very warmly received, intended himself and was 
intended by the Director# in London, to take active measures 
for counteracting Jlussy at Haidarabad ; but found himself 
precluded from so doing by the convention between the 
Governors in the Carnatic. Having first, with the aid of 
Admiral Watson, suppressed a piratical chief named Angria, 
at Geriah on the west coast, he was at the end of the year 
dispatched to Bengal ^n account of the proceedings of the 
Nav&b of tlgit province. ilhring previous disturbances, 
Calcutta and Chandernagar had abstained from hostilities, 
but on the news arriving (1757) that war had been declared, 

Clive at once seized the French settlement. Bussy was 
not disposed to weaken his grip on Haidarabad in order 
fo contest the position in Bengal : and hostilities in the 
south^Snly ^reached an acute stage with the arrival of 

The chances of the French in India depended on two The last 
things — persistence in the policy of Dupleix, and support P hase * 
from France g>n a scale equal to that given to the British by 
the hpmq authorities. But Lally *vas ordered to leave the 
native courts alone, confining himself to direct contest with . 
thefftitish; wlfile the inauguration of Pitt’s aggressive naval , 
policy very soon ensured full occupation in the West, for any ' 
ships thatecould make their way out of French ports ; France 
was not willing, and lacked the power if she had been willing, 
to do more thaif let the forces actually in India win if they 
could. • The opposed fbrces on the spot at the beginning of 
1858 were not unequal; but tj^l&g&ch were 4gbting„i» 
i solation , foe jt ptis h , with . . jJ Wgt . »n^ited . TSgm&.tom 
Eng^S , to bring up if required ; and time after time the 
French operations were baffled by the appearance of an 
unopposed British squadron. 

L&Uy arrived in^India at the end of April 1758. An Lally. 


irishman, born in exile, the son of one \)f the valiant de* 
fenders of Limerick, he had served brilliantly in the armies 
of France. But his valour in the field was counterbalanced 
by a disposition so overbearing and tactless that his officers 
could hardly keep on terms with him. Many of them were 
in a habitual state of practical if not technical mutiny, and 
the Natives were enraged by his total disregard for th% senti- 
ments prejudices and principles wl^ich were a part of their 
being. The labour and the supplies readily provided for the 
diplomatic Dupleix were grudgingly a$d with every* possible 
evasion and delay extracted by Lally. * 

Yet he began successfully enough with an attack on Fprt 
St, David ; which should have been able to hold out in- 
definitely, but surrendered within a month. He could not 
however, get money from th 5 civil authorities ^.t Pondichery ; 
so attempted to acquire the sinews of war by compelling the 
Raja of Tanjur to pay moneys due. ' The Raja resisted ; 
Lally was on the verge of capturing ‘the town and burning his 
last cartridge in doing so, when a British squadron appeared 
Frustra- off Karikal, at the time Tally's military base. He had tb 
tion of leave Tanjur, and hurry back to Pondichery, whiled' Ach^, 
plans! * n comman d of the French squadron with which he had 
arrived, declined to do battle with the British and withdrew 
to the Mauritius. 

Lally now summoned Bussy and the troops t from Haidar- 
aba 3 and the Sarkars to^his assistance. ' Bussy obeyed the 
order, and his obedience destroyed the last chance of carry- 
ing out the Dupleix policy. Lally laid seigb to Madras in 
December ; but there was a sufficient garrison, with Lawrence 
in command. After two months siege, Lally was» ; about to 
storm ; when once more a British squadron appeared on the 
scenes, a panic seized Lally’s troops, and he was obliged tb 
retire precipitately to Pondichery, leafring many of hte guns 
behind. (Feb. 1759). 

In this year, Lally paid the penalty for withdrawing Jh|s$y 
fjpm . Haidarabad, and the officers and troops from the 
Sarkars. To them he might have looked for the supplies 
and the money which were not forthcoming in the Carnatic. 
Bussy’s influence with the Nizam amounted to very little 



when the great sofdier and his forces were at a distance and Capture of 
in a subordinate position : the Sarkars, instead of feeding the 
French, fell a prey to their opponents. The immense value Iforde. * 
of that district was apparent to Clive at Calcutta; and in 
spite of his seemingly precarious position there, he dispatched 
Colonel JForde, in the autumn of 1758, with every available 
soKfieif on an expedition against Masulipatam ; trusting to 
his own prestige, and liis own unmatched audacity and 
resourcefulness, to maintain his position in Bengal. Forde 
conductefl his operations with brilliant success, and though 
tfie Nizam at last moved in support of the French, Masuli- 
patam was taken in April before he arrived. Consequently 
the Nizam, instead of attempting force, transferred his 
alliance to the British a^d made over formally to them the 
territories prevjpusly granted to fiussy. 

Meantime Lally, with troops ragged, half-starved, and more 
than half-mutinous, w 5 s quite unable to operate effectively in 
the Carnatic. Here towards the close of the year, the 
command of the British was taken up by Colonel Eyre Eyre 
Coote, a brilliant officer sent down from Bengal by Clive, Coote. 
who had recognised his abilities at Plassey. Coote recovered 
Wag^w^b, which had been occupied by the French. 

Laily’s attempt to recapture it resulted in the battle of 
V£and$W3&h (Jan. 21, 1760) which was practically decisive. Wande- 
Coote had under his command rather less, Lally rather more, wa *h. 
than 2000 Europeans. There was also a much larger body 
of Sepoys and Marathas present, but these took practically 
no pfrt in the Engagement. The fight was well contested 
but t^e British victory was complete. Bussy himself was 
among the«prisouers. One after the other, the French posts 
fell into the hands of their rivals. Pondichery itself was 
invested in OctcAer, and surrendered* m January (1761); 
and altHbugh t he tra ding stations were restored to the French 
as trading stations when the Peace of Paris was concluded in 
12^3, they were dismantled and made permanently useless 
fpr military purposes. Twenty years later, in the hour of 
Britain’s worst peril, it seemed for a moment possible that a 
blow might be struck for France; twenty years after that 
again the shadow of Napoleon vexed the souls of Indian 


statesmen; but the question whether trance or Britain 
ishould dominate India ceased in actual fact to be a question 
from the hour of Lally’s final failure. 

Fate of For Lally himself, with his valour, his arrogance, and his 
great talents, France reserved a fate appropriate to the 
successor of La Bourdonnais and Dupleix. Slandered by 
his own countrymen, he returned to Paris, to be fluhg into 
the Bastille, and later executed \rith extreme ignominy : a 
doom more shameful to France than even that of Admiral 
Byng to England, ten years before.* 


Scale: I Inch - 140 Miles I ORISSA 



‘ \Map IV) 

HTHE wars in which the British were engaged in Southern Different 
1 India, for fifteen years, frorn^i^ to 1761, were “ h a ‘"' n “ st 
directly # or indirectly wagetk agains^ a rival European Power, in Bengal. 
Neither British n»r French had levied war directly upon any 
Native State ; in form tljey had only lent their help to one or! 
another of rival factions within a State, where the legitimate? 
sovereignty was in dispute. The primary purpose was the' 
supj^gsion of a commercial rival: the secondary purpose, 
influence at Native Courts. 

In Bengal, however, the situation from the outset was 
quite different. The commercial rivalry of French and 
British settlements was but an accident in a greater conflict. 

The British as a grievously insulted Power attacked the 
Power which hsfci incited them, overthrew it in the field, 
and found themselves with no alternative — even had 
they desjred one— to the substitution of their own effective 
dominiom/or that which they had demolished. We have 
noted already how/gubstantially their conquest aided them in 
the last pha.<& of the struggle in the Carnatic : yet in itself it 
was mot' part of that struggle, but was the first positive step in 
thed^ctipn not of influence but of dominion. 

Between the time of # Nadir Shah's invasion and the Position of 
collision between the Bengal Court and the British, the 
position of affairs in Hindostan had not materially altered 
except for an increased definiteness in the independence of 
the provinces. The Maratha chiefs who supported the 
Feshwa had inarched up to the banks of the Jamna. The 
Berar Raja, otherwise known as the Bhonsla, had penetrated 



Oudh and Bengal and threatened Calcutta. The assassina- 
tion of Nadir Shah had enabled ^hmed Khan, chief of the 
Abdali tribe of Afghans, to become Ahmed. Shah the king .of 
KabuL and, in virtue of incursions which led to anothef sack- 
ing of Delhi, more or less the acknowledged lord of the 
Panjab and Sirhind. Safdat Ali, Wazir and Nawab of Oudh, 
had dropped the functions of Wazir and confined hi! energies 
to securing the practical independence of his province. Ali 
Vardi Khan had made himself Nawab of Bengal and Behar, 
and come to terms with his dangeroui neighbour of Berar. JSTo 
one in Hindostan attached political significance to the British 
and French factories at Calcutta and Chanderhagar ; even the 
startling developments of 1 747-1 751, amounting in the 
Bekhan to a revelation ^nd a revolution, had hardly been 
recognised in their. Jfull importance when eAli Varcfi Khan 
died in 1756, and was succeeded by # his youthful grandson, 
the incapable and unspeakable Surai-ud : daulah. 

The Fort William, the British settlement in’ Calcutta, was in 
Calcutta 1 8 “W rfarl y incompetent hands. In spite of repeated gaid 
' pressing advices from the Directors*m London, the Governor, 
Drake, had completely neglected the defences of the fort, and 
even in immediate anticipation of a Franco-British War made 
only the most elementary provision for contingencies ; doubt- 
less reckoning that Fort William and Chandernagar would 
keep the peace between themselves as they toad done before. 
Stiraj*ud- Suraj-ud-daulah had a singularly keen scent for treasurer 
daulah. The breath was hardly out of his grandfather’s body # when he 
sent from Murshidabad to Calcutta to demand the person 
and the property of a wealthy Hindu recently arrived there ; 
following this up by an order to demolish the fortifications. 
By way of reply to a remonstrance, the Nawab commanded 
his army to march on Calcutta. Drak% and the military 
commandant stole out in boats to the British ships on the 
Hugii ; the ships dropped down the river and left the factory 
to its fate ; after a brief but hopeless resistance, Fort Wi lliam 
The Black wag captu red qij July 2 1 , 1756. Then ensued the"ghastiy 
Hole, tragedy^ 1 off the Black Hole. The prisoners — a hundred and 
forty-six of them — were thrust into a room where they had 
about two square feet apiece for standing-room, ahd nothing 


but a small grating •to let in air. It was in Calcutta and 
it was midsummer. When the survivors were allowed to 
stagger out in the morning there were one hundred and 
twentjfrthree corpses in the chamber. 

Early in August the hideous story reached Madras. Two 
months later Clive and Admiral Watson, fresh from destroy- 
ing the prate Angria, sailed for Bengal to exact restitution 
and reparation from the Nawab : on December 15 they 
came with their ten ships to Fulta on the Hugli, where 
Drake was dying. The fcrt of Baj-Baj was promptly cap- The 
tureti ; on Jan. 2 the avengers were in Fort William. 

A week later the fort of Hugli was taken. The Nawab's 
troops scattered before them. Within a month the Nawab 
had collected his forces, marched on Calcutta, suffered con- 
siderably from an assault conduc&cTby Clive (which was 
deprived of its full effect and almost converted into a disaster 
by the rising of a fog), fled back to Murshidabad, and con- 
cluded a treaty of restitution and compensation. 

Now Suraj-ud-daulah had been possessed with a conviction Intrigue* 
that* the Europeans were* to be utterly despised ; in the 

course of these* two months that opinion had been rudely — L — 

shattered ; consequently, while he publicly cringed to Clive, 
privately he began* to entreat for assistance from theFrench 
at Chandernagar a nd in IKe Sarkars. A combined movement 
against the finti^i in Bengal might have very serious results ; 
ajid the official news that war had broken out between France 
and Britain decided Clive and Watson to strike at Chander- 
nagar fqr|h with. Iff spite of the remonstrances of the Nawab, 
they ptoceeded against the French settlement, capturing it 
after a gallant resistance, and securing some five hundred 
prisoners (March 23). If Bussy in the Sarkars had been 
doubtful before whether to listen to Suraj-ud-daulah, this 
success settled the question. There could be no co-opera- 
tion from Chandernagar, and his troops would be of more 
use in the Dekhan. 

To decide on the course next to be followed was no easy T be 
matter. There were urgent reasons for withdrawing from 
Bengal and concentrating troops in the Dekhan for the d * ,emro ** 
coming struggle. But to do so would involve leaving the 


British settlement again in the hands ofihe incapable Drake, 
and at the mercy of the Nawab, whose promises depended 
for their value entirely on the presence of fear, while he 
was very indignant at the disregard of his authorityrshewn 
in the attack on Chandernagar. How was he to be muzzled, 
so as to make the desired withdrawal of troops possible ? 

The practical answer was given by the Nawab’s own 
ministers. A monarch so bloodthirsty, so capricious, and 
so greedy, made every man’s life uncertain. His commander- 
Conspinwy Jn-chief and his chief financial advisee, conceived 

Sura^ud* ^ea of deposing him and placing Mir Jafar on **the 
dftuiah. throne with British assistance. Communications were 
/opened between the conspirators and the British through 
the agency of the Hindu Amin^ Chand, popularly known 
as Opiichund. It is commonly believed that European 
diplomacy consists largely of skilful lying ; Oriental diplomacy 
may be said to discard truth ahogether. The general 
principle which has guided thra British in dealing with 
Orientals is that of being absolutely straightforward, standing 
fast by every pledge, and securing confidence by fords of 
frankness. The only alternative course is* to accept not 
the European but the Oriental standard, and act down to 
it On this one occasion Clive adopted the latter course, 
ft is not impossible to find excuse for the theory of meeting 
guile with guile and treachery with falsehood ; but morally 
it cannot be justified, and its expediency is more than 
doubtful in the long run. Sometimes, however, it is a policy 
which succeeds. * 4 t 

The Red It succeeded now. In the early stages oU the intrigue, 
*TV«itie& on ty so ^ ar into play that the British maintained 
rea es. correspondence with the Nawab an air of unsuspect- 

mg friendliness, whilejhey were as a matter of fact arranging 
with his courtiers for his overthrow. The huge act of 
deception was perpetrated in dealing with Onjjchund. 
When the crafty Hindu had all the threads of tbe plot in 
his hands — when it was in his power to shatter the whole 
scheme by a word to Suraj-ud-daulah — h*£ suddenly put 
fon^aid the most ^ravagapt demands jw ifeepriijeof silence, 
tibjdr embo^imept in tb$ , treaty^ up 


tjplween the British and Mir Jafar, To refuse meant ruin : 
to submit to so vast a levy of blackmail — considerably over 
a quarter of a million sterling — seemed preposterous. The 
Calcutta Council accepted Clive's method of solution. Twjj 
c opies otthe treaty were made, pn&of which, written 09 
red ^.per, contained Omichund’s clauses: the other copy 
gmitteithem. The red treaty only, signed by the members 
of Council, was shown to the Bengali who did not know 
that one signature, that of Admiral Watson, had been de- 
liberately forged on his^refusal to set his hand to the fraud. 

The other parties to the contract signed the White Treaty 
(May 19), the Mussulmans swearing on the Koran to be 
faithful. Omichund was satified. 

Then Clive's tone to the Nawab changed. He wrote, The gage 
setting forth the British complaints, and announced that he ofbattle * 
was coming witS his men to Murshidabad to take the opinion 
of the Nawab’s council *or Durbar thereon. After which virtual 
declaration of war, the Nawab with his army moved down- 
wards and Clive with his army upwards towards Plassey, 

•Clive’s letter was despatched on June 13, ancf lie com- 
menced his march the same day with his whole force — 1,100 
Europeans, double that number of sepoys, and ten guns. On 
the 1 8th, Katwa, with a fort and granary, was reached and 
seized. Then came a pause. There were rumours of Mir 
Jafar’s defection. The monsoon set in stormily. Advance 
meant triumph or ’annihilation. Retreat meant collapse. 

There remained the alternative of entrenching at Katwa, 
and negotiating %ith the Marathas — with a risk of Bussy 
intervening* Clive hesitated for long. On the 21st he Clive’s 
called a Council of War, and announced that his own vote 
was against advancing. Eleven of the council supported ofWac. 
hi A: seven, headed by Eyre Coote, voted against him. 

Clive retired, and spent an hour by himself debating in 
solitude. The promptings of audacity gained the day. 

He returned to camp, and simply announced that the 
advance would be renewed next morning. 

A stream lay on the British front which was crossed at an 
early hour. Messages, reassuring but not convincing, came Arrival *t 
from Mir Jafar. The army went forward, reaching Plassey pla88e y* 


after midnight ; when the presence in thd immediate neigh- 
bourhood of the enemy, supposed to be some miles off, was 
discovered. The British, who had had a drenching and 
fatiguing march, bivouacked as best they might in a grove. 
With the early dawn Clive drew up his men ; Europeans in 
the centre, sepoys on the wings. Facing these were fifty 
thousand men ; of these fifty thousand, how many weie going 
to fight, how many to desert, how many to stand by and 
wait on events, no one knew. 

There were fifty French with the IfcTawab ; jt. 8 t’clock on 
thye morning of June 23, 1757, their cannon began the figjht 
on which the destinies of Bengal depended. A cannonading 
Victory of duel was kept up for three hours, and still Mir Jafar made no 
Plassey. sign. Clive prepared to maintain ^ defence throughout the 
day, and trust to darkness £nd relaxation of discipline «in the 
enemy’s camp to enable him to make a successful night attack. 
But early in the afternoon, some movement was evidently on 
foot in the Nawab’s army. Theft the French were seen to 
withdraw from their position ; it was promptly seized by a 
British officer, a move which made* a general engagement 
inevitable : Clive turned a heavy fire on the enemy’s guns, 
throwing them completely out of action : then his whole line 
advanced. The rout of the Nawab was immediate and com- 
gletej so prompt was the flight, that only five or six hundred 
of his army fell, the victors losing but severity men. The 
Nawab escaped at spe^d to Murshidab&d : not feeling safe 
there, he attempted further flight in disguise, but was recog- 
nised, brought back to his capital secretly, and them flung 
into prison and murdered by the son of Mir Jafar. A body 
of French troops had been on their way from P%tna to join 
the Nawab, but in the light of recent developments they 
Mir Jafar turned and were chased over the frontier by Eyre Codte. 
proclaimed To the general astonishment, tke revolution was not 
awa succeeded by a massacre; and Mir Jafar must have been 
immensely relieved to find that Clive was carrying out the 
bargain as if he had fulfilled his own part to perfection. On 
June 27th he was proclaimed Nawab in Murshidabad, and 
.were vitally , lords, of Bengal The. hapless 
Omicfeund was, calmly .thrown over. The shock, when he 


found that he had been tricked and was to receive nothing, 
turned his brain. 

^ough Mir Jafar was Nairab, all power was .iff. the 
|jan<js of Clive. In the eyes of every native he was in- 
comparable, invincible; his personal prestige was without 
parallel. With a word he might have doubled or trebled 
the immense sum allotted to him from the royal treasury ; 
others of the English received vast gifts ; the compensation 
awarded to the Company was ample. 

* For thg next two y^rs and a half Clive found his hands His 
full. Mir Jafar expected to reap the benefits of royalty in 
the , ordinary Oriental fashion, but the natives found in Clive Bengal, 
a jprotector not to be trifled with. He restrained the Nawab; 
he quelled revolts almost with a word. He never played 
any nsm false except OrSichundf and that single lapse from 
rectitude appedled to the native mind so entirely normal 
that it in no way injured his repute. About the end of the 
year, an invasion was threatened by the Nawab of Oudh; 
but the danger was quelled by the mere approach of Clive. 

The task of at once co§trolling and conciliating the natives 
was singularly difficult ; happily the British officers at Cal- 
cutta were so far from being jealous of him that when a 
singularly clumsy scheme of government omitting him entirely 
was propounded from London, they practically combined to 
subordinate themselves to their great chief; the Directors 
shortly afterwards making the amendf for their blunder and 
^tpgpintiug him Governor with many compliments. 

In rf?s8, Cliv<* despatched to the Sarkars the expedition 
under Fordp, whose successful course has already been 
narrated. The risk he ran thereby was illustrated early in 
the following year by the reported advance of the Nawab Inv asio n 
of Oudh in conjunction with the Shahzada, the heir of the . 
Mogul Afterwards Shal* Alam), upon Patna. Mir Jafar r^pensa,* 
wanted to buy them off. Clive would have none of it. The 
Shahzada promised the Englishmen unlimited territory for 
his support : Clive declined. With four hundred Europeans* 
two thousand five hundred sepoys, and some troops of the 
Nawab’s, he marched four hundred miles in twenty-three 
days to the relief of Patna which was holding out stoutly. 


Xhe Shahzada’s army scattered, and he himself fled. Cliyg 
accepted as a regard what is known as his jaghiy, the quit- 
rents of the districts granted to the Company on Mir Jafar’s 
accession. # 

Collision This took place about the time when Forde was capturing 
^Duteh* ^ asu ^P atam * Later in the year there was to be still another 
u episode of conflict with a European power — the Dufch this 
time. The story illustrates the idea hitherto prevalent that 
the Commercial Companies were quite entitled to wage war 
with each other irrespective of the anjicable relations of their 
respective governments. The Dutch at Chinsura were not 
profiting by the British ascendancy. Mir Jafar, who was 
very ill pleased at his practical subordination, entered on an 
intrigue with them : in consequence of which, a fleet of seven 
Dutch ships from Batavia appeared in the Hugli in Oetober. 
They required a free passage up the river to Chinsura: 
Clive, suspecting their purpose and the good faith of Mir 
Jafar, was still uncertain how to treat the ships of a pro- 
fessedly friendly nation, when they gave him his cue by 
seizing some English vessels. Forde* back from the Starkars, 
attacked the Chinsura garrison ; on the river, Captain Wilson 
with three ships attacked the seven Dutchmen. Both 
actions were brilliantly successful. The Dutch had to sue 
for Clive’s protection against the Nawab’s son who was 
possessed with a natural desire to trample on the unsuccess- 
ful, whom he had previously intended to ftelp : and the 
Dutch opposition was terminated by a treaty under which 
tney acknowledged their aggression, made due complication, 
and agreed to maintain no more than one hundred and 
twenty five soldiers in Bengal. ^ 

Departure This for the time concluded Clive’s sojourn in India. In 
otClive, February (1760) he sailed for England, though he was still 
to return once more for a salutary brief visit. 0 


(3 laps l and II,) 

W HEN Clive left Bengal, and the struggle between A period 
French and English on Indian soil was virtually 
over ># %2 Company ha dt not yqf acquired Sovereign rights. 

The rulers of* Bengal and of the Carnatic were both in 
effect the servants o^ the Company’s Servants; the British 
had suddenly taken undeniable rank as a railitaiy Power; 
but technically their lands were held by them as zemindars , 
if? landholders paying rent to the crown ; and their dominion 
was the ascendancy of advisers who can compel obedience. 

Both Bengal and the Carnatic remained in form Native 
T 'he exercise of the avowed dominion begins with 
the Governor-Generalship of Warren Hastings ;t the interval 
|is a transition period, to a large extent chaotic, but with the 
^elements of oftler emerging. 

• In the two preceding chapters, w? have followed the first 
steps Ijy which tye British Power was established in India 
between 1745 and 1761. Before proceeding to its further 
stages, we "have to observe the developments which took 
place .amdhg the Native Powers during the same period; 
c^miuitting, in 1761, in the crushing blow dealt totke 
$arathasjby iUualed. Sh^.,Duxasu, at Panipat in Hindostauo, 
and thf seizure* of" the throne of Mysore by Haidar 4 U* 

Clearing a new and aggressive military Power in the South. 

Nadir Shah, the Persian, after his sack of Delhi, de- Ahmed 
veloped the worst characteristics of Oriental Tyranny. A Shah t 
few years later, he was assassinated; and in the resulting 
confusion of the Ab<j£li tribe pfAjfghans 



made himself master of Kabul, and re-esl&blished an inde- 
pendent monarchy there. For some superstitious reason, he 
re-named his tribe Durant instead of Abdali ; in consequence 
of which he became known indifferently as Ahmed Shah 
Abdali or Durani. He led a series of invasions into r the 
Pan jab and Sirhind between 1749 and 1759 with by no 
means uniform success, but with the result that the ^anjab 
became practically a province of the Kabul Monarchy, instead 
Q^ the Mogul Empire. 

Progress In the meantime the Maratha dominion was increasing. 

of the The Berar Raja had obtained the cession of Orissa, aiyl 
ara as. j ev [ ec j c hauth from Bengal and Behar. The Peshwa, 
Balaji Rao, secured recognition as the head of the whole 
confederacy, with Sivaji’s descendant at Satara for a figure 
head. His armies pushed up to the'banks of the Jamn^; his 
brother Ragonath Rao, commonly known as Rhgoba, marched 
into the Panjab, and for a time expelled, the Durani Governor. 
In the South, while Bussy remained with the Nizam, neither 
the Peshwa nor the Bhonsla could operate effectively against 
that monarch; but the withdrawal # of the Frenchman fit 
Lally’s call increased Maratha activities, and produced the 
cession to them of further territories ; though when they 
invaded the Mysore district, they found their match in 
Haidar Naik — afterwards known as Haidar Ali — the Mussul- 
man adventurer who had become chief of the Mysore army. 
Nevertheless, the Marathas’ domain was nort so vast, the 
dread they inspired so ffreat, that they had begun to count 
upon establishing a Hindu Empire on tjpe ruins ,of the 
Mogul dominion. Fortunately, their challenge was taken up 
by the Durani: the Mohammedan and Hindu towers met 
Battle of in the tremendous shock of Panipat. The Marathas were 
Pan i pat. shattered : the campaign cost them 2 00, 000^ men : and though 
they remained collectively the greatest Power in the Penin- 
sula, the danger of their overwhelming predominance was 
indefinitely postponed, and rivalry among the great chiefs 
for supremacy within the confederacy was renewed. The 
Peshwa, Balaji Rao, died shortly, and was succeeded by his 
energetic and capable son, Madhu Rao ; whose supremacy 
however, was less assured than his father's had been. 



On the other hand, the victorious Durani made no attempt Result* of 
to organise a State in the North-West, but retired across the l*anipat, 
mountains, carrying away loot, and leaving behind Governors 
to 2xact tribute. It may here be remarked that a colony of 
tribesmen from the Afghan borders had a few years before 
established themselves under the name of Rohillas in the 
district west of Oudh known as Rohilkhand as masters of the 
Hindu population. The services rendered by them to 
Ahmed Shah at Panipat confirmed their position in Rohil- 
fefaand, while establishing a hostile tradition between them and 
the Marathas. The Mogul himself — now that same Shah 
Alam whom Clive had dealt with as Shahzada — while his 
authority continued to be recognised as Padishah and titular 
head.of the whole Emptre, was practically without territories 
of his own, or Queans of enforcing his decrees. 

About the same tiipe Haidar Naik compelled the Raja of Rise of 
Mysore — a Hindu State # which had never hitherto played 
me q*e than a very minor part — to abdicate in his favour ; and 
assumed under the najne of Haidar Ali a Sultanate which 
his genius rapidly transformed into a great military Power. 

In 1765 Clive, returning to Bengal, obtained from the 
Mogul, then residing at Allahabad, two decrees : one of* 
them constituting the Nawab of the Carnatic independent 
of the Nizam, to whom he had hitherto been technically 
subordinate ; # the other bestowing on the English as from 
the Imperial authority the Sarkars which had been held 
^ nce # i759 as 4 om Nizam. 

Thus in the south there existed four military Powers ; the 
; British of the Madras Presidency with the Carnatic virtually 
; under their control : the Puna branch of the Maratha con- 
federacy : the Nizam : # and Haidar Ali. The conduct of The 
affairs 6y the Madras authorities was consistently incom- Madras 
petent The Nizam, the Peshwa, and Haidar were in a 
perpetual condition of forming and dissolving various com- 
^nations against each other; the British making treaties with 
one or the other, of which the intention was to avoid 
military operations and the practical outcome was to drag 
ttjSS* into war in support of one or other ally. Nor had 


of the 

they the firmness to make an independent stand, but 
habitually found themselves making concessions which were 
repaid by desertion as soon as the tug of war commenced ; 
even agreeing to pay the Nizam a heavy rent for the Sarkars 
in spite of the Mogul's decree. Although the military skill 
of the British commander, Colonel Smith, enabled \\\m to 
win victories in the field, he was so hampered by the civil 
authorities that those victories could never be turned to 
account; and in 1769 mismanagement had reachejl such a 
point that Haidar dictated the terms of an accommodation 
under the walls of Madras, at a time when Smith, if he had 
been allowed to act, was in a position to inflict certain defeat 
upon him. 

By this treaty the British bouAd themselves to assist 
Haidar in case he should be attacked by the Marathas or 
the Nizam ; but when in the following .year the Marathas did 
attack him, they refused assistance; on the ground that the 
provocation had been Haidar’s. The Mysore Sultan had 
much the worse of the encounter, aijd he never forgave tl?e 
British for what he regarded as a treacherous desertion. 

The Marathas, who had somewhat recovered from the 
blow at Panipat, again began to assert their dominion in 
upper Hindostan about 1769, and two years later restored 
Shah Aiam to the throne at Delhi. They then proceeded to 
attack Rohilkhand, retiring presently on the' promise of a 
payment by the Rohillas of forty lacs of rupees (^400,000), * 
guaranteed by the Nawab of Oudh, who r felt himsplf very 
seriously menaced by the proximity of the Marathas. Out 
of this transaction a little later arose the Rohilla war of 
which we shall hear in the time of Warren Hastings. 

Outside of Bengal then the positive changes during this 
transition period are the development of a new military power 
in Mysore, the extension of Maratha ascendancy, and the 
decline of. the Nizam ; negatively, the check to the Marathas 
inflicted by Ahmed Shah, and the diplomatic failures of the 
Madras Government, who lost with the native princes much 
of the prestige which had been gained by the overthrow of 
the French. 

We can now follow the course of events in Bengal, and 



the influences connected therewith in London, which led up 
to the first experiment in British Government carried out 
under Lord North’s Regulating Acts. 


Clive’s departure for England in February 1760 was the signal 
for the commencement of a period of grave misrule in Bengal. 

In %pite of his absence, the military prestige of the 
British was well maintained during the first months by 
Colonels Calliaud and Knox ; Shah Alam having again in- 
vaded tile country and laid siege to Patna, and being 
thoroughly routed by them. 

The position at Calcutta was one offering immense British 
temptations to the Council in charge. Clive was gone : 
three or four more of the giost capable officers were withdrawn ment in 
on account of differences with life Directors ; Vansittayt, thp Bengal. 
Governor, though well meaning, had neither tTie nerve nor 
thlTweight for anything in the nature of a crisis. Uncon- 
trolled, the Company’s Servants scandalously abused their 
position. They were preposterously underpaid : private trad- ■ 
iifg had always been locked to, to supplement their incomes, 
and they neglected the Company’s interests for their own. 

The Company had ‘trade privileges and exemptions from 
duties : the Company’s servants claimed those privileges and 
exemptions for themselves, and their native agents. The agents 
behaved as if*the Company’s troops were at their beck and 
call, exercising every form of oppression in the certainty of 
immunity from punishment. The extortion of presents from 
wealth/ natives #as carried to an outrageous extent. The 
Council, so* far from interfering, were the worst offenders; 
Vansittart /ound only one man, Warren Hastings, who was 
disposed to support him in resisting the majority. Mir 
JaFar, his treasury* depleted by the loss of revenue as well 
as by the extravagant ^ependiture, was unable to pay the 
Council’s claims, and was compelled to abdicate in favour of 
^is son-in-law Mir Citssim. 

Mir Cassim, once in power, resolved to free himself from Revolt of 
the intolerable yoke laid on him by the British : but he Mir . 
worked warily. He privately drilled an army on the sepoy assini 
mocjel. Finding that KeTcould not enforce the trading duties 


against the British he removed them altogether, so that the 
British were no longer at an advantage. By the abolition of 
wasteful sources of expenditure, he found sufficient means to 
discharge his actual obligations. By 1763 he had immensely 
improved his position, and was then allowed by Vansittart, 
despite the protests of Colonels Coote and Carnac, to fail 
upon the native Governor of Patna and others, and f fiii his 
own coffers at the expense of theirs. Matters came to a 
head when Ellis, in charge of the factory at Patna, seized 
the town, and was in turn seized and imprisoned 1 with his 
companions. The w Council declared war on Mir Cassim, 
proclaimed Mir Jafar once more Nawab, and advanced 
against the reigning ruler, who was defeated after a hard 
battle. Mir Cassim in consequence massacred his prisoners 
at Patna, and when that plaice was captured escaped ovfer the 
border to Shuja Daulah, the Nawab of Oudh. 

Munro’s Some months later Shuja DaulaK resolved to invade 
victory at Bengal A mutiny among the sepoys was sternly crushed 
uxar * by Major Munro, who had the ringleaders blown from guns : 
and later In the year marched agdfmst Shuja Daulah on 
whom he inflicted a complete and crushing defeat at Buxar, 
or Baksar (Oct. 1764), which he followed up by marching 
on Allahabad ; thereby impressing on the Naw^ab the folly of 
making war against the British, and bringing Oudh into the 
sphere of British ascendancy. t 

In January Mir Jafai died, and his son w r as proclaimed 
Nawab : then, happily for the good name of the British, 
Return of Clive himself reappeared in May as Governor, with absolute 
^India° ^ ree< ^ om ac ^ on > on ty nominally fettered by a* Council of 

* four members chosen by himself. « 

The It was evident that the servants of the Company must 
Stable 1 e ^ er k ave adequate provision made for them by the Com* 

* pany, or must be expected, whether with or without per* 
mission, to make provision for themselves from other sources. 
A strong Governor might keep them within bounds; but there 
would be no permanent improvement until the temptations 
to misconduct w r ere removed. Clive acted with his accus- 

, tomed energy. Orders were issued forbidding the Company's 
servants to receive presents or to carry on private trade* 



The native agents*were for bidden to trade under colour of 
the Company’s authority. By way of compensation, the 
profits of the trade in salt of which the Company had 

the monopoly were to be added to the salaries of the 

officers. Every civilian in Bengal was furious; but it was 
ho use to be furious with Clive. 

T^mihtary body in turn had its collision with the Supprei- 
Governor : with the usual result. Extra pay, known as “*5 
“ double batta,” had been awarded to the officers as a tem- oppose 
porary grant after Plassf y ; they had grown to regard it as a tion. 
rifht. In January (1766) double batta ceased by Clive’s 

order. The officers agreed among themselves to resign in 

a body on June 1st, demanding the restitution of double 
batta. They were astoryshed to find that Clive was quite 
prepaid to accept all their resignations, re-officer his army, 
and inflict conSign punishment not only on them but also 
on any of the Comparfy’s civilian servants who countenanced 
them. Ringleaders were*placed under arrest and shipped 
off to England. Of the rest, those who were prompt to own 
tlfeir folly, were for the most part reinstated. Clive had 
dealt with th£ crisis in such a manner as to win a victory 
not less complete, ahd not less honourable, than that of 

It is to be observed that Clive had arrived intending to 
abolish the salj monopoly altogether; he retained it, that the 
profits might be tised in the mariner explained. This 
‘arrangement was cancelled by the directors ; who made an 
increase in the Salaries, but not a sufficient one. As a 
consequence neither private trading nor the receipt of 
presents di§appeared, but continued to be abuses for several 
years, though not on the same scale as before. 

The araiy in Bangal was also re-organised on the basis of*/ 
an establishment of 30^0 Europeans, with Sepoys in due 
proportion formed in three brigades. 

Clive’s first reform was in the direction of controlling the Clive 
C v 9JBRany^. ^ryapts. The second was th^recpnstruction pf ^ ^ 
relations ^between the Company aqd the Bengal Government - lwanu 
Hitherto, the Council had imposed their will upon the 
Native Government, but had entirely refused responsibility. 

attitude to 
the Mogul. 

and the 






Clive now accepted from the Padishah the Diwani, ue. the 
control pf the revenues of the. Province, The Company 
tfiemselves were to be responsible for collecting and ad* 
ministering the revenues, subject to specific payments t© the 
Padishah and the Nawab, the army being removed from the 
control of the latter. They thus became not only virtual 
but responsible rulers of the country, at the sarfie time 
acquiring a source of ample and legitimate revenue. 

In the next place, Clive had to lay down the lines of 
foreign j)Qliqy. The first article therein was tfi e Kjcpgn ition 
ofthe Padishah’s formal authority: the power .of appealing 
to the Imperial decrees, and so providing the Company with 
a legitimate backing. On this ground, the proceedings of 
August 12, 1765, are of special importance. On that day 
Clive met Shah Alam, and 1 received from hipi not ofiiy the 
Diwani of Bengal, but also the cession of the Sarkars, besides 
obtaining the separation of the Carfiatic from the Nizam's 
dominions. The titles of the Viceroys being held also from 
the Mogul, repudiation of the title conceded by him to the 
Company would be formally an aot of rebellion on thfeir 
part. * 

Next, Clive recognised in the Marafhas the most formid- 
able Power in India; while he was of opinion that the 
territories now in the hands of the British were as much as 
they could properly manage. Further conquests were not to 
be thought of. Consequently the'Benfr Raja, whose terri- 
tories lay between Bengal and the southern British districts,* 
was to be conciliated; the payment of diauth waScto be 
conceded in return for zemindari rights in Orissa. The 
Peshwa was to be balanced in the Dekhan by support of the 
Nizam, and Maratha aggression on the N.W. was to be held 
in check by the establishment of Oudh«as a buffer State. 
By all Oriental precedent, the British after the battle of 
Buxar had not only the power, but also the right, to take 
possession of that province. Instead, Clive reinstated the 
Nawab, only the districts of Allahabad and Kora being 
ceded and then transferred by him to Shah Alam. 

Clive had returned to Bengal in May 1765; he left it 
finally in January 1767. In those two years h$ had not 


9 * 

provided the country with a permanent Constitution ; yet it 
would be hard to overrate the value of his services during 
that time. He terminated the anarchy and oppression 
which* he found, and would have done so still more 
effectively if his measures had not been in part overridden by 
the directors. He put the Company’s servants in a position 
to learn how the country ought to be governed ; he curtailed 
expenditure ; he laid down the rules for the definite foreign 
policy which he initiated, the soundness of which is ,beyond 
question ; fnd he did it all in the teeth of the most rancorous 
opposition and insubordination, absolutely for the public 
good, with no sort of advantage to himself, and at the cost 
of raising up a host of bitter enemies whose malignity 
pursued him to the end o^his life. Not his own countrymen 
only, blit the natives of India, anfl most among them those 
of Bengal, owe an incalculable debt to Clive, the “daring 
in war,” daring in peac£, “ fearfully courageous.” 


The first time Clive returned to England with the laurels English 
won at Arcot, Pitt had # not yet won the lead in English 
politics, thougli the country was already looking to him as 1 ICS * 

its greatest statesman! During Clive’s second sojourn in 
India, Pitt and Newcastle had made terms with each other, 
and Pitt had already in 1760 raised Britain from the depths 
of humiliation #to the heights of triumph. Quiberon had 
J>een won and Quebec had fallen, t Jfore Clive set sail from 
Calcutta. But he had hardly reached England when the 
old kifig died, G%orge III. ascended the throne, and his 
favourite Bute became a political power. In 1761 Pitt 
resigned and Bute ruled supreme. Bute made the Peace of 
Paris, and then the Bedford ministry followed, with George 
Grenville, Wilkes prosecutions, and the American Stamp 
Act. While Clive was siting Bengal in order, the Rocking- 
ham ministry came in, did what it could to palliate the 
harm done by its predecessor, and went out again. Clive 
was still in Bengal when Pitt again consented to take office, 
was made Earl of Chatham, and then became totally in- 
capacitated by ill-health. When Clive re-appeared in 
England in 1767, Chatham was still nominal head of a 


ministry which was carrying out none of*his plans, habitually 
ran counter to his principles, and was doing everything in 
its power to undo all that the great administration of 1757- 
1761 had accomplished. Before 1770 when Lord Worth 
began his long and disastrous rule, Great Britain was already 
being ignored by Europe and defied by her American 
Colonies. * 

Attitude It is hardly too much to say that during the whole of 
°ment to- period there were in England only two statesmen with 
wards enough imagination to realise either the possibilities or the 
Indian responsibilities of our newly bom Empire in India. Those 
affairs. j wo were an( j Edmund Burke : and to neither of them 
was it given to control the policy of Britain. Had either 
been able to do so, the course of /events would undoubtedly 
have been very different. • Qlive at one tiipe certainly con- 
templated the transfer of authority from the Company to the 
Crown — an idea carried out a hundred years later : but at 
that time he w*as reckoning on Pitt being the man to carry 
the scheme through. Pitt himself was in favour of it, and 
might have done it, but for his brfak-down. Without Pitt, 
no one knew better than Clive that it wa& not possible. 
To other politicians, India represented in the main two ideas 
—a country where private fortunes could be made with 
unequalled rapidity; and a country out of which the. 
Company could suck revenue like a sponge — and sponges 
may be squeezed. Tl*e Company should be taxed to the 
utmost for its privileges : and the clients of the Great— 
to whom clients were useful — might af the wofrsrt have 
prosperous occupations found for their sons. * In addition 
to which, the Great themselves, as well as tbeir clients, 
could arrive at satisfactory understandings with the “Nabobs” 
— as the gentlemen were called who abc*it this time began 
returning from the East with defective livers, and swollen 
money bags. 

Directors The ultimate control of the Indian Presidencies, the 
and Pro- appointment of the officers, and the dictation of policy, lay 
pnetors. ^ c om p an y> s Courts of Directors and Proprietors in 
London. The Government at Westminster collectively 
could bring pressure to bear on the Company collectively 



by with-holding or |ranting military assistance, by threats erf 
challenging the Company’s right to hold territorial acquisi- 
tions, by implying that Charters require periodical renewal 
and may demand modification even between renewals. 
Individually, politicians might acquire influence by accumulat- 
ing shares and extending their representation as Proprietors 
and on the Directorate. It is obvious that such a state of 
affairs gave almost unlimited play to personal preferences, 
jealousies and animosities, besides intensifying the normal 
desire of a^y Commercial body as such to show the biggest 
possible revenue from year to year. 

Thus, when a crisis arose in Bengal so serious that Clive’s Parlia- 
return as virtual dictator was clearly the only chance of avert- noent inter* 
ing a huge disaster, Clive’s party carried the day triumphantly venes * 
in Leadenhall Street : butVhen such a crisis was not on hand, 

Clive’s enemies <&ncelled a great deal of what he had accom- 
plished — very much as parliamentary factionstreated Chatham. 

At last, however, the chaotip results of the existing method of 
carrying on the government of the Provinces, made a change 
absolutely imperative ; ajjd the first experiment in Imperial 
constitution-making was embodied in North’s “Regulating 
Act” 0^1773. 

By this Act the authority of the Courts of Proprietors and North’s 
Directors was retained ; but the Government of India was Reflating 
effectively vested in two bodies — ^Council, appointed in the Act * 
first instance by # Government, and a Commission of Judges. v 
The Council consisted of five members : the Governor of 
Bengal became (iovernor General and President of the 
Council, the # Governor and Council of Bombay and of 
Madras being subordinated ; but the supreme authority was 
not the Governor General himself, hurt the majority of the 
Council for the tiqie being, the majority vote being con- 
clusive. Where the vote \jas even the Governor General had 
a casting vote ; otherwise, against an adverse majority he was 
powerless. Warren Hastings, already Governor of Bengal, 
was made the first Governor General ; with one experienced 
Indian official, Barwell, on the Council The other three 
were Philip Francis ; — almost universally identified with Junius 
of the Letters — Monson and General Clavering, who were 


apparently selected on the ground th tk they had already 
prejudged and condemned the opinions and actions of their 
President for the future as well as for the past. 

*774 *784* The new riginte began with the arrival of the Me # mbers 
of Council at Calcutta in 1774. It was terminated by 
the India Act of 1784. Outside of India these years were 
among the most disastrous of the British annals. «The war 
with the American Colonies broke out in 1775. At the end 
of 1777 it turned definitely against the Mother Country, 
with the surrender of Burgoyne at ^aratoga. Eqjly in 1778 
France took up arms in support of the Colonies. In 1J79 
she was joined by Spain. By land the British were out- 
generalled ; by sea they were out-numbered. For three years 
Gibraltar was besieged ; it was not till the naval power of the 
allies was broken by Rodney’s vicfory of the Saints that the 
country could begin to breathe freely ; £nd before that 
Britain and the thirteen American colonies had already 
been irrevocably parted. 



{Maps /, ///., IV, VIII) 

L ORI) NORTH’S Regulating Act did not take effect 

until 1774. Between 1770 and that date events of 

some (tonsequence had occurred i» India. First in time was The 

the great famine 0 in Bengal of 1770, which emphasised the ^ine^ 

necessity for a strong administration of the Diwani ; since it 0 

appeared that the English, instead of devoting their efforts to 

the alleviation of the catastrophe, preferred to use it as a 

m&ins to their private enrichment by buying up grain and 

then selling it a merciless profit. 

About the same timfc Shah Alam put himself in the hands Further 

of the Marathas by accepting their offer to replace him on advance 

the throne of Delhi, contrary to the advice of the Calcutta Marathas. 

Council. The # Marathas under Sindhia and Holkar took 

advantage of the portion to make th<|m selves masters of the 

Jamna districts, enter Rohilkhand and threaten Oudh, retiring 

on the^promise ofsa heavy cash payment. Shah Alam had 

proposed to reward them by the cession of Allahabad, granted 

to him by flive in 1765 ; but, as this was by no means in 

accord with the objects for which the grant had been made 

the* British reoccupied the district. 

In 1 ^ 2 died the Pe%hwa Madhu Rao, who had given The 

promise 6 f a great career. His younger brother and sue- Pcs hwa 

. , 0 . , , succession, 

cessor in the office was assassinated nine months later; 

according to general belief, by the order of his uncle 

Ragonath Rao, otherwise called Ragoba. Ragoba became 

?£shwa : but his predecessor’s widow bore a son who was 

immediately proclaimed Peshwa, and a Council of Regency 


of Bengal. 

and the 

was formed at Puna of which the leatfing^ spirit was the 
Nana Farnavis. 

In 1772, also, the Governorship of Bengal was bestowed 
upon Warren Hastings, whose abilities had attracted Olive’s 
attention in 1757. He had then been made Resident at 
Mir Jafar’s court ; had been honourably distinguished among 
the Calcutta Council in the evil years for his rectitude and 
his support of Vansittart ; and had subsequently, after an 
interval in England, held an appointment at Madras. 

For some time past, Shuja Daylah, the Oudh Nawab, 
had been hankering after Rohilkhand which lay on his Ncfirth 
West frontier. The Marathas had just retired from an 
incursion thither, and he feared or pretended to fear that 
the Rohillas would join hands with that aggressive Power 
and seriously endanger h i*> position. The normal popula- 
tion of the country consisted of quite unVarlike Hindus; 
the Rohillas, few in number but fine. soldiers, had not been 
in possession for so much as fprty years. According to 
Oriental international ethics, he was quite entitled to turn 

them out by force of arms if he cguld : but he wanted the 
help of the British. A bargain was in process of com- 
pletion, by which tlj£ Allahabad distriot was to be transferred 
to the Nawab by the British, and garrisoned by the latter 
at the cost of the former. Thus a convenient opportunity 
presented itself for appealing to the British^ for assistance. 
To obtain that, he w^s aware that some plausible excuse 
beyond mere aggression was needed ; and he accordingly 
supported his application to Calcutta with* a moral argument 
^pd a material one. The moral one had jusf enough re- 
lation to the truth to pass muster — he averred that the 
Rohillas had been delivered from the Marathas by the 
presence of his own army, and the British troops in Oudh, 
backed by the payment by him t of forty lacs of rupees 
(about £400,000) which they had undertaken to repay; 
that they had repaid nothing and were intriguing with the 
Marathas. The material argument was, that the Company 
would be remunerated in hard cash. 

The evidence is obscure ; but the fact appears to be that 
the Nawab had guaranteed the forty lacs, had not paid it 


to the Marathas, but had received a first instalment from 
the Rohillas who were not unwilling to compound. Hastings Hastings 
however was easily satisfied. security of Bengal de- S ra . nts 

pended a good deal on the security of Oudh, which would to^he* 106 
be very much increased if Rohilkhand and the line of the Nawab. 
Ganges were held by the Nawab instead of by a fighting 
community which might turn its arms against him and 
help the Marathas to an entry. Tf the Nawab had a tolerable 
excuse, the British would have reasonable ground for 
helping hift. The excuse put forward was tolerable. Then 
the material reasons came in. The Directors in England 
were bombarding Calcutta with demands for retrenchment 
and money. Here was an opportunity. The army, which 
could not be disbanded, #rould find employment at Shuja 
Daulah*s expen^, and there woSld also of course be a 
substantial cash payment. 

The bargain was concluded. Forty lacs were paid to 
the Company, who were to*receive a subsidy for maintaining 
troops in the Allahabad district. They were to send a 
contingent to help the ^N T awab in coercing the Rohillas. 

The precaution, the need of which has since been fully 
recognised, of securing control to the British commander, 
was omitted; and the coercion was carried out with gross 
and superfluous violence. The Rohillas were crushed, and 
Rohilkhand became a part of Oudh. ' On the ground of Conquest 
expediency, there was much to be laid in favour of the Rohiik- 
transaction ; and its moral enormity has been absurdly an * 
exaggemfed. The*inducemcnt to Hastings was particularly 
strong, and ifrdid not occur to his censors in the Company 
either to restore Rohilkhand to the Rohillas, or to refuse 
the price of the offence. Macaulay’s rhetoric bears little 
relation to the fact!, except in so far as the reigning Rohilla 
chief happened to be a gfcod ruler. Nevertheless the affair 
was discreditable. A better case for attacking the Rohillas 
sBould have been required, and a strict adherence demanded 
to the rules of civilised warfare, as a condition of the 
employment of British troops. 

The Rohilla war was carried through by Warren Hastings in 
his capacity as Governor of Bengal ; and before his appoint- 



The ment as Governor-General, the Bombay Presidency had been 
Council se duced into mixing itself up with the Maratha affairs — the 
and the three Presidencies being at the time independent. 

Pgshwa- Madhu Rao Peshwa died in Nov. 1772 : his brother 
srnp. Naraian R ao was assassinated in August 1773, when Ragoba 
became Peshwa. In January 1774, Nana Farnavis and his 
party set up a Council of Regency on behalf of the expected 
posthumous son of Naraian Rao ; the babe was born in 
April and promptly proclaimed Peshwa, Ragoba however 
obtained the support of Sindhia and Holkar, the Maiwa chiefs, 
negotiated with the Bhonsla and the Gaikwar, and finally 
laid proposals for assistance before the Governor of Bombay. 
Bombay wanted to acquire the neighbouring ports of Salsette 
and Bassein, but this was^at first 'too much for Ragoba to 
agree to. In the meantime, however, the Fyna regency had 
bought over Sindhia and Holkar, while the Bhonsla and the 
Gaikwar were in no haste to commit themselves to either 
party. Ragoba narrowly escaped capture, fled to Bombay, 
Treaty of and in March (1775) concluded the Treaty of Surat, ceding 
Surat Salsette and Bassein, assigning som£* additional territory, and 
promising an annual cash payment ; Jor which the British 
were to furnish three thousand troops to aid him. In signing 
tfee treaty, Hornby the Governor of Bombay exceeded his 
authority ; as by this time the Presidencies were subordinate 
to the Governor - General and his Council.# A couple of 
Battle months later there was a sharp engagement at Arras in 
of Arras. Gujerat between Colonel Keating and a Maratha force ; in 
which the British, though severely handled drove thVenemy 
in rout across the Nerbadda — whereby the Nfeam was en- 
couraged to give his support to what looked like <;he winning 

A Maratha war was the last thing wanted at Calcutta ; but 
Hastings was aware that Bombay had practically committed 
him, and that as it was too late to draw back the only safe 
course was to fight~for conclusive victory. Unfortunately, 
the "Council established by Lord North's Act could over- 
rule the Governor - General. There were four members 
besides Hastings, and three of them acted consistently 
against him. The Triumvirate — Francis, Clavering and 



Monson — quashed the treaty of Surat, and despatched an 
agent, Colonel Upton, to Puna, to negotiate, .with the 
Regency. The result was the new tj^aty of Purandar Treaty of 
(Poorunder), March 1776, which cancelled the pledges given f^ndat. 
to Ragoba and retained for the British only Salsette and a 
contribution towards expenses. 

Hastings was at daggers drawn with the Triumvirate: 

Bombay was furious with them : and in August, dispatches 
drived from the Directors approving the treaty of Surat; 
whereby Bombay was tficouraged. 

Early in the next year a French adventurer, St Lubin, Complica* 
appeared at Puna promising French assistance; by this time 
Great Britain was in the thick of the struggle with the Calcutta. 
American colonies, and 4he prospect of a French interven- 
tion tfierein wa^ really imminent ; the Puna Regency received 
St Lubin with open arms ; and in the meantime Bombay was 
giving an asylum to Ragoba, contrary to the terms of the 
Purandar Treaty. Theif came more dispatches from the 
Directors, ratifying the Purandar Treaty under protest, as 
being now impossible ft) repudiate except on the ground 
of infractions by the Puna Government. Meantime, the 
Maratha chiefs were quarrelling, and Holkar changed sides ; 
while at Calcutta, Hastings at last got the upper hand with 
his Council owing to the successive deaths of Monson and 
Clavering. Im March (1778), he wrote to Bombay practi- 
cally authorising war, and prepared f to send an expedition 
across India. In November, a new treaty was made with 
Ragolfu'on the liftes of the Surat treaty : and then came a 

Bombapwished to have to itself the credit of victory. So The 
an. expedition started from it in December, without waiting disaster of 
for the Bengal contingent. But the leadership was in hope- War S am * 
lessly incompetent hands*, having got within twenty miles of 
Puna, the chiefs were seized with a panic ; it was only the 
brilliant behaviour of the rear-guard under Lieutenant Hartley 
that saved the force from being cut up ; and on Jan. 12 the 
disgraceful Convention of Wargam, made with Sindhia, threw 
over Ragoba and gave up everything that Bombay had 



France had declared war against Great Britain on behalf 
of the American colonies in the summer of 1778; affairs 
were going exceedingly ill in the western hemisphere ; and 
the prospect of French intervention in India had become 
extremely serious. Hastings was taking energetic measures 
Goddard’s for strengthening the forces, and an expedition under Qoddard 
march. ^ as on wa y B om 5 a y > w hich had got as far as Burhampur 
{about 100 miles north of Aurangabad) with some assistance 
from the Raja of Bhopal, and also from the Bhonsla, whien 
the news of Wargam arrived. Goddrftd at once ma # de a swjft 
march for Surat; covering some 300 miles in 20 days, and 
by his timely arrival preventing any further disaster. Shortly 
afterwards Sindhia, who was now aiming at being the arbiter 
among the Marathas and posing to the British as their friend, 
allowed Ragoba, who had surrendered to hifln, to escape to 
Surat Nana Farnavis required that Ragoba and Salsette, 
should be handed over as a preliminary to further negotiations. 
Goddard replied by making overtures to the Gaikwar, en- 
forced by a military demonstration; captured Ahmedabad in 
February (1780)3 and dispersed thd troops brought against 
him by Sin 3 hia and Holkar. 

A A little later in the same year, a detachment was sent from 
diversion Bengal under Captain Popham to create a diversion in the 
in Malwa. Northern part of Sindhia’s country, at the timely request of 
the Rana of Gohud ; a little principality sone sixty miles 
from Agra on which the} Marathas were encroaching. 
i^But the sudden and tremendous invasion of the Carnatic 
by JlaidilL Ali in July gave the war a neV aspect, atod we 
'must now turn to the events in Southern India Which led up 
^ fp that great irruption. *» 

‘'‘Throughout the sixties, as we have seen, the government 
jg-jcf the Madras ‘"Presidency had been distinguished for its 
Attend general - " incapacity ; and the close of that decade found both 
Madras. Haidar Ali and the Nlzam very ill disposed towards the 
Irtish Power. Matters were by no means improved during 
the decade ensuing. ^The Nawab of the Carnatic or of 
Arcot — to adopt the more familiar title — a singularly worth- 
less monarch, was very much in debt to the Company, and 
also to sundry servants of the Company who held security in 



the way of mortgages on lands and revenues. It seemed 
good to him that his coffers should be filled by appropriating 
Jamur : the Madras Government found it reasonable to 
support this idea, on the theory that Tanjur might, if treated 
with sufficiently consistent injustice, become hostile to the 
British. t So at the end of 1773 Tanjur was compulsorily 
transferred to the Nawab. The proceeding was so shameless 
that the Directors in London dismissed the Governor of 
Madras, and sent out Pjjgot, who had previously done good 
service ifi the same jftsitlon, to replace him. Pigot set 
about rectifying the prevailing abuses ; but in the attempt to 
override the corrupt coterie at the head of affairs, h ? evreeded 
his constitutional p owers and was deposed and imprisoned 
by the stronger party. • He died before the next orders 
arrived from I^ndon, and was presently succeeded in office 
by Rumbold, wfio appears to have regarded his position 
primarily as a cover for the illegitimate acquisition of wealth. 

Within two years, Hastings as Governor-General had practi- 
cally suspended him, but not before mortal offence had been 
given to the Nizam, by Pool proposals to ignore inconvenient 
points in the existing treaties with him. This took place at 
the beginning of 177*9 when the convention of Wargam had 
just reduced British prestige to the lowest point. Con- 
sequently' the Nizam devised and set about actualising the 
project of "a great confederacy of all the southern Native 
Powers against the British. # 

In the meantime, Haidar Ali had been taking every Increasing 
advantage of the* Maratha complications. The Marathas °* 
were too much occupied with internal rivalries turning on ar 
the contest between Ragoba and the Regency, and with the 
hostilities and negotiations with Bombay and Calcutta, to 
concentrate against* him. So from 1773 to 1779 he steadily 
enlarged*his dominions ; *not only absorbing minor principal- 
ities southwards, but pushing steadily north to the river 
Krishna. Angry as he was with the British, hejyas far J;oo 
asjute a statesman to allow his feelings to contrqL his polky, 
and made repeated overtures to them, which, however, were 
received with extreme coolness. Then came the prospect of 
reneweJTiostilities between France and England, and Haidar 


opened communications with the Mauritius. In *1778, war 
was actually declared. Hastings issued prompt orders for 
the seizure of all French stations. Pondichery was captured; 
so was Mah<£ on the west coast. But |$ahe was, in Haidar’s 
view, under his protection ; that protection was ignored by 
Anti* the British, and Haidar felt that the cup was full.,. A few 
British months later the Nizam made his proposals for the great 
com tion’ joint attack. The Bhonsla was to deal with Bengal : the 
western Marathas were to deal with Bombay : Mysore and 
Haidarabad were to invade Madras.* Haidar was prepaid 
to compose his differences. He had for long been building 
up such an army as no Indian monarch had ever brought 
into the field before; suddenly in July 1780 the great 
invasion burst like a tornado upon /he Carnatic. 

Britain Thus, in this summer of* 1780 it was not only in India but 
at bay. j n ever y quarter of the globe that Britain was battling for 
bare life. Since 1775 she had been fighting her American 
colonies, in whose favour the tide 6f war had definitely turned 
with Burgoyne’s surrender at Saratoga in the end of 1777. 
In the following spring France hah declared war, and ap- 
peared capable of keeping the British fleets very thoroughly 
occupied. By June 1779, Spain had added herself and her 
fleet to the anti-British combination. It seemed that there 
was more likelihood of French than of British armaments and 
reinforcements finding their way to India. oAnd in India 
itself, the only compensation for the bad* business of Wargam, 
had so far been the successes of Goddard in Gujerat and on 
the Nerbadda; while it appeared that owing to thc‘Kizam’s 
successful combinations, every native army in India was to 
be hurled simultaneously upon the British. * 

Invasion Madras, with the fatuity which marked its rulers, had made 
Carnatic 9 P.P re P arat * on f° r storm> The Genef&l in command was 
by Haidar Hector Munro, the hero of Euxar-^but the energy a«d ability 
Ali. he had then shown were now no longer forthcoming. For 
six weeks Haidar and his hordes swept the Carnatic with 
fire and sword, ravaging and pillaging almost to the gates 
of Madras, without let or hindrance save for the splendid 
defence of an occasional outpost, such as that of Wandewash 
by Lieutenant Flint. At the beginning of September an 


attempt was made* to unite the main Madras column under 
Munro with a column from the Northern districts under 
but the incapacity of the commanders allowed 
Haidar to drive a wedge between them, cut up Baillie’s 
army, and drive Munro back on Madras in precipitate 

~ In other fields, fortunately, affairs were taking a different 
course. During the summer Popham in northern Malwa 
had been operating with success against the Marathas in 
that region ; on August^ 3rd he, with his subordinate Bruce, 
sfertled the Indian world and retrieved completely the fame 
of the British arms by the brilliant feat of capturing by a The 
surprise the all but impregnable fort of Gwalior. The effect 
on our prestige was immediate and striking; and the in- 7Waior ‘ 
fluent on the Confederacy of the change was invaluable. 

The Bhonsla hSd never been more than half-hearted and the Results. 
Nizam was already ha>f repentant. Beyond this, the capture 
had a most important strategical result, inasmuch as it at 
once withdrew Sindhia from the south to take care of his 
own dominions. Godtiard’s earlier operations had success- 
fully separated the Gaikwar from the Confederacy, so that 
now the Bombay forces had only the Regency and Holkar 
to deal with. 

This was particularly fortunate, as the affairs of Madras 
demanded every rupee and every man that Bengal could 
provide, and Bombay was left entirely to its own resources. 

' The Governor, Hornby, displayed a seasonable energy. 

Beforg ihe end ofc the year the Konkans were cleared of the 
enemy by Hartley (who had almost saved the situation at 
Wargam) ^nd Goddard. In the spring the British met with 
a reverse m attempting to attack Puna, the credit of which 
fell to Holkar ; but this was counterbalanced by another 
success Jin the north. Iiopham had been inexplicably super- 
seded. In April his successor appeared to be practically at 
Sindhia’s mercy, when by the daring counsels of Bruce a 
sudden attack entirely reversed the position, and S^ndbto 
array was completely routed. 

Sindhia, whose hostility to the British had never been 
of an uncompromising character, found Holkar’s reputation 


greatly raised at the very moment when his own had suffered 
seriously, and began to look to diplomacy as the means to 
recover his lost ground. The Bhonsla some time before had 
come to a private understanding with the British, and was 
helping rather than hindering Hastings in sending a force 
overland from Bengal to the Carnatic. In short, j^ter April* 
j, 7Jx actual hostilities with the Marathas practically ‘came to 
§n end. 

In the Carnatic, however, the war with Haidar Ali con- 
tinued to rage. On the news of the irruption and #f Baillie’s 
Eyre disaster, Hastings acted boldly and vigorously. Sir E/re 
Madras* Coote, the victor of Wandewash, now a member of Council 
* and in supreme military command, sailed from Calcutta for 
Madras, which he reached in November 1780, and the old 
Sultan of Mysore knew that he had a great soldier matched 
against him. Coote was scandalously hampered by the 
incompetence of the Madras authorities and the want of 
supplies ; nor was it till June thrvt he was able to take the 
offensive. In three months from July 1st, Coote was 
victorious in three engagements — ait Porto Novo, at Pollihir 
(the scene of Baillie’s disaster), and at Solingarh, near 
Vellur. In June a new Governor, Lord Macartney, arrived 
at Madras with news that Holland had declared war on 
England ; and Macartney, conscious of the uses to which 
the Dutch ports "might be put under the % circumstances, 
succeeded in raising tin additional force, which captured 
Negapatam in November, and Trincomali in Ceylon in 
January. t - 

Improved Thus in the fifteen months since Baiilie’s ^disaster the 
position position of the British had greatly improved. TJie Bhonsla 
South 6 k ~ a< 3 definitely withdrawn from the Confederacy. Sindhia 
’ was conducting negotiations on the basis of the Purandar 
treaty; the Dutch declaration of w^r had been concerted to 
the advantage of the British ; and Haidar Ali, though not 
expelled from the Carnatic, had more than found his match 
whenever it had been possible to force an engagement. The 
cutting up of a detachment under Colonel Br athvya ite was 
counterbalanced by a disaster to Haidar's forces on the 
Malabar coast, followed by the revolt of the principalities 



which he had seized in that region. But it still remained 
extremely doubtful whether Haidar could be fairly beaten off. 

Britain’s enemies were still facing her on equal terms by 
sea; # and a French fleet, and French troops under Bussy, 
were a very imminent danger. Already a squadron under 
D’Orves had appeared, which, with a more capable com- 
mander,* might have completely paralysed Coote. Fortunately 
it had retired, and the British squadron under Hughes was 
now a fairly strong one. 

Hardly however, ha*l Trincomali been taken when a Suffren 
new French squadron arrived, under Suffren, perhaps the best , 
naval commander France ever produced. Four times in the g es * 
course of the year the two squadrons met and fought stub- 
bornly. In none of thg four fights could it be said that 
either*side had inflicted defeat eti the other. But Suffren 
was enabled to* throw reinforcements into the Carnatic and 
to recapture Trincomali, while the operations by land 
produced little advantage 4o either side. At the end of the 
year Coote’s health broke down completely ; but to counter- 
balance that, yaidar AlWdied at the advanced age of eighty, Death of 
leaving his son Tippu Sahib to succeed him. This turned Baidar 
the scale as concerned the Marathas. The Puna Govern- u 
ment, which had hitherto held back from finally committing 
itself to peace, signed the proposed treaty forthwith. The 
arrival of Bus^ at Gudalur or Cuddalore early in the year, 
its investment by a strong British forc« under an incompetent 
commander, the return of Suffren on one side and Hughes 
on th<^ other, pointed to a crisis in which the odds were in 
favour of the triumph of Bussy and Tippu, when the main With- 
hostilities jycre suddenly terminated by news of the peace drawal 
between France and Great Britain. French 

•Tippu was now the sole open antagonist left. He was on 
the Malabar coast, and Colonel Fullarton was sent to operate 
in Mysore, which he did with great success until the Madras 
Government, in the exercise of its recently habitual functions 
as the evil genius of the British Power, chose to negotiate 
with Tippu, and to order Fullarton to cease hostilities and 
abandon his conquests. The cabal against Hastings in 
England had by this time gained the day, and the great 


Governor-General was unable to compel the obedience of 
the Madras Government. Tippu succeeded in making it 
appear that the British had sued to him for peace. The 
Madras Government succeeded in making it appear that 
they would submit to any ignominy for the sake of coming 
to terms. 

Treaty Peace was finally concluded with Mysore on the* basis of 
with ^ general restitution of conquests. The struggle with the 
ippu ’ Marathas had concluded with the resignation of Ragoba’s 
claims, and the restoration of territories as they were before 
the Purandar treaty. * 

The The only addition to British territory in India made in 
policy?} time of Warren Hastings was that of the zemindari of 
1 Warren Benares, ceded by Oudh. But it was the genius of Hastings 
Hastings, which mainly saved India«at all in a period of extraofdinary 
. peril. His own policy was one not of extension or aggres- 
sion, but of consolidation and conciliation. War was forced 
upon him by the blunders of Bombay and the blunders of 
Madras. When he had to fight, his plans were laid with 
equal audacity and skill, for he knew that in India die 
must fight to win. The disastrous errors of Bombay were 
redeemed by the brilliant audacity of Goddard’s march across 
the peninsula, and the no less brilliantly conceived and 
executed movements of Popham and Bruce in the north. 
The folly of Madras brought the Southern Powers upon us 
in a mass at the time when half Europe* was attacking us in 
the west ; the skill of Hastings broke up the confederacy by 
detaching the Bhonsla, neutralising the Nram and fluttering 
Sindhia. Thwarted at every turn, sometimes, by the in- 
capacity and quite as often by the insubordination and 
rancorous opposition of subordinates and colleagues, he 
nevertheless maintained the position * in India against 
enormous odds, whilst his enemiej made him the mark of 
every species of obloquy and misrepresentation at home. In 
his conduct throughout the Maratha and Mysore vfg. rs, his 
worst enemies can now hardly find opportunity for detrac- 
tion. In the next chapter we shall examine that portion of 
his public career — his administration in Bengal — for which 
he has been most severely censured. 



{Maps /. and IV) 

T HE acceptance by Clive for the Company of the Bengal Lack of 
Diwani in return foj an annual payment to be made to 
the PaHishah, failed of the intendbd effect after Clive’s de~ Bengal, 
parture. The (Company’s servants in Bengal had not them-/ 
selves the knowledge afid experience requisite for organising 
a revenue department, andtthe authority was placed primarily 
in the hands of a Native, Mohammed Rhe/a Khan, with 
Native revenue collector. A little later, British collectors 
were appointed to supervise the natives ; but instead of 
supervising they practically worked with the Native sub- 
ordinates, to their mutual private profit, and the loss of the 
Company. It was with the intention of remedying this state 
of things that barren Hastings was made governor of Bengal 
in 1772, being then* forty years of $ge. For the past two 
years, he had been rendering excellent service in Madras, 
after ag interval oifour years spent in England. 

The rule of Hastings falls into four periods. In the first Four 
period, he # was Governor of Bengal, and supreme in his * u j e 
province. This lasted from April j.772 to October 1 774. 0 f Warren 
In" that month, tho> new members of Council and the four Hastings. 
Judges rgached Calcutta, «and the system devised under Lord 
North’s Regulating Act came into force. From that time until 
Monsou’s death in Sept 1776, Hastings was systematically 
over-ruled by his Council, nor did he definitely recover 
control until the death of Clavering, a year later. From 
17.77 to 1782 he held the supremacy, though with a some- 
what uncertain tenure; and again from that time to his 



departure from India the attitude 6f the Directors at home 
enabled his opponents in India to thwart him at every 

.Hastings In the matter of the Diwani, Hastings took prompt and 
J a-nd the effective steps. Under the existing conditions the soil was 
lw * nk tilled by the ryots or peasants, paying rent to the zemindars 
or landholders, who in turn paid a tax or rent to the Govern- 
ment. Between zemindars and Government collectors, it 
was certain that the amount which reached the treasury was 
not what it ought to have been ; buC the data for c a new and 
sound assessment were insufficient. Hastings adopted the 
plan of putting up the land to competition — making the 
* highest bidders zemindars— feu; a period of five years. Control 
of the department, now made more, simple by definiteness, was 
transferred from Murshidatiad to the Company’s headquarters 
at Calcutta. At the same time, courts of justice with 
Europea n K magistrates were established in each district, with 
a court^of appeal at the capital. *' In connection with these 
reforms, Mohammed Rheza Khan was removed from office, 
pending inquiry into various charges of peculation which had 
been brought against him, by order of the Directors ; who 
were ready enough to attribute the deficiencies of revenue to 
fraud in a Native. The charges were energetically pushed 
by the notorious Nuncomar (more correctly Nanda Kumar) 
a high-caste BraKmin who had acquired nvich power, and 
wished to supplant thti Mussulman ; but the completion of 
the new arrangements preceded that of the investigation, 
when Mohammed Rheza Khan was cleared of suspicion. 
Nuncomar however had in the interval succeeded in obtaining 
for his own son the post of manager to the Nawab’s house- 
hold, or more accurately the household of the Mani Begum, 
widow of a former Nawab, to whose care the infant ruler was 
entrusted. • , 

The new In October 1774, the new members of the new Council 
Members reached Calcutta. Without delay the Triumvirate — Francis, 
o Council, uiavering and Monson — proceeded to set themselves openly 
against Hastings and his loyal supporter Barwell. They 
condemned everything Hastings had done — the transfer of 
Allahabad to Oudh, the Rohilla war, the presence of British 


troops in Oudh, and the new revenue arrangements. They 
withdrew the Resident placed by Hastings in Lucknow, the 
Oudh capital, and sent a nominee of their own in his place. 

They ^ven demanded t • see the private correspondence 
between the previous Resident and Hastings. 

