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2013-06 

Digital semaphore: technical feasibility of QR 
code optical signaling for fleet communications 

Jaiaree, Thoetsak 

Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School 


http://hdl.handle.net/10945/34699 


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NAVAL 

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THESIS 


THE SECURITY ASPECTS OF WIRELESS LOCAL 
AREA NETWORK (WLAN) 

by 

Thoetsak Jaiaree 
September 2003 


Thesis Advisor: Norman F. Sehneidewind 

Seeond Reader: Douglas E. Brinkley 


Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 




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September 2003 Master’s Thesis 

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: 

The Security Aspects of Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) 

5. FUNDING NUMBERS 

6. AUTHOR(S) 

Thoetsak Jaiaree 

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 

Naval Postgraduate School 

Monterey, CA 93943-5000 

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ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER 

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AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 

II. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 

I2a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 

13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) 

Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN) are increasing in number in both home and business uses due to the 
convenience, mobility and affordable prices for wireless devices. Wireless technology allows the mobile stations to freely 
move within the range of Access Points without being physically connected to the wired network. Ideally, the WLAN gives 
mobility and flexibility to users in homes and hot spot environments, such as airports and campuses. 

However, WLANs have serious security problems because the wireless signal of the WLAN is broadcast through the 
air in all directions simultaneously. An unauthorized user can easily capture this signal using freeware tools to exploit WLAN 
vulnerability. 

This thesis provides an introduction to WLAN technology, security vulnerabilities in the WLAN, and the 
recommended countermeasures for the Software Metrics Laboratory in Ingersoll 158, in the Naval Postgraduate School, with 
particular emphasis on security concerns for the implementation of the WLAN extension to the existing wired LAN. 

14. SUBJECT TERMS 

Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN), WIFI (802.1 lb). Access Point, WLAN Security 

15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 

97 

16. PRICE CODE 

17. SECURITY 
CLASSIFICATION OF 
REPORT 

Unclassified 

18. SECURITY 

CLASSIFICATION OF THIS 
PAGE 

Unclassified 

19. SECURITY 
CLASSIFICATION OF 
ABSTRACT 

Unclassified 

20. LIMITATION 

OF ABSTRACT 

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Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 


1 



























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11 



Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 


THE SECURITY ASPECTS OF WIRELESS LOCAL AREA NETWORK (WLAN) 


Thoesak Jaiaree 
Captain, Royal Thai Army 

B.S., Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy, Thailand, 1995 

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 


MASTER OF SCIENCE IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT 


from the 


NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
September 2003 


Author: Thoetsak Jaiaree 


Approved by: Norman F. Schneidewind 

Thesis Advisor 


Douglas E. Brinkley 
Second Reader 


Dan Boger 

Chairman, Department of Information Sciences 



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IV 



ABSTRACT 


Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN) are increasing in number in both home 
and business uses due to the convenience, mobility and affordable prices for wireless 
devices. Wireless technology allows the mobile stations to freely move within the range 
of Access Points without being physically connected to the wired network. Ideally, the 
WLAN gives mobility and flexibility to users in homes and hot spot environments, such 
as airports and campuses. 

However, WLANs have serious security problems because the wireless signal of 
the WLAN is broadcast through the air in all directions simultaneously. An unauthorized 
user can easily capture this signal using freeware tools to exploit WLAN vulnerability. 

This thesis provides an introduction to WLAN technology, security vulnerabilities 
in the WLAN, and the recommended countermeasures for the Software Metrics 
Laboratory in Ingersoll 158, in the Naval Postgraduate School, with particular emphasis 
on security concerns for the implementation of the WLAN extension to the existing wired 
LAN. 


V 



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VI 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 


I. INTRODUCTION.I 

A. WIRELESS LOCAL AREA NETWORKS.I 

1. Advantages of WLAN Over LAN.I 

a. User Mobility . 1 

b. Rapid Installation . 1 

c. Flexibility . 2 

2. Disadvantages of WLAN Over LAN.2 

a. Electrical Interference . 2 

b. Quality of Service . 2 

c. Slow Throughput Rate . 2 

d. Higher Initial Cost . 3 

e. Security . 3 

B. PROBLEM STATEMENT.3 

C. THESIS OVERVIEW.3 

II. BACKGROUND.5 

A. WIRELESS NETWORKS.5 

1. WLANs.6 

2, Ad Hoc Networks.6 

B. WLAN INFRASTRUCTURE.7 

1. Access Point (AP).8 

2. Mobile Device.8 

3. Wireless Network Interface Cards (NICs).8 

4. Security Server.8 

C. WIRELESS STANDARD.8 

1. IEEE 802.11.9 

a. 802.11a. . 11 

b. 802.11b. . 12 

c. 802.11c . 12 

d. 802.11d. . 12 

e. 802.11e . 13 

f 802.11f. . 13 

g. 802.11g. . 13 

h. 802.11h . 13 

i. 802.11i . 14 

2. Bluetooth.14 

D. THE APPLICATION OF THE WLAN IN A SOFTWARE METRICS 

LABORATORY (ING 158).14 

1. Existing LAN.15 

2. Planning a WLAN.15 

III. SECURITY CONCERNS FOR WLAN IN SML.19 

A. THE CONCEPTS OF C.I.A.19 

I. Confidentiality.19 

vii 












































2, Integrity.20 

3. Availability.20 

B. TYPES OF HACKER.20 

1. Accidental Users.20 

2, Script Kiddies.20 

3. Casual Hackers.20 

4, Skilled Hackers.21 

C. THE HACKER’S WLAN TOOLS.21 

1. Available Freeware Tools.21 

2, Antennas.21 

D. TYPE OF ATTACK ON WLAN.23 

1. Passive Attack.24 

a. Eavesdropping . 24 

b. Traffic Analysis . 24 

2, Active Attack.25 

a. Masquerading. . 25 

b. Replay . 25 

c. Message Modification . 25 

d. Denial-of-Service . 25 

E. VUNERABILITY OF THE WLAN IN SML.26 

1, Internal Vulnerabilities.26 

a. A Rogue WLAN. . 26 

b. Insecure Network Configurations . 26 

c. Accidental Associations . 27 

2. External Threats.27 

a. Eavesdropping & Espionage . 27 

b. SSID and MA C Address Theft . 28 

c. War Driving . 29 

d. Evolving Attack [Ref. 14] . 29 

F. SUMMARY.31 

IV. SECURITY IN THE SOFTWARE METRICS LAB.33 

A. WLAN USAGE POLICIES.33 

B. NETWORK CONFIGURATION POLICIES.34 

1. User Authentication.34 

a. Turn Off SSID Beacons . 34 

b. Change the SSID . 34 

c. Implement Network Authentication . 35 

d. Implement MAC Filtering . 35 

e. Manage the APs Unavailable on Wireless Connections . 36 

2. Confidentiality and Integrity.36 

a. Use WEP. . 36 

b. Establish Proper Encryption Settings . 37 

c. Change Default WEP Keys . 37 

d. Rotate WEP Keys . 37 

3. Disable SNMP.38 

viii 
















































4, Setting the Firewall.38 

5. Keep Firmware Updated.38 

C. SECURITY POLICIES.40 

1. Security Education.40 

2. Prohibit Unauthorized APs.40 

3. Prohibit Ad Hoc Networks.40 

4. Secure APs Physically.41 

5. Limit User’s Privileges and Access Rights.41 

6. Log and Audit.41 

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.43 

A. CONCLUSIONS.43 

B. FUTURE WORK.44 

1. The IEEE 802.111 Standards-Based Wireless Security.44 

a. The IEEE 802.lx Port-based Authentication Framework... 44 

b. The Temporal Key Integrity Protocol. . 44 

c. The Advanced Encryption Standard Encryption 

Algorithm . 45 

d. Cipher Negotiation . 45 

2. Virtual Private Network Wireless Security.45 

APPENDIX A. COMMON WIRELESS FREQUENCIES AND 

APPLICATIONS [REF 2].47 

APPENDIX B. THE IEEE 802.11 B STANDARD.49 

A. OPERATION MODES.50 

1. Infrastructure Mode.51 

a. Basis Service Set. . 51 

b. Extended Service Set . 51 

2. Ad Hoc Mode.51 

B. THE IEEE 802.1 IB PHYSICAL LAYER.51 

1. Transmission Methods.52 

2. The PLCP.53 

a. The PLCP Preamble . 54 

b. The PLCP Header . 54 

C. THE IEEE 802.11B MEDIUM ACCESS CONTROL SUBLAYER.56 

1. Inter Frame Spaces (IFS) and Frame Types.56 

a. Short Inter Frame Space (SIFS) . 56 

b. Point Coordination IFS .57 

c. Distributed IFS. .57 

d. Extended IFS .57 

2. The Basic Access Method.57 

a. Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) . 58 

b. Point Coordination Function (PCF) . 58 

3. The IEEE 802.11b MAC Frame.60 

a. The IEEE 802.11b MAC Frame Format . 60 

b. Frame Control. . 62 


IX 











































c. The IEEE 802.11 MAC Frame Format Types . 63 

D. THE IEEE 802.1 IB SECURITY BASIC METHOD.67 

1. Service Set Identifier (SSID).68 

2. Media Access Control (MAC) Address Filtering.68 

3. Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP).69 

GLOSSARY.71 

LIST OF REFERENCES.75 

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST.79 


X 











LIST OF FIGURES 


Figure 1. The WLAN Topology (From: Ref 2).6 

Figure 2. Ad Hoc Network (From: Ref 2).7 

Figure 3. Open Systems Interconnect (OSI) Reference Model (From : Ref 4).10 

Figure 4. The Connection of SML through NFS Backbone (From: Ref 11).16 

Figure 5. SML WLAN Design Architecture (From : Ref 11).17 

Figure 6. The Commercial Antenna(From Ref: 15).23 

Figure 7. Homemade Antenna (From Ref: 16).23 

Figure 8. Taxonomy of Security Attacks (From Ref:2).24 

Figure 9. Map of NFS (From Ref:20).28 

Figure 10. The Detected Wireless Signal in Monterey, CA.30 

Figure 11. Setting the Firewall in SML.39 

Figure 12. 802.11 VFN Wireless Security (From: Ref 4).46 

Figure 13. OSI Reference Model (From: Ref 6).50 

Figure 14. Infrastructure Mode and Ad Hoc Mode (From: Ref 27).50 

Figure 15. Channel Shape and Channel Spacing (From: Ref 27).53 

Figure 16. Short FLCF FFDU format (From: Ref 29).55 

Figure 17. Long FLCF FFDU format (From: Ref 29).55 

Figure 18. Interframe Space Relation (From: Ref 31).57 

Figure 19. 802.11 Collision Avoidance Mechanism (From: Ref 31).58 

Figure 20. The MAC Frame and Control Field (From: Ref 31).61 


XI 























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LIST OF TABLES 


Table 1. Freeware Tools (From: Ref 14).22 

Table 2. IEEE 802.1 lb Data Rate Specifications (From Ref: 27).53 

Table 3. Type and Subtype of the Frame Control Field (From: Ref 28).64 


xiii 






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XIV 



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 


I would like to express my sincere thanks to Professor Norman Schneidewind and 
Professor Douglas Brinkley for their advice during the research and completion of this 
thesis. I would also like to thanks Chye Bin Tay for the future work recommendations 
from his thesis. Finally, I would like to dedicate this work to my father and mother who 
have passed away. Additionally, I extend special thanks to my family that includs Col 
Suwan Jaiaree, Winate and Wilailak Tapapsanan, and Piengkamol Kraidej, who have 
always motivated and supported my efforts. 


XV 



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XVI 



1. INTRODUCTION 


A. WIRELESS LOCAL AREA NETWORKS 

Wireless technologies are becoming more popular in business and personal life 
than in the past. Wireless communications offer organizations and users many benefits, 
such as increased portability, flexibility, and productivity. The Wireless Local Area 
Network (WLAN) does not replace the wired infrastructure, but complements it and 
significantly increases its range and flexibility for connecting a wireless device (e.g., 
laptop, PDA) to a wired LAN. Today, wireless technologies cover a broad range of 
differing capabilities oriented toward different uses and needs. For instance, WLAN 
devices allow users to move their laptops from place to place within their office without 
the need for wires and without losing network connectivity. This results in an increasing 
number of government agencies, businesses, and home users using, or anticipating the 
use of wireless technologies in their environments. 

Nonetheless, these groups need to be aware of the security risks associated with 
wireless technologies. They need to develop strategies that help mitigate those risks as 
they integrate these technologies in their computing environments. 

1. Advantages of WLAN Over LAN 

Wireless networks allow users to access and share networks without physically 
connecting to the network, so the existing LANs can be set up to work with a WLAN 
without installing new wires. This gives the users four primary benefits: 

a. User Mobility 

Users can access files, network resources, and the Internet without 
physically connecting to the network with wires. Users can be mobile yet retain high¬ 
speed, real-time access to the LAN. 

b. Rapid Installation 

The time required for installation is reduced because network connections 
are possible without moving or adding wires, or pulling these wires through walls or 
ceilings. 


1 



c. Flexibility 

Users have the flexibility of installing and moving WLANs to any location 
as needed. Users can also quickly install a small WLAN for temporary use in conferences 
or meetings. 

2, Disadvantages of WLAN Over LAN 

Regardless of the benefits of the WLAN environment, there are several 
serious problems should be addressed prior to deploying a WLAN to supplement a wired 
system. 

a. Electrical Interference 

Frequency allocation for Radio Frequency (RF) WLANs present a 
problem because most spread-spectrum transmissions are in the frequency range 
established by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for Industrial, Scientific 
and Medical (ISM) usage [Ref 1]. In addition, other products, like microwave devices, 
transmit energy in the same spectrum that can potentially induce some level of 
interference. This interference is one of the factors that possibly causes degradation in 
throughput. Background noise comes from all kinds of sources, but the most prevalent 
types are caused by ordinary microwave ovens and cordless phones. 

b. Quality of Service 

WLANs typically offer lower quality than wired LANs. The main reason 
for this disadvantage is the lower bandwidth due to limitations in the radio transmission 
(only 1-11 Mbit/s), higher error rates due to interference, and longer delays due to 
multipath propagation. Moreover, overhead, configuration, and security factors can 
reduce the actual throughput to lower than 11 Mbit/s. 

c. Slow Throughput Rate 

Factors that affect throughput include airwave congestion (number of 
users), propagation factors such as range and multipath transmission, as well as the 
latency and bottlenecks on the wired portions of the WLAN. The common throughput 
rate for a WLAN is up to 11Mbps for the 802.1 lb and 54 Mbps for the 802.1 la and the 
802.1 Ig; whereas, for a typical wired LAN, a throughput rate of up to 100Mbps is 
possible. Hence, a WLAN is suitable when dealing with text files or e-mail files. 


2 



However, if the use of multimedia graphics and sound is essential, a wired LAN is 
currently still the better choice. 

d. Higher Initial Cost 

The initial cost for a WLAN is more expensive than that of a wired LAN. 
The infrastructure costs depend primarily on the number of Access Points (APs) 
deployed, where the number of necessary APs typically depends on the required coverage 
area and/or the number and types of users to be serviced. 

e. Security 

The WLANs send their traffic over shared space, airwaves. This 
introduces interference from other traffic and the need for additional security. The open 
radio interface and several hundred feet of transmission distance make eavesdropping 
much easier than with a wired LAN. This unsecured area allows an unauthorized person 
to gain access to a network from outside a building or home. Even though some 
encryption protocols are implemented in WLANs, such as Wired Equivalent Privacy 
(WEP) to increase security, some anti-WEP technologies have been developed to break 
the encryption. In other words, WEP can be broken by skilled intruders who have the 
time and sufficient motivation to penetrate a network. 

B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 

In any wireless technology, some risks are similar to those of wired networks; 
some are exacerbated by wireless connectivity; some are new. The most significant 
difference, the main source of these risks, is that with wireless networks the 
organization’s underlying communications medium, the airwave, is openly exposed to 
intruders, making it easier to be attacked by malicious hackers and unauthorized users. 
This thesis identifies vulnerabilities in WLANs and proposes methods to prevent these 
vulnerabilities. Administrative security and the protection of data should be considered 
during initial system planning. 

