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Full text of "Ironclads in action; a sketch of naval warfare from 1855 to 1895, with some account of the development of the battleship in England by H.W. Wilson. With an introd. by Captain A.T. Mahan"

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FROM 1855 TO 1895 

" It is our business to be quite sure that no improvement of foreign 
fleets and no combination of foreign alliances should be able for a 

moment to threaten our safety We must make ourselves 

safe at sea whatever happens." 

LORD SALISBURY, Nov. 19, 1895. 


In 2 vols., demy 8vo, maps and plans, price 3O/- 


Uniform with the above, in i vol., demy 8vo, maps and plans, i8/- 


ADMIRE FARRAGUT, 8 VO , doth, e/- 

" Captain Mahan's name is famous all the world over." 

Westminster Gazette. 

" They are simply great ; the best things ever written." 




31 gttotcJj <xf Itatml 

FROM 1855 TO 1895 















C!a " 1 5 ^ ...3 2 

-' ' ' 





XIX. The Bombardment of Sfax and the Battle of Foochow 2 

XX. Descent of the Min and Torpedo Action of Sheipo . 12 

XXI. Caldera Bay. Insets, Chilian Littoral, Valparaiso 

Bay, Torpedo Action 21 

XXII. Rio de Janeiro Bay 36 

XXIII. Sta. Catherina Bay 44 

XXIV. Attack on the Aquidaban. Elevation of Aquidaban, 

showing Injury. ....... 46 

XXV. Theatre of the War in the East and Wei-hai-wei . 52 

XXVI. TheYalu, 1 88 

XXVII. The Yalu, II., Ill 90 

XXVIII. The Yalu, IV., V 92 

XXIX. Naval Formations 156 

XXX. Accidents to the Grosser Kurfurst and to the Victoria 194 













Japanese Sailors at the Yalu . . . Frontispiece 

The Wei Yuen and King Yuen 14 

Elevation of Blanco Encalada 28 

The Itsukushima ....... 58 

Elevation and Deck Plan of Ting Yuen and Chen Yuen 62 

The Yoshino 68 

The Tsi Yuen's Conning Tower 70 

Elevation of the Naniiaa 74 

Admirals Ting and Ito 82 

The Matsushima's Officers. 94 

a 2 




XXIX. The Chen Yuen in Battle 100 

XXX. The Chen Yuen 's Side after Battle . . . . no 

XXXI. The Chih Yuen 114 

XXXII. The Ting Yuen ........ 122 

XXXIII. The End of a Battleship 172 

XXXIV. H.M.S. Victoria. . ..... . . .197 

XXXV. Diagram of the Victoria just before she capsized. . 202 

XXXVI. The Last of the Victoria ... . . .204 

XXXVII. English Ironclads, 1 220 

XXXVIII. Systems of Protection 228 

XXXIX. English Ironclads, II .232 

XL- , Early and Modern Breech-loader .... 246 

XLI. Eight-inch Quick-firer. 250 

XLII. French Ironclads 262 

XLIII. The Battleship Neptune .264 

XLIV. The Battleship Formidable 266 

XLV. The Cruiser Alger 268 

XLVI. The Sub-marine Boat Gustave Zede .... 270 


(PAGES 291 314.) 

I. United States' Naval Ordnance, 1861-5. 

II. Union Fleet at New Orleans. Confederate Forts and Squadron. 

III. Union Fleet at Fort Sumter, April 7, 1863, and Confederate 


IV. Union Fleet at Mobile. 

V. Union Fleet at the Second Bombardment of Fort Fisher. 

VI. The Southern Commerce Destroyers and their Prizes. 

VII. Italian Fleet at Lissa. 

VIII. Austrian Fleet at Lissa. 

IX. Comparison of Fleets at Lissa. 

X. Types of French Ironclads in 1870. German Ironclads. 

XL Fleets of Chili and Peru, 1878. 

XII. Ships which took Part in the Bombardment of Alexandria. 

XIII. Armament of the Alexandria Forts. 

XIV. Shot and Shell Expended at Alexandria by the British Fleet. 
XV. French and Chinese Ships at Foochow. 

XVI. Congressional and Balmacedist Squadrons, 1891. 

XVII. Fleets in Brazilian Civil War. 

XVIII. Chinese Fleet at the Yalu. 

XIX. Japanese Fleet at the Yalu. 

XX. Comparison of Fleets at the Yalu and Notes on Guns. 

XXL Details of Japanese Losses at the Yalu. 

XXII. Leading Types of English Battleships. 

1. Progress in Size, Dimensions, and Armour. 

2. Progress in Armament. 

XXIII. Progress in English Cruisers. 

XXIV. English Heavy Guns. 

XXV. Summary of Torpedo Operations. 




Difficulties between France and Tunis I 

Sfax bombarded. July io-i6th, 1881 2 3 

Capture of Sfax. July i6th, 1881 4 

Hostilities between France and China ..... 4 

Courbet at Foochow 5 6 

The French attack the Chinese. Aug. 23rd, 1884 ... 7 

The Chinese squadron destroyed ...... 8 9 

Descent of the River M in. Aug. 25-28th, 1884. . . . II 12 

Torpedo affair of Sheipoo. Feb. I5th, 1885 .... 13 

The Chinese ships sunk 15 

Rice contraband 15 


The revolt of the Chilian fleet. January, 1891 .... 16 

Balmacedist and Congressional fleets 17 18 

Physical features of Chili 18 

The Blanco Encalada hit at Valparaiso ..... 20 

Balmacedist torpedo-vessels leave for Caldera .... 22 

The attack on the Blanco Encalada. April 23rd, 1891 . . 23 

Congressionalist account. The Blanco sunk .... 24 6 

Captain Goni's report 27 

Action between the torpedo vessels and the Acongagua. 

April 23rd, 1891 . 29 30 

Subsequent torpedo operations ....... 31 

Fall of Balmaceda 32 

The case of the Itata 33 4 





Revolt of Admiral Mello. September 7th, 1893 ... 35 

Ships and resources of Mello and Peixoto 36 7 

The Melloist ships pass the Rio forts 37- 40 

Peixoto acquires a fleet ......*.. 40 

Worthlessness of his fleet, Collapse of the revolt at Rio . . 41 2 

Torpedo attack upon the Aquidaban. April !5-i6th, 1894 . 43 

The Aquidaban discovered ........ 44 

She is torpedoed by the Gustavo Sampaio ..... 45 

Melloist version .......... 46 7 

The value of the battleship ........ 49 

Lessons of the war ......... 50 


Outbreak of war between China and Japan. July 29th, 1894 . 51 

The Japanese revival ......... 52 3 

The effeteness of China ........ 54 5 

The state of the Chinese Navy ....... 56 

Renders tactical conclusions uncertain . , . , . 57 

The ships of the Japanese ........ 57 61 

Japanese merchant marine, and docks ..... 61 

Organization of the Chinese fleet ...... 62 

The Chen Yuen and Ting Yuen ...... 63 4 

Other Chinese ships 64 5 

Chinese Merchant Marine, and Docks ..... 65 6 



Chinese and Japanese ships off Asan ...... 67 

The Nani-wa engages the Tsi Yuen. July 25th, 1894 . . 68 9 

The state 'of the Tsi Yuen after the action ..... 79 

The Kuixan-shi and Tsao Kiang destroyed or captured . . 71 

The Nani-wa meets the Kowshing . . . . . . 72 

The Nani-wa sinks the Kowshing. July 25th, 1894 ... 74 

Violation of International Law ... . . . . 76 

The position of the Kowshing ' ... . . . . 77 

Admiral Ting puts to sea' .'..'..'. . . 79 80 

Orders of Li Hung Chang to Admiral Ting ' . ' . . . 81 



The Chinese despatch transports to the Yalu River 

Ting with the fleet convoys them 

Japanese fleet in the Gulf of Korea . 

The two fleets sight one another 

Preparations of the Chinese .... 

The battle opens. September ijth, 1894 . 

The Japanese defile past the Chinese line abreast 

Heavy losses of the Chinese .... 

Both sides draw off ... 

The Matsushima's share in the battle 

Fortunes of other Japanese ships 

The Chinese ships in detail 

Alleged misbehaviour of the Tsi Yuen 

The Yalu compared with Lissa 

Losses of the Japanese ..... 

Losses of the Chinese ..... 

Does naval warfare grow bloodier 

Guns of the Chinese ...... 

Broadsides of the two fleets .... 

The Japanese Canet guns ..... 

Size and speed in the two fleets .... 

The ram and the torpedo not used 
Value of deductions from the Yalu 
Line abreast ....... 

The value of armour ...... 

The gun still the predominant factor . 
Tactical value of speed in the battle . 
Training and discipline the secret of victory 









loi 3 



1 06 7 

1 08 






The Chinese fleet retires to Port Arthur 126 

The Japanese capture Port Arthur. Nov. 2ist, 1894. . . 127 

Wei-hai-wei bombarded 128 

Torpedo attack upon the Chinese Fleet. Feb. 4th, 1895 . . 130 

The Ting Yuen torpedoed 131 

Torpedo attack of Feb. 5th, 1895 132 

Surrender and suicide of Admiral Ting, Feb. I2th, 1895 . . 133 





Little material for induction ....... 136 

A special class of ships to fight in the line necessary . . . 138 

The cruiser and the battleship 139 

Inferiority of the cruiser ........ 141 

Cruisers are of three classes ....... 143 

Weak ships in line a disadvantage . . . . . . 144 

Examples of the division of a fleet 146 

Sphere of torpedo craft in battle. The torpedo -gunboat . . 147 

The torpedo-boat in battle ........ 148 

The ram in battle ......... 150 

The pneumatic gun ......... 150 

The position of the Commander-in-Chief ..... 151 

Battle dispositions 153 

Line-abreast and bow-and-quarter line ..... 155 

Groups 156 

Line ahead : its advantages ....... 157 

Manoeuvring before and during battle ..... 158 

The value of the ram ......... 160 

The value of the torpedo ........ 161 

The warship's top-hamper ........ 162 

Effect of the long-range fire ....... 163 

Fires in action 165 

Percentage of hits in battle 166 

Maintenance of internal communication on board ship . . 167 

The conning-tower ......"... 168 

Perforation of armour in action ....... 1 70 

The encounter at close quarters . . . . . . . 172 

Loss of life in battle . . . . . . . . . 173 

Duration of battle 175 

Losses of ships .......... 176 

The type of battleship best adapted to this forecast . . . 178 

The armament of the ideal battleship . . . . . 179 

Devolution of command during battle ..... 181 

Summary ........... 182 



The Captain 183 

She goes to sea with the Channel Squadron . . . . 185 

She founders during the night. September 6 7^,1871 . . 168 



Story of the survivors . . . . . . . . . 187 

Verdict of the court-martial 189 

The Vanguard is rammed by the Iron Duke. September ist, 

1875 J 9 

She sinks . ... i ...... 191 

Verdict of the court-martial 192 

The Grosser Kurfurst rammed by the Kbnig Wilhelm. May 

3ist, 1878 . 193 

Effect of the collision : the Grosser Kurfurst sinks . . . 194 

The Victoria 196 

A dangerous manoeuvre ordered ....... 197 

The manoeuvre executed 199 

The Camperdo-wn rams the Victoria. June 22nd, 1893 . . 200 

Efforts to save the Victoria ........ 202 

Splendid behaviour of the Victoria's crew ..... 203 

The ship capsizes with grievous loss of life ..... 204 

Finding of the court-martial ....... 206 

Loss of the Reina Regente. March, 1895 ..... 207 


Great changes in the implements of naval war .... 209 

These changes due to steam . . . . . . . 210 

Growth of displacement . . . . . . . . 212 

Number of engines on board ship ...... 214 

Specialization in the type of ship 2.15 

The appl cation of armour to ships ...... 217 

The Gloire and the Warrior . . . . . . . 219 

Captain Coles invents the turret . . . . . . . 220 

The central -battery ironclad . . . . . . . 221 

The Sultan ........... 222 

The Alexandra and Temeraire ....... 223 

Early turret-ships ......... 224 

The Devastation class . . . . . . . . . 226 

The armour deck .......... 227 

Unarmoured ends : the Inflexible ...... 228 

The " echeloned " turret -ship ....... 229 

The " Admirals " ......... 230 

The Victoria and Sanspareil ....... 232 

The Nile and Trafalgar ........ 233 



The Royal Sovereign class 234 

The Centurion and Barfleur ....... 236 

The Renown ........... 237 

The Majestic class .......... 238 

Summary of progress in ironclad construction .... 239 

Reappearance of moderate armour ...... 241 

English and foreign types of battleships compared . . . 242 

The development of artillery ....... 245 

The rifled gun and the early breech-loader .... 246 

Resistance of early ironclads to artillery 246 

The monster gun . . . . . . . . . 247 

The muzzle-loader abandoned in England 248 

The new breech-loader ........ 249 

The quick-firer .......... 250 

Improvements in projectiles ....... 252 

Improvements in armour ........ 253 

Progress in engineering ........ 254 

The first cruisers ......... 255 

The Esmeralda and fast cruisers 255 

The belted cruiser ......... 257 

The torpedo-boat . 257 

The torpedo ... ....... 258 

Appendix I. The Development of the French Navy, 1855 1895 260 274 
Appendix II. Report of the French Committee in 1870 upon 

the practicability of attacking the Prussian littoral . . 275 76 
Appendix III. British Ironclads ...... 277 78 

Appendix IV. Leading Authorities consulted . . . 279 288 
Appendix V. Illustrations ,...,.. 289 

Tables I XXV 291314 

Index I. Actions 315 

II. Names . . . 317 357 

,, III. Subject -Matter and Technical Terms . . 359 374 





IN 1881, difficulty with the Khroumirs, a Tunisian tribe on the 
Algerian frontier, and the fact that the Bey of Tunis was in 
secret abetting them, led France to take vigorous measures 
against Tunis. In the last week of April the army on land 
commenced operations whilst the fleet supported it. On 
April 25th, Tabarka, an island on the coast of Tunis, which 
was protected by an antiquated castle, was bombarded by the 
gunboat Hyene, supported by the Surveillante, Tourville, 
Chacal and Leopard. A very feeble resistance was offered 
by the Arabs, and next day a detachment of troops landed 
and occupied the place A week later Bizerta was seized to 
serve as a base for the French operations. On May yth, Beja 
was captured, and it was supposed in France that the war was 
over. A few days later the Bey practically accepted the 
protection of France, and about the middle of June the French 
army was recalled. But as a matter of fact the Arab popula- 
tion was by no means ready to submit to France. Fostered 
by Mussulman agitators, an insurrection against the Bey, 
who was accused of selling his country, broke out in the 
south. Sfax was seized and occupied by the insurgents, and 
the foreign residents in the country were in grave danger. 

The French did not quietly acquiesce in these proceedings, 
On the contrary, as might be expected, they at once made 



preparations to re-conquer Tunis. For operations on the 
coast they had a formidable squadron ready in the Mediter- 
ranean under Vice-Admiral Garnault and Rear- Admiral Martin. 
The first had for ,his flagship the Colbert, the second, the. 
Trident. The other ironclads of the squadron were the 
Galissoniere, Friedland, Marehgo, Surveillante, Revanche, 
Alma, and Reine Blanche. With these were the unarmoured 
vessels Tourville, Hirondelle, Desaix, Voltigeur, Hyene, 
Chacal, Leopard, and Gladiateur. To the force thus con- 
stituted the Intrepide, Sarthe, and Pique were added. 

On July 5th, the Reine Blanche and Chacal appeared off 
Sfax, and the latter reconnoitred the place, and bombarded it 
at a range of 5000 yards, directing her fire especially upon 
the water battery, which was some little distance from the 
town wall, and making a breach in it. Only eighteen shots 
were fired in reply. Next day two more formidable vessels, 
the Reine Blanche and Alma, opened upon the town, early in 
the morning. They continued to shell it till midday when they 
were joined by the gunboats Pique and Chacal. As the reply 
of the Tunisians was exceedingly feeble and ill-directed, the 
gunboats ventured in to 2400 yards ; in the evening the Hyene 
arrived. This day the batteries only fired thirteen shots. 
On the yth, the Reine Blanche and Alma resumed their slow 
bombardment of the town, assisted by the Hyene and Chacal. 
A lighter, mounting one r 4-centimetre smooth-bore, was also 
employed, and was of great value, since it drew very little 
water and could therefore be taken close in to the town. 
The depth of water in the Bay of Sfax was indeed the chief 
difficulty which the French had to face, as it prevented their 
heavier and more powerful ships from playing that part in the 
operations which would have been expected from vessels of 
their size and strength. 

On July 8th, a boat attack was made upon the place. The 
boats approached within rooo yards of the land and opened a 
vigorous fire upon the Arab trenches and lines. They were 
supported by the Chacal and Hyene. After this some days 

Hyene<? Leopard . 


' Reine Blanche 




...' Surveillante ^Revanche 

/ Marengo Trident 


Or. rfaup <fc oon, 

G-. Philip kSa 



of inaction followed, during which the two ironclads shelled 
the town from time to time. 

On July 1 4th, the rest of the French squadron arrived, and 
on the following day the bombardment was resumed with 
increased vigour. The attack was delivered by the ironclads, 
gunboats, and boats of the squadron. The ironclads anchored 
according to their draught at a mean distance of 6500 yards 
from the town. They were in ,two groups : * in the first, 
furthest out, were the Marengo, Surveillante, Colbert, 
Revanche and Friedland ; in the second, the Alma, Reine 
Blanche and Galissoniere, with the unarmoured cruisers 
Desaix, Sarthe and Intrepide. Nearer in, at a distance of 
2200 yards, were the gunboats. Finally, the boats of the 
squadron, armed with Catlings and machine-guns, moved to 
.and fro only 500 yards from the shore. The boats were 
supported by two lighters on one of which was a 1 6-centimetre 
rifle, and on the other a 1 4-centimetre smooth-bore. The fire 
maintained by the ships was slow and steady, and did much 
damage to the town. 

On the next day, the i6th, it was decided to effect a landing. 
The beach was of soft yielding mud and the shallowness of 
the water made approach difficult, but this was overcome by 
the construction of a temporary floating jetty. Six of the 
ironclads had been ordered each to prepare a raft of spars 
and topmasts on the evening of the I5th. When ready, these 
rafts were towed in separately by launches and fastened 
together as close to the shore as possible. The boats laden 
with men were to be ranged as near in as they could go by 
four o'clock in the morning, and, at a given signal from the 
gunboats, were to dash in and land the men on the jetty. 
There were eighteen boats in all, armed with four 12-centi- 
metre and one 4-centimetre gun, besides thirteen various 
machine-guns. By daylight the preparations were completed, 
and at 4.30 a shot from the Colbert opened an unusually 
fierce bombardment. 

* See Plan. 

B 2 


The boats were massed 500 yards from the batteries and 
only waited the signal to dash in. The landing party 
numbered 3000 men, and was composed of 1600 sailors and 
1400 soldiers. At three in the morning the raft was secured 
firmly inshore about 400 yards from the mole ; at six, the 
signal for the troops to land came, and they made for the 
shore with some little confusion. The Arabs, however, had 
been unable to hold the trenches under the fire of the ships 
and boats, and to add to their discomfiture a great quantity 
of esparto grass near their lines was set on fire by shells, and 
burnt fiercely. The French sailors and soldiers quickly 
carried the water-battery, and forced the gatrs of the town. 
The loss of the fleet was not heavy. In all it amounted to 
eleven killed and fifteen wounded. 

The attack upon Sfax was well conceived and well executed, 
but, of course, little resistance could be offered by the Arabs 
to the powerful artillery of the French squadron. Here, even 
more than at Alexandria, the attacking force was so much 
stronger than the defence that the result of the fighting was 
bound to be very one-sided. No damage was done to any of 
the ships. 

In 1884, France, provoked by the attitude of China towards 
the corps of Black Flags or freelances on the Tonkin frontier, 
proceeded to acts of hostility against that power. Without 
any previous declaration of war, the port of Kelung in the 
island of Formosa was bombarded and occupied on August 6th. 
Nine days later the Chinese Government issued a declaration 
of war against France. 

A French squadron under Rear-Admiral Courbet had, 
before the declaration, ascended the River Min, on which 
stands the city of Foochow, where was the most important of 
the Chinese naval arsenals. The ships which Courbet com- 
manded included the Duguay-Trouin, a large composite 
cruiser, the Villars and D'Estatng, both wooden third-class 
cruisers, the Volta, a wooden sloop which carried the admiral's 
flag, and three gunboats, the Lynx, Aspic, and VipSre, all 


composite, and all of about 450 tons displacement. In addi- 
tion, at the mouth of the Min, lay the armoured cruiser 
Trtomphante, a central-battery and barbette vessel protected 
by iron armour, 6 inches to 4! inches thick. Her commander 
was busy lightening her for the ascent of the river, as he had 
received Courbet's permission to attempt it. Including this 
ship, the squadron mounted six 9'4-inch, eight y6-inch, fifty- 
one 5 - 5-inch, and nine 4-inch breech-loading rifled guns. The 
weight of one discharge from these would amount to a little 
over 6,ooolbs. Two torpedo-boats were present with the 
squadron ; their numbers were 45 and 46, their speed was 
sixteen knots, and they were armed with spar-torpedoes, 
containing a bursting charge of 281bs of gun-cotton. The 
total of the French crews was 1830 men. 

Ascending from the "coast, the River Min at first takes a 
south-westerly direction, but about a mile below Foochow, at 
Pagoda Point, makes a sharp bend to the north-west. At 
this point no less than seven channels or waterways converge, 
the main channel of the river alone having sufficient depth of 
water to permit the movements of large ships, and then only 
at flood-tide, which lasts at this point four hours. Admiral 
Courbet anchored at his ships at the angle of the stream, the 
Volt a being just abreast of Pagoda Point, the two torpedo- 
boats on her port quarter, and the three gunboats astern. 
The other ships were lower down, in the centre of the stream. 
On Pagoda Point were Chinese batteries, whilst other works 
protected the arsenal, which is 2000 yards above the Point. 

In the River Min was moored a considerable Chinese 
squadron."* This included one moderate composite cruiser, the 
Yang Woo, which acted as the Chinese flagship ; six very 
indifferent wooden sloops, Foo Poo, Chi-an, Fei Yuen, Ching 
Wei, Foo Sing and Yu Sing; two transports; two Rendel 
gunboats, each mounting one heavy gun in the bow, the Chen 
Sing and Fuh Sing; seven launches fitted with spar-torpedoes ; 
and eleven war junks, sailing vessels, armed only with smooth- 
* Vide Table XV. for details. 


bore guns. This flotilla was as badly manned and commanded 
as it was armed. The eleven steamers of any size included in 
it, carried only 1190 men, whilst the artillery on board, ex- 
cluding smooth-bores, comprised one i8-ton, two i6-ton, one 
6i-ton, eleven 3^-ton, twenty-four 45-pounder, and two 
4o-pounder guns, mostly muzzle-loaders, and of inferior power 
and penetration to the French breech-loaders. The weight of 
metal discharged by them was under 45oolbs. The French 
had thus a superiority of one-third, which would probably have 
given them the victory over well-trained opponents, but the 
men whom they were to fight, a disciplined force themselves, 
had neither skill, discipline, nor courage. Add to this that 
the Chinese captains, with one or two exceptions, were as 
ignorant and as cowardly as their men, and it will be seen 
that the work before Admiral Courbet was not of a very 
difficult nature. 

The Chinese flotilla was thus disposed : * Abreast of the 
D'Estaing, and lowest down the Min, lay the Ching Wei ; 
abreast of the Villars, the Chi-an ; and abreast of the Duguay 
Trouin, the Fei Yuen. In a backwater of the river between 
Pagoda Point and the mainland, lay nine of the junks ; two 
others with the torpedo launches were on the opposite side of 
the river, thus flanking the Volta and the French gunboats. 
The rest of the squadron lay above the Volta, between her 
and the Arsenal, and the leading ships Yang Woo and Foo 
Sing were 400 to 600 yards ahead of her. In the river were 
several French mercantile steamers, the English warships 
Champion, Surprise, and Merlin, and an American squadron 
composed of the Enterprise, Juniata, Trenton, and Monocacy. 
These vessels were either above or below the hostile 
squadrons, and kept well out of the way, in view of a French 
attack upon the Chinese. 

For day after day the two enemies confronted each other, 
whilst the neutrals expected every hour to see the attack 
begin. The French were always cleared for action ; their 
* Vide Plan, p. 2. 


upper masts were struck, their cables ready for slipping, and 
their crews, in watches, relieved one another at the guns 
Each day brought rumours that this was the appointed time, 
and as each day passed without incident, the vigilance of the 
Chinese, never very remarkable, was relaxed more and more. 
The French were waiting for the arrival of the Triomphante ; 
the Chinese close under their enemy's guns, perhaps, imagin- 
ing that the French did not really mean business. They were 
to be terribly undeceived. On Friday, August 22nd, in the 
evening, Courbet summoned his officers to his flagship, and 
there made known to them his plans. Next day, just before 
two o'clock, when the tide ebbed, the ships were to weigh and 
get to work. A signal from the Admiral would tell the torpedo- 
boats to steam forward and attack, No. 45, the Yang Woo, 
and No. 46, the Foo Sing. A second signal, and the ships 
were to open fire, the D' Estaing, Villars, and Duguay- 
Trouin upon the Chinese steamers which lay abreast of them, 
with their port batteries, whilst their starboard guns played 
upon the junks off Pagoda Point. The Duguay-Trouin, 
when this work of destruction was completed, was to settle 
the launches and support the Volta, which in the meantime 
would cover the torpedo-boats, and with either broadside 
assail the junks. Finally, the three gunboats were to steam 
forward and sink the Chinese vessels off the Arsenal. 

The morning of the 23rd dawned cloudless and intensely 
hot, the strong sun causing the men at the guns of the French 
ships no little discomfort. Courbet early gave notice to the 
consuls and others, that he intended to attack the Chinese 
soon after noon, so that he gave his enemy some warning. 
To the watchers on board the Enterprise, the hours seemed to 
go slowly beyond endurance, and it appeared as though the 
French were never going to begin. At 9.30, the flood-tide 
was in, and soon after, steam was up, and the French crews 
took a meal. At 1.30, silently the men went to quarters, and 
the Chinese followed suit. A quarter-of-an-hour later, anchors 
were weighed, and the preparations were completed. At 1.50, 


the Triomphante came in sight, and there passed some signals 
between her and Courbet. Six minutes later, the stillness was 
broken by the rapid discharge of the Hotchkiss in the Lynx's 
top, and almost simultaneously the Ching Wei replied with a 
broadside. At the signal, the torpedo-boats had dashed 
forward, and only twenty-seven seconds after the first shot, 
the sound of a terrific explosion dominated the uproar of the 
engagement. No. 46 had exploded her torpedo under the 
Yang Woo's side, amidships. Of 270 men on board the 
Chinese vessel, only fifteen escaped, and so great was the 
force of the explosion that, it has been stated by an eye- 
witness, mutilated bodies were found after the engagement on 
the roofs of houses a mile away on shore. * The Yang Woo 
drifted away, an utter wreck, and as the French continued to 
pour in a hail of shells, caught fire and sank. The boat w r hich 
had dealt the blow, reversed her engines, but was struck by a 
shell and disabled. Having lost one sailor, killed by a bullet, 
she drifted slowly down stream and anchored. No. 45 was 
not so successful. As she ran forward to attack the Foo Sing, 
a Chinese torpedo-launch encountered her, and forced her to 
swerve to one side. Thus she failed to strike the Foo Sing 
amidships, and, embarrassed by the Chinese boat, caught her 
bow in the Foo Sing's side. A hot fire was poured in upon 
her by the Chinese. Her commander was dangerously 
wounded, and one of her crew had his arm broken. At last 
she got clear, and retired down stream towards the Enterprise, 
whose surgeon went to the help of her wounded. Her crew 
were bespattered with blood from head to foot, but their boat 
had received no serious injury. They had not, however, 
disabled the Foo Sing, which was slowly steaming ahead, 
when a second torpedo attack was made by a launch from the 
Volta. The torpedo this time exploded close to her screw, 
and completely disabled her. She drifted slowly down stream 

* Messrs. Roche and Cowen. " The French at Foochow," p. 25. The 
statement seems to me most improbable, but I give it for what it is worth. 


upon the French vessels, which received her with a terrible 
fire. A minute or two later she was boarded and carried, but 
she was too much injured to float, and quickly went to the 

Meantime, the French fire upon the Chinese was terrific. 
In the stillness of the air the smoke hung heavily about the 
ships, but it could not save the unfortunate Chinese. The 
Volta was hotly engaged with the junks, and had a shot 
through her chart-house, which killed her pilot, and all but 
killed Admiral Courbet. She retaliated by sending the junks to 
the bottom, and even when they were helpless and sinking, con- 
tinued to fire her machine-guns into them. The Chi-an and/'Vz' 
Yuen could offer no resistance to the Villars and Duguay, 
and they were quickly on fire and sinking, whilst the Chinese 
crews fled ashore. The Ching Wei alone showed heroism, 
and for a time, faced the D^ E stain g bravely. But now the 
Triomphante was coming on, having passed the Chinese 
batteries with the interchange of only a few shots, and as she 
neared the Ching Wei, fired her 9 - 4-inch guns at her. A shell 
from one of these struck the Chinese vessel in the stern, and, 
passing the whole length of the ship, burst with a tremendous 
cloud of smoke in her bow, lifting her in the air and setting 
her on fire. The gunners thereupon jumped overboard, but 
the officers stuck to the ship, working her guns with their own 
hands. They made a desperate effort to run her alongside of 
the D' E stain g and sink their enemy with them, by exploding 
the Ching Wei's magazine. Attempting this, they received a 
tremendous broadside from the Villars ; fresh fires broke out ; 
the small-arms' ammunition exploded ; and the Ching- Wei 
went to the bottom, but not before she had fired one last 
parting shot as she vanished in the water. In seven minutes 
from the first shot the action was virtually over, and every 
Chinese ship was sunk or sinking. The Foo Poo had run 
away up stream at the commencement of the fight. Her 
captain drove her ashore, breaking her back, gave her crew 
leave of absence, and then fled himself. A second Chinese 


captain, after firing one broadside, left his ship with his crew, 
having first set her on fire. The Lynx, Aspic, and Vip&re, 
proceeding up stream after the Chinese sloops, were now 
busied in shelling the Arsenal and the shore forts, and traces 
of their handiwork soon began to drift down the river towards 
the heavier ships. At 2.8 a Rendel gunboat came round 
Pagoda Point, and fired her 1 6-ton gun at the Duguay, but 
missed her. Immediately the guns of the fleet were concen- 
trated upon this luckless craft, and the torrent of descending 
and exploding shells was so great that it literally stopped her 
way. Two minutes she remained almost stationary, a helpless 
target ; then, with a crash, her magazine exploded, and she 
dived headlong to the bottom. At 2.20 a mine the Chinese 
had laid under the dock at Foochow exploded, fired either by 
inadvertence or the French shells. At 2.45 the French fleet, 
which had slackened its fire, again opened on the Chinese 
forts. All the while burning Chinese vessels were drifting 
down past the neutral ships. One sloop was seen in a great 
blaze with crowds of Chinamen close under her stern clinging 
to her hissing rudder-shaft ; one of these had had his thigh 
shot close off, and many were terribly wounded. The water 
was full of wreckage and Chinamen, six or seven together, 
clinging desperately to masts or timbers. Many were rescued 
by the English and American launches. 

The French machine-guns were extremely effective. "The 
continued hail of shell from Hotchkiss cannon in the tops of 
the French men-of-war upon their antagonists, swept them 
down like wheat before the mower. Relays of men could not 
be brought up from below fast enough to fill up the gaps in 
the gun-crews. The diminutive shell came crashing through 
the sides and bulwarks of the ship. Splinters, flying in every 
direction, killed many more."* 

About four o'clock the French ceased their fire, when at 
once the land batteries redoubled their exertions. Flaming 

* Roche and Cowen, 43. 


rafts, set loose by the Chinese, came drifting down upon 
Admiral Courbet's ships. Courbet re-opened the duel with the 
forts, whilst the rafts were caught and towed aside. At 4.55 
the fleet anchored for the night out of range. The ships were 
not much injured. The Volta had one hole a little above the 
water-line. Her pilot and two men at the wheel were killed, 
whilst six powder passers, on the berth deck, had been cut 
down by the shot which hulled the ship on the water-line. 
The Duguay and the other ships had the most trivial hurts. 
The French loss is reported, by eye-witnesses, to have been 
twelve killed, though in the official despatch of Courbet it is 
only given at six killed, with twenty-seven wounded. The 
Chinese loss is returned at 521 killed and 150 wounded ; and, 
in addition, there were a large number of men missing. 

This fight, if fight we can call it, has been described by 
French writers as a most splendid achievement. " The great 
glory of Foochow," is the title given. As a matter of fact, it 
was little more than slaughter necessary no doubt, but yet 
deserving no extravagant laudations. It may be placed 
in the same class with the bombardment of Alexandria. Both 
operations were undertaken against men who lacked training, 
and in each case very heavy loss was inflicted by the Western 
force upon its Oriental opponent. Courbet's great reputation 
rests rather upon his professional ardour, and the skill with 
which he formed his plans, than upon great performances on 
the scene of action. His enemy was contemptible. 

The day after the battle the French once more bombarded 
the Arsenal. That night the Chinese attempted a torpedo 
attack, but on being discovered by the search-lights of the 
fleet ran ignominiously. On August 25th Courbet moved his 
flag from the Volta to the Duguay, and prepared to descend 
the river, his ships being placed in the following order : 
Triomphante, Duguay, Villars, D'Estaing, Volta, and the 
three gunboats. A succession of Chinese batteries fringed the 
banks, but most of the guns pointed down stream, and little 
preparation had been made against the possibility of an attack 


from above. The French ships, except the Triomphante, had 
ascended the river before the declaration of war, and thus they 
were in a peculiarly favourable position to effect the destruc- 
tion of the forts. For this they used their 9^4 and y6-inch 
guns, the 5*5 and 4-inch weapons, being too small to make 
much impression. Whilst they were at work the cannon of 
the Galissoniere and Bayard, two ironclads similar in type to 
the Triomphante, could be heard bombarding the forts on the 
lower reaches. On the 25th a battery on Couting Island was 
silenced by fire from the rear, and its one 8-inch gun burst 
by a landing-party. The fleet then entered the narrows of 
Mingan, on which a number of works bore. On the 26th 
these were attacked in succession by the Duguay and Triom- 
phante, and silenced one by one. On the 2yth landing parties 
destroyed the guns with gun-cotton, after which the ships 
weighed and proceeded to the Kimpai Narrows. On the 
afternoon of that day a battery there was silenced, and during 
the night a number of junks loaded with stone, which had 
been placed in readiness to block the channel, were attacked 
and destroyed by the French boats, covered by the gun- 

Next day the squadron, reinforced by the Sdone and Chateau 
Renault, proceeded to force the narrows. The passage here 
is little over 400 yards wide, and on either side of it wooded 
hills rise steeply. Two strong works, armed with y-inch and 
8j-inch guns, had to be silenced. This operation was very 
skilfully conducted. The Duguay and Triomphante anchored 
with springs to their cables. These were paid out, till, 
dropping down stream, the ships' batteries would bear upon 
the first embrasure. On this the whole fire was concentrated, 
and, needless to say, at such short range, the work quickly 
crumbled away, and the gun was silenced. These tactics 
were repeated with embrasure after embrasure, till at noon 
on the 28th the Chinese had abandoned their forts. Courbet 
then led his fleet through the narrows, and after forty days' 
absence rejoined the ships which had remained below. 


Point where M. Gowdjcmtg 
feexxfc 'went, ugroimcL. 




The next important action in the East was the affair of 
Sheipoo, which took place on the night of February i/|.th I5th, 
1885. Two Chinese vessels, the cruiser Yu-yen, mounting 
one 8j-inch, eight 6-inch, and twelve ^.-y-inch Krupps, and 
the despatch-boat Token Ktang, carrying one 6'3-inch, and six 
4'y-inch guns, had been cut off by the French, and were 
lying between Sheipoo and Tungnun Island. They were 
watched by the French warships Eclaireur, Nielly, Bayard, 
Aspic, and Sdone, which effectually prevented their escape. 
As the navigation of these waters is intricate and difficult for 
heavy ships, Admiral Courbet decided to attack them with 
torpedo-boats, on the night of the i4th. For the command of 
the two launches selected, he designated Lieutenants Gourdon 
and Duboc. The boats were 30 feet long, carrying spar- 
torpedoes loaded with 281bs. of guncotton ; the engines were 
constructed to work silently, and picked coal was burnt. 
The colour of the hulls was black. 

At eight o'clock the boats were made ready, and at 11.30 
M. Gourdon started from the Bayard. At 12, M. Duboc was 
to follow. M. Gourdon* gives us the following account of the 
expedition. " The moon was new, and the night absolutely 
dark, so that it was a matter of great difficulty for the vidette 
boat and launch, which were accompanying my torpedo vessel, 
to keep together. We repeatedly lost and found one another. 
Our difficulties were increased by the fact that, from fear of 
injuring the spar-torpedo, I could not go close to the vidette 
boat, and the strong south-easterly current was another 
disturbing factor. A turn brought us clear of the Ngew Tew 
Straits ; then leaving these narrows we tested our conductors 
and their insulation, and ran the spar in and out. All worked 
well. And now we go straight for the Chinese, but they are 
not at the anchorage which they occupied during the day. 
They have disappeared. It is 3.15 a.m., and we steam in 
search of them. At 3.30, I see a great black mass in front 

* I have compressed the account given, but without, I trust, losing the spirit 
of the narrative or impairing its accuracy. 


of Sheipoo, with four or five lights on shore. The vidette 
boat is detached to inform Duboc of her whereabouts. I get 
her three masts in line and move slowly on. On shore there 
are numerous lights ; are they signals ? The loud rattle of 
my boat's engines prevents me from hearing anything. When 
200 yards from the Chinese, I run out my spar, and connect 
the firing wires with the battery, then ' Full speed ahead.' 
The frigate lights up ; on port and on starboard there are 
spurts of flame. Are these the Nordenfelts ? On we go 
swiftly. Then the order ' Astern,' and a violent shock. The 
torpedo has exploded ; the boat is violently lifted and strikes 
the enemy's side, catching in it. ' Astern quickly,' is my 
order. The quarter-master is trying to push us clear, when a 
Chinaman looks out of a port -hole and gets his fist in his eye. 
All the while the boat is stationary, and steam escaping from 
her valves. The oil feed has been smashed by the shock ; I 
plug it with a bayonet ; still the boat does not move. Our 
spar has caught and must be abandoned. It is freed and falls; 
the boat goes astern at last, and leaves the lights of the frigate. 
Duboc's boat has come up now, and I wait to help it, in case 
it needs assistance. Meanwhile, the Chinese ships are firing 
on each other, and the men ashore on both. A marine falls 
killed by a bullet. Through the hail of projectiles, Duboc 
.advances, passes to starboard, and explodes his torpedo, then 
retires. We meet ; ' What news ? I have a man killed.' 
' We've not a scratch.' We cannot find the vidette, which 
was to show a red light. I take Duboc in tow, and we are 
off."* Whilst retreating, the boats experienced some little 
delay through the towing rope getting caught in the screw of 
the leader, and then through Gourdon's craft running aground. 
He got her off, and rejoined the Sdone soon after ten o'clock 
that morning. The vidette-boat saw the explosions, and 
waited till six o'clock, but then as the boats did not re- 
appear, gave them up for lost. It was a welcome surprise 
when they returned safe and sound. 

* Loir, 215-8. 


See p. 132.** 


See p. 64. 


On reconnoitring the two Chinese ships, it was discovered 
that both had sunk. As only one had been torpedoed, this 
must have been due to the carelessness of the Chinese, who 
doubtless fired into friends in the hurry and excitement of the 
attack. This is a serious danger in all night engagements 
with torpedo-boats, as the English manoeuvres have shown. 

One or two questions of importance in international law 
were raised during the war. On October 2oth, 1884, Courbet 
proclaimed the blockade of all the ports and roads of southern 
Formosa. England, however, protested against this blockade 
as inefficient, and the proclamation was withdrawn. On 
February 2Oth, 1885, the French Government declared that it 
would treat rice, when bound for open Chinese ports, as 
contraband. Four days later this declaration of contraband 
was restricted to cases where the rice was being conveyed to 
the northern ports of China. In a note the French Govern- 
ment explained that the stoppage of supplies would bring 
China to reason with less injury to neutral trade than would 
be inflicted by a close blockade of the Chinese ports. Protests 
were made both by the English minister at Pekin and the 
English Government at home, but the war came to an end on 
April yth, 1885, before the point at issue had been settled. 
In the course of the war French cruisers seized lead on 
English ships as contraband, though it was a regular article of 
trade with China. They also used Hong Kong as their base, 
.coaling and refitting there. 


January August, 1891. 

IN January, 1891, the Chilian fleet, which was lying off 
Valparaiso, declared against the government of President 
Balmaceda, who was accused by the Congressional party in 
Chili of aiming at a dictatorship. On the 6th, the ironclad 
Blanco Encalada, which we have met before, the fast Elswick- 
built cruiser, Esmeralda, which had replaced Arturo Prat's 
gallant little craft, the O' Higgins and Magallanes, put to sea. 
That night they were joined by the Cochrane, and returning 
on the next day, took possession of the Huascar, which was 
lying, out of commission, in the harbour. Having prepared 
her for sea, they added her to their squadron, of which Captain 
Montt took command. They also laid their hands upon every 
steamer which carried the Chilian flag, including some mail 
steamers of the South American Steamship Company. The 
Imperial, however, the fastest vessel of the line, happened, 
with another vessel, to be laid up, and consequently escaped 

President Balmaceda was thus left without a sea-going 
warship on the coast. He had the Imperial, which he armed, 
and which could perhaps accomplish fifteen knots an hour, 
and he had a dozen torpedo-boats of various patterns, mostly 
equipped with spar-torpedoes. Two torpedo-gunboats of the 
most recent design, were on their way out from Europe. 
Their names were the Almirante Condell, and the Almirante 
Lynch. They were steel vessels of 750 tons displacement, 


built by Messrs. Laird, of Birkenhead, and launched in the 
previous year. With water-tube boilers they had steamed 
twenty-one knots under forced draught on the measured mile, 
and with a bunker capacity of 175 tons, could carry coal 
enough for 2500 knots at economical speed. Their armament 
consisted of two i4-pounder Hotchkiss quick-firers placed 
en echelon forward on their deck, and one aft, besides four 
3-pounder quick-firers and two Maxims. They carried four 
torpedo-tubes for the discharge of the 1 4-inch Whitehead 
torpedo. The Capitan Prat was building for the Chilian 
Government in Europe, but was not ready at the beginning of 
the war ; and two other cruisers, the Presidente Errazuriz, 
and the Presidente Pinto, were detained at La Seyne, in 
France, till the French Supreme Court should decide whether 
they were to be permitted to depart. Week by week the 
Balmacedist papers reported the movements of these ships, as 
if they w r ere actually on their way to Valparaiso, and thus, 
perhaps, deceived the people of Valparaiso and Santiago, if 
not the Congressionalists. Halmaceda held the forts of 
Valparaiso, where numerous heavy guns were mounted, and 
had at his back an army of 40^,000 men. 

The Congressionalists had the ironclads Blanco, Cochrane, 
and Huascar, of which full details have already been given. 
All three had been re-armed with the 8-inch Armstrong breech- 
loader, and the two central-battery ships carried each four 
6-pounder quick-firers four Nordenfelts, and two Catlings, in 
addition to their heavy guns. The speed of the three cannot 
have exceeded eleven knots. Perhaps the most formidable 
vessel of the squadron was the Esmeralda, the first fast 
protected cruiser, launched at Newcastle in 1884, of 3000 tons 
displacement, and 18*3 knots speed on the measured mile. She 
carried an end-to-end i-inch steel protective deck, a little 
below the water-line, under which were boilers, engines, and 
magazines. Above the water-line she had considerable 
protection from her coal-bunkers. Fore and aft were mounted 
lo-inch 25-ton breechloaders, and amidships, six 6-inch breech- 



loaders, three on each side in sponsons, with steel bullet-proof 
shields. In her bunkers she carried 600 tons of coal, which 
would enable her to steam 2000 miles at ten knots. She was 
a good sea-boat though so heavily gunned, and her speed, 
which was in 1891 sixteen knots or a little less, made her a 
dangerous enemy to the craft which Balmaceda possessed. 
The other Congressional ships took little part in the struggle, 
or have been already described. The Aconcagua, however, 
deserves a word. She was a mail steamer of 4100 tons gross, 
and had been armed with two 5-inch guns, one 4O-pounder, 
and several machine guns. Her speed was twelve knots. 

The physical configuration of Chili, to which we have 
already alluded,* rendered sea power of peculiar importance in 
this civil war, as in the struggle between Peru and Chili. 
Since 1880, the Chilian frontier had been moved north 
450 miles by the annexation of the arid and waterless Peru- 
vian provinces of Tacna and Tarapaca, and the Bolivian 
department of Antofagasta, territories which are rich in 
nitrate and guano deposits, and which for that reason are a 
source of great wealth to the country. Dues levied on the 
export of these commodities formed no inconsiderable part of 
the Chilian revenue, so that whoever held the north held the 
purse strings. Land communication between the nitrate 
ports and Valparaiso or Santiago there is none ; in fact, the 
towns along the coast might be regarded strategically as a 
series of small islands, each separated from the other by seas 
which are represented by deserts. The Congressionalists 
with their mobile naval force were thus at an enormous 
advantage, of which they proceeded to make the fullest use. 
The small Balmacedist garrisons in the various nitrate ports 
were attacked one by one and compelled to surrender. 

The first interchange of shots was at Valparaiso on the gth, 
when pickets on shore fired on a boat in the harbour, to 
which the warships replied from their tops. The Congres- 

* Vol. i. 314. 


sionalists procured their supplies from the ships which they 
had seized, and from the coast to the north and south, whither 
their vessels were despatched to raise recruits and obtain food. 
At a later date they actually drew coal, stores, and provisions 
from Valparaiso itself, by a most ingenious use of neutral 
ships. These would come into the harbour and load the 
stores most required by the insurgents, and then proceeding 
up the coast would be brought to by Congressional warships, 
and would, under the pretext of compulsion to satisfy their 
consuls, sell coal and food. President Balmaceda knew 
perfectly well what was happening, but owing to the presence 
of strong foreign squadrons on the coast, found it expedient 
to shut his eyes. 

On January i6th the only Congressionalist ship in Valparaiso 
Bay was the ironclad Blanco, which was quietly lying at her 
moorings. Her business off the port was to procure supplies 
and forward them north. There was no blockade as yet, and 
indeed, when the Congressionalists endeavoured to close the 
harbour and to stop all trade at a later date, the foreign 
consuls refused to permit such action. She was distant from 
Fort Bueras, which was on her starboard beam 150 feet above 
the water level, 600 yards, and from Fort Valdivia 1200. 
Suddenly, at 5 a.m., these two forts and Fort Andes fired each 
a round at her. In Fort Bueras a 2o-ton lo-inch muzzle- 
loader was used, firing a common shell of 450 Ibs. weight, 
filled, and fitted with a time and percussion fuse. The charge 
on this occasion was i3olbs. of pebble powder, a very heavy 
one. The shell struck the 8-inch armour on her starboard 
battery just upon a bolt, and bursting outside drove the bolt 
through. It disabled an 8-inch gun and made a large hole in 
the deck above, but did no other damage. The shell from 
Valdivia was fired from a Krupp 8'2-inch lo-ton gun, with a 
charge of loolbs. powder, and weighed 25olbs. It struck the 
Blanco 's stern outside the armour, and, entering a compart- 
ment, where a number of the crew were sleeping on deck or in 
hammocks, was shattered by the 5-inch iron bulkhead which 

C 2 


protects the central battery from raking fire. Fortunately for 
the forty men asleep in the compartment it was charged, not 
with powder, but with sand, yet even so it killed six men and 
wounded six others, three mortally. One of the killed, who 
w r as in the line of fire, was horribly mutilated. On its way 
into this compartment the projectile had passed through the 
captain's cabin, and carried the pillow of an officer sleeping 
there from under his head, without hurting him. The third 
shell missed. After this the Blanco slipped her moorings and 
stood in to the town, making fast to a buoy off the Custom 
House. Here she could not be fired at without the risk of 
projectiles dropping into the town. At night she left the 
harbour, and henceforward watched it from a distance. The 
O' ' Higgins joined her, and pitched some shells from time to 
time at the torpedo depot outside the bay. Meanwhile 
Balmaceda fitted out his torpedo-boats, which w r ere not much 
the worse for the O'Higgins' fire, and armed the Imperial 
and Maipo, both merchant steamers. 

About the same date the rest of the Congressionalist squad- 
ron was busy in the north laying its hands upon the nitrate 
ports. Iquique was the first place to be attacked, but in it was 
Colonel Soto, with a Balmacedist garrison, who gave no signs 
of willingness to surrender. A blockade was maintained by 
the Cochrane and other ships for some days, and the Con- 
gressionalists, concentrating their troops, marched upon it by 
land from Pisagua. After a check the town was captured on 
the 1 6th of February, but three days later the Balmacedists 
re-entered the town, driving the Congressionalists to the 
Custom House. The rebel ships supported their men ashore, 
and vigorously bombarded the town, the possession of which 
was of vital importance to them. In the afternoon a dynamite 
magazine blew up and the town took fire. On this the English 
commander on the Pacific Station, Rear-Admiral Hotharn, 
invited the Balmacedist and Congressional commanders to a 
conference on board his flagship, and succeeded in arranging 
an armistice. Next day Soto evacuated the town, though he 




so 100 EDO Miles 


G.Philip & Son. 



should have held to it to the last ; and the insurgents obtained 
control of the richest of the nitrate ports. 

On January 2yth an attempt was made by a steam-launch of 
the Blanco to destroy the armed steamer Imperial with a 
Whitehead. The torpedo missed the Balmacedist vessel, pass- 
ing unpleasantly near the British mail-steamer Britannia. 
After this the torpedo boats in the harbour, which had so far 
remained inactive, in spite of the entreaties of Balmaceda's 
officers to be permitted to take them out against the enemy, 
were more on the alert and patrolled the harbour. On 
March 8th the Maipo, an armed steamer, was carried off by 
her crew to the Congressionalists. On March 2ist the 
torpedo-gunboats Lynch and Condell arrived. They were in 
very bad order, as their English engineers had left them at 
Buenos Aires, not caring to face the risks of war, and the men 
who had brought them on had damaged their boilers, burning 
through many of the tubes. These were replaced at Valparaiso, 
and a French torpedo artificer was engaged to handle and 
adjust the Whiteheads. 

At last they were ready, and on April i6th left Valparaiso 
in the company of the Imperial. On board this ship was Mr. 
Hervey, the " Times " correspondent, whilst Captain Moraga, 
of the Condell, was in command of the small squadron. Under 
him was Captain Fuentes, in charge of the Lynch. Both these 
officers had passed through the torpedo school at Valparaiso, 
and both were admirable disciplinarians, men of dash and 
determined courage, beloved by their crews. Just before he 
left Valparaiso, Mr. Hervey had somewhat indiscreetly 
telegraphed to the " Times" that he was leaving with a torpedo 
expedition, and the news had been cabled back from Europe 
on its appearance to Chili, and on April 2ist it was published 
in the Congressionalist journal ' Patria." Hence the in- 
surgents received some warning of what was to be attempted. 

After some days of constant small-arms and torpedo practice 
at sea, the three vessels left Quinteros Bay on April 2ist, the 
Condell and Lynch hugging the shore, and the Imperial 


further out. No lights were carried at night, the better to 
escape the Congressionalist ships, though of these there was 
only one, the Esmeralda, faster than the Imper 'al, and even 
she would, in fine weather, have been distanced by the torpedo- 
gunboats. The destination of the squadron was Caldera Bay, 
450 miles north of Valparaiso. According to the information 
which Captain Moraga had received, the revolted fleet was 
at anchor there, without its torpedo-nets, which had 
been left at the outbreak of the insurrection in store at 
Valparaiso. On the 22nd the Imperial lost sight of the 
gunboats at dusk, and heaving-to off Caldera waited for 
signals from them. The night passed without any being 
made, but an officer on board believed that he heard firing 
towards Caldera. 

The gun boats reached Huasco on the afternoon of the 22nd, 
where news was received that at Caldera were the Blanco, 
Cochrane, and Huascar, with a corvette and three transports. 
Captain Moraga, therefore, summoned Captain Fuentes on 
board his vessel and arranged with him the plan of attack. 
He did not stop to take Mr. Hervey on board, as had been 
agreed, but went straight on to Caldera. A little later the 
Lynch, which had been running her torpedoes, spoke a boat 
and received the intelligence that three Congressionalist 
vessels had already left Caldera, and that if the torpedo- 
gunboats wanted to catch the others they would have to make 
haste. The two boats increased their speed, steaming abreast, 
and at half-past three in the morning found themselves well 
to the north of Caldera. The plan decided upon was as 
follows :- Entering the bay from the north, the Condell was to 
lead by 200 yards. Both vessels were to make for the 
insurgent ships, the Condell upon the starboard side and the 
Lynch upon the port side. They were to creep up as close as 
possible, and, first of all, to use their bow tubes ; then after- 
wards, the training tubes abeam. The night was dull and 
cloudy, and though there was a moon, it was, from time to 
time, hidden by the clouds. 


At 3.30, just as the day was dawning, Moraga led the way 
into the harbour. In the uncertain light the hostile ship 
could be discerned from the bridge of the Condell, lying at 
anchor in the western curve of the bay. The Lynch was very 
close astern, not more than twenty yards off her leader. 
When the position of the enemy had been ascertained by 
Moraga, he headed at half-speed for the larger of the two 
vessels, which he imagined to be either the Blanco or 
Cochrane. Astern of her was the Biobio, a small transport, 
which he mistook for the Huascar. When only a hundred 
yards off he fired his bow tube at the ironclad, but the torpedo 
just missed her, going astern, and passed very close to the 
Biobio. An instant later he turned his helm hard to starboard, 
and ordered Lieutenant Vargus, who was in charge of the 
port tube, to fire a second torpedo, which, he thinks, hit the 
target.* Just at this moment the ironclad opened a sharp fire, 
using small-arms, quick-firers, and heavy guns. The Condell, 
going full-speed, now discharged her third torpedo, which 
missed. But the Blanco s gunners had not noticed the Lynch 
creeping up behind the Condell, and had concentrated all 
their fire upon the latter. The Lynch was able to come on 
unmolested till within fifty yards of the big ship, when she 
fired her bow torpedo, which missed. Turning, she fired her 
starboard tube and hit the Blanco amidships. The torpedo 
exploded with great violence, and two minutes later the Blanco ' 
went to the bottom. The Biobio lowered her boats, and others 
put off from the shore, saving between them ninety-six officers 
and men. When the ironclad opened fire, and it was clear 
that the torpedo vessels were discovered, they replied to her 
discharge with deadly effect from their Hotchkiss 12-pounders 
and 3-pounders. Seven minutes only elapsed between the 
discharge of the first and last torpedoes. After the Blanco 
had sunk, the two torpedo-gunboats left the bay at full speed. 

* In this he was probably mistaken. The Congressional account mentions 
only the bow torpedoes of the Lynch, and does not allude to these two, which 
perhaps dived. But inconsistencies in such a matter are only to be expected. 


The above is Captain Moraga's official account of the action. 
Mr. Hervey adds some interesting details. The first torpedo 
fired by the Lynch went straight to the bottom ; the second 
steered wide ; and the third, which had always run badly in 
practice, alone struck the Blanco* A torpedo was after- 
wards picked up in the bay, and was found to be a Mark IV. 
Fiume Whitehead, set for 600 yards and to sink. The pistol 
had been altered unskilfully. 

What was the Blanco doing to be thus taken off her guard ? 
we may ask ; and to her proceedings and the Congressionalist 
accounts we may now turn. To begin with, her Captain, Senor 
Goni, was under the impression that he was outside the range 
of Balmaceda's torpedo-boats, and never, apparently, gave the 
least thought to the fast and formidable gunboats. He may 
also have imagined, as is said to be the case, that the Presi- 
dent's boats would never, from patriotic motives, go to the 
length of sinking a Chilian ship. If so, he was singularly 
deceived. On this particular night he was on shore with a 
force which was attempting to capture Copiapo, according 
to one account ; according to other stories, at a banquet. In 
his official report he speaks as if he had been on board, and 
his own evidence must be accepted. The following is the 
drift of the Congressional account : The ship was left moored 
to a buoy, with enough steam up to move her engines. Her 
armament, in addition to her six 8-inch breechloaders, con- 
sisted of three 6-pounder Hotchkiss quick-firers, mounted one 
on each side of the forecastle, and one on the poop. She 
had four i-inch Nordenfelts, which were placed, two on the 
fore-bridge, one on the after-bridge, and one on the poop ; one 
Hotchkiss quick-firer in her top ; and two Catlings. Of her 
crew, which numbered nominally 300 officers and men, the 
greater portion were ashore, leaving only eighty of her 
original complement. The vacancies on board had been made 
up to 288 by adding raw recruits, who neither knew the ship 

* Hervey, 322. According to Moraga, the Lynch only fired two torpedoes. 


nor her weapons, and could not therefore be expected to per- 
form well in the trying emergency of a torpedo attack. Of 
her two steam-launches one was undergoing repair on deck, 
and the other was in bad order. Neither was employed on 
patrol duty on the night of the 22nd, though this is stated to 
have been exceptional. Seven men formed the total of her 
w r atch, and the officers on deck were Commander Gonzalez 
and Aspirant Aguilar. At about 4 a.m., or probably before, 
the torpedo vessels were seen at a distance of no less than 
2000 yards. The alarm was given at once, but the crew were 
slow in going to quarters, as they thought that this was merely 
a false alarm to practise them. It is also said that the bugler 
made a mistake, and sounded the ordinary morning call, 
instead of the summons to go to quarters. In any case the 
leading torpedo vessel was 500 yards off before the Blanco 
opened fire. This does not altogether agree with Captain 
Moraga's version, according to which the Blanco 1 s guns were 
not fired till the Condell was well within a hundred yards. Either 
then the Congressional officers over-estimated the distance, 
or having mistaken the Condell for a friend, and allowed her 
to approach, they waited till her torpedo showed her to be an 
enemy. Their inaction is cer'ainly hard to explain Accept- 
ing the Congressional statement, an interval of five minutes 
at least, the time required by the Condell to cover 1500 yards 
at half speed, must have elapsed between the giving of the 
alarm and the commencement of fire. The Blanco did not 
use her search-light, either because it was out of order, or 
because the growing daylight was strong enough to enable her 
men to see their enemy. Nordenfelts and 6-pounders were 
the first to open, and the assailants at once replied. On 
giving the order " Clear ship for action," the port engine had 
been ordered to go ahead and the starboard one to go astern, 
to turn the ship a little. The engines were just in motion 
when the torpedoes struck her. The Lynch and Condell 
having now drawn very close, the Condell fired her bow tube, 
but the torpedo ran ashore and exploded, after which the two 


seemed to stop their engines. Probably, this was at the 
moment when they were turning. An instant later, the 
Lynch went on full speed, passing the Blanco's starboard 
quarter, and as she passed, fired simultaneously two torpedoes 
at a distance of 100 yards. * The Blanco was struck on the 
starboard side, near the dynamo room. The shock was 
tremendous. Every light in the ship was extinguished, one 
of the 8-inch guns was thrown off its trunnions, and a large 
number of men were killed. Portions of iron and machinery 
flew about in the engine-room, and killed or wounded six 
engineers. The only one who escaped, was carried by the 
violent rush of water up a ventilator. Though orders had 
been given to close all water-tight doors, it is almost certain 
that this had not been done. The Blanco began to heel 
heavily to starboard, exposing her decks to the pitiless hail 
from the quick-firers of the torpedo-gunboats, which mowed 
the men down as they poured up from below. A shell from 
a I4~pounder Hotchkiss burst in her fore compartment, killing 
Lieutenant Pacheco. The ironclad fired one of her heavy 
guns in reply, but the shot passed over the torpedo gunboats. 
The ship began to go down very fast, and a minute later the 
order to abandon her was given. At that moment, the sills 
of her battery ports were level with the water. Of her total 
crew, which mustered 288 officers and men, eleven officers 
and 171 men were killed or drowned. Forty of these were 
said to have fallen victims to the machine-guns of the torpedo 

AsiheBtanco sank, her men saw the Lynch steam round under 
her stern and fire a torpedo at the Biobio. This missed, as it 
was said to have passed under her. The gunboats then left 
the bay apparently uninjured. The only damage done to 

* In the plan of the action the final torpedo, which settled the Blanco, and 
which was fired by the Lynch, is that which was discharged just as she turned 
to go under the ironclad's stern. Apparently from Captain Moraga's account 
she only fired one torpedo at the Blanco in this position, and not two as the 
Congressional version runs, or three as Mr. Hervey's. 


either of them by the Blanco, was the cutting of the electric 
firing apparatus of one of the tubes just after the torpedo had 
been discharged. Both vessels had gone into action with 
five loaded torpedoes on their decks, so that a hit before they 
had got rid of any of them would almost certainly have been 
fatal. The worst damage was self-inflicted, caused by the 
firing 'of their 14-pounder Hotchkisses, which jarred them so 
much that some of their boiler tubes burst. 

The official report of Captain Goni was as follows : 
" To my regret, I have to inform your Excellency that the 
ship under my command was sunk this morning, at half-past 
four o'clock, by the combined attack of the torpedo vessels 
Lynch and Condell, which succeeded in hitting the Blanco 
with six out of seven torpedoes fired. We have lost one-half 
of our crew, including amongst the officers, Paymaster Guzman, 
Lieutenant Pacheco, Aspirants Soto, and Aguilar, and 
numerous engineers. I have also to lament the loss of Don 
Enrique Valdes Vergara. The torpedo-gunboats received a 
heavy fire from the Blanco before she went down, and after- 
wards from the Aconcagua, when, on leaving Carrizal, she 
entered the harbour. We are, however, unable to ascertain 
what damage they have suffered. The ship is lying on her 
starboard side, with the tops of her bridges out of water. I 
beKeve we shall be able to recover the guns on the upper 
deck, and the others later. I have a diver here." 

There is some discrepancy as to the number of torpedoes 
which hit the Blanco and exploded. According to Moraga 
six were fired and three exploded. Goni's statement that 
six struck her is probably a loose exaggeration. It is even 
doubtful whether more than one torpedo struck the Blanco. 
Her hull was carefully examined by the diver of the Champion, 
a British cruiser which was present on the coast. It was 
found in about sixty feet of water, lying on the starboard side. 
The port side was intact, but on the starboard side was a large 
hole blown through the bottom of the ship, fifteen feet long 
and seven feet broad. The ship, having been wood-sheathed 


and cased with zinc, the iron skin had been detached near 
the hole from the wood-sheathing, and much of the zinc was 
torn off. The scuttles, on the port side, were found open, only 
the officers' ports being closed. From this account it looks as 
if the injury had been inflicted by one torpedo alone, unless 
two or more happened to strike exactly in the same place a 
most unlikely supposition. The uproar and confusion which 
prevailed can readily explain mistakes in the accounts of eye- 

This is the first occasion on which the Whitehead was 
successfully employed against an ironclad, where we possess 
full details. Once before, during the Russo-Turkish war, a 
ship had been sunk by it according to the assertions of the 
Russians; but whereas then the Turks denied their loss, now 
the fact was beyond dispute, and the hull of the sunken ship 
could be seen and examined. Once more, as so often in these 
minor struggles, we have exceptional circumstances which 
would not be likely to recur in a European conflict. For an 
ironclad to be at anchor without nets out, without launches to 
protect her, without a search light, and with a very insuffi- 
ciently trained crew on the top of all this, points to 
singular carelessness on the part of her commander, who had 
had warning, be it remembered. If he had chosen to trouble 
himself he had ample time, between the publication of the 
intended attack at Iquique on the 2ist, and the morning of 
the 23rd, to have constructed a boom, or again he might have 
taken his ship to sea for the night and cruised in the offing 
with lights out, when he would have been comparatively safe. 
The torpedo-gunboats were handled with courage and cool- 
ness, but the task before them was not difficult. Smaller and 
weaker vessels could have destroyed, with less risk, this iron- 
clad at anchor. If captains choose to imperil their ships as 
Captain Goni imperilled the Blanco they will lose them. But 
French or English ironclads are not likely to lie in open 
harbours without taking the most elementary precautions. 
We may notice that the inexperience or want of smartness of 


the Blanco 's men rendered her quick-firers and machine-guns 
almost useless. If they had stood smartly to their Nordenfelts 
and Hotchkisses they might have sunk or disabled the gun- 
boats before they got close, and we may be certain that a hail 
of shells would not have improved the aim of the men at the 

For the Lynch and Condell the fighting was not yet over. 
As they stood out of the Bay they saw r what they thought was 
the Imperial, and went towards her. When they got closer 
they discovered that it was not the Balmacedist vessel, but 
the Congressional armed transport Aconcagua. Her decks 
could be seen crowded with troops. She carried no flag, and 
was at once attacked by the two gunboats with their Hotch- 
kisses. They poured into her such a furious fire, that the roll 
of it resembled the rapid discharge of small-arms rather than 
heavy guns. At first they separated and prepared to assail 
her one on each beam, but realising that this would enable 
her to bring both her broadsides into play they drew together 
again and fought her, keeping on her starboard beam. The 
Aconcagua replied vigorously with her 5-inch guns and small 
quick-firers. After some minutes, finding that she was getting 
the worst of it and that from the great speed of the gunboats 
she could not well retreat, she headed towards Caldera, 
probably hoping that the Blanco would come out to her 
support, but the Blanco was, of course, at the bottom. At 
last, after an hour-and-a-half, she stopped her engines, 
according to Captain Moraga, and had apparently surrendered. 
The gunboats were on the point of steaming in when a large 
cruiser was seen on the horizon. This they supposed to be 
the much dreaded Esmeralda, and therefore at once retreated. 
The tubes of one of the Condell' s port boilers were leaking 
heavily and neither vessel was in condition for a fresh 
action with a powerful cruiser. Soon afterwards, when their 
prey had got safe into Caldera, they discovered that the 
approaching vessel was the British flagship Warspite 
and not the Esmeralda,- and the chagrin of Captains- 


Moraga and Fuentes was unbounded. Neither of the 
torpedo-gunboats was much the worse for the fighting, 
though considering the loaded torpedoes which they had 
about, it was a most foolhardy adventure to attack the 
Aconcagua in broad daylight. They fired more than 400 
projectiles, of which only eight, or two per cent., hit her. 
All these struck her above the water-line, and the damage 
they did was most trifling. Of the crowd of men on board 
only four were slightly wounded, two by a shell which struck 
the upper part of the funnel casing. The Aconcagua fired 
137 rounds, seven from her 5-inch guns, and with these 
probably scored an even lower percentage of hits than the 
Lynch 1 s and CondelTs guns. The captain of the Aconcagua 
in his official report drew attention to the worthlessness of the 
torpedo-gunboat for open and straightforward fighting. She 
is built to act by surprise, and except when so acting is of 
little value. Had these boats, however, been armed with a 
heavier quick-firer than the i4-pounder, the 4'y-inch gun, 
for instance, as in the British service, the hits might have 
been as numerous, since the men would have fired more 
carefully, whilst the damage done would have been infinitely 
greater. The medium quick-firer, for such we may call the 
i2-pounder and i4-pounder, is not of much value except for 
the attack upon torpedo-boats, but the larger weapons of that 
type can do a great deal of damage. The Yalu confirmed 
this conclusion, as the small projectiles fired on that occasion 
had little effect. This action would also point to the 
comforting fact that merchant steamers, well equipped with 
medium quick-firers, have little to fear from torpedo-craft. 
This has an important bearing upon the defence of our 

The Imperial, after waiting hours for her two consorts, 
returned to Valparaiso, where she found them all safe. The 
next occurrence was an attempt of the torpedo-boat, Guale, 
which was employed by the Balmecedists to patrol Valparaiso 
Harbour, to run off and join the Congressionalists. She did 


not, however, get very far, as the Lynch was sent in pursuit, 
and quickly overtook her. She was taken back to Valparaiso, 
where her crew were shot for their disloyalty. 

On May i4th, the Condell, with the Imperial and Lynch, 
was off Iquique, endeavouring to repeat her performance at 
Caldera. The Congressionalists, however, had learnt by 
experience, and were quite ready for them. Though there 
were no warships in the roads, booms and numerous sunken 
torpedoes had been placed about the anchorage, so that there 
was nothing to be done. The Congressionalists, since the 
loss of the Blanco, steamed out to sea every night. Thence 
the Condell proceeded to Caldera, off which port she arrived 
on the night of the i6th. It could be seen that there were a 
large number of vessels inshore, and with everything ready for 
the attack, she ran in. Mr. Hervey, the " Times " corre- 
spondent, was on board, and has given a vivid picture of the 
suspense, the breathless anxiety, of those whose fate it is to 
be boxed up in these fragile cases of machinery with hundreds 
of pounds of gun-cotton, in the shape of torpedoes, covering 
the deck. When the Condell got close in, she found that 
once more the insurgents had been too clever for her. Two 
lines of ships were moored in the bay ; the inner line towards 
the shore, composed of armed transports ; the outer line, of 
neutral sailing-ships ; and the worst of it was that the outer line 
was so disposed, as to cover the transports. It was therefore 
impossible to use the torpedo, and though Moraga was 
anxious to give his tubes an airing, and neutrals a lesson, he 
was dissuaded from a course which . would have certainly 
embroiled his government with powerful enemies. A few days 
later he had an opportunity of sinking the O'Higgins ; he had 
caught her in harbour at night,* and apparently off her guard, 
and was advancing to the attack upon her, when one of his 
crew told him that he had a brother on board. With touching 
tender-heartedness, Moraga abandoned the attack and with- 

* At Pacocho. Hervey, 213-4. 


drew ; the act deserves to be remembered, though in war 
there is small room for consideration such as this. 

The torpedo gunboats made one more attempt to ensnare 
their opponents. On June 4th the Imperial started north. 
At night she steamed ablaze with lights, whilst astern of her 
in absolute darkness followed the gunboats. It was hoped 
that the Congressional cruisers would see her, and stand 
towards her when she was to surrender. Whilst the 
Congressionalists were lowering boats the torpedo craft were 
to attack them off their guard, and sink their ship or ships. 
But the plan came to nothing as no Congressionalists showed 

The final downfall of the Balmacedist Government came in 
August, and was the result of a combined military and naval 
expedition against Valparaiso. Having week by week col- 
lected more and more troops in the north, armed them with 
repeating rifles, and obtained German generals, the Congres- 
sionalists were ready. The whole insurgent fleet collected 100 
miles north of Valparaiso, and as there was little to fear from 
Balmaceda's torpedo-vessels, steamed to Quinteros Bay. It 
was off the bay on the night of August igth, and next 
morning, after a search for mines conducted by the smaller 
vessels, the troops carried on board were landed. Meanwhile, 
on the i gth, the Esmeralda had engaged the Valparaiso forts- 
to divert the attention of the Balmacedist troops. On the 
2oth, in the morning, two of Balmaceda's torpedo-boats came 
out to see what was happening, but were quickly driven back. 
The troops having been put ashore by means of large punts, 
which had been conveyed from the north, fastened bottom 
outwards to some of the ships, at Concon on the 2ist r 
supported by the fire of the ships, drove back the Balmacedists r 
and a week later captured Valparaiso. Thus ended the naval 
struggle on the Pacific. 

The Chilian Civil War is important for two reasons. 
Firstly, because then the Whitehead for the first time sank an 
ironclad ; secondly, because of the admirable strategy of the 


insurgents. They used their fleet sparingly against fortifica- 
tions, making no attempt to capture Valparaiso by bombard- 
ment from the sea. They recognised a truth which is some- 
times forgotten, that fleets cannot act on land, though they do 
exercise a very marked influence on land actions. They were 
confronted by a naval force which lacked all capacity of action 
except by surprise, and they showed that such a force is 
powerless to change the issue of a war, though it may destroy 
individual ships. We may, perhaps, wish that Balmaceda had 
been able to place in line the two cruisers detained at 
La Seyne. In that case we should have seen what we are 
particularly anxious to see a contest between last, lightly- 
armed vessels on the one hand, and slow, heavily-armed 
vessels on the other. Such a contest would have taught us 
much concerning the value of speed, and the practicability of 
raiding the enemy's coast, in the face of a superior but slower 

Efforts were afterwards made to raise the Blanco, but they 
were unsuccessful. 

One other incident of the war deserves mention, though it 
concerns the lawyer rather than the sailor. At the outbreak 
of the struggle the Congressional party had despatched a 
commission to purchase arms and munitions of war in the 
United States. The Itata, a Congressional steamer, was sent 
to embark these at San Francisco, but through a mistake 
arrived too soon, and lay waiting in harbour there. The sus- 
picion of Balmaceda's representative who was, of course, the 
official representative of Chili, as the Congressionalists had 
not received recognition was aroused, and a watch was kept 
on the Itata, to prevent her loading with contraband. Seeing 
that it would be impossible to take a cargo on board at San 
Francisco, the Congressionalists embarked the arms on board 
two American schooners, which were to meet the Itata, and 
tranship their cargoes to her, outside the three-mile limit. In 
the meanwhile the Itata, proceeding south, ran short of coal, 
and put into the United States' port of San Diego. As it was 



believed that she intended to take the military stores on board 
there, a United States marshal was sent on to her to detain 
her. This was on May 5th. On May 6th, early in the morn- 
ing, she slipped her cable, went out to sea, met the schooners, 
and transhipped the arms. Two days later she put the United 
States' marshal ashore. Indignant at this outrage to their 
flag, the United States' Government issued orders to their 
officers on the Pacific Station to seize her when she reached the 
Chilian coast. She was surrendered at Iquique on June 3rd to 
the American Admiral Brown. The incident very nearly led the 
Congressionalists to come to blows with the United States. 
In the end the case of the Itata came before the United States' 
Supreme Court, which returned the ship and arms to their 
owners, on their giving bonds for 120,000 dollars. The 
Bc.lmacedist Government had fallen by then, and the Con- 
gressionalists had become the legitimate rulers of Chili. 

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September, 1893 April, 1894. 

HARDLY had the civil war on the Pacific coast come to a 
conclusion when a fresh struggle broke out upon the Atlantic. 
Since the fall of the Empire Brazil had been in a more or 
less disturbed state, and considerable ill-feeling had arisen 
between the army which supported Marshal Peixoto, and the 
navy which was in favour of Sefior Custodio di Mello. The 
trouble came to a head on July 6th, when Admiral Wandenkolk 
of the Brazilian navy seized the merchant steamer Jupiter 
at Montevideo. With a large number of sympathisers he 
steamed to Rio Grande do Sul, captured two diminutive 
Brazilian warships, and issued a proclamation in which he 
invited his brother officers of the fleet to join him. His 
career was short and unsuccessful. On July 2oth, the Republica 
and Santos came up with him and compelled him to surrender; 
but a more serious attempt had to be faced on September yth, 
1893, when Admiral Mello, assisted by thirty-six naval officers 
and six or seven members of the Brazilian congress, seized 
the warships in Rio Harbour. Amongst these were the 
following vessels : the Aquidaban, a sea-going turret-ship of 
a design similar to the Ajax, with two turrets amidships 
placed en echelon; she had been built in England and carried 
as her heavy armament four 9'2-inch guns ; the Javary, a low 
freeboard, coast-defence, ironclad, carrying four lo-inch muzzle- 
loaders in two turrets placed fore and aft ; the small river 
monitor Alagoas; the cruiser Almirante Tamandare, which 

D 2 


had been disabled by injuries to her machinery ; and was 
armed with quick-firers which were protected by thin 
armoured casemates ; the Elswick cruiser Republica ; the old 
cruisers Guanabara and Trajano ; two ancient gunboats ; 
two transports ; three large sea-going torpedo-boast, of 
twenty-five knots maximum trial speed ; four smaller ones ; 
and a host of armed merchantmen.* 

Though this very miscellaneous squadron only included two 
ships of any real power, the Aquidaban and Tamandare, 
Marshal Peixoto found himself quite unable to oppose it at 
sea at the outset of the war. The Riachuelo, which closely 
resembled the Aquidaban, was in Europe, as also was the 
cruiser Benjamin Constant. On the South American coast 
he had the Elswick gunboat Tiradentes, which was in dock at 
Montevideo, with a not too trustworthy crew ; the Bahia, a 
very indifferent coast defence monitor, and five small gunboats 
or cruisers. The torpedo gun-vessel Aurora was, however, 
expected from Europe, where she had just been completed by 
the Armstrong Company. She was of 480 tons displacement,, 
equipped with three torpedo-tubes, two 2o-pounder quick- 
firers, and four 3-pounders. Her trial speed was eighteen 

The contest that followed was, in its initial stages, one 
between ships and forts, and almost entirely destitute of 
incidents of either tactical or strategical importance. The 
Melloist ships lay in the Rio Harbour, and day by day 
exchanged fire with the Peixotoist forts. The ships were 
short handed, as the total force at the disposal of the insur- 
gents was only 1500 men,f and though Admiral Mello had 
numerous adherents in the southern provinces of Brazil, he 
was quite unable to equip a land army. He started with a 
considerable advantage in being able to control the sea, as it 
is needless to state that the vast extent of the Brazilian coast 

* See Table XVII. 

f The naval force of Brazil consisted of 3020 marines, 990 sailors, 3300 firemen 
and naval apprentices. 


Insurgent, Positions Sec. Black. 


G. PkULp <fe Son. 


renders communication difficult between the various points by 
land. He endeavoured, following the strategy of the Chilian 
Congressionalists, to establish himself in the south, but did 
not meet with their success. Peixoto, on the other hand, had 
at his disposal considerable financial resources, which the 
Melloists lacked, a formidable military force of 24,800 officers 
and men armed with breech-loaders, and all the forts com- 
manding the harbour of Rio, with the sole exception of that 
on the island at Villegagnon, by far the most heavily armed. 
This was at first neutral, but later declared for Admiral 
Mello. Numerous foreign ships of war were present in the 
harbour and their commanders prevented Admiral Mello from 
enforcing a strict blockade, which might perhaps have reduced 
Rio. They also did all in their power to avert a bombard- 
ment of the city. 

On the morning of September lyth, the Republica and 
Diaz ran out of the harbour, past the forts, unharmed, and 
were followed next day by the Pallas and a second ship, with 
equal success. From September i4th onwards, there was 
constant firing between the forts and the ships, but the powder 
used by both sides was extremely bad, and though there was 
a liberal expenditure of ammunition, extraordinarily little 
damage was done. In this hot climate explosives deteriorate 
greatly by years of storage, and it was never certain how any 
gun would shoot with the stuff from the magazines. On 
September 23rd, Fort Santa Cruz fired eighty-five projectiles 
without harming anything but an old wooden hulk. On 
September 3oth, the Aquidaban was under fire, and was hit 
several times, receiving very slight damage. A 6-inch shell 
came through her deck and exploded in the admiral's cabin, 
but did not set her on fire. A 6-inch shot entered her 
starboard side, and struck a shell which was standing in a 
shot-rack, ready loaded and fused. This exploded, wounding 
an officer. A third shell entered the admiral's bath-room, and 
a fourth burst in a coal-bunker, penetrating the unarmoured 
side, but only made a round hole of the diameter of the 


projectile. Fragments from this shell were driven through the 
inner wall of the bunker and wounded a man. A fifth 
projectile struck the shield of a 6-inch gun, but did it no harm. 
Other shots struck the armour, leaving only dents. On 
October 6th, Fort Villegagnon joined the insurgents, and co- 
operated with them in bombarding the other forts. 

On the night of October i2th, an incident of more interest 
occurred. The armed merchant steamer, Urano, with 200 
Melloist troops on board, attempted the run out to sea, past 
the Peixotoist forts. The mouth of the harbour is not more 
than a mile wide, and is commanded by three forts Santa 
Cruz, which mounted two Armstrong ro-inch muzzle-loaders ; 
Sao Joao, with one ro-inch muzzle-loader; and Lage, with 
three 6-inch Whitworths. As she went by, the forts fired into 
her, Santa Cruz hitting her several times, and she lost forty 
killed or wounded. She was riddled by machine-gun bullets, 
and the men on board her w r ere demoralised, and fled on shore. 
A few days later the Melloists scored a success to counter- 
balance this loss, as the cruiser, Republica, rammed the Rio 
de Janeiro, which was conveying iioo troops south, for 
Marshal Peixoto. Five hundred soldiers are said to have 
been lost, but details are wanting. On the 25th, a Melloist 
magazine was blown up by the fire of the forts, and on the 3rd 
of November, a depot on Gobernador Island, containing 100 
tons of powder, was destroyed by an emissary of Marshal 
Peixoto. Five officers and seamen from the British squadron 
happened to be near the magazine and lost their lives. On 
November 2oth, a field-gun on shore struck a torpedo-boat 
which was lying in the harbour close to the Aquidaban, and 
sank it. On the 22nd, the Javary was hotly engaged during 
the morning with the forts. In the afternoon, whilst off 
Villegagnon, she was discovered to be sinking. Efforts made 
to tow her into shallow water were unsuccessful, and her crew 
were compelled to abandon her, though not before an 
audacious seaman had fired two of her heavy guns, which had 
been left loaded, at the forts, only a minute or two before she 


capsized and sank. She was an old vessel, and had probably 
been shaken badly by her own fire, though it is just possible 
that one of the enemy's projectiles had damaged her, as a shell 
from Fort Sao Joao fell either on her deck or close to it, just 
before she went down. 

On November 29th, the Aurora arrived from Europe, and 
was taken over by Marshal Peixoto at Pernambuco. Her 
name was changed to Gustavo Sampaio, but as yet she was 
not brought round to Rio, probably through want of men to 
work her. On the night of November 3oth December ist, at 
12.30, the ironclad, Aquidaban, accompanied by the armed 
steamer, Esperan$a, ran past the forts. The Aquidaban 
manoeuvred to draw the fire in the glare of their search-lights, 
and received the attention of all their guns, herself returning 
their fire. The gunners in the forts knew that she was coming 
and were ready for her, but in spite of this could inflict no 
damage upon her. Not a man on board was killed or wounded, 
and only a single shell struck her hull. This burst in a coal 
bunker. Some small projectiles also dropped on her deck. 
The Esperan$a was hulled by a shot which passed through 
her engine-room, and lost her chief engineer, killed, besides 
one or two men wounded ; but was quite able to continue her 
voyage. Admiral da Gama was left in charge of the vessels 
in harbour, and on December 3rd engaged the forts with the 
Tamandare. On the 4th another armed steamer ran past the 
forts. On the 22nd the Tamandare was again in action, 
using ballistite for her quick firers. The new explosive per- 
formed well, and it was most demoralising to the men in the 
forts to find shells dropping amongst them with no premonitory 
warning, such as is given by the smoke from an ordinary 
charge of pebble or brown powder. The Tamandare was 
often hit but not damaged. About this time the Republica 
had a brush with the Peixotoist transport, Itaipu. 

On the 1 2th of January. 1894, the Aquidaban ran past the 
forts at dawn without being touched. Steaming up the 
harbour she was hit twice with very trivial damage, and the 


loss of two men, wounded. Admiral Mellowas not on board, 
having remained in the south to organise a military force. 
In this he was unsuccessful, as there were numerous insurrec- 
tions on hand, each with a separate leader, competing for 
support. On January i6th Mucangue Island, which had been 
occupied by the Government, was recaptured by the Melloists. 
January, and the first days of February, passed without more 
than an intermittent cannonade, but on the gth of February 
the insurgents made a desperate attempt to carry the Armacao 
battery, on the east side of the harbour. They were repulsed 
with h^avy loss, and the gunboat, Ltberdade, was repeatedly 
hit whilst covering the landing party. 

In the meantime Peixoto had been busy acquiring an 
improvised fleet. In the United States he had purchased a 
collection of naval curiosities, which he now prepared to use 
against the Melloists. One of his purchases was Ericsson's 
submarine gunboat Destroyer, renamed the Piratiny. This 
was a small steamer, with a gun built into the bow, from which 
a torpedo, thirty feet long, could be fired. Above the com- 
partment which contained the gun, was a thin armour-deck, 
and above this again a compartment filled with inflated india- 
rubber air-bags. The engines and boilers were protected by 
two stout armour-plates, inclined at an angle of twenty-three 
degrees, forming an athwartship bulkhead above the water- 
line. This vessel had been built for the United States' 
Government, but, the Ordnance Department having changed 
heads, in 1881, the new chief refused to purchase her. A 
similar gun to the one carried on the Destroyer was sent to 
the Peruvians in 1880, but never used; the weapon was also 
experimented with by the British Government. Besides the 
submarine gun she carried a Howell training torpedo tube and 
two Hotchkiss i -pounders. On the steamer Nictheroy 
(formerly El Cid, of the Morgan line), a Zalinski pneumatic 
gun had been fitted forward, for the discharge of aerial 
torpedoes containing 5olbs. of dynamite. This weapon is 
fifty feet long, and has a calibre of 15-inches. It is capable 


of training, and can throw its shell by compressed air to a 
distance of 3000 yards, but the time occupied by the shell in 
its flight, projected as it is with very low initial velocity, is so 
considerable that it must be difficult Avith it to hit a moving 
target. It was, however, an interesting experiment to mount 
it, and we may regret, in the interests of naval science, that 
it was not tested in action. In addition there were one 4'y- 
inch quick-firer, two lo-centimetre quick-firers, eight 6-pounder 
quick-firers, and several small guns. Besides these vessels 
there were the armed steamers Advance, Allian^a, Finance, 
and Seguranca, the America* with a Sims-Edison controll- 
able torpedo, the small steam-launch, Feiseen, re-named 
Inhanduay, which had the phenomenal trial speed of twenty- 
five knots, the twenty-two-knot launch Nada, five Schichau 
torpedo-boats, and a small Yarrow boat. The Nada and 
Feiseen were carried on the Nictheroy s deck. 

Trouble was early experienced with this odd assemblage of 
ship-. Their crews were untrustworthy, and on board almost 
all of them were Melloist emissaries, who lost no opportunity 
of damaging their machinery. Breakdowns were constant ; 
there were neither swords nor cutlasses for the sailors who 
were to fight them, and trained men to handle the new engines 
ol \\ar were lacking. There was no one who understood the 
Sims-Edison torpedo. The dynamite gun had an altogether 
insufficient supply of ammunition. Five loaded shells, only one 
of which contained a full charge, were not enough to sink the 
Melloist squadron. In addition, there were, it is true, five 
unloaded shells, but the few fuses on board were untested and 
untrustworthy. The torpedo-boats had been very carelessly 
placed on deck, and could not be hoisted out, as the necessary 
tackle was wanting. Parts of the boats' gear were missing, 
and their torpedo tubes were in bad repair. The Destroyer 1 s 
engines had broken down, and, in short, the improvised fleet 
was useless. The most serviceable part of it was the squadron 
of Schichau boats, which had safely crossed the Atlantic ; but 
* Re-named Andrada. 


these were not used as yet. After numerous executions of 
untrustworthy Brazilians, some ships were at last ready for 
action. On February i8th, the Nictheroy appeared off Rio, 
and landed 300 troops. She had intended to try her dynamite 
gun on Villegagnon, but the gunner had disappeared, and at 
the critical moment the weapon would not work. 

On February 23rd, the armed Melloist steamer Venus was 
struck by a shell, which exploded her boilers or magazine, 
blowing her in two, and killed thirty officers and men. A 
fortnight later came the end of the tedious warfare at Rio. 
On March ioth, Peixoto's squadron appeared off the harbour, 
and next day, notice was given by him of his determination 
to attack the insurgents. On the i2th, Gama proposed terms 
of submission, which were rejected. Despairing of his cause, 
he went on board a Portuguese cruiser which lay in the 
harbour, with all his superior officers, and landed his men on 
one of the islands. The warships were left to serve as a 
target for Peixoto's fleet. At noon on the I3th, the Nictheroy, 
Andrada, Tiradentes, Paranahyba, San Salvador, Gustavo 
Sampaio, two steamers and five torpedo-boats began the 
attack. For four hours, supported by the forts, they played 
upon the squadron in harbour, and then discovering at last 
that there was no reply to their fire, came in towards Rio. 
Next day, they seized the insurgent vessels. It does not 
appear that the Nictheroy used her dynamite gun. 

Having recaptured the rebel ships, Peixoto demanded the 
surrender of the officers, which was refused him, the Portuguese 
vessel steaming away and landing them in neutral territory. 
Peixoto on this, broke off diplomatic relations with Portugal, 
but nothing more followed. 

The insurrection, or one of the insurrections, still smouldered 
on in the south, where Admiral Mello, with the Aquidaban, 
was at large. In April, Peixoto decided to make a torpedo 
attack upon her, and in consequence, a squadron of six ships'* 

* The ships were the Andrada, Nictheroy, Tiradentes, San Salvador, Itaipu, 
and Santos. 


and four torpedo-craft were sent against her. She was 
lying, short of men, stores, and ammunition, in the Bay 
of Santa Catherina, close to Desterro. Off this place, the 
Peixotoist flotilla arrived in April, and from Tijucas Bay, at a 
distance of four or five miles, kept a watch upon her. She 
lay close to the small island of Santa Cruz, upon which stands 
a fort, whence she drew her supplies. Between this small 
island and the larger one of Santa Catherina she had placed 
one line of mines in the fairway, and was preparing to place 
a second to the rear of the first. The islands and the main- 
land were in the possession of Melloist sympathisers. Four 
torpedo vessels were selected for the attack. They were the 
Elswick torpedo gunboat, Gustavo Sampaio, with three tubes, 
one fixed in the stem and the other two training, one on 
each beam, and the Affonso Pedro, Pedro Ivo, and Silvado, 
Schichau boats, of 130 tons and twenty-six knots' speed, with 
complements of twenty-four officers and men each, and three 
1 6-inch torpedo-tubes. On April i/|.th the Aquidaban was 
reconnoitred by the boats, and was seen to be lying at anchor 
about two miles to the south of the Santa Catherina light, and 
under the lee of Santa Cruz. On the night of the i4th i5th 
the first attack was attempted. The boats ran in under the 
northern shore of the bay or strait, but, before they had got far, 
saw that they were discovered. Bengal lights were burnt by 
the insurgents on shore, and signals made to the Aquidaban. 
In consequence the boats had to return without effecting any- 

On the next evening at dusk the steamer San Salvador 
steamed in towards the bay, and on the Bengal lights being 
shown, as before, opened upon them with machine-guns. In 
this way she must have destroyed the look-out stations, or 
driven off the watchers, as there were no more signals made 
during the night. When the moon set the torpedo-boats 
started once more. The sky was cloudy and the night 
extremely dark. They entered the bay, keeping in the centre 
of the fairway, and crossed the line of mines without misad- 


venture. The plan arranged was as follows : They were to 
advance in line abreast till well within the bay, and then to 
turn in succession to starboard, thus spreading fan-wise, and 
steaming in a north-westerly direction."* By this disposition 
they confidently expected to find the Aquidaban, although the 
night was so dark that they could not see her at any distance. 
They would, too, in the formation adopted, be less likely to 
get in each other's way, and thus impede the execution of 
their attack. The Aquidaban, as it turned out, had moved 
from her anchorage of the i4th, further to the north-west. At 
2.30 the Sampaio was in the bay, and almost at once lost sight 
of the other boats. On drawing near the place where she 
expected to find the ironclad, her speed was reduced to make 
as little noise as possible, and silently, without showing any 
lights, she glided through the still water. The obscurity was 
impenetrable : nothing could be seen or heard. After passing 
the Aquidab&n's anchorage of the i4th, she turned in a north- 
westerly direction, as had been arranged, but could still see 
nothing, and began to suppose that in the darkness the Aqui- 
daban must have slipped out of the bay. Her captain resolved, 
however, to make the full circuit of the waters before retiring, 
and had gone one mile to the north-west, when he made out 
what he took to be a small tug upon his starboaH bow. He 
was passing it, no. thinking it worth his attention, \^ nen it was 
suddenly lighted up, a sharp fire of artillery was opened upon 
him, and it became evident that here at last was the Aqui- 
daban. At once he went full-speed towards his enemy, 
circling so as to bring his bow tube to bear. When he 
thought the range sufficiently short, he shouted down the 
voice-pipe of the bow tube to fire, but the officer in charge 
had already fired the tube, fancying that he heard the order 
given. The first torpedo consequently missed the Aquidaban. 
The captain now took his boat round the ironclad's stern, 
passing very close indeed to her, and turning, with his star- 

* See Plan. 


board to her port, stopped. The way on the boat took her 
slowly past the Aquidaban, at a distance of only 400 feet, 
When abreast of her funnel the order was given by the voice- 
pipe to fire the starboard tube, but nothing happened. The 
second officer, who was standing by the captain, seeing that 
there was danger of missing the Aquidaban in spite of all the 
risk that had been run, since the Sampaio was passing her 
fast, hurried aft, and seizing the lanyard of the tube, pulled it 
himself. The Sampaio had meanwhile travelled sixty feet, 
as three seconds had elapsed from the first giving of the 
order to fire the starboard tube. The torpedo ran straight, 
and in consequence of the delay, struck the Aquidaban very 
far forward instead of amidships.* The explosion was 
exceedingly violent, but to the surprise of the Sampaio 's men, 
who saw a great uprush of water, and heard a terrific crash, 
did not change the ship's trim. The Sampaio moved ahead, 
and, just as the torpedo struck, the ironclad stopped her fire. 
The Sampaio, travelling at her fullest speed, covered 1000 
yards before the Melloist gunners re-opened. Up to this 
point they had not used their search-lights, but these were 
now turned on. 