In January, S huj a Daulah died, and was succeeded by The 
Asaf-ud-D$ulah. ^TEe^fiegums — Shuja Daulah’s mother and 
widow — claimed not only an immense proportion of the * 
late Nawab's accumulated treasures, but also the revenues of Nawab. 
largp estatft, under a wilfr which was not produced. There 
were no documents to support the claim ; even if there had 
been it is more than doubtful whether the depletion of the 
State treasury involved could have been regarded as legal, 
while its inexpediency was*patent. To support the claim of 
the Begums was ^o cripple the Nawab. But it was the aim 
of the policy of Blastings, as it had been of Clive's, to 
strengthen the Nawab’s "Government ; his vehement opposi- 
tion to the Begums was enough for the Triumvirate. They 
were the majority ; they compelled the Nawab to submit ; 
they guaranteed the propAty to the Begums on behalf of the 
British ; and on the plea that Shuja Daulah’s death cancelled 
obligations entered upon to him personally, they required the 
cession of the zemindari of Benares and an increase of his 
subsidy on pain of withdrawal of the British troops. As the 
Nawab’s own troiops were in revolt for lack of pay, and the 
Begums had all the* money, Asaf-uS- Daulah was wholly 
dependent on the British troops for the maintenance of his 
throne, mnd had no^hoice but to submit. The responsibility 
for these transactions lay entirely with the Triumvirate, Hastings 
being at every point opposed by them ; but technically the 
Triumvirate's doings were the doings of Government. 

rfhe next move w£fc a personal attack upon Hastings. Its The 
interest is^ strictly speaking*, more personal than political, but attack on 
it looms so large in the pages of historians as to demand full 
relation. For it has, in fact, been used to blacken the 
characters of Hastings and of the Chief Justice Impey, very 
notably in Macaulay's Essay, whereas the investigations of 
later judicial enquirers show conclusively that nQ real 
reproach attached either to the one or the other. 


It had become evident, from the moment of the Trium- 
virate’s arrival, that they were prepared to welcome any sort 
of evidence which would tend to discredit the Governor- 
General and to shelter his accusers. Charges against him 
of having received gratifications — otherwise called bribes — 
Nun- began to appear before the Council. Nuncomar, whose 
comar’s enmity towards him dated back as far as 1764, came forward 
c argcs * with a string of charges and documentary evidence of gross 
corrupilon, Including what purported to be a letter written 
by the Mani Begum which referred 1 to bribes in Connection 
with the guardianship of the young Nawab. The signature 
was doubtful; the Begum repudiated the letter; the seal 
appeared genuine, but a perfect counterpart was subse- 
quently found among Nuncomar’sr effects. The Triumvirate 
demanded that Nuncomar should be hfard before the 
Council. Hastings declined entirely to preside at his own 
trial, refused Nuncomar a hearing, but offered to submit the 
charges to a Committee. Thric^ he broke up the Council, 
and on his retirement with Barwell the rest carried on the 
sittings. At last he resolved on \ co unter-stroke, indicting 
Nuncomar for conspiracy. The Council ostentatiously took 
$un comar’s part. 

Mohan The upshot was doubtful enough, when a deus ex machina 
Persad. appeared. For years a legal feud had been carried on with 
Nuncomar by a native named Mohan Persad. The estab- 
lishment of the new Iiigh Court with Its English Judges and 
English law presented an un looked for opportunity to this 
man’s legal adviser. The Brahmin was irfdicted for fisfrgery — 
a minor offence in the eyes of the Hindus, but a capital one 
at that date in the view of English law. Nuncomar was 
tried before the full court, found guilty, condemned and 
executed. 0 

The There is no shadow of evidence that the trial was con- 
execution ducted ^otherwise than with absolute fairness. The Judges 
°coman were unanimous > nor is it disputed that the evidence was 
conclusive. The propriety of the sentence can only be 
questioned on the ground that it was in accord not with 
Hindu but with English law ; but that fault belonged to the 
constitution of the Court. There was sufficient reason for 




the Council to obtain a respite in order to refer the matter 
to England ; but when the Triumvirate, the friends of 
Nuncomar, refused to move, it was hardly to be expected 
that Hastings should go out of his way to protect his own 
enemy. Nor is there the faintest evidence that Hastings 
had pullgdT the strings which set the trial in motion. The 
circumstances are fully sufficient to account, without any 
imputations on the Governor-General, for Mohan Persad’s 
action ; the charge was brought by him with a vindictive 
intent, wh?n he realised # how much heavier the blow would 
be in consequence of the establishment of the Supreme 
Court. Hastings himself made oath that he had neither 
^ suggested nor encouraged it. But it fell so pat — it so 
completely serve 1 the purpose of wrecking the attack on 
Hastings — that Jhe mere human tendency to disbelieve in 
convenient coincidences remains as a sediment at the bottom 
of the otherwise empty cup of evidences against the Governor- 
General. ' 

With Nuncomar’s death, the case against Hastings col- 
lapsed completely. This # took place in June 1775. 1 ° the 

previous March, when the discussions in the Council were 
raging, Hastings had* written to his agents in England 
authorising them to lay his resignation before the Directors, 
if his conduct in regard to the Rohillas and Oudh were 
censured. In dMay, he had retracted this authorisation; 
nevertheless his resignation was subsequently submitted, by 
his agent in England, to the Directors, and acted upon by 
them. • • 

For the next twelve months, the struggle between Hastings The 
ajid .thejnaj ority of his Council continued ; his arrangements 
establishing district courts of justice were cancelled, and the Council, 
jurisdiction was restored to the Nawab’s officers; Mohammed 
Rheza Khan being reinstated to that end. The difficulties 
of the Bombay Government with the ‘ Marathas narrated in 
the previous chapter at this time offered the principal 
problem, the Surat treaty having taken place while the 
NuncomaT affair was in progress, and that of Purandar in 
the March following. Much of the Council's time was also 
occupied in conflicts with the Supreme Court, to which we 


shall presently revert. Monson!s death in. 1776 gave 
Hastings-predominance in the Council, and in the following 
year came the information from London that * the resigna- 
tion of Hastings had been accepted, that a Mr Whelesr was 
appointed to take his place, and that Clavering was to act in 
the interval. Hastings repudiated the resignation ; c he and 
Clavering issued antagonistic orders to the Military, who 
supported Hastings, and each claimed to act as Governor- 
General ; finally the question was referred to the arbitration of 
the Judges, who unanimously decide! in favour of*Hastings. 
Shortly afterwards, Clavering died ; Hastings was confirmed 
in his office by the Directors and Wheler arrived to take 
Monson’s place, the fifth seat on the Council being filled by 
Eyre Coote as military member. 1. The re-establishment of 
Hastings was probably in part due to the disastrous turn of 
events at this time in America, which made the maintenance 
of a strong chief in India the more imperative. 

Hastings The change inaugurated the (nird phase of Hastings’s 
dominant Governorship — the second after he became Governor-General. 

’ It is necessary to observe that bfoadly speaking, his rule 
coincides in time with that of North’s ministry in England. 
Burgoyne’s surrender at Saratoga corresponded with Claver- 
ing’s death at Calcutta: from that time till Rodney’s victory 
of The Saints in 1782, the war by sea and land went steadily 
against the British, and Hastings was not only left to his 
own resources in combating the coalitiohs of Native Powers, 
but was expected to find profits for the Company to pay in 
to the Treasury. 

Two reforms he was enabled by his newly acquired 
The superiority in the Council to carry out. The fiast was the 
i R g 0 e ^ e establishment of a Board for the systematic examination of 
* land tennis, and for the provision of* a sound basis * of 
assessment — a matter of the utmost importance, where the 
Government revenue is in the main derived from land. The 
second was the reconstruction of military arrangements in. 
The Qudh — the first example of the “ Subsidiary Alliances ” which 
^Alliance * ater developed ^ nto an immense instrument of ascendancy. 
^itj/Under treaty, the Oudh Nawab was bound to maintain an 
Oudh? army for the defence of the Ganges provinces : assisted by a 


brigade of the Company’s troops. Vlt was now arranged that the 
Nawab should have an army drilled, officered, controlled and 
paid by the British, who in return were to have the revenues 
of certain districts allotted to them for that purpose. System- 
atically applied, it is easy to see that such an arrangement 
would have far-reaching effects, practically turning the Native 
ally into a protected instead of an independent State, while 
in effect adding the allotted districts to the Company’s 
tentorial possessions. 

Now ateo Hastings wms enabled to deal with one of the 
most serious problems created by North’s Regulating Act — 
deposition of the Supreme Court. 

From the outset this was a most extraordinary anomaly. 

The device of a Cour^il ruling by a majority vote was The 
sufficiently strange ; but on to this North had tacked a Q^ me 
High Court, consisting of four judges to administer the law, 
without defining the relations between them and the Council. 

The Court then declared ^hat its members were responsible 
to the Crown at home, and to no one else, though they were 
acting in a country vMiere professedly the Nawab w r as 
sovereign, subject to a sort of undefined allegiance to the 
Padishah ; while the de facto ruler, controlling the military 
forces, which are the ultimate sanction of every government, 
was the Council. The Court claimed the right of haling all Contest 
cases before itself, constituted itself a general authority for between 
hearing and deciding on all complaint, and refused to recog- ^cUhe^ 
mse any superior authority. The Company’s servants up- Council, 
country, and the zemindars, found themselves liable to be 
dragged down to Calcutta every time that it suited an 
honest or # dishonest person to make a charge frivolous, 
fraudulent or genuine. Such a state of affairs was manifestly 
intolerable. Hastings at an early stage endeavoured to urge 
upon Lojd North the need of terminating it by the definite 
assertion of the sovereignty of the British Crown in the 
Company’s territories ; but North was not the man to carry 
out such a scheme. At last matters reached such a pitch 
that Hastings, despite his personal friendship with Impey, 
was forced to join with Francis in asserting the authority of 
Council ; the process of the Court was disregarded by 

^ ' H *' 


I 1 

order of the Council, backed by the troops ; the Court issued 
writs, summonses, and fulminations against the Council and 
its abettors, ^ho ignored them. The remedy was devised 
by Hastings. * 

Hastings's The Council had seen fit to restore the Nawab’s criminal 
grange- jurisdiction in the districts of the Provinces, the civil and 
ment ‘ fiscal jurisdiction being combined in the hands of the Com- 
l pany’s revenue officers, blastings now separated the civil 
* and the fiscal, established civil courts in the districts, and 
transferred the appeal, which had kin to the Council, to a 
Court of Appeal — the “ Sadr Diwani Adalat ” — in Calcutta, 
and offered the position of chief in this court and general 
supervisor of the system to Impey as an officer under the 
Company. Impey accepted, the deadlock was removed, and 
it was immediately found that the new system promised to 
work very satisfactorily. Hastings has been charged with 
giving, and Impey with receiving a bribe. But the plain 
fact is that a compromise between the two rival authorities 
was the only available method by which either could escape 
without discredit from an impossible situation, and the 
compromise was acted upon loyally and judiciously, and 
entirely to the public advantage. 

Two more episodes of his Governor-Generalship were 
afterwards used against Hastings with great effect, and do, 
as a matter of fact, illustrate the great difficulties of his 
position and the unde&rable expedients*which he was forced 
to adopt — not in any sense to his personal advantage, but to 
obtain the funds without which the positi m in India would 
have been untenable. These are the affairs of Benares and 
of the Oudh Begums. v 

The Benares was transferred to the British on the accession of 
Raja of Asaf-ud-Daulah, which in effect meant, that the Raja' of 
enareS ‘ fignj-res paid a tax or tribute tp thp British instead^of to the 
$Iawah. The title of Raja does not imply independence; 
there is no precise European equivalent ; it was borne both 
by independent sovereigns and by vassals of the great 
potentates. The Raja of Benares held his province by a 
^sort of feudal tenure analogous to, but not identical with, the 
mediaeval tenures of the West. Thus it is clear that while 


under ordinary circumstances he was liable for the amount 
of his tribute or rent and no more, he was also in time of 
war, or under other extraordinary conditions* liable to be 
called on for additional contributions by his superior, the 
fights haying been surrendered by the Oudh Nawab to the 
British. It was a matter of course in the East that any 
vassal thinking himself strong enough to resist such claims 
should do so ; but so far as the term legal is applicable to 
rules depending for their enforcement mainly on the relative 
strength ^of the individuals concerned, the claims to extra- 
ordinary aids were legal. 

Now r the Raja, Cheyt Singh, was quite strong enough to IJss 
have resisted pressure from the Oudh Nawab ; pressure from withe 
the British was another ^natter. ^In 1778 Hastings, embar- 
rassed by the* financial strain # of the Maratha troubles, 
demanded an extra contribution of five lakhs — ^50,000 — 
frpmJBe.nares. This $as paid. The demand was renewed 
next year, and again paid^but only after much delay. Then 
a contingent of horse was called for, but not provided ; and 
tlfe suspicion grew vefy strong that between Haidar Ali 
and the Marathas, Cheyt Singh thought the British were 
sufficiently deep in difficulties to warrant him in an attempt 
to throw off the yoke. Hastings, on the other hand, con- 
sidered that the utmost severity was needed in dealing with 
any sort of recalcitrancy under such conditions, and that the 
Raja might very wtdi be compelled to pay heavily, to the 
advantage of the Calcutta coffers. Therefore, instead of 
modifjpng his dtfnands, he ordered Cheyt Singh to pay a 
fine of fifty lakhs, and proceeded to enforce the demand in 
person, eitfering the Raja’s territory with what was, under 
the circumstances, a very small escort The Raja was 
placed under arrest in his own capital ; thereupon his The 
soldiers jose and cut up 4 he sepoys ; he himself escaped to Benares 
one of his fortresses ; and Hastings had to effect a rapid tion. 
withdrawal to Chunar, a few miles down the river. From 
thence he conducted operations and carried on business 
with extraordinary coolness and vigour. The nearest 
detachments of troops were ordered up, and Hastings was 
lucky in having Popham to command them. The district 


had broken into a flame, but it was quenched with great 
promptitude and skill. Cheyt Singh fled to Baodelkhapd, 
and a new J&aja was set up, whose family still hold the 
position. It was while at Chunar that Hastings carried on 
those negotiations with Sindhia which led definitely to the 
Maratha’s adoption of a friendly policy. 

The Qudh At Chunar also the Nawab of Oudh came to see him. 
Hastings wanted money from the Nawab, whose subsidies 

were much in arrear, and Asaf-ud-l>aulah took the oppor- 
tunity to point out that while he had none, the Begums had 
plenty which really belonged to him. It was only the 
British who prevented him from claiming his own, and if he 
did claim it, and get it, the British could have a share. It 
was true that the British had guaranteed the Begums their 
jaghirs or estates : but tlfis had been done in despite of 
Hastings, and there was a plausible case for maintaining that 
the Begums, bv fostering the Benares insurrection and acting 
against the British, had forfeited the support promised. 
Hastings was quite satisfied with the argument, which 
afforded fair justification for withdrawing British protecti6n 
frpm the Begums ; but he went further, ordered the Nawab 
to seize forcibly not only the jaghirs, but also the treasures 
in the palace of Faizabad (the abode of the Begums), used 
the Company’s troops, and sanctioned a severity and a 
violence in carrying out the programme of compulsion which 
were an outrage to iiliropean ideas though mild enough 
according to Oriental practice. The Begums, however, were 
granted an abundant pension, w'hile the Nawab w r a$ qnabled 
to pay up his arrears. 

Warren Hastings acted with his eyes open ; he reckoned on being 
Hastings : held up as an object of horror to the British public ; and he 
ciT^and acce P te( I obloquy for himself that the State might have 
Wracter* S a * n - I n the case of Nuncormr, the worst tha f t can be 
said of Hastings is that he did not go out of his way to be 
magnanimous. In fact, magnanimity appears to have been 
the great want of his character. To friends he could be 
generous, towards opponents he came perilously near to 
being vindictive. He treated the politics of India as a 
matter of business in which there was no room for senti* 


mental considerations. The three episodes on which hostile 
historians fasten are the Rohilla war, and the affairs of Cheyt 
Singh and of the Oudh Begums. It is probable that in each 
of tltese cases Hastings honestly persuaded himself of the 
justice of his course. In none of the three is it possible to * 
find a l\jnt of any personal benefit to himself as a motive, 
fiy all three, the Company profited greatly. On each of the 
three occasions revenue was raised which was imperatively 
needed in order to avert disaster, and each time it was 
obtained Trom parties wfcose supposed hostility to the British 
gave the exactions the colour of reasonable if severe penalties. 
To a man endowed with a larger natural magnanimity, the 
penalties would have seemed extortionate, and the proof of 
the justifying hostility inadequate; yet it is extremely doubtful 
whether such a # man would not nave failed where Hastings 
succeeded, under the actual conditions. The difficulties were 
enormous ; the stake ^as enormous ; European dominion 
among Orientals was in\ts infancy. We have learnt by 
experience that European rulers must apply European stan- 
dards to the ethics of government ; but Clive in one notable 
instance had deviated from that rule and declared ever after 
that he had taken the* right course. Hastings was satisfied 
to know that not the most enlightened of Orientals would 
have had a moment’s scruple in taking the course which he 
took. The British reaped the advantages, and Warren 
Hastings paid the p'enalty. In 1785 he returned to Eng- 
land, and was attacked with all the virulence of Francis, the 
dramatic sensibility of Sheridan, and the moral lightnings of 
Edmund Burke. The exigencies of party politics turned the 
scale with Pitt and Dundas ; Hastings was impeached ; and 
although after some years the* Fords gave him honourable 
acquittal, the man *who saved India and whose departure 
from Beqgal was genuinely lamented by the natives, is still, 
to the eyes of many of his countrymen, presented as the 
type of all that a pro-consul ought not to be. 

Clive after his retirement from India became the target of 
the bitterest animosity in England. Warren Hastings was 
impeached. Wellesley was censured. Lord Hastings died 
the victim of unwarranted attacks. Later years have not 


been lacking in parallel cases. The treatment by the British 
Nation of the men who have to solve the problems of 
government in remote territories is scarcely a source of self- 
congratulation. Perhaps the best that can be said for *t is, 
that at the worst it has never been quite so scandalous as 
the treatment of La Bourdonnais, of Dupleix, and of Lally. 


extension' of supremacy 


(Maps* III. and VIII.) 

F ROM the foregoing chapters, the reader will have learnt, Growth 
if indeed he had not previously realised, the intimate °f the 
relation between the course^of events in India and occurrences p^ r 
in the West. The first „ stage of oftr struggle on Indian soil 
and in Indian wdlers had been one of rivalry with France ; 
its outcome had depended less on the comparative capacities 
of French and English in\ndia than on the naval contest 
fought out for the most part in European seas. As its 
result, the French rivalry was permanently removed from 
the effective to the merely potential sphere; so that the 
British were enabled -to reap unchallenged the fruits of 
Clives triumphs in Bengal. I n Jffie ^.econd. stage, the 

British were involved in prolonged complications with the 
Country Power in which they were forced to depend 
entirely on their own resources in IndiR ; and to strain those 
resources to the very uttermost, because the Mother Country 
chose t<^ involve herself in a conflict with her own American 
colonies, which expanded into a struggle for life against the 
combined forces of France and Spain. 

Throughout both phases, the chief authority in India was 
perpetually hampered by the authority in Leadenhall Street, 
which in its turn was largely manipulated according to the 
exigencies # and the varying influences of parties and groups 
at Westminster, which cared little and knew less about the 
actual conditions prevailing in Hindostan and the Dekhan. 

^The genius and resolution of Warren Hastings achieved 
victory in the face of difficulties to which almost any other 
man would have succumbed ; but at the cost of such mis- 



representation and vilification of that great statesman that 
it has taken the best part of a century to restore — and not 
even now completely to restore — the good name of which he 
ought never to have been robbed. # 

Mutual From the peace of 1783 till the outbreak of the war with 
of^eventsth e French Republic in 1793, and indeed for some years 
in East longer, affairs in India ceased to be affected diredly by the 
and West. European relations of Great Britain. Then, as the vast 
designs of the new Military Chief of France began to be 
revealed, the idea of French intervention again assumed 
huge proportions in the eyes of Indian statesmen, and 
dominated their policy, until that Titanic career was checked 
by Nelson and finally broken by Wellington. But if 
European international politics cease for a time to influence 
the policy of Indian Governors, the period before us opens 
with a parliamentary struggle at Westminster as a factor of 
primary importance : Indian affairsxplaying a very large part 
therein. For it is a mutual influence that we have to 
recognise : the influence of India in England, as well as that 
of England in India. • « 

The long and disastrous government called Lord North's, 
but in truth that of King George LI I. himself, had at last 
given place to a Whig Administration : but when after a 
few months Lord Shelburne became its head, parties broke 
up and the famous Coalition ministry resulted — the ministry 
in which Fox and North, who held no political principles 
whatever in common, combined to drive out Shelburne. 
It^ wa s recognised on all hands that .a, pew system^ust bp 
introduced in India, and the Coalition Government brought 
ijrj an Indian Bill. 

Fox's It was manifest that whatever the new Constitution for 
India Bin. India might be, two things were absolutely necessary. The 
J Governor-General must have immense latitude of action ; 
and political control could no longer be allowed *to rest in 
the hands of a body of men who in the nature of things 
could not depose Dividends from being their first and second 
and third consideration. Government must assume a largely 
increased share of the responsibilities. Fox's bill however, 
Yfhil e covering these two points, included as a cardinal 



part of it a proposal which aroused the passionate opposition 
of the King, the Company and every politician who was not 
in the Coalition. Control was to be vested in a body of 
sevencommissioners, appointed for a term of fo ur^e ars by 
the legislature ; who should not only dictate^olicy, but 
should h^kbfhe bestowal of all appointments in their hands. 

The patronage of the Crown, and the patronage of the 
Company were annihilated; and to make matters worse, 
even the commercial management was to be transferred to 
a ijew bdBy not elected by the Company but chosen by 
the legislature — that is, by Government — from among the 
Proprietors. A storm of opposition arose ; it was a trick, 
men said, by which ministers hoped not only to enrich 
their own followers forthwjjh, but to acquire during the four 
years ensuing such a force of “Nabobs” behind them as 
would give a permanent control over parliamentary elections. 
Secure in a big majorto. ministers defied the storm ; their 
Bill went triumphantly thr^igh the Commons ; but the King, 
in flagrant violation of constitutional practice, gave the Peers 
to Understand that he would regard their votes as personal 
to himself. The Lords threw out the Bill ; the King re- 
quired the resignation *of ministers ; to the general astonish- 
ment, the young William Pitt accepted the leadership, and 
fought almost single-handed for three months against the 
banded forces the ablest debaters and most experienced 
parliamentary hands y while his popularity rose, the majorities 
against him diminished, and the mockery of his antagonists 
gave j^ace to al%rm. In March 1784, parliament was 
dissolved : when the new one met, Pitt’s minority had been 
turned int<j an overwhelming majority. 

The regulation of Indian affairs was now in the hands of Pitt’s 
Piflt and his right# hand man Duhdas. The India Bill * ndia 
brought in by them supplemented by a declaratory Act a few 
years later, remained the instrument under which our Indian 
possessions were governed, with minor modifications, until 
the extinction of the Company in 1858. 

The vital featuii^aiLJitt's India Act were these. Each * 
of the three Presidencies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay, 
was to have its own Governor, and its own Commander-in- 


Chief, and two other members of Council ; but the Governor 
and the Commander-in-Chtef of Bengal were to be supreme 
also over the other two provinces. The Governor-General 
had very full powers, which were so far increased «at the 
insistence of Lord Cornwallis that he could act on emergency 
without his Council. He was, however, to abstain from com- 
promising alliances without directions from home. The 
Directors retained their patronage, and their general power 
of Tssuing instructions ; but they were subordinated to a 
parliamentary Board of Control, changing with tHe ministry 
of the day, with" a minister at its head, having access to all 
correspondence and general powers of supervision. Thus 
while the Directors retained the bulk of the patronage, the 
Board of Control — in other wprds the ministry — could 
exercise a very effective share therein (utilised, as some com- 
plained, by Dundas, who was first President of the Board, 
to inundate India with ScotsmenVand practically had the 
most important appointments in iA’ own hands. 

Lord The first Governor-General appointed under the new 
Corn- S y S tem was Lord Cornwallis ; a man whose sterling character 
va 1S * and high ability were sufficiently demonstrated by the fact 
that he retained the entire confidence of the public in spite 
of his having been in command at Yorktown when it was 
forced to surrender, and thereby end the effective contest 
between Britain and the American colonies The office of 
Governor-General wa#' held ad interim from the recall of 
Hastings to the arrival in India of Cornwallis in September 
1786 by Sir John Macpherson. It hadr been intended to 
appoint Lord Macartney, the Governor of Madras ; but the 
claims to authority which he desired to have fornyiily ratified 
were made an excuse for cancelling the appointment, which 
was unpopular, although the same claints were conceded* to 
Cornwallis. The final appointment was made in accordance 
with the rule generally but not quite universally recognised 
thereafter, that while the Council should consist of Indian 
experts, the Governor-General should be a man trained in 
another arena. 

, Cornwallis reached India in September 1 186, with the 
^avowed intention of carrying out a policy norof expansion 



I fflt o f Consolidation and Retrenchment* Like not a few of 
his successors, however, he found that, opposed as he might 
be to British aggression, a nti-Br itish aggression demanded a 
response more stringent than diplomacy ; and that in India, \ 
the policy of restoring conquests after victory is not under- 
stood, buj regarded as an invitation to challenge a fresh 
contest at a convenient opportunity. 

The Marathas, as we have seen, made their peace with The 
the British when Haidar Ali died. Tippu, the new Sultan ^°^ rs 
of hjysore^iad also mad# his peace some while after; but |) e khan. 
on terms, and under circumstances which the fatuity of the ,w 
Madras Government had enabled him to regard and to 
represent as magnanimous concessions to the humble 
entreaties of the British. Jrlis subsequent conduct showed^ 
that^jke was filled w r ith extravagant Sdeas of his own power 
and abilities, ancf of his role as a propagandist of Islam. 

He forcibly converted fhns of thousands of his subjects, 

Hindus, or Christians, to tne Faith, with sundry barbarities ; 
and Nana Farnavis at Puna became seriously alarmed ; 
the Aore so as the recent proceedings of the British did not 
point to their taking an active part in keeping the Sultan in 
check. Now the Nana’S theory of allies w r as that they were 
meant to serve as catspaw r s. The most effective catspaws 
failing, he fell back on the Nizam : who, however, held his 
own theory mutatis mutandis. So the Nizam and the Nana 
continued to operate • again st the formidable Tippu„ each 
seeking to shift the burden of work on to the other without 
prejudicebto his ownsclaim on the spoils. 

The Puna Government had another reason for activity Madhava 
in the Dekjian. Madhava Rao or Madhoji Sindhia in 
Hindostan was working out a policy of his own. We have ^ wa# 
already observed, hoW that able diplomatist had made it 
his businejs to fulfil the wle of conciliator and arbitrator, 
with a particularly keen eye to his owm advantage in every • 
instance. So skilfully had he handled his opportunities 
that even the disasters inflicted on him by Popham and 
Bruce had not prevented him from emerging successfully 
out of the treaty of Salbai with dominions and prestige un- 
diminished. This threatened ascendancy was eyed askance 


by the Puna Durbar ; none the less as the ambitions of the 
Gwalior chief became more clearly revealed. '/The object 
to which he now devoted himself was in fact tjig r dominatigin 
of Upper Hindustan, under a specious display of ostentatious 
personal humility and loyalty to the ghost of an Emperor 
at Delhi, and the ghost of a Peshwa at Pupa, whose 
ancestors had been served by his own in the capacity of 
slipper-bearer. The very ingenious pose adopted was that 
of a mere instrument of the Padishah, who was lord of 
India, and of his vicegerent, the acknowledged 8hief of the 
Marathas. The Panjab was beyond Sindhia’s, range: the 
gradual mastery of Mohammedan rivals at Delhi, and of native 
chiefs in Rajputana, sufficiently occupied his energies. The 
peculiarity of the position lay however in this : that ostensibly 
the Patel 1 as he was csfiled, assumed no ^rivalry with other 
Maratha chiefs, made no attacks m them, and gave them no 
opportunity for attacks on him. 'P'Te only method of counter- 
balancing his power was for them to achieve independent 
successes in other regions — that is to say in the Dekhan. 

Sindhia Sindhia’s attitude to the British is open to various hiter- 

Brftish 6 P retat ^ ons * He ^ as been credited with a life-long endeavour 
’ to combine the natives of India against them. On the 
other hand he has been credited with anticipating the attitude 
adopted in the Panjab at a later date by Ranjit Singh, of 
seeking a steady alliance with them, much* in the same way 
as he anticipated that astute monarch’s schemes of military 
reconstruction on a European basis. The latter theory 
appears at least to be nearer the tru'h than th^ former. 
But it is not altogether the truth. In the seventies, the 
military strength of the British was an uncertain quantity. 
Well led, they were invincible : but there was no certainty 
that they would be well led. Sindhifc, therefore, was only 
inclined to oppose them as om who might desire their 
friendship to-morrow. \ The vicissitudes of Ragoba’s wars, 
established in his mind two convictions; one, that if they 
showed military incapacity in one quarter, they were 
tolerably certain to redress the balance with startling effect 
in another : the second, that the folly of subordinates could 
1 Patel, sometimes written Potail, is the title of a village head-man* 



not cancel, however it might hamper, the supreme capacity 
of Hastings. Thereupon, his attitude underwent a slight 
change. vH e^ bofiaiPfiJte ^frieadLof the British *., with £ 
m entaUr^g gy yft tiQn : remaining on the watch for any display 
ofweakness. No sooner was Hastings out of the country, and 
control fqjr the time vested in Sir John Macpherson, than 
he put the new chief to the test by reviving the Emperor’s 
claims to tribute. Sir John’s reply was decisive, and the 
demand was promptly withdrawn with explanations. The 
expyiment*was repeated* with a like result towards the 
close of the Cornwallis administration. yBriefly, if the 
British should show a becomingly retiring disposition, 

Sindhia meant to take full advantage of it : but he was quite 
resolved to have no war jvith them, to display no active 
hostility in his own person, unfess quite unexpectedly 
favourable circumstances should arise. 

Thus when Cornwallis*^ ppeared in India in the autumn Cornwallis 
of 1786, he found Tippu ui the Dekhan waging war with and the 
the Nizam and the Southern Marathas, on the whole to 
the Advantage of Mysore, *while Madras stood aloof ; and 
Sindhia working out Ins own private policy in Upper 
Iiindostan. Here, there was certainly no demand for 
intervention ; while a reorganisation of the military establish- 
ment in the South was a sufficient warning to Tippu, that 
if intervention tbere should become necessary it w T ould be 
effective. For the time being therefore, peace was restored 
in the Dekhan, and the Governor-General was able to give 
his attention to thy# jreform of abuses, and a modification 

Jjhe treaty with Oudh, where the incapacity and misrule 
of successijjp Nawabs was to be a perpetual source of 
perplexity to one Governor-General after another. On 
this ’occasion, the Nawab’s Government was hardly touched, 
but his finances were assisted by a reduction of the subsidy 
claimed by the British, and by the repudiation on his behalf 
of the private debts, most of which in fact if not in form 
were in the nature of outrageously usurious loans. 

The abuses attacked at this time were of the personal Reforms 
kind — jobbery, corruption and extortion. The great weight 
of Cornwallis’s name enabled him to take a firm stand, " a 


and flatly refuse to pay attention to the countless applica- 
tions which poured in from influential quarters — from the 
Prince of Wales downwards — for posts for incompetent or 
worse than incompetent prot^gds; and even to force upon 
the Directors what the Governor-General's predecessors had 
striven for in vain, the appropriation to the Company’s 
servants of salaries reasonably commensurate with the 
responsibilities of their position. 

till 1788 that the relations with ihe Country 
Powers , began to, look threatening. As long ago as 1768, 
The a* treaty had been made between the Nizam and the Madras 
Nizam. Government, by which the former agreed that on the 
demise of the then Governor, Basalat Jangh, brother of 
the Nizam, a district known as* the Guntur* Sarkar should 
be ceded to the British. This cession had never been 
carried out ; and Cornwallis, in accordance with instructions 
from home, having waited till th^Nizam was free from the 
embarrassments of his quarrel* with Tippu, now required 
that the provisions of the treaty should be given immediate 
effect. To the perplexed astonishment of the British, the 
Nizam replied by a prompt expression of his readiness to 
effect the cession, if they would duly carry out their part 
of the contract, and supply him on demand with forces 
to recover certain districts usurped — as the old treaty put 
it — by “ Haidar Naik.” However awkwardi or unreasonable 

- t 1 

now, there stood tne obligation by ‘treaty, though in the 
interval, the British had twice over formally acknowledged 
Haidar and Tippu as sovereigns of theudistricts in«question. 

. In short, the ingenious ineptitude of the Madras Govern- 
ment twenty years before was responsible for a Hfcry awkward 
situation. The British claim to the Guntur Sarkar had 
been quite independent of conditiohs; yet a pledge ‘had 
^gratuitously been given which retained a technical validity, 
/though its fulfilment had been rendered impracticable in 
\he interval. 

Com- The solution found by Cornwallis was a compromise. 

letter S to^ ere was no sort < ^ ou ^ )t ^at Tippu was merely waiting 
the Nizam! opportunity to renew hostilities with the British— that 

their extermination was the object he had most at heart; 



while Cornwallis was not disposed to take the initiative and 
make the attack himself. Accordingly he wrote a letter to 
the Nizam, on Tuly yth T 1780, explaining his view of the 
obligation imposed by the treaty. Vtixe troops as stipulated 
were to be . supplied to the Nizam, but were not to be 
employed ..against any_Enwer in. alliance with the British. 
iTthe districts named should come into possession of the 
British by the Nizam’s help, they should be handed over 
to him. A list of the “ allies ” was appended, in which 
Tippu waa*not named. ^The letter was virtually an under- 
taking that if the Nizam attacked Tippu, he should have the 
assistance as stipulated. On the other hand it required the 
active co-operation of the Nizam, and threw upon him the 
onus of challenging Mysore. 

The India Act had expressly fo’ifidden the formation of The 
alliances without Authority from London ; but it was one of Governor- 
the many advantages of Ijje Cornwallis appointment that he freedom 6 
could take risks which no Njthcr man could have done, and of action, 
was able to establish invaluable precedents. If a Clive or a 
Hastings cut through red-tope for the public service he did 
it at the risk of his own ruin. Cornwallis, without any 
pretensions to the genius of either of those great men, but 
with the advantage of a high and unsullied name, was able by 
sheer force of character and a sound and sober intelligence 
to achieve such ^ measure of public confidence as rendered 
him unassailable. In .spite of technics restrictions, he had 
in fact a free hand, and the precedent greatly increased the 
freedom of his successors. 

It is impossible to judge whether the letter to the Nizam 
precipitated Tippu’s action : his preparations for a movement Tippu 
were already virtually complete. By the treaty of Mangalur 
at the conclusion of tjae last war, 'fravancore at the extreme core# 
south of India, much coveted by Tippu, had been placed 
under Brifish protection. Now, in spite of warning, Tippu 
attacked Travancore before the end of December. He was 
repulsed, and thereupon gathered a great army to effect the 
desired conquest. The gage of battle was fairly flung down. 

The Nizam and the Puna Government were both ready to 
combine in the attack upon him after their own fashion. 



The British army was placed under the command of General 

Opening Owing to the deliberate, continuous, and criminal neglect 
campaign 0 f foe Governor of Madras, who took an early opportunity 
Tippu : living the country, Medows found himself in difficulties 

1790, from lack of supplies and of transport, very much as Eyre 
CooteTiad done in the war with Haidar. The Madras army 
.was to operate on the south of Mysore, while a second army 
was to march down the coast from Bengal and to co-operate 
from the North East of Mysore lat^r in the years. Medows 
in course of time capturejj „ Koimbatur (July 1790); # but 
when he attempted to advance through the passes to 
Seringapatam he was foiled by the superior skill of his 
opponent and forced to fall back. In August, the Bengal 
army reached the Carnatic, and in despite of Tippu a 
junction was ultimately effected towards \he close of the 
year : but the only satisfactory feai&re of the campaign was 
the brilliant success of a small detachment on the Malabar 
coast under the command of Colonel Hartley. 

Cornwallis now resolved to conduct operations in person ; 
for he himself, a distinguished soldier, held the office of 
Commander-in-Chief as well as that of Governor-General. 

Cornwallis In February (1791), having concentrated his army at Vellur, 
takes the some seventy miles from Madras, he marched up to the 
j ^ : Mysore plateau, evading Tippu whom he had successfully 
misled as to his intended route; aud captured ^Bangalqr, 
one of Tippu’s most important strongholds, before the end 
of March. This success had the eflect a of bringing up the 
Nizam’s army, which had hitherto been amusing itself on 
the northern borders of Mysore territory, and of encouraging 
the Marathas who had been similarly employed in a more 
westerly direction. < 

But the advance of the Marathas was unknown to the 
British, and the arrival of the Nizam’s forces had Enormously 
increased the difficulty of maintaining supplies, without pro- 
ducing any corresponding advantage. Cornwallis fought a 
successful action, and arrived before Seringapatam in May: 
General Abercromby (not Sir Ralph) was on his way up from 
the Malabar coast: but by this time, men and cattle alike 


were in such a condition that offensive operations had 
become impossible, and Cornwallis was obliged to order a 
retreat. The arrival of the Marathas did not facilitate 
matters ; in fact they seized the opportunity to ask for funds ; 
and with the implied alternative of their transferring their 
alliance there and then to Tippu, Cornwallis felt obliged to 
comply with the demand. The Marathas under their famous 
leader Hari Pant then retired to the North West, the Nizam 
tcT the North East, and Cornwallis himself Eastwards; to 
spend th^remainder of the year in reducing the fortresses of 
the Baramahal district lying between Vellur and Bangalur. 

The Mysore Sultan’s calculations were however much Third 
disturbed when he found that in the following January the campaign 
Governor-General was aggin on the march with an army 
better equipped with war material £nd supplies than he had 1792. 
yet brought into the field. This, the decisive campaign, was 
a short one. The British force was not only the best 
equipped but the largest tfiat had ever taken part in an 
Indian Campaign. On February 5th it was before an en- 
trenched position, in sigh? of Seringapatam. The defences 
were extraordinarily strong, but the English Chief planned 
and executed a night attack with entire success. Abercromby 
was coming up with reinforcements, and Tippu found that 
his best hope lay in submission. By the terms dictated, Resulting 
^nearly half of Tippu’s dominions were ^lrrendered, as well as acquisi- 
tive persons of two of»his sons and a heavy indemnity. In * ion . of 
spite of the discovery of documents which proved that both y * 
the Nizcqp and the*Marathas had been corresponding with 
Tippu throughout the war : in spite also of the purely 
imaginary ^Jraracter of the assistance they had rendered: 
Cornwallis treated the bargain with them as binding, and 
gave to each one-thifd of the ceded districts and of the 
indemnity. The British retained for themselves the Baramahal 
district, before mentioned, in which were important passes into 
Mysore, with other regions on the South and the West coast : 
these last being attached to the Bombay Presidency. 

This acquisition of territory was of course attacked in Approval 
Parliament, but Cornwallis was triumphantly vindicated, and or Corn- 
rewarded with a marquisate. The Statesmen of India and policy* 


Westminster alike viewed territorial expansion with no little 
apprehension. But it was thoroughly understood that there 
was no one more thoroughly opposed to an aggressive 
policy than Cornwallis himself: it was felt that if he r trans- 
gressed his own theory, it was only under the conviction of 
imperative political necessity. However reluctantly, it had 
to be recognised that only way of dealing with a resolutely 
aggressive Native potentate was to curtail his dominions ; 
whether the districts of which he was reft were taken 
under direct British control or *>nly under British pro- 
tection. Where there was no representative of a re- 
cognised and long established authority, the presumption 
was in favour of direct rule rather than the setting up 
of an authority incapable of n\aintaining itself unaided; 
but the decision in sucfi cases could not profitably rest in 
other hands than those of the supreme ‘British Authority 
on the spot. 

His further Not only did Cornwallis conduct a great war to a successful 
reforms, issue, and set a precedent in foreign policy ; under his rule 
were also effected far-reaching adirflnistrative changes. These 
will be examined in detail in later chapters ; here it will be 
sufficient merely to mention the famous “ permanent settle- 
ment ” of Bengal under which the land-revenue was established 
on a permanent system ; the final separation of the functions 
of Collectors and Magistrates ; the re-organisation — with 
very qualified success — of the criminal courts ; and the 
codification of the law, whereby an extremely elaborate code 
replaced the simple one previously framed by fyr Elijah 

His retire- Cornwallis retired from India at the close qf 1793, just 
meat, after the declaration of war between Great Britain and 
the Revolution Government in France, of which the only 
immediate effect in India was , f he seizure of Pondichery. 
v Loyal, just and resolute, he had confirmed the best traditions 
of British policy and British character ; happy in that free 
exercise of control which had been so desperately needed 
by his predecessor, and for the lack whereof that predecessor 
had won through so hardly, and with eternal discredit to 
the foes that were of his own household. 



The intention of those who had framed the new consti- His 
tution for British India was, that the Governor-General successor 
should be chosen from among men at home who combined *** 
a confirmed social position with recognised political talent,"*"* 
strong enough to resist the pressure of private influence, 
and ftm from the stereotyped preconceptions likely to be 
produced by an exclusively Oriental training. But such 
men were not easy to find, and Cornwallis was actually 
succeeded by an Indian Official, Sir John Shore: an 
admirable adviser, who* had done ""excellent service in 
connection with the land-settlement; but wanting in the 
vigorous self-reliance required to cope successfully with the 
complex diplomatic and military problems to which in 
India the term “Politicals is appropriated. 

The departure of Cornwallis was followed by a rapid Maratha 
succession of changes iy the personnel of the Maratha chiefs. affairs * 
Shore had no confidence in Sir Robert Ahercromby, his 
own commander-in-chief, £nd was unduly afraid of risking 
Maratha hostility. In consequence, a good deal of the 
prestige gained under Tjornwallis was lost during his 
administration. The great Sindhia, Madhava Rao, died in 
1 794, and was succeeded by a boy Daulat Rao : after two 
or three changes, a new Baji Rao became Peshwa and the 
Nana’s ascendancy at Puna was very uncertain ; Holkar was 
growing more •independent. All wtre disposed to treat 
British pretensions with diminished respect. Qjrmvallis 
lyad wished to cap the overthrow of Tippu by a guarantee 
treaty between the •Mara th as, the Nizam, and the British, to 
prevent any of the three being dragged into hostilities with 
yppu by*>ne of them, or any one of them adopting an 
digressive attitude towards another. This agreement had 
fceen avoided by the *Marathas who now proceeded to attack 
the Nizajp. Shore persuaded himself that, as the league 
was broken up, he was not called upon to defend the Nizam, 
who had to make submission and cede territories to Puna : 
and that monarch, disgusted by the desertion, attempted to 
secure his own position by raising fresh troops under the 
command of a French officer, Raymond, who had already 
rendered him efficient service. Fortunately the internal 



partisan troubles of the Marathas called them off from 
further aggression, and the British saw the necessity of 
substituting their own support at Haidarabad for the possible 
dangers of a force under French control. 6 

reputed son, Wazir Ali. But Wazir Ali’s title was challenged, 
and on enquiry the Governor-General was fully convinced 
that he was not the son of the lafe Nawab at alf: nor was 
there any son alive. Sir John accordingly informed Saadat 
Ali, brother of the late Nawab, that the British intended to 
place him on the throne, at the same time requiring him 
to accept a treaty on thpse termf. A British army of ten 
thousand men was to be maintained in OufJh, supported by 
an annual subsidy. The Nawab^own army was not to 
exceed thirty-five thousand ; and 'he was to have no in- 
dependent diplomatic relations with other powers. Allahabad 
was to be in possession of the British. It was a definite 
assertion of that British supremacy "in Oudh which had been 
implicitly but not explicitly recognised ever since a previous 
Nawab had been replaced on his throne by grace of Robert 
Clive. While the arrangements for Wazir Ali’s removal were 
being made, Sir John remained imperturbably at Lucknow, 
tjie Oudh capital, caVing up no military assistance ; being 
perfectly aware that he might at any moment be assassinated, 
but that on the other hand a collision between the British 
and Wazir Ali's followers might set thS whole province in 
a flame. His cool courage triumphed. Wazir Ali’s followers 
fell away day by day ; when Saadat Ali arrived at Lucknow, 
all opposition had been withdrawn without disturbance, and 
his rival was removed to meditate revenge, on a comfortable 
pension. # * 

pis Very different was the Governor-Generars management of 
contest a preceding episode, to which brief reference must be made. 

^Array? This was the virtual mutiny^ of the European officers of 
* the Bengal army in 1795-6. The Company's army had in 
fact been seething with discontent for a long time past. 
The total military establishment consisted partly of King's 



troops, i.e. regiments of the Regular army, partly of 
Company’s troops, that is regiments, of which some con- 
sisted of Europeans but most of Sepoys commanded by the 
Company's officers. There was extreme jealousy between 
the King’s officers and the Company’s officers, and between 
the Company’s officers and their Civilian fellows, who in 
their view were unduly favoured as compared with themselves 
under the new system of payment which Cornwallis had 
succeeded in introducing, (^ornwallis had proposed a scheme 
for# amalgamating the tvfo military branches; but this had 
not - found favour at home; and the expected alternative 
scheme of re-organisation was so unsatisfactory that the 
officers united to demand that certain concessions should be 
guaranteed, failing which 4hey should seize the government. 
In effect, Sir Johji and the Commander-in-Chief surrendered 
at discretion and granted everything in their power. The 
Ministry in England entreated Cornwallis to save the situa- 
tion by returning to India, and he agreed ; but when he 
found that Ministers themselves were negotiating with repre- 
sentatives of the Mutineers in London, and were on the 

point of inviting him to sail with instructions to concede 
everything, he resigned* in disgust. The office of Governor- End of 
General was thereupon accepted by Lord Mornington. Shore 
however had time to retrieve his reputation in Oudh, and to tration. 

justify the bestofral of a peerage — he became Lord Teignmouth 
— before Mornington # s arrival. 

The tact, firmness and courage displayed by Sir John Shore v 
in the Oudh affair iontrast curiously with his failure in other 
cases where vigorous action and readiness to accept responsi- 
bility werasdemanded. His persistent avoidance of interfer- 
ence in the Dekhan had only produced in the Nizam an 
impression that the*Eritish Power was but a broken reed, 
and in tjie Marathas and*Tippu a belief that its decay was 
setting in only rather more rapidly than was normal among 
the eternally changing dynasties of the “ unchanging East.” 
The delusion was to be ruthlessly shattered by Sir John’s 
formidable successor. 


The new 




LORD WELLESLEY: (i) 1798-1802 

{Map Ilf.) 

T ORD MORNINGTON, better known by his later title 
' ' as the Marquess Wellesley, was thirty-seven years of 
age when he was nomyiated G&vernor-General of India. 
He was a brilliant scholar, and had already *von considerable 
distinction as a speaker. On intimate terms with both Pitt 
and Dundas, he had already been fpr four years on the 
Indian Board of Control, and had a thorough knowledge, 
from that point of view, of Indian politics, as well a.% of 
European affairs. The policy of deliberate expansion with 
which he identified himself was to a great extent engendered 
by the progress of Napoleon, whose vast designs were 
beginning to be recognised at the time of Wellesley's 

The dominant conception in Indian statesmanship had 
hitherto been the preservation of a balance of power between 
the three .great States of Southern India, Mysore, Haidarabad 
and the Maratha confederacy. The feasibility of th£t policy, 
if no external factors were considered, was still doubtful ; 
since it depended largely on the acquiescence o! the three 
Powers*” which could by no means be continuously depended 
upon. „ Aggression was ingrained in the minds of Oriental 
princes, as being, so to speak , 9 part of their profession. 
None would have had the smallest compunction about 
annihilating another, if the opportunity occurred. Still the 
effort was made : and so, when Cornwallis had Tippu under 
his heel, he did not take advantage of the fact to destroy 
him, but only to reduce his power for independent 


LORD WELLESLEY: 1798-1802 137 

Now, however, the external factor had to be reckoned Tfcg - 
with. No one could foretell the developments of French 
powar under the guidance of a military genius with an F?^ C e, 
unbriiled imagination. If France should succeed in " ’ " 

achieving a renewed footing on Indian soil, as the ally of a 
native Rower, the British would certainly have to fight for 
life. Before Nelson’s great victory of the Nile (Aug. 1798) 
such a consummation was by no means impossible : even 
after it, the impossibility was very far from clear. To . 
counteract the danger l?y alliances with Native courts was 
insufficient, because no Native court could be relied on to 
maintain an alliance for a day, if any immediate advantage 
for itself could be acquired by desertion. Hence no oppor- 
tunity must be lost whereby the British could obtain in the 
native States a d { g facto military control. This was the more 
imperative, because ea<jh of the States had French officers 
and sepoy battalions in their service. Madhava Rao Sindhia 
had achieved the ascendaftcy, which he bequeathed to the 
young Daulat Rao, by entrusting his military organisation to 
a frenchman, De Boigne* the Nizam, denied assistance by 
Sir John Shore, had organised a force under the Frenchman 
Raymond : Tippu had* French officers in his pay, and was 
already very strongly suspected of being in correspondence 
with France. Finally, Napoleon was now making Egypt his 
immediate objective; and Egypt was# regarded as the half- 
way house to India.’ 

Wellesley touched at the Cape on his voyage to India, in The 
February (1798). # There he discussed the situation with situation 
sundry Indian experts — Lord Hobart, the last governor of * 
Madras : Macartney ; and others who had a thorough know- 
ledge of the native courts. Hence when he reached Calcutta 
in May he was already fully informed of the situation, and 
was prepared to act with the utmost promptitude and vigour. 

The danger was much more pressing than had been supposed 
when he left England, because there appeared to be a further * 
probability that the Afghan monarch of Kabul, Zeman Shah, *\\ 
was about to invade India; and his strength, though after A 
events showed it to have been vastly exaggerated, was 
believed to be very great, rendering the prospect of his 


alliance with the Mussulman zealot at Mysore particularly 

Wellesley had hardly arrived when, in June, a proclamation 
was printed in Calcutta which had been issued some riionths 
/ earlier by the French governor of Mauritius, inviting French 
citizens"* to take service with Tippu, in accordance with 
proposals received from that monarch. Tippu’s intrigues 
for French assistance were thus no longer a matter of 
suspicion but of absolute certainty. 

Prepara- The Marathas were for the time Sufficiently occupied with 
tionsfor a their own rivalries. Tippu required immediate attention ; so 
M War? ^ thS Nizam, lest he should be drawn with his French 
force into alliance with Mysore. Wellesley forthwith set 
about * preparations for a war with Mysore, and brought 
immediate pressure to near on Haidara^ad in order to 
remove danger in that direction. Tfje Nizam succumbed to 
the judicious vigour of Kirkpatrick and John Malcolm who 
were sent to negotiate with him/ The French corps known 
as Raymond's was disbanded : a British subsidiary fqrce 
was substituted, and the Nizam undertook to employ no 
Europeans without assent of the t Company. Malcolm 
remained at Haidarabad as Resident, his tact and vigilance 
securing freedom from any further danger in that quarter. 

To render Tippu harmless was a much heavier task; 
involving at least the txquisition by the British of the whole 
of the Mysore litoral : since, once completely cut off from 
the sea, the Sultan would not be able to work in concert 
with the French. The reasons for abiding a \far were 
sufficiently strong. The Madras authorities, both civil and 
military were full of apprehension ; they remembered how 
Medovrs and Cornwallis himself in his first campaign had 
been foiled in the last war, in spite of tTie victorious termina- 
tion of the final campaign. Thefe was still no prospect of 
efficient help from the Nizam, and a presumption that if the 
Marathas took a part at all it would be against the British. 
Wellesley however, had made up his mind : and happily he 
received dispatches from England which fully supported him. 
rHe made strenuous preparations, while pressing Tippu to 
make an amicable agreement, reject the French alliance, 

LORD WELLESLEY : 1798-1802 139 

dismi ss all Fre nch, officers, and_accept the presence of 
aJBrTtSh Resident As the year went on, he was able to 
emphasise his representations by reports of French mis- 
forturfes in Egypt. His demands were met only by constant 
evasions. By the New Year, there was still no hint of an 
accommodation being effected. Wellesley, knowing that the 
conditions of weather and climate demanded that the cam- 
paign should be finished decisively by June, resolved to 
strike at^pnce. 

ft’ ‘Bombay army was collected at Kananur on the Malabar Thg 
coast, close to Mah£, to advance from the West under Mysore H 
General Stewart. The main Madras army, commanded by ^^ aign 
General Harris, and accompanied by the Govern or-General’s * 
younger brother, Colonel •Arthur Wellesley, afterwards Duke 
of Wellington, yas to enter Mysore by way of Bangalur. 

By March (1799) th$ advance had begun. Tippu, who 
had shewn a good deal of his father’s military capacity 
on occasion, displayed little of it in this campaign. He 
attempted to crush Stewart’s smaller force on the South 
West ; but when his attack was repulsed after hard fighting, 
he changed his plans and fell back to oppose the advance 
of Harris on the North East. He was again defeated, and 
retired to cover the expected route of the invaders to 
Seringapatam : but Harris evaded him, by following a more 
southerly line bf march, which afforted better facilities for 
transport beside simplifying the junction with the Bombay 
force : and Tippu had to withdraw rapidly to Seringapatam. 

Early iif April, siegfe works were advanced close to the town ; 
about the middle . of the month, Tippu was sufficiently 
alarmed fo open negotiations. But the General’s terms 
were too severe for him, and he rejected them with great 
indignation. The besiegers, however, were in desperate 
need of. supplies : a protracted siege was out of the 
question, and on May 4th Seringapatam was carried by fail of 
$torm. The fight was very fierce ; great numbers of the Seringa- 
defenders were killed, and among them Tippu himself, 
whose courage at least did not fail him. With the fall of 
Seringapatam, the rule of the Mussulman dynasty of Mysore 
was ended. 



The . The Mysore war differs from those that follow it in this ; 
Mysore that it was a war against a Dynasty, while they were wars 
ynas ^ with races. The hostility of Mysore to the British ceased 
with the fall of the house of Haidar Ali. There was no 
Mysore People with a tradition. But Marathas and Ghurkas 
and Sikhs retained a national tradition, however tfoeir wars 
with the British might result. In Mysore Haidar himself 
was but a Mohammedan adventurer who occupied the 
throne of a Hindu principality and made the neighbouring 
principalities subject to himself. 'I’ippu has been made*the 
subject of panegyric ; but his fanaticism and his cruelties are 
unquestionable facts, while his virtues appear to be quite 
apocryphal. The moral claims of any rule obtained by the 
sword can be tested only by the beneficial character of the 
government and its power of resistance to adversaries : at 
least until a considerable period ,has elapsed since its 
establishment. But the Mussulman dominion in Mysore 
lasted for less than forty years. * The Sultan’s kin were the 
. only losers by its annihilation ; r and membership of, an 

Oriental royal family carries with it so many risks as to be 
an extremely doubtful privilege. 

Partition The division of the spoils offered a serious problem. The 
of Mysore. Nizam had actually given help and was fairly entitled to a 
share ; policy required that the Marathas should be offered 
a share also. On thfc other hand, it would be unsafe for 
the British either to seize too much or to give away too 
much. The solution arrived at was ingenious. 

A large portion of the territory was reserved intact^and the 
representative of the old Hindu dynasty was made Raja under 
British protection ; that is, under conditions which' precluded 
the protected State from assuming a hostile attitude. The 
Marathas were offered the north-western districts, on condi- 
tion of an anti-French alliance, aif‘ undertaking to employ no 
Europeans without the Company’s consent, and a promise to 
guarantee the inviolability of the new Mysore State. They 
rejected these terms, and the territory was consequently appro- 
priated partly to the British and partly to the Nizam. To the 
Njzam also were assigned the districts from Chitaldrug to 
Guti, his boundaries being thus carried some way south of 

LORD WELLESLEY: 1798-1802 141 

the line of the Tanghabadra and Krishna rivers, to which 
they had been driven back by the aggressive Mohammedan 
chiefs. The British took the lion's share, appropriating all'i 
the Mysore litoral and the southern districts below the Ghats 
as well as the control of the forts commanding the passes, 
including; Seringapatam ; the British and the Nizam between 
1 them thus almost completely encircling the new Mysore State. 

The value of the conquest was completely secured by a Subsidiary 
^further treaty with the Nizam in 1800. That monarch found , 

hinjself ii? serious difficulties. He was not strong enough to Nizam f 
resist the constant pressure and claims for chauih of the 1800. 
Marathas, or to control his own tributaries who found it 
safer to resist his demands than those of Puna. Hence 
also hjs subsidies to the ^British fell in arrear. He there- 
fore finally accepted British protection. In return for a 
British force of ten thousand men — available, not as 
before only in case of open war, but for general defence 
against aggression — and t in lieu of a subsidy for their 
maintenance, he handed over to the British his share of 
the* Mysore territories ; at the same time agreeing to sub- 
mit all his disputes to British mediation. « Thus the only 
independent Power left in the Dekhan was that of the 
Marathas ; while this immense advance of the British 
supremacy had been effected in a manner and under con- 
ditions of wlrch the legitimacy yas beyond dispute ; 
although the Governor-General had carried the theory of 
his right to act without specific authority to its extreme 

A like extension of supremacy was about to be effected in 
Oudh ; wiggle in the south a supremacy already existing was Annexa- 
converted into practically direct dominion. Questions of 
succession arose at Surat and Tanjur, both small States ; in Tanjur, 
both cases, the British government coupled its recognition of and Arcot 
the heir with a treaty which transferred the entire administra- 
tion civil and military to its own hands. More important 
was the termination of the system of dual control in the 
Carnatic. Hitherto, the treaties had provided that the British^ 
should protect the Nawab’s territories in returp for a subsidy: 
that they should not interfere with his administration ; but 


that he should have no independent diplomatic relations with 
other powers. On the failure of subsidies, districts had been 
assigned as fixed sources from which the payment should be 
drawn. -The Nawabs however continued to sink deeper and 
deeper into debt, privately, giving mortgages even on the 
assigned districts; while their general administration was 
hopelessly incapable; and finally, convincing evidence was 
produced that the reigning Nawab was in treasonable corre- 
spondence with Tippu even" at the time of the last war. These 
discoveries were not hastily acted upon; but in it?oi, Lprd 
Clive the Governor of Madras was instructed to make strong 
representations to the Nawab, Omdal ul Omrah. Action how- 
ever was suspended owing to the Nawab’s illness. On his 
- death in July, there was as usual a disputed succession ; and, 
also as usual, no decisive? rule for judging the force of the 
respective claims. Government could recognise whom it 
would; and it put a price on its recognition — the accept- 
ance of ajtreajty. Under this instrument, “the entire adminis- 
J ' T tration was transferred to the Company, which took, over the 
responsibility for the liquidation <3f legitimate debts ; while 
the new Nawab kept the title and dignity, and an assignment 
of an adequate revenue. 

Thus in 1801 all India south of the Tanghabadra and 
Krishna rivers was under direct British dominion ; except the 
new Mysore State anc^ some small principalities which were 
however effectively under British control : whilst the Nizam’s 
independence had become very little more than a figure of 
speech. In the same year, the defensive cposition in. Hindo- 
T be stan was secured by the enforcement of a new treaty 
cSo^dh 1 u P on There the prevailing conditions w$re exceed- 

9 u h * ingly anomalous. Qudh lay as a buffer between the 
.British dominion on one side, and o A the other Sindhia’s 
dominion, or any invader from beyond the Satlej ; whether 
the Sikhs, who were hardly yet recognised as formidable, or the 
Afghans who were supposed to be more formidable than the 
facts warranted. Hence the vital importance of Oudh being 
th oroughlj^. defensible . Under the existing treaties, a British 
army was already maintained in Oudh, by means of a subsidy 
which had been in fact commuted for the cession of territory. 

LORD WELLESLEY: 1798-1802 143 

In addition, however, th$ Nawab of Oudh maintained an 
army of, his own, over which he could exercise only very 
inefficient control : so much so that while it was of the 
utmost importance to keep the whole British force 
ready for action on the frontier, a large portion of it 
was required to dominate the Nawab’s own troops. More- 
over the internal administration of Oudh was conspicuously 

Wellesley then came to the conclusion that the Nawab’s l*ew 
*t>wn arm,* must be reduced or . disbanded and the British 
conHngent increased. This would involve an increased Oudh. 
subsidy ; which could only be secured, in the existing state 
of the Nawab’s finances, by a cession of territory; the 
territory required being roughly Rqhilkhand and the district 
known as the Qoab, lying between the Ganges and the 
Jamna. The necessity for this arrangement was impressed 
on Saadat Ali, who protested vigorously against it, and 
declared that he would abdicate. Wellesley replied that 
if he abdicated the Government must be handed over 
entirely to the Company, since, if he with all his experience 
was unable to cope with the difficulties of the situation, 
obviously his youthful heir would be no better off. The 
Nawab withdrew his suggestion of abdication; Wellesley 
replied that in that case the cession of the districts and the 
reform of the a/my must be forthwith) carried out, and the 
right of the British admitted to advise on internal administra- 
tion, though this had hitherto been expressly negatived in 
the treaties. Saadat Ali argued that as he was not in arrears 
with his subsidies, the British had no right to make new 
demands. % The technical answer to him, that there was no 
security for his solvency in the immediate future, was clearly 
insufficient. In effect, the Governor-Generals real position t 
was that the public safety imperatively required a reorganisa- 
tion, and since the existing treaty did not provide for it, the 
Nawab must accept a new treaty whether he liked it or not. 

The negotiations were entrusted to another of the Wellesley 
brothers, Henry, afterwards Lord Cowley: and finally the 
Nawab submitted under protest, declaring that he did so 
only because it was not in his power to resist 



Peculiar The justification of the Governor-General's high-handed 
positioner action lay in the two principles ; that under Oriental condi- ^ 
' tions,* no existing Government in India could be held to have 
really acquired the full status of what international jurists 
mean by a State ; and that a State in the Oriental sense I 
could not be allowed to subsist on the British border under 
conditions which made it a standing source of peril. To 
this it is fair to add that Oudh itself had always stood in a 
peculiar relation to the British since the battle of Buxar. 
By all Oriental custom, it had then become forfeit to the 
British, having been overthrown in a war in which it fiad 
openly acted the part of aggressor entirely without provoca- 
tion ; and there was always a tacit sense that while the 
British had shown a surprising generosity in not claiming 
the forfeit, their title to* do so on occasion still remained 
morally valid. 1 

During the first period of his career', the Governor-General's 
energies were by no means restricted to dealings with the 
Wellesley’s Country Powers. ^'His views of Indian policy had their root 
gainst * n P r0 ^ em which Bonaparte wt.s presenting to the staies- 
France. men of Europe. Having a grasp of the principles of maritime 
defence, Wellesley would have crippled the activity of the 
French in Eastern waters by falling upon their naval station 
at the Mauritius ; which they were able to use greatly to the 
detriment of the traffic round the Cape, gjid would have 
become trebly dangerous, if the maritime supremacy of 
Britain could have been shaken, as a base for attacking India 
itself. In this, however, he was foiled ^by the obstinacy of 
Admiral Rainier, who refused to carry out his instructions 
without orders from the Admiralty ; and the opportunity was 
lost. Similarly his efforts to make use of Ceylon were foiled 
by the obstinacy of the Governor, and 4 he refusal of ministers 
to incorporate that island with the Indian dominions. His 
activity however was congenially displayed in the dispatch to 
Egypt in 1800 of an expedition commanded by Sir David 
Baird. The troops on their arrival found no fighting to do, 
as their approach decided the French to capitulate to the 
force from England which was already there. The idea of 
a combined Franco-Russian invasion overland also led to 

LORD WELLESLEY: 1798-1802 14S 

the opening of diplomatic relations with Persia, by the 
magnificently equipped and skilfully conducted mission of 
John Malcolm to Teheran. 

In 1802, however, Wellesley was on the verge of a struggle 
with the one Power which might, under slightly altered 
conditions, have seriously contested the British ascendancy 
in India. ' 


LORD WELLESLEY: (2) 1802-1805 
{Maps V, and, VIII) 

W ELLESLEY’S Mysore policy and his triumph over 
Tippu had been hailed with universal applause, 
Dis- alike in England and in India. The subsequent application 
a RP , ‘J > l Va J oi of the same root principle, the flat negation of the ideal of 
C at the non-interference, was viewed with much dLfavour in Leaden- 
India hall Street and with only half-heartefc approval by the ministry 
House. * n L on cl on> In fact, the Directors and Proprietors were 
growing distinctly hostile to the Governor-General. Other 
causes were combining to this usd. . The Governor-General 
was exercising patronage extensively. His appointments 
were indisputably excellent, but the Directors felt that a 
privilege which they still regarded as their own was slipping 
from their hands. They required the cancellation of the 
appointment of Henry Wellesley to the administration of 
the districts ceded by Oudh, which were afterwards known 
as part of the North West Provinces; as well as of other 
appointments ; to the extreme disgust of Lord Wellesley. 
They were indignant with him, because he recognised what 
had now become the necessity of admitting merchants other 
than the Company to the privileges of trade ; since they 
believed that their financial interest would suffer by any 
relaxation of their monopoly. Wellesley perceived the 
urgent need of educating the Company’s servants in India 
for the performance of their functions as rulers, and on his 
own responsibility established a college in Calcutta partly 
for that purpose. The Company demanded the abolition of 
the college, and only under pressure from the Board of 
Control assented to its maintenance in an eviscerated form. 




LORD WELLESLEY: 1802-1805 147 

They regarded Wellesley’s tone towards them as arrogant, 
he considered their tone to him as insulting. Moreover he 
was vehemently dissatisfied with the treatment he received 
from (government, who had rewarded him with an Irish 
Marquisate for converting the Dekhan into a province of 
Britain. As yet however, neither directors nor ministers were 
at all prepared to do without him ; and when he sent in his 
resignation in 1802, he was requested with complimentary 
phrases to continue at his post. 

Now, however, a new* phase was opened by the com- 
plications of Maratlja affairs. 

On the death of Madhava Rao Sindhia in 1794, his vast Feuds 
dominion and a somewhat impaired supremacy among the ^ratha 
Marathas descended to the young Daulat Rao. The death leaders, 
of the Peshwa, the nominal head of# the confederacy, shortly 
afterwards led to <he establishment in that position of Baji 
Rao, son of that RagonMh Rao or Ragoba who had caused 
so much disturbance in the time of Warren Hastings. The 
minister Nana Farnavis, after some fluctuations of fortune, 
returned to his position cm admittedly the shrewdest head 
in Maratha counsels till his death in 1800. The dominions 
of the house of Hollar had for some time been well 
administered by Ahalya Bai, the widow of the last chief, 
excellently served by Takoji Holkar, a member of the same 
clan. These twx> dying within a sho^t time of each other, 
the Holkar succession and the Holkar dominions fell into 
the utmost confusion ; out of which Jeswant Rao Holkar, 
son of Takoji, ultimately emerged as the chief ; in alliance 
with Amir Khan, a Nathan leader of free-lances. Through- 
out 1800-1802, Holkar and Sindhia and the Peshwa were 
raiding anff ravaging in each other’s dominions, each striving 
for his own suprema<jy. At last, in October igg^ there 
was a fierce battle fought under the w'alls of Puna, between 
Holkar and the allied troops of Sindhia and the Peshwa, in 
which Holkar’s desperate valour in what seemed the moment 
of defeat changed the fortunes of the day; and Hplkair 
gntejred Puna in triumph, the Peshw'a himself, Baji Rao, 
having retired precipitately out of reach. 

Now Wellesley had already been for some time endeavour- 


Reluctance ing to impose his system upon Puna ; that is, to repeat at 

of the p una w h a t was accomplished at Haidarabad. The establish- 
rowers to * 

attempt ment there of a strong British subsidiary force, and the 
subsidiary dismissal of Frenchmen from the Maratha service, would 
alliances, complete the security of the English dominion ; and would 
* naturally result in the extension of a Pax Britannica over 
nearly the whole peninsula. Apart from the question of 
security, the populations outside our own dominions could 
not fail to benefit enormously by the termination of a 
perpetual state of war, waged aPer the bloodthirsty and 
desolating Oriental fashion. Naturally, however, the Country 
Powers took a different view : acquiescence came only when 
a sovereign felt that his only escape from destruction by 
rival Powers lay in British protection. It was not an 
abstract fondness for British rule, or a thirst for the reign 
of Peace which led the Nizam to accept the Wellesley 
scheme : it was fear of the Marathas, though the Nizam’s 
peaceable subjects were probably very well pleased. The 
Marathas therefore themselves, who in combination had 
nothing to fear from any quarter except the British — 
especially since Tippu had been removed — united in re- 
sisting the most pressing invitations to admit a subsidiary 
force. "None of the rival chiefs wanted protection ; each 
wanted dominion, which was incompatible with British 

Now however the opportunity had at last arrived. To 
rrca iy qf the Peshwa it appeared that his own power was irretrievably 
wSTthe ru * ne< ^ ky Holkar’s victory at Puna ; by accepting the British 
Peshwa. proposals he could recover a position corresponding to that 
of the Nizam ; the only alternative was, to escape to private 
life in British territory. Accordingly, Baji Rao declared 
his readiness to accept the proposals which he had previously 
rejected; and on December 3ist,^i8o2, the treaty of Bassein 
was signed. * ~ ^ 

However the actual supremacy among the Marathas might 
be from time to time absorbed by a Bhonsla, a Sindhia, or a 
Holkar, the formal primacy of the Peshwa was always 
recognised. vBy the treaty of Bassein, the technical head of 
the Maratha confederacy accepted British control — the 

LORD WELLESLEY: 1802-1805 149 

presence erf a subsidiary British force, for the support of 
which districts were assigned ; British arbitration in disputes 
with the Nizam ; an obligation to employ no European 
belonging to nations at war with the British, and to enter 
on no war without the British assent. It was a formal 

abrogation of Maratha independence. 

It is a contingency remotely imaginable that if Wellesley Grounds 
had not made this treaty, the Marathas might have continued 
fighting each other until they ceased to be a formidable r€?a 
Power. Th any other evefit they must sooner or later have 

become involved in a life and death struggle with the British. 
It was still perfectly possible that they might enter on that 

struggle with the French as allies. The treaty forced their 
hand. If they acquiesced # it would not be long before the 

British would make their grip in ?he west too firm to be 
shaken. If resistance was intended, it must be soon. And 
the British were in a stronger position for the struggle with 
the treaty than without it* the creation of the subsidiary 
force alone was of no little strategic value as securing a 
military foothold in the Country. The argument for the 
treaty however involves the recognition of a principle which 
the Western mind is always disposed a priori to reject — that 
a powerful native State is by its nature aggressive and 
belj^cose; a consolidated Maratha empire would not have 
divided India with the British, but v^puld necessarily have 
challenged the British*arms, and have renewed the challenge 
until one or other was shattered, whether the French inter- 

vened or not; while# the continuation of the existing system 
with unchecked internal rivalries and uncontrolled feuds 

would be 4iot only ruinous to the Maratha country, but a 
perpetual incitement to disorder within the British 
dominions. • 

In May 1803, Baji R^p was reinstated at Puna; but Combina* 
already tik was repenting. The Bhonsla was making his don of 
best endeavours to unite the chiefs in an anti-British league. 

Sindhia’s co-operation was secure, but Holfear from whatever 
motive was hanging back and the Peshwa with Arthur 
Wellesley controlling him was powerless to act. 

The General called upon Sindhia and the Bhonsla to 


retire with their troops to their own respective dominions ; 
but they remained. In August, the British Agent with 
Sindhia was instructed to withdraw — which amounted to a 
declaration of war. To follow the war and the subsequent 
arrangements, we must note the situation of the various 
Maratha dominions. 1 

The The Bhonsla’s territories extended from Berar to Kattak ; 
domhtans & P es k wa>s embraced the western Dekhan. Th** lands of 
' the Gaikwar, Holkar and Sindhia are not easy to disentangle. 
Sindhia's lay chiefly on the North afid East, including Gwalior, 
the upper part of the Ganges and Jamna Doab, and some 
districts west of the Jamna; west of Sindhia, with his capital 
at Indur, and his chief fortress at Ratnpura, was Holkar; 
west of Holkar, the Gaikwar. Both Sindhia and Holkar 
claimed authority over sundry Rajput States. 