C. THESIS OVERVIEW 

Chapter II of this thesis surveys various technologies, topologies and standards 
used to build a WLAN. The known vulnerabilities of lEE 802.1 lb and WLAN in 


3 



Software Metrics Lab (SML) will be discussed in Chapter III. The methods to secure a 
WLAN in SML are explored in Chapter IV. Chapter V concludes with recommendations 
for securing WLANs. 


4 



II. BACKGROUND 


Wireless technologies enable one or more devices to communicate without 
network cabling. Wireless technologies use radio transmissions as the means for 
transmitting data while wired technologies use cables. Wireless technologies range from 
complex systems, such as WLANs and cell phones, to simple devices, such as wireless 
headphones and microphones that do not process or store information. In addition, 
wireless technology includes Infrared (IR) devices like remote controls, some cordless 
computer keyboards and mice, and wireless Hi-Fi stereo headsets. These devices require 
a direct line of sight between the transmitter and the receiver to transmit on the link. This 
chapter presents a brief overview of the critical elements of wireless technology, wireless 
networks, and wireless standards. 

A. WIRELESS NETWORKS 

Wireless networks serve to transport information between wireless devices and 
between wireless devices and wired networks. Wireless networks are diverse; however, 
they are frequently categorized into three groups based on their coverage range: Wireless 
Wide Area Network (WWAN), Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN), and Wireless 
Personal Area Network (WPAN) [Ref 2]. The range of a WWAN includes wide coverage 
area technologies, such as 2G Cellular, Cellular Digital Packet Data (CDPD), and Global 
System for Mobile Communications (GSM). The range of a WLAN includes 802.11, 
Hyperlan, and several others, while a WPAN includes Bluetooth and Infrared. All of 
these groups receive and transmit information using Electromagnetic (EM) waves. 
Wireless technologies use wavelengths ranging from the Radio Frequency (RF) band up 
to and beyond the IR band. The frequencies in the RF band cover a significant portion of 
the EM radiation spectrum, extending from 9 Kilohertz (kHz), the lowest allocated 
wireless communications frequency, to thousands of Gigahertz (GHz). As the frequency 
is increased beyond the RF spectrum, EM energy moves into the IR and then the visible 
spectrum. (See Appendix A for a list of common wireless frequencies.) Since wireless 
network and technology are so diverse, the primary focus in on WLAN technologies, 
which would be employed in SML (Ing 158) 


5 



1 . 


WLANs 


WLANs allow greater flexibility and portability than wired LANs. Unlike a 
traditional LAN, which requires wires to connect a user’s computer to the network, a 
WLAN connects computers and other components to the network by using an AP device. 
An AP communicates with devices equipped with wireless network adaptors; it connects 
to a wired Ethernet LAN via an RJ-45 port. The AP device typically covers areas of up to 
300 feet (100 meters) [Ref 3]. This coverage area is called a cell or range. Users can 
move freely within the cell with their laptops or other network devices. As shown in 
Figure 1, the AP cells can be linked together to allow users to “roam” even within a 
building or between buildings. 



Figure 1. The WLAN Topology (From: Ref 2) 

2, Ad Hoc Networks 

In Ad Hoc networks, each mobile device communicates directly with other 
mobile devices within the network. No existing APs connect the Ad Hoc network directly 
with any wired LAN. The Ad Hoc mode is designed so that only the mobile stations 


6 

























within transmission range (within the same cell) can communicate with each other 
without the associated AP as shown in Figure 2. If a mohile station in an Ad Hoc network 
wants to communicate outside of the cell, a memher of the cell must operate as a gateway 
and perform a routing service [Ref 4], While WLANs use a fixed network infrastructure, 
Ad Hoc networks maintain random network configurations, relying on a system of 
mohile routers connected hy wireless links to enable devices to communicate. In a 
Bluetooth network, mohile routers control the changing network topologies of these 
networks. The routers also control the flow of data between devices that are capable of 
supporting direct links to each other. As devices move about in an unpredictable fashion, 
these networks must be reconfigured simultaneously to handle the dynamic topology. The 
routing protocol Bluetooth allows the routers to establish and to maintain these shifting 
networks. 



Figure 2. Ad Hoc Network (From: Ref 2) 

B. WLAN INFRASTRUCTURE 

A typical WLAN is set up as an extension of the existing corporate network, as 
shown in Figure 1. This enables mobile devices to remain connected to the wired network 
while mobile devices are moved. A basic WLAN configuration includes the following 
components: 


7 
























1. Access Point (AP) 

An AP is a router that enables wireless devices to access the wired network. The 
APs are usually placed outside the firewall to facilitate convenient access, but this also 
makes them vulnerable to attacks. In addition, APs support specific WLAN types, such as 
802.11b. A Dual-band AP, which supports both 802.11b and 802.11a WLANs, is also 
available. 

2, Mobile Device 

Mobile Devices include laptops. Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), Tablet PCs 

and other similar mobile devices. However, unless these remote devices are configured 
with wireless network capability, they cannot access a WLAN. 

3. Wireless Network Interface Cards (NICs) 

Wireless Network Interface Cards (NICs) enable mobile devices to communicate 
with the AP using radio frequency transmissions [Ref 2]. Each card has a unique Media 
Access Control (MAC) address, which can be used for authentication purposes. The 
wireless NIC must be compatible with the AP. For example, an 802.1 lb AP must be used 
with a 802.11b Wireless NIC. Dual-mode NICs, similar to dual-mode APs, are also 
available. 

4, Security Server 

A Security Server enforces and manages security policies to ensure that wireless 
users have access to the appropriate information on the corporate network while 
preventing threats from intruders. The server is a centralized security system for 
restricting access to resources. A Security Server replaces the security functions in 
individual applications with a centralized system, allowing simpler administration and 
management of secured functions. Instead of implementing changes in security policy 
from one workstation to another workstation, administrators can make changes in one 
location for all users in the network. This capability protects their system logic and data 
from unauthorized use. 

C. WIRELESS STANDARD 

Wireless, at its current relatively immature state, has a variety of standards. The 
principal advantages of standards are to encourage mass production and to allow products 


8 



from multiple vendors to communicate. The Advanced Mobile Phone System (AMPS) 
standard, which dominated first generation mobile telephone devices [Ref 2], allows 
devices from various manufacturers to work on a wireless network infrastructure 
developed by other manufacturers. The AMPS standard uses Frequency Division 
Multiple Access (FDMA) and requires a lot of bandwidth while operating in the 824- 
829MHz range (similar to FM radios). Other telephony standards include IS-136, a Time 
Division Multiple Access (TDMA) standard, IS-95, a Code Division Multiple Access 
(CDMA) standard, and Global System for Mobile (GSM), which is another TDMA 
standard. Many handheld devices (e.g., PDAs and cell phones) have followed the 
Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) standard, which provides secured access to e-mail 
and the Internet. All of these standards are different and offer varying levels of security 
features. For this thesis research, the discussion of wireless standards is limited to the 
IEEE 802.11 standard. 

1. IEEE 802.11 

In 1997, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) approved the 
802.11 WLAN standard [Ref 5], establishing a global standard for implementing and 
deploying WLANs. The throughput for 802.11 was 2Mbps, which was well below the 
IEEE 802.3 Ethernet counterpart. Late in 1999, the IEEE approved the 802.1 Ib standard 
extension, which raised the throughput to II Mbps [Ref 5], making this extension more 
comparable to the wired networks. The 802.11b also supports the 2 Mbps data rate and 
operates on a 2.4GHz band radio frequency for high-speed data communications. 

As with any of the other 802 networking standards (Ethernet, Token Ring, etc.), 
this 802.11 specification affects the lower layers of the Open Systems Interconnect (OSI) 
reference model, and the Physical and Data Link layers [Ref 6] as shown in Figure 3. The 
Physical Layer defines how data is transmitted over the physical medium. The IEEE 
assigned 802.11 two transmission methods for Radio Frequency (RF) and one for 
Infrared (IR) [Ref 7]. The two RF methods are Frequency Hopping Spread-Spectrum 
(FHSS), which operates within the Unlicensed National Information Infrastructure 
(UNII) and Direct Sequence Spread-Spectrum (DSSS), which operates within the ISM 
(Industrial, Scientific, and Medical) 2.4 GHz band for unlicensed use [Ref 8]. Other 
devices that operate on this band include remote phones and microwave ovens. 


9 



OSI Reference Model 



Figure 3. Open Systems Interconnect (OSI) Reference Model (From : Ref 4) 

Both FHSS and DSSS are different techniques to transmit data over radio waves. 
For FHSS, a simple frequency hopping technique is used to navigate the 2.4GHz band, 
which is divided into 75 sub-channels of IMHz each [Ref 5]. The sender and receiver 
negotiate a sequence pattern over the sub-channels. 

On the other hand, DSSS utilizes the same channel for the duration of the 
transmission by dividing the 2.4 GHz band into 14 channels at 22MHz each with 11 
channels, which have eight overlapping and three non-overlapping channels [Ref 5]. To 
compensate for noise and interference, DSSS uses a technique called "chipping," where 
each data bit is converted into redundant patterns called "chips." 

The Data Link layer is made up of two sub-layers, the MAC layer and the Logical 
Link Control (LLC) layer [Ref 1]. The Data Link layer determines how transmitted data 
is packaged, addressed and managed within the network. The LLC sub-layer uses the 
identical 48-bit addressing found in Ethernet, where the MAC sub-layer uses a unique 


10 




mechanism called Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) 
[Ref 1]. This mechanism is similar to the Carrier Sense Multiple Access Collision Detect 
(CSMA/CD) used in Ethernet, with a few major differences. As opposed to Ethernet, 
which detects collisions, CSMA/CA senses the airwaves for activity and sends out a 
signal when the airwaves appear to be free of transmissions. If the sender detects 
conflicting signals, it will wait for a random period plus a period proportional to the 
existing traffic before retrying transmission. 

The 802.11 standard includes the RTS/CTS (Request To Send/Clear To Send) 
function as an optional feature to solve the hidden node problem [Ref 6], in which two 
stations on opposite sides of an AP can both hear activity from an AP but not from each 
other. Although the first station may sense the channel to be clear, the second station may 
in fact be transmitting to the AP. Therefore the collision may occur. This problem occurs 
when a wall and other structures create obscure radio coverage areas. When this feature is 
in use, a sending station transmits an RTS packet and waits for a reply from the AP with 
a CTS packet. Since all stations in the network can hear the AP, the CTS packet causes 
them to delay any intended transmissions. This allows the sending station to transmit and 
receive a packet acknowledgement without any chance of collision. However, the 
RTS/CTS packet adds additional overhead to the 802.11, especially at small packet sizes. 
It is typically used only on the largest-sized packets, for which retransmission would be 
expensive from a bandwidth standpoint. 

In addition, the 802.11 MAC sub-layer provides other robustness features. Cyclic 
Redundancy Check (CRC) checksum and packet fragmentation [Ref 2]: a CRC checksum 
is calculated for each packet to ensure that the data was not corrupted in transit. Packet 
fragmentation makes it possible to split large packets into smaller packets before 
transmitting over the air. This is useful on a crowded transmission, since large packets are 
more easily corrupted; it also reduces the need to send packets again; this increases the 
throughput of the network. 

a. 802 . 11 a 

The 802.11a extension operates on a different physical layer specification 
than the 802.1 lb. The 802.1 la extension operates at 5GHz and supports data rates up to 
54Mbps. The Federal Communication Commission (FCC) has allocated 300Mz of the RF 
spectrum for unlicensed operation in the 5GHz range [Ref 9]. Although 802.1 la supports 


11 



much higher data rates, the effective distance of transmission is much shorter than 
802.11b. Additionally 802.11a is not compatible with 802.11b equipment and, in its 
current state, is usable only in the United States. However, several vendors have 
embraced the 802.11a standard, and some have dual band support AP devices and 
network cards. 

b. 802 . 11 b 

The 802.1 lb extension is currently the de facto standard for WLANs; it raises the 
data rate from 2Mbps to 11Mbps by using the 2.4 GHz frequency band, but the actual 
throughput is much less. The increased data rate from 2Mbps to 11Mbps is achieved by 
utilizing an advanced encoding technique called Complementary Code Keying (CCK) 
[Ref 9]. The CCK uses Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (QPSK) for modulation to achieve 
the higher data rates. 

c. 802 . 11 c 

The 802.11c extension provides required information to ensure proper 
bridge operations by using 802.11 APs to bridge across networks within relatively short 
distances from each other. This project has been completed with related procedures as 
part of the IEEE 802.11c standard. Product developers utilize this standard when 
developing APs. 

d. 802 . 11 d 

The 802.1 Id extension was introduced to facilitate the worldwide use of 
802.11. It has an ongoing charter to define PHY requirements that satisfy regulatory 
requirements within additional countries. This extension allows APs to communicate on 
the permissible radio channels with acceptable power levels for user devices. Since the 
802.11 standards are not legal in some countries, the purpose of 802.1 Id is to add 
features and restrictions that allow WLANs to operate within the rules of these countries. 
In countries where the physical layer radio requirements are different from those in North 
America, the use of WLANs is lagging behind. Moreover, since equipment 
manufacturers do not want to produce a wide variety of country-specific products and 
mobile users do not want to carry full country-specific WLAN PC cards, the result is 
country-specific firmware solutions. The standard was completed in 1999. 


12 



e. 802 . 11 e 

The 802.1 le extension is a supplement to the MAC layer that provides 
Quality of Service (QOS) support for LAN applications. This extension will apply to 
802.11 physical standards a, b and g. The purpose of this extension is to provide classes 
of service with managed levels of QOS for data, voice and video applications. Many 
WLAN manufacturers have targeted QOS as a feature that differentiates their products 
from others. Therefore many proprietary offerings will be available before 802.1 le is 
complete, which is still in the developmental stage. 

f. 802 . 11 f 

The 802.1 If extension is designed to achieve AP interoperability within a 
multivendor WLAN network. This reduces vendor lock-in and allows multivendor 
infrastructures. This standard defines the registration of APs within a network and the 
interchange of information between APs when a user is handed over from one AP to 
another. Like 802.1 le, 802.1 If is still in the standard developmental stage. 

g. 802 . 11 g 

The 802.1 Ig extension offers wireless transmission over relatively short 
distances at speeds from 20 Mbps up to 54 Mbps. It operates in the 2.4GHz and 5GHz 
radio band ranges. The 802.1 Ig standard uses Orthogonal Frequency-Division 
Multiplexing (OFDM) modulation [Ref 9]. However, for backward compatibility with 
11b, it also supports Complementary Code Keying (CCK) modulation and, as an option 
for faster link rates, allows Packet Binary Convolutional Coding (PBCC) modulation. 
The 802.1 Ig extension is still in the standard developmental stage. 

h. 802 . 11 h 

The 802.1 Ih extension is supplementary to the MAC layer to comply with 
European regulations for 5GHz WLANs. European radio regulations for the 5GHz band 
require products to have Transmission Power Control (TPC) and Dynamic Frequency 
Selection (DFS) [Ref 10]. This feature, TPC, limits the transmitted power to the 
minimum needed to reach the farthest user while DFS selects the radio channel at the AP 
to minimize interference with other systems, particularly radar. This extension is still in 
the standard developmental stage. 


13 



I. 802.11i 

This extension focuses on enhancing WLAN security and on 
authenticating the 802.11, which includes Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service 
(RADIUS), Kerberos, and network port authentication (IEEE 802.lx). The 802.1 li will 
apply to 802.11 physical standards a, b and g and will provide an alternative to Wired 
Equivalent Privacy (WEP), with new encryption methods and authentication procedures. 
This extension is still in the standard developmental stage, but it is expected to be 
approved in September 2003. 