Whilst the Sampaio was thus making her attack, the other 
torpedo-boats had been attracted to the sound of firing. The 
Pedro Ivo, indeed, had had to abandon the attempt, as the 
pressure in her boilers suddenly fell to iolbs., and she could 
scarcely keep in motion ; but the other two had gone forward. 
The Silvado, at first led, but when she got near the 
Aquidaban found the Sampaio between herself and the 
ironclad, and was forced to stop. She turned to starboard 
and passed the Aquidaban' s bows at a distance of 1000 yards, 
without discharging her torpedoes, or taking any part in the 
attack. At the same time, a launch coming from Desterro, 
headed towards her, endeavouring to ram her, and to avoid 
this launch, she turned once more and retired. The Affonso 

\f * It was of Schwartzkopf pattern, carrying i25lbs. of guncotton. 


Pedro, as the Aquidaban opened, put on full speed and 
steamed past the ironclad's starboard side. When abreast of 
her, she fired two torpedoes from her training tubes, but it 
is uncertain whether either hit. According to the lieutenant 
in command of the Affonso, the first struck the Aquidaban. 
Having passed her enemy, the Affonso circled and retired, 
rejoining the other boats at Tijucas Bay. They were not 
aware of the success of their exploit; indeed, they seem to 
have supposed that the explosions had not harmed the ironclad, 
and were preparing for another attack on the night of the 
1 6th, when the officers of the German cruiser, Arcona, in- 
formed them that the Aquidaban was deserted. The Affonso 
Pedro, though she went within 200 yards of the Aquidaban, 
was not touched. The Silvado was struck by one Nordenfelt 
bullet. The sailors of both boats heard the enemy's pro- 
jectiles whistle over their heads. The Sampaio, which had 
stopped for a minute-and-a-half alongside, at a distance of 
150 yards, was hit in all by thirty-eight Nordenfelt i-inch 
bullets ; but though nearly forty men were on board her, only 
one was very slightly wounded. The vessel herself was not 
at all the worse. The hits were distributed along her whole 
length. Two bullets struck the drum of the search-light, 
and the guns and torpedo tubes were scored. 

We may now turn to the account of the Aquidaban 's 
officers. That vessel had been expecting a boat from 
Desterro, probably the launch which engaged the Silvado, 
and when she saw the Sampaio, mistook her for this friend. 
In consequence, it was a minute or more before it became 
evident that the approaching torpedo vessel was an enemy, 
and not till it was recognised as the Sampaio, was fire opened. 
The Aquidaban used all those of her i-inch Nordenfelts and 
5' 7-inch breech-loaders which would bear, but not her heavy 
guns. When the torpedo exploded, the shock felt was 
terrific ; and the officer of the watch was thrown from the 
bridge into the sea. No one was killed by it, as there was no 
one in the forward compartments, which were torn open. 

Injury to Aquidaban by Torpedo. 




The water-tight doors were closed. There was great con- 
fusion after the ship had been struck, but in spite of this the 
ship's engines were started, and she moved a short distance to 
the north, where she slowly sank till sh<e took the ground, in 
about twenty-two feet *of water. As her draught was eighteen 
feet her deck and upper works remained above the water- 
level, and her crew were easily able to get ashore. On 
receiving promise of pardon one third of her men returned 
and surrendered. 

The Brazilians took possession of heron the i6th. Making 
a careful examination, they discovered that the torpedo had 
struck close to the bulkhead, which separated compartments 
two and three, about thirty-five feet aft from the ram. It had 
blown a hole nineteen or twenty feet long, and six feet six 
inches broad, and at either end the steel skin of the ship had 
been torn.* The tear extended aft six feet longitudinally, 
past the bulkhead dividing the third and fourth compartments. 
The water-tight doors in this bulkhead had been loosened by 
the shock, so that the fourth compartment, which was a very 
large one, had filled as well as the first three. Inside every- 
thing was smashed beyond recognition. The armoured deck 
had been driven out a little, just over the place where the 
explosion occurred, and numerous rivets in the skin had been 
loosened. In all, it was calculated, she had taken on board 
500 tons of water, and only the shoals saved her from 
foundering. On the starboard side forward, forty feet from 
the ram, was another hole, but much smaller than that to 
port, as it was only three feet in diameter. This may have 
been caused by the head of the first torpedo being driven 
right through the ship by the force of the explosion, or again 
it may have been made by the Affonso 's torpedo. There is 
some doubt whether this hit, as no one appears to have heard 
or seen a second explosion ; it is possible that it struck the 
ground, and, if it exploded, did not exert its full force on the 

* See Diagram. 


ship's bottom. This, however, is only a guess. The torpedoes 
used were of Schwarzkopf make, containing 57 kilogrammes 
(i25lbs.) of gun cotton. 

In this torpedo action there are one or two points of interest. 
Firstly, the Aquidaban betrayed herself ; had her watch 
been a little less smart she might have escaped attack. The 
difficulty of discovering the vessel selected for destruction must 
always be great on a dark night when there is a wide sheet of 
water to be searched. A fleet of course would be easier to 
find, yet, on any but bright nights, even considerable 
squadrons should be safe from discovery on the open sea, 
provided no lights are carried. Secondly, having discovered 
that a vessel was approaching her, and knowing that hostile 
torpedo-craft were in the vicinity from the unsuccessful 
attempt of the previous evening, a mistake prevented her 
from opening fire till the enemy was too close. Thirdly, 
though the Sampaio lay almost motionless, not four hundred 
feet off her, the ironclad's gunners did not succeed in sinking 
the small torpedo gunboat. Probably the Sampaio was for 
nearly half-a-minute at very close quarters. The Aquidaban* 
lacked medium quick-firers ; between her 5'y-inch yo-pounder 
and her i-inch Nordenfelts, she had nothing. All the 
evidence which we possess points to the utter futility of the 
machine-gun as a means of stopping torpedo craft of any 
size. A shell, with plenty of penetration, and a good 
bursting charge, is essential so that it, or its fragments, may 
rake the boat and open up its compartments. In fact, the 
larger the quick-firer the better, but for work against 
torpedo-boats the size of the gun must be conditioned by 

* In the Table, which is based upon the report of Lieutenant Rogers (U.S.A.), 
in the U.S. Naval Intelligence publication, she is credited with six 4'y- 
inch quick-firers. There is no mention of these either in Mr. Laird Clowes' 
account of the war (Naval Annual, 1894), or in Lieutenant's Verlynde's, 
(R.F.N.) detailed description of the affair in the " Revue Maritime," March, 
1895. We may, then, feel doubtful whether she mounted them. Of course, if 
she did, the remarks upon the necessity of heavy quick-firers lose their point, 
and the case against the large ship becomes very black. 


the rapidity of its fire. The i2-pounder weapon would seem 
to be about the right weight, as it can deliver a good number 
of rounds in the minute, and its shells are large enough to do 
plenty of damage. One-inch Nordenfelts and Catlings are 
useless for this special purpose. Fourthly, the Aquidaban had 
no nets out and was at anchor. No vessel has as yet been 
destroyed by the Whitehead, when in motion on the open sea, 
and it looks almost as if the conditions, which Mr. Laird Clowes 
has shown to apply to the use of the ram, apply also to the 
torpedo.* There were no vedette boats patrolling the bay, and 
there was no attempt to protect the ship by a boom. The 
mines, as is often the case, were a very delusory protection. 
Some of them were fished out of the water a few days later. 
Lastly, it is certain that her full complement was not on board, 
and that many of the men she carried were comparatively 
untrained. Admiral Mello is known to have suffered from 
shorthandedness, and he had lost some of his sailors in the 
land fighting. 

From first to last the Aquidaban was the mainstay of the 
insurrection. She was able to take a certain amount of 
punishment from the forts, and though an antiquated vessel, 
secured for the insurgents the command of the sea, till the 
collapse came at Rio. It is not likely that Peixoto would 
have moved his squadron upon the harbour had she been 
present. The efforts made to effect her destruction showed 
that Peixoto did not feel himself safe whilst she was afloat. 

The war cannot be said to have added greatly to our know- 
ledge. It showed that an improvised fleet, without trained 
seamen, is a most untrustworthy instrument, but that is a self- 
evident fact. It showed that ships can pass forts with impunity, 
or something approaching impunity, if there is an unobstructed 
channel, but a long series of actions has already proved this.f 

* As it is at present. See page 160. 

f It is, however, possible that the pneumatic gun will modify this where the 
channel to be defended is narrow. This gun can be absolutely concealed, and 
is able to fire a shell a minute. The explosive charge of the shells is extremely 
heavy and one hit should disable any man-of-war afloat. See also p. 150. 



Duckworth's brilliant run up the Dardanelles, Farragut's 
exploits on the Mississippi and, above all, at Mobile, had 
left no doubt. On the other hand, where there are ob- 
structions in the channel, where there are mines or booms 
to hold the ships under fire, such proceedings become, not 
risky, but well-nigh impossible. It must be remembered that 
Marshal Peixoto's forts were not armed with heavy quick-firers, 
and that the powder used in the guns was very bad. The insur- 
rection collapsed, not through any masterly activity on the part 
of the President, but rather through the incapacity of the 
Melloist leaders, and the fact that they could not collect an 
army. A fleet without an expeditionary force behind it is only 
valuable for defence, and lacks offensive power. Modern war- 
ships do not carry the crews of three-deckers, or even frigates, 
and have lost the power of landing a considerable body of men. 
The complements are barely sufficient to work the ships, and 
no one can be spared without risk. 

Two months after she had been torpedoed the Aquidaban 
was patched and raised. She was then repaired at Rio, and 
her name changed to the 24 de Maw. 

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Section i. The Combatants and their Ships. 

FROM Brazil to the Yellow Sea is a far cry, but it is to this 
.quarter that we must next turn our gaze. Hardly had the 
naval war in the West, a struggle so feebly and fatuously con- 
ducted that it seems almost absurd to call it a war, come to an 
abrupt conclusion, than the guns began to shoot in the East. 
Japan and China have been old enemies, and there is placed 
between them an apple of discord in the peninsula of Korea. 
In the spring ot 1894 an insurrection broke out in the south of 
that kingdom. The King appealed to his nominal suzerain 
China for help, and help was granted. Two thousand Chinese 
soldiers were landed at the Korean port of Asan. Now by 
the treaty of April i8th, 1885, China was bound to inform the 
Japanese Government of the despatch of troops, and, as this 
had not been done, Japan promptly embarked a force of about 
5000 men, and landed them at Chemulpho at the end of June. 
There followed the affair of the Kowshing and the declaration 
of war. 

It seemed a most perilous adventure for Japan, a small and 
poor state with forty-one million inhabitants, single-handed to 
assail the colossal Chinese empire, with its four million square 
miles of territory and its three hundred millions of inhabitants. 
The task was not so formidable as it looked, for the colossus 
had feet of clay. The striking peculiarity of Japan is that there 
.alone in Asia we find Western methods, Western organisation, 

E 2 


Western strategy, assimilated by an Oriental race. An 
observant eye might have discerned the prognostics of this 
astonishing phenomenon a generation back. At the close of 
the last century came a great revival of learning, bringing 
with it the study of earlier Japanese history, reminding a 
receptive and patriotic people that they possessed a great 
past. The revival of interest in their earlier history again 
contributed to the re-establishment of the Mikado's rule, in 
place of the Shogun, who had usurped much of his power. In 
1853, when an American squadron threatened Yokohama, a 
historic debate took place at Yedo, in which the party who 
advised compliance with the American demands pointed out 
that, as they were, the Japanese must be beaten with no gain. 
'J he Kai-Koku, for so this party was called, went on to say r 
" Rather than allow this, as we are not the equals of foreigners 
in the mechanical arts, let us have intercourse with foreign 
countries, learn their drill and tactics, and, when we have 
made the nation as united as one family, we shall be able to 
go abroad and give lands in foreign countries to those who 
have distinguished themselves in battle." Japan was opened 
to the United States and later to England and Russia. In 
1863 Japanese officers were sent to Holland to study naval 
war. In 1867-8 came the civil war, which ended in the 
triumph of the Mikado and the party of innovation. Japan 
steadily carried out the policy laid down by the Kai-Koku. 
Railways, telegraphs, roads were constructed. Schools were 
built and the population educated in a European fashion ; a 
university at Tokip, as it was now called, was founded. First 
a deliberative assembly, and then, within recent years, a 
constitution was granted. The calendar was Europeanised, 
postage stamps, and an imperial post, were introduced ; the 
criminal code was remodelled, and torture abolished. 
Newspapers were permitted to be published, and, in spite of 
a, somewhat rigid censorship, there were 113 as early as 1882. 
Western manufactures made their appearance ; cotton mills,, 
paper mills, coal mines, and ironworks sprang up. At a 











K Philip & Son,. 

1894-5] THE STRUGGLE IN THE EAST, 1894-5. 53 

bound the country passed from the twilight of barbarism into 
the daylight of full civilisation. 

Japan, in its barbarous days, had always possessed a 
singularly high code of honour; its nobles had shown no 
want of self-sacrifice or devotion, whilst from end to end of 
the kingdom the story of their great past fired the Japanese, 
and made them ready to sacrifice their personal prepossessions 
for the welfare of Japan. The nation progressed eagerly 
upon the path of the Kai-Koku party. The army first 
received attention and was organised on the basis of universal 
service. That it is no paper force, but is not far from being 
the equal of any European force, is attested by its bravery 
and discipline in 1894-5, and by the unanimous evidence of 
observers. The Japanese fleet was similarly organised on the 
European model, England being chosen as the pattern; whilst 
English instructors were brought out to give practical and 
theoretical instruction. The islanders of the East take kindly 
to the sea. Captain Ingles, the ex-naval adviser to the Mikado's 
Government, states that they are just like Europeans smart, 
constantly on the alert, cheerful, and patient. Their gunnery 
is excellent, though they are not so good with machine- 
worked as with man-handled weapons. The engineers are 
very good, keep the engines in capital order, and use them 
well. Thus Captain Ingles saw the Naniwa worked during 
the naval manoeuvres at 100 revolutions, which was her 
maximum natural draught rate in England on her trial.* 
Boilers and machinery are as efficient on the Japanese ships 
as they can be made. The discipline is comparable to that 
of an English squadron. The officers are hard-working and 
well up in the technical literature of their profession ; in 
intelligence, capacity, and courage they are Europeans. 
Admiral Ito, the officer in command, is not a mere paper 
sailor, but has had training and experience in the annual 

* On the other hand it is stated that the Japanese could never get anything 
like the trial speed out of their ships ; and that the Yoshino in the action off 
Asan could not overtake the Tsi Yuen. See p. 69. 


manoeuvres. In short, the Japanese fleet is a war-force, and 
does not merely exist for show. 

Some years were required to bring it to this pitch of 
efficiency, and as late as 1890 the Japanese Parliament 
refused to sanction a programme brought forward by Count 
Kabayama, which would have greatly increased the expendi- 
ture upon the navy, on the ground that the condition of the 
Japanese personnel was not satisfactory. It was thought that 
the naval officers had been selected by favouritism rather 
than merit, and there were objections to the pattern of the 
warships. But none the less a great deal was done between 
1884 and 1894 towards providing modern and powerful 
vessels, and care was taken to procure the most modern guns 
and explosives. The naval officers in the war of 1894 proved 
that they were as good as their ships, and may be said to 
have surprised Japan no less than Europe. 

On the other side of the China Sea is perhaps the most 
effete and barbarous state in the world. Whilst the national 
character of the Japanese stands high ; whilst we admire 
them individually for their determined courage upon the battle- 
field, and for the intelligence and foresight which have won 
them victory, we can feel little but contempt for China. There 
is to be found an alien despotism, cruel and superstitious, ruling 
a vast congeries of human ants, nourished in filth, educated 
only in obsolete formulas and catechisms, taught to believe 
themselves infinitely superior to the ''foreign devils" whom 
they so despise, and, if not without certain noble qualities, a 
certain passive stoicism, a remarkable faculty of application 
to work, yet ignorant, lethargic and bitterly opposed to 
Western innovation. The Government is as corrupt and 
treacherous as it is incapable. The rulers of provinces, the 
generals of armies, the admirals of fleets, are selected by an 
extraordinary system of examination, which would seem ex- 
pressly adapted to choose the unfittest. Peculation is, with very 
rare exceptions, the primary object of everyone, from the exalted 
members of the Tsung-li-Yamen to the meanest mandarin. 

1 894-5 J THE STRUGGLE IN THE EAST, 1894-5. 55 

Though time after time China had come into contact with 
Europe, and smarted sorely on each occasion, she had not 
learnt Japan's lesson. Indeed, we may doubt if she could have 
Europeanised herself so thoroughly and effectually, even had 
she followed hard in the footsteps of her rival, since there 
must have been a deep difference of character between the 
two races. China had no Daimios, no Mikado, no Kai-Koku ; 
there was no one to hound her forward, and she remained true 
to Asia, true, that is to say, to hideous cruelty, to dirt, and to 
extortion ; she retained an imposing exterior, but those who 
looked closely saw that it covered internal weakness and dis- 
organisation. She deceived Europe, but she did not deceive 

Needless to say, that a government which could do nothing 
but prevaricate, procrastinate, and peculate, would not be 
likely- to bring into existence either a strong army or a strong 
fleet. Both might, indeed, exist on paper, for the benefit of 
the mandarins' private purse ; neither would be found ready 
when the tug of war came. The army was a collection of 
dirty savages, whose tactics were grimaces and voluptuous 
music, whose arms were bows and arrows and unfamiliar rifles, 
to whom discipline was a word unknown, who fought to avoid 
the executioner's knife, not to defeat the enemy. The navy 
was more imposing. For a time China appeared to be follow- 
ing western models. Ironclads were bought in Germany, 
cruisers in England. A handful of naval instructors were 
enticed to China from Europe, and then insulted and thwarted 
till their. forbearance was exhausted. Captain Lang, awhile an 
admiral of the Chinese navy, has, indeed, asserted that under 
Admiral Ting the Chinese navy was a splendid force. Against 
that we may put the evidence of the " Times" correspondent 
and Mr. Norman. Ting, it appears, was an ex-cavalry general, 
and is said to have been devoid of tactical and strategical 
knowledge, though he certainly did not lack courage. The 
discipline of the Chinese fleet may be judged from the fact 
tha th ewould play pitch and toss with the sentry at his cabin 


door, and, when he had won all the man's money, would order 
the paymaster to advance his subordinate more, that his game 
might continue. As to its efficiency, the ships were filthily 
dirty, which is, after all, only what we should expect ; the 
water-tight doors were seldom closed or used, a fact which we 
must remember when we come to the Yalu ; the guns were 
employed by the sailors as receptacles for pickles, rice, and 
chop-sticks ; the heavy Krupps were kept in shocking order, 
and the rings on them were beginning to open out. As a 
foreign instructor said to Mr. Norman, so far from the 
Chinese squadrons being formidable, it was only a question 
who should get them as prizes. The officers were either in- 
efficient nominees of the authorities, or more able but power- 
less. Quick-firers were not bought because there was little 
money to be " squeezed " out of them. One Chinese battle- 
ship is stated to have gone to the Yalu without one of her 
heavy guns, which her captain had pawned. There were 
shells loaded with charcoal ; charges for heavy guns of stuff 
which would not burn, instead of cocoa powder ; and there 
were docks silted up from neglect, or useless owing to the 
bad arrangement of their pumping machinery. In vain did the 
English and German advisers beseech the Government to add 
^hips, to procure sailors, coal, stores, and oil. They pointed 
out that the Chinese engineers dared not use forced draught, 
and that the Chinese officers were so nervous when handling 
torpedoes that they fired them at 800 yards instead of 350. 
The Chinese seamen on occasions displayed both coolness 
and courage, though their gunnery left much to be desired ; 
but they lacked that confidence in their leaders, which is, after 
all, an essential of success. 

All this is of great importance as showing us what kind of 
a task the Japanese had before them, and how few deductions 
can be drawn from the way in which that task was performed. 
The Chinese fleet was not allowed to seek the Japanese. It 
was kept by orders out of the sight of Admiral Ito till com- 
pelled to fight. The strategy of the Tsung-li-Yamen may or may 

1894-5] THE STRUGGLE IN THE EAST, 1894-5. 57 

not have been sound, but it could have contributed to neither 
efficiency, discipline, nor morale. The officers were bad, the 
sailors certainly lacked training, and Ting, whatever his 
courage, was not a brilliant commander. Can any very serious 
tactical conclusions be drawn from the performances of such 
a force ? We ^ay, it is true, observe how the Chinese ships 
behaved under the Japanese fire, which will give us informa- 
tion as to construction. But can we get much more than 
this ? Can we say that the Yalu proves line ahead to be the 
ideal formation, and not line abreast? We maybe persuaded 
of it, but we shall do well not to rely overmuch upon this 
Eastern engagement. Had the Japanese made their onset in 
line abreast, it is quite probable that they would have won. In 
fact, the gulf between the two forces w y as immense. The only 
question from the beginning of the war was, how many of the 
Chinese ships would have to be sunk before the others could 
be captured and added to the Japanese fleet. The issue of an 
engagement with the Chinese was confidently predicted as a 
success for Japan by Mr. Norman, writing with full knowledge 
of both combatants, a month before the Yalu. 

And now to turn to the Japanese fleet and naval resources. 
The Japanese sea-going ships fall into three classes: the first 
comprising three old and indifferent armoured vessels ; the 
second, eight large protected cruisers ; the third, eighteen 
gunboats and smaller vessels. Taking the first group, its 
members are the Fusoo, Hiyei, and Kongo. The Fusoo is an 
old central-battery ship, designed by Sir Edward Reed, and 
launched in 1877 at the Thames Iron Works. On her 
main deck in a citadel she carries four 14^-ton guns, one at 
each corner of the citadel. On her upper deck are 
mounted two 5^-ton guns. Her armour of wrought iron, 
7 inches to 9 inches thick, is of very inferior quality and 
resisting power to the steel now used. Right ahead or astern 
she can fire two 14^-ton, and two 5^-ton guns ; on the broad- 
side two 14^-ton and one 5|-ton. Her speed at the beginning 
of the war did not probably exceed ten knots. She is very 


similar in type to the English Iron Duke class, but is smaller 
The Hiyei and Kongo are sister ships of a very different type, 
protected by a 4^-inch iron belt, for one quarter of their length, 
amidships; they were both built in England in 1877-8, and 
carry on their main-deck six 3-ton guns and three 6-ton. 
Their ahead-fire is from two 6-ton guns, their broadside from 
two 6-ton and three 3-ton. There are no similar vessels in 
the British fleet. The Riojo, like the last two ships, has a 
wooden hull, and is an antiquated ironclad, built in England, 
carrying 4^-inch armour. She took no part in the fighting, 
and need not therefore be further considered. 

In the second group, the Chiyoda alone has a chrome-steel 
armour-belt, 4^ inches in thickness, for two-thirds of her 
length. In addition, she has an inch protective deck from 
stem to stern with coal above it, and round her machinery 
compartments, coal and a belt of cellulose. She is divided 
into eighty-four water-tight compartments, and has a double 
bottom amidships. Her engines develop 5600 horse-power 
and give her a speed of nineteen-and-a-half knots an hour. 
She was built by Messrs. Thomson of Clydebank, and 
launched in 1891. Her armament includes ten 4'7-inch Arm- 
strong quick-firers, and fourteen 47-millimetre Hotchkisses, 
with three Catlings and three torpedo-tubes. Next come 
three larger vessels of 4240 tons, the Hashidate, Itsukushima, 
and Matsushima. They were designed by M. Bertin, and 
the last two were built at La Seyne in France, the first at 
Yokosuka in Japan. They carry an end-to-end steel turtle- 
back deck 2 inches thick amidships. Forward in the first two, 
aft in the last, is a barbette protected by 1 2-inch steel plates, 
but open at the top on which is mounted a 12 6-inch Canet 
66-ton gun, the most powerful weapon of its size in the world, 
built to fire cordite, and loaded and manoeuvred by hydraulic- 
power. The loading machinery is sheltered by the thick 
armour, but the barbette is open underneath, having only a 
small armoured ammunition shaft for the passage of projec- 
tiles and charges from the magazine to the breech of the gun. 

1894-5] THE STRUGGLE IN THE EAST, 1894-5. 59 

A bullet-proof shield protects the gunner sighting the weapon. 
Besides this immense gun, which can at 2000 yards perforate 
any armour afloat, each vessel carries eleven Armstrong 
4'7-inch quick-firers, five mounted on each broadside, behind 
bullet-proof shields, and one placed at the opposite end 
of the ship to the heavy gun.* The Hashidate further has 
six 6-pounder quick-firers, and six machine-guns, whilst the 
other two have each five 6-pounders, eleven 3-pounders, and 
six machine-guns. Each ship has four torpedo-tubes. Their 
speed is from sixteen to seventeen-and-a-half knots, and they 
were launched between 1889 and 1891. Their enormously 
heavy gun makes them something more than mere cruisers 
indeed, in general feature they approximate most closely, on a 
small scale of course, to the huge Italian cruiser-battleships. 
Even more powerful than these is the Yoshino, an Armstrong- 
built cruiser of 4150 tons, launched at Elswick in 1892. From 
stem to stern she has an armoured deck 2 inches thick, but 
on its slopes amidships the thickness is 4^ inches. The hull 
is minutely sub-divided, and there is a double bottom amid- 
ships. On the measured mile her speed reached the very high 
figure of 23-03 knots, and at the date of her trial she was the 
fastest cruiser in the world. Her armament is extremely 
strong. Forward she carries three 6-inch Armstrong quick- 
firers, mounted separately behind stout steel shields, whilst 
astern is a fourth. Two of the four are on the keel-line, the 
other two on sponsons forward. Amidships, on her upper 
deck, are eight 4'7-inch quick-firers, protected, like the 6-inch 
guns, by shields. Two fire right astern. She thus brings to 
bear, ahead three 6-inch, astern one 6-inch and two 47-inch, 
and on either broadside three 6-inch and four 4'7-inch guns, 
all quick-firers of the latest pattern. Besides this, her main 
battery, she carries twenty-two 3-pounders and five torpedo- 
tubes. Her supply of coal is 1000 tons, and the bunkers are 
so disposed as to protect the engine-rooms, boilers, and vitals. 

* In the Matsushima two 47 inch quick-firers are placed forward, making her 
total of these guns twelve. 


She has two funnels and two military masts, each with one 
top ; on the forecastle is an armoured conning-tower. The 
Akitsushima is a Yokosuka-built cruiser, similar in design to 
the Yoshino, but carries two less 4' 7-inch guns. She has a 
deck of steel, i| inches thick on the flat, 2\ inches on the 
slopes. Her speed is nineteen knots ; her armament consists 
of four 6-inch quick-firers, placed on sponsons, two forward 
and two astern, with six 4' 7-inch quick-firers mounted amid- 
ships. Her bow and stern fire is delivered from two 6-inch 
guns, but on the broadside she brings to bear two 6-inch and 
three 4'y-inch guns. She has fourteen 3-pounders and 
machine-guns, and carries four torpedo-tubes. By an error 
she is described in the older " Naval Annuals " as armed 
with a 66-ton Canet gun. Last come the Naniwa and 
Takachiho, two Elswick-built cruisers, launched in 1885. 
They are of interest as being practically sister-ships of the 
celebrated Esmeralda, which, designed by Mr. Rendel for the 
Chilian Government, was the prototype of the fast, heavily- 
armed, unarmoured ship. Their tonnage is 3600 to 3750. 
They have an end-to-end steel deck 3 inches thick on the 
slopes, 2 inches on the flat amidships and at the ends; above 
this deck are coal-bunkers. They have also cork-packed 
compartments running nearly round the ship on the water-line. 
Forward and aft, fifteen feet above the water, are placed two 
28-ton, lo-inch guns, on central-pivot carriages, with hydraulic 
turning and loading gear. A steel screen revolves with the 
gun and protects the gunners, whilst an armoured loading- 
station is provided to the rear of each gun. Amidships are 
six 6-inch Armstrong slow-fire breech-loaders, mounted three 
on each beam, on sponsons. Besides these, twelve smaller 
weapons and four torpedo-tubes are carried. The trial speed 
was 1 8' 7 knots, and there is bunker space for 800 tons of 
coal. Altogether, these are fine ships, if a trifle out of date. 

The smaller Japanese ships do not merit any detailed 
description, as none of them, with the exception of the Akagi, 
a small gunboat, were at any time engaged. The torpedo- 

1894-5] THE STRUGGLE IN THE EAST, 1894-5. 61 

boats are forty-one in number, and of these, one, the Kotaka? 
has i -inch armour: though an old boat, built in 1886, she did 
good service. 

Behind her war-fleet, Japan had a very considerable 
mercantile marine, in which were included in 1894, 288 
steamers of 174,000 tons. The Nippon Yusen Kaisha is one 
of the important shipowning companies of the world ; to 
it belong fifty steamers, of which four can steam thirteen 
knot;-, whilst two, the Saikio Maru and Kobe Maru, of 
2900 tons, steam fourteen knots. The government sub- 
ventions this company to the extent of one-and-a-half million 
dollars yearly. Just before the war, in 1894, the Japanese 
Government purchased a large number of steamers at 
Shanghai and Hongkong, so that it wanted neither auxiliary 
cruisers nor transports. With the exception of the 66-ton 
gun, everything required by the Japanese ships is produced 
in Japan ; machinery, castings, armour, guns, projectiles, 
melinite, powder, all are manufactured in the country."* At 
Tokio is the arsenal, employing in peace over 1000 men; 
whilst the dockyards are three in number. Onohama is the 
least important, building gunboats and torpedo-boats, and 
employing less than 1000 men. Yokosuka is more important; 
it builds cruisers, and has three docks, of which the following 
are the dimensions : 

Length. Breadth. Depth on Sill. 

No. i ... 392 feet ... 82 feet ... 22 feet 
No. 2 ... 502 ... 94 ... 28 
No. 3 ... 308 ... 45 ... 17 ,, 

At Tokio, there is one dock 300 feet long, fifty-two feet 
broad, and fourteen deep ; at Nagasaki, one 400 feet long ; 
and at Osaka, where there are important ironworks, a dock 
250 long. In addition, there are three slipways, one capable 
of lifting a 2ooo-ton ship At Kure, on the Inland sea, is a 
new dockyard recently established. The Japanese are clever 
workmen, and were able to effect repairs with great rapidity. 

* Japan has not, however, as yet been able to build large warships. 


Whilst the Japanese fleet thus included a large number of 
thoroughly modern vessels, equipped with quick-firers, and 
capable of fast steaming, whilst these ships were manned by 
well-trained sailors, and officers who had studied strategy and 
tactics, the Chinese fleet had remained almost stationary since 
the close of the war with France in 1885. To begin with, it 
could scarcely be described as a fleet, being a local rather 
than an imperial force. In peace, it was organised, so far as 
it had any organisation and was not merely a jumble of badly 
kept ships, in four squadrons, the North Coast, the Foochow, 
the Shanghai, and the Canton. The first-named was the 
largest and strongest, though the Foochow was not much 
inferior. The total included two armoured second-class 
battleships, three small and indifferent armourclads, eleven 
old but heavily armed cruisers, ranging from 2200 to 2500 
tons, nine smaller cruisers of over 1000 tons, thirty small 
vessels and gunboats, and forty-three torpedo-boats. In 
numbers, China, then, had a very decided superiority ; but 
whilst the two large armoured ships were very much better 
than anything the Japanese possessed, the Chinese cruisers were 
old or in bad repair. The Chinese artillery was of a much 
older pattern than the Japanese, and there is reason to believe 
that very few quick-firers were included in it. 

The two largest vessels which flew the Chinese flag, were 
the sisters Chen Yuen and Ting Yuen,, of about 7500 tons 
displacement, built by the Vulcan Company at Stettin in 
1 88 1 -2. They carried 14 inches of compound armour upon a 
citadel which occupied about half their length ; the other half 
was unarmoured. Thus forward and aft their ends were 
quite unprotected externally, but internally there was a 3-inch 
horizontal deck, a minute cellular sub-division, and a large 
number of cork-packed compartments. The extreme speed 
at their trials was fourteen-and-a-half knots, but their 
boilers were in a bad condition in 1894, and it is doubtful 
if they could steam much over ten knots in the hour. 
The heavy armament was placed at the forward end of 

i8 9 4-5] THE STRUGGLE IN THE EAST, 1 894-5- 6 3 

the citadel, in two barbettes, protected by 1 2-inch compound 
armour, and disposed en echelon. The barbettes were open 
at the top, but a bullet-proof shield protected the gunners.* 
Hydraulic power was used to work the four 1 2-inch 35-ton 
Krupps, placed two in each barbette. At each extremity of 
the ship, one 6-inch Krupp breech-loader was mounted in a 
small, lightly-armoured turret. In addition, there were twelve 
smaller guns, and two torpedo-tubes. The general design 
was similar to that of the Ajax and Inflexible developing 
bow-fire at the expense of the broadside. As this feature may 
have exercised some tactical influence upon the battle of the 
Yalu, we may be permitted to dwell upon it. 

In theory /each of these ships could fire ahead or astern the 
four heavy Krupps and one 6-inch gun ; in practice, the blast 
of the inner gun in each barbette, when both were trained 
right ahead, would prevent the 6-inch gun from being worked, 
and might even demolish its turret ; the same would be the 
case when they were trained aft. With an antagonist exactly 
abreast, all four guns would bear on the broadside, but yet on 
either beam there was a wide angle which was not covered by 
the fire of more than two heavy guns, since the barbettes, 
diagonally placed, obstructed each other. The funnels 
prevented the after barbette guns from bearing upon the port 
quarter; on the starboard quarter, the fore barbette guns 
could not fire, because of the after barbette; and six 
points before the beam on the port quarter, the after 
barbette guns could not bear for the same reason. The 
best fighting positions for these ships would then be 
to have their enemy right ahead or right astern exactly 
abreast of them on the port (left) beam, or rather, ahead 
of them on the starboard (right) beam. In those positions, 
only would four heavy guns bear; in any other position, half 
their heavy armament would be useless. These vessels 
represented a tactical theory already obsolete in 1894, as they 

* These shields were removed in the course of the war 


were built to attack in line abreast. At the date of their 
construction, the heavy gun was the dominant factor in naval 
tactics, coupled, it is true, with the ram. Since, 1882, 
however, had come the large calibre quick-firer, compelling a 
return to the fore and aft disposition of the guns, through the 
necessity of finding room for such useful weapons on the 
broadside. There followed in consequence a general return to 
line ahead as the battle formation, since the greatest weight 
of metal, with ships carrying their guns fore and aft, is 
discharged on the broadside, which line ahead leaves free. 

The King Yuen and Lai Yuen were, again, sister barbette- 
ships of 2,850 tons, built by the Vulcan Company of Stettin, 
and launched in 1887. They had a very short armour-belt, 9^ 
to 5j-inches thick, over their engines and boilers, but the top 
of the belt lay flush with the water-line, and thus it was not of 
much service to them. Over the belt was a deck of steel 
i ^-inches thick, which at the unprotected ends was twice as 
thick. Like the larger battleships, they had minute sub- 
division and cork packing outside their armour. Amidships 
only had they a double bottom. The nominal speed was 
sixteen-and-a-half knots with forced draught, but in 1894 they 
could not do much more than twelve or thirteen. A conning- 
tower protected by 6-inch armour was placed forward ; and 
the armament consisted of two 8J-inch Krupps mounted in a 
barbette forward, on which was compound armour- 8 inches 
thick. The gunners had the shelter of a stout steel shield. 
Sponsoned out on either beam was one 5'9-inch breechloader, 
and thirteen smaller guns were also carried. The Ping Yuen 
of the same displacement was built at Foochow, and had a 
complete water-line belt of 8-inch armour, a deck 2 inches 
thick, and a barbette forward, protected by 5-inch plating and 
a shield. In this barbette she carried one 22-ton Krupp instead 
of the two 8-inch weapons ; otherwise her armament was the 
same. Her speed was only ten and a half knots on trial, as 
money ran short when she was on the stocks, and her length was 
cut down, ruining her lines. The Tsi Yuen was a Stettin-built 

1894-5] THE STRUGGLE IN THE EAST, 1894-5. 65 

cruiser, having a 2 to 3-inch deck and a barbette forward, 
armoured with 10 inches of plating, in which were mounted 
two 8^-inch Krupps. Aft she carried one 5'g-inch Krupp gun 
mounted in a steel turret. Her speed was nominally fifteen 
knots. The Chih Yuen and Ching Yuen were Armstrong 
cruisers, launched in 1886, and, like all that firm's ships, 
extremely powerful for their size ; their armoured deck was 
4 inches thick on the slopes, and 2 inches on the ends and 
centre; two 8-inch guns were mounted forward behind a shield 
and one aft, whilst one 6-inch gun was sponsoned out on 
either beam. The speed was at their trial eighteen-and-a-half 
knots. The Tshao Yong and Yang Wei again were of Arm- 
strong construction, but older and smaller. Their speed had 
been sixteen knots, but their boilers were completely worn 
out and good for very little. They carried fore and aft 
one lo-inch Armstrong gun, on a central-pivot mounting, and 
amidships four 5*1 -inch slow-firers and seven machine guns. 
All these vessels took part in the Yalu, with, in addition, two 
small cruisers of about 1000 tons, whose names and armaments 
are uncertain and unimportant.* Of the vessels which did not 
take part in that action the most important were the Foo 
Ching, Ye Sing, Foo Sing, Kai Chi, Nan Shuin, Nan Ting, 
and Yang Pao, all very similar to the Chih Yuen, carrying 
8-inch or 8j-inch, and 4'y-inch guns. The gunboats were 
mostly of the Rendel type, carrying one 38-ton or 35-ton 
muzzle-loader forward. 

In her merchant marine, China was far behind Japan, 
having only thirty-five steamers of 44,000 tons. In docks she 
was better off. At Foochow, the most important Government 
yard, was one dock 390 feet long; at Amoy, one of 310 feet 
and two smaller ; at Shanghai, one of 500 feet and four of 
over 300 feet, whilst one other w>as out of use. At Taku w r as 

* Knang Chia or Kmang Kai and K-aiang Ping. The first is described by 
Captain McGiffiin as of 1030 tons, armed with threes-inch quickfirers; thesecond 
as of 1300 tons armed with three 6-inch, four 5-inch, and eight small guns. 
Details of the ships engaged at the Yalu are given in Tables XVIII.-XIX. 



one of 340 feet and another of smaller dimensions; at 
Whampoa, two of over 400 feet ; at Port Arthur, one 400 feet 
long and one smaller dock. On the Gulf of Pe-che-li China 
possessed two excellent harbours in Port Arthur and Wei- 
hai-wei, each of which was defended on the seaward face by 
strong works mounting very heavy guns, Armstrongs and 
Krupps. But the management of the dockyards was not 
good, though there seems to have been little fault to find with 
the Chinese workmen. 

Serving in the Chinese fleet were eight or nine Europeans, 
of whom Major Von Hanneken, a German, acted as 
strategical adviser to Admiral Ting. Five were Englishmen 
with some knowledge of naval matters, one or two having 
passed through the British Navy. The Japanese depended 
entirely upon themselves, and had no Europeans. 

r n% to TarttcwK bru 

iO c l l ; f - >t in 4, 11 / 

.' jio c J ni ijtuociir, I '.'~.l! 


KOWSHING, July 25th, 1894. 

ON July 25th the Japanese Flying Squadron under Rear 
Admiral Tsuboi, consisting of the ships Yoshino, Naniwa, 
Takachiho, Akitsusu* all fast cruisers, was off Asan, 
a port in the Gulf of Korea, then in the possession of 
the Chinese. At anchor off Asan were three Chinese warships, 
the Tsi Yuen and two other vessels whose names are given as 
the Kuwan-shi and Tsao Kiang. These two are identified by 
Mr. Laird Clowes with the Kwang Yi and the despatch-boat 
Tsan Chieng, which had been purchased some time previously 
and was only a mercantile steamer, lightly armed. The Chinese 
ships weighed anchor, and putting to sea, perhaps to cover the 
transports which were coming up from Taku, fell in with the 
Yoshino, Naniwa, and Akitsusu in the gulf. According to 
the Japanese account the Chinese failed to salute Admiral 
Tsuboi's flag, as international etiquette requires, but were 
cleared for battle and gave various indications of a hostile 
purpose. Seeing this, the account proceeds, the Japanese 
stood out to sea to get out of the narrow waters in which they 
were manoeuvring ; but the Naniwa was so closely followed by 
the Tsi Yuen that she turned and headed for the C hinese ship, 
which was commanded by Captain Fong, one of the ring- 
leaders in the intrigue to drive Captain Lang out of the 
Chinese navy. The Tsi Yuen being now in turn closely 
pressed by the Naniwa, though no shots had as yet been fired 

* Or Akitsushima. Other accounts do not mention the Takachiho 

F 2 


on either side, hoisted the white flag above the Chinese naval 
ensign. Under cover of this she approached the Japanese 
ship, and, at a distance of only 300 yards from her stern, 
treacherously discharged a torpedo at her. The torpedo 
missing, the Nantwa opened at once on the three Chinese 
ships, and was supported by her two consorts. This happened 
about nine o'clock in the morning. The Chinese version is 
very different, and is, for once, the more probable. The three 
Japanese ships fell in with the Chinese, and without any notice 
or warning opened upon them. The Chinese were taken by 
surprise, their ships were not cleared for action, and there 
was some delay before they could reply. At the first Japanese 
discharge several shots struck the conning-tower of the Tsi 
Yuen> piercing it, and blowing to pieces the first lieutenant 
and a sub-lieutenant. The head of the first lieutenant was 
left hanging on to one of the voice-pipes, whilst steering gear, 
engine-room telegraphs, and voice-pipes were completely 
wrecked. Captain Fong, who was inside, was not, however, 
wounded, and at once gave orders to clear ship for action, 
and went below. Before anything could be done a second 
broadside struck the ship, doing great damage. A shell, 
glancing from the armour-deck below, flew up under the 
forward turret, passing through the armour of the turret. It 
forced up the deck and damaged the shot-hoist, disabling one 
of the two 8-inch guns. A few minutes later a second shell 
perforated the turret, and bursting inside killed the gunnery 
officer and six men,* but did no damage to either of the two- 
guns. Not a man was left on deck, so searching and deadly 
was the fire ; those of the crew who were not killed had fled 
below the armour-deck, nor could they be driven to the guns- 
till, the officers had drawn their revolvers, and threatened to 
use them with effect. A large number of shells entered 
between decks ; one wrecked the officers' cabins and tore a huge 
hole in the side ; another struck the base of the funnel and 

* This shot also wounded fourteen men. It was a shell with base fuse, and 
struck the turret to the rear. 


burst in it, killing several of the stokers. The boats were re- 
peatedly hit and set on fire, whilst the military mast was 
struck more than once. Huge holes were blown in the side 
of the ship by the Japanese shells. On the armour-deck lay 
six torpedoes, which had not been sent below owing to the 
suddenness of the attack. One of these was discharged by the 
torpedo lieutenant without purpose or without aim, anxious 
only to get rid of a petard which might readily hoist his own 
ship. Strange to relate, not one of the other torpedoes 
was hit, though shells were bursting dangerously near them. 
As soon as her hand-steering gear could be got to work, the 
Tsi Yuen turned from her enemies and headed for Wei-hai- 
wei. The ship was already in a dreadful plight, and with her 
stern to the Japanese she would not have appeared to have 
any chance of surviving a running fight, since the only gun 
which could fire astern was a 5'9-inch Krupp, mounted in a 
thinly-armoured turret aft. Behind her was the Yoshino, at 
least four knots faster, and bringing to bear upon her three 
6-inch quick-firers, which were equivalent from the rapidity of 
their fire to six at least of the Tst Yuen's guns. The awning 
aft, with the stanchions which supported it, had not been 
removed in the confusion, and hampered the single Chinese 
gun. Fortunately for the Tsi Yuen a shot from her one gun 
struck the Yoshino' s bridge, whilst a second hit the Japanese 
conning-tower, and wrecked the chart-house. The Chinese 
also state that they knocked one of the hostile cruiser's guns 
overboard. In any case the Yoshino abandoned the pursuit 
whether because of the damage to her bridge and chart- 
house, with possibly some injury to her steering gear, or 
because her machinery broke down at the critical moment, it 
is impossible to say.* The Tst Yuen proceeded on her way, 
and reached Wei-hai-wei without further adventure. She had 
been terribly knocked about, losing sixteen killed, of whom 
three were officers, and twenty-five wounded. She had been 

* It is now, however, stated that she was not injured, but that she could not 
overtake the Tsi Yuen ; if so something must have broken down in her engines. 


struck a great number of times by 6-inch, 4'7-inch, and smaller 
projectiles, but the damage was not quite so serious as 
might have been expected, owing to the fact that a great 
many of the Japanese shells failed to explode. A European 
officer who saw her on her arrival thus describes her appear- 
ance : " The vessel presented the appearance of an old wreck. 
The mast was shot through half-way up, the gear was torn in 
pieces, ropes hung loose and tattered. On deck the sight was 
cruel, and beggars description. Woodwork, cordage, bits of 
iron, and dead bodies, all lay in confusion. Between decks 
matters were as bad." And an English officer adds*: "The 
slaughter has been awful, blood and human remains being 
scattered over the decks and guns. Three of the five men 
working the 4-ton gun in the after- turret were blown, to pieces 
by a 6-inch shell from one of the Naniwa's (?) quick-firing (?) 
guns, and a fourth was shot down while attempting to leave 
the turret. The remaining gunner stuck to his post, and 
managed to load and fire three rounds at the Naniwa, and, 
one shell entering her engine-room and another blowing her 
fore-bridge away, she hauled off. The Chinese admiral 
awarded the plucky gunner 1000 taels. One shell struck the 
Chen Yuen's [sic] steel deck, and, glancing, passed up through, 
the conning-tower and exploded, blowing the gunnery 
lieutenant to pieces, and leaving his head hanging on to one 
of the voice-pipes. Huge fragments of armour and backing 
had been torn from their fastenings and carried inboard, 
crushing a number of poor wretches into shapeless masses, 
even the upper part of the funnels being splashed with blood. 
An engineer-officer (European) was sent for to repair the 
steam-pipe of the steering-engine, and tried to grope his way 
through the smoke of bursting shells and heaps of killed and 
wounded lying on the deck, when a shot struck his assistant 
and disembowelled him, covering the engineer with blood. 

* In the earlier acconnts the vessel inspected was described as the Chen 
Yuen, which, as now appears, was not engaged. The Tsi Yuen is evidently the 
ship referred to. 




He nevertheless managed to reach the steering-engine, and 
repaired the pipe, for which he received a rather handsome 
reward from the admiral. The engagement lasted about one- 
and-a-quarter hours, when the Japanese hauled off, and the Chen 
Yuen made the best of her way back to Wei-hai-wei, their naval 
station, where she arrived the next day in just the same con- 
dition as she left the scene of action, no attempt having been 
made to wash away the blood or remove the dead bodies." 

Meantime the Kuwan-shi, or Kwang Yi, had fought first 
the Nani-wa and then both the Naniiua and Akitsusu, with 
gallantry, though only a small vessel and lightly armed. She 
was heavily hulled, and lost no fewer than thirty-seven men 
killed, before her ammunition ran short. In a leaking and 
sinking condition, her captain ran her inshore, beached her, 
and got the remnant of his crew away in safety. The 
Japanese left her for the time, but, returning later, fired 
thirteen rounds into her, one of which exploded a torpedo in 
her after torpedo-room, and blew her stern clean away. The 
courage of her captain and crew is evinced by the fact that 
only eighteen men, most of them badly wounded, escaped. 
The despatch-boat Tsan Chieng was not chased till after the 
sinking of the Kowshtng, when she was quickly overpowered 
and taken. Captain Fong, of the Tsi Yuen, was, for deserting 
these two vessels, condemned to death on his arrival at 
Wei-hai-wei, but was subsequently given a chance of redeem- 
ing his character at the Yalu. It is hard to see what good he 
could have done by remaining to fight the Japanese ; the odds 
were heavily against him, and his ship could only have fallen 
a prize to Admiral Tsuboi, or have been disabled. Fong 
behaved very badly at the Yalu, and for this was executed 
after that battle ; on this occasion he does not seem to have 
been at fault* 

* Fault has been found with the Japanese, and with good reason, for their 
failure to capture the Tsi Yuen. They had four good cruisers, all much faster 
than the Chinese ship, and yet they let her get away, how or why, it is difficult 
to understand. 


We must now go back a day or two to follow the fortunes 
of the Kowshing. Towards the end of July the Chinese 
decided to despatch troops to Korea by sea. Accordingly 
three British steamers were chartered, amongst which was 
the Kowshing, an iron screw-propelled vessel of 1355 tons, 
built in England, owned by Messrs. Jardine and Matheson, 
sailing under the British flag, and carrying a British captain 
and officers. On July 23rd she left Taku, having on board 
uoo Chinese infantry, two Chinese generals, Major von 
Hanneken, and twelve field-guns, besides a large quantity of 
ammunition. Early on the morning of July 25th she sighted 
the islands in the Gulf of Korea, and about the same time 
noticed a large warship, which resembled the Chen Yuen, 
and appeared to have been in action, steaming westwards. 
This vessel was upon her port side, and must have been 
the Tsi Yuen in retreat before the Japanese. The Tsi Yuen 
might have signalled to the Kowshing what had happened, 
and so have prevented the catastrophe which was to 
follow, but no signals were made, either because Fong 
\vas not aware that the Kowshing was in the Chinese 
service, or more probably because all his concern was for the 
safety of his own ship. Some minutes later a vessel was seen 
under sail, upon a course which would cross the Kowshing's 
bows. This was the Tsan Chieng. An hour later still, at 
eight o'clock, a large warship came into sight from behind the 
island of Hsutan, and following, her were three Others. All 
appeared to the Kowshing 1 s officers to be ironclads. At nine 
o'clock it could be seen that the nearest vessel flew the 
Japanese flag. She approached rapidly, saluted the Kowshing, 
and passed hen The four Japanese ships were now in line 
abreast and heading west ; they appeared to be chasing the 
Tsan Chieng, and to intend no harm to the Kowshing. 
Presently, however, the ship which had saluted the Kowshing 
signalled to the English vessel to anchor, at the same time 
firing two blank shots. The order was obeyed, and was 
followed by a second, " Remain where you are or take the 


consequences," after which the Japanese ship was seen to 
circle and signal to her consorts. A few minutes passed, and 
the warship once more headed towards the Kowshing ; as 
she drew near it was observed that her crew were at quarters 
and her guns trained on the Kowshing. A boat was lowered 
and a boarding party sent off to the English vessel, when 
Major von Hanneken and the English officers learnt that the 
ship observing them was the Elswick cruiser Naniwa, Captain 
Togo. The Chinese soldiers and generals were greatly 
excited, and when Von Hanneken and the English officers 
tried to persuade them to surrender, asserted that they would 
die rather than yield, and that if the Englishmen attempted to 
leave the ship they should be killed. Between the Chinese 
and the Japanese the Europeans were in no enviable plight. 
Meantime, several Japanese officers came on board and 
inspected the ship's papers. They were told by Captain 
Galsworthy that the Kowshing was a British ship, with the 
British consul's clearance, and flying the British ensign, and 
that she had sailed in peace. After some hesitation and 
argument she was ordered by the Japanese to follow the 
Naniwa. Whilst this short conference was proceeding the 
excitement on deck was growing, and the Chinese had set a 
guard upon the anchor. When the Japanese left, the Chinese 
absolutely refused to allow compliance with the Naniwa's 
demands. As argument was useless, Von Hanneken had the 
Naniwa 1 s boat recalled. He explained to the Japanese that 
the position on board the Kowshing rendered obedience to 
their orders impossible, and asked that, as the ship had sailed 
in peace, she should be allowed to return to Taku. The 
Japanese officers understood, and promised to report to their 

Once more the boat left the transport, and some minutes of 
suspense followed. It reached the Naniwa, and the next 
thing was an imperious signal from her, " Quit ship as soon as 
possible." It was addressed to the Europeans, but they were 
helpless. Finally came the order, " Weigh, cut, or slip ; wait 


for nothing." To attempt obedience in the face of a thousand 
armed Chinamen was hopeless. Captain Galsworthy replied, 
" We cannot," and his signal was acknowledged. Immediately 
the Naniwa began to move ; she blew a loud blast on her 
steam siren and hoisted a red flag ; then when she was broad- 
side on to the Kowshing, abreast with her, and at a distance 
of 500 to 300 yards, fired a torpedo. At that moment, all the 
Europeans on board the doomed vessel mustered on deck, in 
obedience to Captain Galsworthy's orders. Whevher the 
torpedo struck or not is doubtful, since, almost at the same 
instant as the torpedo left the Nam'wa, that vessel fired 
with a terrific crash a broadside from her five guns, two of 
28-tons, and three 6-inch. According to Von Hanneken the 
torpedo struck a coal bunker amidships. " The day became 
night : pieces of coal, splinters, and water filled the air, and 
then all of us leapt overboard and swam." According to 
the other survivors, the torpedo missed, and the damage was 
done by a 5oolb. shell from one of the 28-ton guns, 
which exploded the boilers. The transport listed heavily 
to starboard, whilst the pitiless Japanese fire searched her 
vitals. From the Naniwa's tops, where were mounted 
Catlings, and from Nordenfelts and small quick-firers on 
her upper deck, came a hail of small projectiles, tearing through 
the dense mass of Chinamen on the Koivshing's deck. The 
Chinese replied in a futile, though gallant manner, by dis- 
charging their rifles at the enemy. The result could not 
be long in doubt. The heel of the Kowshing grew greater, 
and she sank lower and lower in the water, till about 2 o'clock, 
an hour from the firing of the first shot, her deck was sub- 
merged. All this time the Europeans, and many of the 
Chinese who had leapt overboard, were in the water, exposed 
to stray projectiles from the Japanese, and deliberately fired 
upon by the Chinese who still were left on board the sinking 
ship. "Bullets began to strike t':e water on all sides of us," 
says Mr. Tamplin, the Kowshing' s first officer, who had 
jumped overboard after the explosion, " and, turning to see 


whence they came, I saw that the Chinese, herding round 
the only part of the Kowshing that was then out of water, 
were firing at us. I swam straight to the Naniwa. I had 
been in the water nearly an hour when I was picked up by 
one of the Naniwa' s boats." On telling the Japanese officer 
in charge that Captain Galsworthy was swimming for his life, 
Mr. Tamplin heard that he was already being looked after. 
The water was alive with Chinese soldiers, and two lifeboats 
had put off from the transport, crowded with Chinamen. What 
followed now was the most disgraceful feature of the day's 
proceedings. The Japanese made not the smallest attempt to 
rescue their drowning enemies ; they did, indeed, look after the 
Europeans, but they left the Chinese to their fate or worse. 
For, when Mr. Tamplin was on board the Naniwa 's boat, the 
Japanese officer told him that he had orders to sink the 
Chinese lifeboats, and in spite of remonstrances proceeded to 
do so. Two volleys were fired, and the Chinese boats were 
sunk. This atrocious act has been denied by the Japanese, 
but the evidence for it appears incontrovertible. Some of 
the Chinese succeeded in swimming to the island of Shopaul, 
whither Von Hanneken had escaped, after being hours in the 
water. The French gunboat, Lion, and the German warship, 
Iltis, saved, between them, three hundred, many of whom 
were wounded. Some of these had been in the boats and 
corroborated Mr. Tamplin's assertion that the Japanese fired 
on them. In one boat all were killed or wounded. Having 
completed her bloody work, the Naniwa steamed backwards 
and forwards till eight o'clock that evening. The Europeans 
were shown a shell in one of the officer's cabins, which it was 
stated, had been treacherously fired into the Naniwa by the 
Tsi Yuen. Next day they were transferred to the Yaeyama, 
which conveyed them to Japan, where they were set at 

The Japanese had thus committed three questionable 
acts. i. They had attacked the Tsi Yuen in peace and 
before a declaration of war. 2. They had followed this up 


by destroying a neutral ship, which had sailed before the 
action off Asan, and could not therefore know that a state 
of war existed. 3. They had fired upon the Chinese in the 

As regards the first head, if we follow the Chinese account, 
the Japanese committed an act of violence almost of unpro- 
voked aggression, by attacking the Tsi Yuen and her con- 
sorts. At the same time, there was on the 25th every proba- 
bility of war between China and Japan, and the Tsi Yuen had 
no business to be taken off her guard. It is the commonest 
thing possible for states to go to war without any declaration, 
or for acts of hostility to precede * declaration. Indeed, the 
vulgar idea that formal notice is necessary is probably due to 
the fact that histories use the phrase " war was declared " as 
a convenient expression for " hostilities commenced." That 
body of precedents which goes by the name of International 
Law, give^ ample justification for such a course. Colonel 
Maurice has shown that between 1700 and 1870 there were 
only ten instances in which formal notice preceded act? of 
hostility. We cannot, therefore, condemn the Japanese for 
acting as they did : they were only once more copying the 
West. And if their story is true, which it does not appear to 
be, they themselves were the injured and the Chinese the 

We come now to their attack on the Kowshing. Here things 
are complicated by the presence of the neutral flag. Had they 
any right to treat her as they did, accepting their own version 
of the Tsi Yuen's behaviour? Before a declaration of war 
there is no contraband, and there are no neutrals, since all 
states are assumed to be friends in peace. There is then no 
obligation upon the neutral to avoid the conveyance of con- 
traband, or the performance of non-neutral acts, unless, and it 
is an important proviso, it is notorious that a state of war 
exists. There is no right of search, no power to visit neutral 
vessels or examine their papers, resident with either of the 
two parties to the quarrel, till the quarrel has become war. 


The whole question, then, turns upon this : Did a state of war 
notoriously exist on July 23rd ? Apparently the English 
Government was satisfied of this, since we do not know 
that any demand for reparation has been made. And yet 
we question whether it could be said with truth that on the 
23rd war was inevitable, or a state of war a notorious fact. 
The Kowshing cleared on that day from a Chinese port, and 
could not very well have received later intelligence. There- 
fore, if hostilities had commenced on the 24th she might yet 
with reason have been spared. She was carrying Chinese 
troops to Korea, it is true, but this was permitted by the treaty 
of 1885 between Japan and China. The neutral may carry 
whom he likes and carry him where he likes till war has been 
declared. Whilst the Kowshing was at sea the first act of 
hostility was committed if by the Chinese, it does not follow 
that the neutral in the Chinese service should be injured, 
before he has had time to dissociate himself from the aggressor 
if by the Japanese, still less. Nor can the neutral be con- 
verted into a belligerent by an attack at sea. He may, indeed, 
be requested to return to the port from which he had sailed, 
but for some reason or other, no such request was made in 
the case of the Kowshing, though the Chinese generals were 
ready to allow the English vessel to go back. Obviously, the 
English captain could not then and there discharge his living 
cargo into the sea. On the other hand, the Japanese captain 
saw before him a cargo of troops in a neutral ship, and 
these troops might be used against his country. He had, by 
his own account, received considerable provocation from the 
Chinese. If he ordered the Kowshing to proceed to a Chinese 
port, she might double when out of his sight, and return ; to 
place a prize-crew on board her in the midst of a thousand or 
more armed Chinamen, was impossible ; to escort her with 
his own ship, might well have been inconvenient. He 
therefore attacked her, but his attack was illegal, and 
constitutes a dangerous precedent. For it cannot ' be 
tolerated that neutrals should be treated with severity for 


breach of obligations which do not come into force till war 

On the second head, the Naniwa took the extreme course 
of sinking the ship, but only after the Japanese captain had 
requested the Kowshing to " weigh, cut, or slip," and the 
Chinese soldiers had refused to allow her to do this. He had 
further done his best to save the European officers. Having 
once decided to make her his prize, it is hard to see what else 
he could have done. As has been said, a prize-crew was out 
of the question. But his own act, which was illegal in the 
first instance, led to a grievious loss of human life in the 

For the firing on the men in the water, there is no justifi- 
cation ; it was an act at once barbarous and cruel. The 
principle which governs war is to avoid inflicting unnecessary 
suffering, and very few commanders have ever gone so far as 
to slaughter their enemies when they were helpless. Even 
the ancient Egyptians are depicted on their monuments as 
rescuing their drowning foes. It was an act comparable to 
the slaughter of the wounded after battle, and Japan with her 
fine professions should have shrunk from it. The Japanese 
commander might, indeed, allege that if he had rescued his 
enemies, they would have been an element of great danger on 
board his ship, for the Chinese are an ignorant, treacherous, 
and cruel race, who could not be expected to obey the rules 
of war. But when once in the water they were helpless, and 
care might have been taken to disarm them when they were 
got on board the Naniiva's boats. Again, he might have 
urged that he was punishing them for the Tst Yuen's act. 
But one act of barbarism does not justify another, especially 
as Japan was contending with a barbarous power, herself 
a civilised state. It is the clear duty of the surviving 
combatant, after an action, to do his utmost to rescue his 

About this same date, or perhaps a day or two later, the 
Chen Yuen is said to have encountered and driven off the 


Takachiho and Hiyei. Details of this engagement, if it 
really happened, and the Chen Yuen is not an alias for the 
Tsi Yuen are still to seek. The Hiyei is said to have been 
very severely handled, and to have been left a cripple. But 
Captain McGiffin, the commander of the Chen Yuen, in a 
letter of August 2nd, makes no allusion to it, and indeed it is 
hard to see how the ironclad could have been at sea eight 
days after a pitched battle. 

At the time of the action between the Tsi Yuen and the 
Japanese, the heavy Chinese ironclads were at sea, under 
Admiral Ting Ju Chang, the ex-cavalry officer who had been 
appointed commander of the Northern Squadron by Li Hung 
Chang. Captain Lang and numerous European officers have 
spoken well of him, and his acts testify to some obstinacy 
and no lack of personal courage. Though he inspired 
confidence in his foreign subordinates, he was great neither 
as a tactician nor as a strategist. " He knows nothing at all 
about naval matters ; he is just the mandarin put on board by 
Li," said a foreign instructor in the Chinese navy to Mr. 
Norman. Perhaps the instructor somewhat exaggerated 
Ting's incapacity, as the admiral had held command in 1884 
during the war between France and China, and must have 
picked up some fragments of knowledge from the various very 
capable foreigners in the service of China. He was not, how- 
ever, a Nelson or a Tegetthof, if he never sank so low as a 
Persano, and he displayed the usual Chinese cruelty in orders 
that no quarter was to be given, at the same time encouraging 
a belief amongst his sailors that the Japanese would give no 
quarter. Of the Chinese preparations Captain McGiffin, who 
was present on board the Chen Yuen, gives us some details in 
a letter : " We are reinforcing our turrets on all the ironclads 
by bags of coal piled round them eight feet to ten feet thick. 
That is my own idea. Don't believe the sneers you may see at 
the Chinese sailors. They are plucky, well-trained, full of 
zeal, and will fight better against the Japs, their lifelong 
enemies, than anyone." 


On the arrival of the Tst Yuen at Wei-hai-wei, after her 
action with the Japanese squadron, six Chinese ships went 
out to attack the Japanese. Captain McGiffin, in a letter 
dated August 2nd, states : "We are now on our way 
to meet the enemy, and I hope we will sink the dogs. We 
have been expecting war for days, but China has kept peace- 
able, and therefore Japan deliberately picked the fight. Ad- 
miral Ting and I wished to go to Chemulpho, and open fire 
on the Jap fleet, but at the last moment we got a direct cable 
from [the] Tsung-li-Yamen not to do so. It would have been 
splendid, for we would have destroyed their navy almost, I 
think. Our crews are full of enthusiasm. It is very pleasing 
to see them. We have had several alarms at night and by 
day from strange vessels, and the way we go into action is 
splendid. We are all clear for action, everything that could 
possibly cause splinters left ashore or thrown overboard. We 
have left all our boats behind. We will not need them, for 
if we sink the Japs will give no quarter, and we shall give 
them none either. The admiral is on the ironclad [the Ting 
Yuen\ .... He made two signals to-day at noon. One, 
' If the enemy shows the white flag, or hoists the Chinese 
ensign, give no quarter, but continue firing at her until she is 
sunk.' The other, ' Each officer and man do his best for his 
country to-morrow.' " 

The expected battle never came off. For three days Ting 
hunted for the Japanese, but either could not find them or did 
not want to find them.* The Japanese were presumably 
engaged in convoying transports, and were quite content to 
be let alone ; possibly some of their vessels had received 
serious injury off Asan, and were undergoing repair. In any 
case they do not seem to have paid much attention to the 
Chinese, who returned to Wei-hai-wei and remained strictly 

* Ting was anxious to fight, but was dissuaded by his flag-captain, according 
to " Blackwood's " Correspondent in China. This writer's articles did not 
appear in time to be used in the text. They represent Ting in a very favour- 
able light. Corrections from them are given at the end of subsequent chapters. 


on the defensive, in obedience to orders from Li Hung Chang ; 
to the effect that they were not to cruise to the east of a line 
drawn from Wei-hai-wei to the mouth of the Yalu. The 
Japanese appear to have known of this order, which 
practically effaced the Chinese fleet. Meanwhile from time 
to time, they reconnoitred Wei-hai-wei, and even on 
August loth made some pretence of bombarding it. 



September lyth, 1894. 

THE Chinese fleet, though on the whole superior, had thus 
abdicated the command of the sea, and lay, through no fault 
of its gallant commander, inactive at Wei-hai-wei. The 
Japanese were straining every nerve to convey as large a 
force as possible to Korea, and merely observed Admiral 
Ting, if, indeed, they gave themselves this trouble. Such was 
the situation through the last weeks of August and the first 
days of September. But early in September the Tsung-li- 
Yamen awoke from its lethargy, finding that China could not 
move men with sufficient rapidity into Korea by land. It 
decided to send a force by sea, and Admiral Ting was 
informed of the decision. 

There were two courses open to Ting and his foreign 
advisers. They might collect every available warship, steam 
in search of the Japanese, and, having found them, fight a 
decisive action. If the Japanese were beaten in this the 
mastery of the sea would be to Ting. If the Chinese were 
beaten they would at least be unencumbered by transports, 
and would not waste men unnecessarily. Or Ting might 
convoy a flotilla of transports, holding his ships ready to 
protect them. His own inclinations appear to have been 
towards the former alternative. He was anxious to search 

* I have retained the popular name, though the official Japanese accounts 
call it the battle of Haiyang from the island of Haiyang-tao, near which it 
was fought. 


for the Japanese and fight before he took the transports 
forward. But the defeat of the Chinese land-forces at Phyong- 
Yang forced his hand and compelled him to use all possible 
expedition. He was driven to convoy the transports with his 
fleet, whilst the Japanese were still at sea unbeaten, and 
whilst the command of the sea was in dispute. 

The transports, five in number, had left Taku and taken on 
board four or five thousand men at Talien Bay. Here Ting 
joined them. He flew his flag on board the battleship Ting 
Yuen, and with him were the Chen Yuen, her sister, the three 
small ironclads, King Yuen, Ping Yuen and, Lai Yuen ; five 
cruisers, Ching Yuen, Chih Yuen, Tsi Yuen, Tshao Yong, 
and Yang Wei ; two revenue cruisers of the Canton flotilla, 
lightly armed and ill-protected, Kivang Kai, and K-wang 
Ping ; and at least two torpedo-boats. Chinese accounts 
mention four Rendel gunboats and four torpedo-boats as 
present with the fleet. If the gunboats were there, they took 
little or no part in the fighting. The Chinese torpedo-boats 
were in bad order, having been used for scouting and despatch 
carrying. Their boilers w r ere burnt out, and their machinery 
in bad condition. Two, however, a Yarrow and a Schichau 
boat, played some part at the Yalu. 

Ting might with wisdom have detached his fast cruisers 
the Chih Yuen and the Ching Yuen, which were still perhaps 
capable of making fifteen knots to scout, as obviously he 
would be at an enormous disadvantage if the Japanese 
suddenly came down upon him. He did not do this, probably 
because he was afraid of dissipating his strength, and preferred 
to risk a surprise. On Sunday, September i6th, at one 
o'clock in the morning, he left Talien Bay, the convoy keeping 
inshore, whilst the fleet steamed a parallel course in the 
offing, drawn up in line ahead. That same day he reached 
the mouth of the Yalu, and the transports, with the Ping 
Yuen, the Kwang Ping, and the Schichau and Yarrow 
torpedo-boats, entered the river. Ting anchored his squadron 
twelve miles off the coast, which is a difficult one to approach, 

G 2 


owing to banks and shallows. The night of September i6th 
iyth passed without event. 

In the Gulf of Korea was a large Japanese fleet, having its 
headquarters at an island in the Gulf, where were facilities 
for coaling, a mine-field protecting the anchorage, a soft 
bottom in shallow water for running disabled ships aground, 
and a torpedo station. In command was Vice-Admiral Ito, 
an officer who had distinguished himself at various times in 
the Japanese naval manoeuvres with the cruisers Matsushima, 
Itsukushima, Hashidate, and Chiyoda, all modern and fast, 
the old ironclads Fusoo and Hiyei, and the despatch gunboat 
Akagi. His second-in-command, Rear-Admiral Tsuboi, had 
under him the Flying Squadron, which had already been 
engaged with the Tsi Yuen, and which comprised the splendid 
Elswick cruisers Yoshino, Naniwa, and Takachiho with the 
Akitsusu or Akitsushima. In addition the Saikio, an impro- 
vised cruiser taken over from the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, was 
present, having on board Rear-Admiral Kabayama, chief of 
the naval staff, who was on a tour of inspection. The second 
Flying Squadron, including the old vessels Tsukushi, Chokat, 
Maya, and Banjo, and the third Flying Squadron composed of 
the Kongo, Takao, Yamato, Muzashi, Katsuragi, and Tenrio, 
were engaged in co-operating with the land forces, and took 
no part in the battle. The two more powerful Japanese 
squadrons had been convoying troops up to September I4th r 
and had not paid the least attention to the Chinese, unless,, 
indeed, a telegram which reached Ting from Wei-hai-wei on 
September I4th, to the effect that there were two large 
Japanese vessels off that port, was correct. In that case these 
ships must have been detached on the I2th or I3th. Admiral 
Ito, leaving the convoy, anchored off Cape Shoppek, where he 
remained till the afternoon of the i6th. Thence he proceeded 
to the island of Haiyang-tao, off which some Japanese 
torpedo-boats were cruising. He reached the island at half- 
past six on the morning of the iyth. It appears that he 
expected a Chinese fleet, having perhaps been informed o 


Ting's intentions by spies. At Haiyang-tao no Chinese fleet 
was to be seen. He then steamed east-north-east 10 Yalu 
Island, and at half-past eleven saw smoke on the horizon. 
From its volume he judged that there was the Chinese fleet, 
and steered towards it at a low speed. 

Meanwhile, the Chinese had observed a dense cloud of 
smoke far away to the south-west, about ten o'clock, or an 
hour-and-a-half before they were seen by the Japanese. The 
Chinese ships, it will be remembered, were at anchor, and 
therefore would not be likely to emit much smoke, whilst the 
Japanese used their native coal, which produces a great deal 
of smoke, and they were probably at a distance of nearly 
thirty miles when they were seen by Ting. Had the latter 
possessed fast ships he might, by approaching the enemy at 
full speed, have surprised him. The Chinese had their fires 
banked, but steam was at once raised and anchor weighed, 
when the whole fleet proceeded in a south-westerly direction 
at the rate of seven knots. 

Some time before the action, according to Mr. Laird Clowes, 
Ting had issued three very important orders, i. In action, 
sister ships, or groups of pairs of ships, were, to the best of 
their power, to keep together and support each other. 2. All 
vessels were, if possible, to fight bows on. 3. All ships were, 
as far as possible, to follow the movements of the admiral. 
These orders were issued because Ting's squadron was not 
homogeneous, being composed of many types ; because the 
Chinese signalling staff was extremely weak, and it was 
apprehended that signals could neither be made nor received 
in the heat of action ; and because it was felt that the course 
of battle could not be foreseen, but must be left to individual 
judgment.* The heaviest battleships of the squadron indeed, 
the only two which could be called ironclads were built for 
end-on work, and possibly Ting had thoughts of using the 

* This was very much Persano's defence of his action at Lissa. He held 
that the details of the battle could not be foreknown, and that orders were 
useless. Von Hanneken was perhaps rssponsible for these tactics. 


ram. None the less, these instructions had a disastrous 
effect. The group formation is, perhaps, a good one with 
perfectly trained officers and men, but it destroys the unity of 
a fleet. It is obvious throughout the battle which followed, 
that the Chinese were little better than an incoherent mass of 
ships, whilst the Japanese were an organised and compact 
force, striking together and acting together. There seems to 
have been no definite plan on the Chinese side ; but every 
captain instead was to do that which seemed good in his own 
eyes. For fighting in line abreast Ting cannot be blamed ; 
it was the designers of his ships who had forced him to this 
tactic. But his dispositions were not good even for line 
abreast, and there was no preparation for the maintenance of 
that order in the face of a turning movement. The Chinese 
left their anchorage in what is described as " sectional line 
abreast," or columns of divisions line abreast ; that is to say, 
the ships were in two lines, one behind the other, the ships of 
the second in rear of the gaps between the ships of the first. 
There does not seem, however, to have been overmuch order, 
and one very fatal mistake was made. The heaviest and 
most powerful ships were placed in the centre instead of on 
the wings, thus violating the tactical axiom that the extremities 
of a line should be strong. Had Ting placed the Ting Yuen 
on one flank, and the Chen Yuen on the other, some, at least, 
of the Chinese disasters might have been averted.* 

On the Chinese ships, what were the preparations for action? 
The Tsi Yuen's fight off Asan had given Ting and his advisers 
some idea of the precautions necessary. The barbettes of 
the ships had been, as we have seen, protected by sacks of 
coal. Sandbags were used to shelter the lighter guns, and 
mantlets of rope were disposed in suitable places to catch 
splinters. The tops of some at least of the conning-towers 
had been removed to allow the gases and fragments of 
bursting shells a free escape, and to diminish the size of the 

* The Tshao Yong and Yang Wei were slow in weighing and were left behind 
at the outset. 


target. The shields on the barbettes in the ironclads had 
also been left on shore, and thin armour had been generally 
dispensed with, on the principle that no protection is better 
than a weak one. All the boats had been left behind except 
one gig for each ship. The decks of the Chen Yuen were 
well-drenched with water, a precaution which does not appear 
to have been taken on board other ships. And there was one 
very obvious provision which was neglected by the Chinese 
to give their men a meal before action. The Japanese, 
with greater wisdom, had been piped to dinner on sighting 
the Chinese fleet. A full stomach is an important element in 
the battle. 

Both sides were now approaching each other, cautiously, 
and at a low speed, neither wishing to run the risk of a 
violent shock, and each, perhaps, desirous to see what his 
opponent was going to do. It was the first time that fleets, 
equipped with the modern engines of destruction, monster guns, 
torpedoes, quick-firers, were going into action. With no 
knowledge of personnel it would have been hard to say which 
of the two was the stronger. The Chinese were infinitely the 
worse armed, but then they had two well-armoured battle- 
ships, a type which the Japanese did not possess, and the 
strength of their defence may have compensated for their 
offensive weakness. Ting had also a considerable number 
of Europeans to advise him, and to stiffen the resistance of 
his crews. On the Ting Yuen was Major Von Hanneken, 
Ting's chief of the staff, with Messrs. Tyler, Nichols, and 
Albrecht. On the Chen Yuen were Captain McGiffin and 
Herr Heckmann ; on the Chih Yuen, Mr. Purvis, and on the 
Tsi Yuen, Herr Hoffman. 

At about five minutes past twelve the Japanese could 
clearly make out their opponents, distinguish the types of 
vessels, and see what lay before them. Admiral Ito hoisted 
a large ensign and ordered his ships to clear for action, whilst 
the Saikio and Akagi were directed to move from the line of 
battle and take up a position on the port side of it. The 


fleet was now in line ahead, ranged thus : First, Admiral 
Tsuboi led the Flying Squadron, including the Yoshino, which 
carried his flag, Takachiho, Akitsusu, and Naniwa, a 
homogeneous force, steaming over seventeen knots and 
heavily armed. Then followed Admiral Ito with the 
Main Squadron, comprising the flagship Matsushima, with the 
Chiyoda, Itsukushima, Hashidate. Fusoo, and Hiyei. Last 
was Admiral Kabayama, with the Saikio and Akagi, to some 
extent covered by the rear vessels of the Main Squadron.* 
When the two fleets were separated by an interval of about 
five miles, the Japanese, according to Captain McGiffin, 
passed into line abreast, and in that formation advanced for 
some minutes before passing back again into line ahead. f 
There is no mention of this in Admiral Ito's account, and 
if it took place it is difficult to understand what the object 
was, unless to puzzle the Chinese. There was now a fresh 
east wind blowing, the sky was grey, and the sea rough. 

Soon after twelve Ito had signalled brief instructions to his 
captains. His fleet was to attack the Chinese right and fight 
at ranges of from 2000 to 3000 yards, circling round the 
Chinese vessels. The Chinese had now combined their two 
lines into a single line abreast, facing almost south-west, but 
the wing ships had been slow in getting to their stations. In 
consequence the Chinese line approximated to a crescent, the 
horns of which were away from the Japanese. From right 
(starboard) to left (port) the ships were placed thus : Yang 
Wei, Tshao Yong, Ching Yuen, Lai Yuen, Chen Yuen, Ting 
Yuen, King Yuen, Chih Yuen, Kwang Kai, and Tsi Yuen.% 
The Tsi Yuen was some distance behind the other vessels 
as she had had trouble with her engines. On the other horn 
the Yang Wei and Tshao Yong were also to the rear, whilst 
the Ping Yuen, Kwang Ping, and the two torpedo-boats 

* See Plan I. 

t In the earlier versions which appeared in the Pall Mall Gazette. In the 
Century he states that they kept to line ahead. 

See Plan I. 












Chinese Ships 

e Slaps 




were just coming out of the harbour of Takushan, and were 
widely separated from the bulk of the fleet. 

The Flying Squadron steadily approached the enemy, at 
first heading to starboard, and then keeping away to port, 
when Admiral Tsuboi had got within range. The speed was 
ten knots at 12.30, but at 12.45 was raised to fourteen. The 
first shots were fired from the Ting Yuen's 1 2-inch guns some 
time between 12.20 and 12.50. The concussion of the 
discharge was so great, or the Chinese officers were so 
unaccustomed to target practice with their heavy guns, that all 
who were on the bridge, which runs just above the barbettes, 
were thrown down, and Admiral Ting was so much shaken, 
that he was taken below. At a range of 6000 yards, the 
Chinese shots fell short. The Chinese ships were painted 
grey, and the Japanese white, so that mistakes could not very 
well occur. As the Japanese came on, the east wind blew 
their dense coal-smoke down, hiding them for minutes from 
the view of the Chinese. Their masts, however, were visible 
always, and enabled the Chinese gunners to lay the guns. 
This same wind carried away the smoke from the guns of 
the Chinese, so that it did not embarrass them much at this 
stage of the proceedings. 

Ship after ship of the Chinese fleet opened fire, and the 
roll of heavy guns became continuous. The Japanese had notyet 
replied, but stood straight on till they were within 3000 yards 
of the centre of the Chinese line, when they turned in 
succession eight points to port, at the same time opening with 
their broadsides. Their 6 and 4'y-inch quick-firers poured in a 
hail of steel, which descended upon the Chinese, riddling the 
upper portions of the ships' superstructures, and filling the air 
with bursting shells. The water was lashed into foam by the 
shells, which, ricochetting, inflicted most of the hits. The 
sandbags piled up inside the vessels, prevented much damage 
being done as yet, and the Chinese gunners were kept lying 
down as far as possible, so that losses were small. As the 
Japanese came on, the two large Chinese battleships left the 


line and steamed forward as if to break through the enemy's 
line, or ram. The Japanese fired three or four times as fast 
as their enemies, sweeping their decks, cutting down masts, 
and riddling funnels. The Chinese appeared to fire slowly 
and at random ; their shots went wide of the target. Admiral 
Tsuboi now raised the pace of his Flying Squadron, and 
rapidly neared the Chinese right flank. The Chinese had 
already lost what little order they possessed at the start, and 
were becoming a mob of ships, some of which masked the 
others. The left was practically out of the battle, whilst half- 
a-dozen vessels on the centre and right were bearing the brunt 
of the engagement. 

The details of this engagement are hard to follow. No 
full and official account has appeared on either side, and, 
therefore, the story of it must necessarily be pieced together 
from various and often contradictory statements. The general 
features are, however, well ascertained, and we shall put 
these before our readers concisely, before proceeding to 
chronicle the fortunes of the various ships. 

The Flying Squadron passed rapidly along the Chinese front, 
and when it reached the starboard flank, attacked vigorously 
the Yang Wei and Tshao Yong, small ill-protected vessels, 
and furnished with the most indifferent ammunition. Ap- 
proaching till it was within 1700 yards range, it directed a 
tremendous fire upon them. In a few minutes the projectiles 
began to tell ; the Tshao Yong was seen ablaze, and listing 
heavily to starboard. The Yang Wei was also in difficulties. 
On the other hand, the angular formation of the Chinese 
ships prevented half their vessels from bringing their guns to 
bear, and as each ship in the line turned, facing the enemy, 
they masked one another's fire. At this point, however, Rear- 
Admiral Tsuboi was recalled by a signal from his chief, and, 
circling to port, returned to assist the slower vessels of the 
Main Squadron. 

We have seen that as the Main Squadron defiled past the 
Chinese front, the heavy Chinese battleships moved forward, 


^ PING Y. 



f oUt 





PINO Y^ ^ 
/ '^ ^^ x 

^ / 


x /' 


YAN6 W. 




supported by the Lai Yuen, King Yuen, and Chih Yuen, 
The faster Japanese ships drew ahead of the slower vessels 
to the rear of their line, the Fusoo, Hiyei, Saikio, and AkagL 
On them fell the brunt of the Chinese attack. The Fusoo 
cleared the advancing ironclads, but the Hiyei was compelled 
to turn sharply to avoid the enemy's rams. With extra- 
ordinary audacity, she headed for the Ting Yuen and passed 
between the flagship and the Chen Yuen at a range of 700 
yards. * Fortunately for her, the Chinese ships could not 
pour in their fire on her without risk of injuring one another, 
but none the less she was hit several times. Two torpedoes 
were discharged at her, but missed and passed astern. The 
Akagi was near her and suffered more severely. Indeed, it 
was only the arrival of the Flying Squadron which saved her 
from destruction at the hands of the Lai Yuen, Chih Yuen, 
and Kwang Kai. The Saikio kept further away to port, and 
passed along the front of the Chinese line, receiving a very 
heavy fire. On rounding the Chinese right, she found herself 
confronted by the Kwang Ping, whilst the Chih Yuen was 
coming up astern. Her steering gear was disabled, and to 
add to her perplexities, the Chinese torpedo-boats assailed 
her. Three torpedoes were fired at her, and as usual missed. 
She was compelled, with the Akagi, to retire from the 

The position of the Chinese was now as follows : The line 
abreast had become a disorderly conglomeration of ships fight- 
ing anyhow. On one side of them was the Flying Squadron,, 
on the other the Main Squadron of the Japanese, t which had 
turned the right flank of the Chinese, and completed the 
discomfiture of the unfortunate Yang Wei, which ran from 
the scene of action ablaze. On turning the Chinese right, 
the Main Squadron had a short but sharp engagement with 
the Ping Yuen and the Chinese torpedo-boats, in which the 
* See Plan II. 

f It is said that this was due to a mistake and that Admiral Ito had intended 
to keep his ships together. 


latter were driven off. The Chinese ships in the line were 
thus left to themselves, and had an enemy in front and an 
enemy behind. The Flying Squadron engaged the cruiser 
Chih Yuen, which broke from the line, and endeavoured to 
ram the Yoshino. The Yoshino's quick-firers, using cordite, 
covered her with bursting shells. At 3.30 she went to the 
bottom, having been sunk by gun-fire alone. Since the two 
Japanese squadrons were in danger of hitting each other, as 
they steamed backwards and forwards to the front and rear of 
the Chinese, they went further apart, always, however, 
drawing in when they were opposite the smaller Chinese 
vessels. The hail of projectiles upon the Ting Yuen and 
Chen Yuen was extraordinarily fierce, but there was no sign 
of their yielding. The Tsi Yuen and Kwang Kai, however, 
took to flight, and in her flight the former collided with the 
unhappy Yang Wei, damaging her severely. The Ching 
Yuen had also retired, as she was on fire. The Lai Yuen 
could be seen ablaze. To her and her sister, the King Yuen, 
the Japanese Flying Squadron turned its attention. At 3.52, 
the Takachiho, 3300 yards from the King Yuen, opened upon 
her. The Yoshino, with her 6-inch quick-firers, joined in at 
2500 yards. At 4.48, the Chinese ship had a list to port, and 
could be seen ablaze. The bottom of the vessel showed ; the 
rudder was useless ; she veered to and fro in the smoke and 
uproar. The hail of shells tore her open ; her stern dipped ; 
and with a violent explosion she went to the bottom. On 
their side the Japanese lost the Matsushima which at 3.30 or 
3.40 was fearfully injured by the Chinese. She steamed out 
of action and Ito transferred his flag to the Hashidate. 

The loss of the Chinese so far had been heavy. Sunk were 
the Chih Yuen and King Yuen ; disabled and sinking the 
Tshao Yong and Yang Wei ; ashore the Kwang Kai, which 
had taken the ground in her desperate efforts to escape ; in 
the offing the Tsi Yuen retiring to Port Arthur; and closer at 
hand the Ching Yuen and Lai Yuen, endeavouring to put 
out fires. The Ping Yuen and Kwang Ping were holding 



(on fire) 

(on fire) 




/^ /iHIYEI 


CHg .TSU. ng. VOSH. .AKJTS. 



discreetly aloof. In line there remained only the Chen Yuen 
and the Ting Yuen, both of which were on fire. The 
Japanese had lost the Matsushima, Hiyei, and Saikio, but 
the Akagi was already preparing to return to the battle. The 
Flying Squadron proceeded to chase the retiring Chinese 
ships, whilst the Main Squadron, after a brief respite, once 
more pounded the Chen Yuen and Ting Yuen, though the 
two combatants were now beginning to draw slowly apart, 
probably because ammunition on either side was running low^ 

The day was now verging upon evening. The Flying 
Squadron was recalled from its pursuit by signal, and the 
Matsushima, Hiyei, and Saikio, were sent off to the port 
of Kure for repairs. Whilst the Japanese concentrated, the 
Chinese did the same, and the two heavy battleships still 
unsubdued and still battle-worthy collected round them the 
Lai Yuen, the Ching Yuen, the Ping Yuen, two Rendel 
gunboats and the two torpedo-boats. The Japanese, with 
w^earied crews and exhausted ammunition, did not care to risk 
a night action, in w r hich the torpedo-boats would have had 
an opportunity to show their efficacy. They followed, at a 
distance, towards Wei-hai-wei, but when day dawned the 
Chinese were not in sight. On this, they returned to the 
scene of action. The Yang Wei was destroyed by a spar- 
torpedo, used against her by the Cktyoda's launch. After 
coaling and taking on board ammunition at their base, the 
Japanese prepared for a second engagement. The Naniwa 
and Akitsusu reconnoitred the Chinese ports, whilst the rest 
of the squadron cruised in the gulf. In Talien Bay two 
Chinese ships were sighted. One, perhaps the Tsi Yuen, ran 
on seeing the Japanese, and succeeded in effecting her 
escape. The second turned out to be the Kwang Kai, hard 
and fast aground. She was destroyed, either by the Japanese 
or by her crew. 

To turn now to the individual fortunes of the ships most 
hotly engaged. The Matsushima did not suffer heavily till 
she fought the Ping Yuen. With her she opened fire at 


3000 yards, and continued firing till she was within 1300 
yards. At 2.34 she was hulled by a io'2-inch shell from the 
Chinese vessel, which killed four men at the port torpedo-tube 
aft, and striking the barbette was shattered against it. This 
.shell passed very close to a loaded Whitehead torpedo, which 
would assuredly have destroyed the ship had it exploded It 
then coursed through store-rooms and an oil-tank, but proved, 
when it went to pieces against the barbette, to have been 
loaded with cement. In reply the Japanese disabled the Ping 
Yuen's big gun. Later in the afternoon, when facing the 
Chen Yuen, the Matsushima was far more severely handled. 
A 12-inch shell, from the Chinese ironclad, entered her 
battery, hurled the fourth 4'y-inch gun from its mount, and 
exploding, fired a great heap of ammunition. Two 4'y-inch 
guns were disabled, ninety officers and men killed or wounded. 
The gunnery officer, who was standing close to the ammunition, 
was blown to pieces, only his cap being afterwards found. 
The ship listed and a fire broke out. The crew, with unabated 
gallantry and courage, divided their attention between the 
fire and the enemy. The bandsmen went to the guns, and 
though the position of the ship was critical, and her loss 
appalling, there was no panic. The fire was on the lower 
deck, just above the magazine. In charge of the magazine 
were a gunner's mate and a seaman. The shell had, apparently, 
dented the plating over the powder, and the red glow through 
the crevices showed the danger. But these brave men did 
not abandon their posts. Stripping off their clothes they 
crammed them into the cracks and saved the Matsushima ; 
though nearly a third of the men above the water-line had 
been put out of action, the remnant got the fire under. 
With fifty-seven officers and men dead, and nearly as many 
wounded, the ship steamed out of action. 

The Hiyei,or\ escaping the torpedoes fired at her, had with- 
stood the attack of the Chen Yuen. One 1 2-inch shell struck 
her in the neighbourhood of the ward-room, which was being 
used as a temporary hospital ; bursting, it killed instantly her 


chief surgeon and paymaster, with a large number of wounded. 
The mizzenmast fell and the ship took fire. A second heavy 
shell, bursting on her upper deck, killed many of her gunners. 