During the nine years that hac[ passed since Madhava 
Rao Sindhia’s death, young Daulat Rao had never been in 
his own territories ; which had keen left mainly to the care 
of the Frenchman Perron, De Boigne’s successor. Sindhia 
himself had spent his time, always with a powerful army, in 
the Dekhan, occupied with the intrigues at Puna and the 
operations of Holkar. Thus, when ‘the Maratha war broke 
out, Sindhia and the Bhonsla were able to act in conjunction 
in the Dekhan, while Sindhia's second great army with its 
French general, French officers, and French organisation, 
was acting in upper Hindostan. Holkar was sulking in his 
tent, while the Gaikwar, always the least formidable of the 
“ pentarchy,” was neutralised by the penuasive diplomacy of 
the British Agent, Major Walker. 

The command of the British army in the Dekhan was 
entrusted to Arthur W elles ley : that in Hindostan to General 
Lake. Wellesley struck at once. The“ Agent had been 
withdrawn from Sindhia on Aiig. 3. Ahmednagar and 
Ajg? : Aurangabad were captured successively, and on f Sept. 23 
was fought the great battle of^Assaye ; where, after a fierce 
struggle the combined armies of Sindhia and the Bhonsla 
were routed with great slaughter, and with British losses 
amounting to nearly one third of the force present. Two 
1 Maps II. and V, 

LORD WELLESLEY: 1802-1805 151 

months later, the Bhonsla again faced the same general at 
^ Arga on, where he was completely ^defeated ; and his resist- 
ance was ended by the capture of his great fortress of 
Ga wil garh, a fortnight later. 

Equally prompt and vigorous were Lake’s measures in Successes 
Hindostan. Aligarh between Delhi and Agra was tg^en on Lak^in™ 1 
Sept. 4. Perron, the French General, whose position had Hindo- 
long been rendered extremely difficult by the intrigues of stan. 
native rivals, learnt just at this time that the intriguers had 
su«ceede!t in procuring ins dismissal — which he anticipated 
by resignation ; a step from which a fine spirit of loyalty had 
alone hitherto restrained him. The command was taken 
by another Frenchman, Bourquin, who faced Lake in the 
neighbourhood of Delhi. * He was completely defeated after 
a hard fight ; gel£u, and the persoft of Shah Alam, fell into 
the hands of tne British, and three days later Bourquin 
surrendered. Agra was taken on Oct. 18 ; and on Oct. 31, 
j^idhia’s forces were finally crushed at the battle of ^aswarif 
Throughout the campaign, they had fought magnificently : 
but the war conveyed flvo military lessons in particular. 
yOne was an old one — that by taking a vigorous offensive,'’' 
even with very great risks, victory was certain to fall to the 
British if they were well led. The other had not before 
been demonstrated ; that a native Power which adopted 
European metWxls in the field, although placed at a great 
advantage in lighting Oriental rivals, was less fitted to 
maintain a prolonged resistance to the British, because the 
effect of any defeat* was much more decisive. 

By the end of December 1803, Sindhia and the Bhonsla, 
both con^pletely worsted, had signed respectively the treaties mission 
of Surji Arjangaon and ^Deogaon. Mloth surrendered all 
. claim to chauth , agreed to accept British arbitration in an d 
disputes with the Nizam, and gave up the employment ofSiadto. 
French Officers* Sindhia. _ ceded, in the Dekhan, Baroch 
and Ahmednagar, the latter being transferred to the Nizam ; 
in Hindostan, the Doab, and other districts north of the 
Chambal river. The Nagpur Raja ceded Berar (west of 
the Warda) which was also transferred to the Nizam, and 
JCattak on the East coast, so that the British territory now 


extended unbroken from Q&lcutta to the Carnatic. Apart 
from the new revenues thus acquired, these treaties gave the 
British through communication by land between Bengal and 
the South, and a defensible frontier in upper Hindostan; 
besides what was of immense political importance, the 
guardianship and control of the Mogul himself, and there- 
with the official responsibility of general sovereignty. 

Wellesley’s policy up to 1802 had effected a complete 
change in our position in India : the treaty of Bassein and 
the war of 1803 expanded the diange into a ftvolutkm, 
which proved too much for the nerves of the authorities at 
home. Their restive disapprobation was converted into 
panic by the events of 1804. The disturbing factor was 
Holkar. He had abstained fronj, supporting Sindhia and 
Resistance the Bhonsla : but it became clear as time passed that he 
of Holkar. was m i nc jed to try conclusions with the British on his own 
account. Within four months of tlie treaties with Sindhia 
and the Nagpur Raja, it becamp necessary to declare war 
on Jeswant Rao. 

The British troops this time wefe to advance from Gujerat 
under Murray, and from the Jamna under Lake. Rampura 
was taken within the month ; Holkar retreated. Lake" ought 
either to have moved in hot pursuit or to have waited till 
after the rains for further action ; but unfortunately what he 
did was to withdraw ( ,his main army beyond the Jamna, 
sending forward Colonel ftlpnson, with a force which only 
brilliant leadership could have made adequate, that he and 
Murray might catch Holkar on two sidef,. But Murray fell 
back before the Maratha who turned on Monson. There- 
Monson’s upon Monson began to retreat. Holkar’s horseme#, without 
r ®. t - r 5 at * joining battle, harassed him cruelly. The rajas through 
whose territories he was passing, at Kotah and elsewhere, 
refused him passage. The rai$s coming on made the 
country almost impassable. Supplies were failing/ and the 
intelligence Department was useless. Monson paused in 
his retreat for some time at Rampura; then he moved 
again ; the retreat became both hasty and disorderly ; 
Holkar’s attacks became more and more destructive; it 
was finally a routed remnant of the corps that found its way 

LORD WELLESLEY: 1802-1805 153 

back to Agra, while Holkar swept northwards and laid siege 
to Delhi. 

The triumph was short-lived, but an infinity of harm had Alarm in 
already been accomplished. All the Marathas were pre- En gl and * 
paring to rise : insulting ballads were sung all over the 
country. 1 At home the alarm at the India House spread 
to Ministers, and Wellesley’s recall was decided on. Corn- 
wallis, now sixty-seven years of age, was entreated to go out 
once more and save India, by reversing the entire policy 
of *he headstrong Goveftior-General. He consented, and 
arrived in India in July 1805. In the meantime, Holkar had Successful 
been just repulsed at Delhi which was brilliantly defended operations 
by Ochterlony, afterwards famous in the Ghurka war ; then n 0 lkar. 
he was routed at. Dig, pursued through the Doab, and finally **’ 
expelled from it by General Frasdh To Lake himself it 
was due that thl recovery of prestige was seriously dis- 
counted by the complete and sanguinary failure of his siege 
of Bhartpur — which had gtyie over to Holkar in the tide of 
his success. It was evident however that the Marathas* 
powers of resistance were* practically exhausted, and that 
Wellesley’s policy was on the verge of being decisively Wellesley 
vindicated in the military point of view, when he found reca Ned. 
himself superseded. 

On his return to England, Parliament declined to support 

3 A rhyme which survives in nurseries to-day is worth quoting, if only 
because of Macaulay’s curious misinterpretation of it. 

“ Ghore par hauda, 

1 lathi par zin 
Jaldi bhag-gaya 
Kornail Monsin ” — 

rendered by Yule 

Ilortes with howdahs, and 
Elephants saddled 
Off helter-skelter the 
Sahibs skedaddled. 

f Now this rhyme was of early date, and the name of “Warren Hasteen” 
often takes the place of “ Colonel Monseen.” But Macaulay, unaware of 
the inversion of howdahs and saddles, thought it was a tribute to the 
splendour of the great Governor-General : whereas it probably refers to 
his escape from Benares. 



the attacks made on the great Empire-builder : but the India 
House, Directors and Proprietors alike, condemned him; 
nor was it till some thirty years later that they rescinded 
their condemnation and rendered their applause to *>ne of 
the greatest of their many great servants. 



'T'HE jmmense and far reaching activity of Lord Wellesley 
had created sonfething like a panic among the 
authorities in England ; and a brief era followed, which Reversal 
began with an energetic reversal of policy, but developed of Wel- 
under Lord Minto into a perpetual straining at the Directors’ * 
l<eash — a renewal of activity which required constant defence, 1 
and yet fell far styort of the necessities of the case. 

Wellesley’s immediate successor was once more Cornwallis, 
who took up his duties in India in July 1805. Cornw f allis The 
however died early in Octcber — not three months after he ®“ c ^ sors 
landed. The home authorities had made no provision for Governor- 
such a contretemps, and Sir George Barlow, the senior General- 
Member of Council succeeded to the office of Governor- : 
General, pending a fresffi appointment from London. Barlow Tallis : 
became an energetic devotee of the new policy and found Barlow, 
much favour with the Court of Directors. But in the ^ 
beginning of i8t>6 a new ministry wasMormed at Westminster 
which included some* strong advocates of Wellesley’s policy. 

The Directors wished to confirm Barlow as Governor-General, 
and Lord Minto, at this time President of the Board of 
Control, agreed to the appointment as a temporary measure. 

The Min»try how r ever would have none of him, and appointed 
Lord Lauderdale. Lauderdale was opposed to the Company’s 
monopoly, besides having indulged in an extravagant display 
of Jacobinism at an earl}» stage of the French Revolution : 
so the Directors in their turn would have none of him. The 
deadlock was removed by the appointment of Lord Miqto Lord 
himself, a capable 'statesman, well grounded in Indian affairs Mint ? 
by his experience at the Board of Control. He arrived in a PP° mtc • 
India in 1807, remaining till 1813 when he was succeeded 
by Lord Moira, better known as Lord Hastings, 


The European affairs continued during this period to have 
menace* 1 on the government of India, direct or indirect 

* Napoleon had become Emperor in 1804. In October 1805, 
the victory of Trafalgar finally ended his maritime ambitions. 
But in Europe, his course of conquest was maintained at 
Austerlitz, and in October 1806 at Jena. In his 

power attained its most alarming pitch when he entered on 
the treaty of Tilsit with Russia, and it seemed probable that 
the combination would not only crush the life out of Europe, 
but would threaten Asia as well. But in 1808, the Spanish 
people rose against the Bonapartist dominion ; British troops 
were thrown into Portugal, and the Peninsula war began, 
absorbing masses of Napoleon’s troops. In 1809 the amity 
between the Tsar and Napoleon was markedly cooling, and 
in 1810 it had turned info hostility. In 1809 therefore, all 
dread of immediate aggression in Asiq had passed away, and 
: from that time, the terror of France fades and presently 
vanishes, to be replaced as the years passed on by the ever 
encroaching, ever approaching shadow of Russia. 

The practical effect then is, tliat up till 1805, it had 
continued to be a primary object to guard against the 
possibilities of French troops being thrown into India by 
sea, to lend their aid to Native Powers against the British. 
The realty of the risk had in fact been removed by the battle 
of the Nile; yet not With sufficient definiteness to allow of 
The its being ignored. After 1805, the possibility to be guarded 
Russian against becomes that of invasion overland ; of which feeling 
menace. t ^ e f irs t dear symptom was Malcolm’s mission to Persia in 
1800. The problem of external defence is transferred to 
the North West frontier and the lands beyond it ; c.nd even 
here, after Lord Minto’s time, no serious general appre- 
hensions are aroused for a quarter <Jf a century. Since 
then, the frontier, and frontier policy, have been always 
with us. # 

Wei- Wellesley had systematically acted with the following 
li^left Ejects — t0 contr °l the international policy and the military '/ 
^°uncom- armaments of all great Native States ; to do so, by main- 
' pleted, taining within each of them, a British force, theoretically for 


the security of the Native Government; the force being 
therefore justly supported at the expense of the said Govern- 
ments ; from whom in consequence cessions of territory were 
demanded, as security for the payment of the forces. It was 
not however a part of his policy to take over the administra- 
tion of the States themselves, except in such a case as that 
of Arcot, where the ruling dynasty had for half a century 
proved itself consistently incapable beyond hope of re- 
vivification. In Mysore an alien dynasty which had usurped 
dojniniofr less than forty years before, was destroyed ; but 
the earlier dynasty was restored, with very much its original 
domains, and the administration was not withdrawn. In 
general, it was required only that the Native rulers should 
not allow their territories to fall into such a condition of 
anarchy as would make them a •menace to the general 
peace. # 

But these ends had *been achieved only by a very heavy 
immediate outlay, alarming to the commercial instincts of 
Leadenhall Street, where it seemed as though endless vistas 
of •military projects were being opened out. The achieve- 
ment was yet incomplete, the Marathas had been only 
partially brought within the scheme, Holkar was still in 
the field, when the reins were transferred to other hands, the 
policy was reversed. Yet the work was necessary ; it had 
to be complete^ a dozen > ears later and that it might be 
completed much of it. had then to be done over again. 

When Cornwallis arrived, Holkar was still active, and Reaction- 
Sindhia’s attitude wjls extremely uncertain. He. had agreed 
to Wellesley’s terms under the impression that he was to wa iii s and 
withdraw^from the territories north of the Chambal ; but Barlow. 
Wellesley demanded also the cession of Gwalior itself, in 
spite of lake’s remonstrances. Cornwallis however was 
prepared to go much further in the way of concession ; to 
restore Owalior and even Y)elhi to Sindhia, and to withdraw 
the promised protection from the Rajput princes. These 
i views he embodied in a dispatch to Lake on Sept. 19 ; but 
Lake would not act on them till he had submitted his 
objections, and the Governor-General had died before these 
reached him. Barlow, taking office declared for the new 


policy. In the meantime Lake was simultaneously moving 
troops, and negotiating with Sindhia, who fortunately had 
just appointed a minister favourable to the British and 
animated by a strong dislike to Holkar and his fathan 
associate Amir Khan. Sindhia therefore was satisfied with 
the retention of Gwalior, and the establishment of the 
Chambal as his boundary. 

Holkar withdrew towards the Pan jab, raising troops ; Lake 
started in pursuit, chased him across the Satlej, and came to 
an agreement with Ranjjt^ Singhj pie Raja of Lahore, lyho 
refused thenceforth to countenance the Maratha chief. 
Barlow’s Holkar was forced to sue for peace, and got it, very much 
conces- j-q i 1 £ s own contemptuous astonishment, on the lines laid 
Holkar! down by Barlow. . The Governor-General however altered 
even the accepted proposals in Golkar’s favour, gave back 
to him all possessions south of the Chambal including 
Rampura which had before been Expressly excepted, and 
entirely withdrew all protection from the Rajput Rajas of 
Jeipur, Bundi and other States, who had loyally declined to 
support the Marathas against the British, and were now 
shamefully left to pay the penalty which Holkar exacted to 
the full. Lake himself was so scandalised at the desertion 
that he resigned his political functions. The final result of 
the Maratha settlement as effected by Sir George Barlow was 
that the Rajput States, where disorder arjjd violence were 
normal, passed through a period of desperate turmoil, suffer- 
1 ing many things beyond their wont at the hands of Sindhia, 
Amir Khan, and Holkar. The career £>f the last however 
was shortly brought to a close; for in 1808 he became totally 
insane, and died three years later. 

Occasional Unhappy as were the consequences of Barlow's government 
firmness of on the independent States of Hindustan, within the area 
Barlow. w ^ ere British control had already been definitely established 
he evinced some degree of firmness. Having » originally 
supported the treaty of Bassein, he declined to recede from 
it at the call of the Directors ; and at Haidarabad, when the 
Nizam began to display a desire to be rid of his protectors, 
Sir George insisted on his restoring to office a minister 
friendly to the British. 


"•Vi ' * 

Xhe latter part of Barlow’s administration was made Thpn 
memorable by the mutiny of the Sepoys at Vellur. The 
Princes of Tippu’s family had been allowed to take up their « - 
residence there. The mutineers, one regiment of whom 
consisted of Mysore Mussulmans, hoisted Tippu’s flag, and 
there was no doubt that the deposed family were responsible 
for encouraging the movement ; though, on investigation, it 
became tolerably clear that the Sepoys had actually risen on 
the strength of their own grievances ; various new regula- 
tion hav&g been introduced by a commander who did not 
appreciate native prejudices, which appear trivial enough but 
to them have a serious religious import. The idea was 
started that the regulations were a step towards imposing 
Christianity upon the Sepoy. Several officers were murdered: 
but the mutiny was promptly quelied by the arrival from 
Arcot*of ColoneK>illespie with a small detachment. The 
ring-leaders were executed ; there was some delay in dealing 
with the rest, as the matter was referred home. It was 

' I 

finally settled by Lord Minto on his arrival, the men being 
dismissed instead of suffering any severer punishment, on 
the ground that they had had a really serious grievance. 

Lord William Bentinck, Governor of Madras and subse- 
quently Governor-General, was recalled, with the Commander- 
in-Chief, as soon as the news of the mutiny reached England, 
though Bentincl^ w r as not in fact to bl^me. Tippu’s family, 
though not without cpmplicity in the rising, were removed 
to Calcutta but not otherwise punished. 

Another mutiny of a somewhat serious character occurred Mutiny of 
in 1809-10 when Sir*George Barlow was Governor of Madras, ^^ dras 
whither he had gone on vacating the governor-generalship. 

This time, the mutineers were the British officers of the 
Madras army. According to the vicious system of under- 
paying the Company’s servants, and making up the deficiency 
in anomalous perquisites, certain contracts w r ere placed in the 
hands of the officers. They were wrong in principle, and 
ought to have been abolished ; but the authorities set about 
abolishing them by way of curtailing expenditure. Much 
violent language was used on the part of Sir George Barlow 
on one side, and the Commander-in-Chief on the other, and 


Persia and 

and Jones. 

improper arrests were made on both sides. Matters however 
quieted down on the General's retirement ; but some months 
later Barlow revived the trouble by attacking some of the 
officers who had taken part in the agitation. Thp whole 
military body was furious ; but a few stood by the Govern- 
ment as a matter of discipline : and the King's troops were 
loyal. Barlow successfully defied the mutineers, though 
strongly advised to give way. The contingents at Haidara- 
bad, Masulipatam and Seringapatam, had all declared their 
adhesion to the revolt ; but in a calmer moment tlfcy realised 
the nature of their action and made submission. The per- 
sonal feeling against Barlow had counted for much, and the 
resolute but conciliatory intervention of Lord Minto termin- 
ated what had at one time threatened to prove a very serious 
incident. Barlow was recalled — an unfortunate example of an 
admirable public servant who was quite utffit to rule. 

Lord Minto’s arrival in India whs signalised almost im- 
mediately by a collision with the Home Government. Persia 
having hastily entered on a Russian War in 1806, appealed 
for British protection on the strength of the 1800 treaty, in 
1807. The appeal was declined, and she turned to Napoleon. 
A French Embassy arrived and was about to complete arrange- 
ments extremely adverse to both Russia and Britain, when 
the treaty of Tilsit changed the French policy towards the 
former Power. A British envoy had clearly € something to do 
at Teheran. Lord Minto dispatched Malcolm, whose previous 
mission qualified him eminently for the post ; but ^uiiiisters 
sent Sir Harford Jones. Sir Harford was^detained at Bombay; 
but Malcolm, on arriving in Persia, took umbrage at the treat- 
ment he received and withdrew. Sir Harford was now allowed 
to proceed ; but a few days later, it was resolved to send a 
military expedition as the best counterpoise to the French 
influence at Teheran. Meantime, Sir Harford informed the 
Shah, speaking as the representative not of the •Governor- 
General but of the Crown, that there should be no aggression 
against his territories. The change in the attitude of the 
French towards Russia had now become apparent, and a 
treaty of friendship was promptly accepted ; the Shah agree- 
ing to resist the passage of any European force through his 


. territories, while the British engaged to help him with troops 
or money if Persia were invaded. Lord Minto accepted the 
treaty, but felt bound to assert himself by sending Malcolm 
on wtyit may be called an Embassy of Display, and the 
presence of two opposition British ambassadors at one court 
was in danger of producing most unseemly results. The two 
however had the wisdom to join hands; Malcolm had an 
immense gift of popularity ; and the friction was dissolved. 

The recurrence of the trouble was obviated by the appoint- 
mept from London of Sii Gore Quseley, and the withdrawal 
of both Malcolm and Sir Harford. From that time, British 
diplomacy in Persia has been controlled not from India but 
from Westminster — with very little credit to Westminster. 

The same anxiety as to the possibilities of a European Missions 
attack overland brought about th* mission to Kabul °f and^Sindh 
Mountstuart Elpkinstone ; by which little was gained, be- 
yond some knowledge df the country, owing to the fact that 
the position of the king, Shah Shuja, was at the time too 
unstable to allow his friendship to be of much value : and he 
wa» summarily ejected frorr.this realm a year later. A mission 
to Sindh about the same time issued in a treaty of friendship 
of no great value. 

. Within India, Lord Minto was unable to revert to 
Wellesley’s policy; but he saw at once that unmitigated 
non-intervention^ was impossible. Hi$ attention was called " , 
to Bandelkhand immediately on his arrival. Bandelkhand Bandel- 
is a district, inhabited largely by Rajput clans, lying on the khand. 
south of the Jamna, east of its confluence with the Chambal. 

It had owned the supremacy not, as might have been expected, 
of Sindhia, but of the Peshwa ; who, a year after the treaty 
of Basseiff, had exchanged it for territories in the Dekhan, 
ceded to the British ynder that instrument. A n archy &nd 
jobbery, to which the Marathas had no objection, had 
habitually* prevailed throughout the country which was 
studded with fortresses. The free-booting Sirdars objected 
to an organised rule; and despite the representations of 
Lake, Barlow had not considered it worth while to take the 
steps necessary for bringing it into order. Lord Minto 
forthwith made it known that anarchy within the British 


dominion would not be tolerated, and most of the rajas 
were prompt to mate submission when they realised that the 
warning was meant seriously. The wilder spirits however 
were in possession of the great fortresses, and offered a 
prolonged resistance ; with such vigour indeed that four 
years elapsed before the last and ablest of them offered to 
submit, on terms highly favourable to himself, which a weary 
Government conceded. 

Lord A more definite breach, however, of the theory of non- 
die Sikhs? intervention was brought about in Sirhind, lying between the 
* 1 Satlej and the Jamna, in the occupation of a number of Sikh 

chiefs. The trans-Satlej Sikhs of the Panjab had of late years 
been growing into a strong military organisation, especially 
since the rise of Ranjit Singh, Maharaja of Lahore, who now 
sought to extend his dominion over his Cis-Satlej compatriots. 
They however were not interested in theoambitions of the 
Panjab Sikhs, nor were they threatened by the same enemies, 
and they proceeded to request the intervention and protection 
of the British, in 1808. Ranjit entered his protest, with a 
declaration that they were his subjects. Lord Minto was 
alive to the impolicy of allowing the Panjab to absorb Sirhind, 
but was at the time embarrassed by the desire to secure the 
friendliness of the frontier State in case of Franco-Russian 
Metcalfe machinations. Cjharles Metcalfe was sent to negotiate, and 
^ an |j t Ranjit was quite alive to the advantages of his own diplomatic 
^ * position. The young civilian however encountered him 
with great firmness and tact. While the diplomatic contest 
was still going on, the fears of the Government of India were 
allayed by the severance of France and Russia and the 
situation changed at once. /The astute Ranjit had no 
intention of risking a war, retreated skilfully from his position, 
and agr^e&to withdraw his claims 04, Sirhind if the British 
would promise not to interfere wjth him in the Paniab. From 
; that hour till his death he remained the very good friend and 
ally of the British — though with a possible moment of waver- 
ing, during the Gurkha war. 

Rise of the By 1809 the consequences of the lenient treatment of 
Pindaris. Holkar began to be displayed in unmistakable fashion by the 
raids of his ally the Pathan free-lance Amir Khp. Holkar s 



insanity had already developed, and Amir Khan, who had at 
his back half the Mussulman and Pindari 1 mercenaries of 
India, professed to act in Holkar’s interests. Having made 
the most of extensive opportunities in Rajputana, he next 
thought fit to plunder Nagpur. Now however the limits of 
British neutrality had been reached. In defiance of doctrines 
of non-intervention, Lord Minto prepared to take arms in 
defence of the Bhonsla. The Nagpur troops themselves 
twice defeated Amir Khan in the field, but he was renewing 
the^attaok when he learnt that the British were advancing 
against him ; whereupon he retiredjto Indur, on the ostensible 
ground that the regency there required his services. The 
immediate object of the British being accomplished, the 
Governor-General held his hand, and turned his attention to 
other affairs, not without much dctibt as to the view that 
might be taken oS his intervention at the India House. So 
beyond the Nerbadda, Fathans and Pindaris were allowed to 
wax gross. 

"~To Lord Minto however fell the opportunity, which he Capture of 
seiaed with great success, of intervention in the deadly struggle Mauritius 
with Napoleon. The French naval station at Mauritius was and J ava * 
a standing danger while, French fleets were powerful : it con- 
tinued to be a thorn in the side of the East India trade even 
after Trafalgar. British expeditions thither had proved com- 
pletely unsuccessful. But at the end $f j8io, the Governor- 
General fitted out a great expedition from India which captured 
the islands, and permanently extracted the thorn. Further, 

Napoleon having absorbed Holland, the Spice Islands had 
become French property. In 18 1 1, the Governor-General, 
having obtained permission to attack Java, personally accom- 
panied a*great expedition to ffie Island. The prize was 
secured after some hajd fighting in which Colonel Gillespie 
who had quelled the Vellur mutiny greatly distinguished him- 
self. * • 

Shortly after his return to India, Lord Minto learnt to his Lord 
surprise that he had been superseded by Lord Hastings. Minto 
The new Governor-General however did not arrive till the reca * lcd * 
autumn of 1813. 

1 The Pindaris were free-booting bands of light horse, mainly Marathas. 



(Maps /., V. an* Fill.) 

Lord T ORD MOIRA, who soon afterwards was created Marquess 
Hastings. of Hast j ngS) 

was now in his fifty-ninth year. He had 
seen active service as a very , young man in the * war 
of American Independence. He had taken a considerable 
part in public affairs, was a persona grafo with the Prince 
Regent, and had made an unsuccessful attempt to form a 
ministry. Wellesley had left England with a strong prejudice 
against Warren Hastings, but his Indian experience rapidly 
converted him into a political disciple and a personal 
admirer. Lord Hastings in his turn — he was not related 
to his predecessor — when in England was strongly opposed 
to Wellesley’s policy of aggrandisement, but in his career 
as Governor-General, the policy he found it imperative to 
carry out was that <bf which Wellesley evas the typical 
exponent — the systematic extension of control over Native 

The circumstances were in fact too strong for a precon- 
ceived judgment to stand against them. The new Governor- 
General found himself almost at the outset face to face 
with a new aggressor ; by the time that aggressor was 
disposed of, Pindaris, Pathans, an& Marathas, had given 
such unmistakable proofs that thpy could be dealt with only 
by the strong hand that even a Barlow would have been 
convinced. The necessary policy might however have been 
pursued reluctantly and inc<jpipletely ; JIas tings having once 
accepted it carried it out firmly, intelligently and thoroughly. 

The The new aggressor was the Gurkha State of Nepal, lying 
Gurkhas. a ] on g the Northern Mountain border of India the whole way 



from the Satlej on the west to Sikkim on the east. The 
Gurkhas are an admirably hardy and courageous race of 
Mountaineers, claiming a Rajput descent, but probably 
sprung from a Mongolian stock with a comparatively recent 
infusion of Rajput blood derived from militant Rajput 
immigrants. In number they were singularly few, very 
unlike the hordes of the Marathas, and not even comparable 
to the Sikh minority which dominated the Panjab ; but in 
fighting ^qualities they were second to none. They had 
begun to organise themselves into a State only in the latter 
half of the eighteenth century, and had rapidly established 
tThemselves from end to end of the long and narrow strip 
of territory known as Nepal. But they were not content 
with their mountains and t>egan to encroach on the Terai — 
the fertile plain ^kirting the foothills, watered by the upper 
streams of the Ganges <md its tributaries. During the first 
decade of the nineteenth century the encroachments began 
tq affect British territory. • 

At the close of Lord M\pto’s administration the advancing The 
Gurkhas laid claim to districts near Gorakhpur, which they 
occupied. Their claim was negatived, and they were required Nepal, 
to withdraw, but before their official answer was received, 

Lord Hastings was in office. Their reply was a refusal, 
and Hastings returned a peremptory % response, followed up 
by the occupatiBn of the disputed districts. Counsels were 
divided at Katmandhu, the Nepal capital. Amar Singh, 
their best soldier, opposed war ; but the Durbar, confident 
in the impregnability of their mountains, were defiant, and 
threw down the gauntlet by attacking the occupied district : 
and waf%llowed. 

fndian warfare there is one established rule — not to 
take the defensive, but to strike and strike hard against 
almost any odds. In this t;ase, the numerical odds were all 
against tne Gurkhas, whose trained force amounted to little 
if at all above 12,000 men. In their favour however, they 
had the extremely difficult nature of the country, while the 
Governor-General was greatly hampered by want of funds, 
and neither the officers nor the men of the Bengal army had 
experience of hill fighting. 


The Hastings was Commander-in-Chief, as well as Governor* 
GU wain General, an< ^ controlled the plan of campaign. Two columns 
disastrous were to enter Nepal at the Western end, commanded by 
opening. Ochterlony and Gillespie ; two were to advance or! Kat- 
maiidhu at the Eastern end, from Behar. Ochterlony’s 
skilful manoeuvring on the extreme west against Amar 
Singh was rendered ineffective by a disaster to Gillespie; 
whose headlong valour led him to a quite unnecessary 
attempt to storm a Gurkha fort k Gillespie himself was 
killed ; in this and a subsequent attack the valiant defenders 
slew more of the enemy than their own numbers all told; and 
the whole column was held at bay throughout the winter 
(1814). In the meantime, the Eastern columns under 
Generals Marley and Wopd met wfih no better success : the 
Gurkhas repulsed their attacks, and the Generals lacked the 
persistence to force their way and ihe intelligence to out- 
manoeuvre the much smaller forces opposed to them. 

Excite- The effect of the check was serious. All over India the 
mndo” nat * ves a S a * n began to believe that the decadence of the 
stan. -British power had commenced. The Peshwa renewed 
intrigues with the other Maratha princes. Sindhia and 
Amir Khan set their forces in motion. Ranjit Singh moved 
an army to the Satlej. On the other hand, Hastings raised 
new regiments and otherwise prepared for emergencies. For- 
tunately, internal quarrels broke up the hostile armaments. 
Sindhia’s generals fell out : Ranjit Singh found affairs on the 
Afghan border pressing: Amir Khan could not resist the 
Success of opportunity for plundering Jodhpur. ^Most important of 
Ochter- a [^ Ochterlony turned the tide of failure. After months of 
skilful manoeuvring against a skilful foe, he isolated Amar 
Singh and his brave followers in the # fort of Malaun, in the 
Simla district, in April. In the same month, a special force 
of irregulars under Colonels Gardner and Nicholls took 
Almora, the principal place in Kumaon. When affairs had 
become desperate, Amar Singh allowed those who would 
to surrender, but resolved himself to resist to the last with a 
small but devoted band. Finding however, that this was 
only to doom them to certain death in a hopeless cause, he 
at length surrendered. All honour was paid to the heroic 


foe ; but the whole territory from the Satlej eastward to the 
river Kali submitted to the conquerors ; and the Gurkhas of 
those territories having been fairly beaten in a stand-up 
struggle forthwith attached themselves heartily and loyally to 
the new Government. 

Hastings now offered terms to the Nepal Government at 
Katmandhu, and at the end of the year it seemed that his 
proposal had been accepted, when Amar Singh succeeded in 
reviving the no-surrender policy. He had raised his voice 
against the war originally, but he held it shame to surrender 
now to the British demands. Ochterlony however was placed 
in command of the force to proceed to Katmandhu. The 
parses were held, but the British general turned the Gurkha Conquest 
positions, and they had* no option save surrender to his 
superior numbers and armament. The cession of the 
territory west of the River Kali was confirmed by treaty; a 
portion of the Terai was given up and transferred to the , , * 
Nawab of Oudh who had rendered valuable pecuniary 
assistance ; and a war Redounding to the honour of the 
Gurkhas was concluded by an honourable peace, and an 
amity no less honourably maintained ever since (March 

Ever since Cornwallis had stopped the completion ofE^thans 
Wellesley’s schemes, the power of the great free-booting jJ^daro. 
companies asSembled about and * beyond the Nerbadda 
valley had been grooving increasingly dangerous. These free- 
booters were of two classes ; the Mussulmans or Pathans who 
contemned any occupation but that of fighting, and the 
Pindaris, largely Marathas, who also lived by pillage, and 
had foflhed themselves into large bands of light horsemen, 
but had never definitely attached themselves to any one in 
particular among the # Maratha potentates. These two classes, 

Pathans and Pindaris, ware to some extent interchangeable : 
but for the most part the Tathans served under the banner 
of Amir Khan, and the Pindaris under those of other 
captains' of whom the ablest was Qhifcu. The Pindaris 
proved audacious enough to carry their incursions, which 
were accompanied by the most ghastly atrocities, even into 
the British districts of Orissa. 



Disturb- To curb these dangerous bands, Lord Hastings sought to 
establish a subsidiary alliance with Nagpur, but the Bhonsla 
India. V as t0 ° anxious to preserve his independence. Hastings 
then proposed to follow that course with other minor princes 
at Sagar near the Bandelkhand border, and notably with the 
ruler of Bhopal in the Nerbadda valley — a Mussulman 
principality which had on various occasions rendered loyal 
service to the British. 

In 1813, Sindhia and the Bhonsla combined t$ attack 
Bhopal ; where however Wazir Mohammed offered a stubborn 
resistance, and appealed for British help. The Governor- 
General, in spite of the still active Gurkha complication, took 
upon himself to warn off the Marathas ; and while Sindhia 
was protesting, Ochterlony was restoring the British fortunes 
in Nepal. The Bhonsla and Sindhia both retired, but the 
alliance which Hastings had contemplated was almost simul- 
taneously declined by Wazir Mohammed and vetoed by the 
India House. «. 

The Members of Council, likc^ the India House, we$;e 
opposed to the views which Hastings had developed : 
but the Governor-General laid them before the authorities 
in London at an auspicious time. George Canning had 
just become President of the Board of Control ; and though 
his first despatch was antagonistic, the report of the last 
Pindari irruption caused it to be followed ih three weeks 
by another authorising the most rigorous action and 
practically allowing Hastings a free hand. 

Intrigues In the meantime, the conduct of BajV* Rao the Peshwa 
of ®^had been extremely unsatisfactory. While avoiding any 
Peshwa. °P en display of hostility, he was constantly engaged in 
intriguing against the British at the other Maratha Courts. 
The Gaikwar was at this time the fhost friendly of the 
Powers to the British : partly owing to the influence of a 
Brahmin minister. On the other hand the Peshwa, 'himself 
a Brahmin, was much under the influence of a low-caste 
Hindu named Trimbakji. Ostensibly for the settlement of 
disputes between the Peshwa and the Gaikwar, the minister 
of the latter, known as the Shastri, was inveigled to Puna 
under a British guarantee of safety, and was then murdered 

by Trimbakji’s orders (July 1815): no one having a doubt 
of Baji Rao’s complicity. Formally of course his declara- 
tions of innocence were accepted ; he was obliged however 
by the tesolute attitude of the Resident, Elphinstone, to 
surrender the person of Trimbakji, but continued his intrigues 
none the less zealously* 

In 18Y6 affairs at Nagpur took a favourable turn. Subsidiary 
^aghoji Phonsla. died : his son was an imbecile; the *l eat y wita 
"regency w^s disputed ; and ^p aikhib. the heir presumptive, rSagpjr ' 
thinRing that British support would be useful to him, 
offered to accept the subsidiary alliance which Raghoji 
had always declined. He showed clearly enough later on, 
that he had not been actuated by any pro-British senti- 
ment; but the accomplishment of the treaty gave us a 
military control within his dominions which proved of no 
little value. « 

The whole position, then, at the close of 1816, may be The sgtw 
summarised. "The danger •which had for a short time^ ** 1 
arisqi with the disasters at the beginning of the Gurkha 
war, was over: no disturbance threatened from Nepal. 

The Pindaris in Central India were growing more audacious 
and irrepressible. The fhinor princes were divided in mind 
between their desires for British protection and for their 
own independence — incompatible advantages. Sindhia, 

Holkar, and Arffir Khan, had not % oeen brought under 
British control; and were certainly not friendly. Daulat 
Rao, it may be noted, was still little more than thirty; 
and Holkar was a minor, whose Durbar was divided into 
factions. The Peshwa and the Bhonsla’s regency were now 
held in ckeck by the British Residents and Contingents, 
but the former at least was vehemently set upon escaping 
from the bonds which* he had forged for himself. The 
Nizam had ceased, and the Panjab had not really begun, 
to be active political factors. The recent performances of 
the Pindaris had almost converted the opposition members of 
the Calcutta Council, and Cannings dispatches withdrawing 
the non-intervention instructions were on the way out. 

The plain truth w r as that there never had been order Need of a 

in Hindostan, except while some paramount Power was ff ramount 

1 ower* 


recognised all over it. Hence the Mogul dominion with 
all its defects had rendered great benefits to the whole 
population. That dominion had not been overthrown by 
the British : it had collapsed for reasons already explained. 
But it had become imperative that its place should be 
taken by someone, and the only possible someone was 
the British Power. On us, however reluctant the 'merchants 
and politicians in London might be to face the fact, the 
responsibility had devolved; it was no longer possible to 
refuse its acceptance. 

Attitude In 1817, matters were clearly working up to a crisis. 

Marath^ one k an( ^ N& s i r Mohammed, the successor of 

ara as. -yy az j r Mohammed in Bhopal, accepted the subsidiary 
alliance, afterwards displaying fhe habitual loyalty of his 
house; and several of the Princes of Rfijputana came into 
the British alliance. On the ofcher hand, the imbecile 
Bhonsla was murdered and succeeded by the regent Apa 
Sahib,; who, no longer needihg external support for his 
claims, was now as anxious a»~ the Peshwa to be rid of 
British control. In the Puna country, Trimbakji escaped 
from confinement, and set actively to work to produce 
an anti-British insurrection ; it was perfectly certain that he 
was in league with the Peshwa : and the latter after much 
evasion was compelled to assent to a new treaty confirming 
that of Bassein, but also accepting an* increase of the 
Contingent, and making material cessions of territory and 
fortresses besides formally resigning the suzerainty or 
hegemony of the Maratha Confederacy. Finally, negotia- 
tions were entered upon with Sindhia, Amir Khan and 
Holkar — who were all notoriously interested in ftlaintaining 
the Pindaris — with a view to persuading or coercing them 
into taking part in the suppression of the free-booters. 
In especial, it was impressed fipon Sindhia that he had 
frequently violated the conditions upon which he had been 
permitted to retain his independence, and that a revision 
of terms was imperative. 

Opening Tfag campaign against the Pindaris opened in the Autumn 
of the 0 f i8iy t on a gigantic scale : for the arrangements were 
necessarily based on the possibility that the whole force of 


the Marathas, as well as of Amir Khan, might act on behalf 
of the Pindaris. 

Of the military operations which followed, it is im- 
possible to do more than attempt to give an intelligible 

Looking at the Maratha map (V.): the Pindaris, whose 
§Uppress!cm was the prime object of the war, had their 
head-quarters in and about the valley of the Nerbadda. 

I; must *e observed that the Doab had now passed from 
SinShia to the British, who were free also to operate from 
Bandelkhand, from the Bhonsla’s dominions, the Haidarabad 
border, and the districts from Puna north to Gujerat. That 
is, tl*ey formed a sort of horse-shoe embracing Sindhia, the 
Pindaris, Amir Khan, and* Holkar with the Rajput States 
on the open sic^p. At the same time, both Puna and 
Nagpur might rise upon them. Hastings had carefully Skilful 
disposed the divisions of the great army he had been 
preparing — it numbered nearly 120,000 — so that as they 
moved towards the centre •they would come in touch with Hastings, 
each other and form a cordon. The first movement how- 
ever did not take place till the end of October (1817) when 
two divisions were sudSenly advanced from the Doab so as 
to threaten Gwalior from two sides and paralyse any attempt 
at adverse action on Sindhia’s part: whereby he found himself 
compelled promptly to sign the treaty which he had been 
evading for some months past. One of the divisions then 
pushed southward up the Chambal. Another division was 
advancing from Baifdelkhand under Marshall, and another 
was already on the upper Nerbadda under Adams, while 
MalcolmPwas advancing from Amrawati. The progress of 
these three drove theJPindaris to retreat, one portion under 
Chitu moving west, the other under two chiefs named Wasil 
Mohammed and Karim, towards Gwalior. 

This move was due to Sindhia having received temporary Forced in- 
relief, cholera having broken out in the division left to watch °* 
him, which in consequence had changed its quarters. But ** 
it was brought into the field again in time to isolate Sindhia Holkar. 
and intercept the Pindaris, who now had to make all haste 
to escape back into Holkar’s country ; which their extreme 


mobility enabled them to do, though not without suffering 
heavy losses by the way. 

Fight ?t During this time — roughly the months of November and 
dd^aTof December — Sindh ia had been effectively paralysed ‘by the 
*'* tSl grip of the northern British divisions. Holkar remained 
Pesbwa. i nac tive ; but both Puna and Nagpur witnessed memorable 
struggles. The Peshwa collected a large army, ‘ostepsifely 
to attack the Pindaris ; but Elphinstone, the Resident* knew 
their purpose to be different Accordingly on November ist 
he removed the British brigade to a strong position at Kirki, 
in the immediate neighbourhood. On the fifth, he himself 
joined them, and had hardly left the Residency when it was 
sacked. More British troops were expected, and the Pe$hwa 
resolved to begin by wiping out those present. He moved 
his 25,000 men against Kirki; the force ,in Kirki, about a 
tenth of their number, took the offensive, and after a sharp 
action routed them. A fresh attack was not ventured upon ; 
ten days later, the arrival of re-inforcements enabled the 
British to attack and occupy* Puna which the Peskwg 
evacuate^ ip, haste, retiring to Sgttara where he carried off 
the raja — the descendant of Sivaji — and for some time to 
come found sufficient occupation in evading the British 

Very similar were the events at Nagpur. The still smaller 
British force there withdrew, with the Resident, Richard 

Fight at Jenkins, to Sitabaldi close by : they were attacked on the 
27th after a night of bombardment by masses of the 
Bhonsla’s troops which included a large body of Arab 
Sa$jK mercenaries ; the attack was stoutly resisted and finally 
dispersed by a brilliant cavalry charge. The Ma&thas lost 
heart, and in a few days re inforcements arrived. The 
Bhonsla, however, did not escape but surrendered. It 
was somewhat unfortunate that the Arabs, who had sensed 
the citadel were permitted to surrender on their own terms. 

Submis- Am ir K han, who appears to have evinced a wholesome 
distaste for coming to actual blows with the British, after 
1 some hesitation accepted the terms offered him, though the 
treaty was not signed tilP^ecember 15. His Pathans, 
who, unlike their chief, were not comfortably provided for 


were in no hurry to lay down their arms ; but Ochteriony, 
who had brought down a reserve division from the North, 
drove a wedge between the two main bodies, who thereupon 
submitted and gave up their arms. 

Theleaders of Holkar’s army, and his Durbar, were divided Collapse of 
by faction ; the army itself was eager to rise for the Peshwa. &&***• 
The mone turbulent faction got the upper hand, murdered 
the regem^a widow of Jeswant Rao, and were consequently 
jpromptly attacked, and the army shattered, by the nearest 
British division. Malcolm marched in pursuit of Holkar, 
who accepted a treaty on Jan. 6. By Jan. 1818 therefore 
resolved itself into a pursuit of the scattered 
bancjfc of Pindaris; of whose chiefs, Karim made terms, 

$£sil Mohammed was captured, and Chitu alone made 
good his escape. By a Singularly appropriate nemesis, he 
was killed in the jungle a year later by a tiger. 

Baji Rao and his troops remained to be accounted for, 
and the treacherous Apa Sahib of Nagpur had not been 
deposed. At the end of December, the Peshwa was once Successes 
more marching on Puna when he caught a small body of ***** the 
800 British on the way to reinforce the garrison there. The Fes wa ' 
little force however spent New-year’s day in offering an extra- 
ordinarily brilliant defence, and the next day— evading the 
Peshwa by a ruse — their leader, Captain Staunton brought 
them back in triumph to Sirur, fr^ni whence they had 
started. The Peshwa again retired hastily from the pur- 
suit of the British Brigades. He was overtaken however, 
and fled from the field, while his best general was killed, 
and his captive, tlfe Sattara Raja, fell into the hands of 
the British. Baji Rao himself made for Nagpur (March 
1818). m 

IX had become evident however that Apa Sahib was Final 
preparing for a rising: and in March, Jenkins placed him in op***- 
confinement. Baji Rao after a series of doubles found him- tlons * 
self hemmed in near the Nerbadda : and was finally allowed 
by Malcolm to surrender on very generous terms. Not the 
least remarkable achievement during this period was the 
subjugation of the Southern part of the Peshwa’s dominions 
by Sir Thomas Munro; who, left with only a very small 


force, by personal influence and skilful management, gathered 
troops, overcame all resistance, and converted a hostile into 
a friendly territory. The escape of Apa Sahib, and the need 
of reducing fortresses, protracted matters for some time. 
The ex-Bhonsla disappeared, eventually reaching the” Panjab 
where his presence was ignored by Ranjit Singh, and he 
ended his career under surveillance in Rajputana. The last 
fortress — Asirgarh, near Buranpur — did not surrender till 
April 1819; when it was found that the resistance had been, 
maintained at Sindhia’s instigation. *• 

Results af The Governor- General’s object had been completely 
the war. achieved. For the sake of clearness the story of the great 
war has been narrated, without interruption by details of the 
several treaties entered upon in its course. These may,*now 
be reviewed as forming the grotfnd work of the necessary 

1. Pathans reconstruction. With the Pindaris, no Jreaty was made. 
p . A They were simply broken up and scattered without possibility 

in ans. re ^ orn t)ining. The Arab mercenaries in the service of 
/ the Bhonsla and the Peshwa were for the most part shipped 
out of the country. The Patfcan chief Amir Khan twas 
favoured with a principality at Tonk ; his artillery was handed 
over to the British ; and the Pathan troops were disarmed 
and disbanded, large numbers of them being transformed 
into Sepoys of the Company. 

2. Sindhia. Sindhia had been ruled out of the conflict from the begin- 

• ning, by the pressure ot the British armies ; ind had to accept 
a treaty freeing the British from the obligation, imposed on 
them by Barlow’s earlier treaty, of abstaining from political 
relations with the Rajput and other chiefer over whom Sindhia 
claimed supremacy. The extension of the British Protectorate 
over them followed. Asirgariyvas ced£d, and a tfr/iall sub- 
sidiary contingent admitted. 

3. Nagpur. The treachery of Apa Sahib resulted in his deposition. 

Instead however of annexing Nagpur, the British set up a 
new Raja of the Bhonsla family, during whose mihority the 
State was admirably administered by the Resident, Richard 

4. Holkar. Holkar, after the brief outbreak, accepted a subsidiary 

treaty, and resigned all his claims in Rajputana. Some 


minor principalities, notably Sagar, whose Rajas had mis- 
behaved, were annexed. 

Finally the arch-Maratha, Baji Rao, who had called for 5 * The 
Wellesley's protection in 1802, and ever since the granting wa * 
of it had persistently plotted and intrigued against his pro- 
tectors, was accounted beyond the pale of political restitution. 
IJiSuoffige and his .honours were abolished, and his dominions 
were ann£5e«il by the British. Yet so strong was the desire 
to maintain native administrations wherever possible, that a 
Ifffirtion oj^the territory was set aside and erected into the 
new principality of S attara with the representative of the 
house of Sivaji as its head : the principle of political sub jec v 
tton and administrative independence being maintained. 
f fheTdea of this arrangement was no doubt in part to 
destroy what had become in the course of a century the 
traditional elevation of the Peshwa family to the Maratha 
hegemony, a position which the Sivaji family would have 
no opportunity of recovering for themselves. Much to the 
Governor-General's annoyance, the^ Peshwa himself was 
allovjgd by Malcolm to reti^ to a jaghir in the Doab with 
a*pensfon four times as large as Hastings had intended to 
sanction. ' r * ■ ' 

The total result therefore was this. Sjndhia, despite the Summary 
privy instigations to resistance of which he was known to of result*, 
have been guilty while openly professing loyalty, was not 
further penalised. * He was allowed to ?etain a larger degree 
of independence than any other prince, nor was he deprived 
of more territory, though certain exchanges were made for 
greater convenience. Holkar was reduced to the position 
of a normal subsidiary ally, with an able native minister 
*.appointed^by the British. The trans-Chamba! claims of 
both Sindhia and Holkar were cancelled. It is noteworthy 
that Daulat Rao Sindhia*at last recognised the logic of facts 
and remained docile and loygl for the rest of his days. The 
Gaikwar whs already in the position of a subsidiary ally. 

A new Bhonsla was set up at Nagpur, in a like subordinate 
position, in preference to annexation. The lands of the fifth 
member of the pentarchy were annexed, excepting the portion 
allotted to the new Sattara State. Protection was extended 


to the provinces of Rajputana, and to the minor principalities 
within the area of Maratha supremacy. The work of pacifica- 
tion and the introduction of orderly government was carried 
out under the supervision of that brilliant gathering of ad- 
ministrators, among whom the most famous names hre those 
of Munro, Elphinstone, Malcolm, Jenkins, Ochterlony, and 

The King The marked loyalty displayed so repeatedly bjpthe Nawab 
°and the Oudh was rewarded in a peculiar manner. He was 
Mogul, elevated from the rank of Wazir of the Mogul tf that of* a 
formally independent sovereign, with the title of Padishah 
or “Ring. A similar honour offered to the Nizam was in- 
dignantly refused as treason to the recognised head of the 
Mohammedans in India. .Wellesley’s idea had been to 4 .make 
use of the power of the MogiA’s name : that of Hastings 
was to deprive it of weight, and induce the recognition of 
the British Empire on its own merits. In Wellesley’s time, 
when the Hindu Sindhia had set so much value on the 
Mogul fiction, he was certainly right. Time had probably 
justified the change of view as** concerned the Hindus^ but 
it is at least plausibly held that the earlier attitude helped to 
maintain a hold on the Mussulmans, and that the change was 
one among the innumerable factors associated with the 
mutiny of 1857. 

The affair Great as were the services rendered by Lord Hastings, 

Qi r er ^ ere were th° se at nome whom he had bffended, and who 
°* wished to enjoy the fruits of his policy, while repudiating its 
author. A further handle was given to this party by an 
incident at the close of the Govemor-General’s career; in 
which Hastings behaved in a manner sufficiently injudicious 
to allow of grave misconstruction being placsJ on his 
conduct. The trouble arose at Haidarabad. The Nizam 
was required to maintain a force Jcnown as the Haidarabad 
Contingent, which was separate from the subsidiary force. 
On this and on other objects an extravagant Expenditure 
was kept up. Finally to help him out of his difficulties, 
an exception was made to the usual rules, and an English 
banking house, Palmer & Co., was allowed in 1816 to make 
advances to the Nizam’s treasury. One of the partners 


was a connection of the Governor-General, who used ex- 
pressions which gave rise to a belief that Palmer & Co., 
could rely upon Government to back them in any differences 
with their clients. When Metcalfe arrived at Haidarabad 
in 182c? he found that the position the house had acquired 
was anomalous, dangerous, and strongly suggestive of 
jobbery. ^ Hastings at first met his representations with 
indignation^ but on finding how real was the ground on 
which they were based, he approved the cancelment of the 
permit granted to Palmer & Co., and provided funds for 
theVlizam to meet his obligations, by arbitrarily commuting 
for a lump sum the tribute hitherto paid by the British for 
the Sarkars. But the accusation of having been improperly 
connected with the Banking House — which was ultimately 
ruined by the issue of tfte transaction — continued to be 
urged against him Jby his ill-wishers. 

The suppression of the Pindaris had been sanctioned Conduct of 
by Canning in 1816; but the authorities in London India 
maintained a consistent incapacity for recognising the * ouse# 
necessity of the consequences involved. The great ex- 
tension of British territory accompanied by the formal 
acceptance of ever-increasing responsibilities which it would 
have been a crime towards the weaker States at least to 
ignore, found no favour in London ; while ministers applauded 
the accomplishment of great military achievements, they 
regretted the inevitable appearance of insatiable ambition : 
and when ministers "regretted, Directors displayed active 
hostility. Moreover though the result of the war was to 
place the Indian treasury in a more completely satisfactory 
position than had been known for many years, the outlay 
was of ^>urse enormous, and the Company had ever an 
intense aversion to casting its bread upon the waters. 

Also, Hastings had a perverse determination to put the 
best men in positions of responsibility, whereas the directors 
considered that their own totally irrelevant wishes should 
be paramount. 

Thus the tone of the India House had for some time Retire- 
been capjtious ; on the affair of Palmer & Co. Hastings meat of 
regarded It as a tantamount to a censure : and he resigned, $ 


His resignation was accepted, with formal compliments; 
but it was strictly in accordance with precedent that two 
years later the India House practically censured him as 
guilty in the Palmer matter — only six years after raising 
a statue to Warren Hastings, who died in 1818. 4 



{Map I) 

P i ERE was some doubt as to who should succeed Lord Lord 

Hastings. George* Canning, had actually been ap- Am herst. 
pointed, when the, death of Castlereagh made him elect to 
remain at Westminster. • The choice then remained between 
Lord William Bentinck, to whom reparation was owed for 
his recall from Madras, artd Lord Amherst who had con- 
ducted an embassy to China with credit and had suffered 
from shipwreck and other troubles in connection therewith. 

Amherst was chosen. Bentinck’s turn was to come later. 

Hastings left India in Jan. 1823, the administration being 
conducted in the interim by Mr Adam : and it was not till 
some months had passed that his successor arrived, to find 
trouble brewing % in a new quarter. 

The rulers of Hindbstan had never carried their dominion “Further 
into the mountains on the East of Bengal. Chittagong, India/' 
lying east of the de'la of the Brahmaputra, was included in 
the Bengal province ; otherwise the Brahmaputra valley was 
'in effc# its eastern limit, passing along the frontiers of 
Assam and of the hill tribes of Manipur and Lushai. 
Immediately south of fchittagong w*as the kingdom (at one 
time) of Arakan, south of *that Pegu, and south of that the 
coast of ♦Tenasserim. In the latter half of the eighteenth 
century, Arakan, Pegu, Tenasserim, and the whole basin of 
the Irawadi, besides Assam, were absorbed into the kingdom 
of Burma with its capital at Ava. It was the action of the 
Burmese monarchy which forced upon the new Govemor- 



General a not very glorious and a particularly expensive war, 
and a quite unpremeditated extension of territory. 

Retrospect As early as the rule of Sir John Shore, the Burmese 
ofrelat ^jh monarch y k ac * come in contact with the British. Fugitives 
Bunn^fr° m Arakan had sought an asylum in ChittagoAg; the 
Burmese troops followed them : and Shore declined to shelter 
the fugitives, provided that the Burmese would keep to their 
own territories. Consequently the Burmese supposed that 
the British were a feeble folk. Not long after, several^ 
thousands of Arakanese again took flight into Bri*;jh terri- 
tory. Wellesley was Governor-General, and they were not 
surrendered; on the contrary they made several armed 
invasions into Arakan from their new quarters. Three 
missions were however sent at intervals to Ava ; but §ince 
their instructions were yi each ctfse conciliatory, the earlier 
impressions of the Burmese court were confirmed. More- 
over, the Burmese authorities wera as ignorant of affairs 
outside as the Chinese, and suffered from a similar mental 
inflation. Therefore, when during the lapse of several years 
/the British steadily declined to srrrender the Arakanese, cthe 
king of Ava in 1818 sent to Lord Hastings, demanding the 
restoration of his territories of Chittagong, Dakka and Mur- 
shedabad ! The communication was returned to the king 
by Hastings with the remark that of course it was a 
forgery. < 

Collision Now the Burmese possessed a by no meins contemptible 
with the general named I|gnduia, who was quitd confident of his own 
urmese. t0 con q Uer the British : and the desire to try con- 

clusions developed not only at the Court but all over the 
country. There is a small island, where the borders of 
Chittagong and Arakan meet. This the British hSu always * 
regarded as their own. In 1823^ the Governor-General 
thought it necessary to place a guard on the island. The 
Burmese sent a force which ejected the guard and took 
possession Lord Amherst ejected the ejectors, And wrote 
to the king saying that his government wished for peace but 
would find themselves forced to retaliate if persistently in- 
sulted. So Bandula prepared to invade Bengal, and the 
Burmese Governor of Pegu was instructed to inform the 


Governor-General that he had better make his petition to 
Bandula, as the “Lord of the White Elephant” would 
receive no more communications. After that, it was 
sufficieiftly obvious that a declaration of war was the only 
course open : and ^ar was declared in Feb. 1824. 

Ignorance of the country was the great obstacle with which Plan of 
the British 2 »d to contend. There was a strong conviction Campaigns 
that any attempt to enter Burma by land would be disastrous 1 24 ‘ 
from pealilence and the want of supplies. So the plan was 
devised of sending the expedition by sea to Rangoon, on the 
hypothesis that it could then proceed up the Irawadi. The 
Bengal army was largely composed of high-caste Hindus, 
undjr a religious prohibition against crossing the sea. The 
Madras troops being dratfn from t^e lower castes did not 
feel the same objection ; therefore the expedition was made 
up of Europeans and Madras sepoys. 

The armament reached Rangoon in May. The town was Opera- 
promptly occupied, but the entire population disappeared ll £ ns 
from it into the jungle leaving it denuded of every species of 4 * 
supplies. Then came the rains, and with them malaria and 
dysentery; while the troops were fed on the provisions 
procured from Calcutta contractors. Calcutta contractors 
were notorious. The exertions of Sir Thomas Munro, now 
Governor of Madras, only sufficed save the situation — 
but the army wa* forced to remain almost inactive till nearly 
the end of the year. # 

Bandula had started on his invasion of Bengal, also in 
May. An unsuppoited British outpost in Chittagong had 
suffered disaster at his hands ; but he was recalled in order 
r, to deaMdth the counter-invasion in Pegu. In December, 
he arrived before the British position at Rangoon, with sixty 
thousand men, who threw up a stockade behind which they 
prepared pits with great ^rapidity and dexterity. But a 
fight onlDecember 7 followed by another on the 15th 
caused him to fall back to a position several miles up the 

The British General, Sir Archibald Campbell, did not how- Opera- 
ever advance till February. Bandula in his entrenchments h° ns °* 
repulsed the column sent against him, and the general spring. 


advance was delayed till April ist, when Bandula was killed 
by a bursting shell, and his army beat a hasty retreat. The 
British proceeded as far as Pro me, which they occupied 
without resistance, but the rainy season set in, and again 
stopped offensive operations. 

Two other expeditions set out by the routes rejected in 
the previous year — one by way of Manipur, tb^Ttfher into 
Arakan. The first found the country hopelessly impassable 
the moment the rains set in ; which they did as«sarly as 
February. The commander could see no alternative to with- 
drawal. Morrison in Arakan progressed very slowly ; and as 
soon as the rains began, the greater part of his army was 
prostrated by disease which killed large numbers, though J;hey 
found no other enemy tq fight. h 
Opera- As the year passed on, the British offered, to negotiate ; but 
tions of the court of Ava though less confident of the invincibility of 
Autumn : * ts arm y> refused to agree to the cession of Tenasserim and 
Arakan, with the payment of a ’heavy indemnity. Another 
army was collected, but suffered n complete defeat, and *the 
Burmese reopened negotiations. Their envoys agreed to 
everything except the amount of the indemnity, which was 
then reduced. But while the ratification of the treaty was 
being awaited the enemy strengthened their entrenchments. 
Therefore on Jan. 19 /he British attacked and routed them, 
capturing all their guns and stores, and mardned towards the 
End of capital. A last desperate effort was made with a force of some 
the war. 16,000 men — all that the Burmese could collect — to crush 
the British force which now had less than a tenth of that 
number in its fighting line. The attack was completely 
defeated; and the Lord of the White Elephant Accepted- 
the British terms. yAssam, Arakan and Tenasserim were 
ceded ; Manipur was declared independent; a heayy indem- 
nity wa$ paid ; and the presence of a British Resident at 
Ava was assented to. 

Considera- vtfW most remarkable result of the war was the amazing 
tions development of the resources of the three ceded provinces, 
ereon ' which had not been supposed to have much value. The 
war itself bad been in many respects a disastrous one. 
It had been declared on Feb. 24, 1824: the treaty of 


peace was signed on Feb. 24, 1826 after precisely two years. 

As a mere matter of fighting the troops opposed to us 
were of less account than any of our previous antagonists ; 
but thare was much gross mismanagement which, coupled 
with the effects of the climate, caused an appalling amount 
of disease and a very, heavy mortality; attributed by the 
sepoys to magic arts of the enemy. To hold back from 
the war would have been impossible, and the subsequent 
•cessing of territory was inevitable — the more so as the 
population of the ceded districts detested the Burmese rule, 
which was peculiarly unenlightened. 

One unfortunate incident must be noticed — the mutiny The 
of a sepoy regiment at Barrackpur close to Calcutta.' The ® arracJc ' 
soldiers had been expected to pay for the transport of their Mutiny, 
own baggage ; but this regiment, 'fchich was under orders 
to march for Anfkan, <^ked to be relieved on the ground 
that the transport expenses were exceptionally high. Their 
memorial, a perfectly proper one, was curtly rejected by 
the military authorities. The officers had only been with 
the regiment for three months, and had not acquired in- 
fluence; the men became insubordinate. Two European 
regiments were brought* up to the spot by night ; the sepoys 
were paraded and ordered to march or ground arms. They 
would do neither. The Europeans opened fire on them. 

No resistance was made : numbers Vere killed ; the ring- 
leaders were executed and the remainder sent to work in 
irons. Next year these were pardoned. After the point of 
mutiny had been rezmhed, it is probable enough that any less 
severe action would have had a disastrous result ; but if 
J&e mQfc had been fairly met at first, there would never 
have been any mutiny. 

If^the memory of disaster is quickly wiped out by victories, p;ppble at 
the memory of victories i^ still more quickly wiped out by : 

disaster, j The contrast between the swift successes of Lord 
Hastings* and the dreary drag of the Burmese war, agitated 
the minds of the Indian population, and there was danger 

of fresh disturbances. For a moment affairs at Bhartpur, 
the Jat principality west of the Jamna before whose fortress 

Lake had so signally failed some years before, became 


extremely threatening. The succession of a child to the 
throne was officially recognised : but the child was dis- 
possessed a month later by a cousin named Durjan Sal. 

Ochter* Ochterlony, who had been fighting in the Company'? armies 
l°ny. ever s l nce the days of Haidar Ali, was in charge of the 
Rajputana and Malwa district. He promptly ordered up 
a British field force to establish the rightfyt^Raja and 
vindicate British authority. But in doing so, he exceeded 
his legal powers; to proceed against Bhartpuj^., mea&r* 
besieging it again : the place was of immense strength, 'and 
had baffled Lake completely in 1805 : a fresh failure would 
certainly have very serious results. Government, which was 
by no means on the best of terms with the old soldier, 
snubbed him, and countermanded the force. Durjan *Sal, 
who had manifested a disposition to yield, was encouraged 
to believe that the British were afraid. f Ochterlony, who 
was perfectly confident of his ability to capture Bhartpur, 
resigned his position in bitterness of spirit There were 
thousands of fighting men deprived of their occupation by 
the recent settlement, who now flocked to Durjan Sal's 
standard : disaffection became generally recrudescent. These 
events took place in 1825, while India was very doubtful 
as to the probable issue of the Burmese war. The Calcutta 
Council was divided as to the proper course to take. Thither 
however came Mctca/fe, on his way from*. Haidarabad to 
replace Ochterlony in the North-West With the facts be- 
Capture of fore him, his opinion was emphatic. The circumstances 
Bhartpur. absolutely demanded that the British ^should assert them- 
selves unmistakably. The Governor-General bowed to his 
judgment. Metcalfe proceeded to Delhi, and c b*ied 9, 
preliminary expostulation with Durjan Sal who continued 
recalcitrant. The princes of Upper* India, deluded by the 
belief that Burma was exhausting jhe entire British resources, 
were surprised by the appearance of an army <^f twenty 
thousand men. The great fortifications which Lake had 
persistently attempted to storm, fell before the science of 
the Engineers, and inja^ry i£?6, the capture of Bhartpur 
objj, tested the misconceptions pf twenty years. There was 
no longer an “ impregnable ” fortress left. The achievement 


was more convincing to the Native mind than all the 
successes of the Pindari campaigns : and removed all 
remaining inclination to challenge the supremacy of British 
arms. • 

BJiartpur was the decisive expression of an already A pause in 
a^conjplished fact. Between the Burmese annexations of expansion. 
1826 and tj[je conquest of Sindh in 1843 there was no 
further territorial expansion ; nor any serious military opera- 
t frs m ti\^the Afghan expedition of 1839. The attention 
of the Governors-General was concentrated on administration 
and progress. The further dealings with Native States, up 
to the time of Lord Auckland may be treated in a few 

Aftiherst was succeeded in 1828 by Lord William Lpjd 
Bentinck, formerly Governor of MaTlras, whose benevolent William 
and progressive *goverpment received its merited and succeeds 
eloquent eulogium from the brilliant pen of Macaulay. Amherst. 
In his dealings with the N^ive States among which British 
Ascendancy was accepted, he was controlled by the emphatic 
instructions from England to maintain the habit of non- Renewal 
intervention. The unfortunate effects of the extreme ^ on ‘ 
application of this policy, especially in Oudh and at Gwalior 
became apparent in after years. 

After the death of Daulat Rao Sindhia in 1827, the affairs 
of that State fell into considerable disorder, resulting ultimately 
in the undue predominance of the soldiery therein, which 
had to be terminated by the campaign of Maharajpur in the 
time of Lord Kllenborough. In Oudh, the misgovernment 
became so serious tnat even the India House authorised 
, ^ipexatjftn in the last resort ; but Bentinck contented him- 
self with remonstrances and threats, periodically renewed, but 
not enforced till the enc> of Dalhousie’s administration. 

Some interference however was made necessary by mal- Minor an- 
administration in the Rajput State of Jeipur, where a ncxation * 
permanent Resident was finally appointed, who exercised 
a salutary influence. Bentinck also found himself compelled 
not to annex, but to take over the administration of Mysore ; 
where however the dynasty has since been re-instated in 
authority. Affairs there had prospered under the first 


minister appointed by Wellesley ; but after his death anarchy 
had developed, and it was the actual revolt of the population 
against the government which necessitated Bentinck’s action 
— an action received with the complete acquiescence of the 
Mysore State itself. 

The small State of Kurg on the south of Mysore, which 
had actively helped us against Tippu Sahib wg^-in a some- 
what similar manner annexed on account of the general 
violence of its ruler : and the little province of J^charf?£!r 
the borders of Assam and Manipur, ivas by its own desire, 
on the death of its Raja without an heir, added to the British 

Metcalfe In 1835, Sir Charles Metcalfe succeeded to the Governor- 
Genera^*/ Generalship ; but in spite of a strong body of opinion tfhich 
interim recognised his essential fitness for the post, his appointment 
was not confirmed in London, and yltimafely after long delay 
the post was bestowed upon Lord Auckland, who went to 
India in 1836. # . 

Metcalfe had an unusually string title to exceptional treat- 
ment, but was prepared to return to the position of Governor 
of the North-West Provinces or of Madras. During his 
tenure of the Governor-Generalship? however, he had taken 
a strong and independent line in releasing the Press from the 
strict Government control to which it had hitherto been 
subjected. This stejl was distasteful to tke India House ; 
and not only was he passed over for Madras, but the North- 
West provinces were once more reduced to a Lieutenant- 
Governorship before the appointment tljere was again offered 
to him. The slight was too grave; and Metcalfe resigned 
the Indian service, to follow out his distinguished^ireer, ^ 
Canada and elsewhere. 

Appoint- With Lord Auckland’s administration there commenced a 
mC Lord new era war ^ are » i ts ^ n f v ^ a W e result of expanding 
Auckland, dominion, reaching its climax in the rule of Lord *Dalhousie 
and the transfer of the Government from the Company to 
the Crown in consequence of the great Mutiny. 



A STAGE has now been reached in the story of the British 
Expansion, at which it becomes practicable to give a 
connected review of the machinery by which the expanding 
rule was made effective, and of the results which that rule 
brought into being. • 

In the early days of British dominion, the whole system of First 
government was tentative^ experimental, amounting to very 
little more than a makeshift. Between 1760 and 1765 it an ^y n 
was no better than that of the Afghan Nawabs. Clive’s last 
visit Jiad wrought considerate improvements. Then came 
the open assumption of the Diwani, North’s Regulating Act/ ' 
and the Governor-Generalship of Hastings. That temporary 
constitution has been already examined. In 1785 it was 
replaced by the new Constitution framed under Pitt’s India 
Act, which remained substantially in^force until the Act 
renewing the Corflpany’s Charter in 1833; from which time 
until the suppression of the Company in 1858 no grave 
change was introduced. 

Now in ijj 8^, the ^British dominion proper extended on The 
the Ganges over Bengal, Behar, and certain ceded districts £*°wth of 
■*wr" the ^tet of Oudh, forming the Bengal Presidency : the Presi-^ 
Northern Sarkars, and some districts in the Carnatic, forming dencies. 
the Madras .Presidency : and some districts in the neighbour- 
hood of Bombay, forming* the Bombay Presidency; the 
whole ext^it of which may be seen at a glance on the map 
(VIII. A). As new districts were acquired, those south of 
the Krishna River were attached to Madras : those on the 
west of the Nizam’s dominions to Bombay ; and the rest to 
the dominating Presidency of Bengal. In course of time the 
great accumulation of new territories attached to Bengal led 


to the institution of separate Lieutenant-Governorships or 
Commissionerships within the Presidency, such as the North- 
West Provinces — i.e. the Ganges districts above Behar — the 
Central Provinces, Arakan, and the Panjab ; but the army in 
all was the Bengal army. 

The Con- Primarily then, the Constitution of 1784 recognised the 
stitution of three Presidencies, each having its own Gojfarnor, its own 
17 * Council, its own army, and its own Commander-in-C hief. 
t/But the Governor, Council and Com mander-i^Chier^iiP 
Bengal were also supreme over the Madras and Bo'habay 
authorities. With them lay the making of treaties, of war, 
of peace. Bombay could not again drag the Governor- 
General into a war, as it had done with Warren Hastings 
over Ragoba's affairs, nor could ^Madras make havoc the 
results of a successful campaign as it had done in Mysore 
in 1784. As yet however, the, two Vninor Presidencies 
were independent in the matter of legislation. 

Technical The supreme government in India, then, was that of 
powers of Governor-General in Council. The other members of 
Governor- Council being now three in number, the support of one of 
General, them sufficed to ensure that there should be no such un- 
seemly thwartings of the Chief as had made the tenure of 
office by Warren Hastings so incomparably and unreasonably 
difficult. Further, tjie Governor-General had power to act 
on emergency without consulting his CoUhciL Thus when 
immediate action was necessary, he* was no longer under 
the necessity of submitting to formal checks and delays, or 
to the risk of being hampered by unprofitable hesitations. 
At the same time, no practical danger existed of the liberty 
being abused, since he was liable to be called te*&cccw£pi 
and to be compelled subsequently to justify the treatment 
of any particular crisis as an emergency. 

On the other hand, he wa? ^ obliged to §^rcise M „iJiat 
almo^f amounted to the authority of an a^pqrat m th^ jspoit 
His wlthan^ye to the supreme authority in England! He was 
practical £ fact much in the position of the Manager of a Company 
powers. w j i0se Board lays down the general principles of policy, 
but leaves Kim a large latitude in neglecting the letter of 
their instructions provided that he can point to a reasonable 



justification in the circumstances for his having done so. 

