Skip to main content

Full text of "Pan-Germany, the disease and cure, and A plan for the allies"

See other formats

New Edition Doubled in Size 

Price 35 Cents 


CM " 

5 f^^ 








f ] 



Pan-Germany is an accomplished fact. Whether it shall remain 
or not is for America to say. 

This little book is of essential importance to the 
understanding of the War. 







By Andre Cheradame 

New and Greatly Enlarged Edition 

containing not only all of the material of the 
first Edition of 'Pan-Germany: The Disease 
and Cure', but also articles from later issues 
of The Atlantic Monthly and two chapters 
never before published. 



Copyright, igiy and 1918, by 

Copyright, 1918, by 

[No student outside of Germany itself has studied the Pan- 
German scheme in all its details more thoroughly than the 
distinguished French publicist, Andre Cheradame. For more 
than twenty years he has devoted all his energies and resources, 
physical and intellectual alike, to a vigorous and exhaustive 
investigation of the origin and progress of the monstrous con- 
spiracy which threatens to overwhelm the liberties of the 
entire world. 

His articles from the Atlantic Monthly issued in paper- 
covered book form under the name of Tan-Germany: The 
Disease and Cure', have been distributed throughout the 
country by the thousands. To meet the constantly changing 
war conditions and to elaborate upon his earlier suggestions, 
M. Cheradame contributes much timely material to the new 
and enlarged edition. In the additional chapters, the author 
not only emphasizes his delineation of the menace of Pan- 
Germany and the proper means of meeting it, but he criti- 
cizes fearlessly the failure of the Allies to adopt comprehen- 
sive measures to that end, because of their belief that war 
is to be won or lost on the Western Front. 

Published in inexpensive form with special rates for patri- 
otic distribution, the new edition offers to the American 
people further understanding of the present crisis. 

Besides the articles which M. Cheradame has contributed 
to The Atlantic Monthly, the same author has written 'Pan- 
Germany Plot Unmasked* and 'Pan-Germanism and the 
United States' (Charles Scribners & Son). 

The last two chapters in the present edition, pertaining to 
* A Plan for the Allies,' have never before been published in 
any form.] 


I. How Cheaply Germany Has Fought The 

War I 

H. How Much Germany Has Won in The 

War i8 

HI. The Necessity for a Decision 47 

IV. The Allies and Pan-Germanism 62 

V. Military Operations 81 

VI. Pan-Germany's Strength and Weakness 91 

VII. The Best Way to Crush Pan-Germany ... 113 

VIII. Political Strategy 129 

IX. The German Pacifist Manoeuvres 156 

X. The Western Front 165 

XI. The Western Front Theory Criticized, . . 182 
XII. The Lesson of Three Years of War and 

of Events in Russia 200 

XIII. A Plan for the Allies 214 

The Disease and Cure 


How Cheaply Germany Has Fought 
THE War 

At the beginning of 1916, I said in my book The 
Pan-German Plot Unmasked ^ — 

^ Finally, when all negotiations for an armistice 
have fallen flat and Germany's situation has be- 
come still more critical, we shall see Berlin play 
her trump card. Protests against territorial an- 
nexations will become insistent beyond the Rhine, 
secretly sanctioned by the German government, 
which will finally say to the Allies: "Let this 
slaughtering of one another cease ! We are willing 
to listen to reason; we resign our claims to those 
territories of yours now occupied by our armies. 
The game has been played to a draw; so let us 
treat for peace on that basis." 

*0n the day when this proposition is put for- 
ward, the Allies will find themselves face to face 
with the most subtle move yet made by Berlin — 
the most insidious German snare. Then, above 
all things, must the steadfastness, the perspicacity, 


and the unity of the Allies be most brilliantly 
made manifest. The trick of the ' ' drawn game, ' * 
if successful, would involve an overwhelming tri- 
umph for Germany and an irreparable tragedy for 
the Allies and for the liberty of the world.* 

Only a few months after these lines were print- 
ed, the prophecy began to be fulfilled more and 
more completely. Every possible step has been 
taken by Germany to bring about peace on the 
basis of a draw. The slogan, ^ Peace without an- 
nexations or indemnities,' was coined to that end. 
At first the Allies believed that this formula origi- 
nated in Russia; as a matter of fact, however, it 
was worked out in Berlin and then suggested to 
the Russian Socialists through secret agents whom 
Germany has successfully established in the Pet- 
rograd Soviet, These Socialists, doubtless well- 
meaning, but over-fond of theories and always 
ready to embrace the wildest Utopian schemes, — 
ignorant, too, of all realities, as has been shown by 
the steady aggravation of the general situation in 
Russia since they came into power with the Rev- 
olution, — have declared enthusiastically for the 
' peace without annexations and indemnities.* As 
there exist also in the other Allied countries groups 
of Socialists with a stronger grip on theories than 
on facts, and also because Allied sympathies natur- 
ally rallied strongly to the support of the Russian 
Revolution, the formula, ' peace without annexa- 
tions or indemnities,' thanks to its apparent 



origin, has unquestionably made serious inroads 
on a certain section of Allied public opinion. 

The Stockholm manoeuvres, engineered by all 
the powerful and varied means at the disposal of 
German propagandists, were designed to estab- 
lish this formula as the fixed basis of all peace 
negotiations. When the astuteness of the Allied 
governments prevented the fulfillment of this 
attempt within the period desired by Berlin, the 
Vatican was persuaded through Viennese agencies 
to throw its influence on the side of peace as deter- 
mined by Germany. 

As a matter of fact, the Pope's peace proposals, 
while not embodying the exact terms of the Kai- 
ser's formula, involved, in the last analysis, prac- 
tically the same essential results. Berlin, there- 
fore, in order to assure unceasing discussion of her 
formula, — a discussion tending at least to bring 
about an armistice, which would split up and mor- 
ally disarm the Allies, thus making it possible for 
her to deal with them separately, — outdid her- 
self in mobilizing toward one end the most widely 
divergent forces, from the Maximalist anarchists 
of Petrograd to the most hidebound reactionaries 
of the Sacred College. The extent, the vigor, and 
the persistence of the amazing * pacifist* offensive 
launched by Germany were such that the expres- 
sions 'peace without indemnities or annexations,* 
'drawn game,' 'white peace,* *paix hoiteuse' have 
become as current in the Allied countries as if 



they had some established connection with reality. 
This is entirely contrary to the fact : with the best 
intentions in the world, peace without annexations 
or indemnities y as things stand noWy is impossible. 
There can be no ^ white peace^ no ^ drawn game,' 
no ^ paix boiteuse.' 

To tell the truth, a section of Allied opinion has 
become befuddled by these formulae of Berlin, 
whose function is to accomplish in the moral order 
the same asphyxiating action as that of the gases 
employed on the battlefield by the German Gen- 
eral Staff. The result of this moral intoxication is 
that important groups of the Allies begin to juggle 
with words and lose sight of facts. As the natural 
outcome of giving serious thought to impossibili- 
ties, grave errors are made in weighing the present 
situation, with an attendant weakening of the 
joint action of the Allied democracies. It is im- 
perative, therefore, that the pursuit of Utopias, 
leading only to disaster, be abandoned, and that 
we return to those realities which alone can lead 
to victory and the establishment of a durable 

If the formula * peace without annexations and 
indemnities* has been allowed to insinuate itself 
into the general discussion, it is only because great 
numbers of the Allied peoples fail to understand 
the overwhelming advantages which Germany, by 
means of the war, has been able to assure to her- 
self for the present and the future. The object of 



this paper is to show just what these advantages 
are, and at the same time to brand the utter hy- 
pocrisy of the slogan, ' peace without annexations 
and indemnities,' which, regarded even in the 
most favorable light, would allow Germany to 
make off with immense booty, leaving the Allies 
to face the incalculable losses incurred by them in 
a war launched by their adversary. 

The significance of the low rate 
of German exchange 

The continual fall of German exchange is re- 
garded by many of the Allies as proof of the pro- 
gressive and irremediable impoverishment of Ger- 
many. When, for instance, the mark drops 47 per 
cent in Switzerland, while the franc has depreci- 
ated only 13 per cent. Frenchmen are for the most 
part inclined to believe that the war has affected 
the two countries in relatively the same propor- 
tion ; they then conclude that Germany's financial 
situation is infinitely worse than that of France. 
In reality, such a comprehensive conclusion can- 
not be reached simply through the rise and fall of 
exchange, which reflects only certain special as- 
pects of the financial situation of a country. 

Among the various causes affecting exchange, 
there are two principal ones. The first is moral. 
It cannot be denied that the fluctuation of ex- 
change responds to foreign confidence. If German 
exchange is low, it implies, to a certain extent at 



least, the existence of a universal conviction that 
in the long run Germany cannot hold out against 
her formidable ring of adversaries. As a result, 
there is no great demand for the currency of a 
state whose credit, it is thought, must finally col- 
lapse. It should be noted, however, that the rea- 
son for this fall of exchange is only a moral evalua- 
tion anticipating a probable outcome; it is not 
due to a mathematically certain estimate of what 
Germany now stands to win or lose as a result of 
the war. 

The second great factor affecting exchange, on 
the other hand, is based on present realities which 
are susceptible of being accurately determined. 
Germany, since she has been blockaded by sea, 
exports infinitely less than formerly; consequently, 
her ability to settle her accounts in foreign 
countries is limited. When she was able to sell 
the United States a million marks' worth of mer- 
chandise, she then had at her disposal a million 
marks with which to pay cash for such imports as 
she needed. Now that her exports have been so 
reduced, she has little money to spare for spending 
abroad. If she wishes to increase these foreign 
purchases, she must export her gold and conse- 
quently reduce the security behind her bank- 
notes. This results in a lowering of the basis of 
German credit, with a resulting drop in exchange. 

We shall now see that this falling exchange, 
whatever its importance, does not take into ac- 


count all the elements of the general financial situ- 

If the blockade of Germany seriously compli- 
cates her food problems, on the other hand it is 
in a way advantageous from a financial point of 
view. In a word, when Germany found herself 
blockaded she was obliged to evolve means of ex- 
isting on her own resources or those of her allies. 
Our enemies had great difficulties of organization 
to overcome, but they turned them to good ac- 
count: for if Germany's exports are small, her im- 
ports have been correspondingly reduced. Hence 
she needs to send very little money abroad — a fact 
which is financially in her favor. 

Now, the case of France is radically different. 
The French government, feeling assured of the 
liberty of the seas and believing that the war 
would be a short one, found it more expedient to 
place enormous orders abroad than to rely on do- 
mestic resources to supply the nation's need. As 
a result, French imports, according to published 
statistics, exceed exports by one billion of francs a 
month. This means that, as things stand now, 
France must pay to foreign countries the stagger- 
ing sum of twelve billion francs a year, with no 
corresponding compensation, since her purchases 
consist of products which are destroyed in use. 
For this reason France is undergoing serious im- 
poverishment while Germany gets off compara- 
tivelyeasily. It is therefore plain that the fluctua- 



tions of exchange bear little relation to those con- 
ditions which must be taken into consideration in 
riiaking an appraisal of the general situation ; they 
reflect, in fact, only a special and limited aspect of 
the financial situation as a whole. Popular con- 
clusions drawn from the fall in the value of the 
mark are false when attempts are made to give 
them an absolute or general significance. 

Why people are still ignorant of the vast advantages 
gained by Germany from the war 

Many of the Allies are hoodwinked by the 'great 
illusion* which even now prevents them, to their 
endless detriment, from seeing things as they ac- 
tually are. In the Allied nations, in fact, people 
continue to speak of Germany, Austria-Hungary, 
Bulgaria and Turkey, as if these states remained 
j ust as they were before the war. But these terms 
have no longer any relation to reality. The 
Quadruple Alliance of Central Europe is simply 
a great illusion, studiously fostered by William 
II, for by its means his plans are vastly facili- 
tated. As a matter of fact, Turkey, Bulgaria, 
and Austria-Hungary are not the allies, but the 
vassals, of Berlin, and their influence with her is 
less than that of Saxony or Bavaria. The rulers 
at Constantinople, Sofia, Vienna, and Budapest 
are simply marionettes moved by threads which 
are pulled by Berlin according to her strategic 



Very often we hear it said, ' Germany has creat- 
ed Mitteleuropa,' This is another mistake. Geo- 
graphically speaking, Mitteleuropa includes only 
Central Europe; and Germany's dominion is in- 
finitely further flung, extending as it does from the 
west front in France to the British front before 
Bagdad. If we wish to see things in the light of 
reality, we must say, for the present at least, 
' There is no longer any Germany; instead, there is 
Pan-Germany,' This is an essential assumption 
if we are to reason justly. The map of Pan-Ger- 
many at the beginning of 191 7, which is printed 
above, shows clearly the essential, but all-too- 
little-known elements of the present situation, 
which is characterized by the fact that 73 million 
Germans, aided by 21 million vassals, — Magyars, 
Slavs, and Turks, — have reduced to slavery 82 
millions of Latins, Slavs, and Semites, belonging 
to thirteen different nationalities. Pan-Germany, 
which has now almost completely reached the lim- 
its set by the Pan-German plan of 191 1, consists, 
therefore, of one vast territory containing about 
176 million inhabitants and natural resources of 
the greatest variety. 

I beg my readers to refer to this map of Pan- 
Germany every time it is made desirable by the 
text. This repeated study of the map is indispen- 
sable to a clear and complete comprehension of 
the demonstration which follows. As regards the 
profits which Germany has wrung from the war, 



it is particularly important, in order to grasp the 
idea of Pan-Germany; for it is the direct result of 
its creation that Germany, in spite of the losses 
and expenses inevitably incurred by a warring 
nation, has been able to assure herself of certain 
advantages which, considered as a whole, far out- 
balance her losses and expenses, as we shall see. 

In order to understand the nature of these ad- 
vantages, one point must first be made clear. 

The war has cost the Germans comparatively little 

For six fundamental reasons, the conduct of the 
war has really cost the Germans far less than it 
has cost their adversaries. 

I. No Experimentation. Germany, in order to 
produce a vast output of various types of guns and 
projectiles economically evolved in times of peace, 
needed only to extend, by means of machinery of 
domestic manufacture, her arsenals and muni- 
tion-factories, which before the war were already 
considerable. On the other hand, the production 
of war-material in France at the outbreak of hos- 
tilities was very slack, while in England and Rus- 
sia it was almost negligible. In these three coun- 
tries, therefore, it was necessary to improvise, as 
best might be, thousands of new plants, to equip 
them with machinery purchased in America at 
vast expense, and hastily to evolve new types of 
cannon, projectiles, and the rest. Now, improvi- 
sation, especially in war-time, means false starts 



and inevitable bad work, which must be paid 
dearly for. Germany was not obliged to incur 
these very considerable expenses. 

2. Regulated Wages, The fact that the problem 
of German wages was worked out at leisure in ex- 
act correlation to productions whose types were 
exhaustively studied in the calm of peace-time 
certainly allowed the Germans to obtain war-ma- 
terials at a lower net cost than was possible for 
the Allies. 

3. The Prevention of Waste, The absence of ex- 
perimentation and the simple extension to war- 
work of highly efficient industrial methods tested 
in peace-time, naturally allowed the Germans to 
avoid in all spheres those immense losses of ma- 
terial of every nature whose bad effects and heavy 
cost were incurred by the Allies. This state of 
affairs in France caused losses which were as 
expensive as they were inevitable. One may 
imagine the conditions existing in Russia, where 
control is far more difficult of exercise than in 

4. Cheap Labor. The Germans have forcibly 
enlisted the labor of about two million prisoners 
of war. Moreover, the official French report of 
April 12, 19 1 7, concerning acts committed by the 
Germans in violation of international law, asserts 
that in the occupied territories deportation of 
workers has been a general measure. It has ' ap- 
plied to the entire able-bodied population of both 



sexes, from the ages of sixteen to sixty, excepting 
women with young children. * 

Now, the Germans requisition labor from among 
7,500,000 Belgians, 3,000,000 French, 4,500,000 
Serbians, 5,000,000 Roumanians, 22,000,000 
Poles, Ruthenians, and Lithuanians — a total of 
42,000,000 slaves. 

Let us see what sort of remuneration is made. 
Take the case of a young girl of Lille, twenty years 
old, who was forced to work for six months, har- 
vesting and threshing wheat and digging pota- 
toes from six in the morning to twilight, receiving 
all the while the vilest food. For her six months 
of work she was given 9 francs, 45 centimes. The 
Germans, therefore, have at their disposal a vast 
reservoir of labor for which they pay next to noth- 
ing ; moreover, the small amounts they do pay re- 
main in Pan-Germany. 

The Allies, on the contrary, pay high wages to 
their workers, and, when they run short, must 
needs pour out good gold in bringing reinforce- 
ments from Asia, Africa, and America. This 
means that a considerable part of the wages paid 
these foreign workmen will leave France or Eng- 
land for all time. 

5. Free Coal and Iron Ore. In addition to their 
own mines, the Germans have seized important 
coal and iron mines in France, Belgium, and Po- 
land. A vast proportion of their ore and coal 
therefore costs them nothing. Naturally, then, a 


German shell made with French iron and Belgian 
coal costs far less than a French shell made with 
American steel and English coal. As a result, the 
net price of a greater part of German munitions 
is much lower than that paid by the Allies. 

6. Economical Transportation. By reason of 
the grouping of the Central Powers, — a result of 
the conquest of the Danube front by the Teutons, 
— Germany profits by a geographical situation 
which is infinitely more advantageous than that 
of the Allies, as regards not only the speed, but 
also the cheapness, of war-transportation. It is 
evident that it costs far less to send a shell from 
the Krupp factory to any one of the Pan-German 
fronts than to send an American shell to France, 
a Japanese shell to the Polish front, a French shell 
to Roumania via Archangel, or an English shell 
to the army operating in Mesopotamia. By the 
same token, the cost of transporting a soldier of 
Pan-Germany to any of the battle-fronts is infi- 
nitely lighter than that of transporting Allied 
soldiers from Australia or America. 

We should note that each one of these six fac- 
tors which we have just enumerated reacts pro- 
foundly on the sum-total of general war-expenses, 
and that, taken together, they involve a formid- 
able sum. It can therefore truthfully be said that 
Germany carries on the war much more econom- 
ically than the Allies. Figures are so far lacking 
which will give the true proportions, but we shall 



certainly remain well within the realities of the case 
if we conclude that, as a result of the six factors 
mentioned above, France must spend one hundred 
and fifty million francs for war material to every 
hundred million spent by Germany. When, 
therefore, France spends thirty billions, Ger- 
many evidently spends not more than twenty bil- 
lions. And what is true of France applies even more 
accurately to some of the other Allied nations. 

This is a fact of the greatest general import- 
ance in coming to a true understanding of the fin- 
ancial situation created by the war — a fact 
which takes on its full significance when we real- 
ize that Germany is not only carrying on the war 
cheaply, but that she has been enabled, by means 
of this war, to win very important advantages. 

They consist of seven principal elements. The 
last six of these, it should be noted without fail, 
depend solely on the existence of central Pan- 
Germany — that is, on the hegemony exercised by 
Germany over Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and 
Turkey; they are therefore wholly independent 
of the first element, which relates to Germany's 
occupation of enemy territories, particularly to 
the east and west. They may be summarized 
as follows: — 


The first group includes: — 

The advantages derived directly from Ger- 



many's aggression, comprised in a single element, 
namely, the plunder accruing from the occupa- 
tion of enemy territory. This may be analyzed 
thus : — 

(a) The value of the 500,000 square kilometres 
of Montenegrin, Serbian, Roumanian, Russian, 
Belgian, and French land held by the Germans. 

This value, estimated according to the national 
fortunes of the respective countries before the 
war, — the area and population of the occupied 
portions being taken into consideration, — is in 
the neighborhood of 155 billion francs. 

This figure, though naturally only approximate, 
is probably far below the real sum. We know that 
the entire national fortune of France, with its 
1536,000 square kilometres, was put before the war 
at 325 billion francs. The valuation of the 500,- 
000 square kilometres of occupied territory at 
155 billions seems therefore an underestimate, es- 
pecially when one remembers that these 500,000 
square kilometres include Belgium and the North 
of France — the richest districts in the world. 

{h) The plunder of human beings, supplies, and 
property (laborers, war-material, provisions, min- 
erals, raw products, manufactured products, per- 
sonal property, art objects, war levies, specie, 
jewels, and securities) which has been going on, in 
some cases for as long as three years, throughout 
the occupied territories. This booty unquestion- 
ably represents a value of tens of billions of francs. 



These tens of billions should be deducted from 
the total of the national fortunes of the invaded 
districts. The plunder in question is composed of 
property or supplies already used up by the Ger- 
mans or taken away by them into Germany ; the 
value it represents, therefore, no longer exists in 
the invaded districts. 

The second group includes: — 

The advantages which Germany has assured 
herself for the present or for the future through 
the creation of Pan-Germany, which in turn re- 
sult from 

{a) Germany's burglarization of her own allies 
— Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. 

{h) The seizure by Germany and her allies of 
Serbia; in all six elements: — 

I. The Pan-German loans, which throw Aus- 
tria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey into a state of 
absolute financial dependence on Berlin. 

II. The value of Germany's monopoly in ex- 
ploiting the latent resources of the Balkans and 
Asia Minor, resulting from the Pan-German loans. 

III. The inherent value of the creation of Eco- 
nomic Pan-Germany. This cannot fail to be a 
powerful instrument for the acquisition of wealth. 

IV. The value of Military Pan-Germany, which 
is a guaranty of the security of Economic Pan- 

V. The value of the enormous economic profits 



assured to Berlin through the existence of Pan- 
Germany at the cost of Russia. These are a direct 
consequence of the estabHshment of Military Pan- 

VI. The taking over by Germany of at least 
2 1 billions of French credit. This is a consequence 
of the establishment of Economic Pan-Germany. 


How Much Germany Has Won in the War 

Let us now take up, in their order, the seven 
elements mentioned in the last chapter. 


The first element of German advantage: the booty 
acquired from the occupation of enemy territory 

Germany is getting direct war-profits from the 
enemy territories occupied by her. These terri- 
tories, listed in the ascending order of their rich- 
ness, are: Montenegro, 14,000 square kilometres; 
Albania, 20,000; Serbia, 87,000; Roumania, 70,000 
(Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary share the pillage 
of these four territories); dependent territories 
of Russia, 260,000; Belgium, 29,000; and France, 
20,000; making^a^grand total of 500,000 square 

In order to realize as clearly as possible the im- 
portance of the booty wrung by Germany from 
this enormous area, we may establish by means of 
examples or statistics that this plunder comes 
from nine principal sources : — 

Seizure of Human Material, — Throughout 
these 500,000 square kilometres of occupied terri- 
tory, the Germans have scientifically enslaved 


42,000,000 human beings, who furnish a vast 
amount of labor — this labor being all the cheaper 
because, as we shall see, the slaves are robbed in 
various ways. 

Seizure of War- Material, — By reason of their 
lightning advances in Belgium, France, Serbia, 
and Roumania the Germans have taken posses- 
sion of vast stores of war-material : cannon, rifles, 
munitions, wagons, locomotives, cars, as well as 
thousands of kilometres of railway, of which they 
make full use, representing a certain value of 
billions of francs. (The Belgian railway system 
alone is worth three billions.) 

Seizure of Food-stuffs, — The official report of 
April 12, 191 7, on the acts committed by the Ger- 
mans in France contrary to international law, 
states: *The inhabitants, subjected as they were 
to annoyances of every sort, watched daily the 
theft of such food-stuffs as they happened to pos- 
sess.* Everywhere the Germans steal horses, 
cattle, domestic animals, grain, potatoes, food- 
products of all kinds, sugar, alcohol, all of which 
constitute the reserve supply of the occupied 
countries. Their harvests, too, are appropriated 
through the cultivation of productive lands by 
means of labor obtained almost without cost from 
the enslaved peoples. 

Theft of Raw Materials, — Throughout the 
length and breadth of the occupied territories, the 
Germans, at the dictates of expediency, have 



seized raw materials: coal and iron ore, copper, 
petroleum, and so forth. Metals — bronze, zinc, 
lead, copper, tin — have been taken from private 
citizens, as well as textile fabrics — wool, cotton 
cloth, and the like. When one learns that from 
the cities of the North of France alone the Ger- 
mans stole 550 million francs* worth of wool, it is 
easy to see that this single source of plunder has 
been worth a number of billions to them. 

Theft of Finished Products. — Everywhere in 
the occupied territories, so far as means of trans- 
portation permit, motors, steam-hammers, ma- 
chinery, rolling-mills, lathes, presses, drills, elec- 
trical engines, looms, and so forth, have been 
taken to pieces by mechanics and transported into 
Germany. The total value of this stolen material 
in Belgium and the North of France alone — the 
richest industrial districts in the world — is al- 
most incalculable. 

Theft of Personal Property. — The official 
French report previously quoted states: 'In the 
shops, officers and soldiers made free with what- 
ever pleased their fancy. Every day the people 
witnessed the theft of property which was indis- 
pensable to them. At Ham, General von Fleck 
carried off all the furniture of M. Bernot's house, 
where he had been quartered.' The property 
thus stolen is sent to Germany, as is proved by 
this advertisement in the Kolnische Zeitung: 
'Furniture moved from the theatre of military 



Operations to all destinations.' From this source, 
war-booty to the value of several billions has al- 
ready been divided among an army of Germans. 

Seizure of Works of Art. — The Germans have 
stolen countless works of art, * in order' — so runs 
a recent official note of their government — * that 
they may be preserved as a record of art and civil- 
ization.' — 'It would be impossible,' declares Le 
Temps, *to find a more cynical admission of the 
thefts committed by the German authorities in 
our museums and public buildings.' If one re- 
members that this methodical pillage has gone 
merrily on among private individuals, drawing on 
the unlimited stores of works of art which have 
been accumulated throughout the centuries in 
Poland, and particularly in Belgium and France, 
it must certainly be apparent that the value of 
these stolen art treasures is immense. 

War Imposts. — Our official report establishes 
that ^Requisitions have everywhere been contin- 
uous. Towns that have had to meet the expenses 
of troops quartered within their jurisdiction have 
been overwhelmed by huge levies.' 

Belgium is staggering under an annual war as- 
sessment of 480,000,000 francs. Bucharest, after 
its capture by the Germans, was forced to pay a 
levy amounting to about 1900 francs per capita 
of the population. At Craiova the levy was 950 
francs per capita. An edict forbids the circulation 
of paper money unless it has been specially 


stamped by the Germans, who retain 30 per cent 
of its nominal value. 

In April, 19 17, the Frankfurter Zeitung an- 
nounced that the leaders of the Austro-German 
forces of occupation in Roumania would shortly 
call for an obligatory internal loan of a hundred 
million francs. In Poland, the German govern- 
ment has just issued a billion marks in paper 
money for enforced circulation. These are only 
single examples. 

Thejt of Specie J Jewels^ and Securities, — In 
September, 19 16, the Germans seized three quar- 
ters of a billion francs from the National Bank of 
Belgium in Brussels, which was subsequently 
transferred to Germany. In January, 191 7, on 
the steamer Prinz Hendrick, they stole a million 
francs from a Belgian who was traveling from 
England, and took ten million francs' worth of 
diamonds from the mail-bags. In the village of 
Vraignes, on March 18, 191 7, the Germans, be- 
fore evicting the inhabitants, stole from them the 
13,800 francs they had in their possession. At 
Noyon — we learn from the official report already 
quoted — the Germans broke open and pillaged 
the safes of banks and private citizens before re- 
tiring from the town. The securities, jewels, and 
silver plate of Noyon represented a value of about 
eighteen million francs. And, as I have said, these 
are only random incidents. 

Taking into consideration, then, the present 


high prices of food-products, coal, metal, petro- 
leum, war-material, machinery, and the rest, it 
can be seen at a glance that each one of the nine 
sources of booty just enumerated, on which the 
Germans have been steadily drawing, in some 
cases for as much as three years, has unquestion- 
ably yielded the value of several billions of francs, 
— certain of them, perhaps, tens of billions. 
Hence we may reasonably conclude that, without 
fixing a definite figure for the yield of these nine 
sources, the total plunder has mounted well up 
in the tens of billions. 

Another basis for calculating the worth of the 
invaded territories to Germany lies in the fact 
that the national fortunes of these countries, ac- 
cording to ante-bellum statistics, amounted to 
about 155 billions of francs. 

We shall now examine the six other elements 
of Germany's present advantageous situation — 
those which result from the domination which the 
war has enabled her to exert over her own allies, 
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. This 
domination, which amounts practically to actual 
seizure, has permitted her to fulfill the scheme of 
Central Pan-Germany as a result of the crushing 
of Serbia. 




The second element of German advantage: 
the Pan-German loans 

A portion of the approximate sum of 115 bil- 
lion francs devoted by Germany, up to the end of 
July, 19 1 7, to the carrying on of the war has en- 
abled her to burglarize her own allies by taking 
advantage of the extremely bad financial situation 
which faced them at the end of the Balkan wars. 
As a result of this situation, Austria-Hungary, 
Bulgaria, and Turkey, in order to sustain the 
present long-drawn-out struggle, have been forced 
to draw on the credit of Berlin. The sum total of 
the loans made by Germany to her allies and se- 
cured by her own war loans cannot yet be verified, 
but there can be no doubt that it mounts up to a 
respectable number of billions. 

These loans have worked out to the immense 
advantage of Germany, for the following reasons. 
Established facts prove that, without the assist- 
ance of Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turk- 
ish troops, and without the numerous products 
supplied her by the Orient, Germany would have 
been beaten long ago, even in spite of the Allies' 
blundering. As these troops and resources are of 
priceless value to Germany, it would seem that 
she must have paid dearly for them, and in gold. 
However, as the reserve of the German Imperial 



Bank was 1,356,875,000 marks in July, 1914, and 
2,527,315,000 in February, 191 7, it is certain that 
Germany has not lent gold to her allies, — in large 
quantities, at any rate, — but only paper, whose 
value depends solely on the strength of German 

In reality, therefore, Germany, simply by keep- 
ing a printing-press busy turning out little stamp- 
ed slips of paper, has obtained troops, food-stuffs, 
and raw materials which were indispensable to her 
in avoiding defeat ; and at the same time she has so 
established herself as a creditor as to give her the 
right to exact final payment by her allies for ad- 
vances which were primarily made to them in Ger- 
many's own vital interest. 

Now these obligations weigh so heavily on 
countries like Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and 
Turkey, already in sore stress, that they incur 
loans which no one of these three countries can 
ever hope to pay off unless a victory of the Allied 
democracies should shatter the financial yoke of 

In order to appreciate the nature of these loans 
and their consequences, the example of Turkey is 
particularly instructive. ' Germany's advances to 
Turkey in no way represent Turkish war-expendi- 
ture. We must add to them the requisitions 
made in the country itself, and the war-material 
purchased in Germany and Austria-Hungary 
which is not yet paid for. * 



At the beginning of 191 7 Djavid Bey arranged 
in Berlin for a new loan of three million pounds, 
simply to enable Turkey to pay her debts to the 
Krupp firm, as well as the advances made her by 
the different groups of financiers and the German 
Minister of Finance. This means, therefore, 
that, when Germany sends arms to the Turks in 
order that they may use them to consolidate the 
Pan-German scheme, she also finds a means of 
making this consignment of arms serve to en- 
tangle the Turks still more hopelessly in the finan- 
cial web. *In Pan-Germanist circles, there has 
been much discussion of the compensations which 
Turkey must make to Germany in return for serv- 
ices rendered in the course of the war. It is the 
unanimous opinion that Germany, without gain- 
ing any territorial acquisitions in Turkey, must 
have controlling rights in the Ottoman Empire, 
so that the Pera-Galata bridge may be as near 
Berlin as Constantinople.' 

What has taken place in the spheres of finance 
between Berlin and Constantinople has, by the 
very nature of things, been duplicated between 
Berlin and Sofia, though of course in a less pro- 
nounced form. Germany, therefore, by means of 
paper loans based on her own credit, has caused 
colossal obligations to be assumed by her allies — 
countries representing vast areas of land : Austria- 
Hungary with 676,616 square kilometres, Bul- 
garia with 114,104, and Turkey with 1,792,900, or 


2,583,620 square kilometres in all. Now these 
three countries are precisely the ones which are 
indispensable to the carrying out of the Central 
Pan-German 'Hamburg to the Persian Gulf 
scheme; the loans, therefore, are Pan-Germanist 

It should be borne in mind, on the other hand, 
that although Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and 
Turkey are financially encumbered in their quality 
of states J the exploitation of these countries by the 
Germans is very profitable. Their combined na- 
tional fortunes were estimated, before the war, 
at about 269 billion francs. We must realize also 
that, although these loans granted by Berlin to 
her allies are merely paper loans, they bind Tur- 
key, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary to Germany 
as closely as debtors can be bound to a creditor. 
None of these three countries can reasonably 
hope to get funds after the war from their present 
adversaries, who, it is certain, will have none too 
much money for their own needs; and so the 
financial situation as a whole combines with the 
enterprise shown by the Berlin General Staff to 
strengthen the grip which Germany has obtained 
over her allies through loans. 

As this financial dependence of the three vassal 
states, with its tremendous consequences, is, as I 
have said, maintained simply by means of a print- 
ing-press and little slips of paper, which cost very 
little indeed; and since Germany receives in ex- 


change for these slips of paper bearing her signa- 
ture, men, food-stuffs, and supplies which, but 
for the action of the Allies, would enable her to 
establish Pan-Germany as mistress of Europe, 
we may safely say that the Pan-Germanist loans 
floated by Berlin at her allies' expense consti- 
tute a powerful element of military advantage, 
which, if one but examines the conditions of its 
origin, must stand out as the most profitable and 
extraordinary swindle ever perpetrated. 


The third element of German advantage: the value of 
a monopoly in exploiting the latent resources of 
the Balkans and Asia Minor 

The figure of 269 billions of francs quoted above 
takes no account of the enormous agricultural 
and mineral wealth, as yet unexploited and unap- 
praised, of the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire. 
Now, the business of tapping these vast reser- 
voirs is entirely in the hands of the Germans, as a 
result of the Pan-Germanist loans. 


