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RECENT CASES. 145
of the cause before such petition. In re Miller, 114 Fed. 838; In re Scatt,
144 Fed. 79. But it has been held that where the arrest is made and charges
are preferred after the petition, a writ of habeas corpus should issue. Ex parte
Houghton, 129 Fed. 239. See In re Carver, 103 Fed. 624. A number of cases,
however, hold that, when an arrest has been made and a writ has issued, if
charges are later preferred against the infant before the final hearing, the writ
should be discharged. United States v. Reaves, 126 Fed. 127; In re Carver,
142 Fed. 623. On principle these cases seem indistinguishable. In both cases
proceedings were pending, but in neither had the court martial obtained juris-
diction when the petition was filed. The principal case seems right, therefore,
in holding that the latter cases practically overrule the former ; and the practical
result reached seems desirable.
Indemnity — Tort Committed at Another's Request. — The defend-
ant, a stockbroker, identified a woman at the plaintiff bank as the owner of
certain stock, receiving only a nominal fee for his trouble. He had good rea-
son for thinking her to be the owner, but she was in fact a fraudulent imperso-
nator. At her order the bank registered a transfer of the stock, which it was
later compelled to make good to the true owner. Held, that the defendant is
bound to indemnify the plaintiff as having impliedly requested the transfer.
Bank of England v. Cutler,  2 K. B. 208. See Notes, p. 131.
Injunctions — Acts Restrained — Contract in Restraint of Trade.
The plaintiff and the defendant, practicing dentists, entered into a contract
whereby the defendant agreed not to practice a certain method of extracting
teeth in Philadelphia for ten years. The plaintiff filed a bill to enjoin the
defendant from so practicing. Held, that although the contract is good at law,
the plaintiff is not entitled to an injunction. Ihomasv. Borden, 65 Leg. Int.
404 (Pa., Dist. Ct., July 31, 1908).
Equity frequently refuses an injunction on the ground that it would work an
injury to the public. Valparaiso v. Hagen, 153 Ind. 337. See 22 Harv. L.
Rev. 61. But this doctrine seems never to have been applied to the case of a
contract in restraint of trade admittedly good at law. The logical reason for
this is that any unreasonable restraint of trade renders a contract invalid.
Nordenfelt v. Maxim, etc., Co.,  A. C. 535. If the contract is valid, it
follows that it does not unreasonably restrain, and therefore equity should not
on this ground refuse to enjoin a breach. It is clear that physicians may be en-
joined from breaking agreements not to practice in a certain vicinity. Wilkinson
v. Colley, 164 Pa. St. 35 ; Beatty v. Coble, 142 Ind. 329. But here it was con-
tended that the agreement tended to give the plaintiff a quasi-monopoly on this
particular method of extracting teeth. The court ruled that there can be no
equitable right to a monopoly in the means of relieving human suffering. This
doctrine, if followed to its logical conclusion, would preclude equity from pro-
tecting patents on surgical instruments and medicines. Clearly that is not law.
Farbenfabricken of Elberfeld Co. v. Harriman, 133 Fed. 313; Rowley v.
Koeber, 135 Fed. 363.
Insurance — Rescission of Contract for Fraud. — The plaintiff was
induced to continue a policy of life insurance by the fraudulent representations
of the insurer's agent. Held, that on discovering the fraud the plaintiff can
rescind, and recover the full amount of the premiums paid. Kettlewell v.
Refuge Assurance Co., 24 T. L. R. 216 (Eng., Ct. App., June 10, 1908). See
Notes, p. 134.
Interstate Commerce — Interstate Commerce Commission — Effect
on Jurisdiction of Territory's Becoming State. — A complaint was
filed before the Interstate Commerce Commission stating that the defendant
maintained an unreasonable rate on shipments between two towns and asking
that the rate be made reasonable for the future and that the complainant be
awarded damages on past shipments. Thereafter the territory within which
both towns lie was admitted into the Union as a state. Held, that the Commis-
sion has no jurisdiction, not only as to regulating the rate for the future, but also
146 HARVARD LAW REVIEW.
as to awarding damages for past shipments. Hussey v. Chicago, Rock Island,
£r» Pacific R. R., 13 Interst. C. Rep. 366.