Thus, according to Cornwallis’s instructions, he was taking 
a risk in going to war with Mysore without express permission 
from home; but the London authorities commended him 
for havir% done so. Wellesley carried out his policy at his 
own risk, dragging a more or less reluctant assent after the 
act from London, until at last London refused to assent any 
longer. His sfiascessors would not venture to ride roughshod 
over the sentiments of the home authorities, trusting to 
tlie^Ccwwplished fact as their justification : but Lord 
Hastings succeeded in carrying them with him sufficiently 
far for the execution of his plans, though in the interval 
Lord Minto had been restrained from the degree of activity 
which he himself rightly deemed desirable. But in any 
case, the home authorities t:ould be absolutely secure that 
each of their Goveynors-General left England with views in 
substantial agreement witfi their own ; and the Governor- 
General knew that if his own views at starting became 
materially changed, he woutd either have to subordinate 
them* or to convert the hoaic authorities, or to take the 
risk of being recalled, censured, and possibly impeached. 

The Home authorities were on one side the Company, The Board 
on the other the Parliamentary Board of Control. In all °f Control, 
political matters the initiative as well as the guidance lay 
with the latter body: which was required by the Act of 
1793, renewing tlie Charter, to meet for the authorisation 
of dispatches. This Board consisted originally of sundry* 
members of the Privy Counci 1 and two others ; the Charter 
Acts of 1793 an< ^ x 8 1^3 left it unaltered, but that of 1833 
made some additional Ministers ex officio members. As a 
-MiWer {practice however, it appears that the whole of the 
real work of the Board was done by the President and a 
couple of secretaries ; acting no doubt largely in accordance 
with the recommendations ofrthe Directors. 

The partial abolition of the Company’s monopolies by Charter 
the Chart* Act of 1813 led to a more careful consideration Acts of 
on its part of political problems ; and this change was made and 
more complete by the act of 1833 : the last also modifying 
the Constitution of the Indian Governments. By it, the 



legislative powers, of Jthe Presidencies,^ were subordinatedjQ 
the supreme, v Governnt£nt. Moreover, the Supreme Govern- 
ment was now made to consist of the Governor-General, 
three members of the Company's service (one being military) 
f tjttid a legislative member from home. If the Governor- 
General was not also Commander-in-Chief — functions which 
had been combined several times, when he was an ex- 
perienced soldier — the Commander-in-ChieC*Hight act as an 
extra member of Council. 

Within the actual British Dominion, then, G* .-i.riWent 
was in the hands of the Presidency Governors-in-Council, 
except so far as they were subordinate to the Supreme 
Political Government at Calcutta : while the deposed sovereigns or 
relations, their families enjoyed ample pensions, retaining in sundry 
cases something of tl]e pomp Ahd circumstance of royalty, 
but absolutely without power. Within the sphere of 
Ascendancy — practically that is vhere subsidiary alliances 
prevailed — Government lay with the Native Durbar, but 
external relations were controlled by the British Supreme 
Government, acting through t Resident or Agent the 
Capital, who also exercised some degree of informal in- 
fluence in domestic affairs. These officers might be either 
civilians or soldiers, and the proportion of the latter 
increased as time went on, the appointment to their posts 
resting with the supreme Government. The employment 
of soldiers as “politicals” is one of the rfotable features of 
the system, and a certain jealousy between the Services is 
occasionally observable in the memoirs of distinguished 
members of both branches; though it would be extremely 
difficult to award the palm of superiority to either, where 
services so brilliant were rendered by both. * ,r - 

The Com- Until the conquest of Bengal, the civilian servants of the 
pany’s Company in India had been in fac? clerks of various grades 
€rvlce ’ in a great commercial concern, r Then in spite of themselves 
the clerks were forced to learn the business of government 
Warren Hastings had to initiate the process byVhich they 
were to be converted into administrators. It was many 
years however before the Company began to feel that 
trade was no longer its own primary raison (TSfre, and also 



that of its civilian employes. But the facts were too strong, 
and under persistent pressure from one Governor-General 
after another, from Cornwallis onwards, the training and the 
character of the Civil Service improved till it became a body 
of quit£ exceptional efficiency and capacity. Its more 
brilliant members found their way into the ranks of 
the Residents and Agents, Commissioners, Deputy Com- 
missioners, M^pibers of Council. The functions of the 
general body were associated either with revenue or judicial 
buSffesuwpr both, according as the working system was from 
time*to time modified. 

Be ng al was jLhe J) irt h-pl ac e of British administration; for Early ad- 
many years its only field. Before North’s Regulating Act, 
the Company had already “stood forth as Diwani” and methods, 
begun to lay upon its servants th<j duties of Collectors 
and Magistrates, though as yet the native servants of the 
titular Nawab exercised functions both in the revenue and 
judicial departments. By North's Act, the new Judicial 
element of the Supreme Court was introduced, with results 
at tfae time which have been already examined : while 
the responsible revenue offices w r ere withdrawn from the 

Under Hastings then,* the judicial system was at first as 
follows. In the several ._dijstricts of Bengal, a civil^ourt, and 
a criminalcourt we re-established, thej European" Collector 
being in charge hot only of the Revenue but also of the 
Civil Court: while the Criminal Court retained its native 
judges, administering the Mohammedan law. Two corre- 
sponding Cour ts of ^ >peal were established at Calcutta, the 
Governor presiding in the civil court, and a Mohammedan 
4tti|§***Mfche criminal. In the districts the Collector, and at 
Calcutta the Governor, exercised a certain supervision over 
the Mohammedan Courft. On the arrival of the Supreme 
Court, consisting of judges# from England, these claimed 
entire control of the judicial system, administering the Law 
according/o the canons of Westminster; with the disastrous 
results we have seen, until something like a working com- 
promise was arrived at by Hastings and Impey. In 1780, 
regulations were issued, under which the ordinary CivU 


1 ' 

Courts were placed under officers appointed thereto, instead 
of the Collectors : but the Collectors retained the charge of 
Revenue suits. 

Changes In 1787, however, under Cornwallis, there was first a 
Com revers i° n > Collectors again becoming the Civil judges. 
walHs" Moreover their jurisdiction was at the same time extended 
to minor criminal offences. But in 1790, owing to the 
prevalence of crimes of violence, another s&ep was taken. 
Four Courts of Circuits were appointed for the administration 
of Criminal justice in Bengal and Behar, each 
British Judges appointed from the Company’s servants. 
The Governor-General and Council at the same time took 
over the Criminal Court of Appeal in Calcutta. The 
Mohammedan law remained except for the abolition of such 
barbaric forms of punishment c as mutilation. Finally the 
junction in one person of the offices of Civil Judge and 
Collector proved to be dangerous in working, because it 
enabled an unprincipled officer to confirm in one capacity 
his own derelictions of duty win the other; hence before 
Cornwallis left India, the judicial and the revenue functions 
were completely separated, and the principle which Warren 
Hastings had attempted to establish was vindicated. Further, 
four “ Provincial ” Courts of Appeal were established, inter- 
vening between the lower courts and the “ Sadr Addlat ” or 
Court of Final Appeal at Calcutta. 

Changes The system remained unchanged till tne time of Lord 
Bendnck* Bentinck, who once more turned over some of 

’ the judicial functions to the Revenue Department : to the 
detriment of the magisterial work, wfyich the Collector was 
apt to regard as a mere appendage to his normal duties. 
But another change effected by him was of a veT^ '^r<Tw«k 
order. It was a fundamental part of the Cornwallis system 
to exclude Natives from any but tfie lowest offices. Hence 
on the one hand the Natives «had a grievance, and on the 
other there were not enough Europeans to da the work. 
Bentinck considerably extended the openings fV Natives, 
and during his term of office, the dispatches from London 
definitely laid it down as a principle that colour or creed as 
such were no longer to debar from office. The removal of 



the legal barrier by no means abolished the practical barrier ; 
but did render it no longer insurmountable. 

Subject to some modifications, the system in force in Regula- 
Bengal applied to the territories acquired up to Lord Minto’s 
time, ancl to the bulk of those acquired under Lord Hastings : iadon?ro- 
which were inclusively termed Regulation Provinces. In the vinces. 
Sikh Cis-Satlej territories, however, in central India, and in 
Burma, k owT2%as Non-regulation provinces, administrative 
posts wer e to a great extent entrusted to soldiers, and the 
systemTfhs allowed to shape itself much more according to 
the peculiar circumstances of the district ; larger latitude and 
independence being allowed to the officers there : a rule 
applying generally where British Ascendancy had been less 
felt before it was transformed into Dominion. 

Generally then in the sphere of Government and judicial Three 
administration certain periods may be observed. First the 
tentative period, at the Close of which Warren Hastings , had periods, 
fore-shadowed the principles which ultimately guided us, but 
which he was not always allbwed to carry out. Second, the 
period of the Cornwallis sysfem, practically synchronous with 
the domination at home of Pitt and his Tory successors. 

Third, the modified system initiated under Lord_Wi]Uam 
Bentinck, and by the Charter Act of 1833: corresponding 
with the era initiated in Home affairs by the struggle over the 
Reform Bill. T^Jie good and the evil! of the political ideas 
prevailing at home during each of these periods finds its 
counterpart, of course with modifications, in the Government 
of Britain’s great dependency : just as we have already noted 
the reflection in Indian politics of European complications. 

Tojone branch of the service however these considerations 
" fio^lS Spply, and it remains to conclude this chapter with a 
brief account of the Arn^y. 

The troops employed in India were of two branches — the The Army 
King’s army, and the Comjfeny’s three armies. The former in India * 
were British regiments, sent out to take their turn of service 
in India.* The latter were almost entirely Native regiments, 
with a small number of regiments of Europeans raised and 
paid by the Company for the Company’s service. In each of 
the three armies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay, the general 



principles were the same. In the Native regiments, all the 
commissioned officers were British, while the non-commis- 
sioned officers were promoted from the native rank and file. 
But there were characteristic differences of detail. 0 In the 
Bengal army, promotion went practically by seniority ; in the 
other two, mainly by selection. The Bengal army was 
recruited mainly from the Brahmins and Rajputs of the upper 
Ganges with a leaven of Mussulmans ; Hflodostanis. In 
southern India, where the proportion of Brahmins^, 
especially of Rajputs to the general population %a.s ^very 
much smaller, the bulk of the regiments were drawn from 
lower castes; though in Bombay, the Hindostani element 
was considerable. Now, the higher the caste, the more 
stringent are the regulations and observances required of the 
pious Hindu, the heavier are the penalties attached to 
breaches thereof, and the greater is the dinger of a collision 
between the demands of military *and religious obedience. 
Hence the risk of such a collision was greater in the Bengal 
army than in those of Madras and Bombay. Added to this, 
the mixture of castes in the Southern armies tended to 
produce a purely regimental esprit-de-corps ; while the system 
of recruiting in the North gave scope for an extra-regimental 
clan or family bond among the soldiers, which when they 
were loyal would be an element of strength, but if they turned 
disloyal became an dement of indiscipline Moreover the 
southern plan of promotion by merit, while apt to cause 
jealousies, still gave control to men who by the fact of their 
promotion were attached to the system, and ceteris paribus 
were more likely to offer a decisive opposition to anything 
like mutiny. The utmost care was indeed required _ even 
in Madras, as the Vellur affair proved : but the Burmese' 
war also proved that demands might be made on the 
Madrasis which could not with safety be pressed upon the 

It has further to be noted that every annexation df territory 
and every subsidiary alliance entailed an increase in the 
number of sepoy regiments, and ought for safety’s sake to 
have been accompanied — though it never was — by a pro- 
portionate increase in the number of King’s regiments or at 



least of the Company’s Europeans. If the sepoy was to have 
a master, he preferred the “ Sahib " ; but owing to the 
disregard of this precaution, a time came when he became 
possessed with the idea that he could dispense with masters 



Land taxa- T N India, the prime source of revenue is the Lan<37 and it 
tion the 1 j s f rom t j ie j an( j that the g rea t mass 0 f the inhabitants 
source of derive their maintenance. The Land “settlements” there- 
Indian fore are of vital importance both in the fiscal and the social 
revenue. S y S tem. The subject is unattractive to the ordinary reader, 
and it is particularly complicated because the actual historical 
facts are often in dispute, and are rqade iftore confusing by 
being translated in terms of Western half-analogies. In the 
present chapter, we shall endeavour to make clear the 
different methods of settlement^ adopted in different parts 
of the peninsula, the reason for the differences, and tkeir 

At all times it had been a matter of course that whatever 
other taxes might be levied, 'the Government claimed a share 
of the produce of the joil. The assessment of the value of 
the produce, the share to be so appropriated* and the method 
of collection, all lay with the ruling Power for the time 
being, and had varied '''considerably. So did the tenures 
under which the cultivators occupied the lands they tilled 
The When the Mogul dominion had b&en in full and un- 
Mogul disputed force, the system followed had been rough ly v p g L 
system. f 0 u 0ws# The land was parcelled out into considerable 
districts: the amount of land under cultivation and the 
nature of the crops were ascertained ; from this the normal 
yield was estimated, and so *Ihe amount to be paid to the 
Government by each district was arrived at. Al collector 
was appointed for the district who was responsible for paying 
over the sum fixed on to the Government, less the amount 
of his own allowance ; and it was his business to see that 
the amount which he collected was not less than that which 



he had to pay. The collector was called an amil or a 
zemindar , and the collectorship, and the district a zemindari. The ze- 
Officers were in many cases given districts, as a reward for mm da r * 
service#, without having to pay the assessed tax to the 
Government, on condition of rendering certain military ser- 
vices. A district so assigned was called a jaghir , and the 
officer a jaghigddr. .The grant of a zemindari or a jaghir 
was not in form hereditary, but in practice both became so, 
sd l 9$mk>a.s a rule to the payment of fines on succession. 
Technically, the Sovereign retained the right of resuming 
either jaghir or zemindari at pleasure. 

The persons from whom the zemindar claimed the tax or 
rent varied according to the locality. It might be the 
individual cultivator. It •might be # the Village Community, 
an institution to which we shall presently revert. It might 
be a local chief, fecogiksed by his clansmen as the lord of 
the soil. 

Now it was not unusual for the office of zemindar to have 
be^n conferred on one of *hcse local chiefs, who might be 
regarded as having something resembling a proprietary right 
dating from a remote antiquity. But the zemindar, as such, 
had no proprietary right ; he merely held a position which 
he had a reasonable expectation would in the ordinary course 
be continued to him and his heirs* subject always to the 
caprice of the M onarch. 

Where the regulatk>n methods of the Moguls had been 
less generally enforced, as for instance in the Southern and 
Western Dekhan, tlje zemindar here generally known as a 
poligar was less prominent, or non-existent ; the office was 
■ .!v*reditary, and the individual was not permanently 
associated with the district. 

Such were the main* features of the prevalent system or Want of 
systems in operation when # the British first began to exercise security, 
dominion. The actual assessment was liable to arbitrary 
revision^ The share demanded by Government was liable 
to arbitrary enhancement. The tenure of the rent or tax- 
collector’s office might, from the Government point of 
view, be merely temporary or practically hereditary; his 
status, from the peasant’s point of view, might be that of a 


Highland chief or that of a magnified exciseman. And the 
actual cultivators held their plots in virtue of no legal enact- 
ments but in accordance with infinitely varying local usages. 
To Western eyes, the system wore the appearance* not of 
system at all but of chaos. All that it w y as possible for 
Warren Hastings to do was to endeavour to extract from the 
chaos some guiding principles, and on them to^base tentative 
but necessarily very defective arrangements. 

When Lord Cornwallis arrived in Bengal, the 
absorbed a great share of his attention, and that of some of 
his most capable subordinates, notably Shore. 

Bengal. Throughout Bengal and Behar, and the Sarkars — the 
regions which now practically made up the British Dominion 
— the Mogul system was in fulb'force. The country *Was 
divided into zemindaris. Nearly always, the zemindars were 
Hindus, since for financial purposes <the Hindus had always 
been better agents than Mussulmans. Within the last half 
century, several of the great zemindars had been elevated to 
the rank, and bore the title, of ra* ; as. , 

Superficially, these zemindars presented a considerable 
analogy to the great landlords, the County Families of 
' England. Guided by that analogy, Cornwallis constructed 
the Permanent Settlement of Bengal. 

The Under the English' system, the welfare of the whole 
English agricultural community is largely dependent on the 
owner." prosperity of the landlord class. A century ago, the 
landowner in theory at least, was the source of all progress 
in the rural population : it was he wljo found the money 
for improvements, encouraged industry and thrift, and 
preserved the spirit of order and loyalty in the 
In general, he might be trusted to be generous according 
to his lights; and anything which would have tended 
seriously to diminish his influence* would have been accounted 
a misfortune. His position was secure, unless he forfeited 
it by grave misconduct or folly : and his securi f ^. was in 
no small degree the cause of his usefulness. 

Theory Thus it was argued that if the zemindar were given the 
mindarl same secur hy he wou ^ have the same inducements to 
setUement exercise his influence and to spend his money for the 


general benefit, looking for his return to the increased value 
of his property. Moreover he would acquire a strong 
interest in the maintenance of the Government to whom 
he ow^d his security. In short, just as in England, the 
proprietary right in the soil was for the most part vested 
in landowners, while the cultivation was carried on by their 
tenants, so also it should be in Bengal : the cultivator 
holding from ffte zemindar under the conditions established 

The vital matter then was that the zemindar should feel 
that he was not going to be displaced, and that if he spent 
his money on improvements, the Government would not 
step in and demand an increased rent from him. 

To attain this object, *the land was assessed; the rent The Per- 
or tax to be paid by the zemind&r was then fixed, and g*”^ 1 
was established ifi perijianence. ment : its 

The actual result was that the zemindars of Bengal and effect on 
Behar did become a loyal # body, and kept firmly to their 
allegiance when the mutiny came : they did not, however, 
fulnl the expectations of Cornwallis in introducing agri- 
cultural improvements ; and no opportunity was left for 
anyone but the zemindars themselves to profit by the system. 
Improvements in the value of the land might come from 
the energy of the cultivators, froiy the action of the 
zemindars, frormthe general effects of a strong Government 
which prevented war. and pillage, from specific measures of 
the Government such as irrigation works ; the profit in each 
case went to the zemindar, except where the cultivator 
could show* that he* had a title to the benefit of his own 

'ihe Cornwallis Settlement was the archetype of all 
zemindari settlements ; *hose, that is, in which the cultivator 
held from the zemindar, the zemindar held from the Govern- 
ment, and the Government claimed its rent or land-tax not 
from th^cultivator or from a group of cultivators but from 
the zenlindars — whether these intermediaries were of old 
or recent standing. In his capacity as a tenant from the 
Government, the zemindar got what he never had before— 
fair rent, fixity of tenure, and freedom of transfer. The 


Its defect. 

The Ryot- 
Wari settle- 

only legitimate ground for his ejection was his failure to 
pay the rent. But as landlord, he was bound in his treat- 
ment of the cultivators to act in accord with established 
usages, and to justify an enhancement of rentals before the 
Court when challenged. 

In making the settlement absolutely permanent Corn- 
wallis acted against the judgment of Shore. In the view 
of the latter, a fully sufficient security wc<Jld have been 
given by fixing the settlement not in perpetuity bijt a 
long term of years. The contrast between that security and 
the previous capricious tenure would have satisfied the 
zemindars, and have given them not much less inducement 
to devote energy and money to getting the most out of 
the land. On the other hand itr would have enabled <ihe 
Government ultimately t*o participate in the increased profits 
of production and of the new land brQUght t»nder cultivation ; 
and also to readjust the relations of the zemindar and the 
cultivator in the light of a wider agd more accurate knowledge 
of the traditional rights of the latfpr. c 

Experience has endorsed Shore’s view. The Permanent 
Settlement deprived the Government of future days of what 
would have become a perfectly legitimate source of revenue 
that would have entailed no sort of hardship or injustice 
on the zemindars ; an^l also made it impossible to confer 
on the cultivators or restore to them proprietary rights 
which might have been desirable. Still in its broad out- 
line, the Cornwallis Settlement was a valuable piece of 
legislation, which, without being intended to do so, in fact 
revolutionised, greatly for the better, tfte pre-existing state 
of affairs. — 

The accession of territory in Southern India consequent 
upon the Mysore wars of Cornwall and Wellesley made 
a settlement necessary in the newly acquired districts. 
The leading principle was to adapt and regulate the exist- 
ing system. The Bengal settlement was an adaption of 
the existing zemindari system. In the South, Haidar Ali 
and Tippu had worked something of the kind, but it was 
not the traditional system, and the zemindari was not 
an established institution. H*re the name most closely 


connected with the Settlement is that of Sir Thomas 

Munro was one of the remarkable trio of Scotsmen, all of 
very mu<ih the same standing, who did much to mould the 
future of India during the first quarter of the nineteenth 
century. Although one of the three was a civilian, Elphin- 
stone, all of them rendered distinguished service in the 
field ; all displa$^d great ability as administrators ; all were 
dipl-snaftatists of a high order. Twice while still a young man 
Malcolm, the third, was the chosen envoy to Persia of the 
Indian Government ; it was he who nipped in the bud the 
attempt of the Indur Marathas to take active part in the 
Pindari war, and he to whom the Peshwa surrendered. 

Elphinstone, when four and twenty, rode by the side of 
Arthur Wellesley in the Maratha Campaign of 1803; when 
the great soldier tdld hipj that nature had meant him for a 
soldier — a judgment ratified by the skill and resource with 
which he baffled the Marathas at Kirki, having performed 
with^great ability the functiqps of Resident at Puna, at the 
court of the crafty Baji Rao, as well as those of first envoy 
to Kabul in 1808. To him, when the war was over, w T as 
entrusted the Settlement of the districts added to the 
Bombay Presidency, a task carried out in the light of 
Munro’s example in the Madras territory. 

Of Munro’s talents as a soldier, the fact that Arthur 
Wellesley invited his criticisms of the campaign of 1803 is 
a sufficient proof, ratified again by his skilful operations in the 
southern Dekhan during the last Maratha war : but perhaps 
his highest title to faAe is that he led Jhe way in the great 
wqrjf /^e nde avouring to establishTKe land-settlement on the 
basi*! of customs understood and prevalent, instead of on 
theories derived from ifiisleading w’es|prn analogies. He 
was little more than a boy 0 when with Major Read as his 
superior he examined and reported on the tenures in the 
BaramahaP district just ceded by Tippu to Cornwallis. A 
little late!, he had like work to do in Canara, and finally 
after Tippu’s fall in the “ ceded districts,” or territories lying 
between Mysore and the Nizam’s dominions. 

The system established is distinguished as the Ryotwdri \ 


The Raiyat y or in familiar spelling Ryot, is the term for a 
peasant cultivator ; under the system, he holds direct from 
the Government, with no intervening landlord ; hence the 
name Ryotwari, as the name zemindari applies wfciere it is 
the zemindar who holds from the Government. 

. The essence then of the Ryotwari system is that the pro- 
- prietary right in the soil belongs to the Ryot : though it 
may be questioned whether the term “ proprietary ” is not 
somewhat strained both in his case and in the zcjjjjftdar’s, 
the Government having the right of resumption if the rent 
is unpaid. The primary object of the zemindari settlement, 
economically, is to give the landlord a direct interest in 
improving his estate ; that of the Ryotwari is to give the 
cultivator a like incentive. Tly^ valuation was madei and 
the Government rental 1 fixed for an extended term of years, 
giving the cultivator his fair rent, # freedom of transfer, and 
practical fixity of tenure. A good deal of misapprehension 
however has arisen from the fact that an annual assessment 
was necessitated by the Ryot’g privilege of surrendering a 
part of his holding or taking up a new holding hitlierto 
waste. The rent in consequence fluctuated according to the 
changes in the boundaries of the ryot’s holding, and hence 
an impression arose that the assessment of the plots under 
cultivation was annually revised. Nothing of the kind 
occurred under the zemindari settlements, where the zemindari 
included jungle, and the assessment jvas not affected by its 
being brought under cultivation or lapsing into non-cultivation. 
The Ryot- The subsequent appropriation of Maratha territories under 
wari settle- J j0 rd Hastings led to a ryotwari settlement on very similar 
Bombay! ^ nes * n new territory, under the management of J^flupt- 
stuart Elphinstone, in the Western Dekhan. It is to be 
noted that in these settlements the share claimed by the 
Government was considerably lower than that demanded by 
its native predecessors : and further, that the individual ryot 
was dealt with. The previously existing usage, which had 
treated the whole group forming a village as*%eing re- 
sponsible for the rent of each member, was abolished. If 
the individual failed to pay his rent, he lost his holding 
and Government lost the rent; whereas the agents of 



Haidar and Tippu had compelled the village to make up the 
amount. /There was nothing unjust in the old system ; 
essentially the Village Community had been looked upon as 
the real ^unit, and so regarded itself : but as yet the com- 
munal idea had not become familiar to the British mind, 
which gave a readier acceptance to the ultra-individualist 
doctrines of Jeremy Bentham. 

Under a ryot\^ri settlement then, nothing even remotely 
rese:**faling a landlord class existed : though there was a 
brief interval, when Barlow was Governor of Madras, during 
which an attempt was made, but soon abandoned to create 
a class of zemindars. 

In the next great settlement, however, th e Village Com- The 
m unfty pla ved a more important part. This was in the 
North-West Provinces, that is the cfistricts on the Jamna Provinces, 
and Ganges above* Beha/, the country to which the name 
Hindostan is applied in its narrowest signification. Here 
the Permanent Settlement hjid not been introduced, assess- 
ments had been made for r short terms, and no principle 
recognising ownership in the soil had been established. It 
was resolved under Lord William Bentinck to organise a 
settlement on a lasting basis ; of which the ground-work was 
laid down by Robert Merttins Bird, and the structure was 
completed by Jame s Th omason. Thojnason was not at the 
head of the work* untiT the next decade : but it will be more 
convenient to treat the, whole subject in the present chapter. 

In the Bengal settlement, the zemindar was constituted the 
proprietor. In the Dekhan settlements, the ryot was con- 
stituted the proprietoi*. In the North-West Provinces, it w'as 
recog^ed that the question, Who should be recognised as 
proprietor? was one that might be answered in various ways. 

The great work Bird and Thomason had to accomplish was, 
first the assessment, and secondly the registration of rights. 

We saw that in Bengal, the zemindar w r as sometimes a The 
local chiq^who in a sense had already been looked upon talukdar. 
by the jJbasants as the lord of the soil. Such chiefs were 
known as talukdars ; and Hindostan was full of talukdars. 

In the Dekhan, we saw that the predecessors of the British 
had treated the Village Community as a unit, though the 



British did so no longer. In Hindostan the structure of the 
The Vil- Village Community was still more marked, and it was con- 
lag mStv" stantl y ev ident that the proprietary rights in an estate lay 
* with the Village, not with the individuals whom it comprised. 
And there were cases in which it appeared that the proprietary 
right lay with the individual ryot. As before, the intention of 
the settlement was to secure to the proprietor, whoever the 
Theory of proprietor might be, a fair rent, fixity of tefSure, and freedom 
transfer. So the assessment was made for at leaertiirty 
settlement$y ears > an< ^ Government claim was fixed for that period. 
>lf the talukdar could make his title good, his right was con- 
firmed : if the ryot did so, his right was confirmed. The 
joint resp onsibility of . Village Community wherever it 
*already_subsisted was maintained* In short, the utmost care 
was taken to ascertain and give the full force of law to native 
usages, without reading foreign Western analogies into them. 

So far then, the principles of the settlement were entirely 
sound. There was no idea of forcing upon the people a law 
theoretically perfect in the eyesi of the legislator ; the object 
was to bring existing usages into working order. But in 
deciding between the conflicting claims of co-existing usages, 
there was very considerable scope for the theoretical bias of 
the administrator to come into play. 

The conflicts in tbc North-West Provinces arose between 
the claims of talukdars and ryots. * 

Objections According to one set of theorists, the talukdar was an 
to the excrescence on the ancient system of a peasant proprietary, 
settlement According to the opposing theory, his fights were at the least 
of a very respectable antiquity. There were plenty of cases 
where the latter view was evidently true, and the talu Mww as 
readily confirmed. In others it was evidently not true, and 
the talukdar’s claim gave way to th3t of the ryot. But in an 
immense number of instances, it was not at all clear whether 
abstract justice ought to confirm or to cancel the talukdaris 
title. The bias of the Thomasonian settlement leamd steadily 
to the ryot. * 

✓ . Democratic ethics support Thomason’s principle. Abstract 
economics are on the same side. But strong political reasons 
could be adduced in opposition, and it is certainly doubtful 



on which side the popular sentiment lay. What we are in 
the habit of calling the feudal feeling was strong; it has 
valuable moral effects*when present ; and it is contended by 
the critics adverse to the Thomasonian method that the con- 
sideration afforded to that feeling was altogether insufficient 
The effe ct at a ny ra te was to d imin ish the pow e r and authorit y 
of the talukdars individu ally and colle ctively, and to de pr ive 
a. class singularly 'panting in initiative energy, of such* leader- 
ship as^the talukdars might have supplied : presenting those 
chiefs with a grievance against the British, while the class 
benefited lacked a countervailing appreciation of what they 
had gained. On the other hand, it is in the gains of the 
latter and th e general economic ad vance ment that the 
iThoqjasonians find their jpwn sufficient justification and 



Settled have observed the continuous progress of the system 

g< ment" * * * nc ^ an -administration from the days of Clive to 

‘ those of Lord Auckland. We have watched the extension of 
the peace area, and the consequent cessation of rapine and 
bloodshed on the greater scale. » We have noted the grudual 
establishment of judicial tribunals which possessed at least 
the merit of being incorruptible apd impartial, even if they 
failed in complete adaptation to native habits and ideas : and 
we have seen revenue systems,, framed wtth immense care, 
which, whatever might be said, against them, aimed at jiving 
stability to existing institutions, and did give to the tillers of 
the soil a security hitherto unknown. The British, in short, 
had raised up in India a government which consistently and 
conscientiously strove to maintain order and justice through- 
out its own dominiqns and to urge the rulers outside its 
dominions to like efforts. Had this been the sole result of 
the rise of the British Power it would still have been an 
immense improvement on a state of things in which order 
and justice depended mainly on the convenience and capacity 
of individual nawabs and rajas. 

Beyond this, however, there was room for progressJc two 
directions : one the abolition of customs in their nature 
barbarous and dating from barbarous ages; the other, the 
introduction of positive improyements tending to raise the 
material, moral and intellectual condition of the people, by 
public works, education, and the force of exampte 
Difficulty In these directions, progress was slow. Immemorial 
of intro- customs cannot be rooted out without risk of producing 
UC forms" v i°l ent irritation ; new ideas are received with intense sus- 
* picion ; the type of man drawn to India in the Company’s 



service, in Its early days, required improvement before much 
moral influence could be habitually exercised by him. The 
efforts in this direction of Hastings, Cornwallis, and Wellesley 
were increasingly effective ; but they hardly bore visible fruit 
before the second decade of the century. The real tangible 
progress therefore did not receive its full impulse till the 
British Ascendancy was completed by the Pindari and 
Maratha wars;'^and the Burmese interlude over, Lord 
William Bentinck was enabled to devote his full energies 
to matters which had necessarily received only a fraction of 
the attention of his predecessors. 

In various parts of India and with varying degrees 
of virulence, practices subsisted which were essentially 
barbarous, sanctioned by neither the Hindu nor the Moham- 
medan code, but in two cases at loast grafted on to the 
former — Suttee , ths self immolation of the widow on the 
death of her spouse : ancf Infanticide. Two others, Thuggee 
and Dacoity , have an odd association with caste. A fifth, 
that of human sacrifices, h&s no sort of connection with 
Hinduism. # 

Of these institutions, the most gruesome was Thuggee j 1 Thuggee, 
an organised system of paurder and robbery, existent from 
time immemorial, which remained actually unsuspected for 
many years after the establishment of the British Power. 

It appears to ha^e prevailed all over India — known to the 
population but carefully concealed from the British. The 
Thugs were a hereditary association of murderers : a caste. 

They had their tutelary goddess, their initiatory observances, 
their mythical origin, ^jieir sacrificial and other rites in con- 
nection with their hereditary occupation. Their business 
was the strangulation and robbery of travellers. If a man 
started out on a journe>and never reached his destination, 
there were plenty of ways of accounting for his disappear- 
ance. The kinsfolk rarely attempted to trace his movements. 

The Thugs worked in small gangs ; when they were not 
engaged jpftheir abominable trade, they were usually peaceful 
dwellers in villages. Often enough they were known to 

1 The spelling Thuggee , Dacoity , and Suttee is too familiar to give place 
to the more correct 7hagt } Dakatti and Sati. 


their fellow villagers : but superstition held thaf they were 
under divine or diabolic protection, and that ill would 
befal anyone who went against them. Their method of 
procedure was usually to entice the intended victim into 
conversation, slip a noose round his throat in an unsuspicious 
moment, throttle, rifle and bury him. Hence the pick-axe 
as well as the noose was an emblem of their trade. The 
deed done, they would return to their ordinary avocations — 
very likely paying toll to the patel % or headman of the 

The sup- Popular belief in the ikbal or Luck of the Company, 

pression. proved to be of no little assistance in the stamping out of 
the institution. It was soberly believed that the great 
Madhava Rao Sindhia had bjen smitten with his t fatal 
illness by the guardian goddess of the Thugs, for having 
disposed of a nest of them ; but it was*., admitted that the 
Company’s ikbal was too strong for Davi, as the goddess 
was named. Evidence therefore was easier to obtain. It 
was about 1829 that the systematic suppression of Thuggee 
was decided on ; the man entrusted with the leading* part 
therein was Major Sleeman. The process of bringing 
particular crimes home to the perpetrators was immensely 
difficult; but it became gradually easier as the nature of 
the organisation was laid bare. Captured Thugs turned 
informers, and gave* invaluable evidence, not only about 
specific cases but about the whole system. The village 
patels began to dread finding themselves brought in as 
accessories. Various legal regulations, constructed on the 
British principle of giving every cory'eivable advantage to 
the accused, were relaxed ; the chances of evading trial or 
punishment on a merely technical plea were diminished. 
The Thugs themselves, who had, considered that Davi’s 
protection made them invulnerable, were disgusted at dis- 
covering their error ; and their* employment lost something 
of its zest, though their consciences remained quite unper- 
turbed. The result was that within ten yeSBfej Thuggee 
in the British dominion had practically ceased, and had 
largely disappeared in the independent native States as 


Dacoity proved more difficult of suppression. The secret Dacoity. 
methods of Thuggee had kept it beneath the surface ; many 
as were its victims, they were less numerous than those of 
the Dacoits. The Thugs were, so to speak, scientific 
gaiotters? dacoity was an organised brigandage. There 
is a silent ghastliness about the noose and pick-axe of the 
Thug : the dacoit worked with lance and fire-brand. As 
with the Thug^ there were regular dacoit castes, who 
pursued their tradCty’ith an accompaniment of similar rites. 

But unlike the Thugs, the dacoits worked in large gangs ; 
murder was merely a normal incident in their operations, 
not an essential feature ; in the separate gangs, the majority 
were not of the genuine dacoit families, though the inclusion 
of some of these as leaders was considered a necessary 
element of success. Amon& them wve numbers of highly 
respectable members of society. Their contributions were 
of considerable importance to the finances of not a few 
village communities and landholders, and again the difficulty 
of bringing crimes home in* the face of organised perjury 
was aiormous. Warren Hastings had proposed the applica- The con- 
tion of very summary methods, discarding the rules ofJ* lct, y uh 
evidence which obtain in British law-courts, and assuming aco1 y ’ 
the complicity of Village Communities cn bloc . But, on the 
principle that it was better that twenty innocent persons 
should fall victims to the dacoits than that one innocent 
person should be falsely condemned for dacoity, British 
legality vetoed Hastings’s plan, and dacoity continued to 
flourish, though here and there some few of its practisers 
suffered exemplary punishment. Even when the methods 
which had proved so successful with Thuggee were applied 
by the same skilful operator (now Colonel) Sleeman, the 
dacoits moved to new pastures and were still flourishing 
almost under the walls of Calcutta in Dalhousie’s time; 
partly no doubt because at *hc headquarters of the British 
government it was less easy to dispense with the legal 
technicalitit^n which the brigands found protection. 

The origin of the practice of Suttee — salt) " dedicated ” — Suttee, 
is unknown. It was more prevalent in Hindostan than in 
other parts of India. Having no sort of sanction from the 


sacred books of the Hindus, it is still possible to see how it 
may have arisen out of the conditions produced by Hindu 
law. The position of a widow is, under that law, painful ; 
that of a childless one doubly so. The idea of a faithful spouse 
following her husband out of life is not a wholly repulsive 
one ; it supplies a motive for suicide which at least is not 
degrading. It is notorious that many a woman became 
satiy deliberately dedicating herself to the^flames, not only 
with willingness, but with an enthusia r .n akin to that of 
some among the religious devotees in Christian convents. 
A splendour of sanctity attached to the wife who thus 
devoted herself. The ethics of the West have recognised 
the “canon ’gainst self-slaughter ’* from whatever motive; 
but in its purest form, suttee was in fact honoured as an act 
of almost divine self-sacrifice. 

d for Yet although we may find not justifjpation but a moral 

sion ex P^ anat i° n °f the pure form, in which the motive was a 
* passionate self-devotion, the existence of the custom leant 
itself to a palpable horror. An unwilling suttee is an unspeak- 
able cruelty ; and widows were with painful frequency 
morally driven to the pyre. It is well to distinguish between 
acts which revolt the moral sense, and others which, however 
they may set at naught the Christian code, still invite a 
degree of admiration for the doer : but when no test can be 
applied to show that a particular act belpngs to one class 
rather than the other, the distinction cannot be recognised 
in practice. The Mohammedan emperors forbade the 
immolation of an unwilling widow, and sometimes actively 
interfered ; for a long time, the British attempted to work on 
the same lines; but in the great majority of cases, it was 
impossible to ascertain whether the widow acted under 
pressure. The relatives of the deceased husband had 
motives of convenience in urging the widow to destruction ; 
they could point to the supposed rewards of the fatal act, 
and could threaten the recalcitrant with long years of utter 
joylessness ; so that a woman might easily be^leji to elect 
for death, yet be practically murdered. Thertiore suttee 
involved in effect an abomination which could be cured by 
nothing short of total prohibition. 


No dou&t the actual prevalence of the practice was much Its sup- 
exaggerated, though in 1819 between six and seven hundred ^ s r s 
cases were reported in Bengal alone : yet so strong was the hesitation, 
impression of its hold upon the religious imagination of the 
people, that one after another of the Governors-General 
hesitated to do more than threaten condign punishment on 
all who were responsible for an unwilling suttee. Even when 
the Court of directors at home expressed themselves 
emphatically on thb subject, Lord Amherst, after obtaining 
numerous reports, believed that any more active interference 
than that of moral suasion would excite the mind of the natives 
so greatly as to render the risks too serious to run. At last, 
however, Lord William Bentinck faced the evil ; and 
suppprted by the weight o£ opinion among those who knew 
the natives best, promulgated a law* in 1829 prohibiting 
suttee altogether ii# British territory, and rendering guilty of 
culpable homicide all persons aiding and abetting a ceremony 
of the kind, whether the widow were a willing party or not. 

It is remarkable that the prognostications of violent opposi- 
tion 'were entirely falsified, and the complete disappearance 
of suttee in the British dominions was accomplished without 
endangering the public, peace. With the British success 
before their eyes and British remonstrances in their ears, the 
Native rulers were not disinclined to follow an example 
which public opinion — under the circumstances — proved 
unexpectedly ready to ^ endorse. 

Though Thuggee and Dacoity were profitable to others 
besides those who actually practised them, and therefore 
found shelter under a pertain degree of popular protection of 
a negative kind, they were always regarded as crimes ; where- 
as Suttee was an honoured custom. But Infanticide was infanti- 
accounted as a sort of {peccadillo necessitated by the con- cide. 
ditions of society. As in the case of Suttee, it had no 
sanction — was indeed forbid 3 en — in the sacred books. Yet 
in many parts of India, so persistent was the habit of 
destroying female babies that among some tribes or clans 
the proportion of girls to boys was about one to six. The 
motive lay in the disgrace attaching under the Hindu 
religion to unmarried women ; a disgrace reflected on their 

of dealing 
with it. 

The mo- 
tives to In- 



parents. It was better that a babe should die than that 
she should grow up to remain unwed, But the marriage of 
daughters involved two difficulties : that of finding a husband 
of admissible caste ; and that of providing the. wedding 
expenses. The higher the station of the parents, ’the more 
serious became both these difficulties ; the stronger was the 
temptation to evade them by having no daughters to marry ; 
the more resolutely did public opinion claifc its eyes to the 
methods by which that evasion was achieved. 

Two circumstances combined to make infanticide easy : 
one, the impenetrable veil behind which the Zenana was and 
is hidden from all enquirers ; the other, the extreme difficulty 
of ascertaining the real cause of an infant’s death. It needs 
only not to “strive officiously keep alive.” Frorr? the 
beginning the British Endeavoured to eradicate the custom ; 
the Natives admitted its existence, readily owned that it was 
very wrong, zealously declared their intention of putting it 
down — but the huge disproportion between girls and boys 
continued unabated. Practicajly it was only in the small 
district of Merwara or Mairwarra in the hills near Ajniir in 
Rajputana that any important advance was made before the 
fourth decade of the century. 

Hitherto nothing had been tried but moral suasion, for 
the plain reason that there was no practicable method of 
applying force, and no alternative course had been dis- 
covered ; now however it was resolved to attack the cause . 
Custom had made imperative an expenditure on wedding 
festivities so immense, that to marry and dower a single 
daughter often exhausted the saving^ of a lifetime. The 
individual was hopelessly shackled by Convention. For those 
shackles, the fetters of law were substituted, limiting the 
expenditure on marriages, and forcibly excluding the hordes 
of privileged beggars who swarmed to every such ceremony 
and exacted alms and entertainment as a sacred right. By 
a happy chance, the guilt of certain chiefs was brought home 
to them, and they were compelled to pay exenS^lary fines. 
Thus the removal of the great source of temptation was 
followed by alarming breaches in the immunity which had 
prevailed hitherto; with the excellent result that in a few 



years, in one after another of the worst districts, the number 
of growing girls had recovered its normal proportion to that 
of the boys. The evil did not indeed disappear, but it ceased 
to be a typrrible portent. 

The abolition of Thuggee and Suttee, the declaration of These re- 
a remorseless war with Dacoity, the immense reduction in due 
the crime of Infanticide, were all in effect the work of British t0 
Bentinck’s administration, though those objects were none rule, 
of them completelyVchieved immediately ; and of themselves 
were a sufficient justification of British dominion. Nor can 
there be the slightest real doubt that but for the British 
dominion, every one of these practices would have remained 
active until the present day. Their suppression became 
possible only when the J 3 ax Britannica was thoroughly 
established. * 

Equally characteristic }vas the civilisation of the wild hill 
tribes who came under British rule — folk of more primitive 
races, dwelling in the Arava^li mountains of Rajputana, the 
western Ghats of Kandesh* the hilly tracts on the east 
through which the Mahanadi flows. 

Merwara has already been mentioned. It fell under The civil- 
British sway at the close* of the career of Lord Hastings in ising of 
1821. The Mers, its inhabitants, lived as banditti, by Merwara * 
plunder; agriculture in the barren hills was too precarious 
too dependent <Sn accidents of weather to satisfy them. 

The district was placed in charge of Captain Hall who 
adopted the expedient which has served as a precedent for 
all similar cases ; he converted the bandit into a soldier of 
the Government* Gfcnpanies of Mers were formed who 
forthwith became a highly efficient and loyal police. The 
Agent won the personal devotion of the people, and with 
it an almost unbounded # influence over them. Under his 
direction they were ready tp appreciate the advantages of 
arbitration as compared with the various forms of trial by 
ordeal whicjj had hitherto prevailed ; they gave up the 
immemorial habit of selling their womenkind, and they led 
the way in putting an end to infanticide, when a Government 
grant was made for the purpose of providing the necessary 
dower for their daughters. Hall was succeeded in 1835 


Dixon, another of the same type ; who gave to agriculture 
a new impetus and a new security by making wells and 
reservoirs ; and then literally created or imported a bazaar or 
market town into their midst, which gave an^ impulse 
hitherto unknown to the arts of peace and the desire for 

The Bhils. As with the Mers of Merwara, so was it with the Bhils of 
Kandesh — the hill-country where the J?£shwa’s domains 
touched Holkar’s. The Bhil country vdls ceded at the end 
of the Pindari war, but the Bhils defied authority. British 
invitations to settle down peaceably were regarded as mere 
pretences : British troops were easily evaded in the passes 
by the expert hill-men. Conciliation and coercion appeared 
to be equally futile. The tribe (/ primitive savages who had 
set at defiance the punitive enormities of Maratha over-lords 
were not to be quelled by the mpst rigorous pressure that 
the British Government could sanction. 

Outram In 1825 the task of bringing them to order was entrusted 
and the to Lieutenant James Outram, yi after days renowned as the 
Bhih. Bayard of India.” Outram began operations with a 
practical illustration of the superiority of British troops, by 
falling suddenly with a few sepoys on a Bhil encampment, 
scattering most of them, killing a few and capturing a con- 
siderable number. The eyes of the prisoners were opened 
to the real purposes of the British ; they*were transformed 
into envoys to their own people. With deep suspicion and 
much hesitation the Bhils began to come in, to see for 
themselves. The personal contact with Outram was the 
one thing needed ; they found him trusting them, and they 
trusted him in return. His frankness, his courage, his 
sportsmanship, conquered them. Outram’s own sepoys acted 
in the spirit of their leader, and suspicion yielded to 
confidence. Hitherto the Bhils had rejected ail attempts to 
enlist them — now a Bhil corps was speedily enrolled with 
results precisely like those in Merwara. The^work so well 
begun was efficiently carried on, on the same Jjnes : agri- 
cultural settlements were formed, arbitration courts were 
established, money was advanced for farm-stock ; on the 
other hand, strict police regulations were enforced, but 


always on \he plan of making the Bhils responsible, and 
turning the village patels into responsible officers of the 
government ; and so, as time passed, the Bhils were converted 
from a primitive banditti into an orderly agricultural folk. 

The story of the Khonds of Orissa, and the abolition of 
Human sacrifices prevalent in that district, belongs to the 
next decade, and will be related in a subsequent chapter. 

So far we have dealt chiefly with the abolition of evil 
customs, and with tDg encouragement of peaceable occupations 
in the wilder districts. But perhaps the movement forward 
with which Bentinck’s name is most intimately associated in 
the British mind, is that of Education ; and this for the Educa 
reason that Macaulay was himself intimately connected tIon ’ 
with # Lord William’s measures. Macaulay went to India 
as the first Legal Member of Council ander the Act of 1833 : 
and he found Calcutta rife with discussion of the Education 

Until 1813, nothing had been done in that direction : in Oriental- 
that year, the Directors gave fnstructions that a lakh of rupees ism * 
shoifld be set apart annually for educational purposes. But 
education had been interpreted as meaning instruction in 
r the language and literature of the classic tongues of the Hindus 
' and the Mohammedans — Sanskrit and Arabic : in other 
words, the inculcation of purely Oriental learning; which 
was very much if in Europe public instruction should be 
confined to the language and the treatises of the mediaeval 
schoolmen. The Calcutta College, a private institution 
which sought to introduce the natives to Western science 
and English literatuje, received no Government support 
till ten years later ; and this enlightened theory of education 
continued to be entirely overshadowed by the idea that the 
Oriental classics were the proper subjects for Orientals 
to study — in part perhaps from the very misleading analogy 
of the study of Greek and Latin in Europe. Bentinck and 
his advisers however recognised that neither Sanskrit nor 
Arabic was the language of India, the tongues of the people 
being many: that English had become the proper official 
language, associated with the various vernaculars. The 
immensely superior value of English literature as an instrument 


The learn* of education, and of western knowledge as a subject of study, 
was recognised and maintained with unanswerable skill by 
‘ Macaulay ; and early in 18 ^5 an otder was promulgated by the 
Governor-General in Council, providing for the ney teaching 
instead'pf the old in all the Government schools and colleges. 
The effect of the change was very far-reaching, since without 
it there would have been no possibility of natives becoming 
practically fitted to enter the public service. By it, the 
necessary equipment was placed at least^omparatively within 
their reach, if they could show also the necessary capacity and 
character. The bar to their advancement was removed, 
without any risk that they would crowd in dangerous numbers 
through the open portals. 

Public Finally, in the matter of Public Works; the IVitish 
Works. Government made no 4 iattempt to emulate the Moguls or their 
predecessors in the erection of buildings* which like the Taj 
Mahal, should rank among the wonders of the world ; but 
already in Lord Minto’s time the enormously important 
question of Irrigation began tp attract its attention, and by 
slow degrees the creation of canals for the distribution of 
water was taken up in the North-West Provinces. Roads 
also were improved ; the Grand 'Trunk Road from Calcutta 
to Delhi, ultimately carried on to Lahore and Peshawar, was 
built, and that from Bombay to Agra was commenced. But 
although these measures had an excellent effect on the revenue, 
there is always a difficulty in grasping the fact that a very 
heavy expenditure may be financially more than justified by 
ndirect results ; and it is probable that a more lavish outlay 
on public works would not only ha vft done much towards 
mitigating recurrent famines with all their horrors, but would 
also have been repaid in the increase of the Government 
Revenue, and of the national wealth. 




(Maps I and VI.) 

I N the twenty years from 1818 to 1838 the only extensive A fresh era 
military operation of Government had been the Burmese °f war - 
warn For twenty years to^ome, wars of varying gravity were 
to afford constant occupation. The ^disastrous Afghan war ; 
the short and sharp campaigns of Sindh and Gwalior ; the 
two fierce conflicts with the Sikhs, involving at least three 
battles of a desperate character ; the second Burmese war ; 
finely the grim struggle i7fc which month after month the 
European garrison of Hindostan supported by a few loyal 
native regiments fought with their backs to the wall till the 
longed-for succour carnet and the great mutiny was crushed ; 
these followed on each other in steady succession. 

Hitherto Lahore and Sindh and Kabul have hardly in- 
fluenced the policy of Governors-General : now they become 
factors of the first importance. Hitherto, consequently there 
have been only incidental allusions made to them : now a 
retrospective chapter will enable us to follow the course of 
events with unbrokei| continuity. 

Mention has been made of the Sikhs as a Hindu people The 
occupying the Panjab and Sirhind. The Panjab proper is Panjab. 
the great triangle of whieh the Indus and the Satlej form two 
sides, and the Kashmir mountains the third. This “ land of 
the Five Rivers” has a title which the geographers have 
some difficulty in explaining, since the great rivers which 
water it are six in number, not five, and it is a moot question 
whether the Indus, the Satlej, the Ravi, or the Beas, is the 
one which is excluded. Sirhind lies between the Satlej and 
the Jamna, on which Delhi stands. This district is also known 


by the same name as a portion of the Maratha* dominion, 
Malwa. The Satlej, for military and political purposes, has 
always been an effective dividing line ; and consequently the 
whole Sikh territory is in two parts — the Panjab, % Manjha, 
or Trans-Satlej ; and the Sirhind, Malwa, or Cis-Satlej. 

This distinction however became marked only with the 
development of the Sikh political organisation, towards the 
close of the eighteenth century. 

Racially the inhabitants of the whofe Sikh region are 
partly Pathan, especially in the northern and western parts, 
but mainly Rajput or Jat ; between whom many ethnologist? 
recognise little if any distinction. The proportion of Mussul- 
The Sikhs, mans is large, forming about half the population. The Sikhs 
primarily are not a separate racq but a Hindu sect which 
has gradually absorbed a large number of the Hindus in a 
particular area. Their peculiar tenets however, the persecu- 
tions to which they were at times subjected, the sense of 
fraternity and unity amongst themselves in the conflict with 
those who do not accept their doctrines, have combined to 
induce a constant separateness which in turn has endowed 
them with racial characteristics, physical, moral and intel- 
lectual, until the Sikh has in fact „ become a definite and 
distinct breed. 

Nanuk, The founder of the sect was Nanuk, a teacher who was 
^the^Sikh a b° u t c o ntem PO rar y with Baber; whose #doctrine was in 
sect the main a protest against the formalism and the hide 
bound conventions of the Hinduism of his day. He re- 
verted to first principles : he taught of the fatherhood of 
God and the brotherhood of Man ^ithout distinction of 
caste or creed : of virtuous living in the world of men as 
the way of Salvation in the future life: and he had the 
very exceptional experience among ♦reformers of arousing no 
hostility, winning the regard and honour both of Mussulmans 
and Brahmins. His followers took the title of Sikhs 
(disciples), forming a united band of religious enthusiasts, 
under a succession of Gurus — a term better rendered by 
“prophet” than, “priest” — gradually assuming a military 
character under the pressure of Mohammedan fanaticism 
and the laxity of Oriental rule; a transformation which 


culminated? in the days of Aurangzib, in the person of 
the tenth Guru, Govind Singh — Govind’s father had been Govind, 
slain with the connivance if not by the order of the imperial the organ- 
zealot. *The religious fervour of the son developed into a the 
fanatical* wrath against Mohammedans at large, and the 
Moguls in particular. Under Govind’s leadership the Sikh 
brotherhood was transformed into the Khalsa , “the army 
of the free” ; bound together by solemn rites and curious 
distinctive observances — the wearing of blue garments, total 
abjuration of razor and scissors, constant carrying of steel, 
the adoption of the common name of Singh (Lion), which 
led to their being frequently referred to as the Singhs ; 
marked by the same kind of devoted adherence as the 
Covenanters of Scotland who at very much the same period 
were bidding defiance to Claverhouso* About a year after 
Aurangzib’s death* Govind was assassinated by the sons of 
a man who had died \)y his orders; and a long period 
followed of bloody insurrections and bloody suppressions, 
in which the Khalsa seerne*! time after time to have been 
wip6d out, yet time after time revived. 

The great expansion of the Maratha power and the Develop- 
invasions of Nadir Shah # and Ahmed Shah at last delivered mentoftbe 
the Sikhs from Mogul dominion, and during the concluding Khalsa - 
forty years of the eighteenth century, the Khalsa becomes 
a great association of Sirdars, or what may be called 
baronial families, in Sirhind and the Panjab ; not organised 
as a State, but every* sirdar with his retainers fighting for 
his own hand ; acting however for the most part in aggregates 
known as Misls, bound together by the intense esprit de corps 
of common devotioif to the Khalsa against all external 
foes, without feeling thereby precluded from internal rivalries 
and dissensions ; owning^md disowning allegiance to Afghan 
or Mogul viceroys and governors as the convenience of the 
moment might dictate; and* capable on occasion of offering 
a combined and formidable resistance to such armies as 
either KabiH or Delhi could send to operate in their 

In 1780 was born the man who was to weld this loose 
confederacy into the powerful Panjab State, Ranjit Singh. 



West of the Indus above its confluence will? the Satlej 
The lies Afghanistan, with Biluchistan to the South. Of 
frontier 1 ^%^ an * stan proper there are four principal towns : on the 

* western side, close to the Persian frontier, Herat ; on the 
eastern, near the Indian frontier, Kabul ; on tile south, 
about equidistant from Herat and Kabul, Kandahar; and 
on the direct line between Kabul and Kandahar, Ghazni. 
The passage from Afghanistan into India through the 
mountains is either from Kabul by way q£ the Khyber Pass — 
through which flows the Kabul river to join the Indus near 
Attok — guarded by the great military post of Peshawar; 
or else from Kandahar through the Khojak and Bolan 
passes by way of Quetta on the Biluchi border : the one 
route lying through the Panjab, and the other through 
Sindh. At the end o r the eighteenth century the Afghan 
kings sprung from the Durani chief A>hmed Shah ruled 
not only over Afghanistan but also over Kashmir, and 
dominated both Sindh and the Panjab ; holding both the 
great passes, Biluchistan being tributary. Afghan Governors 
were posted at Peshawar and at Multan ; and the Sikh or 
Rajput Rajas of the country, as far as Patiala in Sirhind, 
held their titles formally by the Kabul monarch’s patent. 

When the new century opened, the occupant of the 
Zeman throne at Kabul was Zemin Shah, one of Ahmed Shah’s 
Shah, grandsons ; of the Sudozai clan or family. f All over India, 
by British and natives alike, his power was vastly over- 
estimated in consequence of the achievements of his pre- 
decessors ; his desire to invade Hindostan was known ; 
the Mussulmans were anxious to welcojne him as a deliverer 
in the name of the Prophet. Moreo/er the belief that an 
invasion would be heavily backed up by Napoleon was 
universally prevalent. As a matter, of fact however, neither 
the finances nor the stability of the Kabul throne were 
equal to any such schemes on'Zeman’s part; every move- 
ment towards the Indus was quickly rendered abortive by 
insurrections in Afghanistan ; and the Sikh Mi4& were quite 
The as likely to attack as to help a Mussulman invader. In 
brothers 1 l8oi > a ^ am ^y known as the Barakzais obtained the reins 

* of power ; the eldest of a score of brothers Fateh Khan, 


deposed Zdfcnan Shah whose eyes were put out ; and after 
some vicissitudes the Shah’s younger brother, Shuja, became 
king ; making his peace with the Barakzais as well as with 
the incompetent usurper they had proposed to set up. 

By 1868, Ranjit Singh had become the recognised leader 
of the Panjab Sikhs. Shah Shuja was not yet dispossessed 
at Kabul. Lord Minto was Governor-General; and the 
Napoleonic terror was still prevalent. It was eminently 
desirable therefore to insure that Afghanistan should be an 
effective buffer against any possible combinations into which 
France, Persia, and Russia, might enter. It was also very 
undesirable that Ranjit Singh, now Raja of Lahore, should 
be allowed to have his wish of bringing the Sirhind Sikhs 
under his sway, and forming a great military State extending 
across the Satlej ; while tne Sikh Pcuver was already quite 
sufficient to make the maintenance of friendly relations with 
it important. Mountsthart Elphinstone was accordingly Missionsto 
sent in charge of a mission to Kabul, and Charles Metcalfe Shah 
in charge of a mission to Ranjit. Just at this time, how T - Ra^ji t an 
evei^ the rupture between * France and Russia and the Singh: 
progress of the Peninsula War relieved the tension of feeling l8o & 
about the possible projects of Napoleon : the fear of the 
French faded; and negotiations with the Asiatic Powers 
were ultimately conducted on the revised hypothesis that it 
was they rather jjian the British who could least afford to 
quarrel. 'Shah Shuja’s attitude w f as entirely friendly to the 
British. Ranjit Singh liad a sounder appreciation of British 
power and British armies than almost any other Oriental. 
Consequently while he pressed his claims to the utmost 
limit of diplomatic blrgaining, he was resolved throughout 
his career to keep the British Government as his very good 
friends. r rj^s Jhe treatiej of 1809 proved satisfactory to all 
That with Shah Shuja indeed turned out to be of 
little moment, as he was in his turn deposed and driven out 
of Afghanistan in the following year. ’ By that with Ranjit,* 
the Cis-Satl<jj Sikhs were (in accordance with their own 
desire) taken under British protection, Cis-Satlej estates held 
by Trans-Satlej chiefs being on the same footing as the 
rest : while in the Panjab the British recognised Ranjit as 


Maharaja, and in effect promised him a free lu*nd so long 
as he did not attack British interests. An anti-French 
treaty of friendship was at the same time concluded with 
the Amirs of Sindh. 

Ranjit For some thirty years, Ranjit, the one-eyed “ Liun of the 
^ illg *Shah continued steadily and gradually to augment and 

Shuja. consolidate his dominion, till it included one slice after 
another cut from the dominion of Afghanistan. Jammu, 
Kashmir, Multan, the Derajat, Pesha\yar, were absorbed, 
and the Khalsa developed into a mighty engine of war. 
Throughout the same period Shah Shuja was ever making 
fresh attempts, with or without the assistance of the Sindh 
Amirs, of Ranjit, or of the British, to recover the throne 
from which he had been driven. It would be difficult in 
all history to name a man with whom the whirligig of 
fortune played stranger pranks. Also throughout the same 
period the Barakzai brothers from Fateh Khan to Dost 
Mohammed managed among them to dominate affairs in 
Afghanistan, to a normal accompaniment of internecine 
strife, interspersed with foul murders and assassinations of 
which they were sometimes the victims and sometimes the 

The problem of forming a nation out of the confederacy 
of Sikh Misls resolved itself primarily into that of finding an 
individual who could succeed in getting himself accepted as 
its head. The secondary condition was that the head, when 
found, should avoid challenging combat with the one Power 
which was certain to win if it came to fighting. 

Estimate Ranjit Singh possessed precisely the requisite qualities, 
of Ranjit Like the Maratha Sivaji, he was a iruke boy when he began 
Smgh. tQ distinguish himself, and was regarded as the greatest figure 
of his race before he reached thirty. He achieved his 
position by a combination of military skill, daring, extreme 
shrewdness, a consciousness that treachery is not an end 
in itself but only an occasionally useful means, an entire 
absence of scrupulosity, a pose of religious emhusiasm, and 
unfailing self-cpnfidence, courage, and doggedness. Gratitude 
to benefactors and compassion for the weak were unknown to 
him ; but so long as anyone was of use to him, the services 


rendered vte re adequately remunerated in some form or 
other. In action, he displayed a rare admixture of salutary 
c aution with calculated ^audacity. But what distinguished 
him most from the ordinary type of military adventurer who 
achieves Empire was the absence of what the Greeks called 
vfipis; the sane measurement of his own powers, the level- 
-headedness which averts Nemesis. Without for an instant 
placing him in comparison with a supreme genius like Akbar, 
we may fairly class ^im along with Sivaji and Haidar Ali — 
all three were absolutely illiterate — among the most uniformly 
successful of Asiatic monarchs, and that in despite of % ex- 
ceptionally difficult conditions : a curious contrast to his 
Durani contemporary. 

Fpr Shah Shuja’s virtueg and vices were precisely those Estimate 

which do not make for success. He was persistent, but of Shah 

irresolute ; intellectual, but devoid of shrewdness ; mag- uja 

nahimous on occasion, without the strength needed to make 

magnanimity politic; loyal, but not without lapses; ambitious, 

but hopelessly improvident. •jRanjit Singh knew in whom he 

coulS repose confidence, whom he must outwit, whom to 

use as a tool, whom to stamp out. Shah Shuja was habitually 
< * 9 * •' * 

outwitted, and made a togl of; he never stamped out anyone ; 
and his corjidence was constantly given to the wrong people. 

Therefore he lost his throne, and for nearly thirty years failed 
in every effort t« recover it : therefore also when he was 
reinstated, it was only to reign for a short time as a puppet, 
and to perish at last by*the hand of an assassin. 

There may have been an interval, before Ochterlony in 
Nepal restored British prestige, shaken by the first stages of 
the Ghurka war, whefc Ranjit contemplated war with the 
British as a feasible item in his scheme of aggrandisement. 

If so, the idea was quickly removed from his mind. 

By the normal Oriental, power is conceived of mainly as Commerce 
a means to conquest. The rtormal native prince could not 
assimilate the idea of a great military State which was not c 
bent on possessing itself of its neighbour’s territory. The 
acquisition of wealth preferentially by commerce was an idea 
altogether foreign to him : just as, to the uneducated mind, 
mechanical improvements always presented themselves as 


of Ranjit 

ment of his 

devices to tighten the grip of the governing race t>r class on 
the general population. Hence the entirely honest professions 
of the British Government have rarely obtained credence: 
their wish to introduce factories and acquire commercial 
rights beyond their own borders have been habitually 
accounted as the first insidious step in a systematic scheme 
having annexation as its goal. Suspicion breeds secret 
hostility, which in its turn causes counter-irritation ; the latent 
hostility becomes overt; the collision, arrives, and a new 
territory is added to the British Raj. 

R anjit however was almost unique Jn realising t hat t he 
British as a simple matter of fact did not want his territory, 
lie" knew that the time would come when hlis Sikhs would 
get out of hand, and bring about the downfall of his kingdom. 
There is an authentic story that, near the close of his career, 
he sent the son of one of the Sirdars tp Ludhiana to get 
learning from the British; and the' lad returned with some 
government maps. Ranjit looked at them. “ What are all 
those red circles?” he asked. ‘*They mark the Dominions 
of the Feringhis.” Ranjit kicked the map from him wtth a 
wrathful exclamation — u It will be all red soon.” But lie 
did not mean the Panjab to be red while he lived; and 
nothing would induce him to risk a quarrel. 4 

Therefore he devoted his energies to organising the Khalsa 
on lines which should make it as formi4able as possible 
when opposed to other native levies ; he perceived that 
European methods gave an immense ^superiority in the field, 
and that the instrument pf their power lay in a strong artillery, 
a compact infantry, and the presence of European officers. 
On these lines he organised his army 1 / with the assistance of 
Europeans — Allard, Ventura, Court, Avitabile — who had 
seen service in the wars of Napolepn. To such an army, a 
couple of crushing defeats in the field were far more de- 
structive than to the ill-disciplined mounted hordes of Haidar 
Aii or Holkar, so that there is ground for regarding it as less 
fitted than they were to war with the British, tess suited to 
maintain a prolonged struggle. But in proportion to its 
numbers, it made an exceptionally effective machine for 
native wars, and the British themselves found more difficulty 


in dealing* with it at odds of three to one than in routing 
thrice the numbers of Mysore or Maratha troops. 

Ranjifs policy, then, was to Extend and consolidate his *’ 
dominionsDeyond the Satlej, where his proceedings would 
not^disturb British susceptibilities ; and he set about his 
work systematically, advancing step by step and making 
his conquests' sure as he advanced. He had acquired 
his predominance among the Sikhs by finding pretexts for 
overthrowing rivals ^nd appropriating their estates, and by 
calmly dispossessing minors and others who were too weak 
to resist It was now his object to complete his dominion Hi* aims, 
in the Panjab proper by the acquisition of Multan which was 
a province of the Afghans ; to extend his own frontiers across 
the # Indus over Peshawar and the Derajat, and to add 
Ka ffom ir to his territory. * 

ArT opportunity for operating against the Afghan monarchy Ejection of 
arose almost immediately after his treaty with the British f 
when, in 1810, Shah Shuja was driven from Kabul and Kabul* 0 ” 1 
Fateh Khan the Barakzai%et up another of the Sudozai 
family, Mahmud, in his place; making himself Wazir and 
actual ruler, and placing Kandahar, Ghazni, and Peshawar, 
in the hands of others of his own brotherhood. Ranjit 
seized the occasion to offer Shah Shuja his assistance, for, a 
<jpnsj 4 wtion. The Shah moved against Peshawar, but his 
attempt failed ; lie was carried off into Kashmir by his own 
pretended friends, and there held a prisoner. This gave 
both Ranjit and Fateh Khan the Barakzai a pretext for 
attacking Kashmir: and the two came to terms, neither 
having the slightest intention of carrying them out, if he 
could repudiate them* to his own advantage. Fateh Khan 
anticipated his ally in reducing Kashmir, and at once 
declined to go shares witk the Maharaja. The Maharaja in 
return captured Attok, and got possession of the person of 
Shah Shuja. For the time now ever, his projects in Kashmir 
were checked, Fateh Khan’s brother Azim being left there 
as Governor? Shah Shuja also succeeded with much 
difficulty in escaping from his clutches, leaving behind him 
however the famous Koh-i-nur diamond which Ranjit had 
long coveted greedily ; and after various vicissitudes he found 


an asylum at Ludhiana, the British advanced fort on the 
upper Satlej. 

Ranjit ab- Foiled for the time in Kashmir, Ranjit renewed his atten- 
sorbs tions to Multan ; where the Governor professed allegiance to 
the reigning king at Kabul, while confining its expression to 
opposing Ranjit In 1818, Multan after a long and stubborn 
resistance was suddenly carried by a furious and unpre- 
meditated assault, met and almost repulsed by the desperate 
valour of the garrison. r 

Embroil- In Afghanistan meantime Fateh Khan had practically 
ments in parcelled out the whole kingdom except Herat — which was 
g stam retained as the headquarters of the Sudozai kings — among 
the Barakzai brotherhood. Persia was encroaching on the 
western border. Thither marche<i Fateh Khan, ostensibly to 
check the Persians, incidentally to acquire Herat. The 
capture of Herat, with the king and prince Kamran was en- 
trusted to a young brother, Dost Mohammed. But Dost 
Mohammed, while he succeeded in breaking into Herat, 
committing sundry outrages, an/f placing himself beyond the 
pale of pardon by violating the royal Harem, failed to secure 
his position and had to fly for his life to his brother Azim in 
Kashmir. The great Wazir fell into the hands of Kamran 
and was horribly mutilated and murdered. Th^ Barakzais 
determined on revenge. Shah Shuja from Ludhiana was 
drawn into the vortex, but vomited out again as a less con- 
venient puppet than one or two others of the Sudozai dynasty. 
Kabul was captured; Kamran failed in his attempt to 
recover it and retired to Herat ; and once more the whole 
country with the exception of that province was in the hands 
of the Barakzais, who now accepted Afim as the head of the 
family, Kabul falling to his share while Dost Mohammed 
took possession of Ghazni. c 

Ranjit These complications gave Ranjit Singh his opportunity, 
secures Azim had found it necessary tcf be at the centre of events, 
a |Sf nir * an <| in his absence from Kashmir the forces left behind there 
offered no strong resistance to Ranjit. ^Kashrfflr was added 
to the Panjab dominion, a year after Multan. 

As soon as* Azim felt his own position sufficiently estab- 
lished, he resolved to attack Ranjit Singh, and collected a 


mighty fo?ce to march by way of Peshawar. But the 
Maharaja was an adept at intrigue, and drew Dost 
Mohammed as well as Sultan Mohammed, the brother in 
command at Peshawar, into a conspiracy against Azim. The 
advancing army was filled with rumours of treachery: 
suddenly, almost in a night, it melted away. Azim had to 
return to Kabul a broken man, and died there in 1823. 

Sultan Mohammed remained at Peshawar as Ranjit’s tribu- 
tary and governor iq his name, till Azim’s death ; returning 
thither in the same capacity after a brief struggle for 
supremacy among the Barakzais in which he was defeated 
by Dost Mohammed. The Dost, still professing allegiance Rise of 
to a Sudozai king, assumed the office of Wazir, the Governor- 
ship of Kabul, and the Jieadship of the brotherhood, in 
1826; and remained the first man'in Afghanistan till the 
reinstatement of Shah £huja. 

In_ 1834, Shah Shuja made another attempt to get to Shah 
Kabul, this time seeking to approach Kandahar from Sindh ; 
the # northern part of whicl* was nominally a province of r eS>ver the 
Afghanistan. Ranjit would give no help — his terms were throne.- ** 
too high. The British Government had declined to break 
through its policy of non-interference. Shah Shuja collected 
and marcbed an army to Shikarpur, and, after inflicting a 
defeat on the Sindh Amirs, induced them to acknowledge 
his sovereignty, *and to assist his advance. But when he 
entered Afghanistan, he failed as usual. He reached 
Kandahar, but the place held out till a relieving force arrived ; 
when the Shah was completely defeated, but was allowed to 
escape over the border to Kelat, in Biluchistan, and thence 
to his asylum at Ludfiiana. 

In the meantime Ranjit Singh tookpossession of Peshawar. Ranjit^se- 
While Sultan Mohammtd was there, it would have been p^shawai 
difficult to say whether the fortress belonged to the Lahore m 
or the Kabul State, But now Sultan Mohammed took the 
opportunity oractically to make a present of it to the Maharaja. 

This was too much for Dost Mohammed, who proclaimed a 
jsha# or religious war against the Sikh monarchy, adopting 
for himself the title of Amir as u Commander of the Faithful.” 

The fanaticism of both sides was aroused. Moslems of every 


description flocked to the Amir’s standard. B\it intrigue 
proved too much for Dost Mohammed, as in like case it had 
done for his brother Azim. An American adventurer, Harlan, 
was sent by Ranjit Singh ostensibly to negotiate, actually to 
sow dissension. He proved completely successful/ Sultan 
Mohammed suddenly deserted with ten thousand men. 
When the next morning dawned, the Amir’s camp was 
broken up, and the jehad was over. 