The fourth element of German advantage: the value 
resulting from the creation of an economic Fan- 

Economic Pan-Germany, as it was outlined by 
List, Roscher, Rodbertus, and other German econ- 


omists, may be defined as follows: A territory 
uniting under one supreme central control Cen- 
tral Europe, the Balkans, and Turkey — a territory 
large enough to include military and economic re- 
sources entirely sufficient to provide for the needs of 
the population in times of war; and to assure its 
rulers in times of peace the domination of the world. 

The seizure by Berlin of Austria-Hungary, Bul- 
garia, and Turkey — all essential elements of Cen- 
tral Pan-Germany — was accomplished in three 
ways: militarily ^ by the supremacy acquired by 
the German General Staff over the troops of the 
vassal states ; financially ^ by means of the paper 
loans granted by Germany; and diplomatically, by 
the treaties signed in Berlin on January 1 1, 191 7, 
establishing the strongest sort of German protec- 
torate over the Ottoman Empire. This done, the 
consolidation of Pan-Germany was quickly under- 
taken by Berlin in a great number of ways. 

Control of Customs, — As the establishment of 
the great Pan-German Zollverein (Customs Un- 
ion) was not to be accomplished at one stroke, the 
Kaiser's government set about preparing the nec- 
essary steps. Numerous conferences held at Ber- 
lin and attended by German, Austrian, and Hun- 
garian statesmen and business men, resulted in the 
following essential provisions, (i) An economic 
customs agreement of long duration, which would 
make a single economic unit of Germany and Aus- 
tria-Hungary ; (2) to bring this about gradually, a 



progressive increase of duty — free articles, and 
a unification of the customs charges on certain 
goods; (3) a close economic union between Aus- 
tro-Germany and Bulgaria and Turkey, to be ar- 
ranged and established with the greatest possible 

Ethnographic Control, — Certain nations afford 
considerable resistance to the Hamburg-Persian 
Gulf scheme. The Serbians, who are morally irre- 
ducible, are an obstacle to the permanent estab- 
lishment of the Pan-German nexus between Hun- 
gary and Bulgaria; and without this the entire 
Pan-German programme falls flat. The system- 
atic destruction of the Serbian people has been 
entrusted to the Bulgars, who, under pretext of 
quelling insurrections, slaughter not only the Ser- 
bian men, but also women and children, down to 
babies at the breast. In the Ottoman Empire the 
Armenians happen to occupy those regions which 
were characterized in the Reichstag by Herr Del- 
briick as ' Germanic India.* Berlin therefore puts 
to good use the Turks* inherited taste for massa- 
cres of Christians. Already more than one million 
Armenians have been got out of the way. 

Agricultural Control. — The food crisis in Ger- 
many has led Berlin to proceed with the greatest 
haste toward utilizing the rich farming districts 
which the fortunes of war have put within her 
grasp. Hundreds of experts, with thousands of 
agricultural implements, have been sent to Rou- 



mania, Serbia, and Asia Minor. In this latter 
country, two cultural centres in particular have 
received attention. In the province of Adana cot- 
ton-growing is being developed; on the plains of 
Anatolia the intensive cultivation of grain is in 
progress. These energetic efforts have had a two- 
fold result : the Turks will not revolt against Ger- 
manic domination — because of starvation, if for 
no other reason ; and, by reason of the increasing 
yield of Serbian, Roumanian, and Turkish lands, 
more of which are continually being brought into 
service, the food-supply of the Central Empires 
becomes more and more completely assured. 

Banking Control. — The exploitation of Eastern 
Pan-Germany calls for vast capital. The Ger- 
man, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish 
banks have formed powerful combinations. As 
the leaders of this movement in Germany we find 
the Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner Bank, the 
Kolnische Bankverein; in Austria-Hungary the 
Vienna Kredit-Anstalt and the Hungarian Bank 
of Credit in Budapest. 

Economic Control. — As the rapid exploitation 
of the latent resources of the Balkans and Turkey 
is the principal economic object of the Germans, 
they have just established, in cooperation with 
King Ferdinand, the * Institute for Furthering 
Economic Relations between Germany and Bul- 
garia.' In order to facilitate the Germanic pene- 
tration of Turkey, ten thousand Turkish boys be- 



tween the ages of twelve and eighteen years are to 
come to Germany for their technical education. 
These young Turks, living in German families, 
learning German, and saturating themselves with 
German ideas, will soon be able collaborators with 
the Teutons themselves in germanizing Turkey 
and exploiting the numerous concessions which, 
if the war turns out successfully for them, will be 
wrung from the Ottoman government by the sub- 
jects of the Kaiser. 

Railway Control. — The railway systems of Eu- 
ropean Pan-Germany have been brought to the 
highest degree of perfection. In Turkey, German 
officers are absolutely in control of the railroads. 
Out of the 2435 kilometres which separate Con- 
stantinople from Bagdad, only 583 kilometres of 
line remain to be constructed — and this distance 
is traversed by automobile roads. As for the 
Turkish railroads belonging to French and Eng- 
lish companies, the German government has sug- 
gested that the Turks * purchase* them. One 
should cherish no illusions as to the real meaning 
of this word * purchase.' It means, according to 
Turco-German methods, that the expenses in- 
volved in this purchase should be set down against 
the war damages which the Central Powers con- 
sider to be due them from the Allies. 

Canal Control, — The canal project, outlined as 
far back as April 26, 1895, by the Pan-Germanist 
Dr. G. Zoepfl, was taken up and begun by the 



Economic Congress of Central Europe, which met 
at Berlin on March 19, 191 7. This project is 
made up of the following elements: (i) Union of 
the Rhine with the Danube by the opening up to 
navigation of the Main and of the canal from 
the Main to the Danube. (2) Completion of the 
central canal joining the Vistula and the Rhine. 
(3) The Oder-Danube canal, joining the Baltic 
and Black Sea. (4) Opening to navigation of 
the Rhine as far as B^le. (5) Union of the Elbe 
with the Danube by means of the river Moldau. 
(6) Union of the Weser with the Main by means of 
the Fulda-Werra. (7) Connection of the Danube 
and the Vistula by means of canals. (8) Union 
of the Danube with the Dniester by means of 
the Vistula. (9) Opening to navigation of the 
Save. (10) Opening to navigation of the Morava 
and the Vardar as far as Saloniki. The Danube 
is the base of this gigantic programme of con- 
struction. 'The Danube means everything to 
us,' declared General von Groener, in December, 

This rapid sketch of the preparations now going 
on in the economic sphere of Pan-Germany will 
permit any clear- thinking man to understand the 
crushing power which will lie in this formidable 
system when all its latent resources have been de- 
veloped by the Germans to the profit of their he- 
gemony. The organization of Pan-Germany is 



only in its first stages; nevertheless, the concen- 
trated military, economic, and strategic strength 
which it has already put at the disposal of Berlin 
is so great that it permits Germany to baffle her 
far more numerous, but widely scattered, adver- 
saries. What, then, would be the strength of a 
completely organized Pan-Germany? It is unde- 
niable, in fact, that a methodical, big-scale devel- 
opment of all the mineral, vegetable, animal, and 
industrial products of economic Pan-Germany, 
together with the low-cost transportation afforded 
by a complete system of canals, would make it 
possible for the Germans to pay high wages to 
their own workmen, and yet at the same time 
bring about such a reduction of net prices in every 
line of industry as to force Pan-German products 
on the whole world by their sheer cheapness. 

It is easy to see, then, that in the face of eco- 
nomic Pan-Germany's overwhelming methods 
any economic revival on the part of the European 
nations now allied would be impossible. The eco- 
nomic ruin of the Allies, after so exhausting and 
costly a war as this, would by the nature of things 
bring about their political subjection to Berlin. 
Besides, there is not a country in the world which 
could escape the clutches of economic Pan-Ger- 
many on the one hand, or the consequences of the 
irremediable ruin of the Allies on the other. The 
fact that Pan-Germany is organizing itself is an 
ominous event which should receive the concen- 



trated attention of all the world's free peoples; 
for it places in German hands the elements of such 
an overwhelming economic power as has no prece- 
dent in the world's history. 


The fifth element of German advantage: the value of 
military Pan-Germany 

Berlin relies, above all else, on her military re- 
sources to render secure for all time that economic 
Pan-Germany which is destined to provide her, in 
peace-time, with a permanent means of acquiring 
wealth and world-dominion. Military Pan- Ger- 
many is, therefore, the complement and the pledge 
of economic Pan-Germany. The Kaiser's success- 
ful seizure, through the fortunes of war, of new 
sources of man-power — Austro-Hungarian, Bul- 
garian, and Ottoman soldiery; of new strategic 
points or regions of exceptional importance, lo- 
cated in invaded countries or in those of his own al- 
lieSy has furnished him with the basis of military 
Pan-Germany. In 19 14, Prussian militarism held 
sway over only the 68 million inhabitants of the 
German Empire. At the beginning of 191 7, it had 
been extended by consent or by force to the 176 
million people of Pan-Germany. 

This result — evidently the consequence of an 
immense extension of exclusive influence through- 
out Central and Eastern Europe — has permitted 



the German General Staff to take over at will 
certain strategic points or regions of the greatest 
importance, over which it exerted no direct influ- 
ence before the war. Zeebrugge, on the North 
Sea, for instance; Trieste, Pola, and Cattaro on 
the Adriatic; the Bulgarian coasts of the -^gean; 
the Ottoman Straits; the Turkish, Bulgarian, and 
Roumanian shores of the Black Sea, have always 
been strategic points or districts of exceptional 

This value, however, has become vastly greater 
now that these points or districts form part of 
a single military system under the directing and 
organizing power of the Berlin General Staff. At 
present, these essential strategic points and dis- 
tricts are the strongholds of the Pan-German 
frontiers. They are, in fact, connected by contin- 
uous fortifications, defended in the most effective 
way the world has ever known by an intensive 
system of barbed- wire entanglements, deep-dug 
subterranean shelters, machine-guns, and heavy 
artillery. The internal military organization of 
Pan-Germany is being carried forward with unin- 
terrupted speed. Factories of war-material have 
been judiciously distributed throughout the whole 
territory, with the double object of utilizing raw 
materials near their source of origin, thus avoiding 
useless transportation, and of making possible the 
swift dispatch of munitions to any threatened 
sector of front. For this reason the Krupp firm. 



at the outbreak of war, established important 
branch factories, not only in Bavaria, but also in 
Bulgaria and Turkey. 

The railway system and strategic automobile 
roads in Pan-Germany have been developed ver}/ 
swiftly — notably in the Balkans and in Turkey, 
where the need was relatively great. Back of 
every military front railroads running parallel 
with that front have been constructed, so that re- 
inforcements may be sent to any given point with 
the maximum of speed. All this, taken as a whole, 
has converted Pan-Germany into one gigantic, 
extremely powerful fortress. 

A new phase is now in preparation. The Kai- 
ser's General Staff, not content with holding the 
high command of all forces in Pan-Germany, is 
determined to standardize as far as possible their 
arms, their munitions, and their methods of in- 
struction. The Deputy Friedrich Naumann — 
one of the sponsors of the Mitteleuropa idea — is 
plainly smoothing the way toward this end, 
which, because of geographic reasons, most inti- 
mately concerns Austria-Hungary. In the Voss- 
ische Zeitung he has just outlined a scheme of ' full 
and complete harmony of the Central Empires in 
so far as military matters are concerned.* He 
boldly adds an avowal which is well worth remem- 
bering. ^Mitteleuropa is in existence to-day. 
Nothing is lacking save its organs of movement 
and action. These organs can be provided by its 



two emperors, since they have at their disposal the 
necessary elements for the creation of a common 

This prophecy merits our close attention ; for it 
can readily be seen that, if the unification of the 
Armies of the two Central Empires were to take 
place, neither Bulgaria nor Turkey, on whose mili- 
tary resources the German General Staff is getting 
an increasingly firm grip, could prevent the ab- 
sorption of their armed forces into the Pan-Ger- 
man system. 

As for the military strength of Pan-Germany, 
it is an easy matter to estimate it. Even if the 
Kaiser's armies were to withdraw from Russia, 
Poland, Belgium, and France, Pan-Germany 
would still include 150,000,000 people. Now, as 
Germany has mobilized about 20 per cent of her 
own population and that of her allies, — who have 
become vassals, — we see that Central Pan -Ger- 
many can count upon approximately 30,000,000 
soldiers. Prussian militarism, whose destruction 
by the Allies has become the true, legitimate, es- 
sential aim of the war, has therefore become far 
more widespread, through the carrying out of the 
Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme, than it was in 
1 9 14. It is proved by well-established facts that 
Berlin, while vigorously pushing a peace campaign 
destined to disunite the Allies, is doing everything 
in her power to turn Pan-Germany into a fortress 
the strength of which is unexampled in the world's 



history. In any case it is undeniable that, as mili- 
tary Pan- Germany is a pledge of the success of 
economic Pan-Germany, its establishment consti- 
tutes an important element of advantage for the 
German cause. This will be further proved when 
we come to examine the two final elements of ad- 


The sixth element of German advantage: the im- 
portance of the vast economic profits which accrue 
to Berlin at the expense of Russia through the 
establishment of Pan-Germany 

We need only glance at the map to realize that 
a really free Russian republic could never range 
itself on the side of Pan-Germany. It is self- 
evident that, if Pan-Germany were to succeed in 
splitting Europe in two, her economic and mili- 
tary pressure toward the East would be irresist- 
ible. The countless agents whom Berlin already 
maintains in the immense territory of Russia 
would find their work becoming easier and easier. 
Following up the hypothesis, then, Russia, suc- 
cumbing to insoluble financial problems and un- 
ending internal difficulties, would break up, from 
the Baltic to the Pacific, into a series of anarchis- 
tic republics — all of which is according to the 
plans of Lenine, who is a creature of Berlin. After 
that there would be nothing to prevent German 
influence from becoming the controlling force in 



the economic exploitation of the immense natural 
riches of European and Asiatic Russia. 

We are well within the bounds of reason in pre- 
dicting such a possibility. The fact that German 
agents have already succeeded in stirring up most 
serious trouble throughout the length and breadth 
of Russia — that they have provoked separatist 
movements in Finland, Ukrainia, and the Cauca- 
sus, and that all China is seething with disturb- 
ances which react on Asiatic Russia — proves to 
the satisfaction of the most skeptical that the 
break-up of Russia into little states inevitably 
subject to the political and economic influence of 
Berlin would be an inevitable consequence of a 
successful Pan-Germany. 

It is plain, therefore, that the huge profits 
which the Germans would stand to gain by such a 
state of affairs — a direct result of military Pan- 
Germany — form an element of advantage wor- 
thy of being considered by itself. 


The seventh element of German advantage: the trans- 
fer to Germany of at least twenty -one billion francs 
of French credit 

The creation of military and economic Pan- 
Germany makes possible a method of securing 
war-booty planned in advance by the Pan-Ger- 
manists, which may be stated as follows: The 



transfer to Germany of funds owed to one of her ene- 
mies hy another enemy, or hy one of her own allies. 

In order to understand this method of extortion 
one need only read a passage from Tannenberg's 
book, Greater Germany, pubhshed in French trans- 
lation in 191 6 by the firm of Payot. This work 
possesses exceptional interest for two reasons: 
first, it appeared in Germany in 191 1 ; its publica- 
tion, therefore, was evidently inspired, as in many 
other cases, by the ruling class at Berlin, in order 
to prepare the German people for war by promises 
of colossal booty; second, the facts of the case 
show that the German General Staff, ever since 
the outbreak of hostilities, has been modeling the 
political conduct of the war on the exact lines laid 
down by Tannenberg, who may be said to have 
officially declared the Pan-German scheme of 191 1 . 

Now, independent of the 35 billion marks — 
nearly 44 billion francs — which were to be im- 
posed on France in the coming war by way of reg- 
ular war indemnity, Tannenberg, in Article 5 of 
the hypothetical treaty, outlined the following ad- 
ditional extortion : — 

* France cedes to Germany her claim to the 12 
billion marks (15 billion francs) lent by her to 
Russia.* This means nothing more or less than a 
cession of credit. 

On page 308 of Payot's edition, Tannenberg in- 
dicates as follows the use to be made by Germany 
of these Russian debts to France : — 



'We shall not be able to give thanks to Holy 
Russia for this splendid sum, for she has made 
such vile use of these billions that to-day almost 
nothing remains. There is no question of reim- 
bursement. Russia is not a mortgaged property 
subject to payment of interest, which can be sold 
when this interest is not promptly forthcoming on 
the day it is due. However, we shall be able to 
collect our money in another way, simply by tak- 
ing in exchange for these credits the territories of 
the Poles in Posnania, East Prussia, and Upper 
Silesia; of the Lithuanians on the banks of the 
Niemen; of the Letts on the Duna; of the Estho- 
nians on the Embach and the regions bordering on 
the rivers of the northern coastal country; of the 
Czechs in Bohemia, Austrian Silesia, and Mora- 
via; of the Slavs in Southern Ukrainia, Carinthia, 
Styria, Croatia, Dalmatia, Goerz, and Gradiska, 
in so far as they come within the southern and 
eastern limits of Greater Germany. 

*This procedure enables us to kill three birds 
with one stone. Russia rids herself of the burden 
of debts and interest-paying which is crushing her ; 
the Slavs of the West and South become citizens 
of a Slavic country; and we Germans obtain, free 
of debt and incumbrance, the much-needed terri- 
tories for colonization.* 

These words were written in 191 1 . On May 24, 
191 7, the Berlin Tdgliche Rundschau thus exposed 
Germany's future attitude toward Russia: — 


' If we reach an agreement with the new Rus- 
sian government, or with the government which 
succeeds it, so much the better; but in making 
our terms we shall deliberately turn to account 
the internal situation of the ancient empire now 
in revolution. It is more essential to-day than 
ever before that we should push our claims against 
Russia for indemnity and for the annexation of 
that territory which we so sorely need for coloni- 
zation. ' 

The similarity between this programme of an- 
nexation and indemnity, written so recently, and 
Tannenberg's outline, published six years ago, is 
indeed striking. 

Let us now see how, in the present state of af- 
fairs, Tannenberg's plan for a transfer of credit 
could be worked out. Suppose we suggest a hy- 

In the first place, it is evident that, if Russia 
should continue to submit to anarchy fostered by 
German agents, her financial situation, already 
perilous, would no longer permit her to pay the in- 
terest on her bonds held abroad. Again, if Pan- 
Germany, now momentarily established, con- 
tinues to exist, Berlin will be able to take over 
Russian obligations to France without the neces- 
sity of a formal treaty. In fact, the tremendous 
pressure against Russia, exerted by the mere 
geographical contact of Pan-Germany as she lies 
athwart Europe, would practically render unneces- 



sary the formal cession of French credit. BerHn, 
taking fullest advantage of the situation, would 
then say to Petrograd, * We consider that France 
owes us a considerable sum by way of war-in- 
demnity. We are unable to collect this, but you 
Russians also owe an indemnity. We therefore 
assume the position of France as your creditor, 
and, as the strength of Pan-Germany has put you 
practically at our mercy, we demand the pay- 
ment of your debts in such and such a form.* 

What resistance could disorganized Russia 
make to this claim, presented with true German 

Russian extremists need not hope, as certain 
of them do, to avoid paying the debts contracted 
by the old regime. If they do not care to fulfill 
their obligations to France, which is working hard 
to sustain the Russian Revolution, they will have 
to pay those same debts to Berlin, where full use 
would be made of them to exploit the Russian 

Moreover, the 'purchase' of French- and Eng- 
lish-owned railroads in Turkey, suggested several 
months ago by Berlin, of which we have already 
spoken, proves convincingly that the Germans 
intend also to follow out the system of transferring 
credits in cases where money is owed by Ger- 
many's allies to Germany's enemies. For a long 
period great numbers of Frenchmen purchased 
the state obligations of Austria-Hungary, Serbia, 



Bulgaria, Roumania, and Turkey. It is impossi- 
ble to give the exact amount of French money 
thus invested in Pan-Germanized Central and 
Eastern Europe, for the securities of the above- 
mentioned countries were generally floated in 
several foreign financial centres at once; but per- 
sons who have the most thorough knowledge of 
French investments make a minimum estimate of 
six billion francs. As for the French money in- 
vested in Roumania and Serbia it will vanish into 
thin air as soon as the Austro-German conquests 
are consolidated. As for investments in Austria- 
Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, the assumption 
by Germany of French credits — supposing peace 
to be concluded on the basis of the present war- 
map — would be easily accomplished if she rea- 
soned as follows with her allies: — 

* France now owes you war indemnities which 
you cannot collect. By putting them down 
against the obligations owed by you to France, 
you cancel this debt. However, we Germans have 
lent you during the war great sums, and furnished 
you with supplies without which you could never 
have continued the struggle. Since you cannot 
meet these obligations we shall secure ourselves, 
in part at least, by assuming France^s position as 
your creditor.' 

On the whole, if the present state of things 
were to continue, Berlin, by the process of trans- 
ferring credit, would be able to cause France the 



very considerable loss of about 15 billion francs 
owed her by Russia, and 6 billions owed by Ger- 
many's vassal states — a total of at least 21 
billions. Now that the Pan-German scheme has 
for the moment been accomplished, we can truth- 
fully say that 21 billions of French money, at the 
lowest estimate, represented by Russia, Austrian, 
Hungarian, Serbian, Bulgarian, and Turkish se- 
curities, have been virtually Pan-Germanized. 


The Necessity for a Decision 

In the preceding chapters I have pointed out 
that the advantages which Germany has already 
gained through the war, or has assured for her- 
self in the future, if the present situation remains 
essentially unchanged, consist of seven chief 
elements. Before we arrive at final conclusions 
concerning these elements, let us establish the 
following facts: — 

I. In three years of war, Germany has spent 
on the war 1612 francs per capita of her popula- 
tion. France, in the same period, has spent 2200 
francs per capita — that is to say, 608 francs, or 
the immense figure of 38 per cent, more than Ger- 

If the formula * without indemnity' be adopted, 
with respect to the expenses of the war, far 
indeed from serving the cause of the Right, it 
would result in this unspeakable iniquity: each 
Frenchman who desired peace would have to bear 
a financial burden heavier by more than a third 
than that of each German and loyal subject of 
the Kaiser who loosed the dogs of war. There- 
fore this enormous difference — 38 per cent — 
in the per capita war-expenses between France 



and Germany would in itself suffice to make the 
economic — and hence the political — downfall of 
France, swift, complete, inevitable, and beyond 

2. Unquestionably Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, 
and Turkey, as separate states, have been ruined 
by their war-expenses, but this ruin is all to the 
advantage of Germany, as it throws her vassals 
into a condition of absolute financial dependence. 
As a result, if Pan-Germany is to continue to 
exist, the Berlin government must be the unchal- 
lenged controller of all the financial combinations 
on which the peace and well-being of Pan-Ger- 
many depend. Now these combinations evident- 
ly can serve only to strengthen the German hege- 

No parallel situation is to be found among the 
Entente powers. The ruin of Russia, for example, 
would simply make the ruin of France more inevi- 
table, unless a decisive victory of the Allies were to 
rob Germany of her iniquitous spoils and at the 
same time guarantee to France the legitimate rep- 
aration which alone can save her from irretriev- 
able financial disaster. 

3. If Germany can still continue to float new 
internal loans with comparative ease, it is because 
her wholesale territorial and Pan-German seizures 
are considered by her people as new pledges of the 
credit of the German state as the heart of Pan- 



4. France, which has spent in three years of war 
2500 francs per capita of her population, has suf- 
fered only loss: 20,000 square kilometres of her 
territory have been invaded, and given over to 
undreamed-of spoliation at German hands. Ger- 
many, on the other hand, which has spent only 
1 69 1 francs per capita for the war, has occupied 
500,000 square kilometres of foreign soil, bur- 
glarized her own allies, and piled up huge profits 
from the war. 

The diversity of these profits is so great, and 
the mortgage that they have placed on the future 
is so heavy, that no figures will convey the sum- 
total of these advantages; but enough has been 
said to show that the aggregate is enormous. If 
one deducts the 115 billions of francs devoted by 
Germany to the war from the total represented by 
all the elements of advantage already enumerated, 
one begins to realize that Germany has really 
wrung from the war present and future profits 
which can be computed only in hundreds of bil- 
lions of francs. This war, therefore, has brought 
Germany boundless material gain, such as no war 
in history has ever brought to one people. It is 
equally certain, on the other hand, that Germany 
can utilize her advantages only on the express 
condition of maintaining certain indispensable 
conditions of the situation on which they are 
based. We shall now see to what minimum these 
conditions may be reduced. 



Our table shows that out of the seven elements 
of advantage won by Germany from the war, the 
last six — that is, those in the second group — 
are altogether independent of the first, except for 
one small detail relating to the national fortunes 
of the territories occupied by Germany to the 
southeast — that is, in Albania, Montenegro, 
Roumania, and Serbia. 

If, therefore, the formula, * peace without an- 
nexations and indemnities, * were actually adopted, 
Germany, by withdrawing from Belgium and 
France to the west, Russian Poland to the east, 
and Montenegro, Albania, Roumania, and Serbia 
to the southeast, would renounce her first element 
of advantage, represented by the value of the in- 
vaded territories — that is, about 155 billion 
francs. From this, however, must be deducted 
the tens of billions* worth of plunder carried out 
of the invaded territories during these three 
years, consisting either of products already used 
up by the Germans, or of material, metals, and 
securities which have already been removed to 
Germany. Her renunciation of this first element 
of advantage would therefore be rendered rela- 
tively incomplete were the formula adopted. 

We should note also that there are excellent 
reasons why Germany's renunciation could never 
apply in reality to the territories invaded by her 
to the southeast — to Serhiay at all events. 

The six elements of German advantage forming 



the second group of our table are infinitely more 
important to Berlin than the first element — 
which is in any case partially assured by the 'no 
indemnity* formula, as we have seen. Although 
they are less directly apparent to the Allies, the 
six elements of the second group are nevertheless 
real, for they depend on incontrovertible military, 
economic, and geographic facts. Now these six 
elements, big with possibilities for the future, de- 
pend entirely on the covert but certain seizure 
which the war has enabled Germany to make of 
her own allies. But this seizure was possible only 
as a result of Serbia's destruction. Serbia, there- 
fore, formed the geographic bulkhead which Ger- 
many had to batter down before her influence 
could predominate over Bulgaria and Turkey. 
The destruction of Serbia was the sine qua non 
of the establishment of Central Pan-Germany, 
which assures the Kaiser of the six principal ele- 
ments of advantage from the war. Moreover, it 
is undeniable that the essential prop of Central 
Pan-Germany has been furnished by the Berlin- 
Bagdad Railroad, of which the most important 
branch, that of Belgrade-Nish-Pirot, runs across 
Serbia. Now, that Germany is fighting for the 
Berlin-Bagdad line. Count Karoly, an ally of Ber- 
lin, admitted, speaking on December 12, 1916, 
in the Hungarian Chamber. (See Le Journal de 
Geneve, December 30, 19 16.) 

To sum up, then, German victory and the 



fruition of her most important war-advantages 
depend directly on the maintenance of Central 
Pan-Germany, made up of Germany, Austria- 
Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Now 
this maintenance is based on two prime condi- 

1. The continuance of Serbia's state of subjec- 
tion to Austro-Germany. 

2. The preservation of the new economic and 
military lines of communication between Berlin 
on the one side and Vienna, Budapest, Sofia, and 
Constantinople on the other. These are, indeed, 
the bonds which have enabled Berlin to reduce to 
practical slavery the Poles, Czechs, Jugo-Slavs, 
and Roumanians, — the adversaries of Pan-Ger- 
many, — and then, without changing any names 
or long-established frontiers, to make Austria- 
Hungary and Bulgaria vassal-states of Berlin, 
and, consequently, active elements of Central 

Finally, if the present order of things in Central 
Europe is preserved, Germany can maintain the 
Hamburg-Bagdad line. This would be assured 
by the adoption of the formula, 'peace without 
indemnities and annexations.' This is easily 

As we have already seen, even if Germany were 
to withdraw in the East and West, the stipulation 
'no indemnities' would permit her to give back 
the territories stolen from Russia, France, Bel- 



gium, and Roumania in a condition of complete 
economic, physical, and moral collapse: in a word, 
sucked dry. By reason, too, of the principle of 
' no indemnities, ' the reconstruction of these dev- 
asted countries would be another cause of finan- 
cial exhaustion for France, Russia, Belgium, and 
Roumania, already overburdened with the costs 
of the war. But, even assuming that the Ger- 
mans withdraw from these occupied territories to 
the East and West, — although at present there 
is no reason for seriously considering such an 
eventuality, — no one in his senses could believe 
that they would give up Serbia unless forced to do 
so by the most ruthless methods; for Serbia, by 
reason of her geographic position, is absolutely 
essential to the existence of Central Pan-Ger- 
many, on which, in turn, Germany's vast advan- 
tages depend. 

Of course, it is easy to imagine that Germany 
would give her signature to treaties of settlement, 
even involving Serbia. But treaties signed by 
Germany have no value whatever. ' We snap our 
fingers at treaties, ' said the Grand Duke of Meck- 
lenburg-Schwerin to Mr. Gerard, American Am- 
bassador at Berlin. Besides, even supposing that 
Berlin were party to a treaty concerning Serbia, 
this treaty might allow Serbia to exist in theory, 
but not in fact. We must look the situation in the 
face: Serbia is one great graveyard. Her pop- 
ulation has been systematically butchered by the 



Bulgarians, with German approval. Serbia is ut- 
terly ruined: the Bulgaro-Austro-Germans have 
taken everything. 

Now the principle * no indemnities ' would keep 
Serbia in this terrible and irremediable state of 
misery. It is evident that under these conditions 
the Serbian state would be hopelessly crippled. 
If, therefore, Austria-Germany were to say to the 
Allies, * Very well ; in conformity with the formula 
"no annexations, no indemnities,** we are willing 
to recognize Serbia's dependence by treaty, ' who 
would be deceived by this sinister and portentous 
j oke ? Who could believe in the sincerity of a prop- 
osition which, on the face of it, is rendered im- 
possible of fulfillment by the *no indemnities* 
clause. And what guaranty would the Allies 
hold that Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria would 
withdraw from Serbia at the same time, in view 
of the fact that such a withdrawal, if bona fide, 
would imply Berlin's renunciation of the whole 
Central Pan-German scheme and its vast attend- 
ant profits? 

To suppose such a thing possible implies a com- 
plete ignorance of the Germanic spirit as it has 
manifested itself since the beginning of history. 
Besides, declarations made by the Germans them- 
selves show that they will never recede from their 
position as regards Serbia. As early as Decem- 
ber, 1916, the Frankfurter Zeitung prepared its 
readers in advance for the ' pacifist ' tactics about 



to be employed — tactics which are now being 
tried out with the help of the Russian anarchists, 
the Kienthal Socialists, and the Pope. 

'Certainly,' said the Frankfort paper, 'if we 
are to make a lasting profit from the military 
situation, both in its favorable and in its less ad- 
vantageous aspects, it is essential that special 
questions should be severally considered in their 
relation to the whole. To-day our point of view 
should be as follows : in the East, the formulation 
of definite demands, and in the West, negotiations 
on a flexible basis. This is not a programme but 
a general line of action. " Negotiation is by no 
means a synonym for "renunciation." * 

This last sentence should be read and pondered 
over by all the Allies. Here we find an absolutely 
clear statement as regards the fate of Serbia, 
whose restoration, by means indicated later, is 
the one thing which can save the world from 
the consequences of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf 

On August 8, 1 91 7, at a banquet given at Lon- 
don for M. Pachitch, the Serbian Premier, Mr. 
Lloyd George acknowledged in decisive terms 
Great Britain's obligations to Serbia — obliga- 
tions which are practically those of the whole 

'What I have already said in the name of the 
British Government regarding Belgium, I here re- 
peat in the name of the same Government regard- 



ing Serbia. The first condition of peace must be 
its complete and unrestricted restoration. I have 
not come here to make a speech. I have simply 
come to say that, no matter how long the war 
should last, Britain has pledged her honor that 
Serbia shall emerge from the conflict independent 
and completely restored. Moreover, it is not 
only a matter of honor. The security of civiliza- 
tion is directly involved here. In the West, Bel- 
gium has blocked Germany's way, and Serbia in 
the East has been the check of the Central Pow- 
ers. She must continue to mount guard over the 
gateway to the East.' 

To this the Berlin Kreuzzeitung made reply, — 

* Mr. Lloyd George has said that the integral 
restoration of Serbia was an essential condition of 
peace and that British honor, was pledged to this 
restoration. The war-aims of England and those 
of Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria are in absolute 
opposition on this point.' 

The Hamburger Fremdenblatt, speaking for Ger- 
many as well, added, — 

'Germany and Austria-Hungary have crushed 
Serbia. They alone will decide what disposition 
is to be made of King Peter's former realm. ' 

There can be no illusion here. The formula 
' peace without annexations and indemnities ' can- 
not apply to Serbia, which is the keystone of Pan- 

We now see that, even if the withdrawal of Ger- 


many from the territories of Belgium, France, and 
Russia now held by her were to take place, Cen- 
tral Pan-Germany would remain essentially in- 
tact ; and her commercial competition alone would 
suffice to bring about the economic ruin of France, 
England, and Russia. The last-named countries 
would be staggering under their colossal war- 
debts, with no offsetting compensation, whereas 
Germany, thanks to six great elements of advan- 
tage, would find her war-losses more than counter- 
balanced by her profits. What chance would the 
Allied powers, exhausted by a deadly peace, have 
against the thirty million soldiers of Pan-Germany, 
when Berlin, refreshed by a short respite, should 
choose to renew her hold over those western ter- 
ritories which she had temporarily relinquished? 

Is it not plain what depths of deception lie be- 
neath that formula, 'peace without annexations 
and indemnities,* which the Russian Socialists, 
ignorant of the vast advantages accruing to Ger- 
many from the war, have adopted at the sugges- 
tion of Berlin's Leninist agents? Let us look at 
the facts, not at the words. If the formula * peace 
without annexations and indemnities* is accept- 
able to the Germans, it is simply because this for- 
mula, in the opinion of Berlin, will assure the 
maintenance of Central Pan-Germany, which, in 
turn, pledges to Germany the domination of 
Europe and the fulfillment of all other elements of 
the Pan-German scheme. 