The Akagi had to face the Chinese ships of the left 
unsupported. At 850 yards she engaged them fiercely, 
clearing the Lai Yuen's deck with her starboard battery. At 
i. 20 a shot struck her bridge and killed her captain, Com- 
mander Sakamoto, with two gunners. The command passed 
to her navigating lieutenant, and a few minutes later she was 
hulled repeatedly about the level of her lower deck, losing 
four firemen. Her steam-pipe was shattered, and the scalding 
.steam by its escape cut off the supply of ammunition, just 
when it was most wanted. The shot and powder had to be 
sent up by a ventilating shaft, thus incommoding the engine- 
room complement. Three gunners were killed at this time 
on the upper deck. The Lai Yuen, Chih Yuen, and Kwang 
Kai were coming up astern, and her position was one of 
extreme danger. Turning to port, she for a time eluded her 
enemies whilst repairs were made. Once more the Chinese 
neared her, and once more she fought them, now heading 
south. Her mainmast was shot away, and at a distance of 
only 330 yards from the Lai Yuen, her bridge was struck, and 
her new commander wounded. A lieutenant took his place, 
whilst those guns, which would bear astern, fired steadily at 
the Lai Yuen. At 2.20 a shell set the Lai Yuen's deck on 
fire, and the other Chinese vessels slowed down to give her 
assistance. The Flying Squadron, too, was coming up astern 
of them, and beginning to engross their attention. Thus the 
Akagi was enabled to steam out of range, when her steam- 
pipe was repaired and her crew given a much-needed rest. 
At 5.50, three hours after her withdrawal, she again joined the 
Main Squadron."* 

The Saikio had an even more wonderful escape than these 
two ships. Passing along the Chinese line, she was struck in 

* Admiral Ito imagined that she had been sunk. 


quick succession by four enormous shells from the Ting Yuen. 
Two went clean through her, doing no damage. Two common 
shells, however, burst in the upper-deck saloon, shattered the 
woodwork, and disabled the steering-gear. Signalling that 
she could not steer, and manoeuvring with her twin screws, she 
passed through the Flying Squadron, between the Nani'va 
and Akitsusu. Relieving tackle was fixed, and at 2.20 or 
thereabouts she was again under control, and now found the 
Ping Yuen before her. With this ship, the Kwang Ping, 
which had already been in action with her, and the two 
torpedo-boats, she began an engagement about 2.50. Open- 
ing at 3300 yards, she continued till she was only 500 yards off 
the Chinese. One torpedo-boat was driven off by her fire, 
but the second discharged three torpedoes at her. The first 
crossed her bows, the second ran along her starboard side, 
the third dived. Though she kept up a vigorous fire from 
her machine-guns upon the boat, it escaped quite unharmed. 
At 3.30 the Saikio, on fire astern, abandoned the engagement. 
She had received a large number of projectiles, some of which 
narrowly escaped her engine-room, but her damage was 
inconsiderable and her loss of life nil. Nothing so surely 
demonstrates the incapacity of the Chinese gunners as their 
failure to sink this ship. A weak merchant steamer, she had 
faced the Chinese line, and after this ordeal had engaged two 
Chinese warships, one of which had considerable armour pro- 

Next let us pass to the Chinese ships. The Ting Yuen 
fought stoutly all through the day. At the beginning of the 
battle a heavy shell, probably a ricochet, struck her fore mili- 
tary mast, killing seven men in the top and bringing it down. 
As we have seen, Admiral Ting and Major von Hanneken 
were injured by the concussion of the guns at the first dis- 
charge. Later in the day a very serious fire broke out for- 
ward. The smoke from it completely shrouded the barbettes, 
and for some time the only gun which could fight was the 
6-inch Krupp aft. The fire was got under through the exer- 


tions of Herr Albrecht, after it had gravely imperilled the 
ship's safety. On board the Ting Yuen was killed Mr. 
Nichols, an ex-petty officer of the British Navy, who dis- 
played great gallantry throughout the battle. The Chinese 
on board showed no great spirit : unlike the Matsushima 's 
men, when they saw the ship ablaze they bolted, and did not 
even think of fighting the ship. Albrecht it was who saved 
her, standing to his hose amidst fire and exploding shells. 
It was found impossible to signal when the foremast had 

Like the Ting Yuen the Chen Yuen suffered much from fire, 
She was ablaze no less than eight times, but, mainly through 
the Europeans, each time the fire was got under. A European 
who was on board her records his experiences as follows:* 
" In helping to put out one of these fires, I was wounded. 
The fire was forward, on the forecastle, and there was such a 
fierce fire sweeping the deck between it and the fore-barbette, 
that the officer, whom I ordered to go and put it out, declared 
it to be impossible to get there alive ; so I had to go myself. 
I called for volunteers, and got several splendid fellows some 
of our best men, unhappily, for nearly all were killed, but we 
got the fire under. The fire was on the port side, and as the 
starboard fore-barbette gun was firing across it, I sent orders 
that it was only to fire on the starboard side, but, as bad luck 
would have it, the man who received the order, the Number One 
of the gun, had his head shot off just after 1 had gone forward, 
and his successor did not know of it. As I stooped to pick up 
the hose, a shell, or a fragment, passed between my wrists, 
grazing each. Shortly afterwards, I heard a loud explosion, 
and saw a brilliant light behind me, was knocked down, and 
lay unconscious for a while how long I do not know. I 
believe it was the flame from the gun which I had ordered to 
fire only on the starboard side, but it may have been a shell 
exploding, though, if so, I ought to have been blown to pieces. 

* Captain McGiffin in the Pall Mall Gazette. 


Anyhow, I was pretty badly burnt, and when I came 1o, I sat 
up leaning on my elbow, and found myself looking almost 
down the tube of the great gun, pointing straight at me. I 
saw the end move a little to one side, then to the other, up a 
little, then down ; and I waited for years a fraction of a 
second no doubt for the gun to fire, for I knew that the 
gunner had taken aim. Then it suddenly occurred to me to 
make an effort. I rolled over on my side, and by great good 
fortune, down a hatchway some eight feet or so, on to a heap 
of rubbish, which broke my fall ; as I fell I heard the roar of 
the big gun." Her Chinese crew behaved better than the Ting 
Yuen's men. The discipline was excellent, the guns were 
fairly handled, and she was manoeuvred with some skill. With 
the Ting Yuen, she bore the brunt of the Japanese attack, and 
with the Ting Yuen, circled slowly round, attempting to 
keep end-on to the two hostile squadrons. She was much 
shattered in her upper works, but not seriously injured. The 
spindle of the port gun's hydraulic gear was struck, and the 
port gun put out of action for a time. The bow 6-inch gun 
was disabled by an accident. The foretop was hit twice, and 
six officers and men in it killed. 

The Chih Yuen, under a brave and determined captain, 
Tang, had advanced from the line at the outset of the battle, 
and was hotly engaged with the Flying Squadron on its 
return. She was hit repeatedly, amidst loud cheers from the 
Japanese, and began to list to starboard. Her captain made a 
futile effort to ram, but the Japanese quick-firers were too 
strong for him. As he closed with the Yoshino, the list 
increased, the screws showed above water, racing in the air, 
and the ship went down with all hands. As she sank, a 
violent explosion was observed. She is said to have been 
finished off by a i2'6-inch shell from one of the big Canet 
guns. As in the case of the King Yuen, the appearance of an 
explosion may have been due to the bursting of her boilers, 
or the detonation of a torpedo in one of her above-water 
tubes. Her European engineer, Purvis, went down with her. 


The.Kmg Yuen was badly on fire about the time the Chih 
Yuen sank, and dense volumes of smoke were seen pouring 
from her. She moved forward upon the Yoshino, and received 
a tremendous hail of shells. She was seen rolling very 
heavily, now to port, now to starboard, and as one after 
another the Flying Squadron plied her with their projectiles, 
she lost all power of steering and described wild circles. Her 
end is veiled in mystery. All the Chinese, who saw her go 
down, attributed her loss to a torpedo, but the Japanese fired 
mone. There was a very thick cloud of smoke and an 
explosion just before she vanished, like the Victoria capsizing 
and showing her bottom. Of a crew of 270 men only seven 

The Lai Yuen again was put out of action by fire. For 
an hour-and-a-half she was seen ablaze. A shell struck her 
deck, and though a bucket of water would, at the start, have 
put out the flames, with Chinese apathy she was allowed to 
burn, till the fire, having consumed almost everything above 
the water-line, burned itself out. She was left a mere shell, 
terribly damaged by fire and shell, yet, strange to say, her 
fighting and manoeuvring qualities were little affected. She 
was brought safe to Port Arthur. Her deck, of 2-inch teak, 
and the large amount of paint and varnish lavished upon her 
woodwork, made her a ready prey to any shell. 

The Ching Yuen was three times on fire. She retired to 
extinguish one of these fires, and, therefore, took little part 
in the battle. 

The Tshao Yong had her steering-gear disabled and was 
.seen ablaze. The Yang Wet ran aground, and was on fire 
when she was rammed by the Tsi Yuen. The Kwang Kai, 
Kwang Ping, and Ping Yuen took little part in the fighting, 
and were very slightly damaged. 

The Tsi Yuen was commanded by Captain Fong, whose 
acquaintance we have made already. He is said to have run 
in a cowardly manner before his vessel had received serious 
injury, and it is certain that he managed his ship very badly, 

H 2 


but, in justice to him, we must record the statement of Herr 
Hoffman, who was on board, and who gives us an interest- 
ing picture of the battle. " We accomplished the journey to 
Tatungkow in safety, landed the troops, and about 1 1 o'clock, 
on the iyth ultimo, the whole fleet got up anchor, and prepared 
to return to China. A short distance outside the mouth of the 
river we met the Japanese fleet, and a battle followed, which 
lasted till 5.30 in the evening. It was the most tremendous 
fight I had ever dreamt about. Captain Fong fought the Tsi 
Yuen with courage and ability. We had seven or eight men 
killed on board, and continued firing away as fast as we could 
until between 2 and 3 o'clock in the afternoon, by which time 
we were terribly damaged, and had to leave the scene of 
action. Our large gun aft, i6-centimetres, [ 15-centimetre?], 
Krupp, was disabled, and the two forward guns had their gear 
destroyed, so that they could not be used, and to all intents 
and purposes the ship was useless,* so Captain Fong decided 
to get out of the action and make the best of his way to 
Port Arthur, to refit. The smoke was so dense that no one 
could see very much of what was going on from the deck r 
but from time to time we heard that this, that, or the other 
ship was gone. Having left the fight in the Tsi Yuen, I know 
nothing of what subsequently happened. We arrived at Port 
Arthur five or six hours before the remainder of the fleet,, 
which came in about 8 o'clock. On the way in we had a 
collision with another vessel [the Yang Wei\ which sunk. 
From the injuries to the Tsi Yuen, which were all abaft the 
stern, I should say the other ship rammed us. The water 
poured into the Tsi Yuen in a regular torrent, but we closed 
the water-tight doors forward, and went on safely. I don't 
think that the charges of cowardice, which have been brought 
against Captain Fong, can be supported for a moment ; he 
fought his ship until it was no longer serviceable. The smoke 

* Captain McGiffin, however, states that on examination at Port Arthur all 
her guns were found in good order, except the 15 -centimetre stern-chaser, which, 
must have been disabled during her retreat. 



By ]. T. JANE. 


was so thick that one only had a chance of knowing what was 
going on in his own ship." 

There is one point unexplained in the battle. The Chinese 
assert that the Chih Yuen was successful in her attempt to 
ram ; the Japanese that she failed. Some foreign observers 
on the Chinese ships saw a vessel sinking with revolving 
screws, and thought that it was the Chih Yuen's victim. 
More probably it was the Chih Yuen herself, or the King 
Yuen. The torpedo-boats of the Chinese found it difficult to 
distinguish the combatants in the smoke, though there was 
the wide difference of colour, between white and grey. 
The speed of the torpedo-boats was found to be only 
fourteen or fifteen knots, instead of the trial figure of twenty. 
The boats were seen at once, and fired at by the Japanese, 
long before they got within range. 

The five transports up the Yalu river received a message 
from Ting at the close of the engagement, ordering them to 
join him. They were too far up the river to do so at once, 
and their crews were prostrate with fear. Not till four days 
after the battle did they leave, and then they had the good 
fortune to return to Taku unmolested, in the face of the 
victorious Japanese fleet. 

In its general features, there is a singular resemblance 
between this battle and Lissa, with this broad difference, 
that the Yalu was a long range fight, and Lissa a melee* The 
Chinese, like the Italians, fought as a mob of ships, without 
orders, without plans, and without commander. Each vessel 
had to do what it could, as there were no signals after the 
Ting Yuen's foremast had been shot away. The Japanese, 
like the Austrians, knew what they meant to do, but they 
had this immense further advantage, that throughout they 
manoeuvred and fought by signal. A signal at a decisive 
moment brought back Tsuboi with the Flying Squadron to 
support the Hiyei and Akagi; a signal recalled him a second 

* There was, of course, some fighting at close quarters at the Yalu, but 
generally speaking the engagement was a long range one. 


time at the close of the day, when pursuit might have been 
dangerous. Like the Austrians, the Japanese had won a 
distinct advantage, and yet failed to annihilate their enemy. 
Still directly, or indirectly, they struck off his list of ships five 
vessels, and so injured one that it was henceforward useless.* 
Tegetthoff, on his part, sent two Italian ships to the bottom, 
and disabled a third. And like Tegetthof, if he did not 
exactly wipe out the Chinese, Ito left them with little stomach 
for future fighting. At the Yalu, China lost all chance of 
commanding the sea, and by losing it, brought on herself 
defeat in the war. 

In another respect, the Yalu resembled Lissa. In each 
case the assailed fleet was engaged in covering a landing 
force. But whereas the Italians were encumbered with troops 
and transports, and whereas they were caught in the midst of 
disembarkation, after they had unsuccessfully cannonaded 
Lissa, the Chinese were taken at no such disadvantage. The 
earlier reports of the battle represented it as having taken 
place close inshore. As a matter of fact, the Chinese had no> 
want of sea-room, nor were their movements in any way 
hindered by their convoy, which had ascended the river, and 
was therefore safe from attack, since the Japanese ships of 
heavy draught could not follow it. There seems no reason 
then to attribute the Chinese defeat to the presence of the 
convoy. Except that it brought the Chinese fleet to sea, it 
cannot be said to have had any effect upon the issue of the 
day. Had the Chinese warships been cruising alone, the 
result must have been the same. The bearing of this, and, 
indeed, of all the moves of both Chinese and Japanese during 
the earlier period of the war, upon the doctrine of " the fleet 
in being" is self-evident. It has been held that the presence 
of an inferior squadron at sea will prevent even a superior 
squadron from attempting to convoy or disembark troops. 
Yet by either side, up to the battle of the Yalu, this rule w r as: 

* The ships sunk were the Chih Yuen, King Yuen, Tshao Yong,. Yang Wei r 
and Kvaang Kai. The Lai Yuen was disabled. 


disregarded, though the two squadrons were approximately 

As Tegetthof drew off at Lissa when apparently he had the 
Italian fleet in his grasp, so Ito retired at the Yalu. In either 
case it was probably the want of ammunition which led to the 
withdrawal.f With heavy guns and limited displacement the 
supply carried cannot be inexhaustible, and we may anticipate 
in future actions a similar indecisiveness at the r dsh, if from 
first to last the battle should be fought out a long ranges. 
That the Japanese did not close may seem strange, but in the 
first place they probably wished to capture the two big 
ironclads instead of destroying them. Captain Ingles in a 
telegram at the outbreak of war had recommended this course. 
Ulterior motives thus supervened to protect the Chinese, for 
if the Japanese had closed they must have employed the ram 
or the torpedo, their ammunition being exhausted, and either 
ram or torpedo would have sunk the battleships. Again, the 
Japanese with their unarmoured ships could not have thus 
closed without heavy loss. A cruiser is never very strong in 
the bows, and. disregarding the Chinese fire, the injury in- 
flicted upon the "rammer" must have been very considerable. 
The Japanese, too, could hot be certain that the Chinese, who 
fired very much more slowly, had used almost all their ammu- 
nition. There would have been risk of the two big battleships, 
protected as they were by armour, sinking, in a close action, 
the Japanese unarmoured cruisers. 

The Chinese are stated to have made desperate efforts to 
come to close quarters with the Main Squadron, and to have 
been foiled by the superior speed of the Japanese. If the 
efforts were serious they should have succeeded. The Fusoo, 

* The Japanese may, however, have known of the orders of the Tsung-li- 
Yamen to Ting. Still the Japanese fleet was hampered by no such order=. 
Captain Mahan's pronouncement on the " fleet in being," that such a fleet 
would not constitute such a deterrent force upon the movements of a resolute 
man, as had been supposed, seems to be fully justified by facts. 

f See I. 240. 


which kept her station in the Japanese line, was slower than 
one, if not both, of the Chinese battleships. The " Times " 
correspondent, however, states that the commanders of the 
ironclads gave orders to go at full speed, but that the Chinese 
lieutenants at the engine-room telegraphs, fearing for their 
own skins in a close action, did not transmit the orders 
correctly. The battleships are said to have begun the action 
with a very limited supply of common shell. Of this species 
of projectile they had but fifteen rounds per gun for their 
heavy ordnance, whilst the rest of their ammunition was 
armour-piercing shot. If this is true it was a piece of gross 

On their return to Port Arthur, like the Italians, the Chinese 
claimed the victory. They represented that at least three 
Japanese vessels had been sunk, and probably still believe it 
to this day. 

The first important battle since Lissa the second since the 
introduction of the ironclad had been fought and won, and 
the elaborate contrivances which had replaced the line-of- 
battleship had at last been tested at sea in a general action. 
It had been expected that the losses in such a battle would be 
very heavy, yet it cannot be said that this expectation was 
altogether justified. The Japanese lost, in killed, ten officers 
and eighty men, in wounded, sixteen officers and 188 men. 
This gives a grand total of 294. Their total force of sailors 
engaged in the battle could not have been much less than 
3000, and may have been a little more. They lost then ten 
per cent, of their force.* The heaviest loss fell upon the 
Matsushima, where the killed numbered fifty-seven and the 
wounded fifty-four. As the flagship she would naturally be 
singled out by the Chinese, and would receive a heavy fire. 
She also went dangerously near the two large Chinese battle- 
ships. She carried no vertical armour, except on her heavy 
gun. Second came the Hiyef, with nineteen killed and thirty- 

* See Table XXI. 


seven wounded. She had no armour except a very short belt 
on the water-line, and, like the Matsushima, she was at very 
close quarters with the Chen Yuen and Ting Yuen. The 
Itsukushima, with thirteen killed and eighteen wounded, was 
third; she, too, was unarmoured. The Akagi lost eleven 
killed and seventeen wounded, but the Saikio, wonderful to 
relate, only eleven wounded. Bad gunnery on the part of the 
Chinese can alone explain this astonishing fact. The Akitsusu 
had fifteen killed or wounded, the Fusoo fourteen, the Yoshino 
and the Hashidate twelve each, the Takachiho three, the 
Nani-wa one, and the Chiyoda none. The escape of the 
Chiyoda is extraordinary, when it is remembered that she 
fought in the line between the Matsushima and Itsukushima, 
both of which suffered severely. 

The Chinese loss on board the ships which survived the 
encounter was not so heavy as that of the Japanese, but a 
very large number of men were killed, wounded, or drowned 
in the action on board the ships which went down. We shall 
not, perhaps, be exaggerating when we place the number of 
lives thus lost at from 600 to 800. In addition, thirty-six were 
killed and eighty-eight wounded on board the seven vessels 
which survived. The Ting Yuen lost fourteen killed and 
twenty-five wounded ; the Lai Yuen, ten killed and twenty 
wounded ; the Chen Yuen, seven killed and fifteen wounded ; 
the Ching Yuen, two killed and fourteen wounded ; the Tsi 
Yuen, three killed ; the Ping Yuen, twelve wounded ; and the 
Kwang Ping, three wounded. The Chinese may have had 
3000 men present at the action : in that case, they lost from 
twenty to thirty per cent, of their force. It is interesting to 
notice how the armour of the Ting Yuen and Chen Yuen 
diminished their losses. They were the most hotly engaged 
of the Chinese ships, and had for hours to serve as the targets 
of five Japanese vessels. Yet the losses of these two ships, 
added together, are just half of those incurred on the Japanese 
flagship alone. And it must be remembered that the practice 
on the Japanese side was probably better than on the Chinese. 




If it did nothing else, then, armour saved a very large number 
of human lives. 

Comparing the losses at the Yalu with those at Lissa, and 
earlier battles, in the days of wooden ships, we get these 
results : 

Total of 


Total Killed 

Percentage of 











to Force. 

Yalu . [ 



600 800 ? 


Say 700 

23 ~> Average 


3000 ? 




loj of botn i6J 

Lissa | 







2} " 4 

Trafalgar ... [ 

Allies ... 


No re 

turns access 




Nile { 




mated at 


- - 

Camperdown -. 








loj .. 3 

First of June \ 






*> " I?i 

Figures for earlier battles from Hodge : " Losses in Naval War." Journal Statistical Society, 
vol. xviii. Average for thirteen battles 1782-1811, nj per cent. 

It would thus appear that the loss of life in the engagement 
we are considering was rather heavier in proportion than it 
was before the days of ironclads. There is this also to be 
taken into account : on board the old line-of-battle ship very 
few men were below the water-line, whereas on modern iron- 
clads and cruisers, quite a considerable proportion of the crew 
is busy in the engine-room or stokehold, below the armoured 
deck, and therefore out of the reach of shot, exposed only to 
death by drowning if the ship sinks. When this is remem- 
bered, the proportion of men killed and disabled amongst 
those exposed mounts considerably; especially on the Japanese 
side, where no ships were sunk, must this be recollected and 
the percentage adjusted. At least, five hundred men on the 
twelve Japanese ships must have been engaged in tending 
boilers or machinery, in addition to those at work at the 
ammunition hoists. If 2500 men only were exposed to fire, 
the loss would amount to twelve not ten per cent. It would 
net then seem that, with the modern engines of destruction, 
war has become less bloody, but, rather, that the risk of the 


individual serving in the modern fleet has been slightly 
increased. At the same time, the loss of life might be greatly 
diminished if special vessels were at hand to rescue the 
drowning in the water. Both at Lissa and at the Yalu, the 
greater proportion of deaths on the beaten side were due 
to drowning. At Lissa, Tegetthoff, as we have seen, 
endeavoured to give aid to the Italians in the water, but 
was prevented from doing so by the onset of the Italians.* 
At the Yalu, the Japanese saw the men crowding in the Ishao 
Yang's tops, after she had collided with the Tsi Yuen and 
sunk. They pitied, but as in Tegetthof's case, the stress of 
the battle would not suffer them to aid. The Chinese torpedo- 
boats, however, took off a large number of men, who must 
otherwise have fallen victims in the struggle, and their success 
in this mission of mercy suggests the question, whether some 
international agreement not to fire upon ships or vessels, 
engaged in saving the drowning, should not be arrived at. 
In the days of Nelson, chivalry and self-interest forbade the 
line-of-battle ship to fire upon frigates thus engaged. It 
would go without saying that these special vessels would not 
be armed, and would be distinguished in some way by 
colour or build from the combatants. The first principle of 
warfare is to crush the enemy ; the second, which has only 
been recognised in modern times, is to inflict no unnecessary 
suffering in crushing him. When the enemy's sailors are in 
the water, they are as helpless as the wounded, and as 
ambulances are not fired upon, why should not ambulance- 
ships be given all possible immunity ? The importance of 
this point was fully understood by Tegetthof, who was anxious- 
after Lissa, that a European conference should be convened 
to deal with it. Unfortunately, this step has never been taken. 
There seems little doubt that the stiffness of the Chinese 
resistance was greatly increased by their belief that no quarter 
would be given. With the exception of the Tsi Yuen and 


K-wang Kat, no ships in the Chinese line showed cowardice. 
Incapacity and blundering there was in plenty, but having 
their backs to the wall, as they supposed, the seamen fought 
courageously. On land, the Chinese invariably fled before 
their better-trained, and better-armed, opponents ; here alone' 
they stood up to them, and by doing so, once more proved 
that courage alone, without skill, will not win battles. The 
crews of the ships were one half composed of raw recruits, 
owing to the peculation of admirals and captains, who had 
maintained in peace a shadow of the nominal effective. 
Corrupt administration i* a most fatal failing when there is 
fighting toward. 

The gunnery of the Chinese was extremely indifferent, but 
their ships and guns were in part to blame for this. They 
had eight 1 2-inch Krupps and five lo-inch weapons by various 
makers, twelve guns of 8-inches, fifteen of 6-inches, and 
twelve of 4'y-inch, besides 130 machine-guns or Nordenfelts. 
Their heavy guns were of somewhat antiquated pattern, and 
they carried no large quick-firers. Thus they lacked the very 
weapons which would have been most effective against 
unarmoured ships. They were further very ill-provided with 
guns of moderate size. The Japanese had of weapons 
ranging from the 6'8-inch Krupp to the 4'7-inch Armstrong, 
no less than ninety-four, and of these sixty-six were quick- 
firers. The Chinese had of corresponding calibres only 
twenty-seven, with scarcely an exception, slow-firers. In 
auxiliary armament the Chinese were thus immeasurably 
behind their enemy, and the numerical difference is increased 
by the lact that, as a quick-firer will discharge in a given 
time from three to six times as many rounds as a slow-firer, 
each Japanese quick-firer was worth three Chinese guns. As 
the Japanese fought at a long range, and moved with fair 
rapidity, the Chinese gunners did little but miss them with the 
heavy guns, which have, indeed, a very long range, but are 
slow and awkward to lay upon the target. We find, there- 
fore that, as we should have expected, the great guns made 


few hits. Five of their shots struck the Saikio, three or four the 
Matsushima, two the Hiyei, one the Nam'wa, and possibly 
some the other ships. This would give a total of twelve to' 
fifteen. Now the Chen Yuen and Ting Yuen alone fired 
between them 197 1 2-inch projectiles, to say nothing of 268 
of 6-inch calibre. The other ships must have discharged fully 
as many io - 2 and 8'2-inch shells. Thus a very rough esti- 
mate of heavy shots fired will give at the least 400, of which 
not twenty, or four per cent., struck the target. This is 
curiously in accord with the experience of the Shah. Of 
the Chinese heavy projectiles which did strike, a considerable 
proportion again appear to have been armour-piercing shot, 
which would do little damage. It was estimated by a Japanese 
officer that ten per cent, of the Chinese shot, and fifteen per 
cent, of the Japanese scored hits."* The estimate appears a 
high one, when we consider the long ranges which prevailed, 
and if it is correct for the Chinese, the low percentage of hits 
made by their heavy guns must have been compensated by the 
high percentage of their medium and light guns. Applying 
this estimate to the figures given for purposes of comparison 
in Table XX., each Chinese ship was firing 32*8 shots a minute, 
with 3-28 hits, each Japanese i88'3 shots, with 28^24 hits. 

The slow fire of the Chinese moderate-sized guns made 
strongly against good shooting, besides placing them far 
behind the Japanese in the weight of metal thrown in a given 
time. With a moving target, the shorter the period that 
elapses between the shots, the less the need for a fresh 
adjustment of sights, and the more likely the shot to hit 
the target. Not only is the 6-inch quick-firer a longer, a 
heavier, and a more powerful gun than the earlier 6-inch or 
5"9-inch, but it is also more accurate. One man does the 
training and aiming, having the weapon completely under 
his control ; and this, of course, applies with still more force 
to the 4" y-inch quick-firer. The rapidity of fire, which is so 

* Captain McGiffin, however, gives the Chinese percentage as 20, and the 
Japanese as 12. The truth lies perhaps between the two. 


startling a feature in these weapons, is not, perhaps, of so 
much importance as the excellent mounting of the gun. 
Yet, of course, the power to discharge a great number of shells 
at a critical moment may be of immense value.. A rough 
calculation shows that the whole Chinese fleet could fire on the 
broadside, in a period of ten minutes, 58,62olbs. weight of pro- 
jectiles, whilst the ships which fought in the line, as opposed 
to the inshore squadron, could only fire 53,ioolbs. The 
weight of metal discharged in the same period by the 
Japanese was, on the other hand, 119,700^5., so that their 
artillery preponderance may be expressed as 1 19 to 58, or as 
two to one.* 

The structural damage inflicted by the Chinese fire may now 
be considered. Two 4'y-inch guns appear to have been the 
only Japanese weapons hopelessly disabled. The Matsushima, 
though so severely hulled, was not externally much the worse. 
Indeed, even the Hiyei and Akagi, which were in the very 
hottest of the fray, carried little trace of the Chinese handi- 
work. The Akagi had several small holes in her starboard 
side, and her funnel was riddled. The Hiyei 'had a "large hole 
in the stern, and several smaller ones in her sides. The 
Naniiva had a shell in her coal bunkers on the level of the 
water-line. The Itsukushima had one shell in her torpedo- 
room, another in her engine-room, and a third some way up 
the mast. The Hashidate' s barbette was struck by a 5'g-inch- 
shell. The Saikio had the following hits distributed about 
her hull, boats, and funnel: 1 2-inch shell four, 8'2-inch one, 
5'g-inch two, 4 - y-inch four, 6-pounder, or smaller, ten. It is an 
extraordinary fact that such a vessel could take so much 
punishment. The 8'2-inch shell, however, was within ten feet 
of the engine-room, and, had it struck, it must have disabled 
the ship. 

Unlike the Chinese, the Japanese had obtained the very best 
guns, and mounted them on their ships. They had three very 

* Vide Table XX. 




heavy Canets of 1 2-inch calibre, but these guns were 
unnecessarily large for the work to be done. On the proving 
ground they had indicated a perforation of 44-inches of 
wrought iron ; we must, therefore, feel exceedingly doubtful 
whether any of their armour-piercing projectiles struck the 
Chinese battleships.* Three dents, three inches deep, are 
mentioned in the Chinese armour ; these must have been 
from their common shell, as armour, 12 to i4-inches thick, 
.could scarcely resist the 66-ton armour-piercing shot, even at 
2000 yards. It has been said that the Japanese were bound 
to mount heavy guns in their fleet, as otherwise the Chinese 
ironclads might, early in the action, have simulated disable- 
ment, and so have enticed the Japanese unarmoured cruisers 
to close quarters, to their destruction. f For a fleet, which 
might have to oppose ironclads, to be absolutely destitute of 
armour-piercing guns, could not be expedient. But, whilst 
heavy guns were a necessity, it is not certain that the 
66-ton gun was not too heavy, and that a pair of 3o-ton 
guns would not have been as efficient a deterrent to such 
tactics, whilst their more rapid fire would have rendered them 
better able to deal with unarmoured ships. A shell from one of 
the 66-ton guns is said to have struck the King Yuen, 
perforating her armoured deck, and wrecking her compart- 
ments so hopelessly that she foundered. Another may have 
hit the Chih Yuen, and produced the curious explosion noted 
by on-lookers. Yet, there seems no evidence of this. The 
Ching Yuen is stated to have had a 1 2-inch shell in her 
bunkers amidships, but not to have been injured. 

The quick-firers were most efficacious and deadly, shattering 
the structure of the Chinese ships outside their armour, and 

* Captain McGiffin in. the Century states that the Chen Yuen was struck by 
the heavy Japanese projectiles. But on examination, after her capture, no 
trace of hits from the Canet guns could be found. 

f This would, however, have exposed the Chinese to the risk of being 
rammed or torpedoed by the more numerous and better handled Japanese 


killing or wounding all on their decks. The Yang Wet was 
riddled by the 4'y-inch shells of the Japanese, whilst the two 
heavy battleships had each about 200 shot marks. The hail 
upon them is described as most terrible, and forward and aft 
they were full of holes, whilst cheir superstructures were 
reduced to a tangle of ironwork and splinters. Yet, in all, on 
the Chinese ships, which survived, only three guns were 
dismounted. The Yoshino fired cordite, which performed 
admirably, enabling her gunners to shoot with great accuracy, 
owing to the absence of smoke. It does not appear that this 
explosive was used on board the other ships the practice 
of the Japanese was better than that of the Chinese ; when 
we remember the far greater number of shot and shell 
which the former were projecting, we get at once one explana- 
tion of their success. The empty cartridge cases, from the 
Japanese quick-firers, were got rid of, by pitching them down 
the hatchways. 

In the matter of size and speed the Japanese had the 
advantage. The Chinese had, indeed, two large battleships, 
but their other vessels were small and weak, with the excep- 
tion of the Elswick cruisers. The slowest Chinese ship in line 
was the Chen Yuen, whose speed from the state of her boilers 
could not have exceeded twelve knots. The average tonnage 
of their twelve larger ships in company was 2950 tons. The 
Japanese had no vessels of the size of the Chen Yuen or Ting 
Yuen, but their ships were more nearly even in displacement, 
and, excluding the Saikio and the gunboat, had an average 
tonnage of 3575.* The slowest ship with their fleet was the 
Hiyei, which could not do twelve knots, and the Fusoo, 
Saikio, and Akagi were little better. The rest of the fleet 
was both fast and homogeneous, with an effective speed of 
about fifteen knots. It is doubtful whether anything whatever 
was gained by bringing the slow vessels into line. The 
Japanese cruisers could have manoeuvred with more freedom r 

* Vide Table XX. 


and would have been stronger in fact, if not in appearance, 
had they eliminated their obsolete and improvised ships. Il is 
interesting to notice that of the four slow ships, three were 
greatly damaged, and two lost very heavily. On the other 
hand the Fusoo kept her station with the Main Squadron, 
though at her best she was only a thirteen knot ship. 

The number of fires which occurred on board the ships of 
both combatants is a striking feature of the battle. The Lai 
Yuen was so severely burnt that nothing but her ironwork 
remained above the waterline ; the King Yuen, her sister 
ship, was seen to be blazing before she was sent to the bottom ; 
the Ting Yuen was on fire three times, and it was only 
through the courage of her foreign officers that the fires were 
got under; the same might be said of the Chen Yuen, which 
had eight fires ; the Ching Yuen was on fire three times, but 
owing to her powerful pumps and the discipline of her crew 
got the flames under ; the Yang Wei, Tshao Yong, and 
Kwang Kai, were all on fire at least once. This makes a 
total of eight ships, and nineteen fires, out of ten ships seriously 
engaged. The Japanese, on their part, suffered somewhat 
from fire, though not so seriously as the Chinese. Doubtless 
their ships were in better order, and discipline on board them 
was more thoroughly maintained. It is also probable that 
less wood was used in the construction of their vessels. It 
does not appear that any high explosive was employed as a 
" burster " on either side, though it has been stated by 
Japanese officers that they had melinite, and used it in some 
of their shells. The fires seem to have been the effect of 
gunpowder alone. 

It had been widely prophesied that machine-handled guns 
would break down under the stress of war. This forecast 
has not been altogether justified. In all, there were nineteen 
such guns mounted in the ships which were seriously engaged. 
One Canet gun of three was temporarily put out of action ; 
one of the eight 1 2-inch Krupps on board the two Chinese 
battleships was not in working order at the close of the battle ; 



and four others were temporarily disabled through causes 
which we do not know. This, if not a good record in itself, 
is by no means so bad a one as the opponents of the heavy 
gun would have led us to anticipate. 

From the tactical point of view, there are two very 
astonishing features in this battle. Neither the ram nor the 
torpedo scored a single success. The explanation of this, is 
that the Japanese, with their superior speed, and the mobility 
which obedience to signals conferred upon them, deliberately 
decided against both these arms arms which are as deadly as 
they are uncertain. To use the ram, ships must come to very 
close quarters, and, as during the battle, with a few exceptions, 
the Japanese kept at a distance of over 2000 yards, it was 
obviously impossible for the Chinese to ram. The Chih Yuen 
made an attempt, and was thought to have succeeded ; but it 
was the King Yuen which was seen sinking, and not a 
Japanese ship. The torpedo was still more useless. The 
Chinese ships engaged carried forty-four tubes ; the Japanese, 
thirty-two. These, with their accompanying supply of 
torpedoes, were so much dead weight, conveyed to no purpose, 
except to endanger the ships which conveyed it. It would 
have been more profitable for both sides to have devoted the 
space and weight thus absorbed to guns or ammunition. The 
Chinese torpedoists were only too eager to get rid of their 
above-water torpedoes, when the hail of projectiles began to 
descend upon their ships. They had gone into action with 
torpedoes in the tubes, and others charged, ready on deck to 
reload. On the Chen Yuen, all these were hastily discharged 
when she came under the fire of the Japanese, and hardly had 
this been done, when the stern tube was struck by a shell.* 
On the Ching Yuen, the same course was followed, and it is 
probable that the other Chinese ships took steps to get rid of 
these truly remarkable weapons. Some were set to sink on 

* Captain McGiffin, however, denies that on the Chen Yuen the torpedoes 
were discharged merely to get rid of them, and asserts that they were used 
against the Japanese. If so they must have been fired at very long ranges. 


being discharged, but not all ; and thus there must have been 
a certain number of live torpedoes floating about in the water. 
The question suggests itself : Did the Chih Yuen strike one of 
these, or was a torpedo in one of her tubes exploded by a 
Japanese shell ? In her case, it will be remembered, there was 
an explosion, as if of a torpedo, just before she sank. There are 
no means of answering the question, but there can be no 
doubt that in future, captains will be very careful what they do 
with their torpedoes. The torpedo-boats which were present 
with the Chinese, effected nothing during the action. They 
did not dash into the battle under cover of the smoke and 
uproar, and fall upon their enemies, as had been prophesied. 
The engines of one went wrong, and a second missed at the 
closest quarters, three times. Yet this boat, though some 
minutes under fire, received from the Japanese not the slightest 
damage. At the close of the day, however, the torpedo- 
boat did exercise some influence on the tactics of the Japanese ; 
since the mere possibility of a night attack upon his worn and 
tired crews, decided Ito against a close pursuit. He stood 
badly in need of destroyers, or fast torpedo gunboats, to 
make an end of the hostile boats before dusk came on. Thus, 
if the torpedo proved ineffective in the battle, the influence of 
the torpedo menace after the engagement, must yet be 

The collision of the Tsi Yuen and Yang Wei, recalls the 
fact that there were similar accidents at Lissa on the Italian 
side, though in no case was a ship sunk. Whenever the 
vessels of a fleet are fighting independently, it would seem that 
this is a real danger. The duration of the battle was four-and- 
a-half hours, from 12.30 to 5 p.m., but during the last hour- 
and-a-half the fire maintained on both sides was very desultory. 
Trafalgar and the First of June both lasted about five hours, 
and St. Vincent five hours-and-a-half. Lissa was over in 
less than three hours. 

From the battle the most varied and contradictory deduc- 
tions have been drawn. Indeed, each naval expert would 

I 2 


seem to obtain from it confirmation of his own particular 
fancies. Let us, however, pass in review the different lessons 
and consider how far they are really supported by the evidence 
we possess. Full and accurate details of the injuries inflicted 
on the Japanese ships are not at present accessible, but doubt- 
less when the official history of the war is published by the 
Imperial Government, much new light will be thrown upon 
the battle. And before we proceed to consider the lessons, 
let us ask how far any of them would be applicable to a 
Western engagement a battle, say, between the French and 
English Mediterranean fleets. The first point to emphasise 
is that no large battleship of modern construction fought at 
the Yalu. Between the Royal Sovereign, of 14,150 tons, or 
the Brennus, of 11,000, and the Chen Yuen, of 7430, the gap 
is immense, both in defensive and offensive power. The 
Chen Yuen represented obsolete naval theories the sacrifice 
of broadside to end-on fire, and the enormous preponderance 
of the heavy over the auxiliary armament. She was at least 
four knots slower than either of the two ships named. It 
is not fair, then, to regard her as the type of the modern battle- 
ship, which carries heavy guns firing with twice the rapidity 
of her 12-inch Krupps, and a large complement of the most 
powerful quick-firers into the bargain. Secondly, the average 
size of ships in the line-of-battle in a Western engagement 
would be much greater than it was at the Yalu. Taking iron- 
clads and large cruisers, as opposed to scouts, the average dis- 
placement of the British Mediterranean fleet is 10,000 tons.. 
the average of the French Evolutionary Squadron 9500. The 
British average is thus nearly three times that of the Japanese 
fleet, at the Yalu. With these increased displacements come 
increased sub-division, increased protection, increased arma- 
ments, increased steadiness, and therefore better shooting, 
whilst there is for practical purposes no difference in speed 
between the two rival fleets in the Mediterranean, England 
having, perhaps, a very slight advantage here over France. 
It is obvious that their greater size would render these ships. 


less likely to be sunk by gun-fire, but it would at the same 
time conduce to a desire to employ the torpedo-boat, since the 
blow dealt to an opponent by the destruction of such large 
vessels would be a very serious one. Thirdly, the inequality 
in training, the lack of a courageous, well-disciplined, and 
thoroughly efficient personnel, which so handicapped the 
Chinese, would be found on neither side. Both England and 
France have reduced naval training to a fine art, and it is im- 
possible to say to-day which has the better men. Probably 
both are equally good. Fourthly, an engagement would not 
be likely to be fought at long ranges with the gun only, with- 
out some attempt, and perhaps very determined attempts on 
the part of the weaker side to come to close quarters, and 
bring on a general melee, in which the weaker cannot lose. 
There would on neither side be any motive to spare the enemy's 
battleships. Each would endeavour to sink and spare not. 
Fifthly, without doing any injustice to either Japanese or 
Chinese, it may be prophesied that the gunnery in a Western 
engagement would be better, and that more hits at the same 
ranges and with the same number of projectiles would be 
inflicted. Thus the damage done would probably be far 

We will now review the deductions which have been made. 
In the first place, as regards strategy and tactics, we are told 
with varying truth, that, since the value of line ahead, and the 
weakness of line abreast, were foretold, naval tactics have 
been demonstrated to be an exact science ; that steam has 
not vitally affected tactics nor strategy ; that line ahead is the 
one formation for battle ; that on sea, as on land, increased 
rapidity of fire has necessitated open order ; and that it has 
been proved that the tumult and confusion of the encounter 
do not prevent fleets from acting coherently and obeying 
signal. First, as to line ahead ; the only authority who has 
found fault with the disposition on the part of the Japanese, 
is the Italian Admiral di Amezega. His opinion is that the 
Japanese ideas of strategy and tactics were based on the days 


of sailing ships, and that their operations have taught us 
little. He holds that the group system is the ideal one, and 
that the Japanese should have linked their vessels in 
" homogeneous groups, which should have entered action in 
succession, pouring in their fire." The criticism is not very 
clearly expressed, and it is difficult to discover any particular 
point in it. Yet line abreast cannot be said to have been 
fairly tested at the Yalu ; had Ting made his wings strong, 
and manoeuvred his fleet together, keeping bows on a 
difficult, but not impossible, evolution the condemnation of 
this formation might not have been so vehement. It cannot 
be maintained that it lost him the battle; it was only one, 
and apparently a minor one, of numerous causes, amongst 
which were bad ships, bad guns, bad officers. His heavy 
ironclads more or less compelled him, by their structural 
peculiarities, to fight in line abreast. To blame them, is 
only to find fault with the past. And when line ahead is 
pronounced the only battle formation, and it is unhesitatingly 
laid down that for battle in line ahead alone must ships be 
constructed, we may be allowed a protest. For how do we 
know that the enemy will not decide to fight a stern battle, 
if we leave our bow-fire weak ? In that case, of course, a 
chase formation, or line abreast becomes necessary. And the 
peril incurred by the rearward Japanese ships is noticeable.* 
The line ahead defiling past the line abreast, runs the risk of 
the wing of the line abreast being projected, so as to cut off 
the rearward ships. The Chinese movement was not well 
executed, but with capable gunners and good captains against 
them, the Japanese would indisputably have lost the Hiyei, 
Saikio, and Akagi. On the whole, however, we may 
endorse the value of line ahead. If it is not strong at all 
points, what formation is better ? Only both van and rear 
should contain very powerful ships, a truth which the Japanese 

* Captain Mahan in the Century criticises the Japanese severely for thus 
defiling past their enemy's front, instead of doubling upon the Chinese left. 


The Japanese made full use of signals under fire. It is 
most important to know that signalling is possible in battle, 
but with good gunnery on both sides, we may be permitted to 
doubt whether much could remain of signalmen, who are 
generally very much exposed, or of signalling gear, after a very 
few minutes. The Japanese shot away halyards and masts, 
and if they did not suffer the loss of their own gear, this was 
due to their enemy's indifferent marksmanship. We should 
be very rash to conclude that it will be possible to communi- 
cate orders in a Western engagement, after the battle is fairly 

The strategy of both sides is certainly against the view of 
the Jeune Ecole that steam has changed conditions and 
replaced the warfare of squadrons by such old substitutes, 
under new-fangled names, as the guerre des cotes, and the 
guerre de course. Neither Chinese nor Japanese fleet attempted 
the one or the other. Ting might have given us a great deal 
of information had he been obliging enough to detach his only 
two fast ships, the Chih Yuen and the Ching Yuen to 
bombard Japanese ports, and interrupt the Japanese lines of 
communication. The Japanese, during this part of the war, 
obeyed the old principles of strategy, husbanded their 
resources, and only used their ships against ships. 

Turning now to details of structure and tactics, it has been 
in one and the same breath maintained, that the Yalu has 
proved the necessity of vertical armour ; that it has shown that 
the unarmoured ship can face and defeat the ironclad. The 
latter is the deduction of the Jeune Ecole, and will not be found 
to bear inspection. Doubtless the Japanese fleet was, for all 
practical purposes, an unarmoured one, whilst the Chinese 
included two well-armoured ships. But the real test, which 
enables us to discriminate between the resistance of armoured 
and unarmoured ships, is given by the behaviour of these two 
different classes in the Chinese fleet, where both cruiser 
and ironclad had to withstand a hail of 6-inch and 
4'7-inch shells, with an occasional shot from a heavier 


gun. The two Chinese ironclads came out of the 
encounter much battered, but still battle-worthy. Their stout 
plating stood them in good stead. They could still manoeuvre 
and fight their guns, whilst the loss of life on board them was 
small considering the vehemence of the attack delivered upon 
them. Far different was it with the unarmoured ships, in 
which class virtually fall the King Yuen and her sister, the 
Lai Yuen, with their very short belts below the water-line. 
Of the eight in line, two fled before they had been punished; 
one withdrew on fire ; one was sunk by collision, and three 
were sunk or hopelessly damaged by the Japanese fire. One 
only fought through the battle and survived it without serious 
injury. Both the Chih Yuen and King Yuen had end-to-end 
decks which did not save them. It may have been that their 
hatches and water-tight doors below were not closed, or, to 
give yet another hypothesis for their loss, that the water poured 
through the breaches in their sides and collected upon their 
armour decks till they capsized, because, as they rolled, the 
great weight of water rushed to one side and destroyed their 
righting power. We know the sea was rough. Yet, though 
all this damage was done, a good many of the Japanese shells 
failed to explode, even when they struck armour. With high 
explosives the ravages might have been much more frightful. 
On the other hand, owing to the Chinese lack of common 
shell, the Japanese ships were not fairly tested. Armour- 
piercing projectiles would only pass through both sides of 
unarmoured vessels without scattering fragments or splinters, 
and it is the bursting of a shell, rather than the perforation 
of a shot, which does the damage. The long range, at which 
the action was fought must also be taken into account, and 
the fact that at five in the evening, after four-and-a-half hours' 
incessant fighting, the two ironclads were as formidable as 
ever, whereas the Matsushima had suffered terribly and was 
out of action. Three of the Japanese cruisers carried heavier 
guns than are found on board any European vessel of their 
type approximating, indeed, to the great Italian battleships 


and they had armour on their heavy gun positions. They 
would, as we have seen, have done better with smaller guns, 
or perhaps with one smaller gun, and plating on their 4'7-inch 

So far then from demonstrating the superiority of the 
unarmoured ship, the Yalu has shown that armour is necessary 
for ships which are to lie in the line-of-battle. As at 
Alexandria, it was proved that under practical conditions the 
resistance of plating is far greater than would be imagined 
after experiments on the proving ground. A large extent of 
surface protected by a moderate thickness of steel will be 
best such as we find in the design of the Majestic. It will 
save human life and it will make the ship very hard to sink. 
And it seems a matter of the utmost importance to protect 
the powerful guns with armour whether on board cruiser or 
battleship. Indeed, one gun behind six inches of steel is 
worth two without any protection. Farragut's maxim that 
a powerful fire is the best protection is admirable, but can be 
pushed too far.* It is, of course, urged that the 6-inch guns 
on the Chen Yuen and Ting Yuen were not disabled, though 
only very weakly protected. They were, however, only four 
in number, and were placed at the extremities of the ships, 
so that that the Japanese gunners could not be likely to aim 
at them, since the range was great, but rather at the centre of 
the hull. The heavy guns would have been disabled, judging 
from the number of hits on the armour round them, had they 
been unprotected as on our cruisers. Water-line hits appear 
to have been very few, a fact which has an important bearing 
on the question of unarmoured ends. Both the Chinese 
ironclads had only a citadel amidships, which did not extend 
over half the ships' length. Forward their unprotected ends 
were exposed to the tornado of projectiles, and were hit 
without the ships suffering much. This may be held to point 

* Farragut himself recognised the value of armour. He did not attack at 
Mobile till ironclads had been sent to him, and indeed delayed expressly to wait 
for them. i. 1 19-20. 


to the uselessness of armour, but it must not be forgotten 
that the vitals were strongly protected, and that shot or shell 
could not reach the engine-room or boilers. Their athwart- 
ship bulkheads, too, prevented shells from raking them. 
Whilst the armoured citadel thus served a useful purpose, we 
cannot doubt that the complete belt is the best and most 
efficient means of water-line protection. It need not be 
broad forward and aft, but should just cover the space 
between wind and water in fine weather. Had the two fleets 
come to close quarters the damage to unarmoured ends might 
have been very great. There is no record of hits below the 

The experience of the Ting Yuen, where all four heavy guns 
placed close together were temporarily disabled, is strongly 
against concentration of armaments. The more the guns 
are dispersed the better, and perhaps in time we may see 
introduced on English battleships the lozenge-wise disposition 
of heavy guns, so long adhered to and so late abandoned by 
the French. We have fully recognised the importance of 
dispersing the auxiliary armament, placing, as we now do, 
each gun in a separate casemate. Though the heavy guns 
on our ships have the advantage of thick armour, it might be 
wise to reduce the thickness on the barbettes, whilst increasing 
the number of barbettes. Another important point to note 
is the danger of placing torpedo-tubes above the water-line. 
With quick-firers the risk of this has become so great that 
henceforward all tubes in cruisers and battleships must be 
submerged. The sooner the above-water tubes on our com- 
pleted vessels are removed the better ; they are mere lumber, 
except in the few cases where they are protected by armour. 
No wise captain would employ them in action. Again, wood 
should never be employed above the water-line, owing to the 
risk of fire, which is great when gunpowder is used as a 
burster, and perhaps even greater with melinite. The sub- 
stitutes are metal, papier-mache, or linoleum, the latter being 
very largely employed between decks on modern French vessels. 


It is somewhat disquieting to notice that the weight of wood em- 
ployed on board the Majestic is as great as that on board the 
earlier and older Royal Sovereign. Further, wooden companion 
ladders, and perhaps wooden boats, should be replaced by iron. 

Tactically it is argued that the gun is now supreme in the 
contest between the gun, the ram, and the torpedo. We have 
already seen that there was a special circumstance which 
would hinder the Japanese from using either ram or torpedo 
in the later stage of the battle, this circumstance being the 
wash to capture the heavy battleships. Hasty deductions must 
therefore be avoided. The newest type of torpedo-boat was 
present with neither fleet, though, according to a European 
officer on one of the Chinese ships, there were whole minutes 
when he could see nothing owing to the smoke, and when a 
torpedo attack must have succeeded. The Japanese were 
undoubtedly in the same case. The torpedo-boat, from 
its small size, can steam under the shelter of the battle-ship,, 
only emerging at the critical moment, and is particularly 
dangerous in battle. The gun has always been the most 
important weapon, and such it still remains, but it is not 
everything. There is the fullest evidence that very great 
attention to gunnery will be amply repaid on the scene of 
action, and that, with the possibility of an engagement fought 
at high speed, the gunner should be trained in peace by 
firing at targets from rapidly moving ships at sea. He mus.t 
be taught to husband his ammunition, and not to waste a shot, 
although it is so very easy to load and fire the quick-firer. 
And great care should be taken, not only to have an ample 
supply of ammunition with, the fleet, but also to see that every 
ship is well provided with the various descriptions of ammuni- 
tion w r hich may be needed common shell, armour-piercing 
shot, and shrapnel. 

As to speed, it has been concluded that the Japanese owed 
nothing of their success to it, and also that they entirely 
owed their success to it. Which view is right ? Speed, we 
know, is a strategical factor of the utmost importance. Is it 


also a tactical factor? We may recall the fact that the slowest 
ship of Admiral Ito's squadron was slower than Admiral 
Ting's slowest, but the Flying Squadron, which fought and 
manoeuvred quite independently of these slow ships, was able 
to use its speed. This speed enabled it to double, and arrive 
in time to support the hard pressed rear of the Main Squadron, 
thereby undoubtedly contributing to the Japanese success.* 
The Japanese slow ships, with the exception of the Fusoo, 
were out of action quite early, because they could not avoid 
coming to close quarters with the Chinese, when, being feeble 
ships at the best, they were overpowered. But for the Chinese 
to endeavour to ram or torpedo the Flying Squadron was 
hopeless, and in the Main Squadron, at the close of the battle, 
there was only one vessel which they could catch. And if 
their slow ships, without a round of shell, had endeavoured 
to fall upon the Fusoo, the speed of the Japanese would have 
enabled them to concentrate round these assailants, and, 
having more numerous and faster vessels, to ram or use the 
torpedo. For under no circumstances, given sea-room, can the 
fast ship be rammed by the slow, whilst the slow is always 
exposed to the ram of the fast. This may at the bottom have 
been the circumstance which deterred the Chinese from closing 
in the final phase of the battle. Therefore speed had a very real 
influence on the engagement, giving the Japanese an advantage 
comparable to the possession of the weather gauge. 

As for guns, the heavy quick-firers of 6-inch and /j/y-inch 
calibre were irresistible when pitted against slow-firers of 
their own size, nor was any difficulty in supplying ammunition 
fast enough experienced. It has been concluded that an 
armament of numerous, moderate-sized guns is best, and that 
the heavy gun is played out. If the moderate-sized gun be of 
about 8-inch or lo-inch calibre, with good penetration, we 

* The loss of life on board the ships composing the Flying Squadron was less 
than on those of the Main Squadron. The former steamed 14 knots, the latter 
10. Undoubtedly the high speed of the Flying Squadron rendered it hard to 
hit, and acted as a protection. 


may agree, but for the attack upon the newer type of battle- 
ships, which carry a considerable amount of armour sufficiently 
thick to resist the shells of the quick-firer, heavy guns are still 
necessary. The smaller quick-firers and machine-guns appear 
to have only inflicted trifling damage, though firing from the 
tops at close quarters they might be found useful. Rifle-fire 
is not mentioned as causing any loss, and we may conclude 
that the days of small-arms at sea are over. 

Lastly, in the opinion of all, training and discipline are shown. 
to be indispensable if victory is to be secured. However good 
are the guns and the ships, they will be well-nigh useless if the 
officers and men who are working them are not thoroughly ac- 
quainted with their business, if gunners cannot shoot straight, 
if officers do not handle their ships with skill. A well-trained 
personnel 'is the first requisite, if an efficient navyistobe created. 
Constant manoeuvring and target practice at sea, expensive 
though they may be, are the one royal road to success. 

Having reviewed the various deductions, we see that, with the 
exception of the danger of fire, the Yalu has done nothing but 
emphasise principles already known and understood. Its 
teaching is in no way revolutionary, but tends strongly to 
confirm the argument of those who hold that naval science is 
an exact science, and that its issues can be predicted. On 
the points where we most want practical information, such as 
the true place of torpedo-boats in a fleet action, or the 
possibilities of ramming, it yields no light. 

NOTE. According to " Blackwood's" correspondent, the Ting Yuen's flag- 
captain did not signal to the Chinese fleet the dispositions which Ting and Von 
Hanneken had ordered ; and it was impossible at the last minute to change the 
formation. Of steel common shell the Chinese heavy guns had not fifteen 
rounds apiece, but only three between them. These were of 3*5 to 4 calibres- 
long, with a bursting charge of I32lbs. of powder. All three were on board the 
Chen Yuen, and one was used with such terrible effect upon the Matsushima. 
The other shells supplied were 2'8 calibres long, carrying a charge of 25lbs. of 
powder, and, being made at Tientsin, fitted badly, and often were loaded with 
non-explosives. It thus appears that not the Chinese gunners, but the Chinese 
ammuniticn was at fault. 


October, 1894, to February, 1895. 

DEFEATED at the Yalu, the Chinese fleet was seen no more at 
sea. It retired to Port Arthur much crippled and battered, 
and was refitted in a leisurely manner. The Japanese fleet kept 
the sea, and all the ships, except the Matsushima, Hiyei, 
Akagi, and Saikio, effected their repairs without having 
recourse to port. Admiral Ito, in the weeks which followed 
the battle, was chiefly engaged in convoying transports, paying 
no attention whatever to the Chinese. On October 24th a 
Japanese army disembarked near Port Arthur, and the attack 
on that place began. Admiral Ting had before this, in 
.obedience to orders, withdrawn to Wei-hai-wei, where he 
remained till the last act of the war was concluded. As soon 
as Admiral Ito had accomplished his transport work, he 
steamed to Wei-hai-wei, and offered battle to the Chinese. 
Their fleet included the Ting Yuen, Ching Yuen, Tsi Yuen, 
and Ping Yuen, with the cruiser Foo Sing* which was a 
powerfully armed ship, and the K-wang Ting, a smaller vessel. 
There were also in harbour : the Chen Yuen, which had run on 
a reef whilst entering the harbour, and was therefore tem- 
porarily disabled ; the belted cruiser Lai Yuen, which had not 
been repaired since the Yalu ; the K-wang Tsi, which was 
unarmed ; six Rendel gunboats, and fourteen torpedo-boats. 
The Chinese showing no inclination to come out, Admiral Ito 

* It now appears that this ship was not at Wei-hai-wei. 


returned to Port Arthur, where he supported the land attacks 
of the army on November 2oth and 2ist. 

On November 2ist the Japanese ships shelled the forts at 
long range, doing very little damage, and the Chinese spas- 
modically replied, without, however, securing a single hit. 
At four in the afternoon the fleet was six miles from the forts 
on which the troops were making their assault, when a squall 
of rain came down. Under cover of this, ten torpedo-boats, 
led by the Yarrow-built Kotaka, which has i-inch armour, 
dashed into the harbour, their rush being supported by two 
cruisers. The rest of the fleet assisted them by maintaining 
a long-range fire upon the forts. The Chinese soldiers were 
crowding down to the water, whilst those who were in the 
forts could be reached with ease from the interior of the 
harbour, as the works faced landward. The torpedo-boats 
opened with their machine guns, doing terrible execution, and 
completed the confusion of the Chinese, who, seeing them- 
selves taken in rear, were seized with panic. Thanks to this 
audacious rush, the place was within half-an-hour in the hands 
of the Japanese. The Chinese had laid mines in the entrance, 
but these failed to explode. Altogether this was a brilliant 
performance on the part of the Japanese sailors, and inflicted 
no loss upon them. By the fall of Port Arthur they obtained 
.an excellent naval base, with docks and workshops in the 
Gulf of Pe-che-li. 

There still remained to the Celestials Wei-hai-wei, and on 
this place fell the next attack. On January i8th and igth the 
fleet bombarded Teng-chow-foo, which lies eighty miles west 
of Wei-hai-w T ei, and on the 2oth the army landed to the east 
of the naval port, and the investment began. The harbour is 
formed by two bays, off which lies the island of Leu-kung-tau. 
There are thus two entrances : one to the east of considerable 
width, with the island of Jih-tau almost in the very centre 
of the fairway, and one to the west, which is not half the 
width of the other, and is rendered difficult by reefs. 
The entrances to the harbour were protected by very 


strong forts and batteries mounting heavy breech-loaders 
and quick-firers, whilst the mountainous islands of Leu-kung- 
tau and Jih-tau were also well fortified. On Leu-kung-tau 
were the naval headquarters with a gunnery school, a naval 
school, and a coaling jetty. There was no dock, but only an 
anchorage, in some degree sheltered from a bombardment 
from the sea by the Island. Here the remnants of the Chinese 
navy had gathered, and as the Chen Yuen had now been 
repaired, they constituted a formidable force on paper, and 
were capable of giving a great deal of trouble, if used with 
vigour. Tow r ards the end of January the Japanese fleet 
appeared off the place and watched both entrances. Admiral 
Ting was now caught in a trap. At sea were the victors of 
the Yalu, on land the conquerors of Port Arthur. He could 
only extricate himself by sacrificing his slow ships, and from 
making this sacrifice he shrank. 

On January 3Oth the Japanese ships in concert with the 
army, opened a long range fire upon the forts. The Naniwa, 
Akitsusu, and Katsuragi assailed the works at Chao-pei-tsui, 
on the eastern entrance, which, after the explosion of a 
magazine, they silenced. Meantime the rest of Ito's squadron 
bombarded Leu-kung-tau. Most of the land forts had passed 
into the hands of the Japanese, when, on the night of the 3oth- 
3ist, a torpedo attack upon the Chinese fleet was decided 
upon. Both entrances to the harbour were closed by booms 
constructed of three steel hawsers, one to one-and-a-half inches- 
in diameter, supported at intervals of 30 feet by wooden floats. 
The eastern boom was about 3300 yards long between Jih- 
Tao and the shore. There were two openings in it, a small 
one near the coast, which was obstructed by numerous rocks 
and therefore very dangerous, and a larger one 300 feet wide 
in the centre, to allow the Chinese ships to go in and out. 
Mines were plentifully sown but did not prove very effective. 
On blockading Wei-hai-w r ei the Japanese had attempted to- 
clear the central passage but had not entirely succeeded. 
Their boats, therefore, moved to the attack by the landward 


passage vhere they would be covered by the forts which were 
now in the hands of their army. The boats were sixteen in 
number, and were formed in three divisions, thus constituted : 

I. Division. No. 23 (Division boat), Kotaka, Nos. 7, n, 12, 13. Total, six boats. 
II. Division. No. 21 (Division boat) Nos. 8, 9, 14, 18, 19. Total, six boats. 
III. Division. No. 22 (Division boat), Nos. 5, 6, 10. Total, four boats. 

The Kotaka had been built by Yarrow in 1886, and her trial 
speed was nineteen knots ; Number 21 was a Normand boat 
launched in 1891, when she steamed twenty-three knots; 
Numbers 22, 23 were by Schichau, built in 1891, and of twenty- 
three knots extreme speed. These were all first-class boats. 
The others were of the second-class, built at Onahama, ancl 
probably did not steam more than 18-19 knots at their trial. 

The boats proceeded under the cover of darkness towards 
the passage, and were nearing it when the land forts suddenly 
opened upon them and betrayed their approach. The 
Japanese gunners had taken them for Chinese boats, and there 
was nothing for it but retreat. They retired accordingly 
without suffering any loss. 

Next day the weather was extremely bad, a violent wind 
blowing, and snow falling heavily. The larger ships of 
Admiral Ito's squadron retired for shelter to Teng-chow, but 
left a cruiser to observe the Chinese. On February 2nd they 
re-appeared. The sea was now calm, but the cold was 
intense. At a distance of 2400 yards they steamed rapidly 
past the forts on Leu-kung-tau, which now alone remained 
to the Chinese, and bombarded them, producing very little 
effect. On the other hand the Chinese gunners could not hit 
the Japanese moving at a rapid speed. On the night of 
February 2nd a second torpedo attack was attempted, but 
failed, as the Chinese discovered the boats and opened upon 
them. On the 3rd and 4th the bombardment of the island 
was vigorously carried on both from the sea and from the land. 
The Chinese forts and ironclads replied, but the latter were in 
difficulties as they had not much room for manoeuvring. On 
the 8th twelve Chinese torpedo-boats made a desperate 



attempt to escape by the western entrance. The Japanese fleet 
opened upon them as they came out, and gave chase, capturing 
or sinking most of them. With engines and boilers in bad 
order they could not hope to elude fast cruisers of the Yoshino 
and Akitsusu type. 

A third torpedo attack was planned for the night of 
February 4th. The first division was to head for the western 
passage and create a diversion by making a false attack. 
The real assa .It came from the east, and was delivered by the 
2nd and 3rd divisions. About 3 a.m., when the moon went 
down, the ten boats composing these divisions steered for the 
central opening in the boom, using the masts of the Ting 
Yuen as their guide. * Numbers 8 and 21 were unlucky enough 
to touch rocks on their way in, and though they got off, could 
take no more part in the attack. The cold was intense 
there were eighteen degrees of frost and the spray froze on 
the boats, clogging their torpedo-tubes, as they travelled 
through the water. At four o'clock the attack was opened by 
Number 5 as she drew close to the Chinese, but firing too 
soon her torpedoes missed. Number 22 followed her ; in 
silence she advanced, in silence fired three torpedoes, then 
turned and retired without anyone on board being able to say 
whether the Chinese ships had been hit. The orders were 
strict, forbidding the men to expose themselves. As she was 
backing to get away from the Chinese, who had now opened 
a heavy fire, she either struck a Chinese boat which had come 
up to drive her off, or, more probably, grated against a rock 
and lost her rudder. In another minute she ran with great 
violence upon the rocks, and as her plight was hopeless the 
crew decided to abandon her. They had only one boat, which 
would hold six men, whilst there were sixteen on board. The 
first boat-load got to the shore safely, but on the second trip 
the boat foundered close in shore, leaving on board one sub- 
lieutenant and six sailors. There they remained till daylight 

* So the account in /,? Yacht, April 22, 1895. I do not understand how they 
could be seen in the darkness. 


in the bitter cold, and the sub-lieutenant, Suzuki, and one 
sailor, half frozen, fell overboard into the water and were 
drowned. With daylight the Chinese opened a sharp fire 
upon the five who were left, but being seen from the shore, a 
boat was sent to them, which brought the survivors off in 
an exhausted condition. Next came Number 10. Steaming 
at the rate of ten knots, she passed very close to a number of 
small vessels and Chinese torpedo-boats, moored to the west 
of Jih-tau. As she drew near the enemy's large ships, she 
collided with another torpedo-boat engaged in the attack, but 
suffered no harm. Approaching through a hail of Catling 
bullets a great grey mass rose suddenly up before her. It 
was the Ting Yuen, and at it she fired her bow-tube. Owing 
to the ice, the torpedo did not leave the tube but stuck pro- 
jecting from it, half in, half out. Her commander turned 
gently to port and fired his broadside tube. In spite, however, 
of the fact that the sights were most carefully laid, and the 
speed corrections accurately applied, the torpedo which had 
been pointed at the centre of the Ting Yuen, distant about 
300 yards, only just caught her stern. A man looking out 
from the boat saw it explode. Number 10 at once circled 
under a heavy fire from the Chinese, and turning, touched, 
with the projecting torpedo in her bow-tube, Number 6. The 
two boats ran a terrible risk, for the trigger of the torpedo 
was actually smashed, without exploding the detonator. They 
separated, and Number 10 retired, whilst Number 6 went 
forward to continue the attack. When within range her bow- 
tube was fired, and once more the torpedo stuck. Circling, 
she brought her broadside tube to bear, but the torpedo broke 
in two on leaving the tube. A hail of i -pounder shells from 
the ironclad's Hotchkisses was falling about her, and yet 
strange to say no harm was done her. One only struck her 
hull abreast of her engines, and stuck in her side without 
exploding. The screw of the fuse must have come loose in 
flight. Number 9 fired a torpedo at a despatch-boat, when 
she was herself pierced by a projectile which burst her boilers, 

K 2 


wounding fatally two men and slightly two, whilst four were 
scalded to death. The boat, however, remained afloat. For 
some minutes she lay helpless under a heavy fire till Number 19 
came to her aid and took her in tow, but she sank before she 
could be got out of the harbour. The attack was now over, 
and the Japanese boats retired. Numbers 8 and 18 had their 
rudders or screws injured by touching rocks or by contact 
with the boom. They were, however, towed off. Number 6 
had been hit by forty-six rifle shots, and one Hotchkiss shell ; 
Number 10 by two rifle shots. The loss of life was not, 
however, heavy. The damaged boats were either repaired on 
the spot or sent to Port Arthur. 

The fourth and final attack was made on the night of 
February 5th. This time the first division was selected to do 
the serious work, whilst the remnants of the second and third 
watched the western entrance. The Chinese did not discover 
the boats till they were right in amongst them, and then made 
only a feeble resistance. Seven torpedoes were discharged by 
theKotaka, and Numbers 11 and 23. The Ting Yuen seems, 
to have received another ; the Wei Yuen one, and the Chtng- 
Yuen one. The Lai Yuen, too, was hit on this occasion, and 
capsized, her bottom showing above water. Her crew were 
imprisoned alive in an iron tomb, and were heard knocking 
and shrieking for days. It was a work of great difficulty to 
cut through the bottom, and when at last this had been done, 
all were found dead. The Ting Yuen floated in spite of the 
torpedoes, but was seen to be slowly settling next day. Her 
water-tight doors were either closed before the explosion, 
or immediately after, and thus delayed her loss. The Ching 
Yuen was disabled, but not destroyed, and she could still fire 
her guns. Whilst the Japanese suffered trivial loss twelve 
killed, and two torpedo-boats sunk they had thus, in one way 
or another, reduced the Chinese fleet to the Chen Yuen, Tsi 
Yuen, Ping Yuen, and Kwang Ting. 

On the 6th, fresh parties of sailors and marines were landed 
on the island to support a force which Admiral Ito had 


placed ashore previously, and a heavy fire was poured in upon 
the last remnants of the Chinese fleet, and upon the forts. On 
the yth, the Japanese fleet was very hotly engaged with the 
Chinese works, and suffered considerably. The Matsushima 
was struck by a shell, which destroyed her bridge and wrecked 
her funnel, and almost immediately after, by a second, which 
passed through the engine-room and entered the torpedo 
magazine,* but, luckily, glanced up and exploded harmlessly 
above the armour deck. The Yoshino and Naniwa were also 
hit. On the other hand, a Chinese magazine was blown 
up. On the 8th, the island forts were attacked by storm, and 
all but one captured. The Ching Yuen was sunk on the gth, 
just after she had delivered her broadside. A shell from a 
9-inch gun in one of the land forts in the possession of the 
Japanese, struck her bow a little above the water-line, and 
sent her to the bottom. Yet Admiral Ting still held out, 
though his enemies w.ere closing in upon him, and the 
western mine-field had been destroyed. This day the 
Itsukushima was hit on the water-line by a shell which failed to 
explode. The loth and i.ith, the bombardment went on, and 
of the Japanese ships, the Katsuraki and Tenrio were hit and 
damaged. On the I2th, Admiral Ting bowed his head to fate 
and surrendered. He did not outlive his defeat, choosing 
rather to die by his own hand. 

The total losses of the Japanese fleet in these various 
actions, were two officers and twenty-seven sailors killed, 
wh 1st four officers and thirty-two sailors were wounded. 
Those Chinese ships which were afloat, including the Chen 
Yuen, were taken to Japan. 

Thus ended, with the fall of Wei-hai-wei, the career of 
Admiral Ting. The ex-cavalry officer had shown patriotism 
and pluck, but perhaps he made a mistake in refusing at the 
beginning of the siege to put to sea and risk an engagement. 

* Pall Mall Gazette, April 8th, 1895. This is suspiciously like the shot 
which struck her at the Yalu (vide page 94). It is possible that the corre- 
spondent misunderstood his informant. 



If defeated, the result could not have been worse for him or 
his country than it was, and his two heavy battleships might 
have got safely away to Foochow, where they could have 
been reinforced by cruisers from the southern squadrons. 
The Japanese would have found it difficult to stop them. 
His slow and feeble torpedo-boats, his battered ships, his 
treacherous officers, his disheartened seamen, were not capable 
of conducting an active defence, or of harrying the blockaders 
on the dark nights, and his fleet played a purely passive 
role. It degenerated into a target for the projectiles of the 
land forts, for the guns which the Chinese themselves had 

The combats of the Japanese fleet with the land forts, 
teach us little, yet that little confirms the lessons of the past. 
It was not the ships, but the heavy guns on land, which 
silenced the forts, and Admiral Ito had a narrow shave of losing 
his flagship. The torpedo attacks were well conceived and 
well conducted, but the demoralised condition of the Chinese 
must be taken into t account. We see clearly that booms and 
mines are a very futile defence, if they are not covered by 
heavy guns, and if the openings in them are not closely 
watched by launches and torpedo-boats. It is^ increasingly 
evident that only in absolutely enclosed harbours can fleets 
rest absolutely secure. The fact has been already recognised 
in France, where, at great expense, sheets of water have been 
surrounded with breakwaters both at Cherbourg and Brest. 
It has also been recognised in England witness the new 
works at Portland, Dover, and Gibraltar. Not that British 
fleets are likely to copy Chinese strategy, and lie in port 
whilst their enemy is sweeping the sea. But it is necessary 
to possess havens of refuge, where isolated) battleships and 
cruisers, perhaps harassed by weeks of blockading, perhaps 
damaged in action, will be able to lie without needing even 
to keep a watch. The mere possibility of a torpedo attack, 
imposes a terrible strain upon officers and men. 

The Japanese boats, when once they got in amongst the 


Chinese, did not effect such wholesale destruction as we had 
been led to expect. They did not sink ships right and left. 
On the other hand, the losses both in men and boats were 
singularly small considering the results achieved. Five 
vessels are claimed to have been injured, representing a 
displacement of at least 14,000 tons, considerably larger than 
the displacement of the ships sunk or destroyed at the Yalu. 
Not one of the attacking boats was directly sunk by gun-fire, 
but then the Chinese ships were almost entirely devoid of the 
larger quick-firers 6-inch, 4'y-inch, 2o-pounder, and 12- 
pounder, which would probably stop these small and delicate 
craft with a single hit ; nor were they over well provided with 
6-pounders and 3-pounders. Certainly the attack upon a 
Royal Sovereign or Brennus at anchor would be quite a 
different matter. The boats, too, had the support of the land 
works, which would not be the case if a European squadron of 
these vessels went to look for its enemy in harbour. This is 
the first occasion on which the torpedo-boat, pure and simple, 
has succeeded in sinking larger vessels with the Whitehead. 
Both the Blanco Encalada and \heAquidaban were torpedoed 
by torpedo-gunboats. The torpedoes used were of the 
Schwartzkopf type, fired by electricity, with a charge of 200 
grammes (less than \ Ib.) of powder. 

NOTE. " Blackwood " gives the following account of the torpedoing of the 
Ting Yuen, from Commander Tyler's journal : " I saw a torpedo beat approach- 
ing us end on. When about 300 yards off she turned hard-a-port. Just then I 
saw one of our shot take effect, a cloud of steam rising from the boat. A few 
seconds after she turned her torpedo struck us. It was a loud dull thud and a 
heavy quivering shock, a column of water dashed over the decks, and a faint, 
sickly smell of explosives. . . . Within a minute of being hit I was down 
below. The water was bubbling up from one of the water-tight hatches, 
and there was about a foot of water in my cabin. . . . The water-tight 
doors . . . were in working order, and were kept clear. They were all 
leaking badly, however. The ship was beached ; she did not fill and sink at 
once, though all her bulkheads leaked owing to the shock. Thus it appears that 
the I25lb. charge of gun cotton will not necessarily inflict a fatal wound." 


THE difficulty of forecasting the future is nowhere greater 
than where the mind has little material upon which to base 
its judgment, where, in other words, the instances are insuffi- 
cient for an induction. On land there have been two great 
wars within the memory of the present generation, and yet 
even with this experience it is difficult to predict the details 
of a future land-battle ; so considerable have been the changes 
of materiel in recent years. At sea, changes in materiel 
have been far greater, and have exercised an influence more 
profound upon the science of war. Monster guns, torpedoes, 
rams, are factors which no soldier has to consider. So rapid 
is the progress of invention, so swift the march towards per- 
fection, that at sea what was yesterday the most formidable 
of fighting machines may be looked upon to-morrow as little 
better than lumber. On land it is men who fight, at sea, men 
and machines. And though we have no warrant for thinking 
the machines all- important, they must necessarily affect in 
some degree the issue of any war. Naval progress is a race 
to obtain the best machines, and the constant structural 
changes, made to obtain that best, exhibit a state of flux 
unparalleled in the past. But whilst the implements of war 
are in this transitional state there is no sign of a similar flux 
in principles. Strategy, it would seem, remains the same as 
in the past, and tactics have only altered in detail. 

We may now sum up the world's experience since the intro- 
duction of the ironclad. There have been two pitched battles : 
Lissa, in 1866, and the Yalu, or Haiyang, in 1894. The 


former is not of much value, as it represents an action 
between ships as different from those of to-day as they them- 
selves were different from the ships of Nelson. The Yalu, 
as the more recent, is also the more valuable. But here 
really modern battleships were absent on either side, and 
there were certain ulterior motives interfering with the con- 
duct of the engagement. Moreover, both at Lissa and the 
Yalu one side was greatly inferior to the other in discipline 
and morale. We may say that there is no instance of fleets 
approximately equal in skill, discipline, and numbers encoun- 
tering one another. Some such encounter is necessary to 
test our a priori conclusions concerning the value of parti- 
cular classes of ships, of particular types of construction and 
armament, and of particular formations. 

Actions of single ships are rather more numerous, and 
fairly numerous, too, are actions of ships with forts. The 
American Civil War abounds in this last type of engagement, 
and since then there has been the bombardment of Alexandria, 
when, however, the Egyptians, being Orientals, did not make the 
resistance which we should have to expect from Westerners ; 
and the various actions at Rio. Of single-ship actions the 
most important are the fight between the Merrimac and 
Monitor; between the Tennessee and Farragut's fleet; between 
the Alabama and Kearsarge; between the Shah and Huascar; 
between the Vesta and Assar-i-Chevket ; the two engagements 
in which the Huascar faced the Chilians ; and the encounter 
of the Tsi Yum with the Japanese Flying Squadron. Of 
torpedo actions, the French affairs with the Chinese on the 
Min and at Sheipoo, are of little value, as in this case the 
torpedo-boat encountered enemies who were careless to an 
extreme degree. The Russian attempts upon Turkish iron- 
clads in the Black Sea, the sinking of the Blanco Encalada 
and the Aquidaban, and the repeated attacks of the Japanese 
at Wei-hai-wei are more instructive, but cannot be said to 
have definitely decided the powers and limitations of the 


The remoter past is of importance as illustrating certain 
questions, such as the influence of dimension, the general 
requirements of battleships, the methods of attack, and the 
formation to be adopted. Though steam has changed a 
great deal it has not changed everything, and though French 
writers of the Jeune Ecole often tell us that the abyss which 
separates us from the past is profound, we may obtain some 
profit by crossing it. Naval warfare is as much a matter of men 
as of ships, and even if ships have changed, men have not. 

First as to the battle dispositions of a fleet. What ships 
are to be placed in the line, if line there is ? Is the protected 
cruiser to figure in it, and if so, what class of protected cruiser? 
Can the older and smaller battleships take their place with 
the newer and heavier vessels ? Where are the torpedo-boats 
to be stationed, and what is to be their business in the 
conflict? Is there to be a reserve, or is the whole of the 
fleet to come into action simultaneously ? 

The history of the past shows that " a special class of ships 
to fight in the line of battle " was necessary. In " Naval 
Warfare,"* Admiral Colomb has pointed out how at first a 
heterogeneous medley of vessels, with scarcely a break from 
the largest to the smallest size, lay in the line ; but that by 
slow degrees, experience showed it was inexpedient to place 
small vessels side by side with large ones. Gradually the 
English line of battle tended to uniformity. The I2o-gun 
ship was found too large, the fifty-six-gun and forty-four- 
gun ship too small. It was the mean which conquered in 
the shape of the seventy-four. The frigate, during the 
revolutionary war with France, took no place in the line. 
It did not venture to encounter the crushing broadside of the 
line-of-battle ship,t but rather acted as an auxiliary to the 

* Page 80. 

f With very rare exceptions, e.g., Melpomene (French), engaged Agamemnon 
(English), and Agamemnon was a good deal injured. Three frigates, Nelson 
thought, had an advantage over one ship of the line (64 gunsj. Laughton. 
Nelson, 54. 


combatants, saving men and towing disabled ships. At 
Camperdown, it is true, it played some part in a fleet action ; 
but Camperdown was the exception rather than the rule. 
Still less do we find sloops or corvettes engaging side by side 
with heavier ships. The frigate, the corvette, and the sloop 
were built for one purpose, the battleship for another. Each 
stuck to its last. 

The next question to be considered, is whether the protected 
cruiser of to-day stands to the battleship as did the frigate to 
the line of battle vessel. To decide, we must examine the 
defensive and offensive power of the two contrasted classes of 
ships in each period. As type of the frigate, we may take the 
thirty-eight-gun ship of 1805; as type of the battleship, the 
seventy-four-gun ship of the same date. The armaments, 
broadsides, and complements of the two classes are given by 
James as follows : 

f 28 32-pounders ~} Broadside, 

82 euns* 5 28 l8 -P unders L 78 ilbs. 

j 1 8 g-pounders f With carronades, 

V. 8 12-pounder carronades ) 829lbs. 

Men and Boys, 594. 


^28 iS-pounders ^ Broadside, 

48 guns 5 212-pounders / 3 oolbs 

I 8 g-pounders C With carronades, 

V.IO i8-pounder carronades j 39olbs. 

Men and Boys, 277. 

In weight of metal discharged, and in the number of men 
carried, important for boarding, the seventy-four was to the 
frigate about as two to one. But in reviewing the gun-power of 
the two vessels, there is this to be considered, that in James' 
words " the destruction caused by discharges of cannon is in 
a great degree proportionate to the diameter and weight of 

* Carronades were not taken into consideration in the official classification of 
ships, by the numbers of their guns. Hence the seventy-four was really an 



shot." ' Now the seventy-four carried the 32-pounder, which 
was nearly twice as powerful as the frigate's heaviest 18- 
pounder, when we look at the weight of metal thrown, 
and far more efficacious in battering the sides of the wooden 
ship. In defensive strength, the seventy-four-gun ship had 
stronger scantling and thicker sides, so that here again 
there was another point of superiority. 

And now to pass to the modern cruiser and battleship. As 
type of the former the medium vessels of the Eclipse class 
may stand, and of the latter the medium battleship Renown, 
when we get these results : 


Offensive. Guns 45 

IV lo-inch 29-ton-guns" 
X 6-inch quick-firers 
VIII 12-pounder ,, ,, 
XII 3-pounder ,, 
IX Machine, &c. 


19 projectiles. 

Torpedo tubes, seven. 

Cannot force a torpedo action. 






All guns over 12-pounder behind armour 6 10 inches 


Water line and side 8 to 6 inches armour. Coal. 
Deck below water, 3 inches maximum thickness. 
Bulkheads to prevent raking-fire. 
Minute sub-division. 

Probably 600. 


T V 6-inch quick-firers 

VI 47-inch ,, 
Guns 25 + VIII 12-pounder,, ,, 
I 3-pounder ,, ,, 
[_ V Machine, &:c. 
Torpedo tubes, &c., four. Can force a torpedo action. 

Guns protected only by shields. 

Coal protection. 

Deck below water line 2^ inches thicK. 

No bulkheads. 

Minute sub-division. 



ii projectiles. 

In weight of metal thrown, the battleship is to the cruiser 
as five-and-a-half to one, and all that has been said of the 

* James, i., 44. 


value of heavy artillery in the case of the seventy-four applies- 
here with redoubled force, since the Renown s largest pro- 
jectile is not twice, but five times the weight of the Eclipse's 
largest. The side of the Renown is impervious amidships to- 
all the Eclipse's shells ; the Eclipse from stem to stern is> 
open, and exposed to the smallest projectiles. The Eclipse" 
can be raked in the end-on position, the Renown cannot. 
The Eclipse, with her main armament ill-protected on deck, 
cannot hope to silence by gun-fire the RL nown's well-protected 
weapons. Both ships are of the same date and designed by 
the same hand, yet it can scarcely be denied that the disparity 
between them is enormous. The sole advantage which the 
Eclipse possesses is that of forcing a torpedo action, and to- 
do this she has to approach closely to the battleship, thereby 
giving the latter the opportunity of crushing her by gun-fire. 
We may conclude that this cruiser could not lie in the line of 
battle beside the battleship, as she exhibits a comparative 
inferiority very much greater than that of the frigate.* 

It may be said, however, that whilst the medium and smaller 
cruisers are manifestly unable to enter the line, the larger and 
more powerful ships of the class, which are beginning to- 
abound in our navy, could do so. To test the statement we 
will make one more comparison between the most powerful 
cruiser afloat, the Terrible, and the most powerful battleship,, 
the Majestic. These are the figures : 


C VI 1 2-inch 46-ton euns "^ r> j -j 

VII -ic / Broadside, 

Xll g-inch quick-firers f , T ~.IK 

Offensive. 52 guns 4 XVI i2-pounder ,, ( 4HIDS. 

3 s VTT \ 24 proiectiles. 

| XII 3-pounder ., ,, J J 

LVIH Machine, &c. 

Torpedo tubes, four. Cannot force a torpedo action. 

* It is a common argument of some theorists, that the large battleship's 
equivalent weight in moderate cruisers would be more than a match for 
her. Three cruisers of the English Astrea class would slightly exceed the 
displacement of the Renown, and would bring to bear on the broadside between 
them, six 6-inch and twelve 4'7-inch quickfirers, with a broadside of i i4olbs. 








B ATTL E S H I P CO Tl td. 

All guns above 12-pounder behind armour 6 14 inches 


Water line and side 9 inches armour. Coal. 
Deck below water line 4 inches maximum. 
Bulkheads against raking fire. 
Minute sub-division. 

About 750. 



22 projectiles. 

T II 9 - 2-inch 24-ton guns 

I XII 6-inch quick-firers 
53 guns. \ XVI 12-pounder ,, ,, 

| XII 3-pounder ,, ,, 

[_ XI Machine, &c. 
Torpedo tubes, four. Can force a torpedo action. 

All guns above 12-pounder behind armour 6 inches 


Deck below water line 4 inches maximum. 
No bulkheads. 
Minute sub-division. 

About 850. 

The inequality between these two is far less than that existing 
between the Renown and Eclipse, but it is still very great. 
The four heavy guns of the Majestic are the factors which 
give her her preponderance in broadside fire. Omitting these, 
and the Terrible 's 9'2-inch guns, the two ships are almost 
identical in armament. But whereas the Majestic' s gunners 
can fire with effect at every square yard of the cruiser's side, 
the casemates exposing a negligible surface of armour, the 
vitals of the Majestic are proof to all the cruiser's shot below 
9'2-inch in calibre. The absence of bulkheads, as in the 
Eclipse, is a further handicap to the big cruiser. Still she is 
in a very different position from the small cruiser, as a very 

against the Renown's 25Oolbs. (excluding the smaller guns on either side). If 
the old seventy -four was considered a match for three frigates (Naval Chronicle, 
xxxix., 459), though these fired a greater weight of metal, the battleship may be 
considered more than a match for three cruisers, since, in addition to her 
.advantage of concentrated size and power, she fires twice their weight of metal. 
The torpedo is the only factor which can affect her superiority. 


considerable amount of cover is given to her guns, and her 
broadside is heavy * It is difficult, then, arguing wholly on 
a priori grounds, to suppose that she cannot lie in the line, 
but if she does lie in the line it will be at no small risk to 

Armoured cruisers, if they have water-line protection, plated 
gun positions, and bulkheads, are better fitted for action in 
the line of battle. The Dupuy-de-L6me, for instance, at long 
ranges, under service conditions, might be found proof to the 
shot of the 6-inch quick-firer, and could not be perforated by 
the shell of that gun. The Imperieuse verges very closely 
upon the second-class battleship of her date. The belted 
cruisers of the Aurora class are of an older epoch in design, 
and could not face battleships of their own date. Their 
armament is unprotected, their gunners exposed to every 
shell, and in a hot or close action their batteries could not be 

Cruisers thus fall into three classes, (i) The medium or 
small cruiser, unfit for the line of battle. (2) The very large 
cruiser which may fight in the line but at considerable risk. 
(3) The armoured cruiser with water-line protection as well 
as armour on her guns, fit for the line. The belted cruiser of 
Aurora type will fall somewhere between the first and second 
class, and is unfit for the line. In general it will be best to 
keep cruisers to their own proper duties as far as possible, 
but with a large cruiser squadron present on either side, 
the temptation to place them in line will necessarily be 

Why should they not be placed in line ? it may be asked 
once more. There will be vessels of the same class present on 
either side, perhaps cruisers in the opponent's line, and surely, 
even if they go to the bottom, it will not be till they have 
.done very considerable mischief by their fire to the enemy's 

* It is still, however, weaker in proportion to the battleship's than was that 
.of the thirty-eight-gun frigate to the seventy-four's. But the armour in the 
Terrible protects the gun-crews well. 


cruisers and the unarmoured surface of his battleships' sides. 
The battle will, as far as we can judge, be fought fleet to fleet 
in its earlier stages, and there will not be a number of actions 
between individual ships in which the cruiser will run the risk 
of having to encounter the battleship. In answer, we may 
say that the loss of ship after ship will be very discouraging 
to the crews of such vessels as survive, and that if one fleet of 
ten battleships and five cruisers, all of which are placed in 
line, assailing another of similar strength, in which the 
cruisers are held in reserve, succeeds in damaging severely 
one or two of the hostile battleships but only with the loss of 
three or four of its cruisers, the infliction of this damage will 
not compensate for the moral effect of the loss of the ships.* 
It is very evident that at the Yalu, neither Chinese nor 
Japanese gained anything by bringing the weaker ships into 
battle, whilst, though the Saikio and Yang Wei were poor and 
feeble vessels when contrasted with modern cruisers, they 
were not faced by any ship comparable in offensive power to 
the Royal Sovereign or Renown. It looks as though fleet 
to fleet actions made uniform battleships as necessary as 
in the past. Again, cruisers, being longer in proportion 
to their beam, are not generally so handy at a moderate 
speed as the shorter and broader battleship. Their inclusion 
in the line will thus reduce the manoeuvring power of the 

The best solution of the difficulty would seem to be the 
sharp separation of cruisers and battleships. As the Japanese 
placed their fast ships in one squadron, the slow in another, 
which each acted independently of the other, the same should 
be done with cruisers and battleships. The cruiser line may 
attack independently, seeking first the enemy's cruiser line, 

* When the Tecumseh sank at Mobile (i. 124), the Confederate gunners, 
imagining that their fire had sent her to the bottom, at once redoubled their 
exertions, whilst the Federal fire grew perceptibly less vehement. It was only 
Farragut's dauntless handling of the Hartford that restored the Northern elan. 
So also at the Yalu, a foreigner on the Tsi Yuen states that the news " Another 
ship gone," greatly depressed the Chinese, as well it might. 


or may face the hostile battleships, keeping at a great distance 
from them to neutralise the cruisers' want of armour, and to 
minimise the risk of hits from heavy shells. By pouring in a 
hail of 6 and 4 - 7~inch shells, the enemy's attention may be 
distracted from the more serious assault of the battleships, 
which will be simultaneously delivered. The ships of each 
class will then be together, and the principle of like with like 
carried out. The cruisers will be able to use their high speed 
if it is found desirable ; the battleships will not be hindered 
by ships with large turning circles. 

The line of battleships will be composed, naturally, of vessels 
similar to those figuring in the hostile fleet. At the outbreak 
of war, each side may be expected to employ its newest and 
best ships. Provided the smaller vessels are well armoured 
and armed, there is no reason why they should not lie in the 
line. The French Jemmapes, the Russian Admiral Ort- 
shakoff are of the battleship type, though smaller and less 
powerful than armourclads such as the Renown or Royal 
Sovereign. To the latter, they are what the fifty -gun ship 
was to the seventy-four or i2O-gun ship. It will be well if 
older vessels, whose speed is low, armour thin, and armament 
weak, are formed in yet a third division, should they be 
present.* Such vessels would be well adapted to act as 
a reserve ; if they fight, it must be at long ranges, where 
their moderate armour will stand them in good stead. 
If introduced among more modern or first-class battleships, 
they will lower their speed, and in some cases reduce their 
manoeuvring qualities. Let us by way of illustration take 
the squadrons of England and France at their present 
strength, and further suppose the English Mediterranean 
fleet to have been reinforced by the Channel Squadron. The 

* A further argument for this is that more than eight or ten ships cannot, at 
intervals of two cables (400 yards), be handled in one line. If the interval is 
diminished, there will be the risk of collision between friends. In the grouping 
of ships, speed is especially to be considered, as if an eighteen-knot vessel is 
with a fourteen-knot ship, an element of tactical superiority is wasted. 




following would be the division of the English force on this 
principle : 


Second or Reserve 

Second Cruiser 

Third Cruisei 









Royal Sovereign 




Empress of India 




















First Cruiser 















The French fleet, if the same principle were followed, would 
be drawn up thus : 



1 6-8 


Ba udin 


Dupuy de Lome 











* Armoured Ships in italics. The figures give the trial speed of the slowest ship in each 
squadron, in knots. 