In 1837 there was another collision between the Afghans 
and the Sikhs at Jamrud above Peshawar, when the latter 
lost their general, and received a severe defeat ; but Ranjit 
had organised his military system so thoroughly that reinforce- 
ments and guns were pushed up to the front with extra- 
ordinary rapidity, and the Afghans found that whatever 
chance they had of recovering Peshawar was hopelessly lost. 
The district was now placed under the command of Avitabile, 
one of the Maharaja’s Europeans, and was finally and com- 
pletely incorporated in the Panjab domains. 

Ranjit and In one direction only had r fne British interfered with 
Sindh. R an jj t Singh’s plans. He had desired to carry his arms into 
Sindh ; but jugt at the same time the British had made up 
their minds to get the Indus opened up for commerce; and 
a war between Sindh and the Panjab would have disconcerted 
their measures. Ranjit Singh bowed to the inevitable, silenc- 
ing the murmurs of his sirdars with the unimswerable argu- 
ment — “ Where are the two hundred thousand spearmen of 
the Marathas?” But the consequent irritation, and the 
suspicion engendered by investigatory expeditions sent up 
the Indus, bore their fruit at a later day when the strong 
hand and shrewd brain of Ranjit Singh ^iiad ceased to control 
the Khalsa. 

Not long after the rounding off* of his dominion by the 
final occupation of Peshawar, the great Panjab monarch died ; 
some months after the ill-omendd expedition of the British 
to Afghanistan had started on its way (June 18 30). 

At the beginning of the century the Sikhs wdfe only com* 
mencing their career as an independent Power. Afghanistan 
was already falling into the turbulent and disorganised condi- 
tion which destroyed its power of serious independent 


aggression . 0 Its real importance lay in its position between 
Persia and the Indian peninsula — and Russia loomed beyond Persia and 
Persia. Russia - 

We have already noted the part played by embassies to 
Persia in the first decade of the century, when the Power 
that oppressed the minds of Indian statesmen was France. 

On our part, the Persian treaties were directed against France: 
on the part of Persia however, they were directed against 
Russia. Virtually *Jiough not explicitly the idea was that 
we guaranteed Persia against Russian designs in return for 
Persia’s guarantee against French designs. By 1826, how- 
ever, we were in no danger from France. It is the recog- 
nised rule of British politics, that movements in unfamiliar 
geographical districts attract no attention till we find ourselves 
plunged into an unexpected war; and accordingly West- 
minster was not interested in the progress of Russia in Central 
Asia. It is a singular fact that when either Russia or England 
goes to war in the East the open rupture is always due to an 
act^ of aggression by the "Asiatic Power against Russia or 
England. The overt act of hostility comes from the other 
side. The explanation of course is different in the two cases. 

Russia, we know, provokes the aggression on purpose ; with 
us there would be no provocation, but for persistent if in- 
telligible misconstruction of our benevolent intentions. That 
is how the matter ordinarily and honestly presents itself to 
the British but not always to the Continental mind. 

In 1826 Russian progress excited Persia into a jehad Russo- 
against her, with the natural result when a weak State attacks Persian 
a strong one. Persia had to make an ignominious peace. war * 1 2 ^‘ 
England was bound iy the definitive treaty of 1814 to support 
Persia in a war with any European Power, unless Persia 
should be the aggressor England in this case applied to 
Russia the doctrine which she usually keeps for application 
at home ; and so finding Persia the aggressor refused 
assistance. There was an uneasy feeling in the British mind 
that we ha8 in this done something very like shirking a 
positive obligation ; and we adopted the unimpressive course 
of giving Persia cash to pay her indemnities in consideration 
of her formally cancelling such obligations for the future. 


Persia for her part formed the conclusion that England was a 
broken reed, and resolved for the future to cultivate by 
preference the amity of Russia. 

Persia as When the horse had been stolen the use of stable doors 
Russia's began to be borne in on the political mind. Russia and 
p g * Persia were suddenly become friends ; and Persia began to 
find warm and hardly veiled encouragement to aggression in 
the direction of the Indian border. Under the aegis of 
Russia, she became suddenly formidably The alarm which 
had once been inspired by Zeman Shah in combination with 
French possibilities was transferred to Persia combined with 
Russian possibilities, and from that day to this the latter have 
never ceased to dominate all Indian military or politico- 
military problems ; not because a Russian invasion is practic- 
able, but lest the hope of Russian help should rouse the 
natives of India to revolt. The ide^ of a great Mussulman 
invasion backed by Russia, and of a call to arms of the 
Mussulmans in India, followed hard on the Russo-Persian 
treaty; and there is no doubt, hiat the idea was seriously 
entertained by the Persian princes. Afghanistan however 
must first be absorbed. Herat was in the hands of the 
Sudozai Kamran, who was anathema. to the Barakzais as the 
murderer of Fateh Khan. If nevertheless the brothers should 
fail to join for his destruction, the group at Kandahar might 
as a next step, be detached from the Amir at? Kabul. 

The new aspect of affairs did not immediately penetrate to 
the official mind, though Persian restlessness caused it some 
uneasiness. The Shah- in-Shah’s grandson Mohammed moved 
on Herat in 1833, but he was obliged to withdraw by his 
father’s death and a threatening of^ troubles about the 
succession. In the next year these difficulties were disposed 
Aggressive of ; Mohammed Shah ascended the throne on his grand- 
designs of father’s death, and the talk of vast aggressive schemes became 

PcJTSISL) „ _ _ _ _ „ 

1834. open. 

A new move on Herat was in contemplation. There was 
in fact a good deal of solid justification for such fn expedition 
in the conduct of Kamran who had raided Persian territory 
and kidnapped Persian subjects. But the British objections 
were as obvious as the Russian encouragement. Pressure 


was broughf to bear on the Shah and on Kamran to force 
them to terms : but while the Afghan proposals were reason- 
able, the Persian demands under Russian influence passed all 
bounds; including not merely Kamran’s submission as a 
vassal of Ue Shah but the recognition of Afghanistan as far 
as Ghazni as a Persian province. Kamran would not assent : 
Petersburg repudiated in public the action of its representative 
but did not interfere with him. In 1837 the Shah with a The 
great army marched on Herat. The Barakzais at Kandahar, 
by no means with Dost Mohammed’s approval, displayed an jj erat 
inclination to side with the invader. The expectation of a 1837. 
great Mussulman irruption, with Russia behind it, was setting 
all India in a ferment. It was evident that unless active and 
energetic steps were taken ^t once to counteract the intrigues 
of Russia, consequences of the most serious character might 
ensue to the British supremacy. 


upset, and the exiled Shah Shuja restored to* the throne, 
by the help of the Sikhs whom the Afghans abhorred, 
by means In its first form, this surprising scheme involved only that 
of British gh a h Shuja’s army of restoration should be officered and 
yonC S ’ trained by British. But it was presently borne in upon the 
authorities that if the plan was to be carried to a successful 
issue a large force involving the employment of quantities 
of British troops would be desirable, especially as Ranjit 
Singh was obviously half-hearted ; in ^pite of the fact that 
Shah Shuja himself took by no means the same view of a 
restoration by British bayonets as of one by troops whom 
he could regard as his own. The justification of the plan 
lay in the fact that Herat had already been besieged for a 
long time, and that it would recyiire a great force, either to 
save it or to counteract the impetus which the Persian 
invasion would receive from its fc*U. Such, therefore, was 
the scheme which, with the official reasons and explanations, 
was announced to the world in the Simla manifesto, issued 
on October ist, 1838. • * 

Successful In the meantime however, the chief raison d-ctre of the 
Herat* sc ^ eme disappeared. On November 23, L837, the 

* Persian army had sat down before Herat. Month by month, 
the besiegers attacked, bombarded, and were cepelled by 
^ stubborn determination of the garrison, maintained by 
the persistent energy of Eldred Pottinger, who had 
volunteered his extremely valuable services. Russian 
officers were aiding and encouraging the besiegers : M'Neiirs 
arrival in the Persian camp had brought hopes of an 
accommodation, but an immediate access of Russian activity 
much more than neutralised his * influence. Still, the 
brilliant conduct of the defence held the Persians at bay. 
A last desperate attack was desperately repulsed in June, 
and the siege became a blockade. But a small expedition 
dispatched from India to the* Persian Gulf was magnified 
by report into an overwhelming force; t he Shah began to 
realise that. Russia ^did^ noLiotouL to comproniS^ herself^ 
more_d£eply,..<and to belie ve that .England- was going t<T 
put forth her might against him ; and on Septembq^jL838 
he broke up camp and retired. For the tim e th& dang er 


of Russo-Persian aggression w as a t a ny rate completely 
sco tched. 

Nevertheless, to the general amazement, Lord Auckland Auckland 
and his advisers resolved to go on with their plan for the P ersisU * 
restoration of Shah Shuja ; a plan of which it may be said 
tKat practically every competent authority disapproved, as not 
6rfly, Jb&rdy practicable in itself but involving consequent com- 
plications of incalculable extent. Auckland had the support 
of the Cabinet at Westminster guided by Sir John Hobhouse, 

President of the Board of Control ; but the policy met with 
unmitigated condemnation not only from Wellesley, Bentinck, 
and the Duke of Wellington, but also from experts such as 
Elphinstone and Metcalfe. It was probably the most un- 
qualified blunder committed in the whole history of the 
British in India. 

The army assembled at the British cantonments of Plan of 
Firozpur, on the Satlej. Ranjit Singh naturally objected to campaign * 
its marching through his dominions, so it was arranged that 
Shah Shuja, accompanied by Sir W. Macnaghten as Envoy 
and adviser, with the main army under Sir John Keane and 
Sir Willoughby Cotton, should march by way of Bahawalpur, 

Sindh, Biluchistan, and the Bolan and Khojak passes on 
Kandahar;* while the Sikh expedition accompanied by 
Colonel Wade and Shah Shuja’s son Timur should make its 
entry by the diiict route for Kabul, by way of Peshawar 
and the Khyber pass. The reluctant Sindh Amirs were 
required to pay a heavy subsidy, influenced by the persuasive 
presence of Keane’s troops. 

It was not till the end of February (1839) that the Sindh Advance 
difficulty was settled, jand Cotton’s column began to move ^ r Kanda 
from Shikarpur. The “ military promenade” was tedious ar * 
and painful; there was want of water and forage; it took 
sixteen days to traverse the country from Shikarpur to Dadar, 
the beginning of the Bolan £ass. To get through the pass 
took six days more ; and had not the Khan of Kelat 
restrained tHfe tribesmen, the journey would hardly have 
been accomplished without disaster — though the Khan had 
also impeded the collection of supplies. Quetta was reached 
at the end of March. Early in April, the whole army was 


assembled there, very much in want of supplies, and firmly 
convinced that the Khan of Kelat had been and still was 
deliberately throwing every possible obstacle in its way. 
But there was no military resistance, and at the end of the 
month Shah Shuja entered Kandahar, amid popiAar excite- 
ment which, at the moment, passed for enthusiasm; his 
formal installation a fortnight later hardly appearing to excite 
interest. There is no doubt that the restoration of the 
legitimate monarch presented itself to the Afghans merely in 
the light of a successful foreign invasioff. 

A mission was dispatched to Herat ; and on the arrival 
of # much needed supplies, about the end of June — while 
Ranjit Singh was dying in the Panjab — the army proceeded 
Capture of against Ghazni ; Dost Mohammed having by its inaction 
Ghazni. b een m i s i e d into a belief that # Herat, not Kabul, was its 
objective. Ghazni was an almost impregnable fort, and 
Keane arrived before it without a # siege train. By a con- 
venient accident however, the fact was betrayed to Major 
Thomson of the Engineers thA one of the gates had not 
been walled up, and might be breached. The defenders 
were beguiled by a feint, the gate was blown up and entered 
by a storming party: the strongest fortress in Afghanistan 
had fallen into our hands almost without an effort, though 
the actual fight to secure it was a sharp one. 

Shah The Amir at Kabul would fain have resisted, but the only 
back's* terms offered him were, an asylum in British territory. He 
Kabul, made a stirring appeal to his follower^ to let him lead them in 
a last charge ; but their loyalty was not equal to the demand 
on it. Flight alone was left, and he escaped to the Hindu 
Kush, across the Afghan border, in fpite of a hot pursuit. 
On August 7th Shah Shuja entered Kabul. Three weeks 
later he was joined by his son Timpr, the Sikhs having been 
enabled to pass through the Khyber without difficulty by the 
successful tactics of Colonel Wade. For a little while it was 
imagined that fresh lustre had been added to the British 
Arms. By the end of 1841, that lustre, such m it was, had 
been lamentably besmirched. 

Shah Shuja had been restored on the hypothesis that he 
was to be hailedVith acclamation by a devoted population. 


and maintained on his throne by their loyalty. Almost from 
the first moment it was manifest that he owed his re-instate- 
raent entirely to alien arms, and that if the British retired, he 
would have to make haste after them, back to Ludhiana. 

It was resolved to retain a garrison of 10,000 British troops British 
at Kandahar, Kabul and other points, the main body 
Kabul ; where Cotton at first remained in command, but was st a n. S * m 
later succeeded by the hopelessly incompetent General 
Elphinstone — a very different person from his particularly 
competent civilian naifcesake. General Nott was appointed 
to Kandahar where he performed his work well. Macnaghten 
with Burnes at Kabul controlled Political affairs. The vtoy 
for ultimate disaster was carefully paved by the extraordinary 
folly which, in deference to Shah Shuja’s request, resigned to 
him^nd his seraglio the citadel known as the Bala Hissar 
which completely commanded Kabul, and relegated the 
garrison of 5000 men to almost indefensible cantonments 

Persia was now quiescent p Russia had more than enough 
to otcupy her in Turkistan ; *the Khan of Kelat had been 
duly punished for his supposed delinquencies ; the separate 
government of Herat was enjoying large subsidies; the 
tribal chiefs of Afghanistan (notably the Ghilzais of the 
Kandahar 3 istrict who in the previous century had for a 
time made themselves masters of Persia), were bribed into 
good behaviour. Dost Mohammed was still at large, but Surrender 
the danger from him was removed in 1 b-Jb. By a desperate ^J )ost 
charge at the head of a few horsemen, he had scattered in hammed 
ignominious flight a much larger body of troops which had 
been sent against him ; *and having thus retrieved his honour, 
he voluntarily surrendered himself, and was placed under 
honourable restraint within the British dominion. Macnaghten 
and Burnes believed themselves to be complete masters of 
the situation. • 

The expense, however, was enormous. The actual army 
of occupation^ said to have numbered some 25,000 men* 

The Dost’s surrender seemed to offer a legitimate opportunity 
for withdrawal, but neither Macnaghten nor Lord Auckland 
would countenance such a step. Retrenchment was the 


course adopted, and the form it took was the withdrawal of 
the subsidies to the tribal chiefs. The whole country was 
promptly in a ferment of latent hostility, aggravated at Kabul 
by the habitual and flagrant misconduct of some of the 
English there. Suddenly in November (1841) the flame 
blazed out. 

Murder of It began with an enieute in Kabul which ought to have 
nJmS? ^ >een P^mptly and easily suppressed. A mob attacked the 
ov# 84 * house of Sir Alexander Burnes, captured it, and murdered 
Sir Alexander. The mob was not fet large; there were 
5,000 troops outside. To have marched in and crushed the 
rising within twenty-four hours would have presented no 
difficulties to any commander of ordinary capacity. But the 
insurgents were allowed instead to sack the treasury and 
capture the military stores, while^ the General did nothing: 
and every Afghan was in arms forthwith. 

Messages were dispatched to Nott at Kandahar and to 
Sale at Gandamak, calling for assistance : but the latter was 
in no position to answer the call, and took the wisest avail- * 
able course of falling back on Jellalabad, so as to comnftand 
the Peshawar road. Nott dispatched a brigade, but with a 
strong conviction that between the snow which was beginning 
to fall and the now inevitable opposition of ^intervening 
tribes, it would either fail to reach Kabul or would only get 
there shattered, useless, and too late to help. The Brigade 
started ; but its commander soon made up his mind that the 
advance was wholly 'impracticable, and’ returned to Kandahar. 

Mis- At Kabul, Elphinstone’s imbecility was palpable, and 
matters were not * m P rove d by the association with him of 
Kabul. Shelton, whose temper rendered hip equally destructive. 
Day after day every conceivable blifnder was committed; 
disaster was heaped on disaster ; # by the end of the month 
the General informed Macnaghten, that it was impossible to 
maintain the position, and he must negotiate. The Afghans 
demanded the unconditional surrender of the whole force. 
Macnaghten refused ; but the General in his torn obstinately 
declined either to occupy the Bala Hissar as Shah Shuja 
himself had urged, or to attempt to collect food and forage 
by force of arms. 



On December n, Macnaghten, made helpless by the 
military authorities, renewed negotiations. The terms agreed 
upon were that the troops at Kabul, Kandahar, Ghazni, and 
Jellalabad should evacuate the country ; hostages were to be 
left ; and the Afghans were to supply provisions and carriage 
to expedite departure. Shah Shuja might stay, with a 
pension, or retire, as he chose. The ignominy of the sur- 
render was without parallel. It can only be said, that in the 
face of the attitude of the military authorities, Macnaghten 
had no choice, if the* lives of any of the garrison were to be 

But Akbar Khan, son of Dost Mohammed, who ^m- Murder of 

mediately after the rising had been recognised by the in- 
surgents as their chief, took no steps to carry out his part 



of^he bargain and begail demanding the surrender of the 

military stores, and of more hostages. Macnaghten decided 
to try and play the game of intrigue : Akbar Khan proposed 
and Macnaghten accepted a plan for a plot which in saner 
moments the British Envoy would have recognised as a 
palpable trap for his destruction. In accordance with the 
proposal he gave his directions to the General, and went out 
to meet Akbar, with a total escort of three officers and 
sixteen men. The four officers were suddenly seized ; 
Macnaghten struggled ; in a moment of exasperation Akbar 
shot him dead vylh his pistol ; the captors of the other three 
with difficulty carried two of them to & place of safety. The 
third fell, and was murdered where he &y. 

Major Eldred Pottinger, a recent arrival, on whom now 
devolved by general consent the office which had been held 
by Macnaghten, tried hard to have the convention repudiated : 
but the military autarkies over-ruled him. It was ratified 
on January 4th, and orders were sent for the evacuation of 
Kandahar, Ghazni, and j # ellalabad ; at each of which places 
however, the instructions were repudiated. Two days later 
the evacuation of Kabul began, some 15,000 souls starting The great 
on the mar»h : men, women, and children, insufficiently disaster, 
provided with food and clothing, and without means of 
defence, they went out through storm and snow. One day, 
three more officers including Pottinger and George Lawrence, 



were demanded and surrendered as hostages: s*>day or two 
later, eleven ladies with fifteen children and eight officers 
were handed over ; and again a little later, the generals 
themselves; chiefly because their position seemed fraught 
with less danger as captives, than with the unhappy force. 
The Afghans entirely disregarded their promises ; in every 
defile and gorge the tribesmen poured in a heavy fire on the 
fugitives; of all that host a single survivor alone reached 
Jellalabad on January 14, to tell the awful story; all he 
rest save the hostages perished on the way, whether from 
exposure or from the murderous attacks of the Afghans. 

£he energy of George Clerk at Agra prevailed upon the 
despondent and almost paralysed Governor - General to 
dispatch a brigade for the relief of Jellalabad; but it was 
incompetently led, and the Sikhs— despite the good-wih of 
Sher Singh, now Maharaja at Lahore — made the merest 
pretence of rendering assistance. The Brigade failed to 
advance beyond Peshawar. By sheer persistance Clerk 
practically forced Lord Auckland and the Commander-in- 
Chief, Sir Jasper Nicholls, to send forward a fresh brigade 
— commanded this time by the very able General Pollock : 
though it was still maintained that the sole purpose in view, 
the sole object to be achieved, was the safe withdrawal of 
the Jellalabad garrison. 

Retire- At the end of Februarj„.(j 84a}*, Lord Elle^iborough arrived 
ment of as Auckland’s successor : the most disastrous reign in our 
Auckland. I n( ^ an annals was -urought to a close. Lord Auckland 
possessed admirable Equalities for a routine adminstrator 
under peaceful and progressive conditions; but he had 
proved himself totally incapable^of facing a crisis ; his want 
of self-reliance, his injudicious selection of advisers who 
controlled him, and his complete lack of nerve, made him 
utterly unfit to deal with great events. His was 

brilliant, and versatile, but erratic, bombastic, and theatrical 
to a degree. Lord Ellenborough’s career in India destroyed 
his reputation ; but it was at least less positively disastrous 
than that of Lord Auckland. 

The British forces whose movements have to be followed 
were posted thus ; the largest body a t Kap dahar, under Nott, 


with a gyrison at the fort of Kelat-i-Ghilzai ; Sale at 
Jel lalaba d : Palmer at Ghazni. General England was ordered 
up ToTlCandahar witfT* supplies and some fresh troops, by 
the Quetta route. General Pollock was to advance from 
Peshawar to the relief of Jellalabad. 

At Kandahar, Nott and the political agent Major Rawlinson Events at 
were in no straits. An attempt to raise the Durani tribe Kanc3ahar - 
in their support, on the theory that Shah Shuja was in 
their favour, was unsuccessful ; but when an insurgent army 
moved on the city,* Nott inflicted a severe defeat on it 
after twenty minutes fighting ; and in March, after a summons 
to evacuate, in accordance with the orders sent from K£bu), 
which was declined, another attempt of the insurgents to 
make their way in was severely repulsed by a portion of the 
gafrison ; the bulk of wflich had been temporarily enticed 
away from the scene of action. Ghazni on the other hand 
was ^surrendered at about the same time ; opinions differing 
as to how far the Colonel in command was justified. At the 
end of the same month, General England allowed himself 
to *be checked in his advance from Quetta, and declined to 
move again until he was sure that Nott was in possession of 
the intervening Khojak pass. 

At Jellalabad the defence was maintained with great skill Defence of 
and success ; the main credit being perhaps due to the Jellalabad. 
spirited counsel^ and energetic action of Captains Broadfoot 
and Havelock. A day or two after tjie occupation an attack 
in force had been soundly defeated.* A position at first 
hardly defensible had been rapidly converted into a strong 
fort. There was a short period about the end of January, 
during which the principal authorities wavered, owing to the 
belief that Government had abandoned them. But while 
negotiations were passing, news came that Pollock was 
on his way; a foray brought in a quantity of cattle; the 
chiefs took heart, and broke off the negotiations. A 
great earthquake overthrew the fortifications, but they were 
repaired with such speed and vigour that the enemy 
believed the shock had passed harmlessly. Akbar Khan, 
son of Dost Mohammed, appeared on the scenes and attacked 
the town : the garrison sallied forth and repulsed him. A 


few days later, another sally and foray brought in another ten 
days’ supplies. Before the ten days were out, the garrison 
(April 7 th) arranged a decisive plan of attack on the be- 
siegers, drove them from all their positions into the river, 
captured guns and supplies, and effectively jaised the siege. 

A week later Pollock arrived. He had reached Peshawar 
on February 5th, but for two months he had been employed 
in mastering the mutinous spirit not only of the Sikh allies, 
but of some of his own officers. Not till April 5th had 
Thtpssi- he been able to move, clearing, the *Khyber by masterly 
vppi* 1 manoeuvring; when he joined hands with Sale at T ellalaba d, 
P the* whole of the district, as well as the wholeKandahar 
yistriqt, >yas practically under British control again. 

Such was the position in Afghanistan, when, in Hindostan, 
the Governor-General and the Corfimander-in-Chief made* up 
their minds that Kandahar and Jellalabad must, both be 
evacuated .and the troops withdrawn at the earliest possible 
date; the prisoners being still in the hands of the Afghans, 
and the career of the luckless puppet king at Kabul having 
been ended by his assassination two days before the siege of 
Jellalabad was raised. 

Nott and Rawlinson received the order to retire ; in spite 
of their disgust, they had no alternative but to set about the 
preparations for carrying it out, although their position had 
been still further strengthened by the complete repulse, with 
heavy slaughter, of a fierce attack on Kelat-i-Ghilzai. Pollock 
discovered that the w*a nt of cattle must ‘prevent an immediate 
evacuation of Jellalabad, and might detain him for several 
months. Throughout the Indian peninsula there was an 
explosion of indignation. Just in tim^, Lord Ellenborough 
discovered a way to maintain a particularly empty show of 
consistency, and at the same time to satisfy the universal 
With- demand for the decisive re-conquest of Kabul and recovery 
*awal ™°f the prisoners as a preliminary to withdrawal. On July 
u ‘ 4th he dispatched a letter to Nott, suggesting that he might 
perhaps, if he thought the risk not too grea$, retire from 
Kandahar via Ghazni and Kabul : and a copy of the same 
to Pollock, with a suggestion that if Nott elected to retire 
via Kabul, the Jellalabad force might co-operate. It was 


somewhat %s though a French army occupying Dresden 
should be instructed to withdraw with the option of taking 
Berlin en route . 

Nott had nearly completed his preparations for retirement ; 

Pollock *had accurrfulated large supplies. Both promptly 
decided in favour of the novel method of withdrawal sug- 
gested. On August 7th, Nott marched in force from 
Kandahar; on the 20th Pollock advanced from Jellalabad. 

The former re-took Ghazni, and blew up the fortifications ; 
the latter inflicted & complete defeat on Akbar Khan at 
Tezin. On the 15th September he hoisted the British Flag 
once more on the Bala Hissar at Kabul; on the 16th, Iftott 
joined him. 

^The prisoners during tjiese months had been shifted from The 
place to place ; sometimes protected, not without difficulty, British 
by the good offices of* a chief named Zeman Khan ; but on P nsoners# 
the whole receiving fairly good treatment. When Nott and 
Pollock advanced on Kabul, Akbar Khan hurried his captives 
off to the Hindu Kush, arfb t they were given to understand 
that their destiny was, to be distributed in permanent captivity 
among the Usbeg chiefs beyond the Afghan border. Before 
reaching a place called Jlamian, however, the cupidity of the 
chief of Jheir escort was so worked upon that when they 
were there, Pottinger assumed command, set up a new 
Governor, retailed the escort in his own service, and 
prepared for a siege. On receiving/, the news of Pollock’s 
victory at Tezin, the party resolved on an immediate return 
to Kabul, started on September 16, were met next day by 
the advance body of troops sent to recover them, and on the 
22nd were once mor| at Kabul — free. 

Nott and Pollock nad vindicated the honour of the British The 
arms. They had proved*that we had competent commanders triumphal 
against whom the Afghan levies could make no stand. They j^ a c r £ h 
had rescued the prisoners. a They had re-taken Kabul. The 
Insurgents were everywhere in full flight. Their troops, in 
Kabul itself, 1 “getting out of hand, had taken signal vengeance 
for the fate of their comrades. There was nothing more to 
be done but to retire from the hopelessly false and untenable 
position into which Lord Auckland’s great blunder had thrust 


us. On October^* the victorious forces began & triumphal 
march from Kabul to Agra. Lord Ellenborough issued a 
proclamation which would have done credit to Bonaparte. 
The sandal-wood gates of the temple at Somnath — or copies 
of them — carried off centuries ago by Mahmud of* Ghazni, 
were brought back as a trophy, the centre of much 
grandiloquent rhetoric ; and promptly forgotten. At 
Firozpur there was a grand review, with great pomp and 
circumstance, intended especially to impress the Sikhs. 
Finally, Dostjtfohammed was liberated, and returned to 
rule for several years at Kabul; where in 1856 his suc- 
cessful opposition to Persia showed how entirely superfluous 
the whole disastrous episode had been. 

Effect of But that wanton act of interference bore its evil fruit [ or 
the us, not only in the great disaster of 1841 ; and subsequent 
episode, internal complications in Afghanistan,/ but also in its revela- 
tion to the Native mind — as the events of the next six years 
proved, at the cost of no little bloodshed — that possibly after 
all the British arms might not be Invincible. 



( Maps I. and V.) 

T F the Afghan episode is the most disastrous in our Indian 
annals, that of morally even less excusable. 

Sindh is the country lying on both banks of the Indus Sindh and 
below the Panjab, with* the Shikarpur region at the extreme Sindh 
north, and the sea on the south. The upper districts had Amlrs ' 
been tributaries of the Durani kingdom. The chieftainship 
of # the whole was divided ’amongst a Biluchi family, known 
as the Talpurs, in three groups — the Amirs of Khairpur, 

Mirpur, and Haidarabad ; their subjects were mainly Biluchi 

As early as 1809 a treaty had been made between them 
and the British, for excluding “ the tribe of the French.” 

From 1832 to *1838 various commercial agreements were 
made in connection with the opening up of the Indus. In 
the last year, Ran jit £ingh had been doing his best to obtain 
the assent of the British to his carrying his arms into Sindh ; 
and the treaty with the Amirs provided for our mediating 
between them and tkjp Maharaja. This mediation took the 
form of a n arrangem ent by which Shah Shuja as de jure 
monarch of Kabul •felevsed the Amirs from all claims to 
service or tribute in consideration of a cash payment whereof 
some two-thirds was to be* handed to Ranjit Singh. The 
demand for payment however was not pressed till negotia- 
tions for a ffesh treaty in connection with our advance into 
Afghanistan were set on foot in 1839. The justification of 
the proposals then made is not obvious, seeing that the 
Shah had already given the Amirs a formal release in return 



for benefits received on the occasion of his attempted re- 
storation in 1833; and also we now claimed what had been 
expressly refused to us in existing treaties, the right of send- 
jing our forces and stores through Sindh. On the other 
hand, it is fair to recognise that the Amirs had been showing 
/ signs MilfiSjility to us, and threatening^lliances withJPersia ; 
which conduct at least gave colour to a demand on our part 
for a subsidy and a military station at Thatta on the Indus, 
some sixty miles below Haidarabad. The Amirs submitted 
under protest ; and if they were sore at our treatment, they 
still fulfilled the letter of their engagement throughout our 
Afghan troubles, when it lay in their power to cause us 
considerable embarrassment. 

Outram. Shortly after the restoration of f>hah Shuja in 1839 M^jor 
James Outram — “the Bayard of India,” as Sir Charles 
Napier named him later — was appointed Resident for Sindh 
and Biluchistan, in which post he did much admirable work, 
especially in the pacification of Kelat. Unfortunately for 
himself, he offended Lord Ellep borough — who had virtually 
promised to make him Envoy instead of merely Resident — 
by restoring Quetta and the Shal valley to the new Khan 
(from whose predecessor they had been taken), in accordance 
with his recommendation approved by Lord Auckland but 
neither ratified nor rejected by the new Governor-General. 

The disasters in Afghanistan had created much unrest, 
which affected the Amj/s unfavourably. Such charges against 
them as required investigation were formulated by Outram ; 
and there is little doubt that in self-defence it was advisable 
for us to demand concessions which would enable us more 
readily to check anything like active/ disaffection. But in 
the autumn of 1842, while Nott and Bollock were restoring 
British prestige in Afghanistan, Outmm was superseded by the 
veteran soldier Sir Charles Napier who was placed in supreme 
control both military and political. 

Sir Charles Sir Charles conducted his operations on the theory that 

Napier the annexation of Sindh would be a very beneficent and 
Amirs! advantageous piece of rascality for which it was his business 
to find an excuse — a robbery to be plausibly effected. Ali 
Murad, a brother of Rustam the old Rais or head of the 



Khairpur Aihirs, is the villain of the piece. Rustam had 
no sort of idea of resisting the British power ; but Ali Murad 
wanted the “ Turban ” or symbol of authority for himself. 

To Napier he posed as the one friend of the British, while 
he terrified the old Rais by friendly warnings of the dire 
fate that awaited him if he fell into the hands of the British 
Commander ; whose hectoring tone gave a certain specious 
plausibility to the flagrant misrepresentation of his intentions. 

Rustam did not dare to obey Sir Charles’s summons to meet 
him : Sir Charles attrfbuted his conduct to contumacious- 
ness, regarded his excuses and protests as mere prevarication, 
and made Ali Murad Rais in his place : at the same tin 5 e 
sequestrating the upper territories of Khairpur as far as 
Saidjar (Sukkur). The res^ of the Amirs were then ordered 
to meet Outram at Khairpur to sign a treaty which was 
practically an abrogation of their sovereign status. Ali 
Murad succeeded in preventing their attendance on the 
appointed day, and on their arrival two days later, they were 
ordered to meet Outram at Hrydarabad instead. 

Tfie result was that the treaty was not signed till Feb. 1 2 The Sindh 
(1843), by which time the^Biluchi population at Haidarabad War. 
had been roused to a violent pitch of animosity ; and three 
days later Jhey made_a fierce attack on Outram at the 
Residency. The attack was brilliantly repelled, but Outram 
was obliged to withdraw to his steamer on the river. This 
overt act necessitated the appeal to arms. Napier, who, two 
months before, had deliberately dispatched a force of some 
five hundred men to seize the fort of Imamgarh in the 
Mirpur territory without provocation — an act of splendid 
audacity from the military point of view, but morally in- 
defensible — was now marching on Haidarabad. With a 
force of 2700 men, he njet the Biluchi army numbering 
20,000 at'Miani a few miles from Haidarabad on Feb. 27 ; Miani. 
and by Srffliant generalship f routed them completely with 
great slaughter, at the cost of casualties amounting to about 
a tenth of his kittle force. Haidarabad •'surrendered, and the 

A nyrs submi tted. About a week later, Sher Mohammed 
of Mirpur made a gallant attempt to recover independence, 
but was completely routed at Daba, a village not far from 


Haidarabad ; a detachment was sent to seize &mirkot ; Sir 
Charles Napier made his famous and only too truthful pun — 
“ peccavi) I have Sindh” — and another province was annexed 
to the British empire. 

The An- The fatuity and blundering which had marked *our opera- 
f^dh* t *° nS * n Afghanistan unt ^ arm ^ s of Kandahar and 
° m ‘ Jellalabad vindicated our honour, were counterbalanced by 
the brilliancy of the general commanding in Sindh ; but the 
story of the annexation is a unique and deplorable example 
of departure from every principle which had hitherto made 
annexation only the last resort in dealing with persistently 
irreconcilable powers, or at most the final remedy for endless 
misrule. Our interference in Afghanistan, however unjustifi- 
able, was at least not dictated, by the desire of territory. 
Sindh is the one instance in which it is difficult to believe 
that the case for annexation was not?' more or less deliberately 
manufactured, in opposition to the declared sentiments of 
the most high-minded, capable, and well informed servants 
of the Government. * * 

The excuse, such as it was, is to be found in the loss of 
prestige consequent on the Kabul disaster, though such 
disaffection as it had produced m the Amirs was trivial 
enough. But elsewhere it was not trivial, and was re- 
sponsible for the particularly short and sharp two days’ 
campaign of Gwalior, and, two years fater, for the first 
sanguinary struggle »?ith the Panjab State. The anne xed 
territ ory was plac ed for the time under^-thfe ^admlp istrative 
1 contr ol of Sir Char les Napier. 

Mutinies A minor result of the annexation — not however without 
of sepoy significance in the light of later evefts — was the first grave 
regiments. out break of a mutinous spirit among the sepoy regiments ; 
the first sign of a tendency which was probably intensified 
by the Sikh wars, during which perpetual appeals were made 
by the agents of the Khalsa to the cupidity as well as the 
religious sentiment of the sepoys, and comparisons instituted 
between the rate of pay for serving and fdt opposing the 
British. In the case of Sindh, the trouble arose because 
before the Annexation the sepoys of the Bengal Army in 
Sindh were paid as for service on a foreign station ; after it, 


they were required to serve beyond the Indus without extra 
allowances. The matter was probably made worse by the 
fact that many of the sepoys employed in the Afghan war 
had literally lost caste on service. One regiment after another 
refused to lharch : the 64th N.I. at last breaking into open 
mutiny. They were quieted by injudicious and unauthorised 
promises on the part of the Colonel ; and the promises being 
repudiated at Shikarpur, they mutinied again. The General 
commanding in the district, recognising the provocation, was 
content with punishing* the ringleaders. Very much the 
same thing happened with some Madras regiments which 
were ordered to Sindh : after which, neither Bengal nof 
Madras troops were called upon to serve there, the province 
being^associated with the Bombay army. But the beginnings 
of insubordination were a premonition of troubles to come, 
as yet unsuspected by all but a few. 

In an earlier chapter (xv.) it has been observed that on Gwalior, 
the conclusion of the Maratfca* wars in 1818, Daulat Rao 
Sindhia at Gwalior was allowed to retain a very much greater 
independence than any of the other Maratha princes ; since 
he had displayed, though .much against his will, a practical 
recognition pf British paramountcy. Daulat Rao died with- 
out issue in 1827 ; when his energetic and ambitious widow 
found herself compelled to adopt his kinsman Jankoji, though 
she retained the government in her own hands for some six 
years. In 1833 Jankojf wrested control from her, and she 
was driven from his dominions. In 1843 (February), Jankoji ,, 

^iejL Jeaving an extremely youthful widow, Tara BaT— she 
was in her thirteenth ye?r — without issue and without having 
adopted a successor. 1 ara Bai adopted a boy of eight years 
old, with the concurrence t of her own chiefs and of the 
Governor-General. Under such circumstances, and consider- 
ing the great extent of Sindhia’s dominions, Lord Ellen- 
^borough insisted on the appointment of a single regent in 
iieu of a Council. The Rani’s selection for the post was Intrigues 
the hereditary chamberlain known as the Dada : Lord Ellen- for power, 
borough’s was an uncle of Jankoji’s known as the Mama, 

The Mama was duly appointed : and the Rani and the Dada 


proceeded forthwith to intrigue against him, while the British 
Government was under the circumstances obliged to range 
itself definitely in his support. Now, Sindhia — that is to 
say the Gwalior Government — was lord of one of the two 
great native armies still existing in India ; the 'second and 
the greater being the Khalsa in the Panjab. When a 
political situation develops such as had now appeared in 
Gwalior, and also as we shall presently see in the Panjab ; 
when the Government is divided int o factions, and there is 
also a large and united army; the army ^ry promptly 
becomes the leading factor in the situation, and can dictate 
its own terms to the rival factions as soon as it realises its 
own powers. 

The It may be remarked that, while Sindhia was a Maratha, 
G^or the whole of his principality was outside the real Maratha 
army * country, in the heart of Hindostan. The army consisted 
mainly of Brahmin or Rajput regiments with no sentimental 
allegiance to the Maratha dynasty which was of inferior caste 
to their own ; to the arrogaijcL of conscious power it added 
the pride of caste — the pride not of nationality but of race : 
to which was conjoined unity of religion. The special 
danger of the situation lay in the fact that the Sikhs also 
were a sect, if an unorthodox sect, of Hindus ; tJ the religious 
antipathies of Hindu and Mussulman would not be present 
to stand in the way of a combination ; a*-combination would 
mean a desperate bid for the recovery of Hindu supremacy 
throughout the fndian Peninsula: and the general belief 
in the practicability of such an attempt had been immensely 
advanced by the Kabul disaster, while the newly reported 
victory of Miani had been effectiv^ more as restoring our 
own confidence in ourselves than as recovering our prestige 
among the natives in general : „and finally the controlling 
perspicacity of Ranjit Singh in the Pan jab had been removed 
for nearly four years. 1 

For some months the Gwalior army continued to wax 
in insubordination and arrogance. The coirrt intrigues con- 
tinued,' The Mama was not strong enough to control the 
situation ; the Rani dismissed him from his office, and the 
Dada drove him from the country. Lord Ellenbotough 



;ook the next step to brea king off dipl omati c relation s by With- 
withdr awing the Res ident JaTStafon on the forger. 

The Rani was now nominally at the head of affairs : the Resident. 
Dada was practically dominant. The Rani entreated the 
Resident to return : he replied that the Dada must be 
surrendered as a condition precedent. The Rani offered to 
deprive the Dada of office, but demurred to giving up his 
person. Some of the nobles, supported by part of the 
army, captured him ; but he escaped, resumed office, and 
succeeded in issuing * eight months’ pay to the troops, 

.hereby securing them on his side. In the meantime, 

Sher Singh the Sikh Maharaja, who had been personally 
oyal to the British, was assassinated, and the attitude of 
.he Khalsa was increasingly threatening. The Governor- 
Gendfal made up his mind 'that the Gwalior crisis must be 


A “ camp of exercise ” was formed at Agra ; in other 
words a very considerable army was assembled there and 
set in fighting trim. Thithe* came Lord^ Ellenborough on Demands 
Decefnber nth, 1843, and forthwith he informed the Rani °f Lord 
;hat a fnenSly government capable of keeping order must borough, 
oe ^esJiEfished at Gwalior, and that his army was on the 
narqhJto -see that it was 'done. A week later this message 
was supplemented by a demand for the reduction of the " 
Gwalior army, and the increase of the British subsidiary 
contingent in the dominion. The Governor-General some- 
what characteristically backed his demarAl by reference to 
a treaty nearly forty years old which had been ignored by 
both parties from the date of its signature. Moreover he 
declined to remain within the British border, to receive the 
Rani for the signature ^of the proffered treaty. The army 
was not to be held back ; the meeting was to take place 
on the 26th, in Gwalior territory. 

The Gwalior chiefs and tha army alike regarded this as 
tantamount to declaring the independence of the State at 
an end : and the army in particular felt that its doom would 
be sealed by submission. It was resolved to fight. The Mahawj- 
Rani was dissuaded or frightened out of attending on the 
day named. The bulk of the army marched out to a strong 


position at Chanda, and on the night of the 2&h entrenched 
itself at Maharajpur. Another column on the south of 
Gwalior awaited the expected advance of a second British 
column in that quarter from Jhansi. 

On the morning of the 29th Sir Hugh Cough, the 
Commander-in-Chief, with between six and seven thousand 
men, advanced on Maharajpur. A complete conviction 
prevailed in British quarters that the resistance would be 
insignificant, and not only Lord Ellenborough but a party 
of ladies accompanied the advance The nature of the 
country made it impossible to bring up the heavy guns. 
The enemy's lines were as a matter of fact carried only by 
sheer hard fighting in the face of exceedingly stubborn 
resistance, their men standing fast and fighting hand to 
hand ; but they were finally dfiven in complete rout, r with 
heavy loss. 

Puniar. On the same day, General Grey, advancing from Jhansi, 
routed the second Gwalior column at Puniar, losing only 
some two hundred men. Tfee total British casualties in 


the two engagements were just over 1000. 

New ar- There was no further resistance. Sindhia’s kingdom was 
^tS 3 t^ no t dismembered but was deprived of independence. A 
GW allor. <ounc il re g enc Y was appointed to conduct the government 

until the young Raja should come of age, tfie Resident 
having authority to dictate their measures at his discretion. 
The army was reduced from 40,000 to 9,000 men, and a 
British contingent' of 10,000 was subsidised. This contin- 
gent, it may be remarked, subsequently became a particularly 
well-appointed and capable instrument of war, which in the 
time of the Mutiny joined the revolt, murdered its British 
officers, and had the unique credit *bf defeating an English 
General on its own responsibility. 

Recall of Six months after Maharajpur, Lord Ellenborough was 
Lord recalled, and was succeeded ir the Governor-Generalship by 
borough! Henry (afterwards Lord) Hardinge. His erratic methods 
* and his gasconading proclamations had b^n no less dis- 
tasteful to the India House than the dictatorial tone of his 
correspondence with them: while his absorption in the 
excitement of military programmes had entirely withdrawn 



his attention Jrom administrative concerns. In Afghanistan 
he had fortunately changed his policy between April and 
July. In Sindh he had unfortunately withdrawn his con- 
fidence from Outram and transferred it to Sir Charles 
Napier. Gwalior he had adopted a sound course, but 
had gone out of his way to put forward an unsound 
justification. 'His proceedings were a series of surprises and 
produced a nervous perturbation, and an uneasy suspense, 
particularly ill adapted to the exigencies of the government 
of India: the feeling thjit he was not “safe” w r as irresistible, 
*No one had ever suspected Lord Auckland of genius; he 
was simply a capable domestic administrator who found 
himself involved in diplomatic and military complications 
entirely outside his province and beyond his capabilities. 
Different as were the causes *)f his failure, Lord Ellenborough 
is perhaps the only one of our Governors-General to whom 
the famous phrase about Galba applies — omnium consensu 
capax imperii y nisi imperasset . 


{Map VI.) - 

Sir Henry T IKE each of his immediate predecessors, Sir Henry 
Hardinge. Hardinge arrived in India, hoping for an era of peace; 

as in their case, his rule is remembered as an era of war. In 
no other respect, however, docs'his administration resetnble 
that of either Auckland or Ellenborough. The Afghan affair 
was wantonly conceived, recklessly 'conducted, and brought 
its own nemesis. The Sindh business had destroyed such 
credit as we had hitherto obtained for abstaining from wilful 
aggression. But the war with the Sikhs was forced -upon 
Lord Hardinge by an unprovoked invasion ; the terms imposed 
at the close of a hard-fought but triumphant campaign were 
studiously moderate; the Panjab State was maintained in 
its independence in spite of a quite legitimate excuse for 
annexation. The men who were brought Jo the front by the 
Governor-General's choice or with his approbation were those 
whose names stand in the front rank of the British roll of 
honour. Retrenchments were required of him where policy 
would have maintained the existing expenditure, but the 
resulting dangers were reduced to a minimum by judicious 
organisation ; and the great soldier w6io had won a European 
reputation in Spain before he was thirty added a fresh wreath 
to his laurels, partly, it must be admitted, owing to the un- 
due detraction of which his Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hugh 
Gough, was made the object. 

There were many reputed sons of Ranjit ^ingh, but only 
J&npb one his paternal relationship to whom he confidently recog- 
nised. This "prince, Kh&rakSingh, who was almost imbecile, 
Smgh. succeeded Ranjit as Maharaja, the government falling into 




the hands o# his son Nao Nihal Singh, and of the family 
variously known as the Dogra Rajas or the Jammu brothers, 
of whom the chief were Dhiai^jSingh and GholaJ^JSingh. 

These men were not Sikhs, but Rajputs, who had won the 
favour of*the old Lion of the Panjab — very able, very 
unscrupulous, and decidedly unpopular with the Sikhs them- 
selves. At the end of 1840, Kharak Singh died, and his 
son — too capable and promising to suit the Jammu brothers 
(so called, because Ranjit Singh had made them jointly Rajas 
of Jammu when he acquired that country) — met with a fatal 
“ accident.” She^ Singh, a reputed son of Ranjit, was made 
Maharaja, with Dhian Singh as Wazir, Gholab Singh retiring 
to Jammu. Sher Singh and the brothers kept the Khalsa 
und^r some degree of restraint, and the Sikh government 
succeeded in maintaining a friendly attitude to the British 
throughout the Afghan ^troubles. In 1843, Lhian Singh, 
aiming at greater power, joined in a plot for the assassination 
of Sher Singh; but this was hardly accomplished when his 
fellow-conspirators removed # bim also ; and his son Hlra 
Singfi in turn overthrew the conspirators, made himself 
Wazir, and established as Maharaja the boy Phulip Singh, a 
possible son of Ranjit’s by a young wife known as the Rani 
Jipdan. S^e with her brother and her paramour Lai Singh, 
played a leading part in the Sikh Anarchy which followed. 

Now it was tha* the Khalsa became the principal factor The 
in the situation. We have seen that the great Maharaja had ?balsa, 
organised a powerful Standing army on European models, 
with the help of European officers. It included some 
Mussulman regiments, but the great bulk of it consisted of 
Sikhs, who were fanatical religionists however little they 
respected the moral coae of Nanuk. They had a curious 
constitution of their own the regiments were really con- 
tilted, not by their officers, but by elected committees of 
five Known as Panchayets ofi the analogy of the Village 
Communities. Their insubordinate conduct towards the 
officers had grven to British observers a totally erroneous 
idea of their effective discipline in the field, for to the in- 
structions of the panchayets they were absolutely obedient. 

Their armament included 250 guns, in the management 



of which they were experts; and when we fo 4 nd ourselves 
at war with them it was discovered that they were also 
experts in the art of rapidly throwing up entrenchments 
behind which they would fight with unsurpassed doggedness 
and courage. The Sikh Sirdars were able to oring large 
bodies of armed retainers into the field, but these were quite 
inferior to the Khalsa regiments as instruments of war, and quite 
inadequate to making head against them for political purposes. 

Intrigue The Rani and her entourage intrigued against Hira 
and Singh ; both parties endeavoured to win over the Khalsa. 

narc y. j n t j ie j r m J n ds the consciousness that so long as 

the Khalsa, loyal to itself and to “ Govind ” only, retained its 
organisation, any and every Government would be insecure. 
Both had the idea that the way out of the difficulty might be 
found in letting the army loose against the British ; in which 
case, it would either solve the problem by being totally 
wrecked, or would by victory give prestige to the Government, 
which would claim the credit. The Sikh Sirdars were afraid 
of the army; they hated al ; k£ the Rani’s circle and the 
Jammu party ; and their sentiments to the British were mixed. 
In the game of intrigue, the Rani won, and Hira. Singh, 
whose success mirht perhaps have eventually produced a 
strong government, was killed. The Khalsa more than ever 
became masters of the situation ; and by the autumn of 
1845, there was little room to doubt that^they had resolved 
to make a bid for the Empire of Hindostan. 

The Sikh Ever since the assassination of* Sher Singh the Sikh 
problem. Anarchy had been a source of grave anxiety to the British 
Government. It had hurried on the decisive action of 
Maharajpur : which in its turn had helped to curb, for the 
time, the aggressive inclinations of the Khalsa, and had most 
fortunately cleared away the ope formidable force whose 
geographical location at Gwalior would have rendered it not 
only an inevitable but an exceedingly dangerous ally of Sikh 
invaders, by threatening the rear of our advance. The 
Lahore Government could put at least fifty thousand drilled 
troops and probably nearly twice as many irregulars in the 
field, and the British forces in the frontier districts were quite 
insufficient to deal with such an army effectively: while to 


increase their* numbers would be to court the charge of wilful 
provocation. But in the circumstances, the thing had to be 
done, and was done with no little skill and the least possible 
display. Nevertheless/ the problem of balancing the demands 
of political against military expediency offered its usual 
difficulty, and the attempt to evade war involved making the 
shock of sudden onset the more perilous. 

During October and November (1845), Khalsa Disposi- 

obtained entire control over the Lahore Court or Durbar ; bo Q °f 
but the British Politica> Agent, Major Broadfoot, still thought 
it possible that the Sikhs would abstain from the irrevocable 
step of crossing the Satlej. The British troops, of which ah 
unduly small proportion were Europeans, were now collected 
to the number of 7,900 at the advanced fort of Firozpur, and 
were in considerable force at Ludhiana, Amballa, and one or 
two other forts west of the river Jamna. The largest station 
was at Mirat, or Meerut, east of the Jamna. The threatening 
movements of the Sikhs led Sir Hugh Gough, the Commander- 
in-Chief, to order up some* of the Mirat troops ; but opti- 
mistic advisers induced Hardinge, who was himself at Ludhiana, 
to have.them sent back, though all available regiments were 
ready to move on receiving the order. On the 9th Dec. 
Broadfoot announced the Sikhs’ advance. On the 12th came The Sikhs 
the news that they were over the Satlej and marching on cross the 
Firozpur; on the* 13th the Governor-General issued his ej * 
declaration of war, and the troops at the western station 
were immediately on thg march. 

Gough himself was in command ; and the Governor- 
General, whose military repute was of the highest, placed 
himself a week later at the service of the Commander-in- 
Chief as second in command. The situation was somewhat 
awkward ; previous Governoss-General, who had been soldiers, 
had either exercised their right of taking supreme control, or 
had not accompanied their arnfies. 

The advance was performed with extraordinary rapidity; 
the Amballa fotce starting on the 12th, overtaking that from 
Ludhiana and reaching Mudki on the 1 8th, having covered 
about 140 miles in seven days, their route lying for the most 
part through heavy sand or jungle. 


Mudki. On reaching Mpdki after a twenty mile masch the troops 
numbering some ten thousand had halted to rest, when 
approaching clouds of dust heralded the arrival of the advance 
column of the Sikh army ; the battle was joined at about four 
in the afternoon. The engagement was fierce and the 
resistance stubborn, but the Sikhs, whose number may have 
been anything between twelve and thirty thousand were driven 
from the field, with the loss of 17 guns. So" hot was the 
fighting while it lasted that the victors lost little short of 
900 men. 

Firozpur. Firozpur was now not very far off ; and after two days’ halt 
to enable more troops to join, the army advanced on its way 
thither. Littler, commanding there, had orders to join hands 
with the relieving force. It was, known that one portion of 
the Sikh army under a prominent Sirdar, Tej t Singh, was 
before Firozpur 3 and the other portion under Lai Singh the 
Wazir, the Rani’s favourite, had been thrown forward to 
oppose the advance. By skilful manoeuvring, Littler brought 
a division out of Firozpur, evading Tej Singh, on the 21st, 
while Gough and Hardinge on the same day moved from 
Mudki. The Sikhs had entrenched and occupied at Firozshah 
a formidable position shaped like a horse shoe, impossible to 
turn, commanding the line of march. 

Firozshah, Here in the morning, the main British army found them. 

Dec. 21. Gough, having inspected the position was anxious to make 
an immediate attack : Hardinge wished to wait for Littler’s 
re-inforcement. After the unlooked-for vigour of the opposi- 
tion at Mudki, the Governor-General was so convinced of 
the immense risk involved, should his force prove insufficient, 
that he exercised his authority and over-ruled Gough. 
Littler arrived at three o’clock ; the attack commenced at 
four. When night fell, the British had partly carried the 
entrenchments, but the fight was still raging, the troops were 
losing touch of each other in tne dark, and there was nothing 
left for it but to fall back and renew the attack next day. 
^ygr had a British army in India been placed in so critical a 
pgaitilOP ; for no one could feel that defeat was impossible, 
especially if Tej Singh should re-inforce Lai Singh ; and 
defeat would mean annihilation for the force and, for the 


time being, df the British Power in India. The stubborn 
resolution of officers and men alike was rewarded when in the 
early morning the entrenchments were rushed and it turned 
out that dissensions, born of distrust in the competence and 
loyalty of tfteir leaders, had caused the Sikhs to withdraw most 
of their forces during the night, falling back towards the north. 

The crisis was not passed, for the British had been for no Firozshah, 
long time in occupation of the Firozshah position — they were Dec * 22 - 
too much exhausted for effective pursuit — when Tej Singh 
with some thirty thousand fresh men was seen to be 
approaching. If a new attack were vigorously pressed, 
disaster was still possible. But though it was opened with 
vigour, it was not maintained. For some reason unknown, 

Tej # Singh began to fall # back. A small body of light 
Dragoons and Lancers made a sudden charge, which pre- 
cipitated retreat into flight : the great struggle was converted 
into a complete rout of the foe. 

- It is commonly assumed that Hardinge’s action in over- Current 
ruling Gough on the 21st &ved India from disaster. Yet criticisms 
it is at least an open question whether Gough’s plan was 
not the sounder. As it fell out, the attack did not begin 
till four o’clock in the afternoon of the shortest day of the 
year. But # of Littler’s force, for whose arrival it had been 
delayed, only one regiment took effective part in the fight. 

Before night fell, Xhe entrenchments had been forced, and 
another hour of daylight would have made the victory 
complete. If Gough Had had his way, Littler would have 
• been in time, with his reinforcement, to make the result 
secure, much as it befel Moltke at Sadowa, and Tej Singh’s 
appearance next day would have been fraught with nothing 
like the same danger, :2ft may be that of the two plans 
Hardinge’s was on the whote the right one — the less risky — 
to follow ; ^ 5 ut it is certainly unjust to describe the one as a 
piece of hot-headed rashness c and the other as a counsel of 
sober judgment. Both the alternatives — there was no third 
—carried the itsk of an overwhelming catastrophe; the one 
chosen all but led to disaster, but ended, not without the 
help of good fortune, in complete success, though at the 
cost of close upon 2,500 casualties. 



Firozshah broke up the Sikh invasion; it*was now our 
turn to overthrow the Khalsa in the Panjab. Within two 
months, on Feb. ioth, the decisive battle was fought 
at Sobrapp. In the interval, the British were engaged in 
gathering their forces for the final blow, the Sikjhs in com- 
pleting their defences on the Satlej, and in threatening the 
British line of communication towards Ludhiana. A partial 
success at Budhowal on Jan. 20th was redeemed by 
Sir Harry Smith’s decisive victory at Aliwal on the 26th 
when the raiding column was driven Over the river. 

Sobraon, The Sikh position at Sobraon, on the British bank of 
Feb. 10, the Satlej, was of extraordinary strength; but if it could 
4 * be stormed, retreat would be for the bulk of the enemy 
impossible. Gough resolved tp storm it. At sunrisp on 
Feb. 10, the artillery opened fire; but after a two 
hours’ duel, it was clear that we had gained no advantage. 
The advance with musket and bayonet was ordered; after 
desperate fighting, with more than one check, the entrench- 
ments were carried, the Sikhb resisting valiantly to the 
last; when finally they were being driven in complete rout 
over the bridge, it gave way with them ; their losses amounted 
to not less than 10,000 men and sixty-seven guns; the 
possibility of effective resistance was at an ♦ end. The 
British losses were much the same as at Firozshah, though 
the proportion of killed was much smaller.* 

In two months there had been four fierce engagements, 
all stubbornly fought, two of them at greater cost than 
even Assaye. The resistance had been of a quality such 
as no native opponents had ever before displayed except 
the Ghurkas ; in sixty days, the menace of the Khalsa was 

The Annexation, or the attempt to^establish a capable govern - 
ment in the Panjab, were the alternatives before the 
Governor-General, who chose K the second. At the end of 
March ( 1 84.$) the^JLahore treaty was, signed. By way of 
penalty ahfd indemnity, the Jalandar Doab- 1 -/.*. the lands 
between the Beas and the Satlej — was annexed; about a 
million and a half sterling was demanded, and the cession 
of Kashmir' with half a millipn sterling accepted instead; 


Kashmir was then handed over, as an independent State, 
to Gholab Singh of Jummu for a million ; the Sikhs gave 
up the artillery they had used in the war ; their army was 
reduced to thirty thousand men; a Council of Regency 
was appoifeted ; by desire of the Sirdars, British troops were 
to remain at Lahore till the end of the year, the chiefs 
declaring that without such assistance they could not be 
responsible for maintaining order ; Henry Lawrence was 
appointed Resident with large powers, and the great race 
of British Frontier Oncers was called into existence. The 
excitement created throughout India by the Sikh invasion, 
and by the rumours of a coming Hindu triumph, was allayed 
by a triumphal march on which the 250 surrendered or 
captured guns were displayed. When Lord Hardinge retired 
(he # and Gough having bdfcn raised to the peerage) some- 
thing less than two yjsars later, early in 1848, he was 
under the belief that no more wars would be needed for 
several years to come. 

The task before the Resident, Henry Lawrence, in the Henry 
Parfjab, was one of extraordinary difficulty, and was performed Lawrence, 
by hiip with extraordinary success. The personal confidence 
and the influence he acquired among the Sirdars, were 
amazing. Hardly was fie established at Lahore when" in 
October tfus power was shown by his leading a Sikh army 
with only a small contingent of British troops to force the 
recalcitrant governor of Kashmir to yield that country to 
Gholab Singh ; a mission accomplished without a single blow 
being struck. The Court party however, were by no means 
satisfied with the new order of things, intriguing against the 
Resident, and fomenting the ill-feeling of the Khalsa, which 
retained a conviction •that its defeat had been due to the 
treachery of its Commander, not to its own military inferi- 
ority. When the time came at the end of the year, for the 
retirement of the British troops, the Sirdars again declared 
that anarchy must result. Despite the Governor-GeneraFs 
anxious desirf to withdraw from the Panjab, the force of 
the Sirdars 7 argument was conclusive. A^pew treaty was 
accordingly concluded at Bhairowal or Bhyrowal by which Treaty of 
t&e .J?anjab * administration was placed absolutely under Bhairowal 


British control — Henry Lawrence becoming virtual dictator 
— until the young Maharaja Dhulip Singh should come of 
age in a little less than seven years’ time ; when the British 
were to withdraw altogether. 

The During 1847 many of the Panjab men who were lo become 
Tanjab famous learned their work under Lawrence’s inspiration — 
officers. j 0 hn Nicholson, Herbert Edwardes, James Abbott, and 
others including Henry Lawrence’s no less famous brother 
John. One notable effect of their actions was that the 
Pathan and Biluchi tribes, from Haz^a on the North to the 
Sindh border on the South, learned a curious devotion to 
the Englishmen which stood them in good stead when the 
Khalsa again rose. For the Mussulman tribesmen did not 
love their Sikh masters, whose conception of Government 
had been hitherto restricted to' the collection of tritfute. 
Their method was unconsciously sujnmed up by the remark 
of a Sirdar, that as there had been no contributions from 
the Derajat for two or three years, it was “ time to send an 
army.” The methods of Edwardes, Abbott, and the rest 
were less drastic but more efficacious and a good deal less 
costly; persuasion coupled with an occasional display of 
supreme audacity, impressing the untutored mind in a way 
which astonished the Sikhs. It 'must not be forgotten 
however, that all the time Lawrence’s men were acting as 
representatives not of the British Power but of the Lahore 
Government temporarily administered through them. 

Outlook in The Rani’s party* had been weakened before the treaty of 
the Bhairowal by the removal of Lai Singh who was implicated 
anjab. * n ^ res } s t ance 0 f Kashmir: and in 1847, the discovery of 
other plots and correspondence caused the Rani herself to 
be removed from Lahore, though not<for some months, un- 
fortunately, from the Panjab. By the end of the year, it 
seemed as if the Khalsa itself was settling down into a 
sullen acquiescence in the new* order; a good many of the 
Sirdars were becoming more definitely well-disposed to the 
British; the non-military population was difcovering the 
advantages of British administration ; the hill tribes were 
increasingly friendly. Could Henry Lawrence’s sympathetic 
acumen have been retained at Lahore continuously for the 


next six yeans, it is more than possible that a complete and 
salutary revolution of Sikh sentiment, and even of Sikh methods 
of government, might have been peacefully brought about. 
But Lawrence’s health broke down ; the situation demanded 
an extraoWinary man, and he was replaced by an ordinary 
one ; while simultaneously a new and inexperienced if ex- 
ceptionally able Governor-General succeeded Lord Hardinge. 
In January, 1848, Hardinge and Lawrence sailed together 
from India : Lord Dalhousie arrived at Calcutta : and Sir 
Frederick Currie was placed in charge at Lahore. A new 
war was not long in following. 



(Maps J and VI.) 

Position of HP HE desire for retrenchment, and the expectation ^of a 
British X prolonged peace induced Lord Hardinge before his 
orces. re ti remen t to make a very large reduction in the Native or 
Sepoy army; though he so reorganised the distribution of 
forces that a greatly increased mass of troops was placed in 
the North West districts. As Lahore, Jalandhar (the newly 
ceded territory), and Firozpur, brigades were formed as 
movable columns of all arms, which made a repetition of 
the Satlej campaign impossible. Nevertheless, before the 
end of April (1848) a revolt broke out which in tsix months’ 
time had developed into a fresh rising of the Khalsa against 
British influence. <J 

The Multan, at the South Western corner of the Panjab, was 
Multan the scene of the outbreak. The Governor, Mjyflraj, had been 
revolt. j n corr espondence with the Rani. Pie had declared his 
desire to be relieved of the Governorship, on the ground 
that he was not able to collect the revenues of his district. 
On his presenting himself at Lahore, it was decided to allow 
his resignation ; and two British officers, Vans Agnew and 
Anderson, accompanied by Sikh and other troops, returned with 
him to take temporary charge di affairs. On reaching Multan, 
Mulraj’s soldiers rose; he declared that they would not 
permit his resignation ; Agnew and Anderson were murdered, 
and a*revolt against the British domination was proclaimed. 

Multan was in rebellion against what was not a usurped 
but a perfectly legitimate Government at Lahore. Techni- 



cally it was the business of the Sikh authorities to suppress 
the rebellion. But if the rebellion made head, there was 
every probability that the Sikh soldiery would join instead of 
suppressing it. A message had been got through by Agnew, 
before hi% murder, calling for help, to Herbert Edwardes in 
the Derajat ; and the news was soon at Lahore and Firozpui. 

At the moment, it seemed incumbent on the British to 
march to the rescue of the Englishmen in Multan, regardless Campaign 
of the technicality. But when it was^known that the murders deferred, 
were accomplished, tlte position changed. Punishment was 
the business of the Sikh Government : and it was resolved 
that the British troops should not interfere. The argument 
was, that interference might be resented ; that if the Sikh 
St^Jte were really well disposed, it could and would quell the 
rebellion; if it were not, the whole country would shortly 
be in arms, and the risk to small columns in such an event 
would be greater than the chance of their being able to 
quench the conflagration at the outset. Lord^Qough pre- 
ferred the chance of a ?)i£ revolt with the certainty of 
throwing a powerful conquering army into the Panjab late 
in the year to the hazard of at once sending a small force, 
when failure might precipitate serious disaster : especially as 
Multan was reputed to be exceedingly strong, and the 
country a dangerous one to Europeans for summer cam- 
paigning, being Intensely hot. This view was endorsed by 
Dalhousie, and acquiesced in by Currie. 

For a year past, Lieutenant Herbert Edwardes had been Herbert 
employed under the Sikh Government, controlled by Henry Edwardes 
Lawrence, as an officer in the Derajat beyond the Indus. 

There he had wrought wonders among the tribesmen by the 
novelty of his methods. Never before had discussions 
between them and the collectors of taxes been carried on 
with arguments less material than the musket or the tulwar. 

His frankness, his geniality, his audacity and his untiring 
energy won their confidence and admiration ; between them 
and their old Sikh oppressors there was no love lost, but 
in Edwardes they recognised a born leader. Remote as 
was his position, he could not await orders, and when 
Agnew’s message reached him, he did not hesitate to take 


on himself the responsibility of action. The hill-men answered 
to his call, and he soon had at his back Pathan levies whom 
he could trust, as he could not trust the Sikhs who formed 
his regular troops. His chief reliance was upon a very able, 
brave, and wholly trustworthy Mussulman, Foujdar Khan, and 
a capable half-caste commander, Van Cortlandt. He set him- 
self energetically to preparing for a move on Multan, and to 
urging on the authorities the advisability of securing success 
by some British help; ^ failing which, he could only do his 
best with his own regiments, and die assistance of the 
friendly Mussulman State of Bahawalpur. Meantime the 
Lahore Government was preparing columns to send to 
Multan ; but it was obvious from the outset that while some 
reliance might be placed on the Mussulman regiments, tfyose 
of the Khalsa were by no means trustworthy. 

In June Edwardes crossed the Indus; on the 18th, the 
anniversary of Waterloo he joined hands with the Bahawalpur 
force, and won a victory at Kiniri. On July 1st, he won 
another victory at Saddusam which brought him close up to 
Multan : and a week later, the Khalsa contingents, com- 
Sher manded by the Sirdar Sher Singh arrived. As yet, Sher 
Singh. gj n gh seems to have been personally well affected ; but his 
father Chattar Singh was playing a double gavae in the 
Peshawar and Hazara districts, intriguing for Afghan support 
in exchange for the cession of Peshawar, arid urging his son 
by letter to use the opportunity to raise a revolt of the 
Khalsa : and Edwardes was painfully alive to the possibility 
that the bulk of the army before Multan might go over to 
Mulraj any day. 

About this time, Currie resolved to use his powers, and 
send the movable columns at Lahore' to support Edwardes. 
Gough thereupon, while protesting against the whole policy of 
the movement, still considered that if a column was to go, it 
must be strengthened. The result was that Mulraj continued 
to improve his defences until, early in September, General 
Whishsent Whish joined Edwardes with a division and<ra siege train. 

Some minor engagements, preliminary to an intended general 
p * ’ assault, met with success ; but the situation was suddenly 

changed when, on the 14th ,*Sher Singh and the whole of his 


Sikh troops went over to Mulraj. The capture of Multan 
was mow rendered impossible ; the besieging force could only 
sit down in front of it, and three weeks later Sher Singh 
was able to depart with his troops northwards, unmolested, 
calling all*the old members of the Khalsa to his standard as Eking, at 
he went. The Sikhs had committed themselves once more it® T 
to a stand-up fight with the British. a . sa ’ 

Gough's plan of operations precluded him from listening 
to appeals for the help of a brigade at Peshawar, Hazara, 
or Bannu between Peshawar and the Derajat, though George 
Lawrence and Abbot were urgent. His scheme required the 
concentration of his forces, with the exception of the Bombay 
column ordered to join Whish at Multan : with whom a 
junction was to be effected after the fall of that town. 
Consequently the Sikhs from the Derajat prepared to join 
Sher Singh, and Chattar Singh’s intrigues resulted by the 
beginning of January (1849) in the capture by insurgent 
forces, with some Afghan help, of Peshawar and Attok, with 
George Lawrence. The forie at Multan was not strong 
enough to push the attack till the Bombay column arrived 
late in, December, and the place was not finally won till Jan. 


In the jneantime, Gough completed his preparations and GougVs 
began his advance. Broadly speaking, all the districts advan f e » 
beyond the river Chenab were in revolt ; those between the ^ ov * 4 * 
Chenab and the Satlej were restrained from open rebellion 
partly by the influence* of a few Sirdars, partly by the activity 
of John Lawrence in securing posts which might otherwise 

have become centres for the gathering of insurgents. 

By the middle of November, Sher Singh was waiting with 
a large army to dispifte the passage of the Chenab, which 
was not bridged. On Noyember 22 a sharp skirmish took 
place about the river bed at Ramnagar (Ramnuggar), where Ram- 
a gun stuck fast in the sand under the enemy’s fire, and had na g ar * 
to be abandoned, while the Sikh advance posts and a regi- 
ment of Britisb cavalry, the 1 4th Light Dragoons, were both 
severely handled The Sikh position was too strong to be 
forced ; but a few days later, a considerable body of tioops 
was taken across twenty miles up the stream and moved 



down to attack the Sikh encampment. This turning move- 
ment made Sher Singh resolve to fall back to another*posi- 
tion. A part of his army engaged the British turning force on 
Sadulapur. the afternoon of Dec. 3 at Sadulapur, retiring under cover of 
night ; the Sikh leader withdrawing his whole foi'ce North- 
ward to the Jhllum river, at R&ssul. 

The Chenab was crossed ; but the enemy’s army was in 
full strength, entrenched, in a very difficult country, well 
supplied with artillery, and thoroughly skilled in maintaining 
a defensive position though with no < corresponding skill in 
attack. Gough wished to wait for the fall of Multan and 
tlffe release of his column there before proceeding to strike 
what he hoped would be the final blow ; but strong pressure 
was brought to bear on him in ; political quarters to nqake 
him advance at once, lest Sher Singh should be re-inforced 
from the North ; a contingency made the more probable by 
the fall of Attok. Accordingly on Jan. 12 (’49) he moved 
forward with an army of about 14,000 men; and on the 
following afternoon was fought '’the bloody and indecisive 
battle of Chillianwalla. 

Chillian- A turning movement being in the Commander-in-Chiefs 
view not practicable it was his intention to make a frontal 
Jan. 49 - a ttack. Towards mid-day on the 13th the enemy’s entrenched 

position was disclosed, extending along the near bank of the 
river with their left flank resting on the Ra&ul hills. Gough 
proposed to camp at Chillianwalla, and to fight next day ; 
but the Sikhs had actually advanced to a nearer point 
through jungle, and suddenly opened fire showing that the 
intended encampment would be untenable. It would be 
necessary for Gough either to fall back or to attack at 
once; and he chose the latter alternative. In advancing 
through the jungle, certain brigades failed to keep touch with 
each other; there was a panic among the cavalry on the 
right wing, and a stampede, whfch left the flank uncovered. 
For a time it seemed possible that there might be a great 
disaster. But by pluck and hard fighting, the©Sikhs were at 
last beaten off and driven in rout towards the river. Once 

again, as at Sadulapur and on the first night of Firozshah, a 
complete if sanguinary victory was snatched from the British 


by the fall oft darkness ; this was followed up by three days 
of heavy rains which made further movements impossible. 

Thus a desperately contested battle left the Sikhs still in 
occupation of a very strong position at Rassul, where for a 
month to dome the British had to be content with watching 

The carnage on both sides had been great : colours had 
been lost: some regiments had brought grave discredit on 
themselves. There was a great outcry at home and in some 
circles in India over tha disaster, and Sir Charles Napier was 
appointed to take Gough’s place as Commander-in-Chief. But 
before the change took effect, Gough had already terminated 
the war by the brilliant victory of Gujerat. 