In general, a court which has once obtained jurisdiction over a case cannot
be deprived of it by a subsequent change of circumstances. Culver v. Wood-
ruff County, 5 Dill. (U. S.) 392. But, if the legislative act under which the
court has jurisdiction is repealed during the action, the court loses power to
pronounce judgment. Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U. S. 398. The organization of
a territory into a state ordinarily repeals federal laws existing as to that territory.
Ames and Duff "v. Colorado Central R. R., 4 Dill. (U. S.) 251. In the principal
case it is clear that the Commission lost jurisdiction to regulate the rate in ques-
tion for the future. But the repeal of the jurisdiction of a court must be express
or necessarily implied. See Pratt v. Atlantic &* St. Lawrence R. R., 42 Me.
579. And it is not entirely clear that the organization of the territory into a state
necessarily implied the loss of the commission's jurisdiction to award damages
for shipments already made. The case goes on the ground that the Commission
was not authorized to interfere with a rate unless such action would tend to
establish the uniformity of the rate.
Landlord and Tenant — Conditions and Covenants in Leases —
Assignment by-Sale under Legal Process. — The plaintiff gave a lease
with a condition of re-entry if the lease should be assigned or the lessee's inter-
est sold under execution or other legal process. At the lessor's request the
court appointed a receiver for the lessee and ordered him to sell the leasehold.
He sold without covenants .to one who became bankrupt. The trustee in bank-
ruptcy applied to the court for an order to sell the leasehold. Held, that the
trustee may sell without forfeiting the term. Gazlay v. Williams, 210 U. S. 41.
In order to prevent a forfeiture courts of law will construe strictly a condition
provided to work one. Riggs v. Pursell, 66 N. Y. 193. Accordingly in the
absence of collusion amounting to fraud a transfer by operation of law is not
regarded as violating a condition against assignment. Doe v. Carter, 8 T. R.
300; In re Bush, 126 Fed. 878. Furthermore the court seems justified in hold-
ing that the involuntary transfer to the trustee was not a sale under legal pro-
cess. And the trustee in bankruptcy should not be bound by a covenant or
condition against assigning ; for the property came to him for that purpose.
See Doe v. Bevan, 3 M. & S. 353. It is not clear whether the court considers
applicable to this case the rule that a condition not to alien without license is
terminated by the first license. Dumpor's Case, 4 Co. 119^. See 12 Harv.
L. Rev. 272. It seems very doubtful whether the rule applies ; for the lessor
expressly stipulated that the land be sold with the old covenants. If, however,
there was a license sufficient to satisfy the rule, it was unnecessary for the court
to construe the lease ; for the condition would be terminated forthwith. See
20 Harv. L. Rev. 420.
Landlord and Tenant — Conditions and Covenants in Leases —
Severance of Reversion. — The plaintiff leased to A with a condition pro-
viding for re-entry for failure to cultivate. The defendant through eminent do-
main proceedings received a conveyance of the reversion of part of the land and
an assignment of the entire leasehold. The plaintiff claimed the right of re-entry
for failure to cultivate. Held, that he is entitled to re-enter. Piggott v. Middle-
sex County Council, 125 L. T. 337 (Eng., Ch. D., July 24, 1908).
A grantee of part of a reversion is not allowed to enforce against the lessee
a condition in the lease concerning the land. Mitchell v. M'Cauley, 20 Ont.
App. 272. A severance of the reversion destroys the condition, and so even
the grantor's right to sue. Knight's Case, 5 Co. J 5 b. An early case established
an exception in cases where the severance is "by descent, eviction or act of
law," as opposed to an act of the parties. Winter's Case, Dyer 308 b. The main
case in holding a severance by eminent domain an act of law within the excep-
tion reaches a just result. It was thought the reason for the general rule lay
in the fact that otherwise two suits might be brought against the lessee. Ac-
cordingly, when this possibility was destroyed by a grant of part of the reversion
to the lessee, a second exception was made. Hyde v. Warden, 3 Ex. D. 72.