Engaging vessels as little armoured as are the French first- 
class battleships represented in this list, there seems no 


reason why the first-class cruisers should not lie in the line.* 
The " Admirals " are almost too good for a reserve, and could 
perfectly well lie in line ; though lacking quick-firers, as they 
do at present, and thin armour to keep out high explosives, 
they would be distinctly inferior to the other nine. The 
Polyphemus would be with the reserve squadron, as her time 
does not come till the fleets close. 

The precise position of the torpedo craft is also a matter of 
dispute. The torpedo gunboat offers too large a target in 
broad daylight, and is too vulnerable to attack at the com- 
mencement of the engagement. All the objections which 
have been urged against the cruiser in the line of battle apply 
with additional force to the torped ogunboat. Two possibili- 
ties remain. The torpedo gunboat may be placed to leeward 
of the battleship and emerge only to defend its larger mate 
from the assault of the enemy's torpedo-boats. t This would 
appear to be the original intention of the designers of such 
craft. When the assailing flotilla arrives at a distance of 
600 yards, just outside torpedo range, it will find itself faced 
by the torpedo gunboats. The assailants would be under fire 
from about 3000 yards up to 600 yards, for a distance of 
2400 yards. The assailed torpedo gunboats would only be 
under the enemy's heavy fire for the time occupied in steam- 
ing out 600 yards from the battleship, if that ; for the battle- 
ships of the assailants would have to fire over their own boats, 
which might prove a dangerous experiment. The torpedo 
gunboat, thus placed, must to some extent hamper the move- 
ments of the battleship, if a sudden turn becomes necessary, 
but it will be fairly sheltered and ready at hand when wanted. 
Should it be formed up with others of its own class, upon 
it will fall the duty of watching and combating the enemy's 

* The Baudin and Formidable, broadside on, expose 400 square yards of 
unprotected target. 

f In such a position, however, unless very close under the f battleship, it will 
be exposed to the risk of hits from such projectiles as pass over the battleship, 
lowing to too great elevation. 

L 2 


torpedo craft, whether gunboats or boats simply. It may also 
have to make a rush at the critical moment, when the enemy's 
quick-firers have been dismounted or silenced, and only the 
heavier guns have to be faced. 

The torpedo-boat, whether of the sea-going or the still, 
larger " destroyer " class, is nearly certain to be present in 
some force with either fleet. It lacks protection, as its only 
defence is its diminutive size and very high speed, and it is 
valueless for offence outside 500 yards. But it has this great 
advantage. The torpedo which it carries will, if it gets home, 
deal a crushing blow, and almost certainly disable, or there 
and then send to the bottom, any ship which it strikes. It 
is not likely that torpedo-boats will be sent against intact 
battleships, whose quick-firers are in good order and whose 
gunners are unshaken. The boats' time will come towards 
the close of the battFe, when the fight has left great masses 
of iron wreckage ; when the targets have lost their power of 
movement ; when their crews are diminished in number and 
wearied by the intense strain of action. But even then it 
will not be as easy as it might appear to destroy the damaged 
battleships, since they, too, will have auxiliaries, who will be 
able either to meet the assault of the torpedo-boats or to 
destroy the opposing battleships. As it will be an anoma- 
lous position for the boats of each side to deal the final blow 
to the ships of the other side simultaneously, it seems probable 
that at the close of the action between the larger ships there 
will follow a fierce contest between the smaller craft. 

The immense moral effect of dealing a heavy blow at the 
enemy when the battle begins, may, however, in defiance of 
prudence, lead to a rush of the boats of one side upon the 
ships of the other early in the engagement. To meet such a 
rush the assailed must have boats ready. They will steam 
forward, as we. have said, to the limit of torpedo range, leaving 
the hostile boats as long as possible under the big ships' fire. 
The line of big ships will probably draw off, so as to prolong 
the duration of the assailant boats' approach. But supposing; 


that the hostile boats steam straight upon the battleships, and 
the latter maintain a course at right angles to their approach, 
they will be under fire for the time taken to cover 2400 yards, 
which at a speed of twenty knots would be about three and a 
half minutes, during which time a 6-inch quick-firer would 
discharge from ten to fifteen shots, or a 12-pounder twenty to 
thirty. Though in the torpedo attacks of the Chilian and 
Brazilian civil wars, torpedo gunboats have come off without 
much more than a scratch, these attacks were made at night 
and upon ships which had not a powerful quick-firing 
armament or well-disciplined-crews. It will be a different 
matter attacking by day modern battleships, equipped with 
quick-firers, and using smokeless powder, though the torpedo- 
boat is never a target easy to hit. It remains possible that 
one or more boats may succeed in their onset, and that an odd 
battleship may fall victim, but the price paid will be a very 
heavy one.* The best plan would seem to be to hold in the 
boats at the beginning of the battle. For it may be better 
to throw away a battleship, than to abandon the chance of 
following up a victory, or striking a heavy blow later in the 
action, which intact torpedo-boats may give. 

Of course, if there is anything like a melee, then comes the 
opportunity of the boats, but even then there may be danger 
to friends as well as foes. If it is true that the Chinese boats 
could not distinguish their enemies at the Yalu, it is a very 
noteworthy fact, for in that battle there was little that savoured 
of the melee, though there was more smoke than would be 
produced with cordite or amide powder. The sphere of 
action of the torpedo-boat upon the battlefield very closely 

* To lose half-a-dozen Cushings would be disastrous to any fleet. The ideal 
torpedo-officer will be too rare and valuable a being to be risked for small gain, 
and if the torpedo-officer is not ideal in courage, coolness, and sagacity, his 
attack will miscarry. In manoeuvres there is no ordeal of fire to sink and slay. 
Crews of boats under a terrific fire, to which they can make no reply, will need 
extraordinary steadiness and heroism. A torpedo flotilla once beaten off with 
any loss, will be good for little, owing to the bad moral effect of such a repulse 
on the men. cf. Cipriani, Journal United Service Institution, xxxviii., 763. 


resembles that of cavalry upon land, and these craft should be 
used like cavalry. They act by surprise ; they complete the 
ruin of the beaten. 

The English fleet includes one vessel which is specially 
built for ramming the Polyphemus ; and the United States 
have in the Katahdin a similar craft. There are many who 
are in love with "the small swift ram," but it is doubtful 
how far such a ship is attainable, and how far she would be 
useful if the ideal could be obtained. Ability to ram depends 
upon speed and handiness in the assailant and the want of 
these qualities in the assailed. To obtain a high speed, not 
only upon the measured mile but in a sea-way, the boilers 
must be heavy and the engines powerful. This necessarily 
involves a high displacement, as the hull must be strong to 
withstand the jar of the machinery and the violent concussion 
of ramming. If the ram is given guns and armour, she 
becomes a battleship ; if she is left without them, she is liable 
to be destroyed by gun-fire long before she can use her sole 
weapon. And that weapon is a most uncertain and two- 
edged one, as we shall presently see. 

There is yet another species of ship which has appeared 
within the last decade the ship armed with the Zalinski gun 
for projecting large charges of dynamite to a great distance. 
The Zalinski gun is at present in an undeveloped stage, but 
there is good reason to suppose, like many other inventions, 
it will be perfected in time. It offers a very large target to 
hostile quick-firers, and it is not strongly constructed, but it can 
project shells containing 2oolbs. of the highest explosive, to 
a range of 2000 yards at the rate of one a minute.* The shell 
is a long time in the air, in some cases as much as twelve 

* Firing at a target which represented the Philadelphia, at ranges of from 
2000 to 1000 yards, 44 per cent, of hits were made. The projectile is practically 
a torpedo, with from two to five times the range of the Whitehead, and, it is 
probable, at least as great accuracy. The fuses of the projectiles and the valves 
of the gun have been vastly improved of late, but there seems to be some 
scepticism as to the value of the weapon, v. Schroeder. Proceedings, U.S.A. 
Naval Institute, xx., 1. ff. 


seconds. Like the torpedo it could not be used with much 
effect against a single ship, which could turn, or stop, or 
increase her speed, and thus avoid it ; but it might be deadly 
against a squadron, where the individual ships cannot act with 
entire freedom, but are dependent upon their neighbours. 
Such a dynamite vessel might lie to leeward of the heavier 
ships, and throw her aerial torpedoes over them at the enemy. 
The effect of her projectiles exploding against a ship's side 
or deck would probably be most destructive. At the same 
time, the American Vesuvius, which has been built for this 
purpose, does not give entire satisfaction, and it has been pro- 
posed to take her pneumatic guns out of her. 

The perfecting of the pneumatic gun would be the death- 
knell of the battleship in its present form, and it is hard to 
see what protection could be devised against its bolts. 
As the jar to the ship is very slight with air-impulse, 
it can readily be fitted upon merchant steamers, and 
was - so employed upon the Nictheroy in the Brazilian Civil 

The position of the commander-in-chief in battle has been 
much canvassed. Persano chose to leave the line at Lissa 
when the Austrian attack was impending, and placed himself 
outside it, to be the better able to communicate his orders. 
As he had failed to acquaint his captains of the purposed 
change, the effect was most disastrous. It has been pointed 
out that for the admiral to withdraw to a light ship, or to 
place himself with the reserve, is very dangerous, as he thereby 
becomes a simple spectator, and cannot be at hand to change 
the formation of his fleet instantly, if this should be required. t 
Farragut at Port Hudson, Tegetthof at Lissa, Nelson at 
Trafalgar, are good precedents for the admiral's ship lead- 
ing. | It is more difficult than it was in the past, when ships 

* Page 40-41. f Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, 353, ff. 

J Nelson before Trafalgar, Farragut at Mobile and New Orleans, were each 
entreated by their captains not to lead, because of the danger. Nelson complied 
with the request, but only momentarily, and on second thoughts took his 


were closer together, and when it was comparatively safe to 
stand on deck, for the leader, by his personal example, to 
encourage his fleet. But if his personal heroism cannot be 
witnessed, the behaviour of his ship can be seen by all. 
And if he takes his place at the head of the line, it will be 
possible to fight the battle without signals, upon the " follow- 
my-leader" plan, a plan which was constantly practised by 
the Mediterranean fleet under Admiral Tryon. In most 
English battleships and cruisers the signalmen are altogether 
unprotected. The masts are naturally liable to be shot away, 
and the semaphores are placed in a very, exposed position 
upon the bridge, where the hail of shells, fired direct, or 
ricochetting from the water, would exert its most devastating 
effect. If a really simple arrangement can be devised whereby 
the signalmen can work the signals, whether at the mast- 
head, on Prince Louis of Battenberg's plan, or otherwise, 
from under cover, a great many of the difficulties of the 
commander-in-chief will vanish. It will still, however, be 
hard to communicate with those divisions of the fleet which 
are at any distance, and with a large fleet and open order 
the distances must be great. It is therefore absolutely 
necessary for the subordinate commanders to know before- 
hand what the chief is going to do, for them to discuss with 
him the various possibilities, and to be saturated with his 
ideas. Thus it was that Nelson's captains learnt what were 
their admiral's intentions, and were prepared at the moment 
of action to execute his wishes.* The want of such knowledge 
amongst the Italian commanders was one of the chief factors 
which produced the disasters of Lissa. 

At the Yalu Admiral Ito led the Main Squadron, and 
Admiral Tsuboi the Flying Squadron, and then signalling was 

position in the van (James, iii., 391). Farragut gave way on both occasions, 
but never ceased to regret his compliance at Mobile. There he resumed the 
lead at the critical moment of the attack (i., 125). 

* " The necessity for many signals was thus entirely done away with." 1 
Laughton, Nelson, 215. For Persano at Lissa see i., 224, 232-5. 


comparatively easy on board the Japanese Fleet. On board 
French ships, with their strong military masts, which contain 
a steel core inside the stairway, signalling would probably be 
easier in action than from the tops of English ships. It is 
possible that in one or other of the tops the admiral might 
find it advantageous to take up his position during action, as 
Farragut found it necessary to climb the rigging at Mobile. 
But special protection should be given to the admiral's battle- 
quarters, as his life is a valuable one, and the military masts 
are much exposed. It was a saying of Admiral Tryon that 
the captain must look forward, the admiral aft. From the 
forward conning-tower ships astern cannot be seen, and from 
the after conning-tower the same is the case with ships 
forward. From the upper tops a good all round view can be 
had, and there is not much to obstruct the field of vision. 
Two or three inches of Harveyed steel would, however, at 
that great height, diminish the ship's stability. It goes with- 
out saying, that if the top be selected by the commander as 
his battle position, communications with the captain must be 
fully assured. 

We must now pass to the general formation of fleets for 
battle. There are five various dispositions which may be 
adopted : line ahead, line abreast, one or other of these two 
with the ships en echelon, triangular or group formation, and 
naval square. The tactics to be adopted and the structural 
peculiarities of the ships engaged, must to some extent dictate 
the nature of the formation adopted. What is suited to a 
melee, or to the use of the ram and torpedo, is not necessarily 
best adapted for the employment of the gun. 

A single line, whether abreast or ahead, has these dis- 
advantages : its extremities are weak ; a great extent of 
water is covered ; the force is not concentrated ; and the 
attack of the enemy may be delivered upon a section of the 
fleet. In addition line abreast masks the broadside fire of 
the ships placed in it and compels an end-on attack, which can 
only result, if the enemy meet it by a similar disposition, in a 


confused melee, in which the fleets will break up into a 
number of isolated units and chance will decide the issue.* 
The end-on attack was favoured by our constructors between 
1875 and 1885, when most of our "echeloned" turret-ships 
were designed. Vessels of the Inflexible and Colossus class 
are clearly meant to fight in line abreast, since the disposition 
of their turrets limits the arc of their broadside fire. But our 
more modern ships are marked by a return to the older and 
sounder conception of a powerful broadside, t and no admiral 
would be likely, of his own choice, to place such ships in an 
order which would reduce their efficiency, and prevent them 
from employing their numerous and formidable quick-firers. 
Any disposition adopted, however, must be to some extent 
guided by the action of the enemy, and if we look at the 
French battleships we shall see, between 1880 and 1890, the 
tendency, which has been observed in England, to secure 
powerful end-on fire, though stern fire is not neglected, as it 
has been neglected in England in the past. This looks rather 
as though the French meant to fight a stern battle in line 
abreast. In such an order ironclads like the Magenta and 
Carnot can bring to bear three heavy guns to our two in our 
more recent designs. But since France has followed us at 
last in the fore and aft disposition of the heavy guns, in her 
very latest ships the St. Louis class it is somewhat 
doubtful what she intends to do. 

In a stern battle the French fleet would form in line abreast, 
and steam away from our ships. As we hold at present the 
weather gauge in speed, we could overtake the retreating 
fleet, but we should probably have to chase in line abreast. 
If our ships were in line ahead, the. leaders would run the risk 

* It can also be easily doubled upon, or turned on either wing, as the 
broadside fire of all the ships in it except one is masked. 

f At the same time good end-on fire is a necessity, as the enemy may other- 
wise, with equal speed, fight a stern battle, and torpedo attacks are generally 
best delivered from ahead, cf. Sturdee. Journal United Service Institution, 
xxxviii., 1244-5. 


of disablement from the enemy's concentrated fire. If we 
attacked in two columns in line ahead, one coming up on each 
quarter of the French line abreast, our two divisions would be 
widely separated, and the enemy might concentrate upon one or 
other, since steam lends itself to sudden and rapid movements. 
Our cruiser divisions, or at least our powerful first-class 
cruisers, would no doubt thus move on the French flank, 
striving to disable one ship, and so compel the others to delay 
in order to support it. The superior speed of vessels, such 
as the Edgar and Powerful, would enable them to avoid any 
sudden concentration by the enemy. 

Line abreast can be readily converted into line ahead by a 
quarter turn. But for ordinary purposes it has all the 
disadvantages of line ahead and none of the advantages. The 
strong point in line ahead is that it leaves the broadside clear, 
and allows the ships to follow the movements of their leader. 
It is the most elastic and the most simple formation, and the 
target is small. For, as errors in shooting more generally 
arise from vertical than horizontal misdirection, and as more 
shots fly over the target than fly wide of it on either side, 
with a trifling error in elevation, projectiles will be more likely 
to drop on the deck of the ship end-on, when the target is- 
300 feet to 380 feet long, than upon her, broadside-on, when 
the target is only 60 feet to 80 feet. The armour is no doubt 
presented at a sharper angle end-on, and glances will be more 
frequent, but the gain in this direction does not compensate 
for the loss in other ways. The object in battle is not so 
much to elude the enemy's projectiles as to pour projectiles 
upon him. 

A third formation is the bow-and-quarter line adopted by 
Tegetthof at Lissa. This leaves free both broadside and bow 
guns, but there is some risk of gunners in the uproar and 
excitement of the battle hitting friends. It is, too, a formation 
which lacks elasticity. A better disposition is a slightly 
indented line ahead, which permits the bow chasers to fire 
at the enemy, but does not avoid the risk of accidental 


injury to friends. .A line ahead, re-inforced at both of its 
extremities is, perhaps, the best formation of those con- 
sidered. The vessels supporting the leaders can be ships 
with a powerful bow fire, when the most will be made of 
them. In the same way, those supporting the rear should 
have a strong stern fire. 

Groups of ships acting together, and supporting one another 
in a series of triangles, each composed of three ships, were in 
great favour as a battle formation some years ago, but now 
receive less enthusiastic support. The group-commander is 
a fresh intermediary between the admiral and his captains, and 
an unnecessary intermediary. It may be taken for granted 
that whatever order is adopted, each vessel in the line will 
support her neighbour, so that there is little gained by 
detailing B and C to cover A. Nor does there seem any 
reason why the group should consist of three ships and not 
of two or four, since, as has been said, there is no transcen- 
dental power in the number three. For the group it may be 
argued that, with such a formation, ships of similar type can 
best act together, and that often there are not more than two 
or three ships of identical type. But it will always be the 
case that ships in line will be similar, and small differences of 
construction do not necessitate a total change of formation. 
Where the differences are important, the ships of the different 
types will not be jumbled together, but placed apart. The 
group as a sub-division of the division is hardly necessary. 
Most group formations, too, offer a good target to hostile fire. 

Naval squares, or the arrangement of ships in qumcunces, 
again, are open to the same objection. They offer too good 
a target to the quick-firer. Such dispositions lack elasticity, 
and inevitably mask the fire of the ships in more than one 
direction ; and, as in all complicated formations, there is risk 
of gunners hitting their friends. The formation of six ships 
in a triangle, recommended by MM. Montechant and Z.,* is 
open to all these objections. 

* Guerres Navales de Demain, p. 185. 







A A 


1 I 

t 1 * 





J. ^ 





















v 1 



S. i 


t ' 



1 I i 1 



' >. 


e D 


1 1 1 1 


1 1 | I 3. 

/. Bow & Quarter Lines 2. Line Abreast . 3 Indented Line Abreast . 
4. Line Ahead 5. Indented Line Ahead . 6. Line of Groups Ahesd 
7. Line Ahead Re-inforced 8. Quincunx 9. Line of Groups Abreast 
Navsl Formations. 



There is little doubt that line ahead is the best formation 
when the enemy does not run away. It is the normal forma- 
tion for cruising, and thus its adoption for battle does not 
necessitate a sudden alteration at the last minute ; it is easy 
to make changes of direction or formation with it ; the broad- 
side is left clear, and there is no danger of firing into friends : 
station can readily be kept ; signals are almost unnecessary,, 
or reduced to a minimum ; and bow fire can be obtained by 
reinforcing the head with ships powerful in this direction, or 
by indenting the leading vessels. There is no other dispo- 
sition which offers so many advantages and which has so few 
defects ; moreover, there is this additional argument in its- 
favour, that it was the formation adopted by the deliberate 
experience of the past. Though details may have changed 
principles have not, and if our ancestors feared to allow their 
ships to be raked, we shall be wise if we refuse to expose 
ours to such a risk. 

Line ahead, then, will probably be. the formation adopted 
by a judicious commander-in-chief, and the various classes of 
ships will be in separate divisions or lines. The main battle- 
ship squadron will engage closely with the enemy, at ranges 
not exceeding 3000 yards and not less than 1000. To lee- 
ward of it will lie the reserve battleship squadron and the 
torpedo divisions, whilst the first-class cruisers will attack 
at long range, not going inside 2000 yards, and the second- 
class cruisers will lie yet farther out. The cruisers will 
endeavour to divert the enemy's attention. They may steam 
round and round him if they are fast and he is slow, or they 
may steam alongside on the same course. It is certain that 
the battle will be a running battle, that both sides will be 
in motion, and perhaps in rapid motion. For either side to- 
lie to whilst the other cannonades him would be suicidal. 
At the outset, ships will probably use their highest trust- 
worthy speed, leaving a reserve of one or two knots for 
contingencies. As the action progresses the speed will 
diminish, when ships are more or less disabled. Vessels very 


severely injured will leave the line, and their place will be 
taken from the reserve. Should both fleets steam fast upon 
a parallel course in one direction, injured ships will be left 
behind, a prey to torpedo-boats. Over these there may be 
fierce engagements, as the one side will detach torpedo- 
boats to attack, and the other, boats to protect ; or the two 
fleets may. like the Alabama and Kearsarge, circle on a 
-common centre. Generally speaking, the battle will, in its 
earlier stage, be fought fleet to fleet, and individual ships 
will not fight isolated actions. The effort of each commander 
will be to concentrate upon a portion of his enemy's force 
his whole strength. This will be a vastly harder proceeding 
with alert opponents, whose ships are propelled by steam, 
and can move rapidly to any point, than it was when the 
line had only to be broken to secure the advantage, and 
when our enemies were hardly our match in skill, however 
fiery their courage may have been. The victory in war goes 
to the side which makes fewest mistakes, and no doubt mis- 
takes will be made, otherwise it looks as though, with even 
forces, battles would be a matter of hard pounding, and there- 
fore indecisive. The certainty and rapidity of movements 
with steam, however, render great combinations, sudden 
changes, rapid developments, possible. The fleet which is 
skilled and practised in steam tactics will threaten attack in 
one direction and in one formation, and then, perhaps, change 
to quite another with great speed. If the opponent is less 
.skilled in station keeping or manoeuvring, he will fall into 
disorder, his ships will mask one another's fire, and he will 
lose from the start. 

A period of manoeuvring may thus precede the opening of 
fire, as well as succeed it. Unless the ships are well handled 
.and the formation simple, there may in this be some risk of 
collision between friends, as the fleet will be possibly under 
fire, and the tension and excitement tremendous. To get the 
weather gauge, so that the smoke from funnels and guns 
blows down upon the enemy, may be very advantageous ; 


advantageous, too, it may be to place the sun in the hostile 
gunners' eyes. If neither side forces a melee* there will be a 
long range cannonade, during which considerable damage may 
be done on either side, but such a long range encounter cannot, 
it seems, be decisive. t Careful gunnery, strict fire discipline 
will be essential to prevent the waste of precious ammunition. 
The quick-firers and heavy guns will be alone employed, as 
.small projectiles cannot do much harm at these considerable 
ranges, and their turn will come later.J The preliminary 
cannonade will continue till one side is getting decidedly the 
worst, or till both have expended a good proportion of their 
ammunition. In the former case, the weaker side may be 
desirous to close, to redeem if possible what has been lost in 
the chances of the melee. In the latter case, each side will be 
anxious to end the battle by bringing it to a decision. It is 
possible that the weaker may attempt to steam off ; but if he 
does, he will abandon his disabled ships to destruction or 

So far, there is mention of neither ram nor torpedo as being 
employed by ships. The ram has been shown by repeated 
analyses to be a most difficult weapon to use. It involves 
actual contact with the enemy, and if the enemy has engines 
unimpaired, and sea room, the past proves that such actual 
contact is difficult to effect. The ram has hardly ever scored 

* It will require great self-restraint and strict discipline to prevent a dash 
upon the enemy, when he comes into sight. There may be disobedient captains, 
like Tang of the Chih Yuen, who will be anxious to use the ram, and may for 
that object, leave the line. The strain upon the crews is, perhaps, less at close 
quarters, as the duration of the action must then be shorter. 

f The Yalu was a striking demonstration of the resistance of ironclads to 
long range fire. 

J As it will be useless to attempt to pierce armour at long ranges, common 
shell will be used. When the fleets close, it might be advantageous to use 
common-shell and armour-piercing shot alternately. 

Mr. Laird Clowes shows that of seventy-four attempts to ram, in twenty 
cases the rammed ship was much damaged, disabled, or sunk. There is only 
one case in which serious damage was inflicted upon a ship under steam with 
.sea room. Journal United Service Institution, xxxviii.^223- 


against ships in motion. When the Merrimac rammed the 
Cumberland, the latter was at anchor ; when the Ferdinand 
Max charged the Re d 'Italia, the Italian was motionless. In 
the American Civil War, few attempts to ram were successful 
out of the great total. The use of the .ram involves a melee 
which tacticians agree in regarding as detestable. And if 
vessels are charged whilst running at a high speed, the 
damage to the "rammer" may be great. The Camperdown 
was badly injured, though the Victoria's speed was only five 
knots ; the Kdnig Wilhelm had her stem badly twisted by the 
Grosser Kurfurst, which was steaming at ten knots. The 
Iron Duke alone charged a vessel under way without being 
much the worse for it. The utmost skill will be necessary to 
deal a blow with a ram. At very close quarters a furious hail 
of projectiles will crash upon the conning-tower, and render 
the direction of the ship a matter of extreme difficulty. And 
there is the great risk of being rammed by the enemy if there 
is any miscalculation, or without miscalculation, of being 
torpedoed. Indeed, the torpedo may be said to have relegated 
the ram to the background. Yet, if the fleets charge one 
another end-on, there may be cases when the ram will be 
used, but there will be great danger then of end-to-end 
collisions should the commanders on either side be determined, 
and these will almost certainly result in the loss of both ships, 
unless, indeed, the bows of the ship on one side are so weak 
as to take the full force of the collision and to break it. 
More probably the less determined man will swerve at the 
last minute and expose his side, as did Buchanan at Mobile. 

The torpedo has a limited range, though not so limited as 
the ram.* As long as the fleets fight at a distance it cannot 
be used, whilst even at close quarters it is somewhat uncertain, 

* In Table XXV. will be found all the instances of the employment of the 
torpedo in war up to this time. So far as any result can be deduced it is that 
the torpedo is not successful against ships in motion. But, unlike the ram, it 
has not been often enough employed to give grounds for any induction, and it is- 
moreover an essentially progressive weapon, improving every year. 


It is a most deadly projectile when it strikes, but the difficulty 
is to ensure its striking. If the submerged tubes on ship- 
board are used whilst the ship is in rapid motion there is 
danger of the head of the torpedo being wrenched off as it 
leaves the side, or of the torpedo being deflected in quite a 
different direction to that intended. Instances have occurred 
in which it has fouled the screw of the vessel from which it 
was discharged ; this was only in practice but had the head 
contained a charge, very unpleasant results might have 
followed.* With a line of ships astern the danger is greatly 
increased. Above water tubes, when they are not protected 
by armour, could hardly be used in action, t and even from 
them the deflection is just as great. Moreover, when the 
torpedo has safely left the discharger and is running straight, 
its course can be followed, and the ship at which it is aimed 
can elude it by a quick movement. Doubtless the Whitehead 
is improving day by day, and may ultimately be brought to 
the comparative perfection of the gun. But at present it is 
by no means perfect, and could not be employed by the large 
ship except in a mel6e, or at the close of the artillery duel. 
It is useful as a protection against the ram ; otherwise it is 
best left to its special craft, the torpedo-boat. 

There is one other kind of torpedo that might conceivably 
play some part in a fleet action, the dirigible torpedo of 
pattern similar to the Brennan and Nordenfelt. At present it 
is in an undeveloped stage, but there is no doubt that a 
torpedo which could be steered and directed from a distance, 

* Some of these difficulties are now overcome, or are in a fair way to be so. 
The chief causes of deflection must be (i) The speed of the ship, which can be 
ascertained and allowed for. (2) The inclination of the ship, which cannot be 
ascertained, as it varies with the helm used, and the state of the sea. Torpedoes 
are fitted with an arrangement which prevents their explosion till they have run 
a safe distance. The chief arguments against the torpedo are these : (i) Its 
complication. (2) Its limited range. (3) The terrible effects of an accidental 
explosion. (4) Its many failures in peace when uncharged. Lloyd and 
Hadcock. Artillery, 261. 

t At the Yalu the Chinese are said to have emptied their above-water tubes, 
though this is denied by Commander McGiffin. 



would be a most formidable weapon. Still the difficulties are 
great. It is one thing to direct such an engine of destruction 
from a stationary ship at a stationary ship, and quite another 
to manage it when both ships are travelling at a high rate of 
speed through the water. One or two French cruisers have 
been fitted with such a dirigible torpedo, but its employment 
in battle would probably necessitate special craft. 

At the close of the long range cannonade will come the 
close action. The range will be diminished to 600 yards or 
700 yards, and the stronger side will steam in to assure its 
victory. This will be the most terrible period of the action. 
Up to that time, indeed, the damage done to the vitals of the 
battleships will not have been serious, but no doubt the 
internal economy of these vessels will have been impaired. 
The heavy quick-firers, judging from the Yalu, will not, at long 
range, inflict much injury on the water-line. It will be upon 
the upper works, superstructures, military masts, funnels, 
ventilators, chart-houses, bridges, and stacks of boats and 
top-hamper, that the hail of projectiles whether fired direct 
or ricochetting from the water, will descend. The battleship 
has to carry about with her all sorts of odds and ends which 
are essential to her in peace, but useless in war. It is difficult 
to know what should be done with the top-hamper.* When 
the ship clears for action the boats cannot be taken below, 
and must remain above to be shot to splinters and to cause 
fires. Equally dangerous and difficult to dispose of are 
wooden companion ladders, mess-tables, benches, and the 
various impedimenta usually found between decks ; if of wood 
they will add to the risk of fire, which is very great. They 
can hardly be thrown overboard, though it is a point to be 

* The presence of such top-hamper adds greatly to the difficulty of clearing 
for action. It is said by Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright (U.S.N.) that 
some of the ships of the English Mediterranean fleet took twenty-four hours to 
clear. The amount of time available may determine the tactics of a battle. 
The French instructions order boats to be filled with water and surrounded with 
splinter-proof, material. The torpedo launches carried would most likely be 
lowered if time allowed. 


noted that the Japanese crews did without them, and so kept 
their decks clear. It would seem best to leave all but the very 
barest minimum of boats on shore. It is stated that this 
course will be adopted by the French in war, and it is a 
proceeding which commends itself to common sense. No 
boats will be of much use for saving life after a battle. This 
is a duty which, as we have urged, should fall upon special 
vessels, protected by the white flag or the red cross.* There 
should, however, be some provision of life-preservers for the 
crew of the big ship, and as far as possible the preservers 
should be non-inflammable. With the ship's upper deck 
thoroughly cleared of wood there will be no wreckage to 
ifloat and save the drowning. India-rubber distendable air- 
bags would seem, on the whole, the best suited, and there 
is no reason why one should not be supplied to each man, 
ready to be inflated. It would support him in the water till 
the special craft could pick him up. 

Upon the upper works of the ships, then, will fall most of 
the damage inflicted during the preliminary cannonade. They 
will have been prepared for the strain in every conceivable 
way. Round the funnels sacks of coal will be placed, and 
near the quick-firers mantlets to catch splinters. The conning- 
tower and the positions from which the ship will be fought, 
will also, doubtless, receive attention. In this way the injury 
done may be reduced to a minimum, but it will still be 
extensive. The effect of even small shells charged with high 
.explosives upon unarmoured structures is very deadly. Great 
holes will be torn in the outer plating; splinters and frag- 
ments of side and shell sent flying through the confined space 
within ; and any wood that may be about, which has not been 
thoroughly drenched with water, will be set on fire. The 
funnels and ventilators may be riddled till they come down, 
and inside them, on the splinter-gratings, which commonly 
vcross them at the level of the armour-deck, fragments of iron 

Page 107 

M 2 


and wood will collect and obstruct the draught. If the venti- 
lators are blocked, and flow of air to the stokehold checked, 
the stokers and engine-room men will be exposed to terrible 
hardships gasping in a hot and vitiated atmosphere for the 
air which cannot reach them. The boiler-fires will fail and 
the steam-pressure sink. It is true that nothing of this kind 
appears to have happened at the Yalu, but the fire main- 
tained there was not so accurate as it would probably be with 
highly-skilled and cool Western gunners. The danger to the 
funnels and ventilators is, indeed, so great, that it is strange 
that no attempt has been made to protect them by an 
armoured shaft rising at least as high as the upper deck. 
The American monitors had, one and all, armoured 
funnels. If the funnel is injured between decks there will be 
some risk of fire, and there is certain to be great inconveni- 
ence from smoke. The more improvised protection provided 
the material used is non-inflammable -the better. Other 
points which will require protection, if any can be given, 
them, will be the supports of the barbettes in ships such as 
the Amiral Duperre or the Benbow, where the bases of the 
heavy gun positions are left unarmoured.*" If the iron-work 
under them is much damaged, there will be the risk of the 
barbette, with its ponderous weight, coming down and sink- 
ing the ship. In such ships, too, the auxiliary 6-inch battery 
must receive attention. We have seen the free use made of 
sand-bags on board the Northern ships in their attacks upon 
the New Orleans forts and Mobile. It is to be feared that 
with a full weight of coal, stores, and ammunition on board r 
modern ships could not load themselves with sand. Coal 
would be the only substance available. And here again it 
is impossible to overlook the fact that a fleet fresh out of 
port, with full bunkers, has a great advantage over one which 
has been cruising some time at sea, from the mere fact that in. 
the former coal protection will be at its maximum, and plenty 

* In the " Admirals," there are coal-bunkers under the barbettes. 


of coal at hand for extemporised defences, whilst in the latter 
many of the bunkers will be empty. In theory, of course, a 
warship will always burn first the coal in those bunkers, 
which are least valuable for defensive purpose ; she will avoid 
using the fuel from the water-line bunkers. But in practice, 
regard for stability will prevent the emptying of the lowest 
bunkers, whilst the upper ones are left full. Doubtless, if 
there is time, the ship can use water-ballast, and transfer as 
much of her fuel as is convenient to the positions where it 
will be most useful ; but she may not always have the time 
required. And thus, in considering the relative value of 
coal and armour protection, it should not be forgotten that, 
however efficacious the former may be when in its place, it is 
as likely as not, not to be in that place, whilst armour cannot 
be burnt in the furnaces, and is always there. 

During the preliminary attack fires are certain to be 
frequent, unless the ships engaging are of the very latest 
pattern. At the Yalu and at Lissa, as we have seen, they 
were numerous, and it is possible, though not certain, that 
they will be even more frequently produced by high explosive 
bursters. Such fires will greatly add to the difficulty of 
working the ship. The temperature in the Lai Yuen's 
engine-room is reported to have risen to 200 Fahrenheit, and 
the engineers to have been seared and blinded by the heat. 
Fires will certainly render yet harder the position of the 
stokers and engine-room complement, and may seriously 
interfere with the supply of ammunition at a critical moment. 
Though the hoists to the heavier guns are well protected on 
all ships, there are many cases when projectiles and charges 
have to go up to the smaller guns with very scanty armour to 
protect them against heat or the enemy's shells. The con- 
tingency of a shell on its way up dropping down the hoist 
through some damage to the apparatus or through accident, 
is guarded against in some ships by automatic brakes on the 
hoists, but there are other ships which are defective in this 
respect. To extinguish fires, good pumps placed out of reach 


of shells, and good discipline are necessary ; but since pre- 
vention is better than cure, it will be better to use as little 
wood in the construction of the ship as is possible. 

The number of hits which will be effected in this preliminary 
period, demands some attention. An English admiral has 
estimated it, throughout the battle, at two per cent ; other 
writers place it as high as fifteen. The average of the 
Chinese and Japanese fleets at the Yalu, works out to twelve 
and a half, if we accept the estimate given by an eye-witness, 
but this is probably too high. At the same time, there seems 
little doubt that the shooting with quick-firers will be more 
accurate than it was in the past with the slow-fire muzzle or 
breech-loader. In practice, great feats have been performed. 
Thus, the Royal Arthur, at ranges varying between 1600 and 
2200 yards, hit a target fourteen times out of sixteen shots, 
and this whilst steaming at eight knots. The French fleet has 
demolished targets at 4000 metres range. There is, however, 
a great difference between firing at a motionless target, and firing 
at a moving enemy who is returning your fire. In the old days, 
misseswere frequentwhen theships fought at very close quarters 
and it would be thought impossible for a shot to go astray. 
But generally speaking, the state of the sea will exercise most 
influence upon the quality of the marksmanship. If the water 
is calm, good shooting may be expected, and the percentage 
of hits will rise above ten or fifteen : if rough, it will fall very 
rapidly, perhaps below two per cent. The steadiness of the 
combatant vessels will in any sea-way become a factor of 
great importance, as two guns upon a stable and steady ship 
will beyond doubt effect more hits than as many weapons upon 
an unsteady and unstable one. In the days of top-heavy ships, 
it is well to bear this in mind. 

We have already alluded to the huge military masts carried 
by most French battleships.* They would be of immense 

* In the latest American design, the fo-wa, the military mast has vanished, and 
there is not even the light mast of English pattern, but only signal-poles. So 
also in the Brooklyn. The French are removing the after military mast from 


value in close action, but it is doubtful whether they will sur- 
vive the long-range cannonade. They tend to make the ship 
which carries them unsteady ; they are very heavy, and their 
fall might do serious damage. The English military masts are 
much lighter and smaller. French officers are of opinion that 
their masts would stand a good deal of knocking about, and 
that a single 6-inch or 4'y-inch shell would not bring them 
down. At the Yalu the Japanese military masts on board 
the three great cruisers, Matsushima, Itsukushima, and 
Hashidate, apparently survived the conflict without receiving 
damage. On the other hand the Akagilost one of her masts, 
which was not, however, of the military pattern, and the 
Chinese ships are stated to have been even more unfortu- 

The maintenance of communications within the ship 
during action is even more important than the maintenance 
of her communications with the admiral. How far is it 
possible to use voice-pipes in the turmoil of battle ? We 
read how at the Yalu officers fought with their ears plugged 
and yet remained deaf for weeks. There will be, not only 
the tremendous din and concussion of the ship's own guns, 
but the not less disquieting crash of the enemy's shells, and 
the crunch and jar of the iron under the blows. In the 
ship's interior will be smoke from high explosive shells, 
smoke, perhaps, from the funnels, and smoke from fire. Voice- 
pipes may be severed by heavy projectiles impinging upon 
the tubes which carry them down, or perforating the armour. 
A trustworthy system of signalling from oire part of the ship 
to another is most urgently required. It should be operated 
by electricity, have a reply-indicator, and should supplement 
the existing voice-pipes* Mischances with the present form 

many of their ships. On the one hand, military masts are valuable for signalling 
and top-fire at close quarters : on the other hand it is doubtful whether they 
would survive the preliminary encounter. 

* The telephone has been suggested, but in the uproar of battle might be 
difficult to use. 


of engine-room telegraph, which is purely mechanical, are 
constantly occurring, and in the Victoria disaster the catas- 
trophe may have been aggravated by its failure on the 
Camperdown to convey an order correctly at a very critical 
moment. There may be many critical moments in battle when 
such a failure would mean destruction. A string of men to 
pass orders is found not only on board the Monitor in 1862, 
but on board the Huascar many years later. Yet here again 
there is room for mistakes in the turmoil and excitement of 
the fray. These vast machines, with all their complex 
mechanism, where the want of simplicity is so painfully 
manifest, have, as in the past, to be handled by men who 
are human and liable to error, but a new danger has been 
created by our Frankensteins in the risk of the machinery's 

It has been doubted whether it is advantageous to indicate 
to the enemy the precise position of the captain the brain 
of the ship by the conning-tower. Forward in most British 
battleships is a tower protected by 1 5-inch to lo-inch plating; 
aft, a second one, with 3-inch or 4-inch armour. The conning- 
tower is the centre of the ship's nervous system ; all the com- 
munications are collected there; it is crammed with voice-pipes, 
steering gear, and firing keys ; from it the outlook is very cir- 
cumscribed in many cases, and too often there is a cumber of 
chart-houses and bridges above it, which do indeed screen it 
from view, but may yet be wrecked by a well-placed shell, 
and set on fire or brought down upon it, thus rendering it 
useless. Beyond all doubt a heavy fire will be concentrated 
upon it ; experience shows us in the past a heavy roll of 
casualties in the conning-tower. In it Worden was blinded 
fighting the Merrimac ; in it Rodgers was killed before 
Charleston ; in it pilot after pilot was killed or wounded on 
the Mississippi ; in it Grau was blown to pieces ; in it 
another commander of the Huascar died ; in it two of the 
Tsi Yuen's officers perished. The rain of splinters will make 
it very hard to see what is happening from the narrow open- 


ing, and any shutters which are left closed may be jammed. 
The concussion of a heavy shell upon the structure, though 
no doubt, it would not necessarily demolish it, might kill or 
injure those inside it, and would very probably destroy 
the communications. It would almost appear as if the best 
method of ensuring communication would be to have at least 
three or four stations,* protected by 4-inch or 5-inch Harveyed 
steel, with, as Admiral Colomb has suggested, a large voice- 
pipe leading straight down to a station below the armoured 
deck, the simplest telegraphic instruments, and the least 
possible number of gun and torpedo directors. The multipli- 
cation of positions whence the ship can be fought, gives a 
better guarantee against the destruction of its brain, than the 
provision of a single heavily plated shelter, as the enemy will 
be at a loss to know where to concentrate their fire. More- 
over, if the captain delegates his authority, if the gunnery 
officer is given the control of the ship's guns, the torpedo 
officer of its torpedoes, and the conning-towers are four in 
number, dispersed lozenge-wise, three will always face the 
enemy ; when captain, gunnery officer, and torpedo officer 
will each have a separate position, each commanding a good 
view of the enemy, and all three will not fall at one blow, as 
they would, if present together in one conning-tower. In case 
of injury to those in the captain's tower, the command can 
instantly devolve. For the ship to be straying masterless in a 
great fleet action like the King Yuen or Huascar describing 
erratic curves, would be fraught with the utmost danger not 
only to herself but to her fellows. She might, at such a time, 
ram or be rammed by her friends, and veering to and fro, 
though only for a moment, would throw any line into 

* The more recent French ships have three such positions. Croneau, 11,425. 
The Germans station the second in command on the lower deck, in a position 
of safety. But even so, if the captain is killed, his successor will take seconds 
or minutes to reach the tower, during which much may happen. With three 
towers, the command can pass at once, and only a message from one to the 
others is needed. 


The paramount importance of preventing such an evil is 
evident. It may be that in the earlier stage it would not be 
likely to occur, though no one could say, for after all the 
conning-tower is a small target to hit. But should there be a 
close action hits must be more numerous, and in a close 
action a brainless ship will be most perilous. Many captains 
may, till the fleets close, decide to keep outside their shelters 
and choose a point of vantage on bridge or deck, where they 
can be seen, and whence they can encourage their men.* The 
hail from the quick-firers, however, killed or wounded all at 
the Yalu who showed themselves on the Chinese decks. A 
suggestion which has been made in " Le Yacht" is worth con- 
sideration if such a course is adopted. Cloth or canvas, of 
the same colour as the ship's upper works, should be hung 
round the captain's position, hiding all but his head. Where 
practicable the same protection should be given to the crews 
of the machine-guns and small exposed weapons. It is a 
protection, as it in some measure conceals from the enemy 
the exact position of men and guns ; moreover, a screen 
between the gunners and the enemy makes them cooler. The 
only risk is that of its being fired by the enemy's projectiles. 
To prevent this, it can be drenched in alum or any other anti- 
combustion solution. 

How far armour will be penetrated in a long range engage- 
ment is an open question. If we can judge from the Yalu, it 
will not be penetrated at all when it is of moderate thickness 
twelve inches or thereabouts. t But guns are so rapidly 
increasing in power, that it is dangerous to dogmatise. A 
weapon such as the new Elswick 8-inch quick-firer, with a 
nominal perforation of twenty inches of steel^ at the muzzle, 

* Or like some of the American monitor captains, stand to leeward of the 

f The experience of the Yalu shows that thin armour is worse than useless. 
By thin armour, is meant plating less than 4 inches thick, which is the least 
thickness that, under service conditions, at long ranges, could be trusted to keep 
out the 4'7-inch and, possibly, the 6-inch shell. 


should, under service conditions, in action, send its bolt 
through ten inches of compound, or eight inches of Harveyed, 
armour at 2000 yards, if it hits nearly at right angles to the 
target. The thickness of metal perforated by guns on the 
proving ground, is, of course, only useful to indicate their 
power under the most favourable circumstances, and to give 
some standard of comparison. And when the claims of 
moderate sized guns are urged, and it is said that the present 
English 2Q-ton gun, for instance, is quite heavy enough for 
work at sea, because it can pierce the thickest plate afloat, it 
should not be forgotten that whilst it can do it, it is never 
likely to do it, and that to decide a battle it may be necessary 
to be able to pierce the enemy's thick armour, and to possess 
guns which not only can, but are likely to do it.* The rapid 
progress of artillery is, however, giving us guns which will be 
able to do all that is required on a moderate weight. Such 
weapons must necessarily be long, but it is better to submit 
to some inconvenience than to sacrifice ballistics. t 

* The endurance of a battleship must ultimately depend upon the endurance 
of her men, but there can be no doubt that if the ship does not capsize through 
injury on her water-line, all guns which are not protected by armour, may be 
put out of action in a close encounter. The thickly. armoured positions may 
hold out, and inflict much damage if they cannot be silenced, and the victor, 
without heavy guns, will be driven to torpedo or ram the ship. With heavy 
guns he can overpower the enemy. The recoil from the big guns seems to have 
reached its limit, and it does not appear that any nation will go much lower 
than 12 inches for the heavy armament. The United States are returning to 
the 13-inch gun for their new battleships. There are many advantages in the 
big gun ; like the big ship, it can deal a crushing blow, and can fire a shell 
containing a large burster; its shell, too, is more likely to perforate. On the 
other hand, the larger the gun, the slower its fire, and the shorter its life. 
Fewer weapons can be carried, and the chance of a breakdown, where much 
machinery is carried, increases. The battle of the guns is no new one. In the 
past, there was the struggle between the i8-pounder and the 24-pounder, 
between the long 42-pounder and the short 32-pounder. 

t The howitzer has received much support in France of late. Short, large- 
calibre guns might, perhaps, be combined with the longer weapons, for use, like 
the old carronades, at close quarters. But they would be of little value- till the 
fleets closed. With long guns, the trajectory is flat, and there is less chance of 
missing the target through a trifling error in judging the distance. On the 
other hand short, large-calibre guns can fire a very heavy shell. 


When the now battered hulls draw nearer, and hits, though 
from a diminished number of guns, become more frequent, the 
last phase of the battle begins. Probably the auxiliary arma- 
ment of all the ships, where it is not thoroughly protected as 
in modern English and American types, will have been put out 
of action by the awful carnage wrought by the high-explosive 
shells in batteries which are not armoured, where the guns are 
massed together. This is the hour for the torpedo-boat, and 
it will dash to the attack, no longer to be pelted with light 
projectiles, for the ship it is assailing has reverted under fire 
to the conditions of 1870, when heavy guns behind thick 
armour were the only armament. The torpedo attack must be 
met by a corresponding defence of torpedo-boats, and a fresh 
struggle will begin, to be decided by a superiority upon the 
one side or the other, followed, perhaps, by a cruiser action, 
as these craft draw in to support their various boats. Mutual 
destruction or disablement may be expected to be the issue, 
when the battleships on each side will meet in the final colli- 
sion, and reserves of uninjured ships will decide the day. 
The ram will now be used upon ships with engines disabled, 
if they will not surrender ; the torpedo will also come into 
play. A duel between the heavy guns on either side will con- 
clude the battle. We have some idea, from the effect of the 
Chinese 1 2-inch and lo-inch shells upon the Matsushima, 
what will be the effect of projectiles weighing 850 Ibs. and 
I2oolbs. crashing through thick steel, carrying inboard splin- 
ters and fragments of plating, and exploding with delayed- 
action fuses in the interior."* These deadly and stunning blows 
dealt on either side will rend and tear the ships perhaps past 
recognition. So in the uproar and confusion, the smoke and 
the fire, the long agony of the battle will draw to its close 

* A fifty pound charge of melinite exploding against a steel armour-deck 
shatters it over a surface of one square yard, driving down fragments weighing 
400 Ibs. with a velocity of 210 to 200 foot seconds upon engines or boilers. A 
12-inch shell might thus disable any ship. It is doubtful, however, whether 
the fuse has yet been devised which will take a high-explosive through even 
thin armour. Crcneau, ii., 71. 




on board the mastodons, which are now settling in the water r 
rolling terribly, and threatening to engulf their crews. The 
picture that rises before us is one of horror almost transcend- 
ing imagination, a scene of bloodshed and destruction so- 
fearful, that man's high purpose and devotion can alone re- 
deem it from the ghastliness of the shambles. But it is neither 
profitable nor elevating to batten upon horrors. 

But will the slaughter be great, it may be asked ? Will the 
damage be so tremendous ? And it is certainly the case that 
a ship can only take a certain number of hits without surren- 
dering or sinking. The temper of the crews will largely 
determine the percentage of loss. Courageous, resolute, and 
devoted men will stand firm through slaughter from which 
weaker men will quail, and thus the braver the combatants 
the heavier the loss. The sailors on either side will be dis- 
ciplined men, not as very often on both sides in the last 
French war, a conglomeration of merchant seamen, prisoners,, 
landsmen, and genuine naval sailors. In the British Navy,. 
they are now picked men they may be said to be the flower 
of the nation. They are taken in youth, taught and trained 
to instinctive obedience, and high courage. They are not. 
swept on board against their will by the arbitrary injustice of 
the press. They are regarded by the nation with the most, 
absolute confidence. They are animated by the national 
spirit bred in men who know what England really is, and 
who day by day behold her power and the splendour of her 
Empire. They know that the race is for an object 

. . . owe ifpijiov ovSe /3oeir)i> 
a\\a irepl \J/uxJ?s- 

that the result of the battle will be life or death to that 
England. They have behind them a past of uniform success,, 
and they will not be ready tamely to surrender it. We may 
expect from them a most obstinate resistance if the battle 
goes against them, and with an obstinate resistance the loss- 
must be heavy. So, too, with our opponents there will be 
every probability of a determined resistance. The French. 


sailor is a picked man ; he does not want courage, discipline, 
or training, and he has a burning desire to revenge the defeats 
of the past. It is, of course, often asserted that war grows 
less bloody with time, and history does show it is so on land, 
but at sea there is small evidence to prove it. We have 
already reviewed the losses at the Yalu and Lissa, and have 
compared them with earlier battles. All the sea engagements 
of the period 1 860-6, in which ironclads fought, show slight 
loss of life, because armour had then conquered the gun. It 
is now beaten by it,* and there is also the torpedo to be 
reckoned with. The slaughter on board the Maisushima 
drove her out of battle, but it amounted to more than one- 
third of her crew. So in the desperate actions of the war 
of 1812 British ships more than once held out till they had 
suffered similar loss.f The casualties may then reach as high 
a figure as thirty or forty per cent, including killed, wounded, 
and drowned. And as it is with loss of life, so it is with the 
loss of ships. Though the vitals are well protected in 
battleships, the deck may at close quarters be perforated by 
plunging shot, the hull below the water-line pierced as the 
ship rolls. Heavy losses in armoured ships may not be 
anticipated till the fleets draw near to each other,:}: but when 

* The thickest armour is still impenetrable to the guns, under service 
conditions, or only barely penetrable. But only a small portion of the ship 
can be thus protected. The increasing power of the gun has compelled designers 
to leave many important parts ^>f the ship unprotected. 

f The following is the percentage of British loss in some of the hottest actions 
of this war. Gtterriere and Constitution, 32 ; Frolic and Wasp, 67 ; Macedonian 
and United States, 37 ; Java and Constitution, 38 ; Peacock and Hornet, 33 ; 
Reindeer and Wasp, 67. In two of the bloodiest single-ship actions of the 
French war, the English losses reached 32 and 34 per cent. 

J A few hits on the water-line may, however, lead to the loss of any ship. 
The catastrophe to the Victoria, as battleships go, a stable vessel, has shewn 
how slight injuries on the water-line may impair any ship's Rotatory qualities. 
Professor Elgar, writing in Nature, xlix., 153, suggests that it would be well 
before action to fill unarmoured ends with water. There would then at least be 
no changes in the ship's trim. But if in the Sanspareil and probably in the 
" Admirals " the ends were thus filled, the top of the belt would be on or below 


-they do so approach, some are almost bound to go to the bottom. 
The torpedo and the ram will claim their victims ; wrecked 
water-lines in a sea-way will lead others to capsize, perhaps 
with little notice. The losses in craft so ill protected, as most 
cruisers are, will probably be very severe. 'I he old wooden 
ship of war, attacked by feeble smooth-bores, could stand a 
prodigious amount of battering, without very often being much 
the worse for it. Far otherwise is it with our delicate boxes 
of machinery, attacked by guns which can easily send a shell 
through them at two miles. Though the Saikio came off so 
cheaply at the Yalu, it was to chance she owed her escape, as 
the fate of better built Chinese cruisers showed. Again the 
wooden ship, when she did sink, sank slowly, giving her men 
plenty of time to escape. These iron hulls capsize, or founder 
in a minute. 

It is difficult then to suppose that the loss, whether of men 
or materiel will be small. Nor will it, in all probability, be 
spread over a long period of time. On the contrary, the 
battle cannot last very long. The fleet actions of the past 
occupy a time which seldom exceeds five hours. Lissa was 
over in considerably less, and the Yalu in a trifle less. At 
the Yalu, however, there was no effort to come to close 
quarters, but merely a prolonged and distant cannonade. The 
increasing rapidity of gun-fire, the relatively small supply of 
ammunition carried, the potency of the implements of des- 
truction, all point to a short and sharp struggle. Neither side 
has much to gain by prolonging the unendurable tension of 
the battle. There will be on either side an anxiety to bring 
the affair to an issue, and as soon as either sees a favourable 
chance, he will dash in. 

Not that such a struggle need necessarily be decisive. If 
no mistakes are made, if men and ships on either side are 
equal, there cannot be great results to either. But so many 

the water-line. Luckily the present form of projectile ricochets over the ship 
or goes to the bottom when it hits the water short of it, so that long range 
.hits between wind and water will be rare. 


ifs are not likely to be combined. One side may have more 
ships, better men, greater manoeuvring skill, and abler 
commanders. War is more largely a personal matter than is 
often supposed. Not the best ships, but the best men will 
win. Only we must insist upon good ships and not in peace, at 
least, profess to regard ourselves as better than our neigh- 
bours. If at the close of the day one side has ships intact, 
and the other ships damaged, no power on earth can save 
the latter. There is no wind to suddenly blow him away from 
his foe, or to compel his enemy's retreat. Absolute, hopeless- 
ruin for. the beaten side is the prospect in a great battle 
where the result is not wholly indecisive. There does not 
seem to be any betwixt or between. 

The losses of ships on the beaten side in the more important 
naval engagements of the last hundred years may be sum- 
marised as follows : 




s c Srli 


Name of 

Nationality of 


c rt 




Si 3 O 

. Sj*jJ 

tn rt v 


J C 4> 

DQ ' 


W-S i. 41 

Z t.0 


Q ^ 


o " 


April 1 2th 







June ist 







St. Vincent 




















French & Span 








Turks & Egypt 














* Sank at Ancona after Battle. 

t Of these three were recaptured and ten wrecked, scuttled or burnt. Five other ships 
were captured, October 24th, and November 4th. 

The disappearance of capture may be due to chance and an 
insufficiency of modern instances, or may be a feature of 
naval warfare under the new conditions. It seems to have 
been replaced by the total destruction of the beaten ship. 

All that has been said hitherto applies to day actions, in 
which neither fleet is surprised. If a fleet should be caught 
unawares, either by day or by night, it will be lost. But this 
is not at all likely if both sides have, as they probably will,. 


plenty of scouts. A night action, in which both sides would 
be willing combatants, is hard to conceive. It might be 
preceded by a torpedo attack, in \\hich one or more large 
ships having been damaged, the assailant's heavy ships come 
up and endeavour to capture or destroy them. The use of 
the search-light would be necessary upon either side, and 
very strict control over it would have to be maintained to 
prevent it from being flashed in the eyes of friends. But a 
night attack would leave so much to chance if conducted by 
heavy ships that admirals are not likely to run the hazard. 

Boarding, as a feature of naval warfare, has vanished. It 
is only when the motive power of a ship is disabled that it 
becomes practicable, and a disabled ship is entirely at the 
mercy of an assailant who is free to move. Perhaps the 
action between the Covadonga and Independencia illustrates 
this most clearly. It is needless to waste life by boarding 
when the crew can be reduced to submission by the threat of 
a torpedo or the ram. 

If the battle be as we have represented it, what type of 
ship will be best adapted for action in it ? By comparing 
such an ideal vessel with the battleships now under construc- 
tion, we may be able to verify the probability of our guesses 
at truth, since the acutest minds are everywhere brought to 
bear upon the problems of naval construction. Taking 
protection first, the parts most essential to the ship, and 
therefore requiring most attention, may be placed as follows: 
First, the lower-works, on the safety of which depends the 
safety of the ship, as, if they are shattered and torn open, 
in spite of compartments and water-tight doors, she must 
founder. Next come the engines, boilers, and motive power 
generally. As the lower portion of the hull cannot be hit 
directly, unless the ship rolls very much, it is left unarmoured 
on the exterior, but to protect the interior from harm a 
horizontal deck of armour will be necessary. The lower this 
is kept below the water-line the better, though to give space 
for engines and to assure flotation there are obvious limits. 



On the side upwards from the water line, to as great a 
height as the weight at the disposal of the architect will allow, 
should be disposed plating, proof against the largest quick- 
firer under service conditions, to protect the ship's upper 
works from the ravages of all but the largest shells. The 
captain's position, as the brain of the ship, and the commu- 
nications as its vital nerves, should be assured by duplication 
and moderate armour. The heavy guns should be mounted 
in separate and well-armoured positions. The quick-firers 
should, wherever possible, be in turrets, when awkward 
arrangements for housing them become unnecessary. It is 
well to allow for a possible growth in length in the near 
future, and it is manifest that a gun much over 20 feet long 
could not be stowed as on the Royal Sovereign. The thick- 
ness of armour will range from 6 inches or 8 inches of 
Harveyed steel on the quick-firer turrets, to double that 
amount on the heavy guns. On the side, 8 inches or 9 inches 
of steel will, at long ranges, exclude even the 8-inch pro- 
jectile when it does not strike perpendicularly. Such a ship 
will have three or four positions whence she can be fought in 
action. As far as stability will permit the guns should be 
mounted high, when the command will be greater, and the 
difficulty of using the weapons to advantage in a sea-way 
less. The funnels and ventilators will be carried up a large, 
thinly armoured shaft, to some feet above the upper deck. 
The freeboard will be high, but the superstructure will be 
reduced to a minimum. Such a vessel will be very far from 
invulnerable an impossible aim unless all fighting qualities 
are sacrificed. 

Though water line hits may not be numerous, chance pro- 
jectiles are nearly certain to strike the ship betwixt wind and 
water. It is to guard against such hits, w r hich in so vulnerable 
a quarter might do immense damage, that a belt is carried 
by every battleship except the great Italian vessels. No 
amount of subdivision without armour can ensure the ship's 
flotation. A single heavy shell bursting in a mass of cells 


such as are found above the armour-deck of the Italian ships, 
would tear them open and shatter them severely, perhaps 
setting their cork packing on fire. Again, grave injuries can 
easily be inflicted upon the armour-deck, where it is placed 
low, and has no barrier of side-plating to explode shells 
outside the ship. It does not seem absolutely essential to 
carry the belt round the ends of the ship, as shell wounds 
there are not so serious as amidships, but it is undoubtedly 
better to have a complete belt. If the bows are much 
wounded, the rush of the ship through the water will tend 
to force the sea in, and impair the manceuvring qualities by 
depressing the forward portion. The screws will come 
nearer to the surface, and in a sea-way there will be risk 
to the engines and propellers from racing, and from the 
enemy's projectiles. Injuries astern are not so much to be 

The guns carried should be numerous, manageable, and 
powerful. Four heavy weapons is the number which ex- 
perience accords to large battleships, though in some recent 
German examples there are six. Ability to pierce the thickest 
plating at short ranges must be demanded of such weapons, 
but at the same time the weight of the gun must not be 
extreme. The 9'45-inch gun* of fifty or fifty-five calibres can 
perforate two feet of wrought iron at 2000 yards, and weighs 
from thirty tons upwards. Such a gun would exhibit a 
perforation greater than that of the 68-ton weapons of the 
Royal Sovereign, with less than half their weight. Whilst it 
should be loaded and trained by electricity or hydraulics to 
ensure rapidity of fire, alternative hand-gear can be fitted. 
Each of the heavy guns, if weight allows, should have a 
.separate armoured position, as in the French Magenta class, 
for why separate widely the secondary armament whilst 
concentrating the primary? The auxiliary armament should 
include as many 8-inch or 6-inch quick-firers as can be given, 

* The Canet 9'45-inch gun, as long ago as 1890, could perforate 23^5 inches 
.of wrought iron at 2000 metres. This gun was fifty calibres long. See p. 250. 

N 2 


whilst to stop hostile torpedo-boats and riddle the enemy's 
unarmoured works at close quarters, the i2-pounder and 
i -pounder are necessary. A certain differentiation of 
armament is as needful to-day as it was in Nelson's time. 
To give the battleship an armament composed of one single 
size of gun, would be sacrificing to an ideal simplicity the 
efficiency of the ship. The principle of dispersing the 
armament and concentrating its fire, should be carried as far 
as is possible. Torpedo attacks will be generally delivered 
from ahead, and demand a strong bow-fire. 

The ship which we have sketched corresponds generally to- 
the English Majestic class, though in certain features, such 
as the four gun-positions, it approximates to the earlier 
French type. The arguments against four gun-positions are 
strong,* but still stronger, it appears to us, is the argument 
that, with the heavy weapons mounted in pairs, a single hit 
might disable half the ship's primary armament. 

In action at long ranges, the heavy guns would fire only 
an occasional shot, and the quick-firers would maintain a. 
rapid and steady fire upon the enemy. When the time came 
for closing, the guns would attack, according to their size, 
the thick armour, the thin armour, or the unprotected portions- 
of the opponent's side.t This, of course, involves familiarity 
on the part of the officers and gunners with the enemy' s- 
designs, but it is always easy now to obtain fairly accurate 
information on such matters. At this period the fire will be 
as rapid J as possible, and efforts will be made to concentrate 

* See page 269. < ., 

f At long ranges the diminutive size of the target prevents such dis- 

J Rapidity of fire in practice will depend not only on the mount and breech 
action of the gun, and training of the gunners, but also upon the supply of 
ammunition, Power-hoists to the quick-firers are of great importance, as they 
reduce the number of men that will be required below, and they abolish the 
need for large emergency magazines on deck, which must prove a source of 
danger, especially where there are many guns close together. The accidents 
or. board the Palestra and Matsushima warn us of the danger of such exposed. 


the fleet's weight of metal upon ship after ship in succession. 
But as each side will try the same game this need not lead 
to decisive results. 

It is more than possible that the command within the ship 
may devolve with great rapidity. In her engagement with 
the Chilian ironclads the Huascar had in quick succession 
four commanders ; on the Akagi, at the Yalu, commander 
after commander was injured, and any ship which comes to 
anything like close quarters may fare as badly. It seems, 
then, a matter of great importance that every commissioned 
officer on board should have practice in handling the ship 
at fleet manoeuvres. So, too, the methods of fighting the 
ship, when she has lost heavily in men, must be studied. 
No modern battleship carries any spare men, yet to supply 
the place of those who have fallen at the guns, or in exposed 
positions, men will have to be drawn from somewhere at 
whatever sacrifice. If they come from the stokehold it will 
be at the expense of the ship's speed ; if from the maga- 
zines, at the expense of her rapidity of fire. The import- 
ance of giving engine-room hands and stokers a training in 
gunnery, where practicable, is manifest. It is when the ship 
is in extremis that its value will be felt. 

A small matter, but a very important one, is the adoption 
of some distinctive mark or colour for the ships of each side. 
Neither side is likely to gain much by a disguise. A dis- 
tinctive colour, which is varied from week to week, with a 
broad stripe running right round the ship, will serve to show 
friends to friends. Individual ships can be marked on the 
Austrian plan, by belts of colour on the funnels. * In spite of 
all precaution, in a melee there might be great risk of 
accidental injury to friends. The ships would be much 
injured, perhaps veiled in a wreath of smoke, and if the 

magazines. On the Tamandare, in the Paraguayan war, there were three 
explosions arising from this cause. Still, as Captain Mahan has pointed out in the 
Century (August, 1895), it is better to risk an explosion than to concede to the 
enemy superior rapidity of fire. 


morale of the gunners has been much shaken, they may not 
be too careful. The view from casemate or turret is not 
extensive, and the temptation to fire at an object crossing the 
field of vision must be strong. For to be active in battle is 
less trying to the nerves than to stand and look on. In such 
a matter as this, discipline and training will tell strongly. 

This then is a forecast of the battle of to-morrow. Two 
great lines of monster ships steaming side by side, but far 
apart, whilst the uproar of the cannonade, the hail of shells, 
fills the air. As the minutes pass, funnels and superstructures 
fly in splinters, the draught sinks, the speed decreases, ships 
drop to the rear. The moment for close action has come, 
and the victor steams in on the vanquished. The ram and 
the torpedo, amidst an inferno of sinking ships and exploding 
shells, claim their victims. The torpedo-boats of the weaker 
side in vain essay to cover the beaten battleships. Beneath 
a pall of smoke, upon a sea of blood, the mastery of the 
waters is decided for a generation. Such an encounter will 
not lack sensation. To live through it will be a life's 
experience ; to fall in it a glorious end. And that Heaven 
may send our fleet success, when the great day comes, is the 
ardent prayer of every Englishman. For though men can do 
much by the stoutness and constancy of their hearts, there are 
chances which lie evermore on the knees of the gods. 



THE first of the three great disasters which have made 
Englishmen look with some apprehension upon the ironclad, 
did not occur till 1871. For ten years our experience of the 
new type of warship was untried by any serious misadven- 
ture. And strangely enough this first great catastrophe had 
been all but foretold at the Admiralty,* and was the fault, not 
of Whitehall, but of the British public and press, which had 
persistently urged the construction of a certain demonstrably 
unsound type of vessel. 

The ill-fated Captain was an iron armoured, turret-ship, of 
6,900 tons, designed by Captain Cowper Coles, the English 
inventor of the turret. He had converted the three-decker 
Royal Sovereign into the first English turret-ship, but she was 
not a sea-going vessel, and was fit for little more than harbour 
defence. For the latter she was excellent : her turrets were 
ingenious and gave complete satisfaction. Captain Coles, 
however, dreamed of yet greater triumphs. He had set his 
heart Hpon a sea-going, masted turret-ship, with low free- 
board, and, much against the will of the technical advisers of 
the First Lord,t chiefly through the influence of the press, he 
was at last permitted to build such a ship. Messrs. Laird were 
the contractors, and needless to say their work was well done. 

* Parliamentary Papers, 1871, xlii. ; 677, "utterly unsafe;" 678, "cannot 
possibly prove a satisfactory sea-going ship ; " 892, "the danger to be appre- 
hended from these [fully rigged] monitors is very great." 

t Parliamentary Papers, 1871, xlii., 668, 673. 


When completed in 1870, she was considered by all except a 
few experts, who had misgivings, the finest fighting ship in the 
fleet, and was to be the type of future battleships. 

Her length was 320 feet, her beam 53 feet, and her draught 
25 feet gi inches. As designed by Captain Coles she was to 
have had a freeboard of a little more than 8 feet 6 inches.* A 
curious error of her designer had reduced this to 6 feet 
8 inches, so that, if unsafe in embryo, she was still more unsafe 
in her completed state. Indeed, Messrs. Laird would seem to 
have been by no means easy about her, as, when they handed 
her over, they requested the Admiralty authorities to test her 
stability by inclining her. This was done with fairly satisfac- 
tory results.f The ship carried four 25-ton guns in two turrets, 
placed fore and aft in the keel-line. She had a high forecastle 
and poop, which were connected by a hurricane-deck running 
above the turrets. The armour on the turrets was 13 to 8 
inches thick, and on the water-line 6 to 8 inches. There were 
three tripod masts, with full sail-power, a sail-power which was 
greater than that given to her safer competitor, the Monarch, 
in proportion to her size. There was one funnel. The com- 
plement consisted of 500 officers and men, and the supply of 
fuel was 500 tons, though Captain Coles had undertaken to 
give her 1000 tons. 

As the finest ship in the fleet she was commanded by a most 
able and promising officer, Captain Burgoyne, whilst on board 
her, in various capacities, were sons of Mr. Childers, Lord 
Northbrook, and Sir Baldwin Walker. Everyone had absolute 
faith in her, and she was in due course sent to sea with the 
Channel squadron. In May she faced a heavy gale in the 
Bay of Biscay. On this cruise her fighting capacities were 
well tested. In a heavy sea she fired her great guns without 
any difficulty, making good practice. Under sail she stayed 
and wore beautifully, beating the Monarch with great ease. 

* The Monarch's freeboard was 14 feet. The Captain, in spite of Coles' 
criticisms of the Monarch, was only an indifferent replica of that ship, 
f Her metacentric height was 2'6 feet. 


Admiral Symonds, after noting her behaviour and inspecting 
her, reported : " She is a most formidable vessel, and could, I 
believe, by her superior armament, destroy all the broadside 
ships of the squadron in detail." A second successful cruise 
across the Bay of Biscay confirmed this good opinion of her, 
and even her detractors were forced to confess themselves 

A third time she went to sea with the Channel squadron 
under Admiral Milne ; and Captain Coles, her designer, sailed in 
her, to observe her behaviour. The vessels cruising with her 
were the Lord Warden, the flagship, the Minotaur, Agin- 
court, Northumberland, Monarch, Hercules, Bellerophon, 
and the unarmoured ships Inconstant and Bristol. To test the 
turret -ship thoroughly they crossed the Bay of Biscay, and on 
September 6th, 1871, were near Cape Finisterre. That day a 
heavy sea was running, and, on Admiral Milne visiting her, he 
pointed out to Captain Coles that the lee side of the deck 
was under water when she rolled, and said that it looked 
ugly. Captain Coles assured him that it made no difference, 
and mattered nothing. Both Coles and Burgoyne were 
anxious that the admiral should spend the night on board, 
but, fortunately for him, he declined. The Captain was under 
sail, but with steam up, ready to be used if required. She was 
rolling heavily, the angles averaging twelve-and-a-half degrees 
and sometimes reaching fourteen degrees. 

At 8 p.m. that evening the sea was high, and it was cloudy 
to the west, but there was as yet no indication of a gale. 
The ships were in station, the Captain astern of the Lord 
Warden. At 1 1 o'clock there was a fresh breeze and some 
rain. At midnight the barometer dropped, the wind rose, and, 
a- it became evident, that dirty weather was at hand, sails 
were reefed. A little before i p.m. a furious gale set in from 
the south-west and sails were furled. The rest may be told 
in Admiral Milne's words : " At this moment the Captain was 
astern of this ship, apparently closing under steam. The 
signal, " Open order," was made, and at once answered; and 


at 1.15 a.m. she was on the Lord Warden's lee quarter, 
about six points abaft the ship : her topsails were either 
close reefed or on the lap ; her foresail was close up, the 
mainsail having been furled at 5.30 p.m. ; but I could not 
see any fore-and-aft set. She was heeling over a good deal 
to starboard,* with the wind on her port side. Her red bow 
light was at this time clearly seen. Some minutes after I 
again looked for her, but it was thick with rain, and the light 
was no longer visible. The squalls of wind and rain were 
very heavy, and the Lord Warden wa* kept by the aid of 
the screw and after-trysails with her bow to a heavy cross-sea, 
and at times it was thought that the sea would have broken 
over her gangways. At 2.15 a.m (of the yth) the gale had 
somewhat subsided, and the wind went round to the north- 
west, but without any squall ; in fact, the wind moderated, the 
heavy bank of cloud had passed off to the eastward, and the 
stars came out clear and bright ; the moon, which had given 
considerable light, was setting : no large ship was seen near 
us where the Captain had been last observed, although 
the lights of some were visible at a distance. When the 
day broke the sqtfkdron was somewhat scattered, and only 
ten ships, instead of eleven, could be discerned, the Captain 
being the missing one." 

The dreadful truth dawned upon the admiral. The 
splendid, the trusted ship, was gone, and how no man 
knew as yet. The vessels of the squadron scattered and 
searched in every direction, but it was not till the afternoon 
that the foreboding became certainty. Some portions of her 
hurricane-deck, a spar with a handkerchief tied to it, the body 
of a seaman, told the tale. The Captain had foundered in one 
of the heavy squalls soon after one o'clock, when a heavy 
cross sea was running, and had taken to the depths her crew. 
The Inconstant, the fastest ship of the squadron, was ordered 
to steam at her fullest speed for Plymouth and carry home the 
terrible news. 

* Eyewitnesses placed her heel at fifteen degrees. 


And what had been her end ? The survivors, who in evil 
plight struggled ashore to the sullen coast of Finisterre, could 
alone tell the story. About midnight the wind was very strong, 
and the ship was then under her three topsails, in each of 
which double reefs had been taken. Steam was up, but, appa- 
rently, the screw was not working, and she was making little 
way, rolling very heavily. The starboard watch had been 
called a few minutes after midnight, and had just mustered on 
deck. As they were called there was a very heavy lurch r 
but the ship righted herself again. When the men came on 
deck* they heard Captain Burgoyne give the orders, " Let go 
topsail halyards," and then " Let go fore and main topsail 
sheets." Before they got to the sheets a second and more 
terrible lurch began. In quick succession the angle of the 
heel was called, in answer to a question of Captain Burgoyne, 
" Eighteen degrees ! Twenty-three degrees ! Twenty-eight 
degrees ! " At the sheets the heel to starboard was so great 
that some of the men were washed off the deck. The ship 
was now on her beam-ends, lying down on her side, slowly 
capsizing, and " trembling with every blow which the short, 
jumping seas, white with foam, struck her?' It was a dread- 
ful moment. The steam, escaping with a tremendous roar 
from the funnel, did not drown the cries of the stokers, which 
came up from the bowels of the ship. The boilers were fired 
athwartship, and when the Captain was on her beam-ends the 
furnace doors in the port row of boilers would no longer be 
able to resist the pressure of the glowing coal inside, but 
would be forced open, and thus would discharge their contents 
upon the hapless men, flung in a heap upon the fronts of the 
starboard boilers. And, as the draught failed, and the water 
descended by the funnel to the furnaces, upon the torment of 
fire would come a rush of flame and steam, till death by drown- 
ing ended the tortures of that inferno. It is sometimes said 

* Court Martial, H.M.S. Captain, p. 124. This fixes the time and shows 
that Admiral Milne must have been mistaken when he thought he saw the 
Captain at 1.15. 


that the men in engine-room and stokehold are safe in war. 
But, when they die unseen and unsung, at moments such as 
this, without a chance of escape, we must own that they con- 
front a danger more unnerving than is faced by the sailor 
fighting on deck, and that they deserve special honour. 

As the ship heeled, and it became evident that she was 
capsizing, many of the men ran forward to the weather- 
forecastle netting and leapt overboard, still hearing the roar 
of the steam, even when the funnel was below the water. 
Others climbed up the tilting deck with the help of ropes, and 
got out on the port side, and then as the Captain slowly turned 
over, walked up her bottom. One man caught his foot in a 
Kingston valve, and finally reached the place where the keel 
would have been, had there been one, when the ship fell 
suddenly away from under him. The gunner had a very 
narrow escape. He had been asleep in his cabin, when some 
marines aw r akened him by the noise they made. Noticing 
that the ship was rolling heavily, he got up and went to the 
turrets to see that the guns were properly secured. He 
visited the fore-turret, and was in the after-turret when the 
fatal lurch began. As the heel grew greater, he climbed out 
of one of the sighting holes, and was just clear when the ship 
went down. The last seen of her was the prow. The few 
survivors, all, except the captain and the gunner, of the star- 
board watch, climbed on to the launch and the pinnace, which 
were floating about. The second launch was cleared, and the 
men set to work to row her to the help of the pinnace, upon 
which, as it swam bottom upwards, were Captain Burgoyne 
and several men. Many of the men jumped to the launch, 
but Burgoyne would not, and as the heavy sea prevented close 
approach, and all but swamped the launch, he had to be aban- 
doned. He refused an oar, telling the men they would want 
all those they had. Eighteen survivors reached dry land, after 
in vain hailing the Inconstant, which passed close to them, 
without hearing or seeing them in the uproar and darkness of 
the squall. 


The news was at first received with incredulity in England, 
and then with grief and indignation. The loss of so fine a 
ship, with so many promising officers and nearly 500 men, 
was a national disaster. At the court martial which sat to 
try the survivors the verdict was a vindication of the Ad- 
miralty. "The Captain" it ran, "was built in deference to 
public opinion, and in opposition to the views and opinions of 
the Controller of the Navy and his department." Her heavy 
masting, her sails, her low freeboard, far lower than her 
designer had intended, and her great top-weights, in the shape 
of her hurricane deck and turrets, were the causes of the 
disaster. She might have been a safe ship without her masts, 
or with them she might have been a satisfactory coast-service 
vessel. But there is no doubt that she was too unstable for 
work at sea. Her loss has not been without effect. In the 
first place, it has led our constructors to pay great attention 
to stability, a virtue the value of which would be felt in war, 
though it does not necessarily make a great show in peace. 
In the second, it has for ever warned off amateur designers. 
The art of designing a ship is so intricate, and needs such a 
deep technical knowledge, if the product is to be satisfactory, 
that in this there is only cause for satisfaction. 

The second disaster was happily unattended with loss of 
life. The Channel Squadron, consisting of the five ironclads, 
Warrior, Achilles, Hector, Iron Duke, and Vanguard, left 
Kingstown for Queenstown on September ist, 1875, at 
10.30 a.m. On reaching the Kish lightship the Achilles left 
the squadron to steer for Liverpool, whilst the other four pro- 
ceeded on their course, formed in line ahead. At about 12.30 
a very thick fog came on, and it was not possible to see more 
than fifty yards ahead. The positions of the ships were now 
as follows : First came the Warrior and Hector ; then, a mile 
or two astern of them, the Vanguard and Iron Duke, the 
former ship leading.* The speed, which had been ten or 

* The Vanguard and Iron Duke were three cables instead of two cables, the 
right distance, apart at the time of the collision. 


twelve knots before the fog came down, was reduced to seven 
or eight.* 

Soon after half-past twelve a large sailing vessel crossed 
the Vanguard's bows, and compelled her to sheer from her 
place in the line. Her helm had been put hard-a-port, and 
her way thus checked, when suddenly the Iron Duke, which 
had first sheered, for no adequate reason, and then had corne 
back to her course, loomed up through the fog, not one 
cable distant, with her ram pointed at the Vanguard's broad- 
side. Simultaneously the Vanguard was seen by the Iron 
Duke, and Captain Hickley, the commander of the latter, who 
was on deck, at once ordered his engines to go astern, but 
too late to avert a collision. Steaming at a rate of something 
less than seven knots, the Iron Duke struck the Vanguard, 
which was steaming about six knots, four feet below her 
armour, just abaft the mainmast on the port quarter, abreast of 
the engine-room. Avery large rent, twenty-five feet square, was 
made in her, and the water came through in a torrent. Unfor- 
tunately, the ram had damaged the ship at her most vulner- 
able point, tearing a hole in the athwartship bulkhead, which 
parted the engine and boiler compartments the two largest 
compartments in the ship. The shock was very violent. The 
armour-belt of the Vanguard, here 8 inches thick, was 
driven in more than a foot, but the inner skin was not actuallv 
pierced by the ram.f Other bulkheads in the ship were so 
much damaged that they leaked badly, and on deck spars 
and blocks fell from her masts. Immediately the collision 
occurred the water-tight doors were closed. There was no 
panic, and the discipline maintained was excellent. The 
engine-room, stokehold, and alleys were quickly filled, the 

* The " Fog Signal Instructions," however, laid down the rule that in fogs 
the speed should not exceed three or four knots. 

f The inner skin of the double bottom only went as high as the lower edge 
of the armour belt. Thus for some feet below the water-line there was nothing 
behind the side-plating and its supports. Had the Vanguard been built with a 
wing-bulkhead as are all modern ironclads she would certainly have floated, 
notwithstanding her severe injuries. 


boiler drowned out, and the steam-pumps left without steam. 
An artificer, with great presence of mind, opened the boiler 
valves, and allowed the steam to escape, thereby averting 
an explosion. The men were mustered on deck in order, and 
no attempt was made to save the ship, all the energy of 
Captain Dawkins, her commander, being devoted to the 
saving of life. A certain want of promptitude, resolution, 
and resource was perhaps visible amongst the officers, but 
looking at the case of the Vanguard in the light of later 
catastrophes, it is doubtful whether much could have been 
done. The Iron Duke, which had disappeared in the fog, 
came up as close as she could with safety, and as quickly as 
possible, but, with perfect order, the men were transferred to 
her. Within twenty minutes they had all been taken off, 
the captain, as usual, being the last to leave the sinking 
ironclad. One hour after the collision, at 2.15 p.m., the 
Vanguard, which was heavily down by the stern, whirled 
round two or three times and went to the bottom in nineteen 

The Vanguard was a second-class battleship of 5899 tons 
and 3500 horse-power.* She was one of a class of six ships 
designed to meet the French Alma class, and was primarily 
meant for service on distant stations. She carried ten 
12^-ton muzzle-loaders and two 64-pounders. She had a 
complete armour-belt, 6 to 8 inches thick on the water-line, 
and a central battery protected by 6-inch plating. She had a 
speed of i4'9 knots at her trial, and carried a crew of 450 
men. On her steam trials she was found to be defective in 
stability, and her double-bottom had been filled with bricks 
and cement. There were seven athwartship bulkheads dividing 
the hold into eight compartments, and it was calculated that 
any one of these might be breached without disaster to the 
ship. Unfortunately, the possibility of a blow being struck 
over one of the bulkheads, and thus laying open two 
compartments to the sea, had been overlooked. 

* See Plate xxxvii. p. 220 for elevation of her sister-ship Atidacious. 


The court, which tried the officers of the Vanguard, came 
to the conclusion that the disaster was due, firstly to the high 
speed which the squadron was maintaining in spite of the 
fog ; secondly to the fact that Captain Dawkins, of the 
Vanguard, though leader of his division, and though the 
weather was foggy, had left the deck ; thirdly to a reduction 
of speed by the Vanguard without any signal to the Iron 
Duke astern ; fourthly to an increase of speed by the Iron 
Duke in spite of the fog, and in spite of the fact that the 
speed was already high ; fifthly id the Iron Duke's improperly 
sheering out of line; and sixthly to the absence of any fog- 
signals on her part. Captain Dawkins was censured and 
dismissed his ship for neglecting to get the pumps to work, 
and instead hoisting out the boats. The court held that he 
should have tried to cover the rent in the side with sails. 
The navigating lieutenant was censured for not endeavouring 
to run the ship into shoal water, when she might have been 
recovered, even if she had sunk. It was held that the Iron 
Duke should have made some effort to tow her into shallow 
water. The commander of the Vanguard was reprimanded 
with the chief-engineer and carpenter. The Iron Du&e's 
watch-officer was dismissed his ship. 

The Iron Duke, which was precisely similar to the 
Vanguard, suffered no injury of any moment. Her ram 
projected but very slightly below her armour-belt, and could 
have repeated the blow without danger. The accident 
produced in England a tendency to favour the ram, whilst, 
seeing how easily the largest ship could be destroyed by it, 
various impracticable suggestions for an unsinkable ship were 
put forward. 

Three years later a similar disaster occurred to the German 
fleet, but this time there was grievous loss of life. On May 
6th, 1878, a squadron of three ironclads the Konig Wilhelm, 
carrying the flag of Admiral von Batsch, the Grosser Kurfurst, 
and the Preussen went into commission at Wilhelmshaven, 
After completing their crews and fitting out, on May 2Qth they 


left the port on their way to Plymouth. On May 3ist, they 
were in the Channel off Folkestone. The formation adopted 
was a triangular one, the Konig Wilhelm leading, and the 
Preussen following astern, in line with her. To starboard of 
the flagship, slightly abaft her beam, was the Kurfurst. Her 
distance from the Konig Wilhelm, had originally been 440 
yards, but an hour before the collision, she had been ordered 
to draw closer, till only no yards parted the two vessels, 
and from the shore it was noticed that they were in dangerous 
proximity. Whilst steaming thus, two sailing vessels, hauled 
to the wind on the port tack, crossed the bows of the squadron. 
In obedience to the rule of the road, the Kurfurst ported her 
helm, and turned to starboard to clear them. Having done 
this, she turned sharply to port to recover her original 
direction. The Konig Wilhelm at first tried to pass ahead of 
the sailing vessels, but finding this impossible, turned to 
starboard, and found the Kurfurst lying across her bows, 
at right angles to her course.* To avoid the collision now 
imminent, the Kurfurst 's captain went full steam ahead, and 
tried to cross the bows of the oncoming ironclad in time 
to clear her. Seeing that this was impossible, he essayed to 
turn to starboard, hoping to come round on a course parallel 
to the Konig Wilhelm, or at least to receive only a glancing 
blow. On board the Konig Wilhelm, both admiral and 
captain were below, and in these few critical instants there 
was not time to summon them on deck, or for them to do 
anything if they had been summoned. The helm was in 
charge of a petty officer, a one-year volunteer of no ex- 
perience, and six raw recruits. When the watch-officer gave 
orders for the helm to be starboarded, to bring the ship round 
to port, the men got confused, and instead of obeying the 
order, did the exact opposite, and ported the helm, thus 
swinging the ram more round to starboard, whilst the 
Kurfursfs stern swung round to port to meet it. As the 

* See Plan, p. 194. 


collision was now inevitable, the order on board the Konig 
Wilhelm was given to reverse the engines, and they were 
actually going astern at the moment of impact. 

With a speed which, in spite of the reversal of the engines, 
reached six or seven knots, the Konig Wilhelm crashed into 
the Grosser Kurfurst, which was steaming at nine or ten 
knots, between the main and mizzenmasts. The ram ploughed 
up the armour as if it had been orange-peel, whilst a sound of 
crunching and rending filled the air. The angle of impact 
was more than forty-five degrees and less than ninety. On 
board the Konig Wilhelm there was no shock, but a gentle 
trembling. Glasses of water on her tables were not upset, 
nor was the water spilled. On the Kurfurst there was a 
violent shock. The ship lurched to starboard, away from the 
Konig Wilhelm, but kept her w r ay, and twisting and breaking 
the ram cleared it, and grated alongside. The bowsprit of 
the Konig Wilhelm caught the Kurfurst' s rigging and brought 
down her mizzen topgallantmast, before it was broken off. 
The boats on the rammed ship's quarterdeck were shattered 
or swept away. The water poured through the great breach 
in the side and down the stokehold, flooding the furnaces, and 
driving the stokers up the hatchways and steps inside the 
ventilators, whilst the steam escaped violently. A heavy list 
to port laid the doomed vessel on her beam end, and prevented 
the crew from getting out the boats, which were smashed on 
the port side, and lying on the side to starboard. There was 
little time to do anything, but an effort was made by the 
captain, Count von Montz, to run her into shallow water. 
Before she had moved any distance, five minutes from the time 
of the collision, she sank in fifteen fathoms of water, sucking 
down many of the crew. Her hammocks had been stowed 
away in an unusual position between the boom-boats so 
that they could not float away and act as buoys. Of the men 
on board, most jumped into the water when the end was at 
hand. Thirty sailors met a dreadful fate. In spite of the 
entreaties of the boatswain, they leaped over the bows, and 


were caught in the netting under the jib-boom, entangled, and 
carried down. The first lieutenant felt himself sucked in when 
the Kurfiirst foundered. There was a sensation of a 
tremendous pressure upon his ribs, as if the water 
was forcing him down. Then a minute later the pressure 
was reversed, and drove him to the surface, where he caught 
a spar and saved his life. The captain was similarly carried 
down, but came again to the top, and was saved. Fishing 
vessels, and boats from the Konig Wilhelm, were quickly on 
the spot, though the Preussen was very slow in getting her 
boats ouL Of a crew, which numbered 497, 216 were picked 
up, of whom three afterwards died from exhaustion. Twenty- 
three officers were saved, and six drowned, amongst whom 
were an engineer and a paymaster. 

The ram of the Konig Wilhelm was greatly damaged. The 
stem was broken in two places, and twisted over to port at an 
angle of forty-five degrees.* All the rivets near it were 
sheared, or broken away. The sea rushed into her fore 
.compartment and filled it, heavily depressing the bows. There 
was great excitement on board, as it was at first thought that 
she too was going to founder, and her captain prepared to 
beach her, but, finding that the pumps could keep the water 
down, abandoned the idea, and returned to succour the 
Kurfiirst. A sail was placed over the bows, w r hilst the four 
side-boats, the cutters, gigs, and one steam-launch, were 
lowered to save the drowning men. When the Kurfiirst 
sank, a cloud of steam, caused probably by the bursting of her 
"boilers, was seen to rise from the water. The Konig Wilhelm 
and her consort, after cruising about in the neighbourhood of 
the sunken ship till the afternoon, went to Portsmouth, where 
the damage was repaired. 

This accident, whilst it showed the dreadful efficacy of the 

ram, showed also that its use was attended with much danger 

Jto the assailant. In a heavy sea, the injuries to the Konig 

Wilhelm might have caused her loss. Her bows, however, 

* The stem was a solid forging 4 inches thick. 

O 2 


were not particularly strong, as she was a comparatively old 
ship, and built before the value of a ram was fully understood. 
Though armour-belted, her plating did not descend to the 
extremity of the ram, and there was no support against a 
transverse strain. The Grosser Kurfiirst was a turret-ship of 
6600 tons, resembling the English Monarch. In her two 
turrets she carried four 24-centimetre Krupps, and on her 
upper deck two 1 7-centimetre guns. Her armour was from 
7 to 10 inches thick. 

The last and most tragic of all these misadventures, was the 
loss of the Victoria. She was a single-turret battleship of the 
first class, andthe most recent construction.* Completed in 1890 
at a cost of 724,800, exclusive of guns and gun-mountings, she 
had a speed of i6'7 knots on the measured mile, and a 
tremendous armament, included in which were two iio-ton 
guns, one of 29 tons, and twelve of 6 inches. She carried a 
belt of armour from 16 to 18 inches thick, extending for about 
half her length on the water-line ; and forward, was her single 
turret, with its two huge guns. Her original name had been 
the Renown, but on the stocks it had been changed to Victoria,. 
in honour of the Queen. The total strength of the crew 
including officers was 659. On board her, as the finest ship 
of the Mediterranean fleet, Vice-Admiral Sir George Tryon r 
the commander-in-chief on the Mediterranean station, had 
hoisted his flag. 