^bile Chillianwalla was being fought, the closing opera- 
tions of the siege of Multan were in progress ; a week later, MSSiP 4 
the citadel fell. The expected re-inforcements from the 
North came into Sher Singh’s camp, but the troops released 
from besieging Multan were on their way to join Gough. The 
Sikhs attempted two or threfc tftnes to draw him into making 
a fresh attack, in which they were abetted by renewed British 
political pressure; but the General was not to be again 
enticed or pushed until he had his whole army concentrated, 
and his guns raised to the requisite numbers by the arrival 
of the batteries from the South. Hitherto, despite the 
surrender of canfion after the Satlej campaign, the Sikh 
artillery had always proved superior. 

A month after the* battle, on Feb/ 14th, Sher Singh Gujerat. 
suddenly marched on Gujerat : Gough in turn moving, not 
to bring on a fight but to cover the river (the Chenab). On 
the 20th Feb. he was joined by the Multan column and their 
guns. Next morning ^he battle^jppened with heavy cannon- 
ading ; but at last the British had the superiority ; in less 
than three hours the “Sikh defence was broken up ; and 
only then was the general advance ordered. In another 
hour the enemy were in flight, leaving their camp, their 
baggage, and rtheir guns; an effective chase being main- 
tained by the British cavalry till nightfall. The Khalsa had 
received the final irrevocable blow, our casualties being less 
than one third of those at Sobraon, Chillianwalla, or Firozshah. 



A force was despatched under Sir Walter Gilbert which 
followed hard on the tracks of the routed Sikhs ; who finally 
surrendered at discretion on March 12. Peshawar was 
yielded a few days later, and the Afghan contingent made 
good its escape over the border. This time the' Sikhs felt 
that they had been soundly and unmistakably beaten in fair 
fight without suspicion of treachery on the part of their 
leaders; so that a primary incentive to revolt was finally 

XJie The attempt to evolve an independent and friendly 
annexed g° vernnlent * n the P an j a b had failed. Five years before, 
** * Smdh had been annexed without reasonable excuse : in the 
Panjab we had manifestly done our utmost to abstain from 
Annexation ; but abstention wasj. no longer possible. jfOn 
March 30th, 1849, the Panjab was formally annexed to the 
British Dominions; the boy Mahaiaja, Dhulip Singh, was 
deposed and withdrawn from the territory, but granted an 
ample pension ; and Lord Dalhousie proceeded to the 
settlement of the new province. 1 

Henry In the beginning of the year (’49) Henry Lawrence had 
anefthe returne( * f rom England. In his view, the sound policy to 
annexa- follow was one of conciliation ; annexation was at best an 
tion. unpleasant necessity, and on any other principle a would be- 
come not only dangerous but also unjust. As he regarded 
matters, greater tact and skill would have stverted the Multan 
outbreak altogether : failing that, the outbreak could and 
should have been hipped in the bud. The Sirdars would 
have remained loyal if they could : but the British had 
insisted on throwing all responsibility on them, and leaving 
them to keep the Khalsa in check unaided ; the Khalsa had 
once more proved too strong for thim ; and they deserved 
very little blame for finally yielding to the pressure and 
throwing in their lot with the revolt. Dalhousie had no 
sympathy with this view, whiclt implied a certain censure on 
the course he had adopted; he considered that the Sirdars 
deserved the sternest treatment. Lawrence, again, held that 
if we annexed, policy apart from justice required that the 
Sirdars should have increased not diminished power as 
compared with the soldiery ; and that with adequate British 


forces in the t province, they would become loyal themselves 
and exercise a very strong influence in our favour, as the 
natural leaders of the people. Dalhousie held that the less 
power they had the more readily would the population at 
large be converted into supporters of British rule. And 
Dalhousie was supported by Henry Lawrences brother 

Sir Henry was the last man to be placed in office for The 
the carrying out of a policy to which he was diametrically 
opposed ; while there no doubt of the practical necessity oar 
for retaining his services in the Panjab. Dalhousie solved 
the difficulty by appointing a Board of three instead of^ 
single Chief Commissioner, consisting of Henry Lawrence as 
President, with John Lawrence, and Mansel (succeeded by 
RoUfert Montgomery) as leg&l member. The outcome of the 
brothers’ divergent views, was a series of compromises. The 
Sirdars, with diminished wealth and influence, sombrely, if 
without enthusiasm, acquiesced in a treatment which was at 
any rate less severe than tl#ey|might have looked for ; and 
the population at large soon found themselves enjoying an 
unprecedented prosperity. The Khalsa was disbanded, but 
many of its members were re-enrolled in new British regi- 
ments ; while the more turbulent spirits among the frontier 
tribesmen found scope for their energies in the irregular 
corps raised to foam the afterwards famous Panjab frontier 
force by Nicholson, Lumsden, Coke, Hodson, and others. 

A general disarmament* in which the village headmen found 
themselves associated with Government and made responsible 
for enforcing its orders, combined with a judicious distribu- 
tion of garrisons, made the prospect of any organised rising 
so remote that its possibility soon faded from the popular 
mind. The essential work <jf the Board was virtually accom- 
plished before the differences of the two great brothers made 
a continuation of compromises impossible. Dalhousie then 
chose the one whose views agreed with his own to be Chigf 
Commissioner ;^and Henry Lawrence, to the deep disappoint- Henry 
ment of himself and the “ frontier men ” who worshipped 
him, was transferred to Rajputana as Resident in i852. t0 R a j. 
Here also however his sympathetic tact gave him an influ- putana. 







Insult tO 

the British, 

ence aver the Rajput chiefs which enabled him tp tranquillise 
them under the excitement produced by certain aspects of 
Dalhousie’s policy to which we shall presently turn ; but for 
which it is probable that they would have taken active part 
in the great rising of 1857. ». 

Dost Mohammed at Kabul had practically stood aloof 
from the Panjab war, though he had allowed his brother 
Sultan Mohammed to help Chattar Singh. He was now 
thoroughly convinced of the inevitability and permanency of 
British Ascendancy; and in 1855 fre made a treaty with 
Lord Dalhousie’s Government, (finally ratified at the begin- 
ning of 1857), which bore fruit not only in his successful 
resistance to Persia in the following year, but also in the 
complete absence of disturbance on the frontier throughout 
the Sepoy revolt. * 4 

From the conquest of the PanjaJ) we turn to Dalhousie's 
second conquest, that of Pegu, on the Far East. 

The Burmese monarch, since the peace of 1826, had 
shown no disposition to carj^ out the spirit of the treaty 
then made. The British Residents sent to his capital at 
Ava had experienced such habitual discourtesy that they 
had been finally withdrawn. The merchants established on 
the coast, instead of being protected by the Governor of 
Rangoon, were harassed in every possible way, subjected to 
groundless accusations, and fined even when acquitted. By 
the summer of 1851, matters had reached such a point 
that in Septembei the European community at Rangoon 
memorialised the Government at Calcutta, setting forth their 
grievances, demanding intervention, and declaring that in the 
alternative they would be compelled to abandon their business 
and their property. t 

Two months later, a British warship anchored off Rangoon : 
commanded by Commodore Lambert, with authority to en- 
quire into the complaints of the merchants, and to demand 
suitable compensation from the Burmese Government, together 
with the removal of the Governor of Rangooi^ The attitude 
of the Governor himself was uncompromising ; but the Com- 
modore's missives were dispatched to Ava, and met with a 
reply which was taken as being friendly and pacific Its 


apparent purport was belied by action. The Governor was 
indeed withdrawn from Rangoon, but with every mark of 
honour, instead of disgrace. His successor ignored Lambert's 
existence. An audience was demanded, but when at the 
appointed# hour the officers reached the Palace, they were 
informed that the Governor was asleep ; and after being 
kept waiting in the open under a burning sun for many hours, 
they withdrew in great indignation. 

Such a deliberate insult changed the aspect of affairs. 

The Commodore demanded the immediate payment of the 
compensation, assessed at only ^1000 sterling, and a personal 
apology from the Governor. Further, he seized a royal 
vessel lying in the river as security for the payment, and an- 
nounced a blockade. The Governor then addressed Calcutta, 
but*in terms not of compliifhce but of extreme arrogance. 

These events had tafcen place between September 1851 p re para- 
and January 1852. At the end of the month, Dalhousie, tion for 
who had been in the North West, reached Calcutta. He war * 
made immediate preparations for war, but at the same time, 
white announcing his intention of appealing to arms, he 
informed the Burmese Government that a peaceful settle- 
ment might still be obtained by meeting all the previous 
demands and paying a further indemnity of jQi 00,000 by 
the first ot April. It was of the first importance that the 
campaign should ibe concluded by the end of that month, 
by reason of the rains and the unhealthy climate, which the 
war in Lord Amherst's time had shown* to be much more 
formidable than the Burmese army. 

The preparations were pushed on with extraordinary skill 
and vigour ; and with an unparalleled attention to the 
sanitary requirements of the troops. An important result of 
the Panjab annexation was now manifested. The problem 
of transporting Hindu soldiery across the sea had been 
hitherto serious, for Caste reasons: but it was found that 
the Sikhs were entirely free from that prejudice, and were 
perfectly ready § to take service. 

Early in April, the whole army was concentrated on the Capture,, of 
Irawadi] on the nth it was before Rangoon. During the ^^on. 
next three days, there was heavy cannonading while the 


British General, Godwin, was making his dispositions; on 
the 14th the great Pagoda, the fortified temple which formed 
the citadel, was stormed with extraordinary valour ; Rangoon 
was captured, and the British occupation was accompanied by 
the immediate establishment of a firm provisional Government. 

Godwin rightly declined to advance upon Ava in the 
summer : in September Dalhousie himself arrived on the 
And of scene. In October, Prome, half way to Ava, was captured, 
Prome and an d a month later the town of Pegu was finally secured. 

1852! This terminated the military operations. The extension 
of dominion outside the British boundaries was not, a priori , 
a !* part of Dalhousie’s programme, though in the case of the 
Panjab he had annexed without reluctance. On the other 
hand, he had no intention of drawing back a yard from 
territory on which the British flag had once been planted. 
An advance on Ava would in lvs view necessitate the 
annexation of all Burma; and therefore he resolved to 
proceed no further but to annex the conquered province of 
Pegu. Even this he descrtoed> as an annoying necessity 
forced on him by the circumstances. 

Annexa- The annexation was effected simply by Proclam at ipn, un- 
tion of ra tified by any treaty — a matter of the less consequence, since 
Burma ! lt was certa i n that the Burmese court would ha\;e regarded 
any treaty as waste paper. The act cannot be regarded as 
in any way exemplifying a spirit of greed ttr aggression. In 
the circumstances, there had been no alternative to a war, 
or to a cession of 'territory on the conclusion of the war — 
virtually a universal rule in the East. And in this case, 
there was no sort of question that the entire population of 
the annexed province would have chosen, had the choice 
been offered, to be placed under the ‘British flag in place of 
the unqualified tyranny under .which they suffered. The 
condition of the provinces of Arakan and Tenasserim pre- 
viously ceded had been the abject of their envy for many 
years : in Pegu the annexation was undoubtedly a matter of 
rejoicing, and to Pegu it brought unexampled, prosperity. It 
was not however till the time of Lord Dufferin that the 
further inevitable step was taken, and Upper Burmah also 
was added to the British Empire. 


(Mips /. and VIII.) 

A S concerns the two annexations by conquest, of which The an- 
the history has been related in the last chapter, the £ exatlons 
verdict that no other course was open to the Governor- quest. 
General is almost unanimous. It is conceivable that Henry 
Lawrence might have inbuilt the Panjab State ; it is quite 
certain that no other man in In f dia could have done so. Nor 
is it possible to find fault with |he annexation of Pegu, except 
on the hypothesis that the despot at Ava was entitled to be- 
have as he pleased to foreigners within his own territory — an 
argument which would have justified Suraj ud daulah. 

The course however which was adopted by Dalhousie to- The “ An* 
wards the dependent and semi-dependent States of India is Ration 
matter of debate. When the Mutiny broke out, innumerable ° icy * 
voices were raised? laying the blame of it primarily upon the 
“ Annexation Policy,” and condemning that policy as immoral 
per se and as a departure from all precedent. Since that 
time, Dalhousie’s apologists have held the field ; and it has 
become customary to treat any criticism of him with very 
scant respect. Yet at the time, not a few of the ablest and 
most experienced officers in India were on the other side. 

Dalhousie’s actual view »was frankly and definitely stated p a l- 
in his Sattara Minute; quoted in every book which deals Sp.visie!» 
with the subject, ' lie held tffat if any legitimate oppor tunity Sfe&OT* 
occurred^ for bringing j dependenf^tate under the formal 
'Sorninmn 'of’ the Company, it would be wrong to * let the 
o pp ortunity pass. T he groun ds Tor that view are no less 
clear than the view itself. The* quality of any native govern- 
ment depended almost entirely on the personal character of 



ing views 
as to land- 

Policy in 
ffJT past. 

the ruler for the time being. Under the Qrjen t&L sxstenxj&e 
d^eneration of every royal family was assured ; while even 
tlhe ancient remedy of violent deposition by a capable ad- 
venturer was now forbidden. Hence, i£jE&& only by absorption, 
i pto the British dominion that any jprospect of continuous 
good government could be obtained. 

In the opposition view, it was maintained that people do 
as a matter of fact prefer to be ill governed (within limits) 
under methods with which they arc familiar, and which have 
been evolved in the course of their dwn history, rather than 
t9 be scientifically governed under alien methods. It was 
better therefore to help the indigenous system to develop in 
a healthy manner, rather than to impose a foreign system 
in itself greatly superior. The ceaseless wars of the past 
had prevented that healthy development; now, with peace 
guaranteed by the might of Britafh, the opportunity had 
come. Therefore, it was not advisable to annex, except as 
the alternative to palpable irredeemable mis-government, or 
to the up-growth of a dangerous militarism. 

One point deserves to be noted as strongly influencing 
the minds of the partisans of either view. British dominion 
was inevitably accompanied by the loss of influence and 
wealth on the part of the owners of large estates-^-jaghirdars 
or zemindars — and theoretically at least by an improvement 
in the lot of the peasants. But in many parts of India, 
especially in the Rajput districts from Behar to Rajputana, 
the relations of the landholder and the peasantry were often 
akin to those of Highland chieftains to their clansmen, owing 
to hypothetical bonds of family : or to the looser but still 
effective bond of feudalism. The advocates of one view 
pointed to the palpable, tangible, material superiority of the 
modern over the mediaeval system : the advocates of the 
other laid stress on the real value of the mediaeval sentiment, 
and the danger of attempting to bridge five centuries by a 

*Tt will be observed that the question now Resenting itself 
was different from that dealt with generally by the earlier 
Empire-builders. "Wellesley had extended British dominion 
by obtaining cessions of territory ; but even in the case of 


Mysore he had gone out of his way to reinstate a native 
dynasty ; the cessions had been treated as matters of political 
n ece ssity. Tflis subsidiary alliances and Lord Hastings’s treaties , 
had always assumed that th e native S tates .should be entirely 
respg nsibte for their own domestic affairs. The question 
whether it was better to maintain a native State on these 
conditions, or to end its existence as a State had been 
habitually answered i q r j fav our of its maintenance; except 
where, as in the case of Arcot, the reigning dynasty had 
been given up as past hope. In like manner, the irrecon- 
cilable attitude of Baji Rao had led to the annexation of the 
Peshwa’s dominions, but even in the act Hastings had restored 
the principality of Sattara. 

In short, it would seem that the right of annexation** 
( ins ufficient ground had keen recognised and acted upon, 
whether the ground was irreconcilability or flagrant and 
continuous misgovernment ; bit opportunities had not been 
sought, and where they had Occurred they had repeatedly 
and deliberately been deuiinfd more often than accepted. 

The attitude had been, that the individual case must be 
judged on its merits, but that the presumption was in favour 
of maintaining the Native State. 

It is Jiere therefore that we shall find Dalhousie’s Nature of 
“ departure.” There was fully adequate precedent for Dal* 
every one of hi$ annexations. “But his predecessors had^ ousl ® s r 
acted on the general principle of avoiding annexation if it * 
could be avoided ; Dalhousie acted on die general principle 
of annexing if he could do so legitimately. Neither Dalhousie 
nor his predecessors, however, treated the general principle 
as a Universal Law. 

The third alternative, of intervention in the domestic 
affairs of a native state, without annexation, had never been 
treated as practicable except when the reigning prince was a 
minor, as for instance in the Panjab between the two Sikh 
wars. It was always laid down that such intervention should 
cease when th& prince attained his majority. 

Now it happened that during JDaUiousxe’s tijme„a singularly 
lar ge number of opportU Dil lesj oTan ne xatio n occurred. "The 
case of Pegu belongs to the category of cessions rather than 



annexations ; it was the confiscation of territory after a 
successful war, not the absorption of a principality. The 
annexation proper, after conquest, of the Panjab, has already 
been discussed ; but there remain the “ opportunities ” within 
the sphere of Ascendancy. * 

Different These fall into two classes. In very nearly every instance, 
grounds annexation was carried out. The classes are, those of lapse 
tions. or escheat, and those of misgqvernment. In the former there 
are four leading cases — Sattara, Nagpur, Jhansi and Kerauli : 
in the latter the leading case is that o£ Oudh. 

In each of the five there were two questions to be asked 
-<*would annexation be legitimate? And if so, would it be 
expedient ? An affirmative answer to the first question would 
by no means necessarily involve an affirmative answer to the 
second. And it might even be that in each case, if treated 
by itself on its own merits and if treated in conjunction with 
the rest, a different answer misfit be given. 

The adop- In the cases of lapse, the legitimacy turns primarily on the 
ti0n lion" q ues ti° n Adoption. It wai admitted that on the demise 

* of a Dependent Prince leaving no heir, the government 
' legitimately lapsed to the Sovereign Power. The n pecu- 
liarities however of the Hindu religion had brought about 
the custom of Adoption. The welfare of the squl in the 
next life depended in part on the due performance in this 
world of sundry religious functions by the offspring of the 
departed : if a man died without offspring, these functions 
could not be performed : hence the doctrine of adoption, by 
which all the capacities and qualities of genuine offspring 
were created in an adopted child, with a full religious 
sanction. The adopted child became the heir of his adoptive 
father, precisely as if he had been bont of his bone and flesh 
of his flesh. w 

As far as private concerns and private property were 
affected, this was simple enough : the complication arose 
when inheritance of political functions also was claimed. 
It does not appear that in dependent Hin<£u States, the 
validity of such inheritance had been disputed. But half the 
Hindu principalities had been subordinate to a paramount 
Mahommedan power ; and the paramount power had main- 


tained that iox political purposes its own sanction was 
requir ed to render. an adoption vaUd. That sanction had 
been on occa^on withheld, and had habitually been made 
conditional on some sort of payment. In taking the place 
of that paramount Power, it seems quite indisputable ,that 
the British Government were entitled to refuse their sanction 
fo » an, adoption ; and that their refusal rendered it invalid for 
political though not for private purposes. 

Accordingly, as long ago as 1834, the Court of Directors The in- 
had laid it down that adoptions "sliould be sanctioned not as structions 
a matter of course, but only as a matter of exceptional grace. 

The occasions however had hitherto been rare ; though thte 
declaration of 1834, supported by two or three instances 
whijh had occurred in the interval, were clearly sufficient 
to justify Dalhousie in treating fresh cases as “legitimate 
opportunities ” for absorption. Dalhousie had hardly arrived 
in India when the question was Raised in connection with the 
principality of Sattara. 

On the annexation by ^ord Hastings of the Peshwa’s The case 
dominions, the Governor-General had erected out of a oTSattara. 
portiorw of them the State of Sattara which he had bestowed 
upon the representative of the house of Sivaji. In 1839 the 
Raja _h ad J>een deposed for persistent misgovernmenC and 
rgpl aq ed by h is brother. The brother had no children ; 
and he recognised the authority of the British Government 
by repeatedly petitioning for permission to adopt a son, 
which permission was # consist eh%„ refused. Nevertheless, 
just before his death in j 8.48, he did adopt a son. Hence 
arose the question — should the British Government recognise 
that adoption, although it had not been sanctioned, or should 
it claim that Sattara had lapsed to the Sovereign Power, 
since there was no other heir to the prince upon whom the 
State had been bestowed by grace of the British Government 
in 1818. c 

The legitimacy then of annexation is beyond dispute. It 
was a departure from a policy which had prevailed up to 
1834, but it was in accordance with the declaration of that 
year, which moreover had been acted upon more than once 
in the interval : nor did the fact that a different policy had 


been followed before touch the legitimacy of a change. The 
question was which of two legitimate policies should be fol- 
lowed. Dalhousie decided for annexation. The weight of 
authority favoured that view ; and it received the approbation 
of authority in England. The opposi tion, mainly Represented 
by Sir. George Clerk, one of the ablest administrators in 
fndia, relied on the injustice of acting upon a plea technically 
valid but by custom exercised only in exceptional cases. 

The case The second case w r as that of Jhansi, a district in Bandel- 
ofjhansi. khand, cede d by the Peshwa m 1817. The hereditary 
authority of its subordinate ruler had been then confirmed 
fey the British, and he had been dignified with the title of 
Raja fifteen years later. Qn hia. death in 1835^ a J9P adopted 
without sanction had been set asi/le, and a kinsman had |)een 
given the succession. On his death, the British had again 
selected the successor who 1 died irt 1853: leaving an heir 
whose adoption had not foeen sanctioned. Again, the 
legitimacy of absorption is Hear ; its expediency from the 
point of view of the Jhansi population was supported by the 
disastrous effects of the rule of the first two Rajas. Jhansi 
was annexed, and the Raja’s widow pensioned ; but the pro- 
ceedings filled her with the bitterest animosity to the British. 
The case Kerauli stands third. This was a small Rc.jput state, 
pfl> €rau li- lying just beyond the Chambal, which had been subject 
to the Marathas. The case differed frofii those of Sattara 
and Jhansi in this, that it was a principality of considerable 
antiquity, in which — as throughout Rajputana — the right of 
adoption had not hitherto been challenged: whereas both 
X Sattara and Jhansi had been in effect creations of the British, 
I within areas where the political validity of adoption had long 
' depended on recognition by the paramount Power. Dalhousie 
f himself was in favour of maintaining even in this instance the 
principle of refusing to recognise an unauthorised adoption \ 
but he was alive to the distinction, and referred the ca§e 
home. The Directors decided in favour *of the adopted 
t lieiry on the ground that Kerauli was not* a “dependent 
* principality n but a f< protected ally.” 

These three may be regarded as the test cases of the 
Adoption question. They implied the definite decision that 


in minor dependent States at any rate, the perpetuation of a 
dynasty by the method of adoption would no longer be per- 
mitted, and that such States on the failure of heirs would 
henceforth be escheated. 

The annexation of Nagpur was on a somewhat different The case 
footing. Like the Peshwa’s dominions, Nagpur had fallen of Nagpur, 
forfeit in 1818;- but Lord Hastings theiCdelTberately re]q- 
st ateff a~ youfhf u 1 member of the royal house as Raja. During 
his minority, the administration had been conducted by the 
British Resident, Richatd Jenkins, to the extreme satisfaction 
of the general population. When the Raja came of age, 
laxity and dissipation set in. In 1^853, about the same tirne 
as the Jhansi Raja, die. Raja of Nagpur died. He had con- 
sistently refused to adopt a p heir. There was no legitimate 
successor. There was a general sense that British administra- 
tion would be welcome the alternative was to discover some 
one, remotely connected with llie late Raja, who might per- 
haps prove a success ; but th^e was no candidate who was 
in tbe least promising. On The other hand, Nagpur had been . 
one of the great States of the Maratha Confederacy. Its 
position after 1817 had been different from that of the 
states of Holkar or Sindhia ; but for certain purposes, 
such distinctions are apt to be lost sight of. The dis- 
appearance of Nagpur would certainly be felt as ominous, 
its reinstatement would be held as auspicious. In forming 
fits decision Dalhousie placed before all other considerations 
the prosperity of the people of Nagpur : therefore he annexed. 

But the bulk of the princes of India attributed his action to 
the other motive, the desire to add to the Company’s terri- 
tories. "In the whole^eries of annexations by Lapse — and 
they amounted to more than a dozen in Dalhousie’s time — 
the Governor-General had declared that he did not intend 
hisjaile to apply in semi-sovereign States ; but it seemed not 
unreasonable to suspect thaf its extension to them would 
follow logically in due course ; and it would have been very 
remarkable if ho uneasiness had been produced in such a 
court as that of Gwalior, where it was at least half believed 
that every reigning Sindhia was fated to die without leaving 
any actual heir of his body. 


TJie case The final act of Annexation, that of OudhJ did not turn 
$ Ouclh. on the doctrine of Lapse at all. After the battle of Buxar in 
1764, Oudh was forfeit to the British by all Oriental pre- 
cedent. Clive, by what was regarded as a pure act of grace, 
had then reinstated the Nawab Wazir. Some 'forty years 
later, Wellesley had been within an ace of deposing a later 
Nawab, and annexing his dominions ; nor would such a step 
have seriously shocked the Native mind at that time, when 
the government was still regarded as existing by grace of the 
British. But the dynasty had been allowed to go on, though 
one after another the Governors-General threatened and 
remonstrated. A century and a quarter of rulership had 
Persistent established a belief in its permanence ; yet the misgovern- 
mis ' ment seemed to grow worse year by year, and the king’s 
g °ment. mercenary army to grow more dangerous, more undisciplined, 
more uncontrolled. 

In 1847, Lord Hardinge *iad given the king two years to 
put his government in order, vdtfh a very explicit warning that in 
case of his failing to do so, the British Government would have 
to assume control. 1849 came, yet once more remonstrance 
alone was resorted to. Two years later, Colonel Steeman, 
then Resident at Lucknow, sent in a report which seemed 
to point to only one possible conclusion. Finally in 1854, 
Colonel James Outram, Resident in his turn, once more re- 
ported that the condition of the province could hardly be worse. 
Alterna- It was clearly impossible for affairs to continue as they 
tive pro- were< The British must undertake the administration, either 
p a s * for a term of years or in perpetuity. In either case, the king 
might be allowed to maintain his rank and dignities. The 
only remaining alternative was formal deposition and annex- 
ation. Of the three courses, the second was recommended 
by Dalhousie. In deciding whcch to adopt, it had to be 
remembered on the one hand that the dynasty with all its 
vices had been uniformly loyal to the British, and on the other 
hand that it was only the British protection of the dynasty 
which had preserved it from overthrow by revolution. The 
British could not free themselves therefore from some 
responsibility for the endless misrule, nor from a very 
marked obligation to the dynasty, 


Of the members of Council, two supported DalliQuaieVOudh 
plan of maintaining, the ostensible'-sovereignty of the- king ; annexcd# 
two advocated open annexation. The arguments appeared 
to be very evenly balanced and it is noteworthy that in this 
case it was the Home authorities who decided in favour^ 
pf the extreme measures to which the Governor-Generals 
judgment was opposed, though not strongly opposed : for 
in stating his view, he had expressed his own readiness to 
carry out the annexation if that course should be decided 
upon. The actual performance of the task was entrusted 
to Outram; who however failed to persuade the king to 
abdicate, and Oudh was formally annexed by proclamation 
on Feb. 13, 1856. 

In addition to these annexations, and a series of minor 
one? mostly effected on tbfe ground of lapse, but partly on 
that of misgovernmetit,,and partly also, as in the case of 
Sambalpur, on the petition of tlje population, the Company’s 
territories were increased by ail assignment from the Nizam. 

The transaction was somowhift complicated and difficult. The Berar 
According to treaty, the Nizam maintained a Contingent Assign- 
with British officers, controlled by the Resident. The - ent * 
payments were constantly in arrears, but no reduction of 
the force was practicable; a heavy debt had already been 
incurred to the Company for advances to cover the de- 
ficiency, and stilV the arrears accumulated. From 1849 
onwards, Dalhousie repeatedly pressed the Nizam, and in 
1850 a temporary reduction was actually effected, but the 
debt immediately began to grow again. The Nizam was 
urged to transfer territory, partly to liquidate the debt, 
partly to secure the regular payment of the Contingent ; 
he would only reply with promises, and declarations that 
any cession was quite unnecessary. At last in 1853 a treaty^, 
was presented for his accepfance which found favour with his 
ministers; but the Nizam himself remained obstinate, and 
was finally with the utmost difficulty persuaded by his own 
people to sign * n a moc hfied form. Berar and other 
districts were assigned, to be under the "control of~tEe 
Resident, The Nizam retaining his sovereignty. The Nizam 
was released “from his treaty obligations to help the British 


with troops when called on ; but the Contingent ceased to 
be a part of his army, while the British were now under 
obligation to maintain it. The surplus revenue from the 
districts was to be paid back into the Haidarabad treasury. 
It may be remarked that a portion of the territory was 
restored in i860, when it had been proved that under 
British administration Berar by itself supplied the requisite 

In the field of relations to Native dynasties it remains 
briefly to dismiss certain cases in which the Governor- 
General was accused of “spoliation” or harsh dealing. 

The < On the death of the Nagpur Raja, the British, correctly 
Nagpur as a matter of law, laid claim to considerable treasures which 
Measures. t k e ^ ecease( j prince had accumulated out of State funds. 
Dalhousie however decided th£t the treasures should" be 
sold and the proceeds appropriated not by the British but 
for the benefit of the Ra|a’s family. There was some 
friction, because the Begum/; refused to give up a part of 
the treasure for the purpose ;* and some ill-feeling was 
aroused because the sale was accomplished by the' un- 
dignified process of auction ; but there was no spoliation 
in the matter. 

TheArcot The Nawab of Arcot died in 1/8 53. In 1801, the title, 
fjSP^y* the dignities, and a pension, had been bestowed on a member 
of the family; but the clause in the draft treaty continuing 
them to his heirs had been deliberately struck out The 
grant was strictly personal. It was renewed however to his 
son in 1819, and to his son again in 1825. On the death 
of this last in 1853, a claim to succession was made by his 
uncle; but the Governor and Council of Madras were 
supported by Dalhousie in considering that the continuation 
olf'tfre '"title and dignities would be contrary to the public 
weal, and that the previous grants, so far from recognising 
a~ claim, had expressly disaUowed it. It was therefore 
decided that the justice of the case would be fully met 
by bestowing adequate allowances on the uncle Azim Jah 
and other members of the family. 

* Last is the affair of the notorious Qggd& JE&Oth, better 
known as the Nana Sahib who later achieved eternal infamy 


by the Cawnpore massacre. He was the adopted son of Baji Rao 
Baji Rao, formerly Peshwa. Baji Rao after a career marked jjsM 1 * 
by some talent and ceaseless treacheries had been finally gahib. 
dethroned by Lord Hastings, and removed from Puna: 
when Sir John Malcolm incurred some disapprobation for 
the exceedingly generous terms granted to the fallen Peshwa, 
who was to have some eight lakhs — ^80,000 per annum. 
Malcolm did not consider the amount very excessive, 
precisely because it was granted to him personally, and 
not to his heirs. Baji Rao lived to 1856, and made 
sundry unsuccessful attempts to get the pension extended 
to his' heirs. Dying, he left much wealth, and might if 
he had chosen very easily have left much more. To this 
wealth the Nana was of course recognised as the heir, and 
Government added to it* a considerable jaghir. Nana 
Sahib however persuaded himself that he had a right to 
the continuance of the pensio 1 and that he was a victim 
of the most flagrant injustice. jHe never forgave the British 
for treatment which erred v if ■ at all, in the direction of 
superfluous generosity : and when his opportunity came he 
took a signal and ghastly revenge. 



1838-1848. TN an earlier section 1 of this volume, we described by 
anticipation some of the administrative achievements of 
the ten years preceding Dalhousie’s arrival in India. To 
this period belong Thomason’s Settlement of the North 
West Provinces, the greater part of the crusade against 
Dacoity, and the more definite successes in the combat with 
Infanticide. r 

In other respects howeven- these years, with their constant 
warfare on and beyond thk frpntier, were not remarkably 
fruitful. To Thomason falls the credit of having advanced 
the cause of Education by the establishment and encourage- 
ment of schools in which the vernacular was the meciium of 
Public instruction. In the department Of Public Works, progress 
Works, was slow. A great famine in 1838 was contemporaneous 
with and gave an impulse to activity in t canal-making ; but 
even in this field, a set-back was given by Lord Ellen- 
borough, who disorganised the great* scheme of the Ganges 
canal, then slowly progressing, partly by reducing its scope, 
partly by changing its main purpose from irrigation to 
transport. Lord Hardinge however reverted to the original 
project. But throughout these yeai# all public works were 
w r ofully hampered through coming under the financial control 
of a body called the Military Bo£rd which acquired a singular 
reputation for preventing efficiency wherever its power ex- 
The P. & tended. Another change also took place after 1842, which 
O. Com- greatly affected India, though it did not emanate either from 
pany * the Company or from Government ; in the establishment of 
a great service of steam communication via Suez by the 

1 Chaps, xviii., xix. 



famous Peninsular and Oriental Company, Tentative efforts 
had been made in this direction under Lord William 
Bentinck, but the Home authorities had discouraged and 
discountenanced them. 

There reftiains during this period one important piece of 
work to which only a brief reference has hitherto been made; 
the abolition of the custom of Human Sacrifices among the 
Khonds of Orissa. 

The Khonds were a primitive race, dwelling in the hilly The 
districts about part of »the Mahanadi. Technically their Khonds. 
country fell partly in the Madras Presidency, partly in that 
of Bengal ; but in fact they had not been brought under* 

British control. They believed in a Good Spirit, and also 
in an Evil Spirit ; but whereas one section believed that the 
former had brought the latter into subjection, another section 
held that prosperity was conditional on an adequate propitia- 
tion of the evil goddess. This? propitiation could only be 
effected by the ceremonial sacrif/;e of human victims. These 
people were also much given to Infanticide though for a 
peculiar reason. When one of their women was wedded, the 
husband paid a large price to her father ; but she was free 
to leave him after a year, and in that case the price had to be 
repaid ; which might be a difficult matter. Also the woman 
might elect to attach herself to a new husband who was 
thereupon bound tcf receive her — and to pay. But in each 
case, it was not only the individual but the entire tribe which 
became responsible for the payment. Consequently the man 
who possessed marriageable daughters was by no means to 
be envied, for the feuds arising out of these peculiar matri- 
monial customs were innumerable. Therefore the habit 
was to take the short ^vay of avoiding the possession of 
marriageable daughters. * 

The district of Gumsur is on the edge of the Khond The 
territories, under the hills, aitaost on the border of the Gumsur 
Northern Sarkars. Gumsur was tributary to the British, and ^°Ma<> 
its failure to p.%y in 1835 brought the British for the first pherson, 
time into actual contact with the Khonds. The resulting 
punitive expedition revealed some of the peculiarities of 
these unknown tribes; and Captain Charters Macpherson, 


remaining at the Agency in those parts, became keenly 
interested in studying them. Reports were made on the 
subject of the Human Sacrifices. No systematic effort 
was made to put them down ; but an occasional rescue 
party marched into the hills and rescued a batch of 

At last however, in 1842, Macpherson was commissioned 
to deal with matters more systematically. He proceeded on 
the principles which Hall and Outram had found so successful 
with the Mers and the Bhils. He gradually persuaded the 
Gumsur Khonds that his intentions were entirely friendly. 
He got himself called in to preside over their judicial 
councils ; where his awards were accepted with keen satis- 
faction. He argued out with t^iem the principles of their 
theory of sacrifices, pointing out how other races had out- 
Abolition grown the idea. At last he persuaded them to attempt the 
of Human alarming experiment. The t British, he said, would accept 
Sacrifices. ^ res p 0ns ibility. The go Idess might be invited by the 
Khonds to visit her vengeance on them as the t real 
cause of this defection from her service. The experiment 
was tried. The victims who were to have been offered at 
the great annual sacrifice, whereof the particular object was 
to secure a good harvest, were handed over ins*ead to the 
British — and as it befel, the harvest was certainly none the 
worse. The Gumsur Khonds were convinced, and made up 
their minds that at last the Good Spirit had got the evil 
goddess fairly in "subjection. 

Macpherson’s operations were at first confined to the 
Madras territory; but he was presently deputed by the 
Governor-General to deal with the Khonds in general, 
whether in the Madras or the Bengal regions. The adjoining 
tribes of Bod or Boad followed Jhe example of Gumsur ; and 
though Macpherson’s work was greatly thrown back by his 
removal from the district, undbx circumstances which reflected 
very little credit upon those who were responsible for that 
wholly inexcusable step, the work of civilisation was carried 
on by the Khond Agency, until human sacrifices entirely 
disappeared, and infanticide was at least very greatly 



Before Loud Dalhousie’s time, the most important of the Dalhousie 
non-regulation provinces was the newly-conquered Sindh, and the 
where the administration was given a singularly military form Pan J ab * 
under the control of Sir Charles Napier. But of the new 
territories Acquired under Dalhousie’s rule, one — the Panjab 
— immediately assumed a position of the first importance. 

The Governor-General dominated every department of the 
State: but to none were his energies and his interest so 
enthusiastically given as to the organisation of the new 
Province. He devised* for it a scheme of Government, in 
the form of the triple Board, without precedent and without 
parallel ; but that scheme — impossible for continuance, an<i 
most galling to the members of the Board while it lasted — 
was ^precisely calculated to e^ect the immediate objects which 
Dali tousie had in view. Antagonistic as were the ideas of 
the Lawrence brothers, rhost of the subordinate officers had The 
already absorbed the spirit of t he one before he was trans- Lawrence 
ferred to Rajputana; while the other, seeing eye to eye with bro :Crg * 
his jhief, had imported a gitater strictness of method and a 
closer attention to detail than was compatible with Henry's 
temperament or was much to the taste of the brilliant 
subordinates who chafed against the bonds of what seemed 
to them superfluous control. Nevertheless, they were allowed 
in their own districts a freedom of initiative and an amplitude 
of personal responsibility unknown elsewhere. However 
deeply the once great jaghirdars might resent their loss of 
power, prestige, and wealth, to the population in general 
the new order of things quickly proved acceptable enough. 

Many taxes were removed altogether, others which had been 
intolerably heavy were very much lightened ; with the usual 
paradoxical result that tltey yielded a greatly increased revenue, Benefits of 
owing to the increased demand and the improved profit on their rule, 
production. Reasonable assessments reconciled the frontier 
tribes to paying their dues wfthout having an army sent to 
extort them. The Hill-men found their thirst for fighting 
satisfied in the canks of Coke's Rifles or Lumsden’s Guides ; 
and their military talents were utilised in the suppression 
instead of in the practice of robbery, the bandit or assassin 
of one day becoming the loyal soldier of the next. Thuggee 


which had survived under the Lahore Government was 
stamped out. The great inducement to infanticide was 
removed with excellent results ; for here too, despite the 
strong injunctions of Nanuk, the father of the Sikh religion, 
infanticide had prevailed. The barbarous punishment of 
mutilation tempered by fines which had been extended to 
every sort of offence by Ranjit Singh, gave place to the 
milder, but not less effective penalties acceptable to British 
ideas. Further, Dalhousie, more lavish in his expenditure 
on public works than any of his predecessors, was most 
lavish in his favourite province ; in which, it is to be finally 
observed, alone among his acquisitions, a really adequate 
military force ^as raised or planted, with a proper proportion 
of European troops, and officered c by the pick of the seryice 
— an arrangement which bore very good fruit in the Panjab it- 
self, but increased the already excessive disproportion between 
Sepoys and European soldiers J.hrough the whole of Hindostan. 
Increased In other respects, the Pan jab helped to shift the Imperial 
import- centre of gravity. Simla became almost as much the hpad- 
the^Upper Q uarters °f Government as Calcutta ; the relative importance 
Provinces, of Mirat (or Meerut) as a military station was greatly in- 
creased, many more troops being concentrated in the Upper 
Ganges Provinces. To the extension of territory may also 
be attributed the change by which Bengal was now placed 
under a regular Lieutenant-Governor, the* Governor-General 
being relieved of any specific association with that province. 
Educa- The first steps towards the institution of Vernacular 
tion. education had been taken by Thomason ; and after a brief 
experience, Dalhousie proposed to extend the scheme 
throughout the North-West Provinces. The home autho- 
rities however, went beyond what he had recommended ; 
and in 1854 a despatch from Sir Charles Wood laid down 
new principles, which were vigorously applied by the 
Governor-General, and amounted to what might be called 
an educational Charter. A complete system was established 
* of schools regularly graded, from the local native schools up 
to Universities, under State control ; and these have steadily 
increased and" multiplied, till their students at the present 
day number some millions. 


It is only when we succeed in realising the enormous import- 
extent of Inilia that we can quite grasp the vastness of ance of 
the change introduced by a revolution in the means of 
communication and of transit. Vienna is the European cation, 
capital furthest from the sea; the distance from Delhi to 
the coast is nearly double as great. Supposing Vienna to 
occupy in Europe the traditional political position of Delhi ; 
the distances from Delhi in a straight line to Calcutta, 

Madras, Bombay and Lahore correspond nearly to the 
distances from Vienna of St Petersburg, Madrid, Paris, 
and Berlin respectively. From Calcutta to Peshawar is 
about as far as from Paris to Constantinople. Hence fee 
the purposes of Government from any one centre the process 
of communication before the introduction of steam and 
telegraphy was infinitely slftw ; and that of transferring the 
Governor-General with Ijis entourage from point to point — 
not to speak of masses of troops — involved an immense 
expenditure of time. 

Until Lord Dalhousie’j time, railway enterprise .had Railways, 
received the minimum of encouragement. The risk for 
private capital was far too great; and Government would 
undertake nothing and guarantee nothing. Lord Ellen- 
borough scoffed at the whole idea. The financial railway 
crash in England frightened the investing public. By 
1852, the whole *f the mileage of railway lines sanctioned 
in ' India amounted only to a couple of hundred miles. 

In that year however,. Dalhousie was urgently pressing for 
a c hange of policy in this matter ; English capitalists were 
already waiting only for guarantees to be more than willing 
to invest ; and the next year the renewal of the Company’s 
Charter was to come # before Parliament. Presented with 
so many motives for action, the Directors resolved to take 
up railway construction ; Dilhousie laid his plans for running 
lines all over India ; thousands of miles were brought under 
survey for the purpose and railway works were commenced. 

Had these schemes been initiated ten years earlier and carried 
out with the same vigour, Government, when the Mutiny came, 
would have been able to shift and transport troops in a way 
which might easily have crushed the great Revolt before it 


had assumed formidable proportions. The sanction came 
too late for that. By a curious irony, the raifways in 1857 
had not yet reached the stage of being actively serviceable, 
while the operations connected with them had gone far 
enough to arouse by their incomprehensibility thet suspicions 
of uneducated Native intelligence. But in a few years 1 time 
they were to bear ample fruit. 

The Tele- Something of the same kind happened with the Telegraph, 
graph. Experiment of any kind was made particularly difficult by the 
liability of the atmosphere to violent electrical disturbances 
and by the lack of skilled electrical engineers; but the 
difficulties were triumphed over. The magic wires were 
stretched across the land. The story is familiar, how the 
cool-headed operator in Delhi flashed to Lahore the news 
of the rising in a sentence that Was barely finished ; and Sir 
Colin Campbell throughout his campaigns was in telegraphic 
communication with Calcutta^ But the system was still too 
incomplete for full use to be * nade of it, and in the popular 
mind it was still a thing uncanny, suspicious, and reflecting 
suspicion on the British. As it was Dalhousie whose designs 
ultimately brought Peshawar as near to Calcutta as Patna 
had been in the days of Warren Hastings, so it was to 
Dalhousie’s energy that the creation of the telegraphic system 
was due. 

The Dalhousie also created a new Department of Public Works 
P.W.D. w j t h an Engineer at its head in each Presidency, abolishing 
the effete and unworkable Military Board. Roads were built 
of which the most notable was perhaps that from Dakka to 
Arakan, whereby it became possible for the sepoy to march 
from Bengal to Burma without crossing the “black-water.” 
Irrigation by canals was greatly advanced, and more 
particularly the great Ganges canal was at last completed, 
watering the upper Ganges districts. Steamers also were 
multiplied on the Hugli, the fndus, and the Irawadi. Not 
the least important of the reforms for which Dalhousie was 
Half- responsible was the creation of a half-penny post for the 
penny whole of India ; in lieu of the old system of heavy charges, 
Post# varying according to distance, and materially increased by 
the illegitimate demands of local native officials : a charge 


which broke down the walls that isolated every village, and 
immensely fcfcilitated the free communication which is 
invaluable to commerce. 

When a^ the beginning of 1856 Dalhousie withdrew from Estimate 
the scene of his labours, his exhausted frame bore witness to 
the amazing energies he had devoted to his task. He had hoasie. 
not been satisfied to conduct a part of the Government 
himself and to supervise the rest ; everywhere he had exercised 
a control so vigorous and intimate as to render him in fact 
the working head of evdty department. Swift in decision and 
utterly self-confident, he was a complete autocrat ; and though 
when his affections were stirred, he could on occasion show 
no little kindliness and even tenderness, he was as a rule 
little disposed to show consideration for the susceptibilities of 
others, and tolerated nothing that savoured of opposition to 
his will. When that equally autocratic veteran, Sir Charles 
Napier, came into collision v ith him, the Commander-in- 
Chief was forced to resign. Over such a man as Henry 
Lawrence he asserted his authority with an absence of 
courtesy and an arrogance of tone which were needlessly 
galling! Hence, as not seldom happens with men of a 
masterful genius, many Of Dalhousie’s subordinates learnt to 
regard th&nselves as mere instruments, and lost the spirit 
of initiative and the readiness to assume responsibility so 
necessary in a crisis, when the master hand was no longer 
there. # # 

The day is still to come when the final judgment shall be 
passed on the great Governor-General : for he left many 
documents with strict injunctions that they should not be 
made public till fifty ^ears after his death. But whether he 
is to be adjudged greater or less great than the general verdict 
pronounces him to-day, mdre far-sighted or less so than we 
deem him, it is at least certain that his place will be found 
amongst the Great rulers who have guided the destinies of 
the race, and have emphatically “ made History.” 





E ARLY in 1856, Dalhousie’s successor arrived. Lord 

Canning was George Canning’s third son : but both Caa&ixig* 
his elder brothers had died. Canning himself had beeu 
offered, without accepting the post of Foreign Secretary, and 
in 1855 was a member of the Cabinet, when he accepted the 
Indian appointment ; to become the last of the Company’s 
Governors-General, and. the first of the Viceroys of the 
Crown. His rule was the epoch of a great convulsion ; and 
before following its events, it is well to examine the actual 
situation in India, as left bjj Lord Dalhousie. • 

Dalhousie had completed the Dominion of the British. The disap- 
From tjie mountain barrier to the sea, all India acknowledged 
their supremacy ; though Native princedoms remained in p en dcnt 
varying stages of dependence, from the Nizam and Sindhia States, 
down. The Nizam’s rule in the Dekhan, and the old Mogul’s 
court at Delhi, w'<sre practically all that was left of the great 
empire of Baber’s race, and the Mussulman supremacy. Of 
the Maratha pentarchy, the formal head had long been 
removed, and the greater part of the real Maratha country 
had been annexed at the same time. Then another cantle of 
the Maratha country had been absorbed with Sattara, and 
another of the pentar^iy had vanished with the last Nagpur 
Bhonsla. Of the three remaining members, the Gaikwar 
had never been dangerous ; Holkar’s power had been 
shattered; and that of Sindhia, the least Maratha of the 
five, had been diminished. Not fifteen years ago, the in- 
dependent Sta^e of Sindh had been annexed, and six years 
later the independent State of Lahore. The last act of the 
administration just closed had been the deposition of one of 
the two still reigning Mussulman dynasties in Oudh. 


British n ow the history of India had been the history of a series 
Native conquests. The Mogul dominion was alien. The 

Dominion. Maratha dominion in Hindostan was for the most part alien. 
The Mussulman sultanate of Mysore was alien. But the 
British dominion was more distinctively alien than that of 
any predecessor just as in Teutonic Europe the Turk would 
be more alien than the Spaniard. 

It will not be pretended that the change to British Govern- 
ment was anything less than an incalculable benefit to the 
mass of the population. To them, the enforcement of the 
Pax Britannica , and the protection of the weak against the 
strong, were an unmixed blessing. But for those who had 
been the “ strong ” — who had been wont to reap the advan- 
tages of the 4 ‘good old rule, the simple plan ” — the blessings 
were less obvious. It was precisely this section which was 
capable of becoming dangerous ; and within British territory 
this section, already deprived of licence, was inevitably restive ; 
while in the semi-independent territory the annexation policy 
caused it to anticipate a like fate in the near future. That 
this should have been the case is no condemnation of that 
The pre- policy. It meant in the first place that the conditions of 
classed * n * nc ^ a trough centuries had taught a large proportion 
* of the inhabitants to be turbulent and predatory and opposed 
to all restraint by whomsoever exercised, except so far as 
organisation was helpful in the practice of plunder. To all 
such spirits, British government was unpopular precisely in 
proportion to its restraining force. This was the class which 
would always desire to have no settled government at all : 
the class which attained its worst development in the old 
Pindari days, and was now not stamped out but caged. To 
The ruling these must be added the classes which had been accustomed 
classes. | 0 exercise dominion, including particularly the Mussulmans 
associated with the Mogul supremacy. The glory had de- 
parted from Delhi. It is probable enough that without our 
intervention the Marathas would have wiped out the glory 
with thoroughness : but it appeared to be the British who 
had wiped it out, an impression intensified by the Oudh 
annexation. The Marathas themselves on the other hand 
felt that they had been beaten in their bid for empire, while 


in them that t feeling was joined to the Pindari spirit And 
beyond these, wherever the British had come seeking to 
alleviate the lot of the peasant at the expense of the land- 
holder, the landholder, whether he happened to be called a 
jaghirdar, or a zemindar, or a talukdar, felt himself to be a 
person with a legitimate grievance. 

The irony of the situation lay in the fact that those vast The 
classes who did definitely gain by British rule, could neither ^sses^ 
appreciate the extent of their advantages, nor appear as active 
factors in any political, or military complications. When 
the wolf and the sheep-dog fall out, the flock has very little 
to say to the contest. Also, guarded by the dog, it learns t* 
forget the wolfs bite, whereas the dog's bark makes it feel 
nervous. In like manner, the British method of government 
ma3e the peasantry nervous. 

A vigorously effective combination of these various ele- 
ments for hostile purposes was not in any event probable ; 
their conjunction was only possible for purely destructive 
end^; they would inevitably split over their incompatible 
policies of reconstruction. Moreover it was palpable that 
so long as the British wielded the sepoy army, any attempt 
to resist them was foredoomed to entire failure. In the 
control ofjthe sepoy army lay the crux of the position. 

Could the sepoys have brought a trained political judgment The 
to bear upon the # facts, it would have been evident that for Sepoys, 
them in the aggregate at least, the British rule was satisfac- 
tory. Under it the Sepoy’s livelihood %as secure, and he 
would expect his sons and his son’s sons to follow him in 
taking service with the British. The Brahmins and Rajputs, 
of whom the Bengal army was mainly composed, had no 
natural inclination to become subject to low-caste Marathas 
or to Mussulmans. But T$ r hen once an army has become 
imbued with the idea that it can choose its own Caesar, it is 
apt not to be governed by cool reasoning, but to become the 
tool of political intriguers — though with the proverbial 
qualities of e<jged tools. 

Here, then, lay the danger. The paradox of the British 
conquering India and holding it mainly with native troops 
was sufficiently surprising : but from the earliest times every 


Governor-General had recognised that unless <&« 4 ue propor- 
tion of British to Native troops were maintained, the paradox 
Deficiency miglit have alarming developments. It had always been 
° pean Emitted that a ratio of one to four was absolutely the lowest 
troops, which could be viewed without very serious apprehension, 
and that a ratio of one to three would be anything but 
excessive. Yet ip 1856, the ratio of British soldiers to 
sepoys was no more than one to five. This was due in part 
to Hie great increase in the number of sepoys necessitated by 
the annexations (Note B), the additional troops being required 
in the new districts : in part to the reduction of the British 
garrison by the home authorities, who, instead of sending 
out additional regiments as urged by Dalhousie, withdrew 
troops to serve in the Crimea and never even replaced them. 

This disproportion, dangerous *in any case as tending to 
produce in the sepoy mind a conviction that the native army 
was the real master of the situation, was rendered the more 
so by other considerations. The blunder which in defiance 
of the terms of enlistment had 'ordered Bengal sepoys to 
serve in Burma, had quite recently enabled one regiment to 
achieve a victory over the authorities. The withdrawal of 
British troops to the Crimea, had revived the idea that 
Britain’s resources were not sufficient to cope with her foes 
elsewhere. The newly acquired Panjab had absorbed a dis- 
proportionate share not only of European regiments but of 
the best British officers, denuding Hindostan. Outside the 
Panjab, the military commands were held by men who at the 
worst were something less and at the best very little more 
than respectable from the professional point of view. 

Unconsci- Finally, it was not the least perilous feature of the situation 
ousness of that the authorities, almost without exception, appear to have 
an ® er ‘ been totally unconscious of the thinness of the ice. Henry 
Lawrence was awake to the danger, but practically every one 
else, including his brother Johvi in the Panjab was utterly 
taken aback when the outbreak came ; and except in Luck- 
now no precautions had been taken. It is pathetic to read 
how the officers of one regiment after another fell victims to 
the convictiori that, whoever else might mutiny, their men 
would prove staunch. 



Apart fron^ these political and military considerations, the 
native mind generally was in that condition of nervous dis- 
quietude which is the opportunity of the secret agitator. 

Even in the long ago days of the Vellur mutiny, suspickut^e religi- 
had been fife that the British intended to force Christianity ~ Jjf Jjj£e 
oh their Native subjects mainly by the insidious method of 4 
making them break caste rules. There were always a few 
British officers who were far too ready to override religious 
prejudices in their disciplinary regulations. Of recent years, 
missionaries had been allowed to become more aggressive. 

The Government had put down the practice of suttee, and 
had refused to let a change of religion interfere with inherit- 
ance as the Hindu law prescribed. The Educators had 
hardly concealed their expectation that with western know- 
ledge the sacred fairy tale? of the East would be dissolved, 
and the basis of populaily cherished creeds would be swept 

These things were not enough to produce revolt, but they Th« 
created an atmosphere favourable to revolt. And lastly, ^ lsh 
"apart from the prestige of Government, the prestige of the 
“ sahibs ” as sahibs was — in the view of many who were in 
India in those days — materially diminished by the tone of 
superiority adopted by the “pucka” civilians, i.e. those in 
the Government service, not only towards the up-country 
planters and dealers, but towards the military branch as 

During the fifteen • months which passed between the 
succession of Canning and the outbreak of the Revolt, some 
of these conditions were modified, it might be for the better 
— it might be for the worse. 

The deposition of tlie King of Oudh irritated the Mussul- The con- 
man population of the province, who were chiefly congregated °* 
in the cities. But the greater part of the land was in the u ° 
possession of talukdars, of Rajput* or semi-rajput clans or 
castes, surrounded by their clansmen who had no particular 
interest in the Mussulman dynasty. While Outram remained 
to administer the newly annexed country, the talukdars were 
by no means dissatisfied with the change, Outram being one 
of those who had learned by his experience with the Bhils 


and in Sindh to pay a due regard to the fixgd ideas and 
prejudices of the native mind, however little they might be 
consonant with the abstract political theories of the West. 
But Outram was compelled by health to go home on 
leave : and for some months the district was administered by 
subordinates. Dalhousie, with his masterful practice of 
dominating every department, would have kept them in 
order himself: but this very masterfulness had tended to 
bring to the front officials who were excellent servants but 
wanted initiative and capacity for independent action. 
Canning w T ith his task to learn, slower to form unalterable 
convictions, and slower in acting upon them, did not assume 
a mastery like Dalhousie ; and the subordinates were in- 
adequately controlled. They set about reforms with more 
zeal than discretion ; they ignored the clan-relation between 
the talukdars and the people ; the former found themselves 
deprived of traditional rights, while the latter failed to 
appreciate material benefits which they hardly knew how to 
utilise, conferred at the expense of immemorial sentiments. 
Oudh was soon in a ferment, which however was to a great 
extent allayed when Henry Lawrence was called from 
Rajputana to take charge. The beneficent effect of his 
influence was seen after a few weeks ; the vast majority of 
the talukdars refusing to join in the revolt, until they were 
persuaded that the British had given up the hope of fighting 
their way through to Lucknow, and had surrendered the 
Residency garrison 1 to its fate. 

Rajputana The same influence, exercised in Rajputana, had already 
and the toned down the alarm created among the princes of that 
Panjab. semi^n^ependent province over the Adoption question ; and 
a like spirit to Sir Henry’s was shown 4>y his brother George 
who succeeded him there. In the Panjab, the policy of 
John Lawrence and Dalhousie had not conciliated the 
Sirdars, but it had deprived them of much of their influence ; 
while the old Khalsa men, whatever their sentiments might 
be towards the British, were more positively hostile towards 
the Hindostani sepoys, who were apt to assume the offen- 
sive airs of conquerors. The British Frontier officers had 
acquired the devoted adherence of half the hill tribesmen j 



there was ev^n a sect of “ Nikalsainis,” who had deified 
John Nicholson to his own intense disgust. And beyond 
the border, Dalhousie’s movement — instigated by Herbert 
Edwardes — towards an alliance with Dost Mohammed of 
Kabul, was successfully consummated by treaty in Feb. 1857, 
with the result that the old Amir stood loyally by his troth 
when the conflagration came. 

On the other hand, the_state of the Bengal army was The Ben- 
increasingly unsatisfactory. Except for a few recently raised S al arm y* 
T3T01 and Ghurka regiments, it was enlisted almost entirely 
from the Hindostanis, that is from the dwellers in Hindostan 
proper ; a small proportion were Mussulmans, but the jjreat> 
bulk were hi^gh-caste Hindus. By the terms of enlistment 
fEey might not — except in the case of six specific regiments 
— Bfe called upon to serve 'outside India : and they further 
differed from the Bombay and Madras armies in regimental 
organisation, in ways which induced a comparative laxity of 
discipline. Now the annexations in Burma had put the 
authorities in a dilemma# Burma needed troops. , To The 
increase the call on the Madras army would check enlist- £ en< : ral 
ment iq that province. To meet the difficulty, ^onj^Cai??iis^ Enlist- 
issued the Ge neral Service Enlistment Act, under which all ment Act. 
recruits for the Bengal army were in future to be liable for”' 
general as well as for home service — a serious matter for the 
high-caste families* who looked to the army as a profession 
for their sons after them, and to whom the crossing of the 
sea involved a breach of caste. The new regulation appeared 
to have been accepted quietly ; but it was soon brought, in 
the minds of the sepoys, under the catdgory of the insidious 
measures aimed at Caste : another of the items accumulating 
to form an avalanche. ,, 

At the end of 1856, a quarrel which had been growing The 
with Persia came to a heaa. Encouraged by the Crimean Persian 
war, the attitude of the Persian Government had for a year ®^ dl ‘ 
past been first insolent and then defiant. In spite of vigorous 
representations, the Persians marched an army on Herat, and 
took it in October. War was declared next month, and in 
the beginning of 18 57 a considerable force from Bombay, 
including some European regiments, and commanded by 


Outram with Havelock and Jacob under him,. was engaged 
in bringing Persia to reason. Thus the loyal garrison was 
further reduced at the most critical time. For India it was a 
fortunate accident that Britain had also become involved in 
a war with China — whereby in the summer, «the Indian 
government was enabled to intercept and detain for its more 
urgent need some troops which arrived from England under 
orders for the Chinese war. 

Then in the beginning of 1857 came the blunder, which 
gave the enemies of British rule a gratuitous lever wherewith 
to engineer an upheaval. 

The cart- c This was the affair of the greased Cartridges. It had been 
decided to replace the musket hitherto in use by the Enfield 
* rifle. Depots for the new weapon were established at Dum- 
dum, one of the cantonments near Calcutta, and at Amballa 
in Sirhind, and a cartridge factory *also at Mirat, south-east 
of Delhi where there were several regiments. A lubricant 
was needed in the manufacture of these cartridges, which the 
sepoy would have to bite before uising. At the beginning of 
January — before a cartridge had been issued — a low-caste 
employ^ at the Dumdum factory, quarrelling with, a high- 
caste sepoy, threatened him with impending loss of caste 
and degradation for all sepoys because he said cqw’s fat and 
pig’s fat were being used in the manufacture of the new 
cartridges : for the Hindu accounts the c’ow as sacred ; and 
the Mussulman too would be defiled, since Mohammedans 
hold swine to be tvnclean. From station to station the report 
sped like wild fire. The minds of the sepoys, wrought up to 
an acute stage of religious nervousness already, were gripped 
The by it. Agitators who had been watching for their opportunity 
maSns^d se * zec * lt - The P ar, i c among the soldiery was vigorously if 
the Nana secretly fomented. Moslem fanatics found excited listeners 
Sahib, of their own creed. Intriguers of the Mogul party played 
insidiously on the fears of the ‘^infidels ” whom they meant to 
use as catspaws : the Brahmin heir of the late Peshwa, hot 
with wrath against the British, from his jaghy: at Bithur near 
Cawnpore, began secretly to play for his own hand. 

Signs of Denials and explanations were vain; the Government 
unrest. re g U [ at j ons ^ t0 *h e ingredients in the manufacture had been 


strict enough^ but contractors were known to have evaded 
them to some extent. In February a regiment near Mur- 
shidabgd, the home of the old Bengal dynasty, refused TEe 
caFEridges, and practically carried their point. Incendiarism 
broke out# At the end of March a Barrackpur regiment 
became insubordinate. There were no objectionable ingre- 
dients in the cartridges issued, but nothing would convince 
the sepoys that it was so ; instead, the wildest rumours were 
swallowed of contamination in other government supplies. 

A prophecy was repeated from lip to lip that the British 
were to reign for their hundred years — and this was the 
hundredth year from Plassey. Yet the authorities continued 
to take no steps for dealing with a possible outbreak. In 
the end of April, some troopers at Mirat mutinied: the 
nultiny was suppressed, anti the men were thrown into gaol. 

The insubordinate Barrackpur regiment was disbanded ; so 
was that of Murshidabad. Then suddenly, at the centre of 
Mogul disaffection, the blow was struck. 

The truth has to be found somewhere between those *who Was the 
say* that the Revolt was simply a Mutiny of sepoys in a panic, Revolt 
and tfypse who call the Mutiny an organised Revolt. The or S aniscd ? 
/panic was engineered by political intriguers: but the insur- 
rection was not organised. None of the Native rulers "had 
made ujT?helf minds to rise. There is every indication that 
the sepoys took liheir leap blindly in the dark, not knowing 
whither they were going. But there is also every indication 
that the. Nana Sahib on one side and a ftk)gul faction on the 
other had a great deal to do with working them up to take 
the Jeap, and that the Mogul faction at least had a tolerably 
definite idea of the use which was to be made of the leap 
when taken. It was* a use which did not appeal to the 
Hindu princes ; and by showing their hand at the outset, the 
Mussulmans provided these* last with an excellent reason for 
holding back. Whether they would otherwise have risen 
remains an open question ; but on the surface, it would seem 
that the panic took effect prematurely, and so ~Ibrce4~a 
prematurF^ofeuncement from, the Moguls. 

At any rate, on the tenth w of_May, the sepoys at Mirat The 
mutinied, released their imprisoned comrades, broke open die outbreak. 


gaols, shot their officers, killed every European they could 
find away from the British regimental quarters, and made for 
Delhi, On their arrival there the next morning, the city 
population rose : the Europeans were massacred : half a score 
of British held the arsenal for some time — then when resist* 
ance was no longer possible blew it up, and with it two 
thousand of the insurgents ; and then the Restoration of the 
Mogul Empire was proclaimed, Tfie Revolt had begun. 


{Map VII.) 

'T'HE outbreak at Mirat and the seizure of Delhi by the Breathing* 
**• insurgents were the beginning of the great revolt : yet time * 
the explosion did not follow immediately. Had the rising 
befcn thoroughly organised, the mutineers could have practi- 
cally made themselves cnasters of the country from Delhi to 
Patna. Had the British, on the other hand, been prepared 
for the emergency, they could have paralysed the revolt, 
unorganised as it was at *he beginning. As matters stood, 
nearly all the sepoys in the Ganges districts were given the 
opportunity of joining the insurgents, while on the other 
hand the British were given time, so to speak, to get their 
backs to Jjie wall. 

Between Delhi and Patna there were an immense number Disposi- 
of sepoy regimenfc ; but the supply of European troops was 
extraordinarily small. At Mirat there were two regiments 
and a strong force of* artillery : at Agra* one regiment, and 
some artillery : at Lucknow, one regiment and a few artillery- 
men: at Dinapur, near Patna, one regiment: at Cawnpore, 
there was a detachment of the Lucknow regiment The 
Native regiments at th$se stations were — Mirat, three; Agra, 
two ; Lucknow, four ; Dinapur, four ; Cawnpore, four. At 
Benares, and at the all-important station and fortress of 
Allahabad, there were no European troops at all, and none 
at Delhi. 

It was withy this region that the British with the loyal Area of the 
Native regiments, were at death-grips with the sepoys, until Mttti ny. 
the pressure was relieved by the capture of Delhi and the 
first relief of the Lucknow Residency in September. Outside 



this area, prompt and vigorous measures entirely prevented 
the rising from making any head in the Panjab ; it was held 
in check in Bengal ; and though the Gwalior army rose after 
some delay, it did not throw itself into the struggle during 
this first stage. South of the Nerbadda, there was no out- 
break. Of the reigning native Princes, none associated 
himself with the revolt, for the Mogul at Delhi was a 
mere simulacrum ; but the Oudh Begum and her son, the 
Rani of Jhansi, and Nana Sahib the adopted son of the 
quondam Peshwa Baji Rao, threw all their energies into 
the struggle. 

' The real series of mutinies did not begin till May 28th, 
nearly three weeks after the Mirat outbreak. In the interval, 
the Panjab had been secured : a force had been collected at 
Amballa and Mirat to attack D£ihi : Henry Lawrence in 
Lucknow had been steadily pressing on preparations in 
expectation of a siege, and detachments of troops were 
beginning to make their way up from lower Bengal towards 

The In the Panjab were many of the men whose names men 
Panjab hold in highest honour : John Lawrence, the Chief Com- 
secured. missioner, at the head; Neville Chamberlain, Herbert 
Edwardes, John Nicholson in the Peshawar district; 
Montgomery : M‘Leod, Richard Lawrence, J. D. Macpherson 
and Corbett, at Lahore. At the moment ef the Delhi news 
arriving, John Lawrence himself was absent. The Lahore 
officers forthwith iesolved to disarm the sepoy regiments. 
The presence of a British regiment there, and of two others 
at the arsenals of Firozpur and Phillur made it possible to 
carry out the disarmament and secure those important points. 
With John Lawrence’s assent, the frontier officers promptly 
formed a movable column, which marched rapidly upon 
disaffected stations, and soon brought the whole province 
under control. It must be observed that in the Panjab, not 
only was there an exceptionally large proportion of European 
soldiers, but also the levies of frontier tribesmen such as the 
famous Guides, and the regiments composed of Panjabis and 
Sikhs, were antagonistic to the Hindostani regiments of the 
Bengal army, and in many cases enthusiastically devoted to 



their British officers : so that there was also an exceptionally 
large proportton of well-affected Native troops. 

Between May 30th and June 14th nearly every regiment Series ot 
from Delhi to Benares mutinied. Some murdered their mutinies, 
officers : others escorted them to places of safety. Some of 
the regiments marched off to join the main body at Delhi, 
others to swell the armies gathering on Lucknow. The 
mutineers of Cawnpore were actually taking the former 
course, when Nana Sahib induced them to return to besiege 

At Benares the muriny took place on June 4, but the 
station was saved by Neill who had just arrived with $ 

British detachment. At Allahabad, Brasyer with a Sikh 
regiment seized the fort, which was secured five days later by 
Neill’s advance from Benaies. 

West of the Jamna and the Chambal, outside of the Panjab, 
the sepoys mutinied successfully at Hansi, Hissar, and Sirsa ; 
to the east of those places, the chiefs of the Cis-Satlej Sikhs 
were actively loyal. Southwards, Nasirabad close to Ajmir 
wa$ one of the first to revolt, the sepoys afterwards distin- 
guishing themselves by maintaining their order and discipline 
among* themselves : and at Ni milch, well to the South, the 
men also mutinied. These regiments went to swell the 
army at # Delhi. 

The Gwalior contingent, in Sindhia’s service, officered by 
British, mutinied on June 14th : but Sindhia himself, guided 
by his able minister pinkar Rao, and th$ agent S. C. Mac- 
pherson, was loyal and succeeded in conveying most of the 
British to Agra. The Gwalior troops for the time remained 
south of the Chambal and Jamna. At J hansi the mutineers 
massacred the British ; but at Sagar, southwards, a loyal 
native regiment secured and held the fort. 

By June 12, the coluntn from Amballa and Mirat had The force 
driven the mutineers opposgd to it into Delhi after some^^? 
sharp engagements, and was in occupation of the famous e 
Ridge. Being gradually joined by forces from the Panjab, 
its numbers at the end of June reached 6500 : while the 
Delhi sepoys were probably nearly 30,000. 

At Cawnpore, a handful of combatants and a large number Cawnpore. 


of non-combatants' held out against the Nana from June 8 to 
June 26. By that time the defences had beedme worthless 
and the defenders were decimated. The station had at one 
time been of great importance, and it now contained a large 
number of European women and children. Thesg had been 
collected together behind very inadequate intrenchments ; 
but the swarming sepoys and followers of Nana Sahib were 
kept at bay day after day with extraordinary resolution, the 
small garrison pouring so fierce a fire upon the enemy that they 
were constantly beaten off. But the sufferings of the besieged 
were intense; in less than three wdeks some two hundred 
and fifty had perished ; and when the Nana offered terms, 
it was felt that for the sake of the women and children they 
must be accepted. The whole party were to be placed 
in boats, and sent down to Allahabad under safe conduct 
Then ensued that ghastly act of treachery which roused the 
English People to frenzy, and to a thirst for vengeance which 
dominated every other sentiment. The exhausted garrison 
wer^ allowed to reach the river, f and were packed into the 
thatch-covered native boats ; but instead of starting on the 
journey down stream, the Native boatmen slipped overboard, 
and volley upon volley was poured into the doomed vessels. 
The thatch was fired : as a last rfesort, men, women, and 
children struggled into the water. The men weV& killed, 
save a very few who succeeded in escaping; the women and 
children were allowed to live, and were taken back to Cawn- 
pore, to be literally butchered, in cold, blood, to the number 
of over two hundred, not three weeks later, when Havelock’s 
force was all but entering the town. 

Prepara- The fall of Cawnpore turned the siege of Lucknow into a 
tions at certainty. There Henry Lawrence h^d made the Residency 
Lucknow. rea< jy f or a prolonged resistance, while maintaining the Machi 
Bhaun fort temporarily, in order* to control the city. Now 
however, the mutineers concentrated on the N.E. An 
attempt to check them was foiled at Chinhat ; it then be- 
came necessary to evacuate the Machi Bhaun, which was 
successfully accomplished; and the famous* siege of the 
Residency or J^aily Guard began upon June 30th, 

On the same day, Henry Havelock who had been on the 


Persian Campaign arrived at Allahabad and took over the 
command thefe. 

With the close of June ends the first phase of the revolt, Composi- 
by which its character was established. Whatever the tion . of the 
original de^gn may have been, it had actually resolved itself 
into a rising of the Hindostani sepoys, of whom the vast 
majority were Brahmins or Rajputs — high-caste Hindus ; 
while owing to the deliberate policy of the British, only a 
small proportion of Mussulmans were recruited. The Mussul- 
man population however, was heartily on the side of the 
rebellicm, which the Mdhammedan leaders intended to turn 
to account for the restoration of the Mogul dominion. Bui 
as yet, not only did the princes, Maratha, Rajput, and Sikh, 
abstain from hostilities, but the great landholders and their 
clansmen in Oudh also hekl aloof ; with the exception only 
of such as considered th^t they had an extreme personal griev- 
ance against the British, like Nana Sahib and the Jhansi Rani, 
their tendency was to observe neutrality. Nor was there any 
recognised head, or any cl^irly defined policy ; for while*the 
Mo£ul party had a programme, it was not one acceptable to 
the Hindus. 