Now, if Central Pan-Germany were to survive, 
thus assuring to Germany all its vast attendant 
advantages, and leaving the Allies to face their 
incalculable war-losses, could such a peace prop- 
erly be called a 'white peace'? Could a peace 
which gave Germany the domination of Europe 
be called a * drawn game,' a * peace without annex- 
ations or indemnities'? What sort of 'limping 
peace ' (paix boiteuse) would permit Prussian mili- 
tarism to hold sway over the 150 million people 
of Pan-Germany instead of the 68 millions of 
19 14, and put 30 million soldiers at Berlin's dis- 
posal? What one of the exhausted states of 
Europe could lift a hand under such conditions? 
This would be no paix boiteuse; it would be the 
peace of slavery. 

If the Allies are to understand the crucial situa- 
tion which lies before them, they must realize 
that, as Lloyd George said, 'The security of civi- 
lization is directly involved in the independence 
of Serbia. ' But the independence of Serbia can 
never be assured so long as Germany practically 
exercises hegemony over the 50 million people 
of Austria-Hungary, for the Austro-German unit 
of 118 million inhabitants, all subject to Berlin, 
is geographically the mistress of the Balkans. The 
pledge of Serbia's independence y therefore^ does not 
lie in Serbia, but north of the Danube, This pledge 
involves the liberation of the peoples under Haps- 
burg domination, — the Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, 



Jugo-Slavs, and Roumanians, — which alone can 
permit the creation of a barrier sufficiently strong 
to block the Hamburg-Persian Gulf line, and, at 
the same time, annul the vast advantages that the 
definite establishment of the formidable economic 
and military Pan-German scheme would assure to 
the Kaiser and his people. 

Now it is much easier to devise the destruction 
of Pan-Germany than is generally supposed. This 
fact will become plain as soon as the Allies as a 
whole realize that the freedom of the nationalities 
subject to the Hapsburgs should not only be an 
object of the Entente victory, but also a means to 
that victory. This, however, is a matter which 
needs greater elaboration than I can give it at 
this point. It is discussed at length in the con- 
cluding chapters of this volume. 

In a word, the solution of the Central European 
problem means everything for the Allies. So long 
as it shall remain unsolved, victory will be out 
of their reach. On the other hand, when this one 
point has been settled, all the other special war- 
aims of each of the Allies can be fulfilled with 

Assuming now that the problem of Central 
Europe has been solved, could it be said that the 
resulting peace would be * without annexations 
and indemnities'? Plainly not: for this peace, if 
it is to break up forever the autocracies of the 
Central Empires, must, for reasons of nationality, 



change the existing frontiers, which have made 
Austro-German imperialism possible. It might 
involve also certain legitimate reparations. Can 
it be said that peace on the terms of the Allies 
would be a 'white peace' — a 'drawn game'? 
Again we must say no; for such a peace would 
bring incalculable benefits to the world : the end of 
Prussian militarism, together with the possibility 
of organizing the society of nations under other 
and better conditions. Neither could it be 
called a *paix boiteusey' for the destruction of 
Prussian militarism would insure to the world a 
long term of rest after the present awful struggle. 

The formulae ' peace without indemnities or an- 
nexations, ' 'white peace,' 'drawn game' and 
' paix boiteuse' have therefore no more connection 
with reality in the event of an Allied victory than 
in that of a German victory. The truth in a nut- 
shell is that, by virtue of the prime importance of 
the Central European problem, either the Allies 
will win victory through the destruction of Pan- 
Germany, or else the Germans, thanks to Central 
Pan-Germany and its economic and military ad- 
vantages, will reduce all Europe to slavery. 
These are the two phases of the dilemma. 

In any case, the fact that expressions without 
any practical application, and hence absurd, are 
constantly made use of in many Allied organs of 
public opinion in the discussion of peace, proves 
beyond doubt that certain Allied circles, poisoned 


by the influence of Lenine or Kienthal, have lost 
their sense of reaUties. With such insidious ene- 
mies as the Germans, this involves a real danger 
for that moral resistance of the Allies which is so 
invaluable. The Americans, through their prac- 
tical common sense, can be of the greatest service 
in helping the European Allies to set it at naught. 

President Wilson, by his message to Russia and 
his Flag Day address, has already done much for 
the common cause by clearly setting forth the 
concrete difficulties to be overcome by the Allies 
if they are to live at liberty. Mr. Gompers has 
done the same by his firm stand regarding the 
Stockholm conference. By energetically oppos- 
ing the pernicious Socialist theoreticians, he has 
supported those real Socialists in France, England, 
and Russia who understand the vital importance 
of killing Prussian militarism. 

May all true Americans continue to speak as 
these two men have done ! The common sense of 
their opinions, spread broadcast among the Euro- 
pean Allies, will help us to neutralize the deadly 
action of those among us who have become intoxi- 
cated by theories. The cause of the Allies is an 
ideal, but the triumph of this ideal can never be 
insured by words; it can be compassed only by 
the accurate knowledge of military and economic 


The Allies and Pan-Germanism 

It is now twenty years that I have worked tire- 
lessly to tear the veil from the Pan-German 
scheme, which my investigations in all parts of 
the world have enabled me to unearth. In spite 
of the positive and abundant proofs of its exist- 
ence which I have been publishing for nineteen 
years, I was unable to persuade the responsible 
authorities in France, Russia, or England, that a 
formidable peril was swiftly and more swiftly 
drawing near. Paris and London were steeped in 
blind pacifist delusions. As for Petrograd, the 
sinister Teutonic influences which, until only yes- 
terday, were at work on the highest personages, 
prevented the great Russian people from knowing 
the real nature of Germany^s projects. 

If the Europeans most directly interested in 
knowing the truth were, until the very outbreak 
of hostilities, completely hoodwinked as to the 
true intentions of William II, it is only natural 
that Americans should take some time to realize 
the staggering facts concerning the fantastic and 
odious plan of world-domination so toilsomely 
built up by the government at Berlin. In peace 
times, too, the affairs of old Europe, especially the 


intricate tangle of Austro-Hungarian and Balkan 
politics, had no practical interest for so vast and 
remote a nation as the United States. This was 
particularly true of her Western citizens. To-day, 
however, Americans as well as French, British, 
Russians, and Italians, are faced with the obliga- 
tion of mastering the problems of Central Euro- 
pean affairs; for, without exaggeration, it is on 
the proper solution of these problems that the in- 
dependent existence of the United States depends. 

As events have justified the views I have held 
for a score of years, I trust my American readers 
will hold this fact in my favor. If I should seem 
to run counter to the ideas they now hold, they 
should realize that I do so deliberately, in order to 
save priceless time and better serve their own legi- 
timate interests. 


The present situation in Europe is due to two 
factors: first, the almost complete fulfillment by 
the Germans of a plan which they had long been 
preparing with the utmost care; second, the re- 
peated mistakes of the Allies in their carrying on 
of the war — mistakes which alone have permit- 
ted the Germans to consummate their plan almost 
without opposition. 

The Pan-Germanist programme of 191 1 called 
for the establishment of Prussian hegemony over 
a territory of nearly 4,015,000 square kilometres 


— in other words, besides actual conquest in the 
East and West, it meant the indirect, yet effective 
seizure of Austria-Hungary, the Balkan States, 
and Turkey. At the beginning of 191 7 — before 
the capture of Bagdad by the English and the 
strategic retreat of the German troops in the West 

— the programme had been realized to the extent 
of 3,600,000 square kilometres — that is, in nine- 
tenths of its entirety. 

The basic explanation of this achievement lies 
partly in the fact that, if the Germans are outlaws 
they are very intelligent outlaws, perfectly trained 
for the task of seizing the booty on which they 
have set their hearts; partly in the fact that the 
leaders of the Allies, intelligent and animated by 
the best intentions though they are, have been 
quite unenlightened as to the multiple realities of 
the European tangle, a thoroughg6mg knowledge 
of which is absolutely necessary for the conduct 
of the terrible war in progress. 

The proof of this ignorance lies in the recog- 
nized truth that the heads of the European states 
now in league against Germany were, without ex- 
ception, taken by surprise when war broke out. 
Posterity will look on this fact with amazement. 
The governments of the Allies were no better pre- 
pared to direct the war intellectually than were 
their generals to carry it on materially. Now, the 
intellectual prosecution of this war presents un- 
precedented difficulties : it calls uncompromisingly 



for a detailed knowledge, not only of matters mili- 
tary and naval, but of geographic, ethnographic, 
economic, and political questions which, by reason 
of the scale of the present conflict, react profound- 
ly on all military operations of general scope. As 
a result of this interpenetration of all the various 
problems, the world-conflict is not, as many peo- 
ple still believe, a purely military struggle, in 
which the mere machinery of war plays a decisive 
r61e. In spite of appearances, mind — that is, the 
intellectual element — dominates the material 
element which, though indispensable, can attain 
full effectiveness only when it is employed in fur- 
therance of a definite plan of action, backed by 
clear thinking; and such a plan can never be form- 
ulated unless the ethnographic, psychological, 
economic, and geographic factors capable of af- 
fecting every great movement of a general strate- 
gic nature are calculated as carefully as the purely 
military factors. By reason of the potency of 
these many factors — invisible, but very real and 
powerful — it may be said: *This war is not a 
mere war of armaments — it is a war of political 

It is because the strategists of Berlin have long 
recognized this conception of modern warfare; it 
is because they have at their fingers* ends a docu- 
mentation of political science, slowly accumulated 
and of unquestionable worth, that they are in a 
position to meet endless problems as they present 



themselves, and to achieve successes against the 
Allies which, on the surface, appear incomprehen- 

As for the leaders of the Allies, it seems as if 
many of them are not alive to the element of polit- 
ical science in the war, even at the present mo- 
ment. The reason is simple. The same men who 
ignored the realities of Pan-Germanism before the 
war are, naturally enough, unable to grasp the 
politico-scientific, geographic, economic, ethno- 
graphic, and psychological realities of all Europe 
now that the conflict has burst on us. In the 
realm of the intellectual there can be no improvi- 
sation. To master the politico-scientific elements 
necessary for the prosecution of this war, there is 
need of minds trained by the unremitting applica- 
tion of fifteen or twenty years. Among the lead- 
ers of the Entente no man isi:o be found who has 
bent his will to such intellectual effort; and the 
pressing problems brought forth by each day give 
no time for minute, deliberate study by the men 
who have succeeded to the seats of power since 
war began. 


The caoital mistakes in the prosecution of the 
war committed by the Entente proceed directly 
from the defective equipment of its leaders which 
I have just pointed out. They explain the differ- 
ence in the results obtained by the two groups of 


belligerents, although the courage and self-sacri- 
fice of the Allies' soldiers are as great as those of 
the Germans. They explain, too, why the three 
hundred millions of the Allies — this takes no ac- 
count of their colonial resources or of the support 
drawn from trans-oceanic neutrals — have not yet 
succeeded in defeating Germany, which entered 
the war with a population of sixty-eight millions 
and one ally, Austria-Hungary, of whose thirty 
million people three quarters were directly antag- 
onistic to Berlin. 

These capital mistakes made by the Allies are 
as follows. They believed that a friendly agree- 
ment with Bulgaria was possible, although that 
country was treaty-bound to Berlin and Constan- 
tinople long before the war. They cherished illu- 
sions concerning King Const an tine, who, above all 
else, was brother-in-law of the Kaiser. They or- 
ganized the Dardanelles expedition, which should 
never have been attempted. Even if this opera- 
tion had been judged technically feasible, its futil- 
ity would have been apparent if the Allies had 
realized — and it was their arch-error not to realize 
— that the strategic key to the whole European 
war was the Danube. The mere occupation by 
the Allies of the territory stretching from Monte- 
negro through Serbia to Roumania, would have 
resolved all the essential problems of the conflict. 
Cut off from the Central Empires, Bulgaria and 
Turkey, whose arsenals were depleted by the Bal- 



kan disturbances of 1912-1913, would have found 
it impossible to make a strong stand against the 
Allies. Turkey, who had been imprudent enough 
to defy them, would have been obliged to open the 
Straits within a very short time, for sheer lack of 
munitions to defend them. This opening of the 
Straits would have been effected by a strong pres- 
sure by the Allies on the south of Hungary. More- 
over, by the same action the Central Empires 
would have been barred from reinforcements and 
supplies from the Orient. Germany, finding her- 
self cut off on land in the South as she was block- 
aded by sea in the North, would have been obliged 
to come to terms. 

Unhappily, the general staffs of the Allies in the 
West were not prepared to grasp the politico-sci- 
entific character of the war, especially the cardinal 
importance of the economic factor. This igno- 
rance remained unenlightened until Roumania was 
crushed in 19 16. As a result, for twenty-seven 
months the Balkans were looked on by the leaders 
in the West as being of only secondary military 
importance. During these twenty-seven months 
the Allies were obsessed by the idea that they 
would vanquish Germany on the Western front 
by a war of attrition. This conviction delayed 
the Saloniki- Belgrade expedition, and when it 
was finally undertaken, it was on too small a scale 
to insure success. Such a grave error would never 
have been committed by the Allied strategists if 


they had fully realized that the principal objective 
of the Pan-German scheme, for the attainment of 
which Germany was primarily fighting, was the 
seizure of the Orient. This point of view, how- 
ever, was for a long time ignored, in spite of the 
tireless efforts made by a few to demonstrate its 
vital importance. 

The Austro-Germans, profiting by this basic 
mistake of the civil and military chiefs of the En- 
tente, were able in October-November, 19 15, to 
join hands with Bulgaria and Turkey over the 
corpse of Serbia. From that time on, the General 
Staff at Berlin has been profiting by this situation, 
improving it and consolidating it by seizing half 
of Roumania toward the close of 1 9 1 6. The direct 
result of the mistakes of the Allies, coupled with 
the methodical procedure of Berlin, has been the 
realization of nine tenths of Pan-Germany. 

This Pan-Germany is composed of two ele- 
ments. First, the great occupied territories taken 
by Germany from Belgium, France, Russia, Ser- 
bia, and Roumania. Second, the practical seizure 
effected by her at the expense of her own allies: 
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey ; for, as a 
matter of fact, the Quadruple Alliance is nothing 
but a great illusion carefully fostered by the Kai- 
ser for the purpose of concealing the true situa- 
tion from the neutrals — particularly the United 
States, which was then in that category. If one 
wishes to see things as they are, one must realize 


that Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey are 
not the allies — that is, the equals — of Germany. 
These three states are practically the vassals of 
Berlin, in whose sight they count for scarcely more 
than Saxony or Bavaria. The principal proof of 
this state of affairs lies in the fact that the Kaiser 
wields an uncontested supremacy from Hamburg 
to the British front at Bagdad. 

Since the beginning of hostilities there has been 
a formidable extension of Prussian militarism. At 
first, it held in its grasp only the sixty-eight mil- 
lion people of the German Empire. By April, 
1 91 5, it had extended and organized its influence 
among the thirty millions of Austro-Hungarians, 
who until that time had taken orders from their 
own independent military chiefs. After October- 
November, 191 5, — the date of Serbia's downfall, 
— the Prussian system reached out to Bulgaria 
and Turkey. By taking account of these exten- 
sions and adding together the populations of the 
territories occupied by Germany, together with 
those of her infatuated allies, one finds that to-day 
Prussian militarism no longer controls sixty-eight 
million souls, as at the beginning of the war, but 
about one hundred and seventy-six million Euro- 
pean and Ottoman subjects. 

This is the brutal, overwhelming fact which 
Americans must face if they wish to learn the sole 
solution of the war which will assure to them, as 
well as to the rest of the world, a durable peace. 


The following figures will show how the three 
groups of the population of Pan-Germany were 
divided at the beginning of 191 7: — 


The Masters 


The Vassals 








The Slaves 


(about) 3,000,000 



Alsatians, Lorrainers 




Poles, Lithuanians, 







1 1 ,000,000 









Ottoman Greeks 









To sum up, seventy-three million Germans rule 
over twenty-one million vassals and eighty-two 
million slaves, — Latin, Slavic, Semitic, belonging 
to thirteen different nationalities, — who are 
bearing the most cruel and unjustifiable yoke that 
the world has ever known. 

It is undeniable, moreover, that each extension 
of Prussian militarism over a new territory has en- 
abled Germany to prolong the struggle by obtain- 
ing new. supplies of food, new reinforcements to 


press into her service and territory to exploit, new 
civil populations, whose labor is made use of even 
in works of a military nature. As a result, the 
technical problem now confronting the Allies in 
Europe is, through the mistakes of their former 
leaders, infinitely more complicated than at the 
outbreak of hostilities. 

To-day Berlin, by means of Prussian terrorism 
methodically and pitilessly employed, disposes of 
the military and economic resources of one hun- 
dred and seventy-six million people, occupying a 
strategic position in the centre of Europe which is 
all to her profit. It is this very state of things, 
founded on the slavery of eighty-two millions of 
human beings, which is intolerable. 


Many times, and rightly, the Allies have de- 
clared that it was not their object to exterminate 
the German people and bring about their political 
extinction. On the other hand, it is just and es- 
sential to proclaim that Pan-Germany must be 
destroyed. On this depends the liberty, not only 
of Europe, but of the whole world. This is the 
point of view which, in the crisis of to-day, should 
prevail with Americans, for the following reasons. 
Suppose that Pan-Germany were able to maintain 
itself in its present position. It cannot be denied 
that its territory contains considerable latent mili- 
tary and economic resources, as well as strategic 


positions of world-significance/ like the Darda- 
nelles. If these resources were freely exploited 
and developed to their highest pitch by the relent- 
less organizing spirit of Berlin, Prussianized Pan- 
Germany, dividing Europe in two, would domi- 
nate the Continent, uncontestably and indefinitely, 
by means of her crushing strength. France, Rus- 
sia, England, Italy, ceasing to exist as great pow- 
ers, could only submit to Germany*s will. And 
Berlin, mistress of Europe, would soon realize, not 
merely the Hamburg-Bagdad and Antwerp-Bag- 
dad railways, but the Brest-Bagdad line as well; 
for Brest has long been coveted secretly by the 
Pan-Germanists, who would make of it the great 
military and commercial transatlantic port of 
Prussianized Europe. 

Moreover, if Germany achieved the ruin of the 
Allies, it is entirely probable that the General 
Staff of William II would launch a formidable ex- 
pedition against the United States without delay, 
in order to allow her no time to organize herself 
against the Prussian tyranny hypothetically dom- 
inating Europe. Even if Berlin felt it necessary 
to defer this step, Americans would none the less 
be forced to prepare for the inevitable struggle and 
to serve an apprenticeship to militarism which 
would be odious to them. If Americans; then, see 
things as they really are, and perceive the dangers 
to which they are pledging their future, they will 
be convinced that they, as much as Europeans, 


have a vital interest in the annihilation of Pan- 
Germanism. In a word, it is clear that any peril 
accruing to the United States from Europe can 
arise only from so formidable a power as Pan-Ger- 
many, and not from a Germany kept within her 
legitimate frontiers, and forced to behave herself, 
by the balance of other powers. 

We must also realize that the moral considera- 
tions at stake are a matter of the liveliest interest 
to the United States. Can republican America 
allow the feudal spirit which kindled the torch of 
this war to triumph over the world? This spirit 
is made up of the following elements : the feudal- 
ism of the Prussian Junkers, chief prop and stay 
of the Hohenzollerns; the feudalism of the great 
Austrian land-owners ; the feudalism of the Mag- 
yar grandees, whose caste-spirit is precisely the 
same as that of the Prussian lordlings; and the 
Turkish feudalism of Enver Bey and his friends. 
In other words, this four-ply feudal spirit which is 
the basis of Pan-Germany is in radical and abso- 
lute opposition to the democratic spirit of the 
modern world. Granting for a moment that Ger- 
many were victorious, Russia, after a frightful 
reign of anarchy, would be forced to submit once 
more to the yoke of autocracy. As for the peoples 
of Western Europe, reduced to worse than slavery, 
they could only renounce their dearest ideals — 
the ideals for which they have shed their blood for 



The present war, then, is manifestly a struggle 
d outrance between democracy and feudalism. To 
Americans as well as to Europeans falls the task, 
not only of preserving their corporeal independ- 
ence, but of saving our common civilization. This 
can be accomplished only by the destruction of 

It is plain that Berlin, failing so far to crush the 
Allies completely, is bending every effort to main- 
taining Pan-Germany in its present position, so 
that, after peace is declared, it may crystallize and 
swiftly develop its full power. When, in Decem- 
ber, 1 91 6, President Wilson requested the bellig- 
erents to make known the causes for which they 
were fighting, the government of Berlin issued no 
definite statement. The reason for this attitude 
is plain. If Berlin still hopes to enforce her out- 
rageous pretensions by her immense military 
power, she cannot possibly put down her terms in 
black and white, in a document subject to general 
perusal, without instantly calling down on her 
head the blazing reprobation of the civilized 

The Allies, on the contrary, replied to Mr. Wil- 
son's question easily and with precision. 

The universal attention drawn to this reply 
has entailed advantages and disadvantages. By 
the very nature of things, the Allies definitely an- 
nounced that the smaller nationalities in Turkey, 
Austria-Hungary, and the Balkans must be set 



free, thus implying a radical opposition to the 
Hamburg-Persian Gulf idea. This has enabled 
Berlin, for one thing, to bind her accomplices at 
Vienna, Budapest, Sofia, and Constantinople more 
closely, if possible, to her cause, and also to gal- 
vanize for a still longer period the forces of the 
German people, who are resolved to endure the 
bitterest suffering in order to insure, after peace 
comes, the immense advantages accruing from 
the fait accompli of Pan-Germanism. 

By way of compensation for this, the publicity 
given the reply of the Allies has accomplished 
two excellent ends. First of all, it has permitted 
every one to see that the common purpose of the 
Allies is to solve the Central European problem, 
which, as a matter of fact, is not only of European, 
but of universal interest, since such a solution 
puts a quietus on German dreams of world-dom- 
ination. This publicity, too, has made it possible 
to compare the principles invoked by the Allies in 
their peace-terms with those of President Wilson, 
proclaimed in his message to the Senate on Janu- 
ary 22, 1 91 7, and to establish the fact that these 
principles are identical. 


The reason for this harmonious point of view 
lies in the adoption of the principle of nationality 
by the Allies and by President Wilson as the fun- 
damental basis for the reconstruction of the Eu- 



rope of to-morrow. Because of this point in com- 
mon, it is evident that the war measures of the 
Allies and the pacific endeavors of Mr. Wilson 
have in view the same general geographic solu- 
tions of the problem of organizing Europe on the 
lines of a durable peace. This is a fact of the ut- 
most importance, as I tried to show with the aid 
of maps in an article in L' Illustration, of Febru- 
ary 27, 191 7. Allies and Americans, then, may 
join hands and press resolutely ahead, — especi- 
ally since the Russian Revolution has come to 
pass, — for, with a common ideal, their general 
practical solutions for meeting this formidable 
crisis cannot but be identical. 

In order to understand fully the seriousness of 
the situation, one must distinguish clearly be- 
tween the moral position of the Allies and the 
strategic positions of the two groups of belliger- 
ents. The moral position of the Allies is excellent. 
After Washington and Peking broke with Berlin, 
and especially after the magnificent revolution 
in Russia, after Bagdad fell and a fraction of the 
invaded French territory was won back, the 
spirit of the Allies was all that could be desired. 
But even while recognizing the excellence of this 
moral strength and its potentialities of success, 
we must first of all consider the general strategic 
situation. The events of this war have plainly 
shown that, unfortunately, brute force in the 
service of the lowest passions can prevail over 



the holiest rights, the purest aspirations. Since 
August, 1 914, incontestable rights have been vio- 
lated, and noble nations martyrized. 

Let us face the cruel truth and say: the Allies 
may yet be completely vanquished if certain de- 
velopments come about, or if new strategic mis- 
takes are added to those portentous ones which 
nearly lost them the fight, in spite of the righteous- 
ness of their cause and their immense, if badly em- 
ployed, latent resources. If we wish, then, really 
to understand the crisis of to-day and the mighty 
peril which still menaces the world's liberty, we 
must not shrink from meeting the realities of the 
military situation. We must be ready to face the 
most serious developments that can be conceived. 
Such an attitude implies, not pessimism, but that 
readiness for the worst which lies at the root of 
military wisdom. 

Let us now accept the following facts. The 
troops of France are beginning to be exhausted. 
The iniquitous administration of the Tsar had 
seriously compromised the provisioning of the 
Russian army with food and munitions. In that 
vast country, where conditions were ripe for ideal- 
istic extremists to guide the revolution toward 
pacifism or anarchy, there are alarming symp- 
toms of the prevalence of the latter condition. 
The swarming agents of Germany are working 
there without respite. If their efforts shall finally 
succeed, the strength of Russia will swiftly dis- 


solve. This would practically insure a German 
victory, for, with the Russian armies demoralized, 
all the forces of Pan-Germany could be flung 
against the Franco- British front. Moreover, if, 
from the moral standpoint, the Berlin govern- 
ment is universally to be despised, the same can- 
not be said about her general technical military 
ability, whose elements are as follows. 

Berlin is incontestably mistress of Pan-Ger- 
many — that is, she has absolute disposal of vast 
resources in men and in the manifold products of 
a great territory with a population of one hun- 
dred and seventy-six millions. The Kaiser's 
Great General Staff, whose intellectual resource- 
fulness cannot be questioned, is quick to make the 
most of every lesson taught by the war. The 
annual levies of men from the various territories 
of Pan-Germany certainly outnumber the losses 
sustained each year by her troops. It is therefore, 
in my opinion, a grave error to assume, as the 
Allies have done, that the Germans can be beaten 
by mere attrition of their forces. By organizing 
under one uniform system the soldiery furnished 
by the many different countries of Pan-Germany, 
Prussian militarism has unquestionably given its 
troops a cohesion and a unity unknown to the 
vassal-allies of Germany before the war. This 
state of affairs has undoubtedly added to the 
military effectiveness of the vast armies which 
take their orders from Berlin, 



The German military authorities most advan- 
tageously employed the respites given them by 
the strategic errors of the Allies. Never have the 
broad lines of trenches, the far-flung battle fron- 
tiers, been more powerfully guarded than now. 
Never have the Germans had more abundant 
stores of munitions. Never has the network of 
railways covering the length and breadth of Pan- 
Germany been so complete. Never has the Great 
General Staff, making full use of its central posi- 
tion, been better able to concentrate on any front 
with lightning speed. For these reasons, it is my 
opinion that we may safely say that never before 
has the Berlin government, from a military point 
of view, been so strong. The various statistics 
which justify such a conclusion are, I think, to be 
relied on. Even supposing them to be exaggerat- 
ed, it is much better to run the risk of overesti- 
mating the enemy's strength than to underesti- 
mate it. Many of the Allies* mistakes sprang from 
neglect of this axiom. 


Military Operations 

As a prelude to the further consideration of cer- 
tain aspects of the world- war, I should like, if I 
may, to quote a few paragraphs which I printed 
early last summer, by way of forecast, and which 
events have not wholly belied. 

Let us now attempt to forecast the German 
military plans for 191 7. For some weeks persist- 
ent reports have been telling of their tremendous 
preparations for hurling an offensive against the 
Russian front. As for the Franco- British front in 
the West, it was stated that the General Staff at 
Berlin would be glad to hold things stationary on 
that side until, after winning the victory on which 
they count in the East, they are free to devote 
their attentions to the occidental theatre. This 
project, of course, cannot be confirmed; but the 
voluntary shortening of the western line by the 
Germans would lend color to its probability. 
Moreover, such a plan would coincide perfectly 
with the present interests of Berlin, with the 
habitual methods of the Kaiser's General Staff, 
with the broad Pan-Germanist scheme, and with 
the personal preferences of Marshal von Hin- 


denburg. It is natural also that the Germans 
should avail themselves of the sinister and undeni- 
able effects of the Russian imperial administra- 
tion on the army and civil population of the coun- 
try before the new government at Petrograd has 
time to repair the all-too-abundant harm that 
has been wrought. 

We must cherish no illusions. As long as it can 
dispose of the vast resources of Pan-Germany, 
which, to my thinking, are still taken too lightly 
by the Allies; while the results of the Russian 
Revolution are still uncertain ; while the reorgani- 
zation of the Muscovite armies still remains un- 
completed, the government at Berlin, in spite of 
its serious problems connected with the food- 
supply, is still convinced that it can win a decisive 
military victory by dealing with its adversaries 
one by one. And so we should foresee that the 
German General Staff will meet its problems in 

It seems probable, then, that it will follow the 
basic principles of warfare and concentrate all the 
forces at its disposal against the weakest front. 
This, without question, is the Roumano- Russian 
line. Its great extent, together with the formid- 
able development of the German railway system, 
— infinitely superior to that of the Russians, — 
makes it easier to introduce the element of surprise, 
which is of capital importance for swift, decisive 
victory. The Russians, too, are certainly less well 


provided with munitions of war than the Franco- 
British troops; and the Germans have succeeded 
in further weakening them by means of the ter- 
rible explosions recently engineered by their spies 
at Archangel. As a result of the execrable ad- 
ministration of the former government, the food 
situation in Russia is most critical, while the rev- 
olutionists are not yet sure of the reorganization 
of the military forces. The Germans, therefore, 
have an unquestionable interest in profiting with- 
out delay by this state of affairs. 

A vigorous offensive on the Eastern front is 
also in harmony with the Pangermanist plan, 
which for twenty-five years has looked forward to 
the seizure by Germany of Riga, Little Russia, 
and Odessa. And a German success in the south 
of Russia would be big with economic, naval, 
military, and moral consequences of world-im- 
port. The Germans would become masters of the 
rich and boundless wheat-lands of Little Russia, 
which, from the midst of their food-problems, 
they watch with greedy eyes. The capture of 
Odessa and the complete conquest of the Black 
Sea, by means of transports (sent in large num- 
bers down the Danube, thus permitting surprise 
attacks at vital points), would end in the loss of 
the Crimea and, probably, the fall of the Caucasus 
into the hands of the Turco-Germans. The Brit- 
ish, then, could no longer hold out at Bagdad. 
Freed by such successes from all immediate fear 



of Russia, the Germans could then turn in enor- 
mous strength against the Balkan front of the 
Allies. Under these hypothetical conditions, one 
may assume that the Allied army north of Salon- 
iki, demoralized by the Russian reverses, would 
be taken prisoners or driven into the sea. 

These various operations in the East vigorous- 
ly taken in hand, as the General Staff at Ber- 
lin knows so well how to do, would require four or 
five months for their execution. This interval of 
time, combined with the depressing moral effect 
brought about by the supposed German victories, 
would act, as it were, as an automatic preparation 
for the final Teutonic offensive on the Western 
front. It must be remembered that during these 
four or five months the submarine warfare, pur- 
sued more and more ruthlessly, would consider- 
ably impede neutral navigation and decimate the 
tonnage of the Franco- British merchant marine. 
The food-problems and the war-expenditure of the 
Allies would be enormously increased. Even if 
their pressure has forced the Kaiser to evacuate 
a considerable portion of France and Belgium, 
the importance of this retreat would be only rela- 
tive, for it would be temporary. Following our 
hypothesis, then, if Russia were beaten, the army 
of Saloniki driven into the sea, and the food crisis 
in the West intensified, the moral depression and 
discouragement among the soldiers and civilians 
of France would be most profound. Under the 



given material and psychological conditions, the 
concentration of all the Pan-German forces on 
the Western front would probably permit them to 
break through. This would spell ruin for France 
and for England as well, and assure that decisive 
German victory which would mean the mastery of 

If this theoretical German plan is to be accom- 
plished in 191 7, however, the general technical 
situation in Europe must remain much as it stands 
at present. No new power capable of making it- 
self felt on the battle-field must come to the sup- 
port of the Allies. It is necessary, then, that the 
scheme be carried out in 191 7, before the Russian 
Revolution, which is essentially favorable to the 
Allies, has time to repair the damage done by the 
former regime, and before the United States, 
realizing that it is to their vital interest to take 
part directly and without delay in the war on the 
Continent, are ready to do so effectively. 

The tactics of Berlin, after being forced to a 
diplomatic rupture with Washington, consist in 
doing everything to avoid actual blows with the 
United States, while keeping up a vigorous sub- 
marine campaign, and in making frantic efforts 
to effect a miscarriage of American military pre- 
paration — especially as regards sending rein- 
forcements to Europe. In pursuance of this 
scheme, Berlin instructed Vienna to send Wash- 
ington a dilatory answer concerning submarine 



warfare, in order to avoid a diplomatic break and 
thus gain time. This procedure was specifically 
intended to make America believe that Austro- 
Hungary can act independently of Germany. 
And so, by virtue of this delusion, William II veils 
the existence of that Pan-Germany whose reality, 
for the sake of his plans, must not be revealed 
until the latest possible moment. 


If the programme for 191 7, which we have good 
reason to attribute to the Germans, were sub- 
stantially carried out (and, after all, this is not 
impossible), in six to eight months the United 
States would find themselves face to face with 
a Germany controlling the resources, not only of 
the present-day Pan-Germany, but of all Europe. 
And, Americans, do not think your turn would be 
long in coming. Do not take it for granted that 
the German people, worn out by the endless hor- 
rors of war, would cry to their masters, * Peace at 
any price ! * The German people, as I know them, 
filled with enthusiasm by a victory that would be 
without parallel in the history of the world, mad- 
dened by incalculable plunder, would follow the 
lead of their Emperor more blindly than ever. 
The pride and ambition of the Kaiser and his 
General Staff are so prodigious that, unless all 
signs fail, they wouldjgive the United States no 
chance to organize against a Prussianized Europe. 


In eight or ten months, after new advances had 
been made to Japan, who would be isolated by the 
defeat of her allies in Europe, and with the aid 
of the German- Mexicans and German- Americans 
whose mission, as every one knows, is to paralyze 
by every possible means the military organization 
of the United States, it would be possible to look 
for ruthless action against America by the Pan 
germanized forces of Europe. 

The prediction of such extraordinary eventuali- 
ties will no doubt seem fantastic and improbable 
to many of my American readers. I beg them, 
nevertheless, to consider them seriously. As a 
matter of fact, if we consider all that has been 
achieved by the Germans since August, 19 14, the 
events which I have forecast are much less amaz- 
ing than those indicated by me in 1901, when, in 
my book U Europe et la Question d'Autriche au 
Seuil du XX e Si^chy I unmasked the Pan-Ger- 
man plot, which was then looked on as a mere 
phantasmagoria — although as a matter of fact 
it was so real that it now stands almost completely 

You Americans, then, should learn your lesson 
from the past. Your own best interest lays on 
you the obligation to face facts which may at 
present seem improbable, and to prepare your- 
selves without losing a day for meeting the grav- 
est perils. As the situation now stands, a delay 
in making a decision may involve disastrous re- 



suits. For instance, the three weeks of parleying 
indulged in by the Allies before deciding to send 
troops to Serbia were of the utmost significance. 
Those three lost weeks simply prevented the 
Allies from achieving victory, and resulted in an 
unthinkable prolongation of the war. 

The surest, the most economical way for Amer- 
icans to avoid excessive risks is to prepare at once 
for the severest kind of struggle, on the hypothe- 
sis that the Allies may sustain grave reverses. 
Everything favors concerted action by the United 
States and the Allies. Their material and moral 
interests are identical, and, in doing away with 
autocracy, Russia removed the well-justified dis- 
trust felt in the United States for the land of the 
Tsars. As we have seen, a German victory over 
Russia, involving the fall of Saloniki and, later, 
the breaking of the Western front, would be un- 
questionably the most dangerous eventuality 
imaginable for the future security of the United 
States. American interest therefore demands, 
not only that support should be given France 
and Great Britain, but that the United States 
should hasten to help the Russians, who will prob- 
ably be called on first to meet the onslaught. 

On reflection, perhaps, Americans may even 
find it worth while to give further thought to an 
idea which, a few months ago, would have seemed 
preposterous to them. Since President Wilson 
cherishes the ideal of the brotherhood of nations, 


— a noble conception, but one which can be 
realized only after Prussian militarism is ground 
in the dust, after the Hapsburgs and the Hohen- 
zollerns have gone the way of the Romanoffs, — 
why should not this world-crisis provide an op- 
portunity for intimate cooperation between the 
United States and Japan? 

Even if Americans were to admit the necessity 
of so doing, it will be long before they are in the 
position to throw into the European conflict those 
reinforcements which, by exercising a decisive 
influence, would hasten the end of the mad 
slaughter. At the present moment Japan alone, 
outside of Europe, has at her disposal a trained 
army capable of taking the field at once. Every- 
thing considered. President Wilson might well de- 
cide that the interests of humanity called for the 
intervention of Japan in Europe. If he succeeded 
in convincing Tokyo of this, he would stand out 
as the great, decisive figure of the war. From the 
technical point of view, it is certain that victory 
for the Allies calls for a simultaneous concentric 
attack on all the fronts of Pan-Germany. For 
that reason, Japanese troops on the Russian line, 
at Bagdad, Alexandretta, and Saloniki, would 
furnish the Eastern positions of the Allies with 
the supplementary strength that they need to 
achieve decisive results and so hasten the end of 
the whole war. 

Let me again urge my point that the line of 


action morally and materially most profitable to 
the United States is that which, by achieving 
the total destruction of Pan-Germany and Prus- 
sian militarism, will terminate the horrible car- 
nage once for all. This is the moral pointed by the 
past. If the Allies had undertaken the Saloniki- 
Belgrade expedition in the beginning of 191 5, the 
war would have ended a year ago. If you, Amer- 
icans, had cast your lot with us a year ago, it 
would be ending about now. If you act to-day, 
with all your energies, and especially if you com- 
pass the Japanese intervention, you will save 
the lives of millions of men who, without your 
military and diplomatic support, will surely be 

The real problem for America is clearly to dis- 
cern Pan-Germany lurking beneath the Quad- 
ruple Alliance of the Central Powers, and to de- 
cide to strike this Pan-Germany quick and hard. 
This is the one and only way to foil the odious 
Prussian militarism which threatens the liberty 
of the world. 


Pan-Germany's Strength and Weakness 

In April last, when it was generally believed in 
Paris that the Revolution at Petrograd made cer- 
tain the end of German influence over the vast 
former Empire of the Tsars, I wrote the study 
referred to on page 8i and reprinted here as 
Chapters IV and V.^ I then said, [In Russia] 
'Where conditions were ripe for idealistic extrem- 
ists to guide the revolution toward pacifism or 
anarchy, there are alarming symptoms of the 
prevalence of the latter condition. The swarm- 
ing agents of Germany are working there without 
respite. If their efforts succeed, the strength of 
Russia will swiftly dissolve. * 

Unhappily, events have justified this word of 
caution in only too full measure. The efforts of 
the Allies to reorganize the forces of Russia have 
thus far met with small success. It is a task to 
which their duty and their interests alike make it 
imperative for them to devote themselves with 
their utmost strength. But we must cherish no 
illusions. The rebuilding of the forces of Russia 
must inevitably be a long, arduous, and doubt- 
ful undertaking. It is advisable, therefore, to 

^See Atlantic Monthly ^ June, 1917, p. 721. 



consider, at the same time, if there is not some 
method of making up for the Russian default by 
bringing into play, to further the victory of the 
Entente, certain powerful forces which the Allies 
have not thus far even thought of employing. 

Now, these forces and this method do exist; 
but in order to enforce clearly their reality, their 
importance, and the way to make use of them, I 
must, in the first place, call attention to a funda- 
mental and enduring error of the Allies, set forth 
the extraordinary credulity with which they allow 
themselves to be ensnared in the never-ending in- 
trigues of Berlin, and describe the principal shifts 
which Germany employs, with undeniable clever- 
ness, to annul to an extraordinary degree the effect 
of the Allies* efforts. These essential causes of 
mistaken judgment being eliminated, we shall then 
be able to understand what the existing forces are 
which will enable the Entente to make up with 
comparative rapidity for the Russian default, and 
to contribute with remarkable efficiency to the 
destruction of Pan-Germany. 



For three years past events have notoriously 
proved that the concrete Pangermanist scheme, 
developed between 1895 and 19 11, has been fol- 


lowed strictly by the Germans since the outbreak 
of hostilities. Now, the diplomacy of the Entente 
is devised as if there were no Pangermanist 

This is the source of all the vital strategical and 
diplomatic errors of the Entente — consequences 
of the failure to understand the German military 
and political manoeuvring. Here is proof derived 
from recent events — one of many which it would 
be possible to allege. 

When it was announced a few weeks ago that 
Austria would play an apparently preponderating 
part in the reconstitution of Poland, a very large 
number of newspapers in the Entente countries 
decided that ' it is perfectly evident that the Aus- 
trian policy has carried the day in Poland.* A 
similar deduction has led Allied readers to believe 
that Vienna has prevailed over Berlin. The re- 
sult has been to strengthen the faith of those who 
deem it possible to impose terms on Berlin through 
the channel of Vienna, and even to induce Austria 
to conclude a separate peace. Now, to convey 
such an impression as this to Allied public opin- 
ion is to lead it completely astray. If the Haps- 
burgs are playing an apparently predominant 
part in Poland it is solely because that part, as we 
are about to prove, is assigned to them by the 
Pangermanist scheme. 

In the pamphlet, Pan-Germany and Central 
Europe about 1950, published in Berlin in 1895, 



which contains the whole Pangermanist plan, we 
find the following : — 

'Poland and Little Russia [the kingdom to be 
established at Russia's expense] will agree to have 
no armies of their own, and will receive in their 
fortresses German or Austrian garrisons. In Po- 
land, as well as in Little Russia, the postal and 
telegraph services and the railways will be in Ger- 
man hands. ' 

For twenty-two years the Pangermanist scheme 
has been followed up. Tannenberg, in his book, 
Greater Germany, which appeared in 191 1, — a 
work whose exceptional importance has been dem- 
onstrated by events, and which, in all probability, 
was inspired officially, — prophesies very dis- 
tinctly, — 

' The new kingdom of Poland is made up of the 
former Russian portion, of the basin of the Vistula, 
and of Galicia, and forms a part of the new Austria. ' 

These most unequivocal words appeared, it will 
be admitted, three years before the war. Now Le 
Temps of September 7, 191 7, said on the authority 
of the Polish agency at Berne, which is subsidized 
by Austria and publishes news communicated to 
it by the government of Vienna, — 

' Germany would take such portion of Russian 
Poland as she needs to rectify her "strategic 
frontiers." This portion would include almost a 
tenth of Russian Poland. The rest would be an- 
nexed to Austria. The Emperor Charles would 



thereupon issue a decree of annexation of Russian 
Poland to Galiciaj under the title of Kingdom of 
Poland. . . . The dual monarchy would then be- 
come triple, and the first result of this readjust- 
ment would be to compel all Poles to undergo mili- 
tary service in the Austrian armies. All the dep- 
uties representing Galicia would automatically 
leave the Austrian Reichsrath, to enter the new 
Polish Parliament, which would give the German 
parties in the Austrian Parliament a certain ab- 
solute majority.* 

This result of the present action of Vienn^a and 
Berlin, foreshadowed by the Temps apparently 
for the near future, has been in view for twenty- 
two years. In fact, in the fundamental pamphlet 
of 1895, already quoted, it is said that ' Galicia and 
the Bukowina will be excluded from the Austrian 
monarchy. They will form the nucleus of the king- 
doms of Poland and Little Russia . . . which, how- 
ever, may be united, by the personal link of the 
sovereign, to the reigning house of Hapsburg. ' 

So it is that, very far from having forced any- 
thing on Germany in relation to Poland, Charles I 
of Hapsburg has shown that he submits with do- 
cility to the Pangermanist decrees, since he gives 
his entire adh.esion to the carrying into effect of 
the plan followed at Berlin from 1895 to 1914 — 
for nineteen years before hostilities began! The 
actual fact, therefore, is the direct antithesis of 
what the .conclusions of 'many Allied newspapers 



have, of course in absolute good faith, permitted 
their readers to believe. Now everything goes to 
show that this error arises solely from a technical 
ignorance of the Pangermanist scheme, of which 
the guiding spirits of the Entente seem to have no 
more conception than a considerable portion of 
the Allied press. However, if they wish for vic- 
tory, the Allies must inevitably act in systematic 
opposition to the Pangermanist scheme. They 
cannot therefore dispense with the necessity of 
becoming thoroughly familiar with it. 

Nor is there any more reliable guide, since the 
events that have taken place for three years past 
have demonstrated the absolute accuracy of the 
Pangermanist outgivings anterior to the war. 
Knowing what the Germans are going to do, we 
can deduce therefrom the best means of opposing 
it. If this method had been followed, no serious 
error would have been committed by the Allies. 
They would have understood that Germany was 
making war in behalf of the Hamburg-Persian 
Gulf enterprise, — which was intended to supply 
her with the instruments of world-domination; 
that, consequently, the Danube front, which the 
Allies heldy must be retained at whatever cost, 
which would have been, comparatively speaking, 
very easy, if they had recognized in time this im- 
perative necessity. 

Now, if the Allies had retained their hold of the 
Danube front, the war would have been over 


nearly two years ago. It is, in fact, solely because 
they did not grasp the necessity of thus holding it, 
that the Germans have been able to carry out 
their Eastern plan and to constitute the Pan- 
Germany which must now be destroyed in order 
to avoid the defeat of civilization, and eventual 
slavery. To effect this destruction is infinitely 
easier than is generally believed, on the condition 
that the most is made of the causes tending to the 
internal dissolution of Pan-Germany. But, to 
understand these available causes, familiarity 
with the Pangermanist scheme is indispensable. 
It is urgently necessary, therefore, to put an end 
to this intolerable condition, namely, that, while 
the Allies have an extraordinary opportunity to 
become accurately acquainted with the whole pro- 
gramme of procedure at Berlin, as contained in a 
multitude of German documents, — that is to 
say, the real objects of Germany in the war, — 
while they have this opportunity, they go on act- 
ing and arguing as if that programme did not 
exist. It is this condition which proves most clear- 
ly the extraordinary and enduring credulity which 
the Allies exhibit in face of the endless German 



The heads of the Allied governments, moved 
by the best intentions but completely taken by 



surprise by the war, are carrying it on far too 
much in accordance with the ordinary procedure 
of times of peace — negotiations, declarations, 
speeches. Notably in the gigantic palaver into 
which Maximalist Russia has developed, men 
fancy that they have acted when they have talk- 
ed. The events of three years of war prove con- 
clusively that the Boches, turning to their profit 
the predilection of the Allied leaders for verbal 
negotiations and manifestations, — a predilection 
complicated by ignorance of the Pangermanist 
scheme, — have succeeded in nullifying to an ex- 
traordinary degree the effect of the sacrifices of the 

Until the Russian Revolution, Berlin brought 
to bear on the diplomacy of the Entente those 
allies of Germany who were then regarded by the 
Entente as neutrals. Indeed, the declarations of 
Radoslavoff, confirmed by the recently published 
Greek White Booky have conclusively established 
the fact that the agreements between Germany, 
Bulgaria, Turkey, and King Constantine, in con- 
templation of this wary antedated the opening of 
hostilities — that certain ones of them go back as 
far as April, 1914. Now, it is known that the En- 
tente diplomacy had no knowledge of this situa- 
tion, and that it allowed itself to be hoodwinked 
for three months by the Turks, for thirteen months 
by the Bulgarians, for thirty months by the King 
of Greece, the Kaiser's brother-in-law, and even, 


to a certain degree, down to a very recent period, 
by Charles I of Hapsburg, certain Allied diplo- 
matists having persisted in coddling the chimera 
of a peace with Austria against Germany. 

Unhappily, to solve the present problems, 
which are, above all, technical, the best intentions, 
or even the most genuine natural intelligence, are 
insufficient. is necessary to know how, and one 
cannot know how without having learned. The 
Allied Socialists who have placed themselves in 
the spotlight have shown themselves to be, gen- 
erally speaking, utopists, entirely ignorant of 
Germany, of the German mind, of geography, 
ethnography, and political economy, pinning 
their faith, before all else, to formulas, and know- 
ing even less than the official diplomats of the 
technique of the multifold problems imposed by 
war and peace. As the anti- Prussian German, 
Dr. Rosemeier, has stated it so fairly in the New 
York Times y these idealists, by reason of their 
radical failure to grasp the inflexible facts, are 
doing as much harm to the world in general as the 
Russian extremists and their German agents. 

It is undeniable that Berlin has found it easy 
to profit by the state of mind of the idealistic 
Socialists of the Entente by causing its own So- 
cial Democrats to put forth the soi-disant * demo- 
cratic* peace formulas, which for some months 
past have been infecting the Allied countries with 
ideas that are most pernicious because they are 



impossible of realization. Despite the efforts of 
realist Socialists, men like Plekhanoff, Kropot- 
kin, Guesde, Compere-Morel, Gompers, and their 
like, the Stockholm lure, notwithstanding its clum- 
siness, has helped powerfully to lead Russia to 
the brink of the abyss, and hence to prolong the 
war and the sacrifices of the Allies. In France 
and England a few Socialists have been so gen- 
uinely insane as to say that the occupations of 
territory by Germany are of slight importance; 
that we can begin to think about peace ; that Ger- 
many is already conquered morally, and so forth. 
In view of such results, due to the astounding 
credulity of the idealistic Socialists of the Entente, 
it is quite natural that Germany should pursue 
her so-called 'pacifist' manoeuvres. 

Late in 191 6, the Frankfort Gazette advised its 
readers of the spirit in which these intrigues were 
to be conducted by Berlin. 'The point of view 
is as follows: to put forward precise demands in 
the East, and in the West to negotiate on bases 
that may he modified. Negotiation is not synony- 
mous with renunciation. ' 

This last sentence summarizes the whole of 
German tactics. All the proposals of Berlin have 
but a single object: to deceive and sow discord 
among the Allies by means of negotiations which 
would be followed by non-execution of the terms 
agreed upon, Germany retaining the essential 
positions of to-day *s war-map which would as- 


sure her, strategically and economically, the domi- 
nation of Europe and the world. 

Now, it is an astounding fact that the warnings 
given by the Germans themselves — the occupa- 
tion of more than 500,000 square kilometres by 
the Kaiser's troops, the burglarizing of Austria- 
Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey by the govern- 
ment of Berlin — have not yet availed to prevent 
a considerable proportion of the Allies from con- 
tinuing to be enormously deceived. At the very 
moment when the German General Staff is 
strengthening the fortifications of Belgium, es- 
pecially about Antwerp, there are those among 
the Allies who seriously believe that, by opening 
negotiations, they will succeed in inducing Ger- 
many to evacuate that ill-fated country and to re- 
pair the immense damage that she has inflicted 
on her. 

There are those who wonder what the objects 
of the war on Germany's part can be, when the 
occupations of territory by Germany, correspond- 
ing exactly to the Pangermanist scheme dating 
back twenty-two years, make these objects as 
clear as day. 

There are those who attach importance to such 
declarations as the German Chancellor may 
choose to make, when every day that passes forces 
us to take note of monumental and never-ending 
German lies and of the unwearying duplicity of 



There are those who are willing to listen to 
talk about a peace by negotiation, when the facts 
prove that Germany respects no agreement, that 
a treaty signed by Berlin is of no value, and that, 
furthermore, it is the Germans themselves who 
so declare. At the very outbreak of the war Maxi- 
milian Harden said, ^ A single principle counts — 
Force. * And the Frankfort Gazette printed these 
words : ' Law has ceased to exist. Force alone reigns , 
and we still have forces at our disposal. * To Mr. 
Gerard, United States Ambassador to Germany, 
the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin said, 
^We snap our fingers at treaties.' 

After such facts and such declarations, the 
persistent credulity of a certain fraction of the 
Allies is a profoundly distressing thing, for which 
the remedy must be found in a popular documen- 
tary propaganda, thoroughly and powerfully pre- 

The pacifist German intrigues are manifest 
enough. We can particularize six leading exam- 
ples, employed by Berlin, either separately or in 



I. A separate peace between Germany and one of 
the Entente Allies. The Alsace-Lorraine coup 

It is evident that the defection of one of the 
principal Allies would inevitably place all the 



others in a situation infinitely more difficult for 
continuing the struggle. If we assume such a 
defection, the Germans might well hope to nego- 
tiate concerning peace on the basis of their pres- 
ent conquests. 

That is why they have multiplied proposals for 
a separate peace with the Russians. At Berlin 
they are especially apprehensive of a continuance 
of the war by Russia because of the inexhaustible 
reserves of men possessed by the former Empire of 
the Tsars. The time will probably come when 
they will attempt also to lure Italy from the coali- 
tion by offering her the Trentino, and if necessary, 
Trieste, at Austria's expense, this last-named ces- 
sion, however, being destined, in the German plan, 
to be temporary only. 

The desire to break up the coalition at any 
cost is so intense among the Germans, that we 
must anticipate that, at the psychological mo- 
ment, they will even go so far as to offer to restore 
Alsace-Lorraine to France. As for the sincerity of 
such an offer, these words of Maximilian Harden, 
written early in 191 6, enable us to estimate it: — 

'If people think in France that the reestab- 
lishment of peace is possible only through the 
restitution of Alsace-Lorraine, and if necessity 
compels us to sign such a peace, the seventy millions 
of Germans will soon tear it up, ' 

Moreover, nothing would be less difficult for 
Germany, thanks to the effective forces of Cen- 


tral Pan-Germany, than to seize Alsace-Lorraine 
again, very shortly, having given it up momen- 
tarily as a tactical manoeuvre. 

2. A separate peace between Turkey y Bulgaria, or 
Austria-Hungary, and the Entente 

A particularly astute manoeuvre on the part of 
Berlin consists in favoring, under the rose, not 
perhaps a formally executed separate peace, but, 
at least (as has already taken place), semi-official 
negotiations for a separate peace between her 
own allies named above and the Entente. 

The particular profit of this sort of manoeuvre 
in relation to the definitive consummation of the 
Hamburg- Persian Gulf scheme, is readily seen if 
we imagine the Allies signing a treaty of peace 
with Turkey, for instance. In such a hypothesis 
the Allies could treat only with the liegemen of 
Berlin at Constantinople, for all the other Turk- 
ish parties having any political importance what- 
soever have been suppressed. Now, if the Allies 
should treat with the Ottoman government, reek- 
ing with the blood of a million Armenians, Greeks, 
and Arabs, massacred en masse as anti-Germans 
and friends of the Entente, the following results 
would follow from this negotiation: the Entente, 
agreeing not to punish the unheard-of crimes com- 
mitted in Turkey, would renounce its moral plat- 
form : it could no longer claim to be fighting in the 
name of civilization. The Turkish government, 


which is notoriously composed of assassins, would 
be officially recognized; and thus the self-same 
group of men who sold the Ottoman Empire to 
Germany would be confirmed in power — the 
group whose leader, Talaat Pasha, declared in the 
Ottoman Chamber in February, 191 7, 'We are 
allied to the Central Powers for life and death!' 
The control by Germany of the Dardanelles, a 
strategic position of vast and world-wide impor- 
tance, guarded by her accomplices, would be con- 
firmed ; the numerous conventions signed at Ber- 
lin in January, 191 7, which effectively establish 
the most unrestricted German protectorate over 
the whole of Turkey, would accomplish their full 
effect during a Pan-German peace. 

The Bulgarian intrigues for a so-called separate 
peace with the Allies have been at least as numer- 
ous as those of the Turks of the same nature. In 
reality, the Bulgarian agents who were sent to 
Switzerland to inveigle certain semi-official agents 
of the Entente into negotiations, were there by 
arrangement with Berlin for the purpose of sound- 
ing the Allies, in order to determine to what de- 
gree they were weary of the war. The Bulgarians 
have never been really disposed to conclude peace 
with the Entente based on compromise upon 
equitable conditions. They desire a peace which 
will assure them immense acquisitions of territory 
at the expense of the Greeks, the Roumanians, 
and, especially, the Serbians, for at Sofia they 



crave, above all things, direct geographical con- 
tact with Hungary. Thus the great Allied Powers 
could treat with the Bulgarians only by being 
guilty of the monstrous infamy of sacrificing their 
small Balkan allies, and of assenting to a terri- 
torial arrangement which would permit Bulgaria 
to continue to be the Pangermanist bridge be- 
tween Hungary and Turkey over the dead body 
of Serbia — an indispensable element in the func- 
tioning of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme, 
and hence of Central Pan-Germany. 

Now, this is precisely the one substantial re- 
sult of the war to which Bulgaria clings above all 
else. So it is that a peace by negotiation — in 
reality a peace of lassitude — between the Allies 
and Bulgaria, would simply give sanction to this 
state of affairs. 

In the same way, such a peace with Austria- 
Hungary could but give definitive shape to the 
Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme. From the finan- 
cial and military standpoint, the monarchy of 
the Hapsburgs, considered as a state, is to-day 
absolutely subservient to Germany. The reign- 
ing Hapsburg, whatever his private sentiments, 
can no longer do anything without the consent of 
the Hohenzollern. Any treaty of peace signed by 
Vienna would be, practically, only a treaty of 
which the conditions were authorized by Berlin. 
There must be no illusion. Nothing less than the 
decisive victory of the Allies will avail to make 



Germany loosen her grip upon Austria-Hungary, 
for that grip is to Germany the substantial result of 
the war. In truth it is that grip which, by its 
geographic, military, and economic consequences, 
assures Berlin the domination of the Balkans, and 
of the East, hence of Central Pan-Germany, hence 
of Hamburg-Persian Gulf, and the vast conse- 
quences which derive therefrom. 

Let us make up our minds, therefore, that all 
the feelers toward a separate peace with Turkey, 
Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary, which have been 
put forth and which will hereafter be put forth, 
have been and will be simply manoeuvres aimed at a 
so-called peace by negotiation, which would cloak, 
not simply a German, but a Pan-German peace. 

3. The democratization of Germany 

Certain Allied groups having apparently made 
up their minds that the * democratization * of Ger- 
many would suffice to put an end automatically 
to Prussian militarism and to German imperial- 
ism, it was concluded at Berlin that a consider- 
able number, at least, of their adversaries, being 
weary of the war, might be willing to content 
themselves with a merely formal satisfaction of 
their demands, in order to have an ostensibly 
honorable excuse for bringing it to an end. That 
is why, with the aim of leading the Allies off the 
scent and inducing them to enter into negotia- 
tions, Berlin devoted herself during the first six 


months of 19 17, with increasing energy, to the 
farce called 'the democratization of Germany.' 
Meanwhile the most bigoted Pangermanists put 
the mute on their demands. They ceased to utter 
the words 'annexations* or 'war-indemnities.* 
They talked of nothing but 'special political ar- 
rangements * — a phrase which in their minds led 
to the same result but had the advantage of not 
embarrassing the peace-at-any-price men in the 
Allied countries. The device of democratization 
of Germany was complementary to the Stock- 
holm trick, which, as we know, was intended to 
convince the Russian Socialists that Russia had 
no further advantage to expect from continuing 
the war, since Germany in her turn, was about to 
enter in all seriousness upon the path of democ- 
racy — and so forth. 

We must acknowledge that many among the 
Allied peoples allowed themselves to be ensnared 
for the moment by this manoeuvre, and honestly 
believed that Germany was about to reform, of 
her own motion and radically. But when the 
German tactics had achieved the immense result 
of setting anarchy loose in Russia, — a state of 
affairs which was instantly made the most of in a 
military sense by the Staff at Berlin, — the farce 
of the democratization of Germany was aban- 
doned. Von Bethmann-Hollweg was sacrificed to 
the necessity of dropping a scheme which he had 
managed, and Michaelis — Hindenburg's man, 



and therefore the man of the Prussian military 
party and of the Pangermanists — succeeded him. 

As a matter of fact, the Germans have, for all 
time, had such an inveterate penchant for rapine 
that they are quite capable of setting up a great 
military republic and submitting readily enough 
to Prussian discipline, with a view to starting 
afresh upon wars for plunder. 

We must bear this truth constantly in mind: 
if the Hohenzollerns have succeeded, in accord- 
ance with Mirabeau's epigram, in making war 
*the national industry,' it is because, ever since 
the dawn of history, the Germans have always 
subordinated everything to their passion for lu- 
crative wars. The same is true of them to-day. 
Especially in the last twenty years the secret 
propaganda of the Berlin government has con- 
vinced the masses that the creation of Pan-Ger- 
many will assure them immense material benefits. 
It is because this conviction is so firmly rooted 
among them that substantially the entire body 
of Socialist workingmen are serving their Kaiser 
without flinching, and are willing to endure the 
horrors of the present conflict so long as it may 
be necessary and so long as they are not conquered 
in the field. 

4. Peace through the International 

This is another of the tricks conceived at Ber- 
lin. In reality the International, having always 


followed the direction of the German Marxists, 
has been the chief means employed for thirty 
years to deceive the Socialists of the countries now 
in alliance against Germany by inducing them 
to believe that war, thanks to the International 
alone, could never again break out. In a report 
on *the international relations of the German 
workingmen's unions* (1914), the Imperial Bu- 
reau of Statistics was able to proclaim as an un- 
deniable truth: ' In all the international organiza- 
tions German influence predominates. ' 

The conference at Stockholm, initiated by Ger- 
man agents, and that at Berne, upon which they 
are now at work, are steps which German union- 
ism is taking to reestablish over the workingmen 
of all lands the German influence, which has van- 
ished since the war began. The idea now is to 
force the proletariat of the whole world into sub- 
jection to the guiding hand of Germany. The ob- 
ject oflicially avowed is to rehabilitate the Inter- 
national in the interest of democracy. In reality, 
it is proposed, above all else, to replace in the front 
rank the struggle between classes in the Allied 
countries, in order to destroy the sacred unity 
that is indispensable to enable the most divergent 
parties to wage war vigorously against Panger- 
manist Germany. As the Berlin government is 
well aware that it has nothing to fear from its own 
Socialists, the vast majority of whom, even when 
they disown the title of Pangermanists, are parti- 



sans of Central Pan-Germany, the profit of the 
manoeuvre based on the International would in- 
ure entirely to Germany, who would retain her 
power of moral resistance unimpaired, while the 
Allied states, once more in the grip of the bitterest 
social discord, would find their offensive powers 
so diminished by this means that peace would in 
the end be negotiated on the basis of the present 
territorial occupations of Germany. 

5. The armistice trick 

All the schemes hitherto discussed, whether 
employed singly or in combination, are intended, 
first and last, to assist in playing the armistice 
trick on the Allies. This is based upon an astute 
calculation, still founded on the weariness of the 
combatants, which is so easily understood after 
a war as exhausting as that now in progress. At 
Berlin they reason thus — and the reasoning is 
not without force: ' If an armistice is agreed upon, 
the Allied troops will say, ''They're talking, so 
peace is coming, and, before long, demobiliza- 
tion." Under these conditions our adversaries 
will undergo a relaxation of their moral fibre. * 

The Germans would ask nothing more. They 
would enter upon peace negotiations with the fol- 
lowing astute idea. If, hypothetically, the Allies 
should make the enormous blunder of discussing 
terms of peace on bases so craftily devised, Ger- 
many, being still intrenched behind her fronts 


which had been made almost impregnable, would 
end by saying, ' I am not in accord with you. After 
all is said, you cannot demand that I evacuate 
territory from which you are powerless to expel 
me. If you are not satisfied, go on with the war.* 
Inasmuch as, during the negotiations, every- 
thing essential would have been done by German 
agents to accentuate the moral relaxation of the 
country which was most exhausted by the conflict, 
as they succeeded in doing in Russia in the first 
months of the Revolution, the immense military 
machine of the Entente could not again be set in 
motion in all its parts. The result would be the 
breaking asunder of the anti-German coalition, 
and, finally, the conclusion of peace substantially 
on the basis of existing conquests. Thus Berlin's 
object would be attained. 

6. The ^status quo ante' trick 

The last of the German schemes, and the most 
dangerous of all, is that concealed under the for- 
mula, * No annexations or indemnities ' — a for- 
midable trap, which, as I have pointed out in 
earlier chapters, has for its object to confirm 
Germany in the possession of the gigantic advan- 
tages which she has derived from the war, and 
which would assure her the domination of the 
world, leaving the Allies with their huge war- 
losses, whose inevitable economic after-effects 
would suffice to reduce them to a state of absolute 
servitude with respect to Berlin. 


The Best Way to Crush Pan-Germany 

the united states and the vassals of BERLIN 

In the wholly novel plan which I am about to 
set forth, the United States may play a prepon- 
derating and decisive part; but by way of pre- 
amble I must call attention to the fact that the 
United States is not, in my judgment, as I write 
these lines, in a position to give its full effective 
assistance in the conflict, because it is not officially 
and wholeheartedly at war with Austria-Hun- 
gary, Bulgaria, and Turkey — states in thrall to 
Berlin and constituent parts of Pan-Germany. 
This situation is, I am fully convinced, unfavor- 
able to the interests of the Allies, and it paralyzes 
American action, for these reasons. 

As a matter of fact, Germany can no longer 
carry on the war against the Entente save by 
virtue of the troops and resources which are 
placed at her disposal by Austria-Hungary, Bul- 
garia, and Turkey. If the Allies wish to conquer 
Germany, their chief adversary, it is necessary 
that they understand that they must first of all 
deprive Prussian militarism of the support — 
apparently secondary, but really essential — 



which it receives from its allied vassals. It is, 
furthermore, eminently desirable that it should be 
recognized in the United States that Turkish, 
Bulgar, Magyar, and Austrian imperialism are 
bases of Prussian imperialism, and that in order 
to establish a lasting peace, the disappearance of 
these secondary imperialisms is as necessary as 
that of Prussian imperialism itself. Moreover, 
the fact that Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and 
Turkey are not officially at war with the United 
States enables Berlin to maintain connections in 
America of which we may be sure that she avails 
herself to the utmost. 

This situation is propitious also for that Ger- 
man manoeuvre which consists in making people 
think that a separate peace is possible between 
Turkey, or Bulgaria, or Austria-Hungary on the 
one side and the powers of the Entente on the 
other. However, as the game to be played is com- 
plicated and difficult, good sense suggests that we 
proceed from the simple to the complex, and 
hence that we strike the enemy first of all in his 
most vulnerable part. Now, as we shall see, it is 
mainly in the territory of the three vassals of 
Germany that the new plan which I am about to 
set forth can be carried out in the first instance, 
without, however, causing any prejudice — /ar, 
far from it, — to the invaluable assistance which 
the Americans are preparing to bring to the Allies 
on the Western front. For all these reasons, it 



seems desirable that American public opinion 
should admit the imperious necessity of a situation 
absolutely unequivocal with regard to the govern- 
ments of Constantinople, Sofia, Vienna, and Bud- 
apest, which are vassals of Berlin and by that 
same token substantial pillars of Pan-Germany. 



I believe that I have demonstrated, in earlier 
chapters of this book that, because of the advan- 
tages, economic and military, which the existence 
of Central Pan-Germany guarantees to Germany 
for both present and future, the essential, vital 
problem that the Allies have to solve — a problem 
which sums up all the others — is, how to destroy 
this Central Pan-Germany. 

It is infinitely easier to destroy than is gener- 
ally supposed among the Allies, because it con- 
tains potent sources of dissolution. The Allied 
leaders seem not to have bestowed upon this situ- 
ation the extremely careful attention which it de- 
serves. In any event, down to the present time 
they have not sought to take advantage of a state 
of affairs which is eminently favorable to them. 

To understand this situation, and how it may 
be utilized at once, we must set out from the fol- 
lowing starting-point. Of about 176,000,000 



inhabitants of Pan-Germany in 191 7, about 
73,000,000 Germans, with the backing of only 
21,000,000 vassals, — Magyars, Bulgars, Turks, 
— have to-day reduced to slavery the immense 
number of 82,000,000 allied subjects — Slavs, 
Latins, or Semites, belonging to thirteen different 
nationalities, all of whom desire the victory of the 
Entente, since that alone will assure their libera- 
tion. In addition, a considerable portion of Ger- 
many's vassals would, under certain conditions, 
gladly throw off the yoke of Berlin. 

Among the 176,000,000 people of Pan-Ger- 
many we distinguish the following three groups. 

Group I. Slaves of the Germans or of their vas- 
sals capable of immediate action favorable to the 
Entente — say, 63,000,000, made up as follows: — 

(a) In Turkey, — 

Arabs 8,000,000 

Generally speaking the Arabs detest the Turks. 
A portion of them have risen in revolt in Arabia, 
under the leadership of the King of Hedjaz. 

(b) In Central Europe, — 
Polish-Lithuanians 22,000,000 
Ruthenians 5,500,000 
Czechs 8,500,000 
Jugo-Slavs 1 1 ,000,000 
Roumanians 8,000,000 




There are, then, in Central Europe alone, 55,- 
000,000 people determinedly hostile to German- 
ism, forming an enormous, favorably grouped 
mass, occupying a vast territory, commanding a 
part of the German lines of communication, and 
comparatively far from the fronts where the 
bulk of the German military forces is. 

Moreover, at the present crisis, these 55,000,- 
000 human beings, subjected to the most heart- 
less German and Bulgarian terrorism, are coming 
to understand better and better that the only 
means of escape from a ghastly slavery, from 
which there is no appeal, is to contribute at the 
earliest possible moment to the victory of the 
Entente. The insurrectionary commotions that 
have already taken place in Poland, Bohemia, 
and Transylvania, prove what a limitless devel- 
opment these outbreaks might take on if the Allies 
should do what they ought to do to meet this 
psychological condition. It is clear that, if these 
55,000,000 slaves of Central Europe should re- 
volt in increasing numbers, this result would 
follow first of all: the default of Russia would he 
supplied. Indeed, the Germans, being harassed 
in rear of their Eastern fronts, would be consider- 
ably impeded in their military operations and in 
their communications. Under such conditions 
the attacks of the Allies would have much more 
chance of success than they have to-day. 



Group 2. Slaves of the Germans or of their vas- 
sals, who cannot stir to-day, being too near the 
military fronts, but whose action might follow 
that of the first group — nearly 16,000,000, made 
up as follows : — 

(a) In Turkey, — 
Ottoman Greeks 



(b) On the Western front, — 
French 3,000,000 
Belgians 7,500,000 
Alsatians and Lorrainers 1,500,000 
Italians 800,000 


Group J. Vassals of Germany, possible rebels 
against the yoke of Berlin after the uprising of 
the first group — about 9,000,000. 

Of 10,000,000 Magyars, there are — a fact not 
generally known among the Allies — 9,000,000 
poor agricultural laborers cynically exploited by 
one million nobles, priests, and officials. These 
9,000,000 Magyar proletarians are exceedingly 
desirous of peace. As they did not want the war, 
they detest those who forced it on them. They 
would be quite capable of revolting at the last 
moment against their feudal exploiters, if the 


Allies, estimating accurately the shocking social 
conditions of these poor Magyars, were able to 
assure them that the victory of the Entente would 
put an end to the agiarian and feudal system 
under which they suffer. 

Is not this a state of affairs eminently favorable 
to the interests of the Allies? Would not the Ger- 
mans in our place have turned it to their utmost 
advantage long ago? Does not common sense tell 
us that if, in view of the pressure on their bat- 
tle fronts, the Allies knew enough to do what is 
necessary to induce the successive revolts of the 
three groups whose existence we have pointed out, 
a potent internal element in the downfall of Pan- 
Germany would become more and more potent, 
adding its effects to the efforts which the Allies 
have confined themselves thus far to putting 
forth on the extreme outer circumference of Pan- 

Let us inquire how this assistance of the 88,000,- 
000 persons confined in Pan-Germany in their 
own despite can be obtained and made really 

Let us start with an indisputable fact. The 
immense results which the German propaganda 
has achieved in barely five months in boundless 
Russia, with her 182,000,000 inhabitants, where 
it has brought about, in Siberia as well as in Eu- 
rope, separatist movements which, for the most 
part, — I speak of them because I have traveled 


and studied much in Russia, — would never have 
taken place but for their artificial agitation, — 
these results constitute, beyond dispute, a strik- 
ing demonstration of what the Allies might do if 
they should exert themselves to act upon races 
radically anti-Boche, held captive against their 
will in Pan-Germany. Assuredly, in the matter 
of propaganda, the Allies are very far from being 
as well equipped as the Germans and from know- 
ing how to go about it as they do. But the Ger- 
mans and their vassals are so profoundly detested 
by the people whom they are oppressing in Pan- 
Germany; these people understand so fully that 
the remnant of their liberty is threatened in the 
most uncompromising way; they are so clearly 
aware that they can free themselves from the 
German-Turkish-Magyar yoke only as a result 
of this war and of the decisive victory of the En- 
tente, that they realize more clearly every day 
that their motto must be, * Now or never. ' 

Considering this state of mind, so favorable to 
the Allies, a propaganda on the part of the En- 
tente, even if prepared with only moderate skill, 
would speedily obtain very great results. Fur- 
thermore, the desperate efforts which Austria- 
Hungary, at the instigation of Berlin and with 
the backing of the Stockholmists and the Pope, 
was making to conclude peace before its threat- 
ening internal explosion, show how precarious 
German hegemony in Central Europe still is. 



The Austro-Boches are so afraid of the extension 
of the local disturbances which have already 
taken place in Poland and Bohemia, that they 
have not yet dared to repress them root and 
branch. Those wretches, to fortify themselves 
against these anti-German popular commotions, 
resort to famine. At the present moment, not- 
ably in the Jugo-Slav districts and in Bohemia, 
the Austro-Germans are removing the greatest 
possible quantity of provisions in order to hold 
the people in check by hunger. But this hateful 
expedient itself combines with all the rest to con- 
vince these martyrized peoples of the urgent ne- 
cessity of rising in revolt if they prefer not to be 
half annihilated like the Serbs. 

To make sure of the constant spread and cer- 
tain effectiveness of the latent troubles of the 
oppressed Slavs and Latins of Central Europe, 
there is need on the part of the Allies, first of moral 
suasion, then of material assistance. 

To understand the necessity and the usefulness 
of the first, it must be said that, despite all the 
precautions taken by the Austro-Boche authori- 
ties, the declarations of the Entente in behalf of 
the oppressed peoples of Central Europe become 
known to these latter comparatively soon, and 
that these declarations help greatly to sustain 
their morale. For example. President Wilson's 
message of January 22, 191 7, in which he urged 
the independence and unification of Poland, and 


his ' Flag Day* speech, on June 15, in which he set 
forth the great and intolerable peril of the Ham- 
burg-Persian Gulf scheme, manifestly strength- 
ened the determination of the Poles, the Czechs, 
and the Jugo-Slavs to free themselves at whatever 
cost from the fatal yoke of Vienna and Berlin. 
In addition, the constantly increasing power of 
the aeroplane enables the Allies to spread impor- 
tant communications broadcast over enemy terri- 

First of all, it is essential that the three races 
which, by reason of their geographical situation 
and their ethnographical characteristics are in- 
dispensable in any reconstitution of Central Eu- 
rope based on the principle of nationalities, and 
who consequently have a leading part to play in 
the centre of the Pan-Germany of to-day, should 
be, one and all, absolutely convinced that the vic- 
tory of the Entente will make certain their com- 
plete independence. The Poles have received 
this assurance on divers occasions, notably from. 
President Wilson, and very recently from M. 
Ribot, commemorating in a dispatch to the 
Polish Congress at Moscow 'the reconstitution 
of the independence and unity of all the Polish 
territories to the shores of the Baltic. * But the 
11,000,000 Jugo-Slavs and the 8,500,000 Czechs 
have not yet received from the leaders of the En- 
tente sufficiently explicit and repeated assurances. 

There are two reasons why this is so. In the 


first place, the absolutely chimerical hope of 
separating Austria-Hungary from Germany has 
obsessed, down to a very recent date, certain 
exalted personages of the Entente, who, having 
never had an opportunity to study on the spot 
the latest developments in Austria, still believe 
in the old classic formula, * If Austria did not ex- 
ist, we should have to create it. * In the second 
place, certain other personages of the Entente in- 
cline to the belief that, in order to obtain a swift 
victory, the problem of Central Europe is a prob- 
lem to be avoided. Now, as to this point, the few 
men who unquestionably know Austria well — 
for example, the Frenchmen Louis L6ger, Ernest 
Denis, M. Haumant, Auguste Gauvain, and 
others, and the Englishmen, Sir Arthur Evans, 
Seton-Watson, Wickham Steed, and others — 
are unanimous in being as completely convinced 
as I myself am that the breaking-up of the mon- 
archy of the Hapsburgs is indispensable to the es- 
tablishment of a lasting peace — and further- 
more, such a breaking-up as a result of the revolt 
of the oppressed peoples is one of the most power- 
ful instruments in the hands of the Entente to 
bring the war to a victorious close. 

In fact, there are certain quasi-mechanical 
laws which should guide in the reconstruction of 
a Europe that can endure. Now, without a free 
Bohemia and Jugo-Slavia it is impossible — im- 
possible, I insist — that Poland should be really 



free, that Serbia and Roumania should be re- 
stored, that Russia should be released from the 
grip of Germany, that Alsace-Lorraine should 
be restored permanently to France, that Italy 
should be protected from German domination in 
the Adriatic, in the Balkans, and in Turkey, that 
the United States should be warranted against 
the world-wide results of the Hamburg-Persian 
Gulf enterprise. Bohemia is the central point of 
the whole. With its circle of mountains, it is the 
indispensable keystone of the European edifice, 
rebuilt upon the basis of the principle of nation- 
alities. Whosoever is master of Bohemia is mas- 
ter of Europe. It must be, therefore, that liberty 
shall be master of Bohemia. 

On the other hand, it is undeniable that the 
successive uprisings of 8,500,000 Czechs and 
11,000,000 Jugo-Slavs, taking place concurrently 
with that of 22,000,000 Poles, is absolutely in line 
with the present military interests of the En- 
tente. Therefore, for the Allies to assume an at- 
titude of reserve toward the Czechs and Jugo- 
Slavs is as contrary to the democratic principles 
they invoke as to their most urgent strategic in- 
terests. But this mistake has been frequently 
made, solely because the exceptional importance 
of Bohemia has not yet been fully grasped. Mr. 
Asquith, in his speech of September 26 last, 
furnishes an example of this regrettable reserve 
with respect to the Czechs — a reserve which is 



diminishing, no doubt, but which still exists. He 
said : — 

' If we turn to Central and Eastern Europe, we 
see purely artificial territorial arrangements, 
which are repugnant to the wishes and interests of 
the populations directly concerned, and which, 
so long as they remain unchanged, will constitute 
a field fertile in new wars. There are, first, the 
claims of Roumania and Italy, so long overdue; 
there is heroic Serbia, which not only must be re- 
stored to her home, but which is entitled to more 
room in which to expand nationally ; and there is 
Poland. The position of Greece and the South 
Slavs must not be forgotten.' 

Thus, while Mr. Asquith manifests the best in- 
tentions toward the oppressed peoples of Central 
Europe, he does not even mention the Czechs, 
that is, Bohemia. Now, in reality, all the prom- 
ises that the Entente can make concerning Po- 
land, Serbia, Roumania, and Italy, are not cap- 
able of lasting fulfillment unless, Bohemia is set 
free, for Bohemia dominates all Central Europe. 
Furthermore, Mr. Asquith's silence as to the fate 
of Bohemia may be a legitimate cause of uneasi- 
ness to the Czechs, who are now doing the im- 
possible to contend with Germanism, despite the 
shocking terrorism which lies so heavy upon them. 
So we may say, that Mr. Asquith would have serv- 
ed the interest of the Entente more effectively if 
he had emphatically named Bohemia and the 



Czechs who are so much in need of being sup- 
ported and encouraged by the Allies, whom they 
regard as their liberators. 

The misconceptions that have led to the ignor- 
ing of the claims of the Central European Slavs, 
and of their extreme importance in the solution 
of the war-problem, will soon prove themselves 
an even heavier load to carry than those commit- 
ted in Bulgaria and Greece. To put an end to 
these vagaries, it is necessary that henceforth 
the leaders of the Entente should earnestly en- 
courage, at least the Poles, Czechs, and Jugo- 
slavs — that is to say, about 42,000,000 slaves of 
Berlin in Central Europe. The encouragement of 
these peoples as a single body is indispensable, for, 
although the Boches are able to control the local 
and, so to say, individual insurrectionary move- 
ments, on the contrary, because of the vast area 
which a general insurrection of the 42,000,000 
would involve, its repression by the Austro- 
Boches would be practically impossible. The ex- 
ample of a successful general uprising would cer- 
tainly induce a similar movement by the balance 
of the 88,000,000 human beings who are vitally 
interested in the destruction of Pan-Germany. 
To bring about this result, then, the first essential 
thing to be done is for the leaders of the Entente 
to put forth a most unequivocal declaration, giv- 
ing the Poles, Czechs, and Jugo-Slavs assurance 
that the victory of the Entente will make certain 


their complete liberation. It is impossible to see 
what there is to hinder such a declaration. Its 
effects would soon be discerned if it were enthusi- 
astically supported by the Allied press and by the 
Allied Socialists, who, let us hope, will finally 
realize that, while it is impossible to bring about 
a revolution against Prussian militarism in Ger- 
many, it can very easily be effected in Austria- 

But, some one will say, a revolution is not pos- 
sible without material resources. Naturally, I 
shall discuss this point only so far as the interests 
of the Entente will allow me to do it publicly. 
In the first place I will call attention to the fact 
that, by reason of the immensity of the territory 
they occupy, simple passive resistance on the 
part of the oppressed races of Central Europe, 
provided that it is offered in concert and accom- 
panied by certain essays in the way of sabotage 
and strikes, which are easy enough to practice 
without any outside assistance, would create al- 
most inextricable difficulties for the Austro-Ger- 

But there is something much better to be done. 
At first sight, it seems very difficult for the Allies 
to bear effective material aid to the oppressed peo- 
ples of Pan-Germany, because they are surround- 
ed by impregnable military lines. In fact, by com- 
bining the results of the tremendous development 
of the aviation branch made possible by the ad- 



hesion of the United States, with certain technical 
resources which are available, the Entente can, 
comparatively quickly and easily, supply the 
Poles and the rest with material assistance which 
would prove extraordinarily efficacious. 

I am not writing carelessly. I have studied for 
twenty years these down -trodden races and the 
countries in which they live. I know about the 
material resources to which I refer. If I do not 
describe them more explicitly, it is because no 
one has yet thought of employing them, and in 
such matters silence is a bounden duty. But I 
am, of course, at the disposition of the American 
authorities if they should wish to know about the 
resources in question, and to study them seriously. 
I am absolutely convinced that, if employed 
with due method, determinedly, and scientifically, 
in accordance with a special technique, these re- 
sources, after a comparatively simple prepara- 
tion, — much less in any event than those which 
have been made in other enterprises, — would 
lead to very important results which would contri- 
bute materially to the final decision.^ 

* To the editor, M . Cheradame has written with less reserve on 
this vital subject; but it seems best to put in print at this time no 
more than the suggestion indicated. — The Editor of the Atlantic 


Political Strategy 

Germany is, to all intent, mistress of Central 
Europe and the Balkans, of Turkey, and of 
Russia. As I write these lines (in December, 
191 7), the last part of the German scheme which 
I set forth in the June Atlantic^ is in preparation. 
All the disposable forces of Pan-Germany are 
concentrating on the Western front. If such a 
state of affairs is possible when the Entente has 
an abundance of admirable troops and boundless 
resources, it is because, as Mr. Lloyd George 
declared in his speech of November 12, with his 
wonted and most salutary frankness, after more 
than three years of war the Entente has no strate- 
gic plan. What is the cause of this unfortunate 
condition? That is what it is most important to 
ascertain first of all, for the Allies cannot think 
seriously of winning a decisive victory unless the 
problem of the strategy which is an indispensable 
necessity of their position is stated in such terms 
that it can readily be solved. But it has not 
yet been so stated. To be sure, Mr. Lloyd George 
dwelt upon the extreme gravity of the situation, 
but, despite the fact that he is certainly the most 

^ See Chapter v, supra. 



keen-sighted of the leaders of the Entente in 
Europe, he did not point out definitely the posi- 
tive remedies capable of putting an end to a state 
of affairs which is intolerable because it is infi- 
nitely dangerous. 

The reason for this absence of concrete sugges- 
tions on Mr. Lloyd George's part is that, notwith- 
standing his great natural intelligence, he too is 
subject to that profound failure of insight in re- 
spect to the conduct of the war which has befallen 
all the leading men of the Entente without excep- 
tion. This failure, which is wholly independent 
of their will, is due mainly to the fact that the 
present leaders of the Entente, having one and all 
been firmly convinced that the war would never 
take place, had not trained themselves intellec- 
tually to carry it on when it should break out. 

Moreover, for we must set things down as they 
are, the majority of these leaders of the Entente 
knew the political geography of Europe only in 
the most superficial way. As for the ethno- 
graphic detail which plays in this war a funda- 
mental part that is still far from being under- 
stood, they know absolutely nothing about it. It 
is the same with the practical political economy 
of Central Europe, of the Balkans, and of Tur- 
key, and with their national psychology. Now, 
these sciences — geography, ethnography, politi- 
cal economy, and national psychology — are abso- 
lutely indispensable to the wise conduct of the 



war; and they do not teach themselves. It is 
altogether impossible to become familiar with 
them without hard work, long continued. That 
is why, even assuming that all the guiding spirits 
of the Entente are endowed with innate genius, it 
is absolutely impossible for them, held fast as 
they are at every moment by the daily, always 
urgent, demands of a war which took them en- 
tirely by surprise and in which they had to impro- 
vise everything, to acquire during the conflict that 
intellectual preparation without which the war 
cannot be effectively carried on. 

Strictly speaking, it is possible, by spending 
enough money, to extemporize in two or three 
years a supply of war material, and armies in the 
shape of soldiers and regiments, whereas these 
same operations would require half a score of 
years in time of peace ; but all the gold on earth is 
powerless to implant swiftly in any man's brain, 
however well endowed he may be, the enormous 
mass of positive knowledge which alone will en- 
able him to evolve the guiding ideas which are 
indispensable for the conduct of a war so complex 
as this. Such knowledge and such ideas cannot 
spring to life spontaneously in a human brain; 
they cannot make their way into it, and arrange 
themselves there in the logical order of their rela- 
tive importance, except as the result of a mental 
training which demands, not only a native intelli- 
gence, but an enormous amount of time. 



To acquire these essentials William II and his 
collaborators, despite the vast resources at their 
disposal, had to work a full quarter of a century. 
Now, not one of the leaders of the Entente had 
received, even in the most rudimentary form, 
down to twenty-five days before the war, the spe- 
cial kind of intellectual training without which it is 
impossible to direct effectively the conduct of this 
war, which resembles no other war in history be- 
cause of the vast scope which the Germans have 
given to it and the endlessly varied methods 
which they are employing in carrying it on. 

These reasons, then, furnish a simple explana- 
tion of the fact that, although all the leaders of 
the Entente have at last agreed to form an Allied 
Staff, in order to unify the conduct of the war, no 
one of them is able to say how this staff should be 
constituted to meet the special necessities of the 
conflict. Doubtless they understand perfectly — 
as indeed the great mass of the public understands 
— that this is not simply a military war, but a 
political one as well. But this idea of the connec- 
tion between the war and politics is still extremely 
vague and confused. Consequently, then, it is 
essential, first of all, to give it a definite form. 





The first cause of the errors of the AlHes in their 
conduct of the war is their failure thus far to 
understand clearly its predominant characteristic. 
Some say, 'This is a war of effectives.' Now the 
Allies have had for three years an overwhelming 
superiority in effectives. They have had entire 
liberty in arming them and making use of them, 
and yet they are not victorious. 

Others of the Allies declare, 'This is a war of 
materiel.' Another mistaken idea. In the third 
year of the war the Allies, as a whole, certainly 
had more materiel at their disposition than their 
adversaries. Now if, in the second half of 191 7, 
the Russians have given way; if the Italians have 
allowed their Friuli front to be pierced, it is be- 
cause they elected not to avail themselves of the 
materiel on hand. In these instances, then, it is 
very clear that the moral factor far surpassed the 
material factor. 

Lastly, others of the Allies declare that ' This is a 
war of credit. When Germany is ruined, she will 
go to pieces all in a moment.* These men do not 
understand that, although Germany's external 
credit is beyond question sorely shaken by the 
stoppage of her exports, on the other hand, her 
internal credit is constantly augmented by the 
enormous profits which the war enables her to 



realize.^ Now this internal credit is based upon 
actualities so evident that it will permit the Berlin 
government to negotiate all the internal loans it 
may desire, to support the burden of the war as 
long as is necessary. If the character of the war 
is not yet understood, it is because it has been 
shaped in every detail by the Germans them- 
selves, who, having embarked upon it with a con- 
crete end in view, have long been studying the 
question by what endlessly diversified means they 
might attain that end. It is their employment of 
these means which gives to the war its wholly 
unique character. 

The Berlin government entered into this war 
in order to obtain by conquest the instruments of 
universal domination. As this was a far-reaching 
object, the Germans devoted themselves for a 
quarter of a century to studying all the military, 
naval, geographic, ethnographic, economic, and 
national-psychologic problems of the whole world, 
and especially of Europe. This preparation — 
profoundly scientific, we must admit — for the 
gigantic Pangermanist scheme, led the Germans 
to make a most thorough investigation, not only 
of everything relating to the army and navy, but 
also of four political sciences — geography, eth- 
nology, political economy, and national psychol- 
ogy. These four sciences are known, outside of 
Germany, only in the theoretical or rudimentary 

1 See Chapters i and ii, supra. 



stage; whereas the Germans have carried their 
study of them so far, that they derive from them 
immense practical powers which have a constant 
and far-reaching influence on the whole evolution 
of the war. 

The Allied leaders do not even suspect the 
extreme importance of these factors — for two 
reasons. In the first place, not one of them has 
made a sufficient study of the four political sci- 
ences in their application to Central and Eastern 
Europe to realize the extraordinary efficacy of the 
intensive use that the Germans are making of 
them. Secondly, while the powers derived from 
the political sciences are immense, and as real as 
the X-rays, like those rays they are invisible. 

The constant use of the political sciences, in 
enormous doses, made by the Germans in their 
conduct of the war, has this result : that the utili- 
zation of the military art alone, even when most 
highly perfected from a material standpoint, is 
absolutely insufficient to ensure victory to the 
Allies. It is because of their failure to under- 
stand this that, notwithstanding their boundless 
resources, they have condemned themselves to 
the most unremitting, the most cruel, the most 
heart-rending disappointments. As a matter of 
fact, this war not only is not solely a military 
and naval war — it is, in addition, a geographical 
war, an ethnographical war, an economic war, 
a war of national psychology. To define its 



endlessly complex character by a brief phrase 
which includes all these factors, we may say that 
it is a war of political sciences. 

A few examples derived from actual events 
will prove that this is not a matter of words alone, 
but that the utilization of the political sciences is 
an absolute necessity for the Allies. 

Down to the present time the swift invasion 
of Roumania — October-November, 191 6 — has 
been regarded as a triumph of the German heavy 
artillery. But, while the action of the heavy ar- 
tillery in forcing the Dobrudja and the passes of 
the Carpathians was the great physical fact, man- 
ifest to all, which determined the German victory, 
the effective use of the heavy guns was possible 
only because, long before the military movement 
was begun, the ground had been prepared for the 
invasion of Roumania, by the Staff at Berlin, with 
the aid of a practical application of the political 

Geographical preparation. In March, 191 6, it 
was known that a system of espionage had been 
organized in the Roumanian Dobrudja by Ger- 
mans who alleged archaeological explorations as a 
pretext for their travels. The very precise in- 
formation thus acquired by the Staff at Berlin 
was quite indispensable to it. In fact, the Rou- 
manian Dobrudja is a swampy region of a very 
peculiar nature, altogether impassable under or- 
dinary conditions by the immense and heavy 



materiel of modern armies. To move quickly 
through such a country, it was necessary to look 
ahead — to construct months beforehand, and 
have in readiness for use on the Bulgarian fron- 
tier, innumerable small bridges to be thrown 
across the streams, and enormous supplies of mov- 
able floors to be used in building, on the unstable 
soil, artificial roads practicable for motor caissons 
and the tractors of the heavy artillery. 

It was the turning to account of the minute de- 
tails of the geographical information in the hands 
of the Germans, operating long before the inva- 
sion, which enabled her Staff to realize precisely 
the nature and amount of the special materiel 
which it was necessary to manufacture and to get 
together long before the offensive, in order to 
ensure, when it should be launched, a rapid for- 
ward movement of the troops at the predeter- 
mined points. 

Ethnographical preparation. In the Dobrudja 
there were Bulgarians and Turks as well as Rou- 
manians. Side by side with the geographical 
study went the ethnographical research, which 
made it possible to arrange systematically for a 
general uprising of these Pro-German elements — 
a movement which was considerably facilitated 
by the rapidity of the German invasion. 

Economic preparation. Early in October, 191 6, 
before the movement was begun, a number of 
merchants, experts in cattle and cereals, and cer- 



tain specialists in political economy, assembled 
behind Falkenhayn's front, and were thus all 
ready to exploit Roumania after the invasion. 

Therefore the overthrow of Roumania by 
means of military operations, — advance of the 
Kaiser's troops and effective employment of 
heavy artillery, — which alone were regarded by 
Allied public opinion as having had a decisive 
effect, was long anticipated by the geographical, 
ethnographical, and economic preparation for the 
military invasion, which was simply a conse- 
quence of that preparation. In fact, when one is 
familiar with the swampy character of the Do- 
brudja, one can but be satisfied that, without 
careful forethought for the geographical obstacles 
and without preparing the means to overcome 
them, the rapid advance of Falkenhayn's heavy 
artillery — an inescapable condition of military 
success after the offensive was started — would 
have been impossible. On the other hand, it was 
due to the previously arranged scheme for the 
economic exploitation of the country that the 
German troops were able to obtain their supplies 
on Roumanian soil and thus to force the Russo- 
Roumanian troops back without loss of time. 
Now, this rapidity of movement was an essential 
condition of the military success. It is perfectly 
certain, therefore, in the case we are considering, 
that the military success of the Germans, which 
was apparent to all eyes, was achieved only by 



virtue of the previous employment of three ex- 
tremely powerful invisible forces, derived from 
the practical application of geography, ethnog- 
raphy, and political economy — redoubtable 
forces of which the Allies have as yet made no use 
in any of their operations. 

Utilization of national psychology. The recent 
occurrences in Russia and Italy will enable me 
to demonstrate the even more tremendous power 
of still another political science — national psy- 

The extraordinary disruption of Russia by 
Germany, which entails such threatening conse- 
quences for the whole world, was brought about, 
not by force of arms, but by means of a moral 
propaganda carried on by speech or in print. 
The reason that this manoeuvre has produced such 
tremendous results is that it was based upon 
exact data supplied by national psychology — a 
political science of which the Allies seem not even 
to suspect the existence. It was by favor of this 
science, no less subtle than powerful, founded on 
minute observations, that the Germans were able 
to exploit unerringly the extraordinary ignorance 
of actualities of the Russian Socialists, their im- 
measurable pride, and the artlessness, even the 
very genuine evangelical spirit, of the Russian 
people, which lead them naturally to forget 
affronts, and, lastly, the particularist tendencies 
of certain Russian nationalities, which the Boche 



propaganda has transformed into separatist 
movements to be immediately carried out. Thus 
the moral, and even the material, dissolution of 
the vast Russian ex-Empire of one hundred and 
eighty millions of people was made possible in a 
few months by the application of the science of 
national psychology. 

Now, although this force is invisible, it is un- 
questionably far greater than the most stupen- 
dous military force imaginable, since its knowledge 
of the national psychology of the mixed peoples 
of Russia enabled the Berlin government to ob- 
tain a result which could never have been ob- 
tained by millions of German troops using the 
most highly perfected weapons and the most ter- 
rifying explosives of the present day in greatest 

Again, it was this same gigantic force, national 
psychology, which enabled the Boches to manu- 
facture systematically the 'defeatist* frame of 
mind, by virtue of which they were able to break 
through the Italian front at Friuli, which they 
would probably never have succeeded in doing if 
they had had to carry by sheer assault the exceed- 
ingly strong mountain positions held by the 





The utilization of these invisible forces by 
the Germans has varied in accordance with the 
changing phases of the war. 

One can distinguish three very clearly marked 
phases in their conduct of the war. By studying 
them, we can appreciate how the Grand General 
Staff at Berlin has unvaryingly pursued the same 
end — the fulfillment of the Pangermanist plan of 
1 895-1 91 1 — with the assistance of widely dif- 
ferent methods, which, taken as a whole, consti- 
tute the 'strategy of political sciences,' which 
necessarily coordinates with the * war of political 

First phase — from August i , to the early days 
of October, 19 14; about two months. 

The Staff at Berlin plunged into war confident 
of a speedy triumph by means of a whirlwind 
campaign in two acts : first, utter defeat of France 
in five or six weeks, following an initial blow of 
formidable and unparalleled intensity; second, a 
powerful blow against Russia, which would cer- 
tainly be incapable of resisting single-handed the 
German armies which had just triumphed over 

If this scheme could have been carried out, 
Germany, after a contest of about three months, 


would have been mistress of the whole of Europe. 
In that case no Balkan campaign would have 
been necessary. Serbia and Roumania would 
have had no other choice than to submit on the 
most severe conditions. As for Austria-Hungary, 
Bulgaria, and Turkey, by the force of events they 
would have fallen under the absolute hegemony 
of Berlin. As a result of this new state of affairs 
Pan-Germany would have been constituted with- 
out visible effort, — automatically as it were, — 
thus assuring Prussianism of the domination of 
the rest of the world. 

But the calculations of the German Grand 
General Staff were upset by events not only un- 
foreseen but coincident : the invasion of East Prus- 
sia by the Russians, the resistance of Belgium, 
the intervention of Great Britain, the much 
greater consumption of munitions than had been 
anticipated, and, finally, by the victory of the 
Marne, which was in large measure the conse- 
quence of all these facts. During this first phase, 
marked throughout by violence carried to the 
point of frenzy, the German strategy was purely 
military — the strategy of political sciences had 
not yet appeared. 

Second phase — from October, 19 14, to Decem- 
ber, 191 7; about thirty-eight months. 

At the beginning of October, 19 14, William 
IPs Grand Staff found itself constrained to aban- 
don the idea of carrying through the Pangerman- 


ist scheme by means of the whirlwind campaign 
which it had prepared. It was obHged therefore 
to plan to attain its object by means of a long war. 
It resigned itself the more readily to this necessity 
because it knew that it was infinitely better sup- 
plied than the Allies with material to bring about 
the essential moral and physical conditions — 
various and complicated as they are — of a long- 
drawn struggle. 

Furthermore, on the morrow of the battle of 
the Marne, the Stafif had been in a position to 
appreciate the extraordinary defensive power of 
strongly fortified continuous points, consisting of 
deep trenches protected by barbed-wire entangle- 
ments; a defensive system the technique of 
which it had studied exhaustively since the 
Russo-Japanese War (i 904-1 905), whereas it 
was wholly unknown to the French and British. 
For these reasons, from the battle of the Marne 
(October, 19 14) down to the end of the first phase 
of the offensive against Italy, that is, to Decem- 
ber, 191 7, a period of thirty-eight months, the 
whole tactics of Berlin has been directed to the 
object of carrying out a programme composed of 
the following elements : — 

1. To organize an immovable defensive on the 
Western front, while pretending now and then to 
attempt a genuine attack. 

2. To carry out without pause a series of circu- 
lar offensives against Russia, Serbia, and Rou- 



mania, in order to seize one after another the ter- 
ritories of those states, which are essential to the 
constitution of Central Pan-Germany according 
to the plan of 1895. 

3. To take advantage of these successive offen- 
sives on the Eastern fronts in order to strike at the 
very vitals of Germany's allies, properly so-called : 
that is to say, under color of helping Austria-Hun- 
gary, Bulgaria, and Turkey to defend themselves 
against Russia, Serbia, and Roumania, to organize 
those three countries militarily and economically 
to the precise degree and in the precise form nec- 
essary to bring it about that even, at need, with- 
out changing their ancient names and the frontiers 
of 1 9 14, they should contribute to practical pur- 
pose, and almost without suspecting it, to the 
constitution of Central Pan-Germany. The plan 
of 1895 assigned to Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, 
and Turkey an essential and indispensable part 
to play in its execution. 

Let us, first of all, prove, with the aid of a docu- 
ment of unquestionable authenticity twenty-two 
years old, that this was actually the plan of the 
Berlin Staff. 

The Pangermanist plan of 1895, which is that 
of Central Pan-Germany, the formation of which 
is the first condition of carrying out all the other 
Pangermanist plans, is set forth in detail in a 
pamphlet published at Berlin in 1895, with a 
colored map, under the title, Greater Germany and 


Central Europe about IQ50. The extraordinary 
importance of this pamphlet is no longer open to 
question, for these three reasons. First: from 
1895 on it was spread broadcast among the Ger- 
man masses by the Pangermanist League {All- 
deutsche Verband), whose action after that time 
in making war inevitable was as deplorable as it 
was persistent and notorious. Second: every- 
thing points to the probability that this action of 
the Pangermanist League toward executing a 
concrete scheme of annexations was secretly but 
very definitely agreed upon with the Berlin 
Grand Staff. Third: the force of this assump- 
tion is peremptorily proved by the fact that the 
German Grand Staff , from the beginning of the 
second phase of the war, has carried it on in a way 
exactly in accord with the political Pangermanist 
plan set forth in the pamphlet of 18 Q^. 

In very truth, after an interval of a score of 
years, coincidences so perfect as these between 
plans and their execution assuredly cannot be 
fortuitous. The verification of what I say is sup- 
plied by the map printed on page 146, a repro- 
duction of the map of the pamphlet of 1895, on 
which I have had the colors represented by lines 
and have shown the German front as it was at 
the end of 191 7. Now, it will be noticed that the 
German armies have stopped a little beyond the 
lines marking the future frontiers of Central Pan- 
Germany, or in the positions that are necessary 


Map Printed in ' Greater Germany and Central Europe 
ABOUT 1950* (1895) 


to make sure the creation of the satellite states of 
Pan-Germany to the eastward. Thus, on the 
Eastern front, they have stopped on lines laid 
down beforehand, even when they had before 
them no Russian troops capable of opposing their 
further advance. Our map also enables us to 
declare on the most irrefutable testimony that the 
offensive against Italy — that is to say, first of 
all, the seizure of Italian Friuli, which was such a 
surprise to the Allied Staffs — was provided for 
most definitely in the plan of 1895. In fact, on 
our map Italian Friuli is plainly included in Pan- 
Germany, and in the text of the pamphlet, pub- 
lished in Berlin twenty-two years ago, is a passage 
on the rectification of frontiers between Italy and 
Austria which the Pangermanists had already 
determined to be indispensable. On page 19 we 
read as follows : — 

'The frontier between Italy and Austria will 
start at Marmolata, and will run by Monte Cris- 
tallo, Monte Croce, and Paralba to the water- 
shed between the Piave and the Tagliamento. It 
will continue by Monte Cridola, Monte Premag- 
giore, Monte Valcolda, and Spilimberga, and will 
follow the line of the lower Tagliamento to the sea.* 

Now, on November 22, Italian aviators re- 
corded the fact, confirmed by German officer- 
prisoners, that extensive fortifications had been 
constructed by the Austro-Germans to form a 
Hindenburg line 'on the line of the Tagliamento,' 



that is to say, precisely on the frontier line laid 
down in 1895. 

Lastly, the Austro-Boche schemes of annexa- 
tion in this region have been plainly asserted. In 
the orders of the day to his troops on November 
4, the Emperor of Austria described the invasion 
of Italian Friuli as the * liberation of my territory 
on the Adriatic littoral,' a phrase which suggests 
explicitly both the idea of premeditation and the 
idea of conquest. 

Let us remark in passing that, as in the matter 
of Poland and indeed in all others, the Emperor 
of Austria cooperates docilely in the execution of 
the Pangermanist ideas of Berlin. Certain per- 
sons of the Entente believe that the government 
of Vienna is subjugated by Berlin, whose tyran- 
nous yoke it would be glad to shake off. Nothing 
of the sort is true. Even though the hegemony 
of Berlin may be offensive to Austrian self-esteem, 
the leaders in Vienna and Budapest submit to it 
readily enough for this simple reason : the dynasty 
of the Hapsburgs is quite well aware that its 
fate is bound up with that of the Prussian autoc- 
rac3^ and that it can save itself only by saving 
the HohenzoUerns, that is to say, by strengthen- 
ing the enormous extension of Prussian milita- 
rism. If this point of view had been grasped at 
the outset by the Entente, blunders resulting in 
endless evil consequences could never have been 



Our pamphlet and map prove, therefore, that in 
the second phase of the war the German Staff 
subordinated everything to the determination to 
create Central Pan-Germany first of all. This 
determination is easily explained when one is 
familiar with the Pangermanist ideas and the 
conditions of their fulfillment. Brought abruptly 
face to face, after the battle of the Marne, with a 
redoubtable coalition which it had not foreseen, 
and which threatened to take in the whole world, 
the German Staff realized perfectly that the 
military forces alone of Germany and Austria- 
Hungary, in view of the ineradicable hostility 
of the Slavs and Latins who form the majority of 
the population of the Empire of the Hapsburgs, 
and because of the insufficient food-supply of the 
Central Empires, could not resist the combined 
forces of Russia, France, and Great Britain. On 
the other hand, the exhaustive investigations pur- 
sued for more than twenty years in preparation 
for putting into effect the Pangermanist plan, had 
shown the German staff that a Central Pan-Ger- 
many actually constituted, comprising, in addi- 
tion to the Central Empires, the Balkans and 
Turkey, would contain all the military and econ- 
omic elements necessary to confront a formidable 

Indeed, it was because it had been established 
before the war that Central Pan-Germany would 
supply Germany with the means of universal 


domination, that the war was begun. Under 
these conditions, then, it was absolutely logical 
that the German Staff, before seeking to obtain 
a final decision in the West, should determine 
to create a Central Pan-Germany, either at the 
expense of Russia, Serbia, and Roumania, or, by 
dissembling its purpose, at the expense of Berlin's 
own allies, who, by the very fact of this creation 
of Pan-Germany would automatically become 
more and more completely the vassals of Ger- 

It is not true, therefore, as people still persist in 
saying among the Allies, because of their extraor- 
dinary and obstinate ignorance of the Panger- 
manist plan, that the Germans, for three years 
past, have by their circular offensives simply been 
seizing territorial pledges ; no — during the second 
phase of the war the Germans have taken posses- 
sion of the various fragments of territory essential 
to the formation of Central Pan-Germany, not 
regarding them as pledges, but as acquisitions 
long anticipated, or as destined to remain forever 
in subjection to the will of Berlin. 

Of course, to refute my interpretation of events, 
any one can say, *But Verdun proves that the 
Germans wished to break through on the Western 
front early in 191 6.' This objection has only an 
apparent or very imperfect force. In reality, the 
German offensive against Verdun was of a two- 
fold character which is not yet understood by the 



Allies, Still because of their ignorance of the Pan- 
germanist plan. In the conception of the German 
staff the Verdun operation had, not one, but two 
objectives — a maximum and a minimum. If 
the maximum objective could have been secured, 
that is to say, if the morale of the French poilus 
could have been destroyed by the length and the 
savagery of the German offensive ; if the Germans 
had succeeded in breaking through and taking 
Paris, France, struck to the heart, would unques- 
tionably have been put out of the war. Verdun, 
therefore, may and should be regarded as an at- 
tempt to break through and to resume the war- 
fare of movement. 

But what must be clearly understood is that, 
even if they had been certain at the outset that 
this maximum result was absolutely impossible of 
attainment, still the Germans would have under- 
taken the Verdun operation; for to them it had 
its full justification in view of the extreme im- 
portance of the minimum objective which it had 
in the conception of the Staff — an objective 
which, as we shall see, was in conformity with the 
general decision at Berlin to constitute Central 
Pan -Germany first of all, before really thinking of 
annihilating France by a genuine offensive. 

This demonstration brings me to the setting 
forth of a number of points of view which have 
never, to my knowledge, been suggested. 

Not until the early days of 191 6 did Germany, 



as a sequel of the recent seizure of Serbia, come 
into direct geographical contact with Bulgaria 
and Turkey. Berlin was still a long way from 
having organized the various resources of those 
two countries — resources which were indispen- 
sable to her to enable her to continue the war. 

Now, at that very time, certain persons in 
France were making persistent efforts to have the 
French and British supply the expeditionary 
force at Saloniki with the powerful means of ac- 
tion which it ought to have. These efforts were 
on the point of success, for a very large body of 
public opinion had become convinced of the con- 
siderable importance of the Balkan theatre. If 
therefore the Eastern army of the Allies had 
received quickly the powerful reinforcements 
which the leaders in Paris and London did not 
give it, as the Bulgarians had not as yet the neces- 
sary materiel for fortifying themselves strongly, 
it is exceedingly probable that the Allies would 
have been able to recover the Danube front — 
that is, the strategic position which is the key of 
the whole war; for its possession alone, by putting 
into effect automatically the land blockade of 
Austria-Germany, and depriving her of the men 
and supplies without which she could not go on 
fighting, would have assured the Entente a com- 
plete victory, with efforts tenfold less vigorous 
than those which have been compulsorily decided 
upon, with the result that we know. 



The German Staff, realizing fully that the 
lengthening of the war would be of advantage 
only to that one of the two groups of belligerents 
which should be in possession of the Danube 
front, spied an immense peril in the campaign car- 
ried on in France in favor of Saloniki. It deter- 
mined therefore, at any cost, to prevent the Allies 
from ascribing to their actions in the Balkans the 
importance which would have made it possible to 
bring to naught all the Pangermanist plans. To 
divert the attention of the Allies from Saloniki- 
Belgrade, a violent and persistent offensive against 
Verdun was the best expedient that could be 
imagined, given the fact that the Pangermanist 
scheme was at that time wholly unknown to the 
Allied leaders. 

In fact, the Verdun operation, by threatening 
the very heart of France, presented from the 
German standpoint this enormous psychological 
advantage, that it apparently justified those of 
the French and British leaders who at that time 
regarded the Saloniki expedition with the oppo- 
site of sympathy. Indeed , early in 1 9 1 6 they were 
still claiming that the Balkans could not have any 
decisive influence on the result of the war, since 
they were sure, as they declared, that they could 
break through the Western front — which they 
called the most important one — whenever and 
wherever they chose. 

Under these conditions it is easy to see why a 



part of the press also — and hence of public opin- 
ion — was hostile to the Saloniki expedition, in 
France, but especially in England. This being 
so, a vigorous offensive against Verdun could not 
fail to strengthen these currents running counter 
to the Balkan expedition by seeming to justify the 
opposition that had been offered to it. Thus the 
minimum — but exceedingly important — objec- 
tive of the Verdun operation consisted in prevent- 
ing the Allies from shifting the chief theatre of the 
war to the Balkans in the beginning of 191 6. 
This minimum objective was completely attained. 

Unquestionably the Verdun operation was ex- 
pensive to the Kaiser's troops; but in reality these 
enormous sacrifices had their justification, since 
they resulted in enabling Berlin to complete the 
formation of Central Pan-Germany, which alone 
could furnish the means of contending against the 
world-wide coalition. It cannot be denied that 
Verdun, by reason of the Allies* ignorance of the 
Pangermanist plan, caused them to throw away 
their last chance of sending sufficient reinforce- 
ments to the Balkan front before the Austro-Ger- 
mans and Bulgars had the necessary time and 
materiel to make it, humanly speaking, about as 
hard to break through as the Western front. 

Third phase — from December, 191 7, to . 

As Central Pan-Germany has become an accom- 
plished fact in thirty-eight months, and as its mil- 
itary and political forces have been sufficiently 



developed, the combined consequences of the 
length of the war and of the existence of Central 
Pan-Germany, have manifested themselves in 
accordance with the anticipations of the German 
Staff. As Russia, under the government of the 
Tsar, was not put in a condition to sustain a long 
struggle either morally or materially, and as she 
was, later, completely disorganized by the Max- 
imalist traitors and maniacs, she has gone under. 
As a result, Roumania has been reduced to im- 
potence. Thus, at this moment, only the Allied 
army at Saloniki continues to embarrass the Ger- 
man Staff. But that army not having been rein- 
forced sufficiently to form as dangerous a menace 
as was essential, the Staff has already, in effect, a 
sufficiently free hand in the East to enter upon the 
third and last phase of the war, that is to say, to 
concentrate on the Western front the whole of the 
disposable forces of Pan-Germany, — Germans, 
Austro-Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Turks, — in 
order to make another trial of the war of move- 
ment likely to bring about the final decision. 

At this moment the concentration is proceeding 
with all possible speed. But we must thoroughly 
grasp the fact that in the German scheme the gen- 
eral offensive in the West is regarded as a very 
complex operation, necessitating recourse to the 
strategy of the political sciences, and hence of 
national psychology, which lies at the root of all 
the German pacifist manoeuvres. 




In reality Germany has succeeded in creating 
Central Pan-Germany only with the aid, since the 
beginning of the second phase of the war, of her 
six main pacifist manoeuvres : a separate peace be- 
tween Berlin and one of the Entente Allies; a 
separate peace between Turkey, Bulgaria, and 
Austria-Hungary and the Entente ; the democrat- 
ization of Germany; peace through the Interna- 
tional ; the armistice trick; and the drawn game of 
the deceptive formula, 'peace without annexa- 
tions or indemnities.' 

These six manoeuvres, which have served in 
some sort as a screen for the never-ending military 
achievements of the German armies, had as their 
chief object the exploitation to the utmost extent 
of the intellectual lacunae of which the Germans 
had detected the existence among the Allies — 
that is to say . — 

I . The incredible yet indubitable ignorance on 
their part of the Pangermanist plan. Even at 
the present moment this ignorance is still so great 
that some of the leaders and some even of the 
great newspapers of the Entente are wondering 
what Germany's real war-aims can be, although 



they have been laid bare for twenty- two years in 
numberless German publications, and the whole 
German people knows them, and the geographical 
boundaries of Pan-Germany correspond exactly 
to those indicated in the basic plan of 1895, as our 
map shows. It is this undeniable ignorance on 
the part of the Allies which has enabled the Ger- 
mans constantly to spread the belief that they 
were going to stop; whereas in reality they have 
planned and executed without a pause the series 
of offensives destined to constitute Central Pan- 

2. The credulity of the Allied diplomacy, which 
ever since the outbreak of war has allowed itself 
to be deluded into incessant negotiations, official 
or semi-official, with the Turks, the Bulgars, and 
the government of Vienna. This credulity con- 
tributed largely to the loss by the Allies of the 
Danube front, the key to the war. 

3. The credulity of the Allied Socialists, which 
is as extraordinary as that of the diplomatists. 
The Socialists have been hoodwinked by means 
of the Stockholm manoeuvre, which has had the 
following disastrous results: the accession to 
power of Lenine; anarchy in Russia; the capture 
of Riga ; the conquest of the Baltic ; the fact that 
many Allied Socialists have declared their adher- 
ence to the Boche formula of ' no annexations or 
indemnities,* without a suspicion that its applica- 
tion would assure the overwhelming triumph of 



Prussian militarism and the autocracy ; the pierc- 
ing of the Italian front through the 'defeatist* 
campaign; and, finally, the armistice with Russia 
and Roumania, which puts them at Germany's 
discretion while leaving her at liberty to devote 
all the effectives at her disposal to the final offen- 
sive in the West. 

This last manoeuvre was sure to be attended by 
a lot of others, of which the chief are easily de- 
tected already. Portugal is to be detached from 
the Entente. The recent pronunciamento, issued 
at Lisbon early in December, 191 7, has begun the 
process. Switzerland, deeply undermined by the 
German propaganda, as was proved by the dis- 
turbances at Zurich in November last, is to be 
violated. If the passage of troops through Swit- 
zerland should become possible, the Germans 
would seize Marseilles and Toulon. France 
would then be cut off from the Mediterranean, 
and the situation for which the Boche propaganda 
has long been laying wires in Spain, would then 
produce all the results foreseen. The scheme is to 
align Spain against the Entente through the me- 
dium of the junta of pro-German officers who are 
to create a military dictatorship, receiving its 
orders from Berlin and managed by Prince von 
Ratibor, German Ambassador at Madrid. 

To sum up — the * idealistic' offensive of Pan- 
Germany against all of Western Europe which is 
still outside the rays of the light that shines from 



Berlin, as it is projected by the Staff of William 
II, is to be executed finally by means of a land 
attack, on a line which will form a complete 
envelopment on the day when the intrigues of 
Berlin have reached their fruition in Switzerland 
and Spain. Furthermore, it is probable that the 
attack on the Western front will be made up of 
several simultaneous Verduns, in order to involve 
the Franco-British troops, admirable in their gal- 
lantry and courage, but manifestly fatigued by 
three years and a half of atrocious warfare, in a 
momentary weakness which will make possible 
the piercing of the wall behind which the freedom 
of the world is still sheltered. 

It is clear, moreover, that the general offensive 
of the Pan-German forces against the Western 
front must, in order to be successful, take place 
before American troops, having gone through 
the training that is indispensable to make them 
into effective fighting men, have arrived in suffi- 
cient numbers to reinforce that front. 

Let us glance now at the other side. If the Ger- 
man offensive now in preparation on the West 
presents a very serious and undeniable danger, we 
must consider as well that it will have to reckon 
with many contingencies. The disposable forces 
of Pan-Germany which can be concentrated on 
the Western front are tired out, whereas the Allied 
troops on that front are infinitely more numerous, 
better equipped and disciplined than they were 



at the time of the attack on Verdun. It is ex- 
tremely probable, therefore, that the Verdun 
achievement will be repeated on a gigantic scale, 
thus postponing the definitive decision and giving 
the Allies another chance to conquer Pan-Ger- 
many if they decide to make use at last of the 
long unemployed forces existing in Pan-Germany 
itself which I have described in a previous paper. 

The grave nature of these contingencies is well 
understood at Berlin. That is why the prepara- 
tion for the general offensive against the Western 
front is sure to be attended by the same pacifist 
manoeuvres which, by bringing about anarchy in 
the Russian front and rear, have enabled the Ger- 
man Staff to avoid an expensive military move- 
ment which the moral downfall of Russia has 
made unnecessary, while leaving the Germans to 
become de facto masters of the former Empire of 
the Tsars by virtue of the monstrous Maximalist 

It is plain, in truth, that if — let us pose this 
hypothesis in order to make our argument plausi- 
ble — a decided moral backsliding should mani- 
fest itself among the Allies in the West, the general 
military offensive against them of the forces of 
Pan-Germany, involving such great losses and so 
many contingencies, would cease to have any 
purpose; for fallacious negotiations on the basis 
of a so-called peace by agreement, of which the 
negotiations of the Boches with the Maximalists 
1 60 


give a very succinct idea, would suffice to assure 
Germany of a complete victory, avoiding the 
necessity of its making itself manifest by a bril- 
liant military operation as a tangible sign. 

For this reason. The war-expenditures of 
France and Great Britain are so formidable that, 
unless the conflict ends with the utter defeat of 
Germany, making possible a progressive repara- 
tion for the incredible damage caused by her, a 
few months of the Boche peace — the * peace by 
agreement* — would suffice, if our hypothesis 
should prove true, to cause the French and Eng- 
lish bank-notes to lose their value, and there would 
ensue in France and Great Britain a financial, 
economic, and moral disaster of such gigantic pro- 
portions that those two countries could no longer 
offer the slightest resistance to the constantly aug- 
mented economic and military resources of trium- 
phant Pan-Germany. At that moment the Ger- 
mans, without the slightest risk, could overrun 
France as far as Bayonne. And on the day when 
affairs reached this pass, the Germans would meet 
with no serious obstacle to their projected inva- 
sion of the British Isles. 

The analysis we have made of the German 
methods of warfare proves that the strategy of the 
Grand Staff at Berlin, infinitely more complex 
than the purely military variety, is a strategy of 
the political sciences. 



This is a result of the fact that the creation of 
the complex Pangermanist scheme has brought 
the Germans to realize that the solution of every 
great problem susceptible of statement demands 
for its performance an accurate acquaintance 
with, and, generally speaking, the employment of 
six well-defined factors: a military factor; a naval 
factor (in fact, a problem that seems to affect only 
the centre of Europe always reacts to some extent 
on the general naval situation) ; a geographical fac- 
tor; an ethnological factor; an economic factor; 
and a national-psychologic factor. 

It results from this that a military operation to 
be executed on land, on the sea, or in the air, as 
soon as it proves to have any relation whatsoever 
to the general conduct of the war, is not decided 
upon at Berlin until the following points have 
been determined by means of a documentation 
always kept in sight. 

1. The military or naval, geographical, ethno- 
graphical, economic, and national-psychologic 
conditions of the execution of the operation pro- 

2. If the operation should be successful, what 
would be its military, naval, geographical, eth- 
nological, economic, and national-psychologic 
reactions on the general situation? 

The result of these considerations is that the 
solution of every problem presented by the gen- 
eral conduct of the war requires the solution of an 


equation with six unknown quantities, not one of 
which is negligible. 

To place in relief the extreme importance of 
this last aspect of the matter, I will take as an 
example the unknown ethnographic quantity. 
The determination of this quantity is so indispen- 
sable to the proper conduct of the world-war, that 
the German Grand Staff, although already pos- 
sessed of a documentation of exceptional value on 
the ethnographic questions, carefully got together 
in peace-time, does not, nevertheless, deem itself 
justified in neglecting other sources of informa- 
tion. That is why it has mobilized in its service 
all Germans who are specially familiar with for- 
eign countries, particularly those who are experts 
as to the various nationalities of Austria-Hungary, 
the Balkans, and Russia. Thus no major opera- 
tion which may have an effect on foreign peoples 
is decided upon at Berlin until the opinion of 
these specialists has been most seriously consid- 

It was by virtue of this information, — of a 
purely psychological and intellectual order, — 
that the Germans were able to obtain in the East, 
and especially in Russia, the successes of which 
we are all aware, although the normal condition of 
affairs was exceedingly unfavorable to them, and 
would have remained so, had the Allies known 
enough to make the very slight effort which would 
have sufficed to effect that result. 



To summarize, then — it is in the strategy of 
scientific politics — that is to say, in the intellec- 
tual management of the war in every domain — 
that the whole secret of the German victories re- 
sides. In like manner, it is the ignorance on the 
part of the Allies of this kind of strategy which 
explains their successive set-backs and their con- 
stant disappointments despite the superabund- 
ance of their material resources. Now, this ig- 
norance is so undeniable that, after three years 
and a half of war, it is impossible to point to a 
single operation of theirs, of which the geographi- 
cal, ethnological, economic, and national-psy- 
chologic conditions of its execution have been 
first seriously studied. They have not even 
thought of such a thing; and at the present mo- 
ment their leaders have no organization intellec- 
tually equipped to solve a complete strategic 

But such an organization is absolutely essential 
to winning a victory. All the elements exist for 
creating it whenever they choose, in such wise 
that it will give practical results with comparative 



I HOPE that I have shown in my last chapter 
what the real, deep-seated reason is of the suc- 
cesses that the Germans have achieved over the 
Allies. We have seen that, while the Germans 
are past masters in burglary and murder, and, in 
committing these thefts and other crimes, employ 
the most highly perfected material resources, the 
most thorough study of chemistry, and the most 
ingenious mechanical inventions, they are equally 
far advanced in the purely intellectual domain, 
which enables them to derive from the four fun- 
damental political sciences — geography, eth- 
nography, political economy, and national psy- 
chology — important practical results. Now, 
the Allies, having even at this moment no com- 
prehension of the extraordinary potency of these 
invisible forces, are making no use of them. The 
result is that they are still in considerably less 
advantageous condition to contend with the 
Boches, notwithstanding their vast resources. 

Our deductions have led us also to define the 
* strategy of the political sciences' and the in- 
tegral strategic equation which makes its appli- 
cation possible. This equation contains six un- 



known quantities: military, naval, geographical, 
ethnographical, politico-economic, and national- 
psychologic. The facts established by three and 
a half years of war prove that it is absolutely in- 
dispensable to find these six unknown quantities 
before undertaking any operation capable of 
exerting an appreciable influence on the general 
development of the war. Indeed, the amazing 
and perilous present state of affairs is susceptible 
of this explanation, which summarizes all others : 
the general operations of the Staff at Berlin have 
been planned and carried out in accordance with 
the strategy of the political sciences. On the 
other hand, the operations of the Entente have 
been conducted in such utter ignorance of this 
strategy, that none of them could reasonably be 
expected to succeed. 

It is of supreme importance for Americans to 
understand quite clearly the fundamental cause 
of the strategic errors of the Entente. Indeed, 
such a clear understanding is the only means 
by which the United States can avoid sacrifices 
in men and money infinitely greater than are 
necessary, as the European Allies of three and a 
half years must agree. I shall, therefore, treat 
this part of my subject by appealing to the un- 
mitigated truth, without the slightest regard for 
other considerations. 





I propose to show that, as a matter of fact, all 
the strategic errors of the Entente are derived 
from this: that the Western front has been re- 
garded as the most important front. The first 
source of this idea is the incredible but undoubted 
ignorance of the Pangermanist scheme on the 
part of the leaders of the Entente. This ignorance 
is a phenomenon which I set down, but which I 
cannot explain. The Pangermanist scheme dates 
from 1895. Since then it has been elaborated in 
Germany in thousand of lectures. Innumerable 
pamphlets, spread broadcast, have made this 
scheme familiar to an immense majority of the 
sixty millions of Germans. Moreover, it was for 
the reason that this scheme was carefully devised 
a long while beforehand that the Germans became 
earnestly desirous of its execution, and, generally 
speaking, went cheerfully forth to war, believing, 
doubtless, that it would be short, but. firmly con- 
vinced that it would bring them enormous booty 
— a bait which has always set the Germans in 
motion from the beginnings of history. 

Now, despite the extraordinary publicity of 
the Pangermanist scheme throughout Germany 
for twenty-two years, the guiding spirits of the 
Entente did not believe in its existence during the 


first two years of the war. I agree that this state- 
ment seems incredible, but I receive constantly 
so many new proofs of its truth that to doubt it 
is impossible. 

This ignorance of the Pangermanist scheme on 
the part of the Allies has had this result ; that they 
have failed to realize that Germany made war, 
before all else, to make the Hamburg- Persian 
Gulf plan a reality, and that that achievement, 
by reason of its inevitable consequences, would 
suffice to assure Germany of the dominion of the 
world. It is this failure to grasp the real war-aim 
pursued by Germany, which explains why the 
supreme importance of the Danube front — which 
was the key of the war, which the Allies had in 
their possession, and which it was relatively easy 
for them to retain — did not receive serious at- 
tention while it was time. At the opening of 
hostilities, and even for a very long time there- 
after, the leaders of the Allies were convinced 
that Germany was fighting to rid herself of France, 
and especially of England. France and England 
therefore undertook simply to fight Germany and 
Austria-Hungary, very little importance being 
attributed to the action of the latter. Practically 
then the war was regarded, at Paris and London, 
as a sort of prize-fight, in which one of the two 
chief adversaries — either the French and British 
on the one hand or Germany and Austria on the 
other — would fall in the ring. 



This quasi-' sportive ' idea of the war was par- 
ticularly prevalent among the British. Having 
in reality no military traditions, they regarded 
the conflict as a gigantic boxing-match, in which 
the best * slugger ' would necessarily be the victor. 
So it came about that to the British the war was, 
and perhaps still is, solely a matter of endurance. 
On the other hand, once the war was begun by 
Germany, the question of Alsace-Lorraine inevit- 
ably came to the front for the French. Now, 
Alsace-Lorraine was close at hand. Must she 
not be set free first of all? 

For these diverse reasons, the French and Brit- 
ish were inclined to argue that the chief theatre 
of operations was necessarily where the chief 
adversaries were, and, at the same time, to all ap- 
pearance, their principal and mutual interests — 
that is to say, in the West. This conviction once 
formed, this consequence was deduced from it in 
London and Paris, namely, that the Balkans and 
Turkey could have no serious effect on the result 
of the war; that it was not only useless, therefore, 
but positively dangerous, to send a considerable 
force to the East, because the principal front — 
that in the West, where everything was destined 
to be decided — would thus be deprived of the 
benefit of armies which the Entente, taken by 
surprise by the war, had been obliged to raise and 
equip in haste, and therefore had no right to send 
them a long way from home. 



This extraordinarily limited conception of the 
vast conflict inaugurated by Germany also pre- 
vented the realization of this fact: if it be true 
that the Western front is the principal one from 
the standpoint of the Germans, because there 
alone can they win a decisive victory over France 
and England, on the other hand, the Germans 
could not undertake to bring about such a defini- 
tive decision in the West until the day, the mo- 
ment indeed, at which we have now arrived, 
when the Allies have committed the error of con- 
centrating all their forces in the West. 

Furthermore, we must reflect that the Western 
front could not be the principal one for the Allies 
— the one, that is to say, on which to bring about 
a final decision. For, ever since the day when 
it was demonstrated that fortified fronts which 
could be very rapidly increased in depth by means 
of trenches, deep shelters, and barbed-wire en- 
tanglements could not be quickly pierced, — a 
demonstration which was almost conclusive in 
October, 19 14, — it has been contrary to common 
sense for the Allies to hope that they could obtain 
on the Western front a victory so overwhelming 
as to compel Germany to abandon the Hamburg- 
Persian Gulf idea. But this controlling point of 
view was unheeded — a perfectly natural con- 
sequence of the Allied ignorance of the Panger- 
manist scheme. 





However that may be, the theory that the 
Western front is all-important has been repeatedly 
laid down by Colonel Repington, lately the 
military critic of the London Times 

Finding myself compelled, in order to make 
more clear my indispensable demonstration, to 
show how far Colonel Repington has gone astray, 
and what infinite harm his errors have done to 
the cause of the Entente by reason of the mighty 
influence of the Times which is almost a national 
organ, I conceive that no sinister motive can be 
attributed to me if I make, by way of preamble, 
this statement. I was one of the first Frenchmen 
who favored the Franco- British rapprochement, 
at a time when public opinion in my country was 
opposed to that policy. To the powerful Times, 
which has many a time assisted me in propagating 
my ideas, I am most grateful. To me personally, 
therefore, it is really distressing to take issue with 
one of its chief collaborators. But according to 
my honest belief, Colonel Repington, because of 
the extraordinary influence of the organ in which 
he writes, has been instrumental in leading the 
Allies to commit errors in strategy which have 
cost millions of men and endangered the issue of 
the war. I feel, therefore, in duty bound to call 

1 Now of the Morning Post. 



the attention of the Allies to the immense amount 
of harm done by Colonel Repington. His con- 
stantly repeated forecasts have this characteristic 
in common, that for three years and a half they 
have been falsified by events in the most striking 

But the Repington peril still exists. In fact, 
even to-day a large number of Allied newspapers 
continue to reproduce his forecasts because they 
appear in the Times as coming from one having 
authority, although any sort of credit should have 
been denied to him a long while since. But his 
failure to reason from the most indubitable indi- 
cations and the most notorious facts seems to be 
complete. This appears from certain passages in an 
interview on the general condition of affairs given 
by the colonel to the Temps, October lo, 1917. 

*The situation [declared the military critic of 
the Times at that late date] is that the Boches are 
getting the worst of it except in Boche commun- 
iques, and that they know it. Moreover, every 
time that we go into battle they are beaten. . . . 
Our losses are slight now because we are proceed- 
ing according to the plan of an offensive with a 
limited objective. . . . Our victories are almost 
automatic. . . . Italy and Russia still have very 
strong effective forces. . . , Russia? Yes, she is 
passing through a serious crisis, but we must not 
lose confidence in her. Russia is a jack-in-the- 
box, and the winter is working on her side. ' 



Less than a month after these statements the 
ItaHans suffered a serious disaster, Russia went 
to pieces, and Roumania was reduced to impo- 
tence. Now, these disastrous events might very 
easily have been forecast several months before, 
with the help of the frequent and accordant in- 
telligence from Italy and Russia. But Colonel 
Repington has been so hypnotized by the West- 
ern front that he has consistently refused to give 
any weight to what was going on in the rest of 
Europe. We proceed now to trace the chrono- 
logical development and the influence of his 

At the end of August, 19 14, Colonel Repington 
set forth his own conception of the most important 
front when he described the part to be played by 
the Russian armies on the one hand and by the 
Franco- British armies on the other, in the words 
quoted below, disclosing at the same time his 
idea of German strategy. I quote from Le Temps 
of September i, 1914: — 

'We must fight, even if we have to fall back to 
the Atlantic, without allowing Germany to over- 
whelm us. It is absolutely indispensable for her 
to have her Metz and her Sedan, and a long war 
would be disastrous for her with her largely indus- 
trial population, her business paralyzed, her coast 
blockaded. Her entire strategy is based on these 
considerations, and it should be our aim to bring 
this plan to naught and to fight with all our 



strength, without endangering the welfare of our 
people by brilliant coups which would expose us 
to attack by the enemy. 

' It is fear that is behind the present German 
tactics, borrowed from the dervishes — the Ger- 
man vandalism and this policy of terrorizing the 
civil population ; it is fear — not physical fear, 
but fear of the consequences which would result 
for her if France and England should not be 
quickly and completely crushed. 

'Russia, for her part, is performing the func- 
tion of a "steam-roller." Her r61e in the war is 
most important, and final triumph depends in 
large measure on the way in which she carries it 
out. The Franco- British armies have diverted 
the main bulk of the German armies from Russia; 
and while the Allies operating in France keep 
their claws in that bulk, Russia must take ad- 
vantage of the opportunity. 

* The results obtained by her thus far indicate 
that such is her purpose. 

'Taking into account the season of the year 
and its natural concomitants, Russia must reach 
Berlin within two months; if, at the end of that 
time our claws are still buried in the mass of the 
German armies of the West, and if Serbia has suc- 
ceeded in maintaining until then her hold on the 
Austrians, the strategic and political object of 
the war will have been attained.* 

These lines expose very clearly the germ of the 



theory of the main front afterward developed by 
Colonel Repington. According to his idea, the 
Franco- British armies must 'operate in France,* 
Russia playing the part of 'steam-roller/ moving 
forward slowly but surely in such wise as to reach 
Berlin in two months. The plain inference from 
these words is that Colonel Repington was the 
original inventor of the phrase, ' Russia, the steam- 
roller.* Events have shown the value ^of this 

The passage quoted proves in addition the error 
of Colonel Repington as to what military Russia 
really was, as to the condition of the Russian 
fortresses in 19 14, and as to the very different 
condition of the German armies and fortresses at 
that same time.^ 

As the ' steam-roller * had not arrived at Berlin 
in November, 19 14, according to his forecast, 
Colonel Repington gave the final touch to his 
theory of the main front by publishing the follow- 
ing in the middle of 191 5, when the question arose 
of sending Franco- British troops to Serbia: — 

deem myself justified in these reflections because, on page 
414 of my book, Le Monde et la Guerre Russo-Japonaise, published 
in 1906, eight years before the war, I wrote, after much investiga- 
tion in Russia and the Far East: 'Will Russia become again a 
great military power? First of all, is the Russian people bent 
upon it? Nothing is less certain. Putting the best face on affairs, 
and recalling what happened in France after 1870, we must never- 
theless conclude that she will not within ten or fifteen years have 
become again a great military power, in condition, for example, 
to take part in really effective fashion in a war against Germany.' 



*What we must do is kill Germans until the 
German losses mount up to ten thousand daily. 
If we accomplish our task, we shall make final 
victory inevitable. What we must avoid are 
adventures which might give Germany an oppor- 
tunity to secure important strategic successes, as 
at Ulm and Sedan. 

*The war of attrition, in the trenches, on both 
fronts, is exceedingly burdensome; there is noth- 
ing inspiring about it, but it must kill Germany 
in the end if it is kept up.' ^ 

The Allies having followed Colonel Repington's 
advice and sent no troops to the Danube, the at- 
tack on Serbia was begun in October, 1915. At 
that time energetic action on the part of the Allies 
in the way of sending to Serbia, by way of Salon- 
iki and by the Santi Quarante route, sufficient re- 
inforcements, might still have saved the greater 
part of Serbia and thus have maintained the 
Allies in a position to recover the Danube front. 
Thereupon Colonel Repington reiterated with 
singular vigor his theory of the main front as op- 
posed to the dispatch of Allied troops to the rescue 
of Serbia. 

*No new units [he said] have made their ap- 
pearance in the East or the West for several 
months. It may well be true, therefore, that 
Germany has not the necessary men to create 
such units. Under these conditions our manifest 

^ See Le Matin, June 18, 19 15. 



duty is to persevere on the main front, that is, in 
France and Flanders. That is where the final 
decision will be had, and nothing on earth would 
justify us in withdrawing troops from there. We 
must send thither all the men and all the muni- 
tions at our disposal, in order to kill the greatest 
possible number of Germans. 

'The Germans are still capable of holding out 
against Russia, and of massing more troops 
against us. What a plight we should find our- 
selves in if, at such a time, our forces in the 
Western theatre had been reduced ! The respon- 
sibility would fall, not on the army, which has 
fought so superbly, but on those who have the 
supreme management of the war.*^ 

These vigorous arguments had a tremendous 
influence on British public opinion, and Serbia 
was abandoned to her fate. Furthermore, still 
as a result of this theory of the main front. 
Colonel Repington afterwards, whenever he had 
a chance, made the bitterest opposition to the 
dispatch of the Allied expeditionary force to the 
Balkans. As he found important supporters in 
France, the army at Saloniki is still without sufii- 
cient means of action. 

However that may be. Colonel Repington*s 
campaign in support of his disastrous theory 
that the Western front is the most important one 
has produced such far-reaching effects that it has 

^Le Petit Parisien, October 15, 19 15. 



influenced men occupying very high official posi- 
tions. For example, early in October, 191 7, 
General Smuts, a Boer officer, unquestionably of 
great valor, but, by reason of his foreign birth, 
having never been in a position to study the vast 
complexities of the European war, in a speech at 
a luncheon given by the President of the Cham- 
bers of Commerce of the United Kingdom, — a 
speech of special importance because of his mem- 
bership in the British War Cabinet, — declared : — 

'The Central allies are beaten everywhere, are 
retreating everywhere, except in Russia. . . . To 
whip Germany we need not go as far as the Rhine. 
To effect this purpose one strip of land is as good 
as another, so long as the Germans choose to oc- 
cupy it; and, take my word for it, long before we 
have reached the Rhine, Germany will sue for 
peace. . . . Our military superiority on the West- 
ern front is no longer open to the slightest ques- 
tion. ... If we turn to the Italian front, can we 
entertain any doubt, after the great victories of 
the Italian army, that our Allies on that front 
have obtained a complete preponderance over 
the Germans?' 

A few days later events proved the value of 
these assertions. As General Smuts had several 
times announced that Germany was virtually 
whipped, the Weekly Dispatch did not hesitate to 
make the following truly stupefying comment 
on these statements : — 



' When so circumspect a soldier and statesman 
as General Smuts declares that we have won the 
war, we can assume that there are good and suffi- 
cient reasons why so bold an assertion is a proof 
that we have won it/ 

Comments of this description unfortunately do 
not stand alone. For three years and a half a 
number of Allied newspapers have reproduced 
declarations of men of more or less prominence, 
about as valuable as those of General Smuts, as 
being undeniable truths. As a result, very great 
harm has been done, for Allied public opinion has 
been misled by men of unquestionable sincerity, 
who are, nevertheless, incapable of forming an ac- 
curate judgment of the situation because they 
have never been trained for it, and because they 
do not know a hundredth part of what it is neces- 
sary to know in order to put forth a prophecy of 
any value. 

It is because of these divagations that a forest 
of false ideas has been nurtured among the Allies 
like a carefully tended garden, until in December 
last the majority of newspapers proclaimed the 
victory of the Entente at the precise moment 
when the Pangermanist schemes were on the 
point of fulfillment. 

Be that as it may, the aberration caused in 
numerous controlling councils of the Allies by the 
theory of the Western as the principal front has 
gone so far that, even after the Italian catastro- 



phe, when Germany was already master of three 
fourths of Europe, Major Sir Philip Sassoon, 
M.P., private secretary to Sir Douglas Haig, in a 
letter to his constituents, reiterated this theory, 
declaring that the outstanding facts of the war 
are not the momentary collapse of Russia and the 
invasion of Italy, but the steady, inexorable ad- 
vance of the British armies in Flanders, which 
neither the enemy nor the weather conditions can 
check. At that time Major Sassoon believed that 
the British advance on Cambrai would prove to 
be irresistible and continuous. A few days later, 
the German counter-attack, and the serious Bri- 
tish losses which resulted from it, gave the lie 
once more to forecasts of this sort. 

On the occasion of Major Sassoon 's amazing 
letter the Socialist journal VHumanite, which 
often indulges in Utopian conceits, published so 
accurate a summary of the doctrine of the princi- 
pal front at the end of 191 7, that I deem it my 
duty to quote it. 

* " Don't be alarmed," say the partisans of Oc- 
cidentalism, or Repingtonians, *'by the confusion 
and backsliding of Russia. Don't ascribe too 
much importance to the invasion of Northern 
Italy, Serbia, Roumania — there is no use in 
stopping to talk about them. All this is of no ac- 
count. The absolute definitive victory we shall 
win on the Western front, or, more precisely, on 
the British front. The irresistible advance of the 


British army in Flanders will give it to us. The 
occupation by the enemy of Poland, Lithuania, 
and Courland, of Wallachia and Venetia; Riga 
captured, Venice within cannon-shot of the Aus- 
tro-German lines — all this is of no account in 
comparison with the taking of Passchendaele (a 
small village in Flanders), ^yhat's the use of 
unifying the conduct of operations, when there is 
but one operation of any importance?" — Such is 
the doctrine. It has never varied. ' ^ 

^ VHumanite, November 17, 19 17. 



As for the reasons given to justify this theory of 
the principal front by its partisans, they are all 
summed up in this statement, which, however, 
has never been supported by any technical evi- 
dence. 'This is a war of attrition. As the re- 
sources of the Allies are inexhaustible, they can 
certainly hold out much longer than the Germans, 
who are the besieged party. We have only to 
establish ourselves more and more strongly on 
the Western front. As the Germans cannot re- 
main in a state of war indefinitely, they will be 
compelled to attack us. Consequently the Kai- 
ser's troops will have, perforce, to come and be 
killed on the Western front. It is a mathematical 
certainty, therefore, that a time will come when 
we shall have inflicted upon Germany losses in 
man-power so prodigious, that, finding herself 
bled white, she will sue for a peace every condition 
of which we shall be in a position to impose upon 
her. At that moment we shall be completely vic- 
torious without having been compelled to cross 
the Rhine, as we have many times declared.' 

Such is, in reality, incredible as it may appear, 
the ominously puerile and prodigiously rudimen- 


tary reasoning which has been the sole basis of 
the management by the Allies of this complex, 
world-embracing war; whereas the Germans in 
carrying it on act consistently according to some 
plan or other, but always one that has been 
studied in every part of the Universe without ex- 
ception. In truth, this theory by which the West- 
ern front is regarded as the principal one does not 
deserve even to be considered as a strategic plan 
at all, for it rests upon an accumulation of such 
gigantic blunders that it would seem impossible 
that they could have been committed, were we 
not constrained to admit their reality by facts 
that are only too manifest. 

Let us remark first of all that this theory is 
strictly opposed to the fundamental principle of 
warfare as established by military history from 
its most far-off origins. This immutable princi- 
ple may be stated thus: While supporting one's 
allies to the utmost, to carry the war into the 
enemy's country, at the weakest spot, with su- 
perior forces. Now, the theory that we are con- 
sidering has had the following results : — 

1 . It has prevented the Allies from carrying the 
war into the enemy's country, and has confined 
the most frightful struggle that has ever taken 
place to the richest and most densely populated 
territory of Belgium and France. 

2. It has compelled the Allies to abandon the 
hope of striking their enemy at his weakest point, 



which was beyond question the southern Hne of 

3. It has led the AlHes to concentrate their 
most powerful forces against the strongest por- 
tions of the German front, where the German staff 
could most easily manage the most stubborn de- 
fense by virtue of the vast network of railways 
that it controls in the West. 

4. It has abandoned successively to the Pan- 
germanist Moloch such admirable, gallant, and 
loyal allies as the unhappy Serbs and Roumanians. 
Such abandonment not only was an unpardon- 
able moral error on the part of the Allied leaders, 
but also consummated the substantial strategic 
blunder of the Entente. For, by an extraordinary 
chance, the territories of Montenegro, Serbia, and 
Roumania were, and still are, strategically con- 
sidered, the key of the world- war, because they 
form the natural Danube front, the mere posses- 
sion of which by the Allies deprived Austro-Ger- 
many of the aid of the Bulgarian and Turkish 
effectives, and of the resources of the Orient, with- 
out which it could not have continued the war. 
Therefore, by supporting with vigor their small 
Balkan allies, the great Allies would not only have 
fulfilled their moral duty, but would at the same 
time have forwarded their essential strategic in- 
terests and the war would long since have ended 

Now, the sole obstacle to this logical develop- 


ment of the military efforts of the Allies has been 
the theory that the Western front is the principal 

Given the huge blunders, even of a strictly 
military description, which have resulted from 
this disastrous theory, one can readily under- 
stand that it makes no account of the strategy of 
the political sciences, the existence of which is not 
suspected, even at the present moment, by the 
supporters of that theory. Let us note once more 
that it is based by them upon a long succession of 
material misconceptions. Events have proved 
that Colonel Repington*s reckoning of the Ger- 
man reserves was erroneous. Furthermore, in his 
calculation of the enemy's forces. Colonel Reping- 
ton has never dealt seriously with the Austro- 
Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish effectives, 
which, however, do actually exist and whose sup- 
port enables Austro-Germany to keep the field. 
Not taking into the account the total military 
effectives of Pan-Germany, Colonel Repington 
has neglected also to consider the resources in sup- 
plies and raw materials of this vast territory. But 
these resources, because of the effects of the sub- 
marine campaign, are to all intent greater for the 
Boches — or, at all events, more readily acces- 
sible and transportable — than the resources of 
the Western Allies, who cannot live now without 
America and Australia, that is to say, without 
articles of prime necessity brought from a great 



distance by slow, infinitely burdensome, and un- 
certain means of transport. 

Lastly, if it had been true that Austro-Ger- 
many, blockaded by land, — the Allies being on 
the Danube front, — would have been in effect 
a besieged fortress inevitably doomed to capitu- 
late by reason of the insufficiency of food-supplies, 
— because, in fact, the resources of Austro-Ger- 
many alone would have been insufficient for its 
population, — on the other hand, it was utterly 
absurd to regard Austro-Germany augmented by 
the Balkans and Turkey (that is to say, Pan- 
Germany) as a fortress susceptible of being re- 
duced by starvation. Pan-Germany to-day is in 
very truth a fortress, in the sense that it is en- 
circled by continuous fortified fronts; but it is 
nonsense to liken Pan-Germany to a fortress 
having necessarily to surrender because of famine, 
when, by virtue of its geographic immensity, in- 
cluding the vast exploitable territories of the 
Balkans and Turkey, it affords the most diverse 
products of the soil. And the latent resources of 
Pan-Germany are immeasurably increased now 
that the whole of European and Asiatic Russia 
is open to it. 

To sum up — the theory that the Western 
front is the principal one is the capital strategic 
blunder of all the Allied leaders, and it explains all 
their other blunders. The facts are at hand to 
prove that it was impossible to conceive of any 


general plan for the conduct of the war by the 
Allies which would have made it easier for the 
German General Staff to carry out the Panger- 
manist scheme. For, from this point of view, the 
theory has had the following further results : — 

1. It has allowed Germany to lay hold freely of 
the territories necessary for the creation of Pan- 

2. It has given her all the time that she re- 
quired so to organize Pan-Germany that its mili- 
tary strength should bring about one of its first 
effects — the collapse of Russia. 

3. It has confirmed Germany in the possession 
of all the sources of troops, supplies, and raw ma- 
terials existing in the Balkans and Asiatic Turkey. 

4. On the other hand, it has deprived the Allies 
of the sources of strategic strength, and of effec- 
tives, represented by the Balkans and Russia, and 
has compelled them to seek beyond the Atlantic 
those things which are indispensable for their 

5. It has enabled the German General Staff 
to concentrate all the disposable effectives of 
Pan-Germany on the Western front, which con- 
centration was impossible so long as the Allies 
were sufficiently formidable in the East. 

Doubtless it is no longer possible to deny to the 
Western front the title of principal front; but 
this is because there is, practically, no other now. 
Clearly it is the principal one for the Germans, 



because they can unquestionably bring about a 
definitive decision there. But it is assuredly not 
the principal one for the Allies except so far as it 
is a question, first of all, of not being hopelessly 
defeated there. 

Thus the first effort of the Allies must be to do 
their utmost not to be crushed in the West. But 
will all the successes that they may be able to 
win in the West suffice to give them the victory 
— that is to say, to force Germany to abandon 
her grip on Central Europe and the Balkans, in 
other words, on the instruments of universal 
domination? Of course, no one could undertake 
to say absolutely that it will not be, but the 
chances of such a result are exceedingly slender. 
The facts developed by the war, and the concord- 
ant precedents of all military history, enable one 
easily to convince one's self that it cannot be so. 
In fact, Germany not only is proceeding with the 
organization of Pan-Germany, but she proposes 
also to exploit Russia, whence she will obtain im- 
mense supplemental resources. The means of 
resistance of the Germans on the Western front 
must be regarded therefore as augmented in at 
least as great measure as the means of offensive 
action which the Allies will be able to accumulate 
on that front. Consequently it is, to say the least, 
extremely doubtful whether the results on the 
Western front can be decisive for the Allies. 

Now, the mere fact that any doubt about it 
1 88 


exists is enough to make it the duty of the Allies 
to take the precautions which wisdom enjoins 
against this new possible blunder, which this time 
would be beyond remedy. The Allies must 
therefore understand that, to win the war, they 
must, by new methods, enter upon military opera- 
tions elsewhere than on the Western front. As 
I hope to show, such supplementary operations 
are comparatively simple to prepare. 



In his reverberating speech at Paris on Novem- 
ber 12, 1917, Mr. Lloyd George performed the 
service of proclaiming aloud the military blunder 
of the Allies, — which he justly characterized as 
'inconceivable,' — in having fixed their attention 
solely on the Western front. I quote the essential 
passages of this speech which particularly merit 
the notice of American readers. But I must call 
attention to the fact that, although Mr. Lloyd 
George did fully realize the essential nature of the 
Danube front from the military standpoint, he did 
not grasp its capital political importance, as is 
shown by his speech of January 5, 191 8, in which 
he sanctions the maintenance of the integrity of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire; I allude further 
to this speech at the end of this chapter. 



' There is one feature of this war which makes 
it unique among all the innumerable wars of the 
past. It is a siege of nations. The Allies are 
blockading two huge Empires. It would have 
been well for us if at all times we had thoroughly 
grasped that fact. In a siege, not only must 
every part of the line of circumvallation be strong 
enough to resist the strongest attack which the 
besieged can bring to bear upon it ; more than that, 
the besieging army must be ready to strike at the 
weakest point of the enemy, wherever that may 
be. Have we done so? Look at the facts. 

'The enemy was cut off by the Allied navies 
from all the rich lands beyond the seas, whence 
he had been drawing enormous stores of food and 
material. On the east he was blockaded by Rus- 
sia, on the west by the armies of France, Britain, 
and Italy. But the south, the important south, 
with its gateway to the East, was left to be held 
by the forces of a small country with half the 
population of Belgium, its armies exhausted by 
the struggles of three wars, and with two treach- 
erous kings behind, lying in wait for an opportu- 
nity to knife it when it was engaged in defending 
itself against a mightier foe. 

'What was the result of this inconceivable 
blunder? What would any man whose mind was 
devoted to the examination of the whole, not 
merely to one part, of the great battlefield, have 
expected to happen? Exactly what did happen. 


While we were hammering with the whole of our 
might at the impenetrable barrier in the West, the 
Central Powers, feeling confident that we could 
not break through, threw their weight on that 
little country, crushed her resistance, opened the 
gate to the East, and unlocked great stores of 
corn, cattle, and minerals, yea, unlocked the door 
of hope — all essential to enable Germany to 
sustain her struggle. 

'Without these additional stores Germany 
might have failed to support her armies at full 
strength. Hundreds of thousands of splendid 
fighting material were added to the armies which 
Germany can control — added to her and lost to 
us. Turkey, which at that time had nearly ex- 
hausted its resources for war, cut off from the 
only possible source of supply, was reequipped 
and resuscitated, and became once more a for- 
midable military power, whose activities absorbed 
hundreds of thousands of our best men in order 
to enable us at all to retain our prestige in the 
East. By this fatuity this terrible war was given 
new life. 

*Why was this incredible blunder perpetrated? 
The answer is simple. Because it was no one's 
business in particular to guard the gates of the 
Balkans. The one front had not become a reality. 
France and England were absorbed in other 
spheres. Italy had her mind on the Carso. Rus- 
sia had a thousand-mile frontier to guard, and, 


even if she had not, she could not get through to 
help Serbia, because Roumania was neutral. It 
is true we sent forces to Saloniki to rescue Serbia, 
but, as usual, they were sent too late. They were 
sent when the mischief was complete. 

' Half of those forces sent in time — nay, half 
the men who fell in the futile attempt to break 
through on the Western front in September of 
that year — would have saved Serbia, would have 
saved the Balkans and completed the blockade of 

*You may say that is an old story. I wish it 
were. It is simply the first chapter of a serial 
which has been running to this hour. . . . 

* When we advance a kilometre into the enemy's 
lines, snatch a small shattered village out of his 
cruel grip, capture a few hundreds of his soldiers, 
we shout with unfeigned joy. And rightly so, for 
it is the symbol of our superiority over a boastful 
foe and a sure guaranty that in the end we can 
and shall win. But what if we had advanced 
50 kilometres beyond his lines and made 200,000 
of his soldiers prisoners and taken 2,500 of his 
best guns, with enormous quantities of ammuni- 
tion and stores?' 

Fundamental strategic errors, then, have been 
committed. The responsible cause of these errors 
is very simple. The leaders of the Entente, with 
the assurance born of their misconstruction of 
actual European conditions, of which they have 


afforded so many proofs, deeming themselves 
sure of their position, have obstinately refused 
to listen to the few men who are aware of the real 
object with which Germany entered upon the war, 
and consequently of the means which would per- 
mit an effective opposition to her success. 

The same reason explains why Mr. Lloyd 
George's speech of January 5, 191 8, contains the 
heartrending contradictions and technical blun- 
ders to which I deem it my imperative duty to 
call the attention of my American readers. If 
his declarations relative to war-indemnities should 
be followed by a practical application, France, 
on the signature of the treaty of peace, would 
be condemned to absolute bankruptcy, and the 
value of the French bank-note would vanish 
with magical rapidity. 

On the other hand, the declaration concerning 
the maintenance of the integrity of the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire is utterly at variance with 
the principle laid down by the Allies, that the dif- 
ferent races must be permitted to decide freely 
concerning their own destiny. Now, the Czechs 
and Jugo-Slavs want no more of the Hapsburgs or 
of Austria-Hungary. Why compel them to re- 
main subject to the yoke of Vienna, which, as all 
those familiar with the Central European prob- 
lem are well aware, is unable to escape from the 
grip of Berlin? They know equally well that it is 
altogether impossible to place the least reliance 



on Austria-Hungary, which is not a nation, which 
is not even a state, but which is, in reality, a sys- 
tem of ultra-reactionary oppression, operating 
for the benefit of the German-Magyar hegemony 
of Europe. As for the Hapsburg dynasty, for 
centuries past it has broken its word as freely as 
the Hohenzollerns have broken theirs. Not the 
slightest credit can be given to its signature by 
any sane person. 

On the other hand, if Austria-Hungary is al- 
lowed to exist, the promises of integral restitu- 
tion made by Mr. Lloyd George to Roumania, 
Montenegro, and Serbia, are valueless, because 
incapable of fulfillment by reason of the conti- 
guity of the Austro-German mass. Nor has the 
promise of restitution of Alsace-Lorraine any 
greater value. Such restitution could not be 
permanent unless Pan-Germany is definitively 
crushed, that is to say, unless Austria-Hungary 

It is not pleasant to place one's self in opposi- 
tion to the almost universal concert of approval, 
which has greeted Mr. Lloyd George's declara- 
tion in the Allied countries ; but I cannot consent 
to conceal a truth of which, in my judgment, it is 
indispensable for the Allies to be informed. For 
twenty years I stood alone in proclaiming the 
Pangermanist peril, and the impending war in 
exactly the shape which it has assumed. I shall 
stand alone, if I must, in telling you this: Lloyd 



George's peace terms are either unrealizable or 
can result only in a terrible deception of the 
Allies which would cause them to lose the war by 
making Pan-Germany triumphant. 

If the enormous political blunders which I am 
forced to point out have been committed by Mr. 
Lloyd George in his peace programme, it is still 
for the same old reason: he has neglected to con- 
sult the real experts, that is, the Englishmen who 
have given long study to the problem of Central 
Europe. To consult these men is an absolute 
necessity, for at this moment there is not, in the 
whole Entente, any political leader, any diplomat, 
who is personally thoroughly conversant with this 
question of Austria-Hungary, the thorough com- 
prehension of which requires about twenty years 
of study. What has Mr. Lloyd George done? He 
has consulted Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Asquith, and 
Mr. Henderson, who certainly have never been to 
Austria-Hungary to make serious investigations. 
Per contra^ Mr. Lloyd George would assuredly 
never have been guilty of the serious errors that I 
am indicating, if he had chosen to listen for one 
hour to the only three Englishmen who, to my 
knowledge, have given genuine study to the Aus- 
tro-Hungarian question on the spot, for many 
months: Sir Arthur Evans, Mr. Seton -Watson, 
and Mr. Wickham Steed. The last-named gen- 
tleman was for ten years before the war the re- 
markably able correspondent of the Times at 



Vienna. His service of information was so well 
organized that it was to him that the French and 
British embassies applied for information on a 
multitude of matters, which they were utterly 
unable to procure for themselves. It is, therefore, 
altogether contrary to the most elementary com- 
mon sense, to say nothing of British interests, 
not to place the greatest reliance on his opinion 
as to the proper solution of the problem of Central 

All the foregoing leads us to insistence upon 
the urgent necessity of this step: to revise the 
revision of the war-aims of the Allies as set forth 
in Mr. Lloyd George's programme; for that pro- 
gramme embodies technical blunders which make 
it either infinitely hazardous or practically un- 

It will be enough, I believe, for every right- 
thinking American to know that Mr. Lloyd George 
made these no less justifiable than alarming state- 
ments concerning the strategic blunders of the 
Entente in November, 191 7, or after forty months 
of warfare; and that in the forty-second month 
the same Lloyd George was guilty of the tech- 
nical political blunders that I have pointed out, 
in connection with the Allies' terms of peace — 
this will be enough, I say, to convince every such 
American that the conduct of the war and the 
preparation for peace, so far as it has developed 


at present as well in the military as in the political 
aspect, can no longer be tolerated. 

One of the greatest services that the United 
States could render to the Allies in Europe would 
be to say to them: ^We, the United States, are 
determined to wage war to the limit by all the 
means at our disposal, but we do not propose 
that our men and our money shall be wasted to 
no avail. Henceforth the war must be carried on, 
and peace prepared for, in accordance with seri- 
ously considered, and hence truly scientific, 
plans, as well in the intellectual as in the material 
domain, and as well from a political as from a 
military standpoint. * 

I am well aware that you Americans, by the < 
very force of circumstances, have much to learn 
from our military leaders, in order to be able to 
carry on effectively this great war in which you 
have become involved so suddenly ; but you have 
special advantages over the Allies in Europe, 
which should be utilized. Your distance from 
the other side of the Atlantic gives you the neces- 
sary interval of space to avoid being hypnotized 
by the special views of each of the Allies, and 
hence to see the conflict as a whole, which is most 
essential. Having never been obliged up to the 
present time to take sides in European political 
questions, you have none of the old-time, erro- 
neous ideas with regard to them which are held 
by the Allied diplomats in Europe — archaic 



ideas which are the initial cause of all the dip- 
lomatic set-backs of the Allies. You have there- 
fore nothing to forget; and that fact gives you 
an immense chance of avoiding many disastrous 

As you certainly have no predetermined plan, 
and as you are seeking honestly the actual truth, 
you will inevitably find it if you follow the meth- 
od of your great captains of industry, all of whom 
know that, in order to accomplish anything im- 
portant and efficacious in a province with which 
they are not familiar, they must begin by apply- 
ing to the ' expert.' Of course, the expert is not in- 
fallible. He may, like all of us poor mortals, be 
mistaken; but when he really deserves to be 
called an expert, he avoids, with certainty, the 
commission of such monumental blunders as 
those heaped up by the European Allied leaders, 
simply because they did not realize the necessity 
of consulting experts. Now, there are among 
the Allies experts on each of the great questions 
presented by the war and the peace that is 
to ensue, who are neither politicians, nor dip- 
lomats, nor soldiers, but who must be con- 
sulted because they know these questions, root 
and branch, for the very simple reason that they 
have studied them long and freely. To be sure, 
these men are far from numerous, but I declare 
that they do exist. If you Americans demand 
that henceforth a call shall be made upon men 


of real competence, and that there shall be no 
more discussion about phrases, but solely about 
carefully studied realities, you will confer upon 
all the Allies a tremendous service, which will 
bring us considerably nearer to victory. 

All these advantages are peculiarly yours, 
Americans. If you choose to make the utmost 
use of them, you will then be, in many instances, 
in a position to play the part of a beneficent ar- 
biter between the European Allies. Although 
their leading minds, having been taken unawares 
by the war, have not conducted it as they should 
have done, they are honest and well-meaning 
men. Your advice will certainly be well received, 
provided that they feel that it is invariably 
dictated in the interest of a mutual, decisive, 
complete victory — the only sort of victory that 
will ensure peace for many years to come, and will 
save civilization. 



In the preceding chapters, seeking only the truth, 
I have laid before my American readers the actual 
situation of affairs with regard to the war, the 
causes of the blunders heretofore committed by 
the Allies, and the operation of political strategy 
— or what I have called 'the strategy of the 
political sciences/ In my mind these studies are 
not simply of an historical or theoretical nature. 
They were intended to precede, and at the same 
time to justify, the exposition of a concrete war- 
plan for the Allies — a plan which should be quite 
new, based upon the political sciences, and really 
adapted to conditions as they exist to-day. 

I have devoted twenty years of my life to study 
of the Pan-German scheme, in order to prevent its 
execution by giving warning of the peril. I have 
not succeeded in making myself heard in time. 
And now when, in spite of everything, Pan-Ger- 
many is actually created, I would like to demon- 
strate the surest method of destroying it, and 
hence of putting an end to the war by winning it, 
and — making due allowance for the blunders 
already committed — winning it comparatively 



I have laid down the broad outlines of the plan 
which I recommend, in my paper, ' The Best Way 
to Crush Pan-Germany,' in the Atlantic for De- 
cember, 1917.^ The pages which follow are 
written with the object of setting forth this plan 
in detail, and of convincing public opinion in 
America of its possibilities and advantages. When 
it shall be so convinced, the mighty force of Ameri- 
can opinion will go far to secure quickly the adop- 
tion of the measures essential for its execution. 

The plan that I suggest is in reality the out- 
come of much meditation on the war and the 
means of winning it. As for the technical infor- 
mation which the plan assumes, I can fairly say 
that it is derived from the most reliable sources. 
Naturally, like every novel idea, it may cause 
surprise at the first glance ; but it must be clearly 
understood that it is impossible to get out of the 
strange and unprecedented situation now existing 
in Europe as a result of the audacity of the Boches, 
except by adopting ideas which are themselves 
unprecedented and of premeditated audacity. 
Moreover this plan is based solely on the employ- 
ment of elements now in being, in the moral no 
less than in the material domain. In reality, 
therefore, there is nothing fanciful about it. 

I beg leave to remind those who may be 
tempted to ascribe especially great weight to the 
possible objections which every momentous pro- 
* See Chapter vii, supra. 



posal is likely to arouse, of these facts: that 
events have shown, unhappily, that the other 
plans suggested by myself since the beginning of 
the war, — for instance, that relating to the for- 
mation of the Danube front, the strategic key to 
the whole business, — were not only the simplest, 
but the most susceptible of execution, the most 
efficacious, and the least costly in men and 
money. But these plans were regarded as chi- 
merical by persons who were considered especially 
competent to judge. 

At the present moment, the question is how 
to put an end to the existing cataclysm as soon 
as possible — but only by victory, for slavery is 
more cruel than death. I may be permitted 
therefore, I trust, to be listened to in season for at 
least once in my life. 

That is why I am making a personal appeal to 
American public opinion, and I urge it to support 
me vigorously and instantly if I succeed in con- 
vincing it. 

For my own part, I have a deeply rooted con- 
viction that, if the execution of the general plan 
set forth in this study is begun without delay, 
methodically, persistently, and upon broad bases, 
it will certainly bring the Allies a complete vic- 
tory by the end of 191 8; but I must make one 
explicit reservation. The longer the execution of 
this plan is postponed^ the less efficacious it will he. 
If this be true, it is for the reason that the Austro- 


German seizure of Russia involves tremendous 
consequences which are even yet imperfectly real- 
ized by the Allies. If they give Germany and 
Austria-Hungary time to double, yes, even to 
triple, the railways connecting them with South 
Russia, the Austro-Germans will have at their 
disposal limitless supplies of every description, — 
food, metals, and all the rest, — which will enable 
them to hold out as long as is necessary against 
the universal coalition. But, on the other hand, 
such multiplication of the railways connecting 
the Central Empires with South Russia cannot 
be effected within six months. It follows that 
during that interval the communication of Austria- 
Germany with the East, where are the particu- 
larly sensitive and vulnerable strategic positions 
of Pan-Germany, must be definitively cut. Fur- 
thermore, the state of mind of the slaves of 
Central Europe is still such that they can be led 
to rebel. We must not run the risk of moral 
collapse on their part which would inevitably 
come about if the Allies should neglect to give 
their attention immediately and by practical 
methods, to the fate of the eighty-six millions of 
Slavs, Latins, and Semites who are immured 
against their will in Pan-Germany and are atro- 
ciously oppressed. Thus there are very serious 
motives for entering at once upon the execution 
of the plan proposed. 

For these divers reasons, I regard it as my 


imperative duty to declare emphatically my con- 
viction that this plan is not only necessary, 
but indispensable, to the victory of the Allies. 



In view of the general condition of affairs in 
Europe at the beginning of 191 8, the dissolution 
of Russia, provided that the lesson it teaches is 
thoroughly learned, in no wise lessens the chances 
of the complete victory of the Entente, as the 
German propagandists are doing their utmost 
to convince Allied public opinion that it does, 
through the medium of pacifists of various breeds. 
The one thing that the dissolution of the forces of 
Russia by Germany demonstrates above all else 
is the potency of the strategy of political sciences, 
which the Allies can employ in their turn to dis- 
solve Pan-Germany, and thereby to obtain, in a 
comparatively short time, a complete victory. 

It was not by the employment of military force, 
in the sense ordinarily given to that phrase, that 
the Germans put Russia out of the game, but by 
turning to account their knowledge of the eth- 
nography and psychology of the various races 
living in Russia. Indeed, it was this knowledge 
which enabled the Germans to exploit unerringly 
the extraordinary ignorance of actualities of the 
Russian Socialists, and their stupendous pride; 


the artlessness, even the very genuine kindliness, 
of the Russian people, which predispose them to 
forget speedily the most cruel outrages; and, 
lastly, the particularist tendencies of certain Rus- 
sian nationalities - — tendencies which the Berlin 
propaganda has artificially transformed into sep- 
aratist movements to be put into effect at once. 

Now, I maintain that the ethnographic and 
psychological facts of which the Germans cyni- 
cally take advantage to reduce these peoples to 
slavery, can very quickly be turned to account, 
equitably and effectively, by the Allies, to free 
those who are oppressed by the Boches and Pan- 
Germans, to assure the truimph of liberty, and to 
make certain the absolute defeat of Prussian 



To make sure that we do not deceive ourselves, 
we will not only leave Russia out of the reckoning, 
but will also omit the resources, considerable and 
varied though they are, which the Allies derive 
from their extensive colonies, and the assistance 
(although, taken as a whole, it is very important) 
of the Belgians, Portuguese, Serbs, Greeks, Rou- 
manians, and Japanese. We will enumerate sim- 
ply the forces of the great Allied powers. 

France has forty millions of inhabitants ; Great 
Britain, forty-six millions; Italy, thirty-six mil- 


lions; the United States, one hundred millions; 
making in all two hundred and twenty- two mil- 
lions of the Allies, who have to contend against 
seventy-three millions of Germans, ten millions 
of Magyars, five millions of Bulgars, and six 
millions of Turks — or only ninety-four millions 
of actual adversaries. 

But we have, in addition, allies in the fortress 
that we have to subdue. 

In fact — and this is a matter of extreme im- 
portance^ — all the rest of the one hundred and 
eighty millions of inhabitants of Pan-Germany, 
the enormous number of eighty-six millions (that 
is to say, nearly one half), of French, Belgians, 
Alsace-Lorrainers, Danes, Poles, Lithuanians, 
Letts, Ruthenians, Czechs, Slovaks, Jugo-Slavs, 
Roumanians, Italians, Armenians, Greeks and 
Arabs, are slaves, imprisoned in their own despite 
in Pan-Germany. They are, therefore, anti- 
Boche by conviction, being well aware that only 
the decisive triumph of the Entente can put an 
end to their serfdom. 

Having studied these oppressed peoples on the 
spot for more than twenty years, knowing their 
interests and their sentiments, I affirm that this is 
a psychological situation of enormous concern to 
the Allies. I maintain further that these eighty- 
six millions of Slavs, Latins, and Semites represent, 
by virtue of the strategic importance of the dis- 

* See map opposite. 



tricts in which they live, a force which — on the 
single condition that they are supplied with the 
means of action adapted to their unique situation, 
— may assist materially in the final victory, and 
a force infinitely stronger than that which the 
hundred and eighty-two millions of inhabitants 
of the former Empire of the Tsars ever repre- 

Estimated according to its psychological value, 
the minimum bulk of the Allies is composed of two 
groups : — 

(a) The two hundred and twenty-two millions 
of the declared Allies ; 

(b) The eighty-six millions of latent allies 
immured in Pan-Germany. 

Thus, regarded from the standpoint of their 
sentiments, the Allies form a total minimum of 
three hundred and eight millions, opposed by only 
ninety-four millions of Boches and Pro-Germans ; 
that is to say, they are about three to one. 



But some one may say : ' These eighty-six mil- 
lions of latent allies can do nothing because they 
are shut up in Pan-Germany.' But it is this 
very condition which is extraordinarily favorable. 
In order to win the war the Allies must absolutely 
subdue the immense fortress which Pan-Ger- 


many now is. The experience of three years has 
proved that its ramparts, constantly strengthened 
by the Boches, are very hard to raze ; but hitherto 
the Allies have assailed it only from the outside, 
heedless of the important fact that half of the 
garrison is inclined to favor their action. 

Now, out of these eighty-six millions of anti- 
Boches in Pan-Germany, an ethnological analysis 
enables us to reckon that about seven millions 
(Slavs, Latins, and Arabs) have been mobilized, 
that is to say, incorporated against their will in 
the armies directed from Berlin. At the present 
moment, therefore, in the armies of Pan-Germany, 
one man in every three — an enormous proportion 
— is an anti-Pangermanist, who detests this war, 
who is a soldier by compulsion, who is fully aware 
that his own sacrifice helps to confirm his own 
servitude and that of his family, and who holds 
his oppressors in horror; who is armed, and who 
will beyond question be overjoyed to use his 
weapons against his Boche or Pan-German neigh- 
bors the moment that a condition of general 
unrest enables him to do it effectively. 

It is possible, too, for the Allies to arm the 
other, immobilized anti-Boches, who are shut up 
in Pan-Germany, to such effect that there will 
result a condition of general unrest so far-reaching 
that the seven millions of anti-Pangermanist 
soldiers mobilized contrary to their wishes will 
be able to rise suddenly and use their weapons 


against their oppressors with irresistible force, if 
at that moment a carefully planned Allied of- 
fensive is started on the Western front. 

Judging from what the Boches have done in 
Russia, and what they are at present trying to 
do in Greece, Switzerland, and Spain, it is very 
certain that if they were in our place they would 
long gone have profited tremendously by the 
exceedingly favorable conditions which we have 
described. The essential reason that the Allies 
have not yet taken this situation into serious 
consideration is that they have deemed it neces- 
sary to employ only the material instruments of 
war, not ascribing the importance that they de- 
serve to intellectual methods based upon a knowl- 
edge of ethnography and national psychology. 
But the dissolution of Russia by the Boches has 
proved — and herein it may be of use to the 
Allies — the extraordinary potency of these 
intellectual methods, which is certainly much 
greater than that of the most terror-inspiring 

On the other hand, from a moral standpoint, 
the Allies unquestionably have, not only the 
right, but the absolute duty of conveying to those 
Slavs and Latins and Arabs effective means of 
successful revolt, since they are now subjected to 
the most odious form of servitude. Finally, there 
are in each of the Allied countries numerous 
students who are thoroughly familiar with the 



ethnographical and psychological facts which 
make it possible to prepare upon genuinely 
scientific lines the contest for the liberty of the 
oppressed peoples of Pan-Germany. 



To bring about an explosion in Pan-Germany, 
we must start with the following formula, deduced 
from the lessons of the war, which seems, in view 
of the present situation and the blunders hitherto 
committed, to be the formula by which the Allies 
are destined to win a complete victory. 

To combine henceforth the military pressure of the 
Allies outside of Pan-Germany with the scientific, 
methodical, constant, and persistent development 
of the internal causes of dissolution which exist in a 
considerable part of the territory of Pan-Germany, 

To maintain on the Western front an impenetrable 
and vigilant defensive; but, in order to keep down 
the losses to the lowest point, to undertake no offen- 
sive on a grand scale on that front until the German 
rear has been thrown into confusion, morally and 
physically, by means of legitimate and essential 
insurrections systematically organized by the Allies 
and carried out by the slaves shut up in Pan-Ger- 
many, demonstrably to their advantage. 





This programme, if carried into effect, would 
have enormous and prompt consequences; and 
yet it can be carried into effect with comparatively 
little exertion. Indeed the effectiveness of such 
exertion depends, not on its extent, but on its 
intelligence. It must be put forth against the 
specially vulnerable parts of the military organ- 
ization of Pan-Germany. 

Of the eighty-six millions of Boches shut up in 
Pan-Germany, at least fifty millions of non- 
mobilized inhabit the vast territories stretching 
from the Baltic to the southern Balkans (about 
1500 kilometres). Now these territories con- 
stitute the most essential and, at the same time, 
the most vulnerable strategic bases of all military 
Pan-Germany. In fact all the channels of com- 
munication — rail and water — which connect 
Austria-Germany with Russia, the Balkans, and 
Turkey, pass through these territories. Now, 
three years have shown clearly that without the 
troops and multifarious supplies of the Balkans 
and Turkey, — to which are now to be added 
the resources of South Russia, — Austria-Ger- 
many would long ago have found it impossible 
to continue the struggle. In reality, therefore, 
it is enough that the Austro-German communica- 



tions should be seriously disturbed, for the situa- 
tion to become, with extraordinary swiftness, 
very difficult both morally and materially for the 
armies concentrated on the Western front by the 
German Staff. 

This result can be secured by an entirely 
novel method of carrying on the war. 


A Plan for the Allies 


A NEW war-plan may bring about very swiftly 
the explosion of Pan-Germany, and, as a result, 
the complete triumph of the Allies ; hence it may 
make possible the conclusion of a peace on gen- 
uinely democratic principles. 

This plan presents several original features. 
In the first place, for technical reasons set forth 
later, the Boches, even if they knew that the 
Allies were working to carry out this plan, could 
not oppose its execution to any effective purpose. 
Moreover, on the twofold condition that the 
exposition is limited to the general outlines of 
the plan, and that no allusion is made to any 
features of the eventual preparation except those 
which it would be impossible to conceal from 
Boche espionage, publicity ensures to the Allies 
the following immediate and worth-while ad- 

I. It cannot fail to impair the morale of the 
Germans by letting them know that they are not 
by any means so near a final triumph as their 


leaders give them to understand, since the Allies 
are able to employ new media of victory, exceed- 
ingly powerful and of great rapidity of execution. 

2. This publicity cannot fail to strengthen 
materially the morale of all the Allied nations by 
showing them that the vanished Russian coop- 
eration can really be replaced by forces of a dif- 
ferent character, to be sure, and to be employed 
in an unforeseen way, but which, by reason of the 
peculiar vulnerability of the points upon which 
they will be brought to bear, make it possible 
to secure a complete victory much more quickly 
than it has ever been possible to expect it with 
the assistance of the Russian forces. 

3. This publicity, again, cannot fail to demon- 
strate what an enormous and fatal blunder it 
would be for the Allies, yielding to a momentary 
lassitude, to allow themselves to be trapped by 
the Austro-Boche pacifist manoeuvres, when a 
definitive and comparatively speedy victory is 
still entirely possible. 

4. Lastly, this publicity cannot fail to embarrass 
the Germans very seriously, from now on, from 
the strategic standpoint. At this time the Ger- 
man Staff is concentrating as rapidly as pos- 
sible on the Western front all the troops at its 
disposal. A definite demonstration that its vital 
lines of communication with the Orient can ac- 
tually be threatened by unforeseen means and 
at widely separated points, will inevitably cause 



havoc in the calculations of Berlin. On any hy- 
pothesis the decisions resulting from this embar- 
rassment must be advantageous to the Allies. 
If, for prudential reasons, in consideration of 
possibilities which it has not as yet confronted, 
the German Staff should slow up its concentra- 
tion in the West so as to leave sufficient forces in 
the oppressed districts of Pan-Germany, it will 
thereby decrease its chances of success in its ap- 
proaching offensive in the West; the result being 
a reprieve for all the Allied troops. But if, per- 
sisting in its present plan, the Kaiser's Staff con- 
tinues to denude of reliable troops extensive 
regions of Pan-Germany which are capable of 
being roused to revolt, then they will simply 
make it easier than it now is to carry the proposed 
plan into effect. 



Common sense warns us that we cannot seri- 
ously expect the oppressed peoples to rebel, if at 
the same time we refuse to guarantee that they 
shall not long remain under the yoke of their op- 
pressors. In order, therefore, that the desired 
rebellion may become possible, the Allies must 
give the Poles, Czechs, Jugo-Slavs, Roumanians, 
and the rest a categorical promise that, after the 
victory, they shall actually and freely decide 
their own destiny. Indeed it is sufficient to ap- 



ply to the conduct of the war the democratic 
principle invoked by the Entente — by the 
Allied governments and by the Allied Socialists 
alike — for the peace-settlement; a principle 
which is the basis, and, moreover, the justifica- 
tion of President Wilson's intervention in the 
affairs of Europe. The proposed plan, then, as- 
sumes that, in order to bring about a democratic 
peace, the war itself will be waged on democratic 
lines. Under this assumption one of the essen- 
tial objects of the war — the right of 'self- 
determination' on the part of the different 
peoples — becomes likewise one of the instru- 
ments of victory. Thus are set in motion new 
forces which can but hasten the coming of peace. 

I have now to prove that the Allies have 
actually in their hands the material means to 
make the insurrection within Pan-Germany ex- 
ceedingly effective in a very short time. 



To enable them to act efficaciously, the op- 
pressed peoples of Pan-Germany must be put in 
a condition to contend successfully against the 
troops employed to suppress the insurrection. 
The Allies must, therefore, supply in large quan- 
tities a very effective weapon, which, however, 


will meet the complex necessities growing out of 
the present military situation and of the peculiar 
conditions in which the insurgent masses will 
have to operate. For these various reasons the 
weapon in question must be manufactured by 
the Allies rapidly and by the million. It must 
be easy to transport, hence very light; easy to 
conceal, hence small; and yet it must be indis- 
putably powerful. Now, there is in existence a 
weapon which meets all these diverse conditions. 
I can describe it with absolute certainty that I 
am revealing no secret, for, by the irony of fate, 
the weapon best adapted to bring about the 
explosion of Pan-Germany and thus to revolu- 
tionize the war even more completely than the 
machine-gun, the barbed-wire entanglement, or 
the submarine has done, is a German weapon, 
which the Allied factories — notably those in 
the United States — can turn out rapidly by the 
million, at a relatively small expense compared 
with all the other expenses imposed upon the 
Allies by the war. 

The German automatic ten-shooter Mauser pis- 
tol has sights graded to a thousand metres. Its 
bullet is deadly at that distance, which is practi- 
cally sufficient for all purposes. Again, thanks 
to its wooden sheath which acts as a stock, it is 
very accurate at five hundred metres. So that 
the ammunition of this weapon — and this is a 
point of great importance — can be expended 


with pretty good practical results, which is not 
the case with a pistol without a stock. 

For practical purposes, then, this pistol, — 
or some other similar one, provided that it is as 
light and as powerful, has the same range, and is 
supplied with a stock, — which is essential, — is 
as effective a weapon as a rifle. Now, this pistol 
weighs only 1650 grammes. It constitutes, there- 
fore, a sort of pocket machine-gun, very easy to 
keep out of sight. Furthermore, the 7.63 mm. 
cartridge used in it weighs only 12 grammes. 
Thus the whole thing — pistol, sheath, 200 cart- 
ridges, and cartridge-box — weigh less than five 
kilogrammes, with which a man can be effec- 
tively equipped for several weeks. So that the 
weapon that is perfectly adapted to the special 
needs of the slaves of Pan-Germany unquestion- 
ably exists. The next point is to inquire if it 
can be supplied to them in large quantities. 



On this point, again, I shall make my demon- 
stration without revealing anything to the 
Boches. I shall rely solely upon something that 
exists already, and I shall give only reliable in- 
formation which may well be in the possession of 
those well informed in aviation matters. I shall 
give figures relating only to one type of airplane, 


which not only is in being but is sufficiently 
standardized to be built at the present time in 
series. This airplane — or other similar ones 
which are certainly in use in the Allied armies; 
for of course I do not recommend one type rather 
than another, for I am thinking only of victory — 
this airplane, then, can be built by hundreds or 
by thousands, in a few months, without further 

Now, the powerful motor of this standardized 
airplane will run for nine consecutive hours. 
With a tank of sufficient size and an average speed 
of 150 kilometres an hour, it would have a range 
of 1350 kilometres — that is to say, it could make 
a raid of 600 kilometres and return to the start- 
ing-point. Now a range of 600 kilometres is 
more than sufficient to permit an unlimited 
number of expeditions to widely separated and 
strategically vital parts of Pan-Germany, in 
Europe or Asia. 

In addition to the stock of fuel for 1200 kilo- 
metres, the pilots, and their equipment, our air- 
ship can carry on the journey a load of 340 kilo- 
grammes, that is to say, 68 packages of arms and 
munitions of five kilogrammes each, or enough 
to equip 68 anti-Boches. On the other hand, the 
life of an airplane may be reckoned at 80 hours; 
so that as nine hours is enough for a raid of 1200 
kilometres (600 to go and 600 to return), our ves- 
sel will be able to carry out nine such raids, or to 


carry nine times 68 packages of arms a distance 
of 600 kilometres. At that distance, then, one 
hundred Allied airplanes can in a few days equip 
61,200 men in the heart of Pan-Germany, for 
several weeks. A thousand planes would equip 
612,000 men. If four thousand planes were as- 
signed to this service, — a figure not at all chi- 
merical if all the Allies chose to take part, — 
2,448,000 men, all new combatants, could be 
equipped within a few months, in the strategically 
vital portions of Pan-Germany. 

And so, inasmuch as the requisite type of trans- 
port aircraft exists, the Allies, if they are really 
determined upon it, can send millions of arms to 
the slaves of Pan-Germany within a very few 
months from the day the decision is reached. 
And as the Boche and pro-Boche elements of the 
armies of Pan-Germany are held by force of cir- 
cumstances in the West, as their present reserves 
are not inexhaustible, the Staff at Berlin cer- 
tainly could not hold its own against large hos- 
tile forces, fully armed, operating with rapidity 
in the very heart of Pan-Germany — a con- 
tingency which has never been provided for in 
its plans. 

For all these reasons, therefore, it is quite 
within bounds to assert that it is possible to 
establish the ascendency of the revolt of the op- 
pressed democratic races of Pan-Germany over 
the Austro-Boche tyranny. 





I. Possible large increase in the output of Allied 
aircraft, — In its eighty hours of serviceable life, a 
bomb-dropping airplane can carry about ii,ooo 
kilogrammes of projectiles 300 kilometres. Again, 
in eighty hours this same vessel could carry only 
3060 kilogrammes 600 kilometres ; but those 3060 
kilogrammes represent the wherewithal to equip 
612 men in the very heart of Pan-Germany. If 
we deduct military bombardments in the rear of 
the Boche armies on the Western front, — which 
are indispensable operations, — what practical 
effect do 11,000 kilogrammes of bombs produce? 
They result in reparable local damage, money 
loss, and the deaths of a few women and children ; 
but it is certain that they put very few enemy 
fighting men where they can do no harm. On 
the other hand, the 3060 kilogrammes which 
would make possible the fitting out with arms for 
several weeks 612 determined anti-Boches who 
constitute a new fighting force for the Entente, 
dwelling in the strategically vital portions of 
Pan-Germany, and placed in a position to ac- 
count for many Germans and pro-Germans, 
would manifestly have an infinitely greater in- 
fluence on the winning of a speedy complete vic- 
tory than the 1 1 ,000 kilogrammes of bombs would 
have. This reasoning seems to prove that by 



assigning to the armament of these oppressed 
peoples at least a part of their bomb-carrying air- 
craft, which are beginning to come from the 
factories in large numbers, the Allies can very 
soon augment very largely the effectiveness of 
their thousands of aircraft now under construc- 

2. The helplessness of the Boches to defeat the new 
plan. — If it were a question of fomenting an 
insurrection in a small district of two or three 
million people, and the Boches were in no uncer- 
tainty as to the locality threatened, they would 
not hesitate to protect themselves against any 
revolutionary uprising by massacring the popula- 
tion. But such is not the case. The oppressed 
territories in Pan-Germany are of enormous ex- 
tent. The Allies, therefore, can equip the people 
in widely separated districts, and postpone making 
their choice of the special regions to be supplied 
until the last moment. Thus the Germans will 
be forced to remain in a state of uncertainty. 
Moreover, as these oppressed districts contain, 
all together, eighty-six millions of Slavs, Latins, 
and Semites, the Austro-Boches, hard-pressed as 
they are by the Allies on the West, cannot, even 
if they would, put such vast masses of people to 
the sword. On the other hand, the Germans and 
their vassals are already inflicting the most shock- 
ing terrorism on these populations. Long since 
they were forbidden to have weapons, and those 



who have them in their possession are shot when 
they are discovered. But despite the prohibi- 
tion and despite the terrorism, there are constant 
disturbances throughout the oppressed districts. 
It follows that, even if they knew that the pro- 
posed plan was being put into effect, the Germans 
could not terrorize these enslaved people more 
than they are doing. Conversely, since they are 
constantly revolting even now, when they are 
without arms and have small chance of success, it 
is plain that they would make much more trouble 
if they were effectively and abundantly armed, 
so that their chance of success would be much 
greater than it is to-day. 

It is impossible to prevent the Boche air- 
ships from flying over London and Paris, which 
are especially well looked after and defended. 
Manifestly, therefore, the Boches could not inter- 
fere with numerous passenger-carrying aircraft 
which would have an endless choice of routes a 
long way from the military fronts, and by flying 
low, could drop their packages of munitions in 
man}' different parts of Pan-Germany (in Europe 
and Asia), by means of a very simple apparatus, 
without even alighting. How then could the 
Boches, threatened on all sides, set up a really; 
effective anti-aircraft organization over hundreds 
of square miles of territory situated as we have 

If the Boches can, almost at will, with their 



submarines, strew the sea with mines which 
destroy Allied ships, it is equally true to say that, 
whenever the Allies choose to do it, they can, 
much more freely, strew these Boche-harried 
districts with innumerable packages of muni- 
tions — veritable mines which will, by virtue of 

! their combined action, blow up the whole of 

I am justified, therefore, in saying that the 
Boches could not effectively interfere with the 
plan proposed. 

3. The conditions of success of the new plan. — 
If it is to be surely efficacious, this plan must 
be methodically prepared with a view to its ex- 
ecution on a large scale. It is plain that such 
preparations on a large scale could not be con- 
cealed from the Boches, — for example, that pas- 
senger-carrying airships are being built in large 
numbers, — any more than we have been able to 

< conceal from them the manufacture of heavy 
artillery. But the fact that the Boches were ap- 
prized of these preparations would not only be no 
drawback, but would actually be of advantage. 
Indeed, it is essential, in view of the lasting moral 
shock that they are destined to receive, that they 
and their vassals should have the sense 6f being 
constantly threatened in all those parts of Pan- 
Germany which are not pro-German. This threat, 
indubitable so far as the possibility of its being 
translated into action is concerned, but always 



vague as to the exact localities concerned, would 
be to our foes a source of wearing fatigue, which, 
added to all the rest, would hasten the moment 
of their final collapse, and hence of victory. 

The time for carrying out the plan having 
arrived, the transport of arms must take place 
as rapidly as possible to widely separated dis- 
tricts of Pan-Germany. Thus the Boches and 
their vassals, having to deal hurriedly with a well- 
equipped insurrection breaking out over exten- 
sive territories and at points far removed from 
one another, would find it practically impossible 
to put it down. 

Although the general preparation we have de- 
scribed may be known to the Boches without 
disadvantage, on the other hand, the actual execu- 
tion of the plan must be rigorously kept secret: 
for example, the starting-point of the aircraft, 
the time fixed, and the objective of the raid. As 
general preparations would be made at all pos- 
sible starting-points, which are innumerable, 
the Boches would feel that they were threatened 
in every direction — a most desirable consum- 
mation ; but the Allied high command will always 
have the power to issue starting orders, at the 
last moment, to the leaders of the air-squadron, 
as well as to indicate the precise points to be 
reached. Under these conditions, the secrecy 
indispensable to success will be easy to secure. 
Thus it will be a comparatively simple matter 


to surprise the Boches despite their knowledge 
of the plan as a whole. 

I have pointed out why the plan in question, 
that its success may be assured, should be un- 
dertaken on a large scale. I propose now to 
show why a few hundreds of thousands of auto- 
matic Mausers, if they are judiciously distributed 
in Pan-Germany, would alone have a probably 
decisive effect on the war. 

The disturbances which have already taken 
place in Poland, Austria-Hungary, and the Bal- 
kans have seriously embarrassed the Austro- 
Germans and the Bulgarians. Down to the 
present time the Boches and their vassals have 
been able to deal with the situation because the 
insurgents are without arms; but if, in certain 
parts of Pan-Germany, there were supplies of 
weapons practically as effective as the rifle, such 
as the automatic Mauser, the present situation 
would be made much harder for the Boches, even 
if the number of these pistols sent by the Allies 
amounted to no more than 500,000 to 600,000, 
which a bare thousand aircraft could deliver. 

This estimate of the weapons and aircraft to be 
employed, although comparatively small, is large 
enough nevertheless to have a great effect, be- 
cause to-day, after so long and exhausting a 
struggle, a simple rupture of equilibrium is suffi- 
cient to ensure victory. 



At this moment the scales of Destiny may be 
likened to a steelyard, of which the hook is on 
the Western front and the end of the beam in 
Eastern Pan-Germany. For the moment the 
balance is in equilibrium. To break it, the 
Boches are preparing to place the supplementary 
weight of their disposable forces from the East 
on the hook at the West. On their side, to pre- 
vent the equilibrium being thus broken, which 
would mean their defeat, the Allies are preparing 
to station all their disposable forces under the 
hook, in order to checkmate the new German 
movement. But if, in addition, the Allies could 
place a supplementary weight on the end of the 
beam in Eastern Pan-Germany, even though 
the weight be a light one, it will act with great 
force, because of the length of that arm of the 
lever; and its force will be exerted in the same 
direction as the upward push of the Allies in the 
West. Thereupon the hook of the steelyard, 
rising abruptly, will give the Allies victory by 
destroying the equilibrium. 

This comparison, which summarizes the actual 
facts of the situation, will make it clear why this 
army of only a few hundred thousands of Allied 
combatants, recruited from among our latent 
allies, could not fail to have an extremely far- 
reaching influence on the issue of the conflict, 
because they would be a newly organized force, 
operating in territory through which the vital 


lines of communication of Pan-Germany pass. 
Indeed, serious disturbances in Eastern Pan- 
Germany, by disturbing these essential lines of 
communication, would react powerfully, both 
from a moral and a material standpoint, upon 
every one of the Austro-Boches fighting on the 
Western front. As soon as this condition of af- 
fairs is brought about, there would result instantly 
the special situation which would enable the 
seven millions of Slav and Latin troops incor- 
porated against their will in the armies of Pan- 
Germany — of whom Berlin is so far from sure 
that she dares not use them in large bodies on 
the Western front — to join the insurgents in 
Central Pan-Germany, and, armed with their Ger- 
man weapons, to act effectively and with little 
risk against their Austro-Boche oppressors. 

Now, if, at that precise juncture, a carefully 
prepared Allied offensive is launched in the West, 
it would manifestly have a vastly greater chance 
of success than in the past, while at the same 
time the danger of heavy losses on the Allies' 
part would be much less than heretofore. 

4. Cost of carrying out the plan, — An airplane 
of the type under consideration, with all its ac- 
cessories, is worth at most 100,000 francs. The 
value of a package of munitions weighing five 
kilogrammes, reckoning the price of an automatic 
Mauser at the cost to a private individual before 
the war, is about 100 francs. The fuel for a trip 


of 600 kilometres, with equipment for 68 men, 
would cost 1500 francs. And in its eighty hours 
of serviceable life one airplane can make nine of 
such trips. We have, then: — 

Thus the net cost of one armed man 600 kilo- 
metres away in Pan-Germany is only 285 francs, 
or, in round numbers, 300. So that the equip- 
ment of 612,000 men, which can be effected by 
using 1000 airplanes would cost only 184,000,000 
francs in round numbers — or just about as 
much as Great Britain is spending in a single day. 

Now, in order to place half a million men on the 
Western front, the Americans will certainly have 
to spend tens of billions of francs. Consequently 
the cost per capita of their combatant troops will 
be ten times greater than that of equipping one 
fighting man in the strategically vital portions of 

Not only, then, is the plan proposed likely to 
prove extremely efficacious on the military side, 
but its execution would require a relatively small 
outlay in comparison with what the Allies have to 
spend every day in the efTort to obtain results 
immeasurably less important. 

Fuel, 9X1500, 
Packages of munitions, 

100,000 francs 


174,700 francs 

Total cost. 





Beyond question, the plan of which I have 
set forth only the main outlines, like every con- 
ception of the human mind, involves numerous 
difficulties, of different kinds, to be overcome; but 
by studying them one by one, I have con- 
vinced myself that they can be surmounted more 
easily than the problems which must be solved 
in order to carry on a successful offensive in the 

In any case, after all that has been attempted 
fruitlessly, are we justified in not at least giving 
this plan a trial? The moral situation of the 
eighty-six millions of slaves in Pan-Germany is 
indisputably favorable to its execution. The 
essential physical instruments are in being. If 
the Allied leaders really wish it, these instruments 
can be produced in ample quantities with com- 
parative promptitude. The general strategic 
idea of the plan is consonant with good sense. 
The outlay it demands is comparatively insignif- 
icant. The plan would supply the Entente with 
a new fighting force without necessitating the 
sacrifice of more men on its part. It solves the 
problem of effectives for the Allies and makes it 
insoluble for the Boches and their vassals. It is 
in strict conformity with the democratic peace- 
aims of the Allies. Furthermore, its adoption 


would give the war a direction which would pave 
the way for the reconstitution of Europe at the 
peace conference. Lastly, it would nlake the 
offensive operations on the Western front in- 
finitely less costly in men for the Allies, while 
considerably increasing their chances of success. 

During twenty years of peace I warned public 
opinion of the formidable peril that was drawing 
near. Since the outbreak of the war my various 
prognostications have, on the whole, been justified 
by the event. I may be permitted, therefore, 
in the interest of the Allied cause, to appeal for 
the support of public opinion in inducing those 
in authority, first, to examine the proposed plan 
thoroughly and without prejudice; and, secondly, 
to set about the intensive construction, with 
rights of priority, of passenger-carrying aircraft 
with a very extensive radius of action. 

// is my sincere conviction that this plan may well 
lead to a swift and definitive decision before the end 
of IQ18. 

The present time (February, 191 8) is especially 
favorable for preparing to put it into effect 
morally. After the signature of the treaty with 
the Poles, despite the momentary concessions 
made to them, they cannot fail to see that they 
have been duped by Vienna and Berlin. The 
Roumanians, Czechs, and Jugo-Slavs, always 
admirable for their physical energy, are demand- 
ing independence. The Italians realize at last 


the necessity of coming to an understanding with 
the Jugo-Slavs and all the other Slavs, Latins, 
and Semites in Pan-Germany, who also are in 
the bonds of a degrading servitude. 

In very truth, then, the moral cohesion of the 
eighty-six millions of slaves in Pan-Germany, 
fifty millions of whom inhabit the strategically 
vital portions thereof, can be achieved at once. 

Under these conditions, can we, without be- 
traying the cause of democracy, without in some 
sort refusing to accept victory, fail to attempt at 
least to carry out this plan? Can we refuse to 
play this card when it seems to be the best one 
that we can ever hold to win the war? 

As a matter of fact, the present situation is 
perfectly well defined. If the Allies are content 
to fight on on the Western front, allowing the 
numerous pacifist machinations to depress the 
morale of their people, they risk — on the most 
favorable hypothesis — being compelled within 
a few months to negotiate a peace on the decep- 
tive basis of * no annexations and no indemnities.* 
In that case, as the governments of Berlin and 
Vienna have never kept their word, whatever 
terms the Allies may make with them will be ab- 
solutely worthless. Pan-Germany will survive. 
The Boches will derive a formidable accession of 
power from their enormous war-profits, whereas 
the European Allies, sinking under the deadly 



weight of their incredible war-expenditure, will 
be reduced to servitude. And — mark it well, 
Americans — the assault of Pan-Germany on 
the United States will begin forthwith. 

On the contrary, if, desiring to conclude a 
democratic peace, we are able, in addition, to 
conduct the war on democratic principles, — 
that is to say, to supply the eighty-six million 
slaves of Pan-Germany, at the earliest possible 
moment, with effective means of fighting for the 
liberty of the world, — we shall inevitably bring 
about an internal explosion in Pan-Germany, and, 
before the close of 191 8, complete victory will 
be ours. Then will the conclusion of an equitable, 
restorative, and durable peace become possible. 

The choice must be made between these two 




This book is a spiritual interpretation of the suffering and sac- 
rifice of the World War, expressed in a group of three papers of 
kindred significance, yet written from three different points of 
view by a Frenchman, an Englishman, and an American. The 
volume includes: 

Young Soldiers of France, By Maurice Barres. 

JuvENTUs Christi, By Anne C. E. Allinson. 

The Soul's Experience, By Sir Francis Younghusband. 

Each writer is seeking in the dreadful welter of war some com- 
mon revelation of spiritual comfort and advance. Is the agony of 
these years meaningless and wanton? Is the heartsickening 
struggle brutal and brutalizing, and nothing more? Each, in his 
or her own way, finds an answer. 

One, a questioner by temperament, has come to see the regen- 
eration of human life in the miracle which the war has worked in 
the younger generation. Another, by profession a soldier, found 
a new and vivid faith born of physical impotence and pain. The 
third, an American woman, has come to her new belief from far 
distant fields of the imagination. All three unite in confidence 
that the generation now culminating in manhood is passing 
through blackness into light brighter than any dawn the world 
has known. 

The spirit of the volume is the spirit of youth, learning in the 
Book of Life, trusting that the best is yet to be, and reading with 
shining eyes to the end. It is the spirit or Leo Latil, a young sol- 
dier of France, who, shortly before his death on the edge of a Ger- 
man trench, wrote to his family, — 

Our sacrifices will be sweet if we win a great and glorious victory, — if there 
shall be more light for the souls of men; if truth shall come forth more radiant, 
more beloved. 

The War and the Spirit of Youth is an inspiring, heartening 
little volume. It is well printed, handsomely bound, and sells 
postpaid for one dollar. 




By William Townsend Porter 

Few works of fiction are so filled with action as Doctor Porter's 
book; few writers of romance ever pictured scenes more colorful 
or more thrilling. And this story is true. The scream of the 
shells, the humor and tragedy of the trenches, the triumphs and 
pathos of the hospital, goings and comings in a war-ridden 
countryside, alarms and excursions of battle, soldiers, officers, 
nurses, peasants, dignitaries — Doctor Porter presents them all — 
clear and compelling cameos cut from life. 

Doctor Porter was sent abroad by the Rockefeller Foundation 
to investigate the cause and treatment of shock. His quest was 
successful; for as he modestly sums up his work, 'the cause of 
shock was found, and a new remedy.'. Yet, in the words of the 
New York Sun, — 

*This is not a medical treatise, hut a series of glimpses of the 
war, done in sharp strokes by a physician who has as pretty a technic 

with the pen as with the scalpel Members of his profession 

will turn to medical journals for the detail of his work; the public 
will get from what is here presented just the sweeping outline of 
discovery and results that matter to us all.' 

The author's profession has taught him to observe. Together 
with his remarkably ability to see things, he has sympathy, humor, 
and a talent for writing unsurpassed in the literature of the war. 
From the text: — 

Opposite me is a man evidently in poor health — an intelli- 
gent, kindly face, lined with premature old age. He has two 
collapsed air-cushions, but breath only for one. I blow up the 
second cushion. We fraternize. 

•You must know,' says he, 'that I am a Frenchman living in 
Canada. I have come over to be ready for my call. They have 
called the class of forty-seven. My age is fifty. Soon they will 
need me. Of course,' he adds, carefully adjusting the air-cushion 
to support his ailing back, ' I cannot hope for the first line, but 
perhaps I can slip in just behind. ' It is the celebrated French 

Shock at the Front is attractively bound in cloth, and 
priced at $1.25, postpaid. 




By Vernon Kellogg 

When the World War broke out, Vernon Kellogg was Professor 
of Biology at Leland Stanford University. As a man of science, he 
was accustomed to weigh facts calmly and dispassionately. He 
was an admirer of Germany, a neutral, and a pacifist. With the 
hope of relieving human suffering, he went to Europe and became 
special envoy of the Committee for the Relief of Belgium at Ger- 
man General Headquarters and at the headquarters of General 
Von Bissing in Brussels. 

For many months. Professor Kellogg lived with Germany's 
military leaders in the West, worked with them, argued with 
them, learned from their own lips their aims and principles of life. 
He saw the workings of German autocracy among the people it 
had crushed, heard German methods defended by some of the 
ablest men in the Kaiser's empire, tried in vain to understand the 
German point of view. 

"Quite four nights of each seven in the week," he says, "there 
were other staff officers in to dinner, and we debated such trifles 
as German MilitarismuSy the hate of the world for Germany, 
American munitions for the Allies, submarining and Zeppelining, 
the Kaiser, the German people." 

These "headquarters nights," and the days he spent trying to 
assuage the misery caused by the German military system, 
brought about "the conversion of a pacifist to an ardent sup- 
porter, not of War, but of this war; of fighting this war to a defini- 
tive end — that end to be Germany's conversion to be a good 
Germany or not much of any Germany at all." 

One of the most graphic pictures of the German attitude, the attitude which 
rendered this war inevitable, is contained in Vernon Kellogg's Headquarters 
Nights. It is a convincing, and an evidently truthful, exposition of the shock- 
ing, the unspeakably dreadful, moral and intellectual perversion of character 
which makes Germany at present a menace to the whole civilized world. 

Theodore Roosevelt. 

Headquarters Nights is attractively printed and bound in 
cloth. Its price is one dollar postpaid. 




Everyone who wishes to keep informed on the issues 
of war and peace, absolutely vital to the world, should 
read the war papers appearing in The Atlantic Monthly. 

Over and above M. Cheradame's articles, month by 
month, The Atlantic debates every phase of the Great 
War, in papers ranging from the recital of personal 
adventures by fighting men to statesmenlike discus- 
sions of policy during and after the war. 



Univenity of Toronto 








Acme Library Card Pocket 

The, Distribution of This Little Volume 
is a Patriotic Service 

Copies of this book for patriotic distribution can be had 
quantities at the following rates: 

5000 or more at $ .23 per copy 1 
1000 or more at .25 per copy > Carriage additional 
100 or more at .28 per copy J 

3 copies for $1.00 postpaid 
Single copies 35 cents each postpaid 

Orders promptly filled by