At 10 a.m., on the morning of June 22nd, 1893, the fleet 
left Beyrout for Tripoli. The vessels present were the 
armoured battleships Victoria, Camper down, carrying the 
flag of Rear-Admiral Markham, the second in command,. 
Collingwood, Sanspareil, Nile, Edinburgh, Inflexible, and 
Dreadnought, with the cruisers Edgar, Amphion, Phaeton, 
Barham, and Fearless. The order was line abreast, and the 
speed eight knots Five miles off the intended destination, 
at 2. 20 p.m., the order was changed to columns of divisions 
line ahead, disposed abeam to port, the two columns being 

* See page 232 


six cables* apart. This brought the fleet into two parallel 
columns, the starboard one headed by the Victoria, containing 
six ships, and the port column headed by the Camperdown, 
containing five. The Barham and Fearless were not formed 
up with the heavier ships. A few minutes earlier, Admiral 
Tryon had sent for the Victoria's commander, Captain 
Bourke, and her navigating officer. To them he explained 
the manoeuvre, by which he proposed that the fleet should 
take up its position preparatory to anchoring. The two 
columns, only six cables apart, were to turn inwards sixteen 
points. t towards each other. This half-turn would exactly 
reverse their direction and leave the ships still in a double 
column, but extremely close together. 

The danger of the proposed manoeuvre was at once realised 
by both Captain Bourke and the staff-commander. The 
space between the two columns was wholly insufficient, for in 
manoeuvring with other ships the tactical- diameter % of the 
least handy ship must govern the movements of the handiest. 
With twenty-eight degrees of helm, which was for manoeuvring 
purposes the limit of the Victoria, and without "jockeying" 
with the screws, driving one ahead and the other astern, a 
practice which Admiral Tryon discountenanced, the diameter 
of the Victoria's circle was 800 yards, or four cables. The 
Camperdown with about the same turning circle was therefore 
demonstrably bound, if both ships started turning inwards at 
once with a distance of only six cables between them, to ram 
or to be rammed by the Victoria. They must collide unless 
quite exceptional measures were taken. The staff-com- 
mander suggested eight cables as a better distance, and the 
admiral accepted the suggestion, remarking, " Yes, it should 
be eight cables." The surprise of the commander was there- 
fore great, when at 2.20 the admiral sent orders to signal the 

* A cable is 200 yards. 

f There are thirty-two points in the whole circle of the compass. One point 
is eleven degrees fifteen minutes. 

J Tactical diameter is the diameter of the circle which a ship describes in 
making a complete turn. 


distance between the columns as six cables, and as he 
apprehended that there must be some mistake, the admiral's 
flag-lieutenant, who had carried the order forward, went 
below, and asked once more whether the distance was to be 
only six cables. Once more he was told by Admiral Tryon 
to " leave it at six cables." Captain Bourke, who was with 
the admiral, reminded him that the turning circle of the 
Victoria was 800 yards in diameter, but to no purpose. 

Admiral Tryon was a masterful, as well as an able officer. 
He was, says Captain Bourke, " always ready and glad to 
discuss any manoeuvre after it had been performed, but I 
never knew him to consult anyone before. He loved argu- 
ment, but he was a strict disciplinarian. He always used to 
say that he hated people who agreed with him, but that again 
was different from arguing against a direct order." Captain 
Bourke left the admiral with an uneasy confidence in him ; he 
was uneasy because the manoeuvre was manifestly dangerous, 
confident because he was serving under a commander of vast 
knowledge, immense experience, and great caution. The 
discipline of the service, which to obtain great results must 
necessarily be strict and exacting, forbade further action on 
his part. He had done his best to point out the extreme peril 
of the evolution, and Sir George Tryon would not understand. 
Therefore, he probably thought, the admiral must have some 
other intention than that to which the signal appeared to point. 

An interval of an hour passed, during which a remonstrance 
might have averted the terrible disaster which was impending. 
But no further remonstrance was possible on Captain Bourke's 
part without something verging upon insubordination. At 
3.28 the fatal signal was made in the following terms : 

Second division alter course in succession sixteen points to starboard, 
preserving the order of the fleet. 

First division alter course in succession sixteen points to port, preserving 
the order of the fleet. 

The signal was received on board the Carnperdown and other 
ships. Admiral Markham was at once seized with the same 


misgivings as Captain Bourke. " It is impossible as it is an 
impracticable manoeuvre," was his remark to his flag-lieutenant. 
He ordered him to keep the signal, which he was repeating, 
at the dip, to show that it was not understood. On this the 
Victoria signalled to him to know why he was waiting. He 
answered : " Because I do not quite understand the signal." 
Unhappily his reply, which might even now have saved the 
Victoria, was not received on board her, and, as there was no 
answer, Admiral Markham came to the conclusion that the 
commander-in-chief must intend the second division to turn 
first, whilst he with the first division circled round outside it. 
It was a most unfortunate error, but there is only one law at 
sea, for the junior officer to obey. There was hardly one of 
the captains of the other ships who did not think the manoeuvre 
fraught with the utmost danger, yet all complied with the 

The signal was passed down the two lines, and the fatal 
turn began. The Victoria and the Camper down at the head 
of the two columns led the way. On board the Victoria the 
helm used was thirty-five degrees, the extreme limit possible, 
and when the ship had swung but a very little distance to port, 
it became evident that a collision was at hand. Captain 
Bourke, the staff-commander, and Midshipman Lanyon were 
close to the admiral on the Victoria ' s flying-bridge above the 
chart-house. The first remark of the captain was : " We 
shall be very close to that ship (the Camperdo-wn}^ and, 
turning to Lanyon, he ordered him to take the distance. This 
occupied some seconds, during which the two great ships 
were swinging rapidly towards each other. Meanwhile, 
Captain Bourke asked the admiral to permit him to go astern 
with his port screw, and so help the turn. Three times he 
asked in quick succession before the admiral, after a glance 
at the Nile, the next astern, consented. A very short time 
afterwards both screws were put astern full speed, but it was 

* Dangerous manoeuvres, it must be remembered, may be necessary as a 


now too late. No power could avert the collision, and the 
two ships drew closer and closer. A minute before the actual 
crash came, the orders " close water-tight doors " and " out 
collision-mat " were given. At the former order the crew 
would go at once to their collision-stations and fasten every 
door and hatchway, thus isolating every compartment and flat. 
The order for collision-stations is given by a " G " on the 
bugle or by the ship's foghorn. 

The . Victoria's crew was a new one, and therefore had not 
had time to become fully acquainted with the ship. The time in 
previous drills, occupied in closing water-tight doors, was three 
minutes, therefore at the moment of the collision, they could 
not have been secured. The discipline was admirable ; there 
was everywhere steadiness and obedience, no hurry and no 
confusion, but the time given was not sufficient. At " out 
collision-mat " a large mat is brought to the neighbourhood of 
the leak by a party on deck, ready to be placed over it, if 
possible. Thus the last seconds passed on board the Victoria 
in preparing for the now imminent disaster. 

Four minutes at the most after the signal, the Camperdown 
struck the Victoria very nearly at right angles, just before the 
armoured breastwork which encompasses the base of the 
turret. The ram ploughed its way in about nine feet, shatter- 
ing a coal bunker and breaking a man's leg. A petty officer, 
standing in his mess, looked up and saw the nose of the huge 
ship come right in amidst a cloud of coal dust. The water 
could be heard pouring into the ship below. The deck and 
ironwork buckled up before the ram, and there was a dreadful 
crunching sound.* The shock was tremendous, if indeed it 
could be called a shock, for the Victoria was forced bodily, 
sideways, a distance of 70 feet. No one was thrown down, 
but the wrench was violently felt throughout the ship. For 
an appreciable time the two vessels remained in contact, and 
the way on them gradually swung their sterns together whilst 

* The blow was struck just over a water-tight bulkhead, which was probably 


the Camperdown } s ram, still in the breach, worked round and 
perhaps enlarged the hole. Then as Admiral Tryon hailed 
the Camperdown and ordered her to go astern, that ship 
cleared the Victoria. The Camperdown' s engines had for 
some seconds been moving astern, and since her speed, which 
was only five knots at the moment of the collision, had been 
further checked by the collision, it would not be long before 
they began to drive her backwards. The water at once began 
to pour into the Victoria by the breach, which measured about 
125 square feet. 

On board the Camperdown the turn had been executed with 
twenty-eight degrees helm, instead of thirty-five degrees, the 
extreme angle possible. Though both Admiral Markham and 
Captain Johnstone had expressed, as we have seen, their 
opinion that the manoeuvre was a dangerous one, the fullest 
helm was not used, nor were the screws "jockeyed" to 
diminish the turning circle. Both watched the Victoria 
attentively till, when it was seen that she was end-on to the 
Camperdown, approaching her and not circling outside her as 
had been expected, the orders were at last given to close 
water-tight doors and go astern with the starboard screw. An 
instant later both screws were ordered to go astern at full 
speed, but, through some defect of the engine-room telegraph, 
the order when it reached the engine-room was only for 
tliFee-quarter speed astern. This could not have made much 
difference, as the time was too short for the reversal of the 
engines to have much effect upon the speed. At 3.34 the 
Camperdown delivered the blow, and about two minutes after- 
wards cleared the Victoria, when the flagship steamed ahead. 
The collision-mat was placed over the Camperdown 's bows, 
whilst she too filled forward, and was heavily down by the 
bows. The crew had been prevented by the inrush of water 
from closing all the water-tight doors forward. 

Meantime on board the Victoria the men, closing the doors 
forward, were driven up by the water and gathered on the 
upper deck, above the auxiliary battery. The party with the 


collision-mat could do nothing ; the water rose steadily 
forward, and when the mat was taken to the forecastle the 
upper deck was so far below the surface that the men at the 
foremost stations were wet to the waist. As the bow was 
depressed the stern rose out of water, and the port screw 
could be seen from the other ships racing in the air. The 
effort had to be abandoned, and, as the men of the forecastle 
party reached the upper deck, the water was up to* the turret- 
ports and was beginning to wash in at the door in the screen, 
at the forward end of the auxiliary battery .* There was a 
steadily growing heel to starboard, the side on which were the 
injuries. The engines, which had been stopped at the moment 
of the collision, were going ahead, in the vain endeavour to 
run the ship into shoal water, and this, in no small degree, 
tended to force the water into the breach, and also to depress 
the ship's bows by the leverage of the water acting upon the 
inclined plane of the deck. The steering engine would not 
work, as the hydraulic machinery had been disabled, and the 
same was the case with the hydraulic boat-hoists, when they 
were tried. 

Admiral Tryon, the staff-commander, and Midshipman 
Lanyon were on the top of the chart-house ; whilst Captain 
Bourke had gone below, at the time of the collision, to see 
that the water-tight doors were closed. The first recorded 
remark of the admiral was " It is all my fault." He then 
asked whether the ship would float, and the commander 
assured him that in his opinion it would. No one appears to 
have expected the sudden disaster which followed. The 
Dreadnought having prepared to send boats, a signal was 
made directing that they should not be despatched, but kept 
ready. Below, as Captain Bourke passed through the passages 
and flats of the huge ship, where the electric light was now 
burning faint and dim, the men were coming on deck without 
haste or hurry. Looking down into the starboard engine-room, 

* This is the condition represented in the diagram. 

Turret port 

Breach caused 
by C.'s ram 




he spoke to the engineer in charge, and heard that there was 
no water in the engine-room. He heard, also, the gongs of 
the telegraphs, and could see that the engine-room men were 
steady at their posts. Meeting, in the main passage, the fleet- 
engineer, he was told by him that the boiler-rooms were water- 
tight. The trend to starboard was great when he reached the 
upper deck. There, on the port side, with their faces away 
from the ship's side, were drawn up, four deep in line, the 
whole of the Victoria's crew, except the doomed men below 
in the engine-room and stokehold. It was a memorable sight- 
Steadiness the most perfect, obedience the most unwavering, 
discipline the most admirable, held the company. Though it 
must have been evident to all that the ship's end was at hand, 
there was still no panic. Not a man moved to the side, not a 
sailor stirred. All in the presence of this overmastering 
catastrophe demeaned themselves like men, as if to prove to 
this nation what their bearing would be before the enemy. 
For many there these were the last few minutes of life. And 
deep and tender though our sorrow must be for noble lives thus 
lost in peace, we can yet feel something akin to exultation at 
the thought that at this supreme moment another imperishable 
tradition was being added to the glories of our sea service, and 
that the children of Nelson met death in a manner not un- 
worthy of their past. 

The tilt of the great ship grew. The deck heeled towards 
the perpendicular, and the order "Jump," was given. The 
line of men broke and made for the side, but with difficulty, 
owing to the growing angle of the list. Some threw them- 
selves over, others were thrown through the air by the ship. 
Those astern had to leap past the whirling screw, which is 
said to have killed or injured no few. There was no want of 
gallant deeds in the awful instants which succeeded. On the 
chart-house Midshipman Lanyon remained by Admiral Tryon, 
and the staff-commander, to the last, though ordered by the 
admiral to the boats. The final lurch came at 3.44^, just 
ten minutes after the collision. There was a tremendous roll 


to starboard, the stem of the Victoria dived, a crash of boats 
and top-hamper falling into the water filled the air, and then 
the flagship went to the bottom amidst a cloud of smoke and 
steam. The last seen of her was the stern, with the screws 
still revolving. A great uprush of air, a violent upheaval of 
the surface followed, and spars and fragments of wreckage 
carried up by it injured many of the men in the water, whilst 
others were sucked down in the whirling vortex. The men 
were so close together that it was hard to strike out, and as 
there were many who could not swim, or who had been injured, 
in the water, these clutched hold of the others and carried 
them down with them. The officers and crews of the other 
ships were horror-struck witnesses of the scene, and, as quickly 
as they could, sent their boats to the help of the drowning men. 
In from five to ten minutes they were near the place where the 
Victoria had foundered, and rescued between them 338 lives. 
Admiral Tryon was never seen again after the final lurch. 

Nothing was wanting to complete the tragedy. There was 
amongst the spectators of that scene the same foreboding of 
evil which was present in the mind of the Greek in his theatre. 
The play must inevitably end in tragedy. They saw evil 
coming and could not avert it ; they saw their chief seized 
with " God-sent madness " and stood powerless. The com- 
mander-in-chief was guilty of a grave error, and by that 
error he doomed 321 officers and men. He refused to listen 
to a suggestion or remonstrance, and his order was obeyed. 
He expiated his fault by death, and with a noble magnanimity 
acknowledged his fault. The second in command was guilty 
of an error, of judgment in obeying, without a question as to 
the real meaning of the signal. There is little doubt that on 
board the Victoria the officers had a presentiment of the 
collision which would follow. They may be blamed for doing 
nothing which might have averted it, for not making their 
remonstrance felt. But in justice we must own that it was 
discipline which was to blame, 'not the officers. Without 
discipline, without prompt and unquestioning obedience, a 


navy would be worthless. And so, as it has been well 
said, by one of those antinomies which occur more often 
in fiction or the drama than in real life, the collision was- 
precipitated. The finest ironclad, or all but the finest, in the 
squadron, before the eyes of all, on a clear summer day, went 
to the bottom as the result of a touch of the ram. All the 
skill and ingenuity which had been lavished upon her 
proved of no avail to keep her afloat ; perhaps they were even 
a snare, as they led to excessive confidence in her stability. 

The Camperdown was very severely damaged in her bows. 
A great hole, ten feet by six feet, was torn by the sharp edge 
of the Victoria 's armour-deck, and the stem was broken above 
the ram and twisted to port. The water shipped brought up- 
her draught forward from 27 feet 9 inches to 32 feet, an 
increase of over four feet. She could not, therefore, have 
repeated the blow, and must have been in great danger if 
a storm had arisen. 

The great loss of life on board the Victoria was due in the 
first instance to the number of men who could not swim, and 
would go down at once ; in the second, to the violent swirl and 
subsequent agitation of the water ; and in the third, to the 
number of men below in the engine-room and stokehold. No 
order was given to them to come on deck, and they died like 
Englishmen, with a poetic splendour, doing their duty, how- 
ever useless and hopeless a one. Upon their fate we scarcely 
can dare to speculate. The rush of water down the funnels 
would be followed by a burst of steam from the boilers. 
Probably, as the ship touched the bottom, the pressure, in 
eighty fathoms of water, drove in the sides, and so killed any 
who had survived the scalding steam. The water above the 
ship was greatly agitated by escaping air for some consider- 
able time after she had gone down. There was no explosion 
as she sank, but only steam, probably from the funnels. 

The court martial which met at Malta found that Sir 
George Tryon was to blame for the collision, acquitted 
Captain Bourke and the Victoria? s officers, and praised the 


order and discipline maintained on board. It regretted that 
Admiral Markham had not signalled to the commander-in- 
chief his doubts as to the evolution. An Admiralty minute 
blamed Captain Johnstone for not making preparations in 
view of the collision which he expected. The same minute 
pointed out that the foundering of the Victoria was due, not 
to defective construction, or instability, but to the fact that 
many of the water-tight doors and scuttles forward had not 
been closed, and thus the water, instead of being confined to 
two compartments at the most, filled the forward part of the 
ship. This weight of water depressed the bow, and brought 
the ventilators on the upper deck, some of which could not 
be secured, below the water-line, and admitted the sea to the 
mess deck. Next the turret-ports, the door in the screen, and 
the forward portholes of the 6-inch battery, all of which were 
open, became awash. Flowing through them into the angle 
formed by the side, and the now sharply sloping deck, the 
water lodged there, and capsized the vessel, as all her stability 
was gone. Had all watertight doors been closed, had the 
ports and ventilators been secured, the Victoria would beyond 
a doubt have floated, though with a heavy list. But we have 
seen that the men at collision-stations had only one minute 
instead of three to do the work.* It may be said again that 
Captain Bourke should have caused the doors to be closed 
earlier. To have done so, however, would have been almost 
insubordination, a direct reflection upon the admiral. It may 
be said, again, that they should not have been open at all. 
But if the doors are there they are meant to be used, and it 
is extremely difficult, indeed impossible, to work a ship 
minutely subdivided, with every door closed. Even in battle 
it would not in practice be found feasible thus to isolate every 
compartment. Human foresight and ingenuity can do much, 

* There were a great many doors in the forward bulkheads, and there were 
numerous openings in the decks fitted with water-tight hatches, all of which had 
to be closed. Some of the doors could only be secured by entering the flooded 
.compartments, a manifest impossibility. 


but cannot do everything. The ship which no injury of the 
ram shall be able to sink has yet to be designed. 

One point of some importance is dwelt upon by the minute. 
The presence of an armour-belt would not have saved the ship, 
as it could not have resisted the terrific force of the Camper- 
down's blow, and must have been crushed in. This has been 
questioned both in England and in France, and does, indeed, 
seem doubtful. The force of the blow struck by the 
C amp er down s ram was about that of the 45-ton gun pro- 
jectile at the muzzle. If i6-inch armour will keep out such 
a projectile where all the energy is concentrated upon an 
extremely small space, it should have been able to keep out 
the ram, or at all events to limit the damage done. The loss 
of the Victoria has not increased the confidence in the 
English type of battle-ship with its large unarmoured ends.* 

" The order and discipline maintained upon the Victoria 
. . . was in the highest degree honourable to all concerned, 
and will ever remain a noble example to the service," con- 
cludes the minute. It is a noble epitaph, and that order and 
discipline converted a great disaster into a greater triumph. 

Last of all, and still unexplained, is the loss of the Spanish 
cruiser Reina Regente, with all hands, during March, 1895. 
She was conveying the members of the Moorish mission from 
Spain to Tangiers. She had thus no great distance to cover, 
and she was not, like the Captain, exposed to the fury of the 
Bay of Biscay. A violent storm, however, arose, and in it 
she must have foundered. No trace of her, whether wreckage 
or bodies of her crew, has as yet been discovered. She was 
a very heavily armed vessel for her size, and it is therefore 
conjectured that her stability was deficient, and that she cap- 
sized. She carried a crew of over 400 officers and men, 
besides the members of the mission. In general outline and 
size she was similar to the English belted cruisers of the 

* If the compartments above the armour-deck were riddled the Victoria and 
similar ships would sink 5 feet by the head. They should, says Professor Elgar, 
i>e classed as protected ships, not as armour-clads. See also pages 233, 174. 


Australia type. She carried four yS-inch guns, two forward 
and two aft, with six 4'j-inch guns in the waist of the ship. 
She was a comparatively new ship, having been launched in 
1887 at Messrs. Thomson's yard at Clydebank. Her displace- 
ment was 5000 tons. 

Catastrophes of less importance were the loss of the 
Japanese cruiser Unebi in some unexplained way at sea, the 
foundering of the French floating battery Arrogante off 
Hyeres, the loss of the British gunboats Wasp and Serpent, 
the boiler and gun explosions on board the Thunderer, in all 
of which there was heavy loss of life. 



THERE is, perhaps, no period in the history of the human 
race which has seen changes so numerous, so startling, so far- 
reaching, as the present century, or we might almost say the 
half-century in which we live. Fifty years ago ships, guns, 
and the art of war were much as they were left at the close 
of the Dutch wars of the seventeenth century. All was 
clear and all was certain, for the implements of battle had 
been constantly tested, not only in peace but in war. What 
was found by practical experience to be useless was quickly 
eliminated, because there was practical experience. Structural 
modifications of ships were numerous between 1690 and 1840, 
but at the same time they involved no radical changes. There 
was a slow and steady progress, not an advance of lightning 
speed. Warships were divided into distinct classes with 
distinct objects : line-of-battle ships, frigates, corvettes, sloops. 
For the one class to engage the other was, if the assailant was 
of superior class, almost a breach of the conventions of war, if 
of the inferior, an act of foolish temerity. The line-of-battle 
ship of 1840 was an implement in which practical efficiency 
and beauty of form were combined in the highest degree. 
Yet, propelled by the force of the winds, in a day when men 
had not mastered and applied the forces of nature to their 
own use, the Victory or the Agamemnon was helpless and 
motionless in a calm. Her movements had, to a certain 
extent, to be governed by the direction of the wind, which 
cannot be foretold or foreknown. Whilst there was certainty 



as to the value of ships and the methods of tactics, there 
was yet uncertainty in regard to strategical combinations. 
It was often impossible for fleets to effect a junction, starting 
from different points, on a pre-determined day. The first 
requirement of the sailor was ability to sail a ship. He had 
to be a good seaman, to be a smart topman or yardsman, alert, 
agile, and courageous. The merchant-sailor and war-sailor 
were of one and the same trade ; and each could learn his 
vocation in either service. The only weapon carried by 
ships was the gun, and the gun was of a rudeness and sim- 
plicity which rendered naval gunnery a science easily acquired 
by any man who had sea-legs. There was no breech action 
with its elaborate mechanism, to be understood \* there 
were no sights to be mastered ; there were no complicated 
gun-carriages and mountings ; no hydraulic or electric motors. 
The torpedo existed only in the imagination of sanguine 
inventors ; the ram was an impossibility with sails. Battles 
were fought and won by concentrating a superior force upon 
a detail of the enemy a task rendered moderately easy 
where the only motive agent was sail-power. The ships then 
drew as close as possible and battered each other, till the 
critical eye of the captain told him that the time had come 
for boarding, when a rush of seamen and marines carried the 
enemy's deck. 

The steam engine has changed all this, and changed it in 
two ways. First, by rendering the ship, when it is placed on 
board her, capable of defying the winds and following her own 
course ; and, secondly, by enabling men to employ mechanical 
implements of extraordinary power. Till machinery was 
introduced it was impossible to forge or handle large masses 
of iron. It was impossible to obtain accuracy and exactness 
in matters like the rifling of a cannon or the fit of a breech- 
plug. The machine is unaffected by external causation to a 
degree unattainable in a human being. That is to say, a 

* The return of simplicity is a gratifying feature in our new quick-firers. 


lathe can be set with accuracy to plane a shaft to a certain 
dimension, and it will continue to do this till it wears out or 
the power is exhausted. A man with a file varies from day 
to day. He will approximate to the required standard, but 
will never attain to it, and his personal equation, profoundly 
.affected by a vast train of causes ceaselessly in operation, 
must be taken into account. This is the real explanation of 
the failure of early ideas on subjects such as the use of 
turrets, or the employment of the breechloader. They were 
.sound enough in themselves but the means necessary for 
their manufacture were wanting."* So iron ships could not be 
cheaply constructed before the days of rolling-mills and 
steam-hammers, if, indeed, they could be constructed at all. 
And when we plume ourselves upon our enormous advance, 
let us remember that our ancestors were, after all, step by 
step building up the means which should take us forward. 

Steam was at first applied to the propulsion of ships by 
means of paddles, which were clumsy and exposed. It was 
impossible to mount a heavy battery on the broadside with 
.such interruptions amidships, and thus the new motor could 
not well be employed on board anything larger than a frigate. 
Accordingly, sailing line-of-battle ships were to be towed into 
action by tugs when the wind was against them. But the 
advent of the screw changed everything, as, from the date of 
its application to the steamer Stockton, in 1837, by Ericsson, 
it steadily made its way. It lay below the water-line and 
w r as not exposed to hostile shot, whilst it could be readily 
fitted to ships of the accepted pattern. By the date of the 
Crimean war the fighting ships of the world were screw- 

The adoption of steam had numerous effects on the con- 
struction of the ship. Whereas with the warships of the past 
speed had been obtained by diminishing size, thus making the 
.frigate faster than the line-of-battle ship, it could now only be 

* Lord Armstrong, even as late as 1854, could not obtain satisfactory steel 
iorgings for a gun-barrel only r88 inches in diameter. 

P 2 


secured by giving increased weight and space to machinery, 
engines, and boilers on board the fast ship. Moreover, the 
discovery that the larger the ship the more economically is 
the power exerted, also tended to increased size. The 
principle would not apply to sailing ships whose motor was 
the wind, where not economy of power, but the direction 
to the required end of what power existed, was sought. 
Extreme fineness of lines again was dangerous where a vessel 
had the leverage of masts upon the hull, tending, if the latter 
was not broad and steady, to capsize her. The incompatibility 
of steam and sails, which lies in the different form of hull 
required with each to give the best results, has led to the 
gradual supersession of the latter by the former, though at 
first both were applied conjointly, and though there are great 
advantages in the possession of sails as an auxiliary. Thus 
steam, at Hrst a mere auxiliary, becomes next the main, and 
finally, the sole motive force. The growth of displacements 
begins forthwith. From the days of the Henri Grace a Dieu, 
of 1488, to the Queen, of 1839, the increase had been only 
threefold, from 1500 tons to 4500 tons. From the Queen to 
the Italia or Majestic is a two-fold increase in the half- 
century, a growth not of 3000 tons, but of 6000 tons.* Steam 
and machinery have made the advance possible and necessary. 
A 15,000 ton sailing ship would require enormous anchors, 
huge cables, a vast sail area, with gigantic masts and steering 
apparatus to match. Without steam, and machinery to apply 
the force of steam, the management of such a vessel would be 
a business of extraordinary difficulty. 

Steam having thus vastly enlarged displacements, began to 
increase the speed of ships. The Warrior achieved a great 
feat when she covered a little over fourteen knots in an hour. 
The United States' Government, in the Civil War, projected 
cruisers of seventeen knots, the famous Wampanoag class. 
In our own day most of the advance has been made, since we 

* Allowance being made for the different systems of measuring tonnage.. 


are now building for our service vessels of thirty knots, a gain 
of sixteen knots upon the Warrior, and an enormous advance 
upon the mean rate of progression between two points in the 
case of the sailing ship. The steamer goes in a straight line 
where it lists ; the sailing ship must humour the winds, and 
zigzag for days, or for days lie motionless. Hence, though at 
times, with a favourable breeze, the vessels of oak and hemp 
could obtain fourteen or even fifteen knots, they cannot be 
matched with even the "tramp" for continuous speed. 
Nelson, in his three months' chase of Villeneuve only 
averaged ninety-three miles a day. 

Another effect of the introduction of steam has been the 
growing tendency to fill our warships with machinery of kinds 
other than those necessary for their propulsion. The charac- 
teristic of the nineteenth century is to employ mechanical 
agencies to do the work of man, and it has run riot on our 
ships. The motive force was present in the boilers which 
supplied the main engines with steam. It was certain then 
that secondary or auxiliary engines would be introduced, and 
all the more, because the increasing size of the weights to be 
handled, the increasing amount of work to be done, as the 
ship grew larger, rendered it inconvenient to use hand-power. 

As a consequence of this the crews carried are smaller on 
the modern ship than they were, ton for ton, in the old days. 
In 1793 a i2o-gun ship of 2508 tons (old measurement) 
carried 841 officers, men and boys; a thirty-eight-gun frigate 
of the largest class, 1063 tons in displacement, 277 men ; and 
a twenty-gun ship of 432 tons, 138 men, whilst the French 
ships of like size carried, as a rule, one fourth more. In 1895 
the Royal Sovereign of 14,150 tons carries 720 officers and 
men ; the Devastation, of 9300 tons, 400 ; the Cambrian, a 
cruiser of 4360 tons, 265; and the Dryad, a torpedo-gun- 
boat of 1070 tons, about ninety men. It is possible that these 
crews are not large enough for battle purposes, but the 
economy in human labour is enormous. To gain some idea 
of the work done on board ship by mechanical power, we may 


observe that the Royal Sovereign class carry eighty-six 
engines, the French Magenta over 100, whilst there are at 
least as many on our largest cruisers. Taking the Terrible, 
for instance, we find her equipped as follows : 


2 working the screws (main engines). 

2 reversing the main engines. 

2 turning the main engines. 

4 driving main circulating pumps. 

2 ,, auxiliary circulating pumps and air pumps. 

6 ,, main feed pumps. 

8 ,, auxiliary 

4 ,, fire and bilge ,, 

2 ,, distilling ,, 

1 ., drain-tank ,, 

8 ., air compressors for air jets in Belleville boilers. 

12 ,. fan compressors for stokeholds. 

2 ,, ,, ,, ,, engine rooms. 
4 ,, ,, ,, ,, ventilation. 

3 ,, electric light dynamos. 

4 ,, air compressors for torpedoes. 
2 ,, steering apparatus. 

2 for boat-hoisting. 
2 ,, coal ,, 
12 ,, ash ,, 

1 workshop engine. 

2 capstan engines. 

The engines are in most cases duplicated to prevent dis- 
ablement by accident, but even so, dividing by two, forty-three 
odd sets of engines are necessary to the economy of a large 
cruiser. The warship, then, approximates to a floating 
factory, her decks and hull crammed with machines end 
guns. The Terrible further carries forty-eight boilers, 
occupying, with the engine rooms, 252 feet of her total 
length, and that amidships, where the breadth of the vessel 
is greatest. 

Growth in size, advance in speed, development of machinery, 
are all directly traceable to the influence of steam. Due in 
part to this cause, in part to the influence of the past, is a 


growing tendency to specialisation in the various types of 
ship. Our ancestors, after long experience, found that a cer- 
tain differentiation was necessary. They had the line-of-battle 
ship, the frigate, the corvette, the sloop, the bomb-ketch, the 
fire-ship. But all, except the last, were constructed to use 
guns, though the armament varied in power according to the 
ship's sphere of action. The appearance of armour for a 
time destroyed this specialisation. For the first few years 
after the introduction of the ironclad, we built little but large 
ironclads and small ironclads. The latter were intended for 
coast-defence, or for service upon distant stations. They were 
to the typical battleship of the d \y much as the frigate was to 
to the line-of-battle ship. The difference between the two 
was in degree, not kind. Our ancestors, however, did not 
build vessels for the express purpose of coast-defence, since 
their strategical wisdom led them to aim at the command 
of the sea and the blockade of the enemy's ports, for which 
coast-defence ships, or ships, to call them by their true name, 
of indifferent sea-keeping quality, were quite unsuited. When 
new weapons, in the shape of the ram and torpedo, came into 
favour, and when it grew 7 increasingly evident that slow, small 
ironclads would be eaten up by fast, large ones, a new era 
began. Though all three weapons, the gun, ram and torpedo 
could be combined on board one ship, there were yet advan- 
tages to be gained from the use of a particular type of ship 
for each. As a high speed demanded heavy engines, and 
without it the small ship would be left a prey to the large, 
the required weight was provided by denuding her of armour. 
The cruiser began to differ in kind from the battleship : she 
had no longer thinner armour, but no armour at all.* On the 
other hand, she could decline battle and run. The torpedo 
could be employed by a small boat, and it was fondly imagined 
by enthusiasts that with its advent the day of great ships had 

* The frigate, at any but the very closest range, was impervious to even the 
line-of-battle ship's guns. Now the cruiser is vulnerable, at the extremest 
ranges, to the guns of even her own class of ship. 


passed away. Special craft were constructed to use it, in 
which diminutive size and high speed were combined. These, 
again, led up to special craft constructed to combat them. 
The cruiser, with the lapse of time, has differentiated within 
itself to a degree unknown in the frigate. The gap between 
the Powerful, of 14,250 tons, and the For bin, of 1850, is 
immeasurably greater than that which parted the forty-four- 
gun and twenty-gun frigate. We have this cruiser for ocean 
work ; that for work on the narrow seas ; a third for scouting ; 
a fourth, though this type does not appear in our fleet, for 
commerce-destruction. Our specialisation may be excessive, 
as we can never be certain that our special ship will meet the 
enemy's special ship, and the observance of the uniform mean,- 
whilst adopting a certain number of types, might be best. A 
Nelson might look aghast at the motley array of battleships, 
rams, large cruisers, small cruisers, dynamite ships, torpedo 
gunboats, destroyers, torpedo-boats, coast-defence craft, and 
torpedo-boat carriers which this decade has produced. 

A point also to be noticed is the difficulty with modern ships 
of estimating a vessel's righting force, when she is seen at a 
distance. With the old sailing ship it could be told at once. 
Now a change in the armament in the case of a vessel well 
known, the substitution of long for short guns, of quick for 
slow-firers, may have doubled her power, and may enable her 
to crush an unwary adversary. War may bring many sur- 
prises of this kind. 

The last point to be considered before we pass to a general 
view of the changes in our period, is the increased attention 
which is everywhere being given to naval matters. Fifty 
years ago there were only two fleets in the world, the English 
and French. Russia was quite a minor power, though making 
great exertions, and whilst the United States built very fine 
ships, they had very few of them. England and France are 
still first to-day, but in the intervening years, strong navies, 
some of which aspire to the front rank, have sprung up in 
other quarters. Germany, Italy, Japan are well to the fore 


in the second class, and the United States shows signs of 
embarking upon a great naval programme. The minor 
states of the world are just as active. This phase is probably 
due in part to the increasing fierceness of competition between 
nations as between individuals, in part to the clearer appre- 
hension of the value of sea power. 

The application of armour to ships was an idea of consider- 
able antiquity. In the history of human progress, frequent 
instances will be found where suggestions are made, to be 
regarded at the time as wild chimeras, and adopted with 
enthusiasm by posterity. All the old line-of-battle ships were 
in a certain sense armoured, since their sides and timbers 
were made very heavy and solid on the water-line with the 
express object of keeping out shot. Thus, a ninety-gun ship 
had 1 6-inch oak timbers spaced at intervals of five 
inches, with planking inside seven inches thick and 
outside eight inches. Even at close quarters, the projectiles 
from the old pattern smooth-bores would not always go 
through, especially when fired with reduced charges, as was 
the custom on the guns growing hot. The Spanish floating 
batteries at the siege of Gibraltar were in like manner 
protected by an enormous thickness of timber and hide, 
with bars of iron interspersed. Still, earlier lead p ating had 
been employed by the knights of St. John, though of all 
metals this would seem most unsuitable. But it was not till 
General Paixhans had produced a gun which could fire shells, 
that governments began to seriously dream of iron-plated 
ships. General Paixhans himself suggested the efficacy of 
armour as a protection against these new and terrible pro- 
jectiles. Admiral Page assures us that the French govern- 
ment knew its value, and that Admiral Mackau, Louis 
Philippe's minister of marine, had actually tested its resistance, 
but kept his knowledge a dark secret, wishing to employ it 
as a trump card in the event of war with England, and so to 
get the upper hand. In 1842, the British Admiralty fired at 
a shield of iron plates, joined together to form a thickness of 


six inches, and supported upon the scantling of an eighty- 
gun ship, with the result that no shots perforated it. At the 
same date, the inventor, R. L. Stevens, was busy in the 
United States constructing a shot-proof frigate plated with 
4l-inch iron. This vessel, however, was never completed, 
and it appears that, if it had been, it could not have floated. 
Ericsson, in 1841, pointed out that the shot from a 1 2-inch 
gun which he had designed would pierce its plating, and some 
years later, during the Crimean War, submitted to the Emperor 
Napoleon a rough sketch of an impregnable armoured 
monitor. Between 1849 and 1851, a most important series 
of experiments were conducted in England, on the iron ship 
Simoom. Two iron plates |--inch thick, placed some distance 
apart, were fired at with the 32-pounder, when it was found 
that the shot in passing through produced a most deadly hail 
of splinters. With wood backing to the iron it was still the 
same, but when the wood alone was used, there were far 
fewer splinters. One noteworthy fact, however, escaped the 
consideration of the experts. It seems to have been con- 
clusively proved that these thin plates shattered shells before 
they could burst. The importance of this result does not 
appear to have been realised, nor were the experiments 
pushed further to ascertain whether by increasing the thick- 
ness of plate the shells might not be altogether excluded. The 
results of 1842 were apparently overlooked. Iron was con- 
demned as a material for warships, and a general prejudice 
was created against armour. 

The Crimean War over, in which the value of the armoured 
floating battery had been proved, France began to construct 
sea-going ironclads. The Gloire, the first of these, was a 
two-decker, from which the upper deck was removed. The 
weight thus gained was applied in 44-inch armour-plating to her 
sides. She had no ram, but the end-to-end belt of iron made 
her bow strong. She was masted and rigged, but was also 
fitted with steam power, which gave her a trial speed of 
thirteen knots. In general outline she was like any other 


frigate of her day, but slightly longer and heavier in appear- 
ance. Her gun-ports were only 6i feet above water. Her 
armament w r as composed of thirty-four 5o-pounder guns on 
her main deck, whilst on her upper deck were two heavy shell 
guns. The English Admiralty, alarmed at the prospect of 
having possibly to meet a French ironclad fleet with an 
English unarmoured one, ordered the construction of the 
armoured frigate Warrior, in 1859. But whereas the Gloire 
was a wooden ship converted to her new shape, the Warrior 
was of iron, and designed expressly to carry armour. 
M. Dupuy de Lome was the architect of the French, Messrs, 
Scott Russell and Isaac Watts, of the English vessel. The 
Warrior is remarkable for the fineness of her lines. Her 
great length, in proportion to her breadth, gave her a speed 
extraordinary for her day, since on her trial she achieved 
fourteen knots. Unlike the Gloire she was not armoured 
from end to end, but had a large patch of plating, 218 feet 
long and 4^ inches thick, over her battery and water- 
line amidships. Athwartship she had armoured bulkheads, 
enclosing a portion of her battery. As her total length was 
420 feet over all, only about half her side was protected. In 
exchange for this loss, she was a better sea boat than the 
Gloire, but her rudder head was completely exposed to the 
smallest shot, and she never steered really well. She was 
fully rigged, having three masts ; and her two funnels could be 
telescoped when under sail. Forward, she had a projecting 
figure-head, which hid a slight spur designed for ramming. 
Her battery at first consisted of twenty-six 68-pounders on 
her main deck, behind armour, and twelve which had no 
protection, outside the armour ; whilst ten more guns of the 
same size were disposed on the upper deck.* Forward and 
aft of her armour she had water-tight compartments, which, 
with those amidships reached a total of ninety-tw r o.t In 

* Later altered to two no-pounder rifled Armstrong pivots ; four 4O-pounder 
rifles, all on upper deck ; thirty-four 68-pounders, smooth-bore, on lower deck. 

f Viz. ; In hold space, 35 ; in double bottom, &c., 57. The Royal Sovereign 
has 145 compartments. 


the water her appearance was most imposing; indeed, as a 
conception, she was excellent in every respect. Her designers 
rightly saw that, for England to retain her command of the 
sea, her ships must be sea-going and sea-keeping. She was 
no radical departure from the established form of ship, but 
descended lineally from the frigate, yet in her there was an 
increase in displacement, a concentration of armament as yet 
hardly dreamt of, although her fire right ahead and right 
astern was nil. The weight of armour was 975 tons, as 
compared with 350 tons in the floating batteries of Louis 
Napoleon. A sister ship, the Black Prince, of the same size 
and armament, was constructed at the same time. Both ships 
long outlived the Gloire* 

In 1860, Captain Coles, who had, during the Crimean War, 
prepared a raft with a shot-proof iron shield four inches thick, 
to carry one 68-pounder gun, brought forward a design for a 
turret-ship the first such design that was made public, ante- 
dating by over a year Ericsson's Monitor. .t Coles' ship was to 
carry nine conical turrets, each containing a pair of guns. 
The guns were to be " self-acting," running out after their 
recoil down a slope. As early as 1855, the great engineer 
Brunei had told Coles, with true insight, " You only need a 
breechloader to make your shield perfect." A remoter 
ancestor of the turret may be found in Captain Waymouth's 
proposal in the sixteenth century, to mount " murtherers " in 
turrets on the upper decks of ships, the turrets to revolve 
upon swivels. In 1862, the first English turret-ship was 
commenced, but to her and her progeny we must recur later. 

The design of the Warrior was reproduced in an improved 
form in the Achilles, which was larger, belted from end to 
end with 4i-inch armour, and slightly faster. She carried no 
less than 1200 tons of plating. Simultaneously a large number 
of wooden ships were cut down, converted after the pattern 

* The Defence and Resistance, iron ships very similar to the Warrior, but a 
little smaller, followed her immediately. 

f See \. 33. 




Warrior. 1859. 

Hull. fron. / 

Minotaur. 1861. 

Iron. Royal Sovereign. Hu 

Arm . iron. Bellerophon . 1864- Hull iron. J 

Hercules. 1866. Hull. Iron. ^/ 

Arm. Iron. Monarch . 1866. 

Arm. Iron. 

Audacious. 1867 Hull. iron. _^/ 

Arm. Iron. Glatton. 1869. Hul/ lron. 

Arm. Iron. Devastation. 1869 . Hull Iron 

Arm. iron. Alexandra. 1673. 

\ if 

aire . 1873 . Hu/l. iron. 

British Ironclads . 1859 1673 
Figures give the thickness of armour in inches- 


of the Gloire, and given an armour belt. Amongst these 
were the Zealous, Repulse, Ocean, Research, Royal Alfred, 
Royal Oak, Prince Consort, and Caledonia* Their upper decks 
having been removed, they were lengthened like their French 
prototype and plated, but were not altogether a success. 
They were cheaper in the first instance, but far less durable 
than iron ships, and vanished from the fleet at an early date. 
The series of broadside ships was further developed in the 
Minotaur, Agincourt, and Northumberland, with an end-to- 
end belt, an increase of displacement, and a more powerful 
armament than the Warrior. They were all ships of 
enormous length, and were somewhat deficient in handiness. 
With the advance in artillery, their armour was made 5^ inches 
instead of 4^ inches thick, but the backing was thinner. 

In 1862, Sir. E. J. Reed was appointed to the post of Chief 
Constructor, and signalised his appointment by designing a 
series of ships, of moderate size, well-armoured, handy, and 
fairly fast, which if re-armed, would be capable of rendering 
great service to us to-day. The first of these was the Belle- 
rophon, with plating 8 inches, thick on the water-line. Her guns 
were concentrated amidships, in a small central battery pro- 
tected as heretofore, not only on the two sides, but by stout 
bulkheads athwartship, which prevented her from being raked. 
In her, for the first time, the bracket-frame system of 
construction was employed. She mounted the 1 2-ton and 
6^-ton rifled muzzle-loader,t but had no bow or stern fire from 
guns behind armour. The Hercules was of the same class, 
but a vast improvement. In her, the expedient of recessed 
ports, which had been tried in the Pallas of i866,J received 

* Wooden ironclads of a more powerful type were the Lord Clyde and Lord 
Warden, with y-inch armour on the water-line, 1300 tons of plating, and a 
strong bow fire. They carried each sixteen 8-inch muzzle-loaders, and four 

f Ten 12-ton and two 6j-ton. 

J A small armoured ship for service in distant seas. Similar to her were the 
Enterprise, Research, and Favourite. 


its final sanction, and henceforward appears, whether for the 
heavy or the auxiliary armament, in most of our ships, though 
the sponson* competes with it as a means of giving increased 
arcs of fire. Her armour was at its thickest nine inches, 
whilst two lo-inch muzzle-loaders could fire within a few 
degrees of the keel-line. She was at her launch a splendid 
ship, superior to anything afloat, and she is still a favourite in 
our service. At the same time, six smaller central-battery 
ships of the Audacious class were designed for work on 
distant stations. Two thousand five hundred tons smaller 
than the Hercules, they had 8-inch armour and a central 
box battery t But above this was a second battery, 
very slightly projecting from the side, at each corner of 
which was a recessed port, giving right ahead or right 
astern fire. They thus fulfilled, for the first time in an 
English ship of high freeboard, the ideal of all-round fire. 
They were the first English ironclads to carry an upper 
deck battery. 

Following the Hercules came the first-class battleship 
Sultan, still of the central-battery type, but with considerable 
improvements on the Hercules. The latter ship was ex- 
tremely deficient in axial fire ; this defect was to some extent 
remedied in the Sultan by an upper-deck battery, in which 
two 12^-ton guns were carried. Forward, quite unprotected, 
are two more 12^-ton guns. In the Hercules a 12^-ton 
gun had been placed forward, and a second aft, with very 
slight armour protection. These exposed weapons at the 
ships's extremities henceforward disappear. The speed was a 
little higher than in the Sultan's predecessor. With the grow- 
ing tendency amongst naval men at this period to favour attack 

* A sponson is a curved projection from the side ; for example, the frame- 
work which on paddle-steamers carries the paddle-wheels. Other examples can 
be seen in the illustrations of the Chih Yuen (p. 114) amidships, just below 
and a little to the left of her funnel, and in the illustrations of the Royal 
Sovereign (i. 56;, Blenheim (\. 174), and Dupuy de Lome (i. 310). 

f They were armed with ten 1 2-ton guns. 


with the ram, it was now decided to give a better bow-fire to 
battleships. The last but one of our central-battery ironclads, 
the Alexandra exemplifies that decision. Her guns are 
mounted amidships in a central battery, which rises per- 
pendicularly from her greatest breadth at the water-line, 
whilst fore and aft her sides "tumble home," or fall in towards 
the upper deck, thus allowing four heavy guns to fire very 
nearly right ahead,* whilst two heavy weapons can be trained 
astern. No high-freeboard ship had as yet mounted such heavy 
guns or carried such thick armour. She had two 25-ton and 
ten 1 8-ton muzzle-loaders, and her plating reached a thick- 
ness of 12 inches. Her belt was carried down over her 
ram to strengthen it for shock tactics. Her speed was 
fifteen knots. 

Last of this great group, and standing midway between the 
central-battery and the barbette ship, came the Temeraire. 
She was commenced, like the Alexandra, in 1873, but her 
design differed considerably from that ship. Amidships, as in 
the Alexandra, was a box battery with axial fire, mounting 
two 25-ton* and four 1 8-ton guns. But the feature which 
differentiated her from the Alexandra was the introduction of 
two barbette towers placed fore and aft, each containing one 
25-ton gun,t mounted upon a disappearing carriage. After 
each shot, the recoil upsets the gun and brings it under the 
shelter of the armour. The gun, when loaded, is carried 
back to the firing position by hydraulic power. These 
guns had an all-round fire, and were placed at a great 
height above the water, but the protection given to them 
was not very satisfactory, as the barbettes were open 
underneath. There was an armoured ammunition trunk 
leading down from them to the magazines, but the smallest 
shell exploding under the guns would put them out of 

* The two 25-ton n-inchguns fire right ahead; two i8-ton weapons within 
three degrees of the keel-line, 

f Eleven-inch in calibre. There is another pattern of 25-ton gun, 12-inch in 
calibre, carried on board the Monarch and other ships. 


action. As in the Alexandra, the armour-belt was carried 
down over the ram.* 

We must now return some years to the Royal Sovereign. 
She was a three-decker, cut down on Captain Coles' plan, to 
the level of the lower deck, ten feet from the water. The hull 
thus left was plated on the water-line and above it with 
4j-inch iron, whilst upon the deck four turrets were placed. 
The foremost carried two 12^-ton guns, the others one each. 
The turrets had armour 10 inches thick near the gun ports, 
and elsewhere 5 inches. They were rotated by hand-power 
applied by rack and pinion or winches. The bases of the 
turrets rested upon the lower deck, and the weight, instead 
of being supported upon spindles, as in the American 
monitors, was carried on a roller-way. The ship had 
only three light signal-masts and no rig. Her crew consisted 
of 300 officers and men. She had a lightly-armoured conning- 
tower placed just forward of her one funnel. On her trial, in 
July, 1864, she proved herself to be a most satisfactory vessel. 

The Prince Albert was contemporary with the Royal 
Sovereign, and like her carried four turrets placed in the 
centre-line, with five guns, but differed in being built of iron, 
expressly to suit Captain Coles' designs, instead of having 
been merely adapted to them. She was, then, the first English 
ship built to carry the turret. Like the Royal Sovereign she 
was designed for coast defence, and was not a sea-going ship. 
Coles, emboldened by his success, was anxious to see the 
turret system applied to sea-going battleships, and as the 
result of his energetic insistence the Monarch was laid down. . 
She was a moderate-freeboard turret-ship of 8300 tons, 
carrying two turrets placed on the centre-line, and containing 

* In 1878 when war with Russia was thought imminent, four ironclads were 
purchased by England. They had been designed and built in England for 
foreign powers, and thus are not necessarily of English type. The following 
were the ships : The Superb, generally resembling the Hercules, but more 
heavily armed ; the Neptune, a rigged turret-ship, similar to the Monarch, but 
more recent, and armed with the 35-ton Whitworth breechloader, which was 
exchanged for the 38-ton muzzle-loader ; the Belleisle and Orion, small central 
battery vessels of limited sea-going power. 


each two 25-ton guns. Forward was a forecastle which cut 
off the ahead fire of the fore-turret, but contained two 6^-ton 
guns * ; these were protected by a screen from ahead fire. 
Astern she had a poop which mounted one gun of similar 
pattern. Thus one great advantage of the turret, the all- 
round fire which it gives, was lost. The vessel was fully 
rigged and had three masts. Under steam she made very 
nearly fifteen knots. Her armour on her turrets was 10 
inches at its thickest point, on her side 7 inches. Her 
forecastle made her a tolerable sea boat, and in her day she 
was considered the finest ironclad afloat. 

Captain Coles, however, had never considered her as an 
ideal ship. He criticised her continually whilst she was on 
the stocks, and complained of her high freeboard and her loss 
of all-round fire.t Supported vehemently by the press, he was 
permitted in 1867 to design the ill-fated Captain.\ He gave 
her less than half the freeboard of the Monarch, and quite as 
much rigging. Her displacement w r as 7900 tons, and her 
armour w r as a little thicker than the Monarch's. The 
speed was half a knot or more slower than the Monarch's. 
The vessel capsized, in 1870, in the Bay of Biscay, and no 
more low-freeboard monitors, fully masted and rigged were 
designed for our service. The Monarch, and the purchased 
Neptune are the only survivors of the type. 

Instead, the class of mastless turret-ships for sea-going 
purposes, was developed. The first exemplar of this type is 
the admirable Devastation, designed by Sir Edward Reed in 
1869. She was of 9,300 tons, the largest battleship built for 
the Navy since the broadside ironclad went out of fashion. 
She had neither forecastle nor poop, but was frankly and 
entirely a sea-going monitor. In two turrets, placed fore and 
aft, she carried four 35-ton guns. The thickness of her plating 

* Afterwards changed to two 1 2-ton guns. 

f It is somewhat strange to find that Coles' own ideal ship, the Captain, had 
a forecastle and poop in spite of these criticisms. 

I See Chapter XXIV., pages 183-4. 


ranged from 10 to 14 inches. Between her turrets was a light 
superstructure with a flying deck. On the loss of the Captain 
deep misgivings were aroused as to the value of low-freeboard 
turret-ships, and a searching inquiry was made into her 
stability and seaworthiness. She emerged triumphant, and 
though she is not altogether a comfortable ship, as her decks 
are awash in any sea, she has earned golden opinions as an 
almost invulnerable, powerful and handy ship. She has 
recently been reconstructed and re-armed with the lo-inch 
breechloader, and though now an old, is none the less a 
fine, and valuable, vessel. She is impervious to the deadly hail 
of the quick-firer, and might fare better in an action at sea 
than many larger and more modern battleships. 

Following her, with considerable improvements, the Thun- 
derer and Dreadnought were laid down for sea service, whilst 
contemporary with her, or earlier, were the coast-service ships, 
Hotspur, Glatton, the four Cyclops,* and the Rupert. These 
ships constitute a very formidable group, apart from the rest 
of the fleet, and the Rupert and Hotspur are something 
better than mere coast-defence ships. They were the ulti- 
mate development of the low-freeboard turret-ship which 
Ericsson and Coles had devised. The Dreadnought differed 
little from the earlier Devastation. Her armour was thicker, 
her guns heaviest and her displacement larger by a thousand 
tons. The freeboard was also increased, and hydraulic gear 
was fitted to her turrets and guns. 

The steady advance of artillery had now developed the gun 
till none but the thickest armour would exclude the newest 
projectiles. Hitherto it had been possible to design a ship, 
which should be plated from stem to stern with mail impene- 
trable, under the conditions of the battle, to any projectile, 
though it might be easily perforated on the proving ground. 
Henceforward, the great extent of moderate armour disappears, 

* Their names were : the Cyclops, Gorgon, Hecate, Hydra. 
t 38-ton instead of 35-ton. 


to re-appear in 1893, and is replaced by a small surface pro- 
tected by very thick plating. The vitals only of the ship are 
thus sheltered : the engines, the boilers, the heaviest guns, the 
captain's station, the lines of communication. All else is left 
open, on the principle that no resistance is better than a weak 
one. The ships of the period which we are now approaching 
have never given entire satisfaction. In their own day they 
offered very nearly the whole area of their side to the smallest 
gun's attack. Before the development of the quick-firer 
and the appearance of high explosives this was not, perhaps, a 
matter of great importance. But, when great attention was 
paid to auxiliary armaments, and the number of moderate- 
sized shells that could be projected in a given time increased, 
it became evident that these ships could be disabled without a 
hit upon their thick armour. 

The removal of armour from the ship's side is contemporary 
with the introduction of horizontal plating in the shape of a 
protective deck.* In the earlier turret-ships of the Devastation 
and Rupert period, low-freeboard vessels, which would be 
much exposed to a plunging fire, we find 2 or 3 inches 
of armour placed above the belt, horizontally, protecting the 
deck. In the Alexandra and Temeraire an armour-deck is 
also present, but again above the belt and above the water- 
line. Henceforward we shall see it employed, often without 
the belt and below the water-line, for a considerable extent of 
the ship's side, serving to divide the ship into two portions : 
the one below the water-line containing the vitals, protected 
from gun-fire by the water on either side and the stout 
deck of iron above, off which projectiles would glance ; the 
other above the water-line open to every shot and shell over 
the greater part of its surface, but containing nothing, which, 
if injured, might compromise the ship's safety. In theory, 

* The Mississippi gunboats, designed by Mr. Eads in 1 86 1, had curved decks, 
plated with thin iron. Ericsson's Monitor was similarly protected, but these were 
low freeboard vessels. The step forward lay in applying such a deck to vessels 
of high freeboard. The Comus, designed in 1875, was the first English 
unarmoured ship in which it appeared 

Q 2 


this part might be riddled and shot away without damage to> 
the flotatory or lighting qualities of the ship.* 

The first armourclad of this description was the Shannon r 
a vessel intended for cruising purposes. The first battleship 
was the Italian Duilio, which was copied in the English 
Inflexible. Her displacement was u,Soo tons, or more than 
2000 tons in excess of the Dreadnought, which was her 
immediate predecessor in the line of turret-ships. Instead of 
a water-line belt of plating running right round the ship, 
the armour was stripped off the extremities, and applied to 
increase the thickness on a square citadel placed amidships. 
This carried two thicknesses of iron armour, together reaching 
from 1 6 to 24 inches of metal, t and occupied less than one- 
third the ship's length. Strong bulkheads ran athwartship r 
whilst an armour-deck forward and aft, below the water-line, 
protected the vitals. The two turrets, each containing two- 
Si -ton guns, and plated with compound armour, were placed 
upon this citadel, en echelon amidships. In this way, great 
concentration of fire was obtained. Four guns could bear 
ahead and four on either broadside, though the arc of two of 
the four guns was limited ; but astern only two could be fired,, 
inasmuch as of the two superstructures fore and aft, which 
gave comfortable quarters for the crew, the after one was 
broader, and obstructed the inmost gun in each turret. The 
breadth was extreme, and the speed low. Mr. Barnaby, who- 
had designed this vessel, was denounced in no measured 
terms by numerous critics, and the ship was christened a 
coffin, owing to her want of armour on the water-line. 

A wholly anomalous vessel, neither battleship nor cruiser, 
was the Polyphemus, designed in 1873 and launched in 1881. 
She has a steel cigar-shaped hull, plated on its upper portion 
with 3-inch armour. To accommodate her crew and add to 
her seaworthiness, a light superstructure has been added. 

* See the transverse sections, Plate XXXVIII., which will make the text clearer. 

f An additional defect in the Inflexible, Ajax, and Agamennon is that their 
armour is not rolled in one thickness, but is made up of two plates. 


Water excluding Material 


Half-Sections showing System of Protection 

I. Low freeboard turret-ship 3. Deck protected cruissr 

. with armour deck. fJo armour belt: 

Devastation type Edyar type. 

2 High freeboard barbette-ship 4. Deck below belt srmour. 

with armour decfr Majestic typs 
Adrr.iral Ca.uctin type 

Figures give thickrstt cf 


plate in inches. 


Her primary object is the use of the ram and the torpedo. 
She carries no heavy guns, and only a few light quick-firers. 
She cost 200,000 or more, though only a small ship, and her 
design has not been repeated in England, but in America her 
chief features have been embodied in the Katahdin. 

Two vessels of smaller size but similar features, the Ajax 
and Agamemnon, followed the Inflexible. They carried the 
38-ton gun and were a decided failure ; slow, ill-armoured, 
ill-armed, unsteerable. They are the last vessels built for our 
fleet which were equipped with the heavy muzzle-loader. 
Henceforward, all guns mounted are breech-loaders. An 
auxiliary armament guns of moderate power and penetration, 
midway between weapons whose work it is to perforate armour 
and the smaller anti-torpedo-boat artillery makes its appear- 
ance upon the Inflexible type, though it is at first very weak. 
On board the Inflexible it was composed of eight 4-inch guns; 
on the Ajax of two 6-inch. On this latter ship, steel-faced or 
compound armour was adopted throughout. 

The next battleships of the "echeloned" turret type, the 
Edinburgh and Colossus, launched in 1886, are an enormous 
advance. Not only are the guns twice as powerful, new- 
pattern breech-loaders, but the speed is high, 16-5 knots 
instead of the wretched i3'25 of the Ajax and 13-8 of the 
Inflexible. Instead of four 38-ton guns, there are four of 
45-tons in the two turrets. Instead of the two 6-inch guns, 
there are five in the auxiliary battery. The armour is still 
eighteen inches thick, and still concentrated amidships, leaving 
the ends exposed. But the proportions are not so unfavourable 
to speed as in the Ajax or Inflexible ; the length is greater 
and the beam less. 

Contemporary with these two ships was the coast-service 
turret-ram Conqueror, which, launched in 1882, was followed 
six years later by the precisely similar Hero. They are useful 
little ships of 6200 tons, with a low freeboard forward. A 
little before the ship's centre is a single turret containing two 
45-ton guns, with a good arc of fire ahead and on the broadside. 


Astern of this is a high superstructure to house the crew, in 
which are mounted four 6-inch guns. The turret armour is 
twelve inches at its thickest, and very nearly all the water- 
line is protected ; the belt is carried down to the ram. Both 
vessels are bad sea boats, and they are very weak in stern 
fire, but they are perhaps stronger ships than the Ajax 
or Agamemnon. In a sea-way their speed falls from its 
nominal fifteen-and-a-half knots to nearer eleven. They 
are not suited to work on open waters, from their low 

Whilst the Colossus was in hand, another and a very 
different type of battleship was designed and commenced. 
This was the first of the " Admiral " class, the Collingwood, 
In proportions and displacement she was closely similar to the 
Colossus, but the disposition of her armour and armament was 
widely contrasted. The central citadel, with its vicious con- 
centration of armament, was abandoned, and the four heavy, 
45-ton breechloaders were placed fore and aft in two lofty 
barbette towers, protected by thick armour. The guns were 
left very much exposed, but perfect shelter was given to the 
gunners, except from shells bursting underneath the barbettes. 
To load, the breeches of the gun are depressed till they come 
below the roof of the barbette, when the hydraulic apparatus, 
which is placed behind armour, drives the shot and powder 
into the gun. Forward and aft, the Collingwood has a 
moderate freeboard. Amidships is a superstructure carrying 
six 6-inch breechloaders behind one inch of steel plating. 
Against raking fire there are 6-inch bulkheads fore and aft. 
The auxiliary armament is thus about the same as that of the 
Colossus, but has a certain measure of protection given it, 
which, as we shall find, tends steadily to increase. With 
great prescience a good speed was assured to the ship, and on 
the measured mile, under forced draught, she accomplished 
i6'8 knots. Her armour extends for 140 feet in a narrow belt 
on the water line ; the barbette towers are thickly plated, 
and from each of them a well-protected shaft runs down to 


the armour deck, which is placed below the water-line."^ 
Strong bulkheads at each extremity of the water-line belt run 
athwartship, giving security against raking fire. There is a 
well-plated conning-tower and one mast with two fighting- 
tops. The thickness of the armour varies between eighteen 
and twelve inches, and it is compound. 

This, then, was a ship which could steam fast and hit hard, 
which was, moreover, well adapted for fighting in line ahead. 
The end-on fire is not that of the Colossus, but the broadside 
fire is better, as the guns can be trained through a wider 
angle. Yet the unprotected ends are long, and the barbettes 
could be put out of action by lodging shells beneath 
them. Still the Collingwood was a great advance upon her 
predecessors, and in general outline differs little from our 
newest ships. She was completed in 1886, and has proved 
very satisfactory. 

Five similar ships, the Anson, Benbow, Camper down, Howe, 
and Rodney followed her. They were a little larger and a 
little faster, exhibiting that continuous progress which marks 
our battleships. In the disposition of their armour and 
armament there was no change. The 45-ton gun on four of 
them was replaced by the far more powerful 6y-ton gun, which 
for ten years was to be the standard heavy gun of the fleet. 
The auxiliary and anti-torpedo-boat armament suffered no 
change. The weight of armour carried exceeded 2500 tons, 
whereas in the Colossus it had been 2360 tons, and in the Ajax, 
2220. The Benbow differed from the other four considerably. 
Instead of the four 6y-ton guns she was given two of 1 1 i-tons, 
one fore and the other aft, and her auxiliary armament grew 
from six 6-inch to ten 6-inch guns. The speed of these ships 
was seventeen knots, and they were faster than any French 
battleship of their day. Their defect was still the insufficient 
protection given to the water-line, and the absence of strong 
armour over the auxiliary battery. 

* Except amidships where it is carried across between the upper edges of the 
belt. As in Fig. 2, Plate XXXVIII. 


In these six vessels there was a visible tendency to abandon 
the development of bow fire, and to increase broadside fire. 
The next pair of battleships exhibit no such tendency. 
Indeed, in them bow fire attained its greatest proportions, 
though at the expense of stern fire. They may be described 
as greatly enlarged Conquerors. They retain the essential 
features of that ship : the single turret, the weak stern fire, 
the low freeboard forward, the high superstructure aft ; but 
they carry a shorter and thicker armour-belt. The displace- 
ment rises from 6200 tons to 10,500 tons. Forward, in a 
single great turret, are two huge no-ton guns, firing right 
ahead or on either broadside. The turret, unlike the bar- 
bettes of the "Admiral" class, has its base well protected by 
a large armoured redoubt. Astern is a single 29-ton gun, 
sheltered only by a shield. The superstructure contains twelve 
6-inch guns, placed behind steel plating 3 inches thick, with 
a bulkhead of the same thickness across the stern of the 
battery, and one of 6 inches, protecting the guns from raking 
fire, forward. The thick armour-belt on the water-line is 
162 feet long, and there are the usual English athwartship 
bulkheads. The redoubt is pear-shaped and contains the 
loading apparatus and the base of the turret. The conning- 
tower is heavily armoured. Forward and aft of the belt there 
is an armour-deck below the water-line 3 inches thick. 
The speed is seventeen knots or more. In these vessels for 
the first time triple-expansion engines appear on board a 
British ironclad. The machine-gun armament is unusually 
powerful, including twenty-four 6-pounder and 3-pounder 
quick-firers, and many smaller guns. These vessels were 
christened Victoria and Sanspareil, and were the last ships 
armed with the no-ton gun. Completed in 1889 the Victoria 
same to an early and tragic end in 1893. 

The appearance of high explosives and the growing potency 
of the quick-firer, which, though as yet it only projected shells 
of 61bs., was still capable, in the opinion of many experts, 

._ ""' 

\Hrrn Compound Collingwood 1879. 

10, fg 

Arm Compound Imperieuse 1881. 

Hull. Steel 

.. j ^ ^ ^ T~~I 

Arm. Compound Victoria 1385 


Trafalgar 1386 

Arm. Compound J 

Hull. Steel 

British Ironclads. 1874. -1894. 
figures aive thickncs of Armour in inchas. 



of riddling the unarmoured sides and ends* of the "Admirals" 
and Victorias, and impairing their flotatory qualities, 
led to a distinct change in the Nile and Trafalgar, 
which followed. The general idea of their design was a 
Devastation improved and brought up to date, and there can 
be no doubt that the idea was realised, and that two remark- 
ably formidable ships w r ere the product. They show a great 
increase in size : length, beam, and displacement are all 
enlarged. The armour-belt on the water-line is 230 feet 
instead of 162 feet long, and rises to a great height above 
the water. It is no longer a narrow streak 3 feet above 
the surface, but ascends 10 feet to the level of the upper 
deck, thus forming, with the athwartship bulkheads 16 
inches and 14 inches thick at each end, a great citadel, 
encased with plating from 14 inches to 20 inches thick. At 
each end stands a turret, similarly protected, and containing 
two 67-ton guns. There are two steel, armoured screens 
crossing the citadel, to prevent splinters from raking it. The 
unarmoured ends are comparatively insignificant, and their 
loss would not damage the ship's flotation. In the super- 
structure between the turrets are six sponsons, three on each 
side, in which are mounted six 4 - y-inch quick-firers, behind 
4-inch steel, a thickness sufficient to withstand machine-gun 
bullets, and projectiles from the small quick-firers. There 
are 5-inch bulkheads to protect the men from a raking fire. 
The weight of armour' reaches the high figure of 3400 tons, 
exclusive of the deck, which would add another 1000 tons; 
and thus these two ships are, for their size, the best pro- 
tected in the service. The speed is not so high as in their 
predecessors, but it is by no means inadequate, as sixteen- 
and-three-quarter knots were accomplished on the measured 
mile. In general appearance the two Niles recall the 

* Th^; elevations of the Collinginnod and Victoria (Plate XXXIX.) show the 
srrnll extent of surf ace above the water-line protected by armour. The" Admirals," 
with their unarmoured ends riddled, sink 15 inches. See also page 174-5. 


It was asserted in England that these two ships were the 
last ironclads that would be laid down, as the torpedo was, 
at the date of their commencement, growing in favour, and 
the torpedo-boat was threatening the large ship. But a year 
before their completion this prediction was falsified in the 
most singular manner, by the great Naval Defence Act of 
1889. This provided for the construction of eight large 
battleships, the Royal Sovereigns, and two smaller ones, the 
Centurions. The Royal Sovereigns show a yet further 
growth of displacement, which becomes in them 14,150 tons.* 
They are longer and broader than the two Niles. Their 
primary armament is still the Gy-ton gun, carried in two pairs, 
forward and aft, but the secondary artillery attains an extra- 
ordinary importance. The six 4'y-inch quick-firers, whose 
collective discharge weighs 27olbs., give way to ten 6-inch 
quick-firers, discharging in one round from each gun locolbs. 
weight of metal. The machine-gun armament has grown, 
whilst the coal supply is enormous. Sevent of the group are 
high-freeboard barbette-ships, and the eighth, the Hood, 
a moderate-freeboard turret-ship. But whilst the barbette 
reappears, it is no longer the barbette of the " Admirals," a 
shallow steel cylinder' standing upon the upper deck, and 
undefended below. The thick plating is in the Royal 
Sovereigns carried down to the armour-deck, forming two 
great redoubts at each end of the ship. The bulkheads below 
the turrets were somewhat thin, at their lower edge, in the 
Nile; here they are thick enough to give thorough protection. 
The water-line belt is 250 feet long, against 230 feet, but its 
maximum thickness is reduced from 20 inches to 18 inches, 
and its breadth amidships from i6i feet to 8^ feet. As the 
guns of all ironclads are differentiated, some mounted to 
attack the enemy's armoured positions, some to wreck his 

* The progress in size of the English battleship, is tabulated in Table XXII 

t Royal Sovereign, Resolution, Revenge, Repulse, Royal Oak, Ramillies, and 
Empress of India. 


superstructures and defenceless sides, some to pour a hail 
upon port-holes and gunners, so in the Royal Sovereign the 
armour is differentiated. For 6| feet above the thick belt, 
between the heavy-gun barbettes fore and aft, is a thinner 
plating of 5 inches of steel, thus giving gf feet of protected 
side above the water amidships. The thin plating of steel 
is in two thicknesses, an outer of 4 inches, and an inner of 
i inch. Behind this side are 10 feet of coal. At each end 
of the light citadel, which has a length of 145 feet, is a 
3-inch bulkhead, rising to the upper deck. 

The auxiliary armament is thus carried. Four 6-inch guns 
are on the main deck in armoured casemates, two on each 
side. On the front of these casemates the plating is 6 inches 
thick, and on the rear 2 inches. The other six guns are on 
the upper deck, protected only by shields. Five 6-inch guns 
fire on each broadside, two ahead, and two astern. The 
speed is high, ranging from eighteen knots in the Royal 
Sovereign to seventeen knots in the Hood. At sea, with 
natural draught, the Royal Sovereign steamed to Gibraltar, 
1 08 1 knots, in seventy hours, burning 487 tons of coal. This 
gives her a sea speed of 15*4 knots. She carries enough 
coal in her bunkers for three such trips. 

Her barbette guns are, of course, much exposed. On the 
other hand, the men working them are most admirably 
protected. There is one very serious defect, however, in 
their mounting, since they require to be brought back to the 
fore and aft position before they can be loaded.* The conning- 
towers are two in number; on the forward one are 14 inches 
of armour, on the after one 3 inches. Numerous search-lights 
are provided, and there are two military masts. In sea- 
worthiness, comfort, armament, armour, speed, coal endurance, 

* If the enemy is, for instance, to starboard, the heavy guns, after being fired, 
cannot be kept trained in his direction, when the only target is their muzzles, 
but they must be revolved back till they are parallel with the keel line, when 
they practically present their whole length as a target. Modern French ships, 
in most instances, have a central load, which allows the guns to be kept trained 
on the enemy. 


and homogeneity of structure, there is nothing like this 
splendid group of ships outside our Navy. Other powers may 
have ships better in one or two points: the Royal Sovereigns 
are generally excellent, and combine power with grace of form. 
The gulf between them and the Inflexible, though it does not 
represent more than fifteen years' progress, is profound. 

Little less excellent are the two Centurions.* With 4000 
tons less displacement than the Royal Sovereigns, so much 
power cannot be expected. But they are admirable com- 
promises, and contain all the elements of a good fighting ship. 
Their speed, as they were designed for service on foreign 
stations, is slightly higher than that of the Royal Sovereigns, 
reaching i8'5 knots. Their coal supply is the same. The 
heavy armament consists of four 29-ton guns mounted in pairs 
in barbettes fore and aft. The guns have the advantage of a 
very strong nickel-steel shield 6 inches thick, which revolves 
with the gun. Somewhat unwisely this shield has been left 
open at the rear, with the result that, if the ships found them- 
selves engaged, with an enemy upon either beam, the heavy 
guns would be quickly out of action as the gunners would be 
exposed to every projectile. t The armour on the barbette is 
9 inches as against the Royal Sovereign's 18 inches ; on the 
belt 12 inches, where the Royal Sovereign has 18 inches. 
The belt is only 200 feet long, being thus 50 feet shorter than 
that of the Royal Sovereign ; on the other hand, the heavy 
guns are carried two feet higher above the water-line. As 
in the larger battleships, there is a lightly armoured citadel 
above the thicker belt. The quick-firers, ten 4'y-inch guns, 
are carried, four on the main deck in casemates, and six on 
the upper deck. In general appearance, the Centurions 
closely resemble the Royal Sovereigns. They have two 
military masts and two funnels. Their freeboard is high, and 
they are good sea boats. 

* The Centurion and Barfleur. 

t The open rear of the barbettes must in this position always be turned 
towards one enemy when the guns are trained on the other. 


The Renown, which was laid down in 1893, is a greatly 
developed Centurion. Her armour is rather more evenly 
distributed, and the differentiation of plating is beginning to 
disappear. She has a water-line belt of 8-inch Harveyed 
steel, with, above it, 6 inches of the same material, instead of 
the Centurion s 4 inches. Her two barbettes placed fore and 
aft, and each containing a pair of 29-ton guns, have 10 inches 
of plating upon them. There is a novel arrangement of the 
deck which greatly adds to the strength of the vessel amid- 
ships. In the Centurion and all other ironclads, the armour- 
deck runs across the ship from the upper extremities of the 
thick belt, only dipping below the water-line forward and aft. 
In the Renown it is curved, and arches down to the lower 
edge of the belt. Thus any projectile which perforates the 
side, has to encounter this further obstacle before it can do 
vital damage. The auxiliary armament is not only a very 
powerful, but also a very well-protected one. Instead of the 
Centurion s ten 4'y-inch guns, the Renown carries ten 6-inch 
guns, of course quick-firers, and all the ten are in casemates, 
on the faces of which are 6 inches of Harveyed steel. There 
are no large weapons exposed upon the upper deck. Four of 
the casemates are located upon the upper, and six upon the 
main deck. The light armament is also extremely powerful, 
including eight i2-pounder quick-firers. The speed is to be 
eighteen knots, and the draught is such as to enable her, 
like the Centurions, to pass through the Suez Canal. She is 
a far more formidable ship than the Centurion, and might 
even venture to face the Royal Sovereign, but her displace- 
ment is 12,350 tons instead of 10,500, as in the Centurion. 

The nine huge battleships of the Majestic class * are rather 
developed Renowns than Royal Sovereigns. The water-line 
protection consists of a belt of Harveyed steel 9 inches thick 
and 16 feet deep, extending for 220 feet amidships. Bulk- 
heads, with an outward curve at either end, enclose a great 

* Their names are : the Majestic, Magnificent, Ccesar, Hannibal, Illustrious, 
Jupiter, Mars, Prince George, and Victorious. 


citadel a little over 300 feet long. With their bases pro- 
tected by this citadel, stand at each end of it two barbettes, 
containing each two 46-ton guns. The barbettes carry 
14-inch armour. On the main deck are eight casemates, each 
containing one 6-inch quick-firer, and on the upper deck are 
four, similarly armed. Each casemate is protected on its outer 
face by 6-inch Harveyed steel. As in the Renown, the deck 
springs from the lower edge of the side armour. The speed 
is to be that of the Royal Sovereigns, but we may hope that, 
on trial, the anticipated rate may be exceeded.* Certainly 
the only weakness of our new battleships seems to lie in their 
comparatively low boiler and engine power. The length is 
390 feet, and thus the Majesties are the largest battleships 
afloat in our service. The displacement is 15,000 tons, and 
no less than 1850 tons of coal will be carried. The weight of 
armour, excluding the protective deck, is 2800 tons, or a little 
less than is carried by the Royal Sovereigns, but the improved 
quality of the mail gives far greater security for less weight. 
The minor armament includes sixteen i2-pounder quick- 
firers. In the design the effect of the quick-firer is plain, since 
the main effort of the architect has been to render the side 
impervious to the 6-inch and 4 - y-inch shell, whilst abandoning 
all effort to make it proof to the heaviest projectiles. 

We may next consider in general outline our thirty-five 
years of progress in battleship construction. And first, whilst 
English ironclads, as a rule, show a steady advance, each 
being better than its predecessor, and closely related to it, 
there are yet certain types which appear from time to time 
and die out, because they prove to be unfitted for the conditions 
of war, or because the advance of naval opinion discards them. 
The descendants of the Royal Sovereign, the first English 
turret-ship, display a great mortality. Four varying types 
.appear from time to time, and three of these may be said to 
have died an early death : the low-freeboard masted turret- 

* The Magnificent has done 17*6 knots, and the Majestic ij'8 knots. 


ship, which expired with the Captain ; the single-turret-ship, 
which disappears with the Victoria, and the "echeloned" turret- 
ship, of which the Colossus is the last exarnple. The mastless 
turret-ship of the Devastation type, on the other hand, has a 
singular vitality. After the Dreadnought, launched in 1875, 
it does not appear for twelve years, when just as it might 
appear defunct, it turns up again in the Nile and Trafalgar, 
and from them hands on some of its features to the later 
Majestic class. The battleships of the present day may 
thus be said to be sprung from two distinct ancestors, the 
Warrior and the Royal Sovereign* The extensive side- 
plating, the high freeboard, the great length of the latter-day 
Royal Sovereign recall the Warrior, whilst the barbette 
system of mounting guns is a variation upon Captain Coles' 

The tendency towards high freeboard and good speed in 
our recent battleships is well marked. Both these features 
characterised our older ships, but the rage for impregnability 
drove them out. We had to learn that, admirable though our 
mastless monitors of the Devastation type were, as fighting- 
machines, a ship has to do other things besides fighting. She 
must be fairly comfortable, if her crew are to retain their 
health, and without health the sailor must necessarily lose a 
great deal of his nerve. High-freeboard ships, in which the 
crews need not be battened down in a moderate sea, become 
essential, when it is desired to maintain in good physical 
.condition the men who have to fight and work the ships. Nor 
is this the only gain which a high freeboard gives. When the 
guns are placed very low, in rough weather the waves may 
cut off the enemy's hull from sight, and seas breaking over 
the forward part of the ship may bury the forward turret or 
barbette in spray and foam. On the other hand, the low- 
freeboard ship is a small target to hit, a fact which was 
remarked by the Shah's gunners when they faced the 

* The older turret-ship of 1864. 


Huascar. Still the advantages of a high freeboard are greater 
than the disadvantages, and the high freeboard appears to 
have come to stay. The last low-freeboard vessels in our 
fleet were the two Niles and the single turret-ship of the 
eight Royal Sovereigns, the Hood. 

The early ironclads had to face guns of comparatively feeble 
power. The round shot of the 68-pounder would not perforate 
the Warrior's plating, even upon the proving ground. The 
subsequent advance in the thickness and resisting power 
of armour was entirely due to the advance of artillery. 
Successively 4^ inches of wrought iron gave place to 
6 inches and 9 inches. But the gun kept pace with this 
progress, and before a ship had left the stocks had usually 
rendered it, in a sense, obsolete. The first armour was 
uniform in thickness. Then, as the attack grew more formid- 
able, and the weight of iron required to give protection 
heavier, a greater thickness was given to the vital parts of 
the ship. None of our older vessels were really " ironclad," 
and it goes without saying that none of our modern battle- 
ships are such. The low-freeboard turret-ships, of the period 
1870-5, are the only vessels to w r hich the term can in strict 
correctness be applied. It was found necessary with high 
freeboard ships to denude a great portion of the side of 
armour, in order to increase the thickness over the battery 
and vitals. This denudation reached its extreme limits in the 
Inflexible and the " Admirals," where there are absurdly 
small patches of plating, and where by far the greater portion 
of the side is open to the smallest shell. It was the aim of 
naval architects to keep out the heaviest projectiles from 
certain portions of the ship, but in their effort to ensure this 
they went too far. The secondary armament of the French 
ships was formidable even in the period 1875 1885, and 
w r ould have wrought terrible havoc on the unprotected upper 
works and water-line, forward and aft. Quite possibly the 
Inflexible or Colossus would have been put out of action 
without their thick armour being struck. Sounder counsels 


appear in the Royal Sovereigns, where there is a combination 
of thick and thin armour. The purpose of the thin armour is- 
to exclude high explosives which have a devastating effect 
upon the ship's interior. But even in the Royal Sovereign 
there is very much ill defended, the loss of which might cause 
the vessel harm. In the Majesties thin side-armour, except 
over the auxiliary guns, disappears, and there is one moderate 

But why, it may be asked, is not the ship made invulnerable? 
Of course, it could be done, but not probably with a displace- 
ment smaller than that of the Great Eastern. The danger of 
destruction by the ram or torpedo forbids such a monster, and 
as the ship has after all to fight other ships, she will find them, 
if they are of her date and if she is well planned, as vulnerable 
as herself. If she cannot resist every projectile, neither can 
they ; if her upper works can be riddled, so can theirs ; if she 
is open to the deadly assault of ram and torpedo, so also are 
they. The naval architect's business is, given a certain dis- 
placement, to effect the best compromise between the warring 
factors, speed, stability, power to wound, invulnerability, coal- 
endurance; or given the required degree in which these factors 
must be present, to produce them on the lowest displacement. 
A battleship B, of 15,000 tons, may look no better than one C, 
of 10,000 tons, to the casual eye, but as constructors are not 
born idiots there is something somew'here which will give the 
larger ship the advantage. It may be a heavier and stronger 
hull, which will wear better and stand the tremendous concus- 
sion of the guns longer ; it may be a surplus of ammunition or 
coal. We may quarrel with the constructor for giving in- 
sufficient attention to one factor or another in his compromise, 
but we can rarely say that with a higher displacement he has 
produced an inferior ship. 

The growth in displacement is one of the most striking 
features of our more recent battleships. Seeking perfection, 
striving to improve each type before it has entered upon 
service, we have been driven to greater and greater size. It 



is inevitable, but it is perhaps regrettable, as numbers are 
shown by the history of the past to be a more decisive factor 
than the size of individual ships. There must be a limit to 
this increase of size, and we may have reached it. Overgrown 
ships are not less objectionable than overgrown guns and 
overthick armour. 

The system of mounting guns has changed widely since 
the days of the Warrior. We began with the broadside 
battery, in which the guns were ranged side by side bearing 
on the beam, with no effort to obtain axial fire. We 
advanced from this to the central battery, in which the guns 
were larger and fewer, concentrated in a small box amidships 
with a varying amount of axial fire. The turret was the next 
improvement, and this in turn begot the barbette, the differ- 
ence between the two lying in the fact that in the turret the 
armoured wall revolves with the gun, whilst in the barbette 
the armoured wall is fixed and the gun revolves inside it 
upon a turntable. Our latest ships exhibit a combination of 
broadside and barbette or turret mounting, as the heavy guns 
are placed fore and aft in barbettes or turrets, whilst the 
medium weapons are disposed on the broadside. 

If we compare the latest English type of battleship, the 
Majestic, with similar French, German, and American ships as 
the Charlemagne, Brandenburg, and Iowa, we shall find that 
foreign architects have apparently produced ships as good as 
ours on a smaller displacement. But, as we have said above, 
this can be easily explained. The English, French, and 
American ships all agree in the disposition of the heavy guns, 
which are mounted in pairs fore and aft. The Germans have 
preferred three pairs of heavy guns, all placed on the keel- 
line. The Majesties guns are 27 feet above the water- 
line ; the Charlemagne 's forward pair nearly 29 feet, and 
her stern pair 21 feet, the Iowa's are nearly 18 feet. The 
forward pair of guns in the Brandenburg have a good 
command, but the other two pairs are mounted low. The 
French and Americans have preferred the turret, whilst the 


English and Germans adhere to the hooded barbette.* In the 
German ship the barbettes are unprotected underneath ; in 
the other three, the armour runs down to the deck. The 
auxiliary armament differs widely in the four vessels. The 
Majestic has twelve 6-inch quick-firers in as many armoured 
casemates, each protected by six inches of steel. The French 
ship has ten 66-pounder 5'5-inch quick-firers, eight of which are 
mounted behind 3-inch armour.t The Iowa has eight 8-inch 
guns carried in pairs, in four turrets armoured with 7 and 8 
inches of steel. She also carries six 4-inch quick-firers behind 
thin armour. The Brandenburg carries a very feeble battery 
-of quick-firers, as she has only six 3O-pounder and eight 
2o-pounder Krupps of this pattern. The four, however, agree 
curiously in the weight of the heavy gun adopted as the 
primary armament. The English ship carries the 46-ton gun ; 
the French the 48-ton gun ; the German the 42-ton gun ; and 
the American the 45-ton gun. The weight of the English 
broadside, from guns above the 2o-pounder, is 4ooolbs ; of 
the French, 3293^5. ; of the German, 4730^5. ; and of the 
American, 4532lbs ; but the English ship is superior to any 
in the number of large quick-firers carried, and would in a 
given time discharge as great a weight of metal as any of the 
other three. In gun-power the English, German, and American 
ships are about equal, and the French a little inferior. 

For protection, the Majestic has a broad but incomplete belt 
of 9 inches uniform thickness ; the Iowa, a narrow incomplete 
belt of 14 inches maximum thickness with a strake of 5-inch 
armour above it ; the Charlemagne, a narrow end-to-end belt, 
which tapers from 16 inches to 9 inches, and above it again 
3^-inch armour; the Brandenburg, a narrow end-to-end belt 
1 6 inches to 12 inches thick. The' armour upon the heavy 
gun positions is 1 2-inch in the Brandenburg, 14-inch in the 

* The English hooded barbette, however, differs very little from the French 
and American turret, except that the armour is thinner. 

f She has also six 3'9-inch quick-firers, which are mounted on her super- 

R 2 


Majestic, 1 5-inch in the Iowa, and 1 6-inch in the Charlemagne. 
The latter ship, the Iowa, and the Brandenburg expose a 
considerable extent of side below their quick-firers, which 
might, on being riddled, render the quick-firers unworkable. 
The American and German ship have each one armoured 
position from which the ship can be fought ; the Majestic two, 
and the Charlemagne three. The Iowa has the lower freeboard, 
and would be at a great disadvantage in a sea-way ; the other 
three ships rise well out of the water, though the German is 
inferior in freeboard aft to the English and French. 

As at present designed, the Charlemagne has two heavy 
military masts with two tops and an officer's position on each ; 
the Majestic, two of much lighter type, each with two tops ; 
the Brandenburg, two light masts with one top for guns, and 
one position for officers on each ; on the Iowa, the cumbrous 
military mast vanishes altogether.* 

In speed, the Charlemagne is expected to cover eighteen 
knots on the measured mile ; the Majestic, seventeen-and-a- 
half; the Iowa, seventeen; and the Brandenburg, sixteen- 
and-a-half. In coal endurance, the Iowa and Majestic are 
about equal, with 2000 tons and 1850 tons respectively; the 
Charlemagne comes third with iioo tons, a very big drop 
from the Majestic ; and the Brandenburg last. The English 
ship could keep the sea for a month, steaming continuously at 
ten knots ; the Iowa, five weeks ; the Charlemagne, eighteen 
days; and the Brandenburg, twelve or fourteen. In practice, 
however, as a large reserve must be maintained, this time 
should be reduced by at least a quarter. 

The deck of the Charlemagne is double, 3^-inch above and 
i^-inch below, over the machinery. The Majesties deck is 
single, 4-inch on the slopes and a little less on the flat, but, as 
has been said, it springs from the lower edge of the armour- 
belt, and thus has the full advantage of the protection which 
the latter gives. In the Iowa, the greatest thickness is 
3 inches, and in the Brandenburg, 2\ inches. 

* There is a short steel tower, with a top a few feet above it. 


In displacement, the English ship is largest, as her tonnage 
is 15,000; the Iowa follows with 11,500 tons; then the 
Charlemagne, with 11,200 ; and last comes the Brandenburg, 
w r ith 9850. Of the four ships, the Brandenburg is an older 
design than the other three, and therefore lacks the extensive 
side-protection which is given in them. In offensive qualities 
the English and American ships would seem to excel, but as 
far as armament goes there is not much to choose. If the 
Iowa mounts 8-inch quick-firers, she will be able, at close 
quarters, to bring eight guns, capable of piercing thick armour, 
to bear on either broadside, and six ahead or astern. 

The development of the ironclad has proceeded side by 
side with the development of artillery. At the date of the 
introduction of armour, during the Crimean War, the guns in 
existence were of very moderate power. Artillery had made 
no great advance, and for all practical purposes there was no 
difference between the guns of 1856 and those of 1806, except 
that the former fired shell and were slightly larger. The 
carronade of 681bs., which was the heaviest weapon of Nelson's 
day, had given way to the 68-pounder long gun, a smooth 
bore of 8 inches calibre, and 4 tons 15 cwt. weight. This 
gave a muzzle velocity of 1579 feet per second to its round 
shell, whilst the total energy of the projectile was only 
452 foot tons.* The gun was of cast iron, mounted upon a 
clumsy wooden carriage, which rendered accurate shooting 
very difficult. 

The rifled gun had already been tried in the Crimean War, in 
the embryo form of the elliptical Lancaster gun, which gave its 
shot a twist, but it was in the Armstrong form that it entered 
the British service. The first Armstrong gun, completed in 
1858, had a forged steel barrel, and was built up of a number 
of wrought-iron cylinders fitted closely over this by shrinkage. 
Thus, at one bound, the distinctive features of our newest 
guns, the use of steel, and the building up of the gun from a 

* At 1000 yards. 


number of parts, instead of casting it whole, were anticipated. 
The projectiles for this weapon were of r8 inches diameter, 
at first entirely of lead, and then of iron, lead-coated to take 
the grooves of the rifling. The gun was a breech-loader, and 
the breech action consisted of a plug which, working in a slot 
in the breech, was held tight by a hollow screw, which fitted 
inside the bore.* To prevent the escape of gas the breech- 
block had a copper bush, and the gun a copper face, which, 
by slightly yielding when the breech screw was tightened, 
hermetically sealed the gun. 

These early breech-loaders were before their day. Accidents 
occurred with them, and men, who were not accustomed to 
complicated weapons, preferred the apparent simplicity of the 
muzzle-loader. The breech-loading system had been success- 
ful with guns of 1 1 olbs. and 4olbs. shot, and was being widely 
adopted abroad, but still, at that time, the arguments for it 
were not as overwhelming as they have since become. The first 
breech-loader had only a short life, from 1860 to 1865. From 
the latter year to 1880, for a period of fifteen years, the 
muzzle-loader reigned in our fleet. 

The resistance of the first ironclads to artillery was surprising. 
At Lissa, where two large fleets met, on neither side was the 
armour perforated. In America the Monitor and Merrimac 
cannonaded one another for the whole of a morning without 
anyone being much the worse for it. The monitors before 
Charlestown in 1863-4 received a great number of hits, yet 
their efficiency was little impaired. The Montauk was struck 
214 times; the Ironsides, a broadside vessel, 193; the 
Weehawken, 187; the Patapsco, 144; the Passaic 134; the 
Catskill, 106; the Nahant, 105; the Nantucket, 104; the 
Lehigh, 36. Yet the gunners were not long before they 
re-established the ascendancy of their weapon. In quick 
succession rifled guns followed the feeble smooth-bores ; the 
rifles grew heavier and heavier, whilst armour, to resist the 

* See Fig. i, Plate XL. 

Armstrong Breechloader of 1859 
A. Breech p/uy. B Screw for ti^hteninq. 
or loosening A. C Hollow in B to 
introduce charge when A is removed 
Movable parfs black. 

Armstrong Breechloader of 1889. 
A Lever to release B by a fifth turn 
B Breech pluy with interrupted screw 
Movable part shaded. 




increasing vehemence of the attack became thicker and thicker. 
In England the i lo-pounder screw breech-loader was followed 
by muzzle-loading gy-pounders, i i2-pounders, iy4-pounders, 
25o-pounders, 4OO-pounders, 55o-pounders, and so forth. The 
perforating power of the gun, which in the first muzzle-loaders 
was very low, rose till the 35-ton gun could pierce 16 inches 
of wrought iron at the muzzle. But with this increase in 
power came a great increase in weight, till instead of three or 
four tons the gun reached 35 tons. Such guns could not be 
mounted on the ordinary wooden carriage, but required excel- 
lent mechanical contrivances, if they were to be handled at 
sea, and such contrivances were quickly forthcoming. In 
1864 iron had supplanted wood in gun-carriages; slides and 
traversing platforms appeared, and the recoil was controlled 
not by ropes or breechings, but by compressors which exerted 
great friction. Minor improvements were introduced as time 
went on, but the 35-ton gun was, in muzzle-loaders, the 
largest hand- worked weapon. 

As the development of armour and artillery proceeded side 
by side, a new phase of evolution appeared, the phase of the 
monster machine-worked gun. The 1 2-inch 25-ton muzzle- 
loader gave place to the 35-ton, which could only be man- 
handled with difficulty. In the Devastation the gun was worked 
by hand, but the turret was rotated by steam ; in the Thunderer 
the after-turret had man-handled 35-ton guns, the fore-turret 
hydraulic-handled 38-ton weapons. The hydraulic system of 
working guns proved, after extensive trial, to be altogether 
satisfactory, and was henceforward adopted for all British 
heavy guns, till the time when it gave way in its turn to 
electricity. With the appearance of hydraulics, the com- 
pressor, as a means of arresting recoil, yielded before the 
hydraulic brake, when the strain upon the mounting was 
lessened, and the power of the recoil used to run out the gun 
after the discharge. Hydraulic mountings were adopted in the 
French navy on board the Devastation, and as in England, appear 
in every subsequent battleship, till the advent of electricity. 


But the progress of the gun did not stop when the 1 2-inch 
35-ton and the 12^-inch 38-ton muzzle-loaders appeared. 
They were succeeded by the last of the muzzle-loaders, the 
8i-ton of 1875, and the Armstrong loo-ton of 1876. These 
were huge and unwieldy weapons, far longer in proportion 
than muzzle-loaders had been hitherto, but the craze between 
1875 and 1885 was for heavy guns which should deal crushing 
blows, and abroad ordnance was increasing in length, with the 
substitution of slow-burning powders for the older quick- 
burning powder. The difference between these two kinds 
of powder may be roughly expressed as this : the quick- 
burning powder started the projectile w r ith a violent jerk, and 
all its force w r as exerted in the neighbourhood of the breech, 
thus necessitating a very great thickness of metal round the 
breech, and rendering a long gun unnecessary ; the slow- 
burning powder, on the other hand, started the projectile 
more gently, straining the breech less, and gradually increased 
its push, rendering a long gun, fairly strong in the chase as 
well as the breech, essential. A muzzle-loader of any length 
must necessarily be difficult to load, as it has to be run in till 
the muzzle is inboard. Thus, here was one cause which 
would compel England to adopt the breech-loader, unless she 
was ready to be distanced in ballistics by foreign competitors. 

We clung, however, to our muzzle-loaders, which, though 
good enough in the sixties and early seventies, were now 
being beaten abroad, and not till a lamentable accident on 
board the Thunderer, when on January 2nd, 1879, a 38-ton 
muzzle-loader gun burst, through double loading, killing two 
officers and eight men, did we begin to waver. Such an 
accident could not occur with breech-loaders. In 1878 the 
Armstrong Company had turned out a -6-inch and an 8-inch 
breech-loader, using slow-burning powder. In practice these 
guns behaved admirably. They gave muzzle velocities of 
2000 feet per second, and were vastly better for their size 
than any muzzle-loader. In 1880, the English Government 
decided to return to the breech-loader, and the muzzle-loader 
was for ever abandoned. 


The breech action of the new guns differed considerably 
from the earlier and cruder type. The interrupted screw 
gearing into the breech of the gun was adopted.* Originally 
t American invention, it was the system employed in France, 
and is at once simple and safe. To enable the plug to be 
quickly withdrawn, the thread is not continuous either in the 
breech-plug or the gun, but is in each cut away at intervals. 
Thus, one quarter or one-fifth turn, according to the number 
of such intervals, will disengage the plug, when it is withdrawn 
and swung clear. To give a gas-tight joint, at first a steel 
cup with its concave side towards the charge, so that the 
explosion would press it against the breech-plug and rear of 
the gun, was employed, and later, a pad of asbestos encircling 
a "mushroom stalk" of steel. The "mushroom head" is 
driven back by the explosion towards the .breech, compressing 
the pad and driving it outwards against the bore of the gun. 
A thoroughly tight joint is thus secured. 

With breech-loaders, there was at first the same craze for 
monster guns. The 8-inch gun of 14 tons was followed by a 
12-inch of 45-tons, a 13^-inch of 68 tons, and a i-6j-inch of 
1 10 tons. But with the latter was reached the limit in size, 
and efforts were now made to increase the power of guns in 
other directions, without sensibly adding to their weight. 
The great object of the heavy gun is to fire as many projectiles 
as possible in a given time, and to fire them through as great 
a thickness of plating as possible. By constant improve- 
ments in the mountings, the rapidity of fire of heavy guns has 
been raised till it stands as follows t : 

no-ton gun Machine-handled, 3 shots in 6 minutes starting loaded . 900 bs. ~) 




7 shots in 

12 minutes, 6 hits on target . 


IM9 i| 

Ji tJ 



4 shots in 

6 minutes 






i shot in 

ij minutes (estimated) ... 





i shot in 

2 minutes 10 seconds 

'Z "-> E 



5 shots in 

6 minutes 


^ C V 

1 + 



i shot in 

i minute 

2!Olbs.J -- 

The gain in rapidity, which results from employing 
machinery, is sufficiently obvious. In perforating power, 

* See Fig. 2, Plate XL. The illustration of the 8-inch quick-firer also shows 
the present system of breech-action well. Page 250. 

f With one exception these are all actual performances at sea. 


great progress has been made by increasing the length of the 
gun. Our older muzzle-loaders were of 12 or 13 calibres; our 
early breech-loaders of 25 calibres*, whilst in our newest 
heavy gun, the 1 2-inch 46-ton, we have gone to 38 calibres. 
The French have advanced even further, and are actually 
mounting great guns of 50 calibres. The gain through increas- 
ing the length, and thus giving time for a slow-burning 
powder to exert its full power, is evident from these figures of 
Canet, which show the perforation with guns of the same 
calibre, but of varying length : 

37S-pounder. 9'45-inch gun of 

25 cals. 30 caU. 36 cals. 43 cal*. 50 ca's. in length. 

Weight of gun 14 tons 19 tons 22 t ns 30 tons 34^ tons 

,, charge 12716?. i6ilbs. iqSlbs. 23ilbs. 2661bs. 

Irenes of worught iron ) 

perforated at io yards/ '* 6 2 ^ 

Muzzle velocity, ft. sees. 1772 2001 2231 2438 2624 

By this expedient, with a gun of quite moderate size and 
proportions, enormous power can be obtained. Instead of 
guns growing larger in calibre, they are now tending to grow 
smaller with increased length, increased strength, increased 
charges, and increased muzzle velocities. 

Whilst heavy guns have thus progressed, there has been 
not less striking advance in small and moderate-sized weapons. 
The appearance of the torpedo-boat, which could not be 
readily followed in its rapid motion by a heavy gun, necessi- 
tated a light quick-firing weapon which should get off so many 
shots during the period of the boat's approach, as to make 
certain of hitting her. The Hotchkiss and Nordenfelt, 3 and 
6-pounders, were the result of this demand. They were 
placed upon mountings which gave no recoil, and were able 
to fire ten to twenty aimed shots a minute. It was not long 
before heavy guns followed upon the same road. In 1886 
appeared the Armstrong 3O-pounder quick-firer, which, after 
winning universal approval, became the 4'y-inch 45-pounder 

* A gun of 25 calibres, is a gun the length of which is twenty-five times the 
diameter of the bore Thus a 12-inch gun of 25 calibres is 25 feet long in the 
bore, i.e., 25 times 12 inches. 

u. * 



quick-firer. This gun can in a given time fire five times as 
many rounds as a breech-loader of similar size, but older 
pattern. It is marked by a simplicity and strength which are 
essential in war material. Next, a year or two later, came the 
6-inch quick-firer, and last, and latest of all, the 8-inch gun of the 
same type, in which the breech opens automatically by the force 
of the gun's recoil.* It is probable that the gun of the future, 
whether large or small, will be wholly and entirely automatic. 

In the so-called quick-firers, rapidity of fire is obtained, 
firstly, by the simplicity and rapidity of the breech action ; 
secondly, by the use of recoilless sights, w r hich do not 
necessitate re-laying after each shot, and enable the gunner 
to aim his gun whilst the weapon is being loaded ; thirdly, by 
the use of a cartridge case,t which abolishes the necessity 
of sponging out the gun and is easy to manipulate ; fourthly, 
by the introduction of a mount, in which friction is all but 
abolished, and recoil controlled and used to bring the gun 
back to firing position. 

It is difficult to see how the rate of fire can be further 
increased, unless automatic guns of the Maxim type are intro- 
duced ; otherwise we have neared finality. Without a mass 
of machinery it is impossible to fire more than five or six 
shots in the minute from a 6-inch gun, but it is satisfactory to 
note that England, whether in moderate artillery or in heavy 
guns, is leading the world in 1895 as s ^ e ^ e< ^ ^ m l ^5- The 
English 12-inch gun of 46 tons is superior to any weapon of 
equal size whether in perforation or rapidity of fire. Un- 
fortunately we have still a large number of old pattern muzzle- 
loaders afloat, which reduce the average of our artillery. 

* Vide Plate XLI., which shows the gun with breech open. The breech can, if 
necessary, be opened by hand. The large shield gives good protection to the 
gunners ; and the ammunition comes up an armoured hoist to a door in the 
gun-pivot. One shot in fifteen seconds is the greatest rapidity of aimed fire. 
Even if this be halved, the gun fires 5<5olb. weight of metal a minute, or 75olb. 
starting loaded. 

f The Whitworth breech-loader of 1860 appears to have been the first gun to 
use fixed ammunition. The powder was contained in a tin cartridge. 


In projectiles and powder there has been a great progress, 
as in guns and armour. The old cast and wrought-iron round 
shot have given way, first to elongated Palliser projectiles, 
of iron with chilled heads, then to forged steel shot, and 
finally to nickel steel for armour-piercing purposes. The old 
lead covering which took the rifling was replaced, first by 
studs fitting into grooves in the bore, then in projectiles for 
the breech-loader, by copper rings which are cut into by 
ridges in the bore of the gun. To enable shot to perforate 
the new and very hard armour, produced by the Harvey 
process, the point of the shot, which is liable to fracture upon 
impact, is capped with soft iron, which enables the projectile 
to bite. Gunpowder is no longer the only explosive agent 
with which shells are charged. High explosives have been 
discovered which are infinitely more powerful. Melinite, 
a preparation of picric acid, cordite, gun-cotton, nitro- 
benzols, even dynamite, have been tried, with many others. 
Experiments with these, terrible substances have been 
conducted in secret by most European states, but certain 
details have leaked out. The effect of their explosion is 
terrific, and some at least of them produce dense choking 
fumes which will suffocate those who are not blown to 

Gunpowder which is a stable and trustworthy substance, 
but has the disadvantage of producing thick smoke when fired 
in the gun, is giving way to smokeless powders. In the 
English service the quick-firers of various size use cordite 
ammunition, which makes next to no smoke, and the new 
46-ton gun is constructed to burn cordite. The time is at 
hand when no gun will fire gunpowder. A ship wreathed in 
smoke could be attacked with comparative impunity by the 
torpedo-boat, but the case is very different when smokeless 
ammunition is used. Thus the tactical effect of the introduc- 
tion of the new powders has been to handicap the torpedo- 
boat, and to make the issue of naval battles less a matter of 
chance. Is progress the elimination of chance ? 


The quality of armour has also improved, whilst the gun 
and its accessories have been improving. The Kinburn 
batteries had plating of a very inferior quality, as the metal- 
lurgical science of the day was not sufficient to avoid burned 
metal and layers of scoria The grade of the iron used was 
poor, whilst steel could not be produced in a trustworthy form at 
a moderate price. Gradually the iron improved; the mechanical 
agencies for preparing and rolling it were perfected; and its 
resistance steadily rose, till, with advances in the art of 
preparing steel, it gave way to steel. Yet, at first, solid steel 
armour did not win approval, and it was thought better to 
face soft iron with hard steel. This gave the compound plate 
which was first adopted by England for the Inflexible 's turret. 
Italy and France preferred solid steel, which, though more 
brittle, had greater power of resistance. In the United States, 
nickel-steel was adopted for the new battleships of the 1891 
programme, and was employed in England for the decks of 
the Royal Sovereigns, and the thin plating on the side of the 
Centurions. The nickel fills up the pores of the steel and 
gives great homogeneity and toughness to the mass. 
Tungsten is said to give even more satisfactory results. Last 
came the Harvey process of hardening steel or nickel-steel 
plates. By this, the steel, after being rolled to the required 
thickness, is heated, face downwards on a bed of charcoal for 
a fortnight. This done, it is bent to shape, heated again, 
and hardened again by the application of water. In the 
finished state, the surface is so hard that drills will not bite 
upon it, and special arrangements, whilst hardening, are 
necessary to leave soft places for rivet holes. The first 
English battleships in which it appears are the Majesties 
and the Renown. A plate thus hardened, i8-inches thick, 
has in the United States defied the attack of the 1 3-inch 
66-ton gun. The projectile, weighing iioolbs., and striking 
with a force sufficient to lift a weight of 1000 tons twenty- 
five feet, crushed in the backing of oak, but only dented the 


Various improvements in the method of applying the armour 
and building up the ship's side, have also to be chronicled. 
The Warrior carried her 4^-inch plates upon a cushion of 
oak from 10 to 18 inches thick. She had not a strong iron 
inner skin. But as Mr. Chalmers demonstrated that the 
application of iron stringers, placed horizontally between the 
timbers of the backing, and a thick skin inboard, behind the 
backing, gave better power of resistance, this system was 
adopted. In the Bellerophon were 6 inches of iron upon 
10 inches of oak, with three thicknesses of f-inch plate as the 
inner skin. The framing of this ship was far stronger than 
that of her predecessors. In later ships, steel has replaced 
iron in the ship's structure, teak has replaced oak in the 
backing, and many minor improvements have been introduced. 

As to engineering progress, the Penelope was the first 
British ironclad to be fitted with twin screws ; the Alexandra 
the first to carry compound engines ; and the Victoria the 
first to carry triple-expansion engines. Forced draught, which 
consists in pumping air into the furnaces from below, appears 
in the "Admirals " ; induced draught, which consists in suck- 
ing air through the furnaces from above, in the Magnificent. 
The water-tube boiler was introduced on board the French 
battleship Brennus. No English ironclad has as yet been 
fitted with it, but the great cruisers Terrible and Powerful 
have it. 

Turning now to the cruiser, the progress has been immense. 
The cruiser as a distinct conception is the descendant of the 
frigate, and does not appear in the earliest days of ironclads. 
During the Civil War, the North, to protect its commerce, 
laid down a class of wooden vessels, of great length, the 
Wampanoags, which were to have a speed of seventeen knots, 
and a coal endurance of 5600 knots. As a matter of fact, they 
never did more than fifteen knots, and could hardly be 
considered a success. In 1866, before they were completed, 
the English Government replied to them with the Inconstant, 
and some years later with the Shah and Raleigh. These 


were noble ships, fully rigged, comfortable, and fast for 
their day, as the first two did sixteen-and-a-half knots on the 
measured mile, but they were entirely destitute of protection 
other than that which was afforded by the arrangement of 
their coal bunkers. They were followed by the Bacchante class, 
launched in 1875-7, and the Active class launched in 1869, 
which were slower and smaller. The " C class " launched in 
1878-1881, were still smaller, but embodied one new and 
interesting feature which henceforward appears in all large 
cruisers the armour-deck. The Canada and her sisters 
carried a i^-inch steel deck over engines, boilers, and 
magazines at a level of three feet below the water-line. These 
ships were, however, too slow for cruising purposes, as their 
speed ^was not sufficient to enable them to escape the battle- 
ship, and they were far too weak to encounter her when they 
were overtaken. 

Between 1877-1880, were completed three large cruisers, 
the Shannon, Nelson, and Northampton which had partial 
belts on the water-line and athwartship bulkheads. They 
may be described as dismal failures large, costly, slow, and 
vulnerable. 1877-8, however, saw the launch of two fast and 
lightly armed cruisers, which, built expressly for the purpose 
of scouting, have done good service with the fleet, the Iris 
and Mercury. In 1883 were launched four fine vessels of the 
Amphion class, with a speed of seventeen knots. 

In 1884, an immense step forward was taken. That year, 
the Armstrong company launched the famous Esmeralda, a 
vessel which on a very small displacement, carried a 
tremendous armament. Her speed on the mile reached the 
figure of i8'28 knots, phenomenal at that time. She had an 
end-to-end steel deck i inch thick, curving up amidships. In 
her, forced draught was employed, air being pumped into the 
stokehold and driven into the furnaces, thus greatly increasing 
the rate of combustion. The influence of her design is visible 
in at least three classes of English ships, or indeed, in every 
cruiser we have built since her day. The four second- 


class cruisers of the Mersey type, launched in 1885-6, are an 
improvement upon her. They are larger, have far stronger 
end-to-end decks, and an armament in which, whilst the heavy 
guns are not so large, the auxiliary guns are much more 
numerous. In 1885, too, were commenced seven "belted 
cruisers, " which might again be called greatly enlarged and 
improved Esmeraldas. They had been preceded a year or 
two, by the two Imperieuses which are French in type and 
design, and approach the battleship more closely than the 
cruiser. The new belted cruisers of the Aurora type were of 
5600 tons, and were more heavily armed than the Merseys. 
They carried amidships, a belt of lo-inch armour, and were 
protected by bulkheads against raking fire. A third class 
of cruisers, designed more especially to combat the torpedo- 
boat, appeared in the Archer and her sisters small ships 
heavily armed. 

Cruisers having diverged and developed as a class apart 
from the battleship, now begin to subdivide, and to develop 
classes amongst themselves. In first-class cruisers designed 
for ocean work, with a powerful armament to fight all comers, 
the Blake succeeds the "belted cruiser." She is far larger, 
far faster, and is heavily armed, whilst some of her guns are 
behind thin armour. The only protection on the water-line 
is a stout armour deck. She and her sister Blenheim are 
followed by the nine Edgars, a little smaller and slower, but 
none the less splendid ships. Then in 1894, follow the two 
largest unarmoured cruisers which have ever been laid down, 
the Powerful and Terrible, each of 14,200 tons, with water- 
tube boilers, phenomenal speed, and armament almost wholly 
behind armour. Following these again in 1895, are four 
rather smaller vessels of 11,000 tons, with an armament 
wholly quick-firing.' 96 ' 

In other navies, the "belted cruiser" has persisted and 
developed, and there are signs that we shall recur to it. 

* For tabulated details of the leading English cruisers see Table XXIII. 


Russia has in hand, or completed, three huge vessels of this 
type, whilst France has launched six very remarkable ships 
almost wholly covered with thin armour. These are the 
Dupuy de Lome and her daughters ; and their thin mail might 
render them awkward antagonists to our unbelted ships. 

In second-class cruisers we dropped a little in size, with a 
reduction in armament, from the Merseys to the Medeas, 
which are now rated third-class. But from the date of the 
Medeas begins a steady rise in displacement, armament,, 
freeboard, and coal endurance. The Apollo class of 1880, 
eleven in number, are the parents of the larger Aeolus class 
and of the Astreas. The Astreas, again, lead up to the 
Minerva class, which are of the displacement of our first-class 
" belted cruisers." the Auroras, and they are, in their turn, 
followed by larger vessels. 

Of third-class cruisers, descended from the Medea or 
Archer, the chief types are the Blanche and Pearl class, with 
the newer Pelorus. Here, also, the tendency to increased 
displacement is visible, though not so plainly. 

In smaller craft the torpedo-boat has grown and progressed 
till it has attained extraordinary speeds, and is capable of 
keeping the sea in moderate weather. Between the French 
Chevalier of 1893, steaming twenty-seven knots, and the 
small launch of 1877, which could not exceed seventeen knots, 
there is an immense difference. But in its progress the 
torpedo-boat has produced new types of ships expressly 
designed to combat it, and harry it. The first type is the 
torpedo-gunboat, of which the French Bombe of 1885 was the 
predecessor. In England it appeared with the Rattlesnake^ 
and as usual, grew rapidly in size, till our later vessels of the 
class approach in size the third-class cruisers. Experience, 
however, showed that these vessels could not, on the open 
sea, run down a hostile torpedo-boat, as their speed was not 
sufficiently great. Some kind of craft which should be able 
to deal with the torpedo-boat was urgently required ; and the 
torpedo-boat destroyer appeared to eerve the purpose. These 



little vessels are very large and very fast torpedo-boats, and 
are not only well adapted for the task of harrying the torpedo- 
boat pure and simple, but are also capable of acting as 
torpedo-boats themselves. The speed which they have at- 
tained is extraordinary ; on the mile, the Daring achieved 
twenty-seven knots, and thirty knots are promised in those 
now under construction. Here at last progress seems to be 
reaching its limit, as the screw is not adapted to give a 
higher speed than this. Other methods of propulsion may, 
however be perfected in the future.* 

The torpedo has not remained stationary amidst the whirl 
of change. We have seen it in its crude form scoring successes 
in the American Civil War, when it may be said to have been 
brought to birth. Stationary " infernal machines " were 
succeeded by " infernal machines " which were towed by 
ships ; these were by no means satisfactory, and were aban- 
doned in the seventies. The spar-torpedo, carried on a boom, 
which could be run out from a boat or ship, lived longer, and 
it is not certain whether at the present day, in the hands of 
cool and determined men, it might not claim as many victims 
as the Whitehead. The latter weapon differed from its 
precursors in being automobile. It was first tried in 1868, in 
a crude and imperfect form. Its distinctive feature lay in this, 
that it was a small ship propelled by engines, driven by com- 
pressed air, and carrying a heavy charge of gun-cotton forward. 
It was of 1 6 inches diameter, the speed was nine knots, and 
the charge carried uylbs of explosive. England purchased 
the right to manufacture it, and was followed by most 
European powers. The early English type of torpedo was 
14 inches in diameter with a speed of eighteen knots, and a 

* Hydraulic propulsion by means of a jet of water directed astern, was tried 
on the Waterivitch in 1866, but proved a complete failure, owing to the excessive 
power required to obtain a very low speed. It was again tried in 1878 by 
Sweden, and in 1881 by England. As compared with the screw there is a 
loss of 60 per cent, of the power. It may, however, come back, but the 
difficulties to be faced with it are great. A wheeled ship has been projected 
by M. Bazin in France, but has not been tried except in a model, and could be 
of little u~e in war. 


charge of 32lbs. Gradually the speed and charge rose till the 
newer varieties of 1 4-inch torpedo run thirty knots and carry 
65105 of gun-cotton. As it was doubtful whether even this 
amount of explosive would fatally injure a large and modern 
ship, it has been succeeded by the i8-inch torpedo with igolbs. 
to 2Oolbs. of gun-cotton. 

The range of a Whitehead of the latest pattern does not 
much exceed 350 yards when the ship which fires it is in 
motion. A vessel at rest may make hits at a range of 
800 yards, but at such a distance practice is very erratic, and 
500 yards is perhaps the extreme limit for ordinary purposes. 

There are numerous varieties of automobile torpedo other 
than the Whitehead, but none are so perfect, or have been so 
widely adopted. Last of all has appeared the steerable or 
controllable torpedo, which is guided in its course from the 
ship or the shore. Of this type are the Brennan, Halpine, 
and Nordenfelt torpedoes, and though they have not as yet 
won favour, they may do so with gradual improvements. 

Whilst dealing with the torpedo we must notice the various 
attempts at submarine navigation. The Confederate "Davids" 
were the first attempt at warfare below the surface. The 
French Goubet was a small, egg-shaped craft, propelled by 
electricity at a speed of only five knots, with a torpedo 
attached outside by a bayonet catch. This vessel was 
launched in 1888 and is of little value. Italy claims in the 
Pullino to have a thoroughly satisfactory submarine boat,- 
and the United States are building a vessel which can be 
driven awash, or below the surface, by steam or electricity. 
But the problem of steering a boat below the surface has 
yet to be overcome, and there is some possibility that a com- 
pletely immersed vessel might be very seriously affected, even 
at some distance, by the explosion of her ow r n torpedo. More- 
over, most craft of this kind display a dangerous tendency to 
dive, when their sides would be crushed in by the tremendous 
pressure. None the less submarine attacks upon ships in 
harbour are a possibility of the future. 

S 2 




WE have seen that it was France who led the way in the adoption of 
armour, whether for such harbour service craft as the Kinburn 
batteries, or for the sea-going battleship in the shape of the Gloire. 
The lead that she obtained in 1858 she has on the whole maintained 
since, and there is no country where more ingenuity and audacity 
have been displayed in the designing of warships. A short summary 
of French naval progress will best enable Englishmen to check 
their own advance. 

Contemporary with the Gloire, and precisely similar to her, were 
the armoured frigates Invincible and Normandie of wood, and the 
Couronne of iron. All were armed with the French 5o-pounder 
smooth-bore of 16* centimetres calibre. They were followed by two 
larger vessels, the Magenta and Solferino, laid down in 1859, anc ^ 
carrying fifty-four 1 6-centimetre guns in a two-decked battery. In 
them a spur for ramming appears for the first time. They again 
were followed in 1862 by ten frigates of very similar pattern to the 
Gloire, but carrying, instead of her 4/7 inch plates, armour 5^9 inches 
thick. They were also a trifle faster and more manageable. They 
were uniform in type, and this uniformity beyond doubt gave France 
an advantage which has in more recent years passed to England. 

* The following are the English equivalents of the French calibres in 
centimetres ; 

10 centimetres = 3'Q-inch. 

14 centimetres - 5'5-inch. 

16 centimetres : : 6'3-inch. 

19 centimetres = 7'4-inch. 

24 centimetres = ; g'4-inch. 

27 centimetres = iO' 

30 centimetres ;= ii'8-inch. 

32 centimetres := 12'6-inch. 

34 centimetres - = 13'4-inch. 


They carried from 880 to 950 tons of plating each. Their successor 
was the small ironclad Belliqueuse, of 3750 tons, generally similar 
in design to our Bellerophon, though, of course, on a smaller scale. 
She was intended for cruising in distant waters and was of wood. 
Her battery consisted of four 1 9-centimetre, four 1 6-centimetre, and 
four 14-centimetre guns. In 1865 the Alma type was introduced, 
and seven vessels were built after it. Wood was abandoned for the 
upper works, but still retained for the hull of the ship below the 
water-line. There was an end-to-end belt, a central battery, and 
above this on either beam a barbette tower with fire ahead and 
astern. The barbettes were slightly sponsoned out from the sides, 
and each contained one 1 9-centimetre gun. In 1868 the Ocean, a 
far more powerful ship, was launched, and in 1869 and 1870 she 
was followed by the sister ships Marengo and Suffren. The weight 
of armour carried rose to 1370 tons, and the thickness to 8'6 inches 
on the water-line. The hull was of wood, the upper works of iron. 
The battery was carried in a central armoured enclosure, and in four 
barbette towers, resting upon the armoured walls of the enclosure, 
amidships on either beam. The guns, as usual in the French 
type of tower, revolved on a turn-table inside a fixed armoured turret. 
The gunners were not adequately protected, but then on the other 
hand they could obtain a clear view of their enemy. In each tower 
was one 27 or one 24-centimetre gun, and in the central work four to 
six other heavy guns. Besides the heavy weapons an auxiliary 
armament of 12 and 1 4-centimetre guns was carried. The engines 
of the Suffren were compound.* 

In 1868 the Richelieu, an improved Ocean, was laid down. She 
had the four barbette towers of the earlier type, but a longer central 
battery. She carries in each tower a 24-centimetre gun ; in her 
central battery are six guns of 27 centimetres, whilst one of 
24 centimetres is placed forward under the forecastle. The armour 
is 8'6 inches thick. The speed on trial was 13'! knots. The hull is 
of wood below the water-line ; above it, outside the central battery, 
of iron. The weight of plating rises to 1690 tons. She was 
followed by three ships of similar type, which, however, differ slightly 
from her and from each other. The Trident has two barbette towers, 
and carries eight 27-centimetre guns and two 24-centimetre. The 
Colbert and Friedland carry, the former eight 27-centimetre and six 

* Particulars of most of these vessels are given in Table X. 


24-centimetre, the latter eight 27-centimetre guns, as their heavy 
armament. Their hulls are of wood, and their armour 8'6 inches at 
its thickest. 

In 1872 an enormous advance was made. Wood was abandoned, 
the draught of the ships designed reduced; deck protection was 
introduced, and recessed ports adopted. The Redoiibtable was the 
first battleship laid down which embodied these innovations. She is 
a central-battery and barbette ship, carrying in her central battery 
four 27-centimetre guns ; in two barbettes above the casemate, one 
on each beam, two more 27-centimetre weapons, and aft a seventh 
gun of this calibre. The barbettes have no protection against 
artillery fire, but the central battery is completely enclosed by armour 
10 inches thick. There is an end-to-end water-line belt, which 
amidships is 14 inches thick : 2502 tons of plating are carried. The 
ahead fire is delivered by four 2 7-centimetre guns, two in the barbettes 
and two in the central battery. The light or auxiliary battery is not 
forgotten, and eight 1 4-centimetre guns are disposed on the forecastle 
and quarter-deck. The speed on trial was 14-26 knots. The ship 
was originally fully rigged, but now only carries light military masts. 

The Devastation and Courbet followed the Redoubtable. The 
weight of armour is increased to 2700 tons, and the maximum 
thickness to 15 inches, but the belt is not end-to-end, the stern being 
left unarmoured. The general features of the Redoubtable s design 
are retained ; there is the central battery carrying four guns, 
34-centimetre in place of 27-centimetre, with fore-and-aft fire; there 
are the unarmoured barbettes above the central battery, carrying 
the 27-centimetre gun; but a heavy gun forward is added. 
Hydraulic gear of the Rendel pattern was fitted to the Devastation, 
and subsequently to her sister, and to successive French ironclads. 
The Devastation is perhaps the finest central battery ship that has ever 
been designed, and in all round fire was greatly superior to the 
English ironclads of her type and date. On trial she steamed 
1 5- 1 knots. She carries 900 tons of coal. 

The Amiral Duperre was begun in 1876, some months after the 
Devastation. In her the central battery completely disappears, and 
the barbette is triumphant. There are four barbette towers, two 
placed forward one on either bow, one amidships and one astern, at 
a height of 27 feet above the water. These barbettes are protected 
by 15-inch armour, and each contains one 34-centimetre 48-ton 
gun. They are, however, mere shallow trays of armour, resting 

Alma 1665 



Ocean /S6G 





V/S/*-S S/SS///A 







Am/ral Ban dm 


Iron Sf 




Car not 1831. 

Types of French Ironclads. 1858-1891. 
Material of Hull to Riyht. 

t. Armour to Left. 
Figures qive thickness of Armour in inches. 


upon the upper deck, with an armoured trunk running down to the 
protective deck ; and they expose the gunners' heads and shoulders,, 
whilst shells bursting underneath might bring them down through 
the ship's deck and bottom. There is a narrow end-to-end belt of 
armour 2\\ inches thick amidships. The weight of armour is 
2900 tons. There are fourteen 1 4-centimetre guns mounted amid- 
ships. The chief defect of the ship is the great extent of unprotected 
side which she exposes to the enemy's fire. In this she resembles 
the Inflexible, though she differs widely from that ship in her high 
freeboard and end-to-end belt. 

The Amir al Band in and Formidable, which followed the Duperre, 
are generally similar to her. There are three, instead of four, barbettes, 
and all are placed on the centre-line. The armour is of steel r 
i6| inches thick on the barbettes and 21^ inches amidships on the 
water-line, its weight reaching the very high figure of 4000 tons. 
The guns carried are three 7 5 -ton weapons in the barbettes, and 
twelve 14-centimetre guns amidships. As in the Duperre, practically 
the whole of the ship's side is open to the smallest projectile, and 
only little patches and strips of very thick armour are carried. In 
1880 were laid down three more barbette-ships, the Marceau r 
Neptune, and Magenta^ and a fourth, barbette-ship and turret-ship 
combined, the Hoche. In these ships there are four heavy gun 
positions disposed lozenge-wise, one forward, one aft, and one on 
each beam. Thus, three guns can in most positions be brought to 
bear on an enemy. The 75-ton weapons of the Baudin give way to 
the long 34-centimetre gun in the first three. The armour is 
17! inches thick on the narrow end-to-end belt; 13! inches on the 
barbette; and 3^ inches on the deck. The Hoche differs from the 
others in having two turrets, instead of barbettes forward and aft, 
containing each one 34-centimetre gun ; amidships she had two 
barbettes, each with one 27-centimetre gun. Her weight of armour 
is 3618 tons, and she is reported to be dangerously unstable ; indeed, 
great fault has been found with all the four ships of this class. But 
if they are indifferently protected above the water-line, they carry 
very powerful armaments, as they have no less than seventeen 
14-centimetre guns besides their main artillery. 

The Brennus followed them after an interval of eight years during 
which France only laid down second-class ships. She carried two 
turrets, fore and aft; in the forward one are two 34-centimetre long 
guns of about 71 tons weight; in the after turret is one 34-centi- 


metre gun. From end to end runs a i5|-inch belt of compound 
armour, and above this, amidships, is a lightly plated citadel. On 
this citadel stand four small turrets, two on each beam, each 
carrying one 1 6-centimetre quick-firer. Six more of these weapons 
are mounted in the citadel and separated from each other by splinter- 
proof traverses. Thus ten 1 6-centimetre quick-firers are carried, of 
which five fire on either broadside and four ahead or astern. The 
ship has not ram bows but a perfectly straight stem. As originally 
equipped for sea she was so grievously overloaded that she lacked 
stability. Very considerable alterations are being made in her. 

The Naval Defence Act, passed by the British Parliament in 1889, 
stimulated France to great exertions. In 1891 three first-class 
battleships were commenced the Charles Martel, Carnot, and 
Amiral Jaureguibeny. A return was made to the lozenge-wise 
disposition of the heavy guns which had been abandoned in the 
Brennus. The armament consists of two 3o-centimetre guns, one 
fore and one aft, and one 27-centimetre gun on either beam. The 
open barbette is abandoned and the turret adopted. An auxiliary 
armament of eight 1 4-centimetre quick-firers is carried; in the 
Jaureguibeny the quick-firers are placed in pairs in four lightly 
armoured turrets ; on the other two each weapon has a separate 
armoured turret and ammunition hoist. Thus the guns are well 
separated, and all in armoured positions. The plating carried is 
thick on the heavy gun positions and water-line, where it varies 
between 17! and 10 inches. There is an end-to-end belt of 
this stout armour. Above this again is a belt of 4-inch armour 
about 4 feet deep, running from end to end, but carried up 
forward and aft in the line of the bow and stern waves. The 
small turrets all have 4-inch armour. There can be no doubt 
that these are extremely fine and powerful ships, carrying as they do 
over 4000 tons of armour, but they expose a very large unarmoured 
surface. Their speed is to reach eighteen knots. 

Of closely similar design are the Bouvet and Massena. in which the 
enormous weight of 4160 tons of armour is carried.* The St. Louis, 
Charlemagne, and Gaulois, however, are widely different. In them 
a return is made to the fore-and-aft system of mounting heavy guns, 
and the lozenge is abandoned. Four 3O-centimetre guns are carried 
forward and aft, mounted in pairs in two turrets behind 15! inches 

* Eight lo-centimetre quick-firers are carried on these two ships in addition 
to the 14-centimetre quick-firers. 



of armour. Eight 1 4-centimetre quick-firers are mounted on the 
main deck, four on each side, behind 3-inch hardened steel. Two 
more are on the upper deck, protected only by shields, whilst on the 
hurricane deck six id-centimetre quick-firers are carried. There is 
an end-to-end water-line belt 15! inches thick amidships, tapering 
to the ends, and over this again a 3|-inch belt. The armour-decks 
are two in number ; one 3^ inches thick at the upper level of 
the thick belt, the other i| inches thick at its lower level. This 
gives these ships great protection against both ram and gun, as the 
belt is so strongly supported that it could scarcely be crushed in. 
The axial fire is very powerful. Six 1 4-centimetre, four lo-centi- 
metre, and two 3o-centimetre guns fire ahead or astern; on the 
broadside four 3O-centimetre, five 1 4-centimetre, and three 10- 
centimetre. The guns carried are of enormous length and have 
very high muzzle velocities. The three ships and the Massena all 
have the triple screw, which probably will add considerably to their 
manoeuvring power if not to their speed. 

No survey of the fighting strength of France would be complete 
which did not include her garde-cotes cuirasses, or armour-plated 
coast-defence ships. A few of these are good for nothing but 
harbour-work, but the great majority are capable of going to sea in 
moderate weather, and would certainly have to be reckoned with in 
the Mediterranean. The first of the class were the five armoured 
batteries built in 1855. The Taureau, a wooden ram with one 
24-centimetre gun, mounted forward in a barbette, followed in 1863, 
and a little later four similar vessels carrying two 24-centimetre guns 
in a revolving turret forward. In 1864 a number of floating batteries 
for harbour defence were laid down. They were very inferior ships 
even at the date of their design, and were good for little work at 
sea. In 1872, after the war with Germany, a new type of vessel was 
introduced, similar in general design to our Rupert and Glatton. 
The vessels of this class are mastless monitors, carrying one turret 
and two guns each. Their names are the Tempete, Tonnerre, Vengeur, 
and Fulminant. They were succeeded by two vessels of somewhat 
different design, the Tonnant and Furicux. These have one barbette 
forward, and another aft, with one 34-centimetre gun mounted in 
each There is a very thick end-to-end belt, but the freeboard is low, 
and the pair are not too seaworthy. Their design, however, was 
received with favour, and was repeated with improvements in the four 
ships, Caiman, Indomptabh, Reguin, and Terrible, which are larger, 


just as heavily armoured, and even more heavily armed. They carry 
each two 75-ton 42-centimetre guns, placed forward and aft, besides 
four lo-centimetre weapons. They were launched between 1881 
and 1885. About the same date eight small armoured gunboats of 
very doubtful value were added to the fleet. 

In the Jemmapes class the French coast-service vessel draws closely 
to the sea-going battleship. The Jemmapes and Valmy are of the 
Caiman pattern, with a 34-centimetre 7O-ton gun fore and aft in 
closed turrets. Amidships is a high superstructure, at the angles of 
which are mounted four 10-centimetre guns. These are excellent 
little ships, very well armed, handy, fast ; and even better are the 
Bouvines and Trehouart, in which there is a high freeboard forward ; 
in them the 34-centimetre guns are replaced by weapons of 
30 centimetres, and the number of lo-centimetre quick-firers is 
increased to eight. The speed is also raised. An improved ship of 
this class, the Henri II'., is to be laid down in 1896. 

By purchase at the close of the American Civil War, France 
acquired the monitor Onondaga, and the large casemate-ship 
Dunderberg, which was renamed Rochambeau. Both soon dis- 
appeared from the French Navy List. 

A third class of armourclad which has been built by France is the 
vessel for cruising on distant waters, or for encountering at home the 
cruisers which are now beginning to abound in all navies. The first 
ships of this class were the Alma and her sisters. These were 
followed some years later by the three small ironclads Galissoniere, 
Triomphati/e, and Victorieuse. They are all three of wood, with 
a complete belt 6 inches thick, and 4| inches of armour on their 
battery or barbettes. They are merely weak and slow ironclads, 
and have no important advantages as cruisers. For fighting purposes 
they are about as bad ships as our Nelson. They were succeeded by 
four much better ships the Ttirenne, Bayard, DuguescHn, and 
Vauban. The first two have hulls of wood, the last pair hulls of 
iron and steel. They are reduced copies of the Duperre, carrying 
four barbettes, arranged as hers are, one sponsoned out on each bow, 
one amidships in the centre line, and one astern. The thickness of 
armour and weight of guns are reduced by one half, and the heaviest 
weapon carried is the 24-centimetre breechloader. The speed of 
the four varies between fourteen and fourteen and a-half knots. 

Three years passed between the launch of the DuguescHn, the 
most modern of the four, and the designing of the Duptty de Lome. 


In the meantime the importance of speed had been recognised, and 
the advent of high explosives had made armour more than ever 
necessary. The Dupuy de Lome was commenced in 1886 and 
completed in 1894. She is a fast cruiser with a broad belt of 
hardened steel 4-inch armour reaching from some feet below the 
water-line to the level of her upper deck. Her armament consists of 
two 1 9-centimetre guns mounted amidships, one on either beam in 
sponsoned turrets, and six 1 6-centimetre quick-firers, each in a 
separate turret. Three of these guns are grouped forward, and 
three astern. End-on, two ^-centimetre and three 1 6-centimetre 
guns can be brought to bear ; on the broadside, one 1 9-centimetre 
and four 1 6-centimetre. There is a double armour-deck as in the 
newest French battleships, and the speed is twenty knots, which has 
not been in practice attained, There are two military masts, and the 
funnels are of unequal size a great disfigurement to the ship. But 
there is no denying her fighting value: she is well-gunned, fast, and 
well-protected. She was followed by a group of four similar but 
smaller cruisers. These have a wide belt of 3|-inch steel, and 
3^-inch hardened-steel turrets containing their armament six 
14-centimetre and two ig-centimetre guns. As in the Dupuy de 
Lome, the axial fire is very powerful. The speed is to be nineteen 
knots. In the T atouche-Treville the turrets and ammunition hoists are 
operated by electricity. A fifth, a slightly larger and faster cruiser, 
the Pothuau, is also in hand, and a sixth is projected. 

To unarmoured cruisers France has of recent years given great 
attention. Of the large first-class cruisers similar in design to the 
English Slakes and Edgars, she has only two constructed, the Tage 
and Cecille, but four more are being taken in hand.* In second-class 
cruisers she began with the Sfax, and the admirable Isly, Alger, and 
yean Bart, which are fast and powerful vessels. In all her modern 
cruisers she has aimed at two things, speed and powerful axial fire. 
Ton for ton her cruisers are more heavily armed, than those of 
England. The best known types are the Alger, Davoiit, and Pascal. 
The first carries four 1 6-centimetre and six 1 4-centimetre guns; 
the second six 1 6-centimetre quick-firers and four of 10 centimetres r 
the last four 1 6-centimetre and ten lo-centimetre quick-firers. In 
smaller cruisers of the third class are the Condor and Forbin types, 
which are better suited for scouting than for fighting. They are by 
no means strong ships, and are too small to be of much use at sea. 

* Including two which will be commenced in 1896. 


In the construction of torpedo gunboats France led the way with 
her eight vessels of the Bornbe class, which proved too weak for 
severe work at sea. The Leger and Levrier, which followed, are 
larger, but larger still are the three fine vessels, Casablanca, Cassini, 
D'Iberville. The latter, which has been tested on the measured mile 
and at sea, is probably faster than any of our many torpedo gunboats; 
indeed she is perhaps the fastest torpedo gunboat in Europe. 

With torpedo-boats France is very well supplied. From the first 
her sailors have attached great importance to torpedo warfare, and 
they are certainly second to none, whether in practical knowledge of 
their craft, or in the numerical strength of which they dispose. The 
French torpedo-boats fall into three classes. In the first are fifty-five 
large sea-going boats, over 125 feet in length. These might be able to 
accompany a squadron to sea even in the rough waters of the 
Atlantic. They regularly cruise with the French ironclads, but have 
not seldom, in bad weather, to make for port. Next come 173 boats 
of limited sea-going quality, some not good for much work at sea even 
in fine weather, others little inferior to the true sea-going craft. 
Finally, there are fourteen boats which are less than 86 feet in length, 
and which could be used only for harbour defence or attack. One 
has a hull of aluminium alloy, and did twenty-and-a-half knots on the 
measured mile. In her newest boats France has obtained very 
high speeds. Thus the sea-going Chevalier, on the measured mile, 
accomplished 27-2 knots in an hour. The Forban is expected to 
equal the Sokul's record with thirty knots.* 

Of submarine boats France has four the Goubel, Gymnote, 
Gustave Zede, and Morse. The first two are of little serious value : 
the last two are larger, but perhaps not much better. The Zede has 
a cigar-shaped hull, 131 feet long. Her displacement is 266 tons, and 
she carries a crew of eight men. Her motive force is electricity, stored 
in accumulators. The fumes from these have proved a source of 
great annoyance to her crew, and there have been extraordinary 
explosions on board when they were being charged. During her 
trials she descended forty and sixty feet, and moved about below the 
surface at a rate of six or eight knots, launching torpedoes. As, 
however, it is impossible to see at this depth she is a vessel of very 
doubtful value. The Morse is understood to be very similar to her 
in design. 

* The Sokul, a Russian destroyer, built by Messrs. Yarrow, did 30 knots for 
a short time on her trial : the Forban has since done 31. 

. ' ' . ft. 


Considering the French fleet as a whole, there can be no doubt 
that it is a most formidable force. The first-class battleships are 
all extremely well protected on the water-line, have a good freeboard, 
and a great height of command for their guns. But in the older vessels 
very little protection is given to the guns, and practically none to the 
gunners. The large auxiliary batteries could not be used in action 
against a modern ship. Again, a very great extent of the side is 
left exposed to any projectile a fault, however, which is equally 
shared by English battleships of their date. The French battleships 
of 1879 X 886 have all one perilous weakness that their heavy guns 
could be put out of action by bursting common shell underneath : 
this weakness occurs in our six " Admirals," but not in our turret- 
ships of the Inflexible type, nor in our battleships subsequent to the 
" Admirals.'' The French ships, too, are in many cases defective in 
the very important matter of stability. The Hoche, when three heavy 
guns are trained abeam, inclines fifteen degrees with quite a moderate 
helm. At this inclination her belt is submerged on the one side and 
her unarmoured bottom exposed on the other. Nor is the lozenge 
disposition of heavy guns without grave inconveniences. When the 
two heavy weapons amidships are trained axially, right ahead or right 
astern, their blast impinging upon the ship's works is liable to cause 
serious injuries to the structure, whilst it greatly interferes with the 
working of the auxiliary armament ; a bugle has to sound for the 
gunners in the line of the blast to retire. The great difficuhy 
and confusion which would result from this in battle is obvious. 
The French cruisers and battleships all exhibit this fault, and thus 
the axial fire, which is so formidable on paper, would dwindle very 
much in action. For exampl' 3 , the Dupuy de Lome could never 
fight five guns end-on. Her 1 9-centimetre weapons firing past her 
1 6-centimetre turrets would stun the men in them, besides blowing 
away the upper works of the ship. Of course the French understand 
this as well as their critics, and would never be likely to train the 
19-centimetre guns axially. They have striven to give their guns the 
widest possible angles of fire, and might find these wide angles of 
great value, when, under a heavy fire, portions of the ship's armament 
had been disabled. 

To compare the naval strength of Fiance with the naval strength 
of England is a difficult matter. It is almost impossible to evaluate 
personnel, and it is not much easier to evaluate materiel. The ships 
which these two rival claimants to sea power have built in the past 


are so widely different that action alone can decide their respective 
merits, and it is just possible that the test of war might prove one 
or other type wholly unsuitable. Generally, English designers have 
striven to protect the men working the guns : to do this they have 
reduced the length of the ship's armour. French naval architects, 
on the other hand, have given little attention to the protection of the 
men, and a great deal to the protection of the water-line. In 
consequence they have reduced the breadth of the ship's armour. 
Perhaps the English ironclads of the 1875-1885 period are a little 
better than the French, though they are, where the muzzle-loader 
has been retained, worse armed. The Inflexible at least gives her 
gunners good shelter, and protects well the bases of the heavy gun 
positions. The Duperre and Baudin are defective in each of these 
points, and their barbettes with their thin gun-shields are mere shell- 

The test of a battleship's capacity to fight in line is age, and here 
it is a case of the younger the better. Indeed naval progress generally 
removes ships from the first-class in ten or twelve years, Not that 
they necessarily become valueless : a good and well-built ship can 
generally be re-armed and re-fitted. But -after ten or twelve years 
the advance of artillery, of metallurgy, of boiler or engine-making, 
renders fresh combinations of the items which make up the com- 
promise necessary. Quick-firers may lead to the substitution of a 
great extent of thin armour for a little thick armour, and automatic 
heavy guns firing large projectiles with great rapidity, may again 
compel a return to a limited extent of thick plating. 

" Standard armoured ships,'' or first-class battleships, may then 
be defined to be ships not more than ten years old, reckoning from 
the date of their launch. It is usual to impose some limit of tonnage 
in addition, and as first-class battleships are generally reckoned, they 
must not displace less than 9000 tons. Yet small size is hardly such 
a serious disqualification as old age. In the so-called second-class 
battleships the armament is generally reduced, and the^e is less coal 
and ammunition, but there are certain instances where smaller ships 
are perfectly capable of work in line with their larger rivals. If 
recent battleships are to be subdivided, 8000 tons would appear to be 
a better point at which to draw the line. There will then be two 
classes of standard battleships, the one above 8000 and the other 
of and below 8000 tons, and in each case the ships must not have 
been launched more than ten years. The figures for England and 



O . 

m s 


France, including in the class certain ships such as the Conqueror, 
Baudin, and three of the Caiman class, \yhich the age limit would, 
if strictly enforced, exclude, are (in 1895) : 

Over 8000. Under 8000. Total. 

r, , , ( Building or completing 8 o 8 

En S ]and i Ready for sea... ....... 20 2 22 

p, V Building or completing 8 o 8 

" (.Ready for sea 7 8 15 

This comparison is a little unjust to France as it excludes from 
the first class the Courbet and Devastation which are exceedingly fine 
ships. On the other hand it does not show the homogeneity of the 
English fleet. Analysing the distinct types in either fleet and 
passing over small differences we get these figures : 

English Battleships. French Battleships. 

f 9 Majestic type. [Building.*] 3 Charlemagne type. ^Building.] 

\ i Renown. [Building.] 4 Carnot type. [Building.] 

J 2 Centurion type. . I Jaureguiberry. [Building.] 

\,8 Royal Sovereign type.f I Brennus. 

2 Nile type. 
5 " Admirals. 1 ' 

1 Sanspareil. 

2 Hero type. 

3 Magenta type. 
i Hoche. 

3 Formidable type. 

4 femmapes type. 

4 Caiman type. 

Ships, 30. Types, 8. Average ships j Ships, 23. Types, 9. Average ships 
of one type, 3*75. of one type, 2*55. 

* Two are now ready for sea and are so reckoned in the first comparison. 
t The Hood only differs in detail. 

The nine Majesties and the eight Royal Sovereigns form two 
homogeneous squadrons, in which each individual ship is superior 
to any vessel that France possesses. Eight indifferent but closely 
similar ships would probably be found superior in war to eight ships, 
each of which was better than those of the homogeneous squadron, 
but each of which was at the same time different from the other. If 
ships are kept as far as possible identical if a large number of each 
type are always laid down, the sailor who knows one knows all, and 
the training of the personnel is simplified. Similar and interchange- 
able armaments, similar turning-circles, and similar speed are factors 
of great value, and in our fleet they are combined with superior 
armament, coal endurance, and ammunition supply. The excess of 
tonnage which our newer ships exhibit when contrasted with French 
ships under construction is given mainly to these important elements 
in the compromise. On the other hand the French ships on the 
stocks are to be half a knot faster. 


There can be no doubt that England is very much ahead in 
standard battleships. Taking into consideration the small size of 
eight of the French ships, England is to France here about as five 
to three. If we turn now to second-class armoured tonnage, 
launched between 1875 and 1885, and if this class, like the standard 
one, is subdivided, the line being drawn at 7000 instead of 8coo tons, 
the figures are these : 

Over 7000 tons. Under 7000 tons. Total. 

England 14 3 17 

France 5 8 13 

Included in the English fourteen ships of over 7000 tons are the 
Thunderer and Devastation, which do not, strictly speaking, come 
within the age limit, but which have been completely re-armed, and are 
beyond question, fine fighting ships. The Imperieuse and Warspite, 
which verge upon the battleship, are also included. In the four 
smaller ships the Belleisle, Orion, and Rupert are reckoned. The 
last is an old ship, but, like the Thunderer, has been re-armed. These 
three are not capable of keeping the sea in all weather, but could 
probably be trusted for fighting in the Channel. Of the seventeen 
English ships only eight carry breech-loaders as their heavy armament; 
eight are still equipped with the muzzle-loader a most serious weak- 
ness ; and one has both breech and muzzle-loader. The French 
ships are made up as follows : The Trident and Colbert, both of 
wood, have been rejected ; the Friedland, with hull of iron, though 
launched in 1873, has been included, and with her two of the more 
recent armoured cruisers of Vauban type, the Duguesclin and Vauban, 
and six garde-cotes. Of the total thirteen six are of questionable 
sea-keeping quality. The others are fine and strong ships ; indeed the 
Devastation is as good as, or better than, any ship which England 
possesses in this class. Taking muzzle-loaders into account, there is 
little to choose between England and France in this class. 

There remain a certain number of ironclads which, though more 
than twenty years old, are capable of doing service in the line of 
battle or in reserve. In this category the figures are : 

England, 17; France, u. 

The English figure includes the old ships of Achilles' type, which are 
never likely to do much fighting in line, the Glatton and the Penelope. 
All the French eleven are of woo J, and six of them may be expected 
to disappear at a very early date. 


Of armoured ships, which it is difficult to class as battleships, 
England has h've coast-defence ships, and France eight small armoured 
gunboats. England has further ten armoured cruisers, three of 
which, the Shannon, Nelson, and Northampton, are of no great value, 
whilst the other seven could not face battleships. France has six 
armoured cruisers of Dupuy de Lcme type, which are finer craft than 
the unprotected cruiser, but inferior to the battleship. England has 
no ships of similar type. 

Merely considering figures and paying no attention to the duties 
which war would impose upon the respective fleets, there can be no 
doubt of the great preponderance of England. In standard ships 
her superiority is especially striking, but it is no less evident when 
we consider unarmoured ships. These may be divided into three 
classes : Over 6000 tons, over 2000 tons, and under 2000 tons. 
As the "protected cruiser/' the fast unarmoured ship with hori- 
zontal deck-plating, is a modern conception, most are recent. One 
or two fast but old ships which lack the armour-deck, are included in 
figures given, but no ship appears which has not clone more than the 
sixteen knots at her trial. 

r Over Under 


6000 tens. 


2000 tons. 

2000 tons. 

France . 




Finally the torpedo flotillas of the two powers are as follows : 

Torpedo f*?~ ist class and els ss Total is 

Gunboats. Destroyer?. |^|_ Boats. Boats. Small. ""^'^ 

England ............ 31 .. 62 ... 43 ... 26 .. 4 .. 93 ... 166 

France ............ 13 8 ... 47 ... 53 84 ... 50 ... 234 

As torpedo-boats are the weapon of the weaker power, England 
has given attention rather to vessels designed to combat them to 
torpedo gunboats and destroyers. It is doubtful whether either of 
these types will prove able to endure much work at sea, and there 
are many who hold the third-class cruiser is the vessel to meet the 
torpedo-boat. But if they are useless for cruising, the new destroyers 
will at least be superior to any torpedo-boat for torpedo work. 

Tables of naval strength, however, are only of value to give some 
faint adumbration of the truth : they cannot from their very nature 
deal with such vital points as organisation, training, discipline, and 
character. And here we have no means of comparison, no test 
except the stern trial of war. Yet the English sailor should be 



superior to the average French sailor, from the fact that the former 
is a long-service man, whilst the latter in many cases serves no more 
than four or five years in the fleet. Steadiness and discipline can 
only be assured by a long training, and there is little doubt that war 
would not find our sailors wanting in these essential qualities. On 
the other hand, with long service the provision of a trained reserve 
becomes difficult, and here France is better off than England. 

Lastly, the numerous claims upon the British fleet in war are to be 
considered. It is not enough to be stronger than France; England 
must possess that degree of superiority which will enable her to 
confine her opponents' ironclads to their ports, and prevent the 
hostile commerce-destroyers from plundering her commerce. It is 
possible that two battleships to the French one would be necessary 
for a close blockade. It is certain that four cruisers to the French 
one will not be found any too many in war. 

The probability of England having to confront an alliance, herself 
without allies, is one which politicians should consider. Russia and 
France will unquestionably be as strong or stronger in materiel, 
when compared with England, before the end of the century, unless 
England makes further and very determined efforts. On the other 
hand the single power has a great advantage against an alliance, and 
England holding the interior position could operate against the two 
allies, attacking each in detail. 

In a final table the results already obtained are recapitulated, and 
the Russian fleet is included for purposes of comparison : 

England. France. Russia. & Russia. 

Standard battleships 30 23 16 39 

Second-class battleships 17 13 5t 18 

Third-class battleships 20 n 6 17 

Harbour service ironclads 5 8 13 21 

Cruisers (armoured) ...'. 7* 6 4 10 

(unarmoured) over 6000 tons 17 4 o 4 

,, ,, over 2000 tons 68 22 3 25 

,, ,, under 2000 tons 17 12 O 12 

Torpedo gunboats 31 13 8 21 

Destroyers 62 8 17 25 

Sea-going torpedo-boats 43 47 55 IO2 

Smaller torpedo-boats 123 187 116 303 

* Excluding the Shannon, Nelson, and Northampton, which are reckoned as third-class battle- 
ships, t Including the three vessels of the Admiral Ortshakoff t)'pe and the Nachimoff. 


* Report of the French Committee in 1870 upon the 
practicability of attacking the Prussian Littoral. 

MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE : Rear-Admiral Dieudonne ; 
Duburquois, Chief of the Staff; Lacour, Colonel of Artillery 
Captains Quilio and Serras. 

ALSEN. The depth of water will not permit an approach to this point 
within at most 3300 yards, at which distance attack would be 
useless owing to the plunging fire of the forts. Nothing can 
be done here without a force to land. It is further most 
probable that there is defence by submarine mines along the 
shore. These would have to be removed, and this could not 
be attempted until the squadron was supplied with the 
necessary apparatus- 

DUPPEL AND KAPPELN. Quite out of reach of the ships' guns. Too 
little water in the bays. We could get at them with armoured 

ECKERNFORD. The isolated works could easily be destroyed. They 
are, however, of no importance, and unless troops can be 
thrown on shore the reduction of the forts would be insignificant. 

KIEL. It would be necessary to employ the whole strength of the 
squadron. The success of gun-fire is uncertain, on account 
of the height of the forts above the shore, and the losses which 
the assailants will certainly incur unless they can occupy the 
forts as they are silenced. The forts of Friedrichsort being 
destroyed, as the squadron would be unable to penetrate to 
the bottom of the bay within range of Kiel, owing to the 
obstructions, the torpedoes and all the means of defence which 
have there been accumulated, the French ships would soon 
be forced to .retire without even knowing the result of their 

T 2 


NEUSTADT. An open town without defence. The bay is so shallow 
that the French ships could not even reach with their projectiles 
the merchant ships, which are anchored some distance from 
the port, properly so called. 

It is the same along the coast as far as 

KOI.BF.RG. A strong place, besieged in 1807, and attackable from 
the sea at 2400 yards. Before attacking there it will be 
necessary to make a reconnaissance to make certain that the 
houses along the shore, especially the Casino, do not mask 
fortifications which would compel changes in the plan of 

DANZIG. The fort at the entrance of the bay is within range of our 
upper-deck guns, but only at a distance of 4500 yards. The 
battery guns could not be used elsewhere with advantage. 

CONCLUSION. Kolberg and Danzig alone can be attacked ; but 
the small effect which will result from these two attempts will 
be of a nature to deprive the French squadron of the prestige 
of its force. In order to operate usefully, special vessels are 
required, and the prospect of forcing the enemy to assemble 
his troops on this part of the littoral. But this end is 
unattainable without a landing force. 

* Rene de Pont Jest J.U.S.I., xxxiii., 230, and the original in the Moniteur 



Sea-going Ships. 





^ Black Prince 

( Enterprise* 

Monarch Collingwood 
Captain t ("Howe 


r Defence* 



Devastation (.Rodney (.Northampton 
Thunderer Benbow ^Imperieuse 
Dreadnought r'Anson (.Warspite 
Neptune (.Camperdown fAurora 


f Invincible 

Inflexible f Royal Sovereign 



1 Audacious 


Empress of India 


'Royal Oak*! 

| Vanguard t 




Prince Consort*! 
..Royal Alfred*! 

Llron Duke 


>. Royal Oak 


'Lord Clyde*! 
J.ord Warden*! 


( Victoria t C Centurion 
(.Sanspareil ( Barrleur 

' Minotaur 







Prince George 

^ Northumberland 







* Struck off Navy List. t I-ost at sea. 

Sister ships are bracketed. 

! Wooden hull. 


Coast Service Ships. 




Meteor *t 


| Gorgon 


Ro)-al Sovereign*! 

1 Hecate 

^Trusty *t 

Prince Albert* 



C Viper* 









Total ironclad 

ships built since 1855 


Lost at sea 

Struck off the 



Leaving eighty-two serviceable. 

* Struck off Navy List. t Wooden hull. 

Sister ships are bracketed. 




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Belligerent Right on High Seas. London, 1884. 
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Journal of the United Service Institution. London. (Cited as 


Proceedings of United States' Naval Institute. Annapolis, U.S.A. 
Information from Abroad. Navy Department. Office of Naval 

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Transactions of the Institution of Naval Architects. London. 
United Service Magazine. London. 
Army and Navy Gazette. London. 
Broad Arrow. London. 
Engineer. London. 
Engineering. London. 
Revue Maritime. Paris. 
Le Yacht. Paris. 
La Marine Fran^aise. Paris. 
Rivista Marittima. Rome. 
Mittheilungen des Seeivesens. Pola. 
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A series of articles on the various actions by those 
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From the Confederate point of view. 

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Gives original documents, &c., but often inaccurate. 

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A concise and accurate account of the U.S. Navy. 

Reports of the Secretary for the Navy, 1862 5. Washington. 

Official documents, &c. 
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Deal fully with the strategic aspects of the war. 

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vol. cxxxi. London. (Cited as Stenzel.) 
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Report of the Secretary of the Navy in relation to Armoured 

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Official documents, Confederate and Federal. 
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Reports, &c., of [Confederate] Secretary of the Navy. 

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The official Austrian account, probably revised by 

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A translation of the above. 

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Revue Maritime, vol. xvii. Paris. 

Gives Commodore Rodgers' (U.S.N.) Report on the 
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* Illustrated London News, 1866. London. 

Letters from British Officers at Valparaiso and Callao. 

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* Journal United Service Institution, vol. xxv. London. 
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L'Annee Maritime. 1879 81. Paris. 

Gives official documents. 



^Parliamentary Papers. 52. 1877. London. 
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ROCHE AND COWEN. The French at Foochow. Shanghai, 1884. 
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DE DONCOURT. Les Francais dans I'Extreme Orient. Lille, 1884. 


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Times, Standard, Army and Navy Gazette. 
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* Information from Abroad. 1894. Washington. 
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Black-wood's Magazine, 1895. London. 


McGiFFix. Century Magazine, 1895. New York. (Cited as 

This has not been used in the text, as it did not appear 
till the book was in the press. It has been employed in 
the notes, and is by far the best Chinese account of the 
Yalu that has as yet appeared. 

Broad Arrow, 1894. London. 

A series of articles on the Yalu, in which the hand 
of an eminent British strategist and tactician will be 

Slackwood's Magazine, October and November, 1895. 

Times, Standard, Pall Mall Gazette, Daily News, Army and 
Navy Gazette, United Service Gazette, Le Yacht, Marine 
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Plus d'Angleterre. Paris, i887. 

ARNOLD-FORSTER. In a Conning Tower. London, 1891. 

NELSON SEAFORTH. The Last Great Naval War. London, 1891. 

ROPE. Rome et Berlin. Paris, 1888. 

The "Russia's Hope." London, 1888. 

EARDLEY WILMOT. The Next Naval War. London, 1894. 

LAIRD CLOWES. The Captain of the Mary Rose. London, 1892. 


Originally I had intended that authentic and accurate illustrations 
of the various incidents described should be included, but as there 
were difficulties in the way of procuring such, which would have 
added largely to the size and cost of the book, I decided that 
photographs of the leading English and French ships would be 
preferable, and probably as useful. These have been necessarily 
placed at intervals throughout the two volumes, and not opposite the 
matter which they illustrate. Captain Mahan's flagship, the Chicago, 
has been given as an example of a fine type of modern rigged cruiser 
with heavy armament and fair speed. A number of Chinese and 
Japanese ships are reproduced from Mr. Ogawa's photographs. The 
Huascar is from a print in the " Illustrated London News," and the 
battle of Lissa from an Austrian painting. For the 6- and 8-inch 
quick-firers I have to thank Sir W. Armstrong, Mitchell, & Co. ; for the 
elevations of the Chen Yuen and Naniwa, which are from the " Naval 
Annual " of 1889, the Hon. T. A. Brassey; and for the " Chen Yuen 
in action," Mr. F. T. Jane. The elevations of English and French 
ironclads are all drawn to the same scale, and are compiled from the 
"Naval Annual," the "Engineer," Croneau's "Architecture Navale," 
and " Information from Abroad." The diagram of the Victoria 
sinking is from the Parliamentary Paper on the court martial. The 
" End of a Battleship " is reproduced from the " Cosmopolitan," 
and originally represented the destruction of the Aquidaban by a 
dynamite shell. The maps and plans are compiled by myself from 
various sources : the diagrams of the Yalu are necessarily to some 
extent conjectural. They are based upon the plans of Mr. Laird 
Clowes, Mr. Jukuchi Inouye", and the "Revue Maritime" for January, 



The illustration in the second volume, called " The Last of the 
Victoria,'' is from a photograph taken by Staff-Surgeon Collot, of 
H.M.S. Collingwood, and depicts H.M.S. Victoria as last seen off 
Tripoli, Syria, on the afternoon of the 22nd of June, 1893. It has 
been reproduced, by kind permission, from a print, the copyright of 
Mr. R. Ellis, of Va'letta, Malta. 





Weight in Ibs. 



3 U 


'.:: to 

Name of Gun. 




X oi 




.5 os 

jy SK 














2 IOO 











Smooth-bore ... . 

( 16,000 
(. 12,000 




2S \ 












8-inch . . 

5" 10,000 

I 55oo 

















(, 27CWt. ) 




6 1 




Parrot Rifle 








Parrot Rifle 

( 70 

( IOO 






< - 8-inch 

Parrot Rifle 




4 - 2-inch 

Parrot Rifle 







Parrot Rifle ....> 






Where there are two or more guns of the same calibre, but of different weights and sizes, 
and only one figure is given for range and elevation, that figure refers to the most powerful 

U 2 




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Fort Johnson 
,, Sumter 
,, Moultrie ... 
Battery Bee 
,, Beaurega 
Gregg ... 
,, Wagner 

Rounds fired 



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Huron . .. 














(.1 j 










ll ) 


















( 2 1 




Line No. 2. 


(.SS.B. S 
























































Line No. 3. 
Sant. de Cuba 

f 3 1 



Ft. Jackson 


(.SS.B. j 



















R. R. Cuyler 

( 2 \ 



(.2S.B. j 

Rhode Island 








(2 1 










New Ironsides 












i S3 



Malvern P 


R. = Rifled. S.B. = Smooth-bore. 





Vessels whose fate 
is not stated. 


Vessels on which 
Cargo only was 

Vessels Bonded 
or Sold. 

Vessels Released 
or Recaptured. 

Vessels used as 




























Olustee (ex-Tallahassee) 












Sailing Vessels. 








Jeff. Davis 













* The figures given in this table are based upon the returns of ships captured, in Scharf, 
p. 807-816, and differ slightly from those given in the text in some instances. There are the 
same differences and discrepancies in Scharf. 

t Includes the Hatteras. 






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Coast defence turret-ship. 
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ship ... Blanco Encalada... 
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Damage, &c. 

friomphante ... 


Armoured corvette 




VI 24-c/m, III 


6-4!" plating 

19 - c/m., VI 


Duguay frouin 


Composite cruiser 




V i9-c/m., V 

Hammock nettings amid- 


ships, starboard side, 

carried away. 



Cruiser, \Vooden 




XV i4-c/m. 

Struck a little forward of 

3rd gun-port. 

yolta r Courbet 


Cruiser, Wooden 
Sloop, Wooden ... 





XV i4-c/m. 
Ill 14-c/m., 

Shot-hole a little above 

Ill lo-c/m. 

W.L. amidships to star- 





45 2 


1 20 

Ill i4-Cym., II 








1 20 

II i4-c/m., II 








1 20 

II 14-c/m., II 



Two Torpedo Launches, Nos. 45 and 46, 16 knots speed, spar-torpedoes, crews of 10 men each. 








Damage, &c. 

YangWoor ... 


Composite cruiser 




VIII 3% ton 

Torpedoed, set on fire, 

M.L.R., I 6 

and sunk. 

ton M.L.R. 

Foo Poo 


Sloop, Vv^ooden 


6 10 


VI 45-pr., I 18 

Ran awav sunk and 

/ v 

ton M.L.R. 

back broken. 



Sloop, \Vooden 


6 10 

I ?O 

I 6-in 

Riirnt" and mink 

1 s w 

VI 4J-pr. 

Fei Yuen 


Sloop, Wooden ... 




VI 45-pr. 

Burnt and sunk. 

Ching Wei 


Sloop, Wooden ... 




Isjton M.L.R. 
IV. 4S-pr. 


Foo Sing 


Sloop, Wooden ... 




1 3* ton M.L.R. 


If 4S-pr., II 

Yu Sing 


Sloop, Wooden 


Ill Small 


Yang Pao ~) 
Chun Hing j '" 




I I4S3 




'. Burnt and sunk. 

Chen Sing ) 
Full Sing >"" 


Rendel Gunboats 

( 2S ] 
I 25 } 



I in ton, lo-in. 

Both sunk. 

Eleven war junks; seven launches fitted with .spar-torpedoes. 




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Class of 















2nd Class 













IV 9'2-in. 2i-ton B., IV J'7- 
in. B., VI 4'7-in. Q.F., II 
2-in., XI i-in., and V-4J-in. 
IV ic-in. M.L., IV i-in. 

River monitor 





1 80 










Nords., II Machine 
I 7o-pr. M.L., II i-in. Nords. 

X 6-in. Q.F., II 4'7-in. Q.F., 
V i-in. Nords. 
VI 4>in. O.F., VI 6-pr. Q.F., 











B ) 





VI Machine 
IX 5'7-in. M.L., IV machine 
or Nords. 
VI 4-in. M.L., II i-in. Nords., 
II machine 
II 6-in. B., II 6-pr. Q.F., II 
i-in. Nords. 
IV i2-pr. B., IV i-pr. Q.F., 


Madeira, paddle 
Purus, paddle ... 







IV i-in. Nords. 
II 9-pr. B. 
II i2-pr. S.B. 

Armed Merchant Steamers: Mercuric (1120 tons), Jupiter (1124), Urano (1119), Venus (1171), 

Meteoro (1082), Marte (1121), Pallas (845), Esperanca (823), Vieira da Cunho. 

Totpedo Boats : Iguatemy, Marcilio Diaz, Araguary, each 150 tons, 1550 H.P., 25 knots, 4 torpedo 
tubes, 2 6-pr. Q.F. ; four torpedo-boats (probably) 52 tons, 600 H.P., 13 knots, 2 torpedo-tubes, 2 i-in. 



Class of 





' ^ 

<u S 






5 I 


H _; i D 






Coast defence 







II 7-in. M., II i-in. Nords. 









IV 4'7-in. Q.F., III 6-pr. Q.F., 
IV i-in. Nords. 

,, ,, 

Primeiro de 


7 So 

'8 1 


VII 4'5-in. B., IV i-in. Nords. 


tt tt 


1 60 

1 60 



i 5 






I 6-in. M., II 32-pr. B., II 

i-in. Nords. 





II 4'S-in. B., IV i-in. Nords. 

tt it 




II 4'S-in. B., IV 3-pr. Q.F., 

" " 

IV i-in. Nords. 

Torpedo Gun- 






II 2o-pr. Q.F., IV 3-pr. Q.F. 



Armed Merchant Steamers : tfictheroy, Rio de Janeiro, Itaipu, America, Ad-vance, Finance, Allian^a, 
Seguranfa, t'igilanpia. 

Torpedo Boats : Piratiny ; 12 of various types, Yarrow and Schichau built ; 2 American built. 
B. = Breech-loader. Q.F. = Quick-firer. ' M. = Muzzle-loader. Nord. = Nordenfeldt. 











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5 might have been, for purposes 

irs of this ship are doubtful. 

j-inch and four J-inch guns. 

a quick-firer. It is counted as 
ble of guns.) Capt. McGiffin 

Q.F. = Quick-firer. 
P. = Partial deck. 





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Lissa, i, 230-248. 
Yalu or Haiyang, ii, 82-103. 


Aconcagua and torpedo-gunboats, 
ii, 29-30. 

Alabama and Hatteras, i, 154-5. 

,, ,, Kearsarge,\, 157-164. 

Albemarle, and Northern gunboats, 
i, 108, 109-110. 

Angamos, Battle of, i, 323-332. 
Arkansas and Carondelet, i, 71-2. 
Asan, Action off, ii, 67-71. 
Assar-i-Chevket a.nd Vesta, 1,304-5. 
Atlanta and Weehawken, i, 97-100. 
Charleston, Action off, i, 87-9. 
Coiiadonga and Esmeralda, i, 253. 
Foochow, Battle of, ii, 5-10. 
Fort Pillow, ,, ,, i, 67-8. 
Heligoland, Action off, i, 226. 
Iquique, Battle of, i, 315-321. 
Memphis, Battle of, i, 68. 

Merrimac, Congress, and Cumber- 
land, i, 14-20. 

Merrimac and Monitor, i, 25-32. 
Meteor and Bouvet, i, 279. 
Mobile, Battle of, i, 114-134. 
Riachuelo, Battle of, i, 259-260. 
Shah and Huascar, i, 308-9. 
Selma and Metacomet, i, 127-8. 


Off Alexandria, i, 337-357. 

,, Callao, i, 254-256. 

,, Charleston, i, 92-96, 101-2. 

,, Fort Fisher, i, 137-140, 141-2. 
,, ,, Donelson, i, 64-5. 

Henry, i, 63-4. 

,, Grand Gulf, i, 79-80. 

,, Lissa, i, 220 224. 

,, Min River, ii, 11-12. 

Mobile, i, 124-7. 

,, New Orleans, i, 45-57. 

,; Port Hudson, i, 74-77. 

,, Rio de Janeiro, ii, 38. 

,, Sfax, ii, 1-4. 

,, Vicksburg, i, 70, 78-9. 

,, Wei-hai-Wei, ii, 133. 

[See also Table XXV.] 

Albemarle, Sinking of, i, 110-113. 
Aquidaban, Sinking of, ii, 43-49. 
Batum, at, i, 298, 302, 303-4. 
Braila, at, i, 290-2. 
Caldera Bay, ii, 22-30. 
Shei'poo, ii, 13-15. 
Sukhum Kale, i, 298-310. 
Wei-hai-wei, ii, 129-132. 


ABBREVIATIONS, des. = described; m. = mentioned; M. = Map or Plan; 
n. = note ; PI. = Plate ; q. = quoted ; Tab. = Table. A few other obvious 
abbreviations have been employed. 


Abtao, Tab. xi, xvi, xxv ; des. i, 
313; at Antofagasta, i, 322. 

Aconcagua Tab. xvi ; des. ii, 18 ; 
engages Lynch and Condell, ii, 
29-30, 27. 

Achilles, Tab. xxii, des. ii, 220 ; 
at Alexandria, i, 343, 349 ; with 
Channel fleet, ii, 189; now of 
little use, ii, 272. 

Active, Tab. xxiii, ii, 255. 

Adalbert Prince, commands Ger- 
man squad., i, 273, 275. 

Adalbert, see Prinz Adalbert. 

Adler, engaged off Heligoland, i, 
226; at Kiel, 1870, i, 278. 

Admiral Ortshakoff, ii, 145. 

"Admiral" class consists of six 
barbette ships, named after 
famous admirals, ii, 230-1 ; 
bases of their barbettes un- 
protected, ii, 164, 269 ; patches 
of armour on, ii, 240; ii, 271. 

Adria, Tab. viii. 

Adriatic, M. xi, i, 216; Austro- 
Italian war in, i, 209-250. 

Advance, improvised warship, ii, 41. 
jolus, Tab. xxiii, ii, 257. 
, at Kinburn, i, xxxiii. 

Affondatore, Tab. vii ; des. i, 
212-3 i Persano's faith in her, 
215-6; tels. for her, 217; waits 
for her, 218; she arrives at Lissa, 
222; place in line, 232; un- 
manageable, 233 ; Persano moves 
to her, 233 ; part in battle, 238, 
240, 242, 243, 244, 250 ; sinks 
at Ancona, 245 ; mentioned by 
Persano, 249. 

Affonso Pedro, des. ii, 43 ; torpedoes 
Aquidaban, 46. 

Africa, Alabama off coast of, i, 
156, 172. 

Agamemnon, des. ii, 229; ni. 228. 
Agamemnon v. Melpomene, ii, 138. 

Agincourt, des. ii, 221 ; in Chan- 
nel squad., 185. 

Aguilar, on Blanco Encalada, ii, 
25 ; drowned, 27. 

Aguirre, on Huascar, i, 328 ; killed 


Ajax, des. ii, 228-9 ! m - 335- 
Akagi, Tab. xix ; loss at Yalu, 
xxi ; with J. Fleet, ii, 84 ; position 
in line, 88 ; hotly engaged, 91 ; 
retires, 91 ; re-enters battle, 93; 
loss, 105 ; damage, 1 10 ; speed, 
112; loses mast, 167; devolu- 
tion of command on, 181 ; m. 60, 
61, 101. 


Akerman, i, 286. 

Akitsusu or Akitsushima, Tab. 
xix ; loss at Yalu, xxi ; des. 
ii, 60 ; off Asan, 67 ; with Flying 
Squad, at Yalu, 84 ; position, 
88 ; off Port Arthur, 93 ; loss, 
105; off Wei-hai-wei, 128, 130; 
m. 71, 96. 

Alabama, State of, i, 64; coast 
blockaded, 181. 

Alabama, Confederate cruiser, des. 
i, 152 ; off Azores, 153 ; on the 
Banks, 153 ; at Martinique, 153 ; 
sinks Hatteras, 154-5 ; in central 
Atlantic, 156 ; at Pulo Condor, 
157 ; reaches Cherbourg, 157 ; 
action with Kearsarge, 158-163; 
sinks, 163 ; her crew saved, 164; 
gunnery, 164-5 > ner crew, 153, 
159 n. ; prizes taken, 157 ; effects 
of her cruise, 153 n., 169 n. ; 
measures which might have been 
taken against her, 169-173 ; 
m. 171. 

Alabama, U.S.N., Tab. v. 
Alabama claims, i, 174 n. 

Alagoas, Tab. xvii ; at Curupaity, 
i, 263 ; m, ii, 25. 

Albatross, at Port Hudson, i, 74 ; 
destroys stores, 77. 

Albemarle, Tab. xxv; construction, 
i, 106-7 i des. 107 ; actions with 
Federal gbs., 108-110; first 
torpedo attack on, no; second, 
111-113; sunk and raised, 113. 

Albemarle Sound, i, 106, in, 180. 

Albini commands wooden squadron, 
i, 209 ; against attack on Lissa, 
220; conduct, 221-2 ; insubordi- 
nate, 223; ordered to land men, 
224 ; position of, when Austrians 
appeared, 225 ; Persano signals 
to him, 232 ; conduct during 
battle of Lissa, 234-5, 240, 246, 
250; disgraced, 251 ; m. 248. 

Albrecht, on Ting Yuen, ii, 87 ; 
saves her, 97. 

Alderney, i, 210. 

Alexandra, English, elevation, PI. 
xxxvii, ii, 220 ; Tab. xii, xxi ; 
PI. xviii, i, 350 ; des. i, 338, 
ii, 223 ; at Alexandria, i, 338, 
342, 343 ; opens fire, 344 ; 
anchors, 346 ; loss, 349 ; damage, 
350 ; has armour deck, ii, 227 ; 
compound engines, 254. 

Alexandra, Austrian, at Lissa, i, 236. 
Alexandria, U.S.A., i, 80. 

Alexandria, Egypt, M. xviii, i, 340 ; 
riots at, i, 336 ; E. squad, off, 
336 ; forts at, 340-1 ; general 
order of E., 342-3 ; bombard- 
ment, 344-8 damage to forts, 
351-2 ; Egypt, account, 356-7; 
E. sailors landed, 349 ; m. ii, 

Alger, ii, 267 ; PI. xlv, ii, 268. 

Algiers. Line Toulon-Algiers in 
war of 1870, i, 275, 280; m. ii, I. 

Allianca, ii. 41. 

Alma, Tab. x ; elevation, PI. xlii, 
ii. 262 ; des. ii, 261 ; at Sfax, 
2-3 ; m. i, 267, ii, 191. 

Almanza, in Pacific, i, 252 ; bom- 
bards Callao, 255-6. 

Almirante Cochrane, Tab. xi, 
xvi ; cf. elevation of sister ship, 
Blanco Encalada, PI. xxi, ii, 28 ; 
des. i, 313 ; cleaned, 322 ; faster 
than Huascar, 322 ; sights her, 
324 ; comes up fast, 325 ; action 
opened with Huascar, 325 ; 
attempts to ram, 329, 331 ; 
shells Arica, 334 ; explosion on 
board, 335 ; declares against 
Balmaceda, ii, 16, 17 ; m. i, 
321, ii, 22. 

Almirante Condell, Tab. xvi, xxv; 
des. ii, 16-7 ; arrives from 
Europe, 21 ; sinks Blanco 
Encalada, 23-28 ; engages Acon- 
cagua, 29-30 ; at Caldera, 31. 

Almirante Lynch, Tab. xvi, xxv. 
References as to Almirante 



Almirante Tamandare, hit, i, 262-3 ; 
explosions, ii, 181. 

Almirante Tamandare, Tab. xvii ; 
des. ii, 36 ; in Melloist fleet, 
ib. ; fires ballistite, 39. 

Alsen, ii, 275. 
Althea, i, 134. 
Amazonas at Riachuelo, i, 260. 

America, South, Alabama off, i, 
156, 170; wars in, 252-264, 306- 
335 ; ii, 16-50. 

America, ii, 41, 42. 

American Civil War. See United 
States, Confederates; Index i, 
actions ; Index iii, Blockade, 
Commerce Destroyers, Inter- 
natianal Law. 

Amethyst, des. i, 307 ; seeks 
Huascar, ib. ; action with Huas- 
car, 308-9 ; not hit, 310, 

Amezaga, q. ii, 117. 

Amiral Baudin, elevation, PI. 
xlii, ii, 262 ; des. ii, 263 ; defects, 
147, 270. 

Amiral Duperre, des. ii, 262-3 
defects, 164, 270. 

Amiral Jaureguiberry, des. ii, 
264; m. 271. 

Amoy, ii, 65. 

Amphion, Tab. xxiii ; des. ii, 
255 ; in Mediterranean, 196. 

Ancona, It. fleet at, i, 215; 
Austrians off, 216-7 ! Persano 
delays at, 218; leaves, 220; 
Affondatore sinks at, 229; m. 221. 

Ancona, Tab. vii ; des. i, 213; 
unready, 216 ; under Vacca, 
219; at Lissa, 225; position 
in line, 232; gap after, 234, 236; 
collision with Varese, 240; badly 
handled, 250; m. 247. 

Andes, i, 314. 
Andrada, see America. 

Angamos, Battle of, M. xvii, i, 
326 ; des. 322-331. 

Angamos bombards Callao, i, 333 ; 
des. 332. 

Angioletti, Minister of marine, i, 

Angostura, i, 264. 

Anson, similar to Calling-wood; 

elevation PI. xxxix, ii, 232 ; des. 

ii, 231. See also " Admirals." 
Antilles, i, 269. 
Antofagasta, i, 322; ii, 18. 
Apollo, Tab. xxiii ; ii, 257. 

Aquidaban, Tab. xvii, xxv ; ele- 
vation forward, M. xxiv, ii, 46 ; 
hits on, 37, 39 ; torpedo attack 
on, and sinking of, 43-8 ; no 
large q.-f., 49 ; raised and re- 
paired, 50; name changed to 
24 de Maio, ib. ; mainstay of 
Mello, 49; m. 135, 137. 

Aquidaban, River, i, 264. 
Arabi Pasha, i, 336, 349. 
Araguay, i, 260. 

Archduchess Frederick. Tab. viii, 
i, 230. 

Archer, English, ii, 256-7. 
Archer, Confederate, i, 149. 
Arcona, i, 270, 278. 
Arcona, ii, 46. 
Arens, i, 294. 

Argentine Confederation, war with 
Paraguay, i, 257-9. 

Argonaut, i, 286 n. 

Arica, i, 307, 315, 322 ; bom- 
barded, 334. 

Ariel captured by Alabama, i, 154, 

157. 168. 

Arkansas, State, i, 37. 
Arkansas, i, 71-2. 

Armide, Tab. x, i, 267 ; in Baltic, 


Arminius, Tab. x ; des. i, 269; 
breaks blockade, 277, 281 ; in 
Elbe, 278. 



Armstrong, Sir W., Mitchell, & 
Co., ii, 36, 245, 248, 250, 255 ; 
v. also Elswick. 

Arrogante, i, 208. 

Asan, C. land at, ii, 51 ; action 
off, ii, 67-71 ; sinking of Kow- 
shing off, 72-75 ; m. 80. 

Aspic, Tab. xv. 

Assar-i-Chevket, Tab. xxv ; des. 
i, 287 ; at Sulina, 289 ; torpedo 
attack on, 299-300 ; action with 
Vesta, 304-5 ; m. ii, 137. 

Assar-i-Tewfik, i, 287. 

Astrea, Tab. xxiii, ii, 141, 257. 

Asuncion, i, 263. 

Atahualpa, Tab. xi ; des. i, 312; 

m- 333- 
Atalante, Tab. x, i, 267 ; in North 

Sea, 275. 

Athens, Policy of, in war, i, 184 n. 
Atlanta, i, 179. 
Atlanta, ex Fingal, details of, i, 

97-99 ; defeat and capture by 

Weehawken , 99-100. 

Atlanta, see Tallahassee. 
Atlantic, Russ. fleet in, 1877, i, 

Audacious, elevation, PI. xxxvii, 

ii, 220 ; des. ii, 222. 

Augusta, breaks blockade, i, 278, 
281 ; captures three French 
ships, 278, 280. 

Aurora, Tab. xxiii, ii, 256-7. 
Aurora, see Gustavo Sampaio. 
Australia, ii, 208. 

Austria. War with Italy, i, 211- 
251 ; fleet off Ancona, 216 ; 
Tegetthof, commander, 225 ; 
state of fleet, 226-7 compared 
with It., 227, want of guns, 226, 
228 ; personnel ill-affected, 227 ; 
ill-trained, 228 ; Lissa bom- 
barded, 221 225; fleet puts to 
sea, 229 ; battle of Lissa, 230- 
248 ; war with Denmark, i, 226. 

Avni-Allah, i, 287. 
Azazieh, i. 287. 

Azores, Alabama at, i. 152-3 ; 
strat. importance of, 170, 172; 
Augusta blockade at, 278. 


Bacchante, Tab. xxiii, ii, 255. 

Bahamas and blockade-runners, 
i, 86, 147, 185-187. 

Bahia, seizure of Florida at, 
i, 150; importance of, 170. 

Bahia, Tab. xvii, i, 259,261, 263. 
Bailey, i, 45. 
Baldwin, i, 1 10. 
Bali, i, 290. 
Balkans, i, 288. 

Ballistite, a smokeless powder used 
by Tamandare, ii, 39. 

Balmaceda, President, revolt 
against, ii, 16-17; downfall of, 
32-4; m. 79. 

Baltic, Campaign in 1870, i, 274, 
276-7; French strategy in, 271- 
281 ; difficulty of landing, 281 ; 
Russian fleet in 1877, 286 ; canal 
to North Sea, 285. 

Bangkok, i, 169. 

Banjo, ii, 84. 

Banks, General, i, 75, 80- 1, 154. 

Barbadoes, i, 149. 

Barfleur, sister to Centurion, 
Tab. xxii ; elevation, PI. xxxix, 
ii, 232 ; des. ii, 236. 

Barham, ii, 196-7. 

Barnaby, i, 228. 

Barros, i, 263. 

Barroso, i, 263-264; hits on, 262. 

Barroso, i, 258, 260-1. 

Basilisk, i, 226. 

Basques, m. i, 252. 

Bat, i, 1 88. 



Baton Rouge, i, 61, 69, 72. 
Battenberg, Pr. Louis of, ii, 152. 
Battery Bee, i, 87. 

Gregg, i, 87. 
,, Marion, i, 87. 

Batum, M. xvi, i, 298; boom at, 
i, 297 ; t. attacks on Turks at, 
298, 30! 3- 

Batzitshka, i, 286. 

Band in, see Amiral Baudin. 

Bayard, in China Sea, ii, 12 ; at 
Sheipoo 13 ; des. ii, 266. 

Bazaine, Marshal, i, 251. 

Bazin, Ship, ii, 258. 

Bazley, i, 113. 

Beacon, Tab. xii, i, 340. 

Beaufort, i, 184. 

Beaufort, \, 15, 19. 

Beauregard, General, q. i, 93, 97. 

Bedford, Lieutenant, i, 348. 

Behring's Sea, i, 167. 

Beja, ii, i. 

Belfast, i, 170, 172. 

Bell, Commander, i, 45. 

Bella Vista, i, 261. 

Belleisle, purchased from Turkey, 
i, 224, 272. 

Belleroplion, elevation PI. xxxvii. 
ii, 220 ; des. ii, 221 ; improve- 
ments in, 254 ; m. 185, 261. 

Belliqiieuse, des. ii, 261 ; m. i, 267, 


Belmont, Battle of, i, 63. 
Belnwnte, i, 260. 

Benbo-w, des. ii, 231 ; weakness 
of, 164. See " Admirals." 

Benjamin Constant, ii, 36. 

Benton, des. i, 62 ; at Vicks- 
burg, 78 ; at Grand Gulf, 79. 

Berenguela, in Pacific, i, 252 ; at 
Valparaiso, 253-4 ; a t Callao, 
255-6; damaged, 255. 

Beresford, Lord Chas., conduct at 

Alexandria, i, 346-7. 
Berki'irdelen, i, 289. 
Berlin Decree, i, 197. 
Bermuda, case of the, i, 200. 

Bermuda and the blockade, i, 
86, 98, 1 68, 1 86, 193 ; Florida 
coals at, 149. 

Berlin, ii, 58. 

Biberibe, i, 260. 

Bilboa, i, 199. 

Biobio, Tab. xvi ; at Caldera, ii, 

23, 26. 

Birkenhead, i, 152, 168, 307. 
Biscay, Bay of, i, 278 ; ii, 184-6. 

Bittern, Tab. xii ; at Alexandria, 
i, 340, 348. 

Bizerta, ii, i. 

Black Prince, sister to Warrior, 
Tab. xxii ; elevation, PI. xxxvii, 
ii, 220 ; des. 250. 

Black Sea, Russian fleet in, i, 134, 
286 ; Turkish in, 287. 

Blake, i, 155. 

Blake, sister to Blenheim, Tab. 
xxiii ; PI. ix, i, 174; des. ii, 256 ; 
m . , i , 311. 

Blakely guns ; early rifled, i, 147, 

Blanca in Pacific, i, 252 ; at Val- 
paraiso, 253 ; at Callao, 255-6. 

Blanche, ii, 257. 

Blanco Encalada, Tab. xi, xvi, 
xxv ; elevation, PI. xxi. ii, 28; 
des., i, 313 ; searches for Hua- 
scar, 322 ; sights her, 323 ; 
pursues, 324; enters action, 328; 
damage, 330- 1 ; blockades Callao, 
333. Revolts against Balmaceda, 
ii, 16-17; under fire at Valparaiso, 
19-20 ; launch attacks Imperial, 
21, at Caldera, 22 ; torpedoed 
and sunk, 22-29 I attempts to 
raise, 33; m, 135-137. 

Blanquilla, i, 153. 




Blenheim, Tab. \xiii, PI. ix. i, 
174 ; des. ii, 256. 

Blitz, i, 226. 

Boggio, It. deputy, on Re d'ltalia, 
i, 218 ; at Lissa, 221 ; does not 
change ship, 233; drowned, 242; 
complains of It. gunnery, 247. 

Boghaz Pass, i, 343. 

Bolivia. War with Chili, i, 312 ; 
army, 332. 

Boltiui, i, 286. 
Bombe, ii, 257, 268. 
Bordeaux, i, 289. 
Borneo, i, 157. 
Boston, i, 184, 202. 

Boue't Willaumez, commands Baltic 
squad., i, 272; puts to sea, id. ; 
instructions, id. n. ; off Jahde, 
273; fresh orders, 273-4; in 
Baltic, 276-7 ; strictures on, 281-2. 

Bouledogne, i, 267. 
Bourbaki, General, i, 272. 
Bourbon, i, 269. 

Bourke, Hon, M., Captain of 
Victoria, ii, 197 ; misgivings, 
197-8 ; character of Tryon, 198 ; 
jockeys with screws, 199 ; goes 
below, 202 ; acquitted of all 
blame, 205-6. 

Bouvet, gunboat, des. i, 279 ; 
action with Meteor, 279. 

Bon-vet, battleship, similar to 
Carnot ; elevation, PI. xlii, ii, 
262 ; des. ii, 264. 

Bowling Green, i, 64, 65. 
Braila. i, 288, 290-2. 

Brandenburg, compared with 
Majestic, &c., ii, 242-5. 

Bratec, i, 286, n. 

Brazil, Outrage on neutrality of, 
i, 150-1, 156; war with Paraguay, 
257-8; fleet, 259; personnel, 
259 ; battle of Riachuelo, 
260-1; Humaita, 262-3; board- 

ing attacks, 264 ; defeat of 
Lopez, 264. Revolt of Mello, 
ii, 35 ; Peixoto's fleet, 36; fight- 
ing at Rio, 37-40 ; Peixoto's 
acquired fleet, 40-41 ; collapse 
of Melloists at Rio, 42 ; tor- 
pedoing of Aqiiidaban, 43-49 ; 
lessons of war, 49-50. 

Brazil, i, 264. 
Brazos Island, i, 185. 
Breckinridge, Tab. ii. 

Brennan Torpedo, a controllable 
torpedo for coast defence, ii, 259. 

Brenmis, PI. viii, i, 160 ; des. ii, 
263-4 ; water-tube boilers, 254 ; 
m. 116, 135, 271. 

Brooke, designs Merrimac, i, 4, 5 ; 
m. 167. 

Brooklyn Navy Yard, i, 168. 

Brooklyn, Tab. ii, iv ; at New 
Orleans, i, 45; collides with 
Kineo, 48 ; receives a hot fire, 
50; supports Hartford, 51; 
at Vicksburg, 70-1 ; at Port 
Hudson, 74-5; at Mobile, 120; 
stops under Fort Morgan, 122-3; 
passes the fort, 125-6 ; loss, 132 ; 
at Fort Fisher, 137 ; blockades 
Mississippi, 144-5; off Galveston, 

Brown, ii. 34. 

Bruat, i, xxxiii, 211. 

Brunei, on the turret, i, 220. 

Buchanan, commands Merrimac, i, 
6 ; ill, 15 ; wounded 19 ; com- 
mands Tennessee, 117; his 
attempts to ram, 125-6; tactics, 
127; action with Federal fleet, 
130-1 ; wounded, 131 ; m. 25, 

Buenos Aires, i, 259, 261; ii, 21. 
Bulk Light, i, 270. 

Bulloch, q. i, 81 n., 149 n., 160 n., 
167 n., 170 n., 171 n., 173 n., 
175 n., 199 n. 



Burgoyne, commands Captain, ii, 
184; drowned, 188 ; m. 185, 187. 

Butler, General, i, 138-9. 
Byng, i, 224, 251. 


Cabral, i, 259, 263; boarding attack 
on, 264. 

Cadiz, i, 146. 
Ccesar, Majestic, ii, 237. 
Caiman, des. ii, 265-6; m. 271. 
Cairo, i, 38, 62. 

Cairo, des. i, 62 n. ; sunk by 
mines, 73, 84. 

Caldera Bay, M. xxi, ii, 21 ; 
torpedo affair in, ii, 22-27; action 
with Aconcagua off, 29 ; visited 
by torpedo craft, 31. 

Caldwell, i., 44. 
Caleb Cttsliing, i, 149. 
Caledonia, ii, 221. 

Callao, bombarded, i, 255-6 ; 
guns mounted, 255; torpedo 
affair off, 332 ; blockade of, 
333-4; long-range bombardment, 
333; m. 208, 253, 315. 

Cambrian, ii., 213. 

Camperdown, Loss at, ii, 106 ; 
frigates at, 139. 

Camperdown see Collingivood, 
"Admirals"; in Mediterranean 
fleet, ii, 196 ; turning circle, 
197 ; turns towards Victoria, 
199; collides with her, 200-1; 
precautions on board, 201 ; 
damage to, 205, ,160 ; telegraph 
fails, 168, 201 ; force of blow, 207. 

Canada, Tab. xxiii ; ji, 255. 

Canaries, i, 156 ; strategical im- 
portance, 170, 171, 172. 

Canet guns on Japanese ships, ii, 
58 ; hits at Yalu, .1.1.1.; po .ver of, 
1179, 25Q. 

Canseco, i, 322. 

Canton, i, 169 ; squad, ii. 62. 

Cape, The, i, 167, 170-1. 

Cape Blanco, i, 156. 

Cape Comorin, i, 157. 

Cape Fear River, i, 135, 186. 

Cape San Roque, i, 156, 170. 

Capetown, i, 156. 

Cape Verde, i, 171. 

Capita n Prat, ii, 17. 

Cappellini, on Palestra, \, 241. 

Captain, des. ii, 183; stability, 
184; favourable opinions of, 

185 ; in B. of Biscay, id. ; 
rolls heavily, 185-6 ; vanishes, 

1 86 ; last moments, 187-8 ; 
verdict of court-martial, 189 ; 
m. 207, 225, 239. 

Carbajal, i, 327. 
Carignano v. Principe di C. 
Carlo Alberto, Tab. vii, i, 222, 242, 
Carlson, i, 104. 

Carnot, elevation, PI. xlii, ii, 262; 
des. ii, 264; m. 154, 271. 

Carolina, North, i, 106, 181. 

Carolina, South, i, 78, 86, 177, 

Carondelet, des. i, 62 ; at Fort 
Henry, 63 ; at Fort Donelson, 
64-5 ; passes Id. No. 10, 67 ; 
at Fort Pillow, 68 ; engages 
Arkansas, 71; passes Vicksburg, 
78 ; at Grand Gulf, 79. 

Casablanca, ii, 268. 
Cassini, ii, 268. 

Castelfidardo, Tab. vii ; des. i, 
213; short of petty officers, 
215; at Ancona, 216; at Lissa, 
219, 222, 225 ; position in line, 
232 ; engages Kaiser, 239 ; 
damage, 245. 

Catskill, Tab. iii ; at Charlestown, 
i, 101 ; hits on, ii, 246. 

Y 2 



Cattegat, i, 284. 
Caucasus, i, 287. 

Caynga, Tab. ii ; at New Orleans, 
i, 45 ; passes forts, 46-7 ; en- 
gages Confederate gunboats, 54. 

Cecille, ii, 267. 

Centurion, Tab. xxii ; elevation, 
PI. xxxix, ii, 232; des. ii, 236; 
nickel - steel armour, 253 ; m. 
234, 237, 271. 

Cerbere, Tab. x, i, 267. 

Cliacabuco, Tab. xi ; i, 313. 

CJiacal at Sfax, ii, 2. 

Chalmers, ii, 254. 

Chalmette, i, 56. 

Champion, ii, 6, 27. 

Channel Isles, i, 210. 

Channel Squadron, French, in 
1870, i, 267, 278. 

Chao Yong or Yung, see Tshcio 

Charlemagne, des. ii, 264-5; com- 
pared with Majestic, &c., 242-5 ; 
m. 271. 

Charles Martel, ii. 264. 

Charleston, M. v, i, 92 ; North 
anxious to reduce, i, 86 ; defences 
of, 86-7 ; action off, 87-9 ; Dupont 
ordered to attack, 91 ; the attack, 
92-5 ; Beauregard on, 97 ; 
Dahlgren attacks, 101-2; torpedo 
affairs off, 103-4; fall of, 137, 
185; blockade of, 183; m. 2, 64, 
121, 135, 165, 183, 190, 194, 208 ; 
ii, 168. 

Chateau Renault, ii, 12. 
Chattanooga, i, 179. 

Chemulpho, Japs, land at, ii. 51 > 
m. 80. 

Chen Sing, Tab. xv ; ii, 5. 

Chen Yuen, Tab. xviii ; elevation 
and deck plan, PI. xxiii, ii, 
62 ; in action, PI. xxix, ii, 100 ; 
side after battle, PI. xxx, ii, 
no; cf. also Ting Yuen, sister 

ship, PI. xxxii, ii, 122; des. 
ii, 62-3; defects, 63-4; re- 
ported off Asan, 70, 72, 78 ; 
preparations on board, 79 ; in 
G. of Korea, 83 ; place in line r 
86, 88; decks drenched, 87; in 
battle of Yalu, 91-4, 97-8; shots 
fired, 109; hits on, in ; speed, 
112; on fire, 97, 113; torpedoes 
of, 114; value of armour, 121 ; 
projectiles on board, 125; at 
Wei-hai-wei, 126, 128 ; surren- 
dered, 133. 

Cherbourg, i, 134 ; action off r 

157-164; near Alderney, 210; 

Baltic fleet fits out at, 271-2; 

m. 275, 276 ; harbour enclosed, 

ii, 134- 

Cherub, i, 150. 
Chesapeake Bay, i, 179, 185. 
Chestakoff, i, 290-2. 
Chevalier, ii, 257, 268. 

Chi-an, Tab. xv ; ii, 5 ; position,. 
6 ; sunk, 7. 

Chicago, PI. vi, i, 96. 

Chickasaw, Tab. iv; des. i, 119; at 
Mobile, 119; position, 120; 
under Ft. Morgan, 123 ; attacks 
Tennessee, 131 ; bombards Ft. 
Powell, 134. 

Chicora, blockade-runner, i, 194. 

Chicora, Confederate; action off 
Charleston, i, 87-8. 

Chih Yuen, Tab. xviii ; PI. xxxi, 
ii, 114; des. ii, 65; in G. 
of Korea, 83 ; position in line, 
88; attacks Akagi, 91, 95; 
engaged by Yoshino, 92 ; at- 
tempts to ram and is sunk, 92, 
98, 101 ; cause of loss, 98, in ; 
deck did not save her, 120; m. 
102, 1 14, 1 19, 159. 

Childers, ii, 184. 

Chili. War with Spain, i, 253 ; 
issues letters of marque, id. ; 
Valparaiso bombarded, 253-4 ; 
captures Covadonga, id. ; re- 



quested to seize Huasca", 206. 
War with Peru and Bolivia, 
312 ; fleet, 313-4, Tab. xi ; 
configuration, 314, ii, 18 ; good 
gunnery, i, 318-9 ; loss of 
Esmeralda, 315 320 ; search 
for Huascar, 322 ; disposition 
of fleet, 322-3 ; capture of 
Huascar, 330; gains command 
of sea, 332. Congressional re- 
volt, ii, 16-7 ; desultory warfare, 
19-21 ; torpedoing of Blanco 
Enca'ada, 22-30 ; downfall of 
Balmaceda, 32 ; Itata affair, 

Chill icothe, i. 73. 

Chiltern, i, 337-8. 

China. War with France, ii, 4; 
squadron on the Min, 5-6 ; de- 
stroyed, 7-11 ; French pass 
Min forts, 12 ; torpedoing of 
Yn-yen at Shei'poo, 13-15 ; 
rice, 15. Quarrel with Japan, 
51 ; C. troops land at Asan, id. ; 
government of China, 54 ; C. 
navy 56, 62-65 ; docks, 65-6 ; 
Europe ms in fleet, 66 ; action of 
Tsi Yuen and Yoshino, 67-71 ; 
Koivshing sunk, 72-5 ; breaches 
of international law, 76-78 ; C. 
fleet at sea, 79-80 ; orders of Li 
Hung Chang, 81 ; fleet with 
convoy leaves Taku, 83 ; battle 
of Valu, 87-101 ; ships sunk, 
102 n. ; cowardice of C., 104; 
gunnery, ib., 108; loss, 105-6; 
guns, 108-9; damage, uo-i ; 
ammunition, 125, n. ; fleet at 
Port Arthur, 126; retire? to 
Wei-hai-wei, 126 ; Port Arthur 
captured, 127 ; torpedo attacks 
at Wei-hai-wei, 128-132 ; capture 
of Wei-hai-wei, 133. 

China Sea, i, 170. 

Citing Yuen, sister of Chili Yuen, 
PI. xxxi, ii, 114; Tab. xviii, 
xxv ; des. ii, 65 ; in G. of 
Korea, 83 ; place in line at 
Yalu, 88 ; part in battle, 92-3, 
99; loss, 105; hits on, in; 

fires, 99, 113; torpedoes of, 114; 
at \Yei-hai-wei, 126 ; torpedoed, 
132 ; sunk, 133 ; m. 119. 

Chin Wei, Tab. xv, ii, 5-6. 
. Chippewa, Tab. v, i, 137. 

Chiyoda, Tab. xix ; losses, xxi ; 

des. ii, 58 ; at Yalu, 84 ; 

position, 88 ; torpedoes Yang 
Wei, 93 ; no loss, 105. 

Cliokai, ii, 84. 
! Clwntka, i, 294. 


Chun Hing, Tab. xv. 
Cincinnati, i, 38. 

Cincinnati, des. i, 62 n ; at Fort 
Henry, 63; rammed, 68; sunk, 
80- 1, 84. 

City Point, i, 105. 

Clarence, i, 149. 

Clowes, W. Laird, q., i, 22 ; ii, 49, 

67. 159- 
Clydebank, ii, 208. 

| Cochrane, see Almirante Coch- 

: Colbert off Sfax, ii, 2-3 ; des. 261 ; 
m. 272. 

; Coles' turret design, i, 8, 33, 306, 
ii, 224-5, 220; designs Captain, 
183-4; drowned on her, 185-6. 

Collingivood, Tab. xxii ; eleva- 
tion, PI. xxxix, ii, 232; of 
" Admiral " class ; des. ii, 
230-1 ; defects, 233; m. 196. 

Collins, i, 150-1. 
Colomb, q. ii, 138, 169. 
Colombo, i, 259, 263. 
Colonel Lovell, i, 67. 
Colorado, Tab. v, i, 137. 

Colossus, Tab. xxii ; elevation, 
PI. xxxix, ii, 232 ; des. ii. 229; 
defects, 240; m. 231, 239. 

Columbiad, a heavy smooth-bore 
gun firing shell, i, I. 

Columbus, i, 61, 64-5. 



Comisa, i, 220, 222, 224. 

Comus, sister to Canada. Tab. 
xxiii, ii, 227. 

Concon, ii, 32. 

Condor, English, Tab. xii ; at 
Alexandria, i, 340 ; well handled 
by Lord C. Beresford, 346-47, 

Condor, French, ii, 267. 

Conestoga, des. i, 62 ; m. 63-4. 

Confederates, Southerners, Seces- 
sionists, Rebels, Citizens of the 
Confederacy of eleven States 
which seceded from the United 
States in 1861 ; naval resources, 
i, 1-2, 106-7, 117-18; cotton, 177, 
196; configuration, 179, 204-5; 
population, 179-80; food supply, 
37, 82-3 ; manufactures, 178, 
193-4 i importance of Missis- 
sippi to, 37, 83 ; rise of prices, 
83, 195-6 ; artillery, 40, 136 ; 
torpedo department, 102-5, 115; 
warships, 1-6,41-2, 87,98, 106-7, 
116-17; cruisers, 144-169. 

Congress, at Hampton roads, i, 14 ; 
attacked by Merrimac, 15 ; tries \ 
to escape, 18 ; burnt, 19 ; m., 34. 

Congreve, i, xxxii. 
Connyngham, i, 173. 

Conqueror, elevation, PI., xxxix, 
ii, 232 ; des., ii, 229; m., 232. 

Conrad or Tuscaloosa, i, 156. 

Constantine, Grand Duke, des. i, 
292; off Sulina, 293 ; offSukhum 
Kale, 298-9, off Batum, 301-3; 
m., 286. 

Constantinople, i, 287. 

Cooke, i, 106-7. 

Copiapo, ii, 24. 

Coquette, i, 188, 195. 

Coquimbo, i, 253. 

Cordite, a smokeless powder, ii, 1 12. 

Corrientes, i, 261. 

Corvette Pass, i, 342. 

Courbet at Foochow, ii, 4 ; destroys 
Chinese squadron, 7 12 ; passes 
Min forts, 12; at Sheipoo, 13-14. 

Courbet, des. ii, 262. 

Couronne, Tab. x.; des. ii, 260; 
m. i, 150, 267, 275. 

Couting Island, ii, 12. 

Covadonga, Tab. xi ; captured 
from Spain by Ch., i, 252-3 ; 
des. 313-14; left at Iquique, 
315; action with Independencia, 
316-19; escapes, 320; damage 
to, 321 ; sunk, 334; m., 322, 323, 

Craven, T.A.M., drowned on 
Tecumseli, i, 124. 

Craven, T.T., i, 49-51 ; 311 n. 

Crimean War. Bombardment of 
Kinburn, i, xxxiii-vi, landing on 
Crimea, 281 ; high-angle fire, 
355; m., 207. ii, 218, 220, 245. 

Cuba, i, 147, 187. 

Cumberland, Hampton Roads, i, 
14; attacked by Merrimac, 16- 
17; heroism of her crew, 17; 
rammed 16 ; value of her re- 
sistance, 18 ; m, ii, 160. 

Cumberland River, i, 6l, 63. 
Curupaity, i, 262, 263. 
Curuzu, i, 262. 

Gushing. Torpedo' attack on 
Albemarle, i, 1 1 1-3. 

Custozza, i, 217. 

Cuyler, R.E., Tab. v, i, 137, 148. 

Cyclops, des. ii, 226. 

Cygnet, Tab. xii ; i, 340. 

Czarevitch, i, 290-2. 

Czarevna, i, 290-2. 


Da Gama, ii, 39, 42. 

Dahlgren, in command at Char- 
leston, i, 100; unsuccessful 
attacks, 101 ; m. 121, 194. 



Dahlgren guns, heavy smooth- 
bores designed by the above, i, I, 
5, 10, 26. 

Dalmatians in Austrian fleet, i, 

D'Amico, i, 220-1. 

Danube, torpedo actions on, i, 
289-295 ; Sulina attacked, 295-7 ! 
m. 287, 288. 

Danzig, i, 278 ; ii, 276. 

Daring, PI. x, i, 208 ; des. ii, 258. 

Dauphin Island, i, 114. 

" David," i, 103, 208 ; ii, 259. 

Davis, i, 67, 69, 74. 

Davotit, ii, 267. 

Dawkins, ii, 191-2. 

Decoy, Tab.xii, i, 340. 

Deer, i, 188. 

Deerhound, i, 160, 163. 

Defence, ii, 220 n. 

De Grasse, i, 38. 

De Gueydon, i, 277. 

De Horsey, commander on Pacific 
station,!, 306; attacks Huascar, 

De Kalb, ex St. Louis, des. i, 62 ; 
at P"t. Henry, 63; at Ft. Donel- 
son, 64-5; on Yazoo,*8o ; sunk, 

Delaware, River, i, 154. 
Delaware, State, i, 149, 179. 

Denmark, orders turret-ship, i, 
8, 33; war of 1864, 33, 226; 
France hopes for her alliance, 
271 ; m., 273, 276, 280-81. 

Depretis succeeds Angioletti, i, 
215; despatch to Persano, 217-8; 
responsible for attack on Lissa, 

Desaix, ii, 2. 

D'Estaiiig, Tab. xv ; at Foochow, 
ii, 4, 6-9; descends Min, n. 

Desterro, ii, 43, 45. 

"Destroyer," des. ii, 257-8; m. 
ii, 148 ; i, 208. 

Destroyer, see Piratiny. 

Devastation, English, Tab. xxii ; 
elevation, PI. xxxvii, ii, 220 ; 
des. ii, 225-26; crew, 213; deck, 
227 ; low freeboard, 239; hand- 
worked guns, 247 ; m. 233, 272. 

Devastation, French floating bat- 
tery, i, xxxii-vi. 

Devastation, French battleship, des. 
ii, 262 ; hydraulic machinery, 
247 ; m. 274. 

Diaz, Marcilio, Tab. xvii, ii, 37. 

D'Iberville, ii, 268. 

Dieppe, i, 273. 

Dieudonne, i, 267, 272, ii, 275. 

Dilaver Pasha, i, 289. 

Dixon, i, 104. 

Djigit, i, 290-2. 

Docka, i, 286 n, 

Doctor Batey, i, 74. 

Dog river, i, 117. 

Donau, Tab. viii, i, 227. 

Don Juan of Austria, Tab. viii ; 
des., i, 226-7 ! position in line 
at Lissa, 230 ; part in battle, 243. 

Doubasoff, i, 290-1. 
" Double-enders," des., i, 182 n. 
Douglas, Gen. Sir H., q., i, 4, 34. 
Dover, i, 157. ii, 135. 

Draclie, Tab. viii ; des., i, 227 ; 
position at Lissa, 230; engages 
Palestra, 235 : part in battle, 243. 

Dragon, i, 29. 

Dreadnought, des., ii, 226 ; m., 
196, 202, 239. 

Dryad, ii, 213. 

Duboc, ii, 13-14. 

Duburquois, ii, 275. 

Duckworth, Admiral, i, 38. ii, 50. 



Dugnay Trouin, Tab. xv ; at Foo- 
chow, ii, 4, 6-9 ; descends Min, 


Dnguesclin, ii, 266. 

Duke of Genoa, Tab. vii. 

Dumbarton, i, 165. 

Duncan, General, i, 42, 44, 58. 

Dunkirk, i, 276, 278. 

Duperre, see Amiral Duperre. 

Dnpont or Du Pont, captures Port 
Royal, i, 184, 281 ; in command 
before Charlestown, 89 ; attacks 
unsuccessfully, 92-95 ; by order, 
91 ; refuses to renew attack, 
95 n. ; recalled, TOO ; m. 97, 121, 

Duppel, ii, 275. 

Dupuy de Lome, French naval 
architect, ii, 219. 

Dupuy de Lome, PI. xv, i, 311; 
des., ii, 266, 257 ; end-on fire, 
269; fit for line, 143; m. 273. 

Dursternbrock, i, 270. 


Eads, J. B., naval architect and 
engineer, designs Mississippi 
gunboats, i, 62, 73 ; monitors, 
119; introduces armour-deck, ii, 

East Gulf Squadron, i, 185. 

Eastport, i, 64. 

Echo, i, 143. 

Eckernford, ii, 275. 

Eckernsiinde, i, 33. 

EC aireur, ii, 13. 

Eclipse, Tab. xxiii ; m. ii, 140-142. 

Edgar, Tab. xxiii, ii, 256; m. i, 311, 

ii, 155, 196. 
Edward's Ferry, i, 106. 

Egypt. Riots at Alexandria, i, 
336 ; English fleet before, 336- 
340 ; Egyptian forts, 340-1 ; 
English ultimatum, 342-3 ; bom- 
bardment, 344-348 ; damage to 
forts, 351-2. 

Eider Canal, i, 278. 
Elbe, i, 226, 274, 277, 278. 

Electric Spark, captured by Florida, 

i, 150, 168. 
Elgar, Professor, q. ii, 174, 207. 

Elizabeth, Empress, Tab. viii ; at 
Lissa, i, 237-8. 

Elizabeth i, 277-8. 
Ellerbeck, i, 270. 
Ellet, i, 68. 

Elswick, ii, 36, 59. See also Arm- 

Enterprise, English, ii, 221. 
Enterprise, U.S.N., ii, 6-7. 
Era No. 5, i, 73. 
Erebus, i, xxxiii. 

Ericsson, J., designer of Monitor, 
i, 6-7 ; letter to Navy Depart- 
ment, 6-7 n. ; introduces turret, 
8-9; his critics, 11-2; ships can- 
not fight forts, 9; ; night attacks, 
97 ; invulnerability of his ships, 
i, 266, ii, 246 ; later designs, i, 
89 ; the Destroyer, ii, 40 ; Stock- 
ton, ii, 211 ; and the Stevens' 
battery, ii, 218 ; armour deck, 
227; and Napoleon III., i, 8, ii, 

Esmeralda, wooden cruiser, Tab. 
xi, des. i, 313; captures Cova- 
donga, 253 ; left at Iquique, 
315; action with Huascar, 316- 
319; sinks, 319; m. 331. Steel 
cruiser, Tab. xvi ; des. ii, 17-8, 
255; aids insurgents, 16; m. 22, 

29, 22. 

Essex, frigate, i, 38, 133, 150. 

Essex, gunboat, des. i, 62 ; at Ft. 
Henry, 63 ; attacks Arkansas, 

Esperanca, ii, 39. 

Esploratare, Tab. vii, i, 216, 217, 

220, 225. 
Europeans in Chinese Navy, ii, 

66, 87. 
Excellent, i, 152. 




Faa di Bruno, at Lissa, i, 236-7. 

Farragut, D. G. life, i, 38-9; at 
New Orleans, 45; his conduct, 
48-9 ; difficulties, 58-9 ; at Vicks- 
burg, 69-70 ; attacks Arkansas, 
72; at Port Hudson, 74-6; 
destroys stores, 77; leaves Mis- 
sissippi, 80; at Mobile, 118, 
asks for ironclads, 119; his dis- 
positions, 1 20; letter to his wife, 
120-1; on position of admiral, 
45, 120, ii, 151-2, n. ; climbs rig- 
ging, i, 121 ; takes the lead. 
124-5 ! passes the fort, 127 ; 
rams the Tennessee, 130 ; narrow 
escape, 130 ; on his crew, 133 ; 
use of chain armour, 160 ; com- 
pared with Tegetthof, 226, 228; 
with Bouet Willaumez, 281-2; 
on armour, ii, 120-1 ; m. 50, 144, 
151. 153- 

Fasana Canal, i, 228, 229, 248. 

Favourite, ii, 221. 

Fayal, i, 153, 273. 

Fearless, ii, 196-7. 

Federals, or Northerners, the in- 
habitants of those States which 
were faithful to the Union in 
1861. Sea United States. 

Feiseen, renamed InJiandtiay, ii, 41 . 

Fe'i Yuen, Tab. xv ; at F'oochow, 
ii, 5, 6-9. 

Ferdinand Maximilian, Arclidnke, 
abbreviated to Ferdinand Max 
or Max, Tab. viii ; des. i, 
226-7 ! flagship, 229 ; place in 
line at Lissa, 230 ; rams Re 
d' Italia, 236-7; rams unknown 
vessels, 238 ; share in the battle, 
242 ; m. 243 ; ii, 160. 

Fernandina, i, 184. 

Fernando de Noronha Island- 
Neutrality infringed, i, 151, 156 ; 
strateg. importance of, 170-1. 

Ferre Diego, killed on Huascar, i, 

1 Feth-i-Bulend, i, 287, 293. 
Fetli-iil-Islam, i, 289, 290. 

Fieramosca, Ettore, Tab. vii, i, 

i Finance, ii, 41. 

Fingal v. Atalanta. 

Finisterre, ii, 185, 186. 
, First of June, battle of, ii, 106, 115. 
, Fishbourne, q. i, 34. 

Flandre, des. i. 267, and Tab. x. 

Flavio Gioja, i, 219. 
Florida, i, 177, 181, 184, 187. 

Florida, ex Oreto, des. i, 146-7 ; 
at Nassau, 147 ; runs into 
Mobile, 148 ; runs out, id. des- 
troys commerce, 148-9 ; prizes 
captured, 149 ; on Northern 
coast, 150 ; seized at Bahia, 
150-1 ; sunk, 151. 

Florida Straits, i, 170. 
Flusser, C. W., killed, i, 108. 

Flying Squadron, Japanese, off 
Asan, ii, 67; attacks Tsi Yuen* 
67-71 ; at Yalu, 84, 88, 124. 

Fong commands Tsi Yuen, ii, 67-8 ; 
sentenced to death, 71 ; careless- 
ness, 72 ; misconduct at Yalu, 
99, ioo. 

Foo Citing, ii, 66. 

Foochow, destruction of Chinese 
squad, off, ii, 4-11 ; dock, ii, 65 ; 
squadron, 62, 134. 

' Foo Poo, Tab. xv ; at Foo-chow, 

ii. 5. 9- 

Foo Sing, Tab. xv, xxv ; at 
F'oochow, ii, 5, 6-7, 65, 126. 

Foote, in command on upper Mis- 
sissippi, i, 28, 63; wounded, 67. 

| Forbach, i, 275. 
Forban, ii, 268. 
Forbiu, ii, 207, 216. 
Fo est Queen, i, 78. 



Formidabile, Tab. vii ; des., i, 
212-13 ; at bombardment of 
Lissa, 222-23 ; position during 
battle of Lissa, 225 ; steams off, 
232 ; damage during bombard- 
ment, 245 ; PI. xliv, ii, 266. 

Formidable, sister of Amiral ffait- 
din, which see, ii, 263, 147. 

Fort Ada, Tab. xiii ; des. i, 
340; guns disabled, 351 ; m., 
342, 347, 349, ^55, 356. 

Fort Ajemi, Tab. xiii; des. i, 
340; m., 356. 

Fort Andes, ii, 19. 

Fort Beauregard, i, 87, Tab. iii. 

Fort Buchanan, i, 137. 

Fort Bueros, ii, 19. 

Fort Charles, i, 69. 

Fort Constantine, i, xxxi. 

Fort De Russy, i, 80. 

Fort Donelson, capture of, i, 64-5. 

Fort Fisher, its importance, i, 135 ; 
des. 135-7 ! fi rst naval expedi- 
tion against, 137 ; the powder j 
boat, 138; bombardment 139-40; 
second expedition, 140 ; bom- j 
bardment, 141 ; capture, 142. 

Fort Gaines, des. i, 115; capture, 


Fort Henry, capture, i, 63-4. 
Fort Hindman, i, 73. 
Fort Hospital, i, 347, 352, Tab. xiii. 

Fort Jackson, des. i, 40; bom- 
barded- by fleet, 43-4 ; passed by 
fleet, 45, 54; garrison, 57;.m., 
39, 56, 59, 127, Tab. ii. 

Fort Kamaria, i, 340, Tab. xiii. 

Fort Lage, ii, 38. 

Fort La Mercede, i, 256. 

Fort Lighthouse, 342-43, 346 ; 
ceases fire, 347. 

Fort Marabout, Tab. xiii, i, 340 ; 
engaged by Condor, 346-47. 

Fort Marsa, Tab. xiii, i, 340, 346. 

Fort Martello, i, 351. 
Fort McAllister, i, 90. 
Fort Monroe, i, 35. 

Fort Morgan, des. i, 114-15; 
passed by the fleet, 122-127; 
shots fired, 128 ; captured, 134. 

Fort Moultrie, i, 92. 
Fort Nikolaiev, i, xxxiv. 

Fort Oom-el-Kubebe, Tab. xiii ; 

des. i, 340 ; guns disabled, 352 ; 

m., 343- 
Fort Pharos, Tab. xiii ; des. 

i, 340 ; evacuated, 347 ; guns 

disabled, 351 ;' m. 343, 349, 355, 

Fort Pillow, i, 61 ; battle of, 67-8; 

captured, 68. 

Fort Powell, i, 114, 134. 

Fort Ras-el-Tin, Tab. xiii ; des. 
i, 340 ; Moncrieff gun, 341 ; guns 
disabled, 352 ; m. 337, 342, 346. 

Fort St. Philip, Tab. ii ; des. i, 
40; passed by fleet, 46-54; fall 
of, 56; m. 45-9. 

Fort Saleh Aga, Tab. xiii, i, 340; 
guns disabled, 351. 

Fort Santa Cruz, ii, 37-8. 
Fort Sao Joao, ii, 38. 39. 
Fort Silsileh, Tab. xiii ; guns 

mounted at, i, 337 ; position, 

340; m. 342, 351. 

Fort Sumter, Tab. iii ; position, 
i, 86-7 ; attacked by Dupont, 
92-95; by Dahlgren, 101-102; 
Ericsson urges night attack on, 

Fort Valdivia, ii, 19. 

Fort Villegagnon, ii, 37, 38, 42. 

Fort Wagner, Tab. iii, i, 87, 92, 


Foster, General, i, 107. 
Fondroyante, i, xxxii. 

Fourichon commands French North 
Sea squad., i, 267, 275-277. 


Fox, G. V., i, 38, 91, 184. 

France. Unprepared state of navy 
in 1870, i, 265; ships, 266-268; 
expedition to Baltic, 271 ; dis- 
patch of a squad. 272-3 ; Fouri- 
chon leaves Mediterranean, 275 ; 
difficulty of coaling, 276; gunners 
landed, 276 ; blockade, 278 ; and 
China, see China. Declares rice 
contraband, ii, 15 ; navy, ii, 
260-266 ; compared with Kng- 
lish, 269-274. 

Franquet, i, 279. 

Fraser, Trenholm & Co., i, 194. 

Fratesti, i, 289. 

Frederick, Archduke, Tab. viii, i, 


Friedland, ii, 261, 272. 
Friedrich, Karl. See Prinz, itc. 
Friedrichsort, i, 270. 
Frisbee, i, 53. 
Fuentes, ii, 22, 30. 
Fuh Sing, Tab. xv, ii, 5. 
Fulminant, ii, 265. 
Fu Lung, Tab. xviii. 
Funk, i, 167. 
Furieux, ii, 265. 

Fi/soo, Tab. xix ; loss, xxi ; des. 
ii, 57 ; at Yalu, 84; position, 88; 
hotly engaged, 91 ; very slow, 
103 ; loss, 105 ; kept station, 
113 ; m. 124. 


Gaeta, Tab. vii. 
Gaines, i, 118, 128. 
Galatz, i, 288. 
Galena, Tab. iv, i, 9. 120. 

Galissoniere, des. ii, 266 ; at 
Sfax, ii, 2-3; in the East, 12. 

Galsworthy, Captain, ii, 73-75. 
Galvez, i, 256. 

Garezon, i, 329. 

Garibaldi, i, 211. 

Garibaldi, Tab. vii, i, 221. 

Gaitloise, i, 267, 272, 

General Beauregard, i, 67, 69, 85. 

General Bragg, i, 67-8. 

General Jeff. Thompson, i, 67. 

General Lovell, Tab. ii, i, 68-9, 


General Quitman, Tab. ii, i, 42. 
General Stirling Price, i, 67, 68, 78, 


General Suinter, i, 67, 68. 
General Van Dorn, \, 67. 
Genesee, i, 74-5. 

Geneva Arbitration, i, 149, 174. 
Genoa, i, 21^. 
Georgia, State of, i, 177, 178, 181. 

Georgia, ex Japan, des. i, 165-6 ; 
m. 170, 174. 

Germany, coast of, i, 268 ; fleet, 
269, 270 ; measures for coast 
defence, 273; dispositions dur- 
ing war of 1870, 278; Arminius 
and Elizabeth, 277; Meteor and 
Bouvet, 279; well prepared, 

Gibraltar, i, 146; ii, 134, 217. 

Gibson, Miiner, q. i, 168. 

Giglio, Tab. vii. 

Giraffe, i, iSS. 

Gladiatetir, ii, 2. 

Glasgow, i, 165. 

Glassell, i, 103. 

Glatton, floating battery, i, xxxiii. 

Glatton, turret-ship, ii, 226, 272. 

Gloire, Tab. x; des. ii, 218-9, 
260 ; m. i, 7, 267 ; ii, 220. 

Gobernador Island, ii, 35. 
Golden Rocket, i, 145. 
Goni, ii, 24, 27. 



Gonzalez, ii, 25. 
Goodrich, q. i, 354. 
Gorgon, ii, 226. 
Goubet, ii, 259, 268. 
Gourdon, ii, 13-4. 
Gourko, General, i, 287. 
Governolo, Tab. vii, i, 240. 

Governor Moore, Tab. ii ; des. 
i, 41-2 ; engaged, 55 ; sunk, 56. 

Goya, i, 261. 

Grand Duke Constantine, see Con- 
st antins. 

Grand Gulf attacked, i, 70 ; falls, 
80 ; m. 70, 77. 

Grant, General, i, 63, 64 ; at 
Shiloh, 65 ; at Vicksburg, 73, 
77-8 ; testimony to services of 
fleet, 82, 83; m. 24,80, 81, 84. 

Gravelotte, i, 281. 
Great Belt, i, 277. 
Great Eastern, ii, 241. 

Greene, S. D., on Monitor, i, 14, 
26, 30-1. 

Greville, i, 315. 
Griffiths, i, 328. 
Gril'e, i, 278. 

Grosser Kurfiirst, des. ii, 196 ; 
with German squad., 192; ram- 
med by Kbnig WilJielm, 192-3 ; 
sinks, 193-4. 

Guacoldo, i, 332, 333. 

Guale, Tab. xvi ; ii, 30-1. 

Guanabara, Tab. xvii ; ii, 36. 

Guerriere, ii, 174. 

Giiiscardo, Tab. vii; i, 220, 221. 

Gustava Zede, ii, 268 ; PI. xlvi, ii, 270. 

Gusffivo, Sampaio, ex Aurora, des. 
ii, 36 ; arrives, 39 ; torpedoes 
Aquidaban, 44-49 ; damage to, 
46; m. 42, 43. 

Guyenne, i, 267, 272. 
Guzman, ii, 27. 
Gymnote, ii, 268. 


Habana, see Sumter. 

Habsburg, Tab. viii ; des. i, 226; 
position at Lissa, 230 ; part in 
battle, 242. 

Haines Bluff, i, 80. 

Haiyang, Battle of. See Yalu. 

Haiyang-tao Island, ii, 84, 85. 

Halifax, i, 168. 

Halpine torpedo, ii, 258. 

Hampton Roads, i, 14, 22, 24, 104, 

Hanneken, Major Von, strate- 
gical adviser to Admiral Ting, 
ii, 66 ; on the Ko-wsliing, 72-3, 
75 ; on TinifYuen, 87 ; wounded, 

Hannibal, ii, 237. See also Majestic. 
Harding, I., i, 346. 
Harriet Lane, i, 183. 

Hartford, flagship of Farragut ; off 
Mississippi, i, 37 ; position at 
battle of New Orleans, 45-6; in 
battle, 48-52 ; at Vicksburg, 
70-1; at Port Hudson, 75-6; 
destroys stores, 77 ; at Mobile, 
1 20, 121-5; engages Tennessee, 
130 ; loss, 132, Tab. ii, iv ; m. 
ii, 144. 

Harvey process, des. ii, 253. 

Hashidate, Tab. xix ; losses, xxi ; 
PI. xxii, ii, 58; des. ii, 58-9; 
at Yalu, 84 ; place in line, 88 ; 
hoists Ito's flag, 92 ; loss, 105 ; 
hits, 1 10, 167. 

Hatteras Island, i, 180, 184. 
Hatteras, sunk by Alabama, i, 

154-5, 157- 
Havana, i, 56, 144, 171, 187, 195, 


Havre, i, 278. 
Hayti, i, 153. 
Hecate, ii, 226. 
Heckmann, Herr, ii, 87. 



Hector, ii, 189. 
Heimdal, i, 226 n. 
Helicon, Tab. xii ; i, 340. 
Heligoland, Action off, i, 226 ; 

French off, i, 275. 
Henri Grace a Dien, ii, 212. 
Henry Clay, i, 78. 
Herbal, i, 263-4. 
Hercules, Tab. xxii ; des. ii, 221-2 ; 

m. 185 ; elevation, PI. xxxiii, ii, 


Hero, ii, 229, 271. 
Heroine, i, 267, 275. 
Hertha, \, 270, 278. 
Hervey, M., ii, 21, 28, 31. 
Hickley, ii, 190. 
Higgins, Col., i, 44, 52, 58. 
Hirst, i, 298. 
Hi she r i, 289. 

Hiyei, Tab. xix; losses, xxi ; des. 
ii, 58 ; mythical battle, 79 ; at 
Yalu, 84 ; place in line, 88 ; cut 
off from line, 91 ; passes between 
battleships, 91 ; detached for 
repairs, 93 ; part in battle, 94-5 ; 
loss, 104-5 ; hits on her, 109 ; 
exterior appearance, 1 10 ; slow, 
112 ; m. 101, 126. 

Hobart Pasha, runs American 
blockade, i, 192, 195 ; with 
Turkish fleet, 287 ; q. 293, 297, 

Hobby, Engineer, i, no. 

Hoche, elevation PI. xlii, ii, 262 ; 
des. ii, 263 ; m. 269, 271. 

Hoel, i, 67. 

Hoffman, Herr, ii, 87, 100. 
Holyhead, i, 170, 172. 
Hong Kong, ii, 61. 
Hood, ii, 235, 240, 271. 
Hoste, Sir W., i, 219. 
Hotchkiss gun, ii, 250. 

Hotspur, ii, 226. 
Hotham, i, 20. 

Housatonic, Tab. xxv ; i, 89,. 
torpedoed, 103-4, 208. 

Howell torpedo, ii, 40. 
Hsutan, ii, 72. 

Hitascar, Tab. xi, xxv ; PI. xvi, i, 
328; des. i,3o6; crew mutiny, 306,' 
molests Kng. ships, 306 ; attacked 
by Shah, 308-9 ; escapes, 309 ; 
damage, 309-10 ; compared with 
her opponents, 310-1 ; speed in 
1879, 314; action with Esmeral-ia, 
315-9 ; rams and sinks Esme- 
ralda, 319; bad gunnery, 317-8^ 
crew demoralised, 318; damage 
320; attacks Magal'anes, 321; 
harries coast, 321 ; captures 
Rimac, 322 ; sighted by Chilians, 
323 ; battle of Angamos, 324- 
331 ; crew demoralised, 327 ;: 
attempts to ram, 328; surrenders, 
330 ; repaired, 332. Under 
Chilian flag. Tab. xvi ; block- 
ades Callao, 333 ; declares for 
Congress, ii, 16-7; at Caldera, 


Huasco, ii, 22. 

Humaita, Attacks on, i, 262-264? 
abandoned, 264. 

H umber, i, 343. 
Hunt-Grubbe, i, 343. 
Huron, Tab. v, i, 137. 
Hitsum or Biisum, i, 278. 
Hydra, ii, 226. 
Hyeue, ii, 2. 


Ida, i, 134. 

Idjilalieli, Tab. xxv, i, 287 ;. 
torpedo attack on, 293-4. 

Ignacio, Admiral, i. 263. 
Iguatemi, Paraguayan, i, 260. 
Illinois, State of, i, 61. 
Illustrious, see Majestic, ii, 237, 



Iltis, ii, 75. 

Imperial, improvised war ship, ii, 
16; sent to Caldera, 20-22, 30; 
stratagem, 32, Tab. xvi. 

Imperiense, Tab. xxiii ; elevation, 
PI. xxxix, ii, 232 ; des. ii, 256 ; 
m. 272. 

Inconstant, Tab. xxiii, ii, 185-6, 
189, 254. 

Independencia, Tab. xi ; des. i, 
312 ; action with Covadonga, 
316-319; attempts to ram, 319; 
strikes rock and is abandoned, 
319-20; m. 314-5, ii, 177. 

Independenza, Tab. vii, i, 240. 

Indianola, des. i, 73 ; rammed and 
sunk, 74, 84. 

Indomptab'e, ii, 265. 

Inflexible, Tab. xii, xxii ; PI. 
xvii, i, 338 ; elevation, PI. xxxix, 
ii, 232 ; des. i, 338, ii, 228 ; at 
Alexandria, 338, 343 ; part in 
the bombardment, 344-7 ; little 
ammunition left, 348 ; loss, 349 ; 
damage, 350 ; effect of her fire, 
352-3 ; m. 342 ; tactical influence 
of her design, ii, 154; denuded 
of armour, 240 ; compound 
armour, 253 ; m. 196, 263, 270. 

Ingles, on the Japanese, ii, 53, 103. 
Intrepide, ii, 2. 

Invincible, PLnglish, see sister ship 
Audacious, Tab. xii ; des. i, 
339 ; ii, 222 ; at Alexandria, i, 
337 ; flagship, 336 ; manoeuvres, 
347 ; loss, 350 ; damage, id . ; m. 
342, 343. 344- 

Invincible, French, i, 267 ; in North 
Sea, 275 ; fuel runs short, 276. 

losco, Tab. v, i, 137. 

Iowa compared with Majestic, &c., 
ii, 242-5. 

Ipiranga, Paraguayan, i, 260. 

Iquique, Attack on Magallanes 
at, i, 321 ; action off (Esmeralda), 
315-320; m. 307 ; ii, 28. 

Iris, ii, 255. 

Iron Duke, with Channel squad., 
ii, 189 ; rams Vanguard, 190 ; 
her ram not damaged, 192 ; 
court-martial, 192 ; m. 58, 160, 
190, 191. 

Ironsides, Neiv ; des. i, 90 ; solid 
armour, 9 ; at Charleston, 93-4 ; 
hits, loi ; ii, 246; torpedo attack 
on, i, 103 ; at Fort Fisher, 137, 
139, 140; Tab. iii, v, xxv. 

Iroquois, Tab. ii ; at New Orleans, 
i, 45 ; engages gun-boats, 52 ; 
at Vicksburg, 70-1 ; blockades 
Sutnter, 145-6. 

Iscodra, i, 289. 
Island No. 10, i, 61, 66, 67. 
Isle of Serpents, i, 293. 
Ismail Bay, i, 300. 
Itaipu, ii, 39, 42. 
Itaipuru, i, 262. 

Italy threatens Austria, i, 211; 
naval preparations, 212 ; state 
of fleet, 212-3; personnel, 213; 
gunners, 214, 215, 246; fleet 
arrives at Ancona, 215 ; want of 
guns, &rc., 216; fleet ordered to 
sea, 218; attacks Lissa, 218-224; 
Austrians appear, 224-5 ! state 
of It. fleet, 225 ; no plans, id. ; 
the battle, 231-247; heroism of 
Re d' Italia' s crew, 237 ; of 
Pa1e<tro's, 241 ; mistake of It., 
248-9 ; type of It. battleships, ii, 

Itasca, Tab. ii, iv ; at New 
Orleans, i, 44; position, 45; 
passes forts, 53 ; retires, 54 ; at 
Mobile, 120, 128; torpedoed, 134. 

Itata, ii, 33-4. 

Ito training, ii, 53, 84; orders at 
Yalu, 87; why he drew off, 102-3, 
115; after battle, 126; at \Vei- 
hai-wei, id. at Port Arthur, 127 ; 
blockades Wei-hai-wei, 128-133 ; 
position in battle, 152 ; m. 56, 
88, 95, 124. 


Itsitkitsliinia, Tab. xix ; loss 
xxi ; PI. xxii, ii, 58 ; des. ii, 58-9 ; 
at Yalu, 84 ; position in line, 88; 
loss, 105 ; hit at Wei-hai-wei, 
133; m, 167. 

I v aliy, i, 262. 


Jackson, Lieutenant, killed at Alex- 
andria, i, 350. 

Jackson, President, i, 38. 

Jackson, Fort, see Fort Jackson. 

Jackson, Tab. ii. 

Jacob Bell, i, 148. 

Jahde, i, 270, 273, 276, 277. 

Jamaica, i, 155. 

James River, i, 35, 105, 180. 

Jamestown, i, 15, 19. 

jfanequeo attacks Union, i, 332-3. 

Japan, revival of, ii, 51-3; fleet, 
57-60; mercantile marine, 61 ; 
docks, id.; personnel, 53, 71 n., 
94, 117; disregard of Chinese, 
80, 82, 83 ; action off Asan, 67- 
71 ; sinking of Koivshing, 71- 
78 ; cruelty, 77-8; battle of Yalu, 
85-106; heavy guns, no-i; 
quick-firers, 111-2; signals, 119; 
captures Port Arthur, 127; block- 
ades Wei-hai-wei, 127-133; 
torpedo attacks, 128 132; m. 
i, 169, 269, 278. 

Japan, see Georgia. 
Jardine and Matheson, ii, 72. 
Jaureguiberry, i, 280. 
Jaureguiberry, see Amiral J. 
Java, ii, 174. 

Javary, Tab. xvii ; ii, 35 ; sunk, 

Jeff. Davis, i, 143. 

Jejui, Paraguayan, i, 258 ; sunk, 

Jentinapes, des. ii, 266; m. 145, 

Jeitne Ecole. The followers of 
Admiral Aube in France. They 
hold that the torpedo-boat and 
cruiser have displaced the battle- 
ship ; that speed is everything ; 
and they have a great belief in 
bombardments, i, 321-2, 355, ii, 
119; commerce destruction, i, 
314, ii, 119; war of coasts, i, 
321-2, 324, ii, 119; everything 
not changed, ii, 238. 

Jih-tao or Ihtao, ii, 128. 
John Elder, i, 306. 

Johnston, on board Tennessee, i, 
129, 131. 

Johnstone, C., captain of Camper- 
dotvii, ii, 20 1, 206. 

Jones, on Merrimac, i, 6, 25. 
Jouett, i, 128. 

Juniata. Tab. v, i, 137, ii. 6. 
Jupiter, English, see Majestic, ii, 


Jupiter, Brazilian, ii, 35. 
Jy 'I 'In nd, \, 226 n. 


Kai Clii, ii, 65. 
Kai Koku, ii, 52-3. 

Kaiser, Tab. viii, i, 227 ; position 
in Austrian line at Lissa, 231 ; 
movements, 234 ; rams Porto- 
gallo, 239 ; heavy loss, 240, 244, 
246 ; m. 238. 

Kaiser Maximilian, Tab. viii ; 
des. i, 227 ; position in Austrian 
line at Lissa, 230 ; threatens 
Palestro, 240 ; part in battle, 

Kamiesch Bay, i, xxxiii. 
Kansas, State of, i, 180. 
Kansas, Tab. v, i, 137. 
Kartali, i, 293. 



Katalidin , gunboat, at New Orleans, 
i, 45; passes forts, 48 ; at Yicks- 
burg, 70-1, Tab. ii. 

Katahdin, ram, ii, 150, 229. 

Kate, i, 193. 

Katsuragi, ii, 84, 128, 133. 

Kearsarge, des. i, 158-9 ; chal- 
lenges Alabama, 159; the action, 
160-163 ! sinking' of Alabama, 
163-4; m - H 6 . 157. i'' !37. 1 5 8 - 

Kelasour, i, 300. 

Kelung, ii, 4. 

Kennebec, Tab. ii, iv ; at New 
Orleans, i, 45 ; does not pass 
forts, 53; at Vicksburg, 70-1 ; 
at Mobile, 120, 126, 128. 

Kennon, i, 55. 

Kentucky, State of, i, 65, 179. 

Keokuk, Tab. iii ; des. i, 90 ; 
attacks Sumter, 93 ; retires, id. ; 
founders, 95. 

Keystone State. Action with Pal- 
metto State, i, 88-9. 

Key West, i, 184. 
Khedive, i, 336. 
Khroumirs, ii, I. 

Kiel, M. xv, i, 274; position, i, 
270-1 ; French dare not attack, 
276; ships at, 278; difficulty of 
attacking, 282; 11,275; m - 2 74> 
277, 281. 

Kifz-i-RakIiman,\,2%j; in Danube, 
289 ; attacked at Sulina, 295, 297. 

Kilia. Mouth of Danube, i, 295, 

Kilidj All, i, 290. 
Kimpai Narrows, ii, 12. 

Kinburn, des. i, xxxiv ; bombard- 
ment of, xxxv ; captured, id.; 
English loss, xxxvi ; m. i, 3; ii, 

Kineo, Tab. ii ; at Ntw Orleans, 
i, 45 ; collides with Brooklyn, 
48, 49 ; at Port Hudson, 74-5. 

Kingstown, ii, 189. 

King Yuen, Tab. xviii ; PI. xx, 
ii, 14; des. ii, 64; with Chinese 
fleet at Yalu, 83 ; place in line, 
88; moves out, 91; sunk by gun- 
fire, 92 ; part in battle, 99 ; ex- 
plosion, 98; hit by a big Canet 
shell (?), in; on fire, 113; m. 
101, 102, 120, 169. 

Kobe Marn, ii, 6l. 

Kolberg, French prepare to bom- 
bard, i, 276, 277 ; exposed to 
attack, 284 ; ii, 276. 

Kongo, des. ii, 57-8 ; m. 84. 

Kbnig WiUieltn, Tab. x ; des. 
i, 269; m. 272, 273, 278; flag of 
Germ, squad., ii, 192; rams 
Grosser Kurfiirst, 193-4; dam- 
age to ram, 160, 195. 

Korea, Chinese and Japanese land 
in, ii, 51 ; Chinese troops sent to, 
by sea, 72, 82. 

Korea, Gulf of, ii, 72, 84. 

Kotaka, des. ii, 61 ; at Wei-hai- 
wei, 127, 129. 

Kowshing leaves Taku, ii, 72 ; 
stopped by Naniwa, 72 ; sunk, 
74 ; violations of international 
law, 75-8 ; m. 51. 

Krikun, i, 286. 

Kronprinz, Tab. x; des. i, 269; 
m. 273, 278. 

Kronstadt, i, 289. 

Krupp guns at Yalu, ii, 56, 64, 65, 

Kuang, &c., see Kwang. 

Kure or Hure, ii, 61. 

Kniuan-sJii or K-wang Yi, ii, 67, 71. 

Kivang Kai or Kuang Cilia, Tab. 
xviii ; des. ii, 65 ; with Chinese 
fleet at Yalu, 83 ; position, 88 ; 
attacks Akagi, 91 ; runs away, 
92 ; goes ashore, id. ; destroyed, 
93; did little fighting, 94; om 
fire, 113; m. 95, 102, 108. 



Kixang Ping, Tab. xviii ; des. 
ii, 65 ; with Chinese fleet at 
Yalu, 83 ; position, 88 ; engages 
Main Squadron, 91 ; engages 
Saikio, 96; loss, 105; m. 99. 

Kisuang Ting, ii, 126, 132. 

Knoang Tsi. ii, 126. 


Labo, i, 270. 

Lackcnjoanna, Tab. iv ; at Mobile, 

i, 1 20 ; Tennessee attempts to 

ram, 126; rams Tennessee, 129; 

collides with Hartford, 130. 
Lacour, Col., ii, 275. 
Lafayette, des. i, 73 ; passes 

Vicksburg, 78-9. 
La Guira or Guayra, i, 199. 
La Ronciere le Noury, i, 272. 
Laird, Messrs., shipbuilders, i, 

152, 259, 307; ii, 183. 
Laird Clowes, see Clowes. 
Lai Yuen, Tab. xviii, xxv ; des. 

ii, 64 ; with Chinese fleet, 83 ; 

position, 88 ; attacks Akagi, 91 ; 

set on fire, 95, 99; heat in 

engine-room, 165 ; loss, 105 ; 

disabled, 102; at Wei-hai-wei, 

126; torpedoed, 132; m. 120. 
Lalande, i, 268. 

Lamb, Colonel, commands Fort 
Fisher, i, 135, 140. 

Lambton, i, 349. 

Lamoriciere, i, 211. 

Lancaster gun, ii, 245. 

Lancaster, \, 68, 72, 77. 

Lang, ii, 67. 

Lanyon, ii, 199, 202 ; will not leave 

the admiral, 203. 
La Seyne, i, 253; ii, 17, 58. 
Latorre, i, 322-23. 
Latouche-Treville, des. ii, 267. 
Lave, des. i, xxxii, at Kinburn, 


Lay torpedo, i, 322. 
Lebedi, i, 286, 296. 


Lee, Admiral, i, 108. 

Lee, General, R. E., i, 135. 

Lee, R.E., ex Giraffe, i, 188, 191. 

Legt'i', ii, 268. 

Leliigh, ii, 246. 

Lemoine, q. i, 150. 

Leonoff, Major-Gen., i, 294. 

Leopard, ii, 1-2. 

Lesina, i, 220, 222. 

Leu-Kung-Tao or Tau, position, 

ii, 127, 128-9; captured, 133. 
Levant, French ships in, 1870, i, 


Levrier, ii, 268. 

Lexington, des. i, 62 ; at Fort 

Henry, 63 ; at Shiloh, 65. 
" Le Yacht," q. ii, 170. 
Liberdade, Tab. xvii. 
Lieutenant Poustchine, i, 296. 

Li Hung Chang, order to Ting, ii, 
8 1 . 

Lima, i, 314. 

Lima Barros, i, 259, 263. 

Lincoln, President, Ericsson writes 
to, i, 6 ; on " Black Sunday," 
21 ; q. on importance of Missis- 
sippi, 37 n. ; student of military 
matters, 83 ; on services of fleet, 
id. n. ; proclaims blockade, 177, 
181 ; moderation, 202. 

Lindoya, i, 263. 
Lion, ii, 75. 
Lisbon, i, 166. 

Lissa, M. xii, i, 220; Hoste's 
action off, i, 219; des. id.; 
Persano urged to attack, 217, 
218; Albini against attack, 220; 
report of It. staff, id. ; first bom- 
bardment, 220-2 ; second bom- 
bardment, 222-4 i Austrian fleet 
appears, 225 ; telegrams to 
Tegetthof, 229 ; order of Aus- 
trians, 230; of Italians, 231-32; 
battle, 231-247; tactics of 
Tegetthof, 247-8 ; strategy of 
Italians, 248. 



Little Rebel, i, 67, 69. 
Liverpool, i, 152. 
Loa, Peruvian, i, 255. 

Loa, Chilian, i, 322, 324-25 ; des- 
troyed by a mine, 333-34. 

Long Island Sound, i, 168. 

Lopez, Marshal, President of Para- 
guay, i, 257, 260, 264. 

Lord Clyde, ii, 221. 

Lord Warden, des. ii, 221 ; m. 185, 

Louisiana, State, i, 181. 

Louisiana, Tab. ii ; des. i, 41 ; 
defects, 44 ; brought down to 
forts, 45; m. 51, 58. 

Louisiana, powder ship at Fort 
Fisher, i, 138. 

Louis, Phillippe, ii, 217. 

Lousville, des. i, 62 ; at Fort 
Donelson, 64-5 ; passes Vicks- 
burg, 78 ; at Grand Gulf, 79. 

Lubeck, i, 277. 

Lutfi-Djelil, i, 287 ; sunk, 289. 

Lynx, Tab. xv ; at Foochow, ii, 
4 ; opens fire, 8 ; shells arsenal, 

Lyons, Admiral, i, xxxiii. 


Macedonian, ii, 174. 
Mackau, Admiral, ii, 217. 
Mackinaw, Tab. v, i, 137, 139. 

Madeira Island, Sea King off, i, 
166 ; strategical importance, 

Madonna Battery, i, 222-3. 

Mafitt, commands Florida, i, 147- 

Magallanes, des. i, 313; action 
with Huascar, 321 ; Huascar 
attempts to torpedo, 322 ; off 
Arica, 334 ; joins Congres- 
sionalists, ii, 16, Tab. xi, xvi, 

Magenta, early battleship, Tab. x, 
i, 267, ii, 260. 

Magenta, modern battleship, des. ii, 
263; engines, 214; stern fire, 
154 ; heavy guns, how mounted, 
179 ; m. 271. 

Magnanime, Tab. x, i, 267, 275. 

Magnificent, see Majestic, ii, 237-8 ; 
induced draught, 254. 

Mahan, q. ii, 103, 118. 
Mahmoodieh, Tab. xxv, i, 287, 302. 
Mahopac, Tab. v. 
Maine, State of, i, 168. 

Main Squadron, Japanese, ships 
composing, ii, 88 ; m. 90. 

Maipo, ii, 20, 21. 

Majestic, Tab. xxii ; Frontispiece, 
vol. i ; elevation, PI. xxxix, ii, 232 ; 
des. ii, 237-239; wood on, 123; 
armour, 121, 241, 253 ; compared 
with foreign battleships, 242- 
244 ; with English cruisers, 141 ; 
m. i, 96, ii, 180, 212, 271. 

Makaroff commands in Russian 
torpedo operations at Sulina, i, 
293; at Sukkum, 298, at Batum, 

Malacca, Straits of, i, 171. 

Mallory, Secretary Confederate 
States' Navy, q. i, 2-3 ; m. 6. 

Manassas, des. i, 41 ; attacks 
Northern fleet, 47 ; rams Brook- 
lyn, 50; disabled and burnt, 56; 
m. 49. 

Manco Capac, Tab. xi, i, 312, 322. 
Manego, see Porto M. 

Manhattan, Tab. iv, des. i, 119; 
at Mobile, 120; guns disabled, 
123; attacks Tennessee 130-1. 

Marajo, Tab. xvii. 
Maratanza, Tab. v, i, 137. 
Marceau, PI. xii, i, 270 ; ii, 263. 
Marengo, at Sfax, ii, 2, 3, 261. 



Maria Adelaide, Tab. vii, flagship 
of Albini, i, 245. 

Maria Pia, Tab. vii ; des. i, 213 ; 
at Ancona, 216; at Lissa, 219 ; 
off Comisa, 221 ; position when 
Austrians appeared, 225 ; place 
in line, 232 ; in the battle, 238 ; 
damage, 245. 

Markham, second in command, 
Mediterranean fleet, 1893, on 
Camperdown, ii, 196; misgivings 
atTryon's signal, 199, 201 ; court 
martial, 206. 

Mars. See Majestic, ii, 237, n. 
Marseilles, i, 275. 
Marston, i, 24. 

Martinique, Sumter at, i, 145 ; 
Alabama at, 153. 

Maryland, State of, i, 1 79. 
Mason, Confederate envoy, i, 201-3. 
Massena^ ii, 264. 

Matamoras, trade of neutrals with, 
i, 180, 185, 198. 

Matthias Cousiiio, with Chilian 
squad., i, 322 ; sent inshore, 
323 ; blockades Callao, 333. 

Mattabesett attacks Albemarle, i, 

Matuska, i, 286, n. 
Maumee, Tab. v, i, 137. 
Maurice, Col., q. i, 76 
Maya, ii, 84. 

Max., abbreviated form of name 
Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian, 
which see. 

Maximilian, Archduke, i, 226. 

McGiffin, commander on board 
Chinese ship, Chen Yuen, ii, 87 ; 
q. 79, 80, 88 ; puts out fire, 97 ; 
on Tsi Yuen, 100 ; on hits 
received by Ting Yuen, in ; on 
torpedoes fired, 114. 

Mearim, Paraguayan, i,, 260.. 

Mediterranean, United States' Ships 
in, 1861, i, 182 ; French fleet in, 
1870, 267 ; ships retained there, 
275 ; French communications 
there not threatened, 280 ; Rus- 
sian squadron in, 1877, 280; 
French fleet in, 1881, ii, 2 ; hypo- 
thetical French and English fleets, 
ii, 116; loss of Victoria in, 196- 

Medea, Tab. xxiii, ii, 257. 
Medjemieh, i, 289 ; at Sulina, 295. 

Medusa, i, 270 ; blockaded on 
Japanese coast, 278. 

Mejillones or Mexillones, i, 323. 
Melbourne, Shenandoah at, i, 167. 

Mello, Admiral, revolt of Brazilian 
navy in his favour, ii, 35 ; lacks 
army, 37 ; suffers from short- 
handedness, 49 ; collapse at Rio, 
42 ; m. 46. 

Melpomene, ii, 138. 

Memphis, battle of, i, 68-9 ; Con- 
federate works at, 61 ; railroad 
to, 64. 

Mercedita, action with Palmetto 
State, i, 87-8 ; taken tu Fort 
Royal, 89. 

Mercury, ii, 255. 
Merlin, ii, 6. 

Merrimac or Virginia, design, i, 
3-6 ; discrepancies in accounts 
of, 4 ; the original Merrimac, 
3-4, n. ; designers, 4-5 ; des. 4-5 ; 
crew, 6 ; armament, 5 ; Commo- 
dore Smith on, 13 ; defects, 15 ; 
action with Congress and Cumber- 
land, 16-19; results of action, 
20-21 ; alarm at Washington, 
20; not sea-going, 21 ; repaired, 
25; action with Monitor, 25-31; 
bad projectiles, 27 ; results of 
action, 31-3; subsequent his- 
tory, 35 ; scuttled, id. ; m. 228, ii, 
160, 1 68 ; type of ironclad widely 
reproduced in South, i, 41, 61, 
71, 87, 97, 106, 116; in North, 
90, 266 ; abroad, 255. 

Z 2 



Mersey, Tab. xxiii, ii, 256. 
MesoodieJi, i, 287. 
Messagiere, Tab. vii, i, 220. 

Meteor, in West Indies, i, 270 ; 
des. 279; action with Bonvet, ib. 
Meteor, i, 286. 
Mexico, i, 179-80. 
Mexico, Gulf of, i, 183. 
Miami, i, 108-9. 
Milan Decree, i, 197. 
Milne, Admiral, ii, 184-5. 
Milwall, i, 212. 
Milwaukee, i, 134. 

Min River, descent of, by French, 
ii, u-12. 

Mina, i, 294. 

Minnesota, in Hampton Roads, i, 
14, 1 8 ; attacked by Merrimac, 
19, 25, 29-30 ; m. 24 ; torpedo 
attack on, 104 ; at Fort Fisher, 
137, Tab. v, xxv. 

Minotaur, ii, 185, 221. 

Mississippi River, strategical im- 
portance, i, 37, 81,83; fighting 
upon, 37-85; open to Unionists, 
Si ; gunboats, 62, 73, ii, 227 ; 
tactical lessons, i, 84-5 ; value 
of navy, 83 ; Grant upon, 82 ; 
difficulty of navigating, 39; 
Sumter in, 144-5 ! blockade of 
mouth, 181. 

Mississippi Sound, i, 114, 180. 
Mississippi, State of, i, 64, 181. 
Mississippi, Confederate, i, 41. 

Mississippi, United States', Tab. 
ii ; at New Orleans, i, 40 ; place, 
45; passes forts, 47-8; tries to 
ram Manassas, 56 ; at Port 
Hudson, 74; runs aground, 76 ; 
burnt, ib. 77 ; m. 84. 

Missouri, State of, i, 37, 179. 

Mitchell commands Confederate 
naval force at New Orleans, i, 
41-2, 45; does not send down 
fire rafts, 46 ; m. 58. 

Mobile, M. vi, i, 122; Confederate 
defences, i, 114-5; mines, 115; 
flotilla, 1 16-8 ; Northern fleet at, 
119-20 ; attack begins, 121 ; 
Brooklyn stops, 122 ; Farragut 
goes on, 124; fort passed, 127; 
action in the Bay, 128 131 ; 
Tennessee surrenders, 132 ; tac- 
tical importance, 133-4, 59, 70, 
ii, 50; battle, m. 59, 70, 282, ii, 
151, 164; bay, i, 180, 185; town, 
147, 187. 

Mohican, Tab. v, i, 137. 

Moll, Von, killed at Lissa, i, 243. 

Moltenort, i, 270. 

Monadnock, Tab. v. 

Mona Passage, i, 170. 

Monarch, English turret-ship, 
Tab. xii ;. elevation, PI. xxxvii, 
ii, 220 ; des. ii, 224-5, '> 339 \ 
at Alexandria, 336 ; position, 
342-3 ; share in the bombard- 
ment, 346-8 ; no damage, 351 ; 
m. ii, 184-5, J 96; guns, 223. 

Monarch, U.S., ram, i, 68-9. 

Monitor, elevation, PI. ii, i, 10 ; 
section, PI. iii, i, 26 ; designed 
by Ericsson, i, 6-7 ; the turret, 
8-9> 33 ; completion of, 9 ; des. 
9-10; criticism of, 11-2; price, 
13 ; name, 14 ; passage to 
Hampton Roads, 23-4; arrival, 
25 ; action with Merrimac, 26- 
31 ; defects, 27-8 ; pilot house 
hit, 30; results of action, 31-4; 
founders at sea, 36 ; m. ii, 137, 
220 ; deck, 227, 246, i, 86 ; earlier 
designs by Ericsson, i, 8, ii, 218 ; 
type Lincoln believes in, i, 91 ; 
later examples, 89-90, 1 19 ; 
defects, i, 136, 266 ; armoured 
funnels, ii, 164. 

Monocacy, ii, 6. 

Monongahela, Tab. iv ; at Port 
Hudson, i, 74-76 ; at Mobile, 
1 20 ; rams Tennessee, 126 ; does, 
so again, 129, 



Montauk, Tab. iii ; at Charles- 
town in action, i, 92-4 ; 
damage, 94 ; attacks Fort 
McAllister, 89-90 ; destroys 
Nashville 90, 105 ; hits on, ii, 

Mont calm, i, 267. 
Mont du Roule, i, 160. 

Montechant, French strategist, q. 
i. 209, ii, 156. 

Montevideo, ii, 36. 
Montgomery, Tab. v ; i, 137. 
Monticello, Tab. v; i, 137. 

Montt, commander of Congres- 
sionalist squadron, ii, 16. 

Montz, Von, commands Grosser 
Kurfurst, ii, 194; saved, 195. 

Moore commands Independencia, 
i, 315. 319. 321. 

Moraga commands Condell, ii, 21 ; 
leads torpedo attack on Blanco, 
21-2; his account, 23; number 
of torpedoes fired, 27 ; fights 
Aconcagua, 29 ; at Iquique, 31. 

Morgan, see Fort M. 

Morgan, des. i, 118 ; run aground, 

Morlaix, i, 165. 

Morris, gallantry of, i, 17. 

Morris commands Florida, i, 149, 

ISO, 151- 
Morse, ii, 268. 
MosJier, armed tug, i, 48. 

Mouin-i-Zaffre, i, 287 ; at Sulina, 
289, 295. 

Mound Battery, at Ft. Fisher, i, 142, 

Mound City, des. i, 62 ; rammed, 
68 ; captures Fort Charles, 69 ; 
passes Vicksburg, 78. 

Mount Vernon, i, 137. 
Mucangue Island, ii, 40. 

Mnkhadem KJiair, i, 287 ; at 
Sulina, 289, 293, 295, 297. 

Mustapha Pasha, i, 295. 
Muzashi, ii, 84. 


Nada, ii, 41. 
Nagasaki, ii, 61. 

Nahant, Tab. iii ; action with Ft. 
Sumter, i, 93-4 ; damage, 95 ; 
action with Atlanta, 99-100; hits, 
ii, 246. 

Naniiva, Tab. xix ; loss, xxi ; 
elevation, PI. xxvi, ii, 74 ; des. 
60 ; efficiency of, 53 ; in G. of 
Korea, 67 ; opens on Tsi Yuen, 
68, 70; attacks Kuivang-shi, 71 ; 
stops Koivsliing, 72 ; sinks her, 
74-5 ; fires on men in water, 78 ; 
at Yalu, 84; place in line, 88; 
reconnoitres, 93 ; loss, 105 ; hits 
on, 109, no; at Wei-hai-wei, 
bombards, 128; hit, 133. 

Nan Sliuin, ii, 65. 

Nan Ting, ii, 65. 

Nantncket, Tab. iii, i, 95 ; ii, 246. 

Napoleon III. and the Monitor, i, 
8 ; ii, 218. 

Nashville, destroyed by Montauk, 
i, 90, 165. 

Nassau, Florida seized and re- 
leased at, i, 147 ; coals at, 148 ; 
watched by U.S. cruisers, 186 ; 
centre of blockade-running trade, 
187, 189, 191, 193; number of 
ships clearing from, 194, 195. 

Nav?l Defence Act, 1889, ii, 234, 

Navarino at Sukhum, i, 298-9. 
Nedjem-i-Chevket, i, 287. 

Nelson, Lord, his relations to his 
captains, i, 214, 228 ; on frigates 
and battleships, ii, 138; place of 
admiral, 151 ; m. i, 59, 133, 219, 
282 ; ii, 79, 137, 216. 



Nelson, Tab. xxiii, 255 ; m. 266 ; 

273. 274- 
Neptune, English turret-ship, ii, 

Neptune, French battleship, ii, 263 ; 

PI. xliii, ii, 264. 
Neuse River, i, 180. 
Neustadt, i, 277 ; ii, 276. 
Newfoundland Banks, i, 153, 170. 
New Ironsides, see Ironsides. 

New Madrid, i, 66-7. 

New Orleans, instructions to cap- 
ture, i, 38 ; forts, 40 ; flotilla, 
41-2 ; boom, 42 ; boom breached, 
42, 44; Northern attack on forts, 
46-54; action above forts, 54- 
56 ; capture of New Orleans, 56 ; 
consequences, id. ; garrison of 
forts, 57-8 ; compared with 
Mobile, 59, 127 ; loss of fleet, 60; 
blockaded, 183 ; blockade run- 
ning, 187 ; place of Farragut, ii, 
151, n.; sandbags on board fleet, 
i, 39 ; ii, 164 ; m. i, 281. 

New Orleans, i, 41. 

New York, threatened by Atlanta, 
i, 167-68 ; dockyard, 184 ; m. 
171, 198, 212. 

Niagara captures Georgia, i, 166 ; 
off Charleston, 183; declines to 
fight Stone-wall, 311, n. 

Nichols, on Ting Yuen, ii, 87 ; 
killed, 97. 

Nictheroy, ex El Cid, des. ii, 40; 
pneumatic gun, 40-1 ; appears 
off Rio, 42 ; at Tijucas Bay, id. ; 
m. 151. 

Nlelly, ii, 13. 

Nikolaiev Fort, see Fort N. 
Nikopolis, or Nikopol, i, 294. 
Nile, battle of the ; loss at, ii, 106. 

Nile, English turret-ship. Tab. 
xxii ; PI. iv, i, 32 ; elevation PI. 
xxxix, ii, 232 ; des. ii, 233 ; low 
freeboard, 240; descended from 
Monitor, i, 33 ; in Mediterranean 
fleet, 1893, ii, 196, 199. 

Niloff, i, 294. 

Nils jfuel, Danish, i, 226, n. 

Nippon Yusen Kaisha, ii, 61. 

Nitrate Ports, ii, 18. 

Nordenfelt gun, ii, 250 ; torpedo, 

Norfolk, Virginia, capture of navy 
yard, i, 4; guns from, 35; re- 
captured, 184-85. 

Norman, H., q. on Ting, ii, 55-6, 
79 ; Chinese personnel, 56 ; fore- 
tells Yalu, 57. 

Normand, i, 129. 

Normandie, ii, 260. 

North Atlantic squadron, i, 185. 

Northbrook, Lord, ii, 184. 

North Coast squadron, ii, 62. 

North Sea, French squad, in, 1870, 
i, 267 ; Willaumez off Jahde, 
272; Fourichon in, 275; his diffi- 
culties, 275-6 ; blockade con- 
tinued, 277-8; observation sub- 
stituted, 278. 

Northampton, ii, 255, 273, 274. 
Northumberland, ii, 221, 185. 
Novara, Tab. viii, i, 226, 227. 
Novgorod, i, 286. 

Numancia, Spanish, in Pacific, 
1865, i, 252 ; bombards Valpa- 
raiso, 253-54 ; at Callao, 255-56 ; 
hits, 256. 

Nunez, Spanish Admiral, i, 253, 


Nyack, i, 137. 
Nymphe, i, 277-78. 


Ocean, elevation PI. xlii, ii, 262 ; 
des. ii, 261 ; in Baltic squadron, 
i, 272 ; withdrawn, 277 ; m. 272. 

Ocean, ii, 221. 

Octorara, Tab. iv, at Mobile, i, 
i 20, 123. 



Odessa, i, xxxiv, 211, 218, 293, 296, 

O'Higgins, Tab. xi, xvi ; des. i, 
313 ; searches for Huascar, 322 ; 
chases Union, 325 ; joins Con- 
gressionalists, ii, 16 ; shells Val- 
paraiso, 20; at Pacocho, 31. 

Ohio River, i, 61. 

Ohio, State of, i, 61, 65. 

Old Dominion Trading Co., i, 188. 

Olinda. Paraguayan, i, 2=;8 ; 
& j j 

grounds, 200. 

Olustee, see Tallahassee. 

Oneida, Tab. ii, iv ; at New 
Orleans, i, 45 ; passes forts, 47, 
engages gunboats, 55 ; at Vicks- 
burg, 70; at Mobile, 120; raked 
by Tennessee, 126 ; Florida runs 
past, 148-9. 

Onohama dockyard, ii, 61, 129. 

Onondaga, purchased by France, 
i, 266-7. 

Opinidtre, i, 266. 

Opyt, i, 296. 

Oran, i, 275. 

Oreto, see Florida. 

Orion, purchased from Turkey, ii, 
224; m. 272. 

Osage, i, 134. 

Osaka, ii, 61. 

Osceola, Tab. v, i, 137, 139. 

Osmanieli, i, 287, 300. 

Ossabaw Sound, i, 90, 95. 

Ossipee, Tab. iv ; at Mobile, i, 120, 

Otchakov, i, xxxiv. 
Otsego, i, 113. 
Outka, \, 286, 296. 
Oivasco, i, 43. 


Pacheco, killed on Blanco, ii, 26. 

Pacific, Russian fleet in, 1877, i, 

Page, on battle of Lissa, i, 248 ; 
on armour, ii, 217. 

Pagoda Point, ii, 5. 

Paixhans, General, inventor of 
shell-gun, ii, 217. 

Palacios wounded on Huascar, i, 

Palestra, Tab. vii ; des. i, 213 ; 
at Ancona, 216 ; off Lissa, 225 ; 
position in line, 232 ; engages 
DracJie, 235 ; takes fire, id. ; 
courage of her crew, 241 ; she 
blows up, id. ; m, 249 ; ii, 185. 

Pallas, English, ii, 221. 
Pallas, Brazilian, ii, 37. 

Palliser shells have a chilled point, 
ii, 252. 

Palmer, gallantry of, i, 70. 
Palmer, Surgeon, i, 132. 
Palmerston, Lord, i, 202. 

Palmetto State, des. i, 87 ; action 
off Charleston, 87-89. 

Pamlico Sound, i, 186, 106. 
Para., i, 263. 

Paragtiari, Paraguayan, i, 258 ; 
rammed, 260. 

Paraguay, M. xiv, i, 280; Lopez, 
tyrant of, i, 257-8 ; seizes Bra- 
zilian ship, 258 ; enters La Plata, 
id. ; battle of Riachuelo, 260-1 ; 
Itaipuru, 262 ; Humaita, 262-4 ; 
boarding attacks on Brazilians, 
264 ; end of the war, id. 

Paraguay River, i, 257. 
Parana River, i, 257, 259, 261. 

Paranahyba or Parnahyba, Tab. 
xvii, i, 260, ii, 42. 

Pareja, Admiral, Spanish, on 
Pacific Coast, i, 252 ; commits 
suicide, 253. 

Paris, i, 276 ; treaty of, "free ships 
free goods," 169, 199. Russian 
Black Sea fleet limited, 287. 

Paris, i, xxxi. 


Parrot guns. A species of rifled 
gun : burst, i, 139 ; dangerous, 

Pascal, ii, 267. 

Paso el Patria, i, 261. 

Passaic, Tab. iii ; at Charleston, 
i, 92-94 ; damage, 94 ; hits on, 
ii, 246 ; m. 312. 

Patapsco, Tab. iii ; at Charleston, 
i, 92-94 ; damage, 94 ; hits on, 
ii, 246. 

Patrick Henry or Yorktoivn, i, 15. 
Pawtncket, Tab. v, i, 137. 
Payne, drowned on David, i, 104. 
Peacock, ii, 174. 
Pearl, Tab. xxiii, ii, 257. 
Pe-chi-li, Gulf of, ii, 66, 127. 

Pedro Ivo, sent against Aquidaban, 
ii, 43 ; pressure falls, 45. 

Peiho, i, 35. 

Peixoto, Marshal, President of 
Brazil ; revolt against, ii, 35 ; his 
resources, 37 ; buys a fleet, 40 ; 
its uselessness, 41 ; crushes in- 
surrection at Rio, 42. 

Pelereschine, i, 305. 
Pelorus, ii, 257. 
Pemberton, General, i, 74. 

Penelope, "Tab. xii ; des. i, 339 ; 
twin screws, ii, 254 ; position at 
Alexandria, 342-3 ; shells Mex, 
347-8; loss, 350; damage, 350-1. 

Penhoat, i, 277. 
Pensacola, i, 184-5. 

Pensacola at New Orleans, i, 40, 
45 ; passes forts, 47. 

Pequet, Tab. v, i, 137. 

Persano, Count Carlo Pellion di, 
Italian Admiral ; his record, i, 
21 1 -2 ; faith in Affondatore, 212, 
215-217 ; want of character, 
214-5, 2I 7 ! complaints of fleet, 
215 ; declines battle at Ancona, 

216-7 ! puts to sea and returns, 
218; ordered to sea, 219; stra- 
tegy, 220 ; attacks Lissa, 220- 
224 ; his negligence, 224 ; makes 
numerous signals, 231-2; disposi- 
tions for battle, 232 ; changes 
flagship, 233 ; does not ram 
Kaiser, 238-9 ; no plans, 246 ; 
rage against him, 249; his trial, 
250; condemnation, 251 ; m. ii, 
79. 8 5. 151- 
Persine, i, 290. 

Peru, quarrel with Spain, i, 252 ; 
Callao bombarded, 254-6 ; re- 
pulse of Spaniards, 256 ; and 
England, affair of Huascar, i, 
306-312; and Chili war, i, 312; 
fleet, 312, Tab. xi ; geographical 
position, 314 ; bad gunnery, 317, 
319; cross raiding, 321-2 ; battle 
of Iquique, 315-321 ; of Anga- 
mos, 324-331 ; blockade of Callao, 

Peterhofft case of the, i, 198-200. 

Petropaulovsk, i, 286. 

Petz, Commodore, commands 
wooden ships at Lissa, i, 230-1 ; 
engages Ribotti, 234 ; rams 
Portogallo, 238-9. 

Phaeton, ii, 196. 

Philadelphia, 184. 

Philadelphia target, ii, 150. 

Philippines, i, 169. 

Pticebe, i, 150. 

Phyong Yang or Ping Yang, ii, 


Piemonte, i, 224. 
Pierola, i, 306. 

Pifarefski at Sukhum, i, 298-300. 
Pikysyry, i, 264. 

Pilcomayo, Tab. xi ; des. i, 312; 
at Arica, 322 ; captured by 
Chilians, 332 ; re-armed, id., 
m- 333- 


Ping Yuen, Tab. xviii ; des. ii, ' 
64 ; at Yalu, 83 ; place in line, ! 
88 ; holds aloof, 92-3 ; attacks 
Saikio, 96 ; loss, 105 ; at Wei- 
hai-wei, 126; m. 132. 

Pinola, Tab. ii ; at New Orleans, 
rams boom, i, 44; position in 
attack, 45 ; does not pass forts, 
53-4; m. 56; loss, 60; Vicks- j 
burg, 70. 

Pinzon, Spanish Admiral, i, 252. 

Pique, ii, 2. 

Pirabebe, Paraguayan, i, 258. 

Piratiny ex Destroyer, des. ii, 

Pisagua, Huascar off, i, 307, 308 ; 
m. ii, 20. 

Pittsburg, des. i, 62 ; at Ft. 
Donelson, 64; hit, 65; passes 
Island No. 10, 67 ; passes Vicks- 
burg, 78 ; at Grand Gulf, 79. 

Pittsburg landing, i, 65. 

Plevna, i, 287. 

Plymouth, i, 170, 172, 273. 

Plymouth, U.S.A., i, ur. 

Podgoritza, i, 289. 

Point de Galle, i, 171. 

Pola, i, 229, 251. 

Poltio, gallantry at Lissa, i, 237. 

Polyphemus, PI. vii, i. 132 ; des. 
ii, 228; utility, 147, 150. 

Pope, General, i, 66. 
Popoffkas, circular floating bat- 
teries, i, 286. 

Port Arthur, docks at, ii, 66 ; 
Chinese fleet retires to, 93, 104 ; 
withdraws from, 126 ; captured 
by Japanese, 127. 

Porter, Constructor, i, 5, 107. 

Porter, Admiral, on Monitor ', i, 12 ; 
commands mortar flotilla at New 
Orleans, recalls Itasca, etc., i, 
54 ; commands on Mississippi, 
74; runs past Vicksburg, 77-8, 
84 ; commands at Ft. Fisher, 

137-142 ; on strategy of com- 
merce destroyers, q. 170 ; on 
Port Hudson, 77. 

Port Hudson, fleet passes, 74-6; 
Mississippi lost, 76 ; Porter on 
strategic importance of passage, 

Portland, ii, 134. 

Portland, Maine, i, 149. 

Porto Karober attacked by Italian 
fleet, i, 222-3. 

Porto Manego attacked by Italian 
fleet, i, 220, 222, 224. 

Porto San Giorgio attacked by 
Italian fleet, i, 222-3. 

Port Royal captured by Dupont, i, 
56, 184; m. 20, 89, 185, 281. 

Port Royal, Tab. iv ; at Mobile, 
i, 120, 128. 

Portsmouth, i, 307 ; ii, 195. 
Portsmouth, U.S.A., i, 184. 
PotJiuau, ii, 267. 
Poti, i, 301, 302. 

Powerful, Tab. xxiii ; des. ii, 
155, 216, 256; water-tube boilers, 

Poivhattan, Tab. v, i, 137, 183. 

Prado, General, i, 315. 

Prat, speech to his crew, i, 316 ; 
skill and daring, 315-16 ; boards 
the Huascar, 317 ; killed, id. ; a 
national hero, id. ; reward of his 
courage, 320. 

Presidents Errazuriz, ii, 17. 
Presidente Pinto, ii, 17. 

Preussen with German squadron, 
ii, 193, 195. 

Prince Albert, ii, 224. 

Prince Consort, ii, 22 1. 

Prince George, see Majestic, ii, 



Principe di Carignano, Tab. vii ; 
des. i, 213; at Ancona, 216; at 
Lissa, 219, 225 ; place in line, 
232 ; opens battle, 234 ; attacks 
Kaiser, 239 ; damage, 245. 

Principe Umberto, Tab. vii, i, 

Prinz Adalbert, Tab. x ; des. i, 269 ; 
at Wilhelmshaven, 273 ; in Elbe, 

Prinz Eugen, Tab. viii, des., i, 227; 
place in line at Lissa, 230 ; in the 
battle, 243. 

Prinz Friedrich Karl, Tab. x, 
des. i, 269; retires to \Yilhelms- 
haven, 273, 278. 

Provence in Adriatic, i, 227 ; in 
Mediterranean fleet, 1870, 267; 
in North sea, 275. 

Pullino, ii, 259. 
Pulo Condor, i, 157. 

Purvis on board Chih Yuen, ii, 87 ; 
drowned, 98. 


Quaker City, i, 137. 
Queen, ii, 212. 

Queen of the West, i, 68 ; rams 
Lovell, 69 ; on Vazoo, 71 ; passes 
Vicksburg, 73 ; captured by Con- 
federates, 74 ; rams Webb, id. 

Queenstown, ii, 189. 
Quilio, ii, 275. 

Quinteros Bay, ii, 21 ; Congres- 
sionalist forces land at, 32. 


Radetzky, Tab. viii ; i, 226, 227. 
Ragheb Pasha, i, 337. 
Raleigh, English, ii, 254. 
Raleigh, Confederate, i, 15, 19. 

Ramillies, submarine attack on, i, 

Ramillies, see Royal Sovereign, ii, 
234, n. 

Rappahanock, ex Victor, i, 166, 


i Ras-el-Tin, see Fort R. 
f Rattlesnake, ii, 257. 

Rattazzi, Italian Minister, i, 211. 

Razzetti, gallantry at Lissa, i, 237, 

Read, i, 149. 

Rebolledo, Admiral, i, 315, 322. 

Re di Portogallo, Tab. vii ; des. i, 
212; at Ancona, 216; at Lissa, 
219,221 ; position when Austrians 
appeared, 225 ; place in line, 
232 ; rammed by Kaiser, 238-9; 
damage, 245 ; praised by Persano, 

Re d' Italia, Tab. vii ; des. i, 212 ; at 
Ancona, 216 ; Persano's flagship, 
219 ; at Lissa, 22 1 ; position 
when Austrians appeared, 225 ; 
place in line, 232 ; Persano leaves 
her, 233, 234 ; hotly attacked, 
235; rammed and sunk, 236-7 ; 
gallantry of her crew, 237 ; 
rudder damaged (?) 243 ; praised 
by Persano, 249; m. 237, 242, 
244, 246, 247, 250 ; ii, 160. 

Redoubtable, elevation, PI. xlii, ii, 

262 ; ii, 262. 
Red River, stores destroyed on, i, 

73; stores collected, 74, 77; 

Federal expedition up, 80. 

Reed, Sir E. J., ii, 221, 225. 
Reina Regente, Spanish, ii, 207. 
Reindeer, ii, 174. 
Reine Blanche at Sfax, ii, 2, 3. 
Renard, i, 267. 

Rendel gunboats, carrying one very 

heavy gun forward, ii, 65, 83, 


Rene Adolphe, i, 278. 
Rennie, Messrs., i, 259. 
Renown, Tab. xxii ; des. ii, 253 ; 

compared with cruiser, 140-1, 

142 ; m. 145, 271. 



R 'en own, see Victoria, ii, 196. 

Republica, Tab. xvii ; joins Mello, 
ii, 36 ; passes Rio forts, 37 ; 
rams Rio de Janeiro, 38 ; cap- 
tures Itaipu, 39. 

Repulse, ii, 221. 

Repulse, see Royal Sovereign, ii, 

Requin, ii, 265-6. 

Research, ii, 221. 
Resistance, ii, 220. 

Resolucion, Spanish, in Pacific, i, 
252 ; bombards Valparaiso, 
253-4 ; Callao, 255-6. 

Resolution, see Royal Sovereign, 

ii, 234. 
Retribution, privateer, i, 143. 

Revanche m North Sea, i, 275 ; m. 
257 ; at Sfax, ii, 2, 3. 

Revenge, ii, 234. 

Rhind, i, 138. 

Rhode Island, i, 137. 

Riachuelo, ii, 36. 

Riachuelo, Battle of the, i, 259-261. 

Ricasoli, Italian Minister, i, 215. 

Richelieu, ii, 261. 

Richmond dependent upon Wil- 
mington, i, 135, 142; inland, 179; 
on James River, 180 ; prices at, 
196; m. 4, 5, 35, 106, 107, 185, 
187, 205. 

Richmond, Tab. ii, iv ; at New 
Orleans, i, 45 ; passes forts, 52 ; 
at Vicksburg, 70-1 ; at Port 
Hudson, 74; at Mobile, sand- 
bags, 119; place, 120; danger 
of collision, 125; passes forts, 126. 

Rimac captured by ffuascar, i, 
322 ; hit, 333. 

Rio de Janeiro, revolt of fleet at, 
ii, 35 ; desultory fighting, 36- 
41 ; collapse of revolt, 42 ; m. i, 
171, 259; ii, 137. 

Rio de Janeiro, ii, 38. 

Rio Grande, Mexico, i, 185. 

Rio Grande, i, 263-4. 

Rio Grande do Sul, ii, 35. 

Riojo, ii, 58. 

" River Defence Fleet," i, 42, 58. 

Riveros, Commodore, commands 
Chilian fleet, i, 322 ; action with 
Huascar, 323-331. 

Roanoke River, i, 106, no. 

Roanoke Island, i, 184. 

Roanoke at Hampton Roads, i, 14, 

Rochambeau purchased by France 

from United States, i, 266, 277 ; 

ii, 266. 

Rodgers, G. W., killed, i, 101 ; ii, 

Rodgers, J., i, 101. 
Rodimyi, i, 286. 

Rodney of "Admiral" class, ii f 

Rodolph, i, 134. 

Rodriguez killed, i, 327. 

Rolf Krake, Danish turret-ship, 5, 


Rose, \, 134. 
Rossia, i, 286. 

Rostislav, line-of-battleship,i, xxxi, 
Rostislav, i, 304. 
Rouen, i, 278. 
Roumelia, i, 287. 
Royal Alfred, ii, 221. 

Royal Arthur, target practice, ii, 
1 66.. 

Royal Oak, ii, 221. 

Royal Oak, see Royal Sovereign, 
ii, 234. 

Royal Sovereign, Coles' turret-ship, 
elevation, PI. xxxvii, ii, 220; des. 
ii, 224 ; ancestor of new Royal 
Sovereign, 239; m. i, 33, ii, 183, 



Royal Sovereign, English battleship, 
Tab. xxii; PI. v, i, 56; elevation, 
PI. xxxix, ii, 232; des. ii, 234-6; 
nickel steel decks, 253 ; crew, 
213; engines, 214; unprotected 
surface in, i, 311 ; 111.96, ii, 123, 
135, 144, 178, 239, 253. 

Roydestvenski, i, 293. 
Riigen, i, 277. 

Rupert, des. ii, 226; deck, 227; 
m. 272. 

Rurik, i, 311-4. 

Russell, Lord John, afterwards 
Earl, i, 147, 165. 

Russell, Scott, designs Warrior, ii, 

Russia, war with Turkey, i, 286 ; 
distribution of Russian fleet, id. ;. 
torpedo attacks in Black Sea, 
290, 303 ; Vesta and Assar-i- 
Chevket, 303-4 ; defeat of Turks 
at Sinope, i, xxxi ; bombardment 
of Kinburn, xxxiv-vi. 

Rustchuk, i, 295. 


Sacramento, i, 31 1. 

Saikio, Tab. xix ; loss, xxi ; torpedo 
affair, xxv ; speed, &c., ii, 61 ; 

. at Yalu, 87 ; not in line, id., 88 ; 
hotly engaged, 91 ; torpedoes 
fired at, id., 96 ; sent off for 
repairs, 93 ; part in battle, 95-6 ; 
loss, 105 ; hits on, 96, 109, no ; 
repaired, 126; escape of, 175; 
m. 1 12, 144. 

St. Andre, Jean Bon, i, 218. 

St. Augustines, seized by North, i, 
184 ; distance from blockade- 
running centres, 187. 

St. Bon, i, 223. 
St. Helena, i, 171. 

St. John, Knights of, lead-plated 
ship, ii, 217. 

St. Lawrence at Hampton Roads, 
i, 14, 18, 20, 21. 

St. Louis, see De Kalb. 

St. Louis, ii, 264-5. 

St. Marc, \, 278. 

St. Philip, see Fort S. 

St. Pierre, i, 145. 

St. Thomas, i, 187, 195. 

Sakamoto, killed at Yalu, ii, 95. 

Salamander. Tab. viii ; des. i, 227 ; 

at Lissa, 230 ; part in battle, 

Salto Oriental, Paraguayan, i, 258, 


Sampaio, see Gustavo S. 
San Diego, ii, 33. 
Sandri, i, 220. 
San Francisco, ii, 33. 
San Giovanni, Tab. vii. 

San Jacinto stops Trent, i, 201 ; 
m."i, 153. 

San Martina, Tab. vii; des. i, 213 ; 
at Ancona, 216; at Lissa, 219; 
position when Austrians ap- 
peared, 225 ; place in line, 232 ; 
in battle, 235, 237 ; damage, 
245 ; praised by Persano, 249. 

San Salvador, ii, 42 ; sent against 
Aquidaban, 42, 43. 

Sanspareil, see Victoria, des. ii, 
232 ; m. 174, 196, 271. 

Santa Catherina, torpedo attack 
on Aquidaban at, ii, 43. 

Santa Cruz, ii, 43. 

Santa Rosa, i, 306. 

Santiago, ii, 17. 

Santiago di Cuba, Tab. v, i, 137. 

Santos, ii, 35, 42. 

Sdone, ii, 12, 13. 

Sardinia, i, 211. 

Sargente Aldea, Tab. xvi. 

SartJie, ii, 2. 



Sassacits, Tab. v ; engages Albe- 
marle, i, 108 ; rams her, 109 ; 
disabled, no; at Fort Fisher, 
137, m. 168. 

Saugus, Tab. v. 

Savannah, Atlanta constructed at, 
i, 97, 98 ; fall of, 185 ; distance 
from blockade-running centres, 
187 ; m. 190. 

Savoie, i, 267. 

Scharf, q.on U.S. Navy, i, 196; q. 
i, 44, 89, 100, 119, 124, 143, 144, 
146, 185, 186, 188, 193, 201. 

Schichau torpedo-boats, ii, 83, 129. 

Schwartzenburg, Tab. viii, i, 226, 

Schwartzkopf torpedo, a species of 
Whitehead, ii, 45, 135. 

Sciota, Tab. ii ; at New Orleans, i, 
45, 52 ; at Vicksburg, 70 ; 
destroyed by a mine, 134. 

Scorpion turret-ship, i, 33, 168. 

Sea Bride, i, 156. 

Seaford, i, 208. 

Sea King, see Shenandoah. 

Sebastopol, naval attack on, i, xxxi, 
xxxvi, m. 288, 298. 

Sedan, i, 276, 281. 
Seguranqa, ii, 41. 

Seife, i, 289 ; on Danube, 290 ; sunk 
by torpedoes, 291-2; Tab. xxv. 

Selma, i, 116. 

Selma, i, 118; action with Meta- 
comet, 127-8. 

Semendria, \, 289. 

Seininole, Tab. iv ; at Mobile, i, 
1 20. 

Semmes commands Sumter, \, 
144-6, 151; commands Alabama, 
152-163 ; himself a prize-court, 
153 ; eludes San Jacinto, 153 ; 
sinks Hatteras, 155 ; challenges 
Kearsarge, 159 ; his strategy, 
170 ; Porter on, id. 

Seneca, Tab. v, i, 137. 
Serpent, loss of, ii, 208. 
Serrano boards Huascar, \, 318. 
Serras, ii, 275. 
Sestrica, i, 286. 
Set/i Low, \, 23. 

Seward, U.S. Secretary of State, i, 

Seymour, Sir Beauchamp, later 
Lord Alcester, commands at 
Alexandria, i, 336 ; ultimatum, 
337 ! general order, 342-3 ; 
tactics, 355 ; in. 349. 

Sfax, seized by Tunisian insurgents, 
ii, i ; bombarded, 2-3 ; captured, 

Sfax, ii, 267. 

Shall, des. i, 307, ii, 254-5 ! pursues 
Huascar, i, 307-8 ; sights and 
attacks Huascar, 308, action, 
308-9 ; cannot close, 308 ; not 
hit, 310 ; uses torpedo, 309 ; 
comparison of force, 310 ; m. 
33L ii- 137. 239. 

Shanghai, i, 169 ; squadron, ii, 62 ; 
docks, 65 ; m. 61. 

Shannon, ii, 228, 255, 273, 274. 

Sheipoo, torpedo attack on Yn-yen, 
ii, 13, 14, 137. 

Shenandoali, commerce-destroyer, 
ex Sea King, cruise of, i, 166-7 ; 
English payment for, 174; pur- 
poseless destruction by, 176. 

Shenandoali, United States, Tab. 

v. i. 137- 
Sherman, General, i, 73. 

Sherman, Confederate, i, 48. 

Shiloh, battle of, navy at, i, 65. 

Shogun, ii, 52. 

Shopaul Island, ii, 75. 

Shoppek, Cape, ii, 84. 

Sicily, i, 211. 

Silvado, ironclad, i, 263. 



Silvado sent against Aquidaban, ii, 
43 ; part in the action, 45 ; hit, 

Singapore, U.S. ships laid up at, i, 

Singapore, Straits of, i, 157. 
Sinope, Battle of, i, xxxi. 

Sinope, at Sukhum, i, 298, 299 ; at 
Batum, 301, 302. 

S. J. Waring, i, 143. 

Slatina, i, 289. 

Slidell, Confederate Envoy, i, 201-3. 

Smith, Commodore, i, n, 12, 13. 

Smith, Lieutenant, gallantry of, i, 18. 

Smith, Melancton, i, 76, 108. 

Smith-Dorrien, i, 337. 

Smith's Island, i, 186. 

Sokul, ii, 268. 

Soley, Professor, q. i. 165, 206. 

Solferino, Tab. x, i, 267. 

Sonoma, i, 148, 200. 

Soto, Col., Balmacedist, ii, 20. 

Soto, Aspirant, Congressionalist, 
drowned on Blanco, ii, 27. 

Sound, The, i, 277. 

Southampton, i, 165. 

South Atlantic Squadron, i, 185. 

Southfield engages Albemarle, 108 ; 
rammed by her, id. ; wreck of, 

South Sea, i, 269. 

Spain, quarrel with Peru, i, 252 ; 
squadron despatched to Pacific, 
252 ; loss of Covadonga, 253 ; 
bombardment of Valparaiso, 
253-4 ! f Callao, 254-6 ; with- 
drawal of squadron, 257. 

Springbok, case of the, i, 200-1. 
Stag, i, 188. 

Stanton, U.S. Secretary of War, i, 

.Stchelinski, i, 302. 

Stella d'ltalia, i, 220. 
Stenzel, q. i, 37. 

Stevens, designer of floating bat- 
tery, i, 3 ; ii, 218. 

Stevens at Mobile, i, 123, 127. 
Stettin, i, 277 ; ii, 62, 64. 
Stimers, Chief Engineer, i, 26, 95. 
Stockton, fitted with screw, ii, 211. 
Stodder, i, 28. 

Stonewall Jackson, Tab. ii ; at 
New Orleans, 55 ; abandoned, id. 

Stoneivall Jackson, ram ; des. i, 
168 ; at Corunna, 311. 

Stoney, T., i, 103. 

Stovvell, Lord, rule of "continuous 
voyages," i, 198-9. 

Stralsund, \, 277, 278. 

Suenson, Danish Commodore, i, 

Suffren, ii, 261. 

Suffren's attack upon Hughes, i, 

Sulina, ships at, 1877, i, 289; 
Russian torpedo affair at, 293-4; 
attempt to capture, 295-6. 

Sulina at Sulina, i, 296 ; sunk, 

Sullivan's Island, i, 87. 

Sultan, Tab. xii, xxii ; at Alex- 
andria, i, 336 ; des. 338, ii, 222 ; 
orders to, i, 342-3, part in 
bombardment, 346 ; ammunition 
exhausted, 348 ; loss, 349 ; dam- 
age, 351. 

Sumter, commerce-destroyer, ex 
Habana ; des. i, 144 ; gets to 
sea, 145 ; at St. Pierre, 145 ; 
escapes, 146 ; sold at Gibraltar, 

Sumter, see Fort S. 

Sumter, ram, i, 67, 68. 

Sunda, Straits of, i, 156-7, 171, 172 


Superb, Tab. x ; purchased from 
Turkey, ii, 224; at Alexandria, 
i, 338 ; des. 338-9 ; orders to, 
342-3 ; part in bombardment, 
346-7; loss, 349 ; damage, 351. 

Surprise, ii, 6. 

Surprise, privateer, i, 173. 

.Survetllante, i, 267 ; flagship of 
French Baltic fleet, 272 ; loses 
her rudder on North Sea Coast, 

Suzuki, ii, 131. 

.Symonds, Sir T., Admiral on 
Captain, ii, 185. 


Tabarka, seized by French, ii, i. 

Tacna, ii, 18. 

Tacony, i, 149. 

Tacony, Tab. v, i, 137. 

Tacuari, Paraguayan, i, 258, 260. 

Tage, ii, 267. 

TakachiJio, Tab. xix; loss, xxi ; see 
sister ship, Naniuva ; des. ii, 60 ; 
in Gulf of Korea, 67 ; engage- 
ment with Chen Yuen (?) 79 ; at 
Yalu, 84 ; place in line, 88 ; opens 
on Lai Yuen, 92 ; loss, 105. 

Takao, ii, 84. 

Taku, docks, ii, 65-6 ; transports 
leave, 67, 83 ; return to, 101 ; m. 

Takushan, ii, 89. 

Talien Bay, ii, 83, 93. 

Tallahassee, ex Atlanta, destroys 
commerce, i, 167-8 ; threatens 
New York, 168 ; m. 170. 

Tamandare, Admiral, character of, 
i, 258, 259; his battles, 261-2; 
recalled, 263. 

Tamandare, see Almirante T. 
Tamplin, Mr., ii, 74, 75. 
Tang commands Chih Yuen, ii, 98, 

Tangiers, ii, 207. 
Taranto, i, 215, 229. 
Tarapaca, ii, 18. 

Tatnall commands Merrimac, i, 

35 ; " blood thicker than water," 

35. 349- 
Taureau, Tab. x ; des. ii, 265 ; m. 

i, 267. 
Tavara, surgeon on Huascar, i, 


Tayi, i, 263. 

Tchen Kiang, ii, 13 ; sunk, 15. 
Tchesme, line-of-battle ship, i, xxxi. 

Tchesme, torpedo-boat, at Sulina, i, 
293-4 ; at Sukhum, 298 ; at 
Batum, 301-2; second attack, 

Teaser, i, 15, 19. 

Tecumseh, Tab. iv ; at Mobile, i, 
119; des. id. ; position, 120; 
opens fire, 122 ; crosses line of 
torpedoes, 124; sunk,zV/. ; heroism 
of Craven, id. ; loss on, 132. 

Tegetthof, Baron Wilhelm von, 
his record, i, 225-6 ; off Ancona, 
216; message to Lissa, 222; 
scruples as to Venetian sailors, 
227 ; prepares \\\-~, personnel, 228 ; 
ram and concentrated broad- 
sides, id. ; appears off Ancona, 
229 ; again visits it, 229 ; doubts 
whether Lissa is the Italian 
objective, 230 ; instructions, id. ; 
sails in battle order, 230-1 ; bad 
weather, 231 ; breaks Italian line, 
234 ; rams Re d'ltalia, 236 ; 
reaches Lissa, 241 ; why he did 
not renew action, 241 ; tactics 
247-8 ; rewards, 251 ; death, 251 ; 
m. ii, 79, 102, 103, 107, 151, 155. 

Telegraph Tower, i, 222. 

Temeraire, Tab. xii ; elevation, 
PI. xxxvi, :i,22O; des. ii, 223-4, i, 
339 ; at Alexandria, 339 ; orders 
to, 342-3 ; part in bombardment, 
347-9; no damage, 351; good 
shooting, 353 ; armour deck, ii, 



Tempete, ii, 265. 
Teneriffe, i, 150. 
Tengchow-feu, ii, 127, 129. 

Tennessee River, forts on, i, 61, 63 ; 
importance of, 64, 83. 

Tennessee, State, i, 64, 65, 178, 

Tennessee, des. i, 116-7; crosses 
flats, 117-8, 124; at Mobile Bay, 
118, 119; encounters Hartford, 
125 ; attempts to ram, 125-7 ; 
retires to Fort Morgan, 127 ; 
renews action, 128 ; rammed by 
Monongahela and Lackawanna, 
129; attacked by monitors, 130-1 ; 
strikes, 132 ; damage and loss, 
132; m. ii, 137. 

Tenrio, ii, 84, 133. 
Terceira, i, 152. 

Terribile, Tab. vii ; des. i, 212 ; at 
Ancona, 216; at Lissa, 219; off 
Comisa, 221, 222, 224; position 
when Austrians appeared, 225, 
232, 238; comes up, 240; com- 
plaints, 250. 

Terrible, English, Tab. xxiii ; com- 
pared with battleship, ii, 141-3 ; 
des. 256; m. 214; water-tube 
boilers, 254. 

Terrible, French, ii, 265-6. 
Terror, i, xxxiii. 
Terry, General, i, 140. 
Texas, i, 37, 180, 181, 185, 190. 
Thames Iron Works, ii, 58. 
Thames, i, 212. 

Thetis in Channel, 1870, i, 267 ; 
sent to Baltic, 272 ; m. 273. 

Thomson, Messrs., ii, 58, 208. 
Thunder, i, xxxiii. 
Thunderbolt, i, xxxiii. 

Thunderer, built, ii, 226 ; hydraulic 
worked guns, 247 ; accidents on, 
208, 248 ; re-armed, 272. 

Ticonderoga, Tab. v, i, 137. 

Tijucas Bay, ii, 43, 46. 

Timbo, i, 262. 

Timby, an inventor, i, 8. 

" Tinclads " described, i, 73, 182. 

Ting, Ju Chang, Admiral, portrait, 
PI. xxvii, ii, 84; his experience, 
n 'i 55> 57 ! hi s strategical ad- 
viser, 66 ; knowledge of naval 
matters, 79 ; his wishes, 80 ; 
orders of Li Hung Chang to, 
8 1 ; general orders to fleet, 79, 
85 ; his strategy, 82-3 ; sees 
Japanese, 85 ; tactics, 84-5 ; at 
Wei-hai-wei, 126, 128, 133; 
commitssuicide, 133; his mistake, 
133-4, 86. 

Tin? Yuen, Tab. xviii ; PI. xxxii, 
ii, 122; elevation, PI. xxiii, ii, 62 ; 
des. ii, 62-4; defects, 63 ; Ting's 
flagship, 80, 83 ; at Yalu, place 
in line, 88 ; Europeans on board, 
87 ; opens fire, 89 ; Hiyei passes 
her, 91 ; terrible fire upon, 92 ; 
on fire, 93, 97, 113; military mast 
hit, 96 ; Nichols killed, 97 ; shots 
fired, 109; hits on, in; 6-inch 
gun not disabled, 121 ; heavy 
guns disabled, 122 ; at Wei-hai- 
wei, 126; torpedoed, 131, 132, 
135; m. 94, 105, 112. 

Tiradentes, Tab. xvii, ii, 36, 42. 

Tokio Arsenal, ii, 61 ; university, 

ii, 52. 

Tonkin, ii, 4. 

Tonnant, ii, 265. 

Tonnante, i, xxxii, xxxiii. 

Tonnerre, ii, 265- 

Torpedoist at Sukhum, i, 298, 300. 

Toulba Pasha, i, 357. 

Toulon, line Toulon-Algiers, i, 
275, 280; m. 219, 355. 

Toultcha, i, 296. 
Tourville at Sfax, ii, 1-2. 

Trafalgar, loss at, ii, 106 ; dura- 
tion, 115; place of admiral, 151, 



Trafalgar, see sister ship, Nile, ii, 


Trajano, Tab. xvii, ii, 36. 
Treaty of Paris, see Paris. 
Tredegar Works, i, 107. 
Trehouart, ii, 266. 
Trent, case of the, i, 201-3. 
Trenton, i, 6. 
Trident, des. ii, 261 ; at Sfax, 2 ; 

m. 272. 
Trieste, i, 230. 
Triomphante, Tab. xv ; des. ii, 5 ; 

at Foochow, 8 ; sinks Ching 

Wei, 9 ; descends Min River, 

11-12 ; m. 266. 
Tri Sviatitelia, i, xxxi. 
Trusty, i, xxxiii. 

Tryon, Sir G., Commander-in- 
Chief on Mediterranean station, 
1893, on the Victoria, ii, 196; 
his fatal order, 197-8 ; executed, 
199 ; the Victoria rammed, 200 ; 
on the chart-house, 202 ; drowned, 
204 ; blamed by court-martial, 
205 ; system of following the 
leader, 152 ; maxim, 153. 

Tsan Chieng or Tsao Kiang in G. 
of Korea, ii.,,,67 ; captured, 71, 
72. Same as'Tchen Kiang? 

Tshao Yong, Tab. xviii ; des. ii, 
65 ; at Yalu, 83 ; slow in moving, 
86 ; place in line, 88 ; set on fire, 
90 ; disabled, 92 ; steering gear 
damaged, 99 ; men crowd in tops, 
107 ; fire on, 113 ; m. 102. 

Tsi Yuen, Tab. xviii ; des. ii, 64-5 ; 
action off Asan, 67-71, 53 ; 
appearance of ship after, 70 ; 
Japanese version, 67, 75 ; at 
Yalu, 83 ; place in line, 88 ; 
European on board, 87 ; runs 
away, 92 ; cowardice (?) 100 ; 
collides with Yang Wei, 92, 107, 
115 ; part in battle, 100-1 ; loss, 
105; at Wei-hai-wei, 126; cap- 
tured by Japanese, 153 ; hit on 
conning tower at Asan, 68, 168 ; 
m. 78, 79, 144. 


Tsuboi commands flying squadron, 
i, 67 ; at Yalu, 84 ; leads, 88, 
152 ; raises speed, 90 ; m. 101. 

Tsukushi, ii, 84. 

Tsung-li- Yamen, its strategy, ii, 
56-7 ; orders to Ting, 80, 82, 
103 ; corrupt, 54. 

Tunis, French protectorate, ii, I ; 
insurgents seize Sfax, i ; bom- 
bardment, 2, 3 ; captured, 4. 

Turenne, ii, 266. 

Turkey, war with Russia, 1877, i, 
286 ; state of Turkish fleet, 287 ; 
has command of sea, 287-8 ; task 
before Turks, 288 ; precautions 
against torpedoes, 293, 297 ; in- 
effective blockade of Russian 
coast, 288-9, 2 9 ! torpedo 
attacks, 290-302 ; Vesta and 
Assar-i-Chevket, 303-4; Lutfi 
Djelil sunk, 289, 290 ; little use of 
fleet, 287-8 ; defeat of Turks at 
Sinope, i, xxxi. 

Tuscaloosa, ex Conrad, i, 156. 

Tuscarora, Tab. v; at Fort Fisher, 
i, 137; blockades Sumter, 146; 
Nashville, 165. 

Tuscumbia, des. i, 73 ; passes 
Vicksburg, 78 ; at Grand Gulf, 

Tyler, i, 62 ; at Fort Henry, 63 ; at 
Fort Donelson, 64 ; at Shiloh, 
65 ; chased by Arkansas, 71. 

Tyler on Ting Yuen, ii, 87 ; de- 
scribes torpedo attack, 135. 


Unadilla, Tab. v, i, 137. 
Unebi, ii, 208. 

United States, object of Federal or 
Northern party, i, I ; navy in 
1 86 1, 2, 181 ; measures taken to 
create a navy, 62, 182; ironclads 
ordered, 7, 9, 62 ; consequence 
of naval weakness, 2 ; the Moni- 
tor, 7-14; Merrimac defeats 
Congress and Cumberland, 15- 

A A 



20 ; alarm in North, 20 ; Monitor 
faces Merrimac, 26-31 ; im- 
portance of Mississippi, &c., 37, 
82, 83 ; New Orleans captured, 
39-56 ; the Mississippi opened, 
63-81 ; unsuccessful attack on 
Charleston, 92-102 ; the Albe- 
marle torpedoed, 110-3; Mobile 
Bay forced, 116, 132 ; Fort Fisher 
captured, 136-142 ; Southern 
commerce -destruction, 143-168; 
effects, 168-9; strategy of North, 
169-173 ; Geneva arbitration, 
174; the blockade, 181 ; its 
objects, 177-8; occupation of 
Confederate ports, 184-5; block- 
ade-running, 185-196; treat- 
ment of neutrals, 197-8 ; case 
of Peterhoff, 199-200 ; of Trent, 
201-2 ; doctrine of contraband, 
203 ; the blockade crushed the 
South, 196-7 ; war of 1812, i, 
197 ; and Chile, ii, 33-4. 

Union, Tab. xi ; des. i, 312; with 
Huascar, cross-raiding, 314, 322; 
sighted by Chilian fleet, 323 ; 
escapes, 324 ; torpedo attack on, 
332 ; Tab. xxv ; bombarded, 
333 ; hit, 334. 

Urano, Tab. xvii, ii, 38. 
Uribe, i, 318. 
Uruguay, i, 257. 


Vacca commands a division of 
Italian fleet, i, 219 ; for attack on 
Lissa, 220 ; at Comisa, 221 ; 
enters San Giorgio Harbour, 223 ; 
quoted on Persano's conduct, 
224 ; left unsupported, 234 ; 
wheels on Austrians, 234 ; his 
conduct, 246 ; complains of 
gunnery, 247; given command, 

Valeureuse, i, 267, 275. 
Valmy, ii, 266. 

Valparaiso, bombarded by Spani- 
ards, i, 253-4; neutral property 
destroyed, 254 ; futility of bom- 
bardment, id.; no docks, 314; 
open port, 315 ; revolt of Con- 
gressionalists at, ii, 16 ; fighting 
at, 19-20; captured, 32; m. i, 
322, 332 ; ii, 30. 

Vanderbilt, Tab. v ; at Hampton 
Roads, i, 35; at Fort Fisher, 137 ; 
sent in chase of Alabama, 156, 
171 ; coals in British ports, 149. 

Vanguard, des. ii, 191 ; with 
Channel Squadron, 189; collides 
with Iron Duke, 190 ; sinks, 
190-1 ; court-martial on, 192. 

Varese, Tab. vii ; des. i, 213; at 
Ancona, 216; at Lissa, 219; off 
Comisa (?) 221, 222, 224; posi- 
tion when Austrians appeared, 
225, 232 ; arrives, 234 ; in battle, 
238 ; collides with Ancona, 240 ; 
Persano complains of, 250. 

Vargus, ii, 23. 

Varuna, Tab. ii ; at New Orleans, 
i, 45 ; passes forts, 47 ; en- 
gages Confederate flotilla, 54-5 ; 
rammed and sunk, 55. 

Vauban, ii, 266, 272. 

Venezuela, i, 153. 

Vengeur, line-of-battle ship, i, 17. 

Vengeur, ii. 265. 

Venice, cession to France, i, 227 ; 
m. 211, 213, 230. 

Venus, Tab. xvii, ii, 42. 
Verestchagine, i, 295. 
Vergara, lost on Blanco, ii, 27. 

Vesta, i, 286 ; action with Assar-i- 
Chevket, 303-4; m. ii, 137. 

Vesuvius, ii, 151. 

Vice- Admiral Popoff, i, 286. 

Vicksburg, fortified, i, 61 ; Farragut 
passes, 69-71 ; a second time, 
72 ; attempts to turn, 74 ; Porter 
and Grant pass, 77-8 ; fall of, 
79, 81 ; importance of, 8l ; m. 
77, 83, 282. 



Victor, see Rappalianock. 

Victor Emmanuel, Tab. vii. 

Victoria, ex Renown, Tab. xxii ; 
PI. xxxiv, ii, 196; elevations, 
PI. xxxix, ii, 232 ; xxxv, ii, 202 ; 
des. ii, 196, 232 ; with Mediter- 
ranean fleet, 1893, 196 ; dan- 
gerous manoeuvre ordered, 197-8 ; 
executed, 199; rammed by 
Camperdoiiun, 200; capsizes, 204; 
loss of life, 204-5 ! court-martial, 
205-6 ; why she sank, 206 ; 
value of armour-belt, 207 ; m. 
2 33> 2 39) triple-expansion en- 
gines, 254. 

Victoria, Peruvian, i, 255. 

Victor ieuse, ii, 266. 

Victorious, see sister ship, Majestic, 
ii, 237, n. 

Vigo, i, 278. 

Villa de Madrid, Spanish, in 
Pacific, i, 252 ; at Valparaiso, 
253-4 ; at Callao, 255-6. 

Vi liars, Tab. xv ; at Foochow, ii, 
4,6, g; descends Min, 11-12. 

Villegagnon Island and Fort, ii, 
37, 38. 

Villeneuve, ii, 213. 

Vincedora, Spanish, in Pacific, i, 
252 ; at Valparaiso, 253-4 ; 
Callao, 255-6. 

Vipere, Tab. xv, ii, 4, 10. 

Virginia, State of, i, 180, 181. 

Virginia, ironclad, see Merrimac. 

Virginia Volunteer Navy, i, 188. 

Vishnevetski, Lieut., at Sukhum, i, 
298, 300. 

Vladimir, i, 286, 292. 
Vnoutcliek, i, 286. 

Volta, Tab. xv ; at Foochowi, ii, 4 ; 
position, 6 ; torpedo attacks by 
her launches, 8 ; damage, 1 1 ; 
descends Min, 11-12. 

Voltigeur at Sfax, ii, 2. 
Voron, \, 286, 296. 
Vulcan Company, ii, 62. 


Wabash, Tab. v, xxv, i, 137. 
Wachusett attacks Florida, i, 150. 

Walke, Rear-Admiral, runs past 
Island No. 10, i, 66, 67 ; at Fort 
Henry, 63; at Fort Donelson, 

Walker, Sir B., ii, 184. 

Wampanoag, ii, 212, 254. 

Wandenkolk, Admiral, ii, 35. 

Wangeroog, i, 270, 278. 

Warrior, English ironclad, Tab. 
xxii ; elevation, PI. xxxvii, ii, 
220 ; des. ii, 219-220 ; compart- 
ments, 219, n. ; armament, id. ; 
speed, 212 ; superior to Monitor, 
i, 32 ; m. ii, 189, 221, 239. 

Washington, Tab. vii. 
Washington Commission, i, 204. 
Wasp, ii, 208. 
Wateriuitch, ii, 258. 
Watts, Isaac, ii, 219. 
Waymouth, Capt., ii, 220. 
Webb, Lieut., Confederate, i, 100. 
Webb, i, 74. 
Webb's Yard, New York, i, 212. 

Weehaisoken, monitor, Tab. iii ; 
action with Atlanta, i, 99-100 ; 
action with Sumter, 92 ; has 
bootjack fitted, id. ; opens fire, 
id. ; damage, 94 ; again attacks, 
101 ; injury to, 102 ; founders off 

Wei-hai-wei, M. xxv, ii ; 52 ; 
Chinese naval port, ii, 66 ; Tsi 
Yuen reaches, 69 ; fleet at, 82 ; 
Japanese off (?) 84 ; Chinese fleet 
at, after Yalu, 126; attacked by 
Japanese, 127-8 ; bombarded, 
128; torpedo attacks, 129-133; 
collapse of Chinese, 133; m. 71, 
80, 81, 137. 

Wei Yuen, Tab. xxv; PI. xx, ii, 14 ; 

ii, 132. 

A A 2 



Welles, Secretary of Navy, U.S.A., 

i, 91, 202. 

West, The, i, 37, 65, 83, 180. 
West Africa, i, 269, 270. 
West Gulf Squadron, i, 185. 

West Indies, i, 156, 170, 171, 270, 


West Virginia, i, 172. 
Whampoa, docks at, ii, 66. 
Wharton, Lieut., i, 30. 

Whitehead torpedo, cigar-shaped 
and divided into three compart- 
ments, containing explosive charge 
of 6o-2Oolb. gun-cotton, com- 
pressed air, and propelling 
machinery, des. ii, 258-9 ; 
range, 259 ; defects, 161 ; em- 
ployment in war, Tab. xxv ; first 
used by Shah, i, 309. 

Whi^worth gun, an early rifle with 
hexagonal bore, ii, 251. 

Wilhelmshaven, state of, 1870, i, 
270, 273 ; ships at 278 ; prac- 
ticability of an attack, 283 ; m. 
281, 282. 

Wilkes, Capt., i, 171, 201-3. 

Wilkinson, Capt., blockade-runner, 
on risk of blockade-running, i, 
igfi ; runs, 195 ; m. 189. 

Willaumez, see Bouet. 

William, i, 199. 

William, King of Prussia, i, 270. 

Wilmington, works at, i, 2 ; im- 
portance of, 135, 142, 179-80 ; 
blockade-runners at, 183, 192, 
194; blockading squadron, 185-6; 
distance from neutral ports, 187 ; 
run into, 190-1. 

Windward Island, i, 148. 
Windward Passage, i, 176. 

Winnebago, monitor, Tab. iv ; des. 
i, 119; at Mobile, 120; turret 
jammed, 123 ; saves Oneida, 126 
engages Tennessee, 131. 

Winona, Tab. ii ; at New Orleans, 
i, 45 ; does not pass forts, 53-4 ; 
at Vicksburg, 70 ; off Mobile, 


Winslow, Capt., of Kearsarge, i, 

Winsloiv, Confederate privateer, i, 

WissaJiickon, Tab. ii ; at New 

Orleans, i, 45 ; passes forts, 48 ; 

at Vicksburg, 70. 

Wivern, i, 33, 168. 

Worden, commander of Monitor, 
i, 14, 24 ; attempts to ram, 28 ; 
wounded in pilot-house, 30 ; ii, 

Worth, i, 275, 281. 

Wyalusing, action with Albemarle, 
i, 108, no. 

Wyoming, i, 157, 172. 


Yaeyama, ii, 75". 

Yalu, Battle of the, or Haiyang, 
M. xxvi, xxvii, xxviii, ii, 88, 90, 
92 ; fleets at, Tab. xviii, xix ; 
compared, xx ; loss of Japanese, 
xxi ; value of deductions from, ii, 
57, 116-7, X 37 i Chinese tactics, 
85-6, 103, 118; battle, 87-101; 
compared with Lissa, 101-3, 
losses on both sides, 104-6 ; 
life-saving, 107 ; gunnery at, 
108-110; structural damage to- 
Japanese ships, no; artillery 
preponderance of Japanese, id. ; 
size at, 112; fires, 113; ram and 
torpedo, 114-5; signals, 119; 
armour at, 119-20, 121-2, 159; 
special circumstances restrained 
Japanese, 103, 123 ; speed at, 
124 ; place of commanders at, 
152-3 ; escape of Saikio at, 175 ; 
m. 56, 71, 126, 133. 

Yalu River, ii, 81. 
Yamato, Marshal, ii, 84. 



Yang Pao, ii, 65. 

Yang Wei, Tab. xviii ; des. ii, 65 ; 
at Yalu, 83 ; slow in taking up 
position, 86 ; place in line, 88 ; 
crushed by Japanese fire, 90 ; 
rammed by Tsi Yuen, 92, 99, 
100 ; fire on, 99 ; sunk, 102 ; 
riddled, 112; weak ship, 144; 
m. 113. 

Yang Woo, Tab. xv, xxv ; at Foo- 
chow, ii, 5, 6 ; torpedoed, 8. 

Yantic, Tab. v, i, 137. 
Yarrow torpedo boats, ii, 83. 
Yazoo River, i, 71, 73, 80. 
Ybera, i, 258. 
Ye Sing, ii, 65. 
Ygurei, i, 258, 260. 

Ylo, i, 307 ; action between Shah 
and Huascar off, 308-9, 310. 

Yokosuka, Japanese dockyard, ii, 
58, 60, 61. 

Ypora, Lake, i, 264. 

Ypora, Paraguayan ship, i, 258. 

Yorktoiun or] Patrick Henry, i> 
15. 19- 

Yoshino, Tab. xix ; loss, xxi ; PI. 
xxiv, ii, 68 ; des. ii, 59-60 ; action 
off Asan with Tsi Yuen, 67-71 ; 
bridge and conning tower hit ? 
69 ; badly handled, 53 ; at Yalu, 
84 ; place in line, 88 ; sinks Chih 
Yuen, 92, 98 ; uses cordite, 112 ; 
at Wei-hai-wei, 130; hit, 133. 

Yu Sing, Tab. xv, ii, 5. 

Yu Yen, Tab. xxv, ii, 13, 14. 


Z and Montechant, q. i, 209 ; ii, 

Zalinski gun, ii, 20, 150-1. 

Zatzarennyi, Lieut., at Sulina, i, 
293-4; at Sukhum, 298-301; at 
Batum, 301-3. 

Zealous, ii, 22 1. 
Zouave, i, 15, 18. 




Accidental collisions, in action, 
Brooklyn and Kineo, i, 48 ; 
Nahant and Keokuk, 93 ; Lacka- 
luanna and Hartford, 130 ; 
Ancona and Varese, 240 ; Blanco 
and Cochrane, 328 ; Tsi Yuen 
and Yang Wei, ii, 100, 115 ; dis- 
cussed, ii, 158, 169. 

In manoeuvres, &c., during 
peace, Iron Duke and Vanguard, 
ii, 189-91 ; Konig Wilhelm and 
Grosser Kurfurst, 192-6; Cam- 
perdown and Victoria, 197-205. 

Accidental hits, on Cuchrane, i, 329 ; 
discussed, ii, 155-6, 181. 

All-round fire, Monitor had, i, 27 ; 
want of, on Huascar, 326 ; on 
Audacious class, ii, 222 ; on 
French designs, 263, 264-5, 2 ^9 ; 
on Dupuy -de-Lome, 267, 269. 

Ammunition, expended at Lissa, 
Italians, Tab. vii ; Austrians, Tab. 
viii ; at Charleston, Tab. iii ; at 
Fort Fisher, Tab. v ; at Alex- 
andria, Tab. xiv ; heavy expendi- 
ture against forts, i, 221 ; in 
bombardments, 283-4 ! Italian, 
exhausted at close of Lissa, 240 ; 
fails Spaniards at Callao, 253 ; 
English, exhausted at Alexandria, 
348-9 ; short supply at Alexan- 
dria, 342 ; runs short on Kwang 
Yi, ii, 71 ; Chinese and Japanese, 

runs short at Yalu, 103, 93; im- 
portance of full supply, 123 ; 
limits action, 175; danger of ex- 
posed, explosion on Cochrane, i, 
335 ; on Matsushima, ii, 94, 
1 80- 1 ; discussed, 180-1 ; on 
Palestra, \, 241, ii, 180, n. ; on 
Tamandare, 181, n. ; hoists to 
guns, ii, 165 ; 180-1, n. ; difficulty 
of supplying, on Akagi, ii, 95. 

Arc of fire, limited, compels end-on 
battle, on Ting Yuen, &c., ii, 

Armour, application to ships, early, 
ii, 217 ; adopted by Confederates, 
i, 3; by Napoleon III., i, xxxii ; 
by Federals, 6; quality of early, ii, 
253 ; improvement in quality of, 
253 ; at Kinburn, defies perfora- 
tion, i, xxxvi ; on Monitor and 
Merrimac, 28 ; at Charleston, 
94-5; laminated and solid armour, 
94 ; perforated, on Atlanta, 99 ; 
on Eads gunboats, 62, 63, 70, 84; 
on Tennessee, 130-1, 132; at Lissa, 
defies attack, 243, 245, 246 ; per- 
forated on Brazilian ironclads, 
262 ; Huascar's defies Shah, 
309 ; fails against Cochrane, 
325-8 ; Cochrane and Blanco 
not perforated, 331 ; resistance 
at Alexandria, 350- 1 , 354-5 ; at 
Yalu, ii, 119-122; withstands 
long-range attack, 159, 170; 
summary, 246 ; protects life, i, 
33. 93. IS 2 - 2 46; ", 104-6; 

3 6 


assures flotation, ii, 179; great 
resistance at sharp angles, 155 ; 
methods of application, Plates 
xxxvii, ii, 220 ; xxxix, ii, 232 ; 
xlii, ii, 262 ; ii, 226-7, 2 4 i 
keeps out high explosives, ii, 
172 ; resists ram, 207. Thin, 
dangerous ; Eads gunboats, i, 
62,63, 70, 84; Huascar, 331 ; on 
Tsi Yuen, ii, 68, 70 ; on Chinese 
fleet removed, 86-7 ; at Yalu, 
170 ; cloth instead of, id. 

"Armour-clad." A vessel carrying 
vertical armour, i.e., armour on 
her sides and gun -positions, e.g., 
the Royal Sovereign. 

Army, co-operation of, with navy 
ineffective : Confederate, at New 
Orleans, i, 44, 58 ; on Mississippi, 
81-2, n. ; Albemarle, 113; Fort 
Fisher, 137-8 ; need of army 
for offensive naval warfare, i, 61, 
185, 205-6, 281-2, 284; ii, 33, 50, 

Artillery, see Guns. 

Progress of, ii, 245-252 ; Tab. 

Auxiliary battery or secondary 
armament, carried by all modern 
ships, and is midway in power 
between the heavy guns and 
the machine guns, ii, 229 ; de- 
velopment of, 230, 234, 235, 238 ; 
protection of, on older ships, 
nil, ii, 164; easily put out of 
action, 172 ; on " Admirals," 
230 ; Victoria, 232 ; Nile, 233 ; 
Royal Sovereign, 235 ; Majestic, 
238, 243 ; improvised protection, 

" Axial fire." Fire right ahead or 
right astern, parallel to ship's 
axis or direction : of French ships, 
ii, 154, 269; of English " eche- 
loned " turret-ships, 228 ; of 
Chinese battleships, 63. 

Bow-fire necessary to meet 
torpedo attacks, ii, 180; strong, 
of Conqueror and Victoria, 232 ; 
necessary if enemy fight stern 
battle, 1 1 8. 

Stern-fire, powerful French, 
154; allows stern battle, 118; 
deficient, of Conqueror and Vic- 
toria, 232. 


" Backing." The timber cushion 
upon which armour plates are 
generally mounted, of teak or oak. 
Improvements in, ii, 254. 

" Barbette." A circular or pear- 
shaped armoured inclosure, inside 
which is a turntable carrying the 
gun or guns. The latter fire over 
the edge of the armour, not 
through port-holes, and are said 
to be mounted en barbette. 
PI. xiii, i, 280, shows a gun so 
mounted, forward ; ii, 242. 

Descends from turret, i, 33 ; 
on Temeraire, i, 339, ii, 223 ; 
"Admirals," ii, 230; Royal 
Sovereign, 234; Centurion, 236; 
Majestic, 238 ; French type, 261. 

Danger of unprotected bases, 
ii, 164, 230, 263, 269. 

Bases, seizure of, by North on 
Southern coast, i, 184-5, 2O 5> 
210 ; the Athenian strategy, 184; 
Japanese, in G. of Korea, ii, 84. 

Battle, forecast of, chap, xxiii, ii, 

Close action or melee at Lissa, 
i, 234-248, ii, 101 ; may be 
necessary to close, 117; end-on 
attack results in, 154 ; weaker 
side may close, 159 ; hits nu- 
merous in, 170; its features, 172 ; 
torpedo-boat in, 149, 172 ; artil- 
lery in, i 80. 

Long-range action, Yalu one, 
ii, 101, 103 ; will probably be 
followed by close action, 117, 159; 
hits few in, 120 ; fire discipline in, 
159; damage done in, 162-3; 
guns in, 180. 

See also Loss, Torpedoes. 



Battle formations diseased, ii, 153-8; 
Farragut's, at New Orleans, i, 45 ; 
at Mobile, 120; Tegetthof's, 
230-1, 247-8; Persano's, 232; 
Ting's, ii, 85-6, 88 ; Ito's, 87-8. 

See Map xxix, ii, 156, to the 
figures of which reference is made 
by number below. 

Bow and quarter line. Fig. i 
shows two such lines ; at Lissa, i, 
230-1, 247; ii, 155-6. 

Groups, Figs. 6, 9, at Yalu, 
ii, 85-6; Amezaga on, 118; 
discussed, 156. 

Line-abreast, Fig. 2, weak- 
ness, ii, 153-4, 155; Ting's, 57, 
118; leads to melee, 154, 160. 

Line-ahead, Fig. 4, weakness, 
ii, 153 ; advantages, 155, 157 ; 
length of line, 145 ; at Lissa, i, 
232 ; at Yalu, ii, 87-8. 

Quincunx, Fig. 8, ii, 156. 

Battleship. A ship designed to fight 
in the line of battle, carrying 
vertical armour and heavyarmour- 
piercing guns. Differs from 
coast-defence ship in its superior 
sea-keeping qualities. The 
general features of such a ship 
are shown in Frontispiece, vol. i, 
the Majestic. 

English, French, German, and 
American compared, ii, 242-5 ; 
small, 145, 270 ; antiquated, 145, 
270 ; definition of standard or 
first class, 270 ; homogeneity of, 
271 ; need of water-line armour, 
177-8; ideal battleship, 177-180; 
proportion necessary for a block- 
ade, i, 205 ; battleship -versus 
cruiser, i, 31 1 ; ii, 138 144, 1 19 
121. Mainstay of the Brazilian 
revolt, ii, 49; at Yalu, 120, 122. 
Development of battleship in 
England, ii, 209-242; in France, 
260-269. Earlier French and 
English compared, ii, 269. 

Belt, armour, why carried, ii, 
178-9; protects against ram (?) 
207 ; on cruisers, 143. 

Blockade of Southern coast, 
1861-5, wn y it was proclaimed, i, 
177 ; when proclaimed, 181 ; 
terms of proclamation, id, ; 
objects, to prevent exportation of 
cotton, 178, and importation of 
arms, 179; imperfect at first, 
181 ; magnitude of task, 183 ; 
does not stop trade, id. ; in- 
different craft blockading, 184; 
bases necessary, id. ; the work of 
the army in, 185 ; typical blockade, 
*85-6 ; great rise in prices due to, 
196 ; effect of, 196-7 ; three 
periods of, 186-7 '> invalidated by 
escape of three ships, 183; ships 
too close hit one another, 192. 

Questions arising out of. See 
Neutrals, England, International 

Northern, of Bermuda and 
Nassau, i, 186. 

French, of German coast, 1870, 
i, 274 ; difficulty of coaling, 276 ; 
escape of Arminius and Eliza- 
beth, 277 ; of Augusta, 278 ; 
becomes observation, 278. 

Turkish, of Russian ports, 
1877, i, 288; ineffective, 293. 

Chilian, of Callao, 1880, i, 333. 

Japanese, of Wei-hai-wei, 
1895, ii, 127-133. 

Blockade of French coast by 
England, discussed, i, 204-210; 
France and Confederacy com- 
pared, 205-6 ; English admirals 
on blockade, 204-5 i types of 
ship necessary for, 208-9; isolated 
ships can run, 277, 280-1. 

Blockade-runners, starting points, 
i, 187 ; typical run, 189-191 ; 
Northern precautions against, 
186; three types, 187; sailing, 
187-8; fast steamers, 188-9; 
these could do what they liked, 
192, 203-4 ; how they might have 
been stopped, 206 ; magnitude of 
traffic, 188, 193-4; companies of, 
formed, 188 ; cargoes carried, 
191, 193; enormous profits, 194; 
price of freight, 193 ; wages of 
captain and sailors, 195 ; risk of, 



igi-2, 194-5; insurance on, 195; 
audacity of, 192 ; number cap- 
tured, 195 ; specialisation in 
trade, 203-4 ; illegal seizure of 
ships by North, 198-201 ; ex- 
cuses for North, 203 ; number of 
claims against North, 204; m. i, 
51, 136-7, 138, 146, 167, 168. 

Boats, will be left on shore before 
battle, ii, 162 ; Tsi Yuen's on 
fire, ii, 69 ; left behind by 
Chinese, 87. 

Boilers, water-tube or tubulous. 
In these the water is in the tubes, 
whereas in tubular boilers the 
gases of the fire pass through the 
tubes around which is the water. 
On Brennus, ii, 254 ; on Powerful, 

Damage to boilers, &c., in 
action, Itasca, i, 53 ; Essex, 63 ; 
Sumter, 68; Little Rebel, 69; 
Mound City, 69; Brooklyn, 75 ; 
Mercedita, 88 ; Sassacus, 109 ; 
Mackin aiv, 1 39 ; Villa de Madrid, 
255 ; Ivahy, 262 ; Huascar, 328 ; 
torpedo boat No. 9, ii, 131. 

Bombardment. See also High 
angle Fire, Forts. 

Of open ports, Spaniards at 
Valparaiso, i, 253-4 ; no attacks 
upon, in American Civil War, 
153 ; Bouet ordered to attack 
German, 276-7. 

Danger from, i, 209, n. ; cf. 
334 ; strategically useless, 283-4 ; 
provokes reprisals, 209, n., 284. 

Boom, at New Orleans, i, 42, 49- 
50, 59 ; at Charleston, 87, 93 ; 
round Albemarle, 112; at Kiel, 
271 ; at Sulina, 293, 295, 296; at 
Batum, 297, n. ; at Sukhum, 
298 ; at Callao, 333 ; at Sta. 
Catherina, ii, 49 ; at Wei-hai-wei, 

Need of, i, 96 ; ii, 50. 

Bow and quarter line. See Battle < 

Broadside, weak, of monitors, i, 136. 
Return to powerful, ii, 154, 

Bunkers, advantage of full, in 
action, ii, 164. 


Cap-squares. The metal plates 
which fasten down the trunnions 
of a gun to its carriage. Most 
modern guns have no trunnions, 
i. 95- 

Captain in action, injury to, ii, 168 ; 
protection of, 168-170. See 
Conning Tower. 

Capture in war eliminated ? ii, 176. 
\Huascar captured, i, 327-330.] 

Casemate. An armoured inclosure 
on board ship in which guns are 
mounted, ii, 235, 236, 237, 238. 
Casemate-ships are vessels of the 
Merrimac type, des. i, 3-6. 

Central pivot mountings. A form of 
gun-carriage which allows the 
gun to sweep a wide angle, 
generally from 60 to 270. It 
is usually fitted with a shield, 
and sometimes has an ammuni- 
tion hoist coming up through the 
pivot. PI. xli, ii, 250, illustrates 
this form of mounting ; ii, 60. 

Clearing for action, Farragut's fleet, 
i, 39, 119; at Alexandria, 342; 
Tsi Yuen not, at Asan, ii, 69 ; 
Chinese fleet, 80, 86-7 ; discussed, 
162-3 ! time taken to clear, 162, n. 

Coal supply, bad on Sumter, i, 144 ; 
runs low on Italian fleet, 240; 
poor of French ships, 273, n. ; 
of Royal Sovereign, ii, 235 ; of 
various battleships, 244. 

Smokeless, Russians use, i, 298 ; 
Japanese betrayed by smoke, ii, 
86; blockade-runners use, i, 189. 

Protection improvised on 
Chinese ships, ii, 79, 86. 

Discussed, ii, 163-5. 



Coaling at sea, Alabama, i, 154 ; 
French in 1870, 275-6. 

Coiling in neutral ports. See 

Coaling stations, i, 173, 206. 

Coasts, war of, demands special 
types of ships, i, 265-7 i Huascar 
c irries on, 321. 

Colour of ships, at New Orleans, i, 
39 ; at Lissa, 235 ; of Russian 
torpedo-boats, i, 298 ; of torpedo- 
boats at Shei'poo, ii, 13; at 
Yalu, ii, 89, 101 ; importance of 
distinctive, 181. 

Commander-in-Chief, place of (i) 
in fleet ; Farragut's views on, i, 
46, 120, n., ii, 151-2, n. ; Nel- 
son's view, ii, 151-2 ; Tegetthof, 
i, 231-2; Persano, 233; I to at 
Yalu, ii, 152; discussed, 151-2; 
(2) on shipboard, Farragut in 
rigging, i, 121 ; military masts (?) 
ii, 152. 

Commerce, warfare against, South- 
ern against Northern, i, 143- 
176 ; passengers of captured 
ships, how got rid of, 150, 154; 
surprise rendered it effective, 153, 
157; strategy of Semmes, 170; 
defensive against him, 170 173; 
transfers of Northern shipping 
to English flag, 169, n. ; strategic 
inutility, 175-6; causes which 
may have contributed to ruin 
Northern commerce, 169. 

Commerce-destroyers, Tab. vi; 
two types, i, 143-4 < Sumter, 
144-6; Florida, 146-151, Flori- 
da's tenders, 148-9 ; Alabama, 
152-7; Tuscaloosa, 156; Nash- 
i' lie, 165 ; Georgia, 165-6 ; 
Shenandoah, 166-7 i Atlanta, 
167-8 ; should not fight, 158 ; 
Northern precautions wanting, 
X 53> J 57> I 7-3; prizes taken by, 
Tab. vi. 

German Augusta, i, 278. 
Steamers hard to capture, i, 
168, 175. 

Geneva rules on commerce- 
destroying, 174. 

English will be assailed, i, 143, 
169, 175, 176, 206, 209. 
Compound armour, iron faced with 
steel, ii, 229, 253. 

Compound engines, have two cylin- 
ders, one larger than the other. 
The steam is used at high pres- 
sure in the smaller cylinder, and 
when used passes at a lower 
pressure to the larger cylinder, 
where it is used again. Triple - 
expansion engines have three 
cylinders, quadruple four, ii, 254, 

Concussion, injuries from, i, 26, 28, 
131. 327> 35: 'i. 89, 96, 169. 

Conning tower. An armoured struc- 
ture, generally cylindrical in 
shape, from which the ship can be 
directed in action. Same as pilot 

Kinburn batteries, i, xxxii ; 
Merrimac's, 5 ; Monitor's, 10 ; 
struck, 30 ; struck on Missis- 
sippi gunboats, 65, 78 ; in later 
monitors, 89; difficulty of vision, 
94 ; Rodgers killed in, 101 ; 
struck on Salamander, 243 ; on 
Assar-i-Chevket ? 305 ; on Huas- 
car, 326, 330 ; on Tsi Yuen, ii, 
68 ; on Yoshino's (?) 69 ; tops re- 
moved from Chinese, 86. 

Hits on, ii, 168 ; thick armour 
or duplication, 168-9 ! field of 
view, 153; on various ships, 244. 

Continuous voyages, Lord Stowell 
on, i, 199, n. ; U.S. courts, 199- 

Contraband, U.S. hold Confederate 
Envoys, i, 201-2 ; Northern courts 
(U.S.) on, 203; rice held, ii, 

Crews, of modern ships small re- 
latively, ii, 213. 

" Cross-raiding." [Colomb. Naval 
Warfare, 3]. Warfare by retalia- 
tory expeditions seeking to burn 
and destroy without an effort to 
control or command the sea. See 
Coasts, War of. 



Peruvian in 1879, i, 314, 321, 
322, 324 ; ii, 33. 

Southern cruisers threaten 
Northern ports, i, 149, 150, 153, 

Cruiser. A vessel of less military 
strength than a battleship, in 
which offensive and defensive 
qualities are sacrificed to speed 
and coal supply. Generally 
without vertical armour, but in- 
variably has a horizontal armour 
deck, which usually curves up 
amidships, descending below the 
water-line at the sides and ends. 

Sketch of history, ii, 254-7 ; 
in naval battle, 138 145 ; com- 
pared with frigate, 139-140 ; 
cannot ram, i, 22 ; ii, 103. 

Against battleship, i, 308-311 ; 
ii, 103, 119-121, 138-145. 

Needs armour-piercing guns, 
i, 311. 

Classes of, ii, 143 ; armoured 
cruisers, id. 

Necessary to protect commerce, 
i, 175 ; for blockade, 205 ; place 
in blockade, 209. 


Deck armour, on early floating 
batteries, i, xxxii ; on Monitor, 
i, 10, ii, 227 ; on Eads gunboats, 
ii, 227 ; adopted, id. ; novel 
arrangement of, in Renown, 
237 ; in various battleships, 244 ; 
cuts into rammer's bow, 205 ; 
discussed, ii, 177. 

Injured on Affondatore, i, 244; 
does not save Chinese cruisers, ii, 
120; danger to, 172, 179. 

Declaration of war, attack without, 
ii, 68, 76. 

Devolution of command, ii, 169, 

Differentiation of warships, ii, 215- 

Of armament, ii, 180, 234-5. 
Of armour, ii, 235. 

Difficulty of distinguishing com- 
batants, ii, 101 ; of estimating 
fighting force, ii, 216. 

Dimension, failure of small ships 
at New Orleans, i, 54, n., 60 ; 
Palestra at Lissa, 135 ; at Yalu, 
ii, 112-3. 

Increased by steam, ii, 212, 
241-2 ; of battleship, 270 ; in 
Western fleets, 1 16. 

Resistance of large ships, 
Aquidaban, ii, 49; cf. ii, 116, 120. 

Disguise in general action, ii, 181. 

Distance between ships in action, i, 
344 i 145. n - 

Distribution of armament, ii, 178 ; 
in French battleships, 179-180, 
263, 264 ; disadvantages of, 269. 

Division of command on the war- 
ship, ii, 169. 

Division of fleet, ii, 144 147. 
Docks, need of, i, 313. 

Double on enemy. To turn the 
enemy's flank or concentrate a 
large force upon a small section 
of his command, ii, 118, 181. 

Duration of battle, ii, 115, 175. 


Echeloned turret-ship. A vessel in 
which the turrets are placed not 
in the keel line, in the centre of 
the ship, but diagonally across it. 
See deck plan of Chen Yuen, 
PI. xxiii, ii, 62 ; defect of, ii, 
63-4 ; English, 154, 228-230. 

Electricity, use of, ii, 247, 267, 268. 

End-on battle, Ting orders, ii, 85 ; 
danger of, 153-4; French may 
fight, 154-5. 

End-on fire. See Axial. 
End-to-end collisions, ii, 160. 

Ends, unarmoured, ships with, are 
technically called " light-enders." 



At Yalu, ii, 122 ; danger of, 
174, 179, 207 ; adopted by 
England, 227; in "Admirals," 
231 ; compared with French pro- | 
tection, 269-270. 
Engines, breakdown (?) ii, 69, 88 ; : 

numerous on board ship, 213-4. 
England and the North, the Con- 
federate cruisers, Florida, i, 
146-7 ; Alabama, 152 ; Georgia, 
165; sale of Victor to Con- 
federates, 166 ; Shenandoah, 
166-7 ; coals and refits at Mel- 
bourne, 167 ; ironclads built for 
Confederates, 33, 168 ; sympathy 
with South, 147, 173 ; acknow- 
ledges as belligerent, 181 ; visits 
of English cruisers to blockaded 
ports, 147 ; instructions concern- 
ing blockade, 183 ; and cotton 
supply, 178. 

Case of Trent, \, 200-3 i 
Peterhoff, 198-200 ; Springbok, 
200- 1 ; interference of North with 
trade, 197, 200. 

Northern spies, i, 171. 

Interests antagonistic in peace 
and war, i, 197-8. 

Prize law, 199 ; commerce will 
be assailed, 143, 169, 176, 206, 
209; national insurance, 175; 
our position better than that of 
North, 175; dependence on sea, 
198, 205-6. 

And France, rice, ii, 15. 

Strategy in war with France, 
i, 204-210; fleet necessary to 
blockade French coast, 206-7. 

Want of reserve, i, 207. 

Naval strength of, i, 207 ; ii, 
269 274. 

Personnel of fleet, ii, 173, 273-4. 

Explosion on Cochrane, i, 334-5 ; 

on Matsushima, i, 335 ; ii, 94, 

180 ; on Palestra, i, 241, 335, 

ii, 180; on Tamandare, ii, 181. 


Fire discipline, ii, 159. 
Fires in action, Sinope, i, xxxi ; Con- 
gress, i, 19 ; Minnesota, 29 ; 

Pinola, 53 ; Keystone State, 88 ; 
Kennebec, 126 ; Lackaivanna, 
129 ; Schivarzenbtirg, 226, n.; 
Palestra, 235, 241-2; Ancona, 
236 ; Kaiser, 239 ; Affondatore, 
244 ; Maria Pia, 245 ; San 
Martina, id. ; Castelfidardo, id. ; 
at Lissa, 246 ; Blanca, 256 ; 
Huascar, 325, 329 ; on Vesta, i, 
305 ; on Chinese ships at Foo- 
chow, ii, 8-10; at Yalu, ii, 113; 
Tsliao Yong, 113; Yang Wei, 
91 ; Matsushima, 94 ; Hiyei, 
95; Lai Yuen, 95, 113; Saikio, 
96 ; Ting Yuen, 96-7, 113 ; Chen 
Yuen,gj, 113; King Yuen, 99, 
113; Ching Yuen, 92, 99, 113; 
Kuuang Kai, 113; discussed, ii, 

" Fleet in being." [Colomb. Naval 
Warfare, 122-3.] A fleet not 
contained or masked by a superior 
or equal force. May be com- 
pared to an army acting on 
enemy's lines of communication 
or flanks. It suffices to bar 
territorial attacks ? [Quarterly, 
clxxvii.] Tegetthof's fleet in 
being, i, 220, 222, 224, 248 ; 
German, 275, 277 ; Chinese, ii, 
80- i ; Japanese, 82-3, 102-3. 

Floating batteries, Kinburn, i, xxxii- 
xxxvi, 3, 8, 207. 

Food before battle, i, 231, 343; 
ii, 87. 

Forced draught. Artificial current 
of air in boiler flues. To be dis- 
tinguished from induced draught, 
ii, 254. 

Forts, and ships, Kinburn, i, xxxiv- 
xxxvi ; Duckworth, i, 38 ; New 
Orleans, 45-54 ; not silenced, 
59 ; Vicksburg, 70-1 ; Port 
Hudson, 75-77 ; Cincinnati 
sunk by, 80 ; McAllister, 90 ; 
Charleston, 92-96, 101-103 ; 
Mobile, 124-127 ; forts sur- 
render, 134; Fort Fisher, 135- 
142 ; Lissa, 220-224 ; Callao, 
255-6; on Parana, 262-3; Alex- 



andria, 336-357 ; Wei-hai-wei, 
ii, 127-133; at Rio, ii, 36-40; 
ships cannot silence, i, 57, 128; 
monitors' fire too slow against, 
94, 136, 266 ; advantage of forts, 
91, 96-7, 265-6, 282-3, 353-4- 

Ships can pass, i, 45-54, 70-1, 
75-77, 124-127, 263-4, 282; 
ii, 1 1- 1 2, 36-40, 49-50. 

Freeboard, high, necessary for sea- 
going ship, i, 32-3; 325, ii, 178, 

Frigates at Lissa, i, 219, 221, 234; 
compared with line-of-battle ship, 
ii, 138-140. 

Funnel, damage to, Merrimac, i, 
30 ; Arkansas, 71 ; Albemarle, 
109; Tennessee, 129, 131 ; Chicka- 
saw, 123; Kaiser, 239; Assar-i- 
Clievket, 305 ; Huascar, 328, 
329 ; Tsi Yuen, ii, 68-9. 

Effect of damage, ii, 163-4; 
protection of, id., 178 ; i, 89. 

Fuses, defective, i, 162, 247, 352 ; 
ii, 70, 172. 


Gunnery, changes in, i, 133; value 
of, 159, 165, 215, 247, ii, 123; 
bad, i, 213, 247 ; Chinese, ii, 
96, 105, 108-9 ; English, at 
Alexandria, i, 345, 353, Western 
better than Eastern, ii, 117; 
quick-firer has improved, 166 ; 
influence of weather on, id. ; 
errors in, 155. 

Guns. A 6-inch gun is a gun of 
6-inch calibre ; a 68-ton gun is a 
gun of 68 tons weight ; a 100- 
pounder is a gun firing a shot of 
loolb. weight. Increased power 
of, i, 34, ii, 170; sketch of 
artillery progress, 245-252 ; 
supreme (?) 123 ; has beaten 
armour, 174; long range of, i, 
97 ; moderate size best, ii, 124, 
171, 179. 

Monster guns useless against 
earthworks, i, 353-4 ; craze for, ii, 
247-9; need of big guns, i, 311, 
ii, in, 171 ; weak guns useless 
against armour, i, 309, ii, ill; 
destruction proportionate to size 
of shot, 139, 171 ; disabled at 
Asan, 68, 69 ; at Yalu, 94, 98, 
100, 113-4. 

h arly guns weak, ii, 240, 246. 

Northern (U.S.) guns, Tab. i ; 
burst, i, 65, 139. 

Southern, i, i, 40, 118, 179. 

At Lissa, compared, i, 246 ; 
at Yalu, ii, 108-9. 

English, at Alexandria, i, 339 ; 
Egyptian, 341 ; disabled, 351-2. 

French and Chinese, at Foo- 
chow, ii, 5-6. 

Heavy guns in long-range 
encounter, ii, 159, 171 ; at close 
quarters, 172. 

Carriages, improvements in, ii, 

Hydraulic-worked, at Alex- 
andria, i, 345-6, 353 ; on Chinese 
ships, ii, 63 ; on Temeraire, 223 ; 
onDreadnouglit, 226; Thunderer, 
247 ; general adoption, id. ; in 
French fleet, 262. 

Light (Catling, Nordenfelts, 
&c.), effective against Huascar, 
i, 326 ; little value against large 
ships, ii, 30; deadly at Foochow, 
10 ; on Aquidaban, 48-9 ; little 
damage by, at Yalu, 125. 

Long, advantage of, ii, 248, 

Pneumatic, on Nictheroy, ii, 
40-1, 42, 49 ; accuracy of, 150-1. 

Quick-firing, des. ii, 109-110, 
251 ; PI. xl, ii, 246; xli, ii, 250. 
Value against torpedo-boats, i, 
303-4 ; ii, 48-9, 149. For arma- 
ment of merchant ships in war, i, 
175. Promote accurate shooting, 
ii, 166 ; in long-range engage- 
ment, 159 ; structural influence, 
227, 232, 238 ; tactical influence, 
156; development of, 250-1 ; 8- 
inch, 170-1 ; as secondary arma- 
ment of warship, 178, 179, 180 ; 



Thunderer class impervious to, 
226. At Yalu, ii, 90. 108-110, 


Rapidity of fire, ii, 180; im- 
portance of , no; of heavy guns, 

Smooth-bores, U.S., i, 26 ; low 
charge, id.; short range, 127; 
effective on water-line, 161, 165. 


Handiness, i, 308, 316. 

High-angle fire, at New Orleans, i, 
43-45 ; effect of, 57 ; Farragut's 
belief in, id., 75, n. ; use of, in 
modern bombardments, 96-7 ; at 
Sulina, 296-7 ; on Vesta against 
Assar-i-CIievket, 304-5; Inflexi- 
ble 's at Alexandria, 352 ; Egyp- 
tian, 354 ; value of, urged by 
Lieut. Goodrich, 355. Howitzer 
ships, i, 355. Howitzer, ii, 171. 

High explosives. The name given to 
substances exploding with greater 
violence than gunpowder, as 
dynamite, melinite, and cordite. 
They are used as the bursting 
charge of shells, ii, 252. 

Effect of shells charged with, 
ii, 163, 172 ; at Yalu, 113 ; 
structural influence of, 227, 241. 

Hits in action, on Monitor, i, 32 ; 
Merrimac, id. ; Rolf Krake, 33 ; 
gunboats at Fort Henry, 63 ; at 
Donelson, 65 ; at Grand Gulf, 
79 ; on monitors at Charleston, 
93, 95; Atlanta, 99-100; second 
Charleston attack, 101 ; Ten- 
nessee, 132 ; fleet at Fort Fisher, 
139 ; Florida, 148 ; Alabama, 
164; Kearsarge, 164; Formid- 
able, 223 ; at Lissa, 245 ; 
Brazilian fleet at Humaita, 263 ; 
flat-boat action, 262 ; Vesta, 305 ; 
Assar-i-Chevket, id. Hnascar 
against Shah, 309 ; against 
Chilian fleet, 325-330 ; Coch- 
rane, 331 ; Alexandra, 346 ; 

fleet at Alexandria, 350-1 ; 
French fleet at Foochow, ii, II ; 
Blanco, 19-20 ; Aquidaban, 37 
38 ; Tsi Yuen, 68, 70; Matsu- 
shima, 94; Saikio, 96; Hiyei, 
95 ; Akagi, id. ; Japanese fleet, 
1 10 ; Chinese, 111-2. 

By heavy guns, i, 240, 243, 
255. 256, 318, 325-330; ii, 9. 
74, 94, 96, 98, 109, HI, 172. 

On torpedo -craft, ii, 26-7, 46, 
96, 132. 

Percentage of, at Charleston, 
i, 96 ; Lissa, 246, 247 ; Shah's, 
309-310; Chilian against Huas- 
car, 330 ; on forts at Alexandria, 
352 ; gunboats aga'mst Aconcagua, 
ii, 30; at Yalu, 109-110; future 
battle, 1 66. 

Homogeneity of structure in battle- 
ships, ii, 236, 271. 

Hydraulics. See Guns, Hydraulic- 

Ships propelled by, ii, 258. 


Induced draught. See Forced 

Insurance, on blockade-runners, i, 
195; national, of commerce, 175. 

International law. See also Eng- 
land. Commerce - destroyers ; 
Sumter not allowed to coal, i, 

146 ; Florida uses English flag, 

147 ; coals at Nassau, 148 ; at 
Barbadoes, 149 ; rule in regard 
to coaling, id., n ; at Bermuda, 
id. ; Shenandoah coals at Mel- 
bourne, 167 ; negligence of 
England in regard to commerce- 
destroyers. See England. 

Geneva rules, i, 174 ; Alabama 
claims, 174-5. 

Sumter at Cadiz, i, 146 ; Ala- 
bama at Noronha, 156 ; coals at 
Blanquilla, 153 ; French lay 
embargo on Victor, 166; attitude 
of France, 174, n. 

3 68 


U.S. warships, breach of French 
neutrality, i, 145 ; infraction of 
English coaling rules, 149; seizure 
of Florida, 151 ; complaints anent 
Deerhound, 164 ; repairs in 
English ports, 167 ; precedents 
against, 173; in blockade treat- 
ment of neutrals, 197 ; case of 
Peterhoff, 198-200 ; continuous 
voyages, 199, n.; Slidell and 
Mason, Trent case, 201-3; 
doctrine of contraband, 203 ; 
English claims against North, 
204; pre-emption, id. ; illegali- 
ties in blockade, 183. 

French not allowed to coal at 
Heligoland, i, 275 ; nor English 
pilots to act for, 273 ; but Danish 
pilots procurable, id. 

Neutral property destroyed at 
Valparaiso, i, 254 ; French hold 
rice contraband, ii, 15 ; coal at 
Hong-Kong, id. ; blockade of 
Formosa, id. 

Neutrals stop blockade of 
Valparaiso, ii, 19; of Rio, 37. 

Case of Itata, ii, 33-4 ; of 
KowsJiing, 75-81. 

Hostilities without declaration 
of war, ii, 76. 

Ironclad against wooden ship, 
Merrimac in Hampton Roads, i, 
14-20 ; action off Charleston, 
87-9 ; Albemarle and gunboats, 
106-110 ; Kaiser, 239. 

Against unarmoured ship, 
Assar-i-Chevket, i, 304-5 ; Shah 
and Huascar, 308-11. See also 


Landing part}' from fleet at Fort 
Fisher, i, 141 ; diminutive with 
modern ships, 283. 

Lashing of ships in pairs, i, 74, 120, 

Laws of war, breach of, ii, 78-79. 

Life - saving in battle, or after, 
Kearsarge, i, 163-4 1 Lissa, 
237-8 ; duty of victor, ii, 78 ; at 
Yalu, 106-107 ; Tegetthof wishes 
for conference to settle, 107 ; life- 
belts, 163. 

Light draught, necessary on South- 
ern coast, i, 7, 35, 40, 90, 117, 
125 ; French had no ships, 
266, 268, 273, 282 ; value of, to 
Htiascar, 308, 310; toCovadonga, 
316, 319 ; to Esmeralda, 316 ; 
English want of, at Alexandria, 
339 ; value to Condor, 346 ; to 
gunboats, 347 ; at Sfax, ii, 2, 4. 

Lights misplaced, not, i, 273. 
Line-ahead. See Battle Formations. 

Line-abreast. See Battle Forma- 

Loss in naval action. Men, Table 
of six great battles, ii, 106 ; 
past and present, 106-7, 173-4, 

At New Orleans, i, 60 ; Donel- 
son, 65; Vicksburg, 71; Port 
Hudson, 77; Grand Gulf, 79-80 ; 
Charleston, 96; Mobile, 132; 
Fort Fisher, 140 ; Alabama and 
Hatteras, 155 ; and Kearsarge, 
163, 164 ; Formidable, 223 ; 
bombardment of Lissa, 224 ; off 
Heligoland, 226 ; Kaiser's at 
Lissa, 244 ; total at Lissa, id., 
245 ; Spanish, at Callao, 256 ; 
Meteor and Bouvet, 279; Es- 
meraldas, 319 ; Huascar's at 
Angamos, 331; English, at Alex- 
andria, 349-50 ; French, at Foo- 
chow, ii, ii ; Chinese, id.; 
Blanco' s, 26 ; Tsi Yuen's, 69 ; 
at Yalu, 104-6. 

Ships, Lissa, i, 244-5, "> Io2 i 
at Yalu, ii, 102 and n. ; in future 
naval battle, 174-6. 


Machinery, influence on dimension, 
ii, 210-212 ; on size of crew, 213 ; 
quantity of, on shipboard, 213-4. 


Mantlets, i, 52 ; ii, 86. 

Masts hit, Tsi Yuen, ii, 69; Akagi, 
95 ; Hiyei, id. ; Ting Yuen, 96 ; 
Chen Yuen, 98. 

Value of military, with tops, 
good field of view, ii, 153 ; faults 
of, 167. 

On various types of battleship, 
ii, 244. 

Farragut places pilot in top, i, 
75 ; climbs rigging at Mobile, 

Materiel, influence on tactics, &c., i, 

283; ii, 63-4, 86, 153. 
Melinite. A preparation of picric 

acid, used as a bursting charge 

in shells. At Yalu, ii, 113; 

effects of explosion, 172, 252. 

Metallurgy, progress in, ii, 253. 

Metacentric height. The height, 
above the centre of gravity of a 
floating body with a list, of the 
point through which the resultant 
upward pressure of the fluid 
always passes. The higher the 
metacentre, the more stable the 
ship. In Captain, ii, 184. 

Mines, none at New Orleans, i, 
58 ; Cairo sunk by, 73 ; De Kalb 
sunk, 84; damage Montauk, 90; 
Ironsides over, at Charleston, 93 ; 
Northern losses from, 104, 113; 
at Mobile, 115; sink Tecumseh, 
124; Hartford crosses, 125 ; loss 
of ships in Mobile Bay, 134; sink 
Riode Janeiro, 262 ; sink Sulina, 
297 ; attempt to destroy Chilian 
ironclads by, 334 ; Loa and 
Covadonga sunk by, id. ; none at 
Alexandria, 342, 354; at Sta. 
Catherina, ii, 49; at Wei-hai- 
wei, 128. 

Influence of, i, 97, 122-4; at 
Fasana, 228; at Kiel, 271, 276; 
at Iquique, 316. 

Necessary in a channel for 
defence, ii, 50 ; ports may be 
closed with, i, 209, n. 

Weehawken 's torpedo-catcher, 
i, 92- 

Misunderstanding of orders, i, 28, 

Monitor. A class of vessels with 
low freeboard, carrying their 
armament in a turret, named 
after their prototype, Ericsson's 
Monitor, PI. iii, i, 26. A modern 
ship of this type is the Nile, 
PI. iv, i, 32. 

Small target, i, 26, 97, 308 ; 
invulnerable, i, 101 ; to quick- 
firer, ii, 226. 

Mortars. See High-angle Fire. 

Muzzle - loaders, Shali's fail, i, 
311; Cochrane's perforate, 330; 
reason for difference, 331 ; in 
English fleet, ii, 246; why aban- 
doned, 248. 


Naval strength of England and 
France, ii, 269-274. 

Navy, English, sketch of, ii, 219- 

Navy, French, sketch of, ii, 260- 

Nickel steel. An alloy of steel and 
nickel of exceptional toughness, 
i', 253. 

Night actions, ii, 176-7. 


"Observation." The strategical 
plan of watching a hostile port 
with light and fast ships, the main 
squadron being at a distance. 
Opposed to blockade, in which 
the main squadron is close at 

Organisation, want of Italian, i, 
248-9; want of French, 271; 
German, 283. 

15 P, 




Personnel, Southern, i, 2,42,99, 100, 
129, 159; Northern, 62, 132-3; 
Italian, 213-4, 2I 5 ! Austrian, 
227 ; Chinese, ii, 55-7 ; import- 
ance of, i, 159; long service, ii, 

Philanthropy in war, i, 239-240; 
ii, 3 1 - 

Physical health of men, i, 209 ; ii, 

Plans, Italians have none, i, 224, 
246 ; Chinese have none, ii, 86, 


Plunging fire. Fire delivered .from 
an elevation. 

Popular feeling, leads to attack on 
Lissa, i, 217 ; and French fleet 
in Baltic, 280-1. 

Ports, open. See also Bombard- 

Threatened, i, 150, 153, 167-8. 

Prizes, Sumter's, i, 146 ; Florida's 
tenders, 147 ; Florida's, 151 ; 
Alabama's, 157 ; Nashville's, 
165 ; Georgia's, 166 ; Shenan- 
doah's, 167; captured by North 
in blockade, 195. 

Projectiles. Those most commonly 
used are armour-piercing pro- 
jectiles, or shot containing a very 
small bursting charge, and 
common shell or shell containing 
a large bursting charge. In 
addition, shrapnel shell is used 
by most navies, and case shot by 
a few. 

Bad, of Monitor, i, 26 ; of 
Merrimac, 27 ; Chinese supply 
of, ii, 125 ; early rifled, 246 ; 
improvement in, 252. 

Protection, portions of ship which 
need, ii, 177-8. 

English and French systems of, 

Improvised, cables, i, 39, 64, 
67, 119, 159, 228. Sandbags, i, 
39, 85, 119. Coal, i, 64; ii , 79- 
86, 163. Timber, i, 67, 78. 
Cloth, ii, 170. 


Railways, in South, i, 179 ; on 
French coast, 205 ; German, 
281 ; torpedo-boats sent by, 289. 

Ram. [Laird Clowes. Journal 
United Service Institution, 1894.] 
Merrimac uses, on Cumber- 
land, i, 16-7 ; attempts of 
Monitor to use, 28 ; of Merrimac, 
29-30 ; of Manassas, 48, 49, 50, 
56; of Mississippi, 56; Cincin- 
nati sunk by, 68 ; Mound City 
rammed, id, ; Lovell rammed, 
69 ; Beauregard rammed, id. ; 
Arkansas, 72 ; Queen of West 
rams, 73 ; Indianola rammed, 
74 ; use of, on Mississippi, 84-5 ; 
Albemarle rams Southfield, 108 ; 
rammed by Sassacus, 109-110; 
Tennessee uses, at Fort Morgan, 
125, 126, 127 ; rammed by 
Monongahela, 126 ; a second 
time, 129; by Lackawanna, id.; 
by Hartford, 130 ; latter collides 
with Lackawanna, id. ; Florida 
rammed, 150; Austrian attempts 
to ram at Lissa, 234-235; Re 
d' Italia rammed, 236 ; Ferdinand 
Max rams, 238 ; Affondatore 
dare not ram Kaiser, 238-9, 244 ; 
Kaiser rams Portogallo, 239 ; 
Kaiser Max rams, 242-3 ; Prina 
Eugen tries to ram, 243 ; 
Amazonas rams Paraguari, 260 ; 
Bouet prepared to use, 272 ; 
Bouvet rams, 279 ; Huascar 
attempts to, 309 ; rams Esme- 
ralda, 317-8; Independencia runs 
ashore trying to use, 319; 
Huascar attempts to ram Magal- 
lanes, 321 ; Blanco, 328 ; Coch- 
rane attempts to ram Huascar, 
329 ; at Angamos, 331 ; Re- 
publica rams ? ii, 38 ; Ting 
thinks of using, 85-6 ; Chin 
Yuen attempts to, 92, 101 ; Tsi 
Yuen rams Yang Wei, 115 ; Iron 
Duke rams Vanguard, 190-2 ; 
Kbnig Wilhelm rams Grosser 
Kurfurst, 192-6; Camperdoivn 
rams Victoria, 199-205. 



Value of, i, 22 ; Italian con- 
fidence in, 224; why Tegetthof 
used, 228 ; in Chilian -Peruvian 
War, 331-2 ; at Yalu, ii, 114 ; in 
general action, 159, n., 160, 172. 

Shock of ramming, i, 236, ii, 
190, 194, 200; injury to "ram- 
mer," ii, 160 ; Ferdinand Max, i, 
245 ; Iron Duke, ii, 192 ; Kbnig 
Wilhelm, 195 ; Camperdoivn, 
205 ; Huascar, i, 320. 

Special vessels for, i, 22 ; 
Manassas, 41 ; on Mississippi, 
67 ; Polyphemus, ii, 147, 228 ; 
Katahdin, 150. 

Speed necessary for, i, 32, 125, 
132; ii, 150. 

Structural influence, ii, 241. 

Resistance to, of belt, ii, 207. 
Ransom of prizes. See Tab. vi ; 
vessels bonded, i, 146, 149, 154, 
157, 166, 167, 168. 

Recessed ports, ii, 221. 

Reserve of ships for a blockade, i, 
205 ; of men, 207 ; English lack 
of, ii, 274 ; in general action, 

Rice contraband, ii, 15. 

Sails, speed with, ii, 213; value as 
auxiliary, 212. 

" Scouts." Light and fast ships 
designed to watch or discover a 
hostile fleet. More lightly armed 
than the cruiser. 

Screw, twin, ii, 254 ; triple, 265 ; 
quadruple, i, 119, n. 

Sea power, its influence, i, I, 13; 
victory of Merrimac, 20; virtual, 
of Monitor, 31 ; on Mississippi, 
6l ; at Shiloh, 65; Porter on, 
77. Grant on, 82 ; Lincoln on, 
id. ; general in Civil War, 82-3. 
Fort Fisher brings fall of Rich- 
mond, 142 ; South exposed to, 
37, 178-181; pressure on South, 
185; blockade crushed South, 

196-7 ; enables turning of Hum- 
aita, 264 ; action of, in Franco - 
German War, 280-5 ; in Russo- 
Turkish War, 287-8 ; Chili and 
Peru, 314, 332 ; in Chilian Civil 
War, ii, 18; in China-Japan War, 

86, 1 02. 

Search lights, use of, i, 337, 349, 
ii, II ; Blanco does not use, 25 ; 
Aquidaban's, 45 ; in night action, 

Shields on guns. See Armour, 

Signals, smoke, i, 190; in block- 
ading, 208 ; at Lissa, Persano's 
unseen, 233-4, 2 4 ; Tegetthof's 
not seen, 243 ; at Yalu, Chinese, 
ii, 85, 97; Japanese, 101, 119; 
in general action discussed, 


Mechanical, on shipboard, ii, 
167-8, 201. 

Size. See Dimension. 

Speaking tubes, break down on 
Monitor, i, 28; on Hartford, 75 ; 
shattered on Tsi Yuen, ii, 68 ; 
mistakes due to, on Sampaio, 
44-5 ; in battle, use of, 167. 

Specialisation. See Differentiation. 

Speed, influence in action, Monitor, 
i, 27, 32 ; Albemarle too slow to 
ram, 109 ; Tennessee too slow, 
125, 132; Alabama and Hatteras, 
155 ; and Kearsarge, 158 ; Drache 
cannot catch Palestra, 235 ; Shah 
avoids ram, 310-; want of, in 
Chilian fleet, 314, 321, 322; speed 
in "war of coasts," 321 ; strate- 
gical value of, ii, 33 ; at Yalu, 

87, 89, 112-3, 123-4; in stern- 
Hfbattle, 154; may allow of surprise, 

87 ; advance in, 212 ; normal, of 
sailing ship, 213; limitations to, 
258 ; of various battleships, 244. 

Springs to cables, use of, i, 346. 

Stability, importance of, ii, 166 ; 
Captain unstable, 183, n., 184, 
189 ; Vanguard, 191 ; Hoche 
reported unstable, 269. 



Steam facilitates rapid movements, 
ii, 158; renders doubling difficult, 
id. ; effect of, on naval construc- 
tion, 210-4; increases size, 212. 

Smoke, at New Orleans hampers 
Federals, i, 54; at Port Hudson, 
75, 84; at Lissa, 234-5; at 
Alexandria, 344 ; at Yalu, ii, 
100, 1 01 ; hides Japanese, 89 ; 
from fires on Chinese ships, 96 ; 
with weather-gauge, smoke blows 
on enemy, 158 ; used to escape, 
i, 192-3. 

Smokeless powder at Rio, ii, 
39; in Japanese fleet, 58, 112; 
tactical influence, 252. 

Steamers, two only captured by 
Southern cruisers, i, 150, 154, 157, 
168 ; hard to destroy, 175 ; cap- 
tured blockade-running, 195. 

Steering gear exposed of Tennessee, 
i, 117; damaged, 131; exposed 
of Re d' Italia, 212; damaged, 
235 ; of Huascar damaged, 
327-8 ; of Tsi Yuen damaged, 
ii, 68, 69 ; of Saikio, 96. 

Stern-battle, ii, 118, 154-5. 

Stratagems, masts dressed with 
branches, i, 43 ; dummy monitor, 
75 ; method of sending message, 
77; coal-torpedo, 105; disguised 
powder-ship, 138 ; Semmes' at 
St. Pierre, 146 ; use of neutral 
flag, 147 ; dummy guns, 149 ; 
Alabama's against Hatteras, 155 ; 
Tuscarora's use of twenty-four 
hours' law, 165; use of smoke 
by blockade - runners, 192-3 ; 
false colours at Lissa, 229 ; false 
hail, 291; questionable Peruvian, 
333-4; Co-vadonga's at Iquique, 
316; Imperial's, ii, 32; cloth, 
use of, 170. 

Strategy, of Southern warfare 
against commerce, i, 170-1 ; 
commerce - destruction useless, 
1 75-6 ; suggested strategy for 
North, 170-3 ; strategical im- 
portance of blockade, 179, 196-7 ; 
Northern occupation of bases, 

184-5; of blockade in war with 
France, 204-210; of Italians in 
1866, 218-220, 224, 248; of 
Tegetthof, 229, 230 ; of Franco- 
German War, 271 ; blockade, 
274 ; French force in Mediter- 
ranean, 275 ; Bouet's communi- 
cations, 277 ; attacks on forts, &c., 
281-285; f Russians against 
Turks, 288 ; of Peruvians, 321-2 ; 
of Chilian insurgents, ii, 32-3 ; 
of Mello, 37 ; of Chinese, 79-80, 
82-3, 134; steam has not changed, 

Structural damage at Yalu, ii, 
1 10-2; in naval battle, 162, 175. 
See also Hits. 

Submarine navigation, i, 103-4; ii, 
259, 268. 

Sun in enemy's eyes, ii, 159. 

Surrendered ship, position of, i, 88. 


Tactical diameter, ii, 197. 

Tactics. See also Ram, Torpedo, 

Mississippi contests, i, 84 ; 
Mobile, 1 20- 1 ; faulty, of Bu- 
chanan, 127 ; of blockade, 208- 
210; of Tegetthof, 228, 230-1, 
247-8 ; of Persano, 232-3 ; of 
Huascar, 308, 310 ; of Esme- 
ralda, 316; Chilians against 
Huascar, 326, 327-8 ; of bom- 
bardment, 342-3, 347-8 ; 354-6 ; 
French on the Min, ii, 12 ; 
orders of Ting, 85-6 ; of Ito, 88 ; 
his mistakes, 91, 118; features of 
Yalu, 114, 116-124; gun, ram, 
and torpedo, 123, 159-162 ; 
ulterior motives affect Japanese, 
103 ; structure of Chinese ships 
affects Chinese, 64, 86 ; steam 
and, 158. 

Telegraph, absence of, hampered 
North, i, 173; used at Lissa, 
222, 229-30 ; cut by Italians, 
230; used by Peruvians, 315; at 
Alexandria, 337-8; engine-room, 
ii, 167-8, 201. 



Telephone, ii, 167. 

" Tonnage." The old system of 
measuring, or builder's measure- 
ment, expressed the internal 
cubic capacity of the ship. 
Modern or displacement tonnage 
gives the weight of water dis- 
placed by the ship. 

Top-hamper, ii, 162-3. 

Tops, use of, i, 75, 244, 326, 345, 
ii, 10 ; for signals, 153. See also 

Torpedo, instances of employment 
in Tab. xxv, with reference to 

Invented, i, 102 ; development 
of, ii, 258-9; range, 259; struc- 
tural influence, 215-6, 241. 

Loaded on deck, danger of, ii, 
27, 30, 69, 71, 94, 98, 122. 

Tactical value, prevents ram- 
ming, i, 22 ; in action, ii, 160-1 ; 
its defects, 161, n. ; equalises 
cruiser and battleship, 142 ; use- 
less against ship in motion (?) 49. 
Effect of explosion, Blanco, ii, 
26 ; Aquidaban, 47 ; Ting Yuen, 


Compared with pneumatic gun, 
ii, 150-1. 

In Russo-Turkish War, i, 303- 


At Yalu, ii, 91, 96, 114. 

At Wei-hai-wei, in low tem- 
perature, ii, 130, 131, 132. 

Controllable, ii, 41, 161, 259. 

Spar and Whitehead, ii, 258. 

Torpedo-boats, Tab. xxv, early, 
Southern, i, 102-3; Northern, 
iio-i ; Russian, 286; sent over- 
land, 289 ; Chilian, 332 ; fight 
between boats off Callao, 333 ; 
French, at Foochow and Sheipoo, 
ii, 13; Brazilian, at Sta. Cathe- 
rina, 43, 45, 46 ; Japanese, 61 ; 
Chinese, at Yalu, 83, 91, 93, 96, 
125 ; Japanese, at Port Arthur, 
127; at Wei-hai-wei, 129, 13,0, 
131, 132 ; Chinese, make a dash, 

Value of, in blockades, i, 208, 
284, 288-9, 333 ! stopped by 
obstructions, 293 ; difficulty of 
finding target, 301, ii, 44, 48; 
danger to friends, i, ii, 149, 302 ; 
effect of quick-firer on, i, 303-4, ii, 
48-9 ; prevent Japanese pursuit 
at Yalu, 93, 115 ; in general 
action, 123; place, 148; should 
not lightly be exposed, 149 ; in 
melee, id., 172; ideal torpedo- 
boat officer, 149, n. ; save life, 

Precautions against, i, 297, n., 
301, n. ; ii, 31, 49, 128, 134. 

Torpedo-boat carrier, i, 292-3, 304. 

Torpedo-boat destroyer in blockade, 
i, 208 ; English, ii, 258, 273. 

Torpedo flotillas, French and 
English, ii, 273, 274. 

Torpedo gunboat, Condell and 
Lynch, des. ii, 16-7; sink Blanco, 
22-9 ; attack Aconcagua, 29- 
30; Sampaio or Aurora, des. 36; 
sinks Aquidaban, 42-9 ; useless 
for open fighting, ii, 30 ; place in 
battle, 147 ; English, 257 ; French, 
268, 273. 

Transfers of shipping, United 
States to English flag, i, 169, n. 

Triple expansion. See Compound 

Turret, Ericsson's, i, 6-8 ; Coles', 
8, 33 ; Timby's, 8 ; Monitor's, 
10; defects, 27, 28; concussion 
on, 28 ; jams of monitor turrets at 
Charleston, 94; at Mobile, 123; 
Rolf Krake's works well, 33 ; 
accident in, at Callao, 256 ; 
Huascar's perforated, 327-329 ; 
jams for a short time, 325 ; early 
English turret, ii, 224. 

Turret-ship. See Index II. Moni- 
tor, Nile, Devastation, &c. 

Twenty-four hours' law requires 
the elapse of twenty-four hours 
before one hostile ship can follow 
another from a neutral port. 
Breach of, i, 145 ; blockade by 
use of, 165 ; mentioned, 158, 


u. w. 

Uniformity. See Homogeneity. 


Ventilation, artificial, of floating 
batteries; i, xxxii ; of Monitor, n ; 
damage to ventilators in battle, 
ii, 163-4, I? 8 - 

Water ballast, ii, 165. 

Water-line, hits on, Cincinnati, \, 
81 ; Keystone State, 88 ; Gaines, 
128; Alabama, 162-3; at Yalu, 
ii, 121 ; on Ching Yuen, 133; 
effect of, on modern ship, 174, n., 
cf. 207, n. 

Weak ships in line. See Dimension, 
Yalu, New Orleans. 

Weather, influences shooting, ii, 
166; cf. \, 231. 






''r ,.4 


Wilson,' Herbert Wrigley 
Ironclads in action