Hence at this point, the total result was : — The mutineers Distribu- 
controlled by Mussulman leaders were in great force at tion of 
Delhi (tffiere the British had planted themselves on the ^|^ er 
ridge lying on the N.W. side of the city). They were in June 30. 
great force at Lucknow, where the British were completely 
hemmed in, and whe^e the party of the.*Oudh Begum was 
dominant. They were in strong force at Cawnpore, which 
commanded the passage of the Ganges, where any force 
advancing to the relief of Lucknow would have to cross, and 
here they were under the command of the Maratha Brahmin, 

Nana Sahib. On the south of the Jamna, the mutineer 
regiments had not yet concentrated ; but later on, they drew 
together near Kalpi. Eastward of Benares and Azimgarh, 
they had not yet broken out, and the line of communication 
between Allahabad and lower Bengal via Dinapur was not 
cut, so that Hong this line British reinforcements were 
pushing up steadily though in driblets. Hence during the 
next three months attention is concentrated on three points — 


the operations before Delhi of the British, gradually reinforced 
by troops from the Panjab : the defence of Lucknow : and 
the advance of Havelock to the relief of Lucknow. With 
each one of these forces there were bodies of loyal sepoys. 

Opera- The Commander-in-Chief, Anson, had originally intended 
foreDeihi to con< * uct the Delhi operations ; but he had died of cholera 
’ at the end of May, being succeeded in the command by 
General Barnard. On July 9, Barnard in turn succumbed, 
and was succeeded by General Reed, who, from illness, had 
to give place immediately after to Archdale Wilson. 

From the Ridge, the line of communication to Kumal, 
Amballa, and so to the Panjab, was open. On the other 
hand, the enemy were free to move where they would. 
There had been a moment, just after the Ridge was seized, 
when it had seemed possible th!it the walls of Delhi might 
be captured at once by a sudden ajtack ; but the doubtful 
opportunity was not used, and there was nothing for it but 
to settle down to a siege, in which it was open to question 
whiph of the combatants was really besieger and which be- 
sieged. It was clear however that the city could not* be 
carried until the arrival of the siege train from Fjrozpur. 
During July, and the beginning of August, it was the 
mutineers who attacked the British position ; four times in 
force in July, and on August 10-12; but each time they 
were repulsed, as were also innumerable minor attacks. In 
the meantime, the uncertainty as to the state of the Panjab 
Reinforce- was passing away^ John Lawrence ,was very urgent that 
^hePan 1 should be taken, but it was some while before he 
jab. would consent either to the raising of Sikh levies in the 
Panjab itself, or to the dispatch from it of Nicholson’s 
movable column — either measure beiijg obviously full of risk, 
but the second at least being essential if the Delhi force was 
to accomplish its object. At ISst however yielding to the 
urgent representations of Macpherson and John Nicholson, 
he resolved to take the risk ; for the greater need, the Panjab 
was almost denuded of troops ; and Nicholson led reinforce- 
ments to the Ridge which brought up the numbers there to 
more than 8oqo effectives, of whom nearly half were British. 
An attempt was made at the end of August to intercept the 



approach of the siege train but this was brilliantly foiled by 
Nicholson. Sept 6, the siege train had arrived, and 
about 3000 additional native levies had joined. Wilson 
was persuaded, not without difficulty, to adopt the scheme of 
attack laid flown by Baird Smith the chief engineer, the Thestorm- 
arrangements being carried out with great skill and audacity in g of 
by Alexander Taylor. The breaching batteries began to open DeWli * 
out on the nth, and continued through the 12th and 13th. 

On the night of the 1 3th an immediate assault was resolved on. 

Four columns of attack were prepared : early on the morning 
of the, the way was* laid open for one of them by the 
splendid act of Home and Salkeld, who blew in the Kashmir, 
gate. Two other columns forced their way through the 
breaches, but the fourth assault was repulsed. The ramparts 
were* won, but in the attempt to press forward Nicholson 
received a mortal wound— Nicholson, the dauntless soldier, 
whose figure has become perhaps more vividly impressed 
upon the English mind than that of any other among the 
heroes of the war. So gravg was the situation that Wilsoi\ is 
erroneously supposed to have been on the verge of ordering 
a withdrawal. But if there was any indecision in his mind, 
it was removed by the unanimous opinion of those round 
him. At all risks, the fobthold won was to be maintained. 
Gradually^ clay by day, the British drove their way through 
the city ; on the 2 *st the whole of it, with the person of the 
Mogul, was in their hands, aud the mutineers were in full 
flight to join the army ip Oudh. A column was despatched 
first in pursuit, and then to Agra ; whence later on it went to 
join Sir Colin Campbell’s relieving force at Cawnpore. 

Meanwhile, the force at the Lucknow Residency had been The de- 
maintaining a fierce struggle. In it were some 3000 souls, *? nc f 
including more than 500 women and children, 700 loyal { C no W uc " 
sepoys, and 1000 British Combatants. There was food Resi- 
enough stored for a long sieg$ — there were more guns than deucy, 
could be adequately worked. But round about lay thousands 
of the enemy, under cover, which in places brought them 
within a few yar&s of our defences. 

The garrison suffered a terrible blow at the outset, Henry 
Lawrence receiving a mortal wound. The plans for defence 


however were thoroughly understood. It did not take long 
to learn that the ramparts were too well prepared to be 
Character rushed, and that there was no fear of the enemy's artillery 
°/ the making an effective breach. The supreme risk lay in the 
siege * almost limitless possibilities of mining. The amazing fact 
of the siege is, that out of thirty-seven attempts, from July 
20 to Sept 23, one only was successful in making a breach; 
six mines, which were duly exploded, were short, and did no 
harm ; whereas no fewer than twenty-five were either broken 
into and destroyed by counter-mines or abandoned on 
hearing counter-mines. The circumference which had to be 
^.defended was about a mile. The ceaseless toil and vigilance 
entailed on the engineers, and on the men detailed for 
mining — there happened to be a good many Cornish miners 
among the English troops, wh<ch was fortunate — map be 
imagined. Had the enemy run galleries as they might easily 
have done, at several points simultaneously, it would have 
been physically impossible to detect and meet them all. 

Jhe mutineers could not storm the defences ; but they 
could and did make it impossible for any member of the 
garrison to expose himself from a loophole, for however short 
a time, without receiving a bullet. Three times also they 
made attacks in force ; and though all were triumphantly 
repulsed, the fighting force was being seriously ana constantly 
reduced by wounds and sickness. Oi^ the one occasion 
when a breach actually was made by mining, it was effectively 
repaired before an attempt was made to storm it. But the 
Perilous strain was terrific. Communications with the outside world 
P the iC> arri- f were a ^ most entirely cut off. Rumours of disaster were rife. 
C fi »on. Some of the loyal sepoys, doggedly though they fought, had 
made up their minds that unless relief came by the end of the 
month, they would abandon the defence. An impression pre- 
vailed, which was carried through to Havelock, that the food 
supplies were all but exhausted. It became known that Have- 
lock, after penetrating into Oudh had been forced to fall back to 
Cawnpore: which was construed as the abandonment of Oudh. 
The clansmen of the Oudh chiefs from that time swelled the 
ranks of the besiegers. As a matter of fact, the food $up~ 
plies were ample, and the actual strength of the garrison was 



sufficient to have held the position for some time longer ; but 
it is extremely* doubtful whether the “Banner of England” 
would have continued to blow after Oct. 1st, if Havelock 
and Outram had not arrived before the mutineers from Delhi. 

On June .30th Havelock was at Allahabad and forthwith Have- 
dispatched Renaud with a party in advance towards Cawn- lock ' s ad ' 
pore. He had hardly done so, when the news of the fall of Cawnpore. 
Cawnpore arrived. The whole of Nana Sahib’s force was 
now free to act against Renaud, and might be joined by the 
mutineers from Benares and elsewhere. But on July 7 , 

Havelofck was ready to rharch, leaving Allahabad garrisoned. 

He had with him not two thousand men, of whom more than, 
a fourth were sepoys, mostly Sikhs. On the nth he came 
up with Renaud. Next day he drove back the enemy from 
FatShpur, where they had expected to catch Renaud. Three 
days later he again routed them in two successive actions. 

It was believed that there were still prisoners to be rescued at 
Cawnpore. He pushed on. Next day, the 16th, his force, 
now reduced to less than if 00, routed a mass of the Nana’s 
troops which included 5000 regulars ; pushed on to find the 
enemy %gain drawn up and reinforced ; routed them again ; 
was faced a third time in the same day on the outskirts of 
Cawnpore j drove them m rout a third time; and entered 
Cawnpore the next day — to find that the Nana had already 
completed his ghastly work by slaughtering the prisoners. 

It was not possible to push on towards Lucknow without Havelock 
a brief delay; but on. the 29th Havelock was across theinOudh. 
Ganges with but 1500 men, and advanced to fight two more 
successful actions on that day ; leaving an entrenched post 
behind him at Mangarwar, on the Oudh bank of the Ganges 
besides three hundred pen under Neill in Cawnpore itself. 

Nineteen guns were captured ; but between the fighting and 
an outbreak of cholera, a sixth of his force was killed or hors 
de combat And then came^ the news that the Dinapur 
regiments down the river had mutinied, the communications 
with Bengal were threatened, and there was no present 
prospect of reinforcements coming. Havelock had no 
choice but to fall back on his entrenched post at Mangarwar. 

Thence he again marched on Aug. 4, to fall on the 


gathering enemy a second time at Basharat Ganj, the scene 
of his last victory. But again cholera was ravaging his little 
force ; and to add to his difficulties, there seemed to be every 
prospect of the mutineers at Kalpi moving on Cawnpore. 
With intense reluctance, Havelock felt that he must retire to 
Cawnpore though not without first inflicting a third defeat on 
the rebels at Basharat Ganj, and clearing them from his own 

Have- The retirement to Cawnpore meant evacuation of Oudh 
tirementto terr ^ or y* To the Oudh local chiefs, this seemed the 
Cawnpore, abandonment of the Residency garrison. At last they 
August, ^yielded to the pressure from the rebels, and sent their 
retainers, as we have seen, to join the mutineer army at 
Lucknow ; but till this time, they had not done so, nor even 
now did they personally take up * arms. They did no More 
than accept what appeared to be a <?e facto dominion. 

Besides the threatening Gwalior Contingent at Kalpi, the 
Rohillas were now gathering at Firakabad, to the N.W. 

In the meantime, however, the; line of communication via 
Dinapur had been cleared. The sepoys in Behar had’ not 
mutinied till near the end of July; when they did so, the 
leadership was taken up by Raja Kunwar Singh of Jugdes- 
pur (south of the Ganges), an aggrieved talukdar ; who 
turned his forces against Arrah, a post where thlete were a 
very few Europeans and some treasure.* But besides the 
Europeans, there were fifty of Rattray’s Sikhs at Arrah. A 
Civil Engineer, Mr Vicars Boyle, had on his own account 
converted a house into a fort ; in which the fifteen Europeans 
and the Sikhs collected, and conducted a brilliant and 
successful defence. A detachment was sent from Dinapur 
to relieve them, but it was ambushed and driven back with 
heavy loss. Major Vincent Eyre, however, who was pro- 
ceeding up the river with some guns, learning the position of 
affairs, collected a small force, inarched upon Arrah defeating 
and dispersing a large body of the enemy, relieved the place, 
and with the garrison and some further reinforcements, broke 
the neck of a resistance which had threatehed seriously to 
delay the arrival of the forces about to proceed to Cawn- 



These events happened between July 26th and August 
13th; and a* few days later, Outram, who had recently 
arrived at Calcutta and was given supreme command in the 
district, was on his way to join Havelock. On reaching Outram 
Cawnpore, # with a couple of fresh regiments, instead of taking joins 
command over Havelock, he declared that his comrade Havelock, 
should have the glory of the Relief, he himself serving as 
a volunteer. But this junction of Outram with Havelock 
was not completed till Sept. 15. Neither the Gwalior 
mutineers nor the Rohilla troops were moving. By the 
20th, ihe little army, scarcely over 3000 in number, was in 
Oudh once more. On the 21st it routed an opposing force 
at Mangarwar. On the 23rd it reached and captured the 
Alam Bagh fort, four miles from the Lucknow Residency. 

On# the 25th, leaving a sufficient force to hold the Alam Rescue of 
Bagh, it fought its despe/ate way into the Residency. Luck- the Luck- 
now was saved. Resl ' 

The great defence had been of incalculable service to the 
Delhi force, by detaining ^o large a mass of the rebels in 
Oudh. It is a curious point that had Delhi been captured 
sooner, Lucknow itself might have been overwhelmed by 
the influx of regiments retreating from the capital, before 
Havelock and Outram ccfUld have reinforced the garrison. 

Technically a “ relief” involves the liberation of the 
garrison relieved. * In this sense, the reinforcement of Out- 
ram and Havelock was not a relief, as it did not allow of the 
withdrawal of non-conjbatants. But it v^s a rescue, inas- 
much as the Residency was in real danger of falling, partly 
owing to the exhaustion of the defenders under the strain, 
though there was no fear whatever of starvation, partly 
because the Native portion of the garrison, loyally as it 
fought, was meditating withdrawal. That danger was now 
'entirely removed. The fofce within the Residency now 
knew that it would have nq difficulty in holding its own 
against the besiegers for at least a couple of months, in an 
extended position with improved means v of defence. The rear- 
guard left at tlte Alam Bagh was also able to communicate 
with Cawnpore, and by semaphore with the garrison. So the 
Residency settled down to the second stage of the defence. 


(Map VIJ.) 


Events ^Ty\7HILE these great events had been taking place, there 
elsewhere. V V had been no mutiny south of the Nerbadda. The 
Nizam’s Mussulmans were restive and even clamorous : but 
they were kept in hand by the Ability of his minister 9 alar 
Jang. The attitude however of the Marathas in what had 
been the Peshwa’s dominions, irritated by the Sattara annexa- 
tion, and much in sympathy with Nana Sahib, caused a 
good deal of anxiety and prevented the Bombay forces from 
securing Holkar’s territory; where the soldiery, whether 
sepoys or local levies, declared against the British without 
making any very active movement. Mhow, however, the 
station close to Indur, was occupied early in August by a 
Change in British brigade. The outbreak had thus been stemmed and 
thC S tion * m P act b r °k en at the end of September by the forces 
* already in Hindostan. But now on the one hand the fall of 
Delhi gave a trer.iendous impulse to the hitherto doubtful 
loyalty of the Panjab, in which it at once became practicable 
to raise immense levies for the suppression of the revolt; 
and on the other hand strong reinforcements were beginning 
to pour in at Calcutta and Bombay, the former to be used 
in the Ganges provinces, the latter in the Central Indian 
districts. Sir Colin Campbell had arrived m September to 
take the chief command ; in October he was organising his 
campaign. In the beginning of November, he had six 
thousand men at Cawnpore, and battalions on their way up 
Relief of from Bengal. On November 9 he crossed the Ganges ieav* 
the Luck- i n g a garrison of 1000 men at Cawnpore: on the 12th he 
n °dency. reac hed the Alam Bagh : and then, after some hard fighting, 



the Residency was finally and formally relieved on the 1 7th. 

The next ten days were occupied in the withdrawal of the 
whole force from that position to the Alam Bagh, where 
Outram was left with 4000 men. Havelock, his great 
comrade ift arms, had passed away on November 24th, the 
end achieved for which he had fought so heroically. 

In the interval, the Gwalior mutineer army dropped its Tantia 
role of being merely threatening, and became for the first 
time actively aggressive, under Tantia Topi, the ablest 
leader the mutineers produced. While Sir Colin was 
engaged in relieving Lucknow, Tantia Topi crossed the 
Jamna at Kalpi, was joined by Nana Sahib’s forces* 
descended on Cawnpore, was met by Windham, whose 
troops he drove back step) by step into their own lines, and 
on § Nov. 28 was seriously threatening the position; when 
Sir Colin was able to dispatch the rescued non-combatants 
of the Lucknow Residency to Allahabad on their way to 
Calcutta ; and then on the 6th attacked the rebel force, and 
drove them in rout with® great slaughter, some across *the 
Ganges, and others across the Jamna. 

This, virtually commenced the campaign of conquest. Capture of 
During the next three mpnths, the armies gathered to crush Lucknow, 
the rebels in Oudh. From the east by way of Sultanpur 
came Franks with a column, followed by a Nepalese con- 
tingent led by Jar% Bahadur ; from the west, Sir Colin, with 
reinforcements from Agra ; at the Alam Bagh lay Outram 
with his 4000 men. ‘Both Franks and Outram had sharp 
fighting before the columns had formed their junction ; but 
in the second week of March, the siege of the great mutineer 
army in Lucknow had begun; by the 17th the whole city 
was in the hands of th^ British, and the rebel forces were in 
full flight ; but it was unfortunate that the cavalry missed 
their opportunity, and failed to cut off the retreat or rather 
the rout of the enemy, who* were still able to re-assemble 
and take the field. 

In the Inc^ur district, Durand inflicted considerable Sir Hugh 
punishment on the rebel forces, between October and Rose * 
December when Sir Hugh Rose took over the command. 

In January his force began its march — one column towards 



Agra, the other with Sir Hugh himself, for Sagar and Jhansi. 
The left column cleared the country up to Gunah on the 
direct road; and then during March, moving eastwards, 
attacked and on the 17 th captured the strongly held fort of 
Chandairi. The right column, advancing to Sag^r, relieved 
it on Feb. 3, and after capturing the fort of Garrakota 
started for Jhansi on the 27th. By skilful manoeuvring in 
difficult and hilly country and not without some sharp 
fighting, Sir Hugh reached Jhansi on March 21, where he 
was joined by the column from Chandairi, during the next 
four days. 

Capture of ' Jhansi was a powerful fortress, with 10,000 men behind 
Jhansi. its ramparts. After commencing the siege, Sir Hugh learnt 
that Tantia Topi was on the march to raise the siege. 
Thereupon Rose, leaving the bulk of his force to carry'on 
the operations, marched with 150c men to meet Tantia 
Topi, routed him completely, and captured all his guns. 
Returning to Jhansi, he captured the city on the 3rd April, 
and 11 on the night of the 4th the* Rani evacuated the fort, 
escaping with her troops towards Kalpi. Thus, with Luck- 
now and Jhansi both captured by early April, the war — in 
familiar phrase — was “ practically over.” 

Recrudes- This however did not mean that the fighting wa,s finished. 

cence of The Mussulmans had congregated in Rohilkhand ; Tantia 
struggle 1 in Topi, and the Jhansi fugitives joined fences south of the 
Oudh. Jamna ; and the Govern or- General, acting on a misappre- 
hension, issued a "proclamation the intention of which was 
in turn misunderstood by the Oudh Talukdars ; who now, 
believing that mere confiscation and ruin were to be their 
portion, took the field in person with their clansmen, with an 
energy which heretofore they had not displayed. The result 
was a prolonged and very trying period of active guerilla war- 
fare, and some heavy fighting. 'It was not till the close of 
December, and after the younger Havelock (afterwards Sir 
Henry Havelock-Alien) had induced the authorities to em- 
ploy mounted infantry, that the last embers of rebellion were 
Termitia- crushed out on the north of the Ganges. On the south, the 
tion of the Jhansi Rani ‘and Tantia Topi appeared before Gwalior in 
contest. j une . sindhia, seeking to resist them, was deserted by his 


forces and had to fly to Agra ; Gwalior was in the hands of 
the insurgents, and Nana Sahib was proclaimed Peshwa. 

Rose however was soon moving against the Rani and she 
was killed in the course of an action fought on June 17. 

From this* time, the war dropped into a pursuit of Tantia 
Topi, who with dwindling forces was hunted month after 
month, till, left with only a few followers, he was finally 
betrayed and handed over to the British in April of the 
following year, to die for his complicity in the Cawnpore 

And so guttered out the last sparks of the great conflagration. 


So far this chapter has been occupied with a simple narra- 
tive of events. It is now time to examine some particular 
aspects of the revolt. • 

As to its constituents : in the earlier stage, those who Who took 
took part in it were of these classes: The Hindostani P art in 
sepoys of the Company's army; the Hindostani sepoys 0 f therevolL 
the Native “ contingents, ’’^s at Gwalior ; the Mussulmans of 
the Ganges provinces ; a few aggrieved Talukdars in Oudh, 
with their clansmen ; among the Marathas, the Nana Sahib, 
the Jhansi Rani, and a few minor chiefs. Havelock's retire- 
ment to Cawnpore added to these the levies of the Oudh 
Talukdars generally ; but these never showed fight till the 
last part of the war, when Canning’s proclamation made the 
Talukdars actively instead of formally hostile. Then the 
Rajput clansmen became formidable foes.* The Mussulmans 
of Afghanistan and the frontier, the Sikh, Ghurka, and 
Madras sepoys, almost without exception remained staunch. 

The Princes held aloof. They made declarations of loyalty, 
but would not be answerable for their troops. 

The active elements then are reduced to three — Mussul- Active 
mans associated with the Mogul tradition ; aggrieved chiefs partici- 
and their retainers or sympathisers ; Hindostani sepoys. pants * 
Now these last consisted of a small proportion of Mussul- 
mans, and a very large proportion of high- caste Hindus. It 
was the Hindoltani sepoys that rose : but it was the Mogul 
party which forthwith attempted to turn the rising to political 
account ; with them lay the immense advantage of possessing 


a figure-head. But their action served to check the rebel- 
lious element in the Hindu community. What might have 
happened if Sindhia had rallied the Marathas to his name, 
it is hard to say ; but even the Nana Sahib was not set up 
as representing a cause till June *58. It is quite clear 
therefore that there was no concerted attempt at a Hindu 
rising ; but it is almost equally clear that there was a definite 
Mussulman plot to foment a general Mutiny as a means to a 
Mogul restoration. That the plot would have come to any- 
thing without the cartridge incident is improbable enough ; 
but that incident provided a first-class lever to work \<ith on 
die high-caste regiments of the Company’s army ; more 
particularly in conjunction with the General Service Enlist- 
ment Act. Once the mutiny was on foot, its extension to the 
Gwalior Contingent, largely recruited from the same field, Isas 
natural. That the Mussulman party was prepared beforehand 
to work the Mutiny for its own ends is a sufficiently obvious 
inference from the promptitude with which on its outbreak 
they took its direction on themselves both at Delhi and in Oudh. 

Neutral On the other hand, the Panjab and Frontier Mussulmans 
elements. were not assoc i a ted with the Mogul tradition. Th^. Sikhs, 
Gurkhas and Madrasis were not high-caste Hindus. For the 
third factor, such general suspicion and hostility to the 
British Raj as had been aroused among Hindu princes and 
chiefs had been very much allayed in Gajputana by the 
management first of Henry and then of George Lawrence, 
and in Oudh by Menry. Except among a few Marathas, it 
was not sufficient to produce active hostility; that needed 
the sense of personal grievance to be found in Nana Sahib 
and the Jhansi Rani. But, in spite of those soothing 
influences, and of such ministerial control as was exercised 
by Dinkar Rao at Gwalior, and Salar Jang at Haidarabad 
the anti-British sentiment was sufficiently strong to preclude 
active support of the British, until after the fall of Delhi ; 
except from such quarters as the loyal Maharaja of Patiala, 
and the particularly astute Gholab Singh of Kashmir, who 
inherited from the master of his youth, Aanjit Singh, a 
conviction that in the long-run the British were sure to 
come out, so to speak, on top. 


The conclusion then, in view of all the facts, seems to General 
be this. The condition of any sort of successful rising was ^ sions 
the development in the sepoy of a determined spirit of 
rebellion. There were two classes of malcontents — the 
Mogul party and the aggrieved chiefs — who had a direct 
interest in fostering such a spirit. But the aggrieved chiefs 
had no definite policy, the Mogul party had one. The latter 
therefore were able to calculate that it was their main 
business to make sure of a rising big enough to throw off the 
British yoke, because they themselves would inevitably reap 
the frhits of possessing a definite policy, and would emerge 
dominant among the other conflicting parties. Without active 
fomentation, the mutinies would have been sporadic, and 
readily suppressed. Without the cartridge incident, the 
mutinous spirit could nof have been sufficiently fomented. 

The revolt was not k)ng prepared ; to say that it was 
organised would be an undeserved compliment to the Mussul- 
mans ; but for some months before the outbreak, the Mussul- 
mans were seeking to convert the Hindostani army iiTto a 
catspaw for their own political ends. 

Next, as to the attitude of the Panjab, and the frontier. Behaviour 
Dost Mohammed at Jyibul remained entirely loyal to his 
engagement, vindicating thereby the policy of alliance with me( j # 
him, on which opinion had differed among the highest 
authorities. Dafhousie adopted the policy, which really 
emanated from Herbert Edwardes ; men whose theories were 
poles apart like John* Lawrence and Johfi Nicholson agreed 
in disliking it. But the result was convincing. In the 
Panjab itself, there was sympathy neither with the Mogul 
nor with the Hindostani sepoys ; yet it was not till the fall 
of Delhi that John J,awrence could venture on allowing Attitude of 
levies en masse. Here is one of the insoluble problems of the Pan- 
the might-have-been. The policy carried through by Dal--^* 
housie and John Lawrence prevented the Sikh Sirdars from 
being actively dangerous. The policy advocated by Henry 
Lawrence woujd have made them an active power for good 
or for evil. Would they have thrown in their lot with the 
British or with the rebels? Under Henry Lawrence's own 
guidance, it may be confidently held that they would have 


been loyal like their kinsmen in Sirhind ; byt under any 
guidance less sympathetic the effect might have been far 

So much for the “ might-have-been.” For the actual 
conditions, they seemed to John Lawrence in June* so serious 
that he actually proposed the transfer of Peshawar and the 
trans-Indus to Dost Mohammed, in order to set free the 
troops there to join the Delhi force. Fortunately however 
other counsels prevailed ; and, in spite of the risk, he pre- 
sently assented to the dispatch of Nicholson's column, and 
the employment of Gholab Singh’s Kashmir levies — measures 
entirely justified by the result. 

Conduct of As to the attitude of the Hindostani sepoys themselves ; 
the Hmdo- in the majority of cases they followed the call of a few 
sepoys, energetic spirits ; hanging together, but rarely even fighting 
with much enthusiasm. There were sOme wholesale massacres 
of British officers and residents ; but it was not unusual for 
those officers only to be murdered whose popularity and 
influence were feared, and this not so much from a vengeful 
spirit as from the leaders’ desire to make the regiments 
feel that they had committed themselves irrevocably.- The 
massacres at Delhi, at Jhansi, and at Cawnpore obliterated 
from the ordinary British purview the many cases*. i,n which 
officers and families were escorted to the protection of 
friendly chiefs or of British garrisons by &poys, who, after 
accomplishing their task, returned to throw in their lot with 
the mutineers. n ° 

Lord Throughout the great crisis, the conduct of the Governor- 
Canning. General was the subject of bitter animadversion in Calcutta 

and in England. As a matter of fact he appears to have 
made two mistakes altogether. The first was before the 
mutiny; the General Service Enlisfment Act, already discussed. 
Iis Oudh The second was the proclamation in 1858 directed against 
’roclama* the Oudh Talukdars. Virtually 4 it declared them all to be 
tion. re ^ e ] s ^ an( j t h e i r estates forfeit, subject to such relief as a 

benignant government might think fit to, grant. More 
troubles arise from misapprehensions than from any other 
source. Canning intended the Talukdars to understand 
that if they behaved themselves they would be reinstated by 


grace of the Government. What they did understand was 
that they w?re to be treated as rebels by a Government 
which they expected to be vindictive. Canning, in common 
with most of the community, believed that they had been 
active in the rebellion, whereas in fact they had only joined 
it in a very perfunctory fashion when they thought the British 
had themselves given up hope of recovering Oudh. So that 
Canning’s objects, present to his mind as fair and generous, 
were interpreted by them as being vindictive and harsh ; and 
the proclamation at last turned them into really active rebels. 

It wa5 a curious piece* of irony that “ Clemency Canning ” 
was then rated in England, by way of a change, for harshnegs 
and injustice. 

For the most part this title of Clemency ("aiming expresses Canning 
tlffe attitude towards him*both in England and in Calcutta, and his 
At home the reports gf massacres awoke a passion for ven- cntlcs * 
geance in which all sense of discrimination was lost: to urge 
discrimination was felt as a kind of sacrilege towards the 
memory of the helpless # victims so cruelly butchered. In 
Calcutta the feeling was for obvious reasons greatly aggra- 
vated.; and in addition, the British population there furiously 
resented the application of any sort of restraint on themselves. 

But Canning resolutely insisted on discriminating, and on 
imposing restraints on the British in Calcutta. In nothing 
that Canning said or did was there a hint that anything short 
of the uttermost farthing should be exacted from ringleaders, 
or from participators, in murder or mas^cre. But the regu- 
lations and instructions which he issued, after the great 
Mutiny was an accomplished fact, recognised that whether 
the question >vere argued on the ground of morality or of 
expediency, sheer undistinguishing vengeance on the entire 
population was not ^o be permitted ; and recognised also 
that the irresponsible members of the British community 
had been roused to a pitch # of excitement incompatible with 
the formation of a cool judgment on the facts, or with sober 
action in the absence of restraint. The horrors of the 
mutiny, and fhe consequent irrepressible lust for blood that 
attended its suppression, left behind them an evil legacy of 
mutual hostility, to be eradicated only by long years of 


resolutely just administration ; a legacy which would have 
been infinitely more intolerable, perhaps ineradicable alto- 
gether, but for the unfaltering firmness with which Clemency 
1 Canning, amidst a. storm of taunts and bitter attacks, pursued 
! his policy of unswerving justice. 



T HE great Mutiny ended the reign of the East India The 

Company. For a * hundred and forty years, it had Company’ 5 
been a trading Company and nothing more. Then it had. t Kecor ’ 
become embroiled in a sharp conflict first with the P'rench 
and secondly with the Native ruler of Bengal ; from which 
it had emerged after some •fifteen years as actually, though 
not in the strict technical sense, a territorial and military 
Power without any European competitor. After another 
brief interval, the Company recognised its own new responsi- 
bilities, and the Parliament at Westminster also realised that 
these responsibilities were in some degree shared by the 
nation at large. The first experiment at Constitution-making 
under new conditions was followed by Pitt's India Act, 
which indicated tlfe Parliamentary idea of the proportion of 
obligation tying on the Country and the Company respectively, 
and laid down the .ylan whereby the responsibilities were to 
be distiibuted. As time passed, the Company was forced 
more and more to subordinate its commercial to its political 
functions; while the inconveniences of a divided control were 
in no way modified, and the State evinced a growing in- 
clination to extend its own activities. Just when the 
Company was completing its century of supremacy, the 
crisis of 1857 arrived, Compelling the decisive termination 
of the dual system. • 

That it did so is no reproach to the great Company. The Com* 
The inherent difficulties of governing from London a de- pany’s 
pendency so distant, when the only means of communication Aas * 
was by means <*)f sailing vessels, were immense. It was 
inevitable that the men in London should fail to realise 
always and completely the pressing necessities which were 



apparent to the men on the spot : yet London could not 
simply wash its hands of responsibility, anu allow its ad- 
ministrators in India to take the law absolutely into their 
own hands. To-day, when steam and electricity have so 
immeasurably increased the facility and rapidity of com- 
munication, the difficulty is still sufficiently apparent; in 
the days of which we have been writing it was incomparably 
greater. Yet over and above that difficulty, the Company 
itself was subject to the control of a higher power possessed 
of no better information than its own, though without quite 
the same bias against expenditure. And in governing India 
it was conducting an operation entirely without precedent in 
history, amidst a vast population whose manners and ideas 
were wholly alien, to deal with whom successfully it was a 
prime necessity to divest the mind of superficial western 
analogies, and arguments based on fundamentally foreign 
political and ethical conceptions. If under such conditions 
the Directors had not made grave mistakes, treated their 
pro-consuls with occasional injustice, hampered their action 
at times, resisted their expenditure, and failed to encourage 
their activities in directions which the experience of later 
days shows to have been desirable, they would have been 
more than human. On the whole, the Directors deserved 
well of mankind ; and it may be doubted whether the 
immediate government of Parliament would have been a 
whit better. 

Now however the time had arrived when the State was 
prepared to take the entire responsibility on its own shoulders, 
at a moment when the old difficulty of communication, of 
keeping due touch with the great Dependency, was fast 
vanishing. The formal change of government did not so 
much create a new era as express the fact that a new era 
had begun. 

Transfer of In 1857, Lord Palmerston was in office: and in February 
Govern- 1858, a bill was brought in to transfer the government of 

theCrown° * nc ^ a ^ rom t ^ ie Company to the Sovereign. The Company 
* was by no means willing to surrender its powers and privileges, 
and fought against the new proposals, Palmerston, defeated 
on his “ Conspiracy to Murder ” bill, resigned : and Lord 



Derby took office. A new India bill was brought in, which, 
after many vicissitudes, and much modification, finally passed 
into Law in August 1858. 

By the new Constitution, the East India Company and 
the Board of Control were both abolished. Instead of them, 
the ultimate responsibility for the Government of India was 
vested in a parliamentary Secretary of State who should be 
a member of the Imperial Government for the time being, 
with a Council appointed for life — a term of years being 
afterwards substituted. The first Council consisted partly of 
Directors of the old Company, partly of civil or military 
officers from India. As the Directors disappeared, their* 
places were filled by Indian officials or ex-officials, the India 
Office thus becoming a Department of State in the hands of 
experts, with a Parliamentary chief. 

In India also some cNegree of reconstruction took place. 
The work of administration remained in the same hands, the 
Company’s “ Covenanted Service ” becoming the Indian Civil 
Service of the Crown. he Governor-General or Viceroy 
was given an Executive Council of seven, including his 
Comrna*ider-in-Chief, the member for Public Works being a 
later addition. JThere is, also a Legislative Council without 
whose assant no law can be passed, consisting of the Executive 
Council with additions. The additional members usually 
include some Natives of standing, and some representatives 
of the mercantile community. There is nothing elective or 
democratic about the system : the members of Council are 
nominated from above. It rests on the theory of government 
by experts, which has its disadvantages, but also has merits 
which are perhaps less obvious or less readily recognised, 
from the prevalent theory in England that experience con- 
nected with any given department probably makes a man 
unfit for supreme control of it. It is not clear however that 
as a mere matter of efficiency the Indian system is not on 
the whole the more successful. 

In three respects it is to be noted that the Mutiny was 
followed by and was probably the cause of a change of 
policy. The attitude on the Adoption Question so con- 
spicuously assumed by Dalhousie was given up, and the 


Native Princes were well pleased to know that what they 
regarded as the legitimate course of succession would not again 
be hastily set aside. The Talukdars were gratified by a new 
move in the direction of restoring "the status to which, as 
some held, they were entitled, and which, as others held, 
they had usurped though it is hardly probable that this 
alteration has been altogether to the advantage of the ryots. 
Third and not least in importance : the military arrangements 
were re-modelled. The rule was laid down, that one third of 
the military forces in India must consist of European troops. 
The old jealousies between the king’s officers” hnd the 
“ Company’s Officers ” were obliterated by the amalgamation 
of the forces. The vital fact however was that the European 
soldiery could never again be outnumbered in the over- 
whelming proportions which had ’rendered the struggle in the 
early months of the mutiny so desperate. 

Last It is not our part in this volume to enter on the history of 
words, the new regime. We have had f o trace the history of the 
British in India from their earliest connexion with the East 
until their supremacy was acknowledged from the mountains 
to the sea over all the land. When thei first factory was 
established, the son of Akbar the Great ruled at Agra, and the 
Mussulman kingdoms of the Dekhan still survived in the 
south : while their future power was yet undreamed of, the 
Dekhan kingdoms fell under the Mogul dominion. While 
rival French traders were establishing themselves, the Maratha 
Power was growing, and the Delhi Empire fell to pieces. 
After a short and sharp contest, the French rival was driven 
from the field, and Plassey made the British masters of 
the richest province of India. A century passed ; and the 
heir of the house of Baber was a State prisoner, while every 
prince acknowledged the British over-lordship, confirmed by 
the failure of the great convulsion. The pen of Macaulay 
has made the story of Clive and Warren Hastings familiar in 
some of its aspects : many pens have related the stirring 
episodes of the mutiny. But of the changes which took 
place between 1783 and 1857, and of the men who made 
those changes, the great majority are curiously ignorant. 



The details are difficult to unravel, difficult to view in their 
true connexion. It has been the primary object of the 
present writer to simplify the problem for the student ; 
to help him to a mastery of the fundamental points which 
shall enable, him to appreciate the more readily the records 
of heroic action, of resolute patience, of unswerving justice, 
with which our Indian annals abound : to distinguish more 
clearly between the peoples over whom it has been our task 
to govern. 

Forty-three years have rolled by since the Sovereignty of 
India passed formally to British Crown. Since that day, 
there have been wars beyond the border and “ little ” wars 
wjth the frontier tribesmen. That frontier has not ceased to 
advance. It has girdled in Burma : decade by decade it has 
embraced fresh tracts of mountains and ravines, fresh clans 
of wild hill-men, till only recently we have seen the trans- 
Indus raised into a separate Province. But throughout the 
years since the last embers of rebellion were quenched in 
the last days of 1858, within India Proper unbroken pe^ce 
has reigned. That after all is the most significant of all 
possible comments on the British Raj. In the Panjab, in 
Hindostan, in Bengal, in the Dekhan, fo*r forty years no 
armies have met mi the shock of battle. No foreign foe has 
set foot on Indian soil since the British became definitely 
the leading Power*; since the Sovereignty of Britain was 
proclaimed, no Native potentate has raised his standards 
either in revolt against the alien dominion ^r with aggressive 
intent against his neighbours. Since the days of Mahmud 
of Ghazni, such a period of peace has no parallel in the 
Indian annals. We believe at least that the intelligent 
Natives recognise in the British Supremacy the only alternative 
to anarchy: that they*are alive to the need of some one 
Power whose paramountcy* is beyond dispute; that they 
know that no other overlord would give them the same 
security or tax them so lightly. 

Constantly, but gradually and not often incautiously, the 
number of Natives admitted to responsible office tends to 
increase. But time alone will show whether the Orientalism, 
the forms of thought, the ideals and the prejudices that are 


inherited in the blood, the traditions that have been handed 
down through immemorial centuries, can be displaced by 
those other forms of thought which are our Western 
inheritance, and without which democratic institutions are 
unthinkable. Such a change has not taken p^ice, nor are 
there any trustworthy signs that it is in progress. Still is the 
East East, and the West West. In a land where dominion 
has never been seen and never been held without the power 
of the sword, the military superiority of the dominant race 
must still be the ultimate sanction of its domination ; where 
such domination is the condition of order, doctrines of 
# equality cannot take practical effect. But though as yet the 
British Raj has not brought about the Golden Age, it h$s 
brought peace and security and even-handed justice where 
they never prevailed before save* as traditions of a mythical 
past. Honour to the men who have wrought that great 
work ; may their sons and their sons’ sons merit like honour 
from generation to generation ; worthy, when they depart 
fro^ the scene of their labours to have graven upon their 
memorial tablets the words that sound the keynote of high 
endeavour, the epitaph of one who was not the least among 
the heroes, Henry Lawrence — 

He tried to do his duty. 






A . £h. X. — The Impeachment of Warren Hastings. 

T HE attack on Warren Hastings by Burke and his allies ft 
not strictly speaking a part of the History of India; but 
some further reference to it is desirable. Macaulay has written 
of It in one of his most brilliant passages, and the trial has been 
the subject of much magnificent rhetoric. A brief summary how- 
ever, unembellished by eloquence, may be found useful. 

Hastings reached England in June 1785. His own first im- 
pression was that his reception was entirely favourable, andnhat 
ministers would be wholly on his side, though some sort of 
attack on him would probably be made. 

On tlie other hand, Burke had thoroughly convinced himself 
that Hastings J*rf6 been a* tyrant ; Fox, whatever his moral con- 
victions *Aay have been, saw in the question of Indian ad- 
ministration an excellent means for placing Pitt in a dilemma : 
Francis was the relentless enemy of Hastings, and represented 
the authority of the man who had been on the # spot. 

In January 1786, the Challenge was thrown down by Hastings’ 
own agent, Scott, in parliament ; who invited Burke and Fox in 
effect to come on if they dared, to which they merely replied 
that they were coming on when it suited them. 

In February, Burke m§ved for the papers required for framing an 
impeachment. Parliamentary skirmishing went on during March. 
Then Hastings made the mistake of asking to be heard in person 
at the bar of the House ; themproceeding to read a long vindica- 
tion of his administration, which unfortunately was extremely ill- 
adapted to his audience less on account of its matter than its 
manner. # 

The real campaign began in June, when Burke made the 
Rohilla war his ground of assault. The rights and wrongs in 
v 337 

33 » 


regard to this charge have been discussed in the text. But 
whatever they were, the fact that Hastings had b^en nominated 
to the governor-generalship three times after that war made it 
something of a chose jugie , and Burke’s motion was rejected. 

Now, the supposed facts of this war formed the strongest part 
of the indictment against Hastings. No one believed that, after 
this had failed, any of the other charges would suffice as the 
basis of an impeachment. The second attack was grounded on 
the treatment of the Raja of Benares. Great was the astonish- 
ment when Pitt after apparently defending Hastings, at length 
announced that as in his opinion the fine imposed on the Rajah was 
excessive, he would give his vote in support of the hostile motion. 
Every sort of explanation for the sudden change of front was 
offered. The reason given by Pitt himself was universally 1 
scouted ; nor can it be pretended that it was in any sense 
sufficient to account for his action. Personal motives were freely 
imputed both to Pitt and Dundas. The indisputable fact is that 
when the Rohilla motion came on, Pitt did not intend to 
countenance an impeachment ; when the Benares motion came 
on, lie had made up his mind to countenance it. It is certain 
that in the interval Pitt had been studying the whole question 
of the Hastings administration ; and setting aside the natural 
temptation to seek for improper motives in the conduct of ministers, 
it seems perfectly reasonable to hold, with Loid Rosebery (Pitt y 
p. 85) that Pitt was simply convinced by the evidence' examined 
and digested in the interval not exactly of the guilt of Hastings 
but of the impropriety of the Government identifying itself with 
him. The conclusion was only reached at the last moment, but 
once reached it could only be acted on by accepting the hostile 

Pitt’s action settled the question. The hostile motion was 
carried. In February 1787, Sheridan made the famous speech 
on the affair of the Oudh Begums which w^s regarded at the time as 
having touched the high-water mark of British eloquence. The 
impeachment was now a certainty ; and in May, Hastings was 
formally impeached by Burke at the bar of the House of Lords. 

For a fuller account of the proceedings from the picturesque 
point of view, the reader may be referred to Macaulay’s essay : 
from the historic and ethical point of view, to Lyall’s IVarren 
Hastings (English* Men of Action), chapter viii. Here we need 
only summarise. 



The trial began in February 1788. After the preliminary steps, 
Burke openedtfhe attack with a general indictment, powerful but 
violent. Then Fox had his turn and it was not till June that 
Sheridan again developed his theme in relation to the Oudh 
Begums. After this the court rose — it had been occupied alto- 
gether for thirty-five days. The sittings were not renewed till 
April of the following year when the court sat for seventeen days. 
In 1790 it sat for fourteen days, and for five days in 1791. Next 
year, the defence had twenty- two days. When the defence con- 
tinued in 1793, “ of one hundred and eighty-six peers who had seen 
the Be^um charge opened by the prosecution, not more than twenty- 
eight were now listening \o the defence ” (Lyall) ; yet it was not 
till April 1795 that the House of Lords gave judgment — acquitting 
Hastings by a large majority on every one of the questions sub- 
mitted. The trial had cost the accused about ;£ 100,000. 

B. Ch. XXVII. — The Increase of the Native Army 


It is stated in the text^p. 302, that the grave disproportion 
between British and Native troops was partly due to the increase 
in the letter necessitated by Lord Dalhousie’s Annexation Policy. 

This statement, previously emphasised by General M‘Leod 
Inn£s in his ^fepoy Revolt , has been challenged in a very 
recently 'published work by Mr Demetrius Boulger {India in the 
Nineteenth Century* p. 197), where he writes : “What are the 
facts ? . . . He reduced the number of the native army by 7000 
men. . . . Here it must suffice to say tha^ Lord Dalhousie’s 
annexations did not lea< 3 , as alleged, to an increase of the native 
army, but to its reduction, however slight.” 

Mr Boulger cites no authorities ; and it would be interesting 
to discover his grounds for this very surprising and positive 

“What are the facts^” Jn 1845, when the first Sikh war 
broke out, the numbers of the Native Regular Army were 
about 240,000 {cf. Sir W. W. Haunter's Dalhousie , p. 213). When 
Dalhousie left India in 1856, their numbers were 233,000. That 
is, between i84|^and 1856 there was a reduction of 7000. Is this 
the fact over which Mr Boulger has stumbled? If so, it has 
escaped his attention that, after the first Sikh war, Lord Hardinge 
reduced the Native army by not less than 50,000 men, and 



Dalhousie increased it again by over 40,000. The difference 
between Hardinge’s reduction and Dalhousie’s increase would 
seem to have taken shape in Mr Boulger’s mind as a reduction 
by Dalhousie. Hardinge effected the reduction by lowering the 
strength of the battalions from 1000 to 800— not by disbanding 
regiments. Dalhousie effected the increase by the reverse process 
of raising the same battalions to approximately their previous 
numbers. (See Henry Lawrence’s Paper on Lord Hardinge’s 
administration, in the Calcutta Review , 1847 : also Viscount 
Hardinge’s “Hardinge” in the Rulers of India, p. 167 : Sir W. 
Hunter’s Dalhousie , p. 213 ; and reference there given.) 

The actual fact therefore appears td’ be that the great' Native 
Srmy of 1845 was reduced by about twenty per cent, by Dalhousie’s 
predecessor, and that the Annexations necessitated its restora* 
tion practically to the earlier strength — mainly at the instance of 
Sir Charles Napier, who succeeded Cough as commander-in-chief 
in 1849. 

Yet this does not represent the whole increase, for it does not 
take into account the new regiments raised in the Panjab itself : 
so fhat, under Dalhousie’s regime, the native army was actually 
increased by not less than twenty-five per cent. 

Dalhousie himself viewed the resulting disproportion with ap- 
prehension, repeatedly urged the need for more European troops, 
and actually raised an additional European regiment in each of 
the three Provinces : but this was more than counterbalanced by 
the withdrawal of regiments for the Crimea, in defiance of his 
protests, and later for Persia also. Moreover, he designed a fresh 
reduction, by reversing to the lower strength of Native battalions ; 
in almost the last Minute he wrote, h£ proposed the disband- 
ing of several Native regiments, as well as an addition to the 
European forces. But the broad fact remains that Dalhousie 
took the risk of adopting a policy which involved the increase of 
the Native army by twenty-five per c<?nt., without obtaining a 
corresponding increase in the European, military establishment — 
although he was alive to the resulting danger and urged the 
necessary precautions on a deaf Government at Westminster. 

C, Ch. XXIX.-— Lord Canning. 

The view of Lord Canning taken in the text is one which is 
generally repudiated by residents in Calcutta at the time of the 



mutiny. Calcutta opinion was unanimously in favour of the 
most stringeift measures ; no severity would have been deemed 
excessive ; and all restrictions on Europeans were accounted as 
something of an outrage. The Times in London took the same 
view ; and # it is only necessary to look at the Punch cartoons of 
the period to realise that the popular temper had been roused 
beyond the control of reason. This was natural enough ; and 
neither Calcutta nor London deserves much reprobation, if it is 
true that both capitals “lost their heads.” But that they did lose 
their heads, while Canning kept his — that he was right and they 
were yrong — is certainly the impression produced on the student 
who comes to examine'the question as one not having taken 
part in it. 

Calcutta had many grievances against the Governor- General. 
Ij held that the General commanding in Behar should have had 
positive orders to disarm fhe sepoys instead of being instructed 
to act on his own judgment. It believed that he had dis- 
countenanced the formation of Volunteer Corps in Calcutta. 
It was angry because a strict censorship had been extended 
to the European as w£jl as the Native press, and btcause 
Europeans as well as Natives were required to obtain a license 
if th%y wished to carry arms. There were individuals whose 
s^prices did not meet with the recognition they deserved, and 
for this # Lo^K # Canning was held responsible. Yet in some of 
these cases, it is clear that the Governor-General could not have 
been personally blame ; while in others he would have deserved 
blame if he had acted otherwise than he did. 

But the head and front of his offending # lay in the Resolution 
of July 1857, giving instructions to what may be called the 
emergency officers appointed to deal with deserters and mutineers. 
The effect of these instructions was to confine severe penalties to 
mutineers who had taken part in the murder of officers, or in 
other outrages, or weue taken in arms. The storm of indignation 
roused by the instrue^ons appears of itself to be sufficient proof 
that they were imperatively needed to check what would after- 
wards have been recognised as a fatal policy of bloodthirsty 
reprisals, though the passion of the hour would have accounted 
them as no rry>re than an instalment of just retribution. Never- 
theless it is the fact that Lord Canning deliberately chose to 
accept the obloquy with which he was bespattered on account of 
the Resolution, rather than make public the whole of the evidence 



on which he acted ; not because the evidence was insufficient, but 
because it was too staggering. The historian must*recognise the 
splendid courage and self-control displayed under extraordinarily 
difficult conditions by the Governor- General ; but since the data 
by which he was guided were not made known to the ,oublic, it is 
scarcely surprising that the public did not take them into con- 
sideration though it may be doubted whether in its then frame of 
mind it would have been greatly influenced by their publication. 



A. — General History. 

remains the standard English account of the various Native 
Dominions, prior to the establishment of British Ascendancy. 

*is a work of immense research, to which all students are deeply 
indebted : and it covers the whole ground of custom and myth as 
well as political history. * 

The standard history of the British Dominion down to the first 
decade of the nineteenth century is that of James Mill, 
continued by Wilson to 1835. James Mill however was inclined 
to pose as the Philosophic Historian ; in other words, *as a 
censor of his own countrymen ; and his interpretation of events is 
always inclined to err as imputing the baser rather than the 
higher motive, while he gives undue weight to the evidence 
against the j^Spire Buifders. Substantially, his views on the 
character at the leading actors are very much those of T. B. 
Macaulay. % 

But from the point where his history closes, there is no other 
general work of quite the same rank. M^vrshman’s History 
covers the whole field from the earliest times to the retirement of 
Dalhousie. It is usually sound, accurate, and impartial ; but 
occasionally lacks lucidity. To the same class as Marshman 
belong the Short History of India by Talboys Wheeler, and the 
Student’s Manual by Meadows Taylor. The former is very well 
arranged and indexecf?>| % 

Sir W. W. Hunter in The Indian Empire and the Brief 
Histoty of the Indian Peoples is concerned comparatively little 
with the story of the rise of the British Power. The two 
completed volumes of the History of British India on which he 
was engaged at the time of his death only come down to the 
amalgamation of the rival British Companies in the first decade of 
the eighteenth century. 




Sir Alfred Lyall’S British Dominion in India is an 
admirable study ; but it is more a study than a* history, and 
at any rate after Wellesley it becomes all too brief. As an 
introduction to the subject, however, it can hardly be sur- 
passed. t 

There are gaps in the Rulers of India series, which prevent it 
from forming a complete story ; while the historical interest is, by 
the scheme of the series, somewhat subordinated to the personal. 
The individual volumes are referred to below in connexion 
with their respective periods. 

Tod’s Rajasthan , Crook’s North West Provinces , and Keene’s 
Hindostan , are all informing works, thdugh the two former deal 
rLther with the bye-ways and accessories of history than with 
history proper ; and like the valuable but ponderous (larger) * 
History of Talboys Wheeler, treat of the Peoples of India, 
not with the British Expansion. Cunningham’s History of ihe 
Sikhs , and Grant Duff’s History of the Marathas w ill be found 
serviceable by the student ; and also Sir John Malcolm’s 
Political India (the Rise of the British) and Central India 
(The* Marathas) to 1825. Captain M^ahan’s Influence of Sea - 
Power (chapters vii., viii., and xii.), and the second part of 
Seeley’s Expansion of England , are almost necessary for the 
understanding of certain aspects, military and political, of, v the 
British Expansion ; while the exposition of Iv^ive traits* in 
Sleeman’s Rambles and Recollections , and in LyaLl’s * Asiatic 
Studies may be supplemented by the intinyite knowledge of 
Native habits shown in the Indian novels Tara, Seetah, and 
Tippoo Sultan , by ISJeadows Taylor. 

To these may be added Sir John Kaye’s Lives of Indian Officers 
(a dozen biographical sketches) : Compton’s Lives of the Indian 
Adventurers w hich deals rather with the bye-ways of history : 
Malleson’s Decisive battles of India, a vigorous but not always 
accurate piece of work : Lee- Warner’s Protected Princes of 
India , a work to be consulted only^by pi xous students, but of 
much value: and some portions of Sir John Strachey’s India, 
and Sir George Chesney’s Indian Polity , both of which are 
chiefly concerned with post-mutiny conditions. 

Apart from Blue-books and Despatches in general, sundry 
volumes of selections therefrom will be referred to in connexion 
with their particular periods. Similarly the volumes of the 
Calcutta Review contain valuable articles on current political and 



military topics, and questions of administration, some of which will 
be especially referred to below. 


(The letters R. I. and M. A. mean that a volume belongs to the 
Rulers of India series, or the Men of Action series, respec- 
tively. The purpose of this list is not so much to give a 
partial list of authorities consulted, or for the verification of 
facts and opinions given, as to refer the reader to books from 
which he may gain supplementary information.) 

Cc. i.-iii* . . ElphiVstone’s History. 

Keene’s Hindostan. 

Ch. ii. , . . Baber’s Memoirs : translated by Erskine 

and Leyden. 

Babar (R. I.). 

Akbar (R. I.). 

Ch. iii. „ . . A urattgzib (R. I.). 

Ch. iv. . . . W. W. HUNTER: History of British India, 

vols^ , ii. * 

Albuquerque (R. I.). 

Malleson : The French in India. 

„ Dupleix (R. I.). 

Ch. & . . Bernier’S Travels (Ed. Constable). 

Ch. vi. . Malleson : Dupleix. 

Ch. vi., vii. . £)rme’s (Robert) Military Operations in 

Indus tan. 

Ch. vi., vii., viii. ..Macaulay : Essay on C/iye. 

Wilson : Clive (M. A.) 

Cc. ix., x. . . Macaulay : Essay on Warren Hastings. 

Lyall : Warren Hastings (M. A.) 

Trotter : Warren Hastings . 

Sl R.iCHEY : Hastings and the Rohilla War. 
StIl^jen ; The story of Nuncontar and 
Impcy . 

G. W. Forrest : The Administration of 
Warren Hastings; Selections from Letters 
and Despatches , 1772-1775. 

Madhava Rao Sindhia (R. I.). 

Haidar Ali( R. I.). 

Cornwallis (R. I.). 

Ch. xi. , 



Cc. xii., xiii. . 

Ch. xv. . 

Ch. xvi. 

Cc. xvii., xviii., 

Cc. xx., xxi. . 

Ch. xxii. 
Ch. xxiii. 

Ch. xxiv. 

. Wellesley (R. I.). 

Pearce : Life of Wellesley . • 

Owen : Selection from Wellesley's De- 

. Lord Hastings (R. I.). , 

Diary of Lord Hastings in India (Ed. Lady 

. Lord Amherst (R. I.). 

1. Cornwallis (R. I.). 

Arbuthnot, Sir T. Munro [Minutes and 
Reports of Sir, T. Munro, with Intro- 

Sir T. Munro (R. I.). 

COLEBROOKE : Life of Mount stuart Eiphih- 

Elphinstone (R. I.). 

Lord W. Ben tin eft (R. I.). 

Kaye : History of the Administration of the 

Kaye : Life of / or d Metcalfe . 

„ Lives of Indian Officers , vol. i. 

Mayne : Village Communities . 

Ran jit Singh (R. I.). 

Auckland (R. I.)'. _ % 

Cunningham : History ofthe'Jikhs. 

Gough (Sir C.): The $ Sikhs and the Sikh 

Kaye : Lives of Indian Officers , vol. it. 

„ History of the Afghan War. 

. Goldsmid : Life of Sir James Out ram. 

N apier : Life of Sir Charles Napier . 

. Hardinge (R. I.). 

Broadfoot: TheC areer of Major Broadfoot. 

Lawrence ( J-Ieny y : The Administration of 
Lord Hardinge ( Calcutta Review , vol. via.). 

Gough (Sir*' C.) : The Sikhs and the Sikh 

Innes (Gen. M‘Leod) : H$nry Lawrence . 

Cunningham : History of the Sikhs . 

. Gough (Sir C.) : The Sikhs and the Sikh 
Wars , 


Edwardes (Herbert) : A Year on the Panjab 

Lady Edwardes : Life of Sir Herbert 

Shadwell : Life of Lord Clyde. 

Thackwell : The Second Sikh War. 

Durand: Life of Sir H. M. Durand. (Vol. 
ii. Essays and Minutes.) 

Dalhousie (R. I.). 

Ch. xxv. Dalhousie (R. I.). 

TROT1ER : Dalhousie . 

xxvi. 1 TempiA (Sir R.) : Thomason. 

M acpii erson : Memorials of Service in 

Dalhousie (R. I.). 

Dalhouste : Minute of Feb. 28, 1856. 
xxvii., xxviii., xxix. Kaye and Malleson : History of the Indian 

Innes (Gen. M'Leod) : The Sepoy Revolt. 

„ m „ Lucknow and Oufth 

in the Mutiny. 

Forrest (G. W.) : Selections from the letters 
and dispatches in the Military Dept. 1857-8. 

Canning (R. I.). 

(For the^Iutiny, there are innumerable biographies dealing 
with portions or aspects : eg of Colin Campbell, Havelock, 
Outram, Nicholson, the Lawrences ; Reminiscences, as those of 
Lord Roberts, Lady Ingli^ Holmes, Maude, etc. # It is impossible 
to produce a working list. There is something to be learnt from 
nearly all such books. The first on the list, Kaye and Malleson, 
treats the whole story in great detail ; though the personal pre- 
dilections of the authors are given considerable scope. The two 
next are markedly caref^%nd accurate, but concise, the work of 
an actor in the drama ; theiSfour*h is a selection of official docu- 
ments ; and the last contains a lucid summary of the political 
aspects of the episode, and of the policy of the Governor- General.) 


of Indian Terms, and Phrases likely to be met with, either 
in this Volume or in Works used for Reference 

{Where the modern spelling is given, an'’ the reader may he d ^ubtful as 
to pronunciation, the vowels are marked long or short — a, &.) 

Adalat or Adawlut : court of 
justice. Sadr Adalat or Sudder 
A daw hit — supreme court. 

Afghans: (i) present inhabitants 
of Afghanistan ; (2) Indian Mussul- 
mans of Afghan descent. 

Agent : title of the British repre- 
sentative at the protected or semi- 
independent courts : except the 
most important, where the official 
is termed a Resident. 

Amil or Awmil : one of the titles 
for Revenue collectors under the 
Native rulers. 

Amir : lord, chief; a Mohammedan 
title ; also appearing as Emir and 
Mir . Appropriated in particular 
by the rulers of Sindh, and by 
Dost Mohamme' 1 and his suc- 
cessors at Kabul. 

Ana, Anna: a small coin = A of 
a rupee ; formerly reckoned as 
equivalent to i^d. 

Baboo : originally a title of respect, 
very much like Master or Mr. 
Being particularly affected by the 
class of clerks in Lower Bengal, 
it is now used in common par- 
lance to denote a member of that 

Badmash, Budmash : a rogue. 

Bahadur : champion. A title im- 
plying distinction in battle. 

Batta : extra allowances beyond 
the pay originally fixed for 

military officers, granted on a 
regular scale. The batta came 
to be regarded as an actual r ; ght ; 
and reduction to “ half-batta ” 
wa, a serious grievance. 

Bazaar : the market, the streets in 
which the natives buy and sell. 
“Bazaar rumours, ” the common 
t-^k in the streets. 

Begum : princess, especially the 
daughter, wife or widow of a 

Canarkse : a "»re-Aryan dialect 
spoken in pari~ the N.W. 

Chauth c Chout: the tribute 
demanded by the Marathas, 
amounting to one fourth of the 
revenues of the district in which 
it was levied. 

Chu patty : a sort of flat cake, the 
common food in Hindustan. 

Collector : the District head of 
the Revenue department. 

Commi cc toner : governor of a 
pr ance. Chief Com rnissiotier, 
governor of the greater provinces 
which have not been raised to Lt. 

Cooly : labourer. Probably derived 
from the rac«*-name Koli of tribes 
in the N* W. Ghats. 

Crore : 10,000,000 ; used as the 
equivalent of a “ million sterling" 
in the old calculations which 



reckoned io rupees to the 
sovereign. S<^ a lac or lakh = 
lOOjOOO rupees = ^10,000 ; or 
rfo of a crore. 

Cutcha : not genuine — the opposite 
of pucka ; the nearest general 
equivalent i^ould be “shoddy.” 

Cutcherry : administrative office, 
or court-house. 

Dacoit or Dak AIT: member of a 
gang of professional robbers. 

Dak or Dawk : post or transport, 
by means of relays of carriers 
established at definite pc^jnts. 
Hence Dak - bungalow , the 

. equivalent of a posting inn. 

DArbar or Durbar : (i) the court 
and council of a monarch. ( 2 ) A 
Court function. • 

DAROGA : local head-constable or 
Chief of Police. 

Deccan or Dekhan : (1) India 
south of the Nerbadda ; (2) in a 
more restricted sense, the Nizam’s 
dominions. +* 

Deen or Din : the Faith, i.e. 
Islam > the slogan of Moslem 

Dev^n or Diwan: head of the 
exchequer ^r***Di wani = revenue 

D6ab : the land between two rivers 
above their confluence, * ‘ Mesopo- 
tamia.” “ The Doab ” par excel- 
lence is that between the* Ganges 
and the Jamna. 

Durbar : see Darbar. 

Factory : a trading establishment 
of the East India Company. 

Fakeer or Fakir: a Mohammedan 
devotee or fanatic. ** 

Ferxnghi : a European — th6 nanTe 
being derived from the Arab form 
of the term “Frank” applied 
especially to the Portuguese, but 
also to the British when a 
certain measure of hostility or 
contempt is intended to be con- 

Firman : an imperial decree. 

Five Rivers: land of the; the 
Pan jab, between the Indus and 
the Satlej. 

Gentile or Gentoo : the old 
terms for the Hindus, as dis- 
tinguished from the Mohamme- 
dans who were spoken of as 
“ Moors ” or “ Moormen ” and 
sometimes as “Moguls.” 

Ghazis : Mohammedan fanatics. 

Granth or Grunth : the Scrip- 
tures of the Sikh sect. 

Guru : prophet, religious leader. 
A term of special prominence 
among the Sikhs. The first 
Guru was the founder of the 
sect, Nanuk ; the tenth in suc- 
cession, and the last, was Govind 
Singh, who gave the Sikh insti- 
tutions their final authoritative 

Havildar : a non-commissioned 
officer in a native regiment. • 

Hindi : the purest of the dialects 
descended from Sanskrit. 

Hindostan: (1) All India. (2) 
India noith of the Nerbadda, as 
opposed to the Dekhan (q.v. ) ox 
India south of the Nerbadda. (3) 
Ilindostan proper, i.e. Northern 
India exclusive of the Panjab and 
of Behar and Bengal. 

Hindostani : (1) an inhabitant of 
Hindostan ^oper (v.s.). (2) a 

dialect, otherwise called Urdu, of 
which the chief components are 
I lindi and Persian ; which grew up 
in the mixed camps of the Mogul 
armies, becoming a sort of lingua 
franca or general medium of com- 

Hookam : an order. 

IKBAL : luck, “star.” 

Interloper : the name applied to 
unlicensed traders in the days 
of the East India Company’s 

Jaghir or Jagbrr : an estate 



granted rent-free on condition of 
military service ; usually but not 
necessarily continued to the 
successors of the grantee on pay- 
ment of fines or fees. Hence 
Jaghirdar, the holder of a 
jaghir . 

Jemmadar: a native officer in a 
sepoy regiment. 

Khalsa : the Sikh body in its 
aspect as a military brotheihood ; 
the Sikh regiments of the army 
of the Panjab state. 

Khan : chief, lord ; a Mohammedan 
title, commonly borne by com- 
manders. When a Khan possessed 
himself of a crown, he took the 
title of Shah instead : c.g. Ahmed 
Khan Durani became Ahmed 
Shah, and Nadir Khan became 
Nadir Shah. 

Lac or Lakh = 100,000 ; hence 
Usually for a lakh of rupees — 

Lat-Sahib or Lord-Sahib : native 
title for the Governor-General. 

Maharaja: a Hindu title = great 
king, or king of kings : later, the 
high title of honour granted to 
Hindu princes by the Emperor or 
the British. 

Masnad or Musnud : the royal 
cushion or throne. 

MIr : see Amir. 

Misl : the great Sikh body was a 
combination of small ei groups or 
confederacies called Mists. 

Mofussil : the country districts, 
as distinguished from the cities. 

Mogul: (i) title of the emperors 
ofi the house of Baber ; (2) 

Mussulmans other than Hindu 
converts or those of Afghan 
descent ; (3) the Mughal division 
of the Tartar race ; the origin of 
both the other applications of the 

MohXrram : an* annual period of 
fasting among the Mohammedans, 

accompanied by great religious 

Mohur : the standard gold coin of 
India, of the approximate value 
of 15 rupees. 

Monsoon : the periodical south- 
west wind blowing generally from 
May onwards ; also used for the 
N. E. trade wind, blowing in 
October and November. 

Moonshke : secretary, or tutor. 

Moor or Moormen : the name 
used by old writers for the Indian 

Mo*, lvie : a Mohammedan doctor 
or professor of the Law. 

Mug : the name used by the British 
for the people of Arakan. 

Mullah or Mollah : the same as 

Musnud : see Masnad. 

Mussulman : Mohammedan. Ap- 
parently corrupted from Alusli - 
man the plural of Moslem or 
A/us Urn. 

Nabob : a corruption, (1) formerly 
used for Nawab {q.v.) equiva- 
lent to Potentate; (2) herce ap- 
plied to Europeans who ret jrned 
from India with purses and 
Oriental habits. 

NAwab or Nuwab : a Deputy, or 
nominally subordinate governor 
of a Province of the Mogul Empire, 
e.g. Gudh, Bengal, the Carnatic. 
It seems in fact to have been 
originally a plural of Naib = 
deputy in the same way that 
Omrah came to be used as = 
chief or lord, from being origin- 
ally plural of Amir \ 

Naik : chief, not a title of the 
first rank. Haidar Ali was known 

v as Haidar Naik before he made 
himself Sultan of Mysore. 

Nullah: the bed of a stream, 
whether dry or running. 

Nuzzur: a giti, fine, or benevo- 
lence from a feudal inferior. 

Omrah : chief or lord. Properly, 



the plural of Amir, q.v . A 
Mohammedan title. 


Paddy field : rice field. 

Padishah, or Padshah : the great 
King. A title reserved to the 
Mogul, but bestowed latterly by 
the British on the king of Oudh. 

Pagoda : (i) a Hindu Buddhist 
temple ; (2) more rarely, an idol ; 
(3) a coin, generally but not al- 
ways gold. 

Panchayet or Punchayet : a 
committee or council primarily 
consisting of five members (-from 
pancli, five), which controlleclVhe 
affairs of the village communities, 
•with the Patel or head-man as its 
president. Hence applied to 
otfcer committees, notably thefce 
elected by the Khalsa {q.v.) re- 
giments formed on the *same 

PAndit or Pundit: a man of 
learning, the Hindu equivalent 
of the Mohammedan Moulvar. 

Pandy : the name commonly applied 
to the Mutiny sepoys. Panel? is 
the name of a Brahmin caste 
whv,n supplied a large proportion 
of "the r^egruiD from the Upper 
Provinces^r-i the Bengal army : 
hence allied generally to the 
Hindostani sepoys. # 

Panjab. Punjab, or Punjaub : (1) 
the country lying in the tjiangle 
formed by the Indus, the Satlej, 
and the Kashmir mountains ; liter- 
ally Panch-ab, the Five Waters 
( cf Doab, the land between two 
waters), watered in fact by six 
rivers — Indus, Jhilum, Cjpenab, 
Ravi, Beas, Satlej ; jft*horities 
differing as to which of the six* 
is excluded, whether on account 
of size or of position. The Panjab 
was organised as a State by 
Ranjit Singh. (2) For administra- 
tive purposes, tbt name is ex- 
tended to embrace a province of 
the British System which includes 
Delhi on the £. and Peshawar 

on the W. (3) A portion of this 
rovince (trans- Indus) has in 1901 
een incorporated in a new 
“frontier" province and is no 
longer part of the official Panjab. 

Pars ee : Persian sun- worshippers 
who formed and maintain a 
separate community. 

PAiel: the headman of a village 
community. Madhava Rao 
Sindhia with mock humility 
called himself — and was generally 
called — the Patel. The pronun- 
ciation is shown by the common 
spelling, Potaili of pre-mutiny 

PAth an : (1) name of the N.W. 
frontier tribesmen ; (2) equivalent 
to Afghan , an Indian Mussulman 
of the stock deriving from 
Afghanistan ; (3) specifically, of 
the Mussulman robber companies 
associated with the Pindaris, 
whose most famous chief was 
Amir Khan. * 

Feishwa or Peshwa : primarily, 
the title of a minister of the 
Maratha heirs of Sivaji. The 
office became hereditary in the 
family of the Brahmin Balaji Wis- 
wanath, the Peshwas absorbing 
the supremacy in the Maratha 
confederacy, while the repre- 
sentative of Sivaji became a rot 
fain Sant. 

Peon : chiefly i f use in S. India ; 
(sometimes) for a foot-soldier ; an 
orderly, or a member of the police. 

Pergunnah : sub-division of a Dis- 
trict or Zillah. 

Permanent Settlement : the 
zemindari land settlement of 
Bengal made by Lord Cornwallis, 
fixing in perpetuity the amount 
of the rent or land-tax payable 

f by the zemindar is. 

Perwanna or Purwanna : an 
official order. 

Peshcush : fee, fine, or quit-rent. 

Pin dari : a class of free-booters, 
mainly Maratha, who developed 
into an army of marauders, in 



conjunction with the organized 
bands of Pathans. The most 
celebrated chiefs of the two 
bodies were Amir Khan, and 
Chitu. Their head-quarters were 
in Central India, N. of the Ner- 

Poligar : title of estate-holders in 
the Madras Presidency. 

Political: applied only to “for- 
eign” affairs. The “Political” 
Department is the Department 
for foreign affairs, and “politi- 
cals” the officers engaged thereon. 

Pot ail : see Patel. 

^ Pucka: genuine, hall-marked, the 
opposite of cutcha. 

Pundit : see Pandit. 

Punjab : see Panjab. 

Purdah : the curtain, secluding 
the women of the household. 

Raja : a Hindu title, originally 
equivalent to “ king,” with Maha- 
raja as a sort of superlative. The 
Lead of any Rajput clan was a 
Raja. The Moguls granted the 
title to sufficiently important 
Hindu zemindars or chiefs. 
“Prince” is perhaps the nearest 
equivalent. Rais and Ran A are 
variants : so is the Rao common 
among Maratha names. 

Rana : the form of Raja appropri- 
ated by the chief of Udaipur, 
in Rajputana. » 

Rani : Queen or Princess : femi- 
nine of Raja. 

Rayat or Ryot : an actual culti- 
vator of the soil. Hence Ryot- 
wari settlement, a revenue 
settlement under which the col- 
lector levies the government rent 
or land-tax from the cultivator, 
direct, without intervention of a 
superior land -holder. 

Residency : the quarters of the 
Resident [f.v.). 