2. Bluetooth 

Bluetooth is a simple peer-to-peer protocol created to connect multiple consumer 
mobile information devices (cellular phones, laptops, handheld computers, digital 
cameras, and printers) without wire connection. It uses the IEEE 802.15 specification in 
the 2.4 to 2.5 GHz band with FHSS technology [Ref 2]. Bluetooth enables mobile 
devices to avoid interference from other signals by hopping to a new frequency after 
transmitting or receiving a packet. 

Bluetooth is a low-power-consuming technology with transmission distances of 
up to 30 feet and a throughput of about 1 Mbps. The range is extended to 300 feet by 
increasing the transmit power to 100 mW (milli Watt). It further supports up to three 
simultaneous voice channels and employs frequency-hopping schemes and power 
reduction to reduce interference with other devices operating in the same frequency band. 

D. THE APPLICATION OF THE WLAN IN A SOFTWARE METRICS 

LABORATORY (ING 158) 

This lab provides hands-on instruction in computer networks and software 
engineering. It is also used for faculty research and for student thesis research in 
computer networks, and in software metrics and reliability. The lab supports the 
following courses: Software Design (IS3020), Computer Networks: Wide Area and Local 
Area (IS3502) and Software Reliability (SW4581). 


14 



1, Existing LAN 

The SML is divided into two compartments, Segment 1 and Segment 2. Segment 
1, closer to the entrance, consists of twelve workstations while Segment 2 consists of 
eight workstations and one server. The SML is equipped with two 16-port Ethernet 
switches - one for each segment. These 16-port Ethernet switches are connected to a 
3com Ethernet switch (running at 155 Mbps on its output) via a Cat 5 cable and a Patch 
Panel as shown in Figure 4. 

Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCPMP) is a protocol suite used 
in the Internet that provides application programs with access to a connection-oriented 
communication service. A Domain Name Server (DNS) is an automated system used to 
translate computer names into equivalent IP addresses. 

The existing FAN uses static Class B IP addresses, in a range of 131.120.43.111 
to 131.120.43.131. Only 21 (20 mobile stations and 1 server) of the 254 IP addresses are 
used. The IP Address of DNS is 131.120.254.58 and 52; the IP Address of the Server is 
131.120.43.123; the subnet address is 131.120.43.x and the subnet mask is 255.255.252.0 

The SME has TCP/IP applications, network design, network monitoring, network 
management and application tools, software design, and software reliability programs 
installed and distributed throughout the LAN. Examples of the software and network 
applications employed by the SML are Visio (for network drawings), Telnet, FTP, 
Traceroute, and Ping. In addition, a Windows NT 4.0 Server is the server operating 
system, and Microsoft XP and Windows NT 4.0 Workstation are the mobile station 
operating systems. 

2, Planning a WLAN 

In order to stay current with the latest advances in networking technologies, SML 
needs to have both a wired LAN and a WLAN. The WLAN will supplement the existing 
wired LAN capabilities. 

To implement this plan, ten laptops with the Microsoft XP Operating System will 
be added (five in each segment). This means that ten wireless Network Interface Cards 
(NIC) will be used for this WLAN. In addition, SML will use the ISM 2.4 GHz band 
Spread Spectrum for the WLAN by connecting Ethernet Category 5 cables from the AP 
to the switchs, as show in Figure 5. 


15 



Since the static IP addresses in SML ranges from 131.120.43.111 to 
131.120.43.254. Of these 254 addresses, only 21 (20 desktops and 1 server) of these are 


utilized, leaving 233 addresses available to use between the APs and the laptops. 



Figure 4. The Connection of SML through NPS Backbone (From: Ref 11) 


In order to have the service covered for the entire SML, two APs will be needed 
for use. The two Cisco Aironet 1200 Series APs (with radius of 300 feet) are planned for 
the WLAN design, which is adequate for continuous roaming within the space of 400 
square feet of the SML area. The Aironet 1200 Series APs will be compatible with both 
IEEE 802.11a and 802.11b standards. For the SML WLAN design, the IEEE 802.11b 
standard will be used with speeds up to 11Mbps at 2.4 GHz. The 802.11b standard will 
be presented in greater detail in Appendix B. 


16 












































































NPS Wired Net\>ork Backbone (Ethernet) 

* With two access points for the lab, it will ensure redundancy and provide continuous wireless connections 
when one access point is down. 


Subnet: 13).l20.43.xx 
Subnet Mask: 255.255.252.0 
Default Gateway: I3I.120.40.I 
DNS: 131.120.2^.58 & 52 
Binding: NIC 

NETBEUI: Local Communication. 
I'CP/II’ Applications: PING, KI P, 
I'elnct, I'raceroute. 


Figure 5. SML WLAN Design Architecture (From : Ref 11) 


17 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 


18 



III. SECURITY CONCERNS FOR WLAN IN SML 


In this discussion, note that a WLAN does not currently exist in the Software 
Metrics Lab (SML). Thus, the discussion of security concerns is hypothetical (i.e., 
vulnerabilities that might exist if a WLAN were installed in SML). 

In a wired LAN, electrical and optical communication is confined to a physical 
link between the workstations with the wired connection. Traditionally, a firewall 
attempts to prevent unauthorized access to the network by protecting the workstations 
and the physical link. The security in a wired LAN is easy to visualize and to understand; 
on the other hand, WLANs are completely different. Communication is not confined to a 
physical link, but is broadcasted through the air in all directions simultaneously. Hence, 
the unauthorized user can easily capture this signal over the air. 

Security in a WLAN is important and, as with any wired LAN, should be given a 
high priority. No wired LAN or WLAN can provide complete security. Despite the 
various security measures being implemented into the standards, the security issues still 
remain due to the boundary-less nature of a WLAN. An intruder will likely have more 
access to the network when attempting to break the security measures. There are many 
security risks associated with WLAN technologies, so the administrator in SML should 
have a broad understanding of the various weak points that exist in the WLAN standards. 
This ensures that informed decisions can be made as to whether this type of technology 
would ultimately be of benefit in the uses of a WLAN in SML. 

A. THE CONCEPTS OF C.I.A. 

Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (C.I.A.) are three fundamental tenets of 
the information systems security process [Ref 4]. These three tenets must be considered 
in the security of a WLAN in SML because this is the first step in identifying potential 
threats and protection that should be implemented to mitigate and control risk. 

1. Confidentiality 

Confidentiality is the ability to hide information from unauthorized persons, 
which means the information is limited to those that need it. Confidentiality is the tenet 
most often attacked. Cryptography and Encryption methods are attempts to ensure the 
confidentiality of data transferred from one computer to another. 


19 



2, Integrity 

Integrity is the ability to ensure that information is an accurate and unchanged 
representation of the original information. One type of security attack is to intercept some 
important information and modify it before sending it on to the intended receiver, without 
both ends knowing that the data had been changed. 

3. Availability 

Availability is the guarantee that the information is readily accessible to the 
authorized user when it is needed and that it is ready for use. Some types of security 
attacks attempt to deny access to the appropriate user, such as the Denial-of-Service 
(DoS) attack, which tries to bring a network or server down. 

B. TYPES OF HACKER 

WLAN security is in many ways so weak that people easily exploit it. The 
combination of low barrier against wireless hackers and available freeware tools permits 
these hackers to penetrate WLANs easier. Unauthorized users can be divided into four 
categories [Ref 12]: 

1. Accidental Users 

Accidental users are just unauthorized users of a WLAN. They are not trying to 
hack into WLAN, and they might not even know that a WLAN exists 

2. Script Kiddies 

The term script kiddies refers to people who want to be a hacker but do not have 
much skill and experience. They simply download some available freeware tools, which 
they are able to learn how to use. In addition, they are not able to write their own 
malicious codes. 

3. Casual Hackers 

Casual hackers are more capable than script kiddies. They know how hacker tools 

work. These hackers are able to decode a wireless packet log and analyze the wireless 
packages not for the purpose of stealing, but for entertaining themselves. Although the 
casual hackers are capable, they will target the easiest WLAN, which has minimal or no 
security measures implemented. 


20 



4. 


Skilled Hackers 


The skilled hackers are capable and determined, since they can be employed by a 
competitor who wants to break into a network. They can write their own malicious codes, 
which require patience and insight to exploit cryptographic weaknesses. However, these 
types of hackers are less numerous than the other types of hackers. When securing a 
WLAN in the SML, the administrator needs to decide which of these people to keep out. 
C. THE HACKER’S WLAN TOOLS 

When the new IEEE 802.11 standard has been release, the hackers as well as 
white hat hackers are eager to experiment with tools to break the security standard. This 
effort also introduces new and more sophisticated tools for breaking the security 
standard. This section provides a few examples of these hardware and freeware tools 
available on the Internet. 

1. Available Freeware Tools 

New WLAN hacking tools are introduced on the Internet every week, where 
anyone can download them. Some of these freeware tools, such as WEPCrack and 
AirSnort, can exploit vulnerabilities in the WEP encryption algorithm [Ref 13]. When 
breaking the WEP, the WLAN traffic must be captured sufficiently to recognize a 
repetition pattern and break the encryption key. Administrators need to become 
familiarized with these tools to know the WLAN’s vulnerability posed by these tools. 
Table 1 shows the freeware tools that are well-known, with websites and a description of 
each freeware tool. 

2, Antennas 

Antennas help the hackers receive a stronger wireless signal from longer 
distances: more than 300 feet. These antennas are either available commercial antennas 
or homemade antennas, which are built with available material, such as cans or aluminum 
tubing, as shown in Figure 6 and 7. The later antenna can pick up 802.11 signals from up 
to 2,000 feet away [Ref 14]. 


21 



Tool 

Web site 

Description 

NetStumbler 

www.netstumbler.com 

Freeware wireless AP identifier - 
listens for SSIDs & sends beacons as 
probes searching for APs 

Kismet 

www.kismetwireless.net 

Freeware wireless sniffer and monitor 
- passively monitors wireless traffic & 
sorts data to identify SSIDs, MAC 
addresses, channels and connection 
speeds 

Wellenreiter 

httn://nacketstormsecuritv.nl 

Freeware WLAN discovery tool - uses 
brute force to identify low traffic APs, 
hides your real MAC, integrates with 
GPS 

THC-RUT 

www.thehackerschoice.com 

Freeware WLAN discovery tool - uses 
brute force to identify low traffic APs, 
“your first knife on a foreign network” 

Ethereal 

www.ethereal.com 

Freeware WLAN analyzer - 
interactively browse the capture data, 
viewing summary and detail 
information for all observed wireless 
traffic 

WEPCrack 

httD://sourceforge.net/Droiects 

/wepcrack/ 

Freeware encryption breaker - cracks 
802.11 WEP encryption keys using the 
latest discovered weakness of RC4 key 
scheduling 

AirSnort 

httn ://airsnort. shmoo .com 

Freeware encryption breaker - 
passively monitoring transmissions, 
computing the encryption key when 
enough packets have been gathered 

HostAP 

httD://hostaD.eDitest.fi 

Converts a WLAN station to function 
as an AP (Available for WLAN cards 
that are based on Intersil's 

Prism2/2.5/3 chipset) 


Table 1. Freeware Tools (From: Ref 14) 


22 




If 



Figure 7. Homemade Antenna (From Ref: 16) 


D. TYPE OF ATTACK ON WLAN 

A number of security vulnerabilities have unfortunately been discovered in 
802.11 by malicious hacker exploits. These security threats to the WLAN can range from 
relatively harmless free Internet access to malicious intrusion, snooping, interference, 
destruction of data, and a virus attack. The WLAN may be subject to different kinds of 
attacks, which are usually divided into two broad categories: passive and active [Ref 2]. 
Figure 8 provides a general taxonomy of security attacks to help organizations and users 
understand some of the attacks against WLANs. 


23 



Attacks 


Passive Attacks 


Active Attacks 


Eavesdropping 


Traffic 

Analysis 


Masquerade 


Replay 


Message 

Modification 


Denial-of- 

Service 


Figure 8. Taxonomy of Security Attacks (From Ref:2) 

1. Passive Attack 

A passive attack is the method of analyzing the traffic by intercepting and 
extracting the raw data. The hacker uses a sniffer tool, such as an AiroPeek, to analyze 
this data. Due to the physical transmitting properties of a WLAN, the traffic can easily 
be captured at any location as long as the signal reaches the hacker’s system. An attack 
simply gains access to the network but does not modify the data (i.e., eavesdropping). 
Passive attacks can be either simple eavesdropping or traffic analysis (sometimes called 
traffic flow analysis) [Ref 2]. These two passive attacks are as follows. 

a. Eavesdropping 

Eavesdropping is the most obvious threat for a WLAN [Ref 17]. The 
hackers simply monitor transmissions for message content in real time, since there are no 
boundaries on the wireless medium to acquire information flowing from a mobile station 
to the AP. In addition, the hacker can record this message content for future 
cryptanalysis. 

b. Traffic Analysis 

Traffic analysis is a more sophisticated way than eavesdropping to gain 
intelligence. The hacker analyzes the traffic by monitoring the transmissions for patterns 
of communication. The hacker uses this information to gain access to the traffic from 
each user on the WLAN. 


24 


2 . 


Active Attack 


An Active attack relates to modifying and falsifying a message in the traffic [Ref 
2], Modifying and falsifying transferred information means that a part of the message is 
changed or delayed, re-organized, and resent to enable the desired unauthorized function. 
Detection of this type of attack is possible, but it may not be preventable [Ref 18]. Active 
attacks may take the form of one of four types (or combination thereof): masquerading, 
replay, message modification, and Denial-of-Service (DoS) [Ref 2]. These attacks are as 
follows. 

a. Masquerading 

Masquerading occurs when the attacker impersonates an authorized user 
to gain access as privileged user. In this type of attack, the hacker can modify accounts, 
configuration data, network signaling, and billing and usage data. Masquerading includes 
the use of spoofing, rogue APs, and redirection attacksk 

b. Replay 

In this type of attack, the attacker intercepts transmissions (passive attack) 
in the WLAN traffic and retransmits messages as the legitimate user. The hacker does not 
modify the messages, just resends altered messages to an authorized user pretending to 
the system host. 

c. Message Modification 

Message modification is accomplished when the attacker modifies the 
message by adding, deleting, changing, or recording it. In addition, an attacker may wish 
to alter the configuration of a device using, for example. Simple Network Management 
Protocol (SNMP) to configure APs. 

d. Denial-of-Service 

A Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack on availability prevents or prohibits the 
users from the normal use or management of the WLAN systems. The attacker issues 


1 An attacker on the route between the mobile station and the AP may redirect mobility bindings to a 
desired address simply by modifying the IP and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) headers of the Registration 
Request message. This vulnerability may be used by an attacker to read traffic destined to a mobile station, 
and to send traffic impersonating the mobile station. 


25 



malicious commands or injects a large amount of traffic that fills up the radio frequency 
spectrum. In addition, the attacker can create radio interference by using microwave 
ovens or other WLAN equipment to attack the WLAN. 

E. VUNERABILITY OF THE WLAN IN SML 

A WLAN in SML will face all of the security challenges of any wired network in 
addition to the new risks introduced by the wireless medium that connects stations and 
APs. In addition, there are several vulnerabilities of the security mechanism of the IEEE 
802.11b, which will be used in SML; this issue is discussed in Appendix B. Because 
security risks for the WLAN in SML can come from the most malicious hackers as well 
as from staff or students with the best of intentions, threats to WLAN security can be 
susceptible to internal vulnerabilities and external threats 

1, Internal Vulnerabilities 

The internal vulnerabilities will open the door for intruders and hackers to pose 
serious threats to the WLAN in SML. 

a. A Rogue WLAN 

A rogue WLAN is an unauthorized entry point in the NFS network, and 
poses the risk of unauthorized use of service. Staff or students can easily plug their rogue 
APs into the network for convenience of wireless fast computing, without going through 
the SML approvals. Although adding the rogue AP does not cost much, it will introduce 
vulnerabilities to the NFS network. The rogue AP is a security risk because it allows 
access straight into the NFS network because the default setting of most APs will 
broadcast SSID settings with no encryption. This also makes it easier for the attacker 
from outside to gain access to the NFS network. 

b. Insecure Network Configurations 

Insecure configurations introduce a significant security concern to a 
WLAN in SML. Default settings, including default passwords of the APs, open 
broadcasts of SSIDs, weak or no encryption, and lack of authentication configuration in 
order to emphasize ease of use and rapid deployment, can open the SML to vulnerability. 


26 



For instance, the default of Cisco APs, which will be used in SML, is a “tsunami2” [Ref 
19]. Most of the hackers knew this default SSID. 

c. Accidental Associations 

Accidental associations between a station and a neighboring WLAN in 
SML is a security concern when the signal is overlapping networks. This occurs when 
neighboring WLANs located on adjacent floors operate a WLAN that emanates a strong 
RF signal broadcasting over into SML space. The WLAN Windows XP operating system 
enables wireless users to automatically associate and connect to the neighbor’s network 
without their knowledge. A mobile station in SML connecting to a neighboring WLAN 
can reveal passwords or sensitive documents to unauthorized users in SML from the 
neighboring network. 

2, External Threats 

The external threats come from unauthorized users who are not NPS staff and 
students. These attackers may or may not be located inside the NPS premises. These 
threats include espionage, identity theft, and other attacks, such as Denial-of-Service and 
Man-in-the-Middle attacks. Furthermore, the most secure WLANs are not 100 percent 
safe from the continuously evolving external threats that include eavesdropping and 
espionage. 

a. Eavesdropping & Espionage 

If a WLAN were installed in SML it would be vulnerable to 
eavesdropping, because SML, located in the Ingersoll building, is close to Sloat Avenue 
(approximately 300 feet) as shown in the circled area in Figure 9. This area is the most 
vulnerable to attacks. Walls and doors do not provide sufficient containment of the 
wireless signal. An AP placed inside SML can transmit a signal anywhere up to 300 feet 
indoors and 1000 feet with an antenna outdoors, hence, the attackers do not have to enter 
the NPS premise. Attackers could capture the wireless signal from Sloat Avenue, since 
wireless communication is broadcast over radio waves. The attacker may also use 
antennas to increase the wireless signal strength. The attacker could passively sniff a 
WLAN in SML, without gaining physical access. In addition, messages encrypted with 


2 "tsunami” is the SSID of an AP, which is used as a default by Cisco Systems Corp. for its 
WLAN products. 


27 



the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) security protocol can be decrypted with available 
hacking tools; these tools will be discussed later in this chapter. 



Table C area 


;Table'G' 

area 


Jable 


Table 


Table 


60320 ^ 


* ACADEMIC □ NATURAL RESOURCES AREA 

H OPERATIONS □□ UOPH 

H ADMINISTRATIVE □□ UEPH 

■■ COMMUNITY FACILITIES Cn FAMILY HOUSING r- 

H RECREATION 

□ MAINTENANCE. PRODUCTION. SUPPLY. UTILITIES 


EXISTING 
BUILDING/ 
LAND USE 


Figure 9. Map of NPS (From Ref:20) 


b. SSID and MAC Address Theft 

A WLAN in SML, is vulnerable to the theft of a Service Set Identifier 
(SSID) and MAC address. The SSID is an identification value programmed in the AP or 
group of APs to identify the local wireless subnet; it acts as a crude password to verify 
that mobile stations are authorized to connect to an AP, with the MAC address acting as 
personal identification numbers used to verify the authorized connection with the AP. 
The SSID is shared among the staff and students. Hence, the attackers might know the 
SSID of a WLAN in SML. Some APs broadcast the SSID for initial usage, and some use 
default SSID; these SSIDs can be found on the Internet at http://www.doc-x.de/cgi- 


28 
































































bin/wiki.pl?DefaultSSID. When the SSID broadcast is enabled, any mobile station 
without a SSID is able to receive it to access an AP. 

c. War Driving 

War driving is a term used to describe a hacker who is equipped with a 
laptop, wireless card, and antenna [Ref 4], These hackers drive around a city in a vehicle 
to discover unprotected WLANs. To find WLAN signal in the Ingersoll building, a 
hacker can easily use Digle software. This software can be downloaded free from 
www.wigle.net, and it can run on the Windows XP operation system. However, the 
software requires a graphic (Java(tm) version 1.3.0 and up). The Digle software is 
integrated with a geographic dataset call a “MapPack”. The MapPack is updated by the 
members of the wigle website and is available in any county in the United States. 

This software can provide enough information to launch an attack on a 
WLAN, since the vital information such as SSID, MAC address, and Channel is revealed. 
In some WLANs, an SSID can not be seen, since the AP does not broadcast the SSID. By 
using Digle software, the SSID broadcast from Ingersoll building can be identified as 
GPP, as shown in Figure 10. This map reveals SSID (GPP), MAC Address 
(00:30:ab:2I:d0:d8), Channel (6). In addition, other tools are available to discover a 
WLAN signal, such as Netstumbler and Kismet. Both Netstumbler and Kismet work in 
tandem with a Global Positioning System (GPS) to map exact locations of the identified 
WLANs [Ref 14]. 

d. Evolving Attack [Ref. 14] 

An evolving attack is the sophisticated attack by skilled hackers or casual 
hackers who can write their own malicious codes. The following section describes the 
well-known type of attacks, such as malicious association, Denial-of-Service, MAC 
Spoofing and Man-in-the-Middle attacks, which might make a WLAN in SML vulnerable. 

(1) Malicious Association. Malicious association is an attack 
in which the hackers force a mobile station in SML to connect to an unauthorized AP or 
alter the configuration of the mobile station to operate in the Ad Hoc mode. The hackers 
use the freeware tool HostAP to convert the hacker’s mobile station to operate as an AP 
function. When the mobile stations of the SML broadcast a probe to associate with an 
authorized AP, the new hacker AP responds to the request of SML for association. Then 


29 



the connection between the mobile station of the SML and the new hacker AP will begin 
by providing an IP address to the victim mobile station. At this point, the hackers can 
exploit all vulnerabilities on the mobile station of the SML 



Figure 10. The Detected Wireless Signal in Monterey, CA 

(2) MAC Spoofing. Mac spoofing is an attack in which casual 
or minimal skilled hackers can spoof their MAC address to be legitimate to gain access to 
the network. This presents unique opportunities for hackers to attack a WLAN in SML 
that is difficult to detect, since the hackers can present themselves as an authorized 
mobile station by using an altered MAC address. The hackers capture traffic that is 
generated by freeware tools, such as Kismet or Ethereal; these are available for hackers to 
easily pick off the MAC addresses of an authorized user in SML. The hackers can then 
assume the identity of that user by asserting the stolen MAC address as their own. The 
hacker then connects to the WLAN in SML as an authorized user. 

(3) Man-in-the-middle. Man-in-the-middle is one of more 
sophisticated attacks by skilled hackers. The hackers begin the attack by monitoring the 

30 










traffic of the WLAN in SML between a mobile station of the SML and an AP. They 
gather frame information to send back and forth about the wireless card and AP, such as 
the IP address of both devices, the association ID for wireless card, and the SSID of the 
WLAN in SML. 

The hacker tries to associate with the AP by sending a request that 
pretends this request packet comes from the legitimate mobile station. Then the AP sends 
the challenge to the legitimate mobile station that sends an appropriate authentic response 
to the AP to get access. The AP then sends the station a success packet with an imbedded 
sequence number. At this point, the hackers observe the valid response and act as the AP 
in presenting a challenge to the legitimate mobile station. In the next step, the hacker 
sends a spoofed reply with large sequence number, which pushes the legitimate mobile 
station off the WLAN in SML and keeps this legitimate mobile station from re¬ 
associating. The hacker then enters the WLAN in SML as the authorized station. 

(4) Denial-of-Service Attacks. Denial-of-Service attacks can 
range from basic to more sophisticated attacks. For the basic attack, the hackers can use 
electronic devices, such as microwave, and cordless phones to cause interference on the 
2.4 GHz frequency. These devices can jam airwaves and shut down the WLAN in SML. 

For more sophisticated DoS attacks, the hackers configure their 
mobile station to operate as an AP. By doing so, the hackers flood the airwaves with 
persistent disassociated commands to force all mobile stations in SML to disconnect from 
the WLAN. In addition, the hackers can launch other DoS attack methods by 
broadcasting periodic disassociated commands every few minutes. The result is to push 
mobile stations in SML off the WLAN. 

F. SUMMARY 

The attacks and malicious threats against a WLAN are continually increasing in 
number and sophistication along with computer technology. New hacking activities seem 
to arise daily that block the growth of the WLAN. The security measures for the WLAN 
must continue to improve to keep up with these threats. There are many WLAN security 
issues that require attention when employing a WLAN in SML. The next chapter will 
discuss how to minimize the risk of deploying a WLAN in SML. 


31 



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32 



IV. SECURITY IN THE SOFTWARE METRICS LAB 


As discussed in the previous ehapter, numerous methods are available to exploit 
the seeurity of a WLAN in SML. However, most of these vulnerabilities ean be addressed 
by reasonable seeurity preeautions. The first step to make WLAN in SML seeure is to 
define a seeurity poliey prior to aetual deploying the WLAN. The effeetive seeurity 
poliey involves defining, disseminating, and enforeing WLAN seeurity polieies and 
practiees. These inelude speeifying a configuration and the settings of the WLAN 
equipment authorized for use, as well as doeumenting and managing the APs and the 
eonneeted network inlf astrueture. Seeurity edueation for staff and students also inereases 
awareness of seeurity risks. Some staff members and students may not realize that 
deploying an unauthorized WLAN or using a WLAN deviees form a default setting may 
increase seeurity risks. 

In establishing seeurity of a WLAN in SML, the defined seeurity polieies should 
inelude three key eomponents: WLAN Usage, Network Configuration, and Seeurity 
polieies. 

A. WLAN USAGE POLICIES 

The WLAN security policy in SML must first define the proper use of WLANs. 
This ineludes the applieations that run aeross the WLAN and the exaet loeations where 
WLANs should and should not be deployed in the SML. Another eonsideration is 
determining where staff and students ean use WLAN deviees in environments outside the 
control of the SML. For some applications, WLANs can provide conneetions to the 
campus backbone to run most applications. However, WLANs may not be well suited for 
applieations with sensitive information, sinee WLAN security standards have not yet 
been fully proofed. 

In addition to seeurity eoncems, bandwidth for WLAN is a limited resource. 
Bandwidth intensive applieations and network misuse, sueh as the downloading of MP3 
files, ean significantly slow down the network and limit the WLAN’s ability to serve 
multiple users. 


33 



B. NETWORK CONFIGURATION POLICIES 

Before the WLAN in SML is deployed, the network configuration policies should 
be determined to guide the installation and configuration of the WLAN. Properly 
configured networks can minimize security risk and maximize the network’s 
performance. 

I. User Authentication 

Because a WLAN operates in an uncontrolled medium, authentication is an 
essential measure in securing a WLAN. This authentication allows only authorized users 
such as staff and students to use the WLAN in SML. To make the WLAN in SML secure, 
the following measurements are recommended. 

a. Turn Off SSID Beacons 

The SSID is the wireless identification that distinguishes it from nearby 
WLANs. Most APs broadcast their SSIDs several times each second by configured 
default [Ref 12]. The problem with this type of broadcasting is that anyone can join the 
WLAN to obtain broadcasted SSID. Hence, the WLAN in SML must turn off SSID to 
prevent the APs from broadcasting the network name. It also prevents users from using 
the WLAN accidentally, since they have to enter the correct SSID prior to joining the 
WLAN. 

b. Change the SSID 

Most APs come with default SSIDs, such as the Cisco APs that use the 
default SSID “tsunami” and Linksys that uses the name “linksys” [Ref 21]. The problem 
with using a default SSID is that hackers can easily use the WLAN in SML or even 
accidentally join a neighboring WLAN in the Ingersoll Building. 

To change the default SSID, it is important to select a meaningless SSID 
that an outside observer would see. However, when the SSID is turned off, it can still be 
sniffed by the hacker who can use freeware tools, such as Kismet. Therefore, changing 
the SSID will not prevent anyone from eavesdropping. However, doing this will make it 
less convenient for hackers to gain access, causing them to configure a SSID manually 
instead of joining with a preconfigured default SSID. 


34 



c. Implement Network A uthentication 

All the mobile stations in SML must be set to disable Auto-Logon. The 
Auto-Logon features of Windows 2000 and Windows XP have an option in the operating 
system to automatically log on when a user boots the system, which is very convenient. 
However, if unauthorized users can reach these mobile stations, they can also log on 
automatically. 

In addition, the Network Authentication of the Window 2000 Server must 
be set up to protect against an unauthorized user. In order to gain the access to the WLAN 
in SML, staff and students must provide valid user names and passwords. 

d. Implement MA C Filtering 

The Media Access Control (MAC) address is a physical address that 
uniquely identifies each computer or attached device on a network. Many APs include the 
ability to limit access by MAC ACLs that are stored and distributed across many APs. 
The MAC ACLs of WLAN in SML should be limited to ten MAC addresses of mobile 
stations in order to authenticate only authorized MAC addresses. Any mobile station with 
a MAC address that is not in the ACLs will not be permitted the use of the WLAN in 
SML. Nonetheless, the MAC ACLs do not provide a strong security mechanism by 
themselves, since MAC addresses are transmitted in the clear from a wireless NIC to an 
AP. 

The MAC address can be easily captured by using freeware tools, such as 
Kismet or Wellenreiter. As a result, hackers can spoof a captured MAC address to be 
legitimate, thus gaining access to the WLAN in SML. MAC ACLs may provide some 
level of security; however, an administrator in SML should use this with caution. MAC 
filtering may be enough defense against normal eavesdropping, but it may not be prevent 
a sophisticated attack. Therefore, MAC filtering is used as part of an overall defense-in- 
dept to add security levels of the WLAN in SML. 


35 



e. Manage the APs Unavailable on Wireless Connections 

Many APs have web-based management interfaces3 allowing configuring 
with user name and password authentication for convenient. This makes any wireless 
access for configuration on the APs vulnerable if the hackers can sniff user name and 
password. Therefore the web-base management interface of the APs in SML should not 
be available from the wireless connection to minimize the risk. The administrator should 
configure the APs through the wired LAN by using only certain workstations to obtain 
the web-base management interface. 

2, Confidentiality and Integrity 

Due to the broadcast and radio nature of wireless communication, the 
confidentiality and integrity of information are more difficult to protect from 
unauthorized users. The usage of cryptographic protection can minimize the risk by using 
a WEP method to encrypt the data between two ends. However, the weaknesses of WEP 
and the availability of numerous freeware tools are the critical vulnerabilities of the 
WLAN. To maintain confidentiality and integrity of the WLAN in SML, the following 
measures are recommended. 

a. Use WEP 

Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) has is vulnerable to attack due to the 
lack of key management and the lack of an adequate authentication method (see 
Appendix B for greater detail). Although the WEP has weaknesses in protecting 
confidentiality and integrity, it is better than no protection for the WLAN. In addition, 
although hackers can use freeware tools for cracking WEP keys, the process of breaking 
the keys is more difficult with WEP. Therefore, the WEP can be still useful to protect 
against casual hackers. 

In addition to protecting the confidentiality of WEP keys for distribution, 
these keys should be protected during the distribution of keys to the staff and students. 
Distributed keys must be encrypted by secure means to prevent unauthorized access to 
the key. 


3 The web-based management interface allows users to manage and configure the advanced features 
in the AP, such as AP Bridging, Gateway, DNS settings, or name and password authentication etc 


36 



b. Establish Proper Encryption Settings 

The WEPs are basically passwords to share among staff and students. The 
WEP keys must be carefully selected because they are subject to the same kinds of 
attacks as passwords. Two rules should be considered when selecting the WEP keys. 
First, a user should avoid meaningful words that can be deciphered. 

Second, the WEP keys should be put in a hexadecimal format, which has a 
larger key space than alphanumeric keys. The number of alphanumeric characters is more 
limited than hexadecimal characters — about a hundred million times [Ref 12]. As many 
as 128 bits can be used in the hexadecimal keys. In addition, the administrator should use 
the stronger 128-bit rather than 40-bit encryption. 

c. Change Default WEP Keys 

The manufacturer may provide one or more keys to enable shared key 
authentication between devices trying to gain access to the network and the AP. Using a 
default shared key setting is a security vulnerability because Cisco uses the identical 
shared keys “cisco” for factory settings. The hacker may know the default shared key and 
use it to gain access to the WLAN. Therefore, the default WEP key of Cisco Aironet 
APs, which will be used in SML, must be changed from “cisco” to the proper WEP key. 

d. Rotate WEP Keys 

Changing the default WEP key to the proper WEP key will mitigate the 
risk. However, the longer this WEP key is being used, the more vulnerable the key is. 
After using the proper WEP key for a period of time, the WEP key should be changed 
regularly. This rotation of the WEP key will reduce the impact of staff and students in 
SML giving away the WEP key, and will limit the time for hackers to crack a given WEP 
key. 

The standard compromise is to rotate WEP keys every 30-60 days [Ref 
12]. This is usually enough to keep the WEP key relatively fresh while minimizing the 
amount of time a compromised key grants access to the network. In addition, WEP keys 
should also be changed whenever a wireless device is lost or stolen, or when one or more 
of the staff and students leave the NPS, or when staff and students are no longer 
authorized to use the WLAN in SML. 


37 



3. 


Disable SNMP 


Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) manages the settings and status 
of network devices. Many APs allow configuration through SNMP. The SNMP for the 
AP has security problems. First, the SNMP can display or possibly change AP settings, 
including WEP keys. Second, implementating SNMP possibly allows hackers the 
privilege of administering access to devices. This vulnerability allows hackers to read or 
change settings on the AP; this adds or changes the WEP key for a possible DoS attack. 
Therefore the SNMP should be disabled on the APs for the WLAN in SML. If using the 
SNMP is necessary, the community string^ should be changed from the default by using 
the same policies as for other passwords. In addition, the SNMP should be configured 
through the wired LAN since the community string is sent over the network in plain text, 
and should use the access list to limit SNMP access to the wired side of the AP. 

4, Setting the Firewall 

A firewall is a barrier that separates sensitive components from attack. It can 
improve security and reduce vulnerability for the WLAN in SML. The firewalls should 
be implemented to segregate the WLAN from the NFS network (as shown in Figure 11) 
by putting the APs outside the firewall and setting up rules that permit only the IP and/or 
MAC addresses of legitimate users and authorized network traffic from the WLAN or 
legitimate APs. However, this is not a final or perfect solution because MAC and IP 
addresses can be spoofed. The benefit of the firewall is that it is used as part of an overall 
defense-in-dept to add security levels to the WLAN in SML. 

5. Keep Firmware Updated 

Keeping firmware updated is one of the more important steps in keeping the 
WLAN in SML secure. Software updates are a good way for a company to fix security 
problems, when there are bugs or protocol weaknesses. Since software bugs continue to 
be one of the biggest areas of security weakness [Ref 12], keeping up to date with the 
latest firmware patches is one way to make sure that WLAN in SML systems are not 
running. The administrator of the SML should frequently check firmware updates for a 


4 The community string, an octet string that is between 0 and 255 in the American Standard Code for 
Information Interchange (ASCII) characters in length, is used to authenticate access to the Management 
Information Base (MIB). Community strings function as a “password” embedded in every SNMP packet. 


38 



NIC and an AP which venders often implement via patches to firmware in order to fix 
security issues. 


Laptop computer 3 



Laptop computer 10 


Wireless Ethernet Connection 


' (All lapfops «qLiippnl with wirek^-neiwurk 

intcrftcc cards) 



Access Point 
Wi-R »02.11b 
(100-300 feet range)* 


Access Point 
Wi-Fi 802.11b 
(100-300 feel range)' 


Laptop computer 2 


Cabled Hthemet Connection 

(IPseWressw ot Ihc2 APswillbe 
dynamically assigned by CMICP) 



Firewall 


NPS Wired Network Backbone (Ethernet) 

* With two access points for the lah, it will ensure redundancy and provide continuous wireless connections 
when one access point is dow n. 


Protocols: 

TCP/IP 

Subnet: I31.l20.43.sx 
Subnet Mask: 255.255.252.0 
Default Gateway: I3I.120.40.I 
DNS; 131.120.2^.58 & 52 
Binding: NIC 

NFTBFXI: Local Communication. 
TCP/IP Applications: PING. FTP. 
Telnet. Traceroute. 


Figure 11. Setting the Firewall in SML 


In addition, the administrator of SML should frequently check for operating 
system patches for mobile stations, work stations, and servers. The SML administrator 
can check with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the 
Internet Categorization of Attack Toolkit (ICAT) vulnerability database 
(http://icat.nist.gov) for a listing of all known vulnerabilities in the software or hardware 
being implemented [Ref 2]. 


39 























C. SECURITY POLICIES 

A number of security issues of a WLAN can be addressed with the proper 
configured network. However, the WLAN in SML should also provide additional 
security policies to educate staff and students about security, and prohibit unauthorized 
WLAN hardware, software, and activities in SML. 

1, Security Education 

Security education for staff and students, who are authorized to use the WLAN in 
SML, is very important. This helps staff and students to understand the security 
limitations of the WLAN technology so that they will be aware of the vulnerabilities of 
the uses of the WLAN. Effective security education can be accomplished in two ways. 
First, provide copies of the security policy to staff and students. Second, establish a short 
security educational program, a 15-30 minute session to go over the highlights of the 
security policy. 

2, Prohibit Unauthorized APs 

Users can connect their APs to the WLAN in SML for their convenience. A single 
unauthorized AP or rogue AP attached to the WLAN in SML can expose the 
vulnerability to the NFS network, since the default setting of most APs will broadcast an 
SSID setting with no encryption. This rouge AP can enable the hackers to view, modify, 
or steal data Ifom outside the NPS premises. Hence, any AP that is not approved and 
configured by administrator must be prohibited from being installed on the WLAN in 
SML. 

3, Prohibit Ad Hoc Networks 

Ad Hoc networks allow mobile stations to connect to other such stations by using 
mobile devices instead of the APs. This Ad Hoc network permits staff and students to 
transfer data without going over the NPS network, while offering poor authentication. 
Therefore, the Ad Hoc network should be treated as a rogue AP which can put the 
WLAN in SML at risk without security managers ever seeing the vulnerability. For these 
reasons, security policies must be enforced to prohibit Ad Hoc networks. 


40 



4, Secure APs Physically 

The two APs should be properly secured within the SML to prevent any 
unauthorized access and physical tampering. These APs should be placed in a very secure 
location where they can’t be tampered with. 

Moreover, these two APs should be placed away from electromagnetic 
interference devices, such as microwave or cordless phones, since these devices can 
cause degradation in throughput. 

5, Limit User’s Privileges and Access Rights 

The user’s privileges and access rights to the systems and network resources must 
be restricted. The principle of least privilege must be considered: grant no user greater 
access to the system than his or her duty demands [Ref 22]. This principle can be applied 
to users’ modes of access, such as whether they receive read or write privileges. 

The privileges for configuration of APs and a WLAN key distribution program, 
and any utility or operating system, must be restricted to the SML administrator. This 
also prevents a compromise to the security of other systems with which information 
resources are shared. 

6, Log and Audit 

The Logging and auditing of the WLAN in SML could help to detect 
unauthorized network traffic by using freeware tools, such as AirSnort, Ethereal, or 
AeroPeek. These tools could analyze the traffic of the WLAN in SML, even though they 
are also an important tool for hackers. The sniffed information from WLAN traffic can 
indicate suspect activities, such as invalid SSIDs, unfamiliar MAC addresses, rejected 
DHCP requests, or ICMPS port unreachable. These signatures might well indicate 
intruder activity, which aids analysis and investigation in the event of a SML network 
problem. The SML administrator should periodically perform audits to detect any 
exceptions or abnormal network activities. 


5 Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) A protocol used to pass control and error messages back 
and forth between nodes on the Internet. Perhaps the most used ICMP command is ping. 


41 



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42 



V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 


A. CONCLUSIONS 

A WLAN may provide portability, flexibility, increased productivity and lower 
installation costs. Wireless technology provides the ability to move laptops from place to 
place within the office environment without wires and without lost connectivity. 

Deploying the WLAN in SML will be suitable for its roles and functions as a 
teaching facility for students undergoing computer network related-classes. The design of 
the WLAN was meant to be simple, and at the same time, achieve its desired objectives. 
As a result, the laboratory will be able to demonstrate to the students not only its wired 
but also its wireless networking capabilities. However, the biggest challenge facing 
WLAN technology today is its security vulnerabilities. Some of these vulnerabilities are 
the same as for wired networks, while others are unique to WLAN technology. In WLAN 
technology, because the medium is the air, the radio signal can propagate from outside 
Sloat Avenue to the Ingersoll Building. Therefore the hackers would possibly access the 
WLAN in SML outside of NFS. Loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability are 
typical risks. 

Users may intentionally or accidentally spread viruses or launch attacks that 
prevent staff and students from accessing the network because their laptops are 
compromised. Staff and students may also create a vulnerability for the WLAN in SML 
when installing APs for the WLAN in SML. In addition, the Internet contains several 
public web sites that provide maps of unsecured APs. Intruders or hackers can use this 
information to gain access to the WLAN in SML, which can result in the loss of data 
confidentiality, integrity, bandwidth, and network performance. Security must be 
achieved by defining and enforcing WLAN usage, network configuration, and security 
policies. Although all the countermeasures in Chapter 4 can be effective in reducing the 
risks associated with the WLAN, these countermeasures will not prevent all adversary 
penetration, nor will these necessarily guarantee a secure WLAN environment. Therefore 
improving security and discovering new security standards of the WLAN to deploy in 
SML is an area for further research. 


43 



B. FUTURE WORK 

Future work on security is warranted as follows: First, the WEP is inadequate for 
security. Second, WLANs are very difficult to manage as the size of the installation 
grows. To minimize these two problems, two security methods are suggested for future 
research of this thesis. 

1. The IEEE 802,111 Standards-Based Wireless Security 

Currently the WEP is the only standards-based security offered defining a shared 
key for encryption over the wireless air interface. The keys can range from 40 to 128 bits. 
Recently, WEP has been proven to be inadequate in security, even if the key is increased 
to 128 bits. 

A new working group within the IEEE, the IEEE Taskgroup I (TGi), is 
developing a new security standard to address the user authentication and encryption 
weaknesses of WEP-based wireless security [Ref 23]. The IEEE 802.111 addresses the 
security requirements of AP-based and Ad Hoc wireless networks. The formal completed 
802.111 standard is expected in the second half of 2003 [Ref 8]. The components of 
802.1 li are as following [Ref 24]. 

a. The IEEE 802.1x Port-based Authentication Framework 

The IEEE 802.lx port-based authentication framework is a method for 
transporting an authentication protocol between the mobile station and the AP, and the 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. This TLS protocol handles user authentication 
and key distribution between the end-user device and the TLS authentication service, 
which will sit on a back-end Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) 
server. 

b. The Temporal Key Integrity Protocol 

The Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) is a security protocol used 
within the IEEE 802.111 specifications for Wi-Fi networks. It introduces a sophisticated 
key generation function that encrypts every data packet sent over the wireless medium 
with its own unique encryption key. The TKIP fixes the security problems of WEP 
protocol in IEEE 802.1 lb by using RC4 ciphering with an added function such as a 128- 


44 



bit encryption key, a 48-bit initialization vector, a new Message Integrity Code (MIC), 
and Initialization Vector (IV) sequencing rules to provide better protection. 

c. The Advanced Encryption Standard Encryption Algorithm 

The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption algorithm is the 
standard approved by NIST to replace the RC4 encryption of a WEP. It can generate 128, 
192, and 256 bit keys for enhanced security. The AES will serve as a replacement for the 
Data Encryption Standard (DES), which has a key size of 56 bits. In addition, AES can 
encrypt data much faster than Triple-DES, a DES enhancement that essentially encrypts a 
message or document three times. 

d. Cipher Negotiation 

To accommodate a mix of encryption modes in the same WLAN, the 
802.1 li specification requires that devices advertise their encryption capabilities in AP 
beacons and station association requests. The AP and station then set the appropriate 
encryption cipher based on their mutual capabilities and any specific policies that have 
been set up for the network. 

2, Virtual Private Network Wireless Security 

A Virtual Private Network (VPN) is a private data network that makes use of the 
public Internet. It provides secure access to the corporate network for remote users. In the 
remote user application, the VPN provides a secure tunnel over the insecure network. The 
three most common VPN communications protocol standards are used with, Point-to- 
Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP), Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP), and Internet 
Protocol Security (IPSec) [Ref 23]. 

The VPN technology can also be used for securing the WLAN by using an end- 
to-end encryption method. The APs are configured for open access with no WEP 
encryption, but the WLAN is isolated from the wired LAN by the VPN server [Ref 23]. 
The APs can be connected together via a Virtual LAN (VLAN) or a LAN that is 
deployed in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)6 and connected to the VPN server as shown 


6 The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) is a computer host or small network inserted as a "neutral zone" 
between a company's private network and the outside public network. It prevents outside users from getting 
direct access to a server that has company data. A DMZ is an optional and more secure approach to a 
firewall and effectively acts as a proxy server as well. 


45 



in Figure 12. Authentication and full encryption over the wireless network is provided 
through the VPN servers that also act as firewalls/gateways to the internal private 
network. Unlike the WEP key and MAC address filtering approaches, the VPN-based 
solution is scalable to a very large number of users. 



Figure 12. 802.11 VPN Wireless Security (From: Ref 4) 

The VPN is preferable for large networks because the administrators do not have 
to maintain MAC addresses on each AP. The point at which the number of mobile station 
systems becomes unmanageable varies depending on the organization’s ability to 
administer the network, on its choice of security methods (SSID, WEP, and MAC address 
fdtering), and on its tolerance for risk. If MAC address filtering is used on a wireless 
network, the fixed upper limit is established by the maximum number of MAC addresses 
that can be programmed into each AP used in an installation. This upper limit varies, but 
the practical problem of manually entering and maintaining valid MAC addresses in 
every AP on a network limits the use of MAC address filtering to smaller networks. 

In summary, there is need for future work for the WLAN in SML to enhance the 
security by applying the VPN or the IEEE 802.1 li. In addition, since a new experiment 
and a new tool that is more sophisticated for breaking the new security standard is 
probable, previous and new counter measurements and security policies must be 
reviewed periodically 


46 





























APPENDIX A. COMMON WIRELESS FREQUENCIES AND 

APPLICATIONS [REF 2] 


EM Band Designation 

Frequency Range 

Wireless Device/Application 

VLF: Very Low Frequency 

9 kHz-30 kHz 


LF: Low Frequency 

30 kHz-300 kHz 


MF: Medium Frequency 

300 kHz-3 MHz 

AM radio stations (535 kHz-1 MHz) 

HF: High Frequency 

3 MHz - 30 MHz 

United States Navy fleet communication 

VHF: Very High Frequency 

30 MHz-300 MHz 

FM radio stations 

VHF television stations 7-13, NTSC Standard 
(174MHz-220 MHz) 

Garage door openers (~40 MHz) 

Standard cordless telephones (40MHz-50 

MHz) 

Alarm Systems (~40 MHz) 

Paging Systems (50Mhz-300 MHz) 

UHF: Ultra High Frequency 

300 MHz-3 GHz 

Paging systems (300MHz-500 MHz) 

IG Mobile telephones (824MHz-829 MHz) 

2G Mobile telephone (800MHz-900 MHz) 

Global System for Mobile Communication 
(GSM) 

Enhanced Data Rates for Global Evolution 
(EDGE) (800/900/1800/1900 MHz bands) 

3G Mobile telephones (international standard) 
(1,755 MHz-2200 MHz) 

Bluetooth devices (2.4 GHz) 

HomeRF (2.4 GHz) 

WLAN (2.4 GHz) 

SHF: Super High Frequency 

3 GHz-30 GHz 

Applications in the short range, point-to-point 
communications including remote control 
systems, PDAs, etc 

WLAN (5.8 GHz). Local Multipoint 

Distribution Services (LMDS), a fixed wireless 
technology that operates in the 28 GHz band 
and offers line-of-sight coverage over distances 
up to 3-5 kilometers. 

EHF: Extremely High 
Frequency 

30 GHz-300 GHz 

Satellite Communications 

IR: Infrared 

300 GHz 

Remote controls for home audio visual 
components 

IR links for peripheral devices 

PDA and cellular telephone IR links 


47 




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48 



APPENDIX B. THE IEEE 802.11 B STANDARD 


The 802.11b is a RF standard developed by the IEEE for WLANs. Using this 
standard, businesses and home users can connect their networks with a variety of 802.11b 
compatible devices, such as desktop computers, laptop computers, PC peripherals, 
without wires connected to the PC cards, and mini PCI and USB ports. The 802.11b 
standard is also known as Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi)7 [Ref 25]; its technology is already 
changing how businesses and home users access the network. 

In 1997, the IEEE first 802.11 working group was developed for 1Mbps and 
2Mbps data rates [Ref 25]. This Physical (PHY) layer uses a Direct Sequence Spread 
Spectrum (DSSS) signaling scheme, with modulation methods used for the 1Mbps and 
2Mbps data rates being Differential Binary Phase Shift Keying (DBPSK) and Differential 
Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (DQPSK), respectively. The 802.11b extension was then 
developed by the working group in 1999 to increase the data rate by using 
Complementary Code Keying (CCK), which uses a set of 64 eight-bit unique code words 
[Ref 5]. This extension uses the same bandwidth as the 1Mbps and 2Mbps data rates 
operating in the 2.4GHz (2.4 to 2.483 GHz) unlicensed RF band. The extension can 
transmit up to 11Mbps (Megabits per second). 

The basic architecture, features, and services of the 802.11b are defined by the 
original 802.11 standard, which includes only two bottom levels of an OSI reference 
model, PHY and the Data Link Layer. The Data Link Layer consists of two sublayers, the 
Logical Link Control (LLC) sublayer and the Medium Access Control (MAC) sublayer 
as shown in Figure 13. The 802.1 lb specification affects only the physical layer, adding 
a higher data rate and more robust connectivity [Ref 6]. 


7 Wi-Fi was adopted by the Wireless Ethernet Compatibility Alliance (WECA), which tests and 
certifies products for compliance and interoperability with the 802.11b standard and gives the Wi-Fi label 
to those that pass the tests (see Ref 26). 


49 



Network 

Operating 

System 

(NOS) 


802.11b 


Application Layer 


Presentation Layer 


Session Layer 


Transport 


Network Layer 


Oata Link Layer 


Physical Layer 


TCP 

IP 

Logical Link Control (LLC) 802.2 
Medium Access Control 


Figure 13. OSI Reference Model (From: Ref 6) 

A. OPERATION MODES 

The IEEE 802.1 lb defines two pieces of equipment for a WLAN: first, a wireless 
station, usually a PC or a laptop with a wireless Network Interface Card (NIC); second, 
an AP, which acts as a bridge between the wireless stations and the Distribution System 
(DS) or wired networks [Ref 6]. The WLAN has two operating modes: the Infrastructure 
mode and the Ad Hoc mode, as shown in Figure 14. 


A’ryvl; .’M 


Wiixi 

nHi.hilMii Ivili'II ■ 



Samr 


HjIthHIf 




WinWsii £t>4k>ni 


St 


StAtEHH 




ESS 


(InfrafitfucturA Made} 


EBSS 

(Ad-H« HAd«) 


Figure 14. Infrastructure Mode and Ad Hoc Mode (From: Ref 27) 


50 



































1, Infrastructure Mode 

In the infrastructure mode, at least one wireless AP and one mobile station exist. 
The mobile station uses the AP to access the network. This mode includes a basic service 
set and an extended service set. 

a. Basis Service Set 

The Basis Service Set (BSS) is a single AP that supports one or multiple 
wireless stations. An AP provides a local bridge function for the BSS. All wireless 
stations communicate with the AP but do not communicate directly with wired networks. 
All frames are relayed between mobile stations by the AP. 

b. Extended Service Set 

The Extended Service Set (ESS) is a set of two or more APs that are 
connected to the same wired network. The APs communicate among themselves, 
forwarding traffic from one BSS to another to facilitate movement of wireless stations 
between BSSs [Ref 28]. In addition, the ESS is a single logical network segment (also 
known as a subnet), which is identified by its Service Set Identifier (SSID). If the 
available physical areas of APs are in an ESS overlap, a wireless station can roam or 
move from one location (with an AP) to another (with a different AP), while maintaining 
Network layer connectivity. 

2, Ad Hoc Mode 

In the Ad Hoc mode, also known as a peer-to-peer mode, wireless stations 
communicate directly with each other from an Independent Basic Service Set (IBSS) [Ref 
6]. The mode is a set of 802.11 wireless stations which communicate directly with one 
another without using the AP or wired connection. However, every station may not be 
able to communicate with all stations due to range limitations. Therefore, all stations 
need to be within the range of each other to communicate directly (without the use of an 
AP). 

B. THE IEEE 802.1 IB PHYSICAL LAYER 

The 802.11 Physical (PHY) layer is the interface between the MAC layer and the 
wireless media where frames are transmitted and received. The layer is split into two 
parts, the Physical Layer Convergence Protocol (PLCP) and the Physical Medium 
Dependent (PMD) sublayer [Ref 5]. The PLCP presents a common interface for the MAC 


51 



sub layer to write to and provides carrier sense and Clear Channel Assessment (CCA). 
The PMD provides a clear channel assessment mechanism, transmission, and a reception 
mechanism. It also provides the wireless encoding. 

The PHY provides three functions. First, the PHY provides an interface to 
exchange frames with the upper MAC layer for transmission and reception of data. 
Second, the PHY uses signal carrier and spread spectrum modulation to transmit data 
frames over the media. Third, the PHY provides a carrier sense indication back to the 
MAC to verify activity on the media [Ref 28]. 

1, Transmission Methods 

The IEEE 802.1 lb defines 11 Mbps and 5.5 Mbps data rates (in addition to the 1 
and 2Mbps rates) utilizing an extension to DSSS called High Rate DSSS (HR/DSSS). It 
also defines a rate shifting technique in which 11 Mbps networks may transmit at lower 
speeds, such as 5.5 Mbps, 2 Mbps, and 1 Mps under noisy conditions or to inter-operate 
with legacy 802.11 PHY layers [Ref 28]. If the wireless station moves back within the 
range of a higher-speed transmission, the connection will automatically speed up again. 
Table 1 summarizes the key details in DSSS. 

Traditionally, IEEE 802.11 uses either a Frequency-Hopping Spread Spectrum 
(FHSS) or DSSS technology. Both are good solutions for transmission data rates of 1 to 2 
Mbps. However, IEEE 802.11b cannot use FHSS in the United States for higher speeds 
without violating FCC regulations that restricts subchannel bandwidth to 1 MHz. These 
regulations force FHSS systems to spread their usage across the entire 2.4 GHz band, 
meaning they must hop often, which leads to a high amount of hopping overhead [Ref 6]. 
In contrast, the direct sequence signaling technique divides the 2.4 GHz band into 
fourteen 22-MHz channels [Ref 6]. Adjacent channels overlap one another partially, with 
three of the 14 being completely non-overlapping as shown in Figure 15. 


52 



Data Rate 

Code Length 

Modulation 

Symbol Rate 

Bits/Symbol 

1 Mbps 

11 (Barker Sequenee^) 

BPSK 

1 MSps 

1 

2 Mbps 

11 (Barker Sequence) 

QPSK 

IMSps 

2 

5.5 Mbps 

8 (CCK) 

QPSK 

1.375 MSps 

4 

11 Mbps 

8 (CCK) 

QPSK 

1.375 MSps 

8 


Table 2. IEEE 802.1 lb Data Rate Specifications (From Ref: 27) 



Figure 15. Channel Shape and Channel Spacing (From: Ref 27) 

2. The PLCP 

An additional protocol layer has been introduced to enable access to the different 
PHYs for the MAC. This layer called Physical Layer Convergence Protocol (PLCP) is 
defined differently for each transmission method. Basically, the PLCP for the DSSS 
mode of 802.11b adds a preamble and a header to the PLCP Service Data Unit (PSDU) 
coming from the MAC layer [Ref 29]. 

The PLCP has two formats: a long and a short preamble (see Figure 16 and Figure 
17). All compliant 802.11b systems have to support the long preamble. The short 
preamble option is provided in the standard to improve the efficiency of a network's 


53 




























throughput when transmitting special data, such as voice, Voice-over IP (VoIP) and 
streaming video. The format of PLCP consists of two parts, the PLCP Preamble and the 
PLCP Header. 


a. The PLCP Preamble 

The PLCP Preamble consisting of a Synchronization (SYNC) and a Start 
Frame Delimiter (SFD) field and will be transmitted with 1 Mbps Barker spreading^ [Ref 
29]. 

(1) The SYNC field consists of 128 bits for a long preamble 
and 56 bits for a short preamble. The field aids the receiver in synchronizing to the signal. 

(2) The SFD field consists of 16 bits that help the receiver 
determine the correct frame start timing. The short preamble format uses a time inverted 
variant of the long preamble SFD. 

b. The PLCP Header 

The PLCP Header contains 48 bits of information helping the receiver to 
demodulate the PSDU. Its content is the same for both the long and short format. The 
long header is transmitted with 1 Mbps DBPSK, the short one with 2 Mbps DQPSK, both 
with Barker spreading. 

The transmission duration of the short PLCP preamble and header format is just 
half the time of the long format. Devices soley compatible with the original 802.11 DSSS 
mode will not be able to produce or decode the short format. The following PSDU can be 
transmitted on any of the four available data rates with Barker spreading, CCK or PBCC. 
The long preamble and header format can be combined with any PDSU data rate; 
whereas, the short format is restricted to 2, 5.5, and 11 Mbps. A complete transmission 
frame consisting of PLCP preamble, header and PSDU is called a PLCP Protocol Data 
Unit (PPDU). 

(1) The Signal or Data rate (DR) field consists of 8 bits to 
indicate how fast the data will be transmitted (1, 2, 5.5 or 11 Mbps). 

(2) The Service field consists of 8 bits, which is reserved for 

future use. 


8 The original 802.11 DSSS standard specifies an 11-bit chipping called a Barker sequence to 
encode all data sent over the air. Each 11-chip sequence represents a single data bit (1 or 0), and is 
converted to a waveform, called a symbol, which can be sent over the air. 

9 Barker spreading is the method of modulation in the DSSS PHY layer with 11-bit Barker word, 
which is applied to a modulo-2 adder (Ex-Or function) together with each of the information bits in the 
PPDU. The PPDU is clocked at the information rate, 1 Mbps, for example, and the 11 -Barker word at 11 
Mbps (the chipping block). The output of the module-2 adder results in a signal with a data rate that is lOx 
higher than the information rate. At the receiver, the DSSS signal is convolved with the 11-bit Barker word 
and correlated. The correlation operation recovers the PPDU information bits at the transmitted information 
rate and the undesired interfering in-band signals are spread out-of-band. The spreading and despreading of 
a narrowband to a wideband signal is commonly referred to as processing gain and is measured in decibels 
(dB). Processing gain is the ratio of the DSSS signal rate to the PPDU information rate. 


54 



(3) The Length field consists of 16 bits, which indicates the 
length of the ensuing Medium Access Control sublayer's Protocol Data Unit (MAC 
PDU). 


(4) The Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC) field consists of 16 
bits, which is used for error detecting. 


Scrambled Zero’s Backward 

^ SFD 



Short PLCP Preamble Short PLCP Header PSDU 

72 bits at 1 Mbit/s 48 bits at 2 Mbit/s Variable at 2, 5.5, or 11 Mbit/s 


shortSYNC 

shortSFD 

56 bits 

16 bits 



PPDU 


Figure 16. Short PLCP PPDU format (From: Ref 29) 


Scrambled One's 



1 Mbit/s DBPSK 


Figure 17. Long PLCP PPDU format (From: Ref 29) 


55 
































c. 


THE IEEE 802.11B MEDIUM ACCESS CONTROL SUBLAYER 


The MAC sublayer of the IEEE 802.11b serves as the interface between the 
physical layer and the host device. It is responsible for channel allocation procedures, 
Protocol Data Unit (PDU) addressing, frame formatting, error checking, fragmentation 
and reassembly [Ref 30]. 

This sublayer supports both Infrastructure and Ad Hoc operation modes. Two 
robustness features in the IEEE 802.11b MAC sublayer are Cyclic Redundancy Check 
(CRC) and Packet Fragmentation [Ref 27]. Each packet has a CRC calculated and 
attached to ensure that the data are not corrupted in transit. Packet Fragmentation will 
send large packets in small pieces when sent over the air. This has two advantages. The 
first advantage is to reduce the need for retransmission because the probability of a 
packet becoming corrupted increases with the packet size. The second advantage is where 
a packet becomes corrupted, the node needs to retransmit only one small fragment; 
therefore, it is faster. 

The transmission medium can operate in the contention mode exclusively, 
requiring all stations to contend for access to the channel for each packet transmitted. The 
medium can also alternate between the contention mode, known as the Contention Period 
(CP), and a Contention-Free Period (CFP). During the CFP, the medium usage is 
controlled (or mediated) by the AP, thereby eliminating the need for stations to contend 
for channel access. 

I, Inter Frame Spaces (IFS) and Frame Types 

Priority access to the medium is controlled through the use of Inter Frame Space 
(IFS) intervals. This system allows every station access to the medium at the correct 
moment when sending a frame, but it does not allow one station to transmit data with 
preference over others. The standard defines four different IFS intervals [Ref 30]. Figure 
18 shows the relationships between difference timings. 

a. Short Inter Frame Space (SIFS) 

The SIFS is used to separate transmissions belonging to a single dialog 
(e.g. Fragment-ACK). It is the minimum time Interframe (IF). With SIFS there is at least 
one station to transmit at a given time, hence having priority over all other stations. This 
value is fixed per PHY and is calculated in such a way that the transmitting station will 


56 


be able to switch back to the receive mode and be capable of decoding the incoming 
packet. For the 802.11 PHY, this value is set to 28 microseconds, which is the period 
between the completion of packet transmission and the start of the ACK frame. (The 
minimum IFS) 

b. Point Coordination IFS 

The Point Coordination IFS (PIFS) is used by the AP (or Point 
Coordinator, as it is called in this case), to gain access to the medium before any other 
station. This value is equal to SIFS plus a Slot Time 

c. Distributed IFS 

The Distributed IFS (DIFS) is the Inter Frame Space used for a station 
willing to start a new transmission. It is calculated as PIFS plus one slot time. 

d. Extended IFS 

The Extended IFS (EIFS) is the longest IFS used by a station receiving a 
packet that it could not understand. It is needed to prevent the station from colliding with 
a future packet belonging to the current dialog. 


, Control Irame or next fragment may be 
y sent here 


ACK 


— SIFS- 




PIFS- 


-DIFS- 


PCF frames may be sent here 

. DCF frarr>es may be 
X sent here 

/ Bad frame 
^ recovery 
done here 


EIFS- 


Time 


Figure 18. Interframe Space Relation (From: Ref 31) 


2, The Basic Access Method 

The IEEE 802.11 MAC sublayer provides fairly controlled access to the shared 
Wireless Medium (WM) through two different access methods [Ref 32]. These are the 
Distributed Coordination Function (DCF), using Carrier Sense Multiple Access with 
Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA), and the Point Coordination Function (PCF), providing 
contention-free frame transfers. 


57 



a. Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) 

The basic access method of the 802.11b standard is a Distributed 
Coordination Function (DCF) [Ref 28] that allows for automatic medium sharing through 
the use of a CSMA/CA algorithm (see Figure 19). These are medium access timings for 
different frame types: the random backoff procedure, frame transfer procedures, 
acknowledgement procedures, and Request To Send (RTS) and Clear To Send (CTS) 
procedures. The backoff procedure is used for collision avoidance, where each station 
waits for a backoff time (a random time interval in units of slot times) before each frame 
transmission. Moreover, a priority level for access to the channel is provided through the 
use of IFS, as discussed earlier; however, it does not allow one station to transmit data 
with preference over others [Ref 32]. For example, before each transmission, a station has 
to wait a time equal to DIFS to not disturb other ongoing transmissions, which might be 
only separated by a time equal to SIFS. 


Immediate access vutien 
medium is idle >= DIFS 

, DIFS 

^ DIFS 
^PIFSi 


. Contention Window. 



Busy 

Medium 

SIFS, 

^ ^ yackoff Windo^ 

^Next Frame 


n 

Defer Access 

- 

Slot Time 

Select Slot and decrement backoff 

r 1 

as long as medium stays idle 


Figure 19. 802.11 Collision Avoidance Mechanism (From: Ref 31) 

In addition, all traffic uses immediate positive Acknowledgement (ACK 
frame), where retransmission is scheduled by the sender if no ACK is received. In this 
case, a Stop-and-Wait Automatic Repeat Request (ARQ) error control mechanism will 
take over [Ref 33]. A Carrier sense is performed both through physical and virtual 
mechanisms. The virtual carrier sense mechanism is based on frames (e.g., RTS/CTS, 
Beacon Frames) that convey information about how long the medium will be busy. This 
mechanism is called a Network Allocation Vector (NAV). 

b. Point Coordination Function (PCF) 

Point Coordination Function (PCF) is an extension to DCF, which is an 
optional access method [Ref 30]. The PCF is integrated with the DCF, with both 


58 



operating simultaneously. The PCF using PITS instead of DIFS enables transmission of 
time-sensitive information. The PCF supports Quality of Service (QoS), which 
guarantees certain characteristics during transmission for certain communication 
requirements (high priority traffic to access the medium at constancy interval, higher 
throughput and to maximize the utilization of available bandwidth) [Ref 34]. An AP is 
necessary for PCF, which can assign the broadcasting rights by means of a channel 
reservation to the mobile stations. This procedure is called polling. With PCF, a Point 
Coordinator (PC), within the AP, controls which stations can transmit during any given 
period of time. 

The PC begins a period of operation called the Contention-Free Period 
(CFP), during which the PCF is operating. This period is called contention free because 
access to the medium is completely controlled by the PC and the DCF is prevented from 
gaining access to the medium [Ref 34]. 

The PC resides in the AP and schedules a CFP (within a time period), 
which it announces by sending a beacon frame after the SIFS. This indicates a higher 
priority than the ordinary contention frames. When a station receives the poll from the 
AP, the medium is reserved for the duration of its transfer up to the length of CFP. When 
the data transfer completes or the reserved time finishes, the AP waits for PIFS seconds 
and polls another station. The PCF continues until the CFP interval is up, then the system 
operates in the DCF mode. If the AP finds the medium idle, it waits for a PIFS period of 
time and then transmits a beacon frame with a polling frame following SIFS seconds after 
it. The PCF further maintains a list of stations that have requested to be polled during the 
CFP and polls them. For example, the point coordinator may first poll station A; during a 
specific period of time station A can transmit data frames allowing no other station to 
send. The point coordinator will then poll the next station and continue down the polling 
list while permitting stations to have a chance to send data. 

Thus, PCF is a contention-free protocol and enables stations to transmit 
data frames synchronously with regular time delays between data frame transmissions. 
This makes it possible to more effectively support information flows, such as video and 
control mechanisms that have more demanding synchronization requirements [Ref 5]. 


59 


Timing mechanisms within the 802.11b protocol ensure that stations on 
the WLAN alternate between the use of DCF and PCF. As a result, the WLAN can 
support both asynchronous and synchronous information flows. For a period of time, 
stations will fend for themselves by using CSMA. For the following time period, the 
stations will wait for a poll from the point coordinator before sending data frames. 

3. The IEEE 802.11b MAC Frame 

A MAC frame or a MAC Protocol Data Unit (MPDU) encapsulate the higher 
layer protocol data or contain MAC management messages [Ref 29]. The 802.11b 
specification also details frame format structure. This structure is designed to support 
DCF and PCF operation. The frame format consists of a MAC header and a frame body. 
The frame body contains the MAC Service Data Unit (MSDU) from the higher layer 
protocols, and it has a maximum length of 2,048 bytes [Ref 23]. The frame structure also 
includes a MAC header, which contains information on the frame type, destination 
addresses, and the length of the data payload [Ref 5]. 

a. The IEEE 802.11b MAC Frame Format 

The exact format of the MAC frame differs somewhat for the various 
MAC protocols in use. In general, all of the MAC frames have a format similar to that of 
Figure 20. This general format is used for all data and control frames, but not all fields 
are used in all contexts. The fields of this frame are as follows [Ref 28]. 

• Frame control: This field consists of 2 bits, which indicates the type of 
frame and provides control information. It carries control information being sent from 
station to station. 

• Duration/connection ID: This field consists of 16 bits with each frame 
containing information that identifies the duration of the next frame transmission. 
Whenever the contents of this field are less than the value 32768, the duration value is 
used to update the Network Allocation Vector (NAV) 


60 



(K'tCt.S 

2 

2 

6 

6 

6 

2 

6 


4 


IC' 


.\(l<lress 

.Address 

.Vddress 

sc 

Address 

Fl ame I><td> 



FC = Frame control 

D/I = Diiration/Conneciion ID 

SC = Sequence control 

(a) MAC IVaim* 


l)ils 2 

2 

4 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 


Protocol 

>ersion 

I' j |K- 

Siibt>pe 

T.) 

DS 

From 

DS 

MK 

IM 

I’M 


□ 

□ 


DS = Distribution system MD = More data 
MF = More fragments W = Wired equivalent privacy bit 

RT = Retry O = Order 

PM = Power management 

lb) Frame eontr<il Held 

Figure 20. The MAC Frame and Control Field (From: Ref 31) 

• Addresses: This field consists of 48 bits with four different address fields 
in the MAC frame format. Address-1 is the recipient address. If To Distribution System 
(ToDS) is set, it is the AP Address; if it is not set, this is the end-station address. Address- 
2 is the transmitter address. If From Distributing System (FromDS) is set, this is the AP 
Address. If it is not set, this is the station address. Address-3 is in most cases the 
remaining, missing address. On a frame with FromDS set to 1 Address-3 is the original 
Source Address, if the FromDS is set, then Address-3 is the destination Address. 
Address-4 is used in special cases when a Wireless Distribution System is used and when 
the frame is being transmitted from one AP to another. Both the ToDS and FromDS bits 
are set, so both the original Destination and the original Source Addresses are missing. 

• Sequence control: This field contains 16 bits. It consists of two sub 
fields: Sequence Number (12 bits) used for fragmentation and reassembly, and the 
Fragment Number (4 bits) used to number frames sent between a given transmitter and 
receiver. 

• Frame body: This field is a variable length field containing MSDU or a 
fragment of an MSDU. The MSDU is a LLC protocol data unit or MAC control 
information. 

• Frame check sequence: This field contains 32 bits with a CRC. It is 
calculated over all the fields of the MAC header and the Frame Body field. 


61 




b. Frame Control 

The Frame Control field itself is divided into subfields as shown in Figure 
20. They are as follows Figure 20 shows the 802.11 frame format. This general format is 
used for all data and control frames, but not all fields are used in all contexts. The fields 
are as follows [Ref 34]: 

• Protocol version: This field consists of 2 bits indicating the version of the 
IEEE 802.11 standard. Currently the version of the standard value is fixed as 0. 

• Type: This field consists of 6 bits identifying the frame as control, 
management, or data. 

• Subtype: This field consists of 6 bits defining the type of the Frame. 
Table 3 details in valid Type and Subtype Combination. 

• To DS: This bit is set to 1 when the frame is sent to the Distribution 
System (DS). This includes cases when the destination station is in the same BSS, and the 
AP is to relay the frame. 

• From DS: This bit is set to 1 when the frame is coming from the 
Distribution System (DS). 

• More fragments: This bit is set to 1 when more fragments belong to the 
same frame following the current fragment. 

• Retry: This bit is set to 1 if this is a retransmission of a previous frame. 
This will be used by the receiver station to recognize duplicate transmissions of frames 
that may occur when an Acknowledgment packet is lost. 

• Power management: This bit is set to 1 if the transmitting station is in a 
sleep mode. It indicates the power management mode that the station will be in after the 
transmission of the frame. This is used by stations that are changing state either from 
Power Save to Active or vice versa. 

• More data: This bit is set to 1 when more frames are buffered to this 
station. Each block of data may be sent as one frame or a group of fragments in multiple 
frames 

• WEP: This bit is set to 1 when the frame body is encrypted with Wired 
Equivalent Protocol (WEP), which is used in the exchange of encryption keys for secure 
data exchange 


62 



• Order: This bit is set to 1 in any data frame sent using the strictly ordered 
service class, which tells the receiving station that frames must be processed in order. 
Next, the various MAC frame types are discussed. 

c. The IEEE 802.11 MAC Frame Format Types 

Three main types of MAC frames are used in the MAC layer: data, control 
and management. Data frames are used for data transmission. Control Frames are used to 
control access to the medium (e.g., RTS, CTS, and ACK). Management Frames are 
transmitted in the same manner as data frames to exchange management information; 
however, they are not forwarded to upper layers (e.g., beacon frames). Each frame type is 
subdivided into different subtypes according to their specific function. 

Within the frame structure is a series of control frames. Overall, the IEEE 802.1 lb 
supports six types of control frames: RTS, CTS, AC, PS-Poll, CF-End, and 
CF+End+ACK. 

(1) Control Frame Subtypes assist in the reliable delivery of 
data frames between stations. There are six control frame subtypes [Ref 34]: 

• Request To Send (RTS): This is the first frame in the four-way frame 
exchange. It is optional and reduces frame collisions present when hidden stations have 
associations with the same AP. A station sends a RTS frame to another station as the first 
phase of a two-way handshake necessary before sending a data frame. 

• Clear To Send (CTS): This is the second frame in the four-way 
exchange. A station responds to a RTS with a CTS frame, providing clearance for the 
requesting station to send a data frame. This frame is sent by the destination station to the 
source station to permit sending a data frame. The CTS includes a time value that causes 
all other stations (including hidden stations) to hold off transmission of frames for the 
required time of the requesting station to send its frame. This minimizes collisions among 
hidden stations, which can result in higher throughput if implemented properly. 

• Acknowledgment: This provides an acknowledgment from the 
destination to the source. After receiving a data frame, the receiving station utilizes an 
error checking process to detect the presence of errors. The receiving station sends an 
ACK frame to the sending station if no errors are found. If the sending station does not 
receive an ACK after a period of time, the sending station retransmits the frame to the 
receiver. 


63 



Type Value 

Type Deseription 

Subtype Value 

Subtype Deseription 

00 

Management 

0000 

Association Request 

00 

Management 

0001 

Association Response 

00 

Management 

0010 

Reassociation Request 

00 

Management 

0011 

Reassociation Response 

00 

Management 

0100 

Probe Request 

00 

Management 

0101 

Probe Response 

00 

Management 

1000 

Beacon 

00 

Management 

1001 

ATIM 

00 

Management 

1010 

Disassociation 

00 

Management 

1100 

Deauthentication 

01 

Control 

1010 

PS-Poll 

01 

Control 

1011 

RTS 

01 

Control 

1100 

CTS 

01 

Control 

1101 

ACK 

01 

Control 

1110 

CFEnd 

01 

Control 

nil 

CF End + CF-ACK 

10 

Data 

0000 

Data 

10 

Data 

0001 

Data + CF-ACK 

10 

Data 

0010 

Data + CF-Poll 

10 

Data 

0011 

Data + CF-ACK + CF-Poll 

10 

Data 

0100 

Null Function (no data) 

10 

Data 

0101 

CF-ACK (no data) 

10 

Data 

0110 

CF-Poll (no data) 

10 

Data 

0111 

CF-ACK + CF-Poll (no data) 


Table 3. Type and Subtype of the Frame Control Field (From: Ref 28) 

• Power Save-Poll (PS-Poll): This frame is used when the station wakes 
up, and sends this frame to the AP requesting the AP to sends the buffered data when the 
station is in active mode. 

• Contention-Free (CF)-end: The purpose of this frame is to announce the 
end of a CFP that is part of the point coordination function. 

• CF-end _ CF-Ack: The purpose of this frame is to acknowledge the CF- 
end. This frame ends the CFP and releases stations from the restrictions associated with 
that period. 


64 




(2) Data Frames Subtypes are used for data transmission 
which carries packets from higher layers, such as web pages, printer control data, etc., 
within the body of the frame. The eight data frame subtypes are organized into two 
groups. The first four subtypes define frames that carry upper-level data from the source 
station to the destination station. The four data-carrying frames and four subtypes which 
do not carry user data [Ref 34]: 

• Data: This is the simplest data frame, which is variable in length (29-2346 
bytes). It may be used in both a contention period and a CFP. 

• Data _ CF-Ack: This frame is only sent during a CFP. In addition to 
carrying data, this frame acknowledges previously received data. The ACK is for a 
previously received data frame, which may not be associated with the address of the 
destination of the current frame. 

• Data _ CF-Poll: This frame is used only by a point coordinator when 
delivering data to a mobile station during a CFP, to deliver data to a mobile station. It is 
also used to simultaneously request the mobile station to send a data frame that it may 
have buffered when the current reception was completed. 

• Data _ CF-Ack _ CF-Poll: This frame combines the functions of the Data 
_ CF-Ack and Data _ CF-Poll into a single frame, which is used by the PC during the 
CFP. 

• Null Function (no data): This data frame subtype, without data, is only 
used to exchange information for the power saving function. The mobile station sends 
this frame to the AP to carry a Power Management Bit in the Frame Control field, which 
indicates that the mobile station is changing to a low-power operating state. 

• CF-ACK (no data): A mobile station uses this to acknowledge the PC 
during a CFP. The ACK is more efficient since this frame is 29 bytes long. If the PC 
receives a Data -I- CF-ACK frame from a station, the PC can send a Data -I- CF-Poll + CF- 
ACK frame to a different station, where the CF-ACK portion of the frame acknowledges 
receipt of the previous data frame. The ability to combine polling and acknowledgement 
frames with data frames, transmitted between stations and the PC, has been designed to 
improve efficiency. 


65 



• CF-Poll (no data): The PC uses this to request a mobile station to send a 
pending data frame during the CFP. 

• CF-ACK+CF-Poll (no data): This is used by the PC to combine CF- 
ACK and CF-Poll. 

(3) Management Frames Subtype is used to manage 
communications between stations and APs. It enables a station to establish and maintain 
communication. The following subtypes include [Ref 34]: 

• Association request: The mobile station requests an association with a 
BSS for the success or failure of a request to the AP. If the AP accepts the request, it 
returns an association response with a status field value of successful. The Station must 
then ACK the successful association response for the Station to be associated with the 
AP. There are two information elements in the association request: the Service Set 
Identifier (SSID) and the supported rates. 

• Association response: This frame is sent by an AP to indicate whether it 
is accepting a mobile station for association. If the AP accepts the mobile station, the 
frame includes information regarding the association, such as an association ID and 
supported data rates. If the outcome of the association is positive, the mobile station can 
utilize the AP to communicate with other mobile stations in the network and systems on 
the distribution (e.g., Ethernet) side of the AP. 

• Reassociation request: This frame is sent by a mobile station when it 
roams away from the currently associated AP to find another AP having a stronger 
beacon signal. The mobile station uses reassociation rather than association so that the 
new AP knows to negotiate with the old AP to forward data frames. 

• Reassociation response: This frame is sent by the AP to indicate whether 
it is accepting a reassociation request. Similar to the association process, the frame 
includes information regarding the reassociation, such as the association ID and 
supported data rates. 

• Probe request: This frame is sent by the mobile station to obtain 
information from another station or AP. It contains SSID and the supported rates. In the 
Infrastructure BSS, the AP will always respond to probe requests. In IBSS, the mobile 
station that sent the latest beacon will respond. 


66 



• Probe response: This frame is sent by the mobile station to respond with 
a probe response frame containing capability information, supported data rates, etc. 

• Beacon: This frame is periodically sent by the AP to allow mobile stations 
to locate and identify a BSS. The AP announces its presence and relay information, such 
as timestamp, SSID, and other parameters related to the AP and the mobile stations that 
are within range. The mobile stations continually scan all 802.11 radio channels and 
listens to beacons as the basis for choosing the best AP for association. 

• Announcement traffic indication message: This frame is sent by a 
mobile station to alert other mobile stations, which were possibly in a low power mode, 
that this station has frames buffered and waiting to be delivered to the station addressed 
in this frame. 

• Dissociation: This frame is used by the mobile station to terminate an 
association; either the AP or the mobile station may disassociate. 

• Authentication: This frame is used to conduct a multiple exchange to 
authenticate one station with another. The mobile station must send system authentication 
(the default) of itself before it is permitted to send data. The mobile station sends only 
one authentication frame; the AP responds with an authentication frame indicating 
acceptance or rejection. With the optional shared key authentication, the mobile station 
sends an initial authentication frame. The AP then responds with an authentication frame 
containing challenge text. The mobile station must send an encrypted version of the 
challenge text by using its WEP key in an authentication frame back to the AP. The AP 
ensures that the mobile station has the correct WEP key by observing whether the 
challenge text recovered after decryption is the same that was sent previously. 

• Deauthentication: This frame is sent by the mobile station to another 
mobile station or AP to announce that it is terminating secure communications. 

D. THE IEEE 802.11B SECURITY BASIC METHOD 

Security mechanisms in 802.11b networks should be equivalent to existing 
mechanisms in wired LANs. However, the WLANs have a much larger area to protect 
because the WLANs transmit signals over a much larger area than those for wired media. 
Wired networks are located in buildings, which are already secured from unauthorized 
physical access. A user must gain physical access to the building to gain access to the 
network. On the other hand, a WLAN, which is configured incorrectly, may be accessed 


67 



from any location within the range of the WLAN. Currently in the 802.1 lb standard three 
basic methods exist to secure access to an AP [Ref 35]. 

1. Service Set Identifier (SSID) 

A service set identifier (SSID) is a sequence of characters that uniquely name a 
WLAN. The system manager enters identifier code into the setup of all APs and mobile 
stations that will participate in the network to declare a network as open or closed. The 
SSID will be unique within a Basic Service Set (BSS) or Extended Service Set (ESS). 
This SSID must be known by the Network Interface Controller in order to associate with 
the AP and thus proceed with data transmission on the network [Ref 36]. If the SSID 
does not match the one stored in the AP, the station cannot establish a connection to the 
WLAN. 

Most APs will broadcast the SSID to all wireless devices by default from the 
vendor within the wireless network. This enables a station to determine which networks 
allow mobile station access without a specific SSID [Ref 25]. Although this makes it easy 
to get a wireless network running, it offers no security. Therefore, this feature should be 
disabled because it may assist an intruder in gaining access to a private network. The 
administrator of an AP can disable the broadcast mechanism, but, generally, SSIDs are 
easily shared. 

When installing a WLAN, changing the default SSID and selecting unique ID is 
recommend. By default, the SSID is broadcasted, allowing users to easily identify a 
nearby AP. For added security, this broadcast function can be disabled. However, this 
may introduce additional configuration issues for users and network support personnel. 

2, Media Access Control (MAC) Address Filtering 

The access list contains the media access control (MAC) address of the stations 
authorized to access the network through an AP. A mobile station can be identified by the 
unique MAC address of its 802.1 lb network card. A MAC address is a unique hardware 
number assigned to the network card, which is a permanent 48-bit MAC address written 
into the hardware (no two network devices have the same MAC address) [Ref 37]. To 
increase the security of an 802.11 network, each AP can be programmed with a list of 
MAC addresses associated with the mobile stations allowed to access the AP. Each AP 
must have a list of authorized mobile station MAC addresses in its Access Control List 


68 



(ACL) 10. As a rusult, the AP will grant access to any computer that is using a NIC whose 
MAC address is on the list. If the mobile station's MAC address is not included in this 
list, the mobile station is not allowed to associate with the AP. Filtering the MAC address 
is time consuming because the list of mobile station MAC addresses must be manually 
inputted in each AP. Since the MAC address list must be kept up-to-date it is, therefore, 
better suited for a small network. 

The MAC address filtering provides good security. However, since the MAC 
address is sent in clear text in the data link layer header, it can be obtained by network 
monitoring. At the same time the MAC address of an attacker’s wireless network card 
can be altered to correspond to it (known as MAC address spoofing). Since MAC 
addresses can be spoofed, the MAC address fdtering is not regarded as a strong 
authentication method. 

3. Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) 

Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) is the standard mechanism for security in 
802.1 lb that provides an equivalent level of privacy to the wired LAN by encrypting the 
transmitted data. In addition, WEP is based on the symmetric key encryption! 1 algorithm 
Ron's Code 4 Pseudo Random Number Generator (RC4 PRNG) [Ref. 36]. This 
algorithm provides protection against eavesdropping and physical security attributes 
comparable to a wired network. The mechanism of WEP provides a secured WLAN data 
streams between mobile stations and APs, with confidentiality achieved by encrypting the 
data sent between wireless nodes. To do this, WEP relies on a shared secret key between 
WLAN devices (mobile station device with interface card) and an AP. The key encrypts 
data before any transmission and deciphers it at the other end. 

In WEP encryption, weaknesses that make WEP vulnerable to attacks are due to 
problems with key management. No defined mechanism changes the WEP key, either per 


10 ACL (Access Control List) is used in some WLAN APs to control mobile station access. The ACL 
is usually based on the mobile's wireless Ethernet MAC address which is unique in each mobile station. 
The ACL is a database used to store MAC addresses that can access the WLAN. If the mobile station's 
MAC address is not listed in the ACL, a user’s access will be denied 

11 An encryption system which the sender and receiver use a single key to encrypt and to decrypt 
data. Symmetric-key cryptography is sometimes called secret-key cryptography. 


69 



authentication or at periodic intervals, over the duration of an authenticated connection. 
All APs and mobile stations use the same manually configured WEP key for multiple 
connections and authentications. This makes it difficult to change the WEP key regularly, 
which increases the security risk from an intruder. Moreover, in 2001, WEP encryption 
was proven to be vulnerable to attack because the keys are easily deciphered in its weak 
encryption code [Ref 25]. Scripting tools, such as WEPCrack and AirSnort, were created 
to take advantage of the weaknesses in the RC4 algorithm. These tools were used to 
attack a network and discover the WEP key. 

The combination of a lack of both adequate authentication methods and key 
management for encryption of wireless data has led the IEEE to adopt a new method for 
securing a WLAN. 


70 



GLOSSARY 


ACL 

Access Control List 

APs 

Access Points 

ACK 

Acknowledgement 

AES 

Advanced Encryption Standard 

AMPS 

Advanced Mobile Phone System 

ARQ 

Automatic Repeat Request 

BSS 

Basic Service Set 

CSMA/CD 

Carrier Sense Multiple Access Collision Detect 

CSMA/CA 

Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance 

CDPD 

Cellular Digital Packet Data 

CCA 

Clear Channel Assessment 

CTS 

Clear To Send 

CDMA 

Code Division Multiple Access 

CCK 

Complementary Code Keying 

C.I.A. 

Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability 

CP 

Contention Period 

CF 

Contention-Free 

CFP 

Contention-Free Period 

CRC 

Cyclic Redundancy Check 

DES 

Data Encryption Standard 

DR 

Data Rate 

DMZ 

Demilitarized Zone 

DoS 

Denial-of-Service 

DBPSK 

Differential Binary Phase Shift Keying 

DQPSK 

Differential Quadrature Phase Shift Keying 

DSSS 

Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum 

DCF 

Distributed Coordination Function 

DIFS 

Distributed Inter Frame Spaces 

DS 

Distribution System 

DNS 

Domain Name Server 

DFS 

Dynamic Frequency Selection 

EM 

Electromagnetic 

EIFS 

Extended Inter Frame Spaces 

ESS 

Extended Service Set 

FCC 

Federal Communications Commission 

FDMA 

Frequency Division Multiple Access 

FHSS 

Frequency-Hopping Spread Spectrum 

FromDS 

From Distributing System 


71 



GHz 

Gigahertz 

EDGE 

Global Evolution 

GPS 

Global Positioning System 

GSM 

Global System for Mobile 

HR/DSSS 

High Rate Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum 

IBSS 

Independent Basic Service Set 

IR 

Infrared 

IV 

Initialization Vector 

IEEE 

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 

IFS 

Inter Frame Spaces 

ICAT 

Internet Categorization of Attack Toolkit 

IPSec 

Internet Protocol Security 

ISM 

Industrial, Scientific and Medical 

KHz 

Kilohertz 

LAN 

Local Area Network 

L2TP 

Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol 

LMDS 

Local Multipoint Distribution Services 

EEC 

Logical Link Control 

MPDU 

MAC Protocol Data Unit 

MSDU 

MAC Service Data Unit 

Mbps 

Megabits per second 

MAC 

Media Access Control 

MIC 

Message Integrity Code 

GSM 

Global System for Mobile Communications 

mW 

milli Watt 

UNII 

Unlicensed National Information Infrastructure 

NIST 

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

NAV 

Network Allocation Vector 

NICs 

Network Interface Cards 

OSI 

Open Systems Interconnect 

OFDM 

Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing 

PBCC 

Packet Binary Convolutional Coding 

PCF 

Point Coordination Function 

PDAs 

Personal Digital Assistants 

PLCP 

Physical Layer Convergence Protocol 

PMD 

Physical Medium Dependent 

PPDU 

PLCP Protocol Data Unit 

PSDU 

PLCP Service Data Unit 

PIES 

Point Coordination Inter Frame Spaces 

PC 

Point Coordinator 

PPTP 

Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol 


72 



PS-Poll 

Power Save-Poll 

PDU 

Protocol Data Unit 

QPSK 

Quadrature Phase Shift Keying 

QOS 

Quality of Service 

RADIUS 

Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service 

RTS 

Request To Send 

RF 

Radio Frequency 

RC4 PRNG 

Ron's Code 4 Pseudo Random Number Generator 

RTS/CTS 

Request To Send/Clear To Send 

SSID 

Service Set Identifier 

SIFS 

Short Inter Frame Space 

SNMP 

Simple Network management protocol 

SML 

Software Metrics Lab 

SFD 

Start Frame Delimiter 

SYNC 

Synchronization 

TRIP 

Temporal Key Integrity Protocol 

TGi 

IEEE Taskgroup I 

TDMA 

Time Division Multiple Access 

ToDS 

To Distribution System 

TCPMP 

Transmission Control Protocol/Intemet Protocol 

TPC 

Transmission Power Control 

TLS 

Transport Layer Security 

VLAN 

Virtual LAN 

VPN 

Virtual Private Network 

VoIP 

Voice-over IP 

Wi-Fi 

Wireless Fidelity 

WEP 

Wired Equivalent Privacy 

WAP 

Wireless Application Protocol 

WM 

Wireless Medium 

WWAN 

Wireless Wide Area Network 

WLAN 

Wireless Local Area Network 


73 



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74 



LIST OF REFERENCES 


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[2] Tom Karygiannis, Les Owens, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
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[4] Russell Dean Vines, “Wireless Security Essentials”, Wiley Publishing, Inc, 2002. 

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[6] 3COM, “IEEE 802.1 lb Wireless LANs”, whitepaper, 2002, Available online 
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[7] Dr. Norman F. Schneidewind, “IS3502 Computer Networks: WAN/EAN, 
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[9] Polytechnic University, Roye Oake, Teresa Broxton, Eric Blaise, and James 
Whiting, “Wireless Local Area Network”, whitepaper, December 1999, Available 
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[10] British Education Communication and Technology Agency (Becta), “Wireless 
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[11] Chye Bin Lay, “Wireless LAN Extension”, M.Sc. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
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[12] Jim Graves, “Wireless LAN Threats and Mitigations”, whitepaper, December 
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paper_wireless_lan_threats_1202.pdf], April 2003. 

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[13] Dale Gardner, “Wireless Insecurities, Control mobile computing vulnerabilities 
before they get control of you”, whitepaper, January 2002, Available online, 
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[14] Air Defense, “Wireless LAN security-What Hackers Know That You Don’t”, 
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[15] Proxim, Wireless Network, “ORINOCO Range Extender Antenna”, whitepaper, 
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[16] J. D. Morrison, “IEEE 802.11 Wireless Local Area Network Security Through 
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[17] Karri Huhtanen, “Security problems and solutions in WLAN access zones”, 
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[18] Wireless Integrated Network, Florida State University, “FSU Official Wireless 
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[19] Bob Brewin, “FSU Worldwide ‘war drive’ expose insecure wirless LANs”, 
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[20] Western Division Naval Facilities Engineering Command, “Master Plan Naval 
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[22] Security in the Government Sector, “Chapter 9: Control of Access to Information 
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[23] Dell “Wireless Security in 802.11 (Wi-Fi®) Networks”, whitepaper, January 
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[24] Atheros Communication “Building Secure Wireless Networks, How Atheros 
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[25] Scott Anderson, Carolina Gomez, Jerry MacLean, Erin O’Grady, “Securing Wi¬ 
Fi’s Future SECURING WI-FI'S FUTURE: The Need for a Public-Private 
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[26] William Stallings “IEEE 802.11: Moving Closer to Practical Wireless LANs”, 
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[27] Kanoksri Sarinnapakorn , “ High Rate Wireless Local Area Networks”, March 
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[31] Cleveland State University, “IEEE 802.11 Wireless LAN Standard”, whitepaper, 
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[32] Javier del Prado and Sunghyun Choi, “Experimental Study on Co-existence of 
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[33] Michael Fainberg, “A Performance Analysis of The IEEE 802.1 lb Local Area 
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[34] Prado and Sunghyun Choi, Dongyan Chen, Sachin Garg, Martin Kappes and 
Kishor S. Trivedi, “Supporting VBR VoIP Traffic in IEEE 802.11 WLAN in PCF 
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77 



[35] Javier del Prado and Sunghyun Choi, “Experimental Study on Co-existence of 
802.1 lb with Alien Devices”, Philips Research Briarcliff, whitepaper, 2001, 
Available online, [http://mwnl.snu.ac.kr/~schoi/publication/Conferences/01-VTC- 
T34_3.PDF.], April 2003. 

[36] Toshiba, “Rising popularity of WLANs (Wireless Local Area Network) also 
raises security concerns”, whitepaper, September 2002, Available online, 
[http://uk.computers.toshiba-europe.com/cgi-bin/ToshibaCSG/download_ 
whitepaper.] sp?z=3 6&service=UK& WHITEPAPER_ID=0000000fdd_l 23 ], 

April 2003. 

[37] Toshiba, “Low security is better than no security at all”, whitepaper, 2003, 
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78 



INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 


1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 

2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 

3. Dan C. Boger 
Chair, IS Department 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 

4. Professor Norman Schneidewind 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 

5. Professor Douglas Brinkley 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 

6. Captain Thoetsak Jaiaree 
Ministry of Defense, Thailand 


79