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THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 



Zbc /Iftoorbouse Xectutee, 1907 



THE 

SOUL OF PROGRESS 



BY 



The Rt. Rev. J. EDWARD MERCER 

D.D. OxoN. 

BISHOP OF TASMANIA 



■^ OF THE • 



LONDON 

WILLIAMS & NORGATE 

14 HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN 

1907 



Zo 

THE RIGHT REVEREND 

JAMES MOORHOUSE, D.D. 

SOMETIME 

BISHOP OF MELBOURNE 

THIS ATTEMPT TO FULFIL THE INTENTIONS 

OF THE FOUNDERS OF THE 

MOORHOUSE LECTURESHIP 

IS DEDICATED 

BY 

THE FIRST LECTURER UNDER THE TRUST. 



189165 



CONDITIONS OF THE LECTURESHIP, 

Extract from the Minutes of the Chapter 
of St Paul's Cathedra/, Me/bourne. 



MOORHOUSE LECTURESHIP. 

I. This lectureship shall be called the Moorhouse 
Lectureship, in memory of the Australian episcopate of 
the Right Rev. James Moorhouse, D.D., St John's 
College, Cambridge, Bishop of Melbourne 1876-1886. 

2. The annual income of the lectureship shall be the 
interest upon a sum of £2000 held in trust by the 
Trusts Corporation of the Diocese of Melbourne for this 
purpose. 

3. No lecturer shall hold the office more than twice, 
and at least ten years shall elapse between the first and 
second tenure. Anyone in Holy Orders in the Church 
of England at home or abroad, or in a church in 
communion with her, shall be eligible for election. 

4. The electors shall be the bishops of the metropolitan 
sees of Australia and Tasmania, and the Primate of New 



vu 



viii CONDITIONS OF THE LECTURESHIP 

Zealand, and the Archbishop of Melbourne shall hold the 
office of Chairman. 

5. The subjects of the lecture shall be (i) the defence 
and confirmation of the Christian faith as declared in the 
Apostles' and Nicene Creeds ; (2) questions bearing upon 
the history and authority of the Holy Scriptures of the 
Old and New Testaments ; and (3) the social aspects of 
the Christian faith in their widest application. 

6. The lectures, not less than six in number, shall be 
delivered annually in St Paul's Cathedral, Melbourne, on 
such days as the Archbishop of Melbourne may approve. 
Each lecturer shall be required to publish his lectures in 
a form approved by the electors at his charges within six 
months of their delivery, and shall retain any copyright 
in them. He shall present a copy to each of the electors, 
and to every Diocesan Library in Australia, Tasmania, 
and New Zealand. 

7. It shall be lawful for a majority of the electors to 
decide all questions arising out of the interpretation of 
these conditions. 



PREFATORY. 

A PREFACE should bc brief. On the whole it seems 
best that it should not be apologetic. I content myself, 
therefore, with giving a succinct account of the aims I 
have had in view while writing these lectures. 

In the first place, I have tried to carry out the inten- 
tions of the founders of the Lectureship, by showing 
that the Christian Religion can meet the deepest social 
needs of the individual and of the race. I have ap- 
proached the subject indirectly — first defining the needs 
on grounds of experience, and then showing that a 
soulless universe can never satisfy them. 

I take this opportunity of congratulating the founders 
on having chosen a peculiarly appropriate method of 
commemorating the forceful and brilliant episcopate of 
Bishop Moorhouse in Melbourne. The Lectureship 
will afford to the Australasian Church continuous oppor- 
tunity for making widely useful all that is most pro- 
gressive in her developing life and thought. It is 
especially happy that he whom Melbourne Churchmen 
learnt to love, and thus delight to honour, is able, in his 
well-earned retirement, to appreciate this proof of the 



IX 



X PREFATORY 

deep and lasting effect of his inspiring eloquence and 
unwearied activity. 

In the second place, I have tried to make the social 
movement conscious of its soul. It is surely a matter of 
supreme importance that the great masses of thinkers 
and workers should recognise the spiritual character of 
existence and of human progress. World views are 
bound to have their moral effect on those who espouse 
them. I am jealous that the Church should take her due 
part in moulding and expanding those spiritual ideals on 
which so much depends. It is time that religion should 
realise the power of social science, and it is time that 
social science should realise the power of religion. 

As regards myself, I am a humble disciple of the 
Neo-Darwinians, and find my most congenial philosophic 
home among the Personal Idealists. I mention these 
facts in order that my general attitude may be defined, 
however much it may be reprobated. At the same time, 
I have throughout the lectures (save in certain paragraphs 
duly noted) adopted the working dualism of " the plain 
man " as sufficient for my purpose. 

I look to the hypothesis of evolution as a rallying 
point. The Utilitarian can be happy in its scientific 
conceptions — the Idealist in tracing the development of 
conscious thought — the Theologian in striving to inter- 
pret the manifestations of the Divine life. Isolate any 
one of these thinkers, and he scourges the world with 
dogmatisms which dwarf human nature and impede 
progress. Bring these thinkers together in fruitful 
co-operation, and we shall see many of their seeming 



PREFATORY xi 

antagonisms merged in a higher philosophy which will 
deal with life as a whole. 

I have inserted my quotations in the body of the text. 
Now and again (as in the first lecture) they may bulk 
rather largely. But it is probable that the general reader 
will like to have them presented in the places to which 
they apply. I have only quoted where authority was 
called for, or where there was danger of misrepresenting 
those whom I venture to criticise. 

I trust 1 may stimulate, in however small a degree, 
that interest in the deeper aspects of our social problems 
which is so essential to our welfare. I am only too 
sensible of my shortcomings ; but I rely on the intrinsic 
and practical interest of my subject. Whether I succeed 
or no, the truth stands fast that the key to the inter- 
pretation of history is the unfolding of the Divine 
purpose, culminating in the manifestation of the Son 
of God. 

J. E. TASMANIA. 

HOBART, %th Ap7'il 1907. 



CONTENTS. 



Conditions of the Lectureship 
Prefatory ..... 



PAGE 

vii 
ix 



Lecture I. Fact and Meaning — 

1. Introduction: Stonehenge and Salisbury 

2. Materialism and Social Work 

The Philosophy of Negations. 

3. Apparent Indifference of Nature 

4. All Things Flow 

5. Feeling and Reality 

6. Function of Feeling 

7. Feeling and Reason 
* 8. Value Judgments, 

9. Socrates on Anaxagoras 

Parallel with Modern "Studies in 

10. Truth for Truth's Sake 

11. Value and Purpose 
^ Paley's Watch. 
Hi2i. Feeling and Progress . 



Organic." 



Lecture II. Ideals as Attracting Forces- 

1. Why? Whence? Whither? . 

2. Ideas as Forces ..... 

Nature of Ideals. 

3. Push and Pull ..... 

Mechanism Transcended. 



I 
4 

8- 

II 

13 
17 
19 

22' 
27 

30 
36 

38 



41 

43 
45 



xin 



XIV 



CONTENTS 



4- 



5. 

7- 
8. 

9- 

lO. 



II. 

12. 



The Materialist View .... 

Diihring's " Philosophy of the Actual." 

Modern Materialistic Tendencies. 
Objections of the Practical Man . 
Ideals and Evolution ..... 
Natural and Supernatural .... 
The Beautiful ...... 

Function of Art and Poetry. 
Art and Puritans ..... 

The Good ....... 

The Moral Ideal and the Incarnation. 

The Authority of the Moral Ideal. 
The Ideal and Religion .... 
Transformation of the Material . 

Illustration from a Symphony. 

Science — History and Form — Music. 



PAGE 
48 



53 
56 
60 

62 

68 
71 



74 
76 



Lecture III. Evolution and Life^ 

1. A Time of Transition 

2. Darwinism 

3. The True Sphere of Biology 

4. Evolution and Triangles 

5. History not Explanation 

6. History and the Struggle for Food 

Karl Pearson's View. 
Schopenhauer's View. 
Nietzsche. 

7. Xjiie ....... 

The Biologist still in Ignorance. 

8. Aristotle's Theory of Life . 

,-^^Matter and Form. 
Francis Bacon. 
Ruskin. 

9. The Will to Live .... 
10. " Organic Selection " . 

Importance of this New Development. 



81 
82 

85 
88 

91 
92 



97 



lOI 



108 
113 



CONTENTS XV 



PAGE 



II. Evolution nd Christianity . . . . . .117 

Appeal to Christians. 

Lecture IV. Evolution and Mind — 

1. Materialistic View of Mind . . . . .124 

Healthy Materialism. 

2. Consciousness , . . . . . . .126 

Transcends Categories and Methods of Physical 
Science. 

3. Personality . . . . . . . -131 

4. The Self — Simple or Complex ? ..... 133 

Personality and Social Work. 

5. Conscience . . . . . . . -137 

Attempted Reconciliation of Opponents. 

6. Physical Basis of Mind . . . . . .142 

7. The Chasm ........ 147 

The Theory of Interaction. 
Automatism. 

8. Materialistic Dogmatism . . . . . .152 

The Transmissive Theory. 

9. The Soul 154 

/- Defined as " Conscious Activity." 

Ao. Incompleteness of Nature . . . . . .158 

11. Love and the Incomplete . . . . . .161 

12. Man as Incarnate Reason . . . . . .164 

Lecture V. Free Will — 

i. Progress and Human Initiative . . . / 167 

2. Sphere of the Determined . . . . • .169 

3. Indeterminism . . . . . . . • 171 

4. Self-determinism . . . . . . .174 

Man a Centre of Original Force. 

5. Modes of Causation Differ . . . . . .178 

6. Kant and Causation . . . . - . .181 

7. Psychical Causation .... . . 183 



xvi CONTENTS 



PAGE 



8. Man's Will as Creative . . . . . .186 

Comparison with Creation in iVrt. 

9. Line of Least Resistance . . . . . .189 

Incommensurables. 
^. Sin. 

10. Moral Choice ........ 192 

- w^ The Whole Man Active — 

(a) Reason. 

(d) Will. 

(c) Feeling and Hedonism. 

11. Am I Responsible? ....... 202 

12. Social Aspects of Free Will . . . . .204 

Law and Punishment. 
State Interference. 

13. An Eirenicon ........ 208 

14. The Church the Society of Free Spirits . . .210 
Appendix : Moral Statistics . . . . .211 

Lecture VI. Man as a Social Being — 

1. The Social Factor . . . . . . .214 

Aristotle and Mill. 

The Physical Concepts Inadequate. 

2. Non-Social Theories . . . . . . . 221 

Hobbes — Schopenhauer — Karl Pearson. 

3. Social Impulses . . . . . . . .224 

4. Sympathy . . . . . . . . .226 

5. Unsocial Impulses ....... 230 

6. Competition ........ 233 

Enlightened Self-interest. 

7. Transformation of the Struggle ..... 238 

Huxley's Romanes Lecture. 

8. Kidd's View of Reason Criticised .... 243 

Stoic View of Social Function of Reason. 

9. Religion and the Social Factor 250 

Affords Social Judgments of Value. 
Reveals Society as a Spiritual Organism. 



CONTENTS xvii 

Lecture VII. What, then, is Progress? — page 

I. The Question ........ 256 

Various Problems Suggested. 
yZ. The State of Nature ....... 258 

Rousseau — The Golden Age. 

3. Pessimism ......... 263 

Justifiable — Unjustifiable. 

4. Optimism . . . . . . . . .270 

Need of Education. 

Feeling to be Educated as well as Intellect. 

5. Progress and Happiness . . . . . -275 

Happiness a Secondary Product. 
Function of Suffering. 

6. Slow Rate of Progress . . . . . .280 

Growing Complexity. 

Herbert Spencer's Definition of Evolution. 

7. Dyak, Arab, Hindoo, Albanian . . . . .286 

8. The Alpha and Omega . . . . . .292 

From God — To God. 



UNIVERSITV • 



OF T 



■-/ 



THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

FIRST LECTURE. 
FACT AND MEANING. 



'Ep- 0Lp)(rj yjv 6 \6yo<s .... Trdvra 8l avrov iyivero. v 

" In the beginning was the Word All things were made 

by Him." — St John i. i, 3. 

I. Introduction. 

On Salisbury Plain stands Stonehenge, in ruined but 
impressive grandeur, the finest of those prehistoric 
monuments in which Britain is so rich. Its circles of 
gigantic stones baffle hitherto the keenest research. 
Those most competent to speak would carry back its date 
far beyond the arrival of the Aryan and Celtic tribes in 
England. They would assign its building to certain 
priest-astronomers who, more than two thousand years 
before the Christian era, brought to Cornwall some 
portions of the lore and science of Egypt. We can 
picture those early sages, guided by star charts even then 



2 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

twenty centuries old, planning their mystic circles to fit 
the movements of the starry heavens, and watching the 
flow of time. 

Away over the breezy downs, the Salisbury spire rushes 
up into the blue. To reach it there is but little space to 
traverse, and yet we are some three thousand years lower 
down the stream of time. The Cathedral raises the same 
sense of wonder as does the older monument — compels 
the same admiration for human skill, and endurance, and 
creative power. And yet how overwhelming the contrast ! 
On the one hand, the huge, rough pillar stones with their 
ponderous, broken line of tenoned imposts. On the 
other, the most perfect example of one of the most 
perfect styles of Gothic, with its vistas of polished, 
clustered shafts, and its miracles of delicate and soaring 
structure. 

Let Stonehenge and Cathedral come together in the 
alembic of a thoughtful mind, and reflection is inevitable. 
For they miake visible and concrete the mystery of the 
march of human progress. But the reflections they 
suggest would vary with the bent and training of the 
thinker. The man of science would tend to single out 
the concrete facts. He would determine the weight and 
measure of the megaliths ; he would examine their 
mineralogical structure, and so arrive at conclusions as 
to their original site and the means of their transporta- 
tion. He would recognise also the growth of technical 
and mechanic skill which made possible the lifting of that 



FACT AND MEANING 3 

glorious spire. The archaeologist would dwell rather on 
the traces of the life of the past ; he would seek to 
reconstruct the course of history. The artist would 
absorb the wild and mystic spell of the one, and would 
pass with enhanced rapture to the joyous, springing, yet 
chastened beauty of the other. The philosopher, with 
eager questionings of his inner self, would speculate 
upon the meaning of it all : he would seek to probe into 
the nature of the being who reared such temples. Man, 
the builder, who and what is he ? Whence comes he ? 
Whither goes he ? And what is the purport and destiny 
of that vast temple of the universe in which these human 
monuments fill their little time and space ? 

Human life — its Whence ? and Whither ? — these are 
the deep questions for which I would bespeak your 
attention in this course of lectures. We talk of Progress. 
I shall ask you to bethink yourselves what you mean by 
this word. I shall ask you to decide what postulates 
must be granted if progress is to be more than a delusion 
— more than a specious name for a passing manifestation 
of a soulless Fate. Has life a meaning — a purpose — a 
highest good — a worthy goal ? Unless we can give some 
answer to these questions which shall be more than 
agnostic, why should we prate of progress ? No, if there 
is to be any genuine hope in living, any genuine en- 
thusiasm in social work, any genuine courage in facing 
the evils within and without, progress must have a Sou/. 

Our quest, then, is for the Soul of Progress. Let us 



4 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

not shirk facts where facts may be had. But let us also 
try to see life steadily and see it whole. And let us join 
in the prayer that the good Spirit of God, the Giver of 
Life, will reveal to us " the well of life," and the " light " 
in which we " shall see light." 

IL Materialism and Social Work. 

Throughout this course of lectures I shall be con- 
tinuously opposed to all philosophies of negations — to 
those which maintain the universe to be a closed system 
in which the happenings at any particular moment are 
purely and wholly the outcome of the happenings in the 
preceding moment — to those which deny to man any 
power of initiative or of spiritual freedom — to those 
which regard the cosmic process as unconscious, blind, 
inevitable. To all world views established upon such 
conclusions as these I declare undying enmity. For they 
empty life of all true value and dignity. They kill all 
joy and hope. They dry up the fountains of enthusiasm 
and self-devotion. They render progress meaningless 
and hollow by robbing it of its soul. 

I shall busy myself a good deal with modern material- 
ism — partly because of its widespread influence, especially 
among the ranks of social reformers — partly because I 
feel that in overthrowing its fundamental principles, I 
shall condemn those negative philosophies to which I 
have just alluded. For what matters it how grand a 



FACT AND MEANING 5 

name we give to the ultimate Reality — call it Substance, 
the Absolute, or what you will — if it is to be impersonal, 
blind, and fatalistic ? The true antithesis to materialism 
is the philosophy of the spiritual.^ I use the word 
" spiritual " in its older, nobler, and wider significance, ^ 
as implying meaning, purpose, personality. Unless the 
texture of the universe is shot through and through with 
meaning, purpose, and personality, we are in the grip of 
a soulless fate. Fine phrases can only make the hideous 
reality still more hideous. The cruder forms of material- 
ism may be waning. Negative and agnostic thinkers 
may be driven more and more to make excursions into 
the realms of idealism. But let these explorations of new 
lands be never so venturesome, they cannot avail for our 
comfort unless they yield some better results than the giving 
of pseudo-idealistic names to the old mechanical concepts. 
Without further preface, let me introduce you to this 
philosophy of the soulless. And lest you should deem 
me likely to paint it in colours too dark, I will quote for 
you the words of certain of its recognised exponents. A 
book of essays appeared lately in which various represen- 
tative men discuss the ideals of science and faith. Here 
is a passage ^ from the essay on the " Ethical Approach." 

^ Von Hartmann struggles hard to escape materialism by describ- 
ing his philosophy as a Spiritualistic Monism — his ultimate principle 
being an individual Spirit. But it is unconscious, impersonal, and 
therefore fatalistic. See Phil, of the Unconscious (Coupland's trans.), 
vol. iii. p. 194. 

2 Ideals of Science and Faith, p. 303. 



6 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

After giving the cynical story of the Creation as told by 
Mephistopheles to Dr Faustus in his study, the author 
continues thus : 

" Such in outline, but even more purposeless, more 
void of meaning, is the world which Science presents for 
our beHef. Amid such a world, if anywhere, our ideals 
henceforward must find a home. That man is the pro- 
duct of causes which had no prevision of the end they 
were achieving ; that his origin, his growth, his hopes 
and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome 
of accidental collocations of atoms ; that no fire, no hero- 
ism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an 
individual life beyond the grave ; that all the labours 
of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the 
noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to 
extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that 
the whole temple of man's achievement must inevitably 
be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins — all 
these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so 
nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can 
hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these 
truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair 
can the soul's habitation henceforth be safely built." 

There is a picture of a soulless universe ! Well may 
the painter of it go on to ask " how, in such an alien 
and inhuman world," a creature so powerless as man can 
" preserve his aspirations untarnished." That is the 
question I want to drive home. If we are to have no 



FACT AND MEANING 7 

background to life but this dread fatalism, how can we 
sing songs of the days that are to be 

" When the world grows fair "? ^ 

How shall things ever be fair without if there be unyielding 
despair within ? If we have no firmer or broader base on 
which to build the soul's habitation, how shall we sound 
the call for social service ? If we discard Christianity as 
" a pessimistic superstition," ^ what substitute shall we 
provide ? It is not on negations, however scientific, that 
the heart can feed. It is not a soulless universe that can 
feed the flame of generous enthusiasm. The irrational, 
the impersonal, is fatal, not only to the theology which 
many would destroy, but also to the growing social 
sentiment from which they hope so much. 

No, the questions Whence and Whither must receive 
some deeper answer if life is to be worth living. If the 
materialist tells us, with Spinoza, that vita est meditatio 
vit^^ non mortis^ we can agree with him. But the life 
must be, as Aristotle taught, a spark from the divine — it 
must not be a passing illusion, but must have its founda- 
tions deep down in the heart of the spiritual. It must 
have a value, a meaning, and a purpose. It must lay 
hold on the permanent and the eternal. Given such life 
as that, we cannot meditate too much upon it. It is 
the materialist's world which compels us to meditate on 
death. 

1 W. Morris. ^ Karl V^dixson, Ethic of Free Thought, p. 303. 



8 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

III. Apparent Indifference of Nature. 

A plain man, looking out on life in a plain way, sees 
that various things around him have various values, 
according as they serve his various purposes or supply 
his various wants. To him, therefore, the statement that 
the world as a whole has a purpose is only a natural 
extension of his ordinary experience. 

But there are those who see nothing in the world 
save a ceaseless and unconscious play of forces, bound 
by inexorable laws to go through a fated series of 
changes — each change being a link in an unending and 
unbreakable chain of cause and effect. And as for man 
— toiling, hoping, suffering man — he is but a deluded 
being, who offers up prayers in a universe which heeds 
him not. The heavens are as brass above him ; the 
earth is as iron beneath his feet. The eternal process 
moving on is indifferent to his weal or woe. It recks 
not of just or unjust, of wise or foolish, of good or 
evil. It sweeps away into oblivion man and his works 
' as heedlessly as the sea levels the children's castles on the 
sands.^ 

This last simile reminds me of a desolate passage in 
the writings of a brilliant French moralist. I quote it 
in extenso as a pendant to the sad passage I gave a while 

1 Compare the picture in the Iliad (vii. 454), but note that behind 
Homer's sea there is a personality akin to men, though greater than 
they. 



FACT AND MEANING 9 

ago. I am anxious that you should realise the character 
and conclusions of the " philosophy of negations " by a 
sufficient presentation of them in the words of its professed 
exponents. 

" I remember (he writes ^) that once, sitting on the 
beach, I watched the serried waves rolling towards me. 
They came without interruption from the expanse of the 
sea, roaring and white. Beyond the one dying at my 
feet I noticed another ; and further behind that one, 
another ; and further still, another and another — a 
multitude. At last, as far as I could see, the whole 
horizon seemed to rise and roll on towards me. There 
was a reservoir of infinite, inexhaustible forces there. 
How deeply I felt the impotency of man to arrest the 
effort of that whole ocean in movement ! A dike mipfht 
break one of these waves ; it could break hundreds and 
thousands of them ; but would not the immense and 
indefatigable ocean gain the victory ? And this rising 
tide seemed to me the image of the whole of nature 
assailing humanity, which vainly wishes to direct its 
course, to dam it in, to master it. Man struggles bravely ; 
he multiplies his efforts. Sometimes he believes himself 
to be the conqueror. That is because he does not look 
far enough ahead, and because he does not notice far out 
on the horizon the great waves which, sooner or later, 
must destroy his work and carry himself away." 

^ Guyau, Esquisse d^une Morale sans Ohligatioft ?ti Sa?iction, 
chap. i. sect. 3. 



lo THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

How infinitely sad ! The same elimination of the 
spiritual leads to the same despairing pessimism. Vanity 
of vanities, said the Preacher. But to a soulless universe 
of blind, unpitying forces such a term as " vanity " will not 
apply. For vanity gives the idea of something light and 
vanishing ; whereas this soulless universe is a burden 
which would grow heavier as human consciousness 
realised its drear and blank inevitability. 

Perchance some of you find it hard to accord to these 
views any measure of respectful attention. But such 
impatience is misplaced. For this negative philosophy 
has played a large part in the development of human 
thought. And in the present day, with varying shades 
of vagueness, it forms the working creed of masses who 
have never studied philosophy at all. Largely, no doubt, 
it is a reaction from an unduly arbitrary theology — a 
reaction not altogether without excuse, but one which 
cannot last too long without working untold disaster. 
Laissez-faire is not a Christian policy. Invective will 
embitter. Let us have a calm appeal to reason and 
experience. 
' And from the outset let us guard against the idea that 
because we cannot endure such a philosophy, there can 
therefore be no truth in it at all. It is but seldom that 
any great and continuous school of thought has not had 
some contribution to make to the common stock of 
human knowledge. In this case we find insistence on 
the undoubted fact that the outward frame of things does 



FACT AND MEANING ii 

not carry its explanation on its face. Nature keeps what 
is well called her " open secret." From the dawn of 
conscious speculation men have been driven to seek 
solutions for that secret, and to render to themselves 
some account of their world and of their own relation to 
it. Haeckel's title, the " Riddle of the Universe," links 
him on to an untold past. 

IV. All Things Flow. 

One of the earliest of recorded speculations was that of 
Heracleitus — coming to us from the far-off days of the 
infancy of Greek philosophy, and finding strange cor- 
roborations in the advanced theories of our own time. 
" All things flow," said Heracleitus. And who shall 
deny it ? Look out on the world as presented to the 
senses ; examine it with telescope and microscope ; bring 
to bear the most refined methods of calculation open to 
modern science — you will discover nothing fixed or per- 
manent. What else but this did Shakespeare conclude .'' 

" The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces, 
The solemn temples, the great globe itself, 
Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve, 
And like an unsubstantial pageant faded, 
""^ Leave not a rack behind." 

What else but this was the declaration of the Hebrew 
prophet, endorsed by the Apostle ? " Lift up your eyes 
to the heavens, and look upon the earth beneath : for the 



12 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

heavens shall vanish away like smoke, and the earth shall 
wax old like a garment, and they that dwell therein shall 
die in like manner." So far all seem to be in harmony 
with Guyau and his school. But here comes the parting 
of the ways. 

Heracleitus saw nothing but the ceaseless flux. At 
best, for him, one form of being does but provide the 
contrary for another, supplant another, or flow over into 
another. Eyes and ears delude with a show of per- 
manence where all is really ceaseless flux. We can grant 
him the ceaseless flux — but we need not stop short at 
that — refusing to see anything more. Suppose we dis- 
cover that there are good grounds for accepting the 
simple yet sublime language of the prologue to the 
Fourth Gospel — suppose we can rationally arrive at the 
conclusion that the world has proceeded from the eternal 
Logos — what then ? Why, the ever-changing flow of 
phenomena will then stand out upon a background of 
the spiritually permanent. Instead of an infinitely 
monotonous welter of aimless forces, we shall have the 
gradual and orderly unfolding of a rational purpose. 
Blank resignation will yield to buoyant, sunny hope. 

But mark — in the world of phenomena, as it presents 
itself to our senses, we shall look in vain for this perma- 
nent element. We cannot even tell whether the history 
of the world reveals a progressive purpose or is a mere 
swing in a never-ending see-saw. For though Stonehenge 
and Salisbury Cathedral take us through a few centuries 



FACT AND MEANING 13 

of human history, the arc is too small to give us any 
conception of the complete curve. There is not even 
evidence to assure us that the forward movement may 
not at any time be arrested, or may not give place to 
retrogression. Nay, if we are limited to what physical 
science can teach, we are certain that retrogression is \ 
inevitable. The sun will lose his heat, and life upon our 
globe will decline in quantity and in quality, until it 
ceases altogether. This fate is physically certain, even 
should no friendly comet come along to give us a 
speedier and happier dispatch. 

V. Feeling and Reality. 

Now we are face to face with our problem. On the 
one hand, the ceaseless flux of the world of phenomena. 
On the other hand, the craving of the heart for some 
assurance that the ceaseless changes lead to life, not 
death, and that death itself may be but birth disguised. 
Can we bring the surmises of the heart and the con- 
clusions of the reason sufficiently into harmony to 
warrant us in the indulgence of the larger hope ? Can 
we honestly maintain that progress has a soul ? 

Let us begin where tbe father of modern philosophy 
began. Let us adopt his famous Cogito^ ergo sum — " I 
think, therefore I exist." Here we are on firm ground. 
The external world may or may not be what we imagine 
it — it may even not exist at all. But each one of us is 



14 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

certain, by the immediate evidence of experience, of his 
own existence as a thinking being. But I would have 
you note that Descartes might have taken his spring 
equally well from either of two other propositions. He 
might have said, " I feel, therefore I exist." Or again, " I 
exercise will-power, therefore I exist." If we bring these 
three together, we get the familiar triad into which the 
unity of the self is commonly divided — Will, Feeling, 
and Reason. 

Now, what is the nature and what are the functions of 
these ultimate forms of experience thus discovered ? I 
trust I shall be able to show you that, individually and 
collectively, they carry us beyond the world of changing 
phenomena, out into other spheres and modes of being ; 
that though they refuse to submit themselves to physical 
methods of investigation, they are none the less real forces 
in determining the course of evolution. A brief pre- 
liminary statement will serve as basis for future argument 
and expansion. 

Speaking quite generally, then, I would say that 
science deals with forms of existence which can be pre- 
sented to the mind as objects under the concepts of 
matter and force. Will, feeling, and reason cannot be 
thus presented, and remain, therefore, outside its sphere. 
Reason, instead of being an object, is the very condition 
by which we apprehend and examine the world of objects. 
Will is not an object, but a subjective putting forth of 
effort. Feeling, again, is not an object, but is sub- 



FACT AND MEANING 15 

jective and individual in the highest degree. Thus, in 
and for themselves, reason, will, and feeling, remain out- 
side the range of physical science. So far, indeed, as 
they find expression in external forms and events, they 
may, or may not, yield objects amenable to scientific 
treatment. But they themselves belong to the sphere of 
what I shall call the world of the supersensible. The 
world of science, therefore, does not embrace the whole 
sphere of reality. 

We can reach this same conclusion by another line of 
thoup^ht. Let us ask ourselves, What is our test of 
reality ? Many answers can be given, but there is one 
factor which will be found to be constant, and that is — 
" power to satisfy some want of our nature." If I am 
hungry, I want food ; and I judge that to be real food 
which has the power of satisfying my hunger. If I want 
to write, I judge pen, ink, and paper to be real when 
they enable me to effect my purpose. Now it so happens 
that a majority of our simplest needs are satisfied by 
objects which belong to what is known as the material 
world. We have thus come to judge material objects as 
being real in a special and peculiar degree. But we are 
labouring under an illusion when we regard that which 
we can see and touch, and perceive by any sense, as 
being more real than feelings, ideas, and ideals. The 
true test is, not sense, but power to satisfy. We have 
rational, and aesthetic, and moral needs — we have higher 
aspirations, and hopes, and cravings. And although the 



1 6 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

things which satisfy these immaterial wants are often 
themselves immaterial by the very fact that they can 
satisfy the wants, we are bound to class them among the 
" reals." The aesthetic sense, the heart, the reason, the 
conscience, each make their claims on reality. And any 
philosophy which would deal with life as a whole must 
acknowledge different modes of reality corresponding to 
different modes of satisfying different sides of our nature. 
In other words, the world known to physical science is 
but one world out of many. As in the world open to 
physical science, so in each of those other worlds — ex- 
panding knowledge and experience will enable us to 
correct and adjust our judgments, and will bring us 
nearer to the truth of things. 

It will easily be seen how vital is the issue here defined. 
The claim of the material world to a peculiar kind 
and degree of reality must be discarded, not in a vague 
and general sense, but with full consciousness of the 
significance of the step. It must be realised that the 
appeal to the senses is but one of many forms of appeal. 
Not only so — we find that it is as subject to delusion and 
error as any of the other forms. Modern science itself 
has taught us to reduce the material world to various 
kinds of vibration, and has convinced us that colour, 
sound, heat, cold, taste, and the rest, are in ourselves 
and not in the external world. Granting vibrations, these 
various sensations are our modes of apprehending them. 
But vibrations, in their turn, can be shown to be nothing 



FACT AND MEANING 17 

more than another mode of apprehending the phenomena 
presented In the form of sensations. And thus many 
modern scientists of the first rank are led to conclude 
that our world of material objects Is constituted of chains 
of sensations, which we project outside of ourselves by 
purely subjective processes. The Imagined superior 
reality of the material world disappears. 

However these things may be, the fact remains that 
the ultimate test of the reality of a thing is power to 
satisfy a want. And tried by this test, supersensuous 
phenomena, such as feelings, ideas, and ideals, must be 
placed among the " reals " of existence. 

VI. Function of Feeling. 

For the rest of this lecture, I shall bespeak your 
attention more particularly for the nature and function of 
feeling. I take it first of the three elements in the triad, 
because it is the one which seems to be most peculiarly 
our own. It Is Inalienable from the individual. Others 
may sympathise : imagination and fellow-feeling may 
arouse experiences In different individuals more or less 
similar to those of an individual en rapport with them. 
But feeling begins and remains to the end a purely 
Individual experience. Or, looked at from a different 
point of view, feeling Is that element In our nature which, 
as Hegel expresses it, " is the Immediate, and, as it were, 
the closest contact in which the thinking subject can stand 



1 8 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

to a given content." ^ Or, as Wallace puts it in an 
introductory essay to Hegel's Theory of Mind^ " Sensation 
is the prius — or basis — of all mental life : the organisation 
of soul in body and of body in soul." ^ An external fact, 
whatever it may be, does not become ours by thinking it, 
but only by feeling it. If we are unmoved by what is 
external to us, no effort will enable us to think ourselves 
into the experience gained by the direct result of its 
action upon us. Or, as Lotze puts it,^ " The sensuous 
impressions that perception yields are all equally in- 
accessible to thought : we experience their content, but we 
do not possess them by means of thought. What is 
good and evil can be as little thought as what is blue or 
sweet. It is only after immediate feeling has taught us 
that there is worth and worthlessness in the world, and 
taught us, too, the gravity of the distinction between 
them, that thought can develop out of this experienced 
content, signs which enable us to bring a particular fact 
under these universal intuitions. Love and hate (he 
asks), are they thinkable } Can their essence be exhausted 
in concepts } " 

Such is Lotze's view of feeling. I adopt it, but with 
certain important reservations which I will now explain. 

1 Philosophy of Mi?id {\x2cc\'&. by Wallace), p. 68. 

2 Op. cit.^ p. clvi. 

^ Microcosmos^ bk. viii. chap. i. 



FACT AND MEANING 19 

VII. Feeling and Reason. 

There has been a tendency in recent times to set 
feeling and reason over against each other as disconnected, 
if not antagonistic, elements in our nature. Lotze held 
feeling and reason to be mutually exclusive — neither 
could be reduced to terms of the other. In the theo- 
logical world, Ritschl and his followers have attempted 
to base religion almost wholly on feeling as expressed 
in value judgments, and have depreciated the religious 
functions of reason. Better known among ourselves is 
Kidd's^ onslaught upon reason. He accumulates evidence 
to prove that it is a disintegrating, anti-religious, and 
therefore anti-social force. Such are some among many 
instances of this tendency. I avow myself at the outset 
to be an uncompromising opponent of it. I cannot con- 
sent to any " departmental " view of man's complex 
nature. 

I can much more easily sympathise with Schopenhauer 
in his doctrine that will is the ultimate reality, and that 
feeling and intellect are developments from it. I can 
sympathise still more with Hegel in his doctrine that 
feeling is one stage in the vast sweep of that evolution 
which passes from the lowest forms of consciousness to 
the full dignity of a reason which comprehends itself. 
For Hegel starts with Reason ; Schopenhauer with 

^ Social Evolution, passim. 



20 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

Unreason. But I seem to be nearer to the rich concrete 
whole of real life when I try to combine the two 
doctrines, and to recognise the highest mode of exist- 
ence in acts of rational self-determination which involve 
Feeling, Reason, and Will in an indivisible unity. 

Since, however, such speculations may seem to some 
to be too remote from the world of actual experience, 
1 appeal to modern psychology. You will find that 
the chief authorities agree in deprecating any artificial 
abstractions in the analysis of mental development. The 
three movements of the mental life, manifesting them- 
selves as reason, feeling, and will,^ " are not three 
currents of change which run on side by side, but rather 
different aspects of that one current which constitutes 
' the flow of consciousness.' " So writes Sully in his well- 
known text-book. And he also has this significant 
summing up of his sections on the subject ^ : "It is thus 
evident that, in spite of the fact that intellection, feeling, 
and active impulse are distinct psychical forces or 
tendencies, and that in their most energetic forms they 
assume the aspect of hostile or incomparable tendencies, 
they are organically implicated, so that there can be no 

^ Sully, The Human Mind, vol. ii. p. 296. 

2 Op. cit., p. 298. Cf. Wundt, Philosophische Siudien, x. 121 ff: 
" From inquiry into time relations, .... I attained an insight into 
the close union of all those psychic functions usually separated by 
artificial abstractions and names, such as ideation, feeling, will ; and 
I saw the indivisibility and inner homogeneity, in all its phases of the 
inner life." 



FACT AND MEANING 21 

normal and complete development of one without a 
concurrent and correspondent development of the others. 
In other words, the highest development of feeling, of 
thought, and of volition is a phase of a complete typical 
development of mind." I am quite prepared to rest my 
case against Ritschl and Kidd on this passage. 

May we not accept with intellectual satisfaction the 
doctrine of the fundamental unity of the mind ? May 
we not hold that, while feeling has its peculiar function, 
it will become ever more interpenetrated by reason ? 
For it is the function of reason to discipline mere 
impulse and to co-ordinate our faculties. I shall return 
to this aspect of the subject in a later lecture. But a 
clear pronouncement on the problem of the relation of 
feeling to reason is necessary to all that follows. And I 
therefore here declare my belief that, as man's nature 
develops, reason will tend to lose itself in the glow of 
active love, and active love will tend to manifest itself 
as transfigured reason. 

As things are, this ideal harmony is far from being 
realised — it is only adumbrated. Hence the necessity 
we are under of coining phrases to define the varying 
proportions of preponderance, according as one or other 
element asserts itself at the expense of its companions. 
For instance, it is generally held that women are swayed 
rather by emotion, men by reason. In so far as this is 
true (and the exceptions, especially on the latter count, 
are many), it is largely the result of different training, as 



22 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

well as of differences in temperament. So, again, we 
speak of " a man of feeling," " a man of strong will," or 
" a man of intellect." So, too, with our own varying mental 
states — at one time will is active ; at another, feeling ; at 
another, reason. But all these differences in tempera- 
ment or mood in no way interfere with the fact that 
each element is a part of an indissoluble whole — is a 
factor in an active unity. 

We may further note that under the conditions of our 
present life, it seems impossible for any one of these 
elements to attain to any exceptional development save at 
the expense of the others. And thus, as a thoughtful 
writer suggests,^ " The ideal of humanity on earth — the 
perfection we are intended to attain here — is to be sought, 
not in the surpassing development of our highest faculties^ but 
in the harmonious and equal development of all r 



VIII. Value Judgments. 

I trust I am now at liberty to discuss the more dis- 
tinctive functions of feeling without laying myself open 
to any suspicion of being an enemy to reason. 

There is a very important distinction, now widely 
recognised, between what are called judgments of value 
or appreciation^ and judgments oi fact or description. The 
former are defined as resting upon feeling ; the latter as 

1 Greg works out this aspect of the problem in chap. iv. of his 
Enigmas of Life^ from which the quotation is taken. 



FACT AND MEANING 23 

due to the use of reason. It is essential to my argument 
that this distinction should be clearly appreciated. 

You will observe that the term "judgment" is used in 
each case alike. Our ordinary idea of a judgment is that 
it implies some process of reasoning. But here its 
significance is expanded so as to cover mental determina- 
tions which are altogether independent of reason. This 
extended use is quite warranted by the facts of experience. 
For suppose I taste a piece of sugar — my feeling gives 
me the direct and immediate judgment, "this is sweet." 
That is to say, I have passed a judgment without the 
intervention of reason. No doubt there is implicit reason 
— it is, indeed, on this very score that I refuse to draw a 
line between feeling and reason. But there is no process. 
The judgment is immediate, springing directly out of the 
feeling itself It may stop short at feeling. Or it may, 
while remaining itself, furnish the basis for a process of 
explicit reasoning. We can trace the transition in more 
fundamental cases. For example, if I feel " this is 
myself," " that is not myself," I have arrived at the 
judgments directly and immediately ; but I have also laid 
the basis for the distinction, all-important for thought, 
between the subject and the object. Or again, when I 
say, " I like this," " I do not like that," I have the basis 
in feeling for the logical distinction between affirmative 
and negative propositions. So closely are the two sets of 
judgments allied, and yet so different in their mode of 
coming into being. 



24 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

Note, in the second place, that the result of a value 
judgment, arrived at as it is by an immediate perception, 
defines a relation between percipient and thing perceived. 
This is why it is called a judgment of value or appreciation. 
The content of the judgment is wholly internal and sub- 
jective.^ Hence the well-known saying, " there is no 
accounting for tastes." However much we may subse- 
quently analyse or elaborate a value judgment, and 
however much, by reflection or further experience, we 
may modify its future contents, the fact remains that, at 
the time it was passed, it expressed the immediately exist- 
ing attitude of the perceiving individual to the thing he 
perceived. There was no intermediate process. 

You will see the bearing of this, if you try to imagine ^ 
a man who should not know what it is to feel, but who 
should be pure reason. Now observe — for such a feeling- 
less being there would be no sense of value : he could 
pass no value judgments. All experiences would come 
before the bar of reason, and would be judged solely by 
rational processes. Hence they would all be of equal 
importance : they would all simply " happen." There 
would be no ground for preferring one to another, for 
liking one person better than another, or desiring to do 
one thing rather than another. He would not even eat 
and drink to keep himself alive, since life itself would 

1 This is well stated in Everett's Psychological Elements of Religion^ 
but with too rigid an exclusion of reason from feeling. 

2 Illustration suggested by the above. 



FACT AND MEANING 25 

have no value for him, nor would any craving act as spur 
to the will to live. No volition, inclination, or aversion 
would trouble the placid course of his reasoning processes ; 
until, like Archimedes tracing his diagrams in the dust, 
he suddenly became extinct, or, like a Babbage's calcu- 
lating machine, he wore out or rusted. 

Now here is a startling thought ! The ideal man of 
science ought to be just such a heartless thinking 
machine as this. He should be an achromatic medium 
for the registration of facts. He should be swayed by no 
personal likes or dislikes, by no aiFection for any special 
theory, by no desire to be of use nor to excel. He 
should recognise no distinction between good and bad, 
just and unjust, beautiful and ugly, sublime and in- 
significant. Each fact would have to be taken as it came 
and given a place in a gradually accumulating and 
thoroughly impersonal system. Such would be the ideal 
scientist. But he would not be an ideal man ! Nor 
would his system, however perfect, represent the real 
world ! 

Do I therefore condemn the scientist ? By no manner 
of means. In actual life we well know that men of 
science are far from being achromatic mediums. They 
are as full of human nature as the rest of us. But, qua 
scientists^ they are quite justified in struggling towards the 
ideal, and in striving for an impersonal use of reason. 
We begin to protest, though, when they try to forget 
that significant condition — qua scientists. We object when 



26 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

they want to claim the whole field of experience for their 
methods, and declare that what they do not know is not 
knowledge. We bid them remember that there are 
judgments of value as well as judgments of fact and 
description, and that judgments of value, being purely 
subjective processes, are for ever out of their reach. 
They may register and classify such judgments of value 
as events. But the grounds and meanings of the 
judgments cannot be brought within the scope of their 
methods. In a word — that which makes life worth the 
living cannot be a matter of scientific knowing. 

The true function of science is to get at " facts," and 
to attain this object it must spare no pains or effort. But 
it remxains from first to last in the sphere of the objective. 
It gives us a world of description, not of appreciation. 
The authority for the possibilities of human life is 
" the whole man," and not any one artificially constructed 
department of him. Feeling must be allowed its say as 
well as reason ; otherwise the results will be one-sided 
and misleading. 

Modern science is providing us with a wealth of new 
facts, for which the world should be duly grateful. But 
the facts, as facts, cannot carry us far. They must be 
used as stimulants for fresh feelings. Only thus can they 
bring us nearer to the heart of existence — only as appre- 
hended in judgments of value can they yield interpreta- 
tions and insights. Stonehenge and Salisbury will present 
a myriad bare facts to the investigator. But their secret 



FACT AND MEANING 27 

will never be revealed unless we can reproduce in our- 
selves the feelinp:s of those who constructed them. Here 
science is powerless. We have to rely on the subjective 
force of sympathy. The builders were moved to their 
labours by value judgments. Let us apprehend those 
value judgments, and then (and not till then) we shall 
understand. And this is true of the universe at large. 



IX. Socrates on Anaxagoras. 

This limitation of the sphere of science was seen long 
ago by the marvellously sane subtlety of the Greek mind. 
Do you remember that impressive passage in the Ph^edo 
in which the dissatisfaction of a true man with the world 
of mere fact is so dramatically expressed } Socrates is in 
the prison awaiting the return of the ship which is to 
date his death. He spends the intervening time in 
converse with his friends — speculating on high themes 
and on the life beyond. He tells how, in seeking an 
explanation for sun and moon and stars and all that 
inhabit them, he had felt that the secret lay in the Mind 
which manifested itself in this world of material forms. 
At last he hailed in Anaxagoras a teacher after his own 
heart. " I thought (says he) that he would assign a cause 
to each thing, and then would go on to explain to me what 
was best for each thing and what was the common good 
of all. I would not have sold my hopes for a good deal. 
I seized the books very eagerly, and read them as fast 



28 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

as I could, in order that I might know what is best and 
what is worse." And how great was his disappointment ! 
— a disappointment which comes home to us when we read 
materiahstic treatises, brilHant perchance, but leading us 
nowhither. Let Socrates voice our discontent. " All my 
splendid hopes (he continues) were dashed to the ground, 
my friend ; for as I went on reading, I found that the 
writer made no use of Mind at all, and that he assigned 
no causes for the order of things. His causes were air, 
and ether, and water, and many other strange things. I 
thought that he was exactly like a man who should begin 
by saying that Socrates does all by Mind, and who, 
when he tried to give a reason for each of my actions, 
should say, first, that I am sitting here now, because my 
body is composed of bones and muscles, and that the 
bones are hard and separated by joints, while the muscles 
can be tightened and loosened, and, together with the 
flesh, and the skin which holds them together, cover the 
bones ; and that therefore, when the bones are raised in 
their sockets, the relaxation and contraction of the muscles 
makes it possible for me now to bend my limbs, and that 
that is the cause of my sitting here with my legs bent. 
And in the same way he would go on to explain why I 
am talking to you : he would assign voice, and air, and 
hearing, and a thousand other things as causes ; but he 
would quite forget to mention the real cause, which is 
that since the Athenians thought it right to condemn 
me, I have thought it right and just to sit here and 



FACT AND MEANING 29 

to submit to whatever sentence they may think fit to 
impose." 

Every word of this goes home to-day. Every word 
expresses my own feelings, as I read a book like 
Maudsley's Life in Mind and Conduct. I follow with 
appreciative pleasure while the author insists on the 
" organic in human nature." I admire the exposition of 
the processes of growth and development ; the description 
of the exquisitely fine networks of nervous organisation 
which are the indispensable conditions of earthly being. 
But my soul is saddened by the almost cynical pessimism 
which is the outcome of these " studies in organic." 
Maudsley fails to find any rational meaning in the 
"organic." Ground for hope and cheer there arises 
none. The exquisite processes seem to come from the 
bosom of night and to return thither. He tells us we 
must not think and speak of any mental product, even 
when raised to its brightest power, as if it had value 
outside human limits of thought.^ " The bee (he says) 
would do much the same which should deem its buzzing 
to be of like transcendental import, as at heart doubtless 
it unconsciously yet exultantly does. Let a creature buzz, 
hiss, howl, roar, sing, crawl, fly, creep, walk, or talk, as 
its mode of living self-expression, it must needs translate 
the world into the terms of such mode of being, shape 
the things thereof accordingly, and feel or find therein 
the foundations of its beliefs." 

^ Life in Mind and Co?idtict, p. 437. 



30 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

True, Dr Maudsley — quite true, as far as it goes. But 
why stop just there ? Why should feeling be deemed to 
be worthless because it takes myriad forms ? May not 
each of the forms accomplish some hold on the ultimately 
real ? The buzzing of the bee is not something detached 
from reality — it is itself part of reality. And so of the 
bee*s exultation in its buzzing — that too is part of reality. 
Your censure, Dr Maudsley, falls rightly on those who 
think that all life upon the globe was made merely and 
expressly for man's use and pleasure. But it falls 
harmlessly on those whose creed is wider, and who have 
the faith 

" That nothing walks with aimless feet ; 
That not one life shall be destroyed, 
Nor cast as rubbish to the void, 
When God has made the pile complete." 

X. Truth for Truth's Sake. 

At this stage of my argument, someone may interpose 
with the question whether there is not such a thing as 
truth for truth's sake — that is to say, a pursuit of truth 
apart from feeling. And are we not bound, it may be 
asked, to follow truth wherever she may lead, and what- 
ever may be the consequences ? 

Truth for truth's sake ! It seems a churlish and, 
indeed, a wanton thing to damp or lessen enthusiasm for 
such a phrase. But when those who deny any meaning 
or purpose to the universe, use it as though they had a 



FACT AND MEANING 31 

peculiar right to it, and even advance it as a substitute for 
religion, then it becomes necessary to show its incomplete- 
ness and its hollowness. If the universe is nothing; but 
a closed system, containing a fixed amount of matter and 
energy (or whatever soulless substitutes for these may be 
provided by monistic " substances " or pseudo-idealistic 
" absolutes ") — what possible meaning can there be for 
such a term as truth ? All is machinery, and the truth- 
seeker is simply part of the machinery. He cannot 
genuinely search for anything ; he just " works " like any 
other machine. And even supposing he could search for 
truth, what could he effect but aimlessly amass a host of 
bare facts ? Beyond the power to satisfy his wants, what 
should he care for truth as truth ? The hoarding of bare 
facts would be more foolish than the miser's hoarding 
of gold he never means to use. No, the facts must be 
clothed with some sort of significance if they are to 
induce us to expend energy upon accumulating them. 
In other words, our value judgments must find in them 
material which can give them content. Feeling must 
arouse the will, and the will must spur the intellect. The 
whole man must be put into action. Truth must be no 
cold abstraction : it must be heated in the alembic of life, 
until it glows with the hues of meaning and of purpose. 

How thoroughly is the " value " aspect of the search for 
truth recognised by great thinkers ! Malebranche says : 
" If I held truth captive in my hand, I should open it and 
let it fly, in order that I might again pursue and capture 



32 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

it." Mark the zest, the warmth of feeling, here displayed. 
Lessing says : " Did the Almighty, holding in his right 
hand Truth and in his left Search after Truth, deign to 
tender me the one I might prefer — in all humility, but 
without hesitation, I should request Search after Truth." 
And Jean Paul Richter goes to the heart of the matter 
when he declares that " it is not the goal, but the course 
which makes me happy." That is to say- — there is an 
element of value for the individual in the very exercise of 
the speculative faculties, and in the sense of having effected 
a purpose.^ 

Should the materialist grant this position, and allow 
that we pursue knowledge with a view to decreasing our 
pains and increasing our pleasures — then I urge that this 
admission destroys the lofty dictum with which he started. 
Moreover, there are undoubtedly times when ignorance 
is bliss. Why, then, in those cases, should I seek for 
truth ? Unless there is some real dignity and value in 
truth founded on the nature of things, it need have no 
magisterial authority for me. It would be nothing more 
than one among other means to happiness, to be played 
with, and taken up or put away as occasion might 
require. In a soulless universe, truth for truth's sake 
rings hollow. 

But I go further than this. As I briefly suggested a 
while ago, I deny that for the man who can discover no 

1 See, for these and other similar quotations, Sir Wm. Hamilton's 
Metaphysics^ pp. 12, 13. 

^■4 



FACT AND MEANING 33 

meaning or purpose in the universe there can be any 
such thing as truth. For let us keep him to his nega- 
tions. Everything that happens is to be determined by 
the law of causation. The materialist, Cabanis, tells us 
that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile. 
Very good. Then take two brains — say, mine and a 
materialist's. Each is a part in the mighty mechanically 
determined whole. By some utterly inconceivable 
process, the materialist's brain secretes the thought that 
brains in general, including his own, are mere machinery. 
My brain, by what is, if possible, a still more inconceiv- 
able process, secretes the thought that brains in general, 
including my own, are something more than mere 
machinery. Now who is to decide between us ? Can 
one of us claim to be more the exponent of truth than 
the other ? I cannot see how this could be. For the 
two results are on precisely the same footing. They 
are both (by the supposition) the product of inevitable, 
aimless, mechanical processes. This is all passing strange ! 
One tiny bit of a vast piece of machinery makes itself 
ridiculous by contradicting another tiny bit of the same 
vast machinery. There is no appeal, for the system is 
self-contained. And other tiny bits of the same 
mechanical whole secrete a thought of the ridiculous as 
they behold these things, and other parts of the machinery, 
in close connection with the brains concerned, are auto- 
matically shaken backwards and forwards in space, pro- 
ducing a sardonic cackle. 

3 



34 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

However, since the materialist and his kin can 
apparently swallow all this without difficulty, we must 
even leave them to it undisturbed. But those of us who 
believe that there is a reason without which finds response 
in a reason within, can at any rate frame a doctrine which 
shall make us willing to pursue the truth for the sake of 
the meanings and the values secured. 

What a striking illustration is afforded of the function 
of feeling in the pursuit of truth by the history of that 
great theory on which the materialist is wont to lean so 
heavily — I mean the theory of evolution. We find at 
its base a goodly array of facts, tested by the methods of 
science, and brought into connection with each other 
from a special point of view. But are the facts sought 
for their own sake in the abstract, or even left to stand 
by themselves as facts } Far from it. Into those facts 
thinker after thinker reads his own speculations as to their 
significance for man. Hopes have risen high that new 
light might be thrown upon the origin of terrestrial life, 
and upon the problem of man's place in nature. Contro- 
versy has raged hotly — sometimes too hotly. And men 
of science have not been less heated than others. Now 
where is the nerve of all this throbbing intellectuality ? 
Partly in the pleasure of the search. But chiefly it is 
where it will ever be found — not in abstract theory, 
nor in abstract truth, but in the value judgments 
involved ? 

It is suggestive to look at this matter from the 



FACT AND MEANING 35 

opposite point of view. Writers of popular science ^ are 
always painting for us pictures of the glories of scientific 
discovery and of the increased happiness they will bring 
to the race. We are bidden to fall down in ecstasy over 
Rontgen rays, wireless telegraphy, and radium. There are 
few who have been more roused to wonder by these 
marvels than I. But, with sadness I confess it, the 
wonder has already begun to wear off. And as regards 
the general public, Marconi's system has become a matter 
for commercial speculation and will be valued no more 
highly than the telegraph or the telephone. These and 
all other discoveries have their nine days' glory, and then 
sink into the huge mass of accepted facts. And so it 
will always be. The value of the facts is not something 
objective like the facts themselves — it is a personal, 
subjective affair. Familiarity breeds indifference. The 
glamour 

" Fades into the light of common day." 

Let us therefore be on our guard against a common 
fallacy. Because scientific discoveries give us pleasure 
at first, it is argued that they will always give us pleasure. 
We know from experience that this is not so. Value 
judgments are the determining factor. The true zest is in 
the search for further discoveries — in the exercise of our 

1 For example, a book with a large sale — New Conceptions in 
Science — enthusiastic, bright, but hopelessly deficient in its ideas as 
to what constitutes true progress. 



36 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

functions and faculties — and in the firmer grasp we gain 
upon meanings and purposes which shall make life worth 
living. 

XI. Value and Purpose. 

Value judgments, when occasion calls, stimulate the 
will to action. Thus comes into existence the conception 
of a purpose to be fulfilled — an end to be gained — a 
design to be carried into execution. The full bearing of 
this conception will be considered when we come to deal 
with ideals and free will. Here I want to point out 
that design, or purpose, reposes on value judgments, and 
therefore belongs, like them, to the sphere of existences 
beyond the reach of science. Science has never yet 
managed to weigh, measure, capture, or bottle, a purpose 
— simply because the thing is impossible. We know of 
design or purpose solely as a subjective experience. We 
interpret purpose where we see it by analogy from the 
workings of our own minds. And yet there are 
scientists, who, because by their methods they cannot 
discover design or purpose in nature, refuse to believe 
that it is there. It is cheering to know that the number 
of such scientists is steadily decreasing. 

Some of us belong to the generations to whom Paley*s 
famous " watch " argument was familiar and conclusive. 
But nowadays many tell us that this attempt to prove 
design in nature is hopelessly old-fashioned — that Darwin- 
ism has robbed it of all its point. Well, I suppose few 



FACT AND MEANING 37 

will deny that the watch has received some hard knocks 
of late. But I am bold to believe that it is going yet. 
It may want cleaning, and a new face ; but its essential 
virtue remains. For what is a watch ? It is a machine 
with a design. The fact that it is a machine does not 
take from it the element of design. It embodies and 
fulfils a purpose. And therefore, as a matter of fact^ the 
universe has produced a machine which does actually 
effect a purpose. How enormously significant is this fact 
when its implications are duly apprehended ! For how 
can we deny purpose to a universe which has produced 
a being capable of conceiving a design, and constructing 
a machine in accordance with that design } It seems to 
me that philosophers of the soulless, with the exception 
of Schopenhauer and his school, persistently blink this 
outcome of the cosmic process. Schopenhauer posits 
Will, and so " purpose " follows naturally. But how 
shall purpose emerge as a " product of causes which had 
no prevision of the end they were achieving," or as an 
" outcome of accidental collections of atoms " } The 
process would seem to me to involve nothing less than an 
absolute contradiction in terms. 

I hold, then, that purpose does actually exist — that it 
manifests itself in experience as one of the absolute 
" reals " of life — and that it must be definitely reckoned 
with in any philosophy which hopes to penetrate beneath 
the surface of " facts " to the nerves and tissues of 
" meaning." Science cannot discover purpose. That is no 



38 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

wonder : the wonder would be rather if it could. Feeling 
is the interpreter of purpose. Science cannot touch it. 

XII. Feeling and Progress. 

The first step in my argument is now definitely taken. 
I look to feeling as the means for establishing the prime 
and fundamental relation between living, sentient creatures, 
and the external realities which form their environment. 
Historically, feeling has been developed in the animal world 
in ever-growing degrees of quantity, quality, and inten- 
sity. Beginning with undifferentiated sensations, sentient 
creatures have gradually learnt to smell and taste, to hear 
and see. The evolution has been evoked by form and 
colour, scent and sound, and all the varied stimuli of the 
external world. This upward striving for contact with the 
real culminates in man. And for man, too, there has been 
a historical development of feeling, with a corresponding 
power of piercing to meanings and framing of rational 
purposes. Feeling furnishes material for apprehending 
with increasing clearness the " Reason " underlying the 
phenomena of sense. It enables us to realise, with Lotze, 
that the whole outer framework of the cosmos is " a tissue 
of regularly crossing stimuli, designed to kindle at 
innumerable points the true action of a more intelligent 
life." Set the theory of evolution in the light of such a 
world-view as this, and it begins to be luminous with 
purpose and meaning. Dark masses still move through- 



FACT AND MEANING 39 

out its immense bulk ; but shooting rays of glory flash 
hither and thither, and cast a glow over the very darkness 
itself. 

Such a world-view enables us to understand Carlyle as, 
looking up to the star-lit heavens, his spirit was moved 
within him, and he exclaimed to his friend, " Man, it's 
just dreadful." It enables us to understand another, and 
very different philosopher, Herbert Spencer, when in 
his last essay he writes thus ^ : "Of late years the 
consciousness that without origin or cause infinite space 
has ever existed and must exist, produces in me a feeling 
from which I shrink." Such a world-view enables us to 
understand the psalmist of old time, who, looking up at 
those same heavens, cried, " Lord, what is man that Thou 
art mindful of him, or the son of man that Thou so 
regardest him ? " It enables us to understand how even 
the unimpassioned Kant could declare, "Two things 
strike me dumb : the infinite starry heavens without, and 
the moral law within." For in each, and all such 
experiences, feeling of the most exalted character is 
wrestling with realities, and rises into self-conscious 
acknowledgment of a mystery yet to be solved. Cosmic 
emotion is no empty, meaningless stirring of a futile 
wish to know : it is deep calling unto deep. Man 
cannot rest in "a study of organic," however exquisite 
may be the nerve tissues and processes he may dis- 
cover. The methods of physical science cannot satisfy 
^ Fads and Comments : last words of the last essay. 



40 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

him. He reaches out, through feeling, to learn the 
meanings of this " strange swift course run out beneath 
the silent heavens."^ The knowledge for which he 
yearns is more a knowledge of the heart than of the head. 
The intellectual knowledge of absolutes must always be 
imperfect. For intellectual knowledge implies unreal 
abstractions. His passionate search is for realities that 
can inspire and justify a life of action. Thus it is that 
feeling, more and more tempered, enriched, harmonised, 
organised, by reason, spurs on the will to realise those 
ideals which, as we shall see, express the spiritual 
capacities of man's nature, and constitute the Soul of 
Progress. 

^ J. Caird, University Addresses^ p. 306. 



SECOND LECTURE. 

IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES. 

"Stretching forward to the things which are before." — Phil. 
iii. 13. 

I. Why ? Whence ? Whither ? 

1 ASKED in the first lecture how men can be inspired to 

work for the social good unless they believe that the 

principles of progress are founded in the real ? If 

nature is evil, the case is hopeless. But even if we 

modify the pessimistic view into saying that nature is 

indifferent, the case is not much better. For all certainty 

is taken away ; the eternal flux is too strong for us. The 

heart is taken out of all we would do. The part of 

wisdom would be to face the hopeless future with stoical 

resignation and unflinching fortitude. 

We saw that such conclusions appear to be inevitable 

if we have nothing but the teachings of science to guide us. I 

For science cannot penetrate to meaning, or to purpose. 

These belong to the sphere of the subjective ; and the 

subjective remains essentially out of the scientist's reach. 

41 



42 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

Qui scientist, he has to stop short at facts and descriptions. 
But we also saw that, qui man, he is bound to go on. 
For through the medium of feeling he comes into touch 
with reality in ways unknown to science. He forms 
judgments of appreciation as well as judgments of 
description. If he shuts his eyes to the revelations of 
feeling, he crushes down in himself that which is not 
only the most human in him, but also the most noble. 
If by specialisation he is unhappy enough to atrophy 
some of his sensibilities, and so contract his nature, as 
did Darwin, he will, like Darwin, lament his loss, rather 
than glory in his limitations. 

I maintain, then, that if a man is a man at all, in any 
true sense of the word, he cannot rest content to look no 
further back nor further forward than the bounds set by 
the limits of his natural life. The ultimate questions 
press upon him because his nature expands beyond the 
world of fact to expatiate freely in the unknown and the 
unrealised. 

In proof whereof, here is a touching passage from 
Herbert Spencer. He was feeling the end to be near, 
and he notes how nature forced upon him some of her 
world-old, yet ever insistent questionings.^ " For years 
past (he writes) when watching the unfolding buds in the 
spring, there has arisen the thought — Shall I ever again 
be awakened at dawn by the song of the thrush ? " And 
later he adds : " It is commonly supposed that those 

^ Fac^s and Cotmnents^ last essay. 



IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 43 

who have relinquished the Creed of Christendom occupy 
themselves exclusively with material interests and material 
activities — thinking nothing of the How and Why, of the 
Whence and Whither. It may be so with some of the 
uncultured, but it is certainly not so with many of the 
cultured." 

There you have the simple, direct statement of a great 
thinker and a good man. I take it to be typical. The 
spirit of the writer was humane, sincere, and indefatigable. 
It has now passed beyond the veil, and some, at any rate, 
of these ultimate problems will have found their solution. 
Those of us who have not felt compelled, like him, to 
relinquish the Creed of Christendom, believe that many 
of them, in their essentials, are solved for us already. 

II. Ideas as Forces. 

It is manifest that when we approach these ultimate 
questions we pass from the sphere of objective phenomena 
into that of mental existences — some would say, into the 
sphere of the unsubstantial, if not the visionary. But ideas 
are not unsubstantial, though they be immaterial. They 
have a real existence, and exert a definite force. I need 
not dwell upon this subject. For the tendency of much 
modern psychology is all in this direction of recognising 
ideas as forces. It sometimes almost materialises them. 

From another point of view, ideas have won for them- 
selves a distinct place in scientific philosophy. Science 



44 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

1 now is nothing if it is not a system of ideas. " Law in 
the scientific sense " (says Karl Pearson) " is essentially a 
product of the human mind and has no meaning apart 
from man. It owes its existence to the creative power 
of his intellect. There is more meaning in the statement 
that man gives laws to Nature than in its converse that 
Nature gives laws to man." ^ The source from which I 
take this statement will guarantee its freedom from any 
leaning to a spiritual interpretation of thought. And it 
will also serve to prove how far modern science is being 
compelled to move in the direction of idealism. 

Speaking generally, we may say that ideas are now seen 
to possess a sort of individuality of their own. They 
can combine together in modes of varying complexity. 
They can be " in the air," as the phrase goes. They can 
migrate from brain to brain. They can go to form part 
of the common stock of stored or traditional knowledge. 
In short, though they are " immaterial," they are none 
the less " reals," and act as definite forces in the progress 
of the race. 

Moreover, they are ever subject to the laws of develop- 
ment, if not of evolution. For thought is living and 
progressive. There is a continual struggle for existence 
among ideas, analogous to that in the organic world. 
Our arguments and controversies are but so many 
manifestations of the continued efforts of thought to 
bring itself into harmony with the reason implicit in its 

^ Grammar of Science J '^. 104. 



IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 45 

environment. We have to be thankful that we live in 
times when the conflict for survival among ideas is being 
confined more and more to the arena of peaceful debate, 
instead of being fought out, as so often in bygone days, 
on bloody battle-fields, or in torture chambers, or by fire 
and stake. 

But the ideas involved in the answers to these " ultimate 
questions " are of a peculiar kind. Scientific ideas take 
shape from the study of definite, objective facts. The 
origin of these is quite different. While it is true that, 
in the first instance, they are based on the facts of ex- 
perience, it is more true to say that they owe their 
existence to the absence of facts. They are the outcome 
of attempts to go beyond the facts. They take form 
round obscure tendencies in our nature, and " stretch out 
to that which is before." We project ourselves into the 
unknown, and trust the primal forces of our nature to 
guide us where the light of fully reasoned process has not 
yet penetrated. We feel the direction we should take, 
rather than recognise it by known signs or landmarks. 
The absolutes of nature are not yet intellectually visualised 
by human beings. But they are known, because felt. 

III. Push and Pull. 

By the use of reason, man has made marvellous strides 
in subduing his environment to his will. But with the 
existing order of things he is never satisfied. A peculiar 



46 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

doubleness of his consciousness enables him to put him- 
self outside his world, and to speculate on its why, and 
whence, and whither. But he does not stop short with 
asking questions. He looks round upon the vast un- 
wieldy mass of facts, and begins to criticise it. He then 
tries to picture to himself something better. From the 
springboard of the present he launches out into worlds 
which might be, though they are not. And thus he comes 
to frame those truly astonishing products of his mental 
activity — his ideals, 

^ Science deals with facts — but man's nature chafes 
against facts just because it is greater than the facts. 
As Lange well puts it, the mere stubborn fact must 
always seem bad ; and the materialism to which it leads 
must inevitably end in some form of pessimism. Nay, 
as Lange further points out, pessimism itself is only 
possible because of the shock we experience when we 
contrast the actual with the ideal. Man feels his know- 
ledge to be imperfect. Why ? Only because he has 
an ideal of a more perfect knowledge. Man recognises 
the imperfections of his environment — only because he 
has an ideal of beauty. He grieves over the imperfec- 
tions of his own nature — only because he has an ideal of 
the good. Bereft of these ideals, he would be content 
with what exists. Dowered with these ideals, he devotes 
the energies of his nature to achieving them. 

Now these ideals have one vitally significant and out- 
standing feature which I would emphasise to the utmost 



IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 47 

of my power. Recall for a moment the scientific con- 
ception of nature. It is that of a closed mechanical 
system in which the state of affairs at any given moment 
is the exact resultant of the forces at work in the pre- 
ceding moment. That is to say, the onward movement is 
wholly the result of push from behind. That which exists 
now is nothing more than the outcome of what before 
existed. Contrast the action of the ideal. It belongs to 
a world which does not yet exist at all. It beckons to us 
out of an unrealised future. It pulls us on from the 
front, and brings into existence new creations, new con- 
ditions. It is based on past experience, but it transcends 
that experience. It lures on by the hope of an experience 
yet to be. It frees us from the mechanical. 

I shall hope to show, when I come to consider the 
" will to live," that there is an inner urge in our nature 
which leads us to continuous effort in the direction of 
modifying our environment and developing the " self." 
So far from rigid mechanism pushing everything from 
behind, it is just the operation of such rigid mechanism 
that crushes the bloom and freshness of the impulses 
to new creation. You will realise the force of my con- 
tention if you consider the creative prompting in the 
case of a true artist. You will find that while he obeys 
recognised laws and traditions, he throws them off when 
they unduly cramp and fetter the free expression of his 
idea or ideal. He has had an intuition, a vision, of 
something more beautiful, or more noble, or more 



48 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

rapturous, than anything yet attained. There wells up 
out of his soul a creative power which goes out to meet 
the vision or the intuition. And there comes into 
existence "a thing of beauty" which is "a joy for ever." 
The observation is now trite, but it needs perpetual 
emphasis, that analysis comes after creation. Science can 
gather facts, and classify, and describe. But the aroma 
of the living process, the creative spirit of the artist, the 
attractive force of the ideal, are for ever free from its 
mechanical categories. 

The soul of Monteverde moved about in a world of 
sound not realised. He rebelled against the rigid laws 
of harmony and counterpoint prevailing in his day. He 
insisted on the discord of the dominant seventh, and, 
lo ! the way was opened out for all the glories of modern 
music. Do you say that his discovery was inevitable ? 
I grant you there is a sense in which it was. Every 
real work of art is, in a sense, inevitable. But the 
" inevitable " of the ideal is the very antithesis of the 
"inevitable" of mechanics. For it has all the spontaneity 
of free, self-determining spirit, realising its expanding 
nature in wedding idea to form. 



IV. The Materialist View. 

I need not tell you that the views I have expounded 
have many powerful and uncompromising opponents. 
And naturally the consistent materialist is among the 



IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 49 

most determined of them. Such views of the nature 
and functions of ideals are fatal to his soulless system. 
Hence he makes a desperate effort to show that the 
ideal is, after all, the outcome of pushes from behind. 
If we ask him whence comes its power of modifying 
the future, he assures us that such power is quite a 
delusion. 

How convenient, by the way, these delusions, illusions, 
hallucinations, and the rest, are for these philosophers of 
the negative ! The only wonder is how an unconscious 
and aimless set of soulless forces manages to produce 
them. Suppose that the materialist himself is under a 
delusion ! On his own principles, this dreadful possi- 
bility is quite as likely as the other 1 

Of this anti-spiritual school I select Dilhring as an able 

and brilliant representative. He is a philosopher who 

has evolved what he designates a Philosophy of the 

Actual. He takes the world just as it is — just as it 

presents itself to our senses ; and he interprets it in 

terms of that purely mechanical causation to which I have 

drawn attention. For him, therefore, the future, whole 

and entire, exists potentially in the present. If we could 

know all the forces mechanically at work at the present 

moment, and had sufficient powers of calculation, we 

could calculate its exact state at any subsequent moment. 

On such premisses there is of course neither place nor 

need for any such spiritual forces as my doctrine of ideals 

would necessitate. The ideal becomes a kind of by- 

4 



so THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

product, of no real significance. He falls fiercely^ on 
" everything which points to anything beyond the 
present." And yet it is interesting to note that " what 
really incites him to engage in philosophical speculation 
is the feeling which impels one to search into the mean- 
ing of existence and to seek to transform life : that is 
to say, his speculations are throughout of a passionate 
character." How explain this apparent contradiction ? 
I think it arose from his intense desire to be practical. 
He attacked " everything which leads away from active 
work." And he started on the assumptions that the 
ideal was unpractical, and that religion was nothing but 
weak mysticism. He longed for the real. Hence his 
materialism, which gave him, as he thought, a true 
pedestal for a true philosophy. 

In treating of such a world-view as this, one can have 
every possible sympathy with its aim, while repudiating 
its fundamental conceptions. As regards the inadequacy 
of mechanical conceptions to grapple with the facts of 
experience, I have already said as much as is possible 
under present conditions. But I will point out the 
comforting and edifying fact that Dilhring himself was 
unable to make his own principles account for the actual 
world. For example, when confronted by the facts of 
evolution and progress, he has to fly to principles which 
are not mechanical, and to bring on the scene the gibbering 
ghost of a conscious purpose. He is forced to this by 
^ Erdmann, Hist, of Philosophy^ vol. iii. p. 249. 



IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 51 

his attempt to justify teleology. He also introduces types 
or ideas after the fashion of those of Plato and Schopen- 
hauer. Of course such types or Ideas are quite Inconsistent 
with his materialism. But, waiving this objection, what 
are they but a feeble resuscitation of the older, and saner, 
and most truly human, doctrine of Ideals ? Further, he 
has to acknowledge a mystery In spite of his hatred of 
mysticism. But In order that he may remain faithful to 
his materialism, he leaves the solution of this mystery to 
future discovery. And In order to satisfy the cravings of 
man's Immaterial nature, he deigns to acknowledge the 
sense of cosmic emotion, uses it as a basis for judgments 
of value, and makes it a substitute for religion. 

Now, Is It not fair to ask whether, when so able and so 
subtle a reasoner as Dtihring Is reduced to straits so dire, 
when he would fasten himself down to the world of actual 
fact — is It not fair to ask whether his case is not a bad 
one ? And may we not feel justified In holding to our 
Ideals without submitting the whole materialistic system 
to detailed and elaborate criticism ? I have the greater 
courage in putting these questions, because Dtihring him- 
self allowed that materialism supplied only a small part of 
true philosophy. He put It at one-twentieth ! 

But Duhring wanted to be practical. So do I. And 
therefore I ask you to look at this matter from the 
practical side. Ideals do actually exist — good or bad, as 
the case may be. Let us confine our attention to the 
good. Now, suppose we grant that they are nothing 



52 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

more than empty creations of the human mind, with no 
foundation in the real. Then, if we are to be logical 
and consistent, we must learn to take them for what they 
are — chimerical and arbitrary conceptions : figments of 
the imagination : mirages projected on the mists of the 
future by the flickering lights of vague desires. But if 
ideals be such, why should we waste a thought or effort 
upon them ? The sooner we emancipate ourselves from 
their vain thraldom the better. Perchance Schopenhauer 
and von Hartmann might seriously urge such counsel as 
this. Duhring attempted to escape from such conclusions, 
though in vain. But, all philosophy apart, I ask you as 
practical men and women living in a real world under the 
conditions of real life. What would become of progress 
were the counsel acted upon ? Could we dare to face the 
future stripped of our ideals ? Surely the question gives 
us the reductio ad ahsurdum of the whole philosophy on 
which such a counsel could be founded. 

But, alas ! the true character of the materialistic system, 
and of the soulless systems akin to it, has not yet been 
sufliciently apprehended. The glittering tinsel of a 
criticism that pretends to work with " facts " versus 
" fictions " carries people away, and blinds them to the 
fatalistic tendencies of the doctrines they would embrace. 
And, what is still more sad, the doctrines filter down into 
the ranks of those who seldom read, and still more seldom 
think for themselves. There is a popular Philosophy of 
the Actual which is one of the great dangers of the future. 



IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 53 

Among the toiling masses stirred by eager hopes of a 
social reconstruction, there is prevalent a practical material- 
ism which will inevitably eat out the life of the ideals in- 
herited from a fuller faith — the ideals by which they live. 
Their cry is for machinery — more machinery — machinery 
political — machinery social — machinery industrial. Far be 
it from me to deny that machinery has its place, and that 
we want more of it. But its place is subordinate. We 
must have such a view of the meaning and worth and 
dignity of human life as shall keep alive in us a glowing 
love for all that is high, and pure, and generous. We 
must feel the pull of the ideal drawing us onward, and so 
gain guidance and courage for the task that lies before us. 
Nor would I forget the withering effect of this same 
Philosophy of the Actual on many at the other end of the 
social scale — the moneyed and privileged classes. It leads 
them to fritter away their lives in a round of trivial, often 
harmful, pleasures. It allows of no serious thinking nor 
earnest purpose, nor unselfish effort. In place of these, 
there burns a dull, fierce anger against those who appear 
to threaten property or privilege. Oh for ideals to fire 
their hearts and lift them to a higher plane ! 



V. Objections of the Practical Man. 

In defending the ideal against the negations of the 
materialist, I appealed to the practical side of our nature. 
But I have to bethink me of that large number of good 



54 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

people who somewhat pride themselves on looking at 
life in a matter-of-fact way. An enthusiast of any kind 
perturbs them, if he does not alarm them. And they 
are disposed to regard the man of ideals as a visionary, 
if not a flighty or weak-minded person. These apostles 
of the gospel of " hard common sense " (for so they call 
the quality they admire) point to lives wasted in senti- 
ment ; they hold up to scorn the dreamer, the builder of 
castles in the air, the aesthetic or social rhapsodist. And, 
no doubt, like most people with strong opinions, they can 
often make out a good case. 

But who cannot see at once that in so far as their case 
is good, they are dealing with the abuse of a noble thing ? 
Here, as ever, the adage applies — corruptio optimi pessima. 
To be animated by ideals is not to ignore the actual. 
The well-balanced mind will avoid each extreme. It will 
not ignore the ideal and rest content with the actual, for 
that will mean stagnation and consequent decay. Nor 
will it soar into the ideal oblivious of the conditions 
under which the work has to be done, for that would 
mean imbecility or despair. The idealist, like the 
physicist, must have a fulcrum ; and that fulcrum must 
be found in the definitely constituted world of fact. But, 
given the fulcrum, the idealist will transmute the stubborn 
fact into gold. He will " work upon it in the light of 
the ideal." ^ Regarded thus, if the ideal is anything, it is 
practical. It assigns tasks : it imposes burdens : it com- 

1 Lange. 



IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 55 

mands action. The true poet is impelled to utter his 
message : the artist to embody his vision : the prophet 
to paint the glories of the good times to. come. It is 
woe to the evangelist if he preaches not the good tidings. 
These idealists, one and all, find relief in action. The 
ideal fires them, and calls them to strenuous living. 

One of the saddest anomalies is to see professing 
Christians frowning upon social ideals as unpractical and 
mischievous, and yet praying to God regularly that His 
Kingdom may come and His Will be done on earth as it 
is in heaven. They will read the glowing chapters in 
which Isaiah paints an ideal future, and will be moved by 
them into mild humanitarian emotion. But they will rise 
from the prayer, or shut the book, and straightway con- 
demn those who believe that it is possible for the prayer 
to be answered or for the vision to come true. Social 
ideals interfere with vested interests : they must therefore 
be sternly repressed — Lord's Prayer and Prophet Isaiah 
notwithstanding. 

How easy it is to raise the old cry — " These fellows 
would turn the world upside down " ! Sometimes the 
world wants turning upside down to bring it right way 
up ! I conceive that the chief cause of our social evils 
is our grievous lack of social ideals. The social ideal, to 
be healthy, must be founded on the ideals of the True, 
the Good, the Beautiful ; and it must be pursued by all 
on behalf of all. Nothing can be more practical. 

If to aim at conceiving and realising a social ideal is 



S6 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

to be visionary and Utopian, then I am content to be 
numbered among the condemned. But I hold myself 
free to condemn my judges. I refuse to rest content 
with the actual. I claim that movement is the law of 
life, and that movement should be in the direction of the 
ideal. I refuse to accept any social programme which, 
while boasting itself to be founded on facts and common 
sense, proclaims in reality nothing but the dictates of 
individual or class interest or prejudice. The only ideal 
worth the name is one which will harmonise all interests 
by being simply human. It must be broad and deep as 
the river of life. It must realise the good for man, 
individually and collectively. And my faith stands firm 
that every brave or generous word spoken on behalf of 
such an ideal — every social impulse finding vent in action 
under its light and leading — will enter into the great 
causal series of forces, spiritual and physical, which are 
bringing in the kingdom of God. The social ideal not 
practical ! It is all too practical for most. 



VI. Ideals and Evolution. 

I have dealt with two enemies of the ideal — the 
materialistic philosopher and the man of hard common 
sense. A formidable foeman still remains — the material- 
istic evolutionist, qua evolutionist. He points out to us 
that, when we examine the origin and development of our 
ideals — even those of the True, the Beautiful, and the 



IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 57 

Good — we find that they have not been always and every- 
where the same. 

Now here is undoubtedly a considerable difficulty. 
The light shed upon the history of our ideals makes it 
impossible to deny that this objection is founded on facts. 
How does it affect our views of the validity and authority 
of these forces which, under any theory, are prominent 
elements in our experience ? I will indicate one or two con- 
siderations which may help us to the right point of view. 

I have already alluded to what I ventured to call the 
evolution of ideas. Perhaps the term " development " is 
better, because evolution is so suggestive of processes of 
organic growth. But whichever term we use, the fact 
remains that " knowledge grows from more to more." 
And on the very principles of the evolution theory itself, 
we shall expect that growth will be by the struggle of 
variations and by the survival of the fittest. This is true^ 
even in such sciences as Astronomy and Chemistry, which 
deal with purely objective facts. They have passed 
through some strange phases, such as Astrology and 
Alchemy. And this progressive approach to truth 
characterises our latest and most advanced scientific 
theories. But we do not throw over Astronomy and 
Chemistry because they exhibit evidences of growth and 
development. Why should we mete out different treat- 
ment to our ideals ? We cannot expect equal exactness 
of results in all departments of human knowledge — and 
least of all in man's efforts to grasp the realities of worlds 



58 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

beyond the reach of sense and scientific method. But 
may we not assume, in the case of our ideals, that the 
longer man is in contact with his environment, the larger 
will be the number of his adjustments to it ? This is 
obviously true of Astronomy and Chemistry. On what 
ground shall anyone hold it to be untrue of our adjust- 
ments to the verities of the supersensible world ? 

We can thus see that no new difficulty is raised by the 
discovery that there has been an evolution of ideals. 
The difficulty would arise had this not been the case. 
On the basis of the struggle for life rises that for 
conscious happiness. On this basis, again, the struggle 
for the ideal. Out of ruthless competition springs self- 
sacrificing emulation for the higher life of the race. By 
an infinitely wonderful reversal of the original conditions, 
food, and happiness, and life itself, are freely and 
consciously dedicated in the sacred cause of progress. 
Ideal succeeds to ideal, enthusiasm to enthusiasm. And 
under the spell of the attractive force of the ideal, toil 
and suffering, ay, torture and martyrdom, are welcomed 
by the noblest of our kind. 

There are ideals, of course, which are positively bad — 
which degrade instead of elevating. But the cosmic 
process will eliminate them. The hero worship so 
natural to lads may find unworthy objects in bushrangers, 
highwaymen, pirates, and other undesirable celebrities. 
The Australian ideal of a happy life centres far too much 
in horse-racing and betting. In the industrial world at 



IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 59 

large, commercial ideals are lamentably low. So with 
many of our political and social ideals. These and others 
like them are bound to go down in the struggle for 
survival, to the damage of those individuals and nations 
which yield to them. There is, for example, no full, 
rich life possible for any nation or individual which gives 
itself up to the ideal of accumulating wealth. There is no 
future before Australia unless she can curb and reduce 
the gambling ideal of her people. These are " varia- 
tions " in ideals which the universe rejects. And thus it 
comes that the application of the theory of evolution to 
our ideals provides both warning and cheer — warning 
against the false — cheer for the ultimate triumph of the 
true. 

There is another consideration which may help us in 
our study of the evolution of ideals. However great 
may have been the variations in their contents, their form 
has been persistent. The conception of some ideal, 
whatever that ideal might be, has always confronted the 
actual. Wherever there is progress there is discontent 
with the facts as they are : the progressive individual or 
community condemns them, contradicts them, strives to 
bring them into a better setting. There is necessary for 
progress what Kingsley calls " a divine discontent." And 
since the " form " is persistent, there will always be 
variations from which Dame Nature may " select," and our 
ideals will always be approaching nearer to harmony with 
the underlying reality. 



6o THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

And when for the blind selection of the materialistic 
evolutionist we substitute the guidance of a personal, 
loving All-Father, we may well rest assured that advance 
means real progress, not shadowy illusion. We can 
think of the supreme ideal as itself unchangeable — as the 
absolutely True, and Beautiful, and Good. And we take 
courage in the thought that our ideals, though historically 
relative to special stages and environments, and though 
subject to ceaseless development, are yet the means by 
which we attain our truest and deepest hold upon the 
meaning of existence. Man's relation to the ideal is 
defined once and for ever in the command — " Be ye 
therefore perfect, even as your Father in heaven is 
perfect." 

VII. Natural and Supernatural. 

In discussing the nature and function of feeling and 
of the ideal, I have had frequent occasion to distinguish 
the world of sense or science from what I have hitherto 
called the supersensuous world. It will be profitable as 
well as wise to define this distinction somewhat more 
closely. 

I selected the term " supersensuous " because it seemed 
to be most free from what certain scientists would deem 
the undesirable associations connected with the terms 
" supernatural " and " spiritual." I do not deny that the 
widespread objection to these latter terms is not to some 
extent justified. They have been used unfairly to belittle 



IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 6i 

and discredit the legitimate assumptions and conclusions 
of physical research. Nevertheless, I hold that the 
prejudice against them is largely the result of misunder- 
standings. 

Our study of value judgments in the first lecture will 
have sufficed, I trust, to prove that we do need some 
distinction between the facts which are open to the 
methods of physical science, and those supersensible 
realities revealed to us in the spheres of thought and 
feeling and will. If we employ the term " natural " to 
cover all the phenomena, which yield themselves to in- 
vestigation by " natural science," the simplest correlative is 
" supernatural." But it is clear that we must consider- 
ably modify and expand the theological use of that term. 
It will have to cover, not only certain theological concepts, 
but the whole field of psychological, aesthetic, and moral 
concepts, in so far as these carry us out of range of the 
senses. 

Now I believe it would be of considerable service, even 
to theologians, to adopt this wider usage, provided it 
be clearly defined and accepted by all concerned. Then 
it would be freed from all suspicion of implying some- 
thing " outside " nature altogether — it would not even 
imply " above " nature. It would simply mean, " out of the 
reach of natural science." We should thus preserve the 
grand conception of the unity of nature — a conception 
for which scientists and philosophers alike are very 
jealous. And we should have a definite recognition of 



62 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

the gap undoubtedly existing between what we may 
broadly designate the world of facts and the world of 
meanings. 

If you press me as to why this gap should exist, or as 
to why the world of facts should have assumed this 
particular form, I candidly acknowledge the inability to 
give any satisfactory answers to such problems. But an 
impatient longing for unifying our knowledge, and for 
elaborating " synthetic philosophies," must not blind us to 
real differences in modes of existence. Neither absolute 
idealism nor absolute materialism can hold the fort alone. 
Each finds that, however perfect its system, there is an 
unexplained residue. Hoffding's conclusion seems to be 
the wisest, that we must be content to leave certain 
questions open. He holds ^ that " while we cannot solve 
definitively these great problems, still we can descry the 
road that leads onward and forward, so that the rights of 
both our thought and our life are safeguarded. The 
insolubility of the problems really only means that, no 
matter how far we may penetrate in our research and 
thought, new horizons, new goals, and new tasks always 
rise before us." 

VIII. The Beautiful. 

The great self-contained triad of the True, the 
Beautiful, the Good, constitutes the threefold unity of 

^ The Problems of Philosophy^ p. i86. Trans, by Fisher. 



IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 6;^ 

the ideal world. Concerning the True, I have already 
spoken, and have shown that, to be worthy of pursuit, it 
must be founded in the very nature of things, and that 
it must have a meaning for life. Let us now turn to 
consider the second member of the triad — the Beautiful. 

What is the Beautiful ? I care not how you define it, 
so long as you know what it is to feel it. To the 
ordinary man, nature appears capricious and disconnected. 
To the man of knowledge, she is the embodiment of law. 
To the man susceptible to beauty, she reveals a soul. 
To the poet, 

" The gods talk in the breath of the woods, 
They talk in the shaken pine, 
And fill the long reach of the old sea shore 
With dialogue divine : 
And the poet who overhears 
Some random word they say, 
Is the fated man of men 
Whom the ages must obey." ^ 

The soul of the artist cherishes the myriad feelings that 
can be clothed with colour, light, or form. He embodies 
the world of values in the world of concrete objects. 
The soul of the musician catches strains of harmony 
issuing from the very bosom of the intangible, and 
re-echoes them as " prophecies of the life that is to be.*' 
We speak, and, as I have shown, we rightly speak of 
nature's secret. But when the inspired interpreter 
arrives, her outer frame resounds with spiritual meanings. 

^ Emerson. 



64 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

But now that we are mounting to the higher slopes 
of experience, methinks I catch an icy breath from the 
glaciers of scientific criticism. With a touch of gently 
tolerant, but withering cynicism, we may be told that the 
fancies and emotions of the poet belonged to the childhood 
of the race — that art is a mere plaything — and that all 
really enlightened people keep to facts. And there are 
many who, with no touch of cynicism, but with honest 
fear, confess to themselves that science is killing poetry 
and art, emptying the universe of mystery, and dragging 
out to " the light of common day " all that formed 

''The poet's consecration and the dream." 

But need this be so ? I trow not. Granted that 
science has well-nigh metamorphosed our world for us, is 
the new in any essential less poetical than the old ? Are 
these hidden meanings and subtle analogies destroyed 
which stirred the genius of the past to utterance and ex- 
pression ? By no means — rather the reverse. No doubt 
many figments of uninstructed imagination will have to 
be thrown aside. The mediaeval three-story universe is 
expanded beyond recognition. But in its place we have 
star beyond star, galaxy beyond galaxy, and out again the 
frowning walls of infinitude. Assuredly we have not lost. 
Again, we have learnt more of the laws of light than 
David knew. But are the prismatic hues less glorious 
when there comes " the clear shining after rain " ? Are 
the beauties of heaven and earth reduced in number or in 



IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 6s 

quality ? So far is this from being the case, that the day 
of the triumph of science has seen the birth of art, of 
landscape painting — that form of art for which we can 
claim that it is one of the most original things we moderns 
have accomplished. And what does that development 
imply ? There can be no dispute that it witnesses to a 
new sense of beauty in nature. Tennyson was not robbed 
of his " spirit in the woods " because he knew more of 
botany than Homer. Nor was the edge of emotion 
dulled for his In Memoriam because he was versed in 
the lore of the nineteenth century. Depend upon it, we 
have no need to fear that science will destroy our aesthetic 
joys and ideals. Our most dangerous enemies are else- 
where — in our wrong methods of education, in our love of 
a low range of pleasures, in our Mammon worship. Let 
us but preserve a wholesome freshness in our nature and 
we may cease to fear for the future of poetry and of art. 
Science will keep us closer to fact ; but it will not empty 
fact of its meaning and living power. Matthew Arnold 
has exhorted us to conceive worthily of poetry, and, 
therefore, of all that feeds the feelings and emotions. 
"More and more (he says^) mankind will discover that 
we have to turn to poetry to interpret life for us, to con- 
sole us, to sustain us. Without poetry, our science will 
appear incomplete." Arnold then quotes Wordsworth 
as finely and truly calling poetry " the impassioned ex- 
pression which is in the countenance of all science." And 

^ Preface to Essays in Criticisvi. 

5 



66 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

on this he comments, " What is a countenance without its 
expression ? " 

We can thus claim for art, if it be true art, that it is 
no mere means to satisfy the play-instinct in man — no 
mere by-product of evolution — nor even a mere stimulus 
to exalted feeling. We can claim for it a deeply spiritual 
function. The creator of a true work of art, and he who 
is able to appreciate it, are alike in touch with forms of 
reality higher than can come from the study of facts as 
facts. There is a supersensuous attraction of like to like. 
The soul of man and the soul of nature enter into fruitful 
communion, through the immanent idea of the Beautiful 
which is in both. Kingsley was looking at some lovely 
work of art in a London shop, and at his side was a 
labouring man, attracted by the same object. Their 
eyes happened to meet, and to the lips of each there 
sprang at the same moment the involuntary ejaculation 
— " Is it not beautiful ^ " — which thing is more than a 
parable. 

But we can easily foresee that such claims as these on 
behalf of art and poetry are not suffered to go unchallenged 
by the materialistic school. The new psychology which 
produces " studies in organic " is sometimes terribly in 
earnest in repudiating all idealism. Myers, in his re- 
markable book on Human Personality^ draws a vivid 
contrast between the views of a modern exponent of 
" organic," and those expressed so magnificently in Plato's 

^ Vol. i. pp. 1 1 2-1 15. 



IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 67 

Symposium. He quotes a passage from a French psy- 
chologist in which falling in love is regarded simply as 
a sign that a man is not in good health.-^ This opinion is 
set forth in no light spirit, but, as Myers remarks, " with 
all the earnestness of a modern Lucretius." All effort to 
idealise is contemptuously ruled out of court. Now I can 
admire a man like this for his consistency. But I cannot 
be content with his philosophy. Contrast Plato's doctrine 
of love, with its stages mounting step by step in degree 
and kind. The first step is the love of beautiful shapes ; 
a higher step is the love of beautiful souls ; still higher 
comes the love of beauty as discovered in human 
knowledge ; and highest of all is the love of the ideal 
Beauty, eternal and unchangeable, the parent of true 
knowledge, of true virtue, of immortality. Love is thus 
portrayed as the endeavour of the finite to expand itself 
into the world of the Ideal, and so into the infinite. All 
this, remember, where the student, resting in his " organic," 
can find nothing more than proof that a man is out of 
health ! 

But did not Plato (some may ask) despise that world 
of fact which affords the sole material of modern science } 
Perchance this charge may be to some extent justified. 
But if I have to err, I would rather err with Plato than 
with your philosopher of the organic. Moreover, Plato's 
doctrine is by no means necessarily inconsistent with a 
due recognition of the world of facts. Facts, when filled 
^ Pierre Janet, L' Automatisme Psychologique^ p. 466. 



68 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

with meaning, are manifestations of the real — of that real 
which exists in its fulness in the Ideal. 



IX. Art and Puritans. 

There is another, and widely different objection to the 
claims of art — that which comes from the Puritan strain 
in humanity. This strain is not confined to any one age, 
or race, or country, but is well-nigh as widely spread 
as the love of art itself. It generally appears in the 
character of a reaction. It stands over against the 
lamentable tendency in human nature to degrade art into 
a medium for externalism in religion, or for sensuality 
in morals. It regards aesthetic culture with suspicion, 
even though it may not proceed to the length of con- 
demning it as definitely evil. 

Confining our attention to the development of 
Puritanism in our own race, it would be difficult to 
deny its general hostility to art. I speak of the average, 
popular Puritanism. For that the Puritan spirit at its 
best is not repressive of aesthetic impulse is proved by 
the fact that it was imbibed by men so different as 
Milton, and Wordsworth, and Ruskin. But even in its 
popular form, who shall venture to condemn it wholly ? 
For consider to what it is opposed. There are certain 
enthusiasts who take as their motto. Art for art's sake. 
They interpret this to mean that art must be free from 
all restraint, moral or other ; and they defiantly proclaim 



IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 69 

their own freedom to follow their artistic bent wherever it 
may lead. Now if we have to choose between art and 
morals, who can doubt what the issue should be ? For 
morals mean conduct — and conduct, as Matthew Arnold 
held, is three-fourths of life. 

In dealing with those who claim this licence in art, we 
can grant them much. We can grant them that there is 
a sense in which art may be said to possess elements 
peculiar to itself. But this is not to say that it may cut 
itself loose from the rest of life. As Plato taught, it 
must fit in with, and aid, the development of the whole 
man. He who develops the aesthetic side of his nature 
at the expense of other elements loses his hold on true 
beauty. The triad, the True, the Beautiful, the Good, 
form an indissoluble sisterhood. This is a lesson we 
sorely need to-day. For too often do we see the whole 
resources of art lavished to destroy, rather than foster, the 
ideal good of life. Pictures, poetry, plays, abound with 
immoralities disguised as art. All the charms of light, 
and sound, and colour, and form, are employed to keep 
us from rising to Plato's second stage. They entangle 
us in the meshes of the sensual, and hide from us the 
nobler wealth of beautiful souls. In place of the triad of 
sisters. Vice flaunts her meretricious glamours, and a 
besotted Realism glories in her shrine. Truly there is 
need for the Puritan strain in our nature ; without it, we 
should become rotten at the core. 

So much can rightly be urged in favour of Puritanism. 



70 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

But if what I have advanced as to the function of the 
ideal be sound, the apparent opposition between the 
Beautiful and the Good is dissolved, and loses itself in a 
deeper harmony. Ruskin tells us in a striking chapter 
of his Pr^terita^ how his long debate with himself on 
this subject found its termination.-^ He was in Turin, 
and found himself one Sunday morning in a little chapel 
by the dusty roadside. There had gathered the few 
sheep of the old Waldensian faith, numbering " in all 
some three or four and twenty, of whom fifteen or sixteen 
were grey-haired women. Their solitary and clerkless 
preacher, a somewhat stunted figure in a plain black coat, 
with a cracked voice, after leading them through the 
languid forms of prayer," put his utmost zeal into a con- 
solatory discourse, which dwelt upon the wickedness of 
the city, and on the exclusive favour with God enjoyed 
by the handful of the elect members of his congregation. 
Himself " neither cheered nor greatly alarmed by this 
doctrine," Ruskin walked back into the condemned city, 
and up into the gallery, where the full flood of sunshine 
was lighting up the pictures, and where, through the open 
windows, " came in with the warm air, floating swells " of 
music from the courtyard. " And as the perfect colour 
and sound gradually asserted their power " on him, he 
was convinced, with final certainty, that his old Puritanism 
was lacking, and there was fastened in him " the old 
article of Jewish faith, that things done delightfully and 

^ Vol. iii. chap. i. p. 46. 



IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 71 

rightly were always done by the help and in the Spirit of 
God." 

X. The Good. 

Judgments of value determined by the appreciation of 
Beauty have carried us far from the realm of the purely 
mechanical. We have come nearer to the heart of things. 
The Ideal of the Good brings us nearer still. It is a noble 
thing to be able to distinguish the beautiful from the 
ugly ; it is a nobler thing to be able to distinguish the 
good from the bad. In exercising this function we 
become " as gods, knowing good and evil." That is to 
say, we rise to the dignity of being moral agents in a 
morally governed universe. 

Whence comes to us the Ideal of the Good ? As in 
the case of that of Beauty, I am content to forego 
definition in favour of a direct appeal to experience. For 
there are but few of us who have not a spontaneous and 
abiding conviction that our actual selves are not our true 
selves — that we might be better than we are. We can 
see clearly that we fall short of a standard which we our- 
selves frame and apply. Soiled as we are by travel-stains 
on life's dusty road, we catch sight at intervals of a 
purity, a moral perfection, which we feel to be our 
natural goal, though we have so far to journey. 

It is from experiences and longings such as these that 
we construct for ourselves, with greater or less complete- 
ness, a conception of an ideal man. We build him up, 



72 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

as It were, out of the various qualities of which we 
approve in ourselves and others. The ideal so formed is 
indefinite, indeed, but is by no means a mere abstraction. 
And just because it is not an abstraction, Christendom 
has recognised in the Person of its Founder, the realisa- 
tion of its ideal. You remember John Stuart Mill's 
virile appreciation of the moral grandeur of Jesus Christ. 
Not " even now (he writes ^) would it be easy, even for 
an unbeliever, to find a better translation of the rule of 
virtue from the abstract into the concrete than to 
endeavour so to live that Christ would approve our life." 
If one whom we deem to have had but a partial glimpse 
of the glory revealed in Jesus Christ could form such an 
estimate as this of His unique position as a moral type, 
how much more can Christians rest upon that type as 
their ideal ^ For them, the type is perfect on the side 
of its divinity as well as of its humanity. Their hopes 
and possibilities can thus expatiate in a boundless range ; 
and they do not despair even when there is laid upon 
them the command — " Be ye therefore perfect, even as 
your Father in Heaven is perfect." For in Jesus Christ 
they believe that they have a revelation of the Express 
Image of the Father's Person. They know, therefore, 
that the moral ideal is founded deep in the very nature 
of existence, and that it already wears the wreath of 
victory. 

Another characteristic of the moral ideal here springs 

^ Mill, Theism^ last section. 



IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 73 

to light — its absolute authority over us. Science wields 
its " must " as a word of fate. Morality also wields its 
" must," but it is addressed to a being who is a moral 
agent — who can consciously obey or disobey. Dis- 
obedience means death : obedience means fuller life. 
But there is a choice open to us. With this aspect of 
the ideal I shall be concerned at a later stage. Here I 
would only ask you to remark that the judgments of 
the moral sense, so far from being identical in kind with 
those of physical science, are often at the opposite pole. 
The height of scientific certainty may also be the height 
of moral wrong. The passion for gambling, for example, 
is a scientific certainty as a psychological fact, and can 
be studied as such. But the passion is judged to be 
wrong by the moral sense, and the fact is thus condemned. 
It " is," but it " ought not to be." The ideal, in condemn- 
ing the passion, commands us to repress and conquer it. 

The Ideal of the Good thus stands above all other 
forms of existence, and authoritatively demands that they 
shall be brought into its service. And it thereby proves 
itself to be, not a shadowy abstraction, or illusion, but 
one of the highest forms of reality. 

In the first lecture I quoted from Guyau the desolate 
picture of the ever-devouring sea. The blank fatalism of 
that picture is relieved by a ray of light from the moral 
ideal. " If (writes he) the unknown activity that lies at 
the basis of the natural world has produced in the human 
race a consciousness of goodness and a deliberate desire 



74 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

for it, there is reason and hope to believe that the last 
word of ethics and metaphysics is not a negative." 'Tis 
but a wintry gleam, striking across the grey expanse of 
his heaving ocean ; but, such as it is, mark you, it comes 
from the inspiration of the Ideal of the Good. 

Lotze sees more clearly the orb from which Guyau's 
ray emanates. Hence these noble words ^ : " All being, 
all that we call mode and form, thing and event, the 
whole sum of nature, can be nothing else than the 
condition for the realisation of the Good ; can be as it is, 
only because thus in it the infinite worth of the Good 
manifests itself." 



XL The Ideal and Religion. 

Religion is the outcome of man's stretching out to the 
things which are before. It is that activity of his nature 
whereby he relates himself to forms of existence which 
satisfy his ideals. It belongs, therefore, to the sphere of 
the " supernatural " in the wide significance which I have 
attached to that term. Hence it follows that religion will 
progress in purity and reasonableness step by step with 
the evolution of our ideals. And since we have seen how 
natural and, indeed, inevitable is the evolution of the 
contents of ideals, we also see how natural and inevitable 
it is that religion shall have a historical development. 

A cursory study of the science of comparative religion 

^ MicrocosmoSy bk. iii., conclusion. 



IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 75 

will afford ample proof and illustration of such develop- 
ment. In the typical polytheistic religions we find that 
the gods are ideals and patterns for men to copy. They 
are greater than human, and yet they are conceived on 
human lines. They also belong to the supersensible 
world and embody the moral ideas of their worshippers. 

^ The Greek conceptions of the divinities, for example, 
embodied the Greek ideals. They were gradually purged 
of their coarseness and their more degraded features as 

) the contents of the True, the Beautiful, the Good, were 
more clearly apprehended, until there came the almost 
exaggerated spirituality of Plato. 

And this is just as true of the Christian conception 
of God. The characteristics of the divine goodness are 
founded on our apprehension of the characteristics of 
human goodness — but all carried on to the highest 
plane of the ideal. Take the very names given to 
the Persons of the ever Blessed Trinity — Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit — every one of these names is founded 
on human relationships and analogies. This truth was 
grasped by Pestalozzi. " This I soon saw (he says) 
that the feelings of love, trust, thankfulness, and the 
habit of obedience must be developed in me, before I 
can entertain them towards God. I must love men, I 
must trust men, I must obey men, before I can raise my- 
self to the level of loving God, thanking Him, trusting 
Him, and obeying Him." And is not Pestalozzi in line 
here with the Apostle who asked : " He that loveth not 



76 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

his brother whom he hath seen, how shall he love God 
whom he hath not seen ? " And is not Pestalozzi in line 
with the central truth of the Christian Religion, the truth 
of the Incarnation ? The conception of God, from its 
very vastness, is hopelessly beyond our finite endeavour. 
But in the humanity of the Saviour, God's perfections 
are brought within the comprehension of human faculty, 
while still retaining the unimpaired beauty which the 
ideal demands. While, on the one hand, we are left to 
work out the philosophical and metaphysical problems 
involved in the Absolute and the Infinite, on the other 
hand we apprehend God, through the Incarnation, as the 
Father of Spirits, the moral Governor of the Universe, 
and the loving " Giver of every good and perfect gift." 
And all this is possible for us, just because He is "the 
Father of our Lord Jesus Christ." 



XII. Transformation of the Material. 

We have risen from the " material " to the " ideal," 
and from the " natural " to the " supernatural." And 
progress means the gradual transformation of the lower 
into the higher — the increasing power of pressing the 
material into the service of the spiritual. 

It has always appeared to me that a musical instrument 
affords as perfect an example of this process as we can 
well have. There is the material of which it is formed : 
there is the science expended in its construction : and 



IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 77 

there is the use we make of it to express the most 
dematerialised of our emotions. 

Carlyle says of music that it is " a kind of inarticulate 
speech, which leads us to the edge of the infinite, and lets 
us for moments gaze into that." Let us suppose our- 
selves present at a rendering of the Choral Symphony. 
One of the greatest orchestras of the world, supported by 
a worthy choir of banded voices, shall labour on our be- 
half to interpret the greatest work of the greatest master. 
Let us revel in the sea of harmony. But let us detach 
ourselves at times to watch the faces of those around us. 

Near to us sits a well-known scientist whose scientific 
interests overpower his emotions. His attention is fixed 
on the acoustic phenomena brought into existence. He 
pictures to himself the air carved and fretted into resultant 
waves of almost inconceivable intricacy — waves combining 
in ordered proportions the trembling of the strings, the 
pure tones of the wood instruments, the more piercing 
pungency of the wind and brass, the reverberation of the 
drums, and the volume of human voices floating on an ever- 
varying body of rhythmic sound. He thinks also of the 
miraculous delicacy of the sense of hearing which is able 
to take up and to decompose those intricate waves, and to 
distinguish the various timbres and notes without dis- 
turbing that sense of unity in diversity which orchestral 
music demands from those who would enjoy it. In short, 
he tends to fix his mind on the material aspect of the 
phenomena. 



78 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

Next to him is a musical theorist on theory bent, who 
takes a wholly different view of the phenomena. He 
marks the character of the melodies, the harmonic pro- 
gressions, the daring innovations on set rules of form, 
the orchestral and vocal combinations, the balancing of 
the divisions of the symphony, the contrasts which give 
variety and charm, and the welding of the whole into a 
perfect work of art. There pass through his mind also 
thoughts of the wonderful development of musical science 
and resource, and of the expansion of musical form. He 
recalls the monks with their barbarous " modes " and 
counter-point, the troubadours with their freer strains, 
the Italian awakening to natural beauty and dramatic 
power, and the resistless wave of German genius moving 
onward, and bearing on its crest the mighty Beethoven. 

And next to him again there is a man whose soul is 
evidently lost to science, theory, and history. It is on 
fire. He is drinking in the music and is in mystic 
communion with the soul of the master. Shaking air 
and trembling nerve, for him, are non-existent. He is 
in the supernatural world. The choir to which he 
listens is invisible. He is brought " to the edge of the 
infinite " and is " for a moment gazing into that." 

Now who shall, of these three, be the interpreter of 
the symphony ? The man of science has his place, 
and an honoured place. But can he tell us by his com- 
putations what was in the soul of Beethoven when, deaf 
to natural sound, the master soared into the world of 



IDEALS AS ATTRACTING FORCES 79 

the ideal ? He cannot even pretend to tell us. One 
who has a right to speak of the power of music has said : 
" It seems a gratuitous depreciation of the spirit of man 
to suppose it stirred to such rapture by forces finding an 
absolute equivalent in heat and motion." 

Or shall it be the student of form and theory and 
development ? He can go much further than the 
scientist. He does know something more than can be 
calculated or examined by the methods of physical science. 
He has traced the stages by which the human spirit has 
expanded its emotions in and through musical expression. 
But if he stops short at theory and history, he has not 
gained the grand secret. He has travelled beyond " the 
furthest horizon of science " — but he is still only on the 
threshold of the realm of the living ideal. 

We must come to the man who is snatched away out 

of the body, whose knowledge is absorbed into his mode 

of direct feeling. And he will tell us (to continue the 

words of him from whom I have already quoted) that 

" we feel in such music the touch of God upon our 

souls. Surely (he exclaims) we need not hesitate to 

believe with all our hearts that in such experiences the 

oneness of the finite and the infinite is realised in a flash 

of emotion. Or, as Tennyson has it — 

' The glory of the sum of things 
Will flash along the chords and go.'" 

The application of these three types is self-evident. 
The ideal shows forth the meaning and goal of the 



8o THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

natural. The material is to be exalted until it reaches 
its destined perfection. In working out His purposes in 
nature, God has bound Himself by certain fixed laws. 
These laws it is the function of science to discover by- 
tabulation and systematising of facts. Man conquers 
his environment by rendering obedience to these laws. 
Just as he fashions the violin to become an instrument 
of spiritual expression, so is he working together with 
God to fashion the material framework of His world to 
make it yield the music of the spheres. The laws of the 
trembling string link on to the laws of the trembling soul. 
So do the laws of progress — whether of material environ- 
ment, or of social institution, or of artistic creation — link 
on to the laws of that city, perfect in form as in life, the 
pattern of which is stored in heaven. 



THIRD LECTURE. 

EVOLUTION AND LIFE. 

eyw TjiXOov Iva ^oirjv e;(wo-t, /cat Trcpicrcrov e)(Oi(TLV. 
" I came that they may have life, and may have it abundantly." 
— St John x. io. 

I. A Time of Transition. 

Whether they accept its conclusions or not, there are 

few thinkers who would not agree that since the theory of 

evolution came on the scene, it has imparted a very 

special character and colour to almost every department of 

our intellectual activities. We cannot avoid its influence 

even if we would. Evolution is in the air. Nearly all the 

old fierce opposition has died down ; and in its place has 

come a general spirit of acquiescence which errs rather by 

being too easily tolerant of anything bearing the name of 

evolution. The very utterance of the word has gained 

a power of lulling our critical faculties to sleep. 

The fact is that this theory throws upon the familiar 

landscape a blaze of light which renders all clear seeing 

for a time impossible. The ancient landmarks seem to 

8i 6 



82 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

be removed, if not cast into the sea. We have none of 
us as yet learnt how to accommodate our eyes to the new 
conditions. The first impression, on the part of friends 
and foes alike, was that the new theory would destroy 
religious belief, and establish a militant materialism. 
But the hour of panic has passed, and most of us are 
calmly awaiting the return of clearer vision. Already we 
discover that the old landmarks are pretty much where 
they were. We find, too, that new ones have come into 
sight, and that our horizons are indefinitely extended. 

Lest my attempts to limit or modify the application of 
the theory should be misunderstood, I at once avow 
myself a humble disciple of the Neo-Darwinian school. 
I therefore approach this branch of the " new learning," 
not as a foe, but as a friend. 



IL Darwinism. 

The term " evolution " is sometimes used in a sense so 
extended and universalised, that it covers the whole of 
the cosmic process. Herbert Spencer, for example, in 
his First Principles^ has developed a philosophy which 
looks upon the " unceasing redistribution of matter and 
motion " as constituting evolution, working throughout 
the entire universe, and leading everywhere to " a trans- 
formation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous." 
Each period of evolution is followed by one of dissolution, 
in a mighty rhythm, like unto that fabled by the Indian 



EVOLUTION AND LIFE 83 

sages. With this extended conception of evolution I 
shall be concerned indirectly only. I propose to confine 
myself here to the stricter use of the term, taking it as 
equivalent to what is generally known as Darwinism. 
This latter term is convenient but misleading. For 
Darwin's original hypothesis has been extended and 
modified in so many ways, that, save for the honour due 
to his name, it is safer to avoid any terminology which 
would unfairly define the views of many of his successors. 
By way of rough definition, I shall take evolution to 
mean the history and theory of the development of 
organic life upon our planet. From this point of view, it 
falls wholly within the boundaries of what is known as 
" natural science " — that is to say, it confines itself to such 
facts as can be observed and classified within the field of 
natural processes. Huxley stated the essential feature of 
this view of evolution ^ when he said that in the process 
of development there would be no breach of continuity, no 
point at which we could say, " This is a natural process,'* 
and " This is not a natural process." He compared it to the 
development of a tree from its seed, or of a fowl from 
its egg. By such definition of its sphere, Huxley intended 
to exclude from evolution all reference to creation, or to 
any kind of supernatural intervention. Each stage in 
the process is to be regarded as the exact effect of the 
causes at work in a closed and self-contained system. 
j And he was absolutely warranted, as a scientist, in taking 
^ See Prolegomena io'^EvoluHon and Ethics. 



84 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

this restricted view. For if science is to obtain satisfactory 
results, it must limit its field of operations, and must 
concentrate its attention on particular aspects of its 
problems. 

I suppose the necessity for such limitations is now 
generally recognised in every science. Each abstracts its 
own special material from the total mass presented in 
experience. The mischief comes in when any particular 
science forgets that it is dealing with parts and abstractions, 
not with the concrete or living wholes, and then claims 
for its conclusions an unreserved and universal application. 
Huxley did not make this mistake in regard to the theory 
of evolution as a scientific hypothesis. With his usual 
lucidity and candour he tells us,^ " It is very desirable to 
remember that evolution is not an explanation, but merely 
a generalised statement of the method and results " of 
evolution. And he further remarks ^ that " if there is 
proof that the cosmic process was set going by any agent, 
then that agent will be the creator of it and of all its 
products, although supernatural intervention may remain 
strictly excluded from its further course.'* 

Huxley, then, played the game fairly and philosophically. 
He left the way open for taking into account factors other 
than those included in the categories of natural science. 
And this was all the more praiseworthy because some 
of his theological contemporaries were by no means alive 
to the necessity for giving fair play to scientific inquiry 

1 Op. Cit 2 Qp cit 



EVOLUTION AND LIFE 85 

and speculation. O si sic omnes I Alas ! there are 
evolutionists who, while confining themselves to the 
methods and data of natural science, demand for their 
conclusions completeness and finality. There are to be 
no modes of existence other than those which fall within 
their ken ; there are to be no modes of causation other 
than physical or mechanical ; there are to be no forces 
at work other than those which lend themselves to 
scientific treatment. I trust we have already realised how 
false and blind are such arrogant negations as these. The 
facts of life are wider than the mind of man when acting 
with its widest sweep. Natural science affords material 
for the exercise of part only of the human mind. How 
small, then, is the fraction of reality to which the scientist, 
qua scientist, can hope to penetrate ! 

III. The True Sphere of Biology. 

Bearing in mind the fact that the evolution theory is a 
department of natural science, let us try to mark out its 
province. I have taken it to mean the history and theory 
of organic life upon our planet. The main principles 
involved are now familiar to all. The " laws " of the 
universe, as we call them, apply to organic life, and con- 
dition its development. The germs of life, once started 
on their career, tend to multiply without limit. And, 
since the food supply is always limited, there results a 
universal struggle for existence. Each individual organ- 



86 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

ism is subject to variation from the central type ; and 
such of the variations as happen to be in harmony with 
the environment give an advantage in the struggle, and 
tend to be perpetuated. Thus, through a continuously 
differentiating series of survivals, have come into ex- 
istence the varied forms of life as we have them now. 
The whole process has been governed by the factors 
included in the strict use of the term — " natural 
selection." 

This theory refers for its existence to the marvellous 
discoveries of modern Biology, in its departments of 
Palaeontology, Embryology, and Natural History. It 
relies, with pardonable pride, on the wide inductions 
which have brought into scientific clearness the results 
of the struggle for existence, the survival of the fittest, 
and hereditary transmission. Now here comes the first 
limitation. Let us realise that all I have hitherto men- 
tioned falls within the sphere of Biology. Biological 
methods are applicable throughout. Biological " laws " 
and conceptions are brought to bear on material which 
lends itself naturally to their use. Beyond Biology, 
therefore, the theory has no right to travel. 

But just because Biology has made such wonderful 
strides of late, its professors are in danger of losing their 
intellectual balance. In this they are but like the rest of 
mortals. It is hard for any of us in the full tide of success 
to keep a due sense of the proportion of things. When 
mathematical activity was at its height, the world was 



EVOLUTION AND LIFE 87 

straightway to be reduced to mathematical formulae. 
And now that Biology is having its turn of inflation, 
all existence is to yield to biological method, and to be 
reduced to terms of organic development. So the 
pendulum swings ! 

We may readily allow that Biology has a better chance 
of succeeding than Mathematics, for it deals with higher 
and fuller categories of being ; but when the biologist 
would have us accept him as an interpreter and final 
authority for every possible problem of existence, we 
declare that he, like the mathematician before him, is a 
victim of distorted vision. We can forgive him because 
we can explain him. He is an enthusiastic specialist who 
knows a good many things which other people do not 
know. But he is not therefore omniscient, either 
positively as possessing formulae of universal application, 
or negatively as a dogmatic agnostic. Of course it is not 
every competent biologist who advances such claims. I 
speak only of those who do. 

Let us try to define the limits of Biology. When we 
study the phenomena of life upon this planet, we find an 
outstanding characteristic which seems sufficient in itself 
to serve as differentia — I refer to the fact of transmission. 
There is no form of life known to us which is not con- 
ditioned by reproductive processes. Generation succeeds 
generation in an unbroken descent. And in this fact we 
meet at once with a well-marked limitation of biological 
methods. Any factors of life and of human experience 



88 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

which do not lend themselves to reproductive processes 
are not within the legitimate sphere of the biologist — and 
therefore not within the legitimate sphere of the theory 
of organic evolution by natural selection. 

For example, there has been a parallel development of 
brain and mind. We shall consider the connection of 
the two later. Here I merely want to show that the 
biologist cannot pass from one to the other. The brain, 
said Cabanis, secretes thought as the liver secretes bile. 
Well, take a thought — such as that the three angles of a 
triangle are equal to two right angles. To say that this 
thought is secreted is an absurdity excusable only because 
it is the outcome of enthusiasm. A brain structure may 
develop so as to be able to compass this thought. But 
the thought itself is something apprehended, not secreted. 
It is and remains eternally valid. It is not a causal link 
in a time series, but stands outside the time series as a 
truth in its own right. To say this thought is manu- 
factured, instead of saying it is apprehended, is to commit 
in glaring form the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi. The laws 
of organic chemistry are not the laws of thought. 

IV. Evolution and Triangles. 

Let us follow up our " triangles *' a little further. Some 
may suspect that I am bringing an idealistic philosophy to 
bear without due warning or warrant. Let me therefore 
call your attention to this passage from Herbert Spencer. 



EVOLUTION AND LIFE 89 

He tells us ^ that he was exercised more and more as life 
went on by the problems of space. He remarks that 
little study had been devoted to that subject, and then 
continues thus : " Concerning the multitude of remark- 
able relations among lines and among spaces, very few 
ever ask — Why are they so ? Perhaps the question may 
in later years be raised, as it has been in myself, by some 
of the more conspicuously marvellous truths now grouped 
under the title of ' the Geometry of Position.' Many of 
them are so astounding that but for the presence of 
ocular proof they would be incredible ; and by their 
marvellousness, as well as by their beauty, they serve, in 
some minds at least, to raise the unanswerable question 
— How came there to exist among the parts of this 
seemingly structureless vacancy we call space, these 
strange relations ? How does it happen that the blank 
form of things presents us with truths so incomprehensible 
as do the things it contains ? " And a little later he 
concluded that " Theist and Agnostic alike must agree in 
recognising the properties of space as inherent, eternal, 
uncreated — as anteceding all creation, if creation has 
taken place, and all evolution, if evolution has taken 
place. Hence could we penetrate the mysteries of 
existence, there would remain still more transcendent 
mysteries. That which can be thought of neither as 
made nor evolved presents us with facts the origin of 
which is even more remote from conceivability than is 
^ J^acts and Comments^ pp. 211, 212. 



90 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

the origin of the facts presented by visible and tangible 
things." 

As an idealist I should put this differently, and should 
argue that these space relations imply a perceiving mind, 
even if they are not the subjective condition of sense 
perception. But Herbert Spencer's statement of the case 
quite serves my purpose. He shows that these relations 
are not evolved, but exist. They do not, therefore, 
come within the sphere of Biology. And we have left 
far behind us the conception that the brain can secrete 
them as the liver secretes bile ! 

I am warranted, then, in pressing firmly home the 
difference in kind here revealed. Chemical and organic 
processes cannot explain thought, though they may be 
concerned with the conditions under which thought is 
apprehended by human brains. Not that the conception 
of evolution, in the widest sense of the term, may not be 
applied to thought. Hegel's daring and colossal system 
is proof to the contrary, in which he attempts to explain 
existence by the logical unfolding of the categories. But 
Hegel's system is not biological ! And however much 
or however little of it we may accept or reject, at any 
rate we must confess that it moved in the right direction. 
Nature, for Hegel, was not the cause of spirit, but its 
manifestation. He was not foolish enough to seek for the 
greater in the less. 



EVOLUTION AND LIFE 91 

V. History not Explanation. 

Look at the matter in another way. The enthusiastic 
biologist is tempted often to think that, because he has 
traced the history of a development, he has therefore 
explained it. More especially, because he begins low 
down in the scale of life, he conceives too often the idea 
that the higher orders of phenomena are explained away : 
their very existence may practically be denied. For 
example, because man's physical origin is traced down- 
wards into the animal world, therefore man is to be 
nothing more than an animal. Now while we thankfully 
receive the teachings of the biologist within his own 
sphere, we must quietly but distinctly assure him that 
description and history are not explanation. He brings 
to our notice certain interesting phenomena, say, in regard 
to the development of brain structure. But he cannot 
tell us anything of the underlying causes at work. He 
describes and tabulates a series of happenings on the 
stage of space and time. But he cannot penetrate to the 
why and the wherefore of these happenings. Nor will 
any possible increase in his biological knowledge ever place 
him in a better position for reaching to the modes of 
being manifested in the phenomena of organic develop- 
ment. It will not even reveal to him the secret of his 
favourite evolutionary process. Problems of beginnings, 
endings, tendencies, purposes, and meanings, stretch out 
beyond him on every side. His facts are full of value. 



92 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

But when we come to higher problems than his, these 
facts are neither adequate nor relevant. 



VI. History and the Struggle for Food. 

It will help us to appreciate the biologist's helplessness 
in these matters if we spend a short time in studying a 
recent statement as to the ultimate forces behind the 
evolutionary process. Karl Pearson, in his widely-read 
Grammar of Science^ finds three such forces — the struggle 
for food, the rate of productivity, and geographical dis- 
tribution. These, for him, are the supreme arbiters of 
the course of life, animal and human. Their action is 
most easily followed in the lower stages of the process. 
But all the complexities and refinements of civilisation 
only serve to disguise their continued operation. It is 
on such premisses as these that he bases the following 
remarkable statement ^ : " Only when history is interpreted 
in this sense of natural history does it pass from the 
sphere of narrative and become science." 

Think of it ! The ultimate reason for our being: alive 
is that we happen to have outlived others. And history's 
greatest task is to describe how we managed to do it ! 
It is true we had got wrong with our history — deeming 
it to be a record of plots, and battles, and wars, and 
dynasties. But we have been trying of late to correct 
this mistake, and to get at the soul of the nations and 
1 Chap. ix. p. 13. 2 £0^ cn 



EVOLUTION AND LIFE 93 

peoples. Even under the old conception, be it noted, we 
had risen to think of history as a drama full of meaning. 
We talked of progress and of man's destiny, and of the 
mystery of life. Now Karl Pearson takes us in hand, 
shows us how foolish we are, and throws us further back 
into a more brutal, meaningless theory of life than 
human mind ever before conceived. And yet the author 
of this brutal theory is an ardent social reformer, for 
whom, in that capacity, I have a warm regard ! 

And so the increase of human knowledge has brought 
us to this — that there can be no real history until it is 
written in terms of food, sex, and geographical distribu- 
tion ! All our imaginings of higher and better things are 
but poor, meretricious devices for covering up the loath- 
some realities of an unending struggle for food. This is 
all strange enough ! More especially is it strange when, 
by a most peculiar combination of circumstances, it goes 
hand in hand with dreams of social Utopias. The rigid 
doctrine of undying internecine competition is lovingly 
embraced by many on whose banner is inscribed the 
inspiring legend — The Brotherhood of Man. Truly a 
mad world, my friends ! 

Will someone object that, in thus contrasting scientific 
theory and social creed, I am needlessly putting friends 
at loggerheads in the interests of religion ? Well, I am 
quite prepared to meet them on their own ground. I 
must ask your attention for one or two quotations from 
evolutionists of the negative agnostic type. Haeckel, I 



94 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

presume, will be accepted as an orthodox apostle of the 
school. He writes thus ^ : "If this English hypothesis 
(of Darwinism) is to be compared to any definite political 
tendency — as is, no doubt, possible — that tendency can 
only be aristocratic, certainly not democratic, and least of 
all socialist. The theory of selection teaches that in 
human life, as in animal and plant life everywhere, and 
at all times, only a small and chosen minority can exist 
and flourish, while the enormous majority starve and 
perish miserably more or less prematurely." And he 
avers that while " we may profoundly lament this 
tragical state of things, we can neither controvert it nor 
alter it." 

Does not this justify Schopenhauer's view that human 
beings are produced in bulk, like worthless factory wares, 
and are thrown away in bulk, in accordance with the 
maxim of wholesale production, as cheap and bad ? The 
many, he says, are poverty-stricken wretches, intent only 
on eking out their miserable existence ; their sole aim is 
to procure food, and perhaps produce progeny for the 
same unhappy lot. All this sounds harsh, does it not ? 
But it is quite in accord with Karl Pearson's theory of 
scientific history. 

Once again, hear Nietzsche, whose hard, logical con- 
sistency and unappalled frankness should surely cry 

^ "The Doctrine of Descent and Social Democracy " — being chap, 
vi. of his Freedo7fi i?i Science and Teachings pp. 92 and 93 of the 
Eng. trans. 



EVOLUTION AND LIFE 95 

" Halt " to those who would make a new gospel of the 
evolutionary hypothesis.^ " To demand of strength, that 
it should not manifest itself as strength, that it should not 
be a thirst for enemies, resistance and triumphs, is as 
absurd as to demand of weakness that it should manifest 
itself as strength. If the lambs say that the birds of 
prey are wicked, and that it is good to be as little as 
possible of a bird of prey — the birds may make rather 
mocking eyes and say : ' We do not at all bear a grudge 
to them, these good lambs, we even love them. Nothing 
is more delicious than a tender lamb.* '* Again, he asks ^ : 
" Whom do I hate most among the mob of the present 
day ? The Socialist mob, who undermine the working 
man's instinct, his pleasure, his feeling of contentedness 
with his petty existence." He agrees with Karl Pearson 
in condemning Christianity — but it is on the ground that 
it favours the weak. He calls ^ Christianity " the one 
great curse, the one great intrinsic depravity." Why } 
Because it is the religion of sympathy. And sympathy 
(he says *) " stands in antithesis to the tonic passions 
which elevate the energy of the feeling of life. It 
operates depressively. One loses force by sympathising." 
And, following out this line of thought, he tells us ^ that 
" the weak and ill-constituted shall perish : first principle 
of our charity. And people shall help them to do so. 

^ A Genealogy of Morals^ trans., p. 44. 

^ The Antichrist^ trans., p. 342. 

•^ Op. cit., p. 354. ■* Op. cit., p. 246. ^ Op. cit.^ p. 242. 



96 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

. . . . Sympathy thwarts, on the whole, the law of 
development, which is the law of selection. It preserves 
what is ripe for extinction ; it resists in favour of life's 
disinherited and condemned ones ; it gives to life itself a 
gloomy and questionable aspect by the abundance of ill- 
constituted of all kinds whom it maintains in life." 

Behold, then, the true bearing of the scientific theory 
on which Socialism would too often rear its doctrine of 
Brotherhood ! Can men gather grapes of thorns, or figs 
of thistles ? But perchance such socialists may repudiate 
Nietzsche, and may urge that, as a matter of fact, the 
evolutionary process has produced " the social factor," 
and has favoured social progress. With all which I 
heartily concur, and shall myself urge directly. But this 
is to go outside the scientific history of Karl Pearson — 
and outside even the recognised theory of evolution. The 
cardinal doctrine of that is " the survival of the fittest." 
Whereas the cardinal doctrine of Socialism, or, indeed, of 
any form of humanitarianism, is " the fitting of as many as 
possible to survive." Nietzsche is courageous, consistent, 
and thorough-going. The man who sees nothing in 
history but a struggle for food and who yet asks us to 
work for social ideals is none of these. The rigid 
evolutionist of the " struggle " type immures us in an 
immoral cosmos from which there is no escape. Once 
accept his premisses as final and complete, and away with 
ideals and aspirations, with hopes and fears, with human 
sympathy and love. Cadunt omnes quastiones. All is 



EVOLUTION AND LIFE 97 

resolved into a struggle for food. So long as I can get 
food, I am attaining the sole end of my being. All 
higher matters are delusions connected with the one great 
^ reality. Give me food, and I need struggle for nothing 
else — not even for the latest edition of the Grammar of 
Science. 

VII. Life. 

Karl Pearson would account for Stonehenge and 
Salisbury Cathedral by telling us they are disguised results 
of the struggle for food, conditioned by rate of produc- 
tivity and geographical distribution. The natural man, 
unspoilt by the drear philosophy of negations, rebels. 
But even with this meagre list we can do something if we 
are allowed to go behind it. I will not insist on the idea 
that the conformation of continents and islands, of oceans 
and seas, may itself be the outcome of purposeful design 
— though I believe it. But I will ask why we should 
stop short with such ideas as those of productivity and 
struggle. Productivity implies life. What is life } 
Struggle for food implies will to live. What is will to 
live } The answers to these questions will carry us out 
into the free and breezy expanse of life as we actually 
live it. 

And first — What is life } Most apostles of negation 

either avoid this question, or treat it superficially. No 

one yet knows how or when it appeared on our planet. 

There are speculations, however. And speculations have 

7 



98 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

a knack of mixing themselves up with the facts, and of 
imposing themselves on the imagination as though they, 
too, were facts. Fortunately the spirit of modern science 
is increasingly destructive of such hybrid opinions and 
pronouncements. Personally, I do not refuse to believe 
that life has arisen from what we call " dead matter " ; 
though this has not yet been established, and I am 
satisfied to await further discoveries. But suppose it is 
ever proved that the organic arose out of the inorganic — 
what then .? We shall be just where we were. For the 
inorganic could not rise into the organic, unless the 
organic was already implicitly there. The lower must be 
interpreted in terms of the higher ; for we do not know 
what the lower really is until we have seen it in all its 
manifestations. And then for " lower " and " higher " we 
should substitute " undeveloped " and " developed," or 
" implicit " and " explicit." 

Sir Oliver Lodge suggests, as a working hypothesis, a 
different conception of life. He thinks^ it may bear 
some analogy to the known behaviour of magnetism. 
" If anyone (he writes) should assert that all magnetism 
was pre-existent in some ethereal condition, that it would 
never go out of essential existence, but that it could be 
brought into relation with the world of matter by certain 
acts — that, while there, it could operate in a certain way, 
controlling the motion of bodies, interacting with forms 
of energy, producing sundry effects for a time, and then 

^ Life and Matter, pp. 147, 148. 



EVOLUTION AND LIFE 99 

^ disappearing from our ken to the immaterial region 
whence it came — he would be saying what no physicist 
would think it worth while to object to, what many indeed 
might agree with. Well, that is the kind of assertion 

p, (says Sir Oliver) which I want to make, as a working 
hypothesis, concerning life." 

This is another legitimate way of solving one aspect of 
the problem of Life. It is not, however, at all my 
intention to balance opposing hypotheses of this character. 
I want rather to emphasise the fact that the biologist does 
not yet know anything about Life^ apart from its manifesta- 
tions. If he waxes dogmatic about it, he is dogmatic on 
a basis of ignorance. And if experience tells you and me 
that life is something richer, and fuller, and worthier, 
than a struggle for food, we can trust our value judg- 
ments as against the scientific enthusiasm which o'erleaps 
itself. 

Haeckel, Karl Pearson, Maudsley, and others of this 
school, discourse of" polarities," and " tensions," and such- 
like learned terms, and then expect us to applaud them 
for their explanation of Life. They remind me of my 
evenings at Maskelyne and Cook's entertainments. While 
you are engaged with patter and bounce, the trick is done. 

I Allow yourself to be hypnotised by " polarities " and 
" tensions," and, hey, presto 1 there is Life ! But it is not 
there, after all. It is away in somebody's pocket at the 
other end of the room. The only difference between 
the conjurer and the materialistic biologist is this, that 



^ 



y 



loo THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

the former knows himself to be deceiving, whereas the 
latter is taken in by his own bluff. His favourite and 
solemn formulae impose upon his own imagination, and 
so he loses sight of the real issue. As an accomplished 
biologist himself points out, it is very easy to suppose 
you have had a lecture explaining life when in reality 
you have only had an interesting discourse on organic 
chemistry, or a clever bit of descriptive biology. 

Baldwin issues to the over-bold biologist a significant 
challenge. He points out that the problem of analysis 
is one thing, the problem of genesis is quite another. 
When we ask for the laws of reproduction and growth, 
the physicist is silent. " We discover here (says Baldwin ^) 
the fact that the development is by a long series of 
syntheses, each chemical, but each, so far as we know, 
producing something new — a new genetic mode. If this be 
denied, then we have to ask the chemist to produce the 
series, and if he claims that this might be done if he knew 
how, we ask him to reproduce the series backward. Nothing 
short of this last form of treatment will do for exact 
quantitative science.*' This challenge involves a vital 
distinction (literally " vital "). For every chemical process 
can be reversed. But when an organism dies, " the 
dissolution series is not at all the reverse of the com- 
position series." And Baldwin adds in a note that " this 
point becomes very much stronger when we cite the racial , 
or evolution series, with the immortality of protoplasm. 
^ Development and Evolution^ p. 325. (The italics are his.) I 



EVOLUTION AND LIFE loi 

Think of producing the phenomena of sexual reproduc- 
tion from mature son to infant father instead of the 
reverse ! " This insoluble difficulty, he adds, shows that 
" the later terms have some character which the earlier 
have not." 

VIII. Aristotle's Theory of Life. 

I suppose that the modern biologist seldom troubles 
himself with Aristotle, and thereby, in my opinion, loses 
much. For that subtle thinker was a keen naturalist. 
" It must not be forgotten (says Pierce) that Aristotle was 
an Asclepiad : that is, that he belonged to a family which 
for generation after generation, from prehistoric times, 

had had their attention turned to vital phenomena 

He must have had prominently before his mind the fact 
that all eggs are very much alike, and all seeds are very 
much alike, while the animals that grow out of the one, 
the plants that grow out of the other, are as different 
as possible." Thus dowered by tradition, training, and 
nature, he devoted some of his best thought to the 
phenomena of life — watching its development from the 
germ to the perfect form. And he earnestly sought 
for some principle which should explain life from its 
humblest form in that of the plant to its highest in 
man, or even in the Divine Being. 

Aristotle asks himself what is the widest definition of 
life. And in answering it, he distinctly rejects material- 



I02 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

istic theories. He sticks to the facts of life closer perhaps 
than any other philosopher of his rank ; and on this very 
account is represented in RafFaelle's great picture, called 
" The School of Athens," as looking down to earth, while 
Plato looks up to heaven. But his love of facts did not 
blind him, as it has blinded so many since, to the subtler 
and nobler facts of life in favour of the mechanical and 
materialistic. For example, he rejected the tempting 
theory that life means " movement," because he saw that 
the activity of the intellect cannot be described in terms 
of moving parts. The operations of reason seemed to 
him to be rather of an opposite character, and to resemble 
rest, or the suspension of motion.-^ 

In arriving at his own definition, he draws a distinction 
of the highest value — one which would never have failed 
for general recognition but for the reaction against 
Scholasticism — I mean, the distinction between matter and 
form. The experiences on which it is founded are simple 
and obvious. If you have a cube of wax, you can have 
the same form in iron, or wood, or stone, or a thousand 
other materials. On the other hand, the cube of wax can 
be moulded into a sphere, or a pyramid, or a thousand 
other shapes. The material and the form thus fall apart, 
as it were, and show themselves as independent modes of 
existence. Plato had seized on this distinction and made 
the world of forms to be the real world. He called them 

^ See De Amma^ i. iii., en S' rj voiycrt? toiKev rjpcfx'^crei tivI ^ 
CTTicTTaaet fiaWov rf Kivqcrii- 



EVOLUTION AND LIFE 103 

Ideas, and regarded them as giving to each individual 
thing its special characteristics. A thing is what it is by 
virtue of the Ideas " informing " ^ that particular piece of 
matter. He placed these Ideas in a separate world of 
their own ; in so far as they manifested themselves in the 
world of matter, the union was temporary only, and 
unessential. Aristotle adopts the same theory of the 
function of Form, or Idea, but will not allow that Form 
can exist apart from Matter, or Matter from Form. He 
starts with the concrete individual as actually given in 
experience. All things in the world are thus, for 
Aristotle, ideal compounds, consisting of these two 
inseparable elements. Form and Matter. The Form, in 
the mind of the percipient, is an idea ; but it is also a 
reality in the world outside the mind of the percipient. 
And being itself a real cause, producing all the form and 
meaning of the actual world, the mind which perceives 
the Form of a thing penetrates to the very core of exist- 
ence. And further, since Form in the external world is 
the image of a supreme creative mind, the mind of the 
percipient, in recognising it, is in touch with that which 
is akin to it — the mind that is in the world. Surely this 
is a noble theory to come from the philosopher whose look 
was bent down to earth ! The way was open for him 
through Nature up to Nature's God. 

But now to apply this to the problem of Life. Aris- 

^ Note that the Form is, of course, infinitely more than the mere 
outward shape or figure, as apprehended by touch or sight. 



ro4 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

totle began his researches with the study of natural living 
objects. He watched the oak springing from the acorn, 
the bird from the egg. He saw how matter took form 
under the controlling influence of inherent forces. The 
lowest form of life seemed to be that of plants : his 
definition therefore must include them. He accordingly 
defines Life itself ^ as " the process of nutrition, increase, 
and decay, from an internal principle." But life rose in 
stages above this vegetative basis. In certain living 
creatures sensation was developed ; in others, on a higher 
grade, power of locomotion. Each preceding stage is the 
necessary basis for its successor. And the soul of man is 
the combination of these into one purposeful activity. 
And in the "living natural object " we find the inseparable 
combination of Form and Matter. The body is the 
matter to which the soul acts as form. The soul is 
dependent on the body, as the Form on the Matter. 
But, on the other hand, the truth, the reality, the meaning 
of the body is in its form, the soul. As Grote ^ puts it : 
" The Matter to which (as correlate) soul stands related 
is a natural body (i.e. a body having within it an inherent 
principle of motion and rest), organised in a certain way, 
or fitted out with certain capacities and preparations to 
which soul is the active and indispensable complement. 
These capacities would never come into actuality without 

^ Metaph. ii. i., ^w^v 8e Xiyoixev ttjv Sl ulvtov rpocfiyv re kcll av^rjaLv 
^ Grote's Aristotle^ p. 457. 



EVOLUTION AND LIFE 105 

the soul ; but, on the other hand, the range of actuahtles 
or functions in the soul depends upon, and is limited by 
the range of capacities ready prepared for it in the body. 
The implication of the two constitutes the living subject, 
with all its functions, active and passive." And, as he 
continues further on, " we thus see that the animated 
subject is^ a form immersed or implicated in matter ; and 
all its actions and passions are so likewise. Each of these 
has its formal side, as concerns the soul, and its material 
side, as concerns the body.^ When a man is angry, for 
instance, this emotion is both a fact of the soul and a fact 
of the body : in the first of these two characters, it may 
be defined as an appetite for hurting someone who has 
hurt us ; in the second of the two, it may be defined as 
an ebullition of the blood and heat round the heart." 

All this is brought into closest connection with the 
modern conception of evolution by Aristotle's further 
development of his doctrine of Form and Matter in his 
significant distinction between the potential and the actual. 
Matter is potential only, imperfect, undefined ; Form is 
required to make it complete and determinate. Form 
thus comes to the aid of Matter as the energising 
principle, making that actual which might never have 
been so. Wallace, a master of Aristotelian lore, states this 
conception of " realisation " thus : " Without soul, Aris- 
totle implies,^ the body is a mere potential existence, a 

^ Op. cit.^ p. 459. 2 De Anima^ I. i. 

^ Aristotle's Psychology^ Introd., p. xli. 



io6 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

mere possible substratum for development in future : it 
is nothing actual or real. But the whole meaning of a 
potential capacity lies in its reference to the actual realisation 
which expresses it} Just as the seed reaches its true 
meaning in the tree, so the soul constitutes the real 
significance of the body. Soul is thus not only the 
realisation, the true meaning of the body : it is also in a 
sense its end or termination. When an organism has 
advanced so far as to possess a soul, it has reached, as it 
were, its last stage in development." 

Such, then, in brief, is Aristotle's theory ^ of life. The 
materialistic biologist may turn aside in scorn from such 
old-fashioned stuff. But I ask him what he has to 
substitute for it. His formulae give us what Aristotle 
would call the material cause. But whence comes the 
element of " organisation," which he would call the formal 
cause } It is surely unscientific to stress for ever the 
material cause, and calmly to assume as of no significance 
that cause which alone makes organic development 
possible. Depend upon it, the Aristotelian conception of 
Form has still its part to play in science and philosophy. 
It presents to us all nature rising in an eternal graduated 
conversion of matter into form, an eternal breaking out 
into life in higher and higher functions.^ A particle of 

^ Italics mine. 

2 Aristotle did not sufficiently carry out the idea that form and 
matter are correlatives in a higher unity. But his whole tendency 
was in the direction of rising above all dualism. 

^ See Schwegler's Hist, of Phil. (Stirling's Eng. edit.), p. 107. 



EVOLUTION AND LIFE 107 

the Divine Mind appears as a factor in all existence, 
animate and inanimate. Thus all matter tends to become 
form, all potentiality actuality, all being knowing. The 
full development of the universe is immanent from the 
beginning. It came from God and it returns to God. 

Our own Francis Bacon, who, as Erdmann remarks,^ 
reveals his English origin in the entirely secular character 
of his philosophy, has yet a place for a doctrine of 
" Forms." He rejected all ideal ends, whether the 
honour of God or the satisfaction of the thirst of know- 
ledge, and put in their place prosaic industrial aims. 
He was content to find efficient causes, and despaired of 
grasping the " natures of things." Nevertheless he made 
the natures of things an object of his keen pursuit. His 
doctrine of " forms " approaches very near to that of 
Aristotle, though it had more of a utilitarian cast.^ He 
looked to " forms " for the interpretation of the permanent 
qualities of things. Of what character he deemed such 
interpretation to be is sufficiently shown by his declaration : 
" I had rather believe all the fables in legend and the 
Talmud and the Alcoran than that this universal frame is 
without a mind." ^ 

Or take finally the teaching of a man like Ruskin, who 
looked at the useful chiefly through the idea of the 
beautiful. He feels that in dealing with the problem of 
life, we come nearest to a solution in the consideration of 

^ Hist, of Phil. ^ vol. i. p. 684. 

2 Nov, Org,^ ii. 4. ^ Bacon, Essay xvi. 



io8 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

Form. " Hold fast (he says ^) to the form, and defend 
that first, as distinguished from the mere transition of 
forces. Discern the moulding hand of the potter com- 
manding the clay, from his merely beating foot, as it 
turns the wheel. If you can find incense in the vase, 
afterwards — well." 

So general, and from points of view so varied, is the 
significance of form recognised and emphasised. 

IX. The Will to Live. 

Karl Pearson asks for history to be written in terms of 
the struggle for food. We saw that the word " struggle " 
compels us to go behind it. Why do living beings 
struggle for food ? Evidently because they want it. 
They are creatures, then, with desires. What is the 
driving force behind the desire ? Evidently what 
Schopenhauer calls the will to live — a will which manifests 
itself in many other fiDrms than the desire for food, even 
were we to confine ourselves to the sphere of natural 
history. Granting that there are senses, refined and 
unrefined, in which we may be said to live to eat, I think 
even the rigid Darwinian will not deny that there are 
also senses in which we eat to live. 

But the materialistic or negatively idealistic evolutionist 
may stop short of this will to live, and declare himself 
satisfied with the operation of what is called " natural 

^ Ethics of the Dust, pp. 204-208, 2H, 212. 



EVOLUTION AND LIFE 109 

selection." I am myself prepared to allow enormously- 
wide operation to this factor in the evolutionary process. 
But I am by no means inclined to look to it for answers 
to ultimate questions. What selects ? What is selected .'' 
These questions spring at once to the front, and until 
they are answered, to mutter on every occasion the mystic 
words " natural selection " is to put ourselves into the 
company of those dear, good folk who believe in the 
virtue of such blessed words as Mesopotamia, 

The biologist tells us that " variations " afford the 
material for selection, and that these variations are 
" accidental " or " fortuitous." But he will hasten to 
assure us that by these terms " accidental " or " fortuitous " 
he does not mean rea/ly indeterminate, but indeterminate 
only from the point of view of our knowledge of the 
causes. He holds them to be, like all else, inevitable 
results of definite causation. Qua biologist, he is quite 
warranted in thus limiting his view. Indeed, qua 
biologist, he cannot go much further. But he cannot 
forbid those who want to be more than biologists asking 
whether there is any aim or purpose in this process. If 
he tells us there is no such purpose, but that natural 
selection works blindly on promiscuous variations blindly 
produced, we shall quickly demand from him how he 
knows this. Even on such a basis as is provided by the 
abstract law of probabilities,^ we know from experience 
that a purposeful structure can be raised. The materialist 
^ See Appendix to Lecture V. on Moral Statistics. 



no THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

will not suffer us to escape even by this pathway of 
actual experience. He wants his universe to be blind, 
and blind he will have it. He covers up its beggarly 
ugliness, its brutal self-assertion, by such phrases as " the 
iron law of causation." But I maintain that this law is 
only Chance, or Fate, writ large. For why do such and 
such particular conditions exist, and follow the " law " 
which describes their sequences ? The only answer 
possible to the materialist is that the universe happens to he 
built that way. And what is this, I repeat, but Chance 
or Fate } We are back, by way of " natural selection," 
into the old weltering sea of endless and aimless 
" becomings." 

Is there no way of escape from such conclusions ? In 
a previous case, we were rescued by judgments of value 
and by ideals. We saw also that life has a controlling 
and directing power. Let us now see whether " the will 
to live " can aid us in this present emergency. 

Kant had suggested that in the will of man we should 
be most likely to find the solution to our deepest 
problems. Schopenhauer worked out this idea, and made 
it the basis of his philosophy. He found in it the 
explanation of the whole visible and tangible world. He 
treats it as covering the whole field of cosmic and psychic 
energy. He has all manner of synonyms and sup- 
plementary expressions by which to convey his full 
meaning. He calls it " wish, seeking, stirring, effort, 
impulse, force, push, inclination, passion, fearing, anger, 



EVOLUTION AND LIFE m 

hate, hope, excitation, pressure ; and also compares it 
to gravitation and attraction, and chemical force and 
plant force." I will quote a characteristic passage, in 
order that he may speak for himself.^ " Only those 
changes (he writes) which have no other ground than 
a motive — i.e. an idea — have hitherto been regarded as 
manifestations of will. Therefore in nature a will has 
only been attributed to man, or at the most to animals. 
.... But that the will is also active where no knowledge 
guides it, we see at once in the instinct and the mechanical 

skill of animals In such actions of these creatures 

the will is clearly operative as in their other actions, but 
it is in blind activity, which is indeed accompanied by 
knowledge but not guided by it. If now we have once 
gained insight into the fact, that idea as motive is not a 
necessary and essential condition of the activity of the 
will, we shall more easily recognise the activity of will 
where it is less apparent. For example, we shall see that 
the house of the snail is no more made by a will which 
is foreign to the snail itself, than the house which we 
build is produced through another will than our own ; 
but we shall recognise in both houses the work of a will 
which objectifies itself in both the phenomena — a will 
which works in us according to motives, but in the snail 
still blindly as formative impulse directed outwards." 

I have said, and quoted, sufficient to give a general 
idea of Schopenhauer's theory of will. I confess that 
^ The World as Will and Idea^ vol. i. pp. 147-148 (Eng. trans.). 



112 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

it has a great fascination for me. I have studied some- 
what in detail the marvellous phenomena of instinct, 
and agree with Schelling in thinking that " there is no 
better touchstone of a genuine philosophy than the 
phenomena of animal instinct, which must be reckoned 
among the greatest by every thoughtful being." I am 
also in deep sympathy with Schopenhauer in his Idealism, 
expressed so strongly and so clearly in the opening words 
of his great work ^ : " The world is my idea — this is a 
truth which holds good for everything that lives and 
knows, though man alone can bring it into reflective 
and abstract consciousness." With all this I have 
deep sympathy. But alas ! this Will of Schopenhauer's 
philosophy is blind, and dumb, and unconscious ! It is 
sheer craving, sheer striving, and is continually being 
thwarted by some mysterious check which gives rise to 
what we call " consciousness." The world, upon this 
theory, rests on Unreason, or on what has been well 
called " the dark under-tow of the ever-heaving Desire." 
Can we wonder that such a theory led to pessimism ? 
Can we wonder that he looked on death as the means of 
escape from the burden of insatiable desire ? The Will, 
having somehow attained to consciousness in the brain, 
realises its hopeless blindness and has no better end at 
which to aim than an unconscious oblivion. There is a 
will to live — but it must be repressed, as the source of 
all our misery. 

^ Op. cit., p. 3. 



L 



EVOLUTION AND LIFE 113 

X. Organic Selection. 

As a matter of fact, however, we are by no means 
under the necessity of submitting to such extreme con- 
ditions as those required by Schopenhauer. We may 
grant the will to live ; and if we avoid the impersonal, 
the irrational, the unconscious, as the basis, we may find 
that life is worth living after all. Let us return to 
investigate afresh the action of natural selection. 

I ask you to observe that natural selection is a positive 
name for what is itself purely negative. Natural selection 
produces nothing — it merely eliminates certain individuals 
from a total produced by forces of a positive character. 
It cannot, therefore, explain one single fact of existence. 
It may to some extent tell us why certain organisms do 
not exist ; but for those which do exist, it sends us out 
in search of adequate causes. These causes are some of 
them found in the action of the environment on the 
given organism ; but others are found in the organisms 
themselves. The former have received almost more than 
their due share of attention. The latter have been, com- 
paratively speaking, forgotten. The environment has 
been exalted so exclusively, that the organism has been 
looked upon, if not quite as a passive agent, at any rate 
as one which reacts simply in accordance with mechanical 
laws of action and reaction. 

But the turn of the organism itself has come at last. 

A number of recent labourers in the field of evolution 

8 



114 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

are convinced that the organism is by no means a passive, 
or merely mechanical, recipient of stimuli from outside, 
but that it has, so to speak, a will of its own. It is a 
centre of the will to live, and strives to expand by a 
power of self-adaptation to changes in its external con- 
ditions. That is to say, we are beginning to see that an 
organism is not idly swayed by external forces, like a 
strip of lank seaweed, adrift in the wash of the waves ; 
but that it exerts a directive force from within^ and develops 
by virtue of a conflict with^ and a triumph over^ the difficulties 
it encounters. 

We shall better see the force of this new view of 
development if we put the matter in another way. The 
naturalistic school of evolutionists have recognised the 
part played by pleasure as a factor on the side of the 
organism itself. And this certainly marks an advance on 
the mechanical theory ; for feeling, as being a subjective 
experience, is clear of mechanism. But it does not release 
us from passivity ; for pleasure simply leads its victim 
captive. A creature goes, says Epicurus, where pleasure 
calls him. But more accurate investigation and completer 
reasoning show that we must go behind the pleasure to 
the creature which feels the pleasure. The impulse to 
live acts prior to, and independently of, the pleasure 
which is the result of the impulse. In other words, it is 
the exercise of the activity which creates the pleasure ; it 
is not the pleasure which creates the activity. Of course 
there is action and reaction. The experience of pleasure 



EVOLUTION AND LIFE 115 

becomes part of the total being of the organism. But 
activity opens out the way. 

Considerations of this kind have gradually forced them- 
selves upon the attention of students of vital phenomena, 
with the consequence that we have the new and important 
development of the Darwinian theory ^ which now goes by 
the name of " organic selection." Any detailed exposition 
of this new hypothesis is not possible here. But I would 
take advantage of this opportunity to bespeak for it 
careful attention. I believe it to be fraught with great 
possibilities, and I anticipate from it at no distant date 
results of a somewhat revolutionary character. I will 
describe its main feature, in language as untechnical 
as the subject allows. The gist of the matter lies in 
the use of the term " organic " as qualifying the term 
" selection." " Natural," as applied to selection, is not 
excluded, but it is supplemented. In the words of one 
of its exponents,^ " The organism, so to speak, selects 
itself: that is, it is its own accommodations which are 
instrumental in securing its survival. It is the behaviour 
of the organism^ therefore, which is important, and not 
variations alone, as in simple natural selection generally — 
and hence the adjective ' organic' It is in so far the 
organic function — reactions, struggles, efforts, conscious 

1 For full discussion, with references to authorities, etc., see 
Baldwin's Development and Evolution. 

2 Diet, of Psychology, sub. "Organic Selection." (Italics those of 
the original.) 



ii6 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

choices, etc. — which really count and determine what sort 
of characters shall be saved by natural selection." This 
brief extract will show the new importance given to what 
I have designated the " internal " forces. Individual 
organisms are no longer to be looked upon as wholly 
dependent on their environment. As another exponent 
of the theory puts it, " The creatures pilot themselves. 
.... Selection ceases to be purely natural : it is in 
part artificial." 

This theory of organic selection has been accepted by a 
large and representative number of leading biologists and 
psychologists, and is full of hopeful augury for such an 
expansion of the Darwinian hypothesis as shall make it 
more adequate to the facts of life. The abstractions of 
science are far removed from the complex and infinitely 
varied nature of the " real." Actions and reactions are 
possible in modes to which mechanism can never apply. 
Spinoza's celebrated axiom is again declaring itself as 
applicable to our latest biological developments. " All 
life tends to persevere in life." Moreover, life is seen to 
be a guiding and directing agency — to be, as I shall urge in 
the lecture on free will, a self-determining force, expand- 
ing from within by an inherent energy, and increasingly 
master of its environment. It gains the victory over 
external conditions, not by defying or breaking what are 
known as the laws of nature, but by adapting itself to 
them, and then directing the material forces to serve its 
own purposes. The world is thus modified increasingly 



EVOLUTION AND LIFE 117 

because it is the instrument by which creatures with the 
will to live assert that will. Stonehenge and Salisbury- 
Cathedral are collections of matter, with resident forces, 
which would never have taken that form, but for this 
same will to live. And inasmuch as they are " temples," 
they manifest a growing desire for life fuller and richer 
than any which the " natural " order can provide. Stone- 
henge witnesses to a yearning towards a life but dimly 
conceived, and centred in a God but dimly revealed. 
Salisbury Cathedral witnesses to a belief in Him Who 
said : " / came that they may have life^ and may have it 
abundantly'^ 

XI. Evolution and Christianity. 

We can breathe again. The incubus of a fatalistic 
" natural selection" is gone. We have given one answer 
at any rate to the questions — What selects } and What is 
selected } The organism itself has the will and the power 
to select ; and it tends to select such portions of its en- 
vironment as make for fuller life. We shall obtain other 
answers when we come to consider the relation of the 
evolutionary process to mind, and to the higher faculties. 
I conclude the present lecture by asking what should be 
the attitude of Christians to this hypothesis of evolution. 

Speaking broadly, there can be no doubt that the 
general attitude of Christians has been hostile, and that 
supporters of the hypothesis have frequently resented with 
bitterness an opposition which they could not help re- 



ii8 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

garding as prejudiced, if not factious. But can we wonder 

that there should be a recoil from a theory which leads to 

such world-views as those I have discussed, which would 

make of life a fatalistic struggle for food, and would 

negative every higher quality and spiritual aspiration of 

human existence ? The Christian sense of the value of 

life and the facts of actual experience of religion were not 

to be thrown away as rubbish because a few specialists, 

with a new success to intoxicate them, could not find place 

in their scientific systems for phenomena which obstinately 

refused to bend to their will. Better, therefore, even 

perverse and extreme antagonism than a light yielding to 

crude and early forms of a hypothesis which goes down to 

the depths of " being '' and " becoming." Even negative 

speculators themselves should be grateful for religious 

opposition to their impetuosity — that is to say, if they are 

genuine lovers of truth, and not mere blindly prejudiced 

enemies of all spiritual views of the universe. There 

is a scientific and negationist dogmatism which is as 

hectoring and intolerant as the worst specimens of the 

odium theologicum^ and without the excuse of the latter. 

For the too dogmatic theologian has brought himself to 

believe that it will undoubtedly be well for the world to 

come as speedily as may be to his point of view. But 

if the dogmatic materialist, or negationist, is right, what 

difference can it make to him or to me what we believe, 

so long as we leave each other in peace ? Of course, on 

materialist premisses, this very question is meaningless — 



EVOLUTION AND LIFE 119 

for we can none of us help thinking just as we think. I 
put it, however, from the point of view of the ordinary 
man. And further, must it not be acknowledged that the 
modifications and expansions of the evolution hypothesis, 
since Darwin first propounded it, have been sufficiently 
numerous and weighty to justify the drag put upon its 
acceptance by the conservative elements in the social 
organism ? 

But now for the other side of this matter. I would ask 
Christians in general whether the time has not arrived 
when they should devote sympathetic and detailed study 
to the facts accumulated in such abundance in favour of 
evolution versus special creation ? We are not wise, nor 
even sound in the faith, if we continue wilfully to shut 
our eyes to new truths merely because we do not like 
them, or because they seem to clash with some of our 
older beliefs. Many of the dangers and difficulties an- 
ticipated with dread have been dissipated by fuller research 
and freer discussion. A wider and wiser criticism and 
exegesis are showing us that much which we took to be of 
the essence of the faith is only scaffolding. And many of 
us have found to our joyful surprise that the more firmly 
established results of scientific method are compatible with 
the fundamentals of Christian theology, and sometimes 
flood them with new light and richer content. I am 
jealous for Christianity. I desire to see it shown to be 
in practice what it is in essence — a living religion, able to 
assimilate things new as well as old, and give meaning and 



I20 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

proportion to every phase of existence as it develops, 
quietly confident in the knowledge that — 
"God fulfils Himself in many ways." 

Do some of us still fear that man will be lowered if he 
is linked on to the continuous line of life ? Why should 
we ? For, in the first place, it is God who made all 
things ; none of them came from the hand of any other 
God ; and He pronounced them very good. All things 
are therefore ultimately spiritual, and proceed from the 
fulness of the Divine Nature. And, in the second place, 
questions of origin and genetic problems do not affect 
present matters of fact. Man does not cease to be him- 
self because he was once a child. He does not cease to 
be capable of spiritual experiences because he was once a 
helpless infant. Apply this thought on the large scale. 
Man is not lowered if he is linked on to primordial forms 
of life. The facts of his nature assert themselves, what- 
ever may be the process by which God brought him into 
his state of conscious dignity and moral selfhood. Such 
linking on does not lower him, but flings back a light on 
all that has preceded him — gives worth, and meaning, 
and place, to the various ascending forerunners of his 
higher form of life. 

The great modern poets have fully grasped this thought. 
It is time theologians should grasp it in their turn. 
Emerson conceives that — 



(( 



Striving to be man, the worm 

Mounts through all the spires of form." 



EVOLUTION AND LIFE 121 

And Browning speaks with wonted vigour and directness 
of feeling — 

*' Partake my confidence ! No creature's made so mean, 
But that, some way, it boasts, could we investigate. 
Its supreme worth : fulfils, by ordinance of fate, 
Its momentary task, gets glory all its own. 
Tastes triumph in the world, pre-eminent, alone." ^ 

It has always seemed strange to me that there should 
be so much difficulty in grasping the idea of the unity 
and solidarity of all life. For whence comes life ? Are 
not Christians taught that in the Divine Logos was life ? 
Are they not taught that the life-giving Spirit brooded on 
the face of the waters ? Whence, then, this reluctance to 
see God in every form of life ? Is it because we speak of 
lower and higher stages, and we would fain mark man off 
as absolutely separate from all the rest beneath him. But 
how about the facts of our nature ? Study the embryo 
of man. See how each one of us begins life deep down 
below the level of the conscious, and in a form which 
links on in a thousand ways to various stages in the 
evolutionary process. Watch how he rises step by step, 
by a slow and orderly progress from unconscious insensi- 
bility to perception, consciousness, self-consciousness, 
moral consciousness, culminating in the full sense of 
knowing himself to be a " son of God." There is no 
arbitrary leap at any point. At the base of the process is 
the material ; on that is formed the animal ; and on that 

1 Fifine at the Fair, 



122 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

again the spiritual. And as Aristotle saw so long ago, 
each stage in the ascending scale remains as a support 
for that which carries on the process to a higher point. 
Think of all these facts — and then meditate on St Paul's 
deep saying :".... first .... that which is natural, 
then that which is spiritual." Why should we hesitate, I 
ask, to apply to the evolution of life as a whole, that 
which is so plain, so undeniable, in the case of the indi- 
vidual life ? The process in the individual is, of course, 
infinitely more rapid than the world process. But there 
is no difference in kind. Lapse of time constitutes no 
difference in essence. 

I appeal, then, for a bolder and firmer grasp of the 
facts of life. At present many of us blink them in favour 
of our narrower theories and opinions. But are we not 
persuaded that the ways of God are " broader than the 
measures of man's mind" ? If we really believe this, then 
we shall be receptive of whatever fresh gleams of light 
God may throw upon the works of His hands. Is not 
Alfred Russell Wallace sufficiently a Darwinian ? Why, 
he shares with Darwin the honour of formulating the 
hypothesis. And yet how does he conclude his book on 
Darwinism ? By nothing less than an explicit and earnest 
statement of his belief in the spirituaHty of man's nature. 
There cannot, then, be any serious incompatibility 
between evolution and a spiritual view of existence. 

I hold that the Christian, of all others, should be keen 
and alert to obtain a complete history of life upon the 



EVOLUTION AND LIFE 123 

globe ; for he is bound to see in it a revelation of God*s 
Nature and a gradual unfolding of His purpose. A full 
and accurate knowledge of the past will enable him to 
read ever deeper meaning into St Paul's grand conception 
of the groaning and travailing creation. And his hopes 
for the future will centre in the Incarnate Logos, Who has 
been behind the process from the beginning, and Who has 
assured us of development yet to come — " / came^'' said 
Hcy " that they may have life^ and may have it abundantly T 



FOURTH LECTURE. 
EVOLUTION AND MIND. 

<I>aj5 Kvptov irvor] dvOpwTrwv. — LXX. 
"The spirit of man is the lamp of the Lord." — Prov. xx. 27. 

I. Materialistic View of Mind. 

We have examined the bearing of the evolution hypothesis 

on the nature of Life. We now pass to examine its 

bearing on those elements in our nature which fall under 

the category of Mind. The subject is a vast one. I can 

only hope to drive a few main lines through the mass of 

material it presents. 

Let us understand clearly what the materialistic 

biologist demands. He claims universal application for 

his inductions from biological premisses. Not only the 

body, but the mind of man (the very mind that frames 

the hypothesis !) shall confess its entire subjection to 

purely naturalistic agencies. It will not satisfy him to 

grant that the term " development " may be applied in 

some sense to mental qualities and to reason : it must be 

applied in his sense. Mind is to be evolved out of that 

124 



EVOLUTION AND MIND 125 

which is not mind : reason out of that which is not 
rational : morals out of that which is not moral : religion 
out of that which is soulless. 

Before I proceed to controvert these demands, let me 
clearly assert that I recognise to the full the claims of a 
rational and healthy materialism. I oppose what I deem 
to be perversions, and exaggerations, and misapplications, of 
an undoubted truth. Maudsley tells us ^ it is only timid 
minds and ignorant which are shocked by the very word 
" materialism," and exhorts us " to refine, purify, and 
develop the material being in obedience to natural laws 
of cause and effect, instead of trying to degrade and 
despise it continually as the enemy of an indwelling 
entity." I most cordially concur in these incisive strictures 
upon a maudlin spirituality, or a fevered and un- 
natural asceticism. But these errors are not peculiar to 
Christianity. And as I do not know of any considerable 
body of civilised Christians who are at present committing 
these errors, I am not quite sure whom he means to lash. 
Asceticism is certainly not one of the crying evils of our 
times ! And Christianity is a religion which, in its full 
presentation, most definitely and essentially recognises the 
dignity, and even the eternity, of the " material." 

Dr Maudsley gives to one of his books the title l^ife 
in Mind and Conduct, I wonder what he means by 
mind, and by conduct. Are they concerned only with 
rendering " obedience to natural laws of cause and effect } " 

^ Life in Mind and Conduct^ p. 144. 



126 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

Or are there some other laws to obey ? This is the great 
problem. Mind and conduct cannot mean much in a 
world which is mindless and which pays no heed to right 
and wrong. 

II. Consciousness. 

Set over against Maudsley's pronouncement a well- 
known passage from Pascal : " Man is only a reed, the 
feeblest in nature, but he is a thinking reed. There is 
no necessity that the whole universe should arm itself to 
crush him. A vapour, a drop of water, suffices to kill 
him. But should the universe crush him, man would 
still be greater than that which kills him, because he 
knows that he dies ; whereas the universe knows nothing 
of its advantage over him." 

Now the two passages are far from being inconsistent ; 
up to a point they can easily be harmonised by the 
aphorism — mens sana in corpore sano. But can anyone 
put the two on the same level. Instruction and ex- 
hortation as to the structure, management, and develop- 
ment of the body are most necessary ; for the body is 
the instrument of the mind. But you will not get far 
in developing organ music if you never rise higher in your 
philosophy of music than the organ-builder's workshop. 
And so you wiU never arrive at any worthy conceptions 
of the value and dignity of human life if you remain on 
the level of " studies of organic in human nature." ^ Do 

^ Sub- title of Life in Mind and Co?iduct. 



EVOLUTION AND MIND 127 

not misunderstand me. I acknowledge the need for such 
studies to as full an extent as Maudsley himself. But I 
regard them as means to higher ends. I never feel that 
in prosecuting them I am coming into contact (save 
indirectly) with man's true nature and aim. Whereas, 
with Maudsley, they bulk so largely that they produce in 
him a cynical form of pessimism which takes all the real 
glow of enthusiasm out of life, and leaves one in hopeless, 
sullen rebellion against an order of things which one 
cannot modify or improve. Here is a passage from the 
concluding chapter of the work I have mentioned ^ : "It 
is because of the inevitable strong bias of judgment 
owing to man's conceit of his position and value in the 
universe that sin, evil, corruption, decay, disease, and 
death are anywise anomalies or mysteries to be wondered 
at as needing explanation. His towering egoism prompts 
him naturally to look on disease which sickens, weakens, 
humiliates, and ends him as a continually recurring 
calamity which he would fain abolish. Yet from a wider 
point of view than the anthropocentric standpoint they are 
seen to be good, seeing that they are natural and necessary 
events in the ordered sequence of things." Contrast this 
passage with the joyous sense of a mode of existence 
higher than the material, which brims over with every word 
of Pascal's statement. Of course there is truth in what 
Maudsley says : but it is truth of that dangerous kind 
which, when it is left without its complementary truths^ works 

^ Op» cit., p. 438. 



128 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

havoc with individual lives and with the welfare of the 
community. Let me try to bring some of these com- 
plementary truths into their rightful relation to the 
teachings of materialism. 

And first of all, is there not something manifestly 
absurd in referring a conscious, rational being to the 
conscious and the irrational for his origin, and as the 
measure of his place in nature ? For, as I have already 
remarked, the mind which apprehends the material 
phenomena, and judges the evidence for its very existence, 
not to speak of its nature and qualities, cannot itself be 
one among the phenomena thus apprehended and judged. 
In other words, the relation of subject and object — of 
knower and known — is primary and absolute, if there is 
to be any knowledge at all. By whatever stages con- 
sciousness had developed, the characteristics which it 
presents in its form of human self-consciousness, are 
facts, and must be reckoned with as facts. No biological 
history of organisms, no studies in organic, can make 
them other than they are. We may watch cells join 
themselves to cells, and by infinitely fine and varied 
modifications adapt themselves for the battle with their 
environment and with each other ; we may ^admire the 
complexity of the increasing division of labour, and the 
formation of those larger organic unities in which (to use 
Kant's terse and pregnant phrase) " all the parts are 
mutually ends and means." And we may marvel yet 
more as we discover that the end, or aim, of each cell and 



EVOLUTION AND MIND 129 

organism is not to be self-contained, but to help in 
building up some form of life higher than itself — but 
when we have done all this, we have not come within 
sight even of the problem of consciousness, much less 
explained it. Its very existence, still more its mystery, 
escape us. 

As simple matter of fact, if we have to choose between 
consciousness and the world of things and forces, it is the 
world that must go. For whatever the world may be, 
consciousness is an ultimate reality. For consciousness is 
able to turn back even upon itself, and become conscious 
of itself. That is to say, it is not a mere awareness of 
phenomena presented to it from outside, so to speak, but it 
is aware of itself. Wallace puts this well ^ when he says 
that consciousness is at once " the scene, the play, and an 
observer, who, in some strange league with author and 
manager, is more than observer." Spinoza was too sound 
and thorough a thinker to blink these facts. For him, 
consciousness was one of the modes of ultimate reality. 
Extension and thought are two aspects of the one 
existence which he calls Substance. But the two are not 
really in the same rank. For the ultimate unity of 
extension and thought can never be found in the objects 
of thought as objects, but in the mind — the subject — that 
knows them. It is in the unity of the apprehending centre 
of self-consciousness that we have the awareness both of 
the consciousness that perceives and of the object per- 

^ W. Wallace, Lecitires, p. 170. (Clarendon Press.) 

9 



I30 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

ceived. Spinoza himself realised this,^ and, almost in 
spite of himself, gave thought the preponderance. Kant 
saw this still more clearly and made extension to be 
definitely a mode of thought, a construction of con- 
sciousness. But, in any case, the fact remains that 
the one absolute certainty is consciousness. It stands 
out as supreme and inexplicable. Even though we 
adopt the monistic substance of Haeckel, we can con- 
ceive of it as nothing else than consciousness coming 
to itself in organic nature. For twist and turn things 
as you will, you cannot get consciousness out of the 
unconscious. 

Starting, then, with the fact of consciousness, we find 
ourselves at once in what I have called the sphere of the 
supernatural. We are here out of the reach of the cate- 
gories and methods of physical science. For science is 
itself a construction of consciousness ^ : it is not facts, but 
knowledge of facts. It comes into being because the 
mind turns round upon itself, and asks the what, the why, 
the whence, and the whither. It is the creation of beings 
such as we men know ourselves to be by direct experience 
of ourselves. As Cousin says ^ : " We not only feel^ 
but we know that we feel ; we not only act^ but we know 
that we act ; we not only think^ but we know that we think. 
To think without knowing that we think, is as if we should 

^ See Martineau, Study of Spinoza, p. i88. 

^ Cf. Karl Pearson, chap. i. of Ethic of Free Thought. 

^ Hist, of Modern Philosophy, i. ^74- 



EVOLUTION AND MIND 131 

not think ; and the peculiar quality, the fundamental 
attribute of thought, is to have a consciousness of itself." 



III. Personality. 

I have referred in passing to the function of conscious- 
ness as giving, not only the possibility of experience, but 
a sense of unity in and through the gaining of that 
experience. Let us follow up for a time this further 
train of thought. We are not only aware of ourselves as 
conscious, but as " selves," as " persons," In Locke's 
homely, but sufficient phraseology,^ " a person stands for a 
thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, 
and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in 
different times and places T In more modern and accurate 
terminology, fitting into the doctrine of value judgments 
stated in the first lecture, we may define personality as the 
irreducible element of self-value in all recognition. That is to 
say — all values to be recognised hy me must be values for 
me. The values change and perish, but the identity of 
the " me " for whom they are values remains as the 
continuous centre of value in and for itself. 

We shall best enter into the meaning of such definitions 
as those just given if we bring them into contrast with 
others of a different, and, as I hold, insufficient character. 
For example, John Stuart Mill admits ^ the existence of 

^ Essay ^ bk. ii. 27. (Italics mine.) 
2 See Mill on Hamilton^ pp. 2 1 2 ff. 



132 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

the mind in the form of " a thread of consciousness," 
" aware of itself as past and future," and possessing a 
conviction of the simultaneous existence of other " threads 
of consciousness " and of numerous " permanent possi- 
bilities of sensation." That is to say, a series of separate 
and successive sensations is supposed to become aware, or 
conscious, of itself as a series. But Mill himself acknow- 
ledges-^ there is a difficulty here. I go further, and 
maintain there is an impossibility — nay, an absurdity. 
For how can a series become aware of itself as a series ? 
The words may be put together, but they mean nothing. 
One momentary stage of consciousness is succeeded by 
another. But consciousness, of itself, can only be of the 
present. What, then, is to join the momentary states up 
into a consciousness of each other — what is the thread on 
which they are to be strung ? Or, to change the metaphor, 
who is the weaver who sits behind the loom of experience, 
and weaves the pattern and texture of the individual 
mind ? We can answer the question by looking within 
ourselves. As Locke said, each of us is aware that from 
moment to moment and place to place, he is " one and 
the same thinking thing." Or again, each of us is aware 
of a centre of value for which all values exist — the centre 
which we call the " self." The atoms of my body may 
come and go, but I feel I am not my body. My thoughts 
may course along in a changing stream, but I feel I am 
not my thoughts. Over and above these is what we may 

^ Op. cit.^ p. 213. 



EVOLUTION AND MIND 133 

call a " self-feeling," which persists through the changes, 
and sets itself over against them, organises them, and, as 
a self-conscious referee and arbiter of their nature and 
their claims, uses them as material for further develop- 
ments. Indeed it is but simple truth to say that without 
such a persisting element there could be no change ; nor, 
without a permanent, could there be a series. 

Here we have the secret of the old and profound 
dictum, yvijoOi creavrov — " know thyself." Look not on 
the changing flux of things — on the ceaseless " becoming," 
if thou wouldst have immediate knowledge of the real : 
look into thyself — into thine own abiding self-conscious- 
ness. There thou wilt find depths beyond depths, just 
because God is at the bottom of it. 



IV. The Self : Single or Complex } 

But I may at this point be told by the up-to-date 
psychologist that I am living in the past, and that modern 
discoveries have made such a doctrine of personality 
untenable. He will ask me to study the curious cases of 
disordered personality which have aroused of late so much 
interest and speculation. He will point out that such 
cases exhibit every stage of disintegration and disorganisa- 
tion in self-consciousness — that sometimes there may even 
be alternations of personality in the same individual. 
Arguing from these, and perchance still more recondite 
premisses, he would deny the existence of an absolutely 



134 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

simple and undecomposable " self," revealed by intro- 
spection and intuition. 

I would, however, assure such an objector that I have 
by no means lost sight of such phenomena, nor of the 
arguments founded on them. But I hold that they do 
not at all affect the main principle for which I am con- 
tending. For I have never asserted that the self may not 
be complex. I have only adduced the fact that in the 
normal mind there is an actually established unity of 
self-consciousness. Of course there are degrees in the 
development of the idea of self and of personality. As 
Sully says,^ the attainment of a full consciousness of 
personality " evidently presupposes the highest exercise of 
abstract thought." " Such self-knowledge (he adds) plays 
an important part in the best logical thought about the 
world, as also in the highest artistic and moral effort." 
Of course, also, we know by experience that there are 
derangements possible in this idea of self, whatever degree 
of clearness it may have attained. But it is not the idea 
of self that I am emphasising. // is that element in our 
mental being which renders such an idea possible. As Stout 
says, " The unity of self-consciousness is the crown and 
completion of the unity of consciousness. But the unity 
of consciousness, as expressed in the word ' I,' cannot 
wholly consist in recognition of this unity. Otherwise we 
should be involved in a circle. The unity must already 
exist in some manner and degree before it can be cognised." 
^ Sully, The Human Mind, vol. i. pp. 480-481. 



EVOLUTION AND MIND 135 

As to the ultimate unity or complex character of the 
" self," I do not venture to dogmatise. Mathematical 
ideas of unity have often led us wrong ; the doctrine of 
the Trinity warns us off from that. Life is more than 
mathematics. The unity of the " self " need not be less 
real because it is not a rigid unit, nor an atom, nor a 
monad. The body is one though it has many members. 
So the " self " may be a complex spiritual organism, and, 
just because it is an organism, may possess the highest 
kind of unity. Experimental psychology may also show 
that the " self " is a co-ordination. But whatever may, or 
may not, be shown, the great fact of the actual continuity 
of self-consciousness stands firm. We can see this much, 
at any rate, that the explanation cannot be mechanical. 
Let us labour at the problem. But do not let us, because 
we cannot as yet find the solution, forget or reject the 
cardinal dictum — Cogilo, ergo sum. Disorder among our 
ideas does not disorganise the fundamental realities. 
Because a man believes himself to be made of glass, he 
does not therefore cease to be a human being. The 
doctor will check such a statement by the normal facts 
of life. Why should not the physiological psychologist 
be willing to treat in the same way disordered ideas in 
" diseases of personality " ^ No doubt our conscious- 
ness is a very much bigger and more complex thing 
than any of us can yet imagine. But the " idea " of 
"self" is actually evolved by the normal mind. And 
in the highest minds it is most distinctly apprehended. 



136 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

Here is the bed-rock of fact which must be reckoned 
with. 

A word as to the direct practical aspect of all this. 
The ardent social reformer bids us work for our fellow- 
men, and even sacrifice ourselves for their welfare. Will 
it be unreasonable on our part to ask him how he proves 
to us that they are worth such work and sacrifice. If 
men are naught but vanishing aspects of an impersonal 
substance, I do not quite see why 1 should trouble myself 
about them. I will e'en choose Nietzsche as my prophet. 
Or I will throw in my lot with Schopenhauer or von 
Hartmann, who, in sympathy with the Eastern sages, 
would conduct me to Nirvana — or to something even 
worse ! Surely, of all men, the humanitarian should 
earnestly seek for some spark of the divine in man — 
some element which shall be of absolute value and 
dignity. It is no " colossal egoism," as Maudsley would 
have us think, which leads us to institute such a search. 
For unless we find in our fellows some basis for our 
reverence and our human enthusiasms. Progress has lost 
its soul. Social hope is bound to regard the universe as 
a kingdom of persons, "Be a person," said Hegel, "and 
respect others as persons." Biology can never issue a 
command like that, just as chemical analysis can never 
give us the oak from the acorn. A universe that has 
produced a reverence for persons must be interpreted in 
terms of this, one of its highest products, and not in 
terms of protozoa and ascidians. A recent writer must 



EVOLUTION AND MIND 137 

surely carry us with him when he concludes^ that the 
realities " found in the fully developed man, whose body, 
mind, and feelings are at their highest, are worth more 
to solve the mystery of existence than any conceivable 
application of the genetic method." 

V. Conscience. 

There is a special kind of consciousness which will, in 
its most general aspect, fall naturally for consideration 
here. The word Conscience is composed of the same 
elements as the word Consciousness. But instead of 
keeping the wide sense we have hitherto discussed, it is 
limited to a particular sphere, namely, that of moral 
distinctions. None will deny that, as matter of fact, they 
find within themselves a complex instinct, carrying with 
its exercise a sense of self-approbation or self-disapproba- 
tion, according as its behests are regarded or disregarded. 
It is a force, an impulse, operating constantly during our 
conscious life, and claiming a peculiar authority of its 
own. Its insistence and condemning power are well seen 
in the often quoted words of Ovid — Video meliora pro- 
boque^ deteriora sequor ; as also in Seneca's frequent de- 
scriptions of the struggle between the moral element in 
man's nature, and the weak will under the sway of base 
desires. What is the relation of this " conscience " to 
the evolution hypothesis } 

^ Benedict, Internat, Journal of Ethics^ Oct. 1903 — "Religion as 
an Idea." 



138 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

This question, like so many which come in our way, is 
a very large one. I will suggest the lines on which I 
myself have found an answer. I need hardly tell you 
that there are two great schools of thought which oppose 
one another in their views of the origin and nature of the 
moral faculty. The one is the a priori school, who look 
upon conscience as an original, innate activity, revealing 
an absolute standard of duty. The other is the empirical, 
or utilitarian school, now merged in what we may call the 
evolutionist school, who make morals dependent on ex- 
perience and a gradual process of development. Herbert 
Spencer,^ for example, holds that the sentiment of duty " is 
an abstract sentiment generated in a manner analogous 
to that in which abstract ideas are generated." Its 
" superior authority, unrecognisable by lower types of 
creatures which cannot generalise, and little recognisable 
by primitive men, who have but feeble powers of 
generalisation, has become distinctly recognised as 
civilisation and accompanying mental development have 
gone on. Accumulated experiences have produced the 
consciousness that guidance by feelings which refer to 
remote and general results is usually more conducive to 
welfare than guidance by feelings to be immediately 
gratified." 

Such are the two views between which the battle rages. 
Speaking personally, the more I study them, the less am 
I convinced that they are fundamentally inconsistent. 

^ Data of Ethics^ § 46. 



EVOLUTION AND MIND 139 

For, on the one hand, even the strictest intuitionalist 
cannot deny (if he has any respect for facts) that the 
moral sense develops. We see it on the small scale in 
the individual, and on the large scale in social groups 
and communities. If you would absorb the living truth 
of all this, watch the dawn of moral sense in the mind of 
a child. At first there is the direct, unmoral assertion of 
the individual impulse and will. By degrees the child 
discovers that it has to reckon with other wills, and that 
by entering into certain social relations with these other 
wills, its own desires are more easily and pleasantly 
satisfied. Then, as knowledge of the social environment 
increases, and the social circle expands, there results a 
self-adaptation to a system of mutual subordinations and 
co-operations. And at last there comes a sense of right 
and wrong, which, like all other faculties, is capable of 
development by education and experience. And what is 
true of the individual child, is true also of the childhood 
of the race. There was a time when it cannot be said to 
have existed at all. Is it not St Paul who tells us that 
where there was no law, there was no transgression ? 
The sense of moral responsibility took a long time to 
develop, and is even now very unequally developed. 
The moral standard has varied, and does vary, enormously, 
in different stages of human progress. 

How, then, is the intuitionalist going to meet this 
alarming array of facts ? The least he can do is to admit 
a genuine development of the practical reason, which 



I40 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

implies again a genuine development of the moral sense. 
He may, indeed, affirm that the moral sense is latent 
from the beginning, and comes into consciousness through 
social intercourse. And I am not concerned to deny this, 
if a sufficiently wide sense be given to the word "latent." 
I propose to follow up the implications of the " social 
factor " in a later lecture, arguing that since man is by 
nature social, the development of the moral sense by 
social intercourse is part and parcel of a larger process 
by which the individual will is harmonised with the 
general will. But this is a very different theory to that 
which would regard conscience as an unerring power of 
moral intuition, applied to a code of rigid commands, 
fixed arbitrarily, and imposed by an external authority. 
I look upon morality as being a relation between wills, 
and as, therefore, relative to the development and organisa- 
tion of those wills. In short, 1 deem morality to be social 
through and through. 

On the other hand, as against the purely empirical 
doctrine, I would urge that the very fact of moral progress 
proves that morality is grounded in the nature of the 
universe. I have already laid stress upon this point in 
treating of the moral ideal. And I would add to what I 
there advanced, a further thought. As in the case of 
Life, so here — to trace the history of a development is 
not to explain the origin, nor the causes at work, nor 
the meaning of the results. No moral precept can gain 
any validity or authority from tracing the stages of its 



EVOLUTION AND MIND 141 

manifestation. Hence a strict naturalism can never find 
a basis for the " ought." At the best it can but trust to 
instinct, or social impulse, or enlightened self-interest. 
But " duty " in the full and human sense there can be 
none. The moving and eloquent appeals of moralists 
who wish to sever ethics from any spiritual view of 
existence are simply so much gush. Maudsley's clever 
exposure of the true character of such appeals from the 
society to the individual is one of the best bits of work he 
has accomplished. 

If we are to have real morals, a genuine " ought," we 
must rise above history and biological formulae. We 
must decide that human life has some worthy end ; 
and this decision must itself rest on the moral ideal. 
The moral element is thus final and absolute. What else 
could we expect on the basis of the evolution hypothesis 
itself ? For can an evolutionist hold that such a faculty, 
or power, as that of conscience, with all its complex 
implications for the individual and the community, can 
have no place in the world of ultimate realities ? The 
natural again passes into the supernatural — first the 
natural, then the spiritual. The " is " is the basis for 
the " ought to be." Conscience becomes the subjective 
appreciation of the moral order of the universe. 

I am thus prepared to maintain that the modern 
evolutionary view is not inconsistent with any sane form 
of intuitionalism ; rather does it bring us into deeper 
agreement with the supreme principle of the New Testa- 



142 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

ment. First, there is the reaction, well-nigh on mechanical 
principles, of blow for blow, of eye for eye, of tooth for 
tooth. Then there is the gradual socialisation of the 
individual, as he learns to co-operate with others for the 
general welfare. External law passes into spiritual law. 
The social bond, called by Christianity ayairrj — love of 
God, and love of neighbour — supersedes all moral precepts 
— for "love is the fulfilling of the Law." 



VL Physical Basis of Mind. 

Having discussed the relation of the evolutionary 
hypothesis to consciousness, to personality, and to 
conscience, we are convinced, I trust, that all true 
progress depends on our transcending the limits of 
natural science, and on our piercing through to the 
world of " values " and of " persons." But I feel sure 
that the course of the discussion has over and over again 
suggested to your minds a question, than which it would 
be hard to find one more full of vivid interest and human 
pathos — the question of the relation of the body to the 
mind, or soul. Can we, or can we not, in the light of 
modern science, continue to cherish our hope of Hfe 
beyond the grave ? 

In this field of inquiry, the physiological evolutionist 
is wont to think that he has matters all his own way. 
He considers he has disproved the existence of a soul 
which is independent of the body ; and that therefore. 



EVOLUTION AND MIND 143 

when the body dies, the individual life is at an end. 
You will remember the desolate words of a representative 
modern thinker which I quoted to you at the opening 
of this course. He declared his conclusion that man's 
" origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his 
beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of 
atoms ; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought 
and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the 
grave," and that " the whole temple of man's achievement 
must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe 
in ruins." 

Now, as against this, I ask you whether Burns does not 
voice the soul of the people when he sings — 

" I'll ne'er say that fortune grieves me 
While the star of hope she leaves me." 

Will the race allow the star of hope to be thus buried 
in the dark waters of materialism ? I trow not. " Wir, 
wir leben — und der Lebende hat Recht." Life, as I 
have so often insisted, is wider than thought — and 
infinitely wider than scientific categories. Let us, then, 
approach this difficult subject with the determination that 
we will not blink facts, but will insist on all the facts being 
reckoned with — that we will not refuse to go where 
reason leads, but will not allow specious arguments to 
close avenues for speculation and for hope which still 
open out to us a spiritual and eternal world. 

There are two fallacies into which the materialist falls 



144 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

— fallacies sufficiently obvious when detected. The first 
is one we have already noted, that arising from the 
confusion of history with explanation. Psychologists 
have learnt a wonderful amount about the development 
of the mind — about how the mind has become what 
it is. Dazzled by the increase of such knowledge, 
the materialistic psychologist has waxed over-confident 
in the possibilities of the historical method, and has 
quietly substituted a history of the mind for an explana- 
tion of the mind. This calm assumption is largely 
responsible for such hopeless pessimism as is becoming 
too common in the world. The second fallacy lies in 
the undue prominence given to the material side of 
existence, more particularly in the calm assumption that 
consciousness is a function of the grey matter of the 
brain. In tracing the stages of mental development, the 
structure of the brain has bulked so largely, that a pseudo- 
chemistry is actually willed into existence which provides 
a physical basis for all mental and spiritual phenomena. 
I hope to show that the premisses on which these views 
are founded are illogical, and involve suppositions which 
are inconceivable. 

We find that the astonishingly acute mind of Leibnitz 
grasped this problem of the connection of mind and body 
in all its essential features. He saw that, even if we had 
microscopes powerful enough to reveal to us on a large 
scale all the intricacies of nerve cell and nerve fibre in 
the brain, we should never get beyond " figures and 



EVOLUTION AND MIND 145 

motions." ^ We could conceive the brain " so enlarged 
that, while keeping the same proportions, one could go 
into it as into a mill — but we should never find there 
anything but particles jostling each other." " If in that 
which is organic (he says) there is nothing but mechanism, 
that is, bare matter, having differences of place, magnitude, 
and figure ; nothing can be deduced and explained from 
it, except mechanism. Hence (he continues) we may 
readily conclude that in no mill or clock as such is there 
to be found any principle which perceives what takes 
place in it ; and it matters not whether the things con- 
tained in the machine are solid or fluid, or made up of 
both." Again, he insists that mechanism always means 
partes extra partes. Thus matter can never be said to 
think — it presupposes a thinking, or, at least, a perceiving 
principle. 

All this is delightfully direct and simple. Have recent 
philosophers been able to go beyond it ^ The question 
is so important that I must answer it, not in my own 
words, but in those of a typical representative of modern 
science. Huxley speaks ^ with no uncertain voice on this 
matter. " Nobody, I imagine (he says), will credit me 
with a desire to limit the empire of physical science, but 
I really feel bound to confess that a great many very 
familiar, and, at the same time, extremely important 

^ See Monadology, § 17, and cf. Commentatio de Anima Brutorum^ 
E. 463a; G. vii. 328. 

^ Science a?td Morals, p. 122. 

10 



146 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

phenomena lie quite outside its legitimate limits. I 
cannot conceive, for example, how the phenomena of 
consciousness, as such, and apart from the physical process 
by which they are called into existence, are to be brought 
within the bounds of physical science. Take the simplest 
possible example, the feeling of redness. Physical science 
tells us that it commonly arises as a consequence of mole- 
cular changes propagated from the eye to a certain part 
of the substance of the brain, when vibrations of the 
luminiferous ether of a certain character fall upon the 
retina. Let us suppose the process of physical analysis 
pushed so far that one could view the last link of this 
chain of molecules, watch their movement as if they were 
billiard balls, weigh them, measure them, and know all 
that is physically knowable about them. Well, even in 
that case, we should be just as far from being able to 
include the resulting phenomenon of consciousness, the 
feeling of redness, within the bounds of physical science, 
as we are at present. It would remain as unlike the 
phenomena we know under the names of matter and 
motion as it is now. If there is any plain truth upon 
which I have made it my business to insist over and over 
again, it is this.'* 

Here we have perfect agreement between the pre-evolu- 
tionist and the post-evolutionist — between the philo- 
sophical scientist and the scientific philosopher. It will 
surely require some very strong evidence to overthrow 
such a concurrence of testimony as this ! 



EVOLUTION AND MIND 147 

VII. The Chasm. 

It may be well at this stage to avoid a possible miscon- 
ception. To deny that mind can conceivably be resolved 
into mechanism is not to deny that mental phenomena 
may be invariably accompanied by changes in the material 
of the brain. I am myself inclined to believe that such 
material changes are an invariable accompaniment of 
thought, though I would freely acknowledge that as yet 
we have no proof for such a statement. I take this view 
because of the rapid and massive accumulation of evidence 
for such concomitance — evidence I deem it unwise, as 
well as unscientific, to ignore. 

But in spite of the growing accumulation of evidence 
for concomitance, there is a parallel growing conviction 
that mental and material phenomena are disparate. There 
is no perceptible or perceivable community of nature 
between them. A sensation of red, as Huxley showed, 
may accompany a certain change in the nervous tissue ; 
but to bring the two together is unthinkable. A gap 
separates them which human faculties cannot bridge. 
Tyndall's pronouncement on this subject is clearness 
itself ; and Herbert Spencer in full agreement declares ^ 
that we are " utterly incapable of seeing or even imagining 
how the two are related .... mind remains a something 
without any kinship with other things." He goes even 
further and affirms ^ that " of the two it seems easier to 
^ Principles of Psychology^ § 56. ' '"^ Op. cit.y § 63. 



148 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

translate so-called matter into so-called spirit, than to 
translate so-called spirit into so-called matter (which latter 
is indeed wholly impossible)." 

This last remark of Herbert Spencer's tempts me to 
forsake for a moment my plan of keeping to the point of 
view of ordinary dualism, and to suggest in faintest 
outline the solution of the problem which satisfies me as 
an idealist. I conceive it to be quite wrong to separate 
body and soul as though either could exist independently 
of the other. I hold that the body is the " form " given 
by the mind to certain of its experiences. It is, so to 
speak, concrete will infused by ideas. And my body, 
thus considered, is only part of my universe as " exter- 
nalised " — " projected " — under the conditions of space 
and time, which themselves, again, are ideal conditions. 
For me, therefore, the souls of all living beings are 
indestructible, or rather, belong to the sphere of the 
spiritual, the timeless. The particular body I possess at 
any stage — the present stage or any other — is the special 
lens (to use Leibnitzian phraseology) through which I 
perceive or represent my universe at that particular stage. 
It may be of interest to quote to you Schopenhauer's 
statement of this view. " The body (he writes ^) is given 
in two entirely different ways to the subject of knowledge 
.... as an idea in intelligent perception, as an object 
among objects and subject to the laws of objects. And 
it is also given in quite a different way as that which is 
^ The World as Will and Idea (Eng, trans.), pp. 129, 130. 



EVOLUTION AND MIND 149 

immediately known to everyone, and is signified by the 
word will. Every true act of his will is also at once and 
without exception a movement of his body. The act of 
will and the movement of body are not two different 
things objectively known, which the bond of causality 
unites ; they do not stand in the relation of cause and 
effect ; they are one and the same, but they are given in 
entirely different ways, — immediately, and again in per- 
ception for the understanding. The action of the body is 
nothing but the act of will objectified, i.e. passed into 
perception." In adopting the general tenor of this state- 
ment, I would remind you that the will which I would 
posit at the base of existence is rational and personal. 
Hence it is that I can believe in the possibility of true 
progress and development. Each finite will is filled 
increasingly with the fulness of the Divine Will. Thus 
the " natural body " may yield place to a higher mani- 
festation of will and become " a spiritual body." 

But I must return from this degression. I permitted 
myself to make it only because I desired to illustrate 
Herbert Spencer's suggestion of interpreting matter in 
terms of mind. 1 resume the point of view of popular 
dualism. I have shown that representative modern 
philosophers allow, with Bain,^ that the mental fact is a 
two-sided fact, and that a chasm which cannot be crossed 
separates mechanism and mind. We have escaped from 
the crudities of a crass materialism. Even though we 

^ Mind and Body^ p. 1 34. 



I50 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

went no further, we might be thankful. But there is the 
further problem of causation. There are materialists 
who, while acknowledging the chasm, still hold that the 
brain is tl)e controlling factor — that the functions of 
thoughts are causally dependent on the functions of matter. 
Let us turn to see how it fares with this problem of causal 
nexus. 

When we examine into the present speculations on this 
matter, we find that three main solutions are offered. 
The first allows interaction between mind and body. 
The second allows interaction in one direction only, that 
from body to mind. The third allows no interaction at 
all.^ On the first theory, the brain is regarded as an 
instrument used by the mind ; sensation as the action of 
body on mind ; volition as the action of mind on body. 
There is thus a causal nexus in both directions. We may 
call this theory " interactionism." The second is known as 
" automatism." On this theory, the brain processes pro- 
duce effects upon the mind, but the mind cannot produce \ 
effects upon the body. We are puppets — marionettes, i 
pulled by wires seen and unseen. Consciousness is a ' 
by-product — a mere spectator of results with which it has ■ 
no more to do than the shadow of a passing train has to i 
do with its motion. " We are nervous machines with a i 
useless appendage of consciousness somehow added." ^ : 

i 

^ For a careful analysis of these three theories, see a recent work, ' 
IV/iy the Mind has a Body, by C. A. Strong. 
2 Sully, The Human Mind, vol. ii. p. 368. 



EVOLUTION AND MIND 151 

The third theory is that known as Parallelism. It 
altogether disconnects the mind and the body. Each 
goes its own way, uninfluenced by the other, giving as a 
result two independent series of happenings, each running 
parallel with the other. This third view is that which is 
most widely accepted at the present day ; as an idealist, 
I cannot myself accept it — but, at any rate, it is subversive 
of materialism. 

As you may well imagine, it is impossible for us to 
consider these theories at any length. I have mentioned 
them for two reasons. First, I would have you under- 
stand how little reason materialism has to boast itself. 
Its glory (such as it was !) is departing. Even the 
popular press and the non-Christian socialists will come 
to understand this ere long. Speculations on the nature 
of mind are becoming less materialistic every day. But 
my second reason is more important. I want to bring 
home the fact that these three theories are each of them 
concerned only with the causal issue. We may adopt 
any one of the three, and be at perfect liberty to speculate 
on the totally distinct problems as to what mind and body 
are^ and why they are related at all. To say that each acts 
on each, or that only one acts on the other, or that neither 
acts on the other, is not to tell us anything of the things 
which do, or do not, interact. The main facts of mind, 
of consciousness, and of personality, stand out just as 
strongly marked as ever — they refuse to be explained 
away, or resolved into anything less than themselves. 



152 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

VIII. Materialistic Dogmatism. 

Let us devote a brief study to the full interactionist 
theory from the materialistic point of view. I need not 
specify the various " proofs " adduced for such inter- 
action — the effects of diseases of the brain, of a blow on 
the head, of the use of narcotics and stimulants, of change 
of scene and occupation, and so forth. It is hard for us 
to escape from the reiteration of the familiar list. Let 
us grant the phenomena without further discussion. The 
view I would oppose is that above condemned — the view 
that the working of atoms produces consciousness — or, 
in more general terms, that mind is dependent on 
body. 

James, in his remarkable Ingersoll lecture on " Im- 
mortality," has rebuked the dogmatism of the materialistic 
hypothesis. He shows that to argue from the destruction 
of a brain to the destruction of the life comes from taking 
too superficial a view of the admitted fact of functional 
dependence. I shall avail myself of his general line of 
argument in so far as it bears upon this particular 
question. 

The great mistake of the materialistic physiologist lies 
here. When he speaks of thought as a " function " of 
the brain, he has in view the same creative, or productive 
function as when he says that light is a function of the 
electric current. In fact, there are scientists who would 
have us picture to ourselves atoms at a white heat, as it 



EVOLUTION AND MIND 153 

were, as the causes of consciousness ! But allowing for 
much more subtle exercise of the scientific imagination 
than such a crude theory as this would require, the as- 
sumption remains that this creative, or productive function 
is the only kind possible. 

But this assumption is a piece of almost inexcusable 
dogmatism. For there are at least two other kinds of 
functional dependence with which we are familiar. For 
example, if I touch a button, which fires a torpedo, which 
sinks an ironclad, there is functional dependence. But 
my touch does not create the sinking of the ironclad — it 
merely releases the forces which do the work. We may 
call this " the releasing or permissive function." And it 
is quite possible that the dependence of thought on the 
brain might be of this releasing or permissive character. 
The other kind of functional dependence we may call 
the " transmissive." In this case, the material transmits 
another force, conditioning it in perchance a thousand 
ways, but not creating it. For example, a prism absorbs 
the shaft of light and resolves it into the graded band of 
the solar spectrum. Here is a still more probable way of 
explaining the dependence of the mind on the brain. 
Suppose thought to be a definite and independent form 
of existence, much as Lodge supposed life to be, and 
suppose the brain to be the particular conformation of 
matter which is able to transmit thought, as a telephone 
transmits sound. Then the thinking power of any con- 
scious being which happens to be conditioned by brain 



154 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

development and structure will vary according as the 
transmitting machinery is good or bad. 

Now here are two functions of dependence, both 
absolutely removed from the creative or productive 
function. By what right does the materialist calmly 
assume that his supposition is the only one possible ? 
When we reflect upon such quiet ignoring of all oppos- 
ing hypotheses, and upon the scornful certainty of the 
materialistic controversialist, I think we must own to a 
tremor of fear lest the dogmatic theologian should not 
come in first in the race. And further — these two other 
kinds of functional dependence happen to be known to 
us — may there not be, nay, must there not be an indefinite 
number of others not known to us ? And when we have 
the opinions of men like Leibnitz, Huxley, Herbert 
Spencer, and a host of the greatest thinkers of ancient 
and modern times, to the effect that thought and mechan- 
ism are " incommensurables " — that they cannot conceiv- 
ably be brought together — we may well hesitate to accept 
the dogmatic materialist as infallible, however cynical he 
may be. We may rather regard him as a being whose 
brain has not yet acquired the function of transmitting 
perceptions of modes of existence higher than the 
mechanical. 

IX. The Soul. 

We thus find that the dissolution of the material 
organism by no means necessarily closes for us the 



EVOLUTION AND MIND 155 

avenues into the supernatural world. For even did 
his own theory necessitate such a conclusion (which is 
questionable), we are far from being limited to his theory. 
He has, therefore, no ground, either scientific or rational, 
for barring our perfectly free discussion of the existence 
of the soul, and of the hope of immortality. 

The existence of the soul — it is an old question, is it 
not ? In the Fhado of Plato, to which I have before 
referred you, Crito asks Socrates : "In what way shall 
we bury you } " Socrates answers : " I cannot make 
Crito believe that I am the Socrates who has been talking 
and conducting the argument. He fancies that I am the 
other Socrates whom he will soon see a dead body — and 
he asks how he shall bury me." It is thus that Plato 
raises the great question in a dramatic setting which fills 
it with solemn human content. We must acknowledge 
that Plato's answer to the question was imperfect — but it 
was noble — so noble that a competent critic ^ has not 
hesitated to call the Dialogue " the mightiest of the 
pyramids raised by human hope beside the great river of 
Time " — so noble that, as the same critic remarks, " when 
we contemplate, under the pathos of its weakness, the 
greatness of its power, the question will not fail to suggest 
itself whether, after all, the strongest argument in the 
Ph^do is not the Ph^edo itself, which, in its aspirations 
and aims, is greater than all its arguments." Plato's 
chief error was the outcome of his implicit dualism. In 
^ Geddes, Phado^ Introduction, p. xxx. 



156 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

the Timaus he does indeed suggest that the body was 
fitted to be the vehicle of the soul, but he tended more 
and more to look upon it as a prison house, as a clogging 
burden from which the soul must seek to be freed. We 
may grasp his thought by comparing (with Paulsen) the 
body and the soul to a book and its contents. The body 
is the paper, the soul the words. The paper may be 
burnt, but the words can be produced in another edition. 
Still, I repeat, his error was a noble one — for it sprang 
from his apprehension of the abiding nature of the soul, 
and of the dignity of its functions. 

As to Aristotle's theory on the subject, we gained some 
little idea of it in reviewing his doctrine of Form. We 
saw that he concluded the soul to be the " form " of the 
body, and the body to be the " matter " of the soul. He 
maintains that " this definition should make it evident 
that we must no more ask whether the soul and the body 
are one than ask whether the wax and the figure impressed 
upon it are one." That is to say, the soul, with its 
consciousness, its moral sense, its will, its emotions, is the 
realisation of the body. Matter comes to itself in the 
soul. The body, then, is the soul at its best estate ; and 
the brain is the most highly developed state of matter. 
But the meaning of the body is not in itself, but in the 
consciousness which it renders possible. 

I may say that I hold Aristotle's theory to be sound in 
its main feature. For it is no longer possible, I think, to 
regard the soul as a separate entity, a mystical being 



EVOLUTION AND MIND 157 

separate from the body ; nor is it even possible to regard 
it as something distinct from the content of consciousness. 
Taken in abstraction, it disappears in a barren concept of 
unity. 

But may we not build on these ancient theories a new 
theory which shall embody all that has since been learnt ? 
Such a theory would seem to take the form that the soul 
is the conscious activity itself- — the thinking self — the feeling 
self — the acting self. Such a theory would give us the 
facts of soul life without leading us into the dim and 
perilous paths of abstract spirit, metaphysical unities, and 
all the rest. It gives us all that is really valuable in the 
old-fashioned theory of a separate soul, while avoiding all 
the grave objections to which that theory was open. 
Remember that no theory can alter \}cv^ facts of soul life — 
it is simply a matter of our interpretation of the facts. 
Those facts I have shown to centre round the concepts of 
consciousness, personality, and conscience. If we keep 
close to those we cannot get far wrong. The body is 
the matter ; the soul is the form. As the form varies, so 
will the body in which it expresses itself. 

I do not for one moment pretend that such a theory 
will solve all the mysteries of the connection between 
body and soul. But I am confident that it will lead us 
far on the way to reconciling conflicting claims. On the 
side of science, it allows of such hypothesis as that framed 
by the authors of the Unseen Universe. You will 
remember how, in that intensely interesting speculation, 



158 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

the vibrations generated in and emanating from our present 
body are all taken up by the ether, and may be develop- 
ing for us an ethereal body which will be the external 
expression of the " self " when it shuffles off this mortal 
coil. On the side of Christian theology, the doctrine of 
the resurrection of the body adapts itself perfectly to the 
continued indissolubility of matter and form. And on 
the side of metaphysics, the active element in man — 
conscious, personal, moral — reaches out to the Supreme 
Person, the Father of Spirits, and " the spirit of man " is 
seen to be " the lamp of the Lord." Hence progress is 
not limited by material conditions, and man can gaze 
unmoved even on the spectacle of a universe in ruins. 



X. Incompleteness of Nature. 

The conclusions at which I have arrived are capable of 
being reinforced from many sides. I wish, however, 
to keep as much as possible within the sphere of the 
evolution hypothesis. And in this connection there is a 
statement of HaeckeFs which eminently deserves con- 
sideration. He tells us that, on the whole, evolution 
appears to be a progressive improvement in historical 
advance from the simple to the complex, from the 
imperfect to the perfect. The advance from the im- 
perfect to the perfect — what does he mean by this ? 
What is the perfection to which we are moving ? He 
tells us further that " the life of the animal and the plant 



EVOLUTION AND MIND 159 

bears the same character of incompleteness as the life of 
man." This term " incompleteness " arrests the attention 
even more than the term " imperfection." What is 
meant by " incomplete life " ? What place is there for 
incompleteness in a closed system of simple " happen- 
ings " ? Schopenhauer, who bases his universe on the 
deep under-tow of the heaving ocean of unsatiable desire, 
can answer this question satisfactorily. But what shall 
a materialist say ? For him the machinery merely 
"works," and every result is complete, definite, deter- 
mined, in and for itself. But Haeckel's acknowledgment 
of incompleteness goes a long way to prove that existence 
does imply something more than " happenings " after all. 
But can there be doubt about the matter ? " Man's 
unhappiness (says Carlyle ^), as I construe, comes of his 
greatness ; it is because there is an Infinite in him, which 
with all his cunning he cannot quite bury under the 
Finite. Will the whole Finance Ministers, and Up- 
holsterers, and Confectioners of modern Europe under- 
take, in joint stock company, to make one shoe-black 
kappy ? They cannot accomplish it, above an hour or 
two : for the shoe-black also has a soul quite other than 
his stomach ; and would require, if you consider it, for 
his permanent satisfaction and saturation, simply this 
allotment, no more, and no less : God's infinite Universe 
altogether to himself^ therein to enjoy infinitely, and fill 
every wish as fast as it rose." 

^ Sartor Resartus^ bk. ii. chap. ix. 



i6o THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

Yes, desires are boundless, and the world is incomplete. 
Why should we argue from these facts to pessimism ? 
For, as we saw, we could never criticise that which exists, 
nor long for better things unless there were in us germs 
of the ideal which have within them possibihties of 
indefinite development. We feel instinctively that we 
ourselves, as well as our world, are only " in the making," 
so to speak. Or, as St Paul puts it, the whole creation 
groans and travails, eagerly looking out into the future 
for greater " completeness," for some higher stage of 
perfection. Such instincts, such ideals as these cannot 
be dissevered from their roots in the universe at large. 
Were the sap not flowing, they would long since have 
withered and died. We look for the unfolding of larger 
schemes — the asserting of a wider righteousness — the 
gain of a deeper knowledge — the attainment of a fuller 
happiness — the building up of a nobler character. The 
conviction is confessedly based on life, not on science ; on 
value judgments, not on syllogisms. But it is none the 
less significant on that account. It forces itself up from 
the depths of our being. It represents in us that uni- 
versally pervading spirit in nature which, having evolved 
the various inferior forms of life, has proved to us on the 
stage of world-history that these 

'' All shaped out dimly the superior race, 
The heir of hopes too fair to turn out false." ^ 



^ Paracelsus. 



EVOLUTION AND MIND i6i 

And the unity of nature — that very unity which science 
postulates so eagerly — gives promise that her secret 
potencies will work out the fulfilment of hopes yet fairer 
and more daring. The great mother speaks out in the 
sufferings, the sadness, the aspirations of her child, as 
Emerson ^ makes her speak — 

" Who has drugged my boy's cup ? 
Who has mixed my boy's bread ? 
Who, with sadness and madness, 
Has turned my child's head ? " 

And the poet's answer comes — loud and cheerful — 



secure in the knowledge that "love lieth under these 
pictures of time " — 

" The fiend that man harries 

Is love of the Best ; 
Yawns the pit of the Dragon, 

Lit by rays from the Blest. 
The Lethe of Nature 

Can't trance him again, 
Whose soul sees the perfect, 

Which his eyes seek in vain." 



XI. Love and the Incomplete. 

Human desire, then, is infinite — it has the capacity for 
infinite expansion — and it implies incompleteness. But 
its chief incompleteness, as also its chief bloom, its glory, 
is its capacity for Love. Love is a form of human 

^ The Sphinx. 

II 



1 62 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

activity which does not attach itself to the changing, 
passing qualities of its object, but fixes itself on what we 
may call the essential being of that object — on Personality. 
It cannot rest content with anything less than a living 
and continuous personality. It conquers time — 

" Love alters not with his brief hours and weeks, 
But bears it out even to the edge of doom." ^ 

Nay, Schiller expresses better even than our own great 
poet the peculiar timelessness and spacelessness of love. 
When Hector is taking leave of Andromache, he makes 
him say — 

"Air mein Sehnen will ich, all' mein Denken, 
In des Lethe stillen Strom versenken, 
Aber meine Liebe nicht." ^ 

(" My hopes, my longings, all would destined seem M 

To sink in Lethe's slow and silent stream, 
But not my love.") 






Will the materialist point to the teaching of Epicurus 
on this subject of love ? The picture of Epicurus in 
his garden, surrounded by his disciples in an atmosphere 
of friendship, is truly very delightful. The almost 
unanimous praise bestowed by antiquity upon the gentle 
affection which distinguished their community was doubt- 
less well deserved. But shall we say that such friendship 
displays love in its highest manifestations ? Does it even 
go as deep as the average love of an average mother for \ 

1 Shakespeare, Sonnet cxvi. 2 ffektors Abschied. 



EVOLUTION AND MIND 163 

her child ? Whatever form its actual manifestations have 
assumed, at any rate its theoretical basis was lamentably 
deficient ; for it avowedly based upon " utility mutually 
enjoyed." And this is what love becomes under the 
etherealising touch of materialism ! Nay, materialism 
developed under the favouring conditions of modern 
science and biological speculation, can reach, as we 
saw, an even yet more ethereal height. It can prove 
triumphantly, from a " study of organic," that when 
a man falls in love it is a sign that he is out of 
health ! 

Compare such teaching as this with the deep insight, 
the upward rush of living feeling, which glows in the 
best work of our best poets, and dramatists, and novelists, 
and painters. Think of Watt's pictures of " Love and 
Death " and " Love Triumphant." Realise how that 
the purest love seizes on the essence of its object — on 
personality — establishes an intercommunion of souls — 
and spurns the bounds of space and time. And then ask 
yourselves whether such a capacity as this, constituting 
the very core of the noblest of our race, does not, by the 
very pathos and incompleteness of its present environ- 
ment, lead us on to the conception of stages of existence 
in which it shall find worthier and wider fields in which 
to expand its deathless possibilities ? Many of the forms 
it now assumes are unworthy ; few are altogether free 
from connection with conditions which are what the 
logicians would call " accidents," not " properties." As 



1 64 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

M'Taggart says/ " These cannot be the ultimate forms 
under which love is manifested, since they depend on 
determining causes outside love itself. Love for which 
any cause can be assigned carries the marks of its own 

incompleteness upon it The nearest approach to it 

we can know now is the love for which no cause can be 
given, and which is not determined by any outer rela- 
tion, of which we can only say that two people belong 
to each other — the love of the Vita Nuova and of In 
Memoriamy 

This same author, speaking of the frequently blind and 
irrational character of love, explains the matter thus ^ : 
" Nothing but perfection could really deserve love. 
Hence when it comes in this imperfect world, it only 
comes in cases in which one is able to disregard the other 
as he is now — that is, as he really is not — and to care for 
him as he really is — that is, as he will be." What a 
pregnant sentence this is ! I commend it to your earnest 
thought. And connect it with those three short words 
which dive down to the centre of being — God is love. 

Xn. Man as Incarnate Reason. 

Let us sum up. We have seen that a sound ' 
materialism will give its full weight of the truth that 

^ Studies in Hegelian Cosmology^ p. 290. See this work, from 
p. 262 to end, for a most striking exposition of the cosmological 
significance of love. 

2 Op* cit., p. 262. 



EVOLUTION AND MIND 165 

man is formed of " the dust of the ground." But we 
have also seen that a sound materialism will place no bar 
in the way of the complementary truth that on the dust 
is stamped " the image of God " — that we are " partakers 
of the Divine Nature." We see in this dual aspect of 
man's being, not a real dualism, but an indissoluble unity 
manifesting itself as Matter and Form. In other words, 
man is an incarnation of reason — he is a reasonable soul 
expressing itself in and through a body. 

The body is a machine. Energy passes through it, as 
Huxley teaches, just as it does through a steam engine. 
The heat is kept up by the oxidising of foods. And 
so with all the mechanical aspects of the body with which 
we are nowadays so familiar. But all this energy, 
passing in and out, is the means, interpreted by physical 
concepts, of enriching and developing the abiding core of 
personality. Each of us, as a person, can separate himself 
from all other existences, making them objects for himself 
as subject. Here is the individual aspect of man's being. 
But this individuality does not exhaust that being ; it 
cannot exist in isolation. Each of us is also a member of 
a " kingdom of persons." Each of us, by reason, shares 
in the experience of all rational existences. Each of us 
is linked on by love to souls with whom we can hold 
communion. And so by links of reason and of love each 
one of us has part and lot in the great spiritual order 
which emanated from God and returns to God. What 
is there in such a view of existence which contradicts any 



1 66 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

known scientific fact, or can be disproved by any scientific 
method ? 

All that I have advanced finds its crown and consum- 
mation in the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. Can 
we therefore wonder that the Church, down the centuries 
of her career, has expended unequalled energies, has 
striven even unto blood, for the doctrine of the Incarna- 
tion ? For in that doctrine she lays hold on, and 
proclaims to the world, nothing less than the Divine 
Reason taking form to itself in a human body ; revealing 
to us the spirituality of existence ; showing Himself to be 
not Incarnate Reason only, but Incarnate Love ; and in 
each capacity declaring Himself as the express image of 
the Father's Person. Such is the doctrine which is the 
foundation of the Church's creed — the doctrine on which 
she builds her estimate of human nature, and her hopes 
for future progress in the power of an endless life. For 
those who realise with any measure of fulness the 
implications of this doctrine, the universe is transfigured. 
They say with St Paul : " The life which I now live in the 
flesh, I live in faith — the faith which is in the Son of God, 
Who loved me, and gave Himself for me." 



FIFTH LECTURE. 

FREE WILL. 

®€0v yap icrfxev avvepyoL. 
" For we are God's fellow workers." — i Cor. iii. 9. 

I. Progress and Human Initiative. 

Free Will ! A subject of perennial and absorbing interest 

to all earnest thinkers. Leslie Stephen tells us the 

problem is already threshed out to the last grains. I 

differ from him. I believe that the real issues are only 

now coming into sight. We have had Schopenhauer's 

philosophy. More recently we have the significant theory 

of " Organic Evolution." Are not these proofs of the 

vitality of the venerable controversy ? As for the future, 

I conceive we are as yet but on the threshold of the 

problem of causation. And until that is more nearly 

solved, how shall we know what Will is ? There is an 

increasing array of eminent thinkers who refuse to be 

bound by the iron law of physical causation, and who 

definitely recognise that there are limits to its application. 

And as regards the dwindling band of " the apostles of the 

167 



1 68 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

negative," there is the comforting reflection that while 
they serve as spurs to further thought and research, their 
minds are not, after all, measures of man nor of the 
universe. 

But whether the controversy be threshed out or no, in 
discussing progress we cannot pass it by. If we are asked 
to work for the general good, we must arrive at some 
decision as to the nature of human initiative. Are we 
merely conscious automata, puppets pulled by wires, seen 
and unseen ? Or are we capable of genuine co-operation 
with the forces that make for progress ? If we are 
puppets, then life must be for us 



" Like a tale of little meaning, though the words be strong." | 

Nay, it cannot have any meaning at all. And we 
shall but harbour illusions if we imagine that we can 
avail aught to hasten, modify, or retard the " eternal 
process moving on." 

Let me ask you to apprehend the present issue clearly. 
We speak of Progress. The very word has a magic and 
inspiration all its own. What is our relation to this 
Progress ? Are we conscious automata or are we not ? 
If we are, then it behoves us to see that we are not 
befooled into thinking we are not. Let us see the pitiful 
farce of life as it is. Then our useless enthusiasm for 
humanity will die a natural death. We shall acknowledge 
that the fool rebuked by Solomon is every whit as wise 
as Solomon himself — perhaps wiser, for he need not play 



FREE WILL 169 

at being wise. We shall realise that, individually and 
collectively, we are swept along on the stream of the fated 
and the inevitable. 

But if we can discover in man some fount of original, 
creative, self-determined energy, which shall give him a 
real part of his own to play, then with a sense of our 
dignity and responsibility as moral agents, we can 

" be up and doing, 
With a heart for any fate." 

n. Sphere of the Determined. 

Before we enter on our search for a power of initiative 
in man, let us make sure that we have shaken ourselves 
loose from a popular misconception. There are many 
who think that, when free will is claimed, almost the 
whole of our waking lives must be brought within the 
sphere of its operations. Now this is a lamentable error. 
It shows that there has been no appreciation of what 
Sidgwick calls " the formidable array of cumulative 
evidence offered for determinism." ^ It lays the champion 
of free will open to a multitude of needlessly harassing 
and dangerous assaults. The Article on Predestination 
in the Book of Common Prayer should preserve Anglicans, 
at any rate, from too easy a dogmatism, and should 
render them more than a little sympathetic when they see 
scientists grappling with the same problem in another of 

^ Methods of Ethics^ p. 67. 



lyo THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

its Protean forms. While we rebel against determinism, 
let us not ignore the facts of life. 

In the passage from which I have just quoted, Sidgwick 
states his view that the only valid argument for free will 
is " the immediate affirmation of consciousness in the 
moment of deliberate action." Mark the word " de- 
liberate." As we shall see later, it implies much — a 
conscious effort of attention ; a putting forth of energy to 
hold alternatives before the mind, with a resulting sense 
of tension ; and an act of self-determined decision. Now 
I ask you to reflect how comparatively rare in life are 
such acts of deliberate choice. Most assuredly they do 
not compose the warp and woof of ordinary experience. 
The roughest analysis will reveal to us the astonishingly 
large extent to which our nature and our actions are the 
results of forces and circumstances over which we have 
had no conscious control. How enormously important 
are those facts of heredity which have determined the 
bulk of our physical and mental capacities ! There are 
the more general facts of organic structure and tendency ; 
the distinction of sex ; the influences of time and clime, 
of environment and race, of social and religious conditions ; 
and there are the more individual facts of character, 
disposition, and education. Where shall we stop ? Some 
would say we cannot stop anywhere. I am bold to main- 
tain that we can. Nevertheless, I am anxious that you 
should realise the extent to which our lives and fortunes 
are predetermined. 



FREE WILL 171 

Nor must we lose sight of the fact that these pre- 
determined elements have most of them been predeter- 
mined in their turn — and so back and back until they are 
lost in the general constitution of the universe. 

All this has no terrors for the believer in a divinity 

" that shapes our ends, 
Rough-hew them how we will." 

Rather do we learn the supreme significance of those 
times, however rare, when we ourselves exert a conscious 
power from within. For then we feel that we are rising 
above the externally conditioned elements in our ex- 
perience, and asserting our spiritual freedom in a spiritual 
universe. As Cassius urges — 

" Men at some time are masters of their fates ; 
The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, 
But in ourselves." 

But I am anticipating. I hie me back to the search for 
that which would justify these views. 

in. Indeterminism. 

For what, then, are we about to search ? Is it for 
some faculty within us that shall be free from all law, 
and that shall be able to act independently of character 
and motive, as well as of circumstance ? Must an act of 
free will be a willing in vacuo, so to speak ? There are 
few or none who would claim such a power when the 
question is put to them in this sharp relief. But I have 



172 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

never been convinced that the doctrine called " in- 
determinism " can mean anything less than this. I do 
not want to entangle myself in a metaphysical discussion 
as to the possibility of an uncaused cause. Moreover, I 
have every sympathy with the indeterminists in their bold 
assertion of human freedom. But I cannot see my way 
out of the simple dilemma — either the will is determined, 
or it is not. If it is not, then free will becomes another 
name for "sheer caprice," if not for "chance" ; and if 
indetermination is necessary to a moral act, then morality 
is impossible. L 

For consider the practical bearing of the law of causa- 
tion. Everybody appeals to it. I need not remind you 
how the scientist relies upon it : he shrinks in positive 
horror from the idea of an uncaused event. But I would 
remind you that the theologian is wont to lean upon it no 
less heavily when he would use it as the basis for belief 
in a First Cause.^ Whatever the value of this line of 
argument may be, at any rate the theologian cannot be 
allowed to jettison the law of causation when he comes 
to deal with free will. James, indeed, is prepared to 
grant ^ an element of pure chance in the act of will : 
but he will find few to follow his lead. For scientists 
have rejected the conception of chance, in its older 
sense, and now deem it to be another name for ignorance. 

1 See a terse criticism of this argument in Hoffding's Philosophy of 
Religion^ pp. 34 ff. 

2 See The Will to Believe^ pp. 153-159. 



FREE WILL 173 

And certainly the theologian cannot take refuge here ; 
for if chance is a factor in the process of becoming, the 
world breaks loose from God as well as from man. 

But even if indeterminism were possible, it could never 
be moral. Unless there be some determining cause, or 
reason, why one course of conduct is pursued rather than 
another, whence shall it gain its moral colouring ? All 
genuine bond of connection between agent and act is 
destroyed. Character and training have no moral 
significance ; because, in so far as they determined an 
action, it would not be free. And responsibility (for the 
sake of which indeterminism was invented) is a shadow 
of a shade. Moral conduct becomes a disconnected 
set of motiveless acts. And the apparent paradox of 
morality, that the better a man is, the more certain is he 
to act in a given way on a given occasion, is hardened 
into a contradiction in terms. 

It was this moral aspect of the law of causation that 
roused St Augustine to his indomitable championship of 
predestination. He could not consent to any view of 
the will which would place the world at the mercy of 
uncaused and capricious actions. His own doctrine was 
distinctly more moral than metaphysical. He taught 
that a man is free when he obeys God's laws, and when 
he accordingly conquers himself as well as his external 
conditions. And his doctrine is, of course, profoundly 
true. It forms an integral part of that which I shall 
advocate. But it does not satisfy us in our present 



174 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

search. For we are left to ask whether a man is free to 
be free. Can he assert his own will in determining his 
moral choice, or does this power depend upon some 
external influence ? For example, in the story of Doctor 
Faustus, we would ask whether it represents a genuine bit 
of human experience. Was the Doctor free to sell him- 
self ? St Augustine did not face this ultimate problem. 

But as against indeterminism, the Augustinian con- 
tention holds good. Motiveless action is inconsistent 
with divine government, as well as with reason and 
morality. 

IV. Self-Determinism. 

I hold, then, that indeterminism is unsatisfactory. 
What shall be put into its place ? I will give a succinct 
statement of my own view, in order to make clear the 
general bearing of the subsequent arguments and dis- 
cussions. 

I start with the experience we have of will as force, 
agreeing with Herbert Spencer that the one thing the 
mind is directly conscious of is just this inherent energy 
or force which we know as will. Indeed this experience 
of will as force is the origin of our concept of force. 
But I go a step further than Spencer, and I agree with 
Schopenhauer in altogether discarding the idea of force as 
separate from will. If we can only know force by ex- 
periencing our own efforts to produce changes, why should 
we go behind the will itself ^ Why should we not 



FREE WILL 175 

take " will " to be the ultimate reality ? In so doing, we 
need by no means suffer shipwreck, as did Schopenhauer, 
on the rock of the unconscious and the impersonal. 

Instead of supposing will to be a blind striving, 
rising into consciousness as an unhappy accident, let us 
assume what we actually find in experience — the existence 
of an indefinite number of centres of the will to live. 
How such independent centres of will came into being 
is a metaphysical problem with which we need not now 
concern ourselves. Here they are on every side of us 
— plants, and insects, and birds, and fish, and animals, and 
men. Personally I am prepared to find this will to live 
in the crystal world, and in the ultimate atoms, whatever 
those may be. Each centre asserts itself, as we saw 
when considering the theory of organic selection, in and 
through its environment, selecting such materials as best 
suit its own strivings to develop fuller life. This will to 
live passes upward through various stages with a parallel 
development of consciousness. Consciousness sleeps in 
stones, stirs in plants, awakes in animals, and knows that 
it is awake in self-conscious, purposeful man. And in 
him the will to live, while manifested also in its lower 
forms, rises at times far above mere striving in response 
to unsatisfied desire. It rises stage by stage until it 
displays itself as self-determined activity, directed by 
reason, steadied by deliberation, and delivering itself in 
an act of conscious choice between alternatives. It is for 
volition of this fully developed kind that I claim the 



176 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

term " free will." I hold that it is free, not in a negative 
sense, as being free from external constraint, but in a 
positive sense, as being able to follow the law of its own 
nature, and express itself in definite self-conscious, self- 
determined activities. The will, thus raised to its 
highest power, can best be described as " the glorious 
liberty of the sons of God.'' 

Such a view of the will as this afFords us an adequate 
basis for a philosophy of the universe. We can interpret 
the lowest by the highest. As Browning says, man flings 
back his light on all that went before. He 

" Illustrates all the inferior grades, explains 
Each step back in the circle." 

And as of the past, so of the future. We can trust to 

this upward trend of will, holding with the same poet 

that 

" Man must pass from old to new ; 
From vain to real, from mistake to fact ; 
From what once seemed good, to what now proves best." 

Free will, then, I hold, has its roots deep in the will to 
live. Consciousness bears testimony to its originality as 
a force. Let the mechanical determinist bombard the 
citadel never so fiercely, he is himself compelled to act 
as though he and his fellows had some measure of self- 
determining power. His very militancy against free will 
testifies to his power of selecting from alternatives — that 
is to say, to his freedom. For let us adapt an old 
illustration. If the lump of clay would turn upon the 



FREE WILL 177 

potter and argue with him that it had, or had not, a 
will of its own, the inference would appear inevitable 
that the clay was really to some extent independent of 
the potter. And this remains true, whichever side the 
clay might take in the controversy. And so of man. If 
he can at all put himself outside of his environment, even 
of his own feelings and desires, so as to consider their 
relation to himself, he must in some sense, and to some 
degree, be independent of that environment. He asserts 
himself as against it. That is to say, he is manifest as 
a centre of independent energy. 

But I have already stated that I do not deem such a 
doctrine of free will to be inconsistent with a belief in 
the universality of causation. There is, of course, an 
apparent contradiction in affirming that the will is free, 
and yet subject to law. But the seeming contradiction 
disappears when we distinguish between external and 
internal law. For I hold, with Kant, that the will is one 
of the ultimate " reals " of the world, and that it is a law 
to itself. In obeying itself, it is free. The will, then, is 
an independent centre of original energy, declaring itself 
in and through an environment, and acting in accordance 
with laws inconceivably remote from those of the 
mechanical type — laws which are the expression of self- 
developing and self-determining spiritual life. 

From this point of view, the problem of free will 
assumes a new form. It becomes a problem of causation. 



12 



1 78 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

V. Modes of Causation Differ. 

1 have previously tried to show that there are spheres 
of being in which mechanical concepts are absolutely out 
of place. Let us test this conclusion in the particular 
case of distinguishing a physical from a moral necessity. 

That such a distinction is really needed is acknowledged 
by Karl Pearson. He laments ^ the confusions in the use 
of the term "law." "We sadly need (he says) separate 
terms for the routine of sense impressions, for the brief 
description or formula of science, and for the canon of 
social conduct, or, in other words, for the perceptive 
order, the descriptive order, and the prescriptive order." 
He takes Hooker roundly to task for " stating paradoxes 
based on a confusion between natural and moral law." 
In all this I can agree with him. But I fail to follow him 
when he turns from criticism to construction. He 
bewilders me. My only explanation of him is that he 
is determined to overthrow any spiritual view of the 
universe ; and finding that the idealist attack upon 
materialism waxes fast and furious, he dresses up the old 
principles in idealistic uniforms with a view to demoralis- 
ing the opposing forces. 

Being myself an adherent of the school of Personal 
Idealists, I can sympathise in many of his statements as 
to the relation between the mind and its environment.^ 

^ Grammar of Science, p. 113. 

2 Ethic of Free Thought, chap. i. ; Gramtnar of Science, p. 112. 



FREE WILL 179 

So far as I can understand him, he starts with " sequences 
of sense impressions." Man finds brief expressions to 
describe these sequences, and calls them " natural laws." 
Under the stress of social conditions, he frames civil and 
moral laws to secure self-preservation or a maximum of 
comfort. All this I can assent to so far as it goes. But 
I demur when he, on the one hand, refuses to allow us to 
read reason or purpose into nature, and yet, on the other 
hand, regards man as a natural product. I can understand 
Kant when he would separate the world of things-in- 
themselves from the world of sense, though I cannot agree 
with him. At any rate I get a distinct " thinker," 
separate from the things thought. But Karl Pearson's 
" thinking " hangs in the air. Even the law of causation, 
he would have us believe, is purely a mental product. 
This may be defensible if man is detached from the 
" natural " world into which he reads law. This, speak- 
ing roughly, would be Kant's position. But if man is 
himself a part of, or a product of, this " natural " world, 
then the doctrine becomes meaningless. The whole 
confusion seems to me to lie in the phrase " natural 
process," used so often by Karl Pearson. What is this 
" nature " which manifests itself in these processes ? Is 
man himself included in this " nature," or is he outside 
of it ? Karl Pearson seems to adopt the first alternative. 
If so. Hooker's confusion is thrice confounded. The 
irrational and lawless gives birth to a being who is 
rational, who constructs the universe by a vast logical 



i8o THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

process of thought, who gives laws to his producer, and 
who then is deluded into reading himself into his 
producer. Such a philosophy would seem to smell con- 
siderably of the irrational cask from which its producer 
conceives himself to have been drawn. 

My point, however, is this. Even with such a 
philosophy, necessity is found for distinguishing various 
groups of " laws." I mean exactly the same thing when 
I urge the necessity for distinguishing various modes of 
causation. 

Far back in time, Aristotle had struggled with this very 
problem ; and it is intensely interesting to note his list of 
causes. He gathers up, as usual, the views, contemporary 
and traditional, current in his day. As the result of his 
labours, he enumerates ^ " nature, and necessity, and 
chance, and reason, and all that depends upon man." 
How full of significance that last member of the list ! j 
Man — is he, or is he not, to be put into a special 
category ? Aristotle said " yes." But he was at a lossi 
for scientific or logical definition of the kind of causation, 
exercised by man ; and he therefore had to rest satisfied 
with the simplicity of the phrase — "all that depends upon^ 
man." And yet how significant, 1 say, is that phrase! 
It contains in germ all that Kant, and Fichte, and Hegel, 
and the Personal Idealists have had to teach us. 

^ atrtat yat Sokovctlv eivat <pv(TL'S koL dvdyKrj Koi rvxf) ^tl 8k voDs /ca 
TTOLv TO 8t' dvOp<i)7rov. — JStA. Nic. iii. 3, 7. 



FREE WILL i8i 

VL Kant and Causation. 

I have several times alluded to Kant. Let us turn to 
a brief study of his doctrine on the relation between 
causation and free will ; for we shall thus be brought to 
the core of the problem.^ 

On the one hand, Kant recognised that there is an 
element in man which is independent of the law of causa- 
tion universally prevailing in the world of sense. He 
was also convinced that freedom could not be a matter 
of scientific knowledge, and therefore could not be 
demonstrated. Nevertheless the doctrine of freedom is 
a practical necessity ; it is demanded by the facts of 
human existence. But causation and freedom cannot 
coexist in the same world — they are contradictories. 
There must, then, be two worlds — a world of appearances 
I in which causation reigns, and a world of realities in which 
I freedom reigns. In the world of sense, everything takes 
place according to invariable laws. But in the world of 
realities, underlying the phenomenal world, is found "a 
rule and order totally different from the order of nature. 
For, from this point of view, everything, it may be, 
ought not to have happened which, according to the course 
of nature, has happened^ and, according to its empirical 
grounds, was inevitable." That is to say, Kant builds 
on the distinction I have so often emphasised between 
i the " is " of " fact " and the " ought " of ideal or duty. 

^ See Kant's Theory of Ethics (Abbott's trans., passim). 



1 82 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

If we ask Kant how man is related to these two worlds, 
he tells us that man belongs to them both. He is one 
of the phenomena of the world of sense, and is in that 
regard subject to the law of causation. But he is also 
conscious within himself of a supersensuous element in 
his nature. His knowledge of this element does not 
come by perception through the senses, but by a higher 
faculty which Kant calls apperception ! It is this element 
which recognises the " ought " ; and for the " ought " 
Kant could discover no ground in experience. It does 
not belong to the realm of phenomena known to science. 
But since man finds himself under the influence of this 
" ought," he knows that he belongs to the world from 
which the " ought " issues. That is to say, his sense of 
duty assures him that he belongs to the world of things- 
in-themselves. And further, since a sense of "ought" 
can only appeal to a being who knows what "ought" is, 
and to whom it appeals, it implies a corresponding power 
of acting in accordance with its behests. In the world of 
things-in-themselves, man is a free agent. 

But Kant guards himself. "Although freedom (he 
says) is not a property of the will depending upon 
physical laws, yet it is not for that reason lawless ; on the 
contrary, it must be a causality acting according to im- 
mutable laws, but of a peculiar kind ; otherwise a free 
will would be an absurdity.'' When we follow up this 
lead, and ask Kant wherein this peculiarity of the moral 
law consists, he tells us it is just this self-determining 



FREE WILL 183 

element in man that constitutes him a thing-in-itself — 
that is to say, one of the " reals " of the universe. Indeed, 
he holds that the world of realities consists wholly of 
such self-determining wills. 

But we have further questions to put. We ask how 
man's will can be free if it is subject to law ? I have 
myself prepared you for the answer. It brings us to the 
heart of Kant's moral theory. The moral law is the law 
of the world of realities — that is to say, of the world of 
self-determining wills. But this is the same thing as to 
say that these wills are a law to themselves. And thus, 
when they are obeying the law of their own innermost 
being, they are free. 

Such in barest outline is Kant's epoch-making theory 
of man's moral freedom. It is hard to exaggerate its 
importance. It asserts the true and essential dignity of 
man as an agent in a rational universe. It draws with 
unfaltering firmness the line between physical necessity 
and obedience to moral law. It concentrates itself in the 
famous sentence : " Nothing can possibly be conceived 
in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good 
without qualification, except a good will." 

VII. Psychical Causation. 

It is sufficiently patent how many points of agreement 
there are between this theory and that which I am en- 
deavouring to expound. Instead of dwelling, however. 



1 84 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

upon the points wherein they agree, I propose, in a spirit 
of grateful reverence, to study some of the points wherein 
they differ. For by taking this course, the fundamental 
principles will be brought into clearer view. 

We note in the first place that Kant was not free, 
as Aristotle had been, from that narrow conception of 
causality which takes physical causation as the universal 
type. I trust that in the earlier lectures I sufBciently 
showed the utter inadequacy of this physical type to cover 
all the facts of experience. It is simply an intellectual 
impossibility to apply the categories of physical constancy, 
persistency, and conservation, to the laws of reason, to 
the world of meanings and purposes, or to the influence 
and creation of ideals. Do not imagine that Kant did 
not realise this impossibility. He realised it so keenly 
that he forsook causation altogether, and to escape the 
difficulty, he left the world of sense to soar into an un- 
knowable world of things-in-themselves. Is the situation 
so desperate as all this ? To save free will, are we 
compelled to make an absolute division between the 
territories of reason and of faith ^ I do not think it. I 
pass by the serious contradiction involved in the concep- 
tion of a will which in its actual willings is a slave, and 
which yet in itself is free. I keep simply to the point 
that the real being of existence is not mechanical necessity. 
I believe that we may hold to this view, and yet, with 
Aristotle, allow the will to play its part on the theatre of 
time and space. 



FREE WILL 185 

Let me quote again from Sir Oliver Lodge. " Matter 
(he writes^) possesses energy in the form of persistent 
motion, and it is propelled by force ; but neither matter 
nor energy possesses the power of automatic guidance 

and control. Energy has no directing power 

Inorganic matter is compelled by pressure from behind it ; 
it is not influenced by the future, nor does it follow a 
preconceived course nor seek a determined end." Such 
are the limitations of physical causation as described by a 
competent authority ; and if he is right, we have to look 
beyond the sphere of the mechanical to explain the world 
as we actually know it. We find directing power, the 
influence of the future, preconceived courses, and de- 
termined ends, here and now, without flying to another 
and an unknowable world to escape from the grip of 
mechanical causation. In brief, this type of causation is 
but one of a group, and can in no way claim the pre- 
eminence. 

Of the peculiar nature of psychical causation. Sir Oliver 
gives an admirable illustration. Even an intelligent 
animal, when it is being pushed from behind, resents it 
and is in an ignominious position. It is in a rightful 
position when it is led or called. I like this illustration. 
It expresses so clearly the difli^erence between agit and 
agitur — between " he acts " and " he is driven." ^ But if 
this be true of the higher animals which are almost wholly 

^ Life and Matter^ pp. 117, 118. 

2 Cf. the Stoic saying, Fata volentetti ducunt, nolentem trahunt. 



1 86 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

under the sway of impulse and perception, how much 
more true is it of man, who can reason, deliberate, and 
obey a principle ? Human action in the world of sense 
itself implies modes of causation which utterly transcend 
the mechanical. 

VIII. Man's Will as Creative. 

But we can claim more for the human will than that 
it is self-determining. In a very real sense of the word, 
it is creative. Among the recognised leaders of modern 
thought is Wundt. And he has pointed out^ that, while 
the law of mechanical causes is equivalence^ that of 
psychical development is one of increasing psychical energy. 
And here again there is an appeal to direct experience. 
Is it not plain to any thinker who reflects upon his 
thinking, that psychical event gives birth to psychical 
event in modes absolutely distinct from the laws of 
mechanical stresses and strains } The most significant of 
the diff^srences would seem to be that, as Wundt insists, 
while the eff^ects of voluntary acts are always determined 
by definite causes, they are not already contained in the causes. 
Here we have the psychical parallel to Baldwin's similar 
contention in regard to the processes of life. It may be 
possible to explain after the event, but it is impossible to 
reproduce the series backwards. The will is limited 
by its environment, but it does not merely ring the 
changes on given materials. Like the artist, the poet, the 

^ See the sections on The Will in his Priticiples of Morality. 



FREE WILL 187 

sculptor, or the musician, the moral agent brings something 
new into existence whenever he decides an issue by his 
power of self-determination. An inherent creative force 
wells up within him, and prompts him to new combina- 
tions of the will with ideas — combinations which, though 
they may be capable of subsequent analysis, cannot wholly 
be predicted. As is natural, this creative power is most 
plainly evidenced in the case of a moral genius ; but it is 
present in its degree in every genuine act of choice. 

There is thus a deep analogy to be traced between the 
creation of a work of art and the creation of a character. 
This aspect of the problem of moral action has aroused 
much attention of late, and will well repay careful study. 
The laws of morals are seen to correspond in function 
with the laws of aesthetics, as regulative principles. A 
countless series of moral decisions contribute to the 
accumulating stock of social tradition. The great stages 
are marked by the flashes of insight granted to some pre- 
eminent moral genius — just as in the case of paintina^, or 
the drama, or music. The parallel is close throughout. 

It will perhaps now be sufficiently clear that free self- 
expression is compatible with the reign of law. There is 
no creation out of nothing, but there is the expression of 
a self-determining centre of force striving to develop. 
We do not yet understand physical causation, still less 
spiritual. But the facts of experience, and of development 
in art and morals, do not wait upon our explanations ; our 
explanations must wait upon them. Life evolves, not by 



1 88 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

law, but within law. Or rather, laws are our attempts to 
describe the modes of the development. Hence the 
adaptability of the Christian conception of morals to all 
climes and times. The New Testament does not lay- 
down fixed rules ; it proclaims a new spirit — a fresh influx 
of life. Who shall lay down rigid rules for living a noble 
life, any more than for knowledge, truth, or beauty } 
If the full bloom of our activities is to be attained, there 
must be spontaneous uprushes of the indwelling, self- 
determining power. Mere external obedience to existing 
law is a necessary stage in evolution, but, by itself, is of 
little worth. Each new moral situation calls for a new 
act of choice — a new combination of the will and the idea 
— a new definition of results in the world of concrete 
realities. 

The moral genius, then, is the man who spontaneously 
evolves new moral combinations. He will transcend the 
customary morality whenever it unduly trammels the 
development of his higher self. His genius will manifest 
itself in single acts which are thrown off^ at white heat 
of moral power ; and it will also manifest itself in the 
building up of the whole character. Janet adduces ^ a fine 
example of creative power evidenced in a single act. 
There is a general law that a man ought to sacrifice 
himself for his country. But who could say beforehand 
that this law would lead Mucius Scaevola to put his hand 
into a chafing dish, and let it be burned, so that the enemy 

^ Theory of Morals. 



FREE WILL 189 

might know the kind of men with whom they had to 
deal ? Or take as an example of progressive insight, the 
well-marked stages in the law of the treatment of an 
enemy. Primitive morality said, " Kill him." Later 
morality said, " Hate him." Chivalry said, " Forgive 
him." Jesus Christ said, " Love him." 

As we ponder on this creative power, its nature, its 
functions, and its results, we are led to exclaim — When 
will the materialistic scientist learn his limitations ? 
When will he cease to trouble the unwary and the 
ignorant with the dismal, drear, and soulless creed of 
mechanical determinism ? The spiritual is in the midst 
of us. Man is a true " son of God." Let us not be 
afraid of giving to this name that richness of significance 
which we find attached to it in the New Testament. If 
man is a son, then he shares the Father's nature and the 
Father's power. He has indeed to grow from childhood 
to manhood. But as he puts " away childish things," he 
is called upon to exercise in his degree that very creative 
power wielded by the Father Himself. Thus it is that 
we come to understand the rich content of the marvellous 
title accorded to us — " God's fellow workers." 



IX. Line of Least Resistance. 

We are now in a position to appreciate the falsity of 
the issues raised by the use of certain phrases constantly 
appearing in discussions on the freedom of the will. I 



I90 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

refer to such phrases as " following the line of least 
resistance," or " obeying the strongest motive." It is 
plain that these and similar attempts to describe or define 
the phenomena of volition are borrowed from physical 
and mathematical formulae for determining resultants. 
But unless it can first be shown that such formulae have 
application in the supersensuous sphere, they delude by 
a fictitious simplicity, and quietly beg the questions at 
issue. 

There is, however, one mathematical term which may 
usefully and safely be allowed a wider scope — I mean the 
term " incommensurables." It is employed in mathe- 
matics to denote quantities which have no common 
measure. But there are many other things which have 
no common measure. How, for example, will you 
compare together bravery and a triangle ? How will you 
estimate the porosity of two o'clock ? Or connect the 
truth that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two 
right angles with the fact that I like sugar ? Or estimate 
the morality of the statement that two and two make 
four ? And yet it is just such incommensurables as these 
which are brought together as material for moral judg- 
ments. Determination of the mechanical type is thus 
often totally impossible. The laws governing such 
incommensurables in their connection with moral judg- 
ments must be of a different kind altogether. The push 
from behind is of very limited application. 

Recall the distinction drawn in an earlier lecture 



FREE WILL 191 

between quantity and quality. John Stuart Mill honestly 
recognised it, though it destroyed the symmetry of his 
utilitarianism. He saw and acknowledged that it was 
better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied. 
No doubt the consequences of the distinction are serious 
to materialism. But the facts of experience are too strong 
to allow us to obliterate it. Quality and quantity are 
incommensurables. And hence it is that reason and 
moral sense often call upon us to sacrifice, not the weaker 
for the stronger motive, following the line of least 
resistance, but to sacrifice the less worthy for the more 
worthy, the base for the noble, the false for the true, the 
ugly for the beautiful, the better for the best, following 
the line of the development of the higher self. 

Moral obligation, therefore, has nothing in it which 
resembles external constraint. It is utterly misleading to 
look upon it as a discharge of mechanical force. If I say, 
" I cannot help doing this," I have the idea in my mind 
of some external controlling power or of some internal 
impulse not under the sway of the will. But if I say, 
" I am morally compelled to do this," I have a totally 
distinct set of ideas in my mind. The sense of external 
constraint is gone. I act from within in accordance with 
laws which express my innermost self. It is insistence 
on this fundamental truth that constitutes the glory of 
Kant's theory. I consciously and willingly bend to the 
authority of the law, and willingly yield my lower to my 
higher self. As a bird escapes the snare of the fowler, 



192 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

and wings its way through the bright blue vault of 
heaven, so does the soul, escaped from the snare of 
fatalistic dynamics, wing its way into the free expanse 
of the spiritual world. The moral agent lives and acts 
as a son in the Father's house. 

Of the mysterious subject of sin I cannot treat at 
length. As a dread fact, the evil in human nature 
declares itself along the whole course of human history. 
Much of this evil comes from the fight with the lower 
elements in our nature — the law reigning in the members. 
Much comes, as we shall see, from the " self" constituting 
itself as a false centre, in opposition to the social will and 
to the moral order of the world. But from our present 
point of view, sin, as the result of perverse moral 
decisions, is just as directly an outcome of the power of 
self-determination as is the thinking and doing of the 
right. There is no sin where there is no recognised law 
or ideal which claims moral authority. The source of 
what Kant calls " the bad principle in human nature," 
merges in the problem common to all systems — the 
problem of evil. But a spiritual system alone can offer 
deliverance from evil. 

X. Moral Choice. 

The mention of sin brings us to a subject demanding 
special study — one which we cannot pass by if we would 
at all adequately discuss the problem of free will. I have 
said that man's self-determining power is at its highest 



FREE WILL 193 

in the act of moral choice. Now what constitutes such 
an act ? Is it single, or is it composite ? Let us attempt 
to analyse it. 

The answers to these questions reveal a great historical 
cleavage. The Greek mind inclined to Reason as the 
pre-eminent and essential moral agent. This view found 
expression in the famous Socratic doctrine that virtue is 
knowledge, or rational insight. On the other hand, the 
Hebrews and the Romans claimed the pre-eminence for 
the Will. The opposition thus revealed raised prolonged 
debate in the mediaeval schools. Almost every famous 
doctor espoused one side or the other, and the contention 
frequently waxed sore and furious. Augustine had been 
a champion for the will : Aquinas was a champion for 
the reason. The one school held that it was the choice 
of the will which rendered the act good or bad : the 
other school held that it was the rational character of 
the act. 

The early leaders of modern philosophy almost without 

exception laid the chief stress on reason, while endeavouring 

to find a function for the will. Kant, as we have just 

seen, declared for the primacy of " the good will." 

" Reason (he says ^) is not competent to guide the will 

with certainty in regard to its objects and the satisfaction 

of all our wants (which it even to some extent multiplies), 

this being an end to which an implanted instinct would 

have led with much greater certainty ; and since, never- 

^ Metaphy sic of Morals^ Abbott's trans., p. 12. 

13 



194 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

theless, reason is imparted to us as a practical faculty, i.e, 
as one which is to have influence on the will^ therefore, 
admitting that nature generally in the distribution of her 
capacities has adapted the means to the end, its true 
destination must be to produce a will^ not merely good 
as a means to something else, but good in itself^ for which 
reason was absolutely necessary. This will, then, though 
not indeed the sole and complete good, must be the 
supreme good and the condition of every other, even of 
the desire of happiness." 

With the main purport of this passage from Kant I am 
heartily in accord. But in the light of modern psychology 
I would put the matter somewhat differently. 

First of reason : What are its moral functions ? It is 

obvious that reason is essential to the appreciation of the 

facts of the moral life, and to the practical application of 

the moral standard. A will may be instinctively good ; 

but it has not come to itself until it knows that it is good. 

It is also obvious that reason cannot be placed among 

motives as one of their number. It stands above them — 

examines, selects, arbitrates. In short, without reason, 

there can be no conception of human life, nor of the 

bearings and relations of its various activities and duties. 

Reason, therefore, is essential to morality ; for without 

it, there can be no genuine development of the " self." 

But it does not follow that reason is on this account the 

sole determining element in morality. It can sift : it can 

weigh : but it cannot take the place of feeling : nor can 



FREE WILL 195 

it take the place of will. The Socratic claim that virtue 
is knowledge must then be put aside. 

How, then, about the will ? There is a modern 
version of the older doctrine which makes the essence of 
a moral act to consist in the power of fixing the attention. 
James, for example,^ goes so far as to say that the keeping 
of a difficult object before the mind is " the essential 
achievement of the will when it is most voluntary." He 
calls this act of holding fast the true fiat. He even 
affirms that thus " to sustain a representation, to think, 
is the only moral act." From this point of view the 
Socratic dictum would be altered to " virtue is the power 
of attention." 

Who shall deny the cogency of this reasoning ? Unless 
a man is able to pull himself together, to fix the alternatives 
in his mind, to give his motives a larger setting, and to 
let each have a fair chance of exercising its due influence 
— unless a man is able to make this effort, he cannot 
become a moral being. And this effort requires clearly 
an act of will. The will, therefore, is seen to be an 
essential factor in an act of moral choice. But here again 
we must deny to it the right to be the sole determining 
factor. 

But how if we combine the two — the will and the 
reason — shall we not then have what will suffice for an 
act of moral choice } I maintain that we shall not. The 

^ Psychology^ vol. ii., chap, on " The Will." Compare Kiilpe, 
Psychology, p. 215, and pp. 449, 450. 



196 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

will and the reason in combination can give us the well- 
known sense of " tension." They suffice to prove that, 
as Aristotle says, there is within our single personality 
" a power which includes opposites." Though even 
here there must be added the element of feeling which 
makes it worth while to keep up the struggle against a 
premature decision — the struggle which Descartes felt to 
be so vital to morality. But there is nothing yet to give 
the moral colouring to the decision. Reason may secure 
a wise decision ; but it cannot exercise moral choice. No 
doubt the two qualities, wisdom and rightness, are 
ultimately one. But for us with our present constitution, 
the distinction between right and wrong is one that is felt, 
not reasoned out. A man may have the subtlest intellect, 
and foresee consequences most accurately ; but unless he 
feels that a certain course is right, the rights and feelings 
of others will meet with scant consideration. No great 
knowledge of life is necessary to justify this statement. 
The moral sense, therefore, is another essential factor in 
any true act of moral choice. 

In mentioning feeling as necessary to a moral act, I 
have involved a potent spirit which threatens to dwarf, 
if not enslave, all other factors. The giant form of 
Pleasure, or Happiness, towers aloft — who shall with- 
stand it ^ 

Kant gave battle, and that right valiantly. Armed with 
his " Duty for duty's sake," he altogether repudiated the 
claims of pleasure as a moral agent. He held that, in 



FREE WILL 197 

proportion as pleasure entered into the motives of an act, 
duty lost her native strength and dignity. He was 
almost compelled to take this view because of the exi- 
gencies of his metaphysical system. Duty must belong 
to his world of things-in-themselves — whereas sensations, 
impulses, and desires manifestly belong to the world of 
phenomena, and are, therefore, in the grip of the law of 
causation. Duty and pleasure must, therefore, be divorced. 
Such was the train of reasoning to which he was driven if 
he would be consistent. 

Kant stands out as a thorough-going representative of 
the school of moralists who hold that fulfilment of the 
moral law is the supreme moral aim. The opposing 
school hold that man's chief good lies precisely in the 
pursuit of pleasure, and that pleasure, therefore, is the 
supreme moral criterion. This hedonist doctrine takes 
many forms, from that of Aristotle, who based his Ethics 
on the linking of happiness to the perfection of human 
life, down to the modern schools of Evolutionary 
Hedonists. They all agree, however, in maintaining 
that happiness constitutes the end of human action. How 
does this ancient and still vigorous controversy affect our 
present problem ? 

I answer at once that, after what I have urged as to the 
function of feeling in passing judgments of value, I am 
bound to accept pleasure as a factor in the act of moral 
judgment. But I do not on this account deny the truth 
of the intuitionalist doctrine that morality is founded on 



198 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

the nature of things. Personally I believe that a rational 
synthesis of the opposing views is possible, and that it is 
even now being brought about.-^ 

Few will deny that Kant's doctrine is noble ; few also, 
I think, will deny that it is out of touch with real life. 
As against the hedonist, experience teaches that a sense 
of duty may frequently oppose the solicitations of sense. 
Duty is often seen to lift its serene head above the storm, 
and rebuke the lawless violence of the gusts of passion 
that lash its waters into storm. Duty issues the fiat of 
its " ought," and condemns that which is without care for 
individual ease or pleasure. Evolution, also, has rendered 
the old form of hedonist doctrine untenable. Nature's 
care is not for the individual, but the type. Nevertheless 
it is unnatural, and therefore dangerous, to thrust feeling 
aside as void of moral value. 

In the first lecture I tried to show that feeling and will 
and reason are each and all so closely united that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to draw any hard and fast line 
between them. When feeling prompts us to say, " I like 
this " or " I do not like that," it is passing judgments of 
value ; and these shade off into logical or discursive judg- 
ments. Feeling is also so akin to will, that many would 
regard what we call will as a kind of secondary product 

^ Cf. E. Cairdj Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers^ 
vol. i. p. 371. ''Morality passes into religion, not as with Kant, by 
the external postulate of a Deus ex machina who shall bind together 
goodness with happiness, or the spiritual with the natural world, but 
by the recognition that there is one principle underlying both." 



FREE WILL 199 

of feeling. In any case we saw that the three are bound 
together in the indissoluble unity of mental activity. 

Now, since these things are so, it seems to be impossible 
for us to accept Kant's doctrine of abstract duty.^ 
Modern psychology forbids us to say that a man can act 
from an abstract sense of pure duty. Even Kant himself 
has to admit "a feeling of respect for the law of duty." 
He could not help himself. For feeling is necessary to 
give the sense of worth or value. And we are thus 
encouraged to ask why pleasure and duty should not be 
different aspects of one and the same underlying aim — 
the realisation of fuller life for the self. If this can be 
granted, we need not break away from a true hedonism. 
Religion need not gather up her robes and pass by on the 
other side. For did not the Psalmist sing, in blissful 
ignorance of all our controversies, that at God's " right 
hand there are pleasures for evermore " ? 

Once again, however, I have to urge that because any 
particular factor can be shown to be essential to an act of 
free choice, it does not follow that it is to stand alone as 
the supreme determinant and arbiter. Pleasure is an 
essential factor ; but it is not the complete whole of which 
we are in search. 

What, then, is this whole ? I trust I have prepared 
you for the answer. It is not reason alone — nor will 

1 I deal later with the fact, now acknowledged by nearly all 
morahsts, that pleasure can seldom be the direct object of pursuit. 
It accompanies, rather than produces, right action. 



200 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

alone — nor feeling alone. But it is the living unity of 
the three combined in the " total " man.^ Moral choice 
is the highest function of a being who can will, and feel, 
and think, and who cannot exercise any one of these 
powers in isolation from the other two. As Green puts 
it — a man's action is the result of his character acting 
under certain circumstances. Or, as I prefer to put it, a 
man's action is a manifestation of the will to live as it 
exists at the moment of deliberate volition, conditioned by 
its environment. This means determinism if you include 
the man himself in the total of causes at work. But the 
man is free in so far as he is self-determined. That is to 
say, I deny that his action is determined if that is taken to 
imply that his action is the result of mechanical determinism. 
But it may be asked further — Must not human action 
under such conditions be at any rate the outcome of 
necessity ? Let Green answer this for us. " All results 
(he writes) are necessary results. If a man's action is the 
result of his character and circumstances, we in effect add 
nothing by saying that it is their necessary result. If it 
is not the result of character or circumstances, or (as we 
prefer to say) if it is not the expression of a character in 
contact with certain circumstances, there must be some 
further element that contributes to its determination. 

^ Cf. Aristotle, De Anima^ i. iv. — to Se Xiyuv opyi'^co-^at rrjv xj/v^riv 
ofxoLov Kciv €L Tt9 Xcyot TYjv if/v)(r)v v(fiaLveLV y oiKoSofMetv fdeXxLov yap tew? 
fjLr) Aeyetv Tr]v if/v)(r)v ikcetv, r] fxavdavcLv rj Stavoetcr^ai, 'aA.A.a tov avOptnirov 



FREE WILL 20I 

What is that further element ? ^ Free will * some one 
may say. Very well ; but free will is either a name for 
you know not what, or it is included, is the essential 

factor in character It is simply a confusion to 

suppose that, because an action is a result — and if a result, 
a necessary result — of character and circumstance, the 
agent is therefore a necessary agent, in the sense of being 
an instrument of external force or a result of natural 
events and agencies."^ I freely adopt this statement, with 
the reservation that I would like to substitute the phrase 
" the whole man " for the word " character." This latter 
savours too much of " impress." I want the active 
principle. 

I maintain, then, that we do not need a kind of separate 
will which shall be independent of motive and circumstance. 
I am content with " the will to live." And I am convinced 
that in the doctrine of individual will-centres, self- 
determining, and rising stage by stage into ever higher 
modes of freedom, we have the means of reconciling the 
chief opposing schools of ethics, of bringing ourselves into 
line with modern psychology, and of satisfying our desire 

^ Green, Prolegomena, p. 113. Character means "impress," and 
denotes, properly, the resultant of past impressions. Hence my 
preference for some expression which connects "original activity." 
Moreover, the word character, as here used, suggests (as Green 
himself saw) " the idea of an alien force which, together with the 
other force called circumstances, converges upon him, moving him 
in a direction which is the resultant of the two forces combined, and 
in which accordingly he cannot help being carried." 



202 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

for a philosophy which shall " see life steadily and see it 
whole." And for theologians there is the comforting 
thought that such a doctrine is practically that of the 
great Augustine. For he held that the will is primary 
both in God and man, and that it virtually includes all the 
rest. Hence his pregnant statement — omnes nihil aliud 
quam voluntates sunt. 

XI. Am I Responsible } 

You will remember Sidgwick's statement, that the 
only valid argument for free will is " the immediate 
affirmation of consciousness in the moment of deliberate 
action." At the time, I insisted on the word " deliberate." 
I made no remark, however, on the view that this is the 
only valid argument. But my silence did not imply an 
acceptance of the dictum. I do indeed believe that this 
testimony of consciousness is equal to the burden it has 
to bear. But I hold that there is another of nearly, if 
not quite, as cogent a character. I refer to the sense of 
responsibility. 

Were we but automatic puppets, how grotesque would 
be the world ! Creatures, pulled by wires, praising and 
blaming each other for things which none of them could 
help doing ; and, stranger still, approving or condemning 
themselves. Of course this grotesqueness does not prove 
or disprove anything. But it compels us (does it not ?) 
to mistrust any theory which appears to necessitate it. 
Further, it can escape the testimony of experience only 



FREE WILL 203 

by telling us that in thinking ourselves responsible, we 
are under an illusion. Oh, the grim delight some seem 
to take in assuring poor mortals that " illusion " is the 
last word of philosophy ! But the true man shakes him- 
self free in scorn. You will recall the noble passage I 
quoted in which Socrates disdains the idea that he is a 
mechanical automaton, kept in the prison by a concurrence 
of forces with no personal will at the back of them. Does 
not every true heart thrill in sympathy with his ? 

Yes ! Define freedom as you will, the sense of 
responsibility lifts up its insistent voice, and assures us 
that to be a moral agent is something quite distinct from 
being a puppet pulled by wires, or, to use the language 
more consecrated by " advanced " science, " a conscious 
automaton." The distinction between actions for which 
we are and actions for which we are not responsible 
is ineffaceable. And if the distinction exists, there 
must be ^ome ground for it. And the ground must 
be such as will give some genuine significance 
to praise and blame. Is there any ground con- 
ceivable, short of some measure of self-determining 
power ? Butler's contention ^ still holds good : " A 
machine is inanimate and passive ; but we are agents. 
Our constitution is put in our own power. We are 
charged with it, and therefore are accountable for any 
disorder or violation of it." Or, as Huxley puts it, we 
are machines which can mend themselves. 

^ Pref. to Sermons, § 13. 



204 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

XII. Social Aspects of Free Will. 

It is a weighty confirmation of the views advanced in 
this lecture that there has been developed, and is still 
developing, a social conception of free will. That is to 
say, society has adopted a belief in the responsibility of 
its members for certain of their acts. I do not refer to 
what is known as " legal " responsibility, in its often 
technical and artificial ramifications.^ I refer to that 
working basis of a moral character which society feels to 
be necessary as a justification for the administration of 
rewards and penalties. 

Mill and others have argued that since the will is 
determined by the strongest motive, punishment is 
justifiable as an influence to strengthen the weak will of 
the wrong-doer. In fact. Mill would make responsibility 
equivalent to the " knowledge that punishment will be 
just." ^ But unless responsibility meant more than this, 
punishment would not he just at all^ in any sense of the 
word worth fighting for. Moreover, this connection of 
responsibility with punishment as an invariable concomitant 
is false to the facts of experience. A man can be re- 
sponsible to himself, to a self-imposed law which he 
recognises as binding — to an ideal — to an inner call — 
quite apart from thought of punishment. 

1 See this line of thought well worked out in Hadley's Freedom 
and Responsibility^ chap, iv., "Freedom as a Legal Institution." 
^ See the discussion in Mill on Hamilton^ chap. xxvi. 



FREE WILL 205 

Of course, on the principles of strict determinism, the 
punishment is determined in exactly the same sense as 
the fault. Responsibility, guilt, punishment, justice, are 
all alike simply names for certain concatenated series of 
experiences, and I do not see that there is more to be said. 
They all alike must be, together with discussions and 
conclusions about them. They all simply happen, and 
could not be otherwise. But if we rebel against this 
view of life, and if we grant some value to our sense of 
justice. Mill's theory will not content us. If I am not 
responsible, I ought not to be punished. To say that I 
acted from the strongest motive does not alter my feeling 
of injustice if I feel that I do not deserve a punishment. 
It cannot be that a multitude of automata, deluded into 
the idea that they are not automata, deal out penalties 
to keep themselves from acting as though they were 
automata. Can absurdity further go ! Society, to save 
itself from such a nightmare, has evolved its working 
theory of free will. True indeed that our legal 
codes fall far short of ideal justice. True, we have 
still much to learn about criminology and penology, as 
well as about fair modes of distributing social rewards. 
The complexities of life are often bewildering. Still, 
the social sense of justice, so far from being disinte- 
grated, is growing steadily, and is the source of our 
progress in adjusting our methods to varying degrees 
of responsibility. 

The sense of responsibility is thus seen to be a great 



2o6 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

social institution, of universal validity, and of growing 
solidity. Can we ascribe it to a mere illusion ? 

Having touched upon this social aspect of free will, it 
may be interesting to note another of the ways in which 
social institutions are brought into practical relation with 
our problem. There is manifested on various sides a 
fear that the State may interfere unduly with the indi- 
vidual. As social organisation increases, the area of 
individual liberty appears to become more circumscribed. 
There is a tendency, say some, to mould us all after the 
same pattern, and to repress the variations necessary for 
progress. Mill uttered his passionate protest^ against 
curtailments of individual liberty, and Herbert Spencer 
followed with a powerful and detailed indictment of State 
interference. To brush aside the serious protests of two 
such thinkers would be folly. Nevertheless, I am con- 
vinced that there are many misconceptions mingled with 
their sounder arguments. 

For how is progress possible ? Evolution has taught 
us that individual variations are necessary. But so, also, 
are social institutions. For, without social organisations 
in which the favourable variations may be embodied and 
conserved, little is gained. There are, of course, bad 
institutions as well as good ; and we cannot be too care- 
fully on our guard against the bad. The general fault is 
a tendency to class legislation which fetters the many for 
the benefit of the few. But this fault is not inherent in 
^ See Mill's Liberty^ and Herbert Spencer's Man versus the State. 



FREE WILL 207 

legislation, or in social organisation. Restraint is not 
an evil in itself. Rather is it true that when healthy 
tendencies are crystallised in social forms, they are most 
powerful aids, not only to social progress, but to the 
development of individuals. They do not repress freedom, 
but give it scope for exercise. In fact, they afford the 
social parallel to habits in the individual. Habits, too, 
may be bad as well as good. But we do not on that 
account strive to reduce our habits to a minimum. It is 
so clearly to our advantage to multiply our good habits 
that their formation becomes a direct object of our moral 
discipline. They economise time and labour, and leave 
us free for new developments. There is no sounder in- 
vestment than a good habit ; and a good social institution 
is its counterpart. The adequate discussion of this 
matter would lead us to consider the nature and the 
function of the social factor in progress, and that I must 
reserve for the next lecture. Here I merely deny the 
false antithesis of " Man versus the State," as though 
the State were the enemy of the individual. Just as 
reason and moral sense become incarnate in nerve and 
muscle and tissue, so do they become incarnate in social 
tradition and organisation. And just as co-ordinated 
muscles and nerves and tissues fit us to conquer our 
environment, so, on the large scale, do social institutions 
extend the area of our free action by lessening the 
tyranny of external compulsion. Hence it comes that 
the civilised man is more free than the savage, the 



2o8 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

disciplined than the wayward character. Rational obedi- 
ence flees from passion, from harmful prejudice, and 
from hampering tradition. And on these grounds we 
are led to anticipate that, as individual and social organi- 
sation proceed in healthy and concurrent development, 
so will the compulsory element in our environment — 
that sphere of the determined which is still so large — be 
conquered and diminish. That is to say, we have reason- 
able ground for holding that the compulsory element in 
our experience is contingent only, not essential. 

XIII. An Eirenicon. 

Am I over-sanguine in thinking that in some such 
theory as I have outlined, there will be found the means 
of reconciling the great opposing schools of moralists ? 
I do not believe that any doctrine which has received 
powerful and continuous advocacy through long periods 
of time can be empty of value or significance. May not 
determinists and indeterminists both be right in their 
characteristic essentials, and yet both need modification ? 
Cannot both armies combine without any serious lowering 
of colours on either side ? Life is wide, and the human 
mind is narrow. The more we know, the less we shall 
differ. 

I hold that theologians, scientists, and philosophers, 
can all alike concentrate their forces on the fundamental 
"will to live." All else is implicit in that, up to the 



FREE WILL 209 

very will to love. For the fullest life means love. 

Given certain centres manifesting the will to live, and 

rising, in an environment, and by stages, from obscure 

striving to full self-conscious personality — given these 

and all else seems to find its place. The environment by 

which development is conditioned is being gradually 

conquered. The original energy and creative power 

which characterises these centres of will asserts itself over 

all that is external, and increasingly transforms it into 

material for its self-expression. The goal to which the 

whole process of evolution tends is thus seen to be the 

attainment of ever richer and happier spiritual freedom. 

And inasmuch as the will to live belongs to the sphere 

of the supernatural, it escapes the sweep of the iron 

law of causation, of limitations of time and space. It 

develops and expands eternally in the sphere of the 

ideal. 

That there are degrees of freedom is obvious from 

the facts of experience. There is the freedom of the 

magnetic needle which swings freely on its pivot and 

comes to rest without external hindrance. There is the 

higher freedom of the plant which expands its latent 

powers under favouring conditions of air and soil, of 

sunshine and of shower. There is the still higher 

freedom of the moral agent who can " be determined 

in his action by a reflective choice between diflFerent 

motives." ^ This is the freedom which contains the 

^ Wundt, Principles of Morality^ Eng. trans., p. 37. 

14 



2IO THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

secret of man's greatness, and defines his rightful place 
in the cosmos. 

XIV. The Church the Society of Free Spirits. 

And what of the bearing of Christianity on all this ? 
Why, Christianity here, as ever, carries all on to the 
highest plane. It brings to us the conception of an 
ideal society which is to be a kingdom of free spirits, in 
which each shall be an end in himself and yet find his 
truest self by living in the life of all. To this society is 
given the name of " the Church of the Living God." It 
is founded on the Person of Him Who died for the race. 
It is filled with the Spirit by Whom its members know 
themselves to be the sons of God. In this society, each 
is absolutely free, because he obeys the laws of his own 
being ; and those laws are identical with the will of God, 
who desires the highest happiness of every member of 
the great spiritual family. The appeal in this kingdom 
is ever to inner freedom, not to external force. Its 
Founder stated the essential principle of its existence 
when He said : " I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men 
unto Me." The law is to be lived, not obeyed, for it is 
to be the innermost nature of the agent himself. It is 
thus that love becomes the fulfilling of the law. The 
will to live is transmuted into the will to love. Each 
learns to lose his life in the lives of others, and so each 
finds his life for time and for eternity. 

No doubt this is an ideal. No doubt the actual Church 



FREE WILL 211 

on earth falls far, far short of her high aim and calling. 
But still, there is the ideal as her possession, and new 
life and effort are always possible. Why, then, should 
not all social enthusiasts, all lovers of true freedom, join 
in a mighty effort to come nearer to this ideal than has 
ever yet been possible ? The Church exists and works 
here on earth, and no form of honest human effort is 
alien to her spirit and her aims. But she also reaches 
out into the spiritual ; she sees all human life and labour 
sud specie teternitatis. And thus, with a firm hold both 
on the actual and on the ideal, she lifts high the banner 
of progress. What might not be accomplished if all lovers 
of their kind would but join hands and hearts in the 
brotherhood of " God's fellow workers " ! 



APPENDIX TO LECTURE V. : MORAL 

STATISTICS. 

Many minds are somewhat perturbed by certain results of the 

taking of "moral statistics." It is found that, when the numbers 

included are sufficiently large, the percentages for a group of 

I common crimes remain fairly steady. It would seem to follow 

that such statistics prove that moral events lend themselves to 

I the same methods of calculation as are possible in the case of 

• mechanical probabilities, and that therefore human conduct is 

mechanically, or, at any rate, mathematically determined. 

In considering the significance of these statistics, we must be 
careful not to lay too great stress upon their accuracy. Their 
steadiness is not so marked as a superficial examination might 



212 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

lead us to suppose. But even if we grant their accuracy, they 
need not alarm us. For if we allow that self-determination is at 
work in an environment of externally determined conditions, 
we do not therefore assert that the constitution of things is 
necessarily inconsistent with the prevalence of marked regularities, 
even in the sphere of the self-determined. The externally 
determined forces are always at work, and the will-centres 
develop by virtue of their reactions upon the given material. 
The average type of will-centre will react in an average way 
while still remaining self-determined. 

But we need not even concede so much as this. For we know 
from direct experience that a general purpose may run through 
a process of evolution without interfering with individual pro- 
cesses. Such an idea is familiar to theologians in connection 
with the development manifested in the Bible history. God fulfils 
His divine purposes without interfering with human responsibility. 

But since theologians may not be as clear in regard to the 
ground of this theory as they are in regard to its truth, I would 
draw attention to an illustration used by Baldwin in dealing with 
this very problem.^ I adapt to my present purpose its general 
drift. 

Consider the business of a life insurance society. It is based 
on certain calculations of the chances of Hfe, drawn up in 
mortality tables, in accordance with the law of probabiKties. The 
conditions of the Hves involved are indefinitely varied, and their 
course is run quite independently of the calculations of the society 
which insures them. Individual purpose and initiative swing 
quite free of the existence of the society, save in so far as the 
particular element of risk is provided for. 

But further, the society which bases its operations on the law 
of probabilities, itself serves a double purpose. It secures the 

^ Development and Evolution^ pp. 231 ff. 



FREE WILL 213 

purpose of eliminating, to varying degrees, the risk of financial 
risk or difficulty in the case of those who benefit by the 
insurances. And it also fulfils a purpose which centres in itself 
as a society, by providing dividends for stockholders and salaries 
for officials. We thus see that a regular web of purposes can be 
fulfilled on a basis of probabiKties. Observed regularities are 
found not to be incompatible even with alien purposes running 
side by side. 

With such facts before him Baldwin asks : " Why is it not 
a reasonable view that cosmic Purpose — if we may call it so — 
works by similar, but more adequate knowledge of the whole, 
and so secures its results — whether in conformity to^ or in contraven- 
tion ofy our particular strivings ? " 



SIXTH LECTURE. 

MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING. 

"We are members one of another." — Eph. iv. 25. 

I. The Social Factor. 

More than two thousand years ago, the " Master of 
those who know *' recognised and proclaimed that man 
is by nature a social being.^ By this he did not mean 
to imply merely that man seeks companionship. He had 
something much more fundamental in his mind. To 
adapt one of his own illustrations, he meant that the 
isolated individual is no more a man than a hand is a 
hand without the body. He had a clear prevision, in all 
essentials, of what we now call " the social factor." And 
he was thus ahead, not only of the social thinkers of his 
own times, but of all times almost up to the present. 
For compare two passages. The first is from the work 
in which Aristotle develops his doctrine,^ as stated above. 
" That the State exists by nature, and is prior to the 

^ja.v6po)7ro^ cfivcreL ttoXltlkov ^wov* ^ Politics^ i. i, 2. 

214 



MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 215 

individual, is proved by the consideration that the 
individual is not self-sufficing ; he is therefore a part, like 
every other part, relative to the whole, and so implying it." 
In this profound utterance are implicit the latest develop- 
ments of social theory. It gave a splendid lead for social 
theory and practice. But alas ! it was never worthily 
followed up. And even at the beginning of the latter 
half of last century, John Stuart Mill could write as 
follows ^ : " Men in a state of society are still men ; 
their actions and passions are obedient to the laws of 
individual human nature. Men are not, when brought 
together, converted into another kind of substance, with 
different properties ; as hydrogen and oxygen are different 
from water, or as hydrogen, oxygen, carbon, and azote, 
are different from nerves, muscles, and tendons. Human 
beings in society have no properties but those which are 
derived from, and may be resolved into, the laws of the 
nature of individual man." 

This — and from John Stuart Mill, with Comte behind 
him — and more than two thousand years after Aristotle ! 
One of the debts of gratitude we owe to the conception 
of evolution is that we have learnt to study the individual 
in his relation to his social environment with a fresh 
realisation of the solidarity of humanity. In Mill's 
statement we miss even that ring of social consciousness 
which burst into applause when Terence's line was first 

^ Logic^ bk. vi. chap. vii. § i (quoted by Sidgwick, Philosophy^ its 
Scope aftd Relations, p. 153). 



2i6 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

declaimed : " I am a man — and nothing that pertains to 
man do I deem to be alien from me." ^ Not that I would 
have you think Mill lacking in his recognition of the indi- 
vidual's debt to society. My complaint is that he altogether 
underrates the function and nature of the social factor. 

Before going into more general questions, let me cite 
a few familiar facts which will at once prove Mill to be 
wrong in his assertion that " human beings in society have 
no properties but those which are derived from, and can 
be resolved into, the laws of the nature of the individual 
man." The psychology of crowds is a much neglected 
field of research. But we all know this much, at any 
rate, that the behaviour of humanity in mass is something 
more than the sum of the behaviour of the individuals 
composing the mass. Men will often allow themselves, 
when associated together, a licence which would have 
been impossible to them in their individual capacities. 
The phenomena of panics, the contagion of enthusiasm, 
the subtle influence of even small gatherings for a 
common purpose, the swaying passions and emotions of 
large gatherings — all these aflFord instances of new 
phenomena coming into existence over and above the 
sum of individual forces, as the result of association. 
There is a curious speculation in a recent work on 
abnormal psychic phenomena, by a French savant^ as to 

^ Homo sum, et huviani a me nil alienum pufo, 
2 Maxwell, Metaphysical Phenomena (Eng. trans., with preface by 
Prof. Lodge), p. 65. 



MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 217 

the origin of the strange personifications familiar at 
spiritualistic seances. He is inclined to attribute them to 
a kind of collective consciousness, emanating from the 
circle of sitters ; and in this way only does he consider it 
possible to explain some of the characteristic features of 
such manifestations. Of course this is a guess, and 
must not count for more. But it is in undesigned coinci- 
dence with larger and more serious speculations on the 
part of such men as Fechner, Paulsen, and Romanes — to 
mention no others — as to the possibility of composite 
consciousness. And it is in line with the almost in- 
stinctive theories implicit in such expressions as esprit de 
corps^ the Zeit Geist^ " the national character," and many 
others, not to mention the almost universal practice of 
personifying nations by symbols, nor such more dis- 
tinctively theological speculations as those of Swedenborg. 
It would seem that such considerations as these just 
cited would suffice to overthrow Mill's doctrine of the 
composition of social forces. But let us spend a moment 
or two on his illustration. Even hydrogen and oxygen, 
when combined, produce a result which could not be 
predicted ; and still more is this the case with the other 
elements when combined to form muscles and nerves and 
tissues. Further, in these chemical combinations, the 
elements involved may be separated again, recombined, 
and again separated, as often as we like, without any 
apparent change in their condition. But when you are 
dealing with human beings, who can absorb emotions and 



2i8 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

ideas and social traditions, who can learn by experience, 
and develop a central core of personality, such combinations 
and separations are obviously out of the question. To 
suggest them would be absurd. As Baldwin showed, it 
is impossible to reproduce a life series backwards. We 
are in the sphere of vital phenomena, and chemical 
analogies are dangerously misleading. 

In chemistry we are sometimes bidden to imagine that 
the atoms are held together by little hooks. The device 
is clumsy, but useful. We shall err most grievously, 
however, if we attempt thus to picture to ourselves the 
vinculum sociale. For in the case of " social tissue " there 
are inherent the properties of organised life. Human 
society, on the large scale and the small, generates social 
tendencies which sweep along on their stream individuals, 
and groups, and nations. By far the larger number of 
human institutions have been the outcome of the play of 
unconscious forces. Consider the analogy of a poem. 
Each word in a poem has an individual existence. But 
the separate words are taken up by a spirit of which they 
are unconscious, and form part of an intangible whole. 
The poem is more than the sum of the words. And all 
this is just as true of the separate parts — of the lines, 
and sections, and larger sections — each and all are brought 
together in a higher supernatural unity which presides 
over their order, and endows them with new powers and 
beauties. So with individuals, communities, nations, and 
humanity, as a whole. 



MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 219 

Or consider the actual history of the development of 
language itself, as a typical product of the social factor. 
It has been developed by social forces in obedience to 
social needs. It is handed down from generation to 
generation, becoming part and parcel of the mental being 
of countless individuals. I think it was Coleridge who 
finely called the Greek language " the unconscious meta- 
physics " of a highly gifted race. It came out of the 
" social consciousness." It awoke in the consciousness of 
individuals when Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle began to 
analyse it. And it provided a medium for the expression 
of truths enshrined in the most social and spiritual of all 
religions. Who shall separate for us the strands of the 
web ? Who shall assign to the individual or the social 
factors their shares in the final result ? Or who shall 
isolate the individual and show him to us as he would 
have been without the use of the social traditions em- 
bodied in language ? 

Who shall isolate for us the individual ? Ah, there's 
the rub, not in the case of language only, but in every 
department of life ! Primitive man, for instance, built 
his hut to protect himself ; but it was to protect others 
also. He ate food to satisfy his hunger ; but the meal 
was almost universally a social, and even a religious 
ceremony. He decorated his person ; but it was that he 
might extort admiration from his friends or strike terror 
into his foes. And this social aspect of individualistic 
action remains under the most complex conditions. For 



220 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

example, a man guards his own health in obedience to 
self-regarding motives ; but his action has obvious social 
results — better temper, greater efficiency, less burden on 
others, and others too many to number. A man is a 
good father because, primarily, he finds pleasure in caring 
for his children ; but the results of such action benefit 
the community at large. You cannot isolate either an 
individual nor the action of an individual. Mill saw 
with perfect clearness that each of us owes nearly all he 
has and is to the social factor ; but he failed to realise 
that the social factor had organic functions of its own, and 
so lost himself in ideas about compositions of forces 
analogous to chemical combinations of atoms. 

To insist thus on the social factor does not by any 
means preclude attempts to isolate the individual for 
purposes of special study — but it does imply that the 
artificial character of such abstractions shall not be lost 
sight of. That wonderful invention, the economic man, 
would have been very useful in his way had not theorists 
forgotten his bloodlessness. Nor must we run into the 
opposite extreme, and merge the individual in the 
community, as though he had no specialised existence 
at all. Here again, for certain limited purposes, it is 
legitimate to study men in masses. But we must never 
forget that the social forces are generated by the action of 
the individual parts. To crush the individual would be 
fatal to progress. 



\ 



MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 221 



II. Non-Social Theories. 

In Aristotle's opinion, then, man was by nature a social 
animal. It will aid us materially to grasp his thought 
if we glance at one or two of those social theories which 
start from opposite premisses. 

Our English Hobbes, for example, would have us 
believe that man is by nature unsocial, and that the State 
is the outcome of a consciously realised necessity. He 
draws a vivid picture of primitive man as being " a wolf 
to his fellow man." ^ The natural state he held to be 
one of universal war. Each individual strove with each 
for means of subsistence and enjoyment. Hobbes had 
taken an enormous fancy to the science of mechanical 
physics, and he applied it to his social problems. In the 
world of atoms, said he, the individual atoms assert 
themselves under the sway of the law of the conservation 
of matter. So in the social sphere, the law of self- 
preservation rules the conduct of the individual social 
atoms. 

How, then, did men emerge from this very undesir- 
able condition ? Hobbes tells us that they discovered 
they were going the wrong way to work to get what they 
wanted — namely, the preservation and perfection of their 
individual lives. Right reason, therefore, led them to 
organise various social institutions. But all their co- 

^ Homo homini lupus. Bellu7n omnium contra omnes. 



222 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

operative efforts were due to enlightened self-interest, 
and thus the basis of the State was and remains 
individualistic in aim and essence. 

In criticising this theory of the State, it is only fair 
to Hobbes to say that he invented history rather than 
ignored it. But while we can make allowances for him, 
we cannot follow his lead. For we know now, that 
however far we push back our researches, we never 
come across such an undesirable aggregate of solitaries 
as he bids us summon before the bar of our historical 
imagination. Nay, if we go back to the beginnings of 
life of any kind, we find that in the development of even 
the simplest organisms, love has its part to play as well 
as hate. But though the historical element has vanished 
from this theory, there are still many political theorists 
who would base society on enlightened self-interest. I 
will discuss their views later. 

Or consider Schopenhauer's view. He would have 
us believe that the antagonism between the individual 
interest and the interests of others is final and 
irrevocable — that the natural man is essentially and 
absolutely selfish. He holds that men are sociable 
from vanity, compassionate from self-love, honest from 
fear, peace-loving from cowardice, benevolent from 
superstition. On this estimate of human nature there 
cannot be any such thing as a pure social impulse. And 
the practical outcome is that so frankly and cynically 
expressed by Maudsley. Society has to fashion the 



MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 223 

individual to its will — its self-interest, therefore, is^ 
" to do all the pruning and training of the individual 

necessary to make him serve it best In the end 

it comes to this — that the despotism of morality is the 
self-seeking of the species and the servitude of the 
individual, who is expected to find full compensation 
for his self-sacrifice in the implicit belief of its inestimable 
worth and the knowledge that he is ministering to its 
glorious destiny." This is the line of thought which 
has led Nietzsche to his cruel doctrine of the 
Uebermensch. 

Or recall Karl Pearson's remarkable statement that 
only when history is interpreted in the sense of natural 
history will it pass from the sphere of narrative and 
become science.^ Recall also how that the forces at 
work behind the process are reduced to the struggle 
for food, the rate of reproduction, and geographical 
distribution. 

1 have instanced three theories of the relation of the 
individual to the community. You will note that 
however much they may differ in detail, they agree in 
teaching that the mainspring of progress is internecine 
war of individual with individual, of group with group. 
Competition reigns supreme. Let us turn to see what 
can be advanced in support of Aristotle's dictum that 

^ Life in Mind and Conduct^ p. 68. 

2 Grammar of Science^ chap. ix. § 13. See Lecture III. of this 
course. 



224 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

man is by nature a social being. My own position in 

this controversy is defined by Maurice's burst of 

indignation : " Competition is put forth as the law of 
the universe. That is a lie." 



III. Social Impulses. 

1 begin with what we may call the " larger society" — 
the society which includes all sentient life. In this the 
independence of the social factor stands out clearly. We 
find that from the beginning survival has depended on 
union and co-operation. It is by the union of cells, and 
their mutual subordination through an increasing com- 
plexity in the division of labour, that progress has been 
rendered possible. The limb of a complex organ does 
not exist for itself alone, but serves the larger unity of 
which it forms a part. In the higher animals we meet 
with social feelings and impulses which are common in 
their degree to themselves and men. We can even 
observe certain tendencies to associated life and organisa- 
tion which are definite anticipations of human social 
institutions. Over and above the generic impulse to 
produce and preserve offspring, even at the sacrifice of 
individual life, there are social instincts which bring into 
existence such highly elaborated politics as those of the 
ants and bees. Birds and animals which nest, or herd, 
or hunt, in groups or companies, and which unite for 
common defence, attain to ends which would be impracti- 



MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 225 

cable for Isolated individuals. True it is that such 
associations are seldom based on conscious reflection, 
and that it is seldom possible to trace the stages by which 
they have been evolved — but they are facts neverthe- 
less, and prove that the evolutionary process contains 
tendencies to union and co-operation no less than to 
competition. 

And even on the large scale, as between race and race, 
and group and group, the necessity for union into large 
dependent wholes is obvious. Darwin's familiar example ^ 
will occur to all. Certain kinds of clover are dependent 
on the visits of humble-bees ; the number of these de- 
pends in a great measure on the number of field mice, 
which destroy their combs and nests ; and the number of 
mice, again, is largely dependent on the number of cats. 
" Hence it is quite credible that the presence of a 
feline animal in large numbers in a district might 
determine, through the intervention first of mice and 
then of bees, the frequency of certain flowers in that 
district ! " Put this into general terms, and we reach 
the conclusion that every race depends upon its environ- 
ment : in that environment must be reckoned all other 
living races. And therefore, in spite of the conflict con- 
tinually raging, there is reciprocal dependence of every 
degree and kind. 

I have said enough, without elaborating the evidence, 

^ Origin of Species^ chap. iii. p. 57. Cf. Leslie Stephen, Social 
Duties and Rights, vol. i. pp. 231 ff. 

15 



226 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

to prove that the aim and end of individual existence is 
something that shall not be self-contained, but something 
that shall be part of a higher whole. On the human side, 
this truth is being increasingly recognised, with a conse- 
quent stimulus to the growth of the social consciousness 
— though this is all implicit in the deep saying found in 
the Epistle to the Hebrews that former generations with- 
out us could " not be made perfect." In fact, the whole 
of the sentient universe, the totality of existences that 
have lived, do live, and are yet to live, are bound to- 
gether into a vast organised unity. The State, says 
Aristotle, exists by nature, and is prior to the individual. 
The end of life upon our globe, says the Bible, is the 
perfect city. 

IV. Sympathy. 

But how shall we deal with Schopenhauer, who refuses 
to see in our social tendencies anything more than dis- 
guised selfishness ? Here is the pith of his argument : 
I can be influenced by that only which affects my per- 
sonal will. To say that I desire a thing is to say that 
it has some bearing on my personal happiness. I cannot 
act on feelings which I do not myself feel. Therefore 
when I perform what is called an unselfish act, I am 
really only pleasing myself. 

As against this I put a simple case. A child falls into 
the water. A man, standing near, without a moment's 
hesitation, plunges in to the rescue. He has not time to 



MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 227 

deliberate. Reflection as to the effects of his action, as 
to whether he stands to gain or lose, is out of the 
question. The reaction of his will is immediate. Have 
we not here a clear case of a social impulse which is as 
natural and spontaneous as any selfish impulse, and which 
for the time overpowers regard for personal safety and 
comfort ? 

How can we therefore but acknowledge that the 
individual has within him springs of action which do not 
aim solely at his own preservation ? Intermixed with 
the selfish impulses there are undoubtedly social impulses 
which are pure and direct. Moreover, just as we found 
it impossible to isolate the individual man, so do modern 
psychologists tell us it is impossible to isolate the in- 
dividual motive. All the elements in the character of an 
individual act and react upon one another in endless 
diversity of manners and degrees. And since these social 
impulses exist side by side with the selfish, they are 
bound to make themselves felt at every turn. Take an 
example previously used. A man has regard for his 
personal health. Why ? Hobbes will answer that he is 
acting under the law of self-preservation. Granted, so 
far as it goes. But is it possible for any of us to 
eliminate from such action all reference to those de- 
pendent upon us, or in close relation to us ? Is it not 
even possible that care for others may induce the pro- 
longation of a life which might otherwise be yielded up 
without much effort ? Or how about an artist who 



228 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

paints a picture to satisfy his artistic impulse ? Can he 
possibly eliminate from his mind all thought of those 
who are to look at his picture ? And so with every 
action of our lives. The social motives may be subtle — 
they may often evade us altogether — but they have their 
influence none the less. Man is by nature a social being, 
and his social impulses are blended with every fibre of 
his character. 

Let us go into this matter a little more deeply. For 
unless there is such a thing as genuine sympathy in the 
world, there cannot be much hope for progress towards 
greater brotherhood. 

We may allow that all action must ultimately depend 
upon individual feeling, without in the slightest degree 
emptying sympathy of its peculiar significance. For the 
analysis will turn on the nature of the feeling and of the 
stimulus which brings it into existence. And it is 
undeniable that the solidarity of associated groups of 
men does manifest itself in peculiar and special modes of 
feeling. For instance, a sense of danger impels an 
individual to self-defence. But it can also impel him, as 
we just now saw, to risk his life to save that of another. 
We thus arrive at a distinction between our feelings 
which goes down to bed-rock. The first class originates 
within ourselves as the direct result of our own existence. 
The other class originates in the feelings of others, which 
awaken in us responsive experiences. The latter class, 
are, of course, just as truly our own feelings ; but they 



MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 229 

take a range outside of ourselves. We may even go so 
far as to say that the feelings of others are transferred to 
us by a kind of contagion. The phenomena of such 
transference are shown most strikingly when men are 
congregated in masses. But even at an ordinary meeting, 
it is easy to observe that the tension of feeling is higher 
than would be the case were the same people engaged in 
the same matters individually. We have various phrases 
to express such tension, some of which may be more than 
metaphors. We speak of the atmosphere at a public 
meeting being " electrical " ; we speak of feeling being 
" reflected " from mind to mind ; and we speak of 
" concentrated " feeling, as though it could be focussed 
at certain centres. The influence, whatever it may be, 
is preponderatingly emotional, and, as such, is often 
blind and wayward. But as it becomes filled with in- 
tellectual content — as sympathy lends itself to rational 
control — it enables us to understand one another, and 
forges the links of true brotherhood. 

How utterly indefensible, then, to confuse two sets 
of feelings so distinct in their origin, and in their objects, 
as are the feelings for self and the feelings for others. 
We may rightly call a man " selfish " who does not feel 
for others as he ought and when he ought. But to call 
that man selfish whose feeling goes out of himself, and 
enables him to live in and for the interests of others, is 
to empty language of all serious meaning. 

From the hedonistic point of view, again, it is certain 



230 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

that the exercise of the sympathetic feelings is capable of 
yielding one of the highest forms of pleasure to those 
who are moved by them. But this fact, instead of 
making for the individualist theory of social union, is one 
of the most incontestable proofs of the naturalness of the 
social side of human character. The man who is quite 
indifferent to the happiness of others is looked upon as a 
moral monster. The human heart in its normal condition 
longs for sympathy and spontaneously offers it. And in 
proportion as a man fails to feel with his kind, in that 
proportion does he fail to develop himself. Even lack of 
harmony with one's social environment is attended by 
unhappiness, sometimes amounting to pain. On the 
other hand, that character develops most freely and fully 
which is most open to the influences of family, com- 
munity, and nation — which absorbs elements from the 
aims and experiences of others, and identifies their interests 
with its own. In short, absolute egoism exists only in 
theory, and would defeat its own object. 

V. Unsocial Impulses. 

While arguing thus strongly for the natural and spon- 
taneous character of the social impulses and feelings, I 
do not suppose that you will deem me ignorant of the 
number and strength of the individualistic and anti- 
social tendencies. Indeed, I fear I shall have to grant 
that they are, of the two, the more deeply rooted, just 



MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 231 

because they are more primitive. The earlier stages of 
the struggle for life called for stern self-assertion. And 
this tendency to self-assertion is always ready to reassert 
itself. How often are we startled by the news of singular 
cruelties perpetrated by civilised men who have lived any 
length of time in barbarous communities ! How often a 
man who at home would shrink from the idea of using a 
fellow-man as a slave, will become hardened if slavery 
will make him rich ! So even under the restraining in- 
fluences of Christian civilisation itself, the haste to be 
rich will cause men to use their fellows as mere instru- 
ments to selfish ends. So, too, the anti-social tendency 
to gambling will destroy the finer traits of character, and 
dwarf the weaker social impulses. So, too, with struggles 
for privileges, hereditary or acquired ; with defence of 
the "caste" system, so well illustrated by the appropria- 
tion of the term " society " to one small fraction of the 
social whole ; so, too, with all the manifold forms assumed 
by self-love, desire for pleasure or for power, the rush to 
be rich, and the rest of the dark progeny of undue self- 
assertion. The germ of social sympathy is latent from 
the first ; but it calls for careful and rational develop- 
ment. To the will is set the task of acting under the 
guidance of the reason, and of so reducing the instincts 
and impulses, both egoistic and social, to harmonious 
subjection and adjustment. In brief, the will has to be 
socialised. The process is a long and a difficult one. 
Each class in the community has to learn its lesson. 



232 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

The ardent socialist must learn to sympathise with his 

fellows, even though they be rich and privileged. And 

(what seems to be a much harder task !) the rich and 

privileged must learn to respect the rights of those whom 

for so many centuries they have regarded as their 

inferiors. The middle class also has to learn that the 

same struggle for fuller life which in their own case they 

think so glorious, is no less glorious when the toilers in 

their turn demand a better place at the feast of life. Oh, 

how hard it is for all of us to generalise from that which 

is good for ourselves to that which is good for others ; 

from that which is calculated to advance our own welfare 

to that which is calculated to advance the welfare of 

others ! 

There are stages in socialisation — that goes without 
saying. It is something to learn that we should seek the 
good of others even on selfish grounds, from desire for 
such social health and stability as will ensure our own 
welfare and happiness. It is a higher stage when we can 
find personal interest in social work, such as shall make 
it worth our while on this score to throw ourselves into 
philanthropic aims and efforts. Many of us find real 
pleasure in gaining experience of life and in relieving 
distress. But it will not do for us to stop short at this 
stage. For the gentle enjoyment of such social work 
may leave us unmoved as regards the causes which render 
it necessary ; nay, may even leave us ready to oppose 
measures and schemes which might do much to remove 



MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 233 

those causes. We must go on to the highest stage — we 
must learn to love our fellows as we love ourselves, to 
put ourselves into their places, and to work for them 
with that enthusiasm for the race which led Jesus Christ 
from Bethlehem to Calvary. 



VI. Competition. 

As the social impulses and feelings find their centre in 
social sympathy, so do the unsocial impulses and feelings 
find their centre in the principle of competition. We 
have studied some of its features in the evolutionary 
struggle for food. It would seem to be hard, if not 
impossible, to make competition the supreme and final 
force behind social development ! And yet there are 
many who do take up this position. In spite of all the 
failures of the past, they hold that the world will advance 
most surely and rapidly if free play be allowed to the 
action of enlightened self-interest. They deprecate inter- 
ference with the individual, and would leave him to work 
out his own salvation in his own way. The action of the 
State is to be of a negative character only — it is to protect 
person and property, and to enforce the fulfilment of 
contracts. It is, in fact, to be a big modern policeman. 
Should it attempt to be more, we are solemnly warned 
that it will do more harm than good. In the industrial 
world, more particularly, we are urged to keep the field 
clear for individualistic enterprise. 



fY f 



234 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

Now it would be quixotic to deny that the case for 
enlightened self-interest can present many striking and 
substantial examples of its success in promoting the 
general welfare. It has stimulated invention, extended 
commerce, increased industrial efficiency, and, perhaps 
chiefest of all, has established a working basis for deter- 
mining prices and wages. But these results, though 
important, do not cover the whole of life, nor has it been 
shown that they could not be compassed by methods 
more rational and more in accord with our best social 
sentiments. And the fact remains that enlightened self- 
interest is selfish, whatever fine epithets you may use to 
soften the unpalatable truth ; that the selfishness to be 
of an " enlightened " character only serves to render it 
more subtle and diplomatic. Make it as enlightened as 
you please, selfishness will never be transmuted into the 
spirit of brotherhood. As a matter of experience, do you 
find many convinced philanthropists in the ranks of the 
enlightened egoists ? Why should they be found there ? 
So long as the masses can be kept quiet, and awkward 
or dangerous discontent can be restrained within due 
bounds, their motto must be " apres nous le deluge." It 
would be inconsistent on their part if they did not 
sedulously repress any incipient tendencies to social 
sympathy. Self-sacrifice must only be in exact proportion 
to benefit gained. 

If you ask me how, these things being so, the competi- 
tive principle has done any good at all, the answer is easy. 



MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 235 

Firstly, we have to grant most freely that there is a 
legitimate sphere for the action of enlightened self- 
interest. As I have before remarked, to emphasise the 
social factor does not require us to ignore the individual 
factor. We may even allow that there will always be a 
place for the competitive principle ; but its incidence will 
have to be vastly altered, and its character profoundly 
modified. The good, then, wrought by the legitimate 
working of self-interest, has been undoubtedly great both 
in quantity and quality. Secondly, we note that the 
universe is the scene of moral government. There is in 
it a power that makes for righteousness by overruling 
the evil for good. The Dragon in the Book of Revelation 
cast forth a flood to overwhelm the woman who had fled 
from him, but " the earth swallowed up the flood." So, 
on the largest scale, the cosmic process transforms even 
chaos into order. But this comforting thought cannot 
make us regard the Dragon's overwhelming flood, or the 
reign of chaos, as desirable things in and for themselves. 

That which is selfish shall be selfish still ; that which is 
unsocial shall be unsocial still. If you would see the 
undisguised fruit of the tree of self-interest, read Lord 
Shaftesbury's Life and Letters. Gain from him the true 
horror of England's industrial condition before the State 
stepped in to curb the action of free competition. Do 
you say that the self-interest displayed was not en- 
lightened } How will you show that } Many of the 
colossal fortunes of the northern manufacturers were 



236 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

built up in those times — and who shall calculate the 
privileges, social and political, that have followed in their 
train ? 

Or again — suppose we adopt this principle of en- 
lightened self-interest as our guide, how many are there 
who have the necessary experience and knowledge to 
apply it ? There is need for a very considerable and 
general development of mental and moral faculties before 
a man can be said to be a fair judge of his own interests 
— still more before he can recognise to any large extent 
the parallelism of his own interests with those of the 
community. Further, the greater the increase in the 
experience and knowledge required among those who 
are favourably situated, the worse, because the more 
diplomatic and systematic, will be the exploitation of the 
ignorant. And we thus discover that even from the 
practical point of view the principle fails us as a guide to 
conduct which shall be truly social. 

And, to continue this " practical " line of criticism, can 
any unprejudiced student of sociology deny that industrial 
competition has failed to fulfil the expectations of those 
who looked to it for social salvation ? Production has 
been stimulated beyond the dreams of the most sanguine. 
Machinery, steam, and electricity, have accomplished 
marvels. And yet, as Mill sadly remarks, it is doubtful 
if the lot of any human being has been lightened. 
Certainly, for the great masses of the people, the Golden 
Age is as distant as ever. The fear of want, especially 



MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 237 

in old age ; the struggle with constant uncertainty of 
employment ; the hurry, the excitement, the strain, of 
modern life ; the all too common sense of weakness which 
oppresses those who cannot rise to the surface in the 
competitive whirlpool ; the overshadowing feeling of 
loneliness amid surging crowds — these and countless 
other dark features of the industrial type of civilisation 
check the flow of glib apologies for enlightened self- 
interest. Can we wonder that expectations so bitterly 
dashed to the ground have given place to deep-seated 
distrust of social conditions, and have kindled the 
smouldering fires of discontent and rebellion ? 

Hear Huxley on this subject. He had a wholesome 
contempt for sentimental rhetoric ; and his words are 
therefore the more worthy of our serious thought. He 
is speaking of the condition to which the workers in 
large cities are often reduced — the condition called by 
the French emphatically la misere} " It is a condition 
(he says) in which the food, warmth, and clothing, which 
are necessary for the mere maintenance of the functions 
of the body in their normal state cannot be obtained ; in 
which men, women, and children, are forced to crowd 
into dens wherein decency is abolished and the most 
ordinary conditions of existence are impossible of attain- 
ment ; in which the pleasures within reach are reduced 
to bestiality and drunkenness ; in which the pains ac- 
cumulate at compound interest in the shape of starvation, 
1 Essays — "The Struggle for Existence." 



238 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

disease, stunted development and moral degradation ; in 
which the prospect of even steady and honest industry is 
a life of unsuccessful battling with hunger, rounded by a 
pauper's grave." 

Such is the picture which Huxley draws of some of 
the fruits of the free competitive system. Should you 
object that the colours are too dark for such countries as 
Australia and New Zealand, I would reply that, first, we 
are young as yet, and cannot gauge the trend of our 
development. Secondly, we have by no means accepted 
the principle of free competition ; the State has interfered 
and intends to interfere, to an extent far in excess of 
protection of person and property, and the safeguarding 
of contracts. Did the principle of unrestricted self- 
interest reign among us, our country would not be so 
happy even as it is. And we are bound to go forward 
still in our efforts to bring the total of our social resources 
to bear on the social weal. The dogmatism of the 
individualistic systems is breaking down. Ignorance, 
prejudice, and self-interest, are yielding to the sunny 
influences of the growing social consciousness. The 
dawn of the era of brotherhood is perceptibly brightening. 

VII. Transformation of the Struggle. 

Let us consider it settled, then, that the evolutionary 
process yields social phenomena just as naturally and 
spontaneously as it yields egoistic phenomena, only that 



MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 239 

the former are longer in reaching conscious maturity. 
The materialistic evolutionist may go so far as to grant 
this, and will yet deny that we are taken thereby out of 
the fated circle of the struggle for life. Let us now 
approach the subject from this point of view. 

In his famous Romanes Lecture^ Huxley broke new 
ground. He drew a line between the time before, and 
the time after, the appearance of conscious purpose in the 
world. He showed with his customary boldness and 
honesty, as also with his accustomed force, that among 
the civilised nations the struggle is being transformed. 
Instead of being a struggle for life, it is becoming a 
struggle for the means of enjoyment. Self-restraint is 
taking the place of self-assertion. And the common 
weal is being consciously adopted as an aim by an in- 
creasing number of individuals. Man is no longer 
wholly dependent upon his environment — he can largely 
create it for himself. He can bring into existence, with 
conscious purpose, conditions which modify indefinitely 
the old war of individualistic forces. 

Huxley uses as an illustration of his meaning, the 
artificial state of affairs established in the midst of the 
cosmic process when a man fences in and tills a plot of 
ground to make a garden for himself. Were the cosmic 
process to resume its sway, the garden would soon be 
overwhelmed. But the gardener defeats the tendencies 
of unconscious nature, and adjusts the conditions to the 
needs of the plants he desires to cultivate. Just such. 



240 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

mutatis mutandis^ is man's object in founding social in- 
stitutions. By their means he gets rid of the bare 
struggle for existence. Of course, as Huxley himself 
fully acknowledges, in the widest sense of the word, 
nature includes society, as it includes art. But he main- 
tains that a distinction is useful, if not necessary, since 
society differs from nature in having a definite moral 
object. Hence it comes to pass that^ " the course shaped 
by the ethical man — the member of society or citizen — 
necessarily runs counter to that which the non-ethical 
man — the primitive savage, or man as a mere member of 
the animal kingdom — tends to adopt. The latter fights 
out the struggle for existence to the bitter end, like any 
other animal ; the former devotes his best energies to the 
object of setting limits to the struggle." 

With the general drift of Huxley's argument I am in 
cordial sympathy, though I am not sure that he does not 
underrate the value and influence of the social element 
with which the cosmic process was from the beginning 
pregnant. Still there is no manner of doubt that the 
advent of conscious purpose marks a stage in the process 
the significance of which cannot be exaggerated. I myself 
would venture to put the matter thus. With the develop- 
ment of self-consciousness came the possibility of rendering 
explicit the social tendencies which before were implicit. 
Co-operation takes the place of competition. The number 
of those who seek to limit the struggle is ever growing. 
^ Essays — "The Struggle for Existence in Human Society." 



MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 241 

Even international warfare feels the influence of the new 

spirit, and is rapidly being rendered more humane. The 

social impulses and feelings are gaining the mastery, and, 

guided by reason, and inspired by spiritual ideals, are 

destined to usher in an era of universal brotherhood. 

That is my antidote to Karl Pearson's scientific history, 

written in terms of the struggle for food, of sex, and of 

geographical distribution. We can witness in history the 

evolution of a set of social forces which antagonises and 

suppresses the evolution of the struggle for food. This 

set of social forces is not less " natural " than the other ; 

but with the advent of conscious purpose it gains new 

powers. We can gain consolation, then, from the fact 

that human history reveals something more than the 

struggle for food. Man is steadily winning a victory 

over his environment, training his intellect, amassing 

knowledge and social tradition, developing a social 

consciousness, expanding his ideals. And the outcome 

is a diversion of energy from the struggle to survive to 

the effort to fit as many as possible to survive. Huxley ^ 

sees " no limit to the extent to which intelligence and 

will, guided by sound principles of investigation, and 

organised in common effort, may modify the conditions 

of existence." Karl Pearson cannot say that this is a 

barb tipped with theological jade. It comes home as 

the ripe opinion of a veteran scientist honoured of all 

men. 

^ Cf. Huxley's Romanes Lecture^ and the essay quoted above. 

16 



242 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

But someone may argue that if the struggle ceases, 
the chance of progress will also vanish along with it. I 
By no means. The attraction of the ideal takes its | 
place, and more than takes its place. Here again I have 
Huxley with me.-^ " It is extremely important (he says) 
to note that, the state of nature remaining the same, if 
the produce does not satisfy the gardener, it may be | 
made to approach his ideal more closely." Hence, 
" although the struggle for existence may be at an end, 
the possibility of progress remains." In other words — 
the gardener can be attracted by an ideal. The beautiful | 
can dominate him as well as the useful. And thus it 
comes that by conscious selection he evolves not only 
the cabbage from the wild kale, but the Viola Tricolor 
is nursed and guided into the velvety texture and vivid 
colouring of the pansy. The latter is a fact as much as 
the former. But it is not the outcome of the mechanical 
push from behind ; it comes into existence because it is 
an approach to the ideal of its humbler successor. It 
is a manifestation, not of the struggle for food, but of 
the spirit which strives towards it — the True, the Beautiful, 
the Good. II 

We need not, therefore, shrink from facing the facts 
of the struggle for food, nor from recognising the part 
it still plays, and yet has to play, in moulding history. 
For though its stern realities remain shrouded in much 
mystery, we can see that they are features in an upward 
^ Prolegomena to the Romanes Lecture. 



MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 243 

process from which they will be ultimately eliminated. 
But if we take food in its widest application, though the 
struggle may cease, the striving will abide. Did not old 
Homer sing that " men gape for God," like birdlings in 
the nest for food. This is not exactly what Karl Pearson 
meant. But we may mean it — remembering that man 
lives " not by bread alone, but by every word that pro- 
ceedeth out of the mouth of God." 



VIII. Kidd's View of Reason. 

At this stage of my argument, I have to deal with a 
view of the social function of reason wholly opposed to 
that which I have upheld. Kidd, in his well-known book 
on Social Evolution^ maintains that reason is anti-social 
and disintegrating in its agency, and needs the severe 
restraint of the religious instincts. 

The question turns on the relation of the individual 
to the community. Even Leslie Stephen, anxious as he 
is to establish an evolutionary ethics, cannot see his way 
clearly as regards this problem of harmonising the interests 
of the self and the not-self. In fact, he frankly gives it 
up. He is sure that the individual is moralised through 
his identification with the social organism, and that the 
security of morality depends upon the persistence of 
society. But he regards the attempt to estabHsh the 
complete coincidence between virtue and happiness — 
that is to say, between the individual and the general 



244 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

good — to be as hopeless as the attempt to square the 
circle, or to discover perpetual motion.^ 

Kidd has a still worse case to present. For he holds, 
not merely that we cannot prove a coincidence, but that 
the interests of the social organism and those of the 
individual are inherently and essentially irreconcilable.^ 
With such a theory as this on which to build, we cannot 
wonder that he emphasises " the far-reaching consequences 
which flow from the recognition of this simple fact," 
and its " revolutionary significance." How does he 
arrive at this truly " startling conclusion " ? He assumes 
that all rational acts have self-satisfaction as their object ; 
and he is so boldly consistent that he holds all disin- 
terested actions to be inherently irrational. In brief, 
the reason is set against the social impulses. Here is 
one of his own statements of his case.^ " On the one side 
(he says) we have the self-assertive reason of the individual 
necessarily tending to be ever more and more developed 
by the evolutionary forces at work. On the other, we 
have the immensely wider interests of the social organ- 
ism, and behind it those of the race in general, demanding, 
nevertheless, the most absolute subordination of this ever- 
increasing rational self-assertiveness in the individual." 

Such is Kidd's " startling conclusion." Are we really 
condemned to so hopeless a dualism — to so pessimistic 
a view of the function of reason ? Let me suggest to 

^ Scieiicc of Ethics^ p. 430. ^ Social Evolution^ p. 80. 

3 Op. cit., p. 83. 



MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 245 

you a few lines of thought which may lead to cheerier 
conclusions. And let us derive encouragement from 
such facts as these. The Homeric warrior was frankly 
a self-regarding personage. The naivete of some of his 
views is such as at times to give us a mild shock of 
dismay. Nevertheless, he was always ready to help a 
friend in danger. Why ? Partly from a social impulse 
— but partly also, if not chiefly, from a self-regarding 
motive — " If I do not help, 1 shall not be helped." In 
any case, there was not much reasoning power brought 
to bear upon his moral problems. The Greeks sub- 
sequently developed their reasoning powers to a dazzling 
degree. Aristotle represents that power at its critical 
perfection ; and yet he is the one who founds his political 
theories on the dictum that man is by nature a social 
being, and maintains that the full and harmonious 
development of human nature is possible only for the 
citizen of a well-organised State. These views were the 
outcome of rational researches into more than a hundred 
and fifty Greek constitutions, and into the social and 
political usages of many foreign tribes. Or think of 
that deeply social sentiment expressed in the line of 
Menander, " Life is not living for thyself alone." Or 
think of the teaching of the Stoics, who felt ^ that " the 
further man carries in himself the work of moral improve- 
ment, the stronger he will feel the impulse to society " — 
in spite of a strong bent to the assertion of individual 

^ See Zeller's Stoics^ p. 293. 



246 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

independence, in virtue of their attribution of absolute 
worth to rational thought and will. But just because 
this worth belonged only to rational thought and inten- 
tion, on that very account the individual is bound to 
recognise the community, and is required to " subordinate 
his own ends to the ends and needs of the community." 
They taught that " rational conduct and thought can 
only be said to exist when the conduct of the individual 
is in harmony with a general law ; and this is the same 
for all rational beings. All rational beings must therefore 
aim at the same end, and recognise themselves subject to 
the same law. All must feel themselves portions of one 
connected whole. Man must not live for himself, but 
for society. . . . The desire for society (they held) is 
immediately involved in reason. . . . Like (said they) | 
has an attraction for like ; and this holds good of | 
everything endowed with reason, since the rational soul | 
is in all cases identical." ^ 

All this, and much more that I could add, gives no 
suspicion of the inherent and essential disintegrating 
power of reason. Nay, the very philosophers who insisted 
most on the isolation of the individual, and the paramount 
claims of reason, are the very ones to emphasise the social 
bond, and to evolve a wonderfully deep concept of the 
solidarity of humanity. And so right down to the! 

^ See Seneca, Ep. 95, 52 : The whole world is a unit; "membra 
sumus corporis magni. Natura nos cognatos editit." Hence mutual] 
love, love of society, justice, and fairness. 



MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 247 

present day. An astonishingly small number of the 
best thinkers of the civilised races have definitely adopted 
any anti-social theory of society. And in such cases as 
do appear, the decision has rested more on tone of feel- 
ing than on use of reason. Rven evolutionists can be 
socialists ! 

Let us look at the matter from the evolutionary point 
of view. We find that in the development of the animal 
world, reason plays but a small part. Instinct and 
impulse, built up into cell structure, reign well-nigh 
supreme. As a consequence, the pace of progress has 
been painfully slow. Animals cannot forge much ahead 
of definite physiological change. But conscious reason, 
once developed, enables men to be largely independent 
of physiological change. The rifle renders the skilled 
hunter more than a match for the strength of the elephant 
or the speed of the antelope. The telegraph will carry a 
message further than the most stentorian voice. But 
what need of illustration ! The advantages gained by 
rational processes are too obvious at every turn. And 
the outcome is that the rate of progress is enormously 
increased. A human group can accomplish in a genera- 
tion changes of habit and of mode of life which the 
action of impulse and instinct would not accomplish in a 
thousand generations. Again, even the higher animals 
are dependent almost wholly on their environment. 
Whereas men, as Huxley showed, can modify and create 
their environment. Certain animals have the germs of 



248 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

this power ; but the degree to which man possesses it puts 
him into a world by himself. 

Kidd is right to this extent, that all possibilities of 
progress bring with them corresponding risks in their 
train — and the greater the possibilities the greater the 
risks. But this is a condition of all progress — moral 
progress included. Further, the rate of progress in 
forming instincts and impulses was slow, but it was sure. 
Hence we cannot afford lightly to ignore them or crush 
them down. And it is more especially wise to foster the 
social instincts and impulses, because, being the latest to 
be highly developed, they are the most easy to lose. 
They go to form that conservative element in our nature 
which is so necessary for the stability of society, and, 
therefore, also for the onward march of progress. But 
the conservative element can bulk too largely, as is 
proved by the " arrested development " of China. That 
the civilised nations have not suffered her fate has been 
due to the freer use of reason. And, speaking quite : 
generally, it is safe to say that the real danger lies in our 
lack of reason — in our superficiality — not in our having 
too much reason, or in our going too deeply and com- 
prehensively into our social problems. The more we 
know, the more rapid and solid our progress. And this 
is only natural — for I presume that Kidd himself would 
allow that the universe is ultimately founded on reason. 
Is not Huxley justified in the theory that the advent of 
conscious, rational purpose was the sign for the reversal 



MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 249 

of the selfish struggle to live. We are a long way from 
being socialised yet ; but one of the chief causes is that 
we are yet a long way from being rational. 

Add a consideration on which the Cairds, among others, 
have so often and so convincingly insisted. The intelli- 
gence of man is not wholly a disintegrating agent. It 
analyses, it criticises ; but it does not lose itself in a 
multiplicity of details : it gathers them into groups, 
classifies, seeks hidden bonds, and reduces its material to 
order. The sciences are the outcome of synthetic, as 
well as of analytic processes, and seek to establish unity 
in the study of nature and of human life. 

Add yet again a consideration to which I made allusion 
a while ago. No true social life is possible without the 
use of reason. Man cannot understand his fellow man 
until there is a common basis of intellectual life. Reason 
interprets and guides sympathy. The social impulses 
themselves have to be filled with intellectual content 
before there can be any genuine brotherhood. In this 
regard the Hegelian dialectic has its teaching for us. The 
ego and the alter ego are necessary to one another ; and it 
is only by self-conscious reason that their functions are 
apprehended and developed. 

As I warned you, I have but suggested lines of 
thought ; but I trust they may suffice to prove that 
Kidd's " startling conclusion " is much more startling 
than the facts of the case warrant. Reason in the service 
of enlightened self-interest may be deserving of his lash. 



250 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

But reason in the service of the promptings of social 
sympathy will increasingly modify and soften the struggle 
for existence, and will secure the triumph of the newer 
and nobler factors in the cosmic process. 



IX. Religion and the Social Factor. 

It will be well for us, then, to resist attempts to 
desocialise the reason. But I presume that many will 
still feel that Leslie Stephen's problem is unsolved. We 
still are left to ask whether it is possible to show the 
individual that his highest interest and that of the com- 
munity are identical — or whether we are to give up hope 
of a solution as we have given up hope of squaring the 
circle or discovering perpetual motion. It is allowed by 
all that these interests coincide on the average. But can 
they be shown to coincide completely and absolutely } 
There is the question on which, as 1 believe, the very 
existence of morality depends. 

Now I think it plain that, so far at any rate as Leslie 
Stephen is concerned, the despair of solution arises from 
undue limitation of the field of inquiry. If the life of 
the individual is to be compressed within the boundaries 
of natural birth and death, the " incompleteness," of which 
Haeckel spoke, spoils all rational discussion and argument 
on the problem. For example, if the individual argues 
that to incur the trouble and expense of a family is a 
thing to be avoided, because it interferes with the enjoy- 



MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 251 

ment of life which is otherwise possible, it is difficult 
to give him a valid reason for changing his mind, if at 
the same time you tell him that the present chance of 
enjoying himself is all that he will get. You may appeal 
to him on larger issues, but he will ask what such larger 
issues are to him so long as he can live his own life 
comfortably. Let the State take care of itself. So, too, 
with the shirking of public responsibilities by those who 
are fitted to undertake them. Why should they put 
themselves to inconvenience for the public good ? If this 
is their sole chance, it seems difficult to show them that 
their selfishness is wrong. The only practicable method 
is, as Maudsley said, for society to prune and trim the 
individual to its liking, and compel him to subserve its 
aims and ends. To this extent Kidd is justified — but 
only to this extent. Give reason insufficient premisses 
from which to argue, and it is no marvel if wrong con- 
clusions emerge. Bui nole, the reason is not to blame^ qua 
reason. 

If the social factor, therefore, is to be rationalised, we 
must search for some bond of union between the in- 
dividual and the race which shall link their mutual 
interests together beyond the limits of the individual life, 
and be independent of the changing natural order. In 
other words, the vinculum sociale — the social bond — must 
not be a mere passing accident, or meaningless, perishing 
phase of an unconscious process : it must be of the very 
essence of things, and belong to the world of realities. 



252 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

If we can find such a bond as this, the problem is 
solved. 

I am intensely anxious that social reformers and lovers 
of their kind should face the issues here raised. For our 
world-views are bound to influence our conduct. If we 
tell men that this life is all, then reason must set to work 
to make the best of it. But fortunately for progress and 
for the race, reason itself forces its way, following the 
lead of feeling, into wider and nobler conceptions of the 
meaning and value of existence. With Kidd, I believe 
that the reconciliation of the interests of the community 
and of the individual is found chiefly and permanently 
in religion. But I appeal to my religion, not, as Kidd 
does, because I mistrust my reason, but because my 
reason finds an adequate basis for my social creed in 
the doctrines of the Fatherhood of God and of man's 
spiritual sonship. 

I cannot rest content with trying to keep myself in a 
state of blind, instinctive faith. I would fain struggle on, 
even where I cannot now understand that my highest 
religious conceptions are in harmony with reason, just 
because in the Father of Spirits are hidden all the 
treasures of wisdom, as well as of love. My reason 
is confessedly faulty and finite ; but I cannot ignore 
or bury it under blind movements of my unconscious 
nature. So far as it takes me I am willing to go. 
Where it fails I will follow those feelings and impulses 
and instincts which it tells me are highest and best — 



MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 253 

and so I shall be rational in spirit even where syllogisms 
are impossible. 

The appeal lies to religion as a basis for social value 
judgments. Belief in a supreme Person, who is at once 
the Father and the moral Governor of the universe, lifts 
me out of my individualism, and allows free scope for 
developing my social impulses and feelings. For thereby 
I reach to the true inwardness of the social factor. 
Humanity is no longer a mechanical union of mutually 
repellent individuals, each striving to do his best for him- 
self. Individualistic, selfish, and artificial theories of the 
State are dissipated. Society becomes a morally ordered 
whole — a spiritual kingdom in which social progress is 
not only possible, but essentially natural. Give me this 
belief to build upon, and I shake off all the exaggerations 
of modern individualism — I can seize on the vital truth 
contained in the wiser social theories of ancient Greece, 
and can enrich them with all that the intervening centuries 
of Christianity have to teach of the dignity of personality, 
and of the glory of religious and political freedom. St 
Paul's words become luminous to me — " We are members 
one of another.*' 

But, further, if I am part of a spiritual whole, I can 
even subscribe to the doctrine of enlightened self-interest 
in the form given to it by Jesus Christ — " he that loseth 
his life shall save it." For in preserving and developing 
my higher self I am bound to live in the lives of others ; 
and in responding to the calls which society makes upon 



254 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

me, I am responding to a whole of which my ideal self 
forms an integral and permanent part. I can under- 
stand why egoism is self-destructive : it cuts itself off 
from the source of life. I can see that the question — Is 
life worth living ? — is wrongly put : it should take the 
form — How can I make my life worth living ? For if 
my life is continuous and bound up with the spiritual 
unity of humanity, I shall best advance my own welfare 
by advancing tha*" of the social organism to which I 
belong. But all the advantages of social action will 
accrue to me indirectly. As was evident in tracing the 
stages of socialisation, the highest happiness comes, not 
from calculated, self-centred action, but from the free 
surrender of love. Nay, until the heights of love are 
climbed, there is no real escape from that dark cloud 
which hangs over humanity — the cloud we know as " sin." 
For, in its essence, sin consists in separating oneself from 
the social whole, and acting as an independent and 
isolated centre. To this doctrine the Stoics would have 
subscribed on grounds of reason alone — much more 
clearly does its truth declare itself when we look at the 
matter in the light of love. When the individual will is 
in antagonism to the Universal Will — that is, the Father's 
Will — and so in antagonism to the social will, the clash 
and discord are inevitable. And thus the head and the 
heart alike bear witness to the spiritual, and therefore to 
the timeless, nature of the social factor. The individual 
losing his life in the lives of others and finding thereby 



I 



I 



MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 255 

his ideal and his eternal self — there is the law of true 
progress. And that is the law of the religion of Jesus 
Christ. Christianity provides for the perfecting of the 
individual character as part of a living process which 
involves the perfection of humanity as a whole — it de- 
velops on the stage of time a life that is to be eternal. 



SEFENTH LECTURE. 

WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 

Eyw 6tyu,i TO A KoX TO Q, XiycL Kvpto? 6 0eo9, 6 tjiv Kol o rjv Koi 
6 ipxof^^vo^. 

'^ I am the Alpha and the Omega, saith the Lord God, which is 
and which was and which is to come." — Rev. i. 8. 

1. The Question. 

The average civilised man has settled down to think and 
talk of progress as though the import of the word were 
generally understood and accepted. But if asked to 
define his meaning, he will either be reduced to silence, 
or his answer will be vague, and coloured by circumstance 
of nationality, rank, and disposition. This loose employ- 
ment of the term was prevalent before Darwinism had 
come on the scene ; but since men have begun to talk 
evolution, the case is much worse. For the doctrine of 
the upward development of forms of life has given a 
seemingly scientific warrant to what before was rather 
matter of instinctive faith or of humanitarian hope. And 
yet there are powerful thinkers who, in spite of all the 

race has accomplished, gravely doubt whether there really 

256 



WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS ? 257 

is any such thing as progress, and who are able to advance 
weighty reasons for their scepticism. It behoves all 
those who would have reasonably clear ideas on these 
problems to submit their social theories and pious hopes 
to a little healthy analysis and criticism. 

Of course no one is so foolish as to deny that the 
world changes. There is, for example, no doubt in any- 
one's mind that the last century was marked by a number 
of signal revolutions in matters scientific, social, and 
industrial. The differences arise when we come to 
interpret the meaning and bearing of phenomena. Various 
alternatives present themselve^2^'The changes may be 
rhythmical or recurrent ; developments and degenerations 
may succeed each other. Or a movement forward in one 

^ part of the universe may be accompanied by a backward 
movement in another, leaving the total condition un- 
altered. Or there may be progresses and regresses, with 
a forward movement on the whole. Various are the 
theories which have suggested themselves in different 
ages and in different civilisations. And we may safely 
prophesy that Herbert Spencer's cosmological speculations 
in his First Principles will be by no means the last of 
their kind. In any case, the exceeding smallness of the 

1 section of time open to our observation should make 
dogmatism impossible. The unknown is so indefinitely 
vaster than the known that it keeps us, or should keep 
us, humble and teachable. 

Limiting our attention to the human race, there are 

17 



^** 



258^1 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

many questions of intense interest which press for 
answers with growing insistence. Does happiness in- 
crease with civilisation ? Are we wise, or are we foolish, 
to indulge hopes of better times to come ? What is the 
social ideal at which we should aim ? These, and many- 
others of like purport, are being forced upon us by the 
social developments of our day. Our attitude towards 
them is of extreme practical importance. Supposing 
social progress to have a legitimate ideal and a rational 
aim, any mistakes of ours in regard to them are so much 
to the bad. If we are in earnest, we shall not dare to 
trust to the accidents of temperament or prejudice. We 
shall do our best to get at facts. And when we have 
found them, we shall not shut our eyes to them if they 
chance to be other than we expected. 



'■ ? II. The State of Nature. 

In the last lecture we glanced at the social theory of 
Hobbes, and saw that he regarded the primitive condition 
of man as one of universal war. The State was invented 
to make life more endurable. Thus, for Hobbes, the 
present was bad, but the past had been worse. 

So wonderful, however, is the range of human specula- 
tion that we find precisely the opposite view made into 
the basis for social reconstruction. Rousseau felt the 
present to be unendurable and looked back upon the past 
as the time when man was free and happy in a beautiful 



WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 259 

world. He regarded the whole process of civilisation as 
a falling away from "the state of nature.'* The only- 
hope lay in retracing the false steps which had brought 
man to so great misery. 

We cannot be astonished that Rousseau developed 
such a view when we remember the hideously artificial 
and wholly cruel form of civilisation which he saw around 
him. Well might he look back longingly to the 
simplicity of more primitive times ! Well might his 
arguments be red hot with emotion and enthusiasm, and 
the remedies he proposed be drastic ! Nor did his on- 
slaught fail of its effect withal. Maine testifies ^ that 
" the world has not seen more than once or twice in all 
the course of history a literature which has exercised such 
prodigious influence over the minds of men, over every 
cast and shade of intellect, as that which emanated from 
Rousseau between 1749 and 1762." 

Nor has the condemnation of modern society passed 
away with Rousseau's crusade. It reappears from time 
to time, enforced with much enthusiasm and commanding 
wide attention. There is, for example, a book with the 
title Civilisation^ its Cause and its Cure^ ^ which has 
reached its eighth, if not its ninth edition. Its author 
arraigns civilisation as leading to social disease and as 
breaking up the unity of man's nature. He would fan 
into flame the smouldering fire of dissatisfaction with 
modern conditions. He points out to us the road which 
^ Ancient Law, chap. iv. ^ gy Carpenter. See pp. 25 and 35. 



X 



26o THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

he believes will lead us " back to the lost Eden, or rather 
forward to the new Eden, of which the old was only 
a figure. Man has to undo his wrappings and his 
mummydom of centuries by which he has shut himself 
from the light of the sun." He has " to emerge from 
houses and all his other hiding-places wherein he has 
concealed himself. Nature must once again become his 
home, as it is the home of the animals and the angels." 

Such are the teachings which keep alive the underlying 
spirit of the legends of the Golden Age — the legends 
which recount the cycles of gradual but steady deteriora- 
tion — the legends which are so widely spread, and which 
on that account puzzle us all the more. Certain thinkers ^ 
are inclined to regard them as witnessing to a general 
consciousness of a lost condition of ease and contentment. 
We can agree as to the " consciousness," but we cannot 
allow historical truth to the legends themselves, any more 
than to Hobbes' conceptions of the primitive state of 
universal war. I believe them to have sprung from the 
natural tendency of old age to look back on the glowing 
days of youth with regret for vanished hopes and for 
abated vigour. We can trace the working of such 
feelings in ourselves, and we find them in concentrated 
form in the poets. It is thus that Wordsworth lamented 
the passing of the glory of outward nature^ — 

" I know, where'er I go, 
That there hath passed away a glory from the earth." 

^ Op. cit., p. lo. 2 Q^g 0^ Immortality. 



WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 261 

It is thus that Robert Louis Stevenson lamented the 
passing of the glory of youth that glowed in his soul ^ — 

" Sing me a song of a lad that is gone, 
Say, could that lad be I ? 
Merry of soul he sailed on a day 
Over the sea to Skye. 

Give me again all that was there. 

Give me the sun that shone ! 
Give me the eyes, give me the soul, 

Give me the lad that's gone ! " 

But however these things may be, we have surely all 
now learnt our lesson — we no longer expect that ^ 

'* Time will run back and fetch the age of gold." 

The Golden Age, if it is to be a reality for us, must (as 
St Simon said) lie before us, not behind us. I have 
sufficiently acknowledged the evils of modern civilisation. 
I rejoice in many of the reactions against them. I can 
enjoy Thoreau, appreciate a good deal of Tolstoi, and 
applaud the spirit of Wagner's proposed return to the 
" Simple Life." But I cannot admire the primitive 
savage. The more we know of " man in a state of 
nature," the more do we find that he was the slave of 
custom. Freedom is about the last thing he possesses. 
Every detail of his life is regulated by minute and arbitrary 
rules, the breach of which is an offence against religion, 
and punished accordingly by the severest penalties.^ 

^ Songs of Travel^ xlii. ^ Milton, Ode on Chrisfs Nativity. 

^ See Lubbock, Origin of Civilisation., pp. 448 ff. 



262 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

Just, however, as we found excuse for Hobbes because 
he invented history rather than ignored it, so may we 
find a similar excuse for Rousseau. He was not really 
building on the data of scientific anthropology — he was 
protesting against glaring abuses which actually flaunted 
themselves before his eyes. He was thinking rather of 
simplicity as opposed to a cruelly selfish artificiality. He 
advocated a more general equality of opportunity for all 
classes alike, both for pampered nobles and for squalid 
poor. From his conviction of the fairness of this, there 
flashed his brilliant denunciations of social vices and 
abuses, and the daring paradoxes in which he concentrated 
his wrath and pity. He insisted with amazing energy 
that civilisation increases misery and that our vaunted 
progress is retrogression. His mistake was that he 
dazzled himself and his contemporaries by crediting the 
state of nature with all the culture and refinement which 
centuries of civilisation had made possible. But however 
much his anthropology may be at fault, the moral of 
his tale is sound, and is as wholesome for our times as 
for his own. 

We can amend the imperfections of his theory by 
bringing them into connection with Aristotle's deeper 
doctrine. Man is by nature a social being. By nature^ 
mark. Nature must be taken in the widest sense if we 
are to arrive at sound social theory. It must include 
origin, process, and completed development. For the 
nature of a thing, in Aristotle's sense, is not seen until 



WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 263 

the development is complete. The germ of political 

capacity is there from the beginning. History describes 

its unfolding. Its full perfection is yet to come. The 

present may reveal a mass of corruption which may lead 

us to despair ; but the decay is such as will provide a 

soil for richer growth. Browning has given a grand 

exposition of this noble doctrine, and has set it in the 

light of modern knowledge. He represents Nature as 

full of quiet triumph — a triumph which can 

" Fill us with regard for man, 
With apprehension of his passing worth, 
Desire to work his proper nature out. 
For these things tend still upward ; progress is 
The law of life." 

III. Pessimism. 

If there is to be social salvation at all, we must look 
forward, not backward, for ideals and for inspiration. 
But, as I said, there are some who tell us that neither 
looking backward nor looking forward will avail. Exist- 
ence is radically bad, and our only hope is to face the 
inevitable with a Stoic fortitude. " Brief and powerless 
is man's life ; on him and on all his race the slow, sure 
doom falls, pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil, 
reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its 
relentless way." ' Such is the latest edition of pessimism. 
Schopenhauer definitely declared that the pains of life 
exceed the pleasures ; that increasing sensibility brings 

^ Ideals of Scie?tce and Faith, p. 169. 



264 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

with it increased suffering ; that desire itself is pain. 
Our truest wisdom, therefore, is to mortify the pride of 
life. Our highest bliss is to sink into the bosom of the 
unconscious. 

I would not have you imagine that the arguments on 
the side of pessimism are either few or lightly to be 
dismissed. When we begin to reflect on the amount of 
pain and suffering in the world, the sensitive spirit is 
almost appalled, and administers a crushing rebuke to 
the blind optimism of the contented conservative who 
glibly talks about this being " the best of all possible 
worlds," and glorifies the gospel of laissez faire. A 
Christian can never acquiesce in so comfortable, but so 
blind and so selfish a view of life. He will remember 
St Paul's words that the whole creation groans and 
travails together in pain. He will remember St Paul's 
own personal " Iliad of woes." He will remember above 
all that the Divine Captain of his salvation was a man of 
sorrows and acquainted with grief, who, when burdened 
with the thought of the sin and sorrow of the world, was 
in an agony, and His sweat was as it were great drops of 
blood falling to the ground. No, a Christian who has 
in any degree absorbed the spirit of his religion, cannot 
possibly be an easy-going optimist. At the heart of 
human history there throbs the supreme tragedy. 

With full determination, then, to keep our hand firmly 
on the pulse of real life, let us review the pessimistic 
position, and see whether light does not break through 



WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 265 

the cloud full and bright enough to make us share 
Browning's conviction that 

" God's in His heaven, 
All's right with the world." 

The chief contention of the pessimist is that the balance 
of pain in human life preponderates over that of pleasure. 
It is obviously impossible to refute such a statement by- 
logic, or even by statistics. For pleasure and pain are 
not objective quantities which can be measured — they are 
subjective phenomena — they are dependent on individual 
temperament, and even on momentary mood. We are 
thus compelled to forsake the direct discussion of the 
question. But the indirect methods of discussion will 
furnish sufficiently tangible results. 

Take one of the main positions of the pessimist of the 
Schopenhauer type — that desire itself is pain, and that to 
increase desire is to increase pain. From this it follows 
that pleasure itself is an evil, for pleasure kindles desire. 
Now is it true that desire is always painful ^ If a ship- 
wrecked crew which has taken to the boats is consumed 
with a desire for food or water, the pain will reach a 
terrible intensity. But if a healthy man comes in from 
an invigorating walk, the feeling of hunger or thirst may 
be distinctly pleasant in itself, and serve as a zest to 
the food which satisfies the desire. And so with all our 
desires and appetites, when not too violent. We may 
safely generalise and maintain that there is a definite 
pleasure attached to the healthy functioning of any part 



266 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

of our nature, physical, mental, or spiritual. So certain 

is this conclusion that Guyau, the French moralist, whom 

I have previously cited, has founded his whole system of 

morals upon it. He holds that the pleasure of action 

/ lies at the very root of life. And he points out that 

many people will even prefer the chance, or even the 

actual suffering, of pain to continued inaction. The 

pleasure of expending energy conquers the shrinking 

from what is undoubtedly an evil. And this argument 

applies, as I said, to mental and spiritual experiences, as 

well as to physical. So that Tennyson could acknowledge 

in the deepest depth of his sorrow — 

" 'Tis better to have loved and lost, 
Than never to have loved at all." 

Follow up this line of argument into the sphere of 
evolution. The very fact that life persists and develops 
is proof that, on the whole, it must be worth living. 
Were the pains in excess, the process would cease. 
Natural selection secures the result that those who 
survive, even though they are not optimists, must still 
have sufficient interest to make them struggle to live. 
And since increasing life means corresponding increase 
of life-preserving activities, it follows that the same causes 
which make life possible also make it enjoyable. Hence 
there is much to be said for the view that pessimists are 
often men of ill-balanced constitutions who incline to 
colour the whole of existence with the sombre hues of 
their subjective experiences. At any rate it is safe to 



WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 267 

conclude with Ritchie ^ that " pessimism, genuine and 
earnest pessimism, can never be the living creed of any 
large portion of the race," for " sincere and convinced 
pessimists would kill themselves or cease to continue 
their accursed race." 

If the pessimist takes his stand upon another set of 
phenomena in human life — remorselessly laying bare the 
sordid, selfish features, we have sadly to acknowledge 
the strength of his case. Hobbes' picture of man as a 
wolf to his fellow man is in many respects a true 
transcript from nature. A British firm will sacrifice the 
lives of soldiers who are risking their lives for the 
stability of British commerce, by knowingly supplying 
them with weapons which will fail in the hour of need. 
And the general level of trade morality may be so low 
as to make it impossible to punish those who have used 
such dastardly means to satisfy their greed. For the 
animals men often make the world a hell, not merely by 
cruelties which arise from sheer brutality or ignorance, 
but by scientifically calculated torture applied in large 
and specially endowed institutions in the chief centres of 
civilisation. Hecatombs of human lives may be offered up 
on the ever-smoking altar of human lust and mammon- 
worship. To all this, and to an endless series of like 
indictments, we have to listen with bowed heads and 
saddened hearts. Verily the pessimist has much to urge ! 

Nevertheless, we must not allow ourselves to be 
^ ^itchie^s Philosophical Studies^ p. 226. 



268 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

beguiled into taking a distorted view of human life and 
character. Man is not an angel — but neither is he a 
devil. Who shall estimate the amount of simple good- 
ness of heart, of kindly feeling, of sterling honesty, that 
go to the living of an average human life ? The social 
instinct and feelings, as I have shown, are no less natural 
than the selfish, and are gaining increased rationality. 
There is an abundance of healthy sentiment, of love of 
home and family, of generous goodwill, of rugged worth 
half shy of allowing itself to be seen, of the spirit of 
mutual helpfulness. The poor are proverbially kind to 
one another — and the poor are many in number ! The 
spirit of comradeship can work marvels even among the 
least promising of the race. Further, consider how little 
chance the race has yet had of developing its higher 
possibilities — how inadequate are our methods of education 
— how unwholesome to the whole man the environment 
of vast multitudes of those who compose the bulk of 
our civilised communities. Whatsoever a man sows that 
shall he also reap. A very large number of our miseries 
and shortcomings are remediable. Let us remedy them 
before we feel we have earned the right to judge. I 
have myself worked for seven years in a slum of the 
slums, and I can affirm with Wordsworth, that while 

" I've heard of hearts unkind, kind deed 
With coldness still returning ; 
Alas ! the gratitude of men 

Has oftener left me mourning." 



WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 269 

The mention of the slums brings me to another point. 
One of the most dangerous features in life under slum 
conditions is that the dwellers therein tend to be satisfied 
with that which is, and even to love to have it so. The 
attraction of the ideal almost ceases to be felt. There is 
apathy — there is resentment against any effort from with- 
out to purify or uplift. How infinitely sad if a whole 
people should sink into this condition of passive acceptance 
of the actual ! The sting of divine discontent is the very 
salt of life. Unsatisfied desires, instead of being the 
source of our misery, are the spur to progress and to 
higher development. 

And, lastly, under the head of those arguments against 
pessimism, if the pessimist insists that unhappiness tends 
to increase as civilisation progresses, I think we may fairly 
ask him whether he is not largely confusing cause and 
effect. Our knowledge of suffering is increasing, as also 
our power of sympathising with it. May not such 
increase of knowledge and sympathy produce in our 
minds an exaggerated estimate of the increase of the 
exciting causes ? I deem this to be more than probable. 
And again, granting that there is some ground for the 
view that the finer the nervous susceptibility, the greater 
the capacity for pain, there is still no case for pessimism 
until it is shown that the pains increase more rapidly than 
the pleasures. Can this be proved ? I trow not. Look 
around. Never before in the world's history has life been 
so full of interest for the normal man. Never have so 



270 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

many experiments been open to him for expanding and 
enriching his nature. On every hand the mental vision 
ranges over prospects fresh and fair. Problems of intense 
interest afford exhilarating exercise for the intellectual 
vigour which shows no signs of flagging. New modes of 
feeling and emotion are being evolved. And the social 
ideals which will allow of ever greater numbers rising 
from the level of mere living to that of living well — these 
ideals are seizing on the hearts and imaginations of restless 
and aspiring multitudes, and bid fair to make the world 
a happier and a nobler home for man. Doubtless 
Schopenhauer would warn us that this is all so much to 
the bad. We lay on him and his disciples the burden of 
the proof. 

IV. Optimism. 

I spoke a while back of the dangers of a facile optimism. 
Now that we have repudiated the teachings of a morbid 
and faithless pessimism, we are in a position to enforce 
this earlier theme. I alluded then to the thoughtless, 
heartless optimism of the laissez faire type. I dealt, by 
anticipation, with the optimism (more excusable, but not 
less dangerous) of the sentimental and unreasoning type, 
when I defended the ideal against the charge of being 
visionary and unpractical. For both types I would urge 
the thought that the problems of life are stern and are by 
no means easy of solution. It is dangerous to shut one's 
eyes to facts ; it is dangerous also to indulge in rash 



WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 271 

inductions and humanitarian dreams. We must cherish 
an optimism that shall be hopeful, elastic, and resource- 
ful ; but let us see to it that it be sane withal. The out- 
come of social movements is often startlingly different 
from that anticipated. Let us look before we leap — but 
not look so long as to be paralysed. 

In this regard I am thoroughly at one with Karl 
Pearson when he insists ^ that " really to change human 
nature requires long generations of educational labour. 
y Human progress, like Nature, never leaps ; this is the 
most certain of all laws deduced from the study of human 
development. If this be formulated in the somewhat 
obscure phrase : ' Social growth takes place by evolution, 
not by revolution,' the man of the market-place declares 
in one breath that his revolution is an evolution, and in 
the next either sings some glorious chant, a blind appeal 
to force, or informs you that he can shoulder a rifle, and 
could render our present society impossible by the use 
of dynamite, with the properties of which he is well 
acquainted. Poor fellow ! would he were as well 
acquainted with the properties of human nature ! " 
With the general tenor of these remarks I am, I repeat, 
quite in accord. Education is of paramount necessity. 
But I should differ from Karl Pearson rather seriously 
as to the kind of education required. He lays almost 
exclusive stress on appeals to the reason, as opposed to 
appeals to the emotions. But if anything I have urged 

1 Ethic of Freethought^ p. no. 



272 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

in my first two lectures, as to the relation of feeling to 
reason, be sound, I insist that an education of the feelings 
is of equal, if not greater, importance. As Karl Pearson 
is especially hard on Christian theologians, let me bring 
Guyau to my aid. He will be free from suspicion on 
this score of theology. Could anything be stronger than 
this ? Speaking of instruction in aesthetics, he explains ^ 
that the ancients saw in the poet an almost divine being, 
because the poet is he who best perceives the relation 
of form to emotion and thought. He enlarges thus : 
" The moral, thinking, and feeling being has yet to be 
created in the child ; and just as we do not profess to 
leave the child to discover the fundamental laws of 
science (assuming him capable of such discovery), so we 
ought not to expect him unaided to attain to all the most 
elevated sentiments ; he must be brought to such a level 
little by little ; he must be taught not only the discoveries 
and acquisitions, but also the ideal aspirations of the 
human mind, from which, in fact, all science springs." 
And speaking of the function of the ideal, he declares 
with warmth^ that "the power of the ideal to realise 
itself will become greater in proportion as the ideal is 
placed higher in the society of the future." He warns 
us against always teaching the ufi/iiy of the good while 
forgetting its " beauty^ which causes what is good 

1 Guyau, Education and Heredity^ trans, in Contemp, Science 
Series, p. 207. 

2 Op, cit., p. 183. 



WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 273 

spontaneously to afford immediate enjoyment." And 

even of religious instruction as given in France he tells 

us that " anti-religious fanaticism offers grave dangers, 

just as religious fanaticism does," and that it is the duty 

of the State to preserve the children from both alike. 

I would ask Karl Pearson to perpend these weighty 

opinions of a brother agnostic. For myself, I declare 

my intense conviction that a sane and practical optimism 

must establish itself on educated feeling as well as on 

educated reason. We have seen that science, by itself, 

leads us to fatalism and despair ; for it is bound to stop 

short at unconscious mechanism. We have seen that 

reason without emotion is like an engine without steam. 

Does it not follow that the emotion must be sound, as 

well as the reasoning ? And if we stunt emotion we 

shall stunt humanity. The kind of human being 

prophesised quite solemnly and in the name of science, 

in a leading review,^ is a toothless, bald, toeless creature 

with flaccid muscles and limbs almost incapable of 

locomotion. This is the style of prophecy propounded 

by those who have cultivated reason without at the same 

time cultivating a saving sense of the ludicrous, not to 

speak of the ideal of the beautiful. And we are urged 

to throw ourselves into the arms of a hard rationalism, 

which inspires with the hope of our becoming creatures 

such as that above pictured, in a world where omnipotent 

matter rolls on its remorseless way, and crushes us in 

^ Nineteenth Century^ May 1883, quoted by Carpenter. 

18 



274 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

the end (flaccid muscles and all) in the immense ruin 
of the solar system. Let us cherish no illusions, then ; 
science by itself is not a basis for optimism. It can never 
reveal meanings — it can never supply the soul to progress. 
Rather is its motto that which befits the dungeon of 
fatalistic facts — 

" All hope abandon, ye who enter here." 

Pray do not misunderstand me ! I am an ardent lover 
of science. I regard it as one of the factors essential to 
progress. It reveals to us the world of facts, and 
furnishes material for ever higher expressions of man's 
nature. But it cannot stand alone — to make an exclusive 
claim on its behalf is to extinguish its very possibility. 
I cannot even use my reason unless I go beyond my 
reason, and trust to my whole nature. I must desire — 
in the greatest issues of life, I must love — that which I 
am to strive for and attain. 

Thus it is that true optimism lies enshrined in the 
ideal — an ideal which is not rational only, but aesthetic 
and moral. The cosmic process must be recognised as 
the gradual realisation of perfect truth, combined with 
perfect beauty and with perfect good. Goethe goes to 
the root of the matter ^ — 

" As all Nature's myriad changes 

still one changeless Power proclaim, 
So through thought's wide kingdom ranges 
one vast meaning, e'er the same. 

^ Carlyle's translation. 



WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 275 

This is Truth — eternal Reason — 

that in Beauty takes its dress, 
And serene thro' time and season, 

stands complete in Righteousness." 



V. Progress and Happiness. 

What, then, is progress ? Let us come to closer 
quarters with our question. What is the aim and out- 
come of the process of organic evolution ? Is it happiness ? 
The pessimist denies this absolutely. Others, without 
subscribing to pessimism, doubt whether happiness 
increases with civilisation. Others, again, maintain that 
happiness should at any rate be the goal at which we aim, 
and adopt as their motto for progress the well-worn 
formula — the greatest happiness of the greatest number. 

In criticising Kant's conception of duty, I took occasion 
to give desire for happiness a place in the complex unity 
of the moral judgment. But I argued that it constituted 
a part only of a greater whole, and that in an act of 
moral choice the " total man " is concerned — feeling, will, 
and reason. We may preserve ourselves from much 
wearisome controversy here by applying this conclusion 
to the wider problem. To posit happiness as the aim 
of progress is to put the part for the whole. There can 
be little, if any, doubt that all organisms, from the lowest 
to the highest, seek to avoid pain and to gain pleasure. 
And that on the whole they succeed in their efforts is 
proved by the fact that life persists and develops. This 



276 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

was one of our main arguments against pessimism. But 
to allow this is a totally different thing from allowing 
that pleasure is the sole, or even the most direct, aim in 
the process onward and upward through the stages of 
development. Underlying it, as I have so often insisted, 
is the will to live. The self-determining centre declares 
itself, and strives to expand by using, and even opposing, 
its environment. Regarded in this light, pleasure is seen 
to be normally a secondary product of certain of the life- 
seeking actions. It accompanies, rather than causes, them. 
In other words, it is only under exceptional, and some- 
what artificial, circumstances that pleasure is the object 
directly sought. Impulses and cravings precede the 
experience of pleasure, much more the consciously ap- 
prehended idea of pleasure. Or yet again (for the point 
is a crucial one), in the normal development of an 
organism, pleasure is a sign^ rather than an aim — a sign 
that an aim has been reached, namely, that some function 
has been exercised in a healthy way. 

Long ago the Greeks thought all this out for us. It 
seems a pity we should have to go over the ground so 
often. More especially would Plato and Aristotle have 
condemned the too prevalent modern theory that progress 
means increased material comfort. We are, of course, 
bound to make the material side of life harmonise with 
our ideal of life as a whole ; the Greeks were unique in 
their grasp of this idea, and in the extent to which they 
gave it effect. But Aristotle scorned the thought of 



WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 277 

seeking money as a means to bodily pleasure, or of 
making the accumulation of money an end in itself. 
Wealth and material comforts were to be a means to an 
end — they were to be used, not for living merely, but for 
living nobly and well. Aristotle would have condemned 
our modern State in two respects. The multitudes of 
those who, calling themselves free citizens, live their lives 
under conditions of filth, and squalor, and want, would 
have appalled him. He desired a sufficiency of wealth for 
all. He would have no extremes. He suggested that, 
even under the simpler economic conditions of the old 
world, accumulation should be limited. Our modern 
worship of money would have struck him as unutterably 
vulgar. Such was the teaching of enlightened Greeks 
before Christianity was heard of. We have nearly two 
thousand years of Christianity behind us — and where 
are we ! 

Still, while emphasising with all the force of which we 
are capable the necessity for improving the material 
conditions of the toilers and the poor, we must not lose 
sight of Aristotle's teaching that these material conditions 
are a means and not an end. Sensuous enjoyment must 
never be pursued at the expense of character. It panders 
to the animal in us ; it degrades our true humanity. 
When Mephistopheles would destroy Faust, he plied him 
with satisfaction for his senses. And Faust was saved 
just because there was something in him which rebelled 
against a life of sensuous pleasure. 



278 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

Hear Spinoza, also, searching for the " good " of life ^ : 
" The ordinary surroundings of life which are esteemed by 
men (as their actions testify) to be the highest good, may 
be classed under the three heads — Riches, Fame, and the 
Pleasures of Sense : with these three the mind is so 
absorbed that it has little power to reflect on any diflrerent 
good. By sensual pleasure the mind is enthralled to the 
extent of quiescence, as if the supreme good were actually 
attained, so that it is quite incapable of thinking of any 
other object." Having arrived at the conclusion that 
external, material goods were not, as he originally 
believed, certain, but rather very uncertain goods, he 
reflects that "all the objects pursued by the multitude 
not only bring no remedy that tends to preserve our 
being, but even act as hindrances, causing the death not 
seldom of those who possess them, and always of those 
who are possessed by them." 

True optimism, then, will not regard the universe as 
a large machine for manufacturing happiness — least of all, 
material happiness. Pleasure is not the aim or the goal, 
but a useful means for measuring our success ^ in attain- 
ing to the true end, namely, self-development. 

But we may go further than this. The Greeks them- 
selves saw that unbroken happiness is not good for us. 
They would have concurred from the Greek standpoint 

1 Tractatus de Litellectus Emefidafione — opening paragraphs. 
^ Cf. Clifford, Lectures and Essays (Eversley edition), vol. ii. 
p. 158. 



WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 279 

with the Hebrew expression of the same experience — 
" Before I was troubled, I went wrong, but now have I 
kept Thy word." Continued material prosperity tends 
to a certain hardness of character, a lack of sympathy, an 
undue sense of self-satisfaction. In short, unbroken 
happiness creates a certain attitude of mind which may 
be described as unsocial. The Greeks called it vppL<s — 
wantonness, or insolence. They were afraid of it, deem- 
ing it likely to call down the jealous wrath of the gods. I 
need not tell you how Christianity has spiritualised the 
conception, and softened human suffering by shedding 
on it the light of chastening love. 

/ But thus to argue that suffering has its uses, Is not to 
argue that it is a good thing in itself.^ Much of it comes 
from ignorance. Sometimes it waxes so intense or over- 
whelming that it hardens or crushes. In any case it 
stands condemned as an imperfection, or disorder, in 
the universe. The ideal judges it, however much it may 
seem to have purpose here and now. The spiritual 
element in man refuses to acquiesce in its permanence — 
revolts against it — demands its abolition. As Comte has 
taught,^ we are travelling by a long and stormy road — 
not of untroubled and peaceful growth, but of conflict, 
division, pain. As a recompense, however, he held out 
the hope of the reconciliation of the individual and 

1 Spinoza is most suggestive here. See Ethics^ iii. 11, and Schol. 
iv. 64, Dem. 

2 See E. Caird's Social Philosophy of Comfe^ passim. 



28o THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

society, of humanity and the world. The aim of pro- 
gress I defined as self-realisation. My lecture on the 
social factor will interpret this statement. If man is by 
nature a social being — if the "self" cannot develop in 
isolation but only as an integral part of a social whole — 
then it follows that to aim at self-realisation is to aim at 
nothing short of a perfect humanity. Here is the true 
inwardness of Comte's social theory. And is it not still 
more the inwardness of Christianity ? " Now ye are the 
body of Christ," says St Paul, "and severally members 
thereof." That is to say. Christians know themselves to 
have risen yet another step in the grades of approach 
to the perfection of God's Nature, in that they are 
members of that portion of humanity which has con- 
sciously realised its spiritual nature, its kinship to the 
Divine. 

VI. Slow Rate of Progress. 

Here we touch on what is, to me, one of the greatest 
of mysteries — the slow pace of development. Think of 
the untold ages which have elapsed since life appeared 
upon the planet. Think even of the lapse of time since 
man appeared — and yet his date is but of yesterday as 
compared with the epochs which preceded him. We 
can trace him back into the latest of the Inter-glacial 
periods, and who shall yet say how many thousand years 
that means ? Or who shall yet say how many thousand 
years behind that again we should have to go back to 



WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 281 

reach his cradle ? But these and similar questions of 
intensest interest I am compelled to leave aside. I want 
to consider man as we know him now, and to gauge his 
future rather than meditate upon his past. 

Coming, then, to things as they now are, we realise 
that the pace of progress is manifesting an ever-accelerat- 
ing speed. Last century was phenomenal. The whole 
of civilised Australasia grew up within its limits. It 
witnessed enormous strides in the knowledge of nature's 
laws and forces, and strides no less enormous in the 
practical application of that knowledge. With these 
phases of progress we are all sufficiently well acquainted. 
But knowledge of nature and its practical applications 
touch the surface only of our lives. I have quoted to 
you MilFs doubt as to whether the lot of any human 
being has been as yet thereby relieved. Let us, how- 
ever, put a yet more fundamental question. How about 
the development of the social organism itself} Here we 
have a different tale to tell. Here we have to confess 
that the pace is still slow — painfully creeping. This 
backwardness in social evolution was keenly appreciated 
by Haeckel.^ He quotes, to endorse them, the words 
of Alfred Russell Wallace, how that, " as compared with 
our astounding progress in physical science and its 
practical applications, our system of government, of ad- 
ministrative justice and of national education, and our 
entire social and moral organisation, remain in a state of 

^ Riddle of i lie Universe^ p. 6. 



282 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

barbarism." There are few students of social questions 
who will not agree with Haeckel and Wallace in this 
indictment. 

What are the causes of this lagging ? Many and 
various. Most of them spring from the anti-social 
instincts and impulses which I have already considered 
at sufficient length. There is, however, one factor of 
supreme importance which has not yet been touched 
upon — I refer to the growing complexity of human 
society. With growth in complexity there goes along 
increasing difficulty of modification and reform — increasing 
risk of damaging the social organism by interfering with 
its more vital functions. 

When we think of this increasing complexity, we are 
inevitably reminded of Herbert Spencer's definition of 
the evolutionary process. Starting with the assumption 
that the universe is the scene of an unceasing redistribu- 
tion of matter and motion, he defines^ as follows : — 
" Evolution is an integration of matter and consequent 
dissipation of motion, during which the matter passes 
from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, 
coherent heterogeneity, and during which the retained 
motion undergoes a parallel transformation." Such is 
the famous formula, for the ponderosity of which 
Spencer has been severely blamed by some, while others 
have congratulated the universe on delivering itself of 
such a mighty utterance ! Spencer has as warmly de- 

^ jFirs^ Principles y p. 396. 



WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 283 

fended it, urging the necessity for technical terms 
when dealing with statements of such abstract gener- 
ality. Personally, I should not complain were it not 
that the pronouncing or penning of such ponderosities 
is apt to fill one with a proud, but quite mistaken, sense 
of knowing all about it. When we come to analyse 
homogeneity and heterogeneity, and recognise that neither 
could the homogeneous ever become the heterogeneous, 
nor the heterogeneous the homogeneous, we begin to feel 
doubtful. Unless the whole heterogeneity were potential 
in the universe from the beginning, it could never have 
come about. That is to say, the heterogeneity was always 
there, though taking different forms. That is to say, 
there never was any homogeneity. But enough of this 
criticism ; it was not for such reasons that I quoted the 
formula. It was because of its giving expression to an 
undoubted truth concerning that part of the universe, 
or of existence, which is at present taking the form of 
human society. Civilised communities are becoming 
every whit as complex as the most differentiated of the 
typical physical organisms. So many and so intricate are 
the balancings among the parts, that even smaller dis- 
turbances will often produce unexpectedly serious results. 
The task of moulding and modifying social tissue thus 
demands extreme care and patience if more good than 
harm is to come of our experiments. I have already 
insisted on this aspect of the problem when dealing with 
the necessity for sound education. If we cut too deeply 



284 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

or too rapidly, the healing processes may not be able to 
cope with the mischief wrought. A study of the French 
Revolution will furnish superabundant evidence of the 
difficulties and dangers arising from hasty attempts to 
treat the complex as though it were simple. There is a 
clear call, therefore, to all social reformers to study widely 
and deeply the conditions under which they are working. 
Serious operations and amputations are often of service in 
their way. But it is not good even for the most robust 
constitution to indulge in them too frequently. Our 
supreme aim must be to cast out of the social organism 
all unsocial elements which tend to set up local suppura- 
tions. Let the average citizen be thoroughly socialised 
— all else will follow in due course. The soul will 
speedily evolve a body through which to find its fitting 
expression. 

Used in this fashion, and on these lines, the application 
of biological analogies to social evolution is most valuable. 
But I have shown that we must be on our guard not to 
be overawed by evolutionary formulae and by metaphors 
from organic structure. I should be the last to question 
the statement that in many of its aspects society is an 
organism. But I refuse to push the parallel too far. We 
saw that two factors remain altogether outside all bio- 
logical conceptions and methods — consciousness, and the 
moral " ought " set over against the " is " of the actual. 
Each of these factors, as we have seen, presents features 
which differ by whole spheres of being from those in- 



WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 285 

vestigated In biology. As far as organic phenomena 
transcend physical, so far, if not farther, do social 
phenomena transcend organic. As the possibilities of life 
could never be gauged from a study of the mechanical, so 
the possibilities of social life can never be gauged by the 
study of biology. Progress has been slow in the past. 
But who shall venture to prophesy of the future ? 

There are many who cannot be induced to look beyond 
their own little world. What human nature is in their 
experience, that it will always be. They wag their heads 
wisely, and talk of the leopard changing his spots. The 
industrial type of social organisation is for them the only 
possible type ; and if you venture to suggest that there 
might be a better, they set you down as a dangerous 
revolutionary. Such people have either never read 
history, or else they are devoid of historical imagination. 
Let me therefore bring them down to consider certain 
actually existing types of social development. The 
people I shall introduce to their notice are contemporaries 
of theirs — belong to the same race of beings as themselves, 
and yet look at life in a very different way. I shall con- 
fine myself to four such types, as sufficient for my 
purpose. I trust they will impress the imagination even 
of the most matter-of-fact representative of modern 
commercialism. I trust they will prove to you that 
human nature is enormously elastic, and that there may 
yet come astounding changes in the ideals which make 
life worth living. 



286 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

VII. Dyak — Arab — Hindoo — Albanian. 

Let us travel first to Borneo, and visit the tribes of the 
head-hunters. I was particularly struck by a canoe of 
theirs which I saw in your Museum on the occasion of 
my first visit to your city.^ The tribes of the Dyaks still 
persist in the barbarous practice of killing, simply to 
secure the heads of their victims. To secure heads is 
part and parcel of their life ideal. A recent explorer^ 
tells us it is " the keystone in the edifice of Dyak religion 
and character.*' He surmises that the continuance of 
this practice is leading to the rapid extinction of the race, 
and that it is possible the people will have improved 
themselves off the face of the earth before the custom can 
be entirely abolished. " Births and namings, marriages 
and burials, not to mention less important events, cannot 
be properly celebrated unless the heads of a few enemies, 
more or less, have been secured to grace the festivities or 
solemnities." 

Here is an account of an interview which the same 
explorer had with a famous, or infamous, chief of the 
cannibal Dyaks.^ " He came into my house one day, 
accompanied by his suite of two women and three men, 
and I hardly know whether host or visitor felt the more 
uncomfortable. His personal appearance bore out the 

^ Melbourne. 

2 Bock, The Head Hunters of Borneo^ pp. 215, 216. 

3 Qp^ ^//_^ pp^ 1^4^ j^^^ 



WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 287 

Idea I had formed of him by the reports. I had heard of 
his ferocity and of the depravity of his nature ; but I was 
hardly prepared to see such an utter incarnation of all 
that is most repulsive and horrible in the human form." 
After giving a detailed description of the man, sufficiently 
ghastly, the author continues : "At that very time, as 
he sat conversing with me through my interpreter, and I 
sketched his portrait, he had fresh upon his head the 
blood of no less than seventy victims, men, women, and 
children, whom he and his followers had just slaughtered, 
and whose hands and brains he had eaten." 

I must crave your forgiveness for bringing before 
you horrors such as these. But we are facing facts. 
Here are fellow-beings of the hard-headed commercial 
man — of the laissez faire capitalist or cultured dilettante 
— actually now walking on this same globe. It is not 
such a very great time ago since our own ancestors were 
unpleasantly like them. And it is interesting to know 
that the Dyaks defend their own practice of head-hunt- 
ing by arguing that white men kill in war far greater 
numbers than are ever killed in Borneo ! Of course 
such observations as these must be treated with the 
contempt they deserve. 

Let us away to a race in marked contrast to this — let 
us visit the unchanging Arab wandering over his unchang- 
ing deserts. In order that I may not impose upon you 
creations of my own imagination, I will take as my guide 
a man whose special knowledge is recognised by general 



288 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

consent. He tells us ^ that the Arab " is not in the least 

like an Englishman. His mind travels by entirely 

different routes from ours, and his body is built up of 

much more inflammable materials. His free desert air 

makes him impatient of control in a degree which we 

can scarcely understand in an organised community. It 

is difficult now to conceive a nation without cabinets and 

secretaries of state and policemen, yet to the Arab these 

things were not only unknown but inconceivable. He 

lives the free, aimless life of a child." 

The same authority remarks that " Arab poetry is a 

sealed book to most, even among special Orientalists ; 

they construe it, but it does not move them." But he 

tells us that Browning has got to the heart of it, and 

done it triumphantly in his " Saul," as Semitic a poem as 

ever came from the desert itself. We see, he says, the 

whole life and character of the Bedawy in these lines : — 

" Oh, our manhood's prime vigour ! No spirit feels waste, 
Not a muscle is stopped in its playing, nor sinew unbraced. 
Oh, the wild joys of living ! the leaping from rock unto rock. 
The strong rending of boughs from the fir-tree, the cool silver shock 
Of the plunge in the pool's living water, the hunt of the bear. 
And the sultriness showing the lion is couched in his lair. 
And the meal, the rich dates yellowed over with gold dust divine. 
And the locust flesh steeped in the pitcher, the deep draught of wine. 
And the sleep in the dried river-channel, where bulrushes tell 
That the water was wont to go warbling so softly and well 
How good is man's life, the mere living ! how fit to employ 
All the heart and the soul and the senses for ever in joy ! " 

^ Lane Pool, Speeches and Table-Talk of Mohammad, Introduction, 
passim. 



WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 289 

We are a long way from commercialism here ! And 
let us remember that the chivalry of Western Europe is 
forced to own an Arabian origin. Chivalry and trade 
seem to drift apart — witness the bayonets I mentioned 
as supplied to our troops in South Africa, not to mention 
the sham leather in the boots, and the rotten meat in the 
tins. But chivalry and trade need not drift apart. Each 
in its highest form ennobles the other. 

Let us take as a third type the ideals which have 
prevailed so largely in our great dependency of India. 
The chief inductions of our scientific political economics 
will hardly find recognition — often they would be in- 
dignantly flung to the winds. The most eminent 
Brahmans and Buddhists have definitely preferred poverty 
to wealth. The Kshatriyas loved power and honoured 
courage. It was the Visas, who did not belong to 
the aristocracy, who set a high value on wealth, and 
strove to amass it by industry, trade, and usury. 
The Sudras were reduced to a servile condition, not 
because they were poor^ but because they were a con- 
quered population of inferior race. Modern ideals are 
almost reversed. 

The closest approximation to our modern type is found 

in the caste system. I will cite Sir Monier Williams. 

" Notwithstanding the constant efforts of great religious 

leaders in India to deliver their fellow countrymen from 

the tyranny of caste, the power of caste has always in the 

end recovered its ascendency. So long as a man holds 

19 



290 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

to his caste, he is at liberty to hold any opinions he likes, 
even to accepting the doctrines of Christianity." Oh, 
what cruel comments these, the more cruel because 
undesigned, on the caste system as developed in modern 
society ! Our social exclusiveness, our pride of birth, 
or of wealth or privilege, is in spite of our Christianity, 
which is the religion of brotherhood. In spite of it, our 
caste system always in the end recovers itself. And in 
the drawing-rooms of the select, a new arrival is discussed, 
not on the score of the opinions he may hold, nor of 
what he knows, nor even of his morals ; but judgment 
turns upon who his father was, or upon the set to which 
he belongs. 

Our caste system is being rudely shaken, not by our 
religion so much as by our mammon worship. But even 
so, it dies hard. And we have not the excuses which the 
Hindoo can plead — we do not pretend to hold, as they 
do, that the different grades of society have different skins 
— nor can we urge any form of religious sanction for our 
unbrotherliness. 

As a last type, let us take the races now inhabiting the 
Balkan Peninsula. Here is an extract from a recent book 
of travels ^ in that group of provinces or petty kingdoms. 
Describing the fierce Albanians, the author writes : 
"When a man kills his enemy, he must flee to the moun- 
tains, because it is the duty of the nearest of kin of the 
dead man to sally forth with gun and stalk the murderer 
^ Foster Fraser, Pictures from the Balkans, p. 248. 



WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 291 

till he kills him. Sometimes he gets killed himself. 
Then the family of the dead man wage war on the family 
of the man who shot first. The vendetta begins, and 
lasts for years. Straight face to face fighting is not 
necessary. A bullet from behind a boulder, or a stab 
between the shoulders in the darkness of the night, are 
constant methods by which wrongs are avenged. There 
is nothing very unusual in finding a murdered Albanian ; 
indeed it is so usual that the Albanians take it all as a 
matter of course. They know nothing about courts of 
law and such-like methods of settling differences. Their 
instincts are primitive : a man offends you and you 
remove him by killing him. Elbasan is a town of some 
twenty thousand people. There is plenty of room for 
quarrelling. A murder in the streets is rather more 
common than a street fight is in an English town on a 
Saturday night." 

Comment on this extract is needless. But this which 
1 have given you is by no means the worst. The book 
abounds in gruesome details of terrible outrages on 
women and children, of brutal and gratuitous tortures 
inflicted, of wholesale murders committed at weddings, of 
nails drawn from the quick by robbers to compel con- 
fession of wealth — but I spare your feelings. Read the 
book itself— it gives startling " Pictures from the Bal- 
kans " of a social environment which one would have 
fain believed impossible for peoples of modern Europe. 
It is infinitely sad to learn that some of the Christians in 



292 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

this distracted Balkan Peninsula are even fiercer than the 
Mahomedans. 

There are my four types, and here is my moral. If 
such fundamental changes in character and in ideals 
actually exist now upon our globe, how enormously 
elastic must human nature be, and how capable of pro- 
digious modifications. And when we contrast the lowest 
of these types with the highest specimens of the race, who 
shall say what men may be hereafter. Let us shake off 
our faithless surrender to the actual, and march forward 
into the ideal. Vast social forces are at work. It is no 
mere matter of counting the proportion of socialists in 
legislative assemblies — it is the upheaval of a new order. 
Let us see to it that our ideals are noble, rational, 
brotherly, then we need not fear for the future. 

'* For while the tired waves vainly breaking 
Seem here no weary inch to gain, 
Far back, through creeks and inlets making, 
Comes silent, flooding in, the main. 

And not by eastern windows only, 

When daylight comes, comes in the light ; 

In front the sun climbs slow, how slowly. 
But westward, lookj the land is bright."^ 



VIII. The Alpha and the Omega. 

Let me gather my scattered strands together. / define 
the goal of progress to he self-realisation on the part of beings 

' A. H. Clough. 



WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 293 

who are members of a spiritual society. The soul of progress 
I declare to he the Ideal, The Ideal, as it exists in the 
minds of men, is progressive. The Ideal in its self- 
existence is God. Such are the propositions which 1 have 
endeavoured to establish. 

Man may be of good cheer, and may brace himself 
for further strenuous effort as he reflects on what has 
been, what is, and what is yet to come. For he can 
trace the process by which the will to live has, in him, 
emerged into self-determining consciousness and moral 
purpose. 

In the material world he has largely conquered the 
forces which would have crushed him. He has flaked 
the flint. He has forged the metal. By patient toil and 
infinite cunning he has discovered the magic formulae 
which are rendering him lord of the forces of Nature and 
are opening for him the chambers of her hidden wealth. 
The world of matter cannot be omnipotent. For it in- 
creasingly obeys his will. True, the portion of the 
material which he guides is an infinitesimal portion of the 
whole ; yet it suffices as a type. It proves that mind can 
be master of matter, and that what is possible on the 
scale of the microcosm is possible also on the scale of the 
macrocosm. 

But man's triumphs in the material sphere are but the 
lowest of his grounds for hope. He can frame ideals. 
That is to say, he transcends the mechanical, and pierces 
through to modes of existence beyond the veil of sense. 



294 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

His ideals are imperfect, but they develop. They beckon 
to him from the front. They guide him on his way to 
worlds fairer than any he has yet realised. They fill his 
existence with meanings and purposes which burst the 
bonds of the actual and expand with the bloom and the 
promise of the infinite. They nurse into being and foster 
the irrepressible conviction that the power behind the 
imposing immensity of the material is in league with him 
in his upward struggles and aspirations. They tell him 
he is akin to the ultimate reality — that behind the apparent 
indifference of the external, there is the sympathy of a 
kindred nature. The very fact that man makes his claim 
on reality for more than the actual can give is itself 
assurance that he is greater than the actual, and will not 
be disappointed of his hope. 

This instinct — this conviction — that the power behind 
the phenomenal world is on his side, gains its content 
from the facts of social life. In society, man comes into 
relation with other centres of the will to live. And he 
finds that the more many-sided the intercourse so 
established, the more can he develop and multiply the 
possibilities of his own being. Thus it comes that the 
fierce struggle for existence first softens into the spirit of 
mutual helpfulness, and then is fanned into the flame of 
love. It is seen that the surest way of fulfilling the will 
to live is to allow free expansion to the will to love. Love 
once kindled brings out the inmost significance of the 
personal element in human nature. Love established 



WHAT, THEN, IS PROGRESS? 295 

between persons is felt to have in it the germ of im- 
mortality. And so the heart of human love, reaching out 
into the great unknown, lays hold on the Personality of 
the Supreme Being, reads His nature in the light of love, 
and henceforth feels secure that the secret of existence lies 
in personal relations which are free from conditions of 
time and space. The social bonds developed in time are 
recognised as having their origin and their perfection in 
the eternal. And the keystone to the arch of existence is 
discovered in the truth that God Himself is Love. 

Such is the trend of progress. It is movement in the 
direction of the self-existent Ideal. The Ideal, as appre- 
hended by us, shines " through the arch of experience," 
and reveals to us " the gleam of that untrodden world to 
which we move." The course is seldom or never a direct 
one. It oscillates in spirals round the guiding line. But 
as knowledge grows from more to more, and as the social 
consciousness of the race deepens and broadens, the 
oscillations will diminish and the speed will quicken. 

Stonehenge and Salisbury — what is their meaning ? 
These and all our ultimate questions find answer in the 
sphere of the Ideal. Man reaches out into the Ideal, 
and finds that the self-existent Ideal is nothing less than 
God. Whence.? From God. Whither.? To God. What 
are Stonehenge and Salisbury .? Manifestations of the 
process by which the soul of man, which came from God, 
yearns to return to Him. And there in the midst of 
human history is the Incarnation, presenting to us the 



296 THE SOUL OF PROGRESS 

One who is at once the Ideal Man and the express image 

of the Father's Person. 

" So through the thunder comes a human voice, 
Saying, ' O heart I made, a heart beats here ! 
Face, my hands fashioned, see it in Myself ! 
Thou hast no power nor mayst conceive of Mine, 
But love I gave thee, with Myself to love, 
And thou must love Me Who have died for thee.' " ^ 

He it is who has founded the divine brotherhood, the 
Church, which is to expand and triumph until a perfected 
humanity stands before the throne of the universe. There 
is but one body, and one spirit, and one hope of our calling. 

From God and to God. Our words are stammering 
when we deal with such mighty themes. But may we not 
venture to say that in the mysterious process of evolution 
God has gone out of Himself into the world, founding a 
kingdom of persons who, by the training of experience 
and the development of moral purpose, are capable of 
becoming sons of God and sharing His existence ? Evolu- 
tion is thus the return of the world to God in all the 
fulness of its added wealth of being. This is what St 
Paul means when he declares that Jesus Christ shall give 
up to the Father the completed kingdom, " that God 
may be all in all." This is what the seer of the 
Apocalypse means when he holds up for our worship and 
our love the Being who declares, " I am the Alpha and 
the Omega, which is and which was and which is to come.'* 

^ Browning, An Epistle from Karshish. 



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A Catalogue 



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Divisions of the Catalogue 

PAGE 

I. THEOLOGY 3 

II. PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY 29 

III. ORIENTAL LANGUAGES, LITERATURE, AND HISTORY . 34 

IV. PHILOLOGY, MODERN LANGUAGES . , . •39 

V. SCIENCE, MEDICINE, CHEMISTRY, ETC. ... 45 

VL BIOGRAPHY, ARCHiEOLOGY, LITERATURE, MISCEL- 
LANEOUS 56 

FULL INDEX OVER PAGE 



London 
Williams & Norgate 

14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, W.C. 



INDEX. 



Abyssinia, Shihab al Din, 37. 
Agricultural Chemical Analysis, Wiley, 

Alcyonium, Liverpool Marine Biol. C. 

Ments., 4g. 
Americans, The, MunsUrberg, 30. 
Anarchy and Law, Brewster, 29. 
Anatomy, Cunningham Memoirs, 46. 

Surgical, of the Horse, 49. 
Antedon, Liverpool Mar. Biol. Mems., 4g. 
Anthropolog:y, Prehistoric, Avebury, 56 ; 
EngelJiardt , 57. 
Evolution of Religion, Farnell, 12. 
Anurida, Liverpool Mar. Biol. Mems., 49. 
Apocalypse, Bleek, 8 ; Clark, 16. 
Apostles and Apostohc Times, Dob- 
schiitz, 4 ; Hausrath, ig ; Weinel, 
4 ; Weizslicker, 7 ; Zeller, 9. 
Statutes of, edit. G. Horner, 26. 
Apostolic Succession, Clark, 17. 
Arabic, Grammar, Socin, 37. 

Poetry, Faizullah Bhai, 35 ; Lyall, 36 ; 
Noldeke, 36. 
Arenicola, L iverpool Marine Biol. Mems. , 

49. 
hsc\6\a.,Liverpool Marine Biol.Mems.,^^. 
Assyrian, Dictionary, Muss-Arnolt, 36; 
Norris, 36. 
Grammar, Delitzsch, 34. 
Language, Delitzsch, 34. 
Assyriolog-y, Brown, 56; Delitzsch, 10,34; 
Evans, 35 ; Sayce, 15 ; Schrader, 9. 
Astigmatic Tests, Pray, 52 ; Snellen, 54. 
Astronomy, Cunningham Mems., V., 
46 ; Memoirs 0/ Roy. Astronom. 
Soc, 62, 
Atom, Study of, Venable, 55. 
Augustine, St., Confessions of, Harnack, 

18. 
Babylonia, ^^^ Assyriology. 
Belief, Religious, Upton, 15. 
Beneficence, Negative and Positive, 
Spencer, Principles of Ethics, IL, 31. 
Bible, 16. 

See also Testament. 
Beliefs about. Savage, 25. 
Hebrew Texts, 19. 
History of Text, Weir, 27. 
How to Teach, 22. 
Plants, Henslow, 19. 
Problems, Cheyne, 11. 
Bibliography, Bibliographical Register, 56. 
Biology, Basiian, 45 ; Liverpool Marine 

Biol. Me7ns., 49 ; Spencer, 31. 
Botany, Jour, of the Linnean Soc, 48. 
Brain, Cicnnitigham Mans., VII., 46. 
Buddha, Buddhism, Davids, 14 ; Hardy, 

35 ; Oldcnberg, 36. 
Calculus, Harnack, i,-j. 
Canons of Athanasius, Text &= Trans. 

Soc, 38. 
Cardium, Liverpool Mar.Biol. Menis.,\Z. 
Celtic, sec also Irish. 

Stokes, 43 ; Sullivan, 42. 
Heathendom, Rhys, 15. 
Ceremonial Institutions, Spencer, Princ. 

of Sociology, II., 31. 
Chaldee, Grammar, Turpie, 38. 

Lexicon, Fuerst, 35. 
Chemistry, Van't Hoff, 47 ; Hart, 47 ; 
Noyes,%-i\ Mulliken,i\\ Venable,^^. 



Chemist's Pocket Manual, 49. 
Christ, Early Christian Conception of, 
Pfleiderer, 11, 23. 

Life of, Keitn, 8. 

No Product of Evolution, Henslow, 19. 

Resurrection of, 13. 

Study of, Robinson, 24. 

Teaching of, Harnack, 6, 11. 

The Universal, Beard, 16. 
Christianity, Evolution of. Gill, 18. 

History of, Baur, 8 ; DobschUtz, 4 ; 
Harnack, 6, 11, 18; Hausrath, 8, 
19 ; Johnson, 20 ; Wernle, 4. 

in Talmud, Her/ord, 19. 

Liberal, Reville, 11. 

Primitive, PJleiderer, 3, 23. 

Simplest Form of, Drummond, 14. 

Spread of, Harnack, 4. 

What is? Harnack, 6, 11. 
Church, Catholic, Renan, 14. 

Catholic, A Free, 26. 

Christian, Baur, 8 ; Clark, 16 ; Z?<?3- 
schiitz, 4 ; Hatch, 14 ; Wernle, 4. 

Christian, Sacerdotal Celibacy in, ai. 

Coming, Hunter, 20. 

History of, z'^jw Schubert, 3, 25. 
Codex Palatino-Vaticanus, 7"<7rfrf Z^c- 

tures. III., 43. 
Codium, Liverpool Mar. Biol. Mems.,/^g. 
Communion of Christian with God, Herr- 
mann, 6, 20. 
Comte, Spencer, 32. 
Conductivity of Liquids, Tower, 55. 
Constellations, Primitive, Brown, 56. 
Creed, Christian, 16. 
Crown Theological Library, 10. 
Cuneiform Inscriptions, Schrader, 9. 
Daniel and his Prophecies, C. H. H. 
Wright, 28. 

and its Critics, C. H. H. Wright, 28. 
Danish Dictionary, Rositig, 43. 
Darwinism, Schu->tnan, 30. 
Denmark, Engelhardt, 57. 
Doctrine and Principle, Beeby, 16. 
Dogma, History of, Harnack, 5. 

of Virgin Birth, Lobstein, 10. 
Domestic Institutions, Spencer, Princ. 

of Sociology, I., 31. 
Duck Tribes, Morphology of, Cunning- 
ham Mems., VI., 46. 
Dutch, Cape, Oordt, 42 ; Werner, 43. 
Dynamics, Cunningham Mems., IV., 47. 

Chemical, Van't Hoff", 47. 
Ecclesiastes, Taylor, 26. 
Ecclesiastical Institutions, Spencer, 
Princ. of Sociology, III., 31, 32, 

of Holland, Wicksteed, 27. 
Echinus, Liverpool Mar. Biol. Mems., 

49. 
Economy, Political, Mackenzie, 30. 
Education, Herbert, 57 ; Lodge, 41 ; 

Spencer, 30 ; Hagmann, 42. 
Educational Works, see Special Cata- 
logue. 
Egypt, Religion of, Renouf, 15. 
Egyptian Grammar, Erma7t, 35. 
Electric Furnace, The, Moisson, 51. 
Electrolytic Laboratories, Arrange- 
ments of, 51. 
Engineering Chemistry, Stillman, 54. 
Enoch, Book of, Gill, 18. 




INDEX 

Epidemiologry, Trans, of Epidemiolog: 

Soc, 55. 
Epizootic Lymphangitis, Treatise on, 

Pal lift, 52. 
Ethics, and Religion, Martineau, 22. 
Data of, Spencer, Principles of E., I., 31. 
Individualism and Collectivism, 30. 
Induction of, Spencer, Principles of E., 

I-, 31- 

Kantian, Schurman, 30. 

of Evolution, Schurman, 30. 

of Individual Life, Spencer, Principles 
ofE., I., 31. 

of Reason, Laurie, 29. 

Principles of, Spencer, 31. 
Ethiopic Grammar, 34. 
Ethnology, Cunningham Mems., X., 46. 
Evolution, Spencer, 31, 32. 

of the Idea of God, D' Alviella, 14. 

of Religious Thought, D' Alviella, 15. 
Exodus, Hoerning-, 20. 
Ezekiel, Mosheh ben Shesheth, 22. 
Faith, Herrmann, 11 ; Rix, 24 ; Witn- 

mer, 27. 
Fisheries, British, Johnstone, 46. 
Flinders Petrie Papyri, Cunningham, 

Mems., VIII., IX., 46. 
Flora of Edinburgh, Sonntag, 54. 
French, Bolelle, 40 ; Dclbos, 40 ; Eugene, 
40 ; Hugo, 41, 42 ; Roget, \2 ; also 
Special Education Catalogue. 

Literature, Roget, 43. 

Novels, Arjny Series, 39. 
Gammarus, Liverpool Marine Biol. 

Mem-s., 49. 
Genesis, Hebrew Texts, 19, 35 ; Wright, 

C. H. H., 28. 
Geography, Ancient, Kiepert, 58. 
Geometry, Analytical, Elements of, 47. 
German, Literature, Nibelungenlied, 
41 ; Phillipps, 42. 

Novels, Army Series, 39. 
Germany, Marcks, 59. 
God, Idea of, D' Alviella, 14. 
Gospel, Fourth, Drummond, 17 ; Tayler, 
26. 

Social, Harnack and Heyrmann,iT„xg. 
Gospels, Old and New Certainty, Robin- 
son, 24. 
Greek, Modern, Zompolides, 44. 
Gymnastics, Medical, Schrcber, 53. 
Hebrew, Biblical, Kennedy, 35. 

Language, Delitzsch, 34. 

Lexicon, Fuerst, 35. 

New School of Poets, Albrecht, 36. 

Scriptures, Sharpe, 25. 

Story, Peters, 23. 

Synonyms, Kennedy, 35. 

Text ofO.T., Weir, 27. 

Texts, 19, 35. 
Hebrews, History of, Kittel, 6 ; Peters, 
II ; Sharpe, 25. 

Religion of, Kuenen, 9 ; Montefiore, 14. 
Heterogenesis, Bastian, 45. 
Hibbert Lectures, 14, 15. 
Horse, Life-size Models ot, 48. 
Hygiene, Practical, Handbook of, 45. 
Hymns, Jones, 20. 
Icelandic, jLz7/a, 41 ; VigaGlums Saga,i,7,. 

Dictionary, Zoega, 44. 

Grammar, Bayldon, 39. 



—continued. 



Individualism, Spencer, Man v. State, 32. 

Infinitesimals and Limits, 47. 

Irish, Hogan, 40 ; Leabhar Breac, 41 ; 

Leabhar na H- Uidhri,^\; O'Grady, 

42 ; Todd Lectures, 42 ; Yellow Book 

0/ Lecan, 43. 
\&2\si\\,Dicttrich, 34 ; Hebrew Texts,ig,25. 
Israel, History of, Kittel, 6 ; Peters, 33 ; 

Sharpe, 25. 
Religion of, Kuenen, 9. 
in Egypt, Wright, C. H. H., 28. 
Jeremiah, Mosheh ben Shesheth, a2. 
Jesus, Life of, Keim, 8. 
Sayings of, 13. 
The Real, Vickers, 27. 
Times of, Hausrath, 8. 
6"^^ also Christ. 
Job, Book of, Ewald, 8 ; Hebrew Text, 

19, 35 ; Wright, C. H. H., 28. 
Rabbinical Comment, on, Text it* 

Trans. Soc, 38. 
Justice, Spencer, Princ. of Ethics, II., 31. 
Kant, Schurman, 30. 
Kindergarten, Goldammer, 57. 
Knowledge, Evolution of, Perrin, 30. 
Labour, Harrison, 57 ; Schloss, 59 ; 

Vynne, 60. 
Leabhar Breac, 41 ; Hogan, 40. 
Life and Matter, Lodge, 21. 
Ligia, Liverpool Marine Biol. Mems., 49. 
Liverpool, History of, Muir, 59. 
Lives of the Saints, Hogan, 40. 
Logarithms, Sang, 53 ; Schroen, 54 ; 

^ega, 55. 
London Library Catalogue, 57. 
Lumbar Curve, Cunningham Merits.^ 

II., 46. 
Mahabharata, Sorensen, 37. 
Malaria, Annett, 45 ; Boyce, 45 ; Button, 

46 ; Mems. of Liverpool School oj 

Tropical Medicine, 50 ; i?^^^, 53 ; 

Stephens, 54. 
Maori, Dictionary, Williams, 43. 

Manual, Maori, 41. 
Materialism, Martineau, 22. 
Mathematics, Harnack, 47. 

^^-t? rt/j^ Logarithms. 
Mediaeval Thought, Poole, 23. 
Mesca Ulad, Todd Lectures, I., 42. 
Metallic Objects, Production of, 52. 
Metaphysics, Laurie, 29. 
Mexico, Religions of, Reville, 15. 
Micah, Book of, Taylor, 26. 
Microscopy, Journal 0/ the Roy. Micro. 

Soc, 48; Journal 0/ the Quekctt 

Micro. Club, 48. 
Midrash, Christianity in, Her/ord, 19. 
Mineral Systems, Chapman, 47. 
Molecular Weights, Methods of Deter- 
mining, 45. 
Monasticism, Harnack, 18. 
Moorhouse Lectures, 22. 
Mosquitoes, Mems. of Liverpool School 

of Trop. Medicine, 50. 
Municipal Government, A History of, in 

Liverpool, 59. 
Mythology, Greek, Brown, 56 ; St. Clair, 

59- 
Northern, Stephens, 60. 
Naturalism and Religion, Otto, 13. 
Nautical Terms, Delbos, 40. 



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CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS. 19 

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HARNACK (ADOLF). THE SAYINGS OF JESUS. See 

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and HERRMANN (Dr. WILHELM). ESSAYS ON 

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A. Canney, M.A. See Crown Theological Library, p. 13. 

HATCH (Rev. Dr.). LECTURES ON THE INFLUENCE 
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FAITH AND MORALS. See Crown Theological Library, 

p. II. 

and HARNACK (ADOLF.). ESSAYS ON THE 

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KUENEN (Dr. A.). LECTURES ON NATIONAL AND 
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CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS. 41 

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