Resident : the accredited repre- 
sentative of the British at the 
greater protected or semi -inde- 
pendent courts* 

Rupee : a silver com, reckoned as 
worth two shillings or one-tenth 
of a pound stealing, until the de- 
preciation of recent years. A lakh 
— 100,000 R7= ^10,000. A Crore 
— 10,000,000 19=^1,000,000. 

Ryot : see Rayat. • 

Sadr or Suddrr : supreme : esp. 
the Sadr Adalat or Supreme 

Sahib : title of respect, gentleman : 
applied generally to the British. 

Sati : dedicated ; specifically, a 
widow dedicated to self-immola- 
’von, on her husband’s funeral- 
pyre. The custom was peculiar 
to Hindus. More commonly 
written Suttee. 

Sthad : a Mohammedan of a frmily 
claiming descent from the Pro- 

Sepoy: a native soldier in the 
British service. Also written 

Sh^ h : Mohammedan equivalent 
of king. 

Shahzada : heir-apparent. 

Sh aster : the Hindu sacred 
writings. Shastri, a jKofessor 
ol the Hindu Law. 

Shi a: name of oV**' df the two 
great sects of the Av^hammedan 
body. The Persian “Sofy,”and 
the Mussulman kings of the Dek- 
han were Shias. The Moguls 
belohged to the opposition sect 
of Sunnis. 

Shikari : hunter. 

Sikhs : originally a religious sect 
of “reformed” Hindus, founded 
by N anuk : who gradually became 
fornl$?*. into a semi -religious semi- 
military community, and acquired 
the control of the Panjab and 
Sirhind. Sikh = disciple. 

Singh: lion. A common name 
among Rajputs, adopted univer- 
sally Dy all , Sikhs ; who in the 
literature of the Panjab wars 
are often referred to as the 



Sipahi : see Sepoy. 

SIRDAR : office* chief, lord. 

Sirkar or Sircar: (i) the supreme 
Government ; (2) the Eastern 

districts of the Dekhan ; also 
spelt drear and Sarkar . 

Sofy : the hairopean corruption of 
Safavtj the name of a Persian 

Subaii : (1) a province ; (2) used 
for Subadar 3 the governor of a 
province. Thus the Nizam was 
also called Subadar of the Dek- 
han. # In regimental language, 
the Subadar is the highest -Vade 
of native officer. 

Judder : see Sadr. 

Sunni : see Shia. 

Sunnud or San nad : a parent 
from Government. 

Suttee : see Sati. * 

Talukdar : a landed proprietoi ; 
a term in use in Hindustan. 
Hence, Talukdari settle- 
ment ; a revenue settf^ment 
under which the land-tax or 
government rent is levied from 
the talukdar s without interven- 
tion of a superior zemindar .* 

Tamii. : • vf . pre- Aryan language, 
spoken^f^parts of the Dekhan. 

j Telugu : a pre-Aryan language, 
spoken in parts of the Dekhan. 

Thuggee or Thagi : the occupa- 
! tion of the Thugs, or Thags, 

| tribes of professional hereditary 
( murderers. 

Urdu : the language of the camp, 
i.e. Hindostani {(/.v.). 

‘ Vakii. or Vakeel : secretary ; or 
member of a minor embassy or 

Vedas : the sacred books of the 
j Hindus. '* 

i Vizier or Wazir : chief minister. 


Writer : junior clerk in the service 
of the IT.E.I.C. 

Zemindar : landed proprietor ; 
zemindar 1 : the office or the 
estate of a zemindar. Hence, 

revenue settlement under which 
the land-tax or government rent 
is levied from the zemindars. 

Z I- NANA : the women’s apartments ; 
hence the women of the house- 

1 Z11.LAH : a jevenue district. 


The numbers are those of the maps on which the entries are to be 
found. Places marked on the general map (I.) have also letters showing 
their position on that map. 

Places which the student is likely to find mentioned in other works, 
with a spelling materially differing from ^.at in the text or on ?he map, 
Vare entered in both forms in the index. 

Afghanistan . . Ida, 2. Bandelkhand (Bun-\ e 

Agra . . . i/'<,2,5,7. delcund) /* * 

Ahmedabad , , 16V, 5. Bangalur . . . I DA, 3. 

Ahmednagar . . if/, 5. Bannu* (Bunnoo) . iCa, 6. 

Ajmir . . , 1 CV, 5, 7. Bardwan (Burdwan) . I Gei, 4. 

Aligarh . . . I De, 5, 7. Barech . . .7. 

Aliwal . , . 1 Db, 6. Bareilly . . .7. 

Allihabad . . I Ed, 4, 7- Baroph (Broach) . iCe, 5. 

Almora . . 7. Baioda . . . I Ce, 5. 

Amballa (Umballa) . 1 Db, 6, 7. Basherat-Ganj (Bush-\ 7 
Ambur . . .3. erut Gunge) / 7 * 

Amirkot(Ummercote) \BJ. Bassein . . . iCj, 5. 

Amrawati . . *5- Beas K. . .6. * 

Amritsir (Uniritsar) . 1 Dl>, 6. Beejapore (Bijapur) *>» **£>/*. 

Arakan . . . I He, 2. Behar . . . 2, 4. 

Aravali Hills . . 2. Bcllary (Balleiri) . r Dg. 

Arcot . . . I hh, 3. Benares . . . I Fd, 4, 7. 

Argaon . % . 1 De, 5 Bengal . . . I Gd, 2, 4. 

Arni . . . I Eh, 3. Berar v . . . I De, 2, 5. 

Arrah * . . . 7. Bhartpur (Burtpore) . \Dc, 5, 7. 

Arras . . . iCV, 5. Bhawalpore (Baha-\ r , 

Asirgarh . , -5- walpur) J * 

Assam . . 1 lit, 2, 4. Bhopal . . . iDd, 5, 7. 

Assaye , . . 1 De, 5. Bhotan . . . iGc, 4. 

Attok . . . iCa. BijapurivJ^ejapore) . 1 Df 

Aurangabad . . iDf, 5. I}ikanir . . . I CV. 

Ava<* . . . lie Biluchisfan . . I Ac, 2, 6. 

Azimgarh . 7. f Bithui . 7. 

Boad . . . iFe, 

Bahawalpur (Bhawal*\ * Bolan Pass , . 6. 

pore) jiCc,o. Bombay . . . iCf, 2, 5. 

BajBaj (Budge Budge) 4. Boondee (Bundi) . 5. 

Baksar (Buxar) . s . iFd, 4. Brahmaputra F. (Bur-\ # 

Ballari (Bellari) . 1 Dg, 3. rampooter) / * * ** 

Bamian . • . iBa, 6. Broach (Baroch) , iCe t 5. 




_ - jBaj) 4. 
Bundelcund (Bandel -1 , t?j , - 
khand) / l£d ’ 5 . 7 - 

Bundi (Boondee) . 5. 

Bunnoo (Bannu) . iCa, 6. 
Buranpur (Burham-| J jr >€ $ 

Burdwan (Bardwan) . 1 Gd, 4. 

Burrumpooter R, \ _ r T . 

(Brahmaputra) J 2 ' 4 * 

Burma . . lie, 2. 

Burtpore (Bhartpur) . iDc, 5, 7. 
Busherat Gunge (Bas-' 
herat Ganj) 

Buxar ( i 3 aksar) 

} 7 - 
I Fd, 

# Cabul (Kabul) . 

Cachar (Kachar) 
Calcutta . 

Calicut (Kalikat) 
Calpee (Kalpi) . 
Candahar (Kandahar) 
Candeish (Kandesh) . 
Canouj (Kanauj) 
Carical (Karikal) 
Carnatic . 

Cashmere (Kashmir) . 
CauverjfcV?. (Kaveri) 
Cauveripack (Kaveri-^ 

r^) I 

Ca wn pose •( K ahn j >u r ) 
Ceylon ^0' ' 

Chambal R. (Chum -1 
b«l) j 

I Ba, 2, 6. 

I Hd. 

1 Gc, 2, 4. 

I Dh, 3* 

I Ab, 2, 6. 

1 Ce, 5. 

1 E<. 

1 Eh, 3. 

I D*, 2, 3. 
1 Da, 2. 

1 Dh, 2, 3. 

1 Ec, 4, 7 * 
1^?, 2, 3. 

iDd, 2, 5> 7* 

Chandairi (Chundey-') 
ree) J 7 \ 

Chandernagar (Chun- \ _ 

dernagore) J 10e ’ 4 ‘ 

Chenab X. . i Ci, 6. 

Chengalpat (Chingle-\ 
put) / 3 * 

Chillian walla . . iQf, 6. 

Chinsura . . . iGd, 4 

Chitaldrag . . 1 Dg, 3. • 

Chittagong . . 4. 

Chumbul R. (Cham*\ iDd , 2, 
bal) / 7- 

Chunar • . *4* 

c dSSssr (C *"'} ,a ' 4 - 

Chundeyree (Chan*\ „ 
dairi) / 7> 

Circars (Sarkars) . 1 Ff % 2. 

Cochin . . .3. 

Coimbatoor (Koim-\ 
batur) / 3 * 

Comorin, Cape . . i/>/, 3 

Concans (Konkans) . I C/i 5. 
Conjeveram . . 3. 

Coorg (Kurg) . . 1 Dh, 3. 

Coromandel Coast . 3. 

Cotah (Kotah) . . \Dd , 5. 

Coveripak (Kaveri- 

pak) ) lEh - 

Cuddalore (Gudalur) . I Eh, 3. 
Currachee (Karachi) . I Ad. 
Cutch (Katch) . . iBd. 

Cutwah (Katwah) . 4. 




Deraj at 
Devikota . 
Dholpur . 
Dindigul . 
Dina pur . 
Doab, The 

I Bb, 6. 

I Hd, 4. 
f 1 Dc, 2, 
l 6, 7- 
i Bb, 6. 
1 Eh, 3. 

i • 


7 , 

Emamgur(Imamgarh) l Be, 

Faizabad (Fyzabad) 7. 
Fatehpur(Futteypoie) 7. 
Ferozepore (Firozpur) I Cb, 6. 
Ferozeshah (Firoz- \ ^ g 

shah) J * 

Ferruckabad (Firak- \ c 
abad) j 

Fort St David . . I Eh, 3. 

Fulta . . . 4. 

Futteypore(Fatelipur) 7. 
Fyzabad (Faizabad) . 7. 

Gandak R . 

Gandamak (Gunda- 


Gantur (Guntoor) 

Ghats, > 1 

Ghats, W. 

7 * • 

• iBa, 6. 
r 1 Gtf, a, 
l 5 > 7 * 
3 ' 

5 . 





Ghazni (Guznee) 
Gheriah . 

Gingee (Jinji) . 

Goa .... 
Godaveri R. 

Gogari R. (Gogra) 
Golconda . 

Goomtee R. (Gumti) 
Goona (Guna) . 
Gooty (Guti) 
Gorakota . 

Gudalur (Cuddalore) 
^Gujerat (Goojerat) 

Gumti R. (Goomtee) 
Guna (Goona) . 
Gundamuck (Ganda- 

Guntoor (Gantur) 

Guti (Gooty). . 
Guznee (Ghazni) 
Gwalior . 

Haidarabad (Hydera- 






Hugli R. (Hough ley) 
Hugri R. . 
Hyderabad, see % 

Imamgarh (Emamgur) 
Indore (Indur) . 

Indus R< . 

Irawadi R . 

7 * 

I Ba, 6. 
vfic, 7. 
lEk, 3 


I ■£/. 2, 5- 

I Re, 7 . 

'Of, 3- 
1 Ed, 4, 7. 
7 - 

1 Og, 3 - 
7 - 

1 Eh, 3. 

ICY>, 6. 

1 Cd, 2, 6. 
1^/, 4, 7. 
7 * 

j i/fo. 

3 - 

3 « 

I /to, 6. 

iZ)d,2, 5 , 7 . 

| i/y, 2, 3. 



I Aa. 

I Z)b t 6. 

7 - 

4 - 

iC^, 4- 

3 - 


'Or, 5 . 7 - 
2, 6. 

2 . 

Jabalpur (Jubbalpore) 
Jaganath (J uggernaut) 
Jalandar (Jullunder) . 
Jammu (Jummoo) 

Jamna (Jumna) 

Jaunpur . 


I Ee, 4, 5 , 7. 
1 Re. 
iDb , 6. 
iZto, 6. 

2, 4, 

5 > 7 

5, 7. 

6 . 

Jelum (Jhelum) . iCh, 6. 

J essalmir ( J eysalmeer) 1 /to. 

Jhansi . . . I Dd, 5, 7. 

Jhelum (Jelum) . . 1 Ca, 6. 

Jinji (Gingee) . . 1 Ek t 3. 

Jodhpur . . . iCV, 5. 

Jubbalpore (Jabalpui)' 1^,4, 5,7. 
Juggernaut (Jaganath) iBe. 
Jummoo (Jammu) . 1 Da, 6. 

Tumna X. (Jamna) I lE ?' 2 ’ 4 * 
l 5 > 7 * 

Kabul (Cabul) . 
Kachar (Cachar) 
Kahntpur (Cawnpore) 
Kab\.at (Calicut) 
Kalpi (Calpee) . 
Kananur . 

Kanauj (Canouj) 
Kafidahar (Candahar) 
Kandesh (Candeish) . 
Karachi (Currachee) . 
Karikal (Carical) 
Kashmir (Cashmere) 
Katch (Cutch) . 
Katwa (Cutwah) 
Kavcri R. (Cauvery) . 
Kaveripak (Coveri- 


Kelat-i-Ghilzai . 
Kerauli . . 

Khaibar Pass ( Khyber ) 
Khairpur (Kyrpore) . 
Khistna R. (Krishna) 
KhyberPass( Khaibar) 
Kojak I?ass 
Konkans ('Con cans) . 
Kotah (Cotah) . 
Krishna R. (Khistna) 
xvumaon . 

Kurg (Coorg) . 

Kyrpore (Kairpul) 

iBa, 2, 6. 
1 Hd. 

' JSt, 4 , 7 - 
'Oh, 3- 
1 Ed, 7. 

I Ab, 2 , b. 
iCe, 5. 

I Ad. 
iEk y 3 . 

1 Da> 2, 6. 
1 Bd, 
iRc y 4 . 

1 Be. 

4 . , 

\Dh % 2 , 3 . 
} 3 -* 


Uy 2, 6. 


\DCy 5, 6,7. 



iFcy 4 . 

*A r » 2, 3- 


6 . 

3 * 



1 Ddy 5. 

;ft 2> 

I-DA. 3. 


3 - 

Lahore . . I Cb, 2 , 6 , 

Laswan . . l£>c> 5. 



Lucknow * 

Ludhiana . 

Mahanadi R. 
Maharajpur • . 


Mahi R. . 

Maisur (Mysore) ^ 

Malabar Coast . 

Mandalay . 

Mangalu# . 

Mangarwar (Mungar- \ 
war) / 

Manipur (Munnypore) 
Metanec (Miani) 
Meerut (Mirat) . 

Mhow (Mhao) . 
Midnapur . 

Miani (Meeanee) 

Mirat (Meerut) . 

Mirpur * . 

Moodkee (Murlki) 
Mooltan (Multan) 
Moo^sheftabad (Mur 

Mutiid (Moodkee) 
Multan (lftp< ll an) 
Mungarwftf' (Mangar-\ 
war) f 

Munnypore (Manipur) 
Murshedabad (Moor- ) 
shedabad) J 

Mysore (Maisur) 

lEc, 2, 4, 7. 
i Db, 6. 

I Eh, 2, 3. 
ifie , 2. 
lDc> 5. 

I Ch, 3. 

5 - 

1 Dg, 2, 3 5 
iDh t 3. 

3 - 

lDii, 2, 5. 

1 Ch, 

7. A 

1 Hd. 

2, 3. 

1 Be. • 
7 . * 

I Ge, 4. 

I Be. 

I Dc, 5,6,7. 
\Bd. m 
iDb, 6. 
iC'/;, 6. 

1 6 * 7 , 2, 4. 
1 /#, 6. 

iC£, 6. 

7 . 

I Hd. 

iGdy 2, 4. 

I A>, 2, 3 ; 
17 ^, 3. 

Nagpur . . . iii*, 2, 5. 

Nasirabad (Nusseera- \ 
bad) / # 

Negapatam . . 1 Eh , 3. • 

Nepal . . - 1 Fey 2, 4, 7. 

Nerbadda A\ . . iZte, 2, 5, 7^j 

Nimach (Neemuch) . 7. 

Nusseerabad (Nasira -1 „ 
bad) • ] 7 - 

Oodeypore (Udaipur) iCd , 2, 5. 
Orissa . . i/Jp, 2, 4. 

Oudh . . . lEc, 2, 4, 7, 

Painganga R. (Pen* 



iDby 6. 


I Cby 2, 6. 


l&by 6 , 7* 


lEd,2, 4, 7. 


Ufy 2. 

Pengunga A\ (Pain- 

5 - 


Peshawar . 

iCdy 2. 

Philbbit . 

7 . 


I Gdy 4* 

Pollilur . 

3 . 


I Ehy 2, 3. 

iCf 5. 

Poonah (Puna) . 

Porto Novo 

3 - 


1 Tf 

Puna (Poonah) . 

iCfy 5 . 


iDdy 5. 

Putliala (Patiala) 

1 Dby 6, 7. 


iBb, 2, 6. 

Raigarh . 

iCfy 5- ^ 


1 1 Cc, 2, 5, 

\ 6 , 7* 


iC^, 6. 

Rampura . 

i/? 7 , 5. 

Rangoon . 


Rassul (Russool) 

Ravi R, . 

1 Ca, 6. 

1 Cby 6. 

Rewa (Riwa) 

iTu/, 4, 7. 


J iA<\ 2, 4, 
l 5 > 7 - 


Russool (Rassul) 

iCa, 6. 


I Cby 6. 

Sagar (S augur) . 

iZ> 7 , 5, 7. 

Sakhar (Sukkar) 

\Bc y 6. 

Salsette . 

1 cy; 5. 

Sarkars (Cirkars) 

1/# 2. 

vSatara (Sattara) 

16/, 5. 

Satlej (Sut ledge) 

I Cby 'Ey 6 . 

Saugur (Sagar) . 

iDdy 5, 7 . 
i 7 ?c, 2, 6. 

Scinde (Sindh) . 

Seetapore (Sitapur) . 

7 - 

Seringapatam . 

iDhy 2, 3, 


ii?c, 6. 

1 Gey 4. 


Simla . . • 

1 Db % 6. 

Sindh R. . 

5 * 



Sindh (Scinde) . 
Sirhind . 



Sitapur(Seetapore) . 
Sobraon . 

Sukkur (Sakhar) 
Suleiman M. 

Sutledge R. (Satlej) . 

Tanghabadra R. 

Tapti R. . 

Terai, the 





iBct 2 , 6 . 

\Db> 7 , 

7 » 

5 * 

7 ’ 

6 . 

i Be, 6. 

2 . 

4 , 7 * 

Trincomali , . iEi t 3. 

Tumbudra 7 ?. (TUi- \ ^ - 

ghabadra) / l£J *' 

Udaipur (Oodeypore) iCd \ 2, 5. 
Umballa (Amballa) iDb> 6, 7. 
Ummercote (Amirkot) iBd. 
Umritsur (Amritsir) . 1 Db y 6. 

iCe , 2, 5. 
iC/j, 2, 6. 


1 Eh, 3. 

Vindhya Hills . 


1 2, 3. 



Vizierabad (Wazira- \ 

1 V6, 6. 

3 * 

V*d) J 

1 2, 5* 

1 Ec. 

Wainganga R . . 

5 - 



3 - 

5 - 

Warda A. 

i-Pe, 2 t 5. 

iCf, 5. 

i/V, 2, 3. 

Wargam . 


I Cb, 6. 


Abbott, J., 264, 269. 

Abdalis, 76, 83, 84. 

Abercrombie, Gen. Robert, 130, 

133 - 

Adam, ^r, 179. 

Adoption, 280, 304, 331. \ 

Afghanistan, 222-224, 227-233 ; see 

Afghans, 13, 14. 

imitators, 306. • 

Agnew, Vans, 266, 267. 

Agra, 55, 151, 253, 309, 3ft, 315, 

Ahalya Bai, 147. 

Ahmed Shah, 76, 83, 85. 
Ahme 3 abad, 100. ^ 

Ahmednagar, 14, 20, 21, 28, 150, 

I S*' # 

Ai^la-chapelle, 62, 65. 

Ajilir, 31 1. 

Allbar, Ifc-20, 51. 

Akbar (Prince), 27, 32. 

Akbar Jfifian, 241, 243, 245. 
Ala-ud-din, 14. • 

Alam Bagh, 319, 320, 321. 
Albuquerque, 39. 

Alexander the Great, 6. 

Aligarh, 1 51. 

Ali Murad, 248, 249. 

Ali Vardi Khan, 36, 62, 76. 
Aliwal, 262. 

Allahabad, 88, 90, 95, 96. 97, I 34 > 
309, 3io> 311, 313, V 7 - 
Almora, 166. 

Alptegin, 13. 

Amar Singh, 165-167. 

Amballa, 259, 306, 310, 31 1, 

3 * 4 - 

Ambur, 66. 

American war, 94, 99, 102. 
Amherst, Lord, 179-185, 21 1. 
Amils, 197. 

Amin Chand, see Omichund. 

Amir (Kabul), 229; see Dost 

Amirs of Sindh, see Sindh. 

Amir Khan, 147, 158, 162, 163, 
166, 169-174. - 

Amirkot, 250. * 

Amrawati, 171. 

Angria, 71. 

Anderson, 267. 

Annexations and Cessions — 
Allahabad, 134. 

Arakan, 182. 

Assam, 182. 

Bandelkhand, 16 1. 

Baramahal, 131. 

Benares, 106, 109, 114. 

Carnatic, 141. 

Jalandar, 262. 

Jhansi, 282. 

Kachar, 186. 

Maratha districts, 151, 174. 
Mysore districts, 1 31, 1 40. 
Nagpur, 283. 

N.W. Provinces, 143. 

Panjab, 270* 277. 

Pegu, 276, 277. 

Sagar, 174. 

Sambalpur, 285. 

Sarkars, 90. 

Sattara, 281. 

Sindh, 250. 

Surat, 141. 

Tanjur, 14 1. 

Tenasserim, 182. 

Annexation policy, 277 ff, 

Anson, Gen., 314. 

Anwar-ud-din, 62, 65, 66. 

Apa Sahib, 169-175. 

Appeal Courts, 192. 

Arabs, 12, 1 72. 

Arakan, 179, 180, 182, 276, 294. 




Arcot, 68, 100, 142, 279, 286 ; see 

Argaon, 151. 

Army, 89, 134, 193, 250, 258, 266, 
292, 3 OI > 302, 305, 309, 332, 339, 
340 . 

Ami, 69. 

Arrah, 318. 

Arras, 98. 

Aryans, 6. 

Asaf Jah, see Nizam. 
Asaf-ud-daulah, 109, 116. 

Asirgarh, 174. 

Assam, 179, 182. 

Assaye, 150. 

Assessment, 112, 132, 197, 202. 
Attok, 227, 269, 270. 

Auckland, Lord, 186, 234-242, 245, 
248, 255. 

Aurangabad, 29, 150. 

Aurangzib, 18, 22, 24-33, 43 > 5 1 - 
Ava, 179, 182, 274. 

Avitabile, 226, 230. 

Azim (Barakzai), 227, 228, 229. 
Azim Jah, 286. 

Azinfgarh, 313. 

Baber, 13-17, 19. 

Bahadur^hah, Jp, 34. 

Bahawalptfr, 23^ 268.. 

Baillie, Col., 103. 

Baily CJpard, 312. 

Bairam, 18. 

Baird, David, 144. 

Baj-Baj, 77. 

Baji Rao,;^*? Marath^s, Peshwa. 
Baksar, see Buxar. 

Bala Hissar, 239, 240, 245. 

Balaji Rao, see Marathas, Peshwa. 
Balaji Wiswanath, see Marathas, 

Balban, 13. 

Bamian, 245. 

Bandula, 180-182. 

BandeVihand, 161. 

Bangalur, 130. 

Bannu, 269. 

Barakzais, 222, 224, 227. 232. 
Baramahal, 131, 201. 

Barlow, Sir G., 155, 157-161, 203. 
Barnard, Gen., 314. 

Baroch, 15 1. 

Baroda, see Marathas, Gaikwar. 
Barrackpur, 183, 307. 

Barwell, 93, 98, not 
Basharat Ganj, 317, 318. 

Bassein, 98. 

Batta, 89. 

Battles — 

Aliwal, 262. 

Ambur, 66. 

Argaon, 151. 

Arni, 69. 

Arras, 98. 

Assaye, 150. 

Basherat Ganj, 317, 318. 
Budhowal, 262. 

BuyCr, 88. 

Chfilian walla, 270. 

Chinhat, 312. 

Daba, 249. 

Difi, 153- 

Firozshah, 260, 261. 

Gujemt, 271. 

Kaveripak, 69. 

Kiniri, 268. 

Kirki, 172. 

Laswjiri, 151. 

Maharajpur, 254. 

Miani, 249. 

Mudki, 260. 

Naval battles, 94, 105, 112, j/37, 

15b* % 

Panipat, 16, 18, 83, 84* ' 

Plassey, 80. 

Pollilur, 104# 

Porto Novo, 104. 

Puniar, 254. 

Ramnagar, 269. 

Saddusam, 26S. 

Sadulapur, 270. 

Sikri, 17. 

Sitabaldi, 172. 

Sobraon, 262. 

Solingsf.h,.® T 04 . 

Tezin, 245. 

Wandewash, 73. 

Bfejanuggur, 14. 

Beejapore, see Bijapur. 

Begum of Oudh (a) 109, 1 16 ; (d) 
3io, 313- « 

Mani B., 108, no. 

Benares, 106, 109, 114, 309, 313, 




Bengal, 5, 41, 44, 71, 75 ff-, 87 ff., 
198, 292. 

Bengal sepoys, sfe Hindostanis. 
Benthamism, 203. 

Bentinck, Lord W., 159, 179, 185, 
186, 203, 21 1, 213, 215, 237, 289. 
Berar, 151, ^285 ; see Marathas, 

Bernier, F., 51, 55, 56. 

Bhairowal, 263. 

Bhamani dynasty, 14. 

Bhartpur, 153, 183-185. 
Bhawalpore, see Bahawalpur. 

Bhils, 214. 

Bhonsla, ♦£<? Marathas, Bhonsb. 
Bhopal, 100, 1 68, 170. 

Bhyrowal, 263. 

Bijanagar, 14. 

Bijapur, 14, 20, 21, 28-33. 

Biltfehis, 264. 

Biluchistan, 222, 220, 237, 248. 
Bird, R. M., 203. • 

Bithur, 306. 

Black Hole, the, 76. 

Board of Control, 124, 189, 331. 
Bod, 290. - 

Bolan Pass, 222, 237. 

Bombay, ^42, 98, 99, 103, 106, 201. 
Boondee, see Bundi. 

Boscawen, Adm., 64. 

Bou jjhton^ 4,1. 

Bourquin, iji. 

Boyle, Viffirs, 318. 

Brahmaputra, 179. 

Brahmins, 8, 27, 194, 252, 301. 
Broach, see Baroch. 

Brasyer, 311. 

Brath waite, 104. 

Broadfoot, 243, 259. 

Bruce, 103, 106. 

Buddhism, 9. 

Budge Budge, see Baj Bai. 
Budhowal, 262. ** 

Buffer-state, 234. 

Buildings, 23, 55. 

Bundelcund, see Bandelkhand. 
Bundi, 158. 

Bunnoo, see Bannu. 

Burhampur, 100. • 

Burke, E., 92, 117, 337. 

Burma, 179-182, 274-276, 305. 
Burnes, A., 234, 235, 239, 240. 

Burtpore, see Bhartpur. 

Busherut Gunj, see Basherat Ganj. 
Bussy, 66, 69, 70, 72, 73. 79. 84, 

Bute, Lord, 91. 

Buxar, 88, 144. 

Cabul, see Kabul. 

Cachar, see Kachar. 

Calcutta, 43, 327. 

Calliaud, 87. 

Calpee, see Kalpi. 

Campbell, Sir A., 181. 

Campbell, Sir Colin, Lord Clyde, 

320, 321. 

Canals, 216, 2 88, 294. 

Canara, 201. 

Cananore, see Kananur. 

Candahar, see Kandahar. 

Candeish, see Kandesh. 

Canning, George, 168, 177, 179. 
Canning, Lord, 299, 304, 322, 326- 
328, 340-342. 

Canouj, see Kanauj. 

Cape Route, 39. 

Carnac, 88. 

Carnatic, Nawabs of, 62-74, too, 
1 41, 142, 279, 286* 

Cartridge Incident, 306, 324/ 325. 
Cashmere, see Kashmit'. 

Caste, 8, 181, 194, 251, 275* 3 ° 3 » 
305 > 306. 

Castlereagh, 179. 

Cawnpore, 309, 31 1, 312, 313, 316* 

321, 323, 326. 

Ceylon, 104, 14^. 

Chambai A., 151, 158, 311/ 
Chamberlain, N., 310. 

Chanda, 254. 

Chanda Sahib, 65^1 
Chandairi, 322. 

Chandernagar, 46, 7 1, 77. 

Charter Acts, 40, 44 ; Parliament. 
Chatham, Lord, 62, 71, 91, 92. 
Chattar Singh, 268, 269, 274. 

< Chauth, 31, 35, 90. 

Chenab 269, 270, 27 1. 

Cheyt Singh, 115. 

Chillian walla, 270. 

Chinhat, 312. 

Chinsura, 82. 

Chitaldrug, 140. 



Chittagong, 179, 180, 181. 

Chitu, 167, 171, 172. 

Cholera, 171, 317. 

Chout, see Chauth. 

Chumbul see Chambal A\ 

Chunar, 115. 

Chundernagore, see Chandernagar. 

Chundeyree, see Chandairi. 

Circars, see Sarkars. 

Cis-Satlej Sikhs, 162, 193, 311, 

Clavering, Gen., 98, 99, 107, 112. 

Civil Service, 190, 331. 

Clerk, Sir G., 242, 282. 

Climate, 5, 183. 

Clive, Robert — 

First appearance, 68 ; at Arcot, 
68, 69 ; at Trichinopoli, 69 ; re- 
turns to England, 71 ; destroys 
Angria, 71 ; recovers Calcutta, 
77 ; Omichund intrigue, 78 ; the 
two treaties, 79 ; advance to 
Plassey, 79 ; the battle, 80 ; con- 
duct as victor, 81 ; sends Forde 
to Sarkars, 73, 81 ; foils invasion, 
81 ; his jaghir, 82 ; Dutch epi- 
sode, 82 ; goes home, 82 ; return 
(in ’65), 85, 88 ; reforms, 89 ; 
suppresses mutiny, 89 ; policy to 
Delhi and Oudh, 90 ; accepts 
Diwani, 90 ; final retirement, 90 ; 

, character and work, 91 ; miscel- 
laneous, 92, 93, 95, 117, 284. 

Clive, Lord (Madras), 142. 

Clyde, Lord, see Campbell, Sir C. 

Coalition Ministry^ 122. 

Codification of Laws, 132. 

Coimbatore, see Koimbatur, 

Coke, 273, 291. 

Colbert, 42. 

Collectors, 132, 191. 

Colleges, 146, 215. 

Communication, 57, 288, 293, 294, 

3 2 9* 

Coiripany, the FI on. East India, 

40^-49. 70, 92. 189, 329, 330, 

Dutch E. I., 40, 45. 

French E. I., 42, 45-47, 70. 

Concans, see Kqnkans. 

Control, Board of, 124, 189, 331. 

Coorg, see Kurg. 

Coote, Sir Eyre, 73, 79, 80, 88, 104, 
105, 1 12. 

Corbett, 310. « 

Cornwallis, Lord, 124, 127 — 
Character, 128, 132; the Nizam, 
128; letter, 129; independence 
of action, 129; takes command, 
130 ; retreats, 131 ; decisive cam- 
paign, 13 1 ; policy and adminis- 
tration, 132, 137; retirement, 

132 ; refuses reappointment, 135 ; 
settlement, 198; return to India, 
153, r 55» 157 ; miscellaneous, 

137. 188- 

Cotah, see Kotah. 

Co/^on, Sir W., 237, 239. 

Council (Calcutta), 93, 98, 107 ff.. 
188, 190. 

Courts, no, 1 13, 191, 192. 
Ofveripack, see Kaveripak. * 
Cowley, Lord, see Wellesley, II. 
Crimean War, 302. 

Cromwell, Oliver, 42, 44. 
Cuddalore, see Gudalur. 

Currie, Sir F., 265, 267, 2^8. 

Cutwf h, see Katwa. 

Daba, 249. 

D’Ache, 72. * * 

Dacgity, 209, 211, 213, 288. *'* 
Dada, the, 251-253. 

Dadar, 237. 

Dakka, 294. 

Dalhousie, Itord — 

Arrival in India, 265 ; second 
Sikh war, 267 ; annexation of 
Panjab, 272 ff . ; attitude to Sirdars, 
272, to Henry Lawrence, 273 ; 
Burmese war, 275 ; views on 
annexation, 276 - 279 ; Sattara 
Minute, 277 ; theory of adoption, 
280 ; Sattara, 281 ; Jhansi, 282 ; 
Keraulif 282 ; Nagpur, 283, 286 ; 
t Oudh, 284, 285 ; treatment «of 
Nizam, 285 ; Arcot, 286 ; Nana 
« Sahib, 287 ; system in Panjab, 
291 ; education, 292 ; railways, 

293 ; telegraph, 294 ; public 
works department, 294 ; roads, 

294 ; post, 294 ; retirement, 295 ; 
character, 295 ; miscellaneous, 
304, 325. 



Daoodpootras, see Bahawalpur. 
Daulat Rao, j^Marathas, Sindhia. 
Davi, 208. 

Dekhan, 4 ff . , 50. 

De Boigne, 137, 150. 

Delhi, 13, 35, 37, 55. 9°. 151. *53. 
184, 308, fii, 314, 315, 317, 319, 
320, 326. 

Deogaon, 151. 

Derajat, 227, 264, 267. 

Derby, Lord, 331. 

Devikota, 66. 

Dhian Singh, 257. 

Dholpur, 253. 

Dhulip oingh, 257, 264, 272. 

Dig. 153- 

• Dinapur, 309, 3 1 3. 3*7. 3*8. 
Dinkar Rao, 31 1, 324. 

Directors, 49, 81, 92, 99, 146, 21 1, 
281. • 

Disaffection, causes of, 300 ^; 
Diwani, 90, 108. 

Dixon, 214. 

Doab, the, 143, 151. 

Dost Ali, 65. 

Dost Mohammed, 228, 2m)> 230, 
234, 235, 238, 239, 246, 274, 305, 
325 >« 26 . 

Dr^ce, 76. 

Dumas, 46, 65. • 

Dtnndu*if 306. 

Dundaj-Xi7, 123, 124. 

Dundu ranth, see Njjpa Sahib. 
Dupleix — 

Rise of, 37, 62 ; views of British 
rivalry, 62 ; schemes, 63 ; attacks 
Madras, 63 ; tricks Anwar-ud- 
din, 64 ; supports Native pre- 
tenders, 66 ; thwarted by Clive, 
69 ; his resistance, 70 ; retirement 
and disgrace, 70 ; miscellaneous, 


Dupleix-Fatehabad, 60. 

Durand, 321. 

Duranis, 83, 84, 222, 243, 

Durjan Sal, 184. 

Dutch, 40, 42-45, 82, 104. 

East India Company, see Company. 
Education, 215, 288, 292, 303. 
Edwardes, Herbert, 264, 267, 268, 
30S, 31°, 325- 

ttgypu 137, H4- 
Elizabeth, Queen, 40. 
Ellenborough, Lord, 242-246, 248, 
251-255, 288, 293. 

Ellis (Patna), 88. 

Elphinstone, Mountstuart, 16 1, 169, 
172, 176, 201, 202, 223, 237. 
Elphinstone, Gen., 239, 240. 
Emamgur, see Imamgarh. 
Enlistment, General Service, 305, 
324, 326. 

England, Gen., 243. 
Eyre, Vincent, 318. 

Faizahad, 1 16. 

Famines, 95, 2S8. 

Fanatics, 306. 

Farokshir, 34, 35, 44. 

Fateh Khan, 222, 224, 227, 228. 
Feroze — , see Firoz — . 

Feudalism, 204, 278. 

Firak abaci, 318. 

Firozpur, 237, 246, 259, 260, 266, 
3 IQ - 

Firozshah, 260, 270. 

Fitch, 40. 

Flint, 102. 

Forde, 73, 81, 82. 

Fort St David, 47, 64, 72. 

Fort William, 43, 47, 76. 

Fox, C. J., 122. 

Franks, 321. 

Frontier-men, 263, 273, 304. 
Francis, Philip, 98, 113, 117. 
Fraser, 153. 

Fujdar Khan, ^68. 

Fullerton, 105. 

Fulta, 77. 

Futtey — , see Fateh — . 

Fyzabad, see Faizabad. 

Gaik war, see Marathas, Gaik war. 
Gandamak, 240. 

Ganges, 4, 317, 320. 

Garrakota, 322. 

Gawilgarh, 15 1. 

General Service Enlistment Act, 
305* 324» 326. 

Geography, 3. 

George III., 91, 122, 123. 

George IV., 128. 

Gerian, 71. 



Ghat Mts., 4. 

Ghazni, 222, 227, 228, 241, 243, 

2 45- 

Ghilzais, 36, 239. 

Gholab Singh, 257, 263, 324, 326. 
Ghori dynasty, 13. 

Ghurkas, 165-167, 321, 323, 324. 
Gilbert, Sir W., 272. 

Gillespie, 149, 163, 166. 

Gingee, see J inji. 

Goa, 40. 

Godaveri, 4. 

Goddard, 100, 103, 106. 

Godwin, Gen., 276. 
f Gohud, 100. 

ftolconda, 14, 20, 21, 30, 32, 33. 
Goiakpur, 165. 

Gough, Lord, 254, 256, 259 263, 

Governor-General, powers of, 93, 
188, 190, 331. 

Govind Singh, 221. 

Grenville, 91. 

Grey, Gen., 254. 

Griffin, 64. 

Gudalur (Cuddalore), 105. 

Gujerat (Hindostan), 13, 32. 

(Panjab), 271. 

Gumsur, 289, 290. 

Gunah, 322. 

Gundamuk, see Gandamak. 

G ntur Sarkar, 128. 

Gurkhas, 165-167, 321, 323, 324. 
Gurus, 220. 

Guti, 69, 140. u 

Gwalior, 103, 185, 251-255, 283, 
31 1, 322, 324. 

Contingent, 254, 310, 311, 318, 

3 2 L 3 2 3> 3 2 4- 

Haidar Ali— 

Rise, 83, 84 ; progress, 85, 10 1 ; 
quarrels with Madras, 86, 102 ; 
invades Carnatic, 100, 102; con- 
test with Coote, 104 ; death, 105 ; 
character, 10 1 ; miscellaneous, 
128, 140, 200. 

Haidarabad (Dekhan), 35. 

Contingent, 160, 176, 285. 

Haidarabad (Sindh), 247, 249. 

Hall, 213. 

Hamilton, Dr, 44. 

Harbours, 5, 48, 65. 

Hardinge, Lord, 251*, 256, 259-263, 
265, 284, 288. 

Hansi, 31 1. 

I lari Pant, 131. 

Harlan, 230. 

Harris, Gen., 139. 

Hartley, 99, 103, 130. 

Hastings, Lord, 163 — 

Arrival in India, 164; situation, 
164 ; Ghurka war, 165-167 ; 
Pindari troubles, 167 ; attitude 
of Marathas, 168, 170; alliances 
of Hastings, 169, 170; strategic 
dispositions, 17 1 ; Pindari war, 

1 %j-i 74 ; subsequent treaties, 174, 
175; Palmer & Co., 176; char- 
acter and treatment, 177 ; miscel- 
laneous, 180, 188, 279. 1 

Hastings, Warren —, 87, 96, 107; governor 
of Bengal, 96; Rohilla war, 97; 
governor - general, 93 ; struggle 
with council, 98, 108-112; the 
Oudh Begums, 109, 116; 338; 
Maratha complications, 98 ff. ; 
Diwani, 108, 112, 198; Nun- 
comar, no ; letter of resignation, 
hi ; contest for Governor-Gen^al- 
ship, 1 12; contest with Hj^h 
Court, 1 1 3 ; judicial' ’ arrange- 
ments, 108, in ; Oudh«*>sidiary 
alliance, i?,2 ; action against 
Haidar, 104 ; conduct of foreign 
ahairs, 106; Cheyt Singh, 114, 
338; administration, 112; char- 
acter, 106, 1 16; impeachment, 
116, 337-339; death, 178; miscel- 
laneous, 127, 190, 209. 

Havelock, Sir II., 243, 306, 312, 
316-319, 321. 

Havelock »AlV?n, 322. 

H^ara, 264, 268, 269. m 

Herat, 222, 228, 232, 236, 238, 

, 305- 

High Court, the, no, 113. 

Himalayas, 3. 

Hindi, 6. £ 

Hindostan, 4^/22, 203. 

Hindostani, 6, / 

Hindostanis, 194, 304, 305, 310, 
313, 3 2 3> 345* 3*6. 



Hindu Kush, 238, 245. 

Hinduism, 6, 8, 181, 252, 280, 303* 
306. • 

Hira Singh, 257, 258. 

Hissar, 31 1. 

Hobart, Lord, 137. 

Hobhouse, Sif J., 237. 

Ilodson, 273. 

Holkar, see Marathas, Ilolkar. 
Holland, 40, 43"45» 104. 

Home, 315. 

Hornby, 98, 103. 

Hughes, 105. 

Hugli, 42. 

Human sacrifice, 289, 290. 
Humayun, 17. 

Hyder — , see Haidai. 



Imfey, 109, 112, 113, 114, 132.* 
India Acts, see Parliament. 

India House, 93, 146, 152, 153. 
Indur, 150, 320, 321. 

Indus ^.,230, 234. 

Infanticide, 21 1, 213, 288, 289, 292. 
Interlopers, 43. 

Invasions of India — 

Ahme^ Shah, 76, 83. 85. 
Alexander, 6. 

Arlbs, 12. 


Baber, ^l. 

Ghori,^'j, 14. 

Mahmud of Ghazni, *13. 

Nadir Shah, 36. 

Scythian, 6. 

Tamerlane, 14, 15. 

Irawadi A\, 179, 181, 275. 
Irrigation, 216, 288, 294. 

Jacob, 306. 

Jacobitism, 61. 

Jaghirdars, 197, 278. 

Jalandar, 262, 266. > 

Jammu, 257. 

Jamna JR. (Jumna), 3, 311, 313/ 

amrud, 230. 
ang Bahadur, 321* 

Jats, 9, 220. 

Java, 163. 

Jehandar Shah, 34. 

Jehangir, 20, 41. 

Jeipur, 25, 158, 185. 

Jellalabad, 240-244. 

Jelum R. t see Jhilum R, 

Jenghis Khan, 15. 

Jenkins, R., 172, 173, 174, 176, 

Jeswant Rao, see Marathas, Holkar. 
Jeswant Singh, 27, 29, 30. 

Jey Singh, 29, 30. 

Jhansi, 254, 280, 282, 310, 31 1, 
322, 326. 

, the Rani of, 282, 310, 313, 

322, 323, 324. 

Thats, 9, 183. 

Jhilum A\, 270. 

Jindan, the Rani, 257, 258, 264, 

Jinji (Gingee), 33, 67. 

Jodpur, 25, 166. 

Jones, Sir Harford, 160. 

Judicial System, no, 113, 191, 


Jugdespur, 318. 

Jummoo, see Jammu. 

Jumna Ak, see Jamna. 

Justice, Courts of, 108, no, in, 
1 1 3- 

Kabul, 16, 161, 222, 227, 228, 
238, 240, 241, 245. 

Kachar, 186. 

Kahnpur, see Cawnpore. 

Kali A\, 167. 

Kalpi, 313, 318, 32i> 322- 
Kamran, 228, 2452. 

Kananur, 139. 

Kanauj, 13. 

Kandahar, 222, 227, 229, 238, 240, 
241, 243. 

Kandesh, 214. 

Karim, 17 1, 172. 

Kashmir, 227, 262, 263, 324, 


Katmandhu, 165. 

Kattak, 37, 151. 

ICatwa, 79. 

Kaveripak, 69. 

Keane, Sir J. , 237, 238. 

Keating, Col., 98. 

Kelat, 229, 237, 238, 239, 248 
Kelat-i-Ghilzai, 243, 244. 



Kerauli, 280, 282. 

Khaibar Pass, see Khyber Pass. 
Khairpur, 247, 249. 

Khaisa, the, 221, 226, 252, 257. 
Kharak Singh, 256, 257. 

Kharram, see Shah Jehan. 

Khilji dynasty, 13. 

Khistna R,, see Krishna R . 

Khojak Pass, 222, 237. 

Khonds, 215, 289, 290. 

Khyber Pass, 222, 237, 238, 244, 
Kiniri, 268. 

Kirki, 172. 

Kirkpatrick, 138. 

Knox, 87. 

Kohinur, 227. 

Koimbatur, 130. 

Konkans, 32, 103. 

Kotah, 152. 

Krishna R 4, 141. 

Kshatryas, 8. 

Kumaon, 166. 

Kunwar Singh, 318. 

Kurg, 186. 

Kurnal, 314. 

La Bourdonnais, 63, 118. 

Lahore, 262, 264, 266, 268, 292 ; 
see Sikhs. 

Lake, Lord, 151, 152, 153, 157, 158. 
Lai Singh, 257, 260, 264. 

Oily, 71-74, 1 1 8. 

Lambert, 274, 275. 

Land-holders, 108, 198 ff., 278, 301, 
313 - 

Land -settlements, r$2, 196-205. 
Languages, 6, 215. 

Lapse, see Adoption. 

Laswari, 151. 

Law of Laureston, 69 . 

Lawrence, George, 241, 269, 304, 
3 * 4 - 

Henry, 263-265, 272, 273, 

27*. 2 77> 291, 295, 302, 304, 
310, 312, 315, 324, 325- 

John, 264, 269, 273, 291, 302, 

304 . 3 ™, 314 . 325 - 

Richard, 310. 

Stringer, 64, 67, 69, 72. 

Leadenhall Street, 93, 146. 

Lenoir, 46. 

Littler, Sir J., 26d, 261. 

Lodi dynasty, 14, 16. 

Lucknow, 109, *302, 310, 312, 315- 
317, 319, 321. 

Ludhiana, 228, 259. 

Lumsden, 273, 291. 

Lushai, 179. 

Macartney, Lord, 104, 124, 137. 
Macaulay, Lord, 97, 109, 153, 185 

Machi Bhaun, 312. 

M‘Leod, D., 310. 

Macnaghten, 237, 239-241. 

M'Neill, Sir J., 235, 236. 
Macpherson, Sir J., 124, tzj, 
M^-pherson, J. D., 310, 314. 
Macpherson, S. C., 289, 290, 311^ 
Madagascar, 45. 

MadhavaRao,.r<?* Marathas, Sindhia. 
M^doji, see Marathas, Sindhia. * 
Madras — 

Established, 42 ; captured by La 
Bourdonnais, 64 ; restored, 65 ; 
feeble policy, 66 ; Governor 
Saunders, 68 ; relations with 
Salarbat Jang, 85 ; relations with 
Haidar, 86; general mismanage- 
ment, 102, 105, 106 ; land settle- 
ment, 201. / 

Madras sepoys, 18 1, 194, 25/^305, 
323, 324 - ' ■ * 

Magistrates, 132. 

Mahanadi R,, 4, 289. 
Maharajpur, < 254, 258. 

Mahe, 46, 102. 

Mahmu$ of Ghazni, 13, 246. 

Ghilzai, 36. 

Sudozai, 227. 

Maisur, see Mysore. 

Malaun, 166. 

Malcolm, Sir J., 138, 145, 156, 160, 
I7I ’t 73*176, 201, 287. 

Malik Amber, 21. 

Mama, the, 251, 252. 

Manchus, 12. 

•Mangalur, 129. 

Mangarwar, 317, 319. 

Manipur, 179, 182. 

Mansel, 273. * 

Marathas — 

First appearances, 21, 27 ; rise 
under Sivaji, 28-31 ; under Sivaji’s 



liarathas — continued, I Marathas — Sindhia — continued . 

successors, 32-34 ; development 
under Peshwa?, 37 ; in Carnatic, 
46, 69, 73 ; expansion in Hindo- 
stan, 84 ; checked at Panipat, 83, 
84 ; Ragoba, 84, 94, 98-100 ; war 
with Bombay, 98^ ; Mysore war, 
1 31 ; the Pentarchy, struggles for 
ascendancy, 133, 138, 147 ; wars 
with Wellesley, 150-154; cessions, 
1 51 ; the Pindari war, 170-174; 
Gwalior intrigues, 251-253 ; Ma- 
harajpur, 254 ; in the Mutiny, 
320, 323 ; miscellaneous, 56. 
Barodf, see Gaikwar. 

Bhonsla — 

Pantaji, 34. 

Ragoji I., 37, 46, 76, 84. 
Janoji, 84. 

Mudajji, 98, 100, 103. 

Ragoji 11., 149-151, 163, 168, 

Apa Sahib, 169-175. 

Later, 283, 286. 

Gaikyar, 34, 98, 103, 150, 168. 
Gwalior, see Sindhia. 


Mutfiar Rao, 34. 

S[akoji, 95, 98, 103, 133, 147. 
^jswant Rao, 1 47-1 50, • 152, 
% i>3**57. 158, 162. 

MulJJkr Rao II., 169. 

Talroji II., 320. 

Indur, see Ilolkar. * 

Nagpur, see Bhonsla. 

Peshwa — m 

Balaji Wiswanath, 34. 

Baji Rao I., 36, 

Balaji Rao, 37, 38, 84. 

Madhu Rao, 84, 95, 98. 
Naraian Rao, 98. 

Baji Rao II., 134, 1^7, 166, 
168-175, 279 , 2*7. 

• Puna, see Peshwa. • 

Sindhia — 

Madhava Rao (Madoji), 95, 98J 
99, 103, 116, 125-127, 133, 
137, 208. 

Daulat Rao, #53, 147- 151, 1 57, 
158, 166, 168-175, 185. 
ankoji, 251. 

yaji, 251, 254, 3*1, 3« 

Ranoji, 34. 

Sivaji, 21, 26, 28-31. 

Marley, Gen., 166. 

Marriage, 212, 289. 

Martin, F., 42, 45. 

Masulipatam, 73, 81, 160. 
Mauritius, the, 45, 63, 102, 144, 

Medows, Gen., 130. 

Meeanee, see Miani. 

Meerut, see Mirat. 

Mercenaries, 56. 

Merwara, 212, 213. 

Metcalfe, Lord, 162, 176, 177, 184, 
186, 223, 237. 

Mhow, 320. 

Miani, 249, 252. 

Military Board, 288, 294. 

Mines at Lucknow, 316. 

Minto, Lord, 155, 159-163, 188. 

Mir Cassim, 87, 88. 

Mir Jafar, 78 ff.> 87, 88. 

Mirat, 259, 292, 306, 307, 309, 310, 

Mirpur, 247, 249. 

Misls, 221, 222, 224. 

Missionaries, 303. 

Moazzim, see Bahadur Shah. 

Mogul Dominion — 

Political theory, 52 ; Diwani, 19, 
26, 52, 196; justice, 53, 5si 
merits and demerits, 53^. ; 
nificence, 22, 55 ; aristocracy, 54. 

Mogul party, 306-308, 3 j 3} 333, 

324, 325. * 

Mohammed (Mahomet), 6, 12. 

Ali, 66-70, 100. 

Ghori, 1 3, 14. 

Reza Khan, 107, 108, ill. 

Shah (Mogul), 35, 37. 

(Persia), 232, 236. 

Mohammedanism, 6, 13, 15, 26, 

Mohammedans, 6, 252, 300-30 8, 

3 I 3» 3 2 °> 3 2 3> 3 2 4> 3 2 5> 

Mohan Persad, no. 

Moira, see Hastings, Lord. 
Monopolies, 43, 146, 189. 

Monson, 99, 112. 

Monson, Col., 152. 

Monsoons, 5 ff., 65. 



Montgomery, 273, 310. 

Moodkee, see Mudki. 

Mooltan, see Multan. 

Moorshedabad, see Murshidabad. 
Morari Rao, 69, 70. 

Mornington, see Wellesley, Lord. 
Morrison, Gen., 182. 

Morse, 63. 

Moti Masjid, 23. 

Mudki, 259, 260. 

Mughals, 12. 

Mulraj, 266-269. 

Mulj^n, 227, 228, 266, 268-271. 
Mungurwar, see Mangarwar. 
Munnipore, see Manipur. 

1 Munro, H., 88, 102, 201. 

* Munro, T., 174, 176, 181. 

Murray, Gen., 152. 

Murshidabad, 76. 

Mussulmans, see Mohammedans. 
Mutinies — 

British : undei Clive, 89. 

- Shore, 134. 

Barlow, 159. 

Sepoy: Vellur, 159, 303. 

Barrackpur, 183, 307. 

Trans-Indus, 250. 

Murshidabad, 307. 

Mirat, 307. 

The revolt, 308 ff. 

Series of mutinies, 311 ff. 

,Muzaffar Jang, 66, 67. 

Mysore, 69, 70, 131, 140, 157, 185 ; 
see Haidar Ali and Tippu. 

Nabobs, 92, 123. 

Nadir Shah, 35, 36, 62, 83. 

Nagpur, 37, 280, 283, 286. 

Nana Farnavis, 96, 98, 100, 125, 


Nana Sahib, 286, 287, 306, 307, 
3* 0 “3 I 3> 3i7i 32Q> 321, 323, 324- 
Nanda Kumar, see Nuncomar. 
Nanuk, 220, 292. 

Nao'xVehal Singh, 257. 

Napier, Sir C., 248-250, 271, 291, 


Napoleon, 73, 122, 136, 144, 156, 
160, 163, 222. 

Nasir Jang, 66, 67. 

Nasir Mohammed, 170, 

Nasirabad, 31 1. * 

Nationality, 9. 

Naval influence, 48, 62, 71, 137, 
1 56. ( 

Nawab Wazir, see Oudh. 

Neemuch, see Nimach. 

Negapatam, 104, 

Neill, 311, 317. 

Nepal, 164-167. 

Nerbadda A\, 4, 167, 310, 320. 
Nicholls, Gen., 242, 244. 
Nicholson, J., 264, 273, 305, 310, 

314. 315. 32s. 326- 

Nile, battle of, 137, 156. 

Nimach, 31 1. 

Nizam — * 

£saf Jah, 35, 55, 66. 
v\ T adir Jang, 66, 67. 

MuzafTar Jang, 66, 67. 

Salabat Jang, 67, 70, 73. 

’Ali, 101, 103, 125, 128, 133, 438, 
140, 1 51. 

Later Nizams, 158, 169, 176, 285, 
320, 324. 

Non -regulation Provinces, 193, 291. 
North, Lord, 92, 93, 107, J13, 122. 
Northawest Provinces, 143, 186, 

188, 203, 216, 288, 292. 

Nott, Gen., 239, 240, 343, 244, 

Nuncomar, 108, no. 

Nur Jehan, 20, 21. % , 

Nusseerabad, see Nasira>ad. 

OciiTERLON*, Gen., 153, 166, 167, 
176, 184. 

Omdal-ul-Omrah, 142. 

Omichund, 78, 79, 80. 

Oodeypore, see Udaipur. 
Orientalism, 9, 10, 225, 278. 

Orissa, 37, 90, 167. 

Oudfe, 36, 76, 88, 90, 109, 1 12, 
~1i6,,I27, 134, 143, 167, 176, 
185, 280,' 284, 285, 303, 313, 
« 3i5-3i9> 321-324, 326. 

Ouseley, Sir G., 16 1. 

Outram, 2 1 4, 248, 249, 284, 285, 
303, 317, 319, 321- 

Palmer, 243. 

Palmer & Co., 176, 243. 
Palmerston, Lord, 330. 

Panchayets, 257. 



Panipat, 1 6, 18, 84. 

Panjab (District), 3, 50, 84, 219. 

(Province>in the Mutiny, 310, 

314, 320, 325 ; governing board, 
27 3, 291 ; administration, 291 ; 
army in, 292, 302, 310. 

(State ), »see Sikhs. 

Paris, Peace of, 73. 

Parliament — 

Relations to the H.E.I.C., 92. 
Parties in, 91. 

North's Act, 93, 107. 

Coalition ministry, 122. 

Fox's Bill, 122. 

Pitt's #A,ct, 123, 188. 

Declaratory Act, 123. 
All-the-talents ministry, 155. I 
Charter Act (1793), i8 9- 
— (1813), 189. 

• — (1833). *87, 189. 

Transfer to Crown (1858), 331. 
Miscellaneous, 121. 

Passes, 1, 222, 237, 238, 244. 

Patel, 126, 208. 

Pathans, 147, 162, 167-172, 264, 

Patiala, 222, 324. 

Patna, 81, 87, 88, 308. 

Pe^antfy, see Ryots. 

Pen\sular and Oriental Co. , j88. 
Pequ, 1 7^4276. 

Perron, J£o, 151. 

Persia, 156, 160, 231237, 239, 
246, 274, 305. • 

Persian Gulf, 236. 

Peshawar, 222, 227, 229, 235, 243 
268, 269, 272, 326. • 

Peshwas, see Marathas. 

Peyton, Commodore, 63. 

Phillur, 310. 

Pigot, Lord, 101. 

Pilgrimages, 43. 

Pindaris, 163, 167-174** 

I$tt, W. (l) see Chatham ; (2) n# 9 

*23. 338- 

IPlsLSScy^ 80. 

Poligars, 197. 

Politicals, 190. 

Pollilur, 104. # 

Pollock, Ge :>., 242, 244, 245. 
Pondichery, 42, 45, 64, 73. 

Poonah, see Puna. 

2 A 

Popham, 100, 103, 106, 115. 

Porto Novo, 104. 

Portuguese, 39-41. 

Post, 294. 

Pottinger, Eldred, 234, 236, 241, 

Presidencies, 187. 

Prome, 182, 276. 

Proprietors, Court of, 49, 92, 146. 
Public works, 216, 288. 

Puna, 38, see Marathas, Peshwas. 
Puniar, 254. 

Purandar, 99. 

Quebec, 62. 

Quetta, 222, 237, 243, 248. 
Quiberon, 62. 

Races, 6. 

Ragoba, 84, 94, 98-100, 106. 
Ragoji, see Marathas, Bhonsla. 
Ragonath Rao, see Ragoba. 

Raighar, 29, 33. 

Railways, 293. 

Rainier, Admiral, 144. 

Rains, 5. 

Raj Singh, 27. 

Raja Ram, 33. 

Raja Sahib, 69. 

Rajputana, 3, 36, 50, 163, 176, 185, 
273, 282, 304, 324. 

Rajputs, 8, 12, 17, 19, 25, 26, 2 
150, 158, 170, 174, 194, 252, '27*, 
3 °i. 303- 

Ramnagar, 269. 

Rampura, 150,* 52. 

Rangoon, 181, 274-276. 

Ranjit Singh, see Sikhs. 

Rassul, 270, 271. 

Rawlinson, 243, 244. 

Raymond, 133, 137* I3& 

Reed, Gen., 314. 

Regulation Provinces, 193. 
Religions, 7-10. 

Renaud, 317. 

Residency (Lucknow), 312, 315- 
317 , 319 , 321 . 

Residents, 190. 

Revenue, 196-205, 216. 

Revolt, the, 308-323. 

Ridge, the, 314. 

Roads, 216. 



Rockinghams, 91. 

Rodney, 94, 112. 

Roe, Sir T., 41, 55, 

Roliilkhand, 85, 96, 97, 322. 
Rohillas, 85, 86, 96, 97, 318. 

Rose, Sir H., 321-323. 

Rumbold, 101. 

Russia, 144, 156, 160, 162, 231, 
232, 234, 236, 239. 

Rustam (Rais), 248, 249. 

Ryots, 108, 200 301, 332. 

Ryotwari, 202. 

Saadat Ali, 134, 143. 

Sacrifices, human, 289, 290. 
"Saddusam, 268. 
r Sadr (Sudder) Courts, 114, 192. 
Sadulapur, 270. 

Sadutulla, 65. 

Safavis, 36. 

Safdar Aii, 65. 

Safdat Ali, 76. 

Sagar, 168, 174, 31 1, 322. 

Saho, 33, 35, 38. 

St Lubin, 99. 

Sakhar, 249. 

Salabat Jang, 67, 70, 73. 

Salar Jang, 320, 324. 

Sale, Gen., 240, 243, 244. 

Salkeld, 315. 

Salsette, 98. 

Palt-tax, 89. 

Skmbaji, 32, 33. 

Sambalpur, 285. 

Sarkars, 70, 72, 90, 177, 289. 

Sati, see Suttee. 

Satlej, 3, 4, 219, 259, 262, 269. 
Sattara, 172, 174, 279, 280, 281. 

Minute, 277. 

Saunders, Governor, 68. 

Scinde, see Sindh. 

Scindia, see Marathas, Sindhia. 
Scythians 6. 

Sea-power, 48, 62, 71, 137, 156. 
Seiads, 14, 34, 35. 

Seringapatam, 130, 139, 141, 160. 
Settlements, Land, 132,196-205,288. 
Shah Alam, 81, 85, 86, 87, 90, 151, 

Shah Jehan, 21, 22, 28, 41, 51. 
Shah Shuja, 161, 223, 224, 225, 
327, 229, 236^244, 247. 

Shahab-ud-din, 13, 14. 

Shahji Bhonsla, 21, 27, 28. 

Shaista Khan, 29. 

Shal valley, 248. 

Shelton, 240. 

Sher Mohammed, 249, 

Sher Shah, 17. 

Sher Singh, Maharaja, 242, 253, 

Sher Singh, Sirdar, 268-271. 
Sheridan, R. B., 117, 338. 
Shikarpur, 229, 237, 251. 

Shore, Sir J., 133-135, 180, 200. 
Shuja Daulah, 88, 96, 109. 

Sieges, etc. — 

.Aligarh, 151. 
iircot, 68, 69. ' 

Arrah, 318. 

Bangalur, 130. 

Lhartpur (1), 153. 

; (2), 184. 

Cawnpore, 312. 

Delhi, 31 1, 314, 315. 

Fort St David, 64, 72. 

Gawilgarh, 151. 

Ghazni, 238. 

Gudalur, 105. 

Gwalior, 103. 

Herat, 236. 

Imamgarh, 249. 

Jellalabad, 243. 

Jhansi, 322. 

Kandahar, 243. 

Lucknow Residency, 3 1 2, 315- 
317, 3i9'32i. 

Lucknow city, 321. 

Madras, 64, 72. 

Masulipatam, 73, 81. 

Multan, 268, 269, 271. 

Patna, 87, 

Pondichery, 64, 73. 

Rangoon, 276. 

Seringapatam, 131, 139. 

1 Trichinopoli, 69. 

Wandewash, 102. 

Sikhs — 

Ethnology, 220 ; origin, Nanuk, 
220; creed, 220; development, 
Govind, 221 ; Khalsa, 221, 226, 
252, 257, 269, 273; Misls, 221, 
222, 224; Cis-Satlej Sikhs, 162,* 
[ 223, 3” 5 Ranjit, 221, 223-230 



Sikhs — continued 

( see infra) ; subsequent anarchy, 
253, 256-25$?; Khalsa domina- 
tion, 253, 257, 258, 259 ; first Sikh 
war,256, 259-262 ; Lahore treaty, 
262 ; under Henry Lawrence, 263- 
265 ; Mu It An outbreak, 266 ; siege 
of Multan, 268, 271 ; second Sikh 
rising, 269 ; second Sikh war, 
269-272 ; annexation, 272, 277 ; 
government under Dalhousie, 273, 
291 ; miscellaneous, 9, 158, 166, 
174, 238, 242, 304, see Panjab. 
Govind Singh, 25, 221. 
Hira€ingh, 257, 258. 

Nanuk, 25, 220, 292. 

Rani Jindan, 257, 258, 264, 166. 
Ranjit Singh — 

MetcaHos embassy, 162 ; rise 
of Ranjit, 162, 224, 227 ; char- 
acter, 224 ; political insight, 
223, 22$, 226 ; absorbs Multan, 
228 ; absorbs Kashmir, 228 ; 
absorbs Peshawar, 229 ; Sindh, 
23 p, 247 ; attitude to British, 
162, 225, 230; organisation of 
Khalsa, 226, 230 ; death, 230, 
238; miscellaneous, 126, 235, 
^236, 252, 256, 292, 324. 

Sflter Singh, Maharaja, 243, 253, 
% 2 S7* • 

Sher Singh, Sirdar, 268-271. 

Sikh s<$oys, 274, Vro, 317, 3x8, 

323. 3«4- ^ 

Sikkim, 165. 

Sikri, 17. 9 

Simla, 292. 

Sindh, 3, 161, 229, 230, 237, 247- 
251, 291. 

Sindhia, see Marathas. 

Sirhind, 162, 219. 

Sirsa, 31 1. 

Sirur, 173. 

Sitabaldi, 172. 

Sivaji, 21, 26, 28-31. 

Slave kings, 13. 

Sleeman, 208, 284. 

Smith, Baird, 315. 

Smith, Sir Harry ,*262. 

Smith, Col., 86. 

Sobraon, 262. 

Solingarh, 104. 

Somnath, 13, 246. 

Spain, 39, 61, 94, 102. 

Spice Islands, 39. 

State, theory of, 51. 

Staunton, Capt., 173. 

Steam-ships, 288, 294. 

Stewart, Gen., 139. 

Strathnairn, see Rose, Sir H. 
Subsidiary Alliances, 112, 134, 141, 
143. 169, 170, 174, 254. 

Sudder Courts, see Sadr. 

Sudozais, 222, 227, 229. 

Sudras, 8. 

Suffren, B., 105. 

Sukkur, see Sakhar. 

Suleiman Mts., 3. 

Sultan Mohammed, 229, 230, 235, 

Sultanpur, 321. 

Suraj-ud-daulah, 76-80. 

Surat, 29, 41, 45, 46, 98, 100, 141. 
Surji Arjangaon, 151. 

Sutlej R ., see Satlej. 

Suttee, 20, 207, 209-21 1, 213, 303. 


Taj Mahal, 23, 216. 

Takoji, see Marathas, Holkar. 
Talpurs, 247. 

Talukdars, 203, 301, 303, 304, 316, 
318, 322, 323, 326, 332. 
Tamerlane, 15. 

Tanghabadra R. f 5, 141. 

Tanjur, 66, 72, 101, I41. 

Tantia Topi, 321-323. 

Tara Bai, 251-254. 

Tartars, 12, 15? 

Taylor, Alexander, 315. 

Teheran, 145. 

Teignmouth, Lord, see Shore. 

Tej Singh, 260, 261. 

Telegraph, 294. 

Tenasserim, 179, 182, 276. 

Terai, 165, 167. 

Tezin, 245. 

Thatta, 248. 

Thomason, 203, 288, 292. 
Thomson, Major, 238. 

Thuggee, 207, 21 1, 213, 291. 

Timur Sudozai, 237, 238. 

Timur, 15. 

Tippu Sahib, 105, 125, 127, 129- 
I3L 137-139- 



Todar Mai, 19. 

Tonk, 174. 

Trafalgar* 156. 

Travancore, 129. 

Treaties and Conventions of : — 
Aix-la-Chapelle, 62, 65. 

Bassein, 148* 152. 

Bhairowal, 263. 

Deogaon, 151. 

Lahore, 262. 

Mangalur, 106, 129. 

Paris, 73. 

Purandar, 99. 

Salbai, 105. 

Surat, 98. 

Surji Arjangaon, 151. 

Tilsit, 156, 160. 

Versailles, 105. 

Wargam, 99, 101. 

Treaties with : — 

Burma, 182. 

Bhopal, 170. 

France, 62, 65, 73, 105. 

Gwalior, 254. 

Kabul, 161, 274, 305. 

Marathas — 

Bhonsla, 151, 169, 174. 
Holkar, 158, 174. 

Puna, 99, 105, 148, 170. 
Sindhia, 151, 158, 171, 174, 


Miscellaneous, 98, 105. 

"Mogul, 85, 90. 

Mysore — 

Haidar, 86. 

Tippu, 106, 120, 131. 

Nepal, 167. 

Nizams, 128, 141. 

Oudh, 90, 134, 142. 

Panjab, 16 1, 223. 

Persia, 231. 

Sindh, 161, 223, 247. 
Trichinopoli, 66, 69. 

Trimtyikji, 168, 170. 

Trincomali, 104, 105. 

Troops, see Army. 

Tughiaks, 14. 

Tumbudra R., see Tanghabadra. 
Turks, 12, 13-16. 

Udaipur, 19, 37, 32. 

Umballa, see Amballa. 

Ummercote, see Amirkot. 

Upton, Col., 99. 

Urdu, 6. 

Usbegs, 245. 

Vaisyas, 8. 

Vans Agnew, see Agnew. 

Van Cortlandt, 268. 

Vansittart, 87. 

Vedas, 8. 

Vellur, 303. 

Versailles, peace of, 105. 

Viceroy, 331. 

Village communities, 203. 

Vindhya hills, 4. 

Vizayanagar, 14. 

Vizfer — , see Wazir — ■ 

Wade, 237, 238. 

Walker, Major, 150. 

Wand^wash, 73, 102. 

Warda R. t 4, 151. 

Wargam, 99, IOI. 


Asiatic — 

Afrhan, 240-246, 256. 

Bengal, 77-80. 

Burmese, (1st), 181, 182. 

(2nd), 175, 176. 

Garnatic, 63-73. 

China, 306. 

Ghurka, 165-167. 

Gwalior 253-255. 
Maratha°(W. Hastings), 99, 
100, 103. 

; ( Wellesley), 1 50- 1 54. 

(Lord Hastings), 170- 1 74. 

Mutiny, 308-323. 

Mysore, Haidar, 102-106. 

Tippu (1st), 130, 131. 

(2nd), I37-I40- 

Persian *305. 

Perso-Itussian, 231. 

Pindari, 170- 1 74. 

Sikh (1st), 256, 259-262. 

(2nd), 267, 269-272. 

Sindh, 249, 256. 

Extra- Asiatic — 

American, <&, 99, 102. 
Crimean, 302, 305. 

Egyptian, 137, 144. 

French (1744)1 63. 



Wars — Asiatic — continued \ 

French (1 793), 132 - 
Peninsula, * 56 - 
Seven Years, 70. 

Spanish (1739), 61. 

Wasil Mohammed, 171, 172. 

Watson, Admiral, 71, 77, 79. 

Wazir Ali, 134. 

Wazir of Oudh, see Oudh. 

Wazir Mohammed, 168. 

Wellesley, Lord, 135 — 

Previous career, 136; arrival in 
India, 137 ; theory of balance of 
power, 136; Tippu and the 
French^ 137, 138 ; Mysore war, 
preparations, 138; Mysore war, 
campaign, 139 ; partition k>f 

* Mysore, 140 ; Tanjur, 141 ; Surat, 
141 ; the Carnatic, 141 ; Oudh, 
ftj2 ; plans to take the Mauritius, 
144 ; Egyptian expedition, 144 ; 
Persian mission, 145 ; disagree- 
ments with directors, 146; letter 

Wellesley, Lord — continued . 

of resignation, 147; policy towards 
Marathas, 148; declaration of war, 
150 ; successes (of 1803), I 5 I > 
152; Monson’s disaster, 153; 
recall, 153; policy, 156, 176; 
miscellaneous, 176, 180, 188, 237, 
279, 284. 

Wellesley, Sir A., 139, 150, 237. 

Wellesley, Henry, 143, 146. 

Wheler, 112. 

Whish, 268, 269. 

Widows, 210; see Suttee. 

Wilson, Archdale, 314, 315. 

Wilson, Captain, 82. 

Windham, 321. 

Wiswanath, Balaji, see Marathas, 

Wood, Sir C., 292. 

Writers, 48, 68. 

Zeman Shah, 137, 222, 223, 233. 

Zeman Khan, 245. 

Zemindars, 108, 197^., 278, 301